Civic (Re)Socializing: The Transformative Potential of Deliberative Public Sphere Structures

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Katherine R. Knobloch
Abstract

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This dissertation presents a model for public sphere discourse that situates alienating and deliberative communication norms and practices at opposite ends of a spectrum. Alienating communication routines act as a counter-force to more deliberative forms of communication and (re)create five conditions of alienation – commodification, social isolation, meaninglessness, normlessness, and powerlessness – that influence what individuals know, how they interact, and who ultimately has power in the political process. Moreover, this dissertation looks at how such structural iterations influence the attitudes and actions of those who interact through them and focuses specifically on the potential of deliberative minipublics to correct those conditions of alienation. Normative theory and the limited available empirical scholarship on deliberative public projects suggest that when they actively include regular citizens, those lay participants develop more deliberative attitudes and practices, along with increased political efficacy and engagement. Beyond the effects that deliberation may have on participants, deliberative
minipublics connected to macro-level decision making draw the wider public into the deliberative process and may subsequently affect the public’s political attitudes.

This dissertation addresses these questions by studying two highly structured deliberative forums—the 2009 Australian Citizens’ Parliament and the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review. It first focuses on whether deliberative minipublics can live up to their normative ideals then looks at whether they alter the civic attitudes and behaviors of participants, and in the case of the CIR, the wider public. The findings show that deliberative minipublics can closely approximate their normative ideals and that participants in face-to-face deliberative forums reported increased deliberative efficacy, internal efficacy, communicative engagement, and community-based engagement, though they did not often report increases in more institutionalized forms of political participation. Online participants, by contrast, reported only limited increases in their internal and external efficacy and communicative engagement. Members of the electorate who were either aware of the CIR or read the CIR Statements saw some increased internal and external efficacy.
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seven years. Thank you for thinking aloud with me, for being my partner, and for making my everyday happier. Your love (and cooking) kept me going.
Chapter 1

The Transformative Potential of Deliberative Minipublics

Pamela was a fairly typical Oregonian. She was interested in politics but not particularly politically active. She had never written a letter to the editor or been in the state capital. In August of 2010, Pamela, along with forty-seven other Oregonians, took part in the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR), a pilot process that convened in Salem, the state capital, a representative sample of Oregon voters to deliberate about a statewide initiative that appeared on the November ballot. She and her fellow citizens created a written statement about the initiative they studied, and their statement appeared in the official state Voters’ Pamphlet.

After her experience, Pamela reported feeling a significant political change in herself, and she became an advocate for the CIR process. When asked about her experience a year later, Pamela said this of her week-long experience in Salem:

[It] changed my perspective dramatically. Going in, I was curious but not at all hopeful that this would turn out well. Previous experiences … [had shown] that no viable conversation could be had [about] political issues. And the CIR completely turned those experiences on their heads - I now KNOW that it can be done… A safe space can be achieved and that safe space brings out the individual and collective intelligence of all of us… I have hope that we could in fact reclaim our democracy. I don't know if we will or not, but I know that we have the ability and the intelligence. And I saw the commitment that everyone brought to the process. I would NEVER have believed it if I hadn't been there. But I saw it, and there is NO DOUBT we can do that.
Pamela now sits on the Citizens’ Initiative Review Commission, a state commission that develops and oversees the CIR. She helps to decide which measures a panel of voters will review for the Voters’ Pamphlet, what the process will look like, who can take part, and how it will be convened. She meets with state officials and professional advocates and has testified before the state legislature on several occasions. She has written and had published a letter to the editor and has been interviewed by state-wide and local media outlets. As a member of a state commission, she expresses frustration that the governing process rarely lacks the respect and information-based decision making that she experienced at the CIR, but she remains hopeful that processes such as this one can help revitalize democracy.

Pamela’s story illustrates how institutionalized deliberation can change how someone thinks and acts as a political participant. Though the extent of Pamela’s civic changes is exceptional, the stories presented herein testify to the transformative power of deliberative institutions. By giving citizens the opportunity to cross political divides and engage in informed and respectful political decision making, processes like the CIR have the potential to change how citizens think about their role in governance, take part in political conversations, and engage in public life. In other words, such experiences may resocialize participants into a new way of thinking and acting as citizens, reforming their civic habits and teaching them a new way to think and act as citizens. Throughout this dissertation, I will relate the experiences of those like Pamela, using survey data and participants’ own words to study how two innovative deliberative public projects, the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review and the 2009 Australian Citizens’ Parliament changed the identities and actions of those who participated and of the wider public.

1 Name has been changed.
Theoretical Overview

In Habermas’s (1989) original conception of the public sphere, political discourse serves as a conduit between the general public and governing officials’ decision-making authority. In contemporary Western democracies, however, communication systems often serve to displace the public, rather than empower it (Ginsberg, 1986; Herbst, 1993). These communication structures, such as capitalistic media and professionalized organizations, distance the general public from their democratic powers and, as a consequence, likely have negative effects on the civic attitudes and behaviors of those who participate through them (see Herbst, 1993; Putnam, 2000; Skocpol, 1999; Sunstein, 2007). In other words, dominant political communication practices tend to alienate citizens from their democratic capacity, make them feel inefficacious, and leave them disengaged.

Deliberative structures, however, bring members of the public together for informed and egalitarian decision making, and such structures may correct these problems. These processes try to move public sphere discourse closer to the ideal and encourage democratic empowerment for members of the lay public (Barber, 1984; Chambers, 2003; Fishkin, 1991; Gastil, 2008; Gutman & Thompson, 2004). Studies of recent innovations show that deliberative processes not only model ideal political discourse (Baiocchi, 2001; Crosby, 1995; Fishkin, 2009; Warren & Pearce, 2008) but also have the potential to increase participants’ internal and external efficacy, their deliberative faith and collective identity, and the frequency and form of their political engagement (Fishkin, 2009; Gastil, Deess, Weiser, & Simmons, 2010; Jacobs, Cook, & Delli Carpini, 2009; Morrel, 2005; Nabatchi 2010).

Though the potential for deliberative processes to change participants’ attitudes and actions has received a significant amount of scholarly attention, as will be discussed in detail in
Chapters 4 and 5, past research has focused on either singular aspects of change or on forums that are not directly connected to larger decision-making processes. I aim to correct both of these shortcomings by looking more holistically at the effects of participating in a consequential deliberative forum. This will clarify the potential of such processes, particularly when they hold institutional legitimacy, and my integrative approach will also reveal the connections among the political changes deliberation can engender.

For this project, I focus on small, face-to-face deliberative bodies that are broadly representative of their community, otherwise known as deliberative minipublics (see Fung, 2003; Goodin, 2008). Minipublics create carefully structured settings for discussion and approximate the normative standards of deliberation. This makes them ideal settings for testing the effects that deliberation has on participants. By gathering a cross-section of the public together for informed and egalitarian decision making, these structures can be used to study deliberation’s effects on the general populations represented in such bodies.

In addition, unlike deliberative processes that are either disconnected from macro-level decision making or have a direct role in making governmental decisions (see Fung & Wright, 2003), deliberative minipublics most often attempt to influence official decision-making process through the insertion of deliberation into the larger public discourse (Goodin, 2008). This means that these processes may not only affect the attitudes and actions of participants but also the views of the wider public, which can utilize the outcomes of these processes in making its own decisions. In this sense, these structures can allow those members of the public who did not directly participate but are aware of the process and its outcomes to engage in “vicarious deliberation” (see Gastil, Knobloch, & Richards, 2012). In this form of deliberation, members of the wider public incorporate the knowledge produced through small-scale deliberation into their
own decision making. Vicarious deliberation has the potential to alter the attitudes of those who do not participate but are able to utilize the outcomes of such processes (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). Though this concept has received some theoretical attention (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006), this dissertation is the first empirical study of the phenomenon. Thus, the findings presented here should be particularly important for understanding the larger role that micro-to-macro deliberative processes can play in the larger public sphere.

**Case Studies**

To test the impact that deliberative minipublics have on the attitudes and behaviors of both participants and the wider public, this study focuses on two deliberative forums—the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR) and the 2009 Australian Citizens’ Parliament (ACP). Both of these structures brought representative members of the public together to deliberate about pressing public problems and produced decisions aimed at informing the wider electorate.

The 2009 Australian Citizens’ Parliament brought together one member of each federal electorate to deliberate for four days about proposals stemming from the question, “How can Australia’s political system be strengthened to serve us better?” The 150 parliamentarians went to one-day regional meetings at which they heard about the process and were encouraged to think about the central question of improving Australia’s political system. In addition, the selected parliamentarians, as well a number of other citizens who had not been selected for the Main Meeting, were invited to participate in an Online Parliament, additionally tasked with the job of developing proposals. Proposals developed by the Online Parliament, along with those constructed at regional meetings, were used to set the agenda for the Main Meeting, which took place over the course of four days in February 2009 at the Old Parliament House in Canberra, the Australian national capital. At this meeting, parliamentarians discussed the previously
constructed proposals and developed and deliberated about new ones. By the end of the week, the participants had generated and voted on a set of recommendations for improving Australia’s government, and they presented these in the Australian House Chamber to the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary.

The Australian deliberations will provide a useful basis for comparison with my main case study, the 2010 Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR). This process convened two representative groups of 24 Oregon state voters to deliberate about two state initiatives on the November 2010 ballot and write recommendations about those initiatives for the Oregon State Voters’ Pamphlet. The CIR was tasked with the goal of providing informed, non-partisan information that voters could use when deciding how to vote on initiatives. The panelists met for five consecutive days, reviewing the initiative and listening to evidence provided by advocates in favor and opposed to the initiative as well as neutral witnesses. At the end of the week, the panelists worked together to write a Citizens’ Statement that included Key Findings (information related to the initiative that more than a majority of the panel found both relevant and factually accurate) and Statements in Favor of and Opposed to the Measure written by the panelists who supported and opposed the measures, respectively.

**Methods**

Utilizing these two cases, this study proceeds in three parts: an in-depth look at the quality of deliberation at the CIR, measurement of the effects of participating in deliberation on the CIR and ACP panelists, and a test of how awareness of the CIR and use of the Citizens’ Statements influenced the civic attitudes of the wider electorate. For each study, I relied on several different methods, which include a close reading of the transcripts of the events, questionnaires completed by participants before and during the events, follow-up surveys

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2 For these and other details, see the Final Report at http://www.citizensparliament.org.au.
conducted with the participants after the events, and two state-wide surveys of Oregon voters.

Table 1.1 provides a summary of how I use this data to assess the deliberative quality of the CIR and test the hypotheses in the latter two studies. Though I integrate these methodological approaches in my analyses of the events and their effects, I separate them here to provide a more concrete picture of the materials and processes I used for analyzing the data.

Table 1.1

*Summary of Measurements and Data by Hypothesis*

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Research Question/Hypothesis</th>
<th>Measurements</th>
<th>ACP data</th>
<th>CIR data</th>
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<tr>
<td>RQ1: Did the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review meet a minimum threshold of deliberative quality?</td>
<td>Process performance on analytic, social, and decision-making criteria; Panelist satisfaction</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Observation; Transcripts; Panelist questionnaires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H1: Participating in a deliberative forum will decrease participants’ cognitive alienation.</td>
<td>Changes in knowledge/opinion, deliberative faith, internal and external efficacy, and collective identity</td>
<td>Transcripts; Panelist questionnaires</td>
<td>Transcripts; Observation; Panelist questionnaires; State-wide two-wave panel survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2: Participating in a deliberative forum will decrease participants’ behavioral alienation.</td>
<td>Changes in communicative, community-based, and institutionalized engagement</td>
<td>Panelist questionnaires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3: The presence of a deliberative structure will have an emanating effect, decreasing cognitive alienation for the wider community.</td>
<td>Changes in global and issue-specific internal and external efficacy; Changes in deliberative faith</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>State-wide two-wave panel survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4: The effects of deliberation will be strongest for those non-participants who place more importance on the process and outcomes</td>
<td>Effect of level of awareness and use on changes in global and issue-specific internal and external efficacy; Changes in deliberative faith</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Direct observation, transcript analysis, and participant surveys were used to both evaluate the CIR and explore how participants in the CIR and the ACP explained their changing sense of citizenship. During both weeks of the CIR, two fellow researchers and I closely observed the panel discussions by taking extensive notes throughout the process and routinely comparing our impressions with one another throughout the day. In addition, both the ACP and the CIR processes were transcribed, which allowed an additional examination of their quality as well as indications of how panelists expressed personal change during their deliberative experience.

I also relied on questionnaires distributed to the panelists before, during, and after the events as well as follow-up surveys conducted after the panelists had time to reflect on their experiences many months later. Questionnaires were distributed to the CIR panelists at the end of each day the panels spent deliberating as well as at the end of the week that allowed the panelists to rate the quality of the process and provide feedback about their personal experience. In addition, CIR panelists took a survey shortly after participating (and a year later) that contained additional questions regarding the quality of the process as well as measures of change along five cognitive aspects—knowledge, internal and external efficacy, deliberative faith, and collective identity—and three behavioral aspects—communicative, community-based, and institutionalized engagement. (Definitions for each of these terms and the reasons for expecting such change are discussed in Chapter 4). Likewise, the ACP participants, both face-to-face and online, took a pre-deliberation survey and a year-later survey containing similar questions regarding attitudinal and behavioral change, although they were asked no knowledge questions.

While the transcripts, questionnaires, and follow-up surveys allowed me to explore the quality of the deliberations and the cognitive and behavioral changes to participants, they cannot speak to the effects that deliberative structures have on the wider community. For this task, I
needed to gauge changes to the electorate, the community these processes intend to represent and in whose interest they were developed. To test the emanating effects of the CIR, members of a research team and I conducted a statewide panel survey of Oregon voters. In both waves, respondents indicated their current political attitudes regarding, among other things, their internal and external efficacy and deliberative faith. In the second wave, panelists were asked about their awareness and use of the CIR and other sections of the Voters’ Pamphlet in an effort to determine if knowing about the CIR or reading the Statements produced through it caused widespread attitudinal change.

**Deliberation & Democratic Citizenship**

As will become evident, deliberative minipublics not only have the potential to produce high quality public talk. They also can have a profound impact on the attitudes and behaviors of those who directly participate in the process, and they can have emanating effects for the wider public, increasing their internal and external efficacy. Though these effects are not universal, my results will show that many ACP and CIR participants experienced increased levels of issue specific knowledge and dramatic changes to their political self-confidence, faith in deliberation and the governing process, and feelings of collective identity. Several of the panelists reported increasing their political engagement, particularly changing the way they talked about political issues and engaged in local politics.

Moreover, my study of the Oregon electorate indicates that deliberative minipublics can have emanating effects. Those who were aware of the CIR saw increased external efficacy, and reading the statements caused an increase in internal efficacy. A comparison of those who spent time with the Citizens’ Statements and considered them important in casting their vote showed
that these effects were even greater for members of the public who paid close attention to the CIR.

**Chapter outline**

Before exploring each of these studies in depth, I begin with an overview of the chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the overarching concepts discussed in these studies. In it, I look systematically at the communication structures that make up contemporary public spheres in the United States and similar Western states, creating a theoretical model that positions deliberative structures and alienating structures as sitting on opposite ends of a spectrum of political communication. This section begins by describing a deliberative public sphere and positions deliberation as a model for gauging the quality of contemporary public spheres. This is followed by a discussion of the five conditions of alienation—commodification, social isolation, meaninglessness, normlessness, and powerlessness—and a description of the media and organizational structures that produce those conditions. Integrating literature on public opinion, deliberative democracy, mediated communication, and collective action, this section offers an anti-normative lens for critiquing currently existing practices and understanding how contemporary communication structures operate systemically. This chapter concludes by describing a number of deliberative minipublics and discussing how these structures can overcome the previously discussed conditions of alienation.

Having completed my theoretical model, in the third chapter, I present an in-depth analysis of one of the two case studies used here, the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review. Here, I offer the CIR as an alternative for alienating public sphere structures. In this chapter, I focus on the deliberative quality of the process and utilize, among other methods, participant observation, transcript analysis, and participant questionnaires to see how the process stacks up
against a theoretical model of deliberation that focuses on analytic quality, deliberative discussion, and informed and egalitarian decision making. This chapter will provide a detailed analysis of how the CIR performed according to each criterion and finds that, although the process was messy at times, it ultimately met a high standard for deliberation and produced high quality and accurate Citizens’ Statements for the Voters’ Pamphlet. The model in this chapter will also be valuable for other researchers interested in evaluating deliberative public processes, as it proposes an evaluative scheme that researchers and practitioners can adopt when assessing the integrity of similar events. In addition, this chapter will provide a brief overview of the campaign to initiate the CIR, as well as a discussion of how the Citizens’ Statements developed through the CIR were received by the wider public.

In the fourth chapter, I briefly explore the effects of conditions and structures presented in Chapter 2 and look particularly at how alienating and deliberative structures affect the cognitions and behaviors of those who interact through them. Drawing together literature on the effects of public sphere structures on the understanding and performance of citizenship, I theorize that alienating structures depress citizens’ sense of empowerment, and ultimately their engagement, and that deliberative structures can resocialize citizens into a new way of thinking and acting as political beings. In this chapter, I argue that deliberative structures can correct the effects of alienation by providing citizens with effective ways to participate and by subsequently creating more empowering civic identities.

To understand these potential transformations, I use chapter 5 to explore some (but not all) of the empirical claims presented in Chapter 4. I look to two case studies, one focusing on the 2010 CIR and the other focusing on the 2009 ACP, and draw on questionnaires and follow-up surveys completed by participants from both the CIR and the ACP, as well as observations
and excerpts from the transcripts in which participants discuss the effect the processes have on them. Findings from this study show that face-to-face participants in both forums saw significant change to their political cognitions and behaviors. The consistency of these results across forums is indicative of the validity of these claims and suggests that such processes may produce fairly consistent changes to the attitudes and behaviors of participants. Online ACP participants reported some changes, though not as many as those who took part in the Main Meeting.

In the sixth chapter, I look at the emanating effects of deliberative structures—that is, the effects their existence has on the wider public. For this study, I turn again to the Oregon CIR and use a statewide survey of Oregon voters to see if the presence of deliberative structures alters the political cognitions of individuals who did not directly participate in the CIR deliberative panels but were aware of its existence and outcomes. Because the CIR is designed to connect the micro and macro, by using the deliberative findings of small groups to educate the wider public, this process is particularly suited to understanding the effects that the introduction of a single deliberative structure may have on the wider community. Results show that deliberative minipublics can affect the wider public, particularly increasing citizens’ faith in themselves as political actors and in the governing process.

For the final chapter, I draw these disparate findings together to gauge the transformative power of deliberative minipublics connected to macro-level decision making. Here, I review the studies presented in the previous chapter and conclude that micro-level deliberation can maintain high levels of integrity, transform the cognitions and behaviors of participants, and alter the attitudes of the wider public. This chapter concludes by highlighting specific questions that remain unanswered and offering avenues for future research stemming from the findings discussed herein.
Chapter 2

Alienation and Deliberation: A Model for Analysis and Critique

Ideally, political communication is governed by the rules of communicative action (see Habermas, 1984, pp. 284-289) or deliberation (see Gastil, 2008, also Burkhalter, Gastil, & Kelshaw, 2002, p. 405). Public spheres, however, are often dominated by non-deliberative forms of communication. Although deliberation is widely used as a framework for understanding and critiquing political communication, contemporary scholarship lacks a counter-framework for understanding what happens when communication in the public sphere routinely falls short of this ideal. Much research explores how conventional communication channels function or how the normative model of deliberation may be realized in practice, but scholars have not provided a macro-level perspective that adequately describes structures that fail to live up to deliberative ideals and the effects they have on individuals who interact within them.

In this chapter, I reintroduce the underutilized concept of political alienation and apply it to the context of Western, democratic public spheres. I explore how commodified and professionalized communication structures can distance the public from the production of public opinion and thereby distort the public’s role in democratic governance. Although alienation has been used in a number of different ways, it provides an apt lens for critiquing public sphere practices because it highlights the ways that non-deliberative structures hinder individuals’ ability to use communication to govern themselves. Moreover, the alienation model I propose foregrounds the potential effects that non-deliberative structures may have on individuals. Because structures constrain certain types of agency for the actors who interact through them and enable others (Giddens, 1984), communication channels that alienate individuals from the
production of public opinion likely have cognitive ramifications, affecting the way that individuals think about their roles in governance. This contrasts with deliberative structures, which can foster democratic empowerment and equip citizens with the tools necessary for self-governance (Burkhalter et al., 2002; Chambers, 2003; Fishkin, 2009; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Warren, 1993).

The model of alienation presented below is an anti-normative theory for analyzing and critiquing currently existing practices and their cognitive and behavioral consequences. It juxtaposes alienating public sphere structures against deliberative ones. In this chapter, I first review what a deliberative public sphere would look like in practice, then contrast that ideal with contemporary communication routines, using the model of public sphere alienation to look at how non-deliberative communication structures operate and how they constrain those who communicate through them. After this, I then return to a discussion of a deliberative public sphere, reviewing some specific deliberative efforts that attempt to overcome conditions of alienation.

**Public Sphere Structures and Deliberation**

A public sphere is “a theatre in modern societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk. It is the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, hence, an institutionalized arena of discursive interaction” (Fraser, 1992, p. 57). In other words, public spheres are communicative spaces through which private individuals discuss public affairs, formulate public opinion, and communicate those opinions to the state (Habermas, 1989). In large-scale democracies, this communication is facilitated, in part, through media outlets and organizations that allow mass, dispersed publics to communicate with one another. Interactions within these public sphere structures, then, affect the public’s ability to use
communication as a means for democratic control. Although communication structures do not act deterministically, as routinized ways of interacting they foster certain types of interactions and close off others (Giddens, 1984). So even though individuals may retain some agency when acting within communication structures, the norms and practices that make up these structures limit and prescribe the public’s ability to interact with one another in the formation of public opinion. In short, organizational and media structures influence whose voices are represented and what opinions are expressed (Ginsberg, 1986; Herbst, 1993).

For media and organizational structures to empower citizens, they must allow individuals to effectively express their political opinions to decision-making officials. Ideally, public sphere structures enable this type of expression by acting as a forum for deliberation, or, more commonly, non-coercive and egalitarian political conversations in which individuals share information, discuss underlying values, and weigh the pros and cons of a broad range of solutions (Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Moy & Gastil, 2006). Deliberation is essential to utilizing public spheres for democratic control because it attempts to mitigate the alienating forces of hierarchical communication structures by (1) fostering “enlightened understanding” (see Dahl, 1989, also Chambers, 2003; Fishkin, 1991) and (2) creating conditions of communicative equality (Benhabib, 1996; Dahlberg, 2005).

These two goals are intimately intertwined. For public sphere structures to “enlighten” us, they must enhance individuals’ ability to make the choices they would have made if they had full information (Fishkin, 1991). When people hold low levels of information or believe inaccurate information, their opinion preferences may differ from the opinions they would hold with better information (Fishkin, 1991, 2009; Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, & Rich, 2000). Knowledgeable citizens have more stable attitudes can link their interests and attitudes, and they
tend to choose candidates who hold views consistent with their attitudes (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). In sum, enlightened understanding equates to the knowledge individuals must hold in order to effectively govern themselves. Facilitating enlightened understanding, then, requires public sphere structures to provide avenues through which individuals can acquire accurate and relevant information necessary to form opinions that are reflective of underlying preferences.

Media structures facilitate enlightened understanding by providing individuals with the information necessary to make political choices. Individuals likely rely on shortcuts provided by the media in forming their public opinions (Popkin, 1994; Zaller 1992) and draw on media content in their interpersonal political discussions (Gamson, 1992). Organizational structures can also lead to more enlightened public opinions by fostering communication among citizens. Whereas those who take a mediated view of deliberation (Page, 1996) may see citizen-to-citizen communication as largely trivial in comparison to the formation of public opinion that is directed by political elites, citizen-to-citizen deliberation that is rooted in access to information and attempts to adhere to the rules of communicative action (Habermas, 1984) does lead to more informed, cohesive, and stable political views (Eveland, 2004; Gastil & Dillard, 1999b; Fishkin, 1995). Rather than replacing citizen-to-citizen deliberation, mediated deliberation serves as a tool for citizen-to-citizen deliberation by providing information and opinion guidance (Mutz & Martin, 2001) and, ideally, enhances the development of enlightened understanding.

For public sphere structures to be deliberative, they must not only enhance enlightened understanding; they must also provide equal opportunity to speak under fair and egalitarian conditions (Benhabib, 1996; Dahlberg, 2005; Gastil, 2008). A large-scale deliberative public sphere again relies on the media and organizational structures to meet these needs. Organizations and mediated networks provide representation to dispersed members of the public by allowing
private individuals to publicly connect with one another in the interest of achieving a common goal (Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl, 2005), and sustained organizational involvement is crucial to maintaining influence over policy decisions (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). For this type of representation to serve a democratic function, however, marginalized individuals must be able to use organizational and mediated networks to express effectively their opinions to people in positions of decision-making power. Routinized communication structures can either enable this type of associational representation or hinder it. Recent work in collective action theory illustrates this link by showing how emerging technologies that restructure how individuals organize and communicate can change the ways that individuals and collectives express opinions and use the media to influence decision making (see Bennett, 2003; 2005; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Bimber, 2003; Bimber et al., 2005).

Thus, a deliberative public sphere empowers democratic citizens by increasing their enlightened understanding and creating opportunities for individuals and groups to effectively express their public opinions. This is a normative ideal, as opposed to an existing practice, so it serves as a guidepost by which to critique the current structures of the public sphere (Gastil, 2008, p. xii) but rarely provides an adequate means for describing real public sphere structures and the communication that takes place within them (Mutz, 2006). In many contemporary public spheres, top-down, commodified, isolating, and mystifying media and organizational structures crowd out more empowering avenues and limit their democratic potentials. In the next section, I focus specifically on structures of the public sphere that result in conditions of alienation, providing a model for critique that sits on the opposite end of the spectrum of the deliberative model widely used in the political communication literature.
Public Sphere Alienation

The concept of alienation, originally articulated by Marx as a critique of capitalism, explains how individuals become separated from some facet of their humanity (Ollman, 1976). Looking first to its original meaning, Mészáros (1970) describes alienation as the commodification of human labor and the consequent isolation of the individual. Alienation is:

The universal extension of ‘saleability’ (i.e. the transformation of everything into commodity); by this conversion of human beings into ‘things’ so that they could appear as commodities on the market… and by the fragmentation of the social body into “isolated individuals”… who pursued their own limited, particularistic aims ‘in servitude to egoistic need’, making a virtue out of their selfishness in their cult of privacy.

(Mészáros, 1970, p. 7)

Mészáros refers to a definition of alienation based on labor relations in industrialized societies that convert human beings into commodities, thereby isolating them from one another and stripping them of their collective power. This conception of alienation has served as starting point for thinking through the ways that complex relations among disparate structures can influence the actions of individuals and the results of their collective efforts. As such, it encourages a holistic approach to understanding the reciprocal relationship between humans and society (Ollman, 1976).

Scholars of government, however, have applied this concept to processes outside of labor relations to those that distance citizens from their governing power (Finifter, 1970; Rosenberg, 1951; Seeman, 1959; 1975). It is in this vein that alienation is used in this dissertation—not so much as a critique of capitalism but as a metaphor for understanding how contemporary governing structures impact the democratic power of those who utilize them.
Using the lens of alienation allows us to more clearly delineate which individuals perform which functions and discuss who ultimately has power in the production process. In the context of public spheres, communication norms and practices that distance individuals from the production of public opinion estrange citizens from their governing power and result in five conditions of political alienation – commodification, social isolation, meaninglessness, normlessness, and powerlessness (Seeman, 1959) – that influence what individuals know, how they interact, and whose opinions are ultimately expressed. To explain this model and illustrate its applicability, I discuss each condition below, providing a description of each condition and using it to critique currently existing practices.

Though I present these conditions under different headings, this is only for ease of presentation. The five conditions are closely related both conceptually and empirically, and I theorize that communication norms that produce one condition often produce others. In addition, though I have separated out the effects of organizational and media structures, in many cases they work together to produce public sphere alienation, reinforcing one another by positioning the general public in similarly passive roles. Table 2.1 presents a summary of each condition and its structural causes.

**Commodification**

The primary impetus for public sphere alienation is commodification, which occurs when public opinion is produced for profit. For individuals acting within commodified structures, work is transformed into a saleable object and workers are separated from the products of their labor (Mészáros, 1970, p. 7). Rather than performing work for the sake of the completion of a project, tasks are undertaken for some outside reason, namely financial rewards (Seeman, 1959), and the product of that work becomes a commodity that can be bought and sold for profit. When
Table 2.1

**Structural Aspects of Alienation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Structural causes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commodification</strong></td>
<td>Transformation of public opinion into a commodity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social isolation</strong></td>
<td>Lack of social capital or networks that cross political affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meaninglessness</strong></td>
<td>False choice and low levels of political knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normlessness</strong></td>
<td>Public sphere structures no longer work as a means for enlightened understanding or egalitarian communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powerlessness</strong></td>
<td>Inability to use public sphere structures to influence government decision making</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Commercialized and capitalistic interests dominate structures within the public sphere, public opinion becomes a saleable product constructed for the demands of the market, transforming public opinion from a tool for democratic empowerment into a means for profit.

In the context of organizations, commodification occurs when organizations shift their focus from representing the interests of wide-spread membership to maximizing professional and economic efficiency. Lobbying and litigation often prove more efficient than mass, active participation at inciting effective policy change, costing organizations less time and money and producing more consistent and effective results than widespread public participation (Epp, 1998;
Skocpol, 1999). Recognizing this, individuals join advocacy organizations in order for lobbyists to represent their interests to political figures. As Berry (1999) writes, “There is usually no other reason to join these groups—lobbying is what they do, and those who join understand that” (p. 369).

Because of this, many organizations focus on a small staff of professionals funded by checkbook membership. Under these organizational structures, professionals are paid to create effective expressions of public opinion. This allows wealthy individuals the opportunity to outsource their democratic responsibilities to experts, rather than participate in the formation and expression of public opinion (Skocpol, 1999), and commodifies opinion by transferring the duty of producing opinion from the voluntary activist to the subsidized professional (Ginsberg, 1986). Moreover, because this shift towards professionally produced public opinion requires financial donations rather than the participation of the general public, it may further marginalize disadvantaged groups (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). Those in lower socio-economic groups are already less likely to be able to participate in the political process (Brady, Verba, & Schlozman, 1995; Skopcol, 1999). The dominance of commodified public opinion organizations likely increases their exclusion.

Similar to organizational commodification, mediated commodification occurs when monetary efficiency becomes the primary goal for news organizations. Because market forces tend to drive out public affairs content (Bagdikian, 2004; McChesney, 2004), capitalistic media structures often lead to this condition. The opinions of those already in power generally receive significantly more media attention than those of the public (Bennett, 1990; Entman, 2004), in part because of the efficiency of this form of reporting (Entman, 1989). Governmental press offices often subsidize capitalistic news organizations by generating pre-constructed news,
making reporting on government affairs a more efficient and economical enterprise because they essentially do the journalists work for free (Cook, 1998). Similar trends emerge in the public relations industry. Because news is expensive to produce, journalists rely on public relations experts to provide pre-constructed stories that subsidize the costs of news gathering (McChesney, 2004). This pushes citizens out of public sphere conversations because including them would be monetarily inefficient.

Modern punditry serves as a particularly concise example of mediated commodification, though the phenomenon is underexplored. Pundits ideally act as authoritative experts who can contribute specialized knowledge to the public debate (Nimmo & Combs, 1992) and aid in enlightened understanding; however, punditry, like the news media more generally, has become a for-profit industry. This encourages pundits to produce profitable content rather than enlightened opinions and continues the trend of producing efficient, rather than enlightening, news content.

**Isolation**

The second condition, isolation, refers to an individual’s connection to her community. In the context of public spheres, conditions of isolation can prevent individuals from collectively engaging in the production of public opinion and isolate those individuals who do engage in this process. Professionally focused organizations reduce the opportunities for individuals to engage in political discussions and, thus, opportunities for individuals to collectively construct public opinion. Even within groups, however, isolation may occur when organizational norms prevent heterogeneous discussion, therefore producing opinions constructed in isolation.

Coupled with commodified organizational structures that displace the general public, declines in active organizational membership lead to conditions of isolation. Putnam (2000) has
documented a decline in community-based organizations, illustrating a tendency toward greater isolation. Although scholars, citing changing organizational trends, have expressed skepticism at results showing decreases in community ties (Ladd, 1999; Norris, 2002), the dominance of highly professionalized and commodified organizations pushes individuals out of associational life and diminishes opportunities for diverse members of local communities to discuss public affairs. Moreover, contemporary interest groups that do include members of the public tend to focus on specific policies or events rather than entire communities (Berry, 1999; Bimber, 2003; Skocpol, 1999; Wuthnow, 2002), thereby limiting the extent to which organizations can create sustainable communities. This diminishes the once strong bonds and enduring commitments that characterized earlier organizations (Wuthnow, 2002) and depletes the opportunities for diverse individuals to discuss public affairs and formulate collective expressions of public opinion.

Networking technologies provide opportunities to circumvent these traditional structures, creating avenues for diverse groups of people to communicate with one another and overcome the isolating effects of time, space, and scale (Bimber, 2003; Coleman & Blumler, 2009), but these new structures may foster new forms of isolation. Because networking and datamining technologies allow political organizers to quickly activate latent groups (Bimber et al., 2005; Howard 2006), organizations do not need to maintain regular group members, diminishing the need and opportunity for individuals to gather and create community bonds.

Conditions of isolation can also arise when individuals are gathered for discussion. Out of a fear of conflict, some groups avoid talking politics (Eliasoph, 1996), essentially isolating themselves from discussions of political affairs and thus active expressions of public opinion. In addition, some individuals will remain silent when they perceive that their opinions differ from those of other group members (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). This suggests that gathering individuals
together is not enough to combat the effects of isolation. Even when citizens are not socially isolated, homogeneous discursive norms may prevent citizens from speaking up and alienate them from presumably collective expressions of public opinion.

Tendencies toward homogeneous talk are exacerbated in enclave-based mediated communication. Enclave discussion “occurs within more or less insulated groups, in which like-minded people speak mostly to one another” (Sunstein, 2007, p. 77). As Sunstein argues, the proliferation of targeted media outlets provides individuals with a growing power to filter what they are exposed to, allowing individuals to self-select the information they hear and isolating them from outside information and opinion.

**Meaninglessness**

The third condition of public sphere alienation, meaningless, occurs when communication structures mystify the distinctions between or the consequences of choices. Public sphere structures can contribute to meaninglessness indirectly by fostering isolation or directly by failing to provide adequate information or distorting information. These structures dampen the public’s ability to form enlightened understanding and, in doing so, hamper the opportunities for fair and egalitarian communicative engagement.

Because individuals become isolated from competing expressions of opinion when engaging exclusively in enclave deliberation (Sunstein, 2007), commodified news structures that target enclaves foster meaninglessness. Aside from diminishing individuals’ opportunities to learn from one another (as discussed through isolation), segmentation and targeting emphasize difference over similarity, highlighting the risk that out-groups present to in-groups and preventing the possibility for compromise (Gandy, 2001). This decreases individuals’ ability to form enlightened understanding by discouraging them from considering and learning about
competing viewpoints. Further, because these practices foster meaninglessness, targeted news content allows commentators and journalists to proliferate information that, if not wholly inaccurate, severally frustrates individuals’ abilities to understand the real tradeoffs between choices (Kuklinski et al., 1999; Sunstein, 2007). Again, this trend is complicated by commodification. News outlets that aim for profit over public service benefit by reducing the amount of coverage dedicated to public affairs, limiting the amount of political information provided to the public through dominant media outlets (Bagdikian, 2004; McChesney, 2004).

**Normlessness**

Structural and cognitive normlessness is often referred to as anomie (Dean, 1961; Finifter, 1970; Seeman, 1959; 1975) and coincides with conditions of anarchy (Seeman, 1975). In either real or perceived conditions of normlessness, individuals may feel that working within the system is futile and attempt to move outside of the system, either by circumventing it or by engaging in illegal activity, in order to accomplish desired goals. When the public sphere creates conditions of commodification, social isolation, and meaninglessness, citizens may begin to feel that communication no longer serves as a vehicle for democratic control. In short, they begin to distrust the role of public sphere structures in the democratic process.

Dating back to Habermas’s (1989) conception of the public sphere, scholars have lamented the potential for its structures to hinder, rather than foster, enlightened understanding, collective action, and democratic empowerment. In other words, they have warned of the potential for public sphere normlessness. Under this condition, although the trappings of democratic communication still survive, they are largely anarchistic enterprises in which professionals vie for personal gain. In contemporary public spheres, strategic communication, “the scientific engineering and targeting of messages that subordinate the ideals of deliberation
and transparency to the achievement of narrow political goals” (Bennett & Manheim, 2001, p. 282) threatens to seriously undermine the ability of media and organizational structures to serve as forums for effective democratic empowerment.

Polls illustrate this dynamic. Rather than using polls as a means for understanding the opinions of the general public, campaigns may utilize polls to more carefully craft strategic messages. These measures gauge responses to similar messages worded in different ways to determine which persuasive arguments about a pre-determined policy option will be most appealing to the public (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000). These findings are then used to sell pre-constructed opinion to the public. Subsequent polling can then use these field tested messages to produce results that rest more on semantic differences than preferences, ultimately constructing public opinion that purposefully undermines the public’s will. Campaigns producing public opinion through these means disregard the role of the public sphere in expressing opinions from private citizens to governmental officials, and the public opinions produced fail to advance democratic empowerment.

**Powerlessness**

The result of all these conditions is powerlessness. Political powerlessness occurs when individuals lose their influence over their government (Seaman, 1959). In the context of public spheres, powerlessness refers to the condition in which the general public loses control over the production and distribution of public opinion. Susan Herbst’s (1993) dichotomy of top-down and bottom-up expressions of opinion illustrates how public sphere structures can produce powerlessness. According to Herbst, citizens, rather than those already in power, generate bottom-up expressions of public opinion (e.g., letters to representatives and traditional forms of protest). The power to express and define public opinion in these cases flows up from the citizen.
Alienating structures, however, create a top-down dynamic of opinion that gives political professionals greater power over the generation of public opinion. These structures can be poorly designed to handle sporadic feedback from the public (Coleman & Blumler, 2009) who subsequently play a largely passive role in the construction of public opinion through these channels. Again, polling most clearly demonstrates the top-down dynamic (Ginsberg, 1986; Herbst, 1993). Polling allows political professionals to construct public opinion, deciding which opinions to measure and who can express opinions and providing a limited range of opinions from which to choose (Herbst, 1993; Lewis, 2001). Ginsberg (1986) calls this the “domestication” of public opinion, stressing citizens’ inability to control its production. Advances in Deliberative Polling techniques attempt to correct some of these problems (Fishkin, 1991, 2009), and these will be discussed in the next section.

In the context of organizations, powerlessness results in a shift, “from large-scale organizations to computers, opinion survey analyses, and electronic media campaigns directed by small staffs of public relations experts” (Ginsberg, 1985, p. 149). Under this condition, civic associations transform from membership-based organizations to advocacy groups, heavily dependent on professionalized constructions of public opinion rather than the input of the public. Emerging datamining and targeting technologies complicate this condition by fostering avenues for highly managed forms of participation. Utilizing these tools, campaigns combine data from multiple sources, including information about lifestyles, consumer choices, census records, and voter registrations, and results from polls and surveys, to design highly personalized and strategically targeted messages and mobilization efforts (Gandy, 2001). Campaigns deliver these personalized appeals through individualized communication channels, such as cell phones or social networking accounts, to individuals who are likely to be receptive to the strategically
constructed message (Chadwick, 2006; Montgomery, 2008). These technologies enhance the efficiency of highly professionalized organizations that create opinions for the public rather than facilitate the communication of opinions from the public.

“Astroturf” organizations may be the most explicit example of how political professionals strategically craft collective action while simultaneously limiting the power of the public. “Astroturf” organizations refer to political associations founded by professional lobbyists that appear to represent members of the public but whose members are not in regular contact with one another and do not play an active role in the organizational structure (Bennett & Manheim, 2001; Gandy, 2001; Howard, 2006). Members of these groups may not know they are being represented, and when they do voice their opinions, they often do so through carefully crafted mechanisms and messages controlled by the subsidizing organization (Howard, 2006).

Top-down media structures produce similar results. Five corporations own the majority of traditional media sources (Bagdikian, 2004) diminishing the potential for content produced outside of these structures to receive attention. Further, traditional news practices such as indexing – tying mediated debate to official debate (Bennett, 1990) – additionally privilege those already in positions of power. Although new forms of digital and networking technologies can offer alternatives to powerful media outlets or challenge their gatekeeping functions (Bennett, 2003; Bimber, 2003; Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Norris, 2000), internet traffic is still concentrated around corporate interests, and the bulk of user-generated content receives insignificant amounts of attention (Dahlberg, 2004; Hindman, 2009). As long as emerging channels of communication are dominated by the same market forces and top-down structures that pervade the more traditional arenas, technological advances cannot guarantee reductions in powerlessness (Dahlberg, 2001, 2004).
**Deliberative Structures**

In contrast to the structures mentioned above, several deliberative structures have been implemented within the past twenty or so years that attempt to empower citizens by bringing them together for informed and democratic discussions and then creating avenues for these discussions to affect decision-making processes. Deliberative scholars have introduced and begun to study several deliberative structures that attempt to connect micro-deliberation to the decision-making process, including the Deliberative Poll (Fishkin, 1991, 1995, 2009), National Issues Forums (Gastil & Dillard, 1999a, 1999b) Citizens’ Juries (Crosby, 1995), Citizens’ Assemblies (Warren & Pearce, 2008), Participatory Budgeting (Baiocchi, 2001, 2003), and panels like the Citizens’ Initiative Review (Gastil, 2000a). Though different in many particulars, all of these processes aim to produce more representative and enlightened opinions.

Although there are several other means for creating a more deliberative public sphere, including alternative ways of structuring organizations and the news media as well as the implementation of more widespread public forums (see Gastil, 2008) and the utilization of the Internet for deliberation (Fishkin, 2009; Muhlberger, 2005), here I focus on deliberative panels or minipublics—what Dahl (1989) once called a “minipopulous.” These types of structures, generally consisting of panels that are small enough for face-to-face deliberation but representative of their community (see Fung, 2003; Goodin, 2008), can create carefully structured settings for discussion and most closely meet the normative standards of deliberation. In addition, unlike deliberative processes that have a direct role in making governmental decisions (see Fung & Wright, 2003), these structures most often attempt to influence the decision-making process through the insertion of deliberation into the larger public discourse (Goodin, 2008).
In the following section, I revisit each condition of alienation, describing how specific face-to-face, deliberative forums correct structural conditions of alienation. Table 2.2 provides a synthesis, reviewing the structural causes of alienation, highlighting deliberative structures that attempt to correct these trends, and indicating how deliberative forums remedy these conditions.

**Commodification**

Deliberative structures attempt to overcome commodification by both relying on citizens, rather than professionals, to perform the tasks of opinion formation and decision making and creating conditions that prevent the co-optation of public discourse (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). Forums such as the Australian Citizens’ Parliament (ACP), the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA), and the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR) create opportunities for non-professional citizens to participate. Each of these processes brought together ordinary citizens to discuss pressing political concerns. During each event, lay panelists heard testimony from professional advocates and witnesses, but panelists had the ultimate power in creating the final outcomes (Dryzek, 2009; Hartz-Karp & Carson, 2009; Warren & Pearce, 2008). Eventually, the proliferation of these types of structures may lead to the decreased influence of campaign spending as deliberative discourse takes a larger place in public sphere discussions.

In the case of the CIR (discussed in detail in the following chapter), panelists created a statement for the Oregon State Voters’ Pamphlet, providing an outlet for the distribution of non-monetized opinion. This statement was specifically constructed to contrast the paid for arguments that otherwise serve as the only source of recommendations in the voters’ guide. Participatory budgeting also tries to decrease the power of special interests in decision-making processes, bringing stakeholders, experts, and community members together to decide on issue-specific budgets that meet the needs of the wider community (Baiocchi, 2001, 2003).
Table 2.2

*Structural Causes of Alienation and Deliberative Remedies*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition of alienation</th>
<th>Structural causes</th>
<th>Deliberative remedies</th>
<th>Evidence of structural repair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commodification:</strong> Transformation of public opinion into a commodity</td>
<td>Professionalized organizations; Commercialized media; Government press offices; Punditry</td>
<td>Citizen participation in public discourse (ACP, British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly [BCCA], CIR); Non-monetized public opinion (CIR)</td>
<td>Decreased influence of campaign spending; Decreased professionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social isolation:</strong> Lack of social capital or networks that cross political affiliation</td>
<td>Professionalized organizations; Data mining and targeting; Interest groups; Enclave communication</td>
<td>Representative participation (CIR, ACP, BCCA, Deliberative Polling); Discussion across cultural/political divides (CIR, ACP, BCCA)</td>
<td>Decreased professionalization; Increased heterogeneous communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meaninglessness:</strong> False choice and low levels of political knowledge</td>
<td>Media and organizational outlets perpetuating misinformation; Non-policy oriented politics; Targeting</td>
<td>Focus on information (CIR, Deliberative Polling, National Issues Forums [NIF]); Opportunities to question experts and advocates (CIR, Deliberative Polling)</td>
<td>More analytically rigorous public discourse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normlessness:</strong> Public sphere structures no longer foster democratic empowerment</td>
<td>Anarchy; Prevalence of strategic communication</td>
<td>Insertion of deliberation into public sphere discourse (BCCA, CIR, Deliberative Polling, NIF)</td>
<td>Decrease in strategic communication; Increase in deliberative structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powerlessness:</strong> Inability to use public sphere structures to influence government decision making</td>
<td>Polling, lobbying and litigation; Centralized media ownership; Indexing; Datamining, targeting, &amp; astroturfing</td>
<td>Direct citizen empowerment (BCCA, participatory budgeting, juries); Increased voice in public discourse (CIR)</td>
<td>Real authority (with institutional strength) placed in citizens’ hands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Social Isolation**

The condition of social isolation is best overcome through the use of deliberative minipublics because they provide an opportunity for a representative sample of the population to engage in face-to-face deliberation (Fung, 2003; Goodin, 2008). The propagation of these structures can decrease enclave communication as citizens from different socioeconomic and political backgrounds come together to perform the tasks of public opinion formation and decision making.

Minipublics such as the ACP, the BCCA, and the CIR bring a stratified, random cross-section of the public together to discuss common problems across social and political divides through the use of carefully structured discussions that are designed to ensure that citizens not only learn from one another but treat each other with respect (Dryzek, 2009; Hartz-Karp & Carson, 2009; Warren & Pearce, 2008). All of these processes had rules ensuring that panelists treated others with respect and were facilitated to maintain that respect throughout the process.

**Meaninglessness**

Deliberative structures that focus on information and provide an opportunity for participants to question experts and advocates can decrease meaninglessness by providing citizens with the information necessary to make informed decision. The CIR, Deliberative Polling, and National Issues Forums (NIF) specifically focus on the dissemination of information to participants and equip them to make tough decisions about real policies. Decisions or recommendations emanating from these types of forums can create more analytically rigorous discourse by inserting detailed and relevant information into a policy debate and revealing discrepancies or falsehoods in claims made by advocates.

Deliberative Polling provides briefing materials for participants prior to deliberation and
encourages them to work in moderated groups to form questions for experts (Fishkin, 1991, 2009). NIF provide participants with issue books that outline three policy solutions to specific public problems; participants then engage in small group conversations about what they have learned and explore the pros and cons of each potential solution (Goodin, 2006). At times, both forums have been televised to allow a large swath of the public to engage in the learning process (Fishkin, 2009; Goodin, 2006). During the CIR, citizens continually question advocates and experts and request citations for any information that they use in their statement for the Voters’ Pamphlet.

**Normlessness**

All the structures discussed above can reduce normlessness by inserting deliberation into public sphere discourse. Dryzek’s (1994) conception of discursive democracy points to this potential. Discussing democratic decision making, Dryzek argues for the replacement of seemingly objective technocrats with everyday citizens engaged in rigorous discussion and argues that such citizen-centered discussions can actually produce better solutions to community problems. Further, Dryzek argues that the implementation of such discursive norms will alter what people expect out of public sphere discourse, shifting their expectations from discussions that exclude them to more informed and egalitarian decision-making procedures.

Each of the structures mentioned above introduces informed and egalitarian communication into larger policy debates. The more leverage and publicity these structures have, the greater likelihood that they will shape the larger public sphere debates, decrease the influence of strategic communication, and transform the dominant means for communication in the public sphere from those that produce alienating conditions to those that produce empowering conditions.
Powerlessness

Unlike structures that produce powerlessness, deliberative structures attempt to actively involve the citizenry in forming public opinions and in the decision-making process (see Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). Perhaps the most notable examples of these types of structures are the jury system, which gives citizens direct power in deciding on and providing punishments for civil and criminal court cases, and Participatory Budgeting, which allows citizens and stakeholders to provide input in the allocation of budget resources (see Baiocchi, 2001, 2003). These deliberative structures empower participants by giving them control in decision-making.

While few structures give deliberative forums such direct power (Goodin, 2008), others provide deliberative panelists with indirect power, such as the BCCA and the Oregon CIR. In the case of the former, delegates to the BCCA recommended new procedures for the electoral system in British Columbia (Warren & Pearce, 2008). Their recommendation was then placed on the ballot, and although the BCCA’s recommendation did not receive the 60 percent majority necessary to change the voting procedures, the forum provided the potential for a deliberative body to dramatically impact the governing structure. The CIR took a slightly different track, creating recommendations on initiatives that were placed in the state’s Voters’ Pamphlet and providing an avenue for increased deliberative participation in public discourse surrounding the initiative.

Moving Forward

By now it should be evident that these dimensions are not mutually exclusive. Organizational and media structures that produce one condition of alienation often foster other conditions, and deliberative structures may correct several of these conditions. Public sphere structures affect who expresses opinions and, ultimately, what opinions are expressed.
The hierarchies produced through alienating conditions can lead to commodification by turning public opinion into a commodity that is bought and sold for profit, isolation by discouraging collective action and fostering enclaves, meaninglessness by capitalizing on isolation and distorting information, normlessness by eroding the public’s ability to utilize the structures of the public sphere to effectively express their public opinions, and ultimately powerlessness by fostering top-down expressions of opinion.

Deliberative structures can correct at least some of these problems by reinserting informed and inclusive discussion into the production of public opinion and empowering the lay public in the decision-making process. Deliberative minipublics do just that and are thus particularly well suited for correcting the conditions of alienation. By creating real opportunities for the public to engage in informed and inclusive discussion and publicizing the results of such discussions, minipublics can impact macro-politics and prevent the co-optation of public discourse (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006).

The following chapter takes an in-depth look at one such structure, the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review and asks whether such processes can live up to the normative model of deliberation. So far I have shown that such processes have the potential to overturn alienating conditions, but these claims require closer scrutiny. Certainly many public sphere processes attempt to create ideal discourse and empower citizens. Living up to these ideals, however, requires adherence to a rather lofty standard of discussion that is not easily attainable. Moreover, while many of the processes above are designed to meet these ideals, few have received the strict evaluations needed to answer whether they actually do live up to their goals. In Chapter 3, I attempt to correct that trend and offer an evaluation system designed to test deliberative processes’
ability to meet the ideals of deliberation. I then apply this scheme to the 2010 CIR, using detailed analysis and participant input to see exactly how deliberative this minipublic was.
Chapter 3

Did They Deliberate? Applying an Evaluative Model of Democratic Deliberation to the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review

Having detailed the dilemmas to democratic empowerment generated by alienating communication routines, I now turn to the transformative potential offered by deliberative public forums. In the previous chapter, I hinted at deliberative structures’ ability to improve public sphere discourse in the face of alienating media and organizational routines, but I did not look closely at such structures to see if they actually met these ideals. Here, I scrutinize one deliberative minipublic, the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR), against an ideal model of deliberation and see just how well it lives up to its promise.

Deliberative democratic scholarship maintains a loose connection between normative theory and empirical research (Thompson, 2008). Recent work, however, has begun to merge disparate understandings of deliberation into a conception that recognizes both normative ideals and practical limitations (Black, Welser, Cosley, & DeGroot, 2011). This synthesis coincides with the proliferation of deliberative forums that provide unprecedented opportunity to compare diverse deliberative processes (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Jacobs et al., 2009; Leighninger, 2006; Warren and Pearce, 2008).

Such forums, however, are woefully under evaluated. More often, scholars and practitioners simply assume that deliberation occurred. This generally takes one of three forms: (1) practitioner/scholars provide first-hand accounts of their experience organizing and implementing a deliberative forum without an actual scheme for evaluating their forum (Dryzek, 2009; Fishkin, 2009; Polletta, 2008), (2) scholars lament the failure of deliberative forums but
have applied the term so loosely as to mean any public meeting at which private citizens interact (Mendelberg & Oleske, 2000), or (3) scholars use the presence of deliberation as the justification for measuring the effects of deliberation on participants or public policy without an analysis of whether deliberation actually occurred (Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Fishkin, 1995, 1997, 2009; Gastil & Dillard, 1999a, 1999b; Jacobs et al., 2009; Nabatchi, 2010). This approach makes the assumption that if the structures of deliberation, or simply the intent to gather people together for discussion, are in place, then the event must have been deliberative.

In this dissertation, I hope to avoid that tendency by offering in this chapter an in-depth evaluation of the primary case used in this dissertation, the CIR. In Chapters 6 and 7 I look at the potential for the CIR and a similar project, the Australian Citizens’ Parliament, to change the personal attitudes and behaviors of participants and the wider public. But before we get there, this chapter asks if these public projects can truly match the ideals laid out in deliberative democratic theory. The following research question will guide this evaluation:

**Research Question 1:** Did the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review meet a minimum threshold of deliberative quality?

Presently, the frameworks that exist for evaluating such events widely vary in content and clarity. Discrepant theoretical and operational definitions forestall comparison of deliberative quality across events. Most evaluations use context-specific evaluative schemes to study one facet of deliberative quality to the detriment of analyzing the overall quality of the process (Polletta & Lee, 2006; Ryfe, 2006, 2007; Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spördnli, & Steinger, 2003; Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, and Steenbergen, 2005). Further, lacking a shared method of analysis, researchers cannot juxtapose different deliberative designs. Such research frustrates an important audience—the public officials responsible for funding, designing, and implementing
deliberative forums (Fagotto & Fung, 2006) and can prevent scholars and practitioners from making definitive statements about whether such projects can meet the normative ideals laid out in the theoretical literature.

To fulfill the dual goals of evaluative coherence and public clarity, in this chapter I present a method for assessing deliberation based on a broad theoretical definition. It is my aspiration that this framework will allow scholars to better understand the potential and problems of various deliberative forums, and it should also help practitioners design better deliberative processes. Toward these ends, I first provide a theoretical conception of deliberation, then apply it as a qualitative evaluation tool to assess a specific deliberative event—the Oregon CIR. As a government-sanctioned, consequential deliberative innovation, the CIR merits close analysis, and we can learn valuable lessons from this unique advance in deliberative design. Using this framework, members of a research team and I identified components that aided and detracted from the CIR’s deliberative quality. We moved back and forth among process design, the actual discussion that took place, panelists’ self-assessments, and the deliberative output they produced to identify which parts of the process lead to high quality deliberation, panelist satisfaction, and accurate and just decisions.

Though I write for a scholarly audience, the results section adaptstext from the report the research team and I presented to the Oregon State Legislature in 2011 while it considered renewing the CIR. As explained below, this research helped the legislature decide whether or not to permanently implement the CIR. The results section, then, shares a way of writing about deliberation that decision makers have found useful.
Evaluating Deliberation

Some scholars view strict theoretical definitions of deliberation as futile attempts to compare everyday speech against idealized standards (Button & Mattson, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2009; Mutz, 2008; Ryfe, 2005). Principled as those objections might be, the practical problem remains of assessing the degree to which an actual process approximates the ideal. Lax definitions of deliberation may simply count political utterances (see Jacobs et al., 2009) or topical symmetry (Simon, 2002), but they cannot provide a suitable standard for judging the deliberativeness of highly structured events designed to transcend the limits of everyday speech (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004). In this chapter, I hope to find a way of analyzing deliberative practices that increase the comparative value of research done within the field.

Criteria for Assessing Deliberation

Most working definitions of deliberation incorporate three criteria: analytic rigor, democratic discussion, and well-reasoned decision making (Burkhalter et al., 2002; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Mansbridge, Hartz-Karp, Amengual, & Gastil, 2006). The analytic aspect of deliberation involves four steps: creating a solid information base, identifying and prioritizing key values, identifying a broad range of solutions, and weighing the pros and cons of decisions (Gouran & Hirokawa, 1996). Meeting the analytic requirements means attending to both key factual information and the vantage point of affected parties, particularly those with opposing values and viewpoints (Benhabib, 1996).

Next, the democratic social process requires four conditions: an adequate distribution of speaking opportunities, mutual comprehension, consideration, and respect (Burkhalter et al., 2002; Gastil, 1993; Mansbridge, 1980). This means providing opportunities for people to express
their viewpoints and respecting different ways of speaking and types of information (Young, 1996).

Finally, deliberation requires well-reasoned decision making. Any group decisions must reflect the considered judgments of the participants, and participants should be satisfied with and stable in their final judgments. Such decisions should be reached through an appropriate decision rule (Cohen, 1989; Gastil, 1993; Mansbridge, 1980) that provides an opportunity for dissent (Barber, 1984).

**Identifying Observable Elements of Deliberative Events**

Moving from conceptualization to operationalization, one must move down from high level abstraction to find a way of assessing both the discrete elements and overall deliberative quality of a public event (Black, Burkhalter, Gastil, & Stromer-Galley, 2011; Gastil, 2008; Thompson, 2008). As Mutz (2008) notes, such a conception must not render deliberation an unrealizable ideal, lest all real-world practices be dismissed for failing to “meet all of the necessary and sufficient conditions to qualify as deliberation” (p. 529).

More pointedly, deliberative democratic theory now has the attention of many public officials interested in making their cities, states, and countries more democratic (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). These audiences require a comprehensive conception of deliberation—if not fully measurable in a formal, statistical way, at least presentable in some format that permits comparisons across cases.

With these academic and practical concerns in mind, theoretical concepts are broken down into observable components. In preparation for the CIR, our research team followed a set of criteria (adapted from Gastil, Knobloch, & Kelly, 2012) that researchers must address in evaluating deliberative public processes. One can judge the quality of any deliberative event by
looking at six tangible elements: (1) the context of the event, (2) the project design and setup, (3) the structural design, (4) the discussion itself, (5) the subjective experiences of the participants, and (6) the output or product created.

1. Context. The context in which a deliberative forum occurs influences its quality. For instance, a process staged in an adversarial public sphere will gain certain inherent advantages, such as readily accessible positions in a debate, but it will also face liabilities, such as difficulty finding consensus (Mendelberg & Oleske, 2000).

2. Design and setup. Attention to the setup of a deliberative project can uncover whether a forum is designed to fulfill the conditions of deliberation. Researchers studying project setup should focus on the selection and framing of topics, recruitment of participants, and decision options. For instance, the selection of discussion materials and participants influences what information and values will emerge during deliberation (Leighninger, 2006).

3. Structure. Studying the structure of a deliberative event requires analyzing the actual presentation of information, values, and solutions, the structure of the agenda, logistics, and facilitation protocols. To take one example researchers must consider how organizers present background materials or witnesses, because the content provided at deliberative events has a significant influence on participants (Fishkin 1991, 2009; Gastil & Dillard, 1999b).

4. Discussion. Direct study of deliberation also requires attention to the discussions that take place (Black, Bukrhalter, et al., 2011). Special attention goes to those moments in which individuals make “claims” (Steiner et al., 2005), but other important features include questions, narratives, reflective talk, and turn-taking dynamics.

5. Subjective experience. Participant evaluations shed light on those aspects of deliberation most difficult to decipher through direct observation. Scholars utilizing participant
assessments have relied on participant surveys (Jacobs et al., 2009), questionnaires (Black, Burkhalter, et al., 2011; Jacobs et al., 2009), and interviews (Button & Mattson, 1999; Jacobs et al., 2009).

6. Outputs. Finally, an evaluation must examine the product of deliberation (Leighninger, 2006). Deliberations oriented toward decision strive to produce a written analysis, verdict, or public statement that conveys a judgment and, often, its underlying reasoning. Such output indicates the quality of the decision and may include markers of information, values, and tradeoffs considered in the deliberation and decision making. Whether the output mentions or provides space for opposing or minority opinions may also testify to the level of equality in the deliberation and reveal the presence or absence of mutual comprehension, consideration, and respect.

The Oregon CIR Case Study

The remainder of this essay demonstrates our approach to evaluation by taking it down into the trenches of practical politics. In 2009 the Oregon legislature created the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR), a trial-run deliberative experiment with the express intent of evaluating the process before making it a permanent institution. This marked the first time a consequential, government-sanctioned deliberative project of this scale had been executed in the United States. Although I briefly highlighted the CIR in Chapter 1, the following section provides a detailed description of the CIR and the role of evaluation in the Oregon State Legislature’s review of it. I then provide a condensed version of our assessment, as adapted from the report we presented to the Oregon House and Senate Rules Committees in 2010-2011.
The Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR) pilot project took place in August 2010. Established by the Oregon State Legislature and implemented by a non-profit organization, Healthy Democracy Oregon (HDO), the CIR was tasked with producing Citizens’ Statements for the Oregon State Voters’ Pamphlet. These Statements were meant to provide informed, non-partisan information that voters could use when forming preferences on initiatives in the November election. Organizers and legislators viewed the Citizens’ Statements as a supplement to the more narrowly focused Explanatory Statement and Financial Impact Statements in the voters’ guide, while also serving as an alternative to the more inflamed rhetoric that comes to voters through paid campaign messages.

HDO staff developed and convened two panels in August 2010 in Salem, Oregon. Each consisted of a random sample of 24 registered Oregon voters demographically stratified to match the Oregon electorate in terms of sex, age, ethnicity, education, geography, and party affiliation. For five days, citizen panelists, assisted by a pair of experienced moderators hired by HDO, reviewed the initiative with the goal of developing an informed and useful statement for the Voters’ Pamphlet. On the first day of their deliberations, the panelists engaged in deliberative skills training. The moderators first presented the panelists with rules for discussion, emphasizing the necessity to “stay in learning mode” and listen to the information presented before making a decision and encouraging them to maintain respect for one another as well as the presenters. Panelists then engaged in a brief training session in which they practiced a mini version of the process on a subject unrelated to the initiative.

On the afternoon of the first day and for the next three days, panelists listened to evidence from the initiative proponents and opponents, as well as to background witnesses. Moderators then led the panelists in small and large group conversations that allowed them to distill the
presented information. Panelists then used these conversations and votes conducted with computerized voting devices to identify lingering questions about the initiative and its impact as well as the most important information and arguments about it. At the end of the week, the panelists condensed the information and arguments that they had developed throughout the week and wrote a Citizens’ Statement for the state Voters’ Pamphlet that included Key Findings (information related to the initiative that more than a majority of the panel found both relevant and factually accurate) and Statements in Favor and in Opposition, written by the panelists who ultimately found themselves for or against the measure, respectively.

The first set of panelists reviewed Measure 73, which proposed to increase the mandatory minimum sentence for certain repeat felony sex crimes and implements a mandatory minimum sentence for third-time Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants (DUII) charges. The panelists voted 21 to 3 against the measure, but the electorate ultimately passed the initiative (albeit by a much narrower margin than early polls projected).

The second set of panelists studied Measure 74, which would have established a non-profit system to license the production and distribution of medical marijuana. The panelists split almost evenly (13 to 11 in favor of the measure), and voters rejected the initiative in the November election.

**Research Methods**

House Bill 2895 prompted the development of the CIR pilot project, and it contained a sunset clause limiting the process to the 2010 election and requiring an evaluation of the deliberations. With funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF), a research team was assembled to carry out that assessment.
Performing a systematic evaluation of deliberative public processes requires assessing whether each element of deliberation lives up to the normative ideal of deliberation outlined above. Such an analysis can allow scholars and practitioners to identify precisely which elements either hindered or fostered specific aspects of democratic deliberation. Table 3.1 draws these criteria and elements together and provides suggestions for what types of data are needed for such an assessment. The data appearing in bold represent the most important and cost efficient pieces for those evaluators pressed for time or resources. Below, I describe how these methods were used in our analysis of the CIR.

In examining the setup and structure of the event, the research team looked at its overall design, relying primarily on observations and analysis of archival materials. I conducted interviews with HDO staff and sat in on planning meetings and a test run of the process. The research team also examined planning materials (e.g., the agenda for each day, the rules for discussion and the presentation of information, and the means for organizing the information gathered during the event). This allowed us to determine if the process was properly structured to meet each of the three deliberative criteria.

To assess the execution of the CIR’s design and the quality of the discussion, a team of three researchers sat in on each week of the deliberations, taking extensive notes on the proceedings and assessing the deliberative quality of each agenda segment. Throughout the CIR, the team met during breaks and at the end of each day to compare notes. To facilitate these evaluations, I created a real-time observation scheme that asked members of the research team to evaluate each agenda segment according to the relevant deliberative criteria. After each agenda segment, the team discussed their grades and pertinent notes, attempting to reach a shared understanding of how that agenda segment had performed on the specified deliberative criteria.
For example, to assess whether the presenters created a solid information base, identified key values, weighed the pros and cons, and discussed alternative solutions, the research team rated each advocate or witness presentation in terms of its relevance (whether it was pertinent to the discussion), reliability (whether the information was factually accurate), and sufficiency (whether it fulfilled the information needs of the panelists). To ensure that panelists fully comprehended and considered this information, researchers rated the relevance and sufficiency of the panelists’ questions for the presenters. The observation scheme also highlighted the plan for each agenda segment and asked researchers to take notes on specific aspects of the segment and whether or not it fulfilled each of the pre-developed criteria for deliberation.

After the panels were completed, the proceedings were transcribed to facilitate textual analysis of the event and to assess the parts of the proceedings that HDO did not permit us to observe directly (i.e., the statement writing segments were recorded but not observed live). Finally, with the help of the HDO staff, we maintained an archive of the evidence presented to the panelists.

To evaluate the final output, I looked to the quality of the recommendations produced for the Voters’ Pamphlet, performing a close reading of the Statements and examining the voting process. To check the analytic quality of the process and whether or not the panelists utilized their deliberations in making their decisions, a research assistant performed a fact check of each claim contained in the Citizens’ Statements and studied the transcripts and archival materials to determine what evidence panelists used in developing these claims. The team then created a final evaluation of the statement that linked each piece of information to the point in the transcripts in which that information was produced and the source, if applicable, used to create that piece of information. The research team additionally reviewed the transcripts to determine whether the panels made decisions and wrote their Statements in a non-coercive manner.
### Table 3.1

*Evaluate Methods for Elements of Deliberation by Deliberative Criteria*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Project Setup</th>
<th>Structural Features of Agenda</th>
<th>Discussion Process</th>
<th>Subjective Experience</th>
<th>Final Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principal Data</strong></td>
<td>Archival documents and interviews</td>
<td>Official agenda and record of proceedings</td>
<td>Video, transcript, and/or direct observation</td>
<td>Participant surveys and interviews</td>
<td>Final statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analytic Rigor</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide a solid information base</td>
<td>Adequate search and selection of information and witnesses</td>
<td>Adequate time for testimony and cross-examination</td>
<td>Scrutinizing information and providing personal information</td>
<td>Surveys assessing increased knowledge</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify and prioritize values</td>
<td>Adequate time for considering values</td>
<td>Explicit discussion of values</td>
<td>Surveys assessing values-based choices</td>
<td>Values in statement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider a range of alternatives</td>
<td>Range of information and witnesses</td>
<td>Diversity of witnesses; time for identifying solutions</td>
<td>Explicit discussion of alternatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weigh the pros and cons</td>
<td>Time for weighing the pros/cons and cross-examination</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Democratic Discussion</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality of Opportunity to Speak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Adequate opportunity to express (dissenting) views</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehension</td>
<td>Clarity of briefing materials</td>
<td>Witness presentation of information</td>
<td>Noting when people ask for clarifications</td>
<td>Understanding of issue complexities; Consideration of other views</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consideration</td>
<td>Time to reflect; Not in debate too long</td>
<td>Presence of questions, feedback, reflective talk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>Dis/respect modeled; Rules for talk</td>
<td>Dis/respect shown directly in talk</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sense of feeling respected by other participants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Well-reasoned decision making</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Decision</td>
<td>Clear articulation of deliberative charge</td>
<td>Adequate time for making decisions</td>
<td>Discussion of points of disagreement</td>
<td>Recognition of tradeoffs/consequences; Decision satisfaction</td>
<td>Third-party assessment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, the questionnaires collected at the end of each day recorded the panelists’ self-assessments. Each day, panelists evaluated the overall process, such as the quality of the information provided by the advocates or their satisfaction with their progress on specific parts of the Citizens’ Statements, and the process’s performance on specific deliberative criteria, such as whether they had sufficient opportunity to speak and how well they considered underlying values. In addition, panelists were asked to report whether they detected bias in the proceedings and to provide additional comments to the staff and research team to clarify any of their quantitative assessments or feelings of bias. To check the stability of participants’ perceptions, we then conducted a follow-up survey (79 percent response rate) from October 22 – November 1, a few months after the panels and before Election Day.

**Legislative Report**

Using this framework, the research team compiled our data and presented an evaluative report to the Oregon State Legislature, testifying twice before the House Rules Committee (in December 2010 and February 2011) and once before the Senate Rules Committee (March 2011), as they debated House Bill 2634, the legislation to institutionalize the CIR. Elliot Shuford, one of HDO’s co-directors and an advocate for the bill, commented that skepticism of the process was one of the greatest obstacles to its implementation and that without the evaluation, “I suspect our chances to pass this…legislation…would have been very slim” (E. Shuford, personal communication, May 12, 2011).

Several members of the Rules Committees commented on the utility of an independent evaluation for their decision-making process. As Representative Arnie Roblan, the Co-Chair of the House Rules Committee, stated:
This [evaluation] is what we need to do more of in our state government… and that’s have real research, that we can trust, look at things we do and then give us insight into how to become better. (Public Hearing, HB2634, 2010).

In short, many members of the legislature found this evaluation useful in deciding to continue the CIR. HB 2634 ultimately passed with bipartisan support in a closely-divided legislature, with the House voting 36-22 in favor of the bill and the Senate voting 22-8. The governor signed the bill into law in June 2011, and the first permanent iteration of the CIR took place in August 2012.

**Condensed Evaluation Report to the Oregon Legislature**

In providing a condensed version of our legislative report, I begin with a “deliberative scorecard”—the same device we used to report our findings to the state legislature in Salem, Oregon. Table 3.2 grades the CIR on each deliberative condition using a conventional scale from “A” to “F,” thinking about both the absolute criteria outlined above as well as comparing the CIR to other deliberative processes.

To determine these grades, we relied on our observation, notes, and recollection of the event as well as the real-time quantitative assessments completed throughout both reviews. The observation scheme enabled the research team to grade the event as it progressed and to track the CIR’s progress over the course of the week. As will be evident below, some parts of the process were certainly messy, but problems early on in the process were often corrected in other parts. In the same vein, individual criteria often spanned several agenda segments as well as several elements of the process. For instance, considering a range of alternatives requires that the process be set up to discuss alternatives, that advocates and witnesses be prepared to discuss these alternatives, and that panelists consider them in their discussions. In creating the final scores, the
research team focused on the *totality* of the work, recognizing problems as they arose but accounting for later corrections of those problems. By analogy, this is analogous to rewarding students for mastering material by the end of a course, as opposed to averaging the scores on their graded assignments each step along the way.

With these considerations in mind, an “A” in the scorecard below represents excellence on a criterion, with the process far exceeding conventional expectations for public discussion; a “B” signifies that the event had performed above adequate but still had room for improvement. A grade of “C” would indicate an adequate performance on that criteria—barely meeting the minimum standards for deliberation. A grade of “D” would represent inadequate performance, whereas an “F” would represent abject failure.

The scorecard in Table 3.2 presents the most general finding—that the CIR deliberation was highly deliberative. The analytic sections that follow this table provide greater insight into the basis for each grade by showing the details that went into the research team’s overall assessment of the CIR panels’ performance on that criterion.

**Criterion 1. Promote Analytic Rigor**

Of the three main criteria (analytic rigor, democratic discussion, informed and non-coercive decision-making), the first of these produced the most uneven results. The summary assessment on this criterion was “A-/B+” for the Measure 73 review, regarding mandatory sentencing, and a “B+” for the Measure 74 review, regarding medicinal marijuana.

**1a. Learning basic issue information.** The bulk of the CIR was structured to provide panelists information. Days 2-4 involved hearing from and questioning advocates and witnesses, who largely succeeded in providing high-quality information. Moreover, when advocates and witnesses failed to include relevant information the panelists usually could gain missing
Table 3.2

Summary Assessment of the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review Panels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria for Evaluating Deliberation</th>
<th>Measure 73 (Sentencing)</th>
<th>Measure 74 (Marijuana)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Promote analytic rigor</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1a. Learning basic issue information</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>B+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1b. Examining of underlying values</td>
<td>B-</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1c. Considering a range of alternatives</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1d. Weighing pros/cons of measure</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Facilitate a democratic process</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>2a. Equality of opportunity to participate</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b. Comprehension of information</td>
<td>B+</td>
<td>B+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2c. Consideration of different views</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d. Mutual respect</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>A</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. Produce a well-reasoned statement</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3a. Informed decision making</td>
<td>A-</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3b. Non-coercive process</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
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information by calling witnesses or questioning advocates. Staff created copies of any written evidence presented to the panelists, but the witnesses and advocates sometimes lacked such evidence. This hindered the panelists’ ability to comprehend the information, challenge claims, or utilize this information in their discussion. For example, during the first review the proponents of mandatory sentencing argued that every dollar spent on incarceration saves the state four, but they never backed up this claim. Later, critics showed panelists a chart that indicated that each dollar spent on incarceration saves only three cents. This could have been a crucial piece of information, since cost-effectiveness was a key issue in the deliberation, but lacking direct evidence, the panelists were unable to weigh this claim carefully.

Although as a whole the advocates and witnesses provided sufficient, reliable, and relevant information to the panelists, not all presentations were equally informative. Sometimes,
even the panelists’ follow-up requests for information went unfulfilled. As one panelist who studied mandatory sentencing noted, “We need a lot of very accurate information. What we are getting is info from each side which of course promotes their cause. I am a little worried that we get just small bits of info, instead of the whole amount.”

Group discussions corrected many of the inadequacies. After most presentations, panelists were divided into small groups and instructed to identify the presenters’ key claims and raise additional questions. These claims and questions were presented to the large group and summarized and categorized before being presented to advocates and witnesses. The moderators led the panelists in continually reworking the questions and claims so that panelists could, ultimately, provide reliable information in their Statements.

Though relaying information presented some problems, by the end of the week, every single panelist reported having heard “enough information” to make an informed decision about how to write their final Statement. In the follow-up survey conducted months later (after seeing the issue debated in a full public election), the large majority of the panelists still held that view. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate these results. In the initial survey, all panelists said that they had either probably or definitely heard enough information. We provided slightly different response options in the follow-up survey. On this survey, one panelist who studied mandatory minimums reported being unsure that he had heard enough information to make a good decision. Two panelists who studied medical marijuana dispensaries, however, reported that they “did not learn enough information” to make a good decision.

1b. Examining underlying values. Though the CIR as a whole promoted rigorous analysis, the process did not provide sufficient conceptual and discursive space to address values underlying many of the key arguments. Early in the process, moderators encouraged panelists to
Figure 3.1

*Panelists’ End-Of-Week Self-Assessment of Having Learned Enough to Make a Decision*

![Bar chart showing Panelists' End-Of-Week Self-Assessment of Having Learned Enough to Make a Decision](image)

Highlight larger “issues” (a term loosely defined to encompass values) to organize the claims raised by advocates and witnesses. Panelists could not, however, revisit the issues originally
selected or add new ones. This prevented the panelists from addressing values that only became salient in light of new information. As one panelist reviewing mandatory sentencing stated in her Wednesday comments, “I feel like perhaps we should re-evaluate our first core/central ideas. We chose them the first evening with little information behind us. Now, a few of them seem not important or at least less important.”

In spite of this problem, the panelists gave positive assessments on this criterion. At the end of both weeks, the panelists generally thought the CIR did a good job of considering “the values and deeper concerns” of those both in favor of and opposed to the measures, with all but one Measure 74 (medical marijuana) panelist rating performance on this indicator as either “good” or “excellent.” Measure 73 (mandatory sentencing) panelists gave lower average scores for this criterion, with four panelists saying that the performance was only “adequate.” In sum, values played an important role in the CIR, but the process could have given greater priority to examining underlying values.

1c. Considering a range of alternatives. Because initiatives are simple up or down votes, considering a range of alternatives amounted to one simple question: Should we endorse or reject the initiative? More subtly, the initiative’s proposed solution had to compete with any number of alternatives raised by the opposition. Thus, much of the impetus for expanding a range of alternatives fell to the opposition advocates and witnesses, with proponents explaining why all other options had failed or would fail if attempted. This process was thorough for the mandatory sentencing initiative (Measure 73), as panelists learned of successful rehabilitation/sentencing programs in other states. It was less thorough regarding marijuana dispensaries (Measure 74), in part because the opponents were not well organized. Opponents of Measure 74 spent more time critiquing the measure than offering alternative means of providing
drug access to patients, indicating that analytic rigor hinges on the presenters’ ability to discuss alternative solutions.

1d. Weigh the pros/cons of the measure. For both weeks, the panelists—aided by advocates and witnesses—did an excellent job of weighing the pros and cons of the measure. The panelists continually requested detailed information about fiscal and social impacts and evidence of the effects of comparable laws. When advocates could not provide requested evidence, they often suggested which witnesses to call for answers.

For both reviews, the panelists were particularly vigilant about drawing out the unintended consequences of the measures. During the first week, the panelists exposed several flaws in the mandatory minimum sentencing law—particularly its inadvertent encompassing of minors and cases of “sexting” (text-messaging explicit sexual content). Regarding the medical marijuana initiative, the panelists scrutinized its enforceability and indirect ramifications for current medicinal marijuana growers.

Two structural components contributed to the CIR’s high performance on this criterion. First, the process was organized so that advocates could rebut claims made by their opponents and witnesses. This gave advocates ample opportunity to question the conclusions that the panelists were starting to reach. Second, moderators repeatedly required panelists to identify key pieces of information and lingering questions. This helped panelists stay focused on—and understand the nuances of—the most critical issues in their deliberations.

Criterion 2. Facilitate a Democratic Process

The CIR received very high marks for creating a democratic discussion, with Measure 73 (mandatory sentencing) earning an “A-” and Measure 74 (medical marijuana) receiving an “A” average. The structure of the panels encouraged a highly democratic process that ensured
panelists, advocates, and witnesses had sufficient and equal opportunities to speak. The process also encouraged panelists to fully consider opposing viewpoints and fostered mutual respect.

2a. Equality of opportunity to participate. To be democratic, a process must first ensure that individuals have an equal opportunity to join the panel and speak up during its deliberations. The CIR panelists were randomly selected from Oregon state voters and demographically stratified to match the Oregon electorate. After sending out invitations to approximately 10,000 Oregon voters, the HDO staff anonymously selected twenty-four panelists and five alternates for each week to match the state’s electorate in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, education, partisan affiliation, and place of residence. Though last-minute cancellations and substitutions created slight demographic imbalances, the final panels approximated those demographic targets.

To maintain equality during the discussion, the CIR provided multiple opportunities for panelists to express themselves and pose questions to advocates and witnesses. Because the panelists often broke into small groups, those reticent in large groups had a more relaxed setting in which to talk. The CIR’s full-panel discussions then enabled panelists to bring ideas from small groups into the larger deliberation. Success along these lines shows the value of multiple rounds of mixed discussion methods; it helped panelists parcel out complex claims and counter-claims and afforded panelists’ adequate speaking opportunities.

In the full-panel sessions, the moderators ensured that the most vocal members of the group did not dominate the conversation. Each week’s panel contained a single outspoken citizen who other panelists perceived, at times, as domineering or distracting. By the end of each week, in part because of active facilitation by the moderators, both of those individual panelists had
restrained themselves. Several panelists gave the moderators high marks on this in their end-of-week evaluations. In this regard, moderation was essential for the CIR’s success.

Throughout both weeks, most panelists felt that they had a “sufficient opportunity to express [their] views.” As illustrated in Table 3.3, 21 out of the 24 participants studying mandatory sentencing said they had a sufficient chance to speak on all five days, with one or two panelists saying they were “unsure” each day and one or two saying that they “did not have sufficient opportunity to speak” for two of the days. The review of medical marijuana fared even better in this regard: Only one panelist (on only one day) reported insufficient speaking opportunities.

Table 3.3
Panelists’ Self-Report of Sufficient Opportunity to Speak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Measure 73</th>
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<th>Measure 74</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Unsure</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tues</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The format of the CIR also provided equal speaking opportunities for the advocates. Advocates presented their case to the panelists on the second and fourth day. They were given equal time to speak to the panelists, rebut claims made by their opponents, and address questions. Twice, the CIR panelists assessed whether the proponents and opponents were given equal time, and every panelist gave the same answer on both surveys—marking the midpoint on the scale to indicate that “both sides had equal time.”

2b. Comprehension of information. Small group discussions and the constant ability to ask questions encouraged comprehension of Measures 73 and 74. As previously mentioned, at
the beginning of the week, panelists took part in a training exercise that taught them how to sift information, distinguish larger issues from specific claims, and develop questions. This training session appeared valuable for panelists, who used it as a frame of reference more than once. This illustrates the need for at least a modicum of education in deliberative skills in large-scale deliberative processes.

Throughout the week, small and large group discussions identified and scrutinized claims made by the advocates and witnesses. During the question and answer sessions, moderators encouraged panelists to ask for clarification about anything they did not understand and repeat questions that still felt under-answered. As one panelist noted, “The process… taught us how to extract critical information from proponent, opponent, and expert witness statements.”

On the end-of-day evaluations, panelists were asked how often they “had trouble understanding or following the discussion.” For the mandatory sentencing review, an average of 16 panelists said that they “never” or “rarely” had trouble understanding the discussion, and on only one day did more than one panelist report having trouble “often.” Again, the medical marijuana review fared slightly better, with an average of 20 panelists saying they rarely or never had trouble. Because the CIR gave panelists many opportunities to digest information, the vast majority rarely experienced difficulty comprehending the discussion.

2c. Consideration of different views. The rules provided to panelists on the first day encouraged them to keep an open mind and make no decision until hearing all of the available information. The panelists’ self-assessments suggest that they took this directive seriously. Each day panelists were asked, “When other CIR participants or Advocate Team members expressed views different from your own today, how often did you consider carefully what they had to say?” Most days, all but one panelist said they considered views different from their own either
“often” or “almost always,” with the single individual saying that they considered these views
“occasionally.” On the other days, every single panelist said they considered these views either
“often” or “almost always.” By the end of the week, the panelists recognized this open-
mindedness in both themselves and one another, with several commenting on their surprise at
finding so much common ground when drafting their final Statements.

This criterion was also met by limiting bias in the CIR. Again, the formats for group
discussions, advocate presentations, and the selection of witnesses were essential. At the
beginning of most small group sessions, each of the panelists took turns speaking to the topic at
hand before the group moved into informal discussion. This ensured that all voices were heard at
the outset.

The moderators also played an important role by modeling neutrality. Each of the five
days, the citizen panelists assessed the fairness of the CIR moderators. For both weeks, on three
of the five days no panelist reported moderator bias, and no more than two panelists each week
ever perceived that moderators preferred a particular side.

Witness selection also ensured mutual consideration. Using a computerized voting
process to narrow down the panelists’ selections, the panelists chose expert witnesses to meet
specific informational needs. This mitigated potential organizer bias from HDO in the selection
of witnesses. One panelist connected the ability to hear from different sources of information
with the goal of listening to all sides; in her end-of-week evaluation, she reported being “exposed
to many different points related to this measure, and this has allowed me to become more open-
minded about the value of other opinions.”

2d. Mutual respect. The subjective feeling of respect is one of the best measures of
whether a person has been respected (Gastil, 1993; Steiner, 2009; Rostbøll, 2011), so we placed
primary emphasis on participants’ assessments on this criterion. Table 3.4 shows that panelists studying medical marijuana felt particularly respected, with all panelists reporting that they either “often” or “almost always” felt they were “treated with respect.” The review of mandatory sentencing fared slightly less well, with a few panelists only “occasionally” feeling respect toward the end of the week and one saying on Thursday that she “rarely” felt respected.

Table 3.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Measure 73</th>
<th></th>
<th>Measure 74</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Almost Always</td>
<td>Often</td>
<td>Occasionally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mon</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tues</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wed</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurs</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fri</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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One might brush aside that lone subjective experience as an outlier, but such cases merit scrutiny because the minority’s experience has special importance. That Thursday, the penultimate day in the CIR, was particularly difficult for panelists studying mandatory sentencing. As they began to hammer out the details of their Key Findings, the tone of the debate revealed the vast majority of panelists intended to oppose the measure. Some of this tension spilled over into Friday morning as the panelists finalized their Key Findings for the Citizens’ Statement that would subsequently appear in the official Voters’ Pamphlet. That morning, one panelist told the group that a statement written and voted on the previous afternoon was “not jumping out” at her. Another panelist took offense at the comment and said it amounted to “dissing” the panel’s work. The moderators allowed the panelists to express their frustration but quickly settled the matter, telling the panelists:
There will be another opportunity for you…to agree or disagree with that statement. We are trying to make sure that every voice is heard…You are here to deliberate, and that means that there are going to probably be differences of opinion. And that's okay. We're hoping that you continue to respect the discussion ground rules of disagreeing positively and with respect.

The two panelists who had exchanged sharp words ate lunch together and talked one-on-one, a clear indication that they had not let the tough debate fully undermine their regard for one another (or for the CIR itself). Throughout the process, moderators fostered civil communication across difference, specifically by facilitating the quick resolution of hostile disagreement.

In addition, Measure 73 panelists occasionally felt disrespected by one of the advocates for mandatory sentencing and, to some extent, the moderators. In their open-ended comments, panelists generally gave the moderators good reviews. A few panelists, however, commented that repetitive moderator instructions made them feel like they were being treated like children. These panelists resented instances when they felt that the moderators failed to acknowledge their competence.

Similar problems arose regarding the advocates in favor of mandatory sentencing. On a number of occasions, the lead proponent told the panelists that without extensive training in the law they were not capable of understanding the initiative. In addition, particularly in their closing arguments, which contained an extended slide show of car crash victims, proponents used emotional appeals not always connected to facts or arguments germane to the measure. As one panelist stated, “Please pass on to the pro advocates that certain tactics don’t work. Scare tactics in particular—I thought their time could have been spent in much more informative ways today than the slide show. It made me angry that they wasted my time when they could have been
giving me facts.” Ensuring mutual respect, then, requires that organizers, advocates, and witnesses treat participants as competent and capable of the task at hand.

**Criterion 3. Produce a Well-Reasoned Statement**

The last criterion requires that the panelists produce a well-reasoned Citizens’ Statement. For both measures, the CIR receives very high marks. For the mandatory sentencing measure, the Statement receives a grade of an “A/A-,” and for the medical marijuana measure, it receives a solid “A.” In part because the process was sufficiently rigorous and democratic, the panelists produced informed and well-reasoned statements through a non-coercive process.

3a. Informed decision making. Overall, the CIR fostered a highly informed decision-making process that allowed panelists to construct high quality Key Findings and Arguments in Favor and Opposed to the ballot measures. Our independent analysis of the Citizens’ Statements found no inaccuracies or exaggerations, and every claim tied back to a particular piece of evidence presented during the CIR.

In part, this reflects the careful organizing and filtering process the panelists used to establish a solid information base, but the Citizens’ Statement writing process also enhanced its quality. During both reviews, panelists repeatedly voted on which claims were the most important, and they pared down and reworded these carefully in pursuit of precision and validity. Although panelists had five full days to review the initiative, during large group discussions and in their end-of-day evaluations, they often expressed the need for more time, illustrating a desire to provide accurate and informed Statements. Feeling time pressure on Thursday afternoon, panelists formed committees and met after hours to write first drafts and refine the Key Findings developed and prioritized during the regular session. These refined claims and arguments were then delivered back to the group for further development Friday morning. This form of
participant agency, which the panelists themselves grafted onto the CIR, allowed participants to spend many additional hours reflecting, prioritizing, and rephrasing their ultimate Citizens’ Statement. (Concerns about the potential inadvertent impacts of such extra-hours efforts caused the HDO organizers to build into the 2012 CIR process a panelist subcommittee that could work with staff on grammar issues after hours.)

On the final day, when the panelists broke up into groups favoring and opposing the measures to write their argument statements, the transcript reveals that the panelists attempted to incorporate the best available information and exclude irrelevant, inaccurate, or unverifiable information. For example, the three panelists supporting mandatory sentencing considered including the four-to-one figure regarding the ultimate savings produced through incarceration but excluded it because it remained unverified and they recalled hearing information refuting it. Though it could have proven a rhetorically powerful claim, they chose to leave it out, lest they inadvertently mislead Oregon voters.

After the Arguments in Favor and in Opposition to the measure were drafted, the panelists came back together to check the factual accuracy of those drafts. Panelists in favor and opposed to the measure suggested changes to the Statements that they had not personally worked on to improve their factual accuracy and conceptual clarity. Members of the HDO staff and the research team also used this time to check the factual accuracy of the Statements. The panelists in the pro and con caucuses then chose whether or not to incorporate the suggestions. In every instance, the groups chose to make the suggested changes, and this resulted in more careful and accurate Statements—in one case catching a rather large statistical error made by the panelists supporting mandatory sentencing in their Arguments in Favor section.
One way to test whether panelists used the best available information was to ask them at what point they made up their minds about how to vote on the measure. This strategy only occurred to the research team after the first week, so data are only available for the medical marijuana review. When asked “on which day did you decide how you would vote,” one panelist reported reaching a decision on Monday and three reported reaching their decision on Wednesday, with the large majority of panelists deciding how to vote either Thursday (11 panelists) or Friday (8 panelists), when they had more information at hand. (One panelist declined to answer this question.) Though this may not provide a clear inclination at which specific point they made up their mind (for example, Tuesday could mean either before or after hearing the advocates presentation), these answers indicate that most panelists made their decision after hearing testimony from advocates and experts and engaging in discussion with fellow panelists.

By showing how participants’ opinions changed over the course of the week, Figure 3.3 illustrates how the information provided during CIR shaped the citizen panelists’ decisions on the ballot measures. At the end of the week panelists were asked to recall the opinion they held when they first came into the process, as well as their final decision on the measure after the process. (We declined to ask pre-deliberation opinions at the start of the first day of the CIR, lest staking a prior position cause some participants to anchor their views.)

At least by their subjective recounting, panelists were largely undecided before beginning the deliberation, with a majority of panelists for both measures saying that they were undecided when they came to Salem. By the end of the week, their opinions had developed and shifted dramatically. For mandatory sentencing (Measure 73), panelists were overwhelmingly opposed to the measure, and for medical marijuana (Measure 74), panelists split pretty evenly on the
measure. This indicates that though many panelists were initially neutral on this issue on which they would be deliberating, the process allowed most panelists to reach a clear decision, with the majority expressing strength in their end-of-week opinions and only one panelist remaining undecided.

3b. Non-coercive process. Our evaluation also found that the decision-making process allowed the panelists to make up their minds and vote free of structural coercion or social pressure. We found very little indication of bias in the proceedings and the panelists’ assessments affirmed our observations. Almost all votes were conducted through touch pads so that panelists would not experience the social pressure of public voting. In addition, the Citizens’ Statement itself clearly presented the number of votes for each claim it contained, allowing voters a transparent view of the panelists’ understanding of specific aspects of the measures.
Our observations and analysis of the transcripts also found no evidence of coercive pressure. As one panelist studying medical marijuana noted, “No one CIR panelist needed to feel that his or her learning curve, participation level or expertise in the research/data or any of the work this week needed to be like any one of the other panelists.”

Nonetheless, one panelist did write in a survey, “The last day when formulating the pro and con of a measure was difficult... The conclusions written were not as strong in wording, but I felt compelled to agree.” As this response indicates, the pressure to produce final Citizens’ Statements within a specified time period placed pressure on at least some of the panelists. In fact, the organizers from HDO chose to reserve time on Friday for a public press conference, rather than permit an additional hour or two of Statement revision. Perhaps that choice could be pointed to as a mistake; however, the extra time may not have lessened the pressure this or other panelists might have felt.

Finally, panelists’ satisfaction with the statements they wrote provides a key indicator of the presence of coercion. Panelist dissatisfaction might signal coercion or frustration with the decision making process. Overall, the panelists were “satisfied… with the Key Findings” in both the exit and months-later follow-up surveys. On the mandatory sentencing measure, six panelists’ assessments were “neutral” at the end of the week, but by the follow-up survey, all but one panelist were at least “satisfied” with the Findings. The medical marijuana review received similarly high marks, with at least sixteen panelists “satisfied” with the Key Findings and only one “dissatisfied” when asked both at the end of the week and in the follow-up survey.

**Conclusion**

The preceding assessment of the Oregon CIR yields two main points about applying deliberative democratic theory to real experiments in public talk. First, one aim of this chapter
was to demonstrate a practical way of evaluating deliberation that produces meaningful results in a real political context while maintaining fidelity with more abstract articulations of democratic deliberation (Barber, 1984; Cohen, 1989). Our research team did not try to quantify the level of deliberation beyond the rows of the “scorecard” in Table 3.2, though the movement from grades to scores would be straightforward if one deemed quantification essential for making deliberative theory “testable” (Mutz, 2008; Thompson, 2008). Further, this evaluation offers an approach that could lead to more systematic metrics for assessing deliberation beyond the content analytic approaches under development (Steiner et al., 2005). Applying this scheme as a basis for future comparison, researchers could better understand what specific aspects of deliberative events foster analytic rigor, democratic discussion, and well-reasoned decision making. Consideration of other structural and contextual features might also shed light on which factors prevent those conditions from being fulfilled.

Second, this case shows just how deliberative a carefully structured event can become. Direct comparisons are not yet possible, but the CIR showcased a more intensive, high-quality deliberation than many popular alternatives, such as Deliberative Polls (Fishkin, 2009) or National Issues Forums (Gastil & Dillard, 1999b) and offers insight into how to structure future deliberative processes.

Moreover, this evaluation shows that deliberative structures can closely model the normative ideal. The CIR gave a diverse group of lay citizens the opportunity to engage in informed and respectful face-to-face discussions about real community issues. The citizens produced high quality statements that held a place of legitimacy in larger public sphere discourse. In short, this process did reverse many of the trends that dominate professionalized
and capitalistic political communication routines and showed how deliberative forums can correct the structural conditions of alienation.

The remainder of this dissertation moves from structure to agency. The next few chapters explore how deliberative forums can transform the cognitions and behaviors of individuals who interact through them and the attitudes of the wider public who utilize their results in making their political decisions. Chapter 4 presents a theoretical justification for expecting that structural change can lead to individual change, using the spectrum of alienation and deliberation presented in Chapter 2 and addressing how specific structural conditions equate to cognitive and behavioral effects for individuals interacting through those structures. Chapter 5 then tests the claim that deliberative structures can correct the cognitive and behavioral trends caused by alienating conditions and uses the CIR and the 2009 Australian Citizens’ Parliament as test cases. Chapter 6 takes this one step further and asks if such forums can have even farther reaching ramifications. In that chapter I look at how the CIR affected the attitudes of the members of the Oregon electorate who knew about its existence and utilized its recommendations in casting their votes.
Chapter 4

Theorizing the Effects of Deliberation on Participants:

A Framework for Understanding Cognitive and Behavioral Change

The last few chapters have focused on public sphere structures—how they shape and constrain the practice of civic life. In Chapter 2, I positioned alienating and deliberative structures as sitting on the opposite ends of a spectrum; the former deplete the lay public’s power to use public opinion as a tool of self-governance and the latter attempt to correct those trends. Chapter 3 then asked whether deliberative structures could truly live up to this normative ideal and used the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review to investigate this question. A close look at the CIR found that though the process was difficult, and at times difficult, such events can meet a high standard of analytic rigor, democratic discussion, and just decision making.

Admittedly, such processes are still rare. The CIR is the first of its kind and, as discussed in Chapter 2, those deliberative structures that do exist often lack both the ability to influence wider public sphere discourse and the legitimacy granted to the CIR as a state-sanctioned institution. Even so, the CIR represents a remarkably important step in the deliberative movement precisely because it has been sanctioned by state government. Moreover, such processes have the potential to spread. Participatory budgeting in Brazil has seen such expansion, growing from an experiment in participatory governance to an institutionalized system of budget allocation in Brazil and other countries in South America and Europe (Cabannes, 2004). The CIR has similar potential. Good governance organizations and elected officials in other locations have already expressed interest in bringing Citizens’ Initiative Reviews to their communities, including the California Secretary of State and representatives from the European Union.
At the present however, such processes are often a novel experience for participants, in part because of their departure from the traditional options for engaging in political communication outlined in Chapter 2. By replacing citizens with professionals, distancing citizens from one another, and distorting public knowledge, alienating structures degrade political communication and the citizens’ role in the democratic process. Individuals who interact through such structures, then, are limited in their agency by the norms and routines that dominate the public sphere.

Deliberative structures may have the opposite effect. The CIR exemplified a different kind of participation, one that encourages participants to sort through complex information, engage in respectful discussion with those with whom they disagree, and produce recommendations for voters about statewide initiatives. Because this type of engagement is such an exceptional experience, it likely has a profound impact on those who participate, transforming how people think about themselves as political actors and their potential to influence the political process. In this sense, such experiences may resocialize participants by teaching them a new way of engaging in the political process.

Deliberative structures, which actively include regular citizens in egalitarian decision-making process, instruct participants in the habits and practices of deliberation and may foster empowered civic identities and greater political engagement (see Burkhalter et al., 2002; Gastil, 2004). In this chapter, I look to the existent literature to explore these claims and use the conditions of alienation described in Chapter 2 to provide a comprehensive framework for thinking about the effects of deliberative structures on participants’ cognitions and behaviors.
A Coherent Theoretical Model of Deliberation’s Effects on Participants

Contemporary understandings of the “good citizen” reflect changes in the institutions that provide avenues for civic engagement and shape norms about citizens’ roles in democratic self-governance (Schudson, 1999). In other words, public sphere structures socialize individuals into the habits and practices of citizenship. By interacting through them, individuals learn what it means to be a citizen, and this socialization affects how they understand their role in democracy.

Scholarship on political socialization often focuses on the development of political attitudes and habits for children or young adults, but an expansion of this scholarship into adulthood indicates that one’s life experiences can cause changes to political cognitions and behaviors throughout the adult years (Niemi & Sobieszek, 1977; Sigel, 1989; Steckenrider & Cutler, 1989). Studies on immigrant socialization have been particularly fruitful, finding that adults exposed to new political systems can be resocialized into the political process, transferring previously developed attitudes and behaviors to their new environment but also developing new ones when confronted with different political norms and routines (Hoskin, 1989; White, Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil, & Fournier, 2008).

In other words, both experience and new environment can lead adults to alter their political attitudes and habits as they are resocialized into new political realities. Prolonged exposure to highly professionalized and capitalistic public sphere structures, the kinds detailed in Chapter 2, may have negatively shaped public beliefs and behaviors related to democratic citizenship. Deliberative structures could have the opposite effect. Most work on deliberation’s transformative potential for participants, however, lacks a coherent framework for understanding those effects. When such affects have been theorized and tested, these changes are usually presented as a list of possible affects without much of an articulation as to the range of potential
effects or how those effects may relate to one another (Burkhalter et al., 2002; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Jacobs et al., 2009).

The theoretical model I describe here takes a more methodical approach. In Chapter 2, I introduced a model of public sphere discourse that juxtaposes alienating structures against deliberative ones. This model looks at the conditions that can emanate from such structural arrangements and, because of this, speaks to how such norms and routines impact individuals who interact through them. This model, then, provides a coherent framework for understanding how participation in both alienating and deliberative discussion impacts the cognitions and behaviors of participants.

This chapter explores changes brought about by interacting in alienating and deliberative communication, dividing the practice of public sphere citizenship into five cognitive aspects—internal efficacy, collective identification, deliberative faith, and external efficacy—and three behavioral aspects—communicative, community-based, and institutionalized engagement—that directly correspond to the alienating conditions discussed in Chapter 2. The model presented below explores how communication structures, both alienating and deliberative, affect each of these cognitive and behavioral aspects of democratic citizenship. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the conditions of alienation and their cognitive and behavioral effects as well as how deliberative structures can repair the alienating effects of each condition.

**The Cognitive Impact of Deliberating**

Several studies have looked at the effects of both alienating and deliberative structures on political attitudes and cognitions. In the following section, these disparate findings are parsed before discussing behavioral change.
### Table 4.1

**Cognitive and Behavioral Effects of Alienating and Deliberative Structures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition of alienation</th>
<th>Cognitive aspects</th>
<th>Behavioral aspects</th>
<th>Evidence of cognitive repair</th>
<th>Evidence of behavioral repair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commodification:</strong> Transformation of public opinion into a commodity</td>
<td>Low levels of internal efficacy</td>
<td>Checkbook engagement</td>
<td>Increased internal efficacy</td>
<td>Increased direct personal expression of public opinions; Increased deliberative skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social isolation:</strong> Lack of social capital or networks that cross political affiliation</td>
<td>Lack of community identity; Fear of difference</td>
<td>Low levels of social capital; Selective exposure; Homogenous discussion norms</td>
<td>Increased communal identity; Understanding opposing viewpoints</td>
<td>Increased community-based engagement; Increased heterogeneity in discussion norms and social life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meaninglessness:</strong> False choice and low levels of political knowledge</td>
<td>Low levels of political knowledge/sophistication</td>
<td>Inattention to public affairs; Selective exposure</td>
<td>Increased political knowledge</td>
<td>Increased attention to public affairs; Increased heterogeneity in media intake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normlessness:</strong> Public sphere structures no longer work as a means for democratic empowerment.</td>
<td>Low levels of deliberative faith</td>
<td>Engaging in non-deliberative behavior; Disengagement from the public sphere</td>
<td>Increased deliberative faith</td>
<td>Increased deliberative skills; Increased deliberative engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powerlessness:</strong> Inability to use public sphere structures to influence government decision making</td>
<td>Low levels of external efficacy</td>
<td>Low levels of political engagement</td>
<td>Increased external efficacy</td>
<td>Increased political engagement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Internal Efficacy and Commodification

Because structural conditions of commodification replace the work of the citizen with the work of professionals, commodifying public sphere structures likely reduce citizens’ confidence in their own political competency. In short, with the job of citizens being performed more efficiently and effectively by professionals, individuals may not feel they are capable of performing the task of citizenship; thus, commodifying structures likely reduce individuals’ internal efficacy, or their feelings of political self-confidence (see Niemi, Craig, & Mattei 1991). Commodification, then, prevents citizens from understanding themselves as either capable of self-governance or a vital part of the governing process.

Deliberative public sphere structures should have the opposite effect. Results from experimental work show no global direct effects on internal efficacy, though those in face-to-face deliberations had more situation-specific internal efficacy than those who only voted (Morrell, 2005). Moreover, field studies of National Issues Forums (NIF) found that participation in deliberative education actually had a negative effect on group efficacy, diminishing participants’ confidence the group was capable of performing political tasks (Gastil, 2004). Even so, a survey of archival materials on NIF found many accounts of NIF increasing self-efficacy (Gastil & Dillard, 1999b), and participants in Deliberative Polls have consistently shown increases in internal efficacy (Fishkin, 2009). Finally, participation in a 21st Century Town Meeting has been shown to increase internal efficacy, though not significantly (Nabatchi, 2010), and structured, online deliberation has been shown to increase participants’ feelings of political self-confidence (Min, 2007).
Collective Identity and Social Isolation

Structural conditions that result in isolation likely lead to conditions of cognitive isolation, primarily by limiting the chances to build community bonds and by fostering fear of difference. Declining participation in organizations limits the public’s opportunity to build social trust with one another (Putnam, 2000), limiting their willingness to engage in communication with outside groups and form a sense of collective identity. In addition, like-minded discussion, proliferated through both media and organizational structures catering exclusively to enclaves, can increase extremism and group homogeneity, encouraging polarization and harming the ability for heterogeneous groups to identify common interests (Sunstein, 2007). In short, these structures likely result in cognitive isolation, limiting the public’s ability to connect with one another and see each other as co-members of a community.

Deliberative structures, however, provide opportunities to overcome these divides. Normative deliberative theory suggests that such events should generate spaces that allow individuals from different groups to understand their common concerns as well as the viewpoints of those different from themselves (see Benhabib, 1996; also Dahlberg, 2005). The results of studies on the effects of deliberation on communal identity, however, are mixed. A survey of jurors found that whereas feelings of being treated with respect during jury service predicted trust in fellow citizens, neither participation in a more deliberative discussion nor satisfaction with the verdict caused jurors to move from more individualistic to more communal identities (Gastil, Black, Deess, & Leighter, 2008). Forums that more closely structure the rules and procedures of discussion, though, may be better suited to creating a sense of communal identity. An initial review of the ACP found that by the end of the process participants began to form a shared identity with one another, crossing cultural and geographical divides despite Australia’s
heterogeneous makeup and traditional ambivalence toward a national identity (Hartz-Karp, Anderson, Gastil, & Felicetti, 2010; see also Felicetti, Gastil, Hartz-Karp, & Carson, 2012).

**Knowledge, Opinion Change, and Meaninglessness**

Scholars generally measure meaninglessness as political “knowledge” and “sophistication” (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1987; Zaller, 1992)—the former generally referring to citizens’ knowledge of governing institutions, people who act within those institutions, and contemporary political issues, and the latter generally measured as the coherence between citizens’ opinions on various issues, as judged against the left/right ideologies that dominate U.S. politics. Although measures of cognitive meaninglessness may be an unfair evaluation of citizens’ competence for self-governance (see Lupia, 2006 for a refutation of these indicators as measures of competency), the public’s generally poor performances on these measures is often used to delegitimize their role in the democratic process (see Converse, 1964; Lippmann, 1922; Luskin, 1987; Popkin, 1994; Schudson, 1999; Zaller, 1992). According to this account, expressions of public opinion on these issues by these citizens are meaningless because the general public does not understand the consequences of their choices.

This problem is frustrated when individuals are not only uninformed, they are misinformed, holding factually inaccurate information (Kuklinski et al., 2000). Those who pay attention to more extremist and enclave-based media outlets hold higher levels of misinformation (Hofstetter et al., 1999), suggesting that enclave-based communication practices can not only proliferate misinformation, they can prevent individuals from achieving enlightened understanding.

In contrast to structures that produce meaninglessness, several scholars have noted the capacity for deliberative events to increase participants’ political knowledge and sophistication
and to foster enlightened opinions (Fishkin, 1995; Gastil, 2006; Gastil & Dillard, 1999a). Numerous studies of the Deliberative Poll have found that partaking in the event led to increased knowledge and often causes participants to develop new and different opinions on the issues in question (Fishkin, 1995, 1997, 2009). And although these events tend to focus on participants learning new information, rather than partaking in sustained discussion with one another, studies of deliberative forums oriented more toward discussion show similar results. For example, a study of NIF participants indicated that participation can increase the schematic integration of related beliefs and differentiation between opposing beliefs (along the left-right continuum) and increase opinion certainty (Gastil & Dillard, 1999a). And although studying less formalized communication, Gastil (2006) finds that, for the most part, balanced discussion in conversation and meetings leads to greater knowledge.

**Deliberative Faith and Normlessness**

When individuals lose their faith in deliberation as a viable means for deciding on community issues, they are likely recognizing the normlessness within the public sphere. When public sphere discussion is dominated by alienating structures, citizens may begin to lose faith that communication can serve any purpose other than strategic manipulation. In short, they begin to lose faith in the possibility of deliberation. Though this concept has not received much scholarly attention, the connection between alienating structures and faith in the deliberative process is worth exploring. When members of a community recognize that professionals working within public spheres routinely shut them out of the conversation, peddle opinions for profit, disseminate misinformation, and fragment community bonds, they may begin to lose faith in the prospect of deliberative communication.
Participating in a deliberative process, however, should counteract the effects of alienating public sphere structures. Deliberative participation has been shown to increase individuals’ faith in deliberation as a way of solving public problems. Through participation, participants build deliberative skills and habits and thus develop their ability to reach common ground across difference (Burkhalter et al., 2002, Nabatchi, 2010). Because of this, deliberation likely has a self-reinforcing effect, increasing participants’ willingness to engage in deliberation in the future (Burkhalter et al., 2002) and, thus, their faith in the deliberative process. Recent work testifies to this. A study of jurors found that deliberative talk led to trust in juries (Gastil et al., 2008), indicating that participating in deliberation led members of the public to place their faith in deliberation as a means for making important political decisions.

**External Efficacy and Powerlessness**

Scholars often define cognitive feelings of powerlessness as low external efficacy (Morrell, 2003; Niemi et al., 1991). External efficacy deals with people’s perceived system responsiveness, or their belief that governing officials care about them and that there are legal ways to influence governing decisions (Niemi et al., 1991). Citizens with low levels of external efficacy do not feel that they have a say in government decisions and think that their representatives do not care about their opinions (Niemi et al., 1991). In other words, cognitive powerlessness refers to an individual’s awareness of her structural powerlessness; it is “an individual’s feeling that he [sic] cannot affect the actions of government” (Finifter, 1979, p. 390). When individuals get pushed out of public sphere communication through top-down structures that provide little opportunity for them to provide meaningful or effective input in governmental decision-making, they likely begin to lose faith in the political system as a means of democratic government.
Participating in deliberation, however, should have a positive effect on individuals’ political faith, increasing their sense that participating in government can be efficacious. Deliberative participation often positively affects individuals’ external efficacy, or perceived system responsiveness (Niemi et al., 1991). Deliberation can heighten citizens’ sense that they have a say in government decisions and that their representatives care about their opinions. Longitudinal analysis of participants in an AmericaSpeaks 21st Century Town Meeting and studies of Deliberative Poll participants have found that the events significantly increased panelists’ sense of external efficacy (Fishkin, 2009, p. 141; Nabatchi, 2010). In addition, survey data indicates that discursive participation, either face-to-face or online, correlated with higher levels of general efficacy and participation in face-to-face discussions correlated to higher levels of trust in the government (Jacobs et al., 2009). A survey of jurors supports these findings; jurors that were satisfied with the verdict and engaged in deliberation had greater trust in judges and higher levels of perceived system responsiveness (Gastil et al., 2008, 2010).

**The Behavioral Impact of Deliberating**

As Chapter 2 illustrated, public sphere structures that produce conditions of commodification and isolation tend to prevent individuals from engaging in political activities by either replacing citizens with professionals or preventing them from interacting with one another. In addition, because they likely produce cognitive conditions of alienation, such as low levels of political information and sophistication or faith in themselves, politics, deliberation, and one another, alienating structures likely further diminish people’s engagement. The literature on the effects of political distrust attest to the cyclical problems associated with this type of cynicism. Several scholars have documented the lack of trust or confidence citizens hold for governing institutions and politicians (Bennett, 1998; Ladd, 1999; Levi, 1998) the media (Bennett, 1998;
Cook & Gronke, 2001), and other citizens (Levi, 1998; Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow, 2002), as well as the connections between lack of trust and declines in civic participation (Putnam, 2000). Although a democracy necessitates some level of distrust to keep governing officials in check, severe cynicism can be detrimental to society. Deep cynicism may result in anomie, as people doubt the validity of the institutions that structure society and the validity of democracy as a desirable political ideal (Gastil, 2000b; Levi, 1998).

Because deliberation likely increases participants’ faith in themselves, the political process, and other citizens, it should reverse these trends. Deliberation should spur not only deliberative engagement (Jacobs et al., 2009, p. 87) but other forms of political engagement, given the general association between such variables (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). Though one study found that heterogeneous communicative engagement leads to declines in participation (Mutz, 2006), others have found links between deliberative participation and increased political participation (Gastil et al., 2010; Jacobs et al., 2009).

Unfortunately, types of engagement are not as easily distinguished from one another as political cognitions, and, as discussed previously, conditions of alienation likely lead to decreases in multiple types of engagement as lay citizens are distance from their ability to utilize media and organizational structures to participate in public sphere discourse. Having already detailed how alienating structures decrease the public’s opportunity for political engagement, I use the following section to break political participation into three gross types of engagement—communicative, community-based, and institutionalized—exploring how deliberative participation can counteract the low levels of engagement associated with conditions of structural alienation.
**Communicative Engagement**

Theory holds that taking part in structured deliberation should increase participants’ future willingness to engage in political discussion and other deliberative public acts (Burkhalter et al., 2002; Fung & Wright, 2003). After all, participating in deliberation allows individuals to practice and refine their relevant skills (Burkhalter et al., 2002; Fung & Wright, 2003). Thus, field studies of NIF sessions found that participation resulted in greater ideological and demographic diversity in people’s conversation networks and less dominance in their conversational behavior (Gastil, 2004), and both online and face-to-face deliberation can increase individuals’ willingness to participate in future deliberative events (Baek, Wojcieszak, & Delli Carpini, 2011). Even less formalized political discussion and media use can lead to more thoughtful reflection and forum participation in the future (McLeod et al., 1999; Moy & Gastil, 2006).

**Community-based Engagement**

Beyond increased communicative engagement, training in deliberative skills along with an increased sense of community may spur local, organizational involvement, such as attending meetings or volunteering. In these community-based and often less controlled and strategic activities (see Gastil & Xenos, 2010), participants may have more opportunity to practice their deliberative skills than they would in hierarchical, electoral institutions. Although the link between deliberation and community-based engagement has not been thoroughly sorted out, deliberation may increase this type of engagement. For example, discursive participation correlated to higher levels of engagement in community service (Jacobs et al., 2009), and face-to-face, and to some extent online, deliberation has led participants to engage in follow-up action related to the issue under discussion (Baek et al., 2011).
Institutional Engagement

Perhaps the hardest type of behavioral change for participants to undergo is to their electoral institutional engagement. This requires changes to not only private behaviors, such as interpersonal conversations and media use, or changes in how one engages with their local community, but changes to how they engage with the larger political process. Even so, deliberative participation has been linked to increases in these forms of engagement. Increased levels of discursive participation correlate with higher levels of electoral participation (Jacobs et al., 2009), and citizens who served on a jury that deliberated were more likely to vote in subsequent elections than were those jurors who deadlocked, served as alternates, or were dismissed after being empanelled, i.e., due to a mistrial (Gastil et al., 2010). Studies of online engagement, however, have not been as promising. Recent work suggests that online discursive participation does not necessarily lead to greater engagement (Jacobs et al., 2009), whereas more formal forms of online deliberative engagement have produced a desire for further participation (Min, 2007).

Conclusion

In the above discussion, I have tried to create a coherent framework for understanding the range of changes that participation in alienating and deliberative structures can cause. Public sphere structures limit and constrain the possibilities for the practice of civic life. This means that they likely alter both political cognitions and behaviors. While alienating structures prevent lay citizens from partaking in the production and expression of public opinion and, subsequently, dampen citizens’ knowledge and faith in themselves, one another, and the political process, deliberative structures can have the opposite effect. This chapter has focused on how deliberative public events can resocialize participants by reversing the cognitive and behavioral trends
associated with alienation. Such structures can boost citizens’ competence and confidence and foster further political engagement.

The next two chapters test and expand on these claims. In Chapter 5, I turn to two specific deliberative events, the Oregon CIR, which serves as the primary case study for this dissertation, and the Australian Citizens’ Parliament to test some of the claims presented in this chapter. Here, I look specifically at how the CIR and ACP affected the attitudes and actions described above. Chapter 6 then investigates how far these effects can reach. In that chapter, I explore the idea that the presence of minipublics connected to macro-level discourse can alter the attitudes of the wider community in which it operates. For that, I again investigate the CIR, this time to see how awareness of the event or use of its Citizens’ Statements affected the Oregon electorates’ feelings about themselves, the government, and the viability of deliberation as a decision-making tool.
Chapter 5

Civic (Re)Socialization: The Educative Effects of Deliberative Participation

In Chapter 2, I theorized that structures that push lay citizens out of the public sphere likely discourage the expression and production of public opinion and engender the feeling that engagement is pointless. These structures likely produce low levels of faith in the political and deliberative processes as well as low-levels of political self-confidence, political knowledge, and communal identity. As discussed in the previous chapter, however, deliberative public sphere structures may serve as a remedy by resocializing participants into a new civic identity—one that is politically efficacious and encourages engagement in public sphere discourse. Instances like the Citizens’ Initiative Review, described in Chapter 3, can meet a high standard of deliberation, and it is possible that they could substantially change how their participants subsequently think, feel, and act in public life.

In addition to the lack of a coherent framework for understanding such effects, however, several methodological limitations foreshorten our knowledge of the breadth and extent of such effects. Research often focusses more on deliberative decision making than on understanding the effects of deliberation on participants’ cognitions and behaviors (Pincock, 2012). Studies that do address participant effects tend to focus on discrete aspects of attitudinal or behavioral change within singular contexts. Further, most research looks exclusively at face-to-face deliberation, limiting our understanding of the transformative potential of online deliberation, and is short-term in scope, assessing changes to participants soon after the deliberative events take place. This obscures the range of attitudinal and behavioral changes as well as how these changes may vary among contexts and over time. Also, most studies of deliberative effects are exclusively
quantitative and focus on concepts already established in the theoretical literature, potentially missing key effects not hypothesized by the researcher. Finally, though longitudinal deliberation studies showing change in scale responses have shown changes in response scale patterns (e.g., Gastil et al., 2010), researchers have not considered participants’ subjective experience of change in these settings.

That said, scholars have pinpointed several potential effects of deliberative participation. As I noted in the previous chapter, deliberative participation can lead to increases in political knowledge, efficacy, trust in one another and the government, and political and civic engagement (Fishkin, 2009; Gastil et al., 2010; Gastil & Dillard, 1999b; Morrell, 2005; Nabatchi, 2010). Still, some doubt remains about the beneficial effects of participation, particularly as several studies have found either few deliberative effects or decreases in measures such as group efficacy and political engagement (Gastil, 2004; Mutz, 2006). In short, scholars still do not have a clear understanding of the effects of participating in deliberative forums.

Moreover, a growing literature on online forums suggests that computer-mediated deliberation can have benefits similar to those stemming from face-to-face interaction (Fishkin, 2008; Grönlund, Strandberg, & Himmelroos, 2009; Wright & Street, 2007). Online processes can foster larger-scale deliberation, owing both to the efficiency of online social networking and the logistical ease and cost effectiveness of online deliberative formats (e.g., Price & Capella, 2002), but scholarship rarely asks whether these events can produce the same participant benefits as face-to-face forums.

To address these questions, in this chapter I use both quantitative and qualitative self-report measures to record participants’ sense of change in response to two highly structured deliberative forums—the 2009 Australian Citizens’ Parliament and the 2010 Oregon Citizens’
Initiative Review from Chapter 3. These survey measures were taken both immediately after the events occurred and then a year later and reveal how two highly deliberative, consequential public forums affected the short- and long-term cognitions and behaviors of participants on two different continents.

Chapter 4 provided a more detailed breakdown of potential cognitive and behavioral impacts, but herein, I focus on one particular kind of effect—participants’ subjective experience of transformation. This sense of change is often cited as an important purpose of convening a wide range of deliberative events (Lukensmeyer, Goldman, & Brigham, 2005; Scully & McCoy, 2005). Historical and qualitative field studies have documented individuals who said that their engagement in group decision making and deliberation might have changed their sense of themselves as citizens (Evans & Boyte, 1992; Gastil & Dillard, 1999b; Mansbridge, 1980; Polletta, 2002). Focusing on this aspect of change leads me to the following summary hypotheses, which this chapter will test:

**Hypothesis 1:** In both the short-term and up to a year later, participants in structured face-to-face or online deliberative events will attribute to their experience (a) opinion change and increases in their political knowledge (b) faith in deliberation, (c) internal efficacy, (d) external efficacy, and (e) identification with larger publics.

**Hypothesis 2:** In both the short-term and up to a year later, participants in structured face-to-face or online deliberative events will attribute to their experience increases in their (a) communicative public engagement, (b) community-based political participation, and (c) institutionalized electoral participation.

**Research Settings and Rationale**

For this study, I closely examine participants’ sense of attitudinal and behavioral change
in response to the 2009 Australian Citizens’ Parliament (ACP) and the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR). Principally, this study focuses on participants’ changing sense of self shortly and long after their events concluded via closed- and open-ended survey questions.

Before discussing the data in detail, however, I begin by describing the ACP (having already provided an extended discussion of the CIR in Chapter 3) and explaining the rationale for the use of the ACP and CIR as cases for investigating these effects.

**The Australian Citizens’ Parliament**

The ACP brought together a stratified cross-section of Australian citizens to discuss large-scale policy proposals for Australia’s national government (Dryzek, 2009; Hartz-Karp & Carson, 2009). The ACP, based on a variety of processes, including the 21st Century Town Meeting model developed by AmericaSpeaks (Lukensmeyer et al., 2005), gathered one member of each federal electorate to deliberate about and develop proposals related to the following question “How can Australia’s political system be strengthened to serve us better?” (New Democracy, 2009). Participants at the Main Meeting were selected through stratified random sampling, ensuring representativeness in terms of age, gender, and education and including several indigenous participants.

Initially, the 150 Parliamentarians went to regional meetings where they learned about the ACP and were encouraged to think about and discuss the central question. These 150 Parliamentarians, and interested citizens who expressed a desire to participate but were not selected for the Main Meeting, were invited to partake in an Online Parliament, which allowed small teams of users to create and refine proposals for improving Australia’s government. Proposals developed at the regional meetings and through the Online Parliament set the agenda for the Main Meeting. For four days in February 2009, Parliamentarians met for the Main
Meeting at the Old Parliament House in Canberra, the Australian national capital. At the meeting, Parliamentarians were divided into 24 tables, each with a volunteer facilitator, where they discussed the previously constructed proposals and developed and deliberated about new ones. These small group deliberations were synthesized and organized through several mechanisms. At the end of the week, the participants had constructed and voted on a set of recommendations that they presented in the Australian House Chamber. On behalf of the government, the ACP’s final report was received by the Prime Minister’s Parliamentary Secretary Anthony Byrne.

**Rationale**

In part because participants must think deliberative processes work and have a purpose in order to gain the civic benefits associated with participation (Stromer-Galley & Muhlberger, 2009), carefully designed forums conducted in real-world settings are likely the best means to answer questions related to cognitive and behavioral changes (Fung, 2003; Levine, Fung, & Gastil, 2005). The CIR and the ACP are both highly controlled processes, utilizing representative samples of citizens discussing problems within their own communities and relying on skilled moderators. The participants are both representative of the wider public and likely more invested in the process. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, a formal evaluation of the CIR found that the event either met or exceeded deliberative standards. Although I do not provide in this dissertation a comparable, formal evaluation of the ACP, a team of scholars has assessed it and found it to have been highly deliberative (see Carson, Gastil, Hartz-Karp, & Lubensky, in press); its structure shared many of the elements that made the CIR a success, and analyses of transcripts and the post-ACP surveys show that both observers and participants themselves found the process to be deliberative.
Methods

This study relies principally on participant surveys, augmented by transcript analysis and direct observation. Though I will integrate these methodological approaches in the analyses, I distinguish them below to provide the details of each.

Survey Participants and Schedule

The principal method for assessing subjective change was a series of questionnaires distributed to the ACP and CIR panelists. Below, I provide a brief description of each instrument used, and then turn to the types of effects these instruments were designed to measure. (For details about each survey, see Appendix B.)

ACP preliminary questionnaire. Prior to participating in the ACP, the citizen panelists (or “Parliamentarians”) completed a pre-deliberation survey constructed and distributed by Australian National University and Practical Evolution (a civic not-for profit involved in the project) and conducted between November 2008 and January 2009. Because of some changes to the final makeup of the ACP, the pre-deliberation questionnaire had a 61 percent response rate. (All rates in this study were calculated using AAPOR’s RR2 metric.) Because these questionnaires were constructed prior to the conception of this project, they do not contain all of the efficacy and engagement questions included in the CIR instruments but do serve as a template for constructing the CIR questionnaires and surveys.

ACP follow-up survey. The ACP follow-up surveys were distributed to the 150 Parliamentarians one year after the completion of the ACP and had a 77 percent response rate. The surveys were via a collaboration of ACP researchers and distributed by New Democracy (via mail in Australia) and Practical Evolution (via web-based survey). They repeated a few questions from the preliminary survey, but their primary purpose was to present new items that
measured participants’ self-reported changes in their political engagement and efficacy as a result of their ACP experience.

A follow-up was also conducted with the 175 individuals who had a userid in the Online Parliament but did not serve as Parliamentarians at the face-to-face meetings. The substantially lower response rate for this survey was the first sign that it was a much less meaningful experience. Only 63 replies came back, for a response rate of 36 percent. That rate would improve only modestly if one removed the handful of non-working email addresses. Moreover, in the Online Parliament process, a majority (62 percent) did not post comments during discussion, reflected in the fact that 18 respondents said that they “knew about but did not participate actively in the Online Parliament,” and one “did not remember” the event. Those 19 responses to that opening question led to a skip to the end of the survey since the focal question was the impact of active participation in deliberation.

**CIR daily and end-of-week questionnaires.** Questionnaires were distributed to the CIR panelists at the close of each day’s panel deliberation. Every participant completed all of those questionnaires, resulting in a 100 percent response rate. While the questionnaires primarily asked the panelists to evaluate the process, they also contained space for open-ended comments, with the final day’s questionnaire asking them to judge whether or not they believed the CIR experience had changed them.

**CIR short-term and year-later follow-up surveys.** A short-term follow up survey of CIR panelists was conducted online and over the phone by undergraduate research assistants and myself that allowed the panelists to provide information about their cognitions and behaviors since participating. The study was conducted from late October to early November 2010, a few months after the panels completed and right before the election concerning the initiatives voted
on by the panelists. The short-term survey had a 79 percent response rate and included a number of open-ended questions related to changes in panelists’ cognitions and behaviors. A similar survey was conducted online, over the phone, and through the mail a year later, from late October to early December 2011, and had a 77 percent response rate.

**Statistical power.** It should be apparent that these samples vary considerably in size and, consequently, in statistical power (Cohen, 1988). The main ACP survey has enough power to detect moderate effect sizes, and the CIR and ACP Online Parliament surveys have roughly 38 respondents. The latter samples are sufficient for detecting large effect sizes, but when they yield non-significance, caution must be used when inferring the absence of effects in the larger population.

**Survey Measures**

Having provided an overview of the questionnaires and respondents, the next section turns to the specific items contained in them. Below, I discuss how the different cognitive and behavioral effects are measured in these instruments, and Table 5.1 provides an overview of how these measures are used across instruments.

**Attitudinal changes.** The effects of participation on panelists’ knowledge were only measured for the CIR. To measure how the CIR may have changed participants’ knowledge, I compared the participants’ general and issue specific knowledge to that of the wider population. In the survey delivered prior to the November election, participants were asked six questions related to their general political knowledge about state and national government and a number of fact questions relevant to each initiative (12 for Measure 73 and 10 for Measure 74). (For a complete list of survey questions see Appendix C.) A statewide rolling cross-section survey of
Table 5.1

*Quantitative Measures of Cognitive and Behavioral Change to Panelists by Instrument*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
<th>Distributed</th>
<th>Measures of Cognitive Change</th>
<th>Measures of Behavioral Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACP Instruments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP preliminary</td>
<td>1-2 months prior to deliberation</td>
<td>Deliberative faith</td>
<td>Communicative engagement;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>questionnaire</td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective identity</td>
<td>Community-based engagement;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Institutionalized engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP follow-up</td>
<td>12 months after deliberation</td>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
<td>Communicative engagement;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>survey</td>
<td></td>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td>Community-based engagement;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deliberative faith</td>
<td>Institutionalized engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIR Instruments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIR questionnaires</td>
<td>End of each day of deliberation</td>
<td>Opinion change</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIR follow-up</td>
<td>2 months after deliberation and 1</td>
<td>Issue-specific knowledge</td>
<td>Communicative engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>survey</td>
<td>week before the election</td>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
<td>Community-based engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td>Institutionalized engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Deliberative faith</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective identity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Oregon voters conducted between August and November 2010 (response rate = 9 percent, \(N = 1,991\)) asked respondents these same questions, offering an opportunity to compare the knowledge of CIR participants with those of the general public. (For details pertinent to this rolling cross section, see Appendix D.)

The general political knowledge items were converted to a scale for general political knowledge, with participants receiving 1 for a correct answer and zero for an incorrect answer, with “don’t know” scored as incorrect. These scores were then added to create a mean general
knowledge scale, though this scale had a somewhat low level of reliability ($\alpha = .568$; 0-1 scale; $M = .72$, $SD = .22$). For each issue-specific item, participants again received a 1 for a correct answer and a zero for an incorrect answer, with “don’t know” scored as incorrect, and these scores were averaged to produce a scale measure of issue-specific knowledge for Measure 73 ($\alpha = .489$; 0-1 scale; $M = .38$, $SD = .19$) and Measure 74 ($\alpha = .410$; 0-1 scale; $M = .42$, $SD = .19$), though again, these measures had low levels of reliability.

In measuring opinion change, the team of researchers working on this project was wary of priming participants to stick to an opinion that they had provided prior to participation. On the end of week evaluation, however, we asked participants to indicate their opinion prior to participation and their opinion post participation. Participants indicated whether they strongly opposed (1), opposed, supported, strongly supported (5), or where undecided on the measure in question (prior position Measure 73, $M = 2.96$, $SD = .90$; Measure 74, $M = 2.87$, $SD = .87$; end-of-week position Measure 73, $M = 1.46$, $SD = .93$; Measure 74, $M = 3.09$, $SD = 1.76$). In addition, we asked participants to indicate which day they had made their decision from Monday (1) to Friday (5) ($M = 4.09$, $SD = .95$), an indicator of whether or not they had used the deliberations to make up their mind.

Appendix C provides complete sets of items, but the basic structure of most of the remaining attitudinal questions was the following preface: “Please tell us whether you believe that participating in the [CIR or ACP] has led you to agree less or more with the following statements.” For attitude statements, respondents could say the event caused them to “agree less” (1), led them to “agree more” (3), or “did not change” their beliefs one way or the other. Because these measures were asked at different times to different samples, Table 5.2 provides descriptive
statistics for each measure of attitudinal change, including the means, standard deviations, and number of valid responses for each.

To measure changes in deliberative faith, the follow-up surveys asked ACP and CIR participants if they had changed their beliefs about the effectiveness of deliberative discussion. Participants indicated whether they agreed more or less with the following statements: “The first step in solving our common problems is to discuss them together,” and “Even people who strongly disagree can make sound decisions if they sit down and talk.”

For all of these attitudinal measures, I chose to examine responses at the granular level—as individual items rather than as combined scales. This permitted me to observe any within-scale differences in results that might raise useful questions for future research.

In addition, the ACP pre and post surveys asked participants whether they “believe that individual leaders make better decisions than groups like committees.” Respondents responded along a five point scale from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). Because deliberating should cause participants to have more faith in group decision making, I expected participants to move toward a “disagree” answer after participating in the deliberation.

Standard measures of internal efficacy (Craig et al., 1990; Niemi et al., 1991; Morrell, 2003) were used to assess changes to participants’ sense of political self-confidence. These questions were only included in the follow-up surveys, and panelists were asked if participating in the forum had caused them to agree more or less or had not changed their sense of internal efficacy along three measures: feeling more informed about politics and government than most, having a pretty good understanding of the issues facing the country, and feeling well-qualified to participate in politics.
Table 5.2

*Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Valid Cases for Attitudinal Variables by Sample*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>CIR Participants</th>
<th>ACP Face-to-Face and Online Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deliberative Faith</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first step in solving problems is to discuss them. (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.68 .48 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first step in solving problems is to discuss them. (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.65 .48 37 2.68</td>
<td>.79 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who disagree can make decisions if they talk. (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.78 .42 36</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who disagree can make decisions if they talk. (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.70 .52 37 2.67</td>
<td>.78 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from different parties can have civil, respectful conversations. (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.78 .42 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from different parties can have civil, respectful conversations. (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.73 .45 37 2.58</td>
<td>.80 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Efficacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more informed about politics/government than most. (2-3M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.38 .68 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more informed about politics/government than most. (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.35 .63 37 2.22</td>
<td>.94 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a pretty good understanding of the issues facing this country. (2-3M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.24 .50 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a pretty good understanding of the issues facing this country. (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.38 .59 37 2.41</td>
<td>.91 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics. (2-3M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.32 .53 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics. (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.43 .50 37 1.78</td>
<td>.93 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Efficacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People have the final say, no matter who is in office. (2-3M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.03 .55 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People have the final say, no matter who is in office. (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.97 .65 36 1.75</td>
<td>.82 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People like me don’t have any say about what government does. (2-3M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.58 .60 36</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People like me don’t have any say about what government does. (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>1.47 .70 36 1.81</td>
<td>.66 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are many legal ways to influence</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.54 .56 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are many legal ways to influence government. (YL)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>CIR Participants</th>
<th>ACP Face-to-Face and Online Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>government. (2-3M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.76 .44 37</td>
<td>2.37 .92 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are many legal ways to influence government.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.22 .42 37</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being an Oregonian is important to my identity.</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.24 .60 37</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-3 M)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being an Oregonian is important to my identity.</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.24 .60 37</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(YL)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “2-3M” = Survey completed 2-3 months after participation (CIR only); “YL” = Survey completed a year after participation.

Standard external efficacy scales (see Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Niemi et al., 1991; Morrell, 2003) were used to measures participants’ changing attitudes toward government. On the follow-up surveys for both the CIR and ACP, panelists were asked if participating in the forum had caused them to agree more or less or had not changed their sense of government responsiveness along three measures: that people have the final say no matter who was in office, the people like them don’t have any say about what government does, and that there are many legal ways to influence government.

The CIR follow-up surveys also contained an item asking whether participation in the event changed their sense that “being an Oregonian is important to my identity,” again along a three point scale from “agree less” (1) to “agree more” (3). In addition, ACP & CIR panelists were asked an open-ended question about whether participating in the process had caused them to change how they think about other citizens. A previous study has already assessed changes to ACP participants’ collective identity (Hartz-Karp et al., 2010) and will be discussed in the results section.

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3 This measure was reverse coded to match the direction of the other two external efficacy items.
Behavioral changes. Like with some of the cognitive measures, behavioral changes were measured slightly differently for the ACP and the CIR. Both the ACP and CIR follow-up surveys contained items drawn from traditional scales of political engagement (Verba et al., 1995). Using the same basic structure as the self-reported attitude change items, these eight post-deliberation-only behavioral questions asked if “attending the [ACP or CIR] has caused you to change the frequency with which you do the following activities.” Respondents could say the event led them to do the activity “less frequently” (1), caused them to engage in it “more frequently” (3), or “did not change” its frequency (2). Within this item structure, CIR and ACP participants were asked four questions related to communicative engagement, two related to community-based engagement, and two-related to institutionalized electoral engagement. Like with the attitudinal items, ACP participants were asked a few behavioral items in both the pre- and post-deliberation surveys that were not asked of the CIR participants. Table 5.3 provides a complete list of behavioral variables and descriptive statistics for each measure.

To measure changes to communicative engagement panelists were asked if they paid more or less attention to public affairs while reading the newspaper and while watching TV and whether they engaged more or less often in discussions in which they “learn about political issues or candidate” or talked “to other people to show them why they should vote.” On both the pre- and post-deliberation survey, ACP panelists additionally responded to two questions along a five point scale from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5) regarding their behavior in political discussions. In particular, panelists were asked if their “friends and family know [their] political views” and whether they felt “compelled to defend [their] political views.” Because deliberation compels individuals to voice their opinions and learn from those holding opposing viewpoints (Gastil, 2008), and because participating in deliberation should reinforce deliberative
Table 5.3

Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Valid Cases for Behavioral Variables by Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>CIR Participants</th>
<th>ACP Face-to-Face and Online Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communicative Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking to people to learn about an issue or a candidate (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.57 .50 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking to people to learn about an issue or a candidate (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.59 .50 37</td>
<td>2.01 .99 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking to others about voting choices (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.54 .51 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking to others about voting choices (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.38 .49 37</td>
<td>1.39 .78 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying attention to news while watching TV (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.43 .50 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying attention to news while watching TV (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.57 .50 37</td>
<td>2.19 .98 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying attention to news while reading the newspaper (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.47 .51 36</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying attention to news while reading the newspaper (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.54 .51 37</td>
<td>2.36 .93 114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrote a letter to the editor in the past year (YL)</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
<td>1.52 .78 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends and family know my political views. (PD)</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
<td>3.73 1.00 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends and family know my political views. (YL)</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
<td>3.96 .77 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel compelled to defend political views (PD)</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
<td>3.20 1.04 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel compelled to defend political views (YL)</td>
<td>1-5</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
<td>3.46 .95 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community-Based Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarily working in your local community (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.24 .44 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarily working in your local community (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.30 .46 37</td>
<td>114 1.40 .80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussing local affairs with other community members (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.54 .51 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussing local affairs with other community members (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.27 .45 37</td>
<td>114 1.98 .99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined an advocacy or activist organization (YL)</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
<td>1.17 .50 115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalized Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to political meetings, demonstrations, fund raising dinners (2-3 M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.11 .39 37</td>
<td>--- --- ---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CIR and ACP panelists were also asked two questions related to community-based engagement along a three point scale from engaged in that activity less (1) to engaged in that activity more (3). Specifically, panelists were asked if they had changed the frequency with which they volunteered to work or co-operate “with others in [their] local community to try to solve some of the community’s problems” or the frequency with which they discussed “local community affairs with other members of [their] community.” In their year-later survey, ACP panelists were also asked if they had joined an advocacy or activist organization within the past year.

Finally, CIR and ACP panelists were asked two questions regarding institutionalized electoral engagement along the three point scale from engaged less (1) to engaged more (3). Panelists were asked if they had changed the frequency with which they go “to political meetings, demonstrations, fund raising dinners, or things like that” and with which they do “volunteer work for a party, candidate, or campaign.” In the year-later survey, ACP panelists were also asked if they had joined a political party within the year since their deliberations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>CIR Participants</th>
<th>ACP Face-to-Face and Online Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to political meetings, demonstrations, fund raising dinners (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering for parties or candidates (2-3M)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering for parties or candidates (YL)</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joined a party in the past year (YL)</td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “PD” = Survey completed prior to deliberation (ACP only); “2-3M” = Survey completed 2-3 months after participation (CIR only); “YL” = Survey completed a year after participation.
Transcript Analysis and Observation

Transcripts of the events and participants’ answers to questions posed by the researchers complemented the quantitative data. I led a team of undergraduate researchers in open-ended coding with “constant comparison” (Glaser, 1965) to identify key themes and commonalities. We paid particular attention to specific parts of the process—roundtable discussion on Day 4 of the ACP and a large group discussion on Day 5 of the CIR—wherein participants were specifically asked to reflect on their experience. Whereas these self-reports delivered during the event may not be indicative of either actual behavioral changes or longer-term effects, they indicate changes to the participants’ understanding of themselves and other citizens. In addition, a fellow member of the research team was present during the entirety of the ACP, and other members of the research team and I observed both full weeks of the CIR. Members of the research teams closely observed the discussions, took extensive notes, and routinely compared observations throughout each day. After the event, these notes were compiled and reviewed in developing this chapter.

Results

For participants’ quantitative survey responses, I used inferential statistics appropriate to each of the survey items. Most results employed a binomial nonparametric test, measuring the likelihood that participants would agree more or less with statements regarding their attitudes and behaviors after their deliberative experience. This is a “coin flipping” test to see if one result (positive change) is more common than its opposite (negative change), with every “no change” response reducing the sample size of the positive versus negative comparison. For those items asked before and after the ACP, I used paired-sample t-test comparisons to see if the average response changed from one survey period to the next.
Hypothesis 1: Reported Cognitive Changes

Regarding the cognitive change hypothesis, the results in Tables 5.4 through 5.6 show that those who participated in face-to-face deliberation at the ACP and CIR attributed to that experience significant positive changes in the full range of civic cognitions in this study. Participants’ reported opinion change and increases in their issue-specific knowledge, internal and external efficacy, their faith in deliberation, and their sense of collective identity, though the latter was only measured for the CIR.

Those who participated only in the ACP’s Online Parliament, however, attributed relatively few attitude changes to their deliberative experience. This difference does not appear due to sample size, as the CIR has a comparable sample yet yields significance levels resembling the face-to-face ACP. Moreover, as discussed below, one of the Online Parliament’s few significant attitude changes does not even match the direction of the ACP and CIR’s perceived effects.

Knowledge and opinion. Looking first to knowledge and opinion change, CIR participants had significantly higher levels of issue specific knowledge when compared to the general public and made substantial shifts in their opinions over the span of their deliberations. Below, I compare CIR participants’ knowledge to the general public’s both before October, when the electorate had likely been exposed to a limited amount of initiative-specific information, and October and later, when the electorate were more likely to be exposed to campaign and media messages regarding the initiatives.

As shown in Table 5.4, CIR participants for both weeks were not likely to have higher levels of general political knowledge than the wider population. Measure 73 participants ($M = .66$, $SD = 0.25$) and MSR 74 participants ($M = .64$, $SD = 0.17$) had similar levels of general
political knowledge as the electorate before October \( (M = .73, SD = 0.23) \) and after October \( (M = .70, SD = 0.24) \). Panelists for both weeks, however, had higher levels of issue-specific knowledge about the measures on which they deliberated (MSR 73 panelists’ MSR 73 knowledge, \( M = .70, SD = .12 \); MSR 74 panelists’ MSR 74 knowledge, \( M = .71, SD = .14 \)) than the general public, who had comparatively low levels of issue-specific knowledge both before October (MSR 73 knowledge \( M = .37, SD = .19 \); MSR 74 knowledge, \( M = .42, SD = .19 \)) and after October when they were more likely to have been exposed to campaign and media messages about the initiatives (MSR 73 knowledge, \( M = .38, SD = .18 \); MSR 74 knowledge, \( M = .43, SD = .19 \)).

Table 5.4

**General Political and Initiative-Specific Knowledge for CIR Participants and the Oregon Electorate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>General Political Knowledge</th>
<th>Measure 73 Knowledge</th>
<th>Measure 74 Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MSR 73 Participants</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.66 (.25)_a</td>
<td>.70 (.12)_b,c</td>
<td>.60 (.20)_c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR 74 Participants</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.64 (.17)_a</td>
<td>.52 (.18)_c</td>
<td>.71 (.14)_b,c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public before October</td>
<td>1084</td>
<td>.73 (.23)_a</td>
<td>.37 (.19)_d</td>
<td>.42 (.19)_d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public after October</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>.70 (.24)_a</td>
<td>.38 (.18)_d</td>
<td>.43 (.19)_d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Numbers in table are mean scores on knowledge scales, counting “don’t know” as incorrect. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Results found using a one-way Anova followed by post-hoc Tukey tests, measuring participants by week against the general public, before and after Oct. Within columns, different subscripts indicate statistically significant post-hoc Tukey comparisons.

a Indicates no significant difference from any of the other samples
b Indicates CIR participant increase in knowledge over other CIR participants, \( p \leq .05 \)
c Indicates CIR participant increase in knowledge over the general public, \( p \leq .01 \)
d Indicates the general public had no significant change in knowledge after October, when the voting guide was released.

CIR panelists also had higher levels of knowledge about the initiative on which they did not deliberate than did the general public (MSR 73 panelists’ M74 knowledge, \( M = .69, SD = .20 \); MSR 74 panelists’ M73 knowledge, \( M = .52, SD = .18 \)) indicating that they not only learned
more about the measure they deliberated on than the wider public, they also learned more about the issue on which they did not deliberate. This result hints that panelists may have been more invested in the initiative process than their fellow non-participant citizens. Perhaps because they were more likely to read the Citizens’ Statement for the issue that they did not discuss or because they were more eager to sift through initiative-specific information before casting their votes, panelists learned more about the imitative on which they did not deliberate than did the general public.

Turning to opinion change finds significant shifts in panelists’ opinion on the measure on which they were deliberating. Figure 5.1 revisits the results previously presented in Chapter 3, showing that most panelists entered the deliberations undecided on the initiative about which they would be deliberating. For Measure 73, 6 opposed, 5 supported, and 13 were undecided on the initiative, and for Measure 74, 5 opposed, 3 supported, and 15 were undecided. By the end of the week, however, panelists had made decisions regarding the issue, with Measure 73 panelists overwhelmingly opposed to the initiative (21 opposed, 2 supported, 1 undecided) and Measure 74 panelists fairly evenly divided (10 opposed, 13 supported). And while most panelists moved from undecided to a position on the issue, a closer scrutiny of these results found that some panelists actually switched their preference. Three panelists moved from support of Measure 73 to opposition of Measure 73, and one panelist moved from opposition of Measure 74 to support of Measure 74.

**Deliberative faith.** Over two-thirds of the face-to-face participants said that they gained greater faith in deliberation along all three measures, both in the short and long term. Tables 5.5 and 5.6 detail changes to participants’ deliberative faith as well as their internal and external efficacy. In the short-term survey, CIR participants increased their faith that the first step in
solving problems is to discuss them (68.4%), that people who disagree can make decisions
together by talking (76.3%), and that people from different parties can have respectful
conversations (78.9%), all significant at $p < .001$. For these measures, as with others below, the
remainder of participants reported no change (31.6%, 21.1%, and 21.1% respectively), and none
decreased their deliberative faith along any of the measures. When reporting similar findings
below, I simply report the percentage of respondents who increased or decreased along each
measure.

In the year-later surveys, CIR and ACP participants showed similarly high levels of faith.
Significant portions said their experience increased their faith that problem solving begins with
discussion (CIR = 64.9%, ACP = 82.1%), that people can reach decisions across disagreement
(CIR = 73.0%, ACP = 80.7%), and that people from different parties can have civil discussions
Table 5.5

Self-Reported Changes in Political and Deliberative Attitudes One Year after Participating in Face-to-Face or Online ACP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ACP, Face-to-Face (N = 115)</th>
<th>ACP, Online (N = 38)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree Less</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deliberative Faith</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first step in solving problems is to discuss them.</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who disagree can make decisions if they talk.</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from different parties can have civil, respectful conversations.</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Efficacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more informed about politics/government than most.</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a pretty good understanding of the issues facing this country.</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Efficacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People have the final say, no matter who is in office.</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People like me don’t have any say about what government does.</td>
<td>52.6%***</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are many legal ways to influence government.</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Significance was found using binomial nonparametric tests.  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.*
Table 5.6

Self-Reported Changes in Political and Deliberative Attitudes Two-to-Three Months and One Year after Participating in CIR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CIR, Two-to-Three Months Later</th>
<th>CIR, Year Later</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N = 38)</td>
<td>(N = 37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative Faith</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The first step in solving problems is to discuss them.</td>
<td>0.0% 31.6% 68.4%***</td>
<td>0.0% 35.1% 64.9%***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who disagree can make decisions if they talk.</td>
<td>0.0% 21.1% 76.3%***</td>
<td>2.7% 24.3% 73.0%***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from different parties can have civil, respectful conversations.</td>
<td>0.0% 21.1% 78.9%***</td>
<td>0.0% 27.0% 73.0%***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel more informed about politics/government than most.</td>
<td>8.3% 40.5% 48.6%**</td>
<td>5.4% 51.4% 43.2%***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I have a pretty good understanding of the issues facing this country.</td>
<td>8.1% 47.4% 43.2%**</td>
<td>2.7% 62.2% 35.1%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics.</td>
<td>2.7% 70.3% 27.0%*</td>
<td>0.0% 56.8% 43.2%***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Efficacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People have the final say, no matter who is in office.</td>
<td>13.2% 68.4% 18.4%</td>
<td>21.6% 56.8% 18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People like me don’t have any say about what government does.</td>
<td>47.4%*** 44.7% 5.3%</td>
<td>62.2%*** 24.3% 10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are many legal ways to influence government.</td>
<td>2.6% 39.5 57.9%***</td>
<td>0.0% 24.3% 75.7%***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being an Oregonian is important to my identity.</td>
<td>0.0% 76.3% 23.7%**</td>
<td>8.1% 59.5% 32.4%*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Significance was found using binomial nonparametric tests.  
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
(CIR = 73.0%, ACP = 77.0%), all significant at $p < .001$. A few participants did lose faith along these measures, with 2.7% of CIR participants and 1.8% of ACP participants in the year-later survey agreeing less that people who disagree can make sound decisions and 3.5% of ACP participants agreeing less that people from different parties can have respectful conversations.

Looking at the comments made by face-to-face panelists, several reported their surprise at their groups’ ability to deliberate and expressed a conviction that deliberation was the best tool for decision making. Deliberative faith was so closely tied to group efficacy that faith in the process was almost always mentioned in conjunction with faith in other group members or fellow citizens. The following excerpt from the CIR end-of-week discussion transcript illustrates this trend:

I have had the opportunity to learn something from each and every one of you, and I am thankful for that. And during this time, we have been able to come together as a group, representing people from all over Oregon, and we have had some very good conversations over both an emotional and controversial subject…I think we’ve all had equal input and ultimately have come up with something that will truly [help] Oregon’s voter population.

Like others, this panelist’s faith in the deliberative process was intricately intertwined with faith in her fellow panelists.

Online participants, however, did not significantly change their attitudes toward deliberation, and though more online participants reported gaining than losing faith in deliberation, as much as one fifth lost their faith along at least one measure. Though none of these findings are significant, they are worth detailing in contrast to the gains seen by face-to-face participants. Of online participants, 33.3% increased their belief that the first step in solving
problems is discussion, though 13.9% decreased their faith along this measure. Similarly, 32.4% of online participants agreed more that people who disagree can make sound decisions, but 16.2% agreed less with this statement. Finally, 25.7% of online panelists increased their belief that people from different parties could be respectful to one another, and 20.0% decreased their belief in this possibility after their experience.

**Internal efficacy.** As for personal efficacy, my results suggest that both the ACP and the CIR led participants to experience significant increases in political self-confidence, over both the short and long term, particularly for face-to-face participants. Clear majorities of ACP participants felt more informed (57.0% agreed more, 7.9% agreed less) and better able to understand political issues as a result of their deliberation (69.9% agreed more, 0.9% agreed less), with a significant but smaller proportion (34.2%) more likely to consider themselves “well-qualified to participate in politics,” though 9.6% were less likely to consider themselves well qualified, all significant at $p < .001$.

The short-term and long-term CIR effects were comparable, if more subdued. On the short-term survey 48.6% felt more informed about politics, though 8.3% felt less, $p = .004$; year-later results saw 43.2% of participants agreeing more with this statement and 5.4% agreeing less, $p < .001$. In the short-term survey, 43.2% felt like they had a better understanding of political issues after their experience, and 8.1% felt a decrease in this measure, $p = .002$; in the year-later survey, 35.1% of respondents agreed more with this statement and 2.7% agreed less $p < 001$. Compared to other measures of internal efficacy, feeling well-qualified to participate in politics saw the least gain on the short-term survey, with 27.0% feeling more qualified and 2.7% feeling less, $p = .012$. These feelings improved by the year-later survey, however, with 43.2% attributing
their experience to an increase in feeling self-qualified and no respondents reporting a decrease along this measure, $p < .001$.

In the words of one ACP panelist, from Day 4 of the General Meeting, “I think it’s the empowerment that we as individuals have received collectively and can now confidently feel we can go out into our community and just wave the flag and say, ‘Hey you guys we can do something that we didn’t know.’”

The Online Parliament participants also reported a significant change, with over a quarter (27%) reporting a better “understanding of the issues” and none feeling less able to do so as a result of their deliberative participation, $p = .002$. Online participants did not, however, see significant changes in either of the other measures.

**External efficacy.** Changes in participants’ external efficacy were more complicated, as shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6. In the short-term and year-later surveys, CIR participants reported significant increases in perceived government responsiveness along two items, with 47.4% agreeing less that people don’t have the final say and 5.3% agreeing more and 57.9% increasing their belief that there are many legal ways to influence government and only 2.6% decreasing their faith on this measure. They maintained these increases in the year-later survey, with 62.2% of participants agreeing more that people had the final say and 10.8% agreeing less. Similarly, 75.7% of participants increased their belief that there are legal ways to influence government, and none decreased their faith on this measure, all significant at $p < .001$. ACP face-to-face panelists saw similar trends, with 52.6% more likely to feel that people do have the final say and 14% agreeing less and 66.7% agreeing more that there are legal ways to influence government and only 3.5% agreeing less, both significant at $p < .001$. 
Face-to-face panelists did not, however, increase their belief that “people have the final say, no matter who is in office.” For both the ACP and CIR, this one item was the most likely to generate results in the direction opposite from the one I predicted. CIR panelists were more likely to agree with this statement in the short term (18.4% agree more, 13.2% agree less), but by the year-later survey, these findings were reversed, with 21.6% agreeing less and 18.9% agreeing more, though these findings were not significant. Similarly, ACP face-to-face participants were more likely to disagree (27.2%) that people have the final say, no matter who is in office, than agree (23.7%), although, again, this finding did not reach significance.

In the case of the Online Parliament, this pattern did reach significance, with 37.8% reporting that their participation left them more doubtful of the people’s “final say” compared to 8.1% reaching the opposite conclusion, \( p = .013 \). And though online participants saw no significant change in their faith that there are legal ways to influence government, they did see significant increases in their faith that the public has the final say (31.6% agree more, 5.3% agree less, \( p = .013 \)). In other words, it appeared that both face-to-face and online participants were more inclined to develop faith in themselves and the deliberative process than in contemporary political actors.

These mixed results may be a consequence of participants’ increased affinity toward deliberation. When expressing decreased external efficacy, panelists often compared their own conduct at these events with those of their elected representatives. As one CIR panelist stated, “I think it has changed the way I think about the people in that I think they are more open minded than I thought they were before, government on the other hand I still do not trust.” Another CIR panelist expressed a similar sense of trust in citizens while indicating distrust of politicians, stating:
With honest dialog and patience, we did make decisions that at times were a give-and-take that was positive. Now if we could have our elected representatives do the same in our state government, perhaps they could do a better job of representing the people who elected them and not the special interests that shower them with money. As these responses suggest, panelists began to see they could interact civilly and find common ground, which left them disenchanted with politicians unable to do the same.

**Collective identity.** CIR panelists also reported increases in collective identity, with a significant portion stating in both the short-term (23.7%, \( p = .008 \)) and year-later survey (32.4%, \( p = .035 \)) that the experience made them more likely to consider “being an Oregonian” an important part of their self-understanding and no panelists agreeing less on the short-term survey and 8.1% agreeing less in the year-later survey. This parallels findings from the ACP that indicate that despite Australians’ traditional lack of national identity, several panelists began to understand themselves as Australians and find common ground across difference (Felicetti et al., 2012; Hartz-Karp et al., 2010).

An analysis of the CIR panelists’ open-ended responses show that they not only formed a collective identity with other panelists, several extended their identification with the wider electorate or the general public. That said, the most common change for the CIR panelists’ sense of identity was their ability to see themselves as connected to other panelists with whom they had not traditionally identified. As one panelist said in a follow-up survey:

I couldn’t believe that we were so closely divided, but we found so much to agree in, in common. I think this would be a great example for our state and for our nation, if we could get together and put aside some differences, look at each other as human beings, and work out some realistic solutions.
This improved impression of fellow panelists, and the desire to carry this goodwill over into other aspects of the political process, was mirrored by several of the panelists.

Aside from reporting increased collective identity and faith in fellow citizens, a few panelists indicated changes to how they understood themselves as citizens and their role in the political process. Several expressed an increased sense of responsibility to other citizens and some even expressed feeling representative of other citizens. This feeling of representation appeared to shift how panelists approached decision making. One panelist said that:

The most interesting aspect of this process for me personally has been discovering how carefully I weighed my role as “representative” of Oregon voters in forming my final decision. At one point during the week, my personal (pro) opinion was in complete opposition to my “civic stance.”

A few others expressed similar sentiments, indicating that the changing sense of identity developed during the CIR transformed not only how the panelists understood themselves and one another but shifted how they thought about and approached the issue in question.

**Hypothesis 2: Reported Behavioral Changes**

As with the subjective attitude change, results generally supported my hypothesis for face-to-face deliberation but not for the Online Parliament. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 show that ACP and CIR participation led to increased engagement along some, but not all, measures, and face-to-face participants increased their engagement along more measures than online-only participants. Those who participated in face-to-face deliberation reported significantly increasing their communicative engagement, both in person and through the media, as well as their community-based engagement. Online participants, by contrast, saw only a handful of more modest behavioral changes, all in the form of increased communicative engagement. A
substantial proportion of neither group said it had increased participation in institutionalized electoral activities, perhaps stemming from mixed changes regarding their external efficacy.

**Communicative engagement.** A majority of participants attributed their experience to an increased attention to public affairs, with 44.7% of CIR participants saying they increased their use of newspapers for public affairs in the short-term, and 56.8% percent recording an increase a year later, both significant at $p < .001$. Of ACP face-to-face participants, 58.8% increased their use of newspapers, though 1.8% decreased their use, $p < .001$. Only 26.3% of online panelists increased their newspaper readership, though this is still a significant increase, $p = .002$. Similarly, a significant portion of CIR participants reported paying more attention to television news in both the short term (47.4%) and a year later (54.1%), both significant at $p < .001$. Again, the ACP face-to-face participants reported comparable changes with 67.5% reporting increases in this behavior and 0.9% reporting decreases, $p < .001$. Fewer online participants reported change, though they still recounted significant increases in paying attention to television news (31.6%, $p < .001$).

CIR participants additionally reported significant increases in talking with others about political issues, both in the short term, with 57.9% reporting an increase, and a year later, with 59.5% reporting an increase, $p < .001$. Turning to the ACP, 49.1% of face-to-face participants said they had increased this behavior, and 2.6% reported that they had decreased it, $p < .001$. Online participants also saw an increase in discussions about political issues or candidates, with 26.3% saying they engaged in them more and 5.3% saying they engaged in them less after their experience, $p = .039$.

Face-to-face participants were also likely to increase the frequency of conversations in which they talked to others about voting. As with the other forms of communicative engagement,
Table 5.7

*Self-Reported Changes in Political and Deliberative Behavior One Year after Participating Face-to-Face and Online ACP*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ACP Face-to-Face (N = 115)</th>
<th>ACP Online (N = 38)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communicative Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking to people to learn about an issue or a candidate</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking to others about voting choices</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying attention to news while watching TV</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying attention to news while reading the newspaper</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community-based Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarily working in your local community</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussing local affairs with other community members</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalized Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to political meetings, demonstrations, fund raising dinners</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>88.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering for parties or candidates</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>95.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Significance was found using binomial nonparametric tests.*

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.*
Table 5.8

Self-Reported Short-Term and Year-Later Changes in Political and Deliberative Behavior after Participating in CIR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CIR, Two-to-Three Months Later (N = 38)</th>
<th>CIR, Year Later (N = 37)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Communicative Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking to people to learn about an issue or a candidate</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talking to others about voting choices</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying attention to news while watching TV</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paying attention to news while reading the newspaper</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>55.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community-based Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarily working in your local community</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discussing local affairs with other community members</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalized Engagement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to political meetings, demonstrations, fund raising dinners</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteering for parties or candidates</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. Significance was found using binomial nonparametric tests.

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.*
no CIR panelists reported having these conversations less often, though on the short term survey 55.3% said they had these conversations more often, \( p < .001 \). A year-later this measure saw the most dramatic decrease, with only 37.8% of CIR panelists saying they engaged in this activity more often a year after their experience, though this increase was still highly significant, \( p < .001 \). Only 18.4% of ACP participants said they had these conversations more often a year later, with 1.8% saying they engaged in these conversations less, though, again, this is still a significant increase in this behavior, \( p < .001 \). Online participants, however, reported no significant increases in discussions about voting, with only 7.9% reporting an increase in these discussions and 2.6% reporting a decrease.

Aside from the changes measured for both CIR and ACP participants, ACP face-to-face participants were asked a number of additional questions related to behavioral changes, including whether or not they had written a letter to the editor in the past year. A one-sample \( t \)-test found a significant increase in this activity with 39 panelists saying that they had done so in the past year, \( t (113) = 7.08, p < .001 \). Though I did not ask this question of CIR panelists, in their open-ended responses eight panelists said that they’d either written letters to the editors of local newspapers or given interviews to local media about their experience at the CIR.

Finally, though most of the measures of attitudinal and behavioral change relied on post-only measures, the research team did ask two before-and-after questions to some face-to-face ACP participants. The first, using a paired-sample \( t \)-test, \( p = .005 \), found that participants were significantly more likely to agree that their friends and family knew their political views after participation, \( t (74) = -2.92 \). The second pre and post measure asked participants how compelled they felt to defend their political views. Although without some treatment we would expect responses to this item to regress toward the scale midpoint, “neutral,” in the post-test, I
hypothesized that a greater percentage would move towards agreement, indicating that they felt the need to defend their political views but not to the extent that they were not open to updating those views. The results confirm this hypothesis. A paired-sample $t$-test, $p = .004$, with responses recoded into their absolute distance from the most deliberative answer, “agreed,” found that a significant percentage of those who indicated they were either timid or defensive in the pre-test moved towards agreement rather than towards the scale midpoint, $t (74) = 2.95$.

These findings are verified by the panelists’ open-ended reports of behavioral change. Most panelists who discussed behavioral changes talked about having more conversations with friends and family, generally about either the process or issues discussed during the process, or about being more deliberative in their own conversations. Conversations with friends and family often went beyond information based discussions, however, and involved encouraging others to be more deliberative or more active voters. Panelists seemed to be attempting to spread their own effects onto friends and family. As one CIR panelist said in the short-term survey:

I’ve told people that for our political climate to change, people have to be willing to listen respectfully to those with different opinions. And I’ve tried to think of ways to express my own opinions in as neutral a fashion as possible, to welcome discussion rather than to impose my own ideas on others.

This panelist, along with several others, hoped that he could teach others to be more deliberative, attempting to spread the positive cognitive and behavioral changes he had undergone to others.

**Community-based engagement.** Though no significant changes were found for online participants, face-to-face participants in both the ACP and the CIR reported significant increases in working or volunteering in their local communities and discussing local affairs with community members. A significant number of CIR participants reported volunteering and
working in their local community more frequently after their deliberative experience, in both the short term survey (26.3%, \( p = .004 \)) and the year-later survey (29.7%, \( p < .001 \)). Many ACP participants also reported this change, with 19.3% saying they increased their level of community volunteerism and 1.8% saying they decreased this type of engagement, \( p < .001 \). Online participants did not see significant change along this indicator, with an equal amount saying they volunteered less in their communities as those who said they volunteered more (7.9%).

Face-to-face participants also reported increases in their discussion of local affairs with other community members. In the short-term survey, 55.3% of CIR participants reported that they had these discussions more often, \( p < .001 \), and in the year-later survey, 27.0% percent said they were more likely to have these discussions, \( p = .002 \). Looking at ACP participants, 47.4% of face-to-face panelists increased their frequency of engaging in such discussions with 3.5% decreasing this behavior, \( p < .001 \). Online participants were not statistically more likely to engage in this activity, however, with 15.8% saying they had these discussions more often and 7.9% saying they had these conversations less often.

ACP face-to-face participants were additionally asked if they had joined an activist or advocacy organization in the past year. For this analysis, I again used a one-sample \( t \)-test, \( p < .001 \). Fourteen participants joined at least one activist or advocacy organization, \( t (113) = 3.59 \), showing a significant increase in their willingness to engage in organized political activities. These findings were backed up in participants’ qualitative comments. For example, one ACP panelist reported that she had started a parent group at her school and several face-to-face panelists from both events reported being more actively involved in their local communities.
**Institutional engagement.** These results suggest that simply participating in a deliberative process has limited impact on individuals’ institutionalized engagement. Though a small number of respondents indicated that they had increased their involvement in electoral activities, such as volunteering or attending meetings or fundraiser for a party or candidate, over 75% of all participants said they had engaged in these activities neither more nor less frequently since their deliberative experience.

CIR participants reported no significant increases in going to political meetings in either the short term, with 15.8% increasing this activity and 2.6% decreasing it, or a year-later, with 16.2% increasing their attendance at meetings and fundraisers and 5.4% decreasing their attendance. ACP face-to-face participants did see a significant increase in this behavior with 9.6% increasing their meeting attendance and 1.8% decreasing it ($p = .022$). No online participants increased their attendance at political meetings, and 5.3% decreased this behavior, though this decrease was insignificant.

Looking to volunteering for a candidate or candidate, I found no significant changes to behavior. Of CIR participants, 7.9% increased this behavior two to three months later and 10.8% had increased this behavior a year later, with 2.6% decreasing it two to three months later and 2.1% decreasing it a year later, though these findings are insignificant. Similarly 2.7% of ACP participants increased their level of campaign volunteering, though 1.8% decreased it, and online participants were again more likely to decrease this behavior (5.4%) than increase it (2.7%), though this finding was also not significant. Finally, ACP panelists were asked if they had joined a political party in the past year. Only two panelists indicated that they had joined a party, and a one-sample $t$-test found no significance, $t (112) = 1.42, p = .158$. 
Conclusion

The results presented above strongly support the original hypotheses I developed in Chapter 4. Both the Australian Citizens’ Parliament—particularly the highly structured, face-to-face General Meeting—and the Oregon CIR led many participants to report subjective cognitive and behavioral changes. Participants often held greater faith in the political process and themselves as a result of their participation, and they also attributed to that experience subsequent increases in their communicative and community-based engagement.

These findings of subjective change are indicative of the potential for deliberative processes to resocialize participants by transforming how individuals understand themselves and their role in the political system. Through participation, many of the panelists underwent somewhat of a civic transformation. They moved away from the forms of alienation detailed in Chapter 2 and came to view themselves as more capable of participating in politics. They often reported that they had become more active members of their local communities since their deliberative experience. This suggests that deliberative experiences have the potential to not only change how individuals think about and participate in government, but also how they understand themselves as citizens and their place in the political process. Such experience can generate more empowered identities that foster a more active role in community governance.

The consistency across the ACP and the CIR (and between the CIR short-term and year-later surveys) testifies to the generalizability and validity of these results. As Table 5.9 illustrates, nearly identical changes were found both when comparing the face-to-face events and over time. This suggests that highly structured processes that bring representative groups of the public together may create fairly consistent attitudinal and behavioral changes. Such processes
Table 5.9

Summary of Self-Reported Changes in Political Attitudes and Behaviors after Participating in ACP and CIR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CIR, 2-3 Mos. Later (N = 38)</th>
<th>CIR, Year Later (N = 37)</th>
<th>ACP, Year Later Face-to-Face (N = 115)</th>
<th>ACP, Year Later Online (N = 38)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudinal Changes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Efficacy</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberative Faith</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Efficacy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Identity</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>NM</td>
<td>NM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Behavioral Changes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicative Engagement</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based Engagement</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalized Engagement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Figures in table represent net changes to participants’ attitudes and behaviors. Significance was found using binomial nonparametric tests, \( p < .05 \). Summary indicators are as follows: ++ = all measures positive and significant, + = some measures positive and significant, +/- = mixed results, 0 = no effect, NM = not measured.
can empower those who participate and encourage them to take a more active, and more deliberative, role in the political process.

Though the main findings were consistent with my theoretical model, analysis of these data also yielded some unanticipated findings. Although I anticipated increases in collective identity, this study also found that some panelists began to see themselves as representative of the wider public and altered their participation based on this new stance. When discussing their experience, some participants said that they felt responsible to the wider community and took this responsibility into account when engaging in the deliberations and casting their vote. This finding highlights the way that collective identity may change by decreasing social isolation. Panelists not only felt more connected to each other, they also felt connected to the wider public. Even more interesting, that feeling of collective identity changed the way that they acted, causing them to take into consideration the needs of the wider community and their responsibility toward them when engaging in political activities.

In addition, several panelists attempted to spread their own deliberative effects to others through conversation, an effect not fully theorized in the literature. Many of the face-to-face participants from both forums reported informing their friends about the process, teaching them to be more deliberative, and encouraging them to engage in deliberative activities. In short, these panelists valued the deliberative skills they had acquired and wanted to pass them along to the wider community. This highlights the importance of deliberative skills as a facet of behavioral change, an effect I did not thoroughly work into the model presented in Chapter 2.

Though not explored in detail here, several of these results suggest that changes in attitudes are likely related to changes in behavior. Previous work has attempted to untangle these pathways, using longitudinal data to clarify whether attitudinal changes or behavioral changes
precede one another, and points to the need to draw out these links through further research (Gastil & Xenos, 2010). The above data is based on the presumption that attitudinal changes stem from the behavioral change of participating in a deliberative event, but this research also presents evidence that attitudinal changes lead to behavioral changes.

Out of all the attitudes measured, participants were least likely to increase their faith in the political process, particularly regarding their faith that politicians listened to the public, though face-to-face participants did have more faith in their own power to affect government decision-making. In line with this, participants were not more likely to join party organizations or work to elect specific candidates though they were more likely to join community organizations and engage in local politics. This indicates that participants’ changing sense of external efficacy likely impacted their engagement choices, in this case, encouraging participants to eschew traditional political institutions for more citizen-centered activities. More research needs to be done sorting out these links, particularly the connection between external efficacy and behavioral changes. Though we traditionally measure external efficacy along a scale, my results suggest that these items may have discrete meanings as participants’ distinguish between their ability to utilize the political system for change and their faith in institutions’ willingness to listen to the public. Gastil and Xenos (2010) took such an approach, breaking apart external efficacy and civic faith. Their results showed that high levels of these measures could actually decrease attention to public affairs and voting respectively.

Coupled with the connections between external efficacy and community-based and institutional engagement mentioned above, these findings suggest a curvilinear relationship between external efficacy and engagement. Those with low external efficacy are likely to be disengaged precisely because they do not think that their engagement matters. Those with high
external efficacy, at least as currently measured, may also be less likely to participate in political activities because they perceive a high level of system responsiveness and thus would see no need for further engagement. Moderate external efficacy, however, may be the most likely to spur engagement. The deliberative participants discussed here often suggested that they were more likely to engage in local and community politics because they distrusted those in power and felt the need to speak up or become involved with decision making as a consequence. They did not, however, increase their engagement in electoral activities, likely in part because they distrusted elected officials.

None of these effects, however, are universal, and as Table 5.9 demonstrates, less structured forms of deliberative communication, such as online-forum participation, may not have the same power for fostering democratic faith and participation. Researchers should continue to explore how different deliberative structures affect which cognitive and behavioral changes participants experience, both subjectively and actually. Although face-to-face and online participants paralleled each other in some cognitive and behavioral effects, particularly in increases to communicative engagement, similar mixed-media events structured in different ways or which integrate online and face-to-face experiences differently may result in different effects. Chapter 4 highlights the likelihood of this possibility, as studies of alternative forms of online deliberation have been shown to increase measures of internal and external efficacy and political engagement not found here (Baek et al., 2011; Jacobs et al., 2009; Min, 2007).

Future studies could advance our understanding of how deliberative participation affects individuals across contexts by applying the same measures used here to different deliberative forums, exploring whether participants with different deliberative experiences underwent the same cognitive and behavioral changes. Moreover, coupling studies of subjective change with
gauges of actual change may help clarify the link between political cognitions and behaviors and help identify which attitudinal changes are most likely to spark which types of engagement.

Aside from the effects that such processes can have on participants, however, minipublics, by connecting to larger public discourse, may have the potential to transform the wider public (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; Fung, 2003; Nabatchi, 2010). In this chapter, I have shown how transformative participating in deliberation can be. Minipublics, however, are designed to draw the wider public into the deliberative process (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006), and because of this, they should foster a pseudo-deliberative experience for the larger community (Goodin, 2000), increasing their access to information and respectful opposing viewpoints and allowing them to make more enlightened decisions.

Moreover, minipublics grant lay citizens power in decision making and highlight their ability to create enlightened public opinions. The presence of such processes, then, may have the potential to transform the political attitudes of the wider public who participate in the vicarious deliberation and see citizens like themselves competently performing roles normally reserved for political professionals. In Chapter 6 I explore such possibilities and use a statewide survey of the Oregon electorate to see if awareness of the CIR and use of its Citizens’ Statements changed how the wider public thinks about themselves as political actors and their role in the governing process.
Chapter 6
Emanating Effects: The Impact of Micro-Level Deliberation on the Public’s Political Cognitions and Behaviors

In the previous chapter, I showed how people’s civic beliefs and behaviors can change as a result of their participation in deliberative “minipublics”—highly structured, face-to-face deliberative processes in which a representative sample of the public engages in decision making that is connected to macro-level political discourse. Such participant effects are a laudable outcome of deliberation, and scholars have expended considerable energy documenting them (Gastil, Deess, Weiser, & Simmon, 2010; Fishkin, 2009; Jacobs et al., 2009; Morrel, 2005; Nabatchi, 2010). This, however, was not the focus of those who have advocated the formation of minipublics (Dahl, 1989; Fung, 2003; Fishkin, 1991; Gastil, 1993; Goodin, 2008; Goodin & Dryzek, 2006.). Rather, the point was to achieve a grander, macro-level goal, such as forming a broader policy consensus or reshaping public opinion or the balance of media coverage (e.g., Fishkin, 1995). This was certainly the intention of both of the cases studied in this dissertation. The Australian Citizens’ Parliament (ACP) was meant to redirect federal priorities regarding political reform, and the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR) was meant to improve the quality of initiatives passed in that state.

But what if these processes influenced the wider public in some of the ways I have shown them to reshape their participants? The presence of deliberative minipublics connected to macro-level decision making may affect the cognitions and behaviors of those who did not directly participate in the deliberation but are, nevertheless, highly aware of its structure and outcomes. Minipublics are specifically designed to connect micro-level deliberation with macro-level
public discourse through the incorporation of their findings into political discussion and decision making (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). These structures draw the wider public into the deliberative process by providing them with better information constructed through democratic and representative discourse. Those who are highly aware of these structures and their outcomes are, in a sense, themselves engaged in the deliberative process because they can incorporate deliberative findings into both their internal deliberations about those issues (Goodin, 2000) and their interpersonal conversations.

Because of this, small-scale deliberative structures may also affect the public’s attitudes and behaviors (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006). By incorporating a representative group of citizens into the decision-making process, deliberative minipublics have the potential to boost perceived legitimacy of government and the political process (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; Fung, 2003; Nabatchi, 2010). The establishment of these inclusive minipublics may signal to the wider public the development of a more deliberative public sphere—a sign that governing officials are willing to listen to public input and desire the public’s involvement in decision making. Further, seeing fellow citizens competently perform the tasks normally fulfilled by political professionals may increase the public’s confidence in their own political abilities as well as those of their neighbors.

Although this potential deliberative impact has received only scant theoretical attention (and, to my knowledge, no significant empirical attention), it is worth testing whether the presence of deliberative structures will have an “emanating” effect on the wider public. 4 Though the introduction of a one-time-only deliberative structure into an already crowded public sphere may receive little public attention (and thus have rather weak effects), evidence of any emanating effects for those who do learn about such interventions will help us better understand and build

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4 The phrase “emanating effect” was developed in conversation with Michael Barthel, John Gastil, and Carolina Johnson.
effective deliberative structures in the future.

Below, I discuss some specific ways that micro-level deliberation may impact the attitudes of the wider public. I first review the existing literature on minipublics and discuss how they affect public sphere discourse before hypothesizing about their potential to transform the political attitudes of members of the communities in which they are embedded. I then look to the CIR for evidence of such change and use a panel survey of Oregon voters to test this hypothesis. My results suggest that awareness and use of the CIR can generate positive political cognitions for the electorate, increasing their internal and external efficacy, and that increased faith in the Statements and exposure to them spurs even higher levels of efficacy as well as other positive political cognitions.

**Connecting Deliberative Effects to the Wider Community**

Unlike conventional structures that push citizens out of the political process, such as those discussed in Chapter 2, deliberative structures attempt to actively involve the citizenry in forming public opinions and in decision making (see Goodin and Dryzek, 2006). Moreover, most minipublics work to incorporate deliberation into macro decision making by funneling the results of deliberative discussion into the wider public discourse (Goodin, 2008).

In other words, minipublics are designed to draw the public into the deliberative process (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006) and should allow people who did not directly participate in the process but are aware of its existence and outcomes to engage in vicarious deliberation (Gastil, Knobloch, & Richards, 2012). In vicarious deliberation, members of the public benefit from the small-scale process by incorporating the outputs of such processes into their decision making. As these processes gain greater awareness and are granted more power, they will be better able to influence the production and expression of public opinion. This could potentially decrease the
effects of alienating structures and increase the empowerment of the lay public. Table 6.1 connects the conditions of alienation to deliberative minipublics and summarizes their potential to correct feelings of alienation among the larger public. Here, I focus on the cognitive impact of such structures, though the presence of minipublics eventually may lead to behavioral change (Fung, 2003; Nabatchi, 2010).

The discussion below clarifies these connections and explores how specific structures may generate specific cognitive benefits. The remainder of this chapter tests these claims; in particular I focus on changes to the public’s internal and external efficacy and deliberative faith.

**Commodification and Internal Efficacy**

Minipublics rely on citizens, rather than professionals, to perform the tasks of opinion formation and decision making and create conditions that prevent the co-optation, or commodification, of public discourse (Goodin and Dryzek, 2006). Such structures, then, have the potential to boost the public’s internal efficacy, or their belief that they are capable of self-governance (see Niemi et al., 1991). Previous work, as well as the findings presented in Chapter 5, show that face-to-face deliberative events can increase the political self-confidence of those who participate in them (Fishkin, 2009; Gastil & Dillard, 1999b). As the outputs of such forums are disseminated to the wider public, these changes may spill over into the larger population who utilize the results of deliberative minipublics in making their own political decisions.

As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the primary impetuses for the creation of the CIR was to diminish the influence of paid for arguments, or commodified political communication. Forums such as the ACP, the CIR, National Issues Forums (NIF), and Deliberative Polling create opportunities for non-professional citizens to participate. By both offering the public a credible source of information and allowing them to see other lay citizens perform this work competently,
Table 6.1

*Cognitive and Behavioral Emanating Effects of Alienating and Deliberative Structures*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition of alienation</th>
<th>Cognitive aspects</th>
<th>Evidence of structural repair</th>
<th>Evidence of cognitive repair</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commodification:</strong> Transformation of public opinion into a commodity</td>
<td>Low levels of internal efficacy</td>
<td>Presence of lay citizens in public discourse (ACP, CIR, NIF, Deliberative Polling); Non-monetized public opinion (CIR, NIF, Deliberative Polling)</td>
<td>Increased internal efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social isolation:</strong> Lack of social capital or networks that cross political affiliation</td>
<td>Lack of community identity; Fear of difference</td>
<td>Representation of diverse viewpoints (CIR, ACP); Messages that cross cultural/political divides (CIR, NIF)</td>
<td>Increased communal identity; Understanding opposing viewpoints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Meaninglessness:</strong> False choice and low levels of political knowledge</td>
<td>Low levels of political knowledge/sophistication</td>
<td>Proliferation of credible information (CIR, Deliberative Polling, NIF)</td>
<td>Increased political knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normlessness:</strong> Public sphere structures no longer work as a means for democratic empowerment</td>
<td>Low levels of deliberative faith</td>
<td>Insertion of deliberation into public sphere discourse (BCCA, CIR, Deliberative Polling, NIF)</td>
<td>Increased deliberative faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powerlessness:</strong> Inability to use public sphere structures to influence government decision making</td>
<td>Low levels of external efficacy</td>
<td>Direct citizen empowerment (BCCA, participatory budgeting, juries); Increased voice in public discourse (CIR)</td>
<td>Increased external efficacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

such minipublics may boost the wider public’s internal efficacy as citizens begin to understand themselves as capable of making decisions about important community problems.

**Social Isolation and Collective Identity**

Minipublics also have the potential to overcome social isolation, particularly the type of
isolation generated through enclave communication (Sunstein, 2007), and foster collective identities. Because such processes are specifically designed to bring opposing viewpoints into conversation with one another, the recommendations or statements produced through them ideally reflect the diverse viewpoints of the participants. Members of the public who utilize these statements, then, are exposing themselves to information and arguments to which they otherwise may not be exposed. Further, those who understand the structure of the process may receive additional benefits by seeing a diverse cross-section of the public competently engage in decision making, potentially gaining faith in members of their community and increasing their feelings of connectedness to the wider public.

**Meaninglessness and Knowledge**

Deliberative minipublics are particularly well suited for overcoming meaninglessness. Because such processes are meant to bring opposing viewpoints into conversation with one another, the recommendations or statements produced through them ideally reflect the diverse viewpoints of the participants. Members of the public who utilize these statements are exposing themselves to information and arguments to which they otherwise may not be exposed. The decisions or recommendations emanating from forums such as the CIR, NIF, and Deliberative Polling can create more analytically rigorous discourse by inserting detailed and relevant information into a policy debate and revealing discrepancies or falsehoods in claims made by advocates. A study of the CIR showed just that, with 20 percent of the electorate saying that they found new information or arguments by reading the Statements produced by the CIR (Gastil, Knobloch, Reedy, Henkels, & Cramer-Walsh, 2011).

**Normlessness and Deliberative Faith**

Similarly, the presence of such processes may decrease individuals’ sense of
normlessness and increase their deliberative faith. If members of the public value the decisions or recommendations produced through such processes, they will likely gain faith that deliberation is a valid form of decision making. Further, by allowing members of the lay public to participate in the discussion, inserting credible information into political discourse, and paying respect to alternative viewpoints, such forums can signal that communication is a means to democratic empowerment and increase the likelihood that the public sees deliberative communication as a viable and effective form of political engagement. Though deliberative faith is still an underdeveloped concept, perceived legitimacy of such structures should cause the public to value the ideals of deliberative democracy

**Powerlessness and External Efficacy**

Finally, though few structures give deliberative forums direct decision-making power (Goodin, 2008)—the jury system (Gastil et al., 2010) and Participatory Budgeting (Baiocchi, 2001, 2003) being notable exceptions—many provide deliberative panelists with indirect power, such as the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA) and the Oregon CIR. Because of this, they have the potential to reduce powerlessness and boost external efficacy.

As discussed previously, the BCCA made recommendations for the adoption of a new voting system in British Columbia (see Warren and Pearce, 2008). This recommendation was then placed on the ballot, twice, and though it never received the 60 percent necessary to change the voting system, the process had the potential to dramatically alter the electoral system. The CIR took a slightly different route, placing recommendations in the State Voters’ Pamphlet regarding two statewide initiatives. Though the presence of the CIR did not ultimately overturn the vote on either measure, reading the largely oppositional Citizens’ Statement on mandatory minimum sentencing made voters five times less likely to support the measure (Gastil et al.,
As such forums proliferate, citizens may begin to believe that elected representatives and governing officials care about the will of the public and that the governing process provides avenues for citizen empowerment.

In sum, deliberative minipublics may alter the attitudes of the general public in ways that mirror the effects seen to lay citizens who directly participate in such processes. The remainder of this chapter looks to the CIR as an example case and asks whether it alters some of the cognitions mentioned above for members of the wider public. On this basis, I proposed the following hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3:** The presence of a deliberative structure will have an emanating effect, increasing the (a) internal, (b) external, and (c) deliberative efficacy of the wider community.

Increases in efficacy should be heightened in proportion to the degree of one’s awareness of the deliberative process. Understanding the purpose and functioning of these structures may help to increase their legitimacy (Fung, 2003). Those who see such structures as legitimate and important likely are more empowered by their implementation. Placing a high level of importance on such processes, then, may increase the likelihood that knowledge of these structures will positively affect cognitions related to democratic citizenship.

In addition, those more highly aware of the process likely had more exposure to news and information regarding the event. In other words, they have received a higher dose of exposure, and therefore may be more likely to have been affected by it (see Schenck-Hamlin, Procter, and Rumsey, 2000, p. 59). In short, if such processes do alter how individuals think about themselves and government, more exposure should lead to even larger changes. Thus, I propose a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: The effects of deliberation will be strongest for those non-participants who (a) find the deliberative structure’s outcomes important in their personal decision making and (b) devote more time and attention to them.

**Methods**

To test these hypotheses, I again turn to the Oregon CIR, the micro-to-macro deliberative structure detailed in Chapter 3. The 2010 CIR brought together two groups of twenty-four randomly selected citizens, stratified to match the electorate in terms of gender, ethnicity, age, party, and place of residence. The panelists met for five consecutive days to learn about and deliberate on two state-wide initiatives, one concerning Measure 73, which increased mandatory minimum sentencing for third time DUII charges and certain felony sex crimes, and one concerning Measure 74, which would have created a system for the production and distribution of medical marijuana. At the end of the week, the panelists created a Citizens’ Statement that appeared in the Oregon State Voters’ Pamphlet, which over 80% of Oregon voters use when making voting choices (Gastil et al., 2011). The Statements contained key facts related to the initiative as well as arguments for and against it. By the election, about 40% of the public were aware of the CIR, and those who read the statements received new facts and arguments related to the initiatives and, in some cases, subsequently changed their voting choices (Gastil et al., 2011).

**Panel Survey and Experiment**

To measure the changes that awareness and use of the CIR may have had on the attitudes and actions of the wider public, the CIR research team and I conducted an online, two-wave panel survey of the Oregon electorate. (See Appendix D for details.) The panel survey, conducted by YouGov Polimetrix, was an online survey of registered Oregon voters, with the first wave conducted in August 2010 and the second wave, as well as a post-only survey,
conducted during the two-weeks preceding the election. Because the panel survey allowed us to pose questions to the panelists both before the CIR occurred and directly before the election two months later, these surveys can measure changes in respondents’ beliefs stemming from knowledge and awareness of the CIR. This entailed measuring awareness and use of the CIR in the second wave and comparing second-wave attitudes with those measured in August. In statistical terms, I ran a regression equation to predict Wave 2 attitudes based on awareness and use of the CIR Citizens’ Statements, after controlling for Wave 1 attitudes and other demographic and attitudinal control variables.

The survey also contained an experiment that allowed an additional approach to testing the hypothesized effects of the CIR on the wider public. In this experiment, discussed briefly in Chapter 3, online survey respondents who had not already read the Voters’ Pamphlet and had not already voted (so were unlikely to have seen the Citizens’ Statements) were randomly placed into one of four conditions. Respondents in the first condition received a letter appearing in the opening of the 2010 voters’ guide from the Secretary of State, which contained no initiative-specific information. The second group received a summary of Measure 73 and its financial impact pulled from the explanatory section of the voters’ guide. The third group received the Measure 73 Citizens’ Statement developed at the CIR. The fourth group served as a control group and received no treatment.

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to predict how receiving each of the treatments – the Measure 73 Citizens’ Statement, the summary Explanatory Statement, the letter from the Secretary of State, and no treatment (control group) – affected the political attitudes detailed above. Experimental treatment was used as the predictor, with Wave 2 measures of change as the dependent variables.
Survey Measures

Below, I detail each measure used in the survey. Descriptive statistics for each item are also found in Table 6.2.

**Independent variables.** In the second wave of the survey, respondents were asked if they were aware of the CIR (0-1 scale, $M = .53$, $SD = .50$) and, for those who had read the statewide Voters’ Pamphlet, whether they had read either the Measure 73 or Measure 74 Citizens’ Statement (0-1 scale, $M = .20$, $SD = .40$). Those who had read the Citizens’ Statements were asked additional questions about their use of the Voters’ Pamphlet, including how much time they’d spent reading the Citizens’ Statement and, for the purposes of a post hoc analysis, how much time they’d spent with the other parts of the Voters’ Pamphlet.

For both Measure 73 and Measure 74, respondents who indicated that they had read the Voters’ Pamphlet were given the following prompt, “Thinking ONLY about the section on Measure [73, regarding increased sentencing for certain sex crimes and DUII charges,] please estimate how many minutes you spent reading each section and how important that section was in deciding how to vote on [Measure 73].” Respondents were then asked to state the number of minutes they spent on each section of the Voters’ Pamphlet and how important, on a scale from “Not at all important” (1) to “Very important” (3), they considered each section. In particular they were asked to state how many minutes they spent on and how important they considered the Citizens’ Statements produced by the CIR (the Key Findings, Arguments in Favor, and Arguments in Opposition), the summary information about the measure (including the text of the measure, the Explanatory Statement, and the Fiscal Statement), and the paid for arguments in favor of and opposed to the measure written by proponents and opponents of the measure.
Table 6.2

*Means, Standard Deviations, and Number of Valid Cases for Variables by Survey*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th># of Items</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Wave 1</th>
<th>Wave 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Awareness of Statement</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aware of CIR</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read Citizens’ Statements</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Received CIR Treatment</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Importance of Sections</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Time with CIR</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time with summary</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time with paid arguments</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
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<td>Importance of CIR</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td>1-3</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance of paid arguments</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>---</td>
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<td><strong>Dependent Variables</strong></td>
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<td>3.07</td>
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<td>External Efficacy</td>
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<td>1-4</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>2.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strong arguments on both sides</td>
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<td>1-4</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>.67</td>
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<td>Would change mind if studied</td>
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<td>1-4</td>
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<td>.71</td>
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<td>Initiatives are empowering</td>
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<td>1-4</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>.93</td>
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<td>Citizens wiser than legislature</td>
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<td>3.78</td>
<td>1.38</td>
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<td>Debate and consensus equal</td>
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<td>0-2</td>
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<td>.74</td>
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<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
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<td>Age</td>
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<td>Gender</td>
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<td>.50</td>
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<td>1.41</td>
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<td>Variable</td>
<td># of Items</td>
<td>Scale</td>
<td>Wave 1</td>
<td>Wave 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<td>--------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Variables (Cont.)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>8.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
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<td>1-7</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3.74</td>
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<td>Political interest</td>
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<td>2.44</td>
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<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1-6</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>3.74</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summary Treatment</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
respectively. In addition, for both measures respondents were asked, “In deciding how to vote on [Measure 73], how helpful was it to know whether the Citizens’ Initiative Review panelists supported or opposed the Measure?” on a scale from “Made no difference” (1) to “Very helpful” (3).

To determine the total amount of time readers spent with each section of the Voters’ Pamphlet, the number of minutes spent on each section for both measures was added to create a scale measuring the total amount of time a reader spent on the Citizens’ Statements (6 items; $\alpha = .885, M = 17.75, SD = 19.12$), the summary information (6 items; $\alpha = .794, M = 22.90, SD = 24.29$), and the paid for arguments (4 items; $\alpha = .830, M = 11.45, SD = 13.15$). To determine how important they considered different parts of the Voting Pamphlet, their responses to how important they considered each section and, for the CIR Statements only, how important they considered the voting cue were averaged to create a mean scale of how important users considered the Citizens’ Statements (8 items; $\alpha = .876, M = 1.93, SD = .54$), the summary information (6 items; $\alpha = .811, M = 2.35, SD = .48$), and the paid for arguments (4 items; $\alpha = .638, M = 2.14, SD = .51$).

Finally, those panelists who had not yet voted or read the Voters’ Pamphlet were placed in one of the four experimental groups described above. This variable was recoded into a three point scale. Those who were in either the control group or the group that read the letter from the Secretary of State containing no initiative-specific information received a score of 1; those placed in the summary statement group received a 2, and those in the CIR treatment received a 3. Those panelists who received the CIR treatment were excluded from the larger measures of CIR awareness and having read the CIR to prevent the experimental intervention from muddying the results of the wider population.
Dependent variables. In both waves of the panel survey, participants were asked standard questions regarding internal efficacy (3 items; Wave 1 \( \alpha = .792 \), \( M = 3.07 \), \( SD = .60 \); Wave 2 \( \alpha = .794 \), \( M = 3.04 \), \( SD = .59 \)) and external efficacy (3 items; Wave 1 \( \alpha = .875 \), \( M = 2.31 \), \( SD = .81 \); Wave 2 \( \alpha = .863 \), \( M = 2.32 \), \( SD = .77 \)) on a four point scale from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (4).

A series of more exploratory questions probed attitudes toward internal efficacy and situation-specific external efficacy and public deliberation. Respondents were asked whether the U.S. Congress or 500 randomly selected citizens would “show the greatest wisdom on questions of what the government should do” on a five point scale from Congress showing “a lot more wisdom” (1) to 500 citizens showing “a lot more wisdom” (5) (Wave 1 \( M = 3.78 \), \( SD = 1.38 \); Wave 2 \( M = 3.66 \), \( SD = 1.40 \)). This item is an indication of internal efficacy, as belief that citizens are more capable than Congress is sign that one feels competent to perform self-governance. Regarding situation-specific external efficacy, panelists were asked how much power they thought the initiative process gave Oregon citizens on a scale from “reduce the public’s real power” (1) to “much more power” (4) (Wave 1 \( M = 2.72 \), \( SD = .93 \); Wave 2 \( M = 2.65 \), \( SD = .92 \)).

To measure initiative-specific deliberative faith, panelists were asked if they usually found that “there are strong arguments both for and against a ballot measure” along a scale from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5) (Wave 1 \( M = 2.75 \), \( SD = .67 \); Wave 2 \( M = 2.43 \), \( SD = .73 \)) and whether they might change their vote on an initiative if they “studied a ballot measure carefully for five days” along the same scale (Wave 1 \( M = 2.57 \), \( SD = .71 \); Wave 2 \( M = 2.43 \), \( SD = .73 \)). In addition, panelists were asked whether they considered “debate” or “consensus” more important. This question was recoded so that answering either debate or
consensus as more important received a score of zero and equally important received a score of 2 (Wave 1 $M = .85, SD = .74$; Wave 2 $M = .83, SD = .70$), with the expectation that readers and users of the CIR would move toward a belief that they were equally important, as both are goals of deliberative theorists.

**Control variables.** The survey also contained a number of control variables, including measures of age ($M = 49.54, SD = 17.12$), gender (male = 0, female = 1, $M = .51, SD = .50$), education (with highest level of schooling measured from “Grades 1-8” = 1 to “Post-graduate” = 6, $M = 3.82, SD = 1.41$), yearly income (from “Less than $10,000” = 1 to “$150,000 or more” = 14, $M = 8.61, SD = 4.03$), party affiliation, political interest, and political knowledge. Party identification was measured along a seven point scale from “Strong Democrat” (1) to “Strong Republican” (7) ($M = 3.74, SD = 2.16$). Political interest was gauged by asking participants how often they paid attention to government and public affairs on a four point scale from “hardly at all” (1) to “most of the time” (4) ($M = 2.44, SD = .84$). To measure political knowledge, participants were asked six multiple choice questions related to both statewide and national politics. Respondents received a 1 for a correct answer and a zero for an incorrect answer, with “don’t know” treated as incorrect. Their scores on each item were added to create a knowledge scale (though this had somewhat low reliability, $\alpha = .568$, $M = 3.74, SD = 1.36$). Finally, the summary statement experimental treatment exposed some of the sample to information about Measure 73, and unlike those in the CIR treatment group, members of this group were not excluded from the larger awareness variables. Because of this, receiving the summary statement experimental treatment was also used as a control (summary treatment = 1, remaining treatments = 0, $M = .25, SD = .43$).
Results

Effects of Awareness of the CIR and Use of the Citizens’ Statements

The first hypothesis suggested that simply being aware of the CIR or reading the Statements produced by the citizen panel would generate increases in internal and external efficacy, as well as deliberative faith. The results confirmed that simple awareness can increase global external efficacy but that one must read the statements to gain internal efficacy. I found scant evidence for increased deliberative faith and no evidence for the remaining measures of attitudinal change.

I utilized a simple linear regression to determine if awareness of the CIR, or reading the Citizens’ Statements produced by the panels, caused an increase or decrease in feelings of internal and external efficacy, deliberative faith, feelings of empowerment, or trust in representative officials over average citizens, after controlling for Wave 1 measures of these attitudes as well as age, gender, education, income, party, political knowledge, and political interest. Tables 6.3 through 6.5 provide detailed descriptions of changes to each of these measures.

Internal and external efficacy. As Table 6.3 illustrates, simple awareness of the CIR process had no effect on traditional measures of internal efficacy, but it did cause a significant increase in external efficacy ($\beta = .076, p = .002$). In short, knowledge of the CIR’s existence, as a novel deliberative structure added to the conventional Oregon political process, caused respondents to feel that the government was more responsive, even if it did not alter voters’ own sense of political capacity.

By contrast, reading the CIR Statements had its lone significant effect on internal efficacy ($\beta = .081, p = .005$). In other words, the act of reading the CIR Citizens’ Statements was
positively associated with Wave 2 political self-confidence, even after controlling for Wave 1 measures of internal efficacy and the raft of other control variables.

Table 6.3

Awareness and Use of the CIR Predicting Changes to Internal and External Efficacy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>predictor</th>
<th>Internal Efficacy (Wave 2)</th>
<th>External Efficacy (Wave 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( B ) (SE)</td>
<td>( \text{Beta} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.015 (.100)**</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.001 (.001)*</td>
<td>-.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.026 (.031)</td>
<td>-.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.018 (.012)</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.003 (.004)</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>.007 (.007)</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>.147 (.022)**</td>
<td>.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>.049 (.012)**</td>
<td>.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Treatment</td>
<td>-.037 (.034)</td>
<td>-.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy (W1)</td>
<td>.473 (.028)**</td>
<td>.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy (W1)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( R^2 \)

\( N = 1340 \). Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis) followed by standardized coefficients controlling for variables listed (age through external efficacy Wave 1).

\( \dagger p \leq .10; * p \leq .05; ** p \leq .01. \)

Figures 6.1 and 6.2 present boxplots illustrating the differences in efficacy levels across the key comparison groups. These figures show the mean efficacy scores for different levels of awareness and use of the CIR in both Wave 1, before the election was in full swing, and in Wave 2, right before the election. The lower and upper bounds of the boxes represent one standard deviation away from the means on these scores, providing a comparison of how these means changed in comparison to changes across the entire sample, and outliers are represented by dots. Though these figures are cruder than those found through the regression analysis (because they do not control for related factors such as political interest and party), they are useful for
illustrating the relative degrees of change in these different groups and, thereby, provide insight into how deliberative minipublics alter the macro public’s political attitudes over the span of an election.

A simple comparison of the Wave 1 and Wave 2 external efficacy means for those who were unaware of the CIR (Wave 1 \( M = 2.22, SD = .81 \); Wave 2 \( M = 2.21, SD = .76 \)) and aware of the CIR (Wave 1 \( M = 2.32, SD = .86 \); Wave 2 \( M = 2.41, SD = .79 \)) show that each group entered the election season with similar levels of external efficacy. By the end of the election, however, the external efficacy of those unaware of the CIR remained relatively stagnant, whereas those who were at least somewhat aware showed a slight rise in external efficacy, with those who had the lowest levels of external efficacy seeing an increase while those with already high levels of efficacy mirrored those who were unaware. (See Figure 6.1.) This suggests that the effects of the CIR might be particularly beneficial for those with low external efficacy, though those with already high levels of external efficacy may not see much change.

With regard to internal efficacy, Figure 6.2 shows a more powerful trend in relation to use of the CIR Statements. Those who did not read the Statements had similar initial levels of political self-confidence (\( M = 3.12, SD = .58 \)) as those who read the CIR (Wave 1 \( M = 3.22, SD = .55 \)). Over the course of the election, however, those who did not read the CIR saw a decrease in internal efficacy (\( M = 3.02, SD = .59 \)); by contrast those who read the Statements saw a negligible increase to their feelings of political self-confidence (Wave 2 \( M = 3.26, SD = .49 \)). Rather than boosting internal efficacy, it appears the CIR Statement sustained one's sense of internal efficacy in the course of an election that otherwise depleted voters’ feelings of political competence.
Figure 6.1

*Mean External Efficacy Scores by Level of Awareness of the CIR*

![Box plot showing mean external efficacy scores for different levels of awareness and waves.](image)

Figure 6.2

*Mean Internal Efficacy Scores by having Read the CIR Statements*

![Box plot showing mean internal efficacy scores for different reading status and waves.](image)
Interaction effects. Having found significant effects for CIR awareness and use on internal and external efficacy, I ran an additional post hoc analysis with the purpose of discovering whether or not any of the control variables actually had a moderating effect on the results. To test this question, I ran moderated simple regression, creating interaction variables for each of our control variables and awareness and use of the CIR and testing to see whether any of these interaction variables led to significant changes to internal or external efficacy.

One of the most consistently influential control variables in this study was political interest, and the post hoc analysis indicates a significant negative interaction between political interest and reading the CIR Statements on internal efficacy ($\beta = -0.154$, $p = .014$). As illustrated in Figure 6.3, reading the Statements seems to negate the effect that political interest would have on internal efficacy. Though one might expect that political interest would increase internal efficacy, reading the CIR balances out the changes to internal efficacy over time. In other words, reading the CIR corrects the influence of low levels of political interest, causing those with low interest to respond in ways similar to those with high levels of interest. Or, viewed another way, reading the CIR Statement shrinks the confidence gap between political inactives and those who self-identify as interested in politics.

Party affiliation also proved to have significant interactions with both awareness and use of the CIR in affecting changes to external efficacy. Simple awareness of the CIR interacted with party affiliation, affecting voters’ levels of external efficacy. Figure 6.4 suggests that Democrats who were aware of the CIR tended to increase their external efficacy in relation to moderates, whose awareness of the CIR increased their external efficacy in relation to Republicans ($\beta = .226$, $p < .001$). Reading the CIR, however, had the opposite effect, as illustrated in Figure 6.5. Republicans who read the CIR Statements increased their external efficacy in relation to
Figure 6.3

*Reading the CIR by Political Interest Predicting Internal Efficacy*

![Graph showing the relationship between political interest and internal efficacy.](image)

*Note.* $N = 1335$. Figure shows Wave 2 internal efficacy predicted by having read the CIR by party affiliation, controlling for Wave 1 internal efficacy as well as age, gender, income, education, party affiliation, political knowledge, political interest, and having received the summary treatment.

moderates, who saw only modest increases in external efficacy, and Democrats, whose external efficacy decreased ($\beta = -0.105, p = .026$). Though interesting, these findings are difficult to interpret with the limited available data, though in the discussion section I provide some speculation as to their meaning and suggest the need for further research.

**Other measures of efficacy.** Our results suggest that neither being aware of the CIR nor reading the Citizens’ Statement led to changes in the remaining two political attitudes related to efficacy. As shown in Table 6.4, the survey found no evidence that voters changed their opinions when deciding whether 500 randomly selected citizens or U.S. Congress would be wiser when making political decisions and no change to respondents’ feelings of empowerment regarding state initiatives.
Figure 6.4

*CIR Awareness by Party Interest Predicting External Efficacy*

Note. N = 1322. Figure shows Wave 2 external efficacy predicted by awareness of the CIR by party affiliation, controlling for Wave 1 external efficacy as well as age, gender, income, education, party affiliation, political knowledge, political interest, and having received the summary treatment.

Figure 6.5

*Reading the CIR by Party Predicting External Efficacy*

Note. N = 1322. Figure shows Wave 2 external efficacy predicted by having read the CIR by party affiliation, controlling for Wave 1 external efficacy as well as age, gender, income, education, party affiliation, political knowledge, political interest, and having received the summary treatment.
Table 6.4

Awareness and Use of the CIR Predicting Changes to Political Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Citizens Wiser than Legislature (Wave 2)</th>
<th>Initiatives are Empowering (Wave 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE) Beta</td>
<td>B (SE) Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.786 (.161)**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001 (.002) .008</td>
<td>-.002 (.002) -.045</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.037 (.079) -.013</td>
<td>.002 (.055) .001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.047 (.030) -.047</td>
<td>.010 (.021) .016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.008 (.010) -.022</td>
<td>-.003 (.007) -.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>.059 (.019)** .091</td>
<td>.020 (.013) .048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>-.070 (.053) -.042</td>
<td>.073 (.038) † .067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>.044 (.032) .042</td>
<td>.061 (.023)** .091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary treatment</td>
<td>-.093 (.088) -.029</td>
<td>.114 (.062) † .054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens wiser than leg. (W1)</td>
<td>.542 (.030)** .539</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives are empowering (W1)</td>
<td>--- ---</td>
<td>.531 (.030) .538</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Predictors        |                                        |                                    |
| Aware of CIR      | .037 (.089) .013                       | .006 (.062) .003                   |
| Read CIR Statements | -.137 (.109) -.040              | .070 (.077) .031                   |
| $R^2$             | .350                                    | .329                               |

*Note. N = 1340. Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis) followed by standardized coefficients controlling for variables listed (age through external efficacy Wave 1). † $p \leq .10; \ast p \leq .05; \ast\ast p \leq .01.*

**Deliberative faith.** Simple awareness of the CIR was not enough to influence deliberative faith, but Table 6.5 shows that reading the Citizens’ Statements had a significant effect—though not in the direction predicted in Hypothesis 3. Reading the Statements did not change respondents’ attitudes along two of the measures of deliberative faith: their belief that they might change their mind after studying an initiative or that strong arguments usually exist both for and against a measure. Reading the Statement, however, may have actually decreased participants’ faith along one measure, considering debate and consensus equally important. This measure approached significance, with panelists more likely to move away from believing both to be equally important than toward considering them both important ($\beta = -.064, p = .086$). A post-hoc analysis, intended to see if those exposed to the statements moved toward either debate
### Table 6.5

**Awareness and Use of the CIR Predicting Changes to Deliberative Faith**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Consensus and Debate Equal (Wave 2)</th>
<th>Would Change Mind if Studied (Wave 2)</th>
<th>Strong Arguments on Both Sides (Wave 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( B (SE) ) ** Beta ( B (SE) ) ** Beta ( B (SE) ) ** Beta | ( B (SE) ) ** Beta | ( B (SE) ) ** Beta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.661 (.130)** --- 1.680 (.164)** --- 2.290 (.152)** ---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001 (.001) .016 - .005 (.002)** -.113 .002 (.001) .053</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.045 (.047) .032 - .030 (.049) -.020 .037 (.043) .028</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.010 (.018) .019 .015 (.019) .028 -.044 (.016)** -.096</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.001 (.006) -.004 .006 (.006) .032 .002 (.005) .014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-.011 (.011) -.033 .008 (.011) .023 .010 (.010) .032</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>-.024 (.032) -.029 - .047 (.033) -.053 -.053 (.029) † -.068</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>-.027 (.019) -.052 - .019 (.020) -.035 -.032 (.018) † -.067</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary treatment</td>
<td>-.021 (.053) -.013 -.031 (.055) -.018 -.003 (.048) -.002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consensus and debate equal (W1)</td>
<td>.322 (.032)** .337 --- --- --- ---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would change mind if studied (W1)</td>
<td>--- --- .413 (.034)** .400 --- ---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong arguments on both sides (W1)</td>
<td>--- --- --- --- .286 (.032)** .292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aware of CIR</td>
<td>.071 (.053) .051 .015 (.055) .010 -.014 (.048) -.011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Read CIR Statements</td>
<td>-.112 (.065) † -.064 -.044 (.068) -.024 -.092 (.059) -.057</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>.134 .197 .147</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note. N = 1340. Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis) followed by standardized coefficients controlling for variables listed (age through external efficacy Wave 1). †p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01.*
or consensus, did not add much clarity to this result. Although individuals were more likely to move toward an emphasis on debate rather than consensus, these results were not significant.

**Experimental manipulation.** As shown in Table 6.6, the experimental manipulation found no significance regarding the relationships among any of the treatment conditions and the dependent variables. That said, results approached significance for believing that ballot measures usually had strong arguments on both sides, $F (3,356) = 2.57, p = .054$. Respondents in both the Citizens’ Statement condition ($M = 2.75, SD = .70$) and the Explanatory Statement condition ($M = 2.74, SD = .62$) reported greater increases in their belief that they might change their mind if they carefully studied an initiative than either those in the SOS condition ($M = 2.51, SD = .69$) or the control group ($M = 2.66, SD = .61$). A post-hoc Tukey test approached significance when comparing both the CIR Statement group and the Summary group with the SOS group, $p = .073$ and $p = .087$ respectively, but there was no significant contrast with the control group. This odd and marginally significant result has no clear theoretical meaning, and though it could merit re-testing in a replication study, I discuss it no further in this dissertation.

**Effects of Importance of the CIR and Use of the Citizens’ Statements**

With some facets of Hypothesis 3 confirmed, namely that awareness of the CIR and use of the Statements can increase voters’ internal and external efficacy, I move to Hypothesis 4, which suggested that these normative effects would be greatest for those who had higher levels of involvement with the CIR. To test this claim, I ran simple regression analyses, focusing only on those who had read the Statements. Within that sub-group of respondents who had read the CIR Statements, I created two independent variables. The first distinguishes between those who found it important compared with those who attached no great significance to the CIR Statements they read. The second measures the length of time spent reading the Statements.
Table 6.6

*Effects of Experimental Treatment on Political Attitudes*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave 2 Political Attitude</th>
<th>CIR Statement</th>
<th>Explanatory Statement</th>
<th>SOS Letter</th>
<th>No Treatment (Control)</th>
<th>(F)</th>
<th>(\eta^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy</td>
<td>2.85 (.60)</td>
<td>2.79 (.67)</td>
<td>2.82 (.59)</td>
<td>2.79 (.60)</td>
<td>2.61</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy</td>
<td>2.34 (.73)</td>
<td>2.38 (.69)</td>
<td>2.33 (.77)</td>
<td>2.28 (.70)</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus and debate equal</td>
<td>.92 (.81)</td>
<td>.93 (.66)</td>
<td>.84 (.57)</td>
<td>.95 (.73)</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would change mind if studied</td>
<td>2.75 (.70)</td>
<td>2.74 (.62)</td>
<td>2.51 (.69)</td>
<td>2.66 (.61)</td>
<td>2.57†</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong arguments on both sides</td>
<td>2.80 (.63)</td>
<td>2.91 (.49)</td>
<td>2.92 (.63)</td>
<td>2.92 (.52)</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens wiser than legislature</td>
<td>3.73 (1.33)</td>
<td>3.65 (1.25)</td>
<td>3.86 (1.25)</td>
<td>3.61 (1.28)</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives are empowering</td>
<td>2.60 (.83)</td>
<td>2.76 (.78)</td>
<td>2.60 (.93)</td>
<td>2.46 (.92)</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* \(N = 1340\). Number ins table represent means with standard deviations in parenthesis.

\(†p \leq .10; *p \leq .05; **p \leq .01.\)
**Internal and external efficacy.** Those who considered the Statements important saw significant increases in their external efficacy when compared to those who read the Statements but did not consider them important. As described in Table 6.7, those who thought the Statements important were more likely to gain faith that the government was responsive to citizens ($\beta = .139, p = .005$). This group, however, did not increase their internal efficacy in comparison to those who considered the Statements less important. In contrast, those who spent more time on the statements were more likely increase their belief that they were personally capable of self-governance ($\beta = .268, p < .001$), though they were not more likely to increase their external efficacy.

Table 6.7

*Minutes Spent Reading and Considered Statements Important Predicting Changes to Internal and External Efficacy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>Internal Efficacy (Wave 2)</th>
<th>External Efficacy (Wave 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$ (SE)</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.981 (.248)**</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.002 (002)</td>
<td>-.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.029 (.063)</td>
<td>-.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.020 (.024)</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.008 (.008)</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-.002 (.015)</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>.161 (.045)**</td>
<td>.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>.072 (.026)**</td>
<td>.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Treatment</td>
<td>-.035 (.070)</td>
<td>-.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy (Wave 1)</td>
<td>.468 (.059)**</td>
<td>.480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy (Wave 1)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minutes spent reading</td>
<td>.008 (.002)**</td>
<td>.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considered Statements important</td>
<td>-.100 (.061)</td>
<td>-.092</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ .516  .639

*Note. N = 263. Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis) controlling for variables listed (age through external efficacy Wave 1). **$p \leq .01.$*
efficacy in comparison to those who spent less time on the Statements. These results parallel those found within the general population, with awareness of the CIR leading to external efficacy and use of the CIR leading to internal efficacy.

To ensure that these effects were not simply a result of having read some aspect of the Voters’ Pamphlet, a post hoc analysis was performed comparing the effects of time spent with and importance of each section of the Voters’ Pamphlet, including the CIR Statements as well as the summary information and the paid for arguments, on internal and external efficacy. Results suggest that the boost in internal efficacy is not merely a matter of having spent time reading information about the initiative. As shown in Table 6.8, when compared to time spent with the other sections of the Voters’ Pamphlet, spending more time with the CIR Statements contributed to higher increases in internal efficacy ($\beta = .263, p = .002$) than did time spent with the paid for arguments ($\beta = .156, p = .046$). Moreover, time spent with the summary statements may have actually decreased readers’ internal efficacy, though this result only approaches significance ($\beta = -.171, p = .064$). Turning to external efficacy, time spent with the CIR Statements showed no increases to external efficacy (mirroring our previous findings), though time spent with the summary information significantly increased external efficacy ($\beta = .226, p = .006$) and time spent with the paid arguments decreased it ($\beta = -.198, p = .004$).

When looking at how important readers considered each section, Table 6.9 shows that considering the CIR Statements important decreased readers’ internal efficacy ($\beta = -.202, p = .012$) though considering the summary statements important increased it ($\beta = .249, p = .009$). Turning to external efficacy, the only significant change was caused by placing importance on the CIR Statements, which caused a reader to see significant increases in perceived system responsiveness ($\beta = .180, p = .008$). This also mirrors our previous finding that placing
importance on the CIR, but not spending time with it, boosts external efficacy. 

Table 6.8 

*Minutes Spent Reading Sections of the Pamphlet Predicting Changes to Internal and External Efficacy*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Internal Efficacy (Wave 2)</th>
<th></th>
<th>External Efficacy (Wave 2)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>B (SE)</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.736(.212)**</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.378(.244)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.002 (.002)</td>
<td>-.065</td>
<td>.003 (.002)</td>
<td>.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.018 (.063)</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>.011 (.071)</td>
<td>.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.024 (.024)</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.024 (.028)</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.008 (.008)</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>-.004 (.009)</td>
<td>-.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>.001 (.014)</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.008 (.019)</td>
<td>-.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>.170 (.045)**</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>-.039 (.048)</td>
<td>-.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>.058 (.027)*</td>
<td>.133</td>
<td>.036 (.031)</td>
<td>.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal efficacy (Wave 1)</td>
<td>.488 (.058)**</td>
<td>.500</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External efficacy (Wave 1)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.745 (.052) **</td>
<td>.776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minutes Reading CIR</td>
<td>.008 (.003)**</td>
<td>.263</td>
<td>-.001 (.003)</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minutes Reading Summary</td>
<td>-.004 (.002)†</td>
<td>-.171</td>
<td>.007 (.003)**</td>
<td>.226†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minutes Reading Paid Arguments</td>
<td>.007 (.003)*</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>-.012 (.004)**</td>
<td>-.198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*R2 = .522. 545.*

Note. N = 262. Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis) controlling for variables listed (age through external efficacy Wave 1).

†p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01.

**Other measures of efficacy.** I found changes to the remaining efficacy items measured in this study when comparing time spent on the Statements, though significant increases were found when comparing how important a reader considered them, as suggested by the results in Table 6.10. Perceived importance of the CIR was unrelated to one’s faith in lay citizens versus the U.S. Congress or in feeling that the initiative process was empowering. Those who spent time with the CIR Statements, however, did see increases in their faith in citizens over Congress (β = .165, p = .012) and in their empowerment regarding the initiative process relative to their fellow readers (β = .161, p = .017).
Deliberative faith. Results were less clear when looking at changes to respondents’ deliberative faith. Those who considered the Statements more important saw no significant difference in changes to their deliberative faith when compared to those who considered the Statements less important. Those who spent more time on the Statements, however, actually decreased their deliberative faith along one measure, believing they would change their mind if they studied a ballot initiative for five days ($\beta = -0.229, p = .002$), as shown in Table 6.11. Time spent on the Statements, however, did not seem to impact changes to either believing that debate and consensus were equally important or believing that strong arguments existed both for and against most ballot measures. Again, these changes to deliberative faith are contrary to what I
Table 6.10

Minutes Spent Reading and Considered Statements Important Predicting Changes to Political Attitudes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictors</th>
<th>Citizens Wiser than Legislature (Wave 2)</th>
<th>Initiatives are Empowering (Wave 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$ (SE)</td>
<td>Beta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.707 (.597)**</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001 (.005)</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.035 (.169)</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.050 (.065)</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>0.001 (.021)</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>0.046 (.042)</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>-0.073 (.114)</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>0.074 (.071)</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary treatment</td>
<td>-0.081 (.190)</td>
<td>-0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens wiser than legislature (W1)</td>
<td>0.549 (.065)**</td>
<td>0.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives are empowering (W1)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minutes spent reading</td>
<td>0.012 (.005)*</td>
<td>0.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Considered Statements important</td>
<td>-0.204 (.163)</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ = .372

Note. N = 263. Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis) followed by standardized coefficients controlling for variables listed (age through external efficacy Wave 1).

*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01.

hypothesized. Rather than increasing their deliberative faith, those who considered the
Statements important either saw no change when compared to those who spent less time with the
Statements or decreased their deliberative faith.

Discussion

This study tested two interrelated hypotheses: (1) minipublics connected to macro-level
decision making can engender positive political attitudes for members of the wider public who
did not directly participate in the process but were aware of its existence and outcomes, and (2)
that these effects would be greatest for those who were most highly aware of the results and used
them in their decision making. Although this study found mixed results when looking at changes
### Table 6.11

**Minutes Spent Reading and Considered Statements Important Predicting Changes to Deliberative Faith**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Consensus and Debate Equal (Wave 2)</th>
<th>Would Change Mind if Studied (Wave 2)</th>
<th>Strong Arguments on Both Sides (Wave 2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$ (SE)</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td>$B$ (SE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.640 (.337)</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>1.701 (.379)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001 (.003)</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-.004 (.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.045 (.101)</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>-.028 (.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.009 (.039)</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.016 (.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.003 (.013)</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.001 (.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>-.006 (.024)</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>.014 (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political interest</td>
<td>-.025 (.068)</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>-.051 (.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political knowledge</td>
<td>-.038 (.042)</td>
<td>-.073</td>
<td>-.043 (.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary treatment</td>
<td>-.022 (.113)</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>-.035 (.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus and debate equal (W1)</td>
<td>.321 (.068)**</td>
<td>.336</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would change mind if studied (W1)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>.438 (.071)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong arguments on both sides (W1)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Predictors**

- Minutes spent reading: -.005 (.003) | -.123 | -.009 (.003)** | -.229 | .001 (.003) | .016
- Considered Statements important: .084 (.098) | .065 | .087 (.098) | .064 | -.007(.091) | -.006

$R^2$ | .143 | .240 | .143

*Note. N = 336. Coefficients are unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in parenthesis) followed by standardized coefficients controlling for variables listed (age through external efficacy Wave 1).**

**p ≤ .01.
to both deliberative faith and exploratory measures of efficacy, both hypotheses were partially confirmed in regards to standard measures of internal and external efficacy.

Results indicate that different types of interaction with the CIR lead to distinct attitudinal changes. Although those who were simply aware that the CIR existed appeared to increase their external efficacy, they saw few, if any, other attitudinal changes. Those who actually read the Statements saw a larger scope of changes, depending on how much they used the Statements and considered them important in casting their vote. Those who read the Statements tended to increase their internal efficacy while potentially losing faith in deliberation, and those who considered the Statements important saw significant increases in external efficacy over those who did not consider the Statements important. These results did not hold up for the experimental treatment, with those receiving the CIR treatment showing no evidence of change.

Still, these findings are a bit more complex than predicted at the outset, with different types of involvement leading to different types of change. Regarding Hypothesis 3, those who were merely aware of the process, but had not read the Statements produced by the panelists, saw increases to their external, but not their internal, efficacy. In other words, simply being aware that such structures exist tended to boost voters’ faith that average citizens played a vital role in the democratic process and that governing officials are responsive to citizen input. This verifies the claims of those who say that mere the presence of deliberative minipublics have the possibility to boost the perceived legitimacy of the political process (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; Fung, 2003; Nabatchi, 2010).

Those who actually read the Statements produced by the CIR saw changes to their internal efficacy but saw no additional increases to their external efficacy over simple awareness. Two interrelated explanations may be responsible for this result. First, simply seeing other
citizens competently perform roles generally relegated to government officials and political professionals may allow readers to gain confidence in their own ability to self-govern. Second, deliberative minipublics are designed to draw the larger community into vicarious deliberation (Goodin, 2000), and, as Chapter 5 and other studies have shown, deliberative participation can increase participants’ internal efficacy (Fishkin, 2009; Gastil, 2004; Morrell, 2005). In other words, deliberation within (Goodin, 2000) may have some of the same benefits as interpersonal deliberation.

A closer look at these findings showed that those who were unaware of the CIR actually decreased their internal efficacy over the course of the election while those who read the Statements increased their feelings of political self-confidence. These results are indicative of the effects of deliberative versus alienating public sphere structures. As the election progressed, and voters likely gained greater exposure to the traditional media and organizational routines discussed in Chapter 2, those who were unaware of the CIR and did not read its output became further alienated, moving more towards commodification than towards internal efficacy. Those who read the Statements saw the opposite effects, moving away from commodification and towards political self-confidence.

Further, a post hoc analysis indicated that these findings were moderated by both political interest and party. In the case of internal efficacy, reading the CIR appeared to moderate traditional effects of political interest, causing low interest voters to match their high interest counterparts in feelings of political self-confidence. The effect of party was dependent on how one interacted with the CIR. Simple awareness tended to increase Democrats’ external efficacy while reading the Statements increased Republicans’ external efficacy and decreased Democrats’.
These findings suggest that knowing that deliberative processes exist can increase Democrats perceived system responsiveness, perhaps because they assume that such processes would allow them greater influence over government decision making. Upon reading the Statements, however, Republicans, not Democrats, increased their external efficacy, possibly as a result of feeling that the outcome was more bipartisan than expected. Democrats, on the other hand, decreased their perceived system responsiveness, perhaps let down that the Statements did not align with their previously held expectations. These findings, however, merely hint at the ways that deliberative effects may interact with party affiliation; more research is needed to verify and tease out these findings. Further interpretation must wait until similar interactions are replicated, and I plan to use data on the 2012 CIR to explore these connections further.

The experimental manipulation, however, produced no real changes, and this perhaps speaks more to the utility of an experiment for understanding these types of changes than to the validity of the findings generated by those who voluntarily chose to read the Citizens’ Statements. Those placed in an experimental condition did not seek out the information, and therefore, may have not placed as much faith in the information provided. Further, those placed in the treatment groups may have been aware that they were being tested, and therefore may not have even known that this process actually existed or that the Statements were actually produced by a cross-section of Oregon voters. In short, when taken out of their natural context, the Voters’ Pamphlet, the Citizens’ Statements may not have held as much validity and, subsequently, may not have had as much power to affect actual attitudinal change.

Turning to the second hypothesis, this study found that those who considered the Statements important in making their voting choice saw significant increases in their external efficacy over those who thought them less important but not in their internal efficacy. This
mirrors the findings from the larger population, which showed that simple awareness was the
catalyst for increased external, but not internal, efficacy. By contrast, those who spent time with
the Statements increased their internal, but not their external, efficacy. Again, this replicates the
results from Hypothesis 3 that found that reading the Statements, but not simple awareness,
spurred greater political self-confidence. This largely confirms assumptions that changes to
political attitudes would be greatest for those who were most aware of the process and its
outcomes and indicates that the existence of the CIR may have even greater effects as voters
become more aware of the process and utilize it when making their voting decisions.

Moreover, reading the Statements had effects that were distinct from those produced by
other sections of the Voters’ Pamphlet. Spending time with the Statements increased internal
efficacy relative to changes to efficacy produced by time spent with other parts of the Statement,
particularly in relation to the summary information which marginally decreased readers’ political
self-confidence. Time spent with the statements, however, did not alter readers’ external
efficacy; in contrast, the summary information boosted readers’ external efficacy and the paid for
arguments decreased it.

Measures of how important voters considered each section of the Voters’ Pamphlet
further complicates these findings. Those who considered the Statements important were the
only group to increase their external efficacy when compared to those who considered other
sections of the Voters’ Pamphlet important. Measures of internal efficacy, however, produced
different results. Those who considered the CIR Statements important actually decreased feelings
of internal efficacy, while considering the summary information important increased it. Though
these findings are contrary to my original hypothesis, they align with results found in a study
measuring the electoral impact of the CIR Statements (Gastil et al., 2011) in which researchers
found that voters were less likely to be sure of their voting choices after reading the Measure 73 Statement. In that study, the researchers hypothesize that the introduction of new information may have raised previously unconsidered questions for voters who were now less confident in their knowledge about the benefits and consequences of the measure.

These findings are particularly interesting in light of the model of alienation developed earlier in this dissertation. These post hoc results shed light onto how different structures, both alienating and deliberative, affect members of the public. Some of these findings point to a validation of that theory. Time spent with the commercially and professionally produced (or alienating) paid for arguments decreased voters’ external efficacy, increasing their feelings of powerlessness. The summary information, which more closely matches the ideals of deliberation, however, had the opposite effects, increasing voters’ perceived system responsiveness and decreasing their feelings of powerlessness. Moreover, placing importance on the CIR increased external efficacy, while the other sections produced no change.

Some of these findings, however, are a bit murkier when placing them in the context of the alienation model. Though the CIR Statements had the strongest effect in increasing external efficacy and decreasing powerlessness, so did the paid for arguments, if to a lesser extent. So though the increases produced by the CIR match the model’s expectations, similar increases produced by the paid for arguments contrast them. In addition, placing greater importance on the CIR actually decreased voters’ feelings of internal efficacy and increased their feelings of meaningless. Even so, awareness of one’s own lack of issue-specific knowledge could classify as a decrease in meaninglessness, so a refinement of the model may be needed to better differentiate actual meaninglessness from valid recognitions of inadequate issue comprehension.

The exploratory measures of efficacy found slightly different results. Those who found
the Statements more important had no significant increase in either their faith that citizens could be wiser than members of the legislature or in their feelings of empowerment related to the initiative process. Those who spent time with the Statements, however, saw significant increases along both these measures when compared with readers who devoted less time to the Statements. Finally, comparisons of those who spent time with the Statements also found that those who spent more time with the Statements were actually likely to decrease their deliberative faith, decreasing their belief that they may change their mind if they studied a ballot measure for five days. This finding is contrary to the one I hypothesized, though further research is needed to make sense of what this means for the effects of such outcomes on the public’s faith in deliberation.

**Conclusion**

The above results indicate that deliberative minipublics can cause an increase in positive political attitudes, particularly for those who most utilize their results. This gives credence to theorists who suggested that such macro-level attitudinal change was possible through the introduction of deliberative minipublics (Fung, 2003; Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; Nabatchi, 2010) and further justifies the proliferation of such institutions. As these processes expand and as their political power increases, they may produce even greater attitudinal shifts for the general public and cause the average voter to have more faith in themselves as political actors and more faith in current governing processes. This potentially could spread to behavioral changes, as members of the public begin to feel that they have a legitimate role to play in democratic government.

Even so, the results presented here are applicable to a limited context. The Oregon CIR is the first of its kind, and although good governance organizations and elected officials in other locations are interested in introducing similar processes, none have yet been implemented. This
limits our ability to understand what these results would look like in other locations, particularly in more ethnically diverse or politically divided places, or if structured and implemented differently. Oregon is a fairly homogenous state, overwhelmingly white and skewing fairly old. The process may be more contentious when involving a more diverse population or may have to be altered to meet the needs of particular locales. This could potentially affect the power of the process to affect large-scale attitudinal change. As these processes spread, researchers must continue to test the theories and results presented here, looking to whether these results hold up or if different locations produce different effects.

Moreover, the CIR holds significant power when compared to many of the currently existing minipublics. Its results appear in the statewide Voters’ Pamphlet, which every Oregon voter receives and which a large majority, as many as 80%, use when casting their vote (Gastil et al., 2011). A process that does not hold as much power or have the same ability to reach a wide swath of the public would likely not produce such widespread change. To understand the effects of different types of minipublics, the research presented herein must be replicated across contexts with the goal of understanding which processes are most likely to affect change. These results can then be compared to differentiate which aspects of these processes are most likely to produce widespread results and which aspects appear to have little effect on the macro public.

Some methodological limitations additionally constrained the viability of these results, particularly regarding the lack of power displayed by the experimental treatment and my inability to create a reliable scale for deliberative faith. As previously mentioned, the experimental approach used here may not be the most effective way of measuring real attitudinal change. If individuals do not self-select into the process or are unsure that it even exists, they are probably less likely to actually change their attitudes about either themselves or the governing
process. Researchers may want to try different experimental manipulations, though studies that test participants in their natural environment will likely hold more power.

Moving to deliberative faith, on a few instances I found changes that approached or reached significance, though often in the opposite direction than predicted. This study used only two measures of deliberative faith, and these measures could not be reliably combined. Future research should include more measures of deliberative faith in an attempt to produce a reliable scale and understand whether these processes do actually produce decreases in deliberative faith, or, if taken as a whole, deliberative faith actually sees no change or increases.

Finally, the results presented here deal primarily with what I am calling “second-level” emanating effects, or effects for those members of the public who had no direct connection to either the process or those who participated in it. Another level of emanating effects may be possible, however. These effects may be even greater for those who are not directly connected to the process but who do have some connection to those who participated as panelists. As discussed in Chapter 5, CIR participants saw change to their knowledge and opinion, internal and external efficacy, deliberative faith, and political engagement. In the future, researchers should test the potential that these individual changes can affect the wider community. By following panel participants back to their local communities, researchers can test whether the personal change exhibited by the panelists spreads to those who they most often discuss political affairs with or to the larger community in which they interact. We may see even larger changes to local communities, or first-level emanating effects, as participants bring their new-found political attitudes and deliberative skills home and, potentially, alter the attitudes of those with whom they interact and the way politics is conducted in their local communities.
Chapter 7

Restructuring the Public Sphere:

How Deliberative Public Projects Can Transform Civic Practice

I began this dissertation by lamenting the alienating effects of dominant public sphere structures in contemporary Western society. Chapter 2 explored how such communication practices distance the general public from their democratic power and offered institutionalized deliberative forums as means for overcoming such alienation. Deliberative democratic theorists have pushed for more participatory governance that fosters information-based, civil decision making among representative groups of the general public (Barber, 1992; Gastil, 2008). At the present time, however, research on the quality of such processes and the effects that they may have on the public remains somewhat underdeveloped (Mutz, 2008). As the number and influence of deliberative opportunities increase scholars face an ever greater imperative to clarify our knowledge on the quality and impact of deliberative public projects.

I have used this dissertation to enhance this body of work and explored the quality and effects of two large-scale, consultative deliberative processes: the 2010 Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review (CIR) and the 2009 Australian Citizens’ Parliament (ACP). Chapter 3 provided an in-depth analysis of the CIR and showed that such processes can be highly deliberative and produce accurate and useful information for larger public discourse. Chapters 4 through 6 then looked at the potential for such processes to overcome the alienating effects of current communication practices and resocialize those who participate in them and found that they can positively influence the civic cognitions and behaviors of participants and the attitudes of the wider public. Below, I review the theoretical argument that underpins this project—that
commodified and professionalized public sphere structures alienate the public and that deliberative structures can correct those trends. I then revisit the results of each study contained herein and highlight what they can tell us about public sphere discourse and civic socialization more generally before suggesting some concrete ways that scholars can continue to explore these processes and their effects.

**Alienation and Deliberation**

In contemporary democratic societies, the public relies on its communication structures to facilitate self-governance. Through these structures, the public talks about common concerns, forms opinions, and expresses those opinions to decision makers (Habermas, 1989). The practices and norms of these structures influence who can express opinions and what opinions will be expressed (Ginsberg, 1986; Herbst, 1993). Ideally, these structures are deliberative; they foster enlightened understanding and communicative equality and aid the public in making good decisions (Dahl, 1989; Chambers, 2003; Dahlberg, 2005; Fishkin, 1991). When these structures are commodified and professionalized, however, the public becomes alienated from one another and the opinions expressed through them and, ultimately, from a source of democratic power.

Deliberation and alienation, then, sit on opposite sides of a spectrum of public sphere discourse. Deliberation acts as a normative model and alienation an anti-normative framework for critique. Alienating structures create conditions of commodification by replacing lay citizens with political professionals and creating public opinion for profit, social isolation by distancing citizens from one another, meaninglessness by providing biased and at times inaccurate information, normlessness by thwarting deliberative discussion, and powerlessness by creating top-down structures that hinder the public’s decision-making power. Deliberative structures can correct those trends by involving the lay public in informed and egalitarian decision making.
Further, by limiting certain types of political communication and engagement and enabling others (Giddens, 1984), alienating and deliberative structures likely influence the publics’ political cognitions and behaviors, including their internal and external efficacy, deliberative faith, collective identity, and communicative, community-based, and institutionalized engagement. Alienating structures likely decrease these positive civic attributes, and deliberative structures likely increase them. The studies presented here all draw on this framework. In the first, I asked if deliberative structures truly can live up to their normative ideal. The second then moved to the individual level, and I explored how deliberative structures affect the attitudes and actions of those who participate in them. For the final study, I looked to the wider community and analyzed the impact that the implementation of a deliberative forum had on the attitudes of the electorate.

Findings

Chapter 3 assessed how one deliberative minipublic, the 2010 Oregon CIR, performed on each of three deliberative criteria: analytic rigor, democratic discussion, and just decision-making. Relying on panelist questionnaires, direct observation, and transcript analysis, the research team and I found that the process was highly deliberative. Though we noted specific areas for improvement, our evaluation concluded that the CIR lived up to the deliberative ideals that inspired it, particularly in comparison to the strategic rhetoric that often dominates public sphere discourse.

Chapter 5 then explored the potential for such structures to resocialize participants and looked at the cognitive and behavioral effects that deliberative participation had on panelists. Here, I utilized subjective feedback from participants in the CIR and the ACP. The findings confirmed and clarified much of what we already knew, verifying an already extensive body of
research on the positive effects of deliberative participation (Fishkin, 1991, 1995, 2009; Gastil & Dillard, 1999b; Gastil et al., 2008; Jacobs et al., 2009; Morrell, 2005; Nabatchi, 2010). Face-to-face CIR and ACP participants gained knowledge, deliberative faith, a sense of collective identity, and internal efficacy.

Interestingly, I found mixed results regarding external efficacy, with participants increasing their faith that the political process provides means for citizen empowerment but not necessarily their faith in governing officials. This complicates findings showing deliberation increases external efficacy (Fishkin, 2009; Nabatchi, 2010) and suggests that the common external efficacy scale may actually be measuring a number of different facets of attitudes toward government (see also Gastil & Xenos, 2010).

Additionally, panelists generally increased their communicative and community-based engagement, though fewer increased institutionalized forms of engagement. This latter finding, coupled with the external efficacy results, illustrates that participation caused panelists to increase their desire for and engagement in empowering forms of civic activity though it may have caused them to be wary of the dominant forms of public sphere engagement that, as mentioned in Chapter 2, often serve to undermine, rather than empower, citizens’ role in self-governance.

The ACP gave me an opportunity to compare the attitudinal and behavioral effects of face-to-face deliberation versus online deliberation. These results showed that although online participants gained internal efficacy and increased their communicative engagement, they did not necessarily increase their external efficacy or deliberative faith and did not increase their community-based or institutionalized engagement. Although, as noted in that chapter, these findings may have been due to a smaller sample size, a similarly small sample of CIR face-to-
face participants did produce results along most of these measures. These findings indicate that whereas online deliberation may provide a valuable means for public engagement and can have civic benefits for participants, it cannot necessarily emulate the transformative power of face-to-face practices.

Finally, Chapter 6 addressed the possibility that minipublics connected to macro-level public decision making could shift the political attitudes of not only the participants but of the wider community who was aware of or utilized the results of such processes. These claims have long buttressed scholars’ justification for the proliferation of such forums (Goodin & Dryzek, 2006; Fung, 2003; Nabatchi, 2010) but till now have received no empirical attention.

Relying on a statewide survey of Oregon voters, this study explored how knowing about the CIR or reading its Citizens’ Statements affected how the Oregon electorate felt about their own self-competence for government and their role in the governing process. The results from that study found that awareness of the CIR did increase citizens’ faith in the governing process and that reading the Statement increased voters’ feelings of personal self-competence. Moreover, these effects were greatest for those who spent time with the Statements and considered them an important factor in casting their vote. These findings further justify the call for micro-to-macro deliberative public projects and illustrate that their benefits can go beyond the simple insertion of information into public discourse and transform how members of the electorate understand their role in the governing process.

In short, the findings presented here largely confirm the theoretical model developed in Chapters 2 and 4; deliberative public processes do have the power to resocialize citizens by overturning the public’s feelings of alienation. Such experiences can cause participants to gain confidence in themselves, one another, and the government and increase their engagement.
Moreover, the benefits of these processes can emanate to the wider community, shifting how the public think about themselves as political actors. These results contradict others that find conversation across difference decreased engagement (Mutz, 2006) or arguments by stealth democrats who claim the public would actually prefer less involvement in politics (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). The model presented here suggests that the public is not so much disinterested as disempowered. By correcting the conditions of alienation, deliberative processes give lay citizens a place for meaningful and effective involvement, an opportunity rarely offered in the wider political process. Those who have engaged in deliberation appear eager to continue their political involvement, even if they do not choose to engage in the more traditional forms of participation associated with electoral institutions.

Together, these results justify the proliferation of such projects and bolster the claim that deliberative projects have the potential to reinvigorate democratic practice (Delli Carpini et al., 2004), particularly deliberative minipublics that can draw the mass public into the deliberative process. This structuration (Giddens, 1984) has the distinct advantage of allowing small-scale, ideal deliberation to produce benefits that extend far beyond those directly involved in the discussions. When such processes maintain their design integrity and are consequentially situated in the public sphere, they have the potential to transform our political system by allowing the public to feel empowered and competent for self-governance. Such processes shift public spheres away from the top-down, commodified and alienating structures that generally dominate political discourse and toward a more inclusive and egalitarian form of decision making that transfers the power from a limited cadre of political professionals to the wider public.
Methodological Limitations

Still, some methodological limitations highlight a need to continue this research program, with the goal of solidifying our understanding of deliberation’s transformative power, particularly across contexts. First and foremost, the studies presented herein focus on two specific deliberative forums, both of which had representative bodies of the public gather together for intensive multi-day deliberations and had institutionalized connection to decision making officials. Although other such forums exist, few have the power held by the CIR or the authority that comes with approval by state and national governments. Further, many such processes do not currently have the means to reach out to the public in the ways that the CIR in particular had. All this is to say that this study focused on two highly unique processes. And though these processes will likely serve as models for similar processes in the future, the findings presented here cannot speak to deliberative forums that are structured differently, either including a less representative sample of the population or providing less time for deliberation, or that lack the official capacity seen in these two instances. Other structures might fail to produce such individual level change and, without a means for disseminating the outcomes produced through them, other processes will likely not have the emanating effects found through the CIR.

In addition, particularly regarding participant effects, I was limited in my ability to get baseline measurements of participants’ cognitions and behaviors before deliberation. This caused me to rely on subjective measures of change, which, although valuable, cannot answer questions about real personal change. This is not to say that these measures are invalid. In fact, they may prove over the long run to be a particularly important factor in understanding how these processes affect individual participants. This is only to note that this methodological shortcoming
limited my ability to definitively assert that the panelists underwent objective changes, particularly regarding their political engagement.

A final note regarding methodological limitations: much of the research regarding emanating effects was exploratory. As mentioned in Chapter 6, I was unable to produce a reliable measure of deliberative faith and found few results for those items not reliant on traditional scales of political attitudes. Owing to these limitations as well as the contextual limitations mentioned above, this line of research needs further testing to understand the overarching validity of these findings. Further refinement of the attitude measurements would provide a more consistent basis on which to measure change. This will become particularly important over the long run as such processes become entrenched in the wider public sphere. As will be discussed below, the 2012 CIR has already seen the incursion of strategic communication. As advocates and members of the public better recognize the latent strategic potential in such processes, their transformative power may diminish as the public begins to doubt the integrity of such deliberative events. To fully understand such processes and their effects, researchers must continue to ask questions about how deliberative public projects influence both participants and the wider public.

**Lingering Questions**

The circumstantial and methodological limitations mentioned above hindered the clarity of these results, and future research must aim to correct these problems in order clarify the quality and effects of deliberative public processes. The Citizens’ Initiative Review is still new, and the data developed out of this forum will offer a rich body of knowledge for scholars to use in parceling out how deliberation works and what affects it may have for participants and the wider public. Moreover, the research presented here stems from two rather similar processes.
Because deliberative processes vary in terms of who is included, how deliberation occurs, and what role the process plays within larger public sphere decision making, understanding deliberation’s quality and effects will require a continued extension of this research in different contexts.

**Understanding Alienation**

First, it should be noted that this dissertation has attempted to explore the deliberative half of the model presented in Chapter 2 but has not provided much empirical evidence on the effects of alienating structures. More work needs to be done looking specifically at how structures interact, following the formation of public opinion across structures to see how they complement and clash with one another and ultimately influence who participates and what opinions are produced. Advancing methodologies related to collective action will likely provide a particularly useful resource for this type of work, as they recognize the amorphous nature of contemporary political communication and the fluidity of actors, resources, and ideas that move through them.

Scholars of collective action have already pointed toward ways that new information and communication technologies allow citizens to circumvent top-down, commodified, and isolating channels of the public sphere and reclaim their role in the formation of public opinion (Bennett, 2003, 2005; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Bimber, 2003; Bimber et al., 2005). Researchers should continue to study both geographically localized and transnationally networked communities to understand how members of the public form, discuss, and express public opinions in their own words and from the ground up. Scholarship that relies on qualitative methods, such as interviews, ethnographies, direct observation, and focus groups can foster better understandings of public opinion as it emanates from the people and combined with studies which rely on surveys, content
analysis, and network analysis can show how network structures interact with one another and influence the role of the public in utilizing public sphere structures for democratic control, particularly in comparison to more traditional means.

My own difficulty in better matching alienating conditions to their behavioral effects also points to the need for further clarification of this aspect of alienation theory and towards the need to better discern types of engagement. In conducting a literature review for that section, it became clear that connections between political cognitions and political behavior are often measured through the impact on voter turnout. Although this is useful knowledge, voting is not the only valid form of political engagement, and scholars would be better served by more adequately disentangling multiple types of engagement from one another. Two such categorizations, self-actualizing versus dutiful engagement (see Bennett, 2008) and communicative, community-based, and strategic engagement (see Gastil & Xenos, 2010)—the categorization loosely utilized in Chapters 4 and 5—are steps in this direction. Researchers should continue to parcel out these distinctions to better understand how structures and cognitions affect specific forms of political participation.

Assessing Deliberative Quality

Although the analysis of the deliberative quality of the CIR contained in this dissertation provided a thorough description and critique of the process’s deliberative quality, the methods used to create this analysis were both labor- and cost-intensive. Researchers are continually attempting to create a real-time coding scheme of such events to more efficiently gauge their deliberative quality, though such schemes have so far failed to maintain reliability (see Edwards, Hindmarsh, Mercer, Bond, & Rowland, 2008). For the 2010 and 2012 CIRs, I developed a real-time coding scheme that coupled our definitional criterion for deliberation with each segment of
the agenda, using multiple questions to measure how the process rated on the relevant deliberative criteria for each agenda segment. Our research team used this scheme to keep detailed notes and compare impressions, but the coding scheme itself was never tested for reliability and the quantitative results were not included in our ultimate analysis of the 2010 CIR. Testing the reliability of this scheme should be a priority for future research. Even if reliability is not found, this scheme can likely serve as a framework for focusing the attention of evaluators and ensuring that researchers are in constant conversation regarding the deliberative quality of such events.

In addition, the evaluation of the CIR suggests testable hypotheses that speak to the need to figure out which specific components of deliberative processes produce best outcomes (Mutz, 2006). The evaluation suggests the importance of a number of factors, including the presence of moderators, training in deliberative skills, mixed discussion styles, and question-and-answer sessions and suggests that such structures likely lead to desired outcomes such as knowledge gains, feelings of respect, and the civil resolution of disagreements. Further, these findings point to a number of research questions, including queries related to the best way to provide participants with information and evidence, how to incorporate values discussions, and the best ways to mitigate the potential coercive pressure of real time constraints. Researchers interested in deliberative design should test these claims and questions, linking the inclusion or exclusion of these factors to desired outcomes. Only through such research will we realistically refine and ultimately realize the aspirations of deliberative democratic theory.

As the CIR develops and potentially expands its power within the electoral process, entrenched interests are likely to learn how the process functions and, in the interest of gaining ground for their cause, attempt to co-opt it. Researchers should continue to closely evaluate the
process, looking at how both the process evolves and how advocates’ understanding and utilization of the process changes. I, along with two other researchers, again sat in on the 2012 CIR as an evaluator and noticed some of these transformations. Though the process improved on some aspects, particularly the inclusion of time for feedback on the final Statements from both the advocates and panelists, the better inclusion of values discussions, and the replacement of the Shared Agreement section with an Additional Policy Considerations section, other parts of the process are still in need of adjustment to match deliberative ideals. For instance, panelists created a number of items that could be contained in the Key Findings and Additional Policy Considerations section, but after a prioritization process on day 3, many of these findings were inadvertently excluded from the final Statement. These structural changes must be continually tracked and compared with the goal of figuring out which process most closely matches the ideals of deliberative discussion and produces the most accurate and useful Statements for the Voters’ Pamphlet.

Along with these structural changes came a better understanding on the part of the advocates and the panelists about their strategic role in the process and the process’s strategic role in larger public sphere discourse. The advocates at the 2012 CIR were better prepared to engage in sustained deliberation and provided detailed sourcing materials for most of their factual information. With this change, however, came some caveats. The influx of sources and statistically verifiable information actually added a greater level of confusion for the panelists, who now had to decide which source to trust. Particularly in week two, which dealt with the implementation of non-tribal casinos, both sides brought their own economists who offered conflicting claims about the economic impact of private casinos. In the end, the panelists decided that they could not adequately predict the economic impact and this lack of knowledge became a
Key Finding. Advocates will likely become even savvier as the process develops and, as a consequence, ensuring the integrity of the process will likely become even more difficult. This possibility is likely for not only the CIR, but for all deliberative processes as they proliferate and become more entrenched in decision making, so evaluative teams must provide specific feedback on how best to avoid their co-optation.

In addition to the advocates’ recognition of their strategic role, the panelists themselves indicated that they, too, were working as strategic actors. Several times during the 2012 process, panelists discussed how to best convey information to the average Oregon voter. In some instances this facilitated a better statement, as panelists recognized the need to keep the language simple and direct and to convey information in a way that recognized that the average voter would not have five days to study the information. On some occasions, however, this led to a more strategic statement. Particularly when writing the sections in support of or in opposition to the measure, panelists would occasionally state arguments as definitive, even if they themselves expressed reservations about whether or not this could be adequately predicted, with the goal of making more persuasive or “bold” claims (as one panelist put it).

Moreover, at least one group purposefully chose to leave out information that could hurt their side’s chance of victory. During the casino initiative deliberations, one of the panelists saw the proliferation of private casinos as a positive for the state due to its perceived ability to bring economic revitalization to financially depressed areas. Another panelist persuaded him to leave that piece out of the final statement, arguing that some voters would be afraid of such proliferation and that the argument could help their opponent. Instances like these are indicative of the potential for not only advocates but panelists themselves to co-opt the process, and again,
evaluators must be tasked with identifying these instances and finding ways to best prevent them from harming the integrity of the deliberations.

**Participant Effects**

Future deployments of the CIR offer the chance to fix methodological shortcomings. Of primary concern is correcting some of the methodological limitations that inhibited the studies reported here. Pre and post tests would be a more effective means to measure actual change, though this type of methodology still relies on panelist self-reports. These tests could, however, include the attitude and behavior measures contained in the present study as well as measures of deliberative skill acquisition. This type of repetition would provide a more stable and longitudinal portrait of deliberative effects. For the 2012 process, I implemented such a pre-deliberation survey, measuring the political attitudes contained herein as well as a number of behaviors more specifically related to deliberation, such as conversation habits. This survey was adjusted based on knowledge gained from the 2010 surveys, particularly by focusing political engagement items on activities more closely related to deliberation and adjusting the deliberative skills items in an attempt to create a reliable scale measurement. I plan to conduct a follow-up survey in August of 2013 that will allow a pre and post comparison of panelists’ political attitudes, level of political engagement, and acquisition of deliberative skills.

The 2010 CIR dataset also contained several measures that have not yet been written-up for scholarly publication. The follow-up surveys distributed to the 2010 CIR participants contained items not discussed in this dissertation. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 5, several of the panelists reported that CIR participation had taught them deliberative skills, showing them how to engage in respectful conversation across difference and better participate in group decision making. In short, when panelists talked about personal transformations, they often
referred to the acquisition of deliberative skills, a concept that was not originally the focus of this research. Moreover, some panelists used the open-ended comments to say that their experience had caused them to understand themselves as a representative of the public, with some indicating that they intended to spread their deliberative skills to other members of their community. Both of these insights are indicative of the transformative power of deliberative participation and provide direction for further research.

With these comments in mind, I developed several survey measures that probed these questions explicitly. Because I developed the year-later survey after analyzing the results from the short-term survey, I added several measures to the year-later survey that stemmed directly from open-ended comments made by participants. Several of the questions directly refer to changes mentioned by participants, and participants were asked to say whether they engaged in specific deliberative activities more or less since their CIR experience. An analysis of these findings will help us better pinpoint what specific skills deliberative experience can foster. Further, by using these measures as an interaction variable to explain cognitive and behavioral participant effects, we may be able to discover whether the acquisition of specific deliberative skills is linked to changes to political attitudes and actions. This survey additionally asked participants to describe political conversations related to their CIR experience and to provide information about the people with whom they’d had these conversations. These answers may provide insight into how skills acquisition may transform one particular civic behavior, participation in informal political discussions.

Still, these surveys measure only subjective change. To measure actual change, ethnographic work is necessary. For the 2012 CIR, I plan to follow panelists back to their communities, conducting intensive interviews, observing their political conversations, and
accompanying them to political activities. This will provide an opportunity to observe real change, looking at how, if at all, panelists utilize their new found deliberative skills when engaged in everyday activities.

**Emanating Effects**

Deliberative events can also be a source for understanding a different type of emanating effect, what I refer to in Chapter 6 as “first-level” emanating effects. Data from the 2010 CIR can be used to better understand the transformation of panelists into ambassadors for deliberative democracy. As suggested by some of the 2010 CIR panelists, deliberative processes may cause people to not only understand themselves as representatives of the public but as ambassadors for deliberation. As these deliberative ambassadors return to their communities and daily lives, they may spread their newfound skill set to other members of their community, either indirectly by acting as models of deliberative communication, or directly by training others in deliberative practices or encouraging them to engage in more political activities. The year-later survey briefly asked participants to gauge whether their conversation partners may have changed since learning about the CIR, and this question may provide guidance in further developing questions and methodologies to study the potentially emanating effects of deliberative ambassadors.

Moreover, the ethnographic research discussed above will further explore first-level effects. While observing panelists engaged in political activities, such as attending meetings or engaged in local political discussions, I plan to pay particular attention to how the panelists’ personal transformations affect those with whom they interact. Do their newfound deliberative skills transform the way that others in their community talk about politics or how decisions are made within civic or political organizations? In addition, I plan to interview those with whom panelists have spoken most often about their deliberative experience, gleaning from these
conversations information about whether the panelists’ transformation have led to any transformations for these people as they either learn directly about the process or alter the way they think about or engage with politics.

In addition to exploring these first-level emanating effects, researchers should continue to test the claims and findings presented in Chapter 6 regarding second-level emanating effects. Though this hypothesis had received scant theoretical attention and no empirical attention prior to this work, the findings in that chapter present compelling evidence that micro-to-macro deliberative structures can cause widespread attitudinal change. I will continue to test these claims for the 2012 CIR, again implementing a statewide survey asking voters about their awareness of the CIR and use of its Citizens’ Statements as well as the measures contained herein regarding internal and external efficacy. In addition, I will attempt to improve the measures of deliberative faith, including more deliberative faith items in an attempt to create a reliable scale measure of that variable.

Other Contexts

Of course, as mentioned earlier, the Oregon CIR and the ACP are not the only contexts in which one can test the hypotheses presented here. Good government organizations and elected officials in other states as well as the European Union have expressed interest in establishing processes similar to the CIR. The current structure of the CIR will likely be modified and adapted to meet the needs of particular communities, and these cases will offer ample opportunities to see if the findings presented here hold up when similar processes are implemented in other locations.

Aside from these possibilities, a plethora of deliberative forums are currently being developed and implemented that offer possibilities for further testing and comparison. I am
particularly interested in examining the effects of community embedded and ongoing processes. The Center for Public Deliberation at Colorado State University, where I begin my first faculty appointment in 2013, will offer me an opportunity to study first-hand such processes. There, organizers have been working since 2006 to develop the community’s capacity for public deliberation, initiating a number of deliberative forums on a wide range of topics. Such community-embedded work will offer the opportunity to see the effects of multiple and ongoing deliberative forums. I expect that such community embeddedness will lead to greater participant change, as participants have the opportunity to practice their new found skills in other contexts, and will additionally have larger emanating effects as members of the community interact with a growing number of deliberative ambassadors and see public officials take deliberative processes seriously.

Though the research presented here found that online forums have limited transformative power when compared to their face-to-face counterparts, new online formats for deliberation or a greater institutionalization of such processes may grant them more power. As these processes develop and spread, researchers should continue to test their potential for participant transformation and emanating effects. I am particularly interested in those processes that link small-scale face-to-face deliberation to large-scale online discourse. These cases will offer the opportunity to see an even stronger connection between participant and emanating effects as participants interact with members of the wider public and members of the public interact with each other regarding the outcomes of small-scale deliberative events.

**Conclusion**

This dissertation has taken a step toward understanding of the power of deliberative public processes and has opened up new lines of study for exploring their transformative
potential. Most importantly, I hope I have shown the importance of structures in the public sphere and how they impact the attitudes and actions of those who interact through them. I have argued that citizens are not merely passive and disinterested, as others have claimed (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002). They simply recognize their own disempowerment. Many contemporary communication practices push people out of politics. When the lay public does become involved, such structures often distort their will by failing to meet the decision-making needs of a large and diverse public. Recognizing such disenfranchisement is not an indication of passivity; it’s an acknowledgement of the futility of engagement.

At the beginning, I introduced you to Pamela, a participant in the CIR who underwent an extraordinary transformation. For Pamela, and many others who have participated in such events, the deliberative experience caused her to recognize her own latent political potential. Panelists come away from their experience with more political self-confidence and a clearer understanding of how politics works. They gain faith in one another and their own and others’ ability to engage in respectful decision making. Panelists often become more attentive to politics and more active in their local communities. They have used their experience to organize other members of their community and spread their new-found skills to their friends and family. And these effects can spill over to the wider community, who, through the proliferation of deliberative minipublics, can begin to rebuild their faith in the political process and their own competence as citizens.

Though I have presented a few cases in which such processes have been able to overcome the alienating forces of dominant public sphere structures, this work is not finished. As the deliberative movement develops and gains traction, researchers must continually work toward evaluating the quality of deliberation, understanding how it changes participants, and exploring their potential impact on the wider public.
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Appendix A: Measure 73 Citizens’ Statement

Citizens’ Review Statement

This Citizens’ Statement, authorized by the 2009 State Legislature, was developed by an independent panel of 24 Oregon voters who chose to participate in the Citizens’ Initiative Review process. The panelists were randomly selected from registered voters in Oregon and balanced to fairly reflect the state’s voting population based upon location of residence, age, gender, party affiliation, education, ethnicity, and likelihood of voting. Over a period of five days the panel heard from initiative proponents, opponents, and background witnesses. The panelists deliberated the measure and issued this statement. This statement has not been edited, altered, or approved by the Secretary of State.

The opinions expressed in this statement are those of the members of a citizen panel and were developed through the citizen review process. They are NOT official opinions or positions endorsed by the State of Oregon or any government agency. A citizen panel is not a judge of the constitutionality or legality of any ballot measure, and any statements about such matters are not binding on a court of law.

Citizen Statement of a Majority of the Panel

Key Findings – The following are statements about the measure and the number of panelists who agree with each statement:

- M73 shifts the balance of power in court proceedings, giving the prosecution additional leverage in plea bargaining and limiting the judge’s discretion in sentencing individual cases. (21 agree)
- Passed in 1994, Measure 11 (ORS 137.770) provides mandatory minimum sentencing of 70-300 months for the major felony sex crimes defined in Measure 73. (24 agree)
- Mandatory minimum sentencing has not proven a significant deterrent to future DUII or sex crimes. (21 agree)
- An unintended consequence of M73 is that juveniles aged 15 to 17 are subject to 25 year mandatory minimum sentences. (20 agree)
- Oregon spends over 10.9% of its general funds on corrections—a greater percentage than any other state. (19 agree)

www.review73.org

Shared Agreement Statement

Public policy impacts all citizens—we have had the opportunity to closely review material not readily available to voters—and have tried to examine both sides of this measure in an unbiased manner.

www.review73.org

Citizen Statement Opposed to the Measure

POSITION TAKEN BY 21 OF 24 PANELISTS

We, 21 members of the Citizens’ Initiative Review, oppose Ballot Measure 73 for the following reasons:

- Longer mandatory sentencing has little or no effect as a deterrent and has not been proven to increase public safety. Furthermore, mandatory sentences are already in effect under Measure 11.
- Measure 73 takes discretion away from judges. Giving leverage to the prosecution, people charged under this measure may be forced to plea bargain whether they are guilty or not, depriving them of their right to trial by jury.
- Measure 73 creates projected expenditures of $238 million over the next 10 years which must come from cuts in other programs or new taxes.
- This initiative leads to unintended consequences. Sexting falls under the definition of explicit material. No one convicted for felony sex offenses would receive the opportunity for treatment.

www.review73.org

Citizen Statement in Favor of the Measure

POSITION TAKEN BY 3 OF 24 PANELISTS

We, 3 members of the Citizens’ Initiative Review, support Ballot Measure 73 for the following reasons:

- This is a public safety measure.
- This measure will take minimum mandatory sentences (70-100 months) on four major sex crimes to mandatory 300 months (25 years).
- This measure changes a third conviction DUII from a misdemeanor to a Class C felony.
- Measure 73 specifically targets repeat serious sex offenders and repeat (third conviction) intoxicated drivers.
- Statistics support that mandatory sentencing is effective on reduction of violent crime rate.

Measure 73 will cost only 1/5 of 1% of the General Fund.

Summary: Measure 73 is carefully targeted at repeat violent sex offenders and third time DUII convictions. If passed it would make all Oregonians safer.

www.review73.org
Appendix B: Participant Survey Methods

Australian Citizen Parliament

**Pre-Deliberation Survey**
Survey dates: November 2008 – January 2009  
Total sample size (N) = 124  
Target population: Participants at the ACP Main Meeting and in the Online Parliament  
Response rate: 61% using AAPOR’s RR2 metric.⁵

**Year-Later Survey – Main Meeting**
Survey dates: February 2010  
Total sample size (N) = 115  
Target population: Participants at the ACP Main Meeting  
Response rate: 77% using AAPOR’s RR2 metric.  
Retention rate: 76% of those completing the pre-deliberation survey

**Year-Later Survey – Online Parliament**
Survey dates: February 2010  
Total sample size (N) = 63  
Target population: Participants at the ACP Online Parliament  
Response rate: 36% using AAPOR’s RR2 metric.

**Citizens’ Initiative Review**

**2-3 Months Later Survey**
Survey dates: October 22 – November 2, 2010.  
Total sample size (N) = 37  
Target population: Participants at the ACP Main Meeting and in the Online Parliament  
Response rate: 77% using AAPOR’s RR2 metric.

**Year-Later Survey**
Survey dates: October 28 – early December, 2011  
Total sample size (N) = 37  
Target population: Participants at the ACP Main Meeting and in the Online Parliament  
Response rate: 77% using AAPOR’s RR2 metric.  
Retention rate: 81% of those completing the 2-3 months later survey

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⁵ RR2 estimates response amongst all eligible respondents, counting partial interviews. See  
Appendix C: Participant Survey Measures

Political Cognition Items

General Political Knowledge (CIR Participants & RXS respondents)
1. Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is CONSTITUTIONAL or not? Is it the President, the Congress, or the Supreme Court?
   Response scale:
   President
   Congress
   Supreme Court
   Don’t know/Not sure
2. What is the main duty of the UNITED STATES CONGRESS? Is it to administer the president's policies, write legislation, or to supervise state governments?
   Response scale:
   Administer the president’s policies
   Write legislation
   Supervise state governments
   Don’t know/Not sure
3. Judges on the OREGON Supreme Court: Are appointed for life by the governor, are first appointed by the state legislature, or face elections every six years?
   Response scale:
   Appointed for life by the governor
   First appointed by the state legislature
   Face election every six years
   Don’t know/Not sure
4. How many seats does the Democratic Party currently hold in the U.S. Senate? Do the Democrats hold a veto-proof majority of 60 OR MORE, a SIMPLE MAJORITY, or a MINORITY of seats?
   Response scale
   60 or more
   A simple majority
   A minority of seats
   Don’t know/Not sure
5. Which party would you say is more politically conservative? Is it the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or do these two parties have the same ideology?
   Response scale:
   Democratic Party
   Republican Party
   Ideology the same
   Don’t know/Not sure
6. Which of the following can be used to AMEND the Oregon State Constitution? Is it a signing statement by the Governor, an initiative petition, or a ruling of the Oregon State Supreme Court?
   Response scale:
   Signing statement by the Governor
   Successful initiative petition
Ruling of the Oregon State Supreme Court
Don’t know/Not sure

Measure 73 Knowledge Items (CIR Participants & RXS respondents)
Preface: For the next few questions, I am going to read out some statements relevant to Initiative Measure 73. For each one, please tell me if you believe it is definitely true, probably true, probably false, or definitely false. If you are not sure either way, just say so.
Probes: If response is Not Sure If you had to guess, would you say the statement is probably true or probably false?
Response scale:
Definitely false
Probably false
Not sure - probably false
Not sure at all
Not sure - probably true
Probably true
Definitely true
1. Currently, there are NO mandatory minimum sentences for repeat drunk driving offenders. 1
2. Increasing mandatory minimum sentencing would NOT add significant costs to STATE AND LOCAL law enforcement.
3. Under current law, judges can give any felony sex offender a sentence as brief as just one or two years.
4. Oregon has become one of the few states that spends more on its corrections system than on higher education.
5. Mandatory minimum sentencing has already raised Oregon's incarceration rate well above the national average.
6. This initiative would LEAD DIRECTLY to funding cuts for rehabilitation services.
7. Longer mandatory sentencing has little or no DETERRENT EFFECT on future crimes.
8. Mandatory sentencing tends to REDUCE the VIOLENT CRIME RATE by incarcerating convicted criminals.
9. Initiative Measure 73 would shift the balance of power in court proceedings by giving the PROSECUTION additional leverage in plea bargaining.
10. This measure would require new expenditures of over TWO HUNDRED MILLION DOLLARS over the next ten years.
11. Initiative Measure 73 would cost roughly ONE FIFTH OF ONE PERCENT of the state's General Fund.
12. The provisions in Measure 73 could be applied to sex crimes committed by 15 to 17 YEAR-OLD MINORS.

Measure 74 Knowledge Items (CIR Participants & RXS respondents)
[same preface/response scale as above]
1. Initiative Measure 74 would require all medical marijuana dispensaries to be run as non-profit organizations.
2. Currently, MOST medical marijuana card holders are forced to go to the black market to buy their medication.
3. Initiative Measure 74 would place NO limit on the number of medical marijuana dispensaries allowed in the state of Oregon.
4. Initiative Measure 74 would LEAD DIRECTLY to legalizing recreational marijuana use in Oregon.
5. Studies have shown that medicinal marijuana does NOT end up in the hands of illegal drug dealers.
6. Studies have NOT shown beneficial health effects from the medicinal use of marijuana.
7. Initiative Measure 74 would generate NEW JOBS for Oregon residents.
8. This measure would implement a SELF-SUSTAINING PROGRAM that would generate ADDITIONAL STATE REVENUE.
9. Initiative Measure 74 EXEMPTS medical marijuana dispensaries and their employees from prosecution for marijuana-related activities so long as they remain in "substantial compliance."
10. Measure 74 would allow felons to work at medical marijuana dispensaries five years after their conviction.

**Deliberative Faith**
Preface: Please tell us whether you believe that participating in the Citizens’ Initiative Review has led you to agree less or more with the following statements.

Response scale:
…caused me to AGREE LESS with that belief
… DID NOT CHANGE that belief
… caused me to AGREE MORE with that belief

1. The first step in solving our common problems is to discuss them together.
2. Even people who strongly disagree can make sound decisions if they sit down and talk.
3. Everyday people from different parties can have civil, respectful conversations about politics.

**Internal efficacy**
Preface: Please tell us whether you believe that participating in the [ACP/CIR] has led you to agree less or more with the following statements.

Response scale:
…caused me to AGREE LESS with that belief
… DID NOT CHANGE that belief
… caused me to AGREE MORE with that belief

1. I think I am better informed about politics and government than most people.
2. I have a pretty good understanding of the important issues facing this country.
3. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics and community affairs.

**External efficacy**
Preface: Please tell us whether you believe that participating in the [ACP/CIR] has led you to agree less or more with the following statements.

Response scale:
…caused me to AGREE LESS with that belief
… DID NOT CHANGE that belief
… caused me to AGREE MORE with that belief
1. There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what government does.
2. Under our form of government, the people have the final say about how the country is run, no matter who is in office.
3. People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.

**Political Engagement Items**

**Communicative engagement**

Preface: Please tell us whether you believe that attending the [ACP/CIR] has caused you to change the frequency with which you do the following activities.

Response scale:

… caused me to do that activity LESS FREQUENTLY

…DID NOT CHANGE how often I do that activity

… caused me to do that activity MORE FREQUENTLY

1. Paying attention to news about government, politics, or community affairs while watching TV.
2. Paying attention to news about government, politics, or community affairs while reading the newspaper.
3. Talking to people to learn more about a political issue or candidate.
4. Talking to other people to show them why they should vote.

**Communicative engagement (ACP participants only)**

1. Through conversation, would you say that your friends and family know your views about political matters?
   
   Response scale:
   
   Strongly Disagree
   
   Disagree
   
   Neutral
   
   Agree
   
   Strongly Agree

2. Are you compelled to defend your views about political matters [same response scale as above]

3. In the past year, have you submitted a letter to an editor, a comment to an online forum or called a radio talk host about a political matter?
   
   Response scale:
   
   No
   
   Yes, once
   
   Yes, more than once

**Community-based engagement**

Preface: Please tell us whether you believe that attending the [ACP/CIR] has caused you to change the frequency with which you do the following activities.

Response scale:

… caused me to do that activity LESS FREQUENTLY

…DID NOT CHANGE how often I do that activity

… caused me to do that activity MORE FREQUENTLY
1. Voluntarily working or co-operating with others in your local community to try to solve some of the community’s problems.
2. Discussing local community affairs with other members of your community.

**Community-based engagement (ACP participants only)**
1. In the past year, have you chosen to join or start an advocacy or activist organisation? (e.g. industry or professional association, environment protection group, social welfare non-profit, rights lobby, anti-policy protest)?
   Response scale:
   - No
   - Yes, one
   - Yes, more than one

**Institutionalized engagement**
Preface: Please tell us whether you believe that attending the [ACP/CIR] has caused you to change the frequency with which you do the following activities.
   Response scale:
   - … caused me to do that activity LESS FREQUENTLY
   - …DID NOT CHANGE how often I do that activity
   - … caused me to do that activity MORE FREQUENTLY
1. Going to political meetings, demonstrations, fund raising dinners or things like that.
2. Doing volunteer work for a party, candidate, or campaign, for example, making a speech, putting up posters, or working in a candidate’s office.

**Institutionalized engagement (ACP participants only)**
1. In the past year, have you chosen to join a political party?
   Response scale:
   - No
   - Yes
Appendix D: Statewide Survey Methods

Rolling Cross Sectional Phone Survey

Survey dates: August 30 – November 1. The survey was generally conducted Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday of each week.

Total sample size (N) = 1,991

Target population: Registered Oregon voters likely to participate in 2010 election

Response rate: 9% using AAPOR’s RR3 metric.

Weighting: Quotas were established for a target weekly with an N of 250, with the Sunday calling trying to rebalance the sample by screening out older female Portland metro area respondents in particular. Demographic targets were set based on the Oregon voter file, which had the following breakdown in its measured demographics:

Region
Portland Metro 37%
Western OR 49%
Eastern OR 14%
Total 100%

Age
Under 40 25%
40-64 yrs old 47%
65 and over 28%
Total 100%

Sex
Male 48%
Female 52%
Total 100%

Representativeness: One way of testing the representativeness of the sample is to compare its estimate of voting results relative to actual election results. As measured in the weighted sample used herein for the last four weeks of the election, 55.5% of respondents in this sample voted for

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6 This appendix is slightly modified from an evaluation report presented to the Oregon State Legislature (Gastil and Knobloch, 2010).

7 Data were analyzed to detect anomalous response patterns indicative of automatic answers (e.g., responding “strongly agree” to a series of unrelated or reversed survey items. This removed 46 cases, which are excluded from all analysis and do not count toward the N of 1991.

8 RR3 estimates eligibility proportions for those respondents whose eligibility is not known (e.g., because the interviewer never got past an answering machine). See http://www.aapor.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ResourcesforResearchers/StandardDefinitions/StandardDefinitions2009new.pdf
Measure 73 compared to 56.9% of actual ballots.\(^9\) On Measure 74, 45.3% of the sample voted “Yes,” compared to 44.2% of all ballots, indicating that the sample closely resembles the voting choices of the Oregon electorate.

As a second check on political representativeness, party identity was assessed. The sample self-identified as 38.3% Democratic, 32.9% Republican, and 28.8% Independent/Unaffiliated/Third Party. This compares to statewide ballot returns from 2010 that were 43.5% Democratic, 35.6% Republican, and 20.9% Independent/Etc.\(^10\) Thus, the sample overestimates Independent voters but retains roughly the same proportion of Democrats to Republicans.

**Online Panel Survey**

**Survey dates:** Wave 1 August 5 – 31  
Wave 2 October 22 – November 1

**Total sample size (N)**
- 640 completed Wave 1 only (i.e., declined Wave 2)
- 971 completed both Wave 1 and Wave 2
- 509 completed only Wave 2 (i.e., not invited in Wave 1)

**Target population:** Registered Oregon voters likely to participate in 2010 election

**Response rate:** 41% for Wave 1 using AAPOR’s RR3 metric.\(^11\)

**Retention rate:** 60% of those completing Wave 1 participated in Wave 2

**Representativeness:** Using the same comparisons as for the phone survey, similar percentages supported Measure 73 as in the full electorate (57.9% of survey respondents versus 56.9% of actual ballots). Nevertheless, 57.4% of survey respondents supported Measure 74, which received only 44.2% of actual ballots.

When respondents stated their party identity, 34.8% identified as Democrats, 25.3% as Republicans, and 39.1% as Independent/Third Party/Etc.. These proportions principally overestimate Independents but also slightly overestimate Democrats relative to 2010 ballot returns by party, which were 43.5% Democratic, 35.6% Republican, and 20.9% Independent.

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\(^10\) Data from 11/5/2010 at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22010/ballot_returns_party.xls.

\(^11\) RR3 estimates eligibility proportions for those respondents whose eligibility is not known (e.g., because the interviewer never got past an answering machine). See http://www.aapor.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ResourcesforResearchers/StandardDefinitions/StandardDefinitions2009new.pdf
Appendix E: Statewide Survey Measures

Independent Variables

Aware of CIR
1. This year, there is a new section in the official Oregon Voters' Pamphlet. For two of the statewide initiatives on the ballot, there is a one-page Citizens' Statement detailing the most important arguments and facts about the measure. These were written by the Oregon Citizens' Initiative Review panels. Were you VERY aware, SOMEWHAT aware, or NOT AT ALL aware of the new Citizens' Initiative Review?
   Response scale:
   Not at all aware
   Somewhat aware
   Very aware

Read CIR
1. Have you already read the Citizens Initiative Review statement on Measure 73?
   Response scale:
   No
   Yes
   Don’t know/Not sure
2. Have you already read the Citizens Initiative Review statement on Measure 74?
   [same response scale as above]

CIR Importance and Use
Preface: The Oregon Voters’ Pamphlet contains many different sections for each ballot measure, only some of which may be important to you. Thinking ONLY about the section on Measure 74, regarding the establishment of medical marijuana dispensaries, please estimate how many minutes you spent reading each section and how important that section was in deciding how to vote on [Measure 73].
1. Citizens’ Initiative Review Statement: Key Findings
   Response options, minutes: Minutes spent reading (estimate) [open text]
   Response options, importance:
   Not at all important
   Somewhat important
   Very important
2. Citizens’ Initiative Review Statement: Arguments in Favor
   [same response scale as above]
   [same response scale as above]

Control Variables

Age
1. In what year were you born?
   Response options: [open text]

Gender
1. Are you male or female?
Response scale:
Male
Female

Education
1. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
   Response scale:
   Did not graduate from high school
   High school graduate
   Some college, but no degree (yet)
   2-year college degree
   4-year college degree
   Postgraduate degree (MA, MBA, MD, JD, PhD, etc.)

Income
1. Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?
   Response scale:
   Less than $10,000
   $10,000 - $14,999
   $15,000-$19,999
   $20,000 - $24,999
   $25,000 - $29,999
   $30,000 - $39,999
   $40,000 - $49,999
   $50,000 - $59,999
   $60,000 - $69,999
   $70,000 - $79,999
   $80,000 - $99,999
   $100,000 - $119,999
   $120,000 - $149,999
   $150,000 or more
   Prefer not to say

Party
1. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a ...?
   Response scale:
   Democrat
   Republican
   Independent
   Not sure
   Probe [for those who answered “Democrat” or “Republican”]: Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
   Response scale:
   Strong [Democrat]
   Not very strong [Democrat]
Probe [for those who answered “Independent”]: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or the Republican Party?
Response scale:
The Democratic Party
The Republic Party
Neither
Not sure

Political Interest
1. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs ... ?
Response scale:
Most of the time
Some of the time
Only now and then
Hardly at all
Don’t know

Political Knowledge
1. Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is CONSTITUTIONAL or not? Is it the President, the Congress, or the Supreme Court?
Response scale:
President
Congress
Supreme Court
Don’t know/Not sure
2. What is the main duty of the UNITED STATES CONGRESS? Is it to administer the president's policies, write legislation, or to supervise state governments?
Response scale:
Administer the president’s policies
Write legislation
Supervise state governments
Don’t know/Not sure
3. Judges on the OREGON Supreme Court: Are appointed for life by the governor, are first appointed by teh state legislature, or face elections every six years?
Response scale:
Appointed for life by the governor
First appointed by the state legislature
Face election every six years
Don’t know/Not sure
4. How many seats does the Democratic Party currently hold in the U.S. Senate? Do the Democrats hold a veto-proof majority of 60 OR MORE, a SIMPLE MAJORITY, or a MINORITY of seats?
Response scale
60 or more
A simple majority
A minority of seats
Don’t know/Not sure

5. Which party would you say is more politically conservative? Is it the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or do these two parties have the same ideology?
Response scale:
Democratic Party
Republican Party
Ideology the same
Don’t know/Not sure

6. Which of the following can be used to AMEND the Oregon State Constitution? Is it a signing statement by the Governor, an initiative petition, or a ruling of the Oregon State Supreme Court?
Response scale:
Signing statement by the Governor
Successful initiative petition
Ruling of the Oregon State Supreme Court
Don’t know/Not sure

**Dependent Variables**

**Internal efficacy**

1. I think I am better informed about politics and government than most people.
Response scale:
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Don’t know/Not sure

2. I have a pretty good understanding of the important issues facing this country.
[same response scale as above]
I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics and community affairs.
[same response scale as above]

3. Which do you believe would be most likely to show the greatest wisdom on questions of what the government should do: the U.S. Congress or a randomly selected deliberative body of 500 citizens?
Response options:
U.S. Congress
Random selection of 500 citizens
Don’t know/Not sure

   Probe [for those who answered either Congress or 500 citizens]: Would they show a lot more wisdom or a little more wisdom
   Response options:
   A lot more wisdom
   A little more wisdom
   Don’t know/Not sure
External efficacy
1. There are many legal ways for citizens to successfully influence what government does.
   Response scale:
   Strongly disagree
   Disagree
   Agree
   Strongly agree
   Don’t know/Not sure
2. Under our form of government, the people have the final say about how the country is run, no matter who is in office.
   [same response scale as above]
3. People like me don’t have any say about what the government does.
   [same response scale as above]

Deliberative Faith
Preface: Different people have their own ways of choosing how to vote on ballot measures. To better understand how *you* go about voting, please indicate how much you agree or disagree with following statements.
1. If I studied a ballot measure carefully for five days, I might change how I would vote on it.
   Response scale:
   Strongly disagree
   Disagree
   Agree
   Strongly agree
   Don’t know/Not sure
2. I usually find that there are strong arguments both for and against a ballot measure.
   [same response scale as above]
3. Some people believe that a well-functioning democracy should encourage DEBATE and DISSENT, whereas others believe democracy works best when it seeks out CONSENSUS and a SHARED VISION. Which do you think is the more important goal for democracy, DEBATE or CONSENSUS, or are they equally important?
   Response scale:
   Debate
   Equally important
   Consensus
   Probe [for respondents who answered “equally important”]: If you had to emphasize one over the other slightly, would you emphasize DEBATE or CONSENSUS?
   Response scale:
   Emphasize debate
   Emphasize consensus
   Not even a slight emphasis either way