The Military System:

The Owi (Five Guards) in the capital are responsible for keeping their system in correct order, selecting and appointing their officials, and exerting actual control over military affairs.

(Note: For each of the 5 guards—the middle, front, left, right, and rear guards, a kuinyon (headquarters) is established, and each of them will have a changsu (general) who will divide up the command of the on-duty troops (ponsang kunsan) in order to guard the palace, conduct training and inspection of the troop ranks.

At the present time there is no fixed (regular) generals among the wijang (guard commanders). Every time they go on duty at the guard, only when they report are they assigned a place in accordance with the (attendance) check of (sujung) and after a few days they are suddenly transferred, so that none of the Five Guards have their own commanders (chang), and the so-called wijang (guard commanders) are in fact (officials) who do not have their own responsibilities (sil wu ki chik). What we ought to do is to fix the responsibilities of each of them, and select ta-fu (taebu) and men who are trustworthy, bright, intelligent and have the talent to be a commander (chang), appoint them to these positions of guard commander and see to it that they actually keep a watch on their responsibilities.

For more details see the section on the bureaucratic system.

Also, the establishment of the Toch’ongbu (都撫府) at the present time is also not in accordance with ancient laws. Abolish the Toch’ongbu and order all the guards to be attached directly to the Ministry of War (Pyöngjo).

-The Five Guards (Owi). (Note: The officials of each every guard unit consists of 1 taejanggun (大將軍), 2 changgun (將軍), 5 pujang (副將), 2 changsa (長史). For details see the section on the bureaucratic system.)

In general the officials from the pujang on up command the kunjang (軍尉). The changsa is in charge of handling all affairs within the guard headquarters (軍司).
- Middle Guards, Front Guards, Left Guards, Right Guards, Rear Guards.

Each of the guards has 5 sa(사), and each of the sa has 500 men. In general the company commanders of the troops on duty (폰'군 참관) will receive orders from the sajang(사장).

(note: the quota of 500 men per sa is the basic quota. If it is ordinary times, then even though the number of troops on duty does not fulfill the quota (of 500), you just ought to go along with howsoever many (are actually on duty). (end note)

The military headquarters yamen (군영-amun) of each of the Five Guards will be located in one place, outside the four walls of the palace, but neither too close nor too far away, and in accordance with the situation (lay of the land).

I (Yu Yu) note that: In this dynasty even though we have established 12 Wijang (guard commanders) for the Five Guards, they are all called Five Guards Commanders (오위장) and they have never had fixed appointments as the commander of any particular guard unit. In every case when they arrive inside the palace for duty and are checked off (as present) they are assigned a place, and three days later they are transferred. This (situation) prevails all the way down to the Kammun (관문) and Sunwi(순위: patrols), none of whom have fixed (regularly designated) soldiers more regularly designated commanders (장).

In the case of all of them the Ministry of War, when dusk approaches recommends them for assignment (망치아), and after a few days they are suddenly transferred. In training in the military arts and in practice in making camp, it is also the case that they are not necessarily commanded by their own commanders (본장), but officers are selected (낙참) from among all the commanders to assume command. It is for this reason that the military system lacks reliability (무기: lacks organization?א, lacks standards) and everything is in a state of confusion. The problems (evils) are so great that one cannot discuss them all. Even though we have been forewarned by the negative example of the excessive power of the officials in the late Koryo dynasty.
military system -3- pyŏngje

nevertheless when the dynasty was established and institutions created, naturally there were those ways (things) that could not be changed and it was not possible to bend (make crooked) established institutions (wang kyŏngje 材勝) just because of temporary evils caused by (the wrongdoings of certain) men. If we were to purposely (intentionally) make confusing changes that would bring about a lack of order (sa wŏ t'onggi 使無自轍), then it would be preferable, fundamentally, not to establish the guards at all. If one day there were to be a sudden an unexpected (problem--invasion, military attack), then how would we be equipped to defend against it? And also how would we be able to prevent corrupt (wily) individuals from taking advantage of the lack of order to seek advantage for themselves? In general what a ruler regards as valuable is only that he should select the right men for appointment to office. If you have (in office) those that cannot do the job (ku yŏ puga 不能), then you can transfer them or dismiss them. How could one start off by creating a disorganized (desultory) and orderless law (system) (mansan mugi chi pŏp 落散無紀之法) which would do harm to the country? How much more so in the case of managing troops. If you have divided them into Five Guards and the on-duty soldiers are transferred and substituted for every two months, then it would be better to have a single Guard (unit) in a single complete control of (unification of the) ranks (man-si-ha-t'ae-sim. The commander (soldier) on duty for a long term (changjong 長從). Moreover with regard to all matters, if no one had the authority to act on his own (kye wŭ chajŏn 慢無自轍) but only took action after receiving royal orders, then they would also be extremely careful in paying attention to the smallest details. What fear would there be then that they could become too powerful and difficult to control? We must have the commanders (chang) fixed (determined) for each of the Five Guards and each of them made responsible for their jobs (duties). Only
then would we be able to manage (control) the military system (kunjong).

Item: (1) The soldiers on duty in the capital will be divided up and assigned to the Five Guards and each of them will have his basic designated (unit: wonjong). Those who are located far off from the capital will be designated to serve at each of the provincial army commanders' yamen (pyongyong兵衛) and (or) the frontier garrisons (pyonjin). (note: In general, soldiers serving on duty in Kyongsu province and in the capital will be divided up and assigned to the Five Guards, and each of them will have a regular assignment (wonjong).) For example, such-and-such a district will be attached to the Middle Guards; such-and-such a district (up) will be attached to the Front Guards, etc.

Only in the case of the troops used for the four sa(四司): the Kumo(合署), Kammun(監門), Songmun(城門) and Igwi(弼衛), shall we calculate the numbers (needed) and distribute (the troops) and attach them (to each of these units). And (in these cases, too) (the troops) will also have regular assignments (wonjong). In addition to these, then everyone will be attached to the Five Guards. And every time (the soldiers) are to go on duty, the Ministry of War will meet together with the guards officials and (check off and investigate the situation) (chomgo點考) and divide up (the soldiers) and assign them (to a unit).

As (for those soldiers) living in places distant from the capital, then each of them will be assigned to duty in the nearest provincial army commander's yamen or at a firm frontier garrison, and in addition, they, too will also have regular assignments (wonjong) and will not be transferred around (from one unit or assignment to another).

I note that according to the dynastic code (taejon), the soldiers of the whole country are all to be divided up and assigned to the Five Guards, except for the soldiers in the two (northern) frontier provinces who are to stay (where they are) for defense of their home province, and none of them are required to serve on duty (at the capital), so
that the Rear Guards and Right Guards usually have no basic soldiers (assigned to them, and their sub-units? (pubun 部分) are always in a state of confusion. At the present time (we should) change this regulations and eliminate (those soldiers) who are not required to serve on tours of duty (at the capital), and only have those places (where the troops, civilians) are required to serve on duty in the capital be divided up and assigned to the Five Guards, each of them to have a regular assignment (wŏnjŏng 有定). And we should see to it that both officers and men know what their assignment is.

If, with regard to those places where there is a requirement for the men to serve on duty in the capital, should for some reason not be able to have their men serve on duty in the capital, then the Ministry of War should study the situation and make transfers, obtain a royal decree and divide up and assign (people to various units). And after the matter is over (the incident causing this abnormality is over), then we can return to the old system. 

Some say that in "later ages" (after the great 3 dynasties of antiquity) those who discussed military systems all were of the opinion that the fu-ping (府兵) of the T'ang dynasty was the best system. Under the fu-ping system, the soldiers of the fu (府) of the empire were all assigned to the 16 guards. So why shouldn't we adopt this system at the present time?

I would respond to this that after the san-tai period (the three dynasties of antiquity) after the well-field system was lost, the military system (associated with it) was also destroyed, and in each age they each did what they thought was necessary and adopted makeshift (temporary) systems (t'ae k'ak suŭi kuch'a 代各隨意苟且), none of which is worthy of emulating. After soldiers and farmers were divided in two (chi 陸 pyŏng-nong wi i chi hu 至於兵農為二), all kinds of problems reached their extreme, and none (of these systems) are even worth discussing.
This military system of the T'ang was the best of those of the "the later ages", but what was good about it is to be found in its granting of land (to people in return for requiring fixed and regular military service (kipch'on ch'ŏngbyŏng), and not because it established the fu and attached them (assigned them) to the Guards. In general, the soldiers of the nearby Kyŏnggi province definitely ought to be assigned to the various Guards, and if they are (living in) distant areas, they cannot all be assigned to the capital guards.

How would you be able to exercise military administration over (army units) several thousand li distant (from the capital)? This is why in the system of former kings (ancient kings), the soldiers of the hsiang and su (領), were attached directly to the ssu-ma (司馬), while the (soldiers of) the various fu (chu-fu 郡服) in remote outer regions were placed under the control of the chief regional officials (fang-p'ai 方伯) or military commanders (lien-shuai 連帥) who took their orders from the court. Even though in "the later ages" they had (other types of territorial units like) the ch'un (commanderies), haien (districts), fan (藩) and ch'en (鎮), in terms of the true (basic principles) of command (ts'ung-ling chih shih 總領之實), this cannot be changed.

Item (2) With regard to the Five Guard's going on guard duty, examinations (of training) and training, in all cases determine regulations (sik 式) for these.

From among the changgun (將軍) and p'up'jang (副將) (commanders and vice-commanders) of each of the Guards, one man will command the troops of one sa (司). (note: It might not be necessary to put him in charge of all the troops of the sa. I will decide this issue after thinking it over.) (end note) And (the troops of 1 sa) will take turns serving on duty guarding the palace. (note: each will have their own duty station (chikso 直所) end note), and they will be transferred after 3 days on duty. When the change of guard takes places (kyŏngjik il 更直日), all will bow respectfully (to the king).
With regard to the patrol of the palace (kwŏllaesun'gyŏng阑内巡警), every night the chang (將), pu (jang) or the sajang (司將) will command 10 soldiers and divide up (the time, shifts) and rotate them on patrol. (note: The previous evening the Ministry of War will divide up responsibilities for shifts among the Five Guards and obtain a royal decree.) (end note) After the patrol is over, a direct memorial (chikkye 直隷) will be submitted reporting whether there were any incidents or not. And one of the sa commanders (sajang 司將) and 1 changsa (長史) will take turns serving on duty in the outer (provincial) (army commander's) yamen (oeŏng 外署). (note: At times when the king is present (ch'wagisim 侍衛時), then the changgun (將軍) and lower officers, except for those on duty in the palace (naejigwan內直員), will all meet (congregate) (end note).

All soldiers who are neither on duty in the palace (naejik內直) nor off duty (ch'ehyujap待休者) will all gather at the headquarters (Yŏng 延) for military training. In the first and last (10-day) weeks of the month the soldiers of the guards will be examined for talent, and in the middle "week" of the month they will train (sŭpcho 習操). (note: The "examination for talent" (sijae 試才) will be run by the commanders (chang) of the guards themselves. It will be all right if once or twice a year the Ministry of War also participated in the examinations.

Training (sŭpcho) will be done by all the guards combined. When the king is prevented from reviewing the troops himself (ch'ŏngch'inyŏl 停親閱), then the Ministry of War will take charge.

Those soldiers currently on duty will not participate in the "examination for talent" (sijae) or in training (sŭpcho). Training will be suspended during the 6th and 12th months. The regulations pertaining to awards and food rations during training will be listed below.) (end note)
To this I would reply that the 3rd minister of War (pyôngjo ch'amgi) might perhaps be the Middle Guards commander (Chungwijang).

Some might ask, Why not have the 2nd minister (ch'amp'an) do it? Moreover, if the Chungwijang becomes the Chunggun, then won't the Middle Guards have difficulty in conducting their business? To this I would reply the purpose of the 2nd minister (ch'amp'an) is to take over the responsibilities of the minister (p'ansô) if for some reason (he cannot perform them), so he cannot be the Chunggun. It's all right if the 3rd minister does it. And moreover, if the Middle Guards commander (Chungwijang) becomes the Chunggun, it won't interfere with the conduct of business (in the Middle Guards)

When the provincial Five Yong (oğang oyông) have combined training (exercises), the Chungyongjang ( Chungyongjang ) commonly becomes the Chunggun ( Chunggun ). When the provincial army commander (pyôngsa) is not there, then he frequently takes over the affairs of chujang (chujang), but there is no problem about this interfering with the conduct (of the yông's) business. (end note)

Item (3) The Kümowi ( Kumungi ) and the Kammunsan ( Kammunsan ), Songmunsa ( Songmunsa ) and other sa will all take charge of keeping their systems in proper order (sujong ki che). (note: The Sunjang( Sunjang ) of today are equivalent to the office of Küm k Küm( Küm ) of former times (Koryŏ?). Its responsibilities are extremely heavy (serious). It is in charge of patrolling the capital (sun'gyöng kyöngsa) and arresting criminals. When the king goes on a tour, on a hunt, or out in the field with the troops, then it is in charge of guarding his camp (chang ki yönggumung). Even though at the present time we have the post of Sunch'ông ( Sunch'ông ), it had no regular commanders (chöngjang) and usually the Ministry of War every night recommends for assignment to duty tangsangwun without posts (mujik tangsangwun), and every three days they are changed (shifted). We ought to establish this as a regular
post and make this official keep to his responsibilities. With regard to this post see my section on the bureaucratic system.

Moreover, at the present time, for the troops of the capital patrol (sun'gyeung kunsu 聖御軍士), they use the troops assigned to the Five Guards. Each of the guard assigns one unit (pu 部) which is assigned on rotation for 3 days of service on patrol duty. This is not a suitable system. In accordance with regulations for the guards, we ought to calculate and set the quotas and make regular assignments (wönjöng 原定) and distribute those assignments (among the soldiers, the guard units).

The Kammunsa and Songmunsa (塞門, 塞門) will also both follow this (regulation). Their officials will all have regular duties and take charge of their soldiers, and there will be fixed quotas for all of them and regular assignments. Completely abolish the present evil practice of having confusing rotations of assignments. (end note) -

Of the officials of the Kammunsa, the changgun (驃軍) and pujang (副將) will be patrol commanders (sunjang 巡護). The nang-jang (郞將) and sanwon (散員) will both be patrol officers (sun'gwan 巡官), just like the P'ach'ong (把換) and Ch'ogwan (哨官). (note: The Ch'ogwan (哨官) who are on duty will also, the same as the sanwon (散員) patrol officers (sun'gwan 巡官)(end note).

The patrol officers (sun'gwan) will take command of the patrol, and the patrol commanders (sunjang 巡護) will also make irregular personal inspections. In general the three men consisting of the chang (將) and his assistants (pu 部) will take turns on duty in their home guard and will be rotated (off duty) every three days. On the day they are rotated off duty, they will all proceed to the palace and bow down before the king (sukpae). (Those going off duty) will present their tallies and (those going on duty) will receive their tallies inside the great palace.
Every morning, the patrol commander (sunjang) will proceed to the palace and report whether there were any incidents or not during his patrol.

The number of soldiers on each shift of the Kūmwi patrol (sun'gyōng) might be set at 200 men. (note: Perhaps this could be adjusted to 340 men.

The troops of the Kūmo are to be allocated and designated from the capital and districts near the capital. All troops going on tours of duty will be assigned (determined) in terms of 8 shifts (pŏn), but in the case of the Kūmogun, since night patrols are particularly difficult (duty), these troops will be divided into 10 shifts (pŏn) which will be shifted every month. When the troops go on duty, then in accordance with the regulation for other troop (units), they will be divided into 2 (duty) shifts (un) and rotated on and off. For their monthly ration, they may be provided 9 tu of rice.)(end note)

Take this (these troops?) and divided them up and distribute them among each of the p'o (1 ch'a punbal & kakk'o) (note: the term, p'o, means what is called the guard station (kyŏngsuso) which will be located at four places outside the palace walls, xiong and within xx and at every 3 li in the streets of the capital you may establish 1 p'o (subnote: Outside the palace, then xiong you may establish 1 p'o every 1 1/2 li)(end subnote) Distribute 5 soldiers to every (p'o) to serve on duty (chiksuk) (subnote: except for students in schools (hakaeng) (people who have passed the military exams) musin and old xiong widowers, widows, orphans and old people without sons and people who are sick, Except for those performing natl labor service (all of whom) should be exempted from labor service, everyone will serve on rotation (yunjik)(end xiong subnote)

In general in places where 5 troops are serving on duty, then the ojang (squad leader) will take charge of them. Even though each squad (o) is stationed (in a separate place), their banners (ki) and units(tae) will be combined to guard the neighborhood p'o (pip'o) stations)
military system -11- pyŏngje

and each of the unit chiefs (taejang) and banner chiefs (kich’ŏng) will have contact with each other and support each other.

As for the p’o stations outside the palace walls, if the Togams (t’o) soldiers are in charge of them, then the Kūmo soldiers will not have to serve on duty (there). (end note)

The rest of the troops (yangnyu kiyŏ) will be distributed among several units and the patrol officers (sun’gwan) will command them in making patrols. (note: either 10 men or 5 men for every unit, and the patrol officers (sun’gwan) will divide up command of the patrols. All p’o stations that are not diligent in police activities (kyŏngch’al) will be severely reprimanded.

-Some might say that these troops are being treated too liberally; that giving them three daily shifts (samun) where they are transferred on and off duty. But rather than keep the number of pŏn shifts (the same) while improving the number of un (daily?) shifts is not as good as increased (improving) the number of pŏn shifts of duty be divided into to 12 (subnote: other troops will all have 8 shifts) (end subnote).

After they serve on tour of duty (sangbŏn), then just like other soldiers they will shift to rest for (in) 2 shifts (un). The salaries of the ch’ogwan (ch’og) troops will all have an additional 1 and 1/2 (what?) given to them, to make things convenient. It may be done like this. (end note)

- Soldiers of the Kammun (Kammun kunsan): (note: equivalent to the guards of the palace walls (kungsŏngmun sugun))

-every shift (maeun) there will be 30 men stationed at the big gate (taemun), and 20 men each at the left and right narrow gates; 20 men at the middle gate; and 10 men each at the left and right narrow? gates; 10 men at the Small Gate (note: In this case, in accordance with regulations divide them into two shifts (un) for being transferred on rest period (off duty). If 30 men are used in one shift (un), then the total number of troops required to go on duty (pŏnsang, at any one time?) is 60.
392, 21:5a) It will be the same as this for the city wall guards (songmun).

With regard to the City Wall Soldiers (songmun kunsa), there will be 30 men each shift at the Great Gate (taemun), and 20 men at the other gates.

-When the soldiers of the Kumo, Kammun and Songmun are off duty (ch'ulchik) (note: that is, ch'ehyu: on rest) (end note), then they will engage in training and testing in accordance with regulations. (note: also the changes (commanders) who are off duty will take charge of each of them) (end note)

Some might say that since the troops distributed among the Guards are all pong sang troops (who serve on alternating shifts or tours of duty), then with regard to the troops who guard the city walls (songmun pyong), that they should be allocated on shift from among the troops of the Togam capital soldiers. How about that? To this I would reply that this seems to be all right, but in fact it is not suitable. The Togam troops are basically few in number and are only in charge of guarding the exterior of the palace walls (note: Outside the four walls of the palace they go on duty, and on the four faces (of the walls) all around there are guard stations (kyongsuso). Every evening in accordance with law they patrol the area (sun'gyong).) (end note) and they also serve on special duty inside the palace. (note: Inside the palace the soldiers of the Five Guards have already been assigned to duty.) The Togam soldiers just serve in small numbers at special stations.) (end note)

(note: Some might say that even though the Kumo-sa, Kammun-sa and Songmun-sa each have soldiers assigned to them, at times when there is training (súpch'o), then the soldiers of every place will all be attached to the Five Guards, and when the time comes (for training) ought to then be attached to it. How about this? To this I would reply that
with regard to training times, there are also regulations I have made for special units being attached (to the 5 guards?) (soldiers being assigned to special units for training purposes). Whether (attached) to the head or tail, these regulations should be followed in carrying it out.)(end note)

I will reinvestigate and determine (sin-jöng) the system for the Naegümwi (兩無衛).

(note: The Naegüm (guards) of today are equivalent to the soldiers selected from the Mü-lin and ts'ai-kuan in the Han dynasty, but their command (changnyöng) is like the Kuang-lu-hsün. We ought to select and appoint their officials and have them investigate and take charge of all recommendations. For this official, see the section on the bureaucratic system. I will also establish a system for the selection of the guards themselves (wisa).)(end note)

- (I will) establish the selection examinations for entering service (sönsi ipch'a for the guards (troops) of the Naegümwi. (note: the basic quota will be 200 men; every examination, take 50 men as a quota limit. Those who are selected will receive 4 kyöng of land (subnote: If you have a case of somebody who is a main-line grandson (descendant) of a merit subject or has the Đm privilege and already has 4 kyöng of land that he has inherited, then he will not be given a double land grant)(end subnote)

-. The Selection Examination for the Kūmwi (Kūmwi sönsi (that is, the Musón) (note: There will be one examination/every three years. (subnote: It will not be conducted on years when there are civil examinations (ch'önsa or land surveys (yangjön) (end subnote) In the capital and the provinces, divide each of them into two places (for holding the exams?) and establish the examining official who will hold the examination. Hold the initial examination (ch'ösi) before the fall, and the xinaehoesi (會試) in early spring, and both will conform to the regulations for the present mukwa (military examinations).

The sons of artisans and merchants and people of the marketplace, and the sons of shamans (巫) and other various types, and public and private slaves...
military system

will not be permitted to take the examination. Those guilty of crimes
punishable by transportation (trans.) or higher, those implicated in
wrongdoing and ostracized from the village (puru ch'ulhyangja)
and those who are not registered (attached to the rosters), will also
take not be allowed to proceed to the examination. It will be necessary that
giving by court officials or chinsa (degree holders) or
living in the village guarantees be given by court officials or chinsa (degree holders) or
two or more hyanggwan ( بالح ) or yakchong (ャく) to the
effect that the candidate has been righteous in all his deeds and has
not violated the village oaths (hyangyangak), and only after
that will his name be recorded.

Any Confucian students in school or those who have jobs or duties
who want to take the examination will be given time off to take
the examination.

In case a candidate gets someone else to take his place in the shooting
test, the one who took his place and the candidate who asked him to
will both be beaten 100 times and personally made into post-station
at workers. Anybody who causes trouble in the examination grounds will
be punished in accordance with statutes, and in all cases their guarantors
will be punished with them.

If a guarantor makes a bad recommendation and he happens to be an official,
then he will be dismissed from his post. If he has no office, he will be
expelled from the dorms (school) and disqualified for recommendation for
office (ch'ulche ch'ong); (subnote: There must be a memorial
and royal rescript lifting the suspension (kyemun haejung) before
he will be allowed to return to his seat (in school)(end subnote) Anybody
who falsifies a guarantee in pursuit of private interest will be punished
by one greater (degree of punishment.) (end note)

-The Initial Examination (ch'osi) (note: by twos, threes, or fours
the candidates) will enter (the examination site) and go before the
examiner (kogwan 짧 ), and they will select one book from
the Sohak (Hiao-hsüeh) and Four Books and read and comment on it (kang)
(to be selected by 俸斿
(Anybody who scores cho
: rough) or higher will qualify to take the examination. Then before his seat he will shoot the wooden xxxxxxxx arrow, and then advance again. The other pairs (groups) will also do like this.

This regulation for reading and reciting from books is like the present day regulation xxxxxxxx for preliminary examination (chohol

Hanhandaesajōn.p.924. choholkang
when a yusaeng stands for the kwagö
before he takes the text he is first checked in the household registers at
in the Sŏnggyungwan and mae to recite from the Sohak. Those who qualify are given the choholch'op (照說) or xxxxxxxx certificate indicating their qualification to take the examination(s) except that (nowadays) they only look to see whether the candidate has general knowledge (comprehension) or not to allow him to take the exam, and that is all. They do not xxxx figure out a grade (mu hwa Hoe ki punsul) (end note)

Wooden Arrow (note: that is, small arrows of a weight of 8 ch’ón 銀 (end note).

They will take three shots at 240 paces (note: generally when you stand and shoot, you take 3 shots), (and they will have to hit) one of the shots.

(note: For every shot that hits, give 7 point; xxxxxxxx (if the shooter stands) further back past (the 240 pace distance), then for every 5 paces give him an additional point; if more than 50 paces, then even if his shot hits outside the target, give him points. The front target(s?) will be 50 paces apart from one another; the rear targets will be 70 paces from one another, and the front and back targets will be 50 paces from one another.

Iron Arrows. (note weight of 6 yang). 80 paces distances, 3 shots of which he has to hit one or more. (note: For every shot that hits, give him 7 points, for every 5 paces he stands further back, give him one extra point) (end note)

P’yŏnjŏn(1/4). 3 shots at 130 paces. (note: Give 10 points for every shot that hits; if it goes through, then double the points. The width of the target will be 8 "ft" 3 "in.", length 10'8". Bullseye (kwan 貫) will be
military system -15- pyŏngje

392, 21:6b) 2 ft, 2 inches wide and 2 ft x 4 inches long

-Shooting from horseback (note: that is, kich'u) (end note)

393, 21:7a) (note: for every shot that hits, give 8 points; 4 hits in 4 thos is equivalent to 3 hits in 5 shots; 3 hits in 4 shots is equivalent to 2 hits in 5 shots. The 5 straw-men targets (ch'uin) will be 30 paces apart from each other and the path for the horse will be 10 paces (wide?). Make the straw man targets with wooden planks generally in the shape of a prisoner, 5 feet in height, 1 ft 8 inches wide, somewhat fatter than the normal person.) (end note)

-Fowling piece (chot'ong). 3 shots at 130 paces. (note: give 6 points for every hit; if he hits the bullseye, give double the points. The target will be 2 ft in width and 3 feet in length; the bullseye will be 5 inches wide and 7 inches long).

At the present time we also have mounted spear throwing and kyŏkku (fighting by kicking; kicking a ball), but there is no use to these so they can be eliminated.

Kang:s (講書: reading and commenting on texts): (Note: Those people who pass the initial examination, prior to the date for the hoesi, will recite from open texts (immun). The grades for every text will be 9 points for excellent (t'ong), 6 points for good (yak), and 3 points for poor (cho) (end note)

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The Four Books (pot'ta héch', lın-yu, mëng-tzu, chung-yung) (note: Two of the Four Books (note: Ta'h-sueh, Lun-yu, Meng-tzu, Chung-yung) will be selected at random (抽開). And (they will be tested on) the...
military system

393, 21:7a) Hsiao-hsüeh (小學), the dynastic code (Taejong), the Chi-hsiao hsin-shu (紀效新書), IV, 1963, p.393. Military text written by the late Ming personage, Ch'i Chi-kung (成啟光), recounting his own experiences, in 19 chuan) (note: the abridged version can be used (ch'olyo 粗略), the same for (those books listed) below) (end note) a Shao On all of these texts the candidate must score poor (cho 粗) or higher.

Those who want to be examined on additional texts may be allowed to add one of the six classics (he may make his own choice), the kang-mu (繕書)(note: limited to 10 chuan each, as in the regulations for examinations (recitation and comment) in the schools). Also he may recite and comment on an additional 1 or two books, all of his own choosing. Even if he does not comprehend it, do not deduct points (he has received) from (his reading of) other books. (end note)

-hoesi (會試) (note: Shooting skills will be tested the same as at the initial examination (ch'oesi), and the points he has received from the kang-si (textual reading) will be calculated (tabulated) and determined. Those people who qualify for selection will only have their names recorded in their home guard unit and in the Ministry of War. There will be no issuing of examination lists (pang 拌) etc. Also they will be prohibited from engaging in song and dance, gaming or any new-fangled customs. Violators will be punished according to law and will also be removed from selection (will have their selection, passing cancelled) (end note)

-These (regulations) are like the mukwa system of the present time. Originally there were no two paths of civil and military (office). In ancient times they raised scholar through learning and the study of the six arts; they selected the ablest and most talented and appointed them to office, when they were at home, then they were officials of the hsia-shun magistrates (tzu-mu 田牧) and when they had to go out (ch'u 出: to respond to invasion, expedition), then they became commanders of defence forces against the enemy (shih-yu yü-hui 士御尹尉). The shih (scholars 詩) were all possessed of
military system -17- pyøngje

of true learning (ke sa kye silhak 資學), and those who did not 無 study
never
could 難 be placed 上置 above (in command of) the troops and people.

If a man's exclusive occupation was shooting arrows or riding horses,
then he assumed the task of a soldier (iisol 守兵). How could they have
established examinations (sölg 教陽) and them

originally was created in the T'ang

The mukwa (military examination) originally was created in the T'ang
dynasty during the reign of Empress Wu, but the details of it are not
worth talking about. (note: In this dynasty, the mukwa began in the late
Koryø period during the reign of Konyangwang(奉讓王 1389-1392).

At the present time (I will) abolish the mukwa and will only establish
regulations (for anything like it) with regard to the selection of soldiers
for the Këmu(禁衛), so that they can be given grades for their shooting
skills and their knowledge of certain texts (kangso 譬書) and tested and
chosen (on that basis).

The quota will be set at 50 men.

- Initial examination, 500 men (note: in case of those who have
the same grades (marks, punsu) (on their shooting 比 tests?), then distinguish
between them on the basis of the their textual exams. At the hoesi, then
select those with the highest grades on the textual exam (kangso)(end note)

Kyønggi 154 men from the capital (Kyøngsøng) (note: Kyønggi province
included. As for men who come from the provinces to the capital on business,
examine their affixi papers (ko kongmu 誼公文) and allow them to proceed to
the capital examination)(end note)

-60 men from Ch'ungch'øngprovince

-70 men from Cheju

-80 from Kyøngsøng

-30 from Kangwøn

-30 from Hwanghae

-40 from P'yøng'an

-36 from Hangyøng
With regard to the above, for the time being I will adopt the present regulations with modifications (yangjong). I will have to make further detailed investigation of the actual figures for land (amount of equitable kyong) and population in order to draw up regulations for equal distribution.

The quota for the regular triennial mukwa examination (mukwa singnyon) is 28 people. The quota for the initial examination is 190, of which Kyongsong (the capital) and Kyonggi combined have 70; Ch'ungch'ong has 25, Cholla has 25, Kyongsang has 30, Kangwön has 10, Haenghae has 10, P'yong'an has 10 and Hanyang has 10.

Ch'eng-tzu in his Kan-hsiang tiao-chih said that of the classics studied in the field of military studies, the San-lueh, Liu'tao (六籍: 6 bowcases?), /the Wei-liao-tzu were inferior and shallow and not worth adopting. That they should be eliminated and that they should add the Hsiao-ching (Classic of Filial Piety), the Analects, Mencius, Tso-chuan portions on military affairs.

(Ch'eng-tzu quote continues)

Some might say that if you eliminate the San-lueh and the other books and add on the study of the Classic of Filial Piety, the Analects and the Mencius, it will not be suitable to the situation (requirements for military studies) and would be difficult to put into practice.

Ch'eng-tzu replied saying: If you think that the San-lueh and the other texts are worthy of adoption, I fear that it is because you have never studied them. The reason why I recommend the addition of the Classic of Filial Piety, the Analects, and Mencius etc., is because I want the soldiers to know about virtue and principle (miri, i-li). This is comparable to Ming-ti of the Han dynasty (58-76 AD) who ordered the Yü-lin to have thorough knowledge of the Classic of Filial Piety, and T'ai-tsung of the T'ang dynasty who made the Fei-chi (飛騎: flying cavalry) receive (and study) the classics. There is no reason why this would not be suitable (for military men, affairs).
Chu Hsi in his Kung-ch'ú ssu-i said that "We also ought to study the advantages and problems with the military examinations and carry out a thorough reform of the system."

The basic number of the Guards will be 200 men. (note: even though you go past the basic quota in recruiting new people, all of them should be attached to the guards and wait until the number of guards is less than 200, and only then should the vacancies be filled. If you have a vacancy but have not selected anyone to fill it, then you can leave it vacant for the time being until after selections have been made.

I note that in the dynastic code it (says) that there are to be 190 Kŭmwi guards, but at the present time there are 600 of them. If you consider the number of sabok and Urimwi who also function as Kŭmgun, the number comes close to a 1,000 men. If you consider what is appropriate, then you see that there should not be more than 200. In the reign of T'ai-tsung of the T'ang dynasty, outside of the fu-ping, he only established 100 cavalry men. If you look at it from this standpoint, then 200 men is indeed more than enough. Generally speaking if you already have capital soldiers and officers on tours of duty, then there is no fear that you won't have enough people to function as military guards, and we already have large numbers of commanders for the king's personal guard (end note)

The state will provide horses to them (note: armor will also be provided to them by the state) and they will be given regular salaries (note: 1 kok 5 tu of rice per month, 6 tu of millet, and 9 tu of yellow beans. Those who do well at the capital examinations will be given a raise in salary.) (end note)
The (guards) will be divided into three shifts (sambŏn 三番) of guard duty (sugwi 宿衛) and every time they go on duty, they will be examined once in shooting. (note: On every 1st and 15th days of the month (mae saek-mang 每朔望) when the shifts are changed, those going on duty will be tested once in shooting. Order the officials of the Ministry of War to test them, and the commander of the guards with jurisdiction over the troops (ponwijang 備將領) must also participate (with the Ministry of War officials). Those who rank first 3 times in a row (yŏn san ch'a kŏ koe cha 連三次展著) will be memorialized to the throne (and a rescript, edict) issued (kyemun 策命) (authorizing) their appointment to office. If the king personally conducts the test, then those off duty will all attend.) (end note)

At times when there are (the guards) will be lined up at the top of the steps (kyeSang 階上: Kwahaguŏn, IV, 1963, p. 67 translates this as in the upper part of the courtyard) (the guards) will be lined up at the top of the steps (kyeSang 階上: Kwahaguŏn, IV, 1963, p.67 translates this as in the upper part of the courtyard) in attendance (siwi 侍衛: on the king). (note: If it is not an important court meeting or felicitous occasion, then only those on duty will serve in attendance (siwi).) (end note)

When the king goes out of the capital (palace? haenghang 行幸), (the guards) will go along on both sides of the king's carriage (hyopka 驊駕). At times when they are summoned to service (chingsa 徵使), they will await orders.

At the major examinations (tosi 都試) held in spring and autumn (those who do best) will be given raises in salary by degrees. (note: Their salaries will be raised by degrees in accordance with their marks (punsu) in the shooting and the textual reading test (sa-kan 講義), of 1 kok and raises in salaries/will be given to one man of rank 6b, 2 men of rank 7a, 3 men of rank 5b, 4 men of rank 8a, 6 men of rank 8b, 9 men of rank 9a, (5?) and 15 men of rank 9b — a total of 30 men in all. As for the rest, they will receive their basic salaries. Those who are granted salary raises will
continue to receive them until the next major examination (tosi).

Anybody who fails to attend the tosi examination without good reason or anybody who violates a regulation will be dismissed (from his post). (end note)

At the end of the year the one man who scores highest on the examinations will be selected (ch'ot'ong ko ki uđingja il in) (note: By combining his scores on the two (spring and autumn) major examinations (tosi) and he will be memorialized to the throne and instructions handed down (kyemun) for his appointment to office. (note: that is, to an actual post as a ch'amha sŏban (rank 7-9 military officials), and he will be appointed to office on the basis of an estimation of his talent. If there is someone who is recommended on the basis of his talent or behavior, then even though he is not the best in the major examinations (tosi), he may still be appointed to a post.) (end note)

(note: Outside of this (regulation for examination) all miscellaneous categories of examinations for selection, under such names as concurrent (kyŏm) Sabok, Orimwi, Ch'in'gunwi, Pyŏlsiwi, P'ajŏgw ri, Chang'yon'gw i, P'och'ungdae, P'o Ch'ungdae etc., will all be abolished.) (end note)

- Item (5) The Ch'ung'ŭiwi and Ch'ungsunwi will be combined into one bureau (ba-). Revise and determine the regulations (to take this into account). (note: This office will also have a commander and vice-commander (changgun, pujang).)

See my section on the bureaucratic system (kwanje). As for such matters as selection and appointment, command etc., all will be in accordance with the above regulations.) (end note)

- the Ch'ung'ŭiwi (note: sons and grandsons of princes (wangja) and merit subjects (kongsin) will be attached to this (guard unit) (subnote: for details see the land system, lower section (ch'ŏnje, ha-ta) ) (end note)

- the Ch'ungsunwi. (note: The sons of officials of rank 9
394, 21:10a) and above and the "selected scholars" (sŏnsa 士 書 士) will be attached to this (unit).

With regard to these two guard units, in the past men who reached the age of 20 and had not entered schools, or who had entered school and had been dismissed (from school) entered 干 and were attached (to these guard units). It will make no difference if these people are illegitimate sons (sŏl 羽 ), and everybody alike will receive 2 kyŏng of land and also will be given two farmers (kyŏngbu 顏 夫 ) as their support personnel (po 保)(end note)

The guards of the above two guard units will provide own prepare their/battle horses and serve on duty in the capital. (note: Those who come from a distance of 500 li will be divided into 10 shifts (pŏn 潘 ); those from 1,000 li will be divided in 12 shifts; those from 1500 li in 14 shifts, and those father away than that, 16 shifts)(end note) And they will be rotated off duty every two months (isaek sangch’ŏl 朔相朝)(note: Those on duty (sŏngguk 桑嶊 sangbŏnja 上番者) will also be divided into 2 shifts (un 上 and off which will be rotated/every 5 days)(end note) Those who serve on duty as royal guards (wi ch’ın’gun sugwī 進親軍衛) will be given duty salaries (note: 9 tu of rice, 9 tu of yellow beans a month. When (a group) first goest on duty, the tangsang officials of the Ministry of War and the guard commander of the guard unit will both attend and conduct and inspection (review of the troops) and their horses and test the troops of both guards in shooting from horseback. They will raise the salaries of those who do the best by degrees from 5 to 2 (tu).)(end note)

Every month they will have a training examination (note: In the middle "week" (chungsun) they will practice making camp, and in the first and last two "weeks" they will be tested on shooting. In the sixth and twelfth months suspend practice in making camp and only have one shooting test (in those months)

In practicing making camp and in going on duty, the troops of these two guard units will be mixed to gether, but their units will be kept separate..xx
Those who are just about to go on duty will not participate in the testing or training.

Keep a record for each examination. Anyone who comes out first in memorialized and (kyemun) five tries (tests) will be appointed to office. (subnote: anyone recommended to the throne for an appointment must pass the textual portion of the exam (kangss떡서), but he will be allowed to select himself which three texts from the required readings for the mukwa he wishes to be tested on.) (end subnote)

When (the troops of these two guard units) are off duty and at home, then they will only participate in the spring and autumn training camp (süpchin陣陣) in their home province. (note: They will not have to participate during the two months prior to and after their term of duty. When they do attend training camp, then the camp's commander (chimujang陣主將) will be their commander (yöngjang領將). Those who live in the capital will also attend training camp held in the spring and fall.) (end note)

They will not attend (participate in) "the examination of talent" (sijae試才) held in their home district town (pon'tıp). (note: If the provincial governor (Ch'oltosa節度使) makes the rounds and arrives (at these exams), then they will also conduct a shooting examination) (end note)

Those people who are kun'gwan(軍官) for each of the yöng(領) governor's or prov. xx military commander's x yamen) or who are changgwan(將官) or kun'gwan in their home district will be excluded from basic tours of duty (ponbŏn本番) while they are serving in their posts.

- Outside of (the above listed guard units), such guxxx miscellaneous guard units as the Ch'ungch'anwi(忠賢衛), Chokch'inwi(族親衛), and Ch'ongnowi(忠護衛) will all be abolished.

(note: As for these various names, at the present time some of them are in existence and some are not. Regarding those that do exist, the fluctuations in their fortunes are not the same (kohŏ苦顯: in a chronic illness, periods when it gets worse and better). In some cases
they are given support cloth (kūppoe), but they are not included among the troops under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of War. Some are divided into 12 shifts (for rotation on duty); some when they serve on duty are also subdivided into two shifts and their service requirements are not the same. But compared to the regular troops (chŏngbyŏng) they have it somewhat easier, it is said. As for the so-called Chŏngnowi (定義衛: designated prisoner guards), this is not included in the dynastic code (taejŏn), but it began after (the code was compiled). Hallyang (開良) and those who have been dismissed from the Naegŏm (內禁) and dropped down and attached to the Chŏngnowi. Also (on the other hand), regular soldiers who are selected for their talent by hitting their target four times by shooting iron arrows at 80 paces (or three?) by hitting a straw man target from horseback are promoted and assigned to the Chŏngnowi. The Chŏngnowi is divided into 7 groups for shifting tours of duty and they serve for 1 month and are then rotated off duty. There are also those who are divided into three groups for rotation on and off duty, it is said. (end note)

Some might say that you should not allow these two guard units to actually go on duty, but should just collect cloth equivalents from them (su ki kap'o), and that this would satisfy both public and private (needs).

But this is something that absolutely cannot be done. It is not in accordance with the intention behind the original creation of these two guard units (the Ch'ung'ŭiwi and Ch'ungsunwi). (note: Some might say that the regular troops (chŏngbyŏng) are all divided into 8 groups for rotating tours of duty (pŏn), and the regulations are no different according to whether they are near or far, the duty shifts vary in number. In the case of these two guard units that the number (of shifts of duty) varies. Why is that?

To this I would reply that in determining the shifts of duty for troops,
Those who do not live far from the capital serve on tour in the capital. Those who live near each of the provincial army commander's yamen (pyŏnyŏng) serve on duty at the prov. army commander's yamen. Those who live in areas contiguous to the border (frontier) serve on duty on defense in frontier garrisons. This country is not to be compared with China (in terms of size?) Outside of this we do not have great distances and for that reason there is no need to different numbers of shifts serving on duty (in accordance with the distances they have to travel to reach their duty posts). (i.e. in the case of the regular soldiers).

As for these two guard units, how far away they live from their duty post, they all have to serve in the capital, and for this reason I have varied the number of shifts that serve on duty (in accordance with how far away they live from the capital.).

-Item (6). The capital troops of the Hullyŏn-dogam (訓鍊都監) will be (treated) in accordance with the present system. We will revise the regulations (pertaining to it). (note: with regard to the system of the changsu (將帥) and troop units (kun'ŏ 军伍), in general we will follow the present system, but changes may be made as convenient where it is felt to be suitable)

As for the P'ach'ŏng (把撈) and higher posts (in the togam), the taejang (大將) will recommend people to fill these positions (ch'ŏnmang 俊望), and the Ministry of War will review the recommendations (chŭl 俊指), (note: In the case and (the king) will put a get next his selection 諸點)
of the Chunggun ch'ŏnch'ŏng (中軍督), then the Ministry of War will also make its opinion known to the State Council (chŏngbu) (end note)

In the case of the Ch'ogwan (摳官), the P'ach'ong (把官) will recommend and guarantee his recommendation to the Taejhang who will submit a memorial (and get a rescript) to appoint the man. (note: In case of guaranteed recommendations, if there should be a case xx of someone who does not qualify, then the main bureau in charge will ask to change it.) (end note)

The grade of the P'ach'ong will be the same as the Sajang (司掌), that is, 6b. The grade of the Ch'ogwan (摳官) will be 9b. Their terms of office will be the same as the other officials. (note: Even though the rank of the Ch'ogwan is set at rank 9, those officials who formerly held rank 7 or lower, selected military officials (muson 指揮) without rank may also hold this post in accordance with the regulations for brevet appointments (이 haeng-su chi ryŏl 치行中之例). When it comes to rewards or promotions in rank, then do it in each case in accordance with the person's original rank.) (end note)

The military organization (of the togam), its p'osu (砲手) and cavalry units (madae 魁箱) will all be organized in accordance with present regulations. Just do not use people living in the provinces to fill (posts in the togam in the capital). Use the people living near the capital to recruit for regular (service as Togam soldiers. Their support cloth (pop'o 保布) will be set at 8 p'il. Reduce the number of soldiers serving in the provinces by an equivalent amount (by the same number as those men recruited for service in the Hallyŏn-dogam), and collect their support cloth (collect support cloth from them, to support the Togam troops?). (note: If you have 1,000 men in the capital troops (of the Togam), then reduce the number of provincial troops by 1,000.

Regarding provincial troops, each household usually has 3 support personnel (support tax payers, san po 三保; i.e. the 4th man serves on duty). If (the 4th man who would have gone on duty is combined in the household--pyŏngho 豬戶), then there are 4 support cloth taxpayers (po sain 保四人).
military system -27- pyǒngje

395, 21:11b) If each man pays 2 p'il, then this makes 8 p'il (per household).

In the case of those who hold the post of Kich'ong (旗揚), give them one additional support cloth portion (po) to make a total of 10 p'il.

In all cases the support cloth levy (pop'o) is to be 2 p'il, but at the present time the support tax for the capital troops, alone, (in particular) is 3 p'il (per support taxpayer) and this is particularly onerous. We should increase the number of persons paying support taxes (for each soldier) by one (i.e., one po) and have all taxpayers equally pay 2 p'il per person.

Payments (to the troops) will be made in spring and autumn for expenses for uniforms and equipment, and they will be given a monthly salary from the regular budget (kyǒng ki kyǒngbi kǒllok) will receive 1 kok 5 tu a month of rice; the cavalry units (madae) will receive 1 kok 5 tu of rice and 6 tu of millet and 9 tu of yellow beans per month)(end note)

(note: The P'osu will receive 1 kok 5 tu a month of rice; the cavalry units (madae) will receive 1 kok 5 tu of rice and 6 tu of millet and 9 tu of yellow beans per month)(end note)

(note: Some might say that once you have a system whereby military service is required of those who receive land grants (i chǒn ch'ulpyǒng) that the quotas of soldiers in the prefectures and districts (chu-gun) will be taken care of (by itself); but that if you exempt a certain number of soldiers in the provinces from the provincial quotas for military service in order to convert them into support taxpayers (po) for capital soldiers, then you will not be able to avoid creating vacancies (in the provinces) and the evil of irregular adjustments (in order to fill the vacancies). It would seem to be better to take the land tax (chǒnse) and convert it to cloth in an equivalent amount and give it to the capital soldiers.

To this I would reply that there are numerous requirements in the regular budget of the state (kukka kyǒngbi) all of which come from the land tax. We already have enough to worry about in paying salaries, if in addition we do this, then no matter how good our budgetary
calculations may be at the beginning, in case of a bad crop year or famine, we would definitely be in a difficult position. We definitely cannot do it.

One can also see that it would be difficult to provide for (take care of) the troops. People who plan for the state (statesmen) cannot help but understand this.)

I (Yu) note that the greatest harm that there is to divide (gh the people) into soldiers and farmers (pyŏngnon, chi pun maktea chi hae ya) 兵農分離最大之害也。If you have too little to provide for (take care of) the soldiers, they will not have enough to do their jobs (pujok wi yuyong不足有害). And if you give them too much, then the people will first become ill (oppressed), and the state will then be destroyed (hui潰). This will be an inevitable result of (such a situation) (ch'a ise chi p'ilyŏn此理邪之極, and the advantages and disadvantages (problems involved) can clearly be seen (in China's experience) since the T'ang and Sung dynasties.

In our country, in olden times we had no capital soldiers (kyŏngbyŏng京兵). Since the time of Hideyoshi's invasions (in the reign of king Sŏng Sonjo (Sŏnjo imjin i hu), for the first time we established the kyŏngp'o't京控). Generally speaking this was a temporary change made at a time when the military system had been destroyed and the nation was in confusion and disarray (p'ant'ang板障:from the Shih-ching). In general the capital is a place the location of which is important and the defense of which should be easy (kŏ pu kyŏngsa kŏjung ḍyŏng chi chi夫京師居重鎮輕之地). Even though there are troops (stationed in the capital) who are rotated on and off duty (ponsang chi kun番上之軍:moved in and out from the provinces on tours of duty), still the capital must also have troops who live there and guard it (kŏsu chi pyŏng居守之兵). This purpose was met by the Nan-pei-ch'un(南北軍 ) of the Han dynasty and the Nan-pei-ya(南北僥) of the T'ang dynasty. It is only that it is all right to provide guard units, but one cannot have too many of them.
If you calculate that your tax revenues are sufficient to support 10,000 troops, then you should set a limit on 4-5,000 (capital guard troops). If tax revenues are sufficient to support 5-6,000, then set the limit at 2-3,000. The resources of this country cannot support more than 1-2,000 and if you exceed this number, then you will cause harm.

Generally speaking, if you support troops (on a regular basis out of tax revenues? yangbyŏng 養兵), in the end it is bound to cause harm, but it is not without temporary advantage. It is only that people who understand (the situation) (who are clear and bright) are able to see things in the long term (have long-range vision), while ordinary people are immersed in those things that are just before their eyes. So at first they just start (by creating permanently supported troops in the capital), but in the end they increase their numbers. In the reign of T'ai-tsung of the T'ang dynasty, he only established 100 cavalry; by the time of Empress Wu they had grown to a thousand, and by the reign of Yejong (睿宗; 710-713) there were 10,000 cavalry, and after this they eventually became permanent soldiers (changjong 長從) who were the Emperor's Bodyguard (k'uo-ch'i lé 藩騎: proper name for the Emp's bodyguard in the T'ang). And the people and soldiers of the empire were no longer what the court could have (control), and as a result of this the T'ang house fell into confusion and disappeared (nangmang 無亡: the T'ang 王 dynasty fell).

The ruler (of a state) ought to take this into consideration in setting quotas (the number of capital guard troops) and he should also clearly display his instructions so that later generations will be careful not to increase (the no. of the capital guards) again. (note: I have heard that at the beginning when the capital guard troops (kyŏngbyŏng) were first established, they established a permanent garrison of troops right near the king (yŏngkok chi ha, or yŏngkoh). The matter was treated very seriously, and even though the post of taejang (太將: military commander) was established for them, nevertheless it was felt necessary to have an outstanding high civil official (taesin) control their affairs.
Men like (of the caliber of) Yu Sŏng-nyŏng (柳成龍), Yi Hang-bok (李恆福) and Yi Wŏn-ik (李元翼) all were made the chejo (commissioners) (of these permanent guards), and all other regulations pertaining to them were very detailed and secret.

After the reign of King Injo, merit subjects were continuously appointed Taejāng and the chief ministers (civil officials: chaesang) all disliked taking on military affairs as part of their responsibilities. As a result all affairs in the (guards) headquarters and the appointment of its officers (changwan) were all monopolized by (done exclusively by) the Taejāng (kye taejang chŏn chi) without any participation or knowledge of the civil ministers (sangsin).

Also, at the outset they only recruited people living in the capital to be soldiers, but after this at times they brought people from the provinces to fill (positions as capital guards). At the present time, the quota (of these capital troops) increases by the year and force is used to get people to fill the slots (as troops).

People who live far from the capital in all the eight provinces/leave their parents and abandon their fields and homes to trek to the capital (for service) raise loud shouts of grievance (have severe grievances over this).

Generally speaking, the soldier support cloth tax (pop'o) was usually 2 p'il (per man), but in the case of the kyŏngp'o-bo (京保保) it alone was a payment of 3 p'il (per man). In addition there were excessive (and arbitrary) designations of other support personnel and a wide collection of kap'o (僱布: equivalent payments instead of cloth). As a result of this old men who were due for an exemption (from service because of age) were not exempted or replaced by the officials in charge of them, but and taken to he would be fettered by the hair/to the capital Togam, and only then would give him an exemption. And the evils of the clerks acting in the middle to obstruct things and seek bribes cannot be fully described.
Moreover using people from the city (siin 市人:marketplace) to be soldiers is clearly warned against both in ancient and modern times. Moreover using people from the city (siin 市人:marketplace) to be soldiers is clearly warned against both in ancient and modern times.

Chi Chi-kuang (wire 祭) said: The most important thing about soldiers is to be careful (skilled, refined) in selecting them. The worst people you could recruit are people from the marketplaces and wells who are slippery (市井油滑之人), and in the second worst people you could recruit are the wily and tricky people (kan'gong chi 奸巧之人). The best (first) people you can use are only the old and true people from the villages and the fields (peasants: hyangya nosil chi in 鄉野老實之人) and the second best people use can use (recruit) are veterans. Chi Chi-kuang really knew what he was talking about, didn't he?

At the present time our capital soldiers consist of men from the marketplaces and wells (city folk) who are induced to serve in the hope of making a profit. In the last several years the Taejang people who have been Taejang have also been asking the throne to allow those capital soldiers who are from the city (marketplaces and wells) in not to be required to perform labor service in the city (siyŏk 市役), and for that reason the capital soldiers have almost completely become city people. And they fight with the other city people, and they hate each other like enemies. It is for this reason that the state's system gets more confused by the day, and the capital troops have gradually become lazier and more arrogant and completely without discipline. This is something that we have no choice but to reform at the proper time.)(end note)

-. The Kip'aegwan (旗牌官). Their selection, appointment, salaries and rank will be the same as the Ch'ogwan (哨官)(note: The changgwan (哨官) and Kip'aegwan will be selected after the shooting text and examination in texts (sisa, kangso試射,試射, all of which will be in accordance with regulations.)(end note)

With regard to the kisu (殺手), kosu (敲手) and other Ch'abigwan (崔備官) (among the kip'aegwan?) pay their salaries out of budgeted funds (i p'um kŏp wŏn'gur 倫給元軍). As for their subordinate units, make special arrangements.
(note: their salaries will be the same as other troops; only their cloth support (pop'o) will be cut in half)(end note)

The capital troops will be tested for talent (sijae) prior to the 15th day of every month, and after the 15th day they will receive training (note: suspend (training) in the 6th and 12th months)(end note)

(note: At the present time for three "weeks" of every month they practice making camp (sūpch'ing, 营陣: have field exercises?), but there are not examinations of talent. I fear that this is not as good as testing for talented men prior to the 15th day, and having camp exercises (field exercises or training) after the 15th day.)(end note)

At the beginning of every season (4 times a year) test and select the most outstanding and exceptional people and recommend them for awards. (note: those who are selected as being exceptional will be divided into grades and recommended for awards.)(end note) The worst ones will be recommended for punishment (note: there should also be degrees of punishment and cavalry units will also be punished if their horses are in bad shape (sickly)(end note) Make a list of (kaegul 藥具) the grades received (punsu 分數) by the sasu (射所) and p'osu (把所) and the ones who are to be given awards and memorialize it to the throne (kyemun 閲聞).

(note: If it happens to be a capital soldiers (kyŏngbyŏng) who is recommended for an award, it will not be necessary to given him a special awarded; just raise his salary, and thereafter when he is tested, he should be recommended for transfer (promotion?) in accordance with his rank. It's also all right to do it like this.)(end note)

After 3 maneuvres (sūpch'ing 营陣) held every spring and fall, hold a banquet (hogyang 業養) for the soldiers (note: The expenses for this banquet will come from the land tax on the kunjajŏn(軍資田 ). For each banquet the amount of rice provided will be 50 tu per soldier. Reduce this accordingly if there is a famine. )(end note)
military system

396, 21:14a) (note: With regard to the expenses for awards to and banquets for soldiers and such matters as the repair of weapons, all will be used from the kunjajŏn (軍資田: military supply lands). For the regulations for the establishment of this type of land and the collection of taxes from it, see the details in the section on the land system. As for the amounts, make adjustments in accordance with the number of troops (being provided for), as in the case of 2,000 capital troops, then the basic tax (원세) would be 2,400 kok. From the land inside Kyŏnggi province under nearby administrative districts allocate one or two places. (Regarding the collection of taxes from it), the Togam will not send out a special supervising official (камган); he will just have that district town (magistrate) handle everything in accordance with the regulations for tax exemptions (tax-exempt land) and send the taxes to the capital (상납). In addition to this, with regard to the management of fishing weirs, salt flats (장, 온분), and iron smelters (철의라), there is no limit to the evils caused concerning these in the provinces. Abolish all of them. (subnote: If people are rewarded by raising their salaries, then reduce the amount of kunjajŏn) (end subnote)

The weapons that are here designated as required are only what are usually repaired and replaced every year, and that is all. If you have to make special weapons not included in the regular plans (budget), then it is also OK to memorialize a request that the state warehouses (armories) do it (issue funds, make the weapons?). (subnote: the same applies to the provincial military commander's yamen and garrisons) (end subnote) Perhaps it might be consider all right that the Togam not necessarily establish land to provide the expenses for the soldiers' (military) banquets and the costs of weapons, but that all these costs should be budgeted and paid out of the granaries and armories (warehouses). But if it is done like this, then during bad crop years it will be difficult to take care of it.
Some might also think that it is a good idea to designate and grant ships and use them in accordance with present regulations, or perhaps collecting taxes. But nothing could be worse than this. Generally speaking, the only thing that the Togam should be in charge of are troops (kunsa), and that is all. It is not empowered to discharge its troops (for other types of service?), and if it should perhaps get involved with recruiting commoners (for work), how would it (have the capacity to) put them to work on ships? And when it comes to collecting taxes, then naturally we have appropriate bureaus to do that; it is not the work to be done by the Togam.)

Regulations for the major examinations (tosi sik) of the Guard soldiers (Wisa tosi sik): (note: Every spring and fall have one the tangsang swan of the Ministry of War sit together with the tangsang of the Kümwi( ) to conduct the examination.)

- wooden arrows. one or more shots (have to hit the target)
- iron arrows. one or more shots (have to hit the target)
- p'yöngjon (片箭)
- shooting from horseback
- shooting fowling pieces (muskets: chot'ong)
- textual examination (kangsö); they have to score poor or better (note: all the above are the same as the regulations for the military selection examination (musön Edwards)

With regard to the Kümwisas (guard soldiers) listed above, all of them will participate, and calculate their marks (punsu) on the shooting and textual examinations and divided them into grades for salary purposes. Also at the end of the year make a total calculation (of their performance for the whole year, ch'o t'onggo) and select the best ones and report them to the throne in a memorial (kyemun) (and obtain a rescript) appointing them to office. Those who do not attend and have no proper excuse and those who violate the regulations will be dismissed.
military system -35- pyŏngje

396, 21:14b) (note: Also allow those people who used to be guards but who were dismissed to participate in the examinations. Let those who get \textbf{100} points or more in marks be appointed to fill vacancies when they occur.) (end note)

(note: According to the dynastic code \textit{(xxj} taejŏn), examinations \textit{(tosi)} are held in the spring and fall in both the capital and provinces at which civil and military officials of grade 3 and below and soldiers and hallyang are all examined \textit{(tested)}. But now (according to my regulations) once we have the military selection examination \textit{(musa} \textit{)} and also each agency \textit{(kakch’ŏng)} \textit{will examine them in shooting}, and we will also have a spring and fall \textit{training session} \textit{(supcho)} \textit{), then it will not be necessary to have a major examination \textit{(tosi)} in addition \textit{(to the above).} \textbf{If you look at the regulations conducted at the present time, you say that they are held only in the capital and that is all.} It would be good to examine the Kūmwi (Kūmwi guards). (end note)

--- Reg. for testing the changgwan in shooting \textit{(鴨官試射式”)} \textit{(note: every month the tangsang of the Ministry of War will participate with the changgwan (鴨官 : chief officials) of the home agency (to which the changgwan are attached?) in conducting examinations of the p’ujiang (고장 : unit commanders) of the Five Guards and lower officers.} \textit{(subnote: Those ch’ogwan (고관) on duty (sangbŏn) will also participate)} (end subnote)

The same regulations will apply to the p’ach’ong (把手) of the Togam and lower officials in the provinces.) (end note)

- willow-leaf arrows \textit{(柳葉箭)} \textit{(note: they have to hit 5 shots at 120 paces)}

- shooting from horseback at a straw man target \textit{(碣箇箭)} \textit{(kich’u)}

\textbf{- All the changgwan listed above will participate. In shooting the willow-leaf-arrows, they will make three rounds of 5 shots (each). In shooting from horseback at a straw man target, they will make one round of 5 shots. Those who hit the target once or less will be dismissed; those who hit it twice or more will be kept (in office); those who hit it 15 times or more...}
will be recommended for an award. (note: Those recommended for an award will be listed in a memorial, the same as for the textual examination (kangso)(end note) Also every year in the spring and fall have one tangsang official each from the ministries of personnel and war, together with the chief officials (changgwan) of their home agencies conduct the textual examination on 2 of the Four Books, 1 of the 4 military classics (both of which they may select themselves), and the Chi-hsiao hsin-shu. Those who do not understand them will be dismissed. Those who score poor or higher will be continued in office, and those who show and exceptional comprehension of them will be recommended for an award. (note: With regard to all those to get awards, calculate (who they are and how much they are to get) and give it to them. In general, a commander (changgwan) tests his soldiers (kunsan) and on the basis of whether the soldiers are able or not, he rewards or punishes them. If it is the commander himself who's being tested (tangsin) on shooting or texts (sa, kang), then only make special mention of those who are either the best or the worst, and that is all.) (end note)

Item: With regard to the military provincial army commander's yamen (pyöngyōng) in the provinces, investigate the situation (topography?) hyöngp'yōn and set them up in large administrative towns (and the provincial army commanders) will take their families with them (to their posts) and serve for long tours of duty (kuim). (note: at the many of present time/the pyöngyōng (prof. army commander's yamen) are located in one corner (of the province), which is not suitable to the circumstances. They ought to be near central adm. towns (chung'up: centrally located); consider the situation and establish them (in such locations) with regard to long tours of duty and the limits on terms of duty, for details see the section on the appointment of officials (imgwan)(end note)

- Ch'ungch'ong province, Hongju (or perhaps Ch'ōngju)
- Hwanghae province, Hwangju (or perhaps... (missing)
in Kyongsang province, the provincial governors will hold this post as a concurrency.

At the present time there has been no pyongsan (prov. army commander) established for Kyonggi; this is also (in conformity with) ancient practice.

In the Han dynasty, the T'ai-shou (太守: Grand Protector) of the Ch'un (郡) was called the ch'un-chiang (郡將) and he was also in charge of military responsibilities, and the San-fu (三輔) soldiers were not attached to the Ch'un-shou (郡守) but were directly attached to the Pei-ch'un (北軍: Northern Army). Generally speaking the situation was like this (in Han times).

In Kangwon province, also, a prov. army commander was not created and the provincial governor held that post as a concurrency. At the same time the chin'gwang (鎮管) divided up responsibility for its affairs. It is all right to do it in accordance with present regulations.

(Note: In our dynasty there is no pyongsan (prov. army commander) in Kangwon province, while in the other provinces, in some cases there are two of them and two prov. navy commanders. In all cases you adjust it in accordance with the topography and the situation.

In the past Hwanghae province also did not have a pyongsan. Our ancestral kings once did establish one there, but they later eliminated it.

After Hideyoshi's invasions in Songjo's reign, they established one there, and the post has continued (in Hwanghae) until the present time.

Those who have discussed the matter say that it is right not to have a provincial army commander (in Hwanghae).
The province is small and it would be difficult to support (a pyŏngsa) and the people would not be able to bear (the burden of extra taxation). While others say that (Hwanghae) is the throat (inhu) of the Western Route (sŏro), and we have no choice but to establish (a pyŏngsa) there. This should be studied further. If we do not establish a pyŏngsa it would seem OK that there, then the provincial governor's yamen should be moved and established in Hwangju (광주). (end note)

Item: With regard to the garrisons along the coast (kwahagwŏn, III, p. 77 says chin refers to the Ch'ŏmch'ŏl-chesa's chin or garrison), also find out where the strategic places are and (establish them) wherever it meets with the circumstances. The Susa (수사), Ch'ŏmsa (금사) and Manho (만호) will also all take their families with them and serve permanently there (kuimju). (note: With regard to the garrisons that are presently established, they are not suited to the topography. They are scattered far and wide in fragmented fashion (susu yŏngjan) and ought to be combined or eliminated, and we ought to take their soldiers and add them to other garrisons. This would strengthen military administration (sa kunjong ᣢ ᣳ and give us something to depend on in case of an emergency (wan'gup kaya). And with regard to the small forts (sobo) where the kwŏn'kwan (권관) is Sahagwŏn, xxx IV, 1963, p. 394, a rank 9b military post, attached to either the Ch'ŏmsajin (금사진) or Manhojin (만호진) in Yi dynasty military organization) and Somo (sa) IV (모사: Kwahagwŏn, xxx, 1963, p. 397, a temporary post created during Hideyoshi's invasions which was in charge of raising "righteous soldier" (ubbyŏng) forces) are located even more out to be cut out (eliminated). If it is a place worthy of having a(ch'ŏk)hu (복), then only the Chŏltosa will divide up his troops (his own 21:16b) troops and distribute them there), or you could order the magistrates to despatch people to oversee and protect (such places), and that is all. For details, see the section on chikkwan (offices and posts). (end note)
During the Koryŏ dynasty, Chŏn Nok-saeng (田福生 : Kwahagwon, IV, 1963, p. 399, a man who lived in the time of Kongminwang (1351-74), who while holding the post of Kigŏ sain (起居舍人) spoke about the evils of the salt and iron special commissioners (yŏngch'ŏl pyŏnggam) and also because of the merit he earned in guarding the king during the Red Turban invasions (Hongdujkok 紅頓域), he reached the post of Munha p'yŏngni (下節理) where he submitted a memorial which said: "Since the (emergence of) the Japanese pirates (wa-僱寇), many border defense garrisons have been established throughout the province (ch'i su ta 置戍多 : su means wisuji 卑戍地, so that now there are as many as 18 places (garrisons). The officers (kunjang 國將) have oppressed (the people of) the districts (ch' ﾍ(州界) in order to establish their authority (i ipwi 入位) and they have recruited men as soldiers for their own private purposes (chesa 清私). As a result they have caused the villages to be stripped bare (thrown into confusion, chop'ye 殡燄) and made the people run away. And when the pirates arrive, they again recruit troops from the districts (chu-gun), which they call Inhugun (因户軍 : Sahagwon, IV, 77, has Yŏnhogun 煙戶軍), but I have not seen where they defend against the pirates' attacks; they only (chih 細) are used to oppress the people. The best thing to do would be to abolish these guard garrison (chesu 置戍) and order the people of the districts to be diligent in lighting the beacons and warning fires and be strict in gathering intelligence (hwa ch'ŏl 前候) so that we may respond to emergencies. If we cannot do this, then we ought to investigate what the most important strategic places are and eliminate (the superfluous) garrisons sites so that some relief will be given to the people (the strength of the people will have something left over) and so that we can economize on military provisions."
At the present time I note that these words profoundly grasp the true advantages and disadvantages (profit and harm) (of the situation), and even though we cannot completely abolish the garrison commanders (chinjang) yet we still could entrust them to the district magistrates (suryŏng). And we have no choice but to investigate where the most strategic places are and eliminate the (superfluous) garrisons and forts. Not only will this ease the burdens on the people and economize on military provisions (expenses), strengthen the nation and defend against the enemy. At the present time garrisons and forts along the sea route are not established in strategic places along the coast, but on the contrary, many of them are placed deep inland in remote places. Consider the fact that in the late Koryŏ, the Japanese pirates (wako) invaded our land every year and the district towns along the seacoast were left with no one living in them; all of them were empty and abandoned places. In establishing garrisons and forts we have no choice but to place them near to those places where the people live, and that is why (I have recommended we do it) like this. All these places (I have listed) are strategic places, and we ought to move the garrisons and establish them there.

-Item. Set regular salaries for all the commanders for each yŏng (prov. army commander's yamen) and garrisons (kak yŏng chin-jang) (note: At the present time none of the provincial army or navy commanders (pyŏngsa, suaa) down to the garrison commanders (chinjang) receive any salaries. All of them are allowed to take what they need from the troops, which is the reason why they discharge their soldiers and collect cloth taxes (instead from them), a practice which has become extreme and cannot be abolished. What we ought to do is use the regular funds in the place where they are located and set regular salaries to be given to them. As for the amounts, see the section on the salary system.) (end note) Determine (the quotas) for clerks and runners (chŏng ki iye)
At the present time each administrative town (district in the provinces) has regularly designated (est.) clerks and runners, at the yong (prov. military commander's yamen) and the garrisons (chin) do not have them; instead they all use on-duty soldiers (ippôn kunsa) to perform (clerks and runners' duties) in their place, and for that reason the soldiers all perform responsibilities of clerks and runners (isô polye) and it is not possible to hold them responsible for training and (skills) in the military arts. We ought to fix (the number of) clerks and runners, and they also all ought to have salaries. See also the sections on the bureaucratic system (kwanjik) and the salary system (mekhe), (end note) chin'gwan.

-. Item) Readjust (sinmyeong) the/system that deals with the soldiers in the districts (chin) of the provinces.

-. After the Imjin Hideyoshi invasions of Sônjo's reign, the chief minister Yu Sôngyong (柳成龍) several times requested a reform (sinmyeong) of the Chin'gwan system, and he submitted a memorial which discussed this, saying: "According to the system of our forefathers, each of the officials (magistrates?) in the 8 provinces had a chin'gwan (鎮管) who was called the Pyôngma chölicesa (兵馬節制使). Not only was the basic intention behind establishing the law like this, but also they wanted (a situation where) in peacetime, the administrative town (district) where the chin'gwan was located would be the main garrison (chujin), and would exercise inspection and control (鎮勒) over the district towns (districts attached to the main town) (smaller) district towns (districts) that were attached to it. And all matters of troop and unit (squad) training could be well managed. And in wartime (yu sa), then the chin'gwan would also command lead the troops of those (districts) that were attached to it. They would draw up the troops in a solid phalanx like a fish's scales (inch'a chôngje in order to listed to the chief commander (chujang) and pledge their strength (i ch'ông chujang yaksok).
just like the human body moves its limbs and the limbs in turn, moves the fingers, the grasping things and letting them go (chojong 操練), extending (the limbs and fingers) and contracting them (sinsuit 伸縮), (and in this manner) only doing what the commander tells them to. (yu chang chi 唯將之為).

Moreover even though the troops of one chin'gwan might perhaps have scattered (and fled) (奔潰: been defeated in battle), the troops of the other another chin'gwan would carry out a strong defense with their (own) great military power in order (one after the other) 且且且且 At times they might grasp (aeek 揚) the enemy (intercept it) in the front, or pursue (süp 送) the enemy's rear (sahagwŏn, IV, p.79 has launch anxusprixse attack-süpkyŏk on the rear), or shake up (摚: turn?) its left or right flank. And no matter how hard the enemy might press to gain a victory (sungsunt 乘勝), they could not dare easily break through (the formation), because it's force would be such (such would be its power).

If you take for the time being (first) the situation in Kyongsang province, 且且且且 (the soldiers from the dozen or so administrative districts 且且 attached to Tongnae-jin 東萊鎮), if 且且且且 all the people there, 且且且且 not to mention the official and private ch'ŏnmin (slaves), were mixed together and sent out to fight as soldiers, then you would get as many as 70-80,000 troops. And if by chance they should unfortunately be defeated, you would also have the troops under the Taegu chin'gwan who would be stationed in the middle to block 且且 off the enemy's advance (kŏjong ch'ajae 居中應截), and the troops of Kyŏngju and Chinju (慶州,咸州) would form the left and right wings and be able to defend against the enemy. And if unfortunately, the troops from Taegu also were put at a disadvantage (pulli 不利: defeated?), then the Sangju chin'gwan(淸州) could also use its heavy troops to put up a strong defense. And the Ch'ongju chin'gwan(淸州) in Ch'ungch'ŏng province could lead all the soldiers (in the districts) attached to it
and seize and cut off the enemy's advance (p'ajae 把截) at the Saejae junction (choryŏng 島嶺) and continue to prepare for rear guard fighting (wi ki hugye 為其後继). The Ch'ŏngju chin'gwan would also lead the troops attached to it and proceed to defend the area around Hwanggan (黃閘), Yŏngdŏng (永同), and Ch'ŏp'ungnyŏng (秋豐嶺). It would perform the role of the right wing (flank). And all the districts in Kyŏnggi province could organize their soldiers and wait. The strength of the country would be like a double door (chungmun 重門) or a double wall (複牆). And even though the enemy might be able to penetrate through one of the layers (doors or walls), there would always be another one (behind it). How would they be able to cut across a thousand li and advance straight (kyŏngjo 建造) to the capital, as if they were treading no man's land? (land where no one lived)? In general the farsighted plan of our ancestors was this detailed (in its perfection), but since the mid-dynastic period (chungse 中世), it has been completely abandoned. And the sadaebu (士大夫:scholars and officials) only concern themselves with polishing their literary style (chot'ak munhwa 文華) or embellishing their idle gossip (punsik hŏdam 物談虚談), and when it comes to the concerns of managing the world (ki き 義明世之處), they don't give a thought at all to that. And it is not only this. In addition we have people with light and shallow plans who take it upon themselves to follow their own inclinations (ch'ims kiŭi 倚己), and completely destroy our old institutions, concocting new regulations which they call "the strategy for gaining victory" (chesŭng pangnyak 制勝方略). The first appearance of this was in the 1555 Japanese pirate attack (ulmyo waepyon 日本倭寇). This was a strategy for saving us from an emergency situation (one-time situation). They did not realize that this strategy was barely sufficient to respond to a very small enemy, and was not a tactic that could be used to check or defend against a large enemy.
military system -44- pyŏngje

398, 21:18b) After this the governors mǔxian and pyŏngsa (prov. army commandert)s of the two southern provinces (Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang) each held to his own opinion; they expanded their tube-like narrow vision (tunnel vision: 漏其管窺) and they trumped up (tu-ch'ūan 托撰) and added to it and confusedly called it(準騖) the Chŏsŏng pangnyak(制勝方略) and it was put into practice everywhere. The reason why national affairs very many reached this point was that even though/mistakes were made with regard to other matters, it was xīnx in general this 2 Chŏsŏng pangnyak that caused them to be in error. I (Yu Sŏng-yong) would like to speak of the reason for this. The gist of the Chŏsŏng pangnyak was that the soldiers of one province in advance be divided up and attached (assigned) to mǔxian the Sunbyŏnsa(巡邊使), the Pang'osa(防禦使), the Chŏbangjang(勅防將), x the Pyŏngsa(兵使: prov. m army commander) and Susa(水使: prov. navy commander). And as soon as a report was heard that the bandits (enemy) was coming, they were not to investigate how many of them there were, what the situation among them was like, whether the terrain was difficult or easy, but uniformly they were to call out all the troops and assemble them at the border. For that reason the troops attached to the Sunbyŏnsa were stationed (tun 永: permanently?) at a single place in order to wait (for an invasion). And even though the Sunbyŏnsa or Pyŏngsa might want to use them, he was not able to mǔxian do it. With regard to the troops attached to the Pang'osa, they too were (permanently) stationed (tun) at one place in order to wait (for an attack), and even though the Pang'osa or Susa might want to use them, they could not do so.

399, 21:19a)

As for the other troops assigned to the Chŏbangjang, x Pyŏngsa and Susa, there were none who were not like this. For this reason, every time the troops were called out, (the troops) of the whole province were all mobilized (moved) and there was nothing left over for reserve strength. And in the case of Kyŏngsang province, that south of Kyŏngju Mungyŏng(開慶) there wasn't one man left in the kun(districts) for military service.
399, 21:19a) And then the court would despatch commanders to a distance of over a thousand li (to take command of the troops stationed in various places), but it was not possible for the court to issue an order in the morning (and the commanders) to get there by dusk, and these troops without commanders were stationed in their (assigned) places, but they had no organization (yaksok) nor regulations (kiryu), and they remained in confusion and exposed on the plains and fields (for the enemy to overrun). They were (stay there) waiting one or two days for their commander to arrive, but he would not get there, and then by the 3rd or 4th day, the enemy vanguard was already pressing close. And after starving for a few days, they would run away in droves like startled birds or frightened bests (驚驚驚驚相率而潰散). The earthen walls were destroyed and scattered like shards (土崩瓦解) such that they could not be repaired. Only after this had occurred would the so-called Capital Commanders (kyông changsu) come dashing down alone on horseback are the runaway soldiers were hiding in the mountains and valleys, so who would have been able to call them in and gather them together (by this time)? And the enemy's vanguard had already come within a distance of 20-30 li (several dozen li), so could there have been any way not to have suffered defeat? (pup'ae hada).

21:19b) And on the 4th month, 27th day of Imjin, a border report arrived at the capital (Yi Il), and the court despatched a horseback (Hun'gyông) was already empty, and when he got to Sangju, Sangju was already empty, and he was barely able to recruit several hundred men from among the soldiers who had scattered (run away) but before he could organize them into units, the enemy had already crossed the Nakdong river (渇束) and was only 10 li away from Sangju.

In general you take warning from what happened before in order to avoid repeating them in the future (pu chingjon so i pihu) and you learn from the past in order to plan for the present (kamgo so i togôm).
In the past at the end of the Sung dynasty, the Yuan soldiers (army) was on the point of being very large, and at that time there was a man named Wang Li-hsin who made a recommendation asking that the chün-i (local districts) be divided into 4 kon (districts), and that shuāi (commanders) be established between them, and that they combine their forces for defense (against the Mongols). Later on in the Yuan dynasty, Pai Yen heard of this strategy and sighed, saying: "If they had used this strategy, how would we have got this far?" Later on Wen T'ien-hsiang also made a proposal that this policy be applied to Li'an after it had been placed in danger.

But at the time, it was already too late, and they never did adopt the plan of Wang Li-hsin for dividing the (countryside) into (pun-hsien). This plan was the same our the law in our dynasty for chin'gwang.

After that there was another memorial which said: "Both the Eastern Chin and the Southern Sung dynasties were established on the left bank of the river, yet the Chin seems to have been able to use the long river two men to defend against Liu-Shih who in the late Chin dynasty carved themselves out of the northern part of the empire for himself and proclaimed himself emperor --Liu Yen and Shih Ku while the Sung dynasty was not able to defend itself against the Mongols. How come?

In general it was because the Chin dynasty had a fan-chen (frontier garrison) system in which they combined several commanderies (chün) over which they establish one large garrison (ta-chen) and made the ta-chiang (command it, and the troop forces (military force) was not divided. And for this reason stand up to, be a match for (their military force) was sufficient to take care of the defense against enemies in one (this) sector. Such (generals) as Huan Chung and Tao K'an were able to control an area of a thousand li.
When the Sung dynasty was first founded they were afraid of what had happened at the end of the Five Dynasties and so they abolished the authority of the fan-chen (藩镇) and they organized everything into chün and hsien (civil districts). When the dynasty declined the armed forces were divided and their strength was weak. When the enemy arrived at one chün, they destroyed it; and when they arrived at a hsien, they destroyed that. (This system) was not sufficient for defending against invasion by the barbarians. It was for this reason that Wang Li-hsin (汪立信) made his recommendation requesting that the chün in the ch'ang-huai (長淮) area be joined together to form four large garrisons (ta-chen) and combine their forces to defend against the northern barbarians (Hu). But at the time they were not able to adopt (his recommendations).

The chin'gwan system in our dynasty in general had this (the same) purpose, and in fact was a grand plan of organization for the military system (sil kunjöng bhi taegang ye 畿軍政之大綱略也). If we were to use this system and not destroy the Chin'gwan, and obtain the right men to exert command over (the units or territories) attached to them, then in peacetime they could train the troops in accordance with law, and in wartime, they could organize the soldiers and form them into units (ch'ongbyöng ch'ikyö 鍾兵紀律). Each would defend its own territory. (Each unit) would listen to (be governed by) the orders of its general (taegang) both in combat and in defense, and the situation of the state both internally and externally would be as secure as a flat slab of stone. How would you ever have "the earthen walls being destroyed and broken up into pieces"?

Item: With regard to the organization of troop units and regulations (py'on'yo yaksok) used the laws in the Chi-hsiao hsin-shu (紀效新書) (note: The laws pertaining to organization etc. in Ch'i Chi-kuang's (齊經Partition) Chi-hsiao hsin-shu are very refined and detailed. It is only that the laws and commands (法令) of the units in this book are not found in our dynasty's system.
With regard to those matters that ought to be changed, you should make adaptations in accordance with the intention (behind it) (end note).

- Item: The Chóltosa (節度使) will have jurisdiction over the garrisons (chejin) (note: The term, chin, means chin'gwan (鎮管). There may be either 2 or 3 or as many as 5 or 6 garrisons per province. In accordance with the number of chin'gwan garrisons in a province (end note).

Chó: The Chinsa (鎮使) will hold concurrent jurisdiction over the kun or hyón (where he is located). (note: The chin'gwan will be called Chóltosa (節度使) which is similar to what is called the ying-chiang 鎮 警 in the Chi-hsin-shu (紀 新 書). As for the other kun-su (郡守) and above in the territory under (his) jurisdiction, called him the Ch'omjólsesa (鎭節制使 ); if it is a hyólyong (縣令), call him the Chóliche-towi (鎮制都尉). If several chin'gwan are combined together then posts like the pujang (副 將) and ch'ajang (次 將) will each be in their adm. towns, and will have exclusive control over the troops. There also will be no limits on the number of kun and hyón under the jurisdiction of the chin (garrison); just do it so that it is convenient. (suitable) (end note).

- The magistrate (suryöng 守 令 ) will exercise jurisdiction over the (p'ach'ong 把 掌) (note: In general with regard to the military system do not establish the post of ch'ujch'ong (督 将 ). The Suryöng (Mag.) will exercise directly jurisdiction over the P'ach'ong. One administrative town may have anywhere from 1 to 2 or 7 to 8 P'ach'ong, in accordance with how many troops there are there.

In the adm. town where the chin'gwan is located establish a special Chunggun (中 幕) to assist in the management of the yóngjang (營 將) 's affairs (i.e. the affairs of the chin'gwan Chólhesa, Sahagwón, IV, 83); do not establish the post of Ch'omch'ong (督 将) (end note).

- The P'ach'ong will have jurisdiction over the Ch'ogwan (哨官) (note: the standard will be for every sa (司) to have 5 ch'o (哨), and if there happen to be any other ch'o besides those organized into sa, then
400, 21:21a) then attach them also to the sa. If in addition to the 3 ch'ō (you have extra troops), then even though they do not make up a full 500 men, establish a separate P'ach'ong. But just do it in accordance with the actual numbers of men in the adm. town (district) and do not attach them to the neighboring adm. district town. Beneath every P'ach'ong he will concurrently have the ch'ogwan for each of the jurisdiction over cavalry and infantry (kibyŏng, pobyŏng), and sogo (slave troops). If in the district town the various types of troops each have a full complement sa (battalion?), then for each of them establish a P'ach'ong.

The Ch'ogwan will have jurisdiction over the Kich'ong (note: For each of the cavalry, infantry and sogo'gun (slave army) establish a Ch'ogwan. The standard number of ki (per ch'ō will be 3, and in addition to those kits (troops) that are organized in ch'ō if you should have any left over, then also attach them to and organize them into ch'ō. If you have 60 men or more, then also establish a separate ch'ogwan for them. Whether you have too many men or not enough, do it in accordance with the actual number of men in the district town (area), and do not attach them to neighboring districts, the same as above. With regard to the Kich'ong and lower (units, officers), they naturally will follow fixed regulations. In general 5 men constitute a squad (0); and 2 squads make up a tae ( ). This makes 12 men (11?). And 3 tae ( ) make a ki ( : ki must then have 36 men--like a platoon) (end note)

Some might say that under present regulations 100 men make a ch'ō (which has its Ch'ogwan ( ). 500 men make a sa ( which has its P'ach'ong ( ). Every 1,000 men has a Ch'ŏnch'ong ( ), and above the Ch'ŏnch'ong you also have a Yongjang ( ). And one province is generally divided into 5 yŏng ( ). This is regarded as eminently logical (well organized) and there are no odd numbers left over (no shortages or excessive nos of men per unit), so why is it that you don't follow this (current) system in every respect?
military system -50- pyŏngje

400, 21,21a) To this I would reply, it is difficult to have just the right number of soldiers and able bodied males in every adm. district. If you stick to closely to regulations and are not able to adapt to differences, then you will not be able to avoid having extra able-bodied males outside the ch’o(chool) units who will be divided up and organized into neighboring district’s ch’o. And this will prevail up to the extra ch’o that don’t fit neatly into a sa(), or the extra sa that don’t fit into the Ch’ŏnch’ŏng()--there will always be some that have to be divided up and organized into a neighboring district. How much more so in the present time when the names (of the various types of) soldiers is no numerous and the soldiers of each of the administrative districts i are all divided up among so many different categories, and each category has a different commander. As a result the leftover numbers of Sog’o troops must be attached to the neighboring district town’s Sog’o ch’o(boom) or sa( ). And the extra numbers of men left over after the organization of a special or sa tae (pyŏltae) must be attached to the ch’o of the pyŏltae of neighboring administrative districts.

   When it comes to such units (categories of troops) as the Chŏngch’ŏgun(精抄軍), name of one of the units, like the Sinsŏng’gun(新選軍) and Pyŏlp’osu() that were temporarily created during the 1636 Manchu invasions and after, Kwahagw’on, IV, 1963, p.399), Pyŏnggun(御營軍), Pyŏlp’osu(), and the abyŏng(牙兵) of each yamen, all of them were attached to and organized within neighboring district towns, or attached to the neighboring districts of neighboring districts (two districts away). The soldiers might be in one district while the officers (chang) would be in another district, and many of the officers and men did not know each other’s faces. The one who was in charge of the soldiers was the magistrate, but the one who commanded them was the officer (chang ).

   The one who instructed and reviewed them in peacetime was the magistrate, while the one who led them into difficulty and commanded them in combat was the officer (ki chang )
In general when someone earns merit or commits a crime, should we hold the magistrate responsible or the officer? (chang) There could not be any greater confusion in the military system than this.

If you investigate what the ancients did, you see that there were quotas for so(many), shih and yu(卒伍師旅) by means (liu-chün) of which an army was formed. The Son of Heaven (had) six armies; large states (kingdoms?) had 3 armies, the next largest sized states had 2 armies, (mechanically) and the smallest states had 1 army, so that they did not stick to fixed numbers of 军卒(卒) (for all), but determined the number of armies on the basis of whether the state was large or small. (note: If you estimate it on the basis of the principle involved, then 4 liang(兩 : Kwahagwön, 1963, IV, p.84 - 1 liang had 25 men) formed one tsu(卒 ), and 5 tsu made one yu(旅 : p.84, of 500 men). Also this refers to the regular quotas, which they did not necessarily stick to.) (end note)

Mr. Ch'i's Chi-hsiao hsin-shu(氏紀效新書) says: "The tui-ch'ang(ancient) commands one tui(旅) consisting of 2 wu(伍), and there are 5 men in a wu, and one tui has 12 men; that is to say, 10 men constitute a shih(什). Under each banner (kilö 旗下) there are from 3-5 tui(旅 ), and in general 30 men make up a chi(旗). Underneath 1 Chi'ogwan(海校) there are /three banners (kilö) to 5 banners, and in all bases 100 men make up a ch'o(哨). Underneath 1 P'ach'ong(把撫) there are 3x from 3 to 5 ch'o(哨), and in all cases 500 men make up a sa(司). Underneath 1 ch'ónch'ong(千撫) there are from 3 to 5 sa(司), and in all cases 3,000 men make up a yông(營). 3,000 men make up 1 yông, but also 4 or 5,000 men can make up 1 yông.

It is not necessary to stick to fixed quotas; just follow what is suitable to the area and the land (locality) and what is suitable to the conditions of the time, and what is in accordance with the quotas for troop rations.

What this means in brief is that you should not depart from the law, but that you shouldn't be bound by the law." (要之, 承用法而不泥乎法也)
The Ping-hsüeh chih-nan (兵學指南) was a military text compiled in 1 ch'ae and composed of 5 kyŏn, which extracted parts of Chi Chi-kuang's Chi-yao Hsin-shu (Chi-yao Hsin-shu) (of the Ming) that dealt with troop training and adjusted them to fit Chosŏn dynasty circumstances. It was compiled in the 11th year of Ch'ŏngjo's reign, 1787. How's this possible? Kwahagwŏn, IV, 1963, p.396) also take this as (the basis) for the system (it constructs), and says: The reason why you do not have more than three t'ui (移營) is to make it more convenient for troop training (戰陣). The reason why you do not have more than 3 ch'i (旗) is because you (want to) stick to the number of troops (軍數 of troops). As for (the number of) ch'i (旗), then whether you have 4, 5, or 6 in each case do it in accordance with the circumstances.

Every ying (營) should not have more than 5 or 6 ssu (司), and every ch'un (army) should not have more than 10 ying; this is because the capacity of the generals (to command) is not more than this. Whether you're dealing in units of tens, hundreds, thousands or ten thousands, they all follow the same principle and are just multiples of one another, and that is all. It is not that one has to stick to this like a fixed law without being able to increase or decrease (the quotas at each level). If you look (at the problem of military organization) from this (standpoint), then (it should be obvious that) the military systems of both ancient and modern times in neither case stick (too closely) to fixed quotas. Also, the so-called (figures of) a thousand or ten thousand are basically not standard and exact numbers. If the ying-chiang (yongjang (營將) should happen to command as many as a dozen ssu (司), the create additional changyong (帳勇) to accommodate them.
If you follow this (system) and make 2 or 3, or perhaps 5 or 6 yong (in each province), then in talking about the (ch'en-fa? method for organization for provincial military training?), won't you be close to having a disorganized system, and won't it lean too far in one direction?

To this IXSB would reply that the method of organizing an army requires that you have a fixed order (kangki yu chong) and that you have simplicity in training (kyoryon yu so), and that if there are cases of people who earn merit or commit transgressions, in all cases the commander should take responsibility for it like this, and that's all there is to it.

If there happen to be temporary divisions or recombinations (of units), then it will only depend on the commander making changes in accordance with the circumstances, and that is all. If you stick too closely (to regulations) without knowing how to make adaptations (to the circumstances) Thus even if you have 5 yong always in existence, you might have to split off the troops of one of the yong and send them out, and this would leave one sector empty.

Someone else might say that: In ruling the people (chumin) and in ruling (managing) soldiers, really you cannot divide them in two. But at the present time the soldiers during peacetime in many cases oppress the people shamelessly; and (on the contrary) when the scholars (munsa) have to go to fight, they are the same as delicate and tender women and children (終從婦兒). How about this?

To this I would reply: Fundamentally there are not two paths (to handle) civil and military (officials) (munmu pon pi to 多武本非二道). In Ancient times, the commanders of the tsu, yu, shih, and ch'un (were the ching-shih (御士: high officials) of the tsu-tang, hsiang, and sui (單位: units of civil administration). When they went in (came back from war) they acted as officials who would take care of assignments and shepherd the people (tzu-mu chih) (warring), and when they went out (to do battle), they were people who defended against the enemy (夷).
In general, all the shih (士) (if a man was a shih—scholar, then) engaged in practical learning (sa kye silhak), and those who did not learn (study), definitely could not become commanders (changyong).

In later ages (after the decline had set in?), letters (mun) became the occupation of people who used pen and ink and and cutters and polishers (engravers), while military affairs ended up consisting of archery (archers) and boisterous wild men (chop'ok), and that was all. This was because the selection of men was not in accordance with the proper way, thus driving the whole age to be that way. If we do not change what is currently respected with regard to the two questions of supporting (taking care of) men (in office, in the army?), and selecting the right men, then what would be the use of discussing the several problems we have to face?

Also, I note that in ancient times when the fang-po (方伯: local officials) punished criminals, the feudal lords personally brought forward their soldiers to go to war. If you look at it on the basis of this, then the chief official of each administrative district (up) has no choice but to take second personal charge (of military affairs), and the xxxxxx official should only be an assistant official. In the Han dynasty, the Chun t'ai-shou (郡将) was also called the chun-chiang (郡将) and he was concurrently in command (charge) of military affairs. The tu-wei (都尉) was in charge of assisting the shou (him) in handling military matters. And in the kuo of the marquises (hou-ko), xxxxxx (the position of the chief magistrate?) was the same (similar to) the chun-shou; the chung-wei (中尉) was xxx comparable to the tu-wei. What this (system represents) is that even though the chief official (magistrate) concurrently was in charge of military affairs, still the assistant official in fact was in charge of military responsibilities. The way it should be done is that the chief official (magistrate) ought to be in charge of military affairs, and if some incident occurs, then the chief officials will lead the soldiers (command the soldiers) and go (to the battle), while the assistant official will remain home and guard the home walled town (district). If something happens, only after an order
military system -55- pyongje

p.401, 21:24a) 
desussed to from the superior general (shang-chiang sh .=) should the
assistant official take command of the troops and act as a substitute
(for the chief magistrate). This is what should be made the fixed law.

--- P'ach'ong (把, 抱) (note: Recommend for appointment (to this post)
those who have previously held a 6th rank office and have talent. (subnote:
If there is no one with this prior experience or
no one suitable, then you may select people from among those who have
held the post of hyanggwan(御官) or from among the dormitory students
(naesasaeng) who have been exempted from military duty. If there
is anyone from among the ch'ogwan(都官) who has talent and ability, long
duty and high rank, then he also may be selected and promoted.)

He will carry out the orders of the chutjang(率領), take charge of
the ch'ogwan, supervise and inspect testing and training, and
at the time of the spring and autumn training exercises, he shall lead his
own sa(司) and go to the k (training camp). The p'ach'ong will have a
regular salary and will receive 3 kok of rice four times a year. Give him
also a fixed quota of 8 sahu.

In the case of men who are chunggun(中軍) in the chin'gwan(鎭管),
select men who have previously held rank 4 or 5 office (posts) and appoint
them (to the post of p'ach'ong), and give them 2 kok additional salary.
And while they are serving in office, the official will provide them with a fixed quota of 12 sahu. Even if the above (p'ach'ong) are not rank 6, or rank 4 or 5,
but are still talented men worthy of promotion, treat them in accordance
with the regulations for sujik(brevet rank and office), whether 6th, 4th or 5th
rank. (subnote: If you have a man who formerly held the post but ought to
be appointed again, do not stick to the fact that his term is filled (up).
If the man is a naesasaeng (inner dorm student), he ought to be treated?
(chakkong? 作真) the same as those in school.)
p.401, 21:24a) -Ch’ogwan (note: Select (these) from among those who pass the military examinations (muson), or outer dormitory students who are exempt from military duty (myonbon oesasaeng), those with the protection (um) privilege (yuum), those with royal relatives (yuch’in), the descendants of merit subjects (sejok), and those who belong to the Ch’ung’uiwi or Ch’ungsunwi who are talented and able and worthy of being appointed to office, and appoint them (to the post of ch’ogwan). Every month when the military test of talent is given, assemble the officials of this (these soldiers; this unit) who will conduct the testing and training. At the time of the spring and autumn maneuvers (training), each of (the ch’ogwan?) will command his troops and lead them (to the training camp).

Each ch’ogwan will receive a salary of 1 kok 5 tu of rice 4 times a year. Given them a regular contingent of 4 sahu (servants)

With regard to infantry ch’ogwan (pobyong ch’ogwan), then when their troops are due to go on duty (ponsang), he will command his troops and lead them to the yamen where they are assigned. If it is in the capital, (he will lead them to) their home Guard unit (ponwi). If it is in the provinces, then (he will lead them) to the yongmun (governor’s or provincial army commander’s yamen) or the garrisons (chejin). When they arrive, he will greet the officer in charge (chujang) with military courtesy (kullye)(ceremony). Then (he? the chujang?) will conduct an inspect archery test and also examine the soldiers to see who is able or not, (whether the ch’ogwan is therefore meritorious or guilty (of a criminal act, transgression)(should be punished)

If (among the ch’ogwan) there should be anyone who is inferior (yongja) and not fitted to be a commander (of troops), the magistrate (of his home town) will be indicted (ch’ugo). If it is a bad case, then punishment will be requested. If he is really worthy and able, he will be promoted and also his magistrate will be rewarded, as a means of encouragement. If (the ch’ogwan) are stationed at the }
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P. 401, 21:24b) then they will receive orders from the sajiang (司 將), and when their troops go on duty (at the palace, ipchik), (the ch'ogwan) will all lead their troops in. Also from the place where they are on duty they will be given a salary of 1 kok 2 tu of rice per month and 9 tu of yellow beans. The salary of the Sahu (同 候) will be 6 tu of rice. (Subnote: Infantry will be comparable to other soldiers (in their treatment?).)

When they are on training in their home district, reduce by half the number of Ch'ogwan and Sahu. Also eliminate one man who will be exempted from military service and will pay cloth, and also make him concurrently a sahu. (End subnote)

This (salary?) will be granted from the rice left over that is collected from the military support personnel (kunbo 軍保) of this (unit).

I note that when (the troops, the ch'ogwan) are sent out (chobal 調整) or shift duty tours (gangham 陣上), it is necessary to have their commanders lead them. Since this is related to military administration, you can't help but pay attention to this to make sure it is done and make it a fixed regulation. How much more so since this military system is based on a fixed division of (soldiers) into duty tours (and units) in which the whole up (district) and the entire ch'o( 候 :company) is involved, and no use of fractional (leftover, individual) soldiers is allowed, so that it even more ought to be like this (that is, the commanders must be in command of their units whenever they go on duty). However, we must have all the (civil) agencies in the capital use their own runners and they must be fully provided with runners and servants (saryong). But soldiers must perform the responsibilities of soldiers; we cannot have them substituting for and doing the tasks of slave runners. Only after you make sure this is the case, will we be able to do it right. (Endnote)

- The magistrate (sury-ong) will recommend (ch'ommang 除名) the p'ach'ong (押 拘)(note; he will only recommend one name (il mang 一 候 ). The CholtoSa (節度使) will review it and make the appointment and report it to the throne for a rescript (kyemun 呈聞). (Note: It will not be necessary to memorialize (report) all appointments and dismissals (chep'a 除 罷). Just do as is done in accordance with present regulations for reporting appts (kyech'a 吉 科).
"So-and-so, for such-and-such a reason is replacing so-and-so in accordance with the recommendation (ch'onmang) I am making this appointment (ch'asum), etc., etc.") (end note)

The P'ach'ong will recommend (ch'onmang) the Ch'ogwan, and the magistrates (suryong) will make the appointment (ch'asum) and report it (po') to the Choltosa. The P'ach'ong will select those who have had experience in a rank 6 post. The Ch'ogwan will be selected and appointed from those who have passed the military examination (muson) and those who are suitable (for the position of Ch'ogwan). If a man has not passed the military examination but still has talent and ability that is outstanding, then test him at archery. (note: the willow leaf arrow test, and shooting at a straw man on horseback) (end note) and give him the written examination (kangso) (two of the Four Books, and one of the 4 military classics, and the Chi-hsiao hsiao-shu), and after (he passes this test), then appoint him.

The magistrate will test all the changgwan(都官) every month in archery, and in the spring and autumn the Choltosa (note: the Governor (Kwanch'a sa) may also hold the post of Choltosa as a concurrency) (end note) will make the rounds and go to the archery and written examinations (note: the regulations for which will be the same as above), and he will give rewards or punishment based on whether the soldiers are able or not. Those who do not "take pity on" (care for) their soldiers, and those who flunk the textual examinations will be dismissed or punished. Those who have earned merit or who are outstanding will be reported especially to the throne for a promotion. (note: Whether promoted in rank or given an appointment, only do what is appropriate) (end note)

When the P'ach'ong and Ch'ogwan have completed two years of duty, then promote them one rank. (note: Those who originally had no rank will be given their first rank appointment. Those who have rank will be promoted in accordance with their original rank. With regard to those whose tour of office is nearing an end, two months prior to the end each district
military system

will make a report to the Choltosa, and the Choltosa will gather together the reports from each of the districts (up) and report them to the Ministry of War (Pyongjo), which will make a report to the throne and issue rank, and then send it (down) to the Choltosa, who will have it sent to the home district (up).

It would seem that there should be some method for praise and blame for the changgwan (将官), but regarding the ability or lack of it among the changgwan of the various districts (up), the situation is such that it is difficult for the Choltosa to have detailed knowledge of them. The system of praise and blame at the present time is a dead letter, and also there is no way to promote or dismiss them. We ought to fix regulations so that when their term of office is up they are promoted in rank. The lack of a system of praise and blame for the hyanggwans (御官) is also like this. (end note)

- Underneath the Pa'ch'ong of every sa (司) there will be one sogi (司), one Hottemisu (科), 2 Kusu (鼓手), one p'allasu (喇叭手) (k'un kodong), one Nap'amsu (喇叭手) (pang'ul), 1 Solpa (soldier) (p'ullas), 1 Koch'su ( bachelor), 2 Sunsi kisu (巡视旗手), 2 Ryonggisu (令旗手), 6 Kulleo (軍卒), 1 Mabu (馬夫), and 1 Chuyok (尉) (note: The Kulleo, Mabu, and Chuyok will all be held by the Sahu as a concurrency. In the case of a Ch'ogwan, it will be the same.) (end note)

Beneath every Ch'ogwan there will be 1 Sogi, 1 In'gisu (旗手), 2 Kulleo (軍卒), 1 Mabu (馬夫), and 1 Chuyok (尉) (Note: All the above posts are to be filled by actual soldiers. Establish (these positions) separately from the ranks of troops in the military unit. None of these men will have support personnel (pot). During training times and at times of war, each of them will perform their duties. Outside of this, four times a year all of them will train in their talents.)
Under present regulations, these kinds of reserve soldiers (ch'abigwan) are combined with the sahu (伺候) of the basic changgwan (差備宛). During ordinary times they serve on rotation as sahu, and at times when there is an incident (war), then each is ordered to take charge of his responsibilities. These banner men and drummers and other types/in normal times must also be ordered to practice their own affairs (what they are expert in). If in normal times they are allow allowed to be idle, then what will they do when there is a war? They should be required to be able to perform their tasks. Moreover/in wartime, each takes charge of his responsibilities, and then there will be no people left over. How would this not bee too haphazard and oversimplified? It would be best to establish definite and separate quotas in each case. (seems to be saying that instead of having a pool of soldiers who can be shifted around to different occupations, it is better to have specific persons assigned specific responsibilities)

For every yong (盈) (note: that is, the district town where the chin'gyong or garrison is located—chin'gyong 鎮管 is in charge of taking orders from the chujang(主將), carrying them out and lining up the ranks (of men) in the un (districts) where the Chin'gyang are located) there will be 4 Kip'aegwan (旗牌官) and 3 Hoch'ongsu (號銃手), and 2 P'allasu (拍篠手), and 2 Nap'alsu, and 3 Hojoksu (喇叭手: t'aep'yongsu 大號平), and 8 H'osu (鼓手), 1 chongsu (>Total), 1 Rasu (啞鎖), 5 obang kisu (玉板旗手), 5 Koch'osu (高招手), 4 Kakkisu (角旗手), 2 In'gisu (旗旗手), 6 Sunsi kisu (巡視手), 6 Ryonggisu (命旗手), 18 kulloe (軍牢).

(note: The magistrate where the chin'gyang (鎮管) is located originally held the post of Yongjiang (營將) as a concurrency, so that the post of kulloe was performed concurrently by the magistrate's servants (saryong 使命) who were normally on duty. As for such types as the Nap'alsu there, they also/were originally regularly established. Ch'wisu (號手), and it would seem proper to make adjustments on the basis of this and determine it.)
The selection and appointment of them will be the same as for the Ch'ogwan. You must appoint people who are well trained. (note: Test them on one of the Four Books, and one of the four Military Classics (mugyong, wu-ching), the Chi-hsiao hsin-shu (経効新書), and the Pyonghak chinam (兵學指南). If among the soldiers there are any who are able at letters and with talent and knowledge, they also may be permitted to take the examinations and be selected for promotion.

Provide (the kip'aegwan) with 3 sahu. They will stay at the same office (ch'ong) with the changgwan, and their salary will be the same as that for the Ch'ogwan. If there is someone (who is to be appointed Kip'aegwan) who has a primary military service duty responsibility, then for the time that he serves in the post (of kip'aegwan), exempt him from his primary service (ponbon), and after he has fulfilled 2 years of service, promote him by one rank. The post of Kip'aegwan is very important, and it is not everyone who can do it well. But at the present time the people (who hold this post) are base and inferior (ch'onbi), which is particularly bad in terms of this post. What we have to do is to treat (the kip'aegwan) the same as the changgwan (鎮官) (i.e., upgrade the status of this position), and after we do that, then we will be able to get good men for the post.

In the case of the Kip'aegwan on duty at the pyongyong and suyong (provincial army and navy commanders' yamen), in normal times they also serve on duty on rotation and await orders. Their salaries also ought to be double those for the Kip'aegwan in each of the (magistrate's) districts (up). In garrison towns (chin) where the Provincial Navy Commander's Yamen is located, then there should be 1 Kip'aegwan for each man-of-war (chonson), so fix the quota of Kip'aegwan in accordance with the number of warships.

(note: 7 men for a T'ongyong (東營), 5 men for a Suyong (水營), 3 men for a Ch'omsajin (金使鎮), 2 men for a Manhojin (萬戶金鎮).
The basic responsibilities of the Kip’aegwan are to assist the Chujang, and that is why only the district towns where the yong are located have them, while the P’ach’ong and Ch’ogwan and below (lower posts) do not have them. If you hold to the logic of this regulation, then (you might say) that in the Sugyongjin (garrison towns were the prov. navy commander’s yamen is located) you also ought not to have (a kip’aegwan) for each of the warships, but naval forces are different from land armies, and you have to have a Kip’ae for each (of the ships). A land army has its changgwan, but naval forces (sugun) do not have changgwan. On the basis of this (alone), you can see that the situation is different. According to the Chik-hsiao hsin-shu, in addition to the t’ingek ling-chiang provided for each ship, each of them has a P’odogwan who takes exclusive charge of the ship’s affairs. This is also something that does not exist in a landed army.

Abolish the post of Tohundo. Generally speaking, under the old system in this country (dynasty?), we only had the post of tohundo of the yosu and other posts. After the Imjin invasion, we first began to use the Chi-hsia hsin-shu methods (laws) (according to which) we created the posts of P’ach’ong, Ch’ogwan, and Kip’aegwan. But we continued to have the post of Tohundo and did not abolish it. At the present time it has no regular responsibilities and is only an underling of the Kip’aegwan and helps out with the archery targets, and that is all. Each changgwan already has a sogi and a kip’aegwan, and in addition has Sahu. As for military equipment, clerks in normal times there are who assist in taking charge of it when it has to be done, so that in each case a man is appointed (to do it). There is no doubt then that the Tohundo should be abolished.((end note)
and the people, but we already have pyongsa(兵使) and uhu(虞候),

and in addition we have the magistrates where the chinyong are located (chinyong suryong 鎮營守令), so that in addition to this to create the post of yongjang, on the contrary only a useless creation of a repetitious post (ch'wegwon 資官). This is why because in recent years the yongjang has made the rounds inspecting the various district towns, the pyongsa (provincial military commander) has completely given up making the rounds of inspection himself and just sits around in his post (office) doing nothing. He has only become an official that attends parties and banquets, such is the situation (that has resulted from the creation of the yongjang). From this it can be seen that this post should not have been created. The only thing that should be done is that the pyongsa and suryong (magistrate) must obtain the right men and hold them responsible for their duties, and we also must be careful and economical in (appointing) people to the posts of Pa'ch'ong and lower posts.

We also ought to abolish the post of chunggun(中軍) in the Provincial Governor's Yamen (Kamyong 超營). The governor basically exercises overall surveillance (inspection), and that is all. The Pyongsa (provincial army commander) takes exclusive charge of training, so that the Chunggun of the governor's yamen has nothing to do (under my system, under the present system?) Originally this post was not included in the dynastic code (taejon), but it has come into existence in recent years. In general this is because the provincial governor and the provincial army commander (kamsa and pyongsa) have divided up responsibility for the conduct of military affairs within the province. It is contrary to the original intention of the law codes that command over the military (in a province) should be divided. So the Chunggun post should be abolished. Only in a case where there is a place with no pyongsa (provincial military commander) should the governor's yamen be allowed to have a Chunggun,
In accordance with present regulations. (end note)

In each yong (prov. commander's yamen) or governor's yamen), garrison (chin) or district in a border area (pyong'up) that has a permanent contingent of troops (yu sanggun ch'oe) in addition to the Chaesol kun'gwan (在牵军官), there will also be an emergency kun'gwan (taebyon kun'gwan) (待警軍官). As for the other districts (chu and hyon), there will only be the emergency kun'gwan (taebyon kun'gwan). There will be fixed quotas for all of them.

- the chaesol kun'gwan (在牵军官) (note: 5 men each for the governor's, provincial army and navy commander's yamen. 10 men each for the two northern provinces (yanggye) and the t'ongyong (統營). Their monthly salary will be 3 kok. In the extremely frontier district towns in the northwest there will be two men. There will be three men in Uiju (울주), Kanggye (康吉), Hoeryong (合陽), Cheju, Tongnae and other (such) places. 2 men in the Ch'omsajin (僉使鎭), 3 men in the Tangsang ch'omsajin in Pusan, Manp'o and other places (where there is rations a tangsang), 1 man in a Manhojin. And their monthly will be 3 kok of grain.

The kun'gwan will be selected by the chujang (主將) from among those who have passed the military examination (muson), previous holders of the post, close relatives of the royali family (yuch'in), those with the um protection privilege (yuum), members of the Loyal Righteous Guards (Ch'ung'uiwi) or the Loyal Obedient Guards (Ch'ungsunwi), and people who are deemed suitable for the post. The Ministry of War will review the recommendation (of the chujang) and memorialie the appointment to the throne (kyech'a). In the case of the governory and provincial army commanders of the two northern provinces (yanggye), then those who at the time are serving in the Naegumwi (內禁衛) may also be appointed (kun'gwan in the local garrisons), and while they are holding this post (of kun'gwan) all of them will be excused from their primary duty assignment (in the Naegumwi). (subnote: In the northwest frontier, interpreter knowledgeable in
military system -64- pyongje

p.403, 21:27b) the Nuchen (Jurchen) language, and in the Cheju or Tongnae area, one interpreter who knows Japanese will be especially given the title of kun'gwan.)(end subnote)

-The emergency kun'gwan (taebyon kun'gwan)

(note: For the prov. governor's and army and navy commander's yamen, 10 men. For the two northern provinces and the T'ongyong, 20 men. For the Taebu, and Tohobu, 10 men. For the Pu, 8 men. For the Kun, 6 men. For the hyon, 4 men. With regard to districts along the extreme frontier in the northwest and in Tongnae and Cheju and other places, double this number. There will be 3 Uhu (虞侯), and 6 Uhu for the Northern prov. army commander's yamen and T'ongyong. There will be 6 men at a Ch'omsa, 8 men for a Tangsang ch'omsa, and 3 men for a Manho.

In the case of a chu or kun, then men from the home district town (pon'up) (will be used to fill this post). In the case of a yong or chin (governor or prov. army or navy commander's yamen or garrison), then in each case the post will be filled with people living nearby. Also, people who have passed the military examinations (muson), those who are close relatives of the royal family (yuch'in), those with the protection privilege (yuum), those who are members of the Loyal Righteous and Loyal Obedient Guards, and those who are suitable for the post will be recommended to the Ministry of War, which will make the appointment. Provide them with 2 Sahu (Subnote: It does not matter whether the Taebyon kun'gwan is granted 2 or 4 kyong of land, in both cases provide him with 2 Sahu)(end subnote)

No regular salaries will be provided them; do not allow them to stay permanently at the officials' yamen (mul sa chang chae kwan'ka), but they will come and participate every time there is an archery examination. At times when there is business for them to do, they will wait for orders in their posts. Those among them who are members of the two guards (Loyal Righteous and Loyal Obedient Guards) will be exempted from their basic tours of service (in those guard units).
The Chaesol kun'gwan and Taebyon kun'gwan will be housed in the same building (barracks). Also in those places where the taebyon kun'gwan officials are located in the two northern provinces, then abolish the post of T'ogwan (士官). (end note)

In each administrative town (up) establish a Military Training Office (Ryonmuch'ong 錄武廳) (note: Set up an archery grounds and all those engaged in military training will take their training at this place.) (end note) And for each district establish a GUNpowder Storehouse (Yomch'oguk 炮藥局) (note: With regard to the establishment of this gunpowder armory and the supply of gunpowder, both of these matters are discussed in detail in the section on local districts (kun-hyon cho).) (end note)

In each yong and chin (governor's and prov. army and navy commander's yamen) and local garrison establish Military Supply Land (kunjajon 軍資田) which will be used to provide military supplies (kunja) (note: All expenses for granting rewards and banquets and for the costs of providing for military equipment will be taken and spent from this fund. The details relating to the quotas of kunjajon, the regulations for the division and allocation of the land, and the regulations for tax collection are discussed in detail in my section on land (Chonje). Provide for a detailed list of the basic quota of income (sosu wonsu 所收元數) and all kinds of expenditures from this kunjajon land at each of the yong and chin and report it to the provincial governor. At the end of the year (he) will submit a report of it to the throne for approval (kyemun 賣聞) (end note)

All expenditures for military supplies (kunja 軍資) in each district town (up) will be deducted (hoegam 削減) from the regular budget (kyongbi 金餉) (note: The reason for this is that each of the yong and chin will have a fixed amount of military supply land (kunjajon) allocated to it, but each of the district towns (up) will pay out expenses from their regular budget (income, kyongbi). End for that reason there can be fixed quotas (of expenses)
p.403, 21:28a) For the yong and chin, but there cannot be fixed quotas at each of
the district towns. (end note)

With regard to the yearly requirement of muskets, powder and musket
balls, then decide on standard regulations in accordance with current practice.

- For a Taebu and Tohobu, 24 muskets (ch'och'ong 高銃), 4,800 rounds of
  lead musket balls (鉄丸), and 96 kun(斤) of powder
- For a Pu, 18 muskets, 3,600 rounds of musket balls, 72 kun of powder
- For a Kun, 12 muskets, 2,400 rounds of musket balls, and 48 kun of powder
- For a Hyon, 6 muskets, 1,200 rounds of musket balls, and 24 kun of powder

For the cost of each musket (provide) 5 kok of rice; for each
100 rounds of lead balls provide 5 tu of rice; for each kun of powder, provide
1 kok (of rice).

Also consider and set regulations to provide for bows and arrows, spers,
armor, and banners. (note: At the present time our military equipment,
standards and stuff is all of inferior make; it is necessary to have
freshly this skillfully and clearly made) (note)

Regulations for income for banques (餉餉) (note: see below)
--- Miscelanneous types of soldiers (chesaek kunsang 謝差軍士)

(note: With regard to our country's military system, those (soldiers)
that are listed in the Dynastic Code (taej=on) will be referred to as
"the old system" (kuje 舊制). Those (types of soldiers) created after
the Imjin (Hideyoshi) invasions will be referred to as "the new type"
(sinje 新制). In recent years so many different categories (types) of
(soldiers) have been established that it is difficult to count them all.
If at the present time it is desirable to establish a system that is in accordance
with the times, we ought to base it on "the old system", and make adjustments
(increase or decrease the numbers or types) in accordance with ancient law
(ancient methods), but with regard to the "new type" of soldiers (units), we
will only retain the Togam/kyongbyong (首都京兵: capital soldiers) and
the Military Training Agency (note: Kyongbyong refers to the P'osu(apos) and
and Madae(馬隊人) in the capital) (end note) and the Sog'ogun(佐佐軍) (note:
The Sog'ogun consists of official and private slaves (ch'on) who are formed into military ranks. In addition to this, in recent years there has been the creation of a confusing variety of units, such as the Oyonggun (御營軍), Chongch'ogun (精抄軍), Pyol'osu (別砲子), Ch'ongch'ogun (精具軍), Pyol'tae (別隊), and Sol'osu (新設軍). The number of military exam passers (ch'ulsin) has been so numerous in recent years, it would be difficult all of sudden to abolish these units, so for the time being leave them as units and wait until (all the ch'ulsin) run out (retire?). The only units that should be retained are the Kibyong (騎兵), Pobyong (步兵), Sog'ogun (末伍軍), Sogun (水軍), and Nungnogun (能探軍). The transport soldiers (cho'ol), the subu soldiers, the tomb guardians (surunggun), etc. For details on all of these see the main text of this section.

Requirements of able-bodied males for military service will be based upon land (allotments). One man (ilpu) will receive 100 mu of land; 100 mu make 1 kyong.
4 kyong make 1 chon. EXCEPT FOR the taebusa and scholars, everyone who passes the examinations, the descendants in the main line of merit subjects, close relatives of the royal family, and clerks and runners--in general every one who has a post or service, every unit of 4 kyong of land will be required to produce one person for service as a Kibyong, Pobyong, or Sugun. And one man who has strong and healthy will be chosen to be the chuo (chief of household) while the other 3 will be support personnel.

With regard to the Sog’ogun, then one man will be required to serve for every 2 kyong of land. This unit will be composed of official and private slaves. One man will be chosen to be the head of household (chuho), and the other man will be his support (po). Military equipment (clothing) and horses will all be provided by them. Muskets and horse equipment (reins etc) will be provided by the officials. Armor and helmets will be provided by the government when the army moves (on an expedition).

If a soldier runs away or dies, then the person who continues to hold or the land will take his place. You might choose one man from among the support personnel and make him the head of household (chuho) and make the one who receives the land grant in the man's place a support person. See the section on the land system.

In the case of the transport troops (choso), one man will be required to perform service from 3 kyong of land. In the case of Subu, one man will be required from 2 kyong of land. And in the case of the Pongsugun, Nungnogun, Sahu, Ksu and Kosu etc., one man will be required for service in each of these cases from 1 kyong of land. In the case of the tomb guards (suhogun of the tombs) and mokcha, in both cases one man will have to serve from 1 kyong of land. For details on both of these see the section on the land system. (end note)
The order of all military units must follow the order of the land (grants) and villages (note: Because in ancient times they required military service on the basis of land (grants, possession) (kocha i chon bu ch'ul pyong ko 者以田賦出兵故...), the tsu and wu(卒伍 ) were organized at the village level (里 ), and the army organization (kunjung軍政 ) was completed at the kuo(郊 :city:suburb) (level). With regard to the men in the (village xun units) of tsu and wu(卒伍 ), the pi and yu(比閰 ) supported one another; the tzu and tang(族堂 ) aided one another. When the men were at home they took their ease (relaxation) together, and when coming in or going out, they worked together. At funerals, they commiserated with one another, and in times of good fortune they were happy together. It is for this reason that during a night battle it was enough for them to hear each other's voices to avoid confusing (them with the enemy), and during a day battle, it was enough for them to see each other in order to recognize who it was. So great were the happy and solid bonds between them that they would give their lives for each other. It was for this reason that if they were guarding (on defense), then they were solid (and strong) and if they were fighting (on the attack), then they would win a victory. If even the army of such like Duke Huan of Ch'ī(齊桓公 ) had been like this, he could have become hegemon (pa) 

Ever since the land system (chonje田制 :land distribution system) in the world fell out of use and was destroyed did Later Ages in organizing their military system only pick up able-bodied males at random and use them to substitute for others in filling the ranks of the armies (士搜括人丁隨得免代 ). This is why the people from the eastern end of a district would be mixed together in the ranks with those from the Western part. And (in organizing) a province, the people of the southern kun would be mixed together with the people of the northern kun in the ranks, the situation was such that they were not bound together (had nothing to hold them together), and their faces were not recognizable to one
another, and in their feelings (psychologically), they were not tied to one another. Thus those who ran away were able to hide their traces (couldn't be discovered because nobody else knew who they were), and those who moved elsewhere were able to operate in a deceitful way (fool the authorities), such was the situation. With the military system in such confusion and laxity during peacetime, what was there to rely on during an emergency? If if there were someone who was good (at running an army), what could he do about it?

So once the land distribution system is carried out, then the kibyong (cavalry), pobyong (infantry) sog'ogun (slave soldiers) will all be formed into units (military units) in accordance with the rank order of their village (communities) (in accordance with the administrative hierarchy that begins with the villages),)

In all cases where the civilian soldiers (kunmin) are performing double service (ilsin yangyok), then reduce or eliminate this and see to it that each man only is required to perform his job (kak chon ki chik)

Note: At the present time among the civilians-soldiers (kunmin), there is no one who is not burdened without double service requirements. Even though a man is already made a regular soldier (chonggun) and pays cloth taxes (napp'o), he is also made a sog'o soldiers, or perhaps xxk is put in the Pyoltae and he alone has to provide for his military equipment and fighting horse. Or perhaps he is required to perform labor service to an official and has to stand long-term service at an official yamen. For each of these various categories, there are none who are not like this (who don't have to do double duty). As for cases of men who have to perform triple and quadruple or more types of service, we should abolish all of this and just have each man do his own job. All jobs and service requirements of all the people should be in conformity with this regulation.)
With regard to all types of soldiers, completely stop collecting the cloth equivalents (mul su kap'o) and for all of them provide support personnel (kuppo) in order to assist them (support them). (note: At the present time in the capital and provincial yamen there are no cases where they do not "release the soldiers from duty and collect cloth from them instead" (pangbon sup'o). Therefore if someone is named a soldier, then it means that he is a cloth taxpayer (py'yon chak napp'o chi). This has long been the custom so that the name of "soldier" has turned into the name of cotton cloth (myonp'o). If you call someone an infantryman it as a name of cloth (pobyong), then everyone thinks of cloth taxpayers, and they do not realize that basically it is the name for a soldier (kunsa). As for the leftover able-bodied males (yojon) of various types of categories, in all cases it is the same with them, too. Since the military system in its decline and in its evils has come as far as this, we ought to thoroughly reform all of this. Moreover at the present time, the new style units (post-Manchu invasions) such as the Sog'ogun and the Pyoltae, do not have support personnel (po). Only in the case of the kibyong and pobyong (cavalry and infantry) are they provided in name with support personnel (po), (in lieu of service), and for that reason, outside of a few people who are on duty (yakkan ippon cha), no one has support personnel (no one on duty is provided with po support personnel).) (end note) Regarding - In our country, the practice of releasing soldiers from duty and collecting cloth (from them in lieu of service) (panggun sup'o), I am not sure when it started. At the beginning they must have felt that it was of no benefit to have large numbers of people on duty during peacetime when there was no trouble, and so they exempted them from going on duty and let them return home to engage in agriculture, and collected a payment in lieu of service (su ki ka) which they used to provide for military expenses.
Thus both public and private interests were satisfied. However, the intention behind this was to provide a makeshift measure, and moreover it was not a correct law. It was only that what at root was a makeshift measure became an evil in later times (in a late age of decline), so much so that one cannot find the words to describe it. Thus what the Ministry of War does is, except for the people on duty (sujik) and the runners (sahwan) in each place, they release (exempt) everyone else from duty and collect cloth from them, and since the home military office (ministry) does this, then the provinces copy it and go much farther (are much worse in the way they do it). With the registers they calculate the names (of the people who are supposed to serve) and every month they collect cloth from them. In referring to a garrison (chin) with 100 defense troops (that are supposed to be on duty there), they say that this is an office that yields 200 p'il of cloth per post month. If it is a garrison with 500 men, then they say that it is an office that yields 1,000 p'il per month (i.e., to the official who holds the post). Those who appoint people to office (chegwan cha) use this as a means of either providing them with a lucrative (opportunity) or a poor (thin) (opportunity—to make money). And those who are appointed to office use this as a means of judging whether they will be happy (well off) or sad (not so well off). And one's friends also use this as a basis for either congratulating someone (on his good fortune at getting a lucrative post) or commiserating with him (at his bad luck for getting a low income post). This is the reason why in name even though you have a garrison that is supposed to have a thousand men at it, in fact there is not even one man there at the garrison. And those who actually are soldiers spend day and night worrying about the difficulty of meeting their cloth payments and they don't know anything about archery or riding horses. And various types of names, such as infantryman (pobyong) and yojong (also only pay cloth; there is not one man of them who has a horse.)(end note)
The provincial army commanders (konsu) and the garrison commanders (chinjang) only regard (the cloth payments) as material (funds) to spend on their wives, concubines and luxuries, or to pay for the bribes that they pay to powerful (influential) people (kwomun). The Ministry of War also used it to pay for miscellaneous expenses. (note: the so-called kuch'ae (丘債 : hilly debts?) of the magistrates are also based on the cloth tax payments received from the provincial choye (跑腿 : runners), and they have nothing to do with regular soldiers.) (end note) Outside of (these kinds of expenditures), (the income from cloth payments) are used completely for the expenses of ch'in'gu insa (贈事 : gifts and favors), for friends, wine and food, and bankquets and music (good times), and that is all. And in between the clerks raise their heads looking for bribes and falsify the registers, so that there is no limit to the trickery and chicanery. The soldiers (kunsal) has already turned into the responsibility to pay cloth (napp'o chi imi) because the officials, commanders, clerks and runners see that to regard the as cloth (myonp'o) (cloth taxpayers), not only do they release them from duty and collect cloth from them, but they exploit and also harass the soldiers who do show up for duty. (Note: At the present time the petty clerks of the Ministry of War ask the officials to get blank ledgers (warrants?) without names in them (kongmyong kwold'im) for them, and when the soldiers on duty are about to arrive, they intentionally make a mistake in writing down the date (when the man is supposed to start service) (chomgi : the day when the guy is checked off as being in attendance on duty?), and saying that the man is late for duty, they collect cloth (from him) (chipkwol sup'o) : on the grounds that the guy is missing, they collect cloth from him). And after the man arrives and at the time when the soldiers are divided up (for duty), they manipulate (the rosters) to control who has to work hard and who gets rest (gets an easy job) (i.e. they control the duty rosters).
Or they might say that the man's work on the job was not good and make a problem (federal case) out of this to collect cloth payments. Or they might say that the man's military equipment is not good, and use this as a pretext for collecting cloth payments. There are so many of these (tricks) that I cannot discuss them all.

And in recent times, not only is the ponsa (home bureau) like this, but the clerks of those bureaus that control soldiers, and families of powerful people and close relations (of the throne?), allof them (say that) they will collect the cloth taxes (themselves?) and substitute another name for military service (taemyong sup'o), but in many cases they do not find a substitute (iptae). No matter how much of these corrupt people you get rid of, they still continue to act in collusion with one another so that usually no one is punished because of vacancies (in the duty rosters, people actually on duty). If you have a place where there are supposed to be 20 men on duty, in fact you actually have no more than 7 or 8 who are there, and for this reason the burdens on those whom actually are on duty are very hard. (end note)

And because the soldiers in the distant areas cannot meet the heavy burdens (of cloth tax payments), they compete to get loans at monthly interest in order to make their cloth payments, but all they get from this is a day's rest. And when the next pon (tour of duty) comes up they leave the village and their families (they leave the hsiang and tsu-their local communities) and run away and scatter in the four directions. And after they abscond, then (the officials) press their neighbors and relatives and hold them responsible for making the cloth payments. And when the neighbors and relatives also run away, then they also press the neighbors and relatives of those neighbors and relatives.

What a deplorable situation! The fact that the training of troops and instruction of soldiers (is essential for) defending the country
and defending against insult (from abroad) is not something that needs to be mentioned (pi ka kion 非の害言), but to cause tens of thousands of innocent people to be all clamoring in the midst of flood and fire (calamity), truly what kind of thing is this? (Note: Even though the cloth paid for release (exemption) from duty is basically only 2 p’il of fine cloth (sep’o 細布), yet with regard to the troops that go on duty in the capital, the Ministry of War, the Toch’ongbu and each place (where they are assigned) make all kinds of demands for bribes. With regard to the soldiers who go on duty at the provincial army commander’s yamen (pyongyong), then all the various kinds of goods that the provincial military commander (pyongsa) uses and the costs of transportation are all made the responsibility of the soldiers to take care of (pay), and in the middle you have the clerks and runners demanding bribes, so that the cost of these payments for a whole year generally is not less than 30-40 p’il of standard cloth (sangp’o 布). (end note)

Moreover, at the present time when among the families of the people a son is born, even before he leaves the breast (is weaned) he is registered for military service and his name is counted for the purposes of collecting cloth taxes. If a commoner family (min 民) has three or four children, then what one family has to pay in cloth taxes for a year comes to over 100 p’il of ordinary cloth (sangp’o). And even before the child has grown up (he absconds) and becomes a vagabond. Even though the court has issued orders to the effect that (the officials) should wait for a boy to attain majority before he is registered for military service, in general this has become a dead letter, and I haven’t seen one case where this law has been followed. Even though this may be the fault of the magistrates, nevertheless, if basically we did not have this business of using soldiers for the purpose of collecting cloth payments, how would this evil exist?

The support personnel unit (kuppo 給保) that will be provided for the cavalry (kibyong), infantry (pobyong), and sailors (sugun) will consist
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405, 21:32a) of three men (pu). The unit for the Sog'ogun (slave soldiers) will consist of 1 man. (note: for each kich'ong provide an additional 1 man.

In general, the support personnel (pobu) will all pay 12 tu of rice a year or perhaps 2 p'il of cotton cloth (myonp'yo) in order to support the main man of the household (chuho). If there is an interdary month during the year, then add 1 tu of rice (to the tax payment). Of the three men constituting the support unit for infantrymen and sailors, one of them will pay either rice or cloth to the place where the soldier serves on duty and it will be used for his rations and salary.

The support personnel may be examined for talent, and if any of them passes, he may be permitted to become a soldier. If there are any crimes involving/excessive taking of support personnel, or miscellaneous goods (as tax payments), then the person on military service will be punished and dropped down to become a support person (himself).

The support units of the grain transport soldiers (chosol) will be two men. The regulations for the way this support is to aid the man on duty will be the same as above. For details see the section on grain transport (choun).

For the cavalry, infantry and sailors in Cheju, in all cases their support unit will consist of two men.

At the present time the so-called Pyoltae are cavalry soldiers (kigun); they are not provided with support personnel but they themselves are required to provide for their war horses. In general at the present time those people who do not have any regular business (sanop) are made Pyoltae. When the land they have or the able-bodied males (labor power) they have becomes somewhat better (so that they can earn a living), the children of their families are included in the numbers of support personnel, and therefore they are able to meet their responsibilities (for providing for their costs and equipment).
But if they are poor and destitute, none of them are able to overcome the difficulty and the burden. Because of this through corruption and violations of the law the number of days (of service?) increase and the lawsuits (in protest against this?) have also increased, and as far as their being soldiers is concerned, they have not been able to take any form (in no way or form are they really soldiers). If the land distribution system is not carried out, there will be no way to handle even one out of a hundred matters. (end note)

Outside of the soldiers, abolish all provisions of providing support personnel for anyone who has a regular salary. (note: With regard to such offices listed in the dynastic code (taejon), such as the eunuch and the officials of officials, the Interpreter's Bureau (Sayogwon), the Physicians Bureau (Chonuigum), the Astronomers' Bureau (Kwansanggam), the People's Relief Bureau (Hyeminso), these officials are all provided with rank and salary and we ought to abolish the provision of support personnel for them. The same thing should apply to the noksa (農事), sanwon (善愿), sowon (善願), uisaeng (醫生), yulsaeng (儒生), maul (幕医), sori (秀士), aksaeng (侠生), akkong (俠工), yongni (騏吏) and chang'inn (匠人). (end note)

Provide the cavalry soldiers (kibyong) with 3 men as support personnel; they will provide their war horses themselves. (note: All those who can shoot (the bow and arrow) while riding a horse should be made cavalrymen. Select the ablest and enter them into training, and in accordance with the regulations for the kun'gwans (軍官), give them armor and helmets.) (end note)

When they are not on duty, then have them stay home and train. (note: every month in their home district there will be two tests of shooting from horseback. In the spring and fall there will be the major test (toxihoe, 都會) (they will all assemble at) the Chin'gwang (鎮管) to train in war tactics as is done under the present regulations for the Pyoltae.) (end note)
Some might say that if the cavalry soldiers do not serve on duty, then there will be no evils of man and horse getting sick (tired) and starving (going hungry), and that with regard to the proper way of taking care of (raising, cultivating) soldiers, this could be said to be correct. Nevertheless, at the present time we already have the capital musketeers (kyongp'o) and the horse units (madae), so we do not have to have the provincial cavalry troops (kibyong) (brought into service). When it comes to the provincial military commander's yamen (pyongyong) in the south, they only have infantrymen (pobyong) and no cavalry. Isn't this too lax (empty, no good) a system? Wouldn't it be best to give the cavalry extra good treatment by providing them with 5 or 6 support personnel and dividing them up for duty (on the job)?

To this I would respond that if you provided/support personnel to serving those in remote and distant places and they had to take their feeding their horses with them and stay there on defense duty, the costs of horses and the expenses for food would be difficult to meet under the circumstances. This was the reason why during the reign of our forefathers even though the law for the inspection of horses was strict, the soldiers on duty (could get around it) by borrowing horses and substituting them for inspection, and that was all there was to it. In fact there was not one man who had a horse (of his own). If you hold a man responsible for what he cannot bear to do, and further pursue him with strict laws, then you don't have to wait for the pirates to come (before you will have a disastrous situation); you can just sit and wait for them to starve and get worn out. (tired). How much worse is the situation at the present time when the pyongyong (the provincial army commander's) yamen are not forts that are competent to stand up against the pirates (enemy); they are only equipped to deal with matters that need not be worried about, and that is all they are good for. The defense provided by the infantry is not insufficient. If there happens to be an emergency, the cavalry could be mobilized together with...
the sog'ogun (slave soldier units), and the only fear you would have is that you might not select the best men. The fact that the cavalry will not be on duty (ippōn)(under Yu's system) is not something that we need worry about.

Concerning the border garrison towns in the two northern provinces, then the cavalry troops may be ordered to serve on duty in the same way that the infantry are and the officials can provide them with fodder for the horses. (note: from the retained portion of the land tax (chonse yuji)(end note) Even in the south, if there happens to be an emergency, then they also may be put on duty in accordance with the above regulation. If it is done like this, then even though you don't have soldiers and horses in a healthy condition on the spot (all the time), when trouble comes, they still can be used. And if you compare (my system) with the present situation where in peacetime you provide them with additional support personnel, the savings in expenses would also be considerable.

Moreover, if you think (say) that having infantry but not having cavalry seems to mean a empty and worthless system, then what do you have to say about the present situation when we collect cloth from all (the soldiers), and where there is not a single man, be he cavalryman or infantryman who actually exists (who actually serves on duty)?

If a cavalryman does serve on duty, then provide him with a ration of 6 tu of rice and 9 tu of yellow beans per month (note: Also give him fodder (for his horse) If he is not provided with fodder, then raise his monthly allowance by 3 tu)(end note)

(note: In the Sung dynasty, there hu-ma(户马) and pao-ma(保马) laws might seem good in name, but in fact that are not. It was not only used in the hsi-ling(熙宁) period (Shen-tsung, 1068-1078); the Great Ming dynasty also put this into practice, but I fear that it was never a good law. In general the terms of the hu-ma-fa (household horse law) was that they abolished the state grazing fields for horses and g distributed
406, 21:34a) to those families that wanted them, the state horses, at the rate of one horse per family, or the state provide money equivalent to the purchase price (of the horse) (kwan yu chi chih 官與其值) and let the people buy them in the market. In the area around K'ai-feng-fu, there were no more than 3,000 horses, and in the outer routes (provinces), there were no more than 5,000 horses. They deducted amounts for feeding the horses fodder and straw and gave them additional cash and cloth. It was also forbidden for people to ride their horses for more than a distance of 300 li.

The pao-ma-fa 保馬法 was generally the same thing except that they provided that 10 households of grade 3 (san-teng 三等) or higher would form one pao 保; and 10 households of grade 4 or below would form 1 she 社, and if a horse died, (the unit) was supposed to make up for it (compensate for the loss of the horse). If a horse died in the pao households, they would have to make compensation for the horse; if in the she households, they would have to make compensation for half a horse.

In general both systems involved turning over official horses to the people and having them take care of them, registering those alive and those dead, and having them provide the calves (young baby horses). With a system like this, how would it not be bad? (end note)

With regard to infantrymen (pobyong), give them three men as support personnel and divide them up for tours of duty either at the capital or in the provinces at the provincial army commanders' yamen or at the frontier garrisons, and have a basic quota for each (category). (note: Divide all of them into 8 shifts (p'al pon 八番) and rotate them on and off duty every two months. In determining the shifts at the capital or provinces, in each case assign them to units that are close (to their homes). Also set a basic quota for all the district towns and do not permit any changes (transfers). And in determining the order of the tours, use...
use (the men from) one district (to fill the ranks) of one company
(i chon up chon ch' (金足全哨). Do not allow ch'o (companies) to be
selected individually from the districts and do not allow platoons (tae)
to be selected individually from companies, so as to cause confusion
in the basic platoons and squads (tae-o) 

In the two northern provinces, the men will have the sole
responsibility of defending their home province. In Tongnae and other
such places they will have the sole responsibility of defending their
home districts. In the navy headquarters and garrisons in the south,
you already have fixed quotas for sail DDS (sugun). Do not allow soldiers
to be added on for defense.

Only in the case of frontier garrisons where the soldiers in each
district are not sufficient should you combine with them the men from
other districts. Do not allow any changes. If you have everyone serve
at the same place, then both host and guest (commander and troops?) will
get used to one another.

With regard to troops serving in both the capital and in the
provinces on duty, divide the shifts (pon) further into two shifts (un
) which will rotate on and off duty every 5 days. It will also be the
same for sailors (sugun)

With regard to navy and army troops on duty who go on duty in the 5th
or 6th month (who are on duty for 5 or 6 months?), every month their
support persons (pobu) will each provide two days of assistance
in cultivating their fields.) (end note)

I note that in the T'ang dynasty they had a system of varying the
grades of tie on duty (ponsang wonso kunsu
) in
accordance with the distance (a soldier lived from the place where he
served). 500 li was made the standard distance for determining differences
(in tours or shifts). But in our country we have a small territory, and
each man can be assigned for duty at a place that is near to his home.
For that reason all men on duty can be divided into 8 shifts (pa'am pon) and there is no need to vary the number of shifts with the distance that the person lives from the place of duty. (pu punsusu 份殊數).

With regard to those who live in Yongbuk (領北: Hamgyongdo) and such places, those who do live from 500 li to 1,000 li away from the place of duty could be divided into 10 shifts (pon).

At the present time the soldiers who serve on duty at the provincial army commander's yamen shift on and off duty every month. This is an evil of having too many shifts. We ought to unify it at a tour of two months.

(note: In setting the tours of duty for the soldiers, in dealing with the frontier garrisons in all cases we ought to calculate how easy or hard (the duty or burden) is and set it accordingly. In the provincial army commander's yamen for the southern provinces, on one tour of duty you have either 6-700 men or 8-900 men (serving). It would seem appropriate to set a limit at 1,000 men. As for the northwest, we might give additional thought to this and increase the quotas. In the Ch'omsajin and Manhojin of the northwest, even though a home district has quotas of regular troops set for it that are always on call (duty), we also should take into consideration the number of troops available in a given district in making divisions and allocations of service, and only then make additions for outside places (distant places of duty) where soldiers have to serve.

According to the dynastic code, in such strategic places in each province like T'aean (泰安) or Puan (扶安), they are all provided with (permanent) defense troops, and each of them has a standard quota of troops. At the present time, if a garrison already has a regular quota of troops attached to it, and sailors serve on duty to provide against emergencies, it will not be necessary to have additional quotas of army troops, for this would only increase the evils (burdens) on the people. We ought to abolish all (such cases)(end note)

---. With regard to infantrymen, except one of the support personnel,
and when he goes on duty provide him with rice rations (from this deducted amount?) (note: As is done at the present time in the case of the Oyonggun, but just collect rice from one of the support personnel. As for the other two, let them provide (grain) themselves for (of support equipment) (of the soldier on duty).

The monthly ration of rice for a soldier on duty will be 6 tu of rice per man. Deduct the 12 tu of rice collected yearly from one of the support personnel and in accordance with standard regulations, pay it to the soldiers serving either in the capital or in the provincial military commanders' yamen or garrisons at the places where the soldiers are serving in order to provide for their rations, and if the troops on duty go up to the (capital or place of duty) for half a year or a full year (on duty), then there should always be a surplus in terms of what is collected, and you can use this surplus to pay the expenses of holding archery tests, providing awards and banquets etc.

With regard to the place where the direct payment of the transported support-rice equivalents? is made (received) (yu pomi chik-nap ch'o), the local magistrate (pon'gwann) will personally go and supervise the payment. In the place where (the payment) is transported by ship and converted to cloth (chakp'o), then a clerk (saengni) will be designated to take charge of the payment. If it is in the capital, then the granary officials (ch'anggwan) will ask an official of the Ministry of War to supervise the collection. If it is a case of the various garrisons (yongjin), then the local official (chibanggwan) will also supervise the collection.

Regarding the release (payment) of salaries (expenses pangnyo) (to these officials who have helped supervise support cloth tax payments), in the capital the granary official (ch'anggwan) will inspect the Ministry of War's warrant (as proper identification for the salary or
407, 21:35a) expense payment to the ministry of war official). If it takes place in the provinces, then the local official (chibanggwan) every month will personally go and sit together (convene) with (them, the officials involved) and check the names and supervise the release (payment of salaries or expenses).

Of the three support personnel (sambo 三保中), designate one man to collect the rice; or if there is someone among them who wants to serve on rotation in making payment, you may also allow him to do so.) (end note)

With regard to the support-person rice (pobumi 保夫米), within a distance of 100 li, it will be paid directly in rice. If (the payment has to be made) from a distant place, then the towns along the subyon (river, ocean? border) will pay it to the place where the boats are with a deduction for the costs of the boat fee. If they are over 100 li from the water route, and then they will commute the payment to cloth or cash, then deductions will also be made for transportation costs.

. 21:35b)

(indented section)

At the present time even though the on-duty soldiers (pon'gun 黃軍) are given support (kuppo 保給), the number of support personnel (pojong 保丁) is not uniform, and in many cases they are not able to receive (support payments, enough support?). In the case of poor and lazy people, they receive (their cloth support payments?) in advance and then spend it all (yesu yongjin 預收用盡), and then when they go on duty they are all destitute (and without funds), so much so that they either freeze or starve to death. Those who do avoid dying have to borrow funds at monthly interest (in order to live) and then when they return home they sell off their land and oxen in order to repay double or triple the value of the debt. This is the reason why all the duty soldiers are beggars and do not seem human in form.
p.407, 21:35b) There is no better way to save them than this (the above method).

Also, something that did not exist under the old system is the fact that at the present time we have the capital soldiers of the Togam (Togam kyŏngbyŏng) and duty soldiers (of this unit) commonly also have to serve in the capital, so that the number of troops in the capital (Kyŏngsŏng) is extremely large. We ought to establish the system so that the infantry (pobyŏng) are all treated like the soldiers of the present byŏnggun, where except for those on guard duty and those on training there are no evil practice of sending anyone to the various bureaus to perform the duties of slaves. And (we should) abolish the byŏngch'ŏng (御營廳) and have the soldiers of the Five Guards (owibyŏng) together with the Togambyŏng (都監兵) be joined together mutually as inner and outer (aspects of the same entity?) like the system of the Nan-pei-ch'un (南北軍) of the Han dynasty. If we do this, there will be no fear that the soldiers will become emaciated and worn out; the state will then have soldiers that it can use, and the regulations and system will also be regular and without not confused. (note: At the present time the soldiers and people (kunmin) with regard to say that/the soldiers of Chosŏn, only the troops of the byŏnggun alone escape the hell (of military service) and are able to see the light of the sun in Heaven, and with regard to the convenience and goodness of the byŏnggun, how is it different from playing music?" How sad this situation is. With regard to this, there is nothing particularly convenient or good about the byŏnggun. Those soldiers on duty receive rations and the support personnel (pojŏng) just pay rice; they neither have to serve in the sog'o (束伍 units?) nor perform double or triple military service. It is for that reason that the situation is so sad.)
p.407, 21:36a) Some might say that if each of the civil bureaus does not divide up the soldiers and give them work to do, then they won't be missing (lacking) people to run errands (sahwan) and attend offices (sujik)?

To this I would reply that each bureau has its basic fixed quota of runners (pogye), and if the quotas are filled, then this should be sufficient to take care of running errands and standing watch (sahwan, sujik). The practice of use on duty soldiers to substitute for this kind of work is essentially an extremely bad practice that has originated in recent times. (note: What this means is that in recent times the servants (pogye) of each of the bureaus have not been filled and they have had no choice but to add on on-duty soldiers and distribute (them among the bureaus to perform runners and servants tasks). The reason why the quotas of pogye for the bureaus have not been filled is also because the task (responsibility) of pogye is forced on people as personal labor service (sinyökö) and they receive no salaries or rations, and thus all of them run away. It is for this reason that gradually (the posts) have got to the point where they are not filled. If we were to provide superior salaries and give it to the pogye (runners), then as a matter of course (the positions would be) filled. (end note)

We must reform this evil, and only after that will the soldiers avoid having to perform the tasks of slaves, obtain training and military skills; and all the bureaus will also always have the appearance (and substance) of (proper) official offices (government offices) (i.e.--they will look like government offices as they should look).

(note: Some might say that the method of collecting rice (sumi: from the support personnel?) and paying rations (kçmnyoyo: --to the on duty troops) is basically good, but when the official concerned or the bureau involved supervises the payment (of rice), you can't avoid afflicting the people (with corrupt and illicit payments), and the officials also cannot avoid getting involved in a lot of (detailed?) work. The best thing would be to have
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the support personnel privately give (the rice payment) (directly) to the soldiers, and (in this way) both public and private (needs) would be met. This, realize then, is to know that they are one (and the same— that both the soldiers and the support people are all peasants liable to actual service or rice payments??); it is not for them to know (thinking of themselves) as two things (as separate from one another). (此乃知其一，未知其二).

With regard to the calculation of advantages and disadvantages, what is light and what is heavy (in terms of tax burdens?), if you give deep thought to it in accordance with the facts (kōsa simsa chih?), then you will be able to get it (figure out what is the best way to do it, best rate of taxation?)

Also if you discuss the problem in terms of ordinary feelings (sangjōng), then (you will see that) if a support-person (pōn) pays 12 tu of rice, compared to the chuho (主: person who goes on duty?) this will seem light. And if 6 tu of rice is equivalent to 1 p'il of cotton cloth (myōn'ō), this would also seem like a light (tax, levy?). But after several years go by and one repeatedly thinks deeply about it, then in the end they would come to the realization that in the end you cannot change (the system). If you really do change it and gradually cause it so that (the burden) becomes heavier, then all the people will be harmed by it and both the host (chu: person who goes on military service) and the support persons (pōo) will both suffer, and the state will also suffer (from a change).

Some people might say that if a soldiers perhaps goes on military duty wouldn't to a far off place, the support person (pōo) also be required to transport (the soldier's) ration rice (to him)? To this I would reply that (I?) am only talking about the usual (operation) of the system. In general, all the soldiers are given fixed (designated) places where they are to serve on duty, and all of them (should) serve at places close (to where they live). For this reason, if it is done like this, then if a
soldier serves at a faraway place, then the grain in provinces along the coast and the provisions that are maintained for defense can be issued from state granaries and provided to them (the troops). (end note)

Item. With regard to the on-duty service of infantry (pogyông), the before and after the agricultural season? front and rear (guards?) (before and after?) each (serve) for two months.

(note: during the agricultural season (subnote: from the 4th to the 7th months), if they are required to serve on duty, then before and after (the agr. season?) they will serve for three months each) (end note) And they will be exempted from training in their home place (village, district). (note: With regard to infantrymen who go off duty, they also will be tested for talent once every month in their home gup. In the spring and fall, they will assemble at the chin‘gwan (garrison) for training in formation? (sŏpchinsu).

If they are required to go on duty, then before and after (their period of duty) you will designate one month each when they will be exempted from (training) and allowed to rest.) (end note)

Some might say that infantrymen already have the (difficult) duty of serving on regular duty, and that if they are required to go to training and be tested in shooting the bow when they are off duty, then it would seem that they would not avoid excessive (difficult) service. How about this?

To this I would respond that at the present time, with respect to both cavalry and infantry soldiers, both the chu and po (on duty soldiers and support personnel) are concurrently members of sog’o (units). They already because they are (either) regular soldiers go (to perform service) or pay the on-duty cloth levy (nap p’yông) and then return home. And in addition, as (members of the) sog’o (units) every week (10-day week) they are tested and graded, and this is why (the present service system) is regarded as onerous. If once they are given assistance and superior (treatment, pay), and then are also required to train, how could this be regarded as onerous? If after they have served once on duty they are not required to train at all for the rest of the year, they would be
Although we would have soldiers, what use would they be? No matter what the matter (problem) is, you always have to find a middle way (of doing things). If you go too far and do not attain equality (in treatment), then this is a mistake. Compare it to the land (tax) system, where the 10% levy (shipil), is the best method in the world (ch'unha chi chungjong). Anybody who would raise the (land tax) to a rate higher than 10% would be (like the bad last emperor) Chieh (桀); and anybody who would lower it to something less than 10% would be like Lo? (洛).

Item. Troops of the sog'o units (sog'ogun) will be designated from among the official and private slaves (long-sach'on) and they will be given a support unit (po) of one man (ilpu). It is just that they will be required to train at the place where they live and will not be required to stand for regular duty (ipp'on).

(note: In general, if a person who enters the sog'o (units) is a public slave (kongch'on), then in accordance with present practice he will be completely exempted from personal tribute (sin'gong). If he is a private slave, then 1 p'il (of his personal tribute obligation?) will be reduced. The same goes for the pobu (support person).)(end note)

Some might say that at the present time a very large number of men have been designated for service as sog'ogun (troops of sog'o units) and that this had thrown the tax system into confusion. So even if my land system cannot be carried out, clear regulations should be established for the sog'o (system). If we make an exception of court officials (chogwan), passers of the munkwa and mukwa, students in schools (hakkyosaeng), and those people who have to perform household services in the Naegümwi (內衛署), and those people who are the sole slaves (of a family? tanno), and require everyone else to be enrolled in (the sog'o units), then there will probably be no evils (problems) for people to complain (to the king) about.