“A Mass Conspiracy To Feed People”
Globalizing Cities, World-Class Waste, and the Biopolitics of Food Not Bombs

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington
2013

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Program Authorized to Offer Degree:
Anthropology, Sociocultural
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Abstract

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This is an ethnography of waste, cities, and social movements. Primarily one social movement in particular, Food Not Bombs, which recovers and freely redistributes wasted food in the public spaces of hundreds of cities, in dozens of countries, on every continent except Antarctica. In the process, chapters contest highly polarised geographies of hunger, homelessness, and public space in these places. This dissertation explores three aspects of Food Not Bombs’ context and cultural logic: (1) the ways in which waste is made and moved about in cities; (2) the ways in which those cities are becoming global in the process of waste-making (and vice versa); and (3) the ways in which this globalised waste-making cultivates globalised forms of social organisation and political resistance. This research has consisted of extensive participant-observation within Food Not Bombs chapters and some of the larger political and cultural communities in which they are embedded—Dumpster-divers, squatters, homeless advocates, punks, anarchists, and so on—in Seattle, New York City, San Francisco, Boston, Melbourne, Australia, and several other cities. It describes the link between urban globalisation and the proliferation of Food Not Bombs chapters, many of which have been located in “global” cities whose post-industrial economies
are intimately entangled in global circuits of elite business investment, high-end consumption, and tourism. Each of these cities generates a wealth of world-class waste: food wasted in the interests of commodity aesthetics, buildings left empty for the sake of property speculation and gentrification, and so on. This waste, and the disparities and deprivations that correspond to it (hunger, homelessness, etcetera), are the material and political preconditions of Food Not Bombs’ work. Broadly speaking, then, this dissertation describes a sort of abject symbiosis between the development of such globalised cities and the politically resistant work of Food Not Bombs.
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It Takes A Village to Write a Dissertation

It takes a village to write a dissertation. And in this case, a decidedly global one—the people and communities I name below are located along at least three distinct coasts. Of course, any work of ethnography is, by definition, a collaborative project, and in this dissertation I endeavour to honour these collaborations in form and in spirit throughout the prose itself. But some contributions are worth making explicit below.

Above all, this dissertation is a reflection of the caring labour of the different Food Not Bombs chapters with whom I have had the inestimable good fortune of working. In particular, I would like to thank Food Not Bombs Seattle, Melbourne, New York City, San Francisco, Davis, Boston, Buffalo, Berkeley, Worcester, New Brunswick, and Wellington, where various Food Not Bombs members have welcomed me into their kitchens, their homes, or both. This international community of Food Not Bombs members has offered me not only food, shelter, and a dissertation topic; they have also been a kind of home for me. Food Not Bombs members have been friends, resources, critics, and peers (and several of them have read and responded to drafts of this dissertation). Indeed, in these various capacities, many of them are named below. For all this I am beyond grateful.

In addition, within the landscapes of advocacy and protest that Food Not Bombs inhabits, many other voices have also been invaluable to my work. Natalie Novak, Rachel Myers, Anitra Freeman, and Wes Browning, all presently or formerly of Seattle's Real Change street newspaper, and Kristine Cunningham, of Seattle's ROOTS homeless shelter have all been particularly helpful to me in making sense of the social and political worlds within which Food Not Bombs moves.

The research would also have been impossible without the financial and material support of a range of institutions. The most important of these have been the University of Washington’s Program in the Comparative History of Ideas, the Department of Anthropology at the University of Washington, the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at the University of Washington, Bothell, the Martha Duggan Fellowship for Caring Labour, the Harry Bridges Center for Labor Studies, the Walter Chapin Simpson Center for the Humanities, and the Nancy Bell-Evans Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy.

As for the ideas contained within this dissertation, they have grown and transformed in dialogue with a great many interlocutors, but most particularly the members of my doctoral committee, Ann Anagnost,
Miriam Kahn, and Celia Lowe from the Department of Anthropology, and Phillip Thurtle from the Comparative History of Ideas. I owe a debt to them not only for their intellectual guidance and critical insight, but for their encouragement, patience, and generosity. Perhaps most of all do I owe this same debt to my advisor, Danny Hoffman, who endured, engaged, queried, prompted, validated, and provoked my thinking as the broad strokes and self-assuredness of my earliest days in graduate school yielded to the more mature, nuanced, and expansive perspective at which I have aimed herein.

In addition, innumerable other faculty and scholars have lent me their ears and insights over the course of this research. My writing and thinking owes much, directly or indirectly, to (in no particular order) Teresa Mares, Victoria Lawson, Crispin Thurlow, Maria Elena Garcia, Rachel Chapman, Lorna Rhodes, John Toews, Michelle Habell-Pallan, L. Shane Greene, Dylan Clark, Jeffrey Juris, Bruce Burgett, Tanya Erzen, Kathy Woodward, Michael Honey, Andrew Stone, Sunila Kale, Margaret O’Mara, James Tweedie, Sonal Khullar, John Findlay, Zev Handel, Miriam Bartha, Jabali Stewart, Alex Vitale, Jennifer Stuller, and Jill Friedberg, among others. In particular, throughout my time studying at the University of Washington, I turned to my fellow students to keep my own work in perspective, most especially Robertson Allen, Matt Hale, Dave Citrin, Amir Sheikh, Mariana Markova, and Kate Boyd.

Beyond these conversations, many of the theoretical, ethical, and geopolitical explorations that have found a place in my writing have begun in the classroom. The Comparative History of Ideas Program, the Department of Anthropology, and the School of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences at the University of Washington have all been beyond supportive of my pedagogical explorations. More specifically, I owe thanks to many of the faculty, graduate students, and staff with whom I have had the good fortune to share teaching workshops, classrooms, and pedagogical conversations, particularly (in chronological order) Catherine Zeigler, Rick Bonus, Third Andresen, Doug Merrell, Heidi Magi, Christina Wygant, Jeanette Bushnell, Tamara Myers, Ryan Burt, Giorgia Aiello, Georgia Roberts, Cynthia Anderson, Stacey Moran, Adam Nocek, Theron Stevenson, Rahul Gairola, Wendy Wiseman, Tim Cahill, Damarys Espinoza, Annie Bartos, Emily Clark, Erin Clowes, Jed Murr, and Alice Pedersen. I also owe a debt to Jim Clowes, who died not long before I began teaching for the Comparative History of Ideas Program and whose work I have tried to continue there in some small way. His pedagogical insights and personal legacy reminded me, perhaps more than any other, what an indispensable place compassion, intellectual humility, human diversity, and (for want of a better term) social justice have in our understanding of the world and how carefully we must protect them from partisanship, narrowness of vision, ego, and simple human frailty.

My students, too, have consistently educated me in new and unforeseen ways, and have always pushed me to think in more detail and with more empathy. The standouts have been too numerous to
name, but a few have offered particular assistance or insight into this project, most particularly Kyle Croft who assisted me with transcribing interviews, and also Chaim Eliyah, Beth Scholler, Heather Rastovac, Jules D’Amour, Shealeigh Heindel, Graham Pruss, Ryder Richardson, and Matthew Venema.

Perhaps my greatest debt of all, though, has been the journey of personal becoming without which no ethnographer can claim to have communicated meaningfully or arrived at any particularly new understanding. Failing that, ethnographic research is only so much ink on paper. Everyone listed above has contributed to this journey, but I would like to single out some people whose contributions have transcended the intellectual and the political. For these personal and political entanglements, for sharing space, time, and thought with me, for sitting with me through my travails and inviting me into theirs, for reminding me what's at stake and why it matters, for reading drafts of this dissertation, for teaching me to think anew, for sheltering me, for letting me shelter them, for pointing me in the right direction, for reminding me how to play, and for caring, I would like to thank Jessie Kindig, Meg Murphy, Rae Wiseman, Amy Peloff, Olivia Little, Francisco Iturbide, Joe Thompson, Jake Warga, Raven Healing, Noora El Shaari, Kris Edin, Violeta Hernandez, Kevin ‘Doc’ Dockery, Ash Martin-Bumpus, Amalia Davalos, Cale Wilcox, David O’Bright, Tobias Kremple, Elizabeth Rard, Monica Cox, David Wallace, Nathan Shields, Britney Wear, Cutter Greene, Laura Palachuk, Lauren Dixon, Kawan Baxter, Chase Bucklew, Mary Holly, Sage Alderson-Gamble, Ani Borua, Koa Kaelepu, Corrina Chase, Victoria Law, Oats Habercorn, Wilson Shook, Eric Wirkman, Peter Donahue, Garlicana Farms, Keith McHenry, Genifer Lamonte D’Belle, Darryl Grandison, Bridgid Roney, Orion Anderson, Dan Loren, Sean Jensen, Adam Bruno, Carlo Cennamo, Greg Larson, Paul Ohnemus, Erin Ohnemus, Jared Fanning-Lytle, and David Trump, among others. And for teaching me, in their diverse ways and from an early age to read, to care, to play, to endure, and to help, I would like to thank Marilyn Boarder Cummings, Neil Blacker, John Cummins, and Michael Giles.

The present work is precisely what it is because these people and many more have been kind enough to help me make it so. The errors, of course, are mine and mine alone. But the successes are ours and multiply to fill the spaces we create for them.
**Introduction**

*Any Given Sunday in Seattle: Discovering Shadow Economies of Waste in the Globalised City*

The city emerges as a space where the powerless can make history... Powerlessness is not simply an absolute condition that can be flattened into the absence of power. People becoming present and, crucially, becoming visible to one another can alter the character of their powerlessness.

Saskia Sassen

*(not exactly shopping)*

On any given Sunday, the Pike Place Market in Seattle is a very busy place. Just try driving a van through the throngs of tourists—who seem not to distinguish between sidewalk and road. They spill out onto the street with nary a glance at oncoming traffic like me.

But it’s hard to blame them. The red bricks in the road are their domain—just as much part of the tourist attraction as the old brick storefronts that line it, which have been doing business for the better part of a century. The bricks in the road aren’t nearly as old, of course, but they’re there (rather than asphalt) to better lend a seamless atmosphere of world-class historicity to the market. With a fairly spectacular range of restaurants, cafés, and stalls, the market is one of Seattle’s most iconic attractions. And they do a brisk business. At the peak of the summer, “busy” can mean almost sixty thousand visitors in a day. And in the space of a year it may mean ten million, tourists and locals alike, most of them here to shop. Over the course of a few years, I’ve spent hours behind the wheel of various vehicles waiting for them to move out of the way.

In a way, I have spent all this time at the market for the same reason as many of them: The food is world-class. Not only have the produce stands been part of the market’s history for nearly a century. Their postcard-perfect rows of fruit and vegetables also inspire high-ticket tourism. There’s hardly a souvenir shop in the city without a few glossy shots of the market’s apples or avocados amid its postcard racks. In this way, the food itself has become a visual symbol both for the market and for Seattle’s global aspirations. Like a lot of other cities whose futures seemed uncertain after the decline of their manufacturing economies in the late twentieth century, Seattle has turned its fortunes around by attracting global capital in the form of business investment and tourism. To this end, the city has capitalised on its urbane image: cosmopolitan but cozy; high-class but not too snooty; diverse but not too far out of the middle-class traveller’s comfort zone; and just edgy enough to be interesting, but pro-
business at heart—and with high-class shopping to boot. The kinds of qualities that might appeal to
globe-trotting people with spare cash to spend or to invest in the city.

Like a lot of cities, Seattle has often appealed to their bellies. And in this, the market has been a
success.

Of course, unlike the tourists, I haven’t exactly been grocery shopping. I’ve just picked up the
leftovers. From these rows of picturesque produce, many of the market-goers are looking for just the right
apple. Or pear. Or tomato, or avocado, and so on. And with stalls vying to attract the attention of ten
million passersby, inevitably a lot of apples won’t make the cut. It takes a lot of waste to keep up Seattle’s
image. On any given Sunday, that’s where I’d come in.

For the better part of five years, I helped to pick up wasted food from various stalls and shops around
Seattle who have been willing to donate it to a soup kitchen rather than throw it away. Many, like the
vendors at Pike Place, are fairly upmarket. Farmers markets, high-end grocery stores, organic-friendly
co-operatives, boutique bakeries, and so on. They cater to the discerning tastes and disposable income of
people working in the higher income brackets of the city’s new post-industrial economy—software
developers, biotech researchers, aerospace engineers, and lawyers, for example. The city’s median
income has grown significantly over the last two decades, and many residents can afford to be choosy
about their diet. In contrast, the food I’ve picked up has ended up in the hands of people who are at a
disadvantage in the same economy—unemployed, underemployed, disabled, homeless, etcetera. Like a lot
of cities, Seattle’s post-industrial fortunes have been both the best of times and the worst of times,
depending on who you ask.

In this respect, the abandoned avocado, the bruised apple, and the other unwanted produce I’ve
picked up from Pike Place has become part of a broad, diverse safety net of soup kitchens, food banks,
meal programs, shelters, and other non-profit endeavours—a kind of after-market shadow economy. This
safety net wouldn’t be possible in the same way without the donated excesses of the city’s urban
consumers and markets. Then again, it wouldn’t be as necessary in a different, less starkly polarised kind
of economy. Nonetheless, without this safety net, Seattle’s post-industrial economy would be an even
starker place. And a lot more people would go hungry.

Once this surplus food is taken off the shelves—and off the market—that’s usually the last the tourists
and shoppers ever see of it. After that, never the twain will meet. If it doesn’t end up in a Dumpster, it
ends up in the hands one philanthropic organisation or another that redistributes it—normally indoors,
and out of sight of the shoppers. The shadow economy of wasted food moves in different spaces than they.
In a way, it has to: The aesthetics of abjection or poverty just aren’t compatible with Seattle’s urbane image. It takes a lot of waste to keep that image up, in more ways than one.

In this respect, though, the group I work with is unlike many other meal providers. I work with a sort of anarchist soup kitchen called Food Not Bombs, a motley crew of anarchists, punks, students, hippies, Quakers, and other politically minded collaborators. And while most soup kitchens operate in fairly hidden or marginal spaces within the city, in contrast, there’s a good chance that our labours might bring the tourists and their passed-over produce back together again later in the same day. Or, at least, the two might move through the same spaces again. While they’re perhaps off to visit the Seattle Art Museum, the Space Needle, Westlake Mall, or what-have-you, each Sunday our group takes the food back to someone’s kitchen and makes an improvised vegetarian meal out of the waste. And then takes it not to a church or a shelter, but to Pioneer Square, which—in addition to being home to a range of low-income housing, shelters, homeless services, and of course, shelterless people—is another popular tourist destination. (And just a mile or two away from Pike Place, in fact.) Also a budding hub for information technology businesses, the neighbourhood is another focal point for Seattle’s global aspirations. And although it interrupts the city’s image of urbane cosmopolitanism, and upsets some of the tourists and businesses, our group shares dinner publicly in a Pioneer Square park with anyone who wants it—many of whom, of course, are homeless. In this, we follow a three-decade tradition of Food Not Bombs chapters:

Throughout the US and dotted across the globe, chapters collect unwanted food from local stores (either through donation or Dumpster-diving—although donation is more common and less time-consuming), prepare it safely, and distribute it in public spaces, often challenging their cities’ anti-homeless measures in the process. These anti-homeless measures have often targeted such food-sharing efforts in public spaces precisely because they upset the environs of urbane consumption. More than this, though, in effect they ban eating in public for anyone who can’t afford their own dinner.

On any given Sunday afternoon, we might eat dinner in the park with forty or fifty down and out residents of Pioneer Square. We might also share the red brick paving stones (recently installed) of Occidental Park with sports fans cutting through the park on their way back from Seahawk Stadium. Or tourists who’ve come to eat at the popular Grand Central Bakery, adjoining the park in another one of Seattle’s historic brick façades. There’s an information booth on the other side of the park, and when it’s closed, tourists have occasionally come over to us to ask for directions to the local attractions. In contrast, other visitors often show up asking for other directions to other kinds of places: train-hopping kids looking for advice about where to squat; fishermen who paid their way to Seattle only to find that the jobs they were promised didn’t exist, that the fishing industry has folded here, who can’t afford a return ticket and need to figure out which shelters might not be full yet; other people for whom there wasn’t
room in the shelters, asking where they can find a blanket, or at least some clean socks; alcoholics looking for a drink, or bus fare, or both.

The contrasts are uneasy. Between the best and worst of times. High-class cosmopolitanism and the down and out. Expensive fine dining and the shadow economy of free leftovers. (Compare our improvised guacamole, a common menu item, with the pristine avocados on postcards at souvenir shops around the corner.) Sometimes the businesses or tourists have felt uncomfortable enough to complain to the city, which in turn has sometimes sent a squad car to ask us to leave (echoing anti-feeding policies in other such polarised cities). The resulting controversies—played out in the park and sometimes the local papers—outline in even starker detail some of these contrasts.

Nonetheless these different spheres and economies are all integral, entangled parts of Seattle’s economy. In this regard, working with Food Not Bombs has been a long, enlightening lesson in the politics and economics of food, class, consumption, and the city. The descriptions above are all matter-of-factly drawn from the concrete experiences of working, collaborating, and researching with Food Not Bombs for five years. As I’ll describe below, they outline the stakes of Food Not Bombs’ work, the stakes of this dissertation, and the stakes of life in the globalising city.

(food not bombs and the globalising city)

This is an ethnography of waste, cities, and social movements. Primarily one social movement in particular, Food Not Bombs, which does the kind of work described above not just in Seattle, but in hundreds of cities, in dozens of countries, on every continent except Antarctica. But there is much more to Food Not Bombs than the term “movement” can capture. So this dissertation aims to accomplish more than an ethnographic case study of a single social movement. (In fact, two fine dissertations have already taken a case study–like approach to Food Not Bombs; see Parson 2010 and Shannon 2011.) Food Not Bombs’ globalised reach—expanded steadily since its inception in 1980—and its place at the margins of economic value and urban space are suggestive of many things. This dissertation will deal with three of them. First, it illustrates the ways in which waste is made and moved about in many cities. Second, it suggests some of the ways in which those cities are becoming global in the process of waste-making (and vice versa). And third, it maps some of the ways in which social, economic, and political developments in these globalising cities at the same time give rise to globalised forms of social organisation and resistance. (In this sense, Food Not Bombs has paved the way for more recent decentralised, global, urban phenomena like Occupy Wall Street—or Occupy [Insert-Your-Home-City].) As such, the object of this
research is not simply a city or a social movement. Rather, it is a transnational cultural logic anchored in these sites.

By way of research, I have not only worked extensively with Food Not Bombs in Seattle, but have been a part of some of the larger political and cultural communities in which Food Not Bombs is wrapped up—Dumpster-divers, squatters, homeless advocates, punks, anarchists, and so on. I have also cooked with Food Not Bombs chapters in half a dozen other cities in the United States and Australia and interviewed participants in these places as well. Of course, not every Food Not Bombs chapter is the same. And not every city where it works looks politically or economically like Seattle. Food Not Bombs has many faces. But in my research, I have found parallels and patterns important enough to write a dissertation about them here.

Maybe most important of these has been the link between Food Not Bombs’ growth and urban globalisation. People have started Food Not Bombs chapters in small towns in the suburban United States, bustling metropolises in Southeast Asia, and everywhere between. But one thing that stands out about many of the most long-standing well-known chapters is that they have been located in cities that have might be called global (Sassen 2001) or globalising (Rennie Short 2004). Cities like Seattle, San Francisco, Boston, New York City, and Melbourne, all of which I have visited for the purposes of my research. Mighty metropolises whose post-industrial economies are constantly becoming-global, in the sense that they are integrated and reintegrated into global circuits of elite business investment, high-end consumption, and tourism. The word “global,” here, denotes both a sociological model of the powerful “command functions” these cities take on in the global economy (Sassen 2001: 6) and an ethnographic description of cultural trends in these cities—which often embrace the term “global” themselves—as they invest in a market-centric and often ethnocentric vision of what makes a city’s public life world-class.

Like Seattle, described above, many of these cities also generate a wealth of world-class waste: food wasted in the interests of commodity aesthetics, buildings left empty for the sake of property speculation and gentrification, and so on. One Seattle Dumpster-diver and Food Not Bombs collaborator I met, for example, called the city “the land of plenty” for Dumpster-divers. (She recalled lovingly that the best peach she had ever eaten came from a Seattle Dumpster.) Through Food Not Bombs, I have met many such Dumpster-ers and squatters in each of these cities who have made a life (if not a living) out of precisely these surpluses. And, of course, these sorts of surpluses are what make Food Not Bombs possible.

At the same time, the upscale consumption that creates this waste also puts food and shelter financially out of reach of many people. Which is, of course, what makes Food Not Bombs’ meals so vital in the first place. While homelessness and hunger are hardly unique to these globalised cities, they take on
uniquely stark proportions in such places where the cost of living is high and the labour market is polarised by high income, white-collar work and low-income, often short-term or part-time service jobs. Not only do the Food Not Bombs groups I’ve worked with try to ameliorate this gap between haves and have-nots, but they also endure it themselves. Many of them share in the economic marginality or instability of the people with whom they’re sharing food. Volunteers are often working for low wages in the bottom rungs of the post-industrial economy. We reflect this in our economic and lifestyle choices. Whether we Dumpster-dive primarily out of necessity or out of an ethical refusal to participate in consumer culture, the cost of living in a world-class city means this is not a hard and fast distinction. (Here, I quite deliberately include myself—the wages of an academic researcher and adjunct instructor in the US are often marginally above the poverty line, and Dumpster-diving has certainly stretched my grocery budget.) Moreover, it’s not unheard of that Food Not Bombs volunteers are homeless themselves (including half a dozen of my own friends and collaborators over the last several years). And squatting is yet more common among volunteers than actual shelterlessness. These arrangements are not, of course, the way a majority of Food Not Bombs collaborators keep a roof over their heads. But while the majority of Food Not Bombs volunteers I’ve met are simply paying rent somewhere, they are often compelled to do so in the cheapest neighbourhoods, in shared cooperative houses, or both. (And to my knowledge, I have never met an active Food Not Bombs volunteer with a mortgage.)

To be clear, I don’t mean to essentialise or generalise. A diverse cross-section of people get involved in Food Not Bombs. But within the polarized territory of the globalised city, there is at least a shared sense that most of us live somewhere on the same shaky economic ground. For this reason, it’s significant that Food Not Bombs collaborators don’t tend to say that we’re “serving” food. Rather, we often say that we’re “sharing” it, echoing a commitment to “mutual aid” rather than “charity.” This is more than a semantic distinction: We eat the food too.

This economic marginality also makes many Food Not Bombs collaborators somewhat nomadic. Through Food Not Bombs, for example, I have worked alongside broke, train-hopping punk rockers and transplanted university students in search of educational opportunities (he wrote, sheepishly), migratory service workers (international and domestic), and underemployed youth following the suburban-to-urban exodus in search of a supportive counterculture and a less shitty job. In these sorts of ways, the post-industrial economies of places like Seattle cultivate a certain mobility in the ranks of Food Not Bombs volunteers. One which echoes the increasing “flexibility” of many labour markets entailed in neoliberal globalisation and the becoming-global of many cities (Sassen 2001). And, of course, Food Not Bombs collaborators often seek out the group upon arrival in new places, lending a densely networked geometry to the movement. To my surprise, for example, I noticed almost accidentally, through chance run-ins in
the kitchen and incidental conversations (to paraphrase: “You’re from Seattle? I visited Seattle Food Not Bombs once and helped cook,” “Oh, I have a good friend from Melbourne Food Not Bombs—I met him while they were on tour here,” etcetera), that I could trace networks of personal acquaintance between any of the Food Not Bombs volunteers I’ve met in Seattle, Melbourne, or any the east coast cities I visited within a mere five degrees of separation. All without including myself as a link—that would be cheating, of course. (What’s more, the popular game “six degrees of Kevin Bacon”—a play on the term “six degrees of separation”—can be played not only via shared film roles, but via Food Not Bombs acquaintances, literally: A few of the people I described above suggested to me that a close relative of the actor plays in an east coast punk band and has been involved in their respective Food Not Bombs chapters!)

From its beginnings in Boston in 1980, Food Not Bombs spread to San Francisco in 1988, to the rest of the country by 1992, and further abroad in the years thereafter, following this kind of networked cultural logic. Many of these intersecting trajectories have been, naturally enough, concentrated in globalised metropolises which tend to be nodes for larger patterns of domestic and international labour migration (Sassen 2001). Saskia Sassen has suggested that global protest movements like Occupy Wall Street represent an emergent, networked kind of cultural resistance that grows out of the networked economic and political relationships that have developed between global cities (2011). Food Not Bombs shows us that such networked resistance may be enduring, rather than episodic: We’ve been doing it for thirty years.

Broadly speaking, then, what I will describe throughout this dissertation is an abject symbiosis between the development of globalised cities and the work of Food Not Bombs. In blunt terms, Food Not Bombs would be neither possible nor important without the surpluses, scarcities, and displacements fostered within these mighty metropolises. In my research, I have observed in concrete ethnographic detail some of ways in which Food Not Bombs has been shaped by political, economic, and cultural trends in the lives of these mighty cities, and, in turn, the roles Food Not Bombs itself has played in shaping these same trends.

In a sense, I would like to suggest that Food Not Bombs chapters each represent part of a kind of many-headed hydra growing out of the surpluses, excesses, inequities, and deterritorialisations of urban globalisation. Not simply a movement, but a broad network (or a network of networks, as Manuel Castels describes it; see Castells 1996) of people who reconstitute its detritus in new cultural, political, and economic forms. An ethnography of Food Not Bombs, therefore, offers the reader a window into some of the non-market economies and transnational, networked, resistant social forms that emerge from
landscapes of waste and abjection in global cities. In other words, Food Not Bombs can teach us a lot about the cultural lives of these cities, wealthy and wanting alike, and the intimate connections between.

In the pages which follow, I will attempt to trace some of the lived relationships between affect, identity, and economy that both create these landscapes, and that allow Food Not Bombs and its larger communities to re-create them. From the ways in which consumers’ aesthetic prejudices drive commercial waste, or the public fears of contagion and deviance that motivate anti-homeless measures, to the shared “structures of feeling” (Williams 1977) which organise acts of political resistance—be they the compassionate act of sharing food or the angry insistence on civil disobedience.

My inquiry will be organised around three themes which intersect throughout the dissertation. First, I discuss the role for globalised cities of what I’ll call *abject capital*, that share of commercial waste that is still useable, but which is, paradoxically more profitable to throw away than to sell. At the same time, I’ll explore some of the new purposes to which this abject capital is put, and the abject economies that are made of it—often constituted through non-market kinds of labour like Dumpster-diving and squatting. Scarcity, after all, may be a cornerstone of market economics, but life itself, as Georges Bataille points out (1991 [1949]), is usually in excess one way or another—and it always finds a way. Second, I explore strategies of municipal governance—particularly anti-homeless policies such as Seattle’s “civility ordinances” or New York City’s “quality-of-life” program. These often prohibit public food sharing and privilege a very particular kind of public life—one in which food and other forms of sustenance change hands mainly through commercial transaction or personal acquaintance, and rarely cross the segregated lines of class and consumption. I’ll call the object of this urban governance a *market-public*. Third, I’ll explore the kinds of emergent resistances and “counterpublics” (Warner 2002) that are cultivated in their very exclusion from this world-class, capital-friendly version of public life. In their alienation from the mainstream public, they at the same time are free to constitute the kinds of non-market shadow-economies I described above. In a sense, they are both oppressed and liberated by their own exclusion from the public sphere, and the exclusion of the public’s unwanted excesses. In this, they are free to forge political resistances like Food Not Bombs or Occupy Wall Street.

I hope this work will be valuable to a range of researchers, policy makers, activists, and interested readers. Scholars of political economy may find an interest in the ways in which value is made and remade through waste-making. Urban ethnographers, geographers, scholars of the global city, and policy makers may appreciate the on-the-ground relationships outlined here between food security, urban policy, and global political and economic trends. And scholars of social movements and activists alike may, I would like to think, find something useful in my description of the big-picture relationships between globalisation, waste, urban government, and the development of resistant communities.
(how do I know all this?: part one, “militant” methodologies)

I have learned a lot from Food Not Bombs. My first personal experiences with the group date back to nine
years ago. At the age of twenty-three, I worked at the back of a second-hand charity shop in Davis,
California—sorting through the cornucopia of unwanted, donated stuff. I periodically saved backpacks
and personal hygiene supplies from the mountain of things, and took them over to the city’s downtown
park on a few occasions to hand them out alongside Food Not Bombs. A few friends from the thrift store
knew a long-term volunteer and had connected me with the group. I had also heard the group’s
recruitment spots on community radio. (Their advertisements always ended with, “And remember… Food
is good, bombs are not.”) This was my earliest education in the shadow economies born of
overaccumulation and surplus. But Davis was a peripheral university town, and the scale of these
surpluses—and of Food Not Bombs—was correspondingly small.

When I moved to Seattle for graduate school the following year—before I ever began to think about
writing this dissertation—I sought out Food Not Bombs out of a commitment to conservation,
humanitarianism, homeless advocacy, and an interest in anarchist politics. After a few false starts, I found
and became quickly committed to Food Not Bombs. (Some have even said overcommitted.) Since then,
Food Not Bombs has, at different moments, been the main locus of my friendships, my social networks,
my political affiliations, my living situation, and even my diet. I lost many an hour of sleep looking for
new kitchen spaces or ensuring that the dishes were washed and the floors swept. I literally wore out my
car’s shock absorbers driving perhaps a half-ton of food and volunteers around the city each Sunday for a
few years. I have come to know intimately many of Seattle’s less storied spaces and down and out
residents. And through it all, many of my own assumptions, values, and epistemological foundations have
been turned on their head, reconstituted, and turned on their head again.

This is all, of course, the very stuff of ethnography.

If the ethnographer’s job is to return from “the field” a changed person—themselves a kind of
“fieldnote” of the lives in which they’ve participated and observed (see Jackson 1990)—I have conducted
a most thorough ethnography. I have embraced, then eschewed, and then embraced again divers radical
modes of political thought and action before finally (and with a healthy intellectual distance) reconciling
myself to both their value and their flaws. (All along I have been uncomfortable with ideological
bandwagons, but in my classes I often tell students I have “anarchist sympathies.”) I have by turns
subscribed to and recanted of a range of radical critiques of both the political status quo and anarchism
itself, all the while aiming at a multifaceted appreciation of the indeterminacy, complexity, and human
stakes of the issues at hand. (A transformation I’ll discuss in the conclusion to this work, but which I hope is nonetheless evident throughout.) And I have been by turns demoralised, elated, frustrated, and deeply grateful to have shared space with my fellow Food Not Bombs collaborators.

Rather than describe these personal commitments and experiences in a preface to this work, then, I reference them here, intimately implicated in the methodologies of my research. In this, I am following the lead of Jeffrey Juris who found a productive synthesis between ethnography and active personal and political engagement in networks of anti-capitalist protest in Barcelona and Genoa (2007). He writes:

In order to grasp the concrete logic generating specific practices, researchers have to become active practitioners. With respect to social movements, this means helping to organize actions and workshops, facilitating meetings, weighing in during strategic and tactical debates, staking out political positions, and putting one’s body on the line during mass direct actions. Simply taking on the role of ‘circumstantial activist,’ as George Marcus (1995) puts it, is not sufficient. One has to build long-term relationships of mutual commitment and trust, become entangled with complex relations of power, and live the emotions associated with direct action organizing and activist networking. Such politically engaged ethnographic practice not only allows researchers to remain active political subjects, it also generates better interpretations and analyses. (165-166)

In the same fashion, I have tried to put my own body “on the line” along with other Food Not Bombs collaborators—by collecting, cooking, and sharing food, by adding my body to the protests of which it is part, by Dumpster-diving with collaborators, and so on. And I have lived along with them the emotions associated with Food Not Bombs’ brand of direct political action. Indeed, the anger that arises from the (at times rather antagonistic) police pressure on our group to relocate or the official policies they are obliged to enforce, the despair shared with homeless friends and diners at their tenuous, unpredictable circumstances, the joys of finding the perfect peach in a Dumpster, the frustration of washing dishes until midnight with too little help, or the gratitude at finding a couch or floor upon which to stay for the night, for example, have all been, in their own ways, important sources of insight which have inspired the arguments in this dissertation—particularly about the structures of feeling that shape different facets of the cultural life of globalised cities. Following Nancy Sheper-Hughes’ (1995) call for a “militant anthropology,” Juris calls this politically engaged sort of participant-observation “militant ethnography.” And while the work of sharing food may not seem as “militant” as other kinds of direct action, the commitment to simultaneous personal, political, and academic engagement is no less valuable. Only through these shared stakes, Juris suggests, can ethnographic writing do justice to political action, and political action find value in its ethnographic representations. Several Food Not Bombs collaborators who have subsequently or simultaneously pursued academic research have done just this, and have made similar arguments for their own politically engaged ethnographic participant-observation in Food Not
Bombs—Nik Heynen (2010) and Deric Shannon (2011), for example. And, indeed, my conclusions build upon theirs (as I will describe in chapters four and six, respectively).

To this end, after working with Food Not Bombs in Seattle for the first year or so, and after conversations with my collaborators at the time about responsible academic research, I began to envision the work you read now. In its course, my research has grown and evolved in direct correlation with my relationship with Food Not Bombs. And although, in the final stages, I have found that writing this dissertation demanded a healthy distance from the group’s day-to-day activities (both intellectually and physically), my relationship with the group continues through friendships, through mutual aid (from offering up my spare mattress for couch-surfing Food Not Bombs collaborators to coordinating student volunteering with the group in classes have I taught), and through the writing itself. Moreover, many of my most enduring ongoing friendships have emerged from our shared work with Food Not Bombs. And many of these friends have been kind enough to guide me through various stages of research and writing.

*(how do I know all this?: part two, multi-sited ethnography)*

In anthropological research, however, “the field” is clearly not just an author, his relationships, and his feelings. For the purposes of this dissertation, these relationships and responses are important insofar as they tell us something about a larger social field. The social fields at stake in this work, then, are the larger urban landscapes in which these relationships have been embedded—cultural and economic strata within the cultural lives of globalised cities. And in this, I take some of my cues from Joanne Passaro, whose work, like mine, deals with the cultural politics of homelessness in a globalised metropolis, New York City—which she explicitly connects to globalised political and economic trends. Bluntly, she argues that you *can*, in fact, “take the subway to the field” (1997). In other words, that the chaotic experiences of daily life in a city like New York are no more complex or indecipherable than any other point in the (post)modern, globalised world. In this regard, Heynen (2010) has also usefully connected his ethnographic insights in volunteering with Food Not Bombs to larger, globalised political-economic pressures and trends in urban politics, basing his own observations about the neoliberal management of urban “geographies of survival” on firsthand participant-observation with Food Not Bombs in Atlanta Georgia, for example. He writes, “Ethnographers have shown that the combination of local participant-observation complemented by engagement with these kinds of global networks can facilitate more meaningful understandings of the ‘global as local practice,’” (1228). My work navigates just such connections.
This is all very well in analytical terms. But pragmatically, what does it mean to do the ethnography of a globalised city or its public life? As Passaro puts it, “what will you do once you step off the boat?” (156).

Passaro’s practical answer was, partly, to multiply her sites of engagement. “[C]onceptualising participation and observation as elements in dialectical tension,” she employed a combination of volunteer labour, advocacy work, and semi-formal biographical interviews with homeless people (156). I have largely followed her example in these three ways. As it happens, both service and advocacy have emerged almost effortlessly from my commitments to Food Not Bombs. In other words, I have not only collected, Dumpster-dived, cooked, and shared food—not to mention washed countless dishes afterwards; along with other Food Not Bombs collaborators, I have also cultivated relationships with a range of advocacy groups in the city, often cooking for fundraising benefits, demonstrations, marches, anarchist bookfairs, and so on. In addition, I have cultivated my own part in some of these relationships further, particularly with certain homeless advocacy or service organisations such as Real Change—a street newspaper which covers homeless issues and is sold by largely homeless people—and ROOTS—“Rising Out Of The Shadows,” a Seattle youth homeless shelter with a more progressive, less hierarchical approach to its daily operations than many. I have attended public meetings for these groups, assisted with research for them, and often coordinated student volunteership with these organisations as part of classes I have taught at the University of Washington. Where Passaro’s approach was already multi-sited, however, my own has been even more so, adding to this service and advocacy a more general participation in the countercultural and political milieu of which Food Not Bombs is a part, particularly the punk and anarchist scenes, from organising (and performing at) fundraising benefits, to attending musical performances and other events at anarchist organisations and shared houses.

In addition to these kinds of participant-observation, I have also conducted oral history interviews with a wide range of Food Not Bombs volunteers from a variety of periods in the group’s organisation. I took a networked, “snow-ball” sampling approach to contacting and asking for interviews. In general I interviewed people I knew whom I thought had significant experiences working with Food Not Bombs, and then interviewed people they knew and recommended to me, and so on. In all, I recorded interviews with thirty-two participants from seven cities: Seattle (fifteen), Melbourne (five), San Francisco (three), New York City (three), Buffalo (two), Worcester (two), Boston (one), and with one of the movement’s founding members, Keith McHenry, who worked for years in San Francisco and Boston, has visited perhaps hundreds of chapters around the world (including most of the same chapters as me), and now often conducts speaking tours dealing with the history of the movement. (I have organised three such lectures at the University of Washington.) In addition, many of my interviewees had worked with Food
Not Bombs in several other cities, reflecting the networked nature of the movement. Besides these interviews, I also conducted four interviews with non-Food Not Bombs volunteers who have worked extensively in homeless services (two interviews) or advocacy (the remaining two) and had no direct connection with Food Not Bombs, but who helped me understand the cultural politics of homelessness and city government in Seattle.

In each of these ways, my work has touched down in a great many places, both in Seattle and beyond. In this, and because I argue that there are explicit relationships between globalised patterns of urban development and the globalised scope of Food Not Bombs, my work answers to George Marcus’ influential description of multi-sited ethnography “in/of the world system” (1995). But if I seem to have done so assymmetrically—focusing disproportionately on Seattle, as I will describe below—I would like to suggest that it only appears so from a narrowly geographic perspective. In fact, none of these globalised cities represents a single “site.” As Sassen has suggested, they represent nodes in a variety of larger networks and flows—of capital, of business relationships, of migratory labour, of commercial goods, and so on. My research, then, might best be understood as distributed along some of these networks.

Even grouped together according to geography, for example, the participant-observation and interviews I have conducted in and about Seattle (which we could imagine as the name for the most prominent concentration of nodes in my research), represent what Celia Lowe has called a “multi-sited ethnography in a single locality,” insofar as they can “reveal the travels of cultural meanings, objects, and identities across wider fields of engagement” (2006, 6). This is so for two reasons.

First, the cultural, economic, and political terrains of any given locality are hardly stable or unified. They are fractured, stratified, and pluralised. They speak in different ways to different people, and even at different times of the day and week. As I described at the outset, for example, to many of Seattle’s tourists, Pike Place and Pioneer Square are related through their world-class, red-brick historicity and postcard-symbolism. To Food Not Bombs and the people who eat with us, in contrast, these two locations are key attractions in a shadow economy of waste, want, and abjection.

Second, not only do the locations we might mistake for “fieldsites” in a narrowly geographic sense contain multiple forms and structures. They also don’t contain them very well! As my experience in Seattle demonstrates, a specific geographically bounded area—whether one as small as Occidental Park or one as big as Seattle—cannot adequately contain the social fields in which I am interested. It is characteristic of Food Not Bombs, for example, that the mobility of its personnel (as I described earlier), lends it a rather ephemeral nature. While some core participants may remain involved for several years at a time, for the most part, in my experience, there is a high turnover in the group’s membership. Many help for just a day or a few weeks. Some help for several months and then never return. (Bemoaning this
inconsistency, one slightly jaded Food Not Bomber complained to me about a kind of “activist resumé building.”) As some drop out and newer participants join, the group itself becomes—gradually and not at all in a linear fashion—an entirely different collective. Like the cells in one’s body, replacing themselves every seven years on average (so it is said), a given city’s Food Not Bombs chapter is made anew and yet occupies the same space. By my reckoning, during the five years or so in which I was actively and regularly embedded in the group, this cycle was repeated perhaps three times. In other words, there were at least three moments in which I realised I was one of only one or two people regularly attending the kitchen who remembered anyone who had been in the kitchen a year or two prior.

In this respect, a single chapter of Food Not Bombs itself may become multi-sited over time. The ethnographer can stay in one place and let the network come to her. Indeed, because Food Not Bombs volunteers are often as globalised as the movement itself, and often travel, stopping to cook or eat with different chapters as they go, by simply staying in one spot, Seattle, I have met collaborators from Food Not Bombs chapters in countless other places—Germany, Argentina, Mexico, Colombia, and Canada, to name the few international chapters that come immediately to mind, and not to mention the dozens of US chapters from whom visitors have come to Seattle Food Not Bombs as well. And the same roving of network of Food Not Bombs collaborators has been in evidence in other chapters I myself have visited as well—particularly in the larger cities like New York, Boston, San Francisco, and Melbourne.

While lazy ethnographers could certainly wait for the world of Food Not Bombs to come to their doorstep, however, there are aspects of the movement’s geometry that may ultimately be illegible from a single spot. In a way, on any given Sunday, the configuration of people cooking or eating with the Food Not Bombs is as likely as not to never be repeated. (Not unlike the menu, improvised according to the vicissitudes of commercial grocery wastes.) In this, they resemble what Lisa Malkki calls “accidental communities of memory,” meaningful but passing phenomena formed in transitory spaces like refugee camps, which are culturally and politically significant, but largely illegible to the (imagined) rootedness of most traditional anthropological fieldsites and methods (1997). Even multi-sited ethnography often carries an unspoken assumption that its “sites” are stable, bounded, and enduring. Food Not Bombs—and the larger countercultural communities and discarded surpluses of which it is made—are none of these things. As such, my work here not quite a “global ethnography” in Michael Burawoy’s terms, imagining the field as a kind of case study for global processes (2000). Rather, it is an “ethnography of global connection,” as Anna Tsing has put it (2004).

To capture something of the significance of these ephemeral configurations and connections, then, I have taken two equally important approaches. I have spent a significant time in one place, Seattle, observing the ways in which Food Not Bombs’ labours are anchored in local histories, economies, and
politics. And I have also travelled to visit other chapters, following as best I could some of the specific networked relationships made initially apparent to me through my time and acquaintances in Seattle. In this, again I take my cues from Jeffrey Juris’ work on protest networks—particularly his multi-sited approach to “network ethnography” (2009). While the concept of network ethnography is gaining popularity more generally as a methodology with which to make sense of the deterritorialisations of the globalised world, and particularly of digital communities and informational flows (cf. Burrell 2009, Howard 2010), what is valuable about Juris’ approach is his attention not to specific information flows but to the embodied cultural practices which make them possible. He recalls one activist telling him, of the People’s Global Action network, featured heavily in his research, “You never really know who is involved… and the ones who are most involved sometimes don’t even think they are a part of it!” (2009: 5). Unlike networks that exist exclusively online, activist networks like the People’s Global Action network, or Food Not Bombs, do not consist of easily marked identities, codes, or transactions. Rather, then, Juris draws our attention to what he calls the “cultural logic of networking”: those “concrete practices through which such networks are constituted” (ibid.).

While Juris focuses on practices that make activists’ digital networking possible, it applies to my own experiences as well: As one participant in Seattle told me, only half jokingly, Food Not Bombs is a kind of “mass conspiracy to feed people.” And mass conspiracies (insofar as the term is meaningful at all) imply a kind of heterogeneous consensus, a shared cultural logic. The qualitatively recurrent experiences of shared kitchens, living spaces, gastronomies, transportation strategies, and communal decision-making that I have observed in Food Not Bombs chapters on either side of the Pacific, for example, are just as important to the constitution of a large-scale network like Food Not Bombs as digital technologies.

Moreover, these shared, qualitative logics only really become visible through the combination of intimate familiarity and geographical breadth at which I have aimed in this work. I would probably never have discovered that I could play a Food Not Bombs version of The Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon if I had stayed in Seattle, for example. Nor would I, if I had simply started travelling from chapter to chapter without first making networked acquaintances and introductions from Seattle. And yet, the surprise encounters and the “small world” which emerges from such dense networks are part of the recurrent qualitative fabric of Food Not Bombs which, in the long run, helps the movement-cum-network-cum-mass-conspiracy to function as such.

In order to write this dissertation, then, in addition to my extensive work with Food Not Bombs in Seattle, at different times I have visited and volunteered for shorter periods, varying from a few weeks to a few days in half a dozen other cities, following a trail of networked friendships, acquaintances, and associations based upon my initial connections in Seattle: Melbourne, Australia; New York City, New
York; Buffalo, New York; San Francisco, California; Davis, California; Boston, Massachusetts; Berkeley, California (in order of experience, from longest to shortest). As I described above, I have conducted semi-formal, recorded interviews at length with Food Not Bombs collaborators from many of these cities, often based upon introductions facilitated by people I had already met in Seattle. I have also, through the same network of social and political connections, met and interviewed informally collaborators from Vancouver, British Columbia; Worcester, Massachusetts; New Brunswick, New Jersey; Wellington and Dunedin, New Zealand; and Portland, Oregon.

It is through all of the conversations, travels, relationships, and personal engagements described above, then, that the questions have emerged that I will wrestle with for the rest of the present work: How does edible food come to be thrown away? What kind of a cultural economy is at work in which some of this waste is donated to soup kitchens while the rest of it is locked away in a Dumpster? What economic and political motivations lead city authorities to forbid the free public distribution of food? What different modes of being-and-surviving in the city do they engender? And how are larger movements, networks, and other social forms created or shaped in the process? Among others. Some of these questions have been answered rather directly in my conversations with Food Not Bombs collaborators and other advocates. Others have demanded a long, slow process of inquiry, observation, and critical reflection that began with that very first eye-opening day of gathering valuable detritus behind the Davis thrift store.

For the moment, the sketch I present here of the dense, ephemeral trajectories and connections that make Food Not Bombs work, of their sometimes symbiotic, sometimes antagonistic relationships with the politics and economics of cities, and of the marginalised people, places, and the mountain of world-class waste that make it all possible, is as best as I can manage a true account of my life with Food Not Bombs.

(who is my audience?)

I will be the first to admit that this is an ambitious project. There is a range of people to whom I would like to speak, and these audiences have, of course, guided the choices I have made about precisely which words to set to paper. Within my own discipline of anthropology, I hope that this work amounts to a substantial contribution to the body of work that makes the leap, as Burawoy suggests, directly from the local to the global stage (2000), to describe the embeddedness of lived cultural processes within global political economic trends and vice versa. In this, I respond meaningfully to the work of political-economic ethnographers like Arjun Appadurai and Pierre Bourdieu, who have helped me think about the ways in which value and cultural economy might generate waste, and to transnational, global, or networked ethnographers such as Juris, Burawoy, Aiwha Ong, and Anna Tsing who have helped me to
think about global connection. In addition, I draw from urban ethnographers and geographers like Passaro and Heynen, whose work has helped me to think about the relationships between the lived experiences of individuals and the cultural lives of cities.

In addition to these anthropologists and ethnographically informed writers, I would like this work to find a place in conversations with politically informed and engaged theorists of urban and global political economy—writers like Saskia Sassen, Sharon Zukin, and David Harvey, who have paved the way for anyone who wants to describe the relationships between urban culture, politics, and globalisation.

Drawing on these thinkers, I hope that what I present here helps future scholars to think about how and why some people in globalised cities do the things they do, prohibit the things they prohibit, and throw away or scavenge the things they throw away and scavenge.

Another body of work to which I hope this work contributes, overlapping with those I’ve just mentioned, includes a range of politically engaged theorists whose writing has found its way into the hands of activists and inspired a range of real political action and interaction. In part, my work responds, for example, to Hardt and Negri’s description (2004) of the globalised relationships, both realised and virtual, that might amount to a global “Multitude,” that in its own ways is constantly liberating itself from capital and its globalised power structures. Similarly, my work responds to Gibson-Graham’s call for “a post-capitalist politics” (2006)—a diversity of non-exploitative economies that might eventually eclipse capitalism in the future and make space for alternative modes of living in the present. These works have been sometimes dismissed or critiqued by activists and academics alike (not that those two groups are mutually exclusive) for being too abstract, allegorical (or at least naively optimistic), and conceptually removed from real world politics. My work shows, however, that such projects are a reality in the here and now. Whatever else may come of it, Food Not Bombs is a globalised form of resistance that is liberatory for the people involved, and that facilitates broader non-capitalist modes of living. Similarly, my work takes up Giorgio Agamben’s writings on political exceptionality, which has found gregarious traction, inspiring academic critiques of policy and insurrectionary direct action alike. I hope to offer a few concepts and descriptions to advance this theoretical conversation, and perhaps to help frame the goals and actions of activists who read this work.

There are, of course, no specific political programs that motivate the claims I make here. I have tried only to give a faithful account of the world as I have come to know it. Nonetheless, in the conclusion to this work I will try to sketch out some of the political implications of the description that has emerged from my work. And these implications, I hope, will inform the work of activists, policy makers, and everyone else whose life’s labours are, like it or not, making and remaking the world as we know it on a daily basis.
With all of this in mind, then, the dissertation is divided into two parts, each containing three primary chapters (along with the odd prologue and excursus). The chapters of the first part are intended primarily to introduce some of the key theoretical terms and conceptual tools with which I have tried to make sense of the political, economic, and cultural forces that shape life in the globalised city—particularly “abject capital,” “market-publics,” and “world-class waste,” as I’ll describe below. Each theoretical discussion is built upon the arguments of the previous ones. The chapters of the second part are intended to explore in more fine-grained ethnographic detail some of the sociopolitical and economic phenomena I have encountered in the course of my research—from the proliferation of feeding prohibitions to the proliferation of Food Not Bombs and the counterpublic spaces that cultivate it. Similarly, each chapter builds on the insights of the previous, and all of them are founded on the theoretical claims of the first half of the dissertation. The first part, then, is intended to establish the theoretical terms and claims that I will employ to make more concrete ethnographic descriptions in the second part. Of course, this is not an absolute dichotomy, but rather a question of emphasis. The theoretical discussions of the first part emerged from my own ethnographic research and insights, while the ethnographic descriptions of the second part have their own important theoretical implications. Altogether, they can be understood as a single argument, each of its components emerging logically from the discussions that preceded it.

The first chapter attempts to explain why there should be so much discarded food available to Food Not Bombs in the first place. It looks at the cultural economy of commercial waste, and asks why on earth it might be profitable for businesses to throw away goods that are still useful. To answer these questions, the chapter explores the ways in which commercial value is reckoned, and suggests that the creation of value is necessarily a dialectic process—there is no value without a contrasting valuelessness. Waste is necessarily the result of the creation of value. In short, it is a quiet, ongoing crisis at the heart of capital. The slightly bruised apples and avocados that are pulled from the shelves to make room for more picture-perfect stock, for example, are in effect sacrificed to inflate the value (and price) of the newer stock. These discarded goods, therefore, continue to serve a kind of spectral economic function in their absence from the market. Drawing on Julia Kristeva, Giorgio Agamben, and Karl Marx, I have described this waste, in its exceptional role—both external to the market and yet vital to its function—as *abject capital*.

The second chapter explores some of the social spaces that are necessarily implicated in the creation of this abject capital. Value, after all, doesn’t create itself. People must value it, and agree to some extent about how much it’s worth. In this chapter, I argue that the creation of economic value demands a particular kind of public sphere, an imagined community of people who are understood to share the basic language and conventions of commerce and capitalist value. If abject, wasted capital has a role to play in
establishing the value of those things left on the shelves, then, it must remain absent from this particular
public sphere. If it circulates at all (and it must, for it cannot be willed into nonexistence), it must do so
apart from those people who participate in the market, both spatially and socially. Drawing on Michael
Warner, who suggests that we think not in terms of a single “public”, but rather many overlapping publics
and counterpublics, I have described the economic sphere where market value is reckoned as a market-
public. The market-public, I argue in this chapter, is not just an abstract theoretical term. It accounts for
some very particular, concrete consequences. It explains, for example, one reason why businesses might
feel comfortable donating discarded food to meal programs, but not be willing to make it available to
Dumpster-divers. The former are understood not to be part of a market-public. In other words, they’re
assumed not to have been potential customers anyway. Moreover, this dichotomy often extends to policy
makers who conflate “the” public to whom they’re responsible with a market-public, and define public
needs and priorities in ways that exclude homeless and economically marginalised people. I take as an
example Seattle’s “civility” codes, which penalise behaviours like sitting on the sidewalk and urinating in
public—essentially criminalising homelessness in a city with inadequate free public seating and toilets.
However, I have suggested that these kinds of exclusions from predominant public spheres also
inadvertently create space for alternative publics where value can be reckoned differently and the
unwanted surpluses of the market can circulate differently. Following Warner again, I suggest that in
recirculating abject capital, Dumpster-divers, Food Not Bombs chapters, and so on, represent not only
non-market economies, but non-market counterpublics.

The third chapter explores the implications of abject capital and market-publics for global and
globalising cities: I argue that they make a “world-class” share of waste in direct proportion to their
globalised aspirations and investments. The governments and business communities of these massive
post-industrial cities, I argue, are under significant pressure to cultivate and cater to particularly upscale
market-publics. I draw here from Saskia Sassen’s description of the global city, and Sharon Zukin’s work
on the spectacular “symbolic economies” in which these cities compete for global capital—in precisely
the way that Seattle, as I described above, has invested in its urbane image and in spaces of upscale
consumption. In cultivating these market-public spheres of high-ticket consumption, I suggest, these cities
also necessarily generate abject capital in equal proportion. Food, shelter, and other things with a
persistent use-value are discarded or cloistered in these cities in significant quantities. (I offer several
examples in this chapter, but none so blatant as the efforts of some upscale clothing distributors in New
York City to make sure their discarded designer jeans stay discarded—by cutting them up before putting
them in the Dumpster, so no enterprising Dumpster-diver might be seen in them.) This chapter engages
intimately with the geography and economy of several globalised cities where I have worked. Particularly
the politics and history of locales like Pioneer Square, in which some of my most important ethnographic
observations have been anchored. As such, this chapter does a significant amount of the political and historical contextualising that might, in a single-sited ethnography, be accomplished in the traditional history chapter—but here, with respect to the development of Seattle and other globalising cities.

In part two, the fourth chapter looks more closely at some of the implications the foregoing theoretical observations have for urban space and policy. In particular, I look at the efforts of Seattle and dozens of other cities around the United States to prohibit the free outdoor distribution of food in large quantities. These feeding prohibitions reflect precisely the economic and political priorities I have described above. I argue that they represent, in practice, an instrument with which to remake Seattle’s public life in the image and interests of the kind of globalised market-public to which Seattle looks to maintain its post-industrial economic success. Such feeding prohibitions ensure that if food changes hands in Seattle in any large quantities, it is primarily through commercial exchange. I argue that in cultivating these urban cultural economies, cities create not only abject capital but other sorts of social abjection, including homelessness and hunger, as a kind of foregone conclusion. To make this point, I take up the “broken windows” theory of social order which has inspired many policy makers, and which has largely justified their cultivation of these market-publics. Meanwhile, the circulation of abject capital—in this case, wasted food—is consigned to marginal spaces within the city. Based on interviews and my own participant-observation, the chapter looks more closely, too, at the assumptions and attitudes of policy makers, public employees, and philanthropic organisations in Seattle, many of whom accept the basic priorities and claims of a market-public—those of Pioneer Square businesses, for example—and who therefore are often distrustful or antagonistic towards counterpublic efforts like Food Not Bombs, who are, after all, defying these feeding prohibitions.

The fifth chapter picks up where the fourth chapter left off—the uneasy relationship between city governments and Food Not Bombs. It describes some of these uneasy relationships in more detail, from the hundreds of arrests of Food Not Bombs volunteers in San Francisco during the 1980s and 1990s to the less dramatic periodic police pressure enforced in Seattle, and other globalised cities examined in my research. Drawing from the commentary of Food Not Bombs interviewees and my own participant-observation, I describe the symbiotic relationship Food Not Bombs has developed with not only the commercial waste streams in these globalised cities, but with state agencies therein—particularly through their efforts to limit or prohibit free outdoor food distribution. I argue that two key trends in state policies have cultivated the emergence of Food Not Bombs. First, municipal authorities deliberately cultivated globalised urban cultural economies, with their corresponding world-class waste and polarised distribution of wealth, creating both an economically alienated, counterpublic demographic with reason to be interested in things like Food Not Bombs, and the raw material necessary to its development,
particularly commercially discarded food. And second, they have often tightly policed the ways and spaces in which people can survive in the city, often by limiting the non-market circulation of food and especially abject capital. The latter move, especially, has fostered the political organisation and growth of Food Not Bombs. Here, I draw on the work of philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari who describe something of a simultaneously symbiotic and antagonistic relationship between what they call “war machines” and “state apparatuses.” The former describes unruly, decentralised social phenomena which emerge in dialectical tension with more formal, bureaucratic efforts of the latter to govern and delimit the social and environmental world. I argue that Food Not Bombs has developed such a simultaneously symbiotic and antagonistic relationship to state feeding prohibitions. It both challenges them and grows in strength and size as a result of them—while the actions of state agencies in turn are organised and at times amplified through their interactions with Food Not Bombs.

And in the sixth chapter, I explore the ways in which Food Not Bombs’s global proliferation has been facilitated not only by its antagonistic symbiosis with feeding prohibitions, but also through a more mutually supportive relationship with the kinds of non-market counterpublics I described at the end of chapter two—counterpublics of Dumpster-divers, squatters, gleaners, and other scavengers, for example. These counterpublics are made possible by the availability of the kinds of wasted surpluses produced in generous quantity in globalised cities—particularly food and shelter—and therefore represent at least incipient global connections. Thus I make the argument that Food Not Bombs’ global proliferation has facilitated and been facilitated by the globalised development of such non-market counterpublics. Drawing from interviews and my own descriptions of Food Not Bombs’ kitchen spaces and provisioning practices, I identify certain globalised, counterpublic forms of “habitus” and “hexis,” in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms—“commonsense” and embodied cultural assumptions that both challenge the norms of predominant market-publics and make possible the real movement of people between different places and chapters and therefore the globally networked structure of Food Not Bombs.

Finally, in the conclusion to this work, as I described above, I would like to take some time and space to reflect on the political implications of each of the above chapters. My conclusion, then, is written as an open letter to Food Not Bombs and other interested parties. Some of the conclusions are broad and perhaps a surprise to policy makers but not Food Not Bombs volunteers—that there are intimate political economic connections between a city’s world-class image and its secondary shadow economies, for example. Other conclusions are often either opaque or misrecognised from the perspective of Food Not Bombs and the city alike—the notion that their work entails a certain symbiosis, for example, may cut against the grain of assumptions by both policy makers and Food Not Bombs collaborators.
I hope the reader will find the claims I have made here enlightening or at least interesting. I hope they are useful to readers of diverse stripes in envisioning more compassionate, connected ways of being-in-the-city. While I outline no specific political platforms here, the framework of interconnection that underwrites the entire project is both empirically significant and profoundly ethically compelling to me. I hope the reader will find it equally so.
Part One

Conceptual Frameworks: Abject Capital, Markets Public, and World-Class Waste
Prologue, Part One

It's Thanksgiving in Seattle

It’s Thanksgiving in Seattle, and I’m up to my elbows in garbage—giving thanks, as it were, for the harvest I’m about to reap.

I’m in a Dumpster at Seattle’s Pike Place Market. Halfway in, actually, head-first, balanced awkwardly on the edge, sorting through the contents. It’s full of fruit and vegetables thrown away by stalls at the market, which closed early today. A crate full of green beans. Potatoes—we’ll make mashed potatoes with these tonight. Asparagus, a little wilted (wilted by retail standards, mind you). Pineapples with a brown spot or two, but otherwise perfectly good—we might save those for the pie, along with the strawberries and the apples we found at the last Dumpster. Or bake them with the yams we found there, with a little brown sugar.

In among the soggy cardboard and the soggy lettuce, only slightly sullied by coffee grounds, are untold post-commodities: some of them beyond hope, some of them ready to eat, all purged to make room on the shelves for newer stock. With a few precautions and a good rinse, they’re no more dangerous than the recalcitrant leftovers in the back of the average refrigerator. Even better, the compost Dumpster at the market never harbours most of the miscellaneous detritus that might accumulate in the average rubbish bin. So it even smells nice, relatively speaking. And in these piercingly damp, grizzled Seattle Novembers, the chipped green walls of the Dumpster are cold to the touch, and keep the contents fresh. Relatively speaking. (As it turns out, value is always relative, but I’ll come back to that later in chapter one.) These factors amount to a Dumpster-diving experience not completely unlike going shopping. Not completely.

I only have to dig a few hand-breadths down to excavate the ingredients for our Thanksgiving meal. The red brick road, worn smooth by a few decades of teeming wheels and feet, is deserted as my friend keeps a lookout and packs the food up in a few waxed cardboard boxes, dragged out of the Dumpster as well. We’ll take our discoveries to a friend’s house to make dinner: stuffing; mashed potatoes; sweet potato pie; apple pie; and a stir-fry. In all honesty (and with apologies to prior family gatherings) it’ll be the best Thanksgiving meal I’ve had in a long time. Then we’ll cart it over to Pioneer Square (where the original “Skid Road” earned its name and continues to do so, as I’ll describe in chapter three)—to give it away to anyone who wants it.

It’s two in the afternoon at this point, so the tourists and patrons who would normally be milling around here are milling elsewhere. Goodness knows what they’d think of us. The stall-keepers have all
gone home. Their Dumpster is sitting at the curb, padlocked. (Taking a cue from Ziploc, “the freshness is locked-in.”) We can open their lids just enough to peer inside, but that suffices to see which one has the produce. And then it’s just a matter of prying out the pin which holds the lid’s hinge in place, removing the hinge—a long, simple iron bar—and then opening the Dumpster from the wrong side. One doesn’t normally do this in broad daylight, but we’re running late. In our case, this was something of a last-minute “plan B,” actually. In fact, for the Seattle chapter of Food Not Bombs (which is doing Thanksgiving this year, qualms about colonial dispossession and nationalist holidays notwithstanding) Dumpster-diving is usually redundant; while the practice is perfectly commonplace for Food Not Bombs groups, many of us find enough vendors willing to donate their “seconds” that we don’t need to spend the extra hours it takes to prospect for produce in the rubbish. We called in earlier this week to a local supermarket to secure donations for today. But, of course, Thanksgiving is a half-day for them, and it’s a busy half-day at that, so when we got there they’d been up to their eyeballs in other things, and they’d forgotten to put anything aside for us except a small bag of flour. What they would have normally donated is what would otherwise go into the Dumpster. And so that’s where it has ended up. That was the first Dumpster we explored today. To supplement it, we visited Pike Place because we suspected the Dumpster might be fruitful—no pun intended. On any other day, the market is a terribly busy place and its detritus reflects that. The goods passed over in the course of its postcard-perfect commerce are world-class. The Dumpsters here virtually overflow with slightly bruised peaches, perfectly tender mangos, and barely overripe avocados—some of the hundred billion pounds or so of edible food thrown away in the US every year, as I’ll describe in the following chapter. Food which has reached the end, not of its usefulness, but of its social life.

Fortunately for the abandoned peach, mango, or avocado, there are often people working to intercept it before it hits the Dumpster. My friend and I are hardly unique. While millions of hands around the country, and around the world, labour to make it valuable—cultivating, harvesting, packing, and shipping it—and in turn labour to de-value it in the final analysis—trucking it off to a landfill, where commodities go to die—there are also thousands of hands working to resuscitate it. Counter-cultures of gleaners, Dumpster-divers, squatters, punks, hippies, Food Not Bombers and so on, for whom the value of a thing doesn’t follow the economic or cultural logics that have banished it to a Dumpster. They’ll tell epic tales of their favourite discoveries, and they’ll build new families, networks, and movements on the reliable availability of resources beyond the capitalist market. The Dumpsters take on a new kind of currency as their names circulate—the bread Dumpster, the chocolate Dumpster, the burrito Dumpster, and so on. People drive up to Seattle sometimes just to hit the juice Dumpster. Rumour has it there’s a cookie Dumpster in Boston somewhere.
This story is both an ethnographic anecdote and an allegory of everyday life in what Karl Polanyi called the “market society” in which the assumptions of a capitalist market economy are woven into both the society’s political and the cultural institutions, from its tax code to its tastes and values (1957 [1944]). The story above poses daunting questions about the way markets (farmers markets, supermarkets, transnational commodities markets, and so on) value and devalue goods. Put more simply, it asks: Why do people throw useful things away, and what can we learn about them, and about the society they live in, from their trash? And finally, what becomes of that trash once it’s thrown away? What sort of afterlife does it find? What new economies and empires might be built upon the detritus of the old? After all, when we made it down to Pioneer Square with our offerings that night, where different charities had been serving turkey all day (unlike most of the other days in the year), we still found people waiting for us, although the temperature was quickly dropping. And we still ran out of food. One older homeless fellow I met under the viaduct that night—as I walked around announcing our presence—summed it up for me: “There’s always more hungry people around here.”
Chapter One

The Anatomy of a Dumpster: Abject Capital and the Looking Glass of Value

The works of the roots of the vines, of the trees, must be destroyed to keep up the price, and this is the saddest, bitterest thing of all. Carloads of oranges dumped on the ground. The people came for miles to take the fruit, but this could not be. How would they buy oranges at twenty cents a dozen if they could drive out and pick them up?

John Steinbeck

Anthropologists are otherwise sensible people who don’t believe in the germ theory of disease.

Roy Rappaport

(beginnings and endings)

This chapter begins, quite deliberately, where many things end (up): the Dumpster. Or the garbage can, the landfill, or the sewer, for that matter—all seemingly points-of-no-return in the social life of a thing.

And yet, in this chapter I will argue that these ends are only apparent, and veil the ways in which the thing continues to exist and, in strange, subterranean ways, to produce. In the trash heap, the thing persists. In its very abjection, it secretes a kind of abject value, both central to and invisible within the social and financial calculus of market societies. Waste of all sorts, in this way, haunts our cultural economy.

Of all these ends, of all these trash heaps, the Dumpster has been most accessible to the soggy research expeditions out of which this argument has emerged (only slightly soiled). This chapter describes my first-hand, ethnographic explorations of the commercial waste stream, and of the Dumpster-diving counterpublics who mine it for resources. Below, I develop a theoretical language, grounded in the work of political economists and post-structuralists, in which to describe my experiences and explain why so much is thrown away before ever reaching the consumer. Dozens of factory, wholesale, and retail Dumpsters, full of still-useful stuff junked at each point in the commodity chain, have been my points of departure—auspicious places from which to ask, above all, why the production of cultural and economic value should generate such waste, and how waste in turn might produce cultural and economic value. On the heels of the most recent episodic global financial crisis, marked as much by bonuses as bread lines, waste may be a cipher to the cultural logics that create and distribute wealth.
In particular, I ask: what can we learn from those commodities that migrate from the shelves to the Dumpster, but continue to have a use-value? Or, if you like, *why do people throw perfectly good things away, and what can we learn about them and their values from their trash?*

These questions suggest a looking-glass cultural economy of trash, one I will outline below, in which Marx is turned on his head, in which labour *devalues* commodities, and things become trash simply by being thrown away. I adopt this “cultural economic” approach to make sense of the ambiguities of valuable garbage, which confound the mathematical rationale of economics, but are nonetheless part of an economic system. To account for shadowy prejudices and enigmatic meanings attached to the trash, I draw on post-structuralists’ ability to reveal the uncanny, ambiguous, and occluded. And in so doing, I tease out the ways in which political economy’s vocabulary might recoup these secrets from within its epistemic foundations. With that in mind, in this chapter I decode the back-to-front logic of waste in the analytic language of Giorgio Agamben, Julia Kristeva, and Karl Marx—in terms of “relations of exception,” “abjection,” and “value,” respectively. Marx taught that a thing *gains* value through productive labour (“value added,” in today’s terms) and yet, here in the trash, the thing seems to have abdicated that value. I borrow Agamben’s notion of the *sovereign exception* to describe the conceptual boundary across which such a thing must pass from a normal, nominally “status quo” value to become *aberrant.* Agamben’s term, I argue, is good to think with where the proverbial exception seems to prove the rule. For example, the prisoner with respect to the free citizen; the homeless to the housed; the mad to the sane; or trash to the not-yet-thrown-away. And I borrow Kristeva’s notion of the *abject*—the revolting, the unsettling, the intimate, gagging estrangement of the strangely familiar—to highlight the bilious affect with which such boundaries are policed. At political and personal scales, respectively, Agamben and Kristeva’s works highlight the stakes of these boundaries, which in very real ways define life and death, value and worthlessness. They also suggest a vocabulary in which to decipher the polysemy incipient in Marx’s labour theory of value. While later Marxists and liberal economists alike have critiqued this theory for its determinism—as if the congealed labour Marx identified with capitalist value were an inherent physical property of the commodity—I argue that trash presents a good case for thinking about the relationship between labour and value relativistically.

Briefly put, I will suggest that the Dumpster, the garbage can, the landfill, and so on, are exceptional, abject spaces, where the lapsed value of the contents is paradoxically relinquished and retained—as the not-yet-thrown away, in comparison, appreciates in value. Or, even more briefly, *sometimes the value of things is determined not by what we keep, but by what we’ve thrown away.*

This research, for better and for worse, demands a look at the trash itself and the point of its inception (or demise, depending on your perspective)—that moment in which a thing migrates from valuable to
worthless, and is discarded. Below, to describe the significance of this transition and the cultural-economic systems in which it is embedded, I draw from several years of ethnographic research recovering food with the Seattle chapter of Food Not Bombs. While quantitative methods can account for the scale, sources and destinations of waste, this transmutation can be riddled with indeterminacy, aesthetics, prejudice, and moment-to-moment reckonings that demand first-hand participation and observation. The economic and cultural logics at stake in our food recovery efforts—both from the Dumpster and from grocers’ donations—reveal the contingent processes through which value is determined. This research, therefore, sets about to give an intimate account of these forces in motion, to complement the more abstract political-economic terms in which they are often described.

To this end, I became a weekly visitor for four years to Seattle markets and grocers, soliciting donations of fruits and vegetables, bread and doughnuts, pastries, coffee, and you-name-it, for the Seattle chapter of Food Not Bombs, before they hit the Dumpster. I developed relationships with the employees and learned from them why they were throwing it all away. And for much longer, I have worked with, lived with, loved, and learned a lot about the rhythms of the commercial waste stream from networks of Dumpster-diving urban scavengers in Seattle, San Francisco, New York City, Melbourne, and beyond. Some of these friends have guided me through explorations of back alleys and parking lots throughout Seattle, from the wholesalers and producers of the industrial district to suburban supermarkets, produce stands, and retailers. And I have inspected, excavated—and, yes, eaten from—dozens and dozens of Dumpsters.

In these ways, I have tried to describe how and why things might come to end up here in the trash, and what they portend for the social life of things.

*(the quiet crisis of waste)*

The first time I climbed into a commercial Dumpster, in the alley beside a Trader Joe’s grocery store on Seattle’s upmarket Queen Anne Hill, any of my remaining antibacterial scruples evaporated at first sight: immaculate, individually wrapped slices of pie; imported cheeses, sealed, on the very date of expiry; and tofu, similarly sealed; pre-packaged salad mix; fresh fruit and vegetables; bread; and a small mountain of fresh-cut flowers. The contents represented an almost-random sample of what was inside the store itself. A few friends, more experienced, had taken me “Dumpstering” that night—the verb of choice in Seattle, although on the East Coast I have heard it abbreviated to “diving.” They knew exactly where to look and on what night. We discretely visited four or five alleys and parking lots, stocked our own refrigerators and a few friends’ as well, and decorated their window-sills with a nice flower arrangement. The abundance
was reliable, and typical of my experience since. Over the course of my research, I have often returned to these Dumpsters and discovered numerous others in the Seattle area, all regularly full of such wealth. The Dumpsters represent a shared geography and the basis of a friendly little gift economy to boot.

The material wealth I have found, cloistered away in Seattle’s factory, wholesale, and retail Dumpsters (or on its way there) is hardly out of the ordinary. Or, if you like, it’s business as usual. The market has not been the efficient arbiter of resources some free-market ideologues imagine. Rather, it makes waste in absurd quantities.

For scale, and by way of example: while the majority of still-useful food is wasted⁹ in the United States by consumers—91 billion pounds or so every year—the USDA estimated that 5.4 billion pounds of unspoiled food is thrown away by retailers without ever reaching the point of sale (Kantor et al. 1996: 1). While the US produces enough food to feed its populace almost twice over each day, a third of it is thrown away before its time; retailers alone throw away enough of it to feed more than four million people daily (2-3). Ironically enough, 5.4 was also the percentage of American households (about 16 million individuals) that reported “very low food security” in 2011, as I began to sketch out this chapter, meaning they had to eat irregularly or less than normal during the year “due to limited resources” (Coleman-Jensen et al. 2011: v). The two trends, towards surplus and towards scarcity, are not completely unrelated.

Waste is a quiet, ongoing crisis at the heart of capital, which, no less than want, stalks the noisier, episodic economic calamities we are more accustomed to hearing about. The American foreclosure crisis of the last several years, for instance, has been characterized just as much by empty houses as by evicted families, but any crusty squatter punk¹⁰ can tell you there is nothing new about empty houses in the United States.¹¹

In scrutinizing detritus and its intimate relationship to capital, this work sets itself apart from other fine studies of waste by anthropologists (e.g. Rathje and Murphy 1992) and other social scientists (e.g. Hetherington 2004; Ferrell 2005; Hawkins 2005) that have focused on the cultural imperatives and excesses of the consumer. In contrast to this consumer-centric analysis, a different body of anthropological research has been asking for a long time what detritus can tell us about a society’s modes of production. But most of that trash is very, very old, and its recovery has been called “archaeology.” It is worth noting, though, that several archaeologists have contributed much to our understanding of contemporary waste as well (e.g. Rathje and Murphy 1992; Jones et. al 2002a, 2002b; DeSilvey 2006). Their insights, however, have lent themselves more to a quantitative analysis than to the intimate, qualitative cultural economy that this chapter attempts. In addition, while all of these bodies of research have been foundational to the present work, they have often followed a pattern pointed out by Daniel
Miller, common to much ethnographic research on cultural-economic value (1995), in that they have focused separately on production or consumption. (Three notable exceptions are Michael Thompson [1979], Mary Douglas [1984], and Georges Bataille [1991 {1949}]. I will return briefly to each of them herein.) With that in mind, the present work sets out to illustrate the dialectic between production and consumption that happens in the creation of value, and in particular inside the Dumpster. While the consumer is certainly implicated in the workings of the market, the role of waste cannot be boiled down to opulence or irresponsible consumption alone.

I mean “market,” here, on both experiential and abstract scales, from the discrete marketplace—be it “the Pike Place Market,” “the supermarket,” or “big-box-mart”—to the “experience-distant” (Geertz 1983) market-as-metanarrative—the Market-with-a-capital-M. The double meaning here folds in a dialectic between the two—between the sum of particular cultural-economic behaviours, and the ways they scale-up in emergent social patterns. In other words, between the ethnographic and the theoretical. And I mean “waste” here both in the sense of “detritus,” and in the sense of “unnecessarily thrown away.” As the market carves out the profitable from the merely useful, the dual meaning of the word is entirely appropriate.

On the surface of it, this waste seems illogical according to the rationality of the market, which, it is sometimes claimed, connects supply with demand with sweeping efficiency. But amid the deregulated markets and globalised commodity flows of recent decades, the waste seems undiminished. More than that, it seems to happen in proportion to the scale of these markets—the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization found that up to a third of the globe’s annual food yield is wasted, particularly in developed nations by retailers and consumers who can count upon its relative abundance and low cost (Gustavsson, Cederberg, Sonesson, van Otterdijk, and Meybeck 2011: 14). At the same time, of course, average food prices around the world have climbed prohibitively higher over the last several years, elbowing millions of people beyond the poverty threshold. This, too, is not completely unrelated. The so-called global food crisis of three years ago was not only a matter of scarcity, per se, but rather of distribution. Nor was it a fundamental change in the pricing mechanisms of the global food system, but rather a quantitative spike, de rigueur, in fact, for the workings of the market. In other words, the “crisis” has been going on for a long time. It is incipient in markets themselves.

Wasted surpluses are, of course, not confined to food: Dumpster-diving scavengers I’ve known from the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, readily attest to the diversity and abundance of useful, wasted surpluses in these market societies. Consider the following practical tip from an anonymous, experienced Dumpster-diver: “do what any savvy shopper does—look in the yellow pages! Chances are, if they sell it in front, they throw it away out back… There’s bound to be a Dumpster out
there to serve you: food, bike equipment, construction materials, kitchenware, books, electronics, clothes, flowers, shoes, bread, bread, bread” (CrimethInc. 2004: 220; my italics, ellipsis). In my research, I have found everything on this list (including all that bread) except for the kitchenware—and only because I already had plenty of kitchenware.

But the Dumpster full of food is a particularly expressive symptom of the ways in which waste and value might be related. Janet Poppendieck observed: “Poor people routinely suffer for want of things that are produced in abundance in this country, things that gather dust in warehouses and inventories, but the bicycles and personal computers that people desire and could use are not perishable and hence not rotting in front of their eyes in defiance of their bellies” (Poppendieck 1998:127). This conspicuous decadence, and the instrumental relationship between food, life, and culture, makes food waste an especially transparent variable in the social calculus of economic value. The relationship implied is asymmetrical: the logic of the market often has more of an impact on life (both biological and social) than the demands of life have on the market. To tease out this calculus, I will preoccupy myself, below, most often with food, and with its commodified and abjectified forms.

(the bulimia of late capitalism)

At the outset of the global financial crisis in 2008, Seattle’s gunmetal-grey autumn days portended for many a winter-of-discontent: meal programs, food pantries, and food stamps saw a surge in popularity and new waves of people fell on hard times and cold streets. But the Dumpster-divers I knew reported practically nothing. No change, that is. None of us saw much of a difference, qualitative or a quantitative, in the things we found in the trash. The Dumpsters seemed to have quietly escaped the recession, despite the incipient panic colouring just about every other sphere of the city’s life. At the time, one vendor at the Pike Place Market mentioned to me (while I was collecting donations of unwanted produce for Food Not Bombs) that he had noticed more customers shopping at the discount tables—produce’s last stop before the trash. I wondered out loud later that day if the markets would have to cut back on their donations. A few Food Not Bombers reminded me, in response, that even during the Great Depression, food had rotted on the shelves, and they expected the same. They didn’t expect a shortfall—not for Food Not Bombs, at least. This turned out to be prophetic, and the donations kept up. But the queues of people lining up to eat with us certainly got longer that year. And other emergency meal–providers around the city described to me the same trend. Ironically, that year, food waste amounted to the greatest recorded proportion of Seattle’s commercial waste stream (Cascadia Consulting Group 2008). The proportion had grown steadily since 1996, in fact, and gave no sign of diminution at last count in mid-2008, in anticipation of the
The cultural economics of waste were not, it seemed, determined by hunger or demand, but rather the reverse.

This goes to show that waste is not a simple reflection of consumption patterns, of American opulence or poverty. Waste is a determinative cultural-economic logic in its own right; one with the potential to shape, rather than just reflect, social behaviour. In other words, commercial waste bears out the argument that social life and cultural values in market societies are made and remade by market forces in the image of economic value. In this vein, Harvey (1990) and Jameson (1991), among others, have suggested that “postmodern” society reflects a wholesale reorganization, over the last half-century or more, of lives, languages, and values, around the needs of “late capitalism” for workers to make its wares and consumers to buy them. Harvey (2007) notes that in its most recent, “neoliberal” phase over the last three decades or so, capital has assumed an unprecedented hegemony, a near-complete capacity to mediate life itself, translating even the barest of human necessities (food, water, shelter, healthcare…) into prices and properties, and cutting the citizen-consumer off from alternate forms of life beyond the market.

Even the consumer’s appetite—literally—has been subject to inflation in capital’s search for new markets: between 1970 and 2003, the average American’s caloric intake grew by 523 calories per day (Farah and Buzby 2005). The greatest increases by far were of fat, oils, and grains, reflecting not just a net increase but a qualitative change in the American diet. Not surprisingly, then, the quantity and diversity of foods available per-person in supermarkets has grown significantly in the United States and Britain over the last two decades—along with the average restaurant’s portion-sizes, and, indeed, the average person’s size (Stuart 2009). Similarly, Goldfrank (2005) has shown that the demand for greater diversity and quantities of produce in the United States is flexible and not immune to advertising.

Following Harvey and Jameson, Guthman and DuPuis (2006) suggest that in the neoliberal market society, the consuming body itself is being remade in the image of capital, whose contradictions are temporarily resolved therein, as it absorbs more and more calories more and more cheaply—becoming, in effect, an expanding market for new products.

But there is, of course, only so much a body can take. The upper-limit of a body’s caloric intake would seem to present a problem of “inelastic demand” (439). Waste itself, Guthman and DuPuis argue, becomes a way for markets to overcome this barrier, and to hyper-extend their reach: They describe a “bulimic economy” of paradoxically excessive portions and empty calories, over-eating and expensive dieting, of economic binging and purging, which has the effect of multiplying capital’s opportunities to return a profit (442). Which is to say, of encouraging us to spend more, and more disposably, on our bodies. They go on:
To put this in a broader sense, neoliberalism’s commodification of everything ensures that getting rid of food—whether in bodies, municipal dumps, or food aid, for that matter, which has been shown to open up new markets—is as central to capitalist accumulation as is producing and eating it. Notwithstanding the laments of those who problematize the costs of obesity, the dieting, health-care costs, and waste management that accompany US food surpluses are internal to the logic of neoliberal capital and are not externalities. In other words, bulimia is not simply a way to read bodies; it is a way to read the neoliberal economy itself. (442)

Their argument echoes the looking glass economy described earlier, in which waste paradoxically creates wealth. And it is an argument born out by the growth in food waste over the last few decades: far from being an inelastic demand, American per-capita food waste has grown steadily by about 50 percent between 1974 and 2003 (Hall et al. 2009: 1-2). Rathje and Murphy, archaeologists of garbage—or “garbologists” (their term)—have estimated household food waste at 10 to 15 percent of total purchases, and implicitly tie it to the growing diversity of product choice, according to their “First Principle of Food Waste”: “The more repetitive your diet—the more you eat the same things day after day—the less food you waste” (Rathje and Murphy 1992: 62-63, emphasis in original).

While Guthman and DuPuis illustrate the intimacy of capital’s influence on eating and on cultural values, however, they still emphasise the ways consumer decisions have driven waste over the ways waste may overdetermine consumer decisions. But if life and waste are organized in the general image of the market, they must also reflect specific modes of production, and reflect the commodity form itself. And food waste, to wit, reflects not just the logic of the market, but of the supermarket. Expiry dates, for example, account for an important proportion of retail and consumer food waste in the US, UK, and other industrialized countries (Kantor et al. 1996: 5; Ventour 2008: 6; Gustavsson et al. 2011: 13). Citizen-consumers often pass over food, guided not by taste, texture, smell, or sensible food-safety principles (as their grandparents might have been), but by these factory-stamped estimates, unregulated by the state (with the exception of baby food),17 with no standard definition or method from producer to producer (“sell by,” “enjoy by,” “use by,” and so on). Expiry dates reflect not the condition of the food so much as the projected conditions of its industrial production, transportation, and sale. And, of course, they are incredibly conservative: Seattle Dumpsterers often preserve food and beverages, junked at or near their expiry date, which will last safely for weeks afterwards. (As I write this, for example, my fridge is full of posh organic fruit smoothies, worth five dollars at the shop. Hermetically sealed, they will taste the same in two weeks, but they “expired” this week, so I found them in the Dumpster by the dozens.) Nonetheless, the passage of the expiry date is often a bit of a sombre occasion in the social life of a thing. Like a “guilty” verdict or a bad credit history, it casts—often unfairly—a sudden shadow over its formerly warm relationship with the citizen-consumer. (Some of my friends are still wary of my refrigerator for this
reason.) In this way, industrial algorithms are incorporated quietly into the market society’s diet and daily routine.

The scale and social significance of these surpluses all point towards a critical role for waste in the cultural economy of value. The slow-motion crisis of waste, like its faster cousins, the global financial crisis, or the global food crisis, is a productive crisis—for some at least. All of these crises, after all, have turned out to be profitable for the right people with the right resources. The richest Americans all got richer in 2008, for example. The more life itself is carved and parsed out into capital, it would seem, the more waste is left in the Dumpster. It remains, however, to look closely at this moment of distinction, to fathom the processes by which some things are valued while others are discarded. It remains to look more closely into the Dumpster.

(banished: the uncommodity)

Of course, the present work sets out not from any particular Dumpster—the technological limits of word-processing hardware being what they are. Rather, it sets about to excavate the conceptual space of the Dumpster. Actual Dumpsters come in all shapes, sizes, colours, and textures. They are filled and emptied by divers individuals and institutions. And that’s to say nothing of their contents—there are a lot of different things here in the rubbish, in vastly different states. No two Dumpsters are the same. (In fact, no single Dumpster is ever the same for very long either—trash is always becoming trash.) And there are a lot of different reasons things might end up here. Bad memories. Broken glass. They span such a range of human endeavour as to have absolutely no common denominator, except that somebody saw fit to throw them away. So, from the outset, we could define the Dumpster as, simply, “away.” That place where things are thrown. The Dumpster, trash-can, landfill, sewer, and other such spaces serve as a kind of cultural elsewhere, an outside to sociality. If, in what Arjun Appadurai has called the “cultural biography” of a thing (Appadurai 1986: 34) one imagines its birth at the vertex of diverse, convergent lines of production, then this is its final resting place—the social afterlife of a thing. “Rubbish,” “trash,” “garbage,” “detritus,” and “refuse” have various etymological roots and associations, but they refer equally to the contents of this cultural no-man’s-land, and will, for my purposes, be synonymous. A proper account of the cultural economy of waste, then, will need to answer the following questions: First, what kind of a social life did it lead? And second, what is the significance of its new location, “beyond the pale” of sociality?

The answer to the first question is straightforward, and depends on one’s point of departure—for my purposes, the commercial Dumpster. The life that leads there is one of commerce. The relevant trash
accretes in alleys, loading docks, and parking lots at every point in the commodity chain prior to the point of sale. And if the contents are still useful, if the food in here is still edible, then the life it leaves behind was not defined by its utility—by what Marx called a *use value* (2000 [1865]: 458). Its social life, or, if you like, its “shelf-life,” was a *commodity life*. As Appadurai has pointed out, a commodity is not simply a category of thing, but rather “one phase in the life of some things” (17). That being the case, he suggests that “the commodity situation in the social life of any ‘thing’ be defined as the situation in which its exchangeability (past, present, or future) for some other thing is its socially relevant feature” (13, italics in original). The most important part of the commodity’s social life is its *exchange value*. Its going rate. For our purposes, while waste is still useful, its exchange value is zero. Trash is free. (Of course, this value is unstable, because what seems of no value to one person may hold value for another. And what is thrown away might just as easily have been sold, traded, or given away under other circumstances. But once in the Dumpster, generally speaking, no one is likely to give you much for it.) I will describe further below how an otherwise useful item might forfeit its exchange value. For the moment, it will suffice to describe trash as “priceless,” in Igor Kopytoff’s words: “in the full possible sense of the term, ranging from uniquely valuable to uniquely worthless” (Kopytoff 1986: 75). Without a price, by Kopytoff’s reasoning, trash has become *decommoditized*. Or in Appadurai’s words, an “ex-commodity” (Appadurai 1986: 16). Of course, it might be suggested that these items do, indeed continue to have a life, albeit in different spheres of value. By some measures, trash remains a commodity all the way to the landfill; waste materials like scrap metal may be big business, and waste disposal companies may jealously guard what has become their property by virtue of landing in the bin. (Although in the United States, at least, the right to pick through other people’s trash has been upheld by the Supreme Court.) But that seems remote from the cultural economy of trash that determines what one puts in the bin and how one deals with it. In general, its “commodity candidacy,” in Appadurai’s words, the set of cultural relationships within which it may be exchanged meaningfully, is null and void (13).

The answer to the second question follows from the first. With respect to its former life, the trash stands in a “relation of exception” (Agamben 1998: 18). Giorgio Agamben coins this term to describe a kind of “ban,” a social or political category that identifies deviance or transgression, and in naming it renounces it. The exception is both explicitly *part* of a social order and *banished* from that social order. Or, in Agamben’s words, “included solely through its exclusion” (18). It is, he says, “not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it” (28). In short, the exception categorically defines a boundary between sociality and its “outside.” A boundary that, in turn, *defines the exception by what it is not*, and repels it on those grounds. For example, the refugee is defined by her lack of citizenship. The prisoner by her lack of freedom. The homeless individual by her lack of shelter. And
the trash is defined simply by its having been thrown away—which is to say, in the case of commercial waste, by its lack of exchange value.

For Agamben, this otherwise-circular definition offers one fundamental insight: it expresses the sovereignty of a bio-political order—a politics of life—to define itself. Sovereignty, that is, to regulate the legitimacy and viability of certain forms of life over others. In the case of the price-less post-commodity at the bottom of the Dumpster (especially the edible one), it expresses the sovereignty of capital. In a sense, Agamben explains, the exception proves the rule: “the exception does not subtract itself from the rule; rather, the rule, suspending itself, gives rise to the exception and, maintaining itself in relation to the exception, first constitutes itself as a rule” (18). While Agamben is largely concerned with systems of law, his thinking applies equally to systems of value, particularly to the extent that they are bio-political—that they delineate a social, cultural, or political mode of life, distinct from what he terms “bare life,” the sheer biological fact of existence. In neoliberal market societies, capital delineates exchange value from use values in just such a bio-political fashion—especially those use values, like nutrition, without which the sheer biological fact of existence would be no more.

Throwing away a commodity despite its nutritional value paradoxically reinscribes a sort of shadow-commodification within a market full of exchange values even as it becomes an ex-commodity. Similarly, Michael Thompson (1979) has called rubbish a kind of “covert” category of economic value, one that continues to have economic significance and social meaning even though it is treated explicitly as if it does not. Otherwise, if it could be “simply set outside the law and made indifferent,” in Agamben’s words, it could be given away, eaten, worn as a hat, or forgotten about, among other things, with no meaningful consequence for the market. The fact that it is usually not—and is even padlocked away at times—reinforces its relation of exception within the social order of commodities—and the sovereignty of capital, rather than bare human necessities, to define the value of everything left on the shelves.

Consider the following simplistic thought-experiment: If the supermarkets’ edible surpluses were given away indiscriminately, instead of thrown away, we might predict that it would be hard to ask “full price” for what was left in the stores. (Philanthropic donations themselves represent another “exceptional” case, as I will describe in the following chapter, and are only viable insofar as they do not disrupt the market.) Even if the surplus were sold at a significant discount, the exchange value of the newer stock would suffer, according to the logic of supply and demand. They cannot be “made indifferent” to each other. Such a market would be an absurd, dadaist paradox. To paraphrase Steinbeck: Why buy it new, when it can be had for less, albeit not quite as fresh, in the alley?

In fact, that paradox is precisely what plays out: Shoppers enter through the front door, and Dumpster-divers take the alley-less-travelled. However, for the majority of citizen-consumers, as I will
outline below, aesthetic standards on one hand, and the uncouth, threatening space of the Dumpster on the other, keep the paradox relatively contained. The waste, therefore, continues to play a role in the market.

In other words, *what we throw away serves a function through its own absence*. Just as “negative externalities”—costs deferred or passed on by the market—are echoed in a price structure, so is waste. Externalities like agricultural subsidies, environmental damage, and labour exploitation, for example, keep the average price of a hamburger from reflecting its real cost, estimated by one study at $200 per burger. Waste, though, is a kind of externalisation of *product*, rather than cost. It keeps prices up, rather than lowering them. The “milk lakes” and “butter mountains” of Europe’s recent past are perhaps the most infamous example, bought and dumped by governments to subsidise dairy prices. Although some producers themselves also practice milk-dumping in Europe, the US, and elsewhere, when demand underwhelms supply and prices drop.

Dumped milk differs from much of what’s in the trash in one important respect, though. While the milk is destroyed almost instantaneously, a lot of ex-commodities retain their use values—at least for a time. (That is, unless they perish in the trash compactor—people in Seattle, San Francisco, Melbourne, and beyond, have all repeated stories of their favourite Dumpsters being replaced by trash compactors. Apocryphal stories circulate of employees sprinkling their trash with bleach, too, although these are harder to substantiate. The dumped milk and the compacted, bleached trash both cease to be use values. The food in the Dumpster, on the other hand, persists.)

This difference is critical. It abandons the useful ex-commodity to an ambiguous relation of exception—both part of the calculus of supply and demand, and yet excluded from the market—the useful detritus of commerce becomes more than just an ex-commodity (which implies simply that no one wants it anymore, or that there is no place to exchange it). In its exceptional ambiguity, I will call it an *uncommodity*. (abject capital)

Of course, most shoppers do not object very strenuously to this state of affairs. They have little business with the Dumpster, which has, after all, been kindly removed from most of their spheres of sociality. And should they cross paths with a commercial Dumpster, a general, creeping mistrust usually prevents them from spending longer with it than they have to.

This has certainly been the initial response of a lot of people introduced to the Dumpster-diving part of my research. (Although, to be fair, many others have asked to come along as well.) Indeed, I found my research the subject of rather intense public interest—part fascination and part disgust—for a short time.
after a feature article on my research (Long 2011) was syndicated. The story was reprinted in dozens of papers, and led to other interviews and features on television, radio, and in print, as well as a string of public lecture invitations. The fascination of my work, of course, was partly that a scholar would deign to get into a Dumpster, let alone eat what came out of it. The readers had mixed responses, many of which were quite viscerally disdainful. And the dis-ease of readers in response to my own research is echoed in reports on Dumpster-diving elsewhere in the popular press, which often conflate it, implicitly or explicitly, with criminality, homelessness, or illness, or present it as a kind of entertaining, but exceptional, side-show. (A small aside: Dumpster-diving is not risk-free, but while food-borne illness is no trivial concern, the risks are distorted rather than clarified by blanket prejudices against trash, and mitigated by a basic knowledge of food safety principles. Of the dozens of Dumpster-divers I’ve spoken with in this research, only one has ever reported hearing of anyone getting sick this way. If only I could say the same thing about my track record with commercial restaurants…) In a way, the experience became a valuable piece of my own ethnographic research, illustrating the powerful affective value of the Dumpster. It serves effectively, in these cases, as a concrete space of bio-political exception: Beyond the pale of sociality, it is illegible and untrustworthy. More than that, though, it also repellent. Why?

The “abject,” a concept borrowed from post-structuralist psycho-analysis, might help explain the threatening quality of these spaces, and their ambiguous, spectral relationship to capital.

Agamben’s insight into this intimate nowhere-in-particular is, of course, useful for describing formal conceptual structures which delineate lived experiences—in the same way that “langue,” the abstract, deep conceptual structure of a language, delineates “parole,” everyday speech and thought. Things can stand in an abstract relationship of exception with respect to language, law, or price structures, for example, and this has real consequences—for what is and is not intelligible, for what is and is not legal, for what is and is not affordable, and so on. However, when the conceptual space of the exception is mapped onto physical spaces and bodies, the possibility for direct contact with it is anything but abstract or formal. In various ways, revulsion, hatred, defilement, and dis-ease all live at the boundaries between the abstract exception and its lived experience. As Agamben points out, for example: “When our age tried to grant the unlocalizeable a permanent and visible location, the result was the concentration camp” (20). While the Dumpster is no concentration camp, some of the people forced to eat from it might not find the comparison completely irrelevant. Not completely.

Ironically, the trash’s bio-political “elsewhere” is not usually very far away at all. It hides in plain sight, in the back yard, the alley, the parking lot. But despite its closeness, it manages not to provoke mass revulsion most of the time. Its conceptual space is quarantined, worlds apart, by a strange, fascinated repulsion that Julia Kristeva (1982) calls abjection. For Kristeva, abjection is intangible but real. It can
inhabit any experience, from the act of social deviance, to the touch of a corpse, to the off-putting skin on a glass of unhomogenised milk. It is the threatening, the disturbing, the contaminating. It is everything the trash might be if it escaped its quarantine. Like Agamben’s relation of exception, what is abject is included in the psyche “solely through its exclusion.” Kristeva explains:

There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an *exorbitant outside or inside*, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, *quite close, but it cannot be assimilated*. It beseeches, worries, and fascinates desire, which, nevertheless, does not let itself be seduced. Apprehensive, desire turns aside; sickened, it rejects. (Kristeva 1982: 1; my emphasis)

For Kristeva, “the abject” signifies not a specific place, person, or thing. In fact, the abject cannot *signify* anything: It is not an object. Rather, it is an affect, a sense of disruption within the self. While this disruption may manifest as an uncanny, gagging aversion, or a sense of defilement in the pit of one’s stomach, its source may be found in a threat to the coherence of self-identity. “It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection,” Kristeva explains, “but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules” (4). In this way, Kristeva’s work on the abject is inspired in part by Mary Douglas’ classic work *Purity and Danger* (1984), and by Douglas’ famous assertion that dirt is just “matter out of place.”

Which is to say, except for once a week when the garbage truck comes to collect what is in the Dumpster and remove it to somewhere else, what is most important about it is that it is *in there*, rather than *out here*. In other words, according to Douglas, what is dirty or dangerous is largely reckoned through a process of spatial classification. (Or, more colloquially, “…and stay out!”)

While Douglas, like Agamben, describes the symbolic threat dirt seems to pose to an abstract conceptual structure, Kristeva investigates the reasons this threat might be experienced so viscerally. What Agamben describes as “exceptional” at a formal, structural level, then, corresponds, at the gut-level, to “abjection.” The two are not precisely the same thing, of course, but they may overdetermine each other at different scales. Abjection describes the extrusion of Agamben’s relation of exception into the dimension of affect, of tactility, of the viscera.

Kristeva’s observation about the abject’s fuzzy status, neither subject nor object, can be extended to Agamben’s exception. Because it identifies a lacuna, an “outside” to systems of identity and signification, the exception can have no direct object. Although, with chilling irony, the ban has been used to categorically target specific people and peoples, the structure of exception defeats direct categorization, as the ban defines an exception circularly by what it is not. The abject, like the exception, cannot quite be named directly.
If, the object, however, through its opposition, settles me within the fragile texture of a desire for meaning, which, as a matter of fact, makes me ceaselessly and infinitely homologous to it, what is abject, on the contrary, the jettisoned object, is radically excluded and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses. (Kristeva 1982: 1-2)

In this way, trash too cannot be named directly. It must simply be understood as that-which-has-been-thrown-away. Or, more precisely, it refers to the “collapse” of meaning that occurs at the point where something has been thrown away. For that reason, ironically, here in the trash, where the sheer tactile reality (colour, texture, smell) of a thing has never been more apparent, its continued materiality is often overlooked.

In this way, where the exception has been spatialised, where its structure is mapped onto lived experiences, there is also the possibility for a disruption to that structure—and the experience of that disruption is abjection. Like the exception, therefore, the abject reinforces a social structure, cordoning off potential sources of disruption. “There,” writes Kristeva, “abject and abjection are my safeguards. The primers of my culture” (2). Like Douglas’ famous dirt, abjection, for Kristeva is not just a threat to cultural structures of signification and self-identification. It is also their foundation. It is this abjection that speaks from within the Dumpster, warning conscientious shoppers to stay away.

Gay Hawkins (2005) has pointed out, quite rightly, that not all contact with waste threatens to disrupt identity or the social order—in fact the work of making and handling trash becomes embedded in everyday systems of signification in innumerable mundane ways, from peeling a banana to taking out the recycling. But in the case of the uncommodity, as I have described, its definitive element is its “awayness,” its estrangement. Abjection is fundamental to the integrity of this order. The trash must continue being nothing in particular, and being conspicuously so, in order not to resolve or congeal back into value. The avocado which, removed from the Dumpster, is still unmistakeably an avocado (albeit with a bruise or two), may become edible once more. As such it becomes a challenge to familiar modes of consumption and commerce.

Here, then, is the secret of abjection: *It is revolting, in both senses of the word*. The paradox of abjection’s “dark revolt of being” is that while it secures a system, it also undermines it. Kristeva points out that the threat of disruption contained in abjection’s fundamental ambiguity is also the fundamental weakness of abjection: it is always on the verge of becoming sublimated. Of being renamed, recategorised, and diffused. “Sublimation,” in Kristeva’s terms, “is nothing else than the possibility of naming the pre-nominal, the pre-objectal, which are in fact only a trans-nominal, a trans-objectal. Through sublimation, I keep it under control. The abject is edged with the sublime” (Kristeva 1982: 11).
The abject, therefore can be recovered. The taboos surrounding it can be reimagined or revalued. Like Kafka’s open door, what initially seems like a prohibition may also be a threshold to be crossed.

Dumpster-divers have often described to me, for instance, their initial hesitations at Dumpster-diving, and then contrasted that hesitation variously with expressions of liberation, righteousness, accomplishment, or joyful transgression, at successfully living on the leftovers. In the same vein, Dylan Clark (2004), describes one way that Dumpster-divers sublimate or displace the powerful abjection associated with trash. Following Claude Levi-Strauss’ “culinary triangle” (Clark 2004: 2), which suggests a structural opposition between the category of “cooked” (equated with sociality), “raw,” and “rotten” (both anti-social categories), Clark suggests that in (super)market societies, the category of “cooked” has become identified with “commodified.” For people who, like the punks in Clark’s work, reject such market-based logic, the structuralist categories may retain their meaning, and yet their revulsion is displaced from waste to the economic system responsible for it. Rather than purchase food, they reclaim it from the Dumpster, and in doing so assert new non-market identities. “By bathing corporate food in a Dumpster,” he writes, “or by stealing ‘natural foods’ from an upscale grocery store, punks’ food is, in a sense, de-commodified, stripped of its alienating qualities, and restored to a kind of pure use-value: food for bodily sustenance” (3). Thus does trash maintain a structural relationship to non-trash:

Eating food from dumpsters is, for a generalizable American whole, repulsive. Food in a trash can becomes spiritually and materially polluted, and it is put there in a rotten state. It goes beyond the pale of Whiteness to eat food from the trash (only untouchables, such as the homeless, eat from trash). So for those punks who were raised White and/or “middle class,” dumpsterers and dumpstered food serve to dirty their bodies, to help tarnish their affiliation with a White bourgeois power structure. In this sense, the downward descent into a dumpster is literally an act of downward mobility. Moreover, the very act of eating food deemed rotten is, in this sense, a forceful critique of the powers-that-be. On an ecologically strained planet home to two billion hungry people, punks see their reclamation of rotten food as a profoundly radical act. (Clark 2004: 11)

If Clark describes explicitly the ways in which the abjection of commercial waste can be overcome, he also points to the ambiguous challenge waste poses to capital’s sovereignty—the taken-for-grantedness of its capacity to define and mediate life. This sovereignty rests on its ability to find traction within a social arena and move reliably through it. As David Harvey reminds us, capital is not simply a quantitative noun, but rather a process of investment and return. So it cannot sit still for very long. “When capital is held in commodity form,” Harvey explains, “it exists as commodity capital. But since capital remains capital only as value in motion, it follows that commodity capital must be continually transformed into money capital” (Harvey 2006 [1982]: 71). (The nuclei of capitalist crisis, he suggests, is this very inability of capital to move on a massive scale.)
Valuable garbage, then, questions the foregone conclusion of this transformation in a given social arena. The price-less ex-commodity in the commercial Dumpster represents a kind of lapsed, *almost-capital*—the capital that *very nearly was*. This is its ongoing capacity as “uncommodity”—its relation of exception, both in and outside of a market of exchange values. The ambiguity and weakness of abjection, and the infinite possibilities for its sublimation, however, frame this not just as capital that very nearly was, but as capital that *very nearly could be*. Which is to say it could become a lot of things, finding new utility in sublimation, revolt, or recovery. It could indeed be reintroduced into the market. (A good friend of mine and radical antiwar activist, for example, once paid off a hefty protest-related fine by throwing a yard-sale in which he sold exclusively scrounged furniture and other household items, effectively recommoditising them.) But more interesting are the ways in which these goods may undergo a parallel kind of non-market economic circulation which obviates in some small way the logic of the market. This incipient value poses a spectral threat, then, to the systems of exchange value that form the market. The threat, in fact, not only of alternative forms of circulation, but of demystifying the commodity form itself, as the deliberate labour of their disposal is immediately apparent in a way that their production is often not. In this capacity, as incipient *disruption* to capital, we might call such wasted goods “*counter-commodities*.”

What is important about this distinction, between a reification of value and its disruption, between exceptionality and sublimation, between uncommodity and countercommodity, is not to gravitate analytically towards one pole or the other. At any given moment waste may occupy either or both. What is most significant about waste, then, is its ambiguous *itinerancy* between the two. The bruised, junked avocado in the Dumpster simultaneously underwrites the market full of exchange values (and pristine avocados on the shelves), and the possibility of eating for free.

Perhaps no ethnographic moment illustrates this more ironically than the curmudgeonly market worker I once met who insisted on throwing away the same melons twice. I was indiscreet, upon this occasion, and was Dumpstering during store hours. I had pulled out a box full of melons and set them aside to look for more produce, but when I returned they were gone. In search of them, I met him instead. I asked him if he had moved a box of melons, and he told me crankily (and confusingly) that he had thrown them away (again) because I hadn’t “taken care of them.” I explained that I wasn’t taking them for myself, but would be taking them to share with people who couldn’t afford to buy melons for themselves. “Maybe I didn’t realise that,” he said, and then begrudgingly, “and maybe I’m sorry.” But he rebuked me angrily for persisting in search of them. If I take him at his word, he was acknowledging the inequity of waste in the face of hunger. He was regretful, and yet still cranky with me, it seemed, for taking them. And in any case, he wouldn’t give back the melons.
In its paradoxical capacities as both uncommodity and countercommodity, then, useful waste constitutes a kind of *abject capital*. The boarded up houses of the foreclosure crisis, for example, thoroughly abject, were both cold harbingers of the housing market (note that while housing prices plummeted, rental costs in some places piqued at the sharp spike in demand\(^3\)), and also a new coat of paint and a discreet squatter or two away from becoming residences. (Homes Not Jails, an offshoot of Food Not Bombs in San Francisco, takes advantage of just this ambiguity, temporarily squatting abject housing when the property title is disputed by multiple financial institutions.\(^3\)) In its *ambivalence*, then, the relationship between abject capital and capital is that of both a functional boundary and the possibility of its negation—not completely unlike the relationship between antimatter and matter. In the same way, the trash emits a kind of *abject value*, in comparison to the value of the stock that remains on the shelves. To this, I will turn next.

*(working trash: labour, value, and waste)*

Theoretically, then, abject capital is something like an antithesis for capital. In aggregate, this is true. Up close, of course, things are not so black and white. The reckoning of value at any given moment is a shifty business: part mathematical calculation, part cultural judgement, and part fortune-telling (literally). Value is a multi-dimensional equation. Acknowledging this, Marx called value a “*a social hieroglyphic,*” a cipher for the innumerable social relations which make up a market (Marx 2000 [1865]: 475). While some have read Marx’s theory of value as crudely positivist, a look here at the trash will recover the relativism in his economy—which is always already a *cultural* economy. The abject capital quarantined in the Dumpster is both the product of this cultural equation and one of its many components. The question trash poses, that I will try to answer below, is this: how do all these variables interact to chip away at a thing’s value, until it is more profitable to throw away than it is to sell?

Here, it helps to remember that equations are also, always comparisons (“=”). This suggests, prosaically enough, that *value is always relative*. And that *a thing’s route to the Dumpster is reckoned in comparisons*.

It is not necessary to fathom emergent trends in the global market, or embark on an analysis of global food prices to begin to see these comparisons. It is enough to watch the moment-to-moment decisions made at any given farmers market or grocery store. I have often done exactly that, standing by as produce workers fill boxes with unwanted produce for me. While I’ve waited, they have frequently made split-second decisions about what is worth leaving on the shelf a little longer, and what they’ll just have to throw away later in the afternoon if they don’t give it to me on the spot. But the choice is often a vexed,
ambiguous one. On at least one occasion, to my dismay, an older employee thought better of his co-worker’s quick decision, grumbled “that’ll sell” at her, and grabbed a box of peaches or apples from my arms just as I was about to walk back to my car. But on other occasions, an experienced worker has glanced across the shelves of what seemed to me like perfectly saleable fruit, and at the throngs of tourists milling past hurriedly, and decided to cull all but the most picture perfect items, either for the sake of creating a more attractive display or simply to make room for newer stock waiting in the back. It’s an art that’s remarkable to watch—each apple or peach hanging on a fraction of a second’s consideration.

The variables at work are no less complex than they might be at the New York Stock Exchange. While the price of a type of thing—say, avocados at Seattle’s Pike Place Market—may be more stable over a day than the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the real exchange value of any specific avocado is constantly shifting, depending on: how many people will visit the market that day (and how picky they are); whether it’s sunny and warm (and therefore how long produce will keep on the shelves); when the next shipment is arriving; what’s popular this month; what any given customer wants it for (and how quickly they need to use it); and how it looks on the shelf next to the other produce. Of course, not every vendor is the same. (Nor is every market worker so unsympathetic as the one who threw away my melons twice. Graciously, at the Pike Place Market, many of the produce employees are punks and Dumpster-divers themselves, already familiar with Food Not Bombs, and some of them err on the generous side.) Some vendors donate their produce. Some have a discount table. As the day goes on workers inspect their avocados (or apples, or potatoes, or…) and make the kind of spontaneous decisions I’ve described above. The ones that won’t sell, or won’t sell quickly enough, disappear from the shelves, to make room for newer stock. “For,” as the critical theorist Wolfgang Haug puts it, “the existence of old stock spells economic death for any capital trapped in commodity form… here the commodity has to perform its salto mortale, the death-defying leap, which carries the risk that it might break its neck” (Haug 1986: 23).

Commodity capital lives and dies in these momentary comparisons. All the work invested in an avocado’s cultivation, packaging, and transport, may or may not pay off in one particular avocado. But the producer, the wholesaler, and the retailer all gamble that on balance they’ll make a profit on their investment. Right up until the point of sale, the avocado’s value is virtual. Like Schrödinger’s cat, it depends upon a moment of inscription to decide its fate.

But live or die, in a competitive market, it cannot sit still for very long. Because, as Harvey pointed out, “capital remains capital only in motion.” Which is to say, it’s no good to the market if it’s gathering dust on the shelf. If it cannot be profitably converted into cash, it must be converted promptly into abject capital.
What counts most at the market is exchange value. And yet, I have argued, exchange is not the only measure of a thing’s value. Waste has, effectively, an exchange value of zero. But as uncommodity and countercommodity, it transmits a kind of abject value to the market. More fundamental to value, then, according to Marx, is labour—productive human life: “Whenever, by an exchange, we equate as values our different products,” he says, “by that very act, we also equate, as human labour, the different kinds of labour expended upon them” (Marx 2000 [1865]: 475). This is the crux of his economics. For him, a thing’s underlying value corresponds to “the labour time socially necessary for its production” (461).

Here, then, is a useful reminder that it is not just signs and signifiers that end up in the garbage. Trash has a very tangible, material component; it, too, is the result of labour. (It’s rare that actual dirt—soil, rocks—ends up in the Dumpster. Sometimes it comes in on lettuce that wasn’t washed thoroughly when picked. But for the most part, what is thrown away is the product of human work upon raw materials.)

At first glance, though, armed with Marx’s labour theory of value, it is hard to explain why a thing should be thrown away, if it can only gain value through productive labour. In the case of abject capital—useful but nonetheless thrown away—these distinctions seem difficult to reconcile, especially from a quantitative economic standpoint. They seem to divorce value and exchange value to the point of making Marx’s labour-value seem redundant. Or worse, a kind of mystical determinism, indifferent to the real workings of the market. One could be forgiven for this interpretation: Marx had rhetorical incentives for centring labour to galvanise it as a political power, the fount of all wealth. But then liberal political economists have incentives for centring the market, too: If value emerges from the interplay of supply and demand, the productive work of actually making things appears secondary to the Atlas-like heroism of buying and selling things deftly. Neither theory represents a flawless, “god’s eye view” of market societies, but both are useful. While a complete investigation of the relationship between these two conceptual lenses is beyond the scope of this work, I would argue that Marx’s theoretical apparatus is invaluable to ethnographers and cultural critics because it keeps in focus the real activities of human beings—in fields, factories, offices, or points of sale—that may otherwise be obscured in the abstraction of the Market.

Nonetheless, some cultural economists have simply dispensed with the labour theory of value. For example, invoking Marx’s “social use values” (i.e. a product must have both social and material uses to be exchangeable), Arjun Appadurai locates the vagaries of value in exchange itself (Appadurai 1986). But the result, as David Graeber suggests, is much like the supply and demand theory of prices used by liberal economists. Or, Graeber says, “anthropology as it might have been written by Milton Friedman” (Graeber 2001: 33). Appadurai’s cultural “regimes of value,” he suggests, ultimately appear as closed, self-referential systems which can only describe value and commodities in their own terms, “as if all
exchanges are simply about things, and have nothing to do with making, maintaining, or severing social relationships” (32). (In a similar way, as I described earlier, Agamben’s sovereign exception does not account for the ways in which a thing might become trash, only how it is treated once there.) While Graeber’s critique may not be terribly generous, he draws attention to the importance of both material production and social reproduction. That is to say, to the ways in which things are produced (wage-labour, factories, farming…), and the social systems which are necessary for that production (jobs, guilds, supermarkets…), and the social systems necessary for the reproduction of a society as a whole. All these things, Graeber suggests, are submerged in the context of exchange.

This does not discount the importance of these regimes of value. In fact, Marx’s theory of value itself describes a particular regime of value. Its strength, overlooked by many analysts (Marxists and classical-liberal economists alike), is its emphasis on the relationship between exchange, production, and social-cultural reproduction. Present throughout Marx’s own writing, is the observation “that value is a unified expression of quantitative and qualitative aspects of capitalism and that neither makes sense without the other” (Harvey [1982]: 36; my italics). Value is above all, a social relation. Both dogmatic Marxists and free-market fundamentalists, then, often miss the commensurability between their two theories: Both the labour theory of value, and the “law” of supply and demand reflect a series of culturally embedded social relations. What Marx termed the labour “socially necessary” for a thing’s production reflected, after all, the vagaries of a labour market. And the law of supply and demand—which Marx accepted, to some degree—must take into account the supply of labour available, because, after all, things must still be made before they can be sold. (Or else a realistic promise of their production made.) Indeed, insofar as the law of supply and demand is predicated on the labour of production and distribution at the same time as it obscures these very labours, Marx considered the principle itself a description of the process of commodity fetishism. Accordingly, below, I argue that the apparent changes in value that trash undergoes are the result of socially specific forms of labour.

While a thing’s exchange value, use value, and underlying labour-value may differ, then, they are all context-specific expressions of the same social relations of its production. They affect each other and at times blur in dialectical ways. I have argued above that abject value is yet another face of these relations of production, then. It, too, dialectically, and ambiguously reflects them. And in that dialectic, I will argue, value is contingent and shifting. This is the dialectic that produces waste.
An entry point into this dialectic, then may be a return from the Dumpster to the shelves, to observe the social relations of value being reckoned, to see what sorts of labour are implicated in the generation of garbage. I will argue that three kinds of work put things in the trash: the work of decay, obsolescence, and convenience.

Decay (things that end up in the trash are “spoiled”): When food is tossed in the Dumpster, the most prominent explanation offered, if not necessarily the most transparent, is that is has “gone bad.” Or it is “old.” Or “broken.” These terms imply a terminal lack of utility. What people normally mean by them is decay. Eventually, and at times despite our best efforts, decay removes a thing from sociality.

However decay is also a kind of work. Milk turns sour. Pipes rust. Decay is the work of nature that eats away at a thing’s social or material use-value. We might call this “material agency” (Pickering 1995; see also Lowe 2006). This is the work of a much larger “general economy” (1991 [1949]), to borrow a term from Georges Bataille. Bataille’s insight was that the thermodynamic world (human and non-human alike) tends towards surplus, and these surpluses must be, one way or another, always productive. The growth of mould, bacteria, ant colonies, rust spots, etcetera are all just such surpluses.

While material agency is distinct from human labour, it blurs the categories of work. Human agency is, after all, founded on the material agency of “the expenditure of human brain, nerves, muscles, etc.” (Marx 2000 [1865]: 473). The work of decay, then, can be coupled with human agency under the right circumstances in an arrangement not unlike the extension of human labour power into machines: “The machine, which possesses skill and force in the worker’s place, is itself the virtuoso” (Marx 2000 [1941]: 408). Similarly, rotten produce is eaten and expelled by worms to become compost. The breakdown of sugars spoils perfectly good grape juice, but when bottled and stored yields a fine wine—and over-aging spoils wine, but yields vinegar. In such a way, in fact, all production is a coupling of human agency with material agency. “All production,” Marx suggested, “is appropriation of nature by the individual within and through a definite form of society” (383).

Decay also, however, draws our attention to work that devalues. Here, it is worth considering that not all work is productive “labour power” in Marx’s terms. To be productive labour, it must produce social use values for the market—things that people want, and will pay for. In contrast, labour devalues if it decays those use values.36 Like milk dumped in the fields: Its value is beyond abject, dissipated completely.
As described earlier, though, the dumped milk still has an effect on prices. Here, the commensurability of supply and demand with the labour theory of value is evident. From one perspective, the milk supply simply shrinks, while demand remains constant. Prices go up. From another, the remaining milk still reflects the labour “socially necessary” for its production—including the work invested in the dumped milk. In both ways, value is effectively displaced. In this fashion, while the destructive agency of decay is often not immediately profitable, its capacity to devalue can be harnessed in certain ways to also transfer value, a process to which I will now turn.

Obsolescence (things end up in the trash that are redundant in comparison to other things): Georges Bataille wrote that “While the resources he controls are reducible to quantities of energy, man is not always able to set them aside for a growth that cannot be endless or, above all, continual. He must waste the excess, but he remains eager to acquire even when he does the opposite, and so he makes waste itself an object of acquisition” (Bataille 1991 [1949]: 72). While Bataille’s general economy is ultimately a closed system, subject to the second law of thermodynamics (entropy increases), cultural economies may make externalities of their disorder. In just this way, the market makes waste into an object of acquisition by producing obsolescence.

Marx observed a structural tendency in capitalism towards overproduction (2000 [1941]: see 398-400)—an observation to which retail Dumpsters bear abundant witness. (Remember, for scale, that the US produces twice enough food to feed its population, and wastes a quarter of it before it has even spoiled.) Therefore, while to make the most money a vendor would ideally sell everything in its stock, it rarely does so. It is, however, against the vendor’s interests to let the remainder sit on the shelf for long enough to be eventually purchased. As Harvey observed, if capital must constantly be transformed from commodity-to-money-to-commodity-to-money:

- The speed and efficiency of this transformation is of great importance to the capitalist. The circulation time (the time during which capital assumes the commodity form) affects the turnover time and thereby the rate of profit.
- The transformation incurs certain costs which are necessary deductions out of the surplus value produced—marketing a commodity realizes value but does not create it. (Harvey 2006 [1982]: 71)

While a thing is still on the shelf, it is still surplus value, or capital waiting to be realised, and taking up space, and costing rent in the meantime. If a commodity can be made to turn over faster, it will be more profitable. So a vendor has to balance a need to sell as much as possible with a need to turn over her stock as often as possible. The surplus built into capitalism becomes a reason to turn over goods faster. The faster older stock can be made obsolete, the faster room can be made for newer stock.
In the case of food, the material agency of decay inevitably devalues older stock, at various rates, in comparison to newer goods. Overripe bananas, for instance, while still useful, are not as valuable as ripening bananas; purchased, forgotten, and left in the fridge for too long, they contribute to the value of newer stock on the shelf at the store in a way that a mop, purchased and forgotten and left in the garage for too long does not contribute to the value of a comparable mop at the hardware store. Decay may also, similarly, be thus harnessed to accelerate a thing’s turnover time. Especially for produce, which has a limited shelf-life. Insofar as food with elevated material agency becomes noticeably obsolete as soon as newer produce hits the shelves, obsolescence may be accelerated simply by restocking the shelves faster.

Of course, this logic at its extreme (quickly reached under the pressure of the marketplace), and in the face of uncertainty about how much of any given product will sell, or how quickly, amounts to an instituted practice of keeping a steady stream of new product passing through the shelves without regard to the volume of waste produced. Bread, or doughnuts, for instance, can be made extremely cheaply and yield the most profit when sold the same day. For this reason, as alluded to earlier, there is an overwhelming amount of free bread in the garbage every day. Overstocking carries with it a financial risk, of course. However, the alternative, according to Haug is worse: the threat of becoming a “white elephant” (Haug 1986: 23). 37

Goldfrank (2005) has described how especially among younger consumers, supermarket shoppers respond enthusiastically to the introduction of novelty and variety in their produce. Such values are, broadly defined, aesthetic values. And the receptivity of consumers to gastro-aesthetic appeals suggests that the work of obsolescing food is, in part, done in the plane of aesthetics. Thus, where customers once might have gone to the supermarket for a potato, customers now go to the store for the perfect potato. Agnes Varda, for example, in her documentary The Gleaners and I (2002) depicts in portrait-detail a cross-section of potatoes rejected and thrown away before even being shipped to the supermarket in the interest of providing customers with appropriately sized and shaped potatoes. (Her favourite potato is heart-shaped.)

But to say that the work of obsolescence is the work of aesthetics is make an incomplete statement. “Aesthetic innovation,” expands Haug, “as the functionary for regenerating demand, is thus transformed into a moment of direct anthropological power and influence, in that it continually changes humankind as a species in their sensual organisation, in their real orientation, and material lifestyle, as much as in the perception, satisfaction, and structure of their needs” (Haug 1986: 44). Here Haug bolsters Graeber’s (and Marx’s) insistence on the relationship between material production and social reproduction.

Thus, the work of obsolescence is the work of progressive, even accelerated social reproduction of demand. Or, more succinctly put, while the work of decay makes a product old, the work of obsolescence...
makes demand new. Thus it is not simply items that noticeably decay, like produce, which can be made obsolete. And storeowners are equally unwilling to give away the longer-lasting items that they clear off their shelves (except, as I will describe in the following chapter, to charity). Consider the posh smoothies from earlier which will, if refrigerated, taste the same in two weeks as they do today. In this case, the work of decay is negligible in the short term. Yet, through the autocratic ordering logic of the use-by date, they have been rendered obsolete, and exiled from the (super)market, to be replaced by newer stock. Whether deliberately or not, expiry dates often accelerate the work of obsolescence.

Ultimately, obsolescence shares an inner unity with decay—the work of producing the new displaces the value of the old (rendering it “abject” in Kristeva’s terms, “abandoned” in Agamben’s). While food may not at first glance seem directly comparable to the products of other durable goods industries, there are various ways in which the acceleration of food obsolescence runs parallel to trends elsewhere in the market, not least of which is the production of “new and improved” genetically modified foods which rely on the same kinds of aggregate technological advances as other industries. And even less evidently modified foods still benefit from the aggregate labour and capital which goes into the production of new products and new, (barely) novel versions of old products (sliced bread, Cheez Wiz) and especially in the production of their packaging. Especially at a time when so many pre-packaged foods can in fact last on the shelves for extended periods, obsolescence is a useful strategy to move products.

Convenience (things end up in the trash because it’s easier and cheaper to put them there): For the most part, the social trajectories which destined food for the commercial Dumpster where this inquiry began are explained by the combined work of decay and obsolescence. However, in a larger sense, everything useful that is thrown away is thrown away out of convenience.

Which is to say, the value of selling, trading, or gifting an unwanted item is weighed unfavourably against the cost of doing so. In other words, in the calculation of the supermarket, customer, etcetera, it is easier, or cheaper, to throw it away. If Marx’s social hieroglyphic represents a “spontaneous social accounting,” rather than a fixed quantity (Rubin (1972 [1928]: chapter 8), then the value of the item is effectively negated in the comparison. In such a moment, exchange value, use value, and the underlying labour value are difficult to distinguish. This is, very broadly speaking, also a kind of redundancy. Like the other kinds of waste, then, this redundant value finds its end in the sovereign ban of the trash.
This chapter ends at the beginning. Like T. S. Eliot, “the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started, and know the place for the first time.” Novel kinds of meaning, labour, and value, I have argued, are all submerged in the cultural economy of trash. And like Bakunin, our penchants for destruction are also penchants for creation, and the end of a thing’s social life, from one point of view, is the beginning of a new existence, from another. Abject capital, in its ambivalence—outside the law but not indifferent to it—is both old and new, end and beginning.

From the perspective of capital, it is decayed, made obsolete, or inconvenient in comparison to everything else on the market. An uncommodity, its exchange value is zero, and yet it is still not free. Sometimes they lock the Dumpster to prove the point.

From the perspective of the Dumpster-divers, gleaners, and scavengers I hang out with, however, its ambiguity—abandoned but useful—is exactly the source of its freedom, if you know where to look (or how to break into the Dumpster). A counter-commodity, it costs nothing, and yet is the foundation of friendly little gift economies everywhere.

The frontier between these two kinds of economy, then, is a space of possibility, where the same labour may both devalue and revalue at the same time.

Because the market trends towards overproduction, towards abundance and waste, the work of production is constantly reproducing this frontier, multiplying both capital and abject capital. We may now see the Dumpster as part of the holistic process of capitalist production rather than its end—as a safety valve which allows capital to keep moving, to recoup its value in the market even as its abject personae (non grata) are locked away. If capitalist crises result from capital’s inability to move or turnover, then waste of all kinds is constantly rescuing capitalism from itself. Waste is a deferred crisis.

These frontiers, however, are multiplying. In *Speeding Up Fast Capitalism*, Ben Agger (2004) suggests that in market societies, the turnaround time for capital, along with the pace of everyday life, is accelerating. Money changes hands more quickly. Novelty is less and less enduring. Trends, updates, investments, and shelf stock turn over at a rate that approaches what he calls instantaneity. Obsolescence too, then, is accelerated. At the same time, not only the pace but the saturation of capital increases, as new realms of life are increasingly incorporated into the market. Melinda Cooper (2007) outlines, for example, the market’s push to appropriate the barest of life, material and biological agency at every scale. She notes that with the patenting of genes and organisms, it is now possible to own “the principle of generation… to capture production itself, in all its emergent possibilities” (Cooper 2007: 37). As all these
kinds of production are multiplied and accelerated, then, the abject production of waste too must be multiplied and accelerated.

If the horizons of capitalism are expanding, and with them, the sovereignty and guiding logic of a market regime of value, we have increasingly to ask what abject forms of life and sovereignty are cultivated at its frontiers. After all, the more capital accumulates, the more it must spend. The more it must throw away. And the more there is for those left behind to recover, if they know where to look.
Chapter Two

Through the Looking Glass: Dumpster-Diving Counterpublics, Marginal Sovereignty, and Market-Publics

The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of a system (e.g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.

Georges Bataille\textsuperscript{40}

As Michael Warner says ‘the moment of apprehending something as public is one in which we imagine, if imperfectly, indifference to those particularities, to ourselves’… In other words, publics don’t shit.

Gay Hawkins\textsuperscript{41}

{(the proverbial free lunch)}

Waste is always productive. As Georges Bataille (1991 [1949]) pointed out, the “general economy” of nature knows nothing of the social life of things. When we throw a thing away it takes little notice. Forgotten or ignored, it goes on expending energy and matter: Mould transfigures bread in the depths of the fridge; Rust forges complex new topographies on derelict cars; Decay and photosynthesis cultivate overgrown “post-American” ecosystems (Solnit 2007) in the all-but-evacuated suburbs of Detroit (the heartland, after all, of North America’s “rust belt”); And the sandwiches cleared from the Safeway deli counter which once might have fed paying customers, will instead feed colonies of microbes and worms. Or, if they’re packed well enough, they just might feed opportunistic Dumpster-diving scavengers. The destruction of value, from one point of view, is almost inevitably the production of value from another.

And the taboos of one cultural economy are often the thresholds across which other economies trespass. The spectre of waste, never entirely forgotten, haunts the calculus of the market through prohibition and abjection. But the material waste is free to be spent in new ways. In this chapter, I investigate the cultivation of new non-market values in the abject space of the Dumpster. Below, based on my ethnographic research in Seattle and similar cities, I describe a cultural economy of Dumpster-divers, gleaners, and scavengers, and their relationship to the predominant urban politics of the market. Mindful,
in their own way, of Bataille’s general economy, these marginal figures quietly salvage the unspoiled surpluses in the commercial waste stream. They recirculate them within subcultural networks that are anathema, in diverse ways, to the dominant market calculus by which it is discarded. Or, if you like, they consume the leftovers.

The market and its ambulant garbage, I want to suggest, relate to each other as a kind of public and counterpublic—categories I borrow from Michael Warner’s work on queer theory (2002). With these two terms in hand, I’ll trace some of the ethnographic and theoretical implications of Dumpster-divers’ modes of living “through the looking glass” of value. This funhouse mirror cultural economy frames their spoils as waste according to the negative dialectics of market value. In other words, they’re defined by what they are not—in this case, profitable. But it is not enough to understand scavengers’ post-market economies as mere inversions of the market. These negative dialectics, characterized below in the post-structuralist terms of Giorgio Agamben’s “relation of exception” (1998) and Julia Kristeva’s “abjection” (1982), also afford what is “exceptional” and “abject” a certain radical freedom to reconstitute meaning and value. Drawing on my research with chapters of Food Not Bombs and other Dumpster-diving networks, I decipher the relationship between the spectre of waste and the meanings and values remade in its shadow.

To that end, this chapter asks two basic questions: First, what has that waste to do with the constitution of the public sphere(s) of market societies? And second, how is that waste simultaneously productive of new counterpublic spheres of value, sociality, and sovereignty within the spaces abandoned by capital?

In part, the answer to the first question is that commercial waste of all kinds draws the boundaries of a market-public. A public sphere whose lingua franca is pecuniary and whose conversations are carried on among consumers, merchants, and producers through the medium of the transaction. Waste, then, establishes the parameters of that public. The terrain within which supply, demand, and exchange value are reckoned. The public anxieties and repulsions inspired by waste designate an abject realm beyond the pale of public decency. This abjection, as I suggested in the previous chapter, keeps things off the market, even if they are still useful. I’ve called these useful surpluses a kind of “abject capital.” One consequence of their waste is to limit a given commodity’s availability on the market and, according to the principles of supply and demand, augment its exchange value. Which is to say, of course, waste keeps prices up. In so doing, it defines a functional limit to the circulation of capital and the legibility of social and economic value.

The answer to the second question follows from the first. The abjection that keeps things off the market is also the condition of possibility for the development of counterpublics with an abject
relationship to the market-public, which makes waste in absurd quantities. If food, clothing, durable goods, and housing are all abandoned by the market (even padlocked away, at times), they are also free to those who know how to obtain them (how to unlock Dumpsters, how to squat and discreetly turn the water back on, and so on). This freedom to renegotiate a lived economy in non-market terms, I argue below—to, literally, live for free—represents a kind of abject sovereignty.

**The difference between dumpster-diving and donation**

The rescue of would-be-garbage from Dumpsters prompts a range of reactions from the people throwing it away—depending on how and why you’re rescuing it. The responses that I have encountered, and that Dumpster-divers have recounted to me in Seattle and other urban centres, run the gamut from hostility to hospitality. But on the whole, I have found it more likely for a commercial establishment to donate its surpluses to a philanthropic third party than to willingly let anyone mine its waste stream directly. The distinction here, I’d like to suggest, defines a set of *spaces of exception*, where waste can circulate without upsetting market relations. These spaces of exception, in turn, outline the contours of a market, and the market-public who constitute it.

Of course, some employees are unperturbed to find somebody in the alley fossicking through their garbage. One Dumpster-diver told me, for example, about worrying when a worker popped out unexpectedly from a bakery’s back door, saw her fishing about in the bin, and disappeared back into the bakery almost immediately—to call the police, she feared—only to emerge a second later with an extra bag of bread for her. Other workers are puzzled, and still others can barely hide their disgust and embarrassment. But, in any case, even though the practice isn’t illegal, quite often the management obliges them to ask Dumpster-divers to stop. (One night, with a few punk friends, behind one of the city’s Trader Joe’s markets, a terse manager discovered us and even asked us to put back everything we found. We obliged, of course, not wanting to upset the employees and risk having them lock the Dumpster.)

One punk rocker and former Seattle squatter I spoke with, who helped to get the Seattle chapter of Food Not Bombs off the ground in the early 1990s, reflected on run-ins she and her Food Not Bombs collaborators (also mainly squatters and punks) had with managers while stocking up for their weekly meal:

We knew all our favourite places we’d go. And some places it was easy—we didn’t have to hide or be sneaky. Other places were, like, in neighbourhoods where we were always worried about getting the shit beat out of us. There was a QFC on Capitol Hill up on 15th that always had a good Dumpster but, boy, they were always really tight about kicking us out if they caught us. So it was always a matter of, like, sneaking in and out of that
Dumpster. If you were in the Dumpster when they came, you just had to sit in there and wait for them to dump the garbage on you and be all quiet and then sneak back out.

A few Dumpster-divers, when asked to leave, take the time to explain to the management what they’re doing. Others politely depart without engaging in a conversation. Most of them, however, make as little mess or fuss as possible, because they know there’s always the possibility they’ll find the Dumpster locked next time. As the volunteer quoted above put it: “We kind of had our own code for Dumpster-diving.” Maybe the most important of these codes, repeated to me by Dumpster-divers in Seattle, Melbourne, New York City, and elsewhere, is summed up by a piece of graffiti (ironically) on the side of my own neighbourhood Trader Joe’s Dumpster: “Rule #1: Always leave the Dumpster cleaner than you found it.”

Simply going through the front door, on the other hand, and asking for donations of the soon-to-be garbage often prompts a different response—most especially if you’re planning to cook it and share it with people who are homeless or hungry. Using the words “soup kitchen” is an easy way to get this point across, even if it doesn’t quite capture all the nuances of a project like Food Not Bombs. I have often had to approach vendors at local farmers markets, bakeries, produce stalls, and grocery stores in Seattle to solicit donations. And the moment in which I do has often felt somewhat vexed: In essence, I have been asking for something for nothing. Some vendors and managers respond with an ill-defined unease, a curt apology, and little or no explanation. But many seem quite happy not to throw the food away, and are willing to set it aside to be picked up, as long as the effort doesn’t cost them too much in terms of time or space. (Note that while donating the food is free, stores often pay a garbage-collection fee proportional to the quantity of waste they make.) In fact, almost all the Food Not Bombs chapters with whom I’ve volunteered had shifted from relying on Dumpstered food to donations because it was easier and less time-consuming. Extensive networks of food-recovery organisations, from grassroots efforts like Food Not Bombs to formal, nationally affiliated non-profit organisations like Food Lifeline, connect commercial food surpluses with “food insecure” people in cities around the US, the UK, Australia, and other market societies. (One street youth explained, of Seattle’s emergency food system, “You can’t starve here.”) Numerous Seattle retailers and wholesalers, in fact, who have turned me and other scavengers away from their Dumpsters also regularly donate their surpluses to local shelters and food pantries.

What, then, is the difference between Dumpster-diving and donation? Why let one group of people collect the waste by one means, but not another group by other means? There are, no doubt, many factors at work. Prejudice and incredulity at the cultural transgression of garbage-picking undoubtedly play a role. As must fears of liability and unforeseen costs. These fears and prejudices, however, are shaped by
the norms of market relations. And it is according to market relations of supply, demand, and abjection, I’ll argue, that the social lives of things and people are often reckoned legitimate or not. Waste, or “abject capital,” I have argued, is discarded and locked up in Dumpsters, warehouses, and abandoned properties because it can’t be simply given away without upsetting the market. “They want it all hermetically sealed, the whole production process, from production to final disposal,” one Melbourne Dumpster-diver told me, speculating on why he’d been chased away from a few Dumpsters. If the five billion pounds of unspoiled food discarded by US merchants each year were given away, for example (or even sold at a significant discount), the principles of supply and demand would deflate food prices. But why, then, should donating it to a soup kitchen not also upset the market?

There is an unspoken parallel drawn between the Dumpster and the soup kitchen or food bank. Each, in its own way, is understood to be an exception with respect to the market. In other words, they are places with which the market is unconcerned, except insofar as it has explicitly abandoned them. Of course, like market value itself, this relation of exception exists not simply between places and things. It is bio-political, and defines a power-laden relationship between people and the means of sustaining life. This exception outlines both the “inside” and the “outside” of what I will call a market-public—that collectivity of people who are imagined to constitute the market, through buying, selling, and producing, and those people who are imagined not to. Another way of putting this is to say that patrons of the soup kitchen are assumed not to have been potential customers anyway. Due to their socioeconomic and spatial remoteness (I’ll argue in chapter four that soup kitchens are largely consigned to marginal locations) they are not imagined to participate in this market-public. This market-public, increasingly, is identified with the public, and has important consequences for the way cities like Seattle regulate public policies, spaces, and behaviours.

(the dimensions of the market-public)

According to Michael Warner (2002), however, there is no such thing as “the public.” Rather, there are many publics. However inclusive they aspire to be, Warner points out, publics are limited by the extent to which they share vocabularies, media, and spaces of circulation. Not the same thing as a crowd, a nation, a class, or a polity, a public is nonetheless, he says, a consequential fiction: a social imaginary that creates the conditions for ideas and affects to circulate among strangers. In this way, a public is a particular species of “imagined community” (Anderson 1983). But unlike the crowd, the nation, the class, the polity, or other imaginary communities defined by identities or attributes, the public is defined primarily by its participation in the circulation of discourse.
Warner draws here on Habermas’ analysis (1991), which identifies the sphere of public discourse as a distinctive, integral element in the development of contemporary liberal market societies. Whereas in feudal states, “public” discourse and authority centred on a royal court, in ostensibly democratic liberal states, the government cannot maintain itself without reference to the category of “the public” which therefore assumes a vital, oppositional role in constituting the nation-state. It was for this reason that classical liberals like Rousseau and Thomas Jefferson touted “Public Opinion” as the ultimate source of both wisdom and authority for the nation (cf. Johansen 1982). While Habermas eulogised a bourgeois public sphere of rational debate among conscientious, literate intellectuals, a sphere he suggested had been eclipsed by a less conversational, more unilateral public sphere dominated by mass-media, Warner argues that the category of “the public” has been multiplied and popularised throughout the globe, with significant consequences for the ways in which societies operate and understand themselves.

While Warner’s public is primarily implicated in the circulation of texts and ideas, his framework also applies to the ways in which economic values are reckoned and circulated on the market. While markets often move concrete goods and services about, they are only markets-quaque-markets insofar as they circulate economic values, mainly in the form of capital and currency. In the same way that liberal states have presumed the existence of a public to circulate ideas and opinions, to which government may address itself, liberal economies have presumed the existence of a market to circulate economic value, and to which products, prices and transactions are advertised. While these markets are often radically disembodied in economic and political rhetoric, they rest on the assumption that there is a collectivity of interested parties who constitute them. Adam Smith’s magisterial Invisible Hand, in this way, is analogous to Jefferson’s Public Opinion. The collectivity of interested parties whose public discourse consists of exchange values, transactions, and a variety of secondary literature—from price tags to stock analyses—is what I will call a market-public.

Marx himself underscored the discursive, public nature of capitalist value by calling it a social “hieroglyphic” (literally, in the original Greek, a “sacred text”). Value, Marx suggested, was a spontaneous social accounting of the amount of labour “socially necessary” to produce something. Not a simple quantity, but a qualitative reflection—a looking glass—of social relationships of production, distribution, and consumption. As such, it is never fixed. It must be realized through socially legible, widely recognisable transactions. In other words, value has to be realized in public. The collectivity of people, then, implicated in these publicly legible transactions, may be understood according to Warner’s criteria for a public.

Warner lists seven organising principles that define a public. First, he characterises publics as self-organised. Rather than public action being dictated by a formal or institutional structure (here he gives the
example of applying for a drivers’ licence), he says, simply, “[s]peaking, writing, and thinking involve us—actively and immediately—in a public” (2002: 69). Thus, publics imagine themselves as free to discuss and circulate meanings of their own accord. Second, he defines a public as “a relation among strangers” (76; my emphasis). This “dependence on the co-presence of strangers in our innermost activity,” he argues, makes possible a range of relationships. He cites the notions of human rights, species-being, and sexuality (ibid.). To this, I would add the market. Third, he writes that “the address of public speech is both personal and impersonal” (81; my emphasis). In other words, it is addressed personally, directly to an audience of potentially interested parties who are, as yet, not necessarily known to the author. Fourth, he argues that publics are constituted “through mere attention” by their participants” (87; my emphasis). Fifth, he spatialises publics, calling them “the social space[s] created by the reflexive circulation of discourse” (90; my emphasis). In other words, they are not so abstract as to exist homogenously across a given territory, like the imagined communities of modern nations. (This will be particularly important to recall in chapter four, where I will discuss the locations of permitted outdoor meal programs wherein commercial food surpluses are recirculated.) Sixth, he says that publics “act historically according to the temporality of their circulation” (96; my emphasis)—headline-reading publics, for example, respond to current events on a punctuated, daily basis. Web-based publics may respond more quickly and fluidly. Scholarly publics more slowly. And finally, he suggests that publics are a kind of “poetic world-making,” with the capacity to define the qualitative terms of discourse and experience for their members: “Public discourse says not only ‘Let a public exist’ but ‘Let it have this character, speak this way, see the world in this way.’ It then goes in search of confirmation that such a public exists… Run it up the flagpole and see who salutes” (114; my emphasis).

Each of these principles could be said to be true of the collectivity of people by whom market value is realised: (1) A market is ostensibly self-organised—the “free” market of popular imagination; (2) It is a relation among strangers, or, at least, discrete parties with no binding relationship among them beyond each discrete transaction; (3) Their estimates of value are both specific to their transactions and yet legible to the market in general; (4) A market presumes not that everyone in the market is actively buying, selling, or producing, but simply that they are paying attention, and might buy, sell, or produce; (5) A market is therefore the social space constituted by the reflexive circulation of value; (6) A market may act and react historically according to the speed with which events and prices are published; And (7) a market is, increasingly, a kind of poetic world-making, given the metonymic power to mediate the very necessities of life—food, water, shelter, and so on—and translate them into its own terms.

In these ways, a complex, interdependent relationship is implied between the market—the mechanisms and outcomes of exchange—and the market-public—to whom these mechanisms and
outcomes are addressed, and by whom they are constituted. The category of a market-public might help to make sense of the behaviour of markets without either radically depersonalising them or ascribing them to an essentialist, overgeneralised archetype, as some influential economic thinkers have done. Neither the abstract mathematical seesaw of supply and demand, for example, nor the fictionalised caricature of “homo economicus,” can fully account for the social contexts and predilections which make a market what it is. Rather, Warner’s criteria draw our attention to the social processes through which economic value is reckoned and public-ised, and to the implications economic value holds, in turn for those social structures—and in particular, for cultural and political mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion with respect to those social structures.

Warner’s first five criteria draw our attention to the spaces and relationships through which value itself is reckoned and made public. These are, of course, ethnographic questions: In contrast to homo economicus or the invisible hand, a market-public is necessarily social and embodied, and takes on different dimensions depending on the social arenas in which participants realise and publish values. The publics constituted by Seattle’s seven weekly farmers markets, for example, are limited to a sphere of buyers, sellers, and producers with the capacity and inclination to meet each other at certain public spaces, at certain times, and to buy and sell local foods at a cost adequate to support their production. In other words, anyone too far away, who works inconvenient hours, or who cannot afford to shop organic and local (or to grow organic and local, for that matter), is probably not part of these market-publics. One consequence of this is that anything left on a vendor’s table at the end of a Sunday ceases to be relevant to the farmers-market-public, since the next weekly farmers market in the city is not until Wednesday, by which time the left-overs might be overripe or wilted. They might as well not exist. (This works to the advantage of groups like Food Not Bombs and my neighbourhood University District food bank, of course, who have both often collected Seattle’s farmers market leftovers.) The market-public constituted by the range of competing twenty-four-hour supermarket chains, on the other hand, is far less limited in time, space, and spending power.

These social arenas are akin to what Arjun Appadurai (1986) called a thing’s “commodity context”—those social spaces and relationships that make exchange possible. While Appadurai’s is a more general term, appropriate to any field of commodity exchange, it shares with Warner’s public an analysis of the ways in which exchange and discursive circulation may cut across other cultural and social boundaries: Both implicate people who might otherwise be strangers. Be they farmers and speculators in international grain futures or teenagers bidding in online auctions from different corners of the globe, they need only possess enough of a common grasp of the norms of circulation to participate in it. Other than that, they need not know a thing about each other. Just as the headline-reading public needs only literacy and access
to a newspaper, the market-public, at an absolute minimum, need only have the skills to fish money out of its pocket at the appropriate moment and place it in someone’s palm. Appadurai’s key insight, however, is that the skills and vocabulary necessary to constitute a market are diverse and heterogeneously distributed. The conventions of economic circulation demand that producers, merchants, and consumers develop different skills in the same way that copywriters, paperboys, and readers occupy different locations within the news media’s public.

Nonetheless, each has an interest in the work of the other, and all are ultimately concerned with the same sphere of circulation. What is distinctive about a public, as Warner says, is that it is constituted through “mere attention.” A market-public is above all, therefore, attentive in diverse ways to the circulation of market value. By this logic, market value is also, to some degree, inherently spectacular in Debord’s terms (2002). It is communicated to a diverse, market-public whose primary role is to pay attention.

Warner’s final two criteria draw our attention to the ways in which publics act reflexively upon themselves and upon the cultural and social structures that constitute them. If a market-public is social and embodied, then it must not only be circumscribed by social, cultural, and material structures, but must in turn reshape those structures into which it is woven. Thus a market-public is not a passive, discrete entity that pre-exists the context of a market, but rather it is itself constantly reconstituted therein.

To wit, Pierre Bourdieu (1986) describes, for example, some of the complex relationships forged between identity and economy as different modes of capital migrate between market and non-market circulation. Cultural and social capital, he asserts, are defined and circulated in non-market forms—from the prestige inspired by a collection of rare art to the deference afforded an Ivy League degree—but may be translated in diverse ways into (cold hard) economic capital. In this translation, market value is reckoned in publicly legible ways determined through the calculus of an economic and social imaginary overdetermined by cultural and socioeconomic logics. In other words, a market-public. Bourdieu describes the reflexive effect of their consumption choices upon such a public: “Taste classifies, and it classifies the classifier. Social subjects, classified by their classifications, distinguish themselves by the classifications they make, between the beautiful and the ugly, the distinguished and the vulgar, in which their position in the objective classifications is expressed or betrayed” (1984: 6).

Here, it is useful to observe the blurry boundaries which show up in practice between analytical categories—as Warner points out, a public may frequently intersect with and influence, or be influenced by other social imaginaries like a crowd, class, or subculture. In any kind of discursive circulation, the participants who understand themselves as the public being addressed inevitably read and respond to
discourse with the full spectrum of their epistemological baggage. This is no less true of the circulation of value. Bourdieu observes, for instance, that a diffuse range of people may prefer Bach’s *Well-tempered Clavier* over the more populist *Sabre Dance* or vice versa, but nonetheless share the discursive terrain within which each is reckoned to possess more or less cultural capital. Although they do not share preferences or classifications, they constitute a shared public to the extent that they participate in the shared process of valuing. (And this listening public, of course, also becomes a market-public as soon as they head to the record store.)

It is not a far leap from there to assert that people may impute social membership in a kind of public sphere directly to the purchases one makes, and from the purchases one can afford to make. Consider in this light, the example recently related to me of a parent in the supermarket who pulled her child away from a table full of free samples. She told her child: “Don’t touch that, honey, it’s free.” (There is, one can only assume, more to the anecdote than meets the casual observer’s eye. Nonetheless, in the most blunt way it reminds us of the importance of market terms to the ways in which public behaviour and decorum are understood.)

This suggests two insights. First, that publics overdetermine each other, and in particular, that the social imaginary which often goes by the name of “the general public” is implicitly overdetermined by a market-public (along with other predominant public spheres). And second, that the social imaginary of a market-public, which ostensibly consists of the collectivity of people engaged in economic circulation, is often overdetermined by non-economic prejudices towards things like race, class, cognition, consumption practices, access to shelter, and so on. In simpler terms, “the public,” so-called, is often identified with those of its members who are willing and able to participate in the market economy. And those who find themselves abandoned by the market due to price and prejudice also find themselves silent partners in that public.

*(on citizenship: “for a few people to disrupt an entire society”)*

Of course, in liberal societies where “the public” is imagined as the reciprocal and responsibility of “the government,” exclusion from the public carries important consequences for citizenship. One of the ways in which “the public” becomes just such an exclusive category is through the regulation of urban public spaces. Too vague or heterogeneous a category to be very useful for political punditry, the market-public serves as its body double. In defining what are legitimate public behaviours, and what are deviant and threatening, the sovereignty of capital itself assumes a distinct legal instrumentality in the guise of this market-public.
Seattle’s municipal politicians, for example, took pioneering steps to identify the public interest with the fortunes of its market by passing a string of what were popularly called “civility laws” in the 1990s, designed explicitly to revive the city’s declining downtown business climate. These laws did not address particular economic behaviours, but rather prohibited things like public urination, sitting or lying on the sidewalk during business hours, and “aggressive” panhandling. In other words, they targeted perceived social obstacles to downtown commerce. Obstacles almost exclusively identified with the public visibility of homelessness and destitution.

Their logic wasn’t completely unfounded. Unapologetically mercenary, perhaps, but not without a rationale: Since the 1980s, post-Fordist cities like Seattle have increasingly relied on tax revenue from local commercial investment and have taken a series of “pro-business” measures to attract it, or at least to keep it from fleeing to more profitable locales. Haunted by the spectre of Detroit’s twin abandonment by industry and retail, these cities have been increasingly obliged to accommodate the whims of businesses and the prejudices of high-income consumers (cf. Gibson 2004).

What is most telling, however, is the way in which commercial and middle-class interests are framed as central to the city’s “quality of life” (a term adopted by New York City and other municipalities who have followed Seattle’s example). City attorney Mark Sidran, for example, who spearheaded the ordinances, blamed the decline of Seattle’s retail core on a climate of “incivility” constituted by the multiplication of “usually tolerable ‘minor’ misbehaviours” like lying down on the sidewalk (Sidran 1993). Not only do these behaviours “cumulatively become intolerable” to the public (whom he avoids defining very clearly), but they are never far from the spectre of violence. One comma away, in this case: Sidran describes a hypothetical future Seattle “where the simplest rules of civility are ignored without consequence, where random senseless acts of violence become pervasive” (ibid.). What both apocalyptic sentence fragments have in common, for Sidran, is that they are inimical to the sensibilities of a civil, economically viable public which he explicitly fears will vacate the city.45 Sidran and other advocates for these “quality of life” ordinances argue that residents simply should not have to put up with it “when incivility begins to threaten their sense of security” (Sidran 1993).

The rhetorical slippages here between discomfort and danger which legitimate these ordinances, according to Samira Kawash, “correspond to a rigorously normative definition of the public that views the propertylessness and displacement experienced by the homeless as a threat to the property and place possessed and controlled in the name of the public” (1998: 320). The threat posed to this public by abject poverty, then, is the same threat that the abject, as a category of experience, always poses to identity, according to Julia Kristeva: “It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated” (Kristeva 1982: 1). She might as well have been writing of Sidran’s uncivil deviance. “Many people,” Sidran wrote “see those
sitting or lying on the sidewalk and—either because they expect to be solicited or otherwise feel apprehensive—avoid the area” (Sidran 1993).

Implicitly, Sidran identifies a “civil” society of consumers whose comfort, personal space, and consequent ease of access to the market are public entitlements—an ironic twist on Lefebvre’s “right to the city” (1968). “Civil,” of course, shares its etymological roots with both “city” and “citizen,” and implies both a sphere of entitlement with respect to the state, and therefore a reciprocal sphere of exception to those entitlements. Sitting, lying, pissing, drinking (alcohol), and “aggressively” asking for money are all defined by these ordinances as “exceptional” behaviours in Agamben’s sense (1998). They are bio-political exceptions to the extent that they frame not only acts, but modes of living—from “sp’anging” (punk vernacular for “spare changing”) for subsistence to pissing in the alley—as beyond the pale of public decency. What marks most of these modes of living as exceptional, ironically, is their very publicness. Jeremy Waldron (1991) has argued that these are often behaviours that are done privately, in the home:

Legislators voted for by people who own private places in which they can do all these things are increasingly deciding to make public places available only for activities other than these primal human tasks. The streets and subways, they say, are for commuting from home to office. They are not for sleeping; sleeping is something one does at home. The parks are for recreations like walking and informal ball games, things for which one’s own yard is a little too confined. Parks are not for cooking or urinating; again, these are things one does at home. Since the public and the private are complementary, the activities performed in public are to be the complement of those appropriately performed in private. (Waldron 1991: 301)

These activities are, therefore, largely the private complement to a public with access to capital, engaged in economic production and circulation—working and shopping. They are “uncivil” primarily with respect to a market-based civility. After all, what seems like “aggressive panhandling” to one well-fed, haute-coutured, well-rested person might seem like a perfectly reasonable insistence to someone else who is cold, hungry, and exhausted. (Interestingly enough, “civil” is also an alternate translation of the “bourgeois” in Habermas’ “bourgeois public sphere.”46 And the market-public outlined here indeed maintains a bourgeois set of conventions for circulating value and capital “civilly.”) Where Sidran has shown a degree of political subtlety in framing this exclusive social imaginary, other local politicians have been more forthcoming and more blunt. Defending the civility ordinances in 1999, for example, former Seattle Councilmember Cheryl Chow said, “I feel it’s not right for a few people to disrupt an entire society” (Bush 1999).

I will expand elsewhere (in chapter four) on Seattle’s role in pioneering strategies like these for policing public spaces—discursive and physical. For the moment, it will suffice to observe that the
market-public centred in Seattle’s urban realpolitik is a complement, at the metropolitan scale, to the increasingly paradigmatic citizen-consumer of neoliberal political discourse. And overwhelmingly, this citizen-consumer is assumed by municipal authorities and by diverse, urban market-publics not to experience abject poverty. Where citizens are increasingly imagined in terms of their individual choices and agency (cf. Rose 1996), “the homeless” often don’t even get a noun: Referred to by a collective adjective, they are imagined as a social force in need of management. The role of government becomes, then, to “steer the homeless towards social service groups” and so on.

Of course, people who are homeless or hungry are not actually strangers to the market-going public. Forty-four percent of people who experience homelessness have paid jobs, for example (National Coalition for the Homeless 2009). And while the income afforded by marginal work, food stamps, panhandling, and other emergency sources isn’t necessarily enough to afford shelter or even food for the whole month, homeless people I met during this research purchased all sorts of things—shoes, gum, radios, hamburgers, beer, you name it, which they were often terribly generous about sharing with me.) Nonetheless, the ways in which they are excluded from the social imaginary of the public are mirrored in legal and material exclusions which are anything but imaginary.

*(eating in public)*

If many people imagine the “public” and “the destitute” to be mutually exclusive, two lonely Venn diagrams on opposite sides of a page (although one much bigger than the other), this also has consequences for how one eats in the city. To the extent that eating in public, eating with strangers, and eating for nothing (“Don’t touch that honey, it’s free”), support modes of living-in-public that are exceptional with respect to the market-public, they are also a target for censure in the name of health, safety, and “quality of life.” (You might say, if you were feeling precocious, that eating for free is bad for business.)

The effect of these restrictions is to constrain the primary form in which food can circulate to that most legible to the market: food-as-commodity. Its circulation, therefore, is not defined by actual physical movement so much as by the reallocation of its value: the transaction. Which is to say, there are legal limits to the extent to which it can publicly *change hands*. Of course, you’re welcome to bring a sandwich from home and share it with a stranger. But not too many. (How many is “too many” varies: In Orlando, the legal limit is twenty-five; In Las Vegas, it’s just one [see below].) These limits insulate the market-public therefore, not only from contact with abject poverty, but from contact with abject capital, enclaving abject economies of food waste and food insecurity at the physical and social margins of the city.
It is complicated, of course, to regulate where, how, and with whom one eats, and to disentangle the different publics which overdetermine the “general public” in this respect. To begin with, to ban eating in public seems like a bad business move (despite my earlier quip). Nonetheless, cities have made diverse efforts to limit the ways in which people dine and share meals in public. Orlando, Florida required permits to share food in public parks with over twenty-five people, and will only issue two per year to any given group.\(^4\)\(^8\) (At least three of the Food Not Bombers I spoke to during this research had risked arrest in Orlando under this ordinance.) The text of Las Vegas’ law outlawed giving away food in certain parks to anyone “whom a reasonable ordinary person would believe to be entitled to apply for or receive [public assistance]” (Archibold 2006). Seattle, as I will describe below, has limited free meals to one location within the city limits. These policies have the effect of creating segregated spaces where food can be shared freely without disrupting the civility of public spaces and market relations.

The civil and political exclusions manifested in these spaces echo Giorgio Agamben’s description of the “camp”: “the pure, absolute, and impassable biopolitical space—insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception” (1998: 123). For Agamben, concentration camps, detention centres, refugee camps, and other spaces where life is “bare”—abandoned by the law, outside of sociality, and literally uncivil—are “the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity, whose metamorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognise” (ibid.). The “camp” itself, of course, takes on different dimensions in urban settings where camping is often both a necessary survival strategy and explicitly illegal. Meanwhile, forced-labour camps for the destitute remain, for the most part, a crass red herring—the spirit of the compulsory Victorian poor house is resurrected only rhetorically on talk radio or the editorial page.\(^4\)\(^9\) In the absence of poor houses, however, the shelter, food bank, and the soup kitchen are near equivalents—some of the “metamorphoses” Agamben warns about. In this vein, Daniel Kerr (2004) paints homeless services—and the “institution” of homelessness itself, in his words—as an “open penitentiary,” and points out that in the 1930s, social reformers openly used the term “concentration camp” to refer to at least one shelter in Cleveland (29). But, as Hannah Arendt points out, even prisoners have some entitlements absent in the camp:

> [N]either physical safety—being fed by some state or private welfare agency—nor freedom of opinion changes in the least their fundamental situation of rightlessness. The prolongation of their lives is due to charity and not to right, for no law exists which could force the nations to feed them; their freedom of movement, if they have it at all, gives them no right to residence which even the jailed criminal enjoys as a matter of course; and their freedom of opinion is a fool’s freedom, for nothing they think matters anyhow. (2000: 37)

She might easily have been writing about the soup kitchen.
It is not surprising, then, that in many cities, these spaces are kept almost exclusively indoors. In Seattle the only outdoor meal provider officially permitted is “Operation Sack Lunch.” And the city has tried to close them down too: Regular outdoor meals were suspended altogether in 2004 by Greg Nickels, Seattle’s last mayor, until protest and civil disobedience (which included several city council members, notably enough) persuaded the mayor’s office to relent. According to at least one homeless service employee I interviewed, Nickels felt that outdoor meal programs were an undignified approach to hunger and homelessness, echoing Sidran’s ethic of public decorum. (Ironically, according to more than one of the homeless Seattleites I talked to during my research, eating in crowded shelters, hidden from public view, being forced to produce identification—and sometimes to hear a mandatory sermon—seemed like an undignified way to eat in comparison to eating in the park.) The present location, arrived at after a four-month hiatus and a year-long period of experimentation, represents a compromise between the mayor’s office, the council, the meal providers, and a variety of neighbourhood associations and business councils—many of whom didn’t want it in their backyard. Instead, it came to be sited under the freeway, outside of the metro-buses’ “ride-free” zone, and a stiff uphill walk away from many of the city’s shelters, not to mention from downtown foot traffic.50

The details of this program’s location and development are complex, of course, and deserve more attention—which I will attend to in the fourth chapter. From the brief portrait above, however, it is evident that the outdoor meal site and the variety of indoor meal programs in the city represent not quite refugee camps nor prisons, but exceptional biopolitical spaces nonetheless, carefully regulated to avoid disrupting the civility and business climate of Seattle’s market-public.

If these spaces segregate urban populations, they also segregate urban cultural economies. As described above, they not only sequester categories of people anathema to the market-public; They are also the final destination of some of the unspoiled foodstuffs of its waste stream. They are, in this way, an alternative to the Dumpster—both for the ex-commodity, and for the people who might otherwise have to eat out of it. And of course some of the same companies who lock up their trash at night are happy to donate the very same stuff to food banks and soup kitchens. The biopolitical exclusion from the market that extends on a human axis to abject poverty extends on a different axis to abject, wasted capital. Or, if you like: Just as the Dumpster keeps useful food surpluses out of public circulation, so does the soup kitchen or the food bank. (In fact, Saint Mary’s Food Bank Alliance, the Arizona organisation which lays claim to originating the concept of a “food bank” in 1967, was inspired by food waste at local grocery stores, and was founded on the willingness of those grocers to let their products be recirculated under the auspices of social service agencies, rather than throwing them away [St. Mary’s Food Bank].)
As I have described in the previous chapter, while a thing might still have a *use value*, its lack of *exchange value* on the market is what gets it thrown away. Its future hangs upon a string of calculations, guesses, and gambles about its capacity for circulation. Which, in turn, depends upon the interests and norms of the market-public. In the course of my research, I have been able to investigate in close detail the ethnographic moment of a thing’s demise and evacuation from the shelves of factories, fruit stands, bakeries, and grocers. Particularly in the case of food, this moment often depends on a range of qualitative factors—how picky the customers are likely to be, to what else is on sale, when the next shipment is, how close it is to closing time, and so on. At other times, the moment simply hinges on a formal threshold (the notoriously conservative sell-by date, for example), although these thresholds are calculated with the same diverse relations of distribution and consumption in mind. (And, of course, potential customers’ squeamishness about the date is one of these relations.)

In any case, once translated by the market into waste, it persists abjectly—neither useless, nor useful, because of the taboos, antipathies, and mistrust commonly afforded to garbage, and to a lesser extent to anything not acquired through to the publicly legible medium of the market. (“Don’t touch that honey, it’s still free.”) As I’ve described, however, because it’s still useful, it still has the potential to upset the market if not kept out of circulation. Moreover, this circulation is *both physical and discursive*. The owners of one Seattle bakery, for example, which donates tremendous quantities of its day-old bread to local food programs (and which also has perhaps the most well-known Dumpster in the city among local scavengers—unlocked up until recently), have expressed concerns that the visible association of their bread with emergency food systems might impact their products’ *brand identity*, and ultimately undermine their exchange value.

Insofar as waste contains within it a boundary, the semiotic outer limits of market relations, I have called it an uncommodity. Insofar as it is still useful, and threatens to violate that boundary, I have called it a countercommodity. This structural ambiguity is what constitutes its abjection.

Julia Kristeva, influenced by Mary Douglas’ classic definition of “dirt” as “matter out of place” (1984), describes the abject as neither subject nor object, but rather as a zone of indistinction between the two. Abjection is a disruption in the structure of meaning and identity (“the place where meaning collapses”). The ambiguity of useful trash—like the five billion pounds of unspoiled food discarded by retailers—represents exactly this kind of collapsed meaning with respect to the conventions of market circulation. For this reason I have called it “abject capital.” If abject capital represents collapsed meaning, a blockage in the circulation of value, it is both a boundary and a threshold for the market-public.
Prohibitions on food sharing, then define a series of exceptional spaces through which this abject capital can move without ceasing to be abject. Where it neither forfeits its use-value, nor is reincorporated into social relations of supply and demand. Like Sidran’s civility laws, these exceptional spaces of survival beyond the realm of commodity exchange outline in negative the dimensions and conventions of a bourgeois market-public. However, in demarcating these exceptions, in policing these boundaries, they create the conditions, beyond these market-publics, for the counterpublic circulation of non-market values. It is precisely this boundary that Dumpster-diving counterpublics exploit.

(dumpster-diving counterpublics and dirty sovereignty)

Getting something for nothing has a long, sometimes proud history in market societies. Since the Elizabethan enclosures,52 which marked the beginning of wage-labour as we know it,53 poachers have snuck past the hedges secluding the English commons, and recouped their historical hunting rights one rabbit at a time. From then on, a variety of practices and identities have been built upon the spaces abandoned or ignored by capital. From the gleaners who comb European fields after the harvest to the denizens of Rocinha, who squat on abject properties outside Rio Di Janeiro, or the Zabaleen (literally, “garbage people”) whose traditional livelihood for generations has been to collect and recycle Cairo’s trash, divers communities have staked out recurrent moments of independence from commodity exchange.54 From these moments, they have cobbled together new kinds of marginal commons. And from the Wobblies55 to the Wombles of Wimbledon Common,56 a series of ideological and literary traditions have made public this possibility. To the extent that people knowingly participate in these traditions—to the extent that they know they’re not alone—they form counterpublic spheres of abject value. The self-conscious margins of capital. And just as the liberal state rests upon a certain bourgeois public sphere, new social and political formations may rest on these abject publics. Urban Dumpster-divers are the latest heirs to this heritage, and from their ranks emerge powerful political phenomena, from Food Not Bombs to Occupy Wall Street.

Of course, they don’t just Dumpster-dive. Rather, Dumpster-diving is one common, maybe even hegemonic, part of the vocabulary of these counterpublics. (If one can say “counterpublic hegemony” without too much dissonance.) A lexicon of marginal value57 and post-capitalist home-economics articulated by people who have in common the reclamation, revaluation, and recirculation of the kinds of surpluses which end up in the Dumpster. Dumpstering, squatting and a variety of post-market practices are privileged in this lexicon over other kinds of circulation of value. At shared punk houses58 or Food Not Bombs chapters, for instance, you’re more likely to walk into a conversation about Dumpstering or
squatting than about shopping or renting (with the possible exception of complaints about the landlord) even though the latter are also common ways of staying fed and sheltered for punks and Food Not Bombers.

These vocabularies are publicised and circulated in a sphere of Dumpster-divers, scavengers, squatters, and urban gleaners who explicitly imagine themselves to pick up after the market-public, and to exploit those spaces of exception passed over by it. This counterpublic is heterogeneous, and transgresses the identitarian boundaries of subcultures or ideologies. (In much the same way as the market-public does business regardless of socio-cultural difference.) One Dumpster-diver and Food-Not-Bomber from Melbourne, for example, described some of the common, differently-inflected identities that draw people to Food Not Bombs: “Poor people, homeless people, and lots of punks as well… do it because, at times they’ve relied on free food. And so they’re giving back. And for students I think it’s a little bit different, like they’re doing it as more, a statement or something, rather than a feeling.” Participants may be privileged teens rejecting their parents’ consumerism, or the working poor trying to stretch their grocery budget, or crusty punks who haven’t held a job and a permanent address in years. Nonetheless, by definition they are participating in a class-inflected set of practices. They share space in the cultural economy of waste with respect to the market-public, and often participate in diverse aspects of this cultural economy, from the Dumpster to the food bank to the food stamp rolls. And while publics are ostensibly “self-organised” (in Warner’s words), it would be misleading to overlook economic and social pressures which overdetermine Dumpster-divers practices and cannot be easily boiled down to sheer choice. Theirs could be said to be an abject counterpublic.

Yet the shared social imaginary of a non-market public also makes possible new socialities and shared non-market labours. (And anyone who has Dumpster-dived, squatted, or otherwise made a living out of surplus knows how much work it can be.) Food Not Bombs is a good example: A magnet for hippies, communists, freegans, Quakers, punks, anarchists, Unitarians, liberal-do-gooders, and university-students-who-want-to-change-the-world (guess which of these categories the author falls into), Food Not Bombs establishes shared conventions for recirculating abject capital in spite of participants’ differences. And, of course, Food Not Bombs represents a kind of caring non-market labour: Goods are distributed without a price-tag or any immediate expectation of reciprocity (in contrast with the variety of institutional strings attached to rescue missions, shelters, and meal programs). For similar reasons, Food Not Bombs insists on distributing food in public, rather than on private premises.

All of these things are only possible in the context of the social imaginary of a non-market counterpublic. Indeed, in the case of Seattle’s Food Not Bombs chapter, the counterpublic was not just ontologically primary; it came first historically too. The squatter and punk-rocker I quoted at the outset,
who helped to establish Seattle’s earliest Food Not Bombs chapter in the 1990s, described to me public, Dumpstered street-feeds that she and her squatter-punk friends had already been putting on occasionally. Upon learning about Food Not Bombs’ actions in San Francisco (in part through a friend and fellow punker, also interviewed for this research, who had been involved in San Francisco), taking on the same name and sharing food more regularly was no great leap.

In other circles, friendly little gift economies circulate abject capital and other goods beyond the market in a variety of similar ways: Dumpster-divers often live in dense networks of shared houses, performance spaces, and arts or activist projects, so they often deliver extra food and durable goods to friends, compile them in “free boxes” in their houses, or publicly swap and gift them at the collective public giveaways known as “Really Really Free Markets.”

These spheres of non-market, counterpublic circulation echo earlier moments of intense counterpublic circulation like the 1960s countercultures of the Haight-Ashbury district in San Francisco. In fact, specific projects like the Really Really Free Market and Food Not Bombs might be indirectly traced back to the radical street theatre of the San Francisco Diggers, an anarchic group whose “Free Stores” and “Feed-Ins,” recirculated wasted food and other commodities to publicly highlight the absurdities of consumerism (Dolgin and Franco 2007). (Interestingly, the Feed-Ins began mining the supermarket waste-stream around 1966, a year before the USA’s first food bank began doing business [Digger Archives].)

If the exchange of goods outside a market-public is a kind of discursive circulation, then one easy step towards constituting a non-market counterpublic is simply to give things away for free. However, non-market exchange alone does not a counterpublic make. Publics demand the concrete possibility of address to an imagined plurality of readers, speakers, thinkers, Dumpster-divers, and so on. Various Do-It-Yourself (DIY) forms of public-ation serve just this function for contemporary Dumpster-diving counterpublics. The overwhelming proliferation of self-published ‘zines since the 1970s, for example, often photocopied and distributed for almost nothing, provides a venue in which to both exemplify non-market exchange and to write about Dumpster-diving and related topics. DIY performance spaces and recordings, produced on a similar budget, serve a similar function as do, increasingly, web-based publications and social networks. While these publications, spaces, and networks often consist of friends and acquaintances, their value, and their transformative potential lies also in the possibility, incipient in all of them, of addressing strangers, and hence in the indeterminate, anonymous, and possibly the expanding horizon of a counterpublic.
(affect, abjection, and counterpublic sovereignty)

For Michael Warner, the relationship between a public and a counterpublic is a relationship between business as usual and its illegitimate progeny. “Dominant publics,” he says, “are by definition those that can take their discourse pragmatics and their lifeworlds for granted, misrecognising the indefinite scope of their expansive address as universality or normalcy” (2002: 122). This certainly describes the market-public that Mark Sidran was able to assert so matter-of-factly, for example. In contrast, counterpublics are defined by their tension with a larger public. They are realms of publicity that, in some ways, contravene the norms of circulation obtaining in that larger public. In a word, they are queer. They exist in tension with the status quo—through the looking glass in both their own eyes and those of the dominant public.

For instance, unlike black markets, grey markets, and other “non-observed economies” which occupy a stigmatised space within the market-public, but which ultimately contribute to a nation’s gross domestic product (Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 2002), efforts like Food Not Bombs are only possible because of their relationship of exception with respect to the market-public. Projects like Food Not Bombs, then, answer J. K. Gibson-Graham’s call “to queer economy,” to disrupt the aura of universality or normalcy which surrounds the discourse pragmatics of the market (2006: xxxvi). (Not to be confused with Jacobsen and Zeller’s “queer economics,” which deals directly with the meeting-points between sexuality and the market [2008].)

Because they are queer, Warner says, counterpublics are also inherently spaces of social change—“spaces of circulation in which it is hoped that the poesis of scene making will be transformative, not replicative merely” (2002: 122). For this reason, he points out, counterpublics are usually connected to subcultures, although the two are not exactly the same: A counterpublic doesn’t depend on common identity, only common discursive circulation. In fact, many of the meanings that a subculture might contest or refuse (cf. Hebdige 2005 [1979]) are terribly hard to overcome without supportive public spaces—both discursive and material. Warner gives the example of internalised homophobia which may haunt gay subcultures: “Styles of embodiment,” he says, “are learned and cultivated, and the affects of shame and disgust that surround them can be tested, in some cases revalued. Visceral private meaning is not easy to alter by oneself, by a free act of will. It can only be altered through exchanges that go beyond self-expression to the making of a collective scene of disclosure… Publicness itself has a visceral resonance” (62-63). Like the prejudices a market-public may hold towards trash, the affect Warner describes is abjection, a collapse of meaning and self-identity (at least from the perspective of the straight world). And like Warner’s visceral revaluations of sex and gender, Dumpster-diving counterpublics also create spaces where the usual, embodied antipathies towards waste can be tested and altered. This revaluation corresponds to what Julia Kristeva called sublimation, the process by which abjection can be
reintegrated into self identity. (And it’s worth noting that, for Kristeva, sublimation is never purely abstract—like all meaning and experience, it must be embodied.)

To begin with, in a purely practical sense, a counterpublic sphere may disclose the very possibility for rethinking abjection, not to mention practical strategies for doing so. Food Not Bombs, for example, is one site where initiates learn that it’s possible to Dumpster-dive without getting sick. Or that squatting is something people might do voluntarily. And so on. And of course conversations around the cutting board are one excellent way to learn where the best Dumpsters are, or how to turn the water back on in an abandoned house. One Dumpster-diver and Food Not Bomber from Melbourne described the difficulties of Dumpstering in isolation and the value of counterpublic spaces like Food Not Bombs. While some people learn through living in communal housing with punks, squatters, and other Dumpster-divers, with whom they share they outings and the spoils, he came to Food Not Bombs and anarchism after attending university and described the process of learning through trial-and-error:

I was doing it for a long time and, just wasn’t any good at it, wasn’t getting anything. So I’d come to Food Not Bombs and say, “What’s going on?” [i.e. “Why aren’t I finding more?”] And they’d say, “Oh yeah, it’s okay”… Because maybe fifty-fifty—maybe a bit, even more—it’s a dud, and there’s nothing or it’s locked. So you’ve got to hear these success stories to inspire you.

As he points out, just as important as the sharing of knowledge is the sharing of inspiration—in other words, affect. Even long-term Food Not Bombs volunteers, for instance, have confessed to me that their visceral discomfort with the Dumpster hasn’t completely abated. So shared “scenes of disclosure” may help to inspire and affirm counterpublic praxis. This also might explain why, as he observed, “People only ever tell success stories. They don’t say ‘I went and I got nothing for months!’”

To the extent that they can make or break new meanings, publics are also, in a sense, sovereign. “Speaking, writing, and thinking” for the benefit of strangers, Warner says, “involve us—actively and immediately—in a public, and thus in the being of the sovereign” (69). (Although he notes, echoing Habermas, that mass media and monopoly capital may obstruct meaningful participation in a public, a factor that distorts the sovereignty of many dominant publics.) To the extent that Dumpster-diving counterpublics public-ise the details and fruits of their non-market labours, then, they foster a kind of non-market sovereignty. (In contrast to gleaning programs run by the City of Seattle and the USDA, which recover unspoiled produce, but which are hardly independent of business interests.62)

Sovereignty is, of course, a big word. In different hands it does different, invariably contentious kinds of analytical and political work. In international relations, it may refer to the self-governance of formal polities. In grassroots politics, it may assert identity and autonomy. In post-structuralist theory, it may
describe the elusive social and political underpinnings of power. And, of course, these are not mutually exclusive. In invoking the term here, I mean to describe the kind of palpable, lived agency needed to persuasively define and circulate new meanings. The qualitative texture of social relations and spaces that makes a counterpublic more than an abstract category. In fact, while writers like Lauren Berlant (2007) suggest taking a few steps away from sovereignty as an analytic category due to its insistence on unitary political categories and its “melodramatic view of agency” (755), it is precisely those imagined unities and melodramatic agencies which give the term its ethnographic significance in counterpublic performances. Particularly in the context of radical political communities which participate in Dumpster-diving. Berlant herself points out the tangible, affective dimension of sovereignty: “To have sovereignty is to feel sovereign” (2010: 29).

And Dumpster-diving counterpublics certainly do stake out a feeling of distinction and independence from the market-public. One index of the strength of these affects might be the reciprocal discomfort, embarrassment, or even guilt sometimes expressed by visitors to Food Not Bombs who feel they don’t align with what they perceive as predominant counterpublic assumptions. They may feel alienated not for eating from the Dumpster, but for shopping. Not for mending their clothes, but for not wearing enough patches. Not for squatting but for paying rent. And so on.

In characterising counterpublic sovereignty, Warner’s implicit definition seems compatible with Agamben’s: Not simply a formal political term, “sovereignty” is the licence (maybe “leeway” is a better term) exercised by individuals and institutions to define and redefine relations of exception. Warner’s approach is interesting, however, because he seems to imply that there can be simultaneously public and counterpublic sovereignties. The latter is a sovereignty more like Georges Bataille’s “accursed share”: That “surplus taken from the mass of useful wealth,” which, Bataille suggests, cannot be expended profitably towards the growth of a system, and therefore must be profitably wasted or sacrificed instead (Bataille 1991 [1949]: 59). For Bataille, this very waste was “sovereign” in its radical externality—from the Aztec sacrifice to the material excesses of bourgeois consumption. Agamben criticised him, though, for mistaking the object of sovereignty for sovereignty itself: “What Bataille is attempting to think here is clearly the very bare life… that, in the relation of the ban, constitutes the immediate reference of sovereignty” (Agamben 1998: 112). In a sense, Agamben accuses Bataille of taking the cart for the horse.

One might read in Warner’s work, then, a resolution of their differences. In the ambiguous relationship between public and counterpublic, inevitably a subaltern relationship, the fact of being in a relation of exception with regard to a dominant public is often the very thing that allows (or forces) a counterpublic to reinvent itself. It carves out alternative practices of circulation in the shape of the exceptional spaces abandoned by the larger public. (Note that sovereignty is always founded on
territoriality [cf. Bartelson 1995: 41].) In so doing, it expresses a kind of marginal sovereignty that takes exception to the social order from which it has been excluded. For both public and counterpublic, the exception itself is the umbilicus, the common axis along which they abandon each other. What is abjected (literally, “cast away” in Latin) by one public becomes the currency of another—from the slurs reclaimed by drag queens to the waste reheated by Dumpster-divers.

Similarly, Dylan Clark (2004) illustrates how Dumpster-diving punks deliberately invert the meaning of Levi Strauss’ dietary pyramid of “raw,” “rotten,” and “cooked” (albeit usually without having read Levi-Strauss). For Levi-Strauss, “cooked” described a symbolically sanctioned, nontransgressive form of food. “Raw” and “rotten” food, then, was antisocial and threatening. For the punks, who identify the cooked with commodification, food which is symbolically raw or rotten—stolen, purchased in bulk, or Dumpstered—is preferable. This freedom, or sovereignty, to revalue that which is exceptional at the level of sociality, then, corresponds at the level of affect to Kristeva’s sublimation of the abject, which I described in chapter one. In this way, counterpublics practice what the French Situationalists called detournement, the deterritorialisation and reinvention of familiar semiotics, which calls into question the entire semiotic architecture in which they were embedded. Marcel Duchamp accomplished the same thing by putting a frame around a urinal.

Often, in Dumpster-diving publics, independence from the dominant market-public is expressed by the adjective “Do-It-Yourself,” a term appropriated by punk-rock countercultures in the 1970s which has since diffused throughout many left-wing movements. This implies, in a way, a sovereignty of evasion, the possibility of cultural autonomy beyond the spotlight or influence of dominant publics. Nothing illustrates this better than the mixed feelings expressed to me by Seattle freegans in response to media coverage of my research. (As I described in the previous chapter, a number of journalists have been interested in the notion that an academic would spend any time in a Dumpster.) Some of them were wary or resentful of the exposure. One told me I’d just be exploiting the local freegan scene “for the amusement of couch potatoes,” and risking getting a few Dumpsters locked up to boot. The implication is clear—too much of the wrong sort of public attention encroaches on the spaces (discursive and physical, in this case) in which counterpublic sovereignty is founded. (I took this seriously, and tried to avoid any on-air characterisations of Dumpster-divers, or identification of any good Dumpsters’ locations!)

Of course, I sounded out numerous people I know in the Seattle freegan scene who were also enthusiastic for a broader public to learn about the excesses of consumerism (otherwise I wouldn’t have agreed to the interview): “I’d be happy,” one of them said, “if I could get soccer moms to Dumpster-dive!” And, to be sure, the coverage generated a great deal of earnest, supportive reader comments and letters to me by people who are not, themselves, Dumpster-diving—as well as its fair share of snarkiness
and detraction. (Although whether it led any “soccer-moms” to start Dumpstering is impossible to tell.) Thus, the umbilicus of exception may also become a site for dialogue between different publics. The affective, discursive, and transactional conventions of a counterpublic are also the ways in which it might find traction with other publics in other ways, and even be reabsorbed into a larger public sphere. The detournement of a safety-pin-cum-earring, for example, that initially helped it circulate in punk clubs in the 1970s, has also afforded it the novelty to fetch top dollar when gold-plated and marketed by expensive boutiques.64 (Ironically enough, even Duchamp’s urinal recirculated in the market-public at auction for £816,000 [BBC 2002]—spectacular both colloquially and in Guy Debord’s (2002) sense of alienated, aestheticized consumption.)

(conclusion)

The borderlands between a market-public and its exceptional counterpublics, then, are productive, porous, and above all busy places. The traffic across these thresholds, discursive and physical, is both constitutive and transformative of the publics themselves. It’s with some of these transformations that I’d like to conclude.

On one hand, as I have described, some of this traffic is antagonistic, and results in prohibitions and blockages—new penalties for pissing in public, or new locks on old Dumpsterers, and so on. In the last year, for example, this fate has befallen three of my favourite Dumpsterers as their counterpublic household name status (the “Bread Dumpster,” the “Juice Dumpster,” and the “Chocolate Dumpster”) and corresponding foot traffic also earned Dumpsterers a higher profile with the proprietors. On the other hand, some of the traffic is more generative. I have described above certain personal, affective transformations cultivated in the Dumpster. As these transformations scale up, so too does their significance: The anonymous, expanding horizon of a counterpublic represents the practical value of its marginal sovereignty. The possibility for new forms to grow from the umbilicus of exception or abjection that ties it to the liberal state or its dominant-publics. If the market-publics described above are busy making social and material waste, then the scavenging counterpublics I have described remake it into communities, countercultures, movements and institutions—which are often illegible to the market-public.

The possibility, for example, of arriving in a strange city and exploring a countercultural economy of Dumpsterers, free boxes, Really Really Free Markets, Food Not Bombs chapters, and the like, represents a limited, but nonetheless very real, very pragmatic kind of sovereignty—less affective, and more material than I have described so far. The kind of sovereignty that members of the organisation Via Campesina
had in mind when they coined the phrase “food sovereignty.” While the term itself has taken on a fluid rhetorical life, it refers consistently to a concrete, pragmatic object of sovereignty—in this case, the ability to decide what one eats. Similarly, the proliferation of countercultures of squatters represents the freedom to snub the housing market and still have some say over where one sleeps.

Through these practical forms of sovereignty, Dumpster-diving, gleaning, and other kinds of scavenging have formed the foundation of emergent political and social phenomena like Food Not Bombs, which have played a significant roles in the politics of public spaces, homelessness, hunger, and so on at countless sites around the world—a topic to which I will to return in much more detail in Part Two of this dissertation. “I never felt that squatting was in itself anything radical,” explained one Seattle squatter, Dumpster-diver, and Food Not Bomber, “but the time that it gives you—I mean sure, it takes a lot of time to scavenge but beyond that—it gave us the time to not have to pay off a landlord, to engage in meaningful projects like Food Not Bombs or Books to Prisoners. And because we had more time than maybe others who were renting or working, the project got moulded into our political proclivities, as it were.”

Similarly, one remarkable and intrepid artist, activist, and Food Not Bomber I spoke to from New York City described to me researching, writing, and publishing countless ‘zines and her first book (she’s now in the final stages of publishing her second), organising international exhibits of her own photography, and raising a child with a relatively miniscule budget and a part-time job thanks to the low-overhead of their squatted apartment. (Complete with electricity, hot water, and insulation, mind you.) And from some European cities, my research correspondents have brought back stories of long-term squats with nightclubs, bars, restaurants, which are virtually a permanent part of their urban landscapes. And of course, the movement of encampments inaugurated recently by Occupy Wall Street has been, in part, bolstered by a steady stream of free reading materials, blankets, food and other materials donated to the cause—much of it Dumpstered or donated surpluses, if Seattle or New York City are any indication (cf. Gordinier 2011).

While these movements, countercultures, and communities are more concrete than the counterpublic relations among strangers Warner describes, the two are closely related, and the former are only possible because of the latter. The possibility of new kinds of sovereignty is based upon the possibility of addressing strangers as a public, an imagined community, and then of finding some of those strangers somewhere, and engaging them as a community. Food Not Bombs’ weekly meals in Seattle and other such sites represent just such spaces Dumpster-diving counterpublics may generate communities of affect, where Dumpster-divers, squatters, train-hoppers, punks, hippies, and other countercultural voyagers may begin to meet each other, to plug into the local scene, and to discover the local resources. As the punk
band Gogol Bordello put it: “There is a little punk rock mafia everywhere you go; she is good to me and I am good to her.”
Chapter Three

*World-Class Waste: Spectacular Capital, Markets Public, and the Erstwhile Metropolis*

*The colonist’s sector is a sector built to last, all stone and steel. It’s a sector of lights and paved roads, where the trash cans constantly overflow with strange and wonderful garbage, undreamed-of leftovers.*

Frantz Fanon

*(if you build it, they will come)*

At first glance, everything else made some sort of sense except the bocce ball courts. Pulling out every third tree made sense to city planners who were anxious about drug dealing, public drinking, and the other similarly shady details that they suggested had been sheltered in the shadows of the park’s canopy. And dismantling the enormous pergola made sense to anyone who didn’t want a great big rain-shelter in the park. (Seattle is, after all, affectionately called “Rain City,” and free outdoor shelter space is in absurdly short supply.) Food Not Bombs used to hand out food underneath it on rainy Sunday afternoons, so this generally seemed like a counterproductive move from our perspective—and presumably also from the perspective of the sixty or seventy people who queued up under the shelter to eat with us—but the local business association, which supported the new plans for Occidental Park (see below), seemed to have made its peace with the idea. One presumes they had their reasons for imagining the park better off without the proverbial huddled masses huddling proverbially under it during the odd downpour. Probably for the same reasons, the parks’ new designers judged the park’s benches “anti-social,” and recommended removing most of them, along with the (only) neighbourhood public toilet, at the north end of the park (Project for Public Spaces 2004: 39). The handful of “more inviting” (ibid.) replacement benches installed afterwards differed in one key respect—iron armrests sectioned them off and prevented anyone from lying down comfortably.

At the public commentary session I went to (along with quite a few other Food Not Bombs volunteers and homeless advocates), deputy parks superintendent B. J. Brooks suggested that the space previously occupied by the pergola might eventually be earmarked for an outpost of Tully’s Coffee or Starbucks. And this too, from an ever-so-slightly mercenary, pecuniary perspective made sense: Seattle’s Pioneer Square neighbourhood, home to Occidental Park, has long vacillated between mascot (and tourist attraction) for Seattle’s historic identity and magnet for the down-and-out. With relatively few long-term residents or dwellings, the neighbourhood is an awkwardly matched quilt of tourist-friendly bars,
restaurants, and other businesses, commercial offices, warehouse spaces, homeless shelters, meal programs, and day centres, stitched together with old red brick and stone walls which seem like equal parts heritage site and safety hazard. Anything that attracted extra financial or cultural capital to the neighbourhood could help tip the balance. A corporate concession stand in the park can, for example, according to the city’s Downtown Parks and Public Spaces Taskforce, “activate” a place. Which is to say: “Retail activity can create interest and bring activity to the parks, which will, in turn, improve park safety and perceptions about the parks as attractive, welcoming destinations” (Parks and Public Spaces Taskforce 2006: 8). Not at all coincidentally, the taskforce suggests that businesses also act as “natural monitors” to discourage and report uncivil or illegal behavior (ibid.). And of course they don’t fail to mention that business in the park contributes to city revenues as well.

Occidental Park’s million-dollar facelift in 2006 was part of the taskforce’s scheme to make the city’s parks more “people friendly and diverse” (Parks and Public Spaces Taskforce 2005). They wrote, “As rising numbers of individuals and families look to downtown as a livable and active residential area, it’s time for Seattle to make its downtown parks the beautiful, vibrant and welcoming public spaces they were meant to be. As downtown booms, the parks should bloom” (Parks and Public Spaces Taskforce 2006: 1). Borrowing the euphemisms of “revitalization” and “renaissance” from so many other urban redevelopment projects around the country and the globe, the taskforce seems to be saying that the newly landscaped parks should be part and parcel of the new urban landscapes of prosperity attending the comparative boomtown that Seattle has become in recent years. Their vision for a people-friendly space seems to be circumscribed by a public whose fortunes are wrapped up in the market—what I have called a market-public.

Of course, that the park was already friendly (or, at least, not thoroughly hostile) to a different, largely unsheltered kind of public life did not go unmentioned. Far from it, the fact that the park was in regular use by homeless people and substance abusers was consistently mentioned in the same breath as its need for change in newspaper reports and blueprints of the new park. One local resident was quoted as saying, “Almost anything (the city) could do would be an improvement. (The park) has been such a disgrace. On the north side is where the mentally ill people congregate, and the south side is where the drug dealers hang out. This is going to let some sun in” (Murakami 2006a). Implicitly, the interests of the mentally ill, the addicts, and the homeless users of the park are at crossed purposes with Seattle’s sunny social and economic prospects.

The winter of Pioneer Square’s discontent, made glorious summer with a bit of landscaping.
Not to put too fine a point on it, Katie Comer, of the local business association, explained the fundamental logic behind the new design: “What we’re trying to do is replace the negative activity with positive activity” (Murakami 2006b).

The park’s facelift, and some of the tensions attending it, I argue in this chapter, scratch at the surface of the intimate relationship between the aspirations of market-publics in cities like Seattle, which have profited from the globalised circulation of goods, services, and finance, and the abject forms of life and economy which are generated at the margins of the markets public.

None of which quite explains the bocce courts.

Bocce ball isn’t very popular in Seattle, you see. Even mayor Greg Nickels, a strong proponent of the new park, needed a bocce lesson when the game was first introduced there. One of my Food Not Bombs comrades who grew up in New England contrasted Seattle’s near-nonexistent love of bocce ball with her experiences in Boston’s North End, its Italian-American cultural centre, where bocce ball has been the done thing for generations: “Did they think if they installed bocce courts, packs of old Italian men would suddenly materialise in the park?”

She may be onto something. While bocce is probably not Seattle’s next big thing, the bocce courts were suggested by a New York design firm which specialises in what it calls “placemaking.” (Or, if you like: “If you build it, they will come,” as my friend described the apparent logic behind the bocce courts and the heralded Italian septuagenarians.) The group, Project for Public Spaces, calls placemaking “both a process and a philosophy” (Project for Public Spaces N.d.). On paper, this approach to planning “takes root when a community expresses needs and desires about places in their lives” (ibid.). In the case of Occidental Park, though, the firm’s suggestions for activating the park were openly “heretical” to local residents’ sensibilities—in the director’s own words, no less—taking more after the landscape architecture of Copenhagen than the Pacific Northwest (ibid.). In this way, the firm and the parks taskforce are enacting a virtual, speculative version of Seattle, what Michel de Certeau called the concept city—“a universal and anonymous subject which… serves as a totalizing and almost mythical landmark for socioeconomic and political strategies” (1984: 94-95; emphasis in original). Fortunately, at planning meetings, local residents had the chance to red-light the worst of these suggested heresies. The astroturf remained a mere splotch of green pencil. And the park’s existing totem poles, ivy, and fire fighter statue escaped the proposed chopping block. (While the trees weren’t so lucky, they were at least in some way commemorated by the post-facto judgement of the courts in favour of several residents who sued to keep
them in the park.) Bocce courts and brick paving (replacing the old cobblestones) mustn’t have seemed like much of a concession, in comparison.

Nonetheless, the Costneresque globalism at work here (Seattle-cum-Copenhagen-cum-North-Boston-by-way-of-New-York) reflects a speculative, utopic, and somewhat ethnocentric vision of the future of public life shared by a lot of urban redevelopment projects (along with the vitalistic euphemisms—which sound a bit worn out these days, ironically enough). While world-class cities like Seattle are “world-class” for a variety of reasons, increasingly, their key export is their own urbane lifestyle. Their world-classiness. Envisioning Seattle’s park of the future, for example, the taskforce describes “a vibrant gathering space for a broad, urban democracy” (Downtown Parks and Public Spaces Taskforce 2005). Their meeting notes add a variety of evocative sketches of this urban vision, from “a visual outdoor gallery” to “the backyard for downtown residents… a place for a picnic, barbecue, or a glass of wine” (ibid.).

It’s telling that they describe it as a backyard, rather than, say, a living room. (A place to play a very civil game of bocce ball, but not to get a night’s sleep. A place to drink a glass of wine, but not a forty-ounce of malt liquor.) The market-public conjured up in this speculative vision invariably engages in a relatively civil (read: bourgeois, or at least not especially cheap) kind of public life, and then has somewhere to go home to at night. (City attorney Mark Sidran’s civility laws in the 1990s, after all, included an 11pm curfew for the parks.)

But it’s even more telling that, surpassing all these sketches, the very first priority listed for the park of the future is that it be “clean, clean, clean” (ibid.).

In other words: “Out, damned spot.”

The grit and disorder of urban living are characteristic stumbling blocks for the speculative urban utopianisms of city planners and developers. From the renaissance in the last thirty years of “broken windows” theories of public order (described in chapter four) to the sixteenth-century French edict to lock up one’s own “sullied waters” indoors, described in Dominique Laporte’s The History of Shit (2000: 4), cities have often reckoned their worth by the identification and negation of what, in contrast, seems derelict, dis-eased, and dirty. What is, in Mary Douglas’ terms, “matter out of place” (1984). But the secret of these incipient utopianisms is that they are never very far away from their erstwhile dystopias. While the ideals of civilisation (“making civil”) are put to work fashioning “socially useful values and goods,” Laporte explains, waste is every bit as much their product, discursive and material: “The necessary outcome of socially profitable production, it is the inevitable by-product of cleanliness, order,
and beauty” (14). Cities in particular, he writes, embody the intimate antagonisms between the civil utopianism of the market and its roots in the production of waste:

The town, as opposed to the country, becomes the site of the rot-proof and advances a new space of the visible. *Where shit was, so shall gold be.* And with its entrance, gold proclaims its implicit and ambivalent relation to excrement. Beautified, ordered, aggrandized, and sublimated, the town opposes itself to the mud of the countryside. But in so doing, it also exposes itself, in the notoriously virginal face of nature, as a place of corruption. ‘The bourgeois reeks!’ ‘He stinks of money!’ So says the citoyen… If the shit that glows in the fields becomes the lasting gold of city streets, the stench of shit lingers where gold sleeps (39).

The contemporary markets and market-publics upon which globalising, post-Fordist cities like Seattle have often hung their collective aspirations, I will argue below, have been built on just such kinds of placemaking and waste-making. On one hand, if you build the bocce courts (or the stadium, the art museum, the symphony hall, and so on) the markets public will come. On the other hand, the abject people and things exempted or excepted from these public efforts will have to go somewhere else.

Not without payoffs of a kind, mind you. Despite a progressive divestment from the urban safety net by upper tiers of government over the last thirty years so, for example, Seattle’s economic successes have allowed it to channel its tax revenues to the human services budget and insulate many of these programs from cuts made at the state and federal levels.

But as I have written already, these projects both produce and segregate urban cultural economies. Market value and marketability are reckoned dialectically—an accumulation of value at one end of the spectrum implies a comparative depreciation at another. And market-publics reckon value spectacularly through public circulation. They are therefore bounded by spectacular wastelands. Until now, I have written mainly about waste as the discursive and material counterpart of these markets and publics. But, of course, markets and publics must exist in space, as must the waste they make. The geographies through which they are performed and produced are often metropolitan in scale. The “shining city upon a hill” of popular imagination is inevitably superimposed onto erstwhile metropolises of surplus and waste, surfeit and want.

This chapter describes the metropolitan performance and production of abject economies in situ in the places where I’ve done my research—particularly in Seattle, where I’ve worked for the longest, along with Melbourne, New York City, San Francisco, and Boston, where I’ve spent shorter periods exploring the social worlds and networks of the Food Not Bombs chapters, Dumpster-divers, and squatters who all mine these abject economies. These networks (which I’ll describe at length in chapters five and six) connect the abject social worlds of each city to the others in a series of webs which echo and are
superimposed upon the webs of wealth and influence that make these cities powerful. This chapter, therefore, situates my ethnographic work within a critical geography of global and globalising cities. The term “global” here refers both the influential model of urban development proposed by Saskia Sassen (2001) to describe some of the ways in which cities, primarily from the Global North, compete for pre-eminence in the global economy, and also to the cultural imaginaries of urbane cosmopolitanism and globalising consumption that often accompany this development. Below, I describe some of the sociological and geographic processes by which Seattle and other similarly globalising, post-Fordist cities have invested in spectacular and speculative efforts at (neo)liberal placemaking, and cultivated corresponding terrains of abject capital and abject cultural economies (which in turn, I have already suggested, give rise to counterpublic social forms like Food Not Bombs). Expanding on the vocabularies of abject value and markets public developed over the previous two chapters, the present work draws on the work of urban researchers like Saskia Sassen, Sharon Zukin, and Timothy Gibson, to investigate the relationships between cost of living, commercial waste, and material privation; between real estate speculation, vacant properties, and unsheltered citizenries; between market-publics, utopic urban spectacles, and the erstwhile metropolis.

In a way, this contextualising chapter seems a little out of order for a work of ethnography, emerging as it does from two chapters of heavy theoretical work, rather than the reverse. While I have developed the theoretical vocabularies of those chapters in the course of my direct participation and observation at the locales described below, in turn, those vocabularies have become the key terms in which I imagine those settings. And so it will best serve the telling to have elaborated upon those vocabularies first in order for me to now describe the places themselves.

Only after describing in the previous two chapters, for example, the tense relationships between market-publics, speculative civil utopianism, and abject cultural economies, does the complete irony of the following observation become clear: On the Sunday after the Occidental Park’s grand reopening, when the chain-link barriers had come down and Food Not Bombs was once again able to hand out food from the middle of the park, neither the old Italian men nor the young urban professionals materialised to take advantage of the bocce courts. But undeterred by the new courts, or the absent canopy, the crowd of hungry and homeless people waiting to eat with us was no smaller than on any given Sunday in the old park. And, while they waited, some of them were playing bocce ball.
(big city dreams and world-class waste)

The big-city dreams and the urban dereliction of a place, as I have argued, are hard to divorce, in both the imaginary and the material realm. De Certeau’s concept city “repeatedly produces effects contrary to those at which it aims: the profit system generates a loss which, in the multiple forms of wretchedness and poverty outside the system and of waste inside it, constantly turns production into ‘expenditure,’” (1984: 95). Laporte’s gold still smells like shit. Seattle’s wealth, for example, was first built on the fortunes of lumber and resource extraction, and the heroically named Pioneer Square was also the very first place to earn the nickname “Skid Road”—originally after the logs that skidded down Profanity Hill toward the city’s first saw mill and the cut-rate bars and hotels that served its workforce. In the neighbourhood’s Janus-faced nomenclature are recorded the fortunes and misfortunes of the archetypal Western boomtown.

Plus ça change. Seattle today is a different kind of boomtown, global in scope, a hub for shipping, research, and high technology, built equally on the fortunes and misfortunes of its day. In Pioneer Square, these fortunes and misfortunes are still mapped onto the old geographies. The neighbourhood is still a focal point for entrepreneurs who can afford to dream, a hub for high technology, tourism, and development. And at the same time, the rescue missions concentrated there still cater to those hard cases who have been let down by the big city. This is still where many a recent, broke arrival to the city begins to map out her chances. Passing through the Food Not Bombs line of a Sunday afternoon, I’ve met veterans looking for a new start, train-hopping punks looking for a place to squat and other train-hopping punks to squat with, fishermen lured by disingenuous promises of long-term contracts (the liberalised market calculus of the Seattle fishing industry and its human consequences deserves a dissertation unto itself), and strangers who’ve bet on failed relationships, have nobody else to fall back on, and can’t afford to go home. Pioneer Square is an entry point for many such initiates into the social spheres of homeless shelters, meal programs, case-workers, panhandling, squats, drug dealers, and other kinds of exceptional, marginal, or liminal lifeworlds.

That the social and economic worlds of a city’s most successful and least fortunate are intimately interwoven is, of course, not in itself a novel observation. It resonates from Dickens’ two cities and Marx’s industrial reserve army down to the struggles of modern homeless politics. What I have argued up until now is that the membranes between such worlds also define the circulation of things between different states of value and worthlessness. More specifically, they except or exile certain things and certain spaces of circulation from the public traffic in goods, services, and value that constitutes a market-public. In the city, then, these membranes and spaces are often mapped and remapped according to the contours of speculative and spectacular geographies of capital and value. Projects like the makeovers of
Occidental Park and the Pike Place Market, for example—another one of Seattle’s most iconic tourist attractions which also receives periodic facelifts—both speculate on their ability to attract and transact capital and spectacularly perform that ability through the urban civility of their bocce courts, the sensory buffet of their post-card-perfect rows of produce, and so on. And, at the same time, these performances are founded on the identification and negation of those people and things that are anathema to such spectacles—matter out of place. In cities like Seattle, whose speculative and spectacular projects represent a powerful kind of currency on the global market—for attracting foreign investment, business headquarters, commercial outlets, wealthy residents, tourism, and so on—the boundaries between public circulation and spaces of exception, between market value and worthlessness, are heavily trafficked. Such global and globalising cities circulate capital of all kinds—financial, social and cultural capital, goods, services, intellectual property, and so on. And in this circulation, a significant share of that capital will inevitably be devalued, made derelict with respect to the market, and removed from circulation. It will become capital that is abject.

What I am saying in this chapter, then, is that, quantitatively, world-class cities like Seattle make a lot of waste.

Here, as in the previous two chapters, by “waste” I mean not just refuse, but things that are wasted. Things that are useful but go unused—particularly as far as the market is concerned. With respect to market exchange, capital that has a use value but is removed from circulation nonetheless is what I’ve called abject capital. That waste takes a variety of forms, from abject labour stalled in its tracks as a result of structural unemployment to the edible surpluses consigned to the Dumpsters at the Pike Place Market—or donated to soup kitchens and distributed under the freeway (as I will describe in the next chapter)—and the abandoned properties which stand, padlocked, waiting for the market to develop an interest in them. Such waste is a kind of manufactured scarcity—a term I owe to activist Peter Coyote, one of the original San Francisco Diggers who I described in the previous chapter. This scarcity is a chronic symptom endemic to the polarised lives of great metropolises and an invariable consequence of the rhythms of market exchange and circulation that make and break globalising cities like Seattle.

Of course, market exchange, circulation, and wasted capital don’t just happen in globalising cities. Indeed, researchers have noticed the growing political and cultural sway held by market-publics and commercial interests over the last three decades or so in industrialising and post-industrial cities around the globe. While market exchange (and its waste-making) has long been at the heart of urban life, there is a consensus among many researchers that markets and their invested publics have come to dominate urban life and politics in distinctive ways since at least the 1980s, at the same time as neoliberal political
and economic reform has achieved something like hegemony among politicians and technocrats working at the national scale (c.f. Mitchell 1997, Smith 2002, Harvey 2007). Theodore, Peck, and Brenner describe this growing political influence as a shift from the discrete “neoliberalisation” of particular cities to a definitive pattern of “neoliberal urbanism,” in which cities rather than nations represent an increasingly significant scale at which neoliberal, market-centric ideologies are translated into policy, strategy, and social reality (2011: 24). From business sponsorship of public development projects like the art museum, the open-air mall, or the sporting stadium, to hefty municipal subsidies for private shopping centres and business parks, or the relocation and restriction of public housing and low-income services, cities of all kinds have been preoccupied with building the perfect container for the market-based forms of life imagined above by Seattle’s Downtown Parks and Public Spaces Taskforce—forms of public commerce and consumption that are civil, utopic, and always “clean, clean, clean.”

Indeed, the placemaking and waste-making of markets and their publics re-form cities of all kinds—from the Zabaleen, ethnic trashpickers of Cairo, to the Dumpster-divers of Seattle—as their fates are increasingly tied to the diverse rhythms of an increasingly globalised economy. There is not, alas, the space in a single dissertation to account for all this urban waste-land-scaping. But the globalised element of these processes suggests that there are at least a few useful comparisons to be made between some of the places in which I have done my work. Geographically distant, they nonetheless share certain cultural and economic relationships to the world market. The markets and publics of Seattle, Melbourne, New York City, San Francisco, and Boston echo one another in a variety of ways. I have spent days, weeks, and years in each of these cities (the latter in Seattle, the former in Boston, and the median in the remaining three), interviewing people involved in Food Not Bombs and participating in it and the various Dumpster-diving counterpublics in which it is embedded. In each place, the wasted surpluses upon which these efforts are founded, and the scarcities of food and shelter to which they respond seemed to be impossible to divorce from the city’s high-profile status within the global economy. While not all of these cities are at the very top of the heap in terms of dominance or prestige in the world market, they all participate in that market in spectacular and speculative ways. While they may not all be global cities strictly speaking, according to Saskia Sassen’s influential model (see below), they are most assuredly all cities which are becoming global—and doing so in some convergent ways. They are globalising cities. I’m borrowing this term from John Rennie Short (2004), who points out that whether or not a city might be placed categorically at the top of an urban cultural-economic hierarchy, a common sense of global “becoming and longing” animates them. Indeed, the term “global” itself holds a weighty cultural cachet often invoked in these cities, a cipher to international economic and political success that is not quite the level playing field the word seems to claim (cf. Tsing 2000). And the game is always changing. World leaders like New York City are seeking to maintain their status just as important regional centres like
Melbourne are aspiring to become global cities. In this way, Rennie Short says, “cities are not so much becoming globalized as being continually reglobalized” (2004: 22).

By definition, the vagaries of global capital flows are a hegemonic, decisive part of the life of these globalising cities. They are competitive players within networks of international economic circulation whose fortunes are constantly being made and remade according to the logic of the world market. And with these fortunes so are the social geographies of the people and things in them made and remade. And, of course, it is according to these shifting prospects that capital may be obsolesced and abject-ified: If cities of all kinds make haste and waste in diverse ways, these globalising cities make waste according to the globalised modes of production, distribution, and consumption which make them what they are. Or, if you like, *world-class cities make world-class waste.*

Scholars have painted the importance and social geography of such influential cities with a variety of brushes. In 1966, in “The World Cities,” Peter Hall popularised the eponymous term to describe such metropolises, highlighting their role as international centres for: political power; research and development; cultural production; and above all, trade and finance. Borrowing the concept from city planner Patrick Geddes (1915), he pointed out that the peddling of such influences inevitably also exerts distinctive, cosmopolitan demands on the architecture and infrastructure of these cities, which need to accommodate international circuits of people, products, and finance. More recently, Friedman observed that these spatial influences in the world city were, logically enough, tied to the “new spatial division of labour” emerging from the post-Fordist globalisation of production and finance (1986: 70). Friedman argued for an emerging hierarchy among world cities which echoes Wallerstein’s core-periphery model of the global economy (1984).

Following in their stead, then, has been the work of Saskia Sassen (2001)—who coined the now practically inescapable term *global city.* The definitive characteristic of global cities, she writes, is their concentration of what she calls their “command functions” within the new global economy. One of the ironies of the new world order, she says, is that capital is both more mobile (in its investment) and more centralised (in its ownership) now than ever. While she sidesteps the bi-polarity of Wallerstein’s core-versus-periphery, she echoes Freidman by sitting these cities atop a hierarchy of nodes within global networks of production, trade, and finance. Her key examples are New York, Tokyo, and London, which she suggests are at the pinnacle of this hierarchy. As industrial production is increasingly atomised, far-flung and flexible (“made in Mumbai-Detroit-Tokyo-Juarez-Shenzhen…”), and the international movement of finance has asymptotically approached (if never quite completely achieved) a kind of tractionless instantaneity, the role of these global cities has been to concentrate the management of this production and movement, accumulating the relevant “producer services” like information technology,
accountancy, banking, research and development, and infrastructures like stock exchanges, office towers, and so on.

It is Sassen’s term, then, that I have put to work below, along with her central conceits that global (and, by extension, globalising) cities jockey with each other for the command of global capital and that they concentrate wealth, elites, and intelligentsia at the top of the global pecking order. Moreover, as Sharon Zukin points out (see below), the terrain on which they compete is not only economic but cultural, and the public lives of these cities are increasingly tailored to a fit a particular market-centric vision of success. From such great heights, I argue, inevitably precipitate not only the best of times and the worst of times, but a hefty share of gilded waste. In the globalising city, gold still smells a little bit like shit.

**market-publics in the globalising city**

Most important for my purposes, then, is Sassen’s account of the ways in which the concentration of this management remakes the economic and social life of a city. Again echoing Friedman (1986), she suggests these cities become increasingly social and spatially polarised. In the absence of the relatively well-compensated, stable employment once typical of the Fordist city’s key industries, Sassen suggests that the booming informational economies of global cities have tended to promote expansion at the top and bottom of the labour market, now polarised by high income, white-collar sectors directly employed in the various command functions, and low income sectors associated with minimum-wage service industries, casual labour, and so on. The growth in low-wage jobs, she says, is compounded by the expansion of well-paid ones:

Economic inequality in major cities has assumed distinct forms in the consumption structure, which in turn has a feedback effect on the organization of work and the types of jobs being created. There is an indirect creation of low-wage jobs induced by the presence of a highly dynamic sector with a polarized income distribution. It takes place in the sphere of consumption (or social reproduction). The expansion of the high income workforce, in conjunction with the emergence of new cultural forms in everyday living, has led to a process of high-income gentrification, which rests, in the last analysis, on the availability of a vast supply of low-wage workers. (285)

While Sassen’s argument has been complicated by subsequent research which suggests a less direct, more multiscalar relationship between the concentration of global managerial services and the growth in low-income job markets (cf. Hamnett 1994, Elliott 1999, Sassen 2001), her thesis remains nonetheless consistent with on-the-ground polarisation in these global cities (Sassen 2001; Fainstein, Gordon, and Harloe 2011). This polarisation of the workforce is, not surprisingly, accompanied by an intensification of spatial polarisation, de facto segregation, and the disproportionate cultural influence of bourgeois (read: “civil,” or at least still not very cheap) forms of social life—particularly high-income consumption.
In response to this bifurcated labour market, many sectors of the urban economy have grown energetically, catering particularly to the higher-income strata of the global city—the software engineers, the corporate accountants, the market researchers, and so on, whom Sassen suggests are big spenders in the urban economy. (Quoth the parks taskforce: “As downtown booms...”) They give rise to a distinctive pattern of urban consumption, from luxury boutiques and expensive produce markets to high-income gentrification and the soaring cost of housing in global cities. In contrast to the predominance of the middle classes in Fordist urban consumption, she writes:

Style, high prices, and an ultraurban context characterize the new ideology and practice of consumption, rather than functionality, low prices, and suburban settings. This is not merely an extension of elite consumption, which has always existed and continues to exist in large cities. It is quite different in that it is a sort of new mass consumption of style, more restricted than mass consumption per se because of its cost and its emphasis on design and fashion. There are distinct areas... where this new commercial culture is dominant and where one finds not only high-income professionals for whom it is a full-time world, but also ‘transients,’ from students to low-income secretaries, who may participate in it for as little as one hour. (Sassen 2001: 323; my emphasis)

This culture of high-income mass consumption is precisely the kind of public life to which city officials have looked to attract investment and revitalise their “retail cores.” It is the portrait painted in architects’ sketches of new shopping malls and concert halls, the face of the market-public invoked in the “broad urban democracy” of the downtown parks taskforce.

It is also a kind of public life in which market circulation and exchange are hyper-dependent on aesthetics and social capital. Sharon Zukin describes this civil, aestheticised urbane public life as a linchpin in an increasingly decisive “symbolic” economy, one “based on such abstract products as financial instruments, information and ‘culture’—i.e. art, food, fashion, music and tourism” (1998: 826). The symbolic economy is, therefore, a composite of distinctive, urban, globalised cultural economies such as those I’ve described here and in the previous chapters. “The symbolic economy,” she says, “is based on the interrelated production of such cultural symbols as these and the spaces in which they are created and consumed—including offices, housing, restaurants, museums and even the streets... Thus urban lifestyles are not only the result, but also the raw materials, of the symbolic economy’s growth” (ibid.). In a way, these lifestyles and locations themselves become a species of metacommodity with a powerful, fetishised symbolic cachet. Sometimes they even have their own advertising campaigns. (As I write this, for example I’m sitting in Chicago O’Hare Airport and I’ve heard two advertisements in the last five minutes for Chicago itself—“Not only a great place to chase your dreams. It’s a great place to catch them.”

Meanwhile my copy of Sky Magazine details five different urban lifestyles through which to “discover” São Paolo, all emphasising upmarket tourism—the “Foodie,” the “Culture Vulture,” the “Night Owl,” the “Fashionista,” and the “History Buff,” [Vora 2012].)
In other words, the prevailing lifestyle of urbane consumption itself is often a city’s most important product. (To wit, it is no accident that it was in the middle of the first properly neoliberal decade, the 1980s, that the “Cosmopolitan” was invented and popularised throughout the US on the strength of the iconic, urbane martini glass in which it was served.)\footnote{Driven on by Sassen’s mass consumption of style, Zukin’s symbolic economy is, more and more, the definitive currency of global cities, defined just as much by the spectacle of the perfect avocado at the market as by the sidewalks full of expensive jeans and posh electronics. Or by bocce ball courts and Starbucks in the park, for that matter.} As this economy and its avid mass consumers of style become increasingly global in scope and aspiration, Zukin suggests they have come increasingly to reflect a coherent, standardised (as distinct from homogenised, mind you) set of conventions. The faux-Italian, faux-Danish urbaniy of the Project for Public Spaces’ designs for Occidental Park described earlier, for instance, offers one small window into the ways in which such a symbolic economy might be standardised and made coherent to a transmetropolitan audience of consumers.

The emphasis on coherence and standardization, however, of course has stormy implications for what is non-standard or incoherent in the symbolic economy—for “matter out of place,” in other words. Amid the overtones of style and prestige in such standardisation is not infrequently a fundamental note of fear, of the threats posed by difference. Of the many qualitative accounts written of consumer-oriented redevelopment in New York City, for example, Samuel Delaney (1999) has given perhaps the most intimate, describing the cultural standardisation and gentrification accompanying new, publicly subsidised retail and entertainment developments in Times Square, which gradually stifled, discouraged, or criminalised cultural endeavours perceived as marginal, low-rent, or deviant. Endeavours like Delaney’s favourite gay porn theatres. (“Out, damned spot.”) The sexually permissive, interracial, cross-class sanctuary these theatres once afforded to gay people living in Manhattan was nothing if not “out of place” with respect to the standardised, civil coherence of Zukin’s symbolic economy.

Of course, it is not only thoroughly global cities that have a stake in asserting and patrolling this symbolic economy. Rather, it is one part of the process of becoming global, in which cities of all sizes have some stake. The cutting-edge, cosmopolitan consumption that defines such urban lifestyle politics implies a series of market-publics upon which the commerce and government of globalising cities look to build their cities’ fortunes. These publics are multiscalar. They include the local white-collar workers who Mark Sidran fretted would desert downtown for good, taking their disposable incomes to the suburbs (see chapter two). Or the restless Fortune 500 headquarters for whose revenue and reputations cities compete salaciously. Or the international Olympic-watching public, and the infamy, investment, and tourist dollars
they wield. To the extent, then, that a city finds itself in the constellations of Zukin’s symbolic economy, attracted by the gravitational forces of global capital investment, concentrated white-collar workforces, and luxury consumption, market-publics at all of these scales become the implicit subjects of its urban redevelopment strategies.

Michael Warner, who has done so much to outline the contours of different kinds of publics, has this to remind us about them: “publics,” he says, “are constituted by mere attention” (as the reader will recall from chapter two). And this, I might add, all the more so when their key purpose is to participate in symbolic economies of style and mass consumption. To this end, Zukin points out, in order to secure a piece of the pies that are commercial investment and upscale consumption, urban development strategies have tended to “aestheticize” the act of consumption and the spaces in which it occurs. In both these senses, a city’s development strategies conceive of these publics and constitute them in the process of simply getting them to pay attention. (As opposed to paying attention to a different, competing city in the case of restless corporate headquarters, or a different, unincorporated shopping locale in the case of local urban consumers, and so on.) In a sense, then, these globalised publics are by definition spectacular. Their job is, fundamentally, to remain attentive.

In this way, they echo the spectating public described by Guy Debord (2002), who suggested that the social relations summed up abstractly in the values ascribed to capital are performed in ever more abstract public representations, or spectacles. Following Debord’s lead, we could, in fact, call capital itself “spectacular” to the extent that it depends on such public performances of value. Value, after all, is an inherently public quality, and is ultimately realised in the publicly legible transactions of the marketplace—in the eyes of a market-public. The chief executives of Enron, for example, understood this implicitly, publishing fairy-tale accounts of their, well, accounts and daring the market to disbelieve them—which, eventually, it did, although not before inflating the exchange value of the company’s stock fantastically. Spectacular capital need not entail so sinister a sleight of hand, though. The auction of a work of art (remember Duchamp’s urinal from the previous chapter?), or the price guide for a used car both illustrate garden-variants of the same thing. Debord’s point (rhetorically hyperbolic, but insightful nonetheless) was that in modern capitalist societies, almost all capital had become spectacular. Extending Debord’s insights, then, media researcher Jonathan Beller rereads Marx to propose an “attention theory of value” in which value is now created not simply through material human labour, as Marx seemed to have suggested, but through the alienated work of just paying attention (2002).

Whether or not one buys into Debord’s or Beller’s all-encompassing theoretical ambitions, they offer useful descriptions of the ways value might be ascribed by the various market-publics which globalising cities covet to secure their place in Sassens’s global urban hierarchy. The value of these cities and their
markets often demand just such a kind of spectacular production—something like what Beller calls the “cinematic mode of production”—accomplished as much in tourism campaigns and glossy downtown taskforce reports as in the ease and opulence of corporate jet-setters and happy downtown shoppers.

(becoming global: a few examples)

I have found these social dynamics and symbolic economies reproduced in locally specific ways in my work in Seattle, Melbourne, San Francisco, New York City, and Boston, all of which are regional and-or international centres for producer services of various kinds. Of course, for my observations to be relevant and comparable, it is important to qualify each city’s comparable importance in the global hierarchy of business and information centres. This is not quite a walk in the park. Criteria are diverse. Each of these cities except Seattle rank in the top three tiers of Derruder et al.’s (2003) global urban hierarchy according to their connectivity within networks of corporate service firms, for instance. (Seattle ranks in the fourth tier, among cities that are “rarely if ever mentioned as world cities,” [883].) Only three of them, however—New York, San Francisco, and Melbourne—make it into the top fifty cities in the world in terms of their share of headquartered corporate offices and subsidiaries (Godfrey and Zhou 1999). At the same time, the runner-up in terms of corporate headquarters, Boston, comes in ahead of Melbourne in Derruder et al.’s analysis of connectivity. And while the city of Seattle trails behind the other four according to the previous analyses, the greater Seattle metropolitan region outshines the relatively provincial Melbourne according to the individual financial worth of some of its “producer services”—including the corporate headquarters of Fortune 500 companies like Nordstrom, Starbucks, Weyerhaeuser, Nintendo, and information technology giants Microsoft and Amazon, as well as many of their smaller competitors and contractors. In terms of the city’s concentration of economic decision-making power and its hefty share of international financial transactions, Sparke (2011) and Gibson (2004) have both reckoned Seattle a “global” city—the latter explicitly comparing the city’s labour market and geography to Sassen’s archetype.

Despite the taxonomic pains in the proverbial neck involved in qualifying or quantifying these cities’ importance within the proverbial global economy, the results nonetheless suggest that they each have a stake invested in their “command functions” and producer services and that the distinctive socioeconomic developments Sassen has associated with those sectors in New York, London, and Tokyo may also be relevant to some degree in each of the big cities in which I have worked. To wit: Seattle, New York City, San Francisco, Boston, and Melbourne have each experienced a decline in manufacturing jobs, a growth in information technology, producer services, and other white-collar work, and a coinciding growth in casual or low-waged service work (see, respectively, Gibson 2004; Sassen 2001; Pratt 2002, Pamuk 2004;
Glaeser 2005, Morin and Hanley 2004; Beer and Forster 2002, Randolph and Holloway 2005). Accompanying this polarisation, the upper strata of the socio-economic spectrum have seen a multiplication of markets and spaces catering to the “new mass consumption of style” Sassen observed at work in New York, London, and Tokyo.

In the absence of similarly detailed quantitative research with comparable criteria in each of the other cities, comparable patterns of upscale consumption in each of them might be reckoned by comparable qualitative developments such as transformations in the built environment. Describing the sway held over many cities by such patterns of ritzy urban living, Sharon Zukin observes: “Attention to lifestyles has given rise to new, highly visible consumption spaces, such as nouvelle cuisine restaurants, boutiques, art galleries and coffee bars. It has also generated new, complex, retail strategies, combining advertising, sales, real estate development and entertainment. Finally, attentiveness to urban lifestyles on the part of city governments has encouraged strategies that ‘aestheticise,’ or focus on the visual consumption of, public space” (Zukin 1998: 825). Zukin explicitly connects these patterns to the influence of world markets (and I have gone so far as to suggests that they are part of the process of becoming global). Each of the municipalities I have described has successfully invested in public and semi-public spaces that both exemplify and cultivate this aestheticized consumption. In New York City, for example, Zukin has described just such an investment in and return on the city’s art museums, cultural landmarks and shopping-entertainment districts. “Yet not just New York,” she writes, “but almost every city has decided to promote its art museums, and convert old railroad terminals and power stations to cultural complexes” (833).

Boston led one such pioneering redevelopment with its multi-million dollar transformation of Quincy Market, also known as Faneuil Hall, through a partnership of public and private investment in 1976. The market and neighbourhood had been, until then, (very literally) low-rent—home not to the posh restaurants and expensive grocery stalls there now, but to meat-packers and pigeons. (The pigeons, actually, were still there when I visited.) The market’s redevelopment demonstrated to a sceptical development industry—who had up until then largely ignored the city centre in favour of the suburban shopping centre—that a market-public could be convinced to frequent a city’s centre, and to spend a lot of money there (Frieden and Sagalyn 1989). Since then, the market has been a “catalyst for downtown regeneration” (Zade 2009: 7), and remains a centrepiece in Boston’s thriving downtown landscapes of retail and tourism. It now attracts more than eighteen million visitors annually (Faneuil Hall Marketplace History). Following suit more recently was San Francisco’s Museum of Modern Art, which in 1995, joining a growing palette of expensive retail and housing developments, opened its doors in the city’s South of the Market neighbourhood. The “SoMA” neighbourhood (hold your Aldous Huxley references
until the intermission) has been a quickly growing hub for the city’s information-technology industry which remains a definitive part of the city’s economy despite the dot-com bust of 2000 (Pratt 2002). In Seattle, similarly, Gibson (2004) has given a thorough account of the city’s public investment during the 1990s and early 2000s in spectacular arenas of downtown consumption like Nordstrom’s flagship department store and the shiny glass-and-steel endeavours that are Benaroya Hall (now home to the Seattle symphony) and the Seattle Art Museum. (I have also described Seattle’s investments in downtown parks and the Pike Place Market above.) Finally, in Melbourne, over the last two decades, similarly glass-and-steel developments like the new homes of the Melbourne Museum (formerly the Museum of Victoria) and the National Gallery of Victoria (enshrined in the city’s uncannily post-modern Federation Square) have found their polished intellectualism balanced by the massive redevelopments of the adjacent Southbank and Docklands regions of the Yarra River—now home to some very slick restaurants, hotels, casinos, and the tallest residential tower in the Southern hemisphere—which constitute a bustling, spectacular “leisure landscape” (Stevens and Dovey 2004). (Underlining the city’s globalising longings, the Southbank landscape even played host to the World Economic Forum in 2000, and saw protests and police efforts that echoed Seattle’s abortive World Trade Organization experience the previous year—with tens of thousands of protesters kept at bay by concrete and steel barricades while Bill Gates and the Australian Prime Minister came and went from the forum by helicopter, [ibid.].)

To the degree that they have been successful, each of these developments represents a qualitative indication of the symbolic economies and the mass consumption of style at work in such globalising cities. Of course, there are plenty of unsuccessful examples of these kinds of projects too—consider David Harvey’s description of the diminishing returns from “feeding the downtown monster” in Baltimore, where ever-increasing public subsidies are demanded while “the citizenry waits for benefits that never materialize” (2000: 141). These efforts, then, succeed or fail partly according to their success at materialising concrete market-publics with concrete spending power and tax revenues. It is worth noting that most of the developments I have described above have endured comfortably into the end of their first decades, or even entered their second, and done so with a robust economic history and outlook.

In addition to these material and spatial changes to the texture and rhythms of the built environment, more distributed market effects, such as changes in the cost and tenure of housing markets in these cities, may also register the impact developing patterns of social polarisation and high-income consumption in the globalising city. Paralleling Sassen’s description of New York City (2001), for example, Glaeser (2004) and Pamuk (2004) have directly associated rises in housing costs in Boston and San Francisco, respectively, with the growing proportion of high-income workers employed in dynamic sectors of the global economy—particularly information technology (see also Pratt 2002). While research is not
available that directly relates Seattle’s own steadily escalating housing costs over the last two decades (see chapter one) to its globalising socioeconomic geography, Morrill (2008) has associated its growing housing costs (home values outpaced the growth national average by a third\(^7\)) with both the growing mean income and tertiary education of Seattle residents, both of which Gibson (2004) has directly associated with Seattle’s successful competition within the hierarchy of global cities—particularly in the sectors of informational technology, research and development, and other producer services. In Melbourne the dynamics of the labour market and social welfare supports echo Sassen’s conceptual blueprints less closely. However, Winter and Stone (1998) have attributed the marginalisation of low-income workers at the bottom end of a hierarchy of housing tenure statuses (i.e. public housing, tenancy, home-ownership, and so on) to a polarisation of the Australian labour market (and therefore the behaviour of its upper strata in the housing market) which may echo Sassen’s polarisation thesis. And similarly, on the metropolitan scale, more directly paralleling Sassen’s description of spatial polarisation and segregation in global cities, Randolph and Holloway (2003) have identified a growing spatial polarisation and concentration of social disadvantage in low-income neighbourhoods in both Melbourne and Sydney, which they identify in part with the polarisation of the labour market resulting from Australia’s liberalised economic restructuring and integration within the global economy.

Of course, such trends in housing markets are neither evenly distributed within these cities or between them. Nonetheless, they index, almost by definition, the behaviour of market-publics who can bear the cost of inflated home values and rents in more expensive neighbourhoods. And because the fortunes of these market-publics are also not evenly or homogeneously distributed within and between cities, while the market can bear the cost, many of those stuck at the low-income ends of such polarised labour markets can not. The phenomenon of homelessness, for example, which Sassen attributes to the behaviour of labour and housing markets in global cities, has grown fairly consistently in cities with burgeoning housing costs like those described above (Bartelt 1997). Of course, the phenomenon of homelessness is a many-headed hydra, overdetermined by many different social developments, and research directly relating its growth to specific housing markets in specific globalising cities is scarce. Overall, however, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that homelessness and other material privations like food insecurity, underemployment, preventable disease, and so on, have been tied to both the inadequacy of service wages and to soaring costs of living, inflated by the presence of big spenders from the top strata of the labour market.
If the public life of these cities is made and remade in the image of the market, it also makes a home for small but thriving counterpublics of Dumpster-divers, squatters, Food Not Bombs chapters, and so on. People who consume the leftovers, so to speak, of these booming markets. As I described in the introduction, for example, one Dumpster-diver and Food Not Bombs comrade compared Seattle and its luxury waste-stream favourably with other cities in which she had lived and Dumpster-dived. She called Seattle “the land of plenty,”

“both in terms of there are a lot of people there that are pretty wealthy and upwardly mobile and all that. But also, you can get pretty much any thing you want for free. Usually legally. And other cities aren’t like that…

Just Craigslist[.org], is a resource, or walking down the street and finding free piles, you find things in Seattle that are worth a lot of money and are very valuable… But that’s something about Seattle that probably makes it easier to do Food Not Bombs. ‘Cause we get gorgeous donations, you know? Organic fresh delicious produce. And, I think, you know also the Dumpster-diving reflects that, because people throw away anything that isn’t perfect, in many of the stores and so that means that what’s in the Dumpster is going to be just slightly less than perfect.

Part of the mass of “nomadic” post-graduate labour I described in the introduction, she based her comparison on a broad sample of cities in which she had lived and Dumpster-dived. And she was not alone in her esteem for Seattle’s world-class waste stream. Other Dumpster-divers I have met through Food Not Bombs sometimes make pilgrimages to the city from smaller towns to forage in the Chocolate Dumpster, the Juice Dumpster, the Bagel Dumpster, the Burrito Dumpster, and so on. These counterpublics exploit the speculations of luxury markets for high-end consumption. These luxury markets, I argue, inevitably make a lot of waste, cutting short the social life (or shelf-life) of things, and obsolescing capital that will not earn enough of a premium in comparison to newer or more highly valued items. This obsolesced, abject capital takes at least two important forms, I argue below: abject commodity capital and abject land capital.

**Abject commodity capital**

Abject commodity capital enters the commercial waste stream in absurd quantities in globalising cities. Of course, cities of all shapes and sizes are already amalgamations of commerce and production, and therefore of their amalgamated waste streams. But to the extent that the markets of globalising cities cater to upscale consumers who can pay a premium for the newest, the freshest, and the most stylish, post-card perfect goods, so do these mechanisms of production, distribution, and exchange obsolesce and discard goods in their own distinctive world-class fashion. The values of these derelict goods ebb and flow
according to the vicissitudes of Zukin’s symbolic economy. Will Straw (2010) describes, for example, how the prestige and cultural capital of a metacommodity like “downtown” can easily be transferred to individual concrete commodities—and just as easily can they be devalued by their proximity to social abjection. Charity shops, he points out, can sell their once-discarded wares for more money if they’re embedded in a built environment dominated by luxury consumption, while the value of pawn shops’ merchandise is tainted by the social stigma attached to their suppliers and the neighbourhoods in which they’re located. Similarly, the tourists at a place like the Pike Place Market seem willing to pay more for, say, an unspotted potato (you thought I was going to say avocado, didn’t you?) than at the utilitarian, wasp-coloured Cash & Carry (decked out in spotlight-yellow and black)—at the opposite end of First Avenue from Pike Place, in the industrial part of town. (Granted, they both throw potatoes in the Dumpster at the end of the day, but the Pike Place Dumpster is inevitably more fruitful—literally and figuratively. It often smells more like a salad. Whereas the Cash and Carry Dumpster smells like soggy paper bags and stale urine. I don’t go there often.)

Not only can the urbane, world-class consumer afford to be choosy. She inevitably has more things from which to choose. The globalised spheres of consumption in these globalised cities amount to a sensory buffet of competing jeans and avocados and electronic knick-knacks and handbags and, well, and so on. The Arizona Garbage Project’s exploration of American garbage discovered that, across both generations and geography, the more diversified a household’s diet was, the more food they waste (see chapter one). My Dumpster-diving friends’ regular windfalls of unspoiled food and other useful goods would seem to attest to a similar pattern emerging from diversification and competition among the myriad goods which end up in the commercial waste stream too. In the garbage, just like in the supermarket, as my friend pointed out above, there’s more to choose from.

Consider the exemplary, upmarket clothing chain H&M—itself a sprawling global creature. It recently took serious criticism for its sizable nightly contributions to New York City’s commercial waste stream (Dwyer 2010). Its midtown Manhattan store had been regularly bagging up heaps of unworn clothing and putting them out to the curb for collection along with the rest of its trash. Many of the clothes were deliberately cut up or torn to prevent anyone picking through the trash to recover them. Regardless of whether the damage was motivated by callous employees or calculating executives, the disposal marks a kind of threshold for their goods: the end of a social life defined in part by the exclusivity of its label. Thus, the circulation of H&M’s products—and maybe more importantly, of its brand identity—was limited to a market-public willing and able to pay for the latest thing off the rack.

Such rarification of supply and status is by definition part of the creation of value in the new mass consumption of style and luxury described above. (It wouldn’t be luxury if everyone could afford it.) It
outlines in negative those circuits of prestige and spectacular capital that populate Zukin’s symbolic economy. And it’s not limited to international fashion pedlars. Even food is part of the rarified symbolic economy. In Seattle, for example, management at the Essential Baking Company, which sells expensive artisanal bread, reportedly worried privately that the appearance of its donated surpluses at local food banks and soup kitchens might ultimately depreciate the value of its brand identity (see chapter two). The bakery, along with other Seattle upmarket producers and retailers like Theo’s Chocolate Factory and the Pike Place Market, and Seattle branches of national chains like Trader Joe’s, Naked Juice, and Whole Foods, for example, all maintain rigorous aesthetic standards for their goods, sell them for premium prices, and discard a lot of food. And while they don’t slash up their garbage with scissors, they do sometimes lock up their Dumpsters. Nonetheless, Dumpster-divers and other scavengers in Seattle find ways to access the upmarket waste (again, see chapter two). Food Not Bombs, for example, for many years has profited from the donations and waste of the city’s iconic Pike Place Market. In similar fashion, the Melbourne chapter of Food Not Bombs often gets their leftovers from stalls at the city’s historic (and touristic) Queen Victoria Market. While there has been little research done to quantify the proportion of still-useful waste in the commercial waste-streams of the cities where I have worked, the presence of these vibrant countercultures of Dumpster-divers and urban scavengers attests to its consistence.

This mass consumption of style can obsolesce and discard even terribly expensive durable goods like “smart” phones at a remarkable rate. In the US, for example, up to fifty percent of Apple’s new iPhones are purchased to replace an old iPhone taken out of circulation (adjusted for the number of second-hand phones recirculated and reactivated) (Dediu 2011). (While smart phones are by no means the exclusive currency of yuppie consumers, it is worth observing Sassen’s point, quoted earlier, that a range of “transients” participate in this new commercial culture without ever feeling completely at home in it.) While smart phones are not as likely as food or clothing to end up in commercial Dumpsters before they’ve reached a point-of-sale, they are still an index of the way principles of obsolescence and style might be aligned with the principles of supply and demand, respectively, in market-publics full of urban professionals with disposable income.

*Abj ect land capital*

In addition to moveable commodities, another kind of waste, abject land capital, also accumulates according to the rhythms of exchange and distribution that characterise globalising cities. From unsold condominiums and foreclosed houses to empty storefronts, this wasted capital may often sit vacant for significant periods. While abandoned properties are not unique to globalising cities (Detroit is filled with them too), the reasons they are abandoned reflect the market that has abandoned them. Different modes of
waste reflect different modes of value production. A combination of real estate speculation and soaring housing costs in Sassen’s polarised city may affect properties in something like the same way the pressure of commodity aesthetics and luxury consumption affect food and other commodities. In other words, just as the cultural economy of global spectacle attracts prestige, value and investment to theatres of *au courant* consumption at the expense of yesterday’s avocado or last week’s jeans, capital may pour into real estate markets (and sometimes “bubble” over) in certain highly valued localities or properties while others are passed over or depreciated a stone’s throw away. Of course, land can’t be thrown away in the same way as, say a pair of pants. But it is nonetheless often left to sit abjectly, off the market until its value has increased. In the same way produce vendors gamble on the premium consumers might pay for a given avocado and make a profit on some while holding others back, landlords may leave condominiums, houses, storefronts, and empty lots vacant until the market appreciates or until they can be put to profitable use.

This amounts to a kind of property speculation, be it deliberate or de facto. Picture the Homeless, a coalition of homeless and formerly homeless New Yorkers, calls it “warehousing” (2007). In Manhattan alone, for example, they counted at least 11,170 vacant housing units warehoused, along with 505 vacant lots and 584 commercial vacancies (ibid.). If the empty lots were built up and these properties opened up to people without shelter, they calculate, there would be more than enough space for the estimated 20,253 unsheltered households in the city and the problem of homelessness would evaporate overnight.

Of course, their thought experiment serves mainly to highlight abstract, systemic disparities in the housing market rather than to suggest an immediate, practical housing policy: Persuading landlords to let their properties out freely to homeless tenants would be more than a tough sell (pun intended)—but *this is precisely their point*. Vacancies in the housing market serve a fundamental structural role. Landlords can no more let people stay for free in their empty properties than grocery stores can give away their surpluses in front of the store without overturning their own apple carts. And in effect, deliberately or not, vacancies keep property values up.

Picture the Homeless also found that the number of vacant housing units was disproportionately high in neighbourhoods which house low-income residents and communities of colour, like Harlem. While on the face of it, it might seem contrary to the logic of a market to let any housing stock sit unused while there is a significant unmet demand for it, the organisation concluded that especially in these low income locales, many landlords were leaving their properties vacant to renovate and upgrade them—to take them out of the auspices of the city’s rent stabilisation policies—or, alternatively, they were often speculating on the growth of their properties’ value as higher-income tenants gentrified these neighbourhoods. In other words, they refused to rent them for less now so that they could be rented for more, later. In a
similar vein, New York City’s Right to the City Coalition noted (2010) that luxury condominiums in three of the city’s neighbourhoods (South Bronx, Greenwich, and Chelsea) sat vacant by the thousands at exorbitant prices (on average $943,514; $336,035; and $4.7 million per condo in each neighbourhood, respectively), out of reach in comparison with the neighbourhoods’ annual median household incomes ($19,111, 35,000, and $92,000, respectively). In the meantime, the net effect on the market is, of course, to constrain the available housing supply and inflate housing prices. However you look at it, here, as elsewhere, owners wager that waste will be profitable in the long run.

Picture the Homeless noted that these kinds of dynamics are not limited to New York City, and listed policies in several cities—including Boston, San Francisco, and Seattle—where a combination of municipal regulation and grassroots activism has identified and attempted to curtail similar patterns of land capital abjection (2007: 18-19). While there is little comprehensive, comparable research that investigates vacant land in the cities where I’ve worked, Pagano and Bowman (2000) reckoned that an average of fifteen percent of land in American cities is either vacant or contains an abandoned structure. They found that while the greatest proportion of this abject land capital was made up of empty lots in cities with geographically expanding boundaries (and therefore, relatively empty hinterlands into which to expand), ironically the cities with fewer empty lots and relatively fixed boundaries—like New York City, which had to build upwards rather than out for the better part of the twentieth century—had the most abandoned structures. Either way, almost half (forty-four percent) of these cities’ vacant real estate remained so at least partly because it was “in the wrong location,” according to the researchers’ respondents (ibid.). The “right” location, one is left to imagine, is one in which the land can be profitably developed.

It’s worth noting that the logic of such waste is amplified by economies of scale. In other words, if you only had one pair of jeans or one property to sell (and were meanwhile paying property taxes on the latter), it might be less beneficial to take either of them out of circulation than if you were in the business of selling many many pairs of jeans or investing in multiple properties. Waste, then (particularly of real estate—which is arguably more capital intensive than, say, an artisanal bakery), is also partly a corollary of the concentrations of wealth and investment that Sassen suggests are characteristic of the global city. Sassen herself directly relates real estate development to social polarisation in the global city: “There is now greater inequality in earnings distribution and in household income, a greater prevalence of poverty, and a massive increase in foreign and domestic investment in luxury commercial and residential construction,” she writes (Sassen 2001: 323). And she points out elsewhere that this polarisation has also raised the stakes of real estate speculation in the housing market: “The rapid increase in housing demand by the growing numbers of high-income workers has raised the profitability of the market for expensive
housing, while growing unemployment among low-income workers has further depressed the lower end of the housing market” (Sassen 1990: 479).

Moreover, not only have the local dynamics of real estate and housing markets been reshaped by the global economy; they have often been significant sites for foreign investment. Indeed, many of the development firms responsible for building new “landscapes of wealth”—from software campuses to luxury condominiums—in global and globalising cities are themselves transnational firms working equally in Seattle, Mumbai, or Shenzhen, for example (O’Mara and Seto, N.d.; see also Smith 2002). In a similar vein, the vicissitudes of Seattle’s downtown office-space market which dramatically elevated both the city’s skyline and its median rent-per-square-foot during the 1990s, were directly fuelled by the waxing and waning of Japanese finance capital (Gibson 2004). And in Melbourne, the remarkable growth of home prices and the corresponding housing insecurity of low-income Melbournians (in reference to which many housing analysts all too studiously avoid using the term “property bubble” [c.f. Soos 2011]) has been directly related to the influx of international investment in real estate (Van Hulten 2010). The globalised economies of scale of such international investments then, may absorb the costs of speculation and hiatuses in the circulation of abject land capital more easily than residents who’ve gotten the short end of the labour market.

As abject properties accumulate in globalising cities, then, so do the possibilities multiply for abject economies and counterpublics of squatters. Through my work with Food Not Bombs in Seattle, New York City, Melbourne, San Francisco, and Boston, I have met small but thriving communities of squatters who take direct advantage of these vacant properties, as well artists, punks, anarchists, hippies, and nouveau bohemians who also benefit from cheap or free access to such would-be wastes-of-space.

In New York City, for example, the community art space and music venue ABC No Rio—a centre of gravity for the Do-It-Yourself art scene on the Lower East Side, a household name in some punk communities as far away as Seattle, and a long-time home to the Manhattan chapter of Food Not Bombs—was throughout the eighties and early nineties a squatted art space. It sat, abandoned by the rhythms of capital, during much of the period in which Sassen situates the maturation of New York’s newly globalised dimensions. In the same way that wasted food is freed up to become the basis for projects like Food Not Bombs, abject land capital like the building that became ABC No Rio is the basis for a range of energetic counterpublics. (I will describe ABC No Rio in particular in chapter six.) While ABC No Rio won the legal title to its property and now remains an important community space, many of the long-term squatters on the Lower East Side have been gradually evicted as the developers and the property market have taken a renewed interest in the neighbourhood. (Ironically, the upmarket condominiums installed in these renovated apartment buildings have benefitted from the squatters’
occupation and the attention they have paid to these buildings—which might otherwise have suffered more broken windows and burst pipes in the winter.)

And in San Francisco’s Mission District, where a similar underground cultural economy of squatted spaces thrives (not far from the South of the Market hub for information technology firms and shiny glass and steel real estate developments), a sister-organisation to Food Not Bombs, Homes Not Jails, has taken advantage of the multiplicity of abject properties by discreetly hooking up the electricity, water, and moving in willing tenants who had until then been homeless (see chapter two).

Food Not Bombs collaborators from Melbourne, Seattle, and Boston have similarly initiated me into the abject home-economics of vacant properties-cum-homes-cum-artsaces-cum-music-venues. The Seattle chapter of Food Not Bombs spent six months cooking at just such a spot, the Scribble Squat—a house occupied by residents at no cost (with the permission of the owner) after a fire damaged part of the house and made it unrentable. Covered indoors and out with intricate graffiti and found-art, it boasted running water and a gas stove (and therefore, adequate sanitary facilities), although the lack of electricity made washing up at night difficult. For several years, the squat hosted well-attended acoustic performances on summer weekends, until the owner finally found the neighbourhood housing market—in Seattle’s rapidly gentrifying Central District—amenable to the renovation and resale of the property.

While Sassen emphasises the spatial polarisation of these globalised geographies, abject properties sometimes even sit fallow smack dab in the middle of some of these landscapes of wealth. One Seattle squatter and Food Not Bombs comrade, for example, squatted for a few months in the winter of 2011 in one certain nearly-complete soon-to-be-million-dollar home (he estimated, based on the nearby home values) in an upmarket neighbourhood in Bellevue—a distinct municipality from Seattle, but nonetheless part of the larger “global city-region” which orbits Seattle (Scott et al. 2002). Bellevue and nearby neighbourhoods have exploded as software engineers and others have migrated to the region to work at Microsoft (headquartered adjacent to Bellevue in Redmond) or any of the numerous information technology companies which hang their hats in the Seattle metropolitan area. (Although clearly, as far as this particular McMansion’s financiers and contractors were concerned, the corresponding home construction has outpaced demand, investment, or both, and paused briefly in anticipation of future financing.) My friend, on the other hand (not a software engineer), moved to Seattle and apartment-hunted while staying at a cheap downtown hostel only to move into an affordable place which he found dilapidated and completely dissatisfactory. With few options, he started camping out at the recent Occupy Seattle protests, where he met other would-be squatters and with them he deliberately scouted the Bellevue neighbourhood for a place to stay rent-free. In the process, he remarked on how many expensive, almost-finished homes were sitting unused in the same area. Like abject land capital elsewhere
in the city, they were, it would seem, sitting patiently while the contractors, the developers, or the investors decided the time was right to finish them up and put them on the market.

All of this is neither to say that this kind of waste does not sometimes happen in other less globalised cities (there are plenty of squatters in Portland, despite the much cheaper rent, but not for all the same reasons), nor that abject economies of vacant properties, surplus food, and other commercial waste don’t differ from world-class city to world-class city. (To say so would be both irresponsibly reductionist and far less interesting.) To the contrary, there are fascinating differences between property markets in, for instance, Buenos Aires’ bourgeois Porteño playgrounds (Guano 2002), Bangalore’s newly developing software campuses (cf. O’Mara and Seto, N.d.), and Mumbai’s ephemeral, interstitial housing tenancies (Appadurai 2000b)—all of which are part and parcel of those cities’ experiences of becoming global. A comparative, fine-toothed political-economic investigation of the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of such distinct economies of surpluses and scarcities in different globalising cities would be both terribly enlightening and beyond the scope of this dissertation—which is, after all, a work of ethnography, and bound to the social worlds and networks of Food Not Bombs with whom I have worked. However the production of abject capital seems to be correlated to at least two variables which we might observe in cities around the globe, particularly globalising cities, and which define the terrain within which the social lives of people and things are animated. First, abject capital is a logical consequence of the relative abundance of resources to be capitalised. (It would defy the rationality of the market to throw away or lock up less-than-perfect diamonds or gold because we can earn a higher profit margin on the perfect stuff, for example… Although, come to think of it, who said the market was always rational?) And second, abject capital reflects the “marginal value”—the value of acquiring one particular thing in comparison to the sum total of one’s other acquisitions—of these resources to high-end consumers. In other words, it reflects the premium I’m willing to pay for a new condominium rather than the old place where I live now, a spotless avocado compared to the mushy one at the back of my fridge, a new pair of jeans rather than the old pair in my closet, or the one with the worn-out knee I found at The Salvation Army, and so on. The abjection of capital is profitable to the degree that posh consumers are concentrated in a market, and willing to pay a significant premium for the latest, the freshest, the ritziest, and so on. To the degree then, that this surfeit and stylistic currency are characteristic of globalising cities, they define the terms and the terrains within which I have gone about my research.
All of which is not as far a cry as it might seem from the ambitious bocce ball courts where we began. In a way, we might think of the bocce ball courts, and Occidental Park’s facelift as a kind of property speculation. And the efforts to discourage homeless people from congregating in the park could be compared to the preference I described above of renting to more profitable tenants later on, rather than renting to low-rent tenants now. (Mark Sidran’s civility ordinances, indeed, include a curfew for the parks, so no one can spend the night there.) Of course this is a comparison made in broad strokes: Parks and other public spaces are not, strictly speaking, on the market. But with the neoliberal turn in urbanism described earlier, they have increasingly been treated as if they were, and their value reckoned accordingly (cf. Lehrer and Winkler 2006). As city councils, chambers of commerce, and markets public find themselves “longing” for the global, chasing the attentions of globe-trotting capital flows, the real-estate appraiser’s checklist might not be a bad way to imagine the nitty gritty work of making-global that goes on in globalising cities. World-class art museum? Check. Multi-purpose sporting stadium? Check. Convenient, post-card-ready shopping malls? Check. Clean, inviting, vaguely European public parks? Check. Unwashed masses in said parks? Yes, that too. (Regrettably we’ll have to knock off a few points for that, but we’re still quite interested in buying... erm... investing in your city; with a few renovations and a new coat of paint we could really do something with the place... Tell you what: throw in a light rail system and you’ve got a deal.)

The claim I’ve made over the course of this chapter, echoing Sassen, Zukin, Gibson, and others, is that in globalising cities, a symbolic economy of spectacular urbanity is increasingly the currency in which capital is rendered and transacted. If the prevailing upmarket urban lifestyle and market-publics conjured up in bocce courts, planning recommendations, consumption centres, real estate developments, and civility laws is a cornerstone of this symbolic economy, it is also often the medium in which metacommodities like Historic Pioneer Square and minor commodities like the perfect avocado or the expensive condominium overdetermine each others’ value. The language in which they talk to each other.

The cultural economy of waste I’ve described in this and the previous chapters, then, forms an important part of this language. As Will Straw pointed out, “matter out of place” with respect to metacommodities of space and place, such as the abject lifestyles and neighbourhoods in which Pioneer Square’s pawnshops are embedded, for example, directly impact the value ascribed to minor commodities like the forlorn guitar or the diamond ring in hock, and vice versa. For similar reasons, world-class cities are often compelled or pressurized to keep their soup kitchens and their tourists out of each others’ sight (as I have pointed out in the previous chapter, and will return to in the next). The matter out of place I have described so far may therefore take on both broad social implications with regard to people and public...
life, and immediate, quantitative implications with regard to exchange values and things. Expensive jeans and avocados and condominiums are stalled, obsolesced, and abject-ified in their circulation partly according to their location within the symbolic, globalising urban economy.

So beyond the immediate social and microeconomic processes that consign goods or properties to dereliction, then, I’ve tried to make the case that a city’s waste is often a consequence of the speculative valuing built into the market-publics of these globalising cities. If the concept-city’s streets are paved with gold, they are also secretly lined with waste. This speculation is necessarily contingent and shifting. It gambles on the future of the city.

Occidental Park is one of the places in Seattle where metacommmodities reflect this trade in urban futures, where membranes between different lived and imagined social worlds overdetermine the values of things. In Pioneer Square, for example, adjacent to Occidental Park, sits a large, overgrown, fenced property and a poorly attended parking lot. When the park was first built in the seventies, the designers imagined these lots would one day be filled with apartments and residents who would treat the park like precisely the backyard imagined by Seattle’s downtown parks taskforce three decades later. Instead, these spaces sit abjectly, waiting on the right moment to realise their potential value. (“Watch this space.”) One version of their potential value was scripted into the South Downtown Vision Project by Seattle’s Major Property Owners Group (MPOG), a consortium including three of Seattle’s biggest developers, in 2003 (Holter 2004), the year before the Project for Public Spaces published its recommendations for remaking Occidental Park. An artist’s rendering of the vision, commissioned by the MPOG, seems to imagine these two expectant spaces (along with much of Pioneer Square and the Sodo neighbourhood to the south) as luxury apartments with a luxury hotel on the pier a few blocks away. The neighbourhood blueprints were partly modelled after Portland’s revamped Pearl District, “the Rose City’s most cosmopolitan urban area, with rows and rows of residential lofts, trendy art galleries and antique shops, and superb dining and retail” (58).

Unsurprisingly, Pioneer Square’s rescue missions and homeless drop-in centres weren’t clearly depicted on the map. One hopes this is a stylistic choice rather than a planning one. The vision makes only one veiled reference to the future fate of the neighbourhood’s entrenched social services and their clients: “Most of the new housing is gauged for middle- to upper-class incomes, [one of the developers] says, to balance the many low-income living quarters already here” (54, my emphasis). (To similarly maintain such a balance, the Pioneer Square Community Association has also taken the step of contacting the police and mayor’s office to prevent further low-income–friendly organisations from locating themselves there, as I will describe in the next chapter.78) The MPOG’s vision then rests explicitly on the transformation of the region into a globalised space of stylish and stylistic consumption. (They also
lobbied the Port of Seattle to relocate the shipping facilities and blue-collar jobs at Terminals 37 and 46 in return for the polarised economy of luxury consumption, and lobbied the city to raise the height limit for construction in the area and build an underground tunnel to replace the ageing, infirm Alaskan Way viaduct—the latter measure passed a popular vote recently, after a capital-intensive public debate.)

This spectacular consumption will surely generate new spectacular wastelands of its own, from food waste at the new neighbourhood’s anticipated upmarket grocery stores to vacant commercial and residential properties waiting for tenants who can afford the rents factored into the neighbourhood’s multi-million-dollar redevelopment. And as such developments expand in Seattle and other globalising cities, so will these wastelands expand. In the meantime, the contact between the globalised urbane lifestyle of Historic Pioneer Square and the historical Skid Road in its midst represents fault-lines of abjection and ambivalence which will haunt property values and revenues in the neighbourhood, and the lots adjacent to Occidental Park will sit fallow, while their high-ticket exchange values wait to become ideas whose time has come, rather than ideas whose time has, for the moment, passed.
Part Two

Living in the Globalising City: Eating in Public, Broken Windows, and Mass Conspiracies
The squad car pulled into the park, right onto the paving stones, and stopped eight paces from the planter. Not much of a planter, mind you. Two anaemic elms and a scrubby young Douglas fir, not so much tended to as prevented from dying by the Parks Department. They served mainly to frame two of the large Chinookan totem poles, carved by a local artist, at the centre of the triangular patch of woodchips and dirt. The totem poles were lovely—majestic even—and survived Occidental Park’s million-dollar facelift two years before by the skin of their wooden teeth. But the planter itself was not much to speak of. A low stone wall bordered its north edge, and that’s where we stood. Lined up on the wall: our pots, pans, plates, cups, and cutlery. We stood behind them as people filed past for a free Sunday dinner that inevitably consisted of coffee, fresh fruit, baked-and-or-stir-fried vegetables (it was sometimes unclear, even to us, by the time we took them down to the park), an unpopular but ubiquitous salad, and if we were particularly on top of our game, dessert. Apple crisp was not uncommon. “We” means, of course, the Seattle chapter of Food Not Bombs. This is all food that would have been thrown away by local markets, so we collect it, cook it, and hand it out weekly. I announced the menu and translated it into Spanish for the benefit of some of the diners—who had come all the way from Mexico, Guatemala, and further south for the privilege of joining Seattle’s casual labour pool and eating in the park of a downtown Sunday.

The officer walked purposefully up to the four or five of us serving food, and forewent any small talk whatsoever. “You are being audio and videotaped,” she said, resting her hands on her duty belt, “and I have warned you about this before.” It wouldn’t be too much to say she was being a bit surly. Not to mention redundant, in a way, because we were videotaping her as well. (This is why I know, for example, how many paces away she parked. I’m a decent ethnographer, but not that good.)

There’s some irony in the fact that both she and our rag-tag soup kitchen felt the need to document each other’s presence here in the park. In her mouth, it sounded like a warning—which she followed up by reminding me personally that she had already copied down my name and address on her last visit, a few weeks ago, and passed them along to the appropriate parties. For us, it was a kind of protection—we gathered that the city might be less vigorous about discouraging public food-sharing if we could publicly circulate images of them doing so.

The officer went on: “Right now, I’m going to—suffice it to say you are to step out of the planter.” (Her emphasis, not mine). “I already talked about this. This is a planted area; you cannot be in there. You cannot serve hot food in the park. You know that already.”
On her last visit, she had told us to pack up our stuff and vacate the park—which was, unsurprisingly, somewhat poorly received by a number of our diners. They spat jokes at her that I admit I thought were funny, but would have been ill-advised to laugh at, given the circumstances. (“Calling all cars: felony feeding at Occidental Park,” or something to that effect.) Perhaps picking her battles, and preferring not to address a small crowd of understandably pissed off homeless people, she had ignored them and instead took the issue up with me, chiding us for stomping around in a planted area. Meanwhile, picking our battles, we had finished feeding the people in the line and packed up the remaining food before anyone else showed up.

Upon her return, she remembered me and addressed me directly. This time, she said, she wasn’t going to make us leave. Instead, she told us to get our stuff out of the planter. “I won’t have you standing in there,” she said, and gestured concernedly towards the planter. “That I have a problem with.”

Not much of a planter, mind you. But her priorities can’t have been lost on the diners within earshot, most of whom were sleeping rough or paying five dollars a night to stay in the nearby rescue missions: The scrubby trees, such as they were, were framed as the hapless victims in all this.

Or, more properly, such were the priorities of City Hall. While she certainly seemed to take a personal affront to our little operation, this officer was acting on behalf of a more concerted policy. This was the summer of 2008, and it was our fourth visit from the police in two months. (And our second visit from her.) One of them told us that the mayor’s office had asked parks department employees to “dial 911” whenever they saw anyone handing out food. (It wasn’t clear whether the officer had been speaking figuratively or not.) Mercifully, not all of the parks workers complied. Sometimes we offered them a few doughnuts and promised to be out of the park promptly. (And even when they did call, I imagine, the police sometimes found more pressing things to do.) Prior to that, downtown parks workers had carried copies of an open letter from Parks and Recreation informing would-be do-gooders that the city allowed outdoor meal programs to operate in one place and one place only: Sixth Avenue and Columbia Street. They’d hand us a copy when they came through the park to empty the garbage cans (see Figure A). Privately, a few homeless advocates who’d spoken with Mayor Greg Nickels confided in me that he didn’t approve of outdoor meal programs. And between 2007 and 2008, on the heels of the city’s downtown parks “renaissance” in 2006 (read: expensive remodelling, designed to make the parks less ‘antisocial,’ as I described in chapter three), the mayor’s office made a concerted push to channel rogue soup kitchens like us up to Sixth and Columbia. We received copies of the letter no less than five times from parks employees, other meal providers, and even emailed to us at the web site for the Seattle chapter of Food Not Bombs.
Having browsed the parks code, however, without finding any unambiguous prohibition of public food sharing, we decided to keep bringing dinner to Occidental Park. (“Events” required a permit, but a few of us reasoned it was more like a picnic than an event—only bigger, and with strangers.) Even now, despite its ambitious redevelopment and the subsequent anti-feeding campaign, the park is a place where people who are hungry or homeless often pass the hours on a Sunday afternoon. It has a long history, in fact, of such tensions between economic development and material privation. Situated at the bottom of the nation’s original Skid Road, Occidental Park and the surrounding Pioneer Square neighbourhood were among Seattle’s very first neighbourhoods, supporting both the city’s burgeoning timber industry and a cut-rate economy of migrant labour, cheap taverns, and other insubstantial housing. Since then, the winners and losers in Pioneer Square’s economy have often laid competing claims, formal and de facto, to the area. I imagined our meal as one small part of this history.

The official outdoor meal site, in contrast to Occidental Park, is subject to no claim at all. It is something of a no-man’s land: under the freeway, outside the old metro buses’ ride-free zone, uphill, and relatively distant from many of the city’s shelters and from downtown foot traffic (as I described in chapter two). And although police crackdowns on unsanctioned meals were ostensibly intended “for safety’s sake and public health’s sake,” according to the Mayor’s office (quoted in Spangenthal-Lee 2008), the effect of deliberately concentrating under the same freeway pillars almost everybody seeking outdoor assistance has not always been to create a welcoming, antiseptic dining experience. While most of the meal providers working there continue to make unimpeachable efforts (and unimpeachable food81) and feed thousands of people every year, the space can be crowded and can force people into close quarters with others they might rather avoid—be it for fear of assault or for other reasons. One diner also told us the police sometimes patrolled the line of diners—sometimes looking for people with outstanding warrants—which might be a comfort to some diners, but not for others. (And not just the violent ones: In a city where camping in the park or sitting on the sidewalk is prohibited, it’s not hard for homeless people to acquire arrest warrants). And, of course, the shelter of the freeway accommodates diverse bodily functions overnight. It often smells like stale piss. All of which raises questions about the city’s criteria for “safety” and “health,” and from whose perspective they’ve been defined. Despite the relatively heroic efforts of meal providers and advocates who work at the site, its very existence is a trace of the bitter, fractious politics of hunger and homelessness in the city. And ultimately, that politics leaves out the voices of people who are homeless, hungry, and would rather eat elsewhere.

On her first visit, our afore-mentioned officer of the peace had in fact asked me why we hadn’t moved our operation up to the official site, to which I replied with the afore-cited reasons. Her solution: We should focus on providing transport to all the hungry people who were disabled or too ill to walk up to
the official site. I think she knew she’d lost the argument on pragmatic grounds at that point, but she nonetheless (or maybe consequently) also threatened to issue me one of Seattle’s “parks exclusion” tickets, an extrajudicial city citation that, although not a criminal charge, banishes an individual from one or more parks for a variable length of time. (Because these are extrajudicial, they are difficult to appeal—although violation of one becomes a criminal charge.) This would have made serving trickier. Thankfully, she forwent that. (Although the next time I saw her she did try to suggest that I had provided her with false information on her previous visit—another reason it’s nice to have a videographer handy when you’re talking to the police).

In fact, that was the last we heard from the police for quite a while. Conceivably, in the shadow of the global financial meltdown later that summer—and its casualties, left in sudden need of shelter and food—the mayor’s office decided we just weren’t worth the hassle. A local journalist had also been kind enough to visit us and publish a photograph one of our conversations with the police (see Figure B), along with a decidedly even-handed article about the whole business, so that might have helped our case, too (cf. Spangenthal-Lee 2008). (The article seemed to get quite a lot of attention, in fact. People who knew nothing else about Food Not Bombs or homelessness in Seattle often knew about the article. They talked to me about the crackdowns even months after it was published.) Whether the city felt like the stakes of issuing parks exclusion tickets to us under public scrutiny were too high, or they simply had more important things to worry about after the “great recession,” they have more or less left the group alone since then. In the intervening years, Food Not Bombs has kept sharing its dinner in Occidental Park on Sunday afternoons. We’ve even been joined by a few other church groups. And the planter survives, unperturbed by our efforts, to this day.

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This was, of course, not the only moment of discord between Food Not Bombs and the Seattle Police Department. Participants from several other phases in the group’s twenty-year tenure in Seattle have narrated to me similar periods in which the group’s presence provoked city agencies, local businesses, or both, to pressure them to move. Nor is Seattle unique in this respect. Food Not Bombs co-conspirators from chapters in San Francisco, New York City, Orlando, and other cities told me the same kinds of stories, from different periods throughout the last thirty years or so. And while the group’s anarchist leanings incline it towards civil disobedience more than most other public meal projects, these stories have nonetheless been multiplied by homeless advocates and service providers around the country over
the same timeframe. Dozens of cities, perhaps more, around the United States and in other market-centric nations in the Global North, have used a variety of tactics, subtle and militant, ad-hoc and carefully planned, to restrict or discourage these efforts: Parks-use permits, health code restrictions, zoning laws, informal pressures, among others. Publics and policy makers, it is clear, have often reacted to growing crises of housing and homelessness by prohibiting and prosecuting the free public distribution of food.

These developments are part of a body of municipal laws and policies which homeless advocates in the United States have sometimes called “the criminalisation of homelessness.” They range from ordinances outlawing “aggressive” panhandling, loitering, and public urination to curfews in public parks and extrajudicial exclusion orders like Seattle’s “parks exclusion” tickets. Strictly speaking, these advocates are spot on: In cities like Seattle where social safety nets can be spotty, ad hoc, and occasionally Kafkaesque affairs, where people without shelter sometimes have no other recourse than these prohibited activities, homelessness itself becomes a petty crime.

But these policies need to be understood, too, on a larger scale. Like homelessness itself, they represent transformations in the fabric of urban living which have been both cause and effect throughout these vexed decades of political and economic (neo)liberalisation. Cities like Seattle are perpetually globalising, investing in their economic and cultural footholds in the ever-shifting terrain of the global economy. And the cultural economies of these cities are constantly remade by and for that terrain. If, for example, prohibitions of free, public meals are proliferating from city to city in the United States and elsewhere, they are also remaking not simply the lives of people without reliable incomes or shelter, but the cultural economy of eating itself—and therefore of life. Mighty urban economies such as Seattle’s produce waste and abjection in more or less direct proportion to the economic value they create, and yet to function they must keep each circulating away from the other, I would like to suggest. This is most poignantly true of eating, as the geography of food surpluses and scarcities, waste and want, are carefully managed. To remake urban life in such a way asserts a powerful, globalised configuration of governmental control and sovereignty at the scale of the urban (rather than, say, the national or the international). But this urban life, remade, neither sits still nor does what it’s told. Its component elements—variously segregated, sanctioned, submerged, or subsidised—emerge from and thresh against each others’ edges in myriad ways. Homelessness, hunger, and survival itself are not only, in a sense, created by these policies; they also exceed every effort to manage them, and in turn, they unravel and reform the city, the state, and the social.
City of Seattle

Seattle Parks and Recreation
Timothy A. Gallagher, Superintendent

April 23, 2008

Dear Meal Provider:

I am writing to this letter to notify you that you must move your meals program to the permanent location of the Outdoor Meal Program. The site is administered by OPERATION: Sack Lunch and is located on the corner of 6th Avenue and Columbia Street in downtown Seattle. The City of Seattle opened this site to continue to provide safe and nutritious meals to those in need and offer meal providers and hungry persons a safe and inclusive atmosphere. Currently, the eight providers using the 6th and Columbia location include: Operation: Sack Lunch; The Lord’s Table; Mt. Zion; Bible Street Ministries; Neighborhood Cooking; Snoqualmie Valley Church; Mother’s Kitchen and Curry Temple. Times are available for other providers.

OPERATION: Sack Lunch and the City of Seattle have been working hard to make the 6th and Columbia site meet all public health codes and City regulations. It is our expectation that all organizations providing outdoor meals to those in need within the City of Seattle will get on the regular schedule at the 6th and Columbia site. This is the only approved outdoor meal location within the City. Un-permitted food distribution in the area of City Hall Park has caused numerous rodent problems and other health issues and is not allowed.

By being part of the official Outdoor Meal Program it assures your compliance with City ordinances and health codes intended to protect the health of those you serve. Please contact Beverly Graham of OPERATION: Sack Lunch for an application.

Feel free to check out the site when the programs are serving:
Monday – Friday: 8:00 AM – 9:00 AM and 1:00 PM – 2:00 PM
Monday – Thursday: 8:00 PM – 9:00 PM
Saturday: 12:00 PM - 1:00 PM, 1st, 3rd, 5th Saturdays: 4:00 PM – 5:30 PM,
Sundays: 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM, 3rd Sundays: 2:00 PM – 3:30 PM

OPERATION: Sack Lunch staff are available during all meal times if you would like to visit the site and ask additional questions. Please contact OPERATION: Sack Lunch’s toll free line at 1-866-277-9252.

Sincerely,

Timothy Gallagher
Superintendent, Seattle Parks and Recreation

cc: Beverly Graham, OPERATION: Sack Lunch
Al Poole, Homelessness Intervention and Block Grant Administration
Judy Summerfield, Survival Services Unit
Fe Areola, Survival Services Unit

100 Dexter Avenue North, Seattle, WA 98109-5199
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Figure A: A Scanned copy of one of several such letters both hand-delivered and on one occasion emailed to Food Not Bombs in early 2007 by Seattle Parks Department employees. (Note that the image has been altered in order to remove the name of the parks employee whose card was paper-clipped at the upper right of the page.)
Figure B: Seattle police instruct Food Not Bombs to leave Occidental Park, June 2008. The author is largely obscured, second from the right, in the polka-dotted shirt. (Photo by Jonah Spangenthal-Lee, reproduced with photographer’s permission.)
Chapter Four

Feeding the Abject Metropolis: Geographies of Surplus and Survival in the Globalising City

I went to City Council and said, ‘Why don’t we turn this into a social justice centre?’ ... And one of the City Council members looked at me and said, “Over my dead body” ... it was: “That’s not my constituency. They’re not the ones who are voting me into this office, so I’m not even going to think about all the people who are disenfranchised.”

Long-term Seattle homeless advocate, describing conflict over free outdoor meals sites (the very stuff of the metropolis)

This chapter explores the relationships at work between markets, publics, counterpublics, and the state in regulating certain modes of living and eating in the globalising city. The central fact of this inquiry is this: In recent years, increasingly, many city governments have tried to control who can and cannot eat in public. Or, in (only slightly) less Machiavellian terms, they have developed a range of ordinances and informal policies to discourage or prevent private citizens from sharing food freely, mainly with homeless people, in public spaces. It follows that anyone who can’t afford to buy food is also discouraged or prevented from eating in public (at least in those spaces where the policies are enforced).

This is not, of course, to suggest that city officials are simply moustache-twirling villains. Rather, my ambit herein is to suggest that the stakes of eating in public have been raised for municipal governments, market-publics, poor people, and would-be-do-gooders alike. Particularly so in the globalising cities of the Global North during the last three decades of neoliberal urban transformation. To make this point, I will draw from my ethnographic experiences within the Seattle chapter of Food Not Bombs—whose free public distribution of food has sometimes brought it into conflict with feeding prohibitions by the municipal government—and from oral history interviews with Food Not Bombs collaborators in Seattle, San Francisco, and several other cities—whose experiences parallel ours in Seattle. If it has become a cliché to point out that incomes, investments, and inequality in many such cities have taken on story-book proportions (the best of times, the worst of times), it nonetheless draws our attention to the stakeholders, the interests, and the incipient conflicts which characterise the market-publics which have, in turn, come to shape urban life in new ways. Feeding restrictions are one site of this transformation. Pundits, researchers, and activists alike have often focused on the impact these policies have on homeless people—and fair enough, too. But their implications for public life are broader. Implications into which
food, shelter, and the social relationships that make a city are all swept. These policies define the means by which food itself may circulate legitimately and legibly in public spaces. Which is to say, the ways that it is allowed to change hands. This is usually in small quantities, by commercial exchange, or both. To wit, eating—and by extension, surviving—in the city is implicitly reckoned a private affair or a business venture. Except for moments of commercial transaction, food (like money) rarely crosses the economic frontiers that segregate social classes in the city. And the moments in which it does become the source of quite a fuss. As one woman who distributed free meals for several years in Seattle’s Pioneer Square neighbourhood explained to me:

The merchants hated me, the city hated me... inside their public space. I was fined. I was—I’m not going to say threatened, but you know, police followed me everywhere. And me, saying, ‘But this is a park, right? Can’t anybody go into this park?’... You know, it used to be that this part of town, it was Skid Row—this was where everybody congregated. And then all of a sudden all the people who have resources came in and started purchasing and remodelling and renovating and now it’s had this revitalisation and the people who were disenfranchised to begin are disenfranchised again.

The stakes, then, are much bigger than policy. They are questions of how we live and how we value life in the city. As such, they demand a holistic, cultural-economic approach. To that end, I draw on five years of ethnographic work with Food Not Bombs in Seattle, and in brief periods in other cities, affording me the chance to observe some of the diverse social arenas which connect official policies, everyday practices, and economic exchanges. In this, I borrow from a long history of urban ethnographers who have been well-placed to point out the ways in which local microcosms and national or transnational macrocosms are linked through the spaces of the city (Leeds 1973), and, in Phillippe Bourgois’ terms, the “‘pawns’ of larger structural forces… emerge as real human beings who make their own futures” (Bourgois 2003: 17). The personal struggles, public prejudices, and tidal political-economic patterns cobbled together in a word like “homelessness,” for example, are not things that simply exist, a priori, apart from law, economy, or society and then become “criminalised” after the fact (as some advocates have termed it). Rather, these things are the very stuff of the metropolis. No less than customer service jobs, ball games, commercial revenues, and so on, they produce the economies and social lives of a city. They are made and remade in precisely such lived moments as Food Not Bombs’ episodic run-ins with the law, as I will describe (and as the reader may recall from the prelude to this section).

But while the work of rogue soup kitchens like Food Not Bombs, and of other abject economies, is a productive part of urban social ecology it is also routinely excluded from representations, political, economic, and cultural. In moments like the encounters between Food Not Bombs and the Seattle police, diverse modes of living in the city are rendered visible, viable, and even grievable (think of the victimised planter in the prologue) within the symbolic economies of major metropolises, while other
modes of living are left bare, hiding in plain sight. And in such moments are forged the ontological and experiential boundaries of metropolises, markets, and publics.

Or, if you like, what is at stake is the content of public life itself.

Ethnographic research, then, may reveal a submerged traffic of people, things, and cultural and economic value among the public and counterpublic circuits of the city. In exploring these, I have found myself a participant-observer in urban cultural economies of homelessness, hunger, and survival in myriad ways, from serving food to spare changing with homeless friends, from Dumpster-diving to soliciting donations of food, from sitting through coalition meetings with homeless service-providers and advocates to sleeping in front of City Hall in protest. And in addition to my participation and interviews with Food Not Bombs participants, below I draw from formal interviews and informal conversations in Seattle with homeless friends, activists, service providers, and city representatives. Many of the above acquaintances and experiences emerge directly from my involvement with Food Not Bombs, whose commitment to anarchist principles of direct action and mutual aid, and its embeddedness in networks of radical activists, give participants a distinctive window onto urban survival and struggles over public space, from massive protest actions such as Occupy Seattle to its weekly food sharings. One original Food Not Bombs volunteer from San Francisco, for example, described the urban pulse upon which the group had its finger in its early years:

There was a lot of disaffected sort of people hanging around San Francisco at that time that didn’t have a job. It wasn’t—there was a recession going on... so people would just come up to the Food Not Bombs table to get something to eat, because they didn’t have a job or anything else, and were sort of marginally living and we were helping them out. And they would sort of hang around and get to know us, and then eventually get involved.

He went on to explain the group’s ongoing insight both into the city’s down and out and its landscape of social service organisations and institutions:

We got to know all of them really well. Because we were becoming front-line, you know, service providers... And we did crazy stuff. We would feed people that had been thrown out of shelters—so, violent, mentally deranged, alcoholic—chronic alcoholic—you know, people that were just not able to cooperate with any other social service network.

This intense embeddedness has given both me and many of the other Food Not Bombs volunteers with whom I have worked a valuable ethnographic window upon some of the myriad forms of life at stake in the city.

So far, to make sense of this traffic of voices and moments, I have told a tale of the global city, woven together of market-publics, abject economies, and after-market counterpublics. And I have also pulled
together a similarly gregarious traffic in voices and ideas in order to frame these urban “character”
sketches. Drawing on Julia Kristeva’s psychoanalytic accounts of affect and Giorgio Agamben’s post-
structuralist political theory, respectively, I have described how certain pathways or embodiments of
value become abject and exceptional—from the material wealth abandoned in a city’s commercial wast-
stream to the perceived menace of unemployed, homeless labour (idle hands, and so on). Segregated from
a market, they nonetheless establish its terms of value. (Waste keeps prices up, unemployment keeps
wages down, etcetera.) And in so doing, I have argued, these pathways and embodiments, kept out of
public circulation, go on to define the constitution and outer limits of what I’ve called a “market-public.”
Building on Saskia Sassen’s model of the “global city” and its emerging role at the commanding heights
of international business investment and consumption, I’ve suggested that market-publics in globalised
cities, with their currency of urbane spectacle and consumption, are particularly anxious to keep the abject
out of view.

The politics of feeding prohibitions are at the centre of all this. In that, this chapter picks up right
where the other chapters left off. What is so important about food, though, is its claim on life itself. And
in that, this chapter turns the spotlight on what has, so far, been only a bit player in the present work:
2004) and others, I’ll suggest that its role on the city stage, and its political currency, lies largely in its
biopolitical sovereignty—it’s capacity to manage the conditions of life.

Broadly speaking, in the present chapter, I would like to argue that the spread of city policies
restricting the free distribution of food doesn’t just passively reflect public anxieties about the virtual
omnipresence of homeless people in globalising cities. These policies both enact and enable what Sharon
Zukin (1995) called the “symbolic economies”, endemic to globalised cities. Such is the name Zukin
gives to the cultural-economic terrain within which such cities compete for world-class status, from clean
and safe parks and world-historical tourist attractions to haute cuisine and couture. In this, globalised
cities (both globalising and properly global according to Sassen’s model; see Sassen 2001) represent a
simultaneously economic and cultural development, as the public lives of these cities are brought in line
with a market-centric (and rather Euro-American) vision of what it means to be “world-class.” These
symbolic economies, I argue, also include homelessness and hunger among their ontological and material
preconditions. In other words, homelessness and hunger are a given, a kind of self-fulfilled prophesy in
the economic imaginary which drives these cities forward. Not only do these stratified economies push
the cost of food and shelter out of reach for a lot of people. They do the same for certain modes of
survival which might alleviate the challenges of homelessness and food insecurity. Consider, for example,
the marginal location of Seattle’s single city-approved outdoor meal site—under the freeway, at the
periphery of downtown, and away from downtown foot traffic—which adds inconvenience and indignity to the daily grind of shelterlessness as I’ll describe further below. Feeding prohibitions articulate this symbolic economy through governmental channels. Writing about Food Not Bombs’ periodic conflicts with city authorities over such policies, Nik Heynen the describes feeding prohibitions as part of a larger “politics of containment” which, he argues, both commoditises public spaces and disciplines urban labour markets (2010: 1225). These policies are, therefore, one biopolitical mechanism by which governments share in the work of what Hardt and Negri (2004) call “immaterial production,” the kind of “soft” power that, in the present period, tends to remake social life itself in the image and interests of the market.

One tentative corollary to be drawn here is that anti-feeding policies, which usually purport to be about public health and safety, might in fact be read as de facto austerity measures which limit the number of spaces in which people who are broke and hungry can access food. If that sounds unnecessarily polemical, it nonetheless points towards a geographically exclusive social order which I will describe at more length below. It also suggests a slightly milder, but no less important implication: that policies which regulate access to public space are also always policies about food security, and vice versa. Public space is, after all, the site and the scale at which access to one’s minimal rights to life (to food, to shelter, and so on) are mediated (cf. Waldron 1991).

(broken windows and free food)

The spectacular glass and steel of world-class cities, and the symbolic economies that trade in them, are full of broken windows. This is not obvious to the naked eye, of course. Rather, their spectre—the spectre of abjection, decay, and waste—looms large in such edifices. The term “broken windows” in this case is more than a metaphor. It has become an allegory, one of the stories with which pundits and planners have expressed their fear of these ghosts. From gaunt, hungry panhandlers to masked, incorrigible anarchists, policy makers and other technicians of the market-public have censured a range of non–market-friendly forms of life, often comparing them to the first cracked panes in a downward slide towards urban ruin; Harbingers that threaten the foundations of a public life inseparable from the market. But through policies like the feeding prohibitions I describe below, they have both conjured and corralled the very same ghosts.

In a way, this is a point I have made already in this dissertation: First, I mapped some of the boundaries between the market-public and its various abject counterpublics in the circulation of food and abject capital through public spaces; And second, I described the simultaneous production of urbane consumption, spectacle, and abject capital at work in globalising cities. In other words, world-class cities
rely upon their ability to carve out both value and abjection from the raw material of human life, and on their ability to keep them apart. Property speculation leaves more buildings empty than people to fill them, but drives up the cost of housing in high-profile cities so they have to sleep outdoors. High-end boutiques throw away unsold, expensive jeans, and cut them up so scavengers can’t wear them without paying the sticker price (see chapter three). Expensive grocers donate their surpluses—perfectly edible, but a day or two beyond their prime—which are then recycled and recirculated by food banks and soup kitchens, but only behind closed doors, away from the public eye. My argument here, then, is an extension of these claims: If globalising cities compete with each other in symbolic economies of posh consumption and spectacular accumulation, and if their regimented social orders rarify the contact between forms of market-centric and non-market life, feeding prohibitions represent one key intervention by city governments to produce precisely these economies.

Not only this, however. These policies also render some modes of living in public grievable, others abject. This means that it is not only the imaginary of a market-public, or the symbolic economies in which that public is implicated, but also the infrastructure of the state that actively authors abject modes of urban living. And this, it does along at least two vectors. While the market produces and discards abject capital, about which I have already said quite a lot, urban policy delineates the counterpublic spaces in which it may circulate, and the counterpublic bodies imagined to inhabit these spaces. State agencies do not, therefore, simply police abjected modes of living after the fact—although influential notions like the “broken windows” theory of policing certainly picture causes and effects in this misleadingly linear way (as I’ll describe below). Even the state’s critics tacitly accept this sequence of events when they describe feeding prohibitions as part of the “criminalisation” of homelessness or hunger. (As if the homelessness was always already there, just waiting to be prohibited.) But as Timothy Mitchell pointed out (following Foucault), state power is never radically distinct from “society,” “the economy,” and so on. Rather, the act of persuading people otherwise is perhaps the state’s greatest trick: “The ability to have an internal distinction appear as though it were the external boundary between separate objects,” Mitchell says, “is the distinctive technique of the modern political order” (1991: 78). Mitchell seems to be alluding to precisely Agamben’s biopolitical exception, the outside which is inherent to sovereignty (see chapter two). Through policies that establish distinct spaces of circulation for distinct types of people and food—and through the theories, assumptions, prejudices, and political-economic calculations that inform those policies—municipal governments, I would like to suggest, simultaneously articulate just such “external” boundaries, and cultivate at those boundaries abject economies of hunger and homelessness.
Wilson and Kelling’s “broken windows” theory of policing (1982) offers the reader a useful vocabulary with which to name some of these external boundaries, and to make sense of the kinds of political motivations behind the feeding prohibitions I describe in this chapter. A vocabulary all the more telling because their theory has been enthusiastically adopted by city lawmakers in Seattle and other high-profile cities, as I’ll describe below. Wilson and Kelling wrote their broken window as an icon of urban disorder, one among a range of modest signs of neglect and dereliction which they said sowed the seeds of blight in urban neighbourhoods. These broken windows were a concatenation of perceived deviance, from panhandling to (conspicuous) prostitution, from the abandoned car to the “ill-smelling drunk” (5). Their main concern was that these signs alarmed neighbourhood “regulars” (2), who either moved away or locked themselves indoors. This set up, Wilson and Kelling said, a vicious cycle of inattention and attrition that led ultimately to major crime waves and decay. Their answer: to focus on policing the nuisances before they could lead to worse crimes.

Broken windows theory has, of course, been regularly debunked for its narrow, highly selective approach to understanding social problems, which through sleight of hand associates homeowners’ discomfort with danger and middle-class aesthetics with economic stability—with nary a mention of the larger structural violences which contribute to crime and disorder. But the theory is not without value. In fact it hit a hell of a nerve. In a sense, Wilson and Kelling’s article is a kind of an ethnographic data point: Its popularity with many law-makers and police is evidence of the self-conscious role the state has played in enabling the kind of bourgeois aesthetic economy Wilson and Kelling describe. Their 1982 article gave voice and legitimacy to the socioeconomic and aesthetic prejudices which have driven several decades of urban policy and conflict. “The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window,” they had written (5). And while the direct link between panhandling and violent crime was much exaggerated, rhetorically, they were certainly right to point out the consequential nature of public prejudices. Cities everywhere took them enthusiastically at their word in the 1980s and 1990s. Seattle’s Mark Sidran, for example, drew arguments for Seattle’s anti-sitting law and other “civility” codes directly from Wilson and Kelling’s language (see chapter two). The New York City Transit Authority even hired on Kelling to advise its efforts to ease commuter anxiety (Pratt, Franklin, & Mau 2011: 110). Employing these sociological justifications for political effect, Seattle, New York City, San Francisco, and other globalised municipalities developed market-centred definitions of civility and prosecuted “incivility” vigorously, lest it scare off the customers and inaugurate a downward spiral towards a Detroit-like post-industrial nightmare.

Any number of examples might illustrate of how powerful and divisive the perceived threat of such “broken windows” has become to the symbolic economies of major metropolises. We might take up, for
instance, the recent controversy over New York City’s “stop and frisk” program, which authorises police
to detain and search anyone they deem to look suspicious, for example. It virtually goes without saying
that ethnic minorities and poor people are stopped disproportionately (Tuttle and Schneider 2008). And
with a roughly ninety percent failure rate (i.e. nine out of ten people stopped and frisked aren’t doing
anything that merits further action; ibid.) the stop-and-frisk program illustrates the importance for policy
makers and their sympathetic market-publics not so much of cost-effective crime prevention as of the
visible demonstration, for the benefit of market-publics and-or marginal counterpublics, of governmental
commitment to maintaining a particular kind of public order. Whether this commitment reflects an honest
faith in the value of social order (as emphasised by broken windows theory), the calculated impact of
election promises, or a fear of the fickle retreat of post-industrial consumers and capital, such practices
have the impact of producing and segregating the grievable and the abject in urban life. One of the key
functions of government, then, becomes to keep these two spheres out of each others’ ways. In other
words, to determine how threatening people and things, abject bodies and abject capital, circulate in the
city. In these economies, urban disorder—from panhandling to public soup kitchens—is framed as
anathema to public interest—which is, in contrast, virtually synonymous with the market, and with urbane
consumption.

(picking a place to eat)

In a similar fashion, then, the politics of food sharing in Seattle offer a window onto the concrete
processes by which municipal agencies and their proxies might build and maintain a city’s world-class
image and symbolic economy. The decision-making behind the location of the city’s only outdoor meal
project and the kinds of assumptions that have animated it are among the mechanisms which breathe life
into a market-public with the ear of the city. One that thrives on a particular aesthetic of health, safety,
and urbanity—with respect to which the unchecked conglomeration of poor people appears as the first
“broken window.” The negative space implied by this appearance of order outlines a range of exceptional
spaces, subjects, and things that must be quarantined from the market-public for it to function.
Contrasting Food Not Bombs’ civilly-disobedient gastro-politics with those sanctioned by municipal
governments, Nik Heynen describes the exceptional and official social orders as different “geographies
of survival” (2010: 1227). While Heynen emphasises the conflict between Food Not Bombs and
municipal authorities over whether or how one may eat in the city, here I would like to emphasise the
relational aspect of the concept. The very term “geography of survival” reminds us, after all, that it is not
so much a question of whether one may eat, but where.
In this, Seattle’s policies seem to echo policies in many other cities—although feeding prohibitions vary in formality and severity: Seattle’s are positively warm and fuzzy compared to the hundreds of Food Not Bombs volunteers arrested in San Francisco for serving food in Golden Gate Park between 1988 and 1992 or Orlando, Florida, where Food Not Bombs fought, for several years, explicit ordinances against sharing one’s dinner with too many people in the park. In a survey of North American cities in 2010, the National Coalition for the Homeless and the National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty highlighted twenty-three case studies of cities with recent food sharing restrictions, varying from explicit legal limitations on parks-use permits to selective health code enforcement to extrajudicial police pressure (National Coalition for the Homeless 2010). And in my own ethnographic inquiries with Food Not Bombs chapters, I have recorded accounts of coordinated state intervention against outdoor food distribution in at least six of the nine cities where I volunteered and/or interviewed participants. Archival web research of course further multiplies these accounts.

Seattle’s example is all the more telling in a way, though, because it is more subtle than cases like San Francisco or Orlando. In Seattle, in contrast to these examples, outdoor assistance is curtailed and channelled through a simple refusal of permission. Via the general parks-use permit process, outdoor meal projects are suppressed in all but a single location. (In fact, that particular spot is not in the jurisdiction of the parks code or other civility ordinances anyway, since—as the reader may recall from the prologue—it’s under the freeway.)

Of course, more explicit legal instruments like Orlando’s ordinance or the one implemented by Las Vegas in 2006, help to make crystal clear certain social structures. The former legally recognizes citizens’ entitlement to a certain symbolic economy, for example, described by the ordinance in relatively vacuous terms as an “aesthetically pleasing atmosphere.” (But to whom?) And even more brazenly, the latter literally obstructs food from circulating freely across class boundaries: Citizens are punished for sharing food in the park with “the indigent,” defined as anyone “whom a reasonable ordinary person would believe to be entitled to apply for or receive” public assistance (quoted in Archibold 2006).

In contrast to these formal exclusions, Seattle’s policies, decided partly by informal mayoral decree, partly through the bitter negotiations of ad-hoc committees, illustrate the kinds of soft power that produce the symbolic economies of the globalised city. The exercise of this soft power, through the above refusal of permission, through the cooperation of nonprofit partnerships and through occasional police pressure (as opposed to arrests and prosecution, as in San Francisco or Orlando), is no less decisive for defining the spaces in which abject capital (surplus food etcetera) may move, or the subjects that inhabit those spaces. In this way, such mechanisms, formal and informal, establish the order of these city’s symbolic economies as well as the “broken windows” against whose outline they are defined.
On account of precisely this soft power, it took at least four months in the winter of 2004 to decide on a location for Seattle’s outdoor meal site—now tucked tidily under the freeway, a stiff uphill walk from a number of the city’s shelters, low-income housing projects, drop-in centres, and maybe more significantly from downtown foot traffic. For those four months, no public food sharing was allowed, at all, after which a provisional location was secured before the eventual, long-term site could be agreed upon. An ad hoc taskforce spent that period searching in good faith for a safe, accessible place for the endeavour. As locations were proposed, according to two of the people I spoke with who participated in the taskforce, businesses, residents, city agencies, and homeless service providers registered their respective opinions and concerns about them. One of them told me, “We looked at a number of sites... But it was very contentious, and not pleasant, to work with people who said very unkind things about low-income and homeless people.” In contrast to these prejudices and complaints, the direct input of homeless people themselves was essentially unsolicited in the decision-making. Partly as a result of this sort of disparate influence, the committee was remapping one piece of the geography of eating in the city along the exclusionary lines of tenancy and investment.

In other words, it was redrawning the boundaries for the non-market circulation of food. And doing so with more of an ear for the complaints of a market-public than for marginalised and displaced diners in the city.

The outdoor meal site’s predecessor, a walled plaza at the Public Health and Safety building, closed down that year when the building was scheduled for demolition. Then-Mayor Greg Nickels simply refused to sanction another one. Citing the usual ‘health and safety’ concerns, he had effectively banned all complimentary outdoor meals in the city. Which went over like a ton of bricks with advocates, meal providers, and a lot of hungry people. Along with a few sympathetic city council members, in fact, they kept on distributing food in City Hall Park, in a surprising coincidence of political clout and civil disobedience. “The interesting thing about that moment,” according to one of the protesting meal providers, “was it was a lot of publicity—every news station in Seattle. But all the City Council came down, rolled up their sleeves, and served the meal. So, you know, the mayor was embarrassed.” After a few weeks he agreed to reinstate the outdoor meal site, and called together the committee which, after a great deal of deliberation, negotiation, and experimentation, found the present location.

According to one taskforce member I spoke with, some rather vocal prejudices against homeless people from both within the committee and from concerned citizens made the eventual location of the outdoor meal site especially arduous. The search was protracted as various proposed locations were rejected out of wariness of complaints from neighbouring stakeholders. Another of the taskforce
participants, who has been involved in city politics for many years, briefly described the importance of these stakeholders in the city’s priorities:

It’s basically about neighborhoods and people’s sense. I mean, essentially, it’s difficult to site things that are connected to homeless people. Pioneer Square is the historic area that’s perceived as the place for homeless people. Pioneer Square has stated in the last twenty years that they have more than their share. And that any new program involving homeless people should be elsewhere. Because they have missions, they have shelters, and it isn’t sort of the, “go spend a day with the homeless people” place. They want to try to revitalize their neighborhood.

Indeed, the concerns of stakeholders like the Pioneer Square businesses are one of the driving forces which put the issue of outdoor meals on city government’s agenda. The taskforce member continued:

Complaints are made by residents or tourists—but residents certainly have more sway. And the complaints go to the police. And the police say they can’t do anything about it. And so then the complaints may go to public health. And they’ll say they can’t do much about it. So then they go to a city council member or to the mayor. And if enough of those complaints kind of pile up... And so, if complaints reach a certain level, and the mayor feels that he or she or a council member will try to do something about it, they’ll convene a team of people of the city... As I went through different mayors, it seemed like after about a year, a new mayor would say, “Here’s this problem, what are you going to do about it?” And so then they would bring in others who are stake holders to see what can be done.

In this case, “residents” explicitly refers to both commercial establishments and people living in the neighbourhood. In the final analysis, the anxieties and prejudices of these squeaky wheels carry more weight than the demands of homeless and hungry people, who hadn’t the same geographic claim to constituency as businesses and residents, with titles, leases, and occasionally formal lobbying groups. A former employee at one of Pioneer Square’s homeless service centres described the influence of local leaseholders on homeless services to me, for example, as follows:

So [the centre] gets a lot of their funding from the city. And the city is getting pressure from all the Pioneer Square businesses on that particular block of [the street], because there are a lot of homeless people that hang out there, because of [the centre] and because of the [nearby] shelter. So the Pioneer Square businesses are bitching about all the homeless people hanging out, and they get mad at the city. Well, the city wants to placate the businesses, and so then they talk to [the centre]... And then [the centre] has to act. So it’s just this filter.

One small example she cited of such action, for instance, was to make sure the centre’s clients don’t congregate in front of the building. Through such channels, homeowners associations, neighbourhood organisations, business communities, and so on are able to lay claim to a certain kind of spatial
occupation. And through this sitedness, they are legible as a constituency to city officials in a way that people without shelter are often not. They are, in effect, afforded a kind of tenancy-come-citizenship, rooted in their territoriality. To drive something like this point home, another local homeless advocate described to me a suggestion made to the City Council in the process of setting the ad hoc taskforce’s mandate:

I went to City Council and said, “Why don’t we turn this into a social justice centre? What a win-win is this? To have a social justice centre that feeds people... and the social justice centre would also have hygiene, it would also have different parts of the building that were used for, you know, maybe domestic violence... And one of the City Council members looked at me and said, “Over my dead body.” And they’re no longer a City Council member, but, you know, this was a few years ago, but it was: “That’s not my constituency. They’re not the ones who are voting me into this office, so I’m not even going to think about all the people who are disenfranchised.”

This tenancy-citizenship is of course, consonant with the market-centric vision of public life often articulated by public officials and the symbolic economies upon which they stake their cities’ success. In the passage of Seattle’s civility laws, for example, justified by the spectre of Detroit’s abandonment by retail and investment (as I wrote in chapter two), or the renovation of Seattle’s downtown parks, redesigned to be less “antisocial” (as I demonstrated in chapter three), the city’s politicians and civil servants generally presumed that the health of the city is synonymous with the health of its businesses, shoppers, and property-owners. These are the people who become legible as job-creators, as tax-payers, as residents, and so on. And within this vision of urban vitality, homelessness and free public meals appear as little more than noise or disruption. (The reader may remember, for example, from the prologue to this section, in what disregard Mayor Nickels held outdoor meal programs, which he felt were undignified for both the city and the diners.)

Noise, of course, can be quite provocative. And the anxieties provoked in the process of locating the outdoor meal site still periodically bubble over when the official geographies established by it, along with the vision of public life to which it corresponds, are disturbed. One period of regular police contact with Seattle Food Not Bombs, for example, in 2001, resulted from a protracted, if somewhat one-sided antagonism between the group and one Pioneer Square resident, who for some months called the police any time he saw them handing out food in Occidental Park. Volunteers only discovered the impetus for these visits after swapping their faded black tee-shirts and political patches for button-down shirts and attending, incognito, a meeting of the Pioneer Square Community Association, where the resident admitted to making the calls. His sentiments, of course, were not isolated. According to woman who volunteered with Seattle Food Not Bombs during that period:
There was a time that some members of [Food Not Bombs] would go down and attend some of the neighborhood meetings there that the city would sponsor. And a lot of the issues that were being discussed was what to do about the park and what to do about factors that ended up being distressing to business owners or potential shoppers. So usually it was in the midst of those discussions that people would express frustration with our group. Because we definitely weren’t discouraging the homeless from being in that area. And that’s one thing that they were trying to do was make that area much more pro-business.

Partly in deference to precisely these kinds of prejudices, the most recent round of police pressure on Food Not Bombs to vacate the park in 2008 (described in the prologue to this section), was motivated directly and explicitly by instructions from Mayor Nickels’ office, according to police officers, parks workers, and meal providers with whom I spoke. And of course, whether they are motivated by concerned tenant-citizens like the cranky Pioneer Square resident, or by the explicit directives of elected officials, these police pressures are often effective at maintaining an officially sanctioned geography of survival. Besides Food Not Bombs, for example, relatively few other rogue meal projects have challenged it for extended periods of time.91

Through concrete processes like these, then, the anxieties and prejudices of a globalising city’s tenants-come-constituents, and the larger symbolic economies of which they are microcosms, are inscribed in the spaces of the city. Timothy Gibson identifies such efforts with an overarching municipal “project of reassurance,” insofar as it sends signals to up-market consumers and business interests that they can take their own version of public life for granted in the city (2004: 153). This project inevitably hinges on a question of geography. It maps out certain strategic territories—the downtown “retail core,” for example—in which to stage its reassurances, leaving other, more marginal spaces, where both people and things that are unwelcome downtown are allowed to move more freely. It is within such territories, then, that the tenancy-citizenship I have described is rooted.

Territory, as Saskia Sassen notes, is more than just space. A territory is a space defined by specific vectors of power and claim-making (2011). Gibson describes at length, for example, the competing claims backed by asymmetrical configurations of political and economic power at stake in the relocation of a proposed homeless hygiene centre in downtown Seattle in 1999. The hygiene centre was initially planned to have been built at Third Avenue and University Street. But its location faced the future address of Benaroya Hall, which has come to cut an imposing figure in the downtown landscape: It’s the world-class, glass-and-steel home of the Seattle symphony. After developers for the hall learned about the hygiene centre, bitter negotiations ensued between developers, the city, and the hygiene centre. The mayor’s office, which had initially supported the hygiene centre, reportedly did an about-face in response to threats by the Benaroya family, who underwrote the project, and other members of the downtown
business community (224). Advocates for the centre were ultimately forced to abandon their standing agreements with the city and prospective landlord and relocate their facility some distance from the downtown core. In much the same way as the outdoor meal site was finally decided, the political and economic pressure of financial investments in a space, and the way their claim to that space was made legible to city officials, weighed more heavily in the final analysis than the voices of homeless people and their advocates.

It is worth noting that feeding prohibitions in particular have often focused on public parks because they represent urban spaces wherein the vectors of power and claim-making are, by definition, more heterogeneous. In other words, public parks are, by and large, the only urban publicly-owned spaces which are not already set aside for very specific purposes (libraries are designed for access to information, sidewalks and roads for transit, and so on). In 2010, for example, in case studies of twenty-three of North American cities with feeding prohibitions, the National Coalition for the Homeless found that fully half of these prohibitions had focused on restricting the use of public parks for sharing food (National Coalition for the Homeless 2010). (Although, interestingly, in other cases, even free meal projects on private property were targeted through local zoning laws [ibid.].) Seattle’s feeding prohibitions, as I have described, follow this pattern closely, working through a simple denial of parks-use permits. And, Occidental Park, in particular, represents precisely the kind heterogeneous territory I described a moment ago, with local businesses, residents, developers, and shelterless people all staking a claim to the place.

Such specific territorial claims, in fact, may also partly explain Mayor Nickels’ more general qualms with outdoor meal programs. These programs have, after all, tended to converge on the highly contested Pioneer Square neighbourhood. For years, it has been home to many of Seattle’s rescue missions, low-rent hotels, homeless drop-in centres, and so on. (It’s the origin, after all, of the term “Skid Road.”) The historic neighbourhood is also conveniently adjacent to downtown, and a key target for tourism, property development, and a small but growing hub of information technology businesses (as I outlined at the end of chapter three). In other words, Pioneer Square is strategic territory in Seattle’s symbolic economy. One wonders if the neighbourhood wasn’t such promising real estate, if Nickels’ distaste for outdoor meals would have become a policy matter. In any case, in this way territories like the Pioneer Square neighbourhood become invested with the claims of developers, tourists, and so on. And the geography of eating and surviving downtown becomes a strategic element in the city’s project of reassurance to a market-public. The connection between space and survival in this process, evident in the Mayor’s attitude to outdoor feeding programs, then, suggests one absolutely indispensible take-home insight for policy makers, indexed earlier in the present work: Policies regulating access to and conduct within public
spaces are also, to one degree or another, inevitably policies that regulate urban food security, and vice-versa.

(Managing the homeless body)

The obverse of the tenancy-citizenship I have written about, of course, amounts both to a kind of *nowhere* and a kind of *nobody* with respect to markets and their publics—which, as I have written, have an interest in determining which bodies and spaces may circulate legitimately in public. If the right to exist, as Jeremy Waldron has argued (1992), is tantamount to the right to occupy space, then the spatial exclusions of outdoor meal projects from public spaces like parks are tantamount to a refusal of the right of hungry people to exist as public, political entities. If the spaces left open for things like outdoor meal programs and hygiene centres are, by and large, places like the undersides of freeways—which don’t seem to figure in the public vitality of globalising cities—then the people consigned to these spaces are often imagined in equally abject, passive terms. Less as constituents, consumers, or citizens, and more as a rogue element in need of management. Ethnographically, I’d like to suggest, this social imaginary has been made concrete in specific moments of policy-making and enforcement just such as those that established Seattle’s outdoor meal site.

Samira Kawash (1998) has called this social imaginary “the homeless body,” a kind of brutish, corporeal objectification that occupies the negative space of an imagined citizen-consumer. For this reason, as I described above, the very existence of an “unchecked panhandler,” according to Wilson and Kelling, may constitute “the first broken window” with respect to a market-public’s social order. The citizen-consumer’s agency within this order, Kawash suggests, is largely understood through her ability to shop, vote, and pay taxes. To this list of legible forms of political agency we might add the acts of tenancy I described earlier—investment, job creation, and property ownership—to outline the kinds of agency that ascribe membership in a market-centric public and value in a city’s symbolic economy.

Of course, it takes, in fact, considerable agency to survive without stable shelter or finances. But this agency remains largely illegible according to the territorialised conventions of a market-public. The homeless body is, therefore, one in a long line of abstract bodies legible to state agencies only through their exceptionality and abjection—from the racialised body of the contemporary gang member or the illegal immigrant back to the queer and dissident bodies of J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, the prostitute under the Victorian Poor Laws, and so on. (All the way back to the sixteenth century Tudor Vagrancy Acts, in which the body of the vagrant himself, imagined as thoroughly seditious, was one of the earliest “broken windows” to underwrite the development of agrarian capitalism and its attendant state institutions.)
Like many of these other abject bodies, as I have described above, the homeless body often inspires in policy-makers a shared chorus of “public safety,” “public health,” and even “public decorum”—with the result that certain such bodies which would otherwise have a claim upon the protection of the welfare state are increasingly managed instead by the criminal justice department, the health department, and so on.

It’s worth acknowledging that there is a wide range of legitimate reasons why homeless and hungry people might find their agency and their efforts at self-care, decorum, and hygiene, compromised, from the extreme to the mundane, from the personal to the systematic—of which their marginalisation in public space and policy is certainly one. And these challenges are, of course, not inconsequential for a larger urban public. Public drunkenness, untreated mental illness, and communicable disease, for example, are real worries for homeless and non-homeless people alike. But the blanket prejudices and exclusions I have described above inevitably distort rather than clarify the challenges—and solutions, for that matter—of homelessness. To wit, the risks of sharing food outdoors with shelterless people, in my experience, are neither negligible nor are they more worrisome than some of the other groups of people who might congregate outdoors. One of the arguments for restricting public meals in Seattle, for example, according to one of the taskforce members quoted above was that “a number of different low-income and homeless people come, food is provided, and then they leave, leaving trash and other refuse in the area,” and that, essentially, the neighbours complained. I have heard this argument from other Seattle public figures as well, who invoke the spectre of consequent rodent infestations. This is not entirely unfounded: In my experience, a certain amount of cleaning-up necessarily forms part of Food Not Bombs’ weekly work. But banning outdoor meals seems like a disproportionate response, particularly when compared to the city’s less hands-on attitude to the unruly sports fans and bar crowd with whom many shelterless people share the Pioneer Square neighbourhood—and who, in the course of my fieldwork, have proven no less likely to dispose of their hotdogs carelessly! Nonetheless, the city has subsidised, rather than prohibited, two nearby sporting arenas—projects which contribute significantly to Seattle’s world-class symbolic economy.

In practice, the illegibility of homeless agency translates into a lack of faith in homeless and hungry people to manage themselves. According to the same taskforce member, for example, one of the key reasons for controlling outdoor meals was to make sure homeless and hungry people got the help they need: “Mayor Nickels... felt they should be more appropriately provided indoors, connected with services. And I think in an ideal world, that is absolutely true.” This sentiment is not limited to Mayor Nickels. It’s a line of reasoning he shares with elected officials in Las Vegas and other cities where feeding prohibitions have been established. And, of course, a lot of shelterless people would agree that they need
more access to these services. Even that meal programs might be a fair place to connect with them. But the connection between those services and specifically indoor assistance seems to be motivated by a coercive strategy of spatial management: Diners at indoor meals would be unable to avoid contact with the kinds of services the city would like them to use. (In this, the argument also echoes efforts by municipal and federal agencies to mandate the recording of individual use of homeless-oriented services.\textsuperscript{93}) In a similar vein, as Kawash points out, a certain disproportionate distrust underwrites the common municipal approach of relying almost exclusively on bureaucratically-run emergency shelter systems, in contrast to homeless-managed projects like tent cities which often in fact yield better recoveries, comparable or fewer calls to the police (by residents and neighbours alike of these encampments (cf. Ervin and Mayo, 2004), and of course cost far less.\textsuperscript{94} While shelters may ultimately be indispensable for a variety of reasons, the ambivalence, and occasional open antagonism,\textsuperscript{95} of municipalities like Seattle towards its tent-cities is hard to account for without acknowledging the deeply distorting effects of such prejudice.

(\textit{expert management})

The production of difference that casts people as an abstract corporeality to be managed rather than as personalised subjects also corresponds to the production of a kind of \textit{expertise} with which to manage them. In the case of people without shelter, this expertise resides with both city employees and with members of a community of nonprofit service providers, from shelter workers to meal providers, who have come to know the ins and outs of the network of officially sanctioned services and the regulations that apply to them. The Seattle Meals Partnership Coalition, for example, consists of nonprofit meal providers from around the city, and meets monthly to coordinate their efforts among themselves and with city officials. In many ways, of course, the collective experience and knowledge of the members of the Meals Partnership Coalition has tremendous benefits. Not least of which is that they are able to much more effectively recirculate food resources through the city than would individual meal providers working separately. (While Food Not Bombs might share food with dozens of people each week—up to a hundred on an especially long night—Operation Sack Lunch, the MPC partner which oversees the official outdoor meal site, has served over three million meals in its two decades of existence.\textsuperscript{96}) They are also able to advocate collectively in city decision-making for those people they serve, and indeed coalition members were important voices for the needs and rights of homeless and hungry people in the process of relocating the city’s outdoor meal site.

The members of the Meals Partnership Coalition are also, however, by necessity, obliged to adhere closely to the various state-sanctioned protocols for recirculating that food, from serving food exclusively
at permitted locations to insisting on the state-authored expertise signified by things like a food-handlers permit. Of course, keeping a watchful eye on food safety is hard to argue with, and the day-long food safety course that accompanies a food-handlers permit isn’t a terrible thing. Many Food Not Bombers have worked food service jobs, so there are usually a few permits in the kitchen at any given time, for example, and the knowledge certainly comes in handy. But the process of obtaining city permission can also serve as a mechanism of exclusion on grounds other than food safety. One long-time Seattle Food Not Bombs collaborator, involved since the late 1990s (who also has experience dealing with the city while working for incorporated non-profit homeless services) recalls, Food Not Bombs has never been collectively issued formal license by the health department, despite a few good faith efforts to obtain one:

There’s a funny cyclical thing that we went through a couple times where we were told we needed a permit to serve. We said, “How do we get a permit?” “Well, you’ve got to have a health department permit.” We went to the health department, said, “How do we get this permit?” They said “Well, you’ve got to talk to the parks department.” Spoke to the parks department, again. It was like, “No, talk to the health department.” So, as far as we could tell, we actually did very earnestly start investigating that, thinking, “Well, if we’re operating out of a kitchen that’s good, and we have folks with food handler’s permits, if it’s easy enough to get a permit, why not just do that? As long as we’re not changing what we do to meet their requirements.” But, we discovered that, in fact, that was just a red herring that they were throwing out. They just didn’t want Food Not Bombs happening.

Of course, a permit from the health department is not the only way to ensure safe food preparation, as he goes on to point out: “Health inspectors have actually shown up to Food Not Bombs meals in the past and found nothing that they could actually cite Food Not Bombs for really.” (Nor is a permit a guarantee of safety, for that matter: Certain Seattle restaurants I have had the poor judgement to keep returning to, for example, in spite of their sometime ill effects, keep their permits up to date for reasons which I cannot completely fathom. For all their permission, they are not, I can assure the reader, safer places to eat than Food Not Bombs. Quite the contrary.)

So the protocols according to which official bodies like the MPC are obliged to adhere have the effect not quite of professionalising the provision of meals, but certainly of constraining it to a smaller circle of providers with a more homogenous range of practices and spaces. The arguments made for this approach, of course, emerge largely from a genuine concern for food safety. As one MPC member put it, “The fact is that when someone is driving up to a street corner and putting down a pot of chilli that has been sitting on their oven, on top of their burne for twelve hours, unheated, that somebody’s going to get poisoned and might even die.” But the centralising influence of government in this regard is also, in practice, inherently conservative and leery of difference. That MPC members often embrace a state-based approach to food safety, then, leads them to take a sceptical attitude towards what some of them call (not without
reason) “drive-by” meal programs. As the meal provider quoted a second ago put it, “There’s a lot of crazy people out there that could poison homeless people just because they don’t want them in the world anymore.” While this was given as an extreme example for the sake of argument, the wariness of risk is clear.

Such scepticism towards strangers or social difference is often directed at Food Not Bombs, whose decentralised organisational structure is often not legible as organisation from the perspective of formal non-profit organisations or state agencies. Food Not Bombs is thus often read as risky, something of a loose cannon, motivated by politics rather than humanitarian concern (as if the two did not go hand in hand). I quote again one of the taskforce members, whose description is telling:

From the perspective of government... Food Not Bombs and others could provide a meal, it was just at this site that was less disruptive to the neighborhood. And if the goal is—and from the government’s perspective—if the goal was truly to provide meals to people, not to proselytize, not to make a political statement, then you’re supported. If it’s about something else then it’s more of—people are trying to use food as a first amendment issue rather than as a, actually trying to help people with their nutritional needs... I never interacted with the Food Not Bombs folks, but the impression was they wanted to use their first amendments rights more than they wanted—it was more an issue of first amendment rights than it was about feeding people in a safe, appropriate way.

As it is presented, here, the choice is fairly stark: between helping people appropriately, according to government’s established protocols, and politically motivated, wilful disobedience. In this way, the geography of eating and the expertise of meal providers is effectively embedded in a politics of public order within which alternative modes of living and surviving in the city are made marginal, deviant, or suspicious. To be fair to the source, this is an order of which many in the taskforce have not been uncritical. Nonetheless, they are obliged to embrace it in practice. And in so doing, they frame as exceptional and risky the open-ended, non-hierarchical organisations like Food Not Bombs which by their structure make more space for homeless and hungry people in their decision-making and their everyday operations than many of the more formal agencies, and which therefore have less need to accommodate the mandates of tenant-citizen stakeholders like those described above.

In the same way, then, that the predominance of shelters forecloses the possibility of alternative arrangements like tent cities, therefore, alternative models of food safety, of meal sharing and other caring labour are foreclosed with respect to assemblages of protocols and institutions such as the Meals Partnership Coalition. These institutions and protocols are in turn beholden to municipal state agencies, and therefore to the kinds of soft power I’ve described above. Ultimately these foreclose the possibility of alternative models of social interaction and non-market agency implicit in grassroots efforts like Food Not
Bombs. In other words, supplemental to their honourable work, the outdoor meal site, the Meals Partnership Coalition, and the policies that they reflect are also, in practice, political technologies that help establish and maintain a city’s symbolic economy—a political and economic order with respect to which homelessness and hunger, in a way, disqualify one from membership. Forms of social organisation or political agency incompatible with that order are likewise marginalised or disqualified.

(Conclusion)

Taking Seattle as an example, I have pointed out two central dynamics at work in the globalising city. One follows from the other. First, policy-makers and their prevailing publics often have a lot invested in an economic vision of their future prosperity based on attracting global capital by way of their world-class image and quality of life—their “symbolic economies.” To the extent that they have put their eggs in this particular basket, they feel a corresponding worry about symbolic threats to those economies. This manifests in things like Mayor Nickels’ reputed distaste for outdoor meal programs (which he felt were not befitting Seattle’s image), and in the disproportionate concern afforded their “health and safety risks” by both officials and constituents. Public officials like Mark Sidran, the Seattle city attorney who championed its “civility codes”, have sometimes drawn on the language of broken windows theory to justify these fears. Following their lead, then, I have borrowed the term “broken windows” to describe those conspicuous modes of living and surviving in the city which are at crossed purposes with a market-public’s sense of symbolic order—conspicuous homelessness, public food sharing, and so on. Anyone who inhabits these exceptional or abject modes of living becomes a kind of “broken window” to officials. Matter-out-of-place with respect to the city’s world-class image.

In this, I haven’t said anything especially new. There is no shortage of critics ready to point out the mercenary exclusions of this kind of vision. But it bears repeating.

Second, though, and perhaps more originally, I have tried to suggest that, in producing these symbolic economies, in a sense, cities like Seattle simultaneously *produce* the very broken windows that cause them so much alarm. I argued in the first chapter of this dissertation that the realisation of capital and market value rested on a negative dialectic which led to, at its opposite pole, the production of waste and the exclusion of abject capital. My point in this chapter, then, has been an extension of that argument: Homelessness, hunger, and other abject modes of being-in-the-city, are cultivated through a negative dialectic with world-class status. They are literally unthinkable in their present form without reference to the conventions of a world-class market-public—often imagined in the image of a New York, London, Los Angeles, and so on. (Lest the reader think I’m overstating my case, a utopian thought experiment
might help: Imagine the kind of abject hunger and shelterlessness that occurs in Seattle and so many other cities occurring instead in a city where people regularly shared food with strangers in public and where the abject capital abandoned by their high-ticket grocery and real estate markets was free to be reused by others who live on non-market terms—and where, therefore, the terms “squatting” and “Dumpster-diving” were meaningless. Such a world is an absurd contradiction. But then, again, so is ours.)

But I am not speaking in purely theoretical terms. I have taken as a kind of ethnographic case study the feeding prohibitions in Seattle and dozens of other cities which regulate not only contact between market-publics and their abject others, but which authorise or prohibit the very modes of living which may manifest publicly and politically. It is the work of government to permit certain modes of biopolitical being-in-the-city, and to take exception to others. In the case of feeding prohibitions, this includes not homelessness or hunger, strictly speaking, but rather the practical approaches to eating that underwrite those phenomena. Feeding prohibitions ensure that if food changes hands in any significant quantities in public the city, it is not free. And, in a corresponding fashion, if food has been rejected from market circulation, it cannot be recirculated publicly. It can be donated to meal programs and served under the auspices of these meal providers, of course. But not in public spaces. These are the both the concrete conditions of possibility for a market-centric social order in the city and therefore also the preconditions for the existence of those broken windows that take the form of hungry, propertyless people. Not only in an epistemological sense, but in a very practical sense—feeding prohibitions and other means of effectively “criminalising” homelessness make it simply harder for people without property or money to eat, and therefore to achieve that private existence that is privileged by the market-public. Those exceptional modes of living are either prohibited outright, or geographically marginalised in a city’s symbolic economy—consigned to those territories on a city’s map not already claimed by influential players within the market-public. Officially, in Seattle, this means under the freeway. Elsewhere in the city, feeding prohibitions also make it much harder for people to share food with one another in any but the most narrowly circumscribed way—according to individualised interactions or for a price.

As such, the becoming-global of a city, measured according to its success in globalised symbolic economies, is directly related to the biopolitical production of both value and its corresponding measure of abjection. Certainly the rise of a certain “neoliberal urbanism,” as I described in chapter three has coincided with the growth of homelessness and socioeconomic privation, through mechanisms just such as the feeding prohibitions I have described here. But there is, of course another kind of becoming-global incipient in the observations I have made. If I have outlined, in this chapter, the work of government to both author a certain biopolitical order and its exceptional others, I have also outlined the conditions of possibility for the growth of the ranks of those others. As the number of people without shelter grows, as
the incidence of food insecurity in the city escalates, the broken windows of the globalising city play a more and more significant political and cultural role in the cultural life of the city, ironically enough. In the chapters that follow, then, I would like to explore the cultural logic of these others who share a counterpublic relationship to the market-publics of the globalising city. For therein, as much as anywhere else, lies the future of the city.
Excursus

Broken Windows Are Primary with Respect to Civility

(A brief ethnographic excursus into the politics of property destruction here, while tangential to eating in the city, helps to outline the relationship between symbolic economies, their abject counterpublics, and the state as they play out in the politics of public space in Seattle. These politics not only take up the question of broken windows from the previous chapter, but they also illustrate the mutual constitution of power and resistance—both themes which point towards the roles that exceptional and abject modes of being-in-the-city play in shaping urban life, and to which we will return in the subsequent chapter.)

May Day, 2012, in Seattle, was hardly what criminologists Wilson and Kelling (1982) imagined when they first wrote about the dangers of broken windows three decades ago. Nonetheless, what they called the “broken windows theory” of policing and urban disorder sheds light on the events of that day, and on the manner in which globalising cities are compelled to police their aesthetics—in ways Wilson and Kelling might not have predicted or even intended: Deliberately battered to shards by a handful of masked, black-clad anti-capitalists during the annual May Day march (commemorating international workers’ struggles), the ruined downtown display windows of Niketown, Wells Fargo, and other massive conglomerates, or the revolving glass doors of the Seattle courthouse, seem like a far cry from Wilson and Kelling’s cracked and boarded-up panes. But they are not unrelated. Wilson and Kelling’s theory of policing suggested that what was most important to the vitality of a community was that it maintained an appearance of orderliness, of business as usual. Without this similitude of social cohesion, according to them, upstanding citizens would be discouraged from venturing into the community. And without these upstanding citizens, the community would gradually slide into decay. While the theory oversimplifies a great deal and perhaps overlooks even more, it also highlights some of the fears lawmakers harbour about their city’s world-class image. Those fears haunt policy and policing efforts in major metropolises like Seattle.

The ongoing power of these visions of ordered urban life in the present day might be gauged by the fuss over Seattle’s May Day vandalism. Echoing the weeks after Seattle’s chaotic World Trade Organisation protests in 1999 (which also featured a few smashed corporate windows), a small counterpublic of Seattle anarchists buzzed privately about what many (though by no means all) felt was a palpable strike against capitalism on behalf of the workers. Referring to the vandalism, one local anarchist newspaper wrote: “This is what terrifies those who profit from us. Their worst nightmare is the
reality of hundreds of people actively applauding, encouraging, participating in, and growing ecstatic at the sight of capital being attacked. They want to obscure this reality however possible, to prevent the contagion from spreading even further.” The anonymous author went on with relish, “Our goal is and will remain to encourage people to disregard the laws that allow this death-culture to grind on and on and on. This does not only mean destruction—for there is so much to create—but it is undeniable that destruction is central to this project of snatching our lives and the earth back from those who have stolen them” (Tides of Flame 2012).

Meanwhile, a different, larger public bemoaned the “violence” perpetrated against a number of panes of plate glass. One police spokesperson, opined, “These were, for the most part, peaceful demonstrations. It’s such as shame that such a small group of individuals were able to hijack the event and dilute the message to one of violence” (Valdes and Johnston 2012). More dramatically, the manager of one of the vandalized stores said she felt “almost like someone broke into my house” (ibid.). Officials and citizens alike in Seattle repeated the word, “violence,” bitterly in contexts where “vandalism” would have been more precise. (It is worth noting that there was at least one injured party in the wake of the black bloc’s action, a press photographer struck in the temple while trying to photograph them. It is all the more telling, then, that this interpersonal violence was not, by and large, distinguished rhetorically from the vandalism.) That this disruption of urban aesthetics and property relations (and the expense for, primarily, several wealthy companies of replacing their windows) seemed to merit such inflated rhetoric from both the insurrectionary anti-capitalists and their detractors points out just how high the symbolic stakes have become for an urban biopolitical order of market-centric civility. (By contrast, compare the controversy over this vandalism to the oft-defiant public sentiments accompanying the burning cars and blankets of tear gas that almost daily characterised recent anti-austerity protests in Greece, Spain, and Italy.)

Indeed, municipal and federal authorities considered these broken windows grievous enough to warrant joint raids on radical activists’ houses by the FBI and local police—complete with battering rams and flash grenades (Kiley 2012, Plante 2012). At houses in Seattle, Olympia, and Portland, evidence was collected for the benefit of a grand jury called, ostensibly, to investigate the May Day vandalism. Up to 80 officers were said to have been involved in the raids (Potter 2012b). The mere possession of anarchist literature and flyers was cited as evidence (ibid.). As I type this, activists are still being held by the grand jury based on ideological evidence collected in these raids. This demonstrates a monumental misunderstanding of anarchist politics. (Anarchists are an incredibly diverse group. Most anarchists I have spoken with in the course of this project, including some whose friends’ houses were raided and whose acquaintances were arrested, have no ties to this sort of property destruction, and hold
mixed opinions about their practical value. The only anarchist I have spoken with who I personally suspect of being involved in such vandalism was a traveller, and is long gone from Seattle, never having given me their real name). But more than that, the raids and grand juries also seem to demonstrate a veritable paranoia about the fragility of the social order of cities like Seattle and the capacity of broken windows and other aesthetic infractions to undermine it.

But in a way, the apologists and apopletics on either side of the smashed store front windows (and maybe even Wilson and Kelling themselves) all miss the point: To paraphrase Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004), broken windows are primary with respect to civility.

Hardt and Negri’s original assertion, “resistance is primary with respect to power” (2004: 64) points out that, although “resistance” is generally framed as a reactionary force, a response to political and economic power, it is also power that must carve its own edifice out of the available human potential. Like a sculpture rendering its own form from clay or marble. Power channels and organises human capacities, some of which are in the process categorized as deviant, illegitimate, or abject to power for the sake of staking out a biopolitical order. Power is, then, in a sense always reactionary. This is not unlike Timothy Mitchell’s point (itself borrowed from Foucault), that state power is intimately embedded in and dependent on the social orders over which it is supposed to exercise control (1991). It is human potential (whether for compliance or resistance) which is the ontological and material precondition of the order established by power. Hardt and Negri make this case largely in terms of the primacy of human labour with respect to capital. And I have already made a similar case about the negative dialectics between abject and active capital, waste and value. Alienated labour and material abjection, then, find their meeting ground in May Day’s broken downtown windows—the very “matter out of place” (Douglas 1984) which outlines the limits of bourgeois civility.

Slavoj Zizek makes a parallel point about the London riots of 2011. He suggests that both progressive and conservative commentators in the UK missed the point: Not only the rioters’ economic and political alienation, but the very individualism and quasi-consumerism that are at play in the act of looting are reflections of predominant market-publics (Zizek 2011). While it might be a stretch (and even a veiled concession to liberal moralists) to identify looting as the definitive act of the riots, Zizek’s point is that rioters’ motivations and the means of resistance were already at their fingertips, incipient in the neoliberal market society itself. While not a particularly creative sort of destruction, they nonetheless mirror the determinisation and atomisation of the citizen-consumer, and the paranoiac anxieties about disorder and contagion that underwrite many modern spaces of consumption.

To be clear, I don’t mean to say any of this destruction was appropriate or not. That’s not my concern. I mean to say it was inevitable.
This angry, industrious response of young, economically disenfranchised labour to the edifice (physical and economic) of businesses, built in part on labour similarly alienated, is precisely what Hardt and Negri were talking about. It is also a fairly good description of Seattle’s May Day vandalism. The culprits seem likely to have emerged from just such a milieu of young radicals, energised in recent months by the tumult of Seattle’s branch of the Occupy Wall Street movement. The public encampments of these decentralized, diverse “occupations” were, themselves, largely made up of people and forms of living alienated from the predominant market-public and its institutions (from over-leveraged, underpaid students to Dumpster-divers, from squatting radicals to foreclosed families to homeless youth—none of these categories being mutually exclusive, and several of them having included the author at one time or another). Indeed, one of the criticisms I heard from middle-class-affiliated participants, in the course of my own participation and observation at Occupy (or “Decolonise”99) Seattle, was that the movement had been “coopted” by radicals and homeless people. (Consider the unselfconscious comment of one apparently white, middle-class protester, made public at the Seattle general assembly: “This demonstration shouldn’t be about homelessness—it should be about politics”… as if homelessness weren’t political.100) Of course, I heard radicals and homeless people from Occupy Seattle adopting the same language of “cooptation”; They complained about middle-class “dumpies,” recently hurt by the recession, coopting their movement. Both comments seem to miss the point of the movement’s diversity and decentralisation. But they do highlight the importance, if contested, of abject labour, bodies, and modes of living, in defining the movement.

At the same time, the antagonism shown towards certain windows on May Day emerges from a climate of self-described “insurrectionary” anarchist thinking and rhetoric which, my fieldwork demonstrated, both pre-existed Occupy Seattle, and was considerably multiplied in response to the sometimes violent efforts101 of police and the mayor to disperse its encampments. (Note, though, that police pepper spray and batons seem to have done considerably more bodily harm at protests this year than the insurrectionists, whose net insurrection has amounted, by all appearances, to the kind of vandalism, rhetoric, and bruised forehead described above.) If power is reactionary, then, it nonetheless has the potential to herd and channel resistance—a point I’ll return to in the next chapter—and this is precisely what seems to have happened in the milieu of Occupy Seattle. The restless energy of insurrectionaries among the occupiers—as nearly as I can tell from my investigations of and participation in Occupy Seattle (mainly via Food Not Bombs’ presence there)—was fed and focused by the police through direct confrontation and grassroots information networks which disseminated (admittedly selectively) details of these confrontations. (And, no doubt, police antagonism was fed by occupiers’ antagonism in equal measure, although I haven’t the same ethnographic basis to make such a claim).
Without taking any moral or ideological stance on the matter, one could still make the argument that May Day’s broken windows were, in very practical terms, a kind of chicken come home to roost. Both the incipient disorder of a stratified urban economy like Seattle’s, built partly on insecure and abject labour, and the efforts of police and municipal authorities to manage and disperse this disorder when, through manifestations like Occupy Seattle, it congeals and threatens to disrupt the highly routinised downtown core of the city, represent structural forces which, I would argue, made May Day’s vandalism utterly predictable. In other words, these particular broken windows were primary with respect to the civility enforced by Occupy Seattle’s eviction from the downtown Westlake Plaza. And the evictions themselves, of course, were a response to occupiers’ civil disobedience in the face of Seattle’s no-camping ordinance—itself a component of Seattle’s civility codes. Thus, one can trace a chain of actions channelling and amplifying the abject forms of life upon which Seattle’s urbane symbolic economy rests. In this, Seattle, like many other US cities, has impeccably followed the logic of broken windows theory. The shrillness of the juridical response to insurrectionary vandalism bodes more of the same.
Chapter Five

Like Water on a Grease Fire: State Apparatuses and War Machines

*If the police had a brain in their head they would have just ignored us. Right? And we would have just become another weird part of the landscape. And they just could've waited us out. And we would have, you know, eventually become bored and moved on, and done something else.*

Food Not Bombs collaborator, San Francisco and Seattle, 1989–1990

So far, in this part of the dissertation, what I have written has consisted of quite a few negations. I have outlined the kinds of agency and citizenship that people who are homeless and hungry are imagined not to possess. The kinds of places there they are not permitted to eat. The powerful investments and territorial claims which announce to poor people and would-be do-gooders, in effect, “not here, move along.” The broken windows and spectres of disorder which seem to secure a city’s public life through their absence. And so on. But while markets and publics might sometimes behave as if they don’t exist, ultimately the objects of these negations have to go somewhere and do something.

What makes my work important, then, is that it ultimately also gives a meaningful account of the lived realities which emerge from this string of “no”s in practice. In a way, this has been my strategy throughout this dissertation: to point out these negations, and then to describe the concrete meanings and social lives cultivated within them. So far, I have argued that market value is predicated on a negative dialectic between waste and value—abject and active capital—and that the quality of public life is determined by the preferential circulation of one, but not the other. What I have argued above, then, outlines the consequences of a series of such negative dialectics for those people who are refused any value in the high-ticket symbolic economies of the globalising city. In Seattle, these consequences have amounted to an exclusive geography of eating and surviving in most of the city’s public spaces, with a correspondingly territorialised citizenship.

If feeding prohibitions sanction certain forms of cultural and economic life as visible, grievable, and so on, they simultaneously censure and abandon a range of non-market forms of living-in-public—from ragtag soup kitchens to Dumpster-diving counterpublics—which must go on, nonetheless, to survive and therefore to produce in ways which are sometimes appropriated, sometimes abhorred by markets public and their public servants. These forms of living almost by definition exceed representation. Often by deliberate design they evade the optics of state agencies. The very existence of these modes of living and
their relationship to state agencies and markets public can often only be evidenced through ethnographic
detail.

I also suggested in chapter two, however, that abject capital and the people and spaces by which it is recirculated might amount to novel, counterpublic social forms which develop a certain degree of political, cultural, and economic autonomy precisely because larger, dominant publics take exception to them. And not only this. These counterpublic forms, in turn, help to make and remake the dominant publics from which they are alienated. Below, then, I mean to extend that thought with respect to feeding prohibitions, Food Not Bombs, and the globalising city.

Food Not Bombs is one manifestation of this sort of marginalised, semi-autonomous social sphere. One San Francisco Food Not Bombs collaborator who was active during the 1980s, for example, a dreadlocked punk-rocker and squatter in his twenties at the time, described the milieu out of which Food Not Bombs grew, and the city’s ineffectual response to it: “Thousands of people were living in Golden Gate Park—I lived in Golden Gate Park, I slept in a camp out there—and hundreds of camps out there. Huge masses of disaffected people just, moving around from place to place. And it was freaking out the local administration.” This milieu persisted despite the city’s various efforts to disperse it: “[The city was] trying to induce them to move out to other places, taking away social services, increasing crackdowns, and police repression, and clearing out camps and things like that—and they made no difference whatsoever” (his emphasis). In this context, as he described it, Food Not Bombs not only was established. It expanded. And when the city focused its punitive efforts on Food Not Bombs volunteers between 1988 and 1992 (Parson 2010), the result was to intensify grassroots organising, media attention, and volunteer recruitment, as I will describe below. After hundreds of arrests and countless hours of bad publicity, the city relented.

Such marginal counterpublic milieu are not necessarily suppressed by the actions of state agencies. Rather, they are sometimes corralled, and sometimes multiplied by government efforts. In this capacity, I will argue, these government efforts amount to more than the sum of their parts. At the municipal scale they work as the kind of heterogeneous but concerted institutional assemblage that philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari called “the state apparatus” (1987). In their evasions and their antagonisms with respect to such state apparatuses, then, Food Not Bombs and social forms like it resemble what Deleuze and Guattari called “the war machine,” that juggernaut of productive self-sovereign forces which, in a relationship of intimate exteriority with the state, enacts some measure of abject cultural or political autonomy. Like water on a grease fire, government can remake, but not dictate, the conditions of life in the city. In this chapter, I will spend some time elaborating Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts before
offering some ethnographic examples to illustrate the structuring effects that Food Not Bombs and city governments—acting as war machine and state apparatus, respectively—have on each other.

What I argue below is that Food Not Bombs represents one instructive example of the kind of counterpublic social forms that emerge from the exclusions I described a moment ago: In Seattle and other places where I’ve volunteered and interviewed Food-Not-Bombs collaborators, its work takes place at the intersection of at least three abject or exceptional cultural economies—those of abject capital (in this case, surplus, discarded food, kitchen implements, and sometimes squatted kitchen space), economic disenfranchisement (socioeconomic instability, shelterlessness, and food insecurity), and marginal or contested territories (the parks and other public spaces where people who are hungry or homeless congregate, and where Food Not Bombs, therefore, regularly shares food). In the absence of any of these three factors, Food Not Bombs would cease to be possible or relevant in the same way. The vicissitudes of these three cultural economies are all exacerbated by the hegemony of a globalising city’s market-public, with its world-class aspirations, high-ticket consumption, discerning grocery-store aesthetics, ridiculous housing costs, property redevelopments, attendant conflicts over territory, and so on.

But more than that, Food Not Bombs and forms of organisation like it offer consequential moments of resistance to these exclusive symbolic orders in a variety of ways. Below, I will detail several ethnographic moments in which this has been so, particularly in San Francisco and Seattle. If, as Hardt and Negri have written, resistance is primary with respect to power (and by extension broken windows with respect to civility, as I wrote in the earlier excursus) then the resistances of organisations like Food Not Bombs represent a constitutive part of the political order and cultural economy of globalising cities. In other words, they redefine, through moments of antagonism and evasion what is both politically and practically possible in these cities. If a buzz-word like “civility” indexes the work of municipal state agencies to inscribe a particular cultural economy in certain urban spaces (as I have written in the previous three chapters), then Food Not Bombs represents one of the broken windows conjured into being—both ontologically and materially—through these efforts.

It is no coincidence, then, that Food Not Bombs’ three-decade proliferation coincides roughly with the development of increasingly spectacular, increasingly polarised global cities (Sassen 2001; Rennie Short 2004), and with it the proliferation in these cities of neoliberal approaches to municipal governance like the feeding prohibitions and other “civility” measures I have described in this dissertation. It might not be altogether fanciful, therefore, to describe the relationship between Food Not Bombs chapters and municipal state agencies in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s war machines and state apparatuses. These terms name two poles in the complex relationship between formal, hierarchical structures of state power and complex, emergent forms of resistance. (It is, in part, Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding that
motivates Hardt and Negri’s pithy formulation, quoted earlier.) As such, they help us imagine the ways in which Food Not Bombs chapters and city governments might be entangled in each others’ efforts. Food Not Bombs represents one expression, therefore, of the exceptional quantities—of food, of people, of territory—which are both exiled from a city’s globally-traded symbolic economy and yet which haven’t much other place to go. In turn, Food Not Bombs’ work also remakes the cultural and economic possibilities of the globalising city in its own way, as I’ll detail below. In Food Not Bombs, therefore, we may identify a traffic in people, things, and ideas between public and counterpublic cultural-economic spheres in the city.

**sovereignty, surplus, and the municipal state apparatus**

State apparatuses, for Deleuze and Guattari, are assemblages of institutional structures and biopolitical power that govern a social order within specific territories, in much the way that feeding prohibitions and the relevant power structures (both soft and hard) organise the geography of eating and surviving in Seattle and similar cities. These apparatuses are defined “by the perpetuation or conservation of organs of power” (1987: 357). As a consequence, they write, “[t]he concern of the State is to conserve” (ibid.). The expertise and institutional structures that enact Seattle’s feeding restrictions have just such a conservative impact on the ways in which food circulates through the city, and therefore also on the modes of living and eating which are permitted to go on in public. These institutional policies, technologies, and expertise, along with the forms of soft power that work with them in establishing feeding prohibitions, might therefore be understood as a complex municipal state apparatus that effectively appropriates and channels the productive power of a city’s spaces and social lives. In other words, they forge a productive symbolic economy in the city. The “civility” ordinances, “quality of life” laws, and other efforts at “criminalising” homelessness described in chapter two might be understood similarly.

And, of course, this symbolic economy makes quite a bit of waste. “It is the State...” Deleuze and Guattari suggest, “that makes possible the undertaking of large-scale projects, the constitution of surpluses, and the organization of the corresponding public functions” (359). In the case of feeding prohibitions, their description is uncanny—the circulation of food which has become surplus with respect to a market-public, and the establishment therefore of distinct public and counterpublic spaces of circulation, is made possible through the assemblages of institutional influence and control, as I have described in previous chapters.

In managing the circulation of these surpluses, and in politically and spatially marginalising those forms of life associated with them, these assemblages proceed precisely in the stead of Deleuze and
Guattari’s state apparatus, whose sovereignty, they emphasise, consists of its capacity to exteriorise, or make exceptional, certain forms of life. “The State itself,” they argue, “has always been in a relationship with an outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship. The law of the State is not the law of All or Nothing... but that of interior and exterior. The State is sovereignty, but sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally” (360). In this, therefore, there is a necessary synergy between state apparatuses which articulate and authorise specific modes of living, and the publics that adopt these modes of living as their circulatory conventions. The descriptions I have given already in this dissertation of the state management of homeless bodies and geographies of eating illustrate one such synergy between a municipal state apparatus and a city’s market-public.

Following Deleuze and Guattari in this regard, Giorgio Agamben (1998) suggests that state sovereignty is most directly expressed in its creation of “bare life,” that biological life which is not recognised as meaningful within a given social or political order. And the life of the homeless and hungry folk who are left to eat, sleep, piss, and shit under the same freeway (as the reader may recall from the prologue to this section), is nothing if not the barest of life. As a symptom of the public life and political pecking orders of cities like Seattle, this is of course, telling. But the notion of bare life doesn’t quite capture the universe of meaningful political and social arrangements to which the state apparatus may take exception. As I suggested above, for example, social relationships of mutual aid, decentralised management, and direct democracy, exemplified by organisations like Seattle’s Tent Cities and Food Not Bombs, tend to be marginalised or foreclosed by the apparatus of ad-hoc taskforces, interest groups, Mayor’s offices, government agencies and nongovernmental expertise that establish a geography of non-market survival in the city.

Lest the municipal state apparatus begin to sound too much like a bona fide conspiracy, however, it is worth reflecting on the diversity of elements at work within the apparatus. In my earlier descriptions of Seattle’s feeding prohibitions, for example, it is clear that there are many different agents implicated in articulating, enacting, and enforcing a particular public order—none of whom are especially villainous or conspiratorial. (Even Mayor Greg Nickels’ distaste for outdoor dining was based on a pro-business set of assumptions about what is, in the long run, economically best for his polity.) And of course these agents all engage synergistically with particular publics—embodied in business associations and “not-in-my-back-yard” citizens’ groups, on one hand, and civilly disobedient public food distributions on the other. The municipal state apparatus, therefore, is necessarily an emergent formation. It is more than the sum of its parts. It is informed but not defined by the explicit mandates and formal structures of institutional power. (After all, even the mayor’s office was ultimately able only to limit outdoor meals, rather than ban them completely.)
(the war machine named, ironically enough, “food not bombs”)

If municipal state apparatuses are emergent, more than the sum of their diverse parts, and shaped by their publics, then they are also overdetermined by an equally emergent “war machine.” This is the name Deleuze and Guattari give to those unruly social forces which are exceptional with respect to such social orders and which also, for the same reason, resist organisation by state agencies. Their description draws our attention to some important things about Food Not Bombs, and the abject economies of which they are a part.

The term, notionally, represents those forms of life that exceed or evade the state apparatus’ order, and yet which through their exception and evasion amount to distinctly productive forces—the “outside” without which the state is inconceivable. Through their resistance they corral and organise state apparatuses. The war machine therefore both shapes and is shaped by the state apparatus through relations of force and resistance—this is the source of Deleuze and Guattari’s enigmatically bellicose term—and yet exercises a certain degree of autonomy from it. This mutually entangled, co-constitutive model of power, therefore, calls our attention to the complex, sometimes submerged ways in which a social form like Food Not Bombs almost simultaneously evades, antagonizes, remakes, and is remade by state agencies.

“It seems to be irreducible to the State apparatus,” Deleuze and Guattari write of the war machine, “to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law: it comes from elsewhere” (352). The “elsewhere” they describe corresponds in large part to the exceptional or counterpublic circulation of people, places, and things I have already described. While much of Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion revolves around more visceral antagonists to state power (Genghis Khan is a favourite), they point out that a range of exceptional forms of life like the ones I have described in this dissertation are breeding grounds for this productive externality—“collective bodies always have fringes or minorities that reconstitute equivalents of the war machine—in sometimes quite unforeseen ways—in specific assemblages such as building bridges or cathedrals or rendering judgments or making music or instituting a science, a technology” (366).

Food Not Bombs functions in precisely this manner. It emerges at the intersection of the three exceptional milieu I described earlier—surplus food, socioeconomic insecurity, and contested spaces—and embodies the distinctly counterpublic labour of reinventing the meaning and value of these things. Here, it is worth quoting at more length the San Francisco Food Not Bombs volunteer’s comments, cited
briefly at the outset of this chapter. He describes the relationship of intimate exteriority between Food Not Bombs, the state apparatus, and the market-public at Food Not Bombs’ inception:

The government, the police, the, social interactions were really what was driving what was going on [with Food Not Bombs], but we didn’t see that. We were looking beyond that. We were looking at the headlines, and the world movements that we thought we were a part of. Which that, now, thinking back to that, was completely ridiculous... All we were involved in was what was happening in San Francisco at that time. And what was happening was a transformation. The city was depopulating. They were moving out poorer people, wholesale. Moving in rich people. And they were picking and choosing who they wanted to have live there. And homeless people weren’t a part of that. And there were thousands of them. And they were sleeping on the streets. They were, you know—thousands of people were living in Golden Gate Park—I lived in Golden Gate Park, I slept in a camp out there—and hundreds of camps out there. Huge masses of disaffected people just, just moving around from place to place. And it was freaking out the local administration. They didn’t know what to do with these people. They tried all kinds of different methods. Trying to induce them to move out to other places. Taking away social services. Increasing crackdowns, and police repression and clearing out camps and things like that, and they made no difference whatsoever.

Like a grease fire in response to water, Food Not Bombs and the abject milieu from which it emerged were changed, but not suppressed by the efforts of the city. In this way, Food Not Bombs, from its earliest days, emerged from the fringes or minorities of urban market-publics. (The volunteer quoted above—a punk-rocker and squatter from further north—moved to San Francisco to be a part of this scene, for example.) In its exteriority, Food Not Bombs constituted a challenge to their sense of order. Like Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine, which exists apart from and irreducible to the state apparatus, for the most part, Food Not Bombs operates “under the radar.” It uses food that won’t be missed (Dumpster-dived or voluntarily donated) and works in spaces that are ostensibly public and freely accessible, usually explicitly eschewing state permission, and generally avoiding market relations and state influence. However, also like the war machine, it periodically encounters (and even inspires) resistance—through feeding prohibitions like the ones described in the present work. And through this encounter, it cultivates recurrent moments of mutual antagonism with representatives of the state and local market-publics.

These recurrent moments must be understood as productive in a variety of ways—productive not only for Food Not Bombs, but for the state apparatuses and the larger market-publics to which they are responsible. While Food Not Bombs collaborators and state representatives alike might balk at the word “productive” here (each as applied to the other’s conduct, at least), following Deleuze and Guattari, I am suggesting that both Food Not Bombs and municipal state apparatuses have structuring effects upon each other, and that they grow and are organised through these effects. This is true in both immediate, concrete
terms, and also in larger discursive ways which are no less consequential. In practical, organisational terms, the very existence of groups like Food Not Bombs is, for instance, the germ of motivation which leads state agencies to draft or enforce feeding prohibitions. And, in turn, groups like Food Not Bombs often grow in numbers and community support in response to publicised efforts by state agencies to suppress their activities. The latter observation also points towards some of the discursive synergies between state apparatus and war machine, too. In terms of the cultural and political terrain of encounter, both Food Not Bombs and feeding prohibitions discursively establish the political, cultural, and even legal terms of each other’s endeavour.

To wit, the relationship between Food Not Bombs chapters and municipal state apparatuses is discursively and materially productive in at least two related ways: Broadly speaking, they *feed each other* and they *circumscribe each other*. I’ll explain what I mean by this, and offer some ethnographic examples below.

*(defying isaac newton—the “deterritorialisation velocity” of affect)*

All gastronomic puns aside, the relationship between Food Not Bombs and the municipal state apparatus is dynamic: They feed each other’s momentum and motivation. Defying Isaac Newton, their actions often prompt opposite but unequal responses, which have the effect of, at times, expanding and organising the structures at each pole, and multiplying the force relations between them. For instance, Food Not Bombs collaborators who have worked in Seattle, San Francisco, New York City, Orlando, and Melbourne have all described to me encountering varying degrees of antagonism with police and the courts. And what is most telling about these interactions is the way state pressure has often amplified and incensed the efforts of Food Not Bombs, *and vice versa*.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the resistance of Food Not Bombs chapters spurs on the work of municipal state apparatuses. Resistance is, after all, primary with respect to power. And as Deleuze and Guattari wrote, these apparatuses operate with a mandate to conserve and extend their own sovereignty: State apparatuses brook no challenge. For this reason, Food Not Bombs’ actions have, at times intensified and reified the state’s efforts to control food distribution—as in Orlando, where the group members’ were arrested and subsequently appealed the validity of their city’s feeding prohibitions in court. Their initial appeals were successful, in fact, and the city, embarrassed, offered to negotiate a compromise according to one Orlando collaborator.102 Rather than negotiate, however, the complainants pursued the appeal to a higher court and the city’s policy was ultimately upheld by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.103 *(According one interlocutor—who left the Orlando group under mutually acrimonious terms and worked*}
for a time with the Seattle chapter—the decision to pursue this appeal in the first place was contentious.) This set a disturbing precedent for feeding prohibitions across the country. In this case, then, the dynamo of power and resistance ultimately not only reified a biopolitical state apparatus of feeding ordinances and urban territorial claims, but articulated it more intimately with the larger, perhaps more intransigent state apparatus of the appellate court system.

In Seattle, Food Not Bombs’ presence has likely also intensified, or at least structured, state mobilisations, albeit in more subtle ways. It is clear, for example, that the group is familiar by name among some participants in the city’s decision-making process and social service agencies. Its anti-authoritarian politics and corresponding decentralisation and informal organisation elicit, as I have written in chapter four, a certain degree of distrust and explicit frustration from some of them, which inevitably informs their reaction to unsupervised meal programs in general. As the reader may recall, for example, during the most recent effort to corral rogue soup kitchens in the Pioneer Square neighbourhood and redirect them to the freeway meal site, the Parks Department contacted Food Not Bombs directly by email in order to deliver an official notice describing the city’s policy about outdoor meals, and the location of the outdoor meal site. While it would be a mistake to cast Seattle Food Not Bombs’ influence as definitive in shaping city policy, it is nonetheless clear that it has left a memorable impression.

Perhaps more interesting for my purposes are the ways in which Food Not Bombs’ work has, in turn, been amplified by the workings of state apparatuses. Through the cultivation of counterpublic affects and discursive circulation, the groundwork for Food Not Bombs growth is laid precisely by the workings of municipal state apparatuses to cultivate a civil, globalised symbolic economy.

Consider the case of San Francisco, where, between 1988 and 1992, municipal authorities arrested hundreds of Food Not Bombs volunteers. What began with just a few arrests quickly escalated in phases, as several San Francisco Food Not Bombs members from that period explained to me. Police would arrest volunteers and confiscate their buckets of soup from Golden Gate Park. And new recruits, moved to action by outrage at news of the arrests, would volunteer. According to Keith McHenry, one of the group’s founding members and most active organisers, as the number of arrests grew, commercial news coverage increased too. First locally. Then state-wide. Then nationally. And with the media coverage, volunteers and community support multiplied. The San Francisco participant quoted earlier described to me the relationship between city intervention and Food Not Bombs’ growth:

There would be periods of crisis where the police would crack down and throw us all in jail and come, you know, confiscate our equipment. And, and then we’d get a whole group of people that were interested in that sort of activity, that civil disobedience. It really wasn’t civil disobedience because we
were—the police weren’t really arresting us. They were just roughing us up. Throwing us in jail, and then kicking us back out again... I was just picked up, thrown in jail, and then released without charges. And as each time happened they just got worse and worse. You know they would just, take my glasses and stomp on ‘em you know, and tear my shirt off and throw me in the tank, you know, and tell the other inmates that I was gay. Things like that. Strip searches. Body cavity—yeah, good times. So as that, you know, kind of went on, the collective changed a little bit. It became more and more groups of people that were interested in fighting the cops. And then we would reach a detente sort of with the authorities... I think City Council members intervened ‘cause it was so embarrassing. And we would reach an agreement and we would have a period of relative peace and calm. And the collective would shift again to a new group of people that were interested in helping homeless people and, you know, doing more social interactions and making food and trying to, you know, do something useful other than fight with the cops, you know. And so the group would change back and forth in that sense.

By the time these phases of antagonism and detente had run their course, over a thousand arrests had been made (Parson 2010), and Food Not Bombs had grown by leaps and bounds as an organisation. The San Francisco chapter—only the second group to adopt the name since 1980, and started by one of the original members from Boston—had ballooned, and new chapters had formed around the country. By 1992, there were even enough chapters to organise a national meet-up. Parson (another Food Not Bombs collaborator and academic) has described in detail the city’s periodic compromises with the Food Not Bombs during this period, and notes a mutual antagonism which upset the detente at several stages (ibid.). Either public officials would resume the arrests and harassment, or Food Not Bombs members would adopt new, equally civilly disobedient locations and tactics. This mutual antagonism implies a certain bilateral traction on the part of both the city and Food Not Bombs. Or, as the participant from San Francisco put it, “If the police had a brain in their head they would have just ignored us. Right? And we would have just become another weird part of the landscape. And they just could’ve waited us out. And we would have, you know, eventually become bored and moved on, and done something else.” Instead where there had been a molehill, the city faced a growing mountain of “broken windows”: bad publicity, community outrage, and above all, intransigent bodies occupying Golden Gate Park each week.

The Seattle chapter has not experienced quite the spectacular degree of pressure experienced by the San Francisco chapter during the 1980s. (In fact, many cities seem to have learned San Francisco’s lesson as there has not been antagonism of this scale to my knowledge between Food Not Bombs and any city since.) Nonetheless, as I described above, in Seattle and many other cities, Food Not Bombs collaborators experience occasional periods of pressure from police, at the behest of either local businesses or state agencies. And frequently, in Seattle these periods of state pressure have become the impetus both for local media coverage and calls from the group for community support, circulated by email, by word of mouth,
and through subcultural channels like punk shows, self-published underground magazines, and more recently through social media. Both news coverage and the group’s own rallying cries have traditionally been accompanied by images of police arresting Food Not Bombs, or ordering them to pack up their food and go home. Of course, these images provoke strong feelings and bolster Food Not Bombs’ numbers—hardly the intended response for local law enforcement or policy makers, but entirely predictable according to Deleuze and Guattari’s model.

The development of a war machine, Deleuze and Guattari point out, is often driven by *affect*, by structures of feeling and attitudes. While state apparatuses are able command a particular order and set of behaviours, they are less able to command sentiment, feeling, and attitude—which are almost inevitably key ingredients for resistance. Insofar as it has the capacity to challenge or destabilise the territorial order of the state apparatus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to the “deterritorialization velocity” of affect (356). In other words, feeling and attitude can completely reshape political relationships.

Like Saskia Sassen (2011), when Deleuze and Guattari write “territorialisation,” they’re talking about more than just space. Rather, “territory” refers the ways in which historical and political claims have been inscribed in space—and not just physical space, but what Lefebvre (1991 [1974]) would call “social space”—a public park, a downtown business district, and so on, whose meaning has been made and remade through lived practice—and “representational space”—that spatial imaginary within which the metaphors of the state’s hierarchy and “verticality” (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002) are conceived. When Saskia Sassen writes that “occupying remakes territory,” then, (describing the mass encampments of Tahrir Square and Occupy Wall Street) (2012), she is partly describing the importance of the structures of feeling and attitudes in upsetting these social and representational spaces. In this, she offers a practical example of the “deterritorialization velocity” of affect. An example echoed on a different geographic and temporal scale by Food Not Bombs’ proliferation from city to city.

In Seattle, San Francisco, and elsewhere, such affective “velocity” has certainly added momentum to the growth of Food Not Bombs and the greater counterpublics from which it draws. One Seattle collaborator from the late 1990s, for example, who moved to Seattle at seventeen—riding the crest of his enthusiasm for antiauthoritarian politics and punk-rock—described his angry response to Seattle’s feeding restrictions during in the late 1990s, and its value in forming an activist identity: “At that time, in downtown, there was a lot of, police presence, it was—which for me, at the time was awesome. Like it was—you know I was an angry young man—but in a good way, like I wanted to *do* some stuff, and they [Food Not Bombs] took me in with open arms.” While he had learned an abstract sense of antiauthoritarianism from political readings and punk rock, he told me, the experience of police repression made his politics more experiential, more affective.
They [the police] were just dicks. And it was really... for me it was a definitely an identity-building experience. Because it was me, questioning without really knowing why I was questioning. But it definitely, fostered, a question of authority, that I—you know, I was taught to hate cops, just through the scene that I was involved with, but never really had, a real experience to hate—and just not cops but just authority—and question why. You know somebody says, “You can’t feed people here,” and I immediately was like, “Why can’t I do that? Why can’t I just feed my friends? In this public environment? We’re not trying to promote anything other than the reality that people are hungry.”

In the sense that Food Not Bombs contributes to the identity formation of volunteers in this way, another participant from New York City described it to me as a kind of “gateway activism.” He described to me, for example, the importance of his experiences as a “bottom-liner” (a kind of anarchist volunteer coordinator) in his later political and personal choices to pursue work in formal non-profit organisations. Similarly, one of his New York City friends and collaborators explained the practical, experiential dimensions of this “gateway” function:

I think in New York City, people come, and for some people—I don’t want to say all, because it’s not true for all—but for some people, I think Food Not Bombs is a good entry point for a certain subset of people—like in their mid-teens to early twenties, of “I want to get involved in something concrete, and I want to get involved in doing stuff, here’s a really good, hands-on way to get involved in doing stuff... And it’s a very good entry point, and then people sometimes tend to move on to other activist stuff that maybe requires more skills or more

She herself moved on to a range of other “activist stuff” including a longer-term commitment to squatting and a prolific body of freelance political research and writing (described at the close of chapter two). “Like I think for me,” she said, “Food Not Bombs was definitely like the entry into Lower East Side politics and squatting and doing that kind of work that I might not have gotten involved with otherwise.”

In these sorts of ways, Food Not Bombs is a mechanism for the affective deterritorialisation and alienation of participants’ relationships to municipal state apparatuses and their market-publics.

Because the war machine, as it was described by Deleuze and Guattari, is not structured by any institutional mandate or centralised plan, but rather by this very deterritorialisation, its structure is emergent and decentralised, an organisational logic that they call “rhizomatic.” It is not, however, simply chaotic, except perhaps in the sense of mathematical chaos theory. Chaos theory predicts the emergence of order from seemingly random, unrelated events according to a “pruning algorithm” of shared initial conditions and laws of motion which foreclose certain possibilities and predispose others (Morowitz 2004). These preconditions constitute the organising logic of complex systems. For the war machine, they are largely affective.
In the case of Food Not Bombs, this deterritorialised affect manifests in at least two ways. The two of
the volunteers quoted above described, involvement with the group is often impelled by a desire to “help
the homeless” and “promote the reality that people are hungry,” on one hand, or to “fight the cops” and
“question authority” on the other. The one, a kind of caring labour. The other a species of
antiauthoritarianism. In the absence of larger institutional structures, or enduring membership, then, these
affects are in large part what accounts for Food Not Bombs’ grown and geometry.

These are not, of course, affects limited to Food Not Bombs. Explicitly inspired by Deleuze and
Guattari’s war machine, in fact, Hardt and Negri suggest that political resistance to the transnational
apparatuses of state and economic power glossed by the word “globalization,” which they call “Empire,”
will be motivated by a shared, generalised affect that they term, simply, “the will to be against” (2000:
35). We could certainly call the antiauthoritarianism at work in Food Not Bombs a kind of “will to be
against.” And the caring labour described above also finds a globalized analogue in Hardt and Negri’s
vision as well, as they employ the role that love plays in forging active transnational connection—not the
intimate love of romance, family, or friendship, but a sort of post-Enlightenment humanism, a love of
one’s fellow species being. Hardt and Negri’s terms are too highly generalised to tell us much about Food
Not Bombs. It, after all, is far more limited in scope and less allegorical than their “Multitude,” the
globalised proletariat-come-war-machine that Hardt and Negri envision. But their argument nonetheless
helps to make the case that large meaningful political phenomena may be structured largely or primarily
by both antagonistic and affiliative affects which emerge in response to the work of state apparatuses.

Caring labour and antiauthoritarianism are of course not, as the Seattle collaborator quoted above
points out (and Hardt and Negri seem to agree), unrelated sensibilities—where state authority is often
mercenary or exclusionary, antiauthoritarianism is often motivated by compassion (although it’s not clear
if the reverse is also true). But they are nonetheless different and can cultivate different forms of
organisation. Parson (2010), in describing San Francisco Food Not Bombs’ conflicts with the city,
suggests that it was precisely an affect of sustained antagonism towards government that gave the group
such overall historical significance and staying power. In contrast, many other organisations motivated
solely by a charitable desire to “help the homeless” more readily accepted a detente with the city, and the
compromises that came with it. Not only are such groups often institutionally beholden to—and even part
of—municipal state apparatuses (as I described in chapter four). They are also often much more
affectively conflict-averse than Food Not Bombs chapters.

The antagonistic face of such a war machine’s affective organising logic has its pros and cons, of
course. Like mathematical pruning algorithms, it predisposes some outcomes and forecloses others. It
inclines Food Not Bombs participants, for example, to align closely with other social groups that share
their affective style—to cook for antiwar protests, to circulate radical ‘zines, to put on punk rock shows to raise money, and so on—while impeding their relationships with others. In Seattle, for example, Food Not Bombs has only rarely developed relationships with the other less radical meal programs in the city (despite occasional “no strings attached” invitations to the table from members of the Meals Partnership Coalition and the potential practical value of a dialogue with them). This affective affinity, at its worst, can also translate into an antagonism towards perceived difference. At a recent protest, for example, I ran into the San Francisco volunteer quoted above, who wryly pointed out a number of what he called “dog whistle anarchists,” so-called because they had a hard time reconciling themselves to duality and didn’t feel comfortable in the company of strangers until they heard certain political catchphrases (thereby communicating their shared affinities and antagonisms). And the Seattle collaborator whose youthful antiauthoritarianism I described a moment ago, similarly recalled (with the gentle sarcasm born of solidarity) the scepticism with which he was greeted by certain “holier-squatter-than-thou” Food Not Bombs volunteers when he visited the Portland chapter:

Literally, I would be in the van, going to the feeding, and having people be, like, doing their conspiracy theories and like pointing at me like “Who are you? Like I don’t even know you... he could be a Fed, he could, I mean”—and other people were like “Dude, shut up”—but he was still their friend and he was being for real. Like he was seriously, like, using these accusations... And you know what, I was thinking like, you know, “Even if I was a Fed, what, what am I going to do to you?” Like, they [the Feds] do, do these things [infiltrate grassroots groups] but it—you’re not that radical. Ha. You’re just feeding homeless people. You’re not Ted Kaczynski, you know?” And I know that’s what the Feds want to find out, but they’re going to, you know, get in a van with you and be like “Alright, this guy is just kind of a twat.”

It is telling that this sort of sceptical relationship to perceived otherness was framed in terms of the State (with a capital “S” in this case, although generally that is a convention of Deleuze and Guattari’s that I don’t follow). But the kind of political antagonism it indexes ultimately amounts to a broad wariness of political difference in general. This can be expressed blatantly, as above, or subtly through a simple negative affect, as the latter Food Not Bomber described encountering in New York City:

It was the same way in, like, in New York City. At ABC No Rio… Which is a famous old squat that turned into, a publicly owned you know, community centre… they would even have flyers up, you know: “Come and Help Food Not Bombs.” And I’d go, show up every week, and: [simulating his own enthusiastic attitude] “You guys need any help?” [And then, simulating their unimpressed, cold response] “Mmm, who are you?”

Referring to the common ideological commitments of anarchists, punks, and other countercultural participants in Food Not Bombs to an ethic of freedom and diversity, he described this antagonism towards difference as “the closed-minded scene of the ‘open-minded’ people.” And, indeed, potential volunteers have mentioned similar feelings of alienation to me after their first time in the Seattle kitchen.
Writing in the 1970s, of feminist conscious-raising groups which were small and deliberately unstructured, Jo Freeman observed that in the absence of formal structure and hierarchy, structures and hierarchies still developed along the lines of pre-existing social divisions, and called the resulting asymmetries “the tyranny of structurelessness” (1970). To the extent that affect forecloses the possibilities of a rhizomatic formation like Food Not Bombs, organized by affect rather than formal mandate, we might adapt her term, and speak of a certain “tyranny of affect.”

As I write this, however, I think of an invaluable conversation I had with one Seattle Food Not Bombs collaborator, squatter, and punk rocker from the early 1990s, with a healthy scepticism about the heady politics of his past. I admitted how much I, too, have been exasperated by the idealisms of my own youth. While he sympathised, he offered this perspective: As narrowly idealistic as he now found it, he admired it, he told me. Even missed it. Because, for all their narrowness and visceral antagonisms, these heady, political battles reflected a commitment to change and possibility. The energy contained therein (following Deleuze and Guattari, maybe we might say “velocity”) he said, was what made movements possible.

And here, perhaps, is where we might find one of the key intersections between antiauthoritarian antagonism and caring labour. For, although I have written a lot here about the tyranny of affect, the difference between Food Not Bombs and some other radical, counterpublic endeavours is that Food Not Bombs, fundamentally, is embedded in a practice of helping others. As such, whatever affective conflicts it fosters are just as readily redirected and translated into an empathetic connection across difference. It is most likely for this reason that, eclipsing the frustrating moments of unnecessary political or cultural antagonism, I have so treasured the informants, collaborators, and friendships I have made through Food Not Bombs.

Such powerful affects are not incidental. As I have argued, they are fed by the workings of municipal state apparatuses—most specifically, in this case, the actions of police and other state agents on behalf of feeding prohibitions and a government-authored geography of survival, as I have already written. But also, more generally, as a consequence of the immaterial production, through institutional channels, of a globalised market-public and its abject, exceptional modes of living and surviving in the city. For such affects to matter politically, of course, they must be shared with a larger (counter)public. In discursive terms, both grassroots and commercial publicity about feeding prohibitions, then, along with the related transmission of public and counterpublic sensibilities, excite existing sympathies and provoke new political identifications. In this way, they help to crystallise a discursive space and identity for a phenomenon like Food Not Bombs.
In Seattle, this has cut both ways. Press coverage has sometimes painted the group as naive or antagonistic. But other times, it has presented the group in a positive or even heroic light, pitched against an unfriendly state. Perhaps not coincidentally, for example, the most recent period of regular police pressure in 2008 came to a halt after an article about Seattle’s feeding prohibitions appeared in the Seattle Stranger (Spangenthal-Lee 2008) which received particularly wide circulation. A number of people in Seattle brought the article up in conversation with me months afterwards—not realizing that I had read it already (or, for that matter, been quoted in it, albeit under a pseudonym). Such moments of antagonistic-encounter-cum-discursive-circulation, then, may serve as a kind of lightning rod for the generation of larger resistant counterpublics which, in turn, shape the terms of discourse within the public sphere.

And in material terms, these moments of encounter, and their discursive circulation, operationalise political sympathies and identifications: More people are moved to volunteer in distributing food in the park, hoping to discourage the police through superior numbers (or, which is the same thing, hoping to be part of the action). And the movement inevitably acquires a few new long-term recruits afterwards, too. Others participate by witnessing, documenting, or publicising these encounters. Or simply by donating money or food. In these sorts of ways, municipal state apparatuses feed the war machine that is Food Not Bombs.

(-neighbours make good fences)

In addition to their mutual dynamism, Food Not Bombs and the municipal state apparatus bound each other. Which is to say, they demonstrably test the spatial and political limits of each other’s sovereignty. This is, perhaps obvious with respect to the state apparatus’ impact on Food Not Bombs and social forms like it. The police can, after all, levy penalties and physically remove people from a public place if they find cause. Perhaps little more need be said to make the point here. (And at any rate, I have already said quite a bit in chapters two and four about the ways in which municipal agencies and their publics can limit the movements of people and things through certain territories.)

But this capacity, of course, is finite. The state can’t be everywhere at all times. The anarchist “ex-workers” publishing collective CrimethInc., which has written widely about Food Not Bombs and a range of other counterpublic, war-machine-like social forms, puts it succinctly: “It’s not against the law if you don’t get caught, as every schoolchild and corporate CEO knows” (2004: 22, emphasis in original). In other words, insofar as an outfit like Food Not Bombs (or Tent City, or Occupy Seattle, and so on) can maintain a civilly disobedient practice as more than just a symbolic gesture, it serves as a boundary marker, where the extent and enactment of the state apparatus is measured in practice against its claims
over a territory. Where, in a sense, its bluff is called. This is one of the ways in which, as Saskia Sassen has commented, occupying a space “remakes territory” (2011).

In Seattle, Food Not Bombs has, in a sense, been calling the city’s bluff for over twenty years. One Seattle volunteer (a graduate student at the time, with no particularly strong initial anti-police feelings, who came to the group through advertisements in a student-run newspaper) explained: “I think I started [volunteering with] Food Not Bombs about the fall of ‘94, and it seemed like that [police presence] all was just there from the very beginning... The police did come down occasionally and would say, ‘You need to close down’... and then they’d leave and a lot of times we’d finish serving, and then clean up and leave. Sometimes they would show up and say, “You have to close down now,” and would just stay there.” Despite this periodic threat of citation or arrest, the group has occupied the Pioneer Square neighbourhood of an afternoon, usually in Occidental Park, every week for most of the intervening period since the group formed in 1992 (“Pokey ’92” 2007). They pulled this off in spite of at least four periods in which the group faced regular demands from the police to pack up and leave. These encounters, recorded through oral history interviews and through my own participation in the group’s activities, were intermittent over periods of weeks or months—nothing on the scale or intensity of the San Francisco arrests. Nonetheless, police officers had the authority to make arrests or issue “parks exclusion orders”—an extrajudicial citation introduced at the same time as some of Seattle’s other civility codes which allows police to eject people from public spaces for various kinds of incivility without actually charging them with a crime. Food Not Bombs volunteers took the threat of arrest or exclusion quite seriously. But, of course, in each case they kept on distributing food. Sometimes they would ignore police orders. Other times they would pack up early, only to return the following week.

At no point, however, was anyone arrested or excluded from the park during the group’s regular activities. Another Seattle participant told me, “Every Sunday cops were showing up and telling us to get the fuck out of there, but never ever arresting us. Constantly threatening us with arresting [us], and that we were not able to do this there, but they never really had any sort of legal action to take against us. It was just it was obvious that they were just trying to bully us out of there... I had cops in my face every single week. And, we all kept our cool, and they never arrested us.”

Conceivably, the police, the city council, or the mayor’s office has wanted to avoid the kind of bad press, community outrage, and logistical hassle of a protracted conflict, in which case Food Not Bombs maps out the extent of the state apparatus’ political capital. Or else they simply had other, higher priorities and were not wholly committed to prosecuting the city’s feeding restrictions. In any case, the contrasts between threat of police action and lack of formal citation or arrest, and between the officially sanctioned
geographies of eating in the city and the actual practices of Food Not Bombs (and other occasional rogue
soup kitchens), establishes a practical boundary to the territorial reach of feeding prohibitions in Seattle.

From this territorial boundedness we might also extrapolate certain discursive limits and conceptual
boundaries. Food Not Bombs has, in effect, represented a sort of test case for the municipal state
apparatus’ sovereignty over public space—literally at times. Remember, for example, that members of
Orlando’s chapter of Food Not Bombs made an initially successful legal challenge to the city’s anti-
feeding law. In addition to these moments of institutional testing, the group is featured prominently in
reporting on feeding prohibitions by both journalists and advocacy groups such as the National Coalition
for the Homeless, which has published a series of regular reports on the extent and proliferation of
feeding prohibitions throughout the United States. Thus the group’s activities help map what advocates
have called the “criminalization of homelessness.” And, as I described above, Food Not Bombs’ moments
of antagonistic encounter with police and other state agencies become a sort of discursive threshold which
makes the state’s reach concrete for a larger public.

By extension, the movement even comes to hold a kind of common symbolic currency, or counter-
cultural capital. In certain counterpublic spheres, the movement is virtually a household term. Far more
people know about it than actually participate in it, and are willing to pay lip service to its importance and
to decry governmental actions taken against it (which, in turn, helps it grow). And, of course, in other
publics, the name has also come to be well known, but draws criticism instead, and in so doing validates
the governmental policies and actions against which it is aimed.

But it is not only such moments of conflict which circulate discursively. At its core, the thing that
most defines Food Not Bombs is that it gives away food. In other words, it represents a useful public
service. When it is not in crisis due to the threat of arrest or citation, and not in its blatantly and publicly
disobedient mode, Food Not Bombs is often quite effective at relatively small scales, at simply doing the
work of delivering healthy food to hungry people, and doing so independently of any formal
organizational structures. That it does this in spite of, rather than in concert with state agencies, therefore,
may also represent a kind of discursive limit to the reach of state agencies.

Consider the examples of Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, when Food Not Bombs’
decentralised structure, improvisational praxis, and minimal overhead costs allowed it to respond with
food aid in New Orleans and New York almost immediately—and often more quickly and flexibly than
governmental agencies and formal non-profit organisations. For a few days the Red Cross was even
handing out the Food Not Bombs’ phone number to people in New Orleans in search of food. Similarly, a San Francisco volunteer described the group’s 24-hour-a-day response after the massive
earthquake in San Francisco in 1989:
During the Loma Prieta earthquake in ‘89, we set up our operation in Civic Center. And started feeding people that were in the Tederloin who didn’t want to live in their apartments any more because the earthquake had shook the plaster off the walls and they were sure it was going to fall down. And there was no electricity. There was no power. And we knew how to pirate the water out of the water mains in Civic Center, ‘cause we’d done it before. And we set up a mobile operation there, and became recipients of the Red Cross—like brought us food and supplies and propane, and we became a whole part of that network. And I felt like, ‘Yeah,” like I was—like you had your hand on the ass of history. Less dramatically, in Seattle, Food Not Bombs’ freedom from red tape means that it has the flexibility to serve closer to Pioneer Square shelters, parks, and viaduct where shelterless people are usually already gathered. One Seattle volunteer, for instance, described the group’s rationale for sharing food in Occidental Park: “There’s a community here that has already been established because this is where all the shelters are. This is where the people come for free food. But we’re just doing it in an environment that they don’t have to listen to a preacher. There’s no hidden agenda.” In contrast, another Seattle volunteer (the former graduate student quoted above) reflected on the contrast between their geographic flexibility and the then-official meal site in the mid-1990s in front of the Public Health and Safety building, which was across the street from City Hall on Fourth Avenue and Cherry Street:

I know that there was one short period of time where we moved up to Fourth and Cherry. And we didn’t stay there long, but it was a place where the city had encouraged us to move. They said if we moved there, we would be welcome to use that space and thus [eliminate] the threats of shutting us down and all that. We struggled with that decision for a while. Ended up saying, “Let’s give it a try,” and a lot of people came to the meals. But one of the things that we decided was that, by and large, it wasn’t the same people who were coming to the meals. There were lots of other people who were serving there. And definitely the meals could be served there and that would satisfy [the need for] serving people who did need a hot meal, a healthy meal. But it took away the edge of the symbolic public action. And that location seemed like there was this kind of big, physical barrier around it so you could even barely see what was going on in that plaza from the street. You’d drive right by it.

The previous Seattle volunteer, a contemporary of the woman quoted a second here, explained further, saying, “They could tell us that we could serve in front of City Hall and that would be fine. But we argued with them, ‘You know what? The people who come and get our food don’t want to eat in front of City Hall. They don’t want to eat in front of the court house.’ Because those are a lot of the places that have given them [trouble].”

To the extent that Food Not Bombs’ flexibility and humanitarian interventions have been public and well-publicised, they have represented in very visceral ways the limitations of state agencies. In other words, the lengths to which state agencies can’t or won’t go to meet the standards for health and safety
that human rights and citizenship are intended to guarantee. Yet another Seattle Food Not Bombs volunteer present when the group decided against the Fourth and Cherry location (who also has extensive experience working with other, permitted meal programs in the city) reflected on the long-term impact of their civilly disobedient stance:

For a long time, Food Not Bombs was the only outdoor meal program on Sundays. Because the city, well at this point, they don’t want anyone serving outdoors. At all. And they really tried very hard to regulate that at the time. And most of the faith groups and whatnot that had done it… when they were told, “Oh, you can’t do this,” most of them were slightly less confrontational than Food Not Bombs and said “Oh, okay.” And would just not do it, because the police had told them not to. And I like to think that Food Not Bombs had a bit of an effect on that, in that people were like, “Well, those guys do it.”

Through its highly visible location at the margins of state power, then, Food Not Bombs looms large as a discursive trope in discussions in which the work of state agencies are mapped spatially and socially. It follows also, then, that the movement informs, and even remakes to some extent, the public order underwritten by state agencies—a kind of broken window come to life. The vitriol of the Pioneer Square Community Association described in the previous chapter, who kept calling the police to have Food Not Bombs removed from the park, may be an index of the symbolic threat Food Not Bombs is perceived to pose to a market-centric public order. At the same time, however, as I have shown, Food Not Bombs and municipal state apparatuses not only structure, but often amplify one another. The relationship between them, therefore, is a vexed one. It is clear however, that to a limited degree Food Not Bombs chapters and other organisations like them set, from the margins, some of the terms within which the municipal state apparatus and its attendant publics establish a city’s symbolic economy.

(conclusion)

What is at stake therefore, as I said at the outset of the previous chapter, is the content of public life itself. What I hope emerges from this chapter, above all, is a complex picture of the ways in which the work of power and resistance actively make and remake the public order of a city. Whereas participants in both Food Not Bombs and governmental agencies may sometimes see their role in urban politics as independent of or reactive to larger urban economic and cultural trends, I have tried to point to certain key moments in which they actively shape the urban landscape, and especially the geography of eating and surviving in the city.

Through policies like feeding prohibitions, city governments have actively engaged in immaterial production—in the work of remaking public life in the image of a market-public, and more generally remaking urban social relations according to the specifications of the symbolic economies in which
municipalities are often reckoned successes and failures in the hierarchy of global and globalising cities. The work of establishing a location for the city’s sole official outdoor meal site, for example, and therefore of prohibiting the free distribution of food elsewhere in the city, is one exemplary moment in which forms of market-centric life are valued more than others. In this way, government agencies ratify the territorial claims and investments of a market-public, and establish exceptional, marginal spaces to which various forms of non-market forms of social life are consigned, exemplified by the outdoor meal program. In the process, these forms of non-market social life—embodied in the homelessness and hunger of people who cannot participate in the market by paying rent or shopping at the grocery store—become both practically and discursively more intractable aspects of life both for the people who experience them, and ironically, for the larger urban publics which have taken exception to them.

I have also suggested, however, that efforts by counterpublic social forms like Food Not Bombs have the capacity to challenge some of these territorial claims and investments, and to renegotiate the geography of eating and surviving in the city. They do this, I have suggested, both materially, by repurposing and recirculating public parks and wasted food, respectively, and discursively, by rallying the support of urban counterpublics and by making concrete and visible the impact of feeding prohibitions and other urban policies.

If that were all, however, this dissertation could easily have made two distinct arguments: one about the ways that a municipal state apparatus marginalises and oppresses certain forms of life; and another about the social spheres forged heroically by oppressed people, out of the marginal places and things available to them—or even about the heroic campaigns of resistance mounted by them. And to be perfectly candid, I am not immune to these romances on occasion. But they are well-worn as romances, and virtually threadbare as arguments. What is more interesting, more honest, and probably more productive, is to look at the ways in which the work of power and resistance is mutually entangled. To this end, I have adopted the conception of mutually constitutive power and resistance at work in the writing of philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, and of the more recent work of political theorists Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, who operationalise Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas. Cribbing from these thinkers, I have tried to show how market-friendly municipal government and resistant counterpublic social forms I have described above act together as a kind of dynamic system.

In these ways, Food Not Bombs has represented an important trend in resistant social forms, one that emerges from important changes in urban cultural economy and state apparatuses. As I have written, Food Not Bombs is attendant both to the growing disparities and bourgeois symbolic orders of globalising cities and their increasingly market-centric, often heavy-handed approaches to governance. Not only this, it resembles, in its decentralisation and spontaneity, the flexible, globalised, post-Fordist kinds of
economic organisation that have driven these urban changes. Thus, anarchic, war-machine-like structures like Food Not Bombs, Occupy Wall Street, or Seattle’s 1999 anti-WTO protests, are growing in prominence where party-based activist groups which looked more like state apparatuses had dominated the left (cf. Graeber 2005). In conclusion, then, I would argue simply that a close examination of Food Not Bombs’ structure and proliferation would be an incredibly valuable microcosm of larger changes in government and resistance. As the early San Francisco Food Not Bombs volunteer quoted at the outset put it:

The way people do politics is changing. The way people are organizing and involving themselves in activities is altered forever. And I think Food Not Bombs was a beginning part of that... It’s a mosaic. It’s a bringing together of all kinds of disparate factions and pieces, and they’re all sort of working together, but not through any, you know, giant control. And so I think that’s what really inspired me to work with Food Not Bombs at that time, you know, it’s just a different way of thinking. And since I left Food Not Bombs and went on my own way, I’ve just noticed that, it just, it just went viral...

There’s not going to be marches in the street any more. There’s not going to be takeovers of government. It’s going to be small, autonomous, disparate groups, sort of working to solve their own problems in their own city, in their own way. And it’s going to be different. And it’s going to be chaotic. And it’s going to get messy. But it’s all people doing their thing and trying to take a certain amount of control over their life. And Food Not Bombs was trying to do that around homelessness and poverty, housing, hunger sort of issues. And they served a need or a function that wasn’t being fulfilled by the society that they were—the group of, you know—the community they were living [in], and they filled that niche. And if that, need changes, then they’ll just sort of adapt to it, because that’s what people do. They adapt. They change. And they, you know, they’re not—people aren’t like bureaucracies. They’re not monolithic. They’re not. You know, they’re complicated.
Chapter Six

A Mass Conspiracy—To Feed People: Counterpublic Habitus and the Revolutions of Everyday Life

Whichever Food Not Bombs you visit, it’s always the same food!

Food Not Bombs volunteer, Occidental Park, Seattle, Thanksgiving 2006

(when I first got to the kitchen)

When I first got to the kitchen, I was early. There was nobody around. But the front door was wide open. So I walked in and made myself at home on one of the beaten-up, second-hand couches upstairs.

In part, this is how I knew I was in the right place.

Food Not Bombs kitchens are often radically open affairs. There are no background checks. No managers (the odd bossy cook notwithstanding). They’re accustomed to strangers showing up and making themselves at home in the kitchen. In fact, they often depend on it—with little or no formal structure, volunteers are entirely at-will, and the turnover is often pretty rapid.

In the absence of anyone to welcome me in and hand me a cutting board, however, an open door alone wasn’t enough to go on. I had asked the taxi driver to wait while I popped in, to make sure I wasn’t in the wrong place.

The locale was a bit of a clue: a faded Brunswick warehouse at the end of an industrial cul de sac—literally and figuratively: The warehouses on this street had clearly seen busier, brighter days as part of Brunswick’s textile industry. But now a lot of those jobs are gone, and the buildings share space in the neighbourhood with Melbourne’s punks, artists, broke twenty-somethings, and adventurous young-urban-professionals who all appreciate the cheap rent and proximity to the city’s central business district. Half of the warehouse’s original company sign still haunted the terracotta brick façade in tall, mid-century lettering, but the wide-open garage doors and the second-hand bicycle parts peeking out from inside were evidence that the artists had taken up residence. The van out front was spray-paint stencilled: “brand new pre-loved.” More evidence. Not an unlikely place for an anarchist soup kitchen.

And to tell the truth, someone formerly affiliated with Melbourne Food Not Bombs had already given me the address for this place—a shared Do-It-Yourself art space with a kitchen. But it is often in the nature of Food Not Bombs and other radical, DIY spaces to be rather ephemeral, so the address could easily have been out of date. I couldn’t be sure from outside.
What really gave the place away couldn’t quite be described as the interior décor. It certainly wasn’t a holistic style like Baroque or Mid-Century Modern. (More like Dada if anything, but I’ll come back to that.) But it was a distinct aesthetic of lived-in-ness. And although this was my first visit to Melbourne’s Food Not Bombs, only the second Food Not Bombs chapter with whom I would cook, I had only to pop in for a moment to suspect that I was in the right place, and then sent the driver on his way. After a year or so of having worked with Food Not Bombs in Seattle, sharing space in the kinds of communes, co-ops, punk houses, squats, independent art spaces, and other locations where the group cooked and put on benefits (and after a few more years than that of living or hanging out in these kinds of places), I would literally have known the place blind-folded… No, really. I wrote in my fieldnotes:

The warehouse already felt familiar. It smelled like a co-op. I don’t know exactly what that smell is, but it contains no artificial colours, preservatives or sweeteners. There are stencils and flyers on every wall. And every wall was a different colour. No pastels. I was early. But there were couches.

The explicit political and cultural semiotics of the walls alone would have been a dead giveaway—announcements for punk shows, radical political slogans, cheeky subversive art, and other countercultural writings-on-the-wall that bespeak the circles within which Food Not Bombs moves in cities around the world. But what’s even more interesting is that I already recognised the smell. Political slogans, musical genres, and art styles are all understood to enjoy a certain international circulation. But can the same be said of scents? I’ve heard punk rockers in different cities (themselves known for their pungency) joke that patchouli and sage "smell like hippy.” Do some things “smell like Food Not Bombs?” What does it mean that this kitchen in Melbourne smelled so much like the kitchens in which I’d cooked in Seattle, or some of the Food Not Bombs kitchens I would visit thereafter?

To say they smelled alike, of course, is really not to say all that much. But the comparison hints at other, more important comparisons between the unspoken sensory landscapes cultivated and inhabited by people working in different corners of the world, ostensibly in the name of a common project, “Food Not Bombs.” Smell is particularly telling, because it has a way of being both highly cultural and completely visceral at the same time. The embodied sensory evidence of a particular kind of everyday life, embedded in memory and accumulated in a single place over time in ways that language can’t always capture—and that social science often overlooks (Low 2005).

If the kitchens smelled alike to me, then, it was not simply because cooks in each place had a shared love of parsley or basil. There were more layers to the comparison. A base note of compost and grey-water, recovered from the sink for flushing the toilets. Mid-tones of slightly overripe produce and slightly overripe travelling punks with limited access to shower facilities. Hints of nutritional yeast. (A favourite
seasoning for some Food Not Bombers, sometimes called “hippy flakes,” or “punk powder,” depending on one’s affinities.)

And these layers cannot, of course, be divorced from the evidence of the other senses. David Sutton has observed that the sense memories both cultivated and awakened in the kitchen turn cooking into a kind of cultural apprenticeship in the range of approaches to consumption, hygiene, and domesticity that inhere in a community (2001). Consider the sensual impression I had at the time, recorded in my fieldnotes, of the various traces left behind in the Brunswick warehouse, and of the practices and sensibilities that seemed to underwrite them:

The toilets at the warehouse are more or less communal, covered in wonderful graffiti, both the scribbles and the murals, the stencils and the sketches in spray-paint. They could use a good scrub. There’s a note on the wall outside the stalls, where the toilet paper and the sinks and the mirror reside, reminding anyone concerned that the warehouse is a communal space and if anyone has a spare minute, they might think about tidying the toilets… The kitchen also could use a good scrub—communal kitchens, I have found, almost never seem to get quite as clean as obsessive compulsion might dictate, but then it almost never really seems to matter. After lunch earlier today I stayed around and just swept for half an hour, because I didn’t have that much to do, and there were crumbs of bread and organic miscellany all over the floor! But then, besides the odd chuckle, there’s not too much comment on the matter. The tables and the walls and the pipes and the sinks all have a bruised skin, like they’ve been saved from the tip and put together without worry about the shiny and the right-angled, without worry about the showroom floor which so many middle-class kitchens are working to recreate. Under the table in the middle, pots and pans and cutting boards and tupperware and colanders and big stainless steel bowls all mingle like a drunken high school social. There’s a locked cupboard with “FNB” stencilled on it and some of the more indispensable things are kept in there, like the giant soup pots and mixing bowls and the really sharp knives. These things also have “FNB” stencilled on them. There’s a set of shelves at the far end where things like rice and corn flour and sesame seeds and seasonings are kept for FNB, and big tins of oil sit on the main table at this end, next to the big waxed boxes of recently collected produce. Some of their stuff looks a lot mankier than the stuff we get in Seattle, but it’s still serviceable. Adjacent to this back wall is a long wall with two fridges (one stencilled “FNB”), a gas range, a wall full of chalk messages to the “bombers,” a sink and some drying racks. No one has cleaned between the sink and the fridge in years. The sink isn’t really part of the cupboard-bench it’s attached to, but it’s pretty stable. There’s a bloody hot tap above it, and under it two buckets, to collect grey water. Besides which there’s no plumbing for it to drain away. And outside the sink, the cherry blossoms have just started to come out. Warehouse residents come in and out without much ado, although they’re friendly and know the basic drill, and sometimes help cook or eat.

In the absence of an interlocutor, then, the space itself told me a great many things. To my senses, it seemed to communicate the kind of radical openness I had met in other Food Not Bombs spaces—walls as egalitarian communication medium, strangers invited to stop in and eat or to take up chores (both in
writing, and by the arrangement and condition of the space itself). The smell of slightly overripe produce and the condition of the couches and kitchen fixtures told stories about regular practices of salvaging and scavenging would-be garbage. The bucket under the sink suggested a self-conscious ethic of conservation. The condition of the floor eschewed showroom aesthetics and a bourgeois paranoia about disease. A range of recurring modes of everyday living with which I had some familiarity and yet in which I was at that moment also being schooled. Practices and sensibilities that, I was learning, tend to deposit these same sensory traces wherever Food Not Bombs goes.

Both these traces and the life-ways wrapped up in them, I argue below, resonate in Food Not Bombs kitchens from Melbourne to Seattle, and further. But not only that. The sensory traces themselves are not merely incidental to everyday practices. The smells, the cluttered walls, the second-handedness of the couches, all play a role in cultivating the practices and sensibilities of the people who live amid them (consider my spontaneous efforts to tidy up). They matter quite a lot, in fact, in building scenes and social movements.

The word I will use most often below to describe the shared social space within which these traces function, however, is not “movement”: Movements depend for their existence on a sense of shared identity or ideological affinity (Oelsen 2005). And while powerful identities and affinities are certainly at play in the places I have described, these social spaces are more diverse and complex than any of the common ideological or subcultural terms might imply. It would not be enough to describe the shared sensory terrains and practices at stake here as a matter of “punk” culture, or “anarchist” politics, for example. That would leave out important people and relationships. The word “scene” is more useful, because it suggests a shared stage, occupied by diverse players. But the strength of a scene is that it is specific and local. What I am concerned with here, on the other hand, is transnational. To describe this next level of abstraction—a kind of meta-scene—I would like to borrow Michael Warner’s (2002) notion of the counterpublic (explored also in the second chapter of the present work). And with it, I propose to describe some of the ways in which people who might not share an identity, an ideology, a class, or even an ethnic background might come, nonetheless, to have something politically and socially in common.

Throughout this dissertation, I have drawn from multi-sited research, but perhaps in this chapter most of all. The descriptions and claims presented here are simply impossible to make without having travelled a lot: I have cooked with Food Not Bombs in perhaps a dozen kitchens (I’ve lost count) in co-ops, punk houses, galleries, and community centres, in half a dozen cities in the US and Australasia, and I have been graciously hosted for lunch or dinner or stayed the night on a spare couch with Food Not Bombs volunteers in several others. And, in addition to these experiences, I have interviewed dozens of Food Not Bombs collaborators. While I am assuredly wary of the dangers of essentialism and wishful thinking, and
am therefore cautious not to overstate my case, the weight of ethnographic experience—mine, and that of my interlocutors in Food Not Bombs, many of whom also travel a lot—demands a compellingly globalised argument. What I attempt in this chapter is not quite an “anthropology of transnationality,” in Ong’s terms (1999), as nationality is not its primary reference. Nor does it adopt the “extended case-study” approach of Burawoy’s “global ethnography” (2000), although it answers to his advocacy of multi-sitedness. Rather, following Anna Tsing’s lead, it is an “ethnography of global connection” (2005) and attends to those moments and mechanisms in which participants’ social worlds are in the process of becoming global.

Scholars have already given convincing descriptions of the development of transnational publics, so it is not such a far leap to speak of counterpublics that are globalised (although far from completely global). Indeed, a handful of scholars have begun to do so. Briefly, I will argue that many of the globalising publics these scholars have described are consistent with the description I have already given (in chapter two) of a “market-public.” And if these market-publics are globalised in contiguous ways, then I will press on to suggest that it makes sense to think that people in disparate social and geographic locations should come to share a counterpublic relationship to these globalising market-publics. If world-class cities make world-class waste, for example, as I have already argued (in chapter three), then it is logical enough to assert that people in each of these places will find ways to appropriate and recirculate the excesses—by Dumpster-diving, squatting, and so on. To the extent that they come to self-consciously share conventions for circulating them, they constitute a globalised counterpublic. Here, where it might stretch the bounds of anthropological credulity to use the a term like “subculture,” which depends on a sense of shared identity and meaning, counterpublic is a meaningful yet antiessentialist category, simply defined by shared practices and spaces. Nonetheless, to the extent that these conventions become a kind of second nature, both common sense and embodied, I would like to argue that it makes sense to describe them as a globalised, counterpublic habitus and hexis.

If the previous chapter concerned itself with parks and the spatial politics of prevailing market-publics in globalising cities, then, this chapter concerns itself with kitchens, and with spaces of globalised counterpublic production. If the downtown parks where so many Food Not Bombs collaborators share their wares represent extremely public interventions in the politics of eating and surviving in the city, then the kitchens where they cook represent a reciprocal to these public actions—one not so much private as counterpublic, where the labours and experiences are shared across difference, one in which people come together and make something new out of the matter at hand.

With that in mind, this chapter sets out to make a series of points, theoretical, ethnographic, and political.
Theoretically, I would like to add some detail to the conceptual anatomy of a counterpublic. More specifically, I would like to expand upon a point outlined by Michael Warner, but easily forgotten by some who have borrowed his ideas: that counterpublics are not only structured by shared texts or vocabularies, but by shared circulatory practices. These practices are always, as I would like to remind us below, embodied. To this end, I will connect Warner’s “counterpublic” with Pierre Bourdieu’s description of habitus and hexis, those dispositions—cognitive and embodied, respectively—that are wholly social and yet seem to be “second nature” or “common sense.” A description of counterpublic habitus and hexis helps to draw our attention to those bodies and practices that make a community more than just imaginary.

At the same time, the theoretical connection here might also make room for a more dynamic reading than has often been given to Bourdieu’s terms, which some have interpreted as overly static and restrictive (Manderson and Turner 2006). The counter in counterpublic—its necessarily subaltern status (Warner 2002, Fraser 1990)—means that its circulatory practices exist in constant tension with other more prevalent or hegemonic practices and sensibilities. This tension becomes a bit more intelligible after a closer look at Bourdieu’s ideas about the improvisations through which habitus structures and is structured by the social. As such, an investigation of the dispositions and embodiments that structure a counterpublic might also suggest the ways that habitus may be dynamic and even, in a way, revolutionary.

Ethnographically, I would argue that Food Not Bombs is structured by precisely such translocal, counterpublic habitus and hexis. A set of embodied dispositions and everyday life-ways which are counter to the increasingly globalised market-publics that dominate contemporary politics in so many cities, nations, and states. These counterpublics have in common an abject and exceptional relationship to capital developed partly through shared counterpublic forms of embodiment and circulation—Dumpster-diving, squatting, scavenging, and so on. Their counterpublic habitus, I suggest, amounts in some ways to a recirculation of the wasted surpluses of market-publics (Dumpstered food, recycled furniture, squatted kitchen-space, and so on). And these shared forms of counterpublic common sense make possible—sustainable, even—the real movement of people from place to place. While the circulation of texts and discourse normally associated with publics is a vital part of Food Not Bombs’ growth, then, it simply would simply not exist without a diverse, geographically disparate social world of people who have come to share such counterpublic modes of eating, surviving, and making do in the wake of global markets and publics.
(transnational market-publics and non-market counterpublics)

By now, many scholars have pointed to the ways in which social and cultural formations have come, increasingly in recent decades, to cross the boundaries of nation-states. Some of the foundational work most relevant to my own argument has pointed to the ways in which transnational processes can lead to meaningfully shared sociocultural experiences in terms of shared patterns of travel or migration (Appadurai 1996, Castells 1996), media consumption (Lash and Lury 2007), forms of urban socio-spatial organisation (Sassen 1992, Harvey 2000, Smith 1996, 2002) and the social organisation of international political movements (Appadurai 2000, Keck and Sikkink 1998). Each new scholar’s arguments and ideas have inaugurated a range of refinements, critiques, and literatures, some of which I have already introduced in this dissertation, and others with which I will not have time to wrestle. It is well and truly established by now, however, that we may speak meaningfully about contiguous social and cultural landscapes on a transnational or globalised scale. The question, then, is simply in what terms to talk about them.

I propose to linger the longest over the terms “public” and “counterpublic.” But I will make one important digression here: To describe Food Not Bombs and the other kinds of transnational social configurations with which I am concerned here, one of the words used most often has been “network” (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998, Day 2005, Juris 2009). Drawing on scholars like Manuel Castells (1996) and Bruno Latour (2005), scholars and activists alike have found the model of the network incredibly valuable for describing the complex, heterogeneous yet consistent relationships developed between numerous agents across great distances, and in the absence of specific shared agreements or cultural-discursive centres of gravity. Drawing especially on Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the “rhizomatic,” multimodal, non-hierarchical, emergent and chaotic patterns that might come to inhere in complex systems (1987), scholars and activists have often followed the lead of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), who have pointed out a decentralised, networked, rhizomatic logic evident in recent forms of both globalised power and globalised resistance. Their very emergence and swarming unpredictability make them powerful—the ones to watch for the twenty-first century, according to many followers of Hardt and Negri.

My analysis, then, owes quite a lot to these writers and thinkers. And Food Not Bombs has certainly been powerfully and insightfully described in just such terms, as a kind of rhizomatic network (e.g. Parson 2010). I won’t say very much more about networks here, then, simply because many others already have, and have done so persuasively.

My contribution, however, answers to one important critique of the network model, by Galloway and Thacker (2007). They don’t deny its usefulness as a description. Rather, they problematize some of the
utopian overtones that accompany it. They suggest that, while in decentralised social networks that resemble Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome, “power” cannot operate in any hierarchical sense, these systems are still not necessarily inherently liberatory. In other words, they are not free-for-alls, nor are they complete chaos. Rather, to cohere, they must still operate according to a certain common organising logic—a “protocol,” in Galloway and Thacker’s terms. That protocol, while not deployed hierarchically, for the benefit of a select few, must still condition or “discipline” the behaviours of agents within the network. Galloway and Thacker distinguish this decentralised discipline from hierarchical forms of power by calling it “control.” A look at counterpublics and at habitus, then, might suggest one of the vectors whence these practices or protocols are received, and therefore one of the ways in which global rhizomatic networks are conditioned.

As Michael Warner puts it, a public (or counterpublic) is “the social space created by the reflexive circulation of discourse” (2002: 90). Constituted by “mere attention” (87), then, a public (or counterpublic) is in a way, a less specific, roomier concept than a network. While the two concepts are neither mutually exclusive nor completely coextensive, generally speaking, we might imagine that the word “public” describes the ontological ground upon which concepts like “network,” “movement,” or “scene” are founded. While networks, movements, and scenes describe specific linkages and relationships, the public is the shared space and attention which allow for those linkages and relationships to form. As such, then, the public or counterpublic is a valuable space to which to turn out attention in order to understand the conditions of possibility which structure a network like Food Not Bombs.

Partly as a consequence of its ontological roominess, the public is also a category whose geographical scope can accommodate a discussion of phenomena as broadly distributed as Food Not Bombs. Publics, I would argue, offer a useful description of the international social terrains that make Food Not Bombs possible. Both Thomas Olesen (2005) and Aiwha Ong (1999), for example, have used the phrase “transnational publics,” in ways consistent with my present argument. Perhaps most useful has been Aiwha Ong’s use of the term to describe the terrain within which Chinese diasporic discourses are circulated—“norm-making systems that, through images and information, structure the cultural life of transnational Chinese in Asian and American contexts” (25). She describes them at more length:

Publics are nonstate fields of power in which images, information, and practices—now highly mediated by print, electronic, and film media—participate in the production of cultural norms that affect the way we view things and act in our everyday life. By normativity, I mean the structuring of norm making through the circulation of images and discourses about objects, features, and goals associated with particular categories of things and people. For instance, Manuel Castells identifies a managerial public formed in the stratospheric space of global elite networks, where “cultural codes are embedded in the social structure in such a way that the possession of these codes opens the access to the power structure.” The attitudes, images, and behaviour
generated in such a corporate public constitute a particular regime of global normativity that competes with other kinds of translocal publics, as well as with national cultural orders. (159)

Although her argument predates Warner’s, the two share a genealogical forbear in Habermas’ description of the public sphere in liberal democracies (1991) and her theoretical understanding of publics resonates closely with Warner’s description of the “poetic world-making,” made possible within shared discursive spaces (2002: 114).

That she attributes to these transnational publics the capacity to transmit, across great distances, cultural norms and values that (re)structure everyday life, then, is important. Even more so, however, is not the content but the ontology of these transnational publics, emerging, as they do from “intensified mobility, mass media, and capital flows” (Ong 1999: 25). Her publics are conditioned partly by their role in the mobility not only of images, or even of “transnational yuppies” (175) and other global elites, but of capital itself—particularly as she goes on to explain, as it is translated between economic, cultural and symbolic forms, through narratives of value. Her invocation of Castells’ corporate managerial publics is telling here. Her transnational publics have the capacity not only to emerge from pre-existing ethnic affinities, but from the creation and the realisation of economic value.

Her transnational publics, then, have much in common with urban symbolic economies I have already described (in chapters three and four). They both describe transnational social formations through which the terms of economic value are set, but which are more broadly social and cultural than any strict transactional account might capture. Of course, the words “economy” and “public” still describe different ontological spaces—one predicated on transactions and the other on attention and discursive circulation. But I want to suggest that Ong has outlined a public whose agency is partly conditioned through its ability to engage in something like the symbolic economies I have described. In other words, her transnational publics are also market-publics. Of course, they are much more than this as well, and her argument is not strictly limited to economy. But her description, nonetheless, suggests that it is possible to envision on a transnational scale the kinds of publics that I have already described operating on an urban one (in chapter two), whose space and attention are circumscribed in the reckoning and realisation of capital. Ong’s argument, then, helps us to name and imagine the international social fields of power and circulation which, indeed, make it possible to imagine that there is such a thing as a “global economy” at all.

There are any number of concrete examples to which we might apply this concept of the transnational, or globalised, market-public—from international publics for high-ticket real-estate transactions to publics for world-class art (and world-class art museums), from the public for international tourism to the public for international food prices. The examples I have chosen are, of course, not arbitrary. For, as I have described in previous chapters, each of these market-publics have significant
political and economic consequences on the ground for people who may or may not participate directly in the markets in question. International art worlds and tourism campaigns have, as I have described (in chapters three and four), profound impacts on urban spatial politics. Real estate markets in world-class cities, similarly, inflate the cost of housing beyond the reach of growing numbers of shelterless people and leave properties abandoned to speculation (as I described in chapter three). Global shifts in food prices affect us all even as food is still wasted in remarkable quantities (as I described in chapter one). And so on.

What I am suggesting, then, is that if it makes sense to speak of globalised market-publics, inevitably we may also speak of globally distributed assemblages of people and things that share an abject or exceptional relationship to these market-publics. I have already spent a good deal of time describing how this might be so in specific moments and spaces, particularly within globalising cities. And, moreover, I have already described the concrete ways in which many of these people have come to renegotiate their everyday lives within the abject and exceptional conditions of possibility afforded them—through Dumpster-diving, through squatting, through gastro-political direct action, and so on. So here, it remains only to make the connection between these moments and spaces—between the abject or exceptional positionalities therein, and the global scale of the market-publics at work—to suggest that we might already speak of, at least in principle, incipient or potential counterpublics.

To be blunt, then, a kind of incipient, transnational counterpublic is present wherever people are aware that they, too, have been abandoned in the wake of global capital and its travels. This germ of a public is the basis for innumerable strategic and imaginative social developments, some short-lived, others enduring.

Outlining just such incipient relationships has been the project of political thinkers like Hardt and Negri, whose works, *Empire* and *Multitude* (2000, 2004) make the case for thinking about a kind of globalised market-centric power structure (Empire) and a corresponding globalised proletariat with a common relationship to that structure (the Multitude). The scope and subject of my work owes as much to the poesis of these works as to the nuance and adaptability of their argument (to which I cannot do justice in these few lines). Their description, for example, of the biopolitical forms of production through which social life is refashioned in the interests of the market lends support to my contention that market-publics may be transnational in scope. However, the philosophical and political value of asserting such gregarious, incipient political relationships on paper chafes against anthropology’s demand for ethnographic specificity, and against the complexities and the contradictions evident on the ground within any given social field. Ong, for one, has warned against the essentialism and ethnocentrism that almost inevitably creeps into Hardt and Negri’s global visions (Ong 2012).
It is for precisely this reason that the notion of publics and counterpublics has been so useful to me. The emphasis on mere space and attention points to meaningfully shared experiences without necessarily burdening them with the “conceptual unity” which has been ascribed to ideas like Empire and the Multitude (Wilson 2012). (It is for this reason, perhaps, that Ong draws upon the concept of publics, too.) Consider the difference, for example, between a counterpublic and a subculture, a term which has also been applied by anthropologists to transnational formations—say, to punk rock (see for example Clark 2004, Greene, in press). Incredibly valuable connections or comparisons may be made across great geographic distances under the auspices of subcultural affinity. Comparisons which the notion of a counterpublic cannot match. But at the same time, the notion of subculture risks obscuring important differences. There’s an open question, for example, of whether the word “punk” means the same thing to people in a mosh pit at a squatted warehouse, or buying their first punk record at Walmart, or singing along with bootlegged tapes of English bands in Lima, Peru (cf. Greene, ibid.). All of these people, however, are still part of a counterpublic for whom the common catchphrases and texts have meaning. And as Anna Tsing has suggested, far-flung agents do not need to share the same interpretations for shared discourses to generate a productive traction and “global connection” in different settings (2005). Far from being a merely nominal category, then, the existence of a self-reflexive (counter)public is a precondition for the development of subcultures and other transnational formations.

My argument here, then is simply that the notion of transnational market-publics and of transnational counterpublics with abject or exceptional relationships to those market-publics, is one theoretically sound response to the gregarious problematics posed by theorists like Hardt and Negri without being so formally determined as to foreclose the ethnographic description of complex, multimodal, political, economic, and sociocultural formations. I began this chapter, after all, with a thick description and a series of ethnographic questions that emerged from it. The “experience distant” concepts (Geertz 1983) with which I am wrestling here are only useful if they help to make sense of the “experience near” (ibid.) ethnographic phenomena from which I started.

If Ong’s description of “transnational publics” helps to establish a conceptual precedent for thinking about the conditions of possibility for the development of transnational counterpublics, Olesen’s use of the term, in contrast, might point towards the kinds of self-consciously shared, resistant positionalities which emerge from these conditions. Olesen poses the term “transnational public,” in fact, in conceptual opposition to the popular notion of a “global civil society,” in a manner explicitly analogous to Nancy Fraser’s influential opposition between what she calls “subaltern counterpublics” and Habermas’ ambitious “bourgeois public sphere” (Olesen 2005; see also Fraser 1990). In other words, for Olesen, “transnational publics” are already counterpublic, in a way. They describe the international context from
which international social movements arise, and within which their work becomes meaningful. Olesen’s use of the term, then, represents a response to and a criticism of the idea of a “global civil society,” which he suggests is too broad and decontextualised (we might also add ethnocentric) to be of very much use in anything other than the most cursory political analyses. While his criticisms of the term almost go without saying for those researchers committed to ethnographic specificity and anthropological empiricism (and in any case have already been made by anthropologists [cf. Burawoy 2000]) his depiction of the fields within which international social movements work as transnational (counter)publics lends support to my own argument here: Transnational publics may be constituted largely or even primarily by their opposition to or alienation from larger, more powerful social fields and conventions.

(counterpublic agency, affect, and embodiment)

Were we to leave it there—at the theoretical validity of transnational market-publics and their resistant counterpublics—we might have a useful conceptual framework within which to situate a broad political discussion. And, indeed, Olesen’s publics are intended to do exactly that—they reframe a discourse within political science and sociology that had gathered steam around the notion of “global civil society.” But Olesen, attributes little agency to these publics. “Transnational publics,” he writes, “in other words, are crucially defined by their engagement with authorities at national and international levels” (424). In other words, they are only important insofar as there are states to respond to them. For him, a public cannot act in the way that a social movement can, and is instead limited to a kind of spectatorship or witnessing. From an ethnographic perspective, then, this isn’t very useful. A commitment to ethnographic description demands a less passive conceptual apparatus—publics must make a difference on the ground.

Fortunately, while Michael Warner and Thomas Olesen share an intellectual genealogy in Nancy Fraser’s influential work, Warner is more concerned than Fraser or Olesen with the semi-autonomous “world-making” capacities of publics—and especially of counterpublics—as opposed to their impact on formal political structures. And it is this analysis which is perhaps most interesting to the ethnographer. While for Olesen, a public’s agency amounts to spectatorship, Warner imagines a whole slew of verbs to use with the concept:

Publics act historically. They are said to rise up, to speak, to reject false promises, to demand answers, and change sovereigns, to support troops, to give mandates for change, to deride counterfeits. It’s difficult to imagine the modern world without the ability to attribute agency to publics, though doing so is an extraordinary fiction. (Warner 2002: 123)
That these forms of collective agency are a kind of fiction reflects the “roominess” of the concept, in a way—strictly speaking, it does not assert that members of a public do more than share a discursive space. But it does assert that how they share this space matters. Given that, Warner suggests that these verbs are all corollaries to the private act of reading (or, by extension, we might add watching), and in this he is not far from Olesen’s conception of a kind of witness-public. Warner suggests that this is the way in which the Habermasian public sphere is usually imagined in relation to liberal governments, and, indeed, Warner says that it is difficult to escape this perspective—“we would have to inhabit a culture with a different language ideology, a different social imaginary,” he says, speaking of the prevailing understanding of publics both in liberal societies at large and in academic commentary (124). However, Warner suggests that counterpublics—whose discourses privilege text less than prevailing publics, and whose world-making often takes place further from their relationship with the state—may be capable of more.

It is in fact possible to imagine that almost any characterization of discursive acts might be attributed to a public. A queer counterpublic might be one that throws shade, prances, disses, acts up, carries on, longs, fantasizes, throws fits, mourns, ‘reads.’ (124)

While Warner’s first list of predicates refers mainly to the political agency of a public or counterpublic, as it might be represented at a given historical moment and mediated through the state, his second list reflects, in a way, a more fundamental ethnographic significance for counterpublic discourse. (It is worth noting that “reading,” for a queer counterpublic isn’t about ink on paper. It’s slang for making a sharp-witted put-down.) While counterpublics that have come to be called social movements, he says, “acquire agency in relation to the state,” he says, “for many counterpublics, to do so is to cede the original hope of transforming not just policy but the space of public life itself” (124).

Here, the ethnographer’s ears perk up. Warner is reminding us that, like Ong’s transnational publics, counterpublics have the capacity to produce and transmit norms that remake the social.

What is distinctive and important about Warner’s counterpublics, of course, is that, as I have suggested above, they don’t rely upon a shared set of identities or values to do so. Publics and counterpublics, the reader will remember, are above all simply spaces formed by self-reflexive circulation. They have both a lighter and a larger ontological footprint, in this sense, than a subculture or a social movement. And yet, Warner is arguing that they make a powerful difference “on the ground.” If they do this, then, they must do so simply through the shared act of circulation itself. Discourse does not circulate, after all, across a frictionless, smooth surface, as Tsing (2005) reminds us. It moves according to historically and culturally determined fields of social relations. And it is not, therefore, limited to reading the morning paper quietly at one of the cafés where Habermas famously located the nexus of
critical-rational public discourse—or even to talking about it with the person at the next table. There are innumerable ways in which the circulation of discourse may occur, some of which, as Warner has reminded us, are not even legible as circulation as long as we imagine publics in terms of their Habermasian rational-critical discourse about the written word.

It is to make precisely this point that Warner’s examples of counterpublic agency above draw our attention not to a counterpublic’s shared responses to texts or programmes, but to shared movements, feelings, and expressions. The shared circulatory conventions that are implied here, therefore, are embodied and affective practices. Implicit within Warner’s argument here is the recognition that every public’s circulatory conventions are necessarily conducted from within specific bodies—even the rational-critical discussion of the Habermasian café. This is, of course, the substance of some of the most important feminist critiques of Habermas’ description of the predominant public sphere, and a conceptual underpinning that Warner inherits from Nancy Fraser. But as Warner points out, it is even more powerfully relevant in counterpublics where reading is not the only, or predominant form of circulation.

What I want to add here is that if such embodied and affective practices are important mechanisms by which counterpublics come to matter, those practices must themselves be circulated and transmitted. After all, while bodies and affects are not purely discursive phenomena, neither can they completely escape discourse (Foucault 1986 [1978], Butler 1993). They may even come to appear as second nature. To make sense of a counterpublic’s significance, then, we need to take these embodied and affective forms of circulation seriously. And as Warner has already suggested, if we are to take these non-textual, non-state-centric forms of circulation and agency seriously, we need a “different social imaginary.” I will suggest, below, that Bourdieu’s description of habitus and hexis contains such a new social imaginary—at least for researchers and social analysts. Below, then, I will try to understand the embodied and affective conventions of the counterpublics in which Food Not Bombs participates through Bourdieu’s lens.

In part, this might fill a gap in scholarship on publics and counterpublics, where Warner’s insight about the ways in which publics are embodied has been perhaps underappreciated. True to Warner’s word, much of this research continues to picture the public as an audience (and implicitly the state as its most important actor), and accordingly to privilege the circulation of printed and electronic texts in its analysis. Even Nancy Fraser’s definitive work on subaltern counterpublics, for example, focuses most directly on their engagement with public texts and policies. Kathy Ferguson’s work on early twentieth century anarchist counterpublics (2010), does interesting work in this regard, insofar as it draws our attention to the material practices and livelihoods of the printers who were willing to print anarchists books, pamphlets, and newspapers. But, of course, these embodiments are valuable to Ferguson’s argument insofar as they facilitate the circulation of literal texts. Ferguson does explicitly invoke the term
“habitus” in order to understand the ways in which anarchist communities have been gendered (2011), but leaves the connection between this gendered habitus and the notion of counterpublics largely unexplored.

For my part, I have already argued (in chapter two) that we might consider a variety of more embodied, non-market practices to constitute counterpublic spheres, insofar as these practices represent alternative or subaltern forms of reflexive circulation. Dumpster-diving, squatting, scavenging, and any number of non-market practices, then, which involve far more embodied, affective ways of recirculating both things and economic values in ways which run counter to the circulatory conventions of the market—appropriating them from Dumpsters, or recovering their use value from behind boarded-up windows, and sharing them freely with strangers, for example—may implicate participants in a range of non-market counterpublics. These kinds of embodied and affective practices, I will argue in the following paragraphs, may therefore come to constitute a shared habitus and hexis which do the “world-making” work of a counterpublic.

(counterpublic habitus… or, “a mass conspiracy—to feed people”)

My favourite description of Food Not Bombs came from a Seattle collaborator one spring afternoon in Occidental Park. He was a local anarchist and sometime visitor to our chapter, who only rarely cooked with us, but who had eaten with Food Not Bombs in a number of cities in his travels. “Food Not Bombs is kind of a mass conspiracy,” he told me, pausing briefly for effect, “to feed people.”

As a kind of shorthand, it gets the point across aptly. Food Not Bombs has no head office. No formal membership or secret handshakes. The closest thing it has to a master-plan might be best summed up by the opening lines of a short speech given by Melbourne volunteers at a local anti-war benefit for which we cooked: “We’re trying to stop the war by cooking food and giving it away.” Or maybe in the words of one of the group’s earliest, most influential members, Keith McHenry, who during the San Francisco chapter’s early days said Food Not Bombs would keep on sharing food “until we have ended hunger and poverty—that’s going to take a while” (Gordon 1988; cited in Parson 2010: 91). These deceptively simplistic visions are certainly underwritten by a more complex shared analysis of the relationship between propriety, capital, militarism and privation. But they are still far from conspiratorial.

And yet Food Not Bombs chapters in hundreds of cities around the globe persist in the shared work of reclaiming wasted food, feeding hungry people, and upsetting the market-centric civility of public spaces, as if coordinated by the same invisible hand. Perhaps, in a way, they are: As I have intimated above, their labours are everywhere made both possible and significant by the surpluses and scarcities created by markets and their publics. Like many of what Day (2005) calls the “newest social movements” they work
in “groundless solidarity” with one another. And while Food Not Bombs chapters are far from uniform, the contiguity of their efforts is remarkable—all the more so, in fact, for their geographic, socioeconomic, ideological, and even linguistic diversity. Partly to capture this combination of heterogeneity and regularity, fluidity and contiguity, Dylan Clark has described Food Not Bombs and anarchic groups like it as “dis-organizations” (2004: 12)—a term I like almost as much as “mass conspiracy.”

Their dis-organization—their unstructured structure—has only been possible because participants acquire the kinds of shared (or at least contiguous) sets of practices, sensibilities, and “common sense” understandings I described earlier on. We might think of these as a kind of globalised counterpublic habitus.

In my own ethnographic experience, for example, volunteers from Food Not Bombs in Texas have arrived at Food Not Bombs in Melbourne already comfortable with Dumpster-diving. Punks from Arizona have shown up to eat at Food Not Bombs in Seattle, realistically optimistic that they’d meet somebody from a shared punk house or a squat on whose floor to sleep that night. (Which they did.) Anarchists from Lithuania have shown up in New York City and moved fairly seamlessly into the role of “bottom-liner” (the “first among equals,” who has the key to the kitchen, and makes sure it is relatively clean before it’s locked up at the end of the day). Volunteers in Seattle moved seamlessly from cooking in a well-lit, well-stocked, vacant industrial kitchen to cooking at a local squat by candlelight when it became the only kitchen available. And when police have approached the group in Seattle, San Francisco, or New York City, asking who is in charge, volunteers I have spoken to from each of these cities have all instinctively replied with either “no one is in charge,” or “we all are.”

In these kinds of diverse ways, they have come to share what Pierre Bourdieu has called a *habitus*, a kind of socialized second nature. Or, in Bourdieu’s most infamously recursive phrase, “a structured structure predisposed to act as a structuring structure” (1977: 72). Habitus is Bourdieu’s way of accounting for the consistent relationship between the experience-distant structures that social scientists think are important, and the experience-near meanings and experiences that are important to the people they work with. One might even say that it is Bourdieu’s answer to the problem of free will. In other words, everything happens as if by design in a given social order, according to Bourdieu, because the sociocultural, economic, and political structures within which individuals live are imprinted upon them as a certain set of shared predispositions, which seem perfectly natural and which therefore tend to reproduce those same sociocultural, economic, and political structures.

Put even more bluntly, for Bourdieu society is already a kind of mass conspiracy. We are always already a part of it. (I am tempted to write “of our own free will,” but the false dichotomy of free will or fatalism is precisely the sort of thing Bourdieu is trying to avoid.)
In Bourdieu’s writing these shared predispositions appear to run very deep indeed, however. They go largely unnoticed and often seem to have taken lifetimes to acquire. (Many of his examples draw on the psychology and sociology of childhood for just this reason.) How, then, should we understand a “mass conspiracy to feed people” whose shared practices run counter to the prevailing norms of markets and publics? After all, most people who make their way into Food Not Bombs have not been born into Dumpster-diving, squatting, or sweeping communal kitchens. These, rather, have been their personal responses to the “mainstream” societies into which they have been born. Can we understand such an everyday revolt in Bourdieu’s terms? A habitus, moreover, that is not only revolting but translocal—contiguous across national, socioeconomic, and linguistic boundaries. Does it make sense to speak of a globalised, counterpublic habitus?

Undoubtedly. Or, such is my contention.

To make this case, I have already given examples of the contiguity of disposition and everyday practice among Food Not Bombs volunteers in different places, and of their globalised mobility. (And I will, of course, give more.) In this sense, I began by reasoning “from the ground up.” To the same end I have also made the case at the conceptual level that globalised publics and counterpublics are inevitably constituted not only by shared discursive spaces, but by certain material, embodied, and affective practices which can neither be reduced to discourse nor can they escape discursive circulation. It remains simply to explore the ways in which Bourdieu’s terms might help to identify these shared practices, and to see how they apply to the imagined and embodied communities which make Food Not Bombs possible.

To this end, it is worth revisiting in its entirety a comment from the end of the previous chapter, made by a participant in the San Francisco Food Not Bombs chapter during the 1980s:

The way people do politics is changing. The way people are organizing and involving themselves in activities is altered forever. And I think Food Not Bombs was a beginning part of that... It’s a mosaic. It’s a bringing together of all kinds of disparate factions and pieces, and they’re all sort of working together, but not through any, you know, giant control. And so I think that’s what really inspired me to work with Food Not Bombs at that time, you know, it’s just a different way of thinking. And since I left Food Not Bombs and went on my own way, I’ve just noticed that, it just, it just went viral... There’s not going to be marches in the street any more. There’s not going to be takeovers of government. It’s going to be small, autonomous, disparate groups, sort of working to solve their own problems in their own city, in their own way. And it’s going to be different. And it’s going to be chaotic. And it’s going to get messy. But it’s all people doing their thing and trying to take a certain amount of control over their life. And Food Not Bombs was trying to do that around homelessness and poverty, housing, hunger sort of issues. And they served a need or a function that wasn’t being fulfilled by the society that they were—the group of, you know—the community they were living [in], and they filled that niche. And if that, need changes, then they’ll just sort of adapt to it, because that’s what people do. They adapt. They
change. And they, you know, they’re not—people aren’t like bureaucracies. They’re not monolithic. They’re
not. You know, they’re complicated.

In part, his comment was intended to illustrate the growing popularity of direct action and affinity-based
movements—the rhizomatic “groundless solidarity” I referred to earlier. But in doing so, he draws our
attention to precisely the kinds of dispositions that I would like to call “counterpublic habitus.” What is
particularly relevant about his point is that it describes not specific movements, subcultures, or scenes, but
a larger sea change in the ways in which radical activism has been conducted. The very groundlessness of
his description implicates not just punks, or anarchists, or environmentalists, or Quakers, or college
students, or others specific groups who might get involved in Food Not Bombs and similar projects.
Rather, as he puts it, it has “gone viral.” The comparison is apt, referencing, as it does, not the metaphor’s
initial source-material in epidemiology, but rather what it has come to mean: the transmission of
information through social networks. It would be hard to describe the linkages he’s talking about here as a
single network, however. Following Castells (1996), we might call it a “network of networks,” perhaps.
But the linkages described in such a meta-social formation seem a bit distant from the ethnographer’s
palette. We can say, then, that the “mosaic” he’s describing, the implicit space created by this viral
circulation is none other than a globalising kind of counterpublic.

And even more important to my point is that the thing that has gone viral in this counterpublic is not a
meme but a method. A common-sense way of addressing the needs and complaints that might inspire a
range of movements, subcultures, and scenes. Like the fellow quoted here, political scientist Sean
Michael Parson (2010) suggests that one of the key political roles played by Food Not Bombs has been
“prefigurative”—a common concept in anarchist circles, but one that Parson suggests holds value for the
academic study of social movements. In other words, it transmits by example the shared practices that
make it what it is. (Anarchists sometimes call this “propaganda of the deed.”) For my purposes here, this
is most important because it suggests not only that the shared practices of this counterpublic are world-
making, but that they are also transmitted partly below the radar of explicit discourse, at the level of
habitus and bodily hexis.

For this reason, such a proliferation of political methodologies also works, in a way, under the radar
of many of the sociological models that scholars have proposed for understanding new social movements,
according to Parson. They miss the importance of these alternative movements, he suggests, because they
are largely rooted in political liberalism—like Olesen, they evaluate the effectiveness of social formations
largely in terms of their impact on institutions of government. This, he suggests, is a mistake. “To
understand the potential impact of radical change,” he writes, “one has to look for a different type of
politics—politics that is not pacified, mediated, regulated, or contained” (48). In contrast, then, Parson
makes an argument for social movement scholars to look to the prefigurative and world-making potential of everyday practices. Parson has written specifically about the importance of affect within the work of Food Not Bombs, particularly the role of antagonism in shaping the group’s political responses to structures of government in San Francisco during its most turbulent period during the late 1980s and early 1990s. His affective analysis is incredibly valuable, however the emphasis on antagonistic politics pulls his attention towards the group’s intervention in the politics of public spaces and its relationship with government, rather than towards the group’s own internal world-making.

Yet more relevant to my argument, then, is the work of Deric Shannon (2011), who has also written about Food Not Bombs. Like Parson, he privileges the realm of everyday practice, and prefigurative politics. But Shannon focuses not on political conflict, but on the group’s own internal “production of culture” and the ways in which actors in the group generate new meanings and practices for themselves rather than within the larger discursive space of urban politics, in which Parson’s analysis is anchored. In like fashion to my argument in this chapter, then, Shannon writes more about what goes on in the kitchen than about the spaces where Food Not Bombs distributes food. He even comments on the taken-for-grantedness of certain shared dispositions among participants in the kitchen—such as the preference for loud, fast punk rock on the stereo—but stops short of calling this “habitus.” Instead, he focuses most directly on the conscious development of “new symbolic codes and cultural frames” (49). The question of music in the kitchen is a useful illustration of his emphasis, in fact. The subject only comes up because somebody new to the group—and unaccustomed to its unspoken predispositions—made a point of bringing it to their attention. (The novice didn’t like punk rock very much.) While Shannon comments briefly on the implications for these unspoken musical predilections for bounding and binding the community, he focuses more on the group’s explicit and intentional efforts to respond to the observation, to produce a more inclusive culture.

Parson and Shannon have both made politically savvy, thoughtful, valuable observations which support my contention, then, that the mass-conspiracy that is Food Not Bombs might be shaped and guided by shared counterpublic habitus. They themselves, however, have stopped short of using these terms, and for this reason have been drawn, ultimately, towards the politics of the formally political and the explicitly discursive, respectively. At the same time, in part because they have both framed the subject of their work in the more bounded terms of “social movements” or “subcultures,” both researchers have limited their scope to the work of Food Not Bombs in single cities. As such, they do not capture the globalising dimensions of the comment I have quoted at length above, and the tacit depth of the practices described therein.
This is, of course, not a shortcoming, but rather a methodological and disciplinary choice (Parson is a political scientist, Shannon a sociologist). In contrast, as Burawoy points out (2000), anthropology is well suited to expand upon both the intimately tacit knowledge and the broadly global scope at work in a formation like Food Not Bombs. Anthropologist Jeffrey Juris has done something quite like this, for example, in his multi-sited ethnographic work on the networked logic of the counter-globalisation movements in Barcelona (2009). He describes his work not as an ethnography of specific networks—which are ephemeral and difficult to trace at any large scale—so much as an ethnography of the “networking practices” that make those networks possible (5). Accordingly, I take some of my cues from his methodological example, and have paid a measure of attention below to those kinds of habitus that facilitate a rhizomatic, international network to emerge around Food Not Bombs. Like Juris, I have found that multi-sitedness of my work renders traces of networks visible in a way that they would not be otherwise. What distinguishes my argument here, of course, is my focus on (counter)publics rather than networks, and my attention to the sensual, the embodied, and the affective logics through which a phenomenon like Food Not Bombs coheres. Below, I would like to focus on two of the most important ways in which the spaces of Food Not Bombs are structured by an affective and-or embodied set of dispositions: (1) a kind of abject improvisation with the physical and symbolic detritus of markets public, and (2) the material construction and organisation of spaces that are radically open and therefore conducive to the kinds of extended networks Juris has described.

(on abject improvisation and the “revolution” of everyday life)

Of all the squats, punk houses, and other shared spaces where I have cooked, eaten, or couch-surfed with Food Not Bombs collaborators, not one has ever left me with a stomachache. Nor has sharing food, space, or cutlery with FNB collaborators ever given me any misgivings about my health or safety. And this is not simply because, as Roy Rappaport might suggest, anthropologists like me “are otherwise sensible people who don’t believe in the germ theory of disease” (Rappaport 1990; quoted in Bernard 2013: 332). Of the hundreds of Food Not Bombs collaborators and diners I have spoken with over the six years or so that I have done this research, I have only heard three stories about Food Not Bombs–related stomachaches—not a bad track record compared to a lot of commercial establishments with fully-stocked industrial kitchens. In my experience, in fact, Food Not Bombs kitchens are usually peopled by cooks with quite well–thought out diets and dietary politics. And inevitably there have been at least a few “bottom-liners” in each Food Not Bombs kitchen who know a lot about food safety and take extra responsibility for making sure the food is actually worth eating. The health department even visited the Seattle chapter at least once, according to one collaborator, and found nothing amiss for which they could
cite them. The health and safety of Food Not Bombs’ work, in my experience, has been remarkably consistent.

But from the look of some of their kitchens, you could be forgiven for doubting me.

Of course, the aesthetic order of its kitchens has very little to do with the quality of Food Not Bombs’ food. But, as the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1984) has pointed out (and as I have already discussed in chapter one) people often reckon safety and hygiene in terms of symbolism and aesthetics, rather than actual pathogenicity. In other words, things aren’t “dirty” because they’ll make us sick. They’re dirty because they violate our assumptions about the appropriate symbolic and social order—they’re “matter out of place” (36). Consider one Seattle Meals Partnership Coalition member, who called the Seattle chapter’s food safety into question because they brought food down to the park in ten-gallon plastic buckets. Having acquired my food handler’s card from the City of Seattle as part of this research, I can assure the reader that there’s nothing especially dangerous about serving food from plastic buckets. (And Food Not Bombs’ serves no meat, dairy, or eggs, so it doesn’t have the same temperature requirements as many meal providers.) But it certainly looks a bit sketchy, from a certain point of view, to serve it from a plastic bucket rather than to serve it from a buffet-style steam-table. In other words, Food Not Bombs’ practices seem out of order.

As I described at the outset of this chapter, then, Food Not Bombs kitchens are often, symbolically, very dirty. Consider my fieldnotes from the punk house where I stayed whilst in Buffalo. Most punk houses have a catchy, slightly deviant name—carried on by the generations of punks who live and hang out there years after the name’s origin has been forgotten. This one was called “The Death Trap.”

The Death Trap was once the Food Not Bombs house. The ‘FNB’ remains inside one of the upstairs cupboards, along with a “Brews Not Bombs Buffalo” poster in the hallway. The house is covered in stencils and scrawled notes and sketches and posters and photographs and collages and the dishes are piling up in the sink. I don’t think I heard a toilet flush the whole time I was there. The landlord asks no questions.

And, of course, the kitchen smelled familiar. (“I remember that smell,” commented one friend and Food Not Bombs collaborator from Buffalo when I told her what I was writing. “There’s a reason they called it the Death Trap,” she said.) In short, it shared some of the same aggregate qualities as in Melbourne or Seattle. Visual, olfactory, and tactile traces built up over time from heavy traffic, liberal use, and perhaps under-scrubbing. This wasn’t a surprise by now. The Death Trap, the warehouse in Brunswick, ABC No Rio in New York City (as I’ll describe below), the Abel Smith St. anarchist bookstore in Wellington, the Scribble Squat in Seattle’s Central District, or the Beacon Hilton in, well, Beacon Hill, Seattle, and any number of other spaces in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand where I’ve helped to cook, or met Food Not Bombs collaborators, have all shared some or all of these familiar sensory traces.
And in this, I want to argue here that these traces reflect a series of embodied practices and dispositions that have both come to be second nature, but that are at odds with certain prevailing “mainstream” practices and dispositions. In other words, they reflect a kind of counterpublic habitus. And insofar as this habitus is rooted specifically in the body—in the muscle memory, in visceral responses to taste, smell, or sight, and so on—Bourdieu also uses the word “hexis” to describe it. This counterpublic habitus and hexis, I want to argue here, emerges from the material and symbolic detritus of mainstream market-publics. The willingness to eat food that’s past its prime, and discarded by grocery stores. Even to Dumpster-dive for it. The adaptation to squatting, or living in low-rent housing in neighbourhoods which have been largely passed over by the real estate market (think of the landlord who asks no questions, the plastic sheeting in lieu of insulation—in one of the coldest cities in the US). The disregard for clean walls and empty counter tops. The habitual water-conservation. (In other words, not flushing the toilets.)

The life-ways that seem to leave these particular practices and traces are, as I suggested at the outset of this chapter, not easily summed up. They’re not exclusive to Food Not Bombs. They’re not part of a cuisine like “Tex-Mex” or “Creole.” Their aesthetics don’t belong to a particular place, like “Weimar,” or a particular ideological-historical formation like “Modernism.” It’s tempting to name them after to a specific movement—punk rock for example, since so many of these spaces are connected to and peopled by punks. But this misses the diversity of the people implicated therein. Not everyone who does Food Not Bombs calls themselves a punk, after all. They’re also anarchists. Or liberals. Or Quakers. Or street youth. Or couch surfers. Or on public assistance. Or college students. Or even hippies. (As much as some punks might scoff at the latter: The Death Trap proudly displayed a sign on its front door, old enough to have originally been more than a joke, that read “Hippies Enter By the Back.”) And so on.

Of course, none of these categories are mutually exclusive, and more than half of them have included the author at one time or another. The life-ways shared among them, then, have perhaps as much to do with an alienation from prevailing markets and publics, as they have to do with a discrete, shared ethos or ethnos. In that, at least, they have something in common with at one art movement—Dada, whose shared ethic amounted to a gloriously irreverent alienation from the prevailing artworlds of the time. Their kitchens reflect as much a rejection of the hyper-sanitary, perfumed-and-deodorised food spaces of the supermarket and the Better Homes and Gardens–inspired kitchen as they do an embrace of any gastronomic or domestic aesthetic. (To quote one Seattle collaborator I spoke with, Food Not Bombs’ meals during her time were “always nutritious, occasionally delicious.”) This alienation is the germ, if you’ll forgive the pun, which develops into a counterpublic habitus.

At first blush, “counterpublic habitus” sounds a bit like an oxymoron. If habitus and hexis represent the dispositions imprinted upon social beings by the larger structures they live in, and if those dispositions
are enduring and unconscious, how could they possibly do anything but reproduce the larger structures that structured them in the first place? Bourdieu has, for this reason, sometimes been accused of developing an overly rigid model of social practice (see Manderson and Turner 2006). But in fact, Bourdieu frames his discussion of habitus from the very beginning within philosophical discussions of free will and revolutionary change. Right off the bat, for example, he takes issue with Sartre’s description of the existential moment in which one’s revolutionary consciousness is awakened and change becomes conceivable. He accuses Sartre of idealism, and of asserting a kind of imaginary Being whose ontology amounts to thin air. No social being, he suggests, can inaugurate new meaning from nothingness—we are always already culturally and historically conditioned. Nonetheless, Bourdieu is also not suggesting that cultural dispositions and sensibilities don’t change, which would be not only to refuse the evidence of history and the senses, but also to assert precisely the kind of abstract, essentialist determinism of which he accuses structuralist thinkers at the outset of his argument.

His model of habitus, as I suggested earlier, seems intended to reconcile these debates—it describes neither “free” will, nor slavish determinism. Rather, habitus, he suggests is inevitably heterogeneous, overdetermined and contradictory. And, moreover, it is the stuff of improvisation. Our dispositions, he suggests, are constantly structured and restructured in the process of their application, and they are applied within the unpredictable, changeable circumstances that make life… well, life. By way of illustration, he gives the example of a gambler who comes to know the odds of winning in a variety of situations and for whom the game becomes second nature. Of course, not every game will be the same, and the gambler is not, of course, incapable of learning or changing her strategy. Nor are the rules and conditions of the game eternal and unchanging. In this, despite his wariness of structuralism’s stiff objectivism, Bourdieu borrows Levi Strauss’ term, bricolage—a kind of creative craftsmanship with the cultural materials at hand—to describe the constant, structured improvisation that is habitus. Drawing on this propensity for structured change, Manderson and Turner suggest that we might best understand the ways habitus might change through the notions of repetition and iteration (2006).

If this model of structured improvisation allows for change and even cultural drift, however, it still seems a far cry from some of the more radical inversions of habitus I have described at work in the Food Not Bombs kitchens. And yet there they are. Everyday modes of living and eating with others, practiced in kitchens around the globe that are completely at odds with the sensibilities and dispositions of hegemonic publics in which they are embedded.

How, then, to account for this revolutionary break in everyday practice? Most of the Food Not Bombs participants I have spoken with are not born into Dumpster-diving, or squatting, or scavenging. Nor did they wake up one day and suddenly make the world anew (despite Sartre’s idealist phenomenology). How
did people discover, and become entangled with Dumpster-diving or direct action? (How are rhizomes, networks, and war machines made?) Unsurprisingly, many of the people I interviewed followed an associative, networked logic in describing their introduction to radical habitus. They learned about Dumpster-diving or the politics of homelessness through their involvement in Food Not Bombs. Or they learned about Food Not Bombs through their involvement in the squatting scene. They learned about consensus-based decision-making from participating in Food Not Bombs meetings. Or Food Not Bombs fed them at Occupy Wall Street, or other protests, and they came to the kitchen to see what it was about. Or they read about Food Not Bombs in the liner notes of punk rock records. Or they started listening to punk rock in the Food Not Bombs kitchen. And so on. This networked logic is not only an important vector for organisation, then, but also an important vector for change. Anthropologists like Juris have written persuasively about this networked logic, and as I have said, I find their work incredibly valuable. My own contribution here, though, is somewhat different.

I want to return to something Bourdieu writes about the process of improvisation in the structuring of habitus. He suggests that habitus makes a virtue of the inevitable. So, in addition to mere iteration and structured improvisation, Bourdieu suggests that there is a certain amount of sheer make-do that structures one’s dispositions. This is how I would like to propose we think about counterpublic habitus: It is a matter of making do with the materials at hand. And I mean materials here in both the literal and the figurative sense: What is at hand, what is available to be improvised with, consists of both meaning and matter. In other words, it includes both discursive and nondiscursive elements that are exceptional with respect to the habitus of a prevailing public.

Here, the reader may recall my discussion of Giorgio Agamben’s exception from the first chapter. What is exceptional, after all, is included in a given social order as an exclusion. In other words, it is made available to thought at the same time as it is made unthinkable. In the sense that these meanings and materials are dispositions that are always already accessible to a given social agent—even if only in moments of abjection or disgust. Stallybrass and White (1986) describe, for example, a kind of “nostalgia” for the gutter, which primarily serves to underwrite an archetypal bourgeois aesthetic sensibility, but which nonetheless, makes a certain aspect of disgust (un)thinkable.

These dispositions, sensibilities, and their corresponding materialities are, therefore, part of an agent’s repertoire for improvisation and iteration. Dylan Clark (2004) has, for example, written thoughtfully about the gastro-politics of punk cuisine in North America, which eschews the predominant culinary habitus of bourgeois consumerism in favour of the “raw” and the “rotten”—structuralist categories Clark adopts from Levi Strauss which are “good to think with,” and that describe the exceptional, symbolically (un)thinkable outskirts of any given gastronomic social world. What is raw or rotten, in Levi Strauss’
terms is antisocial and polluting. And Clark suggests that, for the hegemonic American public, Dumpster-diving or shoplifting food is equivalent to eating it raw or rotten in structuralist terms. Tellingly, though, rather than develop an entirely new vocabulary, Clark’s punks leave these categories intact, and simply embrace the marginal and the anti-social—they embrace Dumpster-diving, shoplifting, and so on. (In a similar fashion, if readers’ sensibilities have been troubled by the descriptions above of grotty toilets and grotty, they might take comfort in knowing that those transgressive moments conceivably also expand their repertoire of things with which it is good to think.) While Clark writes primarily about punk-specific subcultural identifications, his central argument is, in a sense, not about punks per se, but about those things made thinkable and unthinkable within a wider public habitus. And he mentions Food Not Bombs as well, briefly, acknowledging that while it is not a purely punk phenomenon, it is “symbiotic” with the punk scene—suggestive of a shared discursive space larger than a single subculture.

In a similar fashion to Clark’s punks, then, I would like to suggest that counterpublics develop a queered habitus with respect to prevailing publics, improvising with the detritus and the exceptional—those things made unthinkable within the prevailing publics, or thinkable but entirely unreasonable.

As I have already suggested throughout this dissertation, for example, prevailing markets public inevitably make a lot of material waste. This waste becomes the very stuff of Food Not Bombs. The food is donated or Dumpster-dived. The spaces themselves are often squatted or located in shared houses on properties or in neighbourhoods whose value is marginal, and which have been, in a sense therefore, partially abandoned by the real-estate market. And the necessary equipment—kitchen implements, bikes, sometimes vehicles—are either scavenged, donated, or occasionally bought at low costs. The counterpublics within which Food Not Bombs is embedded, therefore, are built in a variety of ways on what I have been calling “abject capital,” and the other detritus of markets public. This is one of the reasons Food Not Bombs has thrived especially in globalising cities, which, I have argued earlier (in chapter three), generate “world-class waste.” Globalising cities like Seattle are, in the words of one Dumpster-diver and Food Not Bombs collaborator, “the land of plenty.” The relative opulence of some such markets and publics cultivates a thriving series of abject aftermarket economies, Dumpster-diving counterpublics that make a virtue of the inevitable surpluses of the post-industrial, globalising markets public.

And in additional to this material detritus, the “civility” of a market-public’s sensibilities and dispositions, as I have already discussed throughout this dissertation, outline in negative a range of exceptional positionalities, social spaces, and ways of being rendered abject, or out of place—from communal living to homelessness (especially voluntary homelessness), from conservation to trash-eating (especially voluntary trash-eating), and so on. These exceptional modes of living closely mirror the kinds
of counterpublic habitus that converge on movements like Food Not Bombs. They implicate a range of abject or subaltern positionalities that are, as I have argued already, not defined by identity—Food Not Bombs collaborators I have worked with have included homeless kids, broke artists, middle-class dropouts, aging hippies, preachy punks, single mothers on public assistance, train-hopping Jack Kerouac fans, people struggling with mental illness, college students in debt, queers and transsexuals, survivors of abuse with post-traumatic stress disorder, none of which are mutually exclusive categories, but all of whom have in common a certain unwillingness or impedance to getting along on the terms of the market-public. In other words, for them it’s not as simply for them as getting “a haircut and get a real job.”

This co-incidence of abjected resources, exceptional positionalities, and marginalised people, then, finds a recurrent intersection in the range of social spaces I have described above—Food Not Bombs events, squats, punk houses, communes, and DIY gallery spaces, and so on, in a great many cities. In these physical and discursive spaces, participants come to share a set of dispositions, not so much anti-capitalist (although many embrace that term) as countercapitalist or postcapitalist. They are not primarily ideological dispositions, but rather are categories of practice, of habitus, which share an etiology in the conventions of the market-public, without which they would not be thinkable.

As a political corollary of the argument I have made here, therefore, I would argue that it is more than simply shared ideologies and identities that matter to political practices. In fact, it is the production of shared spaces and shared “zones of encounter” (Lawson and Elwood, in press) within which counterpublic dispositions, affects, and embodiments may be cultivated that allow ideology or identity to carry any practical weight at all. Food Not Bombs has tended to function in precisely this way—to the extent that one person I interviewed described it as a kind of “gateway activism.” Through their work with Food Not Bombs, innumerable collaborators with whom I spoke made not only lasting political alliances and friendships that crossed identitarian boundaries that otherwise might not have been crossed, but lasting changes to their own habitus, from becoming political radicalised at the discursive level to radical changes in their consumption behaviour at the level of habitus. Particularly in the way they ate and acquired their food—quite a number of them went into organic farming, for example. Radical environmentalists, anarcho-syndicalists, Quakers, insurrectionaries, college activists, hippies, squatter punks, and other people involved in Food Not Bombs might differ widely in their identities and ideologies. But they have all, at times, been willing to squabble over their differences around the same worn old cutting boards for long enough to chop the carrots (and with some very dull knives at that). Food Not Bombs has been only been possible because of this détente.

On paper, of course, there are some explicitly shared ideological agreements that extend across many of these spaces. Food Not Bombs has a sort of mission-statement, for example, agreed upon at national
gatherings years ago, that new volunteers and chapters sign onto implicitly by getting involved: The food will be free and vegetarian, there will be no organizational hierarchy, and the group will be committed to nonviolent direct action. These principles certainly form part of the self-reflexive circulation of discourse and the shared material practice reflected in Food Not Bombs’ work around the world. But in day-to-day practice, the group’s efforts often feel just as much structured by happenstance, an emergent property of the assortment of individuals who’ve shown up, and the food they were able to rescue from the Dumpster that day.

One young punker told me, for example, upon arrival at the Melbourne chapter’s usual distribution spot with a vanful of food to share: “It feels like a miracle every time we get down here.” She said this not with disdain, I gathered, but with some combination of admiration, pride, and wonder. Because the thing is, they always made it.

The sensory quality of life in the Food Not Bombs kitchen, then, is an emergent one—more than the sum of its cultural sources. An aggregate of improvisations and bricolage, assembled from leftover foods, cast-off furniture, low-rent kitchen spaces in borderline neighbourhoods, and the people for whom those low-rent kitchen spaces and neighbourhoods are home. Everyday life in the Food Not Bombs kitchen is part revolutionary invention, and part circumstantial necessity. The ethic of improvisation, openness, fatalism and utopianism—of can-do and make-do—cultivated in the space between Food Not Bombs’ formal ethos and its day-to-day practices is a modus operandi familiar to almost anyone who has spent much time working with Food Not Bombs. Consider, for example, the following recipe, as I managed to record it before the happenstance it emerged from left everyone’s memory:

Recipe for “Glory Soup” (named after much deliberation):

Ingredients… Pumpkin (1 large); Squash (1 small); Tofu (ten packets); Garam masala (too much); Cinnamon (a dash); Ginger (3 inches); Maple Syrup (¼ cup); Peanut Butter (1 jar); Cashews (1 handful); Macadamia nuts (1 ½ cup); Curry paste (4 inch log); Beets (3, grated); Dill (a bunch or two, whole—stems and all); Savery (1 packet); Onions (1); Potatoes (2); Cauliflower (3 florettes—1 purple, 1 orange, 1 white); Broccoli (stems); Lettuce (scraps); Cabbage (scraps); Arugula (scraps); Kale (scraps); Collards (scraps); Grapes (1 bunch); Dates (5 handfuls); Bananas (3); Soy milk, vanilla (1 carton); Carrots (2); Walnuts (½ cup); Water (6 pitchers); Salt and pepper (to taste)

Directions… Boil water; Add Ingredients; Blend some [in a blender]; Burn bottom of pot

Serves… 30+

In essence, Glory Soup was the sum total of everything we had in the kitchen that day. We didn’t have enough of any single ingredient to make soup for thirty or more people. So we improvised with the food
donated that day. This emergence, a sort of constant counterpublic set of improvisations, also lends a kind of openness to the space.

But here’s the thing: Glory Soup wasn’t just easy; It was also, much to our relief, really good. (Hence the name.)

Rather than the producing the chaos sometimes misattributed to anarchists and their cookbooks\textsuperscript{109}, the results of Food Not Bombs’ emergent, abject improvisations are remarkably consistent. Both Melbourne and the Seattle groups, for example, have operated with relatively few hiatuses, despite their constantly changing personnel, since the early 1990s. Just as tellingly, one volunteer who had travelled extensively in the US and visited Food Not Bombs in several cities pointed out, “Whichever Food Not Bombs you visit, it’s always the same food.”

(conclusion)

We can learn a lot from this consistence. After all, Food Not Bombs is proliferating. It has expanded over the last three decades to work in hundreds of cities, in dozens of countries, on every continent except Antarctica. I have argued above that their work in many of these places amount to comparable, even contiguous, practices of bricolage, using the same kinds of surpluses cast off by predominant market-publics in each place. Comparable rescued food. Comparable low-rent kitchen spaces. Comparable second-hand furniture and kitchen implements. I have tried to suggest that the availability of similar resources in a wide range of cities makes Food Not Bombs possible. Not only that, though: The practices involved in reclaiming these surpluses, I have argued, come to reflect a similar set of relationships to those market-publics. Food Not Bombs as a social movement and as a decentralized network has both emerged from and reified these similar relationships. While I have been cautious not to assert an essentialist conceptual framework, I have nonetheless argued that thinking about these similarities across great distances is productive, and that the notion of transnational “publics,” “counterpublics” and habitus can help us make meaningful comparisons, and to draw meaningful connections between a variety of sites. Perhaps most importantly, these spaces and practices connect people meaningfully across great distances—Melbourne, New York City, Seattle, and so on. Those connections may be virtual, as part of a larger public which circulated discourse and embodied practices like Dumpster-diving, squatting, and so on. And they may be also made concrete, as participants in Food Not Bombs and the larger counterpublics in which it is embedded themselves often move, and connect with Food Not Bombs chapters in multiple locations.
When I first got to New York City, for example, half a year after the trip to Melbourne described at the outset of this chapter, my first time at ABC No Rio (and my third visit to a new Food Not Bombs chapter) was resoundingly familiar. Again, I was following street signs, looking for Food Not Bombs at an independent gallery and community space in an area—the city’s Lower East Side—whose (climbing but nonetheless) lower property values prompted a wide range of people to call it home. Again, I knew the place only by reputation—although ABC No Rio was somewhat more storied in punk and DIY circles than the Brunswick warehouse. And again, I had absolutely no trouble picking the place out.

“There was no mistaking it,” I wrote in my fieldnotes, “even without the stylized, hand-painted ‘ABC No Rio’ above the door in two-foot letters.” The door was unlocked again, and unattended—even more unusual in the Lower East Side than it might have been in the run-down part of Brunswick where I found the warehouse I described earlier. This time, the building wasn’t empty, but still nobody stopped me to ask me what I was doing there. I had to stop and introduce myself to one of them, newly arrived from Eastern Europe. But her embodied semiotics—dreadlocks, political patches, a sartorial palette of entirely black and olive drab, and a “Food Not Bombs, Lithuania” button (with a tree on it rather than the more familiar carrot-in-fist logo)—were already completely legible to me as “crusty punk.” And completely at home in the space, which felt as if it shared the radical openness and the patched-togetherness of spaces I had already known. A patched-togetherness that echoed the patched-togetherness of the communities that pass through it.

In fact, the very first thing I noticed when I walked in was a bulletin board near the front stairs advertising an upcoming punk show for a band whose drummer I met at the warehouse in Brunswick—and who helped start the Melbourne chapter of Food Not Bombs. If this was a coincidence, by now it was hardly surprising. The networks that make Food Not Bombs function can make the world seem like a very small place after all. I missed the show in New York, but I saw the band play in Seattle a few months later. (A friend of mine, also from Seattle FNB, copied their record for me so I could listen to them before I went to the show.)

One of the most important things I have tried to suggest about Food Not Bombs and its respective counterpublics, then, is that their etiologies, precipitating as they do from a series of abject improvisations and diverse, exceptional positionalities, lends them a kind of radical openness. This radical openness makes a great deal possible. Food Not Bombs becomes, for this reason, one distinctive kind of zone of encounter where people from a wide range of political, socioeconomic, and even national and ethnic backgrounds may come together around existing shared practices and sensibilities, or where they may come to share new ones. I would like to talk more about this in the conclusion to this book.
Conclusion

Political Implications: An Open Letter to Food Not Bombs and Other Interested Parties

I got more and more to do. I got less and less to prove.

Ani DiFranco

(what do i hope to accomplish?)

As I type this, thirteen people have been arrested in the wake of Seattle’s 2013 May Day anti-capitalist rally—for property damage, failing to disperse, or possibly for standing in the wrong place at the wrong time and wearing the wrong political slogans. (Wait. Now it’s fourteen according to my newsfeed.) Based on the press photographs which are already in circulation, I vaguely recognise at least one of them from my time in Food Not Bombs and the local anarchist scene. A young white fellow with short, sandy blonde hair and the black t-shirt that’s de rigueur for anarchists, punks, and a range of other young countercultural scenes. In the photograph he’s sitting cross-legged, restrained by a police officer. Others in the photo-stream are being carried by grim-faced, black-clad police officers away from constellations of angry, black-clad protesters and pepper spray. From the looks of things, police attended the annual demonstration en masse, many of them in riot gear, aiming to deter the political vandalism that happened at the last march (as I described earlier in the excursus of Part Two). It is unclear if they deterred property damage or inspired more of it this year. “They’re making this into a war zone when it’s not,” said one bystander.

Meanwhile, I type the conclusion to my dissertation.

It’s hard not to feel a little sheepish about this. Perhaps if I weren’t writing, I would be at the demonstration. I’ve been to similar protests before. Probably I will again. But tonight I have chosen to devote myself to a blank page instead. And, indeed, in the course of two years and the hundreds of blank pages that have become this dissertation, I have spent barely any time directly involved in the kind of direct action that I have been writing about, which was such a central part of my experience for the five years before I started writing.

Although no one distrusts a dichotomy less than me, I still catch myself wondering: Did the fellow in the photograph make more of a difference today in the fight against oppression everywhere than the words I will write here? Or is my pen mightier than the projectiles that went through a few storefront windows tonight?
This is the worst sort of either-or thinking, of course. A hang-up from headier days of boisterous, self-congratulatory political posturing. The universe knows nothing of such comfortable black and white distinctions. A march, a dissertation, or a ham sandwich can all be pivotal or paltry, depending on the circumstances, the people, and the perspectives at stake. And the stakes are often not at all clear until long after the fact. Nonetheless, this is a good moment to ponder the aims of my research. What do I hope to accomplish by writing about waste, cities, and Food Not Bombs? What exactly are the political implications of my work? I’ll try to outline just a few below. In a way, this is equal parts polemic, philosophical reflection, autoethnography, and even confessional. In the process, I have relaxed some of the disciplinary and literary constraints that I set for myself elsewhere in my dissertation. But this also allows me to assert some conclusions that emerge from my research, but don’t belong elsewhere in my writing.

Some are concrete, and some speculative. Some have long-term social, cultural and even philosophical implications, and others are immediately tied to policies in the here and now. Some are things I have been schooled in by my friends and comrades in Food Not Bombs. For this, I am thoroughly grateful, and I can only hope to serve as an intermediary, carrying their insights to other audiences. Other conclusions have demanded reflection and critical distance and, I hope, are valuable new interpretations for Food Not Bombs collaborators, city officials, and a general anthropologically interested readership alike. Some are obvious and demand a mere moment’s reflection. Others may be counterintuitive and challenge us to think critically, beyond prevailing modes of political thought—radical and conservative alike—that can, at times, be as oppressive as any “fascist police state.”

I’ve never been good at brevity, so I’ve tried to limit myself below to just four. Three of them written with policy makers and a “mainstream” reading public in mind. The last, and longest, written with Food Not Bombs and other anarchist, activist, and counterpublic audiences in mind, and draws upon the three that have gone before. Overall, I have written this conclusion in the hope that, if some readers never finish reading the whole dissertation, they may at least digest the conclusions below and find them good to think with.

(on anthropological research, social change, and the elusiveness of clear-cut answers)

When I talk about my research with strangers—in interviews, on the bus, in classrooms, at the café, and so on—one of the first things they often ask me is what changes I would recommend. How should we go about wasting less? How can we shrink the scale of homelessness and hunger? Or make easier the lives of those people who endure them? And so on. Sometimes these questions emerge out of genuine concern or
interest. (“What can we do to help?”) Sometimes they’re more rhetorical, asked out of fatalism or cynicism. (“What more can we do about it anyway?” … “But isn’t this just how it has to be?” … “Oh really? What would you do about it if you were in charge?”)

They’re all good questions. But for the most part, I have avoided them in this dissertation. They’re often framed so broadly that it’s impossible to give clear-cut answers—short of scrapping late capitalism and the nation-state and trying something new. (An idea for which I have some sympathy, it’s true. But societies are more complex than such utopian visions usually admit, as I’ll argue below. So I’m not exactly recruiting for the revolution.)

More to the point, it is a thoroughly impoverished understanding of research, as I see it, that measures its value in the number of successful policy proposals it generates. After all, I still believe that knowledge is valuable for its own sake. (Although years of reading post-structuralist theory leaves me less than decisive about what I mean by “knowledge.”) And as many of my anarchist friends and collaborators would point out, the kinds of “action items” that make research legible to government agencies, corporate directors, and other bureaucratic structures are hardly the only sorts of knowledge that are valuable, or that can make a difference in the world. As the anarchist and anthropologist David Graeber writes:

Normally, when you challenge the conventional wisdom—that the current economic and political system is the only possible one—the first reaction you are likely to get is a demand for a detailed architectural blueprint of how an alternative system would work… Historically, this is ridiculous. When has social change ever happened according to someone’s blueprint? … In fact, the idea is so absurd we might well ask ourselves how it ever occurred to us to imagine this is how change happens to begin. (Graeber 2013)

Of course, there is no shortage of ideologues, radical and conservative alike, who are willing to put their own narrow ideological blueprints into action. Their work does make a difference—but not usually the difference they would like. Or, as Angela Davis has put it, describing the successes of the social movements she was part of in the 1960s: The battles we won were not the battles we thought we were fighting.113 As Graeber points out, the legacy of the 1960s, and of earlier revolutionary moments, was to adapt, expand, and popularise new kinds of political and cultural common sense that had been previously unthinkable. Thus, new knowledge and ideas are critical to social change, even if they don’t amount to line-items or policy proposals.

It is in this regard, that the work of my own discipline, anthropology, has been far more profound than to simply suggest specific, immediate actionable changes. The value of anthropological research, I would argue, has often been in its vision. Its ability to disrupt stereotypes and unfounded assumptions. Its ability to point out veiled relationships, meanings, and consequences. In part, this is the function anthropology has often served as both deliberate and de facto “cultural critique” (Marcus and Fischer 1999). And much
of what I have written so far has aimed at just such a critique: to challenge popular assumptions about the efficiency of free markets to distribute resources; to confound common prejudices about people who eat from Dumpsters or have no fixed abode; and to point out the cause-and-effect relationships between homelessness, hunger, and the economic development of global cities.

In addition to simply critiquing, however, anthropology has often also pointed tentatively towards those spaces where we might find new ideas—alternative models of human organisation and “emergent forms of life” (Fischer 2003) which already exist, with the potential to grow in scope and influence. Some of the things I have described in my work—Food Not Bombs, Dumpster-diving counterpublics, and so on—represent just such marginal cultural phenomena that challenge prevailing forms of common sense and have, over decades, grown in their significance and size. In other words, movements like Food Not Bombs demonstrate not only that “another world is possible, and exists now in the shadows of this one,” according to the common anarchist saying. They also demonstrate the potential of these emergent forms of life to expand. (And perhaps, in the process, serve as something of an antidote to the fatalism and cynicism I described a moment ago.)

With all of this in mind, I have imagined my own research as neither polemical nor prescriptive. For the most part, in my dissertation I have sidestepped specific ethical proclamations and policy recommendations. (Although I have not been able to avoid the occasional moralistic overtone.) At heart, then, my work has aimed most emphatically at description—both at the level of ethnographic experience and at the level of theory, political economy, and the “big-picture.” But for the reasons I’ve described above, such description is inherently political. The political implications of this description range from cultural critique (both of the mainstream public sphere and of radical social movements) to the exposition of emergent forms of life. And while I have no illusions about the revolutionary potential of a single dissertation, I do hope that this work will contribute to the ongoing evolution of political common sense across the ideological spectrum.

(conclusion, the first)

The market does not distribute resources efficiently—in fact, capitalism as we now practice it is built on a shocking amount of waste.

This is hardly a surprise to most Food Not Bombs collaborators, of course. A reliable flow of edible waste and other surpluses is what makes their very existence qua Food Not Bombs possible. This won’t surprise a lot of other critics of capitalism, either. But in other circles, the ideological assertion that capitalism is the most (or even only) efficient way to distribute resources still holds sway. At its most
extreme, this philosophy manifests in the prevailing neoliberal economic policies of many governments and financial institutions of the last three decades, which have left the distribution of some very very important things, food and shelter, among them, largely in the hands of “the market.” The thousands of pounds of perfectly viable food I have helped to recover from grocery stands, produce sections, and Dumpsters demonstrate that this faith in the market is flatly wrong.

And more importantly, as some free-market enthusiasts have been quick to point out to me, there is a “market” for this waste: It corresponds to a great deal of want. Supporters of free market capitalism gently remind me that a truly free market ought to simply connect the wasted resources with people willing to consume it. Which, in completely abstract terms, is not unreasonable. But markets are not abstract. In the everyday dealings of commerce, it is often more profitable to throw away the surpluses. The bruised avocado, the day-old bread, the juice that’s close to its “best by” date (not the same as an “expiry” date), to make space on the shelves for newer, picture-perfect goods with more of a cache, for people who can afford to pay for it. Free markets are free to pick and choose their clientele.

To forego such waste therefore, demands taking deliberately anti-capitalist steps. Surpluses could be given away—and indeed often are in various forms, from food bank donations to free samples. (Why hand out new stock when there’s more that’s about to expire?) But this charity doesn’t go on often enough to substantively change the qualitative structures of the market societies that practice it: Dumpster-divers, gleaners, and other kinds of scavengers don’t seem to have run out of waste to scavenge (although they do often make a meal of the free samples at Trader Joe’s or Whole Foods); And the inequalities reflected in the number of people who experience homelessness or hunger in the United States (particularly in world-class cities like Seattle, New York, San Francisco, and other places where I have conducted my research), suggest that the need for non-market redistribution still goes unmet.

These anti-capitalist steps may be small or large. In the middle of the twentieth century, for example, the philosopher Georges Bataille worried about the accumulating surpluses and productive power of Euro-American industry that, needing to be spent somehow, he feared would be channelled into military production and a third massive “world” war. (Looking at the rest of the century, he wasn’t far wrong.) His solution was a sudden emergency wealth dump, a one-off, no-strings-attached gift of massive proportions by the countries with massive surplus industrial production. In the same, albeit more modest spirit, one can imagine a more hybrid sort of economy, in which grocery stores simply set out their surpluses (the bruised avocado, the day-old bread, the aging juice), in front of the store, free for the picking, every other Thursday. A modern-day homage to the Northwest American Indian potlatch (in which individuals’ accumulated wealth was periodically given away in a massive communal celebration). It perhaps sounds naive. I’m certain it would be difficult to implement. But it would surely be a different sort of political-
economic common sense. And for all I know, it might even work. One can also easily imagine the practical criticisms that might be levied by free market demagogues, and struggling retailers alike. But then, the current state of affairs leaves a few million households “food insecure” each year, so it’s clearly not working all that well either.

Less radical stop-gap measures might also be appropriate. More Food Not Bombs chapters couldn’t hurt. Or else, selling the would-be waste for a hefty discount might be a more market-based approximation of my utopian Free Thursdays. And again, in small ways many commercial establishments do this. With respect to food, for example, day-old bagels sell for half-off at my favourite cafes; Some vendors at the Pike Place Market have a dollar table for produce that needs to be eaten quickly; And discount grocery stores like Grocery Outlet serve as a kind of secondary market for less-than-perfect produce. These are valuable strategies, and ought to be multiplied. But all these practices are ultimately undercut by the logic of the market. Without a community-driven or government-mandated incentive, they are moot if they cut into the profitability of the food business. As long as the balance between the cost of raw materials and the spending power and choosy commodity aesthetics of certain sectors of the polity makes it more profitable for retailers to evacuate the shelves to make space for new, more expensive things, the waste is inclined to go on.

This is a particular worry, because Seattle and a growing number of other globalised cities practice a particular brand of late capitalism that puts a lot of its eggs into image-conscious, spectacular, wasteful kinds of consumption. As the global rural-to-urban exodus continues, and an unprecedented majority of the human race looks set to live in large cities, many of those cities will compete in global circuits of world-class consumption. Glorious metropolises have been built on such high ticket consumption, and more will follow, it seems: A shopping trip to Dubai might be a taste of the future for urban economies. This world-class consumption, I would argue, will continue to create a world-class kind of waste, too. And we will need to take measures to prevent it, or accommodate ourselves to the consequences.

(conclusion, the second)

Irrational cultural prejudices against things—particularly waste—are the basis for irrational cultural prejudices against people who consume things differently—particularly the homeless.

I have spent a great deal of time speaking in Seattle with undergraduate classes, high school assemblies, journalists, and colleagues about the implications I have described above. And inevitably an important part of this public scholarship has been to get past a certain disbelief that I, an academic researcher with a comfortable apartment and arguably impeccable fashion sense, would spend my time
exploring the city’s Dumpsters, and would even go so far as to eat what I have found. These conversations, then, tap into a shared cultural economy at work in diverse spaces in the city. In this way, *talking about my research has become part of the research itself*. And the range of responses I’ve received—from incredulity to fascination to nervous laughter—have borne out what the anthropologist Mary Douglas suggested in her seminal work *Purity and Danger* (1984): that a community’s assumptions about what is dirty or clean, dangerous or safe, tell us more about that community’s cultural identity and values than about the material reality of the things of which they’re wary. When I present my research, for example, I almost always take along a sample. (I usually bake cookies from Dumpstered flour and chocolate bars, or if I’m short on time I take a few fruit juice bottles that have been discarded on or near their “best by” date.) And I always consume some myself a few hours earlier, to demonstrate its safety. And even with this reassurance, inevitably there are people in the audience who won’t try it out of an explicitly “grossed out” gut response.

I don’t blame them, of course. Culture is a powerful force. Without it, the economy would not work as it now does. More people would perhaps Dumpster-dive rather than buy their groceries, for example. Perhaps more Dumpsters would be locked or guarded. Indeed, this cultural wariness of aftermarket goods not only inclines people to keep shopping. It also inclines some of them to shop at some places rather than others. Consider the Grocery Outlet I described above, for example. Audience members at my presentations have often pointed to it as a good example of waste reclamation because the food has been passed over by more upscale markets. But they also often comment that they feel uncomfortable shopping there because the food isn’t new or looks a little past its prime. Perhaps even more telling is its common abbreviation, shared even by many people do shop there: “The Gross-Out.”

What’s especially important, though, is not just the way these prejudices—for they are the very definition of prejudice—underwrite an economy. It is also the way they are transferred to people who don’t share these prejudices. In effect, these are people who don’t participate in the economy in the same way: They’re willing to eat out of the garbage, for example; Or, to a lesser extent, to shop at the Gross-Out; Or drink milk that has outlived the date dictated by the company from whom we bought it; And so on. In this vein, for example, news stories on Dumpster-diving sometimes lead with aspersions about its unhealthfulness or grossness, and follow this up with questions about identity theft and other sorts of potential evil-doings associated with the Dumpster (as I described in chapter one). Class-ridden fears of the disease and danger of things discarded by the market, then, are closely related to the stigmas attached to those who don’t adhere to the norms of commercial life. In other words, one of the reasons so many people are so afraid of homeless people, poverty, and other kinds of perceived deviants is simply that *they*
don’t seem to consume the way most people do. This is, of course, linked to other assumptions about their participation or lack thereof in the economy.

Fortunately for me, in this regard, I have the cultural capital to pull off Dumpster-diving. I don’t have racialised stereotypes of criminality, crassness, or dirtiness superimposed on me the moment I walk into a classroom, for instance. And I have a few letters after my name which lend to my words a certain credibility and seem to imply a certain level of socioeconomic success (such are the popular misunderstandings of the academic pay scale). So I am rarely stigmatised in any lasting way in by my Dumpster-diving. (Nonetheless, I’ve taken to wearing a blazer, just in case the added formality helps my audience take me more seriously.)

This stigma is more than simple classism. It is very much wrapped up in a sense of abjection—Julia Kristeva’s word for our visceral sense of dread or disgust at certain hard-to-process experiences (1982). The term perfectly describes the repulsion associated with garbage and other kinds of waste. As one of the directors of Seattle’s (only) dedicated homeless hygiene centre reminded me once, reflecting on the centre’s uphill public relations and public funding battles: Historically, social prejudices have always been framed in terms of hygiene. She cited the Nazis, whose anti-Semitism she said was often couched in terms of a deeply distorted concern for public safety and sanitation. And this is precisely the same distortion brought to bear politically on people who are homeless, or whose forms of consumption are beyond the pale of market-centric civility. Fears of physical abjection, then, become the explicit terms in which prejudices against the homeless are framed: fear of disease, fear of assault or criminality, and a hard-to-name general “grossed out” factor.¹¹⁴

An ethnographic illustration with respect to Seattle might be in order, if for no other reason than to bring the point home in concrete terms, and because I’m still sore about it. Consider the actions of a King County Metro bus driver the other night. A fellow I have gotten to know, little by little, who is probably homeless and who spare-changes in my neighbourhood tried to get onto a bus I happened to be riding. The bus driver wouldn’t let him on. With a forbiddingly outstretched palm, he calmly, smugly intoned, “You have a bad body odour, you may not ride with me.” It was clear that the bus driver had met my acquaintance before—although, for the record, in my experience, his body odour is not all that strong. (I ran into him again on the street earlier today, in fact. I paid closer attention to make sure I was right about that.) All of this happened in a few seconds, and the bus pulled away before I realised what had happened. Before I got off, I tried to plead my acquaintance’s case with the bus driver, who assured me that there were enough free shower facilities in the city that he didn’t need to get on the bus smelling like that. I assured him that I’ve spent a long time researching the network of homeless services available in the city,
and that he was flat fucking wrong about this: There is (as I pointed out earlier) one dedicated hygiene centre, and an inadequate handful of shelters with shower facilities.

I’m not sure how much good my comments did. But the bus driver’s emphasis on hygiene was telling. There are other, perhaps more legitimate reasons he could have cited: My acquaintance is an abrupt, loud talker—I suspect he is autistic, in fact—and it would be easy to mistake him for being confrontational, or to unnecessarily escalate a minor conflict with him. The driver did say they “had trouble” with him before. (There are far more humane ways of dealing with autism spectrum disorder than barring people from public buses, of course.) But that was not the driver’s main problem with him. It was that he smelled bad, and he ought not to have, in the driver’s mind.

This is a fairly blatant example, then, of prejudice being framed in terms of visceral consumption practices—in this case the fact that my acquaintance may not pay for housing, or the associated shower facilities that normally come with it. It’s also not irrelevant to note, too, that the driver was white, while my acquaintance is a person of colour, and that in practice, prejudice is not neatly divisible into racism, classism, anti-homeless prejudice, and so on. That it is an example of racism, classism, or anti-homeless prejudice is bad enough. But there is an additional brutal irony in the fact that without access to public transport, my acquaintance (who walks with a limp, I’ll add) cannot get downtown regularly to take a shower (at the only dedicated public hygiene facility in the city).

Which will bring me to my next point: Such social prejudices not only reflect differences and inequities in consumption practices, they also enforce them.

(conclusion, the third)

*When prejudices based on the way people consume are written into public policy, they not only regulate public space and public life; they also regulate access to resources.*

In a way, this is a fairly logical extension of the previous two conclusions. It is set apart here simply because it is so important. City policies that, in the name of public health and safety tend to exclude people from public life and public spaces on the basis of their non-market practices (sharing food in the park, sleeping rough, and so on), have a direct impact on the ways in which they can access food, shelter, and other resources. If the economy as we now know it is made possible by consumers’ visceral taboos on those things discarded by it, those taboos in effect maintain a particular distribution of resources. In other words, they make sure the waste stays wasted. And if those taboos against wasted resources become the basis for social prejudices against people who consume differently (by Dumpster-diving, food-sharing, squatting, sleeping rough, shopping at the Gross-Out, drinking expired milk, and so on), then those social
prejudices, too, police a certain distribution of resources. This is all the more true when they are written into law.

Throughout my dissertation research, for example, I have recorded some of the ways in which “health and safety” are invoked by city authorities to defend official policies which disproportionately target people who are homeless. Outdoor feeding prohibitions are the example I have spent the most time on. They are a common means of keeping homeless people from congregating in public spaces in very large numbers. City officials don’t frame their reasons so blatantly, but it strikes me as naive or disingenuous to suggest otherwise. They are often defended on the grounds that large outdoor meal programs are dangerous or unhealthy to the public. After volunteering at one of these prohibited outdoor meals for five years, this, too, strikes me as naive or disingenuous. I would argue that what counts as healthy and safe in this case is gravely distorted by the fear and abjection that many people associate with homelessness.

While a certain amount of unruly behaviour is sometimes associated with large free meals, on the rare occasions it becomes physical conflict, it is practically never conflict between perfect strangers, and even less often does it involve both homeless and non-homeless people. In my five years of food sharing, while we followed some basic precautions (we didn’t hand out metal knives, for example) we were never particularly at risk of injury: I witnessed perhaps two fights between people who already knew each other. That’s all. In fact, I would argue, the health and safety risks to a general public (one that includes people without shelter, mind you) are in the long term exacerbated by these sorts of anti-homeless policies, which make life harder, more tenuous, and therefore more violent for people who experience homelessness, and in the long run for everybody who shares the space of the city. One of the implications here is that feeding prohibitions—along with a whole range of anti-homeless measures, “civility” ordinances, “quality of life” laws, and so on—do more harm than good for a city, especially for its most vulnerable citizens, and ought to be scrapped.

While the real value of feeding prohibitions for public health and safety, then, is at best ambiguous, it is clear that they respond to perceptions of health and safety on the part of businesses, residents, and the city officials who are obliged to respond to them. Their official response is, in effect, to dispel the appearance of danger or disorder. The feeling of threat. It is not a stretch, then, to call these policies prejudice writ official.

In a sense, this is understandable, as prejudices, rational or not, can certainly take a toll on the economic stability of a region. (The twentieth century phenomenon of “white flight” from some inner cities to their surrounding suburbs comes to mind, for example.) One implication we could draw from this is that, if prejudice is a legitimate worry for cities, municipal governments might invest in education for their citizens in order to dispel it. (Instead of prohibiting outdoor meal programs, they might offer free re-
education camps to help middle-class white people get over their disdain for homeless people of colour with limited access to hygiene facilities. If that’s even more naive than my “Free Thursdays” idea, I am still only half-joking.)

What is particularly interesting, however, is that while feeding prohibitions like Seattle’s are not specifically designed to keep poor people from eating (or, at least, having interviewed a few of the people involved in establishing them, I’m not cynical enough to believe that they are) what these policies do most effectively is to police the ways in which food can change hands in the public spaces of the city. In other words, in this case, a policy about public space and image is also a kind of de facto food policy.

One of the more serious implications here, then, is that cities like Seattle need to deliberately consider their impact on the city’s food security when establishing policies about public space. Or, indeed, to consider the impact of any regulation of public space on the accessibility of vital resources. (Seattle has taken a similar, promising kind of step in its Race and Social Justice Initiative—in which city agencies are asked to weigh their practices and policies against a benchmark of racial and economic parity: If a policy or statute disproportionately affects one community over another, it is reviewed and revised. One implication of my research, then, is that Seattle and cities like it ought to establish such a benchmark with respect to access to food and shelter.)

This is perhaps not terribly surprising for my Food Not Bombs collaborators, of course, who are often deliberately challenging common political assumptions about homelessness, and who are often at the receiving end of anti-homeless policies. But perhaps a range of other interested parties may find my conclusions here more provocative and productive. To both audiences, I would like to suggest a term that I have found good to think with. I use the term market-public to describe the imagined boundaries drawn around a majority of citizens who adhere to the norms of the market, and whose distorted sense of stability, safety, and decorum, seems to be threatened by the conduct of those people who do not consume as they do. This distinction is rarely stated openly. But it is often implicit in anti-homeless policies, and it has incredibly serious consequences politically and materially.

I’ve been influenced in my thinking here by Michael Warner (2002), who points out that there can never really be a single such thing as “the” public. We are too diverse, speak far too many different languages (literally and metaphorically), and have far too many sources of information and frames of reference to ever really be described as having a unified “public” interest. And yet the modern world is what it is because people have believed in this notion of “the public.” Governments decide what they think is best for it. Journalists report what they think it wants to hear. And so on. So Warner suggests that we think in terms of many publics. Perhaps infinitely many. A conservative public and a progressive public. A punk public, a hippy public, and an academic public. A Spanish-speaking public and an
English-speaking public. And so on. (And of course these often overlap.) A public isn’t like an ethnicity or a subculture, a nation or a party. It doesn’t necessarily share cultural values, opinions, or even prejudices. It simply shares a set of norms for how and about what to communicate. But some publics pass for “the” public, and their shared norms and interests become the focus of concern for public officials. English-speaking public, middle-class public, and White Anglo Saxon Protestant publics, for example, tend to dominate North American politics. In essence, I’m suggesting that market-publics are often mistaken for the public, particularly when cities are determining what sorts of policies to make about public spaces.

Not only are feeding prohibitions a de facto food policy, then. They are a market-centric one at that. They limit the means by which food can circulate in public space primarily to a field of commercial exchange. They stifle alternative sorts of food distribution by which people might avail themselves of the enormous food surpluses of the commercial waste stream. After all, the raw material of Food Not Bombs and other meal programs is often donated (or Dumpstered) commercial food waste.

So in a way, anti-homeless prejudices come full circle: If a visceral prejudice against the reclamation or recirculation of waste serves as the basis for social prejudices against people who might access that waste, those latter social prejudices, levied against homeless people and other deviant consumers, have the indirect effect of impeding the recirculation of waste.

And, of course, there is more at stake than what happens to the food. By way of a reminder (to myself as much as to the reader), as I type this, a friend of mine has just sat down adjacent to me at a local cafe. (I’ve moved on from following the newsfeed described at the outset... writing a conclusion takes some time.) He’s homeless, shuffling between friends’ couches and the street. He tells me he has just spent four days—and his twenty-eighth birthday—in jail for “trespassing.” In other words, for getting caught sleeping in a warm garage adjoining the public library. While a vacant garage is not surplus in precisely the same way that commercial food waste is, I would argue that empty real estate is an equally important kind of waste. There are, after all, at least half a dozen properties sitting vacant in the United States for every shelterless person (as I described in chapter three). In perhaps a less direct way, the fact that these resources go to waste is also a result of implicit market-centric prejudices at work in policy. At any rate, they certainly don’t sit empty because there aren’t people who would rather be sleeping somewhere dry and warm.
(conclusion, the fourth)

In relation to all these exclusions, resistant groups like Food Not Bombs make an important difference (although—to paraphrase Angela Davis—we don’t always make the difference we might think we’re making at the time).

Food Not Bombs, in its own small way, is remaking the terms of urban life. Along with other Do-It-Yourself projects that aim at non-market consumption, such as Homes Not Jails, Really Really Free Markets, couchsurfing.com, and so on, Food Not Bombs makes publicly thinkable and practically viable, on some modest scale, an alternative economy. In other words: Keep it up... what you’re doing is important.

Perhaps this sounds obvious. But there were times when I desperately needed to hear it from someone.

I remember, at twenty-six (I’m thirty-three now), after nearly two years of volunteering with Food Not Bombs—perhaps more participating than observing—already feeling burned out by the work. A Sunday sometimes entailed eleven hectic hours of work, from picking the food up at midday, through transporting it, cooking it, and sharing it, to washing the dishes at the end of the day. There were usually enough people interested in helping to cook—locals, visitors, punks, miscellaneous left-wingers, anarchists. Cooking is the fun part. And almost as many people were available to help serve. Serving can be fun too, although it’s often colder and sometimes wetter. But if it’s not fun per se, it’s edifying in other ways. You learn a lot about yourself and about homelessness. You’re certainly face to face with the short end of the late capitalist stick. And sometimes you get to “fight the cops,” as one of my friends puts it: They are occasionally compelled to clear us out of public spaces, and when they do the resulting nonviolent civil disobedience on the part of Food Not Bombs can be exciting or validating; Attendance at the servings often peaks during these times. In contrast, though, picking up the food and washing the dishes were inevitably lonely tasks. There were rarely more than two of us doing the inglorious work. It was hard to see straight by the time it came to mopping the kitchen floor of whichever outfit was kind enough to lend us their kitchen on a Sunday (including, over five years: three community centres, a Unitarian church, a squat, several shared collective houses, and several tiny apartments). Finding transport was often a problem, but we always managed. We used my car a lot, when I had one. We were late getting down to the park often, but in the five years I was regularly involved, I can only think of once or twice that we didn’t succeed in sharing food with people.
With no permanent kitchen space, just enough money from the odd benefit concert to buy rice and oil, and an ephemeral crew of volunteers for whom Food Not Bombs was often one of far too many commitments (from activism to school to work to family to finding a place to sleep), such consistency was a remarkable accomplishment. But it was easily obscured by the logistical difficulties and frustrations it entailed.

I am not proud to admit that the phrase “pushing shit uphill” occurred to me often that year.

It was also easy to be incensed at the scale of waste and want in the city, and the city’s sometimes mercenary treatment of its most vulnerable citizens. I was already observing the ways in which anti-homeless prejudices had remade public life in Seattle. It was harder to see what we were doing to change it. I remember describing my research to my advisor at the time as the story of how “I fought the law and the law won.”

I’m glad to say I was wrong. But I don’t think I was alone in my exasperation. I’ve interviewed other Food Not Bombs collaborators from Seattle, San Francisco, Melbourne, New York City, Boston, Buffalo and elsewhere who’ve experienced the same kind of burn-out. One Melbourne Food Not Bomber, a middle-aged British ex-pat and punk who was involved for three or four years in the early 2000s, put it succinctly: “It doesn’t matter what chapter, there’s usually someone who’s doing too much.” He went on to reflect on the distribution of labour, saying, “I believe the theory of anarchism, but I don’t know if we could ever get there… I’ve been involved in a few anarchist collectives, and there’s always a few people who don’t want to do fuck all.”

A combination of anarchist labour exploitation and compassion fatigue, then, can often ironically leave us feeling equal parts frantic about the urgency of getting food cooked and transported on time—lest somebody who was hungry go without—and sceptical about what we’re really doing each week—homelessness and hunger don’t seem to do anything but increase, meanwhile, as any grassroots worker will tell you, there’s always too much work to do, and too few hands to do it with not enough resources.

What I lacked when I was twenty-six was exactly the critical distance that Angela Davis drew on in her reflections on the 1960s, cited above. Through this research, I feel as if I’ve found some measure of that perspective. For this, I am eternally grateful to the Food Not Bombs collaborators who were willing to be interviewed. Particularly those people who had the benefit both of years of dedicated volunteering and of subsequent years of reflection and observation.

It has been especially cathartic to interview a range of former Food Not Bombs “bottom liners”—a common anarchist term (described in chapter six) for people who have taken on added responsibility for simply making sure certain things get done. In Food Not Bombs’ case, this meant watching the clock,
making sure the floors were mopped at the end of the day, arranging transportation each week, finding the next kitchen space when access the current one inevitably ran out, and so on. One young woman from New York City, described to me, for example, times when she had no help picking up donated food from a local grocery store. She had to, on her own, carry the produce in buckets for several blocks, down to the subway and over to the kitchen at ABC No Rio. Enough food, mind you, to make a meal for the dozens of people who meet Food Not Bombs in Tompkins Square Park each week. She stopped bottom-lining not long after that, if my memory serves me.

These conversations have been more than cathartic, though. They have helped remind me of the compassion and commitment at work. In an earlier draft of the conclusion, I wrote that in Food Not Bombs, “the division of labour in grassroots organisations is not necessarily more equitable than in the for-profit economy,” to which another former bottom-liner replied that the problem is the exact opposite. She wrote:

I think that frustration, which I certainly felt at times too, comes from being accustomed to a hierarchical and individualistic society… feeling compelled – by yourself – to do something yourself, in order that it gets done, is not the same as inequity. It’s entirely equitable actually, that those who want to see it done, whether it’s finding a new kitchen or mopping the floor instead of just leaving, or doing the pick-up by bike instead of by car, if that’s how they think it should be done, do it, instead of telling someone else to. If anything the difficulty is that it’s way more equitable then we’re generally used to.

Quite so. Equity is not parity. The point, which she underlines beautifully, is that these movements represent a critical mass of uncoerced—perhaps at times unrequited—caring labour. One large enough not only to sustain something like Food Not Bombs, but to expand it from a single chapter in Boston three decades ago into a kind of anarchist “franchise” (as one dry-witted Melbourne bottom-liner described it to me) in hundreds of cities on six continents. This kind of shared caring labour is, in itself, significant. And though the work of washing the dishes or mopping the floor is often not as visible or storied as Food Not Bombs’ more controversial endeavours—its civil disobedience in response to feeding prohibitions, for example—Food Not Bombs and similar projects would be impossible without it.

Jill Friedberg, a well-known Seattle film-maker who has documented some of the most significant moments in recent protest history (she made This Is What Democracy Looks Like about the massive 1999 anti-WTO protests in Seattle) recently put this into perspective for me. She told me that at film screenings in the US, one of the first questions audiences often ask is whether the protesters “won.” But when she has screened them elsewhere in the Americas and the Global South, her audiences have often been concerned less with “winning” than with the dignity and solidarity cultivated through protest. These are distinctly cultural, rather than political goals. And precisely the kind of intangible but thoroughly
consequential social realities anthropological research like mine ought to pay attention to. But at twenty-
six, I think I was still partly in the spell of anarchist rhetoric about “overthrowing” or “abolishing”
capitalism. Although I hardly considered myself a revolutionary, and didn’t even claim to be an anarchist
in any strict doctrinal sense, the very metaphor of political work as a “battle”—a militarised, partisan
ontology of absolutes and either-or thinking, all too common in anarchist circles—made it hard for me to
see the kinds of dignity, solidarity, and community our work was making possible in that very moment.

In other words, the caring labour of Food Not Bombs is its own “victory.” Through it, and the caring
relationships which it cultivates—both among Food Not Bombs collaborators and between them and the
people with whom they eat publicly—a sort of politics and economy are created that are qualitatively
different from those of the market-public I described earlier.

This is made manifest in all kinds of ways, many of which I have described in my dissertation. One of
the most important must be the long-term friendships and relationships of mutual aid developed among
Food Not Bombs volunteers: Many of the people I interviewed who were no longer directly involved
remain connected to people they worked with years before, as volunteers. (These networks were, in fact,
how I came to know a number of interviewees.) In some cases they are engaged in related political and
economic projects—many original Seattle Food Not Bombers are engaged now in organic farming, for
example. For this reason, more than one Food Not Bombs collaborator has described it as a kind of
“gateway activism.” Moreover, friendships and relationships of mutual aid formed through the shared
joys, frustrations, and labours of an all-consuming project like Food Not Bombs are deeply felt and
enduring. (I am hopeful that some of my own friends and former collaborators will read these lines, and I
trust this conveys my love, gratitude, and enduring political and personal commitment to them
adequately.) It is worth observing, for example that while in graduate school, when I’ve needed help
moving a filing cabinet, storing a few suitcases, or to make other kinds of impositions on my friends’
property and labour, I’ve often felt awkward asking for help from my graduate school friends. Such
caring labour is not the currency of any but my closest friendships in these realms. But many of my Food
Not Bombs friends have quite unselfconsciously given what help they could (including passing a critical
eye over the present work). And I have tried to reciprocate at other times—from helping friends move or
cat-sit to lending them my couch when they’ve had nowhere else to stay.

These kinds of long-term connections and caring reciprocities are, of course, not exclusive to Food
Not Bombs, but they are certainly distinctive about it, and about other similar anarchist projects. And they
lend a dense texture of reciprocity and interconnection to life in the various countercultural scenes of
which Food Not Bombs is a part. In the introduction to this dissertation, for example, I told the story of
the Food Not Bombs version of the “six degrees of Kevin Bacon” game: Any two of my Food Not Bombs
acquaintances from around the United States and Australia, I discovered through offhand conversations, could be linked through no more than five degrees of separation in their personal networks. (All without including me, mind you. That would be cheating.) This was true about three or four years ago, at least, and it probably still is. I told a good friend about this—a middle-aged Seattle anarchist, punk, and former Food Not Bombs collaborator who has travelled extensively in the US and Europe with punks and punk bands. Based on these travels, he replied, “Well, that’s punk rock for you.” In other words, these kinds of reciprocities, often based on the kind of caring labour and mutual aid I’ve described, are themselves the basis for larger scenes and social movements.

The caring labour of Food Not Bombs, and the enduring connections that come from it, then, amount to more than simply networks of friendship. As I’ve said, they make possible politics and economies that are qualitatively different from those of the market-public. It is not only close friendships, after all, that are the subject of caring labour and mutual aid, and that benefit from the social scenes created thereby. Through Food Not Bombs and similar DIY projects, complete strangers may also find food, shelter, information, and community.

I would like to suggest another term that has helped me to think about the kinds of larger communities or social formations that are made of such caring labour and social reciprocity: a counterpublic. A counterpublic is one of the many different publics I mentioned earlier. But it is distinctive because it cannot take its publicness for granted the way some others can. So we could talk about a punk counterpublic, or an African-American counterpublic, or a queer counterpublic, or Mormon counterpublic, and so on. A counterpublic’s norms and interests are excluded from predominant publics in exactly the way that I described forms of non-market consumption being excluded from public space earlier. Food Not Bombs and the caring relationships that make it, I would argue, represent a non-market kind of counterpublic. The fact that this counterpublic exists, then, makes it more possible to live, and to reimagine one’s life, in non-market terms.

All of these things are far from the Sisyphus-like task I imagined I was carrying out when I was twenty-six, frustrated at having too few hands to wash too many dishes, without seeing an improvement in homelessness, hunger, or public policy. And it’s true, if one thinks about our impact on that scale, it was not very direct—except in the sense that we made sure there were a few dozen full bellies on a Sunday night. Food Not Bombs’ work was never, I reminded myself often, going to single-handedly bring about the end of homelessness, hunger, or unfair public policies. But Food Not Bombs’ work only seems unsuccessful or unfulfilling if we accept the metaphors of battle, overthrow, and abolishing as the measure of our successes. The irony of this is, of course, that these metaphors, often embraced by anarchists, are mainly metaphors of the state. (Even “justice,” a fundamental watchword for many radical
activists, is at its roots a state-centric idea.) They’re not very useful metaphors, in my opinion. And, at any rate, to paraphrase David Graeber’s earlier question, we might ask: When has social change ever happened by replacing, wholesale, one thing we don’t like with another thing we do like? What now seems obvious to me, at thirty-three, having pursued this research project for nearly eight years, is that counterpublic politics and economics don’t need to overthrow the prevailing structure of society to be important. It is enough that they exist.

In thinking this, I’m also taking my cues from J. K. Gibson Graham’s book, The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It) (1996). In the book, the authors (two feminist geographers who write under a single name) suggest that one of the most dangerous parts of capitalism as we now practice it (that is a key distinction for them) is simply our belief in its absoluteness. This is true both of pro-capitalist ideologues and anti-capitalist activists, they suggest. They both suffer a crisis of vision exactly like the one I’ve described in twenty-six-year-old me. In a way, we’ve mistakenly swallowed Margaret Thatcher’s dictum, “there is no alternative.” We’ve mistaken a market-public for the public.

In their follow-up book, then, A Post-Capitalist Politics (2006), they suggest that “post-capitalist” kinds of economies aren’t simply something that will have to wait until after capitalism’s revolutionary overthrow. Rather, they suggest, these kinds of economies are happening now, in tandem with capitalist economies. And they are growing. Food Not Bombs’ own growth over the last thirty years is hard evidence that they were right. One woman from New York City who bottom-lined there for several years in the late 1990s (and in the process became a long-term squatter and a radical freelance writer to boot) described her initial reasons for getting involved in Food Not Bombs: “This is something hands-on that I can do. It’s not some weird theoretical thing that may or may not happen—like ‘Come the revolution, we will eradicate hunger.’ It’s like, ‘Oh! No, I can chop vegetables and wash dishes.’ Great. Wonderful. And I saw concrete results by the end of the day.”

These approaches to social and economic change echo a much more organic metaphor that is also common in anarchist politics, in contrast to radical clichés of battle and overthrow: the notion of “growing the new society in the shell of the old.” This strikes me as a much more useful metaphor.

Even this more fluid metaphor could be mistaken as describing a kind of separateness between oppressive and liberatory social structures, of course. But in practice, the distinction between “the new society” and “the shell of the old” is much less clear. In fact, one fairly provocative conclusion I have come to through this research is that Food Not Bombs—and maybe in some ways anarchism more generally—could be thought of as symbiotic with the state and capitalism. That’s perhaps not what a lot of people want to hear (radicals, capitalists and state representatives alike). But it has emerged from this research as surely as my other conclusions. In its seminal years in San Francisco, for example, during the
late 1980s, Food Not Bombs’ rapid growth was provoked precisely by state repression (as I pointed out in chapter five, and as Parson has described in more detail [Parson 2010]). One man I quoted in chapter five, who was heavily involved in the San Francisco chapter during these very first rounds of police harassment, explained this poignantly enough to duplicate the same passage here: “If the police had a brain in their head they would have just ignored us. Right? And we would have just become another weird part of the landscape. And they just could’ve waited us out. And we would have, you know, eventually become bored and moved on, and done something else.” And, at the same time, San Francisco Food Not Bombs members often adopted strategies and public positions that were deliberately provocative, which led at times to more explicit, more aggressive anti-feeding efforts by the San Francisco government. (Parson’s work goes into these at more length, and quite even-handedly, acknowledging Food Not Bombs’ role as its own kind of agent provocateur without simply blaming the group for ensuing state repression; see Parson 2010). In my research, I have observed some of these kinds of mutual influences in smaller ways in other cities as well (as I have described in chapter five). And, of course, Food Not Bombs also owes a debt to capitalism (as we know it): Food Not Bombs is only possible and only necessary as a result of the waste and the disparities produced by market-publics.

These symbiotic entanglements are only a problem for us if we frame our political work according to an ideological blueprint or a battle-plan. The value of organic metaphors, then, is that they can help us to think about politics in an ecological rather than an ideological way—in terms of concrete relationships and influences, rather than identities, antagonisms, and “isms.”

This “ecology” has some valuable implications for Food Not Bombs’ relationship with prevailing, market-centric public spheres. It turns our attention to the ways that the fact of their existence carries into these other spheres and spaces. In doing so, they have consequences for how they are able to imagine public life. Exclusions, after all, are not just exclusions: They define the spaces and the social structures doing the excluding, as well. This makes them productive spaces for resistance. Particularly resistance like Food Not Bombs, which is made possible, necessary, and probably inevitable by the combination of waste, want, and access I have described in my research. Among other things, this can simply mean that people talk a lot about Food Not Bombs. Government officials. Homeless advocates. A larger public who are by turns offended at its acts of civil disobedience, and offended that city authorities would see fit to prohibit them. Food Not Bombs frames their discourse in small but important ways. In fact, it serves as something of a lightning rod for discussion. For instance, it is one of the first examples cited in many of the publications I have read by homeless advocates challenging the criminalisation of homelessness. And it is a name spoken with frustrated familiarity by some city officials and employees to whose conversations I have been privy (as I described in chapter four). It is also, moreover, discussed in cafés
and living rooms, particularly when its conflicts with city government earn a degree of media coverage. (I have occasionally overheard these conversations in Seattle, and felt some satisfaction that our efforts don’t go unnoticed.) These discussions are all important threads in the fabric of urban public life.

The woman I mentioned a moment ago (who didn’t want to wait for the revolution to eradicate hunger) also went on to make a related point. One that, I think, is also echoed in Gibson-Graham’s work, and in some of the other conversations I have had with former bottom-liners. Through her involvement in Food Not Bombs, the woman said:

I think I became a lot less tolerant of the “isms”—that you, like, sit around and have meetings and nothing concrete comes of it. Or we sell newspapers. Or sort of all those “isms” that don’t seem to actually do anything that you can see, or is tangible. So I think that’s both for anarch-ism and anarch-ists that sit in meetings and don’t tend to do anything, and other “ists” that tend to do that. So I think it [my involvement in Food Not Bombs] sort of really reduced my tolerance for that.

Several other bottom-liners I have spoken with emphasised a similar distinction between Food Not Bombs’ tangible, caring labour and various ideological kinds of symbolic or identity-based cultural work. When I ran into the San Francisco volunteer I quoted above, for example, at Occupy Seattle, he pointed out to me what he called dog-whistle anarchists: People who with whom he was largely in agreement on paper, but who he was leery of because, he said, they had a hard time reconciling themselves to dualities and couldn’t quite relax until they heard a certain coded political vocabulary repeated by the people around them, reflecting their ideological agreement—their shared “ism.”

In a way, if J. K. Gibson-Graham are right, these shared isms are largely beside the point. If post-capitalist economies already co-exist with capitalist ones, then social and economic change doesn’t depend on an ideological purity of analysis. It can be pluralist. Rather, it depends on a diversification and dissemination of new non-market economic practices.

This is one of the things that makes Food Not Bombs so valuable, then. Not only does it redistribute resources in a non-market way, it does this without regard for the finer ideological differences of its collaborators. Beyond a certain practical acceptance of waste reclamation, direct action, and vegetarian cooking, there is no doctrinal agreement required to chop carrots together. Food Not Bombs collaborators do occasionally suffer from the same intolerance of difference you might expect to find in any political organisation. But what is remarkable about Food Not Bombs is the diversity of identities and backgrounds of people who come together around the kitchen. In my time working in Seattle, I have worked with punks, hippies, Microsoft employees, homeless people, biology graduate students, ecologists, marine biologists, queer playwrights, Quakers, Sikhs, single mothers, self-confessed apolitical stoners, military recruits, and others. Most of these are not ideological distinctions, but in a way, that’s the
point. They represent a diverse spectrum of experiences and perspectives that are not usually codified ideologically. Perhaps Food Not Bombs greatest strength, then, is its role as a contact zone—a kind of “mutable space” where people from different classes and social spaces come together and develop shared political projects and shared mutual understandings in spite of their divergent perspectives (Lawson and Elwood, in press).

In practical terms, then, this might mean a few things. It might serve as a call to chapters of Food Not Bombs to be yet more mindful of those moments in which ideological intolerances still surface in the kitchen. And to further develop the skills to facilitate communication and collaboration across difference. In other words, to cultivate the most diverse spaces and personnel possible without sacrificing basic practices of consensus, direct action, and waste reclamation. (Who knows, maybe this means recruiting volunteers at Tea Party rallies?) As David Graeber points out in Direct Action: An Ethnography (2009), suspicion of political difference (and a related paranoia about state intervention) is often more of a hindrance than a help to radical projects. And while one of Food Not Bombs’ strengths is that it works as a kind of radically open space, these suspicions and antagonisms still surface at times. Political or sociocultural differences can be read unnecessarily (in my opinion) as dangerous, for example. I’m thinking, for example, of the military recruit who volunteered at Food Not Bombs once or twice, who some of my collaborators suspected of spying for the military on Food Not Bombs. While this is not completely impossible, it strikes me as more likely that what was read as “suspicious” might easily have been awkwardness and political difference. On other occasions, difference has simply been tacitly discouraged, as more “mainstream” potential volunteers have met with a tepid or indifferent welcome. Describing these tendency in punk and anarchist politics, one Seattle Food Not Bombs volunteer (quoted in chapter five) described his first impressions at different chapters as “the closed-minded scene of the ‘open-minded’ people.”

Treating Food Not Bombs as a contact zone, then, might also mean that we, as activists, could redirect our energies away from the kind of fractious ideological posturing that does little to cultivate alternative economies. In a similar vein for instance, I recall that each time I visited Occupy Seattle, whether to help share food with protesters or simply to add my body to the mass of people there, there were bitter debates going on privately or in the larger assemblies about whether or not the police were working-class allies of “the 99%” whom protesters represented rhetorically, or whether they were “our enemies,” as some people put it. These debates inevitably extended into diatribes about whether or not protesters could use violence in response to police action. (The Seattle General Assembly spent interminable amounts of time on this issue, and could not even come to a consensus that protesters should use only violence in self-defence.) These debates, of course, reflected the kind of embattled either-or
thinking I described earlier. And they were beside the point: Police *qua* police are *neither* friends nor enemies. They are simply police, contracted and trained to obey the specific orders and protocols of government. They were certainly not going to be talked into letting protesters stay if they had orders to disperse them. And by the same token, antagonising them and yelling epithets at them—which was not the norm, but which happened often enough to be a concern—was going to accomplish precisely nothing, except perhaps to encourage the worst of them to use more force than they might already be inclined to use to break up the protest. The time spent debating over how to think about police and about violence could have better been spent, in my humble opinion, discussing specific tactics, sharing resources, inventing more creative slogans, and so on—all the wonderful things that people involved in Occupy Seattle did a lot of when they weren’t fighting the cops in their minds. Food Not Bombs doesn’t generally suffer from this degree of ideological vexation. But it is a latent potential, as both Food Not Bombs and Occupy Seattle draw personnel from similar pools. Particularly in moments of conflict with state agencies around feeding prohibitions, this conclusion might come in handy.

**(more and more to do)**

What is so encouraging about Food Not Bombs, and why, burned-out as I have felt at times, I continue to embrace the project and will continue to work with it in whatever capacities I can (now that my dissertation is finished), is that Food Not Bombs, and projects like it offer a way forward, a kind of radical, non-market politics and economy that are not based on antagonisms. That are more compassionate than ideological, founded in caring labour and ecological thinking rather than metaphors of battle and justice. For this reason, while Food Not Bombs collaborators have not always been immune to ideological feuds and a suspicious approach of difference, collaborators inevitably spend much more of their time simply practicing a new kind of counterpublic economy. Those people, in particular, who invest the caring labour in bottom-lining—in the inglorious, often invisible labour not of fighting the cops but of washing the dishes—have taught me a great deal about how to build a new politics and a new economy. They have, in Ani DiFranco’s immortal words, “less and less to prove,” and “more and more to do.”

It is, of course, difficult to gauge what sort of a difference these kinds of cultural kinds of resistance really make because culture doesn’t work in the sort of way that one can gauge, really. But, as I have suggested, Food Not Bombs makes thinkable alternate forms of economy and politics that many people outside of its immediate sphere can’t help but respond to. They not only redistribute commercial surpluses, but they model a different kind of consumption, different kinds of cross-class social relationships, and a different mode of living-in-public than those that define a market-public. They help to set the terms of public life in the city—in perhaps a more limited way than the market-publics I have
written about, but in ways that are nonetheless significant. And at the same time, they are part of a larger counterpublic which makes survival itself possible for many of those people who have been excluded from the larger economic and public spheres of the city.

In all of the ways I have described above, then, I believe that Food Not Bombs represents one important part of the future of radical activism and urban living. Occupy Wall Street (Food Not Bombs’ larger, flashier, younger cousin), for example, wouldn’t have been possible without the pre-existence of the kinds of networks and counterpublics of activists who had cut their teeth on other decentralised forms of activism like Food Not Bombs. (In the spirit of historical perspective, my fellow bottom-liner and impromptu editor, quoted earlier, reminds me that Food Not Bombs, in turn, owes its founders and tactics to the anti-nuclear protests of the 1970s, which owed theirs to the Vietnam marches of the 1960, and they, theirs, to the Civil Rights movements before them, on back to something like the beginning of resistance.) And while Occupy Wall Street was in some ways more prominent and more infamous, it was also something like the tip of an iceberg. Food Not Bombs is one small part of the bottom nine tenths of that iceberg. It has grown steadily and extensively for thirty years, and with any luck, it will continue to do so.
Notes

Introduction

1 See Sassen 2011: 1.

2 The Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority has been conducting pedestrian counts since 1977, typically three to four times each year—counting 57,000 pedestrians at the market on a single Sunday in August, for example (Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority 2009).

3 The one of the movement’s “founders,” who helped to start the first two chapters in Boston and San Francisco, maintains a web page listing of Food Not Bombs chapters around the world, based on a combination of electronic or in-person contact with these groups and web-based research. (For more see: http://foodnotbombs.net/contacts.html)

4 In this game, one attempts to connect a given film or television celebrity to Kevin Bacon by association with other actors who have worked with Bacon, or worked with somebody who worked with him, or somebody who worked with somebody who worked with him, and so on.

5 The “many headed hydra” is a term used by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker to describe the socially and geographically diverse, transnational proletariat unified in its relationship to landowners and power brokers under the conditions of European colonialism, slavery, and agrarian capitalism during the seventeenth century (Linebaugh and Rediker 2000). Their use of the notion seems to foreshadow the postmodern transnational proletariat described by Hardt and Negri as a “Multitude” (2004), which partly inspires the transnational scope of this study.

Part One, Prologue

(no endnotes listed)

Part One, Chapter One

6 Steinbeck’s moving passage from the Grapes of Wrath is worth quoting at length:

“The decay spreads over the State, and the sweet smell is a great sorrow on the land. Men who can graft the trees and make the seed fertile and big can find no way to let the hungry people eat their produce. Men who have created new fruits in the world cannot create a system whereby their fruits may be eaten. And the failure hangs over the State like a great sorrow.

“The works of the roots of the vines, of the trees, must be destroyed to keep up the price, and this is the saddest, bitterest thing of all. Carloads of oranges dumped on the ground. The people came for miles to take the fruit, but this could not be. How would they buy oranges at twenty cents a dozen if they could drive out and pick them up?

“And men with hoses squirt kerosene on the oranges, and they are angry at the crime, angry at the people who have come to take the fruit. A million people hungry, needing the fruit—and kerosene sprayed over the golden mountains.

“And the smell of rot fills the country.

“Burn coffee for fuel in the ships. Burn corn to keep warm, it makes a hot fire. Dump potatoes in the rivers and place guards along the banks to keep the hungry people from fishing them out. Slaughter the pigs and bury them, and let the putrescence drip down into the earth.
“There is a crime here that goes beyond denunciation. There is a sorrow here that weeping cannot symbolize. There is a failure here that topples all our success. The fertile earth, the straight tree rows, the sturdy trunks, and the ripe fruit. And children dying of pellagra must die because a profit cannot be taken from an orange. And coroners must fill in the certificate—died of malnutrition—because the food must rot, must be forced to rot.

“The people come with nets to fish for potatoes in the river, and the guards hold them back; they come in rattling cars to get the dumped oranges, but the kerosene is sprayed. And they stand still and watch the potatoes float by, listen to the screaming pigs being killed in a ditch and covered with quick-lime, watch the mountains of oranges slop down to a putrefying ooze; and in the eyes of the people there is the failure; and in the eyes of the hungry there is a growing wrath. In the souls of the people the grapes of wrath are filling and growing heavy, growing heavy for the vintage.”

(Steinbeck 2006 [1939]: pp. 348-349, my emphasis)

8 This is an allusion to the title of The Social Life of Things, an edited volume dealing with the anthropology of commodities and other cultural goods (Appadurai 1986).
9 The USDA has tracked both “food loss,” referring to the total amount of food thrown away in the United States (e.g. Muth et al. 2011), and “food waste,” referring to foods thrown away that may have been recoverable (see above).
10 The term “crust punk” refers to an element of punk rock counter-culture defined musically by highly political, dark lyrics (even by punk-rock standards) and heavy-metal-influenced guitar riffs, and culturally by a lifestyle of itinerancy, hitchhiking, and squatting; Dumpster-diving, spare-changing, and often heavy drinking. A “crust punk,” “crusty punk,” or, simply, “crusty,” is also someone who listens to crust punk and practices this mode of life. The “crust” in question describes the bodily consequences of a lack of regular access to shower facilities.
11 Over the last decade, or so, for example, the quantity of vacant housing stock in the US has steadily risen, from 13.677 million vacancies, or 12 percent of the total housing stock, in 2001, to 18.574 million vacancies, or 14 percent of the total housing stock, in 2011. This increase was piqued slightly by the recession in 2009, but the overall increase was consistent throughout that period (Callis and Kresin 2011).
12 During 2010, for example, according to the World Bank, global food prices have risen to near the levels of the 2008 food crisis, pushing an estimated 44 million people into poverty (Poverty Reduction and Equity Group 2011: 6).
13 The United Nations Environment Programme, for example, has cited inefficiencies in the global food system, resulting in massive food waste, as a direct contributor to food crises like the 2008 price hikes (Nellemann et al. 2009).
14 Between August of 2008, at the outset of the crisis, and the end of the following year, December 2009, Food Stamp participation increased nationally from 29 million people to a record 39 million—or one in eight Americans (Food Resource and Action Center 2009). In Seattle, average monthly foodbank visits increased from just over 80,000 at the beginning of 2007 to over 100,000 in the second quarter of 2008, at the outset of the crisis; they remained at that rate at the end of 2009; at the same time, the local county’s food stamp participation almost doubled between October 2007 and April 2010, with the sharpest increase beginning in October 2008 (United Way).
15 As part of President Roosevelt’s New Deal, for example, the federal government subsidized the slaughter of food animals, the dumping of milk, and the burning of food crops in order to diminish the supply and stabilize declining prices. At the same time, Michael Honey argues that during the Depression many producers, including farmers, simply produced goods at a higher profit margin by simultaneously laying workers off and speeding up production. He points to the contrast between wealthy land-owners and destitute sharecropping tenant farmers in the Arkansas Mississippi River Delta: landlords claimed during the Depression that there was a crisis of overproduction by farmers, forcing prices and wages down, while at the same time about 900,000 of those tenant farmers were evicted from their farms by Arkansas landlords, and finding themselves unemployed, homeless, and food-insecure (Honey, N.d.).
In 1996, food represented 22.2 percent of all commercial waste sampled in Seattle (Cascadia Consulting et al. 1997); in 2000, it represented 25.0 percent (Cascadia Consulting 2002); in 2004, 29.9 percent (Cascadia Consulting et al 2005); and in the first half of 2008, it represented 31.6 percent (Cascadia Consulting et al. 2008).

According to the USDA: “Except for infant formula… product dating is not generally required by Federal regulations. However, if a calendar date is used, it must express both the month and day of the month (and the year, in the case of shelf-stable and frozen products). If a calendar date is shown, immediately adjacent to the date must be a phrase explaining the meaning of that date such as ‘sell-by’ or ‘use before.’” (USDA Fact Sheet).

According to Forbes Magazine, the wealthiest four hundred Americans had increased their net worth by two percent, or 30 billion dollars, in 2008 (Miller and Greenberg 2008).

Rathje and Murphy note that the distinction between “trash,” “garbage,” “refuse,” and “rubbish” emerged at a time when cities separated their garbage into wet and dry: “Trash” referred to discards that were “at least theoretically dry,” they note, such as newspaper, boxes and cans; “Garbage” referred to the wet discards such as food remains, yard waste, and offal, which were slopped to feed pigs in some US cities until the 1950s; “Refuse” referred to both of these categories collectively; “Rubbish” was even more inclusive, referring to both refuse and construction and demolition debris (Rathje and Murphy: 1992: 9).

I adopt this term from Mary Douglas (1984), who used it to refer to the cultural “location” of dirt. The etymology of the term refers, literally, to the outside boundary of a polity or community, marked by a “pale” or stake in the ground; its current use to denote socially unacceptable behaviour, then, illustrates the relevance of the spatialised “inside-outside” distinction I make here.

Rathje and Murphy (1992) noted that scrap metal represented account for up to three quarters of all ocean-borne bulk cargo that leaves the Port of New York and New Jersey—1.6 million long tons every year.

In Melbourne, Australia, for example, trash becomes the legal property of the contracted waste disposal company once placed in the Dumpster, although this certainly varies depending on local ordinances (See Edwards and Mercer 2007).

The United States Supreme Court held in 1988, in California versus Greenwood, that law enforcement does not require a warrant to search a suspect’s trash.

The Centre for Science and the Environment in India made this estimate based on the total social cost of the carbon footprint of a burger grown on clear-cut land (Dunne 1994), however Raj Patel (2009) points out that this cost does not reflect agricultural subsidies to the beef industry.

These terms are, of course, not literal descriptions, but employed by news media to describe the stockpiling in warehouses of dairy products by the European Union to subsidise its dairy exports. While this practice was suspended in 2007, it was temporarily reinstated in 2009 (Waterfield 2009).

In 2009, for example, a group of California dairy farmers spearheaded a national campaign to dump the milk of an anticipated two million cows, to counteract low dairy prices (Foster 2009). The same year, Belgian dairy farmers dumped an estimated three million litres of milk for the same reason (Hornby and Felix 2009).

Consider, for example, some of the reader responses to recent coverage of my research in the Seattle Times (Long 2011), indicating the degree of revulsion inspired by the Dumpster:

“Sometimes I start to think “hey maybe Dumpster-diving wouldn’t be so bad”.….. then I remember the things I throw away in Dumpsters.”

“Obama has reduced us to the level of rats: eating out of Dumpsters.”

“Sorry Dumpsters diving dudes and duddettes, but Dumpster-diving will always be gross.”

“I’ve got a great way for this 31 year-old who is still in college to help solve hunger. Get a job and donate part of your salary to the food bank.”

“when did people become so angry? The comments page has evolved in a hate filled diatribe from the readers. Everybody just wants to complain.” (sic.)
One article from Orange County, for example, associates Dumpster-diving explicitly with “collecting printed information that could be used to steal someone’s identity” or (inexplicably) “scavengers [who] have been caught swiping bikes and other stuff from garages” without describing any other sort of Dumpster-diving at all (“OC Cities Want To Stop Trash Scavengers” January 31, 2011). And in recent coverage of my own work by local media, question of the legality of Dumpster-diving received as many column-inches of text as the question of food-insecurity, and more than the scale of the waste—which I attempt to foreground in my interview (see McNerthy 2001).

An incomplete list of important things I have learned from Dumpster-divers: 1) Basic food safety principles are more useful than expiry dates; 2) Cooked starches like rice or tofu are good growth media for spoilage bacteria, and should be discarded or cooked thoroughly to kill these contaminants; 3) Sprouts and cantaloupe both may grow e-coli and botulism on their surfaces, respectively, if left at room temperature for too long; 4) Anything with an impermeable package or skin can be washed and even passed through a sinkful of water with a capful of bleach in it, and then rinsed (this is how plates are often sanitized in restaurants).

Douglas writes, “In the course of any imposing of order, whether in the mind, or in the external world, the attitude to rejected bits and pieces goes through two stages. First, they are recognisably out of place, a threat to good order, and so are regarded as objectionable and vigorously brushed away. At this stage, they have some identity: they can be seen to be unwanted bits of whatever it was they came from, hair or food or wrappings. This is the state at which they are dangerous; their half identity still clings to them and the clarity of the scene in which they can be seen to be unwanted bits and pieces goes through two stages. First, they are recognisably out of place, a threat to good order, and so are regarded as objectionable and vigorously brushed away. At this stage, they have some identity: they can be seen to be unwanted bits of whatever it was they came from, hair or food or wrappings. This is the state at which they are dangerous; their half identity still clings to them and the clarity of the scene in which they obtrude is impaired by their presence. But a long process of pulverizing, dissolving and rotting awaits any physical things that have been recognized as dirt. In the end, all identity is gone” (Douglas 1984: 197)

Kafka’s short story, Before the Law (from The Trial, 1971) is worth quoting here:

‘Before the law sits a gatekeeper. To this gatekeeper comes a man from the country who asks to gain entry into the law. But the gatekeeper says that he cannot grant him entry at the moment. The man thinks about it and then asks if he will be allowed to come in sometime later on. “It is possible,” says the gatekeeper, “but not now.” The gate to the law stands open, as always, and the gatekeeper walks to the side, so the man bends over in order to see through the gate into the inside. When the gatekeeper notices that, he laughs and says: “If it tempts you so much, try going inside in spite of my prohibition. But take note. I am powerful. And I am only the most lowly gatekeeper. But from room to room stand gatekeepers, each more powerful than the other. I cannot endure even one glimpse of the third.” The man from the country has not expected such difficulties: the law should always be accessible for everyone, he thinks, but as he now looks more closely at the gatekeeper in his fur coat, at his large pointed nose and his long, thin, black Tartar’s beard, he decides that it would be better to wait until he gets permission to go inside. The gatekeeper gives him a stool and allows him to sit down at the side in front of the gate. There he sits for days and years. He makes many attempts to be let in, and he wears the gatekeeper out with his requests. The gatekeeper often interrogates him briefly, questioning him about his homeland and many other things, but they are indifferent questions, the kind great men put, and at the end he always tells him once more that he cannot let him inside yet. The man, who has equipped himself with many things for his journey, spends everything, no matter how valuable, to win over the gatekeeper. The latter takes it all but, as he does so, says, “I am taking this only so that you do not think you have failed to do anything.” During the many years the man observes the gatekeeper almost continuously. He forgets the other gatekeepers, and this first one seems to him the only obstacle for entry into the law. He curses the unlucky circumstance, in the first years thoughtlessly and out loud; later, as he grows old, he only mumbles to himself. He becomes childish and, since in the long years studying the gatekeeper he has also come to know the fleas in his fur collar, he even asks the fleas to help him persuade the gatekeeper. Finally his eyesight grows weak, and he does not know whether things are really darker around him or whether his eyes are merely deceiving him. But he recognizes now in the darkness an illumination which breaks inextinguishably out of the gateway to the law. Now he no longer has much time to live. Before his death he gathers in his head all his experiences of the entire time up into one question which he has not yet put to the gatekeeper. He waves to him, since he can no longer lift up his stiffening body. The gatekeeper has to bend down to him, for the great difference has changed things considerably to the disadvantage of the man. “What do you still want to know now?” asks the gatekeeper. “You are insatiable.” “Everyone strives after the law,” says the man, “so how is it that in these many years no one except me has requested entry?” The gatekeeper sees that the man is already dying and, in order to reach his diminishing sense
of hearing, he shouts at him, “Here no one else can gain entry, since this entrance was assigned only to you. I’m going now to close it.”

(Kafka 1971)

32 Insofar as “cookedness,” embodies a set of social relations in a fetishistic way, and insofar as Appadurai’s definition of a commodity, as any item whose exchangeability is its primary characteristic, is generalisable to non-market-based societies, then the notions of commodity fetishism and alienation might be usefully generalisable to non-market-based societies. (The inner unity between structuralist analysis and Appadurai’s model, and their shortcomings, are dealt with further along in this inquiry.) Weiss’ (1996) work is a promising example, exploring embodiment and alienation through food in non-capitalist contexts, although his analysis avoids some of the pitfalls of Appadurai’s model by taking a phenomenological approach to embodiment. In similar structuralist fashion, Clark’s analysis “bends” or extends the Marxist notion of commodity fetishism to align them with Levi-Strauss’ categories (Clark 2004: 8).

33 The Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University (2011) noted that despite declining incomes, due to a demand for rentals in the wake of the foreclosure crisis, and a general trend towards inflation in the rental market, 48.7 percent of US households were paying more than 30 percent of their income on rent, and further 26.1 percent paying more than half of their income on rent. These represent increases from 41.2 percent and 20.7 percent, respectively in 2001, with fully two percentage points of the increase occurring between 2007 and 2009 alone. In Seattle, for example, despite the crisis in housing prices, rental costs have increased steadily every year for more than the last two decades, with a particularly steep increase of 10 percent between 2007 and 2008 alone, and a subsequent increase of 5 percent between 2008 and 2009 (HUD Fair Market Rents).

34 Formed in 1992, Homes Not Jails describes their goals in the following way: “Taking direct action and engaging in civil disobedience, Homes Not Jails publicly occupies vacant buildings to demonstrate the availability of vacant housing, to promote proposals to utilize the housing, and to put people in the housing. Furthermore, we provide information on squatting and network with other squatting groups… Homes Not Jails opens up vacant buildings and helps homeless people move into them – because people need housing NOW! Over the years hundreds of vacant buildings have been opened, providing housing for people and reducing the overall demand for housing – making housing more affordable for all of us. Many have lasted for years, many are still happening, and more will be opened as long as people are forced to live on the streets” (Homes Not Jails).

35 Schrödinger’s Cat describes a thought experiment by Erwin Schrödinger to illustrate the paradox of quantum entanglement. This suggests that, at the quantum level, matter occupies multiple probabilistic states or locations at the same time, until it is made concrete in the act of observation. Schrödinger hypothesised that a cat, trapped in a box with a poison triggered by such a quantum event (by way of a Geiger counter), might be simultaneously alive and dead, until someone opened the box to check on it. At that point, the quantum event would have resolved in one particular state, and the cat would have lived or died, accordingly. Schrödinger didn’t count the cat’s own perceptions of the quantum event as particularly decisive, apparently.

36 David Graeber has also suggested the concept of “negative value,” social value like “evil,” the magnitude of which may, like other kinds of value, depend on the work put into it and the particular socio-cultural context in which is situated (see Graeber, 2001: 83-84).

37 Haug has also noted the strategy of “artificial obsolescence” by which products are made to last for intentionally short periods once purchased; while noteworthy, this contributes primarily to post-consumer waste, rather than to the waste in the supermarket’s Dumpster (see Haug 1986: 42).

38 These lines are from T. S. Eliot’s Little Gidding (1942).

39 The anarchist Mikhail Bakunin was famous for having written, “The passion for destruction is also a creative passion” (1970 [1916]).

Part One, Chapter Two


41 See Hawkins 2006: 47.
In contrast to Food Not Bombs’ informal, non-hierarchical, autonomous structure, without formal membership, leadership, or legal status, Food Lifeline is a formal nonprofit “dedicated to ending hunger in Western Washington” (see foodlifeline.org). Both organisations collect donations from commercial food establishments, and redistribute them, although Food Lifeline deals in a much greater volume, with a network of nearly 300 food banks, meal programs, and shelters, and is affiliated with the national umbrella organisation Feeding America.

“Food Insecurity” is the term used by the USDA to describe the condition of a household with inadequate access to food.

For example, the Essential Baking Company, Theo Chocolates, and Trader Joes all donate their surpluses widely, but also discouraged Dumpster-diving—employees at the latter two have both asked me to put back my haul upon finding me in their Dumpster, and the former two now lock their Dumpsters after having been popular with Dumpster-divers for several years.

It is worth considering here a significant excerpt from Sidran’s Op-Ed, which illustrates, holistically, his thinking:

“…[W]e Seattleites have this anxiety, this nagging suspicion that despite the mountains and the Sound and smugness about all our advantages, maybe, just maybe we are pretty much like those other big American cities, ‘back East’ as we used to say when I was a kid and before California joined the list of ‘formerly great places to live.’ I think that’s one reason why the increasing disorder on our streets touches a nerve for so many. If the ‘past is prologue’ we have seen one version of the future in city after city, a dying retail core where there is more criminal than commercial activity, where the simplest rules of civility are ignored without consequence, where random senseless acts of violence become pervasive, culminating in the migration of those who can leave. This is not Seattle today, but this downward spiral doesn’t happen overnight and it will be more than just a bad dream if we don’t wake up to the challenges we confront and act.

“Obviously the serious crimes of violence, the gangs and drug trafficking can tear a community apart, but we must not underestimate the damage that can be done by a slower, less-dramatic but nonetheless dangerous unraveling of the social order. Even for hardy urban dwellers, there comes a point where the usually tolerable ‘minor’ misbehaviors—the graffiti, the litter and stench of urine in doorways, the public drinking, the aggressive panhandling, the lying down on the sidewalks - cumulatively become intolerable. Collectively and in the context of more serious crime, they create a psychology of fear that can and has killed other formerly great cities because people do not want to shop, work, play or live in such an environment.”

(Sidran 1993)

The term used by Habermas in the subtitle of his book—"An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society"—was “burgerlich,” which is used in German both in expressions best translated with “bourgeois” (the translator gives the example of “bourgeois family”) and expressions better rendered with “civil” (for example, “civil code,” “civil society,” and so on; the term may also sometimes be used in the sense of the English term “middle class” (Habermas 1991; see translator’s note).

The sentiment quoted here is how the New York Times paraphrased the stated goals behind Las Vegas Mayor Oscar B. Goodman’s support of Las Vegas’ feeding prohibitions, described above (Archibold 2006).

Orlando, Florida requires a permit for sharing food with more than twenty-five people in certain public park. They’ll only issue these permits once a year. At least three Food Not Bombers with whom I have worked, one of whom I interviewed at length for this research, have been affiliated with the Orlando chapter of Food Not Bombs at various times, and described at length the various struggles and strategies the Orlando chapter has had with the city. In 2008, the city’s ordinance was found unconstitutional by a federal court (ACLU 2008), however this year a higher court overturned that decision (Orlando Sentinel 2011).

Consider the following excerpt from conservative talk radio host Michael Savage’s show. Savage’s show is syndicated to over 400 stations, and was recently rated as the talk radio show with the second fastest growing web audience, behind Rush Limbaugh (November Trend Report 2011). Regarding the homeless, he opined: “Why not put them in work camps? … Why do you have to pay a man who’s right now living off the fat of the land? And he’s sucking the fat of the land for, you know, a fairly small check—it is true—but he is a leech. He is not a productive member of society. Where is the money supposed to come from? No, I’ve studied the homeless problem for many years, Ed, because I live in one of the most infested cities in the United States—San
Francisco—and I’ve observed the bums for many years. And the good—the largest portion of them are able-bodied. They’re drug addicts or alcoholics. There’s no reason they could not be put into work camps and do much of the labour that our illegal aliens are doing” (The Michael Savage Show 2008).

Note that while it is a relevant and important observation that the ride-free zone was ignored in siting outdoor meal programs, even that accommodation for low-income and homeless people has been ended: There is no longer any ride-free zone in Seattle.

This detail was conveyed to me by a Dumpster-diver, former Food-Not-Bomber, and trusted friend who worked for the company at the time these concerns were expressed.

The “Enclosure of the Commons,” describes the practice of making private property from land that had previously been held in common. The term originally described the fencing-off of lands to which English peasant farmers traditionally held certain farming, hunting, and fishing rights in return for paying a share of their harvest to the feudal nobility. Beginning in the sixteenth century, English lords and barons began enclosing many of these common lands to pursue more profitable industrial endeavours, beginning with the wool industry. This led Sir Thomas More to observe, in the 1516 classic Utopia, that sheep “have now developed a raging appetite and turned into man-eaters” (1965 [1516]: 25).

In “The Invention of Capitalism” (2000), Michael Perelman describes in detail the way in which enclosures were materially and discursively tied to the birth of a system of wage labour by both English rulers and English political economists, who argued rhetorically both for the necessity of enclosure for social and industrial progress, and against the degeneracy of those unwilling to work for wages.

For a further discussion of the reuse of abandoned land in Rocinha, as well as Mumbai, Nairobi, and Sultanbeyli, Turkey, see Robert Neurth’s Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, A New Urban World (2005). In addition, two excellent films describe the parallel traditions of French gleaning and Egyptian Zabaleen: Agnes Varda’s The Gleaners and I (2002) describes contemporary gleaning practices and their relationships to the market in France, while Mai Iskander’s Garbage Dreams: Raised in the Trash Trade (2009) describes the efforts of Cairo’s Zabaleen to resist the award of the city’s garbage-collection contract to a foreign waste management company, effectively cutting them off from their livelihood.

This was a nickname for the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), a non-industry-specific, international, radically democratic union which organised the trainhoppers and hoboes of Depression-era America and continues to be closely associated with radical and marginal lifestyles like squatting and anarchism.

“The Wombles” was a 1970s BBC children’s television show about a clan of rodent-like creatures who live in a burrow in Wimbledon Common and furnish their necessities from the cast-offs of English society. The theme song included the lyrics, “Underground, overground, Wombling free, the Wombles of Wimbledon Common are we; Making good use of the things that we find: things that the everyday folk leave behind…”

While I mean “marginal” here in the cultural and political sense, the marginal value of recirculated abject capital may also be reconciled with the formal economic concept of “marginal value,” which measures the ways in which the augmentation or diminution of a good’s supply may affect its worth to any given consumer in terms of the other goods the consumer has or wishes to obtain. In effect, the concept of marginal value is a way of zooming in on the interaction between consumer desire or utility and the dynamics of supply and scarcity, and thus may be one useful way of accounting for the production of abject capital I have outlined above.

A “punk house” implies more than simply a house where punks live. It is names a more collective living situation than is the norm in many predominant shared housing situations. Whether rented, squatted, or collectively owned, punk houses often have a collective identity and a name—“The Death Trap,” in Buffalo, “The Brown Warehouse” in Melbourne, “The Compound” in Seattle, and so on—despite frequent turnover in residents. They generally conform to punk standards of décor and hygiene, and host activities like punk shows and vegan potlucks.

The term “freegan” describes a social movement and identity that combine the terms “vegan” and “free,” implying an effort to eat primarily or exclusively free food, from the waste stream, rather than to contribute to further environmental damage and animal cruelty.

A “Really Really Free Market” is a recurrent event organised in public spaces in which a variety of goods and services are given away, rather than sold or bartered. Like Food Not Bombs, Critical Mass, and other anarchic
projects, Really Really Free Markets are entirely voluntary, non-hierarchical endeavours with no formal membership, although they’re often associated with left-wing social movements and anti-capitalist counterculture.

The parallels between the Really Really Free Market and the Diggers actions are obvious, and given the decentralised, broad distribution Really Really Free Markets and the explicit cultural legacy of the 1960s countercultures within some parts of contemporary left-wing American counterpublics, it is hard not to suppose some degree of indirect inheritance between the two. The same could be said of Food Not Bombs and the Diggers’ Feed-Ins, however even more concrete influences are evident. The methods and goals of Food Not Bombs at its inception in 1981 (as described both in interviews I have conducted with Keith McHenry, one of its founding members, and in other accounts of the group’s inception (cf. Butler and McHenry 2000)) were less focused on homelessness (which has tended to dominate chapters’ contemporary political engagements), and more on a kind of anti-capitalist street theatre to publicly challenge the priorities and the waste of market society in much the way that the San Francisco Diggers’ Feed-Ins had (Dolgin and Franco 2007). (The involvement of homeless veterans in the very first Food Not Bombs serving, according to McHenry, was incidental—they came at his invitation when he was publicising it as a political action.) In addition, the approach of securing wasted surpluses from grocers and supermarkets was a precedent set by the Diggers, who explicitly identified the scale of commercial waste as one of their targets for critique. McHenry and the others who organized the first Food Not Bombs kitchens were already seasoned nonviolent, antiauthoritarian peaceniks, closely familiar with the Haight Ashbury movements of the 60s—although McHenry told me that he himself hadn’t heard of the Diggers until after Food Not Bombs was already up and running. McHenry and others I interviewed from the early days of the second Food Not Bombs chapter in San Francisco were thoroughly versed in left-wing countercultural history, however, and it’s hard to imagine none of them were aware of the Diggers’ activities.

While the efforts of cities like Seattle and agencies like the USDA to inaugurate gleaning programs in the first place is to be commended, the constraints of a market-public, as I have described at length above, limit the extent to which state agencies can challenge the logic of the market.

I have borrowed the term “evasion” from the book of the same name (CrimethInc. 2001), which describes exactly this kind of independence, as practiced by its train-hopping, Dumpster-diving, squatting, anonymous author.

A cursory web search, for example, yields several expensive examples of safety-pin-style earrings from, a plain gold-plated pair at $115.00US (at “etsy.com”) to a stylised, jewel-encrusted, white-gold-plate, sterling silver example at $545.00US (at shoplatitude.com).

Via Campesina is the name given to an international peasant movement which organises in up to 88 countries for land reform and peasant sovereignty (see viacampesina.org). The term “food sovereignty” was coined by the group to describe one of its key organising goals, the ability of peasants to determine and manage their own access to the kind and quality of food they eat.

The song, “Immigrant Punk” (Gogol Bordello 2005) describes the experience of relocating to an unfamiliar country, speaking an unfamiliar language, and yet still being able to meet like-minded people and to find common culture within punk countercultures, so it makes a fitting allegory for the conclusion of this chapter.

Part One, Chapter Three


Short-term bocce facilities were actually introduced first in 2004, on the recommendation of the design firm, before the more expensive changes were made in 2006 (Murakami 2004).

My Seattle Food Not Bombs comrade (2005–2008) who joked about the bocce ball courts, had this to say upon reading a draft of this section of the chapter:

“The thing is, if the park was in the ID [the International District] and bocce courts were proposed, perhaps comments at public meetings would have been along the lines of, ‘But people will trip over them doing Tai Chi!’ But what about Pioneer Square? The bocce courts, to me, didn’t seem out of place, but begged the question, what would be in place? Maybe it’s a New England/Boston bias of mine, but I wouldn’t consider Pioneer Square a neighborhood. In that a requirement for a neighborhood would be actual neighbors, as
opposed to businesses. So the fact that the city seemed to be trying to not only start a neighborhood from nothing, in a retail/service center area, but also homogenize and pasteurize (that is, increase retail activity and decrease loitering) while doing so, was both fascinating and disturbing to me because it seemed to show a total lack of understanding of what culture, or a neighborhood, is… Would astroturf have inadvertently made it more of a living room? A sort of wall-to-wall carpeting, probably more comfortable to sit and sleep on than pavers… And it’s just occurred to me in thinking about this comparison that many of the people that the city wanted to discourage from using the park only look like they might sleep there, but are actually using it as a backyard, because it is the backyard of the shelter they stay at. But of course it’s all about the type of liquor you drink at the park, and the clothes you wear. And whether you share your picnic with people you don’t know.”

70 The term “bourgeois,” here is not used frivolously; as described in chapter two, there is a close, somewhat ironic relationship between the English words “bourgeois” and “civil,” as both are alternate translations of the term “burgerlich,” with which Habermas described the public sphere of liberal democratic societies.

71 These include deep cuts to federal subsidies for low-income housing dating back to the Reagan administration, as well as severe cuts to programs like Temporary Assistance to Needy Families made under what was sometimes called “welfare reform” in the 1990s. Joanne Passaro (1996) and Timothy Gibson (2004) both give brief but excellent overviews of the contributions these cuts have made to the growth in homelessness over the intervening decades. For a more detailed exploration of the factors that have led to the shocking growth in the number of people without shelters over the last three decades, see Glasser and Bridgman (1999).

72 Mike McGinn, the current Seattle mayor, deserves some credit for a certain degree of allyship to homeless people and their advocates. He has, in the years since the recession of 2008, worked to avoid or minimize cuts in the city’s health and human services budget—from whence much of the budget for homeless services comes—which members of the City Council have often proposed cutting over the last several years. (This is not to suggest that McGinn has never been criticized for his stances on homeless politics, however he has earned a far better reputation with the homeless advocates I have worked with than Greg Nickels, his predecessor.)

73 The Pike Place Market, founded in 1907, was initially planned for demolition in 1963, before being rescued by a grassroots lobbying effort, after which it was, instead, redeveloped into the tourist attraction it has become with subsidies from the city (Shorrett and Morgan 2007). It is presently administered by Pike Place Market Foundation, a nonprofit organization, and has been, for several years now, undergoing a number of renovations.

74 At a reading for a book about the Diggers, Coyote described the motivation behind the Diggers’ free store: “The thesis was that if there’s technology and machinery on the planet that can make a television set for every man, woman, and child on the planet, and you don’t have a television because you don’t have the money, the money is a way of inventing scarcity” (December 2008).

75 According to one published account of the invention of the drink, Cheryl Cook, a Florida bartender designed the drink in 1985 or 1986. She explained its origins: “What overwhelmed me was the number of people who ordered Martinis just to be seen with a Martini glass in their hand. It was on this realization that gave me the idea to create a drink that everyone could pallet and was visually stunning in that classic glass. This is what the Cosmo was based on” (Regan and Regan 2006).

76 Enron successfully inflated its share price by including projected future earnings in its financial statements. In essence, it was able to revalue its stock discursively, on the strength of the sheer credulity of the market—until that credulity ran out (cf. McLean and Elkind 2003).

77 According to Morrill, Seattle’s housing values rose by eighty-five percent between 1990 and 2000, compared with the national average of sixty-one percent (1998: 51). During the same period, Seattle homes reversed the previous trend in the city of being outvalued by suburban home values (ibid.). During the same period, the city’s household income rose by fifty-six percent, whereas in the suburbs it only rose by forty-two percent (52).

78 One noteworthy action taken by the Pioneer Square Community Association in this regard was to lobby the Seattle City Council to step in to prevent the relocation of Real Change Newspaper to the Pioneer Square neighborhood. They identified Real Change (an organization I have worked with on several occasions both in my academic capacity and as part of Food Not Bombs) as a sort of homeless service and wrote a letter to the City Council, arguing that the neighborhood had its “fair share” of such institutions and requesting that the Council intervene (Krishnan 2010). Real Change’s response was two fold: It argued first that it was not a “service,” but a
source of self-employment and empowerment (since homeless vendors buy the newspaper for thirty cents per copy and sell it for a dollar); and second, it argued that it had legally contracted to lease the new space, and therefore it was beyond the city’s jurisdiction to ask it not to move there. The city agreed with the latter argument, and the Community Association was publicly embarrassed at having attempted to infringe upon an otherwise legal effort by an advocacy group.

Part Two, Prologue

The Project for Public Spaces, contracted to reconceptualise the park, suggested “relocating at least a couple of the totems to allow for activities to occur in the space,” such as performances and games (Project for Public Spaces 2004: 17). Note also that the totems do, indeed, feature carved wooden teeth.

Note, that the land on which Occidental Park was later established was neither a park nor was it land, strictly speaking, at the time that Yesler’s saw mill began operation. It was swamp, later to be filled. Nonetheless, it supported camps of homeless people along its banks, including indigenous Duwamish people displaced by Seattle’s growth (Thrush 2005).

Beverly Graham, director of Operation Sack Lunch which administers the outdoor meals site, is a strong advocate for nutritious and organic meal whenever possible, as opposed to some of the highly processed, fatty foods often handed out by meal providers.

Chapter Four

I borrow this term from Judith Butler’s Frames of War, 2009. Although it is peripheral to my argument, and hence unelaborated, the concept, describes the ways in which some lives and bodies are made discursively visible and available for empathy while the suffering of others hide in plain sight. This would be an entirely appropriate frame for the exploration of the issues I have presented here.

I describe at more length in chapters one and three the impact of property speculation on housing markets and vacancies—which I have called abject land capital.

Bernard Harcourt (2001), for example, has taken the theory to task both for its methodological flaws in data gathering, and, more importantly, for its epistemological validity. The latter critique resonates most closely with my work here: While some criminologists have found statistical correlations between broken windows theory–based order-maintenance policies and declining crime rates, the epistemological foundations of these correlations are fundamentally flawed. Writing in defence of the theory, Corman and Moran (2005) inadvertently make this case for me by quoting New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, an influential proponent of the theory: “There’s a continuum of disorder. Obviously murder and graffiti are two vastly different crimes. But they are part of the same continuum. And a climate that tolerates one is more likely to tolerate the other” (237). Giuliani’s epistemological slippage is precisely the problem with the theory: It takes a perceived “continuum,” and a qualitative “climate” as a quantifiable facts, rather than as relativistic and mutable prejudices and social relationships. An unrepentant Kelling (2009) similarly defended the theory on the basis that it “worked” statistically without problematizing the social, cultural, and epistemological bases of the principles by which is was supposed to have functioned—citing on one hand statistical correlations between aggressive prosecution of misdemeanours and declining crime rates, and on the other hand experimental studies of theft under controlled clinical conditions. While there may be useful epistemological comparisons and relationships to be drawn, Kelling, and broken windows theory in general, seems instead to ignore them. In essence, Kelling’s argument seems to treat cultural frameworks and social relationships as a “black box,” which can be reliably compared and quantified. An argument anathema to anthropologists, of course.

See Parson 2010 for a more detailed account of the distinct periods and situations during which these arrests occurred.

These include: Seattle, Washington; San Francisco, California; New York City, New York; Worcester, Massachusetts; Buffalo, New York; and Orlando, Florida. For a more complete description of my work in each of these places, see the introduction to this dissertation.
Orlando’s ordinance is worth quoting at length here. The emphasis is mine:

WHEREAS, the City of Orlando encourages use of City owned or controlled parks by City residents in a safe, sanitary, and aesthetically pleasing atmosphere; and

WHEREAS, unregulated large group feeding in public parks in the Downtown Community Redevelopment Area (CRA) has resulted in litter on park grounds and surrounding rights-of-way such as food, containers, and other food wrappings creating hazards to the health and welfare of citizens, and is detrimental to the aesthetic atmosphere of parks; and (...)

WHEREAS, excessive use of parks and park facilities in the CRA area for large group feeding by single persons or groups denies that park or facility space for use by other citizens (...)

WHEREAS, the City has provided for and set aside reasonable, ample, alternative land space within the CRA for large group feeding of the homeless by religious and other organizations which land is not covered by or affected by the restrictions of this ordinance.

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF ORLANDO, FLORIDA: (...)

It is unlawful to knowingly sponsor, conduct, or participate in the distribution or service of food at a large group feeding at a park or park facility owned or controlled by the City of Orlando within the boundary of the CRA without a Large Group Feeding Permit issued by the park official. (...)

The applicable park official shall issue a Large Group Feeding Permit upon application and payment of the application fee established by the City. Not more than two (2) Large Group Feeding Permits shall be issued to the same person, group, or organization for large group feedings for the same park in the CRA in a twelve (12) consecutive month period.

(Chapter 18A, Parks and Outdoor Public Assemblies, Code of the City or Orlando)

One of Nickels’ spokespersons explained, “The mayor’s goal was safety first. If people are getting beat up they can’t eat” (Young 2004). The explanation was less than credible, since it was experienced regular meal providers, such as the interviewee quoted in this chapter, who organised a campaign of civil disobedience in protest of the mayor’s decision, continuing to serve meals outdoors.

This was during a hiatus in Food Not Bombs’ presence in Pioneer Square. If they had been active, one wonders what sort of tensions or allegiances would have emerged between them and the formerly officially sanctioned outdoor meal site refugees. Ironically, they had tried periodically over the years to persuade Food Not Bombs to abandon its civilly disobedient stance and join the fold at the Health and Safety Building—Food Not Bombs had, in fact, done so for a number of weeks, but felt that people who had come to eat previously weren’t venturing to the plaza to eat, so they returned to Occidental Park.

The outdoor meal site was hosted by a church for a year or so before moving to its current location.

Since 2005, when I first got involved with Food Not Bombs, there have been many other outdoor meals served at different times in Occidental Park and Pioneer Square more generally. Most of them have been very short-term—for example, the dozens of Thanksgiving efforts I described in the Prologue to Part One of this dissertation. I cannot say whether many of these were permitted, but I suspect many of them weren’t. Three notable exceptions come to mind, however. One of them was a meal provider who served hot dogs and potato chips, among other things, at City Hall Park, at the same time as Food Not Bombs a few blocks away. The line for his food was often longer than ours, and I used to walk over to let people in the line know we were sharing food in Occidental Park (in case they didn’t want to wait in his line). A single individual seemed to finance and organise the entire endeavour, with a string of rotating volunteers. He was referred to only as “the cowboy,” by most of the homeless people I spoke with who ate there. I spoke with him infrequently, but as I understood it from the people who ate there, he had received the same pressures as Food Not Bombs to relocate to the official outdoor meal site, and like us, refused for a long time. Eventually he stopped coming, for reasons unknown to me. The second exception is more recent, a church group that has taken to serving alongside Food Not Bombs in Occidental Park for the better part of a year or so (although they often arrive earlier). In recent years, there has been little or no police pressure on Seattle Food Not Bombs to relocate, and presumably this church group has experienced none either, so they are
only nominally challenging the city’s feeding prohibitions. Finally, the example of Operation Sack Lunch is interesting. This is now the organisation that oversees the official meal site. Beverly Graham, the director of the organisation, for several years in the early 1990s simply handed out sandwiches in Pioneer Square, and garnered both significant police pressure and press coverage for doing so until a city employee brokered a compromise with her that allowed her to use city property regularly and to build the foundations for what is now Operation Sack Lunch. Graham’s persistence and her commitment to homeless advocacy and healthy are striking to people who meet her, myself included.

92 The New York Times describes the defence that Las Vegas mayor Oscar B. Goodman made of the city’s feeding prohibition: “‘Some people say I’m the mean mayor,’ Mr. Goodman acknowledged, but he defended the ordinance as part of the effort to steer the homeless to social service groups” (Archibold 2006).

93 The policy of indoor assistance echoes debates, for example, about the Homeless Information Management System, a means of tracking the services accessed by shelterless people. HIMS was mandated nationwide in 2006 for any service providers receiving federal funds, and required individuals to show a HIMS-specific ID card whenever they slept at a shelter, ate at a soup kitchen, washed their clothes at a hygiene centre, and so on. Several Seattle service providers have told me that the system is not only a time-consuming form of red tape, but also largely ineffective, because HIMS IDs are constantly lost and reissued under whatever name a person gives, lest lack of ID constitute an obstacle to survival itself.

94 Seattle’s two tent cities have had to argue these claims in court on several occasions, as local residents have sought injunctions to prevent them from setting up camp on unused land in their neighbourhoods (at the invitation of the property owners, of course). Records of some of these court proceedings are archived at the web page for SHARE/WHEEL, which operates these tent cities: sharewheel.org.

95 The city’s relationship particularly with Seattle’s second tent city, during the tenure of Mayor Paul Schell was rather rocky, and two homeless advocates I have spoken with who were active in this period have suggested to me that the mayor invited Tent City residents to meet with him, and during this meeting, while they were away from the camp, ordered their tents removed. I cannot find a written record of this event to confirm these accounts, although city employee Al Poole (who I have heard speak in meetings about more recent conflicts between Seattle government and tent cities) has written an account describing the tense relationship between the two during this period (Poole N.d.). More recently, under Greg Nickels, the city had a mutually inflammatory relationship with another tent city which, for this reason, named itself “Nickelsville.” A close friend and informant who lived at Nickelsville for the better part of two years related a similar story about city disruptions to the camp. He told me that anonymous strangers came to Nickelsville and offered residents free vouchers for short-term hotel rooms, after which many residents left the camp for a few days. With the camp’s numbers diminished, the next day, police arrived and arrested numerous people for trespassing—up to several dozen according to my friend’s account. I visited my friend and the Nickelsville community after it had been temporarily displaced, lost many of its tents, and forced to seek shelter in the basement of a church. My friend was not certain, but speculated that the free hotel vouchers had been supplied by the city in order to thin out the camp and make the arrests easier. I cannot, of course, confirm this part of the account.

96 This is Operation Sack Lunch’s own estimate, given at their web page www.oslserves.org (retrieved December 2, 2012).

Excursus

97 Note that, in a statement published at their web page last year, the Seattle chapter of the National Lawyers Guild suggested that they discovered through FOIA requests that these grand juries may have been, in fact, called before the May Day vandalism, in which case the ostensible argument given for the grand juries is incomplete. This statement appears to be no longer available on their web page, although a press release is still posted there condemning the grand juries and raids for focusing on political affiliations and therefore potential infringement of citizens’ First Amendment rights (National Lawyers Guild 2012). In Leah-Lynn Plante’s public statement (made before being imprisoned for refusing to testify before the grand jury), however, she describes this FOIA request as well (Plante 2012). Other antipathies between state agencies and anarchists, therefore, are likely at work as well.
 Nonetheless, the vandalism has been given explicitly as the reason for these investigations and raids, which in itself is significant.

98 Declassified FBI training materials underline this absolute misunderstanding: A slideshow used to brief FBI agents on “Anarchist Extremists” sums them up as “criminals seeking an ideology to justify their activities” (Potter 2012a).

99 The General Assembly ultimately voted to retain the name “Occupy Seattle,” although many participants were in favour of a name change, wary of being associated with war-making and occupations by the US and Israel.

100 This comment was related to me by a young, self-identified radical friend who attended the General Assembly that day.

101 The most widely publicised of these involved the pepper-spaying of an eighty-three year-old woman, however several occupiers I spoke with informally reported uses of excessive force on numerous occasions. Although I witnessed some degree of verbal abuse towards the police, I neither saw nor have heard any evidence to suggest that occupiers showed any corresponding physical aggression.

Chapter Five

102 This was relayed to me by a single Food Not Bombs member from Orlando Florida. It was a contentious issue, and so there is every likelihood that there are a range of perspectives represented in that chapter about how and why the court ruling came about. Nonetheless, the court proceedings and the eventual ruling is a matter of public record and in that sense, what I have written above is relatively objective.

103 See the decision in First Vagabonds Church of God, Brian Nichols, Orlando Food Not Bombs, Bryan Hutchinson, Benjamin B. Markeson, Eric Montanez, Adam Ulrich Versus City of Orlando Florida, filed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, April 12, 2011.

104 On one occasion, at a Reclaim the Streets protest, several members were issued parks exclusion orders from Victor Steinbrook Park, where the protest was happening, and their pots, pans, and soup were confiscated. However the order did not disrupt the group’s regular Sunday dinners.

105 This anecdote was relayed to me by Keith McHenry, one of the groups’ original members from both Boston and San Francisco, who organised a small group of Food Not Bombs collaborators to drive to New Orleans in the wake of the hurricane. He was surprised to find that the Red Cross had not only not begun distributing food, but that hungry people began contacting him based on the Red Cross’ recommendations. (It seems that people who had earlier eaten with Food Not Bombs had passed the number on to the Red Cross.)

106 Other Food Not Bombers referred to it as “The Wall.”

Chapter Six

107 Sandor Katz heard this term from another Food Not Bombs participant in the East Bay (Katz 2006: 283), and it’s not clear whether it’s a term that circulates in some Food Not Bombs scenes, whether it’s a case of two minds thinking alike, or whether the person I was talking to had simply read Katz’ book (although the book had only come out a few months before the interview).

108 “1. The food is vegan and free to all. 2. We have no leaders and use the process of consensus to make desisions. 3. That Food Not Bombs is dedicated to nonviolent direct action towards creating a world free from domination, coercion and violence.” (sic., http://www.foodnotbombs.net)

109 The original “Anarchist Cookbook” was, many anarchists feel, misnamed, since its instructions had little if anything to do with egalitarian politics.

Conclusion

110 These lyrics come from the song, “Evolve,” on the Album of the same name (DiFranco 2003).
This quotation was drawn from the Seattle Times’ blog, which kept running coverage of the demonstrations throughout the day (Carter 2013).

In anarchist circles, this rather ahistorical term is not uncommonly used to describe governments in liberal democracies and dictatorships alike. In essence, it asserts that a common, coercive approach to social order is at work in a wide range of different state-based political systems.

This remark was made as part of a public lecture given by Dr. Davis at the University of Washington on June 16, 2007. I regret that I did not write down her words verbatim at the time (for which reason they are not placed in quotation marks above). However both I and colleagues of mine have heard her make substantively the same comment at subsequent lectures, and I am therefore satisfied that I am not misrepresenting her comments. Regrettably, I am not able to find a published version of them.

A friend and Food Not Bombs collaborator who has appeared in this dissertation a few times (she climbed in the Dumpster with me on Thanksgiving at the outset of Part One and chuckled dryly as the “wrong” park-goers took advantage of Occidental Park’s bocce ball courts in chapter two) reflected on my conclusion here. She made the following observations upon reading about prejudice as grossed-outer-ness. She writes:

“(Here’s an example from this country: there used to be this thing called stonecutters’ TB, which was why people like my great-grandfathers and their coworkers, who worked in granite sheds, had such a short life expectancy (about 40 years). (My great-grandfather Perle Pryor was a bedsetter, my great-grandfather Jack Wark was a polisher, in Barre, VT – then, as now, known as the granite capital of the world. My grandfather told it to me like this: The bedsetter and the polisher are a team. The bedsetter gets the block into place and levels it, so the polisher can come along and polish it. My grandparents met because their fathers were a team at one point, I think Jack was a teen when he was in the sheds, Perle was there all his working life. Anyway, I digress, but I mention them because Jack died on the street, something which I’ll come back to later (or, earlier - as this is the conclusion.) Stonecutters’ TB, they were told, was something that filthy pigs got when they were poor and lived in substandard, crowded housing. This was (coincidentally?), around the same time as the rise of fascism in Europe. Silicosis, as we now call it, is actually what happens when you polish granite with pneumatic tools in an unventilated building – the particles scrape your lungs to shreds in a fairly short amount of time. Were the granite companies lying? Or did they just not know what was causing it? How were they to know whether the problem was the influx of (scary, foreign, anarchist) immigrants – and who knows what diseases, both bacteriological and social, they were carrying – and in what ways their modes of living and their germs comingled and contributed to the problem - or the dust. (The Pryors, Pilgrim descendents, were the exception in Barre: most workers were recent Lithuanian, Lebanese, Italian, Scottish, Spanish, Irish, Syrian, Norwegian, Polish, Greek, French-Canadian, Swedish, or German immigrants. Many were Jewish. The Italians in particular brought a strong anarchist political tradition with them, and Barre was a frequent stop for the leading anarchists of the time, as well as a broader assortment of labor leaders. The Warks were Scotch-Irish-French-Canadian.)

The movement from hand tools to pneumatic tools occurred around the same time, and so the dust increased, and life expectancy decreased – but why would company owners have thought that was it, and not gone with what must have been their gut instinct–fear (of people of other cultures, class, politics – What the hell is in haggis anyway! they might have asked themselves Or hommous? Surely that’s the problem...)). Similarly I think it’s worth asking, was anti-Semitism couched in terms of a deeply distorted concern for public safety and sanitation? Or was that sort of it, at its heart: fear. Of things changing, economic changes, cultural changes, perceived changes in hygiene norms. And it was expressed in terms of a concern for public safety and sanitation – channelled in that direction, because people always want there to be something they can do when they’re afraid. It’s worth remembering I think that Nazis were anti- many other –isms (unionism and Unitarianism, to name a few. Seemingly whatever and whoever it was that was causing them such fear, they wanted it gone). And that Hitler supposedly was scared of his own shadow.

“Compassion fatigue,” literally, refers to the diminishing capacity to feel empathy often experienced by people who work regularly with those who have undergone extreme trauma. While I don’t mean to suggest that I or any other Food Not Bombs bottom-liners stopped feeling empathy for the people with whom we shared food, it was certainly harder, after a time, to feel as keenly or directly motivated by the stakes of our work.

I learned this term from New York City Food Not Bombs, and have heard anarchists in other projects around Seattle using it as well, although I don’t think anyone from Seattle FNB except me ever adopted it.
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