To this I would reply that this is also a matter that is to be taken care of after (my) land system is carried out. If not, then in the end there will be no way to do it (malyu末由未如生) like this.

In general, the searching out of able bodied men (for military service) (suhwal injŏng搜括人丁) is a great evil in the world. Great disruption and great chicanery are both the result of this. Even though one might want to standardize it, there is no way to do so. Even an official of xxga divine intelligence would also not know what to do.

Once there is error in the root (of the system), then from the soldiers and local gentry all the way to the court nobles, or from the clerks and runners and local magistrates all the way to the generals (ch'ongsu興師), at every juncture along the way there is room for people to entertain their private desires (requests for payoffs? yongsa chi chi). There is no principle (way) in the world that once you have opened the path to corruption (extortion, kan奴女), that you can desire to close off that corruption, and this is why the evil of requests for favors (ch'ŏngt'ak請托) and bribery spreads all over the earth and reaches the heavens. If you want to try looking at (the situation at)

the present day, you do not have to wait for words (an explanation) to understand. /If the situation arises from xxmitching that doesn't have to be that way and one were really able to carry out a thoroughgoing uniform system (hoeg'iluniform system), (the fact remains that) it is difficult to make uniform the number of people needed for household service (kanae angyŏk). And also reform of the military service system alone? is not the way by which one equalizes the differences between poverty and wealth (xxxx), fixes the will of the people (chŏng minji聲民志), distinguishes between the outstanding and the ignorant people (pyŏl hyŏn-u人民愚賢), or distinguishes between the (truly) noble and the base (pyŏn kwich'ŏn辨貴賤).

Generally speaking, if the land system is enacted (chŏnje haeng田制行), then the main lines (of the social system) will have been taken care of and...
military system

and all matters will be taken care of very smoothly (favorably) and very easily. But if the land system is not carried out, then the grand outline of society (taegang) will be in confusion, and all matters will become contrary and very difficult. So how could it not be carried out because it is troublesome (difficult to do)? To discuss government outside of this is not something of which I would dare have knowledge. (This is the only way things can be done, as far as I know)

Some people might say that there are a lot of categories and types of soldiers, and that even though you were to eliminate all of them, you still could not avoid having such categories as cavalry (kibyong), infantry (pobyong), and sog'ogun. How about that?

To this I would reply that in organizing the soldiers (military), the best thing would be just to stop with preserving the two categories of cavalry and infantry. It is only that the slave law has not yet been changed, so that you have no choice but to keep (the slaves) separate (in terms of military service)

Someone might also say, how about having everyone serve as regular soldiers in the cavalry or infantry irrespective of whether they are commoners or slaves (yangch'ong). To this I would reply that if everyone is a regular soldier, then you ought to form units where everyone is a member of it. But if you first mix people (of different social status together) prior to reforming the slave law, there will be no limit to the bother that you will have with regard to the obstruction of both public and private (interests, affairs) or the harm done from violations of status (pombun: people overstepping the limits of their status) and confusion of systems.

Some might say that with regard to the fact that private slaves are members of the sog'o (units), that even though you eliminate their personal tribute payments (sin'gong), compared to the regular troops (chongbyong i.e. commoner soldiers?), they would (the slaves) still have excessive burdens. How about that?
To this I would reply that this is also the result of the fact that the slave law has not been abolished. If a slave is not required to perform military service and does not receive land, then that is all there is to it. If it is not done that way, then there is no other way to do it.

Under the old system of this dynasty, slaves (ch’ón’in), slaves were not required to perform military service. Then the number of slaves gradually became large (numerous) and the situation gradually became difficult (desperate—the state needed men for military service), so that at the present time we have the sog’o law (which requires that slaves perform military service in separate units) (note: It began from the time of the imjin wars) (end note) In the Koryó dynasty, even though there were slaves (ch’ón’gu), they did not receive land under the law. Not only was this inappropriate, but also the situation was such that they could not carry out (a land distribution law or system that would provide land grants to slaves). (note: The reason it was this way was because even though slaves were people who basically were used to perform duties (service) in the same household (tongho), in this country we also had “outside resident” slaves who established separate households (away from the master’s family) (oegŏ pyŏkja), all of whom were also slaves.) (end note) How much worse is the situation at the present time when 80-90% of the (population) are slaves (ch’ón’in) and scarcely 10-20% are commoners. If you abandon the slaves (for the purpose of military service), then the state will not have any people (it can control). If you have not abolished slavery, and yet still have no choice but to require (that slaves) perform military service without having received a land grant (pudak pusu chon ch’ulpyŏng), then even though (their burdens) are lighter than what they were in the past, you still won’t be able to avoid putting excessive burdens on them. This is just the way the situation is and there is nothing you can do about it.

Some might ask, why can’t you abolish the slave law?
I would reply, How sad this is! I cannot answer this question easily. In general, if it is not right for punishment to be extended to the descendants of those guilty of crime, how much less so (is it right to punish) the innocent? All (of these slaves) are the same as people whom Heaven (nature) has (born), but even a person who is ignorant and really base still has the power to control the life or death of another person (hok muji ch'ŏnbi i che in samyŏng crop), and even though someone of outstanding talent may appear among them, they still cannot avoid having to perform service for someone else, such as the slave law of our country. How could this be in conformity with the way of ultimate fairness (good) of Heaven and Earth (ch'ŏnji chigong chi to 天地至公之道)? (i.e. How could this be in accordance with the great goodness of nature's laws?) The cultivation (nurturing) of princely men of virtue (ch'ın-tzu) and distinguishing small (amoral) men and good ones is also a principle of both ancient and contemporary times that cannot be abandoned. In ancient times when they granted someone a fief (ponggon ch'aeji 封妻納地), the hsiang-ta-fu (郞中大夫: local officials, gentry) were not afraid that there would be no one to take care of it, and at the present time in China they have the custom of using hired laborers to perform labor service (yongyŏk kogong chi sok 僱役雇工之俗), and for that reason the families of the shih-fu (士夫: scholars, gentry) also have people they (can use) to substitute for them in labor (service).

As for this country, this law has been in practice for a long time, and it has become an old custom. The taebu-sa (ta-fu-shih) all rely on it (depend on it), and their families necessarily (must) give thought to what they must do to protect their families, and only after that may they consider reforming (something). If they do not do so, and if one day there is a sudden reform, then there will be great difficulties in handling it. And this is the reason why I cannot give an easy answer to the question.
Then (someone would) say: All right then, what can be done about it? To this I would reply: Government must be in accordance with the times (ch'ŏng pi ān si 政必因時). In making plans (policy) at the present time, we ought to follow the present matrilineal status inheritance law (chongmobop 從母法) and use it equally (uniformly) to all commoner nimek (yangnyŏng良女) (Note: that is commoner wives of slaves) (end note) and make sure there is a uniform law (that applies to all cases, everyone). In addition to this we also have laws providing for xianxián appointments (of men to office?) (sangt'ak (dictionary has t'aksang 賞搗) as a reward, nor should we abandon people of merit and ability (among the slaves) (note: as in the case of those who have (earned) military merit or those who have scored highest several times in a row in the shooting contests, if they are public slaves (kongch'on) they should be immediately manumitted (chingmyŏn 直免); and if they are private slaves (sach'on) they should either be allowed to provide a substitute (kuptae) or to obtain manumission by payment of a fee (ka hŏ ki myŏnch'ŏn) (end note) If we do things like this, then the evils (resulting from slavery) would not be as bad as they are today. If the number of slaves decreased, then the number of hired laborers (konggong 僱工) would gradually increase, and those at the top and the bottom (of the social order) would both gradually be benefitted, and our customs would gradually undergo change (so that) the law used in China could be adopted and put into practice. (Note: Even though there is slavery in China, xiănxianxiăn all of them were enslaved because of crimes (i ch'ŏe morip 以罪沒入) or people who have sold themselves to be (indentured) laborers (chamae wi yongja 自賣為僱) and that is all. They have no law providing for families to inherit slave status generation after generation.) (end note) (And if we do things like this) then the government of the three kings could also be accomplished. For more details on this see the section devoted to slavery (nobi).
Some might say that if one soldier is to be furnished for every 4 kyŏng of land, then every chŏn ought to furnish one soldier? To this I would reply: If we did it like this, it would be extremely good. It is only that there are discrepancies in the amounts received by those who receive land, so that the situation is such that you cannot be too rigid. If you settle one 1 chŏnja as the basis for furnishing one soldier, then you must be sure that no mistake is made within the same village (in requiring military service), and that is all.

Some (might) say that the types of military service for commoners and slaves is different for each. With regard to the three support personnel provided for a regular soldier (chŏngbyŏng), how would it be if among these three one of them were a slave, who would receive land in place of a commoner? To this I would respond that with regard to the households and support personnel of the commoners and slaves, there is a proper way to deal with each of them in accordance with their category (type). And if there should be a case where a commoner from a distant village has been taken to be a support person (for a soldier on duty), then it would be all right to take a slave (from the same village of the) regular soldier and use him as a support person. Generally speaking, if someone has land at one place, then at the present time it is regarded as sabu-jŏn: scholar land. If later on a substitution is made (and the land is transferred to) either a commoner or slave, then you cannot be too rigid in sticking to the rules (it's OK to do this). Furthermore, you ought to be able to adjust to the circumstances. If there should be a case where an individual is exempted from military service, or there is a change in the military rosters affecting either a regular soldier (chŏngbyŏng) or a sog'ŏ(gun) (slave member of the sog'ogun units), then you should wait for the triennial examination year to change or rectify (the rosters). It is only
military system -96- pyŏngje

p.409, 21:39b) that with regard to the troop units (taeo*** ) and the on-duty households and their support personnel (hobon*** ), you should always make sure that no errors are made with respect to the order of the local villages (within the local villages)(hyangni*** ).(end note)

(also note:) one might/say that since private slaves are already required to perform military service in sog'o (units), you should not allow their masters (chu*** ) to seize control over them (and take them away) arbitrarily, isn't it? To this I would reply that this (statement) is not any different from the way the present law works. Under the present law, with regard to the sog'ogun (and the local soldiers (t'obyŏng*** ) of each of the garrisons, their masters (chu*** ) are not able to arbitrarily take them away (from military service, chokkŏ*** ).(end note)

21:40a) --. Item. Every month soldiers (kunsa*** ) will be tested for talent twice a month in their home up (district towns). (note: Cavalry, infantry, and sog'ogun will before and after the 15th day of the month be examined for talent one time each (twice a month). Infantrymen who have gone off duty will be (tested) once a month (subnote: those who are due to go on duty will have time off before and after they go on duty (be excused from these /for regulations see above; ūkkŏ*** same as for sŏpcho training) tests?))(end subnote) In the sŏpcho (training?) month and in the 12th month the cavalry, infantry, and sog'ogun monthly examinations will be suspended for one exam; between the 4th and 7th months training for infantrymen will be suspended.)(end note)

At the spring and autumn meetings at the garrisons (chin'gwŏn*** ), training will be carried out (sŏpcho*** ) (note: At every training session all will go--the cavalry, infantry, and sog'ogun; infantrymen off duty will also go) end note).

The on-duty soldiers in the capital and provinces will be tested for talent twice a month, in the first and last 10-day weeks of the month, and in the middle ten-day week they will undergo graining (sŏpcho...).
military system -9997- pyongje

p.409. 21:40a) (note: In the 6th and 12th months suspend bivouac training (supchin 習陣); just test them once for talent(skill). With regard to troops on duty in the capital, those of them who are about to go on duty will not participate in testing or training. (subnote: at the present time they orders may be issued from the palace to test skills)(end subnote)

In those garrisons (chin) where the number of soldiers is small, and in the naval soldiers garrisons, tests of skills will be conducted in all three of the 10-day weeks.

With regard to the soldiers on duty in the capital and provinces, outside of the tests held every 10-day week, from time to time there will be private training, and the commanding officer will from time to time examine them.

With regard to naval soldiers who are off duty, an examination of skill will be conducted once a month of those who are attached to a garrison.

From the 4th to the 7th months, and in the 12th month, (these examinations) will be suspended. Also there will be no tests held for the months preceding an following the time when a man is supposed to go on duty.(subnote: If a man is supposed to go on duty during the agricultural season, then he may also be exempted for 3 months)(end subnote)

Those people already on duty but who are also required to go for naval training will be exempted for one year from the tests for talent (skills). For details see the section under sugun (naval soldiers)

Generally speaking, if a person exempted from examinations wants to be tested, then this should be allowed; the same goes whether they are naval or land soldiers.)(end note)

Indented note: With regard to soldiers in the chu and kun, noone can be examined twice in one month. Examinations conducted during training, and examinations held when the provincial governor, prov. army or naval commanders or secret sensors come around, may also be calculated as one of the required examinations (of skill).)(end note)
those people who score highest in the tests for talent will be recommended for rewards. (note: select several men who are the best and calculate what they should be awarded and give it to them in degrees.) (end note)

The worst of them should be recommended for punishment. (note: in giving out punishment, it also should be done by degrees. Give them anywhere from 5 to 2 or less strokes with the stick. Any cavalrymen who doesn't know how to ride a horse should also be punished and changed (to different duty?).) (end note)

In testing people every 10 days or every 15 days, do it in the first every 10-day week or the first 15-day period. If you test people on the first day of the month, then do it on the first day of the month. (note: The ones who should be tested at 10-day or 15-day intervals are the naval and land on-duty troops -- the cavalry, infantry, and sog'o gun. Those who should be tested once a month are the off-duty land and naval troops. At times when the provincial governor, or provincial army and navy commanders come on their rounds and tests are held, then you should not be restricted by these schedules; you must carry out rewards and punishments.) (end note)

Anyone who places first five times (note: keep a ledger for each examination.) For places where the number of troops in a garrison is small, then set limits at 7 or 10 times (placing first), then each garrison or district garrison will especially appoint these men to fill the post of kun'gwan.

In the case of those who are on duty, then transfer their names and have them fill the posts of kun'gwan in their district town (up). (note: Even though there may be enough kun'gwan in their home places, you should still give them a special appointment) (end note)

As for those people with some knowledge who are qualified to be officers, selected them and memorialize (t'ae kye). (note: Observe what kind of people they are and test their writing skills), as in the case of the two guards. Only then should you memorialize the throne (kyemun).

And in accordance with what is appropriate appoint them to office.
military system -99- pyŏngje

p.409, 21:40b) If they happen to be public or private slaves, then memorialize their names and give special permission for their manumission from slave status (myŏnch'ŏn 免賜). (note: If they are private slaves, then find substitutes for them from among the slaves of the civil bureaus (kaksa nobi kŭp ki tae 怪事牛皮替) or provide a price of 20 p'il of cloth (to their masters?).) (end note)

-- Item. Regarding providing banquets for soldiers (hogun 食軍) in the case of on-duty soldiers in the capital guards (kyŏngwi) and in the yŏng and chin (yŏng: governors' or provincial army or navy commanders' yamen) or (chin: district garrisons), then do so in the last month of their duty. (note: Those troops on duty are all on duty?) for 2 months)(end note)

p.410, 21:41a) After they receive training (sŏpch'ŏn 訓練) provide a banquet for them. As for the troops in each of the district towns and in the provincial navy commander's yamen and garrisons, in all cases after they receive training in the spring and fall provide a banquet for them. With regard to banquet in honor of the grant of rewards, in the case of the capital guards and the yŏng and chin, then use the rice and cloth left over from soldier's rations (provisions). In the case of the suyŏng-jin (provincial navy commander's yamen and garrisons), then use the tax revenues from the kunjabŏn(軍稼田: military provision land) to pay for this. Deduct the amounts from the home district town's account (kyŏngbi hoegam 源経會賑). (note: The same applies to expenses involved in giving out rewards when the provincial governors and army and navy commanders make the rounds and tests are conducted and rewards given (to talented soldiers). If there is not enough, then you can take the rice and cash of the ever-normal (granaries) or miscellaneous taxes and deduct it (from accounts). If the grain loan system (nwansang) has not yet been abolished, then you can also use the mogok (interest charges) to provide for these expenses.)(end note)

Every time a banquet is held, then as a standard you should provide 5 tu of rice for each of the 10 soldiers (banqueted) and pay this out.

(note: It would be best to have a banquet after training is held, but with regard to the soldiers of every district town, it would be difficult to...
p.410. 21:41a) do this for all of them on a rotation basis; it would be best to send them back to their home district towns and do it.)(end note)

--- Item. With regard to the regularly scheduled tests of talent it will be necessary to provide for expenses involved in providing awards for grades received in shooting arrows and guns (sapp'okbok). In the case of the capital guards, submit a memorial to the throne every month, and in the case of the district towns and garrisons, do it four times a year and report to the Chöltisa. (note: In the case of reports made four times a year, then prior to the first day of the month of the four seasons report (on what has taken place) in the previous 3 months. With regard to the district towns, there will be no reports for the 3 months of the summer season)(end note) The Chöltisa will also prepare the amounts for his own garrison (headquarters) and submit a memorial to the throne. (note: After the throne is memorialized, in all cases notice will be sent down to the Ministry of War.)(end note)

21:41b) (indentation) Some might say that the expenses involved for holding banquest for troops as a reward for them is too costly; how can you recommend awards every time (there is a test) or hold a banquet every time? To this I would reply that even though the expenses involved might be large in all cases there is a place(source) from which (expenses) will come, and in each case it can be paid for. Furthermore, when you are talking about giving rewards, how could it be that everyone would get a reward? You only give rewards to the best people, and that is all. If you have tested men of talent, you cannot help but encourage them. And when it comes to providing banquets for them, this is even less to be neglected. If you happen to have a bad crop year, then even military training and other matters would also be suspended, so there is no need to discuss holding banquets (for the soldiers--i.e. these would naturally be suspended, too).

(indented note: Some might say that the material (food, funds) for the rewards and banquest for the Five Guards and the various yông and chin (provincial yamen and garrisons) all come from the rice and cloth paid by the
military system

As for the yōng and chin in the provinces, naturally they constitute a single agency, and granaries will definitely exist in those places (where they are). As for the capital guards, there are 5 yamen, and if you divide them into five granaries and each takes charge of receiving (funds) and paying out (expenses), there will be too much dividing up in handling affairs. If they are combined together into a comprehensive granary (toch'ang) and the granary official makes disbursements and receives (payments), then when the time comes to provide rewards and other matters, you also will not be able to avoid constraints (and stagnation) and inconveniences. How about this?

To this I would reply that if you combine (their funds) into a single granary and have separate officials in charge of them, then when you release provisions the soldiers of each of the guards every month may all go to the granary to receive (rations). If it is a question of funds for rewards and banquets then the Ministry of War can make calculations and divide up the basic quotas either the first day of every season (4 times a year) or in spring and summer and issue funds in advance for the convenience of each of the guards, and it can also prepare a report of the sums involved and memorialize it to the throne and make a report for the ministry of war.) (end note)

21:42a

Procedure for examination of (military) talent sikchae-sik (have an examination) for each of the different skills. Rely on the Chi-hsiao hsin-shu in doing it. It is just that in the case of cavalry, have them shoot 5 arrows, and in the case of infantry (pobyŏng), then the p'osu(:cannoneers?) and chot'ong(:musketeers) will fire three shots, and the bowmen (sasu) will fire 5 arrows from a standing position.

Also, it makes no difference what kind of troops are involved, but if someone wants to take a written test, allow him to do so. (Note, let him choose a text from the Chi-hsiao hsin-shu ch'ul'h-yao, the Four Books, and the Military classics (wu-ching ssu-shu). In this case there will be no punishments if the man fails the test.) (end note)
Military system

p.410, 21:42a) Indented section (probably Yu Hyŏng-wŏn's comments): In our country in the past we did not have muskets (fowling pieces, chot'ong nan); they have been passed down to us since the time of the Imjin (Hideyoshi's) invasions. Opinion at the time held that the training of troops was wrong (if Korea were to adopt muskets), and moreover that our customs were different and that fowling pieces were not suitable to our country, and that they were of no value in warfare. Yu Cho-in submitted a private memorial in which he argued his views strongly (his extreme opinions), and he also said that private slaves could not be soldiers. The matter was handed down to the Myŏndang and the minister, Yu Song-nyong stated his views that: "Even though we are skilled in the use of the bow and arrow in our country, still the bow and arrow (can only hit a target) that is several dozen paces away, while the musket (fowling piece) can hit a target at a distance of several hundred paces. The advantages of the musket are not to be compared to the bow and arrow. And when the soldiers are lined up against the enemy ranks, our arrows don't reach the enemy while their musket balls rain down on us. In that kind of situation, even if we had generals like Han Hsin (general of the founding of the Former Han dynasty) or Pai Chi, we still would not be able to match them (stand up to them). If you think that the world is divided up into geographical regions, that the talents and skills of each are different, and those of one (region) cannot be understood by another, then how do you explain how the armored soldiers of the state of Wu (Wu chih-tso) learned from the state of Ch'u her method of fighting on chariots and in the end was able to subjugate Ch'u? Even if one does not talk about remote examples, in recent times in China they did not have fowling pieces (muskets); they first learned about their method (about them) from Chekiang the Wako pirates in Chekiang province. Chi Hui-kwang trained troops (in their use) for several years until they became one of the skills of the Chinese who subsequently used them to defeat the Japanese (wa).
military system -103- pyŏngje

p.410, 21:42b) If you look at it from this (point of view), then there is not much difference between the human nature (of different people, people from different areas); it is just that their customs are different, and that is all. And I have never heard it said that something could not be accomplished just because of someone's customs (sŏpkwan i misŏngja pi sin chi somun ya). If you look at it from this (point of view), then there is not much difference between the human nature (of different people, people from different areas); it is just that their customs are different, and that is all. And I have never heard it said that something could not be accomplished just because of someone's customs (sŏpkwan i misŏngja pi sin chi somun ya). His statement that "the silk-clad (yangban, officials)" and the general public (ganghwa) all regard the musketeers (p'osalsu) as something to be laughed at, is really true.

In general human nature (injŏng) is such that it becomes familiar with (used to, nagun) what is easy (anma) and customs become chronically used to repetitious habits (sŏngt'ae). In this time of crisis we prefer to use the lowly views of former days to disparage and criticize (new) and creative opinions. All sorts of worthless views are floating around and a ruckus is made in the capital and provinces. A hundred means are used to obstruct (progress). Meanwhile people who are (supposed to have) some knowledge of things, on the contrary beat the drum and stir up waves in aid of their own influence. Is this right?

Our country never looked to stir up trouble with the Japanese. In particular our military system is not in good condition and our rules and regulations (kigang) are in a state of confusion; our weapons and tools are not sharpened (in good condition), and our (military) ranks are not well ordered, and our pledges (promises? yaksok) are not clear. Our soldiers do not hear the beat of the metal drums, nor can they distinguish the (unit) banners with their eyes. They don't know what it means to sit (in wait) or to stand, to attack or to thrust (stab), and when all of a sudden they meet with a powerful enemy, the officers don't know their officers, and the troops don't know their officers, and they are broken up like clods of earth and smashed like (fragile) tiles.
military system -104- pyŏngje

411, 21:43a) In a situation like this where at present (our forces) have been destroyed we should take warning from what has happened in the past and carry out a thorough renovation of what has been destroyed. Rulers and subjects, those above and those below should think hard day and night (pusim chuya) of ways by which they can take revenge on their enemies and wipe out the shame. We should also reflect on what was said, that "the training of troops (and weapons) are not an urgent matter" and see that this stems from a lack of understanding of the situation (of affairs).

evil practice of

21:43b) When it comes to the problem of making soldiers out of private slaves, if you talk about this in terms of the customs of recent times, then truly 'people have spoken in this way. If you discuss the question in terms of what is just and fair in the world (ch'ŏnha konggong chi li), could it be that only private slaves are not (part of) the people of our country? Our country is basically a very small (country), and within it is divided into yangban and commoners (kikan pun wi yangban sang'in). There is a difference between noble and base (people in our society), but the so-called private slaves (sach'ŏn) have become more numerous by the day and the month and (are counted by) the thousands and ten thousands. Not one of them is liable for (military) service, but the burdens on the commoners (yangmin) for military service and taxation is so onerous that they cannot make a living. More and more of them have absconded and scattered so that the people in the capital and countryside have all ended up (as slaves) in the private homes of families. Every (private) family is supported (by slaves and servants) in the manner of dukes and marquises, but the government offices have no one at all (to serve in them), and it was for this reason that former worthy men also wanted to carry out laws for the limitation of landholdings (hanjŏn) and the limitation of (the number of) slaves (that could be owned) (han nobi). They were indeed farsighted.

At the present time the altars of earth and grain (sajik--the country) is laid
waste (empty) p.411, 21:43b) and the people are all gone (dead), and there is no way by which plans can be made for the state. If you gather together several hundred or thousand troops with the idea that you are going to train them to defend against the enemy, try to hurriedly patch things together so that your worries and concerns fill up your eyes, then men of will would be moved to tears. But there are those ignorant people who have from time to time in the past not liked the idea (fact) that their slaves and servants have been used for other duties and have raised a lot of fuss and objections without any restraint. These people are the worst example of those who only follow their own interests (thoughts, desires) and give no thought to problems (affairs) of their country.

If you say that a slave cannot serve as an official, then what about Wei Ch'ing  hậu sinh (of the Han dynasty (Pyongyang, vol.4, p.398--fought 7 times against the Hsiung-nu and won every battle, was made a Ta-assu-ma) who who had been a slave (nokobokun) and Chin Erh-tan (Kim Il-tan? ) who was active as (Kim Il-tan? ) who as a prisoner of war. I have never heard that anyone in later ages ever criticized them. Furthermore, why was it that these men were praised for their great talents?

During the time of the Three Kingdoms our country was divided into three parts, Koguryō alone had the northwestern part and during the Sui and T'ang invasions the towns (walled towns) such as Liao-tung, Paeg'an, and Ansi all had 20-30,000 troops. And Ko Yŏn-su( ) and Ko Hye-jin( ) (Ko Yŏn-su defended Ansi against the T'ang in 645 AD; Ko Hye-jin also a commander of the defeated Koguryō army vs. the T'ang in 645) saved Ansi with an army of 150,000 troops. During Koryŏ times, Yun Kwan-fu fought with 0 Yŏn-ch'ong( ) and defeated the Eastern Mū-chen and built 9 walled towns) defeated the Mū-chen. And Kang Kang Ch'ŏl( expelled the Khitan. All of them had 200,000 troops. But in our dynasty,
since the time of our founding fathers even though we sent out armies into the field that were very great, they were no more than 10,000 or more troops. This was because we had undergone a long period of decline and had become weak; it was not something that was caused in one day.

When you meet up with an unusual incident and do not make plans to adjust to the situation and save the situation but simply have to say that "old customs cannot be changed" and "we can't go against the feelings of the masses", this is the same as trying to cross a river with wooden shoes. This is a problem you can discuss with knowledgeable men, but not one with people mired in custom.

Sonjo followed this advice and did not obstruct the (use of) muskets. He subsequently saw to it that everyone became skilled (in its use). And he also organized those private slaves who lived in a place different from their masters into military units which were called, "sog'ogun".

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Item. In the springtime the soldiers are in accordance with regulations to undergo training (supcho), and in the fall they are also to serve as beaters in the game reserves to drive out the game (t'awon). (note: This practice will also be limited to one day. It is just that the study of military arts is the main task. If it is more than one day, then even though no game are caught they will break camp and rewards and punishments will be given out the same as in training bivouac (supchin). There ought to be ceremonies for this. Naval troops (sugun) will not do this.

I note that at the present time in training camp (supchin), even though everyone receives training in sitting and standing (chakcho), advancing and retreating, there are no real results produced in terms of examining them for shooting the bow and riding horses. If the soldiers are used in the hunt (t'awon), then their operations will fit the circumstances (chjak chwajak happyon) and naturally all of them will be trained and they will receive actual training in using their minds to shoot and ride horses.
In addition you can take what they catch and use it for conducting ritual sacrifice and banqueting and meeting official expenses or providing reward banquets and thus cut down on the people's expenses. The way the people of ancient times were sincere in everything they did and saw to it that both the root and branch were done well (taken care of) was just like this. At the present time, even though we are not able to completely (do things) (just) like the ancient systems, that is train and hunt during the four seasons of the year (in a hunting economy?), we can conduct training twice in both spring and summer, and during the spring we can do things in accordance with present regulations, and in the fall, then we can also conduct a hunt (t'awŏn), which will be extremely good, extremely good. And we if we cannot do it (as frequently as this), then even though we carry (out a hunt) once every other year, it still would be all right. In later ages (huse: after the decline from grace of ancient times?), those above and those below lost trust (~ in each other), and with respect to all kinds of affairs they only paid respect to empty (worthless) writings (written laws, regulations). With regard to military training (sŭpchin), then among the military laws of the present time there are some things that are extremely good, but if you compare them with ancient times, then (you can see) that we have not (been able) to avoid "empty written" (worthless regulations). This was the reason why China, on the contrary, came under the control of the barbarians. How sad! (end note)

(indented section) If we are to do things like this, then we ought to select mountainous (areas) and (high) plains which are suitable places and establish parks (yu 国). In the Mencius (there is mention of) the park of Wen-wang (文王) and the park of King Hsüan of Ch'î (齊宣王). In the Spring and Autumn Annals (Ch'un-ch'iu chüan) there is (mention of) the Teng yîan yu(鄭原圃) and the Ch'in chî yu (秦具圃), all of which are examples of this (what I'm talking about).
are located we should select places in the mountains, forests, plains and woodlands that are not suitable for cultivation and set up boundaries around them and not prohibit people from cutting trees, grazing (cattle), walking around, or hunting. As for the hunt (t'awŏn 打圍), it just takes the place of military training (sŭpchin) and testing people in shooting the bow and arrow and riding (horses), and that is all.

One should be careful not to use falcon masters (鷹師) or net-men (nets, in catching fish?) lest by this means you open up (the way) to the evil of unrestrained hunting (poaching?). (You should first) regulate the setting up of camp (bivouac), and only after that form groups, combine them and surround (the game?), and then you let the cavalry and infantry (go) and kill or capture (the game). The hunt should be called off after a day, and the next day, in accordance with present regulations, examine the men in shooting the bow, then hold a banquet for them and give them rewards, and then release the troops (send them home) (end note)

--- Training Regulations (choryŏn kyuje 操練規制)
(note: See the Chi-hsiao hsin-shu shui-chao? chi-chih? which is also like this) (end note)

--- Item (1) With regard to naval troops (sugun 水軍), you must allocate and assign (naval duty) to the men who live in the vicinity of base garrisons (ponjin 给保三夫) along the seacoast. (For every man on naval duty) grant him 3 support personnel (kŏppo sambu 给保三夫), each of whom will be divided up into tours of duty to assume responsibilities for defense (punbŏn ippang) at the garrison to which they are attached. (note: generally speaking, naval service must be allocated among residents of the seacoast. In general, irrespective of whether there are many or few land soldiers (soldiers) in seacoast towns, only after you fill the quotas for navy soldiers in places where there are yŏng (prov. navy commanders' hdqs) or chin (garrisons)
military system -109- pyŏngje

42. 21:45b) should you then make army soldiers out of the people left over. If it should happen that there are not enough people in the coastal towns, then you can designate (people) from neighboring towns along the coast. At the present time, naval soldiers have been living for a long time in the mountainous areas and they have become settled there so that with regard to those whose residences cannot be moved, they can exchange duty from naval service to army service (with those people living along the coast). Those people who can be moved, can be changed and assigned to the barrisons in their home area. As for the chinmu or chinsok: low ranking naval soldiers), let them receive land grants from the area near the garrison and let them reside near the garrison. The same shall apply to grain transport sailors.)(end note)

Indented section: At the present time the sailor soldiers who live in mountainous districts and army soldiers who reside along the seacoast are all aware of the fact that they types of duty they should be performing should be changed, but the grain transport sailors and the naval soldiers have come to hold their duties hereditarily, and this has become an obstacle (to good planning). The practice of hereditary performance of military duties is basically a bad law. Even though these tasks have become hereditary, in fact there is no reason why they cannot be changed. It is only that the people in charge of affairs see the harm done to the state and the people (as somebody else's responsibility), and they have not yet done anything about it.

At the present time, under the law, the sugun (naval soldiers) and the grains transport sailors (chosok) are not allowed to take the examinations. This is a law that is greatly in error. (The exams) should be based only on a person's talent, and that is all. How could it be proper that the route to the examinations for any man should be blocked off? ( ). (The grain transport sailors) should be treated the same as the cavalry and infantry
and all ought to be allowed to take the examinations and be selected
(for office). With regard to the grain transport sailors, it also
should be carried out according to this (with respect to them, too).

--- Item (2) With regard to the naval soldiers (sugun), you should divide
up the basic quotas of men for each of the yǒng (provincial naval commanders's
hdqs) and the chin (garrisons) into two shifts ḍun (運), and each of
these shifts should be divided into three groups (sambǒn 三番 :three
duty shifts), and the number of men to be designated to stand on duty
will depend on whether the wind is calm or high (strong). (note: for
details, see below)(end note)

--- Item (3) With regard to the naval soldiers, you also will exempt one of
the support personnel and collect rice from him, and when a man stands
for duty (ippǒn 立番 ), then give him rations. The official (govt)
will provide the expenses for constructing ships. (note: Whether for the
new construction of or repair of troop ships, in all cases the officials will
provide the cost of expenses. All weapons will be paid for out of the
revenues from kunjajǒn (軍費田 :military provision land). As for
what the garrison commanders consume, all of this is to be provided for
by regular salaries. As for the amounts involved in the expenses of building
ships, see below.)(end note)

--- Item (4) Able oarsmen will also be recruited from among official
and private slaves residing nearby coastal garrisons, and they will not
be provided with support personnel. (note: Each kyǒng of land will furnish
one man (oarsman)(end note) In the case of those whose sole occupation
is involved with making profits from the sea (fishermen?), that is men
who will not receive land grants, then irrespective of whether they are
commoners or slaves, for every two men, one man will be selected (to be
an oarsman). (note: Take one man (the other man) to be a support person
who every year will pay 6 tu of rice or 1 p'il of cloth to assist (the
man on duty). If there is an intercalary month, then add on another 5 sǔng of rice
(end note)
If (a man) does not stand for duty and is not tested for talent, then just have him go for naval training once a year. (note: Do not provide him with military equipment, but just have the garrison commander (chinjang) look him over (check him out) once in the spring and fall.)

(indented note: With regard to people who live along the seacoast, commonly many of them are exclusively engaged in fishing or salt manufacture and do not cultivate the land. Generally speaking this is because they can earn their livings from the sea, and only secondarily (do they) cultivate the land (do they earn their living) from the land)

21:46b) In accordance with a proposal from the Ministry of War in the 5th year of Sejo's reign, these were small troop ships, very fast in speed, which were used for capturing pirates. Another name for them was kodoson  and pigodoson are not included in this figures)

The number of naval soldiers (sugun) was 48,800 men divided into two tours of duty (pön) which were mutually shifted on rotation. (note: every man was provided with three support personnel)

At the present time this system has been abandoned and now no longer exists. There are now only a few naval soldiers that exist. They are combined into groups of three men and provided with one support person. (note: Even though in name they are provided with one support person, (in fact) this support person also together with the main household that serves on duty (chuho) pay cloth, and for this reason there is nothing with which to support the man on duty.)
The only thing that is done (at present) is that land soldiers serve on rotation (as sailors) and are added on for duty on defense. (note: The provincial army commanders (pyŏngsa) divides up the troops into three shifts of duty (pŏn), and the men change shifts once every month, but the soldiers have no (fixed) place to which they are assigned. Nevertheless, they are also (treated) the same as naval soldiers (sugun) insofar as that cloth is collected from the total quota of men and no one actually serves on duty on defense. Moreover, if there should be an incident where the provincial army commander has to command these soldiers, then there is not even one man to serve in each of the garrisons, and if each of the garrisons have to command these troops, then the provincial army commanders (pyŏngsa) do not have any of these soldiers.) (end note)

The garrisons commanders of large and small garrisons calculate (the number of) names (of men on duty as soldiers, sailors?) and collect cloth from them, which they then use to pay for their wives and concubines or as the wherewithal for making bribes. And if there is anything left over they use it to hire a few lowly men in the garrison (area) to act as servants for them with regard to immediate affairs, and that is all. (note: Those idle, miscellaneous people living near the garrisons or ports are called t'obyŏng (local soldiers), and the t'obyŏng are usually hired substitutes) (end note) And with regard to naval training in the spring and fall or times when officials dispatched from the court make periodic inspections, then other men are borrowed to substitute for them (for soldiers) to be inspected. (note: The garrison commanders commonly give cloth to idle people living nearby. Or also when there happen to be unscheduled inspections, they make collections (from the soldiers?) and inspect the substitutes. And these are called chodae (end note)

The state has used up the strength of the soldiers and people, and when there is some unexpected matter involving defense, the garrison commanders
only a monthly basis binds (collects) cloth, while in the garrison there are only 3 or 4 hired servicemen, and that is all. That state affairs have become as bad as this is truly something to be deplored. I will also have something to say about the fact that from the Taesin (top officials) to the top of the government down to the smallest officials in charge of affairs, everyone knows about this but is not able to carry out bold reforms. According to the systems of our country, we have not established salaries for the garrison commanders (chinjang), and we have no resources with which to provide for the repair of warships nor the repair or provision of weapons. Even if we put worthy and able men in charge of it, we still would have no choice but to completely release all the soldiers (from actual service) and collect cloth (taxes from them, in order to provide for expenses). But once you have allowed a few men to be released (from duty), then the greedy, corrupt and ignorant types would in the end release everyone from duty before they would stop (doing so). This also indicates that the systems of the state are not well provided for.

In recent years, these bad practices have got even worse and the number of naval soldiers has shrunk even more. (note:  At the present time, even though the garrison commanders (chinjang) have already collected cloth taxes (from the soldiers in lieu of service), they also require the naval soldiers to pay the costs of rations and side dishes. And when new ships have to be built, they also require the naval soldiers to pay the costs. And at times when there is supposed to be naval training, they also require that those soldiers who are supposed to stand on duty, one man has to take the responsibility for two men and be inspected, so that in those months when there is naval training, the burdens of the troops on duty is even worse. In addition to this there is no order to the payment of miscellaneous expenses for the capital or the provincial naval commander's headquarters. And with regard to such items as musk and feathers and other items that have nothing to do with
the naval soldiers (responsibilities), the men are also obligated to pay for these (too). And when the provincial naval commanders (susa) also add on additional quotas of men and divide up (requirements, responsibilities) among the garrisons, then each of the garrisons also adds on quotas (of men) the naval soldiers and requires them to pay the costs, and they also add on the cost of gratuities (jinjông). There are so many items like this that I cannot count them all. The expenses that the naval soldiers have to pay in one year are at the least no less than 50 p'ul of cloth. And for this reason the small number of naval soldiers that are left only take flight and scatter the more so every day.)(end note)

And when it comes to the quotas of ships, in all cases they also have been changed and reduced (in number). (note: Let's try talking about the one garrison of Gunmu. According to the Law Code (Taejon), (this place) is supposed to have one large ship, 1 middle sized ship, and 2 small ships, and 4 small ships without troops, but at the present time there is only 1 warship there, and 1 coastal defense ship (pangp'ae'son), 1 troop ship, and 2 patrol boats (sahus'on). With regard to this situation, I do not know when this (situation) began. (note: It is said that with regard to the quota of ships, that it was like this after the Imjin wars. However, with regard to the system of ships, then the present system of warships is extremely good and we ought to follow the present system, and with regard to the number of soldiers for each ship, we also ought to change this.) (end note)

At the present time we ought first to establish salaries for the garrison commanders (chinjang) and provide for the expenses of building ships. (note: For the amounts of the salaries of the garrison commanders, see the nokche(餉制). As for the expenses of building ships, see below. In both cases, the costs should be deducted from the accounts of the home base.)(end note) In addition (we ought) to establish quotas of people to be permanently stationed at the garrisons and also for their rations.
military system -115- pyŏngje

p. 413, 21:47b) (note: for the number of men and the amount of rations, see the section on salaries (nokče 福制). This ought go to be kept permanently on hand, and it should be used in accordance with the regulations for subordinate officials (kwansok 官 屬)(end note)

Service as naval soldiers (sugugn) must be allocated from among the residents of seacoast towns, and take away half the men from the basic quota and make them able oarsmen. (the note: The reason why I am taking half of them away (to be oarsmen) is that at the present time, we have really no more than 10% of the naval soldiers (that we are supposed to have), while among the residents along the seacoast, hardly any of them are commoners while most of them are official or private slaves, and because slaves cannot be used for service as naval soldiers, the situation makes it difficult (for us) to fill the quotas (of naval 陸兵 soldiers). If you want to completely fill the quotas, then you will have to fill them with men who live some distance from the sea and are not used to the water, while the people who live along the seacoast and are used to the water, will on the contrary, all be left behind (left out of required service as naval soldiers).

Moreover, on warships, 2/3 of (the crew?) consists of oarsmen-soldiers, while regular soldiers (chŏnggun 正軍) scarcely make up 1/3 (of the crew). If we are to completely fulfill (the quotas for) naval soldiers, then the great majority (of them) will be oarsmen (men who can hold an oar), and it is for this reason that we will take half of the original quota, and with regard to this half, we will use official and private slaves and people who will not receive land grants who are living in the vicinity of the garrison and form them into able oarsmen. This would be the most convenient and appropriate way to do it. And, when trouble occurs, then we will have both regular soldiers and oarsmen-soldiers and there will be no fear that we will not have enough of either of them. Moreover, in normal times, the number of men who abandon cultivation to stand on duty can also be reduced in number.)(end note)
Naval soldiers will be provided with three support personnel, and you will take away (exempt) one of the support personnel. And when (he, the soldier) serves on duty, (he) will pay grain rations. (note: In accordance with the regulations for land soldiers, then exclude one support person and collect 12 tu of rice. He will provide 6 tu of rice per month for each soldier on duty.) (end note)

(The men on duty) will be divided into two shifts (un), and each shift (un) will be divided into three duty groups (pŏn), which will serve on rotation. (note: This service will be a little more frequent than in the case of the land soldiers who will be divided into 8 duty groups (pŏn), but the naval soldiers only have to go back and forth (to a place) nearby (where they live). Furthermore, insofar as they only have to go for naval training once a year, the difficulties involved will be more or less equal (between naval and army soldiers).

As for times when there is naval training, even though one shift is divided into three groups (pŏn?), they will all go together for training. And if there is an emergency, then the two shifts (un) in all their numbers will stand (for training, service) together. The able-oarsmen will not be divided into groups for duty (pŏn). (note: Do not provide them with military equipment and do not test them in shooting the bow. Their garrison commander will only inspect them once in the spring and fall.) (end note)

In addition, divide them into two shifts which will go on rotation for naval training. If there is some emergency, then all will serve. (note: As in the case where there are 300 naval soldiers (sugun) and 300 able oarsmen soldiers in a Manhojin(鎮), and the naval soldiers are divided into 2 shifts (un), then each shift will consist of 150 men, and each of these 150-man shifts will be subdivided into three duty groups (pŏn). In the 12th and 1st months, 30 men will serve on duty; in the 2nd and 3rd months, 60 men will serve on duty; and in the 4th and 5th months, 60 men will serve on duty. And during the spring naval training period, then the above 150 men and one shift of the able oarsmen soldiers of 150 men will go for training together.
And the 150 men of one shift will also be subdivided into three duty groups (pǒn). In the 6th and 7th months, 60 men will go on duty; in the 8th and 9th months, 60 men will go on duty, and in the 10th and 11th months 30 men will go on duty. And the fall naval training will also be like this. If there is an emergency, then the 300 naval soldiers and the 300 able oarsmen soldiers will together go on duty. As for those men who have already served on duty and (are required) to go together (with the others) for service, they will be exempted for one year and will stand down from duty and be exempted from examinations in shooting the bow. If there is an intercalary month, then the 300 naval soldiers will be combined and will serve an additional tour of duty for the intercalary month. When there are high winds, then every man will stand for duty for 3 days. And when the winds are calm, then he will stand for 6 days of duty. Each man will be provided with 2 sŏng of rice per day. The support personnel will pay additional rice for intercalary months. The duty groups will rotate in the spring and autumn and in accordance with present regulations, there will be no excessive duty assigned in the months when the men are supposed to engage in agriculture.

With regard to the able oarsmen soldiers, outside of naval training only a few men will be assigned on rotation for police work or for accompanying envoys and they will be provided with rations from the military support funds (kunja).

Set appropriate quotas of ships in accordance with what is appropriate. (note: In all cases revert to the figures under the old system, but for calculate what is proper in fixing the quotas.) What I propose at the present time in terms of ships for the each of the provincial naval commanders' headquarters and garrisons, see below.)

If all soldiers live nearby (the garrisons where they are to serve), then when they shifts of duty are changed, there will be no excessive labor or expense involved, and when an emergency occurs, they can be assembled immediately. As for the so-called t'obyŏng (土兵) of the present time,
military system

then they ought to be enrolled for service as naval soldiers (sugun), but the slaves and people without land grants ought to be assigned as able-oarsmen
soldiers. And the land soldiers who are added on for defense duty all should be abolished. When the commanding officers from superior agencies come by on tour of inspection, then not only will they inspect the troops, but

they will also conduct examinations for talent, and they will either reward promote or dismiss or punish the garrison commanders on the basis of whether the troops are able or not. If things are done like this, then the naval soldiers can avoid the burdens of excessive service and we will avoid the bother of having to change the chinmu (noncoms?) a countless number of times.

(note: If the chinmu and other type officials are always being changed and transferred and there are no designated men (to handle these posts), then there will be no one in charge of affairs and no one will know anything about affairs.) (end note) If the divisions and quotas (of troops) are made clear then the garrison commanders also will find it difficult to release troops from duty on their own authority. And if anyone should violate (these regulations), then the court can punish them. And if punishments are all carried out, then everything will be done all right. (note: Moreover, once the financial system of the state has been set, then the payment of tribute (chinsang) and other things will be completely separated from (the administration) of soldiers and garrisons (military affairs). At the present time, the bamboo and wood and other items used by the capital troop (military) yamen are also sent (up to the capital) by the various garrisons. All of this should be abolished. If there should be any matter involved weapons, the in accordance with the regulations for the taedong system, the (cost) should be deducted from the account of the local district town's account, and let the district town involved hire a ship and load the stuff on it and send it (to the capital).

(indented note: At the present time, the able oarsmen soldiers of the warships for each district town are not provided with support personnel, and they must go for naval training in both autumn and fall,
p.414, 21:49a) and they all have to provide for their own food. In recent years after the taedong system was put into practice, for the first time they provided them with 3 tu of rice for their food.) (end note)

--. Present quotas for naval ships. (Kumjong sonje)

(note: For every 1 warships (chonson), then there is 1 pang'aesön (p'angp'ae), 1 troopship (pyongsön), and 2 patrol boats (sahusön). Under the old system of large and small maengsön (military system), the construction (of the ship) was rough and they were worthless and not suitable for max. fighting. But the present warships and pang'aes and other ships are very good, so that 10 of the old large max. taemaengsön are not equal to one of these (modern) warships. These so-called chonson (warships) are good for destroying the pirates and driving off aggressive forces, so that we have to build ships in accordance with the present system. These warships are the (so-called) nuok chonham (masted brigs of war). They are max. 11 pal (把: in length at the base. The superior ships commanded by the provincial naval commander are (rọba) 12 pal in length. (armored ships)

The Pang'aesön are to be made like the troopships (pyongsön), but slightly larger. They will have armor (pang'ae) and will be used for fighting in shallow waters in bays. And during peacetime, they will be used as police patrol boats. In normal times, one can take off the armor in using them, in which they could be 8 pal in length at the base.

The troopships are to carry soldiers and weapons and provisions and equipment and they will follow after the warships, and they should be 7 pal in length at the base. The patrol boats will serve as p'ak errand boats (messenger boats, pidosan), and will not be included in the quotas of regular ships, and they will be 4 pal (p'a) in length at the base.) (end note)

--. 2 warships. Every ship (will have)(note: boatmen and oarsmen combined, 80 men; gunners (p'ósua) and sasuk bowmen (sasu) combined, 77 men.) (end note)
military system -120- pyŏngje

p.414, 21:49b) -- 2 armored ships (pang'p'aesŏn 牌甲船); for each ship (note: both boatmen, oarsmen, gunmen and bowmen, combined)(end note) (note: In the case of the armored ship, then in accordance with current regulations, they will stay at the garrison and await trouble. They will not go to naval training. If perhaps there should be a special order for them to go for training and inspection, then keep a troopship (on reserve).)(end note)

-- 2 troopships (pyŏngsŏn). Each ship (note: will have 15 boatmen and oarsmen combined, and 4 gunmen and bowmen combined)

-- patrol boats, 4. Each boat (note: still have 5 boatmen and oarsmen, and 2 gunmen and bowmen combined).

-- the above regulations pertain to a Manho garrison (manhoji 割戍軍). As for a ch'ŏmsa 省使, then there will be 3 warships (ch'ŏnsŏn) (note: as in the case of Pusan and other places, then also add one more)(end note).

In the case of a Susa 水使: provincial naval commander), then there will be 5 warships (of which 1 will be a turtle boat (kusŏn))(end note).

In the case of a t'ongjesa 統制使, there will be 7 warships (of which one will be a turtle boat).

At the present time the basic quotas will be like this, but during naval training, then one warship, one troopship and two patrol boats will be combined and with 150 men will undergo inspection. (note: this figure will include 24 bowmen, 24 gunners, while the remaining 102 men will be boatmen and oarsmen)(end note) This is also in accordance with present fixed quotas. At the present time, the quotas for the ships of the garrisons and district towns are for each, 1 warship, 1 armored ship (pang'p'aesŏn), 1 troopship and 2 patrol boats (sahusŏn), and the armored ship usually is kept at the garrison and does not go out for naval training. For that reason there are many places where there are no armored ships. Among the Ch'ŏmsaจิน (at places like pangdап(防廻:Pyongyang, 4, p.396-- Chŏlla prov., Sunchŏn-gun Tolsan--garrison of the Sugun ch'ŏmsa) and Karip'o(加里浦:South Chŏll, Wando(黄島, garrison of a Ch'ŏmsa citizens) they have 2 warships.
In the case of a Suyŏng (headquarters yamen of a provincial naval commander), then there are 3 warships, 1 turtle boat.

In the case of a T’onggwan (headquarters of a T’ongjesa) there are 4 warships and 2 special warships, and 2 turtle boats, it is said.

(note: At the present time I hear that the number of boatmen and oarsmen are also insufficient and there are barely enough to run the boats for training purposes, and that is all. At the present time the clerks all receive bribes from people and reduce the number of naval soldiers (sailors) (required for service). They go to the provincial navy commander’s headquarters and get checked out? and they are able to move boats around (from one place to another). In addition, in accordance with the situation, they also combine bowmen, gunmen, and oarsmen. In the case of the patrol boats, they tie them to the rear of the ships, and are thus able to go back and forth, it is said. Even though in normal times the number of troops seems to be insufficient, the soldiers of a given garrison are divided into two shifts, and during emergencies they are all called up. At times of emergency, every one is called up, so that in addition to filling the quotas of armored ships (pangp’aesŏn), they are also able to add on ships and there is more than enough.)

At the present time each garrison has been given an additional warships, but these are only warships that are moved from each of the district towns. As for the second warships, they are the ones that the garrison commander (chinjang) and his officials (kūn’gwan) ride on. It may be done in accordance with the present regulations for the naval commanders headquarters. Generally speaking the Susa (provincial navy commander) has the admiral’s ship (taejangsŏn), so that the Ch’ŏmsa has the yŏngjŏngsŏn. The Manho has the P’ach’ŏngsŏn. The seoDŏ warships at the various garrisons are the Ch’ŏngwansŏn. If then the ship that the T’ongjesa rides on is the Taejangsŏn, then the Susa’s ship becomes the Yŏngjŏngsŏn, etc. in order, in accordance with the above regul’n.
It is only that these are temporary allocations. Generally speaking, even though a kun'gw an is riding on a ship, the quality and ability of the ship, its weapons, and its troops and rewards and punishments pertaining to them are all the responsibility of the garrison commander (chinjang); they cannot be entrusted to the kun'gw an (subordinate officials). (note: At the present time, the kun'gw an of Karip'o garrison ride on the second warship so that responsibility for the ship, its weapons, and how good they are are commonly given to the kun'gw an, inx and the garrison commanders have nothing to do with it. This is extremely bad. With regard to the evil of (excluding men from naval duty) and collecting cloth from them instead is so bad that the situation has gone this far.) (end note)

Provide for the expenses and rice for the building of new ships and for making repairs. (note: Build new ships every six years, and every three years make repairs. In the case of warships, the cost of construction of a new ship in rice costs 450 kok. If 360 kok is obtained by selling the old ship, then provide the 360 kok required for making a new one. As for the other ships, follow this model.) (end note)

- 450 kok for making a new warship (chonsön) (note: This is equivalent to 300 sŏk of present day units) (end note), of which (use?) 360 kok. Spend 150 kok to repair a ship.

- 90 kok for (building) armored ships, of which (72 kok (will be needed?).

For repairs, (allocate) 30 kok.

kок for troopships
spend kok

- 45 jij fix t'umilgum, of which 36 jij (are used for repairs, 9 kok)

- 15 kok for errand ships (sahusŏn), of which (12 kok will be needed), and 5 kok for repairs.

(indented note) With regard to the superior ships of the T'onggwan's headquarters (T'ongjesa) and the Suyŏng (provincial naval acommander's hdqs), an additional (provide)/40 kok for new construction, and 13 kok for repairs

Pay these costs out of regular accounts whenever a deadline (limit) is up (reached). If something has to be repaired before a deadline is up,
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p.415, 21:51a) then have the home garrison do it, and then when the deadline (limit) comes you will have to collect $ (payment?) With regard to masts, oars, sails,...

21:51b) seats and other items of the ships, all of this is included in the costs in rice (kam, set aside for new construction and repair). In addition, 1/3 of this (the costs) will be provided for in cash. If there happens to be a bad crop or famine year, then in accordance with regulations, cut (the budget) by 2/10. (20%) (end note)

--- Now, on the basis of the above regulations, determine the ships and quotas of soldiers for each of the yŏng (T'ongjesa or Susa's headquarters) and chin (local garrisons).

--- Ch'ŏmsajin. 3 warships (chŏnsŏn) (nt. e: For each place) there will be 1 warship (chŏnsŏn), 1 armored ship (pangp'aesŏn), 1 troopship, and 2 errand boats (sahusŏn). And the combined total of naval soldiers (sugun) and able-oarsmen soldiers will be 900 men, of which men will serve on duty (note: when the wind is calm, 90 men (will serve on duty), and when the wind is high, 45 men) (end note)

--- Susajŏng. 5 warships; combined total of naval soldiers and able oarsmen, 1,500 men, of which those on duty will be 150 men when the wind is calm and 75 when the wind is high. In addition to this, add on extra troop quotas for superior ships (sangsŏn—commander's ships?)

--- T'ongjeyŏng. 7 warships, with a combined total of 2,100 naval soldiers and able oarsmen, of which those serving on duty (will be 210 men when the wind is calm, or 105 when the wind is high; add on additional quotas for the superior ships) (end note)

(indented notes: Under the old system, there were fixed quotas of large and small maengsŏn for each of the yŏng and chin (commander's yamen and local garrisons), but there was no uniformity to the numbers. The system (of construction) of the ships was also different from what we have today. Generally speaking the troop quotas were as follows:
Right Kyongsang province, Suyŏng (prov. navy commanders' headquarters),

- 1,520 naval troops; for the Suyŏng of Left Kyongsang province
- 1,080 naval troops for the Suyŏng of Right Cholla; 1,160 for the

- 2,200 naval troops for the Suyŏng of Ch'ungch'ong
- 2,040 naval troops for the Suyŏng of Kyonggi province
- 820 naval troops for the Pusan Ch'omsajin
- 640 naval troops for the Imch'i Ch'omsajin

- 1,120 naval troops for the Maryang ch'omsajin (located west of Piin in Ch'ungch'ongdo, Ibid., p. 396)
- 520 naval troops for the Sŏsaengp'o Manhojin (located 53 li south of Ulsan-gun in Kyongsang province, Ibid., p. 397)
- 700 naval troops at the Soch'onp'o Manhojin (located 25 li south of Sŏch'on-gun, Ibid., p. 397)

I have here abridged this list just to give a general idea. (end note)

With regard to Yangso (the two western provinces of P'yŏng'an and Hwanghae), Yongbuk (Hamgyŏng), and Yongdong (Kangwŏn) provinces, there are different (quotas, arrangements) for the naval ship system. We also ought to consider what is appropriate and establish a regular system (for these provinces). I will discuss troop quotas for these provinces in a separate section.

(indented note: Some might say that in establishing official posts, even though you have the grades of Ch'omsa and Manho, the topography and the situation (of various places) is not uniform. There are places where Manho (are stationed, established) but where the situation is more important (than what a Manho should be in charge of); or there are places where a Ch'omsa is stationed, but the place is not that important (for what one would expect of a high ranking Ch'omsa official). It is for this
reason that the dynastic code (taejon) also provides for 2 taemaengsŏn (more than one would expect?) for (certain?) Manho while providing only 1 taemaengsŏn (large ship) for a Ch'omsa. But at present should we not provide uniform standards of the number of ships and naval troops based on whether the yamen is large or small?

To this I would reply that in establishing posts, you have those that are great and those that are small, and basically this depends on whether the situation and the responsibilities are serious or light. If you have a situation where the responsibilities of a Manho are serious but those of a Ch'omsa are not so serious, then what this means is that a mistake was made when these posts were first established. They should definitely be changed and rectified. The number of ships and naval troops ought in every case to accord with whether the yamen is great or small. With regard to the kun and hyŏn (administrative subdivisions) in our country the situation is also like this. There are many cases where the name of an official is a Pusa but where (the place) is extremely small (unimportant), and where a hyŏn'gam (district magistrate) is posted, but where the place, on the contrary, is very important. All such places (posts) should be changed so that they are in accordance with the actual situation.

Some might say that even though the garrison commanders (chinjang) are provided with basic salaries and the clerks, runners, and soldiers are given standard rations and the laws are strict, still/the garrison commanders in distant places, in the end/are not able to guarantee that they will not release soldiers (from duty and collect taxes from them instead). If the situation is like this, then there will only be an increase of expenses for the state. It would be preferable to reduce the (number of) support (personnel?) for the naval soldiers and also not provide them with rations while liberalizing (easing off on) the actual duty they have to perform and just have them act as servants (sahwŏn, runners) for the garrison commanders, and that is all. (note: If it is done like this, then it would not be necessary to restore positions of clerks with regular salaries)(end note) Just require
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p.415, 21:52b) that every month the soldiers be tested for shooting the bow and that in spring and summer naval training be carried out. And if there should be an emergency, call them up for service. How about this?

To this I would reply that with regard to countries that functioned as states, since ancient times there was never any talk about having a law which prevented (the state) from obtaining (the right kind of) people (for service). The intent behind the establishment of official posts and offices is to provide for people who can do the job and to hold those responsible who cannot do it, and that is all there is to it.

If because you anticipate that there will be a problem (with garrison commanders) releasing men from military service (in order to collect taxes or fees from them) you then take measures to exempt people from military service, then this will result in the complete destruction of the basic intention by which garrisons are established (in the first place). You would be better off not establishing garrisons at all and just waiting for an incident (emergency) to occur and send a commander to take charge—this would be less of an evil (than to do what you suggest above). But if you do things like this, would it be all right?

Furthermore, if you establish garrisons but exempt people from standing on duty as soldiers and do not provide them with rations, you would find that in the south along the seacoast garrisons there are places where people live isolated from one another and where there are few people living, who are cut off (from defense). And with regard to the landed garrisons in the northwest there are also many places in a situation similar to this. If people are exempted from military service and have their rations of grain and cloth cut off, then the people living in the areas near the garrisons will gradually leave the area, and within a period of 10 years all the garrisons will become desolated, and after a long time goes by, all the posts of border commanders will be held in low esteem and they will be regarded as no more important than the present day local officers (hyangok tojang), and that will be all.
We would be better off just keeping the system that exists in name today (than adopting the plan you suggest here). (What you are suggesting) is that we should only rely on (the need for reducing) the expenses that exist currently before our eyes, while giving no thought to the difficulties that the state would be in and the harm that would be done. The only reason you are talking this way is because we have no incidents (threat of war) on our borders at the present time. "To be forgetful of danger when you are at peace" is an important admonition that the ancients (have made).

Moreover at the present time there are all kinds of laxity and the garrison commanders are not attending to affairs, and that is the reason you are talking this way (making these suggestions). In addition to the tasks of naval training and examination of the troops, there are such tasks to perform as grain transport, naval escorts, defense, and police work (apprehension of pirates). These affairs are not all the same, and if there are no troops on duty, then who is going to do the work?

(END OF INDENTED SECTION. Indented section seems to constitute Pan'gye's own comments)

---. Once the quotas for warships for the various naval garrisons have been established, then abolish the warships attached to each of the administrative towns at the present time (kūm kak ṣp chōnsŏn) and transfer them (to the naval garrisons).

(note: Under the old system, all the sugun (naval soldiers) were under the command of the naval garrison commander (sujinjang), but each of the administrative towns (ıp) was only in charge of the administration of (supplementing quotas?) recruitment and setting (allocation) of soldiers (ch'ungjŏng chi chŏng 充定之政). (Pyongyang, IV, p.127 translates this as "each adm. district was only in charge of affairs relating to the construction of warships allocated to that district town), and that was all. Because (the district magistrates) have taken their ease and amused themselves (doing nothing) for such a long time, border defense preparations have become more neglected by the day.)
After the Imjin wars there was an increase in the establishment (of quotas of) warships for the seacoast district towns. In general they did not know anything about selecting (the right) garrison commanders or putting the troop system in order. They just increased the number of extraordinary (posts, positions, troops, ships?) by means of which the old system was thrown into confusion. This is the reason why the military system of the present day is not unified and a hundred evils have been produced.

If the number of ships and the quota of troops for every garrison has been deliberated on and established, then we can naturally abolish the warships (assigned to) each of the district towns. Even in such places as Tongnae and other district towns, we also ought to abolish them (the ships stationed there) and put all the naval soldiers exclusively under the charge of the Pusan Ch'ŏmsa. As for the Tongnae-busa (Prefect of Tongnae), he will be in exclusive charge of the pyŏngma (troops and horses) (land forces—the army) and take full responsibility for that. (end note)

Indented section: Some might say that even though there are warships (assigned) to each of the naval garrison but no warships at the home district towns, then if there should be an emergency or some incident requiring defense, then all affairs would be the exclusive responsibility of the garrison commanders (chinjang) and the hands of the district magistrates would be tied, and that would be all there is to it. Wouldn't this be wrong?

To this I would reply that this opinion stems from the fact that you are only looking at it privately from the standpoint of an individual district town. The naval soldiers of a garrison are all soldiers of the home district towns; they are not separate soldiers (other soldiers than those that come from the districts). It is only because the state regards the troop (military) system with the great seriousness that it has especially established the post of garrison commander to take exclusive charge of responsibility, and that it all there is to it. At the present time
p.416, 21:53a) (the state) has not (taken care in) selecting (good) garrison commander and held them responsible for their duties, and yet (the state) has increased the number of warships assigned to each of the district towns. In general, there are no naval troops established (assigned) to the warships of each of the district towns, so that these are ships without naval troops assigned to them. So that this system consists of dividing up the troops of the naval garrisons (and leaving them in the district towns instead of assigning them to the garrisons). And since (the state) has not established commanders, then these are ships without commanders. When the state does establish a commander, then it adds on another (a single) garrison commander.

(note: If the district magistrate himself boards the ship, then in wartime the district town is left without a commander.) (end note) From this one can see that (what they are doing? putting the warships at the naval garrisons) is to construct a house under a house. (note: In recent times there have been many new posts established, and in fact every incident (all affairs) are done like this.) (end note) On an ad hoc basis?) Because (the state) has additionally established warships for each of the district towns, the state has had no choice but to reduce the number of ships assigned to each of the naval garrisons, and of the naval troops assigned (to the garrisons) only one man in ten is left (to staff the naval garrisons' troop quotas), and all they do is use the army troop attached to the pyōngyōng (provincial army commander's headquarters) to serve on defense (on naval duty). During peacetime (the soldiers) have become the material (wherewithal) by which the garrison commander collects cloth (having exempted the men from actual military service). During wartime, then the provincial army commanders command the soldiers, and each of the garrisons is left without any troops assigned to them at all. This system is only one where in name we have created additional ships, but in fact we have reduced the number of ships, where in fact we have only increased the number of troops in name, while in fact we have actually reduced the number of (naval) troops. All we have
p.416, 21:53b) done is to throw the old system into confusion, and that is all.

(note: Moreover, what is worse is that the garrison commanders do not have territorial jurisdiction over the areas where their garrisons are located, and yet what the garrison commanders are supposed to defend is in all cases the territory of the district towns (where they are located). If you talk about unexpected emergencies, then it is an easy matter for the garrison commanders to command on-duty troops who are always stationed there, but the ships stationed at the district towns do not have regular on-duty troops assigned to them. If you talk about the situation (in the towns?) after the then men have gone off to fight as soldiers, then we would have to be concerned over the fact that the home district towns would be left empty (of troops). And if this were so, then the warships of the district towns heard the alarm bell out to fight together with the warships of the naval garrison commanders at the same time and there would be nothing left at the district towns to function as a reserve (naval force). These various concerns about (leaving the towns) empty (and devoid of defenses) are not discussed in this case (in your under my system suggestion). During emergencies, the garrison commander would command the naval forces and fight at sea, but the district magistrates would also command the land troops for defense along the seacoast. How could you then say that the hands (of the district magistrates) would be tied and they would have nothing to do? ) (end note)

(indented section continues) Under the old system the Ch'om(sa) and the Manho were given exclusive charge of the sea routes and for this reason, in addition to defense and capturing (pirates), such matters as coastal grain transport and escorts etc. were all under their exclusive charge. If they did a good job in escorting (the grain transport ships) then they would be rewarded; and if they incurred losses (subken transport ships), then they would be punished. But at the present time each of the garrisons is not in charge of these affairs, but each of the district towns is responsible for them. Each of the district towns is basically without on-duty sailors
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p.416, 21:54a) and when losses (of grain transport ships) occur, then the common people are held responsible for making up the losses (instead of the sailors). If you look at the situation on this basis, then you can see what harm is done under the present system and laws which are in confusion and you can see that all matters are like this.

(END OF INDENTED SECTION)

Item: Naval training will be held in the spring and summer in the home yŏng (naval commander's headquarters). Once every after a two year interval (once every three years), the T'ongyŏng (T'ongjesa's headquarters) will join in the naval training exercises. (note: When the T'ongyŏng joins in in the naval training, the training must be done in the spring when the winds are calm. As for Ch'olla Right province and Ch'ungch'ŏng province, they will only conduct training at their home naval commander's headquarters.) (end note)

For the details of the regulations pertaining to the testing of talent, providing rewards and banquets, etc., see above.

(indented note: I have that in this country umakkkum in the past they did not have naval training, and from this one can see that the military system was completely abandoned (neglected). At the present time naval training is conducted twice a year. Some people think that because the water id dangerous or because the ships might be harmed and a lot of people drowned that there should be only one period of naval training a year, and (that if this were done) it would not be as bad as "forgetting about war just because it is peacetime". Naval training could be conducted every spring and in the fall, the Susa (provincial naval commander) could make the rounds of the garrisons conducting inspections. This is not without merit, but at the present time each of the garrisons is not far from their home headquarters, and if the naval soldiers are divided into two shifts, then they could go on naval training once a year, but one could not reduce this further. Moreover, at the time when naval training is conducted, even though tests are held for bowmanship and a lot of people gather together and there is much confusion, so that one could not regard this as a perfect
The situation for conducting shooting examinations. The Susa (provincial naval commander) would also have to make the rounds of each of the garrisons and inspect affairs (for himself) and test the troops in their military skills.

--- Item. With regard to the grain transport ships for every province, the Susa, Chungsa, and Manho will set (a quota) of troopships for escort duty within the boundaries of their respective jurisdictions. (note: they will designate men from among the on-duty naval soldiers to go along as escort) When commercial boats go by, the garrison commanders will investigate and send a report to their chujin (commanders). (note: The sea route along which grain is transported will be divided into jurisdictional areas and exclusive responsibility will be given to the Chinjang (garrison commander, of a given area); responsibility will not be entrusted to the district towns. As for those people who are not diligent in protecting and escorting grain transport ships, in the case of garrison commanders, indict them for crime, and do not allow it to be taken out on the people of the district town. Moreover, in the past there was no naval training, and for that reason and so Manho were used commonly as commanders in charge of grain transport. This was contrary to the basic purpose of establishing garrisons to be on guard against the possibility of attack (war). How much more so, now that we have naval training, should we permanently abolish this regulation (practice). As for the annyong (押領), then there should be a special official for this task. See the section on grain transport.)

--- Item. All the Suyoungjin (garrisons of the provincial naval commanders) must have on permanent storage enough grain for one month's rations for the basic quota of troops, and when the warships move out, then calculate the amount of grain needed, and load it on board. (this is the so-called emergency grain rations (taebyon ryang)). In the case of a Manho garrison with 600 troops, there should be 360 kok of rice. Calculate
p.417, 21:55a) the amount of grain on hand in each of the yōng and chin (commander's headquarters and garrisons), and if there are places where there is not enough, then take grain from the home place's accounts and use to to give (to the place with a shortage). Keep a permanent ledger. During peacetime, after the 5th or 6th month keep on hand 1/2 of the basic quota of grain and take the other half and divide it up and lend it out to the soldiers who live near the garrison, and have them pay it back/in the fall. If the garrison commander have separate military provision lands (kunjajón) that provide supplementary funds, then do not include them in these quotas. In the case of army garrisons, then they ought to have granaries within the walls of the garrison and there is no need to talk about one or two months (worth of rations on hand). (end note)

---. Item: The commanders of on duty troop stationed at naval or army headquarters or garrisons (yōng, k chin) will only be in charge of ensuring that their troops are well trained in the use of weapons, and are well instructed in military skills and arts. (note: When provincial governors and provincial army and navy commanders and pacification officers (susan) go around on tours of inspection, they will not only call out the names of the men and inspect them, but they must also inspect their weapons and test them in shooting the bow and firing muskets and either promote or demote, reward or punish (the officers) on the basis of whether the men are well trained or not.) The (commanding officers) will not be allowed to substitute slaves for military service and will not be allowed to collect cloth or grain (in lieu of service, from men liable for military service). (note: they will see to it that there is not the slightest wasted effort or harm done to production) (end note). If there is a case, as in the past, (of commanders) releasing men from military service and collecting cloth from them instead (panggun sup'o), then if they do these for more than a single individual, they will all be indicted for the crime of embezzling public funds (changanyul). (note: Any
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p.417, 21:55a) provincial army or navy commander or garrison commander who levies taxes (fees) on the soldiers for the cost of miscellaneous expenses and items or for horses and carrying costs in their travels will all be held guilty of embezzlement.) (end note)

---indented section: Cho Ch'ŏng-an (조정안) Cho Kwangjo, see Pyongyang, vol. 3 for footnote) made a report to King Chungjo in which he said: During Yongjong's reign the king conducted a very liberal and magnanimous administration (of government), and the king was also very magnanimous even in his treatment of the crime of corruption and embezzlement.

The practice of bribery generally had its origin at this time. In the reign of Sejong, then, officials like the Manho also all esteemed each other for being honest and pure. One can see that whether the practices of the scholars are mistaken or correct, and whether the conduct of government is sullied or lofty depends on this.

In the present age, even though these evils have not yet become extremely bad, we must exert strict control over them (over embezzlement and corruption). If people are not allowed to stand in court for even the slightest violations, then everyone will know that they have something to be afraid of and no one will polish his own behavior.

--- Item. The beacon station soldiers will be constituted from among people living near the beacon stations, but they will not be given support personnel. In distant frontier posts, every place will have 32 men with 8 squad chiefs. In places that are in the middle of the country, each place will have 16 men with 8 squad chiefs. (note: People will go on duty for 15 days and then shift. Along the coast or frontier, one shift will consist of 4 men; in the interior of the country one shift will consist of 2 men, and the squad chiefs will also be selected and designated from among the troops. They will live and sleep together with the men on duty and inspect all work. Every place will have a small ondol room and a maru floored room each of which will be one kan in area. Ovens, water jugs, soup bowls, plates and other utensils will be
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417, 21:55b) provided. No one will be allowed to leave the residence. For details, see the Chi-hsiao hsien-shu (紀效新書) and the dynastic law code (taejŏn). If the situation is such that you definitely cannot establish a place for a beacon station, then in each case eliminate it and adjust to the circumstances of the area in accordance with what is appropriate. It would also be all right to place a beacon station on the ramparts or walls of the garrison. In the northwestern frontier if there happens to be an insufficient number of able-bodied men, then cut the basic quota of troops in half, divide them into four shifts (pŏn) and give them grain rations of 3 sŭng of rice per man per day. Beacon stations should be put on high and deep walls, and if there is an incident, then all the troops of the place should be assembled, even if they are slaves, and they should gather at the base of the walls and defend the place and not run away.)(end note)

(indented note: Some people think that within the basic quota of beacon station troops you ought to designate some of them to be on duty soldiers (chuho 산) and have the rest act as support personnel (po). You may also act in accordance with local circumstances and with what is appropriate to the feelings of the soldiers and do it (this way).)(end note)

(double indented note: According to the provisions about beacon stations soldiers in the law code (taejŏn), on the coast or frontier every place should have 16 men (note: for every man on duty, there will be 2 support personnel)(end note) and 2 squad chiefs. In places in the interior of the country (there should be) 4 men and 2 squad chiefs, divided into two shifts (pŏn), and the troops are to be designated from among the people who live near the beacon stations. But at the present time I hear that the aged and all of them in each village are designated from among those who are exempted from being soldiers on account of sickness, and usually many of them live far away from the beacon station. The hardships and difficulties involved are too great to mention. Every place usually has 12 men divided into 6 shifts (pŏn) of 1 3/4 10-day week (duration), but the troops do not have any support personnel.
There might be one place with as many as 30-40 men; the numbers (of troops at the various beacon stations) are not uniform. In the past they just had squad chief who were chosen from among the troops. At the present time, they also designate in addition a supervisory official (kamgwan) who is selected from among the students in school (kyosang) who are exempted from serving on military duty, and they are made to serve on tour along with the troops. But with regard to the soldiers or the supervisory officials (kamgwan), there is not one man in residence defending (the beacon stations) it is said. (end note)

Every three years registers are to be made of all types of soldiers. (note: In the capital the Hangsongbu (Seoul magistracy) will compile the register. In the provinces, then the home district town (pon'up) will compile the register and send it to the Choltosa. The Choltosa will combine them and make a grand register (tojok). Even though military service is to be based on land (granted) (kyejon ch'ulbyong), the military registers will record the surnames and given names, the age, distinguishing marks, and the residences of the troops in accordance with present regulations.) (end note) And they will be sent to the Ministry of War for storage. (note: The provincial governors' yamen and the garrisons will also keep one copy on hand) (end note) The Ministry of War will compile a grand total and memorialize it to the throne for approval. (note: In general the military registers will be compiled every 3 years when the land registers are changed (cadastral surveys are made) (note: Every year all deaths or inheritances will be reported in the winter by the district magistrate to the Choltosa who will change the record by adding a sticker, and the Choltosa will send the paper to the Ministry of war which will also change (the register) by pasting in a sticker and memorialize the throne for approval. The Choltosa will also record special events and send it to the provincial governor who will also make changes by attaching a sticker (to the ledger). The magistrate will compile a separate
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417, 21:56b) record in case of new or increased quotas and send it to the Choltosa, who will attach a note to the basic register, and he will send it to the Ministry of war, which will record it and memorialize the throne for approval and also send it to the provincial governor as above.

The same will be done for the miscellaneous soldiers and the mokcha (牧子). The provincial governor will take charge (of recording) post-station attendants, and the Transport Official (Chon'unsasa) will take charge of the grain transport sailors (chosolsa) (end subnote)

Indented section): Once we have (established the system) of requiring military service on the basis of land grants (kyejon ch'ulbyonggi) then the present evil of requiring military service from the aged, inform and weak and the bad practice of levying service on relatives and neighbors will naturally (by itself) come to an end. Furthermore, at the present time the regulations for compiling the military registers (kunjok jongjon'rongi) do not mention that the magistrates are to compile the registers; the Choltosa is the one who compiles the registers, and for this reason the lower clerks have an opportunity to work their wiles (act corruptly, falsify the registers), so much so that it leads to the compilation of "empty" (worthless) records. We ought to clarify the law. If the magistrate compiles the register then the Choltosa will only (act) in accordance with what is recorded and make a comprehensive (grand total) register (on the basis of the ones he receives from the magistrate).

(note: At the present time small children suckling at the breast are recorded on the military registers for service and every year a cloth levy is collected (from them). Furthermore, if someone happens to abscond or die, then all the relatives and neighbors of the person are forced to pay (in his place). The suffering of the soldiers and people is so great that I cannot bear to completely talk about it. My sonbae (honored colleagues, elders) feel that with regard to people who are not yet 16 se (yrs) of age, that a separate register be made of their names and ages, and that you should wait until they come of age before they are entered onto the (military
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417, 21:56b) service) registers. As for people who have absconded, after three years have passed, then you have the relatives and neighbors (of the absconded person) recommend and report an idle able-bodied male to take the man's place; you are not to extort (payment) from neighbors and relatives. This idea is extremely good, but what it does is divide land and soldiers into two (paths) separate categories), so that those people below (the people) will make it their business to abscond or hide (from the service registrats), and those above (the officials) will have it in their minds to search for and press people and hold them responsible (for service). The situation will be such that in the end you will not be able to carry this out as ordered (as provided for in the law).

Item: All types of soldiers will all wear tallies on their belts. (note: On one face will be written so-and-so is attached to such-and-such army (kun). In the case of cavalry, then it will say kibyŏng. In the case of naval soldiers, it will say sugun. It will also have their age, facial characteristics and residence in such-and-such a kun, such-and-such a myŏn, managing such-and-such a parcel of land (chajŏn). On the other face will be a seal (stamp). For details, see the Chi-hsiao hsin-shu.)

Item: With regard to various kinds of regular soldiers (ch'onggun) (note: ch'onggun refers to the various types of chuho (people who serve on duty); their support personnel (pobu) are not to be included) will all be exempted from miscellaneous labor service (chabyŏk). (note: They will be totally exempted from the labor service due from kyŏngbu (farmers who receive a 100 myo of land to till--Pyongyang, IV, p.132) and from the duties of icemen (pingjŏng). From the kuns (up to the changgwan (and Naegŭmwi), all will be exempted from the labor service due from a farmer who has receive a kyŏng of land. For details, see the land system).

--Item: All soldiers (kuns) who reach the age of 60, or who are severely ill
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p.418, 21:57a) will be allowed to return their land (grant) and be stricken from the military service registers. (note: If a person has sons, grandsons or close relatives (ch'inch'ŏk), he may transfer his land (to them) and pass on his responsibilities (to them). If he has no sons or grandsons and wants to keep his land and drop down to the (status of) support person, then allow him to do so. After a person reaches the age of 70 grant him kubunjŏn (retirement land) in the amount of 20 myo, and he will return the land that is left over (80 myo?). From this 20 myo of land he will also pay a support rice tax of 1/5 (the crop). And after he dies, all his land will be given to a substitute serviceman.

The same (regulation) will apply to clerks and runners who have service obligations. Those who do not have sons or grandsons to rely on will be given kubun (land), which also will be done in accordance with regulations. For details, see the land system (section).

Once we have established the system for requiring military service on the basis of land grants and the return of land grants and exemption from service, then naturally the practice of falsifying one's age in the attempt to gain exemption from military service and the situation where people who ought to be exempted from service cannot obtain exemption will (both) disappear.)(end note)

(Indented section) In the case of soldiers (kunsa) who have fathers and mothers and who are seriously ill or who are older than 70 years of age, permit them to be support persons (pobu) and to stay (on the land) and take care of their fathers and mothers. If their parents die, then also permit them to be support persons for a period of 3 years.

(Indented note: At the present time soldiers who are old or sick in many cases cannot obtain an exemption from military service on account of age. (injŏngp'oj)) In general to (obtain) an age exemption, people have to pay a cloth gratuity which is commonly no less than 30 p'il, and they find it very difficult to manage this (payment). Furthermore, if they do obtain an old age exemption,
then they are immediately enrolled as beacons station soldiers.

Generally speaking the gratuities that soldiers have to pay are so sick numerous they can't all be described, and the old and weak usually have to pay double the amount of cloth. If you calculate how much they have to pay, then it is no different than if they were listed on (the military service) registers, so that most people usually don't even want to be exempted from military service. And when a man dies, commonly a death warrant (sent out by the survivors?) is issued and the death cloth gratuity (mulgo injong'o) is also no less than 20-30 p'il, so that the poor (impoverished) wives of the soldiers in many cases are not able to issue the warrant, or even if they can issue the ib'an (warrant), if they cannot designate a substitute, then they usually have to pay a fee (kap'o).

I once saw a case in a village where a soldier died and his father wanted to take care of the death gratuity (mulgo injong); he rushed around from one direction to the other for over a year but was not able to make plans for the funeral, and because his wife was not able to pay the kap'o fee, she was made a prisoner and locked up in the jail with her hair all dishevelled and crying in distress; it was so pitiful I can't bear to talk about it.) (end note)

--- Item: The abyöng (petty military subordinates of a commander) of all the yamen will all be abolished. (note: At the present time each of the yamen all have abyöng. They will all be abolished. If an official like a provincial governor should have abyöng, then a quota should be set of either 100 men or 2-300 men, and they should be attached to the administrative town where the governor's yamen is located. Sog'ogun (at that place) should be detached to serve as abyöng, and they should all be given training and treated as (regular) sog'o (troops). We cannot do as is done at the present time and let them be scattered throughout the administrative towns and only engage in collecting cloth (fees from people). However, if a provincial governor in fact holds the post of Ch'oltosa as a concurrency, it is not necessary for him to have separate private soldiers (of his own).
If there happens to be a temporary emergency and the Ch'oltosa commands troops and goes off to fight and the provincial governor has to stay and protect his province and also has to have troops (available to do it), then at that time you should calculate (the number of troops needed) and assign him the soldiers who live in the district town where his governor's yamen is located and have him command them and wait for something to happen. In a case like this, you have no choice but to have a few abyŏng (around). But basically it is of no advantage, and if you have too many categories and varieties (of troops) it does great harm in fact to military administration. So there is no doubt that it is possible also to abolish the abyŏng of the governors' yamen. And when it comes to the various district towns, then there is even less worth discussing (about this problem--all the more reason to abolish them). Generally, abyŏng are something that did not exist under the old system; they are (a category of soldier) that was only added on (additionally created) in recent times. (end note)

But if each of the district towns has a wall, one should allocate wall and gate troops (guards). (note: There should be 12 soldiers for each gate, and each of them should be provided with 3 support personnel; divide them into 6 groups (pŏn), with 2 men in each one and rotate them on duty. In the case of a frontier area, then add a few more. In case of a governor's headquarters or garrison, then you should have permanent duty troops.

Some people might say that because gate guards of the district towns do not have to go to serve as distant defensive troops (against invasions) that they have idle responsibilities, but here I am providing them with no less a number of support personnel than infantry. How about this? To this I would reply that these troops also have to serve on duty, and in the provinces all of them in addition will be tested for shooting the bow just like the regular soldiers (ch'ŏngbyŏng), and that is the reason for it.) (end note)
Abolish all the permanently established military police (kullo) stationed at each headquarters. (note: Once you have saryŏng (runners) and have established quotas on the basis of the amount of work to be performed, then there is also no need to have different names and titles or separate categories of people. For an explanation of this see the chikkwan (official posts) and iye (clerks) section. It is only that in the chu and hyŏn the changgwan (officers) have kullo, but also you can have the sahu (ordained boys, runners) do this concurrently)(end note)

Bannermen (flag bearers, kisun) of each headquarters (yŏngmun) and others will be recruited from people living nearby. They will not be given support personnel; they will be divided into 6 groups (pŏn) and will rotate on duty; provide them with rations on duty. (note: 6 tu of rice a month will be the standard, and they will be paid from regular accounts (funds). Originally the number of flag bearers was based on the number of flags. In normal times, then they are divided into 6 groups that rotate on duty, but only a few important flags (banners) are flown. In spring and summer training camp and at times when there are military affairs, then combine those on duty and have them all stand up (for duty) each performing his responsibilities. They will be tested for talent once every season (4 times a year). At the present time, the governor's yamen of Kyŏnggi, Kangwŏn, Chungchŏng have no regular standard bearers; it would be best to do it in accordance with old practice.)(end note)

Regarding the reconnaissance soldiers (sahu) at each place, if they qualify to be sog'o soldiers, then designate them as such. Only when there is some incident or affair, then transfer them. Those who are qualified to be saryŏng (runners) will have no regular duty. (note: during training camp in autumn and fall, then all will stand for duty; when the officers are at home, then they will not stay and wait.)(end note)
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p.418, 21:58b) -- Item: When the king goes somewhere (kŏdongsi'), ceremonial troops will be provided for out of regular on-duty troops. (note: It is said that at the present time it is also done like this)(end note)

--. As for troops used for escorting imperial envoys (note: the so-called kun'ŭigun (軍儀軍))(end note), use cavalry and infantry from towns nearby the route and rotate them on duty. Calculate the days of service and provide them with rations and fodder for their horses. (note: 3 sŏng of rice per day, and 2 sŏng for the price of fodder, 3 sŏng of yellow beans—this to be the standard, and to be paid for out of the regular funds)(end note) Calculate (the time they serve) and deduct it from their training and testing. (note: for the quotas of such men, you ought to consult present regulations and do what is best in determining it. The taejong code does not go beyond 5 units)(end note)

(indented note: I hear that at the present time there may be 50-60 kun'ŭigun or as many as a 100; it is said that there is no fixed number. In Kyŏnggi province, they rotate the pyŏltæ (別限: cavalry) and sog'ogun on duty, and for every three men they designate one man to go along, one man to provide a horse, and one man to provide food and fodder for the horses. But the gratuities (they?) have to pay the Ch'asawŏn (使臣), low level petty officials, Yŏngni (省吏: governor's clerks), and tohundo (都訓導) etc. are so numerous that I can't describe the burdens, they say.)(end note)

--. Item: The messenger (signal?) troops (p'abal.) along the western route (Hwanghae and Pyongan prov.) are also to be filled by cavalry and infantry along the route, and they will serve on rotation for a month; provide them with rations and fodder for horses. (note: (provide) 12 tu of rice per month, 9 tu of yellow beans, and grant it from the regular funds of the place where they are (stationed); also grant them fodder. Shift them every month; the amount of time a man should spend on duty is about 2 months before and after a man serves; (indented note: early exempt them from the archery examination and training camp. Every 15 li (distance) place a p'abal (開: relay station?) and keep 5 horses at each place; if the situation demands it, add more (places).
418, 21:58b) Make special appointments of P'abalchang (commanders) in accordance with present regulations, and grant them rations, the same as above.

419, 21:59a) With regard to the p'abal (messengers) along the northern and eastern routes, use infantry and exempt them from standing for (regular military) service and switch (rotate them) every two months, and grant them 6 tu of rice per month as rations; exempt them from archery examinations and training camp. Everything should be in accordance with regulations for serving on duty. Every place should have 3 men, and if an incident occurs, then assign special cavalry troops as in the case of the western route. In general, if the matter is not concerned with military affairs or border conditions, then (the message) cannot be sent. If anyone makes an error in transmitting a message, he will be indicted for crime.)(end note)

(indented note: If things are done like this, then even though the cavalrymen in the district towns along the route have this kind of service to perform, calculate the rice they need for rations (and give it to them) and give them time off so that their service burdens will be about the same as the cavalrymen from other district towns. The cavalrymen (kipyŏng) are the same as the pyŏltae (special units) of the present time. There is no reason why they cannot function as p'abal (messengers). It is also said that at the present time the muhak pyŏltae (military school special units) rotate on service. At the present time the p'abal relay stations along the western route have 5 horses per place which are kept in waiting; along the northern route there are no horses, but two men are kept in waiting, and if an incident occurs, the assign horses their especially, in accordance with what is done in the western route. The cavalrymen are exempted from standing on military service, and they serve (at the relay stations?) for one month (subnote: 2 months if there are no horses there). Compared to service in the capital, it is very easy and that is why people pay bribes to the yŏngni (government's yemen clerks) in the hopes of getting this kind of service, it is said.)(end note)
Item: With regard to labor service on construction projects (note: such as official buildings, walls, planting trees etc.) (end note), the labor service will be performed by monks (süngdo (süngnyø) - Pyongyang IV 136) and hanho (idle households). (note: Those people who do not receive land and who do not have a job (post, chik) will be regarded as hanho (idle households), and they will be required to perform 3 days of labor service per year. Monks should be assigned an appropriate amount of labor service. If (these people) serve for more than three days, then provide them with rations.) (end note) or hired laborers (köin or hired laborers are to be paid wages (kûpka) whenever they serve (work) (end note)) Such labor as dike (repair and building) which are of benefit to the people will be performed by the kyôngbu (per month). Peasant recipients of land grants) (note: Except for 1 kyông of land (granted to) the taebu (officials) and sa (scholars), and except for the various types of regular soldiers (note: That is to say, the men who actually serve on duty (hoju)) (end subnote) and the clerks and runners who perform labor for officials, in all other cases for every 3 kyông of land, one man will be furnished (for construction labor service) and he will perform 3 days of labor a year. If the labor service exceeds three days of service, then designate an appropriate (number of extra) men. If there are 4 days of service, then require another man to be furnished from 4 kyông of land. With regard to this, the magistrates will not be allowed to levy labor service arbitrarily (tan cho chiao). They must report it to the provincial governor. For details on chiao (labor service), see the land system section) (end note)

21:59b)

It is only that for large labor service projects on walls and moats levy labor service on soldiers. Calculate the number of days of service and deduct it from their testing and training periods of service. (note: No soldiers will be required to perform labor service if it is not a major project such as wall or moat construction, and when you do use soldiers
419, 21:59b) for labor service, it must be memorialized to the throne. Provincial governors and Ch'oltosa will not be allowed to exact labor levies arbitrarily and those who do will be punished under the law prohibiting this. First calculate how large the labor service will be and then calculate and determine the number of able-bodied males to be used, and only send out the various types of regular soldiers (to do it). In the case of infantrymen, the work should not exceed 30 days, and for every 30 days exempt the men from standing on military duty one time and from military training and examinations during the period of work. In the case of cavalrymen and sog'ogun, the work should not exceed 15 days, and when the 15 days is up, exempt them from one year's worth of training and archery examinations. In all cases the official will grant rations at the rate of 3 sŏng of rice for a 10 day week. As for the assistance of the support personnel, it should be done in accordance with standard regulations. And when the work is finished, release them and send them off, and when this is done provide them with a banquet. In the case of men injured or killed (on the job), then provide them with relief in accordance with the regulations for men killed in wartime in the line of duty.)(end note)

Indented section: I note that soldiers who perform one month's worth of labor service will be exempted from two months of (military) duty. Also exempt them from examinations and training and provide them with rations and support personnel; if so, then labor service for soldiers will not be burdensome. (note: Some people think that if labor service is to be performed, then both the ho and the po (both people who serve on duty and their support personnel) should both perform labor service, and that in the case of the support personnel, you also should reduce their cloth payments by half. But this proposition is the result of intemperate thinking, and it definitely cannot be done. You can permit labor service to be performed fixedly by people who have received land grants. In addition provide both cavalrymen and infantrymen equally with three support persons, but cavalrymen should be limited to 15 days of labor service.)(end note)
When there is an emergency, then each of the Chōltosa should lead the troops to the fighting and the provincial governor will remain (at home) and defend his province and take charge of general supervision of all affairs. (note: If the provincial army commander is defeated in battle or if it is convenient to the circumstances, then you do not have to be bound by this regulation.)

(Indented note: Some people say that even though the provincial governor is the main commander (chujang), the provincial army commander (pyōnsa) is in fact the commander of the troops. The provincial governor does not command the troops in peacetime, so that he cannot command them during wartime. What troops would he have (under his command) that he could lead them into fighting? To this I would reply that the civil and military (officials) are not to be divided into two paths (separate categories), and the people and the soldiers are not two (different) people. In ancient times (under the Chou-li?), the local communities of the hsiang and sui and the posts of hou and pai officials who when they stayed (at their yamen, at home) were in charge of governing the people. When they went out (to fight), they became military officers in charge of troops. This is why their responsibilities were uniform and their tasks were not divided. It is only that the state (now, later?) treated their responsibilities as very important and separately established the post of Chōltosa in order to take exclusive charge of military affairs. In peacetime, the provincial army commander is in charge of instruction and training, and in wartime, the provincial governor divides the troops up among the military officers, but this is not the original intent by which (these posts) were created. The provincial army commander leads the troops to the fighting, and the provincial governor does not leave his home province, takes general charge of all affairs, and concurrently supervises the provincial army commanders. If a provincial army commander (pyōnsa) should unfortunately be killed in the fighting, then (the governor?) may immediately take remedial action...
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p.419, 21:60a) and lead the troops into battle. However, it is not the responsibility of the provincial governor to be the first to lead troops into battle, and for that reason in recent time the provincial governors have usually have been first to lead the troops into battle and have left their home about provinces without authorization. People who talk (discuss) this problem feel that this is a mistake. (end indented note)

---. Item: In time of emergency, then the various types of regular soldiers will be led by the district magistrate to follow the army, and the magistrate's assistant official (second official) together with the support able-bodied males and large and small people (common people both great and small) will defend their home district. (note: Those people who abandon their home district without authorization will be punished according to law. For military labor service and the transportation of grain rations, use the kyŏngbu (farmers who have been granted land) and the idle households (hanho, those who have not been granted land).

If the distance is far off or the number of men needed is large, then you ought to especially designate soldiers to do it. At the present time when the soldiers have to act (perform military duty, go to war), commonly rice rations are transported from their home district towns. During the pyŏngja invasions of 1636, the soldiers from south Ch'ungch'ŏng province went to Kwangju( ), and along the route in such places as Kongju( ), Ch'ŏn'an( ), and Suwon and other places, there was a lot of granary grain (stored). And in addition the district towns of Honam (south Ch'ungch'ŏng) were also ordered to transport grain day and night. They never saw the enemy, and yet they used up the strength of the people. This was totally unjustified. We ought to rectify this evil situation and issue clear orders. In general when the state calls out the troops, the place where the army goes should usually provide grain rations from its granaries. Or if the troops leave the boundaries (of the province), or if there is an unavoidable situation, only then can you adjust to the circumstances and require grain to be transported from nearby granaries.) (end note)
In the wars that have occurred off and on in our country, the district magistrates have all left the defense of their territories without authorization. They have either run off into the hills or taken refuge along the seacoast. This has been the situation throughout all the chu and hyŏn (districts) of the eight provinces. If it is a province you're talking about, then the whole province is left without anyone in charge; if it is a district town you're talking about, then the whole district has been left without anyone in charge. Because of this once they hear that the enemy is coming, without waiting for the enemy to spread around, the whole country becomes an empty wasteland and the court has no one to whom it can issue orders, and the fighting troops have nothing to fear or avoid; they just make it their business to take flight and scatter. Bandit (Enemy) cavalry in groups of (only) three or four men roam all over the 8 provinces (8 routes) and plunder the country at will, and there is no one to say who or what to this (no one who can do anything about it). If we just follow what is done at the present time and do not make any reforms of present government (institutions), then even though our territory were to be greater than 10,000 li (in length) and our people 100 times more numerous than they are now, it would only cause the people to be even worse off, and that is all. How would there be any hope that we could resist the enemy and protect the country? We should post clear laws to the effect that in wartime the district magistrates are each to defend their walled towns to the death and not leave them, and anyone who does abandon a town should be punished by law without mercy; only then can we avoid this utmost fear (about people absconding).

Some people might say that this is truly so; it is just that at the present time 80-90% of the district towns are very small and that out in the provinces you can go
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p.420, 21:61a) for several dozen li distance without finding any population or any walled towns or suburbs, and where there are places with walls, they are and narrow goat as low as the walls around sheep pens and you can jump over them with an average step (bound). In many cases the walled areas will not accommodate even one family inside them. If during peacetime these walls are not sufficient to constitute real walls, everyone would laugh of the prospect of trying to defend even 3-foot tall children with walls such as these. How could the people depend on these for defense?

Moreover, once the district magistrates make a move (move out to fight?), then there is no one (left) to manage (defense). Even during normal times people (places where) they vacate their posts there are many empty (as mentioned in official duties), and in wartime, either they lead the troops out to do (fight jointly) the army or they leave their posts on some official business—there are many cases of this taking place (sadang pil). In such cases, even when the official returns to his post, the situation (disastrous, tangyon) has already become confused (dishevelled, disrupted) and there is nothing he can do about it. If you hold a man responsible for something he is not able to do, and then you (not) follow this up by killing him (for failure to perform his duty), isn't this close to killing an innocent man?

To this I would reply that if you do not change the system of the kun and hyön (organization, territorially? of the districts), then there is no sense in even discussing it. We ought to eliminate and combine the small (good sized) hyön to make them into decent administrative towns (districts), and establish superior and assistant magistrates to take charge of wall and moat construction. In those places that have no walls, we also ought to wait for the people to recover their strength somewhat and then build walls. If like this we enact a uniform law, then all the districts will have walls and people to defend the walled towns. During peacetime, everyone must have his designated share (of responsibility), and during wartime no one will be
420, 21:61b) None will have two minds (different opinions) about (staying on the
job and defending the place—hyui). If rewards and punishments
for merit or crime are properly carried out, then the magistrates will
also realize that the people's affairs and the country's affairs is
their own concern, and they will not act in such desultory fashion
laying around lazily eating and drinking as they do at present
just paying vague attention to their responsibilities. If we can really
make each of the administrative towns defensible and restore the tun
(military colonies) so that they will be within eyeshot of one another, then
the whole country will become strong. And even if we unfortunately should incur
another invasion such as the Imjin (1592) or pyŏngja (1636) invasions,
how would the country be so instantaneously thrown into shock and confusion
(as it was at that time? And even though our military commanders might
suffer a defeat in the fighting, the enemy would indeed not dare to take
us lightly and run around the country plundering it as if it were an
unpopulated land.

Some might say that this is truly an excellent plan. It is only that
during wartime the soldiers from the chu and kun (districts) all go out
to fight and no troops are left in the district towns, so what troops
can you use to defend the towns?

To this I would reply that even though all the regular soldiers go out
to join the army, the number of support personnel is double the number of
regular soldiers, and the whole population whether (the people) are great
or small (in status?) must be able to defend the place together. What
fear is there that there would not be any people (to defend the
districts)? If we only (have our people) fight (in the major battles with
the army) and not defend (their home places), then there will be none
to rely on in fighting (the major pitched battles). And if you only
defend the towns and do not go out to fight pitched battles, then your
defenses will not be strong. The regular soldiers should chase the enemy in
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running battles while the support personnel stay home and defend the walled towns. These (two methods) constitute the warp and the woof and a most correct military strategy. (note: With regard to regular soldiers and support personnel, basically it is the people with whom you train soldiers and it is the soldiers with whom you defend the people, and in wartime both are used. This is also like this (what I have said above).) (end note)

(indented note: At the present time with regard to those who are in name regular soldiers (ch'ŏnggun), there is no one from whom cloth is not collected, and for this reason even though they are provided with support personnel in name, in fact they are not provided with support personnel. In addition both regular soldiers and public and private slaves are together used to form the Sog'ogun (units) and support personnel are not provided to the Sog'ogun. It is for this reason that all the people combine two tasks in one person and there is not a single soldier with a support person. If this evil situation is not reformed, then there is no need even discussing the matter.) (end note)

--- Item: Grain transport sailors are to be selected from among those people living in the vicinity of basic (home) granaries along the seacoast and they are to be provided with 2 support personnel. (note: From Haenam (south Hwanghae?) to the south, at times when grain is to be transported, you will also give every man 5 ᵀ of rice. In the area from Sacho'sŏn south (沙州) give 12 ᵀ of rice. (subnote: this only refers to those who are serving on duty on board the ships) (end subnote) Divide them into two groups (pŏn) and rotate them on and off the ships. (note: At the present time with regard to those involved in water transport, the chosol (grain transport sailors) near the capital are in name called subu(sailors) and they ought to have the same name as the chosol (grain transport sailors), and in addition these jobs should be filled with people who live in the vicinity of the granaries on the edge of the river, granted 2 support personnel and divided into 2 groups for duty; their system should be the same (as that for grain transport sailors who go by sea?). The grain transport
The grain transport sailors should all be exempted from the miscellaneous labor service required of the kyŏngbu (farmers who receive land grants), such as gathering straw and wood and carrying ice.

(indented note: Some might say that even though the grain transport sailors go by sea (do not live) far from the transport route, they are still given support personnel. How about this? To this I would reply that because a transport route is not far away, I have determined that there should be two or three trips per year. The number of ships and men has already been determined (by me) in accordance with this. I have given them support personnel and cannot eliminate them.) (end note)

--- Item: Guard soldiers for each of the tombs should be designated from among people who live in the vicinity of the tombs. They will not have support personnel and will be exempted from the basic tax of 2 kok. (note: irrespective of whether they are commoners or ch’ŏn (slaves), designate (guardsmen) from among people who live in the vicinity of the tombs and exempt them from the 2 kok of taxes. If they have 9th rank land, then completely exempt them from taxes, and as for the other grades of land reduce the taxes by two degrees. In addition exempt them from the miscellaneous labor service required of kyŏngbu (regular land grant farmers) such as gathering wood and straw and making ice. There should be 60 men per tomb and they should serve on rotation in 5-man groups. In the case of a ch’ech’ŏllŏng (a tomb of a king more than 5 generations back), then reduce the number of men by 20 and also have them serve on rotation in 5-man groups. (subnote: This is because there are no chesa ancestral rites or incense ritual officials at such tombs nor expenses for this, and so I have reduced the number of men) (end subnote)

Every time men go on duty they will make the rounds of the mountain and inspect to see that the prohibitions (against trespass) are being maintained and they will keep up the ritual hall. If a rite is conducted, they will all stand for duty. The same regulations will apply for guards of former queen’s parents’ tombs and former worthy kings.
Do not exempt them from taxes. As for their numbers, there will be 2 men for the parents of former queens, 4 men for worthy kings of former ages (dynasties), the tomb of Kija and T'aesjo of the Koryó dynasty, and 2 men for the tomb of Kyôngdokwang of Silla, and Hyŏnjong of Koryó.(end note)

At the present time there are 70 guardian soldiers for new tombs and 30 men for ch'ech'onnŭng (tombs of kings of former dynasties). All of them are given 2 support personnel and are exempted from taxes on 1 kyŏl of land (pokchŏn ilkyŏl). (note: If there is tomb support land there (ch'ech'onnŭng), then they are not granted exemptions from taxes)(end note) The expenses for the tomb officials offerings and for the ritual officials all come from the Suhogun (guardian soldiers) (at the present time) and it is for that reason that we have the evil of the ch'ambong extortion and excessive exactions. (note: At the present time the food, lamp oil and fodder for slaves and horses are all taken care of by the guardian soldiers (suhogun), and because of this the Ch'ambong extort funds from the and straw and make them carry wood and charcoal/around for them to take to their own homes. They also privately exempt them from labor service and have pay in them zaek paper, pillows, rice, beans and other objects. In the case of the derŭng(德陵) and hurŭng(厚陵), since they are close to Kaegyŏng, they also require (the guardian soldiers) to pay silver and other utensils. These evils are so bad that I can't talk about them all.) end note) We ought to establish clear regulations. As for tomb officials, we should deduct 1 1/2 kok from their monthly capital salaries and take the expenses from the funds of the adm. town where the tomb is located. Both officials will together be paid 3 kok of rice per month and 6 tu of yellow beans for their rations and lamp oil expenses and also for the food for their slaves and horses when they go on and off duty. Also every year in the beginning of spring provide them with the funds for office expenses and paper to the tune of 3 kok of rice. (note: These are office expenses for the ch'ambong where they are stationed) xx (end note)
With regard to the rice that the ritual officials are to be paid, calculate and determine the amount and divide it up between spring and fall and pay it in advance. If there are special rituals, then make special deductions.

The expenses for ritual items, equipment and utensils will all be deducted from regular funds. The guardian soldiers will only be made to serve on duty in accordance with regulations. When a ritual is performed, they will all stand on duty running errands and attending the ritual officials, and that is all.

All other types of exactions and levies on them are to be abolished.

(indented note: Some people feel that if all these kinds of expenses are provided for by the establishment of wijón (tomb expense land), that you will be able to eliminate the evil of frequently paying out for these costs. However, if you base (payment of these costs) on land, the fact remains that the ch'ambong are not tax-collecting officials and as a result all kinds of evil practices will be restored before long. It cannot be done.)

Tax exempt households (pokho)

In the pokho section of the Taejón (dynastic law code) several solchóng (attendants) are provided for such types of people as elderly (ex-) high and low officials, members of the Naegümwi and the Pyölsìwi (special palace attendants), or they are given a small amount of land and exempted from all taxes (attendant on that) (pokho). In general the able-bodied males of the solchóng (families are exempted (from service) but with regard to the land (granted them), it is only exempted from miscellaneous taxes and not from regular taxes. According to this law, since school scholars and Naegümwi (members) and above are exempted from furnishing men for military service from the land that they receive, then they already have had their family able-bodied males exempted from service. In the case of the land, then outside of regular taxes, they are not liable for any miscellaneous taxes. With regard to the soldiers (kunsa) and above, they are also exempted from the labor service required of the kyöngbu (land grant farmer).
With regard to the kyŏng-taebu (ching ta-fu)(high officials) and the old retired officials, they also should be exempted from the land taxa (on the land granted to them--Pyongyang, IV, p.142), and so there will no longer be any need to have pokho (exempt households) in addition to this. How much more so since this law will ensure that everyone who thought to be exempted from taxes will be exempted from taxes. It will not be like the present laws, where you have laws on the books, but no laws in fact.

(subnote: With regard to the clause on pokho in the dynastic law dode (taejŏn), even though it designates able-bodied males and persons (chŏnggu), yet the officials are not able to find out (how many, who) able bodied males and persons there are in a family, so that the common people do their best to deceive (the officials) and the officials don't know what measures to take. It is for this reason that the pokho system cannot be carried out thoroughly. In addition, given the fact that pokho (tax exempt households exist), there is also tax-exempt land (pokchŏn'gyŏl), but this only carries with it an exemption from miscellaneous labor service (chabyŏk). But then this so-called miscellaneous labor service (instead of being eliminated) is (re-)allocated among the various administrative districts, so that (it would be better to?) completely apply exemptions to the households as has been done in the past. For that reason, the more households exempted, the more the burdens on other households acting in place of the exempted households would become, and this is the reason why there would be a lot of obstructions and evils arising in these affairs. All of this is a case where it is easy to establish written (laws) which are difficult to carry out in practice. Thus with regard to these pokho tax exemptions, at the present time (as stipulated in the Taejŏn) absolutely none of them can be carried out.)(end subnote)

(note:The various categories of pokho tax exemptions ought not to be brought up for discussion at this time except for special cases such as
such as those people who die in battle, or alien barbarians who
submit to us, and in these cases we can make special provisions for them.\(\)end note~

\(\textsf{\textbullet~}\) indented section: With regard to those people who die in warfare
or those who die in the performance of public service, they will be exempted
from 20 tu of basic taxes for a period of 3 years. \(\text{(note: determine this}
\text{on the basis of whether the deed was important or small, light or serious.}
\text{If it is a case of a military commander dying out of loyalty, a person who}
\text{should be provided for under the laws for rewards provided by the state,}
\text{these people should not be discussed under this provision.)(end note)}\)

\(\text{In the case of alien barbarians who submit to us (note: at present}
\text{they are called hyanghwa 同化), for a period of 10 years they will be exempted}
\text{from providing soldiers for military service and for a period of 5 years}
\text{they will be exempted from 20 tu of basic \& taxes. \(\text{(note: If it is a case}
\text{of a chieftain, then in accordance with the situation we should provide}
\text{extra rewards, and they, too, should not be included in this discussion.)\(\)\text{end note}\)\)}\)

\(\text{\textbullet~}\) double indented section: The figures for soldiers (military quotas) in our
country prior to the Japanese invasions of the Imjin period \(\text{(note: that is,}
\text{the 25th year of Sŏnjo's reign, 1592)(end note)}\):

\(\text{\textbullet~}\) Regular soldiers, both cavalry and infantry in both the capital and
the provinces, over 180,000 men. The number of both ho and po (people who
perform duty as soldiers and their support personnel) combined
was not quite 400,000 \(\text{(note: This comes from Cho Chung-bong(\text{\textbullet~})'s}
\text{memorial and the Chibong yusŏl (\text{\textbullet~})\}.)

\(\text{\textbullet~}\) The number of troops) in the Ch'ungsunwi, Ch'ungch'anwi and Ch'ongnowi,
the Samwi(\text{\textbullet~})\) is not known. \(\text{(note: I note that}
\text{in the Taejŏn the basic quota for naval soldiers is 48,800 men, but I do not}
\text{know whether at that time they were able to fill this quota or not.)\(\)\text{end note)}\)

\(\text{\textbullet~}\) The number of soldiers at the present time who are regular cavalry and
infantry soldiers, naval soldiers, pyŏltae(\text{\textbullet~})\) units, and various other categories of troops.
With regard to the various types of sog'o troops listed in the comprehensive registers of the Ministry of War at the present time in kyŏngja year (1660) has been increased (over the period before 1592) by the additions of both public and private slaves after the imjin invasions. And as for the Three Guards and the ho and po (military households and their support personnel) of the cavalry and infantry and the Three Guards, all of these people were also all doubled up and formed into the pyŏltae (special units) and sog'o/ (troop units), and for this reason there has been double counting of the Three Guards and the cavalry and infantry in the compilation of these figures.

Hansŏngbu: Three Guards, combined make 222 (men?) with 60 support personnel. 540 regular cavalry and infantry with 1,273 support personnel.

Kyŏnggi province (note: Kaesŏngbu included) Three Guards, 1,083 men with 335 support personnel; 4,700 regular cavalry and infantry with 12,389 support personnel; Naval soldiers; various types of sog'ogun, 26,812.

Kangwŏn province: 384 men in the Three Guards with 189 support personnel; 3,087 regular cavalry and infantry with 8,641 support personnel; naval troops (unspecified); 5,866 various types of sog'ogun

Ch'ungch'ŏng province: 847 men in the Three guards with 776 support personnel; 7,103 regular cavalry and infantry with 17,325 support personnel; naval soldiers unspecified; 20,142 various types of sog'ogun

Cholla province: 482 men in the Three Guards with 109 support personnel; 11,207 regular cavalry and infantry with their 26,707 support personnel; 2,286 naval soldiers, and 27,082 various types of sog'ogun

-the three adm. towns of Cheju: (none of whom stand for actual duty), 47 men in the Three Guards with 64 support personnel; 820 regular cavalry and infantry with their 1,096 support personnel; 372 naval soldiers, and 704 support personnel, and 3,400 various types of sog'ogun.

Kyŏngsang province: 5,122 men in the Three Guards with their 525 support personnel; 9,721 regular cavalry and infantry with their 20,890 support personnel;
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Cap. soldier & Support

66,702 132,160 = 183,258
Naval soldiers unspecified; 35,232 of various types of sog'ogun.

- Hwanghae province: 499 men in the Three Guards with their 209 support personnel (posol); 6,675 regular cavalry and infantry with their 16,190 support personnel; naval soldiers unspecified; 14,182 various types of sog'ogun.

- Hamgyong province (note: none of them are required to stand for duty, sangbŏn) (end note), 1,006 men in the Three Guards with 1,540 support personnel; 7,079 regular cavalry and infantry with their 13,648 support personnel; unspecified number of naval soldiers; 14,712 various types of sog'ogun.

- P'yŏng'an province (note: none of them have to stand for duty) (end note): 832 men in the Three Guards with their 1,262 support personnel; 5,243 regular cavalry and infantry with their 9,018 support personnel; an unspecified number of naval soldiers; and 14,501 various types of sog'ogun.

- Grand total: 10,527 members of the Three Guards (note: service households and their support personnel combined come to 15,604)
- 56,175 regular cavalry and infantry (service households and support personnel combined comes to 183,258)
- An unspecified number of naval soldiers
- 161,928 of various types of sog'ogun.

(My own total of Three Guards, regular soldiers and sog'ogun: 228,630;
total of service households plus support personnel: 360,790)

(Indented note: Yulgok reported to King Sonjo, saying: "There is much that is lacking in the laws and systems of our country. It is just that we have established the official posts of pyŏngsa and susa (provincial army and navy commanders), ch'ŏmsa, manho, and kwŏngwan etc., but we have not provided them with salaries and upkeep. This causes them to get what they need from their troops, and this has given rise to the evil practice whereby the border officers (pyŏngjang) extract funds (from the local populace)
military system

laws and institutions have gradually become lax, and avarice and tyranny have in turn (come to) flourish. Add to this the fact that the selection of officials has not been done fairly (pugong), (so that) military commanders who (know nothing) but how to make loans (ch'aksu) make their appearance one after the other (chôp-mu). And so people openly say that such and such a garrison commander's post is worth so much, and such-and-such a redoubt official's post is valued at so much. These types (of officers) only know how to fleece their troops in order to benefit themselves, and that is all. In addition how would they be concerned (about anything)?

And the soldiers who find long tours of duty on defense (yubang) and as burdensome voluntarily/pay cloth in order to avoid military duty are only too happy to go along with them (the unit commanders). Those who do stay in the garrisons are forced to perform service that they find hard to bear and are made responsible for paying for costs that they find difficult to manage. It's (like) being fried and simmered in the flames of their own fat. People (after all) are not wood and stone, so who wouldn't look out for his own welfare (in a situation like this)? And when they see other people avoiding military service and resting at ease in their own homes, there is no one who wouldn't long for (this too) and also emulate this behavior. If too many people avoid military service and the garrison and redoubts become empty (of military personnel), then this will induce the people who live nearby (the garrisons) and to borrow other people's names and have substitutes checked off whenever inspections are made (by officials) to ferret out corruption. The officials who make the rounds on inspection only inspect the numbers, and that is all they do. Who is there (among them) who checks to see if the numbers are true or false? And on the other hand, even though paying cloth is more convenient (to people) than performing military service, they still find this difficult to do, and for this reason if they perform military
service a couple of times their families become impoverished and unable to support themselves, and the begin to take flight (from their villages) one after the other. And in the next year when an inspection is made of the military registers and people are forced to assume military duty, then their whole clans in their villages are forced to assume military service. And then when the whole clan absconds, the burden is placed on the relatives of the relatives. The calamity has spread like weeds so that there is no limit to it and in the future it will get to the point where the people will have no seed (children) left over. Only the so-called money-chasing military officers (ch'aeksuju) will be both satisfied and will get their way; they will load all the goods they have obtained on carts) and return home with them and show off to their wives and concubines. And those poor people who have become wealthy will offer bribes to powerful persons (families), also in the hopes of gaining promotion or appointment to office; and those who are base (in status) will become noble (kwi).

Those people who discuss this problem at the present time do not think of reforming (abolishing); they only are concerned about the fact that the quotas of troops for military service are not being filled. In my humble opinion, even though the troop quotas were filled, if this evil situation were not reformed, then the effect would be no more than adding amount cloth (collected by the) (to the number of) border military officers (pyoŋjang), and that would be all.

How would it have anything to do with strengthening military defense? This is the first bad thing (evil). (that has to be reformed). It is not/necessary for either naval or land troops (soldiers) to remain on defense duty (on duty for defensive purposes) in the places where they live, they may either be moved several days away or a thousand li away, and not used to the water or land (local conditions) they get sick, they either suffer from the exploitation of their commanding officers or from the low esteem in which they are held by local soldiers (t'obyōng). They are yoked, suffering from cold, and starving and must the time (to till their fields).
It is even worse for the soldiers from the south who have to go on duty along the northern frontier. They get thin and emaciated and their faces are lacking in color. If they happen to meet up with enemy cavalry, even if they should want to take flight from them, they are not able to do so (don't even have the strength to run away) but just sit there and get slaughtered. How much less hope is there that they could draw a bow and check the enemy's advance? I have heard that when the cavalry soldiers from Hwanghae province go on duty in P'yongan province, the expenses for one trip is necessarily no less than 30-40 p'ii of cloth. 30-40 p'ii of cloth is equal to the production of several village families. If one tour of duty uses up the production of several families, how can they avoid being impoverished and taking flight? This is the second evil.

The law providing for the military registers to be compiled very 6 years has been abandoned and is not carried out. In kyech'uk year (Myongjong 8, 1553) (it was ordered) that all those left out by the failure to compile the military registers for such a long period of time be investigated. Those officials who received orders to do this felt that if they did an urgent and strict job, it would be well done (able). (The result was) that in the chu and hyön (districts), they were influenced (by this attitude) and were only afraid lest they not be up to it (do a quick amat job). They only thought that in making the investigations they might leave someone out, and they did not give a thought to the fact that by peremptorily (in a rushed, careless manner) enrolling someone for military service, they might be bequainting future problems (for these people). As a result all the beggars were enrolled (on the military rosters), and even the names of chickens and dogs were put on the military registers. And in no more than one or two years, the vast majority of these registers became worthless major action records. At the present time it is over 20 years (since this was done—ca. 1575?), and the deficiencies (missing men) in the troop quotas is still worse than it was in 1553, and the small numbers of idle able-bodied males is
military system -162- pyöngje α

424, 21:69a) also worse than it was in 1553. No matter how much skill is used in investigating troops for the military registers, is it possible to make dumplings without flour? At the present time with regard to those who have been ferreted out (for military service), if they are not small children, then they are beggars, and if they are not beggars, then they are aristocrats (sajok-sa) (sons of the yangban--Pyongyang, IV, 147), so could there in fact be a few idle able-bodied males (available for military service)? Even if we were to register troops for military service at the present time, in no time at all we would have compiled empty (worthless) registers. It is not that the Ministry of War is not aware of this, yet no matter how much they think about it, still their only response is that you have to recruit more men for service, and this is just an extreme case of their failure to consider the right way of doing it and the situation that exists.

This is the third evil (that has to be reformed).

There are very many categories of commoner labor service in the capital and provinces, so many that one cannot list them all, but among these those that are said to be the most onerous type of labor service are the chöri and najang (and other clerks). In these cases, too, one can compensate for actual labor service by paying cloth, and that is all. The bureaus to which these men are attached also use other men to substitute for them, and at odd times they make extortionate demands on the chöri to pay the fees in lieu of service for those who are supposed to perform duty (sangch'ae-k). The chöri also have to pay interest on these debts, and if you calculate the total cost to them, it comes to three times what the original person would have had to pay (to get out of service). And for that reason one man always has to assume the labor service burdens of three men, and if there are any who cannot pay for it, then their whole families are required to pay. This is the fourth evil (that has to be eliminated).

These 4 evils have not been rectified up to the present time, and after
a few more years (go by), even the best of men would not know what to do about it. I humbly hope that the king will carry out a reform of the old system (ch'ŏnha kyŏngjang kūku kuje) and establish new regulations. And in addition to the grain carried on the accounts of the administrative towns where the provincial army and navy commanders and garrisons and redoubts are located, we should grant more than enough rations for the pyŏnjang (border commanders). And if the grain in the adm. towns (where they are located) is not sufficient, then we should collect it from adjacent districts to make sure that the border commanders have enough to support themselves and what they need and are without deficiencies (shortages). And we should make sure that the laws and system is strict in terms of the length of cloth (measures) and the measures of grain to see to it that they cannot extort (anything) from their soldiers. We should only see that they train the troops, keep the weapons in good shape and instruct and train the cavalry in shooting the bow and arrow.

The provincial army and navy commanders and those officials who make the rounds inspecting (the troops and garrisons?) will not only call out the names and check to see who is missing (from the rosters, ranks); they must also inspect the weapons and test the cavalry in shooting to see if they are well trained or not, and make promotions or dismissals on this basis. If, as before, they extort funds from the troops and release them from duty (kŏmch'aek pangjol), and it is discovered, then they should be dealt with under the laws for embezzlement.

As for the Ch'ŏmsa, Manhŏ, Kwŏngwan, and other (military officers), irrespective of whether they are (from, in) the south or north, from a far-off distance or nearby, all of them should be assigned a military post and should be given salaries for the support of their wives and sons (children). And when such men are given their first appointment, you must select the right men (for the job), and after they are selected they should be investigated (reviewed) five times and should have
to pass all five inspections (reviews), and then they should (be promoted) from the post of Kwŏn'gwan to Manho, and from Manho to Ch'ŏmsa, and from Ch'ŏmsa they should be appointed to a 6th rank post in the Tongban (eastern file--civil administration). If, in these 5 reviews of their performance, someone should score "middle" (in grade), then he should just be shifted to another garrison of equivalent (rank) and should not be promoted to a higher post so that he would be made to think about his previous (performance?, standards?) (so that he should be made to rely on his previous standards?).

will be urged to be diligent. And when they go to the garrison to serve on defense duty, they must command troops from the adm. district (where they are located), and only when the troops in the district are not numerous enough should they be allowed to designate other troops from neighboring districts. And in the places where they serve on defense duty, all other kinds of commoner labor service should be done away with; the only form of labor service to be retained is service on defense in the garrison (yubang), so that they will not be used on labor at far off distances. And they should divide the men into shifts (pŏn) which will be rotated on and off duty, and when the men are on duty in the garrison, (their clerks) cause they will not have the slightest additional expenses to pay which will exhaust their strength or damage their finances; as the servants (saryŏng) of the garrison commanders, they will only carry firewood and do nothing else. They will not be given anything else to do so that they will be made to devote all their attention to training in the bow and practicing shooting. And in the case of the cavalry from Hwanghae province who serve on military duty in the north, then the king will order this abolished. If there should be fear that the defense of the frontier might be lax (weak), then the magistrates along the seacoast should be ordered to instruct the people and train them in shooting; they should test them once every 3 months in shooting arrows, and give rewards to those...
who hit the target the most times. Those who are the best two times should have their family members exempted from military service. In the case of soldiers who score best 5 times, they should be made special supplementary kun'gwan (軍營官), and (the magistrates) should select from among them those who have knowledge and are suited for leading the troops and memorialize their names to the Ministry of War and make them supplementary (candidate?) kwŏn'gwan (橫管), and by this means test whether a man can be used in office or not. In the case of public or private slaves, then memorialize (report) their names and give them special permission to be exempted from slave status. If they are private slaves, then provide a price which is more than (their market) value to their masters (판주). If the system is done like this, then the number of those who score highest 5 times will be extremely rare (few), and yet all the people along the frontier will be converted into crack troops.

If there should be some emergency along the frontier, then every man will be able to save himself and who would there be who would not do his best (give his all) in fighting?

With regard to the troops serving on duty, the officials in charge of them should also from time to time examine them in military skills and report the best of them and recommend them for awards. Those who score the best 5 times should be given special supplemental posts and promoted to the pst of kun'gwan in the garrisons and forts near where they live, making sure that they have the desire to be well trained in their occupations.

And when it comes to registering soldiers, one should strive to obtain real soldiers and not just haphazardly fill up the (quotas of troops) with idle able-bodied males. And in the case of those who are not yet 15 years of age, they should only record their names and cha (capping names) and ages on a special register and make them wait until they come of age before they are entered on the (regular troop) rosters. All beggars should be stricken from the rosters.
As for the military registers in the district towns, for the time being retain the old figures (quotas) and just record those few names of those positions not filled and ordered the magistrate to afford the local people some ease and security so that they will work hard and will not be lazy, and then when the opportunity affords itself they (the magistrate) will find people to fill in the military service rosters, and without setting any time limits the (required number of soldiers) will all be filled.

Furthermore, every six years there usually must be a re-recording (of the sudden (unexpected) military rosters) to see to it that there is no fear of/confusion (changjol soyul). If you should be concerned that there will not be enough soldiers and you will not be able to perform the service required of a given place, then you can reduce the quotas of on-duty soldiers. And if there are still are not enough, then you can reduce the quotas of troops in areas that are less important for defense. And if there still are not enough, then from the south you can reduce the number of troops who are supposed to serve on station on defense during the winter months. And if there still are not enough, then you can exempt half of the infantry who pay a cloth fee (instead of service?) and use them to fill in the missing slots of those soldiers who must serve in the garrisons on defense. Once the system of service in the garrisons (for the troops) on defense has been freed of the evil of extortion and tyrannical treatment, then the infantry soldiers will also not behave like people trying to hide from fierce tigers.

As for the so-called choye and najang and other clerks, it is not necessary that each of them be assigned to an agency; you can abolish all these names (titles) and change them into infantry who pay a cloth fee (nap kap'o) to the Ministry of War. The Ministry of War will calculate the numbers of men needed to stand for service in each bureau and provide the cloth fees (to them), so that the choriwill be able to avoid irregular demands made on them (for service), and there will no longer be such tyrannical exactions on the people where they have to pay 3 times what is due.
This is the grand outline of the gest policy for military administration. The objective of these five proposals is to guarantee the ease (security) of the people (admin). In general, like this, the details of the proposals only have to be put before the king and enacted, and that is all.

(Yulgok) also said: In raising (nurturing) soldiers, the basic thing to do is to take care of (raise) the people. Since ancient times up to the present, I have never heard where anyone has been able to raise (train) soldiers without being able to nurture the people. (In the state of Wu), the army of Fu-ch'a (夫差) was so strong that there was none that could match it throughout the world, but the reason why that state in the end was ruined (fen chi kuo) was because they did not nurture (yangmin, guarantee the livelihoods of) (take care of) their people. At the present time the strength of the people has already been exhausted, and there are murmurs of grievances in the four quarters of the country (四方感々). If a great enemy (were to make its appearance), then even though we had Chu-kuo (Liang) sitting there making our strategy or Han Hsin (或) or Pai Chi (或) couldn't do anything about it to command our armies, we still wouldn't know what to do. And this all stems from the fact that the distribution of burdens among various types of soldiers is not equal. Those who are at rest (have less burdens) are somewhat able to guarantee (their own livelihood), while those who have heavy burdens have to abscond. And when they abscond, their whole families are exploited and poisoned until it develops into a tragic situation. And what is the worst thing is that whole villages have become empty (ghost towns) because of this. In my opinion we should select worthy and able men and establish a bureau to be entrusted with charge of the military registers, to move and shift the burdensome and easy service and make the military service burdens uniform (among all the people). And in the case of soldiers who have absconded and are missing for more than three years, fill their places with ideal able bodied males (hanjông) to take their place. It is necessary to see to it that all the various types of soldiers are able to...
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424, 21:70b) secure their own support (livelihoods) and be without fear that (the officials) will extort payment from their families (relatives). Thus after the (new) bureau (in charge of the military registers) is established, then those appointed to take charge of affairs can investigate and study (the registers?)."

When Yulgok was governor of Hwanghae province (Haesŏ), the naval soldiers who came from mountainous regions wanted to become land soldiers, while the land soldiers who lived along the seacoast wanted to become naval soldiers. Yulgok requested this in a memorial to the throne, and the two types of soldiers were changed, but the man who held the post of governor after Yulgok was discharged abolished the reform and returned to the old system.

Yulgok reported to King Sŏnjo, saying: At the present time in our country war horses are very precious, and if there should be some incident requiring the mobilization of the troops and horses, we would only have infantry, and that would be all. How could we stand up to an enemy if they had cavalry and all we had was infantry? At the present time we have registers listing horses on islands, but in they do not exist in fact, and (their numbers) are shrinking by the year and month. Even if we should not want to intentionally lose them, these horses are scattered everywhere throughout the islands and are no different from field beasts (wild horses?). They cannot be used in an emergency. In my opinion, those soldiers in the capital and provinces who are good at riding and shooting should be examined for talent and the best of them should be selected and sent to the horse grazing areas. And the Tosa of their province (subnote: this post is equivalent to the present-day Ohu) and the kamgwan (subnote) of their home district will also supervise this and send the soldiers to the grazing grounds to select those horses most suitable for military use, and in the order of their qualification distribute them (to the troops), record their ages, the color of
their coats, how big they are, and how tall they are, in feet and inches.

Three copies of the record will be made. One will be sent up to the Ministry of War; one will be sent up to the Saboksi, and one will be kept in their home magistrate's (yamen), and the troops will be required to take care of their own horses. Every year in the winter, in the capital the Saboksi and in the provinces the home district will investigate to see if the horses are fat or thin, and on this basis give out rewards or punishment. If a horse dies, it will be reported to the official who will investigate the cause of death. If the horse dies before it is 5 years old, then (the soldier will be required to pay for its value. If it dies at an age older than 5, then the soldiers will not be required to pay for it. When war occurs, then the registers will be inspected and horses mobilized to be fighting (war) horses. If the person (in charge of the horse) is to join the army, then he will be allowed to take his own horse with him. If things are done like this, then the horses on grazing grounds on the islands will not be useless, and when war comes we will have horses (to fight with). And if we are to buy Chinese and Nuchen horses, we should also use this method and distribute them to the soldiers, so that those who engage in military occupations will have no fear that they won't have horses, and the state will have the wherewithal to meet emergencies."

Cho Chung-bong returned from a mission to China and submitted a report on the methods for military training in which he said:

Our state's methods of military training are not carried out several times during the year, and even when we do conduct training (exercises), the ranks of the troops are not clear and the banners and drums are not in order, and anyone who observes (the training) would think that they are only like children playing games. If it is like this during peacetime, what could we do during wartime? Even though we have regulations requiring soldiers on duty to train in shooting once a month, the officials in charge of training commonly only receive
425, 21:71a) a piece of paper from the absentees and there is absolutely no training in the methods of shooting the bow and arrow. If this is the way it is in the capital bureaus, then who can we hold responsible in the provinces? In my humble opinion, even though our court should want to conduct training on a daily basis, the situation is such that we are not able to do so.

Generally speaking, the military system of China is such that it provides five soldiers with/yŏjong (extra personnel, support personnel) in both the capital and provinces. Officials provide the funds for (purchasing) a horse. (subnote: That is 15 liang of silver. If the man in charge of taking care of the horse dies, then half the cost of the horse is received (from that man's family?) and given to the yŏjong (support personnel) who take care of the horse in the deceased man's place, and the officials provide the other half of the cost to the yŏjong.) (end subnote)

And in addition they provide food and cloth. (subnote: One soldiers receives two khsit'um and one-half chien of cash and in winter, 1 p'il of cloth. From fall to spring they provide 3 ch'ien for fodder for the horse.) (end subnote)

The officials provide all the armor, bows and arrows, and spears and swords, and for this reason both soldiers and horses are well provided for, and weapons are sharp and in good order, and the men engaged in military training every day so that there is no concern about the state of the army.

21:71b) In our dynasty (by contrast), the soldiers only have one or two support personnel (poin), and either they are unable to provide for their horses, equipment and weapons, for everyone has to provide his own items. At times borrows equipment from when inspections are conducted, everyone commonly ratissaxăm someone else, and if they cannot do so, then they pay a few tu of rice to the clerks, and by this means what does not exist is treated as if it did exist.

As for the men who stand for regular duty in the Special Royal Guards (Pyŏlsiw), even though they have their salaries, they are not given (what is due them).
What they are supposed to receive at the beginning of winter they have not yet received by the spring. As for the soldiers in the provinces, after they serve on duty it is difficult for them to stay around/waiting (to get paid, for the next training period when they would get paid?). And so they have to sell off (their horses) for 1 sok when (the horse) would normally bring 4 sok (of rice), and then they return home, and yet they still are concerned about starving. How then could they keep their horses in the capital in order to wait (for the next) training session? The fact that they have to use up their grain rations and hire horses is because the situation makes it necessary for them to do so. It is the custom of our eastern (land) that we make (the soldiers) responsible for providing their own food and drink, and there is not a place where this evil does not prevail, but it is even worse for the soldiers. As for how many times the practices of sillae (新来, newcomers?), chimyoun (知面, :being acquainted with one another?), and hyangmi(鄉味, :the taste of hometown food?) occur, I don't know how many times (they happen). And without even waiting for the commanding officers to make extortionate demands, (the soldiers) are forced to make payments to subordinate officers like the mess and changmu(掌務). The (soldiers) have to sell off their land and bankrupt their families, and still it is not enough. Only after we have first abolished this evil will the problems of the soldiers be slightly relieved.

In those places where there are a lot of slaves attached to the provincial commanders' headquarters and garrisons, you can use them to carry firewood and water and take care of the kitchen (mess). Also you can divide up and distribute the price of the horses of the kun'gwon (軍官) and privately release them from military service in order to collect (from them?) funds for clothing. Definitely if you use soldiers to take charge of carrying firewood and water and taking care of the cooking (kitchens), their burdens will be too hard to bear, and for this reason you should hire men to do this at double the wages to take their places.
Those who do not stand for duty as substitutes will either weave horsehair hats or weave fish nets, so how could they find the spare time for training in shooting the bow and arrow? It is necessary (therefore) to see to it that soldiers do not act as substitutes for the labor service of slaves, for only if they do not can they use their labor exclusively for shooting and riding. If with regard to these kinds of evils we do not make provisions and regulations (reforms) and are only concerned about diligence in training, then the resentment of the soldiers will grow greater day by day, and on the contrary, they will suffer harm.

--- Yu Sŏn-nam, author of the Chingbikok (戦守機宜), active during the Imjing wars) (P'yŏngyang, IV, p.395) in his ch'ŏnsu kiŭi (Fundamentals of Military Defense) said:

"With regard to military methods (p'yŏngbop), the most important thing is the formation of the troops into ranks (sog'o). And what is meant by this so-called "formation of troops into ranks" (sog'o) is dividing them up into numbers (quotas, punsu). For this reason a former Confucian scholar said that the reason why Han Hsin (한신: famous general of the Han dynasty) was able to manage troops better the more he had of them was only because he clearly divided them into numbers (quotas). Sun-tzu (孫子) said: "You control large numbers (of troops) like you control small numbers, and you do it by dividing them into numbers (small units)."

In our country we do not have even one general who knows the method of forming soldiers into ranks and dividing them up into numbers (units) (sog'o punsu). And every time there is a war (fighting), the soldiers are good at scattering (taking flight). How said! And how extreme the confusion. In general, what is meant by forming the soldiers into units (sog'o) means that the Guards (wi) will command the pu (部門: units), and the pu will command the banners (ki), and the ki will command the companies the tae (隊: and the tae will command the squads (お). No matter whether the number of troops you are dealing with is a thousand, ten thousand,
a hundred thousand, or a million, if you do not use the method for subdividing them into (hierarchical) units (pun-su) and bind them into a tight organization so that there is no confusion, then how will you and how can you move and use them? be able to get all of them to carry out commands? But if the division of the troops into (hierarchical units) is made clear, then it will be like when the meshes of a net are tied together so that a single net is sufficient to control 10,000 meshes (squares?); or like when the branches of a tree are connected to the roots so that one root is sufficient to link together 10,000 branches. For this reason, if one regiment commands 5 companies, then you only have to issue orders to 5 people (company commanders). And when one company commands three banners (ki), and one banner commands three platoons (tae), then you only have to issue orders to three men, and that is all. If one platoon commands 2 squads, then you only have to issue orders to 5 men (5 men in a squad?; 5 must be garbled for 2, Pyongyang IV, p.153 translates this as 2 men; Han, p.150 says 5 men, as in the text).

The more the men that have to be commanded, the more minute are the subdivisions (of the units), and the more subdivided the units, the more refined (efficient) is your ability to maintain surveillance over them. This is the main principle of the method of (organizing) soldiers.

Therefore, in peacetime, you use this in order to command the soldiers, then both the officers and men will be tied together and it will be easy to train them. And in wartime (when they go out to meet the enemy), if you use (these principles of organization) in leading them to battle, their arms and fingers will be so intertwined that no one will either lag behind or get too far ahead. And only when things are like this can you say that you have a well-ordered army (chŏl-če chi sam).

Among the generals of today, there is not asingle man who knows how to do this.

As for the so-called court officials (chogwan) and yangban, those who have a slight knowledge of shooting the bow are called kun'gwan.
425, 21:72a) (military officers) and they are gathered at the tents (of the generals in the field) and are only assigned duties of assisting the commanders or running errands for them, and that is all. And when it comes to the troops, in all cases their magistrates (in the towns where they live), when the time comes (when necessary, temporarily) mobilize them for duty and send them off. Basically they do not know anything about fighting, and they have no units, such as tae, o, ki and ch'ö (隊伍號哨) to which they are attached. They are in confusion and without order, make a big racket (noise) and (ruan around) in confusion, not knowing what to do with their hands, feet, ears or eyes. And then all of a sudden these men are placed in the midst of arrows and stones where they have to fight to the death and (are ordered) to give their all in fighting and gaining a victory over the enemy. Is this not indeed difficult (impossible)?

The method for organizing troops (sog'o) is to be found in the Chi-hsiao hsin-shu (紀功新書), which is extremely clear in what it says about this. If men of will can get a hold of this book and can copy it in organizing the troops, then with regard to the way of moving soldiers and checking the enemy, their thoughts will exceed by half (what they need to do the job?).)