CRITIQUE OF COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN BURMA
The ideas of Scientific Socialism

The ideas of Scientific Socialism first came to Burma in early 1920's, in the wake of post-war nationalist movements. But they were limited to little known discussions in the press and among a few national leaders. Then, they were forgotten.

In 1930's, during the great economic crisis and after, the ideas of scientific Socialism were imported into the country in some intellectuals in form of books on Marxism-Leninism, including selected works of Lenin.

Then, a section of the leadership of the Dobama Asayone (the societies of the revolutionary national democrats) Burnoised the ideas of Scientific Socialism, calling it, e.g., loka nibban (a heaven on earth, temporal liberation) or bond wada (work together, cat together, creed, primitive communism). Spreading it even from the political platform, e.g., the presidential address of the 2nd Annual Conference of the Dobama Asayone. But this organisation remained the organisation of the extreme nationalists for a number of years.

Ideas of Scientific Socialism and knowledge about the first land of Socialism, the U.S.S.R., were getting more and more popular.

United-class movements

In 1935-36 the national liberation movement under the leadership of the Dobama Asayone became wider in scope and deeper in content. It went beyond the bounds of nationalism and grew into class struggles.

The peasantry had been greatly affected by the great economic crisis of 1930-31, and revolutionised politically. Their armed uprising under the leadership of Saya San (Galoo Saya San) had failed. They easily responded to the organisational efforts of the Dobama Asayone. The first class organisation of the peasants came into being.
The colonial Burma was very poorly developed industrially. Compared with Burma, Colonial India was an industrially developed country. Burmese working class was small in number; young in age and experience; having come from peasantry recently. It attempted at organisations in 1920's or earlier, but with no continuing success. Small, scattered trade unions cropped up and withered away.

The great economic crisis of 1930-31 proletarianised the Burmese workers still further. And they answered the call of the Dobama Asayone to organise. After 1939, the first all Burma Trade Union Congress was formed with branches in Rangoon and other industrial areas.

In 1938-39, the Dobama Asayone led the united anti-imperialist movement of the workers, peasants and students. It started with the economic and political strike of the workers of the oil fields and oil refineries, owned by the British capitalists. The strike lasted 10 months and the workers decided to lead a "hunger-march" down to Rangoon, the seat of British imperialists, 400 miles away. The Students who were struggling against slave education given by imperialists, joined common cause with the striking workers. The reputation reaped out to the workers and students provoked general strikes of the workers and students all over the country. The peasants who were already struggling for reduction of rent, tax and interest, for security of land-tenure and against repressions, joined common cause with workers and students; led demonstration marches to Rangoon, to other cities and towns. Other sections of the petty-bourgeois (bazaar-sellers, traders, craftsmen etc) and national bourgeoisie joined the movement. It really assumed the character of the United Front of the whole people against British imperialism. At the same time, it became, for the first time in Burma, the unity of the ideas of Scientific Socialism, i.e. marxism-leninism with the revolutionary practice of the working people. The leadership of the Dobama Asayone adopted the ideas of scientific socialism as their ideology.
Marxist circles and groups

At that time, some Burmese Comrades established contacts with British Communist Party and Indian Communist Party. Thakin Kyaw Sein (now a Committee member of the trade Corporation) had contacts with some leaders of the British Communist Party and he organised a marxist group, on his own initiative. Goshal (a Burmese Citizen of Bengali origin) and some Bengali Comrades had contacts with the Bengal provincial Committee of the Indian Communist Party and he also organised a marxist group, on his own initiative.

Thakin Thein Pe, a post-graduate student of the Calcutta University, while participating in Bengali student movement, came into contact with the underground Indian Communist Party. (Thakin Thein Pe is now U Thein Pe Kyint, writer and journalist and public figure). He invited the Indian Communist Party to send an Organiser to Burma to start communist movement. At first, the Indian Comrades were not sure whether Burma was in their sphere of activity or not. They thought Burma might be in the sphere of the activity of the Communist Party which was understood to have a branch in Singapore with the cooperation of the Communist International. Later, the Indian Comrades asked for clarification and got permission from Communist International to start organising in Burma. The Indian Communist Party sent a party-organiser, a Bengali named Purnandu Dutt, to Rangoon. When he arrived at Rangoon, the United-anti-imperialist movement of workers, peasants and students was already in full swing. He held discussions with the leading Burmese Comrades and the idea of organising the first communist cell was mooted. He also held political and ideological classes. Lectures on organisation were also given.

Thus was formed the first cell or unit of the Communist Party in Burma. It had among its original members, Thakin Aung Son (the late General Aung San), Thakin Soe (Red Flag Communist Leader - now in jail), Thakin Ba Hein (the late member of the Polit Bureau of the Communist Party of Burma), Bo Leta (now "General" Letha, Commander of the Southern Front of U Nu's forces). Mr. Goshal (known as Comrade Ba Tin, the Polit Bureau member who was murdered by Thakin Than Tun during the Burmese edition of Great Proletarian
Thakin Thein Pe (now Thein Pe Myint), who initiated all these, was left out from the first party cell for his individualism and sectarianism on the part of some comrades.

Thakin Than Tun (the late C.P.B leader) was not Communist enough to be in the first cell. Thakin Aung San (the late general Aung San) was appointed the General Secretary of the Burmese Communist Party.

It was in the middle of 1939, and the C.P.B. is celebrating it as its birthday.

But I consider that the first party unit, formed at that time under the auspices of the Indian Communist Party, was never a full-fledged Communist Party. I consider that it was also one of the Marxist groups (sort of Marxist study groups) which existed those days. But it consisted of very important national leaders. It played its part in consolidating the influence of Marxism-Leninism in the national liberation movement and mass-class movement.

The war and split in the Communist Movement.

The war came and it caught the young communists unprepared.

The conflict between the German fascists and the British Imperialists was inter-imperialist. It was an imperialist war, pure and simple. So, the slogan, "Turn the imperialist war into civil war" was very popular. So too was the slogan, "Crisis of British, opportunity of Burmese." (A crisis for the British, an opportunity for the Burmese.)

All patriots shouted the slogans at the top of their voices and resolutions were passed by meetings and conferences in the spirit of the slogans. But organisational measures could not be taken to implement them. Firstly, the communist organisation started only in 1939. The workers organisations and the peasant organisations which grew up in the 1938-39 anti-imperialist struggles, had not yet consolidated.

The students' unions which were earlier formed in 1930's were proved to be without backbone in face of imperialist attacks.

Secondly, British authorities in Burma tried to buy up older generation of politicians and set them against revolutionary wing of
the national movement and used all forms of repressive methods. A good part of the revolutionary leadership was already landed in jail by the time the war came.

This state of affairs caused physical split in the leadership organs of the national liberation movement. Quite often, the leading comrades inside the jails pursued one course and those outside the jails pursued another course.

This prevented the growth of collective leadership in the communist movement which was in an infantile state when the war came.

Up to early part of 1940, this weakness was not serious and harmful, when, during the phase of "phony war," the Burmese patriots carried out the slogan of "Turn the imperialist war into civil war." But the character of the war changed completely with sudden Nazi attack on the Soviet Union and when Nazis dominated entire Western Europe (1941-June 22)

The Burmese Comrades could not take stock of all these developments collectively. Some comrades preserved the old line, especially the comrades outside the jail. That is to say, they regarded British imperialists, whom they were confronting, as the main enemy. They regarded as friends not only other anti-imperialist forces, such as freedom fighters in colonial countries, but also other imperialists. They thought they would use the contradiction between British imperialism and Japanese imperialism to their advantage. The Burmese patriots were out for armed uprising against the British and to get arms aid they would collaborate with any one including Japanese fascists. This was how Aung San and some comrades who at first went to Amoy (China) to seek aid from Chinese communists, got in touch with Japanese agents there and got some help from them, instead of the Chinese. Aung San with the guidance and help of the Japanese organised the Burma Independence Army which participated in the Japanese occupation of Burma.

On the other hand, Thakin Soe and some comrades in jail, together with some comrades outside, took note of the changing character of the war. They saw that the "phony war" phase had
This remark is not true. The people are co-organized
and under the leadership of brilliant and wise leaders.

That leader is General Wang Hua. You heard Student
of all our training, organized into our mass independence
front (Q. M. A.) The Q. M. A. is a symbol of.

British struggle and instrument of anti-imperialist action.
They are able to great change, they educate in military
training and prepare of the masses with independence spirit.
passed and that imperialist powers, Britain, France, USA etc., were forced by the very logic of the war and by the anti-fascist peoples of the world, to fight seriously against the axis powers. They grasped the nature of the peoples' war against fascism and the role Burmese patriots must play in the war. "The British imperialists can not decide the fate of post-war independence of the country," they explained; "The contribution we make to the success of the peoples' war against fascism will decide the fate of the Country."

Most of these leaders were in British jails, and their followers, the masses of the people were disorganised and leaderless, and so they were unable to do anything by way of implementing their line. They sought to negotiate with the British authorities to release them. They said they would organise the people against the fascists, including armed resistance. They demanded moreover, that British government must promise post-war Burmese Independence.

The British authorities turned a deaf ear to them.

There was another trend represented by Thein Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) and other comrades. They accepted that the war was a peoples' war against fascism and that the Japanese were the main enemy. But, they said, since the confrontation was between the Burmese people and the British imperialists who were rulers over them, the Burmese patriots must give battle to the British as well as to the Japanese who were coming to Burma. They participated in the anti-British underground activities and at the same time prepared politically and ideologically for resistance against the Japanese.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese made swift advance into the country and the British forces gave hasty retreat. In May 1942 the entire country was overrun by the Japanese.

Unity among all anti-imperialists for resistance against the Japanese

The Japanese occupation of the country unified all patriots. The patriots who had been blinded by hate towards the British and who were deceived into collaboration with fascists, were soon disillusioned. They were led by Aung San and they formed the mainforce of the anti-fascist and Liberation United Front which was unfolding
(1) Not in 1943, but published in December 1942.

(2) This newspaper has its good side and bad side. The leaders in Robina provided General Aung San with a number of well-bladed patriots. General Aung San spoke out, but certain orphans kept silent. In difficult circumstances, the energy and spirit of the Armed Forces League because of this.

(3) During the war, three manifestos were published. The first was in September 1942, the second issued in December 1943, and the third in late 1944, in name of "To prepare the Revisit." 

(4) First Congress convened on January 1944. And attended 8 in delegation and first observer, 

Attended: (Delegation) Ko Nyein Win, Ko Hlaing, Ko Tin Nyein, Ko Tin, Tin Maung, Ko Hlaing, Ko Tin, Ko Hlaing, Ko Tin and Observer: Ko Hlaing, Ko Hlaing, and Tin Maung (Kyaik Lat.)
under new circumstances.

The marxists led by Thakin Soe and other marxists who proved to be consistent anti-fascists, who proclaimed, from the very first days, the war to be peoples' war against fascism, and who were internationalists under all circumstances, became leaders of that anti-fascist liberation United Front of the Burmese people.

The communists led by Thakin Soe started to form communist cells all over the country, the anti-fascist activists providing the base. This is the first time that the communist movement assumed the character of nation-wide organisation.

Thakin Soe, Thakin Than Tun, General Aung San and other leaders agreed to send a delegation led by Thakin Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) to China and India to contact the allied powers (British, American, Chinese government), to establish fraternal relations with Indian and Chinese Communists, to seek aid from the Allied military commands for the resistance forces in Burma and to coordinate the activities of the antifascist forces outside Burma with those of the anti-fascist forces in Burma. The contacts were established in the 2nd part of 1942, but only in middle of 1943, that the allied South East Asia command and the Kweisington, authorities in Chunking treated Thakin Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) as official representative of the underground anti-fascist movement in Burma.

Early in 1943, the 1st manifest of the Communist Party of Burma, written by Thakin Soe was published. It was a comprehensive thesis on the peoples' war against fascism and the role to be played by the Burmese patriots in the war; it is also a political programme for the Burmese people to unify, to regenerate and liberate themselves.

Altogether four manifestos were published by Thakin Soe during the war.

1st Congress of the Communist Party

Thakin Soe Convened the first Congress of the Communist Party of Burma in 1943. It was attended by four delegates only. In spite of general influence of the communist movement, the Congress was
narrow. The first factor was the nature of the underground organisation under fascist yoke. Second factor was the sectarian character of Leadership of Thakin Soe. This weakness became more apparent later when the situation demanded broader base of the movement and greater unity of the masses.

Yet, nobody cared to raise objection to the narrow character of the Congress. It confirmed the line of Thakin Soe, which was good enough for that period.

**Anti-fascist Peoples' Freedom League**

In 1944, regular contact was established between the allied military command and the anti-fascist movement in Burma. Through Thakin Thein Pe (Thwin Pe Kyint) Indian and Chinese Communist parties advised Burmese comrades to bring about united front of the anti-fascist forces in Burma. General Aung San took the initiative, which had already been established.

Already, at that time Aung San was becoming one of the most popular national leaders and strongest of them all, having Burma Independence Army at his command. The army was loyal to him, not to the Japanese, although it seemingly collaborated with the Japanese. The army was for national independence at any price and under any circumstance.

Thakin Soe treated Aung San and the army as blind patriots, as a vacillating force, and on occasions as treacherous allies. He would neither forget nor forgive their collaboration with the Japanese, even though in driving out the British.

Aung San did not respond to sectarianism of Thakin Soe by his own sectarianism. He took initiative to unite with Thakin Soe and his followers.

Not only that. There was an underground party, called the people's revolutionary party, following almost the same political line as Aung San and the army, although a little more anti-communist. This party and the communist party were rivals in the anti-British, anti-Japanese movement. Using his personal influence over this party, Aung San tried to bring about unity between it and the Communist Party.
In Aug 1944, a conference of leaders was convened by Aung San. Thakin Soe attended, the representatives of the army and peoples revolutionary party attended. Thakin Than Tun, who was at that time a minister in the "puppet" government, and who was working with the communist underground at the same time, also attended. The anti-fascist people's Freedom league (AFPFL) was formed. The political leader was Thakin Soe and military leader was Gen Aung San. Thakin Than Tun was an organisational leader, having organisational links with all puppet organisations, only legal underground organisations under the Japanese rule and with the underground anti-fascist organisations.

The Revolutionary Front, a great step forward towards on party-unity

The unity of Burmese patriots and the marxists reached the peak with the formation of the revolutionary Front, the core of the anti-fascist united Front.

According to Thakin Soe, the revolutionary Front of the Communist Party and the people's revolutionary party, was a transitional stage between broad people's anti-fascist united Front and the one united marxist party to be formed later.

The manifesto published in connection with the formation of the revolutionary Front endorsed the political line pursued so far by the Communists and other anti-fascists and developed it further to meet the needs of the post-war-period; the successful conclusion of the people's war being already in sight. In coordination with the allied armies, the Burmese patriots must wage country-wide armed uprising against the fascist armies, drive out the enemy from the country and must seize power for themselves, not waiting for the British to reestablish their regime. Local organs of people's power were to be formed and certain economic and social reforms were to be carried out. But there was no specific instruction for proclamation of Independence, not for the formation of the provisional revolutionary government. In spite of this weakness, it was a revolutionary programme which, if carried out, would have led to the capture of power by
the people.

The revolutionary Front outlined the organisational tasks obliging the two parties to function jointly in all fields, ideological questions including. Some leading comrades, like Aung San, Thakin Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint), Thakin Chit (now a member of the polit Bureau of the communist party), Thakin Lwin (a former Trade Union leader, now vice-chairman of the Burma Soviet Friendship association), U Nay Win (General Nay Win) etc, were regarded as common members of both parties.

The general uprising and the end of the war

On 27th March, 1945, the general uprising broke out against the Japanese. Before it, there had been partial uprisings in Arakan and in certain parts of Upper Burma, led by the anti-fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL). The British imperialist strategists would have liked only such partial uprisings. According to their plan Burmese anti-fascists should rise up in a certain area, juhāh behind the front-lines, behind the back of the Japanese, so that sandwiched in between the Japanese would have to swiftly with-draw or get smashed and so that the British could occupy the area quickly and disarm the patriotic forces, piece by piece.

The general uprising which took place on 27th March 1945, ignored the wishes and instructions of the British, went against the future interests of the British and was in full accord with the future and immediate interests of the Burmese people. It hastened the end of the war and it strengthened very greatly the liberation forces of the people.

The main force of the anti-fascist revolution was the patriotic army under Aung San. There were people's guerillas led by communists and some army personal and directly helped by the British Special Services. (Force 136)

What little industry the country had, been destroyed by the war and the working class was disintegrated. So the working class, as such, played no organised role in the anti-fascist revolution.
Only individual workers participated in the movement. Most of the schools and colleges had to be closed. The students and the youth—most of them organised in "puppet" youth league and in the army. Peasants and other sections of the petty-bourgeois rallied round the A F P F L and joined the guerillas. The class organisation of the peasants could not function both openly and underground.

Inspite of these weaknesses, the success scored by the anti-fascist revolution was tremendous. The Japanese suffered more from the blows of the Burmese fighters than from the attacks of the allied armies. It was almost a walkover for the incoming British and American armies. They had not expected such quick and convincing victory. They had to openly acknowledge the contribution made by the Burmese patriots to these victories.

At that time on all war fronts, the allied armies and the people's guerilla forces were on the attack, marching towards final victory and the axis forces were on the retreat and on the road to defeat. The peoples all over the world were in upsurge and ascertaining themselves to decide the fate of the war, fate of the peace, fate of the mankind.

The successes of the anti-fascist revolution in Burma and the successes of the allies and world peoples turned the heads of the Burmese Comrades. Their thinking was affected. They thought that the peoples all over the world would achieve complete liberation, military, political, economic, etc very soon and end imperialism and capitalism with the victorious conclusion of the peoples' war against fascism.

The theory of peaceful development.

Under these circumstances, the theory of peaceful development gained ground.

After the successful conclusion of the peoples' war against fascism, the forces of the peoples would be so strong and the positions of world imperialism would be so much isolated and weakened that the peoples would win through, achieve social and national liberation, using peaceful, mass struggles, and legal and extra legal
methods. Armed, violent forms of struggle would be related to the background.

Earl Browder, the General Secretary of the C.P. of U.S.A., went further. After the war American Imperialism would become enlightened enough to see the strength of the peoples the world over, to see its own interests. In cooperating with the other capitalist powers to rehabilitate their economies, to help underdeveloped countries and colonies to develop economically and socially and to gain independence. Mr. Browder drew the post-war picture as a world of free, equal nations working together peacefully. To help other economies is the only way out for American Capitalism to make full use of the production potential, created by the war, and to avoid economic crisis and to prosper. These ideas of Earl Browder were contained in the books published by C.P. of U.S.A. These books along with other Marxist and progressive literature were sent to Burma by Thakin Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint). The book-hungry comrades in war-time Burma swallowed all the books. The ideas of peaceful development were prevalent in the Indian Communist Party, which had great influence over the Burmese Communists. As stated above, conditions in Burma were very favourable for the spread of ideas of peaceful development.

Thakin Soe, the then supreme leader of the Burmese Communists, quoted Marx and Lenin to say "one day there will be socialist encirclement of capitalist countries, and that day is approaching now."

Therefore Burma would win independence from the British rulers peacefully. (6)

Ideological and political differences

As mentioned above the theory of peaceful development gained ground among the leading comrades. Practical political programme was as follows; cooperate fully with the allied armies to drive out the Japanese fascists; to chase the enemy, if necessary, across continents and oceans and give him battle on his homeland, Japan; avoid any clash with British authorities and allies; negotiate with the British for national independence and work for rehabilitation of the shattered economy and for relief of the suffering people.
In other words, the military side of the programme of the revolutionary Front was carried out very well; but not so with the political part of the programme. Local A P F L (anti-fascist people's freedom league) organs did not become local organs of people's power.

Thakin Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) who was still in India during the armed uprising wrote a letter to the Headquarters in Burma, to retain arms in the hands of the patriots in some form or other, to proclaim formation of provisional revolutionary government, to negotiate with the British in the name of the provisional national government. The letter reached Thakin Than Tun but, as he admitted at a Central Committee meeting in 1946, he did not submit the letter to the party, or to the leadership of the A P F L for discussion. He thought it was not important; the military affairs were only important. He also thought that by creating local organs of people's power and formation of provisional revolutionary government it would not be able to avoid clash with the British, which would harm the military struggle against the Japanese.

On the one hand, the theory of peaceful development was gaining ground; on the other hand, the national suspicions of the Burmese patriots against the British reoccupationists were growing. They thought, after the defeat of the Japanese, the armed clash with the British would be unavoidable. They must save arms for that occasion.

A few comrades of the people's revolutionary party argued that since the Japanese would be defeated (just as the Germans in Europe) it would be waste of manpower and arms to fight the Japanese. Save manpower and arms to fight the British reoccupationists! That was their slogan. This line was not widespread. But Thakin Soe, the communist leader, took very serious view of this trend. He equalized this trend with entire peoples revolutionary party. His belief in the peaceful development theory, his sectarian weaknesses and his jealousy of the rivals get the better of him. He dubbed the members of the people's Revolutionary Party as traitors, Japanese agents and opportunists.
He unilaterally stopped the functioning of the joint Committees, broke up the revolutionary front of the Communist Party and the people's revolutionary Party.

The end of the war

The Burmese Comrades envisaged that the war against Japan would continue long after the end of the war in Europe in May 1945. Of course they were not able to foresee the sudden defeat of the best parts of the Japanese armies by the Soviet Red Armies, nor the dropping of the atom bombs (may not even its existence.) So their policy of avoiding any clash with the British so as not to harm the common military cause and to negotiate with the British for independence after the war, had some justification so long as the war lasted. But the war ended in August 1945 and Burmese Comrades were bewildered although jubilant. They continued with the war-time policy. They had neither the time nor opportunity to review that policy in the light of sudden end of the war. The British were able to occupy the country, put their economic and political schemes into effect, the schemes of restoring their old positions; although they were challenged by the existence of the Burmese patriotic Army led by Aung San, the people's guerrillas, the AFPFL organisations and the awakened people.

The British imperialists could not ignore this challenge. They could not disarm the army and guerrillas at will. They could not disband the political forces. The Communist Party of Burma came out into the open. And the People's revolutionary Party too. AFPFL became the legal and most authoritative organisation of the people, organising in it the Communist Party, the People's Revolutionary Party, the Burmese Army and prominent individuals, with liberal politicians among them.
The sectarian leadership of the Communist Party

As mentioned above, Thakin Soe unilaterally broke up the Revolutionary Front and took initiative in quickly organizing above ground Communist Party cells and units, and also worker's unions and peasant's unions with communists monopolizing the leadership.

The People's Revolutionary Party protested against the break-up of the Revolutionary Front and demanded that there should be only one party of the leftists, and, if it were to be the Communist party, all the members of the people's Revolutionary Party must be admitted into the party enmasse. Thakin Soe replied that he must go ahead with the communist party and class organisations under its leadership and if the members of the People's Revolutionary Party wanted to become members of the Communist party, they must apply individually for membership; that the applicant would be considered on his own merit; and that if the leaders of the People's Revolutionary Party could not accept those conditions, they were free to organise their own party and their own class organisations.

Thakin Soe said light-heartedly, "Let us compete—if we win, we survive and if you win you survive. You know the law of the survival of the fittest."

Thus, the People's Freedom Socialist Party was formed out of the people's Revolutionary Party, a rival to the Communist Party and also were formed rival mass-class organisations. This Socialist Party was composed of anti-fascist patriots, who could not bow down to sectarian policies of Thakin Soe; genuine Marxist forces who were not accepted by Communist Party some reason or other or who could not accept leadership of Thakin Soe and Thakin Than Tun; and social democrats who were waiting for a chance to form a rival organisation to the Communist Party. Later this party was called the Socialist Party.
In July 1945, the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Burma was convened under the joint leadership of Thakin Soe and Thakin Than Tun. It was very much more representative than the first Congress of the party. Because of its leadership in the anti-fascist revolution, and because the communists all over the world were gaining influence and popularity, the Communist Party of Burma had great prestige and was held in great esteem by the Burmese patriots.

Delegates from various parts of the country and military areas and guerrilla bases attended the Congress. The credentials committee rejected some delegates because they were supposed to be too loyal to the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Party, who turned Socialists.

General Aung San did not attend, staying neutral between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party. Thakin Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) was still in India, as the representative of Anti-Fascist Organisation. But some Comrades who were sent to India to work with him and returned to Burma just before and during the anti-fascist revolution (most of them air-dropped) attended the Congress.

The second Congress endorsed the ideological and political programme drawn up and carried out all these days by Thakin Soe and Than Tun (and shared on the whole by Aung San, Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) and most of the leaders; i.e. peaceful development, to avoid clash with the British so as not to harm the common military cause, to negotiate with the British for independence.
Obviously, the second Congress and the entire national liberation movement rejected the British schemes of restoring old imperialist positions in post-war Burma—such as white paper on political reforms published by the British government and Simla plans, the plans of economic reconstruction of the refugee government in Simla. (on 17 May 1947)

No doubt, there were ideological and political differences but they did not come to the surface, because protagonists were not strong enough, not mature enough, not clear-sighted enough to force the issues. So differences in organisational matters came to the forefront. Political discontent against leadership was manifested as organisational discontent.

Thakin Soe's personal character was questioned. His moral teachings were challenged. Thakin Soe is an anarchist and an opportunist in matters of morality. He has weakness for woman, and no qualms about alcoholics. At that time he had two wives and gave them divorce to marry the third one, a young woman from the party ranks. To justify his action, he gave quotations from Marx and Engels about bourgeois marriage taboos and proletarian free love. He took to drinking heavily and said prohibition was feudal-religious pretension.

But the delegates censured his immorality especially in connection with the third marriage. He had to resign from the post of general secretary.

The party Congress elected Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) who was at that time in India as general secretary and the Central Committee, with 30 members (Thein Pe getting the unanimous vote). Thakin Soe, although elected to the Central Committee, trailed very much behind in number of votes received. He got thoroughly demoralised. That made him more sectarian.

Thakin Than Tun was also elected to the Central Committee. He was in fact, leader of the Congress. He was at that time general secretary of the AFPFL.

Thakin Mya Thwin, a protegee of Thakin Than Tun and a comrade
returning from Thein Pe's camp in India, was nominated to act as General Secretary till the return of Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint).

Three leftist political groupings

The Communist party under the leadership of Thakin Than Tun and then, after the return of Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) from India, joint leadership of Than Tun and Thein Pe, was carrying out normal activities in accordance with the decisions of the second Congress. Both independent party activity and activity in the AFPFL progressed quite well. The party was consolidating its position in the AFPFL.

One of the most important tasks of that period was the Kandi Agreement regarding the reorganisation of the armed forces. Aung San, Than Tun and other leaders went to Kandi, in Ceylon, the headquarters of South East Asian Allied Command under Admiral Mount Batten. After negotiations there, agreement was reached. A regular army called Burma Rifles was to be formed out of the Burmese patriotic army and other anti-fascist armed forces. It was to be retrained by the British and it was to be the nucleus of the Burma Army in future independent Burma. It was to be under the over-all command of the British, with Aung San or his nominee as the deputy commander.

After this agreement, Aung San left the army, leaving many of his close comrades and communists to continue the task of reorganising. Gen Aung San became whole-time politician and president of the AFPFL.

The size of the newly formed Burma Army was very small compared with the size of the armed personnel taking part in the anti-Japanese revolution. Newly formed Burma Army was of a division strength only. Most of the arms in the hands of anti-Japanese fighters were hidden away. Aung San formed the People's Volunteer organisation (P.V.O) unarmed para military force, out of the demobilized anti-fascist force. Later P.V.O was joined by other patriotic elements, especially the youths.
So in the period immediately following the end of the war, there were three main national revolutionary groups—the leftists, as they were popularly called viz. The communist Party of Burma, (C.P.B), the people’s freedom socialist party (the Socialist Party) and the People’s Volunteer Organisation (P.V.O). They formed the core of the A.F.P.F.L under the presidency of Aung San. Individuals rallied round that core, some individuals being the old liberal politicians.

The British reoccupationists knew that the masses of people were behind A.F.P.F.L and that the Burmese patriots could resort to armed struggle in case of showdown. (with the existence of the newly formed Burma Army, the P.V.O and the hidden arms). So they tried to come to some sort of political settlement with A.F.P.F.L, with Aung San. It was a time of bargaining between the British imperialists and A.F.P.F.L.

The split of the C.P.B

At that time, Thakin Soe was smuggled out of the country to India by British Communists of the Royal Air Force so that he could discuss with Indian Communists and other foreign Communists and Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) and review the entire situation. Thein Pe left Calcutta for Rangoon soon after Thakin Soe’s arrival. Thakin Soe and Goshal (the Burmese Communist Leader of Bengali extraction) spent some time in the Head-quarters of Indian Communist Party in Bombay. At that time in the C.P.I leadership, Comrade B.T. Ranadive was in ascendancy. Ranadive was responsible for left adventurism which prevailed for a number of years in the C.P.I.

As mentioned above, Thakin Soe was a demoralised leader at that time, and had sectarian mistakes to his record.

He returned to Burma loaded with strong convictions. He was convinced that the line, which he and the party were carrying out at time, was wrong, that Browderism, the theory of peaceful development after the anti-fascist people’s war, must be discarded.
that the armed struggle was the only correct method to achieve freedom from the British rescccupationists. He, also, asserted that he was not responsible for the mistakes of the party, the culprits being Thakin Than Tun and Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) who were supposed to have cunningly imposed the incorrect line on the party and himself.

The British governor who came back to Burma and assumed civil administration started negotiations with the A F P F L and other political elements (most of them anti-A F P F L opportunists) to broaden the basis of his government—the governor's executive Council. The A F P F L (with the Communist Participation) agreed to join it on condition that the governors executive Council became defacto interim government. The British governor did not accept the demands of the A F P F L and there was the showdown. Governor formed the executive Council with his own stooges and A F P F L became the opposition. The entire people rallied around the A F P F L and revolutionary mass struggles were waged on various issues, agrarian, labour, civil liberties, cultural, economic, political etc. Situation was very tense, confrontation very sharp.

In January 1946, the conference of the central committee of the communist Party was convened. Almost all the members of the C C, except a few who continue to serve in the reorganised Burma Army, attended. Thakin Soe made the main political and organisational report. It looked as though he was going to resume leadership of the party. He criticized the old line, the Browderist theory of peaceful development, rejected the method of negotiation with the British and called for uncompromising, armed struggle against the British. The worst part of his new line was the wrong class policy. The proletariat could not collaborate with the Burmese Capitalists and land lords. The proletariat must ruthlessly fight the wavering petty-bourgeoisie so as to raise the revolutionary tempo of the people. He characterised General Aung San as the Bourgeois leader, rallying around him the masses of the petty-bourgeoisie, collabora-
ting with the landlords and deceiving quite a big section of the proletariat. In order to be able to fight imperialism, you must fight Aung San, first of all, who was shielding imperialism, Aung San's big influence over the people becoming the greatest asset of the imperialists. He said the party must raise the class struggle on every front, not only inside the national organisation - A F F L, but also inside the party.

In effect, Thakin Soe was pushing the class contradictions to fore-front and national contradiction is the contradiction between the Burmese nation and the British imperialists to the background. Although Thakin Soe was not advocating openly the withdrawal of the C P B from the united Front - A F F L - in the absence of a programme of struggle within the united Front, his line, indeed, was a line of withdrawal from the United Front.

Thakin Than Tun wavered for some time but accepted Thakin Soe's political line. Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) was not politically and ideologically strong enough to fight it back. The result was that the central Committee approved Thakin Soe's political report.

But Thakin Soe was not satisfied with that gain. He demanded that he alone must lead the party with a polit-bureau nominated by him, not elected by the Central Committee. The majority of the Central Committee, being anxious that Thakin Soe with monopoly of leadership in his hands might lead the party on to a disastrous course, rejected his demand. Instead they elected him as general secretary with a polit-bureau including Thakin Than Tun and Thein Pe Myint. But Thakin Soe said that he could not work with opportunists and that if the party would not purge itself of opportunists, he would purge himself off the opportunists. His policy was called "from a crack, to a break away." He and seven of his followers left the Central Committee, leaving behind 20 members and formed Red Flag. Communist party. The majority remained as the Communist party of Burma (C.P.B). But Thakin Soe called the C.P.B as the White Flag Communist Party.

The political scene was dominated by this split. It influenced
the entire political movement in a negative way. Thakin Soe's party left the A F P F L and exercised pressure on the C.P.B to move towards the left, to adopt disruptive policies in the national United Front. From then on, the leftist, adventurist, sectarian mistakes of Thakin Soe today, become the leftist, adventurist, sectarian mistakes of the C.P.B tomorrow.

The formation of interim government and national split

In spite of the Communist split, the confrontation between the national movement under Aung San and A F P F L and the British became sharper. The people's liberation struggle assumed various forms, legal and illegal, constitutional and extra-constitutional, and threatened to break out into armed struggle. The British government under the Labour party leadership, decided to win over the A.F.P.L to work the political reforms, so as to isolate the Communist at the same time. The British government agreed to the formation of an interim government under Aung San, with some reins of power in the hands of the British governor. The British Army was still in Burma. It was agreed that the Burma Army under Burmese Command would be expanded and improved with the help of the British.

The formation of interim government under Aung San was similar to the formation of interim government under Nehru in-India at that time. It was a compromise between the A F P F L and the British. It further strengthened Aung San and A F P F L.

At first the C.P.B approved this compromise, sending a party representative into the Cabinet, Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint). But on the instructions of the Communist Party of India, C P B changed its mind. C P B charged that by forming the interim government, Aung San had betrayed the country, had become a collaborator with the British enemy and that A F P F L had become an instrument of oppression on the people by the Imperialist enemy. This caused the split between C.P.B and A.F.P.F.L under Aung San. Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) had to resign from the cabinet. At that time
Thakin Than Tun was the general secretary of the party and he remained as such until his death in 1968. (7)

At the meeting of the C.C. of the C.P.B. (in about Nov 1946) Thein Pe advocated that in view of further struggles against the British, unity must be rebuilt with A F F F L; A F F F L -Communist unity must be the main slogan. The Central Committee rejected the proposal. Thein Pe was alleged to be wavering towards the enemy and asked to take leave from active party duty so as to study, rethink, and rectify himself. Since then he had been and of the leadership of the C.P.B.

The A F F F L raised the main slogan, "Independence within one year." i.e. the country must become independent in January 1948. The year of 1947 was a year of further struggles of the Burmese people. Aung San advocated peaceful methods of struggle, negotiated with the British government, held the elections for the Constituent Assembly, and organised mass demonstrations and general strikes to pressurise the British government. He also allowed underground preparations for armed insurrection, in case the British refused to give independence.

In the elections for the Constituent Assembly, C.P.B. contested as an opposition party and got 6 seats out of about 200, the rest having gone to the A F F F L. The rightest parties (including U Saw, the assassinator of Aung San) and the Red Flag Communist Party boycotted the elections. The Red Flags went to the extent of burning down some election booths.

During this period C.P.B.'s attitude was sometimes negative and sometimes positive. Sometimes they called for anti-imperialist unity with A F F F L and sometimes called for all out opposition to it. In the Constituent Assembly C.P.B. contributed to the making of a democratic, socialist-pattern Constitution.

During the intensive political struggles, taking advantage of the split in the leftist forces (A F F F L -Communist split) the rightists under U Saw, assisted by some British circles (a few British diplomats and British army officers) assassinated
Aung San and some of his colleagues in July 1947. It was a very severe blow to the liberation movement.

U Nu, President of the constituent assembly and vice-president of A F P F L, was elected as successor to Aung San. There were reconciliation and unity moves following Aung San's death, between A F P F L under U Nu and C.P.B. But without any results.

The constitution making was completed in due course and the British agreed to transfer all power to the constituent assembly and the A F P F L, after signing by U Nu and Mr Atlee (British Premier) of some agreements (financial and defense arrangements) after independence and agreements regarding details of transfer of power.

Burma was declared a sovereign independent republic, the republic of Union of Burma on 4th January 1948. The Constituent Assembly became the provisional Parliament. The newly declared republic was internationally recognised and admitted into the united nations, Soviet Union supporting it. The British army was withdrawing from Burma according to schedule. Only a British military mission with the capacity of advisers on training equipment and assistance, was left, as was provided for in the defense agreement.

**The Civil War**

At first, the attitude of the C.P.B towards these events was quite positive and favourable. Thakin Than Tun, the leader of C.P.B, thought that the constitution which was being enforced, was workable and suited to the stage of development of the revolution. He and his lieutenants attended the official celebrations of the transfer of power on 4th January 1948.

After that, he attended a conference in Calcutta sponsored by the Communist Party of India and at which a representative of the Communist—form—a Yugoslav Comrade was present. He had discussions with him and with the Indian Communist Leaders. Returning from India, Thakin Than Tun changed his views. Gosual (a C.P.B political Burman member of Indian origin) too was in India discussing with
Indian Communist Leaders. At that time B.T Ranadive was the leader of the Indian Communists. The changed views of the C.P.B were reflected in the views expressed by Thakin Than Tun and Goshal to the new age weekly-official organ of the C.P.I. later the new line for the C.P.B was drawn up in detail at the H.Q of the C P I in Bombay by Goshal and Indian Leaders. Goshal came back to Burma with that document which was called Goshal's line although Goshal had a Burmese name, Comrade Ba Tin.

In February 1948, Goshal's line was accepted by the P.B of C.P.B in essence it is as follows.

In granting independence to Burma, the British imperialism was only manoeuvring to maintain its economic, political, military stranglehold on Burma in a new guise.

Goshal's line failed to recognise that British imperialism was forced to grant political independence because of the long, continuous struggles of the peoples of Burma, legal and illegal, open and underground, violent and non-violent, Constitutional and extraconstitutional; the latest bring the armed anti-fascist revolution, united mass movements under leadership of A F P F L and the united demand for independence by F incomplete Conference of representatives of various nationalities under the leadership of Aung San.

Goshal's line characterised the independence achieved in January 1948 as sham, fake independence- not real independence.

Goshal's line characterised the A F P F L which accepted the transfer of power, as the national organisation of the Bourgeoisie and landlords under the leadership of the national Bourgeoisie. And the C.P.B asserted that the national Bourgeoisie, by accepting the sham independence, had gone on the road of collaboration with imperialism without a return road, that the national Bourgeoisie had no oppositional role to play, and that they had completely merged with imperialism.

Fighting national Bourgeoisie was considered to be one and the same as fighting imperialism.
The call of the C P B was "Do what the Chinese Communists are doing to the Kuomintang in China." "Carry on national liberation war against the A F P F L-imperialists".

The A F P F L leaders got information about the new line of the C.P.B before it became official and were worried by the prospect of fratricidal war. ... They were also facing a danger from the Karen oppositionists (the national minority whom the conservative circles of Britain and the Christian missionaries were backing, not only politically but also materially) A F P F L leaders tried to come to understanding with the C.P.B. A F P F L even announced formation of a negotiating committee of the provisional parliament to talk with C.P.B. They tried to get contacts with C.P.B leaders through Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint).

C.P.B-Central Committee was meeting and was discussing the Goshal Line which was put forward as the line of the Polit Bureau. They were debating about the national Bourgeoisie of Burma, whether it has an oppositional role or imperialism; who were the big Bourgeois and landlord elements etc.

Meanwhile Thein Pe (Thein Pe Myint) published his countertheses in the newspapers. To independence given to Burma was not sham independence but political independence which must be used by the Burmese patriots, Burmese people, to work for economic independence, to smash remaining bases of imperialism in economics, military and cultural fields. He asserted that national Bourgeoisie and imperialism were not one and the same; that the national Bourgeoisie has oppositional role to play against imperialism, that the contradiction might not be manifest at that time but must develop and that A F P F L is a popular national organisation with which C.P.B must unite to consolidate independence. He called for leftist unity of C.P.B, the Socialist party and the ppc (the latter two in the A F P F L) to form as hard core of the national unity for national democratic revolution.

He characterised the national liberation war which was envisaged in Goshal line, as a fratricidal civil war.
Meanwhile the leadership of the C P B waged strikes of the workers and the Peasants' Congress at Pynmana ( led by C P B ) declared all out struggle against A F P F L government, no-tax, no-nut campaigns, mass disobedience campaigns etc.

A section of the A F P F L leadership became very sectional. They saw a pattern of insurrection ( to be armed in due course ) in the line and activities of the C.P.B. They must act before the real insurrection of C.P.B. "Before birth, it must be aborted" was their slogan and they struck; having the governmental power, they could use the repressive measures and the bureaucracy which was still strong under A F P F L. This prevented further political negotiations and civil war broke out in the last week of March 1948.

Thus started the civil war of the various Communist groups which remain up to now and which was complemented and complicated by various groups of national minority insurgents and rightist insurgents. Very soon it will be 25 years old but no end and no victory insight.

The wrong class approach persists

Although the C.P.B led insurrections are 25 years old, there has been no change in their basic line, the class approach to the problems being the same throughout. They characterised the A F P F L under the socialist Party and U Nu as the organisation of the big Bourgeoisie and land lord classes. They ignored the mass class organisations under A F P F L and the petty-bourgeoisie ( national Bourgeoisie in Burma being more of petty-bourgeoisie status ) which was supporting the A F P F L. They ignored that the A F P F L government, in the first years after independence, tried to attack foreign Capital ( e.g. nationalised Timber and rice industries, British transport companies, state monopoly of foreign trade and established state banking ) and tried to carry out radical land reforms ( land nationalisation and distribution Act etc ).
They equated the repressive measures of the A F P F L government which were meted out to them in course of combating insurrection and class nature, Their yardstick to measure the government was repression and they would regard anyone as their ally if that one opposed the A F P F L government.

They were so much endeared to the armed methods of struggle that any achievement without armed struggle was not real, be it independance of the country or the abolition of land-rent.

In the name of proletarian leadership and initiative, they were very rigid in tactics and sectarian to other progressive elements.

A few months after the start of the civil war, the A F P F L under U Nu called for unity of Communists, Socialists and P V O's and other progressive individuals to carry out 14-point programme, a national democratic programme. It was ignored by the C.P.B.

Instead, C.P.B. incited P V O's against the Socialists.

In 1949 and round 1950, the leadership of the Burma Army headed by General Ne Win called for ending of the paticidal conflict on the basis of general elections to the parliament under Communist, army, A F P F L joint supervision ( at that time C P B was not yet banned as illegal by the goverment inspite of their rebellion ).

The C P B did not even consider it; instead C P B, together with the outlawed red-flag Communist Party and part of rebellious P V O's (People's Volunteer Organisations) boycotted the general elections burning down election booths etc.

1949-50's were most difficult years for the government, being surrounded by various rebellions and being ironically named by British mass media as Rangoon government (Even Insein at that time 12 miles from the center of Rangoon was in the hands of the Karen rebels).

A.F.P.F.L government under U Nu raised the slogan "Peace within one year" which was Countered by "Victory within two years" the slogan of C P B who openly said that they would build their rule in north Burma with the Chinese help.
(23) - പുരുഷ ജീവികയോ, പച്ച ജീവികയോ, ചെറിയ മൃഗമോ, വളരെ വലിയ മൃഗമോ, ഇതു കാണാം പുഷ്പിക്കുന്ന നെല്ലോ. ഇതാണ് പുഷ്പിക്കുന്നത് മൃഗം ജീവിക്കുന്ന നെല്ലോ. ഇത് നെല്ല് മൃഗം ജനിക്കുന്ന നെല്ലോ. ഇതാണ് പുഷ്പിക്കുന്ന നെല്ലോ.

(24) - എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും.

പുഷ്പിക്കുന്ന നെല്ല് മൃഗം ജീവിക്കുന്ന നെല്ല് മൃഗം ജനിക്കുന്ന നെല്ല് എന്തും എന്തും. എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും എന്തും.
But in the following years, position of the A F P F L govt improved; insurgent groups weakened— a good number of them surrender to the govt in return for civil liberties and facilities for legal political activity.

In 1954, A F P F L govt under U Nu established good relations with the Peoples' China and signed, together with China and India, the joint declaration of 5 point peaceful Co-existence. Burma under U Nu became a sponsoring country of the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian Countries.

In this situation, the C.P.B. oftened its hard line on the surface. This is what they called 1955 line. It called for peace and coalition government and negotiations with A F P F L govt. But their class approach and fundamental political line being the same, their call for coalition government was, in effect, a government of only rebellious groups. Their call for negotiation was, in effect, a call for political battle at the negotiating table.

On the other hand A F P F L government promised the C.P.B general amnesty, legal existence and freedom of political activity in return for giving up of armed struggle by the C P B and other insurgents.

Nothing was achieved out of these moves except that more insurgents surrendered to the government.

C.P.B. continued to call for negotiations. But they never spelled out any definite basis for negotiation. Actually it was negotiation for negotiation's sake.

Revolutionary Council, also the same; but worse

The C.P.B. continued with the 1955 line up to 1964.

Since Independence, there were in Burma many developments which the C.P.B did not seem to recognise. By about 1953 Burmese government had terminated all agreements with the British which imposed some obligations on Burma, such as obligation to stay in the Pound Sterling area or obligation to accept British military advisers. From 1954 onwards, Burma emerged as a strictly neutral
country of the international sense. As a member of progressive
group of Afro-Asian Countries, Burma Contributed to the international
peace and to the freedom of nations from colonialism.

British monopoly of Burmese economy has gone and the attempt
to substitute it by other foreign monopolies had not succeeded.

There grew up some small scale and medium scale national indu-
tries. Burmese national Bourgeoisie was young and weak but determined
to forge ahead. There grew up also Burmese Compradors class which
was weak and heavily dependent on foreign capitalists not only for
capital but also for business skill. The landlord class was disinte-
grating. Agriculture, fisheries, and forestry did not recover from
the war-wounds and effects of country-wide insurrections but this
fact radicalised the peasants and other working people.

In the A P F F L and other political parties and in the army,
political polarisation took place, a big portion becoming progress-
ive. The politically awakened people were discontent with the eco-
nomic stagnation; and fed up with years-long insurgency.

C.P.B. did not recognise the positive factors in the internat-
ional situation too. By 1960's their ideological positions and polit-
ical thinking were drawn much more closer to the Chinese Communism.

Therefore, in 1962, when the revolutionary Council headed by
Gen Ne Win came to power, the C.P.B. was, at first, bewildered and
then saw nothing new in the change. They thought that the Burmese
reaction, the ruling Bourgeois-landlord regime, had split just for
selfish class interests and group power. The class enemy of the
C P B was in crisis. To get out of the crisis the leader of the
bureaucratic capitalist and landlord classes, Gen Ne Win estab-
ished military dictatorship. The Coming to power of the Revolutionary
Council led by Gen Ne Win was nothing but military dictatorship of
the Bureaucratic Capitalists and the landlords. To deceive the
people and the world, the revolutionary Council declared Burmese
way to socialism. To broaden the social base of the Military dictato-

rship of the Bourgeois landlord classes, the Burma Socialist Programme
Party, People's Worker Councils and People's Peasants Councils were for-
23 အားလုံးကို ဗုဒ္ဓဘာသာ ကြီးမားသော စာပိုဒ်များ ဖော်ပြသည်။ သင်ကောက်တွေ့မှုစီမံကိန်းများကို အသွေးတင်ပါ။
Although the C.P.B. held such views, they continued with their slogan of "Peace through negotiation".

Just after March 1962, the revolutionary Council declared general amnesty as a gesture for peace and good-will. The C.P.B. said that Ne Win wanted to humiliate the C.P.B. by giving general Amnest.

In 1963, the revolutionary Council called for negotiations with all armed rebels without attaching any pre-conditions. The rebels could come out of the jungle and negotiate with the government to establish peace and if negotiations failed they were guaranteed safe conduct back to the jungle.

The red flag communists were the first to come out of the jungle. But negotiations failed and they were sent back to the jungle. Except in the case of one Karen insurgent group, negotiations with all rebellious groups failed.

By the time the call for negotiations was made by the revolutionary council, C.P.B was very much weakened and isolated deep in the jungles. The C.P.B. leadership was bewildered by the call for negotiations, although it was a reply to their own call for negotiations. They thought like this. The revolutionary council was very weak and C.P.B position was very strong. So the revolutionary council was forced to call for negotiations with the C.P.B. C.P.B must make use of the negotiations to further strengthen their position and pressurise the Ne Win government to concede to all their demands.

Their first demand was that the Revolutionary government must provide facilities for the return to Burma of Communist Leaders residing in People's China and for the reunion of those returnees and the Communist Leaders staying behind in Burma. That demand was conceded to. Moreover, the revolutionary government of Gen Ne Win created conditions which made it possible for C.P.B Central Committee to meet in full strength. Owing to difficulties of all kinds, C.P.B Central Committee could not meet in full strength for some years. They held what they called "Postal sessions" i.e. discussion by circulating papers.

Long negotiations started. Revolutionary Council was very
eager to come to terms with the C.P.B, knowing that it was the biggest force among insurgents and had Chinese backing. The revolutionary council explained to them its immediate political and economic programme and its determination to march towards socialism and sought the cooperation of the C.P.B.

But the C.P.B had different views, attitudes and aims. As explained above, their analysis of the class characters of the revolutionary Council and their fundamental political line was the same as before. Ne Win government was the military dictatorship of the bureaucratic capitalists and landlords. It was the main enemy of the proletariat. It was an imperialist agent. There could be no collaboration between the C.P.B and the revolutionary Council. So, what they demanded was recognition by Ne Win government of their "liberated areas" with the right to have their own armed forces to defend and to levy taxes in their own areas. After that a cease-fire.

At the negotiating table, the C.P.B concentrated on these demands and outside they held peace demonstrations to pressurise the government.

Had the revolutionary government conceded to the C.P.B demands, Union of Burma would be disintegrated, because other insurgent groups—many nationalities among them, would have many other "liberated areas" and many other "armies" to defend them.

The revolutionary Council refused to concede to them and negotiations broke off.

Communist Leaders went back to where they came. Thakin Ba Thein Tin and a few other leaders were flown back to Peking. But most of them went to jungle and joined Thakin Than Tun.

After these events, C.P.B adopted what they call 1964 line.
It was a line of all out struggle with the slogans "Power Comes from the barrel of the gun", "Established Power", "No Compromise" etc. They carried out their own great proletarian Cultural revolution inside their own campaign villages.

Party members and leaders were examined by Thakin Than Tun and Peking returnees (those who were in China for a number of years and returned during negotiations) whether one stick to the
old 1955 line or strictly followed the 1964 line; whether one was soft during the negotiations or hard; whether one felt repentent about the break down of negotiations and self-justiced and happy about the breakdown and whether one was a revisionist or true Macist. The 1955-line followers were overthrown, expelled and killed. Two members of the Polit Bureau, Goshal ( alias Comrade Ba Tin ) and Comrade Htay and some members of the Central Committee were killed. Thakin Than Tun himself was killed by a member of his bodyguard who surrendered to the government. Now only three old timers were in the Central Committee, Ba Thein Tin ( now in Peking), Thakin Chit ( now member of the Polit Bureau ) and Thakin Zin ( now chairman of the C.P.B ). All the other members are unknown and new members with Peking Returnees ( who survived the cultural revolution, and who do not surrender to the government ) holding key positions.

What remains of the life of the C.P.B as a party and as a fighting force depend on the all round support given them by the Chinese Communist Party and negative social and political consequences of the mistakes, defects and weaknesses committed by the government of U Ne Win and the Lanzin Party especially in the sphere of economics. If the government and the Lanzin Party can rectify them, the C.P.B will not survive even if the Chinese Communists continue to give that all round support.