Undermining Whiteness: Hannah Arendt’s Participatory Freedom and the Political Ethics of Antiracism

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Abstract

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This dissertation seeks to develop a political ethics of antiracism through the work of 20th century political theorist Hannah Arendt. This dissertation explains how Arendt's concept of participatory freedom might reenergize antiracist politics in the 21st century. Participatory freedom highlights the experience of freedom as opposed to the protections that freedom may offer, which might be better conceptualized as liberty or rights; or the psychological state of freedom, which might be better conceptualized as autonomy. Although Arendt's political theory does not take up the particular question of antiracism, I posit that Arendt's theorization of freedom, which emphasizes the participatory and transformative dimensions of freedom, can help us articulate a destabilizing politics, one that privileges practices that might undermine the norm of whiteness.
Introduction

Undermining Whiteness: Hannah Arendt’s Participatory Freedom and the Political Ethics of Antiracism

The ravaged city of New Orleans, which lay in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, challenged the vision of a post-racial United States – an idea that has gathered strength in the decades following the Civil Rights Movement.¹ The televised images of death and destruction that invaded American living rooms in the days and weeks following the storm’s descent revealed a gap between ideals and reality. The bloated bodies floating down flooded streets; the stranded people waiting for rescue from the rooftops of their submerged homes; and the homeless, desperate crowds seeking food and shelter were overwhelmingly black. Although a disproportionate number of the storm’s victims were black, few commentators in 2005 were willing to discuss Katrina and its aftermath as an instance of racism. The media coverage of the storm illustrated the difficulty of seeing race and racism in a society whose dominant racial discourse is one of colorblindness.²

While W.E.B. Du Bois spoke of the problem of the color line at the dawn of the twentieth century, I suggest that the racial problem of the twenty-first century is the persistence of whiteness, particularly white normativity. Although the Civil Rights Movement made participation in the national dream more transracial, it did so by converting whiteness from an exclusive legal category to an inclusive social norm. That is, by normalizing whiteness, the Civil Rights Movement rendered whiteness a more expansive category, which, although potentially open to those formerly barred from its privileges, continues to structure American life. Thus, even though the previous opportunities of whiteness now appear open to all, the survival of
racialized underclass, which Hurricane Katrina exposed, illustrates the challenge of understanding and combating contemporary racism.

This dissertation, which hinges on the premise that contemporary racism operates largely through white normativity, seeks to develop a political ethics of antiracism. If we recognize whiteness as the backbone of contemporary racism, how might we develop a politics that undermines whiteness as a meaningful category? Which concepts and practices might inform an antiracist politics that destabilizes whiteness? In elaborating a political ethics of antiracism, I turn to the work of 20th century political theorist Hannah Arendt. Although Arendt’s political theory does not take up the particular question of antiracism, I posit that Arendt’s theorization of freedom, which emphasizes the participatory and transformative dimensions of freedom, can help us articulate a destabilizing politics, one that privileges practices that might undermine the norm of whiteness.

I begin this introductory chapter by providing a sketch of the problem of white normativity in the post-Civil Rights era. I follow this sketch with a discussion of the political theoretical project of antiracism, distinguishing it from related projects such as nonracism and minority politics. Next, I examine the shortcomings of the orthodox Left response to racism in the post-Civil Rights era. I explain how Arendt’s concept of participatory freedom might reenergize antiracist politics in the 21st century by offering an important corrective to some of the pitfalls of dominant theoretical approaches to racism. Finally, I offer an outline of the three substantive chapters that follow.

**Is White Normativity Racist?**

With the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act, more non-whites were able to assume benefits previously reserved for whites,
such as higher education, public office, and economic wealth. A major victory of the Civil Rights Movement, these laws criminalized the overt forms of racial discrimination common during the eras of slavery and Jim Crow, rendering blatant hostility towards non-whites unacceptable and punishable by law. Although overt hostility towards non-whites is far from obsolete, its manifestations, in the form of lynching and violent intimidation, are less visible than they once were.\(^3\) As such, many in the post-Civil Rights era argue that civil rights legislation has engendered a post-racial America, an America where people and institutions are colorblind, an America in which race does not define social outcomes.\(^4\)

Despite claims about the irrelevance of race in post-Civil Rights America, race is not only an intelligible but also a constitutive feature of American life. Race overly determines important social phenomena such as poverty, unemployment, and incarceration. For example, more than a quarter of blacks and Latinos live below the poverty line, while less than 10 percent of whites do.\(^5\) Similarly, the rates of unemployment for blacks and Latinos are significantly higher than they are for whites. In 2012, the black unemployment rate was almost double that of whites, while the Latino unemployment rate was almost 1.5 times that of whites.\(^6\) Moreover, inmates in the country’s prisons and jails are predominantly non-white. In some states, black men are twenty to fifty times more likely to be incarcerated for drug charges than white men; and in many American cities, upwards of 80 percent of black men have criminal records, which will haunt them for the rest of their lives.\(^7\) Finally, the persistence of residential segregation between whites and non-whites suggests that race plays a significant role in establishing which neighborhoods we live in, which schools we send our children to, and whom we encounter and interact with on a daily basis.\(^8\)
Although non-whites remain disproportionately represented among the American poor, unemployed, and incarcerated, and disproportionately under-represented among the economic and political elite, it has become increasingly difficult to identify racism with the racial inequality that plagues the sociopolitical landscape. As a result, scholars disagree on how to define contemporary racism. One approach equates racism with the intentional action of individual racists and is associated with the discourse of colorblindness, which has become the dominant paradigm for understanding race and combatting racism in post-Civil Rights America. Colorblindness maintains that since race is a morally irrelevant category, references to race in the public sphere work to perpetuate racism. Consequently, the law and public policy should refrain from mentioning race. Colorblindness regards racism “not as a social phenomenon, but merely as the misguided conduct of particular actors,” turning toward antidiscrimination law as a way to punish individual racists, who have harmed others with their racism.  

Both colorblindness and antidiscrimination law, however, are wedded to methodological individualism, which holds that individual action gives rise to social phenomena and that we can understand collective outcomes by studying individual decision-making and motivation. Colorblindness and antidiscrimination law place the burden of proof on the victim of racism, requiring the victim to isolate the particular conditions of discrimination by linking a perpetrator to an act that caused harm. Under anti-discrimination law, non-whites can make claims against individual discriminators, but not against society at large; they can incriminate specific acts of hostility, but not the social conditions that give rise to inequality. As Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw observes, in a colorblind world, “once law has performed its ‘proper’ function of assuring equality of process, differences in outcomes between groups would not reflect past discrimination but rather real differences between groups competing for societal rewards.”
Thus, the discourse of colorblindness explains contemporary racial inequality as the result of non-racial dynamics, obscuring the ways that racism, albeit a reconfigured racism, continues to shape American society and politics.\textsuperscript{13}

Many analysts of race have grown dissatisfied with colorblind approaches to racism, because within the framework of colorblindness, a victim of racism must prove fault and causation. That is, a victim of racism must tie a social outcome to a perpetrator’s actions and intentions in order to claim that racism is responsible for her condition. These critics of colorblindness argue that methodological individualism and its focus on individual motivation and action cannot grasp the inequality of \textit{conditions} between whites and non-whites that persists in post-Civil Rights America. Instead, these analysts turn to social structure and collective norms to explain racism in the post-Civil Rights era. The structural accounts of racism locate race in the very foundations of American society and argue that race is a primary organizing principle of sociopolitical life – so primary that it constructs individuals as racialized and constitutes individual action along racial lines.\textsuperscript{14} In particular, these scholars point to whiteness as the founding racial logic of American society and demonstrate how whiteness came to be constructed as the status quo in American society and how the white body came to be invested with privileges that seem neutral.\textsuperscript{15}

Admittedly, the privileges that accrue to whiteness and the means by which whiteness is privileged have changed. Voting, for example, was once a privilege reserved for whites, namely white men. The passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 reconfigured voting from a white privilege to a right extended to non-whites. As a result, the site of white privilege shifted from the polls and government, more generally, to the private sphere. In the post-Civil Rights era, the ability to afford private schools, security, transportation, and healthcare are privileges that
disproportionately accrue to whites. Nonetheless, whiteness remains the norm around which sociopolitical institutions are organized. These institutions take white people and their interests—such as good schools and security in white neighborhoods, admission to institutions of higher education, and access to professional jobs—as the basis of sociopolitical organization and distribute resources in accordance with white desires, thus normalizing and privileging whites while abandoning and disadvantaging non-whites. Thus, in a racialized society like that of the United States, where white normativity is an underlying logic, race deeply informs individual action and motivation, such that racism is less the product of the intent to do harm to non-white Others and more the result of cultivating the white Self.

The Self-Other dialectic that I am identifying with contemporary racism emerged through a history of racial stratification, in which whites positioned themselves as the Self and non-whites as the Other. Within this dynamic, racism operates through the cultivation of the white Self at the expense of the non-white Other. Prior to the Civil Rights Movement, the repressive institutions of the State—the law, police, and military, for example—supported the cultivation of the white Self. The Civil Rights Movement prevented the repressive institutions of the State from explicitly promoting the white Self. As such, the white Self became normalized and the State upheld the white Self by proxy. To clarify: the white Self is not simply a white individual. The individual is a form of the Self, but it is not the only form that the Self can take. The Self also can manifest itself in collective forms, such as the race, nation, neighborhood, or family. Similarly, Otherization can assume both individual and collective dimensions. The Other can refer to both the abnormal individual (say, a homeless person) and the abnormal collective (for instance, “ghetto kids”). Thus, the Self, as William Connolly suggests, is the expression of either
my or our identity. In both cases, identity “requires difference in order to be, and it converts
difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty.”

In the post-Civil Rights era, the defense of liberal values, such as individualism, self-
discipline, and merit, has played an important role in cultivating the white Self. Racial
stratification—a characteristic of American life since the nation’s inception—is now coupled
with liberal individualism. This coupling confers individuality on white life, thus constructing
the white individual as the normal Self in America. In this way, contemporary racism is less the
product of discrimination against and repression of non-whites (that is, a consequence of what
John Stuart Mill calls “other-regarding behavior”) and more the result of abandoning the Other
when expanding the Self.

Take the 1978 U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the case of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke, for example. Alan Bakke, a white applicant to the University of California
Davis Medical School, applied to the Medical School twice (in 1973 and 1974) and was rejected
both times. During those years, the Medical School had a general-admissions program as well as
a special-admissions program that was reserved for non-whites. Following his second rejection,
Bakke took his case to court and argued that the special-admissions program discriminated
against him based on his race and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. When Bakke’s case appeared before the Supreme Court, the Court ruled 5-4 in
Bakke’s favor. According to George Lipsitz, the decision demonstrates that “white expectations
and perceptions of being hindered in their pursuit of the educational opportunities they desired
were considered worthy of federal protection.” Cheryl Harris observes that “Bakke argued,
and the Court agreed, that the minority admissions plan abridged Fourteenth Amendment
guarantees for whites, who although not historically oppressed, were nevertheless ‘persons’
within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause." In other words, the establishment of an “equal playing field” through the promotion of individual rights, which has been the hallmark of post-Civil Rights politics, does not explicitly target non-whites. Moreover, rather than explicitly enforcing whiteness, Bakke defends the rights of the individual. Still, in upholding the individual, the Court also upheld whiteness because a precedent was being set for abandoning special-admissions programs and their non-white beneficiaries.

*Bakke* draws our attention to the paradox of post-Civil Rights racism: namely, how liberal individualism, with its seemingly inclusive logic, can work to exclude non-whites from the polity. While the idea of racial equality—that non-whites are not inherently inferior to whites—has gained increasing popularity in the decades following the Civil Rights Movement, this idea has been paired with an increasing commitment to discourses of individualism, self-discipline, and merit; and these have worked to renege on many of the Movement’s promises. Through the deployment of the language of liberal individualism, white Americans have criticized and rejected non-whites’ claims to equality. They interpret non-whites’ claims as an infringement on the rights of white individuals.

The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina offers a concrete instance of the racist logic of white normativity. The mass destruction of non-whites’ lives and livelihoods resulted from society’s unresponsiveness to the storm and its aftermath, which left those living in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, particularly African-Americans, to fend for themselves against not only the raging winds and deadly waters that devastated the region, but also one another. The Gulf Coast is both home to a large African-American population and a region plagued by poverty. While African-Americans compose 12.9% of the U.S. population, they make up a much higher percentage of the population of the Gulf Coast states: 26.3% of Alabama, 32.9% of Louisiana,
and 36.6% of Mississippi. Mississippi, in fact, is the state with the largest percentage of African-Americans in the nation.\textsuperscript{22} Poverty is widespread as well. Between the years 2002 and 2004, the proportion of people living in poverty in the United States was 12.4%. The proportion was significantly higher for the states of the Gulf Coast: 15.5% for Alabama, 17% for Louisiana, and 17.7% for Mississippi, making it the poorest state in the nation.\textsuperscript{23} A disproportionate number of the region’s African-Americans live in poverty, earning incomes 40% less than their white counterparts.\textsuperscript{24} Furthermore, prior to Katrina, New Orleans ranked second among the nation’s fifty largest cities with poor black families living in extremely poor neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{25}

The combination of race and poverty proved lethal for many African-Americans in the region. In New Orleans, for instance, 27 percent of blacks lacked access to cars, while only five percent of whites lacked such access. This made escape much easier for whites than for blacks.\textsuperscript{26} Additionally, African-Americans lived in areas that were hit hardest by the storm: 80 percent of New Orleans’ blacks lived in the flooded area, compared to only 54 percent of the city’s whites.\textsuperscript{27} Consequently, the “anarchy” that broke out in New Orleans and along the Gulf Coast in the aftermath of Katrina resulted from non-whites’ deprivation of life-fostering resources, such as cars, access to elevated land, and police protection. Not surprisingly, the losses suffered by black Americans living in New Orleans greatly surpassed those suffered by white Americans: 53 percent of blacks reported that they lost everything in the aftermath of Katrina, compared with 19 percent of whites.\textsuperscript{28}

Hurricane Katrina exposes the racist logic of white normativity because the Gulf Coast in general, and Southern blacks in particular, exist outside the norm of white America. Forty years after the passage of Civil Rights legislation, Hurricane Katrina revealed how colorblindness and silence regarding race has done little to change the conditions of being non-white in America.
American society’s assumption of white normativity was implicated in the abandonment of the Gulf Coast’s non-whites.

The cultivation of white life and the white Self played out in two distinct ways in the case of Katrina. First, on a local scale, the assumption of white normativity among the inhabitants of the Gulf Coast meant that the lives of the region’s whites were taken as the norm, against which non-whites either measured up or perished. This white standard included residing in an area equipped to deal with natural disaster and owning the private means, such as cars, to escape the effects of such disasters. By privatizing the responses to disaster, U.S. society had abandoned the region’s non-whites to a vicious struggle for survival. Second, the privatization of the local response to Katrina is implicated in the larger abandonment of regions heavily populated by non-whites, such as the Gulf Coast, an abandonment that is part of the growing tide of neoliberalism. As Cedric Johnson argues, “The contingent social and political disasters that are commonly attributed to Hurricane Katrina were rooted in the project of neoliberalization that has been transforming American life and culture over the past three decades.” Neoliberalism, which “elevates market freedoms over all others” envisions a new role for the State, which becomes less invested in instituting social equality and more active in promoting “a new order market rule,” where the already capable—e.g. whites—accrue ever-increased benefits and the less capable—e.g. non-whites—are rendered peripheral and expendable. Moreover, neoliberalism exacerbates geographical inequality, elevating the significance of those regions with already-existing infrastructure as well as financial and political power, like the Eastern seaboard; and diminishing the significance of less-developed regions, like the Gulf Coast, sending them into even greater poverty. The assumption of white normativity, rather than hatred of non-whites, enables the abandonment of non-white persons and regions. For example, the abandonment of
the Gulf Coast was facilitated by a discourse of liberal individualism deployed against State-supported social services, which could have helped reinvigorate black communities but which have been interpreted as impinging on market freedoms.

The deadly consequences of white normativity shocked many white Americans, who were surprised by the conditions in which Southern blacks live. The conditions were the product of forty years of white withdrawal from, rather than solidarity with, non-white Americans.  

**What Is Antiracism?**

By connecting white normativity with contemporary racism, I hope to help us better conceive of a political ethics of antiracism, taking seriously Hawley Fogg-Davis’s claim that “[a]bstract thinking about race must not float into political irrelevance, but should instead always be linked, somehow, to solving the political and ethical problem of racism.” In confronting the political and ethical problem of racism, we should first consider the difference between nonracism and antiracism. While both stances regard racism as a problem, nonracism conforms to the logic of colorblindness and adopts a more passive attitude toward combating racism. People are nonracist when they do not actively repress non-whites. Nonracism, however, ignores the ways that people’s self-orientations affect the life-chances of others. The mantra of nonracism – “I’m not racist because I don’t see race” – has enabled white Americans to withdraw into themselves and abandon non-whites. Meanwhile, white normativity renders white bodies as normal, as automatically deserving of life-enhancing power, and abandons the non-white Other. Consequently, the rubric of nonracism can only critique our active orientations toward others; it fails to question the ways that our passive orientations – our subjectivities – are implicated in practices of domination.
Antiracism, on the other hand, entails taking responsibility for our unwilling participation in the practices that reproduce racial inequality. Contemporary racism results largely from inaction rather than action, automatism rather than decisiveness. Consequently, antiracism requires an active opposition to white normativity. In this vein, Tim Wise conceptualizes antiracism as a form of treason—“a betrayal of one’s expected allegiance to one’s race,” particularly one’s whiteness. He argues that “over the course of USAmerican history, whites have been expected to fall in line, to accept the contours of racism, to remain quiet in the face of Indian genocide, the enslavement of Africans, the conquest of half of Mexico, and any number of racist depravities meted out against peoples of color. We were supposed to put allegiance to race, to whiteness, above allegiance to humanity.” Antiracism, on the other hand, asks us to “think what we are doing” in order to contest the everyday, unconscious practices that normalize whiteness and abandon non-whiteness. Rather than promoting a self-orientated politics, antiracism urges us to divest in the white Self and direct our attention toward “challenging the norms that make some lives unlivable.” By challenging the norms that render some lives worth living while relegating others to unintelligibility, antiracism seeks to undermine whiteness in favor of more plural ways of being and doing in the world.

In addition to its departure from nonracism, antiracism is distinct from – although it may entail elements of – minority (as in black or other non-white, such as Latino or Native-American) politics. As Paul Gilroy suggests, minority political struggles “define themselves by their relationship to the everyday experience of their protagonists and the need to address and ameliorate concrete grievances at this level… The elimination of racism is only rarely announced as the object of these struggles.” Rather, minority political struggles witness racial minorities organizing in defense of their lives and communities. While many of the commitments of
minority politics are compatible with antiracism, the foci of the two projects are distinct. Minority politics focuses on blacks’ (or other non-whites’) lives and communities. Antiracism, in contrast, directs its energies towards mainstream, white society, attempting to negotiate relationships between whites and non-whites, ultimately aiming to destabilize whiteness and evacuate it of its meaning.\textsuperscript{40}

Moreover, minority politics is more identitarian than is antiracism. Operating within the paradigm of pluralism, minority politics often construes politics as a competition among identity-based groups and seeks to advance the interests of marginalized groups.\textsuperscript{41} In doing so, however, minority politics tends to entrench racial identities. In particular, minority politics may further entrench whiteness, since within the paradigm of minority politics, groups often enter the public sphere in order to pursue the privileges of whiteness. Antiracism, on the other hand, challenges the significance of whiteness, which gives rise to subordinated racial identities. Antiracism does not necessarily erode the cultural values that accrue to non-white identities, but in targeting the privileges of whiteness, antiracism destabilizes existing racial identities and opens up space for other ways of organizing collective life.

Minority politics may incorporate elements of antiracism, but it attends more to the gradations within the category non-white, advocating for the interests of particular non-white groups. Antiracism, on the other hand, seeks less to establish lines that distinguish non-whites from one another and more to consider how non-whiteness is produced through the normalization of whiteness. In this way, antiracism emphasizes the white/non-white distinction. Within this binary, the category “non-white” is derivative, stemming from the normative category of whiteness. Casting “non-white” as derivative does not necessarily imply that black, Latino, Asian, and Native American identities lack a positive content. As Joel Olson proposes,
“white” is a political category, while black, American Indian, Chicana, or Irish American are cultural identities as well as political categories. Thus, in highlighting the white/nonwhite distinction, antiracism targets a political dynamic: the ways in which whiteness, a seemingly expansive category, racializes that which it abandons. The category “non-white” describes those who were left behind by Civil Rights gains; those who failed to actualize the benefits of voting rights and equal opportunity in housing, employment, and education; those, for example, who remained on the Gulf Coast after Katrina hit. It is this same category of people who, during the Civil Rights and post-Civil Rights eras, were abandoned by the mass migration of whites to the suburbs and were left to cope with the crumbling conditions of inner cities. Today, this category of people finds itself displaced by gentrification, by the return of upwardly-mobile whites to American city centers.

*Left Orthodoxy and Antiracism*

Many thinkers on the American Left recognize the limits of liberal individualism in challenging contemporary racial inequality. These thinkers suggest that the deployment of liberal individualism without attention to structural inequality entrenches inequalities and undercuts individual rights. In seeking to challenge structural inequality, many on the Left have turned to the ideals of social justice and social equality. By linking antiracism to social justice and social equality, however, the Left performs a significant exchange. During the heyday of the Civil Rights Movement, the American Left gained prominence by promoting public participation as a way to expand freedom and challenge racism. Consider, for example, the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, where several hundred thousand people gathered on the National Mall to protest racism under the banner of freedom; and Freedom
Summer, the campaign to register black voters in Mississippi during the summer of 1964. In the post-Civil Rights era, however, the Left has largely relinquished the practice of participatory freedom in favor of the more progressive ideals of social justice and social equality. Through these ideals, the Left has traded political participation for protectionism, relying heavily on the State to protect vulnerable subjects. In turn, the Left has become susceptible to the anti-government rhetoric of the Right, which has launched a protracted assault on the State, and as a result, those who might benefit from State protection, such as non-whites.

In this section, I consider the shortcomings of the orthodox Left approach to racism that has dominated both American political culture and mainstream political theory for the last fifty years. This approach has emphasized the ideals of social justice and equality, which, although important in the arena of democratic theory and politics, do not automatically advance political participation. Because justice- and equality-orientations often derive from anxieties around violation and oppression, they entail a heightened concern for order, organization, boundaries, and security; political participation appears as an afterthought, if at all. As such, justice- and equality-oriented approaches to antiracism may reiterate the passivity and dependence of non-whites, which exposes them to further attack from hostile forces. For a better understanding of how justice and equality might foreclose political participation and promote passive subjectivities, I examine these concepts as they appear in some prominent works in political theory.

Political theory’s foundational text, Plato’s Republic, takes the elaboration of justice as its primary task. Plato presents justice as a problem of order and regulation. When a person is just, Plato explains, “he does not allow the elements in him each to do the job of some other, or the three sorts of elements in his soul to meddle with one another. Instead, he regulates well what is
really his own, rules himself, puts himself in order, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the
three elements together.\textsuperscript{46} As justice for the individual implies the regulation and ordering of
the self, justice for the city calls for a similar regulation and ordering of the public. For Plato, the
order and regulation that justice demands does not derive from public participation. In fact, as
the Platonic Socrates famously proclaims, “A man who really fights for justice must lead a
private, not a public, life…”\textsuperscript{47} Thus, justice, which Plato likens to warding off or containing
illness and infirmity, is a more authoritarian endeavor, one best achieved by allowing
philosophers, the experts of order, to govern the rest.

Plato’s contemporary successor, John Rawls, also links justice to order and organization.
But while Plato’s theory of justice is inegalitarian, Rawls’s theory of justice privileges equality
and seeks to protect the most vulnerable members of society. With the most vulnerable in mind,
Rawls pursues a set of universal principles for deciding how to organize society and distribute
social goods. Rawls’s “difference principle” guarantees the protection of society’s weakest
members by justifying inequality “only if the difference in expectation is to the advantage of the
representative man who is worse off.”\textsuperscript{48} Thus, while Rawls’s theory is egalitarian, in that it
requires justice to consider society’s least off members, it does not automatically encourage
political participation. Rather, Rawls’s egalitarian theory of justice engenders a preoccupation
with ordering in accordance with pre-determined principles that seek to protect the most
vulnerable. This preoccupation with ordering tends to empower “experts” who are able to
determine the effects of public policy on different segments of the population. In contemporary
society, donning Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” is a privilege that requires knowledge of advanced
statistical methods.
Michael Walzer’s account of justice adopts Plato and Rawls’s concerns with order, while discarding their emphases on universal principles. In this way, Walzer’s argument for justice is more consonant with the first book of Plato’s *Republic*, where the principles of justice emerge through shared understandings that are contextual and dialogic rather than universal and authoritative. Nonetheless, Walzer’s interest in context, which encourages political participation and a diffusion of viewpoints, competes with his concern for justice. Walzer reconciles this conflict by advocating for the creation and maintenance of distinct distributive spheres, with each sphere constituted by a different social good and marked by its own criteria and arrangements that are uniquely appropriate to it. Walzer develops his ideal of distributive justice as a means of combating dominance, which occurs when individuals who have one social good $x$ are able to command a wide range of social goods $a$, $b$, and $c$, by virtue of having $x$. In order to prevent dominance, Walzer argues that distributive justice must encourage complex equality, or the autonomy of distributive spheres, through an attention to boundaries. He sees dominance as the opposite of justice and defines it as “a particular boundary crossing, a particular violation of social meaning. Complex equality requires the defense of boundaries; it works by differentiating goods just as hierarchy works by differentiating people.” Thus, while Walzer divests justice of universal principles, his brand of justice still seeks the maintenance of order and shape, the regulation of boundaries.

Like Walzer, political theorists who emphasize social justice and social equality as the goal of politics are more attuned to context and thus more comfortable with some of the messiness that accompanies attention to context. For example, Iris Marion Young defines social justice as “the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression.” Similar to Walzer, Young sees justice as a response to domination. In contrast to Walzer, however, Young wants to
disassociate domination from tyranny (an association that Walzer makes) in order to focus on oppression, which she sees as structural rather than the effect of individual will. Because Young believes that oppression targets groups, she contends that a concept of social justice must begin with a social ontology of groups, whereby group differentiation is not oppressive if groups conceive of themselves as fluid and relational rather than essential. The goal of social justice, then, is for groups to attack oppression and to seek social equality, which refers “not primarily to the distribution of social goods, though distributions are certainly entailed by social equality. It refers primarily to the full participation and inclusion of everyone in a society’s major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity for all to develop and exercise their capacities and realize their choices.”

Young’s approach to social justice and equality is certainly less orderly than those reviewed so far. Moreover, it highlights participation. Yet, Young emphasizes inclusion more than participation, which leads her to the paradox of trying to secure participation through the development of capacities. Although one can secure the preconditions (i.e. capacities) for participation, those preconditions do not guarantee the eruption of activity that is the hallmark of political participation. Thus, in Young’s political theory, we can see the conflict between social justice, which seeks to secure participation through the ideal of inclusion, and political freedom, which highlights the transformative experience of participation itself. In Young’s theory of social justice, which seeks to include groups, particularly marginalized groups, within the framework of a liberal polity, inclusion threatens to reify the terms of marginalization by administering to them. Calling for participation of the marginalized, on the other hand, may transform the terms of marginalization, which is what Young wants to do, although she wants more of a guarantee than participatory freedom promises.
In this way, social justice exchanges participation for the more easily secured ideal of inclusion, which requires that people “have” a capability, not that they exercise it. Consequently, social justice and its counterpart, social equality, lend themselves to more passive, possessive subjectivities rather than active, participatory ones. For example, Martha Nussbaum’s theory of social justice is grounded in the concept of capabilities. The goal of social justice, Nussbaum contends, is “to put people into a position of agency and choice.”\(^52\) Moreover, politics, Nussbaum continues, “should focus on getting as many people as possible into a state of capability to function.”\(^53\) For Nussbaum, the goal of social justice is to include as many people as possible in the realm of human functioning, and it is to this end that we participate in politics. Through the ideal of inclusion, Nussbaum aims to preserve some “space” of discretion for people to decide whether or not they want to participate. But this discretionary space limits the possibility of radical transformation, reifying instead the recognizable template of the liberal individual and her rights, which Nussbaum sees as the most inclusive ideal. The willingness to sacrifice political participation on the altar of inclusion is also apparent in Andrew Koppelman’s approach to social equality. Social equality seeks a guarantee that all people are treated according to certain standards, and Koppelman believes this equal treatment demands some “uniformity of opinion among citizens.”\(^54\) The foreclosure of certain opinions, suggests Koppelman, ensures the inclusion, but not necessarily the participation, of society’s most vulnerable members.

It should come as no surprise that the ideals of social justice and equality dominate the Left’s approach to racism. Racism, which certainly renders the lives of non-whites insecure and particularly vulnerable, seems like the perfect ill for the ideals of social justice and equality to address. These ideals seek to secure the lives of vulnerable subjects by circumscribing the forces
that diminish their life-chances. Justice and equality, however, require only that people be treated fairly and equally, and be protected from oppression and violation. Justice- and equality-oriented approaches to combating racism may seek to guarantee the preconditions for political agency, but they alone do not encourage active, participatory subjectivities. Furthermore, in emphasizing the pursuit of agency’s preconditions, social justice and equality may pose a risk to agency itself. As Bonnie Honig worries, justice-oriented politics constructs “citizens as passive consumers of the state’s goods and services rather than as its active and vigilant interrogators.”

That is, an emphasis on justice and equality threatens to displace politics with administration and citizens with consumers. Moreover, justice- and equality-orientations, which focus on the goods and services that the vulnerable require, often turn to the State or other administrative body as arbiters of those goods and services. Consequently, Left orthodoxy, suggests Wendy Brown, has grown increasingly supportive of “state domination, appeals to expand state benefits, and ever-increasing reliance on the state for adjudication of social injury.”

While the American Left has championed the ideals of social justice and equality, the Right has taken up the sign of freedom but has interpreted freedom within a narrow individualist framework to defend the individual’s ability to do what she wants, with minimal regard for others. The Right’s identification of freedom with private choice is akin to Isaiah Berlin’s concept of negative liberty, which equates freedom with the absence of external interference; and Benjamin Constant’s concept of modern liberty, which Constant describes as “the enjoyment of security in private pleasures.” This understanding of freedom does not entail public participation, which is why Hobbes argues that (negative) liberty is consistent with absolute state sovereignty. As Dana Villa points out, in the contemporary political climate, freedom has lost its public character and has become entirely instrumental to individual rights and interests.
this way, contemporary freedom requires neither the presence of others, nor action with them. It can be experienced in isolation and refers to the discretionary capacity to act, not activity itself. In the post-Civil Rights’ narrative of the American Right, the State, through redistributive policies (such as taxes, public education, and welfare), is encroaching on freedom, understood as the private right of individuals to enjoy their property. The job of freedom is to protect the beleaguered individual from the machinations of the State.

Neither the Left’s indifference to State power nor the Right’s fear of it, however, has expanded the space for political participation. That is, neither the Right’s appeal to freedom nor the Left’s invocation of social justice and equality highlight the active sharing in collective power or the participation in the construction of collective meaning that conditions and makes possible our existence. While racism robs those subjected to it, namely non-whites, of individual rights, while it subjects non-whites to injustice and constructs them as unequal, it also, and perhaps more importantly, renders non-whites passive subjects banned from the public world of action, barred from the activity of collective meaning-making, defined by terms they do not participate in creating. As Wendy Brown argues, “Freedom persists as our most compelling way of marking differences between lives whose terms are relatively controlled by their inhabitants and those that are less so, between conditions of coercion and conditions of action, between domination by history and participation in history, between the space for action and its relative absence.”60 The vision of freedom that Brown advocates is a public-spirited one. When people come together in public life, they encounter one another across potentially radical difference, which may destabilize entrenched categories. For example, the public practice of freedom that the Civil Rights Movement embodied disrupted white supremacy in American society. As an elderly man who participated in Civil Rights activities noted, “I wasn’t no longer me after I took
part in this Movement,” referring to the fact that before the Movement, whites took him as “their nigger,” while after the Movement, his relationship to whiteness, and thus himself, was transformed.  

**Hannah Arendt and the Political Ethics of Antiracism**

In this dissertation, I want to develop a political ethics of antiracism that is oriented around the practice of participatory freedom. Participatory freedom emphasizes the *experience* of freedom as opposed to the protections that freedom may offer, which might be better conceptualized as liberty or rights; or the psychological state of freedom, which might be better conceptualized as autonomy. By highlighting the experiential dimension of freedom, participatory freedom emboldens us to encounter potentially radical difference, which we can do only in political life. The current failure to identify freedom with political life suggests, perhaps, that late modernity has so atomized us from one another that we must either, as the contemporary configuration of freedom proposes, find meaning in our atomization; or, as the concepts of social justice and equality allude, experience collective life through the more sterile workings of administration. Although participatory freedom need not replace justice-, equality-, or rights-based approaches to antiracism, these approaches do not automatically foster encounters across difference – encounters that yield the potential to destabilize deeply entrenched norms, such as whiteness. Thus, I contend that participatory freedom should occupy a more central place in social justice imaginaries, particularly those invested in challenging racism.

At this juncture, I turn to Hannah Arendt, who is the principal interlocutor of this project. Arendt’s discernment of both the possibilities that stem from and the obstacles that hinder participatory freedom in late/post-modernity is unmatched. I seek not only to draw Arendt’s
work into the conversation on race, but also to push those interested in Arendt’s work to consider the ways that her political theory might inform a political ethics of antiracism. In recent years, as Arendt’s political theory has surged in popularity, more scholars have started to scrutinize Arendt’s ideas about race and racism, which, like many of her concepts, are complicated and difficult to situate according to conventional political categories. A native of the 20th century, Arendt witnessed the rise of popular movements challenging racial domination around the world and the collapse of European colonialism and American Jim Crow. Unlike many of her intellectual contemporaries who remained silent about race, Arendt engages these 20th century developments in her work, which addresses slavery, colonialism, the Civil Rights Movement, and black liberation.

What is frustrating to many of Arendt’s readers is that Arendt’s views on race are not easy to situate within an antiracist project. In glorifying Athenian democracy and the ancient public sphere, Arendt seems to condone the social inequality and slavery that undergirded the cultures of antiquity. Similarly, her idealization of the Founding Fathers glosses over the racial, gendered, and economic inequalities that structured American life at the time of the Revolution. Arendt’s sympathies align with the Boer slave-owners of South Africa rather than the Africans who were enslaved by them. She praises the white student activism of the 1960s while condemning the Black Power movement. Consequently, many of Arendt’s readers conclude with Sheldon Wolin that Arendt’s work ignores the fundamental political problems of justice and structural power. Ann Norton, for example, accuses Arendt of endorsing an exclusionary and arbitrary vision of politics. Norton points to “Arendt’s denial of language to the African,” which, Norton suggests, serves “the interests of an unreasonable – and unreasoning – exclusion.” Norton’s critique of Arendt discloses Norton’s own prejudice: namely her Left orthodox belief
that inclusion and rationality should function as measures of political life. Arendt, on the other hand, worries about the consequences of including for inclusion’s sake. Inclusion can too easily collapse into massification, a tendency that Arendt charges with degrading, not enhancing, public participation.

My goal is not to absolve Arendt from what others have criticized as her racism and elitism, nor to argue that prejudice and inequality are absent from Arendt’s political theory. Rather, I strive to read Arendt’s work in conjunction with critical race theory and its broad commitments, which at times entails reading Arendt against herself. I consult Arendt’s political theory in hopes of stirring us out of the intellectual stagnation that characterizes conversations about race in the post-Civil Rights era. Arendt’s biographer, Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, has pointed out that Arendt “never considered what she called the ‘Negro Question’ – thinking of it as comparable to the Jewish Question – from a position acceptable to either liberals or conservatives.”65 Perhaps adopting an Arendtian approach will encourage us to contest the dominant ways in which racism is discussed. Neither the Left’s inattention to the nefariousness of State power, nor the Right’s failure to grapple with the destructiveness of social forces cultivates political participation and human plurality. As Patchen Markell writes, “From an Arendtian perspective… the most fundamental threat to democratic political activity lies in the loss of responsiveness to events.”66 It is in search of this responsiveness that I depart from administrative and individualist approaches to politics in favor of Arendt’s concept of participatory freedom. The responsiveness that Markell identifies at the heart of Arendt’s theory of political action is precisely what might disrupt the automatic reproduction of racial inequality through white normativity, whose consequences in the post-Civil Rights era have not only been depoliticizing but also deadly, as we saw in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
I also turn to Arendt because I agree with Jennifer Ring’s conclusion that Arendt’s political theory “betrays far more trust in human beings as individuals than most modern radical political thinkers do. If there is a strain of idealism and romanticism in her work, it is her overestimation of the capacity of ordinary people, not her belief that human glory was lost with the decline of ancient Greece.”67 A political ethics of antiracism, I think, needs to start with Arendt’s faith in the capacity of ordinary people. The Left’s willingness to rely on the State to not only prosecute acts of racism but also desegregate public spaces has not fostered a culture of public trust. In hiding behind the State, the Left evinced its mistrust of white segregationists and revealed its unwillingness to do the difficult work of speaking with them. Although this State-centered approach may have been necessary during an era when white violence was blatant and forthcoming, an over-reliance on the State and its repressive apparatus has curbed prospects for conversations that might lead to greater public understanding of how race has structured and continues to structure American life. These conversations were largely absent in the years prior to Hurricane Katrina, thus enabling white abandonment of the Gulf Coast. As such, Danielle Allen suggests that “interracial distrust,” more than racism, is “among our core political problems” today.68

I would argue that contemporary racism and interracial distrust are correlated phenomena, as it is the unwillingness to participate with those who are radically different from us that entrenches whiteness as a meaningful category in American life and allows for its undisturbed persistence. For all of the justice that a State-centered approach to racism has brought, its focus on prosecuting white racists and protecting non-whites has failed to challenge the more mundane ways in which whiteness operates—namely, how whiteness is normalized. The conversations that Allen hopes will take place across the color line are conversations that
can only take place when we engage whiteness and disrupt its privileges. This is precisely what Civil Rights activists began to do in the 1950s and 1960s. When Fred Shuttlesworth recalls the “first major march of the Movement,” which took place in Nashville, Tennessee in 1960, he remembers how it captivated white people. Shuttlesworth says: “As we walked by a place where there were workers out for the noon hour. White workers… And they had never seen anything like this… There was a fear there. There was an awe. They did not know what to do. But they knew that this was not to be stopped.” The fear and awe that Shuttlesworth describes refers to what antiracist theorist and activist Melanie E. L. Bush calls “cracks in the wall of whiteness:”

Moments when it is possible to intervene by shifting dominant narratives and corresponding imagery enough so that a white police officer would hesitate before presuming guilt based on racialized notions of criminality, the hiring and treatment of workers would not be tainted by racially weighted notions of merit, and people would decide where to live without consideration of how many of ‘them’ live ‘there.’

Participatory freedom cracks the wall of whiteness by opening up space for new meanings to emerge. This opening, however, is terrifying, which is why many whites responded violently to the political opening ushered forth by the Civil Rights Movement. White violence solicited a State-centered response, which ultimately foreclosed continued public debate.

In contrast, by foregrounding participatory freedom in a political ethics of antiracism, I hope to emphasize how public engagement, despite the fear it inspires, is our only hope for truly transforming the racial landscape in America. In each of the following chapters, I explore the threats that whiteness poses to participatory freedom and how participatory freedom might undermine white normativity. In the first chapter, I think about forgiveness as a practice of participatory freedom. I read Arendt’s writings on forgiveness next to the work of Desmond Tutu in order to consider how the practice of forgiveness can transform the appearance of race. I characterize forgiveness as a future-orientation that reckons with the past in order to detach from
it and create memory in its place. Forgiveness, I argue, might ground redistributive approaches to racism like reparations and affirmative action, which, alone, are more likely to stabilize subject positions through appeals to a historical past.

In the second chapter, I interrogate the relationship between freedom of association and white normativity through a re-reading of Arendt’s “Reflections on Little Rock.” Although we, following Tocqueville, assume that association cultivates the plurality of voices emblematic of the democratic public sphere, freedom of association, I argue, is not particularly public-spirited. Rather, I suggest that freedom of association helped to shape the twin processes of white resistance to racial integration and white flight from the inner cities to the suburbs, because integral to the logic of freedom of association are two drives that devitalize public life: the right to discriminate and the right to exit. While freedom of association monopolizes how we understand the relationship between freedom and association, I upset that monopoly by recasting the relationship, emphasizing the public and transformative power of association. As such, I revisit Arendt’s essay on Little Rock in order to not only understand how the policy of integration incited a white backlash that appealed to freedom of association, but also to develop an antiracist practice of “freedom as association.”

The third and final chapter rethinks black poverty as an effect of “natal alienation,” the trans-generational condemnation to invisibility that slavery initiated but that neither emancipation nor the Civil Rights Movement fully eradicated. In expanding our understanding of black poverty, I examine Arendt’s critique of the politicization of poverty, which hinges on her understanding of slavery and its relationship to the foundation of political freedom in the United States. As Arendt’s political theory reveals, the institution of racial slavery blinded white Americans to black poverty such that poverty itself never appeared as a public concern. The
continued omission of black poverty from the public debate compromises the practice of participatory freedom. In considering black poverty as a concern for participatory freedom, I invoke Arendt’s concept of natality, which refers to the capacity for beginning and newness, a capacity that is more concerned with public participation than it is with delivering goods. An antiracist approach to poverty might redefine black poverty as the deprivation of not only goods but also participatory capacity, which produces invisibility and alienation.
Chapter 1
Forgiving Whiteness: Hannah Arendt, Desmond Tutu, and Participatory Freedom

Both Hannah Arendt and Desmond Tutu emphasize the role that forgiveness plays in politics. In particular, a politics that privileges transformation—the creation of new, previously unthinkable relationships—demands attention to forgiveness as a meaningful form of action. This chapter draws from Arendt and Tutu’s work on forgiveness in order to make a case for forgiveness in the terrain of an antiracist politics, a politics committed to eroding whiteness. I argue that forgiveness constitutes an important supplement to antiracist strategies such as affirmative action and reparations, which, in the context of the post-Civil Rights backlash, have been forced to justify themselves from the perspective of whiteness. On the other hand, forgiveness approaches antiracism from a freedom-orientation rather than a justice-orientation, from the perspective of transformation rather than justification. Instead of appealing to whiteness, forgiveness undermines it, generating new relationships to power and oppression.

Forgiveness as a Political Practice

Linking forgiveness to a transformative vision of freedom, Hannah Arendt offers one of the most eminent articulations of forgiveness as a political practice. Arendt’s political theory, renowned for its focus on freedom, situates freedom at the heart of political life and public action. According to Arendt, action, work, and labor are the three modes of activity that define the human condition. Labor reproduces life in the biological sense; work creates the artificial world of things that houses human life; and action, through speech, relates human beings to one another in the political sphere. Although Arendt recognizes the interconnectedness of labor,
work, and action, she extols action as the quintessentially human activity, because unlike labor and work, action requires the presence of others, and it is the presence of others that makes a life truly human. The presence of others—what Arendt refers to as “plurality”—describes “the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.” Plurality is central to action, because when we act, we insert ourselves, through word and deed, into the web of human relationships that constitutes the world.

For Arendt, action coincides with the appearance of freedom. By inserting ourselves into the world, we interrupt the seemingly automatic processes that constitute that world, an interruption that Arendt identifies with freedom. In Arendt’s thought, freedom is not compatible with the status quo, with institutionalization, with the ordinary. Following the social order, however just it may be, does not render freedom, because the social processes or norms that constitute the social order structure human behavior. In everyday life, our relationship to reality is passive: we are the products of reality and thus appear powerless before it. In contrast, the moment of freedom witnesses human beings interrupting and transforming reality. In this moment, humans actively create reality. Thus, freedom refers to the human power to generate reality, to give rise to a new social order—a power whose appearance Arendt describes as miraculous, because, until that moment, it seemed impossible. As such, Arendt writes, “It is in the very nature of every new beginning that it breaks into the world as an ‘infinite improbability,’ and yet it is precisely this infinitely improbable which actually constitutes the very texture of everything we call real. Our whole existence rests, after all, on a chain of miracles.” These miracles stem not from any divine force, but from human beings, who “have received the twofold gift of freedom and action [and] can establish a reality of their own.”
Consequently, Arendt envisions freedom as transformative, whereby freedom expresses our initiation of a new reality, our authoring of miracles. Arendt fails to reveal much about the content of freedom, because freedom may refer to any public meaning-making activity, any activity that makes sense of our collective experience and transforms our collective sensibilities. Hence, Arendt’s vision of freedom defies the ability to predict freedom’s outcome or stipulate its exact contours, because freedom is not the manifestation of a single person’s will, but the result of multiple wills, acting on and through one another, and generating meaning and value that transcend the imagination and capacity of any single individual or organized body. This generative power of freedom redeems us from the predicament of meaninglessness, which, Arendt suggests, stems from “the ‘devaluation of all values,’ and the impossibility of finding value standards in a world determined by the category of means and ends”—a predicament endemic to modern life. The modern tendency to reduce all experience to means-ends relationships, which Max Weber identifies as the modern shift toward rationality, privileges efficiency as the value par excellence. Efficiency determines our behavior: on one hand, it posits the goals we pursue (the only goals are the ones we can achieve most efficiently), and on the other hand, it constructs the paths we use to realize those goals (the only paths offer the most efficient routes to our goals). Furthermore, efficiency determines our behavior without relying on the inspirational (e.g. rhetorical, persuasive) qualities of speech. It does not convince, it compels. Efficiency’s sensibility is inherent; it does not allow us to make sense for ourselves, to seek and create meaning. By compelling behavior rather than inspiring action, efficiency fails to create new meaning or engender new forms of being. It merely consolidates, streamlines. And while efficiency may produce greater order and certainty, it fails to fill us with a sense of wonder about existence. On the other hand, the interrelated faculties of speech and action enable us to
produce meaningful stories, which go on to make us in new ways, to engender new forms of being. Freedom, which rests on speech and action, derives its energy not from pursuing a knowable objective but from expanding the boundaries of the knowable, from making sense of what previously appeared nonsensical.

Freedom and its associates—action, power, plurality, and politics—cut both ways, however. While they make human life meaningful, offering us the prospect of connection, inspiration, and transformation, they are also deeply terrifying. First, freedom is unpredictable—its outcome is uncertain, as it lies beyond the control of any acting individual or organized body. When we enter the public sphere, we do not know what effects our entry will produce. Second, freedom is irreversible—the effects of freedom are also beyond the control of any acting individual or organized body, so freedom cannot be undone. While freedom disrupts one process, it also begins another, and this new process dwarfs the initiating actor, rendering the actor powerless in undoing what she started. According to Arendt, freedom’s terrifying features—its unpredictability and irreversibility—can be addressed by the potentialities of freedom itself. She has in mind the possible exercise of freedom through promising on the one hand and forgiving on the other hand. Promising provides relief from the “chaotic uncertainty of the future” that results from freedom. It binds us, holds us accountable to our words, and makes us more predictable, thus offsetting freedom’s unwieldiness. Forgiving redeems us from the predicament of irreversibility; it undoes what one has, unknowingly, done, releasing the doer from the deed. Arendt suggests that the faculties of promising and forgiving belong together, because they both renew the conditions for freedom. While promising “serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security without which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in the relationships between men,”
forgiveness releases us from the consequences of what we have done, without which “our capacity to act would, as it were, be confined to one single deed from which we could never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences forever.”

Of the two political acts that Arendt identifies as “correctives” to freedom’s volatility, promising has received the most attention in the Western tradition of political thought, largely through the tradition’s enduring obsession with constitutions. Constitutions, which Arendt also associates with action and freedom, most famously in On Revolution, represent a promise, as they aim to secure a mutual future whereby actors agree to hold themselves accountable to their words. As such, constitutions create relationships, which explains Arendt’s reason for linking constitutions to action and freedom. For Arendt, freedom does not ensue from the state that constitutions establish, as freedom is not a static entity in Arendt’s work. Rather, freedom appears at the moment of constitution, because in this moment, human actors begin something new, produce a new world. Much of Western political theory’s interest in constitutions, however, stems from the belief that constitutions secure freedom. In addition to creating relationships, constitutions order human interactions, providing security and predictability in the frenzy of human affairs by excluding certain possibilities. Securing social order and predictability is consistent with the hegemonic conceptualization of freedom, which equates freedom with the absence of obstacles (i.e. oppression) and the assertion of will. By securing order and predictability, constitutions remove obstacles from the social environment, simultaneously circumscribing will while enabling its assertion. Hence, while promising begins new relationships—the feature of promising Arendt is most interested in and which she associates with freedom—it also closes off certain possibilities by binding people to their words—the feature of promising most appealing to mainstream political theory.
The security-orientation evident in promising may explain why political theory has expressed more interest in promising than in forgiveness. Arendt herself appreciates, “In contrast to forgiving, which—perhaps because of its religious context, perhaps because of the connection with love attending its discovery—has always been deemed unrealistic and inadmissible in the public realm, the power of stabilization inherent in the faculty of making promises has been known throughout our tradition.” Forgiveness, however, plays a crucial role in Arendt’s conceptualization of freedom, and in the \textit{Human Condition}—perhaps the best distillation of her thought—Arendt devotes significant attention to the political relevance of forgiveness. Although Arendt attributes the discovery of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs to Jesus of Nazareth, she encourages us not to dismiss forgiveness’s political significance on account of its religious roots. Forgiveness, she proposes, is not “primarily related to the Christian religious message but sprang from experiences in the small and closely knit community of [Jesus’s] followers, bent on challenging the public authorities in Israel.” Forgiveness arose “directly out of the will to live together with others,” a will that is not specific to religious life, but is, in fact, the animus of \textit{political} life.

In conceiving the will to live together as politics’ energizing force, Arendt suggests that a commitment to a public, plural life entails an openness to trespassing, to the violation of boundaries, which is an inescapable feature of living together. She writes,

\begin{quote}
[T]respassing is an everyday occurrence which is in the very nature of action’s constant establishment of new relationships within a web of relations, and it needs forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on by constantly releasing men from what they have done unknowingly. Only through this constant mutual release from what they do can men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds and start again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin something new.
\end{quote}
The will to live together implies not only recognizing that trespassing is inevitable, but also being open to trespassing, what Arendt refers to as a willingness to change one’s mind. The practice of forgiveness captures this openness, inherent in the will to live together, and says, “I am open to being changed by you, and to changing you. I am detaching from the boundary that constituted our old relationship in order to open myself to a future with you, whereby our relationship will be a different one.” The act of forgiveness does not eliminate boundaries; rather, it recasts them. In other words, forgiveness destroys an old relationship to make a new one. As Arendt writes,

perhaps the most plausible argument that forgiving and acting are as closely connected as destroying and making comes from that aspect of forgiveness where the undoing of what was done seems to show the same revelatory character as the deed itself. Forgiving and the relationship it establishes is always an eminently personal (though not necessarily individual or private) affair in which what was done is forgiven for the sake of who did it.84

By attempting to sever the tie between the doer and the deed, forgiveness embraces the transformative potential in trespassing, the possibility that trespassing could reconstitute a relationship, transform the actors involved rather than condemning them to the iron cage of action’s consequences. Forgiveness enables actors to continue acting, rather than freezing them in the social positions that result from action. Furthermore, forgiveness is a “personal” activity, not an institutional one, meaning that forgiveness requires the forgiver and the forgiven to see one another as persons, not as categories, roles, or bundles of physiological functions, which is how institutions render us. Thus, Arendt does not exclude the personal from the political. In fact, the political is the sphere in which persons, in all of their uniqueness and glory, are revealed.

Forgiveness, however, is not the only response to trespassing. Arendt identifies two alternative responses: vengeance and punishment. Unlike forgiveness, which reconstitutes the
boundaries violated by the trespass, thus releasing the actors from the trespassing action, vengeance re-acts against a trespass, binding everyone to the process initiated by the trespass by maintaining the previous regime of boundaries. In Arendt’s idiom, vengeance locks “both doer and sufferer in the relentless automatism of the action process, which by itself need never come to an end.”\textsuperscript{85} Vengeance, then, is a natural, automated response to trespassing. It is completely expected (sometimes even calculated) and is wholly conditioned by the act that provoked it. Furthermore, vengeance is a private affair, based on the victim’s desire for restitution. On the other hand, punishment, which Arendt names as the second alternative to forgiveness, is a public response. Through punishment,

The wrongdoer is brought to justice because his act has disturbed and gravely endangered the community as a whole, and not because, as in civil suits, damage has been done to individuals who are entitled to reparation. The reparation effected in criminal cases is of an altogether different nature; it is the body politic itself that stands in need of being ‘repaired,’ and it is the general public order that has been thrown out of gear and must be restored, as it were. It is, in other words, the law, not the plaintiff, that must prevail.\textsuperscript{86} While vengeance restores the individual violated by the trespass, punishment restores the entire community, which is constituted by the boundary violated by the trespass. This restoration of the community, or body politic, is justice. Consequently, justice demands punishment. When a trespassing action has disrupted public order (i.e. justice) and unleashed a potentially endless process, punishment puts an end to that process and restores public order. Arendt is not unique in linking justice to punishment. Hobbes and Locke, for example, identify political power with punishment, and task both punishment and politics with the establishment and maintenance of justice.\textsuperscript{87} Like Arendt, Hobbes and Locke view trespassing as an inevitable feature of collective life, but unlike Arendt, the potential for social degeneration inherent in trespassing is more troubling to Hobbes and Locke, because they worry about the degenerative capacity of vengeance. Thus, to preclude social degeneration, these thinkers invest punishment with
political power. Rather than constituting trespassing as a moment for social transformation, Hobbes and Locke aim to restore the order that trespassing violates, and instill in punishment this restorative power.

Arendt, on the other hand, diverges from much of the Western tradition of political thought by privileging freedom rather than justice as the *sine qua non* of politics. Like Hobbes and Locke, Arendt understands punishment as restorative and vengeance as senseless and degenerative, but neither punishment nor vengeance acquire much political significance in her work, because neither is explicitly linked to transformation, which she equates with freedom and politics. Thus, Arendt’s preferred response to trespassing is forgiveness, which she endows with the ability to transform the social order, not just restore or degenerate it. Forgiveness is transformative because it appears spontaneously and “does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.”

Forgiveness is unconditional because on one hand, it emerges outside the economy of exchange, without expectation or obligation, divested from a particular outcome; and on the other hand, forgiveness gives rise to new, unexpected conditions, which go on to make us in new ways. Forgiveness’s power derives not from its ability to deal with guilt or error, to set things right, but rather from its ability to attempt “the seemingly impossible, to undo what has been done... [to make] a new beginning where beginnings seemed to have become no longer possible.” By setting its sights on the impossible rather than the right, forgiveness surfaces as a practice of freedom rather than one of justice. Forgiveness does not employ previously established moral standards—a sense of the right—to evaluate “the guilty” and decide whether “the guilty” can be transformed (i.e. normalized). In forgiving, the forgiver is not exercising her will over the forgiven, appealing to
an objective sense of “the right” to determine the fate of the forgiven. Rather, because forgiveness is a relational practice, it is a past relation between/among people that is forgiven because of a faith in future relationships. This faith in the future of the world and in the future of relationships inspires forgiveness, and this faith emerges through the relationships that define public life, through the practice of appearing in public with others. This practice builds its own context, its own world—a world that goes on to supply people with the faith to continue relating, to forgive.

Although faith in the world of human relationships is central to forgiveness, Arendt contends that the advent of the modern age witnessed a loss of faith in the world, which explains, in part, why forgiveness has fallen to the wayside as a political practice. Arendt links the modern loss of faith in the world to secularization, by which she means not only the separation of church and state, but also the rise of a profound uncertainty about the “reality” of worldly relationships, an uncertainty that Arendt traces to Plato but whose zenith she locates in Descartes. Arendt writes, “modern man… did not gain this world when he lost the other world, and he did not gain life, strictly speaking, either; he was thrust back upon it, thrown into the closed inwardness of introspection.”\(^{90}\) Although secularization foreclosed the prospect of another world, it also failed to invest this world—the one of human relationships—with newfound significance. Instead, secularization intensified doubt about the world of human relationships, positing the self as the source of certainty, thus reducing “all experiences, with the world as well as with other human beings, to experiences between man and himself.”\(^{91}\) While Arendt links the triumph of the self to the modern era and its specific preoccupations, she connects the rise of the self to the Western tradition’s persistent concern with rule rather than action, which enabled the self to dominate the modern stage. She writes,
The supreme criterion of fitness for ruling others is, in Plato and in the aristocratic tradition of the West, the capacity to rule one’s self. Just as the philosopher-king commands the city, the soul commands the body and reason commands the passions. In Plato himself, the legitimacy of this tyranny in everything pertaining to man, his conduct toward himself no less than his conduct toward others, is still firmly rooted in the equivocal significance of the word archein, which means both beginning and ruling; it is decisive for Plato, as he says expressly at the end of the Laws, that only the beginning (arche) is entitled to rule (archein). In the tradition of Platonic thought, this original, linguistically predetermined identity of ruling and beginning had the consequence that all beginning was understood as the legitimation for rulership, until, finally, the element of beginning disappeared altogether from the concept of rulership. With it the most elementary and authentic understanding of human freedom disappeared from political philosophy.92

By identifying public life with rule rather than with initiation, the Western tradition has equated freedom with the assertion of will—a self-oriented activity—rather than with the creation of new relationships—a world-oriented activity. For Arendt, the “freedom” associated with rule is not the active freedom that requires the presence of others. Rule acts on the world, not in it, and thus sees the world of human relationships as an obstacle to its achievement, a hurdle to overcome.

The Western tradition’s correlation of public life with rule coincides with its elevation of justice as the supreme political ideal. Plato, for example, conceptualizes justice in terms of rule, namely rule by reason. Thus, justice for the individual entails self-rule or rule by the most reasonable element within the individual, while justice for the city refers to rule by philosopher-kings, or rule by the most reasonable segment of society. Much of Plato’s political philosophy disparages the world of human relationships for the challenge it poses to rule and consequently, to justice. In this spirit, Socrates maintains, “A man who really fights for justice must lead a private, not a public, life if he is to survive for even a short time.”93 As Arendt suggests, Plato seeks to tame the world of human relationships by applying to it standards he derives from another sphere of human existence, namely the sphere of the self. According to Plato, participation in public life requires the proper knowing of and ordering of oneself. On the other
hand, Arendt wants political life, the world of human relationships, to be governed by its own, immanent logic. Because she wants public values to emerge from the context of public life, Arendt resists the application to public life of values that emerge from other spheres of the human condition. Self-intercourse is contemplative, meaning that it is still and silent. Thus, the insights that emerge from it (which emerge in the form of thought) are not appropriate to public life, whose currency is speech and action.

Moreover, Plato’s vision of justice stresses not simply self-intercourse, but also social order—rule by the wisest, most rational element, whose will is obeyed by the more spirited and appetitive elements. In this way, Plato’s vision of justice is authoritative, marked by a singular, enlightened will, and corresponds to how Arendt understands rule. Rule emerges from the domain of the household, which is inherently hierarchical, and entails an imposition of will, the issuing of order, which is appropriate to the household, where one person’s will governs the rest.94 Public life, on the other hand, is marked by a multitude of wills, and thus defies domination by a single will. Consequently, Arendt wants to disassociate freedom from thought and will, because thought and will are not only detached from a worldly reality, they also view that reality with fear and contempt.95 So, it is by no stretch of the imagination that a tradition preoccupied with rule and the certainty that accompanies it would generate a profound loss of faith in the world, fixating on the insecurity inherent in the world’s relational character, and turning inward, toward the self, for security.

Thus, Arendt correlates a self-orientation with the security- and justice-orientations emblematic of modern life. Attachment to the self, whether individual or collective, engenders a stabilizing rather than a transformative vision of politics. The strong self, deeply identified with a particular regime of boundaries that constitutes it, may be willful, may engage passionately in
the “activity” of pursuing ends that conform to its identity, to attaining what is valuable within an already-existing system of values; but it fails to posit new ends, to create new values, which is the activity of a transformative politics, the stuff of freedom. Forgiveness represents a practice of freedom, an important component of a transformative politics, because the act of forgiving exhibits a faith in the future and the world beyond the self, which are unknown, rather than an attachment to the past and the self, which are known. The power inherent in forgiveness emerges through this leap of faith, a leap into the future and the world, a leap that abandons old values for new ones. Forgiveness projects outward, and its momentum—its power—stems from an openness to being moved by others. As such, forgiveness transforms both forgiver and forgiven, detaching them from the boundary that constituted their relationship, the values that made their previous selves intelligible and meaningful, and attaching them to a new boundary, a new value, which, prior to the moment of forgiveness, was unimaginable. Forgiveness, then, implies a world-orientation rather than a self-orientation.

Attachments to the self animate many skeptics of forgiveness. Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton, for example, argue that negative feelings in response to a wrongdoing are tied to a healthy self-concept: “A person who does not resent moral injuries done to him… is almost necessarily a person lacking in self-respect.” Questioning the compatibility between forgiveness and healthy selfhood, Murphy and Hampton advocate retribution as a form of limited vengeance, which allows the self to recover from insult and degradation. Similarly, Martha Minow writes, ““Perhaps forgiveness should be reserved, as a concept and a practice, to instances where there are good reasons to forgive. To forgive without a good reason is to accept the violation and devaluation of the self. Some acts of forgiveness raise questions about whether the victim has enough self-respect or strength to view the injury as a violation.” Like Murphy
and Hampton, Minow understands transgression as violating the self, and politics as restoring the self. Furthermore, they all view resentment as an importantly self-oriented response to transgression, a sign of robust selfhood. As such, forgiveness’s role in politics should be limited, because forgiveness fails to value the self, fails to restore the self to its optimal power. Arendt, on the other hand, posits forgiveness as an energizing ethic of public life precisely because forgiveness is not a self-oriented but a world-oriented activity, precisely because it is not restorative but transformative, as is her vision of politics. As Peter Digeser offers, forgiveness “focuses on how we act toward or treat others; it is compatible with a form of politics that shies away from demanding purity of heart from its citizens.”

Forgiveness does not emerge from a pure or unified self; rather, forgiveness’s character is public and performative, and although forgiveness “does not necessitate the elimination of resentment, it is still a demanding moral act because it requires a particular form of conduct on the part of the victim. Given its public character, the difficulty of forgiving in a political context is in maintaining civility when dealing with those who have wronged you.” Thus, forgiveness results from acting in a certain way toward others (a world-oriented endeavor) rather than thinking or feeling a certain way about them (a self-oriented endeavor), an acting that transforms relationships, that transforms selves.

**Forgiveness as an Antiracist Practice**

If, as I suggest, an antiracist politics requires more than stabilizing the subject position (self) of non-whites by devoting to them more social energies, if it also entails exploding the category of race by destabilizing whiteness in order to enable new forms of being in the world, then we must prioritize the quest for transformative political practices. It is in this quest that I turn to the work of Desmond Tutu, who, like Arendt, links forgiveness to a transformative vision
of freedom. Tutu, however, considers forgiveness specifically in the terrain of antiracist politics, examining the power of forgiveness in the context of post-apartheid South Africa, a society struggling to transform the effects of centuries of racism. Like Arendt, Tutu situates freedom in the world beyond the self, and conceptualizes freedom as the creation of new and unexpected relationships and associations in the world rather than the self’s will to power. For example, Tutu describes South Africa’s first democratic election, which took place on April 27, 1994, in terms of a transformative, world-oriented freedom. He writes:

The black person entered the booth one person and emerged on the other side a new, transfigured person. She entered weighed down by the anguish and burden of oppression, with the memory of being treated like rubbish gnawing away at her very vitals like some corrosive acid. She reappeared as someone new, ‘I am free,’ as she walked away with head held high, the shoulders set straighter, and an elastic spring in her step. How do you convey that sense of freedom that tasted like sweet nectar for the first time? How do you explain it to someone who was born into freedom? It is impossible to convey. It is ineffable, like trying perhaps to describe the color red to a person born blind.”

Here Tutu distinguishes between natural, birthright freedom, and an active, transformative freedom: the fact of being born into a state without oppression does not guarantee an active and meaningful life. The brand of freedom that Tutu describes requires the activity of entering the unstable, insecure world of human relationships, opening the self up to new possibilities in the world, and being transformed into someone new.

Tutu describes the first democratic election in post-apartheid South Africa as a moment of transformative freedom, because the election created new relationships in the world. On one hand, the election generated a new relationship between blackness and citizenship. By casting a ballot, voting in a context where she was previously not allowed to vote, the black person was transformed into a citizen. On the other hand, the election transformed the relationship between black and white South Africans. It was not precisely the right to vote that engendered this
transformation, but the democratic practice of voting, whereby people from radically different walks of life came together in and around the polls and witnessed one another participating in a public ritual. By voting alongside black people, white people lost some of the burden/privilege of whiteness. As Tutu writes, “The white person entered the voting booth burdened by the load of guilt for having enjoyed the fruits of oppression and injustice. He emerged as somebody new. He too cried out, ‘The burden has been lifted from my shoulders, I am free, transfigured, made into a new person.’”

By divesting whiteness of some of its significance, South Africa’s first democratic election rendered citizenship less “an identity to possess” and more “a power to employ,” expanding the agency not of whites qua whites but as whites qua persons.

Furthermore, the election created a more plural public world. As Tutu writes, the election “was an amazing spectacle. People of all races were standing together in the same queues, perhaps for the very first time in their lives. Professionals, domestic workers, cleaners and their madams—all were standing in those lines that were snaking their way slowly to the polling booth… Those long hours helped us South Africans to find one another.”

Freedom, for Tutu, is this finding one another, this seeing and being seen that the voting queue, as an iteration of worldly space, provided. The world throws people from all walks of life onto one another, mixes them up, and asks them for one thing: to be open. Tutu observes, “Those lines produced a new and peculiarly South African status symbol. Afterward people boasted, ‘I stood for two hours to vote.’ ‘I waited for four hours!’”

The newfound status assigned to waiting in line to vote demonstrates respect for the world of human relationships, as messy, uncomfortable, and painstaking as that world might be. While staying at home on election day might have proven more secure and its end more predictable (no one knew how the voting process would turn out, if it would be successful), hiding in spaces of certainty would have precluded South
Africans from initiating the new relationships that would come to define their new world. The new South Africa, where citizenship was no longer defined by race, was made possible through a practice of freedom (and by the right to vote), a willingness to take risks by opening the self to others, to the world.

Tutu’s understanding of freedom resonates with his philosophy of *ubuntu*, which he describes as “a central feature of the African *Weltsanschauung.*” *Ubuntu* stresses a world-orientation, emphasizing the relational quality that distinguishes us as human. According to Tutu, *ubuntu*

speaks of the very essence of being human… It is to say, ‘My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours.’ We belong in a bundle of life. We say, ‘A person is a person through other persons.’ It is not, ‘I think therefore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am human because I belong. I participate, I share.’ A person with *ubuntu* is open and available to others, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less than who they are.¹⁰⁵

For Tutu, our humanity stems from participating in relationships with others rather than from contemplating, gazing into the self. Because “no one can be human alone,” we create relationships, participate in them, and affirm ourselves and others through them.¹⁰⁶ Like Arendt, Tutu worries that the world of human relationships is in jeopardy, that apartheid, racism, and Western modernity, more generally, threaten to alienate us from one another. As Charles Haws suggests,

Instead of affirming the variegated particularity of all humanity, apartheid claims the inherent right of only a certain particularity. One group stands above all others; such hierarchical oppression does not exist for the good of all but rather for the good of the few. Tutu notices this tendency in the history of Western theology, the individualism of which negates relationship and the importance of ethics. Western theology, in conjunction with the history of philosophy in the West, affirms the individual self as autonomous and standalone. Consequently, it produces a miasmatic milieu of separation and competition. The problem with this system is that it asserts the universality of a
particularity—that it affirms only a certain kind of human life and negates the value of all human life.”

Tutu sees apartheid, in particular, and Western modernity, in general, as eroding the plural character of the world by normalizing one form of the human at the expense of all others, thus yielding a world that is “out of joint,” characterized by “alienation and disharmony, conflict, and turmoil, enmity and hatred,” which undermine our faith in one another and our faith in the future.

The world-alienation characteristic of apartheid stands in sharp contrast to the freedom that miraculously appeared during South Africa’s first democratic election, the freedom that enabled South Africans, black and white, to find one another. On one hand, apartheid pitted the state against the majority of South African society, with state security forces violently targeting black South Africans suspected of “terrorism,” consequently inculcating fear and mistrust. On the other hand, apartheid estranged black South Africans from white South Africans, forcing blacks and whites into separate worlds. As Tutu writes,

The black townships were usually out of sight of whites and it was an easy step from being out of sight to being out of mind. You had to put yourself to considerable inconvenience to visit a black township if you were white. There were those who did, but for most whites it was a great deal more comfortable to remain in your salubrious affluent suburb. We black and white South Africans suffered from an acute form of schizophrenia—we inhabited two separate and alien worlds physically and psychologically.

Thus, apartheid’s racism stemmed not only from the material deprivation it induced in black South Africans, but also, and more importantly for Tutu, from its power to preclude the formation of meaningful relationships between black and white South Africans, as well as its ability to supplant these relationships with terror and suspicion. As Tutu sees it, the paramount challenge confronting post-apartheid South Africa lies in overcoming the fear spread by
apartheid and building new relationships across racial lines. In this vein, Tutu turns to the practice of forgiveness, exploring its promise as a world-building activity.

While Tutu shares with Arendt a vision of forgiveness animated by a faith in the future of relationships, whereby forgiveness creates new, previously unthinkable relationships, he diverges from her in grounding forgiveness in Christian theology, linking forgiveness to a concept of good and evil, as well as compassion and love. Tutu situates the origins of forgiveness in the capacity each of us has “for the most awful evil… None of us could predict that if we had been subjected to the same influences, the same conditioning, we would not have turned out like these perpetrators. This is not to condone or excuse what they did. It is to be filled more and more with the compassion of God, looking on and weeping that one of His beloved had come to such a sad pass.”

For Tutu, forgiveness calls on our ability to distinguish the human person, who is essentially good, from the social conditions that give rise to evil, an ability that requires a god-like compassion, even love. As Tutu writes, “God does not give up on anyone, for God loved us from all eternity, God loves us now and God will always love us, all of us good and bad, forever and ever.”

We, like God, should be merciful, even in the face of evil. It is both compassion—which enables us to see in ourselves the capacity for evil—as well as love—which instills in us a generosity of spirit—that motivate this openness, this ability to forgive.

Arendt, on the other hand, wants to divorce forgiveness from its roots in Christian theology, and posits the will to live together, to be open to the wonders and violations inherent in collective life, as standing on its own, as not requiring inspiration from the religious, or any other, sphere. In fact, Arendt considers love and compassion dangerous to politics, and wants to prevent them from infiltrating public life. Both love and compassion, she suggests, “can comprehend only the particular” and have no notion of the general, no ability to generalize.
Furthermore, love and compassion are curiously mute, and their language “consists in gestures and expressions of countenance rather than in words.”\textsuperscript{113} Because love and compassion abolish “the distance, the worldly space between men where political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located,” Arendt dismisses them as politically irrelevant.\textsuperscript{114} Rather than love and compassion, which grasp people in the particular and abridge the distance between them in an attempt to eliminate it, politics demands respect, which “is a kind of ‘friendship’ without intimacy and without closeness; it is a regard for the person from the distance which the space of the world puts between us and this regard is independent of qualities which we may admire or of achievements which we may highly esteem.”\textsuperscript{115} While love and compassion are worldless orientations that encourage unity, respect is a world-orientation that engenders distinctness and plurality. Because Tutu prioritizes national unity over plurality, love and compassion may appear less threatening to him than they do to Arendt.

Despite Tutu’s religious (and nationalist) leanings, we should, pace Arendt, not reject his insight on forgiveness simply because it draws on the duty of compassion. Tutu’s work on forgiveness is particularly interesting to an antiracist politics, because it pays specific attention to time—not only to the present’s indebtedness to the past, but also to the present’s openness to the future. The persistence of racial inequality in post-Civil Rights America has proved especially troubling to antiracist scholars and activists, because while Civil Rights legislation of the mid-1960s made racial discrimination illegal, such legislation failed to address the historical processes that constructed whiteness as the norm around which our social and political institutions are built. Antidiscrimination law cannot contend with the ways in which white normativity continues to operate by privileging whites at the expense of non-whites, which often occurs in the absence of overt discrimination. In order to target the structural effects of white
normativity, antiracist scholars and activists in the post-Civil Rights era argue that we need to go beyond the jurisdiction of antidiscrimination law, which focuses on overtly racist acts in the present, and examine present conditions as a product of past offenses, such as slavery, genocide, repression, and discrimination. As Kimberlé Crenshaw Williams writes, “Society has embraced the rhetoric of equal opportunity without fulfilling its promise; creating a break with the past has formed the basis for the neoconservative claim that present inequities cannot be the result of discriminatory practices because this society no longer discriminates against Blacks.”116 The injunction to take responsibility for the past motivates much antiracist scholarship and activism, and a critical piece of an antiracist project remains figuring out ways to endow democratic politics with a “historical consciousness.”117

Forgiveness, however, is frequently considered an inadequate orientation toward the past, namely because many view it as falling short of the requirements of justice and as irresponsible to the victims of (historical) violence. Skeptics of forgiveness cite that forgiveness implies forgetting the past. For example, Martha Minow writes, “[I]n practice, forgiveness often produces exemption from punishment… This institutionalizes forgetfulness, and sacrifices justice in a foreshortened effort to move on. Moreover, such an effort to move on often fails because the injury is not so much forgiven but publicly ignored, leaving it to fester.”118 According to Minnow, forgiveness compromises the past for the sake of the future, but in making this compromise, forgiveness forfeits justice, which demands punishment. Similarly, Peter Digeser suggests, “If justice is rendering to each person his due, then forgiveness intervenes in this moral economy by annulling or erasing the debt.”119 In this vein, many antiracist scholars and activists view forgiveness with suspicion, because forgiveness threatens to expunge the debt whites owe to non-whites, a debt incurred through practices such as slavery,
genocide, removal, segregation, repression, and discrimination. Consequently, forgiveness has largely been sidelined in favor of more redistributive practices such as reparations and affirmative action. As Howard McGary writes, “[E]ven though there have been legal and economic changes for the better in U.S. society, many African Americans still believe that the U.S. owes them a debt of justice for what they and their ancestors have endured. The historic and present demand for black reparations is a call for the settling of this debt.”

Many whites, however, view the justice-oriented approaches to antiracism as punitive, as punishing them for actions they did not commit. Thus, whites in the post-Civil Rights era frequently invoke narratives such as “the past is the past” and “I did not own slaves” to eschew not only responsibility for the current condition of non-whites but also their investment in whiteness. In response to the State-led redistributive policies of the 1960s and 1970s, the 1980s saw the beginning of a long battle to renege on the gains of the Civil Rights Movement and reassert white privilege. The War on Drugs, for example, disproportionately targets non-whites, incarcerating them in record numbers, while the shift toward privatization has eroded welfare, public education, and affirmative action in higher education and unemployment, which disproportionately deprive non-whites of valuable social resources.

Tutu is particularly sensitive to the white resentment that accompanies the institution of a new, more egalitarian racial order. The Civil Rights Movement in the United States and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa installed new racial orders in deeply racist societies, orders committed to the principle of racial equality. But while non-whites made important strides during these struggles, Tutu worries about the imposition of victor’s justice, which is how he characterizes the Nuremberg trials that followed World War II and the Nazi Holocaust. He states that “[w]hile the Allies could pack up and go home after Nuremberg, we in South Africa
had to live with one another.”

Thus, the will (or injunction) to live together, black and white, inspired an alternative ethic, that of forgiveness. According to Tutu, foregrounding forgiveness as a political practice invites both blacks and whites into the public world. While punishment constitutes the world as partial to one party over another, forgiveness seeks to transform parties, to redraw lines of identification. Rendering punishment the modus operandi of the public world propagates fear and mistrust, the very ills that were the currency of apartheid. Forgiveness, on the other hand, dissipates fear and builds trust, but not because it forgets the past or because it tolerates anything and everything. Rather, as Tutu points out,

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\text{[N]one of us possess a kind of fiat by which we can say, ‘Let bygones be bygones’ and, hey presto, they then become bygones. Our common experience in fact is the opposite—the past, far from disappearing or lying down and being quiet, has an embarrassing and persistent way of returning and haunting us unless it has in fact been dealt with adequately. Unless we look the beast in the eye we find it has an uncanny habit of returning to hold us hostage.} \]

Forgiveness is miraculous not because it casts a magical spell on the past, making it disappear, but because it testifies to the hard work that people willingly undertake in order to live together. It is the willingness to forge a common future where there is space for all of us that conditions the facticity of truth. As such, the fact-finding work of the TRC, which is conditioned by the ethic of forgiveness, is distinct from other forms of hard work. While most hard work is assumed begrudgingly and tinged with dread, Tutu cites the magnanimity associated with forgiveness. Forgiveness is hard work that is embraced rather than shirked, that invigorates rather than exhausts. He writes, “And, mercifully and wonderfully, as I listened to the stories of victims I marveled at their magnanimity, that after so much suffering, instead of lusting for revenge, they had the extraordinary willingness to forgive.”

Thus, a practice of antiracist forgiveness does not cater to the white fantasy of erasing or forgetting the past. On the contrary, forgiveness requires confronting the past in order to forge a
new relationship to it—the hard work that took place through South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). As Tutu writes, “Forgiveness does not mean condoning what has been done. It means taking what happened seriously and not minimizing it; drawing out the sting in the memory that threatens to poison our entire existence. It involves trying to understand the perpetrators and so have empathy, to try to stand in their shoes and appreciate the sort of pressures and influences that might have conditioned them.”

Thus, forgiveness is consistent with memory: forgiveness asks us not to erase memory, but to remove from memory its sting, to detach from it enough to move on. As Jill Stauffer suggests, forgiveness “can be a mode of honoring the past without living in it—a futural orientation. It learns from the past by letting go. Such forgiveness is not forgetting but a form of remembrance that breaks revenge’s cycle.”

Forgiveness entails an effort not to be determined by the past, but to constitute it, and consequently, to make ourselves anew in relationship to it, reflecting Jean-Paul Sartre’s insight that it is “our very project towards a future” that allows us to “have” a past. The ethic of the TRC, that of forgiveness and futurity, encouraged both black and white South Africans to reveal the violent details of apartheid and racism, not as a way of incriminating the other, but as a way of creating a public memory, of constituting a past. This was the “truth” that the TRC aimed to generate. In creating a public memory, South Africans made the past a thing in the world, a thing to be engaged, rather than an inextricable part of their being. And sometimes, in the creation of this public memory, forgiveness spontaneously ensued, a gift that Tutu recognizes could neither be commanded nor predicted. But in granting the gift of forgiveness, a “victim”—confronted with the past in all its horror—decided not to “be locked into the culprit’s whim, locked into victimhood.” Rather, in forgiving, a “victim” abandoned her “right to pay back the perpetrator in his own coin,” an abandonment that liberated her from her victimhood by
detaching her from the old system of currency and initiating a new one, where whiteness and blackness no longer held the same significance as they once did.\textsuperscript{131}

\textit{Forgiving Whiteness}

One of the primary projects of an antiracist politics is to transform subjectivity such that whiteness is no longer a meaningful category of being. An antiracist politics targets whiteness rather than race because such a politics is sensitive to the burden already placed on non-whites in societies constructed around white normativity. Thus, antiracist activists and scholars should be wary of strategies that ask non-whites to “give up” or “sacrifice” for the greater good, since in racially stratified societies, the greater good usually aligns with the interests of white people. Forgiveness could be seen as requiring non-whites to make a sacrifice on behalf of whites, while more redistributive practices, such as affirmative action and reparations for slavery and removal, attempt to balance the scales, to bring about substantive equality by giving non-whites their due. In making a case for forgiveness in the terrain of antiracist politics, I am not suggesting that forgiveness replace redistributive strategies. In racially stratified societies like that of post-Civil Rights America, the economic inequality that divides whites and non-whites plays a significant role in preventing the development of a common world. The juxtaposition of white material well-being with non-white material deprivation discourages a world-orientation, because the racial Other is rarely seen and when seen, is apprehended through the lenses of fear and mistrust.

Redistributive strategies alone, however, do not guarantee openness to the world and the transformation that accompanies this openness. Oftentimes, as is the case in the post-Civil Rights era, attempts at redistribution provoke heightened entrenchment, generating resentment and backlash, because redistributive strategies, which are closely aligned with justice and
punishment, take place within the economy of sacrifice and obligation. As such, they appeal to those with valued social resources, obligating them to sacrifice on behalf of those with fewer valued resources. Redistributive strategies do not, in and of themselves, transform our set of values. Rather, they operate within an already existing system of values and redistribute values whose meaning has already been determined. Strategies like affirmative action and reparations, for example, redistribute the privileges of whiteness, attempting to undermine whiteness by taking it out of the hands of white people. The post-Civil Rights backlash, however, witnesses white people clinging to white privilege, as they do not know who they would be without it and are not open to the transformation involved in relinquishing their privilege and the value system in which it arose. Whites are not open, because the redistributive strategies endemic of the post-Civil Rights era have not stressed openness to a common future. Rather, the power of these strategies stems from appeals to the past. Thus, calls for redistribution engender resentment among white people, a resentment that can be traced, in part, to the rubric of redistribution itself. Rather than calling into question the system that values whiteness, redistributive strategies like affirmative action and reparations appeal to whiteness in order to undermine it. These strategies recognize white people as white people—as people with power and privilege that non-whites desire—and deploy different logics to obligate them to sacrifice their power/privilege. Resentment ensues because redistributive strategies construct non-white gain in terms of white loss.

I am not rejecting redistributive strategies as an important component of an antiracist politics. I am simply calling attention to a potential danger of affirmative action and reparations and suggesting that these policies be pursued within the larger framework of forgiveness. Unlike redistributive strategies, forgiveness operates outside of the economy of sacrifice and obligation.
In forgiving whiteness, non-whites fail to recognize whites as whites. In the moment of forgiveness, whiteness no longer holds the meaning and value that it previously did and that redistributive strategies fail to divest it of. Non-white agency lies in this failure to see the value in whiteness, but in failing to see the value in whiteness, the non-white forgiver is herself transformed. Moreover, in the moment of forgiveness, a white person struggles under the gaze of a non-white person, a gaze that is not punitive but imploring, a gaze that is conditioned by a desire for a common future. Under this gaze, a white person must grapple with her finitude, which Patchen Markell describes as “the practical limits imposed upon us by the unpredictability of the future.” According to Markell, this struggle with finitude entails a misrecognition, “not the misrecognition of an identity, either one’s own or someone else’s, but the misrecognition of one’s own fundamental situation or circumstances.” The experience of finitude, conditioned by a desire for a common future, devalues whiteness. By situating whiteness in a context where its peculiarities and privileges become evident, because they appear in relation to non-whiteness, forgiveness projects a new value onto the world. This projection—the thrust of forgiveness—emerges through a confrontation between forgiver and forgiven, between white and non-white. In this way, forgiveness offers an antiracist strategy that does not justify itself in terms other than itself. Values are generated spontaneously, in the moment of confrontation and transformation, which is why forgiveness constitutes a practice of freedom.

The disadvantage of forgiveness in relation to redistributive strategies, however, is that forgiveness can neither be coerced nor institutionalized. Even when forgiveness is requested, or when institutions such as the TRC are set up to channel it, forgiveness does not necessarily spring forth. As Jacques Derrida writes, “[E]ach time forgiveness is at the service of a finality, be it noble and spiritual (atonement or redemption, reconciliation, salvation), each time that it
aims to re-establish a normality (social, national, political, psychological) by a work of mourning, by some therapy or ecology of memory, then the ‘forgiveness’ is not pure,” it is not genuine, and it will not bring about transformation. As such, if an antiracist politics invests in forgiveness, it has no guarantee that forgiveness will arise. Nonetheless, when the moment of forgiveness arrives, gain and loss no longer make sense as they once did. In the moment of forgiveness, we forgive whiteness for a new mode of being in the world. Forgiveness *inspires* us to detach from the regime of values through which we previously understood ourselves, thus leaving no room for resentment, which emerges through an intense attachment to a threatened system of values. Forgiveness does not *threaten* values as such. When white and non-white confront one another in the moment of forgiveness, forgiveness arouses detachment from the past mode of valuation—racism—for an antiracist future.

In detaching from the racist past, the confrontation between white and non-white creates memory, which is an important component of an antiracist practice of forgiveness. The creation of memory ensures that forgiveness does not collapse into amnesia. Thus, the act of forgiving whiteness creates a memory of racism—slavery, genocide, removal, segregation—and constitutes this racism as part of our past, as a thing in the world rather than an inalienable part of ourselves. Thus, an antiracist practice of forgiveness allows us to say, “When there was slavery” rather than “When we were slaves,” a declaration energized by our movement toward the future, toward subjectivities divested from whiteness.
Chapter 2

Revisiting “Little Rock”: Freedom of Association, White Flight, and Antiracism

Following the US Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown ruling, schools across the nation began to integrate, though the process encountered varying degrees of resistance from white Americans. Speaking at a public hearing on school segregation in 1960, Thomas Wesley, the president of the Metropolitan Association for Segregated Education (MASE), an Atlanta-based segregationist organization, stated: “To swap forced separation for forced integration is to exchange a lesser evil for a greater one… If the right to associate transcends the right not to associate, then nobody’s privacy is safe. We feel that everyone should be permitted to associate with those he chooses—if the desire for association is mutual.” According to Wesley and the members of MASE, by mandating racial integration in public schools, the US government was compelling whites to associate with non-whites, and thus violating whites’ individual rights, namely their freedom of association. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, freedom of association emerged as a rallying cry for white segregationists, who mobilized the concept not only to oppose racial integration in schools, but also to justify their exodus from a racially integrating world.

The contest over school desegregation corresponded with changing residential patterns in not only the South but across the country. As racial integration penetrated public institutions such as schools and buses, white Americans sought segregation in the private realm of home and neighborhood. In the three decades following World War II, suburbanization exploded, as real estate developers turned land on the outskirts of cities into the new American dream, attracting millions of Americans away from cities and toward the low-density world of the suburbs. Although population growth, car culture, and government housing policies favoring low-density
housing played the most direct role in suburban expansion, race profoundly shaped the process. The period of suburban expansion coincided with the Second Great Migration, where over five million African Americans migrated from the South to cities in the North, Midwest and West; as well as the Civil Rights Movement, which enfranchised African Americans and other oppressed minorities. As such, the original suburbanites were whites fleeing inner cities, where minority populations were concentrated.\footnote{136} The suburbs gave rise to a new consciousness, one concerned with real-estate values, educational quality, and personal safety.\footnote{137} Deeply embedded in suburban consciousness was freedom of association, which suburbanites defined not “positively, in terms of what outside groups they could join, but negatively, in terms of what groups of outsiders they could shun.”\footnote{138} Suburban whites’ invocation of freedom of association helped them not only to shield themselves from the racial pluralism of city life, but also, and more importantly, to consolidate whiteness.\footnote{139} One of the paradoxes of suburbanization, then, is that it invokes freedom of association in order to undermine associational life. Rather than embracing the chance to associate with diverse others in public spaces, millions of white Americans in the post-War era abandoned the heterogeneous world of the desegregating city for a racially, socially, and politically homogenous world in the suburbs.\footnote{140}

Freedom of association, I argue, helped to shape the twin processes of white resistance to racial integration and white flight from the inner cities to the suburbs, because freedom of association is not inherently public-spirited. Although we, following Tocqueville, tend to regard freedom of association as central to democratic life and to assume that it cultivates the plurality of voices emblematic of the democratic public sphere, we misconstrue freedom of association as a social right with freedom of association as a political right. As a social right, freedom of association entails two drives that devitalize public life: the right to discriminate and the right to
exit. On one hand, freedom of association encourages us to discriminate between those who are like us and those who are different from us, gaging likeness and difference by identifying people categorically, which relies on and consequently affirms the categories that currently order the world rather than generating new categories and identities. Moreover, as a social right, freedom of association urges us to dissociate from those who are unlike us, thus conserving already-existing identities rather than encouraging us to engage difference, to embrace the plurality of public life.

In discerning between freedom of association as a social right, on one hand, and a political right, on the other, I turn to Hannah Arendt and her insights on the distinction between the social and the political. In particular, I revisit one of Arendt’s more controversial works, her essay on desegregation in Little Rock, where Arendt offers a defense of freedom of association as a social right. In “Reflections on Little Rock,” Arendt reveals that as a social right, freedom of association fosters comfortable relationships that consolidate already-existing identities, rather than generating new, potentially risky relationships. Accordingly, freedom of association may bolster, rather than undermine, an attachment to whiteness. In contrast, Arendt links freedom of association as a political right to the practice of civil disobedience. Freedom of association as a political right privileges dissent and confronting difference, thus challenging, rather than entrenching, existing identities and attachments. In this way, the political practice of association is ripe for an antiracist politics—a politics committed to destabilizing whiteness. By creating new attachments and undermining old ones, the political practice of association evacuates whiteness of its current meaning and reconfigures subjectivity along new lines.
Freedom of Association in Arendt’s “Little Rock”

In September 1957 a mob of white segregationists protested the integration of Little Rock Central High School, gathering outside the school to harass the nine black children who attempted to attend. Supporting the mob in its effort to prevent the children from entering the school, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus dispatched National Guard troops to the scene. After several weeks of confrontation between the black children and the white mob, President Dwight D. Eisenhower countered the authority of Governor Faubus, sending US Army troops to escort the children into the school. The conflict between federal and state authority, on one hand, and the black children and white mob, on the other hand, inspired Arendt to write “Reflections on Little Rock,” which she published in Dissent in the spring of 1959. Dissent delayed publication of the essay, because it disagreed with Arendt’s views on discrimination and segregation, which were not in line with the progressive politics of the day. Furthermore, notable public intellectuals attacked the essay at the time of its publication, and it continues to solicit criticism among contemporary scholars. Most of the essay’s critics target Arendt’s insistence that the private and social spheres remain distinct from the public sphere. These critics argue that the private/political and social/political distinctions that Arendt emphasizes dissolve in the case of oppressed minorities such as women and African Americans, for whom oppression in one sphere, such as the private or social sphere, carries over into other spheres, namely the public sphere.141

Admittedly, Arendt’s political theory is not particularly concerned with oppressed minorities.142 In fact, in “Little Rock” Arendt supports what some might consider oppression, since she presents an argument in favor of social discrimination, which is exactly what many Civil Rights activists were fighting against, because they connected it to the overall oppression
of African Americans. Arendt, however, links social discrimination to freedom of association, which she defends in “Little Rock.” As such, Arendt elaborates a position that appears similar to the white segregationists quoted earlier. Despite the resonances between Arendt’s position and that of the white segregationists protecting their freedom of association, Arendt’s defense of freedom of association in “Little Rock” is distinct in that Arendt views freedom of association as a social right. Freedom of association and the discrimination it entails are appropriate only in society, not in public or private life. So, while Arendt defends discrimination in “Little Rock,” she, more importantly, defends the separation of spheres. In arguing for the separation of spheres, Arendt confines the discrimination inherent in freedom of association to the realm of society, which is oriented around comfort and security rather than transformation. Thus, while many of Arendt’s critics oppose her rigid adherence to the separation of spheres, it is precisely her spherical thinking that opens up space for us to consider a more political practice of association.

The separation of spheres that Arendt upholds in “Little Rock” is central to her political theory. Arendt separates human existence into three spheres—the public, private, and social—although “Little Rock” offers a slightly different account of the three spheres than the rest of Arendt’s work, especially The Human Condition. In The Human Condition Arendt constructs the political sphere as supremely valuable to human existence, the private sphere as instrumental to political life, and the social sphere as detrimental. While Arendt borrows heavily from antiquity in conceptualizing the public and private spheres, she argues that the social sphere finds no equivalence in ancient life. The social sphere, whose origins Arendt traces to the modern age, addresses human need—the activity once relegated to the ancient household—in public. As a result, the social sphere blurs the traditional boundary between the public and private spheres,
bringing what was once private into public, and so extinguishing the features that previously
defined public life: freedom, action, and politics. Thus, much of Arendt’s work, especially *The
Human Condition*, is critical of the social sphere.\textsuperscript{143} The social sphere of *The Human Condition*
engenders a mere “being together,” a comfort in shared company, which fails to reveal distinctly
human qualities—*who* we are—but instead promotes conformity.\textsuperscript{144} What draws us together in
the social sphere is our “mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else.”\textsuperscript{145} While the
public sphere inspires us by displaying our differences in opinion and perspective, the social
sphere comforts us by highlighting our likenesses. In *The Human Condition* Arendt scorns this
comforting aspect of the social sphere, which, she argues, thwarts attempts at striving and
excelling. Only politics promises to elevate us. Society, on the other hand, confines us to the
familiar, the ordinary.\textsuperscript{146}

The tension between the political and social spheres that Arendt identifies in *The Human
Condition* differs from the tension she describes between these spheres in “Little Rock.” Rather
than taking up her characteristic defense of the political against the social, “Little Rock” defends
each sphere in its own right. In “Little Rock” Arendt aligns each sphere with a governing
principle: equality governs the political sphere, discrimination the social sphere, and
exclusiveness the personal sphere. She writes, “[D]iscrimination is as indispensable a social
right as equality is a political right. The question is not how to abolish discrimination, but how
to keep it confined within the social sphere, where it is legitimate, and prevent its trespassing on
the political and the personal sphere, where it is destructive.”\textsuperscript{147} Here Arendt argues against
forcing both segregation and integration, since both policies attempt to assert principles in
spheres where they do not belong. In this way, Arendt advocates for the separation of spheres,
which she understands as restricting the domain of particular principles, and thus preventing a
single principle from governing all spheres of life. By separating spheres—allowing different principles to govern different spheres of existence—Arendt aims to prevent totalitarianism, whereby a single principle (which could be individualism) dominates all spheres of life, or a single sphere expands to the point where it eclipses all other spheres, thus rendering human existence uniform and shallow.

By guarding the social sphere from equality and upholding the social right of discrimination, Arendt demonstrates a newfound appreciation of the social. The social sphere of “Little Rock” is not the blob of *The Human Condition*, whose untrammeled growth endangers both public and private life. Rather, the social sphere of “Little Rock” is the realm between the private sphere of the family and the public sphere of politics—the realm of group life, which Arendt values. Group life, she suggests, hinges on discrimination, because in order to form groups, we discriminate between those who are like us and those who are different from us. This discriminating activity is essential to freedom of association: “There cannot be a ‘right to go into any hotel or recreation area or place of amusement,’ because many of these are in the realm of the purely social where the right to free association, and therefore to discrimination, has greater validity than the principle of equality.”

Without discrimination and the freedom of association that accompanies it, we would lose the comfort we derive from being among those who are like us, a comfort that is unique to society. While Arendt criticizes this comfort in *The Human Condition*, fearing its lulling and de-politicizing effects, she appreciates it more in “Little Rock,” portraying it as “that untaught and natural feeling of identity with whatever we happen to be by the accident of birth.”

We form social groups with those who are like us, who share common *given* traits or qualities, traits or qualities that are already recognized. Furthermore, we exclude from our social
groups those who are different from us. Determining likeness and difference hinges on the discrimination endemic to social life, which is the result of identifying people categorically, judging them for what they are, for how they are already situated within existing institutions. Social discrimination is the stuff of freedom of association, which, while necessary for us to form selves that ground and protect us from the unwieldy aspects of human existence, does not give us a chance to reveal who we are. Rather, the who, according to Arendt, emerges from another form of freedom, the transformative freedom of public life. Although the who springs forth from the what, the who exceeds the what by generating new associations among the categories that constitute the what such that the what is transformed. In this way, public life is transformative, while social life is conservative. As a social right, freedom of association is also conservative, in that it aims to consolidate already-existing identities. In other words, freedom of association conserves the terms that currently make up the world, pursuing the well-being or advancing the status of identities already in existence.

Racial integration, Arendt suggests, clumsily mixes the transformative impulse of public life with the conservative impulse of social life. While racial integration attempts to undermine existing racial identities—a transformative project—it does so by divesting blackness of its social stigma, thus focusing its energies on the conservative terrain of society, where we work, reside, recreate, and educate. Arendt is especially critical of the effort to begin racial integration in education, because she views education as a conservative endeavor, one that teaches children about the world as it is. In “The Crisis of Education,” Arendt attacks progressive education for seeking to transform when it should conserve, arguing that education does not build a world, but rather introduces a new generation into an old, already-existing world. Although the State requires children to receive an education (i.e. be introduced to the world), Arendt invests parents
with the right to decide *how* to introduce children to the world. The way parents choose to present the world to their children constitutes what Arendt describes as the “social customs and manners of educating children,” which she links to freedom of association. In Arendt’s thinking, then, the school lies at the intersection of the private, social, and political realms. As Elisabeth Young-Bruehl elaborates, “Schools involve private persons’ rights to raise children as they see fit, the social right of all to keep what company they wish, and the government’s political right ‘to prepare children for their future duty as citizens.’” Thus, Arendt argues in “Little Rock,” “To force parents to send their children to an integrated school against their will means to deprive them of rights which clearly belong to them in all free societies—the private right over their children and the social right to free association.” Although education is a private right, it is tempered by the customs and manners of society, which conserves the world as it is. Conversely, politics is transformative. In politics, society’s conservative attitude, “can only lead to destruction, because the world, in gross and in detail, is irrevocably delivered up to the ruin of time unless human beings are determined to intervene, to alter, to create what is new.” In other words, while society reproduces the world as it is, politics transforms the terms that currently order the world, thus recreating the world.

It was the photo of 15-year-old Elizabeth Eckford, the black high school student jeered by a white mob in front of Little Rock Central High School, which spurred Arendt to write “Little Rock.” As Arendt suggests, racial integration forced transformation on children, who do not yet understand the world as it is, because they are still learning the categories that order the world. While teaching children about a future world, about the world we want, seems like an easy way to transform the world, progressive education does not actually create a new world. Instead, progressive education hopes that children will behave *as if* that world exists, but when
children encounter the world as it is, as Eckford did on September 4, 1957, they cannot act into it. So, when a white mob confronted Eckford, thwarted her entry into the school, and threatened to lynch her, she burst into tears. Seeking the nearest bus stop, Eckford sat down and continued crying. When a white television reporter pushed a microphone in her face and asked her to state her name and whether she planned to attend Central High School, Eckford was silent.

Eventually, a white woman helped Eckford onto a bus, and she fled the scene. The violence of the white mob, which displayed America’s racial reality, closed Eckford back on herself, where she sought refuge until she could escape the situation. Eckford’s response was not heroic, but as Arendt argues, to expect heroism from children is to relinquish responsibility for the world we have created and thus to forego action. The hope that children will save us from the world that exists if we teach them about a world to come collapsed in the wake of Eckford’s tears.

Teaching children is not a substitute for action, and the only hope for a new world lies in the difficulty of acting in the public sphere and creating new associations that transform old ones.

According to Arendt, racial integration failed to generate this public sphere and transform the meaning of race in public life, because it concentrated on the conservative realm of the social. While equality, as an integral feature of political life, wields transformative potential, racial integration misappropriates equality by deploying it in social life, as a weapon against social stigma. Consequently, racial integration appears less an effort to undermine, and consequently transform, existing racial identities and more an effort to promote an already existing identity. As Arendt suggests, racial integration, as a social policy, can do little more than advance the interests of African Americans, but it does so by engendering the tyranny of equality. By applying equality to a sphere where it is misfit, racial integration undermines both society, which requires discrimination to survive, and equality, whose proper place is public life.
Consequently, Arendt interprets racial integration as the pursuit of status and opportunity for an oppressed minority, construing racial integration as black social opportunism, which has led her critics to target her position as racist, at worst, and racially insensitive, at best.

Arendt’s critics are correct to point out her shortsightedness regarding race. Although Arendt’s insistence on the separation of spheres guards against tyranny, she is more concerned with the tyranny of equality than with the tyranny of whiteness. From the founding of the American republic, whiteness has dominated not only the political sphere, but also the social and private spheres. While whiteness has dictated the terms of citizenship, allowing only certain categories of people to vote and run for office—to appear in public life—it has simultaneously governed the terms of social life, defining employment, housing, recreational, and educational possibilities. Additionally, whiteness has organized private life by shaping the terms of personal relationships—for example, discouraging sexual intimacy between whites and non-whites. Arendt, however, fails to recognize the tyranny of whiteness, because she fails to recognize whiteness. Rather, Arendt only sees blackness, which she identifies with “visibility.” While Arendt considers blackness peculiar and the essence of race, she regards whiteness as general and non-raced, lacking particular traits or qualities. Accordingly, Arendt fails to see whiteness as an identity with particular interests. Rather, when whites pursue their particular interests (like increased property values and high-quality education) through freedom of association, which allows them to retain control of valuable social resources, Arendt considers this pursuit a general defense of the social sphere.

As such, Arendt cannot see how her defense of the social sphere is also a defense of whiteness. On the contrary, she believes that in defending the social sphere, she is defending children, especially black children. Racial integration, suggests Arendt, forced black children
into the public sphere, which they were not prepared to encounter. The photo of Eckford reveals to Arendt that the public sphere is dangerous for children, and as such, we should prepare them for the dangers of the world in school, which safely introduces children to the world. But it was not racial integration that exposed black children to the dangers of the world, making them uncomfortable in a space—the school—where comfort is of key importance. While racial integration turned the school into an uncomfortable space for white children and parents, the school and society were already uncomfortable and disorienting spaces for black children. The famous doll tests conducted by psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark in the 1940s saw black children expressing preferences for white dolls (over non-white dolls), attributing positive qualities to white dolls, and even selecting white dolls as best representing themselves. The Clarks’ tests show that while education attempts to teach children about the categories that order the world as it is, children are not immune from those categories: they are “never spared politics.” Teaching black children about the categories that order the world as it is produces shame and terror, because for black children, the world is disordered. While the school nurtures selfhood for white children, it turns black children against themselves. Thus, Jean Bethke Elshtain writes, “[N]ot going public when the world is in turmoil may be much harder on children than for them to take up their share of the burden.” Arendt’s insistence that education remain distinct from politics overlooks the existential realities of African Americans, for whom the social sphere is not the comforting realm Arendt wants it to be. As such, Ralph Ellison criticizes Arendt’s argument that African American parents endangered their children by publicizing the social realm. As Ellison contends, African American parents “are aware of the overtones of a rite of initiation which [sending their children through the lines of hostile people] actually constitute for the child, a confrontation of the terrors of social life with all the mysteries
stripped away.” For Ellison, exposing black children to white hostility is part of introducing them to the world as it is. Because society does not protect black children, they must, alongside their parents, fight for protection in the public realm. In this way, the social cannot be neatly separated from the political; and racial matters, in particular, attest to this blending of spheres.\textsuperscript{161}

Arendt, however, views race as a natural fact rather than a product of political contestation. Moreover, she understands racial integration in terms of resource distribution, which, to her, is a social, not a political, matter. But integration as an ideal or principle entailed more than resource distribution, more than meeting black need. As an ideal, racial integration inspired the Civil Rights Movement, which contested the meaning of equality as well as the significance of racial categories. Although African Americans have always constituted a space for themselves within larger American society to articulate the terms of their existence, the Civil Rights Movement empowered the black public sphere such that the terms arising from it infiltrated the larger public sphere and shaped national discourse on race and democracy.\textsuperscript{162}

Thus, while Civil Rights organizing engendered social policies like racial integration, it also galvanized the black public sphere, which was not merely a vehicle to secure black interests. Rather, the black public sphere engaged the larger public, thus transforming the public appearance of race and its significance in American life.

Although Arendt’s “Little Rock” presents a narrow view of race and misinterprets the political significance of integration, we should not dismiss the essay, as it offers important insight to our understanding of the white backlash to racial integration, whereby whites invoked freedom of association as a justification for their flight to the suburbs, away from cities and public schools. As Arendt reveals, freedom of association is a fundamentally conservative social right, one that affirms the categories that currently order the world. Central to freedom of
association is discrimination, which asks us to distinguish between those who are like us and those who are different from us. In order to gage likeness and difference, we rely on, and consequently affirm, the categories that currently order the world. Moreover, as Arendt argues, the adage that governs society is “like attracts like,” and as such, freedom of association encourages us to associate with those who are like us, consolidating already-existing categories and relationships rather than generating new relationships among old categories, relationships that destabilize old categories and create new ones.\textsuperscript{163} The conservatism that Arendt identifies with freedom of association, which she links to the practice of discrimination, surfaces in whites’ invocation of freedom of association as a response to racial integration. Whites mobilized freedom of association as a way to justify associating with others like them—other whites—in order to consolidate white interests and better conserve whiteness, which integration threatened. According to Arendt, such a move is characteristic of social life, where we pursue comfort. Racial integration made whites uncomfortable in spaces where comfort is of prime importance, and whites reacted by erecting alternative social spaces where they could pursue comfort—the suburbs, which allowed whites to choose their neighbors, focus on home and family, and build new “public” schools; and private schools, largely concentrated in the cities, which allowed whites to “maintain” educational quality.

Rather than targeting the racial prejudice of white segregationists, an obvious factor in fueling white flight, Arendt’s “Little Rock” illuminates how the logic of racial integration elicited a conservative response from whites. According to Arendt, racial integration attempted to transform the meaning of world-ordering categories—a political endeavor—in the conservative realm of society. She warns that pursuing transformation in the social realm empowers the social realm at the expense of the political realm. Thus, neither integrationists nor
segregationists were willing to embrace public life and its unwieldiness, to pursue transformation and the risks that accompany it. Instead, as integration shifted national focus away from the public realm and toward the social realm, white segregationists invoked freedom of association in order to uphold the conservatism of society; but in so doing, they also bolstered whiteness.

**Freedom of Association in Liberal Political Theory**

Like Arendt’s account of freedom of association, liberal political theory reveals freedom of association as oriented around security. Unlike Arendt, however, who ties freedom of association to groups and views it as an important group right, a means to secure group identity and interests, liberal political theory links freedom of association to the individual and constructs freedom of association as a way to secure individual liberty and interests. Because Arendt values group life on its own terms by including the social sphere among the fundamental spheres of human existence, Arendt’s conceptualization of freedom of association stresses the right to discriminate, which is essential to group formation and preservation. On the other hand, liberal political theory values the individual above all else, and as such, it is ambivalent about group life. Thus, while liberal political theory recognizes the role that discrimination plays in freedom of association, it draws our attention to the right to exit, a right that protects the individual from the threatening aspects of associational life.

Although freedom of association is not a right explicitly recognized by the US Constitution, it is an important right within American political culture and liberal political theory. Liberal political theory renders freedom of association a significant component of individual liberty, which is liberal democracy’s defining principle. George Kateb, for example, defines freedom of association as the right to pick one’s company. He writes: “Picking one’s company is part of living as one likes; living as one likes (provided one does not injure the vital
claims of others) is what being free means.”164 Because freedom of association is closely connected to individual liberty, it hinges on the separation of spheres. While Arendt distinguishes among the public, private, and social spheres, liberal political theory only differentiates between the public and private spheres. Unlike Arendt, who identifies the private sphere with necessity and the life process and sees private life as largely instrumental to public life, where freedom prevails; liberal political theory champions the private sphere as existentially significant, since it is here where individual liberty thrives, where each individual defines the terms of her existence. The liberal public sphere, on the other hand, does not wield the creative power of Arendt’s public sphere. Rather, it exists to protect the private sphere and the individual liberty that flourishes there. By so closely tying freedom of association to individual liberty, liberal political theory situates freedom of association in the private sphere. Unlike the public sphere, which liberals conceive in terms of involuntary or compelled association, the private sphere gives rise to voluntary associations, whose legitimacy derives from individual consent. In the private sphere, the individual elects to join associations that express her will, and as such, freedom of association is a private right.

While freedom of association primarily connotes the individual’s right to choose her company, it also entails her right to discriminate—to exclude others from her company—since making choices about who not to include is part of living as one likes. In a liberal society, one that aims to maximize individual liberty, the only justification for limiting an individual’s right to discriminate is when that right conflicts with the vital claims of others, with others’ ability to exercise their rights as individuals.165 When exclusion from an association clearly determines an individual’s life chances, she has a vital claim. Associations that wield such life-determining power belong in the public sphere, because individuals do not elect to join them. Rather, such
associations monopolize social goods, thus requiring individuals to join them. Consequently, liberals view life-determining associations as legitimately subject to compulsion, although liberals differ among themselves about what counts as a life-determining association. For libertarians, only the State exercises such life-determining power, but many liberals (particularly those interested in more robust accounts of justice) grant that other associations, namely economic ones, exert life-determining power as well, particularly when they band together to discriminate against people categorically (e.g. when businesses refused to hire African Americans). Private associations, on the other hand, are voluntary: individuals choose not only which associations to join, but also with whom to enter into association. Because the private sphere is plural, brimming with associations, no single association determines life-chances. Thus, private associations are inherently non-vital, since those excluded from one private association can create their own (discriminatory) associations. Because discrimination in the private sphere, where freedom of association is active, does not threaten an individual’s life-chances as it does in the public sphere, the discriminatory aspect of freedom of association does not violate others’ rights as individuals. Accordingly, a liberal society strives to expand freedom of association by limiting the realm of compelled association (the public sphere) and enlarging the realm of voluntary association (the private sphere), thus giving the individual as much room as possible to decide the terms of association: to choose when, where, how, and with whom to engage.

By so closely aligning association with individual liberty, freedom of association allows the individual to choose not only with whom to associate, but also whether to associate at all. As such, freedom of association includes not only the right to discriminate, but also the right to exit, since the ease with which an individual can exit an association indicates the degree of her liberty
as well as the degree of voluntariness binding an association. As Loren Lomasky suggests, exit has played a constitutive role in liberal political theory since its origins in the early modern age. He writes, “Occupational and residential mobility emerged with the waning of a feudalism that tied individuals to land and labor. Entitlement to take up whatever employment may be on offer presupposes a liberty to divest oneself of prior jobs; moving to a new address presupposes a right to leave the old address.”

Although individual mobility, a sign of liberty, entails movement both towards and away from relationships, liberal political theory more readily equates individual liberty with the cutting of ties over the establishing of bonds, since in the act of exiting a relationship, an individual appears individuated and hence more “free,” while in the act of entering a relationship, he “sacrifices” some of his individuality. The republican vision of Rousseau’s social contract, which demands “[t]he total alienation of each associate, together with all of his rights, to the entire community,” haunts liberal political theory’s imagination of association, as Rousseau’s social contract shows how association can alienate the individual from himself, thus violating individual liberty. Consequently, liberal political theory is ambivalent toward association: while association enables the individual to live as she likes, it also wields the power to undermine the individual.

John Stuart Mill’s fear of society’s tyranny over the individual captures this ambivalence toward association, an ambivalence that is absent from Arendt’s conceptualization of freedom of association. Because Arendt values group life on its own terms, she does not posit a tension between the individual and the group and does not view freedom of association as a threat to the individual. On the other hand, Mill values the individual above all else, and although he acknowledges freedom of association as an important individual right, he has little to say about the virtues of association. Rather, Mill writes, “The greatness of England is now all collective;
individually small, we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining… But it was men of another stamp than this that made England what it has been; and men of another stamp will be needed to prevent its decline.”

Here Mill evinces his suspicion of association. Mill’s individual, while free to associate, appears most powerful when not in combination with others. Because Mill locates greatness in the individual, he worries that the combination of individuals reduces power rather than produces it. Thus, while Mill admits that individual liberty requires “freedom to unite for any purpose not involving harm to others,” he fails to articulate how association glorifies the individual. Rather, Mill, like Arendt, links association to society. But unlike Arendt, who in “Little Rock” recognizes the virtues of social life, Mill views society as tyrannical, as crushing the individual under its compulsion to conform. As such, Mill posits individual glory and association in tension with one another.

The tension between the individual and association that Mill presumes permeates liberal conceptions of association. Despite the efforts of some liberal political theorists to consider the individual as associated, association’s value in liberal political theory stems primarily from its ability to protect and express individual liberty. In the private sphere, where associations abound, individuals can more closely realize the values they already hold when in association with others. In this way, liberal political theory’s imagination of association privileges individual liberty over the creation of new relationships, which is, perhaps, the defining activity of association. In fact, freedom of association might circumscribe the creative power of association by foregrounding the individual’s right to exit as the hallmark of voluntary association. While the right to exit empowers the individual, it potentially enervates associational life if it takes as the basis of associational life the atomized individual, which renders many potentially meaningful relationships impossible. Moreover, by placing association
in the service of the individual, freedom of association represents association within the compulsion/consent dichotomy. The individual either is forced to associate, which defines the individual’s relationship to the State, or the individual elects to associate, which characterizes activity in civil society, where freedom of association prevails.

In contrast, Arendt’s concept of political action, which she only hints at in “Little Rock,” exceeds the compulsion/consent dichotomy that mires freedom of association. In relating public life to the theater, in recognizing an affinity between politics and performance, Arendt offers an account of association that resembles a play, whereby actors encounter one another through masks. The mask functions “to hide, or rather to replace, the actor’s own face and countenance, but in a way that would make it possible for the voice to sound through.” In donning a mask, an actor submits to a persona, a part he is expected to play in public, “with the provision, however, that his own voice would sound through.” The mask, and the expectations that accompany it, condition the actor’s performance, such that the conditions of the play (the roles, the script), which appear to interfere with the actor as an individual, actually produce his voice. That is to say, the mask is not an obstacle the actor seeks to overcome. Rather, the mask relates the actor to others, giving him something about which to speak. Without the mask, the actor turns toward his individual, naked self—what Arendt describes as “the natural Ego”—which obscures him. In contrast, the mask turns the actor outward, to the world and his fellow actors. Thus, the mask simultaneously illuminates and shields him.

In this metaphor, association is a masked encounter, whereby actors speak through already-constituted masks, which not only enable them to speak, to sound their own voices, but also transform the appearance of the masks themselves. Association, then, is twofold: the masked encounter creates an association among actors that produces the actor’s voice, on one
hand, while the voice that sounds through the mask creates a new association with the mask—no such voice ever sounded through the mask before—such that the mask’s appearance is transformed, on the other hand. In this view of association, the actor does not command his mask to appear as he wills it to appear. Instead, donning the mask subjects the actor to others’ expectations. Yet, in this case, others’ expectations are not tyrannical, in Mill’s sense. While the masked encounter calls on the actor to subordinate himself to others’ expectations, he performs not to those expectations, but through them. Others’ expectations serve as a site through which the actor distinguishes his persona. The mask neither joins the actor perfectly with others, nor opposes him perfectly to them. Instead, it is through the mask that new associations are created. That is, the mask enables the encounter with radical difference that is endemic to public life; it secures the undoing of the self that inevitably occurs on stage. While the actor’s attachment to the mask is not liberatory, since it subordinates him to power, it is not oppressive either, because, as Judith Butler suggests, subordination gives rise to subjectivity, which is the presupposition of agency.\(^{176}\) In other words, subordinating ourselves to power reveals us as agents.

The transformative power of association that Arendt’s masked encounter captures eludes liberal political theory’s account of freedom of association, which clings steadfastly to the individual and the compulsion/consent dichotomy. In so elevating the individual, freedom of association inevitably privileges exit, because exit secures the individual when association threatens to undo her. As such, the “freedom” characteristic of freedom of association is private and isolationist rather than public, closing the individual back on herself rather than opening her up to the world, which gives rise to new terms of existence. While association can fundamentally transform and consequently make us, freedom of association’s exit option incites the individual to protect her individuated self by fleeing associations that undermine who she
thinks she is, thus curtailing association’s transformative potential. In this way, the conservatism that Arendt identifies with freedom of association also surfaces in liberal accounts of freedom of association, namely through the right to exit, which conserves the liberal individual when the individual is under siege.

*Freedom as Association: Toward an Antiracist Practice of Association*

Neither Arendt nor liberal political theory recognizes freedom of association as particularly public-spirited, as committed to participation with others unlike oneself, participation that generates new terms that reorder the world. Rather, Arendt links freedom of association to the social sphere and sees it as an important group right, one that conserves already-existing group identities through the right to discriminate. Similarly, liberal political theory connects freedom of association to the private sphere and views it as an important individual right, one that conserves the ideal of the individual through the right to exit. In both Arendt and liberal political theory’s accounts, freedom of association secures already-existing values instead of creating new values by generating new associations that transform old attachments. Furthermore, in both accounts, freedom of association bolsters values that precede public participation, values such as group identity and individual liberty. While group identity and individual liberty could entail public contestation—for example, the black public sphere contested the meaning of blackness, a group identity, just like human rights conventions debate the meaning of individual liberty—freedom of association renders group identity and individual liberty self-evident in that their protection is automatic. In other words, freedom of association, through the rights to discriminate and exit, draws us toward comfortable values, values that we feel naturally or automatically, values that are pre-associational. Moreover, rather than
proliferating identity categories, freedom of association aims to secure already-existing categories. As such, freedom of association inspires a fear of being undone.

The draw toward comfort and the fear of being undone inherent in freedom of association enabled white segregationists to mobilize it as a means to escape the plurality of the public sphere and consolidate whiteness in the private/social realm of suburbia, which aligns family life with social life (i.e. employment, residence, recreation, and education), such that residents can increasingly meet all of their needs while avoiding the uncertain, uncomfortable encounters with diverse others that city life entails, encounters that challenge and undo us. Because freedom of association is a private/social right, it focuses its energies on the private/social realm, where we come together for comfort and safety—to live as we like with those who are like us. Rather than encouraging encounters with those who are different from us, encounters that might transform the terms that currently order the world, freedom of association conserves the world as it is. Consequently, freedom of association appealed to white segregationists as a means of conserving whiteness in the face of racial integration, which threatened to transform the meaning of race in American life. Racial integration, however, attempted transformation in the conservative realm of society, where we seek comfort. As such, racial integration legitimized the pursuit of comfort by converting a public conflict about the meaning of race into a private/social conflict about access to already-meaningful goods. In response to racial integration, then, whites mobilized freedom of association, a private/social right, as a means to secure access to those goods—to pursue comfort—away from the integrating city and the public sphere. Furthermore, freedom of association enabled whites to oppose racial integration in race-less terms. While the right to discriminate inherent in freedom of association allowed whites to mobilize as a social group to assert their particular group interests (i.e. to retain control of
valuable social goods such as education), freedom of association’s right to exit encouraged whites to assert their group interests by exiting integrating workplaces, parks, and schools to pursue homogenous alternatives in the suburbs, where they could secure whiteness via the seemingly race-less individual and his rights.

While freedom of association draws us toward comfort and inspires a fear of being undone, public life is inherently uncomfortable and thrives on the spirit of undoing. As such, public life inspires us to cultivate a practice of discomfort, to consider freedom as association. While freedom of association moves us toward likeness and away from difference, freedom as association calls us toward difference, toward the insecurity of the world, which pluralizes social positions and intimate experiences. Plurality is transformative, working to destabilize, rather than consolidate, already-existing categories and generate new ones. In responding to the critics of her “Little Rock,” Arendt offers an instance of what I call freedom as association, describing a practice of association that is simultaneously public-spirited and antiracist. She writes:

If, however, I were strongly convinced that the situation in the South could be materially helped by integrated education, I would try—perhaps with the help of the Quakers or some other body of like-minded citizens—to organize a new school for white and colored children and to run it like a pilot project, as a means to persuade other white parents to change their attitudes. To be sure, there, too, I would use the children in what is essentially a political battle, but at least I would have made sure that the children in school are all there with the consent and the help of their parents; there would be no conflict between home and school, though there might arise a conflict between home and school, on one side, and the street on the other. Let us now assume that in the course of such an enterprise, southern citizens who object to integrated education also organized themselves and even succeeded in persuading the state authorities to prevent the opening and functioning of the school. This would be the precise moment when, in my opinion, the federal government should be called upon to intervene. For here we would have a clear case of segregation enforced by governmental authority.

In describing her “pilot project,” Arendt does two things that she fails to do in her original essay. First, she eases up on her insistence that the social and political spheres remain distinct and presents an example of a socio-political practice. Arendt’s “pilot project” is social in that it
entails discrimination/freedom of association by gathering like-minded citizens (whose likeness stems from a shared belief in integrated education) for a particular end—educating children in a racially integrated school, which furthers the like-minded citizens’ likeness. Furthermore, as a social endeavor, Arendt's “pilot project” promotes comfort, since the values disseminated in the school are comfortable values in that they are not new. Rather, the school’s values resonate with the values the children already encounter in their homes. In this way, the “pilot project,” like society, is conservative, as the school conserves the participants’ pre-associational values by educating children in the already-existing values of their parents.

Arendt's “pilot project” is political, however, neither in its pedagogy—in the teachers’ approach to their students—nor in its bringing together teachers and parents who already believe in integrated education. Rather, the “pilot project” is political because it asks the teachers and parents involved to enter the public world, which lacks a consensus on integrated education. The world houses a plurality of views, and the “pilot project” encourages participants to embrace that plurality, to enter the public debate on race, racism, and integration, to engage difference.

Arendt suggests that those involved in the “pilot project” use their experience with the project—that is, their social experience—as a point of entry in the public debate. While society houses groups of like-minded citizens who remain closed to those who are different from them in order to better control the outcomes of their activity, the public sphere is open to different positions and as such, its outcome is unpredictable. Thus, in entering the public sphere, the participants in Arendt’s “pilot project” take the risk that the public, namely whites, will not embrace integrated education. Moreover, participants risk that their starting position on integration will change, that as a result of public debate, they will alter or even abandon the “pilot project.” Nonetheless, because Arendt’s “pilot project” is socio-political, it attempts to contain two potentially
contradictory impulses—the conservative impulse of society and the transformative impulse of politics. It aims to conserve the value of racial integration, at least for a small segment of society, while also transforming the public appearance of race by revealing integrated education as a reality.

In addition to blurring the boundary she characteristically draws between the social and the political, Arendt, in describing her “pilot project,” makes a second move away from her original argument in “Little Rock.” In “Little Rock,” Arendt defends a classic conception of freedom of association, but in responding to the essay’s critics, she articulates a relationship between freedom and association that is both public-spirited and antiracist, that corresponds to what I call freedom as association. Although the social aspect of Arendt’s “pilot project” embodies freedom of association, bringing together like-minded citizens for a particular end, the political aspect of the project, which encourages a public confrontation between participants in the project (i.e. pro-integration blacks and whites), on one hand, and white segregationists, on the other hand, represents a form of freedom as association. This public confrontation is uncomfortable, as it demands pro-integration blacks and whites to speak their position to those to whom it may be unintelligible.

The public persuasion that Arendt asks pro-integrationists to engage in requires them to don a mask, to give language to their position that will move their audience, which includes segregationists. The language that moves their audience will appear very different from the language that participants use in the “pilot project,” where they communicate with the like-minded. In finding language to communicate across difference, however, we leave the certainty of the self and venture into the abyss of public life, where we hope to achieve recognition, which simultaneously undoes and remakes us. The association entailed in this public encounter is
distinct from the association endemic to social life. While association in social life (i.e. freedom of association) gives rise to groups of the like-minded, bringing together people who already speak the same language; public association, (i.e. freedom as association), moves us away from the comfortable and the secure and asks us to generate new language that constitutes divergent subjects as mutually recognizable, thus creating a relationship where there was previously none, where such a relationship was previously unimaginable.

Freedom as association corresponds to an antiracist politics, because unlike freedom of association, which consolidates already-existing values, strengthens an already-existing language, freedom as association undermines existing values and replaces them with new ones. In this way, freedom as association offers the possibility of divesting whiteness of its meaning. In confronting white segregationists in the public sphere rather than in the social sphere, pro-integration blacks and whites give language to race, rendering it contestable rather than natural. Moreover, in articulating their position in favor of integration, in giving language to their experience with the “pilot project,” pro-integration blacks and whites inspire white segregationists to articulate their position, to give language to segregation, to convey whiteness as a meaningful way of being in the world. If whiteness fails to animate pro-integration blacks and whites, if they fail to turn toward whiteness, whiteness as it existed can no longer dominate the public sphere. As such, whiteness becomes less meaningful, less valuable.

Integrationists’ failure to turn toward whiteness, however, does not mean that integration will replace whiteness as the new racial paradigm. The public sphere offers no guarantee that white segregationists will be compelled by integration. In fact, white segregationists may fail to recognize the position of the pro-integration participants in Arendt’s “pilot project.” Such is the risk of persuasion. On the other hand, forcing whites to concede crucial aspects of their
privilege—which has been part of Left orthodoxy in the post-Civil Rights era—will only result in whites reasserting whiteness in new spaces, in private schools and in the suburbs. So, rather than forcing white segregationists to relinquish their position, Arendt’s “pilot project” calls participants to embrace the challenge of persuasion. Using their experience with integrated education as a starting point, participants move into the public sphere, where they endeavor to communicate the value of integration to those who do not find it valuable. This, Arendt argues, is the way to invest integration with the transformative power of the public sphere, which might move white segregationists toward a new position, a new identity.
Chapter 3

Black Poverty, Hannah Arendt and Participatory Freedom: Toward an Antiracist Approach to Poverty

In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, the poverty rate in the United States has soared, reaching a twenty-year high with 15 percent of Americans currently living in poverty. Among the newly impoverished are an increasing number of white, middle-class Americans, who had previously reaped the benefits of the American Dream but now find themselves struggling to make ends meet.\textsuperscript{180} The new emphasis on “middle-class poverty,” perhaps an oxymoron, treats poverty as representative of the post-racial landscape of contemporary America. The post-racial narrative posits that if whites are equally susceptible to poverty, then poverty is no longer a racialized phenomenon. The fact remains, however, that almost 27% of African Americans live in poverty today, compared to 25% of Latinos and 13% of whites. Moreover, black poverty has seen a slight increase in the last year, while white and Latino poverty have experienced small decreases.\textsuperscript{181} More troubling still is wealth disparity: white households have at least 20 times the wealth of African American households (and 18 times that of Latino households), which suggests that even as the economy improves, African Americans will find it more difficult to escape the poverty trap.\textsuperscript{182}

In this chapter, I argue that an antiracist politics should be wary of efforts to not only whiten the face of poverty but also construct poverty as a middle-class interest. Although these efforts are largely undertaken as a way to make anti-poverty politics more inclusive, they ultimately do a disservice to the black poor, whose poverty is often chronic and with different existential implications than the “new poverty” of the Great Recession. I suggest that we regard black poverty as a legacy of slavery, rethinking black poverty as an effect of “natal alienation,”
the trans-generational condemnation to invisibility that slavery initiated but that neither emancipation nor the Civil Rights Movement fully eradicated. In expanding our understanding of black poverty, I examine Hannah Arendt’s critique of the politicization of poverty, which hinges on her understanding of slavery and its relationship to the foundation of political freedom in the United States. In reconstructing Arendt’s reading of the American founding, I conclude that race plays a critical role in the fundamental exclusion of poverty from American politics. As Arendt’s political theory reveals, the institution of racial slavery blinded white Americans to black poverty such that poverty itself never appeared as a public concern.

I suggest, moreover, that the continued omission of black poverty from the public debate compromises the practice of democratic freedom that Arendt identifies with the American founding. In considering black poverty as a concern for political freedom, I invoke Arendt’s concept of natality, which refers to the capacity for beginning and newness, a capacity that is more concerned with public participation than it is with delivering goods. An antiracist approach to poverty might redefine black poverty as the deprivation of not only goods but also participatory capacity, which produces invisibility and alienation – the obscurity that helped to construct “blackness” as an impoverished racial category. Although black poverty is foundational to American life, the concept of natality emerges as a way to challenge the invisibility associated with black poverty. By linking human dignity to public participation, natality emphasizes how the struggle inherent in public participation undermines racial domination.

*Freedom vs. Necessity: Hannah Arendt’s Critique of the Politicization of Poverty*

The economic boom following World War II generated a newfound interest in the question of poverty, with intellectuals and policy-makers puzzling over poverty’s ability to
survive despite increasing material abundance. In 1963, the year after journalist Michael Harrington published his landmark book on American poverty, *The Other America*, and the year before the US government declared its short-lived War on Poverty, Hannah Arendt published *On Revolution*. In its time, *On Revolution* was not regarded as part of the new literature on poverty, since its primary aim was to consider the role of revolution in modern life. Nonetheless, poverty figures strongly in Arendt’s understanding of modernity and revolution. While many of Arendt’s contemporaries draw attention to the ways that affluence further entrenches poverty by rendering it invisible and more difficult to combat, Arendt argues that poverty becomes visible only in an affluent society. In other words, affluence creates the conditions whereby poverty appears as a problem. Arendt posits that for most of human history and in much of the world, scarcity, not affluence, has been the status quo, and the poverty that accompanies scarcity has been accepted as a natural fact. Only when a significant segment of society achieves material abundance do people begin to question the necessity of poverty, turning poverty into a “social question,” a product of social organization rather than an effect of nature’s vicissitudes. Arendt’s point, however, is not to question whether poverty is a social construct or a natural fact. On the contrary, Arendt views society and nature in similar terms: both are governed by necessity rather than freedom. Both society and nature cater to the needs of living bodies, and as such, both are concerned with economics, with the production and distribution of resources. What distinguishes society from nature is that society is the human endeavor to appropriate natural processes, to bring necessity under the human will, and to produce and distribute resources along different lines than might “naturally” occur. Thus, for Arendt, the distinction between nature and society is less relevant than the distinction between society and politics. While nature and society are concerned with producing and distributing resources, the already-defined goods of
life, politics is an activity that illuminates excellence through speech and action. The difference between the squabble over goods and the illumination of excellence is paramount for Arendt, as the former represents our attachment to necessity while the latter reveals our capacity for freedom, our ability to transform given conditions.

Arendt’s understanding of poverty hinges on the distinction between freedom and necessity. While politics expands human freedom by proliferating opinions and points of view, poverty binds its victims to necessity, to a “state of constant want and acute misery,” which “puts men under the absolute dictate of their bodies.” Rather than inciting human beings to excellence, as politics does, poverty reduces human beings to physiological functioning. As such, poverty reveals bodies rather than distinct human personalities and “never can produce ‘free-minded people.’” Accordingly, Arendt defines poverty as a social, not a political question, a question concerning not how to define the good or goods, but how to distribute the already-defined goods of life. Arendt traces distribution to production, to how much a society is able to produce, which she sees as a technical endeavor guided by necessity, and thus apolitical. Although production may call upon a collectivity like politics does, the relationships of production do not involve “the specifically political forms of being together with others, acting in concert and speaking with each other.” Production treats others as instruments to a common goal, asking workers to produce according to a single vision—a vision determined by human need—and to subsume their wills under that vision. In contrast, political relationships are not only instrumental. People come together in political life not only to achieve particular ends, not only out of necessity, since the original intention of political actors is never what results from political action. Rather, political relationships witness people coming together to be seen and to
see others. In this way, political relationships are, foremost, neither useful nor necessary relationships; they are meaningful ones.

Arendt argues that the challenge to poverty first emerged in Western culture not as a result of political freedom, of people coming together in the public sphere to discuss poverty as a matter of worldly import. Instead, the challenge to poverty arose in response to the development of productive forces in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a development that Arendt understands as a mechanistic response to necessity. In particular, Arendt situates the challenge to poverty in the experience of American colonialism, which, she suggests, was so productive that it generated wealth that human society had never before experienced, wealth that, although not equally distributed, permeated the social fabric such that even “the laborious in America were poor but not miserable… they were not driven by want.” In Arendt’s reading, the prosperity of colonial America extended to all segments of society such that the machinery of colonialism solved the social question. Moreover, by eradicating poverty from the American experience, American colonialism spawned a doubt about whether poverty must exist at all, a doubt that permeated European society, which had not yet “discovered the means to abolish that abject misery of sheer want which had always been held to be eternal.” Although eighteenth-century Europe lacked the productive machinery to eliminate poverty, Europeans began to imagine a society whereby equality was not a political right of citizens, endowed by participation in the polis, but a natural right of men, endowed by birth.

The social contract tradition popularized the ideal of natural equality, constructing natural equality out of a state of nature, a hypothetical site of human origin modeled after colonial America and its perceived abundance of material resources. Being born into a state of nature with unlimited resources—a situation that existed only in the colonial world (and perhaps only in
the imaginations of those viewing the colonial world)—leveled the playing field such that anyone was capable of achieving success. The success that natural equality makes possible, however, is distinct from the excellence that political equality enables. While success suggests a continued ability to advance, an ability to accrue status and resources that secure future survival, excellence is a more fluid marker that adheres to an action rather than a state of being. In contrast to success, excellence does not predict future survival. Instead, excellence is ephemeral, indicating simply a heightened presence.

The shift from excellence to success and survival, from political equality to natural equality engendered the problematization of poverty, since natural equality constructs poverty as a violation of nature’s intention and thus a problem that human beings not only created but also can treat. In Arendt’s thinking, however, the treatment of problems, although they may be collective, is not an inherently political activity. Politics is about defining problems and transforming discourses. Society, on the other hand, treats the already-defined. The confusion between politics and society stems from the character of society, which is collective yet anti-political. Society, which emerged with the modern age, deals with people as a mass such that our social relationships are marked by common needs rather than plural aspirations. The confusion between politics and society is most acute when it comes to poverty, and Arendt credits this confusion with devastating the French Revolution. Confronted by widespread poverty and inspired by the ideal of natural equality, the French Revolutionaries turned to politics, to constituting “the people” around the needs of the poor. Rather than harnessing nature by intensifying production and investing in technology and labor, the appropriate avenue for social endeavors, the French Revolutionaries turned to the political realm as a means to return to the poor their natural rights.
Arendt, however, is critical of efforts to use the public sphere to “restore” a natural order. For Arendt, equality is a political construct, one that has no basis in nature. In order to justify equality, we have to be willing to exercise political freedom, to take the risks inherent in speaking, in giving language to what we want and listening to what other people want. Natural equality, on the contrary, constructs equality as a product of nature, as necessary to human survival such that equality no longer needs to be justified through speech and action. As such, the French Revolutionaries saw speech and action as obstacles to what nature commanded and attempted to push them aside to let nature take its course. Arendt argues that in place of speech and action, the French Revolutionaries promoted compassion as a public virtue. Compassion, which is stirred only by “the predicament of poverty, and not either individual frustration or social ambitions,” strives to articulate suffering in public.\textsuperscript{190} In Arendt’s view, compassion “can comprehend only the particular” and “cannot reach out farther than what is suffered by one person.”\textsuperscript{191} When compassion, whose language “consists in gestures and expressions of countenance rather than words,” tries to capture the suffering of an entire group of people, it loses its authenticity and “speaks” with an urgency that sacrifices speech, the medium of public life and political freedom, on the altar of necessity. On the public stage, the urgency with which compassion speaks quickly destroys “the distance, the worldly space between men where political matters, the whole realm of human affairs, are located.”\textsuperscript{192} Thus, Arendt sees compassion as anti-political.

In describing compassion as anti-political, however, Arendt does not exclude it from collective life. In fact, compassion may play an important role in social life. Although Arendt is critical of the social sphere, charging it with depoliticizing modern life and undermining freedom, she does not suggest that we can return to a pre-social way of life. Rather, the
challenge that Arendt’s political theory poses is how to make the most of what society has to offer while also carving out a space for freedom. In this spirit, we can consider the efficient treatment of collective problems as a virtue of the social sphere, which enables us to channel resources in order to address already-defined problems. Compassion may enhance this endeavor by regulating the social realm, ensuring that the treatment of collective problems is carried out with an eye toward minimizing, even alleviating, suffering. The bonds that compassion cultivates ensure that efficiency does not drive social endeavors to the point that such endeavors forget the people they aim to help.

But while compassion nurtures bonds that benefit social endeavors, these bonds may undermine political life. Society treats problems and thus sustains populations by conditioning us to behave according to norms that regulate and define those populations. Politics, on the other hand, challenges norms and disrupts routines through action. As such, politics does not sustain populations; it sustains the world that gives rise to populations, to different and always-changing groupings of people. Unlike behavior, which is routinized and self-perpetuating, political action is fleeting. While political action may bring new norms or identities into existence, it lacks the means to guarantee the survival of those norms or identities, to sustain populations. Compassion, on the other hand, strives to endow political action with the means to sustain populations. Although compassion may disrupt the current state of affairs if that state of affairs causes unwarranted suffering, compassion disrupts in order to ensure survival, in order to meet need. Because need is insatiable, however, compassion “acts” by calling for permanent disruption, which ultimately distorts political action.

Poverty: What’s Slavery Got to Do with It?
The distinction that Arendt draws between necessity and freedom informs her desire to exclude poverty from political life. This distinction, however, relies on a troubled reading of the American founding. For Arendt, the primary difference between the American and French Revolutions is the presence of the social question in the latter and its absence in the former. Poverty, argues Arendt, plagued pre-Revolutionary France such that the French Revolutionaries succumbed to “the urgent needs of the people,” which “sent the Revolution to its doom.” On the other hand, colonial America, she suggests, was blessed with the absence of poverty, which blocked compassion from entering the revolutionary scene and allowed the American Revolutionaries to focus not on restoring a natural order but on creating a political one.

A closer reading of Arendt’s discussion of the American founding, however, reveals that what protected the Americans from poverty was African slavery. To her credit, Arendt recognizes that the absence of poverty in colonial America “was, after all, quite deceptive, and that abject and degrading misery was present everywhere in the form of slavery and Negro labour.” African slavery, which was fundamental to the mechanics of American colonialism, allowed the American colonists to create the wealth that gave rise to the ideal of natural equality, which encouraged Europeans to question the necessity of poverty. Moreover, African slavery relieved the American colonists of the burden of poverty such that they could concentrate on political freedom. Despite acknowledging the role that African slavery played in facilitating political freedom during the American Revolution, an acknowledgment that sets Arendt apart from many of her contemporaries who remained silent about this point, Arendt is not particularly disturbed by the American colonists’ reliance on slaves. In fact, Arendt excuses the American colonists for ignoring the condition of African slaves, suggesting that this ignorance was peculiar to the institution of slavery rather than the result of “any perversion of the heart or upon the
dominance of self-interest” among the Americans. According to Arendt, slavery condemns the enslaved to “an obscurity even blacker than the obscurity of poverty,” rendering slaves completely invisible to their masters. Consequently, the American colonists were unable to even see African slaves as worthy of the social question. Arendt writes, “It is as though the American Revolution was achieved in a kind of ivory tower into which the fearful spectacle of human misery, the haunting voices of abject poverty, never penetrated.” Perhaps the ivory tower to which Arendt refers is the institution of slavery, which simultaneously racialized American poverty while protecting the American colonists from recognizing (black) poverty. So, although African slavery helped to create the wealth that enabled the social question to emerge in Western culture, it also shielded its practitioners from seeing African slaves as worthy of the social question.

Although many contemporary scholars criticize the epistemologies of ignorance that slavery unleashed, Arendt appreciates the shielding effects of slavery, specifically, slavery’s ability to protect its practitioners from compassion. Slavery, which precedes the economy of natural equality, denies a common humanity to the slave, who is usually an outsider, a stranger to the master’s community. As such, slavery shields the master from feeling the slave’s suffering in the same way he might feel his own or that of his neighbor. While slavery marks its victims as strangers, poverty, which coincides with the economy of natural equality, reveals in its victims something familiar, which is why it arouses both compassion and discomfort. Through poverty, one recognizes one’s own flesh in the suffering of another, and one is naturally moved by that recognition. Unlike slavery, which befalls those outside a community or constructs those it befalls as outsiders, poverty can afflict anyone, which makes poverty so much more discomforting than slavery. As such, poverty does not shield us from suffering like slavery does;
rather, poverty exposes a common humanity and thus provokes compassion. Arendt’s vision of politics, however, does not sit well with the concept of humanity and the tools for preserving it, like compassion. Arendt identifies humanity with bodily need, which is relentless, overwhelming everything it encounters and extinguishing any space where non-necessary relationships might thrive. Grounding politics in a common humanity risks converting politics from a debate about how we want to live into a formula for what we need to survive. In contrast, slavery, which denies humanity to the slave, does not appeal to a common humanity, to natural equality. The slave societies of antiquity and of colonial America were based on particular ways of life rather than a universal sense of humanity. Slaves may have had needs in common with their masters, but they did not share their master’s way of life.

While Arendt concedes that slavery violates human life, her appreciation of slavery stems from the fact that it does not violate the public world, which requires protection from life’s exigencies. Slavery degrades life at the expense of the world, but the effort to politicize poverty, to turn the social question into a public concern, defends humanity and bodily life at the expense of the world. It is on these grounds that Arendt challenges Marx’s effort to liken capitalism to slavery and to equate the bourgeoisie with slave-owners. Under slavery, a class of slave-owners compels slave labor in order to liberate itself from necessity. Capitalism, on the other hand, liberates laborers “from their masters only to put them under a stronger taskmaster, their daily needs and wants, the force, in other words, with which necessity drives and compels men and which is more compelling than violence.” Ownership exercises a different effect on the bourgeois owner than it does on the slave-owner. The bourgeois owner does not own the means of production in order to liberate himself from labor and the necessity that compels labor. Instead, the bourgeois owner aims to expand production through labor, and the desire to expand
production binds the bourgeois owner to necessity as much as it binds the worker to him. Accordingly, while Marx is more concerned with how capitalism renders the worker dependent on the capitalist and thus embodies a form of slavery, Arendt points out that capitalism shackles both the worker and the owner to the production process, to necessity. Slavery, on the other hand, liberates masters from production such that they might entertain another form of existence, apart from necessity. It is this form of existence—free from necessity—that Arendt identifies with political freedom.

Not all forms of slavery are compatible with political freedom, however. Arendt’s treatment of American slavery stands in stark contrast to her indictment of Boer slavery in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. While Arendt forgives the “criminal and even beastly… deeds… that helped colonize the American continent,” she argues that slavery corrupted the Boers, who

[L]ived on their slaves exactly the way natives had lived on an unprepared and unchanged nature. When the Boers, in their fright and misery, decided to use these savages as though they were just another form of animal life, they embarked upon a process which could only end with their own degeneration into a white race living beside and together with black races from whom in the end they would differ only in the color of their skin.202

Arendt’s disparate treatment of American and Boer slaveries stems from the distinction she draws between imperialism and colonialism. Arendt identifies Boer slavery with imperialism, which she recognizes as a form of domination specific to the modern bourgeoisie. Through imperialism, the bourgeoisie converted expansion, which “has its origin in the realm of business and speculation, where expansion meant the permanent broadening of industrial production and economic transactions characteristic of the nineteenth century,” into a political concept.203 While expansion might be an appropriate concept for economic production, because the “processes of production are as unlimited as the capacity of man to produce for, establish, furnish, and improve on the human world,” its political consequences are disastrous. Under the logic of expansion, the
drive for wealth is unquenchable such that wealth becomes the goal of not only economic life but political life as well. As such, imperial slave-owners like the Boers produced for the sake of production rather than for political freedom. Moreover, Arendt links imperial domination to the concept of race. Race naturalizes power, converting power—which Arendt sees as a political phenomenon, one dependent on speech and action—into natural authority, which is speechless and does not require justification. Arendt charges imperial slavery with corrupting the Boers by racializing (i.e. naturalizing) their authority, which made them lazy, not toward production, but toward the challenges of public life—namely, engaging one’s equals through speech.

Arendt contrasts imperialism’s effort to rule a subject population according to the logic of economic expansion with colonialism, whose roots she traces to ancient Greece and whose modern practice she identifies with the British, who “[i]nstead of conquering and imposing their own law upon foreign peoples… settled on newly won territory in the four corners of the world and remained members of the same British nation.” While colonialism may seek to produce a surplus and to organize tools and people for this purpose, expansion is not its governing principle. As such, colonists are not corrupted by the penchant for wealth acquisition and domination and can instead acquire a taste for public participation. Consequently, colonial slavery, of which Arendt sees American slavery as an example, is neither expansionist nor racially motivated. As Arendt argues, slavery “did not make the slave-holding peoples race-conscious before the nineteenth century. Throughout the eighteenth century, American slave-holders themselves considered it a temporary institution and wanted to abolish it gradually. Most of them probably would have said with Jefferson: ‘I tremble when I think that God is just.’”
Arendt’s characterization of the American Founders is not entirely accurate. On one hand, as Sheldon Wolin points out, Arendt’s account of the American founding ignores the material concerns of the Founders. In addition to creating the framework for a republican government, the Founders, through the Constitution, instituted what Wolin calls “a capitalist’s version of the social question.” The Founders were motivated by not only the accumulation of capital, but also by race. Many historians agree that Africans in America were not uniquely identified with the condition of inheritable servitude until the nineteenth century, after which blackness became a marker of slavery. Nonetheless, contrary to Arendt’s belief, race-consciousness began developing in the eighteenth century, with Jefferson himself contributing to that development through his comments on the differences between blacks and whites in his 1781 *Notes on the State of Virginia.* Because Arendt reads American slavery as pre-racial, however, she fails to see it as a crime against humanity. In fact, Arendt argues that slavery became a crime against humanity only when it became racialized, when “some men were ‘born’ free and others slave, when it was forgotten that it was man who had deprived his fellow-men of freedom, and when the sanction of the crime was attributed to nature.”

The racialization of slavery, which began at the end of the eighteenth century, invested masters with a naturalized sense of entitlement such that they began to conflate mastery with freedom. Moreover, the racialization of slavery coincided with the rise of the bourgeoisie, who, by the end of the nineteenth century, had transformed wealth production into the ultimate good such that slavery was no longer capable of maintaining the divide between necessity and freedom. While slavery sheltered the American colonists from poverty, it was the American colonists’ ties to antiquity that shielded them from both race-thinking and bourgeois expansionism. On the other hand, although slavery guarded the Boers from poverty, it did not
protect them from the drive for wealth, which is as detrimental to public life as the pursuit of the social question. Thus, Arendt’s denunciation of the French Revolutionaries for squandering political freedom in their effort to abolish poverty equally applies to imperialists like the Boers, who sacrificed public life for economic expansion and the creation of wealth. In this way, poverty and wealth constitute two sides of the same coin: both poverty and wealth stem from the pursuit of necessity, while neither results from the pursuit of freedom.

*Natality vs. Necessity*

As others have pointed out, Arendt’s treatment of slavery emphasizes slavery’s impact on slave-owners while saying little about slavery’s effects on the enslaved.\(^{210}\) Arendt acknowledges, however, in both *Origins* and *On Revolution*, that slavery denies human dignity to slaves. As she writes in *Origins*, “Slavery’s fundamental offense against human rights was not that it took liberty away (which can happen in many other situations), but that it excluded a certain category of people even from the possibility of fighting for freedom.”\(^{211}\) For Arendt, human dignity is founded upon the possibility of fighting for freedom, and this possibility stems from belonging to a community, or polity. The crime of slavery, suggests Arendt, is “the loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever.”\(^{212}\) It is precisely this loss that Orlando Patterson identifies as a constitutive feature of slavery. Patterson argues that slavery suspends the physical death of the slave by requiring the slave’s social death. He offers the concept of “natal alienation” to describe how slavery transforms the slave into a social nonperson or a socially dead person: “Alienated from all ‘rights’ or claims of birth, he ceased to belong in his own right to any legitimate social order. All slaves experienced, at the very least, a secular excommunication.”\(^{213}\) Patterson’s usage of the term “social” is less distinctive (some might say less rarefied) than Arendt’s. When Patterson invokes society, he is not speaking of the
specifically modern phenomenon of public housekeeping that Arendt’s concept of society conjures. For Patterson, society simply refers to community, whose contours are socio-political, since it is through community that we experience both the social and the political dimensions of collective life.

This notion of community is intimately related to Arendt’s concept of natality, a concept that she had yet to develop when she wrote Origins, but which later became critical to her understanding of human existence.\textsuperscript{214} In its most general sense, natality refers to birth, but Arendt understands it more precisely as the capacity for political action that arises with birth. As Arendt writes in The Human Condition, “the new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting.”\textsuperscript{215} Thus, natality does not simply refer to biological birth, to the initiation of the life process, since life itself does not make action possible. Rather, political action requires that one be born into a community, into a particular way of life. In this way, natality, as Miguel Vatter posits, marks “the transition from life as object of power to life as subject of freedom.”\textsuperscript{216} In other words, natality links necessity to freedom, the life process to the public sphere. As such, natality is “an entirely world-oriented (that is, worldly) phenomenon whose capacity for beginning anew ideally is for the sake of the durability and futurity of the world we hold in common.”\textsuperscript{217}

While the concept of natality draws attention to birth as a world-orientation, slavery denies this world-orientation to the slave. Through natal alienation, slavery exchanges a particular way of life for bodily life, preserving the body of the slave while severing the slave’s ties to her community, and thus the world. Consequently, slavery atomizes the slave to the point that her context, her source of meaning, is the master. The practice of naming best captures how
natal alienation works. In slaveholding societies like that of colonial America, the master chooses a name for his slave, thus rupturing the slave’s independent ties to her past as well as her independent claim to the world. In contrast, in non-slave communities, representatives of the community, often parents or other family members, confer a name on the child as a rite of initiation. The name integrates the child into the community as one who not only receives names but also may name in the future. In other words, the name simultaneously subordinates the child while also enabling her agency, a dual action that the concept of natality captures. In the case of slavery, however, naming only subordinates, since it is through naming that the master dissolves the slave’s independent ties to her past and constitutes the slave as wholly dependent on him. As Patterson writes, “Slaves differed from other human beings in that they were not allowed to freely integrate the experience of their ancestors into their lives, to inform their understanding of social reality with the inherited meanings of their natural forebears, or to anchor the living present in any conscious community of memory.”  

In this way, slavery divests the slave of her inheritance, which is simultaneously material and symbolic. Slavery undermines a community’s efforts to not only pass on material resources to its descendants but also to perpetuate the bonds of the community. Thus, while slaves often forged powerful relationships among themselves, “these relationships were never recognized as legitimate or binding.” As countless American slave narratives reveal, masters often split up slave communities, separating parents from children, brothers from sisters, and wives from husbands, thus evincing an unwillingness to recognize the independent relationships that African Americans established among themselves.

Regarding slavery as an assault on natality offers a different vantage point from which to consider slavery, one that is distinct from more common interpretations of slavery as a violation of natural law. According to the logic of natural law, the fact of creation—of being created—
invests one with rights, such that creation becomes the source of human dignity. Slavery violates natural law, because slaves are created like everyone else and to deny them the rights that creation endows is unjust. Creation, however, is simultaneously singular and passive. On one hand, one is created in the singular; while on the other hand, one is created by another(s).

Moreover, natural law separates creation from community. The fact of creation, not the entry into community, invests one with natural rights. Although proponents of natural law argue that natural law is foundational to human communities, natural law operates independently of human communities: natural law derives from creation in order to govern communities. In contrast, the concept of natality rests not on creation, but on eruption: the eruption of human energy into a world. Within the logic of natality, creation does not impose its rule on a community, nor does a community perfectly absorb the creature. Rather, natality emphasizes the possibility for action, which depends on the fact that human birth energizes the community in unanticipated ways. In this way, natality is intimately related to plurality, “to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.” Natality locates human potential not in the singularity of creation, but in the plurality of the world—the potential that human energy achieves via the community. We can only act because we are part of a world, and the world can only exist because new actors are constantly born.

Slavery, then, is not only an attack on creation; it is also, and perhaps more importantly, an attack on the world, because it robs the world of new actors. Racial slavery is particularly devastating, because it excludes an entire category of people from participating in the world, which diminishes the plural character of the world. In the American context, racial slavery thwarted African Americans’ claims to the world. This is not to deny that a variety of black countercultures emerged within the experience of slavery. But while slavery did not entirely
repress black political agency, it forced that agency underground, thus making it largely invisible in the mainstream, white world. As such, the metaphor of invisibility is a persistent theme in African American thought, appearing most notably in Ralph Ellison’s 1952 novel *Invisible Man*. Ellison’s protagonist, a black man who remains nameless throughout the entire story, proclaims at the beginning of the novel: “I am invisible… I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me… because of a peculiar disposition of the eyes of those with whom I come in contact.” The nameless invisibility in which Ellison cloaks his protagonist emerges as a legacy of slavery, as the result of natal alienation, which sentenced millions of black men and women to the dark trenches of the American experience. Ellison’s protagonist inhabits a forgotten New York City basement, reminding us that the blackness that racial slavery attached to Africans in America, which prevented them from being seen, continues to haunt American life. Moreover, the two worlds—the one of light and the other of shadows—that racial slavery created did not disappear with emancipation in the nineteenth century nor with the Civil Rights Movement of the twentieth century. Emancipation from slavery may have severed the chains between former slaves and their masters, but it did not abolish white supremacy. Rather, white supremacy took the form of legalized segregation, which crumbled with the victories of the Civil Rights Movement, only to persist as black poverty.

Aware of the poverty that engulfs him, Ellison’s protagonist challenges the darkness to which he is condemned by warring with the electric company, siphoning power into his basement, which he floods with light—“an act of sabotage,” he alleges. “Light,” he claims, “confirms my reality, gives birth to my form.” In other words, light allows Ellison’s protagonist to be born, to begin to speak before an audience. Arendt’s concept of natality captures the nexus between light and birth, which is present in Central and South American
Spanish, where “dar a luz,” or “give to light” is the term used for giving birth. The concept of natality unsettles the distinction between freedom and necessity that grounds Arendt’s critique of the politicization of poverty. While Arendt understands poverty as an expression of necessity, the rubric of necessity fails to encapsulate the existential dilemma that black poverty presents, namely the dilemma of invisibility. By situating invisibility at the heart of the black experience, Ellison reveals that light is as central to existence as is food and shelter. To reduce black poverty to the material needs of black bodies is to continue to relegate African Americans to darkness and invisibility, to fail to recognize black poverty as one of the trans-generational effects of slavery.

An Antiracist Approach to Poverty

Although Arendt understands poverty as an expression of necessity and shies away from considering the political implications of poverty, I propose that we use the distinction between freedom and necessity that her political theory presents to reconstruct poverty as a political problem. I suggest that ignoring poverty compromises the practice of democratic freedom in two significant ways. First, poverty threatens the general practice of freedom by holding it hostage to necessity. As Arendt posits, the modern age has empowered the ideal of natural equality such that the presence of poverty is regarded as an injustice rather than a misfortune. Consequently, the mere existence of poverty in modern life incites compassion and authorizes necessity to dictate the terms of the public sphere. In other words, by constituting poverty as an assault on justice, modernity ensures that wherever poverty exists, a call to end poverty will emerge. Although the call to end poverty may not arise from or be heeded by the majority, the desperation that drives this call—desperation informed by the needs of the poor—is often so forceful that it takes over the terms of public debate. For example, when someone enters a
conversation and says, “I need X,” it is almost impossible to respond to that person without invoking the language of need. One might respond by agreeing to meet the person’s need, or by asserting, “I need X too,” “I need X more,” or “they need X the most.” But ultimately, competing claims of need replace visions for the world, and the conversation lapses into a clinical comparison of symptoms of deprivation.

Such is the constitution of need, which, although contextual and constantly changing, is linked to survival and thus difficult to negotiate. In the moment at which need is expressed, it appears objective, a matter of life and death, something that cannot be moved. The essence of political freedom, on the other hand, lies in an openness to being moved. It is this openness that characterizes public life and enables the transformation, the sweeping changes, that can occur through politics. The problem that anti-poverty rhetorics pose to the practice of political freedom is that they are likely to make sense of collective existence through the matrix of need, positing access to material resources as more central to existence than public participation. As such, anti-poverty rhetorics threaten to render existence shallow and uniform, a reflection of need, rather than complex and plural, a reflection of freedom. The solution, however, is not to exclude poverty as a collective concern simply because poverty jeopardizes political freedom. Instead, the challenge is to commit enough of our collective energies to society such that society is well-equipped to address poverty and other expressions of human need, while also recognizing two things: first, that need is infinite and will demand more and more of our collective energies unless we erect a boundary against it; and second, that social life does not address all dimensions of collective existence. Thus, from the perspective of political freedom, poverty is a problem not because it degrades life (which may be more a concern for justice than it is for freedom), but because it prevents public participation. A freedom-centered approach to poverty might seek to
end poverty with an eye toward enhancing public participation rather than promoting rampant consumption.

The second threat that poverty poses to democratic freedom is that poverty deprives the world of potential actors, weakening the plural character of the public sphere. By translating material dispossesion into political dispossession, poverty excludes the poor from the public sphere, from the conversations that make sense of the world and define what we want. As Harrington writes, “[T]he poor are politically invisible. It is one of the cruelest ironies of social life in advanced countries that the dispossessed at the bottom of society are unable to speak for themselves… As a group, they are atomized. They have no face; they have no voice…” Poverty imprisons the poor in an existence characterized by necessity, whereby their experience with collective life is entirely passive, via the social sphere, rather than active, via the public sphere. Most anti-poverty rhetorics, however, emphasize resources over relationships and downplay the important role that participating in collective meaning-making plays in fostering human dignity. Part of the reason, perhaps, is that it is easier to measure resource deprivation, an ease that enables measurement to define poverty. For example, a common definition of poverty is living on less than a designated number of dollars per day. Even most conceptions of homelessness define poverty as lacking access to housing. In forwarding such definitions of poverty, however, anti-poverty rhetorics construct the poor as recipients of the already-defined goods of life (such as dollars and permanent housing) rather than participants in the conversations that define those goods. As participants in the public conversation, those experiencing homelessness might challenge the norm of permanent housing, giving voice to alternative conceptions of “home” that may prove as meaningful as bourgeois notions of housing.
In this way, black poverty is particularly threatening to democratic freedom, because it not only excludes the black poor from public life by chaining them to necessity; it also undermines the very capacity of the black poor to participate. Although Arendt’s critique of the politicization of poverty does not adequately consider the racialization of American poverty that resulted from slavery, slavery simultaneously constructed American poverty as a predominantly black phenomenon, while rendering black poverty invisible. As such, the genealogy of black poverty is distinct, since black poverty traces its origins to slavery and the deprivations that slavery entailed, namely natal alienation. While poverty prevents the poor from participating in public life, slavery denies the slave natality, the capacity for participating in public life. The difference between the poor and the black poor, then, is that the black poor are not simply subject to necessity, to the deprivation of material resources. Black poverty represents a combination of material and relational deprivation, which generates black invisibility. By “relational deprivation,” I do not mean the “decline of the black family” that many conservative commentators point to as the source of black poverty. Rather, relational deprivation refers to the genealogical isolation experienced by the black underclass, an isolation that subjects the black poor to necessity in the present, but that is a product of a history of white supremacy. White supremacy, which began with the institution of slavery, which gave way to de jure segregation, and persists as de facto ghettoization, frustrates black efforts to create inheritances, both economic and cultural, that can be passed on to future generations. Sociologist Thomas M. Shapiro attributes black disinheritance to not only perpetuating but also worsening racial equality. He argues, “it is virtually impossible for people of color to earn their way to equal wealth through wages. No matter how much blacks earn, they cannot preserve their occupational status for their children; they cannot outearn the wealth gap.” In other words, simply leveling
the current playing field, which is often the proposed solution for tackling economic inequality, will challenge neither racial inequality nor black poverty. These phenomena are conditioned by a history of white supremacy, which has made it difficult for blacks to claim their economic and cultural birthright.

The Arendtian challenge to black poverty, I suggest, stems from the concept of natality, which posits inheritance, one’s connectedness to a trans-generational community, as a fundamental aspect of human dignity. The concept of natality resists the treatment of black poverty as a problem of the individual. Although individuals experience poverty, poverty operates in part through atomization, and in the case of black poverty, through alienating the individual from a trans-generational community. In this way, the concept of natality encourages us to scrutinize programs that provide material assistance to individuals who meet the measurement of poverty while neglecting to foster community ties. Such programs threaten to empower the State or other agency, while reiterating the poor as passive (yet satiated) subjects rather than active, aspiring citizens. In contrast, a natality-centered approach to poverty might emphasize connectedness in addition to material assistance. It is this connectedness that the Black Power theorists Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton refer to as “cultural integrity” and which they cite as vital to an active practice of freedom. They write, “The racial and cultural personality of the black community must be preserved and that community must win its freedom while preserving its cultural integrity. Integrity includes a pride—in the sense of self-acceptance, not chauvinism—in being black, in the historical attainments and contributions of black people.” For Carmichael and Hamilton, the possibility for freedom is rooted in reclaiming black natality, and this is precisely what their concept of Black Power aims to do.
Admittedly, Black Power has lost traction in the post-racial/identity landscape of contemporary America. Even in its heyday, it faced severe criticism from those both inside and outside of the Civil Rights Movement.\textsuperscript{228} Arendt herself was among its critics, as she blamed Black Power activists for the violent turn in the student movement of the 1960s.\textsuperscript{229} At its worst, Black Power lives up to its critics’ depiction as politically irresponsible, a crude form of identity politics that, as Harold Cruse writes, condemns “any effort on the part of the American Negro to seek racial equality within the American system.”\textsuperscript{230} It was this side of Black Power that appealed to the more militant elements of the black community, who invoked the needs of the black poor as an excuse by which to bypass politics in favor of revolutionary violence.

Although the concept of Black Power has had many interlocutors, whose ideologies represent the spectrum of radical political theorizing, the concept of Black Power that Carmichael and Hamilton put forward is particularly helpful because it pursues Arendt’s vision of political freedom—although with the black underclass in mind.\textsuperscript{231} As such, the concept of Black Power may offer guidance to an antiracist approach to poverty. As Winston Van Horne suggests, Black Power embodies an ethic of openness, which “allows a range of friendships to be formed,” even, and perhaps especially, friendships between blacks and whites.\textsuperscript{232} Black Power, however, distinguishes friendship from the relationships of subordination and mastery that have traditionally characterized relationships between whites and non-whites, and it is this distinction that sets Black Power apart from the paradigm of racial integration. Carmichael argues that from the perspective of Black Power, racial integration “speaks not at all to the problem of poverty—only to the problem of blackness. Integration today means the man who ‘makes it,’ leaving his black brothers behind in the ghetto… This reinforces, among both black and white, the idea that ‘white’ is automatically better and ‘black’ is by definition inferior.”\textsuperscript{233} Separation, however, is
not the ultimate goal of Black Power. Nor is domination or exploitation. Rather, Black Power, at its best, seeks for African Americans “an effective share in the total power of the society,” which is possible only when blacks begin to claim their inheritance, to recover natality.\textsuperscript{234}

Natality, then, is the vehicle through which African Americans regenerate their capacity for participation. The brand of participation that Black Power endorses, however, is not identitarian, rooted in a fixed notion of blackness. Rather, a trans-generational sense of black identity is the launching point for an antiracist practice of participation, oriented toward destabilizing oppressive racial identities and relationships in order to create space for political friendships.

By identifying the struggle against black poverty with the sharing of public power, Carmichael and Hamilton evince an understanding of poverty that is distinct from Arendt’s. While Arendt views poverty as the result of production and distribution, which she distinguishes from political participation, Carmichael and Hamilton cannot separate poverty from participation. For them, black poverty is not just a resource problem, one that will be answered with “money and jobs,” through economistic machinations. Rather, Carmichael and Hamilton encourage us to consider black poverty as a participatory problem, writing: “We do not seek to be mere recipients \textit{from} the decision-making process but participants \textit{in} it.”\textsuperscript{235} The concept of Black Power situates the capacity for public participation in belonging to a trans-generational community. Creating a historical consciousness among the black poor, connecting African Americans to a black diaspora, is as central to fighting poverty as providing material assistance to black individuals.

In this view, black poverty is a culmination of practices geared toward constructing African Americans as passive recipients rather than as active participants in American life. It is these practices that Carmichael and Hamilton assemble under the heading of “institutional
racism,” whose backbone, they contend, is the American middle class. The racism that Carmichael and Hamilton identify with the middle class is an expansive racism, one that is inclusive of a range of phenotypes and that operates by whitening those it incorporates. The content of institutional racism is focused on private consumption rather than public participation; it is a self-orientation rather than a world-orientation, to use Arendt’s language. As Carmichael and Hamilton suggest, the middle class “manifests a sense of superior group position in regard to race. This class wants ‘good government’ for themselves; it wants good schools for its children.” As such, Carmichael and Hamilton warn that the expansiveness of the middle class should not be mistaken for public-spiritedness, since middle class values “are based on material aggrandizement, not the expansion of humanity.” In other words, the expansionary whiteness of the middle class cannot capture everyone, and those who remain in the shadows of whiteness are blackened by poverty and invisibility.

Although the Great Recession has heightened class-consciousness among Americans, and the distinction between “the one percent” and the “99 percent” has become familiar to many of us in the wake of the 2011 Occupy Wall Street demonstrations, the newfound attention to inequality focuses largely on the middle class and its diminished prospects for prosperity. As such, even the renewed interest in poverty reflects a middle-class bias, as it seeks to restore to the middle class their birthright of upward mobility (through homeownership, small business ownership, and higher education), which, as the current debate suggests, has been thwarted by Wall Street and its allies in Washington. Although many economists as well as the Obama Administration criticize “trickle-down economics” for the ravages it has wreaked on the middle class, few have questioned how policies that favor the middle class will impact the chronically poor, a disproportionate number of whom are African American.
I conclude with the proposition that founding an anti-poverty politics on middle-class values will do little to contest the racialization of poverty that has haunted us since the American founding. The middle class is a segregating class. In other words, the middle class deals with poverty—which, as Arendt suggests, demands attention when one encounters it—by turning away from it, by constructing, as Carmichael and Hamilton write, “cloistered little closed societies tucked away neatly in tree-lined suburbia.”\textsuperscript{238} Or today, in gentrified urban centers. While segregating themselves in gated communities or gentrified urban neighborhoods protects the middle class from having to consider poverty as a public problem, it further entrenches whiteness while perpetuating black invisibility, and does little to expand spaces for public participation. Thus, although poverty may be of public interest, it is not of middle-class interest, since the middle-class is worried primarily about slipping into poverty rather than contesting poverty in toto, as that might also require contesting affluence, which is a central ideal of the middle class. An anti-racist approach to poverty might challenge the segregating practices of the middle class, linking them to not only the racialization of poverty but also an impoverished public life.
Where Do We Go from Here?

In 1951 a group called the Civil Rights Congress issued a petition to the United Nations, charging the United States government with genocide against African Americans. The document, entitled “We Charge Genocide,” provides detailed evidence that the United States government – broadly understood to include the dominant political, social, and economic institutions of white America – is committing mass murder on the basis of race. The Civil Rights Congress predicates its charges of genocide upon a sophisticated understanding of racism, one that is focused less on discrimination and the barriers that obstruct African Americans’ access to the privileges of whiteness, such as high office and higher education; and more on the deleterious effects of whiteness on the everyday lives of black people. The African American petitioners recognize whiteness as a force that has devastated black communities and lives through lynching and other forms of mob violence, police brutality, widespread poverty, deprivation of medical care and education, and the denial of voting rights. Moreover, in appealing to the international community, the Civil Rights Congress constructs whiteness as a threat to not only African Americans, but to non-whites around the world, warning “that a nation which practices genocide against its own nationals may not be long deterred, if it has the power, from genocide elsewhere. White supremacy at home makes for colored massacres abroad. Both reveal contempt for human life in a colored skin.” By establishing a connection between whiteness and genocide, the Civil Rights Congress embarked on a radical, antiracist trajectory, one that appeals to both the dignity of the black community and non-white solidarity beyond the borders of the nation-state.

The same year that the Civil Rights Congress petitioned the United Nations, Hannah Arendt delivered her indictment of the nation-state in The Origins of Totalitarianism. Arendt opens Origins with the plea that “human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only
in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity… must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities.” Arendt suggests that the nation-state, with its tendency to concentrate power and convert people into masses, erodes particular communities, from which the capacity to participate emerges. In bypassing the nation-state, the petitioners of the Civil Rights Congress echo Arendt’s entreaty for a new political principle grounded in particular experiences but with global scope. The experiences of the black community enable the petitioners to seek a global audience, a public sphere that the (American) nation-state has failed to provide for them. They write:

> It is our hope, and we fervently believe that it was the hope and aspiration of every black American whose voice was silenced forever through premature death at the hands of racist-minded hooligans or Klan terrorists, that the truth recorded here will be made known to the world; that it will speak with a tongue of fire loosing an unquenchable moral crusade, the universal response to which will sound the death knell of all racist theories.  

In striving to constitute a post-national public sphere that would contest the genocidal propensities of whiteness, the Civil Rights Congress orients antiracist politics around the practice of participatory freedom. Neither justice nor equality figures strongly into the language of the petitioners. “We Charge Genocide” does not pursue for African Americans the privileges of whiteness; it does not charge the US government or white society with “unequal” or “unfair” treatment of non-whites, although inequality and injustice are implied in the document. Rather, the members of the Civil Rights Congress protest the genocide of African Americans on the grounds of freedom. They declare: “We know that no American can be truly free while 15,000,000 other Americans are persecuted on the grounds of ‘race.’ …The fact of our ethnic origin, of which we are proud…is daily made the signal for segregation and murder.” In other words, the members of the Civil Rights Congress recognize that the institutions that normalize
whiteness are lethal for non-whites, particularly blacks. These institutions target not only black bodies, but also the spirit that animates black dignity. Consequently, the petitioners challenge the deadly consequences of whiteness through politics, through a practice of participatory freedom that entails reaching out beyond the walls of their communities and even their nation. By invoking the concept of “genocide,” which has global resonance, the petitioners put the experiences of African Americans in conversation with the experiences of other dominated communities around the world, contesting the structures of domination rather than seeking to gain the privileges of the dominant.

Three years after the Civil Rights Congress petitioned the international community, the US Supreme Court decided the case of *Brown v. Board of Education*. While the Civil Rights Congress sought to empower black communities by constituting a global public sphere where members of these communities could articulate their claims, *Brown* triggered a (nation-) State-centered response to racism that worked to expand the privileges of whiteness. With the *Brown* decision, the US government indicated its willingness to deploy State power toward the project of integration. But during the post-Civil Rights era, integration has been interpreted narrowly as a way to harvest the talents of exceptional non-white individuals who are being denied the privileges of whiteness through discriminatory laws and policies. In this way, the integrationist thrust of *Brown* set the stage for the post-Civil Rights emphases on antidiscrimination law, which favors legalized responses to racism and empowers legal professionals at the expense of grassroots publics; and affirmative action, which makes space in dominant (i.e. white) institutions for exceptional individuals of color. In contrast to “We Charge Genocide,” which constitutes the “we” around the experiences of black communities, *Brown* enables the State to administer racial justice in what Michelle Alexander calls a “trickle-down” fashion. But the
“justice” being trickled down is the privileges of whiteness. As such, by following the path initiated by Brown, we in the post-Civil Rights era have found ourselves in a strange situation: for the first time in our nation’s history, we have an African American President, but we also have more African Americans locked up in prisons today than were enslaved in 1850. Whiteness has become more inclusive, but its lethal and disenfranchising tendencies are nowhere near their demise.

I conclude this dissertation by proposing that rather than perpetuate the trajectory of Brown, we pursue instead the abandoned path of the Civil Rights Congress, which sought not to expand the privileges of whiteness to exceptional non-whites, but to undermine whiteness entirely by calling it out as a form of lethal domination. Nowhere is the dominating tendency of whiteness more evident than in the system of mass incarceration, which, I think, offers a concrete starting point for an antiracist politics oriented around participatory freedom. While the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements promised non-whites the chance for a public life, the opportunity to participate in creating institutions that would in turn govern them, the promise of participatory freedom was quickly dashed with the expansion of neoliberalism in the early 1970s. The globalization of markets and the decline of American industry, the initial hallmarks of neoliberalism, took a particular toll on inner city black communities, which depended on industrial jobs. At the same time, the State diminished its welfare function and enlarged its warfare function. Rather than offering material support (in the form of education, technical training, medical care, and housing, for example) to dispossessed communities of color, the US initiated the War on Drugs, which continues to rage today. The War on Drugs has disproportionately devastated black communities, which have seen a greater percentage of their members arrested and imprisoned on drug charges than any other group. Between 1980 and
2000, the US prison population grew from roughly 300,000 to more than 2 million, with convictions for drug offenses responsible for most of the growth.\textsuperscript{245} Although data suggests that selling and using drugs is equally distributed across racial groups, in some states blacks are twenty to fifty times more likely to go to prison on drug charges than whites. Moreover, in some American cities, upwards of 80 percent of black men have criminal records as a result of drug charges.\textsuperscript{246} These staggering numbers indicate that the privileges of whiteness, such as jobs, education, and public safety, require hundreds of thousands of black and brown men to remain behind bars and millions more to suffer the long-term effects of a criminal record, which precludes them from voting and securing gainful employment. As a result, mass incarceration has become a means by which we create and maintain a state of “permanent marginalization” for millions of black and brown men.\textsuperscript{247}

While the phenomenon of mass incarceration is undoubtedly a problem for justice and equality, its threat to participatory freedom is particularly acute. At precisely the moment in American history when non-whites began to launch a public-spirited assault on whiteness, the grassroots were mowed down by the War on Drugs. From the perspective of participatory freedom, mass incarceration appears as a method geared toward eviscerating the public sphere by judging everyone according to the principle of economic productivity rather than human dignity and the capacity for public participation that ensues from it. With the rise of neoliberalism, mass incarceration has developed as a technique for dealing with “disposable” populations, simultaneously generating and warehousing the unproductive, i.e. “criminal,” elements of society. These disposable elements obstruct the smooth operation of whiteness. That is, the maintenance of the privileges of whiteness, such as gainful employment, quality education, and
public safety, require the permanent deactivation and racialization of a significant segment of the population.

In this way, mass incarceration is a system that isolates black and brown citizens from their communities, from the sites where they might realize democratic participation, and sentences them to permanent disability. For the “unexceptional” non-whites (i.e. the majority), the system of mass incarceration constructs their relationship to white society as one based on fear and intimidation, not one of democratic association. Moreover, mass incarceration wreaks havoc on the communities from which the incarcerated hail. For every black man in prison, there is a mother who has lost her son, a sister who has lost her brother, a child who has lost his father, or a spouse who has lost her/his partner. Mass incarceration erodes the integrity of the black community, which is central to fostering leadership and participatory capacity, and from which the world-changing activism of the 1950s and 1960s emerged.

An antiracist focus on mass incarceration would differ significantly from the post-Civil Rights emphases on antidiscrimination law and affirmative action. While the phenomenon of mass incarceration highlights the lethal and disenfranchising workings of whiteness, antidiscrimination law and affirmative action prop up whiteness by seeking to extend its privileges to exceptional non-white individuals, largely ignoring the detrimental consequences of white normativity on non-white lives and communities.

The dimensions of participatory freedom that I have outlined in this dissertation and that I have situated within a larger political ethics of antiracism – forgiveness, association, and natality – may guide an antiracist challenge to mass incarceration. In Chapter 1, I considered forgiveness as a radical openness to a common future as well as a way of contesting the victimization that issues from whiteness. Adopting an ethic of forgiveness toward the victims of mass
incarceration could stem from a desire for a common future, where there is place for all of us. A more public-spirited response to the globalization of markets could entail a commitment to preventing disposability rather than heightened competitiveness and fear. Such a commitment might engender dialogue between whites and non-whites that could transform our understanding of “crime.” As the War on Drugs reveals, in a society organized around the norm of whiteness, crime is often racialized and understood as activity that threatens the privileges of whiteness. Hence, the penalties for the use or possession of crack, a predominantly “black” drug, are much more severe than the penalties for the use or possession of cocaine, a predominantly “white” drug. A desire to create a common future might encourage us to adopt a magnanimous approach toward “criminals,” the victims of mass incarceration, whose permanent marginalization (and racialization) is a product of protecting whiteness.

In Chapter 2, I examined how a practice of democratic association, which involves engaging in uncomfortable relationships across difference, might work to destabilize entrenched norms like whiteness. A willingness to engage “criminals” in a mass movement, to organize a mass movement around forgiving racialized “crime,” might destabilize the “politics of respectability” that has played such a significant role in non-white political movements. By orienting movements around “respectable” non-whites, who adhere to the norm of whiteness in every way but phenotype, the “politics of respectability” has inadvertently worked to bolster whiteness. By fostering the political participation of “criminals,” those accused of violating the racialized norms of society, an ethic of association would contest those norms and the racist logic on which they are founded.

Finally, in Chapter 3, I argued that an antiracist politics privilege the concept of natality, which situates human experience within a trans-generational community and resists the treatment
of racism as a problem of the individual. From the perspective of mainstream, white society, crime is the result of individual choice; and prisons, which keep individual bodies alive, provide a “humane” method for dealing with those who have violated social norms. The concept of natality, however, encourages us to evaluate mass incarceration not from the perspective of the individual and the individual body, but from the vantage point of particular communities, whose integrity is central to the prospect of political participation. On one hand, mass incarceration isolates the incarcerated from their communities and diminishes their capacity for public participation. On the other hand, mass incarceration disrupts the integrity of communities of color by depriving them of millions of potential participants. Perhaps most importantly, however, is the obstacle that mass incarceration poses to the ability of communities of color to integrate the wisdom and gifts of the past. That is to say, mass incarceration prevents the gift of participatory freedom, which the Civil Rights activists of the 1950s and 1960s fought for, from being transmitted to future generations.

In the early 1970s, when mass incarceration was in its infancy, Civil Rights veteran Ella Baker reflected on the future of the Movement and the future of her community. She hoped that the Movement would survive her and that her struggle would be passed on, in some way, to future generations, when she stated, “I believe that the struggle is eternal. Someone else carries on.” Following Baker, an assault on mass incarceration might stem from a claim to the inheritance of our foremothers and fathers. In reclaiming Baker’s hope for the future, we honor the past while keeping vigil over the public sphere, whose light is eternal, but whose borders are fragile and fleeting.
Notes

1 Sections from pages 1-12 of this work are reproduced from Deepa Bhandaru, “Is White Normativity Racist? Michel Foucault and Post-Civil Rights Racism,” Polity, vol. 45 (2013): 223-244.
2 I use the term “Katrina” to signify the hurricane as a social phenomenon rather than a natural phenomenon. My use of the term emphasizes how people responded to and were affected by the natural phenomenon of the storm. I borrow the distinction between social and natural phenomena from Nimitz, who compares the U.S. response to Hurricane Katrina to Cuba’s response to similar hurricanes, arguing that a storm’s toll on human life is less the result of the natural strength of the storm, and more the result of society’s response to it. See August Nimitz, “Natural Versus Social Phenomena: Cuba and the Lessons of Katrina,” Black Scholar 36 (2006): 43-51. Katrina’s disproportionate impact on African Americans is illustrated in Patrick Sharkey, “Survival and Death in New Orleans: An Empirical Look at the Human Impact of Katrina,” Journal of Black Studies 37 (2007): 488-489. Sharkey finds that old age was the single most important factor in determining who died as a result of Katrina. After controlling for old age, Sharkey concludes that elderly blacks were more likely to die as a result of the storm than elderly whites, and that non-elderly blacks were almost twice as likely to die than non-elderly whites. Similarly, Gabe et al show that 44% of the storm’s victims were African American, and that that blacks made up a greater proportion of the population than whites of those displaced by flooding or damage in Orleans Parish. See Congressional Research Service, Hurricane Katrina: Social-Demographic Characteristics of Impacted Areas, by Thomas Gabe, Gene Falk, and Maggie McCarty (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2005), 14-16.
4 In using the term “post-Civil Rights,” I do not suggest that we live in a society that has realized civil rights for everyone. Rather, I use the term as a way to mark the passage of time since the antiracist struggles of the 1950s and 1960s that resulted in not only the passage of civil rights legislation, but also a broader cultural shift in how Americans understand race. In particular, the Civil Rights Movement heralded the demise of biological racism and the sociopolitical practices that upheld it, such as segregation.


18 In his discussion of “other-regarding behavior,” Mill does not distinguish between “the other” and “the Other.” For Mill, “the other” refers to that which is not the self and is not constitutive of the self. Mill treats the self and the other as pre-political entities that precede their relationship with one another. See John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1978), 73. On the other hand, “the Other” connotes that which is constitutive of the self. For example, in *The Second Sex*, Simone de Beauvoir describes “woman” as man’s Other, suggesting that the feminine Other constitutes the masculine Self. Similarly, Edward Said discusses “the Orient” as the West’s Other, as that which gives shape to the West’s self-understanding. See Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (New York: Vintage, 1989), xxii; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, NY: Vintage, 1979).


20 Harris, “Whiteness As Property,” 1772.

21 Forman and Lewis suggest that racial apathy—namely, white indifference and ignorance of the social reality of race in America—is largely responsible for the racial inequality that Hurricane Katrina exposed. They posit that in the post-Civil Rights era, “racial apathy may be more important to the reproduction of racial inequality than are traditional forms of Jim Crow prejudice.” See Tyrone A. Forman and Amanda E. Lewis, “Racial Apathy and Hurricane Katrina: The Social Anatomy of Prejudice in the Post-Civil Rights Era,” *Du Bois Review* 3 (2006): 177.
25 Dyson, *Come Hell or High Water*, 6.
26 Dyson, *Come Hell or High Water*, 6.
27 Dyson, *Come Hell or High Water*, 31-2.
32 Forman and Lewis, “Racial Apathy and Hurricane Katrina.”
34 Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists*, 16.
35 Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists*, 16.
37 “To think what we are doing” is a formulation of action put forward by Hannah Arendt. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1998), 5.
40 Gilroy, “There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack,” 115-117.
43 For a deeper explanation of this dynamic, see Deepa Bhandaru, “Is White Normativity Racist? Michel Foucault and Post-Civil Rights Racism,” *Polity* 45 (2013).
45 Richard H. King argues that Civil Rights’ Movement activists mobilized the language of equality, rights, and justice with much less frequency than they invoked the language of freedom.


54 Koppelman’s progressivism is emblematic not only of mainstream political theory but also contemporary Left orthodoxy. See Andrew Koppelman, *Antidiscrimination Law and Social Equality* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 7, 113.


61 Quoted from King, *Civil Rights and the Idea of Freedom*, 55.


74 Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, 171.
75 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 236.
76 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 236.
77 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 236.
79 We can trace the idea that constitutions secure freedom from ancient political thought, namely Aristotle, through the social contract tradition (e.g. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau), to contemporary liberal theory (e.g. Rawls).
82 Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 239.
94 Arendt envisions the household as inegalitarian by definition, because the household is an instrumental sphere: it exists for the purpose of something else. For Arendt, instrumentality entails hierarchy.
Admittedly, Digeser offers an account of “political forgiveness,” whereby he makes a case for forgiveness in politics when “justice cannot be fully attained” (709). Nonetheless, Digeser approaches forgiveness from a justice-orientation. For him, politics is the pursuit of justice, and forgiveness is only appropriate as a supplement to justice (708). Howard McGary, “Achieving Democratic Equality: Forgiveness, Reconciliation, and Reparations.” The Journal of Ethics no. 1 (2003): 98. Eduardo Bonilla Silva cites four narratives that whites in post-Civil Rights America use to justify their position vis a vis blacks: “the past is the past,” “I did not own slaves,” “If (other ethnic groups) have made it, how come blacks have not,” and “I did not get a (job or promotion) because of a black man.” Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 77. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2010), 7.


Although today’s suburbs are home to an increasing number of middle-class non-whites, including African Americans, their large-scale movement to the suburbs did not begin until the 1970s. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontiers*, 301.

Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontiers*, 276.


Avila argues that the suburbs promoted an “expansive white identity, one that extended to various social groups who removed themselves from the racialized spaces of the inner city vis-à-vis home ownership.” Avila, *Popular Culture*, 6. See also David R. Roediger, *Working towards Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs* (New York: Basic, 2006).


Danielle Allen points out that although Arendt thought she was writing about the photo of Elizabeth Eckford, which appeared on the front page of the New York Times on September 5, 1957, she in fact describes the photo of Dorothy Counts in Charlotte, North Carolina, which accompanied the photo of Eckford in the Times. Allen, Talking to Strangers, 197.

Arendt’s critique of integration in “Little Rock” is not based on a social defense of all discrimination. In fact, Arendt supports integration of services, “which, whether privately or publicly owned, are in fact public services that everyone needs in order to pursue his business and lead his life.” These services include mass transit as well as hotels and restaurants in business districts, but not schools. Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” 52.
Kateb, for example, tries to downplay the primacy of the individual to liberal accounts of association: “[T]he individual is the main (but not exclusive) beneficiary of constitutionally protected freedom of expression, but the associated individual is often the true bearer of the right (as with the free exercise of religion).” Kateb suggests that many individual rights, such as the right to speech, are less meaningful without association. Kateb, “The Value of Association,” 54 (my emphasis).


Arendt, On Revolution, 63.


Arendt, On Revolution, 68.

Arendt, On Revolution, 23.

It is notable that absent from Arendt’s discussion of modern revolutions is the Haitian Revolution. For a discussion of this omission, see David Scott, *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 211-218.


Black poverty in the post-Civil Rights era is in no small part perpetuated by the politics of mass incarceration, which, since the mid-1970s has helped to create the black underclass. See Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness* (New York: New Press, 2012).


Cruse, *Crisis of the Negro Intellectual*, 552.


