Judging the book by its cover?
Latvian integration beyond the headlines

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SECTION I
BUILDING A TWO-WAY STREET

While the Baltic States are often mistaken for their geographic homonym, the Balkans, Estonia and Latvia are far from experiencing the type of ethnic cleansing that took place in Yugoslavia with the collapse of communism. Still, Estonia and Latvia are home to very ethnically diverse populations. Individuals who identify themselves as Russians or Russian-speakers make up more than a quarter of the population in each country. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, these two states have struggled to appropriately integrate the sizable minority populations into Estonian and Latvian society. Indeed, they are often identified internationally — and domestically — by their integration failures.

Both Estonia and Latvia have faced numerous cases in the European Court of Human Rights and have weathered political and media blitzes from Russia, the “ethnic homeland” of the majority of their minority populations. The rhetoric surrounding minority integration in these Baltic states is quite damning; but is it accurate? In this thesis I focus on Latvia as a case study of integration that is actually working beyond the amplified voices of politicians and the headlines. This thesis looks at integration in two issue areas that have been repeatedly criticized in public discourse, (1) citizenship legislation, and (2) education reforms. I argue that the country has made real progress in bringing the post-Soviet Russian-speaking population of 1991 closer to a real part of Latvian society in 2013. This is not to say Latvia has “succeeded;” continued improvements to social integration are necessary. However, in the two decades after reestablishing independence, Latvia is moving in a positive direction, despite the disseminated discourse arguing the contrary.
Loud voices, small issues

“There is no conflict at the everyday level, but if you open up a newspaper, it’s there, if you close the newspaper it’s gone. If you switch on the TV, it’s there, but if you switch it off, it’s gone.” — Focus group participant (cited in Sulmane, 2010, p. 246)

Before delving into cases studies of citizenship and education, it is necessary to look at the loudest representations of integration in Latvia. Mass media in Latvia and Russia frequently latch onto this hot button issue. Politicians capitalizing on ethnic tensions, in turn, feed debates in the media. Ethnicity plays a large role in Latvia’s political system, in which parties are colloquially identified by their pro-Latvia or pro-Russia stances. Indeed, in the 2011 parliamentary elections, each party directly referred to issues of ethnicity in its political platform, solidifying the link between ethnic tensions and party politics. On the left-right political spectrum, ethnic distinction is also fairly established. “Latvian” parties (Unity, Reform Party, Union of Greens and Farmers, and National Alliance) lean to or are firmly on the right; Harmony Center, the dominant party geared toward Russian-speakers, is left of center.

While most parties claim to move beyond ethnic politics in their platforms, issues dealing with ethnic or language policy are easy fodder used by politicians to discredit rivals. For example, in February 2012, a national referendum was held to promote the status of Russian to an official language. While it was nearly impossible for the referendum to pass, politicians on both sides of the ethnic divide encouraged their constituents to vote in mass numbers. Two civic organizations, United Latvia (Единая Латвия) and Mother Tongue (Родной Язык), initiated the referendum in response to National Alliance’s attempted referendum to make Latvian the only language of instruction in publicly financed schools. Both of these attempts to change legislation resulted in volatile debates on ethnic identity in the public and private spheres. By exploiting “us vs. them” rhetoric, politicians used these events to rally their constituents.
Both the structure and financing of the media system make it relatively easy for politicians to mobilize their core based on ethnic issues. While Freedom House (2012) rates the Latvian press as “free,” ownership structures and the prevalence of key journalist-politicians create a rather murky picture of the media market. In fact, almost all significant news outlets in the TV and print media market have traceable and suspected links to influential politicians in Latvia or Russia (see Delna, 2010; Muižnieks, 2008; Rulle, 2012; Rožukalne, 2012; and others). Latvian-language media and Russian-language media occupy two separate sectors in Latvia’s media market, with very little crossover. The information that reaches the public can differ extensively, depending on the language of transmission; both the Russian-language and Latvian-language media have tendencies to radicalize ethnic tensions to their respective target groups in the press (Šulmane, 2010 p. 243).

In addition to Russian-language content produced in Latvia, Latvia also receives a steady stream of media from Russia. Russian-produced content dominates television, particularly in low-cost cable packages by Baltcom and Lattelecom and for households without digital converter boxes (Juzefovičs, 2011). Freedom House rates the Russian media as “not free,” and the most influential Russian-language media sources have direct ties to the Kremlin (Freedom House, 2012; Rostoks, 2008). Several scholars argue that the Kremlin is able to use this media control to manufacture an unfavorable image of Latvia both for audiences in Russia and for Russian-speakers in Latvia (Muižnieks, 2008). Petrenko argues that the Russian-speaking population in Latvia is constructed as a unified community that needs Russia for protection against a discriminatory Latvian state (2008).

The 2004 school reform increasing Latvian-language instruction in minority secondary schools is a prime example of media manipulation of integration issues. Though the reforms had
been planned since 1998, when the transition neared, the media was rife with images of protesting school children and accusations of assimilationist tactics on the part of the Latvian government. In the Russian media, “journalists illustrate these stories of a [Russian] community under threat,” while in the Latvian media, Russian-speakers are accused of disloyalty to the Latvian state (Petrenko, 2008, p. 76; Šulmane, 2010). Group identity (Russians vs. Latvian state) plays a strong role in media portrayals of ethnic tensions that are meant to solidify communities in an “us vs. them” construct, despite the fact that these “communities” are more invented than real (Petrenko, 2008; Šulmane & Kruks, 2006). This tendency is not limited to major changes in integration policies, but also happens with regularity during calendar events. For example, March 16 is an unofficial remembrance day for the Latvian Legion¹; every year the date is surrounded with controversy. While the legionnaires are portrayed as Latvian patriots in the Latvian media, the Russian media labels them fascists. Events like this draw huge political and media attention within Latvia, and often become the subject of foreign-language reports on Latvia.

The Latvian and Russian media effectively highlight the failures of integration, both for Latvian and Russian audiences, as well as for the international community. Exploiting the ethnic divide for political gain is common practice. Controversy sells newspapers and gets votes, but does it fairly represent the situation for Latvians and Russian-speakers living their daily lives in Latvia? Ethnic violence has not been a part of Latvia’s post-Soviet transition, and there is a high rate of positive interethnic interaction in the workplace and in social lives. While the ethnic battles are raging in newspapers, we must look beyond the headlines to understand the true story behind the progression of integration in Latvia.

¹ Latvian soldiers, most illegally conscripted, fighting in the German armed forces (Waffen-SS) against Soviet forces in World War II (Ezergailis, 1997).
Literature Review

As in the public discourse, the academic discourse largely highlights the failures of integration reform and its implementation in Latvia. While this thesis seeks to highlight the oft-overlooked progress in this area, it requires an understanding of both the Latvian academic analysis and broader literature on integration. I rely largely on the work of Nils Muižnieks, an academic and policy maker in Latvia, to further explore these themes.

According to Muižnieks, while there are some successes, integration policy in Latvia has been contradictory and inconsistent (2010). These themes are prevalent in most critical analyses of the topic. Juris Rozenvalds highlights the deep divisions in the political elite that have prevented effective integration policies from taking root (2010). For example, in the early post-Soviet years, strict language and citizenship requirements were partially enacted to promote the departure of Russian speakers (Pritt Jarve, 2003, referenced in Rozenvalds, 2010, p. 43). Though now laws have loosened, there still exists a lack of political will to solve integration dilemmas (Rozenvalds, 2010).² Iveta Silova similarly critiques the haphazard reforms to the Latvian school system post-1991, where policy failed to appropriately take into account the situation on the ground (2002). Dilans (2009) and Kangaro & James (2008) echo the critique of contradictory reforms in the education system. Looking to citizenship, Kristīne Krūma highlights the declining rate of naturalization, drawing on the effect of Russia’s post-Soviet compatriot policies (Krūma, 2010, p. 18). The picture of Latvian integration becomes very grim when analysis is turned to issues of historical memory and calendar demonstrations (see Zepa & Klave, 2011; Muižnieks, 2010, and others). The greater picture, in both academia and public discourse, generally highlights the failures of Latvian integration.

² Quotas for naturalization were lifted and children born in Latvia were given the right to citizenship without naturalization. For a longer discussion, see Section II.
How integration is defined in the European and Latvian context is also critical to the discussion. The distinction between assimilation and integration is extremely significant in the academic and public vernacular. Muižnieks points out that the term “assimilation” evokes a fear of cultural override, in Latvia’s case, a fear of unequivocally disenfranchising Slavic culture (2010). While perhaps not to the extreme of John Stuart Mill’s argument for paternal ethnocentrism, these older notions of engineering a culturally homogenous society still inform the term (cited in Birch, 1989, p. 38). “Assimilating” minorities is no longer a viable policy goal for modern-day Europe. The word “assimilation” is often used in the Russian-language media, though usually as an incorrect portrayal of proposed government reforms. Rather, “integration” — which can include greater steps toward acculturation, but does not demand homogeneity — has become the buzzword for addressing mechanisms of promoting ethno-cultural social interaction. Europe faces constant challenges in efforts to integrate non-titular populations; divergent approaches range from acculturation to non-participation (Siiner & Vihalemm, 2011b; Hogan-Brun, 2006; Wikan, 2002). There are no binding European directives with regard to integration, rather, an established set of norms that countries follow (Siiner & Vihalemm, 2011b, p. 118). Norwegian anthropologist Unni Wikan presents as problematical the concept of unequivocally preserving minority “culture” as separate from majority culture; “… culture plays down the internal differences among members of a group and thus gives a false picture of homogeneity.” Integration policies must be wary of subverting social norms and rights in attempted deference to cultural traditions (Wikan, 2002, p. 88). The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, while delegitimizing assimilationist tactics, legitimizes “integration policy” as a means of shaping society (Council of Europe, 1995; Muižnieks, 2010).
What exactly measures integration is another important factor in this discussion. It is widely accepted that knowledge of the official state language is emphasized as a key element to achieving integration and social cohesion (Muižnieks, 2010; Laitin, 1998; Gellner & Breuilly, 2008; Anderson, 2006, and others). According to those whom Will Kymlicka labels “liberal nationalists,” common education and language of education is seen as a fundamental prerequisite for members of society to have equal opportunities (Kymlicka, 2001, cited in Muižnieks, 2010, p. 19; Gellner & Breuilly, 2008). Unlike the U.S. and Great Britain, countries like Latvia face challenges to promoting language acquisition. In the former, immigrant children quickly give up their mother tongue in favor of a more “useful” language, whereas in the latter, immigrants often maintain better connections to their mother tongues. Latvian is largely insignificant on the world stage, particularly in comparison to Russian; “[the language] has no international prestige or usefulness and it becomes the clearer why, for people to have an incentive to learn it, there must be some bonuses built into the system” (Wikan, 2002, p. 52). Finding appropriate incentives is key; Muižnieks argues that language knowledge can promote “further participation to equal access and social goods,” which are elements of an integrated society. He also draws on the United Nations, Council of Europe and the EU to promote a definition of integration as a “‘two-way street’ of mutual accommodation,” where both non-discriminatory access to integration and participation in society are necessary (Muižnieks, 2010, p. 30). The concepts of non-discriminatory access and rational choice are useful in understanding integration in the two Latvian case studies discussed here (citizenship legislation and education reform), where the avenues to integration must be open, and individuals must actively choose to participate in these functions of society.
Theoretical Framework

Muižnieks and his Latvian contemporaries set the premise for discussing integration in Latvia today. However, the general picture presented is that Latvia is facing an uphill battle. While individual policy successes are occasionally highlighted, the progress toward integration can often fall by the wayside. This thesis pinpoints the successes in citizenship and education integration from both the policy and social perspectives. To do so, I look back at David Laitin’s 1998 seminal work on the Russian-speaking minority population in post-Soviet states. Using his interpretation of rational choice theory, I explain why many Russian-speaking individuals have integrated linguistically and civically in the past 15 years. In addition to Laitin’s work on individual choices, it is also important to recognize how Latvian legislation fits into the European context. For this, I focus on Marc Morje Howard’s framework for standardizing citizenship policies across the EU-15, offering a calculation for Latvia based on his existing work (2009).

According to Laitin, predictions regarding social integration in the Baltic can be linked to the manner of incorporation into the USSR. Laitin argues that the Baltic States experienced an “integralist” method of incorporation, wherein titular institutional structures existed parallel to Russian-language structures. In the integralist system, there was no rational need for Russian speakers to become bilingual. However, as titular nation states reemerged in the 1990s and Russian was no longer an official language, Soviet Russian-speakers lost the right to be monolingual. Instead, they were often categorized as fifth column “occupiers” in nationalizing states (Laitin, 1998, p. 96; Brubaker, 1998; Conventions, 1949). The exogenous shock of the fall

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3 Laitin does not adequately explain that, in contrast to Russian-speakers, titulars both perceived the benefits of and were mandated to learn Russian, despite the existence of parallel institutions.

4 Legally, Art. 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the transfer of civilians from the territory of the occupation force to the occupied territory. Under this international law, Soviet-era settlers can be classified as occupiers in Latvian territory (Conventions, 1949).
of the USSR — and the contracting state borders — forced individuals, particularly the Russophone “beached diaspora” to explore new personal and social identity choices to take the place of Soviet citizen.

A personal identity assumes a primordial quality, while social identities are constructed with regard to the environment, according to Laitin. Based on Erik H. Erikson’s theory, Laitin marries both the inherent and constructed qualities of identities in a Janus-faced structure, where each side exists without impinging on the other (1998, p. 20-21). Both the primordial and social aspects of identity appear in public debates on integration in Latvia.5 As this thesis focuses on education and citizenship — social institutions — my theoretical discussion is narrowed to Laitin’s ideas of the constructed quality of social identity. Social identities can be both chosen by the individual and imposed by others, based on what can “plausibly be connected to their history and present set of behaviors” (1998, p. 16). According to Laitin,

Social identities are distinct from personal identities, and they are built from available categories that both divide and unite people in a society. People have inter alia national identities, racial identities, religious identities, and hometown identities. Yet issues of social identity become part of public discourse only when the categories themselves become fuzzy. Self-appointed boundary-keepers arise to redefine these categories so that rules of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the behavioral implications of belonging to this or that category, can be clarified (1998, p. 16).

Both politicians and the media act as “boundary-keepers” that can both enforce a collective ethnic group identity and ostracize “misfits” who defect from “the community.” A person may have multiple identities, but, “when the actions or behaviors consistent with one identity conflict with those of another identity held by the same person, as they do when the two identities represent antagonistic groups on the political stage, people are compelled to give priority to one identity over the other” (Laitin, 1998, p. 23). This is the crux of the proselytized integration

5 This is perhaps complicated by the linguistic lack of distinction between civic and national pronouns; as opposed to russkiy and rossiyskiy in Russian, Latvian has only latvietis.
problem in the Latvian case: Individuals are asked to choose which of their identities takes priority in the political and media space. However, on a daily basis, as Laitin foresees, distinct ethnic and civic identities can exist without conflict.

In 1998, Laitin predicted that the Russian-speaking population (to which he attributes a conglomerate identity) would assimilate linguistically to Latvian society. The Russian-speaking community would “[adopt] the ever changing cultural practices of dominant society with the goal of crossing a fluid cultural boundary separating [minorities] from dominant society” (1995, p. 35.). Laitin (like many scholars, politicians and legislative structures) uses language as the primary indicator of integration (Anderson, 2006; Gellner & Breuilly, 2008). It is a method through which the “cumulative assimilation of Russian speakers into Balts [sic]” can occur (Laitin, 1998, p. 359). As Wikan posits, incentives are part of encouraging linguistic assimilation. Laitin argued that, based on a calculation of incentives versus disincentives offered, individuals would exercise rational choice in their decision to learn or not learn Latvian. Using Tomas Schelling’s tipping model, Laitin forecasted a cascading identity shift, in which Russian speakers would make a rational choice to assimilate linguistically to Latvian society if they perceived such a shift would occur among other monolingual Russian speakers.

A relevant example of the tipping model is seen in the street protests that cascaded across Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. A stable “pre-protest” Eastern Europe quickly tipped to a stable “protest” Eastern Europe; as it became clear that protesters did not face retaliation, more individuals were expected to — and did — protest, cascading into revolution (Laitin, 1998, p.

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6 That is, “a category of membership that is a common denominator among a set of identity groups that share some characteristics that are distinct from those in the dominant society in which they live” (1998, p. 31). In this case, persons who use Russian as their dominant or first language, regardless of ethnic background (Ukrainian, Belarussian, Jewish, etc.).

7 Laitin’s understanding of linguistic assimilation should not be conflated with definitions of “assimilation” as discussed in Sect. 1.2. Rather, it refers to the acquisition of Latvian language without necessarily implying a loss of cultural identity.
21). “Such cascades occur because people’s choices about their actions are based on what they think others are going to do” (1998, p. 21). Laitin argues that this mechanism is similarly appropriate for measuring the assimilation of Russian-speakers into Latvian society because individuals will choose to adopt Latvian as the benefits increase relative to the costs. Assimilation occurs when (1) the pay-offs for assimilation are higher, (2) the group is divided and does not “maintain a tight-knit community,” and (3) the majority culture accepts the would-be assimilators (as in marriage or social affairs) (1998, p. 29). Both the first and third assumptions are realities in Latvia; assumption two is heavily contested in the media and political rhetoric, but consolidated ethnic “group” identity is limited in daily life.

While it is possible to live in a Latvian Latvia and a Russian Latvia with little practical need for the alternative language, Laitin predicted that a lack of social disincentives would spur individuals to choose to learn Latvian (Rozenvalds, 2010, p. 37; Laitin, 1998). Of the four post-Soviet republics Laitin studied (Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan), Laitin posits that Russian-speakers in Latvia were most open to assimilation, largely based on an evaluation of social costs (1998, p. 251). Though Latvian Russians were the least likely to agree that it was economically useful to learn Latvian (in 1998), “Russians in Latvia do not scorn fellow Russians who are seen to be speaking Latvian as much as Russians in [Kazakhstan and Estonia] … Latvians do not scorn assimilationist efforts by Russian-speakers as much as the titulars in all three other republics” (1998, p. 256). The relatively few disincentives of learning Latvian outweighed the lack of more concrete incentives, leading Laitin to predict that assimilation was likely to occur. Though also recognizing the importance of English as the language of “wider-range mobility prospects” beyond the borders of Latvia, Laitin projected Latvian would become the only language necessary to succeed in the country (1998, p. 361). The education and
citizenship case studies in this thesis attempt to update Laitin’s predictions, using his understanding of rational choice theory to explain why Latvian language knowledge (as an indicator of integration) has grown considerably.

In addition to rational choice and language learning, this study attempts to understand the legislative aspects of integration, most particularly in citizenship policies. This is especially significant in Latvia because there exists a large non-citizen population — the remaining “beached diaspora” to which Laitin refers. Laitin’s rational choice plays a part in explaining both the continued persistence and erosion of the non-citizen population; however, in this case study, I also use Marc Morje Howard’s framework for categorizing the legislation as it relates to citizenship in Europe. Howard’s 2009 text offers an extensive analysis of the scholarly debate on citizenship liberalization across the EU-15. Though the Baltics often face scrutiny from the international community with regard to their approaches on social integration, Latvian citizenship standards — like other current integration policies — are not uncommonly demanding within the context of the European Union. They do not present an insurmountable barrier, which allows Russian-speakers to choose civic integration by attaining citizenship.

While the political and media rhetoric highlight a deep gap between “Latvians” and the Russian-speaking “community,” I look to citizenship legislation and education to argue that real progress toward integration has been made. This analysis of Latvian integration will build on the extensive work done by scholars of the Baltic. Because of the longitudinal tendency of this case study, as well as time and travel constraints, data collection is primarily based on document review of existing sources, rather than the development of new surveys. Individual studies on the two issue areas are readily available. They present an appropriate basis for identifying longitudinal changes in this analysis. As this study focuses on the policy perspective of
integration, documents such as legislation, bills and official statements are used extensively. Human Development Reports, censuses and migration affairs data provide a quantitatively sound perspective to a largely qualitative study. I provide self-collected data on current trends in media and education. More than two decades after the exogenous shock of the collapse of the USSR, the story of Latvian integration is still plagued by judging the book by its cover. While a pessimistic image may catch the eye of the world, the story behind it is much more positive.
SECTION II
CITIZENSHIP: UNEXPECTED LIBERALISM

A first broad look at Latvian integration can be evaluated through successes in civic inclusion, i.e. the attainment of citizenship for Soviet-era immigrants. While some scholars argue that national citizenship is losing value because social rights are provided outside of the nation-state structure (i.e. at the supra-national level) (Sassen, 1996; Jacobson, 1996, cited in Howard, 2009), Howard posits that national citizenship is still relevant from both a political and social rights standpoint (Howard, 2009, p. 7). Ben Herzog argues that “citizenship laws do represent the ideal of national belonging that assumes exclusive … allegiance” to a country (2012, p. 739). Therefore, the naturalization patterns of non-citizens are critical indicators of rational choice integration in Latvia. The Latvian parliament (Saeima) is in the process of amending and liberalizing the Law on Citizenship for the first time since 1998. Changes will include provisions for dual citizenship, as well as loosening naturalization requirements and easing the path to citizenship for children of non-citizens (Latvijas Republikas Saeima [LR Saeima], 2012). However, since the post-Soviet citizenship law liberalized in 1998, Latvia has already documented strides in civic integration of Russian-speaking non-citizens. While 14% of the total Latvian population still does not access political rights, the non-citizen population has diminished since 1995 and it is primarily older individuals that retain this status. With high rates of successful naturalization, the 14% may be a segment of the population that actively chooses to remain non-citizens. Upcoming changes to the citizenship law have the potential to even more easily facilitate civic

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8 Non-citizenship is a status that applies only to former Soviet citizens; the majority is Russian-speaking. Of the total Latvian population, 14% have non-citizen status. About half of the total Russian-speaking population in Latvia are non-citizens. While the percentage is high, it may be a reflection of rational choice on the part of non-citizens.
integration through citizenship; however, I argue that civic integration is already happening and the currently debated amendments will have a primarily symbolic effect.

In this section, I also examine Marc Morje Howard’s predictions regarding the widely publicized “restrictive” nature of the Latvian citizenship law (often discussed in the media and by politicians). I argue that contrary to his 2009 assessment, citizenship legislation is not overly restrictive; instead, it does provide an appropriate legal framework to reduce the non-citizen population (Howard, 2009, p. 177). Additionally, I address the history of Latvian citizenship law, the impetus for and process of citizenship liberalization and the potential future effects of these amendments on integration. This section is based primarily on document review. This includes analysis of the current Law on Citizenship, proposed amendments, statistical information on naturalization and demographics from the Latvian Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (Pilsonības un migrācijas lietu pārvalde, PMLP) and the Central Statistical Bureau (CSB), as well as public opinion surveys from the 2010/2011 Human Development Report on Latvia and transcripts of public speeches by politicians.

**From past to future**

**Legal continuity trumps Soviet legacy.** When the Soviet Union dissolved into successor states in 1991, it left a significant population in Latvia without a clearly defined citizenship. A “zero-option,” which would have effectively granted citizenship to all residents of Latvia after the dissolution of the USSR, was rejected. Instead, a significant reduction of the titular population in Latvia during the course of Soviet occupation prompted a return to the 1919 citizenship law in the 1991 Renewal of the Republic of Latvia Citizen’s Rights and Fundamental Principles of Nationality (Krūma, 2010). Invoking the principle of state continuity, citizenship was open to those who had been
citizens of the interwar Latvian republic, as well as their descendants (Kalvaitis 1998; Ziemele 2001, cited in Krūma, 2010). Latvian citizens who left Latvia as refugees between June 17, 1940 and May 4, 1990 and had acquired different citizenship had the right to apply for Latvian citizenship by July 1, 1995, as did their descendents (LR Saeima, 1998). In 1995, individuals who had migrated to Latvia during the Soviet era and their descendents (regardless of whether or not they were born in Latvia) were granted the “temporary status” of non-citizen, with the opportunity to naturalize in the future. Importantly, this status was offered after the 1994 withdrawal of Russia’s troops, who had remained stationed in Latvian territory after independence was declared. Twenty-two years after the restoration of Latvian independence, 14% of its population continues to have this “temporary” non-citizen status, which is considered a significant problem for Latvian integration (Table 2.1). However, this number cuts in half the 1995 non-citizen population, which was more than 30% (Krūma, cited in Howard, 2009, p. 176).

Table 2.1 Population by citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2000</th>
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<th>2011</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total population</strong></td>
<td>2377383</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2067887</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizens of Latvia</strong></td>
<td>1770210</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>1732880</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-citizens of Latvia</strong></td>
<td>503999</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>290660</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Citizens of other countries</strong></td>
<td>103174</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>44347</td>
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<td>703</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5730</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Not EU Member States</strong></td>
<td>102471</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>38617</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Data:</strong></td>
<td>CSB, 2012g</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

accordance with these international standards, Latvian law distinguishes between stateless persons and non-citizens. Some international actors, including Russia, do not accept this distinction. According to Latvian law, the category of non-citizen is only applicable to “citizens of the former USSR who reside in the Republic of Latvia as well as [those] who are in temporary absence and their children,” given that they comply with the standards of the law (Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2006). Non-citizens have most of the rights of Latvian citizens, with the exceptions of the right to vote and work in civil service or national security positions (Reine, 2007). Unlike stateless persons, they enjoy Latvian consular protection and are able to travel on a non-citizen passport. According to 2011 census data, less than 0.0001% of the Latvian population is stateless (CSB, 2012g). At the 2007 Seminar on Prevention of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons within the European Union, Latvian representative Inga Reine asserted:

It has been the firm position of the Latvian Government that Latvian non-citizens may not be regarded as stateless persons within the meaning of the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons due to the specific and interim nature of their legal status, as well as a very broad scope of rights enjoyed thereby. This position has been accepted by the majority of states and international procedures as compatible with international law.

In 1994, the Fifth Saeima adopted the Law on Citizenship, which contained strict naturalization quotas (Dreifelds, 1996, p. 98; Eglītis, 2002). The quotas were designed to limit the number of naturalized citizens, based on population growth to maintain a Latvian majority in the population. This meant that even if individuals qualified for naturalization, naturalization would be dependent on demographic statistics. Under pressure from the international community (Latvia was particularly responsive to the EU pre-accession negotiations [Howard, 2009, p. 176]), then-President Guntis Ulmanis rejected the numerical quota, opting for an amended version of the citizenship law in
1994. This law included “naturalization windows,” which staggered naturalization eligibility by birth (Šūpule, 2007). The Law on Citizenship was most recently amended in 1998, which included abolishing “window naturalization” and providing a bureaucratic, but accessible, path to citizenship for children born in Latvia to non-citizen and stateless parents.

**Naturalization:** Since 1995, 139,886 individuals have become naturalized citizens (PMLP, 2013b). Current naturalization requirements include (1) five-year residency; (2) fluency in Latvian and familiarity with Latvian history, the Constitution and national anthem; (3) legal means of subsistence; (4) renouncement of former citizenship; (5) oath of loyalty. Children under 15 can be naturalized with their parents. The Latvian language test required for naturalization is comparable to a first-year Latvian language test at the University of Washington (according to an observer of the testing, cited in Clemens, 2001, p. 125). Naturalization is not possible for persons who have (1) acted against independence or the democratic parliament or state; (2) incited national or racist hatred or propagated totalitarian ideas (as proven by the court); (3) are officials in a different country’s government; (4) serve in a different country’s military (LR Saeima, 1998).

More than 83% of all naturalizations since 1991 occurred between 1999 and 2007, with a spike in 2005 (Figure 2.1). The jump in naturalization between the years 1999 and 2007 began with the 1998 abolishment of window naturalization and centered around the 2004 accession to the EU (Šūpule, 2007, p. 203). As Laitin predicted, accessibility to the European job market appears to have been an incentive to naturalize. Conversely, in 2008, Russia opened visa-free travel to non-citizens, and non-citizens were allowed to travel visa-free throughout the Schengen Zone (Ivļevs & King, 2012). Therefore, some
incentives to become a Latvian citizen have decreased, particularly for those with connections to the West and the East. Though nearly 300,000 people remain non-citizens, since 2008, only 12,100 people have naturalized, less than an average of 2,500 people per year. This is less than the average of naturalizations between 1995 and 1998 (2,860), despite the comparatively restrictive law until 1998. Critics of Howard argue that political rights, which come with citizenship, become less of an incentive to pursue naturalization when social benefits are already being provided outside of citizenship, as they are in the case of Latvia’s non-citizens (Howard, 2009). Additionally, many current non-citizens are older, and, given the rights and benefits afforded non-citizens, may not perceive any additional incentives to make an effort to naturalize.

**Figure 2.1: Individuals naturalized as Latvian citizens**

Data: PMLP, 2013b.

**Liberalizing changes & potential effects.** Recent changes to Latvian citizenship law will permit Latvian citizens to hold dual citizenship with EU, NATO, and EFTA countries, as well as countries with bilateral treaties on citizenship. Citizens of other states could attain dual citizenship with the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers (LR
The concept of dual citizenship, though not yet permitted on a large scale, is not foreign to Latvia. Tens of thousands of Latvian citizens already hold dual citizenship in conjunction with legal continuity from the interwar state. Significantly, proposed liberalization would not allow for dual citizenship with Russia, though many individuals living in Latvia with foreign citizenship are citizens of Russia (PMLP, 2012b).

According to the World Bank, 12.2% of Latvian residents were living abroad in 2011 (cited in Kešāne, 2011, p. 70). Within these recent emigrant communities, many have retained their Latvian citizenship or non-citizen status. More than 82,000 Latvian citizens live abroad; the most live in Great Britain and the United States. Just over 3,500 Latvian non-citizens live abroad, primarily in Russia and Germany (PMLP, 2012b). Some Latvian citizens are beginning to institutionalize their relationship with their new country by applying for citizenship in order to claim benefits in their host country (Kešāne, 2011, p. 75). There are indications that these individuals would prefer to retain their Latvian citizenship, but are currently unable to do so — practical considerations outweigh emotional links (Kešāne, 2011). Dual citizenship provisions may prevent additional loss of citizens by allowing individuals to naturalize without losing their Latvian civic rights.

Head of the Saeima Legal Affairs Committee for citizenship legislation, Ingmārs Čaklais has argued that thousands of non-citizen children eligible for Latvian citizenship are not registered because the process is overly bureaucratic or because both parents cannot or do not give consent; “This creates a situation, which is unfavorable for the child, because in Latvian law, this child is given the right to be a citizen of Latvia, but for so-called ‘technical reasons,’ this child cannot realize his rights” (2012b). The proposed
changes to the Law on Citizenship would ease these bureaucratic requirements. Parents would be able to assign their child citizenship by checking the appropriate box when registering the birth; additionally, only one parent would be required to give consent. Former President Valdis Zatlers has also advocated an “opt-out” versus “opt-in” system for *jus soli*, i.e. children born in Latvia would automatically be considered citizens unless a parent “opts-out” when registering the birth (Zatlers, 2012). According to the amendments, parents would also be required to formally acknowledge their duty to raise their child with respect and loyalty to Latvia, as well as supporting the child’s acquisition of Latvian as the national language (LR Saeima, 2012).

Approximately 14,500 non-citizens, born in 1991 or later, who had the right to register as Latvian citizens have not done so (PMLP, 2013). This is about 5% of the non-citizen population and less than 1% of the Latvian population as a whole. The number of non-citizens by year of birth has steadily decreased over the years, (Table 2.2). Only 260 of 19,414 children born in 2012 are non-citizens (1.3% of total births). Considering this steady decline in young people who are non-citizens, easing the path to citizenship for children of non-citizens is not likely to have a drastic effect on civic integration. Rather, it shows that civic integration of non-citizens is already occurring within the current legislative structure. These data show that Russian-speaking non-citizen parents see value in assigning their children Latvian citizenship. The proposed step toward liberalization of requirements, however, may serve a rhetorical and symbolic purpose for integration. A major effect of this law within Latvian society, according to Zatlers, would be an increase in loyalty and affinity for Latvia among those who would otherwise be born non-citizens (2012). He argues that Latvia will have legal responsibilities and protection for these
citizens from the first days of their lives, thereby establishing an inherent legal relationship with the state and promoting civic integration for children of Russian-speakers.

### Table 2.2: Current non-citizens by year of birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Latvian Citizen</th>
<th>Non-citizen (%)</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>19032</td>
<td>260 (1.3)</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>19414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>18763</td>
<td>359 (1.9)</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>19311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>19276</td>
<td>401 (2.0)</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>19910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21132</td>
<td>469 (2.1)</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>21875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>23159</td>
<td>518 (2.2)</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>23922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>22524</td>
<td>549 (2.4)</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>23336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>21363</td>
<td>599 (2.7)</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>22275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20487</td>
<td>558 (2.6)</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>21349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>19135</td>
<td>600 (3.0)</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>20064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>19637</td>
<td>609 (3.0)</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>20532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>18671</td>
<td>632 (3.2)</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>19577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>18077</td>
<td>656 (3.5)</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>19013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>18602</td>
<td>750 (3.8)</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>19598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>17724</td>
<td>705 (3.8)</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>18726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>16735</td>
<td>625 (3.5)</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>17650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>29215</td>
<td>1560 (5)</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>31318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: PMLP, 2012b.

**Latvia & CPI: a liberal surprise**

Though there are fewer and fewer Latvian residents who grow up as non-citizens, the 14% of the Latvian population that have non-citizen status is often rhetorically cited as a major impediment to integration. Howard (2009) posits that the current citizenship law is restrictive toward current non-citizens.\(^9\) Indeed, a Google search for “non-citizen Latvia” will return a series of reports criticizing Latvian citizenship policy and alleging human

\(^9\) Howard focuses on the legal requirements of citizenship, therefore I also avoid the emotional arguments tied to naturalization of non-citizens and focus on legal requirements.
rights violations (many of these complaints emanate from Russian sources). However, I argue that Latvia is actually less restrictive than one third of the EU-15 countries that Howard analyzes. In 2009, Howard predicted that Latvia (as well as Estonia) would not experience much citizenship liberalization in the near future; he perceived the nationality question as too politically sensitive to allow for “radical changes” (p. 177). Though the proposed amendments to the citizenship law in Latvia do not promise “radical” change, Latvian law is continuing an overlooked trend of liberalization.

Howard lays out a Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) as a baseline for comparison across the EU-15. Using his methodology, I offer a general calculation of Latvia’s current position on the CPI with regard to non-citizens (see Appendix I for methodology). Contrary to popular rhetoric, Latvia is far from draconian in its citizenship policies. Instead, it falls firmly in the “medium” category when compared to the EU-15, far above historically restrictive countries like Austria and Denmark.

**Table 2.3 Citizenship Policy Index scores for EU-15 (2008) and Latvia (2012)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Jus soli (0-2)</th>
<th>Naturalization requirements (0-2)</th>
<th>Dual citizenship for immigrants (0-2)</th>
<th>CPI score (0-6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive (average) (0 – 1.5)</td>
<td>Austria, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Italy</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1.75</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (average) (1.51 – 3.9)</td>
<td>Germany, Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (average) (4.0+)</td>
<td>Netherlands, Finland, Portugal, Ireland, France, U.K., Sweden, Belgium</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>4.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data (EU-15) & methodology (see notes): Howard, 2009, p. 28.

**Historical analysis.** Howard contributes an in-depth analysis of the historical reasons for citizenship policies. He posits that in the EU-15, countries with liberal standards have
a history of being colonial powers and/or 19th century democratizers. Countries that democratized in the 20th century (like Latvia), have a history of being tied to the concept of the nation-state, and are less likely to be liberal. While I have shown that Latvia’s post-1998 policies are not restrictive, following Howard’s example, I offer a brief historical analysis of why Latvian law had restrictive elements between 1991 and 1998.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the territories now called Latvia and Estonia were a region of the Russian Empire that was administered by an ethnic-German nobility. In the second half of the 19th century, Latvians and Estonians experienced “national awakenings.” As a result of World War I, the Baltic littoral was occupied by Germany and Russia. The war wreaked havoc on the Baltic provinces, but in the aftermath, a power vacuum left by German and Russian forces created space for national groups to take control of the future of the territory (Kasekamp, 2010).

The People’s Council of Latvia (*Tautas padome*) declared independence on November 18, 1918. The original law on citizenship (1919) was not limited to ethnic Latvians; many Russians, Belarusians, Poles, Jews and Germans held Latvian citizenship in the interwar period. The Constitutional Convention (*Satversmes sapulce*) was convened in 1920. Latvia entered the League of Nations in 1921, having achieved recognition from Western powers (Plakans, 2011). However, Soviet and Nazi occupation dramatically impacted the population dynamics of Latvia. Soviet troops entered the country during World War II on June 17, 1940; the USSR annexed Latvia on August 5, 1940 (Purs, 2011). In 1941, the Nazi invasion replaced Soviet occupation in the Baltics, but at the end of 1944, the USSR resumed control. Tens of thousands of refugees fled troops in both directions during the war.
Figure 2.2 Population by ethnicity

Data: CSB, 2012g.

Approximately 60,000 people were deported from Latvia during and after WWII; the largest deportations occurred in 1941 and 1949 (Strods & Kott, 2002). After the reestablishment of Soviet occupation, Moscow-directed investments in industry encouraged large-scale labor migration to the Baltics from other areas of the USSR. Some scholars argue this was done intentionally to dilute the titular population, while others are less convinced. However, the result was that over five decades of Soviet occupation, the demographic structure of the Latvian population drastically changed to the point where the Russian-speaking population had more than tripled and the ethnic Latvian population was diminished to just over a majority (Figure 2.2). The significant changes in the ethnic structure of the Latvian population, as well as the loss of refugees to other countries, have been often cited as an impetus for current citizenship legislation, which requires individuals who arrived in Latvia during the Soviet period to naturalize. Legally, the basis for non-citizenship status and naturalization requirements lies in the existence of the interwar Latvian state (Kalvaitis 1998; Ziemele 2001 cited in Krūma, 2010). This is legitimized by the international law precedent set by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which prohibits resettlement of citizens of an occupying state to occupied territories (Conventions, 1949).

**Liberalizing pressures.** In addition to using a historical basis to explain citizenship policy, Howard identifies reasons for liberalizing trends, citing both international pressures for “postnational” human rights and globalization, as well as domestic pressures. He argues, “if the discussion remains on the elite level, the pressures for liberalization will usually be successful. If, however, anti-immigrant sentiment is ‘activated’ and mobilized politically, it will essentially trump the liberalizing pressures” (2009, p. 11). With this case study of Latvia, I argue that Howard’s assumptions are largely validated with some caveats. The international pressure of economic globalization is the primary impetus for current changes to Latvia’s citizenship law; however, public reaction to liberalization is mixed.

The 2008 financial crisis was felt across the globe, but Latvia initially experienced one of the worst crises in Europe. GDP contracted significantly, plunging the country into a series of austerity measures and skyrocketing unemployment (Åslund & Dombrovskis, 2011; CSB, 2012g). Latvia’s demographic issues were exacerbated by the fiscal downturn. Not only is Latvia experiencing low birthrates, but emigration to Western European countries has reached into the tens of thousands for working-age cohorts since 2008, that is about 5% of the total population (which hovers around 2 million) (see Appendix II, Table 2.4).

While not solely due to the 2008 financial crisis, officials in the Latvian government have been concerned by large-scale migration. An effort to encourage the return of migrants was first introduced to the Latvian political agenda in 2006 after the 2004
accession to the EU sparked migration to Western Europe. Even before accession, the demographic threat was on the horizon (Clemens, Dreifelds, Raun & Suziedelis, in Šmidchens, 2003).

In 2008, the Special projects ministry\textsuperscript{10} was asked to complete several tasks that would assist in maintaining formal links between emigrants and Latvia. This included drafting amendments to the Law on Citizenship that would provide access to dual citizenship, “taking into consideration needs of fellow countrymen residing abroad” (Krišjāne & Lāce, 2012, p. 26). Any changes to the citizenship law, though initiated by international pressures, would necessarily have to address amending the non-citizen issue; while the dual citizenship provision is not directly related to easing restrictions for non-citizens, it is a factor in that step toward liberalization.

There has been little if any outcry from the public against these steps to liberalize the citizenship law. Data from the 2010/2011 Latvian Human Development Report indicate that the Latvian and Russian-speaking communities in Latvia hold similar views on restrictions to citizenship. Comparatively few believe that citizenship should be denied on an ethnic or cultural basis, rather, most believe that if restrictions should apply, they should be linked to the civic responsibilities of citizens. More than half of the population would agree with banning citizenship for those who ignore Latvian law or to whom Latvia’s interests are unimportant (Zepa, 2011, p. 36). Latvian and Russian-speaking residents agree that all people in Latvia must speak Latvian (93.1% and 72.2%, respectively); each group also concurs on the principles of active civic values (paying taxes, voting). Indeed, 71.2% of Latvia’s residents say that Latvian citizens abroad must

\textsuperscript{10} Īpašu uzdevumu ministra sabiedrības integrācijas lietās sekretariāta darbības stratēģija.
vote in elections (Zepa, 2011, p. 26). This indicates that there is support for migrants to retain their rights and duties to Latvia, despite living elsewhere.

Howard’s predictions regarding anti-immigrant (here: non-citizen) sentiment are partially true in Latvia. While Howard predicts that right-wing politicians will encourage popular referenda against attempted citizenship liberalization, in Latvia the opposite occurred. “Russian” politics in Latvia generally occupies the left side of the political spectrum. In 2012, “Russian activists” attempted to force a referendum that advocated granting blanket citizenship to all non-citizens in Latvia. The non-citizen referendum gained media hype concurrent with the buzz about proposed amendments to the law, but was banned due to unconstitutionality (Central Election Commission, 2012). Nil Ushakov, head of the “Russian-speakers” Harmony Party, did not support the referendum; instead, he alleged that right-wing “Latvian” parties had encouraged the attempted referendum to foment ethnic tensions (Ushakov, 2012). Whether or not these accusations have truth to them, it is interesting that the population was mobilized to support liberalization.11

Summary

The data above show that contrary to media and political rhetoric, current citizenship legislation in Latvia has not impeded civic integration of the Russian-speaking population. Indeed, the number of non-citizens — the population commonly used as an indication of segregationist tendencies of the Latvian government — is dwindling. Proposed changes to the citizenship law will further amend the situation. Individuals who maintain that status may actively choose to do so. Non-citizens are entitled to social

11 Certainly, Latvia has a larger non-citizen population than most of the immigrant communities in EU-15 countries. However, this indicates it is not only right-wing politicians who can mobilize their base with regard to citizenship.
rights, and may even see more benefits of retaining the non-citizenship status, particularly if they desire visa-free travel to both the West and East.

While changes to the citizenship law will assist domestic integration, there is also a strong indication that integration with the West is a priority for the Latvian government. Dual citizenship with EU and NATO countries allows Latvians to civically integrate into Western countries without renouncing their legal relationship to Latvia. Indeed, as the CPI calculations show, Latvia is already on par with median citizenship liberalization in “Old Europe.” The high rate of successful naturalizations confirms legal accessibility to civic integration, which individuals can rationally choose to acquire. As the presence of politicians geared toward Russian-speakers shows, Russian-speakers are actively involved in civic and political life, highlighting a critical element of integration. This analysis of citizenship legislation, both current and future, shows that Latvia does have a functional framework to promote integration with Russian-speakers and Europe on a civic scale.
SECTION III
TEACHING INTEGRATION

As the previous section shows, there have been significant strides in civic integration through the acquisition of citizenship. An opportunity to assess progress in the linguistic and social aspects of integration is found in analyzing educational reforms since Latvia regained independence in 1991. Latvia has struggled with the appropriate means of integrating minority populations while maintaining ethnic diversity and complying with European standards. The Latvian education system, which socializes children from a young age, is a critical space for promoting integration. Though the maintenance of ethnic schools has discouraged spatial interethnic integration, post-Soviet reforms have facilitated tremendous strides in linguistic assimilation, which Laitin predicted in 1998. While legislation has occasionally been inconsistent, as in the case study of citizenship, a functioning framework has developed overtime and individual rational choice has improved linguistic integration among students from Russian-speaking households.

This analysis is primarily based on document review, using legislation and statistical data from the Ministry of Education and Science (MoES), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSB), the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs (Pilsonības un migrācijas lietu pārvalde, PMLP), and the Baltic Institute of Social Science (BISS). I build on previous interpretations of 1990s school reforms, particularly Silova’s critical assessment of the disjuncture between legislation and implementation, to address the impacts of 2004 school reform as it relates to David Laitin’s (1998) prediction of rational choice and linguistic assimilation in Latvia. This section argues that linguistic assimilation has occurred through the school system. Spatial
segregation, while prevalent in education institutions, does not prevent interethnic contact after students graduate.

**Minority education**

The Baltics were historically the most educated part of the Russian Empire, and the education system in Latvia is consistently rated as one of the country’s most trusted institutions (Heidmets, et al. 2011, p. 108). Education has been “an important element in the mindset of all three Baltic States;” and by the 1980s, the Baltics were already on pace to match European standards in years of education (Heidmets, et al. 2011, p. 112).

At the beginning of the 2011/12 school year, Latvia had 839 general education institutions (vispārīzglītojošās skolas) with 218,442 enrolled students (CSB, 2012c). State expenditure on education has held steady between 5% and 6% of GDP from 1998 to 2010; in 2010, this amount was 640 million LVL (CSB, 2012e). Foreign financing has increased a great deal since the 1990s. In 1998, foreign investment was 0.1% of the total expenditure on education. By 2004 (the year of EU accession), it was 1.3%; in 2009, it was 3.9%. This growth may be influenced by incoming EU funds, as well as by the increase of private institutions of higher education.

A relic of both interwar and Soviet Latvia, national minority schools operating under different education programs persisted until the mid-1990s. The Latvian state continues to finance separate basic and secondary education (now under the same guidelines as Latvian-language schools) in eight national minority programs: Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Hebrew, Belarusian and Romani (MFA, 2013b). This differs greatly from the standard of many other EU countries, many of which provide

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12 The Central Statistical Bureau and the Ministry of Education report slightly different figures for enrollment and the number of schools. CSB figures are used here.
native language instruction within mainstream schools instead of in separate institutions (European Communities, 2004). The goals of minority education in Latvia are to “maintain ethnic identity,” as well as “to form the basic conception on the cultural heritage of Latvia, Europe and the world” (MoES, 2013b; MoES 2013a).

Russian is by far the largest national minority education program in Latvia; it is not limited to only ethnic Russian students, but attracts pupils with Ukrainian, Belarusian and Jewish backgrounds, as well. In 2011/12, 22.8% of students attended Russian-language schools. An additional 4% studied in Russian in mixed schools (institutions that offer two separate tracks of instruction, one in Russian, one in Latvian in the same building) (Table 3.1). According to the Ministry of Education and Sciences, “The curricula are the same for all educational institutions” (MoES, 2013b). However, it is up to the school to decide which subjects will be taught in Latvian, bilingually or in the minority language (MoES, 2013a). Additionally, the Law on Education stipulates, “Educational institutions shall have independence in the development and implementation of educational programs, selection of employees, financial, economic and other activities in accordance with this Law” (Saeima, 2010, Sec. 28). Schools maintain some control over their curriculum, though they are legally obliged to teach to the standards prescribed by the Education Law and by the Ministry of Education and Science.

Support for national minority education in Latvia exceeds the standard for many other European countries (Muižnieks, 2004). It is in keeping with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which stipulates, “that persons belonging to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language” (Council of Europe, 1995, Art. 14 (2)).
However, the Convention also calls for the state to “facilitate contacts among students and teachers of different communities,” which is inhibited by separate facilities in Latvia (Council of Europe, 1995, Art. 12 (2)). In 1995, the Ministry of Education and Science discouraged interethnic mixing in schools for fear of “negative effects” on students (MoES Regulation 4-7, 1995, cited in Silova, 2002, p. 466). There continues to be very little crossover between the minority and titular population in the educational system.

Latvian students are required to study at least two foreign languages. English is mandatory for most students; in 2011/12, more than 90% of students taking foreign languages took English (CSB, 2012f). Within the entire population, 36% of titulars and 32% of non-titulars rate their English language skills high enough to conduct a conversation (Siiner & Vihalemm, 2011a, p. 135). An emphasis on English-language knowledge is a mechanism to include Latvia in the “world of the English-speaking haves” (Phillipson, 2001, p. 2, cited in Vihalemm et al., 2011, p. 116). According to Vihalemm et al., English is a “new kind of functional literacy” that significantly impacts European integration and economic opportunities for Balts. Laitin, too, predicted that English would be the language of greater opportunity for both titulars and non-titulars (1998). English as the mandatory second language is an indicator of EU integration and a reorientation from East to West. Ose suggests that bilingual education in Latvian and English could speed the process of integration with the West (cited in Dilans, 2009, p. 7). German, while nearly surpassing Russian as a second language in the 2000/01 school year (21.4% of students took German in 2000/01), dropped to 13% in 2011/12. French, the next most commonly available EU language, was studied by only 2.2% of students in 2011/12 (CSB, 2012f).
After English, Russian is the most popular foreign language, studied by 37.9% of students. This is an increase from 2000/01, where only 27.9% of students studied Russian. However, roughly 23% of students (28% in 2000/01) attend Russian language schools, and their Russian-language studies are not considered second-language learning (CSB, 2012f). Russian minority school students are required to learn Latvian as a second language, while Latvians learn Russian as a foreign language. The difference lies in the intended application of the language: “While foreign language learning is never supposed to result in language usage comparable to a native’s usage, second language use is always measured against the ideal of a native speaker’s use” (Vihalemm, Siiner & Masso, 2011, p. 116.) A second language is intended to gain access to a society from the inside; thereby the mechanism of language teaching can facilitate linguistic assimilation (Risager, 2003, cited in Vihalemm, Siiner & Masso, 2011, p. 116).

Rickety reforms

In the early stages of renewed independence, Latvian education policies changed rapidly. The first stage (from 1989 to 1995) can be categorized as a period of decentralization and liberalization (Heidmets et al., 2011; Kangro & James, 2008). As compared with the Soviet structure, state influence was reduced, schools were given greater control over curriculum, and standard qualifications for teachers were abolished. Not only were schools decentralized, but reforms were also decentralized and backed by a variety of external actors (foreign and domestic non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, etc.). This contributed to some disharmony in the system (Dedze & Catlaks, 2001 p. 155). Stage two (from 1995 to 1999) initiated an effort to regain some state control and standardize the education system for both Latvian and minority schools. However, again external actors pursued this reform in different sectors,
causing a lack of cohesion. Success was incorrectly measured by implementation, rather than effect of reforms, and local culture and tradition was not appropriately taken into account (Dedze & Catlaks, 2001, p. 156). The rapid pace and piecemeal style reform did not allow adequate time to evaluate the implications of these changes (Kangro & James, 2008, p. 548).

“Latvianization” of the school system increased the proportion of Latvian language teaching, demanded Latvian proficiency from minority schoolteachers and regulated the source of teaching materials (Silova 2006, p. 114). The second wave of reform in the late 1990s replaced “Latvianization” with bilingual education for minority students to promote increased Latvian language skills. While new policies outlined changes to the education system, financial and pedagogical support to implement changes was lacking, leaving a severe disconnect between policy and results on the ground (Silova, 2002).

**Foreign impact.** For the most part, education reform in Latvia did not take into account the opinions of primary stakeholders (i.e. educators and parents), rather external actors factored greatly into the decision making (Silova, 2006, p. 122). In addition to non-governmental organizations, such as Soros Foundation Latvia, EU officials were primary consultants. The international community has consistently pressured Latvia to improve integration, but, in the case of minority education, signals have been mixed. Within the West, the obligation to provide state-funded minority education opportunities varies greatly (Silova, 2006, p. 104). Certainly, Russia’s attempts to maintain links to “compatriots” (Russian-speaking citizens, non-citizens, and citizens of Russia) in Latvia involves regularly accusing Latvia of violating international norms of minority education rights, often appealing to Europe (Hogan-Brun, 2006, p. 328-329; Petrenko, 2008).
Latvia does comply with various international norms with regard to minority protection. However, government-sanctioned separation of ethnicities on the basis of cultural preservation in order to signal multiculturalism to the international (and particularly EU) community is problematic; it ignores the deeply rooted, historical interaction between the titular and Russian-speaking populations in Latvia. It also necessarily engages Wikan’s critique of safeguarding minority culture while ignoring social issues. Wikan posits that segregation in schools on the basis of language can, in some cases, be “misguided humanism that undermines some children’s prospects” (Wikan, 2002, p. 51). There is an international “politically correct” barrier that prevents issues, such as school segregation, from being addressed, Wikan suggests.

**Soviet-style ‘duplicity’ and textbook uncertainty.** An example of the disconnect between policy and implementation of education reforms can be seen in unofficial textbook sourcing. Though education is a guaranteed right, textbooks are not provided by the government, and can be a large expense for families. Initial changes to the education system were met with concerns from minority schoolteachers, who complained of a lack of relevant Russian-language teaching materials for the proposed transitions (Silova, 2002; Dedze and Catlaks, 2001, p. 157). Textbooks published outside of Latvia are prohibited in state-financed general schools (MoES regulation 501, 1997, cited in Silova, 2002). However, during the reforms of the late 1990s, minimal state funding to implement bilingual education (0.42 LVL/student) and the lack of accessibility to appropriate educational materials and training pushed some minority school teachers to revert to Soviet-era “skills of duplicity,” i.e. books published in Russia would be used on a daily basis and books published in Latvia would be brought out only when inspectors
visited (Silova, 2002, p. 474). While Latvian-published Russian-language textbooks are more easily available now, they remain a significant expense. Russian-published or Soviet-era textbooks may be more readily available. As Silova points out, these may be used when no official is watching. This is a concern because historical interpretations from the Soviet period and contemporary Russia often clash with official Latvian and Western interpretations of history. Use of old or Russian textbooks may perpetuate ideologies that clash with efforts of civic integration in Latvia. However, since this is done unofficially, it is not well documented and knowledge of the situation relies on word of mouth.

A case study of one Russian-minority and one Latvian general school in Riga’s central district provides an example of the potential variability between mainstream and minority schools. Using each school’s supplied textbook list for history in grades 7, 8 and 9 as an indicator, distinctions between Russian and Latvian textbook lists were observed (see Appendix I for details on school selection). There is some crossover in the books used to teach history, and the largest Latvian publishing house, Zvaigzne ABC, distributes all of the books. However, Russian textbooks are relatively older than Latvian counterparts. It is significant that only two books in the Russian-minority school list were published after 2004, the year of Latvia’s EU accession. This is notable with regard to the 2002 History of Latvia, a mainstay throughout these grades. A recent translation of Latvia in the 20th Century (2010) is assigned in grade 9. This book and History of the Middle Ages are the only history books shared between these schools.

Reforms of 2004. Though education reforms have faced significant criticism in the ways they have been implemented, there have been important reforms that have
facilitated linguistic integration. One of the most effective — and contentious — school reforms was initiated in the 1998 education law, which projected that minority secondary education would eventually be conducted primarily in Latvian. As in Estonia, plans originally anticipated a 100% switch to the titular language in all minority secondary schools; this was later amended to be a 60/40 split between the titular and minority languages (Vihalem & Siiner, 2011b, p. 120; Djackova, 2011a, p. 133). Changes to Latvian language legislation in 2000 defined an increased need for Latvian language skills in the labor market that was not being adequately met by minority schools (Muižnieks, 2009). Thus, in 2004, the anticipated 60/40 school language reforms took effect. However, the implementation of changes reignited integration debates. The reform was accused of forcing assimilation on Russian-speakers by barring Russian-speaking children from proper cultural education. It sparked emotionally intense protests across Europe, which included sending minority school children to Strasbourg to protest (Petrenko, 2008, p. 71). However, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe supported the switch, lending credibility to the reforms from the international community (Muižnieks, 2004).

Primary arguments for reform hinged not only on the principles of knowing the state language, but also on promoting the success of students from minority schools in the Latvian job market (Muižnieks, 2004).

**Impact of 2004 reforms**

**Economic benefits.** The 2004 school reforms have been widely successful in improving Latvian language skills among non-Latvians (MFA, 2013a). In a BISS survey,

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13 Latvia has succeeded in implementing these reforms much more quickly than Estonia, which will see graduates from the 60/40 system in 2014.
73% of non-Latvians aged 15-34 said they speak Latvian well, while only 54% of Latvians in the same age cohort said they speak Russian well (BISS, 2008). In practical terms, students in Russian minority schools acquire a bilingual education and subsequently graduate with high-level knowledge of both Latvian and Russian. Conversely, Latvian-language students are taught in a monolingual setting, where Russian is an optional foreign language (Dilans, 2009; CSB, 2012f). While the 2004 school reform has improved the Latvian language skills of minority school graduates, it also provides them with a comparative advantage in the labor market over their Latvian-school counterparts (see Appendix I for a discussion of Russian in the workplace) (Dilans, 2009, p. 8). In a contradictory fashion — true to Muižnieks’ and Rozenvalds’ predicted trend of Latvian integration politics — this mechanism meant to encourage language normalization and leveling of opportunities, may have created a disparity between mainstream and Russian-minority students in its success.

While more than half of non-titulars say they speak Russian more than Latvian in their work place, employment is still one of the primary reasons individuals choose to improve Latvian language skills (58% agree) (MoES, 2010, cited in Djackova, 2011b, p. 125; BISS, 2008). There is a debate as to whether the increase in non-titular Latvian language skills is has its roots in changes to minority education, or is a result of the liberalization of language standards in the labor market during periods of economic

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14 The survey does not delineate between pupils of mainstream schools and pupils of minority schools. However, percentages of mainstream and minority schools fall comparably in line with the declared ethnic make-up of the population. Dilans (2009) argues that official policies and post-Soviet nationalism discouraged Latvian students from taking Russian after Latvia regained independence (37.9% took Russian in 2011/12, an significant increase from 27.9% in 2000/01 when post-independence anti-Soviet Russification mentality and Latvian national enthusiasm was higher) (CSB, 2012f). Russian-language learning also may have suffered post-1991 when pedagogical methods of teaching Russian shifted from second-language to foreign-language teaching.
growth (2002-2007) (Djackova, 2011b; Hazans, 2010, cited in Djackova, 2011b, p. 126). Hazans argues that liberalization cultivated relationships between interethnic colleagues, sparking a push to learn Latvian (2010, cited in Djackova, 2011b). However, given the data on youth improvements in language, it is fair to attribute some success to education reform.

**Online integration.** The progression toward Latvian in the online presence of general education schools in both minority and Latvian-language programs is another indication of linguistic integration. In a survey of all 119 Riga general education schools, it was found that all of the websites for Russian-language schools in Riga provide a Latvian-language option, although the amount of information available can vary between languages. One Latvian-language school was found to have a usable dedicated Russian-language website.

Riga #40 general school (R40.vsk) and Riga #51 general school (R51.vsk), both Russian-minority schools, provide interesting website comparisons. R40.vsk in the center of Riga provides both a Russian and Latvian version of their website. The Russian version is the default language, and includes more content. It is updated and has numerous pages available for the site visitor. The Latvian-language version includes basic content: contact information, the results of a recent hearing on ethics, and a news section that includes none of the information contained in the Russian-language version. However, Riga #51 general school (R51.vsk) in Ķengarags, a Russian-dominated neighborhood in Riga, provides a different outlook. Its website is entirely in Latvian, with

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15 Another school includes a toggle bar to a Russian-language option, but no information is available. One school includes a built-in Google Translate bar for their site.
no visible Russian-language option. The site contains extensive materials for parents and students; EU-themed projects dominate the website.

This lack of Russian-language Web accessibility in a minority school is important because it indicates an active choice to move toward Latvian linguistic integration in an important communication medium. Interestingly, only 29 out of 47 (61%) of Russian minority school websites are available in Russian, or with some bilingual elements. The prevalence of Latvian-language websites for Russian minority schools may indicate legal language compliance, but the presence of usable content is another positive sign of language integration.

**The tipping game.** The 2004 reforms provide an ample opportunity to reflect on David Laitin’s (1998) “tipping game,” in which he predicted Russian-speakers would acquire Latvian language skills as they perceived other Russian-speakers to do so. In the Baltics, Laitin predicted an “intergenerational shift,” where Soviet-era migrants recognize the difficulty of acquiring more than legal fluency in the titular language, but see a large pay-off for their children to be fully functional in the language (1998, p. 155). Hogan-Brun (2006) suggested this had happened in Estonia by 2006. She posits that the value of the titular language in Estonia is high among minority parents, who subsequently send their children to study in Estonian-language schools, while in Latvia this does not occur at the same level. With the 2004 school reforms, 60% of classes in minority secondary schools are already taught in Latvian; it is not necessary to send children to mainstream Latvian schools in order to choose linguistic assimilation. Indeed, in 2003, 75% of non-Latvians supported bilingual education, indicating a desire for non-titular children to acquire Latvian language skills (Zepa, 2003). Between 2004 and 2010, the proportion of

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16 Data compiled by the author from Rigas Dome, 2013.
minority school pupils who supported the 2004 reform jumped from 15% to 35% (BISS, 2009, cited in Djackova, 2011a, p. 133).

However, a consequence of the 2004 reform may be the prevalence of spatial segregation, rather than integration. While there are clear indications that individuals are integrating linguistically, non-Latvian youth are improving their Latvian skills in minority schools, perpetuating the lack of interethnic contact among their peers (see Appendix I for a discussion of the benefits of interethnic mixing in schools). The rate of transfer from minority to Latvian-language schools decreased after 2005, suggesting that the 2004 reform may have slowed physical integration by eliminating the need to attend Latvian language schools in order to acquire Latvian skills (see Appendix I for data on school switching).

This segregation diminishes as students leave the k-12 system. Of 2011 secondary school graduates, 58.3% (about 33,000 students) continued their education at higher education institutions and colleges (CSB, 2012b). Of these, 71.3% (about 23,500 in 2011) attended state institutions; the state finances approximately 35% of the students attending state higher education institutions. In the 2011/12 school year, 28.8% (about 8,260) attended private universities. Around 15% of private university students (about 1,300 or 4% of all continuing students) attended the Baltic International Academy (formerly the Baltic Russian Institute) where Russian and English are the main languages of instruction (CSB, 2012b; CSB, 2012d; Baltic International Academy, 2012). There is a variety of other private institutions, most of which are thematically geared, though several are Russian language-oriented. In comparison to students at state universities, students at

17 The BIA is also associated with the 2012 language referendum, having facilitated some activities of the organizers (DP, 2013).
private universities reported lower Latvian language knowledge (Djackova, 2011a, p. 133). This indicates that while the education system sets up a mechanism for linguistic assimilation, individuals still are actively making the choice to assimilate or not. Sixty-four percent of non-titulars say that education is a primary reason to learn Latvian. The relatively high rate of state higher education attendance indicates that people are choosing to integrate in mainstream higher education; the linguistic assimilation fostered in general education facilitates greater interethnic opportunity as students graduate general schools. Additionally, 75% to 90% of non-titulars say they have at least one ethnically Latvian friend or colleague (Vihalemm & Siiner, 20011b, p. 121). This is higher than in Estonia, where only 60% to 80% identify interethnic contacts (ibid). Latvia also has a high rate of intermarriage; 20% of Latvians are married to a non-Latvian (ibid).

**Summary**

While there is a need for further research on the Latvian education system and its impact on integration, we can determine that there have been important successes in this issue area. The implementation of extensive bilingual education in minority schools has limited the impetus to switch to Latvian-language schools, however Latvian language skills among non-titular youth are improving significantly. The effects of this facilitated linguistic integration are visible beyond the k-12 education system; analyses of work and social spheres indicate positive and substantial interethnic interactions. Though multiple scholars have suggested that education policy has been inconsistently implemented with little understanding of the situation on the ground, the minority school system is functional and complies with European standards. Despite aggressive media blitzes, the Latvian government has managed to facilitate increased Latvian language learning without infringing on minority cultural rights in the eyes of the greater international
community. Particularly since the implementation of the 2004 school language reforms, the education system has succeeded in vastly improving linguistic integration among Latvian youth.
SECTION IV
CONCLUSIONS: SURPRISES & CHALLENGES

If one relies on media reports and politicians, it is easy to categorize Latvia as a dysfunctional post-Soviet state, mired in ethnic hostilities and vengeful policies against a quarter of its population. While far from an idyllic society, since regaining independence, Latvia has taken leaps and bounds toward moving beyond historical legacies and into a modern Europe. Indeed, in several cases, Latvia has surpassed “Old” European states with liberal and inclusionary policies.

This systematic investigation of integration efforts in citizenship and education policies has identified some persistent challenges. In education, there is still a spatially segregated minority school system, where students and parents have very few incentives to seek out interethnic education opportunities. With regard to citizenship, about half of the Russian-speaking population has not naturalized, and is therefore without political rights. These are issues that merit continued attention and forward-looking solutions. However, these hurdles are not indicative of failure. This investigation shows that Latvia has moved forward significantly in both of these issue areas, and overall, the picture of integration looks surprisingly positive.

Laitin’s prediction that Russian-speakers would become an active part of Latvian society has largely proven true. The Latvian-language competency among youth has skyrocketed since 1991 as a result of individual choice and education reform. Though children are educated separately, the language skills they acquire provide greater potential for interethnic contact as they leave educational institutions. There are high levels of interaction in the workplace and in social circles, and the high rate of interethnic marriages indicates that on a personal level, the hostile ethnic tensions the media portray do not hold water.
Citizenship legislation, both current and proposed, offers a host of surprises. Latvia has received abundant criticism for denying political rights to “essentially stateless” non-citizens. While citizenship polices were restrictive for the first seven years after renewed independence, for the past 15 years, Latvia has more than exceeded the European standard in citizenship accessibility through naturalization. While the non-citizen population is high (14% of the total Latvian population), there are indications that many non-citizens actively choose to retain that status. The non-citizen issue will likely remain a thorn in the side of Latvian integration for the time being. However, it is not a problem that will last forever. Only 260 children born in 2012 are non-citizens — every year the number is declining. As the problem largely solves itself (with some help from proposed amendments), the non-citizen population will cease to be exploited by the media for political gain. Latvia must welcome this development with open arms, as it will be a true test of Latvian civic integration.

Latvia still has integration challenges to overcome, but observers and voters should not be blinded by politicians and media outlets. As Muižnieks argues, integration is a “‘two-way street’ of mutual accommodation,” where both participation in society and non-discriminatory access to integration is necessary (Muižnieks, 2010, p. 30). Appropriate legislation has created opportunities for integration in the issue areas of citizenship and education, and individuals have rationally chosen to take steps to integrate within these systems. The surprising successes of Latvian integration should cease to be surprising — progress is happening, and in the larger context of Europe, Latvia is far from clinging to nationalist mentalities. Controversy draws attention, but the real story of Latvian integration is found in steps toward sustained progress.
APPENDIX I

Notes for Section I | Building a two-way street

Note on “Russian-speaking/Russophone population.” Russians are not the only minority ethnic group in Latvia that was affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implementation of Latvian integration policies. Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Jews also have significant minority populations in Latvia. However, Russian is generally the first language of these populations. They are also considered a somewhat unified target population with regard to media, education, history, and politics. This thesis does not intend to preclude the variations among Russian-speakers, indeed, that is an important aspect of this analysis. Language, though often relied upon to help distinguish national boundaries, is not a clear delineator of nation-state boundaries, nor, even, of national groups. Jeremy King cautions against relying on linguistic ethnicity, and ethnicism as a whole, to determine one-dimensional, mutually exclusive national groups (2001). Indeed, most “Russian-speakers” are bilingual Latvian speakers. However, it is common practice to use “Russian-speaking” or “Russophone populations” to describe the majority of minority populations in Latvia (and Estonia); therefore, I follow this trend in my vocabulary.

Notes for Section II | Citizenship: unexpected liberalism

Note on CPI methodology. Howard bases his analysis on the relative citizenship rights of immigrants; unlike the EU-15, Latvia is not a net receiving country. I substitute non-citizens for immigrants in this calculation, as this is both my area of focus, and the population group that has been most affected by Latvian citizenship naturalization policies. However, we can note that under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, some non-
citizens can also be referred to as immigrants because they were born outside of the territory of Latvia. The CPI scores assigned to Latvia were calculated based on the formula laid out by Howard (2009, p. 20-26). Latvia has a *jus soli* score of 1.75 (out of a 0-2-point scale), which is the average of *jus soli* at birth (1.5, based on similarity to Howard’s calculations for Germany, Portugal, and the U.K.) and *jus soli* after birth (2.0, based on availability of entitlement by “declaration”). Latvia’s naturalization score is calculated using immigrant (non-citizen) and spousal naturalization policies. Non-citizen naturalization is scored 1.25, based on a five-year residence requirement. Spousal naturalization receives a score of 0 for a 10-year residency requirement. Howard refines the naturalization score based on “civic integration” requirements. Latvia’s score is reduced 0.5 for the language and civics test requirement, leaving a score of 0.125. I do not add additional reductions based on naturalization rate, which is meant to correct for a “liberal” naturalization policy on paper, but “restrictive” barriers in practice. PMLP statistics show that naturalization is accessible; Howard also says that reductions for naturalization rates “should not be relied on too closely” (2009, p. 24). Latvia receives a score of 0 for dual citizenship because it not legally allowed until spring 2013, (except in the cases of WWII émigrés; Howard disregards dual citizenship for émigrés).

Notes for Section III | Teaching integration

**Note on school selection in textbook comparison case study.** Presented are two municipal general schools (*vidusskolas*)\(^{18}\) in the center of Riga: Latvian-language Rigas #6 general school (R6.vsk) and Russian-language Riga #40 general school (R40.vsk).

\(^{18}\) The Ministry of Education defines *vidusskola* (as a physical building) as a general education institution serving grades 1-12. *Vidusskola* also refers to grades 10-12.
Riga is the capital city and the largest population hub in the country (about 658,000 inhabitants). The proportional breakdown between ethnic Latvians and ethnic Russians in the city is relatively close (46% and 40%, respectively), and there are roughly the same schooling opportunities in both languages (57 Latvian schools, 47 Russian schools).\(^{19}\)

Both of the selected schools are in the city center, not in an ethnically dominated neighborhood. They are roughly 1.6 kilometers away from each other (less than 10 blocks, or 20 minutes by foot). These schools are also roughly equal in student population. Although the average 2011/12 student enrollment in Latvian and Russian-language schools in Riga is about 76% of the enrollment in 2003/04, both R6.vsk and R40.vsk did comparatively better in maintaining high student enrollment. For the 2011/12 (2012/13) school year, R6.vsk was at 85% (83.7%) of 2003 enrollment; R40.vsk was at 102.6% (100.8%) (Rigas Dome, 2013).\(^{20}\)

**Note on Russian in the workplace.** In the work place, 64% of non-titulars say they speak Russian more than Latvian, which may leave non-Russian speakers at a linguistic disadvantage (BISS, 2008). Seventy-one percent of titulars believe Russian is one of the most important languages for personal and career advancement, narrowly beating out English (70%). However, non-titulars rated English higher than Latvian (76% and 70%, respectively) (Eurobaromenter 2005, cited in Siiner & Vihalemm, 2011a, 136). However, it is less likely that English will become a means of inter-ethnic communication in Latvia (as compared to Estonia, for example) because the Latvian skill level among non-titulars is much higher than the English skill level. Russian has maintained its position as a

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\(^{19}\) In addition to these 104 schools, there are also mixed language institutions and other minority language schools.

\(^{20}\) Both schools experienced a gradual decline and subsequent gain in enrollment, centering around 2008. Reasons for this may be varied and are not discussed in depth here.
language of interethnic communication and is used extensively in the private and semi-public sphere (Djackova, 2011b, p. 125; Vihalem & Siiner, 2011a, p. 128). Only 3.5% of Russian-speakers say that they have often faced a situation in which a service would not be provided to them in Russian.

**Note on intermixing in schools.** There is a larger debate as to the benefits of interethnic mixing in schools, however, it is difficult to define a general consensus. For example, a study of American students indicated that, at some ratios of interethnic mixing, school heterogeneity may facilitate friendship segregation, rather than integration (Moody, 2001). However, minority segregation is often tied to academic failures (Bankston & Caldas, 1996). Several European studies have highlighted integration successes of mixed schools. While there is some risk of intergroup conflict in mixed schools, a Belgian study on Flemish and immigrant students concluded that, “monocultural schools should be avoided to stimulate intergroup contacts and thus to promote social integration” (Van Houtte & Stevens, 2009, p. 235). Similarly, studies of Dutch school segregation have cited concerns stemming from decreased interethnic contact (Karsten, et. al, 2006 p. 244). Though these case studies are not directly comparable to Latvia, the discourse surrounding the benefits of interethnic education indicates it is a valid topic to discuss.

**Note on rate of transfer between minority and mainstream schools.** Between the 1990/91 and 2000/01 school years, the percent of students at Russian minority schools dropped more than 10% from 39.1% to 28%.\(^1\) Between 2000/01 and 2011/12, it dropped less than 6% to 22.8%. The change from 2005/06 (after school reform) to 2011/12 was

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\(^{21}\) Some of this could be attributed to Russian out migration, however, between 1989 and 2000, the proportion of Russian-speakers (including non-Russian minorities) dropped by less than 6%, according to the Central Statistical Bureau.
only 1.6%. Meanwhile, between 1990/91 and 2005/06, Latvian-language school enrolment jumped from 44.5% of students to 66%. Since then, it has only increased 1.4% (CSB, 2012a).
**APPENDIX II**

Table for Section II | Citizenship: unexpected liberalism

**Table 2.4 Long-term population migration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Migration balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>-15045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-16428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>-15323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-22367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-23127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: CSB, 2012g

Table for Section III | Teaching integration

**Table 3.1 General day school enrollment by language of instruction**  
(absolute numbers and % of total students)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of students</strong></td>
<td>331857</td>
<td>334572</td>
<td>274256</td>
<td>198469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Latvian language schools</td>
<td>147519</td>
<td>203012</td>
<td>181097</td>
<td>133826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>60.7%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>67.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Russian-language schools</td>
<td>129609</td>
<td>93799</td>
<td>66859</td>
<td>45389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In mixed schools</td>
<td>54729</td>
<td>36427</td>
<td>25013</td>
<td>17073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction in Latvian</td>
<td>29093</td>
<td>22756</td>
<td>16930</td>
<td>9208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% of mixed-school enrollment)</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(53.2%)</td>
<td>(62.5)</td>
<td>(67.7%)</td>
<td>(53.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction in Russian</td>
<td>25636</td>
<td>13671</td>
<td>8083</td>
<td>7865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% of mixed-school enrollment)</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(46.8%)</td>
<td>(37.5%)</td>
<td>(32.3%)</td>
<td>(46.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools with other language of instruction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1334</td>
<td>1287</td>
<td>2181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data: CSB, 2012a
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University of Latvia, 23-38.