The Future of U.S. Democracy Promotion:
Strategies for a Sustainable Fourth Wave of Democratization

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# Table of Contents

Acronyms .......................................................................................................................... 4

Executive Summary

> Semir Hasedžić .................................................................................................................. 5

Introduction

> Stephanie Smith and Natalie Stockmann ........................................................................... 9

Part I: Justifying and Improving the Quality of Democracy

Part I Introduction .................................................................................................................. 35

Chapter 1 Holistic Democracy Promotion

> Samia Ahmed ...................................................................................................................... 37

Chapter 2 The Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights

> Reemah Medina .................................................................................................................. 52

Chapter 3 The Roles of Social and Economic Rights in the Public Arena

> David Lambert .................................................................................................................... 66

Chapter 4 The Relationship between Rhetoric and Policy and its Implications for Effective Democracy Promotion

> Kailyn Nicholson and Anna Schaffer ................................................................................ 80

Part II: The Challenges of Promoting Democracy in Different Types of States

Part II Introduction .............................................................................................................. 105

Chapter 5 Democracy Promotion in Failed and Post-Conflict States

> Annie Durkin ...................................................................................................................... 107

Chapter 6 Why Kenya is not Accepting Western Democracy

> Mohamud Warsame .......................................................................................................... 127

Chapter 7 Democracy Promotion in Multiethnic States

> Denis Rajić and Nathaniel Thomas .................................................................................... 134

Chapter 8 Oil Rents and their Stifling Nature towards Democracy

> Scott Glenn ......................................................................................................................... 164
Chapter 9  Autocratic Hegemons and the Importance of Proximity in Sustainable Democracy Promotion
_Daryl Whitley_ ...........................................................................................................178

Chapter 10  Ukraine: Rethinking U.S. Democracy Promotion in a Post-Soviet State
_Rostislav Voloshin_ ...........................................................................................................195

Part III: In-Country Methods for Promoting Democracy

Chapter 11  Incorporating "Untraditional" Civil Society Groups in U.S. Democracy Promotion
_Alexandra Blum_ ...........................................................................................................218

Chapter 12  Improving U.S. Democracy Aid: Sustainability through Community Driven Development
_Michelle Astengo and Grace Oh_ ......................................................................................234

Conclusion and Recommendations ..................................................................................268

Bibliography ..................................................................................................................271
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Income-generating Activities Support</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESR</td>
<td>Center for Economic and Social Rights</td>
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<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community-Driven Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FNLS</td>
<td>Forces Nationales de Libération</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>IESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
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<td>IFIs</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>IMC</td>
<td>Independent Media Commission</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>ITERATE</td>
<td>International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events database</td>
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<td>KTN</td>
<td>Knitting Together Nations</td>
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<td>M&amp;E</td>
<td>Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization for African Unity</td>
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<td>PNIR</td>
<td>National Rural Infrastructures Program</td>
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<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy</td>
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<td>Right to Protect</td>
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<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwanda Peace Force</td>
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<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>Structural Adjustment Programs</td>
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<td>Trans National Corporations</td>
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<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USD</td>
<td>United States Dollars</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
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Executive Summary

By: Semir Hasedžić

“When we discuss openly our desire for democratic values to take hold across the globe, we are describing a world that may be many years or decades off. Though achievement of the ideal may be limited by time, space, resources, or human nature, we must not allow ourselves to discard or disparage the ideal itself. It is vital that we speak out about what we believe and let the world know where we stand. It is vital that we give hope and aid to those who seek freedom.”

Robert M. Gates, Address to the World Forum on the Future of Democracy
September 17, 2007

U.S. democracy promotion has come under scrutiny in the last two decades. The recent third wave of democratization in the 1990s and 2000s has come to an end, leading to a shift towards authoritarianism. Meanwhile, American motives in democracy promotion efforts have been called into question. To stem the tide of shifts away from democracy and support the emerging “fourth wave” of Middle Eastern transitions, the U.S. must be a major player in providing democratic assistance. However the U.S’s current agenda for democracy promotion will not only damage the country’s image, but, more significantly, the sustainability of democracy will be at risk.

In the past, U.S. democracy promotion has been closely linked to enhancing national security. As such, the rhetoric and goals surrounding democracy promotion have sometimes worked at cross purposes. This report calls for a rethinking of democracy promotion, in particular for an approach that does not utilize a one-size-fits-all model, but rather, that strives for consistency between rhetoric and actions, attention to context, and overall sustainability. This Task Force proposes the following strategies to reform U.S. practices of democracy promotion:
1. **Consistency between actions and rhetoric.** The U.S. has vacillated in its support for democracy around the world from the early 20th century until now. In recent years, the credibility and image of the U.S. have come under fire because of a perceived disconnect between democratic rhetoric and actions. Thus, the U.S. must recognize and acknowledge its past mistakes, be honest about its actual motivations, and be realistic in its expectations.

2. **Disentanglement of democracy promotion from other American interests.**

   Democracy promotion is intrinsically linked with foreign policy that involves military and economic interests. The goal is to disentangle democracy promotion from other foreign policy interests, so that it becomes a priority of its own.

3. **Strategies adapted to countries’ individual needs and challenges.** Problems such as weak civil society, ethnic divides, past conflict, inequality, and proximity to regional hegemons are barriers to the promotion of democracy in different types of states, and must be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

4. **Emphasis on multilateral cooperation.** American democracy promotion loses some of its credibility when it is viewed as a U.S.-centric, unilateral approach. Cooperation with other states and international organizations will increase the legitimacy of U.S. democracy promotion and provide greater access to the knowledge and experience of other states.

This Task Force proposes the following recommendations to implement these strategies, with the goal of improving the sustainability of democracy around the world. The recommendations are grouped in three categories: bureaucracy, diplomacy, and context specific methods.
1. Bureaucracy
   a. Accept and implement the overarching strategy proposed in this report, which will ensure a more effective approach to promoting and establishing sustainable democracies.
   b. Create and disseminate a policy paper to all agencies involved in democracy promotion, which outlines this comprehensive approach to democracy promotion.
   c. Create a post of Undersecretary of Democracy, who will be responsible for coordinating across agencies and departments to ensure that democracy promotion policies are in line with the overarching strategy proposed in this report. Having the authority to oversee a coordinated approach will better position the undersecretary to advocate for adequate funding that meets both the bureaucratic and operational needs of democracy promotion.

2. Diplomacy
   a. Maintain rhetoric that is humble, honest, and consistent with the actions and results of U.S. democracy promotion efforts. This includes not using grandiose and unrealistic rhetoric or using democracy promotion as a façade for other U.S. strategic interests.
   b. Increase the use of multilateral relations by working with international organizations, such as the EU and the UN, in order to increase legitimacy and effectiveness of democracy promotion efforts; participate more willingly in important international treaties (e.g. Rights of the Child, ratify ICESCR).
   c. Increase the use of soft power, diplomacy, and linkages to nudge states towards democracy. Special attention should be given to “autocratic poles” (e.g. China and Russia), where democratic advances would remove regional barriers to other countries’ democratizing efforts.

3. Context-specific Methods
   a. Within multiethnic states: give necessary consideration to the historical, social, economic, and cultural context; avoid placing too much emphasis on elections until institutions within a state are capable of supporting a functioning democracy; promote the creation and maintenance of programs that foster multiethnic linkages and institutions; encourage the use of public surveys, hearings, discussions, and widespread informative media outlets to achieve civic education and support participatory constitution building.
   b. Within weak and post-conflict states: approach state-building and democracy promotion efforts simultaneously and in an integrated fashion; implement a program of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration into society (DDR) for any non-state armed forces (e.g. warlords and combatant groups).
   c. Broaden the scope of civil society as the first step in mobilizing local communities to embrace democratic practices: incorporate informal civil society groups and institutions into transitional process (e.g. women’s and indigenous
groups); encourage privatization of the press to decrease censorship of news sources and social media outlets; work to deepen horizontal linkages among on-the-ground agencies (e.g. grassroots organizations, NGOs, etc.), through Community Driven Development (CDD).
Introduction

By: Stephanie Smith and Natalie Stockmann

On February 11, 2011, Egypt’s president, Hosni Mubarak, was ousted from power after an 18-day revolt. This dramatic demonstration of anti-government sentiment reversed 30 years of political stagnation in Egypt, while simultaneously reminding the entire world of the power of democratic desires. The revolution came as a shock to the rest of the world, and provoked a sense of uncertainty and confusion for other authoritarian leaders. The future of the Egyptian government still remains unknown, despite the demands for democracy coming from the people. The response from the international community has been indecisive, with some world leaders wary of the possible resurgence of non-democratic leadership within Egypt. In response to developments in Egypt, President Obama stated that the U.S. “believe[s] that this transition must immediately demonstrate irreversible political change, and a negotiated path to democracy” (Obama 2011).

However, the U.S.’s relationship with Egypt has not always advocated or openly promoted a democratic transition. Indeed, a majority of the aid that the U.S. has provided to Egypt in the past has been directed towards the military, rather than democracy assistance or civil society growth. In addition to U.S. support for the country’s military was the lack of definitive support for the pro-democracy protestors. The Obama administration “spoke at cross-purposes, teetering one way and then another, neither wholehearted in support of the revolt nor publicly resolute in opposition to Mr. Mubarak” (Torregrosa, 2011). Egypt’s position as a strategic ally for the U.S. has largely influenced the lack of overt democracy promotion efforts
before this point. Thus, in the past, there has been very little public condemnation of Mubarak’s regime from the U.S., and there has been a general disregard for the local activism within Egypt.

The success of Egypt’s revolution and the subsequent protests that have begun in other Middle Eastern countries illustrate the need for the U.S. to move forward in a way that actively supports democratic transitions in the region. By considering each country’s local complexities, providing support for civil society, and maintaining multilateral efforts in order to avoid a patronizing tone in which the U.S. appears to dictate its values, a strategy that supports the establishment of democracy in Egypt could potentially foster the same results throughout the region.

Egypt is thus one example of a situation that requires a specific, unique approach aimed at establishing a sustainable democracy. The purpose of this report is to address the U.S. interests that are served by successfully promoting democracy, as well as the best routes to achieve success. The introduction begins with a definition of democracy that will set the foundation of the rest of the report. Similarly, the introduction provides a brief background of the U.S.’s historical involvement with democracy promotion efforts and argues for the necessity of rethinking democracy promotion today. The next section of the report analyzes what makes democracy a desirable form of government, while also explaining ways that the U.S. can participate in democracy promotion while preventing further backlash against its efforts. Contrary to previous democracy promotion efforts, this report examines different types of states that are not democratic, rather than focusing democracy promotion efforts and policies based on geographical location. This includes a discussion of weak and failed states, multi-ethnic states, resource-rich states, and non-democratic regional hegemons. The last section addresses how the
U.S. can support agencies and programs within transitional states in order to aid in the creation of a sustainable, self-sufficient democracy.

I. Defining Democracy

Before understanding reasons for U.S. democracy promotion, we must have a clear comprehension of the meaning of democracy as it is used today. Today, democracy is commonly understood as a government run for the people and by the people. Several indicators of democracy include but are not limited to, free and fair elections, rule of law, and a civil society autonomous of the state. The citizenry must have the ability to contest government actions and policies, as well as be able to freely participate in political activities without fear that the government will take action against them. Understanding the foundation of a democracy is crucial. Freedom House’s 2010 report “Freedom in the World 2010” found that the number of electoral democracies dropped to its lowest point since 1995 (Freedom House 2010). Based on Samuel Huntington’s findings of “waves of democracy” one can’t help but ask, is the world experiencing another reversal in the creation of democratic governments?

This section will begin with a discussion of Samuel Huntington’s definition of democracy and Robert Dahl’s explanation of polyarchy. Following this section, we will discuss what democracy is not based on the findings of Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl. We will then briefly explain democratic consolidation before concluding with a discussion of what Huntington refers to as “waves of democratization,” and why all of this is important in understanding current U.S. policy on democracy promotion.

The definition of democracy has been debated over the years. Samuel Huntington and Joseph Schumpeter agree and define a “twentieth century political system as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote,” (Huntington 1991, 7). In this definition, the elements of “contestation and participation,” are involved to the extent that the adult population has the ability to choose who their political leaders will be (ibid). In democratic election process then, the losing party will concede knowing it did not obtain majority support and that the elected party did not unfairly steal the election through fraud or corruption. Free and fair elections also imply that “the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns” are not compromised by the current regime or running political parties (ibid). Democracy therefore should not be looked at only in terms of free and fair elections, but also in relation to other “public virtues,” or infrastructures put in place for the people (such as basic rights, the judicial system, public service sectors, civil society, etc.), and also set apart characteristically “from other…political systems,” such as authoritarian regimes, dictatorships, totalitarian rule, etc (Huntington 1991, 10).

As opposed to other forms of government which choose leaders differently and not by popular election, “The central procedure of democracy is the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern,” (Huntington 1991, 6). Today, if elections are not held fairly and freely, then they are not recognized as democratic by international organizations or other governments (Huntington 1991, 8). Elections are an arena in which people can choose their political leaders and can express their political opinions. Without free and fair elections, an outsider can question whether or not the people are truly represented by their government. However, to judge a democracy based solely on the scope of free and fair elections is limited and discounts other indicators necessary to label a government a democracy.

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Elections may be monitored by a third or independent party.
If the democracy is not yet stable, there is potential for the newly elected leader to become the face of a stronger political group interested in gaining and maintaining power, thus undermining the institution of democracy (Huntington 1991, 10). The removal of a non-democratic regime from power does not ensure that democracy will result. If democratic institutions are weak, they may be vulnerable to political organizations or leaders who seek to reinstate a similar authoritarian regime. Institutional stability then greatly affects the success of a new democracy.

Robert Dahl, in his book *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, focuses his definition of democracy on the idea that the government will be responsive to the will of the people and treat its constituents as equals (Dahl 1971, 1-2). Concerning elections and the ability to run for office, his argument focuses on the ability of the people to contest the actions or decisions of their government. As part of this process, people have the ability to join political organizations and speak freely about their preferences without fear of punishment from the government (Dahl 1971). If there is limited room for public contestation because the government does not support public participation, a government may very well be repressive and therefore non-democratic (Dahl 1971, 5). For the purposes of his argument, Dahl uses contestation and participation as two factors of a democracy; however, because a democracy may incorporate more than those two dimensions, the term “polyarchy” is used to represent democracy (Dahl 1971, 8).

A. Types of democracies

There is no perfect form of democracy. Scholars continue to debate the issue, but tend to agree upon certain attributes and types of institutions present in all democracies, which have been, and will be elaborated on in this introduction. Samuel Huntington, Joseph Schumpeter and

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2 Meaning there is little or no opportunity to choose not to vote for a person or bill that may be disagreeable to the majority.
Robert Dahl tend to use more conservative definitions of democracy (Diamond 1996, 21), while Larry Diamond offers descriptions for more liberal democracies.

Liberal democracy, as comprehensively described by Larry Diamond, is a “maximalist” form of democracy that provides many guarantees and freedoms for the people while simultaneously allowing for more participation in the public arena (qtd. in Michael McFaul 2010, 28-31). This type of democracy requires both vertical and horizontal accountability of systems and leaders. Together, these features help ensure that the constitution is protected, keeps one person or group from gaining too much power, and allows for extensive civil and political pluralism (Diamond 1996, 22).

Electoral democracies fall on the other end of the spectrum and tend to “acknowledge the need for minimal levels of civil freedom in order for competition and participation to be meaningful. Typically, however, they do not devote much attention to the basic freedoms involved, nor do they attempt to incorporate them into actual measures of democracy,” (Diamond 1996, 21). Electoral democracies are essentially representative democracies, calling for the people to elect an electorate or body of representatives that will advocate for the interests of the people. The people then are less actively involved with the decision making process, yet still elect their leaders every few years.

Although democracies differ in their procedural approaches, certain elements such as free and fair elections and freedom of speech are essential. The way in which constitutions are written, presidents or parliaments are chosen, elections are carried out, and people are represented vary depended on regional preferences and the “cumulative” will of the people.³

³ We use quotes around cumulative because the will of the people may only represent the will of the people who are legally allowed to vote or participate in politics.
B. What democracy is not

As previously explained democracies must represent the will of the people and allow them to contest and participate in the democratic process. Democratically elected leaders must respect majority rule while protecting the rights of minorities (Schmitter et al. 1991, 79). This returns to the idea that the people must be viewed as political equals by the government in order to effectively practice democracy that is for and by the people. Phillipe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl propose “a matrix of potential combinations” of factors that embody democracy (Schmitter et al. 1991, 83). These include the following: consensus\(^4\), participation\(^5\), access\(^6\), responsiveness\(^7\), majority rule, parliamentary sovereignty\(^8\), party government\(^9\), pluralism\(^10\), federalism\(^11\), presidentialism\(^12\), and checks and balances\(^13\) (Schmitter et al. 1991, 84). These dimensions of democracy will be combined in different ways to create a stable democracy depending on various factors. Although there is no single method to creating a democracy that will work for every country, these above indicators are present in today’s democratic governments. If these indicators of types of democracies are noticeably absent, then democracy is not present (ibid).

Phillipe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, in their article “What Democracy Is…and Is Not,” also suggest what a democracy does not look like. Although democracies allow the citizenry to elect officials they deem capable of effectively leading their country while not

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\(^4\) Majority rule with respect to minority groups (Schmitter, et al. 1991: 84).
\(^5\) The citizenry has an equal opportunity to participate in politics (ibid).
\(^6\) The citizenry has access to the political system (ibid).
\(^7\) Rulers must create policy that is not widely popular, but in the end, they can be held accountable for their actions by the people or rule of law (ibid).
\(^8\) There is a system of accountability that keeps one part of government from having ultimate authority (ibid).
\(^9\) “Rulers may not be nominated, promoted, and disciplined in their activities by well-organized and programmatically coherent political parties, although where they are not, it may prove more difficult to form an effective government,” (ibid)
\(^10\) “The political process may not be based on a multiplicity of overlapping, voluntaristic, and autonomous private groups. However, where there are monopolies or representation, hierarchies of association, and obligatory memberships, it is likely that the interests involved will be more closely linked to the state and the separation between the public and private spheres of action will be much less distinct,” (ibid).
\(^11\) There is a “dispersal of power across territorial…units” from the local to the national level (ibid).
\(^12\) A “concentration of authority is present in all democracies,” whether the person be popularly elected or the position be held by several people (ibid).
\(^13\) A system of accountability keeps the government accountable to the citizens (ibid).
infringing on certain social freedoms, democracies may not be able to immediately solve political, social, economic, administrative or cultural problems without stable institutions that will aid in the government’s ability to provide such services to the people. “First, democracies are not necessarily more efficient economically than other forms of government,” (Schmitter et al. 1991, 85). When a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy occurs, those in power may engage in corrupt practices to ensure their previous economic or income benefits (Ibid). It is possible that institutions affected by the economic disparities will recover, but that process may be prolonged depending on the improvements that happen when a democracy is first in place (Ibid).

Second, administratively, a democracy is not the most efficient form of government (Schmitter et al. 1991, 85). Under a democratic system, the decision making process is slower\(^\text{14}\), however, the people have democratically elected the officials who create new laws or policies, so the assumption is that the majority of the population supports such legislation and the minority groups are still respected. As well, “necessary compromises” made by the new democratic government will “often please no one completely,” (Ibid). Those who believe they lost are then able to use their right to freedom of speech to contest decisions made by the government. Freedom of speech and freedom to organize into political parties allows the opposition to be more vocal about its disagreements with the decisions of government, thus slowing it down.

Third, the democracies that replace authoritarian regimes may not seem more orderly, consensual, stable, or governable when compared to the previous government (Schmitter et al. 1991, 85). This can be partly attributed to the “byproduct of democratic freedom of expression, but it is also a reflection of the likelihood of continuing disagreement over new rules and institutions,” (Schmitter et al. 1991, 85-86). New autonomy allows the people to question certain

\(^\text{14}\) This process can be seen with the due process within the U.S. Congress.
rules and protest the decisions of governing institutions, making the process seem less stable and orderly (Schmitter 1991, 86). Once democracy is consolidated, this arduous process becomes more efficient and less challenged (yet the people are still able to contest the decisions of their government) (ibid).

Finally, although a democracy establishes “more open societies and polities than the autocracies they replace,” the economies are not necessarily as open (Schmitter et al. 1991, 86). It is very possible that the new government create an economy with closed borders and limited trade (Ibid). Schmitter and Karl claim that although this economic closure occurs, there instead is a stronger reliance on “public institutions to promote economic development,” (Ibid). Liberal economic policies may not be the most effective choice for states where “private monopolies and oligopolies exist” and therefore may decide it necessary to find other ways to “protect the rights of collectives from encroachment by individuals, especially propertied ones,” (Schmitter et al. 1991, 86-87). In such cases, ownership may be public or cooperative (Schmitter et al. 1991, 87).

C. The Transition Paradigm

Transitioning to a democracy is a long, sometimes arduous process that will not happen overnight. Overthrowing a regime, establishing a new democracy, and consolidating it so society accepts the new form of government is an unstable process that can result in the return to an authoritarian regime. Thomas Carothers in his article “The End of the Transition Paradigm” argues that this transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic government is not a simple process that can be repeated time and again in any given country (Carothers 2002). Assumptions about where a government is on a continuum toward democracy lead one to believe that the process of becoming a democracy is easily repeatable. Carothers argues “it is certainly true that the current political situations of the ‘transitional countries’ are not set in stone, enough
time has elapsed to shed significant light on how the transition paradigm is holding up,” (Carothers 2002, 9). The word “transition” suggests that countries will continue to follow a path the democratization, when in fact, they may adopt certain traits of democracy, but the ruling party may not fully relinquish power. To continue to claim that states such as Congo, Moldova, Zambia, Cambodia and Guinea, to name a few, are transitioning toward democracy, is “a dangerous habit of trying to impose a simplistic and often incorrect conceptual order on an empirical tableau of considerable complexity,” (Carothers 2002, 14-15). The adoption of a few democratic processes does not make a democracy.

D. Democratic Consolidation

Before democracies are consolidated, there is still potential for the new system to be undermined by stronger parties who wish to take control and rule in ways similar to the previous non democratic regime. Once a democracy is effectively established, stabilized and supported by the people, democratic processes work better. As Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan explain “with consolidation, democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social, institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in the calculations for achieving success,” (Linz et al. 1996, 16). To elaborate further, a democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government. When a government comes to power it is the direct result of a free and popular vote, the government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and the executive, legislative, and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure (Linz et al. 1996, 13-15). The consolidation of a democracy is the last step in completing the democratization process. It ensures a certain amount of sustainability that will prevent the country from reverting back to its previously autocratic ways. As will be evidenced in this report, simply defining and
encouraging democratic ideals and institutions within a country is only the beginning of U.S. democracy promotion efforts; the consolidation of democracy is a true indicator of success.

To create a democracy, a level of stability is necessary with the cooperation of popularly supported civil and political organizations. If a government is elected too soon after the fall of a non-democratic regime, military coups, for example, may strongly undermine the system of democracy, its rule of law and other organizations, as happened in Nigeria with a military coup in 1984, or in many Latin American countries throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Huntington 1991, 19-23). A democratic system and the rule of law will be of little effect if they cannot withstand a rebel group or military coup. Those strong forces may quickly influence outcomes of the state after a non-democratic regime falls, or undermine a democratic government if it is set up too soon after the previous regime left power. Egypt is going to be a country to watch as it (presumably) prepares for elections in September 2011 after Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year reign. The country’s leaders will need to be careful to set up strong political institutions that will support and foster the development of a new democracy.

II. Background of U.S. Democracy Promotion Efforts

This report calls for a shift in the approach to democracy promotion, as it is defined currently. If this is to be a successful prescription for the future, though, the past must first be acknowledged and evaluated. Throughout the 20th century and the first part of the 21st century, U.S. policy-makers have embraced the concept of democracy promotion with various motivating factors, approaches, and targets. From Wilson’s focus on self-determination in the WWI era, to the Bush administration’s preoccupation with regime change, promoting democracy abroad has been considered “a way of enhancing the national security” for the U.S.; however, there have been external and internal factors that have mandated shifts in the way that it is applied in terms
of actual U.S. foreign policy (Smith 1994, 4). The shifting strategies and approaches in regards to democracy promotion must be considered within their historical contexts and in terms of what they mean for the future. This brief explanation of the U.S.’s past involvement with democracy promotion will focus on a few major themes and factors that have undeniably been driving forces in the country’s policy.

A. Wilsonianism

At the beginning of the 20th century, Wilson’s involvement in democracy promotion was one that embodied a certain moral obligation. Through his involvement in Latin America, his creation of and commitment to the League of Nations, and his overall attempts “to make the world safe for democracy,” Wilson demonstrated a desire to promote democracy abroad simply for the sake of democracy itself (qtd. in Smith 1994, 62). The new world order that he envisioned depended greatly on the idea that America’s position as a strong, democratic state put the country in an important position of leadership, and that its purpose was to lead the rest of the world into democratic success. While he saw domestic benefits in the proliferation of the democratic tradition throughout the world, he primarily saw it as a logically moral obligation for the U.S. As Tony Smith states in his book America’s Mission, “Wilson recognized clearly the uniqueness of the American democratic experience, but he insisted as well on the ability of others to learn the virtues of democratic government, and on the duty of America to engage in such instruction” (Smith 1994, 63). This idealistic approach to democracy promotion resulted in the U.S.’s involvement in the 1910 Mexican Revolution, the formation of the League of Nations, and the corresponding peace process after WWI. All of these cases were the result of a facet of foreign policy that was intent on spreading democracy simply because the U.S.’s position of power obligated it to do so.
While other, more tangible national interests dictated the U.S.’s entry into WWI, it was not without hesitation and a belief that the U.S. should remain separate from the fighting so that Wilson could “exert the moral authority needed to end the war on terms that would make for a lasting peace” (McDougall 1997, 132). Indeed, even in the case of WWI, when national security interests won out over the country’s moral obligation to simply support democracy for democracy’s sake, Wilson still believed that the U.S.’s role should be defined not by its involvement on the battlefield, but by its involvement in the peace process. Thus, even in the instance of other motivating factors, U.S. foreign policy remained firmly rooted in the moral obligation the country had as the leader of a democratic world order.

**B. Roosevelt’s Non-intervention**

This concept shifted slightly under Franklin D. Roosevelt who heavily prioritized self-governance. To him, the full consolidation of democracy was not nearly as important as ensuring that larger imperial nations did not enlarge their spheres of influence. In contrast to Wilson’s vision for a new world order and his belief in the necessity of promoting democracy, FDR approached the issue with a non-interventionist attitude; he found exceptions to Wilson’s rule of promoting democracy anywhere and everywhere. Roosevelt recognized certain situations in which the projected outlook for democracy was not positive, and in these cases, he “was satisfied with simply opposing great-power spheres of influences...It was enough, in these circumstances, that states be self-governing in the sense of being independent from direct foreign control” (Smith 1994, 115-116). This step back from the idealized conception of democracy promotion according to Wilson continued after WWII as the tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union mounted.
C. Cold War Era

As the Cold War continued, the idea of containing spheres of influence gained even more credence, and intervening on behalf of non-democratic (though importantly pro-American) governments became a common method and strategy of U.S. foreign policy. Many policy-makers adopted a more realist approach, which perceived democracy promotion as playing a minor role in U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, realists argued that “the true purpose of foreign policy… [was] to defend the national interest,” which was accomplished by containing the influence and power of the Soviet Union (Nau 2000, 127). The emphasis placed on true democracy promotion decreased as the country’s national security concerns changed. Indeed, the heightened conflict between the U.S. and communist forces resulted in a situation in which “the goal of encouraging democracy abroad now became but one ambition among many in the nation’s foreign policy, to be supported in many instances after other problems had been resolved” (Smith 1994, 118). During the Cold War, national security interests and the fight against communism very clearly took precedence over the concept of promoting democracy abroad. Democracy promotion – if used at all – was a means to a different end, rather than being an end in itself.

D. Reviving Wilsonianism

In contrast, during the 1970s and 1980s, there were three important, intertwining external and internal factors that caused a reversal of the Cold War’s realist attitude and reprioritized democracy promotion as being a worthy and fundamental component of U.S. foreign policy. Popular movements against repressive regimes in the Third World, the policy-making community’s reestablished commitment to supporting democracy promotion rather than authoritarianism, and the emergence and growing strength of the global economy all worked
simultaneously and concurrently to provide new motivating factors for U.S. foreign policy (Robinson 1996, 9). With these intertwined and mutually sustained factors, the U.S. attitude towards democracy promotion and the corresponding foreign policy actions that followed, echoed the Wilsonian approach. Once again, democracy became an important and worthy end in itself, which was a definite departure from the intense anti-communist attitude that steered U.S. foreign policy and often compromised the basic tenets of democracy during the Cold War.

During Reagan’s time in office, there was a gradual return to the belief that the U.S. had a duty to not only take on a leadership role in the international context, but also to use that position in order to influence the spread of democracy around the world. Reagan argued that “a world order run by democratic states would be more prosperous, pacific, and morally superior to any other” (Smith 1994, 268). Initially, Reagan’s policies “paid little heed to whether the governments the United States sought to shore up were democratic or not, so long as they were anticommunist” (Carothers 1999, 33). The Reagan Administration’s reintegration of democracy promotion into foreign policy strategy began as the administration shifted its approach to Latin America. By Reagan’s second term in office, a moderating trend occurred, which “led officials to take more seriously the idea of developing the political component of the military-oriented policy toward Central America and to shift away from support for friendly tyrants in decline, as in Chile, Paraguay, Haiti, the Philippines, and South Korea” (Carothers 1999, 29). In addition to this ideological shift among policy-makers, the U.S. government created programs aimed specifically at promoting democracy through “assisting elections and strengthening the administration of justice” (Carothers 1999, 34). While the reinvigoration of democracy promotion during Reagan’s time in office was not necessarily universal or immediate, the
institutions and ideological foundations that it established became especially relevant as the Cold War came to a close.

Indeed, during the 1990s, the lack of a clear communist enemy allowed foreign policy decisions to retreat even further away from the realist tradition. In his book *Aiding Democracy Abroad*, Thomas Carothers states that “a surge of idealism about democracy and its place in U.S. policy rolled through the U.S. policy community in the early 1990s” (Carothers 1999, 45). At this point, policy makers realized the pragmatic value of democracy promotion, “stressing the idea that democracies do not fight each other” (Ibid). At this point, the concept of promoting democracy was no longer seen as purely an ideological interest; rather, it had value and purpose in the post-Cold War era, and it became a respected and valued part of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, the Clinton administration adopted a foreign policy agenda that they titled “democratic enlargement,” which “pointed to the self-evident fact that with the end of the Cold War the possibilities of expanding the zone of political freedom had grown enormously” (Cox 2000, 223). The shift from containment to democratic expansion – while perhaps tempered with the remnants of Cold War realism that provided a depth of pragmatism – harkened back to the Wilsonian attitude that touted the impressive strength of democracy and the importance of providing it to others.

**E. Post-9/11**

In the early 21st century, the approach to democracy promotion changed yet again. The George W. Bush administration adopted what Jonathan Monten deems a sense of “vindicationism”, which perceives the country’s national security as being dependent on “the direct application of U.S. military and political power to promote democracy in strategic areas” (Monten 2005, 1). Monten explains that after the 9/11 attacks, “the Bush administration
increasingly defined U.S. security requirements in terms of the U.S. capacity to influence the domestic political structures and societies of failed and threatening states” (Monten 2005, 29). In the administration’s determination to defeat al Qaeda, the desire to prioritize democracy promotion quickly subsided. For example, in countries like Pakistan, Musharraf’s support for the “War on Terror” became the defining factor in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, despite the fact that he swiftly consolidated his authoritarian grip within the country (Carothers 2003, 2).

Within the administration, some believed the 9/11 attacks occurred as a result of fundamentalism in the Middle East that was fostered and bred by autocratic regimes and former allies. Consequently, these policy-makers argued for the importance of democratizing the region. In his second inaugural address in 2005, President Bush connected the safety of the U.S. with the expansion of democracy to other regions: “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world” (Bush 2005). While this became the new mantra among policy-makers of the Bush Administration, complications arose when it became clear that the core element of their approach was to “undercut the roots of Islamic extremism by getting serious about promoting democracy in the Arab world, not just in a slow, gradual way, but with fervor and force” (Carothers 2003, 9). President Bush implemented this forceful approach and simultaneously employed the rhetoric of spreading democracy, fundamentally shifting the definition of democracy promotion. The changing rhetoric surrounding the invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrates the way that the practice of democracy promotion was molded to fit a foreign policy agenda with different motives than what was publicly announced. Not only did democracy promotion become deeply intertwined with issues of national security, but military force and rapid regime change became associated with U.S. efforts.
The foreign policy enacted during the Bush administration and the way that it was disguised as democracy promotion, compromised the image and reputation of the U.S. abroad and of the idea of democracy itself. Indeed, as Carothers explains, “some autocratic governments have won substantial public sympathy by arguing that opposition to Western democracy promotion is resistance not to democracy itself, but to American interventionism” (Carothers 2006). This has definitively influenced the U.S.’s role in promoting democracy in other states, and must be carefully considered when examining the relevance of democracy promotion at this point in history.

III. Waves of Democratization and Why Re-thinking U.S. Democracy Promotion is Important

A. Waves of Democratization

Samuel Huntington theorizes about waves of democratization and regression since the 19th and 20th centuries. As well, Robert Dahl seemingly aligns with what Huntington terms “waves of democracy”, but does not use the same terminology. These waves of democratization describe periods in which many countries transitioned to democracies. “A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time” (Huntington 1991, 15).

In the 19th century and in the 1920s, many countries transitioned from “hegemonies and competitive oligarchies into near-polyarchies” or governments that look similar to today’s democracy (Dahl 1971, 10; Huntington 1991, 13, 15). This first wave, between the years of 1828-1926, was a relatively long transition period in which countries were slow to fully democratize (Huntington 1991, 16). Although nearly 30 countries had already made the

\[15\] Remember that polyarchies, as Robert Dahl defines them, are primitive democracies incorporate public contestation and participation (1991).
transition to democracies, by the 1920s and 1930s, the first reverse wave began—these countries reverted from democracies to authoritarian or totalitarian regimes during the interwar period as a result of effects of the Great Depression (Ibid). Those most susceptible to this reversal were countries that had established a democracy after 1910. Among those countries were Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia (Ibid).

The second wave of democratization began toward the end of World War II and lasted until about 1962 (Huntington 1991, 16, 18). During the Cold War the U.S. and the Soviet Union struggled against each other to promote either capitalism or communism respectively. From this time until 1974, the world witnessed 22 new democracies revert back to non-democratic regimes (Huntington 1991, 14, 19-20). The third wave of democratization began in the mid-1970s. While liberalization occurred\(^\text{16}\) in some authoritarian regimes, democracy seemed to be gaining more momentum with governments in transition by the beginning of the 1990s, especially in Eastern Europe (Huntington 1991, 21-24). In the early 21\(^\text{st}\) century, with democracy promotion still on the political agenda in the U.S., do we find ourselves in the midst of another wave of democratization?

The purpose of this report is to examine past and current ways in which the U.S. government has promoted democracy, in order to provide recommendations for future endeavors of democracy promotion. Since Huntington wrote *The Third Wave* many states have continued to democratize. Assuming that democracy is the preferred method by people for governance, the U.S. government will continue to have influence in the democratization of non-democratic states. We argue in this report that the U.S. must take several factors into consideration when continuing the process of democracy promotion in the future.

\(^{16}\) As Linz and Stepan note, democracies entail liberalization, but it is not necessary in the reverse. Therefore, authoritarian regimes can practice liberal [economic] policies (1996).
B. Re-thinking current U.S. democracy promotion

In more recent years, and especially during George W. Bush’s presidency, other nations have been increasingly skeptical of U.S. democracy promotion. Suspicions that the U.S. government and/or U.S. organizations were key players in the so-called color revolutions, along with the Bush administration’s shift to “making democracy promotion a central theme of [its] foreign policy has clearly contributed to the unease” around the world (Carothers 2006, 55-56). The backlash can be seen from Russia, China, and several African states. For example, in Eritrea USAID was asked to cease operations due to discomfort “with the agency’s activities, which include promoting citizen participation in economic and political life,” (Carothers 2006, 58-59).

The claims behind this backlash come from authoritarian governments accusing the U.S. government of meddling in their political affairs (Carothers 2006, 61). This so-called meddling began in the 1980s and 1990s when democracies were on the rise. Pro-democracy organizations began to use larger sums of money to monitor elections, support the creation of a strong civil society and thus “foster broad civic engagement in the electoral process,” and provide resources necessary to for opposition parties to conduct an effective campaign (Carothers 2006, 59-60). After early successes with this model, it was widely applied to a multitude of democracy promotion efforts. However, the claim that organizations that promote democracy are honest about their intention only to support free and fair elections, even if the autocrats prevail, is not always widely believed (Carothers 2006, 61-62). This results in mistrust from authoritarian regimes and efforts to prevent these organizations from meddling in elections and civil society.

A number of foreign governments do not trust the U.S. government and see potential that it may once again oust legitimate governments as it did during the Cold War (Carothers 2006,
As a result, when the U.S. government uses “democracy promotion,” foreign governments read “regime change” by military force (Carothers 2006, 64). In more recent years,

The Bush administration has also caused the term [democracy promotion] to be closely associated with U.S. military intervention and occupation by adopting democracy promotion as the principal rationale for the invasion of Iraq. The fact that the administration has also given the impression that it is interested in toppling other governments hostile to U.S. security interests, such as in Iran and Syria, has made the president’s ‘freedom agenda’ seem even more menacing and hostile (Ibid).

The usage of the “democracy promotion” in this case becomes an issue of false or inconsistent rhetoric, which will be covered in more depth later in this report. Mistrust of U.S. standards and principles of democracy continued with mention of the Bush Administration’s “freedom agenda.” Furthermore, certain actions at home have undermined the U.S.’s commitment and adherence to democracy. The use of torture on detainees at U.S.-administered facilities, the transfer of prisoners to countries known to use torture as a means to obtain information, the detention of hundreds of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the authorization of warrantless searches and eavesdropping on phone calls and monitoring of internet activity of U.S. citizens as means to monitor or prevent terrorist activity, among other actions, all weaken the U.S. government’s credibility when promoting democracy abroad (Carothers 2006, 64-65).

The global financial crisis that began in 2008 has undermined international confidence in the success and durability of free-market capitalism and has tarnished the allure of democracy by association. In state capitalist systems, states manipulate markets for political gain (Bremmer 2009, 41). With the financial crisis, it has become much harder to promote or prove the strength and value of free-market liberalism. Since 2008, “state officials in Abu Dhabi, Ankara, Beijing, Brasilia, Mexico City, Moscow, and New Delhi make economic decisions--about strategic investments, state ownership, regulation--that resonate across global markets,” (Ibid).
On one side of the argument, wealthy autocratic states such as China and Russia have navigated the downturn nearly unscathed and now offer an alternative to both the ideology and influence of the Western neoliberal economic order. Even after the worst of the global economic crisis, Ian Bremmer argues that “national oil companies still control three-quarters of the world’s primary strategic resources, state-owned enterprises and privately owned national champions still enjoy substantial competitive advantages over their private-sector rivals,” (Bremmer 2009, 50). This strong economic growth despite the state’s control over the economy has allowed autocratic leaders to maintain power and demonstrate the effectiveness of their system, making it increasingly more difficult for states with liberal economies to exert influence. The U.S.’s declining power may have been offset if more states chose free-market liberalism, because of the potential for global increases in productivity and efficiency.

However, as Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry argue, although China has an increasing growth rate, the overall population is rather poor (Bremmer 2009, 84). As political change is ultimately unpredictable, as can be witnessed in Egypt currently, liberal democracy and free-markets are still possible. Furthermore, “with the advent of capitalism...class stratification and economic inequality became fundamental political challenges and the triggers for long political struggles,” (Deudney et al. 2009, 85). The creation of democracy in such areas leads to “the rise of political parties responsive to working-class needs and interests, and the establishment of the welfare state,” (Ibid). In today’s autocratic capitalist regimes, inequality is present, which may lay the foundation for free-market liberalism and democracy over a long period of time (Ibid).

Confronting this pushback will require a carefully calculated, diplomatic approach. Approaches that seem to “force” other governments to implement democracy, or very superficial
strategies that ignore context will not be well received in the targeted areas. This next section outlines this report’s proposed strategy to re-think current U.S. democracy promotion initiatives.

IV. Democracy Promotion Strategy

This report prescribes several basic tenets for the future of U.S. democracy promotion. They are all mutually reinforcing components of a broad, overarching approach that is more likely to yield success and stability if each element is given the necessary attention. The strategy outlined in this report focuses on 1) being consistent in the types of rhetoric being used and actions being performed, 2) paying more attention to the context of each individual case of democracy promotion, 3) promoting and becoming more involved in multilateral efforts for the sake of democracy promotion, 4) giving ample consideration and resources to the (economic and social) development of a country as a part of the larger democracy promotion goal. The components outlined in this strategy will result in the single most important determinant of success in the field of democracy promotion: sustainability.

The sustainability that this report urges the U.S. to work towards is multi-faceted: it encompasses sustainability in terms of a country’s democratic institutions, practices, and political life as well as the sustainability of U.S. efforts and funding for the promotion of democracy. As the authors of this report, we urge the U.S. to consider our strategy when implementing policies focused on democracy promotion so that the individual states can become self-sufficient, durable democracies that are stable enough to avoid backsliding into any type of undemocratic rule.

A. Rhetoric

There must be consistency between what the U.S. claims its policies and actions are meant to accomplish and what the actual priorities are when implementing these policies. It is a
fundamental requirement for strengthening and maintaining the U.S. image and credibility abroad, and effectively employing soft power. In order to be consistent in the rhetoric presented, it must be realistic. For example, if the U.S. is going to be involved with democracy promotion, it must not use the concept as a way to mask other economic, military, or security goals. If other national interests take precedence over democracy promotion, then that should be acknowledged, rather than publicly claiming participation in a more altruistic venture even while acting otherwise. Similarly, the grandiose rhetoric that associates the U.S. with lofty goals, such as “ending tyranny in our world,” must be minimized. Certainly the rhetoric presented by the U.S. can still be inspiring and hopeful, while still being realistic and attainable. In a similar sense, the U.S. must temper its rhetoric concerning democracy promotion with honesty and humility. Acknowledging past failures in democracy promotion, being honest about other conflicting national interests in certain situations, and admitting that the U.S.’s model of democracy is not perfect will make public rhetoric more powerful. At its core, the purpose of this element of the strategy is to coherently and consistently align U.S. rhetoric concerning democracy promotion with the actions and policies it employs as part of the process.

B. Context

Each state exists with its own historical, political, cultural, economic, and social context that makes it unique from any other state. And if the transition to democracy is going to occur, each state must be given special consideration. This report suggests that contextualizing each case of democracy promotion and consolidation is crucial to the overall strategy. It is the only way to fully understand each regime and the challenges it poses; and understanding the unique elements of each regime and its corresponding society is the only way to know exactly what needs to be done in order to successfully establish democracy. Before attempting democracy
promotion in a state, the following potential contextual problems need to be carefully evaluated and addressed: civil society, ethnic divides, cultural norms, past instances of conflict, inequality, proximity to regional hegemons, the pre-existing notions of democracy, corruption within the current government, the possibility of a hybrid regime, and past attempts at democratization. This report’s in-depth case studies on Ukraine, Kenya and Nepal demonstrates that only by fully examining and addressing the local context of a state and its regime can the U.S. focus its policies and actions in an effective and fully-functioning way.

C. Multilateral Cooperation

This report advocates that the U.S. participate more frequently and more actively in multilateral efforts at democracy promotion. Not only would this increase the effectiveness of democratizing efforts, but it would also boost U.S. legitimacy and reputation abroad by negating the perception that the U.S. uses democracy promotion as a façade for neo-colonial endeavors. The U.S. can become involved with multilateral efforts through numerous organizations: The UN consists of several agencies, such as the UNDP, that can assist and enhance democracy promotion; the European Union and its member countries can contribute a wealth of resources and funding; NATO can provide a certain amount of leverage for those states wishing to become members, but not yet meeting democratic standards; the African Union can give democracy promotion efforts a level of legitimacy with non-Western states, that might otherwise be compromised by the association made between U.S. unilateral democracy promotion efforts and neo-colonialism. There are many other states, organizations, and international institutions that the U.S. could collaborate with to promote democracy, but this element of the strategy is so important because of the increased funding, resources, effectiveness, and legitimacy that can come from more multilateral cooperation.
D. Development

This report suggests that democracy promotion must go hand in hand with economic and social development. They are mutually reinforcing elements that must be approached with equal attention and commitment. Allocating the appropriate amount of resources and funding for development is an important part of ensuring the sustainability of democracy and the institutions that support it. This report specifically advocates community driven development, which puts the responsibility and decision-making in the hands of those most affected by local issues. Not only does this allow for a greater understanding of and interaction with the local context of a state moving towards democracy, but it also gives the local community the opportunity to effect change in their own countries, and in a way that is relevant to them.

The United States will seek the expansion of democratic rule by targeting, on a case-by-case basis, the economic and civil society institutions necessary for enduring democratic governance; furthermore, to maintain the legitimacy of democratic advances the U.S. will enlist the support of multilateral institutions and guard against charges of duplicity arising from inconsistencies in practice and rhetoric. Each individual element of this broader strategy leads to a single end-goal: sustainability – both in the way that the U.S. goes about promoting democracy and the democracy that is established in a country.
Part I: Justifying and Improving the Quality of Democracy

Ever since Samuel Huntington coined the term ‘third wave of democracy’, questions have been raised about why democracy has not been an ideal fit for all states. Free and fair elections, and contestation and participation of people in an open democracy is the ultimate goal for any nation. However as will be seen in Part I, democracy as a form of government feature more than simple elections. Part I will begin to explore four key components in answering the relevance of democracy as a system by first questioning the essence of democracy in “Holistic Democracy Promotion”. Rather than seeking another form of government, democracy becomes the optimal choice for a nation. This chapter will explore the best ways to sustain a democracy, and the engines that drive such a system.

An often overlooked part of democracy is its linkages with social rights, or positive rights. In “The Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights”, the author argues that human rights are not just a parallel entity of democracy but rather those human rights are a basis for democracy. In its efforts to promote democracy, an increased emphasis on human and political rights is necessary for the creation of democratic institutions. Linking itself to the previous chapter, the “The Role of Social and Economic Rights in the Public Arena” demonstrates that social needs, such as education, nutrition, health, and shelter, are overlooked in the current democracy promotion agenda. An agenda that does not see the disadvantaged members of society is unable to create a just and prosperous society. The argument is made that the current U.S. agenda neglects such fundamental arenas by focusing more on liberal market ideologies.

Finally, “The Relationship between Rhetoric and Policy and its Implications for Effective Democracy Promotion” suggests that one over-arching rhetoric, or agenda, is missing from the
current U.S. democracy promotion agenda. Conflicting interests arise when U.S. democracy promotion rhetoric is intertwined with other U.S. foreign policy interests. By addressing the question of rhetoric, the authors seek to show how the reputation and image of the U.S. is harmed, and if democracy promotion is used as a façade for other U.S. interests and to ultimately, provide recommendations for an effective and sustainable democracy promotion effort.
Chapter 1: Holistic Democracy Promotion

*By: Samia Ahmed*

Democracy serves as the catalyst that expands and progresses civil liberties without eliminating antagonism. “It domesticates and transforms through negotiation and compromise, majority decision, and rule of law”, while it also “institutes a set of procedures that make it possible to conceive of justice as involving not only ends-particular actions and policies of government-- but means as well-- the matter, that is in which all policies are determined” (Fairfield 2008, xiv). It is often for these common associations that democracy is perceived of as the optimal governing system. The aim of this paper is to examine the concept of democracy, by asking the question why democracy? What is it about democracy that makes it an end in itself to the extent that it must be duplicated throughout the world? If, scholars such as Michael McFaul argue that indeed democracy has become a world value, whereby the ‘international community’ has accepted it as the optimal goal; why then are there so many states that have become democracies of pseudo-democracies and/or consolidated democracies backsliding to authoritarian or autocratic rule and what are the possibilities for those who aspire to become democracies to do so?

In essence, the foundational basis for this paper will seek to answer the question why democracy, and what the challenges to the spread of democracy are today, particularly relating to U.S. democracy promotion. In doing so, it will first present why democracy is indeed the optimal while also presenting the engines that drive and sustain democracy. It will proceed to examine the stance of U.S. democracy promotion and the challenges that are faced by democratization and democracy promotion throughout the world.
I. Why Democracy?

Michael McFaul in “Democracy Promotion as a World Value” argues that democracy has become a world value that transcends divisions between regions, religions, cultures and ethnicities. He asserts in quoting Dahl that:

Democracy helps prevent rule by cruel and vicious autocrats, guarantees citizens a set of fundamental rights, ensures a broader range of personal freedoms, helps people protect their own fundamental interests, provides the maximum opportunity for self-determination—the freedom to live under laws of one’s own choosing—provides the maximum opportunity for the exercise of moral responsibility, encourages human development, fosters a relatively high degree of political equality, promotes peace—as modern representative democracies do not fight one another—and generates prosperity (McFaul 2004, 148)

It is often for these fundamental rights that Dahl has stated which democracy guarantees that make it a world value.

In answering the question why democracy, Paul Fairfield holds that democracy must be interpreted as a symbol. Democracy as a symbol in its most practiced form allows mediating between the self and the other, by the means available through discussion (Fairfield 2008). Therefore, by utilizing the foundational ethos of democracy, (i.e. free speech, assembly, equal rights, and majority rule) internal differences are minimized, while equally avoiding extreme polarization of politics. Moreover, Fairfield argues, despite all their shortcomings, democratic states display at the very least “the virtue of stability in removing the conditions that give rise to violent revolutions while providing for periodic changes in administration and political leadership” (Fairfield 2008, xi).

Fairfield attributes the reasoning why democracy has prevailed to its inherent legitimations. He does this by separating the concept of democratic theory into two forms; namely, that of the empirical and the normative objects. He argues, the empirical democratic
theory seeks to “describe what in fact democracy is at a fundamental level of analysis,” while, the normative democratic theory seeks to “account for its philosophical rational” (Fairfield 2008, xv). Fairfield focuses on the latter to justify the basis of the book, Why Democracy? Consequently, interpreting democracy as a symbol in the normative analysis is “intrinsic to communication that draws upon ordinary capacities of practical judgment, social criticism, persuasion, reason giving and negotiation” (Fairfield 2008, 87).

However, though democracy has become a world value, its roots are entrenched in Western development. Larry Diamond in the Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout the World argues, “freedom and democracy are not universal values but rather Western concepts” (Fairfield 2008, 17). He contends it is so because “culture limits how far they can travel” (Ibid). He explains this by quoting Samuel P. Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order:

The West differs from other civilizations…in the distinctive character of its values and institutions. These include most notably its Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and the rule of law…in their ensemble these characteristics are peculiar to the West” (Diamond 2008, 19)

Fairfield like Diamond recognizes that democracy is not a universal panacea; because, as he argues it is no more capable of eliminating conflict from human affairs, or creating strong mutualism or “community,” than any other conception of politics. This is so, because “democracy does not seek the eradication of conflict but “civility within conflict” (Fairfield 2008, xiv). Consequently, by fully conceptualizing democracy as what it is rather than romanticizing the notion of democracy, the fundamental question of why democracy, can be answered.
Other forms of democracies that are mostly hybrid forms of democracies such as illiberal democracy\textsuperscript{17}, pseudo-democracy\textsuperscript{18}, electoral authoritarian regimes\textsuperscript{19} as well as competitive authoritarianism\textsuperscript{20} are all diminished forms of democracies that do not guarantee the basic tenets that consolidated liberal democracies do. However, despite the lack of universality in the inherency of democracy throughout the world, democracy now more than ever before has become a world value (McFaul 2004). Democracy functions as the pillar that supports the spread of freedom and preservation of human dignity. According to McFaul, in no country of the world does the support for dictatorship exceed that of democracy (McFaul 2004, 152). He contends that support for democracy is robust and widespread throughout the world. Like Diamond and Fairfield hold, democracy remains the most strived for system of governance throughout the world because of its underpinning as rule by the people.

II. Engines of Democracy and the Process of Democratization

To explain the factors that drive democracy, this section will use Larry Diamond’s analysis of the factors that drive democracy to help foster and sustain the process of democratization. The factors that drive democracy often occur through internal propagation, external proliferation, as well as regional influence.\textsuperscript{21} Each of these factors serves as catalysts that drive democracy and the process of democratization. As is the case in North Africa and Middle East, citizens have been trying to liberate their nations from autocratic dictators by seeking freedom, dignity and justice, the basic tenets of a democracy. According to Diamond, “as people leave the countryside for the cities, cutting their ties to traditional oligarchs, bosses, or

\textsuperscript{17} The people lack the ability to vote for leaders out of office because of corruption (Fareed Zakaria in The future of freedom: illiberal democracy at home and abroad)  
\textsuperscript{18} The people lack the ability to vote for leaders out of office because of corruption (Larry Diamond in Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation)  
\textsuperscript{19} Regimes that present an illusion of multi-party democracy at the local and national levels while effectively stripping elections of efficacy (see Carothers in Critical mission: essays on democracy promotion 2004, and in “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion” 2006).  
\textsuperscript{20} A form of hybrid authoritarianism that isn’t fully authoritarian or democratic (Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way in the Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism).  
\textsuperscript{21} Diamond in the Spirit of Democracy uses these three factors to explain the engines that drive democracy and the process of democratization.
caciques, they also adopt new political attitudes and beliefs, transformed by rising education levels and expanding, and increasingly global, communication” (Diamond 2008, 99).

A. Internal Factors

Internal factors that drive transitional waves of democracy primarily derive from the legitimacy of government (Huntington 1991). “A regime is legitimate when its people believe it is the most appropriate form of government for their country—better than any other alternative they can imagine and therefore that has the moral right to make laws, collect taxes, direct resources and command obedience” (Diamond 2008, 88). Hence, when a regime lacks this fundamental aspect of democracy, it is more likely to be unstable. Since all regimes depend on some form of legitimacy to function, it is imperative to understand the mechanism working for the attainment of legitimacy either through consent (cultural hegemony) or force (domination). Similarly, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter argue that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence of…direct or indirect… importance of divisions within authoritarian regime itself” (Diamond 2008, 90). Much like the current spurs of revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East, the causes of the revolutions are found in both the direct and indirect divisions between the regimes and their respective countries as well as the opposition to the regimes. Consequences that cause authoritarian regimes to divide are often found in the economic development of the country.

Economic development is a fundamental determinant of whether or not a country becomes a democracy or further descends into autocracy (Prezeworski et al, 2000). Prezeworski et al. find in their illuminating study that indeed economic development is not so much a determinant of the process of democratization as much as it is sustenance of the process of

22According to Antonio Gramsci, “the supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership [or hegemony]’” (Gramsci 1971, 169-170).
democratization (Prezeworski 2000, 136-137). Likewise, Diamond makes the same argument by positing that economic development makes the transition to democracy more likely, in that once a democracy has emerged out of an economically developed state, it sustains the democracy from further descending into authoritarianism or autocracy (Diamond 2008, 97).

Development is comprised of interdependencies that shape the social, political, and economical aspects of any existing body of framework (i.e. a nation-state) to evolve gradually to a realized stage of full potential. The social aspects of the term ‘development’ embody benefits attained through the social sectors of society, such as an efficient health-care systems and educational systems. The political aspects of development embodies the political efficacy of governance, indicating lack of corruption at the upper-level of government, accountability to one’s citizens in providing effective means of legitimate governance and mutual trust between the government and its citizens. The economic aspects of ‘development’ focus on the economic upward mobility of nations. This definition of development refers to the interdependencies of the gradual progression of the social, political and economic amalgamations to a realized state of full potential.

According to Diamond, economic development “alters a country’s social and economic structure” …but it also “profoundly shifts attitudes and values in democratic direction” (Diamond 2008, 98). Diamond continues by saying that with the rise in the structural sectors of society, there emerges a growingly conscious middle class that attempts to put accountability and hold on the emergence of ‘extremist threats’ by realigning interest coalitions (Diamond 2008, 98). Consequently, in doing so, there also arises an increasing trend in information sharing, fueled by technological advances. Using Ingelhart and Welzel’s analysis in Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy, Diamond argues that there is a strong correlation between the
level of economic development in a nation and the citizens’ capability to freely self-express themselves; in that, the more a nation is economically developed, the more the citizens can freely express themselves (Diamond 2008, 100-101).

Civil society as the collective social mobilization in the civil political, economic and legal structures of society serves as a catalyst for a regime change. As noted by Diamond, “civil society often plays a decisive role in bringing down authoritarian rule” (Diamond 2008, 91). Diamond lists three primary reasons why civil society prevails in opposition to the continuity of authoritarian rule: the political values shift toward the democratic paradigm; the alignment of societal interests in creating an amalgamation between privileged classes to mobilize against the regime; and finally, the growth in the informal and formal organizations banding together to mobilize against the regime (Diamond 2008, 103).

B. External Factors

On the other hand, external factors as engines of democracy have been prevalent in the wake of the Cold War and continued throughout the third wave democratic transitions. Covert or overt pressures exerted by international organizations as well as independent nation-states, particularly the U.S., have resulted in conflicting possibilities. External influences such as foreign aid (international assistance) have played decisive roles in the development of democracies throughout the globe.

Often the level of pressure that international organizations and independent nation-states exert differs based on the leverage that Western democracies have on the affected states and what linkages are at stake based on the socioeconomic, political and cultural aspects of the affected states. According to Diamond, “international linkages can make critical social and political constituencies within authoritarian countries more committed to democracy or more
sensitive to Western pressure‖ (Diamond 2008, 112). Similarly, leverages, often in the form of sanctions or pressures are sometimes exerted through a variety of channels (i.e. NGO’s and IGO’s).

On a similar note, the “Boomerang Pattern,” as proposed by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sakkink, explains the linkages among domestic rights and advocacy groups in nation-states, and NGOs and IGOs. The pattern explains how pressure is exerted from one state to the other, using the concepts of linkages and leverages. The Boomerang Pattern works when a domestic advocacy group from one state (state A) reaches out to similar functioning groups (i.e. international NGOs). Information is shared between the advocacy groups in state A and international NGOs to exert multilateral pressure on another state (state B). State B then exerts pressure to IGOs. Finally, the IGOs and NGOs all exert pressure (i.e. in the form of sanctions) to state A to relinquish its acts (Keck & Sakkink, 1999, 93).

C. Regional Influences

Regional influence is an important factor in determining whether or not a state democratizes. As noted in the recent spikes of mass mobilizations and revolutions starting in Tunisia and blazing through the Middle East, regional influences are powerful sources of democratization. For instance, historically, with its establishment as the European Community in 1962, the EU was the first of its kind to act upon spreading democracy and the process of democratization throughout the globe. The EU’s scope of influence magnified with the fall of the Soviet Union, by adding Eastern European states to the sphere of influence of the Western states (Diamond 2008). The EU promoted the process of democratization in the former USSR block by attaching conditionalities to the entry requirement, which encouraged the process of democratization on the states seeking to enter the EU.
III. Sustainability of Democracy

The paradox of successful democracies has been to develop sustainable governance while also keeping a watchful eye on authority (Diamond 2008, 155). To sustain a democracy, there must be a welcoming of “moderation, adaptation, cooperation as well as bargaining” (Diamond 2008, 155). A sustainable democracy often invokes higher levels of pragmatism that transcends clashes between religion, ethnicity, and race. Therefore, sustaining democracy requires collective social mobilization as an active form of civil society.

Rule of law often serves as the tenet in the structural framework that produces the stabilization of democracy and maintenance (Diamond 2008, 165). Carothers has defined the rule of law as “a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning and apply equally to everyone” (Carothers 2004, 122). Rule of law in this sense makes possible and keeps track of individual rights, which are at the crux of democracy. Rule of law, in essence, prevents anarchy in democracies by keeping order, while also making possible a balance between an individual’s rights and the sovereign power of the nation. When rulers abuse power, civil society serves as the catalyst that invokes checks and limits the further encryption of that power. Therefore, a sustainable democracy needs the consolidation of the cultural, political and economic sectors of the society to function properly.

IV. U.S. Democracy Promotion

This report posits that there are four core U.S. interests in enhancing democracy promotion: the safeguarding of U.S. national security through the promotion of democracy, the advancement of the U.S. image abroad through consistency between rhetoric and action, the legitimate improvement of human rights throughout the globe, and the enhancement of U.S. economic interests through democracy promotion abroad.
Based on the concept of democratic peace theory, democratic nations are reliable in the sense that they neither go to war one with another, nor harbor or sponsor terrorism against other democracies (Diamond 1992, 30). Promotion of democracy produces in the words of Larry Diamond, “a safer, saner and more prosperous world for the United States” (Ibid). U.S. national security is dependent on the promotion of democracy, due to the threat authoritarian and autocratic states pose. Therefore, an interest in safeguarding the national security of the U.S., means, as Larry Diamond argues that “democracy should be the central focus- [and] the defining feature-of U.S. foreign policy” (Diamond 1992, 31).

The preservation of the U.S. image as an exemplar of liberty (democratic values), prosperity (capitalistic endeavors) and religious freedom (theistic pluralism) is an important factor in the promotion of democracy abroad (Gunn 2009, 8). This often entails consistency both in rhetoric and action in the spread of democracy throughout the world. The danger of using an inconsistent and often contradictory rhetoric can result in backlashes to U.S democracy promotion as evident during the Bush era (Carothers 2006). It is in the best interests of the U.S. to maintain a consistent rhetoric that helps repair the damaged U.S. image previously caused by the inconsistency in rhetoric and action for the process of democratization throughout the world.

Among the basic tenets of liberal democracy is the preservation of the civil and political rights for individuals. The preservation of human rights is an integral part of U.S. democracy promotion, particularly in regions where democracy is negatively received (i.e. the Middle East). Human rights, as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), are pivotal in determining the autocratic status of the nation-state under scrutiny. McFaul contends that indeed America has many needs and wants to function as a society and certainly as the world’s most powerful nation. However, McFaul holds, to further reduce autocratic impulses of nations
throughout the world, U.S. interests would be best served, when it favors “euphemistic phrases such as “good governance” or “human dignity” in relation to human rights (McFaul 2010, 153). Just as the other interests are an integral part of U.S. foreign interests, so too is the enhancement of U.S. economic interests through democracy promotion abroad. The enhancement of U.S. economic interests requires the democratization of states. Democracies form better international economic relations, as they are more likely to uphold treaties (Diamond, 1992, 30). In addition to improving trade relations with other nations, the successful promotion of democracy would also reduce the cost of conflict for the U.S. If, as the democratic peace theory declares, democracies do not go to war with each other, then the U.S. would find itself in fewer military conflicts that require large amounts of funding and commitment. In the long run, these factors would greatly benefit the U.S.’s economic situation.

V. Challenges to Democratization and Democracy promotion

It is almost inconceivable to think of a consolidated or a successful liberal democracy without considering the development of national economy. Moreover, the economic development of a nation goes hand in hand with the promotion and the process of democratization.

A. Failure of Economic Development

Beginning with the Truman Doctrine, the concept of ‘development’ has taken on a hegemonic formula that merely advocates the economic progression of a nation-state. On March 12, 1947 US President Harry Truman, in the Truman Doctrine set forth values of foreign policy mainly targeted towards Greece and Turkey to prevent Soviet Union influence, but it also set forth many principles for the rest of the underdeveloped world to follow. It included values/ideas like that of the “American Dream”, and fast paced mobility, and the importance of time. This
Doctrine has become the roots of the idea of modernization. This idea of modernization came into effect with the publication of Rostow’s *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-communist manifesto*, in 1960.

To better understand this, it is important to consider what causes have led to the failure of ‘development’. According to Stiglitz in *Globalization and Its Discontents*, many of the policies or conditionalities of loans (SAPs) have become recipes for social, political, and economical destruction for underdeveloped states. Stiglitz argues that trade liberalization “…accompanied by high interest rates” leads to job destruction and unemployment for the poor, financial market liberalization “unaccompanied by an appropriate regulatory structure” leads to economic instability, and privatization “unaccompanied by competition policies and oversight to ensure that monopoly powers are not abused, can lead to higher prices for consumers” (Stiglitz 2003, 84).

In essence, ‘development’ as the mere economic progression of nations has failed, because, as it is currently defined in such a way that it disregards the need for a simultaneous progression of political, social and economic structures of a state. In proving this point, Stiglitz uses the example of Russia. He argues that with the failure of the Communism, shock therapy policies were implemented in Russia. The results he argues were disastrous because the policies were not gradual. Russia, much like other states where this form of development has failed, did not have the proper tools to develop to its realized state of full potential, because it lacked the necessary components to do so. It lacked the infrastructure (that is the social and political aspects of development) needed to carry out gradual economic prosperity. Foreign interferences that open up already weak economies are dangerous for any country that is at the initial stage of open-economy to have to compete with already developed economies (Stiglitz 2003).
Often reform policies are implemented from the top down, rather than bottom up. They often result in the exacerbation of the original conditions of nation-states, making way for corruption and rent seeking. Easterly argues that much like China had done, development needs to come from within. He uses his analysis of what he calls searcher vs. planner mentality (Easterly 2006). He argues that development has flourished in China, because, the Chinese utilized their searcher capability, namely encouraging development through the market to a point where today they are the world’s second largest economy. Whereas, where development has failed (i.e. Russia and most sub-Saharan nation-states among others) it is a result of the planning mentality. The planner mentality enforces financial discipline through intrusive planning (Easterly 2006, 214).

B. Backlashes and Backslides in Democracy Promotion

Backlashes to democracy promotion, and often by association to the process of democratization pose challenges to U.S. democracy promotion efforts. The most recent waves of backlashes to Western (particularly U.S.) democracy promotion has denounced it as an “illegitimate political meddling” (Carothers 2006, 55). Countries like Russia, China and Zimbabwe have played critical roles in contributing to the backlashes in democracy promotion. For instance, Russian under Putin made an NGO law that would prohibit the spread of democracy promotion throughout Russia (Carothers 2006, 56).

On the other hand, China around April of 2005 had resisted U.S. and European democracy promotion efforts (Carothers 2006, 58). According to Carothers, “Beijing has delayed the passage of a new law that would liberalize the rules on NGOS in the country and has cracked down on various local groups that receive foreign funding, including a human rights group supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a private foundation funded by the
U.S. government devoted to supporting democracy worldwide” (Ibid). Likewise, Zimbabwe has also driven out Western democracy aid efforts claiming that it is a way for the Western “colonial masters” to undermine the government (Ibid). Like Russia, Zimbabwe in December of 2004 created a law that prohibited NGOs from receiving foreign aid (Ibid).

Like the backlashes to democracy promotion, backsliding from new democracies to pseudo-democracies or from pseudo-democracies to authoritarianism/autocracies often occurs through the loss of faith in the government to manage the economy (Haggard & Kaufman 1994, 7). The manifestations of loss in the faith of the government to manage the economy is often seen in public support for the economic “solutions” posed by authoritarian contenders. Similarly, economic decline in states also intensifies riots and widespread crimes as well as other forms of public violence, polarizing groups at opposite ends of the spectrum, and in turn requiring military intervention to seize control (Ibid). As a result of the multifaceted challenges to democracy, efforts to promote democracy have sometimes taken incongruous and counterintuitive steps towards building democracies throughout the world, sometimes making consolidated democracies difficult to achieve.

VI. Conclusion

The inherent values of democracy make it an attractive concept. Not only do democracies guarantee individuals certain rights and opportunities, but they also have the ability to transcend ethnic, religious, cultural, and political divides in the process of resolving conflict. Thus, it becomes the optimal system of governance and is promoted as such. The establishment and consolidation of democracy can be geared by internal factors such as civil society and economic development; external pressures from other states and international organizations; and the regional influence of larger hegemonic states that hold great sway with a transitional country. In
addition to these motivating factors, there must be a certain level of in-country participation and investment in democracy, in order to make it sustainable and self-sufficient. Ensuring sustainability is the only tangible way to prevent a backsliding that could potentially lead a state back into authoritarianism. Moreover, sustainable, self-sufficient democratic transitions do a great deal to serve U.S. interests that are pragmatic and important.

The promotion of democracy in autocratic states, along with successful consolidation of democratic values, institutions, and processes, serve to protect U.S. national security interests by ensuring more peaceful interactions with other states, as well as U.S. economic interests which benefit from the improvement of trade relations with other nations. Similarly, the U.S.’s image and reputation abroad is served by successful, peaceful, long-term, self-sufficient transitions to democracy. Being part of sustainable democracy promotion processes gives the U.S. more credibility and legitimacy with other nations, which has wavered significantly in recent decades. While these U.S. interests are pragmatic and tangible, the successful promotion of democracy also serves a more altruistic interest: spreading basic democratic values that provide opportunity, freedom, and an improvement in the quality of life to others around the world.
Chapter 2: The Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights

By: Reemah Medina

The U.S.’s international legitimacy relies partly on its commitment to democracy, liberalism, and human rights. Democratic government and human rights have an interdependent relationship and while the U.S. promotes democracy, it can also be a leader in promoting human rights, or rather, where the U.S. encourages the protection of human rights, democracy will better be able to flourish. Accounts of selective U.S. foreign interventions, humanitarian and otherwise, reveal how past policies with a lackluster approach toward human rights can leave the humanitarian and political situations more fragile and less democratic. Where the U.S. is currently invested, an increased emphasis and sensitivity to human rights will create a greater democratic foundation. In this section of the report, I will demonstrate why human rights and democracy are parallel concepts and suggest that because human rights are the basis of democracy, the U.S. can and should continue to promote it.

I. The Relationship between Human Rights and Political Democracy

The foundations of a healthy democracy can also be found in the form of the rights outlined in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Without the guarantee of these basic political, social, and civil rights, no democratic state apparatus can function with respect to the peoples’ position. However, while most countries agree to the liberties outlined in the UDHR, the reality is that many states still struggle in protecting or providing these rights to their citizens. Democracy promotion can and should play a role in encouraging governments to ensure the UDHR rights to their citizens.

The type of political system practiced in a certain nation has a direct correlation to the human rights enjoyed by the population. A democratic system is, by definition, the best form of
government for the protection of human rights because principles of democracy align with those of human rights. Protecting individual rights, which include social and economic rights, like equal access to political and civil rights, including the right to vote, expression, and assembly, are the basis of both human rights as written in the UDHR and constitutions or state documents of stable democracies around the world (Arat 1991, 3).

In his book, “Democracy and Human Rights,” David Beetham outlines carefully the relationship between human rights and political democracy. He explains how the relationship is often misunderstood, and sometimes human rights are seen as separate from political and institutional parts of society. He says the division of the two is due in part to the division of academic disciplines; democracy is the subject of political science, and human rights the subject of law and jurisprudence. Because of this, sometimes human rights are misunderstood as supplementary to democracy or even sometimes “vulnerable to democracy if not independently guaranteed” (Beetham 1999, 90). Either way, they are separated from democracy. Beetham says these characterizations are wrong and damaging, then begins questioning the definitions of both human rights and democracy.

The first problem he addresses is that democracy as a political system and ideology must be understood beyond the basic institutional state structures that are often cited as evidence of a “real” democratic government. Beetham writes “The weakness of any purely institutional definition, in terms, say, of multi-partyism, electoral competition or the separation of powers, is that it fails to specify what exactly it is about these institutions that makes them democratic, as opposed to ‘liberal’, ‘pluralist’, or any other term we choose to employ”(Beetham 1999, 90). Institutions can only be as democratic as the extent to which they allow for and contribute to the popular control of government.
Thomas Carothers also criticizes what he calls the overemphasis on elections in U.S. democracy promotion. He cites the example of El Salvador and US intervention in its political system and accuses the U.S. of being guilty of contributing to and spreading illiberal democracies, ones that do not focus on individual rights. He writes that during the 1980s critics criticized the Reagan administration and its implementation of elections in El Salvador as premature in a war-torn country. This was seen again in the Bush years with “critics faulting Bush for overemphasizing elections, such as in Iraq, Palestine, and the Arab world generally” (Carothers 2009, 3). In order to avoid this emphasis on faulty institutions and practices that are supposed to be democratic, the foundational principles of democracy must take hold first.

Beetham goes on to explain that if these institutions are a key element of democracy, and all democratic countries have them, then the second question that must be addressed is why and how these countries are called democratic to begin with (Beetham 1999, 90). Institutions are the actualization and practice of certain collectively-agreed-to principles, and Beetham argues that rather than to focus only on the institutions and their functions, the underlying principles that the institutions are supposed to embody must be specified in order to understand democracy and human rights relationship (Beetham 1999, 90).

The principles, namely popular rule, popular control over collective decision-making, participation in government, and equal representation, all relate directly to human action and expression, not the political institutions that may exist. Since the starting points of democracy are the abilities of the citizen and not the institutions, individual human rights must come into play when defining, justifying, and promoting democracy. Therefore, in order for the basic tenants of democracy to work (equal suffrage and popular control over collective affairs), the citizens require basic civil and political human rights. Beetham explains “Without the freedoms
of expression, of association, of assembly, of movement, people cannot effectively have a say, whether in the organizations of civil society or in matters of government policy” (Beetham 1999, 91). In other words, without civil rights like political expression, institutions are useless. This is why when the U.S. thinks of democracy and its promotion, it must at the same moment think of human rights as primary and necessary for it.

The relationship between human rights and democracy is not a complementary one, but an “organic unity” (Beetham 1999, 90). Universal civil rights promised to a population plus the necessary democratic institutions will lead to democracy. Personal empowerment cannot be left out of the equation; it is a necessary condition for democracy. To define democracy simply by institutions would be erroneous and ignorant of underlying intrinsic principles of democracy. Since human rights are those intrinsic parts of democracy, Beetham writes that, “democratization may be more effectively advanced in certain conditions under a campaign for human rights than through a campaign for democracy per se” (Beetham 1999,92). Focusing on the individual in his society, along with his rights and abilities, is the first step toward the inception of democracy.

Michael McFaul also comments on the growth of the aspiration for democracy and human rights, claiming that “the radical idea that individuals have rights, no matter where they live, and that rulers face constraints, no matter what challenges they face, is growing” (McFaul 2004, 155). This is to say that ideas which cater to the reification of individual rights, which Beetham calls necessary and relates directly to democracy, are borderless and growing. Through definitions and characterization of human rights as individual rights promised to all people around the globe, states must become more accountable for their citizens. These aspirations, according to McFaul and Beetham, must be respected as universal aspirations.
II. Universality of Human rights and Democracy

After demonstrating how democracy as a political system and human rights have the same basis and work together, the second part of the debate that must be addressed is whether this proposed organization of individual rights and institutions is appropriate for everyone in the world. There are objections to the universality of almost anything, but the case for democracy, like human rights, is a case for the entire world. Because democracy is founded on and ensures universal human rights, then all who hope to enjoy those rights must practice democracy (Beetham 1999, 92).

Democracy is not simply a matter of internal state affairs, but a worldwide aspiration revealed after the collapse of communist regimes and evident in current protests in the Middle East and elsewhere. However, unlike human rights which are commonly argued to be universal, democracy is usually contemplated on national terms. Beetham points out how human rights and democracy both share the same subject, humans and demos respectively, and there is no reason why democracy should be considered on national terms instead of on the basis of all human kind (Beetham 1999, 137). Similar to the transition from political practices like town meetings to the authority of larger states in the 18th century, democracy can be something thought of on a greater scale and effective on a global level (Ibid.).

To promote democracy should not be misunderstood as a paternalistic implementation of a Western ideology or system because democracy is meant to respect all different points of view in a society. Beetham states that democracy is not only universal, but necessary for cultural self-determination because “the very principle which urges our regard for cultural difference—equal respect for persons and their capacity for creative self-determination—is the same that underpins democracy as a universal value” (Beetham 1999, 18).
Different cultural or local views can be incorporated in a democratic system, and “such differences will find expression in the patterns of social arrangement and legislation that a people might collectively endorse, or where they might draw the boundary between the common good and individual liberty” (Beetham 1999, 17). Democracy requires cooperation between different groups and dialogue incorporating different points of view to find a solution. This means that democracy is equipped to both protect individual freedoms while also addressing public affairs, preserving the common good and stability. Endorsing the common good and individual rights is core to a stable democracy, they are not mutually exclusive. Democratic practices hope to reveal the common ground between all opinions in a population.

Beetham continues, “It is difficult to see why we should accord equal respect to other cultures except on the basis of equal human dignity that is due to the individuals who are members of those cultures” (Beetham 1999, 15). Beetham explains that democracy promotion should not be associated with an inferior view toward different cultures and societies and returns to the suggestion that the focus should be on the rights of the individual (Ibid.). With this, he suggests that the best way to respect other cultures is with a consciousness of the peoples’ individual rights within the society. It would be a service to them to expect their governments to respond and be accountable to their citizens’ needs.

Beetham writes, “A non-discriminatory political citizenship presupposes a common humanity; it does not create it,” that is to say that democracy promotion suggests a common humanity; it considers all humanity deserving of individual rights (Beetham 1999, 14). There is no imperialistic goal to it; it is an end in itself. It may look different in different places, but the desire for self-determination and equal political say is borderless.
III. State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Intervention

One challenge to U.S. democracy promotion is the question of state sovereignty as an international diplomatic relations principle. When attempting to promote what we believe to be universal ideals, human rights and democracy, the U.S. should not and is probably unable to impose any functional system on another population. President Obama is now famously quoted in regards to the Arab world that “governments must maintain power through consent, not coercion” (Obama 2010). In saying this, Obama criticizes not only past U.S. efforts in changing political systems, but the coercive regimes in the Middle East as well. President Obama suggests that neither the U.S. nor the respective governments of problem or authoritarian states can stay in power using force or coercion.

His statements also suggest that out of respect for human rights and state sovereignty, the U.S. or any other political actor cannot effectively alter a system of rule or human rights practice. Doing so would undermine not only sovereign democracy, but human rights principles that promise the representation of each national citizen. Any government crafted by an outside entity does not serve individual rights of the local citizen, and does not represent the collective will of the people. It is not in U.S. or world interests to impose or attempt to influence other sovereign nations and government.

Humanitarian intervention is, however, a reoccurring theme in U.S. history, and commonly viewed as necessary when conditions require it. It is a tricky subject because humanitarian intervention does not have the best history. In the past, the U.S. has found itself neck-deep in other countries’ internal affairs and faced negative implications. This brings up the question of when it is truly beneficial for the U.S. to intervene in others state’s affairs, especially if the military is involved, even for the sake of human rights. The line between state sovereignty
and the protection of global human rights is difficult to make clear and solid. When deciding when to intervene internationally to defend human rights, the U.S. must be pragmatic and heed to international norms.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a human rights principle that says developed countries have a responsibility to protect weaker ones. The developed nations have the means and can break state sovereignty norms in order to protect lives or people from oppression abroad. In the case that a government cannot provide protection or respect human rights for its people, R2P provides the most ambitious justification for external intervention in defense of human rights. If governments fail to provide basic security to their citizens, including stopping genocide, then this doctrine contends that the international community has a responsibility to protect threatened citizens by any means necessary, even military force. R2P is a norm, not a law, but many states, multi-lateral organizations, and civil society networks have adopted and pursued policies in accordance with this idea” (McFaul 2009, 226).

Noam Chomsky deeply criticizes R2P and its imperialistic connotations. He criticizes the history of humanitarian intervention as being consistently and radically selective. He gives the NATO bombing of Serbia as a glaring example of selectivity over when to act and compares it to the denial of fundamental human rights in Gaza and the bleak health and death by curable disease that happens every day in Africa with little to no international government response. He concludes with saying “R2P can be a valuable tool, much as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been. Even though states do not adhere to the [UDHR], and some formally reject much of it (crucially including the world's most powerful state), nonetheless it serves as an ideal that activists can appeal to in educational and organizing efforts, often effectively” (Chomsky
2009). He believes that governments are not in a position to act out the necessary portions of R2P and often act hypocritically and selectively when they do intervene in the name of R2P.

Michael McFaul stands on the other side of the debate in contrast to Chomsky. He recognizes that documents like the UNDR can be ignored by the most powerful nations, but believes that those aspiring for human rights and democracy are referring to items like the UDHR and norms like R2P and asking why more isn’t being done. In his article *Democracy Promotion as a World Value*, he writes, “during the last several decades, as new international norms protecting the human rights of individuals have gained strength, the sanctity of state sovereignty as an international norm has eroded.” He quotes the then secretary general of the UN, Kofi Annan, turning away from the traditional position of the UN on state sovereignty, and focusing on the rights of each individual: Annan says, “In the twenty-first century I believe the mission of the United Nations will be defined by a new, more profound awareness of the sanctity and dignity of every human life, regardless of race or religion. This will require us to look beyond the framework of States, and beneath the surface of nations or communities” (qtd. in McFaul 2004, 154). In response to state sovereignty McFaul agrees with Kofi Annan and writes “With sovereignty comes the responsibility to protect basic human rights. When a ruler fails to meet this obligation, external actors can now assume the right and, indeed, may even have the responsibility to step in according to the new norms at play in today’s international system” (Ibid.).

McFaul continues in the article to demonstrate how governments all over the world are using soft power and the idea of universal jurisdiction to make sure human rights abuses do not go unnoticed. Citing the recent attempt by Spain to extradite the Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet is one big example of the break through state sovereignty norms. He goes on to say
that international interventions like this example are happening all over the world and with
greater prevalence today (McFaul 2004, 154). These changes suggest a world-wide jurisdiction
for democratic principles and respect for human life in all corners of the globe.

Another way human rights abuses are being addressed is through international
organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, who work closely with local
human rights groups when possible to document and “compel the abusive regimes to institute
reforms” (McFaul 2004, 154). McFaul cites international courts like the International Court of
Justice, the International Criminal Tribunal and the International Criminal Court as examples of
international institutions “designed to centralize and further legitimate the exercise of universal
jurisdiction” (Ibid). A plan for promoting democracy should definitely take these groups and
institutions into consideration when approaching a state with a regime violating human rights.
Compared with other forms of “humanitarian intervention” like military campaigns, using NGOs
and international courts will prove to be more effective, less costly, and more popular. Bringing
perpetrators to justice for their crimes will better address the grievances of the citizens who have
suffered and leave the citizens in a better position to reform their government.

This, therefore, prompts the question of when - if ever - military intervention is
appropriate to promote human rights or democracy. In cases where human rights protection and
democracy promotion are simultaneously pursued, rather, than letting these two policies become
entangled, an emphasis may be placed on human rights first. In his book, Advancing Democracy
Abroad: Why We Should and How We Can, Michael McFaul writes that “Humanitarian
interventions to interrupt genocide or famine must remain an option, but only when military
action can stop human suffering” (McFaul 2009, 160). McFaul says that most people around the
world boldly agree with the use of military force in order to protect human rights, but powerful
states, such as the U.S. (which has initiated more humanitarian interventions than any other), must be pragmatic and be careful about contradictions made by their actions.

IV. Possible Contemporary Examples

Human rights abuses occur in worldwide, and in countries with which the U.S. is allied. To support (financially, politically, or otherwise) regimes with bad human right records or non-democratic policies undermines the U.S.’s commitment to both democracy and human rights, not to mention perpetuates the abuses going on. One challenge to the U.S. commitment to democracy is the strong tie it has with several autocrats in the Middle East who have dirty human rights records.

Supporting or cooperating with dictators undermines U.S. credibility in regards to advocating democracy and human rights. In many Middle Eastern states, people who partake in anti-government actions or expressions, including democratic activists, face state persecution and arrests. For instance, Egypt under Hosni Mubarak was the second highest recipient of U.S. aid (mostly in the form of military support) in the world. U.S. aid to Egypt materialized as military aid and training for Egyptian armed forces, and did little to support any existing democratic movements in the society. Laws and jurisdiction in Egypt and other authoritarian countries do not favor the people nor bring proper social justice to grievances.

Along with the strategic relationship with countries like Egypt, the U.S. has a responsibility to be conscious of internal policies as well as those that are part of our immediate state security and economic interests. Small efforts have been made in this direction. In Egypt for example, vice President Joe Biden reportedly pressured the Egyptian government into accepting 21 human rights recommendations in the summer of 2010.
The Christian Science Monitor quoted Michele Dunne, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace opinion, “Biden could have easily gone to Egypt and spoken only about Gaza and Iran. I think it's notable that he raised those issues in Egypt…It's not a really high level of engagement, but at least these issues are starting to reemerge in the U.S.-Egypt relationship” (Chick 2010). While the implementation of these human rights recommendations, including an anti-torture agreement, is still uncertain, efforts such as these are the bare minimum of what can be done to improve human rights and eventually democracy, among our allies. Rather than just keeping in touch about U.S. national interests, a focus on something like human rights is a positive part of a relationship between states. Without being overly coercive, Biden was able to use soft power to encourage some reform.

There should continue to be a push toward democracy in the Middle East, despite the bad reputation of U.S. involvement in the region. The birth of democratic political systems would introduce human rights not previously enjoyed by the population. Free assembly and speech will foster dialogue and create a legitimate mode of expression and representation for the diverse opinion-holders in the Middle East to voice their real grievances.

A public sphere for voicing concerns would dissolve the power held by the most powerful opposition groups in the Middle East. It is important to make a safe public sphere for citizens because “Islamists can use mosques to propagate their ideas and recruit supporters, whereas the public sphere space for liberal politicians is much more constrained under autocracy” (McFaul 2009, 142). McFaul says that having a public sphere for dialogue would weaken the radicals appeal to citizens meanwhile offering a “political space” between the autocratic state and those in charge of religious institutions.
On the other hand, Thomas Carothers his policy brief written for the Carnegie Endowment on Obama’s approach toward democracy promotion explains how there is an irrational fear of non-violent Islamic political groups and suggests that these groups and their popularity should not be a “show-stopper” for American ambitions for democracy in Arab states. He says rather than “bottling up” the grievances of these groups, which “only fosters tensions and radicalism that spell serious trouble down the road,” they should be involved in the political discourse of any type of democracy developed.

The current situation in the Middle East, with thousands of protesters from North Africa to the Gulf States indicates that the Arab people are aspiring for change and democracy. While there are mostly secular voices in the crowd, Islamism is also playing a role with groups like the Muslim brotherhood taking part in the protests in Egypt which eventually toppled the Mubarak regime. The inclusion of religious groups will only make a potential democracy there more dynamic and inclusive of popular ideas and minority views, exactly what a democracy is supposed to do. Peaceful political organization of religious groups will only add to the success of democracy in the Middle East.

V. Conclusion

The dynamism of democracy is that there is always room for improvement. Democracy is a system that is part of a continuous struggle to become more perfect and adapt to the changes and needs of people. The same is true for human rights. By examining the relationship between human rights and democracy, it is evident that they go hand in hand and build off of each other. Both are global aspirations and the call for them is becoming clearer and louder as civil action and protests continue to demand reforms.
Since human rights are an intrinsic part of democracy, an effective promotion of democracy must focus on and improve human rights. A greater emphasis must be placed on individual rights during any campaign to democratize the world. Human rights and democracy are both a goal for every nation to further improve on; one cannot exist without the other.
Chapter 3: The Role of Social and Economic Rights in the Public Arena

By: David Lambert

In recent decades, democratic and participatory governance has become the only widely acceptable form of political organization in the international system. Between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made the democratic transition, with the United States playing a leading role in democracy promotion (Huntington, 1999). In its exportation of ideology, the U.S. has promoted a set of concepts including classical liberal ideals of political and civil rights, free markets, and democracy, all presented in a single package labeled freedom. Yet, far too many who are considered free in the eyes of the international community continue to suffer from unfulfilled elementary economic and social needs (Sen 1999, 1). The fundamental necessities for a just and prosperous society, such as education, nutrition, health, and shelter are often neglected by the liberal political and economic agenda, which has rarely acknowledged the powerless, or disadvantaged members of society in the decision making process (Farmer 2003, 5). The Bush administration was particularly tenacious in its promotion of “freedom”, yet ideas of equality, or justice—concepts that past American leaders deemed crucial to our own system of democracy—were rarely even rhetorically stated (McFaul 2010, 155). This U.S. brand of democracy promotion, with its intrinsic ties to dogmatic free market ideology, has failed to give the citizenry of target nations a voice in matters most crucial to their well-being, resulting in hollow democracies with disillusioned citizens.

If America wishes to be an effective and legitimate promoter of democracy, the first step will be to adopt a broader definition of the ideology itself, which takes into account the need and desire of most citizens in developing countries for strong social and economic rights, and a more equitable distribution of societal resources (Farmer 2003, 12). This could create an opportunity
for U.S. policy makers to promote democracy as a means of accruing relatively equal access to social and economic necessities, as well as basic liberties and political freedoms (Chomsky 1999, 131). To achieve this, however, it will become crucial to cease promoting harsh free market ideology as a form of freedom. A true democracy must allow individuals to participate meaningfully in issues regarding the economic and social arrangements of their society. A fundamental trait of free market ideology has been to remove these decisions from the public agenda, putting them in the hands of transnational corporations (TNCs), which have no democratic accountability. This has resulted in the citizenry of many democracies feeling disenfranchised by being guaranteed only nominal sets of political rights, as opposed to substantive decision-making in the areas most crucial to their well-being (Chomsky 1999, 131).

By disentangling democracy with the liberal concepts of market and individual freedoms, an opportunity is created to both make democracy more appealing to most of the human population—80 percent of whom live under ten dollars a day, with increasing inequality—as well as to improve the quality of democracy itself, imbuing the populace with the potential to actively participate in shaping the fundamental characteristics of their society—including the possible redistribution of resources and increased public services. (Global Issues 2010). Paul Farmer, a highly respected doctor in public health, and advocate of social and economic rights, states that, “it is necessary, at some point, to acknowledge what the poor have been saying all along: that their rights cannot be protected while ‘the present economic and social structures foist’ injustice and exploitation ‘upon the vast majority of our people under the guise of law’ these laws, even those designed to protect human rights, don't feel neutral at all” (Farmer 2003, 12).
I. Liberal Ideology and American Democracy

In January of 2005 a sense of pride and euphoria was felt among the Bush administration and members of the U.S. media over purple ink stains on the fingers of Iraqi citizens who had recently voted in their first real election in over 50 years. The ink stains had become a much-celebrated symbol of Iraq’s freedom. The Washington Post reported that:

Voters held up their purple fingers in triumph. It was a new victory sign, maybe someday a peace sign, they hoped. It benefited the low-tech, hands-on feel of this election—democracy at its most basic and emotionally powerful. Democracy had marked them, touched them physically, and they hoped it would last forever (Purcell 2008, 33).

The celebration was not universal, however, with dissenting voices claiming that “democratization [had] become confused with elections” (Purcell 2008, 33). Or as activist and historian Howard Zinn states, “voting is easy and marginally useful, but it is a poor substitute for democracy, which requires direct action by concerned citizens” (Zinn 2009, 729). As will be demonstrated, the nature of democracy that the Iraqis encountered leaves many crucial economic and social issues off the agenda.

Since the inception of the nation, America has embraced and practiced a liberal form of democracy. The liberal ideology takes into account foremost the protection of an individual’s life, liberty, and estates, from any power structure—monarchy, government, religious organization, etc. (Woods 2003, 3). Democracy and liberalism are not as complementary as one may think; societies that display high levels of inequality would benefit from a democratic transition by using their newfound freedom to gain a more equal distribution of society’s riches, thus violating the protection of an individual’s property. The main architect of America’s Constitution, James Madison, foresaw this threat and established a government with the primary responsibility “to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority.” This affirmed from the beginning that, “there are no rights of property, only rights to property” in American society.
This belief has become an underlying assumption of democracy in America, and thus—in the view of many Americans in general—a universal characteristic of democracy (Chomsky 1999, 81).

The liberal interpretation of democracy is quite supportive and conducive of negative rights, which oblige or permit inaction to entitle the individual with liberties such as freedom of speech and conscience, equal treatment before the law, a fair trial, and protection from unreasonable searches and seizures (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010). These rights are designed to protect against tyranny. Yet, in a democracy the concern shifts from the tyranny of a dictator, military junta, or other centralized power structure, to the “protection of the minority from the tyranny of the majority.” Therefore, in a democracy negative rights are in part implemented to protect the individual from the intrusion and persecution of the democratic state (Purcell 2008, 55). Positive rights on the other hand require active responses of the state to insure basic needs required for an individual to flourish. Included among other provisions are a minimum wage, free and universal access to education, and affordable health care (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2010). Most of these measures would require a more equitable distribution of resources, thus conflicting with the liberal belief in protection of an individual’s—or corporation, which are in the American judicial system recognized as people and thus entitled to rights—significant redistribution of property (Arat 2003, 33).

However, as Mark Purcell highlights, democracy can come in many forms. All of which—with the exception of the liberal ideology—are conducive with positive rights, and require a more active citizen base in the decision-making processes, thus a more substantive democracy (Purcell 2008, 33). Without going too in-depth, the different “faces” of democracy that Purcell outlines are:
1) **Liberal**: Popular sovereignty that must be tamed by the need to protect the freedom of the individuals.

2) **Deliberative**: Citizens deliberate towards shared understandings.

3) **Participatory**: Citizens develop their civic virtue through political participation.

4) **Revolutionary**: The people reclaim the power that has been usurped by particular interest.

5) **Radical Pluralism**: Irreducible political difference engaged through agnostic struggle.

In only a liberal form are personal property rights cited as a fundamental requirement, with the other four visions of democracy being completely open towards positive rights.

To return to the U.S. supported elections in Iraq, it can be seen that—despite the high soaring rhetoric—many of the issues that Iraqis cared most about were predetermined by the U.S. appointed interim prime minister who “locked in” certain provisions before the elections even took place (Klein 2005). As journalist Naomi Klein wrote at the time “if genuine democracy ever came to Iraq, the real goals of the war—control over oil, support for Israel, the construction of enduring military bases, the privatization of the entire economy—would all be lost. Why? Because Iraqis don’t want them and they don’t agree with them” (Klein 2005). The winners of the Iraqi elections, the United Iraqi Alliance, claimed victory on a platform, which promised 100 percent full employment in the public sector, among other provisions. Yet, the previous interim government had already signed loan agreements with conditionality that privatized all sectors of the economy, making these sorts of promises impossible to fulfill. Again as Klein states “now they can’t do any of this because their democracy has been shackled. In other words, they have the vote, but no real power to govern” (Klein 2005). The elections were nonetheless hailed as a tremendous achievement by most in the U.S. media.

This mindset towards democracy in which the right to elected leaders is hailed as a triumph in itself, despite the lack of true decision making involved, is outdated and detrimental in achieving actual substantive freedom. In his celebrated work “Development as Freedom”
Amartya Sen demonstrates the need to move beyond a narrow minded view of freedom and adopt a vision that requires the removal of what he calls “unfreedoms”, including destitute living conditions:

Sometimes the lack of substantive freedoms relates directly to economic poverty, which robs people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, or achieve sufficient nutrition, or to obtain remedies for treatable illnesses, or the opportunity to be adequately clothed or sheltered, or to enjoy clean water or sanitary facilities. In other cases, the unfreedoms links closely to the lack of public facilities and social care, such as the absence of epidemiological programs, or organized arrangements for health care or educational facilities, or of effective intuitions for the maintenance of local peace and order. In still other cases, the violation of freedom results directly from denial of political and civil liberties by authoritarian regimes and from imposed restrictions on the freedom to participate in the social, political and economic life of the community (Sen 1999, 4)

In true democracy it is crucial to provide space for citizens to design the way in which their society is best arranged to reflect their individual and collective desires. This failed in Iraq, and is failing for millions of others in democracies around the world. Citizens of developing nations now enjoy negative freedoms on a scale never before experienced. Yet, positive freedoms remain as elusive as ever, and for many, the means to address these serious grievances through a democratic process is non-existent (Tulchin 2002, 14).

As will be shown in the following section, by insisting on linking free market ideology and democracy, while ignoring economic and social freedoms, the U.S. has undermined true democratic participation and decision-making, creating “hollowed out” democracies in which the citizenry is left powerless and cynical of democratic ideals.

II. American Democracy Promotion and Free Market Ideology

The promotion of a liberal form of democracy, with a direct assumption of free market ideology, has been at the forefront of U.S. democracy promotion throughout America’s history, and continues in contemporary times. Political analyst David Sanger states that:
The Clinton Administration is turning to the new World Trade Organization (WTO) to carry out the task of “exporting American values.” Down the road it is the WTO that may be the most effective instrument for bringing America’s passion for deregulation and for the free market generally, and the American values of free competition, fair rules, and effective enforcement (qtd. in Chomsky 1999, 65)

By linking “American values” (synonymous with democracy) to the WTO and free markets, Sanger highlights the liberal notion that these two concepts are one and the same. The refusal to separate democracy and free markets, has led to the view of social and economic rights as incompatible with democracy, since they entail interference with the market’s distributive outcomes, and therefore are contradictory to the liberal view of a free society (Woods 2003).

America has taken such a commanding role in promoting free market democracies abroad that the concept has become known as the “Washington Consensus,” or neoliberalism. Often based on conditionalities known as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS), which are tied to foreign aid for debt relief, neoliberalism requires the removal market interferences. The adoption of neoliberalism represented an ideological shift away from Keynesianism — the dominated economic structure from World War II, to the 1970’s, emphasizing government protection and intervention in the market—to monetarist, supply-side, and rational expectations based theories, which called for cutting public expenditures, privatization of all services, and elimination of barriers to trade (Pederson 2003, 3). Proponents of market based strategies for development claimed that the elimination of interferences will increase efficiency, and an overall welfare will be the result. Included in “market interferences” are government subsidies for improvement of health, education, and other services that are deemed only acceptable for private industry to preside over.

The Washington Consensus has in fact promoted democracy – to an extent. As M. RodwanAbouharb and David Cingranelli conclude in their study, “countries that have been
under structural adjustment conditionality the longest have better-developed democratic institutions, have elections that are freer and fairer… and have more freedom of speech and press than countries with less exposure.” The authors concede, however, that their work does not take into account “substantive democracy” – when decisions being made by the public actually reflect what most people in a society care about (Abouharb 2007, 207). The conclusions of the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN), in their study on the democratic effects of structural adjustment note that:

While procedural democracy has been promoted…real democratic choice for both civil society and governments in the arena of economic policy has been severely limited by the IFIs and their Northern Board members. Governments have been urged to improve their governance, but not so that they will better respond to the interest of their own people (SAPRIN 2005)

As Author Robert W. McChesney states “that is neoliberal democracy in a nutshell: trivial debate over minor issues by parties that basically pursue the same pro-business policies regardless of formal differences and campaign debate” (Chomsky 1999, 5)

Freedom without opportunity can lead to abuses of civil and political rights, and instability, all of which undermine democracy. Millions around the world now have the right to choose their leaders, yet are finding out that this choice is irrelevant. In theory, democracy is meant to provide a means for the citizenry to “express their interest and aspirations and see them acted upon by their government” (Tulchin 2002, 14). This has been lacking in many democracies as compliance with SAPs removes economic and social matters from the public agenda. In recently democratized countries, citizens expect democracy to foster more equitable societal outcomes. A survey conducted about the hopes of citizens in countries, which had made democratic transitions, 59 percent of citizens expected democracy to attenuate social inequalities in Chile, 72 percent in the former Czechoslovakia, and 96 percent in Romania (Przeworski 1995,
Yet, as new democracies are usually strongly in need of international aid, which is attached to structural adjustment, inequality is almost always exacerbated. A study of structural adjustment in 60 countries since 1980 concludes “the reduction of state services has the potential to increase poverty, while the enactment of neo-liberal economic policies potentially supports greater wealth accumulation at the top end of the income distribution.” (Babb 2005, 199)

In her work on democracy and inequality Zehra Arat outlines the path back to authoritarianism from freely elected governments that fail to respect social and economic rights of the citizenry:

1) Civil and political rights are activated. Social and economic rights stay the same or decrease.
2) These democracies start to grow in civil and political rights, while social and economic standings stay the same
3) Perception of injustice intensifies, the system is questioned
4) Unrest among disadvantaged groups starts to grow. And the government tries to suppress it by imposing restrictions and pursuing coercive policies
5) Decline in both sets of rights (Arat 2003, 14)

A functioning democracy constitutes a society in which personal security, tolerance and mutual respect for human agency are crucial. To achieve this as a society, assurances of a basic standard of nutrition, health, and housing must be respected at all levels—local to national (Campbell 1998, 90). When the state refuses, or is marginalized to an extent that basic requirements are impossible to fulfill, violence and instability are often the result. As Adam Przeworski states:

When the state is reduced to the point that it cannot provide physical protection and access to basic social services, public order collapses: material survival and even physical safety can be only privately secured. Private systems of violence are then likely to emerge; violence is likely to become decentralized, anomic and widespread. Under such conditions, it is not only democracy that is threatened, but the very bases of social cohesion (Przeworski 1995, 111-112)
This sequence of events was demonstrated after SAPs were implemented in Nicaragua. As the citizenry increasingly resorted to strikes and other protest methods, or even crime and delinquency to maintain a minimal economic existence, state security forces became the answer to the unrest. Human rights abuses are inevitable in these cases, yet they were increased even further by cutbacks in the police budget, which reduced training programs and encouraged corruption due to low salaries (Campbell, 1998, 57).

It is becoming increasingly clear that the neoliberal experiment has fomented inequality and marginalized the citizenry’s ability to participate meaningfully in the public arena, which has engendered frustration and anger among the population. Inequalities of services and health cannot be mitigated by the free market alone. The doctrinal mindset of neoliberal ideology in democracy creates the notion that suffering, because of lack of opportunities and resources is not an injustice, but rather a natural phenomenon, in which some people are simply “losers in the social lottery” (Farmer 2003, 162). This leaves millions without the basic resources needed to achieve the level of freedom which Sen demonstrated to be necessary in a true democracy. Instances, in which the “losers” have been exploited by groups offering radical solutions to desperate people, are not difficult to come across in history, and the results have been devastating. An urgent change is needed.

III. The Start of History?

A common theme—and perhaps the largest mistake—of those advocating for a neoliberal economic model coupled with a parliamentary system of democracy, has been to claim, in the words of Margaret Thatcher that “there is no alternative.” Francis Fukuyama demonstrated this same mindset with his famous declaration of “the end of history” meaning that liberal democracy and capitalism have triumphed over all other forms of human organization (Purcell 2008,
There is a certain totalitarian undertone to this line of thinking—in the belief that there is room for only one imaginable way forward. In describing the dangers of this sort of mind-set in regards to a neoliberal version of democracy Joseph Tulchin states that:

Social scientist have grown so committed to “systems”—for all the analytical power that comes from closure around an agreed-upon set of factors—that they tend to embrace the systems as the truth. This has led to treacherous conclusions that the system is self-correcting and self-perfecting in the real world. Such theories become the worst kind of ideology because of their defense mechanism, warning us that any intervention, any artificial, deliberate, willful effort to improve upon the workings of the system will only make things worse (Tulchin 2002, 60)

U.S. democracy promotion must reject this essentialist way of thinking and adopt a view that does not imagine democratization to require the same liberal beliefs characteristic of American democracy. In his work on former Soviet states Mitchell Orenstein highlights the beneficial ways in which a vibrant political debate over economic policy helped Poland emerge to both capitalism and democracy claiming that policy alteration, “accelerate[d] policy learning, and encourage[d] policy entrepreneurship, while maintaining the best policies of past governments in the spirit of pragmatism” (Orenstein 2001, 144). This is in stark contrast to the “there is no alternative” mindset, which prescribes a strict policy structure at all cost.

Rejecting a doctrinal view of democracy and putting a greater emphasis on a duel promotion of political and civil freedoms, and economic and social rights has the potential to both advance meaningful democracy and improve America’s image abroad. For example, a cornerstone of Cuban foreign policy has been its exportation of doctors. In response to the devastating October 2005 Earthquake in Pakistan, the Cuban government sent over 3,000 trained doctors to the poorest regions of the country. During their time in Pakistan the Cuban doctors treated 1.5 million patients, mostly women, and performed 13,000 surgical operations. On a global scale, between 1963 and 2005 more than 100,000 Cuban doctors and health workers
intervened in 97 countries, mostly in Africa and Latin America, more than the World Health Organization or Doctors Without Borders (La Monde Diplomatique, 2006).

Cuba remains a characteristically undemocratic country. Yet, by championing health as a human right abroad, the country is winning the war of hearts and minds in many poor nations (La Monde Diplomatique, 2006). The U.S. on the other hand has traditionally been a strong advocate of negative freedoms, yet, has viewed economic and social justice movements abroad with what can only be classified as extreme paranoia. When Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a proponent of liberation theology, which advocates preferential treatment for the poor, was elected in a landslide victory in Haiti, the first Bush administration viewed it as a shift towards communism. Their response was to fund the opposition party, and their supporters in the Haitian military. The result was a bloody military coup and three years of military-civilian juntas ruling the country as ruthlessly as the Duvaliers dictatorship (Farmer, 2004). Needless to say, these sorts of actions by the U.S. do considerable damage to America’s image, and thus the promotion of ideals abroad.

Currently, the world has a great need for increased humanitarian action by the U.S. Some indicators are:

- 1.3 billion lack access to potable water.
- 800 million have inadequate food supplies, and 500 million are clinically malnourished.
- 3 billion, roughly half the human population lives on $2 or less a day.
- Children: The largest generation of youth in human history has inherited the brunt of global issues through daily hardship:
  - 250 million live on the street
  - 211 million must work to feed themselves or their families
  - 115 million have never been to school (Singer 2005, 39)

Ameliorating these tragedies is hardly an utopian fantasy. UNICEF estimates that to ensure universal access to basic services for the world’s poor would require about 10 percent of U.S. military spending (Chomsky 1999, 91). There is no doubt that America has an image problem abroad. Even among nations with friendly governmental relations to the U.S., the populations
remain hostile. A poll conducted shows that only 15 percent of Indonesians, 7 percent of Saudis and 15 percent of Turks have a favorable image of America — despite their governments' positive relations with the U.S. (Marquis, 2005). A more positive image of America abroad is crucial to ensure that the general populations of target countries will embrace democratic ideal when advocated by the U.S.

America is in need of a new foreign policy that will advance its strong emphasis on political freedoms, as well as create stability and prosperity. A shift away from the traditional focus on civil and political rights, to a bottom-up approach championing social and economic rights, has this potential. Advocating positive rights backed by humanitarian action could have a significant beneficial impact on several foreign policy adjectives. By demonstrating that the U.S. is capable of the same grass roots efforts towards greater social and economic well-being, as a poor island nation with no natural resources such as Cuba, is a great ideological force in advocating for both negative and positive freedoms abroad. This would delegitimizing the outdated belief that these two sets of rights are incompatible, dealing a blow to tyrannical regimes that claim to uphold positive freedoms over negative ones.

Much work is needed, but a good first step for the U.S. to take, which would indicate to the world that America is ready to shed its doctrinal stance of negative rights as the only form of human rights, would be to ratify the United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which claims:

In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights and freedom. Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strife for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant (ICESCR 1996, Preamble)
So far 159 nations have ratified the treaty, with six additional countries being unratified signatories. All of America’s major allies, including the entire European Union and G8 have now ratified the treaty. It therefore does not come as a surprise that a 2010 Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) fact sheet reveals that despite being the world’s wealthiest economy, the U.S., has one of the poorest records of economic and social rights achievements of all high-income countries (CESR, 2010). Signing the ICHR would signal to the world that the U.S. is ready to start a dynamic new foreign policy to promote all forms of human freedom. Thus, joining the vast majority of the human population ready restart history, and move away from the laws of supply and demand, embracing instead the laws of justice and mercy through a substantive and active democracy.
At times, American foreign policy conflicts with democracy promotion when other U.S. interests override the value of supporting a democratic system in a certain state. Inconsistency in rhetoric and action by the U.S. in democracy promotion highlights the varying, and at times, conflicting and contradicting interests of the U.S. Reasons for democracy promotion, or lack thereof, can be country-specific depending on the short-term strategic, security, and economic interests of Washington. In most cases, these interests tend to take precedence over the universal interest of upholding human rights and promoting social, political, and economic liberties. Efforts to support democracy abroad are routinely undermined because the U.S. does not maintain an over-arching rhetoric in relation to democracy promotion. This inconsistency in rhetoric is exacerbated when policies intended to promote democracy cannot be separated from other aspects of U.S. foreign policy interests. As a result, the U.S. has been faulted for its efforts in democracy promotion, thus creating a negative image and reputation for the U.S. abroad, but also yielding efforts that are neither sustainable nor successful.

This chapter will analyze the root causes of these conflicting interests related to democracy promotion and the effects they have had on U.S. programs to support democracy abroad. Ultimately, the questions we will seek to answer are: What has the U.S. done to hurt its own efforts in democracy promotion? How has false rhetoric hurt the U.S. reputation and image? And, how has democracy promotion been used as a façade for promoting other U.S. interests? In answering these questions we will propose that to make the case for continued democracy promotion, we must establish that many of these interests can be served by supporting
democracy. Democracy promotion is, in the long run, beneficial for most U.S. interests, even if compromises have to be made in the short-term. Because of this, Washington should not be afraid of improving its image abroad by being more transparent and consistent regarding its rhetoric and actions concerning democracy promotion. As follows, this report will recommend a new framework for democracy promotion rhetoric that will emphasize consistency both between rhetoric and action, as well as across cases of democracy promotion. Furthermore, this report recommends transparency to facilitate multilateral cooperation. The central claim is that the need to compromise short-term strategic concerns for supporting democratization forces should be publicly admitted in order to maintain consistency between rhetoric and action, and to allow for multilateral cooperation and mutual oversight of actual, long-term democracy promotion efforts. This new framework for democracy promotion will reinforce U.S. long-term interests for democracy promotion and will provide the U.S. with an over-arching agenda for sustainable and effective democracy promotion efforts.

I. What the U.S. Has Done to Hurt Its Efforts in Democracy Promotion

Historically, tensions in foreign policy regarding the topic of democracy promotion are prevalent. “All contemporary U.S. presidents vacillate between promoting democratic values and human rights around the globe versus protecting security or national interests” (Hunt 2010). Accordingly, idealism and realism are two seemingly conflicting concepts that appear unevenly and illogically in both rhetoric and action. As a result, the rhetoric regarding U.S. democracy promotion is inconsistent and not reflected in implementation efforts; and, in fact, has hurt the U.S. in its own efforts to support democracy.

Idealism and realism, then, are two schools of thought concerning foreign policy as well as democracy promotion that are traditionally seen to be in opposition with each other. The
concept of idealism in U.S. foreign policy presented itself most distinctly through the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson; while, Theodore Roosevelt is credited with a truly realist foreign policy that identified the national interest so comprehensively with the balance of power (Kissinger 1994, 39). In examining U.S. interests for democracy promotion, it is crucial to look at these conflicting interests of idealism and realism in order to understand how they take form in foreign policy and democracy promotion.

A. Wilsonian Idealism

A Wilsonian view of foreign policy and also democracy promotion declares U.S. interest in upholding moral values. Woodrow Wilson maintained the doctrine that peace depended above all on promoting democratic institutions. “These principles[of Wilson] held that peace depends on the spread of democracy, that states should be judged by the same ethical criteria as individuals, and that the national interest consists of adhering to a universal system of law” (Kissinger 1994, 30). Thus, democracy promotion, according to Wilson, is seen as an end in itself, promoting human rights values, quality of life, and economic, political and social liberties. In rhetoric, America’s stated interests for promoting democracy are normally Wilsonian ideals associated with supporting human empowerment and self-determination and the wish that democratic values are shared globally. Yet, the true motives of policy makers rarely seem to align with the Wilsonian ideals that U.S. democracy promotion rhetoric embodies.

B. Realism and Roosevelt

In contrast, realists place an emphasis on the maintenance of security and the stability of the position of the U.S. amongst other global actors. A firm proponent of realism, Theodore “Roosevelt started from the premise that the U.S. was a power like any other, not a singular incarnation of virtue. If its interests collided with those of other countries, America had the
obligation to draw on its strength to prevail” (Kissinger 1994, 39). Similarly, Roosevelt did not believe that [America] could preserve the peace or fulfill its destiny simply by practicing civic virtues. (Kissinger 1994, 33). Indeed, the concept of balance of power was central to the realist school of thought and appears often in discourse on foreign policy.

C. Democracy Promotion in Rhetoric

The current administration has attempted to steer clear of unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic doctrine. This resolution appears to reflect the Obama administration’s efforts to disassociate from the Bush-era rhetoric that provoked such global criticism. Post 9/11, the Bush administration was seen to sway between a preemptive realism that sought to unilaterally maintain America’s position of power in the world and a lofty Wilsonian rhetoric that espoused spreading democratic ideals to all corners of the globe.

Especially under Bush’s Freedom Agenda, supporting democracy and the promotion of freedom was embraced as a foreign policy goal. The Freedom Agenda incorporated or helped to justify the global war on terror and Iraqi invasion. Increasingly weak evidence to support initial justifications for intervention eventually gave way to the language of democracy promotion as a more appealing rhetoric. And, Iraq became the centerpiece of this agenda executed in the name of promoting democratic values and supporting human rights. In his second inaugural address in 2005, former President Bush stated,

So it is the policy of the U.S. to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world…We will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require decent treatment of their own people. America’s belief in human dignity will guide our principles (Bush 2005)

In claiming that the long-term goal of the U.S. was to end ‘tyranny in our world,’ Bush set unrealistic and idealized expectations for the results of democracy promotion. Much
of the justifications by the Bush administration for democracy promotion asserted the moral grounds for democracy. In a speech at the 2008 World Economic Forum in Sharm el-Sheikh Egypt, former President Bush pronounced:

Some say any state that holds an election is a democracy. But true democracy requires vigorous political parties allowed to engage in free and lively debate. True democracy requires the establishment of civic institutions that ensure an election’s legitimacy and hold leaders accountable. And true democracy requires competitive elections in which opposition candidates are allowed to campaign without fear or intimidation. Too often in the Middle East, politics has consisted of one leader and the opposition in jail. America is deeply concerned about the plight of political prisoners in this region, as well as democratic activists who are intimidated or repressed, newspapers and civil society organizations that are shut down, and dissidents whose voices are stifled. The time has come for nations across the Middle East to abandon these practices, and treat their people with dignity and the respect they deserve (Bush 2008)

Here, former President Bush professed to stand behind democratic forces in all states. The fact that this speech took place three years after the 2005 Egyptian presidential election, where one candidate, Ayman Nour, was imprisoned, highlights a thread of hypocrisy in Bush’s lofty rhetoric. Alternatively, the Obama administration adopted a more realistic rhetoric that gave recognition to other national interests, including security interests and threats to U.S. security. In response to the discourse and policies of the previous administration President Obama stated:

Indeed, one of the lessons of our effort in Iraq is that American influence around the world is not a function of military force alone. We must use all elements of our power -- including our diplomacy, our economic strength, and the power of America's example -- to secure our interests and stand by our allies. And we must project a vision of the future that's based not just on our fears, but also on our hopes -- a vision that recognizes the real dangers that exist around the world (Obama 2010)

Indeed, Obama’s rhetoric implies a much more pragmatic approach than that of the previous administration. Here, Obama stated the need for balancing various U.S. interests and real-world threats, while also acknowledging tensions. One critique of Obama states, “If there is
an Obama doctrine emerging, it is one much more realpolitik than his predecessor’s, focused on relations with traditional great powers and relegating issues like human rights and democracy to second-tier concerns” (Baker 2010). However, it should be noted and taken into consideration that pragmatic responses advocated by the Obama administration may have been influenced by the legacy issues left from the previous administration. It is possible the Obama administration has taken a realistic and pragmatic approach because it is an alternative to the last administration. Therefore, it is important to consider how foreign policy is influenced by legacy and also how it may be constrained by reality. In any case, within any administration, Wilsonian ideals and moral values are never to be ignored. In his most recent State of the Union address Obama gave support to human rights and noted:

Recent events have shown us that what sets us apart must not just be our power – it must also be the purpose behind it. In south Sudan – with our assistance – the people were finally able to vote for independence after years of war….And we saw that same desire to be free in Tunisia, where the will of the people proved more powerful than the writ of a dictator. And tonight, let us be clear: The U.S. of America stands with the people of Tunisia, and supports the democratic aspirations of all people (Obama 2011)

While Obama does still express support for human rights and democratic values he does so with an air of caution. Unlike the previous administration, this administration refrains from soaring unrealistic rhetoric in favor of a more pragmatic and realistic rhetoric regarding foreign policy and democracy promotion. In doing so, this current administration is seen to be noticeably less hypocritical and inconsistent than the previous.

**C. Implementation: Rhetoric in Action?**

In reality U.S. democracy promotion efforts have not reflected the rhetoric surrounding it. Democracy promotion is inconsistent country to country and policy to policy. Actions do not
reflect the language expressed by policy makers to support democracy. After the Bush administration it has become increasingly entangled with military interests resulting in the association of democracy promotion with regime change and forceful coercion. Under the façade of democracy promotion, policies may implement a top-down effort supporting supposed democratic leaders rather than fostering democratic values from the bottom-up through civil society. Its exclusiveness and selectiveness is seen when we support democracy in one state and ignore human rights in another. Within the Bush administration a large gap existed between talk and action whether it was the continued cozy relations with the Saudi government, the U.S. embrace of Pakistan’s former military dictator Pervez Musharraf, or the largely uncritical line toward China’s continued authoritarianism (Carothers 2007).

In the Middle East, the Bush administration later came to characterize its intervention in Iraq as a democratizing mission, when clearly other interests, particularly security interests were involved from the start. Other U.S. autocratic allies in the region felt almost no pressure at all, despite the Bush team’s grand pronouncements about its commitment to a politically transformed region (Carothers 2007). Instead, the Bush administration worked to tighten relations with allies in the region in an effort to create a friendly coalition of states that would serve as useful partners in the War on Terror and would help to maintain the balance of power as it was in the Middle East. Thus, the statement of principles made by President Bush at the World Economic Forum in Egypt in 2008 rarely applies to Egypt or other U.S. allies in the Middle East. Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, Ethiopia have all escaped the rhetoric of supporting human rights and democratic values by the Bush administration (Carothers 2007).

Indeed, inconsistency between rhetoric and action is widespread; however, inconsistency in rhetoric between private and public audiences also exists. This is a different situation where
the U.S. presents public rhetoric of support, for example, in the case of Egypt—prior to the year 2011—but expresses disapproval and criticisms in private. The recent release of WikiLeaks documents has revealed how American diplomats have repeatedly raised concerns with Egyptian officials about jailed dissidents and bloggers. A 2009 cable from U.S. ambassador to Egypt, Margaret Scobey, highlighted the difficulty of promoting democracy in a state that is both a strategic ally, but also a partial democracy ruled by an oppressive president:

We continue to promote democratic reform in Egypt, including the expansion of political freedom and pluralism, and respect for human rights. Egyptian democracy and human rights efforts, however, are being stymied, and the GoE [Government of Egypt] remains skeptical of our role in democracy promotion, complaining that any efforts to open up will result in empowering the Muslim Brotherhood, which currently holds 86 seats in Egypt's 454-seat parliament (Embassy Cairo. 2009)

However, the documents also show that relations between Mubarak and Obama warmed up as a result of Obama playing down what was the so-called ‘name and shame’ approach of the Bush Administration (Landler and Lehren 2011). The nature of the WikiLeaks documents concerning Egypt draw attention to a balancing of private pressure with strong public support for Mubarak under the current administration—underscoring yet another sign of inconsistency.

II. How False U.S. Rhetoric Has Hurt U.S. Reputation and Image

While the U.S. has unparalleled economic and military assets, American influence and standing in the world are significantly low. Frequent gaps between rhetoric and behavior, policy changes or even reversals have harmed the U.S. image as an international power and moral figure. This negative image is partially a consequence of false rhetoric. A recent committee on human rights in Washington acknowledged, “The world is not blind to this double standard. When they see the U.S. promoting human rights, not as a matter of principle but as a matter of convenience, it saps these principles of much of their force, and it makes the U.S. a much less powerful moral force on behalf of the values that this Nation stands for” (U.S. 2008). Even
among other Western nations, the U.S. is seen to have a weak stance concerning human rights. In 1998, The United States Information Agency (USIA) found that 59 percent of the British and 61 percent of Germans said the U.S. was doing a good job promoting human rights. Today, 56 percent of the British and 78 percent of Germans say the US is doing a bad job (Kull 2007). Clearly, opinions of the U.S. on human rights issues have degraded significantly. An American rhetoric supporting human rights and democratic ideals worldwide while, simultaneously, failing to be consistent in implementing this rhetoric evidently will influence this degradation. The U.S. is viewed as hypocritical in its rhetoric about human rights and democracy because it is seen to be selective in its actual application.

American leaders pursue more confrontational strategies for supporting democratic change against those countries with strained relations with the U.S. and adopt policies of engagement to induce or, at times, overlook democratic change with allies and friends. “Close American relationships with authoritarian regimes in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and cordial relationships with autocratic rulers in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Equatorial Guinea, undermine U.S. credibility when criticizing similar types of autocratic regimes with less friendly ties to Washington” (McFaul 2010, 163).

Rhetoric about liberty has been juxtaposed with the instability in Iraq and democracy promotion has become associated with regime change. In the past decade, “the rhetorical conflation by the Bush Administration and its allies of the war in Iraq and democracy promotion has muddied the meaning of the democracy project, diminishing support for it at home and abroad” (Melia 2007, 12). Public opinion polls from a 2005 survey by the Pew Research Center found the U.S. to be broadly disliked in most countries surveyed. Furthermore, a degrading trend in U.S. image can be seen as a repercussion of the inconsistency in rhetoric and policy of the
past. A poll, conducted for BBC World Service in 18 countries, tracked this issue from 2005-2007. “On average, positive views of the U.S. have slipped from 40 percent in 2005 to 36 percent in 2006 to 29 percent in 2007. Negative views have risen from 46 percent in 2005 to 52 percent in 2007” (Kull 2007). What’s more, Gallup Polls in 143 countries reveal the image of the leadership of the U.S. is generally poor worldwide, but that the Obama administration will have the most repair work to do on its image in the predominantly Muslim Middle East and North Africa, where regional median approval is just 15 percent (Ray 2009). One year into his term, global opinion polls taken by Gallup reflect a positive view of Obama’s leadership and foreign policy, yet, still present mixed reviews towards his handlings of trouble spots in the Middle East (English 2010). Such negative views of the U.S. erode U.S. power and undermine U.S. influence abroad.

III. Democracy Promotion as a Façade for Promoting Other U.S. Interests

The point where democracy promotion rhetoric does not properly align with implementation of supporting democracy, in any given state, is a sign of inconsistency and the use of democracy promotion as a façade for promoting other U.S. interests. Inconsistency between rhetoric and action in democracy promotion highlights the varying and diverse interests of the U.S. where democracy promotion, at times, wrongly serves the purpose of justifying other non-related and sometimes contrary U.S. interests. While the U.S. does wish to support and uphold human rights and the universal concept of economic, social and political freedoms, these interests somehow fall behind other US interests. This raises the questions of: whether U.S. interests are presented as prioritized? And how does one account for the supremacy of security interests over values of supporting human rights and democracy in general?

This section will first examine U.S. interests from a Wilsonian, idealist view and next, from a realist view. These two schools of thought concerning foreign policy and inevitably,
democracy promotion are today seen to be in opposition with each other. This can be accounted for by the short-term mindset of foreign policy in any given administration. Foreign policy is bound to vary with each new administration, within the same administration or due to a change in the global landscape. A forward-looking foreign policy strategy encourages a balance between interests of supporting human rights and moral values (so called idealist interests), and realist tendencies to focus solely on security and strategic interests. The current strategy, however, juxtaposes these two interest views and prompts a choice between the two. Thus, while it is in U.S. interests in the long-term to promote democracy as an end in itself, U.S. actions concerning democracy promotion currently seem to be motivated and driven by short-term interests.

This section will analyze where focus on short-term realist interests has prompted a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. In this manner, democracy promotion is used as a tool, rather than an end, to maintain or secure other strategic interests. What’s more, efforts to advance democracy and human rights only occur when they are in agreement with other interests. Short-term realist interests also reveal, in certain cases, that democracy promotion does not even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting democracy. China, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Russia, are sites where security and economic interests override the interest of supporting a democracy (Carothers 2007). Furthermore, lack of clarity and consistency in policies has wrongly entangled democracy promotion with military and security interests.

Security, for any state, including the U.S. is critical to a state’s survival. Indeed, first and foremost, security is America’s primary interest. Michael McFaul notes that the “central purpose of American power is not to make the world a better place, but first to ensure security, prosperity of American people” and the “paramount objective of American foreign policy must always be
to defend the security of the American people” (McFaul 2010, 10, 68). Deterring military foes, forging alliances, creating alliances, ensuring stable access to natural resources, creating and maintaining U.S. military bases, expanding trade and investment opportunities abroad all represent strategies to ensure American security and, therefore, generally precede other policies (United States 2010). However, security is not, nor should not, be the sole interest of U.S foreign policy. Foreign policy, must take other interests into account; clearly, “Not all interests need to be vital to be worthy of American protection” (Haass 1995, 48).

A. The Case for Wilsonianism

A Wilsonian view of foreign policy and also democracy promotion states a U.S. interest in upholding moral values. The U.S. has a moral obligation to human rights, and here democracy promotion is not simply a tool for national interest. Democracy promotion is seen as an end in itself that promotes human rights values, quality of life, economic, political and social liberties. In rhetoric, America’s stated interests for promoting democracy are normally Wilsonian ideals associated with supporting human empowerment and self-determination and the wish that democratic values are shared globally. Critics have deemed this view to be limited in the scope with which it can substantiate a policy action to promote democracy. Richard Haass argues, “The principal problem with this thinking is that the active promotion of democracy is a luxury policymakers cannot always afford” (Haass 1995, 46).

Further critiques note that there may still be instances where national security or economic interests override supporting democratic values. When it comes to human rights, nowhere have the conflicts and contradictions been greater than in Washington’s dealings with superpowers. Haass continues, “When it comes to relations with Russia or China, Saudi Arabia or Egypt, other national security interests must normally take precedence over (or at least coexist
with concerns about how they choose to govern themselves. During the early Bush administration certain neo-conservatives appropriated “the fact that promoting democracy can be difficult and expensive also reduces its attraction as a foreign policy compass” as another means to highlight the apparent conflicting interests associated with democracy promotion (Haass 2005).

**B. The Case for Realism**

Realists emphasize the balance of U.S. power amongst other global actors through the maintenance of security. “This theory prescribes that the U.S. has a security interest in increasing its military and economic power and fostering and maintaining alliances with powerful states to check the influence of other great or rising powers” (McFaul 2010, 76). Above all else, maintaining a balance of power is ideal. U.S. needs access to oil, minerals, basing rights and trade from all countries willing to cooperate, irrespective of whether they are autocratic or democratic. Realists argue that democracy promotion can undermine allies, empower anti-American forces and generate both domestic and international instability. In the case of Egypt, for instance, supporters of Mubarak and Mubarak himself, argued that democratization could give way to the empowerment of non-western friendly actors, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and ultimately destabilize the Middle East region (Embassy Cairo 2010). Haass acknowledges “The strength of the realist approach is that it does not overlook existing and potential threats to U.S. interests, threats that if they were to materialize could overwhelm policy concerns” (Haass 1995, 48).

**C. Democracy Promotion as a Tool, Rather Than an End**

Here is where focus on short-term realist interests prompts a lack of clarity and consistency in policies. Under a realist school of thought, democracy promotion is seen as a tool
rather than an end. It can be emphasized as a strategy to ideally secure other interests. Consequently, democracy promotion, when it exists, can become entangled with military and security interests; or, democracy promotion may not exist at all where other strategic interests are already present.

Still, there are cases where democracy promotion doesn’t even exist at all; the U.S. does not intervene or interfere in certain states where other U.S. interests have a higher priority than supporting a democracy. U.S. military presence in the Middle East prompts the need for allies in the region. Pakistan represents one instance; Pervez Musharraf maintained control of Pakistan with his power as a military dictator up until the 2008 elections. Security interests as well as economic interests play a significant role in undermining democracy promotion in the Middle East. U.S. oil interests invoke a more hardheaded foreign policy that disregards human rights and quality of life standards in states such as Algeria and Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Michael McFaul notes, “Without the illiberal kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a trade partner today, the U.S. would not have enough affordable energy to support our current way of life” (McFaul 2010, 79). On the same note, other countries with limited trade and aid relations to the U.S., such as Syria, will not experience the same policy with the U.S. as does Saudi Arabia, for instance.

Economic and strategic interests have, in the past, prevented the U.S. from taking a firm stance against China’s human rights violations. China, on the contrary, maintains a favored nation status. For the U.S., “promoting human rights was jettisoned in May 1994 when the need to export to China and engage in a host of strategic efforts proved too significant to set aside” (Haass 1995, 53). Indeed U.S. leverage against China’s human rights violations is supposedly limited due to economic interests that are present. Furthermore, when powers face a challenger to
their hegemony, they are more likely to tolerate autocracies that can present themselves as buffer against their rivals (Levitsky and Steven and Way, 2002).

The U.S. has been cited for supporting the ‘democrat’ rather than the democracy where support for autocratic allies is emphasized over support for actual democratic institutions. This policy was seen in Egypt, prior to January 25, 2011, where the U.S. has provided billions of dollars in aid over the past several decades to prop up the Egyptian dictatorship. Supporters of this policy acknowledge the false assumption that elected parties will be in agreement with the U.S. and its foreign policy. They acknowledge that democratic elections could promote the rise of a fascist leader (Kopstein 2006, 89). Mubarak, has been cited frequently for human rights violations; detention, torture, refusal to register opposition political parties were all used by Mubarak as a means to constrain the scope of democracy and prevent a threat to his persistent rule (United States 2008). In Egypt, Mubarak profited from this Western concern that Islamists will win a fair election in the country. “As evidence Mubarak can point to the parliamentary elections of 2005, when candidates backed by the Muslim Brotherhood captured a majority of the seats they contested” (United States 2008). Although the U.S. rarely placed pressure on Mubarak publicly, documents from WikiLeaks reveal U.S. pressure on Mubarak to democratize and to improve human rights. Nevertheless, “U.S. pressure for democratization largely ended with the strong Muslim Brotherhood showing of 2005”(United States 2008). Instances of supporting autocratic allies have happened frequently in U.S. foreign policy, and present a challenge to the consistency in rhetoric of foreign policy and democracy promotion in the future.

D. Entanglement of Democracy Promotion with Military or Security Interests

Inconsistency between rhetoric and action can also manifest itself when other U.S. interests, specifically military and security interests, become entangled with the act of promoting
democracy. In the past decade, entanglement represents one of the greatest faults to American foreign policy and its association with democracy promotion consequently. Entanglement presented itself most distinctly within Bush’s Freedom Agenda where military force became an instrument for democracy promotion and democracy promotion became associated with regime change. Here, McFaul comments that “During the Bush administration, the American armed forces assumed a leading role in fostering democratic change (McFaul 2010, 155). At times, the purpose for a military intervention can be disguised under the veil of democracy promotion. Or, similarly, democracy promotion becomes a façade to fulfill other interests, as was seen in Iraq. “The increasingly threadbare nature of initial US justifications for the invasion, (weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq-Al-Qaeda ‘link’), rendered the language of democracy promotion an attractive fall-back for the administration” (Durac and Cavatorta 2009, 9). A close association between military intervention and democracy promotion overshadows the more traditional and legitimate means for supporting democratic development in other countries. In Iraq, policy makers fell back on democracy when all other legitimate reasons to invade couldn’t be summoned. In cases like this, the act of using democracy promotion as a façade renders U.S. democracy promotion misleading and unfounded.

IV. Undermining U.S. Credibility and Image

A. Accusations of Hypocrisy

The determinedness with which the Bush administration tied democracy promotion rhetoric to aggressive War on Terror military actions had the opposite of its desired effect. The U.S. had hoped that its preemption policy might be more palatable if couched in values that are almost universally agreed upon, like freedom and democracy. President Bush’s statement “For the sake of our long-term security, all free nations must stand with the forces of democracy and
justice that have begun to transform the Middle East” implies that the U.S.’s involvement in the Middle East is consistently aimed at supporting democratic movements. However, the fact that security is a much more immediate concern in military conflicts meant that, in practice, democracy was not the primary consideration when it came to which governments to support and which to challenge. Egypt, for example, is a close U.S. ally and enjoyed generous military support throughout the freedom agenda years despite being decisively authoritarian. On the other hand, the U.S. refused to support Hamas although it was democratically elected by the Palestinian people. While both of these decisions make sense from a geopolitical/security perspective, they do not fit the democracy promotion agenda. When President Bush made universal statements about democracy promotion while at the same time supporting non-democracies and failing to support all functioning democracies for security reasons, the international community recognized the hypocrisy.

B. Accusations of Hubris

Another way in which U.S. democracy promotion rhetoric helped undermine our credibility and image abroad has been by declaring success, or at least marked progress, in places where democracy, if it exists at all, is not functioning enough to improve the quality of life of citizens. By calling these examples successful, the U.S. either looks disturbingly out of touch or too haughty to admit the shortcomings of its democracy promotion efforts. Iraq is an excellent example of this, as Frank Rich of the New York Times points out: “Iraq’s ‘example of freedom,’” as President Bush referred to his project in nation building and democracy promotion, did not inspire other states in the Middle East to emulate it. If Iraq is an example of success, who indeed would volunteer to be the next patient of U.S. democracy promotion? There are many other examples stretching back before the Bush era of similarly willfully inaccurate statements.
Thomas Carothers points to the Congo, Cambodia, and Soviet-free Afghanistan as cases where the U.S. stubbornly congratulated themselves on progress that, to the rest of the world, looked like tragedy. Setting unrealistic expectations for the results of democracy promotion, such as President Bush’s “long-term goal of ending tyranny in our world, “are another form of this hubris (Bush 2005).

These two types of misleading rhetoric create a very stark image of U.S. democracy promotion in the eyes of the rest of the world. The U.S. claims to stand behind democratic forces in all states, but does not follow through when more immediate strategic concerns are present. Actions claimed to be democracy promotion are implemented with military coercion and claimed as successes even if they fail to provide security or stability for the country’s citizens, and, in the case of Iraq, actively destabilize a region. As a result, “the credibility of the US as an agent of democracy promotion in the Middle East is called into question, both within the region and without” (Bali and Rana, 2010).

V. Implications for Diplomatic Effectiveness: Realism

The preceding mistakes have resulted in “Obama and his foreign-policy team edge[ing] away from the language of democracy promotion, which they fear that the Freedom Agenda has rendered toxic. (Taub 2009)” The new administration may feel the need to avoid Bush-era rhetoric that engendered so much criticism, but the associations of U.S. democracy promotion with aggressive militarism, hypocrisy, and arrogance will not disappear overnight. They must be replaced by a strong, realistic redefinition of what democracy promotion means to the U.S., when and how it will be practiced, and when it must take a backseat to other more immediate concerns. Once the U.S. rhetorically embraces realistic standards, it will be possible for policy and rhetoric
to be consistent. This will present a reasonable face for U.S. democracy promotion, encouraging cooperation and discussion rather than avoidance or presumptive opposition.

This is something U.S. policymakers should be concerned with for more substantive reasons than international popularity. Being seen as hypocritical and arrogant strengthens the case of foreign leaders seeking to oppose U.S. policy, both in international forums and bilateral relations. The U.S.’s ability to achieve foreign policy objectives—be they economic, military, or geopolitical—is materially harmed by the perception that we have qualities undesirable in a working relationship. Unrealistic assessment of outcomes, inconsistency, unwillingness to recognize areas of weakness, and arrogance are all characteristics that do not invite support and cooperation. Indeed, McFaul asserts the Bush administration’s rhetoric and policy in the Middle East were damaging to the U.S.’s ability to realize foreign policy goals to the extent that they formed “a serious impasse between the White House and all other international organizations, which subsequently tried to steer clear of associating with Bush policies, including his freedom agenda” (McFaul 2010, 218).

It clearly follows that all U.S foreign policy goals are served by a positive and respected image abroad, because other states and international organizations are more willing to cooperate with policies when they have a positive image of U.S. goals and methods for achieving them. Certain aspects of democracy promotion have been identified as contributing to a negative image abroad:

- Aggression/militarism
- Unwarranted declarations of success/denial of mistakes
- Inconsistency
  - Between rhetoric and action
Between standards for various states

Accordingly, attempts to foster a more positive, cooperative image should involve amending democracy promotion policy to be more:

- Peaceful and non-coercive
- Realistic
  - In assessments of progress and willingness to discuss/learn from mistakes
  - Rhetoric able to be achieved with action
  - Policies capable of being applied consistently across cases (flexible, humble)

Incorporating these guidelines into a new coherent democracy promotion strategy will help the Obama administration avoid the backlash against Bush era mistakes. As previously mentioned Obama is already bringing his democracy promotion rhetoric down to a more realistic level, but he has not fully embraced all the changes necessary for a new effective era of democracy promotion. His administration’s handling of the recent Egyptian protests is an indication of the need for clear, consistent rhetoric that can be employed in situations where democracy promotion and other interests conflict. This is already acknowledged in private. A cable sent from the U.S. Embassy in Egypt in 2008 admits that “An ongoing challenge remains balancing our security interests with our democracy promotion efforts.” Yet instead of openly addressing this conflict in statements on Egypt’s unfolding revolution, President Obama delivered “ambiguous messages about an orderly transition” (Embassy Cairo 2008). More than two weeks into the protests, he issued a statement saying “the future of Egypt will be determined by the Egyptian people” (Obama 2011). While this is certainly an improvement on former president Bush’s coercive and idealistic rhetoric, it does not provide a clear policy on democracy promotion and its limitations. Inherent in the statement is a message of non-coercion,
acknowledgement of the unpredictability of democratization efforts, and an unwillingness to burn bridges with current government authorities. All of these considerations should be stated publicly and result from a clearly defined U.S. policy on democracy promotion that commits to realistic goals and recognizes that other interests like regional security must play a role in immediate decisions without endangering the long-term process of democratization.

A. Non-coercion: Separating Immediate Security Concerns from Democracy Promotion Efforts

As later sections of this paper will discuss, successful democratization is a long-term process requiring diverse economic and civil society development. While it is possible to destabilize a dictatorial regime through military or economic coercion, removing one undemocratic government does not automatically - or even usually - usher a functioning democracy into power. Therefore coercion is rarely a useful tool in democracy promotion efforts. More frequently, as described earlier in the chapter, democracy promotion ends up being used as a justification for otherwise unpopular coercive actions. Iraq is the most recent and most blatant example of military coercion justified by democracy promotion rhetoric, but understood by most politicians to be a strategic attempt to gain influence in the oil-rich Middle East. Cuba provides an excellent example of economic coercion in the name of democracy. If the sanctions imposed by the U.S. really were an attempt to force a democratic transition, the decades of unperturbed socialism since their implementation would have proven this method a failure. The fact that the embargo remains intact proves other strategic interests are at stake. If the U.S. can refrain from using democracy promotion rhetoric to justify coercive policies, foreign governments and citizens will be less likely to balk at the idea of allowing the U.S. influence in their country.
Later sections of this paper will elaborate on strategies for peaceful and non-coercive democracy promotion. This should be a policy that the U.S. is firmly committed to. Not only does it adhere to a basic moral commitment to human rights, peace, and stability, as outlined previously, by showing respect for state sovereignty and international cooperation it will also increase the ability of the U.S. to achieve foreign policy goals through diplomatic channels. Matthew Longo agrees that “Without question, military power is important, but it is not the only road forward. Nor is it always the best agent for change. The message of democracy-promotion abroad is not well-delivered from the opposite end of a gun” (Longo 2010). This is not a call for the U.S. to withdraw its foreign military presence or adopt a pacifist attitude; far from it. It simply urges that democracy promotion rhetoric not be used as a decoration to make military action more palatable. Security rhetoric can be militant, but for the sake of effectiveness in the international arena, democracy promotion rhetoric should be non-coercive.

B. Achievable Rhetoric

The second point, realistic assessment of progress in democracy promotion efforts, is crucial in order to achieve consistency between rhetoric and action. If the government makes grandiose statements about democracy promotion, as were common under Bush’s Freedom Agenda, it will be hard pressed to live up to them. Eliminating tyranny entirely is a noble goal, as is supporting all democratic movements worldwide, but the truth is that the U.S. government is in no position to actually do either of those things. It cannot achieve consistency between rhetoric and action if rhetoric is unrealistic.

This is not to say that there is no place for lofty or inspiring language. On the contrary, it often plays an important role in motivating populations to organize for democratic change. What is essential is that lofty rhetoric not be confused with actual commitments to act or expected
outcomes of an action. For example, instead of claiming a completely free and democratic Middle East to be the goal of a policy like the Freedom Agenda, U.S. politicians could state that all citizens of Middle Eastern states deserve to have their basic rights and freedoms protected by accountable, responsive governments. It is entirely possible to reinforce a commitment to human rights and quality of life for all people without making specific claims about the U.S.’s own power to reshape the world as it sees fit.

C. Realism Allows for Consistency

In addition to rhetoric about goals and actions being realistic in scope, it must also be as consistent as possible with actual U.S. interests, policies, and actions. Clearly this is not possible in all areas of foreign policy, particularly security and intelligence, but for democracy promotion it is largely possible and in fact helpful in many ways.

Cavatorta and Durac point out that often, “rather than being interested in democratic reform for its own sake, the US propounds democracy in the hope and expectation that it will deliver outcomes which the US desires.” It is important not to confuse democracy promotion for its own sake with democracy promotion used as part of a strategy to make a state less hostile to U.S. interests, be they economic, military, or political. This distinction is important because, as previously stated, democracy promotion is a long-term and contextually sensitive project and is unlikely to succeed as part of a short-term effort to affect specific strategic variables. Thus, if democracy promotion is tied to such projects rhetorically, it will seem to have a low success rate and diminish our credibility. If, however, it is made clear that the U.S. is seeking a strategic outcome, for instance permission to build a military base in a foreign state, and democracy promotion is one of many tools being employed to towards this end, no unrealistic expectations are raised. In this case, the U.S. appears pragmatic rather than blindly optimistic. Being clear and
realistic rhetorically about the desired short-term and long-term outcomes of policies will improve the image of the U.S. as an international actor and restore credibility to its democracy promotion efforts.

When democracy promotion is indeed the priority of a given project, it will be more successful and contribute to a more admirable and diplomatically effective U.S. when mistakes are recognized, discussed in a cooperative forum, and amended for future projects. Democracy promotion, like any process, will stagnate if unsuccessful models are ignored and allowed to proliferate because of a desire to save face. It is time to stop “using transitional language to characterize countries that in no way conform to any democratization paradigm” and earn back the respect of the democracy promotion community (Carothers 2007, 4).

D. Realism Encourages Multilateral Cooperation

A further benefit to realistic assessments of progress beyond image repair is the possibility for greater international cooperation on democracy promotion projects. Discussions among democracy promoters about the successes and challenges of particular cases will not only foster a sense of shared goals, but also allow for faster and more effective revisions of unsuccessful tactics. Multilateralism has many benefits that will be more thoroughly discussed later in the paper, but most simply it will make us less vulnerable to accusations of arrogance. Exemplifying the willingness to cooperate and take criticism that we would like to see in other states will only bolster our credibility and effectiveness in the diplomatic arena.

VI. Conclusion

Improving the image of the U.S. abroad will increase its effectiveness in all aspects of foreign policy. Creating a clear, consistent democracy promotion policy that recognizes the need to compromise between immediate strategic interests and long-term democratization efforts is
necessary to eliminate accusations of hubris and hypocrisy so common since the Bush Administration’s Freedom Agenda. President Obama has made steps in the right direction, but has yet to present a cohesive, transparent democracy promotion policy to the public.
Part II: The Challenges of Promoting Democracy in Different Types of States

From the multiethnic states in Eastern Europe and Nepal in Central South Asia, to the regional hegemonic states of Russia and China, the democracy agenda of the United States is being tested every day. What is most important is to realize that a one-size-fits-all approach is not the best solution; rather, a more appropriated contextual approach will garner greater results from U.S. democracy promotion efforts.

Chapter 6, “Democracy Promotion in Failed and Post-Conflict States”, looks at failed and post-conflict states and argues that it is still in the best interest of the U.S. to promote democracy in these states. An extension of post-conflict states is multiethnic states. Specifically historical, ethnic, and social context has been ignored in multiethnic societies and the need for a contextual approach is dire to achieve stability within these states and ensure a successful democracy.

In places such as Kenya, as will be discussed in “Why Kenya is not Accepting Western Democracy” the deep historical and tribal contexts make it difficult to establish a democracy. The issues of corruption and deep tribal divides and tensions must be addressed before a sustainable democracy will flourish in Kenya.

Furthermore, oil and hegemonic states are an underlying arena of discussion for democracy promotion. Oil becomes a conflicting and contradictory issues in U.S. democracy promotion. Are vested interests of democracy in states such as Saudi Arabia and Angola based on democracy, or, oil? In “Autocratic Hegemons and the Importance of Proximity in Sustainable Democracy Promotion”, the advancement of democracy in these regions will aid in the implementation and adoption of democracy in the surrounding states. However, promoting democracy in these regions presents potential pushback against the U.S. and democracy. China and Russia are crucial states in which promoting is a balancing act, but more importantly,
achieving success of democracy promotion establishing a democracy in those two states is central to any long term, sustainable strategy for neighboring countries. The success of democracy promotion in Russia will assist in the success of democracy in Ukraine, as Russia is the hegemon in the geographical area.

Ukraine, having almost seen a democratic breakthrough in 2004 supported financially and diplomatically by the U.S. and the EU, is now appearing as a ‘partly free’ state. Why did Ukraine experience a backlash in democracy transition after the 2004 transition? Is Ukraine a special case, and if so, would a democratic Russia aid it in its own transition to democracy?

The following chapters in Part II use Kenya, Nepal, and Ukraine as case studies to fully demonstrate the different challenges to democracy within different types of states.
Chapter 5: Democracy Promotion in Failed and Post-Conflict States

By: Annie Durkin

Since the Cold War, democracy promotion has played a different role in foreign relations and faced many criticisms domestically and abroad. Democracy promotion no longer aims to combat communism, but instead has a wide array of objectives. Scholars have argued that the “third wave of democracy” came to a screeching halt after the formation of the Balkan states and revolutionary movements on the 1990s. If the third wave is over, we are currently in a fourth wave that has been bittersweet. There have been numerous backslides into authoritarian or semi-democratic rule, but these backslides have been juxtaposed with tumultuous regime changes in the Middle East. Democracy promotion has thus faced harsh criticisms recently by scholars, politicians, citizens, and even within our own government. Congress attempted to slash spending for the United States Aid and International Development (USAID) programs in January. Coupled with these internal doubts and reduced commitment to funding, the world is currently watching as the Middle East experiences a tumultuous phase of revolution without the direct involvement of U.S. democracy promotion initiatives, which threatens its legitimacy as a program. It is still in the U.S.’s best interest to intervene democratically in failed and post-conflict states worldwide despite these recent challenges.

In order to understand failed and post-conflict states, it is important to identify the specific challenges they pose to democracy promotion. First, it is necessary to understand the definition of a state. Scholar Larry Diamond defines the state as,

a set of political institutions that exercise authority over a territory, make and execute policies, extract and distribute revenue, produce public goods, and maintain order by wielding an effective monopoly over the means of violence (Diamond 2006, 94)
The state has become the defining determinant of legitimacy in the present world system. To be recognized as an actor in this world order, a country must have an externally recognized state apparatus.

The transition paradigm outlines five core assumptions that are necessary for democracy to prosper. Failed and post-conflict states defy the fifth core assumption of the Transition Paradigm, which is that democracies are being built on “coherent, functioning states” (Carothers 2002, 8). Post-conflict states, like the Balkan states, are left with a marginal state apparatus. Failed states do not have an externally recognized state apparatus upon which to build. It is therefore necessary to promote state-building as a method of democracy promotion first before we can establish democratic governments through elections. Once the specific challenges have been recognized, state building and democracy promotion can work hand in hand (Fukuyama 2005).

I. Failed States

The term ‘failed state’ and its classification process has faced controversy due to the dynamically different states under the umbrella of ‘failed’. The international community has agreed upon a set of conditions common to all failed states. These conditions are as follows: a lack of law and order and the loss of monopoly on the legitimate use of force to protect their citizens, which results in these institutions being used to oppress citizens; inability to provide basic services and human rights to their citizens; and the absence of an internationally recognized legitimate entity that represents the state beyond its borders (Brinkerhoff 2005).

Some failed states may operate under a guise of good governance, but their failing status is most often due to corruption from an authoritarian, oppressive leader, or lack of a leader all together. Promoting democracy in failed states where harsh and ineffective regimes are in place is especially challenging because it is necessary to encourage the political ousting of such leaders.
without appearing to be a facilitator with imperialistic motives. That is why the challenge lies within careful leadership change or establishment. In order to do so, citizens must be empowered and feel a sense of unity under control of their government, rather than fear. Failed states do not have a solid government in place, which leads their citizens to have little or no feeling of national pride and inclusion. The nature of failed states is not nurturing to political freedoms. Therefore, their citizens are generally apolitical. Empowering citizens through civil society institution building will result in sustainable democratic initiatives (Diamond 2006, 94).

II. Post-Conflict States

The period immediately after a conflict is the most crucial time for democracy promotion and state building. The World Bank found that there is a 40% chance of conflict reigniting again during this brief window of time (Cox 2005, 5). The biggest threats to stability are the power vacuum created by conflict and the concentration of wealth and power in post-conflict states. War-torn societies are perfect hosts for illicit markets and corrupt individuals who are able to manipulate wealth and power. Because failed states are often in a state of war or have recently experienced war, these challenges are similar, but especially pertinent to post-conflict states (Brinkerhoff 2005, 6). Post-conflict states are born weak due to the perils of war. These weaknesses make it extremely hard for the government to provide services for their citizens. It is often easier and faster to utilize the corrupt, illicit economic networks in place rather than go through the state. The challenge lies within breaking up these networks and centralized power holders after conflict. This has been an important initiative for the Balkan states as they have decades of Soviet linkages and corrupt networks. If these networks are dissolved, the state’s legitimacy is proven, and the risk of warlords taking power decreases (Krastev 2002, 52).
III. Security

Failed states pose the challenge of careful leadership establishment or change while post-conflict states must have their intricate corruption and illicit market networks broken down before democracy can be achieved. Despite their specific challenges, there are certain obstacles that must be tackled first in both failed and post-conflict states. The first step to state-building and democracy promotion in both failed and post-conflict states should be reestablishing security. In countries where accountability and rule of law are loosely interpreted, if not absent entirely, security is an absolute concern. The state must have a monopoly over the institutions that utilize violence in order to be considered legitimate. Without this monopoly, the security of its citizens is compromised. Without security, citizens have no motivation to express themselves politically for fear of their lives. It is not uncommon for citizens in these states to live in a constant state of fear, taking for instance the citizens from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or Somalia.

Both of these failed states are run entirely by ruthless warlords and non-state militia groups who have no state apparatus to be accountable to. In the DRC, militant, ethnically divided groups control the resources, economy, and political parties. The DRC has also become home to Hutu extremists who fled from neighboring Rwanda after the 1994 genocide so that they could continue attacking Tutsis without persecution (Burke 1995). Citizens often must pay these corrupt militant groups to ensure their own security. The same disturbing pattern can be seen in conflict-ridden Afghanistan. The country has experienced chronic war since the 1970s, and their criminal networks are particularly saturated. This not only applies to their own citizens, but also for the aid workers and military. A meager shipment of supplies for a military base has to travel through a network of criminals; warlords, impoverished Afghans, and U.S. policymakers before it can even get there. Many people survive solely on the deals and transactions they make
through warlords who control the security of such shipments. When there is no security for a country’s own people, it is safe to assume that there will not be security for international aid workers (Tierney 2010).

Ultimately, the paths to establishing security and empowering the citizenry are mutually inclusive. By promoting what scholars refer to as “DDR—disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration into society” of non-state armed forces, citizens will feel safer, militarization will become centralized, and eventually citizens will establish trust and empowerment (Doumas and Gasan 2008). Warlords, described as “leaders of predatory armed groups that seek power for their personal enrichment without regard for the broader interests of any significant community,” often assume political leadership positions after conflict (Reno 2009, 2). The dilemma here is that these warlords often, though minimally, provide basic necessities to their citizens that the government cannot. This commonly comes with a price, but they are able to deliver goods and services that would otherwise be unavailable (Reno 2009). This is the same reason why many failed and post-conflict states fill their power-vacuum with ex-combatants or warlords despite the international community’s urgings not to. Leaders and warlords, “who have moved into the vacuum created by the collapse of the local branches of the state, may exercise substantial control, provide security, and collect taxes” (Herbst 1996, 122). They are comfortable with these leaders, and therefore it is crucial to set up an institution to integrate them back into the nation in programs that present options other than combatant groups and illicit market operations once democracy promotion has begun.

In failed and post-conflict states, there is no incentive to abide by law or moral code. By establishing a transitory, international governing body, a new set of incentives can be established. The U.S. has been heavily criticized for utilizing strong power and regime change
for democracy promotion, but there is a way to peacefully assist transition by utilizing military presence. One failure in the past has been the paper tiger, blue beret forces that ultimately became targets. Rwanda was the most infamous example of this problem. Another is the unilateral approach to establishing a transitional government, like in Iraq. There must be an established process of accountability for state building and peace, and this cannot be established without a military presence. Rather than abrasively entering a country and demanding control, the strategy should be working with the leaders and existing warlords. Giving them new incentives to cooperate and help break down the complicated web of corruption is essential to sustainable security establishment. Failed state citizen incentives are often life rather than death, and food rather than starvation. Once safety is ensured and “confidence in a democratic alternative to militarized politics” is established, there is room for juxtaposed economic state-building and democratic progress (Barnes 2001, 95).

The only way to establish incentive to maintain order instead of fostering resentment and resistance is by encouraging the international community to take action as well. Unilateral approaches only appear colonial by nature. The international community acts reactively to a fault. By making the present danger of failing nations and the vast human rights violations apparent to the international community, perhaps a proactive policy stance can be adopted. It is in the interest of the United States to establish peace multilaterally in order to then establish democracy. It is possible to implement peace without democracy, but it is not possible to build democracy without peace (and in fact, peace will be better and deeper with democracy) (Diamond 2006, 96).

In order to emphasize the necessity of building peace and democracy in failed states, it is crucial that the international community understands the threats that these rogue states pose.
Countries with a collapse of law and order become run entirely by illicit markets. These illicit markets attract extra-state groups that pose a legitimate threat to the international community’s interests. In many cases, like that of the Great Lakes Region in Africa and Sudan and Ethiopia’s close proximity, there occurs a viscous cycle of “destabilization by proxy” (Lemarchand 1997, 102). When combatants and illicit markets plague one failed state, it becomes easy for this to spill over to neighboring nations. Yemen is also an example of a failed state that is affected by its proximity. The lack of order and institution in Yemen has attracted insurgency groups from Afghanistan and other Middle Eastern countries (Coyne 2006, 356).

**IV. Poverty and Social Capital**

Failed states are impoverished states. Their state apparatuses have collapsed and prevented fair regulation of trade and commerce, and the economic sector is plagued by illicit activity and corruption. Somalia, the ‘most failed’ state of all (Foreign Policy Magazine: Failed State Index 2011), is run entirely by corrupt networks of warlords, pirates, and militant groups. The average Somalian makes $2-3 a day (UNDP Somalia: Recovery and Sustainable Livelihoods). Because there are no economic institutions, thriving national businesses, or state protections in place, citizens have to cooperate with warlords and participate in illicit markets to earn meager wages.

Without the presence of an effective state, the economy cannot flourish, and without a substantial economic system, nations cannot acquire social capital. Economic development is not traditionally included in the discourse of U.S. democracy promotion, but must be implemented in order to achieve democracy in failed states. This is why it would be most effective to utilize state-building strategy to parallel democracy promotion. The challenge is to emphasize both equally, because examples and lessons learned from the past have taught us that, “that economic development is a basic driver of democratic change” (Knaus and Cox 2005, 43).

Ending corruption is of utmost importance in establishing a decent economy in these
countries. Filtering in aid and creating local jobs and participation in projects will not accomplish the task. There must be further oversight in these already established strategies. Corruption will overcome governance efforts and dominating elites will continue to rule with omnipotence. Aid must be decentralized, as politics should be. By decentralizing the aid, money is given to community groups who best understand the projects being implemented (Fukuyama 2007, 86). For those larger infrastructure jobs, it is important that adequate training of local workers and employees be institutionalized so that the economic development is sustainable. In order to employ state building and democracy promotion strategies evenly “every project needs to be preceded by a clear political economy analysis in order to effectively build a state” (Fukuyama 2007, 87). The economic sector must exercise transparency. If too much emphasis is placed on building the state and its economy, then a large, coercive state run by international agencies and concepts will form, and eventually fail. The other fear is that without proper state building, elections will take place prematurely and simply reinstate the ethnic divides and corrupt party lines of the failed state system (Ottaway and Chung 1999).

Post-conflict states, like failed states, are characteristically weak, impoverished from the tribulations of war, and run by centralized wealth and power. Social capital – which comes from vocational training, education, electoral freedoms, and access to welfare via the state – is absent in failed and post-conflict states. In strong states, the government facilitates accumulation of social capital in the form of funding education, research, etc, as well as the basic services for their people. Weak states cannot derive enough revenue to provide these services, which further empowers the corrupt warlords and elites who are able to provide such services (Cox 2001, 16).

Social capital development by way of economic progress and state-building is a sustainable solution to effective democracy promotion. Economic development drives democratic change as
well as self-expression. Self-expression drives activism within civil society. Civil society groups are sustainable democratic actors because their motivation for democratic change is personal, and nothing is more powerful than personal motivation (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 33-49).

An important aspect of civil society that is crucial for the democratic development of post-conflict and failed states is freedom of the press. Democratically motivated media was successfully implemented in the post-conflict nations of Bosnia and Serbia and is currently still developing in the Balkan states and former Soviet nations alike. In Bosnia, an international organization was formed called the Independent Media Commission (IMC) (Cox 2005, 18). This institution was led at a state level by Bosnians themselves, and its purpose was to make sure the media represented all political and ethnic groups rather than the preexisting corrupt leading parties. In post-conflict and failed states like these, it is particularly important that free and fair political information be disseminated through equitable access to media in order to break the cycle of corrupt rule (Cox 2005).

V. Electoral Process

An effective failed state and post-conflict electoral democracy strategy includes local, decentralized democracy first. If there is a strong oversight policy and leader in place at the head of the new state (most likely a U.S. or UN peacekeeping transitional government) it is possible to work from the local level up to install democratic political processes. Most NGOs and policymakers abroad fail to set up incentives and an explicit plan for retreat. True democratic promotion is not in the business of choosing leaders, and therefore we must be open to whomever the people may choose to take over. Warlords and autocratic leaders cannot effectively rule or let the state disintegrate if the local politicos are ethical and democratic. It is unwise to leave out militant or ‘losing’ parties in post-conflict state building. This only solicits opposition and further corruption on the part of the excluded (Reno 2009).
Failed states have no preexisting electoral process from which to build a democratic process. Post-Conflict states most likely did not have any skeletal electoral system either. It is important to distinguish the similarities and differences that failed and post-conflict nations bring to the election aspect of democratic promotion. Both kinds of states are experiencing a power vacuum that can easily be filled by warlords and regime leaders.

Analyzing the different approaches that the international community took when rebuilding failing and post-conflict Rwanda and Burundi gives us a lens into practices discussed in this paper.

VI. Case Study: Post-Genocide Rwanda and Burundi

Rwanda and Burundi most clearly exemplify the delicate line that democracy promoters and international organizations walk between overemphasis of either state building or democracy promotion. Both nations have been plagued for years by ethnic violence and civil war. The violence in both nations was comparable, but Rwanda was placed in the international spotlight during the genocide that occurred in 1994. The U.S. and the international community faced harsh criticism for their inaction during the genocide. United Nations blue berets infamously stood by while Hutus slaughtered Tutsi’s and contributed to the ethnic cleansing by gathering mass amounts of people in one place, which eventually helped the Hutu militias target these civilians. After the genocide, this overwhelming grief within the international community translated into aid and support for Rwanda’s reconstruction. In Burundi, the aid was not as free flowing because the state of unrest was not as apparent. These two nations took divergent paths towards state building and democracy promotion.

Rwanda and Burundi are almost identical in many ways. They are comprised of a similar ethnic makeup; Tutsi minority and Hutu majority. Both experienced genocide from clashes between these two ethnic groups. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was catapulted into the
international spotlight, but much too late. Burundi faced genocide of similar proportions after their president was assassinated in 1993, but this conflict went relatively unnoticed in the shadow of Rwanda’s atrocity. Rwanda received aid from nearly every international organization and multilateral development group in the world, and was even a crucial recipient of the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal aid distribution (CIA world factbook: Rwanda). The United States alone has invested fifteen million dollars in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) since the genocide (NY Times Topics: Rwanda). Rebuilding the Rwandan state system was a high priority for the United Nations peacekeeping mission and the multilateral aid distribution efforts. Economic development and state building were coupled in an effort to start anew and develop a functioning East African nation from the ruins of genocide.

Where the two post-conflict development programs differed was in their implementation of political economy development. Rwanda’s infrastructure, civil society, and economy were quickly bolstered by aid, but the programs failed to establish a political theme to thread through the development process (Zorbas 2004, 30-32). Fukuyama argues that it is crucial to rebuild the state first, because without a functioning state apparatus there cannot be a functioning democracy, but that it is imperative to juxtapose this with political initiatives (Fukuyama 2007, 2).

The UN peacekeeping mission made concerted efforts to establish peace and security right away. They recognized the threat of backsliding into ethnic violence and the active role that the Rwanda Peace Force (RPF) played in the genocide. They acted as a third party military and subsequently decentralized the military power within Rwanda. Because of the genocide being in the international spotlight, DDR was not a viable reintegration option for ex-combatants. The international community wanted to see clear consequences for those who facilitated the
genocide. They set up ‘village courts’, or ‘gurundas’ to prosecute militants, which caused most of them to flee the country to neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, or flee the continent all together. The only effort for ethnic cooperation that was institutionalized was establishing a mandate for people to live in villages with both Hutu and Tutsi inhabitants. However, this only exacerbated preexisting tension (Burke 2005).

The UN Peace Keeping Mission, the NGO network, and foreign aid disbursement agencies underestimated the effects of post-conflict state building with a lack of political emphasis. Immediately following the 1994 genocide, Hutu leaders were forced to step down. This action made it hard to start the reconciliation process, and subsequently stunted that process for years to come. Elections since the genocide have been extremely corrupt, and many would argue that the country is a ‘single-state democracy’ (Lemarchand 2006, 7). The ruling Hutu government continues to arrest people on allegations of treason and ‘genocidal ideology,’ including hopeful presidential candidates (Gettleman 2010). A lack of minority power-sharing mechanisms for the government system and the absence of any reintegration process for ex-combatants have reinstituted the ethnic divides that split Rwanda apart before the genocide. It created what some scholars refer to as ‘chosen amnesia’ as the post-conflict reconciliation mechanism of choice (Buckley-Zistel 2006). Rwanda boasts beautiful national parks, impeccable infrastructure, and the bragging right as “the only growing economy in Africa,” but its government is still wildly corrupt and most of the income for the country comes in the form of aid and revenue from the coffee and tea trade filter into a small group of Tutsi elites as it did before the 1994 genocide (Lemarchand 2006, 6).

Burundi’s trials and tribulations taught the world a different set of lessons about post-conflict democracy promotion and state building. With a similar topography, industries, and
demographics as Rwanda, it arguably could have developed the same post-conflict outcomes. However, it did not. Burundi received less foreign direct investment and aid from the international community than Rwanda did. The state building process therefore took a very political angle instead of a developmental and economic one. They started first by establishing a post-conflict government and recognizing the ethnic minorities within their penal system and institutions. Burundi utilized the government power sharing mechanism known as consociationalism. This theory of political power sharing was developed by Arend Liphjart in the 1970s under the pretenses that “societal divisions are cultural in nature, that is, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and the like” (Barnes 2001, 97). Consociationalism calls for elite cooperation through a carefully formulated cabinet, and the three basic tenants of group autonomy, proportionality, and the minority veto (Lijphart: 495 in Lemarchand 2006). Burundi structured their post-conflict government as follows,

The president is to be assisted by two vice-presidents, a Hutu and a Tutsi, and the government will include 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi. The same proportion will hold in the National Assembly, whereas the Senate will have an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi. The security forces, like-wise, will include as many Hutu as Tutsi. At the communal level, no more than 67 percent of the mayors are to belong to either group. Women are expected to represent at least 30 percent of the members of the National Assembly. Should the poll fail to produce the required quota of 60/40, the constitution allows “the rectification of the imbalances through the co-optation mechanism provided by the electoral code (Lemarchand 2006, 9)

Burundi’s consociationalism experiment has proved effective thus far, but the stability in neighboring nations and presence of the insurgency group Forces Nationales de Libération(FNL) continue to threaten Burundi’s multiparty democracy (Brown, Kaiser 2007, 1140).

Another way that Burundi’s post-conflict restructuring differed from that of Rwanda was in their security implementations and their economy building procedures. Rwanda received direct aid from the World Trade Organization for use in facilitating their coffee and tea trade as an
economic bolster. Burundi, which has similar exports and agriculture, did not receive such specific aid. Eighty percent of their population survives on agriculture jobs, and a large portion of the country is arid and prone to drought, which is something that sets it apart from Rwanda as well. Rwanda and Burundi had similar per capita incomes in 1994, and now Burundi’s is $700 less than that of Rwanda (CIA Factbook: Burundi, Rwanda 2011).

Rwanda immediately began persecuting warlords and those with an active role in the genocide, but Burundi approached this part of the population differently. Because they were not in the international spotlight like Rwanda was, no one was holding the government accountable to prosecute criminals. Burundi implemented an expansive disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program. The World Bank and International Development Agency (IDA) set aside $40 million for a DDR program. A Burundian organization called the NCDDR was formed to carry out this process on a regional basis. The process was split into two sections, first was the demobilization process where ex-combatants were placed into camps and given a stipend while they awaited their reintegration package. The second, reintegration, phase consisted of the choice between five different reintegration options, which were education, vocational training, return to their former employment, entrepreneurial support, or income-generating activities support (AGR) (Douma and Gasan 2009, 19-24).

AGR was seen as the ‘short cut’ route, and many people chose this option. This was where Burundi’s DDR program failed. By offering this option, people would opt to receive this stipend and take high turnover, low skill jobs like taxi drivers or shop owners. The nature of these professions is low social capital and extremely high turnover. Therefore, the DDR program failed to successfully bolster the economy with new labor, social capital, and vocational training. It instead relied on the sparse economic resources that existed already. The program, coupled
with the power sharing government system did succeed in better reintegrating the combatant population and reducing pre-existing ethnic tensions and class divides (Douma and Gasan 2008).

There are many lessons to be learned about democracy promotion from the comparison of Rwanda and Burundi. Being that the countries were so alike in demographic, economic, and ethnic terms, it is arguable that they could have produced identical nations from the post-genocide rebuilding processes. However, that did not happen. Rwanda, with the overwhelming amount of support received from the international community, was able to build a functioning post-conflict state (Lemarchand 1997, 187). They developed state institutions and infrastructure that enabled the development of social capital in the form of education and employment, but were unable to provide a fair, equitable government system. The government failed to implement democratic power-sharing norms, and the elite Tutsi’s quickly took over and reinforced preexisting ethnic divides.

Burundi did not have the resources and international spotlight that Rwanda did. They were not able to establish the necessary institutions and infrastructure for a functioning state, and are therefore still lingering as “the mutant offspring of an expiring failed state... boasting certain essential attributes of a normal state but grotesquely lacking in others” (Glennyqtd. in Lemarchand 1997, 187). Burundi effectively formed a power-sharing government system that permeated democratic norms into many facets of society. They carefully made sure every ethnic group was recognized in the government and in the army, which contributed to the citizens’ feeling of a state. Today, Burundi has “true democratic credentials’ with their ‘feisty’ civil society, forty different political parties, and numerous reputable independent media organizations” (Gettleman 2008).
VII. Lessons Learned and Recommendations for the Future

Many relevant lessons can be taken away from Rwanda and Burundi. In Rwanda, physical infrastructure and economic rehabilitation overshadowed the need for anti-corruption and power sharing initiatives. Because the Rwandan economy improved quickly after the genocide in relation to the rest of East Africa, civil society developed in a linear progression. They were able to receive the goods and services they needed from the powerful state structure and social capital became abundant. The powerful state attempted to force cross-cutting ethnic themes by creating ethnically diverse neighborhoods and by persecuting war criminals as an attempt to show contempt and unity. However, the state became so powerful that the government became a single-party democracy, and the ethnic divides never really dissipated, they were only muted (Buckley-Zistel 2006).

The lesson we learn from this is to not rebuild the state and economy without keeping democracy in mind. They built infrastructure and other physical projects, but they failed to build institutions with democratic themes, such as ethnically diverse community groups. Had they better reintegrated ex-combatants, tensions would have been more easily dissipated. Without the presence of ex-combatant groups, all minorities were not represented in the government, and this led to the Tutsi’s dominating the government and making it a single party government.

In Burundi, the government has successfully maintained a multi-party, power-sharing system, but it has been unable to carry out necessary state-building procedures. It remains a weak state that is unable to provide many basic needs for its citizens. The citizens, however, are self-empowered and active in civil society, and their media system reports free and fair political information surrounding elections.

We learn from Burundi that there must be state building and economic development
alongside democracy promotion. Democracy will not sustain itself if the economy does not produce enough revenue for the government to provide for its citizens. Burundi overcame what many saw as the impossible, which was incorporating all minority groups into a nation where ethnic tensions were so deep it seemed impossible. They built a government system from the ground up that was democratic, multiparty, and equitable. However, this government faces the dilemma of a lack of resources and state infrastructure.

Neither nation is a case study of absolute democratic perfection, but they’ve accomplished separate pieces of democracy through a combination of government restructuring and state building. Rather than advocating for a one-size-fits-all model of democracy promotion, the U.S. should instead look at nations on a case-by-case basis and assess what achievements are possible. As pointed out earlier, modernization is achievable through economic development, and economic development “is a basic driver of democratic change” (Inglehart and Welzel 2009, 43, 47). Thus, it is fruitful to focus more on sustainable methods to achieve democracy that are case specific.

One aspect that makes simultaneous democracy promotion and economic development a sustainable solution is the fact that becoming a member state of the contemporary, modernized world is a powerful incentive for nations. One can confidently say that every state wants legitimacy and sovereignty. Every nation would like to be recognized by the external world as an actor in international affairs, and the way to achieve this is to develop institutions of civil society that are recognized externally. These include the institutions that guarantee basic civil society freedom, like education, shelter, safety, and self-expression. A great deal of debate is devoted to determining what type of government and constitution is necessary for a nation to be democratic—“presidential versus parliamentary, consociationalism and corporatism” (Barnes
There should be no debate, but rather a set of options that have proved effective, and a process to define the necessary actors and resources needed for establishing sustainable civil society institutions (Barnes 2001).

We’ve seen this carrot-stick approach used in many different ways throughout the world. The carrot-stick is simply the idea that all nations want to be viewed as a legitimate actor in the international community with recognized sovereignty and integrity. That alone is a powerful incentive. The carrot-stick of EU membership or African Union membership can bolster the motivation to be a part of the modern international community. The carrot-stick cannot be aid or international support, but rather the chance for respected sovereignty and recognition within the international community. The EU utilized this pressure effectively in the Balkan states, stressing that if peace and security were not established in these post-conflict states, EU membership would not be in their future (Krestav 2002, 44). It is less effective in failed states to dangle UN membership or trade opportunities because these are more vague and easily accomplished without establishing a truly democratic nation (Knaus and Cox 2005).

The approach that has been more effective in the past has been a regional pressure carrot-stick. South Africa and the Organization for African Unity (OAU) have played key roles in stabilizing African nations from Rwanda to Liberia. Membership in regional trade organizations and peacekeeping groups like OAU not only benefit nations economically, but also contribute to greater stabilization within Africa. This is crucial for a continent plagued by failed states because instability is contagious in Africa. Such peacekeeping measures have also been considered “good international citizenship.” Incentives to establish democracy are more feasible if they are presented multilaterally. African nations will have more cultural understanding of an African failed state, as Arab Saudi Arabia will towards Yemen or Afghanistan (Cilliers, Malan 1996).
VIII. Conclusion

Skeptics argue that failed states are failed because they are not “ready” for democracy, or simply not built for it (Brown and Kaiser 2001, 1145). The policymakers and modernization gatekeepers of the world dwell on instances of state failure, but should look at the opportunities for success. Democracy promotion policies in the past have focused too heavily on electoral democracy and too little on establishing a state and developing the nation economically. The most viable way to establish a state with a thriving economy is to compel the citizens to invest in that state. This is only possible through civil society engagement. Failed states have not only failed the Westphalian system, but they have failed to provide basic necessities and security to their citizens. Post-conflict states are in a unique, delicate situation that is often left to crumble into authoritarian, one-party, or ethnically divided states.

These two types of states are at the lowest notch of the hierarchical state system, and have therefore been the recipient of external intervention, aid, policy, or complete disregard many times in the past. Rather than perpetuating this cycle of lofty, fleeting foreign intervention, the U.S. must promote sustainable democracy. Somalia, Bosnia, Tunisia, and China are all capable of democracy, but only if it is sustainable. Civil society is the most sustainable venue for democratic promotion. Civil society cannot flourish in failed and post-conflict states until security is established and social institutions are set up. Once these two key components are ensured, civil society will maintain itself because nothing is stronger than the will of individuals. Economic sanctions can only go so far, as can government upheavals and guidelines, but civil society empowerment guarantees modernization.

In order to fully involve and empower civil society, democracy promotion must be coupled with effective state-building in failed and post-conflict states. State-building entails breaking
down intricate networks of illicit practices and combatants. The illicit markets that are facilitated by war must be broken down in order to take power away from the individuals that control the wealth and resources of post-conflict and failed states. In order to restore security to its entirety, ex-combatants need to be integrated back into society through the implementation of DDR. If they are not properly integrated, the tensions from war will continue and security will be compromised. Once security is established and power networks are broken down, the state can be rebuilt with the essential monopolization of power. When the state presumes this legitimacy, they are more respected by their citizens and are able to provide goods and services.

The third essential component to maintain security and engage civil society is economic development. Economic development can take place with democratic notions in mind. By sustaining the state once it is rebuilt with economic sanctions through trade agreements, encouragement of social capital programs like education and vocational training, and job creation. One way this can be achieved is through encouraging NGOs and aid groups to employ and train local residents.

All of these necessary components will lead to democracy in failed and post-conflict states. It is important to emphasize state-building and economic development while making sure that they are democratic in nature. Once the state has regained legitimacy and the economy is back on track, civil society will be encouraged and democracy will be sustained. Eventually, but not at first, democratic elections will be possible and supported by citizens that truly want and are ready for democracy.
Many people argue that Africa is not ready for a true democracy. What does it mean to be ready for democracy? Democracy is a process which takes years for a society to understand and implement. Many countries who claim to be democratic – in that they hold elections and their people have a few freedoms – do not guarantee certain rights or practice due process under the law. Equality under the law should prevent the majority from crucifying the minority. Freedom of expression should also ensure that the minority has a voice. That is, their rights must be protected from the tyranny of the majority. Freedom of expression must be respected under the protections of the Constitution. Constitutional protections of people’s rights and freedoms are the basis of a free country and an essential part of any democracy. Consequently, many countries are missing important pieces of a true democracy.

I. The Importance of Understand Kenyan Social Organization

In the case of Kenya, the promotion of democracy will find more success if it speaks to local cultures, shared understandings, norms and customs of the people and if everyone feels they have a stake in participating. Kenyan societies are among the most ancient societies still in existence. These societies maintain sophisticated and complex networks of social order. Culture, religion, language and ethnicity play a major role in defining and shaping the shared meaning, norms, and values of Kenyan society.

Kenya is home to a large number of ethnic groups. There are a total of 43 tribes in Kenya; most of them migrated from the western and southern parts of Africa. The Kikuyu is the largest group in Kenya. They make up the majority of the population in major towns throughout the country. Most of the wealthy people are Kikuyu. The first president of Kenya was a Kikuyu
who gave his people advantages in business. The current president, also Kikuyu, relies heavily on his fellow tribesmen for support.

In Kenya, tribal loyalties are by far the most important determinant of voting behavior. Essentially, people vote according to their tribal affiliations, not personal beliefs. In the 2007 election, Raila Odinga of the Lou tribe appeared to receive a majority of the vote. However, the Kikuyu tribe refused to yield power, and Mou Kibaki was instead declared the election winner. Despite being extremely corrupt, Mr. Kibaki maintains support from the Kikuya people. Until this balance is altered the Kikuyu are likely to remain in power, if not by consent then by coercion. Thus, elections in Kenya are nothing more than a disguised national census; they demonstrate the latest balance between the tribes. Kenya thus provides an example of how difficult it is to achieve some of the most important principles of democracy: free and fair elections and the peaceful transition of power.

The relationship between the people of Kenya and their leaders is very different from that seen in Western nations. While U.S democracy is based on the consent of the governed, in Kenya, the governing system is based mutual trust within the context of a coercive state. To establish long lasting social order in any country, it is necessary to understand the particular conditions of that nation. Accordingly, it is paramount to understand the shared meaning, norms and values of the various tribes in Kenya before attempting to implement democracy into Kenya. Every society has developed very distinct norms and values through time. It is important to understand the values and norms of local groups so that one can have a clear understanding of their role in establishing social order and the creation and dynamics of tribal relations.

Kenyan societies are no exception. Like any other societies, they have their own distinct values and norms which function in part to maintain social order. There are two kinds of values
the influence the norms within a society: individual and social. Individual values dictate one’s preference for one thing over another, whatever it may be.

In contrast, social values, which enable us to examine critically our desires and modify them according to ethical principles, emanate for outside to ourselves. Their source lies in the values and norms embodied by friends, associates, and the groups to which we belong or aspire to belong. When we adopt the values and norms of these other people and groups, in effect we “internalize” them in our own minds (Michael Hechter, et al. 2004, 92-93)

The different types of values and the norms they support must be acknowledged and understood if Kenya is to make any sort of transition. Without taking individual and social norms into consideration, the chance of establishing a true democratic system decreases considerably.

II. British Colonial Legacy and How It Affects the Development of a Democracy in Kenya

The colonial history of Kenya goes back to the Berlin Conference in the late 1800s, when East Africa was divided into territories by the European powers. The people of Kenya were and are composed of various ethnic groups who lived in the area before national borders were drawn. After state borders were drawn throughout Africa, dividing the continent for rule by Europeans, ethnic groups found themselves sharing borders with different groups within the same borders or, at times these groups found themselves on different sides of a border. The British Government founded the East African territory in 1895 and, soon after, opened the fertile highlands to white settlers. These settlers were allowed a voice in government while most Kenyans were banned from direct political participation until 1944 (Ochieng 1995, 95).

The Mau Mau was a militant African movement active in Kenya during the 1950s. Their main goal was to remove British rule and European settlers from the country. The Mau Mau uprising, an armed local movement was directed principally against the colonial government and the European settlers. It was the largest and most successful movement in British Africa, but it was not followed by the other colonies. According to W. R. Ochieng, to support its military
campaign of counter-insurgency the colonial government embarked on agrarian reforms that
stripped white settlers of many of their former protections; for example, Kenyans were, for the
first time, allowed to grow coffee, the major cash crop (Ochieng 1995, 120).

III. Contemporary Reasons Why Democracy Has Been Unsuccessful in Kenya

There are many reasons that democracy has not been able to take hold in Kenya, but the
most important factors come from the long-lasting effects of colonial legacies. Understanding
pre-colonial and colonial Kenyan history will explain the reason why democracy is not working.
Another reason that democracy has not succeeded yet in Kenya is the lack of education. If people
do not understand democracy, it cannot work. Indeed, democracy requires an informed
citizenry, but generally Kenyans vote primarily according to their tribal affiliations. This greatly
impairs democracy in Kenya (Ochieng 1995, 140).

Amartya Sen states that democracy is a universal value. He argues that democracy will
develop one’s quality of life and happiness. Sen also asserts that the role of culture in economic
and sustainable development is an important one. Sen goes on to explain the relationship
between democracy and the economy. He then defends his view of democracy as a universal
value against a main argument that deals with cultural differences between regions. Although
Sen agrees that democracy has failed to produce prosperity and happiness in certain countries, he
insists that democracy should be recognized as a universal value and a major revolution in
thinking (Sen 1999, 3-17). According to Pierre Englebert in the New York Times article “To save
Africa, Reject its Nation,” in order to limit the abuses of corrupt and self-interested governments
in Africa, donor countries in the developed world should de-recognize those governments as
legitimate representatives of their states (Englebert 2010). To do this they must withhold
recognition until those governments either achieve consensus in the form of domestic support or
new governments are formed. While, in theory, Englebert’s proposal would be an effective way to exert pressure on the leaders of the Kenyan government who do not act in the interest of their people, there are two important caveats to the prospect of its successful implementation: lack of motivation on the part of the governments of developed nations, which perceive local regimes as being corrupt and abusive and therefore always act in the best interests of developed nations, regardless of how the population is being treated; and the high risk to the interest of both the government of developed nations and domestic populations of African states incurred by the process of de-recognizing and then re-recognizing those governments.

William Reno’s “Illicit Markets, Violence, Warlords, and Governance: West African cases,” disputes the commonly-held belief that warlords, which he defines as “wartime leaders of illicit commercial networks,” are “exploitative” and “lack popular support” (Reno 2009, 313). He points out that in undeveloped nations, warlords are generally thought of as leaders of armed and violent local militias who act in their own self-interest and not in the interest of any broader community. But he argues that many so-called warlords “play key roles in promoting progressive political and economic changes” (Ibid). For example, in a country where the government is wildly perceived to be corrupt, warlords acting in the interest of particular local or tribal communities may provide popular alternatives.

Throughout history, ethnicity has played a major role in human lives, whether it is through establishing a sense of belonging among individuals or even serving as the foundation of an entire system with regard to values, shared beliefs, ideas, code of ethics, territory or language. Jean and John Camaroff identified politics as a factor that can make a major impact on ethnicity. For instance, government affairs that take place in Kenya are noted to have ethnic significance in determining how and by whom a country is governed. Politicians are often seen as using their
ethnicity card in establishing their goals (Camaroff 2009, 9). The authors believe that the improvements and changes brought on by democracy will capture individuals in many ways, whether it’s in business, politics or even the culture itself.

IV. A Path to Democracy

The solution to Kenya’s problems—corruption, famine, genocide and ethnic loyalties—lies in public unification and mutual understanding of each other’s wants and needs. Once people realize the importance of putting aside differences to work together toward common goals, they may begin to think beyond ethnic boundaries. In addition, cross-tribal affiliations need to be promoted in order to build an efficient government and achieve true democracy. For example, development projects, schools, transportation and security issues often transcend ethnicity. Grass roots organizations also give people a voice in community affairs. The West certainly cannot make this happen single handedly. It is important that grassroots organizations in Kenya work with their people to develop institutions and mechanisms that will support an effective democracy that respects its many ethnic and tribal affiliations. International organizations that work with Kenyan organizations must understand and respect these ethnic divisions to create sustainable institutions.

Kenya should not be expected to follow the European or American system of democracy. Kenya needs a form of government that addresses its culture and traditions. In many parts of the country, the influence and importance of tribal leadership cannot be dismissed. Any system of democracy that is developed must take into consideration the realities of tribalism. Because of the power of tribalism, governments in Kenya rule based on the tyranny of the majority, which becomes a majority defined by ethnicity.
Currently, the Kenyan government is not subject to the will of the people. In fact, they rule and control their subjects. Claude Ake states that “…what is important to remember here is it is not what democracy guarantees that is so important, it is what it allows” (Ake 1993, 234). Indeed, a democracy cannot guarantee anything, but it does give people a chance to express their views, and, if in the position of the minority, use their political freedom to eventually become the majority, in a peaceful, non-coercive way. An important factor in determining whether a democracy will work is based on how laws are applied and enforced. The rule of law is an important aspect of a democracy. Until the Kenyan government can set up an efficient judicial system, the hope that its democracy will guarantee anything is minimal. Kenyan leaders need to stop living above the law. When the law is enforced equitably, Kenyan people will be able to exercise their rights and their vote freely.

Not only does the rule of law need to be upheld to make a democracy work, but the people need to understand what a democracy will bring them. The people need to be educated as to why a democracy is better for them, and they need to understand that a functional democracy cannot happen overnight. Kenya needs to set the foundations of a democracy with minimal, yet highly effective, intervention from the international community. Also, the West must be true to democracy and not pretend that any election is proof of a democratic government. In addition, it is important that the international community provide an example to Kenyan people about the benefits of a democracy and how it works. This will require that the West continue to support the aspirations of people everywhere. Then Kenya and other East African nations will be able to use this information for the framework of building their own democracy.
Chapter 7: Democracy Promotion in Multiethnic States

By: Denis Rajić and Nathaniel Thomas

In the last twenty years, we have seen that democracy promotion faces unique challenges in multiethnic states. Ethnic divisions in societies have had a hindering effect on democracy promotion. Applying the same strategies for democracy promotion around the world has led to violence and further fragmentation in multiethnic states. This paper will argue that historical, ethnic, and social contexts have been ignored in multiethnic societies and that a more contextual approach to democracy promotion will be needed to promote success. This, however, comes with a warning that not all states will be able to resolve ethnic conflicts and divisions.

Divisions between ethnic groups are not the only problems faced by multiethnic states. There are deeply embedded social and economic problems that affect these states. These include: the lack of government accountability, the lack of socioeconomic institutions, poverty, and violence. When these problems are divided along ethnic lines, conflicts arise (Stewart 2008, 4). I will argue that socioeconomic and cultural problems are directly related to ethnic conflicts and that democracy cannot be achieved without first addressing these underlying societal fractures. Achieving inter-ethnic connections and cooperation is fundamental to erasing ethnic divisions and is integral to achieving functioning democracies. Without first building institutions and stable societies, democracy promotion will fail in multiethnic states. I will look at the specific problems that multiethnic democracies face including inequality along ethnic lines, nationalism, and the politics of fear. I will look at how this leads to conflict, how these problems have been exacerbated by failed democracy promotion policies in the past, and how democracy promotion strategies need to be changed to ameliorate the problems of multiethnic societies. These interlinked dynamics will be demonstrated by examining Nepal’s sociopolitical struggles. This
chapter will look at a long-term solution with a focus on stability and the prevention of violence as a precursor to functioning democratic multiethnic states.

I. Horizontal Inequalities

Inequality divided among ethnic lines is the primary source of conflict in multiethnic states. In fact, most states in the world are multiethnic states, and the majority of them experience no political or ethnic violence. This leaves us to wonder why it is that only certain states experience ethnic violence to such extreme levels. In *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, Frances Stewart addresses this question through the examination of horizontal inequalities. Stewart defines horizontal inequalities as, “inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups” (Stewart 2008, 3). This differs from vertical inequalities which are inequalities among individuals. Inequalities exist everywhere, however, among poor and multiethnic states, horizontal inequalities, inequalities between ethnic groups, are the most prominent and lead to ethnic conflict. Poverty is directly related to violence as seven out of ten of the world’s poorest states have been, or currently are, in civil wars (2008, 4). However, poverty is not the only factor, as the breakup of Yugoslavia, a developed European state, showed.

When horizontal inequalities exist, they can be used to manipulate and create even stronger divisions among ethnic groups. As the case study on Nepal will show, ethnic minorities who feel left out of the government can become resentful and create conflicts with the ruling majority. Since these inequalities are along ethnic lines, tensions between different ethnic groups arise, creating nationalist and divisive politics.

Horizontal inequalities can exist in social, economic, political, or cultural aspects. Social inequalities are disparities in education, health care, and housing. Economic inequalities are in
income levels, assets, and employment opportunities. Political inequalities are inequalities in distribution among government officials, police forces, and parliaments. Cultural inequalities include the recognition of different languages, religions and customs. These four aspects of horizontal inequalities all serve to propagate ethnic violence and divide groups along ethnic lines.

II. Inequality and Violence

Horizontal inequalities and violence in multiethnic states are closely interconnected. In *Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict*, Frances Stewart argues, “group mobilization along lines of identity is a central feature of many conflicts…The salience of particular identities is increased by political action – by political leaders, media or the education system – sometimes in order to raise consciousness of own identities, sometimes of that of others” (Stewart 2008, 10). However, conflict doesn’t arise simply because of cultural difference. If that were the case, most societies would hardly be able to function. As a matter of fact, as Nathan Glazer points out, “out of all the countries in the world, only seven did not have significant minorities or divisions based on ethnicity, race, religion, or language,” (Glazer 2010, 6). When conflicts along ethnic lines do arise, it is because of a strong connection to economic or political causes. Stewart goes on to argue,

Both political and socioeconomic inequalities are of major relevance to political outcomes; strong political [horizontal inequalities] mean that leaders of groups feel politically excluded and are thus more likely to lead opposition and possibly rebellion; while socioeconomic inequalities mean that the people as a whole have strong grievances on ethnic lines and are thus likely to be more readily mobilized (Stewart 2008, 18)

This is backed up by evidence in a study of 55 developing states by Gudrun Østby, in which he finds that severe social and economic horizontal inequalities in semi-democratic and democratic states consistently lead to a higher risk of conflict (Stewart 2008, 147). Cultural and ethnic
identities are powerful ideas that can be easily manipulated and influenced. Studies have also shown secessionist violence is directly related to regional horizontal inequalities (2008, 2). Furthermore, evidence shows that countries, where political exclusion along ethnic lines is high, face a high risk of violent upheaval. Since violence has such a close relationship to horizontal inequalities, then, to promote stable democracies, we must first focus our attention to these inequalities.

III. Poverty

Just as horizontal inequalities are related to violence, so is poverty. In *Guns, Wars, and Votes*, Paul Collier found that in poor states, democracy raises the risk of violence. He states, “In low-income countries, democracy made the society more dangerous…Whereas in societies that are not poor it enhances their already safer conditions, in poor societies, democracy amplifies the already severe dangers” (Collier 2009, 20-21). In fact, Collier finds a threshold of $2,700 per capita per year as the point at which democracy is peaceful (2009, 21). Most undemocratic societies, however, are well below this level of per capita income. This is a significant finding as it shows that democracy is not the solution to societal problems in poor states. The promotion of democracy for the sake of democracy is not the remedy to deep societal problems. Addressing poverty, inequalities, and ethnic divides are all preconditions to democracy.

IV. Institutional Failure

In the article “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?” William Easterly analyzes the institutional barriers that ethnically divided societies face. Since ethnic identities trump national identity, the incentive for groups to work toward the betterment of the entire state diminishes (Easterly 2001, 4). He argues, “Lower ‘trust’ between diverse ethnic groups make it difficult to form the social networks (‘social capital’) that promote growth by disseminating advanced
technology and economically useful knowledge” (2001, 6). Weak institutions in poor multiethnic states give little protection for minorities and create low trust in government. Easterly goes on to argue, “Ethnic groups may act selfishly in their own interest, because they may receive only spillovers from the human capital or knowledge of those in their own ethnic or neighborhood group” (2001, 4). With little protection from the government and weak political and economic institutions, groups are faced with inequality and only end up supporting their respective ethnic groups.

V. Failures of Past Policies

The first major issue that has been problematic for the push for democracy is the one-size fits all policy of the transition paradigm. The idea that states moving away from autocracy are moving towards democracy is one of the assumptions made by transition paradigm. However, as Thomas Carothers points out in “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” this is not true ubiquitously (Carothers 2010). States that have moved away from autocracy have not steadily moved towards democracy. This is exemplified in multiethnic states who have felt higher instability when democracy is introduced.

The faulty assumption of past democracy promotion programs, as Carothers puts it, is “that the underlying conditions in transitional countries—their economic level, political history, institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, sociocultural traditions, or other ‘structural’ features – will not be major factors in either the onset or the outcome of the transition process” (Carothers 2002, 8). Approaches that have ignored ethnic divisions, cultural histories, and existing institutions have led to bad policy making. Applying the same democratic promotion policy around the world will not only lead to further complications ethnic conflicts, it will not address the underlying societal factors that have led to these problems in the first place.
One of the evident mistakes of past democracy promotion policies has been the focus on elections as a means towards democracy. Past policies towards multiethnic states have failed to address the problems of ethnic divisions. As Paul Collier describes in his book, *Wars, Guns, and Votes*, the main problem with democracy promotion in the past has been the push for elections (Collier 2009). This was propelled by the thought that if only developing states held free and fair elections, democracy would flourish. However, these elections were not only undemocratic, they led to violence, and in the case of multiethnic states to deeper divisions in society. The neglect of inequality, poverty, and ethnic divisions in multiethnic societies has led to an escalation in violence and movement away from democracy (Stewart 2008, 4).

Elections in multiethnic societies have led to ethnic parties which cater only to the needs of their own ethnic groups. Since ethnic politics are based on fear and manipulation, candidates do not stand for moderation but instead move towards extremism. Collier describes this in his book staying, “not only does identity trump policies, but to the extent that policies do not enter, instead of a race to capture the vote of Ms. Moderate the All-Powerful Media Voter, there is a race to the extremes” (Collier 2009, 56). This damages the democratic process as voting for extremist ethnic leaders, “selects the most ardently sectarian leaders, so that when it comes to the stage of reaching compromise in a grand coalition, the starting point for the negotiations is as far toward the position of your own ethnic group as possible” (2009, 57). Extremist politics do not serve to the overall good of the country, but only to calm fears of different ethnic groups, fears that are being propagated by the same system of unfair elections. Elections are won on policies of bribery, corruption, and violence, not resembling western liberal democracies at all.

The push for elections in states that are not institutionally or economically ready for them has led to many issues. The first problem that arises is the issue of government accountability.
Since parties and candidates are elected along ethnic lines and not political ones, there is no system of accountability for the elected. Elected representatives have no incentive to perform well as their entire campaign was built on ethnic backing. This often leads to corrupt leaders and bad governance as the candidates who win do not run on political platforms.

Another problem that nationalist politics can lead to is the further division of states. What is today described as Balkanization, following the breakup of Yugoslavia, is a problem that many multiethnic states face. If ethnic tensions continue to escalate, seeking a solution to economic and political problems, groups will seek to secede from their current governments in order to create ethnically pure states. When looked at in the long run, ethnically pure states would be a solution to ethnic violence. However, ethnic boundaries are not simple and in many cases are not even definable. The violence that would ensue in the Balkanization of multiethnic states would destroy lives, governments, and any strides made towards liberal democracy. The only viable solution for multiethnic democracy is to try and create ethnic cooperation and equality along political, social, economic, and cultural lines.

VI. Multiethnic Democracy

To understand how democracy can be sustained in societies with ethnic divides we can look at functioning multiethnic democracies today. One example of a state with a deep cultural divide is Canada. The divide between English-speaking Canada and French-speaking Quebec has been a part of Canada’s history and has not been without conflict. As described by Nathan Glazer in “Deep Divides,” “the sense of resentment in Quebec over the province’s position in the Canadian economy and political system was all too real, difficult as it may have been for other Canadians to understand” (Glazer 2010, 10). This problem was continuously attempted to be addressed by recognizing Quebec as a nation within Canada, giving the French language
protection, and allowing for special rights for distinct groups. Glazer summarizes Canada’s deep divide saying,

Most Canadians have now wearied of the conflict and claim not to mind Quebec’s leaving if Quebec so chooses….Whatever Quebec decides, there will be no forceful or armed effort to keep it within Canada—that would go against everything Canadian. While Quebec is often governed by a party that calls for sovereignty, and on occasion a majority of public opinion supports it, the Quebec government never goes all the way, perhaps because of the incredible complexity and economic costs of fully divorcing itself from the rest of Canada (2010, 13)

Canada’s deep divide is one that is successfully managed because of its democratic system. Since Quebec elects many representatives in the government, the rest of Canada must listen to their demands. Quebec has an economic incentive to stay unified with the rest of Canada and political stability is guaranteed. Ethnic and political violence is all but nonexistent, and even if Quebec does secede one day, the rest of Canada will not forcefully attempt to prevent it from doing so. The credit for this success is in the governance of the country, high level of prosperity, and low level of horizontal inequality.

VII. Methods of Addressing Ethnic Divides

The specific problem of ethnic divisions in multiethnic societies needs to be addressed before elections can be successful. Here, there are different ways of mitigating this problem. In Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict, Frances Stewart proposes three different ways of dealing with inequalities along ethnic lines. These are direct, indirect, and integrationist approaches (Stewart 2008, 403).

Direct approaches are policies that set quotas on the proportions of ethnic groups in government, education, or employment. This can have positive effects as ethnic groups that are regularly shut out of these institutions can now participate in them. Examples of this include
setting quotas for seats in the government, creating investment in certain groups that have been marginalized, and the recognition of minority cultures and languages. Direct approaches give voice to groups that are usually marginalized and often go unheard. However, direct approaches do have a negative side, as they can create deeper divisions in society. After the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton Peace Agreement, created with the primary intention of ending the civil war, used a direct approach in its framing. The agreement, created a government that splits power between the three main ethnic groups, Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. The positive effect of this agreement was that it ended the conflict over who would have power in the country, however the negative effect has been that the country has been in political deadlock ever since with some even questioning the functionality of the government (Zilic 2003, 6).

Indirect approaches are similar to direct approaches in that they try to mitigate the effects of ethnic divisions by not giving priority to any ethnic group over another. These are policies that try to reduce group inequalities such as antidiscrimination legislation, regional development programs, and freedom of religion (Stewart 2008, 304). Indirect approaches try to address to horizontal inequalities by reducing the importance of identity. However, they are more ineffective in reducing inequalities in a country as they do not address the problems specifically.

The third approach, and the one most oriented towards long term sustainability is the integrationist approach. Integrationist policies try to erase ethnic divisions by creating inter-ethnic linkages and cooperation. Policies range from banning ethnic and religious political parties, requirement of multi-ethnic schools, promotion of multi-cultural institutions, and the promotion of an overarching national identity (Stewart 2008, 304). The integrationist approach seems to be the desired approach in creating long-term sustainable democracies. However,
achieving the goals sought by this approach faces many tough challenges. If ethnic divisions exist, then expecting people to accept multiculturalism will not be easy.

Any serious democracy promotion effort will need to take all of these approaches into account as they all have strengths and weaknesses. However, if the goal is to create sustainability and interethnic cooperation, then integrationist approaches should be promoted. As noted earlier, social, historical, and cultural contexts are immensely important and choosing one approach over the other because of preconceived notions can be dangerous.

**VIII. Building Institutions**

Developing infrastructures and building institutions can have a positive effect on ethnic divisions. In “Can Institutions Resolve Ethnic Conflict?” William Easterly describes the effect that positive institutions can have on ethnic conflicts, “While ethnic diversity is given exogenously, countries may be able to adopt institutional arrangements – clear property rights, freedom from expropriation, effective ‘rules of the game,’ and an efficient bureaucracy – that mitigate the negative repercussions of diverse interest groups” (Easterly 2001, 10). The creation of efficient and sustainable institutions can mitigate the negative effects of ethnic divisions. Given equal protection under the law, competition between different ethnic groups would diminish. Easterly goes on to say, “Institutions that give legal protection to minorities, guarantee freedom from expropriation, grant freedom from repudiation of contracts, and facilitate cooperation for public services would constrain the amount of damage that one ethnic group could do to another” (2001, 6).

The effect of high-quality institutions not only positively affects divisions between ethnic groups; it also lowers the probability of ethnic violence and genocide. William Easterly examines data in states with differing levels of institutional quality and ethnic diversity and finds that,
“Higher quality institutions make a given degree of ethnic diversity less likely to result in genocide” (2001, 17). He also finds that, “Countries in the lowest third of institutional quality have an increasing probability of genocide as ethnic fragmentation increases…Conversely, countries in the upper two-thirds of institutional quality do not show an increasing probability of genocide as ethnic fragmentation increases. Most striking of all, countries in the upper third of institutional quality have NO genocides, regardless of their level of ethnic diversity” (2001, 17).

With this study we see that ethnic diversity is not a direct barrier to a stable society. Easterly correlates institutional quality directly with violence and finds that multiethnic states with weak institutions tend to have more ethnic conflict while multiethnic states with strong institutions have less conflict. One of the most important findings that Easterly finds is when he states, “The interaction with democracy is insignificant, while the institutional quality interaction effect remains significant. If we take institutional quality as a measure of economic and legal freedoms, these seem to be more important than political freedoms in mitigating the effect of ethnic diversity on the likelihood of genocide” (2001, 18). This finding shows that democracy is not the cure to multiethnic states. To build a democracy, one must first build good institutions and guarantees political and economic freedoms to the populous. Easterly concludes the article saying

Poor institutions have an even more adverse effect on growth and policy when ethnic diversity is high. Conversely, in countries with sufficiently good institutions, ethnic diversity does not lower growth or worsen economic policies. Good institutions also lower the risk of wars and genocides that might otherwise result from ethnic fractionalization. Ethnically diverse nations that wish to endure in peace and prosperity must build good institutions (Ibid)

Without first creating a solid foundation for democracy, we cannot expect democracy promotion efforts to be effective.
IX. Knitting Together Nations

Looking at the problems that multiethnic societies face in democratizing, it is clear that democracy promotion policies will need to encompass more than just political aspects. Fostering civil society groups and political parties will need to eventually happen, but more important issues such as addressing ethnic inequalities and institutional failures will need to come beforehand. This means that even simple development programs that encourage inter-ethnic cooperation and foster economic development can have a positive effect towards democracy promotion.

An example of a program that addresses ethnic divisions and focuses on economic development is the World Bank’s “Knitting Together Nations” program in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here is the World Bank’s statement of the goals of Knitting Together Nations:

The initiative known as the “Knitting Together Nations” Project (KTN) was launched in 1997 by the World Bank Resident Mission in Sarajevo, in collaboration with local non-governmental organizations. The overall KTN goals are to create sustainable employment opportunities for Bosnian artisans, mostly displaced women through production, marketing, and sale of traditional knitwear and crafts, and revive and sustain the traditional multiethnic cultural traditions, and build inter-entity linkages between designers and producers (Knitting Together Nations Project).

While at first glance this program could be regarded as just a development program that has little to do with democracy promotion, this chapter argues that this has a very important part in creating sustainable multiethnic democracies. As we saw earlier, ethnic divisions and horizontal inequalities are the foremost barriers to democracy in multiethnic states. Addressing these problems first is crucial to creating a sustainable democratic government. The description of the program goes on to say, “Job opportunities will be created for displaced women from all ethnicities, re-establishing cooperation and friendship among Bosnia and Herzegovina’s divided ethnic groups” (From Bosnia to the World). While this program alone will not create a
democratic society, it is the type of program that will facilitate inter-ethnic cooperation and economic development, two essential preconditions in a multiethnic democracy. This program aims to “create sustainable employment opportunities for Bosnian artisans through production, marketing and sale of knitwear and crafts inspired by traditional Bosnian designs” (Ibid) and to “revive and sustain the multiethnic cultural traditions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and build inter-entity linkages between designers and producers” (Ibid). Understanding the limits of democracy promotion, one cannot expect democracy to flourish overnight, but developing policies and programs that address ethnic inequalities and poverty sets the groundwork for a functioning democracy.

As we can see, one cannot underestimate the problems that multiethnic societies face. This report argues that developmental approaches, focusing on the long term solution to ethnic inequalities, will be the most promising path to creating stable multiethnic democracies. Addressing inequalities and failed institutions is essential to democracy promotion and cannot be viewed through a separate lens. When we look at Nepal, we see a state that is currently dealing with ethnic divisions and inequalities, with an unclear path towards the future. The next section will look at specific challenges that Nepal faces and how they can help us get better insight into multiethnic states and democracy.

X. Case Study on Nepal

A. Sociopolitical Challenges in Multiethnic States

Examining the circumstances in Nepal provides further understanding of the sociopolitical challenges multiethnic societies face. In the case of Nepal historical stratifications have created inherent social inequalities which have regressed civic and economic freedom. Lessening these alienating strains is essential to inclusive democratic consolidation.
Democracy is held as a high form of government in which corruption and conflict are checked by the accountability state actors have to their society, it having been liberated by homogenous civic freedoms. However, problems related to corruption and conflict are “heavily affected by the very social, historical, and cultural considerations that [Thomas] Carothers accuses of ignoring” (Hyman 2002, 30). Hence, it is relevant to consider that many nations which possess vast ethno-cultural diversity have suffered from conflicts deriving from the historic stratifications of prior nation-building. This marginalization can continue to segment state and society, and thus hinder democracy. When describing the institutionalized exclusions that nation-state building can create Kymlicka writes:

Within the territory of most states there are many groups possessing their own language, their own history, their own culture, their own heroes, their own symbols. Such groups are often excluded entirely by the process of nation building, or included only at the price of accepting second-class status, stigmatized by the racialist and ethnocentric ideologies used to justify nation-building. Indeed minorities are typically the first target of these policies, since they are the greatest obstacle to the goal (or myth) of a unified nation-state, and hence most in need of ‘nationalization’. The result, over time, has been the creation of multiple forms of exclusion and subordination for minorities, often combining political marginalization, economic disadvantage, and cultural domination (Kymlicka 2008, 65)

Democracy has the ability to reconstruct state-society relations on the basis of inclusion, recognition, and civic freedoms. This leads to a stable government that can prioritize on economic development and poverty issues rather than sociopolitical calamities. Democracy needs to be promoted in ways which mitigate the social stratifications caused by prior nation-building processes in multiethnic societies. The issue at hand is how democracy programs can prevail over social adversities, Linz and Stepan emphasize this by stating, “the specific ways of structuring political life in multinational settings need to be contextualized in each country” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 26) and that “the greater extent to which the population of a state is
composed of a plurality of national, linguistics, religious, or cultural societies, the more complex politics becomes, since an agreement on the fundamentals of a democracy will be more difficult” (1996, 24).

Furthermore in many cases multiethnic states suffer from structural injustices that have been institutionalized by the dominant group. Due to their overlapping desires for recognition this structural injustice can enable oppositional radicals to mobilize marginalized groups. Mobilizing minorities provides the momentum for political hysteria. Because this ultimately hinders democratic consolidation, it is important to portray these challenges.

B. Marginalization in Nepal

Nepal is a good example of the complexities that multiethnic states face during the process of democracy consolidation. Currently the state of Nepal is trying to devise a constitution; however, this transitional government remains conflicted by varying political parties. The Maoists have played a major role in contributing to the country’s political hysteria, yet the weight of their involvement is largely related to the country’s historic alienations; “conflict in Nepal is a manifestation of complex social and economic demands, intertwined with ideology and a history of discrimination on which the Maoist were able to capitalize” (Lawoti and Anup 2010, 243).

Nepal has over fifty recognized ethnic groups and over a hundred languages spoken. In its history as a Hindu kingdom Nepal used the Hindu religion to create “nationalizing state policies” aimed at increasing cultural homogeneity” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 22). This caused the diverse indigenous ethno-cultural groups to be subordinated by dominant Hindu elites. Over time as the Maoists’ involvement grew, their momentum was built by their denouncement of structural injustices, which in turn enabled them to mobilize marginalized groups. Currently
Nepal remains in a situation where state affiliated elites, Maoist ideologies, and other social factors, continue to impede the process of democracy consolidation.

Carothers mentions a political syndrome called “feckless pluralism,” and specifically mentions that “Nepal is a clear example in Asia” (Carothers 2002, 11). When describing feckless pluralism, he states “overall, politics is widely seen as a stale, corrupt, elite-dominated domain that delivers little good to the country and commands equally little respect. And the state remains persistently weak” (2002, 10). Nepal fits this syndrome because despite suffering from a struggling economy and corruptive politics, it seems to be run solely by elites from a single ethnic group.

The state accentuates common laws and broadly accepted norms in order to create a sense of homogenous identity and moral order. Nepal’s Indo-Aryan aristocracy (Bahuns) sought to do this by establishing their culture as the national model, from which their castes enjoyed “state patronage” (Hoftun 1999, 311). “People, Politics and ideology” by Martin Hoftun mentions that, “In order to maintain their social position the high caste groups had used two powerful tools- the Nepali language and the Hindu religion. The ruling elite had successfully incorporated all ethnic groups in Nepal into the caste system and these groups came to accept a subordinate position in Nepalese society” (1999, 320). Since Nepal’s society consists of substantial sociocultural diversity this stratification fails to promote the homogenous identity the state requires, which further emphasizes the need to base Nepal’s political ethics on multiculturalism.

Theorist James C. Scott says in order to simplify its functionality the state attempts to make society legible, requiring what he calls a synoptic view (Scott 1998). Language is the embodiment of legibility and is a tool states use to coordinate society, for example in the U.S. English governs our street signs, major media sources, and academic institutions. RatnaTuladhar,
previous chairman of the Newar language organization indicates that, “most of the ethnic groups in Nepal were deprived of their basic right to develop their own mother tongue” (Hoftun 1999, 322). In Nepal despite its 92 recorded languages the aristocracy has promoted Nepali for ages, however only about 48% of obtain literacy. The fundamental civic freedom of citizens in democracy is their ability to have an effectual voice in the discourses which implement and determine the norms through which they’re governed, yet how is this possible when statecraft is illegible to more than half of society? Democracy uses choice to create homogeneity, and because polices are open to review and renegotiation social mobility is generated by the populace’s participation. This civic freedom is what authors David Owen and James Tully have called “dialogical civic freedom,” and when considering the Maoists insurgency their discussion of this freedom portrays its deficiency in Nepal (Laden et al. 2007). Owen and Tully write:

Activities of struggling over recognition also allow citizens to dispel resentment that might otherwise be discharged in violent forms of protest and terrorism if this openness is suppressed and a norm of mutual recognition in imposed unilaterally. On this hypothesis, the turn to violence and terrorism increases as the openness to dialogical civic freedom decreases (2007, 290)

The social stratifications and exclusions attributed to the Bahun’s tools of “state patronage” (Hinduism and the Nepali language) have inhibited the multiculturalism needed for state and society agendas to successfully coexist in Nepal. According to the article “Caste, Ethnicity and Inequality in Nepal” by David N. Gellner,

Bahuns and chetris together – just 31 percent of the population – had two-thirds of the jobs, whereas hill janajatis (tribes)... with 22 percent of the population had just 7 percent of the jobs, and Madhesis, with 31 percent of the population had only 11 per cent of the jobs. Dalits with nearly 9 percent of the population had just 0.3 percent of the jobs... Bahun men constitute only 6.5 per cent of the population but lead all the major political parties (Gellner 2007)
Though no longer a Hindu Monarchy, this displays how Nepal’s state remains under the reign of a normalized Bahun aristocracy.

This is a problem because the needs of excluded groups do not grasp the attention of Nepal’s elites. In “Towards a Democratic Nepal” author Mahendra Lawoti writes, “The issue of inclusion is more salient in multicultural societies because, in certain arenas and issues, people with values and experiences that are different from others cannot represent the entire population” (Lawoti 2005, 24). This shows how Nepal’s state is not only mistrusted due to institutionalized exclusion, but by its under-representing the dynamics of Nepal’s society. Furthermore, “Discontent against some signs and symbols-associated with Hindu monarchy—i.e., national symbols, national anthem (phrased in a way that equate patriotism with worship to the king), use of Sanskrit language in education and media, etc. have now turned into agendas of oppositional politics and minority movements”—hence the Maoist insurgency (Baral 2006, 121). In addition to this in “Nepal Facets of Maoist Insurgency” author Lok Raj Baral indicates:

Hindu hegemony denied the multicultural characteristics of the country and hindered the growth and development of multiculturalism—“a conception of democracy in which cultures are presented as equals in the public domain… the state has not fully conformed to the spirit of multicultural democracy as the attitudes, values, norms and practices of the ruling elites have remained unchanged (2006, 34)

Similarly, William Kymlicka states,

Liberal multiculturalism rests on the assumption that policies of recognizing and accommodating ethnic diversity can expand human freedom, strengthen human rights, and diminish racial hierarchies, and deepen democracy (Kymlicka 2008, 18)

C. The “People’s War”

The “People’s War” was started by the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) on February 13th 1996. Their insurgency was a class war fueled by poverty, and their ideology entails replacing the reactionary state with socialism. Maoists are convinced Nepal’s ruling class
has, “apathy to address ethnic grievances…and persistent socio-political and economic exclusion, discrimination and deprivation of ascribed collectivities on the basis of their ethnicity, low caste status, religions, political beliefs and gender” (Baral 2006, 32). Not only has this perspective erected the Maoists insurgency with the support of marginalized groups, it drives their proposition to secularize the state through a federal form of government based on ethnicity and regionalism (2006, 122).

The Maoist used tactics such as demonstration killings to instill fear in rural villagers as well as their opponents. They also threatened property rights by confiscating land from the well-off and 85,185 abduction cases were recorded by the Informal Sector Service Center during the span of their “Peoples War” (Lawoti and Anup 2010, 310). In terms of the state’s contribution INSEC recorded 828 disappeared persons on their behalf, and in many cases the state placed false charges on Maoists as well as innocents whom they perceived as threats. Furthermore out of the 13,347 deaths that were recorded during the “Peoples War” (1996-2006) sixty-three percent of them were committed on the state’s behalf, causing it to be responsible for the majority of those killed during the insurgency (2010, 309). The insurgency also led to an immense amount of displaced persons. Results from INSEC in 2008 indicate that from 2002 to 2004, 50,365 people were displaced, 3,837 by the state, 21,320 by the Maoists, and the remaining 25,199 emigrated out of fear (2010, 310). Basic civil liberties such as the freedoms of press along with the general movement of citizens were also restrained during the insurgency. Not only were civilians pinned down by Maoists and state security forces, but between them were the deaths of 18 journalists due to their mutual attempts to limit conflicting propaganda (2010, 311).
The insurgency has significantly impacted political disarray and contributed to stagnant economic development. In 2006 Nepal’s GNI (gross national income) per capita was a mere US$290, making it the second lowest in South Asia next to Afghanistan, and globally Nepal continues to be one of the most economically deprived nations (Lawoti and Anup 2010, 7). Furthermore in the 1990s Nepal was considered as South Asia’s most unequal country (2010, 8). This is significant because in 1996 the Maoists’ started their People’s War in response to class inequality. Much of Nepal’s social exclusion has been ingrained by the issue of poverty and its unequal distribution amongst ethnic lines, causing poverty to be the primary domestic concern (Pandey 2010, 50). “Not only are groups like Dalit, indigenous nationalities and Muslims poorer, but even the decrease in the incidence of poverty among them is slower compared to Bahun, Chhetri and Newar” (Lawoti and Anup 2010, 10). This reality is also linked to the history of institutionalized exclusion in Nepal, because the state patronage that Nepal’s ‘high castes’ have been able to enjoy has enabled them to monopolize political, economic, and socio-cultural control; “Bahun, Chetri, Newar and Tarai ‘high castes’ have better access to material resources while Dalit, indigenous nationalities, mid-level Madeshi caste, and Muslims are generally worse off” (2010, 10).

In addition to the domestic negativity created through human rights violations the insurgency also damaged the economy; “The major drive behind the growth of the insurgency was economic transformation but, ironically the immediate impact on the economy has been negative. The insurgency, in fact, stunted economic growth” (2010, 315). As mentioned earlier the foremost concern in Nepal is poverty, and even if Nepal were socio-politically resolved it could not address poverty with an insufficient economy. It was the infrastructural calamity that resulted in economic decline, for instance many government institutions, bridges,
communication centers, and power sources were destroyed, and educational facilities were also closed during the Maoists’ radical strikes. The Maoists’ inflictions on rural areas also deprived locals from the supportive services they once received from NGOs and INGOs, for instance by July 2003 the Maoists had demolished forty-three percent of the Village Develop Committee’s office buildings (2010, 316). Remittance economy is also a major income source for Nepali households and many of those who work abroad are from villages. In some cases when workers sent remittance or returned home for the holidays the Maoists would tax their supportive efforts. In addition to this people were either fleeing from or being lured to the insurgency. This caused food production to decline in agrarian rural societies, and in addition to this food sale was also upset by the state’s attempts to curb Maoist food extortion.

D. Military, Diplomacy and National Security

Though external actors were initially passive in regards to Nepal’s conflict, when global fears of terrorism became elevated due to the September 11th attacks, influential nations such as the U.S. and India placed the terrorist label on CPN-Maoists. This goes to show that although there may have been other driving factors for the involvement of external actors in Nepal’s conflict (such as development and commercial relations) their main reasons were related to political influence and their divergence from Maoists’ ideals.

In May 2003 the British Broadcasting Corporation quoted former United Sates ambassador to Nepal Michael E. Malinowski saying the U.S. “does not seek to establish any U.S. base in Nepal,” yet the United States is actually accredited as being a primary external amplifier of Nepal’s conflict due to its desire to widen military influence (Vaughn 2006, 19). The U.S. got involved due to its general safeguards against global terrorism, radical communists, and its tactical interests in Nepal’s geopolitical location between China and India. In the 2005
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, the U.S. Department of State mentioned the following:

Strengthening Nepal to prevent a Maoist takeover is key to achieving U.S. regional and bilateral goals, including preventing the spread of terror, enhancing regional stability, promoting democracy, and protecting U.S. citizens in Nepal. Ordinary Nepalis are increasingly frustrated that the popular democratic reform of 1990 has not yet been translated into improvements in their lives, which is an underlying factor contributing to the Maoist insurgency. Economic and social disparity, corruption, and a lack of good governance and infrastructure are factors which make Nepalis susceptible to Maoist influence and propaganda. U.S. support for Nepal’s counterinsurgency effort consists of a multi-track approach including counterterrorism training and equipment for the military and police, targeted rural development in areas vulnerable to Maoist influence, help in strengthening weak democratic institutions, and human rights training (USA FY-2006)

In addition to military, diplomacy is another method used to preserve national security, and although cheaper and less hazardous, diplomacy often becomes entangled with martial endeavors. Diplomacy essentially entails the ability to mediate, and mediation requires an unbiased third party position so that neutrality can serve as the bridge between misunderstandings. In terms of the counter insurgency the U.S. provided financial support, military intelligence, training programs, and artillery. This illustrates the U.S.’s avoidance of mediation because, “As the Nepali state was a party in the conflict, such engagements with the state to suppress the insurgency added fuel to the conflict” (Lawoti and Anup 2010, 226). Furthermore, “powerful bilateral countries were not able to mediate because of their biased position against the Maoists. The Maoists did not accept diplomats and envoys of the powerful nations like India and the USA as neutral third parties because of their vehement public oppositions to the CPN-M…their actions often further complicated the political situation and exacerbated the conflict” (2010, 220). Although negotiating with radicals may negate U.S. interests, it is crucial to consider the grievances which underlie conflicts.
While in Nepal meeting with the former king, previous Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca stated, “we want Nepal to be a peaceful, prosperous and democratic country where civil liberties and human rights are protected” (Vaughn 2006, 4). During the insurgency numerous human rights violations were committed by the Maoists as well as the state. While Maoist bloodshed threatened the lives of civilians, political opponents and the state’s armed forces, the state was responsible for the deaths of many Maoists and those whom they suspected were affiliates.

E. Multicultural Societies and their Relationship to the State

Violence between political parties has seemingly been renounced in Nepal, their current arena of contestation primarily resting on the promulgation of the new constitution. Being that Nepal is a multicultural society it is crucial for the authors of this legitimate document to acknowledge the issues surrounding the concept of multiculturalism which concerns the politics of cultural difference. When describing issues that pertain to the politics of cultural difference *Multiculturalism and Political Theory* states,

The paradigm situation assumed by the politics of cultural difference is that of a society in which there is a plurality of ethnic, national, and/or religious, but in the current moment one or some of them tend the wield dominant power through the state. These dominate groups tend to bias state action and policy in ways that favor members of their groups-for example, by declaring their language the official political language, or by making only those religious holidays days celebrated by members of their group holidays recognized by the state”, and that “minorities groups resist this dominative power”, and insist that the state “take special measures to assure representation of minority groups in political decisions making , and many other claims for cultural recognition and freedom”…An array of proposals and debates has arisen concerning what it can mean to accommodate such a right, not all of which involve creating a distinct sovereign state for the oppressed nationality, but most of which involve constitutional issues (Laden et al. 2007, 83)
The previous statement supports the fact that during discussions over the new constitution, the parties involved in Nepal’s transitional government essentially have the opportunity to legitimately disown the structural injustices which have transcended into institutionalized exclusions, revolt, and a weakened state-society relationship. It must be considered that, “In normative terms, there is no such thing as a constitutional state without democracy” (Taylor 1994, 122). Furthermore, socialist movements like the Maoists insurgency are known to conclude with the realization that “the central problem of injustice is recognition”, and that effective inclusion requires the state to acknowledge the various forms of marginalization that exist in society (Laden et al. 2007, 105). Moreover, when it comes to minorities’ demands to end structural injustice “post-communist and post-colonial states have difficulty responding to these claims, which threaten not only their traditional self-understanding as unitary and homogenous nation-states, but also pose potential threats to security, human rights and development” (Kymlicka 2008, 295).

As previously demonstrated, the Maoist rebellion was not only an embodiment of threats to security, human rights and development, but it was significantly fueled by its mobilization of ethnocultural minorities. It addition to this relevant point, it is also important to consider that “the problem of violent ethnic conflict, and the need to find paths to ethnic co-existence, is often most severe in countries that are not consolidated democracies” (2008, 8). With this in mind, a democracy based on multiculturalism will not only endorse substantial equality, it will provide the civic freedoms needed to sustain a strengthened and inclusive state-society relationship; liberal multiculturalism having been defined as:

the view that states should not only uphold the familiar set of common civil, political, and social rights of citizenship that are protected in all constitutional democracies, but also adopt various group-specific rights or policies that are intended to recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and aspirations of ethnocultural groups (2008, 61)
The grievances produced by structural injustice have been the fundamental channels for Nepal’s sociopolitical upheaval. Researchers at Oxford University have listed social exclusion and horizontal inequality as primary motives for conflict, and in reference to their studies Professor Bishawa Nath Tiwari of Nepal’s Tribhuvan University mentions, “conflict entrepreneurs mobilize the socially excluded social groups (different caste and ethnicity or races) for violent conflict because such groups have grievances due to political and socio-economic inequalities and inequalities resulting from deep-rooted cultural and historical discrimination” (Lawoti and Anup 2010, 242-243). When highlighting Nepal’s background and U.S. relations, in his 2006 Congressional Research Service report, Bruce Vaughn from the U.S. Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division said, “U.S. policy objectives toward Nepal include supporting democratic institutions and economic liberalization, promoting peace and stability in South Asia, supporting Nepalese independence and territorial integrity, and alleviating poverty” (Vaughn 2009, 17). Consequently in Nepal poverty is significantly higher in those ethnic groups which have been traditionally marginalized. This further illustrates how Nepal’s Maoists were able to achieve momentum by integrating the excluded indigenous minorities. In addition to this when it comes to social disputes studies have shown that ethnicity is a more powerful vehicle than social class (Lawoti and Anup 2010, 244), and in Nepal institutionalized exclusion derives from its history with the Hindu caste system, which actually used ethnicity to prescribe social status. Thus the deep roots Nepal’s sociopolitical situation has in institutionalized exclusion become unearthed by realizing the amalgamation of the Maoist rebellion, Nepal’s ethnic diversity, the nation’s historic exclusions, and its stagnant democratic transition. Because effective inclusive policies require recognition, it is crucial for democracy promotion to grasp the depth of social exclusion.

F. The Multicultural State
When providing a comparative analysis of the Maoists insurgencies of India, Nepal and Peru, Dr. Mahendra Lawoti found that Nepal’s state was the least inclusive of indigenous minorities, and that “The Peruvian and India cases show that government’s inclusive reform policies can blunt the growth of insurgencies” (2010, 151). This further emphasizes that in order to reach and sustain sociopolitical stability Nepal’s polity must prioritize on the development of inclusive policies. As a democratic concept, multiculturalism is capable of this because it can mold Nepal’s state and society by constructing a nationalism based on diversity and equality. Once Nepal achieves a socio-politically stable democracy, its inclusiveness can allow the nation to prioritize on addressing poverty via economic development. Multiculturalism is also necessary because once economic development provides the means for societal advancement opportunities should not be limited to specific groups.

What then would a civic nation look like if it were to function as a multicultural state? In his description of a multicultural state theorist Will Kymlicka highlights three general determining factors:

1. A multicultural state involves the repudiation of the older idea that the state is a possession of a single national group. Instead, the state must be seen as belonging equally to all citizens.
2. A multicultural state repudiates any nation-building policies that assimilate or exclude members of minority or non-dominant groups. Instead, it accepts that individuals should be able to access state institutions, and to act as full and equal citizens in political life, without having to hide or deny their enthocultural identity. The state accepts an obligation to accord recognition and accommodation to the history, language, and culture of non-dominant groups, as it does for the dominant group.
3. A multicultural state acknowledges the historic injustice that was done to minority/non-dominant groups by these policies of assimilation and exclusion, and manifests a willingness to offer some sort of remedy or rectification for them (Kymlicka 2008, 65)

These principles present the ways in which policies based on multiculturalism allow for nation-building to be more pluralistic. This is because these policies are designed to monitor the dynamics of social exclusion so that the relationship between state and society can be reinforced
by recognition. Beyond the application of inclusive policies, the state also needs to tighten its relations with society so that non-state intuitions are also encouraged to indicate and amend their forms of structural injustice (schools, religious institutions, private companies, etc.).

Furthermore, if Nepal does reach governmental cohesion in addition to the necessity of multiculturalism is the establishment of political culture. Political culture is: “the orientation of the citizens of a nation toward politics, and their perceptions of political legitimacy and the traditions of political practice” (Pandey 2010, 89). Put frankly political culture is congruent with civic education. Unfortunately in Nepal political traditions have tended to portray the state’s regional disregards, the institutionalization of exclusion, and an overall selfish way governing. This has contributed to a lack of political education as well as a general mistrust in politics. For instance the improper transition of leadership is an issue in Nepal, because elderly headship throughout political affairs loathes the view of retirement. This is a problem because the young minds which have evolved with the shifting government have been denied the opportunity to contribute. What's more is though democracy became a more widespread topic in Nepal during the 1990s, the concept was the party which won the majority of parliament could in turn govern anyway they wished; thus “As the political parties, especially the ruling party, abused state power and administration to influence electoral outcomes, elections in particular and democracy in general began to lose legitimacy” (Lawoti and Anup 2010, 22). The legislative mistrust generated by Nepal’s poor political traditions have also influenced the invigorating appeals of Maoists; Lawoti writing, “The undemocratic intra-party culture was responsible for disconnecting the leadership from the aspirations of cadres and the common people. The Maoists may not have had intra-party democracy either, but as a rebelling party they were flexible and sensitive toward the people because they had to mobilize them” (2010, 300). In addition to
multiculturalism’s essentiality, being that Nepal’s unresolved constitution is nevertheless moving towards democracy, its legitimacy will not only depend on the improvement of multiculturalism but political culture as well.

G. The Difficulty of Inclusion

The Constituent Assembly formed in April 2008 indicates that Nepal is moving towards an inclusive democracy, it being a multiplicity of diverse political entities. Consequently the Maoists are the largest party. The normalized aristocracy of ‘high castes’ creates controversy even in Maoists leadership; “The role of professionals in rebellions—an educated middle class that wants to change the society—is very important” (Migdalqtd. in Lawoti 2010, 12). The professionals adopt or construct ideology, create awareness, form organizations, train cadres, develop networks and mobilize people, including the poor and the peasants” (Lawoti and Anup 2010, 12). In addition to the majority of middle and upper class individuals in Nepal hailing from the elitist Indo-Aryan ethnic group, they also predominantly lead Nepal’s foremost political parties including the Maoists. This further stresses the need for multiculturalism in Nepal’s polity, because although the Maoists achieved a legitimate position in politics, their elites may overlook the needs of marginalized groups as well.

Civil society plays a huge role in the consolidation of democracy. The distribution of United States democracy assistance sees the majority of its funds allocated toward the cultivation of civil society. In addition to this class structures and social cleavages are domestic forces affecting democracy, because they are variables within civil society; therefore it crucial for U.S. democracy promotion to consider these factors.

XI. Recommendations for the Future
Looking at a state that functions well as a multiethnic democracy, we can try and formulate ideas on how to promote democracy in developing states according to these models. Going with the evidence shown in this report, we argue that a long-term developmental approach to democracy promotion is needed. As we have seen in past examples, a focus on short-term democratic development has not only yielded unfavorable results, it has exacerbated deep problems in multiethnic societies. Democracy is a process that did not arise overnight in the west, so we cannot expect it to in rest of the world. Pushing for quick democratic change will not create democracy as institutional legacies of the past, cultural differences, and socioeconomic standards of developing nations are different. This will be a hard policy to enact as we tend to have a short-term view on the policies we enact. However, if our goal is to seek security and prosperity in promoting democracy, a long-term approach is needed.

The first recommendation that we propose is to spend less time focusing on elections and more time focusing on development. I highlighted the problems of elections earlier in the chapter; holding elections does not equal democracy. Not only does it not produce democracy, it can slow down or even lead to worse leadership. States with no supportive institutions cannot expect to have a functioning democracy.

The second recommendation that we propose is that democracy promotion must take a more contextual approach. The past ignorance of historical, cultural, and sociopolitical elements has hindered the furthering of democracy. Creating a one size-fits-all democracy promotion effort will ignore country-specific contexts that differ from state to state.

The third recommendation is to promote interethnic development programs throughout multiethnic states. While these programs are not directly tied to democracy promotion, they create inter-ethnic linkages essential to building sustainable democracies. The Knitting Together
Nations program is an example of how a development program can work towards economic development and building inter-ethnic linkages. In the long run, these types of programs will create cooperation and trust between ethnic groups, ameliorating their differences and promoting a stable democracy.

Our fourth recommendation is to promote inter-ethnic cooperation in a variety of institutions. This includes the ethnic integration of schools, the inclusion of all ethnic groups in government and not giving privilege to one specific group. A promotion of an overarching national identity, such as in the case of South Africa, “The Rainbow Nation,” can create a new national identity based on multiculturalism and the politics of inclusion. The recognition of minority languages and cultures is integral to including past marginalized groups.

The final recommendation we propose is to promote freedom and recognition through civic education. Civic education is essential for participatory constitution building – unifying the populace to draft a constitution that inclusively addresses citizens’ concerns. It is important that citizens participate in the constitution building process as it will enable them to gain a sense of ownership, while fusing the perspectives of diverse ethno-cultural and religious backgrounds. Adequate participation requires a populace to be aware of policy developments, which is why civic education is crucial. This can be achieved by providing public surveys, hearings, and discussions, along with widespread informative media (newspapers, radio, and television). In the case of multiethnic states, providing drafts of the constitution in different languages is also essential.
Chapter 8: Oil Rents and their Stifling Nature towards Democracy

By: Scott Glenn

On April 28, 2006 President Bush had a busy day of meetings. He met with Kim Han Me, the daughter of North Korean defectors for a conversation likely about the undemocratic elements of North Korea. Later in the day he met with Simon Deng a Darfur advocate with whom he discussed the existing human rights problems. Then he met with President IlhamAliyev of Azerbaijan. Aliyev had been criticized for overseeing a parliamentary election that human rights advocates had criticized as deeply flawed. But Bush lauded “the vision of the president in helping this world achieve what we all want, which is energy security” (Kessler 2006, 1). While America sees it within its interests to promote democracy in many areas of the world there are times that these interests come into conflict with another of our primary interests. This interest is oil.

The inconsistency in the rhetoric of democracy promotion in states in which the U.S. has a vested interest in versus those the U.S. does not is not an inconsistency confined to the Bush administration. For years the U.S. has supported regimes that cannot be called democratic in order to continue a trade relationship with them. Sometimes the U.S. supports them explicitly and sometimes implicitly, however one thing many of these states have in common is that they are rich in oil.

The anecdote above is used in order to show from where the U.S. can move forward. The Obama administration needs to distance itself from the Bush policies of democracy promotion and diplomacy. While in many cases the Bush administration was seen as too firebrand and interventionist in its democracy promotion tactics, in other cases the administration failed to even
nudge a state towards democracy and would support an undemocratic regime in order to serve its interests.

The following chapter looks at the challenges to democracy promotion within states that are rich in oil. The resource curse has been widely examined by political scholars and while the resource curse is often a factor in continuing poverty of a state it is also a factor in the lack of democratization. This chapter defines three main challenges to democracy in oil rich states: the rentier effect, the repression effect, and finally the entanglement of American interests. The rentier effect is the government’s ability to use the rents, or external revenue, as a primary source of income. This can have a severe effect on the governance of the state. The rentier effect is further separated into three main parts: taxation, spending, and group formation. The repression effect is the ability for resource rich states to place their revenue in internal security. A large military and police presence within oil rich states is the norm. Finally, American interest in oil rich states complicate what role the U.S. can take when trying to promote democracy. While the U.S. sees democracy as within its strategic interests the benefits of democracy (trade, democratic peace theory, human rights, etc.) only come with a consolidated democracy. The U.S. should not risk destabilizing a regime if there are no institutions within a country that would keep the state from descending into chaos. This is even more true within a state that provides the world with oil. As of the writing of this chapter, February 2011, oil prices are spiking due to the chaos that is occurring in North Africa and the Middle East. While it is too early to tell what polities will form in the region, this does demonstrate the volatile and precarious situation that the world oil market is in.

The second part of this chapter focuses on the methods that the U.S. should take in its democracy promotion in these areas. This chapter, firmly within the frame of this task force,
recommends two areas of focus for the U.S.: development and diplomacy. Due to its interest in oil, the U.S. should not risk endangering its political relationships with certain oil rich regimes. The democracy promotion in these states should therefore take on a depoliticized character. The focus on development allows the U.S. to continue promoting democracy within these states while not being seen as a potential threat to the standing regime. The second recommendation provided within this chapter is a new stance in U.S. diplomacy. Aligned with the consistency in U.S. rhetoric mentioned in earlier chapters, when dealing with undemocratic, yet oil rich states, the U.S. should openly admit that the regime it is dealing with is not democratic and openly pressure the regime to have more democratizing programs. While this diplomacy may be toothless it serves two functions. First, by being honest about its dealing with undemocratic regimes the Obama administration, and future administrations, distance themselves from the Bush eras inconsistencies. Secondly, these statements can become a rallying point for democratic forces within a state.

Finally, this chapter will provide some case studies for examination. It is the opinion of this task force that each country and regime requires its own specific approach and while oil rich states face many of the same problems, some of the shapes that these problems have taken are drastically different. This chapter will look at three states as models of how the resource curse can develop and how they can develop within the context of U.S. relations. The first model is Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has an exceptional relationship with the US. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil exporter to the U.S. outside of North America. From this relationship and from the shared history of the two states come certain privileges. These privileges and the challenges to democracy that they present are discussed. The second country discussed in this chapter is Nigeria. This case study is used to demonstrate the propensity for violence in an oil rich state that
is ethnically diverse. The third study is Russia. Russia serves to show how economic diversification is equally important to education. Although the population of Russia is highly educated without economic diversification the possibility for democratization in Russia remains slim. These states are chosen not only because they all serve as differing models to approach the same problem but also due to the fact that these three states are the top four exporters of oil to the U.S. aside from Mexico and Canada (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2011).

Although oil presents an extreme challenge to democracy there is no indication that states that are rich in this “manna from heaven” cannot move towards democracy. Furthermore there is a role that the U.S. can play in the movement. This chapter outlines this movement and the U.S.’s role.

I. Problems Created by Oil

A. The Rentier State

Scholars of the Middle East and of North Africa have often described the governments of these regions as “rentier states,” because they derive a large proportion of their revenues from external rents (Ross 2001, 329) The term rentier state gained its current meaning by Mahdavy when he described the transition to a rentier state that took place in the Middle East in the period between 1951-1956. During this time, Mahdavy argues, massive amounts of foreign currency and credit filled the state coffers which in turn transformed these states into rentier state. (Yates 1996, 13-16) There are four characteristics which must be present in order to be classified as rentier. First, the rentier economy must be one where rent situation predominate. Secondly, the source of rent must be external. Third, only few are engaged in the generation of wealth while the majority is involved in its distribution and consumption. Therefore, an open economy cannot be a rentier state even if its revenue comes from external rents because the majority of society is
involved in the creation of this wealth. Finally, the government must be the main recipient of the external rent (Yates 1996, 20-22). These four conditions exist in oil rich states and they produce outcomes that are usually devastating to democracy.

The effects of these characteristics we can further separate into three outcomes: the taxation effect, the spending effect and group formation (Ross 2001, 327-329). The taxation effect is the idea that when governments derive their revenues from oil they are likely to lightly tax their population or to not tax the population at all. This has an effect on the population as they demand less of their government. Without taxation there is less of a demand for accountability from and representation in their government. The logic behind this argument stems from the democratic revolutions of France and the U.S. Many historians and political scientists have convincingly argued that the demand for representation in government was a response to the sovereign’s attempts to raise taxes. In oil rich states scholars have looked at the variation of tax levels and the demand for political accountability. In the case of Kuwait and Qatar the discovery of oil made the governments of these states less accountable to the traditional merchant class (Crystal 1995, 5-14) and in Jordan, it has been argued that the drop in foreign aid in the 1980s led to a demand for more accountability (Ross 2001, 333). It seems that the maxim of the American Revolution is turned on its head here. “No taxation without representation” becomes “No representation without taxation.”

A second component of the rentier effect is the “spending effect,” under this assumption oil wealth leads to more spending on patronage. This patronage can work toward removing pressures for democracy. According to Entelis, in Saudi Arabia it is the spending programs, paid for by oil wealth, that help reduce pressures for democracy (Ross 2001, 333). All authoritarian regimes may use their wealth in order to diffuse dissent however, what sets rentier states apart is
that with their oil wealth the budgets of these states an exceptionally large and unconstrained (Ross 2001, 332-335).

The third part of the rentier effect is the group formation effect. This effect is the assumption that if a government has enough money it will use this money to prevent the formation of social groups that are independent from the state. Social groups outside of the state have been instrumental in the formation of democracy. Yet scholars have observed in the case of oil rich states the regime blocking the formation of independent social groups. This all derives from the idea that the formation of social capital or civic institution above the family and below the state promote democratic development (Putnam 1994, 20-26). Within rentier states the oil wealth has blocked the formation of social capital and therefore prevented the transition to democracy from occurring. Even when social capital or elites are formed they are often co-opted by the state. The largess of the state allows for potential coup plotters to be paid off. If given enough the costs of a coup would outweigh the benefit of remaining with the current system. This becomes even more true if the potential coup is in the interest of democracy. Democracy acts, under ideal conditions, as the majority setting economic policy. In a society where the majority is the poor this could have dire consequences for the rich (Dunning 2008, 5-15).

B. The Repression Effect

The problem existing in an oil rich state is the possibility of the repression effect. Although citizens in a resource rich country may want democracy as much as any other citizen elsewhere in the world, resource wealth allows the government to spend more on internal security in order to block the populations democratic leanings. In 2009, the largest growth in military spending was seen in oil rich countries. From 2000 to 2009, Chad increased its military budget by 663 percent, Azerbaijan increased 471 percent and Kazakhstan increased 360
In the case of Nigeria, a state in which oil and gas revenue make up 37 percent of the economy, security is 20 percent of the national budget whereas the next highest component of the national budget is education at only 8 percent (US State Department). In Saudi Arabia, military spending constitutes 8.2 percent of their GDP (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute). This last number does not account for the spending on police which accounts for a large part of the repression spending. There are two reasons why a state with large resource wealth may have a large military force. The first is that of self-interest. Given that an authoritarian regime is never fully legitimate, especially given democratic norms, an authoritarian government will readily arm itself against political pressures. A second reason for the large military spending is that in many cases the resource wealth causes more ethnic or regional conflict. This is due to the geographic concentration of the resource. If the resource exists in a region populated by an ethnic or religious minority the extraction may promote ethnic tensions and actors compete for mineral rights. These potential competitions lead to a larger military force and less democracy in these states such as Angola, Burma, and Nigeria (Ross 2001, 335-336).

**C. American Interest**

What complicates things further in conjunction with these states is the precarious position that the U.S. is placed in when it tries to serve dual interests. The first is the interest of promoting democracy and the second is the interest in oil. We have, in previous chapters, outlined why democracy fits within U.S. interests, these interests include trade, democratic peace theory, and a commitment to human rights. All of these interests are important in the context of oil rich states. There are two components of trade that have a vested interest in the democratic transition in oil rich states. The first is stability. Although democracies are messy and getting there is even
messier one of the conditions that make a democracy is the peaceful transition of power. Already mentioned above was the condition within oil rich states that incur a tendency toward civil war and increased militarization. If a proper transition to democracy can be made, one that stresses development and creating strong liberal institutions, this instability can be mitigated by rule of law. This would create conditions that are more favorable for oil companies to invest in. This stability is also dealt with in the idea that democracy would decrease terrorism. While there is a broad consensus that terrorist groups are most prevalent in democratic countries, it has also been argued that transnational terrorism is the least frequent in a democracy (Gausse 2005, 2-4).

Transnational terrorist incidents are terrorist attacks initiated by foreign terrorists against a domestic target in a country, attacks by domestic terrorists against some foreign target in a country, or attacks by foreign terrorists against some other foreign target in a country. According to statistical analysis of the ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) database transnational terrorism decreased under democracies. It is this discouragement of transnational terrorism that is encouraging for U.S. interests. While a transition to democracy might incur more terrorism on a nation, especially during the consolidation of the democracy, if the statistical analysis is correct U.S. oil installations would be in a safer position in the future (Li 2005, 287-291).

A second advantage to trade that democracy garners is the possibility of having a social responsibility dealing with oil rich states. Research done on corporate social responsibility and its effect on consumers’ decisions has shown that there is more movement to socially responsible consumer behavior and companies should do well to reflect this shift (Mohr 2001, 68-71). As Western publics become more and more post-materialist there will be a continuing push toward socially responsible oil companies. Democracy promotion can help this push (Inglehart 1981,
The benefits related to trade that democracy affords can also be seen in the other areas of U.S. interests in democracy promotion, peace and human rights. The concept in the decrease of transnational terrorism certainly fits within the confines of the movement towards peace, and with increased human rights comes the ability for oil companies to deal with oil rich states without being pernicious toward human dignity.

However, U.S. interests in oil rich states are not seen from within the prism of democracy promotion. Instead petrol states are approach on the condition of stability. The U.S. has an interest in keeping a stable government. This complicates the role that the U.S. can play while promoting democracy. The U.S. cannot act in the role it is traditionally seen as playing: that of the political promoter of democracy. This political promotion, such as funding democratic groups in order to oust the authoritarian leader, would be dangerous in states with which the U.S. maintains a fair relationship. While a political approach may be used in a bellicose state that the U.S. does not enjoy fair relation with the speculation of oil prices on the world market is a risk that must be considered. Consequently, the U.S. must approach democracy promotion in oil rich state in a different way. These ways follow the outlines defined by this task force, developmental, diplomacy, and attention paid to particular cases.

II. Approaches to Democracy Promotion

A. Development

Development is an important component in democracy promotion. This is even truer in the case of oil rich states. Due to the rent nature of the state, an economic sector outside the state and its resource revenue is very hard to create. This is due to two main factors: First, the co-option of the elites by the states who may have created more liberalized economic activity. Secondly, due to the rentier effect, oil rich states are not accountable to their populations, which
in turn means that proper education and rule of law does not occur within these states. This can be seen in the segregation of women in schools in Saudi Arabia and the erosion of property rights within these states has been explored by scholars who use the resource curse as their explanation as to why this occurs (Wenar 2008, 9-12). In order to break these factors the U.S. must pursue a policy of development. By approaching democracy promotion in oil rich states under a development model we can, in the words of Carothers “open the door to identifying and nurturing useful links between socioeconomic reform and political reform” (Carothers 2009, 10). By using aid to establish these links we can begin a modernization that was stifled due to the resource curse. A focus on education and the diversification of the economy should, by its own accord, begin to create liberal institutions or at least liberal elites within society. While this development may take years spinning its wheels it will eventually move the country towards democratization. However, the U.S. must also couple this push for development with a diplomatic push.

**B. Diplomacy**

The U.S. is in a difficult position when it comes to diplomacy in resource rich states. It cannot push too hard and be left out of the market. On the other hand the U.S.’s coziness with oil rich states makes the U.S. look inconsistent in its rhetoric toward democracy promotion. That is why this task force recommends consistency and honesty, to a degree, in the political rhetoric used in interactions with oil rich states. The U.S. must stress linkages in its rhetoric, by using the framework that if U.S. presence in these oil rich states can promote the development of the people, it can better the condition of the population of a state. This is an important distinction. The U.S. must be coy the expressed purpose of its presence in oil rich states should be said to be twofold: for the energy needs of the American people and in order to better the conditions of the
people within the state. Democracy is not mentioned in this rhetoric as it challenges the authority and legitimacy and therefore stability of the regime.

III. Case Studies

While the general recommendations of development and diplomacy should be followed throughout particular states have particular preferences and therefore each should have its own nuanced approach. The following will outline three oil rich states and the particular challenges faced in each.

A. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia is perhaps the oil rentier state with whom the U.S. enjoys the coziest relationship. This being said Saudi Arabia is experiencing many problems with their rentier status. A sharp decline in per capita income has led to increased unemployment (27 percent for men and 33 percent for women). Due to the rents incurred by the regime since 1973/74 there has been no need to create a job market for these unemployed. The private sector is not up to task only growing on average 4 percent a year whereas based on historical pattern of investment only robust non-oil growth of 5 or six percent a year can absorb the yearly influx of jobs (Looney 2004, 2-4). Saudi Arabia seems willing to diversify their economy. In fact diversification of the Saudi Arabia economy is plan seven in the Saudi five year plans. Due to this willingness to diversify and the U.S. more cozy relationship with Saudi Arabia, a development program should be attainable.

B. Nigeria

Nigeria is a poor country with ethnic divides that makes it one of the rentier states that embody the repression effect. There has been an increase in military spending in Nigeria in the past years, which is due to a willingness for youth in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria to join in
rebels (Oyefusi 2008, 540-543). This willingness stems from the low opportunity cost of joining such groups. The low education and employment opportunities of the Niger Delta region, as oil rich as it may be, makes joining rebel groups a viable alternative. In this case the U.S. can follow both development and diplomacy. This time the development should be argued for under the mantra that it will ensure the peace within the country.

C. Russia

Russia since the time of the fall of the Soviet Union has transformed from a burgeoning new democracy to a full-fledged oligarchy. Due to the weak institutions in Russia when privatization of the oil firms occurred in Russia so did corruption. Most of the top executives of Russian oil companies are connected in some way to Putin’s regime, either through family or ex-KGB ties. While Russia has a highly educated society, there is a dearth of large economic activity outside the oil companies and the state. In order to mitigate the effects that oil has on democracy in Russia, it is the suggestion of this chapter that the U.S. promote investment in firms that are not involved in oil in Russia. This promotion need not be economic but can instead be an open rhetorical call to do so. If investors see the confidence in Russia, then smaller firms should gain power allowing there to some deliberation. However, Russia faces extreme problems of governance that are not so simply solved.

IV. Conclusion

Of course perhaps the most pragmatic tactic the U.S. can take in conjunction with oil rich states is to pursue alternative forms of energy. This serves two purposes. First, it disentangles the U.S. interests. No longer would stability in oil rich regions and the promotion of democracy in the same region be so incompatibly coupled together. Furthermore, without the revenue from...
states buying oil, the rentier effect would be moot. However, this outcome is years off and it is important to stress what can be done immediately.

Oil rich states in the context of democracy promotion require addressing the nature of rentier states. Rentier states have a tendency to remain or become increasingly authoritarian. This is because of the accumulation of rents in the regime. As outlined previously, the problems with resource rich states are three fold. First there is the rentier effect. This is the effect in which due to the revenue gained from resources the regime has no need to tax heavily and therefore does not have as much pressure for accountability from the public. Secondly, within the rentier effect is the spending effect which allows the regime to use its oil revenues to mitigate the democratic pressure. Finally, within the context of the rentier effect is the social group effect that states that a government will use its resources to prevent the formation of groups that could challenge its authority. The second main issue with oil rich states is the repression effect. In states with increased oil revenues, there is the ability for these states to place more of this income into internal security, which in turn prevents democratic movements from occurring. Finally, there is the issue of U.S. interests. Due to the U.S.’s energy needs it makes it difficult to openly challenge these regimes. The recommendations outlined in this chapter follow the recommendations of this task force. First, there is the recommendation that the U.S. should take an approach that stresses development. This approach allows the U.S. to pursue democracy through the understanding that a diversified economy will allow for more powerful groups outside the scope of the internal oil companies and the state. Pursuing democracy promotion under this model allows for the U.S. to continue a relationship with oil rich states while promoting democracy from the ground up. The second recommendation is more honest rhetoric and diplomacy. This calls for the U.S. to gently push these states toward democracy while openly
admitting that it is doing business with less than reputable regimes. This will retune and aid the
global perception of the U.S., whose reputation was hurt by the Universalist and inconsistent
rhetoric of the Bush administration. Finally, this task force promotes taking into account the
particularities of each situation.
Chapter 9: Autocratic Hegemons and the Importance of Proximity in Sustainable Democracy Promotion

By: Daryl Whitley

When the Movement of the Armed Forces overthrew the nearly fifty-year-old dictatorship in Portugal on April 25, 1974, there was no reason for anyone to expect that it would mean very much for the future of democracy.

-Larry Diamond, The Spirit of Democracy

The End of the Third Wave

In 1974 a wave of democracy began to wash over the world. As Samuel Huntington has described it, this development marked a third wave of democracy. The first wave consisted of a long period beginning in the 1820s that lasted for a century, ending with the ascendance of Fascism during the inter-war era. The second wave of democracy, a brief period, was initiated by the success of the Allied Forces of World War II and witnessed a fifteen year advance. This wave was mirrored by a fifteen year retreat of democracy that ended on April 25, 1974 with the overthrow of Portuguese government (Huntington 1991, 12). The movement begun in 1974, the “Third Wave of Democracy”, witnessed 63 of the 110 nondemocratic states of the world transition to democratic governance. Furthermore, 32 of the 46 new states created after the events of 1974 became democracies (Diamond 2008, 52). By 2010 however, challenges to the continuing spread of democracy appear to have given rise to a trend that Larry Diamond of Stanford University has described as a “democratic recession” (Diamond 2008, 64).

Democratic advances in the West appear well entrenched. Beyond the West however, the picture is less definitive and the situation in crucial states such as China and Russia are anything but encouraging. The financial success of Chinese state-capitalism over the last thirty years has allowed the Chinese Communist Party to maintain its authoritarian rule nearly unchallenged. In
Russia the spike of global commodity prices in 2007 resulted in a financial windfall for the oil and gas producing nation. The financial contrast between the neoliberal democratic Russia of the 1990s and the state-capitalist authoritarian regime a decade later has been reflected in the popularity and persistence of the country premier autocrat, Vladimir Putin. By comparison the global financial crisis that began in 2008 has undermined international confidence in the success and durability of free-market liberalism and has tarnished the allure of democracy by association.

Failings in the Middle East by the U.S. have further complicated efforts to advance democracy. The bloody clashes in Iraq have become the visual representation of the George W. Bush “freedom agenda” and the intractability of the Israeli / Palestinian conflict reflects the reality that the U.S. lacks an ability to effectively influence the governance of resistant parties. The uni-polar moment that occurred at the height of Huntington’s third wave has passed.

The authoritarian successes and the democratic failures of the past decade demand a rethinking of the strategic conception of democracy promotion. The multi-polar world of the twenty-first century means the U.S. must contend with the influence of competing powers and reckon with the limits of its own. In order to achieve long-term success, regional centers of gravity, or hegemons, such Russia and China, will need to become external influences that foster, rather than hinder, the advance of democracy. Because of the proximate influence they exert, the transformation of hegemonic states from autocratic to democratic governance will be central to any sustainable strategy of democracy promotion. The proximity of regional authoritarian power centers will continue to undermine the advances of democracy promotion regardless of the methods used to achieve them.

II. The Autocratic Alternative
The financial crisis that began in 2008 witnessed the first global economic contraction since the close of World War II (World Bank 2011). As a consequence states have had to reorient their economic thinking. For the U.S. this has resulted in a focus on domestic economic challenges. As Roger C. Altman stated, “The United States has turned inward, preoccupied by severe unemployment and fiscal pressures. Its economic model is now out of favor. President Obama…made a triumphant overseas trip and is hugely popular everywhere. But his attention and political capital must be reserved for domestic issues…” (Altman 2009, 6). The emergence of an adversarial Republican-controlled House of Representatives has further focused the economic agenda on federal and state fiscal concerns. The combination of domestic preoccupation in the U.S. and the tarnished image of free-market capitalism abroad have combined to expand the opportunities for autocratic advances.

As the neoliberal economic order has been struggling under the weight of the economic downturn, China has escaped relatively unscathed. To the contrary, “Beijing’s unique capitalist-communist model appears to be helping China through this crisis effectively. And measured by its…foreign exchange reserves, no nation is wealthier” (Altman 2009, 7). The effects of this dynamic for democracy promotion are two-fold and have been summed up by Stefan Halper:

Beijing has become rich enough to provide a new source of financial assistance and economic development for smaller countries, which enables these countries to sidestep the traditional sources of Western assistance. The critical distinction between Chinese and Western assistance is that China provides hard-currency loans without the conditions imposed by the West. There is no obligation to create a civil society in the Western sense – and certainly no attempt to interfere in the recipients internal affairs (Halper 2010, 30).

In essence, the financial crisis has created an opportunity for authoritarian regimes to engage in the global economy without meeting many of the democratic norms that were dictated by the tools of Bretton Woods. Instead, “we see a growing number of developing nations that are loosely connected by an admiration for China, a desire to benefit from the power of international
markets, and an equal desire to remain autonomous from Western concepts of global civic culture and liberal development economics” (Halper 2010, 31). In many cases, such as Iran, Sudan, or Zimbabwe, this means autocrats have a new alternative. Rather than being compelled to establish and respect civil society institutions that contribute to freedom and prosperity, these governments can seek assistance from autocratic regimes without condition.

Additionally, as was demonstrated earlier in this report, the international image of the U.S. has suffered due to the war in Iraq. Not only has this impeded the ability to press for democratic reforms, it has provided a basis for authoritarian regimes to characterize U.S. democracy promotion efforts as “self-serving, coercive, and immoral” (Carothers 2006, 60).

III. The Importance of Proximity

Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace has identified “newly self-confident authoritarian regimes pushing back against Western democracy promotion” as one of the major challenges facing international democracy aid providers (Carothers 2009, 19). A clear example of where this has occurred recently has been the former Soviet republic of Ukraine. By examining the internal and external forces being exerted upon this fledgling democracy the role that proximity plays in the success of democracy can be approached.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way have identified an important correlation regarding the success of democratic transitions:

Evidence suggests that proximity to the West may have been an important factor shaping the trajectory of competitive authoritarian regimes in the 1990s. Linkages to the West - in the form of cultural and media influence, elite networks, demonstration effects, and direct pressure from Western governments – appear to have raised the costs of authoritarian entrenchment, making the democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes more likely. Where Western linkages were weaker, or where alternative, nondemocratic hegemons (such as Russia or China) exerted substantial influence, competitive authoritarian regimes were more likely either to persist or to move in a more authoritarian direction (Levitsky et al. 2002, 60)
The dynamic Levitsky and Way identify has been at the very core of the EU’s success. Huntington identified this when he wrote in 1991, “During the third wave, the European Community (EC) played a key role in consolidating democracy in southern Europe” (Huntington 1991, 14). Over the following decade the EU played a similarly decisive role in Eastern Europe. When the “Orange Revolution” occurred it appeared that the spread of democracy was occurring in a literal geographic progression consistent with Levitsky and Way and in correlation to the proximity of the EU.

If the causality of proximity seems speculative in the case of Ukraine, Russia’s response suggests otherwise. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution was Russia’s 9/11, ‘transforming Russian foreign policy thinking into viewing the EU as’ Russia’s major rival” (Krastev qtd. in Diamond 2008, 85). Russia responded in Belarus to the spread of democracy and the “color revolutions” with “efforts to destroy the opposition’s organizational capabilities, silence independent media, undermine independent nongovernmental organizations and create surrogate institutions that make faking democracy and manipulating political processes less risky” (Silitski 2006, 139). With the spread of democracy arrested, Russia moved to roll back the advances in its near abroad. With authoritarianism bolstered in Belarus, Russia addressed it is next target of proximity, Ukraine.

As Huntington observed, “Economic development makes democracy possible; political leadership makes it real” (Huntington 1991, 33). With aspirations toward the EU, Ukraine has been in a position to achieve lasting democratic reform. In January 2010 however, Russia intervened in that reality when it backed pro-Russian Presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich against Orange Revolution heroin Yulija Tymoshenko. The strategic proximity of Ukraine to
authoritarian Russia means democratic advances will continually be viewed as a challenge and meet with resistance.

Domestically, Ukraine has a history of authoritarian rule that will impede democratic reforms as well. While these forces may be decisive in their ability to maintain autocratic leadership they do not nullify the importance of proximity. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan have stated, “Regional hegemons (democratic or nondemocratic) can play an important, though seldom determinative, role in helping subvert a nondemocratic regime or in helping to subvert democracy that is opposing the hegemon’s policy preferences” (Linz et al. 1996, 74). Internal and external tensions may be exerted paradoxically and frustrate democratic advance; however, domestic legacies of autocracy are likely persist as long as they receive the support of neighboring nondemocratic states. Likewise, the future of democratic reform is enhanced when influential states are themselves democracies.

An example of regional influence enhancing democracy may be displayed in countries along Europe’s eastern arc. The political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel collected data in five waves between 1981 and 2007 through representational national surveys covering almost 90 percent of the world’s population. The survey data is available on the World Values Survey website and has been used to predicatively correlate values and democracy. As Inglehart and Welzel have stated, “The correlation between a society’s values and the nature of the country’s political institutions is remarkably strong” (Inglehart et al. 2009, 45). By using survey results a prediction of a nation’s domestic capacity to support democracy can be quantified. While the results reveal correlation and not causality it is worth noting their observations of several European countries, “Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania are overachievers, showing higher levels of democracy than their publics’ values
would predict – perhaps reflecting the incentives to democratize provided by membership in the EU (Ibid, italics added). While the EU is an institutional construction it is also geographic in nature and proximate to all the nations listed.

As Linz and Stepan stated, regional influence is exerted by both democratic and nondemocratic hegemons. For this reason the promotion of democracy will be continually challenged and difficult to sustain until the dominant states in the region are democratic.

IV. Beyond Proximity

In addition to the challenges of proximity that autocratic poles pose to democratic advance, they also provide an alternative to oppressive regimes throughout the world. Stefan Halper of Cambridge University recently argued that China’s need for resources to maintain economic growth and by extension political stability makes it willing to support pariah states that are willing to do business (Halper 2010). In order to maintain economic prosperity China has been willing to support regimes that the international community has condemned. A British Broadcasting Company investigation found evidence of gross UN embargo violations in Sudan by the Chinese. The investigation found:

Chinese army trucks in Darfur; Chinese A5 Fan-tan fighter jets being used to strafe civilians by Chinese-trained Sudanese pilots; artillery pieces and anti-aircraft guns being used to destroy civilian houses, with up-to-date factory codes, model numbers, and registration numbers that led straight to Chinese factories (Halper 2010, 85)

Furthermore, the Chinese Communist Party’s own sense of preservation gives tyrants and dictators an ally on the United Nations Security Council. As Halper states, “Fortunately for the Robert Mugabe and Omar al-Bashirs of the world, Beijing believes sovereignty is inviolate. This view is ultimately rooted in the Chinese government’s own sense of insecurity at home and need to suppress the democracy narrative” (Halper 2010, 31). As long as China maintains its
authoritarian rule it will place self-interest above international cooperation and offer an alternative to democratic reform everywhere.

V. Toward Sustainability

If sustainable advances of democratic rule are to take place, regional centers of gravity, or hegemons, such Russia and China, will need to become external influences that foster, rather than hinder, the advance of democracy. As demonstrated, the role and influence of hegemonic states due to proximity threatens to undermine tenuous democratic advances in neighboring states. Furthermore, due to the wealth and resource demands of these states, they also have the ability and incentive to frustrate democratic pressures wherever it serves their interests. If democracy promotion is going to have enduring success these forces must be mitigated. This will only be achieved when these influential states achieve a significant level of democratic reform themselves and cease to provide autocratic influence. By considering the relationship of political and economic structures the U.S. can create an approach that helps those reforms materialize.

VI. The Contradictions of Capitalism and Authoritarianism

The vibrancy of authoritarian state capitalism in China over the past three decades has given some scholars cause to speculate on the emergence of enduring autocratic great powers (Gat 2009). Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry have asserted otherwise. They present two compelling and complementary arguments that call into question the longevity of capitalist autocracies.

The first of their arguments focuses on the contradictions of capitalist economic systems and autocratic political systems. They state, “These contradictions exist in today’s capitalist autocracies, and the resolution of these contradictions is likely to lead to political liberalization”
They contend there are many ways that capitalism and political democracy are connected but they catalog the three most important:

- Rising levels of wealth and education create demands for political participation and accountability. The basic logic behind this link is that rising living standards made possible because of capitalism over time generate a socioeconomic strata – loosely, the middle class – whose interests come to challenge closed political decision making.

- In capitalist economic systems, by definition, the means of production are held as private property and economic transactions occur through contracts. For capitalism to function, the enforcement of contracts and the adjudication of business disputes require court systems and the rule of law. The practice of independent rights in the economic sphere and the institutions they require are an intrinsic limitation on state power and, over time, create demand for wider political rights.

- The economic development propelled by capitalism leads to a divergence of interest. Modern industrial societies are marked by an explosion of complexity and the emergence of specialized activities and occupations, thus producing a plural polity rather than a mass polity. The increasing diversity of socioeconomic interests leads to demands for competitive elections between multiple parties.

These three elements are consistent with the requirements necessary to achieve a consolidated democracy, suggesting that capitalism's incompatibility is a product of its reliance on institutions that are consistent with democratic rule. In addition to these authoritarian and capitalist incompatibilities, Deudney and Ikenberry also hold that “deeply rooted incapacities and dysfunctions are inherent in the structure of autocratic hierarchies” (Deudney et al. 2009, 83). Likewise, they present three important examples:

- The problem of corruption. The abusive use of state authority for the aggrandizement of government officials is a tendency in every political system, but it is much harder to check in autocratic regimes. In the new hybrid of autocracy and capitalism, government officials are in continuous transactions with capitalist firms and face myriad opportunities to demand bribes for the fulfillment of their official duties. Despite periodic campaigns for the rectitude of officialdom and episodic prosecutions, curbing corruption is difficult without institutional checks on state power.

- The problem of inequality. In capitalist societies, inequality has been a significant force for political change. The presence of acute inequality in contemporary autocratic capitalist regimes suggests that the other shoe has not dropped in their political evolution.
The problem of insufficient flows of information and weak accountability. Closed political systems are prone to policy mistakes arising from bad information. The historical record of tyrannies, despotisms, and dictatorships bears this out. Contemporary autocratic capitalist regimes show much greater capacities than their precapitalist predecessors, but they still are intrinsically impeded by censorship and the absence of open debate on policy alternatives (Ibid).

Some of the arguments that Deudney and Ikenberry lay out are certainly consistent with modernization theory and are open to the charges against such an argument. Specifically, the critique that liberal values are decisively shaped by the overwhelming political, economic, and cultural influence of the West during the last century and that greater affluence may not necessarily lead to liberal Western values. While modernization theory was considered discredited in both its Marxist and capitalist forms during the Cold War, the research of Inglehart and Welzel has created persuasive evidence that a values-based version of modernization theory has a strong academic foundation.

VII. Modernization and Democracy

Inglehart and Welzel describe how modernization promotes democracy and how prior conceptions of the theory were mistaken. They maintain that, “a massive body of evidence suggests that modernization theory’s central premise was correct: economic development does tend to bring about important, roughly predictable changes in society, culture, and politics” (Inglehart et al. 2009, 37). In presenting their argument they point out the failures of earlier versions of modernization theory:

- Modernization is not linear. It does not move indefinitely in one direction; instead, the process reaches inflection points. Empirical evidence indicates that each phase of modernization is associated with distinctive changes in people’s worldviews.

- The process is not deterministic, and any forecast can only be probabilistic, since economic factors are not the only influence; a country’s given leaders and nation-specific events also shape what happens.
- Social and cultural change is path dependent: history matters. Although economic development tends to bring predictable changes in worldviews, a society’s heritage leaves a lasting imprint on its worldview.

- Modernization is not westernization, contrary to earlier, ethnocentric versions of the theory. The process of industrialization began in the West, but during the past few decades, East Asia has had the world’s highest economic growth rates. The United States is not the model for global cultural change, and industrializing societies in general are not becoming like the United States, as a popular version of modernization theory assumes.

- Modernization does not automatically lead to democracy. Rather, it, in the long run, brings social and cultural changes that make democratization increasingly probable (2009, 37-38).

After addressing the problems of prior conceptions of modernization, Inglehart and Welzel approach the theory anew:

The core idea of modernization theory is that economic and technological development bring a coherent set of social, cultural, and political changes. A large body of evidence supports this idea. Economic development is, indeed, strongly linked to pervasive shifts in people’s beliefs and motivations, and these shifts in turn change the role of religion, job motivations, human fertility rates, gender roles, and sexual norms. And they also bring growing mass demands for democratic institutions and for more responsive behavior on the part of elites. These changes together make democracy increasingly likely to emerge. (Inglehart et al. 2009, 39)

This argument is consistent with Deudney and Ikenberry’s contention that capitalism and authoritarianism are incompatible. Additionally, Inglehart and Welzel argue that the modernization does lead to democracy when one considers the importance of values.

Linz and Stepan, “accept the well-documented correlation that there are few democracies at very low levels of socio-economic development and that most polities at a high level of socioeconomic development are democracies” (Linz et al. 1996, 77). Through their research, Inglehart and Welzel have been able to further explain this correlation. As mentioned previously, the World Values Survey is a broad based data set of mass values and attitudes that covers a significant span of time and represents almost the entirety of the global population. According to
Inglehart and Welzel, “These values surveys demonstrate that the worldviews of people living in rich societies differ systematically from those of people living in low-income societies across a wide range of political, social, and religious norms” (Inglehart et al. 2009, 39). The surveys quantify values along two basic dimensions: traditional versus secular-rational values and survival versus self-expression values. Without exception, every nation the World Bank defines as having high income ranks relatively high in secular-rational and self-expression values. By contrast all the low and lower-middle-income countries rank relatively low in those dimensions. Furthermore, when countries are compared in successive waves there is a correlation between rising GDP and the shift from traditional and survival values to secular-rational and self-expression values (2009, 40-41). While there is a correlation the question of causation must be addressed: does democracy lead to wealth or does wealth lead to democracy? Inglehart and Welzel argue that the latter is the case.

Multivariate analysis of the data leads Inglehart and Welzel to conclude that “economic development brings social and political changes only when it changes people’s behavior” (Inglehart et al. 2009, 42). By sorting through the relative impacts of social, economic, and cultural changes they have determined that economic development creates a sizeable, articulate, and educated middle class that is comfortable doing their own thinking. This in turn transforms their values and motivations. They state, “economic development is conductive to democracy insofar as it brings specific structural changes (particularly a knowledge sector) and certain cultural changes (particularly the rise of self-expression values)” (2009, 43). With the emergence of knowledge societies the use of initiative and one’s own judgment becomes common to the point of inviting challenges to the restrictive structures of authority. Finally, when a substantial portion of a society comes of age with the economic ability to take survival for granted self-
expression values prevail. Inglehart and Welzel summarize their conclusion eloquently but also concisely:

The desire for freedom and autonomy are universal aspirations. They may be subordinated to the need for subsistence and order when survival is precarious, but they take increasingly high priority as survival becomes more secure. The basic motivation for democracy – the human desire for free choice – starts to play an increasingly important role. People begin to place a growing emphasis on free choice in politics and begin to demand civil and political liberties and democratic institutions (Inglehart et al. 2009, 43)

If it is accepted that modernization brings social and cultural changes that make democratic transition more likely, and that capitalism and authoritarianism are ultimately incompatible then the next point to approach is the prospect for enhancing democratic emergence in autocratic regional hegemons. As Inglehart and Welzel have pointed out, the transition to democracy is only probabilistic, not deterministic.

VIII. The State of States

Linz and Stepan have observed that three conditions are, by definition, necessary for the formation of a consolidated democracy: “a lively and independent civil society, a political society with sufficient autonomy and a working consensus about procedures of governance, and constitutionalism and a rule of law” (Linz et al. 1999, 10). Furthermore, they conclude that these conditions are most likely to be met if there exists, “a bureaucracy usable by democratic leaders and an institutionalized economic society” (Ibid). China’s path to modernization through industrialization should help pressure the emergence of these elements where they are lacking, if Inglehart and Welzel are correct. Additionally, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the dominant theme was “intra-Party democracy” (Li 2009, 1). According to Cheng Li, “China’s top leaders characterize intra-Party democracy as the ‘lifeblood’ of the Party and the principal determinant of whether the CCP will
be able to maintain its position of primacy in the future” (Ibid). This characterization is consistent with a leadership that recognizes the dynamics presented here. Under this proposal the Chinese leadership is considering choosing some high level posts through a competitive internal democratic process. While this is well short of a democracy as a means of representation it signifies a level of recognition on the part of the CCP. Furthermore, “China is now approaching the level of mass emphasis on self-expression values at which Chile, Poland, South Korea, and Taiwan made their transitions to democracy” (Inglehart et al. 2009, 48). As encouraging as the prospects for democratization may be for China, they are much less so for Russia.

Inglehart and Welzel recognize that the path to modernity runs through industrialization. They contend that the combination of rising GDP and the emergence of a postindustrial society creates the knowledge economy necessary for social, cultural, and political change. Inglehart and Welzel point out an important distinction, “Industrialization makes modern democracy possible, and it also makes possible authoritarian forms of mass mobilization; the emergence of *postindustrial* society makes the democratic alternative increasingly possible” (Gat et al. 2009, 159, italics added). In Russia the position of the autocratic leadership is derived from resource extraction, specifically oil and natural gas, rather than a process of modernization. Given the record of autocratic regimes using resource wealth to maintain authoritarian rule the probability of democratic forces emerging appears less promising.

**IX. The International System**

The growth of autocratic great powers has been greatly enabled by the international system. In the 1990s China’s push to join the WTO was central to the continuing economic growth the CCP needed to maintain domestic political stability. In the shadow of Tiananmen Square the necessity to limit internal descent centered on the continued emergence of China’s
industrial growth. The importance of China, now the world’s second largest economy, has married global prosperity and Chinese economic policy. This “barrel” is one that both China and the international community have each other over. By strengthening institutional linkages the movement to democratic governance in autocratic societies can be enhanced. Washington needs to look to its previous successes as a reference.

The first half of the twentieth century was characterized by conflict. “In the two world wars,” according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Europe had effectively committed political suicide” (Brzezinski 2009, 4). In the western remnant of Europe; however, “to its credit, the United States rose to the challenge” (Ibid). The path chosen by the U.S. created a wholly new approach to international relations. Geir Lundestad explains:

The United States clearly organized its sphere of influence different than other Great Powers had done; for, while they had governed through a policy of divide-and-rule, Washington actually favored the creation of a supranational Europe with its own political bodies and, accordingly, at least the possible development of an alternative political center. As the ‘father’ of European integration Jean Monet put it, the American insistence on integration ‘is the first time in history that a great power, instead of basing its policy on ruling by dividing, has consistently and resolutely backed the creation of a large Community uniting peoples previously apart’ (Lundestad 2003, 37)

The institutions that evolved into the EU in the wake of World War II ended the civil war within the West by paving the way for the political stabilization and democratization of the continent. In the twenty-first century globalization offers the same opportunity to integrate the disparate nations and economies of the world. By continuing to integrate China and Russia into the international order the competitive pressures to reconcile the inconsistencies between capitalism and authoritarianism will exert pressure to form the institutional frameworks necessary for democratic emergence.

Additionally, the U.S. must take advantage of its unique status. It is worth recalling specifically Levitsky and Way’s observation on proximity:
Linkages to the West - in the form of cultural and media influence, elite networks, demonstration effects, and direct pressure from Western governments – appear to have raised the costs of authoritarian entrenchment, making the democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes more likely (Levitsky et al. 2002, 60)

In the case of the U.S. the global reach and appeal of American cultural and media as well as the ability to leverage direct pressure from Western governments allows the U.S. to enlist the influence of proximity almost anywhere in the world. In essence, the U.S. has the ability to be the ultimate “regional hegemon”. For the “demonstration effects” of democracy to be persuasive the U.S. needs to remedy the failings of its foreign policy over the past decade, especially in the Middle East. In the economic realm, “market autonomy and ownership diversity in the economy is necessary to produce the independence and liveliness of civil society so that it can make its contribution to democracy” (Linz et al 1996, 11). The ability of the free-market rather than the state to manage the economic realm needs to be reestablished.

X. Conclusion

The persistence of autocratic hegemons will provide both a proximate influence and an alternative for oppressive regimes. The financial crisis enhanced the appeal of state capitalism and autocratic rule; however, the U.S. remains the largest economy in the world and the combined economic strength of democratic states will remain unmatched. Additionally, the foreign policy missteps of the past decade have discredited American democracy promotion. The current “democratic recession” is the product of American miscalculations rather than the ascendance of an alternative autocratic model. Through development and integration the modernization of hegemonic autocratic states will lead to democratic reforms that enhance rather than threaten democratic advances.

For the U.S. to realize sustainable advances in democracy promotion a revitalization of the economic success of free-market capitalism needs to occur. This will increase the pressure on
autocratic states to adopt the capitalist modes that are consistent with democratic rule. Additionally, a cooperative relationship with autocratic hegemons will allow for greater demonstration of the secular-rational and self-expression values necessary for democratic transition. The U.S. needs to exercise its unique ability to “project proximity” by “drawing closer” to the regional autocratic hegemons in order to enhance the likelihood of democratic transition. In doing so the U.S. must make clear its commitment to democracy and articulate that engagement is ultimately pursued with an expectation of reform. The Obama administration’s “reset” of relations with Russia and its engagement with China provide model examples of policy consistent with this proposal.

In addition to serving the nation’s self-interest, the principles of the U.S. are also served by this approach. The integration of the Atlantic states through NATO and the Marshall Plan enhanced the security and prosperity of the U.S. in the wake of World War II and eventually lead to the consolidation of the EU. Likewise, the engagement of Russia and China will serve to enhance U.S. interest. By understanding the dynamics of development and modernization the U.S. can also claim, in all sincerity, that democratic principles are at the forefront of engagement.
Chapter 10: Ukraine: Rethinking U.S. Democracy Promotion in a Post-Soviet State

By: Rostislav Voloshin

Located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia and rich with natural resources, Ukraine is a country of vital importance to U.S. economic and security interest. A long-awaited democratic breakthrough appeared to take place in 2004 as hundreds of thousands of citizens poured into the streets and squares of Kyiv (Kiev) in protest of allegedly fraudulent elections. Supported financially and diplomatically by the U.S. and the EU, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine appeared to be another successful “electoral revolution” made possible by Western democracy assistance, joining the list of successes already claimed in Serbia, Croatia, and Slovakia. However, the optimism aroused by the Orange Revolution has dissolved over the years since 2004 as Ukraine has slipped back towards authoritarianism and away from democratic reform (Basora 2007). Viktor Yanukovych, deposed by the Orange Revolution five years before, became president in 2010 and in January of 2011, Freedom House reported a decline in democracy in Ukraine, moving the country down from the “Free” category to the “Partly Free” (Freedom House 2011).

Why did Ukraine experience a backlash in democracy transition after the 2004 revolution? Why did the relatively similar U.S. democracy assistance strategy in Serbia and in Ukraine lead to such different and – in the latter case – unintended and undesirable political outcomes? What lessons can be extracted from the Orange Revolution for U.S. democracy promotion? How must the U.S. revise its democracy promotion strategy to address the particular obstacles for democratic reform in Ukraine and other former Soviet states?

The surge of hope following the Orange Revolution breakthrough proved ill-founded because it undermined the strength of the Soviet legacy entrenched in the country’s political
system and overemphasized the role of elections in the democratization process. The “corporatist” political culture in which the ruling oligarchic elites work to fragment the civil society has counteracted the apparent advances made by the electoral revolution and continues to offset democracy promotion efforts and to obstruct democratic reformation. Although the efforts of U.S. democracy promotion have effectively and significantly contributed to the success of the Orange Revolution breakthrough, the current U.S. democracy promotion strategy has areas of weakness which limit its effectiveness in targeting the Soviet legacy that stands directly in the way of democratization in Ukraine.

This chapter analyzes the effectiveness of U.S. democracy promotion in helping facilitate the Orange Revolution in particular and in assisting the democratization process in Ukraine in general. It also proposes a revised democracy promotion strategy that would target the old anti-democratic institutions by increasing support to civic groups and simultaneously applying pressure on Ukrainian government officials. First, the U.S. must continue to push for free and fair elections but should not regard elections as an exclusive method of democratization – in Ukraine and in other parts of the world. Second, the U.S. must allocate more funds and effort to programs that support civil society development rather than top government actors, from supporting “democrats” to supporting democratization. Third, the U.S. should strengthen its approach by leveraging diplomatic pressure on Ukrainian government officials in conjunction with supporting civil society development. The following sections analyze

(1) The lessons from the Orange Revolution for U.S. democracy promotion;
(2) The political situation in Ukraine and its Soviet political “baggage”;
(3) The strengths and weaknesses of the current U.S. democracy promotion strategy;
(4) A proposed revision to the U.S. democracy assistance strategy in Ukraine to be more equipped in targeting the anti-democratization forces operating in Ukraine.

I. Orange Revolution: Lessons for U.S. Democracy Promotion

A number of analysts and scholars agree that the 2004 Orange Revolution led to a democratization breakthrough in Ukraine (Woehrel 2005a, 1; McFaul 2007, 48). It resulted in the coming to power of Viktor Yushchenko, a pro-reform and pro-Western opposition candidate after popular demonstrations were staged against what was believed to be a fraudulent election. U.S. democracy aid, in addition to aid from other Western European countries, was a significant factor in the success of the election revolution. The U.S. assistance strategy was a dyadic one: it combined support to the opposition party and opposition civic groups on one side and sharp criticism of the election by the U.S. government on the other. Despite the trend of excessively optimistic beliefs the revolution sparked among U.S. officials and democracy promoters, the high hopes for the consolidation of democracy in Ukraine turned out to be misled. The Orange Revolution demonstrates what Thomas Carothers warned about in 2001, that an electoral revolution may lead to consolidation of democracy in one social and political context, such as the one in Serbia during the 2000 revolution, but in other contexts it is insufficient (Carothers 2001, 7).

A. Overview of U.S. Support for the Orange Revolution

The execution of U.S. democracy assistance to Ukrainian opposition prior to the Orange Revolution is notably comparable to the way democracy aid was distributed during the Serbian revolution four years earlier. First, the U.S. worked to strengthen civil society groups that supported the opposition and helped develop the network of grassroots groups that later served at the forefront of the protest movement in Ukraine. It financed programs that trained and educated
thousands of students, officials, and journalists and exposed them to the Western political culture (Pan 2010). About $13.8 million was allocated specifically to support independent media, non-partisan political party training, voter education, and training for election officials and observers (Woehrel 2005a, 11). Also, Ukrainian NGOs that monitored the election and conducted exit polls were considerably funded by Western countries (Woehrel 2005b, 9).

Furthermore, in a similar way to the diplomatic isolation of Milosevic in Serbia, the U.S. government applied substantial diplomatic pressure on the Ukrainian government after it intervened in the election process. The U.S. government strongly criticized fraud in elections and warned that a “tarnished election” will cause the U.S. to “review” its relations with Ukraine (Woehrel 2005a, 10-11). The Bush Administration warned that in the event of not free and not fair elections, the ruling elites would be denied Western visas and investigations would be launched into their bank accounts (Kuzio 2005, 188). Sharp criticism of election fraud and threats of sanctions, coupled with the support for civic groups, independent media, and opposition parties contributed to the success of the Orange Revolution as a democratic breakthrough.

The breakthrough brought hope to American and Western European democracy promoters that Ukraine may finally implement comprehensive reforms after nearly a decade and a half of “half measures and false starts” (Woehrel 2005a, 1). The Bush Administration called the Orange Revolution part of the democratization wave sweeping the region and the world (Woehrel 2005a, summary). But as was mentioned earlier, the years following the revolution witnessed a reversal of the democratic advances attained by the revolution. Why has the democratization process in Ukraine not continue after the revolution whereas in Serbia it has?
B. Lessons from the Orange Revolution: Importance of Context

According to Carothers, the success of the Serbian electoral revolution lies in Serbia’s fertile political and social ground for democratization in the years before the 2000 revolution and in the extraordinarily well-designed and executed U.S. democracy aid to the country’s political and civic opposition (Carothers 2001, 7). He emphasizes the importance of Serbia’s prior experience with elections, opposition politics, civil society, and rule of law (Carothers 2001, 1). In addition, Serbia was building up the necessary institutions and environment for democracy well before the influx of aid from Western countries. The 2000 election was a culmination of more than a decade-long struggle by Serbian opposition parties and civic groups against Milosevic’s authoritarian regime (Carothers 2001, 3). Ukraine, however, has had little past experience with democracy since its independence in 1991. Moreover, the deeply entrenched Soviet political culture and institutions maintain a system of oligarchic rule over a stagnant, mistrustful society which undermines the fundamental conditions for democratization.

Before discussing the implications of the Soviet legacy on the democratization of Ukraine, it must be reiterated that electoral revolutions in and of themselves are not sufficient conditions for successful democratization. Carothers warned U.S. democracy practitioners in 2001 to be cautious of promoting electoral revolutions around the world where societies lack the necessary conditions that made Serbia, Croatia, and Slovakia suitable for full electoral revolutions (Carothers 2001, 7). The Orange Revolution of 2004 clearly demonstrated how an electoral revolution does not always lead to democracy. The overemphasis on elections in the Orange Revolution is an example where insufficient consideration of local context backfired in terms of consolidating democracy. The U.S. democracy promoters must recognize that despite the importance of elections in the democratization process, elections must be supplemented with
programs designed to address certain obstacles to democratization in specific social, economic, and political contexts. In some sociopolitical contexts, as perhaps in multiethnic societies or in states with extremely poor populations, an electoral revolution may not be a viable option to facilitate democratic consolidation. If the U.S. democracy promoters were to extract one lesson from the Orange Revolution, it must be the recognition of the immense importance of local political, social, economic, and historical contexts to the success of democracy promotion programs.

II. Prevalence of the Soviet Legacy: The Political Situation in Ukraine

To analyze why the Orange Revolution in Ukraine has not led to a consolidation of democracy, a step back is necessary to examine the political, as well as the economic and social, context in which the revolution was staged. First, it must be noted that Ukraine is not an atypical state among the former Soviet republics in terms of its democratic transition. The Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003) aroused more hope than actual reforms as it too failed to deliver democratic consolidation. Taras Kuzio argues that by 2005, most states that are part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have either become fully authoritarian regimes like Russia and Belarus or remained as unstable competitive authoritarian regimes which fused together the former Soviet system with new political and economic reforms (Kuzio 2005, 167). The legacy of old Soviet politics is one of the most important factors explaining Ukraine’s disappointing progress after the Orange Revolution. In addition, the setbacks caused by the economic crisis of 2008, political infighting after the electoral revolution, Ukraine’s dependency on Russia, and certain ethnological factors contribute to the perpetuation of anti-democratic practices in the country. These factors are analyzed in order to illuminate the political context of Ukraine for a more efficient allocation and implementation of U.S. democracy assistance.
A. Soviet Legacy

As most former Soviet states (Baltic states being the exception), Ukraine is governed by a deeply rooted system of “patronal presidentialism” inherited from Soviet times, where power resides in the executive branch that wields not only formal but also tremendous informal authority based on patron-client relationships (Hale 2006, 307). Prior to 2004, Ukrainian politics were dominated by President Leonid Kuchma and the oligarchic clans comprised of groups of powerful politicians and businessmen supportive of the president (Woehrel 2005a, 1). A division among the oligarchs, characteristic of Ukraine’s political environment even today, prevented Kuchma from consolidating a fully authoritarian regime as occurred in Russia where oligarchs have captured the Russian state and replaced it by the “managed democracy” of Putin and his allies in the security forces (Kuzio 2005, 167; 171).

This profoundly integrated system of Soviet patrimonial politics, commanded by centrist elites, prevented democratic reforms to continue after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Steven Woehrel’s warning in a July 2005 Report to Congress, less than a year after the end of the revolution, turned out prophetic: the businessmen who supported the revolution became the “new” oligarchs and used the political arena in a struggle against the “old” elites over economic resources (Woehrel 2005b, 6). The actors of the political system changed but the prevalent political-business oligarchy model largely remained unchanged even after the electoral revolution.

Another aspect of the Soviet legacy serving as a barrier to Ukraine’s democratization is the political system that aims to fragment civil society and prevent the formation of true autonomous centers of power. The goal of this “corporatist” system is to organize and control society in order to force the population to be passive between elections (Kuzio 2005, 168). The
executive is attempting to control change by preventing social mobilization from below, promoting social unity at the expense of conflict and competition, even if allowing some elements of pluralism (Kuzio 2005, 169). As a result, the civil society in Ukraine is tired, defeated, and alienated, characterized by a feeling of being powerless to change anything (Kuzio 2005, 168). In 2003 the Democratic Initiatives poll found that a striking 49-57 percent did not trust NGOs and political parties (Kuzio 2005, 184). The destructive effect of Soviet political practices and old Soviet institutions – what Kuzio calls “Soviet totalitarian baggage” – work against a radical restructuring of political life necessary for successful democratization (ibid, 169).

B. Ethnographic Tensions, Political Infighting, and Economic Crisis

In contribution to the inheritance of Soviet institutions, several factors, some of which are directly related to the Soviet past while others are independent phenomena, play a significant role in undermining democratization and even strengthening the anti-reformist forces. The country’s ethnographic divide, the political infighting since 2005, and the deep economic recession have taken a significant toll on the progress already made by the Orange Revolution.

First, Ukraine is divided between the western-central Ukrainians which Kuzio describes as having an active civil society and being the stronghold of democratic opposition and reformist sentiment, and eastern Ukrainians, described as inactive between elections and as the main base of support for oligarchs and centrist parties (ibid, 169-70). The support for the Orange Revolution was primarily concentrated in western-central Ukraine while eastern-southern Ukraine wants closer relations with Russia and favors a pro-Russian candidate (Woehrel 2005b, 7). The geographical and linguistic proximity of eastern and southern Ukrainians to Russia and
their long history under Russian rule is an acute problem in Ukraine’s democratization efforts as the remnants of the Soviet system are especially prevalent there.

Second, the strife between the Orange Revolution champions, President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, has not only paralyzed the government since 2005, but also demoralized the population (Woehrel 2005b, 3). Political backbiting has pushed back democratic reforms and rendered the state incapable of effectively responding to the economic crisis of 2008. This has further shattered the already weak and frustrated civil society, the interests of which have been neglected in the face of a receding economy. Opinion polls showed that an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians were disgusted with the Ukrainian political class as a whole (Woehrel 2005b, 4). Political infighting is a characteristic of the oligarchic political system inherited from the Soviet past and its pervasiveness demonstrates the depth of Soviet legacy inside Ukraine’s political culture.

Third, the economic crisis also contributed to the slowing of Ukraine’s democratization process after the Orange Revolution. Prior to the crisis, Ukraine was experiencing substantial economic growth and the impact of the global recession hit Ukraine exceptionally hard. The country’s real GDP fell by 20.3 percent in the first quarter of 2009 on an annual scale while industrial production dropped by 38.8 percent in the same period (Ibid). Decreased economic productivity, together with ethnic division and political malfunction that is deeply embedded in old authoritarian institutions, added to the instability of the state and its inability to implement democratic reforms.

C. Dependency on Russia

A final factor inhibiting democratization is Ukraine’s geographical proximity to and economic dependence on the authoritarian Russia, the regional hegemon. Ukraine’s economic
dependence on Russia is difficult to overstate. About 90 percent of all Ukraine’s oil and about 80 percent of its natural gas is imported from Russia and a substantial part of the rest is transported through Russian territory. Ukraine’s bigger neighbor is also its largest export market which absorbed 18 percent of the country’s exports in 2003 (Woehrel 2005b, 4). Russia has used its energy supply powers to pressure Ukraine on several occasions: it cut off the gas supply in April 2005 (Woehrel 2005b, 8) and then again in the winter of 2008-2009 (Kramer 2009). The Kremlin can potentially use this enormous economic power to press Ukraine away from its pro-Western, pro-democratization orientation which Russia regards as hostile to its interests (Woehrel 2005b, 4). Russia also has traditionally supported the authoritarian-leaning leaders in Ukraine, including Viktor Yanukovych in the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections.

III. Current U.S. Democracy Promotion Approach: Strengths and Weaknesses

Having identified in the previous section the political, economic, and social factors that have inhibited democratic reforms in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution and continue to do so, this section analyzes the current U.S. strategy to address these fundamental roots of authoritarian advance in Ukraine. The primary focus of this section is on U.S. democracy promotion in Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, mainly its strengths in working to bolster the civil society in the country, and its weaknesses in continuing to misallocate funds to programs with questionable results and hesitance to apply diplomatic pressure on Ukraine’s government.

A. Strengths of Current Strategy: Support for Civil Society Development

The USAID and private democracy promotion organizations have implemented numerous programs since the Orange Revolution to assist democratization in Ukraine. Although financial support for these programs has decreased in the recent years, the USAID continues to implement a wide array of projects in the fields of civil society development, strengthening rule
of law through combating corruption and legal reform, media development, parliamentary development, and strengthening of political process (USAID 2011a). This multidimensional campaign to strengthen Ukraine’s pro-democratization forces by targeting different social and political spheres is a notable strength of the U.S. democracy promotion approach. However, scholars and policy analysts have recently criticized a number of U.S. programs, especially the top-down programs, for failing to show intended results in Ukraine.

The civil society development program carried out by USAID in Ukraine has devoted continuous efforts and resources to enhance the technical capabilities of NGOs in the areas of advocacy, organizational development, and legal expertise. In 2008 it implemented the Ukraine Citizens Action Network (UCAN) with the aim to strengthen the organizational capacity of a core group of leading Ukrainian NGOs (ibid). The Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER) also works to support civic groups to be better equipped to represent citizens’ interests, to promote reform, and resist politicization. It also works to facilitate networking among civic organizations and to strengthen their technical and organizational capacity (USAID 2011b). Given the systematic challenges faced by Ukraine’s civil sector in fighting against the old Soviet institutions discussed in the previous section, the assistance to Ukrainian civil society groups is crucial. The short-term results of empowering the civil society in Ukraine was the immediate success of the Orange Revolution in which the main opposition agents, the civil society organizations, were supported by the USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and other domestic and Western private organizations.

Natalia Shapovalova describes the successful implementation of civil society development projects at local levels and the achievement of civil society organizations in lobbying for a better policy and legal framework for their work (Shapovalova 2010, 7). She
specifically points to the success of projects that promote good governance at municipality and district levels in which donors stimulate local government, business, and community to work together. These projects encourage cooperation through advice, technical assistance, and matching of funds and obligate the community and local government to invest their own money. Such approach gives local actors incentives and motivation for reaching results (Shapovalova 2010, 9).

Another strength of the current U.S. approach is the support for the development of an independent media in Ukraine. Many of the strong media organizations that emerged in the country with donor support have contributed to the Orange Revolution and to the media pluralism that emerged after (Shapovalova 2010, 7). Currently, the USAID continues to support media development in Ukraine through Internews Network which provides training and financial support for journalists and media organizations (USAID 2011a).

B. Challenges and Shortcoming of Current Approach

1. Decrease in Financial Aid

One of the primary challenges for the U.S. democracy promotion agenda in a time of authoritarian advance is the sharp decrease of U.S. financial aid for democracy support in Ukraine in the years before 2010. U.S. democracy aid to Ukraine fell from $40 million in 2005 to $20 million in 2008 in what Philip P. Pan described as a “Ukraine fatigue” – growing Western impatience with the political infighting in Ukraine since 2005 (Pan 2010). Pan also ascribes the drop in aid as a possible result of the temptation for policy-makers and activists to label countries like Ukraine as “democratic enough” and concentrate on other authoritarian regimes.

Shapovalova notes that the overall U.S. support to non-state actors in Ukraine decreased by 70 percent between 2004 and 2007 while assistance to the government sector increased by 59
percent in the same period (Shapovalova 2010, 3). The substantial decrease of U.S. aid at a time when democracy in Ukraine is in recession, and in particularly the drastic reduction of aid to non-state civic organizations, poses significant constraints on the effectiveness of civil sector development programs. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Ukraine’s sociopolitical context requires a strong civil society to challenge the Soviet institutional legacy and prevent the advance of authoritarianism in the country. Reducing the funding of active civic organizations is contrary to this goal.

2. Possible Inefficiency of Civil Society Development Programs

Another possible limitation in the U.S. democracy promotion strategy in Ukraine may be an inefficient system of support for civil society groups. This limitation is based on the argument made by Sara L. Henderson who strongly criticizes the approach of the USAID and private democracy promotion organizations in Russia as counterproductive to the ultimate goal of consolidating a strong civil society in the country. She argues that instead of facilitating horizontal networks among civic groups and between civic organizations and target communities which are fundamental to an active civil society, foreign financial aid to individual groups contributes to the growth of vertical, institutionalized donor-client relationships which she calls “principled clientism” (Henderson 2002, 140). This leads to division and fierce competition for grants between groups, the rise of a “civic elite,” and the implementation of foreign agenda by civic organizations which should instead be addressing local concerns (Henderson 2002, 142).

Although Henderson had focused her research primarily on Russia, her criticism raises questions as to whether U.S. assistance to Ukrainian civic groups follows a similar approach to U.S. aid to Russian organizations because of Ukraine’s social and cultural proximity to Russia. Unlike in Russia, however, U.S.-supported civil society groups, with contribution from other
factors, have succeeded in overturning fraudulent election results and installing a reformist
government in Ukraine in 2004. Therefore, U.S. approach to supporting Ukrainian NGOs has
yielded visible results and cannot be dismissed as fruitless. But Henderson’s critique must
nevertheless be considered. It is a question that requires further on-the-ground examination of the
effectiveness of aid in each civic development project in order to make U.S. assistance of
Ukrainian civil society development more effective and efficient.

3. Questionable Effectiveness of Top-down Programs

Since the Orange Revolution, the U.S. has carried out a number of top-down, soft-
strategy democracy promotion programs designed to train and empower the pro-democratic
political actors in Ukraine. Currently, the USAID supports projects aimed at fighting corruption,
strengthening the rule of law through judicial and legal reform, parliamentary development, and
other political development programs. The primary tool of most of these projects is the provision
of training for various public officials and agencies (USAID 2011a). This top-down focused
strategy has drawn substantial criticism from the scholarly community as ineffective in
facilitating democratic reforms. First, in cases when these soft-strategy projects were
implemented and diplomatic pressure on the Ukrainian government was not applied, the top-
down U.S. democracy promotion strategy did not yield significant results. Second, the
effectiveness of these programs is further undermined by U.S. practice of strengthening the
position of “democrats” instead of impartially supporting the democratic process.

Analyzing the democracy promotion of the U.S. in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova,
EcatericaMcDonagh finds that softer, socialization-based democracy promotion activities aimed
at empowering domestic actors to adhere to democratic behavior by teaching and persuading
failed to cause significant results in policy changes (McDonagh 2010, 19). One such recent
failure is the anti-corruption project funded by the Millennium Challenge Corporation which granted $45 million to Ukraine in 2006 but made no significant progress in reducing corruption (Pan 2010; O’Neil 2011; Millennium Challenge Corporation 2006). Another is the evident failure of political party development assistance in increasing intra-party democracy since 2004 (Shapovalova 2010, 8).

In addition, without diplomatic pressure on authoritarian government agents, the soft strategy to empower pro-democratic political actors was ineffective. In fact, empirical evidence revealed that U.S. democracy promotion programs which aimed at empowering pro-democratic government agents were less effective that those activities which were directed at weakening and constraining autocratic agents (McDonagh 2010, 19). Democratic changes occurred only when organizations issued explicit warnings and set concrete deadlines for reforms (McDonagh 2010, 20). Kuzio also states that international isolation is not in the interests of most Ukrainian ruling elite and thus when international organizations have issued stark condemnations, such as the resolutions passed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2004, Ukrainian authorities have usually backed off and reassessed their strategies (Kuzio 2005, 187-188).

Furthermore, the analysis of PovilasZielys of U.S. democracy promotion efforts in the post-Soviet space, particularly in Russia, revealed that the U.S. often supported particular political forces which it regarded as genuinely democratic instead of an impartial democratic process, leading to “the fatal democratization difficulties” first seen in Yeltsin’s Russia and now visible in Ukraine and Georgia (Zielys 2010, 94). The explanation for this democracy promotion failure lies in part in the fact that “[a]t a diplomatic level, the U.S. government did not apply conditionality and tended to excuse antidemocratic actions” of selected Russian “democratic” agents (ibid). The U.S. democracy promotion route takes a relatively analogous position in
Ukraine where support has been overwhelmingly directed towards the pro-democratic political actors and opposition while diplomatic pressure against anti-democratic activity has been minimal in the past years.

U.S. democracy promotion programs such as the ones aiming to strengthen the rule of law by providing training to members of the judiciary, the parliament, and political parties may have been helpful to pro-democratic actors and opponents in keeping their strong positions, but have not been able to provide the sufficient condition for progressive democratic reforms or for holding back authoritarian advance in Ukraine. In particular, there has been a noticeable absence of U.S. diplomatic action against the authoritarian conduct of Ukrainian government officials. A recent article in The New York Times, reporting on the controversial prosecution of Yulia Tymoshenko, the former Prime Minister and leader of the Orange Revolution, states:

In late December, when it appeared that Ms. Tymoshenko might be arrested, the United States Embassy in [Kyiv] took the highly unusual step of issuing a statement chastising the Ukrainian authorities (Levy 2010).

Two points are made here that must be reiterated. First, the U.S. has been reluctant to use diplomatic pressure against authoritarian advance in Ukraine. Second, it provides evidence to support the earlier observations made by McDonagh and by Kuzio of the potential of U.S. diplomatic pressure on Ukrainian government authorities in preventing authoritarian abuse of power.

The top-down approach of the U.S. democracy promotion strategy in Ukraine has considerable limitations in its ability to assist the development of democratic institutions and to strengthen the democratic forces in Ukraine. First, U.S. support tends to target the political agents which are favorable to the U.S. and not necessarily the political forces that are likely to bring democratic reforms. This was evident in the overwhelming support for the pro-Western
opposition candidates in the 2004 presidential elections. Second, the U.S. has been reluctant to apply diplomatic measures in response to anti-democratic turns of the Ukrainian government. Not only has there been little diplomatic pressure on the former Yushchenko government, but even the new Yanukovych government has seen minimal U.S. pressure until the recent case with Tymoshenko. In order for the U.S. democracy promotion strategy to be maximally effective and efficient, policies must be redesigned to better address the anti-democratic forces that prevent Ukraine from democratizing.

IV. Rethinking U.S. Democracy Promotion in the Context of Soviet Legacy

As was discussed in Section 1, the promising success of the Orange Revolution proved short-lived because democracy promoters underestimated Ukraine’s fertility for democratization, particularly the resilience of old Soviet institutions and practices in its political, economic, and social context. Section 2 then outlined the sociopolitical context of Ukraine in relation to democracy promotion; it analyzed the impacts of the Soviet legacy as well as of political infighting, ethnographic divide, economic recession, and Ukraine’s relations with Russia on the vitality of Ukraine’s civil sector and the functioning of its political system.

Then, Section 3 assessed the strengths and the limitations of the current U.S. approach to democracy promotion in addressing these issues as it pursued the democratization of Ukraine. While the stronghold of the U.S. strategy in Ukraine is its support for civil society and independent media development, its three main weak points are: (1) decrease in U.S. financial aid; (2) possible inefficiency of U.S. financial support for Ukrainian civic groups; and (3) the evident incapacity of U.S. top-down programs. The U.S. must address these limitations in its democracy promotion strategy in order to make it more adept to the sociopolitical context of Ukraine in effectively countering its advancing authoritarian forces. This section will consider
the strengths and the limitations of the U.S. democracy promotion strategy and offer recommendations for improving the efficacy of the campaign.

The U.S. must restructure its democracy assistance strategy to include both the diplomatic intergovernmental (top-down) approach and the civil sector development (bottom-up) approach. First, the U.S. must allocate more financial aid for democracy promotion efforts in Ukraine in general, and must divert more of the aid to civil sector development programs in particular. The U.S. must improve its incentives system for distribution of grants to Ukrainian NGOs. Second, the U.S. must stay away from increasing financial support for top-down projects but must apply direct diplomatic pressure to make it costly for Ukrainian public officials to engage in anti-democratic activities. Third, the U.S. must utilize its international leverage to organize pressure against authoritarian advances in Ukraine by working together with the EU, Russia, and multilateral organizations such as NATO and the UN.

A. Increase Support for Civil Society and Media Development

This report recommends the U.S. to increase the funding and to reevaluate the efficiency of its civil society development projects in Ukraine, while continuing to provide training for pro-democratic government agents, and reducing the funding of top-down projects such as the anti-corruption program. First, the U.S. must reverse its current trend of cutting democracy aid to Ukraine and increase aid to at least 2005 levels when the amount was $40 million. The U.S. must not decrease the critically needed financial support at a time when democracy is in retreat in Ukraine. Second, the U.S. must allocate a larger portion of its funds to bottom-up programs such as strengthening of civil society organizations, local communities, and media and a lesser portion to top-down projects such as government institution building and fighting corruption. The lack of significant results from anti-corruption programs, which alone received $45 million in 2006, and
from political party development after 2004 demonstrates the inability of these programs to achieve the desired democratization goals in the sociopolitical context of Ukraine. On the other hand, the evidence from the Orange Revolution reveals the potential of an empowered civil sector in Ukraine and demonstrates the success of civil society organizations and an independent media in mobilizing social opposition against government abuse of power.

Third, the U.S. approach to assisting Ukrainian civil society organizations must remodel its incentive structure to encourage the development of networks and horizontal ties with community members and local business (Henderson 2002, 160). The U.S. must increase its efforts to incentivize cooperation among civic groups as well as the establishment of community-government-business linkages. To prevent the evolution of counterproductive vertical ties between donor organizations and civil society groups, the U.S. must promote the mobilization of local resources and integrate local resources into projects, thus increasing accountability and sustainability of civil society organizations and development projects (Shapovalova 2010, 13). The U.S. democracy promotion strategy must be remodeled to increase the financial and technical support for Ukrainian civil society development and to increase the effectiveness of such projects by providing more constructive incentives to Ukrainian non-state recipient organizations.

B. Apply Intergovernmental Diplomatic Pressure

The U.S. must include both the empowerment of civil society and the imposition of constraints on autocratic agents simultaneously to reach maximum results in its democracy promotion campaign in Ukraine. As discussed in Section 3, U.S. diplomatic pressure, when applied, has been effective in preventing authoritarian advances in Ukraine. McFaul also points out that state-to-state diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Ukrainian government
significantly contributed to the success of the Orange Revolution (McFaul 2007, 82). Carothers notes as well that the U.S. and EU policy of pressure for political change helped bring down the authoritarian regime of Serbia headed by Slobodan Milosevic (Carothers 2001, 1).

Given Ukraine’s “corporatist,” “patronal presidentialist” political system dominated by groups oligarchic elites and a strong executive branch, diplomatic pressure is necessary to complement the civil society development efforts to counter the authoritarian practices and institutions inherited by Ukraine from its Soviet past. U.S. diplomatic pressure can follow the model of issuing resolutions, statements, and threats of sanctions by the U.S. State Department, as for example was done by the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv in response to the Tymoshenko prosecution case in December of 2010. The U.S. must use diplomatic pressure precisely, consistently, and selectively to sustain the diplomatic relations between the two states and avoid the risk of pushing Ukraine towards closer ties with the authoritarian Russia. This can be accomplished and sustained if the U.S. uses clear and consistent rhetoric to demonstrate its democracy promotion goals to the Ukrainian authorities. As such, the U.S. must clearly signal that the cause of a particular set of diplomatic sanctions is the anti-democratic activity of government authorities and that its objectives are for democracy promotion ends, separate from U.S. security, economic, and other interests. Diplomatic pressure must be directed in response to specific anti-democratic actions, such as the contestable indictment of Tymoshenko, and must be applied consistently between cases of government abuse of power.

C. Consolidate International and Multilateral Linkages

In order for diplomatic pressure to have a maximum desired effect in preventing a democratic backslide in Ukraine, the U.S. must utilize its international position to mobilize a consistent institutional force to discourage Ukrainian authorities from abusing power and
incentivizing them to enact democratic reforms. First, the U.S. must seek more cooperation from the EU and Russia, the two regional hegemons in close proximity to Ukraine, in its strategy to promote democracy in Ukraine. The geographical proximity of the EU and its considerable influence in the country must be incorporated into the U.S. democracy promotion strategy in Ukraine for diplomatic measures to be more coordinated and effective. In addition, the U.S. strategy can also benefit from a closer partnership with the EU because of the significant financial aid the institution contributes to democracy promotion in Ukraine (Shapovalova 2010, 3). Also, the U.S. must use diplomatic relations with Russia to make Russia more constructive in the U.S. democratization efforts in Ukraine.

Moreover, the U.S. must use its leverage in international organizations in the UN and NATO to support democratization in Ukraine and ensure coordinated international condemnation in cases of excessive abuse of power. U.S. influence of the UN, which can pass resolutions and apply moral pressure on abusive governments, can be used as a strategic tool to press democratization in Ukraine and establish legitimacy of U.S. actions. Intergovernmental diplomatic pressure must be also balanced with strong incentives for Ukraine to democratize. Hence, the U.S. should continue to press for Ukraine’s accession into NATO, although with increased considerations for Russian interests in the region to avoid retaliation from Russia. Enabling Ukraine to integrate into NATO would provide real incentives to Ukrainian officials to legislate democratic reforms as demanded by the institution. As Levitsky and Way point out, international networks aimed at promoting democracy and human rights have made it difficult to sustain some forms of authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 63). The use of international linkages must be incorporated into the U.S. democracy promotion strategy to make it costly for Ukraine to take steps towards authoritarianism.
This task force recommends that in order for U.S. democracy promotion to be maximally effective in Ukraine, it must be reorganized to direct more aid and effort to bottom-up programs such as civil society development while simultaneously exerting more consistent and coordinated diplomatic pressure on Ukrainian authorities by utilizing intergovernmental diplomacy as well as U.S. international influence.
Part III: In-Country Methods for Promoting Democracy

Achieving a balanced approach to democracy promotion requires not only an approach geared administratively, but also a bottom-up approach. In Part III, the authors address civic society's involvement with the state. In “Incorporating 'Untraditional' Civil Society Groups in U.S. Democracy Promotion” the author explains that people’s interest groups, such as women’s groups and human rights organizations, do not receive funding because they are not directly related to democracy promotion. What the author argues is that the U.S. should consider funding these groups and pursue an agenda of community driven development that indirectly contributes to the formation of democracy.

Furthermore, in “Improving U.S. Democracy Aid: Sustainability through Community Driven Development”, even where U.S. aid funding does go to a non-traditional group, that aid is not allocated effectively, in turn creating adverse results. A major focus is the lessons learned from the past in order to correct the future. The authors argue that instead of upward accountability, which tends to lead to projects that reflect donors’ needs rather than local needs, projects can incorporate downward and horizontal accountability through promoting participation of the local constituency with community driven development as a tool for sustainable democratization.
In December of 2003, the freedom of millions of Iraqi women was at stake. Conservative members of Iraq’s blossoming democratic government passed Resolution 137, which abolished Iraq’s Personal Status Law. Resolution 137 took away Iraqi women’s rights, divided Iraq’s religious sects, and threatened the hope of creating a liberal democracy in Iraq. However, in response to this resolution and the lack of a political space for women in general, Iraqi women from every religious and ethnic group organized to create media campaigns, action plans, and recommendations for their political inclusion at the local, regional, and national level. They organized conferences in Baghdad, Washington DC, Amman, and many other cities and demonstrated outside of the Iraqi Governing Counsel’s office buildings. They launched petitions for women to be included in every body within the interim government and collected nearly 12,000 signatures across Iraq in a matter of days. Women also formed organizations including the National Council of Women, Women’s Alliance for Democratic Iraq, and the Iraqi Women’s Higher Council and created educational campaigns and programs. Taking advantage of their freedom of expression, women utilized newspapers, magazines, and online newsletters to disseminate information and create discussion about women’s issues. As a result of their efforts, women are required, by law, to occupy at least 25% of the National Assembly. They also broadened the space for freedom of speech, press and movement for women, and were successful in helping to repeal Resolution 137. In short, women saw a need for change, advocated, and interacted with the government to achieve the change they required (Stanski 2005, 211-213).
This type of active participation and movement towards equality is the essence of democracy. However, when foreign donors decide what parts of civil society will receive democracy promotion aid, groups like women’s groups, human rights organizations, professional associations, and other people’s interests groups do not receive funding because they do not have a direct relation to democracy promotion. In addition to supporting groups that directly work towards democracy, the U.S. should also fund groups that contribute to the formation of democracy indirectly, by reducing inequality or by identifying citizens’ needs, meeting them, and engaging citizens in collective action. Besides directing money towards NGOs and other people’s organizations, the U.S. can also use social media and civic education to engage civil society and create a cultural basis for democracy.

I. Definition of “Civil Society”

Though “civil society” is a frequently used term within and outside of academic literature, there is still debate as to what civil society actually means and encompasses in relation to democracy promotion. The concept most accepted by Western governments and other aid donors defines civil society as “voluntary associations that foster democracy and promote democratic consolidation” (Ottaway et al. 2000, 11). These organizations interact directly with the state to oppose its nondemocratic behavior, hold the state accountable for its actions, and advocate for the interests of its citizens.

However, many people’s organizations and NGOs outside of this definition play crucial roles in democratic transitions and in sustaining a democracy. A more broad definition of civil society, and the one the U.S. should consider when dealing with democracy promotion, states that civil society is an “intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organizations separate from the state” (Ottaway et al. 2000, 9). These organizations are generally
varied and include, but are not limited to, women’s groups, human rights groups, trade unions, professional organizations, organizations based on kinship, ethnicity, culture or religion, formal and informal social networks, and those who accept the political state of affairs and those who wish to change them. One thing all of these organizations have in common is that they are autonomous and function through voluntary participation of their members who contribute so that they can extend or promote their values or interests. Donors are hesitant to view civil society in this way because when using this definition, civil society does not have a well-defined relationship with the state (Ottaway et al. 2000, 9). However, by neglecting these untraditional groups, the U.S. is ignoring groups that have large roles in creating a long-lasting democracy characterized by political participation and discussion, albeit indirectly.

When thinking about civil society it is tempting to view it as a collection of noble causes, but in reality civil society consists of an array of “good” and “bad” groups. Many civic activists believe that they are fighting for the public good, but what is actually in public interest is debatable. Some civil society groups are solely focused on their own interests and have no interests in balancing other visions of the public good. For example, non-profit groups often seek to advance their economic interests and lose sight of their values (Carothers et al. 2000, 19). For this reason, the U.S. needs to take caution in deciding what groups will receive aid money or other support to ensure that it promotes “good” civil society while examining where and how its resources are used.

II. A Brief History of Civil Society Aid

In the 1990s, the U.S. government began to support the idea that citizen participation is vital to democracy and thus, began to formally allocate democracy aid money towards building civil society (Ottaway 2001). This shift in focus opened up a space for civil society in
transitioning regimes and gave civil society groups room to step in, especially in the developing world as authoritarian governments retracted their reach (Ottaway et al. 2000, 9).

Though many assume that the U.S. is naturally inclined to support civil society, the U.S.’s history of promoting democracy abroad shows that it has actually feared grassroots movements. During the Cold War, for example, the U.S. and other western democracies supported top-down developments but hesitated to support Eastern European civil society, for fear of supporting communist movements. However, civil society groups in various countries throughout Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, did not support leftist ideology but rather challenged and led the charge against communist rule. In Eastern Europe and Asia, many citizens had an adverse reaction to political parties because they had only lived under one rule. On the other hand, they had hope for a successful civil society in which they could influence the government and have a forum for discussion. However, only after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions of 1989 did the U.S. see civil society as a potential force for democracy and began to incorporate it more routinely in planning aid for democracy promotion. Therefore, it should not be claimed that Americans support civil society for moral and ideological reasons; civil society is supported because there is a history that attests to its importance throughout democratic transitions (Ottaway et al. 2000, 7). Furthermore, other countries without the same civic traditions as the U.S. are also gravitating towards this type of aid, showing a global acceptance of civil society as a powerful force for beginning and sustaining democratic transitions.

III. The Importance of Civil Society Today

Supporting civil society combats some of the most common problems foreign governments encounter during democracy promotion. Creating a civil society ensures that there
is a greater amount of civic and political participation from a greater number of people, including citizens who have an understanding of political parties and the political system but continue to view it with skepticism (Carothers et al. 2000, 21). For example, democracy promoters found that they can help create an electoral process in transitioning societies but a functioning democracy requires much more than elections and an active voting population. The liberty to vote means little if there is no freedom of speech or expression, if human rights are violated, or if certain groups, such as women and minorities, are excluded from the political system. A sustainable liberal democracy requires active and continuous participation from a wide range of citizens who organize themselves in a variety of groups to promote their interests and who elicit responses from their government. Instead of just voting for their leaders and stepping aside, civil society creates a political culture in which citizens hold their government accountable for its actions through a constant dialogue (Ottaway et al. 2000, 4).

Democracy promoters also found the task of reforming state institutions to be overwhelming. Often, there is a lack of desire for reformation among leaders whose power would be directly threatened and this lack of enthusiasm trickles down through the middle and lower tiers of political institutions. However, civil society groups have no vested interests in the old system so, in theory, they are reform oriented and able to pressure power holders for the change they desire. Furthermore, civil society groups funded by foreign entities are in touch with the local population but also understand donors’ desires so they can take the needs of both groups into account as they work on advocacy or engage in dialogue with their government.

In the past, the U.S. has encountered problems with the sustainability of democratic institutions and has seen a reverse wave of democratization in which countries have slipped back into authoritarian rule. However, if supported effectively, civil society is sustainable. Civil
society, by nature, requires voluntary participation of its members. A system that encourages and enables active citizen participation suggests democratic sustainability because for democracies to be legitimate and functional, they need to be socially based and there must be a cultural desire to maintain democratic institutions once established. For this reason, civil society is crucial because without it, it is nearly impossible to create an environment conducive to democracy that will outlast foreign aid (Stanski 2005, 200).

Civil society is clearly important for maintaining democracy but only if supported by a strong political system. Several studies, including Sheri Berman’s case study in Germany, suggest, “Civil society can actually reflect dangerous political weaknesses” (Carothers et al. 2000, 21). German civil society thrived in the 1920s and 1930s, with many citizens belonging to the types of professional and cultural organizations that are thought to best promote democracy. However, according to Berman, Germany’s unusually vibrant civil society subverted democratic values instead of supporting them. Because they were not receiving support from weak political institutions, citizens moved their allegiance to nationalist groups. Eventually, civil society enabled the rapid transformation of the Nazi Party into a political regime” (Carothers et al. 2000, 23). This demonstrates that the U.S. needs to take caution when promoting civil society so that it also promotes political structures that can support it.

IV. A New Strategy: Supporting Non-Traditional Groups

Civil society is structured differently in each country and the U.S. should shape its democracy promotion efforts by examining each country’s existing civil society and citizens’ current needs. In societies where large inequalities between citizens exist, the U.S. could support programs that would help disadvantaged populations overcome discrimination and become politically involved. Iraqi women’s effectiveness in promoting democracy (discussed in the
introduction) is just one example of how funding untraditional groups can have democratic results. In a Latin American country, in which indigenous peoples are discriminated against and have poor living conditions, the U.S. should consider supporting these populations to shrink inequality and to engage these groups in political involvement. Again, these are only a few of examples of the types of groups that should be supported when using a broader definition of civil society.

When dealing with poorer nations, the U.S. should fund developmentally aimed civil society groups because citizens are going to care more about meeting their basic needs than about elections and lofty goals of a liberal democracy. However, by supporting developmental organizations, the U.S. would also indirectly support democracy by creating a discussion and making the government accountable to its people. In the Philippines, for example, non-traditional, development related civil society groups drove democratization. Between the years of 1986 and 2001, the number of NGOs in the Philippines increased from 27,100 to over 95,000. Around 7,000 of the NGOs in 2001 were grassroots organizations set up to combat poverty and the rest were professional organizations and associations, labor unions, student organizations, religious groups, and other groups related to middle-class interests. According to one survey, 16% of people affiliated themselves with people’s organizations or NGOs. This seems like a modest number, but it means that NGOs and people’s organizations reached nearly 2,385,000 families (Racelis 2000, 161). Civil society groups thrived and continue to do so today because they have been able to organize communities, improve the social and economic well being of citizens in poor communities, promote social networking, and have had successes in advocacy and lobbying (Racelis 200, 181).
Similar to the U.S.’s current aid portfolio, in the 1990s a significant amount of aid was set aside for helping disadvantaged populations. Though outside of the traditional U.S. funding portfolio, the U.S. provided funding for activities such as micro-financing, low-income housing and architecture, educational scholarships, farming technology, women’s groups, educational scholarships, and vocational training, which all were crucial in creating a democratic space in the Philippines. Once NGOs and people’s organizations helped people meet their needs on a local level, citizens in poor communities quickly realized that sustainable solutions require action on the national level. Then, NGOs and people’s organizations helped citizens create linkages with the Philippine government to promote their interests through advocacy, negotiation, and protest. Furthermore, NGOs helped middle and lower class Filipinos act autonomously which resulted in the state taking their concerns into consideration while shaping policies instead of only focusing on the issues of the elite. Their efforts are affecting national decision-making on a more direct level because more leaders of NGOs and people’s organizations have been winning local office elections, have received political appointments and are using their positions to bring citizens’ values into the political scene. Disenchanted with traditional political parties, they have also formed their own political parties with more progressive agendas.

Supporting groups that represent the needs and desires of the people is sustainable for democracy. Philippine NGOs are aware of the democratic framework that supports their activities but they do not consciously think of their activities as working towards a long-lasting democracy. Instead, they think of empowering people to bring about societal changes and sustainable human development. Zialcita, a Filipino scholar says that the main barriers to democracy are dependency-creating poverty, a hierarchal society, and a weak sense of public good (Racelis 2000, 162). In a direct way, Philippine NGOs and people’s organizations work to
finding a solution to these issues so in an indirect way, they are finding a path towards democratic development (Racelis 2000, 162-163). Commitment to ending their problems motivates civil society groups, not abstract notions of democracy.

V. Ways to encourage civil society without direct funding

When funding civil society organizations, donors run the risk of creating institutions that are dependent on foreign aid and who become removed from their local populations. However, donors can engage civil society through other means, including social media and civic education, to ensure that democracy has strong cultural basis in transitioning societies.

A. Technology

Technology has had an important role in beginning and sustaining democratic transitions because a well-connected, literate civil society that discusses its concerns gives meaning to political freedom. If a civil society is able to create and disseminate literature, or engage in a meaningful political discussion, it can shift the balance of power from the state to civil society. For this reason, encouraging social media could be an important way to encourage civil society.

Currently, when addressing the use of technology the U.S. takes the "instrumental approach," which prevents Internet censoring. While Internet freedom is important, supporters of the instrumental approach overestimate the value of access to information and underestimate the value of discussion, coordination, and the use of simpler forms of communication, such as cell phones. There have also been problems associated with the instrumental approach. For example, Haystack, a program meant to circumnavigate Iranian internet censorship, was applauded in Washington but proved to be dangerous because it did not hide messages from governments and it did not render users anonymous (Shirky 2011, 31). Therefore, it is more
effective to use the Internet as a way to strengthen civil society instead of trying to make sure citizens are able to surf the internet freely.

A study by sociologists Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld showed that a two-step process is required to affect people's political opinions. First, media transmits opinions and then these opinions are repeated through social networks such as friends, family, and coworkers. Katz and Lazarsfeld found that political opinions are actually formed during the second step. This demonstrates that social media can have a serious impact on the way people view politics because websites such Facebook, Twitter, and various blogs provide a forum for discussion and debate (Stanski 2011, 34). For this reason, the U.S. should support social media networking and discussions, or take what is considered the “environmental approach.”

Another way social media helps begin and sustain democratic transitions is by providing civil society groups with a medium for coordination so that they can effectively direct their members to engage in collective action. This “shared awareness” allows every group member the opportunity to understand the current situation and also know that everyone else understands the situation (Stanski 2011, 35-36). One example where technology was used successfully to coordinate the start of a democratic transition was in Moldova in 2009 when massive protests, coordinated in part by Facebook, Twitter, and text messaging ousted the Communist Party from power following an obviously fraudulent election (Stanski 2011, 29).

Even though social media has potential to build cohesion between citizens it is overall a weak strategy because there have been as many failures as successes when utilizing social media for democracy promotion. If the U.S. wants to maximize the positive impact of technology in transitioning democracies, it should think on the small scale and shift its efforts toward supporting social media projects instead of Internet freedom.
B. Education

Without a change in social norms and cultural attitudes, democracy is not sustainable because it will never fully take root. Furthermore, if citizens do not understand their rights they will never be able to fully enjoy them. For this reason, the U.S. should devote more funding towards civic education in transitioning democracies.

Civic education can be defined as teaching citizens about democratic principles, about their own country’s political system, and how citizens can influence it (Ottaway 2001). In democracies, citizens are the decision makers so it is important that they not only understand, but also believe in the democratic process. For this reason, civil education is important in the transition to and maintenance of democracies. It is not enough that the first generation of democracy believes in the principles. For a democracy to be sustainable, each generation must be taught “the spirit and the understanding of the relationship between rights and responsibilities, freedom and license; the critical role of the citizen; the role of tolerance; the duty of participation; the meaning of limited government; the roll of a free press, free speech, and freedom of religion, petition and assembly; and the requirements of due process” (Ridley 1997, 1). By educating youth, the U.S. can ensure that the enthusiasm and desire for democracy does not die with the older population.

In the 1960s, Western researchers began studying political socialization and how youth acquired political knowledge, attitudes, and skills. One of their greatest findings, in consensus with today’s dominant constructionist paradigm, is that youth actively construct meaning instead of passively receiving messages (Hahn 2010, 6). In the Middle East, for example, several studies (Ichilov, Pederson, Shirazi in Hahn 2010) showed that civil education was more effective and more likely to shape students’ views when it incorporated active learning and activities that led
to discussion. Deliberate instruction often enhanced civic knowledge but did little to change their political attitudes (Hahn 2010, 14-15). Therefore, when designing civic education or deciding which organizations to support, the U.S. should make sure that the curriculum is designed to promote discussion, not just the transmission of western ideas. Civic education often focuses around voter education but the U.S. needs to promote education that teaches that voting is important for good citizenship but that understanding their rights, engaging in a dialogue with the state, and political participation are also important.

Civitas, a program set up by the Center for Civic Education in 1995, is a good example of an organization that is culturally sensitive and effective in their education. Civitas pairs U.S. states with countries in democratic transition. These state-nation partners work together to develop exchange programs, teacher training and material development, student participation activities, conferences and projects, research, establish websites, and create an ongoing communication. Their main goal is to “advance education for democratic citizenship and to have a positive impact on students’ political knowledge, attitudes, values, and participatory skills” (Marx 2004-2005, 2-3). Since the program is based off of exchange, both partners learn from each other instead of westerners teaching only western ideas.

In one of their exchange programs, teachers living in transitioning democracies participate in seminars in the U.S. During the seminars, both the transitioning country and the U.S. state learn about each other’s cultures and work to improve civic education. During these programs teachers receive training, discuss and occasionally create new curriculum, develop models of cooperation, and engage in political comparison (Marx 2004-2005, 36). Civic education abroad could be seen as exportation of American ideals but in reality, these exchanges
are, and should continue to be forums for discussion, cooperation, and the sharing of cultures and ideas.

Hungary has had a positive experience with civic education since the fall of communist rule. The dissemination of literature explaining democracy and its values was one of the first steps in Hungarian civic education. In 1994, the U.S. Information Agency and the Joint Eastern Europe Center for Democratic Education and Governance published *Jo Polgar* (meaning “good citizen”). *Jo Polgar* was composed of essays written by Hungarian scholars that included historical perspective, civic information, and civic skills (Ridley 1997, 5). In this way, the civic education was culturally sensitive and based upon Hungary’s current status and prior experiences, an outcome that the U.S. should seek to recreate.

To reach the youth population who would probably not be reading works like *Jo Polgar*, organizations such as Civitas worked in the schools. One program was “Citizen in a Democracy,” a competition based off of the U.S.’s “We the People” competition, in which students demonstrated their democratic knowledge. Over a three-year period, the competition involved thousands of students and hundreds of teachers. Participants first competed at a local then regional level and the final competition was held in Budapest, modeled after a congressional hearing. There, students debated the “implications, opportunities, and responsibilities of Hungarian civic life” before several judges” (Dziuban 2000, 15).

The results of this competition show that 95-98% of students experienced an increase in their understanding of Hungarian democracy, their responsibilities as a citizen, and improved their skills as a citizen. Though not as many students said they would take a more active role in politics (about 75%), these results are still favorable and suggest that this competition had a positive effect on the students (Dziuban 2000, 24). If the U.S. supports similar education
initiatives it can help create a lasting democratic culture by engaging the youth population. Programs like Civitas are especially productive because they not only educate but also facilitate exchange instead of an indoctrination in American ideas.

VI. Egypt as a Case Study and Conclusions

Many westerners believe that Islam and authoritarianism in the Middle East would prevent its countries from ever forming a civil society. However, this is a misconception because civil society organizations have existed in the Middle East for centuries. Though civil society is weaker in the Middle East than in some western countries, the presence of civil society demonstrates that citizens can, in fact, organize themselves voluntarily in a space unregulated by the government and that they can challenge and engage in a dialogue with the state. Middle Eastern civil societies even share many similarities with their civil society counterparts in western countries. The civil societies in both regions have organizations that are based entirely on voluntary participation, many are inspired by religious beliefs, and many are set up to further political goals (Brouwer 2000, 21-22).

When designing civil society aid for Egypt, the U.S. government should examine Egypt’s current civil society and look for ways to support and strengthen it. NGOs are generally the U.S.’s preferred form of donation, but in Egypt they are extremely restricted and, as of now, do not make good candidates for donation because they must be registered under the NGO law and secure government approval to receive donations from domestic and international sources. The U.S. would first need to work towards a reform that would give all Egyptians the right to freely associate (Lawry 2011). Though untraditional, trade unions and professional organizations, especially the Egyptian Bar Association and the Syndicate of Journalists, who have created a medium for political discussion in the past, might be a good place to start advocacy because of
their respected status (Al-Sayyid 2000, 53). Or, human rights and groups working towards ending social disempowerment might be good venues because they are respected among Egyptians and their government alike.

Though the U.S. is hesitant to fund Islamic groups, Islamic organizations are among some of the biggest defenders of civil and political liberties, such as freedom of association, that underpin civil society (Al-Sayyid 2000, 55). Religion is unlikely to lose its grip in the Middle East, so the U.S. should consider supporting some Islamic organizations instead of continuously rejecting them. Resala, the largest Arab voluntary organization, was largely driven by the Islamic motivation before it was shut down by the state in 2008 (Daly 2010, 73, 77). However, it was a completely self-sustaining organization because its members participated voluntarily and had a willingness to create social change while creating safe outlets for political participation. Although they have their roots in Islam, organizations such as Resala act in deeply democratic, secular ways by ending inequality, and encouraging political dialogue, participation, and change.

The U.S. should also look to include women in reform because of their current absence. However, when trying to involve women, the U.S. needs to be culturally and environmentally sensitive. During a Women as Global Leaders conference in Dubai, Western speakers often encouraged Arab women by commending how far “we’ve” come and encouraging them to keep up “the fight”. However, this is a very normative version of women’s activism that does not resonate with many Middle Eastern women. Furthermore, many leadership conferences do not include Egyptian women from all backgrounds because they are expensive, meaning only those who are wealthy, work in well-funded NGOs, have scholarships, and the ability to travel can attend (Daly 2010, 67-68). Instead, the U.S. could work within mediums and with messages that do appeal to Egyptian women.
For example, the number of Egyptians using the Internet has grown exponentially in the last decade and evidence suggests that the majority of the users are young people. Blogs such as Global Intifada, and The Funky Ghetto Hijabi and social networks such as IslamOnline have an enormous youth following. AsefBayat also found that “alternative news websites are probably the most important sites through which networks of critical and informed constituencies can be formed” (Daly 2010, 70). Also, as shown by the recent Facebook-organized strikes and demonstrations, the Internet has huge organizing power in Egypt and the ability to connect like-minded people. These networks are also favorable because they create a discussion of ideas that requires no registration (unlike NGOs), requires no institution, and incorporates a new method of activism that appeals to Egyptians.

The aforementioned strategies are only a few of the ways that the U.S. can effectively support civil society in Egypt. However, there are a few points the U.S. needs to keep in mind while designing its civil society promotion efforts abroad. First, when designing democracy promotion aid, the U.S. needs to begin supporting civil society groups that indirectly contribute to democracy, such as women’s groups, professional associations, and development-oriented groups. Second, the U.S. needs to tailor its approach so that each program is country-specific and works with the existing civil society. Finally, the U.S. should consider utilizing strategies outside of funding NGOs such as supporting civic education or using technology and social media to engage citizens.
Chapter 12: Improving U.S Democracy Aid: Sustainability through Community Driven Development

By: Michelle Astengo and Grace Oh

As of 2004, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) spent $700 million annually on democracy promotion alone (Knack 2004, 252). Democracy aid practitioners use funds and resources to implement programs and strategies designed to target specific sub areas of democracy promotion, such as governance, civil society, and human rights. Foreign aid, however, can also impact a country's prospects for democracy indirectly through their effects on related factors like poverty, which encompass not only a lack of income but also a lack of voice and good governance (World Bank 2000). Consequently, even foreign aid for the purpose of poverty reduction may promote democracy by empowering and modernizing impoverished communities, which is often linked to an increase in the demand for democracy. Yet a prevalent critique of US foreign aid is that donors do not allocate aid effectively, creating sub-par, ambiguous, unsustainable, or even detrimental results. Many of the criticisms leveled against past democracy assistance efforts arise from the supply driven nature of aid. Evidence indicates that upward accountability to donors prevents the creation of locally relevant projects that respond to the needs and priorities of aid recipients.

Community Driven Development resolves this problem by including the input and feedback from local communities that are supposed to benefit from these projects. Unlike traditional forms of aid, CDD projects engage community members by involving them in all the major phases of project development and design. In doing so, CDD initiates a decentralization process that disperses the concentration of political and economic power more equally between members of society, facilitating the growth of more democratic governance. In order for foreign
aid to be effective, democracy aid practitioners must increase accountability, create incentives that encourage learning from past projects, and ensure the sustainability of projects by shifting the primary responsibility of democracy promotion from funding agencies to the communities they serve; CDD accomplishes all of these objectives by putting the development and implementation of projects in the communities’ hands. This chapter seeks to identify the specific weaknesses of traditional democracy assistance and examine how CDD can resolve them.

I. Impact of Democracy Assistance

The overall impact of foreign aid on democracy promotion is ambiguous. A study by economist Steven Knack indicates that foreign aid has, at best, a weak relationship with democratization based on Freedom House scores (Knack 2004, 259). On the other hand, when looking specifically at the impact of aid used for democracy assistance, Steven E. Finkel and Anibal Perez-Linan state in their article, *The Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building*, that aid has at least some positive impact on democracy promotion as measured by Polity and Freedom House scores. When the authors break down their results further in order to determine how democracy aid to different subcategories impact their scores, they find that aid to the categories of Political Processes and Civil Society has a positive effect on the scores of their respective categories while aid to Human Rights has a negative effect (Finkel and Perez-Linan 2007, 433). As the authors point out, however, the underlying reasons for these results are complex and unclear, and thus provide limited insight into the question of how to allocate funds more effectively. The ambiguous effect of U.S. democracy assistance suggests that it has had a mixed record of success at best, and warrants a reevaluation of U.S. strategies for promoting democracy abroad.
II. Donor Needs vs. Local Needs

Any effective democracy promotion program must respond to the unique conditions of each region receiving aid. Because every country possesses characteristics specific to that region, transplanting a democracy promotion program from one country to another will not necessarily produce the same results. Thomas Carothers makes this argument in his article, *The End of the Transition Paradigm*, stating that country specific factors like their economic level and political history matter, and democracy aid providers should tailor their programs accordingly, rather than applying a single “template” to all aid recipients (Carothers 2002, 19). Carothers’s statement naturally extends to aid allocation decisions since they are influenced by the specific strategies and programs aid providers decide to pursue. Aid allocation decisions must pay attention to the specific conditions of aid recipients in order to be effective.

Yet the structure of the aid regime tends to hinder rather than encourage democracy practitioners from focusing on the varied and unique needs of different countries. Part of the problem is that someone else is typically paying donor agencies to distribute funds to a separate beneficiary in a foreign country. This set-up means that while funding agencies may genuinely care about the interests of their beneficiaries, they are also invested in the interests of those who ultimately provide their own source of funding and enable their survival (Henderson 2002, 151). The interplay of multiple interests has the potential to influence aid allocation decisions to benefit donors who fund aid agencies, even at the expense of the constituents these agencies are trying to help. As a result, aid agencies may implement programs that are influenced more by the commercial, security, and political interests of donors more than the region-specific needs and interests of aid recipients.
Even when the terms and conditions of foreign aid are unhelpful or detrimental to the goals of its intended beneficiaries, aid recipients are likely to accept them in order to gain access to the funds. In her article *Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Sector in Russia*, Sarah Henderson describes how Russian NGOs alter their agenda to meet the grant requirements set by U.S. funders. Since the U.S. controls and sets the terms for the bulk of democracy aid available in Russia, recipient organizations respond to the interests of the U.S. rather than their own (Henderson 2002, 157). While the natural inclination of Russian NGOs may be to provide charitable and social services, they alter their language to qualify for grants, which reflect the priorities of the U.S (2002, 156). In Henderson's case, the tendency of foreign aid to reflect U.S. interests poses an obstacle to addressing the specific priorities of Russian NGOs. Rather than meeting local needs, foreign aid can pressure organizations to mold their agenda to fit the interests of the donor country.

To be sure, the priorities of donors that influence aid allocation can be legitimate and in line with widely accepted international norms. The problem arises when ill-matching priorities create ineffective projects that produce unclear results at best and detrimental effects at worst. Even if the funding priorities of donors are acceptable and desirable to the international community, the methods by which they pursue these priorities may simply lead to a mass waste of human and financial resources, which advances no one's interests. For example, even if democratization in Russia is widely accepted as a desirable goal by the international community, providing aid to Russian NGOs for the specific purpose of democracy promotion may ultimately be an ineffective way to allocate resources if they are more experienced and equipped to provide social services. In the instance of Russian NGOs, a more effective way to allocate aid may be to
seek democratization indirectly by focusing on poverty reduction and community empowerment, which adhere to local needs without losing sight of U.S. interests in democracy promotion.

III. Accountability

Creating more relevant, region-specific programs, however, necessitates actual knowledge about real conditions of target areas. Yet, because donors who set the terms for aid tend to be far removed from aid recipients, they typically do not grasp the nuanced differences and challenges that their constituents face, and are prone to supporting irrelevant or ineffective projects. Donors fit the description of what William Easterly calls “planners” in his article, *Planners versus Searchers in Foreign Aid*. He writes, “A planner thinks he already knows the answers; he thinks of poverty as a technical engineering problem that his answers will solve. A searcher admits he does not know the answers in advance; he believes poverty is a complicated tangle of political, social, historical, institutional, and technological factors” (Easterly 2006, 4). Essentially, planners view the world from the top and implement projects without discovering the realities at the bottom (2006, 4). The nature of democracy planners can explain the persistence and widespread application of the “transition paradigm” as a way of approaching democracy promotion despite its widely criticized ineffectiveness. Because planners are so far removed from their constituents, they are likely to support blanket programs based on faulty paradigms even when their constituents do not benefit from them.

Closing the distance between donors and aid recipients require a feedback loop in which the latter is able to express its needs to the former. The current aid structure, however, lacks the accountability processes that facilitate the establishment of effective feedback loops. Since many U.S. aid agencies depend on the resources of the U.S. government and its taxpayers for their survival, they are actually held accountable to funders instead of their aid recipients (Easterly
2006, 10). On the aid recipient side, organizations that receive foreign aid are then held accountable to funding agencies rather than their actual constituents (Easterly 2006, 10). Consequently, no one is held accountable to the intended recipients of democracy aid. In the current aid structure, aid recipients have no economic or political power to make their needs known and have them met.

Easterly contrasts this set up with that of democratic societies in which citizens are able to hold politicians accountable by voting them in and out of office for their performance, and free markets in which firms that do not meet the needs of their customers go out of business (Easterly 2006, 5). In these scenarios, an effective feedback loop ensures politicians are attuned to the needs of their constituents, and firms to the needs of their customers (2006, 5). Constituents of democracy assistance face the opposite scenario in which they are neither able to vote ineffective democracy practitioners out of their jobs nor express their discontent through the use of economic power. In short, aid recipients lack voice in the aid structure to provide effective feedback to democracy providers, which means donor-driven projects that do not help them are likely to persist.

The accountability issues that arise from a weak feedback loop undermine the very democratic processes that foreign aid is meant to cultivate. Current aid relationships concentrate power among donors and elites while shutting out recipient input, which is anathema to the ideals of democracy. The donor-driven nature of aid contributes to a weak sense of ownership and commitment to democracy assistance programs. As Carothers points out in his article *Revitalizing U.S. Democracy Assistance*, USAID predominantly employs U.S. based organizations to carry out every major step of project design and implementation, while local involvement remains secondary (Carothers 2009, 2). High levels of outside support coupled with
low levels of local participation result in weak local attachment to democracy projects and reduce their legitimacy (Ibid). For democracy assistance in particular, however, legitimacy and local commitment are crucial to its success, since democratic leaders require legitimacy among the people they govern.

IV. Sustainability

The lack of local involvement undermines the sustainability of aid projects. When projects are donor-driven, they tend to last only as long as donors remain committed to them. Foreign aid in general has been criticized for supporting unsustainable projects, and this criticism applies to democracy assistance as well. In Toward a New Paradigm, Marina Ottaway and Theresa Chung write that democracy aid practitioners pour funds into supporting solutions that recipient countries cannot afford without continued external assistance, such as transparent boxes for elections that are too costly to maintain without donor funds (Chung and Ottaway 1999, 111). Because donor involvement is typically temporary, the projects that aid recipients cannot support by themselves tend to have short term rather than long term impact.

Foreign aid also weakens a country’s long term prospects for democracy by undermining the sustainability of the organizations that are actually responsible for implementing projects. Temporary external aid enables organizations to survive without the assistance and involvement of its constituents, limiting local participation (Chung and Ottaway 1999, 111). Henderson’s account of democracy assistance in Russia illustrates this effect. She writes that Russian organizations tend to be composed of a small group of elites who chase foreign funds rather than their constituents (Henderson 2002, 155). Organizations that become reliant on donor funds to pay their staff members are likely to experience difficulties once the flow of democracy
assistance stops, and with no additional support from their communities, their continued survival is severely compromised.

V. Incentives and Learning

The failings of foreign aid are well-documented in scholarly literature, but the incentives built into the aid system discourage democracy providers from carrying out meaningful evaluations of past projects. Since donors and aid agencies receive so little feedback from aid recipients, they gravitate toward aid volume instead of results, which are harder to measure, as an indicator of success (Easterly 2003, 32). Thus, staff members are not evaluated on enhancing aid impact and creating sustainable projects but on how much money they move through the system (Riddell 2007, 362). The emphasis consequently falls on inputs instead of outcomes in assessing the success of projects, which distracts from the question of how to make aid more effective.

In order for learning to occur, project managers and leaders must evaluate past attempts and identify not only areas of success but of failure as well. Yet pressure to disburse aid quickly, and limited resource allocation for monitoring aid programs creates disincentives to learn from past projects (Riddell 2007, 362). This is not only characteristic of foreign aid in general but also democracy assistance in particular. In looking back at past efforts, Carothers identifies the tendency of democracy aid organizations to focus on the positives of democracy programs while underemphasizing the negatives (Carothers “A Reply…” 2002, 36). This characteristic of democracy assistance hampers learning by discouraging meaningful review of past projects that fall short on actual results, which could provide valuable lessons for the future.

VI. Case Study

Democracy assistance in Romania illustrates many of characteristics of foreign aid described above. Many U.S. democracy providers became involved in Romania during the 1990s
as the country underwent an abrupt transition from a communist government to a democratic one. Before the 1990s, Nicolae Ceausescu’s communist regime had controlled the Romanian government and actively repressed dissident movements by using the secret police and enacting measures that prohibited the existence of any organization not controlled by the Communist Party (Petrescu 2000, 217). In 1989, Romania experienced a violent revolution that overthrew Ceausescu’s communist regime. Though Romania then underwent the same phases of democratic transition experienced in other parts of Eastern Europe, such as elections, the drafting of a new constitution, and the establishment of political pluralism, the violent and sudden nature of the transition made the new government vulnerable to takeover by former Communists in power and members of the Securitate (Petrescu 2000, 217). The resulting protests nudged along the development of Romanian civil society, and attracted foreign democracy assistance, including U.S. aid. Like many foreign aid efforts, the effectiveness of aid was weakened by mismatched interests, confused accountability, unsustainable funding, and a failure to respond to the unique political conditions of the region.

Much of U.S. funding for civil society development came from USAID through its Democracy Network Program, which dedicated millions of dollars to supporting Eastern European NGOs through grants. Since U.S. donors wrote the terms for democracy assistance, aid allocation decisions at times reflected the interests of the U.S. without advancing the interests of Romanian NGOs. The nature of the program's grant-making set up led U.S. interests to prevail, sometimes even at the expense of local NGOs. In Civil Society in Romania, Dan Petrescu describes how an NGO’s proposal was rejected for a grant because it wanted to promote a piece of clean air legislation that had the potential to harm certain U.S. commercial interests.

The NGO’s staff dutifully went through the Democracy Network training, having their proposal all but spelled out for them. The trainers held up the final proposal as an
example to other trainees. Yet the embassy’s Democracy Commission rejected the proposal—because, according to some observers, powerful American tobacco companies in Romania had the ear of embassy officials… (Petrescu 2000, 225)

In this case, the NGO’s proposal exemplified the type of civil society activity that the Democracy Network Program intended to promote. Yet, when U.S. commercial interests were at odds with the interests of this NGO, the former prevailed over the latter. The aid structure was set up in such a way that the conflicting interests of the donor, in this case the U.S., received more weight in aid allocation decisions even when these interests hindered the very goal that the aid was meant to achieve—the promotion of Romanian civil society. This case is one instance in which conflicting U.S. interests negatively impacted the effectiveness of its own efforts to promote democracy in Romania.

Another unintended effect of U.S. democracy assistance was to encourage upward accountability, which meant Romanian NGOs focused their efforts on meeting the requirements of donors rather than their communities. Petrecesu points to the case of environmental NGOs in Romania, which received support through a national training program sponsored by USAID, as an example of how democracy assistance isolated aid recipients from the communities they were supposed to serve. He writes, “In current NGO parlance, ‘doing a project’ means writing a proposal that will bring in grant money for salaries and the office rent, rather than organizing a protest rally at a polluting factory…” (Petrecesu 2000, 234). Petrecesu’s comments illustrate how upward accountability has focused environmental NGO efforts on appealing to donors rather than their constituents. Instead of engaging the local community through activities such as protests rallies, NGO work on drafting projects targeted at grant makers. These organizations suffer from the same problem of isolation that Henderson says exists among Russian NGOs; by enabling NGOs to survive on foreign grants, democracy assistance has removed the NGOs need
for their constituents’ support and participation, eliminating the accountability processes that would compel them to reach out to the community (Henderson 2002, 160). As a result, communities have limited sway in shaping the activities and priorities of NGOs relative to foreign donors.

Democracy aid is likely to be more effective if designed to address real problems and needs in their target countries. Yet upward accountability creates an aid structure in which Romanian civil society projects funded by U.S. democracy assistance adhere to the beliefs of distant donors at the top than actual problems at the bottom. For example, a number of indicators suggest that the general citizenry in Romania is deeply disaffected by the country’s politicians. These indicators include falling voter turnout and declining ratings that measure the citizenry’s trust in rule-of-law institutions like the Parliament and the Ministry of Justice (Petrescu 2000, 223). An obstacle to democratization, then, is the citizenry’s increasing alienation and disengagement with the country’s political sphere. Effective democracy assistance based on real conditions at the bottom must respond to this specific problem.

This problem, however, went largely unaddressed by distant U.S. donors. Instead of building grant-making and training programs that fit the Romanian context, U.S. donors and democracy providers based them on U.S. experiences of civil society development, which was that of advocacy organizations affecting change through the political arena (Petrescu 2000, 226). Consequently, donors supported and trained NGOs for the purpose of advocacy work targeting politicians rather than engaging the community (2000, 226). Petrescu describes how this narrow focus on advocacy training shaped NGOs relationships with their constituents: “They took the community for granted, or if they didn’t, they lacked the resources and training for what needed to be done: work with citizens” (2000, 223). The “resources and training” for engaging the
general citizenry would presumably have been provided by donors. Instead, donors made aid allocation decisions based on their own perceptions and experiences with advocacy work, which did not match the Romanian context. This lack of attention to local conditions led to the development of NGOs that were isolated from their communities, an unsurprising result of upward accountability to distant donors.

As expected, foreign funds and lack of community involvement introduced sustainability problems. When USAID abruptly stopped the grant making efforts in favor of training programs, many civil society organizations receiving aid in Romania were left “stranded” without enough funds to sustain the organization (Petrecsu 2000, 235). Contributing to the problem was a lack of local commitment to the causes of various NGOs. Because foreign democracy providers did not work on rooting NGOs in the communities they were supposed to represent, these organizations could not rely on local support once foreign aid was pulled out, leading their staff members to look for employment elsewhere (Ibid). Thus the negative impact of democracy assistance was not just that it made NGOs reliant on temporary foreign funds, but that it also undermined their self-sustainability by limiting the involvement and support of their communities.

Using inputs to monitor and evaluate projects prevented democracy providers from identifying and tackling such problems. Rather than gauging project effectiveness through outcomes, democracy programs described above and other donor efforts expressed success in terms of “grants awarded, seminars held, people trained, and so on” (Petrecsu 2000, 232). Consequently, democracy projects with critical issues like weak sustainability and community disengagement could persist without resolution, indicating a lack of learning from past mistakes.

VII. Democracy through Development

Community development arises as a possible solution to the problems that characterize
more top-down, donor-driven forms of democracy assistance. While development by itself does not automatically guarantee democracy, it fosters an environment that is conducive to it. Since other forms of democracy aid can easily damage democracy through confused accountability, which can ultimately introduce sustainability issues, this paper analyzes community development as a means to promote democracy while avoiding the pitfalls of past efforts.

Historically, development has often been linked to democracy in several ways. The baseline theory is that of community empowerment, which economic development essentially accomplishes by changing the productive relationship (Robinson 2006). Structural changes in the economy occur with growth, shifting more importance to human capital over previous imperatives such as land control, thereby negating many barriers to democracy (Ibid). In essence, economic development disperses the concentration of power from the landlord class to subordinate classes (Huber 1993, 75). This dispersion of power makes it harder for traditional elites to exclude others politically, which creates an environment more favorable to the growth of democracy.

Development can further enhance the conditions in which democracy is likely to take root by enabling communities to self-organize in unprecedented ways. By shifting political control away from elites, target communities must reorganize themselves to find appropriate methods for political expression in the new context (Shaw 2001). New forms of communication, transportation, and factory production facilitate this process by increasing their capacity for self-organization (Huber 1993, 75). Thus, communities gain greater ability to develop a voice with which to express their own needs and interests in the political system, laying down the foundation for more democratic governance.
VIII. Shortcomings in Other Approaches

One form of grass-roots development aid which attempts to also serve as a democratizing endeavor is the implementation of private microprojects. This form of development seeks to rectify some of the current accountability and sustainability issues that can prevent poverty reduction as a means to democratization. The utilization of microprojects for democracy promotion originates from two inherent requirements: 1) it must respond to a local specific and agreed-upon prioritized need; 2) it must include direct local support (Egger 1992, 46). These requirements are meant to diffuse the power of government among the people, empowering civic society by allowing the constituency to decide on their own priorities. The second requirement of local support seeks to solve accountability and sustainability issues by stipulating local enduring support. In fact, foreign funding for a microproject cannot exceed 3/4 (Ibid). The intention of this rule is to make community members recognized as stakeholders in projects, thereby enforces bottom-up accountability.

Despite this evolution towards sustainable democratization, many microprojects have developed with a flaw that mitigates the project’s usefulness in teaching democratic values through engendering a sense of civil society. These projects are typically carried out by an enterprise isolated from the target community (Egger 1992, 47). This aspect of the project’s implementation undermines the longevity of these efforts, despite regulations to the opposite intention. Because the people may propose or accept a project, but not administer it, there is a shortfall in participation (Ibid). Further, there is no insurance to a project’s longevity, which may result in asset underutilization (1992, 48). In the end, the target society still lacks the training to utilize any new infrastructure.
Therefore one can gather that in order to create a successful microproject several things must occur. As a foundation to avoid falling into the same invisible donor trap, communities must self-organize to create local committees for carrying out projects. As opposed to this rudimentary form of microprojects, local communities must administer projects in addition to merely proposing or accepting proposals in order to promote real participation. To do so, members of local committees must receive the necessary training. These committees then must institute means of communication. More broadly, these improvements must be outlined within a long-term plan to avoid asset underutilization. These modifications to traditional microprojects will achieve the sustainability goals of this Task Force, as will be further explored in the remainder of this chapter.

IX. Community Driven Development

Community Driven Development embodies the same developmental goals of traditional microprojects, but with a structure more conducive to long-term sustainability and local empowerment that converge into a sustainable democratic system. It is structured by four pillars to build real participation and linkage by all stakeholders, improved accountability, technical soundness, and sustainability (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 79).

Real participation is achieved through the use of Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS), which are plans drawn between community members and local governments to prioritize needs, set goals, and build community institutions to apply the development projects. This step reinforces civil society by distributing a higher level of decision-making power. PRS may also be viewed as a contract to project completion to avoid squandering assets.

The second goal outlined by CDD’s structure is to create linkages among stakeholders, not necessarily shareholders. This distributes accountability downwards towards the community
level, but also implies communication networks from community members, to local committees, and local government. These networks facilitate free access to resources for project completion. Local committees can act as a mouthpiece for communicating the individual community’s goals to the national government. This committee works with the government to establish a plan to execute infrastructure projects that satisfy the community’s prioritized needs. This way, the projects take on a localized form that originates from the demand end.

Improving accountability as a step within CDD is largely covered by the program’s structure. Because those implementing the development projects are essentially those receiving funding according to PRS, the “planners” dilemma is taken out of the equation (Easterly 2006). There is still a level of accessibility to be breached between community members and local government, but some red tape is eliminated due to moving the process downwards. The project relevance is also heightened with the implementation of a PRS. Therefore, in having a feedback system that relies on the previously established strategy agreed upon between the local government and community, accountability is redirected downwards.

Accountability is also improved by giving communities the financial resources and training to support and take ownership of their own projects. The community is given untied block grants by the World Bank to fund their projects. CDD is unique from other microprojects in that the target community has a direct relationship and interest in the project at hand. Community members receive training in addition to the funds to not only build but also maintain the desired infrastructure. Technical soundness is the last pillar of CDD that leads straight to sustainability. This entails training community members to take charge of their own projects and institutions, which facilitates operations, accountability, and sustainability.
X. Philosophy Behind CDD

Through community-led development programs, cultural identity can be maintained within a democratic system because the project originates from the community’s own priorities; and the ultimate participatory goals of democratization can be achieved in a beneficial and non-invasive manner. CDD seeks to democratize a nation ultimately by empowering civil society through government decentralization. This method refers back to classical concepts of forming a democracy that can be found in Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America*. The logic follows that American democracy was largely dependent on the structure of townships and individual sovereignty (Tocqueville 1945, 81). By building local governments and a higher ability for community involvement, development projects recall this foundation for democracy. CDD is held together by a broad structure that allows for democratic ideals to be localized and compatible with the target community. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the U.S. to mark more of its democracy aid toward CDD in order to foster stability and new partnerships that may strengthen international linkages.

XI. Empowerment

CDD leads to democracy by empowering the target community. Instead of treating impoverished societies as objects of pity, these programs seek to provide capable societies with the resources to sustain themselves. CDD empowers the community to plan, implement and maintain projects that serve real needs of the target community. With Community Based Organizations and NGOs helping to sustain the dialogue between governments and communities concerning CDD, politicians and officials are held more accountable to the constituencies that they serve. CDD reinforces the idea of community to allow people to take charge and create
their own society by working with local bureaucrats, and hiring, paying and disciplining the service providers most relevant to the target society.

CDD maintains cultural sensitivity in its capability to be highly individualized. It utilizes a broad structure that can be filled in by individual country needs, history, and starting-point (World Bank “Community” 2000). The process of CDD begins with an in-depth individualized diagnosis of the fundamental dynamics of community, local government, and sector approaches in each country, that results in immediate action plans and long-term plans drawn up by the government in conjunction with the target community, ensuring that these strategies will be unique within the country’s context (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 61). This ensures both a focus on local interests, and that these priorities will be met through a cohesive and non-invasive plan.

A second prong of CDD’s individualized nature is that donors can support a country’s efforts to decentralize but cannot impose it from outside, which leads to a project with a scope of 10 to 15 years (World Bank “Community” 2000). This extended time-frame can be an advantageous addition to U.S. foreign policy, in that quick pull-outs are largely criticized as leading to unstable democracies (Kopstein 2006). In this way, the longer time-frame both keeps resources flowing to sustain a long-term democracy, and may improve U.S. Foreign imagery by association if this method is especially supported.

XII. CDD, Democracy, and Decentralization

The democratizing forces of CDD proceed by decentralizing the government, and dispersing authority among the community. Decentralization is the process by which development can be implemented at local community level with the participation of the people. Political decentralization entails local electoral practice whereby people elect their leaders as
well as their representatives in the legislature, and transferring political power from central
government to give citizens and their elected representatives more voice in public decision-
making—from political governance to economic development. Viewing political
decentralization by this form of transferring decision-making power and authority, it becomes a
strong vehicle for championing local diversity and autonomy (Kauzya 2005). Through it, local
interests are articulated, and local cultural systems are strengthened, rather than threatened.
Decentralization provides a structural and institutionalized venue through which local people can
participate and exert influence on the policies that govern their lives. If democracy means the
rule of the people, then political decentralization promotes democracy.

Decentralization is achieved through three basic steps: initiation, scaling up, and
consolidation (World Bank “Community” 2000). In the initiation stage, communities are
provided with untied block grants to fulfill the resources part, but also begin country-driven
extended in-country discussions to decide priority challenges and actions in order to assert the
authority to utilize these new resources. These discussions result in Poverty Reduction Support
Papers which yield coherent support by the World Bank and other donors (World Bank
“Community” 2000). In the scaling up stage, responsibility for tasks is devolved to the lowest
level of government that can deal effectively with them (Ibid). All of these aspects of putting
both the funds and the responsibility to use them in the hands of the target community further
instill democratic ideals through learning-by-doing (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 19). This
allows communities to harness their own social capacity and take ownership of a project so that
it may become sustainable.

These themes of participation and downward linkage establish the first pillar of CDD.
The continuation of these linkages entails planning and technical support while members of the
target community can be trained (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 22). Here, the technical soundness pillar of CDD is actualized. In addition, communications strategies are put into place during this stage. Therefore, this method invests in both human and social capital, which both instills democratic ideals and sustainable networks. The final phase of consolidation is achieved when the whole process is self-sustaining. The key here is to think of CDD as a process of diffusion and exchange.

Through all of these steps, power is being redistributed in a bottom-up way among people. Through these linkages, people gain voice at higher levels of government; through training, people become stakeholders in their own projects.

XIII. Social and Gender Inclusion

In project design, a trickier feature of decentralization is ensuring the proper representation of vulnerable and/or marginalized groups (i.e. youth, women, and certain castes) in the identification, design and implementation of community development plans (Arcand and Bassole 2006). However, although this widespread participation may seem to be infringing on local cultures, it in fact proves beneficial in that violence from or against minority or marginalized groups tends to lessen as they gain more voice. In this way, decentralization can also bring a level of social peace to a region, in addition to political stability.

The reason that the inclusion of marginalized groups is vital to the attainment of CDD goals is that they bring up issues that might be overlooked otherwise. For example, while men tend to focus on livestock, women tend to focus on water issues; by making sure that both kinds of concerns are addressed on the consultative committee meetings, the resulting project plans are more responsive to the community’s actual needs (World Bank 2011). When able to speak at these community meetings for the establishment of priorities and PRS, women offer more
suggestions regarding the development of health services and literacy programs (World Bank 2011). Without the contributions that women make to development discussions, the areas of water access, health, and literacy go underfunded, and can undermine community priorities and progress.

Similarly, when persons with HIV/AIDS go unrecognized due to “shame, denial, and social isolation,” these inflictions are ignored as community priorities and may go untreated due to the misallocation of funds (World Bank 2011). As well, indigenous groups are kept from participation in the community. When this kind of exclusion happens, access to the decision making base worsens, as program materials are in languages unfamiliar to them. This reiterates the importance for CBOs and NGOs to include these portions of society in discussion early in the process. Leaving any part of the community out of civil society may in fact harm the whole by leaving large holes in development plans.

Therefore, CDD projects must be designed from the start with the inclusion of marginalized groups in mind (World Bank 2011). But because CDD is a development program at its core, some existing projects have overlooked wide inclusion as a priority. If CDD is to be use specifically to promote democracy, these individual projects must be designed with inclusion as a priority. When designing inclusive programs, it is important to understand current decision making processes and local political and social contexts. The next step would be to develop a mechanism for giving periodic attention to inclusion practices throughout the timeframe of any organization or project at the community level. This way, progress towards inclusion and accurate evaluation of community needs are maintained.

Many individual CDD programs in progress around the word design projects with diversity in mind. Projects can be planned in a way to encourage inclusion, first by identifying
the groups in danger of being excluded, and then by making sure than project rules and procedures are not discriminatory. Note that new institutions may need to be created in order to engage these groups.

Also, it is helpful to include indicators specific to marginalized groups in monitoring and evaluation systems to create a feedback system that allow community institutions and intermediaries (NGOs) to improve upon inclusion goals. This kind of feedback is not only indicatory of decentralization efforts and the widening of the decision making platform, but also of the improved relevancy of development projects. In this way, gender and minority inclusion is a two-fold benefit to CDD projects, and democratization in general.

XIV. Improved Accountability

As alluded to, CDD creates an environment more conducive to bottom-up accountability. The local government of the target community and community members, instead of outside organizations, complete the establishment of all four pillars of CDD: real participation and linkage by all stakeholders, improved accountability, technical soundness, and sustainability (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 79). The empowerment of communities and local governments will enable this social capital to be harnessed, and provide bottom-up accountability (World Bank “Community” 2000). As decentralization ideally works from the grassroots level, people should experience an increased voice in rural local governments with smaller yet more direct coverage with an increase in both transparency and responsiveness (World Bank “Community” 2000).

Because accountability for program implementation is refocused downwards, aid will ideally be disbursed and result in more relevant programs and effective democracy promotion. Instead of outside program designers overlaying blanket projects that largely ignore important
facets of the region, community and local bodies with an intimate knowledge of relevant historical, cultural, and economic factors that shape their communities will be able to find individual solutions to governance discrepancies and underdevelopment.

Fiscal rewards and penalties for communities and local governments can also improve accountability by increasing communication and networking systems that can induce competition. The “losers” of this competition are then held accountable by their peers, the real constituents of that locality (World Bank “Community” 2000). Consequently, a feedback loop is instigated which encourages competitors to provide better services. Traditional upward accountability can be strengthened by training communities to conduct monitoring and evaluation (to be expanded upon in later sections of this chapter). With community development programs as democracy promotion, accountability is shifted downwards and therefore feedback is unavoidable, resulting in a continual process of improvement towards the expansion and strengthening of the decision making base that is a vital factor leading to good governance.

XV. Monitoring and Evaluation

Rigorous Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) systems are essential to CDD programs in that it provides information to progressively improve decision-making and project management. As a feature of CDD within itself, M&E systems also provide feedback for the project implementers, who encourage project ownership and empowers community members. Further, M&E can be a management tool which supports the improved downward accountability, transparency, inclusion and learning discussed as vital to a successful democracy in previous sections.

Monitoring refers to the “regular collection and analysis” of data on specific indicators to assist in making clear decisions (World Bank 2011). Further, management receives information
on early indicators on the progress of their community’s CDD objectives. Personnel in management receive important information on what is working, what is not, and what future changes would be advisable. This feature also contributes to the flexibility and individualization of CDD programs in general. A robust M&E programs should ideally monitor a range of factors, including data on financial and physical outputs, independent audits, data from civil society groups, supervision missions, and participatory methods. Evaluation refers to an impact evaluation to assess “changes in the well-being of individuals” that can be a direct result of the particular CDD program (World Bank 2011).

M&E programs can be organized in a way to fortify good accountability practices by including communities in the monitoring systems. Participatory monitoring is a “continuous process of joint learning and reflection on goals and results” (World Bank 2011). Designing monitoring and evaluation systems that allow for community member participation helps drive the setting and attainment of realistic, demand-driven goals. Participatory monitoring can also act as a strengthening process to the relationships between local governments, citizens and service providers as social contracts are reinforced with inclusion, accountability, transparency, and improving service delivery.

XVI. Incentives and Learning in CDD

CDD brings local communities into the feedback loop by placing the primary responsibilities of decision making and project implementation in their hands. As discussed previously, a key impediment to learning in the traditional aid structure is that the major decision makers tend to be isolated from their intended beneficiaries and, as a result, do not receive outcomes-based information about project effectiveness. In CDD, however, local communities carry out their own projects and feel the direct impact of their efforts, making them part of an
Community ownership of projects that characterize CDD builds in incentives for producing real results. For instance, a majority of CDD programs require community co-financing, which involve matching grants in which communities typically contribute between “10 to 40 percent of the total cost of a community project” (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 187). This method of financing projects enhances sustainability and turns community members into real stakeholders who are invested in the outcome of the project. Furthermore, since grants are tied directly to local contributions, project leaders and managers are held accountable not only to foreign grant makers but to their communities as well. In this way, CDD brings local communities into the feedback loop and ensures that leaders have a greater incentive to examine whether projects are responding to the needs of their communities. Real feedback from communities provides essential information regarding project effectiveness, while improved accountability incentivizes them to act on that information.

It should be noted, however, that greater participation does not necessarily or automatically lead to the spontaneous creation of a feedback loop that fosters accountability and learning; it merely creates conditions that are more favorable to them. The formation of an effective feedback loop requires concentrated effort directed specifically to this end. Appropriately, the CDD approach in recent years has taken concrete steps to create monitoring and evaluation processes that are participatory in nature and easily accessible to the entire community. One such step is measuring the impact of projects in terms that all members of the community can easily grasp. In Uganda, this meant that the number of beer bananas households consumed was used to evaluate project effectiveness, since it was easily observable and understood by most members of the community, including children, as an indicator of food
shortage (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 175). The use of such simple yet locally relevant metrics means that the community can easily participate in monitoring results and outcomes, which gives project managers and other community members the necessary feedback to determine places for improvement and make the appropriate adjustments.

Another way in which participatory element of CDD supports learning is by allowing community members to build experience through their own efforts. Because communities participate in essential phases of project development and implementation, they are engaged in a constant learning process as they carry out their projects. In Burkina Faso, for example, community members were heavily involved in project design, choosing relevant technologies, managing their own funds, and contracting for goods and services (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010, 15). The deep involvement of the community embodies the “learning by doing” philosophy of CDD. In the process of planning, executing, and evaluating their results, they build the experience and knowledge necessary to more effectively take care of their needs.

The participatory way in which learning takes place helps to promote democratic ideals. First, when community members are incorporated into the feedback loop, they have a voice with which to express what their needs are and how well they are being met to the top. Second, greater horizontal and downward accountability distributes power more equitably between leaders and community members so that the former has a stake in responding to the latter with appropriate changes. By creating an environment in which feedback from the bottom is used to implement changes at the top, CDD establishes a learning process that is democratic in nature.

XVII. Scaling Up

To this point, this paper has been analyzing the usefulness of CDD as a democratizing tool first and foremost at the community and village levels, but this technique has proven highly
scalable in past experiences. Within months, entire regions have been covered by systems of decentralization, and entire countries shortly thereafter (World Bank “Community” 2000).

First, the CDD program must forge linkages that allow communities, local governments, and the national government to interact fluidly. This communication flow provides constituent accessibility to decision-making functions of the government, encouraging heightened representation that is at the core of democratic ideals. Loyalty to the needs of the country’s actual constituency is also enforced by the mere nature of CDD programs in that they are not Balkanized by donor groups by virtue of their format. If successful and strong means of communication between bodies can be implemented at the village and local level, the CDD project has a better chance of reaching the highest levels of national government.

The second feature most important to have in place in order to scale up CDD projects is a low cost to encourage transfer efficiency (Binswanger-Mkhize et al. 2010). High costs can be incurred due to donor documents of a different language, transportation costs, and excessive salaries. This reality reinforces the importance of training community members for roles in new institutions. This will cut down on language difference and transportation cost. Successful training and supporting community ownership of projects will also leave a self-sustaining body in place that can be more or less replicated at consecutively higher levels of government.

If strategies are planned with transferability in mind, it is entirely realistic for CDD to teach and enforce civic society and communication with the highest levels of government nationwide. An obvious interpretation of this high probability is the simultaneous growth of economic and institutional development that lead to a nation’s concept and defense of human dignity within a new democracy.
XVIII. Case Study: Senegal

In 2007, Jean-Louis Arcand and Leandre Bassole of the University of Auvergne performed a study on the effects of the CDD project in Senegal in 2000 through 2002. This study looked at CDD success in terms of household expenditure and child nutrition in perspective of and in response to political networks. 320 rural communities (the smallest sub-regional administrative unit in Senegal) were chosen from among the poorest in the nine rural regions of Senegal for treatment by World Bank-run PNIR (Arcand and Bassole 2006, 3).

The PNIR’s stated goal was to ensure an increased and predictable flow of resources for investments in community-based social and economic infrastructure; and strengthen the capacity of rural communities to assume full responsibility for local development planning and implementation (Arcand and Bassole 2006, 3). This was to be done through promoting partnerships in participatory local development planning processes to broaden the decision-making platform, or broadly put as government decentralization (Arcand and Bassole 2006, 2). In addition, PNIR provided the local governments with matched grant funding for their community projects. These matched grants support fiscal reform processes and strengthen the capacity of local governments to plan, prioritize, manage, and maintain community (World Bank “Senegal’s” 2000). In theory, this initial structure and support will lead to rural communities being able to plan and manage their own development programs autonomously.

The goals of the rural population were to improve access to roads, drinking water, health and education, and to improve economic opportunities. It is important to note that the community members themselves linked these goals back to democratization in their indication that these goals were to be achieved through participating in the key decisions concerning local
development. In accord with increased community empowerment, they also expressed the desire to assume an increased share in the funding of local development plans.

The first step to achieving these development goals was for the Senegalese government with the participation of civil society to draft a Letter of Decentralized Rural Development Policy to establish a long-term strategy to promote sustainable and equitable economic growth in the rural sector. The key objectives of this letter reflect the overarching goals of CDD vital to scaling-up discussed in earlier sections. The first goal was to ensure effective implementation of the government decentralization policy. Successful handling in this area should lead to a broadened base of participation and representation to empower civil society. The second goal was to promote partnerships between the actors involved in local development planning to facilitate communication within the broadening decision-making platform, and between various levels of government (Arcand and Bassole 2006, 3). This step is necessary to be able to transfer CDD to a national level. Another goal was to ensure an increased and predictable flow of resources for investment in community-based social and economic infrastructure (Arcand and Bassole 2006, 3). This reinforces the sustainability of a project, and increases the likelihood of transferability to the national arena. The last goal was to strengthen the capacity of rural communities so that they could assume full responsibility for local development planning and implementation (Arcand and Bassole 2006, 3). This goal again refers to transferability in keeping costs down through local management and keeping each level self-sustaining for a relatively low-maintenance scaling-up.

To the ends of increasing participation, consultative committees were created. These committees comprised of elected members of local communities and civil society representatives who would speak for the community at the local government level. As a PNIR requirement, at
least one-third of the consultative committee had to be comprised of women. To increase community ownership, communities were also expected to contribute 20 percent of the project costs. PNIR trained 10,000 people from the poorest 100 local governments for the first phase in the development project. Community members were trained in the fields of procurement, participation, supervision, and politics (Arcand and Bassole 2006, 3). The trainees then returned to their communities to exercise their newly learned skills in identifying community needs and raising money for specific projects. To gain outside funding, some invited NGOs to open houses and community fairs. Others decided to partner with communities in other part of the world to raise money. Still others decided to privatize their social assets in order to build community economies. After this first phase, the first 100 target communities were doing better than wealthier counterparts. Communities created ways to gain greater access to water, health care, education, and other services. In fact, other communities were demanding that PNIR to be extended to their areas.

After treatment, all areas studied significantly improved. Expenditures per capita are significantly greater in PNIR treated households than in control households. For height-for-age and weight-for-age, children in PNIR-treated communities have fared significantly better. Although there is no control for any other factors, these results are highly suggestive of the beneficial effects of CDD on the lives of community members. Furthermore, results show that: 1) Residing in a PNIR-CDD eligible area significantly improves access to clean water and health facilities, above and beyond what is being furnished by existing and/or alternative programs 2) Residing in a PNIR-eligible area significantly reduces the prevalence of underweight and stunted children; 3) Residing in a village that received a completed agricultural or educational infrastructure project significantly increases household expenditures per capita and improves the
nutritional status of children; 4) In contrast to elite capture theories, the poor appear to be the biggest beneficiaries (Arcand and Bassole 2006, 2). These results imply that the interlinkage between the attribution of projects and local, sub-regional politics is the real defining issue in a society's ability to flourish. Resources without voice to diverse peoples can still result in poverty, whereas these linkages ensure the best possible use of resources for the betterment of all members of a society.

This last result of institutional linkages is the most important to the purposes of this Task Force, as it reinforces that CDD may be a useful tool in democracy promotion in terms of teaching key concepts of a democratic government to developing nations. Such participatory programs generate social dynamics that can improve beneficiary welfare, by giving voice “to hitherto disenfranchised groups” (Arcand and Bassole 2006, 19). Often, village-level institutions (like the consultative committee discussed earlier) are also created along with CDD programs, in which such empowerment of otherwise excluded groups often occurs. These sub-regional political bodies provide not only for individual villages to affect decision making processes, but for an honest representation of that village to be represented for realistic prioritization of needs.

To project the PNIR effectiveness on the future, the educated populations of rural areas that had previously moved to the cities are now coming back to their rural homes. This reversal of movement can largely be attributed to the success of such CDD programs in that instead of repelling social capital, rural areas are now regaining educated youth who want to become strong voices in their communities (World Bank “Senegal’s” 2000).

XIX. What the U.S. Can Do

The U.S. Government can best support development projects as a means to support democracy by working multilaterally with organizations like the World Bank and UN.
Bank has a comparative advantage in instituting such projects in that it can link the fiscal aspects of CDD to broader state reform issues, thereby getting to the core of the debate on decentralization. It is currently budgeting about 2 billion USD for CDD-related projects, 1.3 billion USD of which is funded by IDA (World Bank 2000). The rest is made up by other social funds. In the last donor cycle, the U.S. pledged 3.7 billion USD to the World Bank’s IDA fund, still a small fraction of this cycle’s total pledged 49.3 billion USD (Schneider 2010). Nevertheless, the U.S. is currently the World Bank’s largest shareholder, and as such has the stature to provide policy advice to the World Bank’s senior management to suit the interests of the country (World Bank 2011). As established already, the wide dissemination of democracy is in fact in line with U.S. interests, and therefore CDD should receive more attention in the regular meetings between the Office of the United States Executive Director and the Bank Group’s North American Affairs Team.

The UNHRC, UNDEF, and UNDP are three bodies within the UN that are concerned simultaneously with democratic governance and poverty reduction. The U.S. is a member state of UNHRC, the largest donor to UNDEF (4.5 billion USD in 2011), and a donor to UNDP through USAID; therefore it can leverage these relationships to further its interest in widespread democracy (United Nations 2011). UNDEF currently maintains projects through local NGOs in Africa, Asia and Latin America that empower civil society, an action supportive of CDD. In fact, 31% of the projects instituted by UNDEF are directed at community development (United Nations 2011). These activities can be further promoted by bringing attention to the need for improving voice in civil society through the U.S.’s position in the UNHRC.
XX. Conclusion

U.S. democracy assistance thus far has yielded mixed results. Many of the problems encountered in traditional foreign aid have interfered with the effectiveness of U.S. democracy assistance as well. Specifically, the donor-driven nature of democracy assistance has introduced problems with accountability, learning, and sustainability. Upward accountability has led to projects that reflect the interests and experiences of donors, leading funders and democracy providers to support programs that do not respond to local conditions and needs. The top-down structure of democracy aid has contributed to the persistence of programs that fail to benefit their intended recipients, since donors and democracy providers do not receive feedback from them; and when the communities at bottom of this structure cannot provide feedback about the real successes and failures of democracy projects, democracy providers cannot learn from them. As a result, critical issues that impede the development of sustainable democracies, such as reliance on foreign funds and lack of local participation, are not resolved.

Since ineffective democracy assistance advances neither the interests of the U.S. nor the recipient country, this chapter concludes that the U.S. might find more success towards achieving both economic development and democratic governance goals by approaching funding for holistic use. Community Driven Development provides a promising way of doing so while at the same time tackling many of the problems that has damaged past democracy promotion efforts. Through the use of an apparent economic development tool, accountability, representation, and sustainability can also be improved through learning by doing. Because CDD empowers communities through an emphasis on local participation and accountability of leaders to their constituents, it also promotes the values and processes that are quintessential to democracies. By
designating development and democracy aid for a combined purpose, the U.S. can help a target nation better address its own needs while at the same time encouraging democratic governance.
Conclusion and Recommendations

By: Semir Hasedžić, Stephanie Smith, and Natalie Stockmann

Since January of 2011, the world has witnessed numerous anti-autocratic uprisings in the Middle East and Northern Africa. From Tunisia to Libya, the calls for democracy have repeatedly demonstrated the strength of the masses. The necessity of establishing and maintaining sustainable, self-sufficient democracies in these places are of extreme importance to U.S. interests.. If the U.S. does not carefully navigate its role in helping these countries establish democracies, there is the potential for a backsliding towards authoritarianism as well as a backlash against American democracy promotion efforts. Thus, this report aims to address the need for rethinking the U.S.’s approach to democracy promotion. Before addressing the tangible methods for improving democracy promotion, this report first aims to emphasize the importance of promoting a type of democracy that embodies certain values, such as improved quality of life and protection of human rights. In addition, we urge policy makers to bridge the gap between the lofty rhetoric often associated with democracy promotion and the reality of their actions and policies. Doing so will legitimize democracy as a desirable system of governing, and give the U.S.’s democracy promotion efforts more credibility.

After this discussion, this report moves on to address the specific challenges that different types of states pose to the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Indeed, our evaluation indicates that there are certain elements within weak and post-conflict states, multiethnic states, resource rich states, and undemocratic regional hegemons that act as roadblocks to sustainable, self-sufficient democratic processes and institutions. Thus, this report urges the U.S. to consider a new strategy that will result in sustainable forms of democracy and be beneficial for both the transitional state and U.S. national interests. This strategy contains four primary points:
maintaining consistency between the rhetoric and actions associated with U.S. democracy promotion efforts; considering and highly prioritizing the contextual situation of each transitional state; increase participation in multi-lateral relations, agreements, and organizations that are relevant to promoting democracy; prioritize social and economic development as catalysts for establishing sustainable democracies.

In order to implement this overarching strategy, we offer a number of recommendations, which fall under three main categories: bureaucracy, diplomacy, and in-country methods. The recommendations dealing with bureaucracy are intended to guide those individuals and departments working within the U.S. who are responsible for democracy promotion policies and decision-making. The second tier of recommendations is focused on external relations; they advise diplomats and embassies to reconsider the way they engage with transitional states. Our final set of recommendations focuses on concrete steps for promoting democracy in a way that emphasizes ground-up, developmental, and sustainable approaches.

1. Bureaucracy
   a. Accept and implement the overarching strategy proposed in this report, which will ensure a more effective approach to promoting and establishing sustainable democracies.
   b. Create and disseminate a policy paper to all agencies involved in democracy promotion, which outlines this comprehensive approach to democracy promotion.
   c. Create a post of Undersecretary of Democracy, who will be responsible for coordinating across agencies and departments to ensure that democracy promotion policies are in line with the overarching strategy proposed in this report. Having the authority to oversee a coordinated approach will better position the undersecretary to advocate for adequate funding that meets both the bureaucratic and operational needs of democracy promotion.

2. Diplomacy
   a. Maintain rhetoric that is humble, honest, and consistent with the actions and results of U.S. democracy promotion efforts. This includes not using grandiose and unrealistic rhetoric or using democracy promotion as a façade for other U.S. strategic interests.
b. Increase the use of multilateral relations by working with international organizations, such as the EU and the UN, in order to increase legitimacy and effectiveness of democracy promotion efforts; participate more willingly in important international treaties (e.g. Rights of the Child, ratify ICESCR).

c. Increase the use of soft power, diplomacy, and linkages to nudge states towards democracy. Special attention should be given to “autocratic poles” (e.g. China and Russia), where democratic advances would remove regional barriers to other countries’ democratizing efforts.

3. Context-specific Methods

a. Within multiethnic states: give necessary consideration to the historical, social, economic, and cultural context; avoid placing too much emphasis on elections until institutions within a state are capable of supporting a functioning democracy; promote the creation and maintenance of programs that foster multiethnic linkages and institutions; encourage the use of public surveys, hearings, discussions, and widespread informative media outlets to achieve civic education and support participatory constitution building.

b. Within weak and post-conflict states: approach state-building and democracy promotion efforts simultaneously and in an integrated fashion; implement a program of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration into society (DDR) for any non-state armed forces (e.g. warlords and combatant groups).

c. Broaden the scope of civil society as the first step in mobilizing local communities to embrace democratic practices: incorporate informal civil society groups and institutions into transitional process (e.g. women’s and indigenous groups); encourage privatization of the press to decrease censorship of news sources and social media outlets; work to deepen horizontal linkages among on-the-ground agencies (e.g. grassroots organizations, NGOs, etc.), through Community Driven Development (CDD).
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