Managing Decline in a Turbulent World: Designing a New Security Strategy for the European Union

Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington

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Faculty Advisor: Professor Arista Cirtautas

Evaluator: Honorable Mr. Dennis Chaibi

Task Force Members:
Naomi Eissinger
Philippe Enos
Gregory Fenno
Yasamine Firoozi
Michael Golomb
Daniel Guillory
Rina Harsch
Sophie Hubbell
Joelle Klein
Cassandra Muilenburg
Shannon Nolan
Anja Speckhardt
Fernando Turin Sanchez
Ji Soo Yoo

Task Force Coordinator: Anja Speckhardt
Task Force Report Editor: Daniel Guillory
About the Authors

Naomi Eissinger is an International Studies General major at the University of Washington with a focus on Human Rights and Development. During the 2012-2013 academic year she studied abroad at Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3 in Lyon, France, specializing in French language and international humanitarian law. Naomi is fluent in French and is currently advancing her Swedish language skills. After graduating, she intends to further her education at Stockholms Universitet in Stockholm, Sweden, to pursue a career in humanitarian assistance and asylum relief.

Philippe Enos is a Political Economy and International Studies double major at the University of Washington. In 2012 and 2013 he was recognized on the University of Washington’s academic Dean’s List. Raised in a bicultural family, Philippe speaks French fluently and Spanish proficiently. He studied abroad at the Université Libre de Bruxelles in Belgium last Summer to learn about the institutions and politics of the European Union. In the Spring, Philippe will be doing an internship at the US Mission to the EU in Brussels, working as an assistant analyst to trade specialists from the US Department of Commerce. After graduating, Philippe plans to start his career as an analyst in international business with a focus on building strategic trade networks between the US and Europe, generating secure economic growth solutions and developing concomitant sustainable business policies.

Gregory Fenno is an International Studies Major at the University of Washington. He has a profound interest in Asian politics and has spent 3 year learning Korean while frequently visiting different regions in Asia. He has a long-term goal of being a Professional Technology Analyst looking at of the world’s vibrant and ever changing tech industry. He currently provides financial analysis for a rising tech firm in Seattle while continuing to reach farther into the particulars of the world tech industry operating in Asia.

Yasamine Firooz is an International Studies General major at the University of Washington’s Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. Her area of academic focus is on foreign policy, security and peace studies. She has been recognized on the University of Washington’s Dean’s List for the 2013 Fall, Spring, and Summer academic quarters. In 2009, she spent time in Antigua, Guatemala working with local communities on areas surrounding land ownership and coffee production, education, and the socio-economic implications of Guatemala’s State-society relationship. She spent six months in the Langa township of Cape Town, South Africa as an English Language instructor and curriculum coordinator in 2010. In 2011, she spent seven months in Barcelona, Spain at the Universitat de Barcelona studying the Spanish and Catalan languages, as well as courses on Spanish society and culture. Yasamine has advanced Spanish, and elementary Farsi language skills. Yasamine intends to build her career as a US diplomat following graduation.
Michael Golomb is an International Studies student at the University of Washington. In addition to being on the Dean’s List, he is also a departmental Honors candidate, pending the defense of his thesis. He spent most of 2013 living in Kenya, where he worked for Johns Hopkins University as a research consultant in a rural public hospital. While living there, Michael gained a modest command of the Swahili language, which he is now expanding on through coursework at the UW. After graduating, Michael intends to relocate to East Africa, where he will pursue his goal of establishing a career in the development sector.

Daniel Guillory is an International Studies major at the University of Washington with a focus in Foreign Policy and Diplomacy. He has been recognized on the University of Washington’s Dean List for each quarter of his 2011, 2012, and 2013 academic years. During the spring semester of 2013 he studied in Lyon, France, gaining fluency in French after years of study. He is also currently learning Mandarin Chinese through classes at the University of Washington. Daniel intends to pursue a career in the US State Department after graduation.

Rina Miyata Harsch is an International Studies major and Japanese language minor at the University of Washington. She has focused her studies in the Global Political Economy track, and hopes to supplement her studies through continuing her education in economics. She has been recognized on the University of Washington Dean’s List in 2011, 2012, and 2013. Rina grew up in a multicultural environment in an English and Japanese speaking household. During summer of 2012 through the end of winter 2013, she returned to Japan to participate in an exchange program at Kobe University’s Intercultural Studies Department. After graduation, Rina hopes to continue her education in economics and pursue a career in which she can utilize her studies and language abilities.

Sophie Hubbell is a double major in International Studies and Political Science. Her academic achievements have earned me placement on the Dean’s List multiple times. In addition she is a fellow of the Slade Gorton Global Leaders Program at the National Bureau of Asian Research. The Slade Gorton Global Leaders Program constitutes a nine-month leadership development program inspired by former Senator Slade Gorton’s legacy of leadership and integrity. During the summer of 2013 she participated in the University of Washington’s intensive beginner Persian language program and this year will complete her studies in advanced French. After graduation she plans to attend graduate school followed by a fellowship with the State Department and a career in the Foreign Service.

Joelle Klein is an International Studies General major at the University of Washington’s Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies with an academic focus in Environment and Development. Her article, “A Suicide for Justice,” was published in the Autumn 2012 Issue of the Jackson School Journal for International Studies. In 2011, she interned abroad for a German Member of the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, and a local tourism development NGO in Belgrade, Serbia. She spent three and a half months in the foothills of the Indian Himalaya in 2012, where she worked on Natural Resource Management and Forestry projects as an intern for the Central Himalayan Rural Action Group. In the summer of 2013 she studied the Vietnam Wars and worked on post-conflict development projects while abroad in Hanoi and Hue. Joelle is fluent in English and German, with advanced skills in French and basic knowledge of Hindi and Russian.
Cassandra Muilenburg is pursuing a double major at the University of Washington in French and International Studies with a focus on Western Europe. She was a long-term Rotary Youth Exchange Student from 2008-2009 in Saint Nazaire, France and studied abroad at Université Paul-Valéry during the 2012-2013 academic year in Montpellier, France. She speaks French fluently and has studied Spanish and German. After graduating, she hopes to teach English abroad and become a Peace Corps volunteer.

Shannon Nolan is a fourth year undergraduate International Studies major at the University of Washington’s Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. She has specialized in Foreign Policy and Nonproliferation. A class on International Law and Arms Control co-taught by professors Thomas Graham Jr. and Christopher Jones first inspired Shannon’s interest in Security Affairs and Nonproliferation, which was followed by a Nonproliferation Negotiations Simulation of the Six Party Talks. Shannon recently studied abroad in the city of San Sebastian, in the Basque country of Spain, where she studied Spanish, Basque Nationalism, nationalism as related to globalization, and Basque Culture. Currently, she is an intern at the UW Center for Human Rights and Latin American and Caribbean Studies Program, and also a Fellow of the Gorton Center Global Leaders Program. Shannon has been on the Dean’s List at UW seven quarters. She hopes to pursue a career in some aspect of nonproliferation or diplomacy, potentially in the Foreign Service.

Anja Speckhardt is pursuing a double degree in Economics (B.S.) and International Studies (B.A.) with Departmental Honors in Economics at the University of Washington. Her area of focus within International Studies is International Political Economy. Anja was recognized on the University of Washington’s Annual Dean’s List in 2011, 2012, and 2013. She was also named the 2013 Alberta Corkery Scholar in Economics by the UW Economics Department in recognition of her outstanding academic record. Anja was born and raised in Germany and attended German schools through 10th grade. She speaks fluent German and French. Anja will be joining the Teach For America Corps in Baltimore after graduating this June, where she will be teaching high school mathematics. She hopes to attend law school and work in education policy in the future.

Fernando Turin is an International Studies and Latin American Studies double major at the University of Washington. His academic track is on foreign policy, diplomacy peace and security. He has been placed five consecutive times in the University of Washington’s Dean List. He was born and raised in Peru and holds a degree in Architecture and Urban Planning from a Peruvian university and had worked for the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as an external consultant attached to Ministry of Education in Peru from 1999-2001. He is a Spanish native speaker and also acquired fluency in Portuguese through the University of Washington Portuguese program. He is currently interning in the Department of Legal Protection at the Consulate General of Mexico in Seattle. Presently, Fernando is seeking acceptance in the Korean Studies Master Program at the University of Washington and planning to pursue a career in the US Foreign Service.
Ji Soo Yoo is an International Studies General major at the University of Washington. Her area of academic focus is on political economy, development and trade. She was born and raised in South Korea. She is a Korean native speaker and also acquired intermediate level in French through the University of Washington’s French program. She has been volunteering as a Student Ambassador through the University of Washington’s Language Exchange Program to support new incoming international students. She is also part of the Jackson School’s Journal of international studies as a peer-reviewer. After graduating, she hopes to build her career in the government sector.
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Used Acronyms

AA – Association Agreement
ADMM – ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting
AFRICOM – United States Africa Command
AQIM – Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM – Asia-Europe Meeting
ASP – American Security Project
AU – the African Union
BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina
BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
BTC – the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline
CAR – Central African Republic
CDM – Clean Development Mechanism
CETA – Canada-EU Free Trade Agreement
CFSP – Common Foreign Security Policy
CSAP – Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
CSCP – Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform
CSDP – Common Security and Defense Policy
DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DRC – Democratic Republic of the Congo
EADS – European Aeronautic Defense and Space
EaP – Eastern Partnership
EBRD – European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
EC – European Council
ECCAS – Economic Community of Central African States
ECLAC – Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States
EDA – European Defense Agency
EDF – European Development Fund
EEAS – External Action Service
EFPS – European Foreign Policy Scorecard
EGS – European Grand Strategy
EIB – European Investment Bank
ENP – European Neighborhood Policy
ENPI – European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument
EPA – Environmental Protection Agency
EUROMED – Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy
ESS – European Security Strategy
EU – The European Union
EUBAM – European Union Border Assistance Mission (to Libya)
EUCU – European Union Customs Union
EUMM – European Monitoring Mission
EUTM – European Union Training Mission (to Mali)
EWS – Early Warning System
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
FTA – Free Trade Agreement
Preface

By Anja Speckhardt

The European Union is at a turning point in its approach vis-à-vis security and international relations. The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) laid out a vision for the EU as an important player on the global stage, encouraging the EU to become more active both in its military missions and in its humanitarian and development efforts. It envisions the EU as a critical actor in international events, working closely with like-minded nations and international organizations such as NATO and the UN. But ten years later, the world has changed. Since 2003, the world has experienced a myriad of significant international developments—widespread economic downturn, civil wars and regime change with the Arab Spring, the Euro crisis, terrorist attacks, famines, and numerous natural disasters. These events have contributed to the weakening of the Western world by diminishing the appeal of liberal capitalism, challenging the efficacy of democratic institutions, and calling into question the West’s ability to influence other countries, whether through military or civilian means. These challenges have prompted widespread isolationism and diminished resources dedicated to foreign policy and security within the EU.

The goal of this Task Force is to re-evaluate the ESS in the light of diminishing European influence and resources. In so doing, we have determined that the EU needs a new security plan that is more realistic, prioritized, and strategic: a European Grand Strategy (EGS). We believe that, if the EU is able to focus its efforts constructively and manage its resources efficiently, it has the potential to be an important regional, if not global actor. In order to accomplish this, the EU must think strategically and prioritize the regions and issues that are most critical to their security, and which can benefit most from their assistance.
Our report begins with an introduction, which will highlight both the potential of the European Union to become more efficient and cooperative in its security policy, as well as the challenges the EU faces in terms of future political and economic integration. Next, we will justify the need for a new grand security strategy using expert analysis of EU policy researchers and academics. We will then present our draft of a European Grand Strategy. Subsequently, we will analyze the diminished capabilities and resources the EU can bring to bear on security due to internal crises within the European Union, especially in light of the Euro crisis. Next, we support the recommendations and priorities we set in the EGS by addressing case studies and security challenges in several critical regions of the world. This portion of our report is divided into two sections: Europe as a Regional Actor (encompassing the European Neighborhood, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa) and Europe as a Global Actor (including China and East Asia, Brazil and Latin America, and finally, Transatlantic Relations). We chose these regions because of their historical importance to the EU and our estimation of the rising powers with which the EU should cultivate a relationship in the future. We conclude our report by offering specific policy recommendations for putting a new security strategy into action.
Introduction
By Anja Speckhardt

Achievements & Potential of the EU

“Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free” (European Union 1). The opening words of the European Security Strategy (ESS) speak to the tremendous economic, political, and social achievements of the European Union (EU). Despite the challenges the EU has faced since its inception, and especially since 2003, the EU has added 13 new Member States, and has become increasingly integrated through the Lisbon Treaty (“The Treaty at a Glance”). Notwithstanding the Euro crisis, the EU’s Single Market policy has propelled the EU to the status of “world class trader and investor” (Hamilton xi). Time and time again, the EU has proven that it is more effective and more influential when it coordinates its efforts to achieve common ends. Especially in the areas of security and development, the EU has significant potential to become more successful in its efforts to promote a safer, more peaceful, and more prosperous world.

Enlargement & Integration

The EU has achieved two important feats since the ESS was written: enlargement by 13 members after 2004, and the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. Enlargement fulfilled the ESS’s strategic goal of “Building Security in our Neighborhood,” allowing the EU to “extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbors in the East while tackling political problems there” (European Union 9). Though enlargement has at times been difficult, as internal problems in new Member States were underestimated (Hungary, Romania) or current Member States have attempted to block new member accession (Slovenia in the case of Croatia), it has also been a major step towards increased integration, strengthening
democracies, protecting human rights, and boosting economic prosperity (Pavilionis, “Lithuania and the EU”). Enlargement has also raised the standard of living in new Member States by a considerable margin: Lithuania’s per capita GDP, just $1,716 in 1995, has doubled since its accession to the EU in 2003 and reached $12,230 in 2011 (Pavilionis “Lithuania and the EU”). With the addition of the new Member States, a larger proportion of the European continent is now represented in the EU, giving the union more influence and prosperity.

The Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007 and adopted in 2009, has also had a profound impact on EU integration. The Treaty strengthened the democratic nature of the EU, improved its efficiency by updating voting rules and EU institutions, guaranteed specific rights and freedoms for all EU citizens, and created the European External Action Service (EEAS) to improve the EU’s efficiency as a global actor (“The Treaty at a Glance”). The Treaty focuses on political—instead of economic—integration, which has historically been a difficult sell to member countries, as the failure of the EU Constitution demonstrated in 2005. The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, though hard-fought, shows that the Member States realize they have more power when they act as a group, rather than individually (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). This also indicates that there is still political will to foster and strengthen the European project. Despite internal challenges like the Euro crisis and increased nationalism in national governments, the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty was a sizable step towards political integration,

*Potential for Increased Cooperation*

Though the EU has had successes in economic and political integration, there are several areas in which cooperation is weak. One pivotal area is defense: the EU could strengthen both its security and defense efforts by coordinating its resources and cooperating more fully (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). Furthermore, in a time of diminished resources, the EU should
coordinate its development efforts more carefully, in order to do the most possible good. Thus far, the EU has restricted its security efforts to CSDP “missions”—unanimously agreed upon, small-scale interventions with limited success (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). Unfortunately, the EU has done little else to integrate their national defense structures. According to the “Cost of Non-Europe Report, European Common Security and Defence Policy” report issued by the European Parliament, the EU could save €130 billion if it were to better integrate its military structures, create a common market for weapons and equipment procurement, and strengthen its political unity and decisiveness in crisis situations (Ballester 75-77). The creation of the EEAS by the Lisbon Treaty was intended to improve the coherence and impact of EU foreign policy, but it has not yet proved fruitful (Ballester 7-8). Especially in a time of waning popular interest in defense and shrinking defense budgets, cost-saving measures are imperative to ensuring the EU remains adequately secure and able to respond to potential threats.

Similarly, the EU could reform its approach to development aid in order to better serve its humanitarian interests. At the 2660th European Council Meeting in Brussels in 2005, the Council set as its goal that all EU Member States increase their Official Development Aid (ODA) to 0.7 percent of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2015 (European Council 20). While the EU remains the world’s largest development aid donor, ODA as a percentage of GNI currently stands at 0.43 percent (European Commission). The Euro crisis and subsequent austerity measures have decreased both the will and the ability of Member States to contribute to poverty alleviation abroad. However, “The Cost of Non-Europe in Development Policy” report claims that the EU could improve its effectiveness in humanitarian assistance, despite smaller budgets, if it were to better coordinate donations centrally (Nogaj 7-8). Under the current system, Member States coordinate their development spending on a national level,
which leads to duplication, high administrative overhead, and the creation of “aid darlings” and “aid orphans” (Nogaj 15-16). Such fragmentation is unfortunate, since the importance of development is one issue on which most Europeans agree: according to Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, the Eurobarometer survey of October 2012 shows that “85% of EU citizens believe that Europe should continue helping developing countries” (qtd. in European Commission). Given the well-established development-security nexus, the EU has tremendous potential to improve its security while also meeting its humanitarian goals, by better coordinating its development policies. At the same time, the EU must have a conversation about its desired security identity—whether it should define itself as a hard power, a civilian power, or a hard/soft power hybrid. This conversation will help to determine where the EU will focus its security spending and maximize the efficient use of its resources.

The EU has been, in many ways, the most successful experiment in joint governance in modern history. It has achieved an unprecedented level of political and economic integration. However, recent challenges call into question the EU’s future cooperation and success. Especially in the arena of security, the EU must do more to coordinate and develop a cohesive strategy, in order to maximize its effectiveness and ensure it does not slip into irrelevance on the global stage. It is the opinion of this Task Force that the creation of a new European Grand Strategy is therefore imperative.

The ESS in Context

Despite our call for a new European Grand Strategy, this Task Force recognizes the great achievement that the European Security Strategy represents. The ESS, which was produced by then-High Representative Javier Solana with heavy influence from British diplomat Robert
Cooper, is an elegantly written, concise, and innovative document\(^2\) (Bailes 11). It carefully enumerates perceived threats and explains the EU’s favored policy methods for addressing them, while enshrining the EU’s status as a normative power by highlighting its most dearly held values, such as human rights, environmental sustainability, multilateral coordination, and development (Biscop “A Strategic Anniversary”). It is clear from the ESS that the EU strives to be a global actor, one that is “ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (European Union 1). The ESS encouraged the EU to put security policy on the agenda. By reminding the EU of the threats and opportunities of a new globalized world, the ESS exhorted the EU to contribute to the creation of a more secure world that undeniably benefits them.

However, while many of the threats and values laid out in the ESS still hold true, the worldview propounded in the ESS is a reflection of a different time. The ESS was written from the worldview of Robert Cooper: the EU as a post-modern power, a transnational conglomeration of states built on openness, mutual interference, and interdependence, the US as a modern, closed and sovereign nation-state, and failed states as pre-modern, chaotic, and dangerous (Cooper). According to Cooper, the world needed a new imperialist power to bring law and order back to failed states and create a peaceful and prosperous world order (Cooper). The ESS implicitly advocates the kind of “postmodern imperialism” that Cooper proposed, by laying out enlargement, development, and democracy promotion as strategic goals (European Union 6-10). Such goals were consistent with the conception of the EU as a normative power capable of spreading its values throughout the world—“empire by example” as Jan Zielonka claimed in his article in *International Affairs* (473). While “Europe as Empire” was the buzz

\(^2\) Despite the fact that, according to Richard Youngs, the document was written in its entirety over a weekend (“European Security Strategy”)
phrase du jour, major changes in the international community since 2003 call into question Cooper’s worldview, challenging the very foundations on which the ESS was written.

Navigating a Changing World

The original European Security Strategy was undeniably elegant and broad in its scope, but was designed for a world far different than the one in which the European Union fights to maintain significance today. Shifting dynamics and power relations suggest new poles of influence and a radically altered system of interaction between states[^3]. Aside from the more literal and visible differences such as new leadership or Member States to the Union itself, most EU policy experts agree on several key facets of the global system today that merit special attention: 1) The relative decline of Western power and the rise of developing countries such as Brazil, Russia, India and China; 2) a so-called multipolar system of powers; and 3) the EU’s internal struggles, including the Euro crisis. Uncovering the nature of these factors demonstrates the need to reassess Europe’s capabilities and potential strategy moving into this new world.

Decline of the West

Though the United States was the undeniable superpower of the 20th century, it has rapidly been losing influence as the world has become more globalized, traditional hard power has become less effective, and the world financial crisis has led to persistently slow growth in Western countries. According to Henry Kissinger, the world is experiencing “the titanic shift of power from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific and the ‘diffusion of power’ to a large group of second-ranked nations.” (qtd. in Lai 14-15). The unipolar system with the United States as a

global hegemon, which has persisted since the end of the Cold War, is crumbling. America’s efforts to preserve its dominance and engage in extensive foreign involvement abroad, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan, have met little success and have called into question the effectiveness of its hard power (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). The decline of the West not only curtails the EU’s influence, but also threatens its security, since the EU has relied heavily on its transatlantic partnership to provide defense (Howorth, “EU and CSDP”). Furthermore, the diminishing appeal of Western values jeopardizes the EU’s status as a normative power, and challenges its ambitions set forth in the ESS to spread its ideals across the globe.

In addition, the global financial crisis and subsequent lackluster economic growth have weakened the appeal of Western-style market capitalism, especially as developing countries are experiencing demographic booms and fast-paced economic expansion. As the US financial crisis spread throughout the world, many developing countries resent the “exporting” of the US market economy, which they believed caused instability and led to a global economic downturn (Grevi 14). Furthermore, China, with its socialist market economy, has weathered the financial crisis exceptionally well, presenting an alternative economic paradigm for developing countries to follow. Especially as fertility rates in developing countries continue to be well above those in the US and the EU, developing countries will benefit from a younger, larger workforce that spurs economic growth, while developed countries’ labor force is aging and shrinking (Van Langenhove 6-7). Together, these changes spell the decline of Western influence and the rise of developing countries, culminating in a new, multi-polar world system.

Multi-polarity/Inter-polarity

As Western powers are losing their hegemonic status, the new world order is characterized by multi-polarity and inter-polarity, in which there is no single superpower. A
multipolar world is one in which many countries, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multi-national corporations (MNCs), and international institutions hold significant power, with no one entity dominating the system. The rise of the BRICs, the diminishing influence of the US and the EU, and the increasing power of non-nation state actors like MNCs and NGOs signal that this shift is at hand. As the world order transitions towards such a system, threats become more diffuse and individual countries become less able to address them, making it “evident that no one state, no matter how powerful, can tackle these threats on its own” (Cameron 2).

Scholars have dubbed this nexus between interdependence and multi-polarity “inter-polarity,” highlighting that each of the actors are dependent on others for economic success, for natural resources, and for security (Grevi 15). The inter-polar system presents new security challenges: the threat of being invaded by a foreign nation state becomes remote, for example, while the threat of piracy interrupting important trade routes and causing an oil shortage is proximate. The EU, which is a model of transnational cooperation, is perfectly equipped to benefit from this new inter-polar system. However, it must accept a significantly diminished role in the world and collaborate with new partners, rather than relying solely on its transatlantic partnership. Then, the EU can adopt a new, cogent security strategy, with realistic priorities and goals.

_EU Showing Weakness_

Due to the EU’s recent external failures and internal struggles, including its ineffectiveness in democracy promotion and the Euro crisis, the EU’s external image has become one of dysfunction and impotence. If the EU strives to be a normative power, image is everything—values, good democratic governance, and economic success lend the EU credibility and influence (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). However, given the scant success of recent attempts to spread European values and governance structures, the EU must recognize the limits
of its power, instead of diffusing its attentions and stretching its scarce resources to the point of insignificance. As Richard Youngs writes, “the EU’s credibility cannot withstand too many more ‘Great Deceits’: Turkey’s accession promise, democracy support in the Middle East, spreading the inclusive benefits of liberal world order” (20). As long as the EU purports to be able to “do it all,” it will continually disappoint and become irrelevant. In order to sustain its credibility and have any success in spreading the values and norms it holds dear, the EU must better focus its efforts and align them with a strategic security plan.

Additionally, the EU’s internal problems have diminished its ability to be an effective external actor: “at present, internal crisis is the EU’s external image” (Youngs 20). The Euro crisis has tainted the world’s view of the EU project, undermining its esteem in international circles (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). Furthermore, the crisis had a tangible negative impact on security budgets, member state trust and cohesion, and the desire to engage in any kind of external policy. While the EU may be able to weather the storm, it must accept that its credibility has been damaged and that it will likely not be able to play the role of critical “global actor” it sought in the 2003 ESS (Youngs 20). However, if the EU can unify more strongly within itself it has a chance to maintain relevance. If the EU can present a realistic security strategy that is backed by all of the Member States, the world may begin to see the EU as a cohesive actor, restoring its credibility and protecting its security.

**Justification for a European Grand Strategy**

In the light of the EU’s successes and recent challenges, this Task Force finds that the EU is in need of a new security strategy: A European Grand Strategy. While the EU has thus far been content with updating its original European Security Strategy, we believe that the world has changed too much since 2003 to justify a mere revision (Biscop “A Strategic Anniversary”).
Considering the evolving state of international interaction, the EU’s priorities and identity must be clearly defined and set forth in European strategic vision. Continued relevance demands that the European Union reassess the goals set out in the 2003 strategy with realistic objectives and a means appraisal for future involvement.

**What Should a New Document Accomplish?**

Various think tanks, foreign ministers, academics and policy experts have put forth suggestions for what a new European Grand Strategy can and should accomplish. While the experts differ in their approach to the creation and the content of a new security strategy, most agree that any new security strategy requires specificity and a mechanism for taking action and measuring its success. According to Sven Biscop, the original strategy tells the EU “how” to do things but not “what” to do, because it lacks clear priorities. He believes a new security strategy “should definitely confirm the preventive, holistic and multilateral outlook of the Union but ought to complement it with much clearer objectives and thus priorities” (Biscop 2). Lars-Erik Lundin, a research associate at the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, agrees that specific goals are imperative, because they allow the EU to “derive overall measurements of success…[giving the EU an] opportunity to promote effectiveness in a period of serious resource constraints” (15). Drent and Landon from the Clingendael Institute add that a new ESS with “clear…top priorities” could be critical to reawakening interest in EU foreign policy, which might “reinvigorate the EU as a foreign and security policy actor” (4). In the light of recent internal struggles and diminishing resources, Jolyon Howorth believes the EU must decide “on the extent to which the Member States have common interests and common values which they wished to preserve and defend,” and from there create a grand strategy that “effectively articulates the relationship between means and large ends” (Howorth 17, 2).
Despite frequent talk of divergent interests, Howorth believes that the EU Member States have several common interests—peace, democracy promotion, and poverty alleviation, for example—on which a new grand strategy could capitalize (“EU and CSDP”).

*Conversations with Howorth, Youngs, and Pavilionis*

Our Task Force had the unique opportunity to discuss our mission with Jolyon Howorth and Richard Youngs, as well as Lithuanian Ambassador to the United States, Žygimantas Pavilionis. While all of these officials had different perspectives on the current EU security situation and the need for a new grand strategy, all agreed that the EU needed to act in order to remain relevant on the global stage. The first question we addressed was whether the EU needs a new security strategy in the face of the many changes the EU has experienced since 2003. According to Howorth, the ESS needs “a serious strategic update” because the world has changed so much since 2003 (“EU and the CSDP”). He believes the EU has been weakened internally by the Euro crisis, and it has had very little success in its international security endeavors, such as accession talks with Turkey and the intervention in Libya. Given these weaknesses, it is more important than ever that the EU prioritizes a limited number of “large ends” and commits resources towards achieving them. Richard Youngs disagrees with Howorth’s assessment, because he believes the EU has been too limited in its priorities, not too broad. According to him, the ESS is still a good document that can act as a blueprint for the EU’s values and ideals, but the EU needs to decide how to accomplish these goals on the operational level (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). His vision would be something of a quadrennial defense review, with ten major priorities for EU action.

Our experts also had diverse opinions on the ability and appropriateness of the EU being either a regional or a global actor. Howorth doubts the EU can aspire to being more than a
regional actor—especially in this time of limited resources and increasing focus on internal security. He believes the majority of the EU’s influence and resources should be concentrated from the Arctic to the Black Sea and North Africa (“EU and CSDP”). Both Richard Youngs and Ambassador Pavilionis disagree, believing the EU has both the ability and the responsibility to be a global actor. Youngs believes that, in this globalized world, it is impossible for the EU to focus solely on its neighborhood; instead, it must work to establish and maintain a credible presence, even if only with soft power, in the Middle East and East Asia as well (“EU Security Strategy”). Youngs also challenges the conventional wisdom that more unity is always better, pointing out that much time is wasted pursuing EU unity as a goal instead of as a means to an end (“EU Security Strategy”). He argues that individual Member States, especially France, Germany, and the UK, should be able to act under the umbrella of a larger EU strategy, even if the EU as a whole cannot or will not act.

Ambassador Pavilionis was perhaps most optimistic about the ability of the EU to be a global actor. He reiterated that the EU has a wealth of resources, intelligence, and money, which, if channeled properly, could have a significant impact on the world (Pavilionis, “Lithuania and the EU”). He bemoaned the possible withdrawal of the EU into isolationism, given the extent of human suffering that persists in other countries and the incredible wealth and influence the EU could deploy. According to Pavilionis, the recent events in Ukraine and Turkey’s desire to join the EU are proof that the EU still has an important role to play in democracy promotion (“Lithuania and the EU”). He pointed to the remarkable turnaround, both in the economy and the political system, of his home country of Lithuania, as an example of the incredible power of the EU to improve lives and help to modernize economies. Pavilionis also believes that joining the EU gives the Member States a greater stake in world events—while he
would never have considered Sub-Saharan Africa his “neighborhood” 20 years ago, joining the EU has made it seem much closer and more relevant to his interests (“Lithuania and the EU”).

Our European Grand Strategy will reflect the tensions between these viewpoints and our attempts to reconcile them. While we appreciated Richard Youngs’ point that the EU does not simply need more paper—it needs more action—we also believe that the ESS can no longer be a useful guide for security policy. The ESS is not a truly strategic document, and it was written for an entirely different world. However, we also acknowledge the need for specific, strategic, and actionable security priorities. Therefore, our EGS includes a broad, ultimate end and guiding interests, as well as strategic priorities that lie on the more operational level. Similarly, we recognize the importance of the EU as a primarily regional actor, but we also believe that it cannot shy away from the world stage as security threats become increasingly globalized and complex. While we will often draw from the policy recommendations and research of these and other EU policy experts, our Task Force has a unique perspective on the EU. As a group of policy researchers in the United States, we bring an outsider perspective that will allow us to objectively and bluntly discuss EU capabilities and priorities. In conjunction with regional expertise and a focus on case-by-case threat determination, our strategy is an attempt to offer a delineated security proposal for the European Union. Our hope is that our document will stir not only discussion in the EU, but also prompt concrete action to help evolve the EU security strategy towards a plan that is viable for today’s world.

*The Largest Threat to EU Security is Irrelevance*

This Task Force believes that the single greatest threat to European security is the looming irrelevance of the EU in the changing international system. If the EU is not able to find an important role for itself within the new global order, its security will be threatened as it will
lose the ability to exercise influence on other global actors. The EU’s top priority must therefore be to unify the Member States behind a plan that protects its security, promotes its values, and pushes the world towards a more effective system of multilateral governance and engagement. To this end, we present a European Grand Strategy, informed by regional security threats and opportunities for engagement, which will help the EU to frame its position on the global stage.

The December EU Council meeting was unfortunately not as fruitful as some policy experts had hoped: while High Representative Ashton laid out an ambitious agenda, the main outcome of the meeting was an invitation to the new High Representative, to be appointed in 2014, to propose “priorities for further actions and for regional engagement” in spring 2015 (Council of the European Union). However, we believe this invitation is our opening to propose a blueprint for a new European Grand Strategy that will propel the EU towards becoming the important global actor it has the potential to be. Therefore, we endeavor to create a strategy that answers the Council’s demands of being both prioritized and regionally focused (Council of the European Union). While our EGS is based on a comprehensive view of EU policies, including security and development agendas, our Task Force’s research focuses largely on developing regional priorities, as this is, in our opinion, an area of critical weakness for the EU. Our Grand Strategy and the supporting regional chapters will address the new challenges and limitations the EU faces in the light of a more globalized and interdependent world. However, we will also highlight the many opportunities and resources the EU has to strengthen its security and promote peace and democracy in the world.
Executive Summary

Designing a New European Grand Strategy

By: Daniel Guillory

Preamble

By prioritizing essential security objectives and the means to achieve them, a Grand Strategy not only enables action in times of crisis or war, but also facilitates preventive action in order to advance internal as well as external security. Moreover, it mandates a comprehensive approach to security through the deployment of economic, diplomatic, civilian and military means while accounting for coordination of internal and external policies. This draft proposal of a Grand Strategy for the European Union is based on an assessment of key regions and their significance to European security as well as the constraints hindering possible EU actions. Expert research and analysis guide the formulation of a proposed ultimate end followed by the Guiding Ideals to unify Member State Action under the strategy. What follows are the expert researched means and limits of the EU, with the principal objective of restoring the EU’s relevance as a global actor.

First and foremost the role and efficacy of the EU as a regional actor – the area most pertinent to its capabilities and immediate security questions – must be re-established. Security cannot be achieved by simply laying out general principles and ideals of the European Union,

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This document was influenced by Elvire Fabry, Giovanni Grevi, Jolyon Howorth, Ambassador Žygmantas Pavilionis, and Richard Youngs.
but must be sought through deliberate and specific coordination of available resources. A realistic assessment of the European Union’s role and standing on the world stage as well as an evaluation of institutional capacities and means are essential in the formulation of a strategic approach to European security. On the basis of such an evaluation, the conclusion is inescapable that the EU’s first engagement, especially with regard to traditional security interests, must be within its region or neighborhood; over extension and over commitment of European resources diminishes their effectiveness. Thus, the reach and scope of the EU’s grand strategy must be carefully defined. The primary focus on internal and regional security represents the area of most influence, capability and thus relevance for the Member States and the EU itself.

As an unconventional security actor, on the other hand, the European Union can and should maintain a global presence as humanitarian assistance, development assistance, support for regional economic integration and democracy promotion are well established European means to foster security internationally. However, in light of the changing international system and diminished European resources, the reach and scope of the EU’s global engagement must be carefully defined and coordinated with critical partnerships. As a multilateral actor, the EU must work within the framework of international law, international institutions and regional integration frameworks. As a transatlantic actor, the EU must develop a more functional strategic partnership with the United States. As a declining power, the EU must cooperate with rising powers to formulate shared solutions to common challenges. In all cases, the Grand Strategy must guide the EU’s approach to involving and collaborating with these institutions and actors, as they are necessary to the achievement of its security goals.
Critical to the success of a grand strategy is unity. The European Union must focus on cohesion not as an end but as the necessary precondition for effective action on a regional and global scale. Adherence to the shared security objectives of the EU and commitment to a grand strategy are essential as they facilitate the ideological agreement that drives successful security achievements. While each Member State has its own interests, strengths, and capabilities, these should all be brought into line with the overall Ultimate End and broad Guiding Interests that the strategy will put forth. Unanimous support and cooperation do not mean completely unified actions. The actions of individual Member States can be individual and specific to national goals but must contribute to the security of the EU as a whole and must never undermine the collective security of the Union.

In keeping with this essential unity, the EU must recognize the ability of key internal Member States and non-state actors to take actions in other regions. At this time, Germany’s influence and centrality within the Union must not be ignored. The importance of Germany not only within the EU but also externally, with its significant soft power dynamics and trade relations – especially with key states such as Russia and China must be acknowledged. Although Germany remains reluctant to engage in hard power intervention, the other Member States, under the strategy, can work for greater security by other means so long as Germany works for the security of Europe and not only itself.

Ultimately, the greatest threat to European security is the looming irrelevance of the European Union, whether through inaction, inadequate action or uncoordinated action. The EU must act swiftly and decisively in coordinating an effective, comprehensive grand strategy which will inform not only the overarching security objectives but will also specify the strategic priorities that should guide EU policies. If the EU does not act now to restore its relevance as a
global actor it risks the disengagement of major allies such as the United States, the disregard of regional powers such as Russia and Turkey and the disdain of rising powers such as China and Brazil.

**The Ultimate End**

To unite the strategic priorities of the EU this strategy will guide policy and action to the ultimate end of reestablishing the EU as a relevant global actor in the new, shifting world order. Paramount to this is the need for a distinct role and identity for the EU relative to the other states and multilateral institutions around the world. Thus we facilitate the move from reactive strategy to proactive strategy in a clear and directed regional approach. The following Guiding Interests represent broad standards under which Member States and the institutions of the EU itself will operate. Below this structure lie the strategic priorities for the EU as a regional actor and then more broadly as a global actor – each with corresponding, state-based studies to instruct direct policy. The EU has both the capability and the responsibility to reaffirm its place and influence in the world.

A comprehensive approach to security remains the necessary means to achieving this end. Through this strategy, the EU must more successfully marry the traditional and untraditional aspects of security to achieve short-term peace and stability coupled with the prospect of long-term development and growth. Continued influence and relevance, and thus a strong role in the multipolar world order, will come from the tandem use of hard and soft powers customized to the region or threat requiring attention. The resources, capabilities, efforts, and organizations are in place; all that remains is to fully coordinate them in this single, unified strategy.
Guiding Interests

To become a responsible regional actor

Current criticism of the EU’s policies demands more than the current level of the EU’s acceptance of responsibility for its proximate neighborhood. With its vast Member States and diverse capabilities and interests, the EU represents the most unified and capable multilateral institution in its immediate region. Its claims to support the ideals of democracy promotion and human security need the support of deliberate and immediate action. EU relevance and efficacy begin with taking responsibility for the aid and betterment of states within its region. The EU prides itself on the concept of being more secure when these other states are better off, and succeeding in this will derive from clearly identified strategic priorities.

There is no precise Article within the Lisbon Treaty to require this responsibility, but adherence to Articles 21, 27, and 214 direct the necessity for coordinated, effective external policies by the EU Member States. This Strategy addresses this absent portion of the Treaty, calling for a specific, actionable priority to foster stability and security within Wider Europe.

To Foster Global Interdependence and Cooperation

As its second role, the EU must act globally representing all of its Member States. As a multilateral institution in an increasingly multipolar world, the EU stands as one of the most capable collectives with the ideological conviction to promote positive interdependence around the world. This will require a new look at the EU’s place and role in the world, avoiding dangerous overextension and striving for a place not as a dominating actor but as one that positively shapes and influences developments on the global scene.
Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty explains this specifically: “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organizations which share the principles [of the EU].” In addition to this the EU is called upon to seek multilateral solutions to problems that are common between these third countries. The mutual obligation of every Member State is already laid out, but the strategies to achieve these ends must be carefully constructed for the EU’s relationships to other global actors.

To Promote Human Security

The EU holds strongly to the precepts of humanitarian aid, democracy promotion, and the support of human rights around the world—as described in Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty. All represent key factors in not only untraditional security but also the emergence of traditional security threats in dangerous failed states. Remaining the number one contributor of aid in the world and using this aid efficiently and successfully entails continued effort and collaboration from the whole of the EU.

The legal framework for humanitarian aid is established in Article 214 of the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty also established the institutions necessary, notably the European External Action Service, but they must be more effectively coordinated, especially with respect to the regional frameworks developed in this strategy. As past experience and current crises demonstrate, the EU must be quicker to direct action with both conflict intervention and crisis management mechanisms. Specific criteria for particular interventions will constitute directives for action to expedite humanitarian efforts.
The EU as a regional Actor

General Strategic Priorities

The primary strategic priority is the creation of new regional security frameworks. The current approaches are unsuitable or inadequate. We must ensure that these new frameworks are interactive and, more importantly, that they integrate local regional actors and are customized to regionally specific needs. With these frameworks we seek to make multilateralism in the region as effective as possible.

Specific Strategic Priorities

Wider Europe – The Neighborhood

• Short-Term: Of primary importance for the EU in this region is the current ongoing crisis in Ukraine. Direct confrontation can be avoided but the EU must not hesitate to implement targeted sanctions and other crisis response mechanisms to mitigate the danger to Ukrainian citizens. Also, the EU, in working with the US, must address stagnant post-Dayton development in Bosnia and Herzegovina by promoting the required constitutional reforms.

• Medium-Term: After the issues requiring immediate attention, the EU must turn its focus to Turkey and develop a stronger Strategic Partnership. Mutual security interests can serve as a foundation to cooperation on issues of regional security, both in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The EU also needs to respond to an increasingly assertive Russia. Russia’s dominance of all aspects of security in the region cannot be ignored, and must be addressed in the medium-term as the EU seeks to maintain its own relevance.
• Long-Term: The EU’s current dependence on Energy from Russia and other potentially unstable countries must be minimized. Improving relations with Turkey will help to stabilize the EU’s energy supplies by providing alternate transit routes from diversified suppliers.

North Africa and the Middle East

• Short-Term: The EU must reframe its regional policy frameworks to address North Africa and the Middle East as a single, coherent region—MENA. More effective and rapid crisis responses, tailored to the specific issues and key actors in the region must be the first goal. Moving forward, the EU must avoid the slow moving processes of cooperation inherent to some multilateral organizations in favor of more decisive actions that promote “effective multilateralism.”

• Medium- and Long-Term: A new Regional Security Framework must be the ultimate goal for the EU with respect to MENA. Fostering “cooperative clusters” of regional stakeholders will coordinate security efforts in the region to achieve more success. The EU must take the lead in facilitating dialogue and mediation between states, while being sure to address the particular situations of the regional actors. This will require inclusion of the Gulf States, especially Saudi Arabia, as they constitute the most influential actors in the region.

Sub-Saharan Africa

• Short-Term: The immediate priority in the region is the crisis in the Central African Republic. The EU has yet to take decisive action as a whole and must expedite the currently planned deployment of forces to the region. Moreover, the EU must contribute
logistical support in concurrence with US efforts to provide African leaders with the tools and training to maintain peace after the conflict.

- Medium- and Long-Term: This is an opportunity to build a more effective partnership with the Africa Union. Furthermore, additional regional security frameworks should be developed consistent with current economic regions in Africa, which will provide more effective means to resolve conflicts in the future. The EU needs to achieve a better balance between development and security, which can only be achieved through cooperation with and support of regional actors.

The EU as a Global Actor

**General Strategic Priorities (Meta-Conclusions)**

Looking outward onto a global stage, the EU must seek to influence and aid others through soft power. New and improved strategic partnerships are key to supplementing the ability of the EU to combat security threats and build more stable regions around the world. Just as coordination with local actors—states, non-state actors, regional organizations and multilateral entities—enables the EU to act more effectively in its immediate neighborhood, strategic partnerships with a variety of other actors on a global scale represent opportunities for constructive EU engagement as a mediator and stabilizer in global security issues.

**Specific Strategic Priorities**

*China and East Asia*

- Short-Term: Action in this region must begin with an assessment of the conflict over the South China Sea and a potential maritime strategy for the EU. Protecting shipping lanes
is vital to EU interests and therefore should be the object of increased attention.

Working with the US is essential to promote regional security.

- **Medium-Term:** In conjunction with efforts to maintain open seas, the EU must establish itself as a mediator enabling resolutions to disputes in the region. Its past experience and effective dispute resolution mechanisms can contribute to greater stability and cooperation between states, provided the EU works with regional multilateral organizations.

- **Long-Term:** Once the EU has established its role as a mediator and arbiter in the region, it can work engage issues relevant to the interests of the Chinese government. Environmental protection and sustainable urban development are of paramount concern to the legitimacy of the PRC’s rule in China. With the EU’s expertise in environmental policy and development, NGOs already in the country can instigate the first changes, but once the EU regains relevance it will be able to extend its own influence and foster environmental protection and preservation.

**Brazil and Latin America**

- **Short-Term:** First, rather than focusing mainly on MERCOSUR, the EU must work with Brazil as an individual actor, supporting its growing strength on the international stage. Fostering this bilateral relationship will improve the EU’s efficacy in the region and allow for greater involvement and influence in trade and mediation. Additionally, by working with Brazil, the EU can promote regional integration through MERCOSUR as Brazil is arguably the most important force in the organization.

- **Medium-Term:** Following this improved partnership, the EU must then work to avoid Brazil’s increased integration into the BRICs. To achieve this the EU must include
Brazil in transatlantic dialogues and larger multilateral cooperation. If Brazil continues to align with other rising powers on global policy issues, the EU will have lost an opportunity to partner with one of the most important new regional powers and will correspondingly lose influence in Latin America as a whole.

- Long-Term: The overarching goal for the EU must be to foster the leadership of Brazil in the region. As a successful developing country and, hopefully, strategic partner to the EU, Brazil will command great influence in the region which can be used to foster regional security and stability. Future security for Latin America is dependent on the strengthening of this partnership.

Transatlantic Relations

- Short-Term: The EU must address the role of NATO as a platform for EU-US strategic cooperation and resolve the relationship between CSDP and NATO. The EU must also be attentive to the strategic implications of the TTIP negotiations and work to ensure the inclusiveness of the negotiating process and to minimize the exclusionary consequences of the negotiations. An enhanced economic partnership will serve as the basis for improved coordination in the transatlantic partnership moving into the future.

- Medium-Term: The EU and the US should work to create a new Transatlantic Strategic Partnership. Through this, clear and delineated avenues of cooperation on issues such as Arms Control and Nonproliferation could also be created.

- Long-Term: Finally, the EU and the US must use the TTIP as a framework to harmonize international standards and regulations for trade while, however, ensuring more equitable trade and investment agreements to foster development and stability. The EU and the US must also determine the role and relevance of NATO moving forward; at a
minimum discussions will have to take place on the use of force and the role of humanitarian interventions.

**Conclusion**

What must not be forgotten in the nature of this strategy is that it updates the priorities and policies of the EU to the altered global situation. Merely 10 years after the first European Security Strategy the world has changed enough to require a renewed look at security. We must, therefore, periodically reprioritize and renew this strategy. Routinizing this reassessment will make security questions a regular discussion for all Member States and prioritize the common values of all within the EU. As the review was conducted five years after the original strategy, and this new approach is developed five years after that, a strategic review every five years would appear to be the optimum time frame for reevaluation. Continued relevance comes with continued action and critical self-evaluation of effectiveness as well as failure.

Expanding upon the recommendations made above, the following chapters provide thorough research into the significance of each strategic priority as well as detailed action plans. Specific, targeted policies are more easily achieved with the clear path that these chapters set out and will guide EU strategic actions to achieve both internal and external security alike.
EU Internal Developments
By Cassandra Muilenburg

Introduction

Since the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) and the 2008 Review, there have been many important changes that have dramatically reshaped the challenges of European security and defense. With increasing globalization, new external security actors have emerged and the European Union has undergone significant internal changes. Therefore, this Task Force has identified three critical institutional, economic, and political changes that have shaped the EU’s ability to address security challenges today. These three developments are: the structural changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the economic challenges posed by the Eurozone crisis, and Germany’s new political centrality in EU decision-making.

The Lisbon Treaty aimed to unify European defense and security actors within a cohesive institutional framework. However, in the same year that the Lisbon Treaty went into effect, the Eurozone crisis began to seriously impact the Union. The implications of the crisis have been widespread and have left many unsure about the future of the European project. Germany’s rise in economic importance has shifted the delicate balance of power in political cooperation and has created animosity between Member States (Beck 2). In addition, the UK, which has long been a dominant European security actor, plans to hold a referendum on EU membership in 2017 (Dempsey, “The Depressing”). The Lisbon Treaty changes have been introduced in this climate of uncertainty, but the political resolve necessary to render them
effective has been largely replaced with economic preoccupations (Dennison 7). National agendas and internal reform have dominated European debates for the past half-decade. However, now that the Eurozone crisis is beginning to stabilize, security has finally made it back on the EU’s agenda.

Yet, plans for an updated European Security Strategy are far from concrete. Professor Richard Youngs argues that, “The EU has declined to update the European Security Strategy because post crisis strategic visions resist convergence” (Youngs, The Uncertain Ch 3). It is this Task Force’s objective to convince the European Union otherwise; we believe that now, more than ever, the EU must unite and define its role as a security actor on the global stage. This is because the Eurozone crisis has brought on widespread budget cuts in every area of security, which has deeply affected both the EU’s hard power capabilities as well as its normative power instruments (Ch 3). In addition, these cuts have undermined multilateral relationships as well as the EU’s influence in its neighborhood (Witney 7). All the while, emerging powers have increased their defense spending and become more important politically and economically.

In this new global security climate, the European Union must recognize that it will not remain an important global actor by default for much longer. The EU must take action and use all the instruments at its disposal to strategically exert its influence at home and abroad. Diminished resources must be viewed as an opportunity to capitalize on the EU’s strengths, and to rely on partnerships to transform its weaknesses. In order for this to be achieved, the EU must draw from the structures and dynamics already in place. The Lisbon Treaty created and allocated resources to actors and institutions capable of cooperating at a high level of efficiency (Biscop 4). However, “Lisbon on its own does not amount to a new narrative”; thus, a strategy is necessary to coordinate the operations of these new actors (Howorth 7). In addition, a strategy
would help to foster the leadership of important Member States, like Germany, in their preferred areas of security, so that the diversity of national strengths and interests are utilized and represented.

Youngs warns, “The crisis is a painfully shrill wake-up call that should leave the danger of decline pulsating in the European brain” (“Europe’s Decline” 181). The best way for the EU to combat this decline is by transforming the crisis into an opportunity to create a European Grand Strategy that will channel its strengths and allow it to emerge from this period as a relevant security player in the new world order.

The Lisbon Treaty Changes

“We were reaching for the stars but stayed on the ground. However, we were better equipped than before” (The President). This is how former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, described the political pursuit of a European constitution and European president that eventually resulted in compromise with the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty has been widely acknowledged as a step in the right direction for European political integration on the institutional level. However, the Lisbon Treaty has also come to represent a turning point of political resignation concerning the European project as a whole. Its institutional changes have given the EU a legal personality and have made European security and defense actors more visible to the global community (Chopin and Lefebvre 3). Yet, the re-emergence of national interests and the lack of political vision driving European decision-making have inhibited the efficacy of the Lisbon Treaty changes; nowhere is this more apparent than in European foreign policy. The reconfigured framework of external security decision-making has amounted to little importance in the absence of strong political leadership and a guiding up-to-date security strategy.
New Actors and Institutions

Though the EU did not succeed in its aims to create a European constitution or president, it did institute some important structural changes that have given a face to European security. First, the Lisbon Treaty designated a permanent president for the European Council to serve as the leader of the political union (Chopin and Lefebvre 2). In addition, the Treaty created the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), which merged the responsibilities of the HR of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and those of the Commissioner of External Relations (Hillion 5). The EEAS was created as an independent body to support the HR in his or her duties and to improve coordination across European security and defense institutions (Chopin and Lefebvre 3). Also, the Treaty increased the European Parliament’s role in foreign policy by requiring its approval of most foreign policy agreements (Passos 50). This change has elevated the importance of the European Parliament in security and defense, thus working to decrease the democratic deficit associated with EU foreign policy. Finally, the Lisbon Treaty created the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which expanded the breadth of missions under the former European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (“EUROPA”).

The High Representative and the EEAS

Though the Lisbon Treaty changes held great promise, their implementation has been underwhelming. For example, much criticism has been targeted at the new High Representative, Baroness Catherine Ashton, for her lack of leadership and vision for the EU (La Guardia). Yet, it is both more pragmatic and more productive to place the blame instead on the Lisbon Treaty for its flawed design of the role of the High Representative. One of the fundamental issues with the HR’s position is the exhaustive amount of tasks that she is expected to manage. In addition
to being the HR of foreign affairs, she is also the Vice President of the Commission, the President of foreign affairs in the Council of the European Union, a member of the European Commission, a participant of the European Council, and the head of the EEAS (Hadeshian 112-113). Professor Christophe Hillion addresses the problem inherent to the HR’s position in saying, “…the sheer number of tasks she is set to assume under the new Treaty entails that she will not readily be in a position to negotiate all agreements, while at the same time attend all the meetings of bodies set up by existing EU international agreements” (Hillion 5). While the various obligations assigned to the HR are daunting on their own, the larger issue lies in the ambiguity of the rulebook Ashton is supposed to draw from when setting the European foreign policy agenda.

The Lisbon Treaty places Ashton at the top of the CFSP but leaves how she should prioritize external action open to interpretation. Article 27 of the Lisbon Treaty establishes: “The High Representative shall represent the Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in international organizations and at international conferences” (“Article 27”). Yet, “the Union’s position” is a matter constantly in contention on most questions of foreign policy and is frequently undermined by unilateral action taken by Member States (Schult). In addition, the division of power and responsibility between the HR and the President of the European Council is left unclear in Article 15 of the Lisbon Treaty and could create problems if the two figures are not compatible in their approaches to security (“Article 15”). Therefore, the design of the post of the HR is critically flawed because it gives too much power and agency to a single person meant to represent the EU on the international stage. This has proven dangerous because it discourages the appointment of a strong leader in
fear that his/hers aims may prove to be “divisive” or controversial, as was largely the case with Tony Blair’s candidature for HR (Chopin and Lefebvre 2).

*Lack of Unified Vision*

Without a guiding comprehensive EU security strategy, Ashton and the EEAS have based their action on a cluster of ad hoc regional strategies that have produced mixed results for the EU (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). Ashton’s responses to the Arab Spring, and later the crisis in Mali, were delayed and insufficient (Schult). In addition, Ashton’s failure to prioritize Ukraine has exposed gross oversight, in recent weeks, concerning Europe’s foreign policy and its ability to secure its neighborhood (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). As head of the CSDP, Ashton scandalized many in 2011 when she delivered a speech in Budapest declaring that the EU had neither the will nor the capacity to exert itself militarily, even though the CSDP was designed in part to do exactly that (Howorth Ch 3). These examples demonstrate the crucial importance of a European Grand Strategy (EGS) that would establish a roadmap for the HR as well as unite the many institutions under a single foreign policy identity. An EGS would ensure that a stronger HR represents EU interests and values, and it would help to guide and strengthen a weaker HR in his or her far-reaching duties.

Predictably, the EEAS, set up by HR Catherine Ashton, has also failed to meet its potential as a supporting body for the CFSP. In fact, many argue that the formation of the EEAS has done more to confuse foreign policy decision-making than “streamline” it (Techau, “European Foreign”). For example, Professor Youngs argues, “The new External Action Service is not harnessed in any tangible way to dovetail with a broader strategy aimed at stemming Europe’s international decline” (Youngs, “Europe’s Decline” 171). Without a clear vision for the EEAS, too much time has been spent on the logistics of trying to make it a
comprehensive security institution. As a result, this has left “little time for more geopolitical
discussion” (15). Therefore, an EGS must assign real purpose to the EEAS, so that it can
complement the other important actors in foreign-policy decision-making post-Lisbon (i.e. the
European Council, the Commission, the High Representative and the European Parliament).
The institutional reforms undertaken by the Treaty of Lisbon were an important step for
European security cohesion, but they will only prove effective if the EU produces a strategy to
bind these institutions together.

*Lisbon Treaty Priorities*

When trying to establish the basis for an EGS, it should be noted that the Lisbon Treaty
legally established some of the key security aims of the European Union. When asked about the
efficacy of the Lisbon Treaty, Lithuanian Ambassador to the United States, Žygimantas
Pavilionis, pointed to the importance of the Treaty’s chapter on energy security (Article 194 (1)
TFEU). He views this chapter as crucial to Europe’s pursuit of decreasing its energy
dependency on Russia, which is important for the EU’s ability to promote democracy and
human rights (Pavilionis). Though Member States are still given sovereignty in designing their
respective energy policies, this chapter of the Treaty encourages a European “spirit of
solidarity” in improving the efficiency of the internal energy market (Braun 9). In addition, it
establishes energy security as both an internal and external security priority that should be
promoted in interactions with the international community (8). This is an example of one of the
achievements of the Lisbon Treaty that recognizes the need for better communication and
cooperation between internal and external security actors.
Internal/External Security Cohesion

Before the Treaty of Lisbon, the Maastricht pillar system “legally separated...justice and home affairs from the EU’s foreign and security policies” (Trauner 23). By doing away with this system, the Lisbon Treaty has allowed for greater integration between internal and external security actors. The CSDP, specifically, has profited from this cooperation in drawing from police and other personnel from the Justice and Home Affairs Council for its civilian missions (25). This new post-Lisbon internal-external security linkage has also proved valuable in achieving other European security goals. For example, the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) of Article 3 (2) TEU has come to depend on close cooperation between internal and external security actors concerning the free movement of EU citizens (9). The creators of the Lisbon Treaty recognized that traditional internal security matters like illegal immigration, organized crime and trafficking, and counter-terrorism efforts could not be confined to the domain of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Monar 11-14). Therefore, the EU has found success in the Lisbon Treaty’s push to negotiate with third states to help secure its borders (Trauner 10). The EU-Turkey readmission agreement is an example of how the Union has begun to use its leverage with neighboring countries to meet internal security goals.

The design of the Lisbon Treaty was to create cooperation across agencies where interests and capabilities have overlapped. While the Treaty has generated improvement in some areas, this aim has yet to reach its full capacity. The EEAS is one area in which such cooperation should be taking place on a much higher level in accordance with European priorities (Korski). Internal security actors should be well represented within the EEAS to better increase coherence on transcendent issues like data protection and the Lisbon Treaty Solidarity clause, which encapsulates united internal crisis management (Article 222) (Trauner 31-36).
Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty establishes a legal basis for development aid (Article 208) as well as the enforcement of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Korski). Thus, these normative power aims should be highly prioritized alongside hard power instruments in a comprehensive security strategy meant to achieve the “EU external action objectives” outlined in the Treaty (Article 21 TEU) (Hillion 9). An EGS should represent these external action “ends” by ranking them in order of priority and by establishing the institutional “means” by which they can be achieved. The Lisbon Treaty has created a body of security actors capable of meeting the EU’s external action objectives, but their cohesiveness and effectiveness depends on a unifying European Grand Strategy.

The Eurozone Crisis and Diminished Capabilities

A year after the Lisbon Treaty, Thierry Chopin and Lefebvre and Maxime Lefebvre wrote, “One of the reasons why the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty is so positive is that it finally enables Europe to turn the page of the navel-gazing debate about institutions, which consumed the better part of the 2000s” (Chopin and Lefebvre 8). Ironically, the half-decade following the Lisbon Treaty has been a period of economic navel-gazing due to the onset of the Eurozone crisis. The crisis has consumed the EU’s attention and pushed external security and foreign policy debates to the bottom of the EU’s list of priorities. National interests have emerged in the uncertainty, and the EU faces division along many different social, economic, and political lines (Fägersten 7). Not only has the crisis threatened European unity internally, but it has also redefined Europe’s position on the global stage. Budget cuts on both national and EU levels have been the most visible symptoms of the EU’s weakening security and development agenda (Liberti 22). With these cuts have arisen many concerns about European defense coordination. Under such financial constraints, it has become clear that a redefinition of European priorities is
of crucial importance if the EU hopes to emerge from this crisis a relevant and strategic security and defense actor. Whether the Eurozone crisis is viewed as an opportunity for an overdue re-thinking of security strategy, or as a catalyst of Europe’s decline as a global actor, it is clear that strategic action must be taken to ensure stability of the European Union and its neighborhood in both the short and long-term.5

Shrinking Hard Power

Though the Eurozone crisis has drawn focused attention upon the weakening of European security and defense capabilities, it is important to note that European defense budgets have been declining since before the context of the crisis. After the Cold War, Western European defense budgets dropped on average from 3.1 percent of GDP in the period of 1985-1989, to 1.7 percent by 2008 (Liberti 15). Considering that the EU security budget has been in general decline since the Cold War, the defense budget cuts that have followed with the onset of the crisis are all the more striking. In the period of 2006-2010, defense spending amongst Member States fell 7.2 percent, with many smaller Member States making the most drastic cuts (Fägersten 8). As the crisis deepened, larger Member States began making plans for more significant cuts in 2012; Germany planned cutbacks of a staggering 25 percent, and the UK planned to cut back 7.5 percent in addition to dramatically reducing its Army personnel to a low-point unmatched since the Napoleonic wars (Youngs, The Uncertain Ch 3). France, one of Europe’s crucial defense actors, responded to the financial crisis in its 2013 White Paper on

5 Not all analysts are in agreement that the Eurozone crisis has resulted in diminished EU foreign policy capacities. Richard Youngs, for example, points to three areas of active EU engagement: assertive geo-economics, more instrumental use of multilateralism, and democracy promotion (Youngs, “The Uncertain”). While these are noteworthy areas of engagement, they do not constitute a strategic approach to overall European security needs. Instead, they are reactive responses to immediate needs: in the first two cases, the need to maintain European market shares in the global economy and, in the last case, the need to redeem EU neighborhood policies in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings.
security and defense. The White Paper announced a freeze in defense expenditure for the next three years and deep cutbacks in personnel and rapid deployment capacity (France 84-87). As the Eurozone crisis begins to stabilize, of the twenty-eight Member States, only Denmark and Poland have increased defense spending (Dempsey, “No Guns Blazing”). The weight of these cuts, which are projected to continue, is deepened by the fact that the security budgets of rising powers only continue to increase. The most pivotal example of this occurred when Asia overtook Europe in defense spending in 2012 (Erlanger). These figures alone serve as the tip of the iceberg to a reality of rapidly shrinking defense capabilities in Europe.

In the context of the CSDP, these cuts have forced larger Member States to accept an extremely heavy burden in carrying out missions. Already, the three leading Member States in national GDP (Germany, France, and the UK) are responsible for about half of the Member States’ portion of funding designated by the Athena Mechanism (Fägersten 8). Fabio Liberti explains that the Athena Mechanism only covers about 10 percent of total expenditure on approved missions. Thus, the remaining lion’s share of spending falls upon the Member States with sufficient monetary and personnel capacities willing to head the missions under the concept of “the costs lie where they fall”. Liberti makes the important point that this model “does not encourage the commitment of Member States to EU military missions” (Liberti 35). As a result, the European financial crisis has brought with it a great reduction in CSDP missions. While there were 22 missions underway during the five-year period from 2003-2008, there were only 6 from 2009 up until August 2013 (Fägersten 8). This reduction in missions is often referred to as “mission fatigue” which suggests that the crisis has played a psychological role in the EU’s conception of its foreign policy identity. In addition, the CSDP’s shrinking
presence has effectively revealed flaws in the CSDP model in terms of burden sharing and incentivizing member state participation.

Too Much Talk About Pooling and Sharing, Not Enough Action

There are mixed ideas about what these spending cuts will mean for European security, but a great cause for concern has been the lack of strategic coordination amongst Member States and other security actors in the context of budget reductions. The rhetoric behind the Pooling and Sharing Initiative has been that the EU’s collective defense capabilities could function more efficiently across borders if military instruments and capacities were shared between Member States (European Union, “EDA’s” 1). There have been some important examples of modest pooling and sharing and EU military cohesion since the onset of the crisis. For example, in November of 2010, France and Britain came to a bilateral pooling and sharing agreement. In addition, the Visegrad Group, the Benelux countries, and the Nordics states have also pioneered multilateral pooling and sharing agreements (Youngs, The Uncertain Ch 3). Extending beyond those agreements, the EU Battlegroups launched in 2003 represent a pooling of European troops, but their formation has been contentious since they have never been deployed in combat (Falegi 2). Small-scale pooling and sharing has occurred between a select few Member States, and there is general consensus in the EU that such efforts should increase (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). However, it is evident that deeper military cooperation is developing too slowly and too insignificantly to make up for the dramatic cuts in funding.

While the idea of pooling and sharing works well in theory, it has not played out in the ivory-tower fashion in which it is often presented. Thus, European defense actors must stop acting as though pooling and sharing serves as an all-encompassing solution to the EU’s limited defense and security capacities. Nick Witney, former chief executive of the European Defense
Agency (EDA), draws attention to the key concern regarding the budget cuts in stating, “What is worrying is not so much the scale of the cuts as the way they have been made: strictly on a national basis, without any attempt at consultation or co-ordination within either NATO or the EU, and with no regard to the overall defense capability which will result from the sum of these national decisions” (Witney 2). Many experts observing the effect of the crisis on European security capacities have pointed to “redundancies” and “inefficiencies” that compound the severity of the implications of the budget cuts (Liberti 3). Professor Jolyon Howorth, expert on the CSDP, argues that the 200 billion Euros spent annually on European security, even after the budgets cuts, would be entirely sufficient if those funds were to be spent rationally. However, he is critical of the current allocation of funding devoted to largely experimental and small-scale CSDP missions. He also regrets the predominantly fruitless and ad hoc outcome of years of discussion on “pooling and sharing” (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). One area that is being cut disproportionately is research and development even though many believe it to be the sector most crucial to the EU’s relevance as a modern security actor (Youngs, “Europe’s Decline” 157). This lack of coordination demonstrates the growing importance of a security dialogue that reaches beyond national priorities and strategically allocates the EU’s resources.

*Strained Multilateral Relationships*

Not only have the budget cuts influenced internal EU defense and security operations, but they have also undermined partnerships with non-state security actors like NATO and the UN. The 2003 ESS touts effective multilateralism, but the EU’s failure to meet its foreign policy commitments threatens the legitimacy of its multilateral relationships (European Union, “A Secure” 9). Since the creation of the European Union, the United States has been Europe’s most important partner in security and defense. However, the economic crisis has complicated
this relationship in several different ways. First, the financial crisis in the US has caused Americans to scale back on their defense spending, which has great implications for the European Union. The EU can no longer rely on the U.S. as its un faltering backup when faced with security threats in its neighborhood (“German Foreign”). This is especially pertinent when considering that recent European crisis intervention in Libya and Mali simply could not have been successful without the help of the U.S. (Erlanger). In addition, the U.S. has begun to focus its attention on Asia, which has further weakened the EU’s image as a strong multilateral actor (Howorth “Chapter 3” Ch 3). Behind these general trends are the numbers that show Europe’s gradual monetary disengagement with NATO in recent years that has not gone unnoticed by the US. From 2001-2013, funding for NATO from the U.S. jumped from 63 percent to almost 75 percent, and of the EU Member States only Britain and Greece were able to meet their commitments to NATO (Erlanger). This refusal to heed the US’s warnings could be detrimental to the EU’s ability to secure its region in the future because it relies so heavily on American defense capabilities.

EU Security, Spread Too Thin

While the Eurozone crisis is largely to blame for the EU’s waning multilateral commitments, the creation of the CSDP has also strained Europe’s security and defense budget. Nick Witney calls the CSDP and NATO “incompatible” (Witney 8). In addition, Richard Youngs has written that, “The EU has gradually taken troops away from UN missions to its own” (Youngs, “Europe’s Decline” 31). The CSDP’s demand on resources combined with the crisis has led Europe on a path of spreading itself too thin without a comprehensive plan for readjustment. Before the crisis and CSDP missions began affecting European defense spending in 2008, the EU’s troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions were at 13 percent but fell
quickly to 8 percent by 2011. The drop in Europe’s police force contributions was even more
dramatic in the same time period, falling from 17 percent to only 5 percent (Gleason 12-13).
The 2003 ESS hails UNSC peacekeeping missions as a means of deeply effective
multilateralism in conflict management, yet the EU’s shrinking involvement sends the opposite
message. If the EU wishes to emerge from the crisis as a relevant global security actor, it must
reassess its budget cuts and think strategically about how it can most efficiently allocate its
limited resources. Prioritizing multilateral partnerships may be the best course of action, but it
will mean a much deeper commitment to NATO and the UN. Richard Gowen, an expert on the
EU’s relationship with the UN, suggests that “While EU Member States have devoted time and
energy to developing a European security identity over the last decade—an effort that remains
politically contentious—the EU’s major contributions to security in the next five years may be
channeled through others as international power dynamics and threats shift and evolve” (Gowen
2). The CSDP, as it operates currently, will not survive without the support of these multilateral
relationships; therefore, its functions must be reevaluated.

*Declining Soft Power*

While it is evident that European hard power has diminished since the onset of the crisis,
it would be inaccurate to assume that the EU has simply shifted its priorities to a soft power
approach. Reductions in development aid and European neighborhood funding show a clear
turn inward where both hard and soft power security are concerned. In 2011, European
development aid saw its first reduction in 15 years, with this fall continuing in 2012 (Youngs,
*The Uncertain* Ch 3). The European Development Fund (EDF), which remains outside of the
EU budgetary framework, has been cut by 11 percent for 2014. In addition, recent decisions on
the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) will mean roughly a 13 percent cut for
“Global Europe”, which funds external action and development aid (“Parliament Evaluates”). In addition, Member States refused to increase the budget for the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in the 2014-2020 MFF, which demonstrates a withdrawal from even the EU’s closest borders (Youngs, *The Uncertain Ch 3*). With cuts in all areas of European security and defense, the Eurozone crisis has made it increasingly clear that the EU must generate a list of priorities and commit to them. Richard Youngs puts it elegantly when he writes that, “the EU falls short in both hard and soft areas of security. Its hard power is used too timorously to accord its strategic leverage. Its soft power is wielded in too hesitant a fashion to be curative” (Youngs, “Europe’s Decline” 60). The Eurozone crisis has only sharpened this reality. Though in 2003 the EU could afford an idealistic security strategy, today’s austerity era does not allow for such far-reaching ambitions. Instead, it requires a reformulated approach that determines realistic ends achievable by way of limited means.

**Germany’s New Centrality**

In addition to reshaping European economics, the Eurozone crisis has also shaped political influence in European defense and security by elevating Germany into a position of acute importance in determining the direction of the EU’s future. However, Germany’s inherent post-war disinterest in hard power and foreign intervention has greatly complicated the EU’s security identity with Germany at its center (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). Chancellor Angela Merkel’s austerity measures have forced Member States into sweeping defense budget cuts and inward prioritization. Additionally, Germany’s refusal to engage in the foreign policy debate has left fellow Member States at a stalemate in redefining the European security agenda (Youngs, *The Uncertain Ch 2*). Though Germany tends to shy away from most demonstrations of hard power, it still wields strong influence in soft power intervention and is a strong
proponent of development aid. In addition, its trade relationships and partnerships with emerging economic powers like the BRIC nations could develop into a platform for effective European strategic partnerships (Guérot, *The New German* 8). Though Germany is not expected to change its position on foreign policy in the near future, the EU could make great strides by recognizing the importance of German interests in creating a European Grand Strategy.

**Germany’s Military Disengagement**

Germany has made several key moves in recent years that have demonstrated not only a national unwillingness to engage in foreign intervention, but also a refusal to support initiatives aimed at strengthening EU security capacity as a whole. Ian Bremmer and Mark Leonard point to Germany’s abstention in the UNSC Libya no-fly zone vote as one of the most prominent examples of this. In this instance, Germany chose to align itself with the BRICs instead of its fellow Member States and the United States. Not only was this a demonstration of Germany’s growing aversion to military intervention, but it also showed that Germany had begun to prioritize its national and economic interests over the EU project as a whole (Bremmer). Another hard-hitting example of Germany putting national interests above the EU was when it prevented a leap in European industrial defense capabilities by vetoing the merger of BAE systems with European Aeronautic Defense and Space (EADS) in 2012 (Youngs, *The Uncertain* Ch 3). The veto was pivotal because it “exposed how competing national considerations can get in the way of cross-border cooperation” (Scott). In the context of the Eurozone crisis, Germany has slowly recognized the need for deeper economic integration but has refused most attempts at furthering political integration (Techau “Chancellor”). This refusal has also manifested itself in security and defense integration. With these actions, Germany has
made it clear that it believes a new vision of European security must not weaken national sovereignty.

Germany Turns Inward

Even though the Eurozone crisis has begun to stabilize, Germany’s central position in the EU remains highly important. As a result, despite growing demand for an updated ESS in Europe and abroad, Germany’s position against a new strategy holds considerable weight (Dempsey, “No Guns Blazing”). For this reason it is no surprise that, at the most recent European Council summit on security, the possibility of a new strategy was not entertained. Instead, a large portion of the summit was spent discussing economic reforms as well as prioritizing EU internal security issues like cyber security, maritime security, border management, and energy security (European Union, “19/20 Dec Conclusions”). This phenomenon of the EU “turning inward” has been both a result of the all-consuming nature of the Eurozone crisis as well as a reflection of Germany’s power in directing the European foreign policy conversation. Angela Merkel’s Germany is comfortable discussing threats to its national security like cyber security or illegal immigration yet it is unwilling to engage in the types of conversations that need to take place such as the growingly precarious transatlantic relationship or the EU’s position on the necessary equilibrium between the use of hard power and soft power (Dempsey, “No Guns Blazing”). In the time leading up to the next European Council security summit in June, Europe must find a way engage Germany in these types of discussions.

Germany’s Post-crisis Identity

In order to engage Germany, it is important to understand that the Eurozone crisis has changed the nature of Germany’s commitment to the EU on multiple levels. While Germans
have reaped the benefits of the EU’s flawed monetary system, they have also come to perceive themselves as “victims” of the crisis (Guérot and Leonard 2). This is because they have been forced into a position of power that they are not comfortable with and because they do not feel it is their responsibility to provide a bailout plan for Europe (2). Because of this, popular opinion of the EU in Germany has plummeted and Merkel’s controversial refusal to take part in Libya, as well as interventions in Mali and Syria, has corresponded with popular opinion in Germany (Techau “Chancellor”). German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, describes the idea of “a German Europe” that has emerged from the crisis and explains that the EU wants Germany to assume its designated leadership role. However, Germany prefers to see itself as Europe’s “schoolmaster” that attempts to lead by example while covertly promoting its own national agenda (Beck 3).

Though before the crisis Germany seemed to be increasingly willing to recognize the importance of a strategic and united Europe with troops in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the Eurozone crisis has undone much of that progress (Bremmer). Thus the new challenge for the EU is to determine how it might channel Germany’s strength and influence into foreign policy pursuits that correspond with Germany’s national interests.

Although Germany has a tendency to shy away from hard power, it still has powerful ways of wielding its influence at home and abroad. The catch-22 that has been repeated over and over since the onset of the crisis regarding Germany’s centrality is well encapsulated in this quote by German political thinker, Ulrike Guérot: “Europe cannot have a strategic focus without Germany, but Germany itself lacks a strategic focus” (Guérot, “The German Election” 5). However, though it is true that Germany lacks a national security strategy, it has released numerous publications on development policy, food security, disarmament, energy security, cyber security, and multilateralism. Also, despite the fact that Germany has made large defense
budget cuts during the crisis period, it has been one of the only countries to increase its development aid, if only by a little (Youngs, *The Uncertain* Ch 3). In addition, Angela Merkel’s bold move away from nuclear energy has made Germany a leader in energy security and sustainability while the EU has begun to falter by lowering its climate protection goals (Schmitz). Therefore, the task will be on Europe to identify the areas in which Germany is willing and able to take a role in security.

*Germany’s Unilateral Pursuits*

One of the most important dynamics that has emerged from the crisis has been Germany’s expansion of its economic partnerships, specifically with the emerging BRIC countries. It has been suggested that Germany has “outgrown the single market” since Germany’s exports to China have increased rapidly in the crisis period as Germany has begun to shift away from its traditional multilateral relationships (Guérot and Leonard 3). In addition, trade between Germany and Russia has continued to grow at a fast rate (6). German foreign policy specialist, Hans Kundnani, calls these economic partnerships “geo-economic” and not geo-political or geo-strategic (Kundnani 32). He explains that Germany has traded in its legacy as a civilian power for a foreign policy based upon its own economic interests. This geo-strategic approach works to “hollow out the international system” without promoting European values like human rights or democracy (42). Germany’s new tendency to branch out on its own has caused strife with the U.S., specifically when Chancellor Merkel took China’s side in the debate on “global rebalancing” at the G20 summit in 2010 (Bremmer). It seems that Germany is in need of a reminder on its stated approach to strategic partnerships in its 2012 strategy paper on ‘Shaping Globalization’: “When it comes to addressing the central global challenges that need to be negotiated with the new players, Germany’s most effective option is to do so in the
context of the EU” (Germany 57). Germany carries the most influence in Russia and China of all EU Member States and must be encouraged to develop these partnerships in a manner that benefits European values and interests.

**Engaging Germany**

With the recent outbreak of conflict in Ukraine, it is becoming even more apparent that the EU needs to devise a strategy on Russia and that Germany should be the one to take the lead. Several experts have suggested that Germany resurrect Willy Brandt’s foreign policy of “ostpolitik” that uses small steps to generate desired change when dealing with Russia and China (Kundnani and Parello-Plesner 3). In Russia, these small steps would work towards creating an environment of “compatibility between Russia and the European Union” rather than attempt full-scale democracy promotion (Trenin 3). In China, these small steps should mean promoting things that would benefit China and the Chinese people, like environmental protection standards (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). Ulrike Guérot and Mark Leonard argue that the best way to do this would be to “…make it in Germany’s interests to put all its eggs into a European basket on three levels: a new deal on economic governance within the EU, a new approach to regional security, and a vision for a global Europe that advances the interests of all Member States in dealings with rising powers such as China” (Guérot and Leonard 8). These three levels would surely be met with resistance, but even achieving one of them would be a step in the right direction for a more strategic and cohesive European Union.

**A Window of Opportunity?**

These suggestions may seem too idealistic based upon the pessimism surrounding Merkel’s unwillingness to advance the EU global security agenda. However, there is new reason to believe that Germany is considering the possibility of deeper security and defense
engagement on the EU level. At the recent Munich Security Conference, German president Joachim Guack spoke out on the necessity for Germany to pull its weight in European security, and he declared that it was no longer acceptable for Germany to use the past as an excuse for its inaction (“German Foreign Policy”). This speech came just after an interview with Germany’s new defense minister, Ursula Von Der Leyen, that made waves because, like Guack, Von Der Leyen took a much more active position on Germany’s defense and security responsibilities that diverged from Germany’s typical foreign policy stance. Von Der Leyen said, “Europe must speak with a single voice in the future when it comes to security policy. But that only works if responsibilities and risks are divided fairly among the partner countries” (Von Der Leyen). Public opinion still remains largely against these types of declarations, but this new German foreign policy dialogue has been seen as an attempt to bring the public closer in alignment with this type of thinking (Leonard). The EU and the German public have received these claims with skepticism, but they suggest that now may be an opportune time to get Germany thinking strategically.

Conclusion

Former Italian Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, said this after the Lisbon Treaty negotiations concluded: “Historically we are losing a great occasion. I only hope that it will come back again—that Europe will be united before the new power of the world will be consolidated” (The President). Though the Lisbon Treaty and the Eurozone crisis brought about a period of prolonged introspection, the dust is beginning to settle. The crisis has stabilized, the EU has become even more economically integrated, and security and defense are finally on the EU’s agenda again (Dempsey “No Guns Blazing”). In addition, Germany’s renewed
engagement in defense and security conversations can be seen as a window of opportunity for the EU to redefine itself as a security actor.

However, the EU is in a fragile state. The Eurozone crisis has produced deep fragmentation between Member States, which jeopardizes the Union in more ways than one. In addition, the EU has lost credibility on the global stage and will have to work especially hard to reestablish its role as a global actor (Dennison 3-5). In light of the EU’s diminished resources, this effort will require deep cooperation and political will. That being said, the Lisbon Treaty changes have provided the EU with the institutions and actors necessary to keep it from becoming entirely irrelevant—all that is missing is the vision (Howorth, “Europe” 7). Therefore, a European Grand Strategy is necessary to revive European will to represent and promote its values in its neighborhood and abroad. The Lisbon Treaty identifies external action objectives and introduces a combination of hard and soft power strategies to achieve its aims.

Thus, the EU must create a strategy that recognizes its constraints and utilizes them to prioritize its security agenda. The EU’s sovereign hard power identity has diminished considerably with the onset of the crisis, but the EU’s multilateral relationships have also suffered (Youngs, The Uncertain Ch 3). Now, the EU must make a choice: should it become a committed multilateral hard power actor, or should it preserve its ability to deploy troops under the European flag? In addition, the EU’s far-reaching goal of globally promoting its values has lost credibility and feasibility in light of diminished resources (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). Meanwhile, turmoil in the European neighborhood has undermined the EU’s ability to ensure peace and prosperity at its immediate borders. Hence, the EU must decide if it can still act as a global security power, or if it should redefine itself as primarily a strong regional actor.

Additionally, Germany’s new centrality has altered the political landscape of decision-making
and has impeded European solidarity in security matters. An EGS must determine how it will use Germany’s centrality to its advantage and encourage Germany to promote EU interests within the framework of its geo-economic partnerships.

These are the types of questions for which the European Grand Strategy must provide answers. The Eurozone crisis has revealed that the EU can no longer afford to simply “muddle through” in matters of security and that it must think strategically in order to preserve its relevance (Howorth “Europe” 9). In a period of great uncertainty for the EU, a new security strategy must shape the future in the way the Lisbon Treaty failed to do. It must give purpose to the institutional changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and foster the potential of the new security instruments to achieve specific aims (Biscop 4). The EGS should prioritize security concerns that will reestablish the EU’s legitimacy in its neighborhood and put the EU back on the map as an important and desirable security partner. Moreover, the EGS should introduce a review mechanism to ensure that the EU’s strategy evolves with time and becomes more ambitious once its security foundations are solidified (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). Though the EU may have missed its chance with the Lisbon Treaty, the new occasion for Europe to re-establish its relevance is now.
Section I: The EU as a Regional Actor

General Strategic Priorities
By Yasamine Firoozi & Michael Golomb

I. Falling Short on the Security & Development Nexus

Considering the emergence of intensified regional conflicts across Wider Europe, the MENA, and Africa, the EU’s adherence to the recognition that: “Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible,” has been brought to question (ESS 2003). The security-development nexus is a reality - the fruits of economic development and integration with the EU cannot materialize if instability is rampant. Conversely, the likelihood of long-term stability is compromised if economic advances are not realized. Current EU policy instruments have been largely focused on the economic and development side of this nexus, while faltering in the security realm - this contributes to the EU’s looming irrelevance.

1. In Wider Europe, the EU’s “.focus on trade agreements have somewhat sidelined issues of democracy and human rights” as free trade is the primary “instrument for political association,” (Scorecard 2014). Ukraine’s recent decision to suspend the DCFTA/AA has highlighted the ENP’s inability to use European economic influence to incentivize its neighborhood to promote political reforms. This focus on the economic side of the security-development nexus in Wider Europe has rendered the EU ineffective
in promoting regional stability. The disparate political and security issues lumped together under the ENP framework represent too wide a set of critical concerns to fit into one broad framework policy. Conflict on the borders of the EU can be better addressed by a regional security framework that is tailored to the unique challenges posed by Wider Europe.

2. **In MENA**, while the EU remains a significant donor to North Africa, the largest donor to the Occupied Palestinian Territories, a significant actor on humanitarian and refugee related assistance to the Syrian conflict, and has overall used economic relations to promote its political influence across this volatile region, the EU’s engagement has again been unbalanced. Europe’s emphasis on economic and financial instruments to engage with the region has resulted in the reality that, “its policy framework failed to help the EU to tackle first order issues in the wider region….Absent tangible results on the political track: the EU state-building project in the OPTs seems doomed to fail...the ENP has provided no guidance as to how to support the broader region on the fallout from the Syrian conflict...2013 was the year in which the irrelevance of the ENP to major developments in the southern Mediterranean became clear,” (Scorecard 2014).

3. **In Africa**, the EU has proudly been the most prolific and longstanding aid donor to the region, which validates their regional relevance (EurActiv). Unfortunately, this relevance is confined to exactly that: a donor/recipient relationship that encompasses development assistance only. Despite the pursuance of CSDP and certain Member States’ ambitions, the EU has not become a legitimate and respected security actor in Africa. A cursory look at the state of Africa today reveals the failures of Europe’s development focused engagement in Africa as instability and violence run rampant across the DRC, the CAR, South-Sudan, Mali, Somalia, and Nigeria - all with grave implications for regional stability.

**II. Searching for Solutions**

Through the previous chapters, our research has not only highlighted shortcomings of EU policy implementation, it has provided recommendations that directly combat looming European irrelevance. The ESS acknowledges security as a paramount concern; the EU must now act upon that acknowledgement. In the ENP, MENA, and Africa alike, the EU must partner its development assistance with a strong focus on the security. Our collective research indicates that: *regionally-framed* policies, with explicit, *thematically oriented* objectives, which...
are *horizontally integrated* with each other will be the most effective solution for the EU’s looming irrelevance in all three of these areas.

In regard to Wider Europe, we recommend that the EU prioritize the following:

- **Regionally specific engagement:** Instability on the EU’s borders can be better addressed by dividing the ENP countries into specific regions with policies tailored to the security needs of these countries and their degree of commitment to shared European political, economic and socio-cultural values and interests. Accordingly the Eastern Partnership countries should have their own regional security framework.

- **Strategic Incorporation of Stakeholders:** Turkey should be included in the Eastern Partnership region due to its engagement in the Southern Caucasus and its interests in the Balkans.

- **Specific policy towards Russia:** Russia’s growing assertiveness in Eastern Europe must be addressed in this regional security framework. The EU cannot avoid coming to terms with Russia as both a de-stabilizing actor in the region and a potential partner in matters of shared strategic interests.

In regard to the Middle East and North Africa region, we recommend that the EU prioritize the following:

- **Comprehensive regional engagement:** Again, the EU needs to develop a MENA specific regional security framework that acknowledges the thematic, cultural, and political linkages inherent across the region, and that discards the artificial segmentation of the MENA under current EU policy instruments.
• **Rapid response** to crises, by utilizing ‘effective multilateralism’ through short-term coalitions of stakeholders that can respond to and engagement in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) violent conflicts.

• **Supporting a collective regional security approach:** The EU should take the lead in promoting the normalization of diplomatic relations between MENA regional powers and in fostering a cooperative regional security framework. By fostering ‘cooperation clusters’ centered around the common security interests of the EU and regional stakeholders in the medium term, Europe can aid in toppling the barriers to trust which competition among regional powers and sectarianism have intensified.

In regard to Africa, we recommend that the EU prioritize the following:

• **Continuation** of crucial development aid and financial support, while actively acknowledging the security component of development.

• **Strategic remapping** of Africa: Local, regionalized economic communities already exist along Africa’s natural economic boundaries, and are highly valuable as first-line responders to developing crises. The EU must acknowledge these existing multilateral clusters as valuable regional security actors.

• **Empowerment** of regional actors: The EU should engage these regional actors as partners by helping them to develop their operational capacities, specifically in terms of security actions.
III. Envisioning the New Regional Security Frameworks

Remapping the neighborhood

If Europe seeks to become a decisive and relevant global actor, not only will this require a more strategic balancing of the Security-Development Nexus, it will require a strategic re-imagining of the Neighborhood concept in light of regional developments and thematic commonalities. New European regional security frameworks should be divided as such:

- **Wider Europe**: The EU must thematically cluster the countries of Eastern Europe—Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus; the Southern Caucasus - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey together as their common security concerns, the nature of competition among outside powers (namely the EU and Russia) are very similar. Moreover, the cultural and political linkages between them are the most closely aligned and instability across many of these countries are produced by similar ‘root causes’

- **MENA**: Europe must deploy a regional security framework which encompasses the broader Middle East and North African regions more comprehensively. Europe must cluster together the countries of North Africa—Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco; the Levant—Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Cyprus; The Arab Peninsula—Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait; the broader Middle East—Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and Turkey together as their inherent political, economic and cultural linkages, and security concerns are all deeply interconnected across the region.
• Africa: EU policy should serve to empower Africa’s pre-existing, local multilateral partnerships to enable them as they become more effective regional security actors. These Regional Economic Communities (RECs) comprise the following: the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Decades of crisis response in Africa have demonstrated that regional actors are the most effective at intervention (Söderbaum & Tavares 6), supporting our position that the EU should partner with such actors to further global security ambitions.

Relation to existing policy instruments

Europe’s ability to balance the security-development nexus strategically will hinge on the nature and scope of its policy instruments and their objectives. Strategically balancing Europe’s economic objectives with its security agenda requires that the two be separated from each other within Europe’s policy instruments. That the ENP has a dual agenda of economic integration and political association aimed at conflict management, yet has only successfully implemented the economic side of its agenda reflects the saturation of the scope of ENP’s objectives. By using the ENP as the EU’s instrument of economic aid and integration only, while deploying separate regional security frameworks which address political and security objectives, the EU’s policy instruments will be better equipped to address the ‘S-D nexus’ than
its currently overloaded policy frameworks. Conditionalities aimed at improving economic conditions in the ENP have not proven to be effective instruments in times of social and political turmoil (Crombois). Alternatively, attaching conditionalities to security policies can improve their efficacy and reinforce the EU’s engagement with ENP countries as a viable security partner.

In Africa, our recommendation is that the EU pursue its security objectives through the broad guidelines of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership. The Partnership clearly acknowledges security as a directly linked concern of both Europe and Africa, so the next step is for the EU to realize the full scope of its role as sponsor and catalyst for the promotion of shared security objectives. To complement cooperation with the African Union, the EU should begin developing strategic relationships with each of Africa’s seven most distinct RECs. These regional policies should serve to empower each REC to become an effective, rapid response conflict intervention force, preventing the types of conflict escalation so prevalent across Africa.

**Relations to each other**

With the understanding of the world as an increasingly interconnected place, regional security policies must communicate extensively with each other. African conflicts, exemplified in this report by the CAR crisis, are a prime example of how quickly local issues become regional burdens. The Arab Spring cascaded with remarkable speed initially across North Africa, disrupting political processes and threatening regional stability; ultimately, its revolutionary sentiment spread to the Gulf region and Levant alike. Instability in the Sahel has great implications for the security of North Africa. Meanwhile, potential crisis in the southern Caucasus would further destabilize the vulnerable Levant region. The ongoing struggle for state legitimacy in Afghanistan has significant spillover effects across the broader Middle East. The
interconnectedness of the world cannot be ignored and must be explicitly recognized within the EU’s regional security frameworks. These new regional security frameworks must avoid the tendency to exist in silos; as a guiding principle, they should maintain the flexibility required to act as plurilateral security forums and be in constant communication and cooperation with each other as circumstances, common interests, and converging thematic security concerns merit (Lewis 80).

**Using bilateral relations and regional actor empowerment**

The prevalence of regional cooperation, “will grow in importance, but will take many shapes,” and Europe must be equipped and ready to make this transition from highly institutionalized multilateral forums to regional frameworks which converge and diverge in different ways, based on different situations on the ground, mutual interest, and shared regional priorities or vulnerabilities (Lewis 65). Through regional security frameworks, the EU will be able to empower partnered regional actors, allowing the EU to project its influence by developing these key relationships. Through increased initiatives by individual Member States to work closely with regional actors using Europe’s regional security frameworks, cooperation can be managed collectively at the EU level.

**Counteracting destabilizers**

The final advantage of regional, thematically focused security frameworks will be the ability to identify and counteract destabilizers across these regional conflicts more effectively. Through increased regional cooperation based on thematic necessity and mutual interest or vulnerability, the likelihood of destabilizers to be collectively identified and responded to can help to minimize their impact over any given region. With regard to Russia, for example,
Richard Youngs notes that, “Improvement for European relations with Russia has no hope with Putin’s administration, but maintaining close contact with Russian civil society, and patiently waiting until regime change does occur is the most feasible option,” (Youngs “EU Security Strategy”). The destabilizing impact Russia currently has on Wider Europe and MENA can be more effectively managed through increased regional cooperation with stakeholders who share similar thematic security concerns with the European Union.
Chapter 1: Wider Europe

Introduction
By Naomi Eissinger, Rina Harsch, and Joelle Klein

In spite of the EU’s extensive engagement in its neighboring regions (Eastern Europe, Balkans, Levant and North Africa) over the last 20 years, the EU now faces an imminent threat of irrelevance as its existing policy approaches have failed to address the central security challenge posed by these regions, namely the challenge of escalating de-stabilization on the EU’s borders. Economic insecurity, declining commitment to democratization, increasing levels of regime corruption and repression, protest mobilizations, civil war in Syria, dangerously simmering ‘frozen conflicts’, aggressive Russian policies and Turkey’s ambiguous position as both an increasingly unstable candidate for EU membership and an emerging regional power have all combined to produce a situation of almost chronic crisis for which the EU has yet to produce comprehensive strategic solutions. Instead, the EU is limited to reactive crisis responses while continuing to pursue the same policies (ENP, Enlargement and a strategic partnership with Russia that is neither strategic nor a partnership) that failed to forestall the de-stabilization in the first place. Experts such as Jolyon Howorth argue that Libya was a watershed event that demonstrated the complete failure of the EU’s CSDP. Ukraine is now another such watershed event that may demonstrate the complete failure of the EU’s ENP
(which already came under critical scrutiny during the Arab Spring) and of the EU’s crisis management policies. If the EU fails to produce a more proactive and strategic approach to its neighborhood, not only will the EU’s internal security be negatively affected by the potential spill-over of regional turbulence into the EU itself, so too will its international standing as a capable global actor and viable partner to the United States. If the EU cannot or will not take on the responsibility of contributing, in immediate and meaningful ways, to regional stabilization and sustainable development, then the danger is not just one of irrelevance. There is an even greater danger -- that of being seen as not just a weak actor but as an obstructionist actor—one that, by its actions and inactions, is contributing more to regional problems than to regional solutions.

To avert the threat of irrelevance, the EU must formulate and implement a new regional security framework that will enable the EU to take a more constructive and coordinated approach to its neighborhood, for “this vast area is the place where the EU can exert the fullest and most comprehensive form of engagement, by applying a broad range of policies in a structured, long term fashion” (Fägersten et. al. 11). While the original 2003 ESS and the 2008 revision may have served the EU well in the past, significant changes in the situation of the EU and in its neighborhood necessitate the formulation of a more strategic approach. Enlargement has almost doubled the number of countries in the EU from 15 to 28 countries; while developments in the region challenge the EU to become “more demanding in geopolitical terms” to act more assertively “in preventing new conflicts from being imported into the EU,” and to cooperate “with other powers with a strong stake in the region” (Fägersten et. al. 10). As noted in our report’s introduction, “Enlargement fulfilled the ESS’ strategic goal of ‘Building Security in our Neighborhood,’ allowing the EU to ‘extend the benefits of economic and
political cooperation to our neighbors in the East while tackling political problems there” (European Commision).” With enlargement on hold, however, for countries such as Ukraine, the enlarged EU must consider updating its policies for “Wider Europe” as “the EU’s credibility will largely depend on its ability to cope successfully with this strategic neighborhood.” (Fägersten, et. al. 10).

One arena in which the EU’s credibility is being challenged is in its ability to act effectively in preventing and resolving crisis. Over the past 10 years, the EU neighborhood has witnessed an increase in social mobilization against authoritarian regimes and corrupts practices in favor of democratic processes and rule of law, often escalating into violence and crisis. In North Africa, the Arab Spring began in Tunisia and spread to Egypt and then Libya, where the EU’s ad hoc reaction and inability to come to a consensus on deploying CSDP sidelined the EU as a regional superpower (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP). In Ukraine, the violent escalation of the Euromaidan protests as a result of President Yanukovych’s decision to suspend signing a DCFTA/AA with the EU, are challenging the EU’s ENP and EaP policies. The EU’s soft-power diplomacy and ad hoc crisis responses failed to prevent the protests from violently escalating. Successful negotiations and compromises between the Ukrainian government, opposition leaders, and pro-EU civil society came only after heightened casualties warranted the introduction of targeted sanctions. The presence of escalating conflict on the fringes of the EU’s borders, as well as the threat of economic and political collapse, would prove severely detrimental to a population of self-identified pro-EU Ukrainians as well as to the EU’s credibility as an effective regional security actor.

A new approach is vital to address increasingly influential actors in the region, especially Russia, as its increasingly assertive foreign policy in the European Neighborhood.
requires a more prioritized and strategic policy framework. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s influence in swaying Ukrainian President Yanukovych towards suspending the EU-Ukraine DCFTA/AA and instead accepting $15 billion in aid and lowered gas prices is a clear indicator of Russia’s return to the regional stage. Putin himself has emphasized the assertive character of Russia’s foreign policy by stating, “I am convinced that global security can only be achieved through cooperation with Russia rather than by attempts to push it into the background, weaken its geopolitical position or compromise its defenses” (Putin). Russia’s strategic position with regard to Ukraine makes it clear that the EU’s ENP and EaP policies have failed to address an increasingly multipolar region.

Turkey’s influence in the region has also grown significantly, largely due to the benefits of its “lucky location between countries that harbor 70 percent of the world’s oil and gas reserves to its east, north and south, and one of the world’s biggest energy markets in the west” (Barysch 4). Not only has it tied itself closely to the EU through its energy trade, it has established stronger ties with Russia, Turkey’s second largest trading partner in 2011 (Babali 4). “As economic cooperation is one of the factors that drive political relations, the close cooperation Turkey has established with the [Russian Federation] is not only reflected in the trade numbers, but has also contributed to the further deepening of relations in the political sphere by creating a mutual economic interdependence” (Babali 4). This mutual interdependence also signals the rise of Turkey’s influence in the European Neighborhood. The economic influence of its energy industry is a major factor in informing Turkey’s regional foreign policies. It has used its leverage within the industry to exert increasing influence in the Southern Caucasus and is establishing deeper relationships with Azerbaijan and Georgia; recently, they collaborated on the establishment of a joint energy pipeline, a manifestation of
Turkey’s economic and growing political influence in the region (Oskanian). As Turkey rises and Russia becomes more assertive, the European Union is at risk of gradually sliding into irrelevance. In order to reflect these shifts in regional power dynamics, the EU must strategically engage these actors and integrate them into a new regional security framework.

Economic growth in the Eastern European Neighborhood has lost momentum as domestic and regional conflicts continue to hinder progress. In many cases, such as the frozen conflicts in the Southern Caucasus and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the Balkans, these existing conflicts have escalated, and are at risk of falling into military conflict. The EU needs to focus more attention on its eastern neighbors as instability is increasing due to these intensifying conflicts. As the EU’s “credibility will largely depend on its ability to cope successfully with this strategic neighborhood—a challenge that will seriously test its capacity for concerted external action,” it’s ability to influence these countries and to push for resolution of these conflicts will reflect on its ability to act cohesively and proactively, as well as its ability to produce results that stabilize the conflicts as a regional and, eventually, global actor (Fägersten et. al. 10). Since the ESS entered into force in 2003, the Southern Caucasus continues to be plagued by its frozen conflicts: tensions have intensified in the disputed areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia, and in Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The August War of 2008 between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia was a short military conflict, but left both sides damaged. Georgia not only endured the results of heavy human suffering (such as over 150,000 internally displaced people), it had to deal with the diminished “democratic credibility” of its reputation with the West (Boonstra 2). Similarly, tensions are also increasing in the already strained relationship between Azerbaijan and Armenia after stalled peace talks in 2011 (International Crisis Group). These tensions have given rise to more
frequent clashes that have spread elsewhere “along the Azerbaijani-Armenian frontier far from Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflict’s original focus” (International Crisis Group). The possibility of these frozen conflicts erupting into full-blown military conflicts is a legitimate concern; “Vigorous international engagement is needed to lessen chances of violent escalation during coming weeks and months” (International Crisis Group).

Significant progress has been made towards integrating the post-war Balkan countries into the European sphere since 2003. However, despite the Eastern Enlargement, the admissions of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, then Croatia in 2013, and the subsequent extension of candidacy status to Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, increasing political corruption and economic instability continue to undermine EU Enlargement as a transformative policy instrument, which calls for a crucial re-assessment of EU-Balkan relations (Hughes 524). Rising instability in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in particular, illustrates the EU’s increasing irrelevance as a pivotal regional actor, for internal disagreements among EU Member States on how to move past the 1995 Dayton Agreement has contributed to Bosnia’s to stagnation and current crisis. As a result, Bosnia’s progress towards European integration is now at a standstill (EC Bosnia Progress Report 2013).

As a result of the Eurozone Crisis in 2008, the EU has shifted its attention away from Enlargement and ENP engagement to internal problem solving which, in turn, has relegated the Western Balkans to the back of the EU’s political agenda. This has provided an opening for Russia and Turkey to deepen their influence in the region. Furthermore, as the Enlargement process slows due to strict accession criteria coupled with the economic and political crises within the EU, “the EU is becoming irrelevant as a regional actor in the Balkans, risking losing the region to nationalism, violence and further breakdowns of agreed states and borders”
The current Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) are failing to encourage progress within the region. Without significant changes to internal corruption and instability, the EU must re-evaluate the current Enlargement policy and instead consider implementing a comprehensive regional framework in which the continuing security threats of political corruption, organized crime, and weak state institutions will be strategically addressed. Scholars have expressed their concern for the EU’s diminished influence in the region, as Beschnev states: “If the EU cannot deliver transformation in the Western Balkans – a region that many see as its backyard – how it can expect other global players to see it as a credible actor in the Middle East, the post-Soviet space or East Asia?” (9).

The EU’s current regional policy frameworks—Enlargement, the ENP, and strategic partnerships—have failed to address the increasingly multipolar nature of regional relationships. Enlargement and the ENP have also come under criticism:

The logic of conditionality that underpins both these policies has become increasingly difficult to sustain, not least because many neighbours are either unwilling or unable to become members of the EU. These neighbours, which should not be perceived as a ring or buffer around the EU, are potential partners, an interface to global powers and a group of states increasingly affected by unstable neighbourhoods of their own.” (Fägersten et. al., 10)

Moreover, the inability of these policies to guide decision-making during crisis and times of instability are becoming increasingly problematic in the context of shifting regional power relationships. In Ukraine, the frameworks of the ENP and EaP failed to prevent and effectively address escalating violence and destabilization. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the failure of the Enlargement policy as a transformative power to work towards stabilizing the political
corruption through the implementation of constitutional reforms has left Bosnia’s accession progress at a standstill. The likelihood of promised enlargement to Turkey is also waning due to its conflicts with Cyprus, and its inability to implement democratic reforms. Caught in the enlargement agenda with Turkey, the EU, however, has failed to engage the country a broader and more strategic level, a failure that overlooks the possibility of multilateral approaches to regional security issues. Within the neighborhood, the rise of Russia’s regional influence has pointed to a gap in the EU’s ability to act within increasing regional Interpolarity. To this extent, the EU’s existing regional security policies do not amount to a strategy through which the EU can effectively respond to security threats in its neighborhood.

The inefficiencies within these EU policy frameworks are increasingly visible threats to the EU’s ability to act as a strong regional partner. Ukraine’s recent decision to suspend the DCFTA/AA has highlighted the ENP’s inability to incentivize its neighborhood to promote political and economic reforms within less stable governments. Furthermore, the ENP lacks strategic priorities for dealing with Russia. The EU’s misdirected enlargement policy is also under scrutiny as the current Stabilization and Association Agreements in the Western Balkans are slowly progressing the region towards accession, but without significant changes to internal corruption and instability. The EU faces a challenge in the growing political unrest in BiH due to the inadequate constitutional reforms, as it must decide how to balance stabilization and accession goals. On the edge of its neighborhood, the EU also faces significant challenges in dealing with Turkey’s rise as a regional power in the Western Balkans, Southern Caucasus, North Africa, and the Middle East. As Turkey moves politically further away from accession goals and the EU continues to prolong enlargement, the EU must carefully re-evaluate and re-establish its relationship to Turkey in order to secure the stability of the region. If the EU seeks
to avoid becoming irrelevant, it must first and foremost address its ability to act strategically within its Neighborhood region. If the EU cannot act effectively in its own neighborhood, it cannot be expected to act effectively on a global scale. With these considerations in mind, we move to address them within our case studies of Ukraine, the Western Balkans, and Turkey.
Ukraine:

A Case Study of the European Neighborhood Policy

By Joelle Klein

Issue

The crisis and escalation of violence in Ukraine are representative of the European Neighborhood Policy’s (ENP) inability to stabilize wider Europe, promote democratic reform, implement a clear strategy regarding crisis management and conflict resolution, and develop a regional security framework that would allow for a more strategic approach to the relations between the EU, Ukraine, and Russia. As the once peaceful Euromaidan protests transformed into bloodshed and rising casualties, the consequences of ineffective bilateral relations between the EU and Russia became clear as Ukraine came close to the brink of civil war. Just as Howorth points to Libya as a watershed moment for CSDP (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”), so the crisis in Ukraine has become the watershed moment for the EU’s ENP and EaP policies. The ENP “builds on common interests and on values — democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion” in order “to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration” (European Union, External Action), the ENP’s conditional nature and preventative implementation are falling short of addressing regional realities (Balfour, 13). If the EU continues to implement its policy instruments ineffectively in the event of crisis in its neighborhood, impressions of the EU as an irrelevant regional and global actor to become solidified in wider Europe, Moscow, Washington D.C., and beyond.
Background

The ENP: Europe’s Neighborhood Policy

As a regional actor, the EU must critically assess the strategic impact of its policy frameworks on the stability and cohesion of the Eastern Partnership region. Under the current framework of the ENP, the European Union is able to coordinate its Foreign Policy with countries within its territorial neighborhood (ENP Review 2011). “The ENP remains the basis on which the EU works with its neighbors to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration. This goal builds on common interests and values — democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion.” (European Union, Joint Communication). However, the ENP’s focus on conditionality and economic integration as a means for value-promotion and democratic reform fails to provide strategic guidelines for action in the event of increasing political and economic turmoil (Schimmelfennig, 684). This is readily apparent:

The links between the ENP and EU actions in conflict management are not obvious.

This is due mainly to three main reasons. First, if the ENP includes actions in conflict management, it was not originally conceived as a conflict management instrument. Second, as tailored mostly by the Commission, the ENP focuses essentially on instruments related to the Commission’s competence and not to other ESDP instruments developed under the CSFSP/ESDP pillar. Thirdly, the concepts used both by the Commission and the Council of Ministers in regard to conflict management are not always clear. (Crombois)
The ENP and Ukraine

Since 2004 and 2009 respectively, EU relations with Ukraine fall under the policy frameworks of the ENP, and its Eastern Partnership (EaP). The ENP implements programs to support democracy promotion, human rights, and rule of law, while the EaP is a more direct link to EU integration and provides financing through loans, grants, and aid packages through the ENPI (European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument), the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank (EIB) (European Partnership; EEAS).

The EU’s ENP is currently under critical scrutiny by scholars, who posit that the ENP’s broad-based framework and soft-power approach to democratic reform and economic liberalization hinders the EU’s ability to promote necessary changes due to the policy’s lack of impact in countries where oligarchs or non-democratic leaders inhibit political and economic reform (Wilson & Popescu; Shumylo-Tapiola et.al; Meister; Lehne; Trenin et. al). This has been linked to the EU’s inability to pivot EaP countries away from Russia’s influence through Association Agreements that did not consider internal realities;

Europeans were taken aback towards the end of the year when Moscow’s threats and pressure prevented Ukraine from signing an Association Agreement with the EU in the framework of the Eastern Partnership policy. Europeans were insufficiently aware of the real nature of discussions going on inside Ukraine, or between Kiev and Moscow, and unable to answer Russian pressure on either a political or an economic level. Torn between normative and geopolitical approaches towards Ukraine, the EU in the end played neither well. (Foreign Policy Scorecard 2014)
The concerns above have been brought to life by recent developments in EU-Ukraine relations. The EU has attempted to expand its relationship with Ukraine through an Association Agreement (AA)—to replace the existing Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)—that includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), which would serve to further integrate and increase trade relations between the EU and Ukraine (Association Agenda, 2013). Despite longstanding expressions of agreement (European Neighborhood Review 2011), Ukraine’s President Yanukovych decided to suspend further progress on the signing and implementation of the AA/DCFTA during the 2013 Eastern Partnership Vilnius Summit in favor of economic assistance from Russia and potential access to its Eurasian Customs Union (Joint Declaration Vilnius; Popescu; Filipchuk). The decision raises major questions about the leverage of the soft-power approach of the ENP in establishing the EU as a strategic regional actor, especially with respect to the influence of Russia in the region. It exposed a weakness in Russia-EU relations as even Putin has remarked, “the current level of cooperation between Russia and the European Union does not correspond to current global challenges, above all making our shared continent more competitive.” (Putin). The EU has learned a tremendous lesson in regards to its approach to Russia and Wider Europe:

The EU is not capable of playing geopolitical games at all. In order to do so, there has to be internal cohesion, clarity of goals and messages, and the willingness to use all available resources. Russia has all of the above. Its message is clear and, for all intents and purposes, very honest. It is requesting a subordinated relationship in exchange for massive economic assistance. (Moshes 1)
The Crisis in Ukraine: A Multi-Dimensional conflict

After Yanukovych’s decision to halt progress on the Association Agreement, Ukraine became the site of escalating tensions, pitting its multi-generational activist and EU oriented civil society against its government. Snyder captures the essence of this high stakes stand-off between regime and society:

On January 16, the Ukrainian government, headed by President Yanukovych, tried to put an end to Ukrainian civil society. A series of laws passed hastily and without following normal procedure did away with freedom of speech and assembly, and removed the few remaining checks on executive authority. This was intended to turn Ukraine into a dictatorship and to make all participants in the Maidan, by then probably numbering in the low millions, into criminals. The result was that the protests, until then entirely peaceful, became violent. Yanukovych lost support, even in his political base in the southeast, near the Russian border. (Snyder)

For the Economic & International Dimensions, as promised aid from Russia was withheld, Ukraine faced increasing difficulties as an economic crisis developed on top of its existing political unrest:

The damage to the economy, which had been stalling before the unrest began, may not be known for some time, but is certain to be severe. The government had less than $18 billion in reserves at the end of January, and is reportedly facing $13 billion in debt-servicing obligations in 2014. (Rumer)
Meanwhile, the EU was slow to act; it scrambled to prepare a competitive aid package with the IMF and an increasingly frustrated US\textsuperscript{6} to de-escalate the situation and re-establish Ukraine’s economic stability,

The economy will remain the greatest problem facing the country, once the leadership questions are settled. The International Monetary Fund remains a potential source of financing to replace the $15 billion that Russia had made available before the protests. But that comes with an insistence on austerity and economic changes that will inflict considerable pain, and it is unclear if Europe or the United States will be willing to do more… ‘Nobody wants to end up owning all the problems that Ukraine faces,’ said Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, ‘the country is bankrupt, it has a terrible, broken system of government and insane levels of corruption.\textsuperscript{(Higgins)}

The EU continued to hesitate while conflicts escalated:

During the first two weeks of February, the Yanukovych regime sought to restore some of the dictatorship laws through decrees, bureaucratic shortcuts, and new legislation. On February 18, an announced parliamentary debate on constitutional reform was abruptly canceled. Instead, the government sent thousands of riot police against the protesters of Kiev.\textsuperscript{(Snyder)}

Given this context, the EU’s inability to act in a timely strategic manner came at a high cost as many protesters were killed or injured.

\textsuperscript{6} The US has expressed its frustrations in the EU’s ability to respond effectively within Ukraine, as Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Victoria Nuland expressed in conversation with US Ambassador Geoff Pyatt regarding the political crisis in Ukraine “F**k the EU” \textsuperscript{(Smale)}
For the Internal Political Dimensions, since his election in 2010, Yanukovych’s presidency in Ukraine has come under heavy criticism for the corruption, fraud and criminal practices within his government. According to Freedom House, “The president’s concentration of power in the executive branch and misuse of the judiciary for political purposes has undermined the system of checks and balances, threatening Ukraine’s pluralistic political model with growing authoritarianism” (Freedom House). Yanukovych has essentially created a family based oligarchy; “Yanukovych has rearranged the structures of national governance, putting an emphasis on personal connections and the predominance of the executive over the legislature and judiciary. His close entourage, known as the Family (with the president’s son, Oleksandr, playing a key role), occupies important positions in the government, which dramatically strengthens its position in the economy and politics” (Freedom House). Furthermore, he was severely criticized for imprisoning his political opponent, Yulia Tymoshenko in 2011, after his 2010 election, without just cause on politically motivated charges (Follath). Oligarchs in Ukraine have a powerful impact on the economy as well given the extent to which “the lion’s share of FDI inflow comes from the deep pockets of oligarchs profiting from close links with the government then routing their money back into Ukraine through tax havens: at the end of 2011, more than 38% in total come from Cyprus, the Netherlands, and the Virgin Islands.” (Toporowski 1). Russian influence is also clearly evident in the circles around Yanukovych: “At least three top Ukrainian officials surrounding Yanukovych have close ties to Moscow and provide insurance that Yanukovych will not stray too far from the Russian fold: Oligarch Viktor Medvechuk, a friend of Putin (who is the godfather of his daughter) who lead a campaign to reject the EU association agreement; Andrey Kluyev, the new presidential chief of staff, who reportedly pressed for a crackdown on the demonstrations in late January; and Mykola Azarov,
the recently resigned prime minister” (Jensen). Taken together all of these factors demonstrate the systemic nature of political and economic corruption and the extent of Russian influence.

**Interests**

**Ukraine**

At stake for Ukrainians, regardless of position or conviction, are Ukraine’s immediate political and economic stability and the composition of its new government. While the protestors may be of diverse backgrounds, their interest in an end to corruption, a new government, and a commitment to sign the DCFTA/AA with the EU, are not. It is also important to note that in contrast to Russian efforts to portray the protestors as marginal and unrepresentative members of their society:

The protestors represent every group of Ukrainian citizens: Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers (although most Ukrainians are bilingual), people from the cities and the countryside, people from all regions of the country, members of all political parties, the young and the old, Christians, Muslims, and Jews. Every major Christian denomination is represented by believers, and most of them by clergy. The Crimean Tatars march in impressive numbers, and Jewish leaders have made a point of supporting the movement. The diversity of the Maidan—the group that monitors hospitals so that the regime cannot kidnap the wounded— is impressive, being run by young feminists. Moreover, an important hotline, which protesters call when they need help, is staffed by LGBT activists. (Snyder)

All of these Ukrainians remain united in the “hope that Ukraine could one day join the European Union, an aspiration that for many Ukrainians means something like the rule of law, the absence of fear, the end of corruption, the social welfare state, and free markets without
intimidation from syndicates controlled by the president.” (Snyder). The protests were further driven by a desire to retain Ukraine’s autonomy vis-à-vis Russia. Early on in the protests, after Yanukovych met with Putin, Yatsenyuk told journalists, "If Yanukovych tries to sign anything with Russia about the customs union it will lead to a bigger wave of protests," (Balmforth).

Russia

Russian interests in Ukraine are directly related to Putin’s interest in restoring Russia’s sphere of influence in the post-soviet neighborhood. As has been stipulated by various scholars and demonstrated through its growing assertive foreign policy, Russia’s relationship with and influence in the post-soviet Eastern European Neighborhood have become a priority to re-establish a post-soviet Russian sphere of influence (Motyl; Stewart; Trenin et. al 10; Jensen; Adomeit; Charlemagne; Klussman; Russian Federation). Scholars have pointed to a decrease in action and dialogue on common interests between the EU and Russia especially in regard to the development of the post-soviet European Neighborhood countries, despite the “Strategic Partnership” between the EU and Russia (Stewart 3, 8; Trenin et. al. 13). As economic decline looms, Russia’s foreign policy is moving further away from “European Choice” (Trenin et. al. 10), and Russia’s interest in maintaining the hierarchical, and incredibly beneficial, relationships with the corrupt and fraudulent governments remaining in the European Neighborhood have become a priority (Jensen; Aslund). Russia’s interest in establishing a trade-based Eurasian Union overlaps with its interests in maintaining influential relationships in Ukraine:

The Eurasian Union, unlike the European Union, is not based on the principles of the equality and democracy of Member States, the rule of law, or human rights. On the contrary, it is a hierarchical organization, which by its nature seems unlikely to admit
any members that are democracies with the rule of law and human rights. Any
democracy within the Eurasian Union would pose a threat to Putin’s rule in Russia.
Putin wants Ukraine in his Eurasian Union, which means that Ukraine must be
authoritarian, which means that the Maidan must be crushed. (Snyder)

To this extent the EU’s ENP and EaP failed to take account of Russia’s interests and its ability
to interfere with EU policies for Ukraine and the rest of post-communist Eastern Europe.

_The European Union_

The crisis in Ukraine presents a security threat to the European Union in that the
country’s future economic and political trajectory directly impacts regional stability and the
credibility of the EU’s ENP and EaP policies as effective crisis management instruments. In
general, “the EU’s influence on its eastern neighbors’ reform and democratization trajectories or
foreign policies and on conflict resolution in the region has been marginal at best (Wilson &
Popescu 2). The EU’s slow response to the Ukrainian crisis was no exception, even as
Ukrainians were risking their lives for a better future within the EU, “The EU has come to
represent democracy, freedom and decent, if not perfect, governance. These are universal
values. Over the past week Ukrainians have shown they are prepared to sacrifice their lives for
those values in hope of a better future” (“The Hour”). The EU’s credibility as a regional actor
cannot risk repeating its mistakes in Georgia and Moldova by ignoring Russia:

There is great concern that Russia may try to use this interim period to thwart the
signing of the agreements. The EU could easily be caught napping, as it was during the
run-up to the Vilnius summit. … Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and his Polish
counterpart, Radek Sikorski, have concluded that the EU’s policy toward the region
needs a radical overhaul if the bloc wants to avoid the mistakes it made in
Ukraine...Their message was clear: the EU must go on the offensive in Georgia and Moldova if it wants both countries to go through with signing the association agreements. (Dempsey)

Russia’s growing influence needs to be addressed in the EU’s ENP and EaP, where, in the absence of effective multilateralism between the EU and Russia on common spaces, the EU is leaving its partners vulnerable to increasingly aggressive foreign influence (Klussman; Wilson and Popescu; Overhaus; Rettman). While the immediate interest of the EU in Ukraine remains re-establishing political and economic stability, in the long-term, it needs to address its better address its crisis management strategies in the ENP and EaP as, “In principle, the EU contribution to crisis management is enshrined in article 17.2 of the Treaty on the European Union (European Union, 2006b) The tasks include not only a military dimension, but also a civilian dimension” (Crombois), and “very often, the problem is not that the EU is not offering enough to its neighbors but rather that authoritarian consolidation makes it more and more difficult to promote its interests and values.” (Wilson & Popescu 4). Accordingly, the EU’s primary interest should be in developing crisis management capabilities and strategic policies that take into account Russian actions in Wider Europe as well as the more limited capacity to reform in these corrupt and fragile countries.

Options

The EU had access to several options and instruments in responding to the crisis in the Ukraine. While the situation initially appeared to be stabilizing with substantial diplomatic input from the EU (with the presence of the three EU foreign ministers on the ground), the outcome of the crisis is still uncertain, as of this writing. The EU’s scramble to respond effectively clearly highlights the need for the EU to review its policy instruments and crisis management...
skills (Rettman; Jensen; Dempsey). As the crisis began and as it continues to unfold, the EU had and has two realistically perceived scenarios for action:

- “Muddling Through”
  - As the default approach for the EU’s *ad hoc* foreign policy, “muddling through” entails a lack of improvements on existing policy frameworks and a limited approach to crisis response, leaving any decision-making on proactive measures to individual Member States (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). In the beginning of the crisis, Russia’s aggressive display of influence in determining the outcome of Yanukovych’s response to the EU’s offer of a DCFTA/AA, and the EU’s lack of a clear strategy on Russia, led the EU to express its position using *ad hoc*, “muddling through” policy towards Russia that leaned towards non-aggravation through cautious involvement in Ukraine (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”).

Adhering to this framework in the long-term would effectively reduce the EU’s credibility as an effective regional actor to non-existence. The Lithuanian Ambassador to the US remarked that an EU failure to act on Ukraine’s instability would be a failure to protect the EU’s borders and a failure to speak on behalf of self-identified “Europeans” in Ukraine (Pavilionis). Unfortunately, the inability to define a clear strategy on Russia has opened the door for *ad hoc* policy making in future crises within the ENP and EaP, where Russia has a stake in influencing the region. Even without regard to Russia, “the EU’s approach is too often *ad hoc* rather than comprehensive, and the EU does not draw sufficiently on either its own internal experience as a peace and integration project or international best practice” (Sherriff et. al, ii).
• Decisive Leadership: Under this scenario, the EU takes a firm and cohesive stance against Russia’s involvement in the crisis by responding proactively to escalating tensions through a package of instruments including crisis diplomacy, a comprehensive aid package, targeted sanctions, and a membership perspective for Ukraine.

  Crisis Diplomacy + Aid Package: As the protests in Kiev de-escalate, the focus is now on addressing Ukraine’s economic stability: “the European Union’s top economic official warned that financial aid was imperative to save the country from bankruptcy. “It will have to be measured in billions rather than hundreds of millions,”” (Buckley). Furthermore, the EU has significant resources in conflict management and crisis prevention, where “there are almost no instances where the EU works alone in mediation and dialogue. Therefore the success (and failure) of EU mediation is heavily reliant on how well the EU can work together with its partners in order to add value” (Sherriff et. al 6). To this extent, the EU as a soft power negotiator could broker a compelling multilateral solution through a comprehensive diplomatic assistance and aid package approach. The focus, however, should be on acting comprehensively, as “the EU’s added value lies in its global reach, its ability to engage over the long term, and its ability to work at multiple levels as well as its more ‘neutral’ profile in certain circumstances. … Where it can act comprehensively, over the long term and across different levels, the EU has more of a chance of achieving a positive impact and this should be incentivized.” (Sherriff et. al ii).

Sanctions: The ENP review in 2011 clearly promotes the use of sanctions in crisis management: “The EU will uphold its policy of curtailing relations with
governments engaged in violations of human rights and democracy standards, including by making use of targeted sanctions and other policy measures. Where it takes such measures, it will not only uphold but also strengthen further its support to civil society. In applying this more differentiated approach, the EU will keep channels of dialogue open with governments, civil society and other stakeholders. At the same time and in line with the principle of mutual accountability, the EU will ensure that its resources are used in support of the central objectives of the ENP” (ENP Review, 3). In order to institute sanctions against a country, the Council adopts a Common Position under Article 15 of the Treaty of the European Union (Treaty of the European Union; Guidelines restrictive measures). After the adoption of a Common Position, Member States individually implement the mandated sanctions in accordance with the Common Position at the national level (Guidelines restrictive measures). Individual Member States have the ability to implement selective sanctions against individuals in through visa bans restricting travel, and banks have the ability to leverage sanctions against those suspected of fraudulent behavior, freezing assets abroad (Guidelines restrictive measures). The EU can lift these sanctions on the conditions of de-escalating violence, establishing a compromise with opposition parties, and requiring OSCE oversight to produce fair and free elections in 2015 (Gardner). As we have seen, this was a compelling option in pushing the oligarchs in Ukraine to come to an agreement, as they maintain personal and financial relationships in the EU that were threatened by such sanctions (Jensen). Sanctions would require the EU to come to a decision about Russia and its
growingly assertive foreign policy, as Ambassador Pavilionis remarked, “making a decision about Ukraine is making a decision about Russia” (Pavilionis). Furthermore, it would require a more visible and effective presence within Ukraine, working towards negotiations and stability with the input of relevant foreign ministers, High Representative Catherine Ashton herself, and a delegation from the European Parliament. The implications of a more active role in the ENP during crisis would solidify the EU’s legitimacy as a regional actor, and would give credibility to the EU’s crisis management capabilities.

- Membership Perspective: Approaching Ukraine with the perspective of EU membership could potentially be a “game-changer” for the EU, Ukraine, and Russia. The perspective of membership signals a more long-term road to European Integration and of increased economic security and stability. For Ukraine, this has massive long-term benefits in the form of access to the European Markets and institutions, yet also threatens the power of a government run by corrupt officials and oligarchs through its democratic conditional economic and political reforms (Charlemagne; Jensen). For the EU, enlargement has become unfavorable due to fears of integrating an unstable economy into the already dampened economy of the post-Euro-Crisis EU (Meister). Any decision on membership also centers highly on the internal divisions within the EU as individual EU Member States seem to split on positions towards Ukraine based on geopolitical factors. Lithuania, for example, sees EU action in Ukraine as a common security interest in checking Russian influence near the EU’s borders (Pavilionis). Others, such as Germany who has been reluctant to balance against
Russia, would be careful to allow Ukraine a membership perspective on the premise of protecting bilateral relations (Friedman and Lanthemann). However, many analysts have been advocating for the EU’s urgent need to address enlargement in the Eastern Partnership after the events in Ukraine (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy; Dempsey; Wilson and Popescu; Trenin et. al). “Sooner rather than later, EU governments will have to decide on their long-term relationship with Eastern Europe. It is clear that the Eastern Partnership countries will not embrace big reforms unless they have the perspective of membership” (Dempsey). The Economist explained the diluted risk of a membership perspective best, highlighting the ambiguity of a timeframe: “The EU needs only to reaffirm article 49 of its own treaty: any European state that abides by European values is eligible to join” (Charlemagne).

The EU’s Response

The EU’s response to the crisis to date has evolved from initial “muddling through” tactics to taking a more decisive position against Yanukovych and his corrupt government recently. While this transition was a welcome one, the EU was slow to become proactive until the violence escalated: “Britain’s foreign secretary, William Hague, said that the foreign ministers had acted because of the “widespread horror” at what had happened in Ukraine” (Castle). The EU first chose to “muddle through,” preferring to exhaust all diplomatic options in an attempt to de-escalate rising tensions between the Euromaidan protestors, opposition leaders, and Yanukovych’s government (Jensen; Charlemagne). Catherine Ashton, who has been criticized for not prioritizing Ukraine in her term as High Representative issued multiple statements deplo ring the violence, and remained very focused on a soft-power diplomacy, re-
iterating that “As I have said in many press points in Ukraine, we stand ready to support the process of dialogue which is so important to try and end the crisis there. We stand ready too, within the reforms that need to be made, with our economic support and we are in touch with many other countries and institutions on this issue” (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”; Ashton, Foreign Affairs Council). Moreover, despite the drastic climb in tensions by February 10th 2014, the European Council’s ministers on foreign affairs continued to avoid more restrictive measures such as sanctions, in favor of diplomatic approaches, and an invitation to ask for support, “The EU stands ready to provide expert support in all areas judged useful and encourages Ukraine also to draw on the expertise of international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the United Nations” (European Union, Council Conclusions 2014).

In recent events, the EU has taken a more active role in the region, issuing targeted sanctions against government officials responsible for ordering the violence against protestors in an attempt to de-escalate the situation (Higgins and Kramer). The EU’s presence in Ukraine has also increased as foreign ministers from Germany, Poland, and France worked with a Russian foreign minister to negotiate an accord between the opposition and the government (Higgins and Kramer; Ashton). Despite Russia’s refusal to sign the accord, as of Saturday February 22, 2014 President Yanukovych has fled Kiev and the parliament has named him “incapable of performing his duties,” thereby calling for elections in May (Higgins and Kramer). In the meantime, “it appears that individuals of Yulia Tymoshenko’s Fatherland Party have filled the parliamentary power vacuum, which Yanukovych and his Party of Regions left behind, after her release from imprisonment on February 21 2014” (Higgins and Kramer). However, the situation in Ukraine is still tenuous as its economic situation remains in crisis.
while Putin’s undistributed aid and the EU’s lack of an aid package leave Ukraine temporarily without economic support, and the potential election of another corrupt president in the future has not been ruled-out (Klussmann; Higgins and Kramer). As Jensen warns, “The most likely scenarios at the moment—a compromise by Yanukovych, a compromise by the opposition, a crackdown, or chaos—would provide only short-resolution to the standoff. None of them ensures stability. The risks of further escalation of the political crisis, economic collapse, and Ukraine’s breakup will remain. All these scenarios, moreover, offer opportunities for Kremlin interference” (Jensen).

Furthermore, it remains to be seen if the EU will continue to counter Russian meddling after the immediate threat of violence has diminished. Putin still holds tremendous leverage over Ukraine in the form of influence in the regions of Donetsk and Crimea, the ability to institute trade restrictions and increase gas prices, issue an infiltration of security forces, and expand media propaganda (Jensen; Klussmann). It is still unclear what the Russian response will be, “In fighting for Ukraine after all, Putin is fighting for himself. No one knows how far he will go” (James Sherr via Jensen). In any case, if the EU continues to dedicate itself to establishing stability in Ukraine as it has stated during the Council on Foreign Relations assembly on Feb. 10, it must simultaneously work to curb destabilizing interference of and multilateral cooperation with Russia (European Union, Council Conclusions 2014).

Recommendations

Lessons Learned from the Ukrainian Crisis

Overall, the crisis in the Ukraine has identified the need for an updated approach to the ENP and EaP that includes a regional security framework to address the EU’s foreign policies more effectively in the Eastern Partnership and the European Neighborhood. As we have seen,
the situation in Ukraine requires a comprehensive and strategic approach to the crisis which the ENP and EaP policies have struggled to provide: “EU member states have not been silent in their concerns regarding the ENP and EaP policies.” Recently Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt’s “20 Points on the Eastern Partnership Post-Vilnius,” have been approved by multiple member states and respond to many of the concerns raised in this paper (Dempsey). To facilitate a comprehensive approach in Ukraine, the EU’s responses should be focused on short term, mid-term, and long-term goals and policy improvements.

- **Short Term:** *In the immediate future, the EU’s priority for the Ukrainian crisis should be a de-escalation of violence and political and economic security for the Ukrainian government.* The EU’s response should therefore be focused on maintaining an EU presence in Ukraine while assisting opposition leaders in preparing for the upcoming elections and to implement a comprehensive aid package to address Ukraine’s immediate economic crisis.

- **Mid-Term:** *As Ukraine works to re-establish its political and economic stability, the EU must adjust its policies to meet the demands of long-term reform and, “Continue engagement with Ukraine on a broad political spectrum and adjust the EU policy in light of developments”* (Bildt, 2). In light of Russia’s involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, this must fundamentally include addressing and offsetting Russian pressure in Ukraine and the larger European Neighborhood. The will of the Ukrainians has demonstrated the importance of an active civil society in pushing governments to pursue greater integration with the EU and its democratic values. To this extent the EU should implement, in the interim, a plan for the long-term stability of the region through
policies that will continue to foster a generational culture towards democracy and European values, which can be achieved through visa-liberalization for students and workers by, “Enhanc[ing] contacts with all sectors of society in EaP countries, including through visits, seminars in EUMS/partner countries, preferably involving also those not already convinced of the benefits of closer EU relations” (Bildt, 1). The dedication of civil society to the EU’s democratic perspectives are necessary to bring about progressive change, and therefore more opportunities for civil-society to engage with Europeans should also be considered in formulating a better strategic partnership with Russia.

- Long-Term: To preserve its relevance as a regional actor, the EU needs to update its European Neighborhood Policy and its Eastern Partnership frameworks to better address realities such as corruption and authoritarian governments in its regional strategic priorities. As we have seen, the EU’s crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities need to be better incorporated into the ENP and EaP frameworks as the EU remained slow to act and unprepared in the aftermath of the Vilnius summit and subsequent escalation of violence in Ukraine: “Raise preparedness in expectation of further external and internal threats or actions against front-runners, such as trade embargoes, restrictions against migrant workers, increased tension in protracted conflicts, etc. A well-coordinated EU response to possible actions of this kind is essential” (Bildt, 2). The EU needs a more comprehensive strategy for Russia, to address its importance both as a regional actor and a strategic partner. They must, “engage with Russia in a substantial, frank, and open dialogue on integration processes in
Europe. At the same time, underline that punitive actions and threats against EaP partner countries are unacceptable.” (Bildt, 2).

If the European Union seeks to avoid the threat of irrelevance, it must update its European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership to reflect the EU’s security interests and its relations with Strategic Partnerships. It must begin to instrumentalize responses to debates regarding the EU’s role as a regional actor and continue to develop a firm but co-operative relationship with Russia. While the EU’s immediate realistic goals and long-term strategies for Ukraine may be irreconcilable, the failure of the EU’s security instruments to prevent violent escalation and destabilization is enough to warrant the development of a long-term regional security framework to address these concerns.
The Balkans
By Naomi Eissinger

Issue

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia-Herzegovina is facing its worst social unrest since the end of the war in 1995. As political corruption, unemployment, and poverty continue to unravel the country and risk ‘State Failure’ status, the crisis in Bosnia is “the greatest security threat and foreign policy challenge” calling for immediate EU intervention (Nations in Transit 2013). Protesters voice that, “our country is broken” as the ‘dysfunctional power-sharing system’ of Dayton continues to govern the country. As the EU’s “main inducement to enlist the cooperation of Bosnian leaders, the prospect of eventual EU membership” has so far proved insufficient (Woehrel 2013). The international community’s efforts are failing, for “a shared vision by the political EU representatives on the overall direction and future of the country, or on how it should function, remains absent (EC Bosnia Progress Report 2013). As former EU High Representative Paddy Ashdown has said in a recent CNN interview on February 12th, 2014, “Europe needs to move swiftly and decisively right now to put Bosnia back on track before this latest unrest unravels into an uncontrollable storm” (Ashdown, CNN 2014). Without immediate action, the EU risks “becoming irrelevant as a regional actor, losing Bosnia to nationalism, and violence and further breakdowns of agreed states and borders” (Balfour 2).

Bosnia’s instability illustrates greater, long-term systemic issues within the EU’s Enlargement policy. Bosnia’s Stabilization Associate Agreement (SAA), or Interim Agreement (IA), is governed within the EU’s Enlargement policy and intended to progress the country towards EU accession in adherence with the strict EU accession criteria. However, it fails to incorporate a regional security framework needed to address Bosnia’s expanding security...
concerns: a weak and dysfunctional governmental system, political corruption, unemployment, inter-ethnic conflict, and economic instability (EC Bosnia Progress Report 2013). Without a comprehensive strategic framework to address these chronic security challenges, Bosnia’s SAA remains at a standstill, repeatedly undermining the Enlargement policy’s transformative power in the Western Balkans and calling for a crucial reassessment of EU-Balkan relations (Szpala, 2010).

As Enlargement is slowing down due to strict accession criteria overshadowed by the economic and political crises within the EU, it fails to progress the region towards further economic and political stability. Therefore, the EU faces the long-term challenges of rising foreign powers—as Russia and Turkey become key actors in governing the region—while simultaneously facing the long-term challenge of admitting countries that are weak, poorly governed and permeable to outside influence into the EU (Noutcheva 10). Therefore, a critical re-assessment of EU-Balkans relations is needed, for a comprehensive regional security framework must strategically address the looming security threats that current Enlargement policies have failed to, specifically: Bosnia’s dysfunctional governing system and the rise of Russia’s energy investment in political interests in the region.

**Background**

*EU Achievements*

Since the Thessaloniki Summit in 2003, significant progress has been made towards EU Enlargement (EC Enlargement Strategy 2013-2014). Croatia’s ratification of the Accession Treaty with the completion of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), becoming the 28th Member State on July 1st, 2013, is an example of the transformative power and stabilizing effect of the enlargement process and the EU’s soft power (ECFR Scorecard 33). EU-facilitated
dialogue between Serbia’s Prime Minister, Ivica Dacic, and Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, has resulted in the landmark Belgrade-Pristina agreement through normalizing relations, progressing both countries towards European integration (EEAS Serbia-Kosovo Deal). Albania’s commitment to addressing corruption, organized crime, and judicial reform remains hopeful, making candidate status within reach. After the EU officially invited Montenegro to begin accession negotiations in 2012, it has continued to move forward through implementing political and judicial reforms (EC Enlargement Challenges 2013-2014).

**Bosnia’s lack of Progress**

The Western Balkans are often described by scholars as “a zone of multiple, very painful and contradictory transitions and transformations,” for, “the speed and character of these transformations in the last two decades are different than any other kind of transformation that has happened before” (Dzihic 11). The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has created a completely new political landscape, as a “strong influence of ethno-nationalism” within the Western Balkans contributes to the “looming crisis of democracy and democratic values in the region” calling for a critical-reassessment of EU-Balkan relations (Petritch 20).

The most profound example of the influence of ethno-nationalism remains Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since the Dayton Peace Agreement, the ‘Dayton’ Constitution “has not only consolidated ethnic division and led to permanent institutional paralysis but also provoked widespread discrimination against so-called ‘others,’ those not belonging to any of the three ethnic groups or not wishing to state their ethnic background” (Stiks 54). Under Dayton, the “remaining citizens are denied the possibility of participation in the newly established system of power-sharing” (Alic 2010). However, as this “complex-sharing system” continues to propel the country into further economic, political, and civil unrest, the EU has yet to produce
comprehensive strategic solutions, for as Bosnia’s “limited statehood” progresses, “incompetent, idle and shallow European institutions preoccupied with their bureaucratic procedures prevail” (Vejvoda 90).

Bosnia at a Standstill

Little is being done at this point to push the Republika Srpska into a closer relationship with the Federation of BiH or to strengthen the state-level government from the International community. The Office of High Representative (OHR) has lost the credibility and international support to intervene in Bosnia, while CSDP EUFOR Althea’s weak military presence that is now responsible for Bosnia has “little military capability to ensure that the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are respected” (Curak 61). As the prospect of EU membership through Enlargement fails to incentivize Bosnian leaders to implement the 2009 European Court of Human Rights Sejdic-Finci case, the international community fails to “de-Daytonize” the region (Hadzidedic 87). While the implementation of the Sejdic-Finci case would ensure constitutional reforms that would push Bosnia past Dayton, scholars add, “it is evident that the international community is not ready to abandon a Dayton-tailored BiH and reconstruct it based upon its ‘positive sovereignty’ from the Yugoslav era” (Domlijan 89). By continuing to neglect the failure of Dayton and the urgent need for constitution reforms, “ambivalence and vagueness across the EU enlargement policy has deteriorated EU leverage in Bosnia” (Balfour 2). By invoking the Dayton Peace Agreement while negating it at the same time, the RS president Milorad Dodik, has, “created an efficient mechanism for keeping the state in agony”, and because of the lack of adequate responses by the international community not willing to push forward major efforts to re-structure the government past Dayton, this “primitive political instrument” has thus far succeeded (Hadzidedic 90).
Failure of Enlargement

Bosnia is confronted with continued corruption—a problem that is not only an obstacle to the implementation of reforms, but also poses a serious threat to everything that has been achieved so far in terms of state and institution building. The recent protests have shed light on the fact that Enlargement has failed to address the rising levels of political corruption, unemployment, poverty, and remains inadequate to address the rising human and economic security concerns (EC Bosnia Progress Report 2013). As Bosnia’s unstable political and economic situation increases unemployment and the instability of the state, Enlargement fails to address the rising human security concerns. Due to Bosnia’s current governing system being formulated by Dayton, human security has been undermined, namely “freedom from fear,” as the civil population has voiced their fear for their futures—“our country is broken”—and their “freedom from want” due to the rising 45.5% unemployment levels (Scorecard 33). Not only has Enlargement failed to address these human and economic security concerns, it has failed to incentivize BiH to make progress to implement anti-corruption reforms (Bosnia Progress Report 2013). Bosnia signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2006; however, the implementation of the anti-corruption legal framework remains absent since no steps have been taken to “harmonize” the legislative provisions at state and entity level “in order to ensure a uniform application of the law” (UN 2006). This makes BiH the only country in the region without an operational anti-corruption body in place (EC Enlargement 2013-2014). Enlargement has also failed to address Bosnia’s judiciary security, for it has failed to ensure “an efficient and independent judiciary that would be able to tackle the challenge of corruption” (Domljan 95). While opinion polls and recent protests show that citizens are aware of the pressing issue of political corruption, having “a profound distrust of government institutions,”
the international community has taken no initiative to address the institutions that are under corrupt politicians (Bassuener 98). In order to address Bosnia’s “lack of basic internal democracy,” failure to implement an anti-corruption framework, lack of human security due to rising unemployment, judiciary insecurity, and economic instability, a strategic security framework is needed in concurrence with Enlargement to progress Bosnia to a “well-functioning” state status. As the BiH political will remains weak to combat corruption seriously without a strategic security framework that addresses political corruption, BiH will not be able to implement the reforms required as part of the European integration process.

Russia’s rise in Western Balkans

As Bosnia’s current status continues to be undermined by Enlargement’s ineffectiveness, Enlargement also remains inadequate to strategically address Russia’s increasing interest and investment in the Western Balkan region. In February 2013, The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation delivered by President Putin addressed Russia’s stance on the current international system, stating, “the world is experiencing a period of transition during which a new polycentric international system is forming, which opens the possibility for new economic and financial systems, new alignments in collective security and shifts in political development” (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2013). Putin’s statement underscores Russia’s increasing economic presence in the Balkans; a presence enabled by the Eurozone crisis, which has “given leverage to foreign economic powers.” Russia has capitalized on these economic and political opportunities, “challenging the EU’s economic supremacy in the region” (Petrillo 2014). EU Foreign Direct Investments have declined, leaving room for Russia to invest in Serbia and sign a number of bilateral agreements such as a Free Trade Agreement and an Intergovernmental agreement on the 2012 South Stream
project, planned to start operation in 2015 (ECFR Scorecard 2014). With economic stability comes political leverage in Serbia-Russia relations, Russia reaffirming its support for Serbia over the Kosovo issue, and Russia’s support for Serbia’s stagnant relationship with NATO, “challenging Serbia’s path towards EU accession” (Alic 2010). These geo-political issues may, with time, “become an obstacle on the path to a full integration of Serbia into the EU, which calls Belgrade’s commitment to the European political goals into question” (Malek 2008). Therefore, not only is energy security at risk, but also political, and regional security. Scholars agree that, “the EU must be aware of emerging foreign powers, mainly Russia, having the capabilities ready to implement a prominent strategic framework if foreign policies begin to undermine the EU agenda” (Noutcheva 12); also, “the EU must be more proactive in avoiding that the Balkans become an arena for Russian future economic and geopolitical ambitions” (Petrillo 8). As Russia is becoming a significant actor in the region, a greater EU strategic framework is needed to address Russia’s growing security interests and investments in the region, for the EU risks disengagement from the region if Russia’s foreign economic and political policy becomes a key factor in governing the region in opposition to EU ideals.

**Interests**

**Internal BiH interests**

The system established under the Dayton accords has “only helped cement corrupt, nepotistic and completely complacent elites” (Jahic 2013), creating “a complex power-sharing system that has increased political unrest and stagnation” between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (largely Bosniak and Croat) and the Bosnian Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (ECFR Scorecard 36). Dayton lays the framework in which “all major decisions have to be made by consensus among the main ethnic parties.” Therefore, as scholars suggest, “it will be
impossible for Bosnia, in its current form, to become a full state serving all its citizens; ethnically divided as it is, there is no chance of it forging a single national interest” (Dzihic 63). Bosnia’s leaders recognize that advancing towards Europe means giving up their ideal solutions: Serbs are aware that, as Bosnia draws closer to Brussels, it will be more difficult for them to pursue nationalistic goals, while the Bosniaks “fear that reducing RS autonomy will be impossible,” and thus, “this gives both a reason to hold back, and both secretly hope to win the EU and U.S. to their side by remaining intransigent” (Curak 68). Some observers believe that RS President Milorad Dodik’s strategy has been to “obstruct the functioning of Bosnian institutions” so much that the Bosniaks, Croats, and the international community will eventually agree to let the Republika Srpska become independent, stating that “a peaceful dissolution of the country should be discussed” (Woehrel 4). As Dodik’s position in the RS may be eroding, the support of “nationalistic, anti-EU, anti-US rhetoric” will not likely change, as they are shared by most Bosnian Serbs (Szpala).

While much focus has been on the conflict between Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH in regards to constitutional reform, scholars have argued the crisis within the Federation of BiH—the larger of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two entities—also deserves attention, “for disputes among the Bosniak and Croat leaders fuel the dysfunctional administrative system and decision-making” (Szpala).

*Internal EU conflicting interests*

Internal EU disagreement fuels the absence of progress in Bosnia. Ashdown voices the concerns of the international community stating, “I have to blame the European Union for the crisis in Bosnia, for it decided that total ownership was over and it would withdraw the leverage that they had to push things forward after the war, and since 2006 all of those huge advantages by the international community and very brave Bosnian politicians have been allowed to
unravel” (CNN 2014). Disagreement remains within the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), led by German-French dialogue, to end the direct international oversight through the OHR, due to lack of political support and diminishing credibility, in favor of a more proactive role by the EU led by an EU Special Representative (ECFR Scorecard 36). This is met with US, UK, and Turkish agreement supporting the OHR as the guarantor of the Dayton Agreement framework (ECFR Scorecard 36). Scholars argue, “because of their ‘realpolitik’ approach to the national interest, the EU members are not able to reach consensus regarding the institutionalizing of actual capacity of the Union’s security and unified political strategy that should mastermind the EU’s state building manager role in BiH” (Dzihic 72). While the majority of the EU wishes to move away from direct oversight of the OHR in order to encourage Bosnian leaders to take greater responsibility for their country, this risks further instability in the region, as Bosnia’s dysfunctional governmental system made clear that it is not capable or willing to implement such reforms. Therefore, it is of great importance that the EU works toward internal agreement for strategically approaching BiH since member state co-operation is needed in order to ensure an effective push towards constitutional reforms.

**EU-US conflicting interests**

Although EU-US relations have taken a step forward though the signing of the 2011 Framework Agreement on American participation in EU crisis-management operations, facilitating US civilian involvement in EU missions, the EU faces the immediate and long-term challenges of working with the US in order to achieve a more secure and stable Bosnia (Gordon; E CFR Scorecard 36). After Dayton, “the US focused on the so-called security-first approach in state-building, which implied, first and foremost, the establishment of security in the country by means of a strong peacekeeping force, followed by reform of the security sector
(primarily, the armed forces), which would aim to strengthen the state monopoly of force and the security apparatus” (Dzhici 84). By successfully completing the defense reform, the US decided to entrust the EU countries “with the more delicate segments of security reform, including the reform of the police system” (Curak 73). However, the EU opted for a “liberalization first strategy,” in which “political and economic liberalization measures represented the key to peace building and democracy in a post conflict society” (Blagovcanin 83). This inconsistent approach by the international community has generated “the opposite of the desired outcome and comprom[ed] the peace-building process” (Igor 49). While scholars note he EU and US now share the same general outlook for BiH—“to see the country become a stable, prosperous, multiethnic democracy integrated into Euro-Atlantic organizations”—continued disagreement on how to implement constitutional reforms underline the inefficiencies of the EU-US partnership responding to BiH (Jahic). EU disunity among Member States, “perpetuates US skepticism towards EU relevance in the region” (Archick 2013). Therefore, to work strategically towards Balkan stabilization, a more involved leadership role is first needed from EU Member States. Through the EU re-establishing itself as a prominent regional actor and working towards internal unity of its Member States, the US will be more inclined to strategically partner with the EU in securing the region (EFCR Scorecard 32).

Options

*The EU continues to muddle through.*

The international community views the EU’s lack of urgency to address Bosnia’s dysfunction government with the prospect of Enlargement to incentivize reforms as ineffective (Woehrel 4). If the EU continues its current inactive approach to Bosnia, labeling the region as “stable but stagnant,” and leaving Bosnian leaders to self-implement needed reforms in the
current corrupt, complex, and multi-layered system of administration political deadlock will persist, further unemployment will rise, and civil unrest will escalate (Alic, 2010). If the EU continues to muddle through without a proactive role in the region, not only will Bosnia’s crisis further unravel, possibly reaching a ‘Failed State’ status, but EU credibility and Enlargement’s “transformative” power will continue risking “looming irrelevance” (Nations in Transit 2013).

The EU implements incremental economic changes.

Due to the failure of previous constitutional reforms, the European Commission has shifted its priorities from constitutional reforms to economic and judicial reforms (EC Enlargement Strategy 2013-2014). Expressed in a statement on February 18th, Commissioner Fule has said, “The European Commission will focus on new initiatives to promote better economic governance, a national economic reform program and action to tackle the country’s nearly 40 percent unemployment rate” (Fule 2014). Incentivizing deeper governmental reforms through an “economic focused framework” will shift the dialogue from “a narrative based on security to one based on the economy” (Bechnev 7). A move away from security in order to gain greater economic rewards will significantly undermine all previous EU efforts for constitutional reform and will fail to address the underlying cause of Bosnia’s dysfunctional government structure, continuing to fuel political corruption and expand civil-unrest (EC Scorecard 33 2013).

The EU pursues immediate constitutional reform.

Nation-wide civil unrest calls for urgent EU action, for there is no alternative other than constitutional reform to resolve the crisis and work towards establishing BiH to a functioning state. Bosnia’s unraveling crisis calling for direct EU response must be met with a proactive security framework, implemented to reach constitutional reforms while ensuring “governmental
functionality” (Archick 2013). Successful constitutional reform to establishing a well-functioning government would finally allow Bosnia’s SAA to come into force, leading to political stability, economic growth, and regional cooperation and encourage “the respect for and protection of minorities” (Joseph 2014). While previous pushes for constitutional reform, during the 2006 “April Package”, and the 2008 EU-US backed Butmir reform did not amount to success due to “a combination of obstruction by internal nationalistic forces and halfhearted commitment by the international community” (Dzihic 91), civil-unrest was not as apparent (EC Bosnia Progress Report 2013). While Brussels “would like nothing better than an excuse for more delay on Bosnia” the international community cannot ignore the protestors voicing that, “[their] country is broken” (Joseph 2014). The window of opportunity is now available, as widespread civil unrest among the BiH’s population sets the platform for the international community to pressure Bosnian leaders for constitutional reform. With Bosnian leaders now at their most vulnerable, “the smug security that politicians have enjoyed for so long is gone” (Joseph 2014); now is the time to press Bosnia’s leaders for serious reform. International support in BiH to “overcome the mutual distrust among inter-ethnic tensions and to create an atmosphere of collaboration with a shared vision for BiH’s constitutional future” will re-establish the EU as a vital role in stabilizing Bosnia’s status, progressing Bosnia towards further EU integration (Jahic 7). Otherwise, they risk increasing inter-ethnic conflict in the region and irrelevance as a regional actor (ECFR Scorecard 36, 2014).

Recommendations

Short Term:

- Immediate EU action must be taken in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EU’s inactive approach of dealing with the political leadership in Bosnia cannot succeed under the current
conditions. The wide-spread civil unrest among the Bosnian population sets the platform for the EU to embody a proactive, assertive and structured leadership role to approach Bosnian political leaders with a clear proposal to push towards constitutional reform, as they are now at their most vulnerable. With BiH in danger of becoming a failed state, Brussels must take affirmative action to see comprehensive constitutional reforms past the Dayton Accords.

Mid-Term:

- As Bosnia works towards re-structuring its political system past Dayton, the EU must incorporate an effective strategic security framework within Bosnia’s current SAA/IA Enlargement policy in order to have direct overview of efforts by Bosnian actors and emerging security threats and policy challenges in BiH during its weak transition period. Within this regional security framework, the EU must carefully monitor leaders’ actions, overseeing constitutional compliance and progress toward membership in order to ensure after-reform functionality. The EU should not impose sanctions, but instead enforce a more direct oversight of the flow of IPA funds, in order to secure effective-state building in lieu of high levels of political corruption and money laundering. To ensure “a uniform application of the law,” the EU and UN should work towards re-activating the UN Convention against Corruption anti-corruption policies (UN 2006).

Long term:

- The EU must re-assess its Enlargement policy in coordination with a regional security framework that acknowledges the long-term security challenges in the Western Balkans. An all-encompassing framework must take all necessary action in
avoiding the EU’s current ineffective tunnel-vision approach to the region. A comprehensive regional security framework must incorporate:

- **Enlargement policies (SAAs and IAs):** Strict adherence to accession criteria must be enforced to ensure candidate countries and potential candidate countries adhere to the Copenhagen Criteria—incorporating a stable democracy, a free-market economy, and rule of law into the fundamental framework—otherwise the EU risks accepting weak and corrupt states as future members into the European Union. The dedication of civilians to these EU ideals are necessary for long-term integration, thus the EU should be focused on engaging civil-society in a more democratic relationship with the EU through ensuring visa liberalization with all countries.

- **Human security:** The EU must re-assess its crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities (CSDP missions, Counter-Terrorism, and Organized Crime) in order to better respond to political corruption and money laundering within weak and unstable governments to prevent further slipping into internal crisis, as seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- **Economic security:** The EU must re-assess the Instrument for Pre-Accession to ensure a more strategically devised sector approach. It must have greater incentives for improved performance and European integration, increased budget support, and a stronger focus on achieving measurable economic progress in the region. A more comprehensive economic framework will help prevent future Member States from massive unemployment and poverty, averting internal instability that will escalate to internal and cross-border conflicts.
• Russia’s influence: Russia will remain a strong economic and political influence in the Western Balkans, calling for a comprehensive multilateral approach to energy security in which the EU will be able to monitor Russia’s economic and political investment in Serbia relations and Russia’s rising influence in Montenegro. A greater strategic awareness with Russia is necessary, as Russia has the economic influence and investment to undermine preexisting European ideals, turning candidate countries in the direction of pro-Russian policies, as well as the potential to foster greater economic stability and regional growth, ensuring greater economic security for the Western Balkans.
Turkey: A Stagnant Accession Process but Growing Regional Prominence
By Rina Harsch

Issue

The EU is slowly losing its regional influence and threats in its regional neighborhood have been exacerbated over time. In particular, the EU has experienced the growing need for energy security after the 2009 Ukraine-Russia energy dispute; the EU also faces the threat of exacerbation of the frozen conflicts of Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia and Abkhazia simmering in the Southern Caucasus.

Turkey has grown significantly as an economic actor in the neighborhood region due to its pivotal role in energy transit; it is positioned between the EU, Southern Caucasus, Middle East, and the Caspian Sea region and is becoming the energy transit hub of the neighborhood region. Frozen conflicts simmer in the Southern Caucasus and threaten to erupt as the power dynamics between Russia, Turkey, and Iran shift. Due to its growing economic power, Turkey has also grown significantly in regional influence and has the potential to assist the EU in stopping these frozen conflicts from growing into crises.

However, the EU-Turkey relationship, thus far based solely on Turkey’s EU membership candidacy, has been stagnant since 2005 due to disagreement on the issue of Cyprus and the Turkish government’s divergence from democracy. The EU must put a new framework into place to engage with Turkey on a more strategic level through an improved Strategic Partnership instrument.
Background

*Turkey’s Slow Accession Process*

Turkey’s relationship with the EU began in 1963 with the signing of the Ankara Association Agreement (“EU-Turkey Relations”). The Ankara Agreement expresses the EU and Turkey’s goal of eventual accession of Turkey into the European Union Customs Union (EUCU) and puts in place a three-step process for establishing a Customs Union (“Agreement Establishing an Association”). Plans to create the customs union were concluded in 1995, and it was not long after this that Turkey was approved as eligible for EU accession in 1997 (“EU-Turkey Relations”). The European Council revised and finalized the Accession Partnership, and accession negotiations started between the EU and Turkey in 2005 (“Turkey-EU Relations”). However, since the accession negotiations began, there have been two major obstructions to Turkey’s accession: the Cyprus issue and problems with democratization.

*The Cyprus Issue*

The dispute stems from a discrepancy of the legal recognition by both Turkey and the EU of the island of Cyprus. While the EU recognizes the entire island as an EU member state controlled by the Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots recognize the northern area of the island (the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), as an independent state (“EU-Turkey Relations”; Ozturk). Northern Cyprus declared independence after the 1974 invasion by the Turkish army and subsequent occupation (Ozturk). In 2005, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, which extended the Ankara Agreement’s customs union to the new EU Member States, including Cyprus (“Additional Protocol”); however, Turkey still refuses to recognize Cyprus and apply the Ankara Agreement to the country. Due to Turkey’s refusal to open its ports to ships and aircrafts from Cyprus and its "failure to apply to Cyprus the
Additionally, the Council decided that eight relevant chapters will not be opened and no chapter will be provisionally closed until Turkey recognizes Cyprus (“EU-Turkey relations”). Since 2006, the dispute on Cyprus remains unchanged, and Turkey’s accession process remains immobile (Scorecard 2014).

Democratization Efforts

There has been considerable progress made in the area of democratic reform in Turkey since 2005, and the EU recognized in its 2013 Progress Report that, “the government continued to express its commitment to further democratization and political reforms” (Masraff; “Progress Report”). However, the European Commission (EC) also stated that there is considerable room for improvement. The EC indicates the oppressive nature of the Turkish government’s response to the summer protests in 2013, particularly the “excessive force against demonstrators,” as evidence that the Turkish government still has to address certain obligations to democratization. The EU requires that Turkey improve in the protection of human rights and promotion of transparency and accountability of the government to strengthen democracy and rule of law.

However, even if there gains in the area of democratization, there remain EU members that strongly oppose Turkey’s EU accession. Greece is resolute in its opposition because it perceives Turkey and its advances in Cyprus as a top-priority security threat (Ozturk). Austria and France also raise strong opinions in opposition to Turkish EU membership, as Sarkozy does “not believe Turkey has a place in Europe” (Masraff 111). Angela Merkel of Germany also expresses doubts that Turkey will gain membership and supports establishing a privileged partnership instead (Masraff 111). However, this does not mean that Turkey should not be

7 “At several instances the police used excessive force against demonstrators. Six people died, including one policeman, thousands were injured, some of them severely, over 3,500 were taken into police custody, of whom over 112 remained in detention on judge’s decision, including members of NGOs participating in the Taksim Solidarity Platform (a grouping of associations active on the Gezi Park issue)” (Progress Report 5).
engaged with strategically. There are several areas of mutual security interest, and through collaboration in these areas a strategic relationship can be formed.

**Interests**

Turkey has a unique geopolitical location, as it is a neighbor to Europe, the Middle East, and the southern Caucasus—all regions in which the EU maintains key security interests. Turkey’s growth within the region, especially in terms of its economy, puts it in an increasingly influential position similar to giant Russia to the North and growing Iran to the East. Turkey has progressively become influential, especially in the energy industry, and it now aims to “[expand] its position as an energy and transportation hub situated at the crossroads between Europe and Central Asia” (Oskonian 24-25). Russia’s economic dominance and political influence is rooted largely in its eminent presence in the energy industry (Yesilada 15). Iran is increasingly seen as a rising power in the region, signaled by its ambitions in securing a nuclear program (Yesilada 3). However, Russia’s regional dominance may be temporary as, “[Russia] will be challenged by both Iran and Turkey within the next three decades” (Yesilada 2-3;10). This uncertainty that accompanies the changing regional power dynamic will likely be matched by instability festering in the southern Caucasus, which is plagued by frozen conflicts (Oskonian). The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the disputes over South Ossetia and Abkhazia between Russia and Georgia have made and will continue to make the southern Caucasus a vulnerable region (Oskonian). These overlapping webs of instability in the region demonstrate that: 1) none of these problems can be isolated from the others, and 2) a strategic, regional approach is integral to cultivate stability. Turkey is geographically well placed to cooperate with the EU for mutual interests in energy and regional security in the southern Caucasus.
Energy

In late 2008, a dispute arose between Russia and Ukraine over the price of gas and no consensus was reached by December 31, 2008—the final day of the existing contract for trade between the two states (Stern, Yafimava, and Pirani 4). After Russia cut off its gas exports to Ukraine, the transit country of Russian energy to EU countries, on Jan 1, 2009, “exports to 16 EU Member States and Moldova were drastically reduced on 6 January and cut completely from 7 January” resulting in a gas crisis in the EU (Stern, Yafimava, and Pirani 4). This culminated in a humanitarian crisis in the Balkans, which were largely reliant on Russian energy, due to lack of energy to heat people’s homes (Stern, Yafimava, and Pirani 4). This gas dispute demonstrated to the EU that Russia’s major gas supplier, Gazprom, was not reliable, and that the EU’s dependency on Russia and Ukraine for energy, while it may be useful due to Russia’s access to energy reserves, also made them highly vulnerable to any fluctuations in their relationship. The EU has made energy supply diversification an energy security priority (Dreyer and Stang 2). The four think tanks emphasized in their proposed European Global Strategy (EGS) that, “the diversification of both energy suppliers and energy supply lines should be pursued, together with an EU-wide connection of physical energy infrastructures in order to increase resilience to disruptions and improve overall efficiency” (EGS 9). Particularly because the EU is dependent on imports for energy—imported gas is estimated to constitute 80% of consumption by 2030—energy supply diversification must remain a priority objective for the EU (Dreyer and Stang 1).

The Caspian Sea countries, mainly Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, are considered to be promising sources of energy in the coming years. These countries’ energy resources remained largely untapped until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and are a focal point...
point for the energy industry as the “EIA estimates 48 billion barrels of oil and 292 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proved and probable reserves in the Caspian basins. Almost 75 percent of oil and 67 percent of natural gas reserves are located within 100 miles of the coast” (EIA 8). The EU has a keen interest in bolstering its relationship with Turkey, because Turkey is conveniently placed between the EU and the Caspian region, and the threats in the EU to energy security necessitate proactive planning to benefit from the plethora of energy available in the Caspian region.

Turkey has had significant economic growth over the past ten years. In fact, it almost doubled its GDP in terms of PPP from 2004 (over $688.3 billion) to 2012 (over $1.3 trillion) (World Bank). This has been accompanied by its rise in influence in the eastern European neighborhood region through its integral role as an energy transit hub (Oskanian 24). Turkey has numerous important gas pipelines running through it, including the BTC pipeline, the Southern Caucasus Pipeline, and the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline. However, Turkey is not the only major actor in the region. Russia and Iran are also showing signs of rising regional power (Yesilada 1). It is in Turkey’s interest to continue expanding its role as an energy hub and its influence in the region by creating more energy trade relationships with the EU.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline runs from Baku, the largest city in Azerbaijan through Tbilisi in Georgia, and ends in Ceyhan Turkey. “Kazakhstan has a contract with Azerbaijan and the BTC Pipeline Company to ship up to 500,000 [barrels per day] of oil via the BTC pipeline” (EIA 22), which is then shipped from Ceyhan by tanker mainly to European markets. Running parallel to the BTC pipeline is the newer Southern Caucasus pipeline (SCP), which also runs from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey. In Addition, the Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TANAP), which will connect to the SCP, is currently in progress. It was signed in
2011, and once it is produced, TANAP will be able to transit oil from the second stage of Shah Deniz, the largest reserve in Azerbaijan, to Turkey (Socor). This pipeline will “run from the Georgia-Turkey border to the Turkey-Greece border” (Socor).

Joint projects between the EU and the leaders of this eastern resource-rich region, notably Turkey, will become important parts of the EU’s energy security and the objective of supply diversification. The Southern Gas Corridor is a major project undertaken by the EC in conjunction with countries in the Southern Caucasus and Caspian region, including Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. Upon completion of this project, the new Southern Gas Corridor will run from Shah Deniz II, Azerbaijan through the TANAP, through the SCP, and into the EU through the Adriatic pipeline, which runs “870 kilometers across Greece, Albania, and on the seabed of the Adriatic Sea, terminating in southern Italy and connecting there with the Italian pipeline grid” (Socor). The plan for the Southern Gas Corridor was finalized in December of 2013, when the European Commission announced the final investment decision of “more than 18 billion Euro [to] be invested in platforms and subsea wells to extract 16 billion cubic meters of gas in water depths of 500 meters in the Caspian sea” (European Commission: “Gas from Azerbaijan”). Though the new corridor is not yet completed, the finalization of the plans indicate that the EU has begun to realize the strategic importance of Turkey as an energy interest and take action accordingly; this is the first step to a stronger, long-term relationship with Turkey.

_Frozen Conflicts_

The southern Caucasus remains a region that perpetuates conflict and instability. Tension between Georgia and Russia in the Georgian secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia finally broke into conflict in the August War of 2008 (Oskonian 24). It began with an
operation by Georgia to seize those territories and the subsequent retaking of the territory by Russia, which used its upper hand to push the border of Georgia back even further ("Five Years On"). Tensions still remain and the likelihood of another conflict remains significant; Georgia and Russia “promptly broke off diplomatic relations with each other while the Russian and Georgian leaders indulged in undiplomatic insults,” though the new Georgian government has claimed that it is interested in restoring economic relationships with Moscow ("Five Years On"). The frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh, the disputed territory of on the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan has created heightened tensions between the two countries. After the peace talks on the dispute were halted in 2011, tensions have been escalating such that military conflict could break out again unless there is pressure from influential regional actors to break the diplomatic deadlock (Crisis Group). In fact, the tensions have also spread to areas along the border with the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan, away from the original area of conflict at Nagorno-Karabakh (Crisis Group).

The EU has a variety of instruments with which it has incorporated the countries in these frozen conflicts. In Georgia, the EU is involved in policy mostly in democracy promotion, development, and border control. The EU includes Georgia in the ENP and EaP for the purpose of stability and development and democracy promotion. The EU aims for a stronger bilateral relationship in terms of stronger economic integration and political cooperation through employment of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement which was later replaced by the ENP action plan ("EEAS: Georgia"). The EU led also the European Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in a civilian CSDP mission in Georgia from 2008 to 2013 after the 2008 conflict with Russia. The purpose was to stabilize the area by monitoring the stabilization process and the internally displaced person (IDP) situation, and by “contributing to the reduction of tensions through
liaison, facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence-building measures” (“EEAS: EUMM Georgia”). On top of this the EU also provides bilateral funding for democratic and economic development and stability through the ENPI, amounting to 180.7 million euro from 2011-2013 (“EEAS: Georgia”).

The EU employs similar instruments in Armenia. Armenia is part of the ENP and EaP for purposes of development and stabilization. An Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area was finalized in 2013. However, “given Armenia's wish to join the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, announced in September 2013,” the Associations Agreement was ultimately not completed as it clashed with this Customs Union (“EEAS: Armenia”). Armenia also receives bilateral assistance from the EU, amounting to 157 million euro during 2011 to 2013 (“EEAS: Armenia”). In fact, EU assistance to Armenia has increased since the country pulled out of the Association Agreement with the EU (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”).

The EU also covers policy for Azerbaijan within its ENP and EaP. The EU’s ENP Action Plan, like its priorities for the other Southern Caucasus countries remain “democratization, human rights, socio-economic reform, poverty alleviation, energy, conflicts, and sectoral issues” (“EEAS: Azerbaijan”). The EC has also provided technical assistance to Azerbaijan to promoting democratization and rule of law, economic reforms, and regional development (“EEAS: Azerbaijan”). In the case of Azerbaijan, the EU does attempt to directly address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but by appointed a special EU ambassador to the region to “facilitate dialogue between the EU and the countries of the region, assist the EU in developing a comprehensive policy towards the countries of the region, and support existing conflict prevention and peace-settlement mechanisms” (“EEAS: Azerbaijan”).
Turkey’s relationships with Georgia and Azerbaijan are based on the framework of their trade relations. On top of the cultural similarities that come from their geographic proximity, their trade relationships further buttress relations. “Beyond Georgia, Turkey is the main conduit for Azerbaijan’s oil exports – through the BTC pipeline – and, potentially, gas exports” (Oskanian 26). Turkey also holds a “one nation, two states” principle of foreign relations with Azerbaijan, and the two countries are actively pursuing stronger bilateral relations. They signed an “Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance” and a “Joint Statement on the establishment of a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” in August and September of 2010 (“Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan”). Turkey’s relationship with Georgia has been similarly very strong due to bilateral trade and regional efforts in the energy sector, particularly the BTC pipeline. In fact, “Turkey ranks [as] the first biggest trade partner of Georgia with a bilateral trade volume of 1.4 billion USD” (“Relations between Turkey and Georgia”). They are also in the process of taking visa liberalization to facilitate travel between Turkey and Georgia without the requirement of a passport (“Relations between Turkey and Georgia”).

Relations between Turkey and Armenia continue to be strained. While Armenia insists that the incident in 1915 in Armenia should be called genocide, Turkey refuses to recognize it as such (Punsmann 4). These poor relations are made worse by the strong ties between Turkey and Azerbaijan, which entails that Turkey supports the Azeri side of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and directly impacts the Turkey-Armenia relationship. “The closure of the border at the height of the war in Karabakh is the Turkish retaliation to Armenia’s occupation of the Azerbaijani territories” (Punsmann 4). In 2009, after months of preparation, Turkey and Armenia signed the Turkish-Armenia protocol, a plan including detailed steps and a timetable.
for establishing better a diplomatic relationship between the two countries (Punsmann 5).

However, after Turkey encouraged linking the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict into the negotiations, the protocol has halted in its progress (Punsmann 5). The EU and Turkey are both heavily invested in the Southern Caucasus, and have it in their interest to bring about stability and development. Turkey and the EU can find areas of mutual interest and shared objectives, particularly economic development and stabilization, in which there is potential for collaboration.

It is clear that Turkey has created strong frameworks, politically and, especially, in terms of trade to interact bilaterally with these countries. Because it has so much invested in these countries through their relationships, Turkey does have an interest in finding a peaceful resolution for these foreign conflicts. However, these strong bilateral ties have proven fairly ineffective when it comes to the problems of “Russia’s volatile relationship with Georgia, and the intractability of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, two issues over which Ankara has little direct influence” (Oskanian 24). Recently, Turkey has made an attempt to interact with the region multi-laterally in a new and innovative approach to these issues called the Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP). The CSCP was a framework proposed by Turkey that included Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia set up in response to the 2008 Russian-Georgian conflict for the purpose of conflict resolution through this regional approach, rather than bilateral relationships (Punsmann 11).

While this framework has been viewed as “innovative” in its regional approach, the inability to bring about progress in Nagorno-Karabakh has prevented the CSDP from becoming formally created: “three years after its announcement, the principles, decision-making mechanisms and structure of the CSCP still couldn’t be worked out” (Punsmann 11).
It can also be seen above that the EU has a lot invested in the Southern Caucasus. It has employed many instruments to approach Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, invested monetary assistance in economic stability, development, and democracy promotion in these areas, and has also provided technical assistance by leading a civilian mission into Georgia. Despite these strong bilateral relationships, though, the root of the instability—the frozen conflicts—has yet to be addressed. The EU is also part of an institution associated with the OSCE called the Minsk group, which aims to hold conferences for the purpose of deciding a peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (OSCE: Background). The co-chairs, representatives from France, Russia, and the U.S have agreed that, “the status quo is unacceptable, and that only a peaceful, negotiated settlement can bring the prospect of a better, more certain future to the people who used to live in the territories and those who live there now” (“Executive Summary”); however, the Minsk group has thus far been unable to hold a single conference (OSCE: Background). The EU could make a difference by initiating an effective multi-lateral approach to the Southern Caucasus’s frozen conflicts—one in which the countries in conflict play major roles. Experts express that the EU has legitimacy as a neutral actor in the Southern Caucasus and has the potential to have greater influence if there existed a multi-lateral framework under which the EU could encourage progress on these issues (Fotiou 11; Boonstra and Melvin 1). The EU and Turkey both have experience with regional approaches to these frozen conflicts; collaboration for a stronger multi-lateral framework has the potential to bring about definitive progress.

Options

There are three scenarios for the EU-Turkey relationship that would affect the EU’s security policy objectives in the neighborhood region:
The first option is to maintain the status quo with the EU continuing its current relationship with Turkey. As it currently stands, Turkey will continue some cooperation in terms of energy, such as the Southern Gas Corridor, and minor non-formalized cooperation in areas of mutual security interest. Turkey is currently the largest non-EU contributor to CSDP missions, particularly in the neighborhood region. In fact, “Ankara provided the second-largest contingent of 255 military personnel to EUFOR Althea, the EU’s force in Bosnia, and 48 law enforcement officers to the police mission in Bosnia. It has also contributed 55 law enforcement personnel to EULEX in Kosovo and indicated a willingness to increase the number to 150 personnel in 2011” (Grabbe and Ulgen 9). Turkey is clearly devoted to being an active part of EU CSDP missions. A collaborative approach to defense and security would create greater capacity for action; however, continuation of the status quo will ignore formalized engagement, and conform relations to ad hoc participation by Turkey in the CSDP. Simultaneously, the rising threats of the frozen conflicts in the neighborhood area will not be extinguished on their own. These threats will continue pose a threat, and the EU will remain largely unable to act in tandem with Turkey, a growing power in the region, to put out these threats.

The second scenario would be one in which no progress is made in the accession process and no other security partnerships are formed with Turkey. As Turkey is showing trends of growing economic and political influence over the neighborhood region, there is the possibility that Turkey will begin to express less interest in accession or partnerships with the EU, preferring instead to act on its own. In fact, Turkey’s current trends, showing lack of commitment to democratization, demonstrate that Turkey’s current administration tends more towards authoritarianism (Progress Report 5). This lack of commitment to both democratization and the EU accession process will force the continuation of EU blocks to
Turkish accession (Cengiz and Hoffmann 1). In this case, Turkey’s divergence from the EU would create a less cooperative relationship between the EU and Turkey, and would be detrimental to the EU’s security objectives in the region considering its strategic interest in Turkey.

The final scenario is one in which the EU takes the initiative to improve the EU-Turkey relationship through a framework in which the EU can engage with Turkey on a more strategic level. In this case, the EU must break through its current barrier of viewing Turkey as solely a country considered for accession and begin to establish a strategic relationship based on the acknowledgement that Turkey has strategic value—especially in the areas of energy security and regional insecurity in the Balkans and Southern Caucasus. We advocate that the EU go through with this ‘break-through’ option of breaking from past policy frameworks and developing a new security relationship with Turkey.

Recommendations

Short-Term

• First, the EU must overcome the tunnel-vision mindset of Turkey as solely an Enlargement candidate and internally acknowledge that Turkey has strategic value on its own. Only after doing this can the EU begin to work on a strategic relationship with Turkey that is not forced into the Enlargement framework.

• Next, the EU should ensure that Turkey is associated with the CSDP, both in terms of planning and in execution and not solely on an ad hoc basis. Especially in regions of mutual interest, such as the Balkans and the policies for stabilization and fostering economic development there, Turkey has interest in being associated with and involved in formalized dialogue on the CSDP missions. Increased cooperation will lead to greater
capacity in CSDP operations. Additionally, this fosters a stronger relationship between the EU and Turkey as equals.

- **The EU should initiate more trade ties with Turkey in the area of energy.** Not only will this directly address the threats to the EU’s energy security and its objectives of energy supply diversification, but also new ties will bolster the EU-Turkey relations. The EU has recognized the importance of making this relationship stronger, as is demonstrated in its finalizing of the plans for a Southern Gas Corridor. It is imperative that the EU goes through with these plans and maintains close energy trade relations with Turkey.

*Mid-Term*

- **The EU must engage with Turkey directly to discuss the frozen conflicts,** particularly Nagorno-Karabakh. Both the EU and Turkey have interests in the Southern Caucasus’s development, and both have experience in trying to engage them in multilateral frameworks towards resolution of their conflicts. The EU should cooperate with Turkey, both because Turkey’s influence in the region is undeniable, and because the two could build off of their individual experiences. Through this cooperation, they have the potential to create a new framework to work towards a regional system to address Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

*Long-Term*

- **Finally, the EU must create a long-term security relationship, a strategic partnership, with Turkey that is layered on top of the accession process and its status as an accession candidate.** This new strategic partnership should be used to
create a dialogue between the countries on their mutual security interests, and initiate cooperation towards addressing these regional threats.

• It is imperative that this new partnership instrument is upgraded. While strategic partnerships primarily address security issues, “trade and economic concerns [also] dominate the EU’s interactions with its strategic partners” (Renard 2).

• Turkey has rejected the idea of a privileged partnership proposed by a number of EU states opposed to its accession on the grounds that this would downgrade its relationship to the EU (Masraff 19). It is imperative that the new relationship is layered on top of its current accession candidacy status so as not to be perceived by Turkey as a downgrade in its relationship with the EU.

It is necessary that the EU take these steps towards creating a stronger, long-term strategic relationship with Turkey because it will not be able to establish such a partnership quickly. The relationship between the EU and Turkey is beginning to turn sour because of lack of progress in the accession process. The relationship is not level, but favors the EU as the deciding power in the accession of Turkey to its Union; on the contrary, an effective strategic partnership requires a level relationship between two more equally powerful actors, a relationship that the EU and Turkey currently do not have (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). For this reason, it is necessary to begin changing the EU mindset towards Turkey and create smaller relationships with Turkey through mutual interests in trade and stability in the Southern Caucasus and Balkans to shift towards a more level relationship that is conducive to creating a long-term strategic partnership.
Conclusion

By Naomi Eissinger, Rina Harsch, and Joelle Klein

Moving Forward: A New Regional Security Framework for the European Neighborhood

As witnessed in the previous case studies, the EU is in need of a more comprehensive long-term framework for the European Neighborhood if it intends to remain an effective regional actor. In Ukraine it became clear that the EU needs to reconsider its relationship to Russia and re-frame its ENP and EaP policies to better address its crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities. In the Western Balkans the EU must integrate a regional security framework within its Enlargement policy to successfully ensure the potential of the Western Balkans as future Member States. Finally, in light of Turkey’s growing influence in the neighborhood region the EU must overcome its limited engagement with Turkey under the Enlargement policy and integrate Turkey into a strategic partnership and comprehensive security framework to cooperate in areas of mutual interest. We argue for the creation of regional security frameworks to address the EU’s strategic priorities on a more individualized scale. Regional conflicts and security challenges within the vast umbrella of the ENP (Eastern Partnership, Southern Mediterranean, Middle East, & North Africa) are so specific that we advocate for the need for a more focused European Neighborhood policy that excludes the MENA region.

A strategic regional framework for the European Neighborhood is justified based on these recommendations:

- The EU needs to develop a strategic framework for Russia. As we have seen, Russia is becoming a more assertive regional actor, and the EU’s current foreign policy
instruments need to better address this change in regional geopolitics. Russia’s role in the current Ukrainian crisis, its influence in the Balkans, and its position as a dominant energy provider all directly impact the EU’s regional strategic priorities. If the EU wants to remain a relevant regional actor, its policy instruments cannot avoid addressing Russia’s regional influence any longer.

- Turkey should be included in the Eastern Partnership region due to its engagement in the Southern Caucasus and its interests in the Balkans. We also recommend the inclusion of Turkey within MENA’s policy framework due to Turkey’s leverage in the Middle East. The EU must begin engaging with Turkey on a more strategic level, both as a strategic partner and a multilateral actor within both regional strategic frameworks of the EaP and MENA.

Furthermore, these strategic regional frameworks should work towards addressing the following regional priorities:

- Economic Security: As we have seen within Ukraine and the Balkans, regional conflicts often escalate in times of economic crisis. The EU can work to prevent this by creating more comprehensive and effective financial aid packages that protect its neighbors and partners from slipping into internal crisis. Furthermore, to avoid exacerbating existing conflicts, the EU needs to consider the economic effects of its crisis management instruments and capabilities on the internal stability of countries in crisis.

- Human Security: The EU must reassess its crisis management and conflict prevention capabilities and instruments within a long-term regional strategic framework. As the crisis in Ukraine has shown, the ENP and EaP policies are ineffective crisis management and conflict prevention instruments. The existence of IDPs (Internally Displaced
Persons) in Moldova and Georgia, violent protests in Ukraine, and potential escalation of frozen conflicts within the Southern Caucasus and the Balkans present major security threats for internal conflict and inequality within the EU’s neighborhood and partnerships. The EU needs to better address Human Security within its policies in order to effectively progress its regional strategic priorities.

- Energy Security: As was demonstrated by the 2009 energy dispute between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU, as well as the resulting energy crisis and humanitarian crisis in the Balkans, energy security—the “uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA)—remains a priority crucial to European security. Building a stronger relationship with Turkey can create opportunities for greater diversification of supply, an essential tool for providing energy security in the EU.

- Russia as an active regional influence: Analysts have long been advocating that the EU needs a more strategic structure for Russia, discussion of which has so far lead to a dead end. One way to potentially break this internal deadlock is to give leaders a larger perspective of what is at stake for other actors within specific regions. As EU foreign policy expert Richard Youngs has said “Don’t assume [the EU] need[s] to get it right first and then go out to interact in these multilateral institutions. Instead, engage other actors from the very beginning” (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). Accordingly, we suggest the multilateralization of forming a strategic approach to Russia by engaging other relevant actors in discussions over shared regional security concerns. In the medium to long-term, Russia should be included in discussions related to a regional security framework for Wider Europe. In the short term, however, as Youngs also pointed out, the EU’s ability to influence Putin’s regime in a positive, constructive
direction is very limited. While waiting for ‘regime change’ in Russia, however, the EU cannot afford to neglect or ignore Russia’s current regional objectives which run contrary to EU interests.
Chapter 2: The MENA

Path to a Global Strategy: How the European Union will secure its Influence in the Middle East

By Yasamine Firoozi & Sophie Hubbell

Introduction

Challenges Facing the European Union

The challenges the EU has in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region are undoubtedly urgent. The Arab Spring has ushered in an era of intense intra-state conflict across North Africa and the Sahel while the Syrian civil war has intensified the fragility of the Middle East more broadly. Sectarian tensions have also intensified, further destabilizing an already chaotic political and social environment. The severe spillover effects of these conflicts across the majority of MENA speaks to the high levels of political, economic, and human instability that plague the region. The stagnation of the Middle East Peace Process has put further strain on Arab-Israeli relations and has a significantly negative effect on the region’s potential for peace and security (Lewis 92). A modestly concealed power struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia has increasingly affected the diplomatic relations of the regional powers causing a pervasive environment of mistrust. The recurrence of political instability, violence, economic breakdown, and resource scarcity illustrates the longevity of insecurity in the MENA and the alarming
absence of a cooperative regional security framework. If MENA conditions remain as they are, the likelihood of widespread violent conflict, state failure and even inter-state conflict in the Middle East will unfold in the future. The proximity of MENA to Europe merits urgent, strategic engagement by the EU.

*Post-Arab Spring: Lack of Political Reform & the Probability of Future Conflict*

Intra-state regional conflict within Europe’s extended neighborhood has substantially intensified since the emergence, and aftermath, of the Arab Spring. Complicating the security and political environment, post-Arab Spring crisis management across North Africa was severely lacking. The situation in Egypt has prompted intense concern, as General Sisi’s military rule grows increasingly repressive, resulting in catastrophic fragmentation of civil society and political parties (Michou 2014 1). Following these dangerous patterns, the reversion of Egyptian political structures back to authoritarian rule perpetuates and potentially legitimizes the shallowness of political reform among the ‘non-revolutionary reformist models’ such as Algeria and Morocco (Youngs 2011 4). Severe authoritarian rule will continue to generate discontent and violent conflict in the region as the unanswered democratic demands of the popular uprisings frustrate civil societies (Youngs 2011 4). If the EU does not pursue high level engagement with civil society in the Middle East, “the prospect for further uprisings, and even renewed revolution, [will be] high: unrest resulting in high societal pressures and unresolved grievances is likely to become the new normal in North Africa” (Lewis 91). Given the EU’s declining influence in the Middle East, the strategic challenges posed by MENA with regards to post-Arab Spring instability are urgent (Dworkin 31-33). Given the region’s existing fragility, the prospect of stabilizing North Africa after another wave of revolution will pose exponential challenges to EU foreign policy. The urgency of swift, strategic EU engagement and leadership
in North Africa’s path to stabilization is vital. Combatting the EU’s growing irrelevance in the international arena will hinge on the effectiveness and efficiency of its involvement in its Southern Neighborhood (Lewis 117). While political rigidity and the prospects of recurring revolution pose significant challenges for the region, the fragmentation of armed coalitions and widespread institutional deficits across North Africa are the fundamental drivers of the repressive political structures and stagnant reform observed today.

Institutional Deficits & Fragmentation of armed groups:

Fragmentation of armed oppositions across the MENA region has imploded the security sectors in Libya, Syria, and Yemen with significant destabilizing effects on neighboring countries across North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf (Mikail 2014 32). The impact of this fragmentation across the MENA region resulted in “a deteriorating security situation, power voids…economic crisis… [and] the lack of strong institutions and a clear decision-making process,” (Toaldo). Fragmented armed coalitions led to a number of excessively unstable countries across the region, which are “awash with weapons and militias, some of whom have connections with terrorist networks” (Grevi 28). This poses a serious threat to the future stability of these countries, European homeland security, and the security of neighboring countries. Rising terrorist activity across the MENA has also been noted by EUROPOL in its conclusion that, “the instability in...MENA post ‘Arab Spring’ continues to be exploited by extremist groups, which have capitalised on the profusion of unsecure weapons and reduced security levels in some states in order to consolidate their presence…[and] have had significant effects on how terrorist groups present their struggle and justify their violent actions” (European Terrorism Situation 21). Fragmentation then, has produced a lawless and chaotic environment which renders the necessary political solutions—which will stabilize these countries in the long-
term—lacking the required foundational structures from which reform and governance can develop. Alongside the strengthening of terrorist activity and rhetoric, sectarian driven violence also flourishes within these conflicts with significantly destabilizing effects.

Sectarian Strife, the Spillover Effect & the MENA Trust Deficit

Fragmentation of Syrian armed coalitions has largely divulged on sectarian lines (Ayub 6). The ability of outside—Sunni and Shia—actors to influence conditions on the ground poses serious concern for the viability of peace in Syria’s near future. Supporting this is Mikail’s notion that: “all the protagonists of the war in Syria have their own international backers, and links with external patrons have so far deepened their determination to continue fighting,” (Mikail 2014, 31). The ongoing nature of the Syrian conflict has placed significant burden on its neighbors as vulnerable borders and refugee populations stretch national budgets and amplify social tensions (Grevi 32). The implications of sectarian driven violence are significant. It has prolonged intra-state conflicts through its divisive effects, incentivized outside actors to engage in the domestic affairs of conflicted states in the pursuit of self-interest, and, as a result, the widespread engagement in sectarian driven struggles for power have destabilized neighboring countries as well as the capacity of MENA States to foster cooperative diplomatic relations (Scorecard 2014).

That “Saudi Arabia and Iran consider that they are engaged in a decisive struggle for regional hegemony in Syria,” has produced destructive results across the region (Grevi 31). The Saudi and Qatari boosting of Salafis in Lebanon, “to challenge Hezbollah’s armed predominance, presuming Bashar al-Assad’s eventual demise to represent a moment of opportunity to weaken the Shia resistance movement,” speaks to the severity of the ‘spillover effect’ that intra-state conflict and sectarian divisions have on the region (Youngs 2013 4) Iran
engages in the same behavior to counter Sunni influence as it, “...fears that the fall of Assad could lead to the installation of a pro-Western and pro-Saudi regime in Damascus. This is why it sent military trainers and allegedly weapons and money to support the Syrian regime, while its Lebanon-based ally Hezbollah is fighting with Assad’s troops” (Mikail 2014 33).

Experts have commented on the engagement of Iran and Saudi Arabia in an ‘Arab Cold War’ using the instrument of sectarianism to propel State power, and pursue self-interest (Valbjorn). Broader regional tensions at the international level are likely to intensify as these regional powers work against each other via sectarian ‘proxy war’ (Lewis). As destabilizing as this behavior is for the viability of a peaceful MENA, its greater significance lies in its impact on the diplomatic relations of the region. That “trust is one of the scarcest resources in international politics…” in the MENA region is a product of this ‘Arab Cold War’ dynamic between the states (Lewis 67). Lack of trust among the regional—Saudi Arabia and Iran—and middle powers—such as Turkey and Qatar—has materialized itself in the form of a MENA region that lacks any coherent, cooperative security framework.

The severity of MENA fragility has been noted in a new European Security Strategy study conducted by Fride stating that, “over the next 20 years the most frequent threat highlighted was conflict in the EU’s neighborhood…” (Lewis 117). That the EU has not been an assertive actor in the region with a strategic purpose speaks to the notion by various policy experts that instability in the Neighborhood will likely become Europe’s greatest security threat. With this notion, the European Union’s (EU) security approach to MENA may not be comprehensive enough as the US withdraws from the region, instability grows rampant at the local and regional level, and the global order meanwhile shifts from unipolarity to multipolarity. Given these current and anticipated transitions, “the need to find a new point of equilibrium
between geopolitical competition and cooperative frameworks is a challenge that needs to be addressed today,” (Lewis 71). If the EU does not assume a strategic position of balanced leadership, at the least in its MENA Neighborhood, the looming threat of EU irrelevance will materialize in the near future.

The Need for a Renewed European Approach

Changes in the MENA

The 2003 ESS identifies numerous and diverse threats to a secure Middle East and North Africa region. Terrorism linked to violent religious extremism continues to be a growing strategic threat (ESS 2003 3). Violent conflicts mark the landscape of the Middle East and are situated close to the European Union. State failure continues to threaten regional stability in the Middle East and can be a potential source for organized crime and terrorism and thus a detriment to the rule of law (ESS 2003 4). Violent uprisings in Tunisia and Mali created a vortex of instability in North Africa and the Western Sahel in 2010 (Haken). 2011 and 2012 saw these popular uprisings spread to the Arab Peninsula and the Levant beginning as popular protest and leading to shallow political reform in Morocco, peaceful revolution in Egypt, violent revolution in Libya, and civil war in Syria (Haken). A storm of instability and state failure has taken shape across the Middle East and North Africa leading to a situation that now requires renewed EU attention to the region, especially as Europeans can no longer rest assured that the United States will provide effective leadership in addressing regional challenges.

The Decline of US Leadership

The Obama Administration is attempting to implement a policy framework in the region under a more sophisticated and holistic approach. However, the erosion of US global power in the wake of the Bush administration’s military and diplomatic errors have called into question
the extent to which the US can engage with the Middle East (Nitze). The pressure of rebuilding
the American economy and the aftermath of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have put the US in an
increasingly constrained position (Nitze). The EU can potentially seize this opportunity to re-
engage with the Middle East and take on more substantial leadership needed to negotiate peace
in the region. The Middle East represents the EU’s backyard and hence the EU is far more
exposed to the threats this region poses in Europe. The US-coordinated soft power strategy
focuses primarily on the Israeli-Palestinian issue in addition to high-level efforts to continue
Arab-Israeli peace negotiations (Kagan 1). US development and military aid are also largely
concentrated on Israel and Palestine in addition to Egypt and Jordan (Kagan 1). American
policies toward Iran are concentrated almost solely on the nuclear issue. Saudi Arabia continues
to purchase American weapons systems; however, few actions have been taken by the US to
facilitate a deeper partnership against Iranian instability (Kagan 1). Through upgraded
engagement with the Gulf region and an integrated policy approach to the Middle East and
North Africa, the EU has the potential to create a broader Middle Eastern regional framework.

**Existing Policy Instruments: The Need for Strategic Engagement Priorities**

*European Neighborhood Policy*

The European Neighborhood consists of 16 countries covering North Africa, the
Southern Caucus, the Levant and Mediterranean and Eastern European countries. The
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) is Europe’s primary instrument of engagement with its
‘neighborhood,’ setting out economic integration, conflict management, and political reform as
its main objectives. The essence of the ENP’s conditionality based approach can be, “summed
up in two slogans ‘more for more’ and the ‘3Ms’ - money, mobility and markets” (Dworkin 27).
While the economic and trade objectives of the ENP have been implemented with relative
success, the political objectives of the ENP have produced much more disappointing results (Scorecard 2013, 2014). The conclusion drawn by the European Council of Foreign Relations are quite negative: “if 2012 was a year in which the EU’s lack of a political approach to the changing Middle East and North Africa region disappointed, 2013 was the year in which the irrelevance of the ENP to major developments in the southern Mediterranean became clear” (Scorecard 2014). The landscape of Europe’s neighborhood has been significantly altered since the ENP’s inception as rapidly emerging crisis, competition for influence among economically powerful regional actors, resource scarcities, and economic, social, and political breakdown have produced a MENA region that is largely unresponsive to the ENP’s methods of engagement.

The fact that EU engagement in North African post-conflict stabilization has been limited to a delayed, small border mission in Libya (EUBAM) and otherwise remained largely focused on economic ties, has driven policy experts to conclude that, “North Africa is the CSDP’s graveyard” (Howorth; Scorecard 2014). These and challenges to EU policies suggest that the relevance of the EU in the new global order will be determined based on its political achievements first, and those of its economy second. As a strategic policy instrument, the ENP falls short in nature and scope due to its lack of a normative political approach, conditionality based financing, and disregard for the thematic and regional dimensions that dictate MENA affairs (Dworkin 32-33). The sporadic and inconsistent nature of European engagement under the ENP, from its calls for political reform and democratic transitions yet continued allocation of non-military aid to the Egyptian military regime of General Sisi has, “...indicated to the rest of the region that the EU’s commitment to upholding the rule of law and democratic development was, at best, highly conditional” (Scorecard 2014). The non-normative political
character of the EU in MENA also has a historical legacy as the pre-Arab Spring autocracies of North Africa enjoyed European support and complicity “…in exchange for their cooperation in keeping their teeming populations…at arms length. The result has been a curiously insubstantial trans-Mediterranean relationship,” (Dworkin 6). This lack of strategic, normative political approach has largely been to the detriment of ENP and EU relevance in the region.

The emergence of new players—namely Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Iran—contending for influence in the region, whose funds are accompanied by less conditionality than Europe’s, has created what Dennison has named Europe’s ‘soft power dilemma’ (Dennison 2013 3). The ‘more-for-more’ principle, then, appears to have become “… a wasting asset in a world in which other regions and powers are increasingly self-confident…[making] ideological, financial and political competition in Europe’s southern neighborhood” likely to persist and even intensify in the future (Dennison 2013, 3). Finally, the manner in which the ENP defines Europe’s ‘Neighborhood’ and segments the MENA region has contributed to the EU’s growing irrelevance (Grevi 16). The neglect of broader Middle East incorporation into its policy framework is perhaps to blame for the EU’s lack of comprehensive engagement as, “…splitting up the Mediterranean and the rest of the Middle East for the EU’s bureaucratic convenience bellies the political and economic logic of the region,” (Echague 2011 2). The EU’s concept of the ‘European Neighborhood’ is an artificially constructed reality, which drives Europe to assume that the geographical proximity of these countries ties them more closely to Europe, relative to other regional structures and dynamics. However, this is not the case as North Africa is, in reality, more closely tied to the broader Middle East than to Europe in cultural, political and security terms (Grevi 17). Middle Eastern and North African societies want freedom, political representation and economic recovery but they do not want the, “European acquis,”
(Dworkin 32). In light of these misfires, re-strategizing the political approach of the ENP, and the scope of the ‘Neighborhood’ concept is urgently required before the region splits into further chaos and instability.

**Case Studies: Justifying a New Strategic Approach to MENA**

*Non-Proliferation and the Rise of Iran*

The 2003 ESS demonstrates a strong commitment to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes against the proliferation of WMDs, and outlines proliferation as the single greatest threat to European security (ESS 2003). Advancements in Iran’s nuclear program were brought to Europe’s attention in the 2008 Review of the ESS (Review 2008 1) and remain a strategic concern in this European Grand Strategy. EU nuclear diplomacy has successfully constructed a deal with Iran in curtailing the country’s uranium enrichment program (Gearan). This interim deal paves the way for a final agreement; however, Iran can no longer be isolated with respect to the nuclear issue. Tehran’s coordinated strategy to extend its sphere of influence can have damaging effects on regional stability. Furthermore, the EU needs to develop a strategic approach that can both contain Iran’s exporting of instability and engage Iran constructively with aid and economic relations should nuclear diplomacy achieve a successful outcome.

*Rising Actors in the Gulf Region*

In recent years the Gulf States have substantially increased their involvement and influence in the process of political transition and security within MENA. They are continuing to assert their global presence with marked success, specifically in the critical region where Europe is faltering—its Neighborhood (Ulrichsen). Aside from economic strength, the ‘diplomatic prestige’ of Saudi Arabia was evident through the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002
which offered universal and normalized Arab relations with Israel in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian State (Bazoobandi 11). The undercurrent of sectarianism that has swept across the region has exacerbated conflicts and regional tensions, but the Sunni-Shia divide is arguably exaggerated (Youngs 2013 4). The nature of Saudi regional politics and sectarian competition - particularly with Iran - have placed it in a position of both opportunity and challenge for the EU. The complex nature of Gulf politics and relations, namely the pragmatism of Qatari foreign policy and its effects on Qatari-Saudi relations, provides Europe with a number of entry points through which it can assert its ‘value-added’ contribution to international security.
Iran:

Understanding the regional threat of Iran beyond the Nuclear Issue
By: Sophie Hubbell

Iran in the Context of Regional Instability

The Rise of Iran

For several years Iran has continued to pursue a coordinated soft power strategy for expanding its sphere of influence in the Middle East. Tehran invests in both hard and soft power activities designed to destabilize the Middle East (Kagan 1). From the Persian Gulf through the Levant and into Afghanistan, Tehran will continue to use its coherent strategy to extend its influence (Kagan 1). The existence of such a strategy can no longer be ignored by the EU as Iran extends its influence and pushes back US presence and hostile Arab ambitions (Kagan 1). The use of soft power supports Iran’s goal of becoming a regional leader and is a comprehensive effort to mitigate isolation from the West since the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Kagan 3). By establishing proxy relationships in Syria and Lebanon, Iran hopes to confront the West and position itself as the natural leader of an Islamic world (Kagan 3). Iran’s external political, diplomatic, economic, religious, cultural, security, and proxy activities are essential to its revolutionary nature and inherently run counter to EU and US goals in the Middle East (Kagan 3). However, the US has a steeper uphill climb ahead in its efforts to build relations with Tehran. In a position of greater neutrality, the EU has an opportunity for principal leadership in the Middle East.

Iran plays a leading role in the region, but the risk of continued instability and regional conflict emanating from the Islamic Republic is a constant threat. In an in-class discussion,
Richard Youngs argued that the security risks involved in Iran are the greatest challenges the EU will face in the Middle East (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy). Youth is the largest population bloc in Iran with over 60 percent of Iran’s 73 million people under the age of 30 (Memarian). Iranian youth are also the most politically active in the 57 nations of the Islamic world (Memarian). This portion of the population represents one of the most urgent threats to Iran’s theocratic rule as they generate influence in Iran’s political agenda and involvement in movements for democratic change (Memarian). “A young population can transform society” according to Youngs and the EU does not have a plan for continued liberalization in Iran and engagement with Iranian society (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy).

Tehran’s hard power strategy is critical to its soft power ambitions, which include the possibility of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Iran’s nuclear activities and missile developments have produced lasting suspicions and a decade of negotiations all directed at curtailing Iran’s uranium enrichment program (Grevi 5). The threat of a Middle East arms race as a result of Iran’s continued pursuit of nuclear power is the European Union’s most pressing regional concern (Grevi 5). Without concerted efforts, Iran’s nuclear advancements could reach a military threshold resulting in a withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Grevi 5). After negotiations in Geneva, Iran and 6 major powers, also known as the P5+1, reached a historic nuclear deal in November (Gearan). In exchange for temporary relief from some economic sanctions, Iran will freeze key parts of its nuclear program (Gearan). The agreement requires Iran to halt or scale back parts of its nuclear infrastructure (Gearan). Halting the installation of new centrifuges used to enrich uranium and capping the amount and type of enriched uranium Iran is allowed to produce are effective freezes and reverse any progression of Iran’s nuclear facilities (Gearan). Halting the installation of new centrifuges used to enrich
uranium and capping the amount and type of enriched uranium Iran is allowed to produce potentially reverses progress at all of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Intended as a first step towards a more comprehensive nuclear deal to be reached in six months, the accord reached in Geneva can restore confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program (Gearan). The success of diplomacy and dialogue that will follow the recent 2013 nuclear deal however, is uncertain. With this in mind, it is crucial to ask whether or not the EU has a plan for dealing with Iran under the two possible scenarios: one that the accord succeeds, the other that it fails. This question is especially acute in light of American withdrawal from the region

**Background**

*The Incoherence of US Leadership in the Middle East*

The Obama Administration shows commitment to diplomacy and dialogue in the Middle East rather than resting solely on hard power activities. The recent removal of US military forces from the Middle East, however, did not culminate in the diplomatic, political and economic surges as predicted by US foreign policy (Kagan 1). Iraqi society has spiraled once again into violent terrorism and sectarian strife in the hands of Al Qaeda (Kagan 1). The 2011 Arab uprising in Syria was potentially an opportunity for the U.S. to unseat one of Iran’s most vital allies, yet few actions have been taken by the US in response to Lebanese Hezbollah’s invasion in Syria; the first military operation undertaken by an Iranian proxy (Kagan 1). As a result, Richard Youngs argues that the EU will need to distance its Middle East policy from U.S. thinking as the intensity of American interest in the region begins to wane (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). The US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan presents a striking pivot by the US away from the Middle East and new uncertainties about the sustainability of American power in the region. The EU can heed this opportunity to reengage with Iran on more pressing
issues—concerning regional stability. At this time the EU does not have a plan B if a long-term agreement with Iran over its enrichment program cannot be reached. The new administration, under Iranian President Rouhani, represents a window of opportunity for the European Union to engage with Iran and forge a balance of power in the region. Failure to recognize Iranian aims beyond the nuclear issue will only widen the gap between EU policy in the Middle East and its relevance as a global actor in the region.

**Cooperation and Diplomacy**

*EU Nuclear Diplomacy in Iran and the E3+3 Joint Action Plan*

In spite of the looming threat of irrelevance the EU faces as a global actor, its previous actions in Iran give the EU credibility and influence. First and foremost, the EU is perceived by Iran as far more neutral in comparison to the United States. This is in spite of the fact that the EU is a major supporter of the sanction regime. In recent years the EU has frequently imposed sanctions or restrictive measures either on an autonomous EU basis or by implementing binding resolutions of the Security Council of the United Nations (*Sanctions*). In July 2010, the EU adopted a decision that introduced new restrictive measures in Iran (*EU and Iran*). In light of the discoveries of Iran’s nuclear activities in 2003, the EU has developed a more active approach to security issues. The EU is united in its belief that Iran’s enrichment program is a serious threat to stability and an issue that should be addressed directly (ESS 2008). The EU has presented an active front against the Iranian nuclear program and has stayed within the track of diplomacy and dialogue in conjunction with a united sanction regime. Last October, High Representative Catherine Ashton together with the E3+3—France, Germany, the United Kingdom, China, Russia and the United States—agreed upon a Joint Plan of Action (Factsheet 1). This agreement concluded several first steps in building a comprehensive diplomatic
solution to Iran’s nuclear program (Factsheet 1). However, this agreement does nothing but reduce immediate tensions (Factsheet 3). Progress towards a long-term nuclear deal has been disappointing and few steps are being taken to broaden crisis management regarding Iran in the event that diplomacy and dialogue fails.

The Importance of Euro-Iranian Trade Cooperation

Vital to EU influence in Iran, trade cooperation is an important channel the EU uses to build relations with the country, which is also in the clear economic interest of the Islamic Republic. Communication and cooperation with Iran by the Commission in 2001 set out the perspectives and conditions for developing closer relations with Iran (Brief History). Launched in 2002, a primary objective was to conclude a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). Iran applied to join the WTO in 1996, but plans to begin the accession process have not been discussed (EU and Iran). With Iran’s nuclear activities discovered in 2003, such economic and political talks regarding a TCA and WTO accession are on hold but represent a foundation on which future constructive interactions could take place (Brief History).

Interests

The EU’s Primary Policy Instruments: Diplomacy and Sanctions

European policy in Iran is largely centered on the nuclear issue as well as actions aimed at pursuing diplomatic options and sanctions (Shelala II 2). Diplomacy and sanctions are the EU’s most important channel of influence and are far less costly than the potential consequences of military action in Iran (Esfandiary 3). The EU will continue to use instruments of diplomacy and sanctions to complement its policy objectives concerning Iran’s nuclear program (Esfandiary 11). The EU will maintain the basic principle of flexibility in its approach to sanctions as the security environment in and around the Iranian landscape changes.
However, the 2013 nuclear deal requires the suspension of certain key nuclear-related sanctions and the cessation of any pursuit of new ones (Fact Sheet). The European Union and the E3 have consistently promoted a non-military solution to the conflict on the basis of improved Iranian guarantees on the peacefulness of its nuclear program (Meier 1). This nuclear deal and the easing of sanctions, however, may not produce desired Iranian behaviors. Under the threat of diminished credibility, the EU may need to pursue renewed political reform in Iran that transcends the nuclear issue.

Understanding the Full Scope and Scale of Iran’s Proxy Relationships:

While the Syrian leader—Bashar al-Assad—remains in Damascus, relations between Iran and Syria remain strong. In the face of growing insurgency, the Assad regime clings to support from Iran (Kagan Iranian Influence 14). Iran intends to ensure the survival of a pro-Iranian Alawite regime in Syria (Kagan Iranian Influence 14). However, an ouster of the Assad regime by the Sunni insurgency can significantly fracture the Iran-Syria alliance (Kagan Iranian Influence 14). The depth of this relationship will be difficult to breakdown if the Assad regime falls apart in the wake of an aggressive insurgency. A successful Alawite counterinsurgency, however, opens the door for strengthened Iranian influence in the Levant. The stakes are high for Iran and the Islamic Republic will continue to play an active role in Syria’s civil war. Iran has turned to pursuing its interests in Lebanon in the face of Assad’s weakened regime. Despite a greatly weakened Syria, Iran has protected and advanced its relations with Lebanon. The ascension of Hezbollah to a position of dominance in Lebanese politics in 2011 has allowed Tehran to establish a more direct relationship to Beirut thereby advancing its interests and extending its influence in the Levant (Kagan Iranian Influence 33). Lebanon has become acquiescent to Tehran’s wishes and more clearly dominated by Iranian-funded and supported
Hezbollah (Kagan *Iranian Influence* 33). This worsens the fears of Saudi Arabia and Turkey and threatens stability in the region.

*Lessening the Influence of Iran in Iraq*

Tehran’s policies have been largely successful in Iraq thereby giving Iran an unprecedented degree of influence at the expense of the US and Iraq’s Arab neighbors (Kagan *Iranian Influence* 1). Iran seeks to maintain the Shi’a dominated, weak, and fractured Iraqi government that will support Tehran’s objectives in the region (Kagan *Iranian Influence* 64). Strong ties to Iraq are essential to Iran’s sphere of influence but further serve as an opportunity for Iran to evade sanctions from the Western powers and to continue financing regional groups (Kagan *Iranian Influence* 2).

*Options*

*Open Discussion on the Dual-Track Approach*

The Dual-Track approach aims to increase sanctions on Iran’s economy and further engage Tehran on the nuclear issue. This policy was proposed in June 2006 and was last reviewed in May 2008 (“Iran’s”). The European Union can address certain drawbacks of the dual-track approach to the Iranian nuclear program issue. The dual-track approach maintains a policy of dialogue and sanctions; however, its effectiveness on Iranian behavior remains in question. Iran’s coordinated soft power strategy however makes the pursuit of nuclear capabilities difficult to give up (Jokar). The threat of deadlock is constant and can make the failure of diplomatic efforts more likely. New nuclear-related sanctions are impossible under the new nuclear accord and few plans have been made if diplomacy fails. President Obama has stated that failure to establish a final and comprehensive agreement remains a possibility (Rafizadeh). Extending over the next several months, negotiations could defuse the danger of
war in the Middle East, transform the regional balance of power, and open up business opportunities to in Iran Western firms (Rafizadeh). To avoid the major setback of a failed long-term deal, the European Union can take a more united approach with the US on establishing a final accord and developing a ‘Plan B,’ should diplomacy fail.

**Increase Cooperation with Turkey**

Turkey plays an important role in negotiations as both a European state and a regional power with the shared goal of curtailing Iran’s nuclear program. A now indispensable regional actor, Turkey is an active player in region using instruments of diplomacy and dialogue rather than the traditional policy of distance (Özcan 1). The withdrawal of US troops from Iraq established a power vacuum that Iran has attempted to fill. As another major power in the region, Turkey rivals Iran on this issue (Larabee vii). Turkey has further captured the influence of Iran in Israel through its assertive support of the Palestinian National Authority (Larabee viii). The individual role Turkey has played in the Middle East is an asset to the EU. Cooperation with Turkey can strengthen the EU’s strategic position in the Middle East if unity is deepened.

**Recommendations**

**Restart Trade Negotiations**

*Restarting negotiations on a Trade Cooperation Agreement will give the EU a new channel of influence in Iran and pave the way for WTO accession.* The EU, while negotiating Iran’s accession to the WTO in the 1990s, believed a Trade Cooperation Agreement would help Iran adapt to WTO rules (*Brief History*). Such an agreement can boost Iran’s economic potential and pave the way for Euro-Iranian cooperation in a number of shared interests (*Brief History*). WTO accession can be a catalyst for the liberalization of Iran’s
economy (Aslan). As a result, WTO reforms would require Iran to broaden and deepen its integration in the world economy (Aslan). The time to engage with Iran over renewed political and economic reforms is now.

Engage Civil Society:

The European Union will need to incorporate an element of human security in its policy framework. Iran is not immune to the wave of Arab uprisings sweeping the region. With the new challenges posed by Iran’s youth-dominated population, the EU will want to address the conditions that can precipitate democratic shifts taking place in Iran. One of Richard Youngs’s greatest concerns is that a policy to engage and incentivize civil society will not be constructed (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). The EU must provide policy instruments that will rehabilitate civil society in Iran and offer opportunities to Iran’s young society. This can come in the form of incentives like educational opportunities and visa liberalization.

Facilitate a United Front against Iranian Instability:

The EU cannot build an effective and lasting security framework without a united front against Iran’s coordinated soft power regional strategy. The EU will need to head a coordinated approach to counter Iran’s sphere of influence by engaging the region’s other key actors, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The possibility of a nuclear Iran and its inherent revolutionary nature necessitate a united front by the EU and the other powers in the region. Accordingly, the EU needs to find a balance between engaging and containing Iran.
As Europe’s Southern Neighborhood remains in a prolonged state of crisis, a sectarian undercurrent swiftly takes hold across the MENA regions. And while economic downturn and resource scarcities intensify social frustrations, the Middle East Peace Process continues to stagnate with destabilizing consequences for Palestinians as broader regional tensions appear to increase the prospect of further instability. In light of these developments, the EU finds itself in a position of strategic ambiguity with regards to both its role in promoting stability in MENA and its relevance as a global actor.

Europe’s “…ENP-based approach to North Africa misfires in a number of ways…it misconceives North Africans’ identities and aspirations…It is too bureaucratic…It underplays the regional dimension…[and] it neglects other tools and others’ assets” (Dworkin 31-34). Europe does not have the collective political will, economic strength, or strategic approach to be the unilateral security leader in North Africa. And with its looming irrelevance on the international stage, the Southern Neighborhood provides Europe with the necessary decision to either confirm this irrelevance and retreat to Fortress Europe, or re-strategize and re-prioritize its engagement via cooperation with influential regional actors despite the risks this may entail. In short, the EU’s need to strike a strategic balance between pragmatism and principle will determine the future of the EU’s global presence (Lewis 79).

The Syrian Civil War, and its illustration of the insidious effects of sectarian fragmentation and hostility, poses a significant challenge to EU foreign policy as well as the future stability of MENA. Europe’s engagement on this issue has largely been within the context of the UN, from which the US and Russia have largely excluded the EU (Dennison).
Yet, its involvement with the drivers of sectarian strife at the regional level—Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular—has been modest. The EU has sorely neglected the growing presence of the Gulf States as powerful and legitimate actors in the region, relative to those in the West. Their influence in the region economically, diplomatically, culturally, and strategically has outpaced Europe’s and poses a significant challenge to the EU’s ability to assert itself as a truly powerful actor, especially in the Southern Neighborhood.

The authoritarian nature of GCC states drives their pragmatic approach to economic assistance and is accompanied by less conditionality than the EU’s, with a certain cultural and political legitimacy that Europe’s support of repressive North African regimes prior to the Arab Spring has diminished for itself (Dworkin 6). A continued neglect of the Gulf States in EU policy frameworks, lack of cooperation on common interests and strategic areas of engagement, and a European reluctance to act assertively in the areas of crisis management, political and security sector reform, diplomacy, and the rule of law will likely result in a conflicted and insecure North Africa far into the future. Continuing on the path of un-calculated and sporadic EU involvement in the region will undoubtedly propel Europe towards global irrelevance.

EU-GCC relations are largely confined to the 1988 Cooperation Agreement with the objectives: regional stability, facilitation of political and economic ties, technical cooperation, a Joint Action Programme for 2010-2013 intended to foster cooperation on ICTs, nuclear safety, energy and economic dialogue, and the EU delegation in Saudi Arabia ("Delegation to Saudi Arabia"). However, despite these ties and agreements, the severity of current instability across the region, and the rising power of the GCC in the diplomatic arena, “relations with the GCC remain low key and strikingly disconnected from Mediterranean policy” (Echague 2011 2). While GCC States enjoy close relations with the Mediterranean in economic and political terms,
EU Member States’ relations with North Africa have remained weak with the exception of Italy, France, and Spain: “…Europe has literally overlooked the region,” (Dworkin 6). Similarly, the narrowness of the geographical scope in Europe’s other policy instruments towards MENA—the Union for the Mediterranean, the Shared Partnership for Democracy and Prosperity, and Support for Partnership for Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING)—has driven their ‘marginal’ results (Dworkin 28). As post-Arab Spring instability intensifies and continues, Europe must re-orientate its approach towards North Africa to incorporate the outside actors who are competing for influence, namely the Gulf States.

The main failure of European engagement in the Southern Neighborhood can be attributed to the nature and scope of the ENP. It was designed first for Eastern European countries and later applied to the Southern Neighborhood; however, the cultural and ideological identities of western and eastern Europeans are relatively similar (Dworkin 30). Meanwhile, the distinct view of the North Africans must be taken into account:

[They] see themselves as Arabs and Muslims who are part of their own regions and communities rather than floating unanchored on the fringes of the EU. Their economic and historical links with the powerful neighbor to the north may be important, but their affinities and security preoccupations are directed much more to their own east and south. Above all…North African revolutionaries want freedom, dignity and quick economic help, not the European acquis. (Dworkin 32)

Europe has clearly overlooked the strategic importance of the GCC’s, “… strong political and economic [ties]… as well as the bonds of ‘Arabism’ that play into these relations,” (Echague 2011 1). Cultural legitimacy among Arab and Muslim societies has also worked in Saudi Arabia’s favor with regards to its applauded ‘soft’ counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization
strategy. With its emphasis on: prevention, rehabilitation, and aftercare programs; its 80-90 percent success rate speaks eloquently to the importance of Saudi Arabia’s ‘value-added’ contribution to international and regional security (Boucek 21).

As the Euro-crisis unfolded and European economies continue to struggle, the rising economically powerful actors have asserted their influence in North Africa and beyond. The irrelevance of the ENPs focus on economic integration—the ‘more-for-more’ principle—as the primary instrument of European political influence has become clear (Scorecard 2014). This is while the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in particular, have shown an emerging global presence, specifically with regards to their leadership in North Africa. Average Gulf investments are much larger ($268 versus $70 million) which has bolstered the GCCs regional influence substantially, outpacing the impact of Europe’s depleted budget and ‘more-for-more’ principle (Echague 2011 4). Similarly, “in terms of seizing new prospects for investment and innovation in the MENA, the GCC states are clearly leading the way,” (Burke 5). Gulf investment in the MENA from 2003-2008 was over $110 billion; Saudi Arabia’s share of intra-Arab investments is over 50 percent and there is a growing dependence of North Africa on Gulf foreign aid (Burke 4-6). Gulf leadership on economic integration and investments in communication, education, and technology have increased while aid donations are predicted to rise as the Gulf realizes its vital role in the process of job creation in the future. Europe’s Southern neighborhood also relies on two actors, the GCC and the EU, as a source of remittances (Burke 6).

In terms of a broader MENA profile, Saudi Arabia is a vital regional actor, a G20 member, and host to the secretariat of the Organization of Islamic Conference. With a critical role in the Islamic Umma, and the ‘diplomatic prestige’ of its efforts in the Arab Peace Initiative
of 2002, it cannot be ignored (Bazoobandi 11, Echague 2011, 3). It is arguably the most influential actor in the Arab world as its broad involvement in MENA affairs, as its support of sunni political parties in Lebanon, its critical role in Yemen’s stability, and its energetic efforts in the Middle East Peace Process illustrates. That Saudi Arabia has been, “…seen as the only regional power capable of bringing Arab countries into line with the goal of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace deal,” speaks quite persuasively to the diplomatic importance of Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States, in the future of MENA stability (Burke 2).

Meanwhile, Qatar has also built up its diplomatic presence, using economic power to support mediation processes and interventions in Sudan, Palestine, Somalia, Lebanon, Libya and Yemen (Echague 2013 3) and has energetically involved itself as an actor in the mediation of regional affairs (Burke 2). Similarly, Qatar has been seen as the Arab ‘haven’ for outspoken media outlets such as Al-Jazeera (Bazoobani 12). Its great successes with regards to regional diplomacy have been noted in the Doha Accords in 2008 and their effects on Lebanese constitutional deadlock. Its support of Hamas in Gaza and its close political and trade relations with Iran, despite Saudi Arabia’s suspicions, has brought other Arab countries to consider whether, “…Qatar is an emerging Switzerland for the region or an unfit maverick with suspiciously close ties to Tehran” (Bazoobani 12,13).

**Interests**

The primary European interest in the future will be its relevance as a global actor. Its engagement in the MENA will prove to be the critical area in which Europe will either confirm or deny this negative assessment of the EU’s influence in the world (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). Crisis, repressive political rule, and resource scarcities in its MENA Neighborhood
will all be to the detriment of European interests in energy, trade, immigration, economic integration, and political association with friendly, democratic government.

Reducing the political and economic burden of illegal immigration, refugee populations, organized crime, terrorism, and humanitarian aid donations to conflict zones situates the facilitation of peace in the MENA region at the top of Europe’s list of vital interests. Particularly, Italy, France and Spain—the ‘big three’—have significant national interests at stake, “…in trade, investment and energy links. They host the biggest North African immigrant communities and worry about radicalization and terrorism” (Dworkin 7). Stability in MENA thus has large implications for European security—political, economic, and human. Negating the ‘clash of civilizations’ narrative that has hindered the relations of the West with the broader MENA region, and establishing close and friendly ties with its surrounding neighbors, as political reform and stabilization hopefully take root, will be a substantial European interest in the long term.

The conclusion of the Middle East Peace Process will arguably be a critical development in the long-term stability of MENA regional relations. Closing the ‘trust deficit’ which characterizes the intense suspicions MENA governments have of each others actions is in Europe’s interest (Lewis 67). Mistrust among regional governments appears to be the central force behind MENA’s lack of a regional security framework which - it can be argued - is the reason behind its excessive fragility. Furthermore, “…the EU and GCC have shared security concerns such as energy, terrorism, militant Islam or the proliferation of WMDs…Gulf States’ goals…tend to be aligned with those of the EU, be it in Palestine, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq or Yemen…” which both understand should, “be addressed at the regional level,” (Echague 2011, 3).
Conclusively, mitigating and, later, illegitimating sectarian strife will be vital to the security of the region and Europe itself. That sectarian tensions at the local level have excessively destabilized intra-state conflicts such as in Syria and Lebanon; its occurrence at the high level among regional powers - namely Saudi Arabia and Iran - destabilizes the region more broadly as MENA governments are dissuaded from cooperating with one another despite their common security concerns (Valbjorn). Remedying this behavior and fostering regional dialogue, trust, and cooperation is in Europe’s interest for the future as a MENA region that is at peace and works together on common objectives will alleviate both Europe’s responsibility to engage in the region and the economic burdens that these crises have placed on European budgets.

That North Africa has been named ‘the graveyard’ of CSDP illustrates the EU’s inability to influence the conditions in North Africa unilaterally (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). Combined with the anticipated US withdrawal from MENA and its ‘pivot to Asia,’ these realities force the EU to make a difficult decision between a retreat back to ‘fortress Europe’ which retains existing strategic priorities and approaches, or a position of global relevance through an opening of alternative opportunities for ‘super-partnerships’ and prioritizing the areas and methods of strategic engagement such as ‘overlapping layers’ of regionally centered cooperation (Lewis 72, 65).

Maintaining European focus on the instruments of the ENP, Union for the Mediterranean, Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity, and the ‘more-for-more’ principle will likely propel Europe further down the trajectory of irrelevance as the European Council on Foreign Relations Scorecards of 2012, 2013, and 2014 have indicated (Scorecard 2012, 2013, 2014). Sticking to current methods of EU engagement will most likely not reverse
the level of instability in North Africa, as Europe has not had many tangible achievements in this regard. However, if the crisis in North Africa and the broader MENA region are not improved in the near future, the prospects of a further deterioration of the security sector, vital institutions, and the economy are likely to ensue, not to mention the probability of North Africa’s reversion back to authoritarian rule. Recurring and prolonged conflict in the EU’s Neighborhood has been highlighted as Europe’s greatest emerging threat (Lewis 117). The economic and social burdens herein associated—immigration, organized crime, terrorist threat, proliferation of WMDs, and the increased or indefinite reliance of North Africa on European foreign aid—will remain high and even increase in the future if crises persist. To avoid this daunting projection, the Gulf States provide Europe with an opportunity for both the ‘super-partner’ and ‘overlapping layers’ of regional cooperation and integration.

Partnering with the Gulf States - collectively, and separately - on areas of critical engagement centered on common interests such as crisis management, counter-terrorism, economic integration, humanitarian aid, trade and investment, energy, education, mediation efforts, peace negotiations, and civil society projects can potentially give the EU renewed legitimacy in the region and increase its influential capacity. A strategic EU-GCC partnership can also open up dialogue with MENA powers on the topic of sectarianism at the local and regional level with the EU as neutral mediator. Although, the limitation of working with authoritarian regimes in an era of Arab political awakening can be to the detriment of the EU’s global image in its treatment of the GCC as an ‘exception’ to democratic pressures. However, given the urgency of EU engagement in MENA post-conflict instability, and its looming irrelevance, the EU must strike a balance between the aforementioned pragmatism and principle nexus in its global strategy. Thus, “the EU should realize that bringing the Gulf States into its
partnerships and frameworks of cooperation with the Mediterranean offers an opportunity to indirectly help reform dynamics in these more reactionary cases,” (Echague 2011, 3).

**Recommendations**

*In the short-term, the appointment of a Special Representative to the Gulf region which focuses on specific thematic and regional issues centered on: mediation and peace negotiations, conflict management, regional security, counterterrorism, de-radicalization, political stability, civil society and development is key,* as these are all areas of vital interest to the EU and which Gulf States have implemented quite effectively (Bazoobandi, Boucek). This measure can help to initiate the process of deeper EU-GCC security cooperation; be it through an EU-GCC partnership, an EU-Saudi partnership, an EU-Qatari partnership, or, a combination of ‘overlapping layers’ of partnerships that will most likely characterize regional cooperation in the future (Lewis 117).

*In the medium-term, absorbing the Gulf States into the EU’s existing regional policy packages such as the Union for the Mediterranean which, “…GCC countries complained bitterly of not being consulter by the EU over,” can help to properly expand the scope of Europe’s policy instruments to address the common concerns across the broader region* (Bazoobandi 14). Similarly, absorbing the Gulf States into the Peacebuilding Partnership for the purposes of strategic dialogue on common objectives and methods of engagement can help to improve to performance of this policy instrument. Currently focused on the, “…peace building capacities of locally based civil society,” with a ‘country specific’ approach, the, “…potential to contribute to the overall objective of building international and regional capacity, to enhance operational practice, and to be of value to the peace building sector as a whole is questionable,” (Bayne 22-23 ). Thus, incorporating regional stakeholders
such as the Gulf States can help to broaden the scope and reach of the Peacebuilding Partnership and enhance European objectives.

In the long-term, developing a strategic ‘super-partnership’ with the Gulf States on areas of regional concern such as: security, civil society, development, improvements on regional trade in MENA, institution building, and recovering of infrastructure and communications can help to facilitate the conditions necessary to maintain stability and promote economic development. More importantly, a partnership such as this can allow the EU to begin to engage with MENA governments, specifically the Gulf in this case, on the impact and nature of sectarianism at the regional, State sponsored level. Its destabilizing effects on the ground in Syria for example, as well as its solidification of MENA’s regional diplomatic ‘trust deficit’ will be critical for the future stability of the region. Acting as a neutral mediator, the EU has the potential to harness the diplomatic pragmatism of the Qatari-Iranian example to help normalize the Sunni-Shia/Saudi-Iranian relationship to mitigate and, ideally, eliminate the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for regional hegemony. The EU’s role in such ‘super-partnerships’ and ‘overlapping layers’ of regional integration can aid in the grand European objective of facilitating a cooperative regional security framework, an institutional deficit which, if unfilled in the long-term, will intensify the level of fragility that has plagued the region to date. The notion of looming European irrelevance as a global actor in the emerging multipolar global order can be effectively negated through such a strategic approach. However, the window of opportunity is quickly closing and the EU must insert itself as soon as possible.
Conclusion
By Yasamine Firoozi and Sophie Hubbell

In light of Europe’s declining resources and the pervasiveness of instability across the broader Middle East and North African regions, the European Union must re-organize the strategic priorities set forth in the 2003 European Security Strategy as it does not prioritize a balancing between 1) comprehensive regional engagement 2) rapid response, and 3) a collective regional security framework.

Comprehensive Regional Engagement

The EU’s method of engagement with its Southern Neighborhood through the ENP has proven irrelevant (Scorecard 2014). In light of this reality, along with Europe’s diminished resources, the fragility of the region, and the pervasive trust deficit among MENA powers, Europe can improve its global presence by organizing its strategic priorities as “...long-term challenges to European interests will not organize themselves into a neatly separate, sealed ‘neighborhood’” (Lewis 96). The artificial segmentation of the MENA under current EU policy instruments dissociates the thematic, cultural, and political linkages inherent across the region. The EU’s ability to tackle the fundamental security concerns of the broader region is constrained by the ‘European Neighborhood’ paradigm. In the short-term, this Grand Strategy recommends that the ENP be supplemented with a regional security framework that includes the broader Middle East, namely the Arab Peninsula. The EU can no longer ignore the role of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in the Middle East. Richard Youngs argues that European policy in the Middle East must begin to react to the deeper linkages taking shape between the Gulf and the Mediterranean (Burke 2010 1). The decline of Iraq, the isolation of Egypt following its recognition of Israel, the crisis in Syria, and Iran’s suspicious relations with Syria and
Hezbollah have made Saudi Arabia the most influential country in the Arab world (Burke 2010 1). Expanding the scope of the EU’s regional partnerships has the potential to increase opportunities for strategic dialogue on common regional interests and facilitate more productive cooperation on crisis management.

*Rapid Response to Crisis: Operationalizing ‘Effective Multilateralism’*

The priority of ‘effective multilateralism’ as set forth by the 2003 European Security Strategy and reinforced in the 2008 review still resonates today (ESS 2003, 2008). With Europe’s diminishing capacity and the diminishing political returns to economic aid in fragile States, multilateralism appears to be the central tool to bolster European influence in the future as a multipolar world order solidifies itself (Dennison 2). However, Europe’s prioritization of available instruments to operationalize ‘effective multilateralism’ placed, “…the UN at its core,” and requires a strategic rethink in light of global changes and realities (Dennison 4). The EU must respond to the shift from a Western dominated world to a ‘Neo-Westphalian world’ in which rising powers assertively reject or avoid participation in western dominated multilateral platforms and the like (Dennison 5). Thus, the EU must retain the priority of ‘effective multilateralism’ in its response to and engagement in MENA. It must learn to work in both bilateral and multilateral fora with the rising neo-Westphalian powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

However, the priority of ‘effective multilateralism’ to maximize the impact of EU engagement must be synthesized with the priority of rapid response. Multilateral cooperation conducted within highly institutionalized platforms, such as the UN, suffers from the ‘slow motion crisis’ in which collective action materializes only once the window of opportunity has
expired. Therefore, the strategic priority must be to maximize EU influence, despite diminished EU resources, by striking a balance between:

- Effective multilateralism, and
- Rapid response

The EU can refocus its strategic approach to effective multilateral efforts on conflict management from highly institutionalized UN platforms, towards more ‘ad hoc’ and short-term coalitions to bring together regional stakeholders. This can provide the EU with an opportunity to escape the ‘slow motion crisis’ plaguing the impact and relevance of its policy on MENA crisis management. Ad hoc coalitions of stakeholders—both state and non-state—formed to address specific crisis and thematic concerns can help to facilitate dialogue and mediation among constituents. This will improve the comprehensiveness of engagement by synthesizing the collective strategic considerations presented by each member and establishing more pragmatic diplomatic relations.

A Regional Security Framework

The long-term objective of the EU’s strategic engagement in the MENA must be centered on assertive EU participation that focuses on normalizing the diplomatic relations of MENA regional powers and fostering a cooperative regional security framework. Through fostering ‘cooperation clusters’ focused on the common security interests of the EU and regional stakeholders in the medium term, Europe can aid in toppling the barriers to trust which competition among regional powers and sectarianism have intensified. A policy of ‘muddling through’ cooperation and crisis management slows the progress of EU influence in the Middle East and allows other, rising powers to outpace its engagement in the Southern Neighborhood. EU brokerage of such experimental ‘clusters’ and their potentially positive effect on the
relations of MENA regional actors can aid the EU in its ultimate objective of establishing a comprehensive MENA regional security framework. This will simultaneously reaffirm its diplomatic strength and, more importantly, reassert the relevance of the European Union as a truly global actor. Europe’s legitimacy, and position in the emerging multipolar global order will hinge on its willingness to take the lead in its extended neighborhood.
Chapter 3: Sub-Saharan Africa

By Michael Golomb

Introduction

The impetus for a new Grand Strategy resides in the simple fact that irrelevance is the single biggest threat to the EU in both the short- and long-term. Jolyon Howorth, in a recent lecture, eloquently compared the EU to a placid cow in a field watching a high-speed train passing by (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). This image powerfully captures the risk that complacency and inaction pose to the EU, as dramatic and fast-moving events alter the world in which we live. In Africa’s dynamic landscape, however, irrelevance is not the sole issue. The EU has proudly been the most prolific and longstanding aid donor to the region, which validates their regional relevance (EurActiv). Unfortunately, this relevance is confined to exactly that: a donor-recipient relationship that only encompasses development assistance. Despite the pursuance of CSDP and certain Member States’ ambitions, the EU has not become a legitimate and respected security actor in Africa. It does not have security imperatives that reflect local conditions and developments. This deficiency constructs the threat to the EU; if the EU wishes to remain an effective presence, it needs security strategies specific to Africa’s organic regions as a component of a new Grand Strategy.

Grevi discusses post-Cold War global dynamics as shifting towards a “heterogeneous international system, where emerging and resurgent players not only assert their individual...
interests but also promote their distinctive worldviews” (Grevi 7). This sentiment is strongly applicable to the situation in contemporary Africa, where developing countries are increasingly looking to diverse global entities for new economic and security partnerships. The involvement of these diverse players is not threatening unless the EU remains absent during the creation of such partnerships. Lack of proactive engagement will cast the EU into irrelevance as other actors assert their own distinctive worldviews, marginalizing the ability of the EU to project its values and support its interests.

The 2003 ESS and the 2008 revision both address Europe’s broad security concerns. On Africa, the 2008 revision specifically mentions, “Through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, we are supporting enhanced African capacities in crisis management, including regional stand-by forces and early warning” (EU 11). This ambition is supported by a key sentence in the EU-Africa Joint Strategy: “Most African countries now enjoy peace and stability. The EU has been a key partner for African countries and organisations to help create conditions for lasting peace and stability“ (EUC 5). Reality, however, has proven contradictory to these statements. This is revealed by even a cursory look at the geopolitical state of Africa today. Successive wars in the DRC have no end in sight. The CAR suffered a fatal coup that is currently spiraling into an unprecedented ethnic conflict. 2011 witnessed not only the violent birth of South Sudan, but also a subsequent civil war that threatens to engulf the region. Uganda has become involved in the Sudanese conflict with air power and is threatening to deploy ground forces if the outcome is not desirable for Museveni’s interests (Human Rights Watch). Three major forces fought for control of Mali in 2012, which saw a major deployment of French intervention troops. The current Kenyan and Sudanese presidents remain charged with crimes against humanity by the ICC. Nigeria deals with the Islamist Boko Haram insurgency on a daily basis, which threatens
Africa’s largest oil exporter (Reuters, “Nigeria’s”). Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt all experienced the same wave of “Arab Awakening” that saw the deposition of their leaders and ensuing chaos of regime change. The contemporary African security situation remains extremely disparate from the claims of the EU in 2008; the EU cannot afford to wade through further indecision and ineffective multilateralism in the face of such widespread yet interlinked security threats.

The growing threat of terrorism relates intimately to African conflicts in both north and sub-Saharan Africa. Currently, at a crucial juncture for Mali, as French forces are downsizing their mission by over half its force, al-Qaeda has resurfaced in a spate of high-profile kidnappings and violence (Rihouay). The war in the CAR is now largely a clash of Muslims and Christians. This opens another door for the entrance of al-Qaeda, as disorganized Christian militias persecute the minority Muslim population. The former prime minister of the CAR has acknowledged that, although major terrorist groups are not yet involved in the CAR crisis, both Boko Haram and al-Qaeda remain operational in the immediate periphery and pose an imminent threat (World Bulletin). On the 22nd of February, Afghan Al-Qaeda issued a public statement decrying the treatment of Muslims in the CAR. This message was immediately repeated by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), highlighting precisely the kind of interconnectedness a global strategy is required to address (Vinograd).

Somalia remains a stronghold of militant Islam. The majority of the country is controlled by al-Shabab despite US policies to strictly oppose this and regional attempts to construct a democratic government (Masters). On 21 Feb, al-Shabab instigated an attack on the presidential palace in Mogadishu, resulting in twelve deaths and reminding policymakers that Somalia remains in chaos despite gains that have been made towards security (Ibrahim & Kulish). In 2011, the Kenyan Defense Force led a coalition of Ethiopian and Somali troops in
an invasion and occupation of Southern Somalia that aimed to disrupt al-Shabab’s influence in the region (Davison). Al-Shabab claims this invasion as their justification for the deadly September 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, which was as deadly as it was symbolic—67 people were killed, and the popular, upscale, “European-style” mall was destroyed (Downie).

This type of spillover was predicted by Helly in 2013:

Yet, the possibility of an enduring asymmetric war between a strengthened new Somali government and its international allies on one side, and Al Shahaab on the other, should not be excluded. In the worst-case scenario, the conflict could become regionalised (attacks in Kenya and Uganda and, to a lesser extent, in Ethiopia). For some experts, like the French scholar Roland Marchal, there is even a risk of Al Shabaab’s influence spreading throughout the region, connecting with terrorists in the Sahel and the Gulf. (Helly 77)

Struggles between emerging contenders for leadership roles in post-uprising North Africa have brought to light links between terrorist groups and political bodies in Europe’s immediate southern neighborhood. Joscelyn’s testimony to the US Congress details the growing threat of al-Qaeda in North Africa; most notably, it illustrates the links between Al-Qaeda, the Malian conflict, and the Libyan conflict (Joscelyn). Free-flowing channels of mercenaries, weapons, and finances cross through the region’s porous borders and allow fighters to move easily from conflict to conflict. These flows have clear detrimental effects on the stability and development of the region through which they move, but what is more alarming is their proximity to continental Europe. The Ansar al Sharia militia, responsible most prominently for the fatal attack on the US consulate in Benghazi but also other regional attacks, has extensive ties to European countries. Chivvis and Liepman published findings positing that North African
terrorist groups could potentially attack targets in Europe relatively inexpensively due to their proximity (Chivvis & Liepman). Terrorism in Africa does not just affect Africa; it is a direct threat to Europe that requires strong, decisive policy making to thwart.

In addition to active armed conflicts, regional economic powers are undergoing shifts that threaten stability in less direct ways. Kenya’s ambitious construction of the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia (LAPSSET) is in the process of changing long-standing economic agreements and conditions by rerouting major energy trading routes (Reuters “Kenya”). When Sudan was one unified country, Khartoum grew wealthy from exporting southern Sudan’s oil. South Sudan seceded, taking with its oil fields, and Khartoum was pacified only by the high taxes it levied on South Sudan’s oil exports that had to be exported through Sudan. Kenya’s new pipeline, port, and refineries will change this dynamic8. Sudan, long the conduit of export for all central African oil, whether Sudanese or otherwise, will now lose its monopoly on this privilege, as the new pipeline will bypass Sudan completely. This threatens to further strain the tense relationship between Khartoum and the new government of Juba, as well as the domestic stability of Sudan while it struggles to replace its lost income.

There is also a clear link between youth unemployment and an increased risk of political instability (Azeng & Yogo). This is a frightening implication for regional security when considered alongside Africa’s population growth projections. The Population Reference Bureau estimates that Africa will more than double in population from the current 1.1 billion people to 2.5 billion by 2050 (Lazuta). Mubila, Lannes, and Aissa demonstrate conclusively that Africa’s poor populations are growing, indicating that Africa’s steady economic growth rates of 4-5%

8 Energy security is another area of EU interest in Africa. Elowson justifies this with a brief discussion of Africa’s resource wealth in the context of increasing strains with Russia: “Europe needs security of supply; a case in point is the major issue of energy security. Africa is an alternative to the volatile Middle East and to Europe’s disadvantageous dependency on Russia” (Elowson 59). US-based energy analysts echo this sentiment (Ratner, Belkin, Nichol, Woehrel).
and growing GDPs do not reflect equal access to wealth (Mubila, Lannes, Aissa 2).

Compounding this is that even in countries experiencing high growth, unemployment is outpacing population growth. Nigeria, for example, experienced a rise in unemployment from 19.7% in 2009 to 23.9% in 2011, despite experiencing positive economic growth of over 3% (ADB 165). These numbers foretell tumultuous decades ahead for Africa if effective improved economic management and wealth distribution issues aren’t sorted out.

**Assessment of the current policy instruments the EU has for Africa**

Africa has changed. Its many regions are not the same as they were during the writings of the 2003 ESS or 2008 revision. As demonstrated, state failure, terrorism, organized crime, and regional conflict are all major themes and components of modern African conflicts. The 2008 ESS update acknowledges these issues as key threats, but a decade forward they remain endemic in Africa. Given this observation, it is clear that the original documents are not sufficient to guide the EU’s security goals. The severity of these developing factors of insecurity, if combined with further EU inaction, is a significant threat to the security and stability of the EU itself. The EU needs to work immediately towards building and implementing a strategic remapping that identifies Africa’s unique regions as clearly linked yet distinctive components of a dynamic continental body. There is no time to waste if the EU wishes to remain relevant as a security provider for both Africa and Europe itself.

In 2009, Mikell raised the interesting question of China’s role as a security partner in sub-Saharan Africa: “The US, France, and the EU must work on finding ways to increase the collaborations with China on Zimbabwe, and to draw China more fully into the security and governance dialogues so that there is greater coordination in multilateral conflict resolution, and more moral resources available to support African democratic initiatives” (Mikell 17).
Continuing with this idea, Youngs maintains that the EU should approach China’s growing presence in the region from the angle of a development and security partnership rather than strategic threat, as China’s vast presence and extensive network in the region provides a foundation for EU-Africa-China cooperation rather than competition (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). This cooperative approach to China exemplifies Grevi’s “heterogeneous international system” and adds strength to the argument that the EU should be actively engaging all regional stakeholders regarding a full range of policy issues.

The EU is not wholly without policy instruments promoting security in Africa. Unfortunately, as currently configured, these instruments are inadequate to confront the challenges at hand. Common Security and Defense Policy was ostensibly developed as a way for the EU to project a unified voice of European security ambitions to the world. “The CSDP offers a framework for cooperation within which the EU can conduct operational missions in third countries. Specifically, the aims of these missions are peace-keeping and strengthening international security” (Europa). Despite its grand framework, however, CSDP deployments have been limited in scope and nature. Of CSDP’s nine active deployments in Africa, only two are military (EUAS). I will argue in my following case study of the CAR that one of the two military missions is too little, too late, and that the inaction prefacing the deployment caused significant harm. Unless substantially revised and better resourced, the CSDP is not adequate to address the multiple, complex, and inter-connected security challenges developing in Africa.

The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership of 2007 is an excellent example of the EU’s acknowledgement of the need to incorporate Africa as a security partner. Unfortunately, it too is inadequate to face looming challenges, as it does not offer the level of specificity needed to create practical and effective ground-level security agendas. It depends on more theoretical
goals of incorporating Africa into European and global affairs instead of taking a pragmatic approach to identify specific problems and offers realistic solutions. Aggad characterizes the shortcomings of the partnership in the following way: “The Strategy covers 8 ambitious partnerships and is seen to have delivered, at best, mixed results. This is partially because it failed to prioritise and secure quick gains to keep the cooperation wheel turning” (Aggad).

Tackling specific, regional security questions can provide quick gains, in contrast to promulgating broad ideas without affording them the localized tools to succeed.

To create an effective security relationship between the two signatory unions, a regional security strategy dealing with Africa’s organic economic and cultural boundaries needs to be developed. The Sahel Strategy is a step in the right direction. It integrates security and development as interconnected components of durable peace and sustainable prosperity (EUAS “Strategy”). Most importantly, it fits policy directives into a true regional framework, allowing for careful tailoring of policy towards regionally specific needs (EUAS “Strategy”). For example, it defines AQIM as a paramount security threat, as opposed to offering only broad condemnations of terrorism and state failure (EUAS “Strategy”1). But the Sahel Strategy is not the complete answer; it is a step in the right direction. What the EU needs, if it wishes to remain a relevant and capable global actor, is a strategic remapping of Africa.

Today’s crisis in the CAR is a multi-dimensional conflict that relates intimately to its neighboring countries and overall region. The primary issue of state failure drives serious concerns of terrorism, regional instability, human security, and large-scale humanitarian issues. Despite the EU’s stance and policies against the proliferation of these issues, the CAR situation has developed to the point of extraordinary crisis.
Through careful analysis of the CAR conflict in the context of EU’s security policies, the inadequacies of the EU’s existing frameworks will become apparent. This report will argue that a timely and decisive EU response could have averted the escalation happening now, but that such a response is difficult under current policy guidelines. The failure of existing frameworks provides a basis for the argument that focused, regional security strategies for Africa’s organic divisions should be components of a new European Global Strategy if the EU desires to remain relevant in a dynamic and evolving world.
Crisis in the Central African Republic

By Michael Golomb

Issue

The Central African Republic is currently experiencing a civil war. Due to the fighting, over 838,000 people have been displaced internally, causing severe humanitarian distress for most of the population (European Commission, “CAR”). Convergence areas for internally displaced persons (IDPs) are extremely deficient in sanitation and other basic services (EUEAS, “Fact Sheet”). Two-thirds of the population lacks access to health services, as pharmacies have been looted and health workers are among the displaced (Bekarou). Accurate estimates of casualties are difficult to find due to the evolving nature of the conflict, but preliminary reports indicate thousands have been killed in December of 2013 alone (Wilson).

Most worrisome is the nature and scope of the violence; targeting killings are increasing in frequency (McNeish). They appear to be decentralized and lacking any sort of direction from authority. The current fighting is now primarily between Christian and Muslim gangs, creating fears of a looming genocide amidst clearly documented instances of ethnic cleansing (Amnesty). Interventions by foreign forces have been ineffective at stopping this, as troop commitments remain small and confined to limited urban areas such as Bangui (Joselow). Peacekeeping missions have been criticized for observing atrocities without intervening, as was the case in a street lynching witnessed by French forces (Human Rights Watch “Central Africa Republic”). The violence is prohibiting humanitarian relief efforts from reaching the displaced, needy, and wounded (Coulilably). Interim president Catherine Samba-Panza, agreed on by all belligerents to lead the country until scheduled 2015 elections, has called for cessation of violence from both sides, but her tenure so far as been marred by further persecution and
increased ethnic violence (Smith “Central”). During a telling recent tour of the CAR to monitor aid progress, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos was unable to travel to many of the planned destinations due to pervasive violence and insecurity (Coulibaly).

The original 2003 version of the European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies a series of “key threats” to European security (EU “Secure” 3). Of this list of five threats, the CAR crisis encompasses at least three: state failure, regional conflicts, and terrorism (EU “Secure” 3-5). The document acknowledges that state failure, “undermines global governance and adds to regional instability” (EU “Secure” 4). Observers in the CAR are witnessing this as fighters move easily across borders, trafficking weapons to militias and contributing to the degradation of the state (Tumutegyereize and Tillon). As the ESS acknowledges, state failure is never a limited problem; the potential for regional and global repercussions via the spread of conflict from the CAR is a real threat to global security.

Background

The Central African Republic gained independence from France in 1960, but hasn’t been able to sustain any long-term democratic governance since. The most recent incarnation of political upheaval occurred in March 2013, when ex-president Francis Bozize was deposed in a coup led predominantly by Muslim Seleka rebels. They installed Michael Djotodia as president, but his tenure was short lived; Djotodia resigned under domestic and international pressure when he failed to subdue the lawlessness and violence that followed the coup (Amnesty). It has been suggested that the Economic Community of Central Africa (ECCAS) played an important role in fostering his exit, which highlights the growing regional power held by the nine-state economic community (Duckstein). The most concerning failure during
Djotodia’s tenure was his apparent inadequacy at controlling the Seleka rebels whom he used to gain power. Unable to provide them with lasting salaries and supplies, his forces looted from those who opposed the Seleka (Florance & Schaefer). Sources close to Seleka leaders have confirmed that the organization has no secure funding, which is an indicator that they are losing organizational power and will likely fade from the arena as a unified political player (Joselow). The damage has been done, however, and the divide between Muslim and Christian populations is manifesting in severe and unprecedented ethnic violence (McNeish). The immediate consequence of Seleka’s crimes was that Christian communities began to form their own decentralized defense forces, called anti-balaka (Tumutegyereize and Tillon). Seleka and anti-balaka forces, answering to no central authority figures, have been fighting in both urban and rural areas (Tumutegyereize and Tillon). It is important to note that although the CAR has an unstable past, never before has it experienced ethnic tensions like those of today; Christian and Muslim communities have historically coexisted peacefully (Pastoor 20).

The primary international forces currently providing military intervention are the following:

1. France – Sangaris, 1600 military personnel (UNOCHA “CAR”)

2. African Union – MISCA, ~6000 military personnel (McCartney)

3. ECCAS – FOMAC, ~2000 personnel (Joselow)

4. EU – EFUOR RCA, 500-1000 personnel, to arrive in March (RFI)

The US should be acknowledged as an important strategic partner in the region, and has been active in aiding crisis response. For example, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) is currently using their logistical expertise and resources to shuttle Rwanda’s contribution of 600 troops to MISCA from Kigali to Bangui (US Army Africa Images). Given the lack of high-volume transportation infrastructure within the AU, this assistance is of vital importance, as it

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serves the common goals of strengthening MISCA (Williams 11). While the US is a key contributor to the relief effort, outside of Africa it is Europeans who have the most pressing interest in resolving this conflict.

**European Interests**

The single most visible non-African intervention in the CAR crisis has been France’s Operation Sangaris. Originally comprised of only 150 soldiers, it began in March of 2013. Their mission was to protect the Bangui airport when it became clear that widespread violence was likely to accompany the transition of power to the new Seleka regime (Meilhan and Botelho). Operation Sangaris grew to its current size of 1600 troops in an effort to deter violence in the CAR, and is focused mostly on Bangui (UNOCHA “CAR”). This deployment represents a modern extension of France’s historic *Françafrique* policy, which is essentially a series of bilateral defense agreements with French ex-colonies (Hansen). France maintains strong political and economic connections with its ex-colonies, as they comprise an export market as well as raw material inputs for French businesses (Melly and Darracq). Speaking on the relationship between France and Africa, French parliament member André Dulait plainly states, “The African continent is our neighbor, and when it’s shaken by conflict, we’re shaken as well.” (Hansen). Melly and Darracq further corroborate this sentiment: “The crisis in Mali and concern about the wider security of the Sahel have reinforced the priority given to Africa. The government’s White Paper on defence policy, published on 29 April 2013, explicitly recognizes a particular role for Africa in national defence and security strategy” (Melly and Darracq 12). France has extensive economic and security interests in the stability of the central African region and is wont to act in defense of these interests. France’s heavily criticized involvement in past regional conflicts, namely the Rwandan genocide of 1994, has led to an
apparent change of thinking in French policy circles, as their interventions in both Mali and the CAR have been much more swift and strategically focused (UN News Centre “Interreligious Violence”). Beardsley cites additional reasons for French intervention in Mali by describing how Chadian peacekeepers were strong French allies in Mali, and Chadian soldiers now comprise a large percentage of the MISCA peacekeeping forces in the CAR (Beardsley).

Outside of key Member States’ bilateral interests, the European Union as a whole has deep ties to sub-Saharan Africa. The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, published in 2007, identifies a set of broad strategic goals concerning the relationship between the African Union and European Union; it is the most comprehensive policy document regarding this relationship (CEU). It acknowledges, “there is today a clear determination by both Africa and the EU to bring this partnership to a new and strategic level, not only to foster peace and security in both continents, but also to address issues of common concern in the global arena” (CEU 5). This statement represents a broad awareness of the complex relationship between states, regions, and their interdependent interests. Most importantly, it identifies the specific nexus between European security and African security. Following that excerpt, the next section of the Partnership agreement provides a framework by which challenges can be addressed (CEU 5). Within this framework are shared strategic priorities, featuring eight specific areas of necessary cooperation between the EU and AU. The first priority is security (CEU 5). This is outlined in paragraph 23 of the Strategic Partnership under the subheading of “Common and Global Peace and Security Challenges”:

While today's global environment has opened up new opportunities to enhance international peace and security, it has also come with new security challenges, which in a world of increasing interdependence and close links between the internal and external
aspects of security, only can be addressed through concerted international action, including in a UN context. Issues relating to transnational organised crime, international terrorism, mercenary activities, and human and drugs trafficking, as well as the illicit trade in natural resources, which are a major factor in triggering and spreading conflicts and undermining state structures, are of particular concern. (CEU 7)

From the security perspective, moving beyond donor-recipient status to a strategic partnership involves building up the capacity of the AU’s intervention forces, as well as that of other regional actors. These issues are addressed in slightly more detail in the Priority Action Plans section, where Priority Action 2’s mission is dedicated to affecting “full operationalization” of the African Standby Force via multilateral, multifaceted support from the EU (CEU 35-38). In the case of the CAR’s crisis, the EU and its partners have provided extensive financial support for MISCA and ECCAS, which serve the common security goals stated in the document (CEU). Both of these groups, however, have been deficient in stopping the violence: even with the sizable Sangaris force supporting MISCA, the situation remains in a state of deterioration (Smith “EU”). It is evident that financial support alone is insufficient; MISCA is not mature enough as a fighting force to act independently in a crisis of these proportions (Fortin). Although funding should be addressed as both a short- and long-term goal, the immediate situation requires hard support, comprising deployable soldiers and supporting technology.

The Strategic Partnership also stresses the importance of regional economic cooperation as an important component of security and development (CEU 11). The most important regional economic union is the ECCAS, which encompasses the CAR and ten of its neighbors (INSouth). The ECCAS has been instrumental in providing strategic political pressure, most
notably in the case of persuading Seleka-installed President Djotodia to resign from his position and leave the country (Duckstein). The ECCAS has and continues to facilitate high-level meetings focused on developing political solutions (Duckstein). Local stakeholders are the first to feel the repercussions of security crises, and as such should be considered high-priority strategic partners. The ECCAS is unfortunately limited in its mobilization capabilities, however, which illustrates the importance of maintaining a strong strategic relationship with more militarily developed actors such as the AU and EU (Pirozzi 45).

In bilateral terms, the EU is the biggest single donor of aid to the CAR, both before and during the current conflict (EUEAS, “Fact Sheet”). The Cotonou Agreement, originally signed in 2000, binds the EU and African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) together in an effort to reduce poverty and advance development agendas. The CAR is a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement, and as such benefits from access to the European Development Fund through its framework (European Union External Action, “Cotonou Agreement”). In addition to development funding, the agreement also provides the following mandate that applies to the security situation in the CAR today:

The Parties acknowledge that without development and poverty reduction there will be no sustainable peace and security, and that without peace and security there can be no sustainable development. The parties shall pursue an active, comprehensive and integrated policy of peace building and conflict prevention and resolution, and human security, and shall address situations of fragility within the framework of the Partnership. (EUEA “Cotonou Agreement” 22)

Despite the expansive nature of such agreements, the conflict in the CAR has managed to reach the level of international crisis. In the short term, this situation challenges the EU’s
immediate crisis response mechanisms. The more sweeping provocation, however, is the question of the efficacy of these frameworks for addressing dynamic security threats in a changing world.

Recommendations

1. Short Term

   Of immediate concern is the ability for intervention forces in the CAR to bring stability long enough that peaceful democracy can be developed. Foot-dragging and indecision allowed the crisis to grow for too long without a proper-sized military intervention, so the EU should take all steps possible to ensure that enough troops are delivered to meet the UN Secretary-General’s recent prescription of a minimum of 12000 peacekeepers (DW). Currently, there are only 9000 troops pledged between the three main actors. In accordance with the UNSG’s request of 3000 more troops, the EU should enlarge its initial commitment to fill this deficit of 3000 troops (Ki-moon). If it finds itself unable to muster the political will to commit a European force of this size, the EU should immediately seek alternatives, such as funding the AU to enlarge MISCA. If the EU intends to remain a global actor, it needs to demonstrate an ability to act decisively and rapidly, despite its inner conflicts regarding foreign interventions.

   A comprehensive and effective engagement includes following in the footsteps of the US in providing logistical support for foreign troop transport not only into the country but also from Bangui to remote destinations where fighting is occurring. It is prudent to note the inadequacies of the existing intervention: Having only enough troops to maintain a presence in the easily-accessible urban areas while a bush war rages out of sight is an abject failure. Troops must be deployed beyond the “low hanging fruit” of urban Bangui (Joselow).
The mission of creating a “safe haven” in Bangui is a start, but great effort must be concerted to ensure safety in the CAR’s rural areas (Croft). The EU should work closely with MISCA, France, and the US to ensure that the peacekeeping mission does not neglect rural areas. The EU can assist with alleviating logistical inadequacies by funding and/or providing hardware such as transport aircraft, vehicles, and infrastructure that supports communication and coordination capabilities.

The EU should continue its existing humanitarian and independent development assistance, but must realize that pouring money and resources into development projects is meaningless unless their encompassing security situations are raised to an acceptable level of stability. **Security and development must be approached in unison.** With this in mind, the EU should address the budget shortfalls of NGOs and multilateral actors alike: Medicins San Frontieres’ scathing open letter to the UN’s humanitarian mission in the CAR represents an unprecedented critique of the international aid community (MSF). The EU should use its political power and fundraising potential to adequately equip MSF, the UN’s humanitarian mission, and other NGOs. If the innocents being maimed in this conflict lose their faith in the international community’s ability to provide basic humanitarian services, the grounds for productive future relationships between Africa and the EU will be threatened. The EU is well endowed with financial resources and should act accordingly.

2. **Mid-Term**

A rapid-response CSDP deployment to the CAR earlier in the crisis could have bolstered French peacekeeping ability and potentially offset the rapid escalation of violence, but there is not sufficient political will within EU Member States to agree on foreign deployments of EU troops (Smith “EU”). Namely, Britain and Germany have traditionally held firm in their
opposition to military deployments to Sub-Saharan Africa, in spite and perhaps because of their engagements in other parts of the world (Gros-Verheyde). The consequential stagnancy of CSDP battle groups, combined with the lack of cohesive political will to change this, essentially eliminates CSDP as a real option for rapid-response in Africa (Dempsey “Depressing”).

**Similarly to EUTM-Mali, the EU can employ the CSDP instead as a medium-term military and police training instrument used to bolster future peacekeeping activities of first-line, local actors** (EUEAS “EU”).

Contrary to its previous positions on foreign policy, Germany has recently demonstrated a will to act militarily in Africa by agreeing to send a contingent of soldiers to support the French mission in Mali (France 24). Germany’s new Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steineier, and Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen have both been uncharacteristically vocal in their support for foreign intervention, signaling a potential change in one of the EU’s most stalwart dove states (Dempsey “Germany”). If the CSDP is to remain an idle force regarding foreign deployments, the EU must look to bolster and support its own Member States when they take initiatives that benefit greater European security. The EU has the option to integrate Member States’ capabilities with EU security policies when the specific intervention aligns with an EU security policy goal. In the case of the CAR, the EU can offer financial assistance to both Germany and France if they are willing to undertake a peacekeeping mission there. Such support can stand as a precedent for new policies that mobilize EU resources to facilitate unilateral and bilateral actions under the broader scope of EU strategy.

3. **Long term**

As described above, the EU has a variety of policy instruments that provide for various levels of intervention in African states both before and during conflicts. What it doesn’t have,
however, is a specific strategic outline for dealing with the need for rapid interventions in emergency crisis situations such as the CAR conflict. The original European Security Strategy of 2003 specifies the African Union as being a contributor to a “more orderly world” but doesn’t offer regionally specific responses for addressing the AU’s inadequacies in dealing with the eruption of sudden conflict (EU “Secure” 9). The 2008 revision calls for a “more effective and capable Europe,” but the EU meets African conflicts only after they have developed to crisis level and without cohesive, strategic responses, despite the broad objectives already in place (EU “Report” 9). **To solve these issues, the AU and EU need to deepen their partnership by developing security instruments that are based on Africa’s diverse economic communities and unique local realities.**

The framework of the Africa-EU Partnership can guide this. Priority Action 2 includes the goal of operationalizing a Continental Early Warning System (EWS) (CEU 35-38). The war in the CAR, which is still intensifying today, illustrates that there is still work to be done on an EWS, and that the EU should prioritize the development of such a mechanism. Helly and Rocca point out that both French diplomats and EU delegates repeatedly warned European policymakers of deteriorating governance in the context of poor European aid efficacy in Mali, but the EU and Member States ignored the warnings in the lead up to the 2012 Malian coup (Helly and Rocca 6). The EU response to the Sudanese conflict of 2003-2005 was criticized partly because, “Unfortunately, the EU does not have, contribute to, or support a specific, mainstreamed conflict early-warning system for Sudan and South Sudan which informs decision-makers in Brussels or at the level of the EU Delegation” (Van der Zwan 24). Van der Zwan continues, “If taken forward by government in partnership with civil society, conflict early warning and early response can also prevent state failure, promote demilitarisation and
help a new state along the path to democratic governance” (Van der Zwan 24). Although the context of that research was an analysis of the Sudanese genocide, the idea of an effective EWS can easily be extrapolated and applied to most Sub-Saharan African conflicts. The EU must further develop its African EWS, which will generate a context for clear and direct pre-crisis and mid-crisis response.

The EU can and should address this issue by incorporating EWSs as components of distinct security strategies that operate within Africa’s organic regional structures, as opposed to lumping Africa’s richly varied regions into one nonspecific policy framework. **Put succinctly, the EU needs to undergo a strategic remapping of Africa.** To accomplish this, the EU must work with the AU and regional actors—both states and NGOs—on developing comprehensive security policies specific to each of Africa’s existing Regional Economic Communities (RECs). These RECs fall roughly in geographic parallel with Africa’s Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which Storey portrays as economic divisions resulting from differing regional economic and developmental needs (Storey 335-336). Development and security are an inseparable binary, so the overlapping EPAs and RECs are natural contexts for regional security policies reflective of local realities. Söderbaum and Tavares support this with their argument that regionally-based interventions are superior to broader, multilateral interventions (Söderbaum and Tavares). Writing on regional security approaches in Africa, they maintain the following:

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9 The eight pillars of the Economic Communities of Africa are the following: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) (Ndomo 8-9).
First, as the members of a regional organization share the same cultural background, they are likely to be more in tune with a conflict at hand. Second, personal relationships with the leaders have developed in the past, which results in greater understanding of the situation and may result in fruitful dialogue based on personal trust. Third, as time management is essential in a crisis situation, regional organizations could offer a more timely response, compared to bureaucratic global organizations as the UN or foreign states. Fourth, as the members of a regional organization are the ones who would suffer more directly the impacts of the conflict, they have a legitimate vital interest at stake in preserving regional stability. (Söderbaum & Tavares 6)

This supports the idea that the EU should continue to work as a financial partner in supporting the development of existing regional associations and their respective security apparatuses. ECOWAS and ECCAS, for example, have made laudable advances in their abilities to intervene in local conflicts (ECOWAS)(Duckstein). An EU security policy based on regional divisions should involve comprehensive engagement with respective local actors, and should focus on building long-term capacity through training programs while providing emergency support when required.
Conclusion
By Michael Golomb

Moving Forward: A New Regional Strategic Framework for Africa-EU Relations

The EU’s overall ability to intervene in African conflicts is realistically limited to soft power projections and support for unilateral and multilateral forces. The current EU troop pledge to the CAR may be, as Smith succinctly put, “too little, too late” (Smith “EU”), but this does not preclude the EU from becoming the proactive regional actor it strives to be in the future. Fortunately, Africa’s multilateral organizations have demonstrated a willingness to work with the EU to order to meet mutually established, large-scale, and long-term security goals. The signing of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership stands as a testament to this will and provides a platform from which the EU and AU can develop effective regional security strategies that provide a more stable and desirable future for both unions.

This report intends to demonstrate that, even though Europe spends exorbitant amount of money on Africa in the form of development aid packages, the root causes of the need for aid and costly crisis interventions remain ignored. Or, rather, that there is fanciful talk about developing good governance and stronger institutions in documents like the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, but the difficult questions of how to truly implement reforms at ground level remain unanswered. Subsequently, countries such as the CAR remain perpetually underdeveloped and subject to sudden crisis. The difficult reality is that development and security are codependent; development cannot occur without security as security can only come when people are lifted from abject poverty and given opportunities. The two must be fostered together. The EU’s need for security combined with the deep, historical connections Europe enjoys with Africa place the EU in prime position to act towards this end.
By empowering regional African actors, the EU will not only project its own high standards of democracy and security, it will safeguard a vibrant future for both Africans and Europeans alike and steer a path clear of crises such as the one in the CAR today. To do this effectively, the EU must acknowledge its inherent limitations. The European Union is not a major military actor in Africa, nor should it pretend to be (Froitzheim, Söderbaum, and Taylor). However, Europe’s position in Africa can be advantageous to both continents. Excessive military deployments overseas can create its own set of problems, such as foreign dependence on external security actors. More worrying is the tendency for large, foreign, multilateral military interventions to become drawn into much longer engagements than anticipated, leading to mission fatigue and potential resentment on both sides of the conflict. By approaching Africa from the position of a comprehensive security and development partner, rather than a military interventionist, the EU can steer clear of these potential debacles while still exerting influence in favor of global security and increased African ownership.

To meet the priorities of a Grand Strategy, it is imperative that the EU and AU work together on the goal of developing a strategic remapping of Africa. The spatial distinctions of Africa’s existing RECs provide a logical point of departure for such an endeavor. These individual security policies should be independently actionable but should also communicate liberally with each other due to Africa’s broad interconnectedness. They should be revisited and updated as often as necessary to reflect significant regional shifts in security and development. As the world evolves at an ever-increasing pace, security challenges rise quickly and must be met with prompt, decisive action; the contemporary global environment does not offer the luxury of muddling and indecision for those who wish to remain relevant in the world.
Section II: The EU as a Global Actor

General Strategic Priorities
By Philippe Enos and Shannon Nolan

I. Working with Strategic Partners

The EU’s strategic partnerships are based on the general framework set by the European Security Strategy (ESS) which states that there are “few if any problems we can deal with on our own,” in today’s world (ESS 13). Threats are commonly “shared with all our closest partners” and “our security and prosperity increasingly depend[s] on an effective multilateral system” (ESS 13;9). In light of this environment, the ESS demonstrates that the EU must “pursue [its] objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors” especially its strategic partners (ESS 13). The importance of strategic partners to the EU’s security is underscored by the extent to which the transatlantic relationship “is irreplaceable” (ESS 9).

The 2013 Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy explains how the transatlantic partners can cooperate closely on issues including Iran’s nuclear program, the conflict in Syria and other Arab Spring conflicts and issues in the Middle East. The European Parliament welcomes commitments to strengthen the EU’s strategic partnership with NATO through a complementary approach. For the EU and
NATO, this implies seeking more cost-effective operational capabilities to solve the ongoing stalemate that is hindering close cooperation between both institutions (2013/2081(INI) 20).

With regard to China, the EU intends to develop a comprehensive Strategic Partnership promoting both parties’ global interests. This improved partnership calls for EU member states to speak with one voice to the Chinese government. The EU iterates the need for greater dialogue on human rights as well as increased Chinese respect for international law. The 2013 Annual Report upholds that both partners must cooperate on common global challenges including climate change, maritime security, financial regulations including efforts to curb tax evasion, and the challenges posed by Iran, North Korea and Syria (2013/2081(INI) 11). Further, concerning China and the US, the EU must continue to support the twin track approach to nonproliferation adopted by these countries as well as Russia.

With respect to Latin America, the EU strives to enhance its relations by increasing political dialogue through the EUROLAT Parliamentary Assembly, working with Latin America on sustainable economic development and reconciling any divergent values and goals regarding governance. The EU supports the process of negotiating an Association Agreement between the EU and Mercosur. Finally, in its 2013 Annual Report, the EU’s recognizes the need to strengthen coordination with Latin American partners in multilateral forums and calls for the adoption of a Euro-Latin American Charter for Peace and Security, as requested by the Eurolat Assembly (2013/2081(INI) 16).

II. The EU is Falling Short of its Objectives

Our research on Brazil, China, and Transatlantic relations demonstrate that EU objectives are not adequately being met. The EU’s Strategic Partnerships remain largely unproductive and have gone downhill because “there has been a general lack of foresight and
planning” (Khandekar 3). EU relations have been largely economic and the more the EU neglects East Asia, Latin America and the U.S. politically, the narrower the window of opportunity becomes to restore its relevance. Thomas Renard, a deputy head of European Strategic Partnerships observatory by FRIDE and Egmont, agrees and insists that “it is not the emphasis on trade and economic issues that is problematic, but rather, their relative disconnection from political (and security) concerns. A strategic partnership can be truly strategic only if it goes beyond the first economic layer of the relationship” (Renard 2). Further, Gunther Maihold, deputy director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, states "The most important Latin American countries have very dynamic trade with the countries of the Pacific Rim and China, and the Europeans need to consider how to position themselves. More is expected of them than just free trade agreements" (Prange De Oliveira). Currently, East Asian countries and the U.S. tend to interact with European states bilaterally. This risks EU exclusion as no single member state alone can match the power and influence of China or the United States. Clearly the EU’s strategic partnerships fall short of their stated objectives.

**III. Searching for Solutions**

The EU must improve its Strategic Partnerships by continuing important dialogue on trade related matters and by expanding the amount of political collaboration especially regarding common security concerns.

**Transatlantic Relations**

Establishing criteria over the use of force, revising the New Transatlantic Agenda, implementing a ‘Transatlantic Security Partnership,’ and reforming NATO in order to foster greater cooperation between NATO and the EU will ensure that the EU-US Strategic
Partnership evolves to become more unified and decisive in response to security threats and crises.

Finalizing TTIP in a transparent and mutually effective manner will strengthen coordination on trade related matters between the EU and US and promote cooperation with multi-lateral partners.

Asia

In order to develop its Strategic Partnership with China, the EU must offer China its environmental expertise and related technology as a means of improving cooperation in the political arena.

Additionally, the EU must take on the role of mediator between China and the US.

The EU must engage China in the Transatlantic dialogue, and cooperate with the U.S. to improve maritime security in the South China Sea.

Latin America

The EU must treat Latin America as an equal regional partner, especially Brazil which is a key actor.

By introducing and including Brazil in Transatlantic affairs, the EU can help Brazil enhance its leadership in Latin America.

These solutions will revitalize the EU’s Strategic Partnerships, strengthening the E.U.’s involvement in areas outside of explicitly economic issues, while continuing to improve the E.U.’s ability to reach economic objectives. These newly revitalized Partnerships will reverse the EU’s diminishing international influence and enable it to more concretely pursue its interests in the future.
IV. Envisioning New Global Strategic Partnerships

The solutions mentioned above will allow the EU to build more constructive and truly strategic partnerships. This will also require the EU to broaden the scope and purpose of these partnerships to fully create the capacity to address global issues that can be envisioned in new Global Strategic Partnerships (GSPs). The EU’s strategic partnerships will need to do more than just summits, become more than just dialogue, and will need to address issues outside of economics and trade. Consistent with calls for greater multilateralism by the ESS, the new GSPs must not be entirely consumed by bilateral issues and rather should be redirected toward global issues. These more comprehensive GSP frameworks should include outside countries and organizations for deeper and broader multi-lateral engagement. Due to the interrelation between internal EU interests and external EU capabilities, the EU’s capacity to pursue its interests outside of Europe is waning. Therefore the EU’s diminishing global capabilities must be revived through new all encompassing GSPs.
Chapter 4: China and East Asia

Introduction
By Gregory Fenno and Ji Soo Yoo

Europe’s greatest security threat is the widespread assumption that they have and will become increasingly irrelevant. The EU has neglected to prepare new strategies to respond to the rapid changes of the world. Currently, Europe finds itself being shoved aside in the politics of the world, and this is largely a result of the growth of Asia at a time when Europe continues to falter. As a housing crisis was gripping Spain and government debt restructuring was dogging Greece, China continued to output growth that is akin to doubling their economy every 7 years (Bachman). Since the Eurozone crisis, evidence suggests that East Asian countries such as China have lost interest in cooperating with the EU (Youngs).

Unlike the EU, the US—the reigning world superpower accounting for 25% of the world’s GDP and maintaining a global military presence—is well positioned to serve as a counter balancing ‘pole’ to the new power dynamic rising out of Asia. It is widely predicted that a US-China Bi-Polar world will be the future (Ikenberry 50). Moreover, it is obvious that American geopolitical interests have been shifting from Europe to Asia. The problem arises that Europe is then left out of the rising future world, except as a mere trading partner to both the US and China. Europe risks being the forgotten player. The more the EU overlooks East Asia politically, the narrower its window of opportunity becomes to restore relevance.
A growing trend of the EU’s policy in Asia is beginning to emerge, which is a disconnect between the EU’s commercial ties on one hand and the EU’s lack of a strategic vision for addressing the consequential changes that have occurred in the region on the other. Since the 2003 ESS and the further development of CSFP/CSDP, which had little impact on Asian policy, Europe’s strategic role in the region has been unclear. Opinions differ on how to cope with this lack of engagement when Europe’s trade clearly depends on it. According to analysts such as Richard Youngs, the EU should look for an area where it can re-engage in East Asia more effectively. One potential area where the EU can engage is in the security matters of the region. Although the EU is unlikely ever to develop a military presence in Asia, they can still develop strategic positions on key issues: securing shipping lanes vital to European commercial interests, resolving territorial disputes between China and Japan, and addressing the looming threat of a security dilemma as countries escalate military spending.

Other analysts disagree and think that the EU should not take on a more assertive strategic role in Asia. Jolyon Howorth, for example, maintains that the EU should prioritize the security of its neighborhood and leave Asian security to the United States (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). He argues that the issue is too complex and that Europe has too many problems closer to home. Youngs, who believes that the EU has distinct strategic interests in Asia, thinks a larger role can and should be played by Europe. For example, while the US seeks to contain China, the EU can seek to engage China across a range of non-military issues that are of concern to both sides. That being said, the EU would still need to determine the appropriate strategic balance between engaging China and counter-acting the negative impact that its rising power is having on the neighboring states affected by China’s new and more assertive policies in the region.
Only with a strategic presence in the region can the EU restore its credibility with Asian countries that have, in recent years, become increasingly dismissive of the EU as a global actor. If the EU cannot develop a more strategic approach to complement its commercial interests in Asia, it is in imminent risk of a double exclusion: exclusion from the changing world order and exclusion from the calculations of its most powerful Member States as they pursue their own personal geostrategic and geo-economic objectives in Asia. Since no single European country can match the power and influence of the United States or China, Europe, and by extension the EU, would inescapably become irrelevant to global security.

The EU is not the same as it was then they launched the ESS in 2003. The ESS in 2003 states that the EU is “ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (European Union 1). Moreover, the EU believed that they should take responsibility in various global challenges such as terrorism, organized crime, and climate change. The EU believed that they could manage these various challenges because, at the time of writing, the EU had the confidence of its Member States and a much more stable economic situation with more resources. These combined to give the EU a much more pronounced reputation as a normative actor.

However, the Eurozone crisis changed the Member States’ perspectives on their collective capacity to engage in the world as a global actor: “At present, internal crisis is the EU’s external image” (Youngs 20). This poses a challenge for the EU; namely, how will they regain their reputation as a global and relevant actor? Some experts, such as Richard Youngs, believe that the EU should narrow down their objectives and focus on few things that they can specialize in, “the EU’s credibility cannot withstand too many more ‘Great Deceits’: Turkey’s accession promise, democracy support in the Middle East, spreading the inclusive benefits of
liberal world order” (Youngs 20). This implies that the EU cannot restore their relevance if they continue trying to “do it all” (Zhang et. al 13).

The EU needs to reconsider what they can do with limited resources and capability in a new security strategy instead of establishing too grandiose goals. To regain their credibility as a relevant actor, “the EU should definitely confirm the preventive, holistic and multilateral outlook of the Union but ought to complement it with much clearer objectives and thus priorities” (Biscop 2). Hence, the EU must now define clearer objectives and priorities, especially with respect to Asia where consequential changes have taken place since 2003.

Since 2003, new emerging powers such as China, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Singapore, Colombia, Mexico, Turkey and Nigeria continue to grow rapidly (“Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” 44). Their rise comes at a time when Western powers face relative decline around the world. Henry Kissinger, for example, notes “the titanic shift of power from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific and the “diffusion of power” to a large group of second-ranked nations.” (qtd. in Lai 14-15). He expects, “By 2030, Asia will be well on its way to returning to being the world’s powerhouse, just as it was before 1500” (Gjelten).

Particularly, China has gained the reputation as one of the world’s most important players. Matthew Burrows, director of the NIC Long Range Analysis Unit, states, “We underestimated the speed with which it was happening,” demonstrating the lack of preparedness by Europe for this expansion in power (Gjelten). Sutter writes, “after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China has been the world’s fastest-growing major economy. From 1979 to 2011, the average annual growth rate of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) was about 10 percent.” He states that China became “the world’s largest trader, largest exporter, and largest manufacturer” (Sutter 205).
Due to this emergence of power, the relationships among countries have changed significantly. The emergence of China has led regional actors such as South Korea and Japan to integrate more economically, while it has also led them to strengthen their security alliance with the US (“Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” 80). This implies that, “the US and China will be in competition with one another but they will also be required to cooperate to solve common threats and challenges and to protect mutual interests” (“Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds” 106). In other words, it is expected that the international order will facilitate bi-polarity between the US and China and leave other major powers behind.

Currently, China’s operations in the region tend towards the explicit use of bilateral relations for their own economic advantage. For example, “China is changing its favored European partners from year to year and beginning to play them off against each other in Putinesque fashion” (Youngs 83). This caused the contorted relationship that François Godement and Janas Parello-Plensner defines as the ‘scramble for Europe.’ Their work explains the danger of the concept:

A kind of ‘scramble for Europe’ is now taking place as China purchases European government debt, invests in European companies and exploits Europe’s open market for public procurement. Crisis-hit Europe’s need for short-term cash is allowing China not just to strike cut-price deals but also to play off Member States against each other and against their own collective interests – replicating a strategy it has already used in the developing world. The expansion of China’s presence in Europe is creating new fault lines within Europe and making it much harder to implement the more coordinated and tougher strategy towards China that the EU was beginning to develop. As Europeans compete with each other for Chinese business, they are reducing their Chan et. alces of
collectively negotiating reciprocal access to Chinese markets. (Godement and Parello-Plenser 1)

In Asia, the emergence of China is not the only threatening problem. Along with an increase of natural resource scarcity, territorial disputes have worsened between regional actors such as China, Japan, and South Korea. The South China Sea dispute is one paramount issue, with the sea acting as the third largest shipping lane in the world. The first issue on this front is the question of national sovereignty, as China asserts its presence in the area. Under the UN Sea rules, a 200-mile economic zone is the norm and most countries do not have problems of following this requirement (UN). However, the South China Sea dispute raises a different challenge. The countries that have invaded, extorted, and otherwise negatively interacted with each other for centuries are now, in many cases, less than 200 miles by sea from each other. This conflict sets up a situation in which the EU can exercise their prowess in negotiating and bargaining in the region since the various actors have been seeking a third-party arbitrator. But this is only if the EU is willing to engage in the region geo-strategically.

The Chinese government faces environmental deterioration such as air pollution, soil erosion, and the steady fall of the water table (Thompson 2). Europe is in a key position to help with these issues. China is now the world’s largest emitter of carbon based fuels; and Europe has built up industries over the course of the last 20 years that can provide the equipment to reverse this trend. Countless areas in Central China have documented cases of people’s lives being shortened because of the deterioration of the quality of ground water and air (Zhou 32). In the past, Europe has managed to combat similar problems, as it cleaned up disastrous water conditions in the former communist European countries. It is then clear that Europe has an
opening for relevance in China by helping to address their environmental concerns. In the future, this could be an area where both sides could mutually benefit each other.

The ESS from 2003 is then no longer relevant, and the EU must realize the drastic change in the world since that time. The EU is now obligated to develop a regional framework towards China and East Asia, as it needs new strategies to be able to relate to this vital region and to the rest of the world. Now is the time for it to make this critical step towards preserving its relevance.

Although ESS 2003 clearly lacks a security strategy towards China and East Asia, the EU has not neglected strategic partnerships that relate to commercial interests in the region. “According to EU policy documents and joint statements, ten countries are commonly included in the list of EU strategic partners, namely Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, South Korea and the US” (Grevi 8). The EU’s strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea and China do seem very promising at first glance. The EU has upgraded the relationship with Japan, adopting the EU-Japan Action Plan in 2001, and has also been negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Japan (Grevi 8). South Korea is the only country that has concluded the FTA process and the comprehensive Framework Agreement, which occurred in 2010 (Grevi 8).

As Casarini’s report explains, “the establishment of the EU-China partnership in 2003 came at a time of converging priorities between the two partners. The EU and China could build on a similar understanding of the post-Cold War international system and look at the place of both partners inside of it. They were brought closer together by cooperation in high-tech and strategic industrial sectors and by closer economic and monetary ties, including China’s support for the euro” (Casarini et. al 23). In addition, the partnership contributed to the EU’s credibility
as a relevant actor because, “it was the first time that the EU had attempted to act strategically with regard to China and tried to go beyond its traditional role as a junior partner of the U.S” (Casarini et. al 24).

However, the EU’s strategic partnership with states in the region has gone downhill since then because of “a general lack of foresight and planning” (Khandekar 3). The 2003 ESS did not provide much guidance to identify common criteria for the core EU interests, their power status, or their normative affinity to the EU (Grevi 9). Grevi further portrays the diminishing profile of the EU in his own report:

The ritual of strategic partnerships, including regular summit events, high-level dialogues and joint statements, [the ESS] continues to provide the EU with reassurance concerning its international profile, … [but] the terms and perception of the relationships with some large partners such as China, India and Brazil are Changing. The EU is no longer mainly a supplier but increasingly a demander of political recognition, which, conversely, appears less urgent for partners whose self-confidence is rising faster than their GDP figures. (14)

Among the strategic partnership countries, the EU’s relationship with China has experienced the greatest decline, “due to growing misperceptions and differences on issues such as trade, technology and human rights. By the time the economic crisis broke out in autumn 2008, the EU-China strategic partnership had reached one of its lowest points” (Casarini et. al 23). Another reason for deteriorating relations with China is that the EU has addressed security and political matters poorly, preferring to remain focused on trade and commercial interests. Thomas Renard, a deputy head of European Strategic Partnerships observatory by FRIDE and Egmont, agrees and insists, “it is not the emphasis on trade and economic issues that is
problematic, but rather, their relative disconnection from political concerns. A strategic partnership can be truly strategic only if it goes beyond the first economic layer of the relationship” (Renard 2).

The impact of the consequences is shown on the European Foreign Policy Scorecard (EFPS). According to the EFPS, the score of the relationship between the EU and China ranged from C- to C’ during 2010-2013. This poor showing is caused by the EU’s lack of coherent action in the region. “Europe faces a structural disadvantage in dealing with China. The EU is divided between Member States with different economic interests and decision-making involves various actors … this asymmetry makes it even more urgent that the EU take steps to coordinate its interests more effectively” (“ECFR’s Scorecard 2013”). This results from the EU’s inability to clarify their position on security matters in Asia. “Europe was forced to think about how it should respond to the US ‘pivot’ to Asia and what its response would mean for its relationship with what will likely become the world’s largest economy in the next decade” (ECFR’s Scorecard 2012). The absence of an EU security strategy in Asia led Member States to stay ominously silent on the maritime disputes between China and its neighbors during the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) (“ECFR’s Scorecard 2012). Lack of political engagement led the EU to be excluded from the last East Asia Summit. These consequences have signaled that the EU cannot overlook political engagement in East Asia anymore.

Additionally, the EU’s absence on security matters impacts their commercial interests as well, as the EU cannot integrate with the region beyond a certain point without political engagement on security matters. For example, “an FTA project with ASEAN was dropped two years into negotiations for political reasons regarding Myanmar. A slower bilateral track was adopted that not only compromised a region-to-region relationship, but also subsequently
affected the EU’s overall strength as an economic actor in Asia” (Khandekar 3). For another instance, “the EU has insisted on signing Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) before FTAs, which are taking multiple years to negotiate and ratify” (Khandekar 3). The postponing of negotiations, caused by the EU’s inability to decide upon coherent ends, impacts the EU’s commercial interests by delaying the benefits of trade liberalization.

Due to the Western financial crisis, major powers such as China, Japan, and South Korea have started to integrate their economic interests together regionally. “China and South Korea will soon begin negotiations on a trilateral FTA while the ASEAN Framework on Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) aims to create a large free trade area by combining ASEAN’s existing FTAs and including agreements covering services and investment” (Khandekar 4). Also, the emergence of Asia countries threatens the EU with increased competition. “When exports to the EU declined during the financial crisis, resulting in falling GDP growth rates, Asia actively sought opportunities in new markets and regions. India for one came up with its Focus Market Scheme, which looks at expanding trade with new markets in Latin America, Africa and East Asia” (Khadeker 5). In light of this increasing cooperation among regional actors, the EU cannot avoid engaging in security matters in the region any longer. Hence, even though the EU’s strategic partnerships with the region worked well at one time and some policies remain relevant, the EU needs to strengthen strategic partnerships through a regional framework involving security matters.

The EU’s irrelevance in Asia is directly related to its lack of a regional security framework that would facilitate strategic political engagement in the region. However, it is not too late for the EU to engage in security matters through the development of such a framework. While the EU is always likely to be first and foremost an economic actor in Asia, there are
important areas in which the EU can contribute to the region’s security. Specifically, the EU will be able to maintain relevance by engaging issues such as conventional security in the region and human security in China.

In conventional security, the EU can show an interest in security matters in several ways. The EU can attend summits and meetings by multilateral Asia institutions such as ASEAN. Also, the EU can bring their effective dispute resolution mechanisms to bear on the South China Sea conflict. In addition, in human security the EU can express their willingness to help China cope with ecological issues, promote sustainable urbanization, and support People to People Dialogue with education and cultural exchanges. Cyber-security as well is potential area for cooperation based on mutual interests. The EU will be restored as a relevant actor and regain credibility in Asia by engaging in the security issues that matter most to regional actors.
Tackling Conventional Security
By Ji Soo Yoo

Issue

Any turbulence, instability, and conflict in the Asia-Pacific region will have a direct bearing on the EU’s economic interests since the EU’s economy is increasingly interdependent with the Chinese economy (“Security developments in East Asia”). Regional peace and stability in the South China Sea should be of critical importance for the EU given the fact that the EU’s maritime trade depends on sea-lanes that cross through this region. The EU to date has focused mainly on its commercial interests in Asia but it is doubtful that this approach can be sustained (Putten). This is clear for many experts on the region:

Developing an EU strategy for ensuring the security and openness of the global maritime commons is therefore not so much a matter of choice and a signal of growing European ambitions, but a pre-requisite for safeguarding Europe’s vital sea lines of communications (SLOCS) and ensuring Europe’s own future as a global maritime actor. This suggests that maritime matters should take a prominent place in the ongoing discussions about a revision of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and present efforts to draw up a European Global Strategy (EGS). (Behr, Aaltola, and Brattberg 3)

Hence, the EU’s challenge is to engage in the region politically rather than only economically. Lack of political engagement in the region has rendered the EU irrelevant as an actor in the perceptions of Asian countries. (Weissmann 2). In the long-term, greater political involvement will give the EU opportunities to regain credibility in the region and to protect European commercial interests (Weissmann 5). Becoming involved politically will require the
EU to become more involved in conventional security issues like that of assisting in the process of resolving the South China Sea disputes.

**Background**

The South China Sea Channel Islands are an extremely important part of global commerce. Currently facilitating a shipping lane, the area provides 50% of global oil tanker shipments and has rich resources for oil development, gas exploration projects, and fisheries (Xu). However, the South China Sea is one of the most disputed areas in the region and runs into potential conflict between countries such as China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. The South China Sea dispute resulted from economic competition and demand for scarce natural resources; it is at risk of increasing in frequency and intensity (Xu).

This is particularly true with China’s urbanized eastern coast. China made the most controversial territorial claim when it submitted a map to the UN in 2009 that included the Scarborough Shoal with the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Xu). China has insisted on the historical legitimacy of the line based on survey expeditions, fishing activities, and naval patrols against the boundaries provided by United Nations Conventions on the Law Of Sea (UNCLOS) (Xu).

China’s declaration on the South China Sea has caused the instability of the global oil tanker shipments with the potential impact of disruptions to regional maritime trade. Many scholars anticipate that the territorial disputes will deepen because, “China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force” (Glaser). This is shown as “China’s 2013 defence White Paper emphasises the need to be able to win ‘local wars’ in the future, a
reference to territorial disputes with neighbours” (Grevi, Keohane, Lee and Lewis 59). This alarms many countries into considering damages that would impact their national interests.

Moreover, different problems arise when countries try to resolve the dispute. China has chosen not to negotiate and has rejected the arbitration mechanisms provided by the UN. It prefers to conduct its own diplomacy on a bilateral basis rather than a multilateral basis. The tendency towards bilateral basis diplomacy applies to other countries in the region as well:

In April this year Japan and Taiwan reached an agreement to jointly share and administer the fishing resources in their overlapping claimed exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea, an important breakthrough after 17 years of negotiations and a potential model for other such agreements. Other incidences of the joint administrations of resources in disputed waters in the SCS have de-escalated tensions and promoted economic development, such as Malaysia and Brunei's 2009 agreement to partner on exploring offshore Brunei waters, with drilling in offshore oil and gas fields off Brunei beginning in 2011; and Thailand and Vietnam's agreement to jointly develop areas of the Gulf of Thailand for gas exports, despite ongoing territorial disputes. (“South China Sea: Background Note”)

Although bilateral cooperation might de-escalate the tension between two countries, this is a very problematic approach because bilateral cooperation does not bring agreeable results for third countries outside of the agreement. In other words, the region needs a mediator that can assist in multilateral dialogues.

Multilateral dialogues encourage reconciliation. This allows the region to avoid military conflict and preserve the area where there are an abundance of fisheries and resources for
maritime trade. Therefore, the region must seek mediators that most countries can agree upon and work through organizations that can provide dialogues and the binding legal commitments.

**Interests**

Maritime trade is 90% of the EU’s external trade and over 40% of their internal trade. South China Sea is one of the most important areas where the EU is highly engaged for their economic interests. As Behr, Aaltola, and Brattberg explain, “Growing commercial interest in the exploitation of maritime resources is adding further pressure for international competition, in particular in the more scantily regulated high sea areas” (Behr, Aaltola and Brattberg 4). However, the territorial disputes within the region have worsened. Countries that are involved in the disputes are, in some cases, among the EU’s largest trade partners. Thus, the EU cannot avoid economic turmoil if military confrontation in the region breaks out (Wacker). In other words, “the EU will face a major challenge in trying to both temper geopolitical tensions and advance a rules-based global order” (Grevi, Keohane, Lee and Lewis 9).

Some Member States such as Germany still believe that they can continue pursuing their economic interests in the region while keeping a low profile on security (Putten). However, many political analysts see this approach as strategically flawed because the relationship is currently characterized as “Asia’s power over the EU, not EU influence in Asia” (Youngs 73). The preservation of the EU’s economic interests lies in developing a more effective security strategy:

European lawmakers will have to understand that an absence of regional security interests by no means implies an absence of greater global security interests. Because of its economic importance, regional stability in Asia is crucial, especially for export-oriented countries such as Germany. Instability in that already volatile region could disrupt the flow of global trade
and severely harm global markets. These global implications make regional stability in Asia a core interest for the economic superpower Europe. (Wolf 2)

This imbalanced relationship requires the EU to review their security strategy and develop more proactive strategies for securing the maritime commons in the region, which the EU has overlooked in the past (Behr, Aaltola and Brattberg).

The EU can increase its credibility through political involvement in the region’s security matters. The EU’s profile has remained that of a development-oriented humanitarian actor and not a security actor (Youngs 90). The EU security strategy for the region is “practically non-existent” (Youngs 92). As a result, East Asian countries have complained about the EU’s unwillingness to engage in security matters in the region, which culminated in the example where, “Singapore has blocked the EU’s guest participation in the East Asia Summit” (Youngs 91). Japan also made the critical point that the EU only sees the region as a global business source. The EU’s lack of interest to engage politically, in security matters, caused it to lose credibility and damaged their reputation as a normative actor. Moreover, the non-existence of an EU security strategy for Asia highlights the EU’s lack of coherence and capacity as an independent actor which in turn weakens the EU’s reputation.

Also damaging to the EU’s reputation is the extent to which many Member States have developed bilateral strategic partnerships with China (Youngs 75). For instance, the Central European states such as Germany, Switzerland, Czech Republic, and Hungary have initiated their own summits bilaterally with China (Youngs 81). Germany’s national approach towards China interrupts the EU’s efforts in the region, as “Chancellor Merkel’s trade and investment efforts have increasingly and conspicuously been oriented toward China, through a flurry of high-level of visits, investment delegations and trade fairs “ (Youngs 61). Germany developed
its bilateral strategic partnership with China in regard to trade standards without coordinating at the EU level (Youngs 61). The Member States’ individual bilateral initiatives have resulted in a situation where “China’s frustration is now with Europe’s weakness and inability to follow a single policy,” while China has been clearer on what its priority demands are from the EU (Youngs 81;85). China is definitely taking advantage of the EU’s lack of coherence, “Changing its favored European partners from year to year and beginning to play them off against each other in Putinesque fashion” (Youngs 83). Making matters worse has been the EU’s inattention to multilateral initiatives in the region. Consequently, Youngs argues, “the EU has to correct a deeply embedded legitimacy shortfall: for many years European leaders failed even to turn up at Asia-Europe meetings, causing Asian participants to conclude that the forum has been of little value in reducing differences or generating the dynamics of positive socialization” (Youngs 77).

Even if the EU has not been active politically in Asia in the past, leaving the region to the US as the sole external security actor is not an acceptable course of action given the differences between EU and US interests. The EU and the US hold different opinions on how to address the new challenges facing today’s world, despite both having similar values like democracy and free trade (Zhongping 80). In particular, the US intends to contain China while the EU prefers to engage it (Youngs 91). China is against the US intervening in a potential dispute and finds the US’s naval presence in the region alarming because the US already plays a pivotal role in Asia’s security strategy (Yujuico).

Unlike the EU, the US is highly integrated into the region through its security strategy. The US has provided a significant amount of military presence, demonstrating its pivot towards Asia. An example of this is the treaty of mutual cooperation and security with Japan and the alliance with South Korea. Also, the US already spoke out and expressed its position in regard
to the territorial dispute in the South China Sea; Hillary Clinton stated at the 2010 ARF meeting in Hanoi, “the United States has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea.” (“South China Sea: Background Note”). In other words, the US “might get drawn into a conflict between either of them—Japan and South Korea—and China” (“South China Sea: Background Note”).

The tension between the US and China gives the EU an opportunity to play a role distinct from that of the US. The EU, largely seen as a “non-threatening party,” can promote a dispute resolution mechanism for the region (Weissmann 2). Current tensions provide an opening for the EU to be a mediator. Therefore, “the EU should consider how it can carefully navigate the Sino-US relationship and help encourage a cooperative Beijing-Washington relationship” (Grevi, Keohane, Lee and Lewis 61).

Recently the EU has started to recognize the significance of Asia’s emerging prowess. Since the EU established the European External Action Service and issued guidelines on the EU’s foreign and security policy in East Asia in 2012, they began to voice their willingness to participate more actively in the region. The EU has also become more outspoken on Asian affairs. The EU and US initiated a joint declaration regarding closer coordination on security, development, and prosperity in the Asian region (Okano-Heijmans and Putten). For instance, the EU publicly criticized Japanese Prime Minster Abe who has provoked great tension in the region (Okano-Heijmans and Putten). Compared to the past, the EU has significantly altered their approach to Asian affairs. Nevertheless, this is not quite enough.

The EU is encouraged to prioritize their main goals and integrate with the region beyond solely economic interests, by participating in matters of security. But, in order to engage in
security matters, the EU needs to seek their unique role in the region. The EU can strengthen strategic partnerships and enhance maritime security for the region by becoming involved in the territorial disputes.

**Options**

*Option A*

The EU maintains its current policy toward China and the rest of East Asia countries. The EU, as an economic actor, continues pursuing only their commercial interests in the region, leaving political and security issues to the United States. Given the EU’s lack of conventional security engagement to date and in light of limited security and defense resources, the EU should focus on its immediate neighborhood instead of following the American ‘pivot to Asia’ (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”).

Under this option, the EU remains engaged in the region primarily through its existing bilateral partnerships and continues to negotiate and deepen its FTAs. The EU also continues to maintain relations with multilateral Asian institutions such as ASEAN, and ASEM. For example, the EU signed a FTA with South Korea in 2010 and is currently negotiating FTAs with Japan, Malaysia, India and Vietnam (Khandekar 2). Also, the EU has negotiated an Investment Agreement with China in 2013 (Khandekar 2). It is clear that, “These agreements could greatly facilitate trade flows with Asia and integrate the EU much more into the Asian economy” (Khandekar 2).

However, the region has many crucial trade partners other than the EU. In other words, “Penetrating such integrated economies at a later stage will be all the more difficult as deep trade links will have already been established” (Khandeker 5). This requires the EU to prioritize how to capitalize on Asia’s market boom and negotiate FTAs with the rest of the
Asian countries rapidly. For example, “the EU-India FTA is particularly important and must be concluded with urgency” because this can buffer the US and China’s dominance in Asian markets (Khandeker 5). Khandeker further explains, “While the US and China are important partners for the EU, they must also be seen as competitors in the region. Given that the US has no free trade agenda with India at the moment, and the vast potential within EU-India trade, the EU-India FTA could provide a considerable leg-up for the EU in Asia” (Khandekar 6).

Under this option, the EU continues to pursue its commercial interests in Asia primarily through FTAs. However, the risk is great that the EU will continue to lose relevance in the region and that its reputation will continue to be undermined. The risk is also great that the EU will be undercut by its own Member States’ pursuit of their national economic interests in the region. Hence, the EU needs to develop security strategy in order to advance their commercial interests. In other words, the EU has to go beyond commercial ties to advance their interests.

Option B

The EU recognizes the need to pursue not only commercial interests but also to engage in the region politically. Rather than developing their own regional security framework, however, the EU acts as “junior partner” to the US. Because the EU has not fully recovered from the Eurozone crisis and must address issues of critical importance in the immediate neighborhood, such as Ukraine, the EU does not have the capability for full engagement in East Asia.

Jolyon Howorth, for example, insists that the EU should be aware of developments in Asia but also be careful not to over extend European resources:

The EU needs lucidity about the consequences for Europeans of the new planetary geo-strategic focus on the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific theatre. A hypothetical EGS
does not imply the same mix of instruments in all parts of the globe. A ‘harder mix’ of instruments will be required closer to home, and the further distant the challenge the greater will be the role of diplomatic, economic and cultural leverage. (Howorth 12)

Even if the EU has the capability to develop a regional security framework for Asia, it should still cooperate with the US because of its preexisting solid, active strategy in the region. Howorth continues, “Recent suggestions that the EU might accompany the US in its ‘tilt’ to Asia, however, should be countered. The EU needs to learn to walk before it can run” (Howorth 13). Many Member States such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and the UK seem to agree, “the EU’s strategic role, such as it is, will thus likely be that of helping to keep America strong in Asia by keeping Europe stable” (Lindley-French).

Therefore, under this option, the EU remains a junior partner to the US in engaging the region’s security matters because of their lack of capability and the need for increased focus on the EU’s immediate neighborhood. The risk of pursing this option, however, is that American and European interests do not always align perfectly with respect to Asia. As Richard Youngs points out, the EU is not comfortable with containing countries as perceived threats. It acts on win-win logic, not zero-sum logic, to engage and strengthen states thereby neutralizing any threat they might pose. (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”)

Option C

The last option is for the EU to create a regional security framework that combines an economic strategy with a political strategy for the region. There are limits to which the EU can pursue their commercial interests in the region without political engagement. As Khandekar points out, “advancing the EU’s FTA negotiations in Asia will require much more political
investment from the EU as well as from member state leaders. Political presence and interpersonal relationships hold great significance in Asia” (Khandekar 5).

For their commercial interests, the EU keeps engaging in the region through multilateral Asian institutions and FTA. However, the EU can develop political engagement by expanding their involvement on security matters. The EU can contribute to the territorial dispute resolution mechanisms over the South-China Sea disputes through the development of a maritime strategy and previous experience with conflict mediation, although the EU still must cooperate with the US in regard to military capability. This option will be developed in greater detail in the following section.

**Recommendations**

*Part I-Develop a regional security framework for Asia*

The EU should develop a regional security framework for Asia with specific focus on a maritime security strategy that would include addressing the existing territorial disputes. In the short term, the regional security framework should determine how to prioritize their objectives and means in light of the new EU maritime security strategy expected in June 2014. The EU can suggest a dispute resolution mechanism for maritime matters as a neutral party due to its lack of military presence in the region (Keohane 49). The EU has already provided a dispute resolution mechanism in East Asia, including Aceh in Indonesia and Mindanao in Philippines (“Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign” 6). Also, the EU has experience in other regions as well: “The EU’s experience in dispute settlement through mechanisms that ensure an equitable sharing of resources in the Mediterranean, the Baltic Sea and the Danube could be applied in East Asia” (Khandekar 91).
In recent history, European countries found themselves in a similar situation, where bitter rivalries were far less than 200 miles from each other, most had invaded each other at one point in the past, and had all experienced negative interactions throughout history. Today the region has improved significantly. What started out as a project to link the tools of war for France and Germany—coal and steel—together economically has now blossomed into a far-from-perfect union, which can arbitrate disputes between Member States in court. Companies are now able to work together with reduced trade barriers and increased specialization to build economies cooperatively instead of in spite of each other (“50th Anniversary”).

Due to the EU’s previous experiences as such, many political figures in the region see the EU as potentially a skilled mediator, being neutral and distant (Khandekar 91). The EU’s engagement in security matters through dispute resolution mechanisms will allow the EU to regain credibility and be seen as a normative actor.

“In addition, the EU should promote the international law of the sea, especially the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to help resolve maritime disputes in the region. The EU’s voice in this area is both important and legitimate, especially since the US does not formally recognise UNCLOS” (Keohane 49). This is another area where the EU could play a unique role:

Unlike the US, EU Member States have, like China, signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which provides a desirable framework for finding durable solutions to maritime disputes. By supporting ASEAN’s demands for multilateral negotiations with China, and by putting its expertise in international maritime law at the disposition of Southeast Asian countries, Europe could contribute to a peaceful resolution of these conflicts. (Camroux and Pawlak 35)
Thus, the EU should work to prevent China from any further attempts to undermine or reformulate the fundamental principles and application guidelines of UNCLOS (“Guidelines on the EU's Foreign” 20).

In the medium-term, the framework should focus on promoting geo-strategically important multilateral partnerships and should develop dispute resolution mechanisms for the region by working with the UN charter.

**Multilateral partnerships are encouraged for the EU, allowing the union to engage with the rest of Asian countries while the EU develops specific policies with China.** In other words, what the European Union says and does with China must be consistent with its relations with other Asian countries so as to preserve a political balance among different EU partners in the region (Godement 61). Specifically, the EU can strengthen their multilateral partnerships with ASEAN and other Asian regional institutions. The EU should support developing “ASEAN’s role in the governance of East Asian security to work with South and East Asian countries on maritime security” (Grevi, Keohane, Lee and Lewis 81). In addition, the EU should be more committed to participate and develop memberships not only in the council for security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSAP) but also in East Asia Summit, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (“The EU in Asia”). As a precondition for effective multilateralism, however, the EU must clarify the reasons for participating in these fora and prioritize the goals that they want to achieve through them (Wacker).

**The EU can contribute to regional security by working on mutual confidence building measures, conflict resolution, and post-conflict stabilization policies because the EU has well-regarded experience in this realm** (“Guidelines on the EU's Foreign” 6). For example, the EU can contribute to build peacekeeping capacities in the Asia-Pacific region;
“The international peacekeeping is almost absent from the Asia-Pacific at the regional level” because Asian institutions avoid developing peacekeeping due to their anxiety about the balance of power (Godement 64). This is where, “the European experience of comprehensive peacekeeping and peace building could be addressed in the dialogue with ASEAN, China and Japan, as a model for better relations within the region” (Godement 65). The EU’s contribution in peacekeeping not only demonstrates the EU is a normative actor but also encourages them to develop security cooperation with China: “The EU’s efforts to train Chinese peacekeepers and to communicate on the mandates and experiences of peacekeeping would be a step forward for both sides, and also a way to deflect potential controversy over the issue of the arms embargo” (Godement 64).

Part II-The EU and the US Cooperation in Asia

Even if the EU develops its own regional security framework for the region, the reality is that the EU’s achievements are limited without American cooperation. Therefore, developing a joint strategy between the EU and the US is necessary, but it will be a long-term objective not only because the EU and US will have to establish shared objectives and negotiate different national interests toward the region but also because the EU needs to develop its own framework before the US will even take it seriously as a security actor in Asia. Then, they will also have to address NATO’s role in the region and Europe’s contributions to NATO’s resources.

The strong relationship between the EU and the US can impact the relationship between the EU and China and the relationship between the US and China, creating a triangular relationship in the region. In the process of building this triangular relationship, the EU must continue to play a neutral role to balance between China and the US. The EU most maintains a distinct role
in the region in order to prevent ‘‘becoming squeezed’’ between Chinese and American ambitions to shape the region’s economic landscape” (Sparding and Small 13).

On the other hand, EU-US cooperation can strengthen the leverage of the Western powers on China. “If a EU-U.S. free trade agreement – the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) – can be concluded, the TTIP could substantially strengthen U.S. and EU efforts to induce China to adopt quality standards and adhere to liberal-economic norms that are favorable to the competitiveness of Western economies” (Putten 3). In addition, the consequence of concluding TTIP goes beyond the economic impact for the EU: “It may pave the way to broader strategic convergence between Europeans and Americans. Whether this happens will in part depend on Europeans’ ability to take autonomous action, notably in their neighbourhood. In turn, this will depend on European willingness to enhance their military capabilities” (Grevi 61).

Lack of EU military presence can be substituted by coordination with US operations: “If European countries can do more to strengthen NATO and secure their own neighborhood, this would strongly boost the U.S. position with regard to China. Firm European support for NATO would allow the U.S. to concentrate more on its diplomatic and military assets in Asia, without inadvertently benefiting Russia’s strategic position with regard to U.S. interests in Europe.” (Putten 3). Furthermore, “A stronger strategic relationship between the US and EU will create a positive long term outcome, potentially ‘‘becoming the pillar of NATO’s viability” (Grevi 61).

The reality is, “While the US will remain the EU’s most important political partner for the foreseeable future, China’s economic importance to Europe is also likely to grow significantly by 2030” (Grevi 61). Accordingly, the EU must balance between these two actors and must think strategically about the best way to do this without losing more credibility in the eyes of
both American and Chinese policy-makers. Through the combination of economic strategy and political strategy in a regional security framework, the EU could regain credibility, be seen as a relevant actor again, and buffer the decline of their power in the world after the Eurozone crisis.
Environmental Issues and Unconventional Security  
*By Gregory Fenno*

**Issue**

The EU has defined environmental concerns as a primary part of their mission and have linked these concerns to the future security and economy of Europe (European Union 141). The EU also states how the union should be “at the core of worldwide efforts to improve lives through development” (European Union 10). Asia, China in particular, is now a strong contributor to the environmental problems that the EU aims to solve. Europe has some influence in the region; as it stands, modern European ideas and some European NGOs are now small forces pushing environmental policy in Asia (Ho 29). Europe, though, in general has seen its power in the region severely diminished in recent years while China has been more assertive both regionally and internationally (Sutter). To combat this decline in influence, European countries could leverage their history of implementing environmental policy and technology. This experience could be used to combat problems that China faces as well as reestablish a strong relationship for broader policy cooperation between these actors (Zusman and Turner 121-149). Developing such a relationship will help solve the EU’s real problem in the region: the perception that “Europe no longer matters” (Haass 1). The building of this relationship could then unite both sides on shared interests that could coordinate the actions of both sides towards more cohesive interaction in the future.

**Background**

*The EU’s Influence in China*

The history of the EU’s environmental policy’s relationship to Asian environmental actions and thoughts comes from the original influence of European ideas on Chinese scholars.
According to Xinning Song in *The Review of International Studies*, China historically had little interest in European ideas. In China, “There was no serious research on Western Europe and European integration” Song states of the time period from the 1940s to the 1970s (Song 756). A primary reason for this is the lack of knowledge Chinese scholars had about outside systems in that period. Real interest only started in the 1980s. When Regan visited China in 1982 interest began to appear on the issue but he writes that this was only associated with some Chinese scholarly interest in studying the US-Europe relationship and how that unique arrangement might apply to Chinese-US relations (Song 756). In studying US-Europe relations the Chinese scholars were then attempting to learn how the EU had managed to make themselves indispensable to the world’s sole superpower (Song 756).

In modern times, though, European ideals have become increasingly influential on Chinese action, providing possibilities for how the EU can now position itself as a key partner to China. These new, more European ideas were recently reflected in a 2004 Chinese directive calling for China to undertake a “Scientific Concept of Development” while at the same time calling for a “Harmonious Society.” Both concepts, according to Song’s research, were European inspired, with Scientific Development relating closer to environmental concerns. The Chinese directive of “Scientific Concept of Development” then comes from the notion that China should duplicate the practice of building an economy based on sustainable growth following European ideals (Song 764). It should be noted that these ideals, which were announced in 2004, have been questioned for the fact that they may have been designed merely to provide propaganda and fodder for international observers rather than meaningful policy (Bachman). Nevertheless, most would agree that, in recent times, the EU has had a more
meaningful impact on Chinese policy and with their future actions can attain even more influence.

*The Current Situation*

By almost every measure, the EU has done more than any other region of the planet, developed or non-developed, to promote and live by environmental policies (Browne 29). Whereas most countries are no longer bound to the Kyoto protocol, including the Japanese—whose signatory city bears its name, Europe remains staunchly legally tied to the treaty. Currently, only countries in Western Europe are still legally bound to targets set forth in the protocol (UNFCCC). If Europe represents, then, the bastion of Environmental activism, then China, in many western views, would be the direct opposite.

Today, China is the world’s largest producer of CO2 and has eclipsed almost every sector in the world for consumption of minerals and raw economic inputs (Chan et. al 292). China’s consumption of inputs like coal and oil are massive and continue to grow every year (Aichele 748). China originally signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 and again in 2002, but has never had to adhere to emissions targets (Browne 20). Chan states that because of its “developing status, China is still at present exempt from the protocol’s legal requirements to cut down its emissions of greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, methane, chlorofluorocarbons and other gases” (Chan et. al 295). The stark difference between these two different regions and their policies may be the key for bringing them together.

As stated before, it is important to note that only European countries are required to follow the standards of the Kyoto protocol. More importantly, European countries that exceed carbon emissions are required as a part of that same treaty to put millions of Euros into a fund called the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This CDM is then to be distributed to
developing nations. Of this money given to developing nations in 2006, China received upwards of 60% and has consistently been the largest beneficiary of the fund (Chan et. al 296). Thus, as Europe was attempting to curve their emissions, they were directly providing money for green initiatives to a country with the world’s largest and fastest expanding coal industry (Fang 312).

Many in the West do not realize the extent to which China has started creating new technologies, some of which are paid for by CDM money. As it stands, China actually gets 9% of its energy from renewable sources nationally and has aggressive plans to increase this number to 15% by 2020 (Kennedy 909). This is especially difficult for China because it is rapidly increasing its total electricity consumption while trying to achieve this future 15% target. This goal was only barely reached with the countries’ rapid development of wind resources fueled by the unmatched power of Chinese factories to quickly bring new turbines to market (Kennedy 910). In 2010, China was supplying over half of the wind turbines internationally, and it has been widely reported that Chinese solar technology dominates the international markets because of their cheap production capabilities. This especially hurt the US and European markets (Haley 19).

Before addressing the possibility of Europeans aiding Chinese environmentalism, there are historical and contemporary factors that need to be taken into consideration. Ideals in China that date back to at least the Qing Dynasty have stressed the importance of self-reliance (Galtung 1). This blanket term means that promotion of the aforementioned wind and solar sources in China means more than simple adherence to green initiatives. The Chinese see these actions as helping China rely less and less on the outside world for energy. Andrew Kennedy in the *Asian Survey* sums this up stating, “China’s enthusiasm for renewable energy is striking, but
so are its efforts to reduce its reliance on the outside world for the underlying technologies” (Kennedy 927). This ideology must then be considered before Europe tries to help the Chinese with their environmental concerns. Contemporary factors, on the other hand, suggest that Europe is uniquely positioned to help China with their environmental problems.

The Chinese mainland has seen a large influx of European ideals in recent years. For instance, activism for government related issues has manifested in the creation of NGOs in China (Ho 44-47). Peter Ho, in a well-studied 2008 report, detailed how “China has seen the emergence of social groups that increasingly escape their view and push at the state imposed limits [PRC limits]” (Ho 22). Ho describes, “Chinese environmentalism features those activities that it learned or copied from green pundits in Western Europe and North America” (Ho 29). The report details how NGOs are then the beginning of only recently allowed activism in China. Their effectiveness, though, has yet to be quantified, but their very existence is useful for the building of EU relations with both government and societal actors in China.

It should be noted that NGOs operations in China are not as free as those in western countries. NGOs operating in conjunction with their European counterparts face strict hurdles but not ones that are insurmountable. In their current state, NGOs are sometimes referred to as GONGOs, or Governmental Non-Governmental Organizations, which means that, though they are allowed by Chinese law, these organizations are heavily tracked and monitored (Schwartz 36). However, their mere existence allows for access to projects and proposals like never before in China. The main factor then is that outside parties now have inroads into the country (Schwartz 39). NGOs have access to provide on-the-ground support for environmental causes. The reason for this allowance is now widely believed to stem from the concern that the PRC is starting to publicly decry China’s deteriorating environment.
The State of China’s Environment

China currently has problems with extensive environmental degradation. In the winter of 2013, for example, the largest particulate matter ever recorded in China was recorded with the air pollution monitors on the roof of the US embassy. The reading captured on January 12, 2013 showed 755ppm of particulate matter in Beijing’s air (Wong 1). The scale used to measure air pollution is normally between 0-100 with 100 being the unhealthy. 500 is supposed to be the top of the scale, anywhere beyond that is labeled “beyond index” as defined by the US government (National Air Pollution). Furthermore, the country has failed in its development to construct facilities that are considered to be standard issue in the West. An article from *Foreign Affairs* observes, “Most Chinese coastal cities pump at least half of their waste directly into the ocean, which causes red tides and coastal fish die-offs.” It further states, “According to the World Wildlife Fund, the country is now the largest polluter of the Pacific Ocean.” This has resulted in the outcome that “Eighty percent of the East China Sea, one of the world’s largest fisheries, is now unsuitable for fishing” (Thompson 3). This situation will need serious attention going forward if China wants to avoid becoming uninhabitable.

Furthermore, China’s relations threaten to be damaged with neighboring states if they do not get their environmental conditions under control. Already, “Chinese pollution related to exports contribute up to 12% to 24% of daily sulfate concentrations” of the Los Angeles area in 2013 (Landau 1). *Foreign Affairs* explains the complexity of the issue:

The dangers of China’s environmental degradation go well beyond the country’s borders, as pollution threatens global health more than ever. Chinese leaders have argued that their country has the right to pollute, claiming that, as a developing nation, it cannot sacrifice economic growth for the sake of the environment. In reality, however,
China is holding the rest of the world hostage -- and undermining its own prosperity.

(Thompson 2)

Other reports point out that, with the rate of degradation the Chinese are causing to their own land, one can quantify what percentage of the nation’s GDP is affected by these environmental concerns. One report by the *International Journal of China Studies* says that acid rain alone, in lost crops and damage to environmental factors, has cost China an estimated 3.05% of their national GDP. It cites that the World Bank estimates that 8% of the GDP is lost due to environmental degradation (Zhou 21).

*The Importance of Acting for China and the EU*

China will likely be more open to working with Europe and other outside nations because of China’s ruling communist party’s concerns that its legitimacy has increasingly been undermined by environmental issues. Legitimacy in China in modern times has been defined by the party’s ability to concurrently provide both economic growth and stability (Bachman). This is beginning to change as an urban middle class emerges in cities across the country, with more concerns towards evolving environmental problems (Cao 57-59). Thus, the party can no longer think of environmental policy as a secondary issue and must provide better conditions to its increasingly dissatisfied populace.

For particular reasons the European Union is especially suited to providing the groundwork for solving this problem for the Chinese people and the Chinese government. Europe has experience confronting its own post communist-era pollution problems. The former Soviet Bloc region of Europe between Poland, the Czech Republic, and former Eastern Germany was previously known as the Black Triangle, referring to this area’s excessive pollution (Economist 1). This area epitomized the complete focus on industrialization during
the Soviet era. It was described in *The Economist* as a place “where coal-fired power plants provided energy for heating and heavy industry, [and] was once one of the most polluted areas in the world, with smog and dust cutting life expectancies and killing whole forests.” The area was further described as a place where “rivers and lakes were poisoned [and] toxic waste was spilled or dumped willy-nilly” (Economist 1). Today, the area thrives in much different conditions. In *Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment*, Martina Habeck describes how, in the area, “emissions of sulfur dioxide and solid particles had been reduced by more than 90%” because of regulations imposed after joining the EU” (Habeck 177). *The Economist* states that because of “EU standards of cleanliness [that] are being passed” in these former communist ruled countries “much has improved” (Economist 1). This shows how the EU has, through their standards and norms, the ability to cleanup areas that are toxic not only because of lack of regulation but also as a result of the extreme environmental degradation that communist led industrialization can produce (Habeck 172). This expertise is sorely needed in China.

Europe currently lacks the proper basis for a stronger relationship with China. Recently, the most widely reported activity undertaken by China in the EU has been their large-scale buyout of European companies. Other reported activities include large underbidding campaigns against European construction firms in their own regions as well as wholesale buying of securities from EU countries most affected by Europe’s financial crisis (Godement 1-3). These actions speak of a weak economy in Europe as well as demonstrating the diminished ability of European companies and governments to influence Chinese policy and actions. A noted example of this was when Xi Jingping visited Hungary in 2010 and “Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who happened to be acting president of the EU, talked of a ‘new alliance of major significance with the People’s Republic of China.’ There was no mention of human
rights during the trip and the government tried to silence Tibetan pressure groups” (Godement 9). This is then in direct opposition to a similar 2000 trip where the then Hungarian President pushed the Chinese president heavily on human rights issues at every turn. The current situation, then, favors China through its constant actions in the EU’s region with little response by the EU in China.

**Interests**

The EU has a stated interest in reducing worldwide carbon emissions and has related this back to security concerns associated with changing environmental conditions (European Union 11). In a 2013 European Commission report, the EU Commission stated that environmental changes will affect “Individuals' safety and security on a large scale and have effects on the right to life and the right to the integrity of the person” (EU Commission 25). As previously noted, China is the world’s largest producer of greenhouse gasses. Therefore, if the EU wishes to stave off the worst effects of climate change, it must work with China.

Beyond fixing environmental issues, the EU desperately needs a way to connect with and subsequently work with the Chinese government. It does not want to become irrelevant with regard to the region’s largest trading partner. Newfound Chinese wealth is rapidly buying up EU enterprises while the EU has provided little return investments in China (Godement 2-4). The EU thus has a vested interest in regaining credibility and resources with which to push back against the growing influence of China.

China concurrently has an interest in finding a partner to help solve its own environmental concerns (Chan et. al 292). Its government knows that its legitimacy is based on improving the economy, yet this principle has traditionally translated for the citizens of China as living a better life (Bachman). If it fails to sustain these increases in living standards, the
Chinese party would have significantly less credibility. Today, in fact, the people of China see increasingly worse living conditions despite being wealthier than ever (Xie 208). As the PRC is aware, this problem could become a major political issue in China (Xie 209). The alleviation of this problem would thus stand to benefit the Chinese government while also providing an opportunity for the Europeans to contribute their expertise.

The US also has an interest in defining and promoting the EU’s actions in Asia. Europe finds itself currently working in a region where American forces are dominant (Wolf 2). However, this situation may be in flux as China builds up its own military. For instance, Robert Sutter observes that China is “sustaining a strong defense buildup in a de facto arms race with the United States”. He goes on to note that “the mutual military buildups of Chinese and U.S. forces underline recent factors that make both sides wary of being put at a disadvantage as a result of uncertain and shifting balances in Asia” (Sutter 201). Potential proxy wars or conflict are distinct possibilities resulting from this interaction. The EU would indirectly feel the effects of these conflicts, especially ones that would pit their two largest trading partners against each other. According to Alexander Wolf, “Instability in [East Asia] could disrupt the flow of global trade and severely harm global markets”. He further states, “These global implications make regional stability in Asia a core interest for the economic superpower Europe” (Wolf 3). It is then imperative that the EU reconnects to Asia, and to China in particular. Using environmental issues for this end appears the best strategy to undertake.

Options

In the short term, the EU can effectively do nothing without incurring significant costs. Short-term non-actions would be unlikely to hinder the economically based relationship that the EU maintains with China. The EU is currently seen by China as only a trade partner and it
would thus be unlikely for that relationship to unravel, especially with China receiving huge returns on its exports to Europe (Wolf 3). In this scenario China would then continue, as it does today, finding its own ways to combat environmental problems.

Farther out, if the EU were to work in a partial capacity with their NGO partners in China, they could still achieve some success. For instance NGOs would likely continue, even without direct EU pressure, to make progress combating environmental problems in China (Chan et. al 294). As part of this solution, the EU might provide some grants or funding to help the NGOs act in China. The key difference here is that the EU would be unlikely to gain any credit for these moves and would also be unlikely to gain any improved relationship with China.

Finally the EU could provide a full court press to address the issue of their growing irrelevance by pushing technology and expertise to solve China’s pollution problem. If and when progress is made on some of China’s most pressing environmental issues, the EU would be able to establish itself as the expert provider of these services in the minds of the Chinese government and the minds of the affected Chinese people. The EU would then be able to sell the technology that has been built under EU regulations and have their interest groups take an on-the-ground approach to solving the disastrous environmental problems facing China. Furthermore, this solution can create a situation where the EU forges a path to build credibility in the region. This option would allow for the EU to have an expanded footprint in the region complete with actions that positively affect the Chinese people.

**Recommendations**

*Europe should first and foremost reach out to China on the basis of its effective remediation and control of environmental issues as well as sell its industrial capabilities to fix environmental problems* (An 177). It should promote the legal structures and
developmental programs, especially those that successfully improved the environment of Eastern Europe earlier in the century (Economist 1). This issue should lay the foundation to create a lasting and important connection between the Europeans and the Chinese—one that will prevent European irrelevance.

**Europe must to this end use the existing NGO inroads that they have built up in China as a primary tool for their efforts.** Having organizations already in the region allows them to further disseminate the success of European actions to clean the former Soviet areas as well as promote improved environmental conditions for Chinese citizens. The EU should then begin to build business relationships to introduce the technology and innovations of EU based firms such as those aimed at cleaning coal emissions and properly disposing of toxic waste (Levi 114). These actions will result in increased EU legitimacy in the region by starting in China.

**Finally, the EU can utilize these established connections and legitimacy in the region to promote European ideas of peace, democracy and stability.** With more legitimacy, the EU will effectively have more assertiveness in the region, as suggested by scholars like Wolf in *Falling Stars, Rising Dragon*. This would also propagate the EU influence needed in the region without requiring the funds and capabilities for direct military presence, as Richard Youngs and other scholars suggest. The EU should then work for more investment and financial influence in Asia, instead of the current trade deficit that is afflicting the EU as a result of massive Chinese investment capabilities.
Conclusion
By Gregory Fenno and Ji Soo Yoo

Asia is too important for the EU to continue to ignore. Specifically, China represents the greatest opportunity and subsequently greatest loss if no action is taken to regain EU relevance in the region. Trade exists in huge quantities between these two regions and security is increasingly a part of this interaction (Putten). Given the pivotal role of the US, it will also be increasingly evolved in this multilateral interaction. The EU’s precepts relating to human rights and development have had some, but arguably very limited, influence on the actions and policies of governments in East Asia. Engaging China in mutual efforts to address the country’s massive environmental degradation promises to be a more fruitful area of cooperation (Thompson 1). With the EU being the world’s foremost proponent of laws to extend environmental protection around the planet, East Asia is now the best place for Europe to work to enact change (European Union 11). Doing so successfully will help the EU to get a foot in the door of Asian politics and connections that it currently cannot maintain. Therefore, the EU must act decisively and effectively in the region to maintain influence in China as well as the rest of East Asia.

Interactions with the US in the region will be mandatory. EU countries have previously relied on the US for security at home, but in Asia the situation is far different, with the US dominating the security strategy of all states with the exception of China (Sparding and Small 13). The EU must work with the US to protect shipping lanes and thus preserve free and open trade with the countries of the region (Youngs). The EU must begin working with the US to make up for the deficit in strategic policy in the region. Maintaining trade routes in the South China Sea should be the first priority for the EU.
Europe will also need some military influence in the region to preserve relevance in the long-term. It thus will need to move towards establishing a security presence in the region. The first step will be for EU member state navies to begin patrolling the shipping routes that are so vital to the EU’s economy. Later, EU Member States, likely the UK and France, could participate in joint patrols with the US, helping to establish these states as part of the security community in the region. Doing so would protect EU interests as well as provide the necessary security for future interactions in the region.

Working with the US on solving the problems in East Asia would also positively impact Europe’s closest and most prized relationship—that which it shares with the US. The EU can provide a much needed helping hand if their diplomacy and environmental solutions can work in the region. This then should be the goal, using American’s role as a security provider in combination with the EU’s ability to mediate conflicts between actors to create a better Asia and a better regional security system in general.

While the conventional and human security goals of the EU and the US do not always align, the discrepancy can be reconciled through selective bargaining and a careful analysis of the EU’s limits of action. Presently, the EU has no military presence in the region and is unlikely to gain any in the near future. With regard to hard power, then, the EU Member States can strengthen their role in NATO while concluding the TTIP with the US. Their strong ties with NATO and TTIP will free the US up from European security issues and allow the US to focus on Asian security matters. However, the EU needs to act carefully not to send the wrong signal of participating in a containment alliance with the “West” against China as this would provoke more tension. The EU should never exclude China from any fora, dialogues and summits, and should continually express its desire to engage with China. Even more, the EU
can mediate between the US and China when they cannot reconcile various engagements in the region. This will help to establish a triangular relationship between the EU, the US, and China. Hence, the indirect engagement in hard power matters will be enough to draw the region’s attention and help the EU gain credibility by employing its expertise and past experience.

However, working with the US to provide security for the region must not be the extent of EU engagement in the region. Increased interaction with China is also a necessity for the EU. The EU has concerns with the Wiegers in China as well as the question of Tibetan independence. The EU has a long history of working to improve human rights around the world. Current efforts to give women more access to the workforce and better access to education in countries like Romania are prime examples of this (Kozak 1). Continued influence of EU leaders and their ideas on the youth in China—who are slowly becoming the leaders—demonstrates the importance of EU ideals and their potential for further promotion (Song 757-758).

Increased environmental activism should also be a prominent concern for the EU. China’s environment is in an increasingly dire situation. The EU, more than any other region, has laid the legislative groundwork to constrain emissions without destroying economies (Economist 1). Their expertise in conservation and environmental protection is sorely needed in Asia, with crops dying from acid rain and fisheries off the coast of China being destroyed by pollution (Thompson 3). The region no longer follows any aspect of the Kyoto Protocol; reform is needed (Aichele 1). The EU, still bound to the targets laid out in the Protocol, has both the capability and the know-how to effect change for the environment in China.

The EU would thus benefit from a relationship built on improving Chinese environmental policy. It has fallen into near irrelevancy in the eyes of China (Haass 1). If the
EU were to assist in the clean up of Chinese cities and improve the legitimacy of the
government, it would bolster the legitimacy of the EU in the country and region—legitimacy
that, in the Chinese system, means an influential position for the EU in the fastest changing
quadrant of the globe (Zhou 32).

Furthermore, the EU should promote soft power engagement such as strong people to
people ties. Environmental issues represent one major area of shared engagement. In general,
however, the EU should continue to encourage students and youth exchanges, which help
younger generations to reconsider relations and ties between East Asia and Europe. This method
allows the EU to bring its expertise of post war integration, as it did when contributing to the
Franco-German reconciliation. Therefore, the EU must employ soft power over hard power in
the region to retain relevance. Engagement is the only option for the EU. In a world where
countries are linked by their economic output, the relationship with China and East Asia is more
important than ever..
Chapter 5: Brazil and Latin America

Introduction

By Fernando Turin

The European Union’s decline as a global actor is affecting its influence globally even in regions with which it shares strong cultural and historical ties; such is the case in the Latin American Region. While many Latin American countries have experienced consistent economic growth, the EU has failed to capitalize on its historical bonds with the region to materialize a deeper and more effective relationship with Latin America. However, the region is experiencing an increasing influence of other rising powers, such as China.

It is critical for the EU to expand its presence in the region and more specifically in Brazil. Susanne Gratius, Associate Fellow of the European think tank FRIDE, mentions how Brazil has shifted its interests during President Lula Da Silva’s administration. She states, “The latest two governments defined Brazil as a ‘country of the global South’ obsessed with development. This has become a strategic foreign policy tool, which also creates a sizeable obstacle to a global partnership between Brazil and the EU” (Gratius, “Brazil and the EU” 9). But the new Brazilian administration seems more open to instigating a new EU-Brazil approach; according to Elena Lazarou, the Head of the Brazilian Center for International Relations of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, “This evolution also reflects the higher degree of affinity between the EU and the Brazilian approach under President Rousseff…when compared to the rhetoric of former
President Lula. Since Dilma Rousseff took office in 2011, Brazil has become more critical of human rights abuses, and has steered away from Lula’s public endorsement of some authoritarian regimes” (Lazarou 8). Moreover, Gratius points out, “The Bulgarian origins of the Brazilian president, her interest in energy matters, and her sensitivity to human rights promise a greater emphasis on Europe, which during the Lula Government occupied a secondary plane” (Gratius, “Brasil y Europa” 1). The EU must take this opportunity to create the momentum to solidify a strong relationship with Brazil. If the EU disregards this opportunity, Brazil certainly would not wait for the EU and would instead privilege other relationships.

A Deutsche Welle report quotes Gunther Maihold, deputy director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs: "The most important Latin American countries have very dynamic trade with the countries of the Pacific Rim and China, and the Europeans need to consider how to position themselves. More is expected of them than just free trade agreements" (Prange De Oliveira). Furthermore, in an interview with TIME, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made a clear assessment of Chinese advances in the Region: “If you think of soft power as being diplomatic power and economic power, they have been very effective in spreading throughout the region, making investments, building things that countries wanted, working to create relationships to displace some of the historic animosity or suspicion” (Stengel). The EU is not just losing power due to its own policies; it is facing increasing economic and political competition in the region. With these factors in mind, a country like Brazil becomes a key partner in the region (Brazil).

The current international landscape clearly indicates the relevance of Brazil as a rising power, which according to the World Bank is the “the world's seventh wealthiest economy.” But the rise of new actors does not match the EU capacity to assimilate this new global
configuration. Professor Richard Youngs sustains that the EU is perceived as falling behind
global developments and as a result is losing relevance as a global actor (Youngs, “EU Security
Strategy”). It is in the best interest of the EU to pursue robust cooperation with emergent global
powers, in this case Brazil, in different regions. Additionally, Brazil shares the same values as
the EU regarding human rights and democracy, which makes it an important partner for Europe
to strengthen multilateral mechanisms and bolster the coordination of joint cooperation in the
global system.

Brazil has gained great importance for its internal growth and its international
breakthrough both as a global trader and as a global player. In the peak of the international
financial crisis, Brazil has been one of the first countries to recover its economic growth. Its
position in the credit markets is privileged, and it has become a major focus of global foreign
investments. A study by the Brazil-China Business Council indicates that in 2010 China’s
confirmed investment was, “US$ 13.1 billion - twenty times the accumulated value of Chinese
investment in Brazil during the previous two years – [making] China one of the largest sources
of foreign direct investment in the country” (Frischtak 17).

In Latin America, Brazil is the largest trading partner of the EU, representing one third
of EU trade in the region (EU-BRAZIL). On the other hand, the ECLAC EU-Brazil 2011 report
indicates that FDI flows from Brazil to EU countries accounted for US$ 8 billion in 2010,
which represents almost one third of the Brazilian investments abroad (Foreign Direct 84). The
EU faces a significant challenge in the current global rearrangement of power; its response so
far has been slow and inadequate. As Brazil is looking for opportunities to be seen as a global
actor, they both need each other. It is imperative that the EU strengthen a solid partnership with
Brazil to engage the region and regain its as a global key player.
Toward a new EGS

Since the release of the ESS in 2003 and its subsequent review in 2008, there have been substantial changes in the global distribution of power. Therefore, a new EU strategy is required to address these variations and regain a favorable equilibrium. The 2003 ESS did not foresee the rapid dynamics of the incoming years, the rise of China as a global power, nor the breakthrough of Brazil in global affairs. In 2008, when all of these factors were already evident, the ESS review failed to address this new international scenario and its outcome was vague and confused. Besides the strong ties of the EU with Latin America, new efficient mechanisms to deepen cooperation and to positively integrate the region were not set. Lars-Erik Lundin considers that, in the absence of “clear strategic priorities, staffing levels at headquarters level and in delegations risk being spread too thin across the world in a way that will undercut the impact of EU policies” (Lundin 12).

The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 provided the EU with more and better tools in foreign affairs and security; a grand strategy should provide the knowledge of when those tools should be deployed, and their proper justification. Sven Biscop, a director of the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels states, “It should also be clear where the institutional ownership of a grand strategy lies and who is responsible for its implementation, an issue on which the ESS remains silent” (Biscop 10). These institutional corsets prevent the EU from implementing strategic actions.

Scholars across Europe, the United States, and Latin America have documented the passivity of the EU towards the new configuration of the world order. A report from the European Global Strategy think tank indicates the EU engagement “should be proactive and not just a response to the actions of others, realistic about what can be accomplished, and adaptive.
to changes in the global environment” (Fägersten 4). Moreover, Giovanni Grevi, Director of the European think tank FRIDE, agrees that securing energy resources and environmental sustainable practices in addition to economic growth are “the three interconnected issues at the core of complex interdependence. All major powers are exposed to the unprecedented conjunction of the economic, energy and environmental crises and none of them can successfully confront these challenges on its own”(Grevi, “The Interpolar” 5). Latin America, and in particular Brazil, has all the conditions to be a key partner of the EU; it possesses leadership in biofuels, its economy is robust and promising, and it possesses the largest and most biodiverse tropical rainforest on earth.

The opportunities that Brazil offers are not unknown by other powers, as China was mentioned above investing heavily in the country. While the EU was critically impacted by the financial crisis of 2008 and is still struggling to recover, the economic and political status of Brazil in the world concert has changed dramatically. Since the 2003 ESS and even after the 2008 review, Brazil has continued gaining international significance and seeks to consolidate its global presence. The new status of Brazil is reflected in the statement of former U.S. Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, in his 2012 official visit: “We welcome Brazil’s growing strength. We support Brazil as a global leader, and seek closer defense cooperation, because we believe that a stronger and more globally engaged Brazil will help enhance international security” (Panetta).

Additionally, this growing ascendance has brought new partnerships and associations. The growing Brazilian participation in the BRICS to pursue its international agenda is a sign of that. The EU has failed to address a strategy to counterbalance Brazil’s inclination to use the BRICS as a platform for international engagement. Andrew Hurrell, Director of the Centre for
International Studies of the university of Oxford, describes this new international approach of Brazil: “The nation has exhibited a new international self-confidence, a determination to forge a bolder and more innovative foreign policy, and a clear sense that Brazil’s time has come”(Hurrell 60). This new determination was seen in 2010, when Brazil, partnering with Turkey, tried to facilitate a nuclear agreement between the international community and Iran. Although this initiative did not succeed, it showed the new impetus of Brazil’s foreign policy. Paulo Sotero from the Brazil Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars writes about this episode: “Brazil’s surprising venture in an area of the world where it has not been present and has little to no influence signaled a significant departure in what had been until then an increasingly active but predictable foreign policy” (Sotero 73).

The 2003 ESS and the 2008 review did not contemplate this new stance of Brazil’s foreign policy, which has been very consistent since then. In 2003, President Lula Da Silva, in a speech addressing the graduating class of Brazil’s diplomacy academy, Instituto Rio Branco, explains the new role of her country:

We no longer accept to participate in international politics as if we were the “poor little thing” of Latin America, a “little country” of the Third World that has street children, knows only how to play football and to dance at carnival. This country does have street children, has carnival and football. But this country has much more. This country has greatness ... This country has everything to become an equal of any other country in the world. And we will not give up on this goal. (Lula Da Silva)

In 2010, the former Minister of Foreign Relations, Celso Amorim, stated before a trip to Iran, “You have a new configuration of power appearing in the world ... We can’t be conditioned by the views coming from the United States and the EU. We have to look from our
own perspective” (qtd. in Keating). Amorim is the current Minister of Defense, which is a clear indication that the important actors of Brazil’s affairs are still those who share the vision of former President Lula Da Silva.

The EU risks being outranked as a whole by new actors like the BRICS and also by Brazil’s own stances in foreign affairs. The negative perception of the strength of EU strategic thinking comes at a particular moment when China is expanding its economic and political influence over Latin America and investing massively in Brazil, a key EU partner in the region. Youngs states, “As Brazil rises, EU trade with the strongly performing Latin American giant has actually stagnated” (67). These new dynamics of cooperation from south to south were not anticipated.

Failure to find the required incentives to deepen the EU Brazil relationship will eventually push Brazil to pursue an agenda not necessarily aligned with EU interests. Gratius address this prospect, writing, “Brazil will become a partner ever less aligned with the EU. If the current tendency towards relative mutual neglect continues, both sides will be in different camps on the global agenda and will compete for status and global influence” (Brazil and the EU 20). Undoubtedly, this is not the best outcome for EU interest.

**EU-Brazil current policy instruments**

The EU addresses its relations with Brazil through two different frameworks: One is the regional trading bloc MERCOSUR that includes Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela in which Brazil is the leading partner, the other is the Brazil-European Union Strategic Partnership (SP), which is a bilateral structure created to increase cooperation between the parties. Brazil is an important partner for the EU at the regional level; it has played a leading role in the 2000 negotiations between the EU and MERCOSUR. However, these negotiations
are encountering difficulties, mainly due to the sensitive issue of EU agricultural subsidies and the political and economic postures of other MERCOSUR countries. Arminio Fraga the former head of the Brazilian Central Bank points out, “It’s good to get on with your neighbors, but the rest of the world is doing trade deals and Brazil risks getting left out,”(qtd. in Rathbone and Leahy).

While EU-MERCOSUR negotiations have encountered complications in reaching a final agreement, the bilateral SP has progressed substantially, but it is still incomplete. Grevi writes, “The strategic partnership that the EU and Brazil have established in 2007 has underperformed in many ways. But poor implementation so far should not detract from the aim to leverage bilateral engagement to improve cooperation in broader formats” (Grevi, “The EU and Brazil” 9). The European Commission recent press release regarding the EU-Brazil Summit that was held in Brussels on February 24, 2014 quotes President Jose Manuel Barroso:

Our strategic partnership with Brazil has come a long way since the 2007 Lisbon Summit. Since then we have been expanding our dialogue on political, economic and sectorial issues, such as education and research. Brazil is a like-minded partner with which we share many common interests. (European Commission “7th EU-Brazil Summit”)

This process has pressured other MERCOSUR members to speed up the MERCOSUR-EU negotiations. The dynamics of these negotiations indicate clearly the relevance and leadership of Brazil in the region and the importance to promote that leadership in order to facilitate EU negotiations with the Latin American region as a whole. Therefore, the EU should primarily focus its interest on consolidating this partnership. Karel De Gucht, the EU Trade Commissioner, has mentioned the economic stalemate with MERCOSUR. She states, “If we
can make progress on our economic agenda we will be laying solid foundations for a stronger alliance across all areas” (European Union). Further development of EU-Brazil trade is largely dependent on the conclusion of an agreement with MERCOSUR.

At the same time, the EU has also expressed growing interest for an alternative solution. Antonio Tajani Vice-President of the European Commission states:

Yes you have Mercosur which longs for trade agreements. But Mercosur has internal problems, and so then we can’t stop talking to Brazil, which is a super important country, which grows, speaks European languages and for us to work with them is far much easier. (Tajani)

As Brazil’s economy continues to grow, its relevance in world affairs is increasing; the frame of institutionalized cooperation and negotiation instruments between the EU and Brazil should be used by the EU to further its role as facilitator or interlocutor in regions in which Brazil seeks to increase its political and commercial activity. The EU has a vast expertise in external relations and this could increase its appeal as a strategic partner. At the same time, this partnership would bolster EU efforts to regain a strong global presence. In light of the recent social unrest in Venezuela, it is evident that more efficient cooperation is needed to defuse internal conflict situations. Patrick D. Duddy, Visiting Senior Lecturer at Duke University, states, “The EU (and especially Spain), has significant investments in Venezuela that would be at risk in the event of an internal conflict” (Duddy). Brazil leadership in the region must be enhanced. The EU’s knowhow with respect to negotiations and the creation of frameworks of dialogue could provide Brazil with useful tools to strengthen and converge Latin-American regional organizations such as the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Andean Community (CAN), Pacific Alliance and MERCOSUR. The full operational implementation of
the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership would be the cornerstone and impetus for more collaborative participation in the region.
The EU Brazil Strategic Partnership
By Fernando Turin

Issue

Brazil’s increasing economic performance alongside its status as a rising power encouraged the creation of a Strategic Partnership by the EU. This agreement was recognition of the new global character of Brazil as well as its relevance as major Latin American regional leader. A 2007 communication to the Parliament and the Council states, “Over the last years, Brazil has become an increasingly significant global player and emerged as a key interlocutor for the EU” (European Union, “Communication” 2).

The EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership establishes a good starting point to developing cooperation between the parties, but it is not functioning as the EU expected. Miguel Otero-Iglesias, Research Fellow of the London School of Economics and Political Science, addresses this issue: “[I]t lacks a coherent direction and the establishment of concrete objectives in order to yield tangible results” (Otero 2). The Partnership requires a real political commitment for both parties; if the EU wants to keep Brazil tied to its historic Western alignments, it has to place the Partnership as a top priority in its global strategy. Otherwise, Brazil will inevitably seek other international initiatives. Grevi agrees as he explains, “This horizon would lead to Brazil deepening ‘bricsalization’ and its balancing strategy” (Grevi, “The EU and Brazil” 21).

The EU now not only faces its own internal issues in dealing with Brazil, it also faces open competition from other BRICS members that are increasingly gaining influence in the region. Such is the case of China, which is pouring investments across the region, and particularly in Brazil. Grevi explains the relevance of the situation to the EU:
For the EU, the shift in trade and investments towards China presents a new incentive to sign a free trade agreement with Brazil… Although neither Brazil nor the EU have suggested negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement, MERCOSUR’s slow dying death opens up a new window of opportunity for negotiating in a Brazil- EU bilateral format and then incorporating the rest of the members of MERCOSUR. (Grevi, “The EU and Brazil” 15)

It becomes clear that the top EU priority in the region is bolstering the Strategic Partnership in order to promote further cooperation and integration in other regional frameworks.

**Background**

The international system is changing rapidly, with new actors and new partnerships across the world. European and Brazilian leaders have created a new framework to continue negotiations regardless of the MERCOSUR stalemate. In July 2007, under the Portuguese EU presidency, the Strategic Partnership was established (EU-BRAZIL). This partnership represented the recognition Brazil sought as a global partner. Grevi explains, “it reflected a change from an inter-regional EU-MERCOSUR perspective to an upgrading of bilateral relations. It marked a clear recognition by the EU of Brazil’s increasing global role” (Grevi and Khandekar 8). The intention of creating a strong bilateral relationship was expressed by Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European Commission, as he described the extent to which the new strategic partnership was predicated on, “acknowledging Brazil’s qualification as a ‘key player’ to join the restricted club of our strategic partners” (Barroso). Additionally, EU Member States have independently created alliances with Brazil and other BRICS members, which creates a potentially difficult situation. As Gratius points out, “To avoid Brazil using a divide and rule policy in its relationship with the EU and to raise levels of internal coordination,
the special relations that some Member States maintain with Brasilia need to be integrated into its partnership with the EU” (Gratius “Brazil and the EU” 11).

At the EU-Brazil summit of Brasilia in 2013, an EU-Brazil joint communiqué states, “The parties agreed to further strengthen their bilateral political dialogue, in order to promote their convergence of views on issues of the global agenda and favored the rapprochement of positions in international fora” (VI Brazil-EU). This partnership is positive for both parties but the perception of Brazil as a global actor has not been completely implemented by the EU. As Gratius writes, “Its status as strategic partner is not reflected in the organigram of the European External Action Service which continues to treat Brazil as part of MERCOSUR, while the rest of the BRICS appear individually” (Gratius “Brazil and the EU” 11). These inconsistencies of the EU’s policies toward Brazil’s role increase the perception of the EU’s irrelevance and its diminished future potential in world affairs. Professor Renato G Flores from Brazil’s Getulio Vargas Foundation Graduate school of Economics states, “Despite the interest of a unified and growing European market, the cost of the relationship with this heterogeneity, their internal different visions, and their lack of coordination are a discouraging factor” (Flores 38). In the same vein, Gratius agrees, “In this sense, Brazil is demanding that the EU be an international player. Internal division within the EU was the very argument put forward by those Brazilians who warned five years ago that a strategic Brazil-EU partnership would not have any added value and that Brazil needed to keep privileging bilateral relations with the main European countries” (Gratius, “Brazil and the EU” 12).
Options

*MERCOSUR*

The EU can continue pursuing the MERCOSUR framework and eventually achieve an agreement as a bloc or pursue a deal with those MERCOSUR countries that are willing to do so. Brazilian foreign minister Antonio Patriota, in an interview to the Financial Times, states, “There are objective conditions that create strong incentives for an advance on the EU-MERCOSUR front…anticipation that each [MERCOSUR] country may be able to negotiate at separate speeds” (qtd. in Rathbone and Leahy). Furthermore, Simon Everett, trade professor at St. Gallen University in Switzerland writes, “Breaking off from MERCOSUR would make commercial sense for Brazil. Given Argentina’s hidden protectionism, any trade partner [such as the EU] knows a deal with MERCOSUR wouldn’t be worth the paper it’s written on.”(qtd. in Rathbone and Leahy). In dealing with MERCOSUR, the EU-Brazil achievements are conditional upon developments in other MERCOSUR members.

*EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership*

The consolidation of the Strategic Partnership is a relevant political endeavor for both the EU and Brazil. Professor Youngs mentions that the EU confronts a diminished international perception of its power (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). Often its international role is questioned, whereas Brazil is seeking recognition and full insertion on the global stage of affairs. According to Grevi, “the strong structured bilateral relations provide the level playing field for trade-offs to maximize respective interests, notably in the economic sphere” (Grevi, “The EU and Brazil” 9). Even when the partnership is still in the process of overcoming the difficulties associated with MERCOSUR, a range of possibilities regarding economic growth can still be negotiated in bilateral terms. Moreover, the partnership also offers the tools to
pursue a joint international agenda in mutually relevant issues such as climate change, biofuels, and renewable energy. Grevi also points out, “Political and security affairs offer much opportunity for the EU and Brazil to join forces” (Grevi, “The EU and Brazil” 10).

The purpose of this partnership was to circumvent the stalemate of MERCOSUR talks but also promote a horizontal relationship with Brazil as it asserts its new global status. The real implementation of this framework has become difficult to accomplish due to the institutional nature of the EU. Gratius writes, “Another challenge for the bilateral relation is harmonizing the new Brussels-Brazil relationship with that of EU Member States. In this regard, Germany (2002) and Spain (2003), amongst others, have established strategic associations with Brazil” (Gratius, "Brasil y Europa” 3). If the EU wants to be seen as a single entity it should coordinate the efforts of its Member States to generate a unified voice to address Brazil.

According to the Head of the Brazilian Centre for International Relations of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, Elena Lazarou, the most visible achievement of the EU-Brazil partnership has been the creation “of a formal high-level dialogue on matters pertaining to international peace and security, including peacekeeping and peace building” (Lazarou 4). Also, in the cooperation and development issues in particular, such as the cooperation toward African Portuguese speaking countries, Grevi points out, “Peacekeeping is an area of clear potential synergy between the EU, its Member States and Brazil, notably when it comes to sharing lessons, devising comprehensive approaches to humanitarian emergencies and deploying jointly” (Grevi, “The EU and Brazil” 10).

**Recommendations**

Considering the financial and institutional issues of the EU and the rapid changes of the global order, recognizing that there is no international status quo for the EU to maintain,
because the EU is not relevant in world affairs, would be the first step. Therefore, EU policies should reflect this harsh reality and push to regain a role in the international arena.

**The EU should privilege the relationship with Brazil and act accordingly.** Patrick Messerlin, Director of the European research Center the Groupe d’Economie Mondiale, explains, “the importance of MERCOSUR is largely related to the importance of Brazil, particularly since Argentina has shifted to a strongly protectionist stance - hence offering little, if any, prospect for fulfilling the EU’s general demand of deeper market access” (Messerlin 1). If MERCOSUR countries show willingness to overcome the stalemate of the negotiations, the deal must be done, but EU efforts should be focused on reaching an agreement with Brazil regardless of MERCOSUR.

An EU-Brazil report the from Belgian Leuven Center for Global Governance points out that the, “European debt crisis has led the IMF to request extra resources to fund recovery measures. However, Brazil and other emerging economies have refrained from contributing to an increase of the Fund’s lending capacity as long as the 2010 reforms are not fully implemented” (Strategic Challenges 9). The EU should encourage the implementation of such a reform that would allow Brazil to increase its quota and alleviate pressures over EU contributions. This initiative would increase Brazilian confidence in a horizontal EU-Brazil relationship.

Along with the IMF reforms, the EU should pay attention to the language used in sensitive areas such as the Amazon. For instance, statements like, “Brazil is custodian of the largest remaining areas of rainforest” do not match the idea of a horizontal or symmetrical relationship. The Amazon is an integral part of Brazil’s territory; it is not just the guardian of global resources. Gratius writes, “The new balance of power has led Brazil to demand treatment
on a more equal basis. This leveling vision is behind the strengthening of border controls for Spanish and US citizens” (Gratius, “Brazil and the European” 13). Building a strong relationship with Brazil requires identifying the small details that can inhibit a constructive dialogue. **A full revision of the terminology utilized to address the EU-Brazil relationship must be conducted in order to reflect the updated views of Brazil as an equal partner.**
Conclusion

By Fernando Turin

The different roles of Brazil—as a leader of Latin America countries, a member of the BRICS, and a member of the MERCOSUR bloc—put the country in a particularly important position. Given the competition of different actors to gain influence in the Latin American region, the implications of neglecting a strong relationship with Brazil, ranked as one of the world’s strongest economies, would be hard to overcome, especially if Brazil shifts completely toward the BRICS group (Brazil Overview). A new EGS should contemplate the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership as an indispensable component. This approach should be focused on key areas: Brazil as an individual actor, its approach to the BRICS, and its role in the Latin American region.

Addressing Brazil as an individual actor

Without diminishing the MERCOSUR framework, the first task should be the prioritization of the bilateral agenda. Grevi and Khandekar maintain that the achievement of an EU Brazil agreement would be easier than the agreement with MERCOSUR: “The latter implies negotiating a common MERCOSUR regime on services, dealing with Argentina’s protectionism and, possibly, entering into difficult talks with Venezuela” (Grevi and Khandekar 9). This approach could result in faster cooperation and also enhance the image of Brazil’s preponderance in the region. It would be detrimental to EU interests not to put the right efforts towards a well-defined EU-Brazil partnership that could offset the increasing inclination of Brazil toward the BRICS. Sotero states, “Russia and China did not support Brazil’s attempt to gain space, in international security decision-making, in the Iranian nuclear case and voted with the United States to impose new sanctions against Tehran” (Sotero 19). The EU could become a
more reliable interlocutor with Brazil in global affairs and partner to achieve common goals, thereby enhancing the EU’s presence. The negotiations with MERCOSUR should not be an obstacle to achieving a more functional bilateral relationship.

Clear steps must be taken, such as better coordination of Member States, to coordinate and unify goals in areas where advancements have already been achieved, such as renewable energy issues, where there is potential for development in the future. A working paper of the European Commission mentions, “Brazil is an essential partner in this sector: it has outstanding expertise, a well-established and highly competitive first-generation industry, as well as optimal conditions for the development of an advanced biofuel industry” (European Commission “Partnering with Brazil”). The EU should promote joint ventures between EU and Brazilian companies to further develop this market.

_Prevent the full integration of Brazil to the BRICS_

To attract Brazil to the EU sphere of interest, the EU should introduce Brazil into transatlantic affairs. The EU should serve as an interlocutor between Brazil and the US to improve their relationship after the espionage impasse of 2013. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff’s speech to the UN general assembly states, “Tampering in such a manner in the affairs of other countries is a breach of international law and is an affront of the principles that must guide the relations among them, especially among friendly nations” (Rousseff). Tempering the tensions between Brazil and the US would be crucial to pursuing a triangular cooperation.

Gratius states, “Widening the transatlantic axis and including Brazil in some of the summits and other fora and initiatives between the United States and the EU would also be a means of reducing the attraction of the BRICS” (Gratius, “Brazil and the EU” 20). A task force report of the U.S. think tank, the Council on Foreign Relations, asserts, “that it is in the interest
of the United States to understand Brazil as a complex international actor whose influence on the defining global issues of the day is only likely to increase” (Sweig). The report also recommends, “that the Obama administration fully endorse the country's bid for a seat as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a formal endorsement from the United States for Brazil would go far to overcome lingering suspicion within the Brazilian government that the U.S. commitment to a mature relationship between equals is largely rhetorical" (Sweig). The EU must seek the inclusion of Brazil in the transatlantic dialogue as Gratius points out, “convincing both Brazil and Washington that tripartite cooperation would be beneficial for transatlantic relations and coordinating global positions” (Gratius “Brazil and the EU” 20). This addition could also reinvigorate the declining EU-US transatlantic relationship.

Enhancing the leadership of Brazil in the Latin-American region

At the same time, the EU should promote the effective leadership of Brazil in the region. This approach is important because Brazil would gain a more prevalent voice with their immediate neighbors, and would hold the responsibility of real global power. Professor Miriam Gomes Saraiva from the State University of Rio de Janeiro writes, “Brazil perceives its regional policy not only as a goal itself but also as an instrument for autonomy and “soft-balancing” the United States” (qtd. in Emerson 230). This approach would secure European investments in the region and promote stabilization mechanisms and crisis management frameworks to defuse potential internal political unrest, such as the current situation in Venezuela. The EU could provide the expertise that Brazil needs to consolidate regional organizations such as UNASUR, MERCOSUR, CELAC, and Andean Community, among others. This position would counterbalance Brazil’s use of the BRICS platform to pursue its international agenda, bringing Brazil to work more collaboratively with Brussels.
The EU can promote the Brazilian model in African countries as a successful development model, “promoting it jointly in Africa and Latin America as a ‘vaccine’ against populism” (Gratius 18). This would serve two purposes: enhancing the profile of Brazil, and also a useful tool for the EU developmental agenda in Africa. The EU could promote UN missions under Brazilian command, given its already gained expertise in Haiti, and also joint missions to increase mutual cooperation on a military level.

Through the development of this research, a trend among Brazilian scholars and political actor shows that the view of the EU as a relevant partner is increasingly challenged as scholars such as Saraiva describe:

The EU is not [the] main priority, and Brazilian diplomacy has certain differences with the EU when it comes to action strategies and perceptions of the current world order. The financial crisis in the Euro Zone has reduced the asymmetry between the two sides, making it harder for them to see eye-to-eye, and prompted Brazil to devote more energy to its initiatives with the other BRICS countries (Saraiva 59).

Furthermore, Otero Iglesias points out that, “While the EU still sees the relationship as asymmetric, Brazil is starting to see itself as an upcoming medium power in the new emerging world order which has no need to be lectured by the Europeans” (Otero 12). In the political realm, the Defense Minister states, “We are taking awareness of our own influence in world affairs and changing the way the world order is organized” (qtd. in Wolfe). The EU should make a serious effort to create the conditions to maintain Brazil not just as a reliable economic partner but also as a solid Western ally.
Chapter 6: Transatlantic Relations

Introduction
By Philippe Enos and Shannon Nolan

The transatlantic partnership is no longer as strong as it was during the Cold War, when the EU and US faced a common threat. A report by Daniel Hamilton and Frances Burwell from the Real Elcano Institute depicts this change:

The world that created the transatlantic partnership is fading fast. The United States and Europe must urgently reposition and recast their relationship as a more effective and strategic partnership. It is a moment of opportunity -- to use or to lose.

(Hamilton and Burwell, ii)

The weakening partnership between the EU and US threatens to compound the increasing irrelevance of the EU in global issues. According to Giovanni Grevi, “creating more targeted partnerships, infused with the right dose of political will, is critical in order to prevent mutual estrangement and the breakdown of multilateral efforts” (9). This is especially true for the transatlantic partnership, which requires deeper and broader multilateral cooperation in order to bolster the global presence of both actors.
The Strategic Challenge: How the EU can restore its relevance as a global actor under the current conditions

In order to avoid the threat of further irrelevance, the EU needs to revise and reprioritize its framework for transatlantic relations and take on security challenges that include a broader range of issues and regions. The ESS has been unsuccessful at accomplishing the goals of leading “renewal of the multilateral order” by involving the US as “the key partner for Europe” (ESS Review 11). However the limits to stronger transatlantic cooperation have primarily been due to the Member States’ inability to work together and for the EU to represent itself as an effective, unified body. The EU cannot continue to respond to global issues in an ad hoc, after-the-fact manner, which undermines cooperation with the US. The EU must change its current strategy with the US to include enhanced cooperation through a European Grand Strategy (EGS). The EGS will improve the EU’s ability to remain engaged in global issues and to cooperate multilaterally with the US and other actors by improving its ability to function as a cohesive unit.

The Solution: A New European Global Strategy

Under the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the transatlantic partnership was only briefly mentioned. When it was written, the EU and the US were divided over intervention in Iraq. The 2003 ESS included no clear framework for cooperation between the EU and the US (European Security Strategy). While the international balance of power has changed significantly since 2003, the EU has not revised its security strategy to accommodate these changes, particularly in the area of the global balance of military power. Nor has it faced the challenge of emerging conflicts in Europe’s neighborhood. In short, the EU has not created a framework to address the challenges that affect the overall vitality of the transatlantic
partnership. The EU must recognize that the ESS does not accurately address current problems that it faces.

**Problems that Require a New Approach to the Transatlantic Relationship**

To include the changes that have occurred in the transatlantic relationship over the last decade and to establish a framework for deeper multilateral cooperation in the future, the EU must craft a new European Global Strategy (EGS). Significant changes in the transatlantic relationship have occurred since the 2003 ESS was written: 1) George W. Bush’s first administration’s decision to invade Iraq was highly unpopular among most EU officials and public opinion; 2) During Bush’s second administration, the transatlantic relationship employed a redemptive period as the partners rebuilt cooperative frameworks for counter-terrorism and information sharing such as SWIFT; 3) After Obama’s inauguration in 2008, the US turned its international focus toward resolving the financial crisis; 4) Obama’s withdrawal from the US-EU ‘09 Summit in Madrid diluted positive European expectations; and 5) the 2013 NSA scandal revealed that the US was engaged in targeted spying of EU officials and citizens. As a result, progress on a new strategic partnership framework has stalled.

In comparison to previous administrations, the Obama administration has shifted the U.S. international agenda away from Europe to prioritize China and the Asia-Pacific region. This demonstrates that Europe is no longer regarded as a top priority to US national security interests. The 2012 United States Department of Defense plans show this priority shift:

[Based on the] withdrawal of two of the four Army brigades deployed in Europe, shutting down a corps headquarters, de-activating two Air Force squadrons, closing four out of twelve Army bases in Germany and, in the end,
bringing home 10,000 of the 80,000 units of US service personnel currently serving in Europe. (Ungaro, 4)

Erik Jones of Instituto Affari Internazionali states: “Should the United States continue to pursue its ambition to global leadership without the benefit of European support, there will be clear and negative implications both for European security and for the transatlantic relationship” (166). The US ‘Pivot to Asia’ evidences the fact that creation of a revised transatlantic relationship is vital not only to maintain global multilateral cooperation, but also for European security.

Crippling issues that have continuously stalled cooperation must be overcome. Jan Techau of The National Interest explains these issues:

Libya, Afghanistan, the Arab Spring, the future of NATO, Guantanamo, Iraq, terrorism, Iran, nuclear weapons, missile defense—the list of traditional “high-politics” issues that dominate the transatlantic debate is long and hot. Both sides are acutely aware of the fact that they need each other for every single one of these items. However, interests and policy approaches on these problems can be strikingly different on both sides of the pond (and, naturally, also within Europe). (“The Dirty Secret”)

If the US and EU are divided in their policy approaches, the greater transatlantic cooperation that is required to reinvigorate the EU’s position in the world cannot be achieved. To achieve better transatlantic security cooperation, the EU must revise its domestic policies by creating a new EGS to address the changes in the world that have occurred since 2003. Formulating such a strategy should improve the EU’s internal cohesion and will make the EU a more predictable partner for the US. While the two sides may not agree on every issue, knowing where and how
Europe is committed in strategic terms will help American policy makers see the value of deeper security cooperation with the EU.

The Lack of EU unity

Since the EU and US share common values regarding democracy, security, and economic liberalization, a framework for deeper cooperation is likely achievable. In fact, it is essential. Despite successes in US-EU cooperation on certain security issues, ranging from Kosovo to the promotion and enforcement of nonproliferation, in the cases of Iraq, Libya, and Iran, dialogue between the transatlantic partners is carried out on a very ad hoc and sporadic basis. As recently demonstrated by the frustration of the US administration over EU inaction on the Ukraine, the EU-US relationship and functionality has been characterized by exhaustion and disdain more often than an active and genuine partnership.

The status quo in the EU prevents decisive cooperation between the US and EU and weakens that relationship. Exemplifying the negative impact of ad hoc collaboration with the US. Soeren Kern explains how, currently, the EU Member States follow individual dialogues with the US president (Kern). Alvaro de Vasconcelos elaborates on this statement:

At the current point in time, it is clear that that the EU-US relationship will be hampered as long as the Europeans fail to act together and to speak with a single clear voice. Only by acting in unison can they build a concrete agenda for a real strategic partnership with their American counterparts. ("The Agenda for the EU-US strategic partnership")

The EU must establish a unanimously agreed upon set of political, military, and economic criteria for engagement in other regions of the globe. This will require a strategic prioritization of EU interests and an evaluation of the extent to which the EU will pursue these interests. It is
important that the EU’s priorities and responses are pre-deliberated in order to act efficiently and effectively when crises arise. Member States must acknowledge that continuation of a unilateral approach to these matters is no longer a viable option for addressing global regions and issues.

The recent release of an unauthorized recording of a conversation between one of Washington’s top diplomats to Europe, Victoria Nuland, and the US Ambassador to Kiev, Geoff Pyatt, reflects the irrelevance of the EU, its inability to address issues of common concern, and the necessity for a new EGS. Referring to negotiations between the EU, US, IMF and Ukraine, Nuland stated that Jeff Feltman (UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs) has “now gotten both [Robert] Serry and [UN Secretary General] Ban Ki-moon to agree that Serry could come in Monday or Tuesday. So that would be great, I think, to help glue this thing and to have the UN help glue it and, you know, fuck the EU” (Transcript, BBC News). This unequivocal statement reflects the fact that if transatlantic relations are to improve, the EU must overcome internal issues in order to cooperate with the US as a single entity with a single strategy and agenda, rather than as a group of discombobulated Member States pushing forward divergent agendas. A redefined strategic framework will allow the EU to collectively cooperate with the US at a time of critical urgency.

A new EGS would improve EU-US collaboration, as it would provide a unanimously derived framework for interaction with the US. In her paper, Kern elaborates why the New Transatlantic Agenda should be reformed:

Moreover, most US presidents end up focusing on ‘high politics’ such as the use of force, while the EU still has a reputation in Washington of being an institution that focuses on issues of ‘low politics’ such as trade, industrial and
environmental policy. This is why most US administrations believe that the most effective way to deal with Europe on security issues is bilaterally with EU Member States at the national level or through NATO. It is no surprise, therefore, that the Bush administration unilaterally decided to reduce the number of summits with the EU to one per year. (Kern)

The US’s tendency to focus on maintaining bilateral relationships with EU Member States rather than unilateral relationships with the EU as a whole signals the EU’s inability to represent itself as an autonomous body (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”). A new EGS would help create a common EU framework and unify EU Member States priorities. Moreover, an EGS would establish the framework for the EU to represent itself as a unilateral body, which would help strengthen the transatlantic partnership and would enable the EU to move up the ladder as a relevant global actor and meet the challenges of a global transition of power.

Such a strategy would increase the EU’s ability to organize itself enough to respond to security threats in a cohesive and decisive manner, thus improving cooperation between the EU and the US. This is well exemplified by Alvaro de Vasconcelos’s statement:

At the current point in time, it is clear that the EU-US relationship will be hampered as long as the Europeans fail to act together and to speak with a single clear voice. Only by acting in unison can they build a concrete agenda for a real strategic partnership with their American counterparts. (“The Agenda for the EU-US strategic partnership”)

As will be further explained in the chapter on NATO, Richard Youngs suggests a security version of the TTIP agreement would provide the necessary forum for better-coordinated security cooperation (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). This will minimize friction on common
priorities between the EU and US and establish collaboration on the tactical means of achieving them.

The Inadequacies of The EU-US Strategic Partnership

The EU-US Strategic Partnership is the primary vehicle for transatlantic relations and cooperation. The partnership is guided by two key agreements, including the New Transatlantic Agenda and the Transatlantic Economic Partnership. While there has been much formal collaboration on a revised transatlantic economic partnership, the current forums for security cooperation are inadequate.

The EU-US Strategic Partnership is maintained through an annual summit, seven ministerial dialogues, fifty-six sectoral dialogues as well as the Transatlantic Legislators Dialogue, the Transatlantic Business Council, and the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue. The majority of these meetings are held on either an annual, biannual or ad hoc basis between the EEAS and the US State Department. These dialogues are important in keeping both sides informed of various issues and in maintaining efforts to cooperate on these issues. However, while they do sustain communication on high-priority concerns, concrete decisions and substantive actions rarely transpire. This is especially evidenced by the EU-US annual Summit which, “Rather than being a forum for a strategic dialogue it turns out to be an opportunity for every single EU member state – no matter how small – to express his/her country’s position to the President of the U.S. As a result this is a photo-op but little real business gets done” (Zaborowski, 11).

The Problem of Declining EU Defense Budgets

The financial crisis has resulted in declining defense budgets across EU Member States. A critical review of The Defense Budget in France: between Denial and Decline explains that
budget austerity has caused France and other Member States’ defense budgets to reflect national interests rather than focus on a common European defense policy (Foucault, 44). However, changes in the current international system, including the rise of Asia as well as conflicts in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe’s neighborhood, make improvements imperative in Europe’s defense budget and policy coordination. Further, the EU must be prepared to allocate the resources to back a unified agenda if cooperation is to move forward, as will be relayed by Ambassador Ivo Daalder in the NATO chapter. The US lacks the will to continue participating in missions where the EU is only involved on paper while the physical and monetary resources are supplied largely by the US. With the EU’s economic constraints, it cannot afford to continue neglecting cooperative efforts with the US, a necessary avenue to preserve the EU’s role as a global actor. The EGS would facilitate transatlantic cooperation by providing a preconceived framework for strategic interaction and deeper trade integration to improve both economies and help mend the EU’s declining defense budget.

**Problems with NATO**

EU-US security cooperation is most typically carried out indirectly through institutions such as NATO. While NATO does serve as the main forum for transatlantic security cooperation, several EU Member States remain outside of NATO and are thus neglected within this cooperative framework. Further, NATO-EU cooperation, as later relayed by Jolyon Howorth, Joachim Koops, and others, remains strained and infrequent to say the least. The pressing need for addressing problems confronting the framework for transatlantic cooperation is well explained by Marcin Zaborowski of the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:
The current structures in place do not facilitate effective cooperation between the EU and the U.S. and do not allow them to get the best value out of their combined resources. In the past the intellectual debate on transatlantic relations was divided between those who believed that NATO should be the key format for our strategic debate and those who argued that it should be the EU-U.S. format. We no longer have the luxury of this theological debate and most Europeans and Americans no longer care what format we use to get our business done as long as it gets done. (Zaborowski, 9)

The inability of current institutions to effectively facilitate active cooperation on issues of mutual interest indicates that reform of these institutions is necessary.

EU and US security initiatives, including the 2010 US Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2008 EU Common Security and Defense Policy review, demonstrate a mutual intent to work on conflict prevention and democracy promotion, as well as to increase multilateral cooperation and strengthen alliances, especially in consideration of today’s strained economic environment. However, these documents do not lay out the framework and issue areas for a future US-EU transatlantic cooperation. Efforts must be made to consolidate common security agendas.

The Lack of Economic Coordination

Paralleling the need for a consolidated common security agenda is the need to consolidate the economic gains to be had from further economic integration. Overcoming recession and revitalizing the transatlantic economy should also be top priorities for the transatlantic partnership. The primary hurdles to a coordinated transatlantic approach have been differences on financial regulation by the EU and US. Both regions follow different policies regarding “liquidity rules for global banks and fiscal policies,” as the EU, unlike the US,
favored austerity measures (Zandonini 55). If the US and EU follow divergent economic policies yet remain the world’s largest trade partners, their economic capabilities will be diminished. Due to the inefficiencies and inability to improve regulatory coordination in the G20 and Transatlantic Economic Council, a new partnership and framework for economic coordination and security cooperation through deeper and more integrated participation of both partners is justified. A stronger transatlantic economic partnership can be achieved by harmonizing common regulations and tabling regulatory areas of disagreement that have little or no potential for improvement in the current dialogue. These steps must be taken in order to expediently finalize the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and revitalize the EU’s economic prominence and global relevance.

**Inadequacies of the G20 Summit**

While there have been efforts between the transatlantic partners to work on common agendas to respond to changes in the global economy, they have been limited in scope. For example, after the 2008/2009 financial crisis both the EU and US collaborated at the G20 summit and acknowledged that important emerging economies were not sufficiently included in principal global economic talks and governance. Zandonini explains that the G20 demonstrates inadequate communication and engagement between bilateral partnerships and multilateral negotiations (Grevi, 6). According to Zandonini, “differences between the transatlantic partners on financial regulation and fiscal policies have contributed to stalling progress in the new forum” (Grevi 6). Inefficient dialogue between the transatlantic partners does nothing to address the urgency of resolving the EU’s declining global presence.
Since the financial crisis, the US and EU have increased their involvement in international meetings. However, the lack of a unitary framework for engagement decreases the relevance of the multilateral meetings as the US and EU have focused on more urgent issues:

At the G-20 Cannes meeting in November 2011, the European debt crisis became the priority. Together with the lack of drive from the U.S., this caused the thoroughly conceived and wide-ranging agenda of the French presidency to be put aside. (Zandonini, 48)

Transatlantic-driven policy coordination efforts in 2009, when President Obama called the G20 “the premier forum for international economic policy,” lacked a long-term solution to implement coordinated policies (Zandonini, 55). The 2009 G20 talks “showed signs of short-term thinking when national economic conditions started to diverge and the initial peak of the crisis was overcome” (Zandonini, 55). As a consequence, the comprehensive London summit agenda was never entirely implemented. Current policy platforms simply fail to provide sufficient long-term coordination on high priority economic issues that is so necessary.

How to Rebuild the Transatlantic Partnership

The current policy framework of the transatlantic partnership is inadequate and even dangerous because coordination policies between the US and EU do not appropriately address global challenges. Preserving the present framework risks the relationship sliding into disengagement (decoupling), which would leave both regions worse off. Marcin Zaborowski explains, “We need both an effective NATO-EU relationship and a strategic cooperation between the EU and the U.S. For the time being we have neither” (9). In order to maintain international relevance, the EU and US need to break through strategic and structural roadblocks in the transatlantic partnership through revisions to NATO and finalizing the TTIP.
negotiations. As the following case studies will demonstrate, the EU’s global capabilities are
dependent upon its economic and strategic ties with the US. Furthermore, the EU will be able to
restore its relevance as a global security actor by establishing a deeper framework for
transatlantic cooperation.
NATO

The Future of NATO in a Changing World

By Shannon Nolan

Issue

Existing institutions are insufficient in their ability to foster active EU-US security cooperation. In “Unstrategic Partners,” Joachim Koops describes what is at stake:

Given the common security challenges and current crises, anything less than achieving an overall, politico-military ‘grand bargain’ between the two organizations this time round will mean a grand strategic omission --not only for the future of NATO, the EU and the European Security Architecture, but also for the promotion of international peace and security around the globe. (72)

NATO must be amended in order to maintain the European Union’s hard security profile and a new cooperative framework must be formed.

Background

Throughout the Cold War, NATO focused on territorial defense. US strategic nuclear warheads were placed in 5 European countries as part of a framework of special nuclear sharing agreements that constitute NATO’s nuclear deterrent. However, with the collapse of the USSR, NATO has increasingly focused on global issues outside of European territorial defense, including missions in Afghanistan and Libya, counterterrorism, and maritime security in the Gulf of Aden. NATO’s recent global orientation not only reflects the dissolution of the common threat which spurred the formation of NATO, but also a shift in American national security
attention away from Europe and toward the Middle East and Asia as primary areas of concern. Washington no longer views Europe as a problem and has called on Europe to take greater responsibility for its own security as well as the security of its neighborhood, and to become progressively involved in global security issues in partnership with the United States.

NATO continues to serve as a platform for EU-US cooperation on security issues, especially crisis intervention. However, relations surrounding the alliance have recently become strained. Senator Gorton and Rich Ellings of the Gorton Center and National Bureau for Asian Research agree that “NATO will only become important again when the US and EU face a common threat” (2014). Recent NATO missions in Afghanistan and Libya have called into question the integrity of the alliance or the ability of its members to agree on a common cause. The lack of European will to participate in military intervention and heavy reliance on key enablers supplied by the US throughout recent missions has led to a weakening of NATO-EU-US relations. While both the EU and US are wary of drawn out missions like those in Afghanistan, the US still remains committed to crisis intervention and has called for the greater involvement of its European counterparts within the framework of NATO.

**Interests**

*NATO’s Contribution to EU Security*

NATO is largely an expression of the U.S. security alliance with Europe and remains central to European security. The European Security Strategy states “The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO” (“A Secure Europe” 2003). This is reaffirmed by the U.S. 2010 Quadrennial Revue:

We will work to ensure a strong NATO that provides a credible Article 5 security commitment, deters threats to Alliance security, has access to U.S.
capabilities such as the phased, adaptive approach to European missile defense to address the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and takes on new threats such as cyberspace attacks. The U.S. relationship with the European Union, together with the NATO-EU relationship, has become even more important in recent years in projecting the full force of transatlantic power.

Additionally, NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept reiterates the alliance’s commitment to European security stating, “NATO’s fundamental and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means,” and further emphasizes the commitment to and importance of cooperation with Europe regarding collective defense, crisis management and collective security (2010 Strategic Concept, 6). Consequently Europe has an interest in improving cooperation with NATO, which constitutes a large portion of its own domestic security capabilities. Klaus Naumann further explains:

  For the time being there can be no security for Europe without the United States.

As the expression of the US treaty obligation to, in cooperation with the Europeans, provide for the security of the area between Vancouver and Brest-Litovsk, NATO must remain intact and be further developed. It is necessary to preserve the tried and tested—like collective defense and the real glue of the alliance: the equitable distribution of risks and burdens— while working to fashion the alliance anew. (“Security without the United States?”)

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10 This is further exemplified by the regular contingency planning, military exercises, and commitment to the vision of a ‘Europe whole and free’ as evoked in relation to NATO’s open ended enlargement policy; which demonstrate that the alliance “sees itself not only as the ultimate guarantor of its members’ defense [as stated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty] but also… as the guarantor for Peace in Europe as a whole” (Alcaro, 19).
Thus, increased engagement with NATO, and synonymously the US, “is not a call to altruism on the European side; it is a matter of European self interest,” as it preserves the commitment of an alliance that is truly integral to its security (Jones, 149).

*The Threat of Irrelevance*

While NATO is still committed to European security, with the re-prioritization of US interests, and increasingly strained EU-US-NATO relations, it is ever more dire that Europe revives its relationship with NATO. That the EU can no longer neglect its relationship with NATO, which endangers the alliance, is well evidenced by Heather Conley and Maren Leed:

Europe pretends that the U.S. security umbrella over Europe is a permanent fixture, allowing it to divert resources to other forms of security, specifically social security and pensions for a rapidly aging population. Americans may scold Europe from time to time about this but Washington pretends that all they really need from Europe is political support and validation of U.S. policy objectives. This self-deception represents a real crisis for an institution [(NATO)] that remains a crucial provider of stability and security, not only within Europe but globally. Given this cognitive dissonance, the question becomes how to change this dynamic in light of diminished political leadership and defense budgets on both sides of the Atlantic. (Conley and Leed)

The US has an interest in maintaining NATO as a framework for multilateral cooperation with Europe, which should mitigate its diminishing resources and adds legitimacy to its international endeavors. However, it is unlikely that the US will continue to have the will to invest in a relationship that remains unreciprocated and unrewarding in the long run, as will be evidenced by cynicism over drastic inequities in defense spending. Thus, it is imperative that Europe
improves its partnership with NATO, given that it is an avenue to preserve the transatlantic partnership, its importance for European security, and in light of Europe’s declining defense budget.

**Policy Analysis**

*The Basis for Greater Coordination Between CSDP and NATO*

Considering NATO and CSDP’s respective weaknesses, it seems most logical that the two institutions should merge capabilities and resources as well as cooperate on missions. Tomas Valasek and Daniel Korski of SAIS state, “Poor co-operation between the two institutions makes it difficult for NATO and the EU to adopt a truly 'comprehensive' approach to warfare, which integrates civilian and military capabilities” (“Closer NATO-EU Ties”). For crisis management, NATO could carry out the more intensive military intervention and stabilization missions while the EU supplies the civilian reconstruction efforts. According to US Ambassador Thomas Pickering, the “EU as a second tier force for more limited tasks, while NATO focus on the greater military tasks… is not necessarily a bad division of labor.” In light of the current economic environment, limited resources, and similar interests of both the US and EU, a division of labor between NATO and CSDP, or even further inter-organizational integration of the two, is most practical.

Afghanistan exemplifies NATO’s capacity for multilateral military intervention, the poor ability of the alliance to carry out post-conflict civilian reconstruction efforts, and the necessity of improved coordination between NATO and the EU. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates relays that, despite initial limitations including a lack of focus and resources, “through it all, NATO –as an alliance collectively– has for the most part come through for the
mission in Afghanistan” (2011). However, Valesek and Korski critique the effectiveness of its missions:

The key lesson from NATO’s recent operations in Bosnia- Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan is that military operations must be fully integrated with civilian-led reconstruction activities: building governance and courts, training police, restarting agricultural production, providing water, electricity and healthcare services, removing sewage etc… NATO has no mechanism for generating, let alone commanding or co-ordinating civilian capabilities, even when no other actors fill the gap (e.g. in southern Afghanistan). (“Closer NATO-EU Ties”)

Considering NATO’s difficulties in the civilian arena, the U.S. 2010 Quadrennial Revue calls for greater coordination between NATO and the EU:

The need for NATO to develop its own comprehensive civil-military approach, as well as greater cooperation with the EU and other international organizations, is especially evident in Afghanistan, where every NATO ally and the EU are contributing to the international effort… (“Quadrennial Defense”)

While NATO is instrumental in its ability to coordinate multilateral crisis management and military intervention, it would clearly benefit from drawing on EU mechanisms for civilian reconstruction.

The EU’s CSDP directly contrasts NATO with its stronger post-conflict civilian reconstruction capabilities and a poor record of military intervention. Alistair J.K. Shepherd relays how, despite efforts to form the CSDP as an institution capable of comprehensive civil-military crisis management, the EU has primarily been involved in pre and post-conflict initiatives, “leaving it largely absent of the most difficult phase” of military intervention
(“Transforming CSDP”). The EU’s largest military mission, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004, was merely a follow-up to the termination of a NATO stabilization force that had been active for nine years (Alcaro, 23). Evidently, the CSDP can benefit from NATO’s capacity for military intervention.

Furthermore, though the EU has carried out almost 30 missions to date, they have been relatively small and occurred post-conflict, as well as being advisory and civilian in nature—police missions, border control missions, security-sector reform missions (Howorth, 2013). Riccardo Alcaro of Instituto Affari Internazionali relays, “That CSDP, in military terms, is just a supplementary crisis management tool is further attested to by the decision by US and European leaders to maintain NATO control over the security of Kosovo after the latter’s declaration of independence from Serbia in early 2008” (23). Further, Jolyon Howorth, a professor at Yale University, states how, in contrast to NATO, “When real crises have arisen (the Balkans in the 1990s and North Africa in the 2010s), the EU has proved unequal to the task” (2013). As later demonstrated by the case of Libya, the reality of the situation is that, no matter how much Europe would like to assert the efficacy of an independent CSDP, the functionality of their security architecture is highly dependent on NATO whether for political or capacitive reasons.

A Background of NATO-EU Collaboration

Considering the complimentary weaknesses and capabilities of NATO and the EU it is no surprise that efforts have been made to increase joint collaboration. Efforts by the EU and NATO include: the NATO-EU declaration on ESDP which established a NATO-EU Strategic Partnership (2002), the Berlin Plus agreement (2003) allowing the EU access to NATO assets and planning, the NATO-EU Mission Concordia in Macedonia (2003), and the NATO-EU
Mission Althea in Bosnia (2004). Both the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and NATO’s Strategic Concept (2010) also emphasize the need to expand cooperation. However, these initiatives have hardly led to the level of cooperation hoped for, and both missions were mainly comprised of NATO resources, which simply served to highlight the limited nature of EU and CSDP involvement. Despite pressures for an improved framework for EU-NATO cooperation, effective reforms have not transpired and the EU-NATO relationship remains deficient.

In fact, the EU-NATO relationship has been characterized by clashes more often than cooperation. This is well evidenced by several clashes between NATO and the EU including the proposal for an autonomous EU operational planning cell made by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg at their Tervuren summit in 2003 as well as the inability of European nations to agree on which organization should respond to the African Union’s request for a strategic airlift for its military mission in Sudan in 2005 (Koops, 45-46). Further, despite “NATO’s announcement in September 2007 that national contributions to the [NATO Response Force] NRF were severely falling short, the EU’s Battlegroup concept seemed to have become the Member States preferred option” (Koops, 55). Finally, in 2008 the EU launched its own anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia (NAVFOR) in spite of NATO’s identical operation—Operation Allied Provider. Despite these antagonisms, much has changed and the current environment necessitates improved EU-NATO cooperation.

Options for an Institutional Merge

Compelling arguments warn of the negative consequences should this trajectory of hardly any cooperation between Europe and NATO remain unaltered. Jolyon Howorth contends that, despite divergent views of Europeans and Americans over NATO’s purpose, with cuts in defense spending, NATO and CSDP must converge. Howorth states, “The EU on its own is not
going to go very far and will remain a bit player” (“EU and the CSDP”). Most importantly, Howorth argues that “it is only through NATO and not CSDP that the EU will become competent” as a defense actor (“EU and the CSDP”). Exemplifying the latter, Howorth compares NATO to a bicycle ridden by the US, with the EU “bundled behind in the baby seat,” but slowly encouraged by the US to ride the bicycle itself, with smaller training wheels—air-to-air refueling, logistics, intelligence—each time (2013).

Yet this transition will require greater US pressure on Europe. The merge between NATO and CSDP and, subsequently, CSDP’s competence “will only come if the US demands responsibility” of the EU (Howorth, 2013). If the US is serious about telling the EU to assume responsibility then they have to be prepared to almost threaten the EU with withdrawal and can no longer bail out the EU. Howorth also suggests that NATO-EU cooperation could be facilitated by substituting the individual EU Member States within NATO with a single EU seat within the North Atlantic Council should political circumstances ever permit it.

Joachim A. Koops argues in Unstrategic Partners that, despite numerous obstacles, an overarching inter-organizational (NATO-EU) ‘grand strategy’ is crucial for jointly tackling security issues (41). Koops states that with respect to “NATO’s challenges to its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and its limited resources and complete absence of civil-military planning capabilities, the idea of a ‘Berlin Plus in Reverse’ has emerged and has found much support in US and NATO circles” (65). Such an arrangement would allow NATO to draw on EU capabilities, creating a more reciprocal framework. Koops makes a critical case for an upgraded means of NATO-EU cooperation.
Obstacles to Greater NATO-EU Convergence Must Be Overcome

Recalcitrant to any improvement of the NATO-EU relationship, numerous obstacles have continued to obstruct efforts and must be resolved should additional initiatives move forward:

Whilst France - despite Sarkozy’s decision to bring France back into NATO in 2009 - has persistently viewed closer NATO-EU relations as a limitation on the EU’s autonomy, Turkey’s refusal of any official NATO-EU exchanges in the presence of the non-NATO EU member Cyprus has been explained by Turkey’s frustrations over the unsettled Cyprus conflict, over its stalling EU accession process and over its lack of decision-making influence in ESDP. (Koops, 53)

The obstruction of several European Member States demonstrates how the political environment in Europe has been opposed to EU-NATO cooperation.

The latter is consistent with EU efforts to demonstrate its ability to act independently of NATO, leading to a ‘de-NATOization’ and ‘Europeanization’ of national policies, however uneven among EU-NATO Member States.11 Member States have continuously chosen unilateral and autonomous EU efforts in attempts to prove the efficacy of CSDP over multilateral cooperation with NATO. Despite widespread ambitions to improve the state of NATO-EU relations, the reality of this partnership has been unproductive.

The Case of Libya: Problems with the Current Framework

While increasing economic constraints might incentivize the EU to scale back its ambitions of an autonomous CSDP and work more closely with NATO, Libya demonstrates otherwise. Howorth has stated that despite being a serious-most security concern, “the EU was
no-where to be seen when push came to shove” (“EU and the CSDP). Notwithstanding improved relations since the inauguration of Obama, as demonstrated by the case of Libya, the EU seems to lack any appetite for multilateral military intervention whatsoever. This is in part due to the current economic environment, distaste for anything close to resembling Afghanistan, and divergent conceptions of the purpose of CSDP regarding crisis intervention.\(^\text{12}\)

Libya not only demonstrates Europe’s dependence on the U.S. for assistance in any mission that is military in nature, but also negative implications for an improved EU-NATO coordination due to the lack of consensus within Europe surrounding the criteria for military intervention. Despite the initial intention to lead from behind,\(^\text{13}\) “The United States played a leading role, first by taking out Libya’s integrated air defense system, then by providing the critical enablers that allowed other NATO countries and partners to shoulder their significant share of the burden” (Daalder and Stavridis). Further, after the “crucial and irreplaceable U.S. contribution to the overall effort” which enabled other partners to participate in the operation, “France and Britain flew one third of all missions — most of them strikes — and the remaining participants flew roughly 40 percent”\(^\text{14}\) (Daalder and Stavridis). This exemplifies the incongruence within Europe surrounding intervention as well as military spending,\(^\text{15}\) which not only complicates coordination within NATO but also the potential for CSDP to coordinate with NATO.

\(^{12}\) Germany voted to abstain from the U.N. resolution authorizing force against Muammar Quaddafi, due to the emergence of competing narratives in German politics over the use of military force to promote freedom and reservations over the deployment of German troops; despite Germany’s staunch support of military intervention in the Balkans previously (Herf).

\(^{13}\) “The U.S. position was that Libya was the responsibility of the Europeans” (Howorth, 2013).

\(^{14}\) U.S. planes flew the roughly 25 percent of sorties over Libya (Daalder and Stavridis).

\(^{15}\) Decline in defense spending; reference Heather A. Conley, and Maren Leed as well as Robert Gates.
Robert Gates’ final policy speech as the US defense secretary, in June 2011, criticizes the weak involvement of some NATO members: "many of those allies sitting on the sidelines do so not because they do not want to participate, but simply because they can't. The military capabilities simply aren't there." While every alliance member voted for a military intervention in Libya, less than half participated. Additionally, Gates demonstrates the negative implications of the rift in European politics over intervention and defense spending on NATO-EU relations:

In the past, I’ve worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance: Between members who specialize in “soft’ humanitarian, development, peacekeeping, and talking tasks, and those conducting the “hard” combat missions. Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but don’t want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable.

Gates demonstrates the unsustainable nature of the current NATO framework as carried out in Libya.

Starkly contrasting Gates’ views on Libya, Richard Youngs and Jolyon Howorth both perceive Libya as a success for NATO and a failure for the CSDP. However, Youngs and Howorth diverge on what this means for European leadership on defense issues and the future of NATO. Youngs regards Libya as a viable model for future military engagements where the EU can take the lead within NATO and the US will provide logistical support. Youngs is content with this model as is and does not see any value in a merge between CSDP and NATO. Youngs states, “There is still a value in having a European security identity separate from
NATO – NATO has more baggage which could be harmful” in certain circumstances (“EU Security Strategy”). According to Youngs, while NATO will continue to serve as a resource for military intervention, the CSDP must remain autonomous despite its inability to carry out substantial military missions.

Howorth views the case of Libya as a lesson and opportunity for greater EU-NATO cooperation, as relayed by his aforementioned ‘training wheels’ analogy. Howorth believes that cases like Libya and Mali demonstrate the benefit of working through NATO, where European nations and the CSDP can gain competence militarily, and Europe can become more engaged as a security actor. Howorth suggests that a greater EU ability to command in NATO, that is not subordinate to US command, would increase EU responsibility (Howorth, “EU and the CSDP”).

Though Youngs and Howorth do converge on the view that the EU must have greater leadership within NATO, Youngs is content with the current framework while Howorth sees this as evidence of the need for greater reform in EU-NATO cooperation.

Contrary to Youngs’ and Howorth’s views of Libya as a feasible model for military engagement but in line with Gates’, Koops believes this type of cooperation where the EU relies heavily on the US is harmful to the EU-US-NATO relationship:

Indeed, the narrow implementation of the existing Berlin package… underlines the limited and asymmetrical impact between the EU and NATO. More crucially, it also points to the fact that the NATO-EU relationship lacks one of the most fundamental features of multilateralism: ‘diffuse reciprocity.’ (69)

This is clearly evidenced by Libya where, despite the US step back and greater European command, the U.S supplied most of the resources and funding. The one-sided nature of the EU-
NATO relationship prevents long-term mutual benefits and is not sustainable. U.S. Ambassador Ivo Daalder stated the dangers of this in his farewell remarks before leaving Brussels in 2013:

Recent trends in defense spending threaten NATO’s ability to confidently face a dangerous and unpredictable future. Most European Allies are jettisoning capabilities, and failing to spend their existing budgets wisely. As a result, the gap between American and European contributions to the Alliance is widening to an unsustainable level. Something must be done.” (“Remarks at Carnegie Europe”)

Any effort to promote further inequitable collaboration between the EU and NATO will hardly receive support from the U.S. and may exacerbate the potential for truly cooperative attempts in the future.

*Unsustainable Levels of Defense Spending*

Clearly, the disparity of current levels of defense spending among NATO Member States prevents a more active EU-NATO partnership and cannot continue. Heather A. Conley, and Maren Leed provide the numbers for this issue:

According to NATO, the 26 European allies (minus Canada and the United States) combined spent $282 billion on defense budgets in 2011 (or about 27.2 percent of the NATO total). While that isn’t an insignificant sum, in comparison, the United States spent $731 billion (70.5 percent). Washington policymakers are now arguing that NATO must quickly move toward a 50/50 rather than a 75/25 alliance. (“NATO in the Land of Pretend”)

Europe has failed to uphold the commitment reached among NATO Member States to allocate 2 percent of their GDPs to defense spending. Furthermore, out of 26 EU-NATO Member States,
France and the U.K. constitute 41 percent of the total European contribution (Conley and Leed). Conley and Leed state, “Simply put, NATO’s future rests on the prospects for European defense spending and European political willingness to use the capabilities in which they invest. The outlook is sobering.” Even if a threshold of 2 percent defense spending of GDP is no longer practical considering the current economy, the imbalance between individual defense contributions and the contention surrounding this issue threatens to render NATO obsolete:

It is not that the Europeans do not spend enough on their defense, they just spend it inefficiently on duplicate military procurement programs and acquisitions that benefit individual countries rather than contribute to a Europe-wide defense profile. Can the Europeans ever think in terms of a European defense profile?

We believe they can, but it will take a dose of tough medicine from Washington to point them in the right direction. (Kashmeri and Howorth)

Evidently, inconsistent coordination of funds within Europe only exacerbates the issue of inequitable spending. Washington is highly critical of the disparity in defense spending; however, this would be mitigated by the greater efficiency of an improved division of military resources and tasks across Europe.

Recommendations

1) Establish Criteria for the Use of Force

The inability of the EU to act in Libya, let alone cooperate with NATO, reflects the inability of the CSDP to devise a unanimously agreed upon method for implementing a well-prioritized strategy. Divergent beliefs over the appropriateness of and prerequisites for the use of force continue to obstruct both CSDP and NATO efforts. Howorth states that there needs to be a reappraisal of intervention and the necessary criteria for intervention: “How can we be sure
that we will actually make matters better?” (“EU and the CSDP”). Furthermore, U.S. former Ambassador Thomas Pickering, referring to the potential for greater EU-NATO cooperation, states that the “problem of the use of force… and the rules of engagement needs to be solved” (2014). Such a simultaneous debate and strategic prioritization could help define and revive the purpose of NATO and the CSDP. As relayed by Howorth and Pickering, consensus must be facilitated on the conditions for military intervention.

2) Revise Existing Agreements Relevant to Security: the Strategic Partnership and New Transatlantic Agenda

Though NATO is indispensable to European security, considering all of the problems revolving around cooperation between CSDP and NATO, NATO may not be a sufficient forum for transatlantic security cooperation in the near future. Moreover, given the differences in the viability of military intervention and the strictly hard power and military nature of NATO, the institution is not sufficient for the whole of US and EU security collaboration. Thus, as suggested by Youngs, there “needs to be more of a security component of the TTIP agreement,” but in the security field (“EU Security Strategy”). Currently, the two existing transatlantic security agreements—the EU-US Strategic Partnership (1990) and the New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA, 1995)—are efforts in this direction; however, they have been largely irrelevant in security and have primarily focused on economic issues. Despite this, there is much value in reviving both the Strategic Partnership and the NTA, which provide a forum for important dialogue on common security concerns.

The NTA outlines a common vision for security cooperation between the US and EU. The document affirms the US and EU commitments to promote peace and stability, democracy, and development throughout the world by, 1) responding to global challenges, 2) contributing to
the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations, 3) building bridges across the Atlantic, parliamentary links, and 4) implementing the agenda (“The New Transatlantic Agenda”). While the NTA is a milestone in defining common objectives between the US and EU, it is ambiguous and outdated. The NTA must be updated in order to directly respond to the drastically different threats facing the EU and US today. In addition, it should be revised every five years considering the rapidly changing nature of today’s threats, including cyberwarfare and climate change.

An updated New Transatlantic Agenda will provide common EU-US priorities regarding security and specific ways to address them. Substantial debate over criteria for the use of force or more generally the means of addressing security issues, as evidenced by the case of Libya, demonstrates the need for a revised, joint EU-US strategic vision. A modernized NTA would be a step in this direction by providing an agenda outlining where and how the EU and US can cooperate, taking into account the interests and capabilities of each side.

Conversely, Soeren Kern, Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute, explains how, while the NTA ideally should be reformed, attempts to update the NTA are “premature, unrealistic and most likely to fail”:

As long as there remain uncertainties about the future of the European constitution and thus the further course of European integration, there will be a lack of transatlantic political consensus over how to reform the NTA. This implies that the main role of the NTA for the foreseeable future will continue to be what it has been during the past decade: to prevent the outbreak of a transatlantic trade war.
Even if the EU successfully overcame the uncertainties related to the failure of the Constitutional Treaty, considerable uncertainty remains as to the future shape of the Eurozone. If the EU is incapable of transcending its internal institutional uncertainties and remains incapable of acting decisively and unanimously in partnership with the US, then a revised NTA will make little difference and the US will continue to work with ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing.’ Thus, it is also equally vital that the EU address internal integration issues in order to create the capacity for a unanimously agreed upon, truly feasible agenda.

3) Implement a ‘Transatlantic Security Partnership’

A Venusberg Group and RAND Corporation Project report written by F. Stephen Larrabee and Julian Lindly-French, “Revitalizing the Transatlantic Security Partnership,” posits “a new transatlantic security partnership must be crafted that reflects both the new global realities and the political realities in Europe and the United States” (8). The ‘Transatlantic Security Partnership’ (TSP) would essentially be a transatlantic security task force at the highest political level of EU-US diplomats, which would provide a forum for greater collaboration on common areas of concern solely regarding security. Bearing in mind the shifts in the balance of power and instability of the current international system, “the centerpiece of the new transatlantic partnership over the next four years must be a new cooperative strategy” with priorities set for both the short, medium and long terms (Larrabee and Lindly-French 21). So long as the will of the EU and US to cooperate on global security issues remains intact, the TSP is the most feasible means of improving coordination.

4) Reform NATO

Though NATO may not be the best platform for EU-US security cooperation in the short term, it will continue to serve as the best tactical resource for multilateral crisis intervention
involving European states and the US. In addition to NATO’s importance for crisis intervention, “the European Union’s hard security profile ultimately depends on the existence of NATO” (Alcaro, 24). As previously demonstrated, NATO is an integral component of the transatlantic relationship and EU security. Therefore, the alliance must be preserved and strengthened.

Internal NATO reforms such as Koop’s suggestion of a ‘Berlin-Plus in reverse’ would allow NATO to draw on the EU’s strengths in civilian crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction. The latter is desperately needed in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, which has seen a complete absence of civil-military planning capabilities. Such a long-term initiative would increase EU involvement and responsibility, as called for by the US, thus reviving NATO and sustaining US engagement with Europe. Marcin Zaborowski calls for a similar approach:

- The EU and NATO must replace the existing Berlin Plus arrangement that allowed for EU access to NATO’s assets in exchange for special rights of non-EU NATO states, with a new more functional agreement. Berlin Plus was used only once – in Bosnia – and has been blocked ever since by the Turkish-Cypriot dispute. (“Organizing a Strategic EU-US Partnership”)

While a ‘Berlin Plus in reverse’ would create diffuse reciprocity within the NATO-EU relationship, debilitating issues including the Turkey-Cyprus dispute must be resolved in order for the new agreement to properly function. Zaborowski relays how, in order to overcome this obstacle, the U.S. must put pressure on Turkey while the EU shows more inclusiveness even if Turkey’s accession into the EU is out of the question, and both should dedicate more attention to helping resolve the Cyprus issue.
In the long term, should the TSP successfully produce a ‘new cooperative strategy,’ this will have a positive impact on NATO-EU relations as it will define the criteria for intervention and the use of force, or more generally, the appropriate means of achieving common priorities. Derek E. Mix explains this opportunity:

According to analysts, the security strategy documents released in recent years by the United States, the EU, and NATO, as well as by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, demonstrate a convergence of perceptions about the international security environment. This trend in the direction of a shared security strategy may present opportunities to recast the dynamics of the US-EU-NATO relationship in ways that enable the Euro-Atlantic partners to better meet the challenges they face. In other words, by bridging the remaining gaps between the institutions’ respective worldviews, a shared security strategy might help accelerate the development of complementary military and civilian capabilities that address the evolving set of interrelated external and domestic security threats faced by all EU and NATO member countries. (24)

Though a joint EU-US security strategy will not be immediately realized, it is the answer to resolving the majority of obstacles preventing greater EU-US-NATO cooperation in the long term.

Summary

Divergent views over the use of force and military intervention obstruct greater EU-US cooperation. Subsequently, a Transatlantic Security Partnership is desperately needed as a forum for dialogue or debate over this issue, and further, to evaluate the potential for a common security strategy between the US, EU and NATO in the future. Even if a common security
strategy cannot be reached for political reasons, the TSP would still provide the greater collaboration required to reach consensus on what collective actions can be made in response to common security concerns. Further, NATO’s future lies in such an ability of the US and EU to find agreement on what issues require which actions. The inequity within the EU-US-NATO relationship would also be lessened by a ‘Berlin-Plus in reverse’ agreement. These reforms are the necessary measures that must be taken not only to increase US-EU-NATO cooperation in security but also to improve mechanisms for ensuring security across the globe.
The TTIP

The Potential of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Implications for Global Relations and Security

By Philippe Enos

Issue:

European Economic Growth Problem – Lack of Global Ambition and Diminished Global Influence

The economic recession has hindered the EU’s ability to maintain its position as a global actor. As was seen in the Internal EU section, the Eurozone Crisis has had a tremendous impact on the EU’s ability to act capably and with relevance. However, as Professor Youngs states, fixing the Eurozone crisis is only the first step as the current stabilization policies do not address the underlying structural problems which, as Dan Hamilton argues, will render the EU increasingly uncompetitive in the globalized economy if it does not undertake essential reforms by 2020 (Youngs “EU Security Strategy”; Hamilton). The link between declining European competitiveness and European security is tied to the EU’s economic strength and capabilities. Acting predominantly with soft power, the EU is heavily dependent on the state of its economy; without a strong economy the EU loses its “power of attraction.” (Akmehtet, I). The single market is the EU’s single most important foreign policy instrument as it provides the EU with leverage and influence without which it cannot successfully implement a European Grand Strategy (EGS).

Since the European financial crisis, the EU faces the reality that its economy has been losing ground relative to the rising powers in the G20. In 2012, the EU’s GDP growth rate was -0.3 percent, in comparison to China’s GDP which grew by 7.7 percent, Russia’s GDP which
grew by 3.4 percent, and India’s GDP which rose by 3.2 percent (The World Factbook 2013-14). Hamilton, for example, explains the importance of the EU repositioning itself in key markets to overcome its low growth problem (Hamilton xi).

In order to meet the demographic challenges of a declining population and to sustain its social welfare model, Hamilton contends that the EU must “raise its productivity” in goods and services as those sectors are underperforming (Hamilton xi). Services account for over 70% of the EU’s GDP but only 23% of Europe’s services contribute to global exports (Hamilton xii). Additionally, 66% of all goods are traded among EU Member States (Hamilton xiii). Hamilton believes that there is room for growth in other sectors (Hamilton xiv). If the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) were implemented, it could constitute a 28% increase in “EU exports of goods and services to the US, accounting for €187 billion annually” (Francois vii). According to Francois, “EU and US trade with the rest of the world is also set to increase by over €33 billion” (Francois vii). According to Ambassador Pavilionis, if the US and the EU are to restore their international leadership positions across a range of critical issues from international trade to conventional security, they must restore the health of their economies first. As he stated, “if we fix the engine, ambition will return” (Pavilionis). Thus, the TTIP will not only benefit the EU and US’s economies, it will also improve global security by strengthening EU-US relations. Based on the potential for Europe to expand its international trade exposure and generate economic growth, the TTIP must be included in a new European Grand Strategy.

Background

**TTIP Historical Context**

Historically, transatlantic trade was conducted through the IMF, the World Bank, the OECD, and the WTO. However, as Smith points out, “those institutions were
designed for a different era” (J. Smith). Recently, these constructs have encountered difficulties addressing challenges and adapting to changes presented by globalization. According to Smith and Workman, the key problems have arisen from the “increased importance of capital flows and investment, the role of the private sector in development, increasing competition for energy supplies, and risks posed by large and growing financial imbalances.” (J. Smith). Consequently, the traditional multilateral platforms have attempted to address global economic problems with limited success.

In 2007, the EU and the US created the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) in response to the financial crisis. The TEC achieved limited success due to regulatory jurisdictional conflicts in the EU and US. For example, in 2011 Britain nationalized some of its banks, while the US floated financial relief and solvency for its largest banks, and Germany denied it even had a fiscal crisis (Stokes 5). While the TEC advanced some regulatory cooperation, it did not produce substantial, enduring changes and lacked a broad strategic vision (Stokes 8).

The need for a revised trade policy platform to enhance transatlantic trade has been an ongoing issue. Over the past decade, trade between the US and the EU has declined. In 2000, goods purchased from the US accounted for 20.8% of the total imports of the EU, by 2011 EU/US trade declined to 11.1%, a decrease of nearly 50 percent (Impact Assessment Report). In contrast, during the same period the EU export trade grew by 7.6 percent to the rest of the world while the exports to the US grew by only 1 percent (Impact Assessment Report). There are multiple contributing factors that explain this disparity, a significant one being the growth of emerging economies. Hence, the decline in trade justifies a new framework that includes deeper and more integrated
trade relations, a necessary component to strengthen the transatlantic partnership.

*TTIP Framework*

Intended as a new bilateral platform to promote economic growth, in early 2013 the EU and US agreed to negotiate the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). The premise of TTIP is a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that reduces trade barriers and strengthens transatlantic trade cooperation (Akhtar 1). If the TTIP passes, it will increase trade and investment to support job creation, economic growth, and competitiveness (Obama). However, both the EU and the US face policy and regulatory challenges that could limit or prevent a comprehensive agreement. For example, the EU and the US have vastly different regulatory approaches in three principal areas: 1) Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS), 2) Technical Barriers to Trade (TBTs), and 3) protections on geographical indications (GIs) (Kovziridze, 49). With regard to SPS, the EU heavily regulates and restricts the sale of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and hormone-treated products. In contrast, the US holds to a more liberal attitude on GMOs for agriculture, following a science-based approach to determine their legality (Kovziridze, 49). While the EU is aiming to keep GMOs “as an exception from the TAFTA/TTIP, the US seems to be determined to negotiate an acceptable deal with the EU, aimed at liberalizing GMO imports from the US to the EU.” (Kovziridze, 49).

In a TTIP assessment for the CATO Institute, Simon Lester examined the problem of regulatory barriers and provided an assessment of what can be achieved. In his assessment, he concluded, “that some of the simpler regulatory divergences between countries can be handled. However, more challenging regulatory issues, where there is strong policy disagreement between the US and EU, may need to be taken off the table.” As a result, while there are potential gains from the TTIP, “they may be smaller than some hope.” (Lester 86). Negotiating
an agreement on the permissibility and usage of GMO grains may be an area that the two sides should table in order to get the agreement passed.

Assessing the Atlantic Council/Bertelsmann Foundation matrix (see Figure 1 below), Daniel Ikenson supports the idea of identifying the most important issues and ranking them based on their difficulty and importance. He argues that “By breaking up the TTIP into more easily digestible pieces, negotiators are less likely to choke, and governments and stakeholders are more likely to stay engaged.” (Ikenson). Additionally, identifying specific issues and determining whether they should be tabled or not would ease the process and improve chances for successful negotiations.

In spite of the challenges ahead, the US and the EU desire to pass the TTIP expeditiously. President Obama has pledged to approve fast track authority in order to pass the TTIP quickly by negotiating the TTIP behind closed doors to avoid sluggish regulatory constraints (Landler). Central to the EU’s interests is the hope of improving the volume of trade of goods and services through the TTIP. How the EU does this is dependent on how it manages three tasks: 1) negotiating the TTIP, 2) revising its internal economic policies, and 3) positioning itself in global partnerships.16 While the TTIP has the potential to provide job opportunities and economic growth for the EU, depending on when and how it is implemented, the TTIP also has the potential to enhance or weaken EU security.

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16 See policy recommendation “make EU negotiations transparent”, “complete the single market”, and “Establish a Tiered Negotiating Process and Incremental Phase-In of TTIP”
Potential Benefits of TTIP for European Security

Economic Security Interests

With regard to economic security, the TTIP has the potential to create jobs and improve the transatlantic economy. According to Transatlantic Council analysts, higher trade cooperation through the TTIP offers significant benefits:

[It] could be the last best chance for the transatlantic partners to demonstrate the effectiveness of an open, rules-based economic model with strong protections for workers, the environment, and intellectual property. Failure to come to an agreement would have significant consequences, especially given the level of political capital invested in this project at the highest levels of both European and American government. (J. Smith)

Improving economic ties through trade has the added benefit of contributing to stronger strategic ties and cooperation. According to Stephen Cheney, Chief Executive Officer of the
American Security Project (ASP), the US has started the transition from “acquiring technologies exclusively from American industries towards drawing from the global commercial market” (Cheney). International trade contributes to a reduction in production costs and improvement in defense technology:

It is essential that the United States can support its allies with defense trade to maintain strong relationships and increase global security. The TTIP provides the United States with an opportunity to enhance its defense trade to improve its own military prowess and ensure that its allies are secure. (Cheney)

From this perspective, a stronger EU-US trade partnership will generate more trade in technology and defense. In addition it will foster information sharing that will build a better framework for stronger US and EU security. More broadly, if the EU changes its global position relative to other countries by engaging in bilateral trade with the US through the TTIP, then the EU and US could increase regulatory standards and leverage against countries like China.

Edward Allen also lauds the prospective partnership:

A successful TTIP could create common or compatible regulatory standards for half of the global economy. That would likely end efforts by China to create its own indigenous regulatory standards, and lead Beijing instead to reluctantly bow to the wishes of its two largest export markets and harmonize with their rules.

(Allen)

Equipping the transatlantic partners with the ability to influence rising powers provides the EU and US with relative security assurance in an era where new economies are emerging and threatening the strength of the Western alliance.

Potential Risks of TTIP for European Security
However, ‘fast-tracking’ the TTIP has been questioned due to its undemocratic nature. Fast track poses potential problems to European consumers, threatens the national sovereignty of EU Member States and the US, and sets the stage for an economic imbalance because it blocks weaker states from competing (Hauter). All of the risks identified, from consumers to less export driven EU states and to countries excluded by TTIP, could undermine the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of citizens, economically weaker Member States, and excluded countries who would question the EU’s commitment to “effective multilateralism”. Again, as a majority user of soft power, the EU cannot risk any more loss of legitimacy both internally and abroad.

Risks for EU Consumers

According to EU Trade Commissioner, Karel De Gucht, one of the stumbling blocks in the agreement is that "Some existing arrangements have caused problems in practice, allowing companies to exploit loopholes where the legal text has been vague" (EU Freezes). This implies that, if the EU and the US do not coordinate their legal framework, the TTIP may be of primary benefit to corporations. European consumer, environmental, and union groups have articulated concern that “so-called investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) agreements could undermine regulations that protect the public good.” (EU Freezes). The ISDS agreement is intended to protect foreign investors from discrimination by governments. In practice, it means that companies will have the right to sue foreign governments if they do not like the local legislation (Martin).

Journalist and analyst Glyn Moody predicts that there will be problems with the TTIP in terms of whose interests are being served, i.e. the public’s or the corporations’. He argues, “People may not want to have their food less safe or environment less polluted for more money.” (Moody). Although there would be fewer constraints, and the TTIP would generate a
lot of money for big companies, relaxed regulation of corporate activities may impose non-monetary costs on consumers who would suffer from fewer protections.

The potential dangers of the TTIP are the capabilities of corporations to push their agendas by taking legal actions against governments. If the TTIP is implemented, Glyn Moody predicts that corporations will take advantage of corporate sovereignty. Corporate sovereignty “lets a company sue a country when their expectation of future profits is being diminished by changes in legislation or legislation already in place” (Moody). Recently, a leaked ‘investment chapter’ from the Canada-EU free trade agreement (CETA), revealed that multinational corporations will have the power to sue EU states that enact health or environmental laws that violate profit expectations of investors (EU-Canada Free Trade Deal). In a current publication by EurActiv, “a separate ‘nature and scope’ document for EU-US free trade talks makes clear that similar parameters are foreseen for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement” (EU-Canada Free Trade Deal). The legal right for corporations to sue the EU creates a burden on the EU’s ability to protect or secure the public interest. Additionally, such a law hurts the EU’s economy due to the financial losses suffered in order to pay damages to corporations.

In addition, German Economic Analyst, Michael Mross, a TTIP skeptic, argues that EU Member States already have their own rights and sovereign laws. He questions why EU consumers should or would submit themselves to US corporatization. Since leaked documents have revealed the US spying on German companies, there is risk that EU citizen’s and corporate sovereign rights to intellectual property and data privacy are unprotected and that unfair competition will take place (Mross).
Risks for the Internal Cohesion of the European Union

Currently, EU Member States have competing geo-economic policies that create competition between them. FRIDE think-tank analyst Richard Youngs argues that the current trade strategy of the EU is not sustainable when it is experiencing a relative decline versus emerging economies (Youngs 2). Growing economies, such as China, take advantage of bilateral trade with individual Member States, such as Germany (Kudnani 2). This has an unintended impact of destabilizing the EU because some EU states with export-led models like Germany hold a competitive advantage over weaker EU states such as Greece (Kudnani 9).

When “competition is increasing between Member States for commercial access to emerging markets,” the EU is not coordinating its trade policies (Youngs 1). Under this scenario, where productivity growth is focused on national trade policies rather than EU trade policies, a free trade agreement such as the TTIP primarily benefits select EU Member State’s economies that specialize in export goods. According to Richard Youngs and John Springford “the Lisbon treaty enshrines a commitment to wrap bilateral investment treaties into single EU deals. However, in practice the scramble for exports has tipped the scales even more towards bilateralism and away from common EU approaches” (Youngs 2).

Risks for the EU: Lack of “Effective Multilateralism”

Although the TTIP will bolster the EU and US partnership through economic gains, the EU risks losing its influential position with the rest of the world. This threat to the EU is best characterized as a backlash from international organizations and third world nations.

A bilateral TTIP has the disadvantage of creating barriers for other countries to participate in transatlantic trade. Research analysts, Axel Berger and Clara Brandi argue the downsides of leaving some countries out:
The transatlantic talks will have uncertain consequences for any country that does not have a seat at the negotiating table. Regional agreements might lead to discrimination against non-members and impede their access to the European and American export markets. Recent studies show that such countries as Mexico, Canada and Japan and the countries of North and West Africa would be adversely affected. (Berger)

Berend Diekmann has argued, “A focus on well-established trade and investment relations will reduce the incentive to intentionally divert trade and thereby discriminate against non-members.” (Diekmann). The possible negative reactions of non-members to the TTIP are numerous. A critical potential risk is that non-members will challenge the TTIP’s regional trade bloc and create their own regional free trade area. In such a case, they could set their own rules and standards and challenge those established under the TTIP (Deikmann).

Herminio Blanco Mendoza, the Mexican candidate for Director-General of the WTO has expressed his views on the potential backlash against the TTIP due to its implications on the WTO and impact on the least developed nations. He argues that the role of the WTO in supporting economic reforms and regional integration has contributed to Africa’s recent growth in trade and exports. African nation’s participation in the WTO has contributed to the opening of their economies to world trade. However, the TTIP partnership threatens African development on two principal levels: 1) the TTIP undermines multilateral trade and the WTO’s credibility and risks the irrelevance of the WTO, and 2) the TTIP diverts trade away from the least developed countries (LDCs) as African exports will face greater barriers to trade due to increased “competition with US companies in the EU” (Venhaus 61; Mthembu, 52). While the TTIP provides preferential bilateral trade between the most developed countries, it restricts
market access to developing and less developed countries. As Mendoza argues, “Unless the African countries have not only legally bound open markets for their products, but also the technical assistance and the capacity building required for a continued growth of their exports, the export-led growth they have recently enjoyed may be compromised.” (Mendoza). As mentioned in the on Sub-Saharan Africa, the EU cannot afford a further loss of reputation and influence in Africa as a result of exclusionary practices associated with the TTIP, especially in light of other actors now increasingly involved in Sub-Saharan Africa like China.

**Recommendations:**

**Short Term**

**Consider A More Inclusive Negotiating Process (TTIP + 3)**

Tyson Barker of the Bertelsman Foundation has proposed that the EU and US work together on establishing a TTIP + 3 process within which Canada, Mexico, and Turkey are included in the negotiations based on their economic size and substantial economic integration with the US and the EU. He argues that “Such a formalized track II process allowing for consistent input from both the US's and EU's most deeply integrated partners will provide legitimacy and act as an elegant bridge for their participation in TTIP talks. At the same time, such a process would avoid compromising the effectiveness of sensitive negotiations on regulatory convergence” (Barker, “On the ‘Outs’”). According to Barker, Canada, Mexico, and Turkey have all made participation in the TTIP negotiations a priority (Barker, “On the ‘Outs’”).

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17 For example, the recent Doha Development Rounds have been blockaded by the US and EU due to their interests in protecting national agricultural industries through government subsidies. The EU and US do not want to remove protection of their farmers and agricultural sectors because they envision that developing countries will be able to outcompete American and European farmers with lower and more competitive prices in agricultural products.
The benefit of a TTIP + 3 is that the US, EU, and the additional three large economies could discuss regulatory differences and take into account their respective interests and differences. For the EU, Turkey’s interest is of utmost importance because it lies within the European neighborhood, it is an emerging economy, and it has the capability to influence countries in the Middle East and promote stability. For the US, Canada and Mexico’s interests are important because it shares a border with those countries, all three countries are members of NAFTA, and regional economic stability is important for US security.

However, the concept of TTIP + 3 does not mean that these three countries would be official parties to a final TTIP. They should be allowed to observe, consult, and advise the US and the EU by using the TTIP as a platform to state their interests. It would be strategically beneficial to include these three other parties in debates on the present TTIP as an inclusive platform for consideration of future agreements. Eventually, perhaps in separate agreements, the three nations, among other interested parties, could be phased into the TTIP. However, it is of utmost importance that the TTIP pass before these further steps are taken.

Including other countries in the TTIP, as Berger suggests, would create a multiplier effect and increase the value of trade, “The negative, trade-diverting effects might be limited, however, if various regional agreements could be merged” (Berger). Merging regional agreements would help include countries such as Canada and Mexico, as well as Central American countries, South American countries, and North and West African Countries in the TTIP agreement. This would be an economic advantage for both the EU and the US.

However, Berger’s suggestion should not be interpreted as involvement in TTIP negotiations that would include other countries as official parties to the TTIP agreement. Rather, it implies that, at some point in the process of the TTIP negotiations, other interested
countries should be involved so that the official parties can take regional agreements and interests into account.

**Make Equitable Regulatory Adjustments**

Regulatory differences must be resolved before agreements are finalized on the TTIP. The EU upholds strong regulatory standards under the “precautionary principal” (Endt 100). The EU must convince the US to uphold similar regulatory standards in order to promote fair competition rather than a competitive authority that maintains lax regulation to promote US corporate interests (Endt 100). The essential element in a resolution of regulatory differences is the establishment of trust.

In order for trust to be established between the US and the EU, both governments must show efforts toward a cohesive, transparent, and coordinated partnership. Governmental guarantees that the US government is not spying on EU consumers and corporations are not sufficient. The EU should demand equal access on information sharing if an equal free trade agreement is to be finalized. Additionally, the US should harmonize data monitoring standards to comply with EU standards. Finally, the US must guarantee that it will not spy on EU consumers, institutions, and corporations in the future.

**Foster New EU Global Bilateral Partnerships**

While TTIP negotiations are ongoing, the EU should pursue negotiations of bilateral partnerships with emerging economies so that they are not excluded from trade and do not establish their own exclusionary trade blocs. Fortunately, the recent tendency of the EU has been to pursue these partnerships as the “cornerstone of the EU’s economic crisis-management strategy, a budget-neutral source of stimulus that will also externally impose structural reform” (Barker, “On the ‘Outs’”). If the EU finalizes its bilateral negotiations with Canada, Singapore,
Japan, the southern Mediterranean—Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia—and India, it could “add up to 2.2 percent GDP to the European economy” (Barker, “On the ‘Outs’”). At the same time, liberalizing foreign markets through bilateral free trade agreements could demonstrate the benefits of democracy and facilitate the introduction of democratic values to other countries.

**Make TTIP Negotiations Transparent**

It is imperative that the EU and the US negotiate the TTIP with full transparency. To date, this has not been the case. Talks should not be held behind closed doors, especially if they involve consumer protections and rights. Legitimate security is a fundamental requirement for democracies to function well. It includes allowing citizens to vote on national or EU-wide matters that influence their lives. It was not until EU-Canada trade documents were leaked regarding clauses that allow corporations to sue the EU that EU citizens became aware of this practice in the TTIP negotiations (EU-Canada Free Trade Deal). When citizens are not kept informed, TTIP negotiations are not transparent. When transparency is established, public opinion should be used to identify areas of contention and support. Once the public’s positions on specific areas of the TTIP are acknowledged and considered, EU and US officials can move negotiations forward with a lessened threat to the legitimacy of the TTIP in the eyes of observers on both sides of the Atlantic. Negative European public opinion regarding the US and the NSA scandal has already had a debilitating effect on the viability of US-EU relations.

**Medium Term**

**Complete EU Single Market**

As the EU’s economy is in decline, the EU needs to readjust its trade strategy to strengthen its economic security. To reap the full potential of the TTIP and encourage long-term growth, Member States need to coordinate their trade strategies by establishing the single
market (Youngs 5). In order to match the US’s competitiveness, the EU needs to increase trade between Member States. According to Youngs, “trade between the American states is four times higher than it is between EU Member States” (5). The TTIP should be considered for implementation only after the Single Market becomes more inter-connected and EU Member States transition away from national production and emphasize EU-wide production.

Youngs believes that bilateral trade deals by individual European states with non-Member States will not help EU exports as a whole. He suggests that the EU should focus on strengthening trade between its Member States, which will help raise the EU’s currently low productivity growth (Youngs 6). To facilitate a more integrated Single Market, Youngs argues that Member States must recognize their respective regulations on goods and services, build a more rigorous competition authority, integrate the energy system in order to be regulated at the EU level (which will lower energy costs), promote policies on non-bank forms of finance particularly for smaller European companies, and establish a “common corporate tax policy” (Youngs 6). Youngs’ revised internal market trade framework suggests that all Member States will benefit more from international trade arrangements because of greater economic integration within the Single Market. The EU must pursue greater integration within the Single Market while, at the same time, creating new EU global, bilateral partnerships.

For the EU to realize benefits from free trade, it must achieve three ends: 1) promote internal integration of production across Member States, 2) have an interconnected trade framework, and 3) change its infrastructure to include different stages of export production across more Member States (Youngs 2). Having a more interconnected trade framework within the EU before finalizing the TTIP will have the benefits of profit sharing, increasing employment, and boosting domestic production, consumption, and competition across Member
States (Youngs 2). According to Hamilton, the EU must complete the transition into a Single Market as it has the potential to produce a growth rate “of about 4% of GDP over the next ten years” (Hamilton xii). Establishing a phased in process for TTIP would allow the EU to implement policies to deepen single market integration at the same time.

*Establish a Tiered Negotiating Process and Incremental Phase-In of TTIP*

As negotiators have been adamant about a 2014 date for completion for the TTIP negotiations, Ikenson argues that “There is absolutely no plausibility to that deadline and, frankly, failure to amend the timetable with realistic deadlines will only undermine the credibility of the undertaking with a public already skeptical of trade negotiations” (Ikenson). Accordingly, many issues with variable complications remain on the table that likely will take years to resolve. Ikenson suggests that instead of insisting on a single deadline to undertake the passage of a comprehensive TTIP in one shot, “the negotiators should announce that their intention is to achieve a multi-tiered agreement that yields multiple harvests at established time intervals” (Ikenson). He mentions that some analysts have referred to the TTIP as a "living agreement," although a common understanding of that concept is not evident (Ikenson). According to Ikenson, neither governments nor negotiators have used the characterization of the TTIP as a “living agreement” in any official context. He argues that this should be implemented and explains the benefits of the phase-in process:

[They should] take stock of the issues on the table and rank them in order of importance to a successful TTIP conclusion. They would then rank those same issues in terms of order of difficulty to resolve. Based on averaging and some agreed upon weighting of those two sets of rankings, negotiators would identify what they and their counterparts see as the most important and least important issues, as well as the most difficult and
least difficult issues to resolve. That exercise would produce a road map for how to proceed. (Ikenson)

By phasing in the most important or most aligned sectors first, negotiators can implement the TTIP more efficiently and have more time to negotiate areas of greater divergence. The negotiations under a phase-in process, or “multi-tiered agreement” as Ikenson calls it, could focus on a few core topics. Once an agreement is reached on those topics, then that section of the TTIP could be implemented and negotiators could move to the next set of core topics.

Long Term

*Maintain Multilateral Partnerships*

The EU must consider multilateral partnerships and how they relate to the TTIP. In a recent statement to the associated press, Herminio Blanco Mendoza mentioned that the WTO is essential for Africa and other growing economic regions to improve overall GDP through enhanced trade. The importance of the EU and US maintenance of their positions in multilateral trade organizations such as the WTO, which contains both developed and undeveloped nations, remains crucial. Mendoza explains that the WTO is not only relevant in world trade but is also necessary to improve cooperation among countries to preserve world peace (Mendoza). Thus the EU should consider enhancing its involvement in current multilateral platforms such as the WTO. Daniel Ikenberg argues that the “TTIP could blaze the path for the WTO by presenting some best practices, which could ultimately be multilateralized and adopted by the WTO.” (Ikenberg). This objective should be considered during the TTIP negotiations to include clauses that make it easier to allow future multilateral associations.

In order for the TTIP to promote the liberalization of trade, the EU could influence non-member countries to become involved with the regional trade bloc by advocating the benefits of
the TTIP. The Centre for Economic Policy Research in London remains optimistic that bilateral trade between the US and EU will have spillover effects that will have an overall trade benefit to developing nations. These multi-national benefits of EU exports to non-US destinations are set to rise by 33.3 billion euros with the passing of the TTIP (Francois 56).

Help to Harmonize International Standards and Regulations

As previously mentioned in the chapter on China, the EU does not share the US’s position toward China. Consequently, it is imperative that the two partners determine the implications of the TTIP with regard to relations with China. The EU must use its position within the TTIP to help harmonize Chinese regulatory standards. The EU can do this by establishing a bilateral agreement with China consistent with the regulatory framework in the TTIP.

Responsibility for influencing Chinese regulatory standards should fall upon the EU because it holds a historic and ongoing position of engagement in that international arena (Ng). The EU uses soft power to assert its influence. In contrast, the US is in no position to assume the responsibility of harmonizing Chinese regulatory standards because the US’s current strategy, through the TPP and the TTIP, is to contain China by excluding it from preferential trade agreements led by the US (Defraigne).

Summary

A phase-in process represents the best comprehensive recommendation as it takes into account the TTIP+3 and the need to complete the Single Market. Acknowledging previous recommendations, the phase-in eventually would engage other countries beyond observer status. Additionally, a phase-in process would buy the EU time to fix its Single Market while simultaneously passing important parts of the TTIP. This would have the added benefit of
generating economic growth by simultaneously making the EU’s internal market more competitive and by allowing the EU to engage in more integrated transatlantic trade.

The main requirement for a phase-in would be a timeline or roadmap based on the EU-US priorities and strategic interests. A slower phase-in process would buy time for the EU and US to cooperate and establish frameworks to cooperate in other areas of mutual importance such as the Middle East and developing nations.
Conclusion
By Philippe Enos and Shannon Nolan

Strategic Priorities for the Transatlantic Partnership

The US and EU have a direct interest in creating an agenda to collaborate on overlapping priorities that would be more decisive in response to crises and more efficient considering today’s economic climate and the difficulty of attempted self-sufficiency. Victoria Nuland accurately explains the relationship between the EU and US:

America and Europe have each tried going it alone at various moments, and the results are rarely good. We need each other to be our best. And, we are at an inflection point. Those who want to live in peace and freedom around the world are looking to us for a “Transatlantic Renaissance.” I believe that is within our grasp. For almost seventy years the Transatlantic community has been the rock on which the world order rests. Our challenge, on both sides of the Atlantic, is to ensure that remains the case. (Nuland)

To overcome the challenges that face the transatlantic partners, the EU and the US must create a roadmap for areas of future cooperation. These core areas must include: institutional reform, traditional security, non-traditional security, and issues that affect the global commons.

In light of the current state of transatlantic cooperation, it is clear that the EU must, 1) establish a tiered negotiating process and incremental phase-in of TTIP, 2) finalize a transparent TTIP agreement after considering a more inclusive negotiating process (TTIP +3), 3) help harmonize international standards and regulations, 4) set criteria for military intervention, 5) update security agreements including the Strategic Partnership and New Transatlantic Agenda, 6) implement the TSP, and 7) reform NATO. These seven strategic priorities are the necessary
means to increase the capacity for more direct and collaborative EU-US cooperation and
dialogue on security issues while simultaneously improving the EU’s role as a global security
actor. In the following section we identify the regions and the security issues that a newly
vitalized transatlantic security partnership should prioritize.

1. Middle East

One region that would tremendously benefit from enhanced transatlantic cooperation is
the Middle East. Securing this region would mutually benefit both partners. The transatlantic
partners can cooperate on priorities in the Middle East such as arms control, nonproliferation,
counterterrorism, cyber-security, and promoting stability.

Water

Water shortage is an issue of the global commons that the EU and US can prioritize and
take a mutual leadership position in due to their advances in technology and interest in
promoting regional stability. The long-term stability of the Middle East is dependent on water
security. Some states in the world most impacted by desertification include Saudi Arabia,
Egypt, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Desertification and water erosion pose short-term
and long-term issues including soil erosion, which makes the land infertile, mismanagement of
water, which includes irrational utilization of the natural resource, and urbanization which
contributes to plots of land being left unattended and exposed to soil erosion. Thanks to the EU
and US’s shared interest in promoting regional stability and peace, the transatlantic partners can
collaborate on promoting universal policies on water conservation and sustainable practices and
technologies in the Middle East.
2. Non-Proliferation

Reinforcing nonproliferation is of high priority for both the US and the EU. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) threatens lethal consequences, undermining the global balance of power by setting off regional arms races, and high risks should terrorists acquire them. Both the EU and the US can agree that nonproliferation mechanisms must be strengthened. This is evidenced by President Obama’s Prague speech, which established the administration’s commitment to reversing proliferation, as well as the strong collaboration between the EU and US over Iran’s nuclear program, which succeeded in reaching the Geneva interim Agreement in 2013. Additionally, both the 2010 US Quadrennial Review and the ESS relay a common intent between the US and EU to strengthen nonproliferation agendas. As relayed by Hamilton and Burwell, “there is much the U.S. and the EU can do together to advance the nonproliferation agenda” (52). Furthermore, “A new, more proactive Euro-American strategy is needed to prevent the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (Laurabee and Lindley-French 30). The following section will lay the foundation for a ‘Euro-American strategy’ on this pressing issue.

Policy Recommendations

1. Prioritize the Middle East

Securing the Middle East would mutually benefit the EU and US as it would create greater stability and drive deeper security cooperation between the transatlantic partners. In 2011, Bjorn Seibert, for example, argues that the Middle East should be an important region for EU-US security and defense cooperation; but, this will not be possible if security cooperation is ad hoc and not included in an overarching framework such as a Transatlantic Security Partnership:
Unlike Asia, the Middle East may appear as a potential area of cooperation for the United States and Europe. The Arab Spring has irreversibly altered the old order and its existing certainties, and an increasingly volatile greater Middle East will continue to threaten international stability. But no matter what kind of new order emerges, future transatlantic cooperation may not be in the cards. Europeans and Americans are diverging in their preferences and policies towards the region and may no longer see eye to eye. If cooperation does take place, smaller ad hoc coalitions of the willing – and able – will be the new modus operandi. (Seibert)

Pertaining to Seibert’s point, to avoid the modus operandi that he mentions, it is imperative that the EU and US do not reduce their cooperation to minimal levels, especially in the Middle East as it is one of the unstable regions in the world that mutually threatens the security of both of the transatlantic partners. In order to achieve the means to its security needs, the EU must create a new framework that includes greater US-EU cooperation in the Middle East.

By harmonizing rules for trade relations, the EU and US can establish a coordinated framework to promote state stability in conflict regions, particularly in the Middle East. In Israel and Palestine, the US and the EU can provide guidance on a two-state solution. If the EU and US can provide avenues for economic growth in Palestine, then the country will be less economically unstable and hence will be less of a threat to Israel. This would increase the likelihood of both countries engaging in peace talks. By potentially extending the economic benefits of the TTIP, this may create greater incentive for Palestine and Israel to begin these peace talks.
Promoting economic diversification in the Middle East should be prioritized to reduce the region’s vulnerability to oil shocks, which lead to economic instability. Industries that the US could promote include tourism and manufacturing. In order to reap the full benefits of trade, the EU and US could negotiate free trade zones within other Middle Eastern countries or associated regions such as North Africa and Turkey.

North Africa

The EU and US have different rules for trade with developing countries. These divergent trade policies create unequal access. In order to make up for this, K.Y. Amoako and Dan Hamilton suggest that the US and EU harmonize “their trade preference schemes for sub-Saharan Africa as part of their partnership pact.” (Amoako; Hamilton). Immediate action toward this front would present to the world that the TTIP is not about diverting trade, but rather it is about opening markets for trade (Amoako). Doing so would influence developing nations to further liberalize their trade policies to improve and strengthen their economies.

Drive TTIP to Include Turkey (TTIP+3)

By including Turkey in the TTIP, the EU could provide a nexus between Europe and the Middle East, which could expand trade and regional stability. Turkey’s robust economy could strengthen trade between southern Mediterranean countries weakened by the economic crisis, such as Greece. This partnership would further integrate Turkey with the EU and US economies, consequently making it more difficult for Turkey to turn back into a non-secular state. Kemal Kirişçi of the Brookings Institute argues this point further:

The exclusion of Turkey from this new emerging international structure, composed of TPP and TTIP, risks pushing Turkey into the arms of those countries that challenge the Western economic order. It would also be damaging to Turkey’s own economic
development and democratization process. Instead, finding a way to include Turkey in TTIP, or alternatively signing a parallel free trade agreement between the U.S. and Turkey, would create a win-win situation for all involved parties: Turkey, the U.S., the EU and even the Middle East. (Kirişçi)

By generating economic confidence in Europe and the US, this economic confidence might cross Turkey’s borders and improve the EU’s relations with the Middle East.

Promote Water Conservation

By working and collaborating with Middle Eastern states on research and development for water conservation, the US, EU and Middle East could exchange new ideas and solutions for sustainable practices and water sharing treaties. Additionally, by collaborating more closely on research and development, Middle Eastern countries may begin participating more actively in climate change summits to resolve water shortage issues that plague the region. Greater involvement by Middle Eastern countries in multilateral environmental summits could prompt these countries to collaborate on finding scientific and policy solutions for their common problem of water scarcity and desertification. Annika Kramer writing on initiative for peace building for the EU explains how environmental cooperation can often translate into cooperation in other areas:

The ramifications of environmental cooperation can therefore encourage local and non-governmental participation and constitute “high” and “low” politics. Since water management, in particular, requires horizontal coordination between different economical sectors, as well as vertical coordination efforts from local to international levels of society, water cooperation offers particular opportunities for spillover of positive impacts. (Kramer, 10)
The effects of collaboration on an issue that impacts the global commons—all regions of the world—could create a more unified and stable Middle East, as it is a policy area in which Middle Eastern States can put aside their differences. By agreeing to collaborate on common priorities like that of tackling water scarcity, and finding solutions together, then cooperation between the US, EU, and Middle East will be more effective.

2. Non-Proliferation

There are several ways in which the EU and US can strengthen nonproliferation:

*Increase the Capacity of the IAEA*

The EU must enhance the capabilities of the IAEA by increasing IAEA resources, better coordinating IAEA access to intelligence aimed at tracking illicit activities, making the Nuclear Security Summits and other dialogue more effective and frequent, and assisting countries in developing the expertise and capacity to comply with the IAEA. Furthermore, the EU and US should establish an international nuclear fuel cycle bank supervised by the IAEA. Such a program would enhance the security of civilian nuclear power programs by giving the IAEA greater control over fuel and supervision over international reserves as well as taking away the need or justification of states to develop uranium enrichment and plutonium separation capabilities (Hamilton and Burwell).

*Improve Verification*

Improving verification mechanisms will allow for the earlier detection of illicit activity. The EU and US should collectively support research intended to improve verification systems and enhance nuclear forensics.

*Strengthen Export Controls*
Further strengthening export controls dealing with illegal shipments and illicit procurement of components of the nuclear fuel cycle as well as dual use equipment will reduce the chances of illicit uranium enrichment and plutonium separation.

*Continue Efforts Surrounding Iran*

The EU and US must continue efforts to stall and reverse Iran’s production of highly enriched uranium (HEU). The EU and US can prevent remaining concerns of nuclear proliferation through rehabilitation and improving relations both politically and economically. Improving US-EU-Russia collaboration on nonproliferation will further help future efforts to prevent Iranian nuclear proliferation as well as efforts countering the proliferation of other states. Russia, as well as China, must be on board so that efforts do not become stalled or shut down in the UNSC as was the case in 2011 when the two blocked additional rounds of sanctions on Iran in response to Iran’s production of HEU.

*Strengthen Compliance with Nonproliferation Regimes*

As previously demonstrated by disagreement over actions on Iran, the US and EU must find consensus with other influential actors—including the UN, Russia, and China—over appropriate mechanisms to enforce compliance with nonproliferation regimes, including the Nonproliferation Treaty and Conventional Test Ban Treaty. F. Stephen Larrabee and Julian Lindley-French explain the necessary actions with regards to non-proliferation:

Europe and the United States will also need to consider both offensive and defensive policies and how best to promote an effective multilateral regime to cope with non-compliance in a world in which there are many more WMD powers than now. That will require further development of the Proliferation Security Initiative as well as enhanced
intelligence sharing, underpinned by credible nuclear deterrence and a credible intent to intervene in extremis with conventional military forces to prevent first use. (31)

Work to Secure Additional Arms Control Agreements

Arms control agreements can be further promoted by the US and EU not only in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, but also regarding the use and proliferation of chemical weapons, ballistic missile technology, and biological weapons.

Advance Biosecurity Initiatives

Little has been done to strengthen international biosecurity mechanisms: “The U.S. and various European countries have advanced domestic biodefense efforts, but relatively little has been done to strengthen international biodefense. Efforts to graft nuclear nonproliferation regimes onto the biological realm have been fraught with difficulties and are of questionable merit” (Hamilton and Burwell). Improved surveillance and detection mechanisms, information sharing, and a system to create greater uniformity across standards are necessary to strengthen global biodefense.

Contradictions to Policy Recommendations

The issue of creating free-trade zones or increasing economic engagement with the Middle East may be contradictory as it could require political, cultural, and religious policies that Muslim countries may not embrace. In turn, trade policies with Middle Eastern nations must be taken delicately, as they risk contributing to greater instability in the region. Muslim nations often perceive liberalized trade with the West as a threat to their national identity. As a result, Middle Eastern states are often reluctant to open their borders to Western ideas, culture, and political systems. Most non-secular Muslim nations have clear preferences for traditional and conservative policies and practices including dress, the role of women, and religious
customs. Free trade areas may not be in line with those conservative areas and may be seen as a form of westernizing the state, which may cause religious tensions, coups, or revolutions such as the recent 2013 coup in which Muhammad Morsi was overthrown in Egypt.

The safest way to reconcile the threat of greater instability in the Middle East due to free trade is to focus on engagement with secular Muslim countries. Using soft power and diplomacy to engage in conversations and collaborate with these Middle Eastern countries should expand economic incentives and the sphere of liberalized trade. By promoting liberalized trade, the economic benefits may spillover into other neighboring Middle Eastern nations. This promotes concept of integrating Turkey into the TTIP negotiations because it is just such a secular state.

While we are suggesting that the EU and US become more involved in the Middle East, it is not necessarily evident that the Middle East is the current top priority region of interest for the US, considering Obama’s recent emphasis on pivoting toward Asia. Since the US is in the process of becoming less involved in the Middle East, as evidenced by the withdrawal of American troops in Afghanistan, increased cooperation with the EU in the Middle East may be contradictory to the US’s interests (Seibert). However, it is not fully evident why the US is shifting toward Asia when the conflicts in the Middle East are not fully resolved such as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Egypt’s failed democratic transition, the nuclear debate in Iran, and civil war in Syria.

The EU must coordinate with the US on forming region specific frameworks in crisis areas that are divided by religion, economic interests, and power. Further, the EU must combine and reinforce efforts with the US to further initiatives strengthening international nonproliferation institutions and regimes including the IAEA, NPT, and CTBT among others.
Using both traditional and nontraditional approaches through improved cooperation in trade and security, the transatlantic partners can create a more unified strategic position to frame solutions on regional problems in the Middle East as well as current and future threats of the proliferation of WMD. This more deeply integrated partnership will have the lasting effect of propping up the EU’s global relevance in a time when its international engagement is becoming less visible and its capabilities are diminished.
Our EGS in Context

Our Task Force would be remiss if it did not acknowledge the influence that many existing proposals have had on our research and recommendations. However, in our creation of the European Grand Strategy, we have attempted to differentiate ourselves by producing recommendations that are more regionally focused, prioritized, and actionable than those we had previously studied. In this section, we will first show where our EGS draws on and agrees with existing proposals, and then discuss when and how our recommendations differ from them.

Several prominent policy researchers and think tanks have drafted proposals for new European security strategies. The two we will focus our comparison on in this section are the Swedish Institute of International Affairs’ “European Global Strategy” and Notre Europe’s “Think Global, Act European IV”. In many ways, their recommendations are similar to ours: both identify “strategic objectives” or “key recommendations” that align closely with our strategic priorities. The European Global Strategy notes the importance of focusing on the EU’s “strategic neighborhood: a geopolitical space that includes not only its traditional neighbourhood...but also broader areas that are functionally linked to vital European interests” (Fägersten et al. 3). Notre Europe’s analysis highlights the necessity to work with strategic partners, such as China, Turkey, Russia, and the US, to meet the EU’s regional and global goals (Fabry et al. 9-13). Similar to our EGS’ strategic interest of promoting human suffering the European Global Strategy team encourages the EU to take the lead in “promoting human development and preventing conflict” (Fägersten et al. 14). Notre Europe cites the importance of reviewing CSDP and re-evaluating the role of the EU in military operations, a suggestion we...
echo in our call for regular reviews of EU security strategy and our recommendations for creating efficiencies in EU defense procurement and through military integration (Fabry et al. 14). Finally, both reports emphasize that the EU must strengthen its internal unity and political will in order to be effective on the global stage, an assessment with which our Task Force wholeheartedly agrees.

Despite these similarities, our report distinguishes itself from existing proposals in its regional focus, prioritization, and actionable recommendations. Our EGS is wholly based on the supporting chapters that focus on regions that are critical to the EU. This bottom-up approach ensures that our recommendations remain specific and actionable. Furthermore, it acknowledges the new, multipolar world order and the growing interdependence between the EU and other global actors. In addition, most major proposals to date have largely cataloged threats or issues that are of interest to the EU, without prioritizing and responding to them. Dr. Jolyon Howorth, addressing the shortcomings of the European Global Strategy from the SIIA, warned that one should not “confuse an analytical diagnosis of the security challenges posed by a globalized world with what the EU can address as a [much diminished] global actor” (“EU and the CSDP”). In order to avoid this cataloging of threats, our EGS does not list the challenges the EU faces; instead, it highlights the one ultimate end the EU should pursue—reestablishing its presence as a global security actor. We then go on identify three guiding interests, under which we categorize several specific strategic priorities that the EU should pursue, both on a regional and a global scale. In this way, we endeavored to create somewhat of a “roadmap” that links specific, actionable priorities to general, overarching EU interests and the ultimate end to which the EU’s external relations should be oriented. Our hope is that this approach facilitates
decision-making and prioritization in the EU, in order to improve the efficiency, coherence and efficacy of its security policy.

*Feasibility Study*

Some of the recommendations we have put forth within our report are either minor changes to existing policies or inexpensive to implement, while others will stretch the EU’s resources and political will. We recognize the limits to EU power and prosperity; however, we want to challenge the EU to prioritize security in order to promote a safer and more thriving union.

Some of the major barriers to adopting the EGS are, 1) internal EU complexity, 2) lack of clear leadership, 3) member states’ diverging interests, 4) the growing importance of Germany, and finally 5) popular opinion.

The EU is a complicated and bureaucratic institution, and it is slow to act. Furthermore, in the wake of the Euro crisis, its resources are limited and must be carefully prioritized. In order to combat these problems, we recommend that the EGS be adopted with minimal discussion and amendment. The EU must feel a sense of urgency in its adoption and implementation of the EGS, or risk irrelevance and inaction. Furthermore, the EU must task a leader with ensuring that the EGS’ priorities are met and that it is regularly re-evaluated. The High Representative is a possible choice for this position, though we recommend an EU Security Council that could take on the role of regularly evaluating and acting on security threats as well as revising and updating the EGS. This Security Council should also work to assess where the interests of the EU member states are aligned and where they diverge, possibly through a survey of member state cabinets or foreign ministers. With this information, it should shape the agenda for future revisions and additions to the EGS. Whichever priorities the Security Council should choose, it must recognize the growing importance of Germany in the
EU. Germany is traditionally reluctant to project power abroad and even more opposed to hard security efforts. While there are some signals that Germany may be moving on these issues, the EU must find a way to engage Germany more fully in its security efforts. Finally, the EU must work to transparently present its security agenda to its citizens. This Task Force believes that there is popular support for European security policies, especially those that focus on development and regional stability. However, the EU must work harder to instill the importance of international engagement and strategic partnerships within its populace. The EU must overcome the barriers to adopting the EGS in order to maintain its relevance and promote its agenda on a global stage.

Next Steps and Recommendations

As we noted in the introduction, the EU Council recently invited the new incoming High Representative to draft “priorities for further actions and for regional engagement” by spring 2015 (Council of the EU). We believe our European Grand Strategy and the supporting regional chapters give specific, actionable, and strategic recommendations for EU security. Therefore, we urge the High Representative to review our proposal and present it, or an amended version of it, for approval in the EU Council. We then recommend the following action steps to ensure that the EU moves forward in its security policy:

1. Call a new EU summit to discuss the EGS and gauge political support for its adoption.
   - Present the EGS at an EU Council meeting in the summer of 2015.
   - Discuss and vote on the proposed draft, amending it if necessary.
   - Encourage the EU Council members to present the EGS to their respective countries and garner popular support for its provisions.
2. Vote to adopt the EGS and implement its recommendations, while recommitting resources to the EU security mission.

- Vote to approve the EGS in the EU Council and adoption of the EGS by the High Representative.
- Create a standard for each country’s resource contribution goals to security, similar to the EU’s development goals of 0.7% of GNI.
- Implement the EGS’s recommended strategic priorities.
  - In the short term, address the crisis in Ukraine, recommit to accessions negotiations with the Western Balkans, and foster a strategic partnership with Turkey.
  - In the medium term, complete TTIP negotiations, create a new security framework for the Middle East, including Iran, Northern Africa, and the Gulf States, and establish a development-military hybrid mission to assist with the crisis in CAR. Reopen accession talks with Turkey.
  - In the long term, focus on building partnerships with ASEAN and Brazil in order to foster interpolarity. Work with China to establish environmental and human security policies. Find constructive ways to engage Russia in the international community. Re-evaluate the role of NATO and CSDP and consider merging the two over time.

3. Create a process for re-evaluating and revising the European Grand Strategy, especially the strategic priorities, every four to five years.

- Ensure that incoming High Representatives have a chance to change and shape the security agenda.
Maintain the EGS as an up-to-date, living, and operational document, by appointing an EU Security Council.

Promote the transparency of the adoption and revision process by creating a publicly accessible web site that introduces the EGS to EU citizens.

Allow the EU to remain flexible as crises arise.

We recognize that the action steps laid out in this proposal are in some cases contentious or expensive. Furthermore, we understand that other EU policy experts, such as Jolyon Howorth, have proposed a more bottom-up approach to adopting a Grand Strategy, involving extensive discussions and multiple drafting stages (“EU and the CSDP”). However, we recommend a more top-down approach because the EU must recognize that the window for action is closing: if the EU does not adopt a cohesive grand strategy soon, it will rapidly slip into irrelevance on the global stage. This would gravely jeopardize the EU’s own security and also waste an opportunity to be a force for peace, security, and prosperity in the European region and the world. That said, in order to ensure that member states and citizens have an opportunity to shape the EU’s security agenda, we recommend periodic updates to the EGS to reflect changing priorities and interests.

Europe as a Global Actor

Jolyon Howorth and Richard Youngs have both argued that the EU needs a new identity around which the member states can rally—perhaps an identity as a normative power, or a great agent for economic opportunity, for example (“EU and CSDP”). In the postwar era, the EU was intended to ensure peace within Europe, and especially between Germany and France. The new generation in Europe takes this peace for granted and is searching for a new cause that gives the EU purpose and defines its place in the world (Youngs, “EU Security Strategy”). This Task
Force believes our EGS is an opportunity for the EU to define itself as an power committed to becoming a responsible regional actor, fostering global interdependence and cooperation, and alleviating human suffering.

On the eve of the 100th anniversary of World War I, the EU is facing a world that is very similar to the multipolar, globalized system that existed in 1914. The EU must learn from the wasted opportunities of the past and cement its place as an active and positive force on the global stage. Now is the time for the EU to shape the interdependent and cooperative world order it desires. Now is the time for the EU to reach out to its traditional partners, and form productive relationships with its new ones. Margaret MacMillan, Professor at Oxford University, wrote this succinctly in her article commemorating the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the Great War:

It may take a moment of real danger to force the major powers of this new world order to come together in coalitions able and willing to act. Instead of muddling along from one crisis to another, now is the time to think again about those dreadful lessons of a century ago — in the hope that our leaders, with our encouragement, will think about how they can work together to build a stable international order.
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