Hsun-tzu discussed military tactics with Lin-mu-ch'un (林武君) general of the state of Ch'u) before Hsiao-ch'eng wang (孝成王) of the state of Chao. The king said: I would like to ask you about the essentials of military affairs. Hsun-tzu responded: The essence (of military affairs) depends on the people. In the army of moral men, those above and below are of one mind. The three armies (the whole force) combines its strength. The relationship of a subject to his lord, and the attitude of abordinates to superiors is like the way sons and younger brothers treat their fathers and elder brothers, or like the hands and arms guard the head and eyes, or cover the chest and stomach. Therefore, the essentials of armies (military affairs) is to be found in relying on the people, and that's all there is to it. The people of the state of Ch'i esteemed military ability and they gave cash awards to anyone who brought
one head (of an enemy), but this was not the right way to reward people.

The men of Ch'i called brave and strong men who attacked and cut off the heads of the enemy, gave him a cash award. The term ponsang (本賞) means that rewards are received for the same acts of merit. If a man cut off a head, then even though the battle was lost, he still was given a reward. And if he did not cut off a head, then even though the battle was won, he was not given a reward. This is what was meant by the phrase, "there was no basic (proper) reward system".

If then the battle was a small affair and the enemy was weak (弱), then you can with pleasure use this method (以克用之), but if it was a major battle and the enemy was strong, then your men would scatter in confusion. This is the kind of army that would lead to the loss of a state (destruction of a nation, mangguk chi pyǒng 亡國之兵).

This (kind of an army) is similar to one that would be recruited by going to the market place and hiring men to fight.

The state of Wei has its wu-tsu (武臣) who are recruited according to xiquan. (note: They select man who are brave in fighting and call them wu-tsu. "To select them according to xiquan standards (to ch'wi chi 度取之) means that they select them according to standard about whether their skills and strength are long or short (good or bad)."

They clothe them with three types of armor (note: explains the names for three pieces of armor that cover the top, middle and lower portion of the body and are connected together), and they hold 12 stones' worth of (note: weighs 120 kǔn--used to calculate the strength needed to pull the bow) They have 50 arrows and the keep their spears above (them). They wear helmets on their heads (戴) and have swords at their waist and are provided with 3-days rations of food. They can march 100 li in a day.
attack and defense -40- pyeongje kosól

p.460, 23:30a) If they pass the test (chungsi 中試), then their households are exempted from taxation (pok ki ho 撄起畝), and their lands and houses are treated beneficially. Even though their vim and vigor (strength) declines after several years, their tax exemptions and privileges are not taken away from them. Even though (responsibilities for military service) are changed and given to someone else, there is no change (in their exemptions and grants) which are left alone.

(note: the phrase, li ki ch'ŏn-t'ae (利耕田宅) means that they are granted land and houses to convenience or benefit them...)

As a result, no matter how great the territory (that the state of Wei possesses), their tax revenues must shrink. And this is the kind of army (military system) that will place a state in danger. (note: Because the state's resources become impoverished, that's why the state will be in danger.)(end note)

In the state of Ch'in, the common people live in a state of poverty (貧困), while the officials who command them 使使 are cruel and fierce (ki saminya kongyŏn 使使蠻心狠). (note: The phrase (使使) means that the people of Ch'in live in a place that is steep and strong. The term cruel and fierce means that they are given severe punishments.)(end note) They make them accustomed to what they want by giving them honors and rewards (使之以賜), and they control them by the use of punishments (使之以刑罰). (note: ch'iu(使之) means chih(使): make them dependent?)(end note)

They make it so that the people have no choice but to fight for the benefit of the king(ruler) (使民所以要利於上者無由). When they act meritoriously they are given rewards; they select the best men and make the chiefs of the wu-chia(五家) and put them in charge of 5 families. (above is Pyongyang, 4, 242; Han, 4, 276 translates this as: They regard one another as superior by means of merit and rewards, and if someone cuts off 5 heads of the enemy, he gets command over 5 families.)
p.460, 23:30a) (note: Those that perform meritorious acts are rewarded. The phrase sasangjang(.pitched) means that if they obtain 5 armored heads, then 5 families in the local village are attached to them for service)(end note)

This (system) is the best way to get an army with many strong men that will last for a long time. Nevertheless, soldiers who plan to obtain rewards and seek profit has never been the way to have a stable (secure) system and proper moral standards. (note: anje(secure) means to be secure in your institutions and not try to exceed the limits of propriety.

The phrase (extremely proper) means to be extremely proper in one's behavior so that one's mind never commits wrong (thinks in error, of wrongdoing)(end note).

Therefore, the skilled fighters (igyok 技勇) of the state of Ch'í are no match for the wu-tsu(军队) soldiers of the Wei, and the wu-tzu soldiers of Wei are not match for the sharp troops (剑士) of Ch'in, and the sharp troops of Ch'in are no match for the proper and well regulated (chol-che節制) armies of Duke Huan of Ch'i(桓) or Duke Wen of Chin(文). The proper and well regulated troops of Dukes Huan and Wen are not match for the humane and ritheous soldiers of Kings T'ang(湯) and Wu(吳). The reason for this is that (in the cases of the lesser armies), they recruit men by dragging them out (by force), or (by paying them) or (they train them) in the ways of deception (deceiving people) and pursuing profit (note...)

It is by virtue and moral transformation (li-i chiao-hua) that one unifies armies (ch'i chih 氣之)(note: The means of unifying the men is to get their minds to be obedient.)(end note) Therefore, if the soldiers (armies) are greatly united, then you can control the world; if they are only slightly united, you can control your neighboring enemies. If your armies are recruited by force or by the payment of money, or if they are trained in deception and the pursuit of profit, there will be no telling which will win or which will lose; there will be nothing to choose
attack and defense -42- pyŏngje kosŏl

p.460, 23:30b) between them. These are what are called bandit armies (troops); a princely man (chŭn-tzu) would not act that way (pu yu

(note: The king also asked (Hsŭn-tzu) about generals, and Hsun-tzu replied: You want to keep your commands strictly (want to have them strictly obeyed), you use awe (dignity) to do it; and if you want to have rewards and punishment, you must use trust. If you want your buildings to be drawn up in a circle (for defense), you must make them strong. If you want your troops to advance and retreat in security (stability), be heavy (weighty). If you want your men to move quickly to spy on the enemy and observe changes in the situation, you want them to be deeply quiet (secret). If you want the troops formed into ranks when they meet the enemy and join in battle, you must definitely carry out what we know (are clear about) and do not do what we are doubtful about. The above are called the 6 tactics. (sul) You must not have (men, generals?) who are covetous (of booty?) and dislike stopping (on command). You must not have men who are lazy when there is a victory and who are forgetful of what it is to be defeated. You must not have (commanders) who are stern at home but easygoing on the outside (regard the foreigners lightly?). You must not have those who seek profit and are not thoughtful of the harm involved. When you give thought to affairs, you must do it thoroughly, and when you use resources, you must be liberal. These are what are called the 5 handles of authority (ch'ūan).

It may be all right to kill, but you cannot allow (your forces) to stop in an unsafe (unprotected) place; it may be all right to kill, but you can't allow an attack to take place when there is no chance of winning. It may be all right to kill, but you cannot allow the common people to be deceived. These are what are called the san-chih(3 utmosts).

The accomplishment of all affairs must depend on being serious in their execution. Failure must be a product of laxity in doing them.
If your seriousness is victorious over your laziness, then you are lucky. If your laziness is victorious (is greater than?) your seriousness, then you will be wiped out. If your planning is greater than your desire, things will follow (your desires, what you want), but if your desires exceed your planning, then you will be ruined. Attack is like defense, being on the move (march) is like the attack, doing something because of merit is like being lucky. Carefully carry out this 6 methods, 5 authoritities and 3 requisites (yuksul samchi) and carry them out with respect and seriousness and without laxity, and such men will be called the generals of the world.

Lin Wu-chiin (林武臣) said: Very good. I would like to ask what constitutes the military system of a true king (wangja chi kunje).

Hsün-tzu replied: (When) the generals die while beating their drums (chang sa ku), when the horse riders (cavalry) die holding the reins of their horses (yu ssu), when the officials die at their posts (jobs); when the shih-ta-fu die on the march—(that's the way things should be?). When the men hear the sound of the drum, they advance, and when they hear the sound of the bell (gong), they retreat. Those who follow orders are regarded as the best; those who have performed meritorious deeds are regarded as the next best men. They do not kill the old and the weak; they do not hunt in fields where plants are planted; they do not take prisoner those who submit, and they do not pardon those who resist (ke, kyok). They do not capture those who run for their lives (punmyong), and when they execute (cut off the heads of people), it is not the common people they execute, it is those who cause the people to rebel that they execute. Any of the people who protect bandits are also bandits. Those who submit to the blade live, and those who resist it, die. Those who run for their lives, you tax. You can
attack and defense -44- pyŏngje kosŏl

p.461, 23:3la) carry out executions, but you cannot attack a city and butcher the people if they do not fight. You do not move the army secretly and you do not stay among the people for a long time, and when moving the army, you do not exceed the deadlines. It is for that reason that people who cause confusion enjoy their administration, and those who cause discontent among their superiors want to get their (and drive them out)?

Lin Wu-ch'un said: Good. Then Chen (? 陳) asked: When former kings discussed armies (military affairs), they regarded virtue and righteousness as the root. But if that is so, then of what use are armies (soldiers)?

Hsun-tzu replied: Humaneness is to be sparing of other people and for that reason to dislike doing harm to others. Righteousness is to act in accordance with correct principle and therefore to dislike causing confusion to others. Therefore, the purpose of armies (soldiers) is to prohibit cruelty and to eliminate harm, it is not for people to contend with one another to take away (each other's property, land?). (end note)

--- Yang Kuei-shan ( 楊夔山: powerful man of the Sung dynasty) said: Since the time when the Yellow Emperor established the chiu-sheng (丘乘) system upon which the administration of military affairs depended, down through the ages they have followed this. In the Chou dynasty it became more detailed. When the troops were living at home (chul ) they were organized into pi, hu, tsu, tang, chou, and hsiang (比閩道州鄉 ), and when they were sent out (to fight), they were organized into wu, liang, ch'un, and shih (使兩軍師 ). They were made to protect and love one another, and in administering punishments and giving out rewards, they used a uniform standard for both. The Son of Heaven, during peacetime would conduct three hunts every year for the purpose of making ancestral offerings, feeding his guests and providing for his kitchens, and that was all. Even though this system...
p.461, 23:3lb) lax and incomplete, nevertheless the king personally (went to the hunting or training field) with his drum in hand in order to teach the troops how to sit and stand, advance and retreat. If there were any who did not follow orders, they were executed punished or executed. So strictly was training conducted that when the soldiers of the 6 hsiang went out (to fight), in every case they won a victory, and the reason for it was because regulations were carried out strictly from the first (wiryong so haeng go ya).

It has been a long time since the chiu-ching system was abolished and we cannot recombine soldiers and peasants (into one), but we must study the system of military organization of the wu, liang, chün, and shih and see to it that in peacetime they protect and love one another and that they are either punished or rewarded. If we use them at time of war, then we should instruct them in the commands to be used to the troops, and require that they know what the order of flags and commands are. Those who do not follow orders must be executed without pardon so that the officers and men will stand in awe of us and not be in awe of (afraid of) the enemy; and only then can (the men) be used (as good soldiers). If the method of organizing the men into ranks is not put in order, then even if you have an army of a million men, it would be like raising a bad boy--you can't use him (for anything) (if they would be useless).

The tradition (ch'ın :Pyongyang, 4, 243, says suhntzu) says:

23:32a) "The sharp troops of Ch'in were no match for the proper and well-regulated (chih chüe) troops of the states of Ch'i and Chin; and the proper and regulated troops of Ch'i and Chin were no match for the humane and righteous troops of T'ang and Wu." In my opinion, even though you have troops that are humane and righteous, if you are lacking in proper order and regulation (chüe), then you still won't be able to take a victory. The Kan-shih( ) chapter (of the shu-ching) says:
and

If you are on the left, you do not attack the left, then you are not following orders; if you are on the right and do not attack the right, then you are not following orders. Execute anyone, and together with their family, who does not follow orders.

The Mu-shih (牧誓) section of the Shih-ching says: "Don't go more than 6 or 7 paces and then stop and unify (your ranks there). Don't go beyond 4, 5, 6, or 7 attacks, and then stop and unify your ranks there." 

With orders and regulations (制), were as strict as this, and for this reason the sages wrote this down in the classics in order to provide a method for future generations. Thus Chu-ko Liang (諸葛孔明), said: "If you have well regulated troops (有制之兵), then even if your generals are hapless, you cannot lose, but if your troops are not well ordered (制), then even though you have able generals, you cannot win." This says it exactly.

Ch'ao Ta'o (趙壹: political figure of the Western Han) said to Han Wen-ti: At the present time the Hu people (in the north) have in several places changed their herds and conducted their hunts below the strategic places (on our frontier), sometimes reaching Yen (燕: 遼) or Tai (代: 蔡) or Tai (代: 鄭) or the northern area (北地), Shang-chün (上郡), and Lung-hsi (陇西) areas. They have come because we have few soldiers on the frontier. If the emperor does not do something to save the situation, then the people living on the frontier will lose hope. If you only send out a few men to save them, then it won't be enough, and if you send out a lot of soldiers, by the time they arrive at the far-off districts, the Hu barbarians will also already have departed. If you gather the troops together and do not dismiss them, this will cause deep problems, while if you do dismiss them all (to return home), then the Hu barbarians will return again.

If this goes on for several years, then China will become impoverished.
and defense -47- pyŏngje kosŏl

p.461, 23:32b) and the people will not be at ease. (secure). If the emperor were fortunately to be concerned about the frontier and send generals and officials and troops in order to control the strategic places, this would be of very great benefit. However, to order the troops in the far-off regions to defend the strategic places for one year, you still cannot tell what the Hu-jen barbarians will do, so it is not as good as selecting people to be permanent residents of the frontier, to have them build their homes there and cultivate the fields and to make preparations for defense. Have them build high walls and deep moats and first make their houses and prepare agricultural tools and give them clothing and food for winter and summer. Then if the Hu barbarians come, they will be able to stop them, and you can take half their herds and give them to the hsien magistrate as payment (reward) to the people (who live on the border). If things are done like this, then the towns and villages will be able to save each other, and even if the Hu barbarians come, they will not avoid (risking) death (to fight them). This will be because they will want to preserve their relatives and increase their wealth. This would be 10,000 times more effective than bringing in soldiers from the eastern regions who are not used to the terrain and who in their hearts would be afraid of the Hu people.

(note: Ch'ao Ts'o also said: If the emperor fortunately recruits people to follow one another off to the frontier in order to strengthen the strategic places and has them settle down in military camps, this will cost less than sending an army there, and it will be of great benefit. The lower officials should sincerely be able to fulfill the emperor's warm intentions and carry out his clear methods and preserve and take pity on the old and week among the soldiers (p men). They should treat the young able-bodied men well and pacify their minds and not oppress them. As for those who get there first, if they rest at ease and in happiness and do not think of their old home towns, then the poor people will recruit
p. 462, 23:33a) Each other and urge each other to go. I hear that in ancient times they moved people to the distant frontiers in order to fill up the broad and empty spaces, and that the ancients established hsien along the frontier in order to prepare defenses against the enemy. When the people got there, they had places to live, and places to cultivate. This was the reason why the people took lightly the fact that they were leaving their old home villages and urged people to go to the new towns. They had 5 families form into wu (wu), and they were organized further into 10 lien (lien). The people of a single town shared life and death and aided one another and their homes were completely secure, and this was the reason that the people were happy in these places and had the desire to live there for a long time. While they were at home (during peacetime), they practice the methods of shooting, and when they went out (to fight), they instructed them in ways of meeting the enemy. If the soldiers and 5-family units are in order in the inside (at home), then the army will be correctly determined on the outside (on expeditions); they will follow instructions (training) and gather in plentiful harvests. Do not allow them to move to other places. When they are children, they will play with one another, and when they are grown up, they will share the same tasks, and if during night fighting they recognize the sound of each other’s voices, then this will enable them to help one another. If in the daytime they recognize each other by sight, then this will help them to recognize each other, and they will be happy and love one another, which will help them to share death together. And if you encourage them with liberal rewards and overawe them with heavy punishments, then they will move to the front to risk death against the enemy and will not retrace their steps (retreat). (end note)
Liu Chih said to Te-tsung of the T'ang (780-805): "If a (true) king wants to defend his territory (feng-chiang, and guard against the invasions of the northern barbarians, then he should select the soldiers of the frontier garrisons and station them (there). In ancient times, those (rulers) who were good at selecting and stationing men (on the frontier) definitely distinguished what was appropriate to the area, investigated the talents and abilities (of the men), knew their likes and dislikes, and in using their strength did not violate their natures; unified their customs and did not make any changes in what they did best; drew in (selected) the best (men) and did not hold them responsible for things they weren't able to do; prohibited them from doing wrong, but did not place them in the position of doing things they didn't want to do; and when they were serving in the ranks, provided for the security of their families. Only after doing the above were they able to ensure that they were happy in their homes and fixed in their wills. By treating them with beneficent kindness, they were impressed and did not act arrogant. By treating them with majesty (dignity), they were respectful and not resentful. And they did not exert close supervision over them, but used a slack (rein on them) in and still the defense of the borders there were not of divided mind? This is why when they were on defense, they were strong, and when on the attack, they were powerful. These tactics (methods, used by former kings in handling soldiers along the frontier) were unparalleled in their convenience to the people, and that was all there was to it. At the present time, we require soldiers in military camps (t'un-shih) to perform military service in far-off regions to defend the frontiers. We ask them to do what they are not capable of doing; we force them to do what they don't want to do; we expand their numbers without studying how they are to be used; we make them responsible for effort without
p.462, 23:33b) investigating their feelings as to whether they can do it or not. Even though we can use them as wing-guards in ceremonies, they are of no true utility in defending the border. Why is this so?

The land of the remote frontier is a thousand li away and is a lonely place (むきほ). The cold winds cut into your flesh; the wolves and tigers live all around. During the daytime the men have to carry their weapons (out to the fields) when they cultivate them, and at night, they have to stand guard by the beacons to keep watch (over the enemy) fearful that they may be attacked. They have no rest from their labors. Unless (these border soldiers) are born in the area and get used to the climate, see each other as children and are at ease when grown up, then they cannot live there in peace (at ease) and stop the enemy.

In the Kuan-tung area (開東 : at present, Ho-nan and Shan-tung) there is lush growth (vegetation) and the men wear luxuriant cloths and have plenty to eat; compared to the frontier regions, their lives are as different as heaven and earth. When they hear (they are to be stationed) in the remote frontier where it is barren, they frown from bitterness (like they had gooseflesh). When they hear about the strong "prisoners" (aliens) living in the strong frontier nations, they tremble with fear. And yet still we make them leave their families and abandon their fields and homes and force them to think sweetly of what they regard as bitter and fight against those they regard with fear. If we expect them to be of some use, are we not indeed being careless (negligent: so流)?

Furthermore, even though we have period where we allow them to rest and new troops to take their place, yet we have no good system for organizing and regulating them (t'ongje chi 손). And with regard to their provisions and supply, we are lax and neglectful. This as arrogant children.
When they advance (on the attack), we do not demand they win a victory; and when they retreat, we do not control them with strict regulations. They count on their fingers (the number of days before) they will return (home) and stretch their knecks to see when the food is coming. If the army is once cut off and injured, then they take advantage of the dangerous situation to spread out along the road and return home to the east. When they are at home in peace, they squander (scratch away and waste) their provisions which they have stored up and use it for idle and superfluous activities, and when they have to approach danger, they abandon their walls and garrisons and by this means shake up the entire region. These evils cannot help but be of no advantage.

If this is the way we manage soldiers (military affairs), then it can be said that we have erred in what we have done.

It is my stupid opinion that we ought to abolish the distant frontier posts in the four quarters of the empire and have the Chiah-tu men as volunteers and station (regional commanders) recruit strong men on the frontier (men willing to be stationed on the frontier). The emperor should order the financial agencies to buy oxen in the marketplaces and send them to the frontier stations (t'un) completely provide food and weapons to the men. When (the oxen) arrive, each family should be given 1 ox and one year's worth of food to two people. We should give them seed and urge them to cultivate it. Then in one year's time they will become self sufficient and will be rested from the rigors of military service obligations, and also we will cut down on the evils involved in transporting (equipment and food) to the frontiers. Then when the troops are sent out to fight, each man will be fighting for himself, and when they are stationed at home each family will cultivate their own fields. Compared (to the present) situation where men are stationed on the frontier for short periods of
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p.462, 23:34b) and then suddenly removed, how could it be the same (how could one
say that the results would be the same)?

**KixChih** (note: Lū "hīh also said: With regard to people exiled to
the frontier, basically they are used to increase
the number of households there and fill up the frontier. If they
perform an act of merit they are allowed to buy their freedom. However,
worthless men have given thought to stirring up confusion and regard
disastrous situations as fortunate, so that (prisoners) are worse
than having the stations on the frontier.

**kunxdefense** All we get from this is trouble with regard to
frontier defense, and no advantages gained by establishing rewards
for merit. Even though previous ages carried this out,
it basically is not something we should follow.)(end note)

--- Ou-yang Hsiu (歐陽脩) said to Ying-tsung (英宗 :1064-68) of
the Sung dynasty: "Frontier defenses begin in the east at Lin-fu(臨安府)
and extend to the areas of Ch‘in and Lung(秦樞:Kansu area).
This territory extends for over 2,000 li. It is divided into 5 x routes (lu)
and further subdivided into chou (pref) and arm es (chūn), of which there are 24. The chūn and chou are further
subdivided into saek(寨), po(堡) and sŏng(城), of which
there are close to 200. And all of them must have troops allotted to them
for their defense. For this reason, even though we have many soldiers,
we must subdivide them, and even though the number of men subdivided
as large, the number of those (assigned to each place) must be small.

**kunxdefense** When the enemy sends out its forces, they always combine the whole force of their country
into one unit when they come. This means that even though we have many
troops, when we subdivide them (into smaller units), (the number of
troops we have for any individual action) is small, while the number
of enemy soldiers even though small, because they combine
attack and defense

them together, they become large. And because their large forces
attack our small forces, we cannot help but be defeated. And this system
of walls and fortress (sông, saek) is not sufficient for their self-
defense. Nevertheless, the grand generals along the 5 routes (wu-lu)
have divided up their fighting soldiers into 24 chou-chün (prefectural armies). If you want to combine them all together and go out (to fight), then I am afraid that later on (the garrisons?) will be empty and there will be nothing on hand to conduct defense.

If you want each of them to remain where they are to defend (their areas), and combine what's left over (to go out to meet the enemy), then their numbers will be too small to launch an attack, and if they have to retreat, they won't be able to defend themselves. The reason why we have not been able to send out the troops even though we have wanted to do so for many years is because of this (the above). Dividing the troops up into small units to conduct defense is what the writers on military affairs regard as a great harm. This harm is always with us.

To use troops who have been rested against those who have been worn out with work is what the writers on military affairs regard as a great advantage.

This advantage is something that the other side always has on its side. If at the present time we can reverse this situation and take what has been harmful to us and give it to the enemy, and take away from the enemy what has been of advantage to them and adopt it for our own, then if we can do this, end of Ou-yang whenever we move (out the troops), we will win victory (will succeed).

Hsiu

Indent section: Chiu Chün (CHU CHUN) says: The frontier territory defended in this dynasty extends from Liao-tung in the east to Lung and Shu in the West. It is not to be compared with the boundaries of the Sung people, which began with Lin-fu in the East and extended to Ch'in and Lung (in the West).
p.463, 23:35a) In the height of our dynasty during the Hung-wu and Ying-lo reign periods (1368-99, 1403-25), even though the number of places we defended were no more than a few, nevertheless in all cases we stationed everyone congregated and seized control of the strategic places. We set them in places where everyone congregated and seized control of the strategic places. We brought our people together and consolidated our power, and when the barbarians came, we had the wherewithal to meet them and we were able to use our total force in order to control them and win victories.

However, since the cheng-t'ung (正統: 1436-50, Ying-tsung) period, we divided our forces among the pao and saek和 day by day increased the number of our soldiers so that they were no less in number than in former days. Nevertheless, even though the number of forts and stations (po, saek堡垒) increase in number by the day, we (ended up with) a situation like that described by Ou-yang Hsiu, "where even though the number of our troops was large, they were so subdivided that (the number of men at any given place) was small. And even though the number of enemy soldiers was small, because they were gathered together (in one force), they were many (compared to our troops that they attacked)."

I beg that orders be issued to great officials who have knowledge of border affairs that they personally should go to the frontier and investigate the establishment of po and saek (garrisons and forts). If they should find that these forts are located in non-strategic places or that even though they may be in strategic places, the number of troops there is too small and insufficient for defending them, they should do away with the ones that have been neglected and take the men from these places and send them to the most strategic areas. If this is done, then the walls and forts will not be "empty" (useless), and the officers and men will all become useful.