JSIS Arctic Task Force 2013

EQUATORIAL NORTH

Centering the Arctic in global and local security
Equatorial North: Centering the Arctic in Global and Local Security
Published by University of Washington Jackson School of International Studies

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Acknowledgements

This Task Force report could not have been achieved without the generous support of a wide variety of individuals and organizations. We would like to extend our sincerest thanks to all those who donated their time, energy, funds, and passion to aid us in this extraordinary experience.

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internationales, de la Francophonie et du Commerce Extérieur du Québec

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Sponsors

This program is supported by the Government of Québec (Visiting Professor & Québec Unit grants); the Centers for Global Studies & Canadian Studies (International and Foreign Language Education, Office of Postsecondary Education, U.S. Department of Education); the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies; Hellmann Fund for Innovation and Excellence in International Studies; International Studies Program Discretionary Fund; Maxwell M. and Julia Fisher Endowment; and, the Chapman Charitable Fund.

The success of this program would not have been possible without expert advice and assistance of Donat Savoie, President, Inuit, Arctic and Circumpolar Affairs Consulting Firm and Knight (Chevalier) of the National Order of Québec (2010). His input and friendship have been invaluable.

We would also like to express our gratitude to Bernard Funston for writing the foreword to our report. We cannot think of a better way to begin the report.

Finally, we would like to thank our instructors Nadine Fabbi and Joël Plouffe for their extraordinary support and guidance through the past ten weeks.
History of the Arctic Task Force

The Task Force on the Arctic prepares international studies majors to effectively deal with Arctic issues and to ensure that the voices of Québec and Canada, including the Inuit of Canada, are included in future negotiations regarding the region. The Task Force program in the Jackson School has an over 25-year history impacting the research and professional development of hundreds of International Studies majors.

The Task Force is a 10-week, 5-credit seminar held in winter quarter. This capstone experience is required for International Studies majors in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington (UW). Recognizing that many International Studies students may be preparing for careers in multi-faceted non-governmental and governmental organizations, the Task Force offers students the opportunity to address policy questions in a “real world” setting. The seminar operates much like a Presidential or Royal Commission – the students research a current and relevant policy issue, prepare a written report, and present their policy recommendations to an outside expert in the field.

2009 Task Force on the Arctic –
http://jsis.washington.edu/canada/file/archive/taskforce09/

The first Task Force on the Arctic, led by Vincent Gallucci and Nadine Fabbi, focused on Arctic sovereignty, was offered in 2009 and included a one-week research trip to Ottawa. Thirteen students produced the report, Towards Arctic Resolution: Issues of Sovereignty and Governance in the Circumpolar North including chapters on the Canada-U.S. dispute over the Northwest Passage, shipping issues, and the role of Canada’s Inuit in Arctic sovereignty. The students presented their findings to Rob Heubert, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary. The report was also presented at the 12th Annual UW Undergraduate Research Symposium, and won Honorable Mention at the UW Libraries Research Award for Undergraduates.

2011 Task Force on the Arctic –
http://jsis.washington.edu/canada/courses/arctic.shtml

In 2011, in an effort to create a truly international educational experience, Canadian Studies and the Makivik Corporation, Nunavik, created a partnership to involve Canadian Inuit participants in the program. As a result, 14 UW students and two Makivik participants formed the 2011 Arctic Governance team, led by V. Gallucci and N. Fabbi. The international team spent a week in Ottawa visiting Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada; six Arctic country embassies; scholars with the Faculty of Law at the University of Ottawa; ministers of parliament; and Canada’s offices for the national and international Inuit associations. Julie Gourley, U.S. Representative for the Arctic Council, served as the expert evaluator.

2013 Task Force on the Arctic –
http://jsis.washington.edu/canada/courses/arcticpolicy.shtml

In 2013 the Task Force focused on Arctic security. Thanks to a Government of Québec grant, Joël Plouffe, l’Université du Québec à Montréal, served as co-instructor of the Task Force and the Task Force team was able to travel to both Québec City and Ottawa as part of their research experience.

Nadine C. Fabbi is the Associate Director of the Canadian Studies Center. For the last ten years her work has centered on the history and geopolitics of the circumpolar north. She is currently engaged in research on indigenous diplomacies and international relations in the Arctic. She earned her MA in Canadian Studies from Carleton University and is currently enrolled in a doctoral program at the University of British Columbia. Nadine has travelled to Alaska, the Yukon, Churchill, Manitoba, Greenland, Iceland and Siberia. In addition to the 2009 and 2011 Arctic-focused Task Force classes, she has taught on Inuit history and political mobilization at the University of Alberta and the University Centre of the Westfjords, Ísafjörður, Iceland. Nadine’s most recent publications include,
“Inuit Political Involvement in the Arctic,” in the Arctic Yearbook 2012, edited by L. Heininen; and, “Geopolitics, Arctic Council, and Arctic Resources,” co-authored with V. Gallucci and D. Hellmann, in Fishing People of the North: Cultures, Economies, and Management Responding to Change, edited by C. Carothers et al.

**Joël Plouffe** is a Research Fellow at the Raoul Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of Québec at Montréal (UQAM). He is also affiliated to the Northern Research Forum network on Geopolitics and Security (www.nrf.is), led by Dr. Lassi Heininen of the University of Lapland, Finland. His research and publications deal mainly with geopolitics, foreign policy making and international relations in the Arctic. Joël holds a doctoral scholarship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and is currently a project member on "Climate Change and Commercial Shipping Development in the Arctic" under the auspices of Université Laval’s ArcticNet and led by Dr. Frédéric Lasserre. In August 2012, Joël was embedded with Canada’s National Defence and Canadian Forces ‘Operation Nanook’ in Canada’s Western Arctic (Northwest Territories). He is currently enrolled in a doctoral program in Political Science at UQAM. His thesis looks at the influence of Arctic geography in US foreign policy making.

**Donat Savoie** is an Anthropologist by training and has occupied several senior positions within Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada for more than 35 years in areas related to Arctic, Inuit and Circumpolar Affairs. He is presently Special Advisor to the Office of the President of Makivik Corporation. He has received several honours during his career and was appointed to the National Order of Québec in 2010 by the Premier of the Province of Québec, the highest recognition of the province for his work amongst the Inuit.

**Bernard Funston** is currently the Chair of the Canadian Polar Commission, a body established by an Act of Parliament to promote the development and dissemination of polar knowledge. He has extensive experience on a range of matters pertaining to the Canadian North and the northern circumpolar region, including systems of governance, international and intergovernmental relations, Aboriginal land claims and self-government processes, resource development issues, scientific research and cooperation, and a range of fields relating to economic and community development. By training, Mr. Funston is a constitutional lawyer and a member in good standing of the Law Societies of Northwest Territories and Alberta. He holds degrees from Trent University, the University of Cambridge (King’s College), and the University of Alberta.
In a very short time the circumpolar North, often loosely referred to as the Arctic, has emerged from the periphery of global geopolitics to become a mainstream issue for the 21st century. The reasons for this are varied and to some degree disturbing. Two primary forces are at work in this transformation: climate change and globalization.

The Arctic is extremely vulnerable to climate change and this region is now experiencing some of the most rapid and severe climate change on Earth. Over the next 100 years, climate change is expected to accelerate, contributing to major physical, ecological, social and economic changes, many of which have already begun. Indeed, the Arctic can be viewed as a barometer that is highly responsive to global processes. Changes in Arctic climate that are resulting in loss of sea ice and glacial ice will also affect the rest of the world through increased global warming, rising sea levels, possible changes to ocean circulation and so on.

Globalization is also reaching into the Arctic. A burgeoning human population is turning its attention northwards, anticipating that reduction in sea ice will lead to accessible natural resources on land and in marine areas. Arctic tourism has begun to increase rapidly. In addition, a number of transboundary pollutants from industrial operations in more southerly latitudes are carried northwards by natural oceanic and atmospheric forces.

However, there is room for optimism. Northern peoples are well known for their resilience and adaptive genius. Arctic states, independently and through cooperative organizations such as the Arctic Council, are carefully studying natural and human systems relating to this region in efforts to devise governance systems and management practices that are effective to meet new challenges. Many non-Arctic states have also turned their attentions to the Arctic, not only because of potential resource development opportunities, but also for purposes of improving understanding of Earth systems through collaborative science with the Arctic states.

It is not surprising that there are many interests and perspectives that inform the up-surge in attention relating to the circumpolar North. These interests and perspectives can be analysed under four broad and often competing conceptualisations: homeland, laboratory, frontier and wilderness.

**Homeland:** Depending on how it is delimited, the Arctic is home to between 4 and 9 million people, including indigenous peoples. Hunting, herding, fishing, trapping, gathering and other renewable resource activities remain important components of many indigenous cultures and economies.

**Laboratory:** For the past few decades, in particular, the Arctic has been a laboratory for increasing scientific research and cooperation, particularly during the recent International Polar Year.

**Frontier:** For many nation-state governments and multinational corporations the Arctic is a frontier with the potential for exploitation of important natural resources to feed national and global demands for energy, minerals, fresh water and other renewable and non-renewable resources.

**Wilderness:** Alternatively, many environmental and conservation organisations see the northern circumpolar region and its flora and fauna as wilderness to be preserved in parks and protected areas.

While this way of characterising the interests engaged in the Arctic is an over-simplification, juxtaposing homeland, laboratory, frontier and wilderness helps clarify some of the values and
goals of various stakeholders. Our stewardship of the Arctic, and indeed the planet, will hinge on how well we can reconcile and balance these various values and goals. Balance is important because the values and goals expressed through each of these conceptualisations are politically legitimate and have to be taken into account in policy-making processes.

The Arctic is not a closed system. Any effort to better understand the dynamics of Arctic human and natural systems, and their connections to a larger global context, has a potential to better inform policy responses. All efforts to generate cooperation have the potential to empower collaborative actions which will be necessary to move towards a lighter human footprint on Earth systems. The Brundtland Commission noted that:

“The environment does not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, ambitions and needs, and attempts to defend it in isolation from human concerns have given the very word ‘environment’ a connotation of naivety in some political circles... But the ‘environment’ is where we all live, and development is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode. The two are inseparable.” [World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987]

Issues arising from climate change and globalization are complex. Arctic state and Arctic non-state actors cannot simply talk among themselves and look inward towards the Arctic region. In turn, non-Arctic actors must not ignore their connections to the drivers of change that are transforming the Arctic. Arctic change is relevant outside the Arctic and will likely have significant environmental, economic, political and social consequences in non-Arctic regions. Both Arctic and non-Arctic interests must accelerate their efforts to find processes and mechanisms to improve dialogue and take actions. Quite simply, a coordinated global approach is needed.

Students and professors from the University of Washington are to be commended for their innovative approach to advancing the discourse on Arctic policy. The 2013 Task Force on Arctic Policy is a joint program between the Canadian Studies and International Studies centers in the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. In addition to conducting research on the Arctic at the University of Washington, these students and professors travelled to Quebec City and Ottawa, Canada to speak with a broad range of officials active in Arctic affairs in government, NGOs, aboriginal organizations, and think-tanks. In addition they visited the Nunavut Sivuniksavut School, and spoke to a number of individuals who specialize in Arctic studies. Their thoughtful report is a welcome addition to the collaborative effort to better understand the Arctic and its relationship to the rest of the planet. It is a testament to a promising new generation of policy-thinkers dealing with important issues.

Bernard Funston
Chair
Canadian Polar Commission
Ottawa, Canada
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Executive Summary

by Binh Vong

As Canada prepares to chair the Arctic Council (2013-2015) now is both a strategic and essential time to reassess political, economic and social matters pertaining to the Arctic region. Frequently considered a barometer for climate change, the Arctic is a region highly affected by climate change and environmental degradation, giving rise to a number of environmental, socio-economic and political challenges. Most directly affected by these problems are the indigenous populations who call the Far North home. As indigenous populations continue to reassert their voice and global interest in the region increase, new strategies must be adopted to successfully reconcile diverging interests.

This Task Force report uses security as both a medium and a framework to reassess issues in the Canadian North. We define security as capacity building for individuals, communities and nations (both ethnic and state) to build sustainable and resilient systems. In so doing, we composed a model for capacity to acknowledge the interdependency of individuals, communities, and nation-states. As the Arctic is a region encompassing both local indigenous and imported systems, the chapters within this report distill and reconcile these differences to form a more thorough narrative. Chapters in this report provide background information, analyses and policy options for imminent issues facing the Canadian Arctic region. The research that underpins these chapters derives from scholarly work and statements from governments, indigenous groups, and other Arctic organizations to form comprehensive analyses of issues at stake.

Part I of our report addresses on-going dialogues between Inuit population in Canada and the Canadian government on the Northwest Passage, land claim agreements in Nunavut, and Québec’s Plan Nord as a case study on the need for Northern and Southern Québec to further collaborate in addressing the challenges and opportunities around Québec’s nordicity. The three chapters in Part I demonstrate that the inclusion of Inuit agenda and perspective into governmental policies is both essential and constructive.

Part II of our report demonstrates capacity building in Northern communities on the following areas: tourism, biodiversity, food security, indigenous homelessness and education. The findings in this section suggest for integration of Northern traditional knowledge with Southern scientific and economic knowledge to foster enhanced mutual understandings of ongoing issues and priorities for the North’s future.

Finally, Part III of our report focuses on the emerging relationship between the Arctic Council and a non-Arctic states, with the last chapter focusing on China’s request to enter the Arctic Council as a permanent observer. Part III found that as environmental problems in the Arctic are imported from other regions of the world, it is necessary to include non-Arctic states into the discourse on Arctic security.

Established after extensive research and analyses, the policy recommendations in Part I and Part II of this report predominantly target the Canadian federal and provincial governments, as well as indigenous populations in Canada, while those in Part III directs toward non-Arctic states and the Arctic Council. These recommendations seek to advance development in the North, calling for a development approach that includes individual, community, and nation-state actors.
Policy Recommendations:

For the Government of Canada:
• Incorporate the Inuit perspective on sea ice in consultation between Inuit and the Federal government, Canada’s Arctic Policy statement, and at the supranational level.
• Devolve land and resource management in Nunavut to the Government of Nunavut and establish an independent institution to oversee the implementation of the NLCA.
• Allocate funds and resources from the Citizen and Immigration Canada’s Government Assisted Refugee Program to indigenous population.

For the Government of Canada and Provincial Governments:
• Practice adaptive co-management focused on ecosystem-based management.
• Provide more information on regulation for tourism in the Arctic.
• Include community infrastructure in policy discussions on the Arctic and increase staffing and resources to maintain infrastructure at a self-sustaining level.

For the Government of Ontario and the Government of Nunavut:
• Create a trust or endowment to expand NS model and value of critical thinking must be incorporated into this model.

For the Government of Québec:
• Incorporate Plan Nunavik into a revamped Plan Nord, and prepare Northern Québec for long-term sustainable growth by investing in human development before resource development.

For Indigenous groups and populations:
• Conduct baseline needs assessments using PhotoVoice in each Arctic community to ascertain community opinions and demands, particularly around food security and infrastructure.

For the Arctic Council and non-Arctic states:
• The Arctic Council must reevaluate the role of non-observer states and allow the entry of new states.
• China must establish an Arctic foreign policy.
Introduction

By Binh Vong and Charlotte Dubiel

Our Task Force report seeks to reinvigorate political discussion regarding security and cooperation in the circumpolar North in the midst of rapid environmental change. Given that the Arctic region is warming at twice the rate of the rest of the globe, the decisions made in the coming years and even months are critical to the capacity of Arctic systems to support resilient communities. As Canada prepares to take the Arctic Council (AC) Chair and negotiate the admittance of new observer states into the Arctic Council in May of this year, our Task Force team has been distilling the most important issues for Canada’s consideration during its 2013-2015 chairmanship. At the last official Council conference in Nuuk, Greenland the United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was in attendance, a first for any prestigious cabinet member representing the U.S. government. Her presence is a testament to the growing importance of circumpolar issues to the foreign policy of the US and other Arctic states, signaling that now is a strategic time to reassess issues pertaining to Arctic security.

On January 21st of this year, the Canadian minister of the Arctic Council Leona Aglukkaq declared that “development for the people of the North” (2013) is Canada’s primary goal for every action it condones within the Council. In her speech Aglukkaq also embraces the common themes conveyed in the media, the likes of which were rearticulated in the boardrooms of Québec and Ottawa: “the Arctic region will not only be facing a time of change and challenge…but also a time of great opportunity” (Aglukkaq, 2013). Our report commends existing innovative solutions for adapting to change and recommends options for new solutions for capacity building. The people who live in the north are responding to the changing climate with dynamic and innovative steps to both adapt to the new environment and determine the political context in which their needs are articulated and addressed. The circumpolar north is already a locale where the agendas of stakeholders who call the Arctic home are intersecting with the agendas of decision-makers and entrepreneurs from the South. Today as we look towards the Kiruna AC Ministerial Meeting in May and prepare to commence official dialogue regarding Arctic development, it is important to consider reframing Northern development such that it is not merely development for the people of the North, but rather by the people of the North for the people of the North.

As our Task Force utilizes security as the medium for discussing human capacity for well-being, defining security must be dynamic in order to provide for climate changes in the Arctic and inclusive if it is to continue to be equated with safety. For the purpose of this report, Arctic security is understood as the capacity
for individuals, communities and nations (both ethnic and state) to build sustainable and resilient systems and to assert a representative voice in arenas of diplomacy and negotiating power. In using capacity building as inherent in security, we define capacity in three different levels that are interdependent and contribute to community resilience and personal or group security: individual, community, and nation-state.

The Arctic is a region with unique systems that incorporate local and imported strategies. Arctic-specific solutions must be innovative, beginning with community solutions for community needs that cultivate resilience and establish political capital. The Centre for the North, in their assessment of community resilience, found that capacity for individuals means the ability to meet basic needs where residents of resilient communities can enjoy food, water and housing security. They say resilient communities establish a general sense of wellbeing amongst members, with a high degree of fate control. The third element of resilience is social capital: community political articulation within the nation-state that is sustainable in that its economic development is diverse and balanced with environmental protection (Sisco, 2010).

Using the Centre of the North’s definition of capacity for community resilience as our foundation, we expand this definition of capacity to include the state. Capacity on the nation-state level is the ability to maintain security within state boundaries and national values internationally. On a community level, capacity entails a self-reliant economy, with diverse and local economic development and the capability to enjoy social capital. Capacity on the community level is needed to protect individual capacity while individual capacity is necessary to assert community capacity. The state is the institution which encompasses both communities and individuals and thus, state level capacity is essential to maintain security for both individuals and communities. Legitimate states can only maintain their capacity to defend their sovereign space insofar as members of that state enjoy the capacity to have their basic needs met and organize politically, i.e., self-determine. In the international arena, the state also relies on the capacity of the community and individual to thrive and be resilient in order to legitimize its national sovereignty.

The model above illustrates the interconnectivity of individual, community, and state level capacity. The double sided arrows represent the interdependence that these multi-levels actors share in building capacity for sustainable, secure solutions. In the same manner as a positive feedback loop, capacity on the individual, community and national levels empower one another.

Our report accompanies the current progressive discourse regarding the Arctic that reframes security beyond a mere political, military, economic or environmental context. Each chapter begins with a brief summary of the background on the issue for discussion, followed by analysis that addresses the interests of stakeholders and finally ends with a list of policy options.

Part one of our report addresses political articulation of the Inuit in the Canadian government at the national, territorial, and provincial levels. The recommendations therein are directed towards increasing capacity for dialogue and implementing solutions at each of these three cross sections of governance. In the opening chapter, Cosford revisits the dispute between the United States and Canada over the Northwest Passage, arguing for the incorporation of the Inuit perspective of sea ice as territory into the debate over the status of the Northwest Passage. Ho’s chapter focuses on land claim agreements in Nunavut, arguing that it is critical for Canada to devolve power in Nunavut as in other territories and pay special attention to Inuit proportional representation for decisions relating to resource management. Van Tulder’s chapter zeros in on interactions between Nunavik and the government of Québec, arguing for the overhaul of Plan Nord if Québec is to abide by the aphorism: “Maitre Chez Nous”.

Along the same continuum towards localization, section two of our report addresses how northern communities might build capacity for development that benefits local well-
The chapters in section two analyze the viability of capacity building in communities for various forms of development and therefore overall security, focusing in on the systems that encompass: tourism, biodiversity, food security, homelessness in indigenous communities and education. Moore examines the implications of tourism on the natural characteristic of the Arctic as well as impacts for indigenous populations. A primary concern that accompanies the development of tourism is the potential for causing damage to biodiversity and wildlife conservation. Sugarman expands the dialogue on biodiversity, arguing for creative integration of scientific and traditional knowledge. Shaw’s chapter looks at food security in the Arctic, arguing that community infrastructure plays a vital role in the cultivation of independent, self-sustaining, and self-sufficient food systems for inhabitants in the Arctic. Dolph discusses homelessness in the North and proposes solutions for building both physical housing capacity and the capacity for prevention through political prioritization. Finally, Guard investigates the potential for Nunavut Sivuniksavut to be implemented as a model for Inuit education. She recommends using the model as a way to integrate indigenous history as social capital and expanding the capacity for education to foster critical thinking, in addition to job skills.

Part three widens the purview of our report from community security to international cooperation. We recognize that the Arctic region is unique in that environmental changes do not originate in the Arctic. Rather, they are imported from development in other parts of the world. In part three we place an emphasis on the capacity for internal voices to be transmitted to the international stage, via the nation-state. Brown's chapter reexamines the institution of the Arctic Council, arguing for the inclusion of nation-state permanent observers. We conclude the body of our report with Tam’s chapter on China’s application to partake in the AC as permanent observer.

Binh Vong and Charlotte Dubiel are juniors at the University of Washington, majoring in International Studies. Binh is also studying Political Science and Chinese language, Charlotte is a double major with Spanish language. Both are members of the Jackson School Journal of International Studies editorial board and very active in the University community. Charlotte is an academic writing tutor and a peer mentor on campus. Her favorite place to teach, however, is in the first grade classroom at Beacon Hill International School. Binh hopes to one day practice environmental law.
Part One: Governance Strategies
Ending the Northwest Passage Dispute: How Inclusion of Inuit Perspectives on Sea Ice Could Build a More Effective Strategy for Canada

By Zoë Cosford

Abstract
The accelerated melting of the sea ice in the Arctic has brought many of the challenges and issues facing those who live in the Arctic to a more prominent position in national dialogues. The dispute over the Northwest Passage has received much coverage in the press and importance as a political tool because it symbolizes historic potential realized in the Arctic. Canada has increasingly been taking actions to assert its claims on the Northwest Passage, but this dispute remains stagnant, with no real progress towards a resolution of the crystalized dispute that commenced decades ago. Inuit conceptualizations on sea ice display an entirely different worldview from those that are held by the non-Inuit. Canada has shown the desire to strongly assert its claims in the Arctic, but is underutilizing its most valuable resource – the Inuit who underpin those claims to begin with. By using recent research as well as the Inuit themselves as sources for sea ice knowledge, Canada can present a more nuanced argument regarding its claims on the status of the Northwest Passage. Engaging indigenous perspectives on this issue, which has shown no progress in decades, can reinvigorate the discussions and lead to a more swift resolution.

Introduction
The Northwest Passage (NWP) has been a focal point of Canadian media and politics for decades, and through that it has become a representation of Canadian sovereignty, and the enormous potential for economic development in the Arctic. There is no question over the sovereignty of Canada in its arctic regions, but rather a legal (albeit politically driven) dispute over the status of the NWP. Inuit conceptualizations of sea ice and territory can bolster the Canadian position on the NWP by reinvigorating the debate itself, engaging in the current development of the inclusion of Inuit and indigenous perspectives into political dialogues and demonstrating the uniqueness of the region, which can serve to remove a major roadblock to American acceptance of the Canadian claim. This paper argues that more assertive integration of Inuit perspectives into both Canadian discourse and the legal argument will reinvigorate the stalemate – an effective solution at its conception, but no longer as relevant as the sea ice melts and potential navigation becomes easier. In recent years, Inuit have had a more vocal role in discussions regarding shipping and development in the Arctic, as evidenced by their consultation in the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), produced by the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group of the Arctic Council (AC). This chapter investigates the state of dialogue on Inuit perceptions of sea ice, looking at how applying this dialogue can revive discussions on the NWP to lead to an equitable resolution of the dispute. This is achieved through the assessment of papers on sea ice as well as materials produced at the supra-national and domestic level.

Permanent sea ice cover has historically rendered the NWP non-navigable. However, the 20th century saw the first crossings of the passage as sea ice began to melt and technology created icebreakers strong enough to endure the difficult sailing. The nature of the dispute between Canada and the United States is based not in claims of sovereignty, but legal status, as explained by legal scholar Donat Pharand (2009)
Canada and the United States maintain diametrically opposed views in the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Canada considers the Passage as a national sea route, in the same way as Russia views the Northeast Passage or Northern Sea Route, requiring its consent for foreign use. The United States considers the Passage as an international strait, in which the new right of 'transit passage' applies. (p. 4)

The rationalities for the classification and organization of bodies of water are laid out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS), a legal structure that originates from actions and sailings on traditionally open seas and oceans. After a series of incidents in the 1960's, 70's and 80's in which the differences between the two states' (Canada and the United States) claims were thrust into public attention, Ottawa and Washington negotiated the Arctic Cooperation Agreement (1988), which, according to Christopher Kirkey (1995) was a political solution for a legal issue. Washington assured Ottawa that its consent would be sought for all navigation by US icebreakers within waters claimed as internal by the government of Canada. The US emphasized, however, that the agreement was unique to this particular area, and not referring to any other maritime areas (p. 417-418). This cooperative agreement, which was concluded, significantly, without prejudice to either legal argument, resulted in the functional crystallization of the dispute as it stands today.

The Canada-US Status Quo

The dispute over the NWP began in 1969, when the American ship SS Manhattan, was sent through the NWP. According to Arctic legal scholars Michael Byers and Suzanne Lalonde (2009), the US government sent a Coastguard icebreaker to accompany the ship to test the navigability of the route being used to transport oil from Alaska to the Atlantic seaboard. The US did not seek Canadian permission for the voyage, but upon learning of the crossing, Canada gave approval. Additionally, Canada sent an icebreaker to aid in the endeavor and arranged for a government representative to be onboard the Manhattan. American refusal to ask for permission triggered political controversy in Ottawa, predicated on the belief that the Manhattan should not enter those areas under Canadian jurisdiction (p. 1148). In response to the voyage of the SS Manhattan, Canada took more long term domestic legislative action. The SS Manhattan situation reinstituted the unresolved legal status of the NWP, and induced multiple Canadian responses. Most significantly, Canada implemented the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, which "...extended Canadian environmental enforcement out to 100 nm from the claimed baselines and into the Arctic Ocean and Beaufort Sea," an important step for Canada in asserting more control in the Arctic (Kraska, 2007, p. 42-43). The United States in turn responded to this legislation by informing Canada of the basis of its security concerns, and the precedent that the extension of claim might set. The United States answered through diplomatic channels, sending a note entitled "U.S Opposes Unilateral Extension by Canada of High Seas Jurisdiction." The note explained US position and expressed American concerns of Canada's action setting a precedent that could influence other countries to take similar jurisdictional action that would be invalid under international law (Byers & Lalonde, pp. 1151-1152). The SS Manhattan incident and subsequent responses by the US and Canadian governments brought their diverging positions to light – the US set out its precedent-setting security concerns, and Canada focused on defending its jurisdictional claims.

Again in 1985, the US icebreaker Polar Sea transited the NWP without Canadian consent. According to Kirkey (1995), US State department and Defense officials informed representatives from Canada's Department of External Affairs in May of 1985 that a US Coast Guard ship, the Polar Sea, would navigate through the NWP. The reason given was that using the NWP would save twenty-thirty days of travel and hundreds of thousands of dollars in fuel costs (p. 403). The United States informed Canada, but did not explicitly request permission. However, Canada once again granted authorization for the crossing (Kirkey, 1995). However, despite agreement that the sailing did not in any way intrude on Canadian sovereignty of Arctic waters or the NWP, the Canadian government began to feel pressured from public opinion to take stronger stance, with “...opposition parties, legal scholars, ardent nationalists, and Canadian society at large, all pressed for an effective response to this unwarranted American incursion into 'Canadian waters.'" (Kirkey, 1995,
The Canadian approach to this crossing was markedly different from that of the 1969 SS Manhattan. The government announced a series of “sovereignty enhancing” actions to take place, including utilizing straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago, the construction of an icebreaker, and plans for naval exercises in the Arctic (Kirkey, 1995). These actions were coupled, however, with diplomatic statements of intention to cooperate with the US:

We [Canada] are prepared to explore with the United States all means of cooperation that might promote the respective interests of both countries as Arctic friends, neighbours and allies in the Arctic waters of Canada and Alaska... Any co-operation with the United States shall only be on the basis of full respect for Canada’s sovereignty (Kirkey, 1995, p. 405).

The aforementioned Canada-United States Arctic co-operation agreement of 1988 is the result of this cooperation. As this agreement was reached without prejudice to the respective legal positions, this can be marked as the effective origin of the crystallization of the legal dispute of the status of the NWP.

Today, the NWP remains the subject of strong rhetoric in Canadian politics. In 2009, controversy erupted when a Conservative MP in the House of Commons floored a motion to rename the NWP the “Canadian Northwest Passage.” UBC legal scholar Michael Byers discussed the issue in a news article that year, highlighting that this move threatened to offend the Inuit of Nunavut, had no productive effect on the Canadian claim and had no standing under international law (Globe & Mail, 2009). The NWP is not as widely discussed in the American media as in Canada, but evidently still maintains a place in US politics. In January 2009, the Bush administration issued a Presidential Directive which reiterated its’ traditional position on the NWP:

Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. The Northwest Passage is a strait used for international navigation, and the Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to passage through those straits. Preserving the rights and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these rights throughout the world, including through strategic straits (United States, 2009, p. 2).

Beginning in the late 1960’s, the NWP has occupied a significant place in Canadian political rhetoric regarding the Arctic, and responses to US actions have largely shaped the bases of the Canadian status claim. As the current agreement is in place without prejudice to the legal positions, it is relevant today to continue discussing the legal status of the passage, as ease of transit brings international interest, from groups who are not party to said agreement.

Inuit Concepts of land and sea ice

Inuit conceptualizations of sea ice and territory, derived from occupancy and use since time immemorial, constitute a completely different worldview from non-Inuit perspectives. Understanding the logic, pragmatism and origin of the Inuit perspectives is vital to recognizing its importance as a potential factor in the Canadian claim regarding the NWP.

In 2008, in consultation with the Arctic Council’s Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group, the Inuit Circumpolar Council – Canada (ICC) published The Sea Ice Is Our Highway. This report sets out to highlight the vitality of the sea ice as part of the Inuit experience, and in doing so seeks to further emphasize the important of keeping the Inuit involved in the conversation regarding development in the Arctic. The Sea Ice Is Our Highway was in turn incorporated into PAME’s Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), published the following year. This was hugely significant, as it was the first time that the Inuit perspectives on sea ice in regards to shipping and development in the Arctic were included in an Arctic Council commissioned publication.

The Inuit have been a nomadic people living in the Arctic since ancient times: their entire culture and identity is based on free movement on the land. Inuit rely on free movement in order to eat, to obtain supplies for traditional clothing and art, and generally to keep their rich cultural heritage alive. Inuit temporarily move out from settlements to harvest resources that are sometimes bartered or traded. This movement takes place on the sea ice that surrounds and connects

The Sea Ice is Our Highway, through analysis of Inuit land use, first person interviews, and studies, presented three key findings, focusing on tradition and adaptation, the standard of sustainable use, and the role of the sea ice as the Inuit highway (ICC, 2008, p. i-ii). These findings underscore the primary Inuit concerns regarding shipping and development in the Arctic: with regards to tradition and adaptation, the Inuit are “highly adaptive people who are seeking ways to cope with these changes while maintaining their culture...They must have free movement over sea ice and open sea As the Inuit stand to be most directly affected by any accidents that damage the Arctic ecosystem, it is their position that any development affecting the land should allow them to continue to live off of it for many more years into the future. This constitutes the Inuit defined standard of “sustainable use.” This standard also applies to the sea, which is vital to everyday life because it is a source of traditional food, and practices including hunting. The connection to the environment – land and sea – gives Inuit a sense of pride and wellbeing (ICC, 2008, p. i-ii).

The Sea Ice is Our Highway presents the Inuit stake in development of shipping in the Arctic, which based on how the Inuit have used the sea ice is very different from the government’s stake in development.

PAME took The Sea Ice is Our Highway and the perspectives that it presented, and incorporated them into AMSA by including a short section on indigenous use: “The sea ice is very important to the way of life and culture. Inuit do not distinguish the water from the land in terms of their hunting and culture” (PAME, 2009, p. 113). The sea ice not only represents a space vital to hunting and harvesting, but also is a space for connection. In contrast with the blockage and obstacle that ice represents to those from the temperate regions of the rest of the world, the sea ice of waterways like the NWP is a dynamic connective force.

Inuit sea ice was recently the subject of an International Polar Year (IPY) supported study through Carleton University. The Inuit Sea Ice Use and Occupancy Project (ISIUOP) led by Claudio Aporta, was a continuation of an earlier, highly influential 1970’s study called The Inuit Land Use and Occupancy Project, designed to produce as comprehensive as possible a documentation of Inuit sea ice knowledge (Aporta, 2011, p. 12). This project worked on mapping the sea ice, creating innovative ways for hunters to use this information while out on the ice, creating educational materials, and passing on the knowledge of the sea ice from elders to Inuit youth (ISIUOP, 2011). The ISIUOP provides very clear analysis of Inuit uses of sea ice. This can serve not only to aid Inuit in hunting practices but also to improve non-Inuit understanding of the sea ice.

“...We will undertake a multidisciplinary approach to understand Inuit knowledge of the sea ice and local observations of change, coupled with analysis of change from local, social scientific, and natural scientific perspectives and methods. In so doing, we will be in a position to broaden our collective understanding of both ecosystem and community vulnerability to sea ice change. Without the important input and direct involvement of Inuit experts it would be difficult, if not impossible, to develop locally appropriate assessments of community vulnerability, resilience, or adaptive capacity to deal with observed changes in the dynamic sea ice environment (ISIUOP, 2011).

The ISIUOP, therefore, was wide-ranging in its purpose: acknowledging that not only is it important for Inuit knowledge to be shared among Inuit, but to look at how Inuit knowledge can improve what they term “adaptive capacity.” This is a clear example of Inuit knowledge being looked at in such a way as to influence potential development of the region.

The study and knowledge of sea ice has evolved in a relatively short period of time. From The Sea Ice is Our Highway and ISIUOP to the inclusion of indigenous perspectives in the AMSA, the importance of distinguishing Inuit concepts has been recognized at the highest levels of Arctic cooperation. One level where this recognition is lacking, however, is at the federal level in Canada. Rosemarie Kuptana, former President of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (now known as Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, or ITK) makes a direct challenge about the lack of Inuit inclusion in the discourse regarding the NWP:

The current positions of Canada, USA and the European countries are disrespectful, to say the least, and harkens to earlier and discredited European colonial practices. Canada is required to consult
and its course to date has been, and is, in violation of its agreements with Inuit which are protected under s. 35 of the Constitution Act 1982. Inuit in this case have the option of invoking the non-derogation clause of the Constitution Act 1982 (Kuptana, 2013, p. 11).

Kuptana’s assertion is rooted in both legality and morality; not only does she argue Canada has the constitutional obligation to operate more cooperatively with the Inuit regarding the NWP dispute, but they are acting in such a way that “harkens to...colonial practices” (Kuptana, 2013, p. 11). A legal challenge by Inuit to the current Canadian position would be costly, both in real terms and symbolically in the spirit of cooperation. Kuptana provides an avenue for cooperation, however, by pointing out a clause of UNCLOS which is in direct contention with Inuit knowledge: “UNCLOS does not address use and occupancy as a way of life on the water as the UNCLOS states that it is impractical for humans to occupy the sea...” (Kuptana, 2013, p. 11). It is evident from The Sea Ice is Our Highway, the AMSA, and ISIUOP that Inuit have indeed been occupying the sea, and furthermore their occupation of that sea is rooted in practicality, as it supports hunting, communities and other practices. Kuptana’s bold statements, directed to both Canada and international actors, argue that participation in the discourse should not be ignored. Kuptana’s depiction of the dichotomy of governmental relations with the Inuit is a choice that the government can make. They can work in cooperation with the Inuit, who can reinforce claims to the Northwest Passage and Canadian Arctic as a whole, or continue with the dissatisfactory state of indigenous inclusion and risk constitutional and legal repercussions.

Practicality of Integration

The primary challenge to the Canadian claim of status in the NWP is the American desire to avoid making precedent-setting concessions, as the idea is that agreeing for the NWP to be recognized as internal waters may give rise to similar arguments in the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and the Strait of Gibraltar (Senate of Canada, 2009, pp. 16). As climate change makes easier navigation of the NWP a more distinct possibility that will affect Inuit life and society, it is important to resolve the stalemated dispute, so that these potential effects can be addressed in a more permanent fashion.

The original cooperative agreement has endured for decades. It has been an effective solution (in that any major issues have been avoided thus far), but climate change, growing international interest in potentially using the strait, and changes in how Inuit have had to use the ice merit a reinvigoration of the debate. Primarily, melting of the sea ice has affected how, when, and where Inuit use the sea ice:

As climate change and reductions in sea ice affect the migration routes of the land and sea animals we rely upon, it may be necessary for us to travel even further than before in order to reach them. Inuit hunters are reporting many changes in the locations and times that our traditional animals can be found... This is why we are very concerned that sea ice routes remain passable for hunters as well as the migratory game they follow, and that the entire Arctic environment be kept free from contamination – both in the areas we are now using regularly and in those areas where we may need to hunt in the future (ICC, 2008, p. 19).

The Inuit stand to be most directly affected by increases in shipping. It is difficult to determine exactly when shipping in the Arctic will pick up, but the fact of the matter is that it is not the quantity by which it increases, but the fact that it will increase at all that determines that this is an issue that needs resolution. Despite the debate over whether climate change will open Arctic waters and the NWP to shipping in few years or in decades, for McRae (2007), the responsible lawmaker has no option but to plan for that possibility now (pp. 20). Finally, Elizabeth Elliot-Meisel (1999) has made a compelling argument as to why now is in the best interests for both states to settle this dispute: “Canada's place as a paramount ally and continental partner of the US, the history of bilateral cooperation for more than fifty years, the geographically unique nature of the Northwest Passage that precludes any arrangement becoming precedent-setting with regards to other straits, and the fact that the passage is not considered a vital choke-point by the US military” form the basis of this conclusion (Elliott-Meisel, 1999, pp.408). Sea ice, and it occupancy and use by the Inuit removes this risk of precedence.
The Inuit concepts of sea ice as an extension of territory and important space for social behavior and survival are an expression of its uniqueness as a region. Asserting that uniqueness would set the NWP apart from the regions where the US would like to avoid setting precedent. Inuit have been involved in publicizing these perceptions at the domestic and international level, and the materials that have been created to disseminate these conceptualizations can be a part of that dialogue. There is a willingness, desire, and in the case of Kuptana, a challenge to the government itself for indigenous involvement in the dialogue regarding the NWP. Jessica Shadian (2006) discusses the political power of Inuit groups, particularly the ICC. In the twenty years before the creation of the Arctic Council, the ICC constructed a concrete basis for discussing how to manage the Arctic environment and development. Inuit agency was well established, and exemplified by the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council. In fact, an official representinga member-state in the Arctic Council declared that “it was this group and not any Arctic government that was responsible for introducing the principles of sustainable development into the circumpolar forum” (Shadian, 2006, pp. 257). The political agency of the Inuit through their organization in groups like the ICC is of crucial importance to the way that the Inuit can and should be included in the dialogue regarding the NWP. The structure for advocacy and materials documenting Inuit sea ice knowledge and use have been established, and successfully applied at the level of the Arctic Council (through AMSA).

The sea ice of Nunavut is much more than frozen water—it is a dynamic part of the subsistence economy, community, and society. Canada has the opportunity to reinvigorate the debate by addressing Inuit perspectives in its own claim—giving innovative nuance to an argument lacking consideration for the regions’ uniqueness.

Policy Options

- Formalize consultation, beginning with more comprehensive knowledge sharing on Inuit perspectives on sea ice and Arctic territory, between the Inuit and the Federal government (particularly, AANDC and DFAIT)
- Amend the next incarnation of Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy statement to include stronger assertions of Inuit sea ice occupancy, and the uniqueness of this occupancy to the region of the Canadian Arctic as well as the NWP
- Using the upcoming Canadian Arctic Council Chairmanship as a platform, encourage a higher level of integration of indigenous concepts of sea ice and territory into discussion and consciousness at the supranational level
- Provide more funding to/promote the creation of more Inuit led projects like ISIUOP in the region of the Northwest Passage, to create a better understanding of how climate change and development will affect the Inuit that live there

Conclusion

Decades in, the stalemate over the status of the NWP has shown no signs of progressing. The government of Canada has expressed, largely through political rhetoric that it wants to stake the strongest claim possible on the NWP. However, without innovation and creativity, this claim remains deadlocked in the same argument. By internalizing Inuit views of sea ice in NWP rhetoric and policy, Canada can add cultural and historical nuance to its legal claim. This dispute has endured for over 40 years, and a resolution of the legal arguments appears less than imminent. The dispute is largely political, and a compromise is a strong possibility. Reinforcing Canadian claims with Inuit occupancy and sea ice perceptions is the most effective way to approach reaching that compromise. Because it is the Inuit who stand to be most directly affected by navigation through the NWP, they have high stakes in the final determination of its status, as said status will eventually determine regulatory powers and restrictions. As Canada prepares to chair the Arctic Council, it has the opportunity to be a more innovative actor in the Arctic. Accordingly, by strongly asserting the concepts of sea ice into its official position on the NWP and into its Arctic Foreign Policy, Canada has the potential to encourage a more timely resolution, moving into its chairmanship with new vigor and sounder levels of partnership with the Inuit of Nunavut.

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Honoring Ottawa’s Promises to Nunavut

By Ngoc Ho

Abstract
Nunavut was created in 1999 to meet the Crown’s obligations under Article 3 and 4 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), a legally binding modern treaty protected under section 35 of the 1982 Constitution. The Nunavut Act was created outside of the legally binding treaty to establish the Government of Nunavut; however, the implementation of the agreements has not fully been honored in the past two decades since its existence. Ottawa’s inability to commit to fulfilling its legally binding discourse has resulted in discrediting Canada’s integrity among not only the international community, but most importantly its Northern Canadian citizens, the Inuit. As Canada is about to take the helm of the Arctic Council in 2013, now is the time for Canada to be a forerunner in effective stewardship and leadership by strengthening sustainable development, cohesive environmental agendas and human security. As a result, Canada needs to address its own underlying issues with sustainable resource development, human security and environmental agendas before it can attest to Arctic security and development.

Introduction
Nunavut is Canada’s largest territory, covering one-fifth of Canadian land mass and containing roughly 70 percent of Canada’s coastal borders, including the Arctic Archipelago (Legare, 1998; Legare, 2008). If Nunavut were to become its own country, it’d be the 12th largest in the world (Berger, 2006). The territory covers 352,240 square kilometers of land, making Inuit in Nunavut technically Canada’s largest landowners; however any resource revenue from surface and subsurface rights to over 38,000 square kilometers of those lands are directly managed by Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI)1 (Berger, 2006; Legare, 1998, Legare, 2008; Mayer, 2007). Settled land claims, Paul Mayer (2007) argues, provide for clarity for development of natural resources, which is an important aspect of devolution, community resilience, and capacity building.

Nunavut today incorporates 34,028 citizens (Nunavut Bureau of Statistics, 2012), with 85 percent being Inuit. Nunavut has the highest birth rate in Canada with 25 percent per 1000 compared to Canada’s 11 percent. As a result, population in Nunavut is comprised of mostly youth, 40 percent of the population are under 16 while 60 percent are under 25 (Mayer, 2007). Population growth raises various socio-economic and political issues such as housing shortages, job insufficiency, leading to increased need for economic funding and self-reliance. The federal government provides an annual unconditional transfer of funding to Nunavut to finance the government of Nunavut’s expenditures, social, health, training, and infrastructure programs (Department of Finance, 2013). Nunavut’s current budget is projected to spend $1.34 billion and to receive $1.47 billion in revenue from the Crown, allocating for well over 90 percent of Nunavut’s revenues (Peterson, 2012). Dependency on Canada for funding is a burden not only for Nunavut, but also Canadian taxpayers in other regions. Therefore, it is in Ottawa’s interest to fully implement the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) and honor devolution in order to build Inuit capacity to become self-sufficient. Honoring these agreements will create a hospitable environment for human rights alleviation, resource development, and self-reliance.

It falls under the responsibility of the
state to implement land claims agreements and devolution of resource management to build state capacity by addressing economic and environmental problems in Nunavut. This chapter argues that it is not only in the interest of Nunavut but also of the Canadian federal government to honor land claims agreements as devolution would allow for capacity building in Nunavut to address socio-economic woes, and prosper. A stronger Nunavut territory will be empowered by economic prosperity, sufficient housing, more funding, proper education and support for Inuit standard of living. Implementation of the NLCA must include Article 23, the most contested issue between the federal government and Inuit population, to establish a government that is for the people and by the people. Transfer of jurisdiction and responsibilities to the Nunavut government enables Inuit to take their future into their own hands and to hold government officials accountable. Moreover, it rebuilds Canada’s integrity and relations with Inuit and the international community. In the next section, I will describe what the NLCA entails, problems with the agreement, and how fully implementing the agreement will be advantageous to Canada. The latter half of the essay is the next step after implementing the land claims agreement in Nunavut: devolution. I will describe what devolution entails by drawing from the Yukon and Greenland examples.

The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement

The Nunavut agreement is a cohesive marriage between Inuit in Nunavut and Canada and therefore, requires attention and commitment from both parties to ensure an enduring coalition (Aldridge & Merritt, 2012; Fenge & Quassa, 2009). The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) is a contract or modern-day treaty that according to the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal People (2008), “serve[s] to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with Crown sovereignty” by relinquishing Inuit ties to the land in exchange for the creation of a Nunavut territory and government as well as the “rights for Inuit to participate in decision-making concerning the use, management and conservation of land, water and resources, including the offshore; financial compensation and means of participating in economic opportunities; and to encourage self-reliance and well-being of Inuit” (Nunavut Land Claims Agreement [NLCA], 1993). Although the Nunavut territory and a territorial public government represented by the people have been established, Canada has failed to honor its fiduciary agreements in fully honoring the spirit and intent of the NLCA (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2011). Unlike Yukon and more recently the NWT, the Nunavut government does not have the administrative capabilities to control land and resource development despite their “province-like’ institutions (Amagoalik & Campbell, 2012).

Since Inuit compose a majority of the population, Nunavut should be a de-facto self-governed administration to be able to better respond to Inuit interests (Legare, 1998, p. 272). The reality of the situation is that Inuit employment in the government is at 50 percent, only a 6 percent increase since it’s implementation in 1999 (Department of Human Resources Planning and Strategic Priorities, 2012). Granted, during its beginnings there were fewer positions. However, more government positions in later years should imply more Inuit employment. The fundamental rationale in creating a separate territory from the NWT is to establish an institution that better reflects the political, social and economic values as well as the perspectives of the Inuit population who occupies a majority of the area in which is now Nunavut (Legare, 1998, p. 274). Initial proposals for a separate Nunavut territory were rejected until a survey conducted in 1980 and 1982 found that 56 percent were in favor of annexing Nunavut from the NWT (Legare, 1998, p. 274-5). Although both the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) and Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) negotiated with the federal government to establish the new territory, subsequent land claims negotiations were conducted only between TFN and Ottawa. The agreement defines the relationship of the Inuit of Nunavut to the Canadian state for international and domestic law.

Article 4 of the NLCA recommends that “Parliament, as a government measure, legislation to establish, within a defined period, a new Nunavut Territory, with its own Legislative Assembly and public government, separate from the Government of the remainder of the Northwest Territories” (NLCA, 1993); this allowed for negotiations on a political accord that would establish the powers and financing of the new Nunavut government (Fenge & Quassa, 2009). Since the Nunavut public government was created outside of the legally binding treaty,
it did not accord constitutional protection under the agreement weakening its legitimacy and lack of recognition from federal, provincial and territorial governments (Legare, 2008; Anderson, McCarthy, & Mehaffey, 2012; Fenge & Quassa, 2009). Fenge and Quassa (2009) argue that by separating the details of the implementation of the Nunavut government from the constitutionally protected land claims agreement, the Crown has the ability to repeal the government of Nunavut; hence, “The Government of Nunavut remains a creature of statute and has only such powers as Parliament has devolved to it” (Penikett, 2011).

Nunavut government does not own, control nor administer public lands and resources; benefits from natural resource exploitation goes to either Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI), who owns 18 per cent of Inuit owned lands, or to Canada who owns the rest (Legare, 2008, p. 348). Furthermore, powers obtained by the government of Nunavut can easily change if parliament amends the Nunavut Act (Legare, 2008, p. 348). Despite lack of economic jurisdiction over land and resources, the Nunavut Legislative Assembly functions fairly smoothly with 15 of the 19 members of the Legislative Assembly being Inuit as of 2013 (Legislative Assembly of Nunavut, 2013). Although the ratio does not reflect Inuit participation in government employment at the representative (85%) level (NLCA, 1993, p. 191) it only takes a majority (10 support) for a law to pass and each member can freely express their views on a given subject (Legare, 2008).

The Government of Nunavut’s objective is to improve the lives of all Nunavummiut by strengthening culture and expanding the economy (Legare, 2008, 350). Social problems in Nunavut are derived from economic realities such as unemployment, insufficient funding for housing, and inadequate schooling and training (Berger, 2006; Courneoyea, 2009; Legare, 2008), resulting in a significantly higher rate of drug and alcohol abuse, criminal behavior and suicide rates. Youth in Nunavut are caught between two different cultures: one of traditional impediments including lack of survival skills and traditional knowledge in harvesting and music and the other of the modern world where poor education, low graduation rates, lack of housing, food security issues, and violent social relations are the norm (Legare, 2008). Rapid socio-economic changes have negative pathological effects on indigenous communities necessitating community resilience and capacity building. If the youth in Nunavut are the solution for the future, then now is the time to stop the cyclical web of socio-economic problems. Ottawa needs to address issues of underfunded school programs that lead to low graduation rates and under-representation in the workforce. Housing shortages must be addressed since a rapidly increasing population requires sufficient housing in order to mitigate “low self-esteem, alcohol and substance abuse, family violence, youth suicide and welfare dependency” (Legare, 2008, p. 352). Unless the Crown steps in to build community resilience and capacity, Inuit youth will likely to continue to face the same socio-economic implications as they transition into adulthood.

**Impediments of the NLCA**

Article 23 of the NLCA stipulates that Inuit employment in the government of Nunavut should be at a representative level of 85% (Berger, 2006; Legare, 2008; NCLA, 1993). As of 2012, Inuit filled positions within the government are at 50% (Department of Human Resources Planning and Strategic Priorities, 2012). Statistics from previous years clearly show that Article 23 is not being met. Legare (2008) and Berger (2006) both suggest that implementation of Inuktitut as an official language and better funding for education and training programs are necessary to ensure adequate Inuit employment in the government of Nunavut. “Even though Inuktitut is the language most widely spoken in Nunavut, 42 percent of the Inuit have reported difficulties receiving services in Inuktitut from their government; the majority of government employers, around 53%, are non-Inuit (Legare, 2008). Inadequate education and training programs makes it difficult to fulfill the employment objective from Article 23 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement. As a result of underfunded and under supported education and training programs, heightened drop-out rates from socio-economic issues have stunted Inuit employment growth in government workplace; they have completely exhausted the supply of qualified Inuit (Berger, 2006; Legare, 2008).

Berger proposes the implementation of a bilingual system in Nunavut to ensure proper education, graduation and employment. However, there are challenges that his proposal faces such as: 1) Canada’s refusal to contribute additional education funding of 20 million; 2) shortage of teachers that can speak Inuktitut; and 3) lack of teaching materials transcribed in Inuktitut.
that is relevant past fourth grade. However, if these challenges can be met, opportunities for Inuit are possible (Berger, 2006; Legare, 2008). According to the World Bank’s findings in 2005, teaching children in their native or first tongue promotes cognitive development that is essential to learn a second language. The World Bank reports that when the language of schooling is rarely or not used at home, students tend to have a lower level of learning and higher rates of drop out and repetition. A case study of Mali corroborates their findings by demonstrating that children who transitioned from a local language to French graduated at a 32% higher success rate than children in French-only programs (Bender, Dutcher, Klaus, Shore, & Tesar, 2005). The study suggests that children who use their first language as instruction are five times less likely to repeat their grade and three times less likely to drop out (Bender, et al., 2005). Ergo, funding the implementation of Inuktitut as the official language of Nunavut along with English as a second language can potentially increase high school graduation rates (Berger, 2006). Furthermore, the use of local vernacular leads to more inclusion of local content into the curriculum. This results in greater participation from parents and the community as they are in a better position to be involved in school when they feel that their knowledge and culture are valued (Bender, et al., 2005). Moreover, transitioning to Inuktitut as the official language fosters capacity building in the region because it empowers youth as it allows them to study in a language that they can relate to socially and culturally. Thus, it is pertinent that Ottawa invests in education in Nunavut.

Current schools taught in English in Nunavut are essentially foreign institutions delivering a foreign curriculum in a foreign language (Legare, 2008, p. 365). Lagere compares language use in Nunavut and Quebec, arguing: “How long would the French Language survive in the province of Quebec, if Quebecois children were educated in English from fourth grade and onwards?” Legare relates Quebec and Nunavut by arguing that Quebecois’s government has the capacity to provide proper education programs that ensures the preservation of its vernacular tongue whereas the Nunavut government lacks the capabilities to provide adequate Inuktitut arithmetic and textbooks past the fourth grade. Although Quebec has been able to preserve French as the main language in school with sufficient teachers, materials, and funding, Nunavut lacks the same financial capabilities to fund their vernacular. Quebec, a province, has jurisdiction over the direction and pace of resource development within its boundaries. In contrast, Nunavut does not have such luxury. Canada should consider fulfilling the NLCA and fully devolve land and resource jurisdiction to the government of Nunavut so that Inuit can become more self-sufficient and resilient to socio-economic issues.

According to Andre Legare (2008), Nunavut can become more self-reliant by acquiring resource rights on Crown lands, reducing dependency from transfer payments, increasing Inuit employment within government, and full implementing the NLCA to receive adequate funding. Nunavut hopes to reduce its dependency on Ottawa by “acquiring from the Canadian government control, management, and benefits over public Crown lands and resources”; this would enable Nunavut to be self-reliant, an objective that the NLCA proclaims to ensure (Legare, 2008, NLCA, 1993). Modern treaties and land claims agreements are the building blocks in developing a productive and auspicious relationship between the Crown and aboriginals (Government of Canada, 1997). However, these agreements can increase tension if one of the two does not meet the promises stipulated in the agreement as Canada has done to Nunavut.

Article 17 of the NLCA promotes resource development on Inuit Owned Lands (IOL) to promote self-sufficiency. However, all resource revenues are directly funneled into NTI’s bank account (Speca, 2012; Legare, 2008) to fund powers, function and authority on behalf and for the benefit of the Inuit (NLCA, 1993). Inuit do not directly benefit from resources developed on IOL. Therefore, Inuit need other sources of economic opportunities that will enable them to be more self-reliant. To fill this gap of economic opportunities, Canada should transfer control and rights to land and resources to the territorial government of Nunavut in order for them to be more self-reliant. Moreover, Canada’s inability to address resource development in a timely manner and complex regulations on businesses impinge upon development of natural resources, making it less appealing to business groups who not only have to face high costs of production due to labor, climate and transportation, but also heightened restrictions and limitations from rigorous regulatory systems (Erlandson, 2009).
Erlandson (2009) warns that “if processes and time frames for development and operations approvals become unpredictable,” then the Arctic as a site for business will appear unattractive (Erlandson, 2009, p. 421). Accommodating to a viable oil and gas sector, facilitating better management capacities, operating regulatory processes more efficiently, improving resolution process for surface rights disputes, guaranteeing risk management, and establishing structured timelines will make the arctic north a more attractive center for research and development (Erlandson, 2009, p. 422). Because the federal government has so many national and subnational issues to resolve, it cannot address sub-national issues on a timely matter. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the federation to devolve those jurisdictions to the subnational level, in this case Nunavut, to deal with subnational issues such as commerce in Nunavut. This will reduce delays in regulations, lower restrictions to territorial standards, and increase business interest in Nunavut for its inviting working environment.

Ottawa’s failure to fully implement the NLCA discredits its integrity among Inuit and the international community. Honoring the NLCA is consistent with Canada’s international and domestic human rights obligations. Canada’s inability to honor its agreement to the Inuit has lowered social well-being; economic self-reliance, growth and stability of Aboriginal populations in their traditional territories, environmental protection; and culture and language (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2011). The United Nations Human Rights Council recognizes that the plight of “aboriginal peoples remains the most pressing human rights issue facing Canadians”; an embarrassing assessment for a first world nation with overall positive socio-economic development. The Government of Canada’s approach to implementing modern treaties needs to change in order to adhere to the international legal, constitutional, and human rights conventions established by the UN Human Rights committee on Aboriginal rights.

Devolution as the Next Step

Devolution is the process of transferring province-like powers to territories. Most responsibilities such as education, health, governance, and transportation have been devolved to Canada’s northern territories except for the management of land and resources. This final step to devolution involves transferring the responsibilities to administer, control and manage land and water to local population (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada [AANDC], 2013). The Yukon is mostly devolved while the NWT had just signed the devolution agreement-in-principle and Mr. Dale Drown was recently appointed Chief Federal Negotiator for Nunavut Devolution (AANDC, 2013).

Devolution is perhaps the next step to address Nunavut’s socio-economic problems. Greater responsibilities and jurisdiction will create more governmental jobs to tackle the influx of the newly transferred government processes for land and resource management. Transfer of responsibilities and management of natural resources will expand Nunavut’s mixed economy that is currently dependent on government jobs and the sale of harvested goods, crafts and art (Bowman, 2011; Mayer, 2007). Lauren Bowman (2011) suggests that the wage economy\(^2\) supports traditional economy, linking the necessity of devolution to sustain traditional knowledge\(^3\), culture and traditions.

Devolution is a critical step towards greater self-reliance. The legislative assembly of the Nunavut government would have the decision-making capabilities over economic development. More importantly, Nunavut legislators have greater access and control of royalties generated from resource development, enabling them to disburse revenues to programs and departments that best reflect the needs of Inuit. Greater self-reliance will empower Inuit and especially youth to participate in their territorial state. Ottawa’s relinquishment of its jurisdiction over land and resources implies trust in the territorial government to be accountable. When responsibility rests in local politicians rather than on the federal level, the territorial government “face stronger incentives and hold greater capacity to address the wide-ranging economic and social interests of the electorate” (Alcantara, Cameron & Kennedy, 2012). As a result of increased faith and support in the Nunavut government to govern and support

\(^2\) Wage economy represents the aggregate paid labor or services on an hourly, daily, or weekly basis. In this argument, we include salaried wages as well to encompass an image of stable income.

\(^3\) Traditional economy reflects traditional knowledge on subsistence consumption from sources such as harvesting, hunting, gathering, and fishing. Typically, these sources of food are used as trade, barter or for sharing in a community.
Itself, Inuit in return, will restore its relationship and trust with Canada.

Devolution would simplify resource management. Rather than having to comply with both the federal and territorial’s various layers of bureaucracy, businesses will only have to negotiate with the Nunavut government, thus reducing time, money and conflict (Mayer, 2007). For instance, resource development pre-devolution in the Yukon was slow; “it took ‘years and years’ for things to get done compared to post-devolution” (Alcantara, Cameron, & Kennedy, 2012, p. 335). Uncertainty, insufficient clarity, lack of timeliness and competing land-use issues further slowed mineral development in the Yukon. It took three years for territorial civil servants to clear the backlog of applications that had accumulated under DIAND’s watch (Alcantara, Cameron, & Kennedy, 2012). A setting that has clear and established procedures in resource development is more inviting for entrepreneurs and corporations to invest and develop in the Arctic.

By devolving jurisdiction and responsibilities to the government of Nunavut, Canada can show just how much it has matured: the Auditor General of Canada reports in 2003 that “by these actions, the federal government and Canadians are accepting that the North is more than a frontier; it is a homeland for the people who live there” (Mayer, 2007, p. 5). Bill MacKay argues, “approached in the right way, devolution will increase self-determination by increasing Inuit capabilities.” Moreover, it will reduce dependency on Territorial Formula Financing (TFF), funding provided for by the federal government while raising the standard of living comparable to that of fellow Canadians (Mayer, 2007; MacKay, 2013). Capability to be self-sufficient from resource royalties will lessen the burden on southern taxpayers and eventually contribute to Canada’s wealth (Speca, 2012).

Yukon Devolution

Aside for the Yukon, which is considered “mostly” devolved, the responsibilities within territorial governments are consistent with provinces except for their jurisdiction and control over land and resources except for the Yukon (Cameron & Campbell, 2009). In Yukon, however, legislative jurisdiction of surface and subsurface lands, regulation and management of waters, forest resources, and mines and minerals were devolved to the territorial government. The Canada-Yukon Oil and Gas Accord provided for the transfer of oil and gas to the territory in 1993, implemented in 1999 (Cameron & Campbell, 2009, p. 201). “The accord allows Yukon to keep the first 3 million of resource revenues from oil and gas development with no offset under the federal formula financing agreement. Revenues in excess of 3 million are subject to an offset in the formula financing transfer in 60 to 80 percent range, through five incremental steps (Cameron & Campbell, 2009, p. 203). By 2003, the Northern Accord completely devolved land and resource management: oil and gas were devolved and shared management of offshore resources was agreed upon (Cameron & Campbell, 2009, p. 201). This accord stipulates that Yukon may retain 3 million per annum in resource revenues without any formula financing offset. However, any revenues in excess of 3 million are offset at a rate of 100 percent or one for one (Cameron & Campbell, 2009, p. 203). Fortunately, Yukon has yet to reach the resource revenue ceiling to attain the one for one ratio.

One important advancement from the restructuring of the Yukon’s constitution is the removal of section 4(3) of the Yukon Act which enables the Governor in Council, in this case the federal minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, to not only appoint the Commissioner of Yukon (Yukon Act, 2003), but also “instruct the commissioner on the administration of the territory directly” (Cameron & Campbell, 2009, p. 202; Yukon Act, 2003). Cameron and Campbell (2009) woefully realized that the amendment of section 4 from the act was to be removed in 2012, ten years after the proposal to amend the act in case federal ministerial direction was needed. However, as of 2013, the act is still in place.

Selling out in terms of reaping the profits from net fiscal benefit or the amount of resource revenue the territorial government is allowed to keep without it being offset against the revenues provided to the territorial government under the territorial formula financing agreement has emerged as a criticism of Yukon’s 2003 devolution transfer agreement (Cameron & Campbell, 2009, p. 203). Formula financing agreement provides at least 75% of territorial revenue based for all three territories and nearly 90% for Nunavut (Mayer, 2007, p. 7). Hiram Beaubier cited in Mayer 2007 revealed shortcomings of the Yukon devolution that Nunavut should take note of: the
need for responsible federal minister to identify a clear vision and objectives for the federal negotiating team, the need for a comprehensive scoping exercise at the outset of the process to ensure focus throughout the negotiating parties, and recruitment of a human resources specialist to provide guidance on the development of a retention strategy for current employees. Though the transfer did not succeed in significantly reducing dependency on Ottawa; “the territory can now determine where, at what pace, and in what resource fields development can proceed. Land, in and of itself, is a valued commodity, and today Yukon has legislative, regulatory, and policy jurisdiction over development on most lands in the territory” (Cameron & Campbell, 2009, p. 204). Cameron and Campbell (2009) argue that although Yukon’s net fiscal benefit is “miserly”, future territorial royalties and revenues will increase, reducing dependency on Ottawa. They further demonstrate devolution as a positive process that Ottawa should pursue by comparing Newfoundland and Labrador in terms of its ability to generate its own source revenues once it was able to control and exploit those resources. Critics of devolution may argue that there aren’t enough resources to exploit, and thus not sufficient in claiming that devolution will, in the future, reduce dependency on Ottawa. However, Cameron and Campbell (2009) argue that this argument is unfounded since resource potential is still unknown (Cameron & Campbell, 2009, p. 204-205).

**Greenland as a Model**

Greenland’s devolution package is the ideal model. As a self-governing entity within Denmark, Greenland maintains jurisdiction over all its land and resource deposits—gold, lead, zinc, iron, earth minerals, rubies, and offshore oil and gas that are projected to produce more than 40 to 50 billion barrels of oil (Speca, 2012). Greenland’s resource royalties are directly funneled into its treasury rather than shared with Denmark (Speca, 2012). Better yet, Greenland continues receiving its “block grant,” similar to the TFF where the government provides revenue to fund government operations, etc., until it reaches DKK 75 million (13 million) in resource revenue without inculcating a corresponding reduction (Speca, 2012). Devolution of resource management allows territorial governments free range over the pace and direction of resource development while at the same time enabling them to keep the profits from resources extracted from their lands. Due to Greenland’s homeland rule, it has the capacity to approve resource development schemes according to their environmental and economic stipulations. Moreover, the country has fiscal control over their budgeting and distribution of funds, allowing the government to support programs that will bolster regional capacity such as education and training programs. Currently, Nunavut lacks the fiscal capacity to alleviate its communities’ socio-economic woes ranging from inadequate housing to high rates of high school dropouts. These issues can easily be remedied with proper funding and support from the government of Nunavut. However, since the government of Nunavut is financially dependent on the Crown, it has no capacity to neither expand their revenues nor look for revenues elsewhere as they don’t have jurisdiction to land and resource rights.

Anthony Speca reveals, “Greenland’s total budget can grow limitlessly in proportion to resource revenues, yet it will never fall below the level of Greenland’s regular, inflation-indexed grant” (Speca, 2012, p. 3). These terms are very favorable in comparison to the Yukon’s, which has more stringent protocols and resource revenue caps, or the NWT’s devolution agreement-in-principle. Nunavut should not expect such favorable terms. As negotiation between Nunavut and Ottawa commence, there will be talks of Nunavut following along similar protocols as the Yukon Territory and the NWT. Although Nunavut will continue to receive its government transfers, these transfers will be reduced at a specific rate ranging from 50 to 100 percent after reaching a certain amount in resource revenue per annum. This amount historically, in the case of the Yukon and NWT, is set at 3 million. Although Canada hopes to transition Nunavut to a net benefit system where its revenues contribute to Canada’s overall wealth, Ottawa cannot expect Nunavut to start contributing without favorable guidelines that will enable Nunavut to build its economic infrastructure and to establish a resilient community through good education and stable incomes.

Through the Equalization program that provinces participate in, “Ottawa provides unconditional fiscal transfers to less prosperous provinces whose ‘fiscal capacities’ to raise own-source revenues fall below the national average for all ten provinces” (Speca, 2012, p. 9). Anthony Speca (2012) suggests Nunavut negotiate for the
provincial Equalization equation that counts half or none of the resource revenues acquired depending on revenue capacity. In Nunavut’s case, current revenue capacity amounts to $3,675 per capita, just under half of the 2011-12 ten province standard of $7,436 per capita; this would put Nunavut in the category of provinces that are unable to meet revenue capacity standards, and thus do not have to allocate their resource revenues against the amount of money configured in transfers allotted (Feehan, 2009; Speca, 2012). This implies that Nunavut will be able to keep its resource revenues while receiving full government transfers. In such a scenario, Nunavut will have the funds to not only finance its government but also endow in education, job training, housing and other social-economic issues that hinder Nunavut’s economic development.

However, it is important to take into consideration that negotiation between Nunavut and Canada will not be the same as Greenland and Denmark. Anthony Speca cautions, “devolution is not the same as decolonization ;” therefore, the context in which Greenland and Denmark are negotiating their agreements are influenced by their view that Greenland will emerge as a sovereign, post-colonial state with full rights over lands, resources and revenues. Nunavut should not expect similar outcomes. Accordingly, the federal government along with Aboriginal governments and Aboriginal organizations need to work on a northern economic development framework to ensure a balance and sustainable economic path. Devolution will secure for young people living in the North a productive and satisfying life in future economic opportunities, emphasizing proper management of eco-life and the environment, sustainable resource development, and building a stronger foundation for infrastructure for the local community (Abele, 2009).

Policy Options for Canada

- Canada should honor its discourse with the Inuit in fully implementing Article 23 by providing, as Thomas Berger suggests, 20 million to fund bilingual education in a timely manner to establish Inuuktitut as an official language taught in school until 12th grade or the equivalent.
- In collaboration with the Crown and Inuit, establish an independent institution to oversee the implementation of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement along the Land Claims Agreements Coalition’s “Four-Ten Declaration” in a time specific manner, fully funded by the federation.
- A funding amount of 10 million to incorporate Inuktitut transcripts in government procedures, signs, and boards; this funding is also intended to promote Inuktitut as well as to teach Inuktitut.
- Devolve land and resource management to the Government of Nunavut.

Conclusion

Failure to properly implement the provisions of modern treaties puts Canada at risk for generating legions of broken promises” (Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples [SSCAP], 2008). As climate change opens access to the Arctic in resource development and shipping opportunities, clear economic and political agendas and policies in the Arctic are necessary for national and regional development. Canada, in the past, has not been actively involved in shaping Arctic security due to their lack of a holistic understanding of sovereignty rights at the international, state and community level. Canada, at this time, does not possess the scope for influencing international debate on the future of the region. Before Canada can attest to its own model for capacity building in the Arctic region, it needs to first focus on capacity building within that region. By honoring its promises in the NLCA and further devolving jurisdiction over land and resource development, Canada will not only rebuild its strained relationship with its Arctic citizens, but also empower self-reliance, create a stronger territorial government that is accountable to its constituents, develop human growth in education and health, and encourage greater overall capacity for Inuit. It is essential that Inuit are included in the policy making and decision making of resource management and economic development of lands, water, wildlife and natural resources because it directly impacts their lifestyle. Thus, the transfer of jurisdiction and control over natural resources to the territorial government of Nunavut is fundamental to the building blocks of Arctic sovereignty, in human development and security.

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Le Québec Total : Creating an Unifying Vision for Northern Development
(Un Plan Pour Tous)

By Nicolas van Tulder

Abstract
This paper argues for the creation of a new vision for the development of Quebec based on a conception of a "Quebec total" which is comprised of an understanding between Quebec's Southern and Northern territories leading to a collaborative partnership for the benefit of "Quebec total." Quebec's Plan Nord in its current form represents a vision formed within the context of Southern dominance. Plan Nunavik, released by the Makivik Corporation in 2011 represents current indigenous priorities that are essential to creating a balanced and productive relationship at the core of "Quebec total." Such a partnership recognizes the interdependence of the North and South and the importance of investing in the human development of the North as a prerequisite for a northern development plan.

Introduction
The presentation of Plan Nord in 2012 was then Premier for the Parti Libéral du Québec (PLQ) Jean Charest's attempt to establish a grand vision for the development of Québec. In it he imagined an "exemplary sustainable development project" with the ultimate goals of advancing the prosperity of "the communities concerned and Québec overall" (Plan Nord, 2012, p. 14). However, his vision does not fully adapt to the lessons of the previous development project including the James Bay project and instead reflects a continuation of historical conceptions of the North. As a result, his vision imposes a dominantly "sudiste" or southern view on Northern development. This perspective prioritizes the exploitation of the resources of the North and incompletely addresses the realities of the Northern context and priorities of Northerners. In order to develop the North in a manner that is truly "sustainable," "respectful," and "prioritizes local and regional spinoff" Québec must adopt a conception of a "total Québec" (Plan Nord, 2009, p. 9; Plan Nord, 2012, p. 21). A "total Québec" means approaching Quebec as a whole, combining northern and southern strengths, knowledge, and priorities. Such a holistic perspective on Québec would include realizing that the responsible development of the North is intrinsically tied to the capacity of its communities to meet their basic needs and seize the opportunities for growth within the context of their culture norms. Thus, in seeking the development of the North for enrichment of the province, Québec must acknowledge the interdependence between state investment and community capacities in fostering sustainable growth and spurring territorial development.

This paper examines the appropriateness of Plan Nord as a vision for Northern development. It accepts Canadian geographer and founder of the Centre for the North at the Université Laval in Quebec, Louis-Edmond Hamelin's argument that Québec is in a state of enforced duality where the non-aboriginal south views itself as distinct and separate from its aboriginal north and enjoys a position of political dominance over it (Hamelin, 2005). Scholars including Hamelin have noted how this duality has resulted in "sudiste" policies for the North that fail to take into account the conditions of the North and its communities. Early policy even treated the North as an empty land with no barriers or conditions for
exploitation (Hamelin, 2012, p. 8). This chapter argues that Plan Nord is based in the dominant “sudiste” perspective and as a result fails to take into account northern conditions and priorities. Thus, it cannot develop the full potential of the North thereby missing the potential for cultural, social, and economic growth for Québec as a whole. Many have noted this failure but the Inuit communities of the North, in an effort to work towards a more collaborative vision of development, have taken to the additional step of presenting their priorities through the release of Plan Nunavik. 1 Therefore this paper argues that an appropriate vision for development must incorporate both southern goals of economic investments and resource extraction set forth in Plan Nord and northern concepts of human development in Plan Nunavik; a comprehensive plan that integrates both paradigms will ensue the development of the Québec province as a whole.

“le Québec Total”

Hamelin describes three entities of Québec. The first is “Le Québec méridional” or Southern Québec consisting of the territories south of a wavering border that sits roughly at the 50th parallel. This territory, he argues, has long been seen as the center if not the entirety of Québec as well as its seat of power and thus exercised political dominance over the second region in the North. Northern Québec is comprised of the territory north of the 50th parallel in what was formerly known as New Québec. This northern territory forms its own entity with a distinctive set of cultural, social, geographical and environmental reference points stemming from the historical dominance of the indigenous majority within its territory. The third entity, “le Québec total,” consists of the previous two parts but “is more than the sum of its parts” because of the issues that are of significance to Québec as a whole must be distinguished from those that are solely of importance to Southern Québec (Hamelin, 2005, p. 25). The concepts of Southern Québec and Northern Québec have had positive effects in the form of peninsular unity in the North, in North to North civil and military flight paths, and in vast infrastructure investments to access natural resources in the South; however, the split identity has also contributed negatively by creating a conceptual division between the people of the North and the South and reinforcing the dominance of a “sudiste” mentality in the governance of the province. As a result, governments whose actions are widely felt in the North remain attached to a distinctly and often exclusively southern perspective; many in the south, Hamelin notes, maintain a much more emotional attachment to Southern Québec than to the totality of the province. The political consequence of this absence of a “vision panquébécoise” is that the government of Québec employs policies in the North that are directly transplanted from the South. These actions are carried out with the goal of integrating the North into Southern structures leading to the rise of an opposing indigenous polity whose goals are strongly rooted in the north. The opposite nature of the two polities precludes the possibility of harmonious collaboration for the advancement of a unified Québec (Hamelin, 2012, p. 26). Responsible governance of the province thus requires three polities, Hamelin argues, a southern polity, an indigenous polity, and a joint polity working from the objective of coexistence with the goal of addressing matters of interest to “le Québec total” (Hamelin, 2005, p. 33). 2

A Northern Plan or a Southern Plan for the North?

L’ambitieux plan nordique, qu’il soit vu au niveau global ou sectoriel, soulève évidemment des interrogations. Elles concernent le quoi et le comment de l’ensemble du programme envisagé, une idée du Nord, une conception des relations entre les Autochtones et les non-Autochtones, de même que les liens entre les grandes opérations économiques et les avancements politiques (Hamelin. 2009).


2 “Afin de réaliser un tel projet, une triple structure dont la racine se trouve dans les façons actuelles de procéder est proposée ; les tâches de chaque acteur politique seraient ainsi mieux définies et liées. Trois polities fonctionneraient en même temps : une politique autochtone, une politique non autochtone, une politique conjointe. Ces systèmes conjugués qui répondent à l’idéologie de la coexistence, exigent des préalables, ceux de la préparation spécifique de l’un et l’autre agent…en établissant de bonnes relations, les peuples contribueraient davantage à l’invention, à l’installation et à la bonne marche d’une territorialité revitalisée.” (Hamelin, 2005, 33)
Plan Nord emerged out of an economic statement given by the Minister of Finance of Québec in 2009 indicating the government’s commitment to promoting the development of the North (Plan Nord, 2009, p. 7). In this statement he outlined a five point plan for the development of Québec’s economy through the following efforts: an agreement on recognition of professional qualifications signed with France in 2008; Free trade negotiations with the European Union; trade negotiations to expand mobility between Québec and Ontario; the implementation of the pan-Canadian agreement on labor mobility; and finally Plan Nord (Plan Nord, 2009, p. 7). While the first four points were aimed largely at opening up Québec to regional and international trade and labor mobility, Plan Nord was the centerpiece that aimed to be a model of sustainable development within Québec that would tap into its underused resources while connecting its people to its rising prosperity. The principle of sustainable development was an oft-repeated guiding principle of Plan Nord. For the administration of Premier Charest, this meant “taking existing cultures and identities into account,” and only embarking on development projects “if certain other basic conditions are met, for example with regard to environmental protection, biodiversity conservation in the northern environment, the participation of local workers in development projects, access to public land, and a minimum supply of quality housing in Inuit communities” (Plan Nord, 2009, p. 9). Plan Nord’s development projects included roughly $326 million a year in investments into roads, airports, housing, health care and education projects in the region. Plan Nord also planned eleven mining projects worth $8.24 billion, a $28.8 million regional fiber-optic network, and billions of dollars in hydroelectric projects (McKenna, 2011). The commitments made under Plan Nord were a continuation of several long term actions and programs under the auspices of a multitude of agencies with portfolios ranging from development, to environmental protection, to aboriginal affairs; however, in bringing them together under one common program, the government of Québec hoped to bring attention to its efforts and thus bring international recognition and support to the benefit of all Québécois.

The guiding principles of Plan Nord were released in 2009 in a Working Document entitled “Plan Nord: For a Socially Responsible and Sustainable Form of Economic Development”. This document announced the development of the plan, grounding it in the principle of sustainable development under the vision of taking “an approach to sustainable development leading to an exemplary project integrating energy, mining, forestry, recreation, tourism, transportation and wildlife development, and promoting the growth of local communities in a way consistent with their culture and identity.” It listed the basic conditions for what it calls “socially responsible sustainable development.” Socially responsible development, within the context of Plan Nord, requires partnership and respect for those affected by development, environmental quality protections, local employment support, investments in local communication and transportation infrastructure, housing development in Nunavik, and respect for indigenous cultures and identity (Plan Nord, 2009, p. 9-11). Guided by the findings of the ACCORD (Action concertée de coopération régionale de développement) program, which was already in the process of searching for regional “niches of excellence” and drafting plans to allow them to be more competitive on international markets, Plan Nord proposed to apply its conditions of socially responsible development to promising sectors which could be used as “levers of development” to grow the economy and benefit all of Québec (Plan Nord, 2009, p. 14).

Plan Nord received mixed reviews from the start. The general consensus from indigenous groups, however, was that Plan Nord needed work. Indigenous protests began as early as January of 2012 when the Cris of Mistissini blocked route 167 to protest proposals to extend the route into their territory (Chalifoux, 2011, p. 96). In its early stages, Plan Nord enjoyed the support of Pita Atami, the President of the Makivik Corporation, until he was voted out of office and

replaced by Jobie Tukkiapik in January of 2012. By February of the same year, Mr. Tukkiapik made it clear the Inuit were reconsidering their position and that support for Plan Nord would be conditioned on the position of the people of Nunavik (Chalifoux, 2011, p. 96). That March, the Algonquin communities of Lake Simon and Pikogan, who had been excluded from Plan Nord, sat down with the government of Québec to consult on the subject of mining development on their land and insisted on being heard in the process of development (Chalifoux, 2011, p. 97).

Writing in 2009 about the recently released Plan Nord Working Document in the newspaper Le Devoir, Hamelin noted that the Plan raised several important questions concerning how and what the program envisioned, what conception of the North it was based on, and how it viewed the relationship between the indigenous and the non-indigenous and the ties between economic projects and political advancement. He further recognized that the discourse of Plan Nord included notable advancements in its consideration of aboriginal rights in comparison to the 1950s and 1960s, the Manicouagan development, and even the James Bay Convention of 1975 (Hamelin, 2009).

However, following the official unveiling of Plan Nord in 2012, scholars critiqued it for being oriented on natural resource exploitation by foreign multinationals and for continuing the same exogenous style of development planning that had dominated Northern planning for decades (Asselin, 2011, p. 40).3 In comparing indigenous and non-indigenous relationships in development projects in Québec and Ontario, Alexandre Germain notes that Québec, itself hyperconscious of its autonomy, approaches its indigenous communities with respect for their autonomy and bases their relations on a nation-to-nation partnership. However, according to Germain, this approach avoids the recognition of the interdependence of indigenous communities and the Québécois, consequently denying the indigenous the possibility of being co-creators of the proposed development plan (Germain, 2011, p. 94).4 Plan Nord vaunts its connection with and sovereign claim to the North, quoting Hamelin in claiming “there is no Québec without the North.” The out of context use of this quote within Plan Nord reveals how the architects of Plan Nord missed the point by its partial use of Hamelin’s statement, which, in its entirety, argued “there is no Québec without the North: there is no Québec without understanding between the indigenous and the non-indigenous” (italics added) (Germain, 2011, p. 94; Hamelin, 2005, p. 1). 5


4 “le Québec, lui-même assez jaloux de son autonomie, exprime une certaine sensibilité pour l’autonomie autochtone dans son approche basée sur un partenariat de nation à nation, mais il ne leur offre pas vraiment la possibilité d’être les « co-concepteurs » du projet de société proposé par son gouvernement. Cette situation suggère que la notion d’interdépendance des nations autochtones et québécoise pourrait être cultivée davantage” (Germain, 2011, 94)

5 “Ici, il semble que la relation qu’entretient le Québec avec « son » Nord, ainsi que l’importance qu’il accorde à sa propre autonomie politique et économique, l’aït rendu moins sensible à la question de l’interdépendance qui le lie aux Autochtones. C’est d’ailleurs dans cette interdépendance que se trouve tout le sens de la citation de Louis-Edmond Hamelin, « Il n’y a pas de vrai Québec sans la zone nordique », placée en exergue du document et citée hors de son contexte, ce qui en brouille le sens” (Germain, 2011, 94)
Un Plan du Nord (A Plan From the North)

The omission of Northern perspectives in the crafting of Plan Nord bears serious consequences for the feasibility of its vision in the North. Current social, cultural, and economic practices in the North are based on distinctly Northern realities and perspectives that do not blend automatically into Southern structures or conceptions. On a conceptual level, the indigenous view of sustainable development depends on a holistic view of their territory and can best be conceived as three nested circles. In this model, the environment (the biggest circle) is the "milieu de vie" in which a thriving society (the second circle) can be realized and eased by the use of an economic system (the third and smallest circle). Plan Nord, however, being oriented around the creation of prosperity, functions according to the reverse of this model (Asselin, 2011, p. 43). 6 On a practical level, Plan Nord’s proposals apply southern solutions that do no resonate in the north. For example, the proposal to set aside 50% of the North as a protected zone is incongruous with indigenous cultures in which the concept of protected zones where human activity is limited or banned outright does not exist (Asselin, 2011, p. 43). 7

In response to this conspicuous absence of the northern perspective the Inuit of Nunavik submitted an innovative response in the form of Plan Nunavik, a plan for Northern development drafted by and for the Inuit communities of the North to reflect their own priorities for development. Plan Nunavik was compiled by the Makivik Corporation with the help of regional Nunavik organizations including the Nunavik Regional Board of Health and Social Services, the Kativik School Board, the Avataq Cultural Institute, and the Nunavik Mineral Exploration Fund. Mirroring Plan Nord, Plan Nunavik provides a 25 year plan for development with focuses in key areas of community development such as housing, health, education, access to the land, environmental and wildlife protection, culture, tourism, bio-food, non-renewable resource, energy, transportation, and communications (Plan Nunavik, 2010, p. 329).

The territory of Nunavik for which Plan Nunavik was written consists of all of Québec North of the 55th parallel, a territory that would be the 52nd largest country in the world if it were to be considered on its own. The Inuit of Nunavik are fully integrated, tax-paying citizens of Canada and yet today they still face severe conditions of living that are unmatched outside of the Inuit North. At least 20-30% of Nunavik households are affected by poverty assessed according to an index based off the lower cost of living in the south. Poverty places a particularly heavy burden on single parent families as well as the elderly who often have little to no education and live off of scant government pensions. This condition is exacerbated by the much higher cost of living in the North where food costs are 47% higher and household items are as much as 97% more than in the south. Nunavimmiut (Inuit term for people of Nunavik) struggle to obtain the high paying jobs necessary to support their families in the expensive north because they lack the education and skills. 53% of all Nunavik Inuit between ages 20-64 never graduated from high school and 94% of Nunavik Inuit high school students drop out before obtaining their degree as compared to 25% of students in southern Québec. Among the worst of Nunavik’s ills is the housing crisis; 68% of housing is overcrowded whereas the rest of Canada faces 7% overcrowding. This not only contributes to Nunavik’s extremely low health conditions (life expectancy is 59.5 years for men and 67.5 years for women) but also leads to a number of social problems including family abuse, neglect, high incidence of alcohol and drug addictions, suicide, high rates of teen pregnancy, and mental health problems (Plan Nunavik, 2010, p. 329).

Through Plan Nunavik, the Inuit insist that “If Québec is to provide benefits from the future development of the north to all Québécois, it must accept as a fundamental principle of the Plan Nord, before anything else, that it has to invest much more to improve the standard of living of Nunavik Inuit taxpayers, the inhabitants of the territory which Québec wishes to exploit for the benefit of future generations” (Plan Nunavik, 2010, 460). Specifically Québec must uphold it commitments made in previous agreements, notably the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (1975) (JBNQA), the Partnership Agreement on Economic and Community Development in Nunavik (2002) (Sanarrutik Agreement), and the Québec undertakings of the Katimajit Conference on Nunavik socio-economic issues (2007). These commitments include setting up an official body responsible for environmental and social impact assessment, ensuring Inuit harvesting rights, and supporting Impact Benefit Agreements between the Makivik Corporation and mining companies operating in the Nunavik region. Plan Nunavik also insists that Québec account for the impacts on Inuit harvesting of traditional foods and seek Inuit input on sustainable development practices, especially the designation of protected areas. Plan Nunavik is not the first document to bring up the issue of Inuit needs and socio-economic challenges and yet this issue had not been addressed and continues to pose serious problems. The Inuit of Nunavik insist that, as taxpaying citizens of Québec signatories to numerous treaties guaranteeing their rights, they need access to services and a cost-of-living comparable to the rest of Québec. In order to fully and accurately understand the conditions in Nunavik, they argue that Québec must compile up-to-date and comprehensive statistical data specific to the Nunavik region. Finally, Plan Nunavik calls on Québec to realign its electoral boundaries to create an independent riding of Nunavik so that the Nunavimmiut can participate directly in Québec’s National Assembly. Of its recommendations for Northern development, Plan Nunavik expressly lists nine priorities as preconditions for support for any of Plan Nord: address the housing crisis by building an additional 1000 units, address the high cost of living, improve the provision of essential services, substantially increase human and financial resources for health services in a culturally adapted way, substantially increase human and financial resources for education services in a culturally adapted way, implement the recommendations of the April 2007 report and the September 2010 follow-up report of the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, and devolve additional self-governance powers to Nunavik including some legislative powers (Plan Nunavik, 2010, p. 465).

The authors of the original Plan Nunavik acknowledge that it was written as a rushed response to Plan Nord and as a result they lacked the time to properly consult with the communities of Nunavik. Thus the Makivik Corporation and the regional organizations of Nunavik have launched Parnasimautik (meaning “what you need to be prepared”), an 18-month effort to produce a locally adapted development plan that will break out of the restrictive model of Plan Nord to be truly inclusive of Inuit culture, identity, language, and traditional way of life. This process will begin with presentations to regional organizations in the initial months of 2013 followed by community workshops in each of Nunavik’s 14 communities the results of which will be consolidated and presented to Makivik’s Annual General Meeting in early 2014 (Nunatsiaq News, 2012). The new plan will expand the focus of development planning to include previously excluded areas of concern including: elders, women, and the youth; justice and social regulation; and community development (Parnasimautik, 2013).

**Un Plan Pour Tous (A Plan for Everyone)**

In her inaugural speech, the new Premier of Québec, Pauline Marois announced her own vision for the North based on the slogan of “le Nord pour tous” (The North for everyone). Her Parti Québécois (PQ) has advocated for revamping Plan Nord, particularly with regards to mining royalties and the financing of infrastructure projects (Shields, 2012). Luc Ferland, recently re-elected member of the National Assembly for the riding of Ungava

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*Des projets substantiels ainsi qu’une politique de rapprochement entre Autochtones et non-Autochtones sont de la plus grande importance, car ils permettent de poursuivre la construction politique, économique et culturelle d’un vaste territoire en Amérique*
(the northernmost riding in Québec including the territory of Nunavik), has also announced that under the PQ government Plan Nord will continue but with more involvement by the people of Nunavik (Nunatsiaq News, 2012). The content of Marois’ speech remains “sudiste” in its exclusive focus on concerns over royalties and mining. If the PQ government wishes to continue with Plan Nord it must open itself in a significant way to northern priorities. The development of “le Nord pour tous” requires “un Plan pour tous,” which must stem from the unifying vision of “le Québec total.”

Development of “le Québec total” involves more than the resource minded development of the South, the resource potential of the region is an asset that can be used to spur the development of the region’s human, cultural, and economic capital including the rich traditional heritage of the north, as well to build a region that is revitalized and enriched by the full realization of its nordicity (Hamelin, 2012, p. 19). However, when it comes to developing the North, this requires a model that borrows more heavily from the North such as the indigenous nested circles model, beginning with the environment and society and afterwards building the economy. This model acknowledges the fact that communities must be strong and secure before they can benefit fully from economic development of the kind envisioned by Plan Nord. An effective “Plan pour tous” would thus begin from the style of community development prioritized by Plan Nunavik and use it as a foundation for the exploitation of its resource potential in a sustainable and locally oriented manner. Prioritizing investment in communities accomplishes two critical functions. First it contributes to the growth of secure communities that are capable of absorbing the pressures of development and capturing a portion of the benefits for internal development. Secondly, it builds crucial local, skilled labor and infrastructural capacity for developing industries. Building secure communities is essential for their capacity to cope with intrusive development processes and develop lingering, local “spin-off” benefits as envisioned by Plan Nord.

The Center for the North (CFN), part of the Conference Board of Canada (CBC) has examined the idea of “community security” in the Arctic, which is a useful step in the process of working towards Plan Nord’s goal of creating “prosperous, dynamic communities that offer an attractive living community for young people, workers and families” and “wealth creation by local communities” (Plan Nord, 2009, p. 19; Rutten, 2010, p. 22). The concept of “community security” refers to “the capacity of a community to recognize and address threats to, and fulfill opportunities for, meeting its inhabitants’ basic needs and developing a basic level of resiliency, including the capacity to:

• promote socio-economic development;
• protect the environment;
• provide health services;
• provide public safety and security; and
• establish effective governance” (Rutten, 2010, p. 22).

The report “Security in Canada’s North: Looking Beyond Arctic Sovereignty” released by the CFN took a preliminary look at community security in Canada’s North and identified several risks to community security in the North, notably “a lack of economic diversity (and thus, job and skill shortages); housing affordability, shortages, crowding, and poor conditions; limited access to education, health, and social services; lack of critical (water, energy, transportation, communication) infrastructure; loss of culture and traditional way of life, due to radical socio-economic and demographic changes; and higher rates of drug-related and violent crimes” (Rutten, 2010, p. 23). These critical risks are the same concerns that Plan Nunavik highlights as its priorities for development in Inuit territory. The investments proposed in Plan Nunavik thus work towards the creation of a secure community ready for the challenges of aggressive development.

Action on the priorities of Plan Nunavik is especially critical for the goals of Plan Nord in the areas of infrastructure and labor capacity. These areas are not only crucial for the development of secure and productive communities; they are essential to the operation of developing industries in the region. Proper investment in infrastructure, early education, and specific skill training is highly demanded by industries interested in mining in the north. “Building Labour Force Capacity in Canada’s North,” another

8 "L’utilisation du concept de nordicité devrait conduire à une québéécité enrichie. Celle-ci aurait considéré le territoire du Québec pris comme un tout, renouvelé avec les Autochtones des relations de peuples, équilibré les démarches globalistes et sectorialistes de développement et comparé les pouvoirs respectifs du Québec du Sud et du Québec du Nord” (Hamelin, 2012, 19).
report from the CFN, concluded that, “there is a competitive advantage available to those businesses that can mobilize their local Northern workforces;” however, “businesses are facing a shortage of workers at all levels, businesses that participated in this study certainly are facing a lack of qualified workers” (Martin, 2011, p. 34). The current alternative of flying in foreign workers imposes significant costs to companies. Local Inuit labor force could prove to be a highly cost effective option while capturing more of the profits from such mining projects for the province of Québec. Likewise, infrastructural investments such as the development of clean energy sources in the North can also aid in the development of communities while providing necessary services to industries attempting to operate in the North. These companies are already engaged in or are looking at partnerships with Québec to improve capacity in these areas including the provision innovative training programs for local workers; however, basic investment in extending energy infrastructure to the North and providing adequate elementary and secondary education still needs to be prioritized (Martin, 2011, p. 34).

Policy Options

1) Strengthen the voice and influence of an Indigenous polity within Québec by increasing their level of self-governance. In order to achieve a joint polity working towards the coexistence of the North and the South in a unified and stronger Québec the indigenous voice in northern affairs must be strengthened through additional self-governance measures. In the case of the Inuit, granting additional powers to the Kativik Regional Government including legislative powers and consideration of the creation of a riding of Nunavik are strong steps in this direction.

2) Incorporate Plan Nunavik into a revamped Plan Nord especially programs to address the following issues:
   a. Education/Job Training
   b. Infrastructure Investment
   c. Housing Shortage

Plan Nunavik is an effective presentation of the Inuit priorities and sets forth clear areas of development that were left out by southern planners. Development in these areas is essential for the creation of secure communities that can be the foundation of strong development.

3) Prepare Northern Québec for long-term sustainable growth by making the appropriate investments in human development before resource development. Québec must realize that Northern Québec still requires significant development to reach parity with the rest of Québec. Improvement in the provision of basic services and conditions of living is essential before any other forms of development can take place.

Conclusion

It is time for Québec to break from its historical pattern and recognize its northern half. Québec needs to forge a new conception of its territory as the unity and coexistence of its Southern and Northern parts are leading to a partnership that unlocks the joint potential of the whole, a “Québec total.” Plan Nord and Plan Nunavik play equally crucial roles in this process as each describe visions for growth in the North; however, each vision maintains a highly regional perspective. Québec could benefit from applying the respective strengths of each region towards a vision for the development of the entire province economically, culturally and socially. To begin Québec must realize the interdependence of the state and its indigenous population in building secure communities and creating sustainable growth. The state depends on the perspective, knowledge, and capacities of its indigenous people just as much as they depend on the support and investment of the state. A strong partnership between the two will lead to a revitalized and thriving province, secure in its unity.

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Part Two: Community Level Development
Arctic Tourism: Cruises and Bruises
By Steven Moore

Abstract
Movement of people to other parts of the world in order to experience new places and cultures, or tourism, is undoubtedly one of the largest industries on earth. Tourism brings people closer together in ways never thought possible in the past. This desire for adventure and new experiences moves people all over the world, from France to North Korea. There is no nation on earth which has not been affected by tourism, even the most remote and dangerous places in the world still attract determined individuals looking to expand their horizons and test their limits. The Arctic is no different; the far north has sparked the curiosity of many adventurous individuals who are drawn by its natural beauty, unique cultures and wildlife. Tourism in the Canadian Arctic today helps to provide jobs and revenue for those who inhabit the region, although the industry has yet to truly meet its potential due to many of the socio-economic and ecological issues that the north faces. This paper seeks to presents paths and perspectives that can be used in order to encourage further sustainable and beneficial tourism to the Arctic.

Introduction
It’s difficult to imagine early humans seeing the Arctic tundra as a place fit for building a civilization. Inhospitable, vast and extreme, the far North of Canada is a place few of us today would ever consider settling down, but for over 4000 years the Inuit have called this place home (Stonehouse, 2010). The Inuit have survived through many generations in this unforgiving climate off of subsistence-living and adaptation, much to the surprise of the first explorers to the Arctic. Early European explorers in the Arctic were driven by the hopes of discovering a Northwest Passage to Asia, or in the case of the Vikings during the 10th century AD a place to call home, far from what any of us would consider your standard tourism affair (History of Arctic Marine Transport). However, it is the stories and romanticism of these northern expeditions that would influence many a voyage to the North throughout the past 500 years. Pioneers of Arctic tourism are described as ‘knapsack’ adventurers who sought to traverse the untamed lands in northern Scandinavia in the 1800s, a precursor of the wild man tourists that would soon turn to the Canadian Arctic, an even bigger and more menacing environment (Stonehouse, 2010). The Canadian Arctic would not begin to see a significant level of mainstream tourism until the mid 20th century with the increasing economic and political development of the Inuit world.

Opportunities for increasing tourism in the Canadian Arctic are not in short supply. The vast and pristine wilderness of the high Arctic contains many natural features which can be used to attract nature lovers from all over the world. National parks containing natural attractions such as the Pingualuit crater in Nunavik, the Torngat Mountains in Nunatsiavut and chances to view the aurora borealis are ripe for drawing people to the region. The Arctic also houses a number of distinctive wildlife viewing prospects for creatures like the polar bear and caribou. Alternatively, for a heavy licensing fee some dedicated hunters seek to make these creatures targets in strenuous hunting expeditions. Fishing, dog sledding, kayaking, cross country skiing and igloo camping are just some of the additional ways in which tourists can utilize the Arctic wilderness for outdoor recreation. The unique Inuit culture and history can also serve as an attraction to travelers who wish to gain experiences with new people and ways of life.

In order to see high Arctic tourism thrive in Canada there are a number of challenges...
which must be addressed in the future. High transportation costs make getting visitors to the far north very expensive and heavily affect the costs of food, medical supplies and other essentials making life difficult for those living there and reducing the amount of money which can be invested into building tourism related infrastructure (Dunlavy, 2009). A lack of infrastructure and stores also creates a number of logistical problems for tourists who need food and supplies to sustain travel. While many villages have at least one lodging facility for guests the overall capacity is unable to accommodate a full cruise ship or large tour group which may require shelter. Inadequate medical infrastructure is another hazardous concern for would be travelers in the region who may be in desperate need of emergency care. The 2011 Annual Report of the State of Inuit Culture and Society states, “Essential healthcare services are less accessible to Inuit in Nunavut than for southern Canadians because geographic distance between communities, high construction costs, and a shortage of healthcare providers often necessitates air travel in order for patients to receive care” (Tungavik, 2011, p. 8). Safety of travelers is one of the hardest obstacles to overcome as the Arctic environment is more often than not, unforgiving and unpredictable.

Several enterprises exist which specialize in tourism in the Arctic such as the Inuit owned Cruise North, Arctic Kingdom Polar Expeditions and Air Inuit that specialize in getting people to and around the north. While successful to a degree the high costs of Cruises which start around $4000 a person can be off putting to the budget tourist (Cruise North, 2013). Development corporations such as Makivik and Labrador Inuit Development Corporation work to improve life in the Arctic through infrastructure aid and economic growth plans, and have a direct interest in improving the situation for tourism in the region (Fugmann, 2009). Along with all these actors, others like the governments of Nunavut and Quebec have developed plans for improving the tourism situation in their land. Government operations such as Plan Nord in Quebec aim to improve tourism with their own economic plans. For example, “The Strategy aims to renew Quebec’s tourism supply by developing new products and attractions and encouraging the growth of small and medium-sized businesses, which will diversify the economy of northern regions. . . . carried out in cooperation with regional and government partners” (Plan Nord, p. 3). With increased government and private sector cooperation it is possible we will see a successful tourism industry develop in Canada’s Arctic in the near future. This paper argues that Arctic tourism should be carried out in a controlled, efficient manner which minimizes environmental damage and prevents the reckless behavior of tourists that could negatively impact Inuit livelihood.

Sustainable Tourism

The key dimension to building sustainable tourism is to enable the Inuit to build a long lasting economy whilst guaranteeing the preservation of their culture and respect for the local ecology. It is important to recognize the Inuit prowess regarding many aspects of the tourism industry, especially in relation to culture based tourism which has the potential to strengthen or dilute tradition (Ettenger, 2012). Inviting outsiders to Inuit communities can open people’s minds to new ideas and ways of life, building unity between northerners and southerners. However it is possible for the opposite to occur; Kreg Ettenger (2012) in his writings on cultural tourism argues, “[t]ourism can also lead to new problems, however, from an influx of outsiders who may not always respect and share local values, to problems inherent in the ‘commoditization’ of culture, which may pose special danger to cultures that value sharing and generosity over exchange of money” (Ettenger, 2012, p. 39). Short boom tourism that quickly fades is an undesirable fate which can leave local economies in a depression, it is important to build tourism practices which keep guests coming back year after year. This chapter will evaluate the effectiveness of current tourism practices, taking into account these facets that make up the definition of sustainable tourism in order to strengthen capacity and formulate better policy options for the future.

While investigating new plans for tourism, I examined the industry’s success, or lack thereof in other nations and gauged how well their approaches have worked. One of the biggest questions in regard to tourism is the amount of regulation that should be placed on it to ensure practices aren’t damaging over time to the host region’s overall well being. Nepal and the Norwegian owned Arctic islands of Svalbard are prime examples of comparable tourism ventures. Much like the Canadian Arctic, these destinations
boasted impressive landscapes without hordes of travelers, which made tourism an alluring industry. Tourism in Nepal took off in the 1960s and was largely unrestricted, granting tens of thousands of travelers entry into the country with little oversight on visa requirements and foreigner behavior once in the nation (Smith, 1981). This unrestricted tourism while bringing lots of revenue to Nepal also had a number of negative cultural consequences and resulted in the country’s reputation as a narcotics haven (Smith, 1981).

Svalbard represents a much more restrictive, planned approach to tourism. Much like the Canadian Arctic, Svalbard experienced a quick growth in cruise tourism to the region, bringing revenue to the residents but also threatening the integrity of the ecology (Guðmundsdóttir, 2009). In order to mitigate the harmful impacts of tourism the Norwegian government took restrictive action as described by Anna Guðmundsdóttir, “[a] management plan for tourism and outdoor recreation was prepared with a view to safeguard the unique environment and keeping tourism development within environmentally sustainable and commercially acceptable boundaries (Guðmundsdóttir, 2009, p. 4). This plan set a limit to the amount of tourists who could visit the region per year and required a heavy degree of preparation for the would-be travelers to ensure their ability to handle the environment was up to standard (Guðmundsdóttir, 2009). It is possible for a similar set of regulations to be put in place in the Canadian Arctic to promote the health of the ecology and safety of visitors all while making the area appealing in an exclusive way.

Due to its remote character, lack of infrastructure and costliness of travel, it is unlikely the Canadian Arctic will see the same explosion of tourism that Nepal did in the 1960s. Nevertheless, with an increasing number cruise boats sailing there every year and more foreign nature trekkers making perilous journeys into the tundra, the sustainability of current tourism approaches demands fastidious research. Tourists getting stranded in remote areas without the aid of a local guide and dying as a result is a reoccurring issue that raises concerns for many in the region (Pfeiff, 2013). Costs and general difficulty associated with search and rescue in the Canadian Arctic make measure preventive against losing people imperative (Wallace, 2012). Prime Minister Stephen Harper has weighed in on the issue, stating: “[p]art of the drill here is how quickly things can be moved up and deployed from the south as well. We have to be realistic. There is no possible way in the vastness of the Canadian Arctic we could ever have all of the resources necessary close by. It’s just impossible” (Wallace, 2012, p. 1). If free reign over the region’s massive landscape is permitted, further tourism could result in more stranded travelers and increased mortality as a result, which is surely incompatible with a sustainable tourism model.

Environmental concerns are an integral element of building sustainable tourism. The disappearance of unique local fauna such as polar bears and caribou would certainly lead to a decline in demand for wildlife based tourism (Tivy, 2010). Global warming and the melting of ice will also directly influence the level of tourism possibilities in the Arctic as the landscape morphs and new challenges for sea travel arise (Tivy, 2010). Ensuring the environmental impact of tourism in this region is minimal will work to alleviate the harshness of climate change in addition to preserving the pristine appearance and natural beauty of the land. Many NGO’s are concerned with this very topic, the WWF states, “[v]ast areas of wilderness without roads or other traces of development are a unique characteristic of the Arctic. These areas are both environmentally valuable and one of the main reasons why tourists come to the Arctic” (World Wildlife Fund, 2010, p. 1). Tourism related overdevelopment of the Arctic and the increased levels of pollution that come with it leading to further environmental degradation would surely diminish tourism to the region over time (Ford, 2007).

Cruise Tourism

Cruise ship tourism is unquestionably the most widespread, developed and perhaps harmful mode of Arctic travel that exists today. According to Stewart there has been a steady increase in cruise boat traffic to the Canadian Arctic over the years, “The number of cruise ships visiting the Canadian Arctic has steadily increased since 1984. In 2006, the number of cruise ships doubled to 22 ships, up from 11 ships in the previous season confirming observations from else-where that the ocean environment has become one of the fastest growing areas of the world’s tourism industry” (Stewart, 2007, p. 370). Despite this steady growth the threat of
climate change could potentially hinder future cruise ship activity (Luck, 2012). The melting of ice throughout the Northwest Passage could potentially allow more boats to journey to the region or make navigation much more difficult as sea and ice conditions could become increasingly unpredictable and dangerous (Johnston, 2012).

Aboard these massive luxury cruises travelers are lavished with similar amenities as they would find in the south (Luck, 2010). Cruises remain quite expensive, attracting a relatively wealthy and pampered clientele, which creates the potential to inject a lot of revenue into local economies. However, the domination of cruise boat tourism in the Arctic creates a number of ecological hazards and difficulties for local communities. Many of the cruise ships traveling to the Arctic are not constructed to deal with ice and the weather conditions of the far north—making the potential for serious accidents high (Stewart, 2010). These hazards can lead to ships running aground, potentially leaking pollutants into the waters (Stonehouse, 2010). The draining of cruise boat wastewater into the Arctic Ocean is also becoming problematic with the increasing level of boats to the region. Discharges of waste water from food, sanitation and toilets contain bacteria harmful to the fragile ecosystem of the Arctic (Luck, 2010). While regulations exist in an attempt to mitigate many of the harmful impacts of cruise tourism the problem can still persist, the extremely remote nature of these cruises makes it difficult to properly conduct tests and inspections to ensure environmental practices are up to standard (Stonehouse, 2010).

The harmful impacts of cruise tourism are often felt by local communities. Preparing to host a cruise ship full of passengers is no easy task for many of these small villages which suffer from a chronic lack of tourism related infrastructure (Stonehouse, 2010). Occasionally weather complications will result in boats being unable to dock in their intended destination, as described by Stewart (2007), “[i]n such circumstances, vessels might bypass communities that were prepared for a visit or arrive in other communities without notice” (Stewart, 2007, p. 373). This type of unpredictability can mean wasted money for economically stressed Inuit communities that prepared for an influx of tourists and missed opportunities for unprepared villages that had no time to gather goods and set up attractions for visitors. Uncertain ice conditions are another cause of changing port calls, which leads to unplanned docking of boats in villages (Dobson, 2002). Clearly communication and coordination between the local communities and cruise ship industries needs to improve to ensure that adequate arrangements are made for the arrival of cruise ship tourists every time. Coast guard communications capabilities have the potential to aid this effort for better coordination (Wallace, 2010).

In order to help reduce the negative impact of cruise ships to this region the quantity and preparedness of boats allowed to go to the Arctic must be reassessed and capped at a level which is appropriate for the Arctic’s capacity. While Inuit-run companies such as Cruise North Inuit certainly take Arctic well-being into account there is still a level of oversight and mismanagement that needs attention. Creating a regulatory body specializing in cruise ship activity has the potential to do a lot of good, as argued by Johnston, “[s]uch an organization was viewed as providing a multilevel liaison for DMRs (decision makers and regulators) that would satisfy the needs of the Government of Canada, the Government of Nunavut, and the private expedition cruise ship tourism industry” (Johnston, 2012, p. 91). Fostering better cooperation, more accountability and establishing a presence on all cruise ships to ensure that safety standards are met will be essential for building sustainable cruise tourism.

Ecotourism, Fishing & Hunting

Ecotourism is the practice in which travelers experience the natural wonders of an area through the landscape and wildlife, whilst maintaining a high level of environmental consciousness and respect. Beyond the reaches of cruise boats Canada’s far north boasts an impressive array of national parks containing thousands of lakes, dramatic mountains and creatures not seen in the distant southern lands (Tungavik, 2010). The Pingos land formations of the Northwest Territories are a prime example of natural phenomena that can only be experienced in the far north. Air travel allows for access to many remote points of interest for tourists, Stonehouse explains, “Backcountry adventures, such as mountaineering, rafting, kayaking, angling and hunting, are served by large fleets of fixed wing and helicopter charter services” (Stonehouse, 2010, p. 30). Wildlife and Landscape viewing from the air has also become a popular
albeit costly method of experiencing the beauty of the expansive Arctic tundra. Eco-tourists are likely to have a high level of appreciation for the pristine wild of the Arctic and be the type of visitors who will endeavor to preserve the region for future tourists.

The chances for trouble in the vast uninhabited Arctic are too numerous to allow any tourist with gear and inflated confidence to trek out by themselves. Current regulations on backcountry permits are minimal, for instance, “Unlike guided wildlife tours, sport fishing and hunting, the adventure tourist is rarely required to obtain a backcountry permit, have a license to demonstrate competence or report their intended routes and schedules” (Stonehouse, 2010, p. 40). Many of these would-be polar explorers make their way to towns like Resolute Bay with dreams of “hardcore survival” in the late winter. An article on the subject in Canada’s Up Here magazine states, “Unsurprisingly, most of these adventurers will fail. A few might even die. But each winter more of them come, speaking a babble of languages, armed with an arsenal of high-tech gear, their parkas bearing the flags of a dozen different homelands” (Pfeiff, 2013, p. 1). Allowing anyone to journey into the frozen tundra of the far north is a major safety liability and the need for emergency care or search and rescue can cost the federal government tens of thousands of dollars (Wallace, 2012). Much like Svalbard, instating guide requirements or proper training and registration for wilderness treks in the Canadian Arctic would help to alleviate problems with inexperienced tourists becoming stranded and dying.

The abundance of wildlife in the Canadian Arctic has made it an incredibly appealing place for well to do fishers and hunters to pursue their hobby on a grand scale. Fishing related tourism is especially profitable for native communities, and relationships between local fishing experts and traveling sportmen are historically advantageous. Bernard Stonehouse speaks highly of this mutually beneficial relationship, “most importantly, the majority of sportmen expenditures remain in the community, directly supporting native jobs and businesses” (Stonehouse, 2010, p. 38). Polar bear hunting in the Canadian Arctic operates on a sustainable hunting system, allotting each Inuit community a certain amount of kills (Freeman, 2006). Inuit hunters are allowed to transfer their kills to traveling sport hunters in the form of guided hunts which are done with dogs and other traditional methods. Currently the hunts are seen as quite sustainable regarding polar bear population levels and the control of bears makes for a safer living environment for the Inuit (Freeman, 2006). Revenue from these hunts is substantial and brings in around $20,000 per bear, “In spring 2000, the outfitter in the High Arctic community of Resolute received $306,700 from the southern wholesaler for taking 20 clients on polar bear hunt” (Freeman, 2006, p. 25). While current practices for polar bear hunting seem to be sustaining healthy populations it is imperative that the Canadian government monitor their numbers closely in the coming years and further restrict hunting if populations drop to an endangered level.

Supporting the population of polar bears bolsters other more sustainable tourism practices like wildlife viewing (Lemelin, 2012). Churchill Manitoba, while not technically north of sixty relies heavily on polar bear related tourism for a good portion of its economy (Chotka, 2004). Ever pervasive issues like climate change will continue to affect the local fauna of the region, and as Chotka states this can have devastating impacts on these towns, “[b]ecause of a heavy reliance on eco-tourism, and relatively small population, the already lean economy of Churchill could collapse if tourism were to decrease dramatically” (Chotka, 2004, p. 5). Nevertheless, Churchill currently stands as a great example of successful northern tourism centered around the polar bear and serves as an example to other northern communities who have yet to develop wildlife based tourism of their own.

**Cultural Tourism**

The most underutilized form of tourism in the Canadian Arctic remains the promotion of Inuit culture as an attraction (Tungavik, 2010). The overall way of life for the majority of Inuit has changed greatly away from the traditional hunter nomad of old with the advent of forced resettlement and the Inuit political reaction in the 20th century (Stenbaek, 1987). Today Inuit culture is experienced through museums, the sale of art, dog sledding/racing and a handful of small gatherings that welcome guests (Snyder, 2010). Culture based tourism is looked upon by many Inuit as a means of strengthening their traditions and building understanding with southerners, in addition to being another means of establishing economic self sufficiency. Arviat in Nunavut
is one settlement which has embraced culture tourism as a primary attraction. The Elders of Arviat even offer storytelling to visitors who wish to learn more about Inuit history, building a closer a cultural connection (Visiting Arviat, 2013).

Challenges with culture tourism always exist, such as “inappropriate visitor behavior, technological innovations and the intrusion of large numbers of people” (Stonehouse, 2010, p. 124) will persist. Poor tourist behavior is often difficult to prevent, embarrassing and culturally insensitive situations may arise but by educating both the Inuit and the visitors about cultural norms and expected etiquette beforehand you can effectively tone down the problem (Luck, 2010). The introduction of new ideas and practices to the Inuit from the south is often unavoidable, but keeping with the vision of The WWF and working to not change the lifestyles of peoples and communities unless they wish it is a safe rule to follow (World Wildlife Fund, 2010). Advanced technological innovations, while capable of improving many facets of Inuit daily life, can be set aside during traditional celebrations as to not dilute the authenticity of cultural practices. Events should be planned well ahead of time and participation should be reserved by guests from the south. Limiting the amount of people who can take place in these gatherings will not only help to prevent an excessive influx of visitors but will also aid in making the gatherings more intimate, providing a memorable experience that truly connects people to the joys of Inuit civilization. Taking these precautions will aid in sustaining the authenticity of Arctic culture for generations to come.

Inuit Benefits of Tourism

In Nunavut alone, tourism brings a total of 30 million dollars annually to the economy, employing over 500 people and helping to provide a livelihood for some 3000 artists and carvers (Tunngavik, 2010). This emerging industry has the potential to become a focal point of lasting revenue to the Canadian Arctic and its inhabitants, further strengthening the autonomy the Inuit have worked for. In Nunavik the Quebecoise government plans for tourism development through Plan Nord focus on expanding all aspects of the current tourist industry, for example “Efforts will mainly focus on developing infrastructures (accommodation, outfitting and hospitality), setting up tourist attractions and products, training human resources, and promotion and marketing—in partnership with local and regional tourism industry stakeholder[s]” (Plan Nord, p. 6). Economic returns from tourism have the potential to be reinvested in order to improve local infrastructure, housing availability, food security and education which will strengthen the livelihood of the Inuit who lag behind the rest of Canada in so many of these fields (Tunngavik, 2011). Ensuring that money used for tourism goes back into the communities is of the utmost importance. Failing to use tourism revenue for the betterment of the Inuit will cast a shadow of doubt on the intentions of the industry, while success will only work to reinforce outside investment and participation in future northern tourism projects.

Not only can tourism generate money for reinvesting in the community, but an increase in demand and decrease in costs of flying to the North could have a number of positive effects on those living in the region. Lower flying costs mean lower prices for goods which must be shipped in such as food and medical supplies (Tungavik, 2011). Tourism is connected to nearly every other facet of commerce and governance in the Arctic. Transportation, hospitality, communication, food and beverage, parks, recreation, and more all play an integral part in the success of tourism. However, Interconnectivity between these industries is lacking, as stated by the Nunavut Tourism Strategy, “[a]t present, there are few strong links between tourism partners, whether they are governmental departments, Inuit organizations, tourism industry members or other stakeholders” (Tunngavik, 2010, p. 8). Improving cooperation between these actors will be necessary in the future success of tourism, and can be easily achieved through local economic forums.

Inuit involvement is crucial to the future of tourism, without direct consent from communities and Inuit leaders for major changes in tourism policy the integrity of the industry will fail (World Wildlife Fund, 2010). If the South is conscientious of the needs of the North and the Inuit willing to collaborate with economic experts and tourist specialists from the rest of Canada there is potential for building a sustainable tourism sector. Tourism investments in Nunavut have a high yield, which is why now is the time to increase the amount of trained tour guides and hospitality specialists in order to prepare
for new travel service expansions (Tunngavik, 2010). Further cooperation with the south is visible today with the government providing additional funding for tourism promotion to the North, which has the potential to greatly increase the level of travel to the high Arctic (Northern Strategy, 2008).

Policy Options

• **Promote, expand and increase tourism-related infrastructure across the board in an attempt to make travel costs more affordable and lure more people to the Canadian Arctic.**

  Ideally, this would be done in a manner which gives a variety of settlements opportunities to have unique flourishing tourism industries instead of concentrating activities in a few villages. One way to increase interest among southerners and foreigners would be the marketing of “last chance tourism” through relevant advertising. This idea states that due to severe changes occurring in the Arctic many features which the region has become famous for such as large dramatic icebergs, pristine wilderness and a healthy population of polar bears may be gone someday, and that it is imperative that you see them before it’s too late. Doing this will not only encourage people to flock to the region but will spread concern and awareness over the troubles of the Arctic and what we can do to help.

  • **The implementation of stronger regulations on tourists.**

    Similar to that of Svalbard, requiring local guides or wilderness competence should be necessary to obtain legal permission to explore the vast Arctic tundra independently. This will minimize the amount of explorer casualties leading to costly search and rescue missions and treatment for frostbite and other winter related ailments. Cooperation by the federal and local governments to ensure these regulatory standards are upheld will be necessary, with local government agencies acting as the implementers for handing out wilderness licenses and keeping track of the various travelers.

  • **Implement on-board surveyors from the government on cruise vessels to ensure waste and pollution control.**

    Stronger regulation on the capability of cruise ships to handle northern waters will also become a necessity in the future as new challenges in navigating the unfreezing Northwest Passage come to light. In addition to complying with NORDREG ships should focus on communication with local communities to ensure preparedness for the visit from cruise ships in all situations.

    • **Sustainable ecotourism should be the focal point of Arctic travel.**

      Wildlife viewing, hiking, camping, fishing and other outdoor activities come with the lowest amount of environmental hazards. The hunting of polar bears while currently seen as sustainable by the government should be monitored closely to ensure it is not negatively impacting the future health of the species, if studies find that hunting is significantly working to decrease polar bear populations then further limiting or getting rid of polar bear hunting allotments should occur.

Challenges and Gaps in Knowledge

Creating new economic regulations comes with logistical challenges. These include gathering the necessary funds for initial investment, ensuring the willingness of all necessary participants and establishing realistic regulatory policy. Creating more infrastructure to accommodate tourists is an expensive endeavor which will require finding willing investors that must be shown the promise of Arctic tourism. In addition, changing the legal requirements for economic activity will be met with opposition; however, the free reign adventure tourism and cruise ship activity currently operating is unsustainable. These recommendations prioritize smart practices that ensure the long term resilience of the Arctic tourism industry.

Conclusion

Tourism covers a broad range of issues when it comes to Arctic security, particularly in the realm of economic, social and environmental security, as the industry is so closely connected to all facets of life in the North. With increasing levels of autonomy for Inuit communities, the need for economic self-sufficiency is ever increasing, and with tourism comes revenue which can be reinvested into other aspects of security, such as food and housing. It is imperative that revenue gained from tourism does not negatively impact the social well being of the Inuit and the ecological health of the Arctic, making the need for sustainable tourism essential. There are endless opportunities to entertain visitors while maintaining the pristine condition of the local flora, fauna and landscape within the Canadian
Arctic. Through this controlled and pragmatic approach to polar tourism, the industry could be a focal point in a new age of economic success for the Canadian Arctic and its people.

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Creative Conservation: New Paradigms of Biodiversity Management in the Canadian Arctic

By Max Sugarman

Abstract
This chapter argues that biodiversity conservation matters to Arctic security, defining a broader understanding of security that aims for local empowerment, human security, and environmental security. After asserting the critical importance of biodiversity for security through ecosystem services, we explain the threats to biodiversity in the current context of climate change. As a response to these threats to environmental security, a wide range of solutions is being developed. Currently international conventions set a standard for biodiversity conservation. At the local and regional level in the Canadian Arctic, biodiversity is managed through the merger of biological science and traditional Inuit knowledge. Harvested species are managed with schemes of co-management, while ecosystems are managed with consultative and planning processes. As climate change continues to alter the Arctic, biodiversity must be managed creatively and integrated between scientific and indigenous schools of thought at multiple levels to successfully adapt to a changing climate. Recent ideas for stronger international frameworks, inclusion of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, citizen science, and ecosystem services provide a ‘creative’ direction for biodiversity management.

Introduction
Biodiversity, the diversity of all living things and ecosystems, is a crucial aspect of environmental\(^1\) and human security. Ecosystem services that stem from biodiversity play a fundamental role in the functioning of the Arctic environment and Arctic societies. As climate change and globalization threaten biodiversity, new paradigms of conservation are necessary. In this paper we will clarify the historic and current biodiversity management strategies. This paper starts with international frameworks for encouraging biodiversity, and then follows with clarification of the role of population management and ecosystem based management currently in the face of the dichotomy of indigenous knowledge and non-indigenous science. Finally opportunities for integrating these two different approaches are offered to bring about a new paradigm for conservation.

Traditionally, conservation has been entrusted with biological science. Conservation began out of the demands of hunters like Theodore Roosevelt who sought to maintain populations of species. From this demographic focus, conservation has grown to a broader goal of maintaining the rich biodiversity – at the genetic, species, or ecosystem level – in perpetuity (Noss, 1990, 355). Conservation methods have historically focused on population statistics, seeking a stable population of a species below its carrying capacity. Conservation practices at the species level include monitoring, culling, and ex situ (captive or off-site) conservation.

At a broader scale, conservation science has called for protected areas of land and water. In the face of climate change, an ecosystem-based approach involving management of non-protected lands, and partnerships between government, landowners, and private citizens has become more prominent. Finally, conservation has enlisted international action

\(^1\) Environmental security is defined as the “maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprise depend” or the protection against vulnerability of ecological systems (Trombetta, 2008).
through the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), and non-governmental organizations like the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN).

However in recent decades, traditional ecological knowledge (TEK), and more indigenous concepts of knowing the natural world have been recognized and incorporated. In the Canadian Arctic, the Inuit have been strong proponents of TEK, especially for the monitoring of species populations (Wenzel, 2004, p. 254; Aglukkaq, 2013). TEK informs different methods of conservation such as population monitoring, but often provides alternative observations. At regional, national, and international forums, the Inuit have called for inclusion of their voice and knowledge in conservation practices. While TEK has many opportunities, the concept itself has many layers, especially with introduction of the broader Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ) 2, or the full aspects Inuit understandings of the world.

Despite decades of collaboration, Inuit knowledge and science have potential to clash. Over the past decade as research and conservation have focused on the North, conflicts have been noted (The Communities..., 2005; Berkes et al., 2007; Tyrrell, 2008). A general call for consultation between science and indigenous communities requires clarification. Despite a strong pattern of collaboration, the conflicts between Inuit understandings and non-indigenous science have increased as biodiversity becomes more threatened. Looking particularly at Nunavik can provide a glimpse at the possible resolutions of diverging viewpoints between science and TEK in both planning and practice. The central question is: how can Arctic biodiversity be conserved despite external threats and in the face of dissenting tactics of conservation? Ultimately, biodiversity must be managed creatively and integrated at multiple levels to successfully adapt to a changing climate.

**Biodiversity at Risk**

Arctic biodiversity is deeply threatened by global and external forces of climate change and globalization. While not traditionally associated with security, biodiversity is relevant to security on both environmental and human levels. The main connection of biodiversity to security is through the need to secure the ecosystem services that biodiversity provides (Trombotta, 2009, p. 599). Ecosystem services are the variety of provisions, culture, and regulatory systems that maintain the stability of ecological and human communities. In the Arctic these services include important ecosystem regulation like the role of mosquitoes in nutrient cycling or direct provisions of consumption goods like Arctic char fisheries (A. Shestakov, personal communication). More subtle ecosystem services include the social bonds and knowledge transfer from harvesting wildlife or the spiritual values of ecosystems (L. Ellsworth, personal communication). First, these services help keep the ecosystem functioning and stable. Additionally these ecosystem services contribute to the security of the human community by facilitating health, social interaction, and community stability. These examples of ecosystem services support the argument that biodiversity is linked to security (Djoghlof, 2011). Along with a security component for communities, there is a strong tendency toward inequality in the impacts of environmental insecurity (Diaz et al. 2006). Besides the security provided for ecosystems and human communities through biodiversity, some people hold an intrinsic value in the biological diversity of organisms, including many indigenous, Québécois, and Canadians (Gouvernement du Québec, 2011, p. 98).

The valuable biodiversity in the Arctic is highly threatened by external forces from climate change and globalization. The Unikkaaqatigiit report shares the observed changes to wildlife and fisheries from climate change according to Nunavik’s Inuit (The Communities..., 2005). These changes include shifts in Beluga whale migrations, new bird species, and changes in fish species and runs (The Communities..., 2005). Along with alterations to wildlife patterns and species diversity, ecosystems are changing dramatically with sea ice loss and lake disappearance (CAFF, 2010, p. 69). These changes to the ecosystem are leading to stressed or declined populations of harvested species such as caribou (CAFF, 2010, p. 29). Besides climate change, there are increasing threats of chemical pollution and invasive species that
As biodiversity is lost to the forces of climate change, the security of Arctic communities is threatened. While new species may be appearing, the overwhelming observations of biodiversity reactions to climate change point to a sharp decline in biodiversity outweighing any benefits of new species or ecosystem services (The Communities..., 2005, P17). Defending the biodiversity of the Arctic will strengthen the resilience of Arctic ecosystems (Chapin III et al., 2006, p. 198). The biodiversity of the Arctic also confers resilience to human communities through ecosystem services (Djoghlof, 2011, p. 15). As many as 279 migratory species of birds may be harmed by severe changes in the Arctic; this presents a security threat to countries beyond the Arctic (CAFF, 2010, p. 8). Not only are food sources disappearing, causing a nutrition deficiency for Inuit populations, but also increases in algae density has lowered the quality of water for drinking showing the comprehensive health risks to human populations from biodiversity loss (Knostch and Lamouche, 2010, p. 10, 33). Biodiversity destabilizes other aspects of human well-being. In the Arctic, linguistic diversity has declined in correlation with biodiversity decline, suggesting strong links between biodiversity and cultural resilience (Knostch and Lamouche, 2010, p. 9; CAFF, 2010, p. 99). Through the impacts on ecosystem resilience, human health, and even culture, biodiversity loss has real implications on human security.

Framed within the debate between indigenous and scientific management, climate change elevates the pertinence of biodiversity management. Increasingly, dramatic changes to ecosystems are causes of urgent concern. These small crises are quickly becoming the norm, and with each ecological crisis, conflict may arise between indigenous communities and science. For example, science may call for conservation of a species at risk, while indigenous communities may seek to continue traditional hunting practices. As climate change continues to shape the Arctic, a new path must be forged that shifts conservation from a crux of conflict to a cavalry of collaboration.

International Frameworks – the Underpinnings of Conservation

International frameworks at a global, regional, and indigenous mindset lay a foundation for the protection of biodiversity. Not only do the dangers to the Arctic’s biodiversity affect the region, but have wide ranging global consequences and responsibilities. During discussions of the CBD, the southern African country of Malawi even noted its concern for Arctic biodiversity as important bird species migrate thousands of kilometers between the Arctic and Africa (Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice, 2011, p. 3; A. Shestakov, personal communication, 2013). These international frameworks encourage change at national and local levels. By clearly defining biodiversity and setting a broad, yet clear set of goals for conservation, the CBD serves as a standard for biodiversity conservation (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992). For instance the CBD has elevated awareness of biodiversity as a global issue, with more governments “explicitly recognizing the value of biodiversity” (Balmford et al., 2005, p. 212). Likewise, the CBD calls for the protection of customs that are “in accordance with traditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation” showing the global interest in integrating indigenous values (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, art. 10c)

Despite the value of a global agreement, the continued threats of biodiversity loss signify the failure of the CBD as a policy instrument, even according to its current head Ahmed Djoghlof (Zeller, 2010). The failure of the convention can be attributed to the absence of important signatories like the United States (Snape, 2010, p. 6). Nevertheless, a comprehensive international regime is necessary for a transnational problem like biodiversity loss (Trombetta, 2009, p. 598; A. Shestakov, personal communication, 2013).

Some models exist at a more regional level and incorporate indigenous perspectives directly. Most prominently, the Arctic Council (AC) supports a working group called the Conservation for Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) with representatives from the nation states and indigenous permanent participants. In fact, biodiversity management motivated the creation of the Arctic Council seeing the need for full state and indigenous involvement to protect a vulnerable environment (Mclver, 1998, p. 149; Arctic Council, 1996, par. 4). Even earlier, the multi-state Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) produced an Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy (IRCS), serving as an indigenous management model as the first indigenous and first regional conservation strategy (Nuttall, 1998, p. 30).
This strategy was credited with United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) awards serving as a globally recognized model for indigenous governance (Nuttall, 1998, p. 30). These models provide the basis for a comprehensive and effective conservation strategy. In particular, the voice of the Inuit offers a setting for a fresh and collaborative approach to conservation.

The Harvest – Co-Managing the Populations of Species

While international responses have offered broad-scale collaboration between scientific and indigenous communities, substantive work has been done in local communities. Historically and presently, biodiversity has been cooperatively managed between scientists and indigenous communities through the conservation of specific populations. Nunavik and Nunavut provide several examples of collaborative efforts to maintain biodiversity of species for consumptive ecosystem services, in particular harvesting – a key component of Inuit society. Nunavik in particular serves as a model for balance between science and indigenous knowledge with harvest limits, monitoring, and research, supported by an extensive scholarly discourse (Lewis et al., 2009, p. 14; Kishigami, 2005, p. 125). However, as climate change has altered populations, disagreement between indigenous and scientific conservation methods has been observed. To ensure the sustained and cooperative conservation of important species, an integrated approach is suggested that can limit potential weaknesses caused by dispute.

Applications of non-indigenous biology and indigenous knowledge align with the conservation of populations. Populations are the groups of individuals of the same species living in a particular geographic area, and “are the primary currency and concern of conservation biology” (Freeman, 2011, p. 4; Van Dyke, 2008, p. 240). Most scientists gain expertise in individual species, matching each species to specific ecological needs. Just as species are ecologically unique, their purpose in the Inuit diet is species-specific (Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, n.d.). Harvested species are managed through limits on harvest; these numbers are based off counts of species. Governance of harvesting can include IQ through co-management boards and community-based conservation. In Nunavik, managers attempt to include indigenous perspectives to manage these populations, but distinct disagreements have existed on species counts and definitions of sustainable harvests (Kishigami, 2005, p. 137).

Quotas and moratoriums have been central policies for managing populations of harvested species in the Arctic, but have not been fully embraced by Inuit harvesters. Since the 1980s, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has instituted quotas and other regulations on the harvest of beluga whales in Nunavik and Hudson Bay (Kishigami, 2005, p. 125; Tyrrell, 2008, p. 323). These management strategies include quotas, or limits on the number of whales harvested, date selection for the hunting season, training for newer hunters, regulations on hunting methods, and codes of conduct (Tyrrell, 2007). In 1996, after concerns over the two endangered populations of belugas in the Eastern Hudson Bay and Ungava Bay in Québec, the DFO placed a “blanket quota” of 240 for all three beluga populations in the Hudson Bay and Ungava Bay (Tyrrell, 2008, p. 325). However, Western Hudson Bay had 57,000 individuals compared to 3,100 individuals in Eastern Hudson Bay. This left the Inuit in Nunavik with a frustrating limit, considering the sharp difference in population numbers. Another challenge with the quota system was the application of the same quota numbers to different communities in Nunavik, despite varied community size. Nunavik communities began to resent the DFO (Kishigami, 2005, p. 130). In certain cases the unequal quotas have forced Nunavimmiut to purchase Beluga meat from Nunavut where management and quotas are less restrictive, or travel far distances to James Bay to harvest beluga (Tyrrell, 2007; Nunatsiaq News, 2012). The forced purchase of a typically subsistence good instills a sense of “powerlessness” in Inuit communities, weakening the social community strength offered through harvest (Tyrrell, 2007, p. 575). The application of these scientifically rooted policies may not be wholly appropriate for Arctic biodiversity management.

Even more drastic have been moratoriums on hunts, suggested by scientists for biological reasons, but in contrast to Inuit ways of thought. In the 1990s, the DFO mandated closures of estuaries to human activities that continue today to protect vulnerable populations of Beluga whales in Eastern Hudson Bay and Ungava Bay (Doniol-Varcuze et al., 2012, p. 7; Nunatsiaq News, 2012). These scientifically pressed moratoriums have strong ecological backing as the harvest of belugas in their calving
4 areas of estuaries has been noted to affect beluga ability to remember habitats (Doniol-Vacruze et al., 2012, p. 5). While this drastic management step was seen as highly necessary for the DFO to protect biodiversity, the agency even admits the strong disagreements with local Inuit (Doniol-Vacruze et al., 2012, p. 5). These closures not only stop the harvest of beluga, but also limit the interactions of Inuit with the estuaries as recreational areas, or harvest zones for other species. By placing estuaries as sanctuaries of the Beluga, the Canadian government is perceived to prioritize wildlife over the Inuit people (Armitage, 2005, p. 721). Even though there is a strong scientific backing for the methods imposed by the DFO, indigenous knowledge is not incorporated meaningfully into these decisions (Doniol-Vacruze et al, 2012). Instead, harvesters prescribe to IQ and harvesters claim that beluga will return if hunted (Doniol-Vacruze et al, 2012, p. 5; Kishigami, 2005, p. 132). While harvesters may disagree with the fundamental behavioral ecology of the beluga whales, the DFO struggles to effectively convey this scientific knowledge to indigenous understandings of the environment.

Population monitoring has been another challenge of wildlife management between indigenous and scientific parties. For beluga whales, there has been substantial controversy over the validity of satellite telemetry\(^3\) counts (Lewis et al., 2009, p. 14; Kishigami, 2005, p. 133). Likewise, scientists consider the polar bear population verging on endangerment, yet Inuit communities sense an increase in polar bear numbers (MacDonald, 2012, p. 3). This discrepancy can be accounted for by the shrinking of sea ice forcing polar bears to forage in community waste to obtain energy, but this concept has not been appropriately conveyed to Inuit communities. These differences in population counts develop an increasing clash between indigenous and scientific priorities. Climate change is increasing the likelihood of these disagreements and as populations shrink the importance of accurate counting is amplified.

Another form of co-management is through management boards such as the Hunting, Fishing, and Trapping Co-ordinating Committee in Nunavik. Importantly these boards establish the leadership of Inuit in their own biodiversity management as leaders who draft regulations (Berkes et al., 2007, p. 150). Placing Inuit in management bodies supports efforts to include Inuit knowledge in the management process. While the concept of Inuit inclusion is ideal, the adaptiveness and effectiveness of this inclusion becomes difficult when the body increases participant numbers (Peters, 2002, p. 682). Meanwhile, limitations on the human capacity and scientific knowledge of members of the committee inhibit the effectiveness of the committee. Armitage suggests that the committees are too complex, and one option is for a simpler co-management system with fewer formal actors involved (Armitage, 2005, p. 726; Kishigami, 2005, p. 135).

Nunavut’s first integrated management plan for narwhals offers an alternative approach within the needs of wildlife management. After consultations with indigenous groups and organizations like the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the DFO set limits based on specific geographic regions, rather than the blanket quotas over the oceanic space. These zones can track each specific animal, keeping in line with the CITES requirements for the harvest and trade of narwhals (George, 2012). Each zone has different quotas adapted to regional differences in population and community demand, fitting a community-based management model (Dawson, 2013). This new effort more effectively includes IQ, by raising the quotas based on human needs in the ecosystem. Moreover, the more specific tracking makes this system more effective by addressing the actual concern of narwhal parts trade, rather than trying to control population numbers.

Institutions and policies in place to protect harvested populations inappropriately apply non-indigenous concepts onto communities that lack the capacity to fulfill the roles required. Likewise, scientists struggle with a perception of illegitimacy from disputed population counts. An integrated approach of human capacity building can improve the existing model, ensuring a positive collaboration.

**Land, Water, and Ice – Can We Conserve the Entire Landscape?**

Beyond populations of species, the current approach to biodiversity conservation is an ecosystem-based management. Instead of simply managing a species, scientists and communities are encouraged to plan conservation for the entire system. Entire ecosystems work as a whole to provide important

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\(^3\) Satellite telemetry collects signals from marked beluga whales and extrapolates locations for the remaining individuals (Lewis et al., 2009, p. 16).
regulating ecosystem services – services that provide resilience against ecological crisis. First, the shifting effects of climate change call for ecologically conscious management of the broader landscape, not merely discrete areas (Heller and Zavaleta, 2009, p. 27). Second, an ecosystem approach includes indigenous voices and knowledge into management decisions because communities become intertwined with the conservation (Berkes et al., 2000, 1260).

The ecosystem-based management (EBM) approach is highly regarded, and Canada is highlighted as a model for EBM (Slocombe, 1998, p. 34). EBM attempts to (1) treat the ecosystem as a unit, (2) practice adaptive management, and (3) involve stakeholder participation (Van Dyke, 2008, p. 350). While population management is easy to discretely focus on species and ignore human aspects, EBM must involve local actors, aligning with indigenous interests.

Currently, co-management presents an opportunity to integrate indigenous and scientific conservation. Recently, the George River caribou herd in Québec saw a dramatic decline from 300,000 individuals to only 27,000 in a few years (Wells, 2013). To deal with this significant shift, a co-management response was developed. Four tribes and several biologists from the Québec government worked together to manage the caribou population (CBC News, 2013). The migratory nature of caribou herds makes them a strong model for EBM because their migratory route must be wholly conserved (Slocombe, 1993, p. 615). Biologists have called for an adaptive management for caribou that includes the conservation of other associated species, sustainable forestry, and protected migratory corridors (Courtois et al., 2004, p. 605). In the Western Arctic indigenous communities participate in mapping the routes of caribou providing nuances of herd dynamics more accurately than a typical scientific approach (Kendrick and Manseau, 2008, p. 407). Other narrative forms of research are challenging to interpret, but “reflect a range of local variability in observations and reflect the range of natural history observations and environmental history of the ranges” (Kendrick and Manseau, 2008, p. 416). Inclusion of this TEK not only brings in improved understandings of the ecosystem but grants respect and dignity to the indigenous Inuit who often sense disengagement with government-led conservation. This follows suggestions for the incorporation of TEK into management throughout Nunavik (Gislason, 2007, p.102). Ultimately, regional co-management panels like the Nunavik Marine Region Wildlife Management Board, which practices landscape-scale management, may be pathways towards an effective inclusion of indigenous ways of thought and voice in EBM (Gislason, 2007). This sort of forum not only can strengthen management, but can also empower Inuit communities.

Currently, community consultations serve as the main way to make determinations of conservation decisions. According to the Makivik Corporation, through Plan Nunavik, new leaders are required to show up, and a round table of core leaders, local leaders and the public attend consultation meetings (J. Salvo, personal communication, 2013). These consultative efforts are consistently recommended throughout the literature (Berkes et al., 2007, p. 150; Johnsen et al., 2010, p. 75; Mallory et al., 2006, p. 23). While consultation is considerate of local concerns, it is crucial that these concerns are not only heard, but incorporated into management decisions.

At the regional level, Nunavik and Québec have prepared to protect biodiversity. Both indigenous people and Québecers want to protect biodiversity (Gouvernment du Québec, 2011, p. 94; Makivik, 2012, p. 333). In response to biodiversity loss, both Québec and Nunavik have presented similar plans, although there are disagreements in the details of the change. Plan Nord, Québec’s Arctic Policy, notably calls for the protection of fifty percent of land north of the 55th parallel (Gouvernement du Québec, 2011, p. 142). Although Plan Nord is no longer in place with the change in government, the ideas and sentiments remain, and the new Parti Québécois government still seeks to protect at least fifty percent of land in the North from industrial development (Blatchford, 2012). This concept is impressive and attractive, but there are substantial critiques. Plan Nunavik, the Inuit response to Plan Nord, still seeks the same amount of protected lands, but the emphasis first is placed on human interactions with the ecosystem instead of bold claims of environmentalism. One of the key facets of Plan Nunavik’s response to biodiversity loss is the need for consultation for protected area designations, bringing Inuit to the forefront of these decisions (Makivik, 2012, p. 422). Other goals for biodiversity protection include the

4 Makivik Corporation is the organization formed after the James Bay Northern Quebec Agreement to protect the rights, finances, and interests of the Inuit in Nunavik.
enforcement of existing wildlife regulations and expanded Inuit human capacity and expertise on wildlife management (Makivik, 2012, p. 419). Science calls for similar goals especially for the concept of a regional adaptive management strategy. This would support a broad-based ecosystem management that is aware of global change and incorporates indigenous voice appropriately (L. Fortier, personal communication, 2013).

Ecosystem-based management is also applied in aquatic ecosystems, especially the vast marine ecosystems that surround Nunavik and are integral to the Arctic. Marine ecosystems as a whole face challenges with management, especially in the complex space of Arctic waters and ice. Marine protected areas are tools for conservation of aquatic regions (Van Dyke, 2008, p. 333). These may range from pristine no-go zones, banning all access to fisheries, or more managed and used zones with multiple purposes (R. Sauve, personal communication). In the Alaskan arctic, a model has been proposed with indigenous support, placing a moratorium on all commercial fishing in the marine waters (Bennett, 2009). Instead, only traditional harvests are allowed (Bernton, 2009). 551 scientists have strongly urged Canada to place a moratorium on industrial fisheries, waiting for scientific research to show that the Arctic waters are sustainable and resilient (Boswell, 2012; Reeves et al., 2012, p. 460). Any broad moratorium would still enable Inuit to practice traditional hunting and social bonding through the harvest. (L. Fortier, personal communication, 2013). With proper consultation, this strategy may be ideal in the short-term.

Several scholars have called for marine protected areas because coverage in the Canadian arctic is fairly weak (CAFF, 2010, p. 98; Peacock et al., 2011, p. 337). However the process of forming a marine protected area has been lengthy and ineffective to some degree (Guenette and Alder, 2007). The DFO calls for marine protected areas that are selective. In addition, these protected areas would not be no-go zones, but managed areas (R. Sauve, personal communication). These managed areas allow for fishing, hunting, and shipping, but are “protected from oil and gas development” (Peacock et al., 2011, p. 337). To determine these specific areas for long-term marine protection, specific areas should be protected with a conservation purpose (R. Sauve, personal communication, 2013). These special areas can be chosen based on tools like Rapid Assessment of Circum-Arctic Ecosystem Resilience (RACER) locating areas of ecosystem resilience that can serve the broader bioregion (Christie and Sommerkorn, 2012, p. 5). Through all of these decisions, consultation with Inuit communities is necessary to form appropriate and meaningful boundaries that respect both cultural and ecological values. To achieve a faster establishment of these areas, Guenette and Alder call for a more devolved process (2007). This process will need to involve Inuit leaders who can help shape these areas and more quickly accomplish protection across their land as sought by Plan Nunavik.

As the current popular approach, EBM is a strong foundation for biodiversity conservation. Conservation is a large-scale issue, and the management of entire ecosystems and landscapes tightly involves indigenous perspectives. Inclusion in management decisions, involvement in planning, and agenda-setting that aligns with goals for ecosystems, all show the strengths of the EBM approach to provide comprehensive environmental security.

**Creative Integration – Forward-Thinking Approaches for Conservation**

The great challenge is continuing the integration of indigenous knowledge and voice with non-indigenous science in the face of climate change. International collaboration offers one opportunity to preserve biodiversity. Several recent ideas can strengthen the current relationship between science and indigenous knowledge including Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, citizen science, and an ecosystem services framework.

**International Legal Proposals**

Before tackling management, international legal frameworks need considerable attention. International approaches to conservation still provide the basis for effective environmental security across the Arctic. Historically attempts to conserve biodiversity internationally have centered on global treaties (Trombetta, 2009, p. 597). However as countries have failed to meet their obligations for the CBD, other forums for conservation need to be discussed. The Arctic Council, notable for its involvement of indigenous peoples, and founded on the basis of international environmental protection, offers a model for cooperative

**Democratizing Biodiversity Management**

Another possible model for conservation of specific species is to involve wildlife in economic pursuits such as tourism discussed in the previous chapter. Tourism commodifies the ecosystem services provided by wildlife, possibly bringing economic growth to Inuit communities. Some of these possibilities include wildlife viewing from cruise ships or vehicles, or trophy hunting. Polar bears have been suggested as a possible (albeit controversial) species for trophy hunting, supporting Inuit communities (Freeman and Wenzel, 2006). By creating a greater value for polar bears through a hunting program, hunters would then become part of the sustainable population conservation effort.

A newer dynamic of indigenous knowledge, known as Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ), challenges the scholarly devised notion of TEK. Instead of providing basic knowledge of flora and fauna in ecosystems, IQ provides cultural, spiritual, and ecological knowledge without trying to fit a Western thought process, making it more meaningful to communities (Tester and Irniq, 2008, p. 55). Wenzel suggests that TEK is less relevant, and fails to integrate Inuit communities into the management process (2004). Instead, IQ, already part of Nunavut’s Wildlife Act, can play a critical role in actually bringing indigenous knowledge and voice to the scientific forum (Tester and Irniq, 2008, p. 49). Leona Aglukkaq, rising chairwoman of the Arctic Council, even mentioned the concept of IQ in her recent speech on Canada’s ascendency to the Arctic Council chairmanship (2013). This philosophy holds currency in Inuit communities, and may be a more effective route for partnership.

Citizen science, or the inclusion of local Inuit in the scientific process of management, may provide an opportunity for integrating scientific and indigenous styles of biodiversity management (Ayles et al., 2007). Research is one critical component of citizen science. The Wemindji Protected Areas Project between Cree and biologists offers a framework for community science. This process involved workshops, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation to capture the greatest amount of local knowledge possible (Mulrennan et al., 2012, p. 249). This community based participatory research becomes a learning experience for scientists, and also Inuit who often are limited in educational opportunities because of their isolation. Together Inuit and scientists can set research agendas and help define how populations and ecosystems can be managed. There are already models for science engagement through the Nunavik Research Centre, making citizen science a real possibility for expansion (S. Hendrie, personal communication, 2013).

Ecosystem services are the fundamental reason for protecting biodiversity. However research on the value of these services through natural capital still needs to be quantified to ensure that the value is clear (de Groot et al., 2010, p. 28). Research done by a variety of projects, like Unikkaaqatigiit, have clarified the role of ecosystem services in Inuit communities (The Communities..., 2005). Placing ecosystem services within the market can then protect these services. In the short-term, the risk assessments of ecosystem services can contribute to Integrated Regional Impact Strategies, planning for the future of wildlife (L. Fortier, personal communication, 2013).

**Policy Options**

- Implement and enforce existing international agreements (e.g. Convention on Biological Diversity) and wildlife regulations
- Communicate the ecological science behind quota and moratorium regulations to communities
- Practice adaptive co-management focused on an ecosystem-based management
- Identify and expand marine protected areas in resilient spaces of special concern
- Recognize the value of IQ and consider the values of IQ in management decisions
- Improve long-term observations and monitoring by creating a new crop of citizen scientists through scientific engagement in Inuit communities
- Involve communities in setting research agendas based off models such as the Nunavik Research Centre

**Conclusion**

Both conservation biologists and indigenous harvesters offer vital perspectives in...
biodiversity management. Together these two powerful beacons of knowledge can shed light on the complex nature of Arctic ecosystems, both with specific wildlife populations, and also with broader understandings of ecosystems. While these management proposals tackle adaptation at a micro scale, the issues of biodiversity are inherently global. Only with regional and international collaboration between nation-states and indigenous participants can biodiversity be meaningfully conserved. Biodiversity is a critical component of community resilience and conservation will secure biodiversity and its ecosystem services. As global carbon mitigation fades in promise, these adaptation methods for populations and ecosystems will provide the resilience to ecosystems and communities that can sustain Arctic communities.

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Pomegranates in the North, Muktuk in the South: Building Infrastructure for Arctic Food Security

By Kevin Shaw

Abstract

Arctic food security is a multisectoral issue affecting human rights and public health in Inuit communities. Although much attention has been given to the pressures and policies that shape food security in the North, less work has been done on food systems infrastructure. This paper examines the role of community infrastructure in Arctic food security by considering three relevant examples: community freezers, greenhouses, and the Arctic Food Network. Together, these case studies demonstrate the potential of community infrastructure to build independent and self-sustaining food systems in the North.

Introduction

The foundations of food security in Canada’s Arctic are increasingly unstable. For decades, the two pillars of the Arctic food economy—country food and imported food—have come under pressure from globalization and climate change. Country food derived from the traditional harvest has declined as a share of the diet of Inuit, especially among youth, spurred in part by fears about contamination and the dwindling transfer of hunting practices (Lougheed, 2010). Since the resettlement of the Inuit into permanent communities in the ’50s, country food has been displaced by imported food from the South, increasing Inuit risk for cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and other non-communicable diseases (Duhaime, 2008, p. 76). Subsidy programs have been put in place to offset the egregiously high cost of imported foods, but communities continue to struggle in meeting their basic needs (Myers, 2008). In response to the urgent public health and human rights problem posed by threats to food security, Arctic communities have implemented creative adaptations in the built and natural environment. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of community infrastructure in strengthening Arctic food security.

In the past two decades, Arctic food security has emerged as a topic of intense concern for the international research community, regional governments, and for Arctic communities themselves. Today, a variety of academic organizations are actively making Northern food security a research priority, including but not limited to the Council of Canadian Academies, the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists, the McGill Climate Change Adaptation Research Group, ArcticNet, and University of the Arctic, which is set to convene its inaugural Northern Food Summit in 2013. As the academic discussion on food security has grown, so too has political mobilization on the ground. The UN Special Rapporteur on Food visited Canada in 2012, making food security in Canada’s Arctic into a subject of international discussion and controversy. While not embraced by all, the UN official’s call has helped galvanize a diverse movement of people around food activism, as exemplified by Feed My Family, a Facebook group around food security that has accumulated more than 20,000 online members. Taken together, these various initiatives have generated political synergy around Arctic food security, including policy options that target the wage economy (e.g. poverty reduction to increase purchasing power, improved food subsidies) and those that target...
the subsistence economy (e.g., hunter support programs, commodification of local foods). One area that remains understudied, however, is community infrastructure. A concluding report from the 2013 Nunavut Food Security Symposium lists the need to “[improve] community-based infrastructure to provide hunters with places to store, prepare, share, and sell their harvests” (Iqaluit, 2013). This paper takes up the question of how community infrastructure might be improved to the benefit of local harvesting and agriculture alike.

How can food security in Arctic communities be addressed at a local level through enhancements in community infrastructure? This chapter explores possible answers to the research question in three case studies that span the history and geography of the Canadian Arctic: community freezers in Nain, Nunatsiavut, greenhouses in Kuujjuaq, Nunavik, and the Arctic Food Network (AFN), a project being implemented by Lateral Office on Baffin Island in Nunavut. Drawing from these examples, this paper discusses the strengths and limitations of food systems infrastructure. The chapter articulates a set of policy options to guide the development of food security infrastructure in the Arctic, including conducting community needs assessments, consolidating emerging knowledge, and increasing human capacity to support Arctic infrastructure. In sum, this chapter argues that community infrastructure has a vital role to play in the cultivation of independent, self-sustaining, and self-sufficient food systems for inhabitants of the Arctic.

Background

Arctic Food Security

In the past two decades, Arctic food security has grown into a topic of intense concern for Inuit communities and academics alike. Contemporary interest in Arctic food security began in the '80s, when researchers began to write widely on the country food-sharing practices of the Inuit (as quoted in Ford, 2012). In the early '90s, the discovery of alarming levels of contaminants in country food triggered a series of studies on the health impacts of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) on human health (as quoted in Ford, 2012). Researchers have been unable to find concrete adverse health impacts arising from the consumption of country food with high levels of contaminants, whereas they have found increasing evidence of the poor health outcomes arising from the widespread transition towards imported, processed food. Somewhat ironically, early warnings around contamination of country food probably assisted the transition away from country food towards imported foods, especially among younger Inuit (Lougheed, 2010).

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations established a definition for food security in the 1996 World Food Summit: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life” (FAO, 1996). This is the definition employed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food in his Country Visit Report (De Schutter, 2012). The FAO’s classic definition of food security is expanded in Duhaime (2008) to take account of availability, accessibility, and adequacy. Availability is a function of “supply mechanisms; that is, the quantity and quality of available food” (Duhaime, 2008, p. 74). Accessibility is a socio-economic measure that typically refers to one’s ability to “acquire supplies made available at markets” (Duhaime, 2008, p. 74). Food security also includes adequacy, both in terms of raw quantity and nutritional quality. Acceptability is a fourth measure that is employed in Canada’s Action Plan for Food Security (as quoted in Duhaime, 2008: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 1998), referring to the uptake and reception of different foods in a local, cultural context.

Today, the academic literature has reached a broad consensus on the multiple factors driving Arctic food security as well as a menu of viable policy options. As a recent article published in BMC Public Health succinctly states, lack of food security in the Canadian North “must be understood in the context of socio-economic transformations that have affected Inuit society over the last half century as former semi-nomadic hunting groups were resettled into permanent settlements” (Ford, Lardeau & Vanderbilt, 2012, p. 1). Political, economic, legal, socio-cultural and environmental changes all contribute to the complex, shifting landscape of Arctic food security, and are driven for the most part by climate change and globalization. Meanwhile, researchers and advocates have assembled a list of prescient policy responses, including the revision and increase of social assistance levels to meet basic costs of living in the North and the
establishment of a living minimum wage (De Schutter, 2012, p. 20). Researchers have also stressed the importance of policy strengthening the subsistence economy through, for example, funding hunter support programs and commoditizing country food (Duhaime, 2008).

**Framing Food Security in a Mixed Economy**

A national right to food strategy must take effective stock of the mixed economy by implementing policy that supports the availability of both country food and healthy imported food. To understand why the Arctic food economy contains elements of both imported food and country food, it is necessary to examine why neither the free market nor pure subsistence present viable standalone models for food security in today’s Arctic.

The free market does not create the conditions for sustainable food security in the Arctic. “In very remote regions, the market is simply not working” says Duhaime (2013). “If you cut social programs, social benefits, you’re running into a wall” (Duhaime, personal communication, 2013). The apparent stability of most food supply chains is belied by the inability of many poor Inuit to access store-bought foods due to high prices. In the Canadian Arctic, over 40% of the population lives below the threshold of poverty. In Nunavik, the cost of food is 60-90% higher than in southern Canada, while the situation is even more severe in Nunavut (Duhaime, personal communication, 2013). Price discrepancies only increase the further North one travels. Meanwhile, levels of social assistance, as disbursed through federal transfer payments, family allowances and pension plans, remain insufficient to cover basic costs of living (Duhaime, 2008).

Neither does pure subsistence present a sustainable model for food security. Prior to the ’50s, Canadian Inuit lived nomadically off the land, relying on the availability and proximity of harvest species for subsistence. While subsistence afforded Inuit direct access to the land, it also made them particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in wildlife. As nomads, the Inuit did not support an elderly population and could not have experienced the demographic growth that occurred after their resettlement. Inuit culture has changed with the introduction of imported food, and widespread starvation no longer poses the clear and present danger that it once did, when Inuit lived in a state of pure subsistence. While the country food harvest remains an integral part of the Inuit diet and cultural discourse, policymakers and advocates alike must recognize that a return to subsistence is neither possible nor desirable.
In discourse and in practice, the Arctic functions as a mixed economy. Today, not only are the subsistence and wage-based economies complementary, they mutually depend on each other for continued existence. Most Inuit households participate in both subsistence and wage-earning to varying degrees, with the earnings from wage employment continually reinvested in equipment needed for harvesting country food (Natcher, 2009). This relationship is unique to the Arctic, where geographical remoteness impedes market function and where globalization and demographic growth have increased the costs of the country food harvest.

**Food Systems Infrastructure**

While the precise definition of infrastructure has been contested by experts in architecture, urbanism, and planning, the basic definition of infrastructure describes it as a system of public works and the resources necessary for some activity (Merriam-Webster, 2013). Infrastructure constitutes both physical capital and a public good. This paper adopts the community as its frame of reference; thus, community infrastructure is built environment that provides a public service to community members. Moreover, White and Sheppard argue that “infrastructure is ecology” (White & Sheppard, 2011), while Yu says that “nature is infrastructure” (Yu, 2012). The impact of these emergent ways of understanding infrastructure on the discourse surrounding Arctic security will be discussed later on in the chapter. This paper defines food systems infrastructure as the following: public architecture that supports the production, distribution, access and consumption of food in Arctic communities.

**Three Case Studies in Food Systems Infrastructure**

This paper presents three examples of community infrastructure intervening in Arctic food security. First, it examines community freezers, which have been used for decades in Inuit communities to store harvested meat for the off-season, focusing especially on the community freezer initiative in Nain, Nunatsiavut. Second, it considers the development of greenhouses in Kuujjuaq, Nunavik. Third, it analyzes the Arctic Food Network (AFN), a project being implemented on Baffin Island in Nunavut. Taken together, these three case studies span both the history and the geography of the Eastern Canadian Arctic. Community freezers, as traditional infrastructure, point to a long legacy of Arctic food systems infrastructure; greenhouses exemplify the present push among Arctic communities for building infrastructure; and AFN suggests how food systems infrastructure can move forward towards greater integration of Inuit tradition and modern circumstance. While these initiatives by no means constitute the only relevant examples of food systems infrastructure in the North, they provide the bases on which an independent, self-sustaining, and self-sufficient food economy can be built.

**Community Freezers**

Community freezers, or kuakuvik in Inuktitut, are a mechanism for food sharing and storage in Arctic settlements. In many ways, community freezers represent the prototypical example of community infrastructure supporting Northern food security. For centuries, ice cellars dug into the permafrost provided a means of storing harvested meat through the off-season. These naturally chilled cellars still remain in use by Inupiat in Alaska, although climate change and unusual weather events in the past decade have rendered many of them unviable in the summer, increasing risk for food borne illness in the population (Brubaker, 2009). Modern community freezers utilizing freon cooler technology emerged in Nunavik in the 1970s and in the Northwest Territories in the 1980s (Organ, 2012, p. 6). In recent times, they have suffered from issues relating to wear and maintenance (Ridlington, 2010). Some communities have allowed their community freezers to lapse out of operation, while others are actively reinvesting into community freezer initiatives, as in Nunavut (Organ, 2012, p. 6). This chapter’s discussion of community freezer initiatives draws heavily from a case study conducted in the settlement of Nain, Nunatsiavut by Jennifer Organ.

From the perspective of cost and sustainability, community freezers constitute a sizable but arguably necessary investment. In the past, hamlet administrations have experienced difficulty in keeping up with costs of freezer
maintenance and energy for refrigeration. In a study conducted of four communities in the Inuvialuit settlement region, only one community freezer remained operational, while another was in construction (Douglas & Chan, 2012). In the Nain study, the community freezer was purchased in 2005 by a community volunteer group, which raised the initial capital investment themselves. Meanwhile, the government covers costs for energy and space and designated hunters donate a portion of their catch (Organ, 2012, p. 12). Despite high energy costs, community freezers present one method of collectivizing the cost of energy related to refrigeration, which would otherwise be borne completely by households using individual freezers. Meanwhile, the Inuvialuit study found that community freezers play an important function in the protection of cultural food security, a subset of food security that centers on accessibility and availability of country foods (Douglas & Chan, 2012). In this view, community freezers are a crucial investment in the long-term sustainability of Arctic food systems. As Arctic integration into the wage economy continues apace, it likely that increasingly few Inuit will have direct access to the land. For those without a hunter in their household or family, community freezers may constitute their only option for accessing country food.

In terms of culture and tradition, community freezers are vital infrastructure for food sharing. Food sharing amongst Inuit typically occurs within immediate and extended family networks (Collings, 2011). Although people can and do share outside these networks, there is little guarantee of this happening in a climate of relative scarcity. Organ’s study found that those without extended family were often the first to access the community freezer in Nain (Organ, 2012, p. 87). The “community of sharing,” formalized in the structure of the freezer, includes those who normally lack access to the kin networks through which Inuit traditions of food sharing typically operate. In particular, the community freezer in Nain was bought because community members noticed the difficulty that Elders and single mothers had in obtaining country food through existing social and economic networks (Organ, 2012, p. 12). Community freezers thus extend the Inuit tradition of food sharing to the most vulnerable and socially isolated members of a settlement by “formalising and normalising [sic] food sharing and promoting traditional food use” (Douglas & Chan, 2012).

Community freezers have received widespread support in different Inuit communities across the Arctic (Organ, 2012; Douglas & Chan, 2012). While they do not present a long-term solution to Arctic food security, they present vulnerable settlement members with a coping strategy in situations of last resort and extend access to country food to the whole village population, at least in theory. Taken alone, they are never “enough.” Yet they play an integral function in Arctic food security by concretizing Inuit sharing traditions in the built environment. As the prototypical example of community infrastructure for Arctic food security, community freezers demonstrate the feasibility and importance of food systems infrastructure.

Arctic Greenhouses

Arctic greenhouses are essentially infrastructure to support the local production of fresh fruits and vegetables in Arctic communities. They are readily scaled to suit different levels of use, such as: individual backyard plots, community gardens that operate during the summer with volunteer assistance, and commercial-scale operations that operate year-round and require heating inputs during the winter. In the Eastern Arctic, commercial-scale greenhouses could easily and successfully employ hydroponic and aquaponic technology. Greenhouses can be easily coupled with other structures and security domains, including schools and youth security, power plants and energy security, and homes and housing security. Because of the wealth of sunlight afforded by Arctic summers, the quality of produce that can be grown in Northern greenhouses easily rivals anything grown in the South (Avard, personal communication, 2013). Promising community greenhouse initiatives are in operation in Inuvik, Iqaluit, and several other northern settlements.
In particular, the greenhouse movement is gaining momentum in Kuujjuaq, a Nunavik settlement where Ellen Avard, a PhD candidate at Laval University, has focused her thesis research.

A major question that skeptics have raised is the feasibility of proposed greenhouse projects. As the emerging literature has shown, however, Arctic greenhouses have been technologically feasible for decades, dating as far back as the Canadian government's experiments with Northern agriculture in the 1950s. At the time, the government established five substations throughout the Arctic, including one in Kuujjuaq, which remained functional until the '60s, when funding abruptly ended (Avard, personal communication, 2013). Since then, greenhouse projects have sprouted up across the Arctic sporadically, typically functioning for several years until funding runs out, the community loses interest, or key personnel are transferred. What is clear enough is that the pertinent issues are funding and political will rather than technical feasibility. The technology behind installing hydroponics and aquaponics is well-understood and readily available. Passive solar greenhouses operate during the sun-rich Arctic summer. During the winter they can lie fallow or operate through heat inputs. Commercial greenhouses could operate year-round requiring heating inputs during winter, but could potentially be coupled with local power plants to utilize waste heat energy that is otherwise squandered (Avard, personal communication, 2013).

Newcomers to the idea of Arctic greenhouses may question whether the installation of agricultural infrastructure comports with Inuit culture and food traditions. In envisioning the role of greenhouses, it is important to keep in mind that the majority of caloric intake in the North already comes from imported foods. Country food only accounts for approximately 20% of the average caloric intake of Inuit, with approximately 80% accounted for by imported foods (Duhaime, 2008). Many of these imported foods are nutritionally deficient, partly because imported produce tends to be low in quality (Duhaime, 2008). Moreover, the role of greenhouses in creating local food cannot be understated. Prior to contact, Inuit lived off the land, harvesting what was available from the herds, rivers, and plants within their localities. When placed within this historical context, greenhouse initiatives harmonize well with the Inuit tradition of maintaining and cultivating a local food ecology (Avard, 2011). Arctic greenhouses, as they are understood by scholars and by Inuit advocates, represent a way of reclaiming ownership over Arctic food systems and asserting control over the means of food production. Greenhouses also present the opportunity to grow herbs and healing medicines unique to the Northern context (Sanofsky, 2012).

There is considerable support for greenhouses coming from the community level in Arctic settlements, from research institutions, and from regional governments. Inuit have readily taken to the inclusion of lettuce, potato, and onion in their diets, for example including potatoes and onions in the preparation of caribou stew (Avard, personal communication, 2013). In the fall of 2012, the University of Saskatchewan convened a workshop on sustainable northern greenhouses that received a greater-than-expected turnout. In addition, greenhouses have garnered significant mentions in plans for the development of Northern Québec. Arctic greenhouse initiatives are included in Plan Nord and in Plan Nunavik, in which they are listed alongside seaweed aquaculture and mussel cultivation under infrastructure-related pilot projects. While current cost projections indicate that growing food in greenhouses will not necessarily save on costs relative to importing produce, it must be emphasized that greenhouse produce vastly outmatches imported produce in terms of quality. Produce that is imported from the South routinely loses mass (and/or quality) by the time it reaches Northern shelves (Avard, personal communication, 2013). Growing food locally would reduce post-harvest losses
due to transportation. Moreover, greenhouses operating at a commercial scale add jobs and revenue to the community. Local restaurants and food stores in Kuujjuaq have already expressed a readiness to purchase greenhouse-grown produce. Clearly, greenhouses have a major role to play in the cultivation of independent, local, and self-sustaining food systems in the Arctic.

Arctic Food Network (AFN)

The Arctic Food Network (AFN) is a social-architectural project in development by Lateral Office in Nunavut. It consists of a regional network of shelters that spans the traditional hunting trails of Baffin Island, traversable by snowmobile. Shelters can serve a variety of purposes, from overnight stay to food storage and preparation. AFN structures differ depending on their environment and whether they are situated on solid land, over open water, or a combination of both. Besides supporting the harvest of country food through land hunting and ice fishing, AFN also provides infrastructure for cultivating seaweed crops and basic aquaculture as well as ecosystem monitoring. It has received considerable attention within the last two years, first winning the Holcim Award (2011) for sustainable design and then receiving the Arctic Inspiration Prize (2012) for contributions to Arctic knowledge. The purposes of AFN are multiple: to establish greater mobility between the various Inuit settlements; to enable better distribution of country foods; to reinforce traditional hunting practices, especially among younger Inuit; and to build the foundations of an independent, self-sufficient food economy.

AFN is designed to be sustainable both in terms of cost and local environmental impact. The project is funded by a partnership between municipal government and local cooperatives, empowering local residents through the process of participation (White, 2012). AFN infrastructure provides the basis for an export economy of country foods that has the potential to reach southern consumers, among them urban Inuit who lack reliable access to country foods. AFN is deployed as a kit of parts ready for assembly by local Inuit using local materials. For instance, the project utilizes reclaimed wood from demolition projects in Nunavut. The project makes use of both rock and snow/ice, two of the most abundant natural resources in the North, implementing snow walls, water troughs, and copper shingles that can resist extreme hot and cold temperatures (White, 2012).

Beyond supporting harvesting, AFN strengthens transportation infrastructure between Arctic communities. Organ found that “anxiety and unsafe travel conditions” led some users of community freezers to opt out of harvesting activities. Concern about the safety of snowmobile trail networks can discourage people from accessing the land. AFN builds on existing snowmobile trails used by Inuit, increasing their safety and adaptability for use by hunters. Perhaps the improved land transportation offered by AFN also increases the potential for an inter-Arctic market for greenhouse produce. The inclusion of infrastructure for data and internet access helps to "bridge between the traditions of the Inuit and the expectations of the young generation” (Holcim, 2012). With data connectivity, AFN shelters can also function as bases for ecological monitoring. By coupling infrastructure for food systems with infrastructure for online data connection, youth integration and wildlife
management, AFN maximizes on the potential of the built environment to intervene in multiple domains of human security. Three pilot sites are currently being developed in collaboration with Nunavut’s Department of Culture, Language, Elders, and Youth (White, 2012).

Discussion

Community infrastructure can intervene within the dual food economy by supporting both harvesting and northern agriculture. Community freezers can make country food available to those who lack direct access to a hunter, including full-time workers, widows, and the elderly. Greenhouse infrastructure introduces alternative sources of healthy and nutritious foods, independent of food imports and country food harvests, and presents opportunities for education, wage employment, and social re-integration within the community. Infrastructure that makes harvesting more flexible and feasible, such as the Arctic Food Network, can enable greater part-time participation in hunting, as well as engage youth in traditional knowledge transfer. At scale, greenhouses and the Arctic Food Network will create micro-economies that generate jobs, revenue, and regional networks of exchange to enhance both economic and food security. As the examples show, community infrastructure can intervene in multiple security domains by coupling built infrastructure with the surrounding ecology.

One of the great merits of community infrastructure is its ability to reach the most vulnerable members of the population in a targeted manner. Community freezers are often built with the most vulnerable in mind, including elders and single mothers (Organ, 2012, p. 12; Connors, 2012). Community greenhouses can provide a crucial means of physical activity for the elderly, while addressing the food security problem posed by lack of direct access to country food. The Arctic Food Network reaches youth who might otherwise be estranged from Inuit culture, makes the harvest more feasible, increases the safety of land transportation networks, and widens access to country foods.

By positing “infrastructure as ecology” and “nature as infrastructure,” emergent urbanisms are eminently relevant to Arctic development (Sheppard & White, 2011; Yu, 2012). Viewing the natural environment as a “security pattern” (Yu, 2012) resists popular perceptions of the Arctic as an uninhabited blank slate. Rather, the natural environment provides for basic needs and should itself be considered infrastructure for life and food. This understanding of infrastructure harmonizes well with Inuit traditions derived from subsistence. Unfortunately, the history of infrastructure in the Canadian North has been mainly one of short-term development perpetuating sovereign control, colonial enterprise, and top-down economic development (Sheppard & White, 2011). Southern infrastructure projects in the North have historically focused on connecting Arctic settlements to the southern military-economic complex, leaving the Arctic dotted with unused ‘legacy infrastructure.’ What about infrastructure that connects Arctic communities to themselves and each other? What about infrastructure derived from and in harmony with Inuit culture that meets contemporary challenges of globalization and climate change? The model of infrastructure embodied by the three case studies proposes to increase independence, self-sufficiency, and sustainability in Arctic food systems and communities.

Policy Options

- Conduct baseline needs assessments using PhotoVoice in each Arctic community to ascertain community opinions and demands, particularly around food security and infrastructure.
- Create a certificate program for Northern food production that can be fulfilled online, patterned after the Prairie Horticulture Certificate (PHC) offered by the University of Saskatchewan (Tanino, 2012).
- Consolidate emerging knowledge in the field of Arctic greenhouses in an accessible online resource that features crowdsourcing and user-led content (Avard, personal communication, 2013).
- Increase human capacity for staffing and maintaining of Northern greenhouses and community freezers, which entails creating delegated position. Integrate these duties to create a position in each land-holding organization and ethnic organization dedicated to monitoring and maintaining food systems infrastructure.
- Establish dedicated federal and regional...
Conclusion

This paper’s title underscores the major role that globalization has played in Northern food security, both as an undermining pressure and a source of new solutions. The phrase “pomegranates in the North” is inclusive of globalization and the importation of Southern foods to a Northern context. The “pomegranates” of the title also point to the possibility that infrastructural and architectural practices that originate in the South can be “imported” to benefit Northern food security. Meanwhile, the phrase “muktuk in the South” references the possibility of a more robust export economy for country foods, which would benefit both Northern hunters as well as urban Inuit who have historically lacked access to a land diet. The “muktuk” of the title also suggests that infrastructural innovations incubated in the North can be adapted to improve food security at a global level. This has already happened with community freezers, which have been adapted by green technology innovators in Vermont to utilize cold outside air (PRWeb, 2010). The advent of Arctic greenhouses can push the local food movement forward by demonstrating that it is possible to have independent, self-sufficient food economies even in environments of relative scarcity. Meanwhile, AFN stretches the boundaries of architecture and urbanism through its development of an ecological concept of infrastructure.

Community infrastructure must be seen as one node within a larger, holistic national right to food strategy. Perhaps most centrally, it must accompany broader policy efforts at the federal and regional levels to combat poverty and increase food purchasing power through poverty reduction. Adjusting current levels of social assistance to meet basic cost of living would be an important first step, but current political conditions in Canada render this unlikely. Demographic trends towards a rapidly expanding youth population mean that current subsidy programs are unsustainable in the long run. Notwithstanding independent critiques of Nutrition North, the sheer fact of the North’s propulsive growth means that existing levels of food subsidy will become less and less sufficient as time goes on. Without systemic policy change for poverty reduction, conditions are unlikely to improve.

Community infrastructure must be seen as one tool in the arsenal of bottom-up and community-based approaches to improving food security. Food systems infrastructure, when implemented on a commercial scale, can become self-sustaining and revenue-generating. This applies to both greenhouses and the Arctic Food Network. If the push to build a commercial greenhouse in Kuujjuaq succeeds, it will be a source of jobs as well as fresh, local produce that can be sold to other Arctic communities. With AFN, Lateral Office hopes to enable a functioning export economy for country food, hence the inclusion of facilities for smoking meat, likely to fit Southern tastes. In addition, excess country food harvested through the AFN can be marketed to urban Inuit, who often lack reliable access to country foods (Pottle, 2013). These examples demonstrate that strong and functional food systems infrastructure in the Arctic should be seen as essential to a national right to food strategy that prioritizes poverty reduction.

Acknowledgements

It is necessary to acknowledge the many wonderful people that the Arctic security task force met in its research trip to Québec City and Ottawa. Among them, Barry Pottle, Donat Savoie, Jean-Francois Arteau, and Leanna Ellsworth all contributed substantially to this report’s understanding of food security and public health in the Arctic. In addition, this report would have turned out very differently but for the candid insights of Gérard Duhaime and Ellen Avard, who agreed to do phone interviews with the author. Their passion, knowledge, and experience are woven into the fabric of this chapter. Thank you also to our professors, Nadine Fabbi and Joël Plouffe, as well as the governments of Québec and Ottawa for sponsoring our trip. Lastly, thank you to Barry Pottle and Henry Kudluk for the use of your images in this policy report.

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Urban Inuit: An Issue of Human Rights Deprivation

By Hannah Dolph

Abstract

Forced Migration is not a foreign concept within the Arctic region. Relocation of Inuit communities in the 1950s and 1960s led to multigenerational trauma resulting from cultural and societal disconnect. Government-executed permanent resettlement has contributed to overcrowding in inadequate housing and a population of Inuit “hidden homeless”. Subsequently, this emplacement has rendered Canadian Inuit Internally Displaced Peoples (IDP) in their territories. In addition, emplacement has caused some to search for economic prosperity, refuge, or education in urban centers, often resulting in a compounded lack of opportunity for upward mobility. This paper argues that as multiple international bodies of law recognize that Inuit are deprived of basic human rights, the Canadian government must act.

Introduction

It is not only the environment that sculpts the Arctic region as tundra of transformation; socio-economic challenges also contribute to these changes. Inuit continue to assert their rights to postcolonial control over themselves through personal development, community empowerment and political mobilization. In exchange for relinquishing their Aboriginal ties to land and resources, Inuit received reparation payments, reestablished and outlined their rights, and established their own territory and functioning self-government beginning with the negotiation and signing of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA). Concurrent with this political mobilization is the growing housing crisis. Homelessness is a lingering result of social upheaval from forced emplacement.

Paternalism has caused homelessness, a concept that depicts being without a place of permanence, automatically connoting an individual inability to construct a consistent life and where day-to-day activities are a constant struggle. In the Arctic region this phenomenon is referred to as “hidden homelessness”. This vulnerable population is a direct result of inadequate housing and lack of infrastructure. Due to weather extremes and insufficient housing, Inuit are often forced into overcrowded houses (National Aboriginal Health Organization, 2008). Rapidly growing populations along with decreasing housing availability leaves Inuit leaders and government officials struggling to combat this ever-alarming situation (Knotsch & Kinnon, 2011). When left without upward mobility in their homeland, Inuit are forced to migrate into urban centers. In light of increasing homelessness, it is crucial that policies and dialogues on the international, federal, territorial, provincial, and community levels acknowledge Inuit homelessness as it hampers community capacity to be resilient. Hence, it is important to frame homelessness as a human rights issue.

In the Canadian Arctic, forced migration has been interwoven into the history of indigenous populations. Oral trajectories of Inuit identity and culture now encompass the colonialism experienced in the past half-century. After World War II, the installation of an American military base in the Arctic generated a scramble for the Canadian government to assert itself for fear of lost sovereignty in the north. Government-forced settlement and installment of a welfare system resulted in a direct manifestation of dependency that left many Inuit dislocated from culture and tradition. Inuit way of life was compounded,
contributing to negative impacts on self-reliance and well-being. Today, Inuit socio-economic duress from resettlement continues by way of inadequate housing, food security, insufficient job opportunities, and deficient means of education. Impacts of colonialism prevail and leave Inuit communities unable to fix these problems.

Given the definition from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), homeless Inuit are classified as Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs). Using this interpretation, I argue that Canada needs to address its human rights issues of homelessness in the Arctic. This essay aims to illustrate the depth of homelessness and its negative effects on Northern communities. Then, this paper will discuss forced migration and its cyclical effect along with homelessness. Finally, I will argue why Canada must take initiative to alleviate these socio-economic issues.

Hidden Homelessness

It is crucial that policies and dialogues on the international, federal, territorial, provincial, and community levels acknowledge Inuit homelessness as it hampers community capacity to be resilient and challenges assurance of human rights protection. Determinants and consequences of homelessness are often difficult to distinguish because of their cyclical nature. Therefore, it is important to view the interdependence between the impacts of hidden homelessness and factors that make it forced migration.

Health

From Cathleen Knotsch and Dianne Kinnon’s report addressing the Inuit housing crisis, many health experts maintain that inadequate housing can be an associated cause of health problems. Significant evidence demonstrates the linkages between overcrowding and reduced ventilation in Inuit housing with high rates of respiratory tract infections (pneumonia or bronchiolitis) and hospitalizations of Inuit infants and children (Banerji et al., 2001, & 2009; Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 2005; Karron, singleton, & Bulkow, 1999; Koch et al., 2003; Kovesi et al., 2006, 2007, & 2009). Studies show that indoor carbon dioxide from cigarettes and the high rates of permanent chronic lung disease among Inuit infants and young children are correlated (Knotsch & Kinnon, 2011; Kovesi et al., 2007).

The community of Kinngait, Nunavut, is one of the most alarming case studies of hidden homelessness and its impact on human health. Tester, the report preparer for Iglutaq, states that approximately forty-seven percent of the homes in Kinngait are overcrowded (Tester, 2006). Respondents of the survey answered that inadequate housing design, age of dwelling and overcrowding as significant reasons why they needed a different or better home. Respondents indicated that overcrowding was a contributing factor to physical ailments including: colds, coughs, flu, insomnia, and stress. Five of the ninety-one people interviewed reported having tuberculosis (TB) (Tester, 2006). However, human health impacts are not the only outcome of homelessness.

Poverty as a Response of Multigenerational Trauma

Homelessness is both a cause and symptom of overcrowding; this is a self-perpetuating social issue that needs to be addressed by building regional capacity. Under social and cultural duress, colonialism continues. After colonialism, housing in Arctic Canada became subsidized, yet today housing remains insufficient and lacking. Overcrowding exacerbates social issues, thus forming a cyclical system. On August 2009, an article was published in The Globe and Mail depicting two boys sleeping on the streets of Iqaluit, Nunavut (Paperny & Minogue, 2009). This article exemplifies the effects of the housing crisis on Inuit youth. Caroline Anawak commented:

“These young kids, you see them walking around at midnight, you see them breaking into cars, you see them stealing food. ... All of that is symptomatic of a great number of people who’ve been left behind in that ugly grinding reality of poverty, of disconnection from services, of family dysfunction at home and nowhere to go and ‘Who cares where I am?’”

This article depicts the inherited trauma that Inuit youth face since colonization by the Canadian government. On the one hand they confront a bleak future with hardly any prospects of upward economic mobility, due to lack of education and employment opportunities. On the other, they must juggle the conflicting cultures and traditions, and often become stuck in a
standstill of historical multigenerational trauma and abuse. In fact, a report prepared for the Working Group for a Nunavut Suicide Prevention Strategy (2007) identified cultural dislocation as the primary cause of the exceedingly high suicide rates in Nunavut (Haghebaert, 2007). Hidden homelessness intensifies family and communities struggles that are a result of multigenerational trauma. Overcrowding is both a cause and symptomatic of social dislocation.

The Canadian government is aware of the human rights atrocities occurring in the Arctic. In issuing apologies for Inuit resettlement and dog slaughter, the Canadian government acknowledges the social duress forced migration had on Inuit communities (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada [AANDC], 2010.) Furthermore, Stephen Harper, P.M., commented on the controversial photos of Nunavut’s homeless that had some people acknowledging the crisis and some people speculating the stigma around it. “As you go to more northern and isolated communities, we know historically and presently these kinds of problems are more acute.” (CBC News, 2009). Canada is a welfare state, and as such has the responsibility to take preventative and curative action.

Inuit are forced to migrate into urban centers of the south because of the dire situation in Northern communities. In officially labeling hidden homelessness “forced migration”, the government of Canada is required to act against overcrowding and homelessness within its borders. As an enforcer of the UDHR, the UNHCR brings notoriety to human rights violations. Within Inuit communities, the right to an adequate living standard as provided through necessary housing is not being respected (UDHR, art. 25(1). This right, outlined in the UDHR, implies that the government plays a role in providing adequate shelter to its citizens. Whether that is in the form of increasing economic opportunity, or providing means of protection against natural disasters. Governments are obliged to make housing accessible.

**Forced Urban Migration**

The UN Report on Internal Displacement defines internally displaced people as groups of individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of origin to avoid the effects of human rights violations and who have not crossed internationally recognized state borders. This forced migration of IDPs to the south calls for recognition by the government. Inuit population in urban centers has grown. “Most Inuit live in Inuit Nunavat, a growing percentage lives in other parts of Canada, and in particular, southern urban centres.” The urban centers with the highest population of Inuit are Ottawa, Gatineau, and Yellowknife as of 2006 (Statistics Canada, 2006). More Inuit will head south if social conditions in the North do not improve, predicts Kishigami (George, 2009).

In Kishigami’s paper, “Homeless Inuit in Montreal”, he depicts the struggles of urban living for the homeless Inuit. City life is disillusioning because in seeking some forms of success, urban Inuit often experience another form of social and cultural disconnect. Cities are physically unrecognizable- there can be almost no connection made with the land. Social customs are completely different. In addition to these severed ties of tradition, there is no longer a strong support system in place (Kishigami, 2008). Family relations are commonly weakened when there is migration from the Arctic community (Kishigami, 2008).

When Inuit migrate from a remote community to a southern city, the culture shock can be overwhelming – from the pace of life, to service bureaucracies, and language barriers. Newcomers to urban centres are often unaware of or unable to access the resources available to them, such as childcare, healthcare, provincial health insurance, and housing (National Aboriginal Health Organization, 2012)

Often times, Inuit flee Northern communities only to find a continuation of socioeconomic and cultural insolvency.

Homelessness persists in urban centers. “Inuit represent 10 percent of the aboriginal population in Montreal, but they count for 45 percent of homeless aboriginal people in the city” (Savoie, 2012). Urban Inuit homes are often overcrowded. Unemployment and drug abuse add to these stresses (National Inuit Health Organization, 2008). Racism and discrimination have also contribute to Aboriginal homelessness, and research in Winnipeg and Thompson, for example, statistically demonstrates discrimination against Aboriginal people in the housing rental market (Corrado Research and Evaluation Associates Inc., 2003). This homelessness within urban centers needs to be
recognized as a result of forced migration.

**Urgency of Action**

Without effective action against hidden homelessness, Canada could face many consequences. Credibility as a world power player would be threatened under scrutiny of the international humanitarian community. Economic prosperity is disadvantaged because lack of community resilience and government dependency is rampant in Inuit communities. Furthermore, as the Canadian government gains Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, scrutiny from the humanitarian, and private sector will focus on the contradiction between resource development for the people of the Arctic region and the human capital development that is nonexistent and leaves Inuit in the hidden homeless bracket or forced to migrate to urban centers. It is challenging to bolster economic prosperity, when basic human rights remain unmet.

Paternalism in the Arctic has caused human rights violations and vulnerable populations of IDPs to suffer. It is interesting to note that while the UNHCR was being implemented on December 14, 1950 to help support and protect the rights of those individuals who were displaced during World War II, Canada was using displacement as a tool to establish sovereignty in the Arctic. Currently, thousands of displaced Iraqi and Iranian refugees will be relocated from Turkey to Canada. So far, about 12,000 Iraqi refugees have been resettled in Canada, according to Citizenship and Immigration Canada. In all, Canada will accept about 14,500 refugees next year through cooperation with the UNHCR (Press, 2013). Not to discredit the recognition of these displaced individuals, but in using this example of displacement acknowledgment, we see that Canada has an obligation to also help protect IDPs in its region. Already the UN has conveyed concern about “Canada’s lack of progress on homelessness and poverty that it asked the Canadian government to report annually, instead of every four years” (Laird, 2007). In framing hidden homelessness as “forced migration”, Canadian government action is crucial.

Additionally, the hidden homeless and forced migration dependency is costly. One study found that in 2001, the annual public cost of homelessness was estimated to be $30,000 to $40,000 per person annually (Eberle, Margaret et al. 2001). Federal action to combat homelessness is predominantly emergency response, lacking an effective national plan that would provide for more cost effective alternatives such as supportive and transitional housing ($13,000-$15,000) and affordable housing for single families ($5,000-$8,000) in comparison to institutional responses such as hospitals, detentions, and prisons ($66,000-$22,000) (National Homelessness Initiative, 2006; Focus Consulting, 2005). Homelessness also has a significant economic impact on urban centers that provide a network of different services that include, shelters, food and clothing banks, and mental health and substance abuse treatment centers (Homelessness Partnering Secretariat; Government of Canada, 2008). Hidden homeless characterize many community food program (CFP) users (Ford & Lardeau & Vanderbilt, 2012). Government initiatives to help homeless Canadians are costly, preventative measures are investments for the future.

**Regional Initiatives Addressing Crisis**

In this section, we will focus on regional initiatives from Nunavik and Nunavut that address housing and homeless issues directly. In doing so, we are able to bridge gaps in Canadian government initiatives. This does not represent that these regional development plans are “models” to follow for the Canadian government, but there are aspects of each that can be pulled to further efficient and effective combat strategies coming from Canada. Without federal funding and support, these initiatives will fail. In addition, some initiatives are nonexistent because there is a lack of federal help. As forced migration is symptomatic of paternalism in the Arctic, Canada needs to confront the issue of hidden homelessness as a partner to Inuit regional and municipal governments of the Arctic.

**Nunavut**

In 2000, the Nunavut Housing Corporation was established to create, administer, and coordinate housing programs, to render the Government of Nunavut (GN) capable of providing availability to affordable housing options to individuals and families. Human capital development in regards to housing is the first goal of this corporation (Nunavut Housing

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1 Additional research can be done to develop understanding on current regional initiatives responding to housing insufficiencies and the hidden homeless crisis in Inuvialuit and Nunatsiavut.
Corporation). Thirty-two percent of households had sheltered temporary residents over the course of a year in Nunavut. Without a doubt, these hidden homeless Nunavummiut contribute significantly to the overcrowding problem that taunts the region (Igluliuqatigiilauqta, October, 2012).

In order to curb the social distresses caused by overcrowding and homelessness, the Igluliuqatigiilauqta report suggests that more houses be built. A long-term comprehensive strategy is required to address homelessness and the lack of housing. The framework for the GN long-term strategy to fight homelessness and lack of housing is as follows:

1) increase Nunavut’s housing stock;
2) improve collaboration within government and with external stakeholders;
3) identify gaps in Nunavut’s housing continuum; and
4) instill self-reliance to reduce dependence on government (Igluliuqatigiilauqta, October 2012).

The comprehensive and collaborative approach that the Nunavut Housing Corporation proposes will provide the government with a guide to address the housing crisis.

To increase Nunavut housing stock, it is essential that financial investment be contributed through partnership with the federal government, Inuit partners, other governments, NGOs and the private sector. In order to establish a realistic response to the housing crisis, there is urgency for understanding demands of Nunavummiut. The report proposes this be done through interdepartmental collaboration within the government to find solutions, along with improved service delivery and reallocation of existing resources where most needed. This collaboration can be furthered with dialogue among Inuit organizations and NGOs that convey information received from the grassroot level.

The “housing continuum” this report is referring to is a range and diversity of housing options. Some housing situations are more conducive to particular income levels. In increasing the variety of housing options available, it is easier to transition with differentiation of income. In Nunavut, there are gaps in the continuum. “The continuum is incomplete, resulting in public housing acting as a catch-all: those whose income would support a move up from public housing are stuck for a lack of affordable options, and those with specific needs are offered few services and little support that would enable them to lead independent, dignified lives” (Igluliuqatigiilauqta, October, 2012). In creating an imagined continuum without gaps, there is further guidance for development within communities. The objective of instilling self-reliance is to reduce reliance on heavily subsidized houses. Economic independence, market choice, and mobility must be goals of the Action Plan (Igluliuqatigiilauqta, October 2012).

Nunavik

By attempting to meet the basic needs of Inuit vulnerable to homelessness, one of Makivik’s most important objective is to prevent homelessness altogether. In providing adequate housing for Inuit men, women, and children, adequate income and integration efforts, and provision of sufficient support services, Makivik helps Inuit adjusting to urban life. Makivik attempts to establish social and cultural networks, promotes healthy lifestyles, and addresses the availability of country food and services for the children within urban settings. These initiatives advocate for a complete and rounded approach against poverty in Nunavik.

To continue the strategy and action plan on Inuit homelessness, Makivik is attempting to further protection of Inuit men, women, and children in Montreal by working with Inuit organizations and groups that help provide social services in the urban center. A partnership agreement was signed on October 4, 2012 between the Makivik Corporation president, Jobie Tukkiapik, and Joey Saganash, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Projets Autochtones Québec (PAQ). This agreement supports the installment and funding of Projets Autochtones Québec, a shelter for Aboriginals in Montreal (Makivik Corporation, 2012).

Plan Nunavik set housing and the high cost of living as one of the main issues to be addressed by Québec within five years. Nunavimmut are entitled to the same quality of life and level of services as other Quebeckers. In building off of plan Nunavik, Parnasimautik is an opportunity for all Nunavimmiut to examine every facet of their lives and propose a sustainable model of development acceptable to everyone (Parnasimautik, 2013). This is a way to bridge the gap of consultation that was overarching in both Plan Nord and Plan Nunavik. “The consultations will give elected representatives,
local organizations and residents an opportunity to discuss the challenges of development” (Parnasimautik, 2012).

Plan Nord pressed for at least 500 new housing units to be built over a period of five years in Nunavik (2011-2016), in addition to 340 dwelling units covered by a tripartite agreement. Furthermore, talks are under way with the federal government and the Inuit partners to build 500 additional housing units (Plan Nord, 2012). Plan Nunavik was in strong opposition to this plan because it lacked consultation with the region’s peoples. Furthermore, skepticism of Plan Nord’s housing development program grew through the absence of money and resource delegation. Communities could not supply the municipal services, such as trucked water delivery; this remained unacknowledged in the development program (Nunatsiaq News, 2012).

Overall, in analyzing the regional plans to combat the issues of overcrowding and Inuit “hidden homelessness” the solution would seem easy—build more houses. Regional initiatives lack the ability to bolster community capacity. The Canadian government must withdraw its paternalist role in the Arctic. The overarching goal needs to be the creation of a housing solution that is independent of government subsidy as well as respecting human rights of Inuit in both the North and the South. The Canadian government needs to take a proactive leap in acknowledging hidden homelessness IDPs as a high priority. Homelessness in and of itself is forced migration calling for international recognition.

**Policy Options:**

**Prevention**

- Recognize hidden homelessness as a human rights issue that must be addressed
- Acknowledge housing sources as multifaceted as they can be used for alternative means to socioeconomic problems.
- Research needs to be conducted to study micro migration and Inuit transience populations. This knowledge gap serves as an opportunity for better understanding vulnerable populations of homelessness and consequences and determinants of it.

**Hidden Homeless of Arctic Region**

- Long-term fund and reallocation of resources toward different housing alternatives; these investments will provide economic prosperity in the form of a competitive housing market, and broad continuum housing that entices adaption to new more conducive life-styles. Providing self-sustainability practices, as ownership and renting will be more suited to diverse income levels.
- Inuit consulting needs to be integrated into policies and initiatives that push for housing development. Unlike Plan Nord, this will equate factors like local municipality needs that are crucial to development planning. With consultation to define what overcrowded populations would really like to see, respect for development plans and housing construction will be subsequent. This could be modeled after Quebec’s Housing Corporation philosophy, “our land, our village, our pride.”
  2. Integration of traditional beliefs
  3. Implementing consultation mechanism by way of social media or within a special Internet forum that advances accessibility to those who are transient.

**Urban Inuit Forced Migration**

- Establish a system of consultation and integration to better understand housing management and resources available to Inuit who are forced to migrate to urban centers
- Create similar Inuit IDP integration process as outlined by the Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s Government Assisted Refugee Program
- Assist in resettlement, employment, accommodations such as food and shelter. Consultation and mentorship programs modeled off of Makivik Corporation partnerships like PAQ.

**Conclusion:**

The issue of homelessness has been poorly acknowledged and is a relatively new phenomenon in the Arctic. As a result, little literature is in circulation and most of it ranges from the late 1990s to the early 2000s. More information needs to be gathered on Inuit homeless counts, their current living situation, and strategies to combat this problem. Even with the absence of recent or thorough information, it is obvious that forced migration is becoming an important part of Inuit trajectories. Through government-enforced settlement and the establishment of a welfare state, dependency...
became a norm that dislocated Inuit from culture and tradition. Installing government housing, schooling, and health care compounded Inuit way of life. The intensifying housing crisis has created a population of hidden homeless. Overcrowding adds stresses of social and cultural disparity that leads to Inuit IDPs, forced to migrate into urban centers of southern Canada.

In framing hidden homelessness and urban Inuit as forced migration, we claim that humanitarian recognition demands Canadian government action. The costs of emergency response and economic burden on urban centers, human right violation of inadequate housing, as well as the gaps in knowledge about these homeless populations, indicate much needed government intervention. Homelessness is both a symptom and cause of social and cultural dislocation, as a form of forced migration itself, is has a strong role in dictating migration decisions. In framing both the urban Inuit and hidden homeless populations in the light of forced migration, there is an attached urgency in fixing the housing crisis. Policy options provided in this report are an attempt toward a holistic approach in fighting overall poverty in Arctic Canada. Looking at the housing issue as a cause of forced migration, we develop a better understanding of the dire situation in Inuit communities.

Hannah Dolph is a second-year junior, double-majoring in International Studies and Law, Societies, and Justice focusing on human rights. With one year left at the University of Washington, Hannah hopes to study abroad, gaining enlightenment through field research and travel experience. After graduation, she aspires to gain a degree in human rights law.
Education in the Canadian Arctic: the Nunavut Sivuniksavut Program as an Inuit-Centered Model

By Charlotte Guard

It is my belief that we need to re-frame this discussion – and view it not as an achievement gap but as an “education deficit” worthy of a national stimulus plan. Mary Simon, Former ITK president.

Abstract

Today, education in the Arctic is at a turning point. After the four regional land claims were settled in 2005 education became the top priority for the Canadian Inuit. Inuit education was damaged as a result of relocation and regional schools and has yet to recover; approximately 75 percent of students do not graduate from high school compared to 75 percent of non-aboriginal Canadians that do. Additionally, those that do wish to pursue post-secondary education find that they do not have the adequate tools for southern universities and less than 5 percent have obtained degrees. The Inuit are a very young population with a median age of 22 and are finding themselves with few opportunities, leading to a rise in illness, crime and poverty. However, there have been strides in reframing the education deficit to examine the underlying problems with Inuit education and to solve not only unemployment, but also to create resilient communities. This is seen most notably in the model of the Nunavut Sivuniksavut (NS), where students learn about their heritage, culture and the Arctic in a supportive and encouraging environment. The school has seen immensely positive results, around 85 percent of students are graduating and a similar number of students are gainfully employed post-program. In order to replicate such positive development NS could be utilized as a successful model for the three other Inuit regions.

Introduction

The deficit in Inuit education is often defined in terms of graduation rates, test scores and university attendance. However, these statistics serve neither to fully address the ill-fitting, colonial legacy of education, nor to offer solutions for the Inuit. The Inuit have reached a turning point in the very core of how education is structured. This trend beyond test scores is evident in the “National Strategy on Inuit Education” released in 2011, which identifies both the challenges and opportunities towards improving education for the Inuit youth. When we look at the conversation surrounding Inuit education it is vital to look at the capacity of a very young population moving through the education system to positively impact their communities. The prevailing education model, developed during colonialism, in the 1950s and ’60s “is founded on a paternalistic ethos with little challenge and incentive to learn” (Salokangas, 2011, p. 267) and has clearly not been effective for Inuit students. Sub-standard living conditions such as home overcrowding and prevalence of illness are contributors to low levels of graduation, which compound ineffectual school models and severely limit the capacity for success (Salokangas, 2011, p. 267). As more students fall through the gaps, and are not able to join the skilled workforce this failing system will only perpetuate itself if it is not reformed.

In his article on education, Poelzer (2009), argued that “a persuasive case could be
made that the single most important instrument for achieving the broader policy goal of building a sustainable North is education” (p. 446). Inuit schools are not currently “appropriate to prepare youth to live in their home communities nor in the south and this has left parents confused about the ways they should help their children in regards to education” (Salokangas, 2011, p. 267). Further exacerbating the problem is the fact that for the 25 percent of Inuit who do graduate from high school, there are few post-secondary options. Inuit students have traditionally been unsuccessful in Southern universities due to the high costs associated with post-secondary education, sheer distance, a lack of confidence and inadequate pedagogical preparation. Yet there has been little funding or research funneled into determining what is a functional and useful curriculum for the Inuit, as is especially evident in post-secondary discussions (Simon, 2011). For the Inuit, better education is not simply a question of improving test scores, but creation of a curriculum that is relevant to their unique geography and culture. Mary Simon, former president of the ITK, (2009) suggested that challenges to Inuit education need to be reframed from an “achievement gap” to an “education deficit” in order to have a meaningful conversation about strategies for success. This shift in conversation has already begun, and it is changing the way that education is viewed in the Arctic. In April of 2008, a national summit on education was held by Inuit leaders in Inuvik, NT in order to address the Inuit education deficit and to develop a strategy that would be successful in improving educational standards among the youth. The outcome was the 2011 National Strategy on Inuit Education (NSIE) which highlights the importance of reframing the discussion of Inuit education to include holistic community based practices that will address Inuit tradition, culture, language and history. The initiative is comprehensive and looks at all ages and levels of education from pre-k to post-secondary, as well as incorporation of modern and traditional knowledge into curricula. Moreover, the shift also encompasses Inuit education not only as a way to train students for the job market training but to also become critical thinkers. Salokangas (2011) frames this as matter of security because “if the education problem is defined as an educational security issue, the discursive frame changes from one of prioritizing economic benefits of the nation to enhancing Aboriginal human rights” (p. 265). When the conversation moves past simply training students to find work to include teaching critical thinking skills and confidence-building measures, it creates the potential to develop into a more appropriate, resilient education system.

In the midst of this monumental conversation of education redefinition, this paper will focus on post-secondary Inuit education. While there are very few students who are able to attend college, it is not for lack of employment. There are not nearly enough trained Inuit to fill roles of leadership, education and other sectors in their communities. Absence of relevant material has also been addressed as a barrier to post-secondary curricula. Education should provide the training and knowledge to allow the Inuit to fill these vacant roles in their communities. If Southern universities have not proven successful in encouraging education, what is the alternative for a young Inuk?

One school in Ottawa has emerged as a leading model to fill this gap. Nunavut Sivuniksavut (NS), a nearly two-decade old school, is unconventional in that it is not designed to function like a Southern university, in fact it was not designed to look like any other model; it was founded and responds completely to Inuit necessities. The classes reflect what students find interesting about their own history and culture and the opportunities that they will have to further their education. About 80 to 85 percent of students graduate from NS and a large majority return to their communities and find gainful employment (Gregoire, 2012). This model is incredibly successful when applied in a respectful manner that incorporates Inuit tradition and values. This school presents an established model that could be emphasized as an alternative to failing education programs.  

I. History of Nunavut Sivuniksavut

In 1982, The Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) replaced Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) to represent Nunavut in the land claims agreement of what was then the Northwest Territories (Nunavut Sivuniksavut, 2012). The

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1 seventy five percent of students do not graduate from high school compared to seventy five percent of non-Aboriginal Canadians that do graduate and only five percent have university degrees.

2I heavily utilize Morley Hanson and Murray Angus’ paper, “The three rs” as there are limited resources written on post-secondary Inuit education and Nunavut Sivuniksavut.
negotiations spanned almost two decades prior to the signing of the agreement in 1993 and the creation of Nunavut in 1999. During that period the TFN realized that Nunavut would need a population of young people who understood the land claims process and could continue the work, leading to the creation of the land claims training program, Nunavut Sivuniksavut, in 1985 (Hanson and Angus, 2011, p. 32). The program that began in Ottawa with two teachers and ten students has grown to the largest class ever with thirty-seven students in the 2012-2013 academic year (Gregoire, 2012). According to Hanson, in that time the program has evolved immensely:

For the first nine years, there were no “courses” in the conventional sense; rather, the two instructors worked with the students each year in a “popular education” mode to explore an ever-widening array of historical and political materials relating to Inuit history, politics, and land claims. In guiding students through this process and responding to their questions it became clear that what the students were seeking was an understanding of “why things were the way they were” in their communities. They wanted to know “their story” and how things in their world in the north had come to be.” (Hanson & Angus, 2011, p.33)

The history of the Arctic is unique to the Inuit who have survived challenging conditions for time immemorial, yet there had been no curriculum in post-secondary education that teaches students about their own story and that of their ancestors. However, as the program formalized Hanson and Angus realized that this was exactly what would be important if students were to rebuild more healthy communities and instill confidence in an educational structure that had been damaged during forced settlements and regional schools. The program is based on a curriculum that not only explains why Northern communities today are economically, politically and educationally struggling compared to the rest of Canada, it also is designed to gain back the trust in education that was lost during colonization by holistically supporting students.

The school has been in existence for nearly two decades and has undergone significant adjustments to accept more students. The building has changed twice in 1998 and 2011, in order raise student capacity and in 2008 NS graduated its 300th student (Activity Report, 2012, pg. 7). In 1994, the classes were packaged to be more formal and course packets made up of news periodicals, government documents, and academic articles were developed. However, the method was the same: respond to the needs of the students to learn and develop their own history and “capture the central elements of the Inuit story” (Hanson & Angus, 2011, p. 33). By formalizing the program it allowed the school to take on new students and gain the recognition it deserved as a successful alternative model for teaching Inuit students at the post-secondary level. In 2003, a second year program was created to allow students to continue taking classes at NS.

Today the school continues to be immensely successful, with graduation rates hovering between 80 and 85 percent with roughly the same number of students employed post-graduation (Gregoire, 2012). The school already “enjoys universal praise among northerners, and has gained national recognitions for its innovations and success” (Hanson & Angus, 2011, p. 32) but across Canada it is also making waves. Thomas Berger, in his report to Ottawa, concluded that “for me, the spirit of Nunavut – and its future – is exemplified by the students and graduates of the Nunavut Sivuniksavut program” (Activity Report, 2012). The Commerce Report to Canada (2012) states that the “(NS) program – the only one of its kind offered in the territories – has proven to be a highly successful stepping stone for Inuit youth who have graduated from high school but have yet to enter post-secondary education” (p. 14). However, even as the program gains recognition it still remains largely unstudied and underutilized among educators in the South. This should be remedied in order to recreate the program’s success.

What makes the school so successful? Can this model be applied effectively in the other territories of Canada, and if so, how? This paper argues that the Nunavut Sivuniksavut training school offers an exemplary model of education because it is based in Inuit-centered education, is relevant to Inuit life and increases pride and confidence in students. NS incorporates students’ own knowledge and experience from living in the Arctic with new and pertinent material, all while providing the support necessary to make the change to life in a large city. The program curriculum and staff not only prepare students
for the job market, but also instill a sense of understanding and pride in Inuit history and culture. With a greater skill set and increased self-confidence, students are qualified to pursue much needed positions in the government or public sector; continue their education and become greater contributors to their communities.

II. An Inuit-Centered Curriculum

Pedagogical Approach

The reason, according to Hanson and Angus, NS coordinators, that the program has been so successful is due to the pedagogical approach that it takes in designing and developing the curriculum. The Post-secondary case studies in Inuit education (2007) report there outlined a number of findings that lead to the program’s success for Inuit communities. One of the findings is that the “program design must be bold, innovative, generous and all-encompassing with a focus on successful student learning rather than on the perpetuation of colonialistic and sometime rigid institutionalized systems” (p. 3).

Not only has NS successfully incorporated and Inuit-based focus into their curriculum, but the program was “founded upon the desire to help the students learn about the world they’re stepping into as young adults (a.k.a Nunavut), and how it came to be, and their own place in it” (Hanson & Angus, 2011, p. 34).

At the start of the program students are shown a curved line on a blank page and asked what it means to them. Initially, it signifies very little but at the end of the 8-month program they will be able to show that the line chronicles their history, beginning with the first interaction with the quallanut, and the start of cultural degradation. On the Y-axis is “Inuit power, control autonomy and independence” (Angus and Hanson, 2011, p. 35) and it begins receding with this first interaction, reaching a low point at relocation and regional schools in the 1960s. However, in the early 1970s the line takes a turn for the better as the Inuit began to organize more effectively to fight for their rights as a people and a voice in the nation’s conversation. The line represents the Inuit story, and for the students this history is the key to understanding where they came from and understanding their cultural legacy of vibrant political participation. This education model changes Inuit students’ opinions of their communities, their outlook on the world and ultimately increases their confidence in themselves, and what it means to be an Inuk.

Additionally, Post-secondary case studies in Inuit education (2007) highlight the importance of incorporating the voices of the Inuit themselves in curricula because the value of one’s own knowledge of the land, history and culture are immeasurable. Hanson and Angus address student knowledge and recognize the value of incorporating it into their program.

The teaching methodology is also based on a presumption that the students bring with them a wealth of expertise derived from their lived experience in the north; by sharing this knowledge, they are contributing to the overall learning experience of the group. Thus, the learning is not a one-directional process from instructors to students, but rather a collegial one where everyone’s knowledge, experience, and perspective is brought to bear on a given topic. It is through this process that students gain confidence that their views about the world in which they live actually do count (2011).

The nature of a pedagogical approach in improving student’s perceptions of education and themselves has been thoroughly analyzed (Hooks, 2008). When students are included in the process of defining education they take ownership and are motivated to contribute to the process.

Moving Past Colonial History

There has been much written about the devastating effect of regional schools and colonization on the Inuit (McGregor, 2012; McElroy, 2008). While the Inuit were not colonized
in the traditional sense, via settlement (Fabbi, 2007, p. 7), they were forced to change their entire existence of living and in one generation lost much of their language, culture, and traditional skills. Poelzer (2009) addresses this issue and argues that though regional schools cannot be blamed for all loss of culture, they created a deep mistrust in structured education and there has been no functional substitute developed. Yet Inuit culture survived the multitude of invasions and trauma. NS incorporates this history and revives traditional ways of knowing as part of its curriculum. One of the most important themes in the class is Inuit history, from the 1400’s right up to today. The history provides students with a sense of background, heritage and context for their communities in the world. They develop a greater understanding for why it is that their communities are struggling, what importance traditional practices like hunting hold and why their parents and grandparents have deep seeded mistrust in the education system. The students learn about their heritage and see that it applies directly to their communities, even directly to their families. “A[n] obstacle to access[i]bility is lack of relevance. Developing curricula that are relevant to students’ experiences, lives and communities is essential to breaking down education barriers” (Poelzer, 2009, p. 446). Relevancy increases interest at the time of learning so students are more focused and engaged, additionally they can see how it will apply when they return home.

Language as the Corner Stone

The significance of native language for both education and culture is clearly of importance for the Inuit community. In the Canadian Department of Education’s strategy for bilingual education, 2004-2008, a long-term coordinated effort is defined in order to preserve the languages. However, many of the recommendations such as K-12 Inuktitut instruction have not been implemented. While Nunavut has the highest numbers of native usage, at 83 percent (Poelzer, 2009, p. 460) it is not taught formally past the third grade, and written Inuktitut usage is declining. The problem is multi-faceted because as students do not receive training past the third grade they are unable to teach it in schools if they become teachers. In addition, many teachers come from the South and have no knowledge or ability in the language. Poelzer (2009) argues that “[t]o lose a language is to lose the cornerstone of a learning system” (p. 433). It is for this reason that in 1999 NS included Inuktitut language classes into the curriculum (Angus & Hanson, 2011, p. 37).

In addition, they also take into account that “[t]raditional ecological knowledge is vitally important to northern communities, not only in relation to traditional activities on the land, but also to ensure the future health and well-being of inhabitants as they are affected by resource development” (Poelzer, 2009, 461). At NS “classes on drum making, sewing, traditional ay ay ay singing, and throat singing...are taught by Inuit instructors, with the help of Elders who are brought down from Nunavut” (Angus and Hanson, 2012, p. 37). These skills do not fall into the systematic strategy for education as defined by test scores and academic excellence, but they are vital to healthy communities as they prevent cultural degradation.

In depth interviews with incoming students have revealed the depth of insecurity that many youth feel about their identity, both as Inuit and as young individuals in the larger Canadian society. Having to negotiate two cultural worlds at home, they have often found themselves forsaking Inuktitut language and traditional skill development as they follow the school system for its prospect of employment and ’better life’ at the end (Angus and Hanson, 2011, p. 42).

These programs are designed to challenge the
belief that in order to be successful, students must give up, or hide their culture. The lack of confidence that students feel is a product of years of colonial programs that convinced students that their communities were backwards and could not compete in the modern era. Inclusion of traditional songs and Inuktitut not only ensure that students continue the traditions but also instill a sense of pride in where they come from.

**A Structure of Support**

Success for the students is not solely a result of the NS curriculum as their approach also emphasizes relationships with both students and teachers. One of the most significant obstacles to post-secondary education is leaving the community. Without an Arctic university students must travel to the South to attend classes, but the isolation that comes with living in a different environment with little support is often insurmountable. The key to “overcoming these barriers requires cohort-based models, with tutors and explicit strategies for moving from dependent learning to independent learning” (Poelzer, 2009). NS points to inter-student support as a facet of their approach. Once students have these independent learning skills they are theirs to utilize in future ventures. If you were to plot on a map the range of areas where these students had come from it would span hundreds of miles (with no road access) and among them are a range of varied communities, linguistic dialects and traditions. However, they share the experience of being far away from home and their dependence on one another is crucial to their success in the program. The cohort method has long been cited for success (Montiel 2012, Nimer, M., 2009, Murray-Harvey et al., 2000) and it is a significant contributing factor for student success. The students often share apartments, help each other with homework and provide support when one feels lonely or isolated. Recognizing the importance of the cohort as the school has grown over the past few years, Hanson split the larger group in half randomly to keep student-to-student interaction tight (Gregoire, 2012).

In addition to peer support the staff at the school are critical to the success of the program. Staff play a multitude of roles in the students’ lives: first and foremost as instructors, but also as counselors, mentors, and guides, and supporters on the full range of student needs, be they personal, social, or academic. Staff are available 24/7 to assist students, as they might need (Hanson & Angus, 2011, p.42).

Some of the staff are former students, and are well versed in the challenges associated with living away from home and completing the rigorous school schedule, and all are knowledgeable about Inuit culture and history. The staff and students address the certain challenges associated with not only living away from home but also an absence of scholastic tools. “The things that one requires to succeed at University (strong research and time-management skills, good study habits, the ability to participate in seminars) are often completely alien to these students” (Poelzer, 2009, p.447). Independent study habits are not inherent but are learned skills that students coming from Southern homes may for granted; at NS the staff and cohort are there to provide the instruction and support necessary to prevent students from becoming overwhelmed.

**Living in a City**

Poelzer argues that “students, especially those from remote Aboriginal communities, are unwilling to leave family and community to travel hundreds, even thousands of kilometers to attend university courses for northern students” (2009). Travel away from communities and the homesickness that accompanies it is thought to be a significant factor for students who do not succeed in other post-secondary models. Poelzer (2009) argues that this is a case for bringing education closer to the Arctic to increase opportunities to participate. However, at NS the location is part of what they believe to be a primary reason for their success. Away-from-home students develop the practical skills of cooking for themselves and learning to navigate a city, and they also mature in other ways. Their life experience in the South gives them a newfound confidence in their personal ability to pursue their educational and career goals as independent young adults. The South has become demystified and they see they have ‘measured up’ and are as capable as anyone else in living in that environment. (Angus & Hanson, 2011, p.44).

The school does more than increase students’ marketable skills and access to available jobs;
it increases students’ confidence in themselves, which has immeasurable value. In the 2011-2012 Nunavut Sivuniksavut Annual Activity Report students are quoted in saying “I am proud to be Inuk. I love it. I am proud my ancestors are my ancestors and our history is our history” (PA, 2012) and “I am not ashamed or shy to be called Inuk anymore. I am proud and happy” (PP, 2012). These statements demonstrate the school’s ability to delve into perception problems among the Inuit youth. Positive self-image is a demonstrable result of student’s time spent at NS.

III: Outcome
Job Opportunities

The question of what Inuit students will do in their communities after they graduate often closely follows the discussion of post-secondary education. In Berger’s report to Indian Affairs (2006) Nunavut unemployment is very high, ranging from thirty to seventy percent, and increasing in more remote communities, yet there are also severe labor shortages (Poelzer, 2009, p. 448). Many businesses and public sector jobs face worker shortages and the high costs associated with bringing people up from the South or elsewhere. There are clearly jobs for the Inuit, but they do not have the skills to take them (Martin, 2011, p. 4). As part of the Nunavut land claims, employment in public service was to be representative of the Inuit population. In 2009, eighty five percent of the population was Inuit but only forty five percent of those employed were Inuit (Poelzer, 2009, p. 449). There are jobs available, and students of NS have had very little trouble finding them, however, for much of the Inuit population they have not been through a training or university program that qualifies them to find a job in the government or private sector.

The barrier to this is education, more specifically, relevant education. Students have not been able to see the connection between graduating from high school and financial security in their future. The Conference Board of Canada, Centre for the North is a non-profit think-tank based out of Ottawa, which has produced reports on a wide variety of subjects including education and job employment. They have found that “employment in a community proved to be an important factor that encourages educational attainment. The prospect of good jobs encourages education, and a more educated labor force attracts additional and better jobs” (2012, p. i). The program is cyclical in nature as nearly 80 percent of NS students work in Nunavut and 60 percent choose to reside in their home communities (Gregoire, 2012). As more students see that there are jobs to be had, they will attain higher levels of education, increasing the likelihood of more healthy communities. Jobs in the public sector are crucial to community health because they avoid the boom-bust nature of resource extraction employment and give the Inuit more influence on the community agenda.

The NS school has a specific focus on training students to enter this particular area of service and a high percentage of students that complete the NS program will go on to be employed by the Nunavut Government. The Government regularly hires students that have graduated from NS because of the students’ “personal enthusiasm, confidence, maturity and overall ‘worldliness’ in comparison with their peers” (Angus & Hanson, 2011, p. 42). NS provides an essential link between educational outcomes and economic success. “Employment in a community proved to be an important factor that encourages educational attainment. The prospect of good jobs encourages education, and a more educated labor force attracts additional and better jobs” (Centre for the North, 2012, p. ii). Job attainment is the key to raising the socio-economic status for individuals, their families and communities.

Many graduates of NS express an interest in continuing their education through the second year program or alternative programs. Some students continue their education at training programs like the Nunavut Teaching Education Project (NTEP), which certifies Inuit to become school teachers. The reintegration of Inuit students into their communities continues the cycle and allows them to apply what they have learned in constructive ways in their community. A survey in 2009 interviewed 143 students from NS and showed that after the program, finding a job was not an area where students generally struggled. Of the 143 who were surveyed, seventy three percent were employed, eleven percent were in school or training, and eight percent were not gainfully employed. The number of students that have been able to find gainful employment serves as evidence of both the necessity for trained Inuit, as well as the success of NS in filling those positions. The jobs that students did when they returned varied
but a large number of respondents, thirty nine percent, worked for the Government of Nunavut. Additionally, fifteen percent worked for Inuit organizations and thirteen percent for the federal government. The remaining thirty three percent worked for non-profit organizations, Inuit and non-Inuit businesses. Many students do enroll in further training programs, from the survey forty two percent said that they had attended college, however, most do not go to Southern universities (Gregoire, 2012). The variety in job attainment shows graduates from NS are not only equipped to work for the Government of Nunavut, as the school was initially designed, but have the skills to find work in other sectors.

Confidence and Critical Thinking

The opportunities for the Inuit to find employment are significant and there is clearly a need on both the sides of employers and workers for greater access to education. However, NS does more than just prepare students for the job market; it breeds confidence that is vital to the health of communities. "Students' motives are no longer directly related to employment, but rather they are looking to further their education" (Hanson, 2003, p.80). Much of the challenges in Inuit identity result from colonization and globalization because "it pulled young people away from their families, communities and cultural practices, rendering many of the students dysfunctional within the traditional lifestyle, and led to a creation of a 'lost generation' of people who were not skilled in the ways of either world" (Hanson, 2003 p. 30). The Inuit youth want to connect to their elders and communities, essentially remaining Inuit, but also to be a part of the 'modern' world, leaving them in a middle ground where they cannot fully relate to either side. Hanson (2003) argues that this contributes to a clash of identity and lack of confidence in, and discomfort with, themselves and their culture.3 However, at NS, Hanson (2003) has observed a positive shift in perception among the students over the 8-month period. Many enter the program feeling ashamed both that they cannot speak Inuktitut fluently or have not learned to hunt, while at the same time embarrassed by the negative views of the Inuit with gambling, drug and alcohol, or other societal problems. Throughout the program a combination of assignment based classes as well as song and dance, contributes to powerful feelings of acceptance and placement (Hanson, 2003). The commerce report (2012) noted that "programs aimed at Aboriginal peoples fail because one critical factor is missing; the programming that gives participants a sense of empowerment, self-worth and pride in themselves and their histories" making programs like NS "an essential step" before the labor market (p. 14). This confidence in themselves and their culture is invaluable. It does contribute to finding a job or continuing education but it is also essential for a vibrant, resilient community.

IV. The Limits to NS

NS is a model that produces successful, confident students, and for that reason alone it is important to examine the underlying contributors of success. Yet, the program has its limits. Much of the NS foundation is based directly or indirectly on cohort and staff support, requiring that the school is kept small. At NS, where they receive more applicants than they can accept, they have to balance a desire for taking on more students and keeping the structure intimate. Additionally, NS functions as a non-profit (Hanson, 2003, p. 77) so is largely exempt from government activity, which allows it a certain degree of flexibility. This has been challenging in a region like Nunavik where the Kativik School Board is a government agency, and therefore has less room to maneuver. NS is not the end all to the question of Inuit education. Issues of access are also apparent, because even as NS provides scholarships and living stipends there are still many that that are not in a position to, or do not want to leave their communities (Rodon, personal communication, 2013). In order to reach all students it is imperative that there be more options for the Inuit, however, the methods that NS uses to achieve success continue to be highly relevant.

V. Policy Options

- A trust or endowment from Nunavut government should be created to expand capacity of NS.
- Other regions of Canada should consider looking at NS as a model of education for the Inuit, for example Nunavik could create an

3 Hanson (2003) outlines his in-depth study of NS student to determine how perceptions changed through attendance at NS. He also provides an excellent overview of the importance of social identity and acculturation, particularly for young people.
NS-like school in Montreal or Quebec City.

- Values of confidence and critical thinking should be included in discussions of new models of education, and funding should be directed accordingly. Constructive higher education must be a priority of the Canadian government.

VI. Conclusion

Post-secondary options for Inuit students are incredibly limited. If they are able to graduate from high school and gain admittance to a university in the south they face extreme challenges. Many students find that they do not have the same set of study skills that other Southern students have acquired over years of academic training, and cannot compete at the same level. Nunavut Sivuniksavut accounts for the challenges associated with post-secondary education by focusing on an Inuit-centered model, one that incorporates the history as well as skills that will be necessary for job placement. Though NS may have begun as a way to involve young people in the government, it is no longer the sole motive. Students gain confidence and skills that they are then able to in translate into jobs and thriving communities. NS is not the only solution to solving educational issues in the North; there needs to be greater access and funding for other models to develop, but it demonstrates important strategies for success. First and foremost, through its curriculum NS builds confidence and encourages critical thinking. These tools are invaluable to the young because they can be utilized throughout their lives in addition to an education that increases the likelihood of finding employment. The success of the NS model must be taken into account in discussions of education because its achievements in increasing positive self-perception among Inuit students directly increase the resilience of communities.

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Part Three: Engaging the Globe
The Arctic Council and non-Arctic interest: managing perceptions and influence in a changing region

By Michael Brown

Abstract
This paper will discuss the Arctic Council and the greater Arctic region as entities undergoing change. However, likely the political and geographic change in the Arctic will be gradual on a political time scale. Considering the concerns in the Arctic about including more non-Arctic players in the Arctic Council, I will examine the Inuit as an example of indigenous influence in the Arctic, the Arctic Council as an institution, and potential changes in the Council. I argue that because of the position of Permanent Participants in the Council, they are in a good position to influence political happenings, including setting the terms under which international actors are admitted to the premier governance forum in the region. Furthermore, any change made to the Council will have to be gradual and limited or the member states will likely not submit to it in the short term. This paper will examine what small changes can be made to the Arctic Council to strengthen it in the short term and what can be done to manage international interests that please both the regional players and international players themselves.

Introduction
The prevailing discourse on the Arctic is that it is a region undergoing changes unprecedented in recorded human history (Koivurova, 2009). The popular media has blown the situation out of proportion by exaggerating tensions between Arctic states and non-Arctic states. The ice is melting, yes, but it is more than simply melting ice, for the Arctic is an inhabited region, so any environmental changes will affect the inhabitants. For the most part, Arctic Council member states are cooperating closely rather than competing, and China’s interest in the region is much more benign than the newspapers would imply (Lasserre, 2013; Young, 2009, Jakobson, 2010). Development will come to the Arctic, that much is agreed upon, but the extent of it and the effect it will have is the real point of debate. Debate amongst stake-holders is focused on human security. The Arctic is an inhabited region, confronted with a multitude of issues ranging from environmental protection to indigenous food security. Currently, the Arctic Council serves as a nexus for discussion about these myriad concerns. The Arctic Council is a nonbinding, somewhat informal institution that has a limited remit for such important issues, yet the information that it produces through its working groups and the recommendations it makes are highly regarded by decision-makers shaping Arctic policy, and it remains as the premier forum on Arctic issues (Young, 2005).

The Arctic Council’s (AC) most unique and, some would argue, important feature is the inclusion of Arctic indigenous groups as Permanent Participants. This membership status ensures indigenous groups have access to the Council’s decision making processes to assure that their interests are considered. For example, Canada’s opposition to the EU’s seal ban lines up with the interests of the Inuit (Huebert, 2013, Koivurova & Graczyk, 2013, p. 9, Byers, 2012, p. 21). As a consensus based organization, the AC tends to shy away from contentious international disputes like military security (Byers, 2012, 16). As transnational and global problems such as: climate change (precipitated by emissions...
from outside of the Arctic), potential oil spills and straddling fishing catches are the most contentious and likely to affect the livelihoods of northerners, a more robust approach to decision making is necessary (Molenaar, 2012). How best to manage non-Arctic states and to mold the Council into a stronger platform for transnational solutions in a way that benefits both the member nation-states and the Permanent Participants? Non-Arctic interests can be defined as the continuing interest in the Arctic as a region for resource exploration and exploitation by actors outside of the region, and their desire for more influence in the Arctic Council. Currently, the Council trends toward postponing membership to the non-Arctic states interested in the region, which may put the Permanent Participants at ease in the sense of keeping international influence out, but is in the long-term counterproductive to interregional cooperation. For a host of reasons, the involvement of non-Arctic states could be a great boon as they can help raise awareness of Arctic issues and contribute expertise and finances. It is entirely possible to include non-Arctic interests in the Council while still respecting the say of indigenous groups (Koivurova & Graczyk, 2013; Rhemann, 2012). The revised criteria for admitting Observers in the Arctic Council from the 2011 Nuuk Ministerial Meeting do a great deal to help clarify the role of non-Arctic states, but more could be done, as will be articulated in the following pages.

**Background: the changing Arctic**

What has become clear over the past decade is that the climate is changing and the ice in the Arctic is melting at a rapid rate, indeed both 2007 and 2012 were record low years for sea ice levels in the summer and the amount of ice more than one year old is almost zero (Fortier, 2013). The melting sea ice has allowed for openings in the Northwest and Northeast Passages in the summer that has led to rampant speculation about changing shipping patterns (Lasserre, 2013). With this thaw has also come the potential exposure of oil reserves underneath the ice. Oran Young (2009) argues that this has led the media to construct an inaccurate picture of the Arctic:

The pundits’ portrayal of recent developments in the Arctic as a ‘land rush,’ and ‘Arctic meltdown,’ a ‘very cold war for energy resources,’ or ‘a perfect storm seeded with political opportunism, national pride, military muscle flexing, high energy prices and the arcane exigencies of international law’ seems frankly unhelpful to an effort to develop thoughtful responses to these questions (p. 9).

Indeed, the oil is still prohibitively difficult to extract, and the opening of the passage has actually made it potentially more dangerous and unpredictable, to the point where no shipping companies are really considering using them extensively (Lasserre, 2013). On a geological time scale, the changes are coming quite rapidly in eye blinks of decades and centuries, but for a political or business time scale, they are quite far off. Furthermore, aside from bickering over a few rocks straddling EEZs, countries in the Arctic are mostly cooperating with few real tensions between them. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the SeaUNCLOS has delineated the majority of the territory in the Arctic with either well-defined boundaries or the mechanism to create such (Bartenstein, 2013). Thus, it is safe to conclude that the AC is not stymied by conflict as the media might encourage people to believe.

Scholars like Carina Keskitalo and Oran Young tend to focus on political rather than physical change. The course of this change follows a path from frontier zone (1800s to the Cold War), to potential theater of warfare (Cold War; 1947-1991), to cooperative frontier zone (present) yet again. The level of cooperation between Arctic states now is a remarkable change from the tense period of the Cold War, when the Arctic was seen as a military platform for the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev’s famous 1987 Murmansk speech helped open up the region to more cooperation (Åtland, 2008). However, Young (2005, p. 9) refers to this new cooperation as a “mosaic,” as it is mostly issue based and not entirely comprehensive. Given the short time period since the end of the Cold War, and the only recent discovery and explanation of transnational problems, this perhaps seems natural. Issues in a changing space tend to creep up piecemeal and get addressed one at a time, rather than in a comprehensive fashion. Furthermore, there is something of a schism in the ranks of the Arctic states, with those coastal states in the Arctic that have extensive territory in the Arctic defined by UNCLOS shying away from more multilateral regulation of the Arctic region. The United States in particular is leery of a stronger Arctic Council or other comprehensive treaty organization, satisfied as they are with what the UNCLOS has provided them, and confident as they are in their
own ability to regulate Arctic affairs in their slice (Locklear, 2013). But each Arctic state has a different strategy and different vision for the Arctic Council. The United States, Russia, Norway, and Canada do not see the need for much change in the Arctic Council to varying degrees. While the United States and Russia are satisfied with the current format, Canada would like to see limited, procedural change to the Council. Norway, on the other hand, values increased international involvement through the mechanism of more Permanent Observers. Denmark, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden all have made recommendations for extensive changes, with Denmark in particular calling for the change from a decision shaping body to a decision making body. Ultimately, each state has a different vision for the Council with few commonalities to bind them (Graczyk, 2012, p. 272-276).

| United States | “The Arctic Council should remain a high-level forum devoted to issues within its current mandate and not be transformed into a formal international organization, particularly one with assessed contributions (U.S. White House, 2009).” However the US is open to the idea of updating current procedural structures to improve future operations. |
| Canada | Would like to see more extensive changes to the Arctic Council than the United States but nonetheless wants to keep the current model. Canada encourages the negotiation of new instruments like the SAR treaty, as well as an increased communication role. |
| Russia | It appears that Russia wants to keep the current balance in the Arctic and views changes to the Council as a change to the current power balance. What’s more, some of its officials have said clearly that they think more actors in the region will lead to more international influence over the region, which it does not want. |
| Norway | Also desires the current format, and offers no specific changes officially. However, it is open to more international observers, and wants to increase their role in the Council. |
| Sweden | Ambivalent to outside actors, and lays out no plans for them in its Arctic strategy. Would like to see the Arctic Council engage in more concrete projects. |
| Finland | Wants to broaden the Council to be a monitor and existing and new treaties like UNCLOS and the SAR treaty. Would like to see a limited admittance of new observers, but what they proposed in their Arctic strategy is not very different from the present situation. |
| Denmark, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland | The Arctic Council “must evolve from a decision-shaping to a decision-making organization” (Denmark, Greenland, Faroe Islands, 2011). Basically Denmark sees great utility in the Council and has outlined specific strategies that would strengthen it and allow it to exert more influence on Arctic states. Also advocates more international involvement, but in a way that caters to the Permanent Participants. |
| Iceland | Actively wants to have Observers present at the working group level, but wants little else besides that officially. |

This mosaic of cooperation at the highest levels rests on top of another change enveloping the Arctic: its identity as a region. The definition of the eight Arctic states had its genesis in the policies made by Mikhail Gorbachev at the end of the Cold War. Trying to de-politicize the region to better fit in with his policies of glasnost and perestroika, he re-focused the discussion on “soft issues” like the environment (Keskitalo, 2007, 194). Thus, the stage was set for further cooperation, and in part due to the initiative of the Finns and the first three Permanent Participants (Inuit Circumpolar Council ICC, Saami Council, and Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North’s RAIPON predecessor) through the Rovaniemi Process leading to the in suggesting the AEPS, the Arctic shifted from a region of conflict to one of cooperation at the end of the Cold War: Keskitalo (2007) sums it up here: “the extent of the ‘Arctic’ has been expanded through time from a ‘High Arctic’ to a five-state Arctic, and finally, the eight-state Arctic of today, the definition of the last entity mainly motivated by Cold War developments” (p. 201). With this expansion has come the profusion of the issues, environmental, indigenous, sovereign, and otherwise that define the region. For now the Arctic is a region defined by environmental issues and indigenous rights as much as a frontier for resource extraction. Key in developing the discourse of cooperation was considering the area as under threat of
damage from global issues like climate change. It provided a convenient banner for countries to rally around, though now the discourse has evolved to questions of governance and region-building in the Arctic rather than the limited specific agreements of the past like the Polar Bear treaty of 1976 (Keskitalo, 2004, 25).

**The Inuit Circumpolar Council**

The Inuit, represented by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, have staked out an impressive level of autonomy (Wilson & Smith, 2011, p.910). The ICC works closely with individual home nations to set the terms under which Inuit land is used, including resource extraction (Wilson and Smith, 2011, p. 911). What’s more, Permanent Participant host governments tend to respect and support them in other areas (with the notable exception of Russia, as seen by their closure of RAIPON (Bennett, 2012)). Canada's financial commitment to their three Permanent Participants and Denmark’s financial support of the Indigenous People’s Secretariat (IPS) is an example of this cooperation (Fenge, 2012).

The Permanent Participants disagree about to what extent increased non-Arctic presence should be permitted in the region, ranging from cautiously welcoming to complete opposition. I choose to focus on the Inuit Circumpolar Council in such detail because they have used their existing position in the Arctic Council to promote their interests in a global context in unprecedented ways. This is an important point to consider as increased non-Arctic international influence in the region is being felt; the Permanent Participants hold a strong position and can certainly engage with powerful interests and come out ahead.

Though technically unified under the auspices of the ICC, the Inuit are divided on how to proceed on the issue of resource development. The ICC's primary concerns within the AC relate to sovereignty and development in the Inuit lands (Wilson & Simon, 2011, p. 912-913). The topic of resource development has resulted in fractious opinions within the Inuit community, which has found difficulty in balancing the local traditions with modern society. Some, like the Greenlandic Inuit, see resource development as a way of garnering economic self-sufficiency and thus more autonomy. A more moderate approach held by others in the community is to review resource extraction on a case by case basis and cautiously develop rather than embrace it wholesale. On the other end, there are also those who view cultural identity and way of life as above any gain in profits (Wilson & Smith, 2011, p. 915-919). As far as their position in the fabric of Arctic governance extends though, it makes much more tactical sense for the Inuit to engage with non-Arctic actors in the Arctic Council than to simply ignore them. Their prominent position in the Arctic Council as a Permanent Participant puts them in a position to affect the decisions of the organization, including under what terms non-Arctic states can be admitted to the Council. For instance, their position allowed them to convince the Canadian government to deny the EU observer status on the Arctic Council due to the EU opposition to the importation of seal products (Huebert, 2013, Byers, 2012, p. 21). While the positive impact of this act is debatable, it appears that they have a strong say in what happens, and thus should use it to further their aims. This way actors like the EU will be admitted to the Council under terms partly shaped by the Inuit and other Permanent Participants. As the Inuit are so established in their own territory, have such a strong position in the Council and cooperate closely with their host countries, they are well positioned, with their strong procedural role and the support of their home government, to deal with non-Arctic interests, like resource extraction and potentially increasing foreign influence, in a way that suits their domestic interests. Accordingly, it would be a waste of their position to refrain from active dialogue with non-Arctic actors.

This dynamic of power-sharing, in which the Inuit have made their rights as indigenous people compatible with their status as citizens of modern democracies, is a hallmark of Inuit diplomacy, and perhaps a further indicator that they can harness change effectively (Simon, 2011). Thierry Rodon and Francis Abele (2007) explain how the Inuit brand of diplomacy is intensely adaptable and pragmatic, which has led them to effectively deal with outsiders throughout their history. Certainly, the Inuit went through the all too common model of colonization at the hands of the Canadian government but, unlike other indigenous groups, have also managed to claw back many of their rights and territory through land-claim treaties (Simon, 2011). This accomplishment plays into Abele and Rodon's (2007) description of Inuit diplomacy as characterized by:
Collective persistence: without at all requiring unanimity, an ability to work co-operatively and in the longer term toward a common goal, despite numerous setbacks and roadblocks. Political realism: strategies taken based on a close appraisal of the balance of power. Adaptability: an ability to readily recognize changed circumstances, however unwelcome these may be, and to react constructively and quickly. Well-developed strategies to avoid win-lose confrontations: a tendency to soften direct criticism by indirect expression, and a reluctance to force an opponent into a corner (p. 48).

Essentially the Inuit have developed diplomatic strategies over time that have lent themselves to a pragmatic approach. The power sharing model of domestic government in the Inuit territories that emerged fits Rodon’s (2007) description well. The Canadian political landscape was fractured at the time, with the “collectivity of francophones” seeming to offer hope for a similar Inuit collective, that the Inuit were exploring the prospects of land claims, and the fact that they were able to engage effectively with the various levels of power in Canada at the time is a testament to their ability to organize and negotiate (Abele & Rodon, 2007, p. 51). They sought and received a power-sharing arrangement compatible with their goals, for the Inuit are realistic and realize an inclusive arrangement will help them much more in the long run, rather than trying to establish “more confrontational racial politics” (Abele & Rodon, 2007, p. 51). The parallels with the current situation in the Arctic are clear: the Inuit have had success with being inclusive in the past, by relying on the “traditions of external relations already present in Inuit culture,” rather than trying to be exclusionary (Rodon, 2007, p. 51). The Inuit see themselves as proud citizens of their respective countries yet possessing of a unique transnational character that they want to preserve (Simon, 2011). The pragmatic approach then would be to engage with international actors, it would be a better way to deal with the problems facing the Arctic, especially as climate change, the primary cause for ice melt in the Arctic, is a problem stemming from the outside world (Fortier, 2013).

The Arctic Council gives the Inuit and the other Permanent Participants the ability to do just that. However, the Permanent Participants do not occupy an unassailable position on the Council and are in many ways reliant on their home governments to continue operations. The very position of the Permanent Participants on the Arctic Council serves to raise awareness of their issues to a potentially sympathetic globe. Currently the RAIPON issue is a major sticking point between Canada and Russia as they enter into Canada’s 2013-2015 chairmanship, which will allow them to potentially make some protest at RAIPON’s treatment (Huebert, 2013). Had the Arctic Council not been such a high level forum, it’s possible that RAIPON could have just been shuttered away with naught but a whisper. So while the Permanent Participants are powerful, they are also vulnerable, and using the Arctic Council to manage non-Arctic interests can both help them operate on their terms and raise awareness of their issues to the rest of the planet.

**International Interests in the Arctic Council**

On the whole, interest in the Arctic outside of the region has been increasing. Sanjay Chaturvedi (2012) argues: “the very fact that the material and the symbolic rise of Asia is tempered with the uncertainties associated with the era of climate change and scarcities (goods, resources, and a clean environment) might further complicate the geopolitical discourse of Arctic ‘exceptionalism’ and question at the same time increasingly untenable inside/outside geographies of cooperation centered on the Circumpolar Arctic (p. 227).”

Basically, China’s and the developing world’s predicted rise will not be easy to ignore, even in a region as removed as the Arctic. However, the media has perhaps sensationalized China’s interest in the region as power-hungry, which has little basis in official Chinese doctrine, as they do not even have an Arctic policy. From their previous behavior, the Chinese will likely not interfere in the Arctic in a way that undermines the sovereignty of Arctic Council member states. Doing so would undermine its position in ongoing disputes in the South China Sea, which it places greater importance on (Lasserre, 2013). China is cautiously monitoring the Arctic, as it sees both the potential negative and positive effects of the melting ice (Chaturvedi, 2012). Climate change is a global issue that will affect the Arctic most visibly in the form of opened
resources. China would be somewhat remiss to not involve itself, given their projected future need for resources (Chaturvedi, 2012, 230). However, they are unlikely to descend on the Arctic and start drilling. They simply don’t have the capability to do so, and the effects of the melting ice won’t be truly realized for years to come (Lasserre, 2013). Whatever happens, they will have to abide by whatever the member states stipulate in extracting resources from the Arctic. The situation is different concerning the EU, which has made a host of recommendations on Arctic governance, including suggesting the ATS as a model for opening the region to the world, a suggestion vehemently opposed by the member states and Permanent Participants (Koivurova & Graczyk, 2013; Rhemann, 2012; Young, 2009). Considering the contrasts between China’s relatively approach to the Arctic in calling for little change besides a permanent seat at the table, to the EU’s relatively more outspoken calls for change the member states might have comparably little conflict with China’s entry into the Council.

However, the Arctic member states and Permanent Participants are concerned that too many observers with a vested interest in the Council would be a hindrance at best and an intrusion at worst. As one Russian diplomat put it: “If you give them the green light, soon there will be one hundred observers on board, who will gradually require more and more rights, and then insist on turning the Arctic into the ‘universal humankind heritage’ on the model of the Antarctic” (Koivurova & Graczyk, 2013, p. 5). Ultimately the member states view the region as theirs to administer and steward, while the Permanent Participants fear multitudes of newcomers ignorant of their traditions and being marginalized in their own lands once again. Of course as it stands under the current observer rules, the non-Arctic states that have Observer status have little influence. For one, they can only make written contributions at Ministerial Meetings, and are limited in the financial contributions that they can make such that they cannot surpass that of member states (Arctic Council, 2013). This financial stipulation in particular keeps non-Arctic influence to a minimum as it keeps members states in a dominant financial position. As it stands right now, it almost seems as though the Permanent Participants have little to fear, as the member states have closed ranks in a way against foreign involvement. The new stipulations in the Observer rules declared at the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting in 2011, and the idea of a minimum financial contribution from Observers, currently being considered by the Task Force for Institutional Issues (TFII), would further hold non-Arctic states to the curb. Indeed, the Observer Rules might actually be too draconian, as they give non-Arctic states little else besides scientific access to working groups (Koivurova & Graczyk, 2013, p. 7). Considering the fact that the Inuit Circumpolar Council and other Permanent Participants have shown such a strong penchant for diplomacy, this almost draconian aversion to outsiders seems counterproductive. As the problems facing the Arctic including climate change and pollution originate from outside of the region, making the AC a largely exclusive body makes little sense for negotiating solutions.

The Arctic Council: the Changing Organization

The Arctic Council is an institution formed out of the embers of the Cold War, as the war wound down, so did the view of the Arctic as a battleground. The Finns took the initiative in the security void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union and came up with a model for action on Arctic issues that would later evolve into the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991. As its name would imply, the AEPS was primarily focused on environmental issues with a smaller emphasis on “sustainable development,” a term which would be ill-defined up until the first few years of the Arctic Council’s existence (Bloom, 1999). A unique body, the AC is an informal forum yet it still has codified rules of procedure and staggered levels of membership, with decisions made on consensus between the eight member states and the Permanent Participants. It straddles the line between formal and ad hoc as there is no voting, no permanent funding scheme, and until very recently there was no permanent secretariat to properly institutionalize it, though its members behave according to written Rules of Procedure (Bloom, 1999). The working groups of the AEPS were folded into the nascent Arctic Council and more have since been added, along with an expansion of the AEPS’s narrow remit and mandate. What’s more, the Arctic Council was also meant to give indigenous groups more influence over regional decision making by establishing the status of Permanent Participant (Bloom, 1999).
There are serious advantages to this format for those member states involved. To the United States, it offers the best of both worlds in that it is fluid and informal, while also offering considerable infrastructure in the form of working groups and technical expertise. In addition to that there are no required contributions and few entanglements, so it can be used at will. Bloom (1999) argues that:

the establishment of the Arctic Council as a forum without legal personality, and thus not as an ‘international organization’ as that term is understood under international law, was an objective of the United States and is consistent with a tendency in recent American diplomatic practice to seek an informal cooperative structure when that structure is adequate for the purposes of the issues involved (p. 721).

Indeed, aside from Denmark and Greenland, the Arctic Eight have little interest in diverging from this format to any great degree (Graczyk, 2012). Little has changed from the AEPS to the Arctic Council. It still maintains the hierarchy of working groups, Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs), and ministerial meetings, and an overall soft-law arrangement. Koivurova (2007) characterizes the Council as remaining in a “study and talk” format that has been hit or miss, with some products of the Working Groups having huge influence with others hardly being glanced at (p, 191). The major difference is the inclusion of the indigenous bodies as Permanent Participants (Koivurova, 2009, p. 6). Only very recently has the Council produced any sort of binding arrangement, mostly serving as a producer of superb technical information with accompanying policy recommendations.

This current format (soft-law, informal, flexible) is more or less preferred by the member states, and has its advantages and limitations. Its recommendations carry some weight but are not enforced or monitored. Issues that are contentious like fisheries and security are avoided due to the need for consensus, and non-Arctic Permanent Observers have not been consistently integrated into the Council (Graczyk, 2012). The recent adoption of the SAR (Search and Rescue) Treaty in 2011 and the ongoing negotiations over an oil spill prevention treaty under the auspices of the Arctic Council point to the format, with some updates, as capable of producing solutions to transnational issues. While many have argued for a hard-law decision making body in the Arctic, Timo Koivurova (2009) argues that the organization is resistant to sweeping changes, but that it can and has evolved little by little to meet new challenges: “it would be a mistake to think that the Arctic Council could easily be turned into a treaty base body having regulatory powers ... [t]his is not to say that no evolution has occurred in Arctic cooperation” (p. 7). From the AEPS to the SAR treaty and beyond, its format is still evolving and bearing fruit. Though few of the Arctic Eight agree to what exactly should be done with the Council, the fact that they have a vision for the Council is an encouraging sign.

Possible Changes: Institutional Amendments and International Involvement

Changes to the Arctic Council, in conjunction with the changing environment it researches, should cater to the Council’s most important functions: as a platform for cooperation for non-Arctic as well as Arctic states (and potentially more legally binding agreements), as a media bridge to the outside world, and as a knowledge aggregate and producer (Graczyk, 2012). Erik Molenaar (2012) argues that as the SAR treaty is an output of the Arctic Council, it would be beneficial to see the Arctic Council as consisting of two instruments: the original foundation as decreed in the Ottawa Declaration, and a system of treaties output by the Arctic Council but not adopted by it (p. 158). Recent trends reinforce the notion that this change is already taking place, as one treaty has already been produced and a second is on the way, much like Molenaar (2012) prescribes in his system. As previously noted, this method is realistic, preferred by the Arctic Eight, and robust enough to confront issues as they creep up. In the long term, the situation may change and necessitate some form of comprehensive treaty(Sellheim, 2012), but in the short term, this seems to be the system of choice.

Increasing the Arctic Council’s role as an awareness raiser is an objective that goes hand in hand with the gathering of knowledge that the Council focuses on now. Its policy-shaping mandate will be better fulfilled if the information it produces enjoys increased visibility. For both of these goals, the establishment of a Permanent Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway is a great boon, for it adds a base to store knowledge, and also provides a continuous staff, as well as further
establishing the reputation of the Arctic Council as an institution (Sellheim, 2012, p. 71). As one of its main tasks is to facilitate information between and outside Arctic Council members, one potential and interesting change would be to task it with producing media packets or newsletters consisting of information culled from the various working groups (Sellheim, 2012, p. 73). As simple an approach as media could help raise awareness in the world similar to what the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) did in 2004, and would help raise the Arctic agenda on the world stage, which is advantageous to member states and Permanent Participants alike. To further aid in this cause, Jennifer Rhemann (2012) explores the potential integration of more scientific groups like the Association of Polar Early Career Scientists (APECS), which could greatly increase the capacity of the Arctic Council to gather information and foster a greater base of talent to work with (p. 34). A greater network of scientists would help disseminate knowledge and awareness. Likewise, more direct involvement between groups like APECs/UArctic and the Permanent Participants would heighten visibility of their interests as well (Rhemann, 2012, p. 39).

Of course, one of the more pressing issues likely to be discussed at the next Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna this May is the issue of Permanent Observers in the Council. Though the Observer Rules adopted at the Nuuk Ministerial Meeting in 2011 help codify the selection process for new observers, there are still some issues. For instance the general trend in the Council has been to view the group as more exclusive than inclusive, and new membership has been looked at askance (Molenaar, 2012). While the idea of having a minimum financial contribution for Observer status might seem like a good way to harness the purse-strings of new members, it might honestly discourage them from joining at all, if they only get the limited access that Permanent Observer status imparts. Molenaar (2012) describes the potential backlash as a hue and cry of “no taxation without representation” (p. 171). As it currently stands, Observer status already applies to states, NGOs, and intergovernmental groups. Rhemann (2012) offers an alternative to Permanent Observer status for non-Arctic states that would help solve this overcrowding issue and further entice them to contribute finances and expertise by creating a new category for non-Arctic states called Consultative Parties, similar to the ATS (p. 40). Though Kristin Bartenstein (2013) has called the adoption of an ATS like body in the Arctic “utopian” in nature, Rhemann (2012) makes a good argument for this particular aspect of the system. By giving Consultative Party (or something similar) status to non-Arctic states and keeping Observer status for NGOs and the like, it would help better delineate responsibilities and privileges in the Council. By establishing a new category, new rules can be constructed that better suit the level of participation that non-Arctic states want. Consultative Parties can participate, but that participation can also be clearly restricted to keep member state and permanent participant interest of primary concern. Giving slightly more access for funds and expertise would help foster cooperation rather than competition, as well as better defining roles of the various ancillary members to the Council (Rhemann, 2012).

Policy Options
In light of what has been examined in this paper, I have identified the following options for the future of the Arctic Council:

- **Continue to adhere to the current soft-law format of the Council.**

  It is a more realistic option than a treaty system. While this might seem limited, recent history has shown that it can produce binding documents. Because it can produce binding documents to deal with Arctic issues, and because the member states are comfortable with it, it is a valid formula to stay with. Reactive and proactive action aimed at specific goals will be more effective than any “panacea” treaty that could be rendered obsolete by changing circumstances. The dual pillared system suggested Erik Molenaar is a good option. It plays to the Council’s strengths as a forum and a producer of knowledge. In the short term, this is the best option.

- **Change attitudes of member states to allow for more inclusivity.**

  International actors can be managed effectively and also bring a lot to the table in terms of expertise and finance. It may help to include a new category for nation states like the Consultative Party in the ATS, as it would perhaps entice actors to engage with the Council while also having them adhere to the greater interests of the Permanent Participants and the member states. Adding in a new membership category
for non-Arctic states would help to delineate privileges and status in the Council between non-Arctic states and international institutions. It would provide a nice short-term incentive to non-Arctic states to be involved while still limiting their influence. At the same time, to pacify the concerns of the Permanent Participants, allowing them an increased presence in the Council would help. Though they would remain unable to affect the decisions of the member states in declarations, perhaps allowing them to share in decision making in admitting new members to the Council would give them the increased control necessary to see to their interests.

- **Build the Council as a media platform.**
  Raising awareness in the wider world will aid in solving Arctic issues, many of which are global in nature anyways. The Secretariat could serve an important role in helping the Council connect with the media and also distribute the body’s superb technical works. The Secretariat could build media packets to bring the world’s attention to Arctic issues. Furthermore, building more cooperation between scientific organizations both inside and outside the Arctic would get the attention of the wider world as well. Establishing a larger, more inclusive network of scientists and non-Arctic participants would allow the Council a bit of control over Arctic discourse, instead of allowing the media to classify the Arctic situation unchallenged.

**Conclusion**

The problems facing the Arctic, in the form of climate change and pollution, largely stem from outside of the region, so it is justifiable to involve non-Arctic states. It is key that the Arctic Council be a forum for more international involvement as this will both broaden the expertise and finances available and serve to raise awareness of Arctic issues beyond the Arctic region. In contrast to the common beliefs that other international interests could dilute indigenous voice, the Permanent Participants maintain the ability and the position to effectively engage outsiders. In fact, not doing so would be counterproductive for their interests. The Arctic Council has the capacity to face the challenges in the Arctic even in its current limited format. These limits are indeed serious, but it makes more sense in the short term to focus on strengthening the Council piecemeal, rather than aiming for a comprehensive treaty system, which few of the member states would agree to, and would likely be rendered obsolete by changing circumstances.

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China and the Arctic Council

By Rachel Tam

Abstract
China’s request for permanent observer status in 2009 was postponed by the Arctic Council, but this did not discourage China from re-applying this year (Arctic Council, 2009). Many countries are eager to gain a seat in the high-level international forum for circumpolar governance. However, there is limited discussion on the actual role of the observer, criteria for admission into the Council and influence of observer states. Despite not having an official Arctic policy, China has openly endorsed the workings of the AC, though was refused entry in 2009. Prominent scholars argue that China’s refusal to the AC has to do with the perception that China’s sole interest in the Arctic is for economic benefits rather than inherent interest in climate change (Jakobson & Peng, 2012). This misrepresentation deserves scrutiny as China has long been involved with scientific research in the polar zones and the actual capability of navigating the Northwest Passage remains unlikely. Rather, China’s objective in gaining observer status in the AC derives from its status as an emerging powerhouse and is part of a broader national strategy to become a responsible global actor.

Introduction
With the sea-ice melting in the Arctic Ocean, scholars describe the phenomenon as the scramble for Arctic resources. The US Geological Survey estimates that some 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered reserves of natural gas and 13 percent of world’s untapped oil lie in the Arctic. The potential environmental transformation will have profound impacts on geopolitical security, especially shipping patterns and resource extraction activities (Gautier et al., 2011; USGS, 2008). With the decision for observer status to be made in May 2013, it is vital that China is considered for permanent observer status due to the growing recognition that the Arctic is becoming an increasingly important geopolitical environment. The Chinese hopes to be considered a key player in Arctic governance and China’s interest in the region is clear.

The aim of this chapter is to reevaluate the inaccurate depiction of China’s interest in the Arctic and to explore China as a potential observer of the AC, which will consequently have various implications for circumpolar relations and international affairs. Part one of the chapter highlights China’s foreign policy and its goal to establish its reputation as a responsible global actor. The chapter then goes on to examine the limited discussions on the role of the observer and the criteria for admission to the AC. In so doing it is crucial to understand Chinese Arctic interests broadly defined, and challenge the dominant belief that China’s interest lies exclusively in Arctic extractive activities or the region’s economic potential (Campbell, 2012; Curtis Wright, 2011; Makki, 2012; Mroczkowski, 2012). The chapter then sheds light on prospective contributions China will bring as a future AC observer. Methodologically, this paper looks exclusively at official Chinese governmental documents (12th Five Year Plan; Chinese Foreign Policy Documents; Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) to assess Chinese interests for the AC and its Arctic foreign policy agenda.¹ In doing so, this chapter challenges existing perceptions of China as an energy hungry giant and argues that China’s objective in gaining observer status in the Arctic Council stems from the desire to

¹ Since this chapter focuses on Chinese official governmental documents, there is no mention of the indigenous population in the Arctic. China does not exclusively have a foreign policy on Inuit in the Arctic, though supports the UN clause regarding indigenous populations.
assert itself as a global power and a broader national strategy to become a responsible and visible actor in world affairs.

China’s Foreign Policy

China’s official governmental documents dictate its foreign policy, which is in accordance with its long-term goal of bolstering its reputation as a responsible global actor. China’s foreign policy is related to its ability to assert its major power position in international institutions. The analysis of these governmental documents reveals China’s broader national strategy of becoming a responsible actor in international affairs. China’s participation in multilateral organizations such as the United Nations and World Trade Organization (WTO) indicates its willingness to cooperate with other member states (United Nations Member States; World Trade Organization, 2013). China respects the existing international order and does not want to be viewed as a threat. Along with its interest in becoming a compliant member, China’s goal to uphold its reputation in the world stage is in line with its foreign policy.

Much of China’s current foreign policy is based on Zhou Enlai’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and is described as “harmony without uniformity”, which encourages diplomatic relations between states despite ideological differences (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2000). Since the reform of China in 1978, the country has maintained better relations with major powers and ties with neighboring states. For example, China currently has diplomatic relations with 171 countries and maintains embassies in 162 (US Bureau of Public Affairs, 2013).

Moreover, China’s State Council Information Office published a white paper entitled China’s Peaceful Development Road, which highlights the importance of peace, collaboration, harmony and beneficial outcomes for China and the outside world. China’s foreign policy follows the road of peaceful development, which “unifies domestic development with opening to the outside world, linking the development of China with that of the rest of the world, and combining the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with the common interests of all peoples throughout the world” (Liu, 2003). It is in China’s national interest to maintain peace in the international stage, which would allow it to continue its domestic development.

As climate change threatens international security, it is an issue of rising importance in the agenda of many nation-states. In alignment with this, the Chinese government fully acknowledges and deems climate change a significant threat to its national security. It is noteworthy that amongst the political leaders of China, there is no dispute on the reality of climate change. In 2011, China published its 12th Five-Year Plan (2011 to 2015), which highlights the incorporation of socio-economic initiatives aimed to ensure growth (People’s Republic of China, 2011). This comprehensive document stresses China’s overall progress in sustainable development. According to the 12th Five-Year Plan, China has since 2003 “proposed concepts such as resource-saving, environmentally friendly society, an innovative oriented country, ecological civilization, green development” and continues to put these into practice (2011). China’s commitment to environmental stewardship and its long-term goal of becoming a responsible actor generate interest to gain permanent observer status to the AC. Hence, the primary driving force of China’s interest in the Arctic region is to enhance its reputation as a responsible player and to exert its influence by joining the AC as observer status. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that China will provide added value as a member of the AC.

Reexamining Chinese Interest in the Arctic

Many countries are concerned with China’s growing influence and view China’s rise as a threat. With a population of over 1.3 billion and the world’s second largest economy, China’s every move has the capacity to influence world affairs. In an increasingly globalized world, China’s every action holds the ability to adversely affect the global economy. Aware that acting assertive will alarm other international actors and harm its reputation as a responsible player, China adopts a low-key non-confrontational approach regarding Arctic matters, as evident in Chinese policy documents and rhetoric from officials (Peng, 2011).

The misperception of Chinese objective in the Arctic originated from a statement by Chinese Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo who claimed that, the Arctic “belong[s] to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it [...] China must plan indispensable role in the Arctic exploration as we have one fifth of the world’s

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2 The author uses this argument on a theoretical basis.
population" (Makki, 2012). The Admiral’s bold statement appropriated international attention, leading to the perception of China as a global power desperate to acquire supplies of energy and other minerals and to secure potential future shipping routes such as the Northwest and Northeast passages. However, it is crucial not to base Chinese foreign policy off of a single statement. The misguided perception that China’s sole purpose in the Arctic is to seek economic benefits is problematic, especially after taking in consideration China’s long history of research in the polar zones and actual navigable shipping routes.

Dedication to Scientific Research
While China is not an Arctic littoral state, its pending application for observer status is not driven by economic motives. In fact, China’s long involvement in the polar zones indicates its dedication to scientific research structured along four main axes: oceanography, biology, atmospheric science, and glaciology (Humpert & Raspotnik, 2012). Since 1989, China has been funding the Polar Research Institute of China (Zhongguo Jidi Yanjiu Zhongxin) in the circumpolar regions of Antarctica and the Arctic. With 124 staff and headquartered in Shanghai, the program supervises three Chinese research stations in Antarctic and one in the Arctic (Curtis Wright, 2011). The (Huanghe) Yellow River Station has been in operation since 2004 and serves as China’s first Arctic oceanic and climatological research station (Chinese Embassy in Norway, 2004). In addition, China’s most recent Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) promotes the “development of marine economy and emphasizes the need to strengthen integrated marine surveying and mapping” (Humpert & Raspotnik, 2012). As shown from the examples above, China’s focus to the Arctic is not a sudden scramble for resources but an enduring interest in scientific research in the region.

Shipping
In recent years, traffic in the Northwest Passage has increased significantly, though owing to tourist and cruise ships rather than commercial shipping. Accordingly, the prevailing notion that Chinese interest in the opening of the Northwest Passage is problematic and requires an in depth analysis of current shipping routes in comparison to the Northwest Passage. Université Laval Professor Frédéric Lasserre (2010) dismisses the assumption that the Northwest Passage will be heavily utilized in the near future. Lasserre argues that Chinese interest in the Northwest Passage as a potential shipping route is not very credible as the Northwest Passage does not necessarily offer a shorter route between major international ports and the unpredictability of melting sea ice makes it difficult for navigation. For example, Lasserre’s research reveals that the distance from New York to Shanghai using the Northeast Passage, also known as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) is 17,030 miles in comparison to 19,893 miles on the Northwest Passage (Lasserre, 2010: 6). In spite of this and the melting of sea ice, it is difficult to foresee when the Northwest Passage will open and close. Such uncertainty makes it difficult for shipping companies to gauge shipping timetables and estimate arrival times for cargo. Moreover, Chinese shipping firms are largely globalized and make decisions based on cost benefit analysis (Lasserre, 2010: 6). For these reasons, the Northwest Passage is unlikely to become the future Panama Canal for China. It is also worthy to note that among the three largest Chinese shipping firms, none has shown an immediate interest in opening Arctic shipping routes due to slower speeds, higher insurance costs, higher probability of delays, and serious risks of damage to the cargo (Lasserre, 2010: 7). Furthermore, shipping companies are reluctant to invest in icebreaker vessels to use in Arctic waters, due to high costs of operation (Lasserre, 2010: 7). Taking into consideration these factors, it is reasonable to presume that for the time being, China’s involvement in the Arctic is not associated with shipping purposes.

The Observer Status
As Canada prepares to take over the chairmanship of the AC, the question remains whether to offer China, the European Union (EU), India, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Singapore observer status at the Council. According to Graczyk, Non-arctic States apply for this role to enhance their position in the Arctic, which includes scientific research activity, “creating specifically designed Arctic policies and showing capabilities for operating in the Arctic” (Graczyk, 2010).

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3 China is portrayed as an emerging power, dire need of energy sources (Campbell, 2012; Curtis Wright, 2011; Makki, 2012; Mrockowski, 2012).

4 In this statement, the Panama Canal is assumed to be the most utilized sea route, connecting Asia, Europe, the Americas and Africa.
Observer status in the AC is open to non-Arctic states, inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organizations (global and regional) and non-governmental organizations (Arctic Council, 2011). Observers are invited to the Council’s meetings and activities, have exclusive access to the Council proceedings, can propose projects through states and participants and can submit relevant documents, at the discretion of the Chair of the AC (Arctic Council, 2011). Further, observers can participate in the AC primarily at the level of Working Groups. Oran Young indicated that non-state actors have been “successful in the past in securing for themselves opportunities to participate in Arctic governance by framing” the issues in a way that corresponded with the agenda of the Arctic states (2009).

The AC serves to be the only major international initiative for non-Arctic states to turn to for formal recognition and participation in decision-making processes in the Arctic (Makki, 2012). For this reason, outside players request Observer status to gain influence and lobbying powers in circumpolar relations. However, there are limits to the role of Observer, as there are many provisions created to restrain external actors from skewing the main objectives of the AC. The AC rules of procedure and Nuuk rules state that the primary role of observers is to merely observe the work of the AC (Graczyk, 2013). Decision making process at all levels within the AC remains the responsibility of the eight Arctic states and Permanent Participants. Furthermore, observers’ financial contributions cannot exceed the funding provided by the Arctic states. The constraint on financial input limits the ability of external actors to influence AC decision-making, as investments in large-scale projects have the potential to exert pressure on Arctic states’ decisions (Graczyk, 2013). These constraints prevent external actors from playing a dominant role in relation to Permanent Participants.

Criteria for Arctic Council Admission
Six non-arctic countries have been admitted as Permanent Observer States to the Arctic Council: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Britain under the rules of procedure created in 1996 (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2013). Since then, the rules of procedure and criteria for admission have changed. At the 2011 ministerial meeting held in Nuuk, Greenland, the AC made significant progress when it released admission criteria for observers and a definition of their respective roles (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2013). Observer states to the AC are granted entry according to their acceptance and support of objectives of the AC defined in the Ottawa Declaration, recognition of Arctic sovereignty, recognition of legal framework that applies to the Arctic Ocean, notable the Law of the Sea, respect of values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic indigenous peoples, demonstration of political and financial willingness and demonstration of Arctic interests relevant to the work of the AC (Arctic Council, 2009).

China’s 2009 Application Revisited
To understand the AC decision to postpone Chinese entry into the AC in 2009, it is imperative to examine empirical evidence from other cases such as the EU’s rejection by the AC. Scholars deemed that the refusal of observer status to the EU is due to the EU’s support for the ban on seal products (Philips, 2009). Canada is the world’s largest sealing nation and has continuously expressed that a seal ban would negatively impact its indigenous population (Philips, 2009). Accordingly, Canadian foreign affairs minister Lawrence Cannon, representing the Harper Government, was opposed to the EU accession to the AC because of their perceived disinterest to cooperate and coordinate with member states in the Arctic (Philips, 2009). Similarly, China has also been postponed entry in 2009. Since 2007, China has participated as ad-hoc observer of the AC and thereby gained a deep understanding of the inner workings of the Council. It fully accepts and supports the mandate and vision of the council (Lan, 2009). Although there has not been an official explanation to the postponing of granting China an observer status, scholars postulate that negative connotations from the media may have affected the decision (Jakobson & Peng, 2012). There is a prevalent belief that Chinese interest in the Arctic is associated with its thirst for natural resources rather than innate concern in climate change.

Prior to 2011, it was common for Chinese analysts to promote assertive views in regards to the Arctic region. However, following the AC’s second deferral of decisions on permanent observer applications, Chinese Arctic scholars have become much more subdued in public. The rationale behind this changing rhetoric is perhaps due to the fear that overly assertive statements may jeopardize China’s future
in the Arctic (Jakobson & Peng, 2012, p. 5). Additionally, controversy stemming from China's announcement of its sixth expedition to the Arctic in 2013 and its intention to build a new 8000-ton icebreaker vessel in 2014 further encouraged Chinese scholars to adopt a less assertive rhetoric (Makki, 2012). Despite meeting criteria of AC admission, the perception of China as a resource hungry entity is the main source for resistance against its entry to the international forum (Jakobson & Peng, 2012).

Contributions from China

Melting sea-ice is not only a regional issue, but rather a global phenomenon that affects every region of the Earth. Adhering to this perspective, China rejects the notion that Arctic states alone should decide issues pertaining to the Arctic. Chinese officials claim that potential environmental transformations will adversely affect China's economy, ecological system and energy conditions.

China, a major global actor with clear rationalized interest in the Arctic, has the potential to become a valuable permanent observer through the provisions of financial support to the AC. The working groups of the AC are funded voluntarily by individual Arctic states. Under the current framework, states propose projects or working groups, and governments of the state that are interested take the lead in implementing and paying for these initiatives (US Department of State, 1999). There are no specified contributions and states within the AC do not finance every project. This funding approach is considered to be unsatisfactory to a number of governments and proves to undermine the work of the Arctic Council. However, including China in this international forum has the potential to correct this problem.

In the 12th Five-Year Plan, the central government allocated a generous budget to the organs of polar affairs (Peng 2011). The increase in funds translates to increased frequency of China's polar research and expeditions. Five Antarctica expeditions and three Arctic expeditions will be carried out between 2011 and 2015. As previously mentioned, a new polar research icebreaker is expected to be in use by 2014 (Bi, 2013). China's future Arctic plans include a new ice-capable plane, a new polar research facility in Shanghai and an increasing number of Chinese polar scientists (Humpert & Raspotnik, 2012).

The compiling of scientific findings from expeditions between different countries benefits the global community and is crucial for development in the Arctic region. Financial contribution from China can also strengthen the Arctic Council by providing communication and cooperation among stakeholders in addressing Arctic issues. As maritime activities in the Arctic increase, there is a growing need for Arctic search and rescue services, profound understanding of operating ships in Arctic waters and the development of successful regulations on safety and environmental protection. China is both willing and able to contribute financially to the work of the council and to strengthen cooperation within the Council.

Policy Options

In accessing the problems of Chinese presence in the Arctic, we propose policy recommendations that will strengthen these relations.

Policy Options for China

• It is crucial for China to establish an Arctic foreign policy to foster communication with external actors.
• Bolster China’s long-term national goal of “sustainable development” by being more active in climate change in the South.

Policy Options for Arctic Council

• Reconsider existing provisions regarding scientific research to permit contribution from outside research.
• Reevaluate the role of Observers by increasing participation of Observers in Arctic affairs

Policy Options for Permanent Participants

• Clearly establish the intentions and objectives of indigenous population/working groups clear to ensure that voice will be heard.

Conclusion

The result to China’s application as a potential observer will be finalized in May 2013 at the 8th ministerial meeting, held at Kiruna, Sweden (Arctic Council, 2011). Thus,
now is a critical time for the AC to respond to China's request, as doing so can expand the AC's international influence. Cooperation with non-arctic states will widen its scope in addressing international issues such as climate change and international shipping. Though China is too often portrayed as an energy-thirsty giant hindering its chances of gaining a seat as a permanent observer in the council, it is important to reconsider China's motives. As seen from governmental documents and rhetoric from scholars and governmental officials, China's objective in gaining observer status in the AC derives from its interest in asserting its position as an emerging powerhouse, which is part of a broader national strategy to become a responsible global actor. As shown in this chapter, China's entry into the Arctic Council entails more benefits than harm to the council. China can positively contribute to the Council through funding for research and communication. As the Chinese government is so intent on changing its ways and showing its keen commitment to solving the global crisis, is there a reason to neglect this global power?

Rachel's interest in the environment stems from her time abroad in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. Naturally, she chose to focus her research in that region, and completed her chapter on China's role in the Arctic. Rachel greatly enjoyed her experience in this Task Force, and is excited to see what the future has to offer for the Arctic region.
Conclusion

By Charlotte Dubiel

Our title, “Equatorial North,” is meant to encourage the kind of vibrant dialogue for Arctic security that begins with thinking about the region as a homeland rather than a periphery. Our Task Force team was fortunate enough to begin our investigation in Québec City and Ottawa, where we met and spoke with experts dedicated to studying and working for the North. Perhaps the most invaluable experience for shaping this report was spending time with our peers from the North at Nunavut Sivuniksavut, perhaps it was shivering out-of-doors in the Canadian January. In reference to the interpersonal, discussion-based learning taking place abroad, our beloved instructor Nadine Fabbi summed-up the purpose of our expedition when she said “this is education.” Our framing, research and writing were all heavily informed by the symposium of presentations, talks and the personal connections we made in Québec and Canada. In this report we have, as authors and researchers, aimed to be cognizant of the voices of stakeholders. Our report accompanies the current progressive discourse regarding the Arctic that reframes security beyond a mere political, military, economic or environmental context. We aim to present a series of recommendations that begins with recognizing the interdependency of individuals, communities and nation-states and the essential role for dialogue between them.

In Part I of the report, Cosford presents an argument for reinvigorating a stagnant nation-state debate regarding the Northwest Passage by considering a different worldview, the Inuit knowledge of sea ice, as a concept that Canada could utilize as a diplomacy tool. Ho’s article considers Canada’s goals for its chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2013, development for the people of the North, in the context of regional land claims agreements and honoring a commitment to devolution. In envisioning a prosperous province, van Tulder’s article advocates for the partnership between the interdependent North and South Québec in order to prioritize human development. Each of these approaches to making recommendations for political and diplomatic discourse begins with a critical look at the derivation of knowledge. The authors consider what community level resilience should look like before the provincial or national-state spheres, so that individuals, communities, and nations might be their most dynamic in developing collaborative relationships.

Part II of our report is a more detailed look at community-specific Northern issues of capacity: tourism, biodiversity, food security, homelessness and migration and education, that draw on innovative models for developing solutions. Moore considers pre-requisites for sustainability regarding the tourism industry in the Arctic and proposes that the state regulate cruise ships as knowledge gaps fill, in addition to recommending common tenants of sustainability, such as ecological awareness and preservation of cultural traditions. Sugarman proposes a hybrid management scheme for biodiversity conservation, engaging biological science,
Inuit ways of knowing the natural world and citizen science in order to develop the most appropriate conservation plan at the local level. Similar to the motivation behind citizen science, Shaw recommends communities in the North make use of targeted needs-assessments tools, such as Photo Voice, to determine management priorities. Guard’s modeling for education, rather than being a multi-sectoral action plan, is Nunavut Sivuniksavut. She recommends policy makers take a look at what is working and use the NS empowerment model as a starting point. Dolph asks her reader to consider the very labels of homelessness and “moving south,” contesting that the terminology itself does not carry enough weight. She incorporates international frameworks for considering forced migration into the Canadian discourse about community well-being and recommends assisted repatriation as part of a reconciliation plan.

Part III of our report jumps to international and nation-state relations at the forum of the Arctic Council. Brown and Tam argue that the Arctic Council must reevaluate the role of non-observer states and allow the entry of new states. New contributors bring new ideas and our authors advocate that Inuit voice be heard in a multiplicity of contexts.

The change that is taking place in the circumpolar North will continue to affect the lives and development strategies of the inhabitants of the Arctic, as well as stakeholders and interested parties. The urgency that goes along with unprecedented change can be used as a catalyst for building dynamic solutions, and growing the capacity for security. Our report focuses on ten key Arctic issues in a variety of discourses and categories of social organization that include the individual, community and nation level. This report began in the spirit of dialogue and interpersonal connections. We conclude by recommending a continuation of the innovative solutions already in place or being discussed in the Arctic, which work towards capacity building for resilient communities. We commend the spirit of organizations like the Arctic Council, a forum for multi nation dialogue, and recommend that the Arctic not close itself off to ideas. The Inuit, as a people, have made incredible progress politically and socially in making their voice heard. We advocate for the continuing interchange of knowledge and think of the Arctic as a regional model for collaboration that would be beneficial if modeled elsewhere in globe. While we could never cover all of the issues relevant to Arctic security, we write this report in the spirit of the borderlands, hoping that each issue brought to the table herein is thought of as crossing levels, and as dependent upon more than itself.
**Glossary of Terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AANDC:</td>
<td>Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada</td>
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<td>AC:</td>
<td>Arctic Council</td>
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<td>ACCORD:</td>
<td>Action concertée de cooperation régionale de développement</td>
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<td>AEPS:</td>
<td>Association of Polar Early Career Scientists</td>
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<td>AFN:</td>
<td>Arctic Food Network</td>
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<td>AMSA:</td>
<td>Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment</td>
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<td>APECS:</td>
<td>Association of Polar Early Career Scientists</td>
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<td>CAFF:</td>
<td>Conservation for Arctic Flora and Fauna</td>
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<td>CBD:</td>
<td>Convention on Biological Diversity</td>
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<td>CFP:</td>
<td>Community Food Program</td>
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<td>CIC:</td>
<td>Citizenship and Immigration Canada</td>
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<td>CITES:</td>
<td>Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora</td>
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<td>DFAIT:</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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<td>DFO:</td>
<td>Department of Fisheries and Oceans</td>
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<td>DMR:</td>
<td>Decision Makers and Regulators</td>
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<td>EBM:</td>
<td>Ecosystem Based Management</td>
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<td>EU:</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GN:</td>
<td>Government of Nunavut</td>
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<td>ICC:</td>
<td>Inuit Circumpolar Council</td>
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<td>IDPs:</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Peoples</td>
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<td>IQ:</td>
<td>Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit</td>
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<td>IPS:</td>
<td>Indigenous People’s Secretariat</td>
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<td>IPY:</td>
<td>International Polar Year</td>
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<td>IRCS:</td>
<td>Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy</td>
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<td>ISIUOP:</td>
<td>Inuit Sea ice Use and Occupancy Project</td>
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<td>ITK:</td>
<td>Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami</td>
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<td>IUCN:</td>
<td>International Union for Conservation of Nature</td>
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<td>JBNQA:</td>
<td>James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement</td>
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<td>NGOs:</td>
<td>Non-government organizations</td>
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<td>NLCA:</td>
<td>Nunavut Land Claims Agreement</td>
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<td>NORDRED:</td>
<td>Nordic Energy Regulators</td>
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<td>NS:</td>
<td>Nunavut Sivuniksiavut</td>
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<td>NSIE:</td>
<td>National Strategy on Inuit Education</td>
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<td>NSR:</td>
<td>Northern Sea Route</td>
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<td>NTEP:</td>
<td>Nunavut Teaching Education Project</td>
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<td>NWP:</td>
<td>Northwest Passage</td>
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<td>PAME:</td>
<td>Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment</td>
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<td>PAQ:</td>
<td>Projects Autochtones Quebec</td>
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<td>PLQ:</td>
<td>Parti Libéral du Québec</td>
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<td>POPs:</td>
<td>Persistent Organic Pollutants</td>
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<td>PP:</td>
<td>Permanent Participant</td>
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<td>RACER:</td>
<td>Rapid Assessment of Circum-Arctic Ecosystem Resilience</td>
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<td>RAIPON:</td>
<td>Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North</td>
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<td>SAO:</td>
<td>Senior Arctic Official</td>
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<td>SAR Treaty:</td>
<td>Search and Rescue Treaty</td>
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<td>TB:</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<td>TEK:</td>
<td>Traditional Ecological Knowledge</td>
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<td>TFF:</td>
<td>Territorial Formula Financing</td>
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<td>TFN:</td>
<td>Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut</td>
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<td>UArctic:</td>
<td>University of the Arctic</td>
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<td>UDHR:</td>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
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<td>UNEP:</td>
<td>United Nations Environmental Program</td>
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<td>UNHCR:</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>WTO:</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>WWF:</td>
<td>World Wildlife Fund</td>
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References

Introduction


Chapter 1: Ending the Northwest Passage Dispute: How Inclusion of Inuit Perspectives on Sea Ice Could Build a More Effective Strategy for Canada


Chapter 2: Honoring Ottawa’s Promises to Nunavut


Canada. (1993). Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in right of Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Tungavik.


Chapter 3: Le Québec Total : Creating an Unifying Vision for Northern Development (Un Plan Pour Tous)

Appendix A

PLAN NORD: INTRODUCTION
FOCUSING ON SUSTAINABLE NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

The Plan Nord is the project of a generation. It first offered a perspective of sustainable development in Québec and is now one of the biggest economic, social and environmental development projects in our time. The world is changing before our very eyes and Québec must constantly renew itself if it wishes to continue to fulfil itself in this new worldwide economic space. The gouvernement du Québec is determined to open new horizons to Québec talent to enable it to express itself the world over. The government’s initiatives in recent years have sought to develop new spaces by bolstering its relations and alliances with France, the European Union, the emerging economies, and its neighbours in Canada and the United States. Accordingly, the government has concluded:

- the France-Québec agreement on the recognition of occupational qualifications and individual mobility;
- a Québec-Ontario trade and cooperation agreement;
- a long-term agreement with Vermont concerning the sale of Québec hydroelectricity.

In addition to these agreements, the Canadian common market and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) give Québec special access to the North American continent. Québec has an export-oriented economy and has always taken advantage of market openness. Through the Plan Nord, we are gaining access to new horizons. Northern Québec is an immense, majestic territory abounding in resources. Their history and culture make the territory’s residents unique. Its rivers have enormous hydroelectricity potential and the territory also has inestimable mineral resources. Its scenery and wildlife offer appreciable potential for tourism.

The Plan Nord proposes a sustainable development model that will allow the natural resources to be developed in a spirit of respect for the environment and ecosystems for the benefit of Northern Québec residents and all Quebecers.
We have elaborated the Plan Nord in partnership. It stems from the reflections of the gouvernement du Québec, regional elected representatives and the representatives of the First Nations and the Inuit who, along with the representatives of the economic, social, community and environmental sectors, have envisaged the North of tomorrow. The Plan Nord will be carried out over a period of 25 years. The initiative will lead to over $80 billion in investments during that time and create or consolidate, on average, 20 000 jobs a year for 25 years, equivalent to 500 000 man-years. The scope of the Plan Nord will make it in the coming decades what the development of La Manicouagan and James Bay were to the 1960s and 1970s. It is planning development differently, i.e. in consultation with the regions concerned. This document presents the perspective underlying the Plan Nord, the objectives pursued and the initiatives to be undertaken. It proposes an initial five-year plan that encompasses the measures in the initial phase of the Plan Nord. Chapter 1 proposes the establishment of a government corporation with its own board of directors, which will have a mandate to coordinate government initiatives bearing in mind the private investment announced north of the 49th parallel. The corporation will ensure the integrated, coherent development of Northern Québec. In particular, it will have a mandate to act as a mandatary in the development and funding of infrastructure and in the social field. Chapter 2 concerns the investment projects anticipated over the next five years to enable northern populations to participate fully in the sustainable development of Northern Québec. Accordingly, it sets out the development projects in the realms of education, manpower, housing, health and culture. Chapter 3 describes the immense resources found in Northern Québec and defines investment projects in the energy, mining, forest and wildlife sectors and the tourism and bio-food industries. Chapter 4 focuses on access to this vast territory and indicates investment projects in the realms of transportation and communications that are essential for Northern Québec's development. Chapter 5 examines the environmental perspective of the development of Northern Québec and the measures to protect ecosystems advocated within the framework of sustainable development. Lastly, Chapter 6 presents the financial framework of the first action plan (2011-2016) under the Plan Nord. Innovative funding measures will enable the government to implement the Plan Nord in a spirit of respect for its objectives from the standpoint of fiscal balance and debt reduction. The Plan Nord establishes a new partnership between the private sector and local residents, the First Nations and the Inuit to enable them to achieve self-fulfilment. It allows for better control over our resources in order to enrich our society and attain greater energy independence. It proposes more effective conception of the sustainable development of Northern Québec in a spirit of respect for the environment and biodiversity. Above all, the Plan Nord opens new horizons to future generations of Quebecers and will offer the world the example of modern, sustainable, harmonious development.

(Plan Nord, 2011, 6-7)
Appendix B

PLAN NUNAVIK : INTRODUCTION

The broad development of northern Québec (including the landmark James Bay hydroelectric project) with its attendant economic, business and job opportunities has energized the imagination of Québécois over the past 60 years. A large part of this territory is also the “land where we live”, Nunavik.

In 1975 under the James Bay and Northern Québec Agreement (JBNQA), the governments of Canada and Québec recognized Inuit rights in Nunavik, and granted the vast territory a legal status and a special regime of governance. The JBNQA was the first, truly modern Aboriginal treaty. The 2007 Nunavik Inuit Land Claims Agreement, for its part, further recognized the rights of Nunavik Inuit to the offshore region around Québec, as well as northern Labrador and offshore northern Labrador.

The Plan Nord by the Government of Québec is set in this context. It is intended by its developers to be a unifying project, the sharing of a common vision, and a model for sustainable development.

In response to the Plan Nord project in 2010, we prepared Plan Nunavik. Our Plan identifies Nunavimmiut’s vision of development and our priorities over the next 25 years in areas such as housing, health, education, access to the land, environmental and wildlife protection, culture, tourism, bio-food, as well as non-renewable resource, energy, transportation, communications and community development.

In Plan Nunavik, the position of Inuit regarding the Plan Nord and the development of natural resources in the region is very clear.

• Plan Nord must comply with and ensure the continued implementation of the Government of Québec’s obligations under all the treaties and other agreements signed with Nunavik Inuit.

• If Québec intends for all Québécois to benefit from the Plan Nord, it must be prepared to invest in the priorities set out in Plan Nunavik and strive harder to improve the standard of living of Nunavimmiut.

Finally, this introduction would be incomplete if we did not recognize the vital contributions of the many other concerned regional organizations towards the preparation of Plan Nunavik. These include the Nunavik Regional Board of Health and Social Services, the Kativik School Board, the Avataq Cultural Institute, and the Nunavik Mineral Exploration Fund, to name but a few.

Introduction prepared in November 2011.
(Plan Nunavik, 2011, 329-328)

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