Feeling Proud and Being Proud: An Investigation Into the Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals

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I argue that there are two sorts of pride—the emotion of pride and the character trait of pride—and defend descriptive and normative accounts of each sort of pride. The emotion of pride involves an evaluation that one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals; having the character trait of pride is having a firm commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. Thus, the two sorts of pride are conceptual related insofar as they each embody a distinct aspect of the moral psychology of personal ideals: the emotion embodies the evaluative use of personal ideals, whereas the character trait embodies the practical influence of personal ideals.
In Chapter 1, I outline and defend a conceptual framework for analyzing emotions that distinguishes between two kinds of considerations that may count in favor of having an emotion. In Chapter 2, I survey the philosophical literature on the emotion of pride and argue that extant accounts of pride are classifiable into three groups: identification accounts, agency accounts, and possession accounts. I argue that each of the three sorts of accounts has significant merits, but that each ultimately fails to provide a satisfactory descriptive account of pride. In Chapter 3, I develop and defend personal ideal-based descriptive and normative accounts of the emotion of pride. In Chapter 4, I provide a relational account of personal ideals that solves two puzzles about pride: the sociality puzzle (to explain how pride can be both a profoundly personal and a deeply social phenomenon) and the hierarchy puzzle (to explain how pride can be implicated in the social dynamics of both hierarchy and solidarity). In Chapter 5, I defend a descriptive and a normative account of the character trait of pride in terms of being firmly committed to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals.
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name. David Keyt helped me to devise a fruitful methodology for this project, one that insists upon attending closely to how we as well as people in different historical circumstances actually speak about pride, and also to how literary authors, from Sophocles and Milton to Austen and Wharton, portray pride in a narrative form. Bill Talbott forced me throughout the process to sharpen the argumentative structure of the dissertation and to discern and confront the most important objections to my proposed account of pride. In particular, Bill has helped me to see the force of a conception of pride that is more social and less individualistic than the conception that I initially found most attractive.

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Introduction

Two Puzzles

Moralists have long been ambivalent towards pride. On the one hand, pride is commonly considered an appropriate response to achievements, to family, and to country;¹ we sometimes link pride with self-respect, for instance in campaigns for social justice (as in ‘Gay Pride’ and ‘Black Pride’);² and some have even posed the question of whether one’s life has meaning in terms of “whether one’s life can be seen as a proper source of pride.”³ On the other hand, pride is known in some quarters as the deadliest sin and the root of much that is vicious in the human personality.⁴ Jane Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice* and its cast of apparently vicious proud people provide a familiar expression of this view.⁵ John Stuart Mill articulates the puzzling nature of these divergent normative assessments in stark terms: “[‘pride’ is] a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which

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mankind are capable . . .”6 That pride is subject to diametrically opposed moral assessments is remarkable, and not easily accounted for. Call this the normative puzzle about pride.

But there is another puzzle about pride—call it the descriptive puzzle—that is less widely discussed: namely, the puzzle of how pride the emotion relates to pride the character trait. The English language obscures this puzzle from plain view by assigning a single name to both sorts of pride.7 However, once this distinction is acknowledged, a puzzle emerges about how the two relate to each other and why they are called by the same name. Solving the descriptive puzzle is a crucial step towards a solution to the normative puzzle, since we cannot fully determine the conditions under which pride is praiseworthy (or blameworthy) prior to determining what pride is.

In this dissertation, I develop and defend solutions to these puzzles. I investigate the emotion of pride in Chapters 1-3, and I turn to the character trait of pride in Chapter 4 and 5. Since I presuppose, in the way that I structure the dissertation, that the emotion of pride is distinct from the trait of pride, it is worthwhile defending this distinction up front. After doing so in the following section, I will motivate the search for a solution to the descriptive puzzle by briefly considering and rejecting three candidates for the solution.

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7 The English language allows for some expression of the puzzle. The emotion is an attitude with intentional content, which is mirrored by the fact that one might say, “I’m proud of the fact that I was promoted in my first year on the job.” Language about the character trait reflects the fact that it is not about anything: for example one might say, “He’s a proud person (period).” In this dissertation the phrase “being proud” is generally reserved for the character trait and the phrase “feeling proud of φ” is reserved for the emotion, where φ is the emotion’s intentional object. Although the word “feeling” is used to conveniently mark off the emotion from the trait, that usage is compatible with being agnostic about whether having the emotion requires having a feeling.
Distinguishing Between the Emotion and the Trait

Consider the type of proud, hubristic character that is often portrayed in Greek tragedy. Sophocles’ *Ajax* begins with Athena tricking the title character into disgracing himself: she induces in him a hallucination that he is exacting revenge on Odysseus when he is, in fact, killing livestock. Athena enjoys this practical joke but Ajax is so humiliated that he takes his own life. So, Ajax rarely feels pleased—let alone the emotion of pride—in the play. In fact, he experiences acute shame. However, it is clear that he feels this shame precisely because he is a proud person.

Ajax sparked Athena’s anger by proudly spurning her help. A messenger recounts the story, beginning with what Ajax told his father before departing to fight the Trojans:

> ‘Father, with God’s help even a worthless man
>   Could triumph. I propose, without that help,
>   To win my prize of fame.’ In such a spirit
> He boasted. And when once Athena stood
>   Beside him in the fight, urging him on
>   To strike the enemy with his deadly hand,
> He answered then, that second time, with words
>   To shudder at, not speak: ‘Goddess,’ he said,
>   ‘Go stand beside the other Greeks; help them.
> For where I bide, no enemy will break through.’
> These were the graceless words which won for him
>   The goddess’ wrath; they kept no human measure.\(^8\)

It is not at all clear whether Ajax feels proud of his military skill: perhaps he takes it, arrogantly, merely as a matter of course that no enemy will break through his line. But it is clear that Ajax is a proud person, one who is concerned about his worth to such a degree that he consistently refuses the help of others. Ajax’s refusal of help is principled and runs deep; he believes that the help of another would undermine any claim to worth he might have. This concern for self-sufficiency in turn helps to explain his

deeply felt shame over Athena’s trickery. For only someone who bases his sense of self-worth upon a commitment to complete self-sufficiency would feel ashamed of having been tricked by a god; Ajax kept no human measure.

Ajax is a proud person, even when he does not feel proud of anything and is, to the contrary, in suicidal despair. If one is a proud person and a total failure then, it seems, one might never feel the emotion of pride. Thus, feeling proud is not a necessary condition for being a proud person.

Neither is feeling proud a sufficient condition for being a proud person. A humble and servile person might feel proud of his ability to anticipate the needs of those who exploit him. Consider Thomas Hill’s example of a deferential wife, who believes that a woman’s proper role is to be a servant to her family. She defers to her husband’s whims and tends not to form interests of her own. Hill presents her, plausibly, as a paradigm of servility, and the servile are not proud people. But, as Hill notes, the servile may feel proud: “No one is trampling on her rights, she says; for she is quite glad, and proud, to serve her husband as she does.”

These examples establish both that the emotion and the trait are independent in the sense that a person can have one without the other as well as, a fortiori, that the emotion of pride is distinct from the character trait of pride.

However, the emotion and the trait are conceptually related, and not merely referents of a homonymous term. It is not coincidental that we use the term ‘pride’ to

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10 Ibid., p. 6.
11 In a similar vein, James Kellenberger (“Humility,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 4, October 2010; pp. 321-336) contrasts the emotion of pride (which he terms “self-reflective pride”) with “engaging life in terms of the self-concerned states of pride and shame” (329). However, Kellenberger appears to conflate the two sorts of pride in his discussion of Aquinas’ virtue of humility, where he remarks that “the kind of pride that contrasts with humility is a self-reflective pride” (325). Since emotions cannot be “directly contrary” to a virtue, it must be the trait of pride, and not the emotion, that Aquinas takes to oppose the virtue of humility.
denote two things (a trait and an emotion), in the way that the dual denotation is coincidental in the case of a term like ‘bark’ (of a dog or of a tree). The group of all proud people seems to overlap considerably—though, as we have just seen, not entirely—with the group of all people who feel pride. In particular, both sorts of people seem to be concerned with acting well, honorably, and in a superior manner. So, given that they are distinct, precisely how do they relate to each other?

Attempted Solutions to the Descriptive Puzzle

The Narrow Dispositional Account

Perhaps the trait of pride is merely a disposition to feel the emotion of pride. This solution to the descriptive puzzle gains intuitive support from similar examples of emotion-trait pairs: the angry person is one who is prone to feeling anger and the sad person is one who is prone to feeling sadness. What leads us to regard Ajax as a proud person, on this view, is his disposition to feel proud.

This account of the trait rightly looks to the emotion for guidance, and thus avoids the conclusion that the trait and the emotion of pride are conceptually unrelated. However, the example of the deferential wife makes clear that being disposed to feel pride is not sufficient for being a proud person.

This account is also incomplete since proud people are proud partly in virtue of being disposed to feel shame on certain occasions, as when Ajax’s pride expresses itself in the form of his shame-fueled suicide. A proud person is also disposed to be angry with those who insult him, pitiless towards those who are unfortunate, and contemptful of those who are beneath him. Ajax announces to his father that “with God’s help even a worthless man / Could triumph” (l. 770-771). This contempt flows directly from
Ajax’s proud character. The dispositional account of pride, according to which the trait is merely a disposition to feel the emotion of pride, lacks the resources needed to explain the emotional and behavioral complexity of the trait of pride.

*The Broad Dispositional Account*

Hume advances a broader dispositional account of the character trait of pride, which he calls ‘greatness of mind’ (T 3.2.2). The great-minded person, Hume notes, feels both humility and pride whenever these sentiments are appropriate. Since there is no reason, in principle, why one could not extend Hume’s account to include dispositions to experience other emotions in addition to pride and humility (such as contempt, shame, anger, disappointment, fear, and indignation), it is worth considering whether such a broader dispositional account provides a satisfactory solution to the descriptive puzzle.

If the Humean account accommodates the emotional variety of the proud person, it is nonetheless unable to explain why all of these emotions, and not others, are united under a single trait of character. A truly explanatory account of the trait of pride must explain why these dispositions hang together as they do, and not merely assert that they do. What do these emotions share in common such that a person who is disposed to experience them in certain situations is characterized as having the trait of pride? Moreover, it is unsatisfying to note merely that the trait of pride is related to the emotion of pride insofar as the trait involves a disposition to experience several emotions, one of which is named pride, because there is reason to believe that the emotion stands in some important relation to the trait, and not merely a nominal one. Thus, the broad dispositional account fails to account for the special relation that holds between pride the trait and pride the emotion. Since my present aim is to explain the
special relation between the emotion of pride and the character trait of pride, this inability gives us good reason to look elsewhere for a better explanation.

Dispositional theorists face a dilemma. Either the relevant disposition is narrowly limited to feeling pride or, as in the Humean version, it is not so limited. If the first, then the account succumbs to the deferential wife counterexample and overlooks the fact that proud people characteristically feel other emotions in addition to pride. If the second, then the account fails to explain the unity of the character trait—that is, why a disposition to feel pride should be joined in a single character trait with a disposition to feel shame, anger, contempt, and so on—and in particular, why the emotion of pride lies at the core of this trait. In either case the dispositional account is unsatisfactory.

The Expectations-Based Normative-Connection Account

According to normative-connection accounts, the emotion and the trait of pride are different ways of relating to norms that one accepts. Unlike dispositional accounts, which make dispositions to feel emotions central to the trait of pride, normative-connection accounts focus our attention on particular norms and on the nature of one’s commitments to those norms. According to these latter accounts, feeling the emotion of pride involves taking oneself to fare well with respect to some norm that one accepts, whereas having the trait of pride involves being firmly committed to living in accordance with that norm. Such firm commitment involves, among other things, dispositions to experience various emotions depending on how one fares with respect to the relevant norm.

Normative-connection accounts of pride differ along three axes: first, according to what type of norm is taken to be relevant; second, according to the relevant notion of faring

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well with respect to a norm; and third, according to the relevant notion of commitment to a norm.

Gabriele Taylor’s analysis of pride constitutes the first example in the philosophical literature of a normative-connection account. Taylor argues that the emotion and the trait can both be explained in terms of what “for some reason or another [a person] thinks she is, or others are, entitled to expect.”13 Taylor provides three kinds of examples of, as she calls them, ‘norms of expectation’: norms given by what an agent expects of his external circumstances (such as the rarity or frequency of that in virtue of which he is proud, or his financial and social circumstances); norms given by what an agent expects that he can or cannot do; and norms given by the agent’s view of the expectations of others in some area of life.14 An aristocrat, for example, might expect that her social inferiors will defer to her, that she will receive at least one dinner invitation each week, and that she will be able to afford a fashionable chauffeured car. It is important to note that these are expectations in the epistemic sense of what one believes will happen, and not in the ethical sense of what one believes should happen. For example, one might expect (in the ethical sense) that one’s children not tell lies while also consistently expecting (in the epistemic sense) that they will inevitably do so. Taylor’s account employs the latter sort of expectation.

According to Taylor, the difference between the two sorts of pride lies in the sort of relation a person has to her norm of expectation. To feel proud is to see oneself as an achiever in the sense of having exceeded one’s norm of expectation. The aforementioned aristocrat, on this analysis, would feel proud of receiving three dinner invitations in one week insofar as this would exceed her expectation threefold. A proud

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14 Ibid., p. 40.
person, on the other hand, need not think that he exceeds his norms of expectation. Rather, being a proud person typically requires “pitch[ing] his expectations high and tak[ing] it for granted that it is at this level he operates”\textsuperscript{15} He takes his superiority for granted and therefore does not typically feel proud of that in virtue of which he is proud. The proud aristocrat does not regard his status as an achievement—rather, he is proud because he regards aristocratic expectations as superior and takes his conformity with them as a matter of course. By contrast, feeling proud of one’s aristocratic status would require having non-aristocratic norms of expectation against which being an aristocrat counts as an achievement. Indeed, it may be that feeling proud of one’s aristocratic status would betray (in the eyes of the true aristocrat) one’s common stock. On Taylor’s view, the difference between the proud aristocrat and the \textit{nouveau riche} aristocrat’s emotion of pride lies in different relations to different norms of expectation.

But this cannot be right. Epistemic norms of expectation cannot play the requisite role in an account of pride. Rather, as I argue at length in §3.6.2, such an account must be based upon ethical norms—in particular, upon personal ideals. The basic charge against Taylor’s expectation-based version of the normative-connection account is that it cannot explain the fact that being and feeling proud both involve caring about what we are proud in virtue of. I take this objection to constitute a \textit{prima facie} case for a personal ideal-based normative-connection account, which is developed in detail in this dissertation.

\textbf{Looking Ahead}

In this dissertation, I argue that solutions to the descriptive and normative puzzles are based upon how personal ideals figure into moral experience, and how personal ideals

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 43-44.
Introduction

should figure into moral experience. These solutions, and the arguments that have driven me to them, will take a complete dissertation to explain. Before I begin this project, it will help to sketch the general layout of the chapters that follow.

In Chapter 1, I develop conceptual tools for clarifying the discussion of the following two chapters about the emotion of pride. I distinguish between the conditions under which a token emotion (1) is intelligibly attributable to a person (attribution conditions), (2) accurately presents its intentional object (warrant conditions), and (3) is morally or prudentially appropriate (external propriety conditions). I argue that attribution conditions are systematically related to warrant conditions but not to external propriety conditions. This conclusion suggests a novel method for deriving warrant conditions from attribution conditions (and vice versa) and a test for differentiating warrant conditions from external propriety conditions. These general distinctions are worth describing in detail for two main reasons. First, these distinctions are not carefully drawn in the literature on the emotion of pride, a failure that muddles some of the disputes between proponents of rival conceptions of pride. In Chapter 2, therefore, I make more perspicuous the relation between the various different accounts of the emotion of pride and find that, when properly understood, some apparently inconsistent claims about pride can be reconciled and that others should clearly be rejected. Second, in Chapter 3, I use the test that I propose for differentiating warrant conditions from external propriety conditions to establish that the emotion of pride has more significant ethical content than one might have thought.

In Chapter 2, I draw a distinction between three influential kinds of accounts of the emotion of pride: the identification account (defended by Amelie Rorty), possession accounts (defended by Anthony Kenny, Donald Davidson, Annette Baier, Philippa
Foot, and Gabriele Taylor), and agency accounts (defended by Robert Solomon, Richard Taylor, and Norvin Richards). These philosophers each offer an account of what I call the ‘pride relation’: the relation that a person who experiences pride takes to hold between herself and the object of her pride. Since many of these authors explicitly develop their preferred account of pride from a reading of Hume’s account of pride, I also present Hume’s account. I establish that the three accounts of pride fail, in different ways, to adequately explain the way in which a person cares about the objects of his pride. This conclusion motivates a personal ideal-based account of pride, which I defend in the following chapter.

In Chapter 3, I explain the personal ideal-based account of the emotion of pride in greater detail and advance a set of warrant conditions for pride. I show how this account makes sense of the four paradigmatic cases of the emotion: the achievement paradigm, the gift paradigm, the ownership paradigm, and the group paradigm. I also discuss the phenomenon of vicarious emotion in order to explain one type of group pride. Finally, I argue that being personally responsible for bringing about the object of one’s pride is neither a condition of pride’s warrant nor a condition of its moral justification.

One general outcome of the discussion in Chapters 2 and 3 is that controversy over the nature and justification of the emotion of pride is best understood as controversy over the nature and justification of personal ideals. For instance, the dispute about whether experiencing warranted pride requires the exercise of one’s agency or, on the contrary, whether it only requires possession of the object of pride should be understood as a dispute about whether living in accordance with worthy personal ideals requires the exercise of one’s agency. I argue, in effect, that settling questions about what warrants
pride requires settling questions about what makes a personal ideal worthy and about what counts as living in accordance with such ideals. This conclusion promises to advance and sharpen debates about the nature and justification of pride. Moreover, the personal ideals account of pride entails that there is no single ‘pride relation’ to be found. Each personal ideal provides its own success conditions, including its own ‘pride relation.’

In Chapter 4, I explain in more detail what I take personal ideals to be and what caring about living in accordance with an ideal consists in. I motivate a social practice-based account of personal ideals by considering two puzzling aspects of pride: first, that pride appears to be focused on one’s relations to others as well as on the self; and second, that pride is often associated both with a sense of interpersonal competition and with a sense of solidarity with others. One might take the fact of these social dimensions to constitute an objection to the personal ideal-based account of pride, which might appear to be overly individualistic. In response, I argue that personal ideals are typically contingent social products, tied to particular social practices, and that this constitutive relationality makes sense of many of pride’s social dimensions.

In Chapter 5, I provide a descriptive and normative account of the character trait of pride. I structure this chapter as a response to a question about why the viciously proud tend to refuse the assistance of others and, more generally, to desire self-sufficiency to the great extent that they do. My answer is that the excessively proud have an excessively individualistic conception of their personal ideals. I generalize this conclusion into an account of the trait, according to which being proud consists in being firmly committed to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. I argue that there are five primary dimensions along which one can evaluate this commitment: the first
concerns the extent to which the proud person explicitly regards herself from an evaluative point of view, the second concerns the extent to which she cares about receiving the respect of others, the third concerns the extent to which she has an individualistic rather than a collective interpretation of her ideals, the fourth concerns the rigidity of her commitment to her personal ideals, and the fifth concerns the merit of her personal ideals. I argue that proper pride requires that one be properly disposed in each of these five respects; in short, having proper (or virtuous) pride involves having a proper commitment to living in accordance with worthy personal ideals. I conclude this chapter by critically evaluating objections to the claim that pride can be a virtue that take the form of a defense of the virtue of humility.

In the Conclusion, I return to the two puzzles that I presented in this Introduction and summarize my solutions. The solution to the descriptive puzzle involves the idea that personal ideals figure into personal experience in at least two overlapping ways: a person may be committed to living in accordance with an ideal, and a person may evaluate herself (or others) with respect to an ideal. Call the former the practical influence of an ideal, and the latter the evaluative use of an ideal. Being a proud person consists in being practically influenced by one’s ideals insofar as one’s personal ideals play a central role in one’s deliberation and related practical activities. On the other hand, feeling proud embodies an evaluative use of one’s ideals, one that depends upon the evaluation being positive and the object of evaluation being the self. The solution to the normative puzzle depends upon appreciating the five dimensions of the trait of pride.

Finally, in the Appendix, I consider the relation between the trait of pride and self-respect. After a brief survey of the neo-Kantian literature on self-respect, I situate the trait of pride in relation to the many forms of self-respect. I argue that, while one
supposed form of self-respect does resemble pride, the concept of self-respect is ultimately not well-suited to describe the trait of pride. For, while it makes sense to say that one has too much pride (which, on my analysis, amounts to being excessively disposed in at least one of pride’s five dimensions), it does not make sense to say that one has too much self-respect.
1. Evaluating Attitudes

1.1 Introduction
One can evaluate attitudes in several ways. It is sometimes said, for example, that one should not feel proud about something unless one is personally responsible for it. This ‘should’ is ambiguous: the claim being made might be that feeling such pride leads one to rest on one’s laurels, and so is prudentially foolish; or, that such pride rests upon or embodies false judgments about the scope of one’s accomplishments or about the nature of personal merit, and so is epistemically faulty; or, that such pride is obnoxious and morally blameworthy insofar as it is a form of ‘taking credit’ from another. The question of whether experiencing some emotion is in some respect good, for instance, is very different from the question of whether experiencing that emotion would be warranted—even if it is true that it is typically good to experience warranted emotions and typically bad to experience unwarranted emotions.

The technical machinery that I present in this chapter helps us to keep separate these and other importantly distinct questions about emotions and other attitudes. In §1.2, I distinguish between the conditions under which a token emotion (1) is intelligibly attributable to a person (attribution conditions), (2) accurately presents its intentional object (warrant conditions), and (3) is morally or prudentially appropriate (external propriety conditions). In §1.3, I raise and consider the methodological worry of how to discern whether attribution conditions for a particular attitude are met in cases in which such an attitude would be unwarranted. In §1.4, I argue that attribution conditions are systematically
related to warrant conditions, but not to external propriety conditions. Attribution and warrant conditions are derivable from the representational content of the emotion whereas external propriety conditions are not. This conclusion suggests a method for deriving warrant conditions from attribution conditions (and vice versa) and a test for differentiating warrant conditions from external propriety conditions.

1.2 Attribution, Warrant, and External Propriety

Each account of the pride to be discussed in Chapter 2 advances a necessary condition for pride. In this section I distinguish between the three types of conditions that I mentioned in the introduction and outline several ways in which they relate to each other. I argue that the warrant conditions, but not the external propriety conditions, of a given emotion are conceptually related to that emotion’s attribution conditions.

Attribution conditions set forth the conditions under which a token emotion is intelligibly attributed to a person. A set of attributions conditions partially defines a type of emotion (such as fear), since it provides the conditions under which a token emotion is a token of that type. Attribution conditions answer the question of what makes your fear of spiders fear rather than some other mental state, such as disgust. Warrant conditions set forth the conditions under which a token emotion accurately presents its intentional object. For example, your fear of spiders is warranted only if spiders are as they appear

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1 “Partially define,” because I leave open the possibility that experiencing an emotion requires having a nonrepresentational feeling.

2 This formulation does not beg the question against non-cognitivists about emotion, who deny that emotions have conceptual content. For non-cognitivists can hold that for any emotion, $\phi$, $\phi$ presents its object as $\phi$-worthy. For a defense of such a view, see Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-quasijudgmentalism)," *Philosophy, Supplement*. 52 (2003), 127-145). The central dispute between cognitivists and non-cognitivists can be cast in terms of whether warrant conditions for some emotion have any cognitive content that is specifiable independently of that emotion.
to you, namely, fearsome (or threatening or harmful). If the spider of one’s fear is harmless then one’s fear is unwarranted. Attribution conditions for $S$’s fear of $x$ include a condition along the following lines: $S$ takes $x$ to pose a threat to herself; warrant conditions include a condition along the following lines: $x$ poses a threat to $S$. If $S$ does not take $x$ to pose a threat to herself, then $S$ does not experience fear; if $S$ mistakenly takes $x$ to pose a threat to herself (and if all other attribution conditions for fear are satisfied), then $S$’s fear is unwarranted.

External propriety conditions provide conditions under which a token emotion is in some way (say, morally or prudentially), and in some set of circumstances, good to have. For example, fear directed at a person on the basis of his membership in a stigmatized group can be morally inappropriate regardless of whether it is warranted. It would be morally blameworthy if the fear merely expressed the agent’s general antipathy toward members of that stigmatized group and if the agent had no reason to believe she were in danger—whether or not it is true that she is in fact in danger. Likewise, the fear of public speaking may be prudentially unsound regardless of whether it is warranted, insofar as fear interferes with one’s ability to make an effective public presentation. These moral and prudential considerations are external to the representational content of the emotion.

Not all warranted attitudes are externally appropriate. For example, Michelle Mason has convincingly argued that warranted contempt for another can be morally

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3 The exact nature of these conditions is contested. They may be conditions of moral permissibility, although some will argue that attitudes cannot submit to the category of permissibility in light of their involuntary nature. Attitudes and emotions might instead (or also) be evaluable along other “moral dimensions,” such as their praise- or blameworthiness. There is some resistance still to the thesis that a person can be responsible for their attitudes in the sense requisite for evaluations of praise- or blameworthiness. I will operate on the assumption that, at the very least, we can be responsible for our attitudes and emotions. For a defense of this view, see Angela Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” *Ethics* 115, no. 2 (2005): 236-271.
inappropriate if the contemnor is guilty of the same flaw that provides the basis of her contempt for the other and does not hold herself equally in contempt. This contemnor is a hypocrite and should not feel even warranted contempt for the other unless she holds herself in contempt equally. Likewise, and more fantastically, in the event that an Evil Demon threatens to torture you if you fear him, fear would be entirely warranted but prudentially unsound.

That some external propriety conditions concern the moral goodness of experiencing an emotion should not be taken as implying that warrant or attribution conditions are by definition morally neutral. For example, a warrant condition of one’s guilt is plausibly that one has committed some moral wrong. This warrant condition plainly has moral content. Likewise, ‘prudential justification condition’ does not imply that attribution or warrant conditions are necessarily prudentially neutral. Prudential considerations are often central to the warrant of fear. The important distinction between warrant conditions and external propriety conditions is rather that the former are, and the latter are not, derivable from the representational content of the attitude. To adopt the preliminary formulation of Pamela Hieronymi, what I am calling ‘external conditions’ bear on the question of whether an attitude is in some way good to have, whereas warrant conditions bear on a different question that typically concerns the content of an attitude.

4 Bernard Williams offers an example that demonstrates that this point applies to all attitudes, even to beliefs. He writes: “One does not feel easy with the man who in the course of a discussion of how to deal with political or business rivals says, “Of course, we could have them killed, but we should lay that aside right from the beginning.” It should never have come into his hands to be laid aside” (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985, p. 185). Even if the man’s beliefs are true—he could, in fact, have them killed and he should, in fact, lay that aside right from the beginning—he is plausibly morally blameworthy insofar as those thoughts should not have occurred to him.

5 Note that these two questions need not be exclusive. See Pamela Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason,” Journal of Philosophy 102, no. 9 (2005): 437-457; see especially p. 445. There is a large and contentious literature, that I cannot engage with here, devoted to finding a precise way of characterizing the difference between warrant and external propriety considerations. See, in particular, Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow- Rasmussen, “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and
In §1.4, I propose and defend a test for distinguishing in general between warrant conditions and external propriety conditions and, following Hieronymi, spell out more precisely the different sorts of questions that warrant and external propriety conditions bear upon. But first, I offer some thoughts about the relation between attribution and warrant conditions.

1.3 Attribution Conditions and Warrant Conditions

It can be difficult, in principle and in practice, to determine whether a particular mental state is an unwarranted token of one type of attitude, say pride, or a warranted token of some other type of attitude. Gabriele Taylor observes that “it is perhaps unlikely that it should always be possible to tell whether some unusual claim fails to meet the conditions for feeling proud altogether, or whether it is a case of quite irrational pride.” In other words, it may be difficult to distinguish between (very) unwarranted but intelligibly attributable pride and some mental state that does not meet pride’s attribution conditions. Suppose your next-door neighbor in Seattle sincerely claims that he takes pride in French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s legislative record. His remark stirs your interest, and you ask him whether he is a French citizen. When he answers flatly in the negative you begin a line of questioning to make sense of his alleged tie to Sarkozy. Is he of French ancestry? No. Is he a Francophile, or a friend of Sarkozy? No. Does he imagine himself to be Napoleon? No—he maintains, with some annoyance, that he’s simply proud of Sarkozy’s great accomplishments and hopeful for the future of the French Republic. What are we to make of this?

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As you take leave of this neighbor you may take one of two paths: either doubt that his emotion is pride (perhaps English is not his native language), or doubt that his pride is warranted (he ‘identifies’ with the French cause, but without any reasonable grounds for doing so). The first path takes some attribution condition, or conditions, to be unsatisfied. For example, one might insist that the neighbor cannot intelligibly be interpreted as feeling proud of Sarkozy since he doesn’t say anything that could be construed as an attempt to show that he is “closely related” to Sarkozy. Taking this path renders otiose any question about the justification of his pride because, of course, you decide that his emotion isn’t pride (but, maybe, is instead admiration\(^7\)). The second path allows that the attribution conditions for pride are met, but denies that all of the warrant conditions are met. This path is liberal about what can intelligibly be called pride and, as a direct consequence, makes sense of our confusion in the face of the Sarkozy case with the thought that such pride is not warranted. The bafflement must be directed somewhere. The first path directs our bafflement at the neighbor’s self-ascription of pride (i.e., “Why does he think he feels proud?”) while the second path directs our bafflement at the neighbor’s feeling pride on the basis of some fact unrelated to him (i.e., “Why would he feel proud of someone who is unrelated to him?”)\(^8\).

That first, illiberal, path is appealing in the Sarkozy example; if we believe the neighbor doesn’t even take himself to stand in some special relation to the French President then we are likely to judge him mistaken about his emotional state. For, intuitively, experiencing the emotion of pride involves a commitment to thinking of oneself as specially related to the object of one’s pride, in the sense of being answerable to

\(^7\) Thanks to Rachel Fredericks for suggesting this example to me.

\(^8\) It is not an option to blame the unintelligibility of the universe, to think that the neighbor’s pride is but one more reason to believe that the world works in mysterious ways.
demands to justify thinking of oneself and Sarkozy in this connection. However, there is a perennial methodological worry that philosophers will dogmatically dismiss as unintelligible slightly less baffling cases of purported pride in order to salvage our favored account of pride’s attribution conditions. How, for example, should we treat a person’s claim to be proud that he has very thick and lustrous hair? You ask whether his fine hair is the result of intensive care on his part, and he says no. In fact, he notes proudly, the beauty of his hair doesn’t reflect upon his agency at all; unlike the vast majority of professional models, he has had to do nothing at all for his hair to be great. Could this alleged instance pride serve as a counterexample to the purported attribution condition that the agent must take the object of his pride to be an accomplishment of his? Again there are two paths: we may deny that he really feels pride, and instead attribute to him some other kind of happiness (“After all, how could he intelligibly feel proud of something without thereby regarding it as an accomplishment?”); or we may accept that he is proud, truly proud, of his natural gift but that such vain pride is unjustified in the sense of morally inappropriate (“He is proud of his hair, the pompous jerk!”). If we take the first path, then what I will call ‘agency accounts’ of prides attribution conditions are redeemed; if we take the second path, then agency accounts face a devastating counterexample.\(^9\)

The desideratum to save the phenomena of our experienced mental life and ways of talking about that life pulls us in both directions, especially when attribution or warrant conditions appear to conflict with external propriety conditions. If there is an established practice of recognizing certain emotions as pride, then we should be wary of countering it for the sake of some tidy set of attribution conditions. For example, we should take

seriously, because they are so frequently avowed, claims of parental pride, national pride, and Husky pride, even if such pride is difficult to make sense of or to see as morally benign. The desideratum thus cautions against excessively draconian attribution conditions, for instance conditions in service of the ‘moralizing’ of our psychology.\textsuperscript{10} Emotional life provides important input for the moral philosopher, as well as the moral person. So we should be wary of defining the emotions in ways that reflect some particular moral assessment. John Deigh similarly cautions against recklessly subsuming our understanding of the emotions under our understanding of ethical first principles the truth of which we are antecedently confident:

Since we are capable of bringing our emotions under rational control, we may regard our feeling a specific emotion as incompatible with our moral principles and so try to make ourselves no longer liable to it. Alternatively, we may regard this emotion as essential to our humanity and so revise our principles. The conflict makes evident the importance of having a correct understanding of such emotions; at the same time we should see that altering the understanding one has in order simply to avoid such conflict or the criticism of irrationality would be misguided.\textsuperscript{11}

However, the task of saving the phenomena sometimes pulls us the other way as well, towards ever more finely drawn distinctions between the different emotions. We must not refuse to impose any attribution conditions whatsoever, or refuse conditions with teeth, on pain of losing our grip of the difference between them. Pride is different from love, gratitude, and simple pleasure, so we must at a minimum track these everyday distinctions in our accounts. There is no methodological moral to draw about where in our account to locate the teeth besides ‘not too liberal, not too restrictive.’ One can only hope to present the best overall explanation of pride and pride-related phenomena.

\textsuperscript{10} See Bernard Williams, “Nietzsche Moralized Moral Psychology,” in \textit{Making sense of humanity and other philosophical papers} (New York: Cambridge University, 1995), pp. 65-76.

1.4 Warrant Conditions and External Propriety Conditions

Warrant conditions for a given emotion correspond, in a sense to be explained, to the cognitive elements of that emotion’s attribution conditions: if, for example, your fear presents a spider as threatening, then to the attribution condition that you take the spider to be threatening there corresponds a warrant condition that the spider is threatening.\footnote{12} If an attribution condition of your national pride is that you take yourself to be closely related to some nation then a warrant condition of that attitude is that you are closely related to that nation. Warrant conditions of an emotion generally follow from the internal structure of that emotion. Warrant conditions are to emotions as truth conditions are to beliefs—indeed one may think of truth conditions as the warrant conditions of belief.\footnote{13}

The following considerations, which I refer to as the argument from transparency, support the claim that warrant conditions correspond to attribution conditions in the way I have indicated.\footnote{14} The argument begins by considering the process of self-attribution of mental states, and generalizes from there to all attribution of mental states. Consider the self-attribution of belief: suppose that you are asked whether you believe that Ferraris are more expensive than Lamborghini's. How would you determine whether you believe this? If you have never considered the matter of car pricing you might be tempted to answer

\footnote{12} It is worth stressing that the corresponding warrant condition is not that you are epistemically justified in taking the spider to be threatening, since an emotion can be warranted in my technical sense of the term without being justified in exactly the way that a belief can accurately represent its propositional object (i.e., be true) without being justified. So there are further types of conditions besides the three I consider here. For example, there will also be conditions under which an emotion is epistemically justified, independent of whether the emotion is warranted. This is analogous to the fact that there are conditions under which a belief is epistemically justified, independent of whether the belief is true.

\footnote{13} If one prefers one can think of warrant conditions as truth conditions for emotions. If emotions were entirely cognitive then there would be no good reason for refusing to call your fear of spiders “true” or “false”—and so call warrant conditions “truth conditions.” However if there are non-cognitive elements in emotions that help to structure its intentional content, then one might have grounds for resisting that appellation.

\footnote{14} Thanks to Bill Talbott for urging me to defend this claim.
that you do not have this belief. But how do you know that you have no belief on the
matter? Perhaps it is something that you have never considered, but that is implied by
something else you believe. In order to determine whether you believe that Ferraris are
more expensive than Lamborghinis you will need to think about Ferraris and
Lamborghinis. In other words, in order to determine whether you believe that Ferraris are
more expensive than Lamborghinis you must consider whether the warrant conditions for that belief (i.e., the truth conditions) are met.

From the first-person point of view, the evidence for answering the psychological question
about what mental states we have is typically provided by ‘outward phenomena’; in this
sense our mental states are transparent.15

More strongly still, in order to actually meet the attribution conditions for this attitude
(not just to determine whether the conditions are met by inferring from evidence) you must
be committed to affirmatively answering the question of whether the warrant conditions
hold. In order to believe that \( p \), you must be committed to answering the question,
whether \( p \), in the affirmative. This commitment is constitutive of belief. Warrant conditions
for an attitude delineate the commitments that are constitutive of having that attitude. By having that
attitude one commits oneself to answering questions and criticisms that would be
answered by providing reasons that bear on whether the warrant conditions for that

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15 There is a large literature devoted to this topic. I borrow the phrase “outward phenomena,” as well as the
genral argument, from Garreth Evans. Compare: “[I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are,
so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward—upon the world. If someone asks me “Do you
think there is going to be a third world war?” I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same
outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question “Will there be a third world
war?” (Evans 1982, 225). I borrow the term “transparency” from Richard Moran: “With respect to the
attitude of belief, the claim of transparency tells us that the first-person question “Do I believe \( P \)?” is
“transparent” to, answered in the same way as, the outward-directed question as to the truth of \( P \) itself”
(Moran (2001), 66). As Moran and others have pointed out, there is considerable difficulty in explaining
how it can be that a question about a person’s psychological states can be answered without reference to
the person herself. For my purposes I merely need the assumption, generally granted, that it can be.
attitude hold. So, attribution conditions and warrant condition are related in the very idea of what Pamela Hieronymi calls the “commitment-constituted attitudes,” which include belief, intention, anger, resentment, fear, pride, and all other attitudes for which one is answerable in this way. On the other hand, as I explain below, assenting to the external propriety conditions of some attitude, $A$, is never constitutive of having $A$—that assent is at most constitutive of having some other attitude about the propriety of having $A$, such as the belief that it would be prudent to feel fear on some occasion.

This account of warrant conditions is least controversial with respect to the attitudes of belief and intention. Whether emotional states are likewise transparent is a difficult and important question, to which I answer in the affirmative. However, one might argue that, unlike beliefs, emotions need not reflect an agent’s judgments, in which case the agent would not be answerable to demands for justification for having particular emotions. Imagine a person who considers his recalcitrant fear of garden snakes to be irrational in the strong sense that it conflicts with his considered judgment that garden snakes are harmless. For him, one might object, the question, “Are you afraid of garden snakes?” cannot be answered in the same way as he would answer the question, “Are garden snakes dangerous?” The answers come apart for the two questions: ‘yes’ to the first and ‘no’ to the second. The answers may also, in other cases, come apart in the other direction: I might answer ‘yes’ to the outward-directed question, and ‘no’ to the self-ascription question (I experience no fear towards snakes but do believe that they are dangerous). So, there is a strong prima facie argument for the conclusion that emotions are not transparent in the way that beliefs are.

I borrow this line of argumentation, and the idea of answerability to questions and criticism, from Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reason,” op.cit.
This argument is associated with non-cognitivist positions in the philosophy of emotion, which deny that emotions are or embody judgments, and so taps into an ongoing debate that I cannot fully engage with. The issue of transparency has not, at this time, been a focus of research among philosophers of emotion, and I believe that it may open a new front in debates about the relation between emotion and cognition. I will outline two lines of response that provide a prima facie case that emotions are transparent.

The first line of objection to the non-cognitivist counter-argument is to note that it does not plausibly explain how we do come to attribute emotions to ourselves if not by answering the ‘outward-directed’ question. How is it that the purported fear of garden snakes is identified as such, rather than as an experience of being startled by garden snakes, say, or as an expression of disgust at the slithery snakes? Hume provides one possible non-cognitivist explanation, namely, that each emotion-type is contingently associated with a different type of ineffable sensation. However, there is good reason to abandon the view that emotions are nothing but ineffable sensations, beginning with the fact that psychological experiments have consistently shown that subjects injected with adrenaline ascribe different emotional states to themselves depending on their beliefs about their environment.

Even if the Humean account of emotions were correct, there is a second line of objection to the counter-argument. There is no reason why we should characterize the supposed fear as recalcitrant or as irrational if not because it expresses a judgment (i.e., that garden snakes are threatening) that conflicts with another judgment of the agent (i.e., that garden snakes are harmless). If emotions were not transparent then we could not describe them, strictly speaking, as irrational or in rational tension with standing
judgments. Rather, if a person wholeheartedly judged that snakes were harmless then it would be more plausible to describe his aversive reactions as mere physiological twitches or pains rather than as fear of garden snakes. If, on the other hand, it is clear that the person is afraid of garden snakes—for example, if he runs away from them screaming—then it is implausible in the extreme to maintain that he wholeheartedly judges that snakes are harmless. Therefore, the potential recalcitrance of emotions gives us reason to think that emotions are transparent to the extent that they can stand in conflict with judgments.\(^\text{17}\)

The fact that first-personal emotional ascription is outward looking shows that attribution conditions are linked with warrant conditions as a matter of necessity. Similarly, in order to ascribe an emotion in the third-personal case, we must look to whether the person judges the warrant conditions to be met.

When I said that each account of the closeness relation advances a necessary condition of pride’s justification, I meant, more specifically, that each advances either a warrant condition (in the case of what I will go on to call “possession accounts” and “agency accounts”) or an attribution condition (in the case of “identification accounts,” many of which deny that pride can be warranted or warranted). Corresponding to that warrant condition will be an attribution condition. I have argued that the two questions, “what relation must you believe to hold between yourself and the object of your attitude in order for pride to be \textit{intelligibly} attributable to you?” and “what relation must actually obtain between yourself and the object of your pride in order for that pride to be \textit{warranted}?”, must be related.\(^\text{18}\)

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\(^{17}\) Cf., Moran (2001).

\(^{18}\) It follows that attribution conditions cannot be separated conceptually from warrant conditions. As I argue in Chapter 2, one cannot identify a mental state as pride without making reference to what would
The external propriety conditions for an attitude are not linked to its attribution and warrant conditions, a fact that indicates a method for determining how conditions should be classified. Such a method is needed, for example, to disambiguate particular criticisms of a person’s emotion. To return to the garden snake example, suppose that I tell you that you should not be afraid of garden snakes because they are harmless. Is the claim, don’t be afraid of harmless objects, indicative of a warrant condition or a condition of external propriety? I propose an exceedingly simple, but surprisingly useful, test for helping to answer such questions which takes the following form: consider whether the claim, (1) that some emotion is warranted, is inconsistent with (2) a particular justification condition or (3) its negation. If (1) is inconsistent with (2), then (3) is a warrant condition. If (1) is inconsistent with (3), then (2) is a warrant condition. If (1) is consistent with (2) and with (3), then neither (2) nor (3) is a warrant condition.

It will help to illustrate this test with the case of belief first, since warrant conditions for that type of mental state (i.e., truth conditions) are generally easy to discern. Consider Bernard Williams’s example of a warranted but morally inappropriate belief—a person who thinks that he could murder his competitor—along with two possible criticisms: first, “He shouldn’t think that because he could not, in fact, murder his competitor,” and second, “He shouldn’t think that because it is morally repugnant to consider murder.” The claim,

\[(1) \text{ that his belief is warranted (in the sense that it accurately portrays its object, a proposition, as true)}\]

is inconsistent with the claim,
(2) that he could not murder his competitor,

which indicates that the claim,

(3) that he could murder his competitor.

is a warrant condition of his belief. On the other hand, the claim,

(1’) that his belief is warranted,

is not inconsistent with either the claim,

(2’) that it is morally repugnant to consider murder,

or the claim,

(3’) that it is not morally repugnant to consider murder.

So, the test indicates that the moral repugnance of the man’s belief is not relevant to its warrant.

Turning from belief, it seems that there is an inconsistency in the following set of claims between (1’’) and (3’’):

(1’’) that the fear of garden snakes is warranted;

(2’’) that garden snakes are dangerous;

(3’’) that garden snakes are not dangerous.

It seems to me that (1’’) and (3’’) cannot both be true. If the fear of garden snakes is warranted then it just cannot be that garden snakes are not dangerous. The inconsistency between (1’’) and (3’’) shows, according to the proposed test, that (2’’) is a warrant condition of the fear of garden snakes.¹⁹

¹⁹ Note that the relevant notion of warrant is an objective notion of accurate representation of an attitude’s intentional content, and not a subjective notion relativized to the agent’s knowledge at the moment of fear.
Consider now a more profound example, involving grief. Suppose that I tell you in stoic fashion that you should stop grieving the death of your child because it ultimately serves no purpose—it is too late, for example, to save your child’s life—and interferes with your daily life. Is the claim that one should feel grief only when it serves some purpose a warrant condition for grief? Consider:

(1’’) that the grief over one’s child is warranted;
(2’’) that one’s grief serves no purpose (e.g., one’s child cannot be saved);
(3’’) that one’s grief serves some purpose (e.g., one’s child can be saved).

To my ear (1’’) is not inconsistent with either (2’’) or (3’’). Thus, grief may be warranted even if, from a practical point of view, it is little more than a waste of time or a psychological illness. Consider also the following argument, from Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*:

[C1] The troubled mind is not fit to perform its function.
[C2] The function of the mind is to make good use of its reasoning power.
[C3] The mind of the wise person is always in a fit condition to make the best possible use of reason.
[C4] Hence, the wise person’s mind is never disturbed.
[C5] But distress [in particular, grief] is a disturbance of the mind.
[C6] Therefore, the wise person is not subject to distress.

Does the fact that grief always disturbs the mind and renders it unfit to reason entail that it can never be warranted? No; grief may be warranted even if it leads to bad consequences for the griever. There is no inconsistency in supposing that a case of grief is warranted and that it will ravage the griever. Not all cases will be as easy to sort out as the

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three that I have provided as examples. But that is because our semantic intuitions may not always be as clear.

As I mentioned above, Michelle Mason argues that holding another in contempt for some feature that one shares with the other is unjustified, unless one also holds oneself in contempt. Contempt for others based on traits you share with them is hypocritical unless one also contemns oneself. Is the condition, *don’t contemn another for something that one is also guilty of (unless one also contemns oneself)*, tied to a condition of warrant? It seems not. We can consistently assert the following:

(1′′′′) That contempt for my neighbor is warranted;
(2′′′′) That I am guilty of the same fault;
(3′′′′) That I am not guilty of the same fault.

That (2′′′′) and (3′′′′) are consistent with (1′′′′) supports Mason’s conclusion that lack of hypocrisy is not a warrant condition of contempt.

This test purports to gauge our intuitions about what conditions are necessary for an emotion to be warranted by appealing to our linguistic intuitions about whether some set of assertions is consistent. However, one might wonder whether we do, in fact, have such linguistic intuitions. We do not commonly discuss whether such-and-such emotion is warranted, as opposed to whether it is morally or prudentially justified. So one might object that the apparently revisionary scheme I defend, which distinguishes between different sorts of justification conditions, cannot pretend to be grounded in ordinary language or linguistic intuition. How often, after all, do we say things like “He warrants contempt, though I am guilty of the same fault?”

This objection raises the question of how revisionary the distinction between warrant and propriety is. I think it is embedded quite deeply in the English language. We
sometimes say, “He warrants contempt,” and we very commonly employ nominalizations corresponding to many emotion-types. We say, “He is contemptible,” “That bear is fearsome,” and “He is pitiful,” for example. Also on the list are: ‘funny,’ ‘shameful,’ ‘enviable,’ ‘outrageous,’ and ‘guilty.’ The test I have proposed does not require that emotions have such nominalizations, since many do not. The point is that from the names that do appear in English we have developed strong intuitions about the warrant conditions of an emotion that allow for ‘open questions’ about other sorts of conditions. We can say, “He is contemptible, but should I contemn him?,” “That loss is (literally) grievous, but should I grieve?,” and so on. This suggests that ordinary language does capture the distinction between warrant conditions and other sorts of justification conditions, even if there are disputable cases.

I will not put this test to work until §3.3, where I defend a set of warrant conditions for pride. I describe the test here in order to make this distinction clear from the start and to make evident the contrast between internal propriety (that is, warrant) and external propriety (for example, moral and prudential justification). This contrast is particularly important in the case of pride because the list of proposed external propriety conditions for pride, which I take to be secondary in importance to warrant conditions for the solution to the descriptive puzzle, is notoriously long. That list ranges from Augustine’s constraints against turning away from god as well as his more secular claim that feeling proud of oneself tempts one into wrongdoing, to Rousseau’s constraint against feeling

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23 Roberts, ibid., suggests that anger and grief do not have corresponding nominalizations.

24 Augustine, City of God, Book 14, Chapters 13-14.
pride because of its aristocratic and socially divisive character,\textsuperscript{25} to Hume’s constraint against displaying one’s pride because of its tendency to elicit envy and painful humility in others.\textsuperscript{26} I discuss external propriety conditions for pride at the end of Chapter 2, and raise the issue again in Chapter 3.

1.5 Conclusion
The distinctions between warrant, attribution, and propriety conditions are recent contributions to the philosophy of emotion that allow us to discuss attitudes and emotions with considerable precision. Accordingly, one goal of the following chapter is to make explicit what the three accounts of pride to be discussed were intended by their authors to be accounts of and with respect to which kind of condition (e.g., attribution, warrant, or external propriety) these accounts are most plausible. These distinctions add nuance to current debates and help us to identify whether disputants are talking past each other.

\textsuperscript{26} David Hume (1978), especially Book 3, Part 3, Section 2, “Of Greatness of Mind.”
2. In Search of the “Pride Relation”

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I critically evaluate the philosophical literature devoted to the emotion of pride. Within this literature, pride is understood in terms of one of three notions: identification, possession, or agency. These three notions provide the basis for three competing accounts of pride, each one of which enables us to appreciate important features of the emotion. Though I ultimately reject each of these accounts, the personal ideals account that I develop and defend in the following chapter builds upon insights gleaned from them.

One can, at least partly, make sense of many emotions in terms of the relations that the subject takes to obtain between himself and the object of his emotion. Being afraid of something typically involves, among other things, taking it to pose a threat to oneself; so fear typically presupposes that the subject takes himself to stand in a particular relation to the object of fear. Feeling guilty about some act involves taking there to be a three-place relation between myself, my action, and the person whom I have wronged. Not all emotions involve taking their objects to have any particular relation to the self. For instance, despising another doesn’t require taking oneself to be in any special relation to the other. Neither does admiration require any such reference to oneself.

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1 I save discussion of the trait for Chapter 5.
Having the emotion of pride does require viewing oneself as standing in some special relation to the object of pride, and the aim of the present chapter is to critically assess the leading philosophical accounts of this relation (which I call the “pride relation”). The difficulty of accounting for the general relation between a person who feels proud and the object of his pride has gripped philosophers since Hume. Though even the simpler emotions have many possible objects—one can be afraid of dying, afraid of losing one’s wallet, afraid of being spurned, afraid (if neurotically) of being loved, and so on—the range of pride’s objects have proven difficult to describe in any unified manner. Referring to himself in the third person, Hume notes the following in the “Abstract” of the *Treatise*:

He observes, that the objects which excite these passions [pride and humility], are very numerous, and seemingly very different from each other. Pride or self-esteem may arise from the qualities of the mind; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, integrity: from those of the body; beauty, strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing, riding, fencing: from external advantages; country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths. He afterwards proceeds to find out that common circumstance, in which all these objects agree, and which causes them to operate on the passions.²

The three kinds of objects of pride listed here—qualities of the mind, qualities of the body, and external advantages—form a subset of Hume’s account of possible objects of pride that he terms “original objects.” Original objects, as opposed to “secondary objects,” need not involve other people and their opinions of us. Secondary objects, which Hume treats separately in a discussion of sympathy, include personal reputation, honor and fame. This is quite a diverse list, and one would be forgiven for being skeptical of ever finding “that common circumstance, in which all these objects agree.”

² Hume (1978), 659-660.
There are roughly three kinds of accounts of the pride relation in the contemporary philosophical literature. This division isolates one of the two conditions that writers on the subject commonly take to be necessary for pride. Those two conditions are: (1) that the subject takes himself to be “closely related” to the intentional object of her pride (the “pride relation”) and, (2) that the subject evaluates this object positively. Nearly all of the contemporary philosophical work about pride is concerned with developing an account of the pride relation. In this Chapter, I grant the methodological assumption that it is fruitful to isolate consideration of the two conditions.

I call the three accounts of the pride relation the ‘identification account,’ the ‘possession account,’ and the ‘agency account.’ According to the identification account, the self and the object of pride are closely related just in case the person ‘identifies’ with the object. According to the possession account, the self and the object of pride are closely related just in case the person thinks that she ‘possesses’ the object. According to

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3 I propose this division in order to make discussion more manageable, even though, as I argue below, these three kinds of accounts are in some cases compatible.

4 The positive account that I ultimately defend in Chapter 3 provides reason for denying that the pride relation can be specified independently of the evaluative assessment of the object. For general reasons to reject the analytical division of concepts of emotions into independently specifiable attribution conditions, see Robert Solomon, “Nothing to Be Proud of,” in Not Passion’s Slave—Emotions and Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); see especially pp. 54-55.


the agency account, the self and the object of pride are closely related just in case one’s actions contributed to the existence, or excellence, of the object of one’s pride.\footnote{See Robert Solomon, The Passions (New York: Doubleday Press, 1976), especially pp. 344-47; Robert Solomon, “Nothing to Be Proud of,” reprinted in Not Passion’s Slave - Emotions and Choice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Richard Taylor, Restoring Pride (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1996).}

In §2.2, I review Hume’s influential account of pride. This review is useful because some proponents of each of the three competing accounts of the pride relation have claimed Hume’s account of pride as inspiration for their preferred account. More important still, nearly all of these writers have adopted Hume’s characterization of the problem to be solved. However, I argue that Hume’s psychologistic account is best understood as a form of skepticism about the existence of any substantive and unified account of the pride relation.\footnote{For a contemporary defense of this skepticism, see Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, Anti-quasijudgmentalism),” Philosophy, Supplement 52 (2003): 127-145.}

In §2.3, I critically evaluate each of the three competing contemporary accounts of the pride relation. None of these accounts wholly succeeds. The identification account explicitly denies that there are substantive attribution conditions; I show that such a denial is unmotivated and leads to implausible results. I next consider three versions of the possession account, proposed by Anthony Kenny (and Donald Davidson), Annette Baier, and Gabriele Taylor. I argue that the attribution conditions that Kenny and Taylor advance are not sufficient to establish the pride relation. Furthermore, these conditions succeed in being necessary for the pride relation only by being trivially satisfiable. The condition that Baier’s account advances is not trivial, but fails to be necessary for the intelligible attribution of the emotion of pride to a person. Finally, I argue that agency accounts advance draconian attribution conditions that are not
necessary for feeling pride. These conditions are draconian insofar as they entail the implausible conclusion that many types of commonly avowed pride are actually not pride—or at least not intelligible as types of pride.

After bringing to light the strengths and weaknesses of these three types of views, I conclude, in §2.4, with some remarks about how one might reconcile these views. I propose that the search for a unified and substantive pride relation is doomed. In the following chapter, I argue that there are many different pride relations, which correspond to the many personal ideals that people who feel proud take themselves to be living in accordance with.

2.2 Hume’s Closeness Relation

It is for good reason that many writers on pride begin their inquiries with a discussion of Hume who, with Part 1 of Book 2 of his *Treatise*, composed the most detailed, comprehensive, and systematic monograph on pride ever written.9 One aspect in particular of Hume’s account of pride has struck several commentators as being both importantly correct and crucially vague. Annette Baier and Gabriele Taylor, among others, have offered several distinct remedies for the vagueness of Hume’s first of five “limitations” of his system of pride.10 These limitations, presented in Chapter 6 of Part 1,
Book 2, provide necessary conditions that serve to distinguish pride from other emotions, particularly joy, which also satisfy the following preliminary account of pride:

\[(P) \text{“all agreeable objects, related to ourselves, by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce pride.”}^{11}\]

Hume observes that the “related to ourselves” clause must be sharpened in order to distinguish the account from an over-broad account of all joyful emotions. For, whenever we take simple joy in anything there is likewise a relation between the agreeable object and ourselves; and, in Hume’s view at least, those agreeable objects likewise produce joy (yet not necessarily pride) by an association of ideas and of impressions. So we must add further conditions to (P) in order to differentiate pride from simple joy. With this end in mind, Hume observes: “We may feel joy upon being present at a feast, where our senses are regal’d with delicacies of every kind: But ‘tis only the master of the feast, who, beside the same joy, has the additional passion of self-applause and vanity.”\(^{12}\) The difference between the feast master’s “additional passion” and the guest’s joy does not, according to Hume, rest in a difference of causes of the passions—both passions are supposed to be caused by the same agreeable object, namely, the feast. Why is it, then, that only the feast master’s joy is converted into a second, distinct, passion of self-applause and vanity (i.e., pride)?

Hume’s answer, the contours of which all commentators (myself included) broadly agree with, is as indisputable as it is elusive: “There is not only a relation requir’d, but a close one, and a closer than is requir’d to joy.”\(^{13}\) The master is, in some way or other, more

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11 Hume, *op. cit.*, 290.
closely related to the feast than are his guests. Though Hume doesn’t spell out the details of the example for the reader, presumably the feast master brought the feast about himself; perhaps he paid for it or chose the menu. The closeness of his relation to the agreeable feast provides a “double force and energy” that converts the joy into a different passion, pride.\textsuperscript{14}

If the proud feast master funded the feast then his causal relation to its success can be described with some justice as “closer” than a joyous guest’s causal relation to its success. That Hume doesn’t seem to provide any concise characterization of the pride relation has dissatisfied some readers.\textsuperscript{15} However, some of Hume’s general remarks about the psychology of this relation deserve more consideration than they have received, and promise shed light onto the matter.

Tellingly, we are told that “[the object of pride’s] idea must hang, in a manner upon that of ourselves; and the transition from the one to the other must be easy and natural.”\textsuperscript{16} Making use of his theory of the imagination (presented in T1.1.4), and in particular of the principle of the association of ideas, Hume notes that in the case of pride, easy and natural transitions occur when the idea of the object of pride and the idea of the self are related contiguously or causally: “The relation, therefore, of contiguity, or that of causation, betwixt the cause and object of pride and humility, is alone requisite to give rise to these passions; and these relations are nothing else but qualities, by which the

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 291.

\textsuperscript{15} For instance, Gabriele Taylor (1985) claims that “the only clarification Hume offers of what a “close” relation might consist in appears in the form of an example [about the feast-master], and there it is hinted at rather than spelt out” (21). In what follows I present Hume’s further clarifications.

\textsuperscript{16} Hume, \textit{op. cit.}, 303. With “object of pride,” I refer to the thing about which one feels pride. This usage inverts Hume’s terminology, since for him the idea of self is always the “object” of pride, and what I call the object he calls the “cause.” But I don’t want to restrict this discussion by committing to a causal analysis of intentionality.
imagination is convey’d from one idea to another.”¹⁷ Thus, according to Hume, the close relation that holds in a given case of pride is identical to whichever relations lead us to transition easily between the idea of self and the idea of the object of pride. Indeed, this clarification is explicit in (P): “…related to ourselves, by an association of ideas…”

According to Hume’s theory of the imagination, our mind transitions to one idea from another when we believe the objects of the two ideas are associated by either contiguity in space or time, causation, or resemblance. The closer the association, the more easily the mind transitions from thought of one to thought of the other. Accordingly, a beautiful house adjacent to one’s own house is more likely (all other things being equal) to cause pride than is an equally lovely house down the street (variation in spatial contiguity); one’s parent’s accomplishments are more likely than one’s grandparent’s to cause pride, even if they occur simultaneously (variation in causation); and Ichiro Suzuki’s baseball records from 2001 are more likely than Ken Griffey, Jr.’s from 1994 to make one proud at the present time (variation in temporal contiguity).

So when Hume claims that the pride relation must be a ‘close relation,’ he means that the relation in each particular case (e.g., possession, agency, belonging) must be either a close relation of contiguity or causation between the object and the self. I call this Hume’s schema.

Hume’s schema is formulated in the psychological terms of his theory of the imagination. The explanatory power of his disjunctive schema depends upon

¹⁷ Ibid., 305. It is interesting that the relation of resemblance does not also facilitate this transition. See T 304, where Hume suggests that resemblance tends not to bring about pride because when someone’s prideworthy quality resembles one’s own then one will feel pride in oneself rather than in someone else. Hume doesn’t address the important scenario in which one resembles another, but not in terms of the prideworthy quality—as when a member of a group united by resemblance is proud of another member in virtue of some group-independent quality.
psychological fact: our minds, as a matter of fact, transition most easily between ideas of things that we believe are related contiguously, causally, or by resemblance.\textsuperscript{18} For various psychological reasons that are beside the present point, pride requires a particularly close relation between the two ideas.

The psychological schema explains why one’s agency—understood as causation involving one’s character—can play the role of the pride relation. One’s pride in one’s fine action presupposes the belief that one’s character caused the behavior of the action—one thinks of the action, and that one’s character is the cause. Since causation is one disjunct of Hume’s schema, the schema explains why agency (as a species of causation) can play the role of the pride relation. Likewise with possession, when it is analyzed in terms of one’s causal powers (hypothetical or actual) over the object. Indeed, even group pride (which Hume does not consider) makes sense under Hume’s schema insofar as group affiliation can be analyzed in terms of contiguity (e.g., local pride; Husky pride) or causation (e.g., family pride).

Contemporary writers have not discussed Hume’s psychologistic proposal, perhaps because some of it has a distinctly off-putting third-person perspective. Hume sometimes says as much: “‘Tis evident, that the association of ideas operates in so silent and imperceptible a manner, that we are scarce sensible of it, and discover it more by its effects than by any immediate feeling of perception.”\textsuperscript{19} What we take pride in is governed by psychological facts that may have no experiential correlates. Indeed, in addition to the pride relation, Hume adds further conditions presented in objective sounding language.

\textsuperscript{18} This fact makes possible the famous “double relation of ideas and impressions” by facilitating the transition from the idea of something and the pleasure we feel because of some quality of it to the separate pleasure of pride and the idea of self that the latter feeling produces.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Op. cit.}, 305.
First, that the object we are proud of is “peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons”\textsuperscript{20}; second, that it “be very discernible and obvious, and that not only to ourselves, but to others also”\textsuperscript{21}; and third, that it not be casual, inconstant, or of short duration.\textsuperscript{22} Gabriele Taylor objects that “Hume is wrong, then, in setting out the conditions of pride in the way he does: they cannot be stated in terms of what is as a matter of fact the case, but must be stated in terms of the beliefs of the person concerned.”\textsuperscript{23} So she argues that it is not the \textit{objective} closeness between the master and the feast that makes his pride possible, but rather what Taylor calls his “explanatory belief”—in the case of pride, whatever belief “is to explain in virtue of what I believe my worth to be confirmed or enhanced”—the master’s belief, say, that he organized the feast himself.\textsuperscript{24}

This objection is apt insofar as, plausibly, something has to be going on in the feast master’s mind that explains his feeling pride and not joy. If the master were an amnesiac and had forgotten that it was he who had organized the feast, then he would only feel joy despite the objective fact that he was the organizer. But Taylor’s complaint of hyper-objectivity fails to capture what we might find troubling in Hume’s account. After all, Hume’s account of the pride relation is formulated in terms of the imagination—and it doesn’t get any more subjective than that. Taylor’s criticism over-shoots the mark if it suggests that Hume’s account ignores the beliefs of the agent and focuses instead solely upon the matter of fact of the causality or contiguity relation between the self and the object of pride.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, 291.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Ibid.}, 292.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}, 292.
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Op. cit.}, 23.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid.}, 24.
Taylor is right to be dissatisfied with Hume’s account of what goes on inside the proud person’s head. However, it is not that Hume omits the subjective, but that he has underspecified it. If we accept as intelligible, as I think we should, all the common sorts of pride on Hume’s list, then we may wonder what it is exactly that all these instances of pride have in common. From the agent’s point of view in particular, why might all of these objects ground the same emotion? Take as an analogy the emotion of fear—surely there are many different sorts of objects of fear, but we make sense of that diversity (at least to a first approximation) with the condition that the agent considers the object to be threatening. Hume’s account does not sufficiently illuminate the attitude of pride. In Hume’s view, a person who feels pride considers the object of her pride to be either contiguous in space or time to himself or else causally related to herself. But why are these disjuncts both grounds for pride—what, in particular, makes sense of the fact that we take pride in objects that are spatially or temporally contiguous to us, and what do these relations share in common with causal relations? The Humean answer to these questions appeals to the brute fact of the natural constitution of humankind (and some other animals). This is not an explanation; it is a rejection of the demand for an explanation. In what follows I consider three responses to these demands for intelligibility: the identification, possession, and agency accounts of the pride relation.

2.3 The Identification Account

Where the philosophers to be discussed in §2.4 and §2.5 work to clarify and sharpen Hume’s vague phrase ‘more closely related’ into a more substantial account, Amelie
Rorty contrastingly takes its open-endedness to be vital for a proper account of pride.\textsuperscript{25} “This explanation seems, at first sight, stunning for its vagueness,” she writes of the phrase, before countering:

But in fact it is just this vagueness that serves: Whatever it is that, as a given original fact, causes pride, turns out as a matter of fact to be what a person takes as significant and particularly close to her. The condition is operational and intentional: it reveals the intentional description under which the cause produced the effect. Hume is working backwards, analyzing the cause from the character of the consequence… The content of the idea [of self] is constituted by the causes of pride, her being the owner of a fine ancestral house [say]. The causal story of a person’s particular pride is the causal story of that person’s conception of herself. Joy that one is the sort of person who delights in light on a leaf, becomes pride—and typically changes its phenomenological quality as an impression of reflection—when that characterization becomes an identification of the self: ‘I, a person who delights in seeing light on a leaf.’\textsuperscript{26}

Rorty’s account, which I term the identification account of pride, is striking on several levels. First, on this account the content of one’s idea of the self depends upon the actual causes of one’s pride.\textsuperscript{27} This account of the self inverts an intuitive presupposition, which is that we can make sense of a person’s feeling pride in terms of the relation he takes to obtain between two independent entities, himself and the cause of his pride. That is, I have staged the present discussion in terms of some intelligible relation that one supposes to hold between (one’s fixed idea of) oneself and some object (just as in the case of fear, one supposes that the relation of “x threatens y” obtains between something and oneself). But if Rorty is correct, then pride cannot be so understood. For one cannot fully specify the content of one relatum, the self, without referring to pride and the objects that cause one’s

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 260-261.
\textsuperscript{27} In Hume’s view, pride alone does not constitute the self; humility will too, as will all other self-regarding emotions (those emotions whose object is the self). There will be, for instance, “I, a person who is ashamed of his ancestors.” Nothing important hangs upon this detail, and surely Rorty would agree.
pride. Thus, if the identification account is correct then a better focus of the present discussion would be the idea of selfhood, and not some relation that is supposed to hold between the self and some independent object. Rather, one’s idea of self includes one’s idea of one’s relations to the objects of one’s pride.28

This leads to two further, and connected, points on which the identification account of pride is striking. First, according to the identification account, to feel pride is to see one’s idea of self as including an idea of a relation to some object. There is a psychological and historical sense in which this relation, as Rorty is careful to point out, can only be a causal relation. We can inquire how and why some object caused me to feel pride but it makes no sense to ask whether the relation is warranted or even, as we would ask our Sarkozy-infatuated neighbor, whether the emotion is in the first place pride. Rorty argues that this apparent limitation actually enables a certain form of criticism:

It is … precisely because this ‘limitation of the system’ is operational and intentional that there is room for a critique of a person’s conception of herself: it is a brute fact that a person might take pride in her pack of hounds or her long fingernails. No rational argument can by itself show that what she feels is not pride. But there is room for an argument that a person whose pride is caused by her hounds rather than by the subtle precision of her sense of justice will forgo many of the goods associated with sociability. The critique is … based on custom and experience.29

Given that the idea of self is not independent from the causes of pride, there is no logical room for making sense of (except in a brute causal sense) why one takes something to be “significant and particularly close.” For, having a self on this account consists in taking

28 Rorty replies to an objection of this sort by noting that we have two ideas of the self: an idea of a metaphysical self that, according to Hume in Book 1 of the Treatise, is constituted by its impressions, and an idea of a practical self or agent. Pride produces the second idea of the self. Nonetheless, this view of the self does undermine the intuitive presupposition that the idea of self is conceptually independent of one’s pride.

29 Ibid., 261.
some things and not others to be significant and close. So, there is no room to ask why this self feels proud of that except in the context of a causal or historical inquiry into why the self is this way. This self just consists in, inter alia, feeling proud of that. Rorty concludes that there is room only for discussion about whether feeling proud of some particular thing is a good thing—i.e., whether external propriety conditions are met—and not for discussion about whether it is intelligibly attributable or warranted. This conclusion underscores the point that Rorty’s account challenges the very presuppositions of the present discussion of the pride relation. If Rorty is correct, then we should stop arguing about what counts as pride and start discussing what external considerations justify some tokens of pride more than others.

According to Rorty’s Humean view, pride is a simple pleasure that is not only easily identifiable, but also infallibly identifiable. This feature of the account is true to Hume’s discussion of pride, which begins as follows:

The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, ‘tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them: But as these words, pride and humility, are of general use, and the impressions they represent the most common of any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them, without any danger of mistake.30

Hume preceeds to describe pride’s functional role, all the while taking for granted that his discussion is anchored in the fact that pride itself is a simple feeling that we can identify “without any danger of mistake.” Thus Rorty might be relying on this, Hume’s sole and ineffable attribution condition for pride, for her confidence in the claim that “no rational argument can by itself show that what she feels is not pride.”

The second striking feature of the identification account is the claim that all pride has the self as its object. It might at first blush seem that Rorty claims the reverse, that one can take pride in anything at all, since she insists that anything can cause pride. But this causal claim is importantly different. If anything can cause pride then, according to the identification account, the idea of self has little, or no, limit to its content. But were Rorty to claim that pride can take any object (as opposed to any cause), then she would lose the result that pride produces the idea of self. Pride constitutes the idea of self by having the self as its object. The object of each instance of pride must be the self who experiences the pride, for example, “I, a person who delights in seeing light on a leaf.”

This is a powerful and intricate account of pride that challenges some assumptions of my discussion. What should we make of it?

That Rorty’s account does not allow for the possibility of unintelligible pride claims is perplexing. When your neighbor bizarrely claims that she is proud of Sarkozy’s legislative victories, all “there is room for” is an argument that her pride is morally or prudentially inappropriate insofar as she forgoes certain goods (perhaps her bizarre claims will alienate her acquaintances). Rorty insists that “no rational argument can by itself show that what she feels is not pride,” and would understand the neighbor to have announced himself thus: “I, a person who delights in seeing Sarkozy succeed.” This announcement is, as it were, the end of the line of inquiry, for such pride is a brute fact about my neighbor. The only question for us is whether to approve or disapprove of this brute fact. However, it is hard to make any sense at all of your neighbor’s feelings towards Sarkozy—and the remedy doesn’t seem to lie in criticizing her for missing out on, say, the goods of sociability. For, such criticism will not enable any further understanding of why she takes
herself to be particularly close to Sarkozy. Reasons must be in principle available for this assessment, just as they are available for the mental state of belief. Pride, no less than belief, cannot coherently be understood as a brute fact—because they are both essentially mental states located in ‘the space of reasons.’ But this is exactly what Rorty denies.

According to the identification account, pride is a mental state with no cognitive content—that is, pride is a brute feeling (though it is causally related to ideas). If we think, as I suggest we do, that pride itself is more than an ineffable impression then we should reject Rorty’s invitation to dismiss questions about its attribution conditions—and along with them, questions about its warrant conditions.

But this reaction might be too fast. Rorty offers an argument for the conclusion that pride is a brute fact—and, consequentially, that pride has no warrant conditions. Rorty argues that it is precisely the fact that pride is a brute fact that enables the possibility of criticism of the self via criticism of pride.31 The argument for this conclusion is the following:

(1) Criticism of the self via criticism of pride is possible.

(2) If criticism of the self via criticism of pride is possible, then the experience of pride is a brute fact;

(3) Therefore, the experience of pride is a brute fact.

However, premise (2) is false, since constraints of rational intelligibility and warrant would not (at all) render criticism of the self via criticism of pride impossible—in fact, just the opposite is true. Such constraints would allow for an additional sort of criticism in terms of the warrant conditions (e.g., “you shouldn’t feel pride because you’re not actually

31 Recall: “It is … precisely because this “limitation of the system” is operational and intentional that there is room for a critique of a person’s conception of herself.” I make the assumption that it is Rorty’s view that a person’s conception of herself is identical to her self.
closely related to it”). Take fear as an example. With the attribution condition that one is afraid of what one takes to be threatening, we have a built-in target of possible criticism: e.g., “you shouldn’t be afraid of that object because it is not, contrary to your belief, threatening.” If you do fear unthreatening objects then you may be a coward.

Warrant conditions enable criticism insofar as feeling pride about some object embodies or reflects a judgment one holds about that object. One might defend (2) by arguing that (i) criticism of the self via pride is possible only if the causes of pride constitute the idea of self, and that (ii) the causes of pride constitute the idea of self only if pride is a brute fact. However, the example of fear shows that (i) is false. Criticism of a coward via criticism of his fear does not require that the causes of his fear constitute his idea of self. Such criticism requires positing that the coward’s fear is unwarranted, not that the coward’s idea of self is constituted by the brute fact of his fear.

We can press further here, since it is difficult to see how pride could have any moral propriety conditions whatsoever—as Rorty rightly thinks they do—if pride were nothing but a brute fact. For brute facts about me, like the quality of my vision or the size of my feet, are not evaluable in moral terms. We can evaluate brute facts as good or bad, better or worse; but not as morally offensive, praiseworthy, or reprehensible.

Finally, I wish to note that Rorty’s favored example is itself very strange, and not unlike my Sarkozy example. The following are questions one might have (and which, according to Rorty, can only be rhetorical): how should we understand the claim to feel proud of delighting in seeing light on a leaf? Is it intelligible to take pride in being the sort of person who delights in seeing light on a leaf? It seems to me that this example is barely

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32 Thanks to Angela Smith for these examples, and for bringing this crucial point to my attention.
intelligible—especially if we are not to think of the agent as having a conception of herself as, say, an outdoorsperson that is logically prior to her experiencing pride. I pick on it only because it seems characteristic of the identification account, according to which there are no attribution conditions for pride, to be unconcerned with matters of intelligibility. If we think that there is room for puzzlement in such cases then the identification account is incorrect.

The identification account does, however, make plain the centrality of one’s self-worth to feeling pride. Feeling proud of something does seem to involve taking that thing to reflect well upon one’s self. That is to say, taking pride in something involves attributing that thing to oneself for purposes of evaluation of the self. The account leaves open the basis upon which this attribution is made, i.e., the attribution conditions. And so I turn to other accounts with the hope of filling this gap.

2.4 The Possession Account

The views under consideration in this section draw on the forceful idea that being proud of something requires seeing it as, in some sense, one’s own. And to be sure, one appropriate reaction to the neighbor’s incomprehensible pride in Sarkozy would be to think that Sarkozy is not his president, that France is not his country, or that French politics really is none of his business. We might develop this idea in any of at least three ways.

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2.4.1 Anthony Kenny

First, some philosophers have developed the idea into a formally articulated schema that is supposed to make sense of the pride relation by posing formal (or grammatical) constraints upon the agent’s beliefs, without specifying any further necessary content to these beliefs. Anthony Kenny suggests the following grammatical account of Hume’s pride relation:

Still, it is clear that Hume is pointing out that in pride whatever one is proud of makes one feel pleased with oneself; and perhaps we could put his point by saying that whatever expression completes the sense of the verb “... is proud of...” must begin with “his own...,” even if what a man is proud of is only his brother-in-law’s acquaintance with the second cousin of a Duke.34

I term this proposal a “grammatical” account because it explicitly stays on the linguistic level—note the phrase, “whatever expression completes the sense of the verb...” We can reconstruct Kenny’s line of thought as follows. Whatever one is proud of makes one feel pleased with oneself; if that is so, then the object of one’s pride must be connected with the self in a manner strong enough to reflect merit upon the self; emotions are linguistically structured mental states; the only linguistic connection strong enough to sustain such reflection is the expression “his own...”; thus the object of a person’s pride must be “his own...” Since one can certainly say ‘He is proud of Joshua’ without being guilty of any grammatical lapse, we should note that the ordinary usage of the phrase ‘is proud of’ does not always precede the words, “his own...” (moreover, women may also feel pride). In light of this diversity of ordinary usage, Kenny’s view must be that the person feeling pride must believe that there’s some accurate description of the object of pride that accords with the schema “his (or her) own...”—for example, suppose he

believes that Joshua is *his own* son. In terms of the sense of the object of pride, we may say that its definite description must characterize the object as “his (or her) own…”

One weakness of this suggestion lies with the resultant weakness of the pride relation. Kenny’s account entails that the pride relation is weak in the sense that everyone can stand in that relation to anything at any time. Any object can be described as “my own …,” as Kenny’s example suggests. Every person is my own fellow man; every trinket is my own fellow object. But the neighbor’s explanation that Sarkozy is his own fellow man is unlikely to render his pride intelligible to us, even if this supposed explanation is (trivially) a necessary condition of our intelligibility attributing pride to him. Moreover, we would still doubt that his pride is warranted. Such dissatisfaction suggests that a formal grammatical constraint will inevitably fail to make sense of the *warrant* pride relation as well as the *attribution* pride relation, since the constraint can be trivially satisfied. Although it is likely that, in principle, *anything* can be the object of one’s pride—it is false that *everything* satisfies the condition of being closely related to oneself.

So, a successful account of the pride relation will accommodate the fact that one is not closely related to *every* object and that, as we also saw in the discussion of Rorty’s identification account, there is room for meaningful denials of the attribution condition. Related to this desideratum, a successful account of the pride relation must provide some substance in the way of warrant conditions. In short, an account of the pride relation must provide guidance about how to determine (1) when a person experiences pride, (2)

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35 Donald Davidson also advances a possession account, which sounds very much like Kenny’s: “It is simpler to drop Hume’s distinction [between the subject of pride and the quality of the subject of which one is proud], and insist that the belief always have the form "I . . . " where the dots supply a predicate that may or may not contain a reference to some further object” (746).

36 Thanks to Rachel Fredericks for discussion on this.
when a person fails to experience pride, (3) when an instance of pride is warranted, and (4) when an instance of pride is unwarranted.\textsuperscript{37}

Why does grammatical possession fail to supply sufficient pride-relation attribution conditions? Even when the constraint is non-trivially satisfied, it may fail to match up with what we might expect of the pride relation. I may believe that in one respect the object of my emotion is my own, yet also believe that we are not closely related in the sense requisite to pride. Surely when \textit{my own} rival wins the glory that we both sought I may intelligibly view his accomplishment with something less than pride—perhaps with jealousy. But as jealousy might evince the presence of the closeness relation we are hunting for, and merely lack pride’s favorable evaluation, imagine a case that would utterly lack any emotional tug. Imagine the CEO of a large company, who discovers that one of her own employees recently won a prestigious grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. This boss may well feel joy for her own employee without feeling any hint of pride. She will explain that she had (and has) \textit{nothing to do with} the grant. The plausibility of such a reaction suggests that grammatical structure alone, at least at the superficial level, seems unlikely to shed much light on the pride relation. Like the identification account, the grammatical account of the pride relation seems to lack the content we want.

These considerations strongly suggest that no formal (grammatical) constraints will be sufficient to capture pride’s closeness relation. Only to the extent that it provides trivial constraints of the sort discussed above will it provide necessary conditions for the pride relation.

\textsuperscript{37} Thanks for Angie Smith for pressing me to make these assumptions explicit.
2.4.2 Annette Baier

Possession at the grammatical level points to the possibility of a weightier account in terms of material possession. Annette Baier argues that in Hume’s view pride is essentially a passion directed at one’s possessions, and cashes out this claim with Hume’s account of the possession of external goods as having the power to use an object as one likes. In short, the basis of attributing a possession to myself is my belief that I have the power to use the object as I like. Here is Baier’s argument in full:

Pride, like love, Hume says, has, as its “causes,” the fine possessions of its “object.” We are proud of what is ours, love another for what is hers. And what is possession? To possess something, Hume tells us in Book Three, is to be so situated with respect to it, as to have it in our power to use…move, alter, or destroy it, according to our present pleasure or advantage (T506). Pride is essentially in possession, and possession is power. I think that, when we take Book Three’s treatment of pride and of possession into account, we can see why Hume in Book Two had cited us a great variety of things in which we take pride, but had singled out virtue, riches, and power as peculiarly apt causes of pride. Pride must be taken in power over something, the thing possessed, and pride in generalized forms of power, such as power over others, or in riches, is pride in its paradigm form. In discussing virtuous pride, Hume says that we must recognize properly moralized pride as a virtue, since tis requisite on all occasions to know our own force, and pride makes us sensible of our own merit, and gives us a confidence and assurance in all our projects and enterprises (T597). At least by the time pride is moralized, it is a sense of power, and if we take seriously Hume’s definition of possession, all along it was, in all its forms, pride in what in fact is power, of less or more generalized sorts. The person proud of the climate of the country where he takes his vacations (T307) is a degenerate case, since his “possession” is no more than the ability to take such vacations, no power over climate or country.

What are we to make of the claim that “pride must be taken in power over something”?

Let’s take care to understand the sense of “must” at play here. The sentence could be

38 Op. cit., “Hume on Resentment,” 140 ff; also her “Master Passions”: “In his argument to show the double intentionality of pride, that it has a “cause” (a fine possession) as well as an “object” (oneself), Hume says that, had it depended only on its object, “pride wou”d be perpetual” (T. 288). Only pride’s relativization to possessions, which both vary in quality and are of inconstant presence, saves us for [sic] total absorption in it, “since the object is always the same, and there is no disposition of the body peculiar to pride, as there is to thirst and hunger” (ibid.).…Hume believes that love easily leads to pride, when the loved person in some way belongs to one” (405; italics mine).

39 Baier, “Hume on Resentment,” 140.
read to mean that whenever one possesses something, that is, whenever one has power over something, one must perforce take pride in it. Because that thesis seems too strong—one can, and sometimes should, be indifferent towards or even ashamed of one’s possessions—Baier should be understood instead as concluding that a necessary condition of feeling pride in something is the belief that one has power over it.  

Pride must, because it can only, be taken in something over which one thinks one has power.

Hume remarks that “the relation, which is esteem’d the closest, and which of all others produces most commonly the passion of pride, is that of property” (T 309), and in emphasizing this aspect of Hume’s account Baier taps into a strong current of our intuitions about pride. We do think that pride in ownership is a paradigm of pride. Someone’s pride in the beauty of her new car seems to be satisfyingly explained by reference to her assessments that the car is beautiful and that it belongs to her; without either of these assessments her pride would be far more difficult to explain. Moreover, this possession account tidily explains why this car lover would not be proud of her neighbor’s beautiful new car. Likewise with Baier’s example of riches, since the wealthy person will typically believe that his wealth is something of value, and that his wealth is a possession of his, subject to his determination for its uses. Hume writes, “The very essence of riches consist in the power of procuring the pleasures and conveniences of life.”

Baier observes that Hume “had singled out virtue” along with riches and power as paradigm sources of pride. How might we comprehend pride in one’s virtue in terms of power? Baier’s account would again take the lead from Hume, as when he notes that “we

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40 Hume’s remark, that “tis requisite on all occasions to know our own force,” leaves open how we are to feel about our own force. Humility and shame also presuppose having such knowledge. So, this epistemic injunction does not entail that pride is the requisite emotional stance one should take towards one’s possessions.

41 Hume (1978), 315.
are pleased when we acquire an ability of procuring pleasure, and are displeased when another acquires a power of giving pain” (T312). If Baier adopts Hume’s account of virtue, that the virtues are dispositions useful and agreeable to ourselves and others, then pride in virtue is pride in one’s power of usefulness and agreeability. So, it seems that we can explain many paradigmatic instances of pride in terms of the assessment that the object of pride grants us some power.42

There is the following ambiguity in the power account of pride. We might take the pride relation to be either power over the object of pride, or the assessment that the object of pride gives one some amount of power over something or other. With pride in one’s beautiful car, it seems that the relevant thought is the former—that I have power over it—though I might have both thoughts (I have power over it and it makes me more powerful). Likewise with pride in one’s virtue, the thought would be that I have a power of procuring pleasure for myself and others. Finally, in her remarks about virtuous pride, Baier points out that pride allows us to “know our own force”—presumably because she thinks we are proud of things we have power over.

But many kinds of pride primarily take the other construal of power, according to which we believe that the object of pride renders us powerful. One’s pride in one’s illustrious family can very plausibly be understood to include the belief that one’s family

42 However, there are strong reasons for rejection this reading of Hume, not just because “power” appears in only five of the 50 pages about pride (311-315), but because this small selection ends by explaining the relevance of power to pride in other, more general, terms: “But there is a peculiar advantage in power, by the contrast, which is, in a manner, presented to us, betwixt ourselves and the person we command. The comparison is obvious and natural: The imagination finds it in the very subject: The passage of the thought to its conception is smooth and easy” (316). That is, the very subject of the sentence, “I command…” enables the smooth and easy transition to the idea of self. So power is both pleasant and directs our thoughts to ourselves—power gets us halfway to pride. But Hume need not, and does not, limit his account of pride by requiring the presence of power. Having power is but one means of transitioning from one’s thoughts about objects to thoughts about oneself. There are other common relations of causality, such as ties of family and relations of contiguity in space and time, that Hume has the resources to bring to bear, and that do not reduce to power relations.
gives one strength; so too can one’s pride in America be understood. It would be exceedingly odd to construe these types of pride along the lines of the subject’s belief that his family or his country is under his power. Baier focuses on this understanding of power, of the object of pride being under my power; but the other construal has wider reach and more plausibility.

Under either construal, Baier brings to light the important relation between pride and power. Often we feel pride in possessions (objects over which we may exercise power), and often our virtuous pride enables us to achieve our goals in life. But notwithstanding these facts, sometimes we feel pride in what we don’t believe we have power over. Indeed, it would be surprising and implausible to hold that pride in my grandfather’s accomplishments must be understood under the paradigm of possession—as if I (metaphorically?) possess my grandfather or his accomplishments, or if his accomplishments must make me more powerful. This example may be a “degenerate” case of pride, like Baier’s example of pride in the climate of the country where one takes vacations. But it is hard to see why we should call it so. If pride in possessions is a paradigm of pride, it’s not exhaustive.

Another thing we learn from Baier’s account is that when we do take pride in our possessions, we need not take the fact of our possession to depend upon our agency. Baier’s account rightly allows for pride in an inherited possession that one has not worked for at all. What makes me closely related to such an object of pride, on her account, is the fact of my property rights over it. Although the conception of property leads, on her view, to one’s hypothetical agency (one’s power to use it as one might please)—the hypothetical

43 Even more surprising is the consequence that pride in my grandfather be thought of in terms of the power to use him as I please (!). Gabriele Taylor makes this point well, op. cit., 32.
nature of the agency requirement should not be lost from view. That is, I can be proud of something without it reflecting the *actual* exercise of my agency. This result strikes me as correct, and as deserving of accommodation in our final account.

2.4.3 Gabriele Taylor

Gabriele Taylor also frames her discussion of pride in the style of Hume, that is, with a focus upon the pride relation. But she is the first of the writers under consideration to explicitly depart from Hume’s account. To be closely related to something, on Gabriele Taylor’s view, is to see its *belonging* to oneself as an accomplishment; a person sees something as an accomplishment, Taylor says, when “she values it in that she sees it as being beyond her norm of expectations in the sense of it being better than for some reason or another she thinks she is, or others are, entitled to expect.”\(^{44}\) As Taylor immediately notes, this account of the close connection renders it constitutive of pride, and not (as for Hume and the preceding authors it was) merely one necessary condition among others. Below, I separate out the condition that parallels Hume’s pride relation condition: that one believes that the object belongs to oneself.\(^{45}\)

According to Taylor, the pride relation is founded upon the relation of belonging that is believed to hold between the self and the object of pride. The relation of belonging at play is in two respects more expansive than Baier’s relation of material possession. First, Taylor stresses that instances of the relation may have more than two places, e.g., that *you* and *I* belong to the same group. So my pride in my grandfather may be expressed as my
seeing the fact *that he and I belong to the same family* as an achievement. Accordingly, belonging is what we might call a multi-directional relation: the object of pride might belong to me; I might belong to the object of my pride (as with group pride); or I might belong to the same group as the object of my pride.

In addition to expanding our conception of the possession relation to include two or more relata, Taylor expands our conception of the sorts of object this relation can hold between. Taylor gives the following set of illustrations:

...we may treat the case of ‘being responsible for’ as falling under the relation of belonging: where an agent is proud of something he has brought about, that which he has brought about would then be regarded as an event which ‘belongs’ to the agent in the sense that he is at least partially responsible for its existence. We may treat similarly the case where a person is proud not of something he has or has done, but is proud of standing in a certain relationship to a thing or person. He is proud not of his beautiful house, but is proud of owning a house (any old house). ‘Owning a house’ is now what he sees as desirable and as ‘belonging’ to him. It may belong to him in the sense that it is a state he is responsible for having brought about. But ownership of that house may have fallen into his lap without any effort on his part. Then the ownership is a belonging of his in much the same way as his personal characteristic, his handsome face or his sense of humour, may be said to be belongings of his.\(^{46}\)

Taylor’s examples of pride are all plausible: one can be proud of something one has done, or of standing in a certain relation to something (like the relation of ownership to a house). Taylor rightly wants to ensure that the closeness relation is able to capture not only pride in something one has or has done—but also pride in “standing in a certain relationship to a thing or person.” So not only might there be such a thing as a feeling of pride in one’s house, but additionally there might be such a thing as feeling proud of the fact that one stands in the relation of ownership to a house. In that event ‘one’s owning a house,’ and not the house itself, is what the person would see as belonging to herself. This

\(^{46}\) *Op. cit.*, 32
distinction is delicate, but valuable. A person might easily be proud of *having* a garden; more difficult to understand is a person who is proud of the garden itself. I might be proud of owning a nice piece of jewelry, but not of the jewelry *itself*.\(^{47}\)

The question before us is whether the relation of belonging best makes sense of these examples. When Taylor extends the sense of belonging, we are left with what appears to be no more than the notion of having some quality or attribute. My pride in owning a house entails, on Taylor’s view, that I believe the attribute “owning a house” belongs to me. Taylor makes it clear that the sense of belonging need not be fleshed out with the owner’s being responsible for having brought his ownership about. He might have merely inherited the house. To see that ‘belonging’ has come down to merely having some quality or attribute, consider a converse example. Suppose I am proud of the fact that I *don’t* own a house (being a communist). Here Taylor could say that the quality, ‘not owning a house,’ belongs to me. It is at this point that one might worry that ‘belonging’ excludes little if anything. The concept of belonging is stretched beyond the breaking point if it is nothing more than any fact about oneself, even the fact that one doesn’t own a house.

Being “closely related” to something has been diluted to having some (metaphysical) property. The metaphysical emptiness of Taylor’s account now seems to parallel the grammatical emptiness of Kenny’s proposal. For, a ‘thin’ predicate like ‘living in the same world as x’ can confer ‘closely related’ status. Again, while it is true that one can feel proud of anything, we want to ensure that the pride relation has some content to it so that we might deny that someone satisfies the attribution condition. Recall the Sarkozy-

\(^{47}\) Thanks to Rachel Fredericks for this example.
phile—it is dissatisfying for the neighbor to note that, say, “living 10,000 miles from Sarkozy” belongs to her (even if she takes the fact that this belongs to her as an achievement). But what resources has Taylor offered to explain this sense of dissatisfaction?

At one point, Taylor does confront the insufficiency of ‘belonging’ to flesh out the pride relation: “It is of course a fact about a person that he belongs to this family, that country or profession, and it may be a fact to which he pays little or no attention. But if he is proud of his grandfather, his local football team, or his predecessor then it must be a fact that weighs with him.” Taylor here adds some much needed substance (“weighs with him”) to the belonging relation. Perhaps what weighs with one, what one sees as important, picks out the salient sense of belonging. This undeveloped idea is promising, and I consider it in greater detail in the following chapter. My criticism here is merely that the weighing metaphor does all the work that the belonging metaphor was supposed to do. “Belonging” is a mere distraction.49

2.5 Agency Accounts

In this section, I consider the promising idea that objects of pride are specially connected to one’s agency. This idea can be developed into either an account of some of pride’s attribution conditions, an account of some of pride’s warrant conditions, or an account of some of pride’s external propriety conditions. In §2.5.1, I consider agency-based

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49 One might object that the weighing metaphor does not take the place of the belonging relation because the former is an evaluative condition that has more to do with valuing the object of pride than with being closely related to it. This is not so, as we can see by considering that failures and other non-achievements can also weigh with one in the forms of regret and grief. For example, we hope that a war criminal’s actions come to weigh with him.
attributed accounts, followed in §2.5.2 by warrant accounts based on the idea of agency.
In §2.5.3, and again in §3.4, I turn to agency-based external propriety accounts.

2.5.1 Agency Accounts of Attribution: Robert Solomon and Kristjan Kristjansson

Robert Solomon argues that pride is directly linked with our activity and, in particular, with our taking credit for successful activity. He writes, in 1976’s *The Passions*,

> The key to the emotion of pride is that it is about our achievements in the world. “False pride” grossly overestimates those achievements, or perhaps even takes credit for something that is not our doing at all. (A person who has taken steps to make himself beautiful or healthy may be proud of his appearance or his health. A person who simply is beautiful or healthy would only be grateful—or perhaps vain—the passive emotional partners of pride. Our frequent confusion of pride and vanity—our calling ourselves proud when in fact we are only vain—is clearly more than verbal slippage).\(^{50}\)

Solomon begins with the idea of achievement, reminiscent of Gabriele Taylor’s “accomplishment,” which could leave open the possibility (left open by Taylor) that one might feel a sense of achievement about non-actions.\(^{51}\) However, he forecloses this possibility by subsequently invoking the criteria “our doing” and “taken steps.” So, the pride relation is supposed to involve at least the causal relation of bringing about some state of affairs in virtue of something one did or took steps to do. Later, Solomon adds that a defining feature of pride is that “One takes responsibility (in praise) for his own works.”\(^{52}\) The addition of the concept of responsibility and praise indicates that a mere causal relation is not sufficient since, for example, one need not be responsible for what

\(^{50}\) Solomon, *The Passions*, 345.

\(^{51}\) The meaning of the modifying phrase, “in the world,” is obscure. It might relate to what Solomon later defines the “scope/focus” of pride as: “Usually some specific accomplishment or developed skill, possibly ranging to the whole person but always stopping short of complete subjectivity.” *Ibid.*, 346.

\(^{52}\) *Ibid.*, 346.
one unintentionally causes. Solomon’s account of the pride relation is the relation of moral responsibility for the object of one’s pride. I call this the agency account.

Solomon’s distinction between false pride and “passive emotional partners of pride,” like gratitude and vanity, indicates that agency is to count as an attribution condition as well as a warrant condition. His parenthetical remarks about “verbal slippage” and his placement of “false pride” within scare quotes implies that we are mistaken in calling ourselves proud of our simply being healthy. That is, we cannot intelligibly attribute pride to a passive subject (the passive analog to pride is vanity or gratitude). Solomon captures the intuition, ignored or rejected by all other writers considered above, that feeling pride requires that one takes oneself to be morally responsible for the object of pride and that feeling warranted pride requires being morally responsible. In making agency an attribution condition as well as a condition of pride’s warrant, Solomon debars similar but passive emotional states from their status as forms of pride (however unwarranted). Like my ubiquitous Sarkozy-infatuated neighbor, we who call ourselves proud of our noble lineage (say) are not just verbally, but conceptually and/or morally confused.

Kristjan Kristjansson has also defended the claim that pride is not intelligible absent the subject’s belief that he is to some extent morally responsible for the object of his pride. He offers the following example to make his case:

The fan who has cheered the team on to victory, bought tickets to its matches and so forth, can of course unproblematically feel proud of the team’s success, and prideful with respect to the recognition it gets. But what about the only person on a desert island who suddenly decides to become a fan of the San Francisco Forty-Niners football team, without ever having shown an interest in the team before,

53 Solomon’s final distinction between feeling pride and feeling vain strikes me as slipping between talk of evanescent passions and of character traits. For, to establish that a person is vain we need to know how that person’s self-esteem is founded systematically upon others’ positive attitudes towards her. A person who feels pride about her health may or may not be vain. For an illuminating discussion of vanity see Gabriele Taylor, *Deadly Vices* (2004).
and subsequently, upon hearing via transistor radio about the team’s victories, claims to feel proud? What grounds do we have for saying that this person is experiencing the emotion of pride as distinct from simply that of joy? None, it seems to me—the person is surely better described as joyful than proud—for the kind of group membership required for taking pride in the group’s successes cannot be claimed simply on a whim. It must require some minimal effort, some minimal participation—that is, some responsibility, however small and partial.54

Kristjansson argues that without the effort required for moral responsibility there are no grounds for attributing pride rather than joy to a person.55 Solomon’s and Kristjansson’s agency accounts imply that we are often mistaken not only in thinking ourselves worthy of pride but also in attributing to ourselves the emotion of pride. The agency account entails that apparent examples of pride taken in objects that one knows one is not responsible for are unintelligible as instances of pride, and that those who take themselves to be experiencing such pride are radically confused.

I will now argue that implementing the requisite error theory for this account is less plausible than rejecting the agency-based account of attribution conditions altogether. Since all agency-based attribution accounts must make recourse to such a theory, an argument against such an error theory constitutes an argument against agency accounts of pride’s attribution conditions. I reserve until the next subsection my discussion of the very different matter of agency accounts of pride’s warrant conditions that are coupled with non-agential accounts of pride’s attribution conditions.56

55 Incidentally, we can agree that the desert island fan, as described, does not feel pride without our having to accept Kristjansson’s conclusion. For, as described, the fan lacks any reason for or interest in cheering on “his” team (he “suddenly decides to become a fan…simply on a whim”), and he certainly does not see the Forty-Niners’ successes as bound up with his identity or with any of his concerns. We can agree, that is, that identification with a group cannot be decided upon, let alone suddenly and on a whim, without having to accept that group identification requires agency. For, in between arbitrary identification and agency lies the possibility of sympathy and other motives for concern.
56 To preview, one option is to couple an attribution condition of (1) taking the object of pride as evidence that one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals with a warrant condition that (2) the relevant ideal must be worthy, and to argue that (3) one condition of an ideal’s worthiness is that it requires the
According to agency accounts of attribution, taking pride in something involves self-attributions of agency. It follows that proponents of those accounts are committed to one of the following two problematic implications. First, one could claim that taking pride in something that does not in fact implicate one’s agency involves the mistaken belief that one’s agency is implicated. Taking this horn of the dilemma requires making very uncharitable belief attributions. For example, it would be uncharitable to attribute to one who is proud to be an American the belief that one’s agency is implicated in one’s being an American (at least among natural born citizens). It is very unlikely that all proud Americans take themselves to be responsible for their being Americans.\textsuperscript{57} Likewise, taking pride in one’s rugged good looks does not seem to involve taking oneself to be responsible for one’s natural physical qualities.

The alternative for the agency theorist is to refrain from such belief attribution at the cost of attributing to those who take themselves to have non-agency-implicating pride widespread linguistic confusion about pride. To take this horn of the dilemma is to regard people who claim to feel agency-free pride as failing to understand the meaning and proper extension of the concept of pride. In the passage excerpted above, Kristjansson implies exactly this consequence, that such people mistakenly describe joy as pride. Such a radical conclusion should be avoided if possible, unless there are strong grounds for accepting the agency view.

\textsuperscript{\textsf{57}} Compare this with the following quip, sometimes attributed to G. B. Shaw: “patriotism is the conviction that your country is superior to all others because you were born in it.”
There is no third alternative for the agency-based theorist. When a subject sincerely claims to have an attitude, there are three possibilities: that the attitude is properly focused, that the attitude is improperly focused, or that the subject is mistaken in his claim to have that attitude. Since the agency theorist denies that agency-free pride is ever properly focused, and since I have just argued that the other two possibilities are unpalatable, I conclude that the agency-based account of pride’s attribution conditions should be rejected.

2.5.2 The Agency Account of Warrant: Norvin Richards

Norvin Richards defends an agency-based warrant condition and a credit-based attribution condition for pride. Experiencing pride about something requires taking that thing to be to one’s credit; experiencing warranted pride requires that the object of one’s pride actually redound to one’s credit. Agency enters the picture by way of an independent argument showing that only things for which one is at least partially responsible redound to one’s credit. Richards begins:

[T]o be proud of something is not the same as simply taking pleasure in it. You might take pleasure in the lovely view from a secluded hillside, for example, taking every opportunity to visit and enjoy it, without being at all proud of the view. If you had managed to complete a marathon, on the other hand, you might be not merely pleased by this but also proud of it. The difference lies in your taking completing the marathon to speak well of you, in some way, and not thinking of the view from the hillside in those terms. You regard the view only as a pleasure, while you take completing the marathon to be something to your credit.58

Richards rightly notes that one might take pride in things that one is not responsible for:

“Certainly, people do not, in fact, restrict their pride in that way. They are often proud of

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things that are not their doing, and that they do not even presume to be their doing.”

Such pride merely indicates that the subject does not think that the relevant sort of credit requires the exercise of agency. For example, taking pride in the successes of your grandparents would involve, on Richard’s view, accepting two claims: (1) the successes of your grandparents is to your credit and, implicitly, (2) credit does not require the exercise of one’s agency.

Richards’s interpretation of non-agency pride is plausible insofar as it does not necessarily involve the attribution of implausible mental states to the subject experiencing pride. People who experience such pride plausibly do accept claims (1) and (2), at least implicitly. As Richards does not provide a substantive account of creditworthiness, this lacuna invites further investigation. For instance, is the relevant notion of credit the notion of moral praiseworthiness? Or, is the credit involved in claim (1) somehow broader?

Developing a general theory of credit is a large task that is not Richards’s concern. However, he does argue for the “appropriately cautious hypothesis” (202) that earning credit requires activity:

One reason to think it is wrong to be proud of what is not at all your doing is that such things are very like the view from the hillside, in an important respect. In both cases, you are only a beneficiary of some good thing; you have nothing more to do with it than that. That is what makes it so odd to be proud of the view from the hillside, I think: you are only in the right place at the right time for this to fall into your lap. If so, the same should apply to being proud of anything that you received only by chance. If your talent or your ancestry or your wealth came your way only by the luck of the draw, it would be equally inappropriate to be proud of them.

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59 Ibid., 203.
60 Ibid., p. 204. I continue to assume that the sense in which Richard thinks it is “wrong” to be proud of what is not your doing is that such pride would be unwarranted, and not that there is some violation of a moral duty.
This argument suggests that the relevant sense of credit is very dissimilar from that implicated in notions of financial credit, epistemic credibility, mere distinction (such as from natural talents), and causal responsibility (“credit him with starting the avalanche with a sneeze”). Credit, on this view of pride, like guilt, requires moral responsibility. Indeed, in discussing another vivid example, Richards comes very close to claiming that non-agency pride is unintelligible:

…imagine someone who has won an enormous sum of money because his name was drawn at random from the telephone book… This delightful turn of events might please him greatly, of course, but suppose he were proud of it. Suppose he took his winning the money to be to his credit, in the way he might regard having acquired it through a carefully planned set of investments. This attitude would be so ludicrous that it is hard even to imagine. He would simply have no business being proud of his piece of good fortune, because he played no role in bringing it about.\(^{61}\)

Here, Richards finds it “hard even to imagine” a lottery winner being proud of having had her name selected from the phone book, and he is right—especially given that the winner regarded his winning the money “in the way he might regard having acquired it through a carefully planned set of investments.” The question is whether that is the only way to understand personal credit. Why do many people take pride in things like their ancestry, but not in things like the view from the hillside?

Elsewhere, Richards dismisses ancestral pride by implying that the subjects do not give the matter even “a moment’s thought.”\(^{62}\) But it seems likely that if we did remind members of the Daughters of the American Revolution that they played no role in the Revolution and if they did assent to this fact, then they would not cease to feel pride. So,

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there evidently is some way to understand personal credit besides regarding it as akin to moral praiseworthiness.

To explain why the D.A.R. would not cease to feel pride, we need to challenge the relevance of Richards’s proposed dichotomy between one’s own doings and mere chance. Richards assumes that all non-agential qualities of a person should be regarded by the person herself as mere chance and that no agential qualities are the result of mere chance. Even though, as Richards has demonstrated, this claim has a certain attraction, it is nonetheless probably false. Much of what one does is (in a sense) the result of chance or luck, as is much of what one finds meaningful. Many non-agential qualities, for instance that I was raised male and that I have the ancestors that I do, seem to be necessary features of my identity as a person.

At this point we have traveled far enough from Amelie Rorty’s identification account—according to which the content of the idea of self is a product of whatever one happens (even by chance) to feel proud about—to appreciate that account’s merits. On Rorty’s view of the self, if one feels pride and thus identifies as a Daughter of the American Revolution then that is (in part) who one is. From the point of view of the proud D.A.R. herself, the significance of this fact will not be on par with the significance of being randomly chosen from a phonebook. Among the qualities of a person that are not her doing, it is plausible that some will be more significant than others. These more

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63 Compare with Rousseau: “Great men are not deceived about their superiority; they see it, feel it, and are no less modest because of it. The more they have, the more they know all that they lack. They are less vain about being raised above us than they are humbled by the sentiment of their poverty; and with the exclusive goods which they possess, they are too sensible to be vain about a gift they did not give themselves. The good man can be proud of his virtue because it is his. But of what is the intelligent man proud? What did Racine do not to be Pradon? What did Boileau do in order not to be Cotin?” (Emile, 245)

significant qualities will include matters of identity—that one is a member of this family, that nation, this religion, that ethnicity, this gender, that sexual orientation, and so on. Significance of this sort is not limited to volitional matters. Indeed, if matters of significance had to be products of a free will then it would be hard to see how anything could be significant. Richards begs the question against this Rortian view, since he assumes that all non-agential qualities are on par with winning the lottery, as far as one’s credit is concerned. This reductive claim, which I have suggested is implausible, surely requires argument. In §3.4, I defend a view similar to Richards’s credit account of warranted pride, but argue that the relevant sort of merit need not involve the exercise of one’s agency.

2.5.3 The Agency Account of Pride’s Moral Justification

If agency accounts are mistaken in their draconian revisions to common parlance and moral experience, then we will need to investigate whether such accounts are guilty of moralizing the psychology of pride. As I mentioned in §1.3, in connection with John Deigh’s remarks, an account of an emotion is moralized if it distorts an emotion’s contours in order to make it conform to conditions of moral propriety. It is, plausibly, often morally suspect for a person to feel proud on the basis of some non-agential feature. There is something off-puttingly aristocratic about the D.A.R. celebrating their noble ancestry, and something vain about taking pride in one’s physical appearance, and (potentially) something morally offensive about taking pride in one’s racial designation.

Notwithstanding my objections to agency-based accounts of the pride relation, I do think that agency is importantly involved in common thinking about pride. I suggest that

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65 For further development of this argument and defense of this view, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University, 2005).
the considerable intuitive force that conditions of agency have derives from our viewing them as possible conditions of moral propriety and not of attribution or warrant. This understanding of agency conditions makes sense of the possibility of feeling proud of something without taking it to be a result of one’s agency (attribution); it also makes sense of the possibility that one’s pride might accurately portray its object even when it is not the result of one’s agency. In §3.4, I consider this suggestion in further detail.

2.6 Conclusion

Each of the accounts of the pride relation discussed in this chapter has a significant degree of plausibility, but also significant flaws. In the next chapter, I argue that each account fixes on a single paradigmatic example of pride to the exclusion of other paradigmatic examples. I argue that these paradigmatic examples—identity-based pride, possession-based pride, and agency-based pride—have in common the fact that the person takes himself to be living in accordance with his personal ideals in virtue of the object of his or her pride. This minimalistic account of pride dispenses with the search for a single pride relation insofar as living in accordance with different personal ideals requires different relations to objects of pride.

“We are tempted to try to reduce this attributed relationship to some essence,” observes Robert Roberts of the pride relation. “Perhaps we can do no better than to enumerate the kinds of relationship in terms of which people can feel pride; the essential point is that, whatever these are, they are such that the subject sees whatever he is proud of as reflecting well on his own worth.”66 Roberts’s skepticism about the possibility of

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decoding the essence of the pride relation allows that, as I put it in the next chapter, pride always involves the subject’s estimation that he is living in accordance with his ideals.
3. Feeling Pride and Having Ideals

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I develop and justify the claim that experiencing the emotion of pride about something requires taking that intentional object to indicate that you are living in accordance with some personal ideal of yours.¹ This thesis best explains the findings of Chapter 2; in particular, it best explains why none of the plausible accounts of the pride relation succeed. The search for the pride relation—that is, for a general yet substantive analysis of the relation between the self and the object of her warranted pride—amounts to a search for a general analysis of the conditions under which an object can provide evidence that one is living in accordance with one’s ideals. There is no general, and substantive, set of conditions for living in accordance with one’s ideals. Each personal ideal provides the terms of its satisfaction—some personal ideals involve possession, some involve successful agency, some involve standing in yet other relations to the world. Or so I shall argue.²

In the next section, I present four paradigm cases of pride that any adequate account of the emotion must be able to explain. These paradigms are achievement pride, gift pride, ownership pride, and group pride. In §3.3, I demonstrate how an appeal to a person’s personal ideals helps to make sense of each of the four paradigm cases. I also

¹ As was the case in Chapter 2, I do not discuss the character trait of pride, the sense in which Darcy might be a proud person, instead confining myself to the emotion of pride. For another account of an emotion that relies on the concept of ideals, see Mason (2003): “In short, I suggest we best understand contempt as presenting its object as low in the sense of ranking low in worth as a person in virtue of falling short of some legitimate interpersonal ideal of the person, one the contemnor endorses if not one that she herself succeeds in meeting” (241). Mason also invokes the notion of living up to, or approximating, an ideal, for the accuracy of one’s contempt demands that “there exists a legitimate expectation or demand that the agent approximate the interpersonal ideal” (250).

² I save discussion about what these personal ideals are until Chapter 4.
sketch pride’s warrant conditions, those conditions under which one’s pride accurately represents its object. These conditions capture what qualities one attributes to an object when one is proud of it.

In §3.4, I consider under two aspects the claim that one should never take pride in something that one is not morally responsible for. First, I consider whether moral responsibility for one’s object of pride is a condition of pride’s warrant. Second, I consider whether such moral responsibility is a condition of pride’s external (moral or prudential) propriety. I conclude that moral responsibility for the object of one’s pride is not a condition of pride’s warrant or external propriety. In §3.5, I show how this result helps us to provide a suitable account of vicarious pride, and can be extended to instances of group pride.

In §3.6, I consider two objections to my account of pride’s warrant conditions. I begin by considering unendorsed pride—in particular, pride that does not appear to bear any relation to the subject’s personal ideals—as a potential counterexample to the ideal-based account that I offer. I show why unendorsed pride in fact poses no threat to the account. Next, I object to Gabriele Taylor’s argument that norms of expectation, and not personal ideals, lie at the heart of the emotion of pride.

In §3.7, I argue that the ideal-based account of pride incorporates and extends the insights of the leading extant accounts of pride in the literature without succumbing to their tendency to focus on one paradigm example at the expense of the others.

### 3.2 Paradigm Examples

Any satisfactory account of pride must recognize and make sense of the full variety of pride experiences. So, before analyzing pride, we must consider the paradigm examples
of the emotion of pride. In this section, I present examples of pride that we commonly take to be warranted, with the aim of getting the relevant phenomena on the table. Although there may be good reasons for denying that these types of examples of pride are ever warranted, there are not any good methodological reasons for assuming that from the outset. In §3.3, I provide a detailed explanation of the manner in which pride portrays its objects, after which I provide an account of the conditions under which these paradigmatic sorts of pride accurately present their object.

Philosophers and non-philosophers alike commonly cite achievement as the most obvious paradigm of pride. Robert Solomon has even defined pride as the emotion fitting achievement: “The key to the emotion of pride is that it is about our achievements in the world.” It seems to many to be appropriate, and even important, to take pride in the fact that one has achieved an important goal. Watching the Olympic Games provides plenty of evidence for the prevalence of the view that achievement can warrant pride. Moreover, it does not appear that these athletes take pride in their bodily or mental qualities alone—they take pride in their victories (which are events) as well as in their physiques and abilities (which are not). Since one of an athlete’s goals might be victory, a natural explanation is that the achievement, often characterized in terms of victory, and not merely mental and physical capabilities, seems to merit pride. Call this the achievement paradigm of pride.

On the other hand, pride is sometimes directed towards qualities having nothing at all to do with one’s agency, let alone one’s achievements. A person might take pride in her god-given physical strength and agility, for example; or in her booming voice or, like Cool Hand Luke, his ability to massively overeat. For better or for worse, such pride is

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3 Solomon (1976), 345. Solomon seems to have abandoned this view by the time he recorded his popular lectures for The Teaching Company, entitled, Passions: Philosophy and the Intelligence of Emotions. See Lecture Six, “Noble? Or Deadly Sin? Pride and Shame.”
common. It would cost in plausibility to claim that such experiences are not instances of pride. In *American Pastoral*, Philip Roth offers an example of the same general sort: “Just a little ways from the church are The Oaks, a pair of two-hundred-year-old oak trees that are the town’s pride.”

We do not have to imagine anyone having done anything in order to accept this as an intelligible example of pride. Call this the *gift paradigm* of pride.

Between these two extremes of agency and gift lie paradigms involving varying degrees of agency. Pride in one’s possessions provides a paradigm that is unlike both the achievement paradigm and the gift paradigm. Consider someone’s pride in her recently acquired 1963 Aston Martin DB5. Her pride need not be based in any activity of hers—for example, she need not be proud of the fact that she bought the Aston Martin, or of the fact that she earned the money that bought the Aston Martin, etc.—since she might have simply inherited it. Rather, she might be proud of simply owning the elegant vehicle. Call this the *ownership paradigm* of pride. Annette Baier reminds us, in her defense of an possession-based account of pride, that a Humean analysis of property reduces property rights to power relations: roughly, to having the legal power to do what one likes with the owned goods.

Hence I do not wish to deny, as I do with the gift paradigm, the presence of any connection whatsoever between this sort of pride and agency. But the ownership paradigm is distinct from the achievement paradigm since it lacks the goal-orientation of the latter. Achievement, but not ownership, requires and is defined in terms of goals.

To these three paradigms of pride one further paradigm must be added: *group pride*. Examples of group pride are familiar, if not foremost among the paradigms of pride, in

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the public and private realms. Family pride, national pride, ethnic pride, and LGBT pride are ubiquitous, as are less significant examples like sports team pride and school pride (say, Husky pride). Whether or not group pride is praiseworthy, it is historically significant enough to count as a paradigm of pride and so must be accounted for. Even immoral pride, such as Aryan pride, count as pride and so its intelligibility must be preserved by my account.

3.3 Warranted Pride

The ideal-based account of pride explains why the cases considered in §3.2 should be considered paradigm examples of pride. As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, I argue that taking pride in something requires taking your relation to that thing to indicate that you are living in accordance with some personal ideal of yours. Elizabeth Anderson succinctly defines a person’s ideals as her “conceptions of what kind of person she ought to be, what kinds of character, attitudes, concerns, and commitments she should have.” Like the possible objects of pride, the possible content of a person’s ideals is broad, tracking the many ways she might evaluate herself.

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6 For an argument in favor of national pride, see Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998), and in particular see the chapter entitled, “American National Pride: Whitman and Dewey.”


8 Personal ideals are norms by which we evaluate persons. Compare Arnold Isenberg (1949)’s treatment of pride in terms of general value: “The definition of pride, then, has three parts. There is (1) a quality which (2) is approved (or considered desirable) and (3) is judged to belong to oneself” (p. 3) And again: “Pride, from the psychological standpoint, is pleasure taken in the possession of some quality that one deems valuable” (4). Values-based accounts of pride like this suffer from a plenitude of counter-examples that do not confront an ideal-based account. For example, I possess and value the quality of being alive, but it boggles the mind to imagine taking pride in the mere quality of being alive. (I want to distinguish this example from pride in *staying alive.*) The reason, I submit, is that being alive, though valuable and desirable, could not indicate that one is meeting any ideal—at least not to the living. Ideals all presuppose this fact.
To regard an event as an achievement warranting pride involves a person’s seeing it—typically, but not necessarily, her action—as evidence of her having the sort of character, or succeeding in the sorts of concerns, that she thinks she should have. Seeing an event in this way is one way of living in accordance with one’s ideals. The proud Olympic medalist takes her victory to show that she has succeeded in contests that matter to her, or that she really does have the courage and tenacity of a champion. It is easy to take for granted the role played by ideals in the explanation of a person’s pride, but this role can be brought to the fore with the aid of appropriate thought-experiments. When the Olympic medalist responds that she is happy with, but not particularly proud of, her setting a world record and personal best, the obvious interpretation is that succeeding in this sport doesn’t matter to her in any significant degree—it is at most of peripheral concern to her, and hence is not bound up with any of her personal ideals. Compare that reaction with the emotion of an athlete who has long aspired to such achievement, who commits herself to that as a goal, and who would evaluate herself poorly if she failed. It is difficult to imagine her as a victor without also imagining her feeling proud.

Likewise, pride in one’s possessions as well as pride in what one regards as gifts might reflect one’s ideals. Only if one evaluates oneself in terms of whether one possesses a luxurious “lifestyle” would mere ownership of luxury goods be a matter of pride. If one does evaluate oneself according to such norms—and, as Americans should well know, there is no shortage of materialistic ideals—then one will be disposed to experience pride in one’s possessions.

Gifts may also connect with ideals. If one is proud of one’s lustrous hair, of one’s Japanese ancestry, of one’s natural citizenship, or of one’s perfect pitch, then one must
care about ideals according to which these qualities matter. If one does not experience pride in such things, then one must not care much about such personal ideals.

The diversity of standards for living in accordance with various ideals closes the door on the search for a single, substantive, *attributive* pride relation. The correct attribution of pride depends upon the success conditions of the relevant personal ideal, and there is no reason to believe (and every reason to deny) that all personal ideals require some one substantive relation between self and object. It is not helpful, for instance, to describe a pride relation as one of “belonging,” where belonging is entirely open-ended; and it is distorting of the phenomena to offer a more substantive attribution condition, such as agency.

Given that an attribution condition of pride is the judgment that one has met some of one’s ideals in virtue of the object of pride, we are in a good position to describe the conditions under which pride is warranted—i.e., the conditions under which a token state of pride accurately represents its object. Warrant conditions assess whether a bona fide token of pride (that is, an emotion that meets pride’s attribution conditions) accurately represents its object. The topic of the present section is warranted pride—pride that accurately represents its intentional object—and the conditions under which pride is warranted. So, it will no longer do to argue that taking pride in something requires seeing oneself as living in accordance with one’s ideals in virtue of that thing. For, it is possible to take unwarranted pride in something. What renders pride warranted?

One’s pride accurately represents its intentional object only when the factual judgments relevant to one’s pride are true. In other words, unlike hope and fear, pride is
“factive” and not merely “epistemic.” If the object of one’s pride is a proposition (e.g., that I won the race) then the proposition must be true; if the object is an event (e.g., my game-winning homerun) then it must have occurred; if the intentional object is a property of some object (e.g., the redness of my car) then the object must have that property. If you are proud of having just won the 100-meter derby, then your pride is “out of focus” if it turns out that you have been disqualified. Compare this against fear and hope—my fear that I will fail can be warranted even if I happen to succeed, and my hope that we will prevail can be warranted even if we fail.

The second condition concerns the relation between the object of pride and one’s ideals. One’s pride accurately represents its object only when one actually has met some of one’s ideals in virtue of that object. If you are proud of having robbed a bank because you take that action to show that you have solidarity with the poor, then your pride is likely to be out of focus. Having such solidarity is a legitimate ideal, but the mere robbing of a bank does little to indicate that you have met your ideal. This condition is not always clear-cut, and will typically involve significant normative controversy. What exactly would count as having solidarity with the poor? Donating ten percent of one’s income to Oxfam might be sufficient—although there is reason to think that mere monetary attention, even if substantial, is probably insufficient.

Some instances of pride clearly violate this condition, though. For example, one form of snobbery involves mistakenly generalizing from the fact that one meets an ideal in one context to the false conclusion that in some other or more general context one meets an

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10 Donating the proceeds of one’s robbery to the poor might indicate that one has met a humanitarian ideal, of course. I return to this sort of example, in which one meets an ideal at some moral cost, in the next section’s discussion of warranted, but morally offensive, pride.
ideal. The movie snob thinks his good taste in movies reflects a general intellectual or ethical superiority over those who lack his discernment; the aristocratic snob concludes from his grand heritage and natural gifts that his pursuits and interests are more honorable than those who lack his good fortune. Thomas Hill, Jr. argues that at the core of snobbery lies the “disposition to count people as worthy of ‘honor’ and ‘contempt’ on inadequate grounds, in inappropriate contexts, or to an unwarranted degree.”\footnote{11} When this disposition leads the snob to overvalue himself, we should judge that his pride lacks warrant precisely because it is over-inflated. So the snob tends to violate pride’s second warrant condition.\footnote{12}

The third condition concerns the normative status of the ideal itself. A person “has” an ideal when she judges an ideal as worthy of pursuit or attainment; one is not committed to an ideal unless one deems it worthy or desirable. So, the judgment that one has met some of one’s ideals presupposes that one regards the ideal or ideals as worthy. Taking pride in something involves not only representing the object of pride in a certain light but, also, representing an ideal as worthy. Since an emotion is warranted just in case it accurately represents its object, warranted pride must be accurate in representing the relevant personal ideal as worthy. This consideration delivers the third warrant condition: that the ideals in accordance with which one takes oneself to be living are worthy ideals.\footnote{13}

\footnote{11} Thomas E. Hill, Jr., “Social Snobbery and Human Dignity,” reprinted in Autonomy and Self-Respect (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991), 155-172; quotation from p. 162.

\footnote{12} Wittgenstein offers what might be a similar case: “When I have had a picture suitably framed or have hung it in the right surroundings I have often caught myself being as proud as though I had painted the picture,” Culture and Value, P. Winch, trans. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), 17e.

\footnote{13} Why isn’t the upshot of these considerations that warranted pride requires that the agent regards the relevant ideal as worthy, rather than (or even in addition to) that the relevant ideal actually be worthy? As I see it, one need not represent oneself-as-regarding-an-ideal-as-worthy in order to regard an ideal as worthy. It is possible to misrepresent to oneself one’s actual concerns. So a person who experiences warranted pride need not see herself as regarding an ideal as worthy. This scenario is one of the possibilities that enable being surprised by one’s experience of pride. Thanks to Angie Smith for posing this objection to me.
This condition, to an extent greater than the first two, brings evaluative content to bear upon pride’s warrant insofar as it excludes the possibility of an immorally grounded but warranted pride. According to this account, a racist’s Aryan pride is not merely odious but in addition fails to accurately portray its object—in particular, it fails to accurately portray its object because it is odious. Such a consequence invites the charge that this warrant condition imposes extraneous moral content upon the internal logic of pride. One might urge that moral considerations about the worthiness of one’s ideals be kept apart from epistemic considerations about the accurate representation of the object of one’s pride. By analogy, one might think, a racially motivated instance of fear might be warranted even if the racist attitudes motivating it are morally odious (that is, if, by chance, the object of fear really is threatening).

The issue comes down to whether ethical considerations about the worthiness of the subject’s ideals are included in the representational content of pride. This raises the issue, addressed in §2.2, about how to distinguish between warrant conditions and moral justification conditions. Could the object of racist pride be prideworthy, even if unethically so?

One reason for answering in the positive is that racist pride does not seem to be the result of a merely alethic mistake. It displays a moral error on the part of the agent that might seem not to rule out the accurate representation of the object of his pride. The white racist who is proud of having only Aryan friends might appear not to have misrepresented the situation. One might urge that the racist’s pride does accurately represent its object; that his fault lies not in any misrepresentation but, instead, in the moral obtuseness of taking pride in that object. The racist correctly takes the fact that she has only white friends as evidence for her living in accordance with her ideals. Compare
that case with that of a racist pedestrian who crosses the street out of his fear of the
approaching nonwhite pedestrian.\textsuperscript{14} Supposing that the approaching pedestrian poses no
threat whatsoever, it is comparatively easy to describe this racist’s fear as unwarranted. It
is not as clear that pride represents its object as bound up with a worthy ideal as it is clear
that fear represents its object as threatening. Perhaps pride merely represents its object as
being in accordance with the agent’s (worthy or unworthy) ideals. And so, with this
evaluatively neutral warrant condition candidate in mind, one might doubt that pride
involves any evaluative representation whatsoever.

In §2.2, I proposed the following test for discerning an attitude’s warrant conditions:
consider whether the claim, (1) that attitude $A$ is warranted, is inconsistent with either (2)
a particular justification condition or (3) its negation. If (1) is inconsistent with (2), then (3)
is a warrant condition. If (1) is inconsistent with (3), then (2) is a warrant condition. If (1) is
consistent with (2) and (3), then neither (2) nor (3) is a warrant condition. This test
presupposes an objective notion of warrant, as I will now explain. For example, consider
the following set of claims:

(1) that $S$ warrants fear;

(2) that $S$ is not a threat;

(3) that $S$ is a threat.

The fact that (1) appears to be inconsistent with (2) gives us a reason to believe that one of
fear’s warrant conditions is that the object of fear must pose a threat. Claims (1) and (2)
could be rendered consistent if we understood warrant to be relativized to the available
evidenced at the moment of fear: for example, “Although $S$ turned out, as a matter of fact,

\textsuperscript{14} See Michael Levin, “Responses to Race Differences in Crime,” in Race and Racism, Bernard Boxill, ed.
to be completely unthreatening, Sam was warranted in her fear given that she had no way of knowing that S’s brandished handgun was plastic.” I am proposing, on the other hand, to test for an objective sense of warrant: as in, for example, “Sam was justified in fearing the S’s handgun, given what she could have known; but her fear was entirely unwarranted. She had somehow stepped onto a movie soundstage without realizing it”

The conception of warrant I am concerned with is of an accurate representation of an attitude’s intentional object, whether or not anyone was in a position to assess this at the moment of fear. Warrant is an assessment of an emotion’s presentation of its object, and not an assessment of the agent’s rationality or responsiveness to evidence. In this, warrant is to emotion as truth is to belief. (The confusion in the example is compounded by the fact that “threat” can itself be understood objectively or subjectively—the omniscient spectator would judge that the lucky Russian Roulette player never faced a threat, but part of the point of the concept of threat is to describe situations with a high probability of harm.)

Indeed, a frightened pedestrian might consistently both feel guilty for his racist cast of mind and yet maintain that, as later evidence disclosed, the pedestrian was nonetheless threatening. The fact that only a racist would have the attitude in question does not preclude the possibility of that attitude “fitting” the circumstances, though it does suggest that it is morally inappropriate to fear others on the basis of their apparent racialized status. We can conclude from this that warranted fear does not require any degree of ethical propriety.

Returning to the case of racist pride, we cannot consistently assert (1) and (2):

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15 Thanks to Angie Smith for bringing the ambiguity of warrant to my attention.
(1) that S has only Aryan friends warrants pride;

(2) that S has only Aryan friends is not in accordance with a worthy personal ideal;

(3) that S has only Aryan friends is in accordance with a worthy personal ideal.

The fact that only a racist would take pride in this dubious achievement seems to preclude the possibility that the so-called achievement warrants pride, in a way that the fact that only a racist would be afraid in some scenario does not preclude the possibility that the apparent threat warrants fear.\(^{16}\) Once one acknowledges the worthlessness of the ideal driving one’s pride there is no longer any reason to judge that the object warrants pride—just as there is no reason to judge that an object warrants fear once we acknowledge the harmlessness of the object of fear.\(^{17}\) If I am correct, then the set of claims comprised of (i) judging that the object warrants pride and (ii) acknowledging the worthlessness of the ideal driving one’s pride would be inconsistent. Therefore, one of pride’s warrant conditions is that the ideal in question must be worthy.

But which ideals are worthy? It would be a large task to develop a theory of worthy ideals with which we could sharpen this warrant condition, since that topic includes and extends beyond all of normative ethics. One very promising, though not entirely uncontroversial, condition on the worthiness of an ideal is that it not violate any moral norms.\(^{18}\) Some ideals, like Aryan Supremacy, are unworthy for just that reason.

\(^{16}\) The truth of this claim is consistent with the fact that the racist himself would disagree with this assessment, since I am concerned with an objective notion of warrant.

\(^{17}\) One might think there is an asymmetry in these two examples, insofar as the harmlessness of the object of fear is a property of the object whereas the worthlessness of the ideal upon which one’s pride is founded is not a property of the object of pride. However, as we can see in the white friends example, it is perfectly reasonable to describe the object of pride (his having only white friends) as itself morally worthless, if not offensive. Thus the symmetry is preserved.

\(^{18}\) I say this condition is not uncontroversial for the familiar reasons often adduced by Bernard Williams, for example in his Gauguin case. Even more persuasive than that case would be a more quotidian and forgivable moral transgression—for example, would an ideal fail to be worthy if adherence to it called for telling a white lie on a single occasion (assuming that white lies are morally impermissible)? The answer is
Nicholas Rescher suggests a measure according to which an ideal might be unworthy that is, I think, interestingly correct but completely unhelpful in the present context: “The validity of ideals is a matter of so conducting our lives that we can take both pleasure and justifiable pride in them.” Since the justifiability of pride depends partly upon the worthiness of the ideal on which the pride is based, accounting for the worthiness of an ideal in terms of the justifiability of pride leads us into a logical circle that sheds no light. I discuss an agency-based worthiness condition in the following section.

So, in summary form, the following is a sketch of the necessary conditions on pride’s warrant:

1. The object of pride exists;
2. The object must provide evidence that one is living in accordance with some of one’s personal ideals; and
3. The relevant ideal must be a legitimate, or worthy, ideal,
   a. which (perhaps) includes its being entirely conformable to all moral demands.

not obvious to me, especially when posed in the categorical abstract like this, though I remain agnostic with respect to that debate.

19 Nicholas Rescher, Ethical Idealism (Berkeley: University of California, 1987), 126.
20 Rescher also offers a more substantive consequentialist or pragmatic account of the worthiness of ideals: “The validation and legitimation of ideals accordingly lie not in their (infeasible) applicability but in their utility for directing our efforts—their productive power in providing direction and structure to our evaluative thought and pragmatic action. It is in this, their power to move the minds that move mountains, that the validation and legitimation of appropriate ideals must ultimately reside” (Ibid., 141). Rescher’s consequentialist or pragmatic account of the worth of an ideal divorces that worth from the content of the ideal, but it is doubtful that such a dichotomy is ultimately sustainable. We should be prepared to judge an ideal unworthy if it called for holding morally offensive attitudes, even if it urged us not to act on those attitudes and so even if it produced good consequences. A full account of the conflict between ideals and morality should allow for the relevance of both extrinsic and intrinsic features of an ideal. The intrinsic undesirability of the content of an ideal counts against committing one’s life to meeting it and measuring one’s life against it, even if such commitment and measurement produced good consequences from the point of view of the universe. For further discussion, see R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University, 1963; especially chapter 8, “Ideals” and chapter 9, “Toleration and Fanaticism”; and P. F. Strawson, “Social Morality and Individual Ideal.” Philosophy 36, no. 136 (1961), 1-17.
One condition that is rightly absent is the following, on the legitimacy of ideals (it would have fallen under condition (3)): that there be a legitimate (public) expectation that one meets the ideal. Many emotions have this sort of warrant condition. For example, one’s guilt is warranted only if there is a legitimate expectation that one meet whatever norm was violated. Likewise, as Michelle Mason has argued, one’s contempt for another is warranted only if “there exists a legitimate expectation or demand that the agent approximate the interpersonal ideal.” Contempt for another due to his (say) failing to remember all of his students’ test scores is definitely misguided, because that expectation is totally unreasonable. With pride, on the other hand, the relevant ideals can be legitimate even if they are unreasonably heroic. For, with pride we enter the domain of the supererogatory. Meeting or even caring about some ideals is, from a moral point of view, optional (meeting other ideals might be obligatory, though). On the other hand, some ideals are not reasonably regarded as optional. Basic moral ideals are not supererogatory or optional in the sense that, say, ideals of beauty are. There might even be a legitimate demand, for example, that a mother or father have proper parental ideals. (If so, this might explain why there seems to be something morally inappropriate with a parent failing to be proud of her child in certain circumstances.)

I will make one last remark about pride’s warrant conditions, in particular the second condition. Since each ideal sets out its own success conditions, there will be considerable, but systematic, variation from case to case in what counts as evidence that one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. For example, many or most personal ideals, unlike natural personal beauty (if such a thing exists), do require successful exercise of agency for their approximation. Unlike gift pride, achievement pride is typically action oriented. To

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21 Michelle Mason (2003), 250.
be properly proud of being a good teacher, you need to do things and be morally responsible for them.

3.4 Agency and Pride

In my critical discussion of Solomon’s agency account of attribution (§2.6.1), I argued that experiencing pride need not involve taking oneself to be morally responsible for the object of one’s pride. Taking pride in something involves taking it to show that you are living in accordance with your personal ideals, and if one rejects the claim that living in accordance with your personal ideals requires moral responsibility for the object of one’s pride, then one can take pride in things that one is not responsible for.

Can one tenably reject this claim? Can one to any extent live in accordance with any of one’s ideals without doing anything? If this question can be answered in the affirmative, then pride’s second warrant condition (that the object of pride must provide evidence that one is living in accordance with some of one’s ideals) does not require that one be morally responsible for the object. The answer to this question depends upon the relevant ideal. Presumably, some ideals allow us to meet the second warrant condition without exercising our agency. The more important question, given pride’s third warrant condition (that the relevant ideal must be worthy), is whether such an ideal can be worthy if it is possible to live in accordance with it without doing anything.

The view according to which it is always unwarranted to take pride in something that does not directly reflect upon one’s worth as an agent has its roots, I believe, in the idea that successful human agency is the only significant measure of a person’s life—the only sort of quality worth taking pride in.
There is a split in our thinking on this matter. On the one hand, there is considerable force to the intuition that the only things that are reasonably attributable to a person—in the sense of forming a reasonable basis for our evaluation of her—result from some aspect of her agency. It often seems unreasonable to praise or blame a person (even in a non-moral sense of praise and blame) for something that she had no direct part in, like winning the lottery. Where we do praise someone for something apart from his agency, say for the luster of his hair, we seem willing to acknowledge that such features are superficial, at least from a moral point of view. There is theoretical pressure to accept that, at least from the moral point of view, the person is nothing more than the agent and so it is mistaken to take pride in what does not depend upon one’s agency.

On the other hand, much of what we take pride in, and much of what makes one’s life meaningful by giving one a “sense of self,” does not appear to depend on agency. Whether it is pride in being a New Yorker, pride in having a Jewish ancestry, or pride in owning Leadbelly’s acoustic guitar, some of what we take non-agential pride in seems to us far from superficial. The first-personal point of view seems to confirm that some of what makes life worthwhile and worthy of pride lies beyond our agency, and beyond the realm of what one deserves moral praise for. Any plausible condition of the worthiness of a personal ideal must take care to avoid moralizing about what a person should care about, for what a person cares about partially constitutes the particular person that she is and helps to make her life worthwhile.

Some agency-independent personal ideals, like the ideal of being a “real American,” partially constitute our identities as the particular persons that we are. James Baldwin’s _Giovanni’s Room_ describes a black American ex-pat living in Paris who cannot help but take pride as an American, even though he is deeply ambivalent about his home country:
When Giovanni wanted me to know that he was displeased with me, he said I was a ‘vrai americain’; conversely, when delighted, he said that I was not an American at all; and on both occasions he was striking, deep in me, a nerve which did not throb in him. And I resented this: resented being called an American (and resented resenting it) because it seemed to make me nothing more than that, whatever that was; and I resented being called not an American because it seemed to make me nothing.22

This character sees himself as inextricably American in the sense that when stripped of this identification “it seemed to make me nothing.” His identification as an American is an essential part of his evaluative point of view and of his particular identity.

One might object that, tragically, it is possible for a worthless personal ideal to figure centrally in one’s identity as the particular person one is. So, the fact that one takes pride in being an American does not establish that the ideal of being an American is worthy. Even so, an ideal that helps to structure one’s identity and attune oneself to the world plays no small role in making one’s life worthwhile. As such, these ideals need not be worthless.

What is clear is that if one’s ideals are integral to one’s identity as the particular person that one is, then taking pride in some external good like one’s ancestry or one’s nation of birth is disanalogous to taking pride in winning the lottery or taking pride in the view from the hillside. Pride in one’s ancestry, for instance, would be a pleasurable affirmation of the importance to one’s identity of, say, the stories about one’s family members. Pride in the view from the hillside, on the other hand, is difficult to imagine or to regard as warranted insofar as it is difficult to imagine the person whose identity as the particular person that she is involves this view.23

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23 Amelie Rorty’s example of pride in being the sort of person who delights in seeing light on a leaf differs in that the object of one’s pride is one’s being a sort of person.
By “identity,” I mean the phenomenon that has recently been well-described by Bennett Helm:

To *identify* with something is to value it by bringing it into your evaluative perspective as a part of the kind of life worth your living, potentially as the result of the exercise of your autonomy and practical reason... Such identification need not (though it may) be deliberate or self-conscious, and it need not (though it may) be something the genesis of which one is responsible for: one may come to identify with certain things as the result of one’s upbringing, in the process of coming to be a person in the first place.24

Defending this conception of personal identity would require defending the claim that one’s identity need not be deliberately chosen nor based upon something that one is responsible for creating.25

It is difficult to determine whether a given ideal is worthy, let alone the general criteria of worthiness for an ideal. One source of resistance to the inclusion of the third warrant condition may be the recognition of this difficulty and the willingness to be epistemically humble about whether our neighbor’s idiosyncratic personal ideals are worthy. What is somewhat clearer is that the worthiness of an ideal depends upon its conformity to moral norms. Ideals that call for demeaning and disrespectful behavior are very plausibly unworthy and so pride based upon such ideals is unwarranted.

Granting that one’s pride can in principle be warranted absent responsibility for the object of pride, the question remains as to whether experiencing such warranted pride is externally appropriate. For example, if it were true that agency-free pride, even when warranted, lead one to rest on one’s laurels, then there may be an external condition of prudential propriety according to which agency-free pride is unjustified. Such pride

25 Such a defense would require consideration of the accounts in Christine Korsgaard, *Sources of Normativity*, and Harry Frankfurt, *The Reasons of Love*. Korsgaard defines one’s practical identity as a “description under which you value yourself,” (101) and argues that this description is a principle that is autonomously adopted.
would be unjustified not in the sense of misrepresenting something but in the sense of leading to bad consequences for the agent herself. Whether such a condition exists depends upon the outcome of empirical study.

It might be that pride in things that do not reflect our agency violates (external) moral propriety conditions. The question, then, is whether we should add the following moral propriety condition to our three warrant conditions: that the subject of pride is morally responsible for the object of pride. A blanket moral propriety condition of moral responsibility for what one takes pride in would render morally offensive many instances of pride that rightly do not offend anyone. Indeed, we do not owe to others indifference about external goods or lack of concern about personal ideals that do not require agency to be satisfied. Since this proposed propriety condition would, implausibly, render some examples of trivial or unendorsed pride open to moral censure, I suggest we abandon the moral requirement of responsibility altogether and look for other suitable candidate moral justification conditions.

One fault that we clearly care about is thinking oneself entitled to undeserved goods or privileges in virtue of the object of one’s pride. This sense of entitlement, I believe, is what we most often find offensive in cases of pride—and legitimately so. The obnoxiously proud Aston Martin owner might think he “owns the road” and that others should defer
to him. One common privilege, or good, that the obnoxiously proud take themselves to
deserve is praise from others. The obnoxiously proud athlete takes his fame to justify his
expectation that others revere him.

However, such delusions are distinct from the pride itself, even if they frequently
accompany pride. Therefore, that one not think oneself entitled to underserved goods is
no more a condition of pride’s moral justification than that one not lash out at others is a
condition of fear’s moral justification. These faults are better located as expressions of
vicious character traits or of offensive beliefs.28

Consider instead the condition that the subject’s meeting the worthy ideal not involve
the violation of any moral obligations. According to the intuition I wish to draw upon, it
is morally offensive to derive pleasure from a moral violation, even if that violation was
necessary for bringing about some good in a particular instance. Bernard Williams’s
Gauguin case illustrates this point. Even given that Gauguin’s creation of the Tahiti
paintings warrants pride, and given (for the sake of argument) that those marvels provide
some reason in favor of his having abandoned his family, we might nonetheless bristle at
his feeling proud of having painted these works. This thought would be available from
Gauguin’s own point of view as well. It would make sense for Gauguin to feel guilty about
his feeling proud of his work, even, and especially, if he acknowledged that his work
warranted pride. For, the experience of pride would place him at an added moral
distance from his family—it certainly would not appease his family if he sent them a
postcard to broadcast his pride.

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28 The common source of violations of this kind is an overestimation on the part of the subject of the value
of her meeting her ideal. One type of morally objectionable proud person cares too much about her
ideal, or about her having met the ideal. For a detailed discussion of this flaw, as it related to the
character trait of pride, see Chapter 5.
3.5 Group pride and vicarious emotion

The ideal-based account of pride suggests that group pride consists in taking oneself to be living in accordance with one’s ideals on the basis of one’s membership in some group. But there is a puzzle here: on what grounds could the mere fact of group membership indicate that one is living in accordance with one’s ideals? One possibility is that group pride presupposes the idea that the membership indicates or confirms one’s individual excellence. If one is a proud member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences then the likely basis of one’s pride, ultimately, is that the importance of one’s academic achievements have been confirmed by people whom one respects. However, many groups are not founded around ideals of personal excellence, though they still inspire pride.

In this section, I argue that there are in fact two types of the emotion of group pride, though the distinction between them is easy to miss. In addition to the person (like the member of the AAAS) whose group pride is reducible to some other paradigm of pride, there is also the person who feels pride because of her sympathy with others in the group. I call this phenomenon vicarious pride. In order to make sense of group pride, the ideal-based account must be supplemented by an account of vicarious pride.

The developmental psychologist, Jerome Kagan, explains one type of vicarious emotion as follows:

The emotions provoked by events occurring to those with whom the agent is identified, called vicarious affect, provide persuasive proof of the potency of thought to evoke feeling and emotion. Individuals who regard themselves as sharing psychologically significant features with another are susceptible to an emotion when the other experiences some desirable or undesirable event, or possess a praiseworthy or unappealing feature. This phenomenon, called identification, is most likely when self and others share a genetic pedigree or

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29 “Group pride” can also refer to the character traits of pride, dignity, and self-respect. I consider the relation between the trait of pride and self-respect in the appendix.
membership in the same ethnic, religious, or national category. A vicarious emotion is more salient if the shared category is distinctive in some way.  

Kagan focuses here upon what he calls “vicarious shared emotion” which (1) is the product of identification with another person(s), and (2) is experienced by the subject of the emotion as concerning himself. All emotions have the potential for vicarious expression. A child’s shame or pride in his ancestry is a vicarious shared emotion because (1) the emotion would not arise if the child did not identify with others in the family, and (2) the child’s experience concerns his own standing and not merely the standing of others.

The second condition distinguishes shared from unshared vicarious emotions, which satisfy only the first condition. Joel Feinberg correctly notes that a complete theory of vicarious emotion will also include an explanation of vicarious unshared emotion. Embarrassment for another person provides a good example of vicarious unshared emotion. Non-vicarious embarrassment, or what I will call “normal embarrassment,” has as its object the self (or some aspect of the self) garnering unwanted attention. Vicarious unshared embarrassment, being embarrassed for another, does not take the self as its object. If I am embarrassed for you because of your breach of etiquette, I do not experience that emotion as concerning myself at all. It concerns you alone. However, the first condition of vicarious shared emotions is met: as Feinberg notes, had I despised you instead of sympathized with you then I would not be embarrassed for you at all. Rather, I might be quite pleased, or perhaps contemptful, at the sight of your social lapse. If we

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32 Providing an account of sympathy is outside the scope of this paper, and I wish to remain neutral with respect to competing theories of sympathy. Vicarious emotion depends upon sympathy at least to the extent that it requires imagining oneself in the place of another. I might be embarrassed for someone who inadvertently offends another, since I believe that none of us can avoid that possibility; but I could never be embarrassed for or ashamed of someone who offends another with a racist slur if I regarded that as beyond the realm of what I might do.
were strangers indifferent to one another, then instead of feeling embarrassment I might pity you.\textsuperscript{33}

With respect to pride, the vicarious shared emotion involves shared ideals where the vicarious unshared emotion does not. Consider the following story, ripped from the headlines. On July 14\textsuperscript{th}, 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama threw out the ceremonial first pitch at the Major League Baseball All-Star game. Willie Mays, who helped to integrate the League, was on hand and spoke to the Associated Press. The article reports: “Baseball legend Willie Mays says he was so proud the night Barack Obama was elected president that he ‘cried for most of the night.’… ‘So I’m just proud of him, you know. He may be proud of something else. But I’m proud of him, what he stands for.’”\textsuperscript{34} There are two plausible, and compatible, interpretations of Mays’s remarks. First, in light of Mays’s substantial efforts towards integrating the nation, he plausibly contributed to the state of affairs that is the object of his pride. So, Mays’s pride in what President Obama stands for could be construed along the same lines as his pride in his athletic achievements, that is, in terms of his own successful agency. On this interpretation Mays experienced normal pride—not vicarious pride—understood under the achievement paradigm, and President Obama symbolizes, or “stands for,” the validation of Mays’s efforts and suffering.

However, Mays might also (or instead) have vicarious shared pride for President Obama, due to (1) their shared membership in a racialized group as well as (2) their overlapping social, political, and moral goals and ideals. On this view, the object of pride concerns Mays is proud because of his racial identification with Obama, and such

\textsuperscript{33} It is worth noting, though, that vicarious embarrassment is easily confused with being embarrassed to be in the presence of some social gaffe. Thanks to Rachel Fredericks for this observation.

\textsuperscript{34} Darlene Superville, “Mays: So proud when Obama elected that he cried.” Associated Press, July 14, 2009; http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5itgwhK_hO2r3sZnk__AFZBJArVfAD99 EILM82.
identification consists in part of shared ideals.\textsuperscript{35} Shared ideals enable the subject to engage in the necessary identification because the object of pride serves as a symbol of these ideals. Shared vicarious pride in another person is still about oneself since one’s identity involves a commitment to the shared ideals.

Is there such a phenomenon as unshared vicarious pride? We can be embarrassed for another, but the locution “proud for another” is awkward. One might argue that unshared vicarious pride is not “pride for another,” but instead simple happiness or even love for another. If one’s beloved is proud of getting the promotion she wished for, the proper sentiment to feel, one might think, would be happiness for her, not pride for her. On this view, pride is essentially a reflexive attitude, which is to say that it essentially concerns oneself and so cannot fail to satisfy the second condition of shared vicarious affects. Hume defends this view, and argues that pride’s reflexivity is all that distinguishes it from love, which is essentially other-directed.\textsuperscript{36} Where pride is the approval of the self in virtue of some quality that is “closely related” to oneself, love is the approval of another in virtue of some quality that is closely related to himself or herself.

\textsuperscript{35} It is tempting to follow Kagan and to reduce the group identification necessary for, say, black pride, to non-normative features such as skin color. But normative considerations, in the form of overlapping social, political, or moral goals and ideals, play an essential role. In Philip Roth’s \textit{The Human Stain}, Coleman Silk, a very light-skinned (and hence “passable”) African-American, deliberates about whether to identify with that racial group (\textit{The Human Stain} (New York: Vintage Books, 2000)). That such deliberation is even possible already tells against the reduction of black identification to skin color. The narrator of the novel, Nathan Zuckerman, describes why Professor Silk decides not to identify as black:

You can’t let the big they impose its bigotry on you any more than you can let the little they become a we and impose its ethics on you. Not the tyranny of the we and its we-talk and everything that the we wants to pile on your head. Never for him the tyranny of the we that is dying to suck you in, the coercive, inclusive, historical, inescapable moral \textit{we} with its insidious \textit{E pluribus unum}. Neither the they of Woolworth’s nor the we of Howard. Instead the raw I with all its agility. (108)

Coleman’s deliberations about whether to identify as a black man, and his characterization of that identity, take an entirely ethical form. He rejects the identity not only because he rejects the particular ideals that he thinks accompany it, but because he opposes group identification as such for its inherent tendency to impose group ideals upon the individual. The claim seems to hold for all group identifications, including nationalism. American pride, for example, will get no grip on Americans without their perception of some shared ideals [i.e., ideology].

\textsuperscript{36} Hume (1978), Part 2, Book 2.
Thus far, I have spoken of the personal ideals account of pride in reflexive terms: feeling pride involves taking oneself to be living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. One might wonder whether an ideals account can be extended in a plausible way to make sense of pride in someone else that really takes the other as its object and is not in any way ego-centric. Bennett Helm defends an intricate extended account of this sort that denies the essential reflexivity of pride. Helm describes pride as a “person-focused emotion” that expresses and partially constitutes one’s intimate identification with the target of one’s pride (the person who is upholding his or her values). Very often the target of one’s pride is oneself; when one is proud of oneself, “the kind of evaluation central to the formal object of pride is more precisely a kind of dignity arising from one’s successfully and notably upholding one’s values and so living as one ought, a worthy kind of life.”

It is possible, though, for another to be this target, provided that one is intimately identified with her. Intimate identification is “taking someone’s identity to heart,” a metaphor that Helm cashes out as valuing the things your beloved values for her sake and “valuing the place this has within your overall sense of the kind of life worth your living, thereby making your upholding her values for her sake itself be a part of your identity, so that you thereby make you own identity dependent on her values—on her identity.” Helm argues that pride taken in a beloved’s achievements, for example, takes the beloved as its target, that one’s pride really is about him, and not covertly about oneself, as is the case with shared vicarious pride. The beloved is the target of pride in that it is for his sake that one values the object of his pride. For example, “in being proud of my wife for winning the bagpipe competition, my pride is focused on her and

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37 Helm (2010), 111.
38 Ibid., 162.
subfocused on her playing the bagpipes.”  

In this example, even if I find the bagpipes hideous, I will value them for the sake of my beloved if I have taken her identity to heart, and will be proud of her when she succeeds in bagpiping.  

Helm’s account of pride taken in others is compelling, but his argument does not succeed in undermining the claim that pride is essentially reflexive or, as I put it above, essentially shared. The account of pride taken in others requires taking the other’s identity to heart, which involves incorporating the other’s living in accordance with her personal ideals into one’s own set of personal ideals.  

Hence, even if I find the bagpipes hideous I will regard my wife’s winning the bagpipe competition as indicating that my life is going well according to the standards set by my set of personal ideals (which includes as a subset my wife’s personal ideals). My pride in her achievement is, indirectly, a felt evaluation of my worth. Therefore, Helm’s account of other-focused pride is fundamentally reflexive. What Helm shows is that one can take pride in others based upon things (like winning a bagpipe competition) that one values for the sake of one’s beloved and not for one’s own sake; but to value things for the sake of one’s beloved requires “that my identity, my sense of the kind of life I ought to live, has become dependent on my responding properly to her values.”  

Helm’s account of reflexive pride, that it is an evaluation of the self as possessing a kind of dignity, holds for pride in others as well. The alternative—that pride taken in another is an evaluation the he or she possesses a kind of dignity—sounds more like love or respect than it does pride.  

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39 Ibid., 156.  
40 As Helm puts it, “…it is only as contributing to her well-being that her piping is valuable to me, so that I share not just her person-focused felt evaluations but also, in this sense, her values and, therefore, her identity as constituted by these values,” Ibid., 157.  
41 Ibid., 162.
conclude that all pride is, at the end of the day, reflexive, even if less obviously or directly so than one might have thought.

3.6 Further Objections

3.6.1 Unendorsed Pride

It is not uncommon to be surprised by what one takes pride in, and if the analysis offered thus far is correct then such events can provide windows onto the concerns of the self. Surprise about the pride you feel upon winning a casual game of basketball can spark reflection about how competitive a person you are, about how much you care for the esteem of certain others, or about how deeply you have always wanted to be a pro basketball player like many of your heroes.

Sometimes, though, one’s pride has no such resonances. I can imagine the pride I might feel at hearing reports of Osama Bin Laden’s extra-judicial killing, or the quick rush of pride that one might get upon winning a few dollars from a slot machine.\textsuperscript{42} In both cases, it seems, one’s pride might not relate to the ideals one holds dear. Yet, the ideal-based account seems on its face to resist the possibility of unendorsed pride.\textsuperscript{43} If pride relates directly to one’s ideals, then it seems to follow that pride as such is an endorsed attitude.

Unendorsed pride, like group pride, is an emotion steeped in social dynamics. The unendorsed pride I might take upon winning money could be more closely tied to how I imagine others would celebrate or admire my luck than it is tied to my ideals. A fruitful explanation is that the subject’s imagining the approval of others for her in virtue of the

\textsuperscript{42} Thanks to Angela Smith for this example.
\textsuperscript{43} Incidentally, I believe that such pride poses an equal challenge to all other extant philosophical theories of pride as well.
object of her pride causes the emotion of pride. A plausible Humean analysis can be made in terms of the subject’s sympathy with the approval of others, imagined or real. Even when the subject does not endorse the approval (and possibly pride) of others, the fleeting thought of having met someone’s ideal is sometimes irresistible.44

But appeals to sympathy alone fail to capture the systematic nature of unendorsed pride. That is because general norms guiding the propriety of pride may be internalized by the subject even if he rejects them explicitly. Allan Gibbard has developed a distinction that is to the point, between internalizing a norm and accepting a norm.45 Gibbard speculates that we share with other mammals the capacity for internalizing norms that have to do with coordinating the behavior of individuals and that can plausibly be explained in evolutionary terms. Just as a dog marks off and protects territory, we too internalize norms without explicit acceptance or even awareness. Not all of these behaviors result from inborn mechanisms—others are explained by social training (and, presumably, not evolutionary history), and it will be difficult to sort out the two contributions.46 Gibbard gives the examples of conversational distance, politeness and cooperativeness, and even the signals we give in order to avoid bumping into each other on a crowded sidewalk as examples of internalized norms.

Importantly, we internalize norms for emotion as well as for action. Gibbard writes:

44 Hume argues that “general rules have a great influence upon pride and humility” (T 2.1.6.8), and in particular, that social forms and the norms that regulate them directly influence what we take pride in—apart from, and even potentially contrary to, our endorsement of those norms. What we take pride in is not entirely up to us, but rather reflects in large measure what is customary for one of us to take pride in. Amelie Rorty offers this illustration of Hume’s point: “So for instance, if aristocratic ancestry customarily produces pride, a person might take pride from her ancestry, even if she herself happens to despise an aristocracy in general and her forebears in particular” (Rorty (1990), 262). Hume argues that general rules influence all passion, not just pride.
46 Ibid., 70.
Socially significant emotions tend to be coordinated. Emotions coordinate action, and so natural selection will work to coordinate emotions. Here again, then, the sophisticated observer can formulate patterns—patterns to which various emotional tendencies are adapted to conform. When a person’s emotions tend to follow a pattern in this way, we can say the person internalizes the norm that prescribes this pattern.47

Like all socially significant emotions, pride has characteristic norms of propriety that we have internalized, even if we do not accept them. All theorists of pride should agree on this point: we are, to use Gibbard’s phrase, in the grip of all sorts of norms for feeling pride, and hence we are likely to sometimes feel pride that we do not endorse. This fact poses no particular threat to the present analysis, no more than does an irrational fear of flying to a threat-based account of fear.

3.6.2 Expectations Versus Ideals

Gabriele Taylor rightly notes, in regards to her belonging-based account of pride, that

> It is of course a fact about a person that he belongs to this family, that country or profession, and it may be a fact to which he pays little or no attention. But if he is proud of his grandfather, his local football team, or his predecessor then it must be a fact that weighs with him.48

I argued in §2.5.3 that Taylor's account of pride collapses into this suggestive idea of a fact weighing with one, notwithstanding her language of belonging. This pivotal idea had gone virtually unremarked upon in the pride literature, and even Taylor mentions it only in passing. But she is correct in noting that any plausible account of pride must explain the significance that objects of pride have for the subject who is proud of them. The present account is an attempt to flesh out that idea. Objects weigh with one when they evince that one is living up to one’s ideals. Therefore, I regard the ideal-based account as an elaboration upon Taylor’s remarks.

47 Ibid., 71.
At a deeper level of analysis, though, our two accounts differ significantly. On Taylor’s account of pride, an agent takes pride in something if she sees its belonging to her as an achievement, which is a term of art that she defines as follows:

The notion of achievement clarifies the respect in which [a person who feel pride] values the connection [between herself and the object of her pride]: she values it in that she sees it as being beyond her norm of expectations in the sense of it being better than for some reason or another she thinks she is, or others are, entitled to expect.49

In §2.5.3, I evaluated Taylor’s possession-based account the connection that must obtain between a person and the object of her pride. Here, I focus on the respect in which a proud person values that connection. According to Taylor, a person’s norms of expectations are what she thinks she is, or others are, entitled to expect. The norms of expectations that are relevant to feeling proud are norms about one’s connection to the object of pride. This is important to the fact that feeling proud of something relates, somehow, to one’s self-worth. For example, your pride in having run an eight-minute mile depends upon your having the belief that, for you, an eight-minute mile is better than you think yourself entitled to expect (or better than you think one in general is entitled to expect). The connection between you and running a mile in eight minutes constitutes the achievement, not the time itself.50

It will help us in characterizing these norms to have at hand some examples. Taylor perceptively marks out three sorts of norms:

There are at least three different ways in which a norm of expectation may be established: a norm is given by what a person thinks he can expect as a matter of course in relation to external circumstances, such as the rarity or frequency of the

49 Ibid., 41.
50 Taylor offers an excellent example: “…while it is her beautiful house which she believes to be a valuable possession of hers, it is not the beautiful house which she regards as the achievement; the achievement is her ownership of it, or her having built it or painted it, or whatever. That is, what in all cases of pride is seen as an achievement is not the desirable belonging, but is that she should be connected with it in the way she is” (40-41).
thing or his financial and social circumstances. A norm is also given by his view of his own abilities and limitations, by what he thinks he can or cannot do. And finally, a norm is given by the person’s view of the expectations of others, by what in his view society expects or can expect in this or that area of life.\textsuperscript{51}

Norms of the first type are norms about what we can expect regarding our connection to external goods like money and power and, more generally, our connection to things that might be out of our control or not entirely of our doing. Which of these norms a person acquires, of course, depends in large part upon her external circumstances. Some people have low expectations of what they will be able to own, or of what social status they can expect to occupy as a matter of course. It is no coincidence that people with such low expectations often acquire their expectations as a result of the impoverished external circumstances of their lives, while those with high eternal expectations of acquire them from the opulent external circumstances in which they live. In particular, they are determined largely by the external circumstances of their youth, since the internalization of most norms occurs in childhood.\textsuperscript{52} Someone accustomed to poverty or financial instability might take the fact that she owns her own house as an achievement, whereas someone accustomed to financial stability and wealth might not.

Norms of the second type will be more directly tied to a person’s self-esteem and self-respect, insofar as they concern what the agent can expect of herself in the way of ability and personal limitation. These norms of expectations are intimately related to a person’s self-confidence, in particular whether he thinks himself able to carry out his plan of life, to borrow Rawls’s phrase.\textsuperscript{53} Someone who is not confident in her professional abilities will take her promotion as a real achievement, much more so than a more confident person.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 40.
\textsuperscript{52} Cf., Dillon (1997).
\textsuperscript{53} Cf., Rawls (1971).
who expects to be promoted. The second person would take the promotion as less of an achievement, other things being equal.

The final sort of norm, what in the agent’s view others expect, is unique in not necessarily being a norm of expectation that the agent himself holds, but one that the agent merely recognizes that others hold. In other words, we tend to count as achievements what we think others count as achievements.

Norms of expectation are very different from ideals. The first type of norm, what a person thinks he can expect as a matter of course in relation to external circumstances, might have nothing whatsoever to do with that person’s personal ideals. For example, I expect to never own a heap of rubies because rubies are rare and expensive, and I expect to never have so much money to squander. So, I have a specific norm of expectation regarding my future wealth and the state of the rare gems market—but this tells us nothing about my ideals regarding wealth or gems. Taking a more positive norm, although I expect my heart to be in decent condition at least until my fifties, I do not have cardiac health as an ideal towards which I am striving.

Even the second type of norm, regarding my expectations of my abilities and limitations, does not directly relate to my ideals (though the relation is likely much closer here than with the first type of norm). I do not expect to be able to run a four-minute mile anytime soon, and if I did run a mile in that time I would definitely count that as a notable achievement. But I do not care about running, which entails that I don’t have any ideals involving my running quickly.

As we can see, the main difference between ideals and norms of expectations is that norms of expectations need not have ethical content. Although norms of expectation embody our judgments about what we should believe, they do not express any of our
judgments about what we ought to do, what kind of person we ought to be, or what kind of commitments or projects we ought to have.

The central characteristic of an ideal is that it represents some set of concerns that an agent cares about and finds important and meaningful. A person’s norms of expectation, as Taylor describes them, might not matter very much to him (or weigh with him). Taylor’s account of the emotion of pride suffers because it is founded on norms that the agent might not care about, and it is difficult to imagine someone being proud of something that she does not care about. This consideration provides one reason why an account of pride must include a reference the agent’s ideals. Ideals fill the gap of explaining which facts weigh with a person. Since one might exceed one’s expectations without feeling pride, the expectation-based account fails to provide sufficient conditions for feeling pride.

Taylor’s account of the emotion of pride explains the emotion in terms of exceeding certain norms whereas my account explains pride in terms of approximating certain norms. It is important to recognize that this is not a verbal dispute; rather it signals that very different norms are central to the two accounts. On Taylor’s account, feeling proud just is seeing something’s belonging to oneself as exceeding one’s norms of expectation, exceeding what she thinks she is, or others are, entitled to expect. On my account, feeling proud involves taking oneself to have approximated one’s ideals, which, for the sake of contrast, we can call “norms of aspiration.” These norms specify what sort of person one aspires to be, what sort of projects one aspires to have, what sorts of commitments one aspires to make, and so on. I would now like to articulate briefly some of the differences between expectations and aspirations.
Exceeding a norm of expectation is not the same as approximating a norm of aspiration. First, as we have seen, exceeding your norm of expectation might, depending on the norm, be of little importance to you. But approximating your norm of aspiration will always seem important since, unlike expectations, aspirations invariably depend upon your sense of what matters.

Second, one might have expectations without aspirations, and vice versa. However, having norms of both types is necessary for living a decent life: having expectations without aspirations suggests a life without hope, while having aspirations without expectations suggests a life devoid of well-grounded self-respect and confidence.

It is also possible, though not desirable, for a person’s aspirations and expectations to coincide. If a person expects as a matter of course to fulfill her aspirations, then her aspirations do not involve what Taylor calls achievements. For, Taylor defines achievement in terms of exceeding one’s norms of expectation. There would be something wrong with a person who expects to fulfill all her aspirations as a matter of course, even if her norms of expectation were very high, for she would aspire to a life that proceeded as a matter of course. There is an unsettling complacency to this attitude, no matter the content of her norms of expectation, because aspiring to a life in which one’s expectations are never exceeded requires that one is either arrogant (if the expectations are high) or timid (if the expectations are low). If the aspirations are high then taking their fulfillment as a matter of course displays a blind arrogance towards the real possibility of failure—a possibility that accompanies all high aspirations. But if the expectations are low then, it seems, one should aspire to something higher.

Consider such a person—one whose aspirations just are her expectations—with a view to the emotion of pride. This case provides a different way of showing that the
expectation-based account fails to provide necessary conditions for feeling pride. Taylor would say that this person could not feel proud of fulfilling her aspirations (since she does not take herself to have exceeded her expectations), whereas my account suggests that she would feel pride (since she has lived up to her ideals). Consider the arrogant and the timid agents’ own possible deathbed assessments of their lives. An arrogant person with extravagant expectations might very well take pride in her life of accomplishment. “I expected the very best,” she would tell us, “and I got it.” Likewise, it seems that a meek person without any grand aspirations could take some measure of pride. “Although I never aspired to anything beyond what I felt entitled to,” she tells us, “I was never once disappointed.” Thus, one’s norms of aspiration seem more directly connected than one’s norms of expectation to feeling proud. Thus, the aspiration-based account of pride improves upon Taylor’s expectation-based account.

3.7 Incorporating Other Accounts of Pride

In §2.4-§2.6 I surveyed three broad kinds of accounts of pride: agency-based, possession-based, and identification-based accounts. In this section I reprise some of my concerns about those accounts in order to make clear in what ways I claim the ideal-based view improves upon its predecessors. I also stress points of agreement between my view and those of others. Since each of the three others accounts is plausible with respect to a large domain of cases of pride, I want to ensure that those insights are preserved in the present account. If the arguments of the present section are sound, then the ideal-based account should be seen as a welcome corrective to these others views.
According to agency-based accounts, taking pride in something requires taking it to be a product of one’s agency. This view explains achievement paradigm examples of pride very well, since achievement, standardly construed, always requires the exercise of one’s agency. Moreover, agency is undoubtedly relevant to pride whenever one lives in accordance with an ideal by doing something. In a large number of cases, living in accordance with one’s ideal is a matter of successfully exercising one’s agency.

However this agency mandate is contingent upon your needing to do something in order to meet your ideal. As I have claimed already, sometimes we meet our ideals without needing to do anything—as when we are proud to be freedom-loving Americans, or Catholics, or ruggedly handsome. If the personal ideals corresponding to those objects of pride are worthy, then pride can be warranted even if one’s agency is not implicated in the object of pride.

Moreover, as a merely dialectical point, even if such ideals were not worthy and even if any ideal worth meeting required an exercise of agency to do so, the ideal-based account of attribution would remain more plausible than the strict agency-based account of attribution. As I argued in §2.6.2, if we did think that unworthy and non-agency-implicating pride exhibits some mistake of focus, it would more plausible to suppose that the mistake involves the subject taking a worthless ideal to be worthy than it would be to suppose that the mistake involves the subject taking her agency to be implicated in the object of her pride.

The ideal-based view of pride accommodates the intuition that pride is importantly tied to agency. It is a strength of the view, not a weakness, that it allows for intelligible agency-free pride, the possibility of which has also been featured widely in the philosophical literature in the form of possession- and identification-based accounts of
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pride. As I suggested in a previous section, the thought that pride must (in some sense) be tied one’s agency is better construed as a condition of its moral justification than as a condition of its warrant, although the implications of that claim are, I argued, draconian in another way.

Anthony Kenny's grammatical version of the possession account, later echoed by Donald Davidson, analyzes pride as joy taken in something that one takes to be, under some description, one's own. It follows from this view that one can be proud of something that one is not responsible for bringing about, a consequence that Kenny emphasizes:

…whatever expression completes the sense of the verb “…is proud of…” must begin with “his own…,” even if what a man is proud of is only his brother-in-law’s acquaintance with the second cousin of a Duke.54

My view of pride incorporates this insight, as I have stressed throughout this essay. So I largely agree with this view, so far as it goes.

However the view is incomplete and best supplemented by the ideal-based account. Kenny recognizes that pride involves considerations of one's merit, in virtue of which one is pleased with oneself. An account that remains at the level of grammar, though, is unable to explain why the proud person cares about “his own...”—especially when the object of possession is so distantly related, as in Kenny's example. We should find it mysterious that someone feels proud of his brother-in-law's acquaintance with the second-cousin of a Duke, at least until we are told that he has aristocratic ideals and aspirations that he takes such an acquaintance to help him meet. An advocate of the grammatical possession account can welcome my ideal-based account as a much needed supplement.

54 Kenny (1963), 23.
Annette Baier argues that taking pride in something requires seeing oneself as having the power to use that object as one likes. She combines with this position the Humean view of property according to which property rights are reducible to the power to use the object as one likes, so that pride in possessions constitutes the paradigm case of pride. I agree that many ideals, and especially materialistic ideals, are met only when one attains a high degree of power over the use of things. If the ideal of joining the so-called Ownership Society captivates you, then feeling proud of that house over there will require that you have property rights to it. I have therefore incorporated into my account Baier’s observation that ownership provides a paradigm case of pride.

But just as it is implausible to view all ideals as reducible to power, it is likewise implausible to reduce all pride to power and ownership. A teacher’s pride in her abilities, or a citizen’s pride in his community, need not be reducible to power or possession. The ideal-based account is designed to capture Baier’s insights without being limited by them. As with the agency-based view, I suggest that the ownership view mistakes a sufficient condition of the pride relation for a necessary condition.

Amelie Rorty recognizes the mistake of focusing on one paradigm of pride at the expense of all others, and with respect to this recognition I follow her lead. According to her identification account, taking pride in something requires identifying with the object of pride. Pride in being an American involves taking one’s being an American as part of one’s identity. Likewise, pride in winning the gold medal involves identifying oneself (partly) in terms of being a gold medal winner; and pride in owning a beautiful home involves identifying oneself as such an owner. As we can see, this sort of analysis is not limited to any one paradigm case of pride. One can, seemingly, identify with any reasonable description of oneself.
However, this latitude has the potential of undermining the account of pride, especially because it is unclear what personal identification amounts to on Rorty’s view. In particular, and in the parlance of my view, it is difficult to see how identification with some positive description of oneself will yield pride unless that identification refers at least obliquely to one’s ideals. Rorty’s identification account of pride leaves out of the analysis the explanation for fact that you take the object of your pride to reflect well upon your merit. Including in your conception of yourself the identification, “I, a person who delights in seeing light on a leaf,” does not transform your joy that you are that sort of person into pride in being that sort of person—not unless you see being that sort of person as an ideal of yours the attainment of which would reflect well on your worth. The ideal-based account is founded around this requirement, and takes it as central to pride.

That a person’s personal ideals must figure into her pride constrains what she can intelligibly take pride in, but there is no reason in principle why we could not construe the notion of identification so as to incorporate a person’s ideals into her self-identification. So an identification theorist might accept the ideal-based view of pride as a welcome addition. However, my account differs from Rorty’s in a fundamental way (I also stressed this in §2.4). Rorty claims that “it is a brute fact that a person might take pride in her pack of hounds or her long fingernails. No rational argument can by itself show that what she feels is not pride.” If pride were a brute fact, then it could not be analyzed and explained in terms of the subject’s other judgments. But I have argued that pride can be explained in terms of its warrant conditions, that a subject can offer reasons to explain and justify her pride. Pride is not a mere feeling, like hunger, that is independent of one’s judgments.

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3.8 Conclusion

One attraction of the ideal-based account of pride is that it reveals as quixotic the search for the much sought-after pride relation: the special relation that all proud agents take (in virtue of their being proud) to hold between themselves and the objects of their pride. Some philosophers have maintained that taking pride in something requires taking oneself to own or possess the object of pride; others that taking pride requires taking oneself to be responsible for bringing about the object of pride. Both of these accounts draw on powerful intuitions about paradigm cases of pride. However, both of these accounts also make some paradigm instances of pride difficult to understand: some people take pride in their god-given appearance, some take pride in their ancestry, and some take pride in their victorious Boston Red Sox. None of the mentioned accounts of the pride relation can accommodate all of these paradigm instances. The ideal-based account, on the other hand, allows that each ideal sets its own characteristic success conditions—living up to some ideals (but not others) requires proper exercise of one’s agency, while others require mere ownership or familial connection. The ideal-based account, if correct, reveals that searching for a single substantive account of the pride relation is quixotic because there is no relation that all people, with respect to all ideals, bear to each thing that counts in favor of their living in accordance with their ideals.

However, the ideal-based account, unlike some other accounts, does provide a substantial (even if incomplete) explanation of which relations a person will take pride in. A person will take pride in something only if he takes his relation to it to indicate that he is living in accordance with an ideal of his. The account does not specify which ideal, and hence which success conditions, are in play. Thus, it rejects the skeptical conclusion that some have drawn from the fact that there is no one substantive pride relation, namely,
that there is no independent characterization whatsoever (substantive or formal) to be
made of the relation between the agent and the object of his pride.\textsuperscript{56} For, the
characterization in terms of personal ideals is conceptually independent of pride, and so
provides a (non-circular) explanation of what any given person is disposed to be proud of.

Although my account of pride is distinguished from its competitors by its invocation of
the concept of ideals, the person taking pride need not have any explicit thought of ideals.
A person’s ideals, in the sense in which I use the term, are his conceptions of what sort of
person he should be, that is, what sort of character, projects, relationships, and interests
he should have. A person’s ideals are often inchoate and difficult to identify and articulate
explicitly.

In the next chapter, I supplement this chapter’s presentation of the personal ideals
account of pride in two ways. First, I offer a sketch of a general account of personal ideals.
This sketch provides information about what exactly I am supposing these ideals to be
and how exactly they do the theoretical work I suppose that they do. Second, I address
some of pride’s social dimensions, which I have largely neglected thus far. For example, I
have said very little about the relation between pride and interpersonal comparison or
camaraderie. In the next chapter, I argue that much of pride’s social side is explained by
the social nature of personal ideals.

\textsuperscript{56} Cf, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (2003, 135-136): “What sense can be made of the possessive
pronouns that arise in glosses of pride, guilt, and many other emotions? We contend that by claiming
thoughts of possession to be a necessary constituent of pride, the judgmentalist tradition has things
backwards. The sense in which the club’s accomplishments belong to the fan is simply that he is able to
be proud of them. It is, after all, “his team”—but in this sense only. Should the quasijudgmentalist fall
back on the claim that the fan \textit{feels as if} the triumph were his own, we would suggest that the only sense in
which this is true is the trivializing sense: he is proud of it.”
4. Personal Ideals, Social Practices, and Pride

“It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”

~Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, p. 6

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that experiencing the emotion of pride involves judging that one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. If this result is tenable then a complete characterization of pride is centered upon the notion of personal ideals. In this chapter, I describe in more detail what I take personal ideals to be.

Although pride involves personal ideals, it is not merely a personal affair. Pride is a social phenomenon, and this sociality is a significant draw of the attention that moralists and other social thinkers, from Augustine to Stokely Carmichael, have given to it. Precisely because it helps us to understand a person’s relations to others, pride is also an important theme in many literary works, from Homer’s *Iliad* and Milton’s *Paradise Lost* to Austen’s *Pride and Prejudice* and Wharton’s *Ethan Frome*. In particular, and notoriously, the emotion and the trait are both related to both a concern for elevated social status and for camaraderie alike.

This observation presents two puzzles. First, pride appears under one aspect to be a profoundly personal characteristic and, under another aspect, to be a deeply social one. One’s pride is implicated in one’s conception of who one should be and, so, might not in general seem to concern one’s views of others (as gratitude and pity, or a sense of justice and generosity, more obviously do). But the self-regarding emotion and trait
of pride are also paradigmatically social phenomena. The phenomenology of the emotion of pride, like that of shame, seems to require the image of an observer of oneself.¹ But it is not clear how an appraisal of the self can take the form of a representation of another person. The trait of pride is also said to concern others; for example, Aristotle’s account of the virtue of megalopsuchia (which Ross’s translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics* renders as “pride”) describes a trait that, among other things, regulates a virtuous person’s attitudes towards praise from others and those whom he rightly regards as his ethical or economic inferiors. Call this the sociality puzzle (or cluster of puzzles): how pride can be both an individualistic and a social phenomenon.

One might argue, however, that this so-called puzzle only arises for accounts of pride that, like the personal ideal-based account, are individualistically oriented. This sociality objection is the charge that both sorts of pride have less to do with how one regards oneself in relation to one’s personal ideals and more to do with how one regards oneself in relation to others. Many philosophers have recently developed analogous objections to individualistic accounts of the emotion of shame, such as that proposed by John Rawls, that construe that emotion as the experience of a loss of self-esteem or self-worth.² John Deigh, for instance, objects that “we should conceive shame, not as a reaction to a loss [of self-esteem], but as a reaction to a threat, specifically, the threat of demeaning treatment one would invite in giving the appearance of someone of lesser worth. Its analogues then are, not grief and sorrow, but fear and shyness.”³ Deigh therefore understands shame as an assessment that one’s relations to others are threatened rather than as a judgment that one is failing to live in accordance with one’s personal ideals or hoped for life plan.

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Likewise, J. David Velleman argues that “Anxiety about social disqualification constitutes the emotion of shame.”\textsuperscript{4} This social conception of shame suggests that, by analogy, the emotion of pride is best understood as something like contentment or confidence about one’s relations to others, regardless of one’s judgments of self-worth.

This social conception of pride is prevalent in the social sciences, as well as in moral psychology. Sociologists and social psychologists have long emphasized that pride is linked to a sense of camaraderie with others. The influential sociologist Thomas Scheff has advanced the view that “Pride and shame serve as instinctive signals, both to the self and other,” that inform oneself and others of the state of one’s social bonds.\textsuperscript{5} Scheff summarizes his view as follows:

I follow the lead of [Charles] Cooley and [Erving] Goffman, whose work implies that pride and shame are the primary social emotions. These two emotions have a signal function with respect to the social bond. In this framework, pride and shame serve as intense and automatic bodily signs of the state of a system that would be otherwise difficult to observe, the state of one’s bonds to others. Pride is the sign of an intact bond; shame, a severed or threatened bond. The clearest outer marker of pride is holding up one’s head in public and looking others in the eye, but indicating respect by taking turns looking and looking away.\textsuperscript{6}

Scheff, and in his view Cooley and Goffman, holds that the emotion of pride is primarily an indicator of “intact” social bonds. How can this be so, if pride involves a judgment that one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals?

Scheff’s account of pride leads into the second puzzle, which concerns pride’s social aspect alone. It is puzzling that pride should be connected both to a humble vision of oneself as but one member of a broader social group (as when one is a proud American)

\textsuperscript{4} J. David Velleman, \textit{How We Get Along} (New York: Cambridge University, 2009), 95.
\textsuperscript{6} Ibid. It is important to distinguish Scheff’s claim from the thesis that pride necessarily has as its object an intact social bond or, more colloquially, the approval of others. The latter thesis is decisively refuted in Isenberg (1949), pp. 2-3. The function of some mental process is distinct from their intentional content. So just as, for example, most utterances are not \textit{about} communicating information even if that is their function, so too is Scheff able to claim that most feelings of pride are not \textit{about} social bonding.
as well as to a notoriously invidious concern for social status—that is, for what sets oneself apart from other members of one’s social group. Feeling pride is linked psychologically, if not conceptually, with thinking that the object of one’s pride is unique or extraordinary. Several of the varieties of vicious pride, like haughtiness, arrogance, and conceit, are not implausibly characterized primarily in terms of a belief in one’s interpersonal superiority. Call this the superiority paradigm of pride, to contrast it with the camaraderie paradigm that Scheff and others describe. This latter conception of pride, unlike the superiority paradigm, makes no reference whatsoever to interpersonal hierarchy. So the second puzzle is that pride seems to be specially related to both unhealthy and healthy social relations. Call this the hierarchy puzzle.

As I indicated in §3.5, some instances of camaraderie pride, like American pride, seem to be assimilable to the status- and superiority-based category in either of two ways. First, some social groups, like the class of Nobel Laureates, are defined in terms of some extraordinary characteristic(s) of its members. So, pride in being a member of the class of Nobel Laureates can plausibly be analyzed in terms of individual achievement and social status. Alternatively, individuals of a group that is not defined in terms of some exemplary characteristic, like the class of Americans or of subscribers to the Seattle Opera, might judge their group to be superior to other groups. This form of pride may likewise be analyzed in terms of a group agent being superior to other group agents. However, I will argue that not all conflicts between camaraderie and superiority are so easily explained.

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7 Cf., Hume, who argues that, “We are rejoiced for many goods, which, on account of their frequency, give us no pride” (T 2.1.6.4)—that is, we must perceive the object of our pride as “peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons,” (Ibid) otherwise we tend to feel mere joy instead of pride. For an empirical study of the phenomenon, see Gaines, Duvall, Webster, and Smith, “Feeling Good After Praise for a Successful Performance: The Importance of Social Comparison Information,” Self and Identity 4 (2005): 373-389.

In this chapter, I explore these two puzzles and their relation to each other. I argue that these apparent conflicts can be resolved by developing an account of personal ideals that makes manifest their social form and social content. In the next section I develop an account of personal ideals that promises to resolve these two puzzles, or at least to deepen our understanding of them. This account makes explicit the social nature of personal ideals. With respect to the first puzzle, the social practice theory of personal ideals that I sketch in §4.2 challenges an unsupported premise of the sociality objection: that judgments about living in accordance with our personal ideals are conceptually independent considerations about the status of our relationships to those with whom we share a moral practice. In other words, I agree with Cheshire Calhoun, Deigh and Velleman that shame (and by analogy, pride) involves judgments about one’s relations to others, but disagree with them that our understanding of these relations is independent of one’s understanding of one’s personal ideals. Our personal ideals help us to pick out which of our relationships are important enough to occasion pride or shame.

With respect to the second puzzle, I argue that a commitment to living in accordance with one’s ideals involves a commitment to a social practice and to living in accordance with norms that guide members of that practice. I also argue that the judgment that one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals involved in the emotion of pride entails a judgment that one warrants respect from fellow members of the practice. On the other hand, the sense of interpersonal superiority that sometimes accompanies both forms of pride is not conceptually related to pride.

However, I refrain from explicit discussion of the two puzzles until §4.3, where I explain how a personal ideals-based account of pride makes sense of these puzzles. But first, in §4.2, I defend an account of personal ideals.
4.2 Personal Ideals

4.2.1 A Topography of Ideals

Personal ideals are conceptions of what sort of person one should be, including what sorts of character, attitudes, projects, relationships, and social roles one should have. Personal ideals are individuated with respect to the domains to which they apply (their generality) and to the ordering of the particular values and aims that constitute them (their complexity). The generality of ideals of citizenship, for instance, is the broad domain of state-related activities. Ideals of citizenship are complex insofar as they are constituted by orderings of various other subsidiary aims, like cultivating patience, respectfulness, courage, affability, diligence, patriotism, etc., as applied to the domain of citizenship.

A spectrum of ideals ranges from the general (e.g., being a kind, or affable, or respectful person) to the specific (e.g., being a great chess player, being a good grandparent), depending upon the breadth of their domains. General ideals are individuated by the domains of the broadest forms of social organization, or practice. These ideals include possessing the moral virtues: being a generous person (the domain of property, as it regards others), being a just person (the domain of distributions of limited resources), being an honest person (the domain of truth-telling), being a courageous person (the domain of fearsome dangers), etc. Some general ideals, like being a respectful person, are not restricted in their application to any particular social practice, and are all the more important for being so general. Not all general ideals are moral ideals. A Romantic ideal of living a passionate life does not seem to be tied to any particular social world—it

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9 For brevity’s sake I sometimes call personal ideals “ideals.” When I refer to other sorts of ideals (e.g., political, environmental, etc.), I do so explicitly.

10 I will use the terms “social organization” and “social practice” interchangeably, unless I indicate otherwise. For accounts of practices see Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, and Margaret Urban Walker, *Moral Understandings*.

might even require of the passionate individual that she not be constrained by any particular society—and does not seem to involve particular moral demands (where, as is common among philosophers, I take “moral” to refer to the relatively narrow ethical domain of what we owe to each other).\textsuperscript{12}

As P. F. Strawson noted, this dependence of ideals upon social practices may be of an empirical or of a logical sort.\textsuperscript{13} Practices may make living in accordance with an ideal more feasible (psychologically, economically, socially, etc.) than it might otherwise be. For example, public schooling is a social practice that is designed to help students gain competencies that will help them to live the sorts of lives they hope to live. On the other hand, practices are sometimes necessary for making any sense at all of particular personal ideals. Some examples of a logical dependence of ideals upon social practice are personal ideals related to the legal profession and politics. Apart from legal and political institutions it would not make sense to even call oneself a lawyer or a politician, let alone to aspire to be a great lawyer or politician.

Specific ideals tend to be complex arrangements of general aims and values that apply to domains that are structured by smaller-scale social organizations. These ideals are sometimes logically related to their organizations and sometimes merely contingently related to them. Aspiring to be a great chess player means having an ideal that combines a range of subsidiary intellectual and moral aims and skills, such as developing general computational abilities, cultivating patience, even-temperedness, resolve, etc., and is tied

\textsuperscript{12} As I claimed in §3.3, there may be some general relation between morality and personal ideals—for example, it may be that the normative status of personal ideals depends upon their being, in some sense, in accordance with moral ideals. This conclusion would require an argument that would take me away from the point at issue.

\textsuperscript{13} Cf., Strawson, “Social Morality and Individual Ideal”: “It is obvious that many, if not all, of the ideal images of which I spoke demand for their realization the existence of some form of social organization. The demand is in varying degrees logical or empirical. Some ideals only make sense in a complex social context, and even in a particular kind of complex social context. For others, some complexity of social organization seems, rather, a practically necessary condition of the ideal’s being realized in any very full or satisfactory way” (5).
to a specific social organization, the chessworld, and specific techniques required for excellence in that domain.

It might be that some specific ideals involve domains that are less obviously structured by social institutions, if at all; but, I suspect, these will be few and far between. (One might think that some specific ideals, like the grandparenting ideal, are individuated naturally and not by social institution. Further reflection shows this cannot be so—consider what a good grandparent would be like in Plato’s Republic.)

Personal ideals are often related to social roles, though the former cannot generally be explanatorily reduced to the latter. Since one can competently play a role that one is indifferent to, playing a role is not sufficient for having an ideal. But social roles, like personal ideals, are characterized in terms of the goals of some social organization or practice and in terms of the methods that are thought best to attain those goals. Many ideals can and must be understood in terms of the roles to which they correspond: what it is to be a great lawyer, and to aspire to be a great lawyer, depends upon what it is to be a lawyer.

Other ideals are less role-dependent: what it is to be a great friend does correspond with what it is to play the role of a friend; but it is less clear that we can characterize the social role of the friend independently of an account of what it is to be a good friend. That is because the role of friend is not the creation of any particular organization but, rather, a title that goes to those who live somewhat in accordance with the ideal of the good friend. Likewise with the role of hero: heroes are those who live in accordance with certain ideals and to the extent that there is a role of hero it derives from the relevant

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ideal. In short, some ideals are given by roles and some roles are given by ideals. For this reason, ideals cannot in general be explanatorily reduced to roles.\(^\text{15}\)

Some ideals may apply to many roles. Earlier I called these general ideals. These regulate the performance of a class of narrower roles: what it is to be a good teacher in a democratic society is plausibly constrained and guided by what it is to be a good citizen, but not vice versa. For, one purpose of education in a democracy is, plausibly, the Deweyan preparation of individuals for civic life. So, teaching ideals are constrained by civic ideals to the extent that being a good teacher involves preparing one’s students for civic life. Ideals, like roles, can be hierarchically arranged.

It is doubtful whether living in accordance with a specific and complex ideal requires full possession of the ideal’s component general ideals. A good elementary school teacher possesses virtues of patience, fairness, imagination, kindness, etc.—at least insofar as they apply in the domain of teaching five- to ten-year-olds en masse (a relatively recent social organization). While being a good elementary school teacher requires patience with five- to ten-year-olds and their parents, it does not require full possession of the general virtue of patience; nor does the ideal chess player need to possess resolve in all aspects of her life. One can be an excellent teacher or scholar, for all practical purposes, without being an excellent person outside of the academic domain. This is in part because living in accordance with an ideal requires, for any domain, mastery of certain domain-specific techniques, broadly construed. One might have mastered certain techniques of classroom fairness without having mastered techniques of, say, domestic fairness.

Although it is a matter of longstanding dispute whether general moral ideals may conflict with each other, non-moral ideals, specific and general, are multifarious and

\(^{15}\) The temptation to translate from ideal to role is strong, even in the most general cases. Imagining an ideal in terms of a role can be a powerful rhetorical and motivation tool: consider the classic tropes of subject in the Kingdom of Ends and volunteer in the army of duty.
clearly may stand in opposition to each other.\textsuperscript{16} Being a good romantic will conflict with the ideal of the realist, and being a good soldier will conflict with the ideal of the pacifist. The possibility of such opposition follows from the fact that social institutions and practices can themselves stand in opposition insofar as they are constituted by either (or both) opposing goals or conflicting methods for achieving those goals.

In this section, I have sketched an account of personal ideal individuation that makes essential the social institution or institutions to which ideals apply (i.e., their generality) and the ordering of various aims and values (i.e., their complexity). This account prepares the ground for a social institution-based account of understanding and reasoning about ideals. For this account of reasoning, I draw from the observation that I just made—that social institutions and practices are constituted by either particular goals and/or methods for attaining particular goals.

4.2.2 Reasoning about Ideals

In this section, I develop an account of how it is possible to argue rationally over the content of personal ideals, in light of the fact that ideals correspond to particular social forms. I argue that this correspondence enables rational argumentation. This account will help us to make sense of what it is to have an ideal, which is necessary for understanding what it is to feel pride.

Practitioners and critics of a social practice develop the standards for specific ideals that are indexed to that practice. This development can be understood as a matter either of creation or discovery. In some cases, especially when people decide what goals their institutions should aim at, this development will be, or at least seem to be, a matter of

\textsuperscript{16} Cf., Raz (2005).
creation; in others, e.g. when methods are developed in order to attain established goals, this development will be a matter of discovery. I suspect that it will sometimes be unclear what sort of development is at hand. In any case, I argue in this section that those engaged in developing these standards aim to give reasons to each other that would convince anyone who takes up a common point of view. As a consequence, it is possible to argue rationally about the content of personal ideals.

People who disagree over the content of a specific ideal can have every appearance of aspiring to objectivity. Let’s consider an example of reasoning about ideals. It is commonly thought, for example, that the ideal team sports player must contribute to the success of his team and, though this is a matter of some dispute among critics and players, that those who hold impressive individual records might nonetheless fail to achieve the status of greatness if they never lead their team to a championship (or at least to notable success). Dan Marino was by all accounts an excellent quarterback for the Miami Dolphins, but one might think that his failure to have ever played on a Super Bowl-winning team counts as a reason against considering him one of the great football players. This dispute reflects the tension within certain ideals between individualistic and collective considerations. Can a team player be great if his or her team never succeeds? I regard this as a substantive question that extends beyond the sports arena to all collective endeavors. The point is not to resolve this question. Rather, the point is that

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17 I, therefore, endorse Elizabeth Anderson’s conclusion that “people interpret and justify their valuations by exchanging reasons for them with the aim of reaching a common point of view from which others can achieve and reflectively endorse one another’s valuations” (Value in Ethics and Economics, 3). See also John Searle’s distinction between epistemic and ontological objectivity in The Social Construction of Reality, p. 8.

18 Of course, it may be possible for entirely subjective discourse to have all of the marks of objective discourse. My project, however, does not require engagement with debates over realism, antirealism, and quasirealism.

19 I discuss this tension in depth in §5.2 and §5.3.3.
resolution of the question requires offering reasons that would convince anyone (or at least any interested party) who takes up a common point of view.

Likewise, whether one can join the pantheon of great baseball players may (as in the case of Pete Rose) depend upon whether critics and practitioners are able to provide good reason for thinking that committing certain alleged ethical wrongs (e.g., betting on one’s team) is at all pertinent to one’s meeting the relevant ideal.\textsuperscript{20} The Pete Rose controversy engages issues about the contours of the baseball ideal, all of which, including the extent to which ethical considerations permeate the ideal, are up for determination by members of the baseball world, who offer reasons to each other that they hope will convince any interested person taking up a common point of view.\textsuperscript{21} Members have this power of determination because they are not, as those of us on the outside are, entirely constrained in their reasoning by the existing goals and rules of the game—they may amend the game itself if they see fit to do so. I will call the complex of a social institution and its objectively-aimed reason-giving practice a \textit{social form}.

But can there really be any objective measure of Pete Rose’s greatness as a baseball player? Surely, if any of our preferences can be “subjectively justified,” as a matter of personal taste, it will be preferences about trivial matters like Pete Rose’s greatness. One might object, in short, that specific personal ideals differ from the most general personal ideals (both moral and intellectual) in that the specific ones are a subjective matter. This objection gains force from the highly contingent nature of specific organizations, such as

\textsuperscript{20} Stephen Darwall defends the claim that qualities of character are typically relevant in assessing whether someone engaged in a specific pursuit (his example is tennis) merits appraisal respect as a participant of that institution: “If a player constantly heckles his opponent, disputes every close call to throw off his opponent’s concentration, or laughs when his opponent misses shots, then even if his skill is such that he would be capable of beating everyone else without such tactics, he is not likely to be respected as a tennis player. Thus,” Darwall concludes, “insofar as respect within such a pursuit will depend on an appraisal of the participant from the perspective of whatever standards are held to be appropriate to the pursuit, such respect will depend on a judgment to which excellences of character are thought relevant” (“Two kinds of respect,” \textit{Ethics} 88, no. 1, (1977), 42).

\textsuperscript{21} Who counts as an interested party is itself up for discussion, and may vary according to the relevant ideal.
Major League Baseball: there might seem to be little reason to think that deliberation about baseball norms tracks any objective truth whatsoever.

I respond to this objection by considering in further detail what it is to have and to argue over some personal ideal. Having an ideal requires caring to (at least) a minimal degree about one’s living in accordance with the ideal. This in turn requires a significant degree of endorsement of the relevant social form: its aims, methods, and norms of success. This baseline endorsement makes possible objective dispute among practitioners over the content of an ideal (as opposed to development of different ideals with differing aims, methods, and/or norms of success). One does not need to care about the ideal to argue over its contours. But to argue over the content of the ideal does involve appealing to considerations that would move impartial adherents of the ideal.

In any disagreement about the norms of a given ideal (or about anything, for that matter), even among those who are not practitioners, much will be taken for granted in order merely to fix the subject matter of the dispute. Only if we can identify what is common ground amongst apparent disputants can we make sense of their activity as a genuine dispute. I am arguing that we can make sense of their activity in this way if we see that there is much common ground and that disputants rely upon (and develop) norms that they expect interested persons from a common point of view to assent to.

Moreover, it would be a mistake to assume that there cannot be an epistemically common point of view merely because only interested persons would care to weigh in. Whether Pete Rose is a great baseball player arguably should not interest anyone, given the overriding importance of other issues—but the claim that a dispute is trivial does not entail that there are no objective standards relevant to its resolution. Moral disputes will

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22 As David Velleman (2002) has argued, this concern may take the form, not of a desire to meet the ideal, but rather of an exercise of make-believe—imagining that one is another person who one aspires to be, and pretending to act as he or she would act (which may not involve any desire to meet an ideal).
be of more general, if not universal, interest, but that does not entail that the relevant standards are more objective (though they may be more objective for other reasons).

Where we cannot identify substantial common ground, a new ideal may be created, especially if something important is at stake. New ideals are often generated via schism, when disagreement about the content of some ideal apparently cannot be settled. For instance, although (amateur and professional) musicologists generally admire John Cage as one of the 20th century’s great composers, there is yet some doubt as to whether he is, in fact, a musical composer. Is 4’33” a musical composition? Cage’s insistence that the sounds produced by the audience and other “background noise” are legitimate musical objects has seemed to prevail among critics. However, this expansion of the form has to a large extent been catalogued as experimental or aleatoric music, a fact that testifies either to the introduction of a new genre or to the continued resistance of some critics (or both).

There is a schism here insofar as there is an open question as to whether a good experimental composer is also a good composer, insofar, that is, as Schoenberg’s description of Cage makes sense to us: “Not a composer, but an inventor of genius.”

The very interpretation of one’s ideals cannot be separated from public discourse about them, and in this respect ideals resemble all other things that carry meaning. This is especially so in the case of role-based ideals, since roles are themselves typically formalized social functions.23 Being a doctor, a parent, a nurse, or a teacher means playing a role that is defined largely by the needs of society. As such, the standards for these roles are also largely, though not entirely, defined by society’s needs and expectations. Being a good doctor means playing the role of doctor well, and so forth.

The very interpretation, let alone the justification, of such ideals cannot be undertaken

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apart from the broad demands of the relevant social organization. These demands constrain, but do not determine, the nature of such roles and their corresponding standards.

I have just argued that the nature and justification of a personal ideal both have ties to the give and take of reasons between the participants in the relevant social form, and that the reasons offered in favor of some interpretation of an ideal are intended to persuade any interested person who takes up a common point of view.

4.2.3 Moral Psychology of Personal Ideals

The social account of personal ideals does not entail that agents think about some social form whenever they are pursuing a personal ideal. A chess player does not usually think about her fellow chess players and their storied history when she deliberates about her next move. Such misdirected thinking can even be prudentially and/or ethically inappropriate. A personal ideal includes norms about, among other things, when it would be inappropriate to think explicitly about social forms. A good teacher will be thinking, on the spot, about her student’s question and not about whether she can justify a particular response to her colleagues. This is not to say, however, that the moral psychology of the pursuit of one’s ideals is unrelated to the social institution-based account of personal ideals.

In particular, the moral psychology of the concern for living in accordance with one’s personal ideals can be understood largely in terms of a process of internalization of the social dynamics that I described in the previous section. Alasdair MacIntyre offers an illuminating discussion of the moral psychology of internalizing the ideal of being a good
chess player that will be helpful here.\textsuperscript{24} In the learning stages, the pupil may not care particularly about chess—its rules, its history, its different schools of strategy, or its techniques. If she wants to learn the game it may be for various reasons that are \textit{external} to chess: she may want to learn a game to play with her friends, a way to fill her free time, a way to improve her college application, or a way of bonding with her niece.\textsuperscript{25}

The acquisition of personal ideals therefore requires a certain degree of receptivity to the valuations and behavior of others who share the practice. Even after the novice internalizes the ideal, psychological traces of this socialization remain. Much has been written about such remnants with regard to the emotion of shame. In a long endnote to \textit{Shame and Necessity}, entitled “Mechanisms of Shame and Guilt,” Williams argues that “the psychological model for [… shame and guilt] involves an internalized figure. In the case of shame this is, I have suggested in the text, a watcher or witness. In the case of guilt, the internalized figure is a \textit{victim} or an \textit{enforcer}.”\textsuperscript{26} As Williams notes, this figure can, but need not, be a particular individual or a representative of some social group. The internalized witness may be characterized, instead, in ethical terms as “one whose reactions I would respect; equally, he is conceived as someone who would respect those same reactions if they were appropriately directed to him.”\textsuperscript{27}

My account builds upon Williams’s discussion in that the social account of the internalization of norms that Williams develops provides the necessary social elements of

\textsuperscript{24} MacIntyre (1984), 188.
\textsuperscript{25} MacIntyre characterizes internal goods in two ways (primarily): (1) they are goods that we can only specify in terms of the practice, and (2) they can only be recognized by the experience of participating in the practice in question (188-189). The distinction between internal and external considerations raises the normative question, which I do not now attempt to answer, of whether a person who is appropriately committed to the ideal will be at all sensitive to external considerations, or whether external considerations are only ever relevant to those outside of the practice, those who do not fully care about the relevant ideals. The important point is that at an early stage (at least) of ideals internalization, a person who aims to live in accordance with an ideal may be motivated to do so by any of a variety of external reasons. But as she acquires the ideal, she internalizes the standards and expectations of others.
\textsuperscript{26} Williams (1993), 219.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}, 84.
my account of personal ideals. Even the normatively characterized witness that Williams
describes (“one whose reaction I respect”) is a product of the internalization of the norms
of social practices: such a figure is an abstracted, idealized, and refined composite of the
members of the relevant social practice. In Williams’s view, the fact that even this
ethically characterized figure is tethered to the real world is crucial for making sense of
shame’s phenomenology:

The internalized other is indeed abstracted and generalized and idealized, but he
is potentially somebody rather than nobody, and somebody other than me. He
can provide the focus of real social expectations, of how I shall live if I act in one
way rather than another, of how my actions and reactions will alter my relations
to the world about me.²⁸

That the internalized figure for shame is ethically neutral (as opposed to guilt’s victim)
helps to explain why there can be a positive analogue of that emotion (namely, pride) but
not a positive analogue for guilt. In the next section, I show that Williams’s spectatorial
model can be used to provide an account of pride. Williams does not speak of pride or
personal ideals, but the considerations he marshals in his discussion of shame can be
suitably extended and reframed for my purposes. As I hope to show, personal ideals are
social practice-dependent norms that are acquired internalizing the norm-guided
activities (including praising and blaming activities) of representatives of that social
practice.

4.3 Pride

In what follows, I return to the two puzzles about pride that I identified at the beginning
of this chapter, and consider the role that pride’s spectatorial phenomenology plays in
generating these puzzles. It is important to note that these puzzles apply to both the

²⁸ Ibid., 84.
emotion of pride and the trait of pride, though, as I will describe, the sociality of pride manifests itself slightly differently in the two states.

4.3.1 The First Puzzle

The sociality puzzle, recall, is to explain how pride can be both a self-regarding and an other-regarding psychological phenomenon. There is widespread agreement about the self-regarding nature of the emotion of pride: the appraisal corresponding to pride is a favorable one concerning the self. And yet the phenomenology of pride involves the representation of some spectator. Why should a form of self-assessment involve any thought of others? How is it even possible that a judgment about the self can take the form of a thought about another? The solution I propose depends upon the account of personal ideal internalization that I discussed in the previous section. According to that account, personal ideals are social practice-dependent norms that are acquired by representing to oneself (“internalizing”) the norm-guided activities (including praising and blaming activity) of representatives of that social practice. Traces of this socialization remain even once internalization is complete. In the experience of feeling pride, one assesses oneself in terms of the (actual or imaginary) response of an (actual or imaginary) observer, a fact that, I argue, the social practice-based account of personal ideals illuminates.

Experiencing the emotion of pride requires some degree of internalization of the standards of a practice in the form of a praising or grateful internalized spectator. Absent

29 I use the language of “correspondence” to encompass cognitivist, non-cognitivist, and hybrid accounts of the emotion.

30 This question is prior to the normative question of whether this form of self-appraisal is morally praiseworthy (see Williams (1993)’s defense of shame against the charge that it is a morally disfigured, heteronomous style of thinking). The question is how, exactly, an apparently “outward directed” thought can be about the self in the first place. However, I think that the internalization-based answer that I defend ultimately undermines the normative criticism that pride and shame are objectionably heteronomous.
this internalization one cannot feel pride, even if representative members of a social practice that one wishes to be a part of actually praise one and one believes that they are correct (by the lights of the practice) to do so. One may feel joy, relief, gratitude, or hope in such a case—but not pride. Suppose, for example, that one wishes to be a part of a community of interior designers because members of this community receive invitations to the best social affairs. Suppose further that one has not internalized the standards of this practice in the sense that one does not particularly care whether one is a great designer and that one does not recognize any value in the internal goods of this practice. One views the practice merely as a means to the external end of mingling with cultural elites. Upon successfully establishing one’s practice and having one’s work showcased in the best interior design magazines, one might plausibly feel joy, relief, and gratitude. But one will not feel proud about one’s design successes, at least not under that description (one might be proud of, say, one’s social coup).

It is possible for the emotion of pride to be an assessment of the self in the form of a representation of the views of (real or imaginary) others because norms of self-assessment (i.e., personal ideals) are psychologically and conceptually linked to the internalization of a social form. The emotional assessment is positive insofar as the appropriate reactions of this social form to the object of assessment involve admiration or gratitude.

The trait of pride, I will argue in Chapter 5, does not necessarily involve any positive assessment of the self—rather it consists in a firm commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. But it, too, has self- as well as other-directed aspects. This commitment obviously involves the self, because it is a commitment to understanding and evaluating oneself in terms of the set of ideals that one cares about. Not all commitments

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31 It is possible that one might feel a more general pride in being a member of the cultural elite. But if so, one has internalized more general standards and one can repeat this sort of example at a more general level, where one substitutes “cultural elite” for “interior design elite.”
involve the self in this way—one might, after all, commit to a project that one does not care about and, so, to a project that does not implicate the self in any meaningful way (though which commitments one takes on always provide grounds for self-assessment). At the same time, the trait of pride involves a commitment to living in accordance with norms that regulate some social practice of which one is a member. Being a proud person therefore amounts to having a form of solidarity with the (real or ideal) members of some social organization. This solidarity consists of shared values that justify the goals of the shared moral practice, sympathetic identification with one’s fellow members, and a shared commitment to regulate one’s life in accordance with the values and goals of the practice.\footnote{32 Cf., Shelby (2005).}

In the next section, I expand upon this idea and show how it manifests itself in both competitive and non-competitive forms of pride. I also consider competitive and non-competitive aspects of the emotion of pride.

4.3.2 The Second Puzzle

The second puzzle, recall, arises from the fact that some paradigm cases of pride (both the emotion and the trait) are competitive while others are embodiments of camaraderie and solidarity. Pride sometimes appears to distance one from others, and sometimes it appears to bring one closer to others. The task is to explain how this can be so.

Personal ideals provide some of the norms that establish what sorts of individual qualities merit esteem or disesteem and what sort of actions merit approval or disapproval (morally or otherwise). Having an ideal typically places one in a (notional if not actual) community with others who largely share those standards of evaluation. Meeting an ideal,
and hence feeling pride, requires meeting standards that this community endorses or should endorse, and hence warrants respect, if not admiration, from others (real or imaginary) in the community. This is the first link to pride’s social dimensions: living in accordance with an ideal warrants evaluative respect from others (real or imaginary) in the community. Success, measured against such standards, carries for the individual (as well as for others who take part in reason-giving about these ideals) the grounds for bonding and camaraderie with others in the social form.  

Consider the case of our pedagogical ideals, according to which being an ideal teacher involves educating appropriate people (“students”) at appropriate times (“classtime”) in appropriate ways (“lectures,” “homework”) on appropriate subjects (“humanities,” “sciences”), inculcating in them appropriate skills (“critical thinking,” “clear writing”), and so forth. These institutional norms of appropriateness are the contingent results of a long history of reasoning among certain groups of educators, students, and critics. This reasoning did not merely increase our knowledge of which activities provide the best education, where the goal is fixed and the best means are discovered; the reasoning also concerned the nature and proper ends of education. All of these norms, as well as the institutions, goals, and methods they prescribe, make up one social form of education. Meeting the relevant pedagogical ideals involves participating well in this social form alongside others who also try to participate well. Meeting an ideal involves succeeding at a task that others with the ideal also strive to meet.

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33 Patricia Greenspan (1995) likewise argues that the evaluative content of pride includes the thought that one warrants the respect of others: “In more normal cases where we raise the question “Why be moral?” the answer may be given by appeal to a form of pride—not specifically to the affective rewards of the occurrent emotion but to a presupposition of its evaluative content: the claim moral behavior gives us on other agents’ regard” (202). Aristotle argues (EN iv.3) that a good person will expect, with good reason, some degree of praise from those whom he or she respects.
That fact suggests one reason why the emotion of pride involves camaraderie: meeting an ideal typically takes a form that warrants a high degree of respect within the social network that forms a basis for the ideal. Taking oneself to have met an ideal is an intrinsically social phenomenon.

This conclusion accords with the analyses mentioned in §4.1 of the emotion of shame, according to which the feeling of shame is essentially an experience of social disqualification. Cheshire Calhoun argues that shame is an emotion tied to participation in a social practice of morality; in particular, shame is a response to a representative judgment of the practice (say, the judgment of a senior member) that one has “fallen short of shared moral ideals”: “Shaming criticisms work by impressing upon the person that she has disappointed not just one individual’s expectations but what some ‘we’ expected of her. In effect they say, ‘You claim to be one of us, but just look how you’re behaving!’”34 In Calhoun’s view, this criticism has weight insofar as our practical identities are partly constituted by our roles in various social practices of morality; thus, shame distances the self not only from others with whom she shares a moral practice, but also (in a sense) from herself.

Social disqualification accounts of shame must explain which relations to others are relevant to shame and why they are so. The answer, I argue, is that the reactions of representatives (real or internalized) of the relevant practice are relevant because one internalizes the norms of that practice. The present account of pride extends Calhoun’s account (though she does not discuss pride) insofar as it analyses pride as a response to one’s normative standing in some social practice. A favorable assessment of one’s standing entails that one supposes oneself to warrant the opposite of social disqualification, namely,

34 Cheshire Calhoun (2004); the block quotation and the quotation immediately preceding it are found on page 140.
social inclusion by others in the practice. This analysis therefore connects the emotion of
pride to the disposition to camaraderie.

The trait of pride, being a firm commitment to living in accordance with one’s ideals,
likewise manifests one’s camaraderie with fellows of one’s practice. As I suggested above,
it is essentially a commitment to acting in accordance with the norms of a shared practice,
and so a commitment to regarding with favor others in the practice who share such a
commitment. These others need not actually exist; they may once have existed, or one
may hope that they will exist at some time in the future.35 Indeed, these cross-temporal
scenarios supply much of the point to the virtue of pride (which I discuss in detail in the
following chapter), insofar as that trait helps one to regulate one’s attitudes and actions
according to personal standards that may run counter to presently prevailing standards.

Considerations about the virtue of pride raise questions about the vice of pride that, in
turn, leads us to consider the competitive forms of pride. That is because the trait’s non-
competitive and competitive aspects are a function of its moral status. If the virtue of
pride is, as I will argue in a Chapter 5, a proper commitment to living in accordance with
proper personal ideals, then the vice of pride involves either an improper commitment to
one’s ideals or a commitment to improper personal ideals (or both). One kind of
impropriety lies in caring too much about what I call individualistic ideals. These i
ideals
advance a zero-sum view of merit, according to which one person’s meeting her
individualistic ideals requires that (at the limit) no other people meet these ideals. Caring
too much about such ideals undermines the social point of the typical ideal. When a
member of some organization cares more about being the best member than about the
practice achieving its foundational goals, we say that she fails to be a team player. Such a

35 Cf., MacIntyre (1984): “To enter into a practice is to enter into a relationship not only with its
contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded us in the practice, particularly those
whose achievements extended the reach of the practice to its present point” (194).
person is viciously proud insofar as she cares too much about her standing relative to individualistic ideals. This sort of vicious pride is competitive—the proud person cares (too much) about being better than others. I will discuss these aspects of the trait of pride in greater detail in the following chapter.

One might think that this individualistic vice applies only in contexts where teamwork is required and, so, does not generalize to all instances of competitive pride. However, this reservation overlooks an important implication of the social practice-based account of personal ideals, namely, that ideals generally derive their force from some social practice that has established goals and methods for achieving those goals. Personal ideals provide norms for self-assessment that make sense and have normative force only in light of such a social practice. Competitive pride involves a rejection of the grounds for solidarity that accompany virtuous forms of pride. This rejection may signify that the ideal has not been completely internalized, since the concern for interpersonal superiority, like the concerns for fame and money, is typically an external consideration. That there has been some degree of internalization is manifested in the agent’s concern for the respect and fame of members of a particular moral practice. A musician who has only partly internalized the relevant norms and who wants to be a famous musician wants to be respected by, and famous among, musicians and other participants of the music world, such as critics and appreciators. When this musician has fully internalized her ideal of being a great musician she will be far less, if at all, concerned with actually receiving the respect and admiration of others, and more concerned with warranting the respect of those whom she respects in the relevant practice.

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36 Thanks to Angie Smith for suggesting this point.
37 Indeed, her understanding of who belongs to the relevant practice may itself change as she internalizes the ideal.
This brings us, finally, to emotional pride and competitiveness, and two competing hypotheses: first, it may be that the emotion of pride is, by its very nature, a competitively driven psychological state. Rousseau is widely thought to have held this view insofar as he argued that the emotion of pride is, in its essence, a manifestation of an innate and ineradicable desire for comparing oneself favorably against others (i.e., “amour propre”). A second, competing, hypothesis is that the common desire to compare oneself favorably against others is conceptually (if not psychologically) independent of the emotion of pride. On this view, one might feel pride without, in Augustine’s enduring phrase, wanting to lord it over anybody else. This view would be charged with explaining why, if not because of any conceptual relation, emotional pride seems to be so frequently associated with interpersonal comparison.

The second hypothesis is the more compelling. First, the Rousseauvian thought that the feeling of pride necessarily involves interpersonal comparison encounters many apparently decisive counterexamples. One can be proud of an accomplishment that has nothing to do with others and that one believes is even overshadowed by the accomplishments of others. Of course, a story involving some interpersonal rivalry can always be concocted; but such stories seem ad hoc. Second, if I am right that the emotion involves a judgment that one is living in accordance with one’s ideals, then it makes sense that competitive concerns would piggy-back on the emotion. For, meeting an ideal is likely to be a rare feat that would provide grounds for interpersonal comparison (as a matter of sociological fact, ideals tend not to portray easily or commonly achievable states).

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Those who desire to be superior to others will naturally exploit their prideworthy accomplishments to this end.\textsuperscript{39}

I conclude that the existence of competitive aspects of emotional pride depends upon a concern for superiority that is independent of the emotion of pride. Those who have such a concern may see fit to express it on occasions in which they feel pride. Others, however, who lack such a concern may experience perfectly non-competitive emotional pride.

4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have called attention to two important features of pride that, in spite of their familiarity, demand an explanation: first, that pride is an assessment of the self in terms of a judgment about the psychological state of some internalized (real or imaginary) other person; and second, that pride sometimes serves to unite, and sometimes to divide, social groups. I used these two puzzles to motivate a theory of personal ideals, some features of which I sketched in §4.2. Those features include (1) that personal ideals are individuated in terms of social practices and (2) that the process of internalizing personal ideals is tied to particular social practices. As I note, Calhoun, Williams and others have made use of similar considerations in the context of discussions of shame, and so to some extent the present chapter can be seen as an extension of these analyses. This chapter also reframes these social considerations in order to produce a theory of personal ideals, which I believe sharpens these previous analyses of shame. This reframing also contributes to

\textsuperscript{39} Achieving superiority and domination can themselves serve as personal ideals, and provide some appeal to power hungry characters. If (contrary to fact) all ideals depended upon the lust for power for their appeal, then the Rousseauvian hypothesis would come back into play.
the development of a philosophical literature on personal ideals, the paucity of which is lamentable (and occasionally lamented)[40].

In §4.3, I argued that the social practice model of internalization helps to make sense of the social bonding that is often present with the emotion of pride. However, I also argued that the competitive dimensions of the emotion do not necessarily accompany the emotion of pride.[41] So the theory of ideals does not by itself dissolve all of pride’s puzzles. My treatment of the character trait of pride, on the other hand, links the trait more closely to the theory of ideals. Competitive aspects of the trait are best understood as a product of misunderstanding the social nature of most personal ideals—that they derive their point and purpose from the goals and goods of a shared practice. The virtuous form of the trait demonstrates on the agent’s part a solidarity with other members (real or imagined) of the shared practice. It was in this spirit that I intended the epigraph to this chapter from Benedict Anderson, whose project is to explain the psychological and political force of nationalism. What is said of nationalism holds in general for each of us who care about some personal ideals: “in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”

In the following chapter, I explain in detail the commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals that constitutes the trait of pride. I also show that the evaluative status of this commitment, especially including how appropriately one understands this commitment in light of one’s relationships with others, informs the evaluative status of the

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[40] Harry Frankfurt wrote in 1988 that, “For the most part, the ideals to which a person freely devotes his life are not exclusively or even primarily moral ideals. I have made a few stabs, in the title essay of the collection and in some of those that were written subsequent to it, toward the development of a theory of ideals. This is, surprisingly and unfortunately, a rather neglected subject, about which I wish I had more to say” (The Importance of What We Care About, “Preface,” vii-viii). For two recent discussions of personal ideals, see Elizabeth Anderson Value in Ethics and Economics; and Nicholas Rescher, Ethical Idealism.

[41] However, there may be an indirect connection. Competitiveness can arise from a flawed distribution mechanism for praise and evaluative respect. In inegalitarian practices honor will inevitably be unfairly distributed. Those who deserve honor will tend to be dissatisfied since they will tend not to be recognized. See Paul Woodruff, The Ajax Dilemma (New York: Oxford University, 2011).
trait. This result will enable us to provide an account of the virtue and the many vices of pride that confirms the thesis of the present chapter: that the moral psychology of caring about personal ideals cannot be adequately understood without considering interpersonal relationships. Indeed, I begin the next chapter by considering one form of the vice of pride in terms of a rejection of the value of collective projects and an assertion of self-sufficiency as a value.
5. Self-Sufficiency and the Trait of Pride

5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, I have defended an account of the emotion of pride and an account of personal ideals. It is time finally to develop more completely the ideals based account of the trait of pride. In doing so, I occasionally discuss the emotion of pride when it serves to illuminate the trait of pride. I also continue to explore the connection between pride and interpersonal relationships that I began in the previous chapter.

The descriptive and normative accounts of the character trait of pride that I develop in this chapter build up to a general conclusion about the proper role of the idea of self in deliberation: namely, that there are conditions under which it is ethically objectionable to be concerned about living in accordance with one’s personal ideals (even if they are worthy ideals). In §5.2, I develop the materials necessary for an account of the trait of pride through consideration of the fact that the excessively proud are typically moved in an ethically objectionable way by considerations of self-sufficiency. I explain the concern for self-sufficiency by distinguishing between ideal-desires, which take the form, “I want that I live in accordance with my ideal of…,” and all other (“non-ideal”) desires.1 I argue that the proud are disposed to care about the objects of these ideal-desires, and the excessively proud excessively so. I find that there are conditions under which the concern for meeting one’s ideals drives one away from the assistance of others (in particular, when such assistance can threaten to compromise one’s standing with respect to some of one’s

1 By “desire” I do not intend to endorse a Humean theory of psychology. I take the term to include any motive.
ideals). One of these conditions involves a distinction that I formulate between individualistic and collective modes of interpreting one’s personal ideals.

In §5.3, I further develop this account of pride and discuss the conditions under which the character trait of pride is virtuous, or proper. There are five primary dimensions to the character trait of pride: (1) the manner in which the proud person explicitly regards herself from an evaluative point of view, (2) the extent to which the proud person cares about receiving the respect of others; (3) the extent to which the proud person is “individualistic,” (4) the nature of the proud person’s commitment to her personal ideals; and (5) the worthiness of the proud person’s personal ideals. I argue, in Aristotelian fashion, that proper pride requires that in each of these five respects one is properly disposed in one’s thoughts, emotions, and actions. In §5.4, I consider the figure of the humble saint, who lacks any trace of pride or concern for self-worth, as a possible objection to my claim that there is such a thing as proper pride.

5.2 Self-Sufficiency

*Father, with God’s help even a worthless man
Could triumph. I propose, without that help,
To win my prize of fame.*
~Sophocles, Ajax, l. 769-771

In this section, I focus on instances of pride that appear excessive, which bring out the character of the trait of pride more vividly than their apparently more proper cousins. Consideration of pathological sorts of pride assists in developing our intuitions about what form the virtue of pride would have to take, a topic I take up in §5.3. Moreover, while many uncontroversially paradigmatic cases of vicious pride appear in popular discourse and literature, agreement about paradigms of proper pride are harder to come by. Indeed, it is the view of some that pride is essentially vicious.
Edith Wharton concludes her novella, *Ethan Frome*, with an unhappy picture of Ethan that is evocatively captured in the following observation from his neighbor, Mrs. Hale, to a recent visitor: “I don’t believe but what you’re the only stranger has set foot in that house for over twenty years. He’s that proud he don’t even like his oldest friends to go there….”

If we thought that being proud required feeling the emotion of pride towards some accomplishment then we would be unable to grasp Mrs. Hale’s meaning, since experiencing this pleasant emotion is unlikely to motivate anyone to keep their oldest friends from visiting. But we do know what Mrs. Hale means.

Indeed, Mrs. Hale’s reference to pride allows even someone unacquainted with Wharton’s *Ethan Frome* to grasp something about Ethan’s character and circumstances, including his proneness to feeling shame about his economic and moral poverty, tracing back to events 20 years ago, symbolized in the form of “that house.” “Proud” conjures up a rich image of Ethan, his actions, and his view of his standing among others. This image need not include the emotion of pride, which involves taking oneself to be living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. If Ethan feels anything while he refuses to accept visitors then it is not pride, but shame at the prospect of having to face those who might contemn or pity him.

One familiar and paradigmatic feature of many of the people we consider to be excessively proud is their desire for self-sufficiency. As Wharton illustrates earlier in *Ethan Frome*, a proud person sometimes dislikes asking for assistance when doing so requires the admission that one is “in a tight place” and possibly “going under.” Consider how Ethan asks his employer for an advance on his earnings:

Ethan felt that if he had pleaded an urgent need Hale might have made shift to pay him; but pride, and an instinctive prudence, kept him from resorting to this

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3 For the remainder of this section the word “pride” will refer to excessive pride.
argument. After his father’s death it had taken time to get his head above water, and he did not want Andrew Hale, or any one else in Starkfield, to think he was going under again. Besides, he hated lying; if he wanted the money he wanted it, and it was nobody’s business to ask why. He therefore made his demand with the awkwardness of a proud man who will not admit to himself that he is stooping; and he was not much surprised at Hale’s refusal…

“See here—you ain’t in a tight place, are you?”

“No a bit,” Ethan’s pride retorted before his reason had time to intervene.”

Ethan did not want to admit to being in urgent need and resented that satisfying his need required making the fact of his dependency publicly known. What might motivate a person to crave the public image of self-sufficiency? Why might one regard asking for help as stooping in the first place?

A first stab at explaining the proud desire for self-sufficiency is that proud people do not wish to admit or to let it be known that they are failing to live in accordance with some of their personal ideals, and so desire self-sufficiency to the extent that it is required for not having to publicly admit to failure. Call this the public failure account. Ethan cares about being a decent person and a supportive family member. When he fails to even minimally approximate these ideals, he cannot bear the shame of admitting the fact to others (nor, perhaps, to himself), and so cannot accept their assistance.

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4 Op. cit., 37-38. Wharton’s metaphorical language in this passage shows us something about popular conceptions of pride. Pride is seen as an object to be handled by the agent: it should sometimes be swallowed or sacrificed, sometimes maintained or strengthened, and never lost. (Again, it is important to note that the pride that figures in these expressions cannot be the emotion of pride. One might think that the swallowing metaphor, for example, points towards some physiological state associated with an emotion—after all, it is difficult to see what swallowing a character trait could mean. However, if any emotion were repressed, or “swallowed,” when one swallowed one’s pride, then that emotion would more likely be shame than pride. Moreover, it seems possible to swallow one’s pride even if one has nothing to feel proud about. So, even if these expressions derive their force from emotional experience, that experience may be essentially linked to the character trait of pride. Thanks to Janice for discussing this point with me. For an insightful discussion of the metaphors of pride, see Kovecses (1987).) If it is not controlled, our pride threatens to keep us from doing what we find it important to do. In this passage, Ethan’s pride prevents his reason from pleading to Hale and, more generally, from letting on to any of Starkfield’s residents that he is in need.

Pride the character trait clearly plays a powerful role in explaining the actions and attitudes of some people. However, I will challenge the image of agents being passive with respect to their pride. Pride is a trait of character, not a character apart from one’s true self. I argue that pride involves the agent’s commitment to personal ideals and that such commitment, in fact, goes to the very heart of agency.
The Trait of Pride

The public failure account, according to which the desire for self-sufficiency is essentially tied to, and explained by, shame about one’s failures, has two principle strengths. The account highlights the significant fact that the proud do not want others to know of their distress (recall that Ethan “did not want Andrew Hale, or any one else in Starkfield, to think he was going under again”). The public failure account also explains the proud concern for the opinion of others in terms of the agent’s shame, a notoriously public emotion that is commonly associated with the trait of pride.\(^5\)

When we think of a proud person refusing help we often imagine someone like Ethan Frome, who is struggling and in need of assistance; or someone who is not like the narrator of the Temptations song, “Ain’t Too Proud to Beg”\(^6\); or a lost traveler who is too proud to ask for directions. These examples absorb our attention because they vividly and dramatically exhibit a proud person when she is most likely to be torn over whether to accept assistance. It is remarkable that one would refuse aid when in desperate need. So it is natural to suppose, as the public failure explanation does, that the proud are opposed to receiving help only when they desperately need it.

But we must take care to avoid both the assumption that the proud refuse help only when downtrodden and, a fortiori, the public failure account. It is not just shame about one’s failures that drives the proud to desire self-sufficiency. Moreover, even if it were only such shame that motivated the proud drive to self-sufficiency, the ultimate explanation for a person’s refusal of aid could not be her shame, because such shame itself calls for an explanation.

The proud are disposed to resist assistance when they are succeeding just as much as they are disposed to do so when they are failing. The epigram to this section illustrates

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\(^6\) “I’m not ashamed to come and plead to you baby / If pleading keeps you from walking out that door.”
why a proud person might spurn assistance in contexts other than failure. As Sophocles represents him, Ajax refuses to be assisted in his pursuit of his heroic military ideals. Ajax takes the fact that “with God’s help even a worthless man / Could triumph” to count in favor of spurning the goddess Athena’s help, which indicates that he cares deeply about his evaluative worth. Ajax judges that the help of another detracts from one’s worth, other things being equal. In this respect, Ajax dramatizes a familiar set of views about the self-sufficiency of the good person. In the Republic, for example, Socrates claims that a criterion of the good person is that “a good person is most self-sufficient when it comes to living well, and is distinguished from other people by having the least need of anyone or anything else.”

A viciously proud person like Ajax construes the proffered help of another as something to be resisted because it poses a threat to his worth, even in contexts in which he has not failed.

What grounds such a conception of personal worth? Aristotle’s notorious portrait of the megalopsuchos (translated by Ross as the “proud man”) provides an important insight that takes us beyond the public failure account of pride: “He is the sort of person to bestow benefits, but is ashamed at receiving them; for the former is the mark of a superior, the latter of an inferior.” This relational explanation of the logic of pride in terms of a desire for one species of social inequality (namely, superiority to others) or fear of another (namely, inferiority to others) helps us to makes sense of several features of pride. Ethan Frome proudly refused to beg for assistance because he did not wish to be socially inferior to his benefactors or to others who are self-sufficient. At root of the desire

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7 Plato, Republic III, 388, tr. Reeve. For a study of self-sufficiency in Greek thought, see Martha Nussbaum, Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1986). See also Elizabeth Anderson (2004).

8 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Rowe, 1124b9-11.
for self-sufficiency, one might think, is a concern to be free from the threat of domination. Call this the *domination account of pride.*

The domination account reduces pride to attitudes about relations of social power and status. These features are important to understanding pride. However, it is crucial to observe that the proud person is characteristically committed to living in accordance with particular personal ideals, and not merely to relations of equality (or non-domination) as such. Ajax wants to be a military hero; Ethan wants to be a provider for his beloved. These reflexive normative commitments differentiate pride from other sorts of dispositions one might have with respect to domination, such as greed or the desire for economic security. The trait of pride is conceptually tied to a concern for one’s living in accordance with particular ideals, like being a heroic warrior, a concern that is not a mere proxy for the concern about dominance over, or equality with, other people. Rather, the equality with or domination over others that may be desired must be equality (or dominance) with respect to some personal ideals. If interpersonal superiority is desired, then it is normative superiority—that is, superiority with respect to particular personal ideals and not merely, or necessarily, dominance understood as relations of power over others.

How exactly do the proud regard their personal ideals? Let us begin with a tautology: for people to whom it is important that they live in accordance with their ideals, it is important that *they* live in accordance with their ideals. Ajax would much rather that he live in accordance with his heroic ideal of defeating his enemies on the battlefield than

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9 Thanks to Patrick Smith for suggesting to me an account of this sort.
that another should defeat them. In this formal sense he is egoistic: he is driven more by the desire that he do good than by the desire that there be good.10

Some sorts of egoistic motives are not essentially related to, or illuminative of, the psychology of the proud. That I want to sunbathe, or have dinner with a friend, or see a movie—and that I want to do these things myself—need not indicate anything about whether I am a proud person. The difference between the characteristic motives of the proud and these motives, I suggest, is that the latter might just reflect my love of sunbathing, of my friend, or of the movies, whereas the former reflect my reflexive concern with living in accordance with personal ideals to which I am committed.

Bernard Williams’s discussion of “reflexive” or “second-order” motives is helpful in the task of characterizing the egoism of the proud. Williams develops a distinction between first-order motives and reflexive motives in the context of his discussion of the charge of moral self-indulgence, which I briefly discuss in the next section. However, the ethical import of reflexive motivation is confined neither to the charge of moral self-indulgence, nor to the domain of moral motivation, narrowly construed as motivation to deliver what we owe to each other in virtue of our shared status as moral equals. Williams draws the distinction between first-order and reflexive motives by reference to the following examples:

One thing the thought [of moral self-indulgence] can express is the suspicion that what the agent cares about is not so much other people, as himself caring about other people… a person may act from generosity or loyalty, and act in a counter-utilitarian way, and not attract the charge of moral self-indulgence, but that charge will be attracted if the suspicion is that his act is motivated by a concern for his own generosity or loyalty, the enhancement or preservation of his own self-

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10 This form of egoism need not be substantively, or crudely, selfish. Formally egoistic desires of the sort that I consider can have the good of others as their object, e.g., as when I desire that I help someone in need. Bernard Williams (1973) develops a similar distinction in terms of what he calls “I-desires.” Williams characterizes I-desires and “non-I desires” in terms of whether the state of affairs, \( p \), in the formula, “I want that \( p \),” requires “I” (or related expressions like “my”). As Williams notes, this formulation comes from Kenny (1963).
image as a generous or loyal person. [In non-moral cases] there are highly analogous contrasts in the matter of reflexivity. It is one thing for a man to act in a counter-utilitarian way out of his great love for Isolde, another for him to do so out of a concern for his image of himself as a great Tristan.\(^{11}\)

Williams cautions that “After that very general recognition [of the distinction in each of these example-pairs], however, there are many respects in which even at the analytical level, let alone in psychological reality, boundaries are quite unclear.”\(^{12}\) One might hazard to formulate the distinction as follows. In each case, where the first-order motive takes the form of wanting to act or respond in such-and-such a way, the second-order or reflexive motive takes the form of wanting to live in accordance with the image of oneself as disposed to act or respond in such-and-such a way.

The proud, I suggest, are most of all characterized by their reflexive motivational structure and reflexive evaluative dispositions. Ajax wants that “I [Ajax] live in accordance with my ideal of heroism,” whereas a less proud soldier might have only the formally non-egoistic desire that, say, “we win the battle.” The proud have a kind of formally egoistic desire that is directed at their meeting their personal ideals. Call “ideal-desires” desires that the desiring agent lives in accordance with some of her personal ideals. Taking a personal ideal to include an image of oneself as disposed to act or respond in some desirable way, I use the notion of an ideal-desire to capture roughly Williams’s notion of a reflexive motive and to make explicit the conceptual role of personal ideals in such motives.\(^{13}\)

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\(^{11}\) Bernard Williams (1981), 45.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 46.

\(^{13}\) Importantly, as we shall see in §5.2, not all reflexive motives are equally morally dubious. As Williams notes, there is nothing morally self-indulgent about a person who asks himself, “What would I do if I acted as a generous man would act here?” (ibid., 47) and is motivated to act on the answer. There is, at most, only something morally undeveloped about this person’s need to ask such a question explicitly. Also notable is that, as the example of primitive moral development shows, reflexive motivation need not involve high self-esteem.
The idea of the self plays a crucial role in the deliberation of the viciously proud. The proud are generally disposed to take themselves to have good, if not sufficient, reason to try to fare well with respect to their personal ideals whenever they have the opportunity to do so. In other words, the proud take it that the most important of their aims is living in accordance with their ideals.\textsuperscript{14} This claim might seem tautologous at first blush—if one takes some ideals to be worthy then (it might seem) one takes it that the best thing one can do is to try to live in accordance with those ideals. But there might be, by one’s own lights, important goods the achievement or pursuit of which do not in any significant way contribute to one’s living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. It may be better, by one’s own lights, to contribute modestly to a collaborative effort of great importance than to achieve something of less importance by oneself, even if more credit accrues to one in the latter case than in the former. Suppose, for example, that with Athena’s guidance Ajax could slay two warriors (but without deserving much credit for doing so), and that without her help he could slay but one warrior. If Ajax’s concern is to do what is best then he should allow Athena to help (making the dubious assumption that his cause is just and that killing Trojans is good). But if his concern is to live in accordance with his ideals, which it is, then he should refuse Athena’s help, which he does. Pride involves a desire to leave one’s stamp on the world, which is very different from the desire that the world be stamped.

The Ajax story brings to light that there are ways to do what is best without doing anything for which one can be proud. In the spirit of Robert Nozick, let’s imagine a result machine, “which produces in the world any result you would produce and injects your

\textsuperscript{14} This is not to say that the proud tend to formulate this disposition as a principle that they think about as a guide in their activity. Thanks to Angie Smith for reminding me of this important point.
vector input into any joint activity." As Ajax might have said, with the result machine’s help even a worthless man could triumph. Entering the machine could bring about good, for sure; it might even be the right thing to do. But, in general, one would have no cause for experiencing the emotion of pride in bringing about those consequences, or for regarding it as a meaningful activity, which indicates that bringing about those consequences may not help one in living in accordance with at least some of one’s personal ideals.

The fact that the proud care about their ideal-desires does not by itself entail what we are trying to explain, namely that they desire self-sufficiency to the extent that they do. It is possible that living in accordance with one’s ideals would demand accepting all the help one can get. The entailment of self-sufficiency requires a separate thesis about the nature of personal worth specifying that the degree to which one meets one’s ideals is inversely proportional to the degree to which one depends upon the assistance of others. In other words, the proud hold the view that the more others help you to succeed, the less you succeed. The more that the gods help Ajax to kill his enemies, the less that Ajax meets his heroic ideals. Call this the dilution thesis.

The proud consider receiving help from others to be similar to entering the results machine. However, it is simply not true that, in general, depending upon other people inhibits one from meeting one’s ideals. For instance, consider the personal ideal of being a good teammate. One basis of this ideal is the fact that the success of a team generally depends upon the success of its weakest member. Being a good teammate, then, involves

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15 Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, 44
16 Rachel Fredericks has suggested to me that a person who cares about the ideal of doing what is right even when it is psychologically difficult might well experience pride in this scenario. Kelly Sorensen (2004) provides a diagnosis of how desiring to be praiseworthy can actually lessen one’s praiseworthiness. His answer is disproportionate concern for what doesn’t matter, the motive appearing near the end of the deliberative chain of motives rather than near the beginning, and the motive being for a state of affairs that is not a close possible world.
not only helping one’s teammates but also accepting the help of others when one needs it. A member who refused to accept assistance would fail to live in accordance with this personal ideal in at least one important respect. This failure would not merely be the instrumental result of refusing help—rather, refusing help is intrinsically bad (relative to the ideal of being a good teammate). We can say of such a person that she is too proud to be a good teammate. A less proud person, on the other hand, could succeed in meeting her personal ideal of being a good teammate due in part to her willingness to accept the aid of others.

The viciously proud, insofar as they are viciously proud, interpret their personal ideals in a peculiarly individualistic way. There is a spectrum along which interpretation of one’s ideals might fall: at the collective end, assistance from others is understood to contribute to one’s living in accordance with one’s ideals, while at the individualistic end, assistance from others is taken to detract from one’s living in accordance with one’s ideals. Interpretations that lie at these ends of the spectrum are not in every instance misguided. As I discuss in the following section, it is likely that proper pride requires individualism in some parts of one’s life and collectivism in others.

This brings us back to the point of entry into the discussion, which is the case of Ethan refusing the aid of others when he is in need. I began by considering the suggestion that Ethan’s refusal is motivated by his shame at having failed to live in accordance with his ideals. The dilution thesis and the notion of an individualistic interpretation of one’s personal ideals strengthens this explanation. Although Ethan already sees himself as a failure, he would consider help from others as threatening to further dilute the little worth he takes himself to have retained. This fear is based in his individualistic interpretation of his ideals, the view that living in accordance with one’s ideals requires the refusal of
assistance. Being in a condition in which one requires such assistance is, in itself, shameful. So it is a bit misleading to say that Ethan is moved by a desire to avoid shame, because we do not fully make sense of that motive without appreciating its basis in Ethan’s fear of further dilution of his worth.

As I noted above, the ultimate explanation for Ethan’s refusal of aid cannot be his shame because the shame itself calls for explanation. Rather, Ethan’s understanding of what is worth doing involves the idea of ethical dilution and an interpretation of personal ideals that calls for individualistic accomplishments. Of course, a less proud person would brush aside the concern for such accomplishments when important needs must be met; but for Ethan, satisfying the desire that he be a good person requires him to refuse the assistance of others.

To sum up: I began this section with the observation that refusing the assistance of others is a paradigmatic feature of the viciously proud that cannot be fully explained by the proud person’s wish to avoid the shame of public failure. For such refusal is also characteristic of the well-off proud, who have nothing to be ashamed of. Instead, I argued that this refusal is typically tied to a robust concern for self-sufficiency. I argued that the concern to live in accordance with one’s ideals may, under certain conditions, entail a concern for self-sufficiency. These conditions include the conditions under which one is viciously proud. I emphasized one such condition, that the viciously proud have an overly individualistic mode of interpreting their personal ideals. This mode of interpretation involves a commitment to the dilution thesis. In the next section, I relate these conclusions in a more systematic way to our moral evaluation of pride and to other considerations that bear upon this evaluation.
5.3 Proper Pride

The preceding remarks about the relation between pride and the concern for living in accordance with one’s personal ideals prepare the way for a systematic descriptive and normative account of the trait of pride. There are five primary dimensions to the character trait of pride and, in any given case, variation along each bears upon our evaluation of a person insofar as she possesses the trait. These dimensions are (1) the extent to which and manner in which the proud person regards herself from an evaluative point of view, (2) the extent to which the proud person cares about receiving the respect of others, (3) the individualistic or collective manner in which she interprets her personal ideals, (4) the rigidity or flexibility of her commitment to living in accordance with her personal ideals, and (5) the worthiness of her personal ideals. I touched upon the first and third dimensions in my discussion of ideal-desires, which are desires that the agent live in accordance with her ideals, and what I called “the dilution thesis.” These five dimensions of the trait serve to flesh out the general characterization that being proud is having a firm commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals.

Having the virtue of pride is having a proper commitment to living in accordance with proper personal ideals. In particular, being properly proud is being properly disposed with respect to each of the trait’s five dimensions. One’s dispositions with respect to the first four dimensions of pride have interrelated cognitive, conative, and behavioral elements. Accordingly, my discussion of the trait does not privilege any one of these elements at the expense of the others. Thoughts and qualitative experiences, such as pleasures and pains, do not merely cause an agent’s behavior; such mental states make a person’s behavior intelligible as the particular goal-directed activity that it is. The particular mental states that cause a set of bodily movements render it intelligible as some action rather than another (or rather than mere behavior). Likewise, an agent’s
behavioral activity does not merely provide objects for new thoughts and emotions; such activity also helps to render a person’s mental states intelligible as the mental states that they are. This interpretive holism also applies when interpreting cognitive states in light of a person’s conative states, and vice versa. As such, an evaluative discussion of any single aspect of a person’s interdependent cognitive, conative, and behavioral life must take into consideration other aspects of this life.

In what follows, I discuss, in reference to each dimension’s basic consideration, ways in which the properly proud get matters cognitively, conatively, and behaviorally right and ways in which those who lack this virtue go astray. Since there are more ways to miss the mark than to hit the mark, I select for discussion symmetrical mistakes that serve to highlight, in Goldilocks fashion, what it is to get things right. In actuality, the jumble of mistakes cannot typically be simply described as too much of this or too little of that.

5.3.1 Taking up the evaluative point of view

There is a notorious sense in which the viciously proud person thinks too much about herself and her standing relative to her personal ideals; she is “self-centered.” I have approached this idea in terms of a person’s ideal-desires, i.e., her desires that she lives in accordance with her personal ideals. Having an ideal-desire involves taking up an evaluative point of view towards oneself insofar as one desires that a favorable evaluation of oneself relative to some ideal be warranted.

One troubling aspect of the viciously proud is their systematic misdirection of attention and, more generally, of concern. Bernard Williams sketches an example of a person who

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17 This holism applies because each of these elements of a person’s character is reasons-responsive in the sense that he is answerable to demands for justification for these aspects of his agency, and because his agency embodies a single evaluative perspective that is essentially governed by norms of rationality. Angie; helm
is concerned with being generous, but whose reflexive motivation should be classified as morally self-indulgent:

...he is concerned with his own generosity, where this implies that he had substituted for a thought about what is needed, a thought which focuses disproportionately upon the expression of his own disposition, and ... he derives pleasure from the thought that his disposition will have been expressed—rather than deriving pleasure, as the agent who is not self-indulgent may, from the thought of how things will be if he acts in a certain way, that way being (though he need not think this) the expression of his disposition... [This sort of reflexivity] involves a reversal at a line which I take to be fundamental to any morality or indeed sane life at all, between self-concern and other-concern; it involves a misdirection not just of attention, though that is true too, but genuinely of concern, and they both issue in differences in what actually gets done.18

The mental activity of the morally self-indulgent involves (1) a misdirection of attention, focusing disproportionately upon the expression of one’s own disposition instead of upon “what is needed,” (2) pleasures derived from thoughts about the expression of one’s own disposition rather than from thoughts about how things will be if one acts in a certain way and, what may already be entailed by (1) and (2), (3) a misdirection of concern. This misdirection of concern in turn affects the agent’s behavior, “what actually gets done.”

One can take up the self-evaluative point of view when one should not, as there are occasions when it is blameworthy to measure one’s moral worth. A benefactor should not in general pay attention to her own ethical status rather than to the needs of those she benefits; doing so provides evidence not only of a failure of generosity, but also of moral self-indulgence. This is not to say that attending to one’s dispositions is in itself objectionable; instead, as Williams notes, it is the disproportionate focus upon himself rather than upon the morally salient needs of others that is problematic.19

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18 Williams, “Utilitarianism and Moral Self-Indulgence,” 47.
Some varieties of excessive pride characteristically involve a misdirection of attention of this sort. Another occasion during which it can be blameworthy to measure one’s moral worth is in deliberating about what to do. As we saw in Sophocles’s representation of Ajax, who decides against accepting Athena’s help because of explicit considerations about his worth, the viciously proud reason about what to do from considerations about who they aspire to be.

In addition to this misdirection of attention, Williams highlights the moral self-indulgence of taking excessive pleasure in the expression of one’s disposition rather than in how things will be if one’s acts in a certain way. As with misdirection of attention, the former sort of pleasure is not in itself objectionable, provided it does not displace the latter sort of pleasure. Taking excessive pleasure in one’s good dispositions is a frequently named attribute of the viciously proud. Thomas Hurka even argues that the vice of pride “involves excessive pleasure in certain aspects of one’s own good,” such as one’s knowledge, achievement, or virtue.

Is Hurka correct in his claim that taking excessive pleasure in certain aspect of one’s own good is a necessary condition for possessing the vice of pride? Since a viciously proud person can be thoroughly and chronically disappointed in himself, taking excessive pleasure in one’s own good qualities is not a necessary condition of possessing the vice of pride. In this vein, the examples of Ajax and Ethan Frome show that the proud are also

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22 In his brief, but very helpful, discussion of excessive pride and shame, Hurka later discusses self-hatred and shame under the banner of the “vice of excessive shame” (*ibid.*, p. 99), which he describes as “the opposite vice” of excessive pride. Hurka’s distinction between these two vices might indicate that his focus is the emotion of pride and not the character trait of pride which, on my account, may involve both the “vice of excessive pride” and the “vice of excessive shame,” among other things. Since Hurka does not clearly distinguish between the emotion and the trait of pride, it is difficult to discern which sort of pride Hurka has in mind. However, since Hurka considers as a competing account the cognitive account of the “vice of excessive pride,” according to which the vice is identical with belief that one is superior to others when one is not, I take it that Hurka is providing an account of the vicious trait of pride.
disposed to feel disproportionate pain at the thought of the failed expressions of their disposition, not just disproportionate pleasure about one’s successes. However, this reservation underscores a broader agreement with Hurka’s conclusion that “At the root of his vicious pride is an excessive concern for his own as opposed to others’ good.”

It is important to recognize, however, that it is possible to take up the self-evaluative point of view insufficiently as well as excessively. Failure to evaluate oneself is commonly thought to be a bad thing insofar as such evaluation provides a safeguard against vice. Consider what is involved in being shameless: the shameless typically fail to engage in proper self-evaluation, either as a result of having a dearth of ideals against which to evaluate themselves or as a result of failing to “take stock” of themselves with respect to their ideals. A virtuously proud person is disposed to experience shame whenever it is warranted.

Likewise, when a virtuously proud person succeeds in living in accordance with her personal ideals in some significant way, she takes note of this fact—and not merely dispassionately so. One who fully grasps the significance of one’s significant merits experiences the emotion of pride. Likewise, one who grasps the significance of significant personal failings experiences the emotion of shame. These emotions are the cognitive and conative resonances of what we take to be significant in understanding ourselves in relation to our personal ideals. There is, prima facie, something objectionable about a person who never takes pride in her accomplishments, just as failing to experience anger,

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23 Ibid., p. 99. To be more exact, since pride is not identical with mere selfishness, the viciously proud person is excessively concerned with the good of living in accordance with his personal ideals.

24 Cf., Mason (2010).

25 There could be a masochistic sort of shamelessness that revels in the conscious violation of personal standards. So, shamelessness doesn’t require a lack of self-evaluation.

shame, guilt, hope, or love when these emotions are warranted provides evidence of some character flaws.\(^{27}\)

If there are occasions when it is inappropriate not to measure one’s worth (as in the case of the shameless) as well as occasions when it is inappropriate to measure one’s worth, then it follows that there is some Aristotelian mean to be had. Possessing the virtue of pride involves properly taking up the evaluative point of view on oneself—that is, considering oneself from this point of view on the occasions on which it is appropriate, to the extent to which it is appropriate, and only in these ways.

5.3.2 Concern for Receiving the Respect of Others

To consider what evaluation one merits differs from considering what evaluations others make of oneself. Furthermore, to judge that one merits evaluative respect differs from caring about whether others actually respect or admire one.\(^{28}\) It is logically consistent to judge that one merits the admiration of others without ever caring whether actual people actually give one the respect that one deserves. Likewise, and perhaps more commonly, one can vainly care about receiving the evaluative respect and admiration of others (and about avoiding their evaluative disrespect and contempt) without judging that one merits it. In this subsection, I consider the trait of pride insofar as it involves a concern for receiving the evaluative respect of others and for avoiding their disrespect or contempt.\(^{29}\)

\(^{27}\) I defend this claim with respect to the emotion of pride in more detail in my “On Pridelessness” (ms.). For an argument against this claim with respect to pride, see Kellenberger, “Humility,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 47, no. 4, (2010): 321-336. See Gabriele Taylor, “Justifying the Emotions,” *Mind* 84, no. 335 (1975): 390-402, for a defense of the general claim that failure to experience an emotion when it would be justified provides evidence of some character flaw.

\(^{28}\) This claim is consistent with the phenomenological claim that self-evaluation sometimes takes the form of imagining the assessment of oneself that people whom one respects would make. For an argument that the emotion of pride differs from shame in that its phenomenology does not take an interpersonal form, see Taylor (1985).

\(^{29}\) Cf., Woodruff (2011).
A virtuously proud person, I claim, is concerned about receiving the evaluative respect, and avoiding the evaluative disrespect or contempt, of representative members of his moral practice.\(^{30}\) For, his commitment to living in accordance with his personal ideals requires a concern about the opinions of at least some of those with whom he shares a practice. This is so for at least two reasons. Representative members of the practice, by definition, largely share his commitment to the relevant personal ideals. It is virtuous to be concerned to know these people’s opinions because this information helps the proud person to interpret his ideals and his standing relative to those ideals. Call these the *epistemic grounds for concern* about the evaluative respect of others.

As Cheshire Calhoun has insightfully argued, there are also *practical grounds for concern* about the self-directed evaluative judgments of co-members of our social practices. We develop and learn how to apply our personal ideals largely by interacting with representative members of one’s neighborhood, profession, family, religious organization, and so forth. These interactions are vital for developing norms that help to adjudicate problems facing members of a practice, and for setting goals about what the practice-specific aims and goods ought to be. As Calhoun nicely puts it, norms “get hammered out among people who already share a social world.”\(^{31}\) We therefore need, for practical reasons, to be sensitive and emotionally vulnerable to the evaluative appraisals, both positive and negative, of at least some others who participate in our social practices.

When we fail by the lights of representative members of our social practices we have good reason, both epistemic and practical, to feel shame; likewise, when we succeed by


\(^{31}\) *Ibid.*, p. 140. Since the scope of Calhoun’s paper is “moral shame,” she emphasizes the development of moral norms. However, nonmoral norms get hammered out in the same way, broadly speaking, and so we must allow for the possibility of “nonmoral shame” in addition to moral shame. For similar reasons, Calhoun omits discussion of the emotion of pride, both moral and nonmoral.
these lights we have good reason to feel pride. In short, we should care about receiving the evaluative respect and avoiding the evaluative disrespect of certain others.

When we have reason to take ourselves to have succeeded by the lights of representative co-members of our social practices, and thus to have good reason to feel pride, we also have good reason to expect the evaluative respect of representative co-members of these practices. When we experience pride or shame, we judge that such co-members have good reason to praise or blame us for the objects of our emotions. On occasions in which one’s judgment about the object of one’s pride differs from the judgment of representative co-members of the relevant social practice, we have both epistemic and practical reasons to care about resolving the discrepancy.

To illustrate the point, consider two characters: at one extreme, James has indiscriminate concern about the opinions of others and, at another extreme, Bell has no concern whatsoever for the opinions of others. If, as I argue, both of these extreme cases are vicious, then the person who has discriminating concern for the opinions of certain others sits at a virtuous mean relative to these extremes. James’s indiscriminate concern about others’ opinions of him is vicious because some people are not in a position to capably judge him. So, indiscriminate concern is at the least epistemically foolish. Moreover, opinions that uninformed or unconcerned people hold about a person will inevitably tend to be superficial. This fact points to the distinctively ethical flaw of having indiscriminate concern for the opinions of others about oneself, namely, that such concern is likely to be a form of vanity. For example, it would be appropriate to describe as vain Ethan Frome’s aversion to his fellow townspeople’s coming to believe that he is in need.32

32 For a defense of the value of modesty that depends upon the value of not seeking the indiscriminate approval of others, see G. F. Schueler, “Why Modesty Is A Virtue,” Ethics 107 (1997): 467–85 and G. F.
On the other hand, a person who lacks any concern for the opinions about him that others hold might seem to possess an admirable sense of autonomy and self-possession. One might think that perfect virtue is at least compatible on epistemic grounds with total indifference to the opinions of others because a perfectly virtuous person has perfectly sound judgment. Be this as it may, if a theory of ethics is designed for humans and not gods, then indifference to the opinions of others is both epistemically and morally undesirable. Total indifference to the opinions of others is epistemically undesirable because there is no realm of life, not even in mathematics, in which an individual can possess objective certainty. (Indeed, professional mathematicians generally appreciate the role that public deliberation plays in certifying the soundness of a proof.) The human condition requires at least some degree of epistemic humility, even about matters that can be justified a priori. One necessary feature of epistemic humility, I am arguing, is some degree of receptivity to the opinions of at least some others. Though it may seem paradoxical, the virtue of pride must be compatible with humility insofar as the latter is also a virtue.  

This epistemic consideration brings us to the moral vice of arrogance. Receiving the advice of knowledgeable others is sometimes indispensable for successful activity. To reject advice across the board would be as absurd as it is rare—not even the most arrogant and hubristic statesman would refuse to consult with his advisors at least some of the time. In light of this epistemic fact, a person who is properly committed to living in accordance with her personal ideals will sometimes be receptive to the opinions of some


people about her standing relative to her ideals. Moreover, she will be at least temporarily dismayed when a person whom she respects voices a negative judgment about her evaluative standing, and will carefully consider the matter in light of this person’s judgment. She will not follow Aristotle’s great-souled man in despising any dishonor as undeserved—at least not prior to careful consideration.

5.3.3 Individualistic and collective modes of interpretation of personal ideals

In Section 1, I argued that a proud person’s refusal of assistance in favor of acting in what seems to her a more praiseworthy manner manifests her individualistic interpretation of her ideals. Ajax would refuse to kill two enemies with the help of Athena in favor of killing one by himself. The viciously proud may view assistance with disdain, since it seems to them to undermine their praiseworthiness even if, say, it promises to lead to better results. Only solitary action reflects well upon her, she thinks.

Is there also a contrary mistake, in too readily giving up on the individualistic pursuit of excellence, in too rarely insisting upon doing things oneself, and in thinking that only action undertaken with the assistance of others can reflect well upon oneself? It is not that such a collectively disposed person would necessarily neglect to take up the evaluative point of view; rather, when he did evaluate himself, he would do so relative to collectively interpreted personal ideals. This person would think so little of his individual agency that he would regard living in accordance with his personal ideals as requiring a dependence upon the provisions of others. He would not think a project worth doing unless others are committed to joining him. Only collective action would be regarded as reflecting well on him.
Such a person seems possible and, more importantly for our normative purposes, seems to be flawed. Some measure of individualism is necessary when, for reasons beyond one’s control, others are unavailable or unwilling to help you to achieve genuine goods. In such circumstances, one may indeed be praiseworthy for pursuing a goal that would have languished without one’s activity. Even if well-intentioned collaborators are available, such people may not be well qualified to collaborate. Though I may be willing to help a friend to choreograph his new ballet, he is doubtless better off to reject my offer of assistance. Therefore the general refusal to engage in solitary projects or even to consider such projects as potentially valuable cannot be a virtue. This conclusion does not conflict with the claim that the disposition to prefer to join and to take pride in collective ventures over solitary activity is praiseworthy. However, the blanket denial of the value of individualism is no more tenable than Ajax’s blanket denial of the value of collectivism.

The properly proud, like the self-reliant, are disposed to care in some circumstances about doing things themselves and to sometimes regard the assistance of others as potentially damaging to the success of their enterprise and, ultimately, to their worth. Unlike the self-reliant person, the properly proud sometimes care about engaging with others, building upon others’ achievements, and even altering their own values in light of others’ concerns. The properly proud appreciate that living a full life requires creating and sharing it with others. Collective and individualistic pursuits are both good and necessary for a good and properly proud life.
5.3.4 The flexibility or rigidity of one’s commitment to one’s ideals (or, Knowing when to hold ‘em, knowing when to fold ‘em)

The fourth dimension of pride concerns the flexibility or rigidity of a person’s commitment to her ideals. Assessments of the rigidity of such a commitment in a given person is a function of that person’s resolution of three sorts of conflicts: (1) conflicts between living in accordance with one’s personal ideals and achieving goods in such a way that does not contribute to one’s living in accordance with one’s personal ideals; (2) conflicts between living in accordance with individualistic personal ideals and living in accordance with collective personal ideals; and (3) conflicts between living in accordance with non-moral personal ideals and living in accordance with moral personal ideals.

Ethan’s refusal to ask for an advance of his wages in order to preserve his pursuit of living in accordance with his personal ideals provides prima facie justification for the claim that he is stubbornly proud. Likewise, a teammate who invariably sacrifices the interests of the team whenever he is able to satisfy demands set by individualistic personal ideals is, prima facie, pursues such ideals in a rigid way. A disposition, on the other hand, to resolve disputes of these two sorts in the other direction is plausibly evidence of excessive flexibility and lack of pride. A properly proud person will adjudicate such conflicts more sensitively, though there should be no expectation of devising an algorithm that will prescribe such sensitivity.

Resolutions of the third sort of conflict, between moral and non-moral demands, correlate less straightforwardly with virtue and vice. Depending on the relevant non-moral ideals, pursuit of non-moral personal ideals at the expense of meeting moral claims may or may not provide evidence of stubborn pride.
5.3.5 The Worthiness of One’s Ideals

Possessing the virtue of pride requires that the personal ideals to which one is firmly committed are worthy. The proud white supremacist is debarred from possessing the virtue of pride by the immorality of the Aryan personal ideals to which he is firmly committed. The virtue of pride consists of a proper commitment to proper personal ideals, and so there is no such thing as a properly proud moral monster.

One might argue, though, that the evaluative status of pride is based upon the status of the commitment only and independent of the worthiness of the proud person’s ideals. For, the proud Aryan’s vice consists not in her being too proud; it consists in her being cruel and callous. Indeed, we would not primarily advise the proud Aryan to swallow her pride, and we would not primarily blame her for lacking a proper sense of humility. If this is correct, then our evaluation of a person insofar as she is proud is independent of our evaluation of her personal ideals, which indicates that proper pride does not require a commitment to worthy ideals.\footnote{Not unrelatedly, Williams (1981) argues that integrity is not a virtue since, unlike generosity, it has no “characteristic motive”—the motive of any act of integrity is supplied by whatever commitments one is holding fast to, whereas the motive of any act of generosity (say) is specifically something like giving to those in want.}

We can object to this argument by noting, first, that it is possible for a person to have simultaneously more than one vice. It is possible for a person to be both cruel and viciously proud because of that cruelty, just as it is possible for him to also be rash, stingy, and unfriendly because of his cruelty. The humble Aryan is, in fact, less vicious than a proud Aryan, insofar as the former might be less firmly disposed to stand fast with her ideals in the face of the criticisms of others.

This leads to the second objection, to the assumption that the form of a person’s commitment to her ideals can be cleanly demarcated, at least in principle, from the...
content of her particular personal ideals. The demarcation is made fuzzy by the fact that certain ideals call for particular sorts of commitments—moral ideals plausible call for a rigid commitment from the agent (the fourth dimension); superficial ideals call for frequent and intent self-evaluation (the first dimension); the ideal of being a good teammate calls for a collective interpretation (the third dimension); and so on. Therefore, the suggestion that the evaluative status of pride is orthogonal to the evaluative status of one’s personal ideals is untenable.

5.3.6 Applications

Since pride’s five dimensions are to a large degree independent, one can go astray in any combination of ways. This independence creates the logical space for many varieties of pride and much conceptual grey area between these varieties. However, for psychological, sociological, or linguistic reasons, some varieties appear to be more common than others. Ajax epitomizes vicious extremes in each dimension: he regards himself from the evaluative point of view when he should not, he is excessively concerned about receiving honors, he is excessively individualistic, his commitment to living in accordance with his ideals is overly rigid, and his personal ideals are morally suspect. Excesses in each dimension might be mutually supporting. Regarding oneself from an evaluative point of view is plausibly correlated with being committed to living in accordance with one’s ideals. But other sorts of pride are possible.

In addition to across the board correlation between excesses of each dimension, correlations may be more qualified, in that a particular orientation in two of the dimensions is correlated a particular orientation in a third dimension. For example, rigid adherence to personal ideals is equally compatible with individualism and with
collectivism, but seems more likely to accompany excessive self-evaluation when one is more individualistic and more likely to accompany deficient self-evaluation when one is more collectively oriented. It would be odd, that is, for one who is stubbornly attached to meeting individually construed ideals to neglect to engage in self-evaluation.

It may be useful to analyze a few common sorts of pride in terms of the five dimensions discussed above. A vain person is characterized largely in terms of excessively taking upon the self-evaluative point of view and caring about receiving the admiration of others. He is deeply concerned with whether he is living up to certain ideals, usually superficial ideals, because he is concerned to garner the approval of many others (who will be, mostly, best acquainted with his superficial qualities). So in one sense the vain are excessively proud. However, that the vain take self-evaluation to be founded upon the opinions of others suggests that, in another sense, the vain lack a sense of pride. Nietzsche offers an aphorism to this point, with a twist: “Vanity is the fear of appearing original: it is thus a lack of pride, but not necessarily of originality.”

The vain are a curious species of the proud; in the sense of self-evaluation they are excessively concerned with the self, yet in the individualistic sense of independence from the help of others they are often deficiently proud. As far as the fourth dimension of the strength of one’s commitment to one’s ideals, the vain are likely to be more committed to seeking the praise of others than to living in accordance with the ideals themselves. Finally, insofar as his ideals are superficial, the vain person also fails to care about living in accordance with more significant personal ideals.

The conceited, like the vain, are disposed to care too much about taking up the evaluative point of view. Unlike the vain, they are not in thrall to others’ opinions about

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their superficial qualities. Rather, the conceited base their self-evaluation upon how they compare to others; in particular, the conceited take pleasure in verifying their superiority to others. So, unlike the vain, the conceited are unlikely to have collective interpretations of their ideals or to seek or accept the help of others. For, engaging in joint projects undermines the interpersonal barrier that allows the conceited to feel superior. Accepting assistance, that is, undermines one’s perceived praiseworthiness if one’s sense of worth depends upon the conceit of superiority.

A servile person, on the other hand, is not firmly committed to his personal ideals, since he is willing to alter his course whenever others demand it. A servile person might have individualistic personal ideals and actively want to do things himself, but when he is told to do otherwise, he defers to authority. This deference may or may not be attributable to his concern for others holding him in esteem. It is easier, perhaps, to imagine a servile person with collective ideals, since a person who is happy to defer to others’ whims is unlikely to care about whether others help him to achieve his goals. Why would one resist the assistance of others while simultaneously accepting others’ demands? The servile may or may not take up the self-evaluative point of view when and only when it is appropriate; the servile may take pride in their servile status or they may be oblivious to it.

I conclude this section by considering how experiencing the emotion of pride affects the evaluative status of the trait of pride, which I understand as a firm commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. Does experiencing the emotion of pride threaten to make one a worse person? It is often said, for example, that experiencing pride leads one down the path to the trait of vicious pride, even if the emotion is
How does experiencing warranted pride affect one’s character in terms of the five dimensions of pride identified above?

Experiencing warranted pride involves taking up the self-evaluative point of view, so the frequent experience of pride may well correlate with a more highly self-centered moral consciousness. If this is so, then the subject must countenance the possibility that she is more attentive to her own evaluative status than she is to other, and more important, matters that she cares about. This disproportionate concern can always be rectified by raising one’s present evaluative standards or acquiring new personal ideals. As for the second dimension of the trait, as I have repeatedly noted experiencing the emotion of pride presupposes that one takes oneself to be entitled to the evaluative respect of others in one’s moral practice. Whether one is concerned about actually receiving this respect, however, is an independent matter.

The third dimension of the trait, however, seems to be unaffected by the experience of the emotion. If one is generally a collectivist then one will take pride in collective accomplishments and continue to be a collectivist; likewise if one is an individualist. The fourth dimension of the trait might be affected by the experience of pride. Perhaps if one feels pride one will gain confidence that will enhance one’s commitment to one’s ideals, and if one does not feel warranted pride one will lose confidence, which will diminish one’s commitments. Whether there is such a connection merits empirical investigation.

In the next section, I consider a challenge to the supposed virtue of pride from a historically influential conception of humility, which objects on moral grounds to the sort of concern with one’s evaluative status that the emotions of pride and shame embody.

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36 For an explanation and defense of the claim that it is possible for a warranted emotion to be morally inappropriate, see Chapter 2.
5.4 The Humble Saint Objection

‘If the experiments are really spiritual, then there can be no room for self-praise. They can only add to my humility. The more I reflect and look back on the past, the more vividly do I feel my limitations... If anything that I write in these pages should strike the reader as being touched with pride, then he must take it that there is something wrong with my quest, and that my glimpses are no more than mirage [sic].’


‘Dear Listener: All Praise Be To God To Whom All Praise Is Due.[…]

During the year 1957, I experienced, by the grace of God, a spiritual awakening which was to lead me to a richer, fuller, more productive life. At that time, in gratitude, I humbly asked to be given the means and privilege to make others happy through music. I feel this has been granted through His grace. ALL PRAISE TO GOD.

As time and events moved on, a period of irresolution did prevail. I entered into a phase which was contradictory to the pledge and away from the esteemed path; but thankfully, now and again through the unerring and merciful hand of God, I do perceive and now and again through the unerring and merciful hand of God, I do perceive and have been duly re-informed of His OMNIPOTENCE, and of our need for, and dependence on Him. At this time I would like to tell you that NO MATTER WHAT...IT IS WITH GOD. HE IS GRACIOUS AND MERCIFUL. HIS WAY IS IN LOVE, THROUGH WHICH WE ALL ARE. IT IS TRULY—A LOVE SUPREME—.

This album is a humble offering to Him. An attempt to say “THANK YOU GOD” through our work, […] as we do in our hearts and with our tongues. May He help and strengthen all men in every good endeavor…

May we never forget that in the sunshine of our lives, through the storm and after the rain—it is all with God—in all ways forever.

ALL PRAISE TO GOD.’

~John Coltrane, from the liner notes to A Love Supreme (1964)

Any discussion of the virtue of pride raises the issue of how to treat the supposed virtue of humility.37 The virtue of pride, being a firm commitment to living in accordance with

37 Historically, the theological appraisal of humility as a virtue has often depended upon an affirmation of two theses: the dilution thesis, according to which one’s praiseworthiness in virtue of some accomplishment is inversely proportional to the assistance of others (“the more that others help one to win, the less that one wins”); and the divine responsibility thesis, according to which God is causally and morally responsible for the occurrence of every good event. These two theses jointly entail that human beings are never praiseworthy, since all of their accomplishments depend entirely upon the grace of God, and if God deserves praise for enabling our successes then we deserve no praise. According to this view of humility, which finds expression in the sentiments of Coltrane, humility consists of the recognition, acceptance, and celebration of this entailment.

By taking satisfaction in one’s successes, one denies that God deserves all praise. Aquinas notes that “the sinfulness of pride of its very nature is most grievous. For it outmatches other sins in the turning away from God.” This turning away is a similar sort of misdirection of attention as that described in the previous section, with the benevolence of God substituted for the needs and interests other people. For one’s accomplishments one should be grateful to God instead of proud of oneself. If humility as sketched...
one’s personal ideals, bears a close resemblance to the virtue that Aquinas calls *magnanimitas*, usually translated as magnanimity, which aims “to strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason.”

I mention this resemblance because Aquinas famously defends the compatibility of magnanimity and humility. This precedent suggests, at first glance, that there need not be any conflict between the virtue that I outlined in the previous section and the trait of humility.

There are several competing accounts of humility in the contemporary and historical literature. First, one might evaluate one’s activity against such high standards that one judges that it never warrants pride. On this view, the humble evaluate themselves as lacking in true merit. This Augustinian conception of humility is both plausible and prevalent. Second, humility might be understood as involving indifference about one’s evaluative status. Being humble in this sense is compatible with any degree of assumed merit, and so differs from the first conception of humility, which involves a low level of assumed merit. On this second conception, one might be warranted in feeling pride and know that one would be so warranted, but one simply does not care.

In this section, I consider the second conception of humility, which constitutes more of a direct objection to the ideal-based account of the trait of pride than does the first conception of humility. The Augustinian conception of humility as I understand it is compatible with having a properly firm commitment to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. For, that commitment is compatible with any evaluative attitude, even

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39 There is also the prevalent view that humility and modesty are identical. If this identity is so, then there are several additional accounts advanced under the label of modesty.
40 For a contemporary explanation and defense of this conception of humility, see Norvin Richards (1992).
shame and contempt, towards the self. Only if Augustinian humility engenders despair and hopelessness might it conflict with being committed to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. According to the second conception of humility, on the other hand, it is commendable to be to some degree indifferent about whether one is living in accordance with one’s ideals. This indifference directly conflicts with the commitments embodied in the trait of pride.

Several contemporary philosophers take up the view that humility conflicts with the sort of concern for one’s worth that possession of the virtue of pride entails. These apparent conflicts mostly lie in the first dimension of the trait of pride, in taking up an evaluative point of view on oneself. In this section, I argue that there is such a thing as neglecting to take up this point of view when one ought to. In particular, the possibility of conflict between humility and experiencing the emotion of pride provides an occasion for considering whether the failure to experience the emotion of pride when it is warranted provides evidence of some character flaw. For, the proud disposition to take up the evaluative point of view on oneself includes a disposition to feel pride whenever one succeeds in living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. I will argue that the failure to experience pride when it is warranted is in some circumstances a moral failing.

James Kellenberger has recently argued that “While humility can be expressed in a number of ways, the more profound expression of humility is one that spontaneously and naturally excludes pride as a self-concerned reaction (and as well other self-concerned reactions, in particular that of shame).” Kellenberger denies that the self-knowledge and focus on self-improvement that might accompany the emotion of pride require ever experiencing the self-directed emotions of pride or shame. Similarly, though less categorically, J.L.A. Garcia defends the view that “The humble are those who are

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unimpressed with their own admired or envied features (or admirable or enviable ones), those who assign little prominence to their possession of characteristics in which they instead might well take pride. They are people for whom there is little personally salient in these qualities and accomplishments.”

Garcia and Kellenberger both note further that experiencing pride either involves or threatens to cause an unnecessary misdirection of concern away from the needs and demands of others. Kellenberger notes the tradition of praising the humble for their total lack of self-concern: Meister Eckhart argues that “perfect humility proceeds from annihilation of self”; and Iris Murdoch argues that “The humble man, because he sees himself as nothing, can see other things as they really are.” The humble person is concerned with the demands of the world and the effects of her activity on the world, and not with how her activity reflects upon her worth.

In order to explain the value of warranted pride, it will help to begin by considering of few of the reasons why the experience of warranted shame is valuable and why the failure to experience shame when it is warranted provides defeasible evidence of some character flaw. The first, easily overlooked, point to make is that shamelessness is, among other things, an epistemic disadvantage. The experience of warranted shame alerts one to a matter of personal disgrace. This epistemic point is familiar to us from Aristotle’s characterization of shame as an emotion that is useful for the morally immature. The usefulness of shame lies in the coupling of the epistemic aspect with a painful spur that, in the standard case, directs one to critical self-consciousness. A shameless person’s lack of concern about her shameful qualities therefore bodes ill for her self-knowledge and for

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43 Ibid., 330, 331.

her self-improvement— one who does not care about this sort of thing is likely to continue not to care. Self-knowledge garnered from warranted shame is morally important; put another way, shamelessness helps to ensure continued shamefulness.

But more than this first-personal epistemic role, shame also provides direct evidence that one cares (at least in some rudimentary way) about living in accordance with the flouted ideal. That a person feels warranted shame tells us, the third-party spectators, not only something about the odds of her becoming a better person; it shows us something about the present quality of her character, namely that she is concerned about the fact that she is not as good a person as she thinks she should be. Such concern, when warranted, is a praiseworthy characteristic, while the lack of such concern, when warranted, is disgraceful. Shamelessness itself warrants shame.

Does pridelessness incur the same moral cost or reveal the same debasement as shamelessness? The emotion of pride, like shame, alerts one to one’s standing with respect to one’s ideals. Like the pain of shame, the pleasure of pride grabs one’s attention. Where the epistemic role of shame is to caution one against maintaining one’s status quo, pride indicates that one is in some respect in good standing. One might think that pride’s epistemic role is, at best, morally insignificant, since it does not appear to counsel any improvement. Furthermore, one might think that pride’s only motivational contribution is to lull one into lazy self-satisfaction.

Drawing this conclusion would be hasty. First, the experience of pride can surprise oneself and alert one to the significance of some almost-overlooked fact. Consider a college student who is intimidated by her friends and family into believing that school’s not cool and that her time would be better spent on finding a husband. Although the

45 Thanks to Angie Smith for suggesting this way of phrasing the matter. Shame need not indicate that one wants to improve oneself, since one might fail to be moved to act upon one’s concern.
young woman assents to these claims, she also takes a certain pride in her academic work. The emotional experience of pride plays the ethically important epistemic role of signaling to her that she cares about intellectual activity. Of course, there is no guarantee that she will attend to the import of this signal, just as there is no such guarantee with shame. All the same, experiencing warranted pride can provide information about what one cares about that can help one to decide to become a better person. The student’s pride might well convince her to question her relative prioritization of marriage and intellectual pursuit.

With this example in mind, we can see that one of Kellenberger’s arguments against the value of pride fails. Kellenberger argues by enumeration that pride is not necessary for possessing any of that emotion’s potentially valuable qualities or side effects. These qualities are enumerated to be: “(a) awareness of strengths and abilities, (b) focused effort, diligently applying oneself to an effort, (c) having definite goals”46 This list, however, omits awareness of what matters to oneself. The failure to feel pride can facilitate continued ignorance about one’s personal ideals. Indeed, it would be difficult for me to learn about what has personal import to me without ever attending to what I take pride and shame in.47 This difficulty calls into question Kellenberger’s conclusion that the emotion of pride is dispensable.

One might object that the student in my example exhibits a peculiar detachment from her emotions and herself insofar as she regards her own pride as a psychological state to provide her with evidence about what has personal import to her. In so doing, one might

46 Ibid., 330.
47 For an argument for the stronger claim that personal import is determined by a pattern of emotions that includes pride and shame, see Bennett Helm, *Love, Friendship, and the Self* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
think, she regards her mental states from an excessively impartial point of view. Learning about what matters to oneself on the basis of what one takes pride in might seem literally preposterous, akin to deciding what to do on the basis of what intention one has. This objection, however, merely highlights the fact that such a person is, by hypothesis, morally immature and thus psychologically conflicted. We who stand in need of self-improvement often require the promptings, painful and pleasant, of emotional experience in order to learn about what is important to us.

So, helping one to identify matters of personal import is one valuable epistemic function of pride. There is a second way in which failing to experience pride when it is warranted evinces, if not constitutes, lack of knowledge. Consider a lawyer who experiences no pride when she achieves her dream of making partner at her legal firm. It is possible that she experiences no pride because she does not, despite what she sometimes thinks, actually care about being a successful lawyer, in which case the lack of pride would serve an epistemic function. Indeed, in such a case, the lack of pride would have positive value. So, at least one form of “pridelessness” is desirable. But suppose the prideless lawyer does care about being a successful lawyer and that she does consider making partner a sign of success. Why might she fail to experience pride? It is possible that although, in some sense, she knows that she has succeeded (she updates her résumé and orders new business cards), in another sense she does not know what has happened—her promotion has not yet “sunk in.”

Failing to feel pride in this achievement evinces that she does not fully grasp the significance of what has happened: “I can’t believe it,” she might as well say. That is, the lawyer might be, in this respect, analogous to a pallbearer

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49 The scare quotes here and in the following paragraph indicate that, although several English expressions refer to it, this cognitive quality requires elucidation that I do not have the space to provide.
who has not yet begun to grieve. Feeling pride serves in this context as a criterion of understanding. The experience of pride is, like all emotions, a registering of some matter of importance. This elusive registering, or “taking stock,” cannot be neatly distinguished from the cognitive state of belief.

In addition to a two-fold epistemic significance, the experience of pride, like the experience of shame, exhibits a concern for living in accordance with personal ideals. Caring about living in accordance with one’s personal ideals is praiseworthy because it is a form of recognition of the fact that being a good person is a good thing. In other words, since it is a good thing for a person to be a good person, a good person deeply values success at living in accordance with her ideals. The proper emotional response to such a success, I have argued elsewhere, is pride. A person who does not experience the emotion of pride when it is warranted either fails to value success at living in accordance with her personal ideals or fails to grasp the fact that she has so succeeded (or both). Pridelessness is shameful if it is the result of a lack of concern about living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. This point mirrors the earlier point about the shamefulness of shamelessness.

So, experiencing warranted pride is morally significant for at least two reasons. First, experiencing pride can alert one to the fact that one is living in accordance with one’s ideals, just as shame can indicate the opposite. As in the case of the student, experiencing pride can alert one to the content of one’s ideals and to what has personal import; as in the case of the lawyer, failure to experience pride can indicate either one’s ignorance of what matters to oneself or a failure to grasp the significance of achievements that have personal import. In both of these ways, pride conduces to self-knowledge that can

50 Or, like the repentant murderer who has not yet begun to feel guilt.
contribute to moral self-improvement. Second, experiencing pride provides evidence that one cares about living in accordance with one’s personal ideals and, hence, about being a good person. Contrariwise, failing to experience pride when it is warranted indicates that one does not care about living in accordance with some personal ideals, or that one doesn’t fully understand one’s achievements.

Still, some will counter that there is something strange, if not off-putting, about a person who takes pride in his good deeds. I will conclude with some remarks intended to accommodate this insight. First, one source of concern about such a case lies in the proud person’s motivation for performing her good deeds. One might suspect that feeling pride about one’s good deeds indicates that one was motivated to perform them for self-interested reasons. This suspicion is particularly aroused when the person displays or announces her pride. There are surely people who are motivated by the prospect of being able to gloat or brag or receive praise. Such motivation deserves to be classifying as, at best, second-rate. (Though it is more childish than positively evil to act in order to receive praise.)

Second, even if one’s original motives were pure, the sustained, temporal quality of emotional experience sometimes mitigates against experiencing pride in one’s good deeds. For example, if I bravely act as a whistleblower in order to expose the grave ethical and financial abuses of the organization for which I work, the proper emotional response on my part should be, for example, concern for the harm done to my organization’s victims and hope for their recovery and restitution. These other-directed attitudes should continue into at least the near future to occupy my attention. It would be morally inappropriate for me to shift my emotional focus to self-praise immediately after
whistleblowing. (This is not to say that all self-regarding emotions would be inappropriate; fear for my safety may very well deserve my attention.)

So, there is indeed something to say against experiencing the emotion of pride. I have argued, merely, that there are also, in many circumstances, a variety of reasons to value the emotional experience of pride. I have tried to show that both blanket condemnations and blanket endorsements of pride are implausible. What remains to be shown are the precise conditions under which pride is valuable or shameful.

5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have sketched a descriptive and normative account of the trait of pride. The descriptive account of pride as consisting of five primary dimensions provides a framework that enables us to map a topography of pride. This descriptive account also sets the stage for a normative account of pride, since the five dimensions of pride each admit of normative assessment.

Two topics that call for further treatment are the relation between the trait of pride and personal integrity and the relation between the trait of pride and self-respect. It would be surprising if these three personal qualities were entirely unrelated, but I do not have the space to develop these connections here. I briefly consider the relation between the trait of pride and self-respect in the Appendix. Next, however, I return to the two puzzles that I set myself in the Introduction and make explicit the personal ideal-based solutions to them.
Conclusion

In the Introduction, I framed the present work in terms of a search for solutions to two puzzles about pride. The descriptive puzzle is to explain how the emotion of pride relates to the character trait of pride. This relation is puzzling because the obvious suggestion—that the trait of pride is just a disposition to experience the emotion of pride—clearly fails. It is possible to be utterly servile—to lack “any sense of pride”—and yet to be disposed to experience the emotion of pride. Indeed, a person who takes pride in his servile activity lacks the trait of pride in part because he is disposed to experience such pride. The normative puzzle is to explain why pride is subject to diametrically opposed, and extreme, normative evaluations—ranging from criticism as the cardinal sin to praise as the basis for self-respect and a sense of the meaningfulness of one’s life.

The personal ideal-based account of pride provides the key to solving both puzzles. I will now briefly summarize these solutions and consider how they help us to make sense of what is arguably the most influential portrait of pride ever drawn: Milton’s Satan.

The personal ideal-based solution to the descriptive puzzle, I show, illuminates a general distinction between two uses of personal ideals. Personal ideals figure into ethical experience in at least two overlapping ways. A person may be committed to living in accordance with an ideal, and a person may evaluate herself (or others) with respect to an ideal. Call the former the *practical influence* of an ideal, and the latter the *evaluative use* of an ideal. I argued in Chapter 5 that being a proud person involves the practical influence of one’s ideals, which is so called because it refers to the role that ideals play in the deliberation and related practical activities of an agent. In particular, I argued that to be proud is to be firmly committed to
living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. On the other hand, feeling proud, I argued in Chapter 3, is a result of an evaluative use of one’s ideals, one that depends upon the evaluation being positive and the object of evaluation being the self.\(^1\) This distinction lays the groundwork for a solution to the descriptive puzzle about pride: the two sorts of pride are bound together by their ties to personal ideals, and they are differentiated from each other by being tied to those ideals in different ways.\(^2\) That these two uses of personal ideals map neatly onto the two sorts of pride provides a reason to accept the ideal-based account of pride. This section sketches the ideal-based account, and concludes by briefly considering an objection to it. But first, consider what both sorts of pride presuppose, namely, that one has an ideal.

Having some minimal concern for living in accordance with an ideal is necessary for (if not constitutive of\(^3\)) “having” an ideal. If you do not care at all about living in accordance with an ideal, then it is not your ideal. Anyone who feels pride cares to some degree about living in accordance with some ideal, even if they are not committed firmly enough to living in accordance with their ideals to qualify as a proud person. The deferential wife’s feeling of pride would be inexplicable if she did not care about living in accordance with some ideal (perhaps that of the traditional housewife). However, though the deferential wife cares about at least one ideal, she is willing to compromise on and even abandon her non-domestic ideals at her husband’s whim. Because she allows another person to dictate her ends, there is

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\(^1\) Feeling shame and contempt are two other possible results of the evaluative use of one’s ideals, results that depend upon negative evaluations of the self and others.

\(^2\) Since a full account of these two roles would require a complete theory of personal ideals, this Conclusion offers only a sketch sufficient to make clear the solution to the descriptive puzzle about pride. For further discussion of personal ideals, see Strawson (1961); R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), Chapters 8 and 9; Lynne McFall (1984); Gert (1998); Frankfurt (1999); Velleman (2002); and Kimberley Brownlee (2010).

\(^3\) One may care about an ideal for the wrong reason—say, because one wants the approval of others. In such cases it may be indeterminable whether it is your ideal that you care about.
a clear sense in which she is not in general firmly enough committed to her ideals to warrant being described as a proud person.

Being a proud person involves having a “firm commitment” to living in accordance with one’s personal ideals that may take any of several forms: obsession, loyalty, care, dependency, obedience, fanaticism, idolization, love, and so on. Ajax’s pride consists in an obsession with living in accordance with his heroic ideals to the point of being indifferent to other considerations of importance, such as the devastating impact of his suicide on his wife and child. One aspect that is central to each of these varieties of firm commitment is the principled shaping of one’s practical reasoning.

A firm commitment to one’s ideals shapes one’s practical reasoning in several general ways. Implicit aspects of the practical influence of ideals include the shaping of one’s moral perception. A proud person sees certain considerations (and not others), which are dictated by his firm commitment to his ideals, as reasons for action. This influence is implicit in that the proud person need not be thinking about her ideal (or about herself as one who is firmly committed to living in accordance with this ideal) when she recognizes these considerations as reasons. She will, typically, simply see these considerations as reasons for action. A proud social reformer will tend to see obstacles to her living in accordance with her goals as challenges to be overcome rather than as reasons to give up. A proud gardener will tend to see the wilted condition of his shrubs as a reason to tend to them immediately and not as a reason to find a new hobby. Likewise with respect to tendencies to notice certain things (and not others) in her environment: the proud gardener will tend to notice things about his garden that the rest of us may not. He would not, in general, explicitly consult his ideals in order to determine what he should notice. This conclusion is especially apparent in the negative case: a proud aristocrat does not consult his ideals in order to determine whom he
should fail to notice as being beneath him. The implicit practical influence of an ideal also affects the agent’s affective reactions to her surroundings. The proud person will be pleased and pained by certain things (and not others); she will feel the pang of an insult (unless it comes from someone who does not deserve her consideration); she will be pleased to be recognized for what she accomplished; and so on.4

The practical influence of an ideal also may be explicit in the agent’s practical reasoning. An explicit appeal to personal ideals in one’s deliberations often occurs in deliberation about practical dilemmas. The proud plumber might decide that he cannot throw in the towel because, appealing though it might be to call in the experts, that would signify defeat and a betrayal of his plumbing ideals. Similarly, Ajax explicitly invokes his heroic ideals in deciding what to do: he would measure up badly with respect to them if he were to accept help, appealing though it might be to survive the war unscathed.

This thought leads us to the evaluative use of ideals, which is not unrelated to their practical influence, for the evaluative use of personal ideals is one aspect of a firm commitment to personal ideals. A proud person is strongly disposed towards taking up an evaluative point of view, though even those of us who are minimally committed to our ideals will sometimes use them evaluatively.

There are many aspects of living in accordance with an ideal, so there are many possible features of a person that one might evaluate with reference to an ideal. For instance, both acting in accordance with what an ideal commends and acting for the reasons for which the ideal commends that one act may provide grounds for believing that one is living in accordance with it to at least some degree. Consider two people who share the ideal of being a great chef, and who both suppose that becoming a great chef requires gaining entry into a

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4 For an argument that one can be morally responsible for these implicit activities, see Angela M. Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (January 2005): 236-271.
prestigious academy like Le Cordon Bleu. Both students feel proud upon gaining acceptance, but one student wants to attend Le Cordon Bleu for the snobbish reason that all great chefs have attended the school (and thus to join that lineage), while the other wants to attend because the school provides the best culinary instruction. The first student, while aware of the fact that her motives are not ‘pure,’ may nonetheless take pride in having acted in accordance with the ideal of being a great chef—she has gained entry to the right academy—while the second student may take pride in having acted for the reason for which the ideal in this case commends that one act—namely, that Le Cordon Bleu provides sound training. Both students feel pride based upon their living in accordance with their culinary ideals, but the grounds of their pride are importantly distinct. The practical influence of an ideal may extend beyond the act itself to the very reasons for which one should act.\footnote{An alternate explanation of the different bases of pride in these two cases is that the two chefs hold different ideals: the first chef has the ideal of appearing to be a great chef and not (like the second chef) the ideal of being a great chef. This raises the difficult but important issue of how to individuate ideals. My brief description of the case makes it difficult to distinguish between this alternate explanation and the explanation offered in the text. If the vain chef gave up his culinary interests when he first encountered resistance, then we might reasonably conclude that he never cared about becoming a chef, per se, as much as he cared about being admired. Thanks to Angie Smith for pressing me on this point.}

Living in accordance with an ideal may require more than just individual good actions. An ideal may commend that one engage in certain long-term projects, that one love or care about particular things, or that one experience certain thoughts and emotions on particular occasions. Being a good parent requires attentive care for one’s child over an extended period of time. So a primary object of assessment in such cases will be one’s commitment to the child rather than any single action. A parent who feels proud of his parenting on the basis of the great birthday present that he once delivered—despite years of general parental neglect—mistakenly thinks that the quality of one’s parenting can be assessed from a single act.
The many different grounds of feeling proud map onto different aspects of living in accordance with an ideal. One can feel proud of an act, an emotional reaction, a commitment to another person, having noticed something, and so on. Thus, one’s personal ideals are plainly linked to the emotion as well as to the trait of pride.6

The ideal-based account of pride explains how the emotion and the trait of pride are related so as to merit the same name without obscuring their distinctness. Both sorts of pride are tied to personal ideals. Yet, the practical influence of an ideal is importantly distinct from and, given the proper circumstances, compatible with any particular outcome of an evaluative use. Thus a proud person—one whose ideals influence him practically—might feel pride, shame, contempt, anger, or nothing at all. Likewise, someone who only minimally cares about living in accordance with her ideals may nonetheless evaluate herself by reference to them—which explains how one might feel pride without being a proud person.

What ties the trait more closely to the emotion of pride than to, say, contempt? The trait involves being firmly committed to living in accordance with one’s ideals and the emotion involves an appraisal of oneself as succeeding in living in accordance with these ideals. In other words, the emotion involves achieving what you care about insofar as you are a proud person. In this light it makes good sense that the trait shares the emotion of pride’s name rather than any other emotion’s name, and vice versa.

The distinction between the practical influence and the evaluative use of a norm holds for all personal norms, including moral norms. The present study of pride is but one special case

6 Kellenberger, op. cit., agrees that feelings of pride “are understandable as reactions to coming up to …a standard or ideal regarding any of various ‘subjects’ that form a person’s ideal self-conception” (326), yet observes that “One can…strive to approach an ideal without that ideal being an ego ideal in this sense [of leading to feelings of pride upon approximating it]” (ibid) if one is humble and lacks all forms of self-concern. Although it is difficult to understand why one would strive to approach an ideal self-conception if one lacked entirely in self-concern, the account on offer allows that one who is not concerned to evaluate oneself will not feel pride, even if one lives in accordance with one’s personal ideals.
of a general investigation into the relation between these two uses of norms. I hope to have shown that these two uses are sometimes fruitfully studied together.

The Normative Puzzle arises with respect to both the character trait of pride and the emotion of pride. From Aristotle and Aquinas to Jane Austen and Gabriele Taylor, normative discussion about pride has often focused on virtuous and vicious forms of the trait of pride.\(^7\) In §5.3, I argued that the normative status of the trait of pride is a function of the normative status of five dimensions of the trait: (1) the manner in which the proud person explicitly regards herself from an evaluative point of view, (2) the extent to which the proud person cares about receiving the respect of others; (3) the extent to which the proud person is “individualistic,” (4) the nature of the proud person’s commitment to her personal ideals; and (5) the worthiness of the proud person’s personal ideals.

When the emotion of pride comes under normative scrutiny, the focus is either upon whether the emotion accurately represents its intentional objects or whether experiencing the emotion at a particular circumstance is morally or prudentially inappropriate (regardless of whether the emotion is representational accurate). In §3.3, I argued that in experiencing the emotion of pride a person represents pride’s intentional object as evidence that one is living in accordance with one’s personal ideals. Since a necessary condition of having a personal ideal is that one regards it as worthy, in experiencing pride one represents pride’s intentional object as evidence that one is living in accordance with a worthy personal ideal. So, one inaccurately represents the object of one’s pride if it is not, in fact, evidence that one is living in accordance with one’s ideals or if the relevant ideal is not, in fact, a worthy personal ideal. One who thinks too highly of himself and, as a consequence, experiences pride in something that is not, in fact, evidence of his living in accordance with his ideals

\(^7\) Important exceptions to this generalization include Rousseau and Hume.
makes a mistake. So too does a person who takes pride in something that he takes to show that he is living in accordance with unworthy or immoral personal ideals.

In §5.4, I returned to the emotion of pride in order to consider whether failing to experience pride, even when the emotion accurately represents its object, is an expression of virtue—in particular, an expression of the virtue of humility. I argued that defenders of the supposed virtue of humility are correct in concluding that experiencing pride can be morally blameworthy, even if the emotion accurately represents its object. Sometimes, for example, one should attend to the needs of others rather than to one’s evaluative status. However, I argued that experiencing pride can also be ethically and epistemically valuable insofar as it is a correct perception of a matter of personal import.

I will conclude by applying the description and normative conclusions of this dissertation to a particular literary example of pride. In the Introduction and in §5.2, I discussed one aspect of Sophocles’ representation of Ajax’s pride, namely, that Ajax spurns the help of the gods from a morally dubious motive relating to his individualistic assertion of self-sufficiency. As a result of this assertion, the goddess Athena takes revenge upon Ajax by inducing in him the hallucination that he is killing Odysseus and his men when, in fact, he is killing mere cattle and inconsequential guardians of the livestock. However, I did not develop a second aspect of Sophocles’ representation of pride (in part because Sophocles himself neglects to develop this aspect, choosing instead to begin his drama in medias res), namely, that Ajax wishes to murder Odysseus because Odysseus was—unjustly, in Ajax’s view—awarded the prize of Achilles’ arms after the two of them jointly battled against the Trojans to recover
Achilles’ body. This murderous motivation is plausibly to be understood in terms of Ajax’s pride.

The envious manifestation of a proud character is a historically influential trope in the history of the discourse on pride. Indeed, the single most significant literary characterization of pride in the English language is arguably an instance of this type—to wit, Milton’s Satan. Because the motives of Milton’s Satan parallel those of Ajax, and because Milton’s portrayal of these motives is one of the literary masterpieces of the world, we should test the mettle of the personal ideal-based account of pride by determining whether it can help us to explain Milton’s descriptive and normative portrayal of Satan.

Milton portrays Satan both as being proud and, on rare occasions, as feeling proud of his (rare) achievements. For an example of the latter, consider Milton’s description of Satan after the latter’s one and only great success, that he convinces Eve to eat an apple from the Tree of Knowledge. In Milton’s telling of “The Argument” of Book 10, he writes that Satan is “proud of his success” against man and that he relates this news “with boasting” upon his return to Pandemonium. According to the account of pride that I defend, in experiencing this pride Satan takes the fact that he has succeeded against man—which is to say, that he has introduced Sin and Death to Earth—to show that he is living in accordance with his

8 Sophocles has characters mention this episode in two places: “[Odysseus:] Then to what end did he [Ajax] thrust his hand so senselessly? [Athena:] He was mad with anger over the arms of Achilles” (Jebb, tr.; lines 40-41); “[Athena:] And have you launched your armed hand against the Atridae? [Ajax:] Yes, so that never again will they dishonor Ajax. [Athena:] The men are dead, as I interpret your words. [Ajax:] Dead they are. Now let them rob me of my arms!” (Jebb, tr.; 97-100). For the classic retelling of this story, see Book 13 of Ovid’s Metamorphoses. For a recent discussion of this aspect of the Ajax myth, see Paul Woodruff, The Ajax Dilemma: Justice, Fairness, and Rewards (New York: Oxford University, 2011).

9 The parallels between the three-party relationship of Athena, Odysseus, and Ajax, on the one hand, and the relationship of God, the Son, and Satan, on the other hand, are profound and deserve a fuller treatment than would be appropriate in the present dissertation. Also of possible significance in this connection is that Milton’s Paradise Lost begins in medias res at the narrative point that is analogous to the beginning of Sophocles” Ajax. In what follows I do not attempt to answer the much investigated literary-theological question of what, ultimately, motivates Satan to rebel from God, given that a wholly benevolent God created Satan.

personal ideals. If this account is correct, then (1) there is some personal ideal that Satan acknowledges as worthy and (2) Satan judges that introducing Sin and Death to Earth is evidence of his living in accordance with this personal ideal. There is textual support for these two claims in Satan’s boasts about his success to the personifications of Sin and Death, who are on their way to Earth to take hold of humanity:

[...]
High proof ye now have given to be the race
Of Satan, (for I glory in the name
Antagonist of heaven’s Almighty king,)
Ample have merited of me, of all
Th’infernal empire, that so near heaven’s door
Triumphal with triumphal act have met,
Mine with this glorious work, and made one realm,
Hell and this world one realm, one continent
Of easy thoroughfare. (X, 385-393; my emphasis)

Milton here has Satan articulate his animating personal ideal: “Antagonist of heaven’s Almighty king.” Satan revels in the fact that he has made of hell and Earth “one continent / Of easy thoroughfare.” This achievement seems to Satan to provide evidence that he is living in accordance with his antagonistic personal ideal because the achievements seems to interfere with God’s plans for humanity. In particular, it seems to interfere with God’s preference of humanity over Satan as exhibited in His decision that His Son take human form.

Why does Satan “glory in the name / Antagonist of heaven’s Almighty king”? Although this question may have no ultimate answer, let us consider whether Satan’s character can be (1) described as proud, (2) understood in terms of the descriptive account of pride offered in Chapter 5, and (3) properly described as viciously proud.\textsuperscript{11} The answer to (1) is provided to

\textsuperscript{11} In his influential study of Milton,\textit{ Surprised by Sin: The Reader in Paradise Lost} (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1997, second edition), Stanley Fish argues that there is in principle no answer to be given—or rather, that the answer can only be in terms of Satan’s free will: “If there can be no answer to the question, “why does
us on the authority of Milton, who repeatedly describes Satan as being a proud person.

Consider the passage in which, chronologically, Satan is first described as proud:

… he of the first,
If not the first archangel, great in power,
In favor and pre-eminence, yet fraught
With envy against the Son of God, that day
Honor’d by his great Father, and proclaim’d
Messiah, King anointed, could not bear,
Through pride that sight, and thought himself impair’d. (V, 659-665)

In this passage, Satan is portrayed as having been envious of the Son of God, and as having “thought himself impair’d.” Due to his pride, Satan experiences envy and “could not bear” to see the Son of God anointed. In contrast to Satan’s pride about his success against man, this pride is not the pleasant emotion of pride, but rather the character trait of pride. Where Ajax’s proud character explained why he experienced shame at having been tricked by a God, Satan’s pride explains his envy.\(^{12}\)

How can the personal ideal-based account of pride help us to make sense of Satan’s character? Satan is concerned with receiving honor from God, and is envious of the Son of God for his being honored.\(^ {13}\) Satan is so concerned with receiving honor, or at least with not being dishonored, that he rebels against the Lord of the Universe. This concern is an instance of the second dimension of the trait of pride, the extent to which the proud person cares about receiving the respect of others.

\(^{12}\) It is notable that Milton’s descriptions of the trait of pride rarely mention the emotion of pride, and that when an emotion is mentioned in connection with Satan’s proud character, that emotion is most frequently envy or hatred.

\(^{13}\) For consideration of an argument that Satan is envious of human beings for having been chosen as the form in which the Son of God exists, see Arnold Williams, “The Motivation of Satan’s Rebellion in “Paradise Lost”,” *Studies in Philosophy* 42, no. 2 (1945): 253-268.
That Satan can fairly be described as obsessed with receiving this honor is an instance of the fourth dimension of the trait of pride, the nature of the proud person’s commitment to her personal ideals. In the opening of Book I, Milton describes Satan as possessing “obdurate pride and steadfast hate” (I, l. 58). Some commentators have emphasized this aspect of his character as being crucial to understanding not only Satan but *Paradise Lost* as a whole. Percy Bysshe Shelley argues the following:

Nothing can exceed the energy and magnificence of the character of Satan as expressed in “Paradise Lost”… Milton’s Devil as a moral being is as far superior to his God as one who perseveres in some purpose which he has conceived to be excellent in spite of adversity and torture is to one who in the cold security of undoubted triumph inflicts the most horrible revenge upon his enemy… Milton has so far violated the popular creed…as to have alleged no superiority of moral virtue to his God over his Devil. This bold neglect of a direct moral purpose is the most decisive proof of the supremacy of Milton’s genius.14

Shelley understands Satan’s “obdurate pride” (I, 58) as “perseverance in some purpose which he has conceived to be excellent in spite of adversity and torture,” and takes this trait to be central to both Satan’s “magnificence” and the excellence of an epic poem that “neglect[s] a direct moral purpose” by showing Satan as possessing no less virtue than God. Shelley’s famous assessment gives urgency to the normative question in its starkest form: Is the Devil’s dominant character trait a virtue or a vice?

Shelley implies that Satan’s “magnificence” of character is unaffected by the fact that the ideals to which he obdurately pursues are evil. This ethical judgment is fantastically dubious, even if our aesthetic enjoyment is enhanced by Satan’s obduracy. It must be said that the aim of introducing Sin and Death into the world in order to exact revenge upon God is evil, even if the success of this aim brings with it the pursuit of human knowledge.

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I mentioned, above, that one of Satan’s personal ideals is to be “Antagonist of heaven’s Almighty king.” But this ideal was not clearly in play before God honored the Son, and so the question arises as to what personal ideal Satan was so firmly committed to prior to this pivotal event. This question is difficult to answer because we know little about Satan prior to his rebellion; but one might object that the fact that Satan’s character is so vivid and captivating suggests that we do not need to know about Satan’s pre-rebellion personal ideals in order to understand his proud rebellion, and hence that we do not need to refer to personal ideals in order to understand pride. Indeed, according to one influential interpretation of *Paradise Lost*, Satan makes himself proud by his own free volition.\(^\text{15}\)

Satan’s pride consists in his determination, unswayed by the edicts of his superiors, to live in accordance with whatever personal ideals he might have. Therefore, the particular content of Satan’s pre-rebellion personal ideals is irrelevant. What is relevant, rather, is his opposition to the erection of any limits to the free pursuit of his aims. He makes the case for his obdurate brand of pride in his speech to Eve:

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Queen of this universe, do not believe
Those rigid threats of death; ye shall not die;
How should ye? by the fruit? it gives you life
To knowledge; by the threat’ner? Look on me,
Me who have touch’d and tasted, yet both live,
And life more perfect have attain’d than fate
Meant me, by vent’ring higher than my lot. (IX, 684-690)
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Satan, speaking as a snake and lying to Eve about his having tasted the fruit, inadvertently describes himself perfectly as one who has ventured “higher than my lot.” Insofar as pride is the trait that exhibits one’s commitment to live in accordance with one’s ideals and to strive for a “life more perfect … than fate / Meant me,” it entails a resistance to external limitations assigned in virtue of “my lot.” The normative puzzle about pride arises in part

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\(^{15}\) See note 11, above.
because this disposition is so difficult to properly calibrate: when properly calibrated it is vital for living a good life, but when obdurate pride takes hold it is potentially threatening to others who stand in the way.
Appendix: Pride and Self-Respect

Discussion of the trait of pride will undoubtedly raise the question for some readers of how this trait relates to self-respect. In this appendix, I briefly and selectively review the large contemporary philosophical literature devoted to self-respect in order to situate the character trait of pride within that conceptual space. That literature has often suggested links between the trait of pride and self-respect. However, the recently proliferating taxonomy of kinds of self-respect raises the new question of what kind of self-respect is supposed to be identical to pride. I describe the alleged species of self-respect that is most similar to the trait of pride, and conclude with a reservation about the conceptualization of this trait as a form of self-respect. This reservation stems from the fact that, unlike pride, one cannot have too much self-respect. Thus, having pride cannot be identical to having self-respect.

More than four decades ago, Joel Feinberg posited that the ideas of pride and self-respect help to explain what it is to have rights: "Having rights enables us to ‘stand up like men,’ to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental way the equal of anyone. To think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but properly proud, to have that minimal self-respect that is necessary to be worthy of the love and esteem of others."¹ Feinberg appears to equate the following three states to each other: thinking of oneself as the holder of rights, being properly proud, and having (minimal) self-respect. Two of these equations have proliferated throughout the philosophical literature: first, pride has

frequently been identified with self-respect and, second, self-respect has been identified with thinking of oneself as the holder of rights. Since, as I tried to show in this dissertation, pride is not identical with thinking of oneself as the holder of rights, at least one of these equations must be false.

One decade after Feinberg’s article appeared in print, David Sachs echoed the suggestion that being proud is sufficient for having self-respect: “...in a well-understood sense of “pride,” what is required for one to have his pride, not to lack it, is to possess one’s self-respect.” Sachs does not defend this claim, except by noting that both the proud and the self-respecting are commonly understood as disposed to guard against being treated as an inferior. Robin Dillon offers a similar account of the relation between pride and self-respect according to which pride is synonymous with self-esteem in one sense and synonymous with self-respect in another sense. Citing the *Oxford English Dictionary* and the *American Heritage Dictionary*, she writes:

> [Pride] is a particularly useful concept, inasmuch as it provides some clues for distinguishing self-respect and self-esteem. Self-respect is treated as synonymous with pride insofar as they both concern “a sense of one’s own proper dignity” or “a proper sense of personal dignity and worth,” whereas self-esteem (a favorable opinion of oneself) tends to be identified with pride when it is “overweening” or “inordinate.”

Like Sachs, Dillon emphasizes the common concern between the proud and the self-respecting for their personal dignity.

The early development of the philosophical literature on self-respect distances that concept from the conception of pride I defend. The two most influential articles on self-

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4 Dillon also raises the issue of unjustified pride, but appears to shift her discussion from the trait to the emotion of pride.
respect explain self-respect in terms of a recognition of one’s moral status. Thomas Hill argues that servility demonstrates a lack of self-respect insofar as the servile person either fails to acknowledge her moral rights or disavows her moral status, publicly and systematically, in the absence of any strong reason for doing so. Thus, Hill analyzes self-respect as thinking of oneself as the bearer of moral rights and as a member of the moral community with a status equal to that of other persons. Not dissimilarly, Stephen Darwall characterizes the relevant form of self-respect as the disposition to give appropriate consideration in one’s deliberations to the fact that one is a person, which involves regarding one’s personhood “as requiring restrictions on the moral acceptability of actions connected with it.”

Both of these accounts of self-respect differ significantly from the trait of pride in two respects. The first respect, which I discuss in greater detail below, is that whereas one can have too much or too little pride, one cannot have too much self-respect. That is, while there are some who we think should swallow their pride, there are none who we think should have less self-respect.

Second, and more importantly, these forms of self-respect are narrowly defined in terms of moral respect for oneself and one’s rights and dignity as a person. This feature has two implications that bring out the contrast with pride: first, that whereas the motivations that characterize the properly proud will differ depending upon which personal ideals they care about, the characteristic motivation of the self-respecting are always the same. Indeed, that is the point of self-respect, on these accounts—that everyone has the same moral duties to themselves because everyone possesses an equal moral status. This leads us to the second implication, namely, that these accounts of self-

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respect entail that we have moral duties to the self. The personal ideals account of the
trait of pride has no such entailment.

At least two neo-Kantian moral philosophers who have written on self-respect have
come to see that the moral rights account of self-respect leaves behind the rich connection
between pride and self-respect that Feinberg, Sachs, and Dillon landed upon. The first is
Thomas Hill, who, in “Self-Respect Reconsidered” acknowledges that his previous
treatment of self-respect, referred to above, is incomplete. There is, Hill argues,

    a way in which a person can respect himself quite aside from acknowledging his
merits and appreciating his rights. This form of self-respect would require that one
develop and live by a set of personal standards by which one is prepared to judge
oneself even if they are not extended to others. The standards might be ideals for
which one strives or merely a minimum below which one cannot go without
losing face with oneself.6

Hill’s examples of “this form of self-respect” do not appear to involve moral
considerations but involve commitments that overlap with the trait of pride. He describes
an artist who, at the behest of a patron, alters an artwork to make it more agreeable, even
though this change would make the piece worse in the artist’s view. As Hill rightly notes,
it seems implausible to trace this apparent failure of self-respect to a failure of moral
recognition for his rights as person. What Hill diagnoses as a lack of self-respect could just
as easily be diagnosed as a lack of pride, where the artist’s personal ideals include artistic
ideals. Whichever diagnosis is more apt, the point is that Hill’s concerns in this essay
substantially overlap with matters of pride.

Robin Dillon has also described an aspect of self-respect that need not be explicitly
linked to an agent’s respect for her moral status. As opposed to moral-status based self-

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(Reprinted in *Autonomy and Self-Respect*, New York: Cambridge University, 1991, pp. 19-24; the quotation
is from p. 22 of this edition).
Appendix

respect, which is based in a conception of shared humanity that is divorced from personal idiosyncrasies, “personal recognition self-respect” is concerned with whatever personal ideals one happens to have:

One cannot be a person without being some particular person, and among one’s responsibilities as [a] person is to live a life of one’s own. An individual with personal recognition self-respect strives to live according to a conception of a life that is worthwhile for her, a “self-ideal” that gives expression not only to the fact that she is a person but also to the ideals, aspirations, commitments, and “points of no return” that define her as the particular person she is.\(^7\)

Dillon’s account of personal recognition self-respect shares several features with the personal ideal account of the trait of pride. First, both accounts center upon the notion of a personal ideal. Second, both accounts try to explain the possibility of having ‘points of no return.’ As I discussed in the previous chapter, Ethan Frome firmly resists certain types of social interaction because he takes it that some sorts of lives are simply unacceptable. At the novel’s end, he literally refuses to return to society. An account of pride should help to explain Ethan’s “point of no return.” Finally, both accounts describe concerns that are not given by respect for one’s generic moral status, but rather arise from one’s particularity. This feature appears to differ from the traditional Kantian basis for self-respect, namely, the dignity that accompanies being a person.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) Robin Dillon, “How to Lose Your Self-Respect,” *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Apr., 1992), pp. 125-139; quotation from p. 134. Interestingly enough, Dillon more recently has identified pride with two other kinds of recognition self-respect, and not with personal recognition self-respect: “…pride can also be a claim to and celebration of a status worth or to equality with others, especially other groups (for example, Black Pride), which is interpersonal recognition self-respect; and pride can be “proper pride,” a sense of one’s dignity that prevents one from doing what is unworthy, and in this sense it is the agentic dimension of recognition self-respect” (Dillon, Robin S., “Respect,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/respect/>).

Interpersonal recognition self-respect involves seeing oneself as an equal among moral equals, and agentic recognition self-respect “involves an appreciation of oneself as an agent, a being with the ability and responsibility to act autonomously and value appropriately.” (Ibid.)

\(^8\) It is open to a neo-Kantian, such as Dillon, to attempt to derive “personal recognition self-respect” from the basic respect that one should have for one’s dignity. Dillon indicates that she is sympathetic to this
However, the trait of pride differs from Dillon’s conception of personal recognition self-respect insofar as the latter appears to be derived from a moral duty “to live a life of one’s own,” and so appears to be committed to the doctrine of duties to the self. It is unclear what this derivation adds to the reasons one has for acting in accordance with one’s personal ideals. For, the fact that it is one’s “responsibility to live a life of one’s own” leaves it open as to what sort of life one should live—and not just in the sense that Dillon intends (that one will develop a personal conception of what matters), but also in the sense that a life of one’s own might involve being untrue to one’s personal ideals and betraying one’s aspirations. The artist who gives in to her benefactor and comes to despise herself for selling out does not fail to live a life of her own. On the contrary, the contempt in which she holds herself presupposes that that is exactly what she did.

One might think of John Rawls’ conception of self-respect as a third candidate for an account of pride, besides Hill’s and Dillon’s accounts, since it also extends beyond the moral realm. According to Rawls, one has self-respect just in case the following two conditions are met (roughly): first, one has aims and ideals (i.e., a “life plan”) that one regards as worthy and, second, one is confident of being well-suited to meet those aims and ideals.\(^9\) This account lacks moral content because it does not require that the agent’s aims and ideals be worthy, but only that the agent herself regard them as such. Rawls’ emphasis on personal ideals calls for a discussion in the present context.

The Rawlsian conception of self-respect requires of the self-respecting agent that she have a favorable view of herself, in that she must be confident that she is able to meet her

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A proud person, on the other hand, need not cease to be proud if she develops an unfavorable view of herself: quite the contrary. A proud person’s pride kicks in most when she takes herself to be failing with respect to her ideals. We do not think that Ethan is any less of a proud person when he begins to see his life as a failure. Likewise with Ajax, whose unremitting pride leads him to end his own life. If either Ethan or Ajax were less proud—if they had literally lost their pride—then they would not feel the shame that they do. For, someone who has lost her pride has to that extent lost her capacity to be ashamed. According to the conception of self-respect that Rawls has in mind, on the other hand, shame is identified with a loss of self-respect. Thus, it is impossible to feel shame without losing Rawlsian self-respect. Indeed, Rawls would probably say that Ethan and Ajax have lost some of their self-respect. So, Rawlsian self-respect is not identical with pride, for losing one’s pride results in losing one’s capacity to feel shame, not in feeling shame.

There is a general reason to doubt that pride and self-respect are identical, arising from the grammar of the terms. As Sachs noted, although there is little difficulty in imagining a person who lacks self-respect, the notion of an excess of self-respect is problematic. Servility is one kind of lack of self-respect but, while it is plausible to oppose arrogance or conceitedness to servility as contrary vices, it is not at all clear that we would describe these as excesses of self-respect. To be sure, the arrogant have too much self-regard and too little regard for others. But self-obsession does not equal self-respect and, hence, telling an arrogant person (or anybody) that he should respect himself less (be a little more servile?) would be suspect advice.

Rawls writes: “self-respect implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s intentions” (Ibid., 440).
Sachs notes in a footnote that we sometimes speak obliquely of a person having too much self-respect.\textsuperscript{11} That is, even if ‘too much self-respect’ never conveys the idea of literally having excessive self-respect, it sometimes serves some non-literal, colloquial role. I believe his idea can be developed as follows, and that it can defuse some initial worries about my conclusion that one cannot have too much self-respect. We might sarcastically criticize a social snob by noting that he has too much self-respect to be considerate to his social inferiors. (It might help to imagine a \textit{New Yorker} cartoon.) But this example does not show that excessive self-respect is possible, for the following reason. In a non-sarcastic case, by saying that a person has too much self-respect to perform some deed, we are merely implying that the deed is shameful and that the person has at least enough self-respect to refuse to perform it. For instance, we might commend a politician for having too much self-respect to accept a bribe. Obviously, this relative sense of ‘self-respect’ (i.e., ‘too much self-respect relative to doing something shameful’) differs from the notion of excessive self-respect insofar as the former refers to a good thing and the latter would refer to a bad thing. Returning to the sarcasm, we see that the remark, as an instance of the relative sense of self-respect, conversationally implies that the speaker believes that being considerate to one’s social inferiors is a shameful deed, which is absurd. Thus the sarcasm.

Sachs also discusses the case of having to sacrifice one’s self-respect with reluctance in trying circumstances. That there are circumstances in which it is appropriate to sacrifice one’s self-respect for the greater good, say, might be taken to show that it can be a good thing to lose some self-respect and, hence, that prior to giving it up one had ‘too much self-respect.’ As Sachs notes, this won’t do either. For the reluctance with which we lose

\textsuperscript{11} Sachs, \textit{op. cit.}, 347, footnote 1.
our self-respect indicates that we regard the lost self-respect as good and, so, not excessive in the sense in which too much is a bad thing or a vice.\footnote{One might think that a perfectly virtuous person would never see promoting the greater good as requiring a loss of self-respect. If this view is correct, then it follows that a virtuous person cannot have too much self-respect (which is in keeping with my position here). But this view raises several interesting points about the relation between proper pride and the demands of virtue can I haven’t had a chance to develop. Thanks to Janice Moskalik for suggesting the point.}

There is good reason to press further than Sachs—who makes it clear that he is not arguing that an excess of self-respect is impossible, but only that it is puzzling and problematic—and to think that having too much self-respect is in general impossible. For, respect is a concept with moral content. One does not respect a person unless one’s attitudes and actions towards the person conform to certain moral standards. I may believe that I respect you and, hence, that I meet these standards; but if I am mistaken about the latter then I am also mistaken about the former. If this is correct then excessive respect is impossible, just as excessive courage is impossible. For, built in to the notions of respect and courage are standards of correctness. Aristotle was right to argue that a rash person has too much boldness, but not too much courage.\footnote{Likewise, in the final analysis I claim that an arrogant person has too much pride, but not too much self-respect.} Either such standards are met or they are not—but they cannot be “excessively met” any more than an action can be “excessively permissible.” Moral standards can be exceeded, to be sure; but such an excess (represented, for example, by the category of the supererogatory) is not in general bad—so it is not the sort of Aristotelian excess with which I am concerned.

If this claim is correct, then we should find ourselves hesitating to say that a person has too much self-respect for the same reason that we would hesitate to say that a servile person respects himself (even if he believes that he respects himself)—because respecting requires meeting certain moral standards with regards to the person being respected—

\footnote{One might think that a perfectly virtuous person would never see promoting the greater good as requiring a loss of self-respect. If this view is correct, then it follows that a virtuous person cannot have too much self-respect (which is in keeping with my position here). But this view raises several interesting points about the relation between proper pride and the demands of virtue can I haven’t had a chance to develop. Thanks to Janice Moskalik for suggesting the point.}

\footnote{Likewise, in the final analysis I claim that an arrogant person has too much pride, but not too much self-respect.}
and because moral standards cannot be met excessively. Moral standards can be violated in only one direction; the other direction leads to the supererogatory, which is no violation.\footnote{Since Sachs identifies pride with self-respect, it is surprising that he never considers whether the thought of a person having too much pride is also problematic. If one can be excessively proud but not excessively self-respecting, then pride is not identical to self-respect. Thus, since self-respect is a moralized concept that does not admit of excess, it cannot be identical to pride, which does admit of excess. The two concepts clearly fall apart at the extreme.}

Except in an oblique sense, one cannot have too much of what Darwall and Hill are describing. On an understanding of self-respect that centers on thinking of oneself as a person who possesses dignity, it is difficult to imagine any way in which self-respect can be excessive. One cannot give too much consideration to the fact that one is a person who deserves not to be wronged, nor to the fact that one holds a moral status equal to that of other persons—or, at least not in a way that we would ever describe as being too self-respecting.

However, even supposing that one could imagine this (perhaps refusing to disavow one’s moral status when there is sufficient reason to do so?), it is doubtful that that is what the vice of having too much pride amounts to. For, having too much pride sometimes involves a failure, not an excess, of respect. An arrogant person, for example, does not seem guilty of affirming her equal moral status too diligently. Rather, the arrogant fail to respect others and, hence, fail to affirm their own moral status as an equal. Since we do not have any problem describing an arrogant person as too proud, but do have difficulty in describing her as having too much self-respect, this feature of the concept of self-respect calls into question the identification of pride and self-respect.

This feature of the logic of the concept of self-respect is present in all forms of self-respect, include Dillon’s personal recognition self-respect. The concept of pride is
therefore better suited to describe the phenomenon that Hill and Dillon categorize as a form of self-respect. For, the previous chapter makes clear the dimensions in which one might have too much pride—one might regard oneself too much from the evaluative point of view, or one might have an excessively individualistic conception of self-worth, or one might be too rigidly committed to living in accordance with one’s ideals.

Stephen Massey disagrees with the claim that self-respect is a moralized concept and has objected to the sort of argument that I am advancing. I am arguing that the fact that we would hesitate to describe an arrogant person as excessively self-respecting (and that we would hesitate to describe a servile person who claims to be self-respecting as truly self-respecting) entails that respect has moral content or, in Massey’s terms, that respect is an “objective” concept. Massey objects to the premise of my argument that states that such hesitation is best explained by the moral content of the concept. Massey uses two examples to undermine this premise: one, of a servile person described as ‘an Uncle Tom’; and another, of a person, Skip, whose favorable attitude towards himself is based upon his having performed morally objectionable actions in the pursuit of wealth. Both characters, Massey maintains, can be understood as respecting themselves, even if we do hesitate to describe them as such:

If there is hesitancy, it can be explained in terms that are consistent with self-respect’s being a subjective concept. Hesitancy because of the Uncle Tom’s failure to recognize and properly value his equal basic rights, for example, might plausibly be explained on the ground that the Uncle Tom’s [bona fide] self-respect lacks certain morally desirable bases, and should therefore not be encouraged on its present bases. We can explain any uncertainty over whether

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16 “If [self-respect] is a subjective notion, it is both necessary and sufficient for respecting oneself that one have a certain kind of favorable self-attitude, which can be adequately defined in psychological terms. If it is an objective notion, then a self-respecting person must not simply value himself, but properly value himself, however the notion of “properly” valuing oneself is defined” (ibid., 247).
Skip respects himself on the ground that his [bona fide] self-respect is not of a morally good sort, since it is based on acting in a morally objectionable way. These alternative explanations show that we do not have to accept the objectivist account of why we may hesitate to say that the people in these examples respect themselves.\textsuperscript{17}

Massey argues that any hesitation we might have in calling the Uncle Tom self-respecting can be traced to our unwillingness to encourage a morally undesirable, but nonetheless bona fide, self-respect. Our hesitation, he suggests, is less about attributing the description ‘self-respect’ than about appearing to endorse a poorly founded self-respect. Likewise with Skip, whose purported self-respect depends upon his mistreatment of others. Massey argues, then, that we can understand our hesitation about simply asserting that these characters are self-respecting in terms of our wanting to provide a more nuanced description of them as self-respecting-but-morally-deficient. We want to provide this nuance so as not to appear to encourage the morally inappropriate bases of the person’s self-respect. So, although Massey might agree with me that we would hesitate to describe an arrogant person as self-respecting, he rejects the inference to the conclusion that self-respect is an objective concept.

Massey’s objection depends upon construing the act of attributing self-respect to a person to imply an endorsement of the bases of that person’s self-respect. We hesitate because we wish to deny any implication that we approve of arrogance or servility, say. But there is no reason for this implication to hold if not for the fact that the concept of self-respect has moral content. We don’t (typically) hesitate in describing Skip as wealthy, in contrast, because the concept of wealth clearly has no moral content and, so, we would never take the attribution of wealth to imply the speaker’s endorsement of the morally objectionable bases of that wealth. The CEO of AETNA Health Insurance, Inc. is

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, 253.
extremely wealthy; if there is any implication in my saying this (as a person who cares about social justice) then it is that I disapprove of the bases of that CEO’s wealth. If, as Massey argues, self-respect were like wealth in this regard then there would be no implication that we are encouraging a misguided self-respect by calling it “self-respect.” So, self-respect has moral content to the extent that the implication Massey describes holds and, therefore, the objection must fail.

To recap, I have focused on establishing the claim that self-respect has moral content in order to contrast it with pride, which lacks moral content. This contrast, in turn, undermines the purported identity between pride and self-respect. Indeed, this contrast lies at the surface level of grammar, as is clear in the earlier quotation from Joel Feinberg: “To think of oneself as the holder of rights is not to be unduly but properly proud, to have that minimal self-respect…” Feinberg, rightly, finds the need to qualify the pride he has in mind—not undue but proper pride. There is no comparable need when discussing self-respect. In particular, I do not think there is any implication that minimal self-respect is the virtuous counterpart of maximal, or excessive, self-respect.18

However, this conclusion is compatible with thinking of (proper) pride as one necessary condition for having self-respect.19 In my view, self-respect has many

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18 Daniel Russell has recently argued against identifying self-respect with pride (“Aristotle on the Moral Relevance of Self-Respect,” in Virtue Ethics, Old and New, ed. Steven Gardiner. (Ithaca: Cornell University, 2005)).

19 Gabriele Taylor holds a similar view of the relation between pride and self-respect, noting that, “A person may be proud in that, for instance, he will not accept help from others who are better off than he is. He does not necessarily think of himself as being superior to others at all; he merely accepts certain standards the lowering of which he would regard as a threat to his self-respect” (Taylor (1985), 45). Thus, Taylor thinks that the proud regard themselves as having to maintain certain standards in order to maintain their self-respect. But Taylor stops short of holding that maintaining certain standards is necessary for maintaining self-respect, because what she says leaves open the possibility that the proud are unique amongst those who have self-respect in regarding themselves in that way (and so, perhaps the non-proud can respect themselves without having to maintain certain standards). The only indication that Taylor offers that she might accept the stronger view that I endorse, that having proper pride is necessary for having self-respect, is her concluding speculation on the matter: “Earlier I characterized such pride in
components balanced just so—“self-respect” is the appellation for that properly balanced constellation of qualities. One of those qualities is proper pride.

In this Appendix, I have surveyed the relevant portions of the large philosophical literature on self-respect and its relation to pride in order to situate the rest of this dissertation within an on-going and overlapping philosophical conversation. It is notable that this conversation almost always takes a Kantian form. One of the benefits of the present approach is to discuss a concept (namely, pride) that is clearly entangled with the concerns of Kant and like-minded moral philosophers but that also seems to have a life of its own, the beginnings of which predate the Kantian emphasis on human dignity and the basis of which appears to differ quite a bit from that.

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20 One danger of characterizing self-respect by using examples of people who lack self-respect (for example, the servile) is precisely that one might mistake a necessary condition for a sufficient condition. Even if the servile are so because they lack self-respect in that they do not acknowledge their moral status, it does not follow that self-respect consists in acknowledging one’s moral status.
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