Beyond Presence:
Electoral Gender Quotas, Female Leadership, and Symbolic Representation

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This dissertation examines how electoral gender quotas affect citizens’ attitudes and behavior towards women in political office. A policy experiment with the random assignment of local-level single-member electoral districts reserved for female community councilors in the southern African nation of Lesotho provides causal evidence to this line of inquiry. Using a unique dataset by merging Afro-barometer surveys with archival data, I first exploit the random assignment of Lesotho’s quota policy to examine how the policy changes female citizens’ engagement with local politics. Counterintuitively, I find that female citizens are less politically engaged under quota-mandated female representation, but present evidence that this result likely stems from the perceived illegitimacy of the quota policy.

This dissertation then examines how the quota affects citizens’ perceptions of local chiefs. I find that exposure to quota-mandated female representatives significantly re-
duces the perceived influence of the predominately male chieftaincy in structuring local governance. Finally, I present results from survey data as well as field experimental tests conducted in Lesotho to reveal how the quota has affected citizens’ explicit and implicit gender biases, both in the political sphere and more broadly. Here, I find that exposure to quota-mandated representatives weakens young women’s preferences for male politicians by challenging existing stereotypes around appropriate gender roles.

By examining how quotas mediate the symbolic effects of greater numbers of women in politics, this dissertation develops new theoretical insights into the ways in which quotas fit into classic theories of political representation. This task is particularly relevant given the rapid pace with which countries continue to adopt electoral gender quotas at both the national and subnational levels.
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Preface: A note on Sesotho terms and the Basotho ethnic group

Lesotho is an ethno-linguistically homogenous nation. Over ninety-nine percent of the population self-identifies as belonging to the Basotho ethnic group. The Basotho people trace their national and ethnic heritage to King Moshoeshoe I, who in the mid-19th century consolidated the region’s chiefdoms to protect the area from encroaching ethnic groups (most notably the Zulu) from present day KwaZulu Natal and later the Boers from the Transvaal and Orange Free State areas. Eventually, to defend his territory from invasion, Moshoeshoe sought protection from the British, who colonized the area in 1884, calling it Basutoland. The territory regained the name, the Kingdom of Lesotho, with its independence in 1966. A Bantu ethnic group, the Basotho people share cultural traditions (centered around the keeping of cattle) and a similar language as the Tswana, Botswana’s largest ethnic group.

The singular term of the plural Basotho is Mosotho, which can refer to either a man or a woman of the Basotho ethnic group. The language of the Basotho people is Sesotho (or Southern Sotho). The term Sesotho is also used to reference the culture and customs of the Basotho people. When referring to the nation of Lesotho as a descriptor, the word does not change. For example, when discussing a policy issued by the Lesotho government, the correct term is the “Lesotho policy” (equivalent to, for instance, if one was referring to the “American policy” or the “South African policy”).

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Chapter 1

Introduction

“The legacy of oppression weighs heavily on women. As long as women are bound by poverty and as long as they are looked down upon, human rights will lack substance. As long as outmoded ways of thinking prevent women from making a meaningful contribution to society, progress will be slow. As long as the nation refuses to acknowledge the equal role of more than half of itself, it is doomed to failure.”

- Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom

“I’d give up my seat for you if it wasn’t for the fact that I’m sitting in it myself.”

- Groucho Marx

Lesotho is a small, landlocked ruggedly mountainous country nestled high in the Drakensburg Mountains. Despite its small size, the country holds many records. Sitting island-like in the southeastern corner of South Africa, it one of the only countries in the world to be completely surrounded by another country. The country’s nickname, the Mountain Kingdom, alludes to Lesotho’s record as the nation with the world’s highest low point (4600 feet). In the public health and development communities, Lesotho is most known for a more sobering fact; in 2012 an estimated 23.1 percent of the adult
population was living with HIV - the second highest prevalence rate in the world.\footnote{Swaziland has the highest rate in the world at 26.5 percent.}

Lesotho holds another much less well known record. Between 2005 and 2011, the country had the highest known number of women in local government in the world - with 58 percent of local community councilor seats held by women. Although there is less reliable data at the level of local government, this percentage is remarkable in comparison to the trend of women’s political representation at the national level. Only two countries in the history of the modern nation state have had majority female parliaments.\footnote{Currently the Andorran and Rwandan parliaments have over 50 percent women.} Lesotho achieved this high number in part through an electoral gender quota that reserved certain local electoral districts for only female representatives. Although this particular type of quota policy is fairly unique (only Lesotho and India have experimented with reserved single-member districts at the local level), Lesotho’s policy is part of a global trend that has transformed the appearance of governance structures worldwide.

Currently 110 countries have implemented some type of quota for women in their domestic political structures, leading to one of the most significant developments in the global composition of legislative bodies in the past twenty years.\footnote{The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) and Stockholm University jointly sponsor the excellent website, \url{www.quotaproject.org}, which keeps up to date cross-national data on electoral gender quota systems at the national and local levels for every quota adopting country in the world.} These quotas have emerged in every region of the world, often in surprising places, with transformative results for the number of women in politics. Rwanda, for instance, which reserves seats in both its upper and lower houses for women, has received international praise for superseding Sweden as first in the world in women’s parliamentary representation, with 64 percent of its total seats held by women against Sweden’s 45 percent. As in Lesotho, gender quotas have also expanded rapidly at the subnational level, allowing
more women access to local political decision-making than ever before. For instance, countries as diverse as Tanzania, Bangladesh, and Mexico have all adopted gender quotas in subnational governance structures in the last fifteen years.

The recent, rapid, and global nature of electoral gender quota adoption has sparked both scholarly and popular attention. Observers have largely raised two immediately relevant questions: what explains the rapid diffusion of quota policies and what effects do these measures have on the ways in which women are represented in the political process?

Regarding the second line of inquiry, advocates argue that quota policies diversify the types of women elected, bring legislative attention to women’s issues, challenge traditional biases against women in politics, and inspire female citizens to become more politically involved. Critics, however, argue that quota laws allow less qualified women into office who may have little interest in promoting women’s issues, reinforce stereotypes about women’s inferiority as political actors, and act as politically correct tokens that may actually bolster the power of authoritarian or repressive regimes (Franceschet et al., 2012: 3). A great deal of scholarly attention is now being devoted to addressing the validity of these contradicting expectations; however, this research is still in its infancy (Franceschet et al., 2012; Dahlerup, 2008; Franceschet & Piscopo, 2008; Zetterberg, 2009).

This dissertation contributes to this growing research agenda by examining whether the path through which women enter into political office affects how these women are able to represent their constituents. In particular, it assesses the reactions quota-mandated female representatives invoke among those they are representing. The three empirical chapters presented here offer causal evidence to this line of inquiry by taking advantage
of Lesotho’s nationwide randomized policy experiment.

In the context of Lesotho, I argue that the reserved district quota caused citizens to react to their new female representatives and their larger local governance structures in unintended ways - both positively and negatively. Some of these reactions relate explicitly to the affirmative action measures stipulated by the quota policy, while others relate to the intended downstream effect of the quota: a greater number of women visibly involved in local political decision making. Largely, I find that these two reactions move in opposite directions. Whereas citizens reject the notion that female representatives should be elected based solely on their sex, women’s increased presence in local politics bolsters citizens’ perceptions of women’s authority and legitimacy in local governance and erodes explicit and implicit gender biases, specifically among younger cohorts of women.

1.1 The Spread of Quotas Worldwide

As noted, the popularity of electoral gender quotas has increased dramatically in the last two decades. Most observers attribute this phenomenon in part to the United Nation’s Fourth World Conference on Women held in Beijing in September 1995. The resulting Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which was signed unanimously by all 189 member states, called on governments to take actions guaranteeing women equal access and full participation in political power structures. The Platform urged states to reach a 30 percent level of female membership in national and subnational legislative bodies and specifically advised quotas as a means for achieving this goal. Women’s advocacy groups still widely refer to the Platform. For instance, the UNDP’s Women’s Empowerment Program in a recent report states, “The Platform provides the
first global commitment to gender mainstreaming as a methodology by which women’s empowerment will be achieved” (UNDP 2012: 4). The Platform had a catalytic effect. Between 1930 and 1980 only ten countries had adopted some sort of quota system, mostly limited to voluntary party quotas in the Scandinavian countries. Twelve states adopted quotas in the 1980’s, but this number jumped to fifty in the 1990’s and over forty more states have adopted quotas since the year 2000 (Krook 2009: 24). This means that more than three-quarters of countries that have passed quota measures have done so in the nineteen years since the Beijing Platform for Action.

New quota adopters have integrated these measures into their political systems in myriad ways. Broadly, however, quotas can be grouped into one of the three following types (Htun 2004; Krook 2006):

- **Reserved seats**: This provision reserves a number of seats in a legislated assembly for women provided under constitutional and/or legislative law. This can take the form of separate electoral rolls for women, designated separate districts for only female candidates, or a designated percentage of seats held for women assigned by each party’s proportion of the popular vote.

- **Legislated candidate quotas**: This provision reserves a number of places on either open or closed electoral lists for female candidates provided under constitutional and/or legislative law.

- **Voluntary political party quota**: These are rules or targets set by political parties to include a certain percentage of women as election candidates. This does not include quotas for internal party structures.

Figure 1.1 shows a map of the world (current as of July 2014) with countries color-coded by quota type. Countries that have no quota policy are indicated by grey.
Figure 1.1 shows the trend in quota adoption over time by indicating the number of countries that held each type of quota system at the national level in 1996, 2006 and 2014. In 1996, one year after the Beijing Platform for Action, only 30 percent of countries worldwide had any type of gender quota at the national level. Ten years later, this number had increased to 47 percent - and as of mid-2014, 58 percent of all countries have some sort of quota policy. Of the countries that currently have gender quotas, 46 percent have voluntary party quotas (17 of these in combination with one of the two other quota types), 46 percent have legislated candidate quotas, and 21 percent have reserved seats.4

Figure 1.2 shows the trend in quota adoption over time by indicating the number of countries that held each type of quota system at the national level in 1996, 2006 and 2014. In 1996, one year after the Beijing Platform for Action, only 30 percent of countries worldwide had any type of gender quota at the national level. Ten years later, this number had increased to 47 percent - and as of mid-2014, 58 percent of all countries have some sort of quota policy. Of the countries that currently have gender quotas, 46 percent have voluntary party quotas (17 of these in combination with one of the two other quota types), 46 percent have legislated candidate quotas, and 21 percent have reserved seats.4

Women’s global level of political representation has increased rapidly alongside the institution of gender quotas. In 1995, women constituted only 10 percent of the world’s parliamentarians. By mid 2014, women held 21.4 percent of parliamentary seats worldwide. Although women are still clearly underrepresented politically, this represents an over 100 percent increase in the past nineteen years. There have been variations in

4Data from the Quota Project Database and the Inter-Parliamentary Union database online. Despite the gains in women’s presence in national legislatures, women remain extremely under-represented in the executive branch. In early 2014, there were 17 female heads of state, meaning that men held 91 percent of these positions. Women have the most difficult time achieving top the top chief executive in their countries when these elections are run through a popular vote. Only nine women in the history of the modern nation state have been elected as head of state through a popular vote.
the implementation of quota policies, but on average, these provisions have led to an immediate and substantial increase in the number of female parliamentarians.

The use of electoral gender quotas has been particularly successful in southern Africa in allowing women access to positions of political decision making. Nine out of the fifteen Southern African Development Community (SADC) member countries have adopted some type of gender quota at the parliamentary level - either voluntarily through political parties or legally-mandated through constitutional or electoral law. South Africa has been the regional leader in ensuring women’s descriptive representation through quotas, as the ruling ANC party has voluntarily adopted a zebra-list quota (men and women listed in alternating order like the black and white stripes of a zebra) in all post-Apartheid parliamentary elections. As a result, women currently hold 44 percent of seats in the South African National Assembly.

The trends in subnational governance structures typically mirror patterns at the national level, as governments often adopt quota policies at different levels of government at similar times. There is less reliable cross-national data on voluntary political party quotas in subnational legislatures, but as of mid 2014, 23 countries have reserved seats quotas and 42 countries have legislated candidate quotas at the local level. Similar to the trend at the national level, these measures have been popular in southern Africa. Seven out of the fifteen SADC member countries have adopted quotas at the subnational level. Again there is variation in implementation of these policies, but largely they have led to immediate influxes of women in local government - sometimes in the course of just one election.

With the rapid spread of gender quota adoption, political scientists have been quick

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5The non-adopter countries are: Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Madagascar, Seychelles, and Mauritius.
to investigate mechanisms that might explain policy diffusion in this area. This body of research has elucidated at least five potential reasons why countries might choose to adopt quotas. First, it is possible that political elites recognize the strategic advantages for supporting quotas. In democratic states, political parities are more likely to adopt gender quotas when competing parties have done so in an attempt to garner more female votes or in efforts to maintain control over rivals inside the party (Caul 2001, Baldez 2004, Meier 2004). Further, in authoritarian states, political elites may see gender quotas as a cheap signal to the international community that they are sensitive to issues of gender parity (Htun & Jones 2002, Longman 2006).

Second, international donor organizations increasingly view quotas as an appropriate mechanism to promote women’s political representation and subsequently pressure aid-recipient countries to adopt quota provisions. Third, countries may be coerced into adopting gender quotas. For instance, following the US invasion of Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan heavily influenced the decision to include a reserved seats quota in Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution (Bush 2011). Fourth, countries often adopt quotas in times of democratic transition when the political landscape both allows opportunity structures for new political actors and ideas about social inclusion are politically and publicly popular (Krook 2006).

Fifth, the fact that countries often adopt similar quota provisions at similar times as their neighbors suggest regional learning or emulation. A cursory examination of the regional patterns of gender quota adoption in Figure 1.1 supports this claim. At times, this trend may be best described as a secondary mechanism, as countries may be learning from or emulating their neighbors, as the previously mentioned dynamics play out in surrounding countries. At other times, regional organizations may explicitly
involve themselves in the promotion of gender quotas.

This later explanation accurately describes the main regional body in southern Africa, the fifteen-member South African Development Community (SADC). SADC has lobbied heavily for women’s increased participation in political decision making. SADC regularly sends lobbying delegations to member countries to meet with civil society groups and political parties in an attempt to build pressure around gender quota adoption. Further, SADC has produced two Protocols on Gender and Development (most recently in 2008), which call on member countries to include women in 50 percent of all political decision-making bodies at all levels of government. The 2008 Protocol has been ratified by all member states except Botswana and Mauritius. Gender quota advocates in member states, both in civil society and political office, refer to this document frequently. Indeed, since ratification, the 2008 SADC Protocol on Gender and Development has been the most influential legal instrument in sustaining what have become known as 50/50 Campaigns to increase women’s political representation through the use of quotas throughout the SADC region.

Finally, although not a reason for adoption, several scholars have noted that gender quotas are much more common under certain types of electoral systems. Proportional representation (PR) systems with closed lists combined with well-institutionalized party systems that have formal, centralized rules of candidate selection (such as the Scandinavian countries and South Africa) are the most likely to adopt gender quotas as well as field female candidates without formal requirements (Lovenduski & Norris, 1993; Waylen, 2000). A review of 53 national legislatures in 1999 found that national assem-

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6SADC member states are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

7For more information, see here: http://www.sadc.int/issues/gender/.
bies in PR systems were composed of on average nearly 20 percent women, compared to under 11 percent in majoritarian systems (Goetz & Hassim, 2003: 51). PR systems (especially those with closed lists) are also more supportive of controversial candidates without quotas.

All of the above explanations make it difficult to disentangle the conditions that give rise to the adoption of quotas from the policies and changes in public opinion that follow. Lesotho’s random variation in the local-level deployment of a quota policy within its own borders, however, provides causal evidence to the effects of the quota policy while keeping constant potential factors that gave to rise to the policy’s adoption - an advantage I detail further in Chapter 2.

1.2 Decentralization and Women’s Political Participation

As countries all over the world have moved towards decentralized governance, new attention has been devoted to understanding women’s access to local political decision making. Examining the effects of decentralization on women’s political representation reveals two opposing expectations. On the one hand, women may be better able to participate in local compared to national politics, as constraints on women’s time, mobility and financial resources are less severe when local council offices are nearby. Further, local legislative positions involve obligations that are not as onerous as those associated with national office, which may appeal to women who are still primarily responsible for childrearing in most of the world’s countries.

This expectation, however, appears to be most relevant to the experiences of West-
ern countries where more women are observed in local than national office. Although attaining reliable local-level data on African governments proves difficult, the data that do exist suggest that women are often less represented in local councils than in national parliaments on the African subcontinent (Goetz & Hassim 2003: 21). In Africa, traditional patriarchal power structures are often more intense and immediate in their repressive effect on women’s public engagement at the local level compared to the national level. In part a legacy of colonial rule, national political actors often use decentralization to explicitly empower local traditional elites as a way to garner localized support.⁸ The explicit empowering of conservative male local elites can exclude women’s active participation in local governance. From this context, it becomes apparent how gender quotas introduce potential power-sharing tensions into local political decision making, a dynamic I explore explicitly in the context of Lesotho in Chapter 4.

Another reason women’s political participation may be stymied at the local level relates to the domestic and regional women’s movements that have been so successful in ensuring the descriptive representation of women in African parliaments. The capacity of women’s rights organizations to support women in local politics is more limited in local compared to national politics, as these organizations are largely concentrated in state or regional capitals. Further, when quotas are adopted at the local level, women’s groups often struggle to provide support and training to potential female candidates, which is more readily available at the national level. Additionally, national governments have less incentive to promote women’s political representation in local governments as it sends less of an immediately visible signal to the international community of a country’s commitment to gender equality when compared to a high percentage of women in

⁸See Mbatha (2003) and de Kadt & Larreguy (2014) on this practice in South Africa.
1.3 Quotas and the Political Representation of Women

Hannah Pitkin’s seminal work on the concept of representation still forms the point of departure for most scholars of gender and political representation. Pitkin largely structures her discussion around three distinct facets of the representative processes. First, descriptive representation describes the basic attributes of those elected; that is, the “numeric similarity between legislative bodies and the electorate they represent in terms of gender, race, ethnicity, or other demographic characteristics” (Paxton et al., 2007: 265). Second, substantive representation, describes the ways in which representatives may “act for” those they are representing through the attention they give to a certain group’s interests in the policymaking process. Finally, distinct from descriptive and substantive representation, the concept of symbolic representation refers to the cultural meaning and ramifications that others take away from the representative process. Pitkin conceptualizes symbolic representation as the way a representative “stands for” the represented and thus, the symbolic meaning and responses the representative invokes in those she is representing (Pitkin, 1967: 97).

1.3.1 Quotas, Descriptive, and Substantive Representation

Gender quota scholars are quick to point out that quota policies are generally designed to advance women’s descriptive representation. Quotas are not, by contrast, inherently designed to boost the substantive representation of women’s interests. This has created somewhat of a tension between women’s rights groups that advocate for
quotas and academic research on the potential impacts of quotas. For instance, transnational women’s advocacy groups, like the Global 50/50 Campaign, seem to implicitly assume the connection between women’s descriptive and substantive representation. The Women’s Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) that founded the 50/50 Campaign states: “There is evidence that when women enter decision-making bodies in significant numbers, such issues as child care, violence against women and unpaid labor are more likely to become priorities for policymakers” (WEDO 50/50 Campaign Declaration Statement 2000). Empirical research connecting women’s increased presence in policymaking to policies that increase the wellbeing of women, however, report mixed findings.

Some scholars have been critical of the link between women’s descriptive and substantive representation, arguing that female legislators are not necessarily better able to represent the interests and policy preferences of women (Swain 1993; Young 1997). It is also important to acknowledge that many feminist political theorists have insisted that sex is not a sufficient basis for assuming common interests (Molyneux 2003: 152). Quotas may exacerbate the specious assumption that women have a unified set of interests, as they do not address differences between race, ethnic group, class, and caste that may be equally important in the ways women form preferences. This may be especially true for minority women (Hughes 2011). For instance, even in the most gender egalitarian Nordic countries, the recruitment of minority women within quota structures has been scarce (Freidenvall et al. 2006: 176).

These arguments criticize the essentialist nature of women’s representation; that is, the idea that a woman, because of her sex, will have a certain set of a priori preferences - a claim that has become popular in much of the rhetoric surrounding gender
quota adoption. This has raised a healthy debate among feminist political theorists, as many have attempted to reconcile the concern of essentializing women’s interests with a democratic justification for electoral gender quotas (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995; Dahlerup, 2006). Most of the arguments in favor of quotas emphasize the shared biological and social experiences women have as a group. As an example, these scholars have argued that it is not essentialist to say that the way a group of men deliberate about maternal health, domestic violence, or combatting rape policies may be different than the way a group of women would discuss these issues. The argument is not that a man cannot be an advocate for women’s rights - but that excluding the voice of a group that has the most at stake in certain policy areas is inherently undemocratic.

Pulling from the representation literature, a growing research agenda has sought to empirically test the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation - and many studies have documented the positive substantive benefits of including more women in governance structures. For instance, research conducted in many different cultural settings has shown that female politicians articulate different policy preferences than men (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2003); initiate equity policies, often in cross-party women’s alliances; (Hassim, 2003; Lovenduski & Norris, 1993; Sainsbury, 2004); and vote differently than their male colleagues (Swers, 2002). Furthermore, a growing literature exploits close elections between male and female candidates to examine whether they make different policy decisions. Studies that use this regression-discontinuity design have found significant evidence that female legislators make more gender egalitarian policies (Clots-Figueras, 2012; Rehavi, 2007). Most of these studies, however, have not made explicit the potential differences between female representatives that enter office through quotas versus those that attain their positions through
non-gendered forms of electoral competition.

Although there have been fewer quantitative studies on the experiences of African countries with gender quotas, several comparative case studies indicate that quotas have had a mixed impact in terms of promoting legislation related to gender equality. For instance, as noted, South Africa’s ruling party, the ANC, has voluntarily adopted a zebra-list quota on its party candidate lists since the first post-Apartheid election in 1994 and subsequently women hold 44 percent of National Assembly seats. In the immediate post-Apartheid era, South African female MPs successfully supported legislation aimed at redressing gender inequality, most notably the Domestic Violence Act in 1998 - one of the most progressive of its type on the continent (Meintjes 2003).

Other case studies, however, have documented ways in which quota adoption has not led the gains envisioned by quota advocates. These occurrences are often attributed to the quota system itself, which can affect the way quota beneficiaries are able to utilize their newfound political positions (Bauer 2008). For instance, some research suggests that reserved seats filled by ruling party appointment are the least successful in advancing women’s interests, as these seats may become an additional vote bank for the government without allowing quota recipients any de facto political power.

It is no surprise then that reserved seat systems are most often found in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes (again refer to Figure 1.1). Tripp (2000, 2010) for example, has argued that in authoritarian systems, parties have actively repressed women’s associational life in the interests of co-opting them to the legitimization projects of the single ruling party. In such instances, female politicians act more as tokens and may be a cheap signal that a regime is concerned about gender equality as it continues to stifle women’s advocacy groups in civil society. As an example, though highly lauded
for its top rank in terms of female parliamentary representation worldwide, Rwanda has come under scrutiny as its female MPs may in fact be participating in the adoption and implementation of policies that compromise the civil liberties of both men and women (Longman 2006: 113).

Similarly, in Tanzania, each political party appoints women to fill special reserved seats in proportion to the percentage of the popular vote that they win after the normal election process. In such instances, quota recipients may feel particularly beholden to the party and less likely to represent the interests of their female constituency if it means going against the party line. Meena (2004) argues that this has overwhelmingly been the case in Tanzania, in part evidenced by the fact that political parties have not shown any serious interest in accommodating women in their own governance structures.

These multiple case studies suggests that although reserved seats have produced some of the highest instances of women’s parliamentary and local representation in the world, they may be ineffective in granting women a strategic presence in political bodies. Unlike legally mandated candidate list quotas, reserved seat provisions generally remove women from the same sphere of electoral contestation as men. Therefore, instead of letting voters factor the selection of female candidates on party lists into their voting calculus, women are either made to compete in redundant seats or appointed by their typically male-dominated parties.

Despite these convincing case studies, there is no overarching consensus in the literature connecting quota type to women’s substantive representation - and several additional case studies point in the opposite direction. For instance, my recent research in Uganda suggests that in some instances reserved seat quotas may prove more effective in enabling quota beneficiaries to lobby for women’s interests as compared to propor-
tional representation systems. Uganda, as in most countries with a reserved seats quota, operates under a first-past-the-post electoral system, in which one candidate wins each single member constituency. There are 215 general electoral constituencies, but unlike the reserved seat systems in Rwandan and Tanzania in which parties directly appoint women after the general elections, in Uganda, there are also 79 “women’s districts” that are cobbled together from and mapped over the general constituencies. This means that there are almost 300 constituency elections in a general election year.

Although the ruling NRM party coffers are large and its reach extensive, it still cannot determine who takes each seat in Parliament to the same degree that is possible when parties submit closed candidate lists under PR systems. This slippage changes the accountability structures of parliamentary candidates. They must answer to their constituents who voted for them, other organizations who assisted in their campaigns (including the Ugandan women’s movement that actively supports female candidates), as well as their political party. Being held to account by multiple actors gives Ugandan female MPs more legislative space to lobby for issues that lie outside of the party chapter and verse.

Further several scholars have observed that the politics of patronage also occur in proportional representation systems. Under these electoral rules, individual MPs, both male and female, either do not have constituencies or have only tenuous connections to them. Rather, the only constituency to which the MP is accountable is the political party, in particular, to party elites. This raises concerns about party paternalism and female MPs’ abilities to push for gender equality platforms in proportional representation systems (Bauer, 2008).

In sum, there is no clear understanding on the ways in which gender quota policies
affect how the beneficiaries of these policies are able to effectively advocate for women’s interests. Though informative, the research thus far has been primarily *ad hoc* accounts of the experiences of individual countries and the gender quota literature has yet to seriously and systematically address how the way in which women become elected to office (either with or without quotas) in different political systems affects the extent to which these women are willing and able to lobby for policies that would benefit their female constituents.\footnote{There have been some exceptions to this. For instance, \cite{Franceschet2008}, \cite{Celis}, \cite{Childs2009}, \cite{Goetz2003} and \cite{Franceschet2012} have all contributed to a slowly developing theoretical framework here; however the discussion relating quotas within political systems to women’s substantive representation is still in its infancy.} This is certainly a research area that could benefit from increased theoretical and empirical attention.

### 1.3.2 Quotas and Symbolic Representation

This dissertation is motivated by recognition that the debate between descriptive versus substantive representation may be an overstated dichotomy. Related to Pitkin’s concept of symbolic representation, descriptive representation may be an important first step in changing a nation’s political culture to allow for the more strategic role of female politicians in advancing the status of their gender at a later point in time. Regardless of a quota’s immediate impact on the substantive representation of women, an increase in the number of women in formal political positions may alter citizens’ perceptions on the legitimacy and capabilities of women as public leaders, and this may lead to increased gender-sensitive reform in the future.

Of the recent surge of political science research on gender quotas, the ability of quotas to redefine individual-level attitudes and behavior remains under-explored. The bulk of scholarship about electoral quotas in political science has been theory building, usually
through the examination of single or comparative case studies. To date, most of these studies have sought to understand the diffusion of quota policies and the effectiveness of quotas in increasing the number of women in politics (Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009; Bush 2011; Jones 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Tripp & Kang 2008). The theoretical and comparative literatures on women’s descriptive representation have argued that more inclusive and diverse legislatures are important for the democratic legitimacy of elected bodies, in part because they provide a voice for historically underrepresented groups (Pitkin 1967; Lovenduski 2005; Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler 2005; Williams 1998; Young 2000). This first generation of quota scholarship has provided the theoretical underpinnings for empirically testable hypotheses on a range of potential impacts of electoral gender quotas, including the symbolic effects of gender-parity in political decision-making (see Franceschet et al. 2012).

This dissertation examines three related dimensions of symbolic representation: women’s political engagement, citizens’ attitudes toward traditional patrilineal leaders, and citizens’ implicit and explicit gender biases. I discuss the relevant theoretical literatures on quota’s potential symbolic effects in each of this dissertation’s three empirical chapters respectively.

1.4 Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation proceeds as follows:

The next chapter introduces the case of Lesotho. Here I explain how the randomized policy experiment with single-member districts reserved for female community councilors provides causal evidence to the potential impacts of the quota policy. I also describe relevant aspects of political, economic, and social life in Lesotho, both in order to give
my findings greater context, as well to provide a framework to understand under what circumstances the findings presented here may be generalizable to other contexts and cases.

In Chapter 3, I explore how Lesotho’s quota policy changed the way constituents view and interact with their female representatives. Using survey data, I find that having a quota-mandated female representative either has no effect on or actually reduces several dimensions of women’s self-reported engagement with local politics. Implications from the policy experiment suggest that the quota’s effect is not accounted for by differences in qualifications or competence between the different groups of councilors, but rather stems from citizens’ negative reactions to the quota design.

Chapter 4 tests for changes in the influence of local traditional leaders after quota adoption. Here I find that having a quota-mandated representative leader significantly reduces the perceived influence of traditional leaders across different demographic groups. I speculate about what this finding may mean about women’s increasingly visible role in structuring local governance.

In Chapter 5, the final empirical chapter, I use the most recent 2012 Afro-barometer data to test for changes on several indicators of citizens’ explicit gender bias after six years of exposure to quota-mandated female representatives. I then use field experimental methods to examine whether the quota affected implicit forms of citizens’ gender bias in previously reserved electoral divisions. Here, I find that the quota had no average treatment effect on the complete sample of respondents, but did have a demonstrable effect among female respondents under the age of twenty-five. Specifically, I find that young Basotho women in formerly reserved electoral divisions are more likely to express explicit egalitarian attitudes toward women in politics, as well as implicitly associate
women with leadership tasks more and domestic tasks less when compared to young women in previously unreserved electoral divisions. These findings suggest that the quota affected young women and girls’ perceptions of female leaders through changing implicit stereotypes around appropriate gender roles.

Finally, Chapter 6 concludes by synthesizing the findings from these three empirical chapters. Here I discuss what these findings mean in the context of Lesotho, how they relate to the broad evidence that has emerged from a similar policy experiment in India, and what in combination these results contribute to our scholarly understanding of electoral gender quotas, female leadership, and symbolic representation.
Supporting Figures

Figures

Figure 1.1: Map of Quotas Worldwide (in Single or Upper House of Parliament) by Quota Type. Map created by author, data source: www.quotaproject.org
No. of Countries with Gender Quotas by Year

Figure 1.2: Expansion of Quotas by Type and Year. Graphic created by author, data source: www.quotaproject.org
Chapter 2

Case Selection: A Policy Experiment in Lesotho

2.1 The Policy Experiment

This dissertation takes advantage of a nationwide randomized policy experiment the Government of Lesotho undertook from early 2005 to late 2011. In 2005, similar to other African nations at the time and in part guided by international and regional organizations, Lesotho began a protracted process of decentralization. At this time, the Ministry of Local Government divided the country’s ten main local administrative districts into 129 newly created community councils. The new law further split each community council into 9 to 13 single-member electoral divisions (EDs), which were each to elect one community councilor through a first-past-the-post election.

The experimental nature of the quota is as follows: The 2005 Local Government Elections Act required that 30 percent of all single-member electoral divisions (distributed evenly across the newly-created councils) be reserved for only female councilors. Women still competed with other women in these EDs, but men were not allowed to compete. Importantly, the all-women constituencies were assigned completely at random. (SADC, 24)
Tangential to this research, in 2011 the Local Government Elections Act was amended to replace the women-only single-member districts with a different type of quota system that now allows open contestation in all electoral divisions. The new system reserves an additional 30 percent of seats for female councilors in each council chosen from a separate list of candidates based on each political party’s vote share.

In short and immediately relevant for the analyses presented here, between April 2005 and October 2011, electoral law required that Basotho citizens in 30 percent of all local electoral divisions be exposed to quota-mandated women as local political representatives, whereas the remaining 70 percent of electoral divisions had open arenas of contestation. It should be noted, however, that despite the 30 percent legal requirement, in actuality only 29.1 percent of EDs were selected for reservation. Importantly, women also won in EDs that were not reserved by the quota. In total during this period, quota-mandated women held 29.1 percent of community councilor positions, non-quota-mandated women held 26.3 percent, and men held 44.6 percent. Section 2.1.1 presents various tests for true random assignment as stipulated by the quota law, including balance diagnostics on observable characteristics between future reserved and unreserved EDs prior to the quota.

Although the authority devolved to the local councils in Lesotho has not been as extensive as the decentralization process in other African countries, the 2005 law vested the councils with new authority. The community councils are charged with village level maintenance issues such as land allocation (discussed below), managing the local water supply, and maintaining village markets and local roads. The councilors elected from each electoral division represent the villages in their district at community council

\[ ^{10} \text{Reservation status was randomly assigned by selecting every third ED (or at times every 4th ED) from the complete list.} \]
meetings, which meet at least once a month.

Local elections were held for the first time in 2005, at which time most candidates were not fully aware of the full range of responsibilities that came with this position. Although fiscal functions have yet to be fully devolved to the local level, councilor positions come with substantial *de facto* power, as one of the central duties of councilors is the allocation of communal cattle grazing lands - the cornerstone of rural Basotho life. The extent of this power was perhaps not truly understood by the first set of candidates in the 2005 elections, however, it has become increasingly realized over the past nine years - and women are becoming increasingly excluded from these positions. In the most recent set of by-elections in early 2014, there was not a single female candidate running for the approximately forty electoral divisions that were holding elections.\(^{11}\)

The electoral divisions are relatively small, with constituencies consisting on average of around 600 adults over the age of 18. Before each council meeting (*pitso* in Sesotho), each councilor customarily has a separate meeting with residents from the villages in his/her electoral division in order to better represent his/her constituents in the community council. The small district size means that councilors are very well known in their communities. In interviews I conducted in early 2014 with over 100 Basotho citizens in councils across the country, almost every respondent knew the names of both their current and previous councilor without hesitation.

As an odd example of international policy diffusion, Lesotho’s Minister of Gender seemed to have gotten the reserved district idea from Rajeev Ahal, an Indian consultant who was working in Lesotho for the local office of the German development agency (GTZ) at the time. Mr. Ahal relayed India’s experience with its reserved single-member district

\(^{11}\)Interview with Rethabile Pholo, Independent Electoral Commission program manager and Gender Links consultant, interviewed by author, Maseru, Lesotho, February 24th, 2014.
quota to the Minister of Gender, and she subsequently successfully lobbied parliament for the policy’s adoption in 2005 (Morna & Tolmay, 2007: 78).

2.1.1 Random Assignment Checks

The experimental nature of the quota design depends on the random assignment of the reserved electoral divisions. First, it is important to note that Lesotho is a small landlocked mountainous country that is ethno-linguistically, culturally and religiously homogenous. 99.7 percent of the population self-identifies as belonging to the Basotho ethnic group and speaks Sesotho as a first language, and 96.7 percent of the population claims to be Christian (Afro-barometer 2008). The clustering of religious and ethnic groups are not plausible confounders of the quota’s random assignment, but other potential ED-level characteristics are. To gain leverage of the validity of random assignment, I test for observable differences across future reserved and unreserved EDs before the quota’s implementation.

Table 2.1 shows data from the 2003 Lesotho Afro-barometer survey, two years before the realization of the quota policy. It lists potential confounding variables, their mean values in the future reserved and unreserved electoral divisions, the difference between the groups, and the standard error associated with this estimate. Column 5 shows the p-values associated with difference of means t-tests and column 6 reports the coefficients of future reserved ED residence with each cofounder as a separate dependent variable. The models are hierarchical with random intercepts allowed at the community council level. Variables that achieve traditional statistical significance (p ≤ 0.05) are indicated in bold.

Table 2.1 here
The only observable potential confounder with a statistically significant difference between the future reserved and unreserved EDs is the respondents’ mean age. Respondents in future reserved EDs are on average 4.6 years older than respondents in future unreserved EDs. Given that there is balance between reserved and unreserved EDs across the other eight indicators, it is likely that this small difference in means is due to sampling variability. For increased transparency and ease of interpretation in the tests that follow, I calculate average treatment effects (ATEs) on the unmatched sample, however, the results I present in this dissertation’s three empirical chapters hold when running their respective analyses on a subset of observations that match control and treatment groups on respondents’ age.

2.2 Advantages of the Lesotho Case

This dissertation employs a small-n quasi-experimental case-based research design. Using the singular case of Lesotho is particularly appealing because the institutional design of the quota imitates treatment and control conditions. The Lesotho case offers clearly observable changes in the treatment (the presence of the quota), post-tests through the use of surveys and field experimental tasks, and few potential confounders due to minimal regional variation in Sesotho culture. In addition, within-case analysis mitigates limitations inherent to other types of case study research, particularly when the purpose is to identify the micro-foundations of a causal relationship (George & Bennett, 2005; King et al., 1994; Gerring, 2007).

Lesotho’s randomized policy experiment has several additional advantages. First, cross-national comparisons do not address the possibility that countries that adopt quo-
tas are also more likely to have a citizenry that holds egalitarian views about the appropriateness and capabilities of women in the political sphere. The use of time-series data also does not ameliorate this problem; the key concern being that countries that adopt quotas may be doing so as a response to an ongoing nationwide change in attitudes towards appropriate gender roles. In such instances, correlations between quota-induced increases in female leadership and individual-level attitudinal and behavioral shifts may not reflect the causal impact of quotas. The random allocation of reserved single-member electoral divisions in one national setting, however, implies that differences in citizens’ attitudes and behavior across reserved and unreserved EDs capture the causal effect of having seen a quota-mandated woman as a local legislator.

This research design, therefore, solves the inherent identification problem involved with understanding the impacts of gender quota policies. Often countries adopt quotas for reasons independently correlated with a particular study’s outcome variable of interest. For instance, countries may adopt quotas because they are consistent with existing or emerging notions of equality and representation. The Nordic countries serve as a prime example. Nordic political parties did not instigate voluntary quotas until there were already a relatively high number of women in office (around 30 percent) and the gap in social and economic status between men and women was relatively small (Freidenvall et al., 2006). In such cases, the direction of the causal arrow between the existence of gender quotas and citizens’ attitudes and behavior towards female representatives is likely reversed.

Further, many countries have adopted quotas immediately after conflict situations in which previously disadvantaged groups disassembled unjust power structures and challenged perceptions of equality and entitlement. Again the example of South Africa
is illustrative, as the liberation party, the ANC, voluntary adopted a 50 percent gender quota in all post-Apartheid elections as a signal of the party’s commitment to the equality of previously marginalized groups (Bauer & Britton, 2006). Domestic women’s groups also may mobilize for quotas to increase women’s representation. As noted in Chapter 1, the Beijing Platform for Action facilitated these domestic movements, as it created a network between county-level women’s groups and transnational advocacy groups (Krook, 2006).

If a country decides to adopt a quota for any of the above reasons, it is difficult to disentangle the potential effects of quotas from the conditions that gave rise to them. Given these inherent endogeneity concerns, the advantages of the Lesotho case become clear. The randomized policy experiment within the quota’s design allows the researcher to identify the quota’s average treatment effect in a way that provides causal evidence attributable directly to the quota policy.

2.3 External Validity

I offer a more complete discussion of the generalizability of my findings in the following empirical chapters, but here briefly put Lesotho’s experience in global context. The electoral system employed through Lesotho’s sub-national policy experiment is fairly unique. Indeed, Lesotho and India are the only two countries in the world that have experimented with reserved single-member districts for women that completely exclude would-be male candidates from running in their districts. However, the results presented here have important implications for the study of the impacts of electoral quotas more broadly.

Quota laws affect the way a citizen may feel she is represented by the state in two po-
tentially contradicting ways. On the one hand, quotas include historically marginalized
groups in state decision-making and thus make the legislature more diverse and inclusive
by design - however, this effect may be attenuated when the policy is seen as giving prefer-
ential treatment to the minority group at the expense of majority members. Not only
does this create the perceptions of exclusionary, rather than inclusionary, institutions
but it can also create a stigma surrounding the beneficiaries of the affirmative action
measures. Whereas testing the implications of (hyper) exclusionary versus inclusionary
political institutions speaks specifically to the quota experiences in India and Lesotho
- testing the stigma effects of affirmative action measures have relevant implications to
many other cases.

Indeed, an increasing number of countries are adopting gender quotas in which bene-
ficiaries of the policy can be uniquely identified as having received preferential treatment.
This has occurred at the national level in majoritarian and mixed systems in which dis-
tricts are reserved for only female candidates (i.e. Uganda and Kenya) or when political
parties adopt all-women short lists (i.e. the United Kingdom). Additionally, even in
quota systems in which women’s reserved seats are appointed proportionally by political
party vote share (i.e. Pakistan, Morocco, and Rwanda), beneficiaries of the quota policy
can be easily identified as “quota women.” Quota systems that employ different elec-
toral rules for women are also becoming increasing popular at the local level (i.e. India,
Tanzania, Bangladesh, and Pakistan). The results presented here shed light on how this
distinction may change the ways quota recipients are perceived by their constituents
in contradistinction to their male and female colleagues elected via non-gender-specific
rules.
2.4 The Setting

Before examining the effects of Lesotho’s 2005 - 2011 reserved district quota, it is helpful to offer a brief background on the economic and political situation in the country, as well as the historical position of women in Sesotho society.

2.4.1 The Political Economy of Lesotho: A Brief Introduction

Lesotho has a population of two million and a territory that is approximately 12,000 square miles (slightly smaller than the US state of Maryland), most of which is nestled high in the rugged peaks of the Drakensburg Mountains. Figure 2.1 displays a map of Lesotho, which also shows the country’s ten main administrative districts.

Lesotho gained its independence from Great Britain on October 4th, 1966. A constitutional monarchy, Lesotho is ruled by King Letsie III, whose duties are largely ceremonial. For 45 years after independence, Lesotho’s political history was marred by instability, violence, and military control; however, since 1998 the country has enjoyed relative political stability and elections since this time have been generally considered free and fair.

Lesotho’s upper house of parliament, the Senate, consists of 22 principal chiefs and eleven other members appointed by the King. Lesotho’s lower house and main legislative body, the National Assembly, consists of 120 members, 80 of whom are elected through
constituency-based first-past-the-post elections and 40 of whom are elected through a nation-wide proportional representation list based on the vote share received by each political party.

Relevant to the themes of this research, the National Assembly Election Amendment Act of 2011 introduced an electoral gender quota at the national level for the 40 proportional representation seats. The Act requires that all political parties submit zebra lists with male and female candidates listed in alternate order. As a result, in the 2012 election women won 45 percent of the National Assembly’s proportional representation seats, but only 16 percent of the first-past-the-post seats (Matlho 2012: 6)

Since 2012, Lesotho’s ruling party consists of a coalition government including the four main opposition parties from previous elections: the All Basotho Congress (ABC), the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), the Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD), which jointly control 63 out of the 120 seats in the National Assembly. Forty-eight out the remaining 57 seats are held by the Democratic Congress (DC), which split from the LCD prior to the 2012 elections.

The 2005 Local Government Elections Act was not the first time that the Government of Lesotho had experimented with devolving legislative authority to either the regional or local level. Pre-dating independence, Lesotho had a well-developed and active system of elected district councils with considerable responsibility and legislative power over a range of local issues. In 1968, these bodies were shut down when they became centers of political resistance to the military regime. This represents a pattern that played out several times during Lesotho’s long period of political instability: the national government would devolve fiscal and administrative powers to regional or local authorities and partisan political conflicts would escalate through these bodies, leading
to their ultimate dissolution [Ferguson 1990: 241]. However, due to Lesotho’s recent political stability, there have not been claims of these types of partisan conflicts being played out in the community councils created in 2005.  

Lesotho’s economy has never been separate from that of its more economically powerful surrounding neighbor, South Africa. For the last 150 years, the South African economy has benefited from Lesotho’s supply of cheap migrant labor, while Lesotho’s economy has been highly dependent on remittances from Basotho employed in South Africa - mostly in the former Transvaal Province. There are records of Basotho working as migrant labor on the South African diamond fields as early as 1870 and the majority of remittances still come from the earnings of young male Basotho migrant laborers employed in gold, diamond, and coal mining (Ferguson 1990: 32) - although due to employment barriers, migration had decreased markedly in recent years.

In the late 1970s, some estimates suggested that the South African mining sector employed up to 60 percent of the working-age male Basotho population (Ferguson 1990: 112). This trend, however, has been decreasing steadily since the mid-1990s, as the post-Apartheid government has encouraged mining companies to give preference to South African miners. By one estimate, the number of Basotho men working in the mines peaked in 1990 at over 127,000 and by late 2010 this number was estimated to be fewer than 43,000.  

Retrenchment and the subsequent loss of migrant wages have hit Lesotho’s economy hard. In the late 1980s, remittances made up 60 percent of the nation’s GDP, whereas in 2005 this figure was 20 percent (Rosenberg & Weisfelder 2013: 333). This feature of Lesotho’s economy has important implications for

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12 I make this observation based on dozens of in-country interviews conducted during my two trips to the field - the first in early 2013 and the second in early 2014.

13 For an excellent account of labor migration patterns from Lesotho to South Africa, see: [http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/lesotho-labor-reserve-depopulating-periphery](http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/lesotho-labor-reserve-depopulating-periphery)
the relationships (and patterns of contestation) that arise between men and women in structuring rural life in Lesotho, which I explore in greater depth in Section 2.4.2.

Male retrenchment from the mines and the continued reliance on subsistence agriculture in rural areas have resulted in the high persistence of poverty in the country. In 2008, the unemployment rate stood at 24 percent, among the highest in the world. The World Bank 2010/2011 Household Budget survey showed 57 percent of the population lived below the national poverty line. Poverty in Lesotho is compounded by the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the country. Lesotho has the second highest HIV rate among adults in the world at 23.6 percent. Due to the virus, life expectancy at birth has declined by more than 20 years in the past decade to its current average of 41 years.\footnote{http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/lesotho/overview.}

## 2.4.2 Women in Lesotho

The position of women in Sesotho society is complex and defined by dualities. On the one hand, there are some indicators that suggest that Basotho women enjoy relative equality. For instance, as noted in Section 2.1, women won 38 percent of local councilor seats in electoral divisions that were not reserved by the quota law. Basotho women also have higher literacy rates than Basotho men and more girls are enrolled in Lesotho’s primary and secondary schools than boys \footnote{UNESCO, 2012}. Other indicators, however, suggest that Sesotho culture is deeply rooted in patriarchal authority in ways that are repressive to women. For instance, the 2009 Lesotho Demographic and Health Surveys found that 37 percent of women and 48 percent of men reported that wife beating was justifiable in certain conditions, including instances in which a wife did not obey her husband.
Further, rural life in Lesotho is best described as centering around an extend network of small agnatic communities. This is captured in the Sesotho expression, “the child belongs to the cattle” (*ngoana ke oa likhomo*), which indicates that with the passage of bride wealth (*bohali*) paid in cattle, comes the absolute transfer of women’s procreative capacity and general rights from the woman’s family to her husband’s family (Murray, 1981: 142). As an extension of this custom, it is common still for girls to be given birth names with the prefix ‘Ma’, (“mother” in Sesotho) followed by a male name, indicating the parents’ desire that their newborn daughter eventually give birth to a boy with that name. With marriage, the young woman’s name is changed to still include the prefix ‘Ma, but followed by the name the husband’s parents desire for their first male grandchild.

Several pieces of recent national legislation have sought to address the inequalities women experience under customary law. While commendable, these laws reveal the legal barriers women continue to face in Sesotho society. For instance, the Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act of 2006 for the first time removed women’s customary legal status as minors, first under the supervision of their fathers and later their husbands. The Companies Amendment Act of 2008 repealed a law that previously only allowed men to start and direct major companies. The Lesotho Bank Amendment Act of 2008 removed the minority status of women in seeking credit and making financial transactions. Finally, the Land Act of 2010 for the first time allowed women equal access to the control of productive resources within the home (SADC, 2013: 42).

The key to understanding these seeming contradictions can be found in the modes of economic production and structure rural life in Lesotho. As noted in Section 2.4.1, since the late 19th Century, Lesotho has primarily served as a supply of cheap migrant labor in
the gold, diamond and coal mines of South Africa. These mines recruit only young men. Because there are scant employment opportunities in rural Lesotho, this puts women at an acute structural disadvantage in the economic production of Sesotho society. For most of the 20th Century, this left women dependent on absent husbands, and economically vulnerable to the exigencies of the South African mining sector. But more than just relations of economic production, this led to a whole range of social relations clustered around the male/female and young/old divide. In his anthropological account of rural life in Lesotho, James Ferguson (1990) describes how Sesotho cultural practices, particularly the keeping of livestock, have evolved around these age and gendered conflicts. Ferguson explains women dependence as follows:

It may be stated as a general proposition that economic dependence of women on men is the sign not of a general and essential female passivity but of structural constraints of the economic freedom of action of women... It is estimated that 70 percent of rural household income is earned by migrant workers in South Africa... Rural Basotho women thus most often find themselves dependent - sometimes completely dependent - on their access to the earning power of the husbands, lovers or sons. Claims by dependent women on the earning power of absent men, then are an extremely important aspect of the rural economic structure, and the gender division thus takes on a fundamental economic importance such as we are more used to associating with class (Ferguson 1990: 140).

Of course, the fact that for over one hundred years most of the working-age male population has been employed outside of the country has led to an odd dynamic in Sesotho village life: most women are economically dependent on men who are not actually present to enforce their economic and social dominance. Indeed, at the height of Basotho migrant labor in South Africa, one study found that women were effective managers of 70 percent of village households (Murray 1977: 86).

Colin Murray (1981), who provides a comprehensive ethnographic account of women
in Sesotho society during the peak of Basotho migrant labor, describes:

[T]he ‘relative autonomy’ of monogamously married women who, in the absence of their husbands on migrant labour, assume a very great onus of domestic responsibility but have little control over the resources with which to carry out that responsibility... [W]omen rationalize their behavior with reference to customary law (Murray, 1981: 117).

This particular economic structure of Sesotho life accounts for some of the apparent contradictions that are revealed throughout this dissertation.

For instance, Murray’s observation is related to an apparently contradiction I discover in Chapter 3. Here I note that in 2003, more than half of all women (and more women than men) agreed that women should continue to be held to traditional laws and customs rather than enjoy equal rights with men - yet two years later, women won a considerable number of community council seats in unreserved electoral divisions. From the previous discussion this apparent contradiction can be understood as women continuing their de facto roles as community leaders, while at the same time maintaining traditional beliefs that, in some ways, reinforce men’s role as economic providers; a status that is difficult to reject in a country in which most families continue to live below the poverty line and remittances from South Africa make up a sizable, albeit dwindling, portion of most rural households’ income.

The economic and social structures that have developed around male migrant labor have been increasingly challenged since the mid-1990s as more and more Basotho men have been retrenched from the mines and are returning home to Lesotho. This has challenged customs that have built up around migrant-based forms of economic production and has led to new gendered realms of contestation over land, property, and wealth that
have yet to be sufficiently documented in the academic community.\textsuperscript{15}

\section*{2.5 Conclusion}

The recent economic and political histories of Lesotho, particularly how these conditions have shaped gendered aspects of rural life, provide context for the three empirical chapters that follow. Understanding the setting of Lesotho allows the reader to draw nuanced conclusions relating the gender quota policy to shifts in Basotho citizens’ attitudes and behavior. It also provides a base from which to understand if and how the findings presented here may extend to other cases. I now turn to this dissertation’s three empirical chapters, which respectively examine how the quota affected citizens’ political engagement, attitudes toward traditional authority, and explicit and implicit gender biases.

\textsuperscript{15}Charles Fogelman, a PhD candidate in the University of Illinois’ Department of Geography, is currently investigating the gendered dynamics of retrenchment in his dissertation \textit{The Men Are Coming Home: Gender, Authority and Land Politics in Lesotho}.
Supporting Figures and Tables

Figure 2.1: Political Map of Lesotho. Source http://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/lesotho-maps.html
### Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean Future Unreserved</th>
<th>Mean Future Reserved</th>
<th>Difference (SE)</th>
<th>T-test p-value</th>
<th>Reservation Effect with Council Random Effects (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% rural</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.828</td>
<td>-1.987 (0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>1.861</td>
<td>1.947</td>
<td>-0.086</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.041 (0.061)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty level</td>
<td>2.928</td>
<td>2.870</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.536</td>
<td>0.006 (0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>2.210</td>
<td>2.171</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>-0.080 (0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>2.640</td>
<td>2.715</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.045 (0.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>41.101</td>
<td>45.691</td>
<td>-4.590</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>3.434 (1.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in women’s equal rights</td>
<td>2.396</td>
<td>2.467</td>
<td>-0.069</td>
<td>0.465</td>
<td>1.093 (0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in traditional leaders</td>
<td>2.650</td>
<td>2.581</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.396</td>
<td>-0.018 (0.081)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact with traditional leaders</td>
<td>2.445</td>
<td>2.401</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.063 (0.094)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Checks for random assignment from 2003 Lesotho Afro-barometer data. \( n = 243 \) for the future reserved electoral divisions and \( n = 542 \) for the future unreserved electoral divisions. Values that achieve statistical significance of \( p \leq 0.05 \) are indicated in bold. See Appendix for variable coding.
Appendices
.1 Variable Coding

Dependent Variables

In your opinion, how likely is it that you could get together with others and make: Your elected Community Councilor listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community?

1 = Not at all likely
2 = Not very likely
3 = Somewhat likely
4 = Very likely

How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what people like you have to say: Elected Community Councilors?

1 = Never
2 = Only sometimes
3 = Often
4 = Always

How interested would you say you are in public affairs? You know, in politics and government.

1 = Not at all interested
2 = Not very interested
3 = Somewhat interested
4 = Very interested

When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters?

1 = Never
2 = Occasionally
3 = Frequently

During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A Community Councilor?

0 = Never
1 = once or more

What about local government (community council)?

How well or badly would you say your local government is handling the following matters, or haven you heard enough about them to say:

1 = Very badly;
2 = Fairly badly
3 = Fairly well;
4 = Very well

Maintaining local market places?
Keeping our community clean?
Making the Assembly program of work known to ordinary people?
Providing citizens with the information about the Assembly budget?
Guaranteeing that local government revenues are used for public services and not for private gain?
**Additional variables used in assessing random assignment**

Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without enough food to eat? (Poverty)

- 0 = Never
- 1 = Just once or twice
- 3 = Several times
- 4 = Many times
- 5 = Always

What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Education Level)

- 1 = No schooling
- 2 = Primary
- 3 = Secondary
- 4 = Post Secondary

**Additional variables used in assessing random assignment**

Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Choose Statement A or Statement B. A: Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so. B: In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do. (Belief in women’s Equal Rights)

- 1 = Agree Very Strongly with B
- 2 = Agree with B
- 3 = Agree with A
- 4 = Agree Very Strongly with A

**Age**

Respondent’s age in years

**Independent variables**

Quota-mandated female leadership

Respondent lives in an electoral division (ED) that was reserved for only female candidates in the 2005 election (0/1)

Under 25 cohort

- 0 = Respondent over 25
- 1 = Respondent under 25

Table A2.1: Variables and coding
Rural Life in Lesotho

Figure A2.1: Community Council, Leribe District, Lesotho. Photo by author.
Figure A2.2: Thaba-Tseka District, Lesotho. Photo by author.
Figure A2.3: Herd Boys (Molisana), Berea District, Lesotho. Photo by author.
Chapter 3

Women’s Political Engagement under Quota-Mandated Female Representation

Note: A version of this chapter is forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies.

Introduction

This chapter investigates whether Lesotho’s quota policy encouraged women in reserved electoral division to become more engaged with the local political process. The potential effect of quotas in this regard relates to expectations drawn from the political representation literature. For historically underrepresented groups, having a representative body that more closely mirrors the electorate may symbolize a more open and legitimate political arena (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005) - and this may improve the group’s political participation as well as how the group views its role in the political process (Mansbridge, 1999; Phillips, 1995).

The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 reviews the relevant literature examining how exposure to female representatives (quota-mandated and non-quota-mandated) may affect women’s engagement with local-level politics. Section 3.2 outlines the theoretical framework of this chapter and offers a discussion of causal mechanisms and the extent to which they are testable from this analysis. Section 3.3 introduces
the data and methods used to measure the impact of Lesotho’s quota law. Section 3.4 presents a series of results examining the quota’s differential average treatment effects across male and female respondents and across different age cohorts. It also provides a measure to identify citizens in reserved EDs with a high latent propensity for female representation as a way to distinguish between the effects of quota-mandated versus non-quota-mandated female representation. This section pays careful attention to the valid experimental and observational inferences that can be made between groups given the experimental research design (see Dunning, 2008; Sekhon & Titiunik, 2012; Gerber & Green, 2012). Section 3.5 offers a discussion of the results in relation to the theoretical framework, as well as situating the contributions of these findings into our understanding of gender quotas and women’s political representation. The final section concludes.

3.1 The Literature

Several recent comparative studies examine the relationship between the presence of female politicians and women’s political engagement, but without a particular focus on the presence of quotas. Wolbrecht & Campbell (2007) find that in a sample of 28 OECD countries, women are more likely to discuss and participate in politics when there are a higher number of female MPs nd that this effect is especially pronounced among young women. Similarly, Norris & Krook (2009) find that in a larger cross-national sample, civic engagement among women is higher in countries with more gender-equal parliaments. Additionally, Barnes & Burchard (2012) examine cases from sub-Saharan Africa and find that women’s political participation increases in countries with a higher percentage of female parliamentarians.

American politics scholars have also developed a substantial empirical literature re-
lating the presence of female public officeholders or candidates to women’s political engagement. The findings here are mixed. Several studies report that women discuss politics more often, feel more internally and externally politically efficacious, and participate in political activities to a greater degree when they have a female representative (Atkeson 2003; Atkeson & Carrillo 2007; Burns et al. 2001) or when there are a greater number of visible female electoral candidates (Campbell & Wolbrecht 2006). However, other research has noted that this apparent effect is largely muted when party congruence is properly controlled for, suggesting that the ideology of the candidate or officeholder is more important than his or her gender (Dolan 2006; Lawless 2004; Reingold & Harrell 2010).

Importantly, the above studies do not explicitly examine how the presence of gender quotas mediates this relationship - that is, whether the way in which women come into political office affects the political engagement of female citizens. There have been fewer studies that directly relate gender quotas to women’s increased engagement with politics at either the national or local level - and the results here have been largely inconclusive. For instance, in a cross-national sample (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer 2012), find that the presence of a gender quota decreases the gender gap in some dimensions of political engagement (political interest), but not in others (political knowledge and discussion). Further, the authors find that the decreased gender gap in political interest is due to men’s decreased interest in politics rather than women’s increased interest (Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer 2012: 40). Using cases from Latin American, two other recent studies have looked explicitly at the role of gender quotas in this regard and report null findings. Examining variation of quota adoption in Mexican states, Zetterberg (2012) finds that female leadership does not influence women’s self-reported interest in politics or does he
find any systematic impact on women’s political engagement across 17 Latin American countries with varying quota experiences (Zetterberg, 2009).

However, several case studies have detailed the largely positive symbolic effects following the rapid proliferation of gender quotas across African countries. These studies have documented how quotas have changed political cultures to be more inclusive of women’s perspectives and how quotas may legitimize women’s presence in nontraditional spheres more broadly (see Bauer (2012) for a review). For instance, using over a decade of ethnographic research to examine the impact of the highly-lauded Rwandan gender quota, Burnet (2011: 315) notes that measuring women’s political engagement in an authoritarian state proves difficult, but that “gender quotas and the increased representation of women in the political system have encouraged women to take leading roles in other areas of Rwandan society.”

In a related literature, economists have also examined individual-level behavioral and attitudinal changes in political engagement following gender quota adoption. Most of this research has come from India, specifically because the design of the Indian quota allows for causal analysis. Similar to Lesotho’s sub-national quota, India has reserved one-third of representative positions in local-level single-member districts for women since 1993, and most states have has rotated these districts at random in each election cycle since 1998. Beaman et al. (2010) use the random assignment of reservation to show that the likelihood that a woman speaks in a village meeting increases by 25 percent when the local political leader position is reserved for a woman. The authors contend that this increased willingness may result directly from the presence of the female leader at the meeting, or indirectly from changes in social norms resulting from female leadership. Also examining the Indian case, Chattopadhyay & Duflo (2003) and Deininger et al.
similarly find that the percentage of women who attend and actively participate in local meetings is significantly higher in districts reserved for women. Additionally, Bhavnani (2009) finds that female candidates are more likely to run and win elected local political positions even after quotas have been removed.

In sum, the literatures to date relating female representation to the political engagement of female citizens report mixed findings. Further, the aforementioned studies (with the exception of Zetterberg (2012)), have only examined the effect of female representation in either the presence or absence of an affirmative action policy. To my knowledge, this dissertation is the first to present both causal and observational evidence on the differential effects of different types of female representation on public attitudes and behavior in the same national setting at the same time.

3.2 Theoretical Framework: Why should gender and gender quotas matter?

The literatures outlined above suggest multiple ways in which exposure to female representatives may influence women’s political engagement. First, as mentioned, an increase in the number of female politicians may have a symbolic effect on female citizens, making the ruling body seem more open and accessible (Phillips, 1995). A government of men may create an immediate psychological barrier for women indicating that they are better suited to be led rather than to be community leaders (Mansbridge, 1999). A governing body that more closely mirrors its electorate appears more democratically legitimate, and this may motivate previously underrepresented groups to engage in the political process in new ways (Bobo & Gilliam Jr., 1990).
However, the positive effects of symbolic representation due to quotas rest on the assumption that citizens respond to quotas in positive ways. Contrary to the intended effects expressed above, it is possible that quotas may actually trigger negative symbolic reactions. When quotas are seen as an illegitimate form of representation in such a way that quota recipients are not seen as deserving their positions - they may discourage political engagement (Zetterberg, 2009). Some scholars have noted that quotas are more likely to be perceived as illegitimate if their adoption is seen as originating from an outside body rather than pressure from domestic groups (Dahlerup, 2006: 12)(but see Bush & Jamal (forthcoming)). Further, it is possible in the case of Lesotho (and India) that quotas’ symbolically exclusionary, rather than power-sharing, nature may cause citizens to become less engaged with the political process (Norris, 2008; Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).

Additionally, the fields of public opinion and social psychology have produced large literatures on attitudes toward affirmative action in employment and education, largely pulling from American experiences. This body of work suggests that responses to affirmative action policies may be related to individual-level perceptions of the existence of discrimination, as this legitimizes the need for corrective policies that privilege one group over another (Stoker, 1998; Martins & Parsons, 2007; Lowery et al., 2006). I explore how this finding applies to Lesotho further in Section 3.5 - but in brief, this research suggests that when women are not considered deserving of special treatment because of their historic marginalization, affirmative action policies may produce a stigma around the policies’ beneficiaries among both in-group and out-group members.

The existence of two types of female representatives in Lesotho (quota-mandated
and non-quota-mandated) provides an important test to differentiate between a “quota effect” and a “female representation effect.” In general, if quotas produce a positive symbolic effect by creating a more open and legitimate ruling body, then I do not expect to see a difference between women’s political engagement under these two types of female representatives. However, when quotas are viewed as an illegitimate form of representation, attitudinal and behavioral differences between citizens (both male and female) under these two female representative types should emerge.

Another distinct way that quotas may affect women’s political engagement is based on the argument that women are better able to substantively represent women’s interests. This theory has empirical backing, as a sizable literature has demonstrated that female citizens (Miller 2008) and female politicians articulate different policy preferences than men (Chattopadhyay & Duflo 2004; Chen 2010; Xydias 2008); initiate gender equity policies, at times in cross-party women’s alliances (Hassim 2003; Lovenduski & Norris, 1993; Sainsbury, 2004); vote differently (Swers 2002); and have more consensus-based legislative styles than their male colleagues (Volden et al. 2013).

If women believe female community councilors are better able to substantively represent their interest, I expect that women will report greater levels of external political efficacy in both reserved and unreserved EDs than female residents in male-led electoral divisions. This, of course, is also an observable implication from the impact of positive symbolic representation as expressed above, and in the presence of such a result either or both of these mediators may be at play.

Another distinct mechanism that may explain how female representation affects women’s political engagement involves female representatives as potential role models. The presence (or lack of) female role models can create different social expectations for
men and women, often learned in childhood and reinforced in adulthood (Steuernagel et al. 1996). This mechanism is a conceptually distinct form of symbolic representation than expressed above. Rather than changing perceptions about the openness, fairness, or accessibility of a legislative body, this explanation contends that a lack of female political representatives signals to women and girls that politics is not an appropriate sphere for women. There is some evidence that women’s increased presence in political bodies encourages the popular perception that women can effectively govern (Alexander 2012). Further, several studies have shown that the socializing effect of exposure to female representatives at a young age encourages women’s political participation, both in America (Campbell & Wolbrecht 2006) and cross-nationally among OECD-member states (Wolbrecht & Campbell 2007).

Evidence from the Indian case also shows that female leadership positively influences adolescent girls’ career aspirations (including aspirations for careers in politics) and educational attainment in reserved districts (Beaman et al. 2012a). The authors claim that having a female village leader creates a role model effect for the young girls in their districts. This role model hypothesis implies that younger cohorts of women will be more politically engaged than older cohorts as local politics becomes an area that may be open to them in the future. The Indian case, however, benefits from having citizens that have been exposed to quota-mandated female leaders in some instances for nearly two decades. In contrast, this chapter tests whether these socializing effects appear in the short term, three years after the adoption of the quota policy.

A negative impact of the socialization theory, however, is also possible and perhaps more likely in the short term. Some research has indicated that instead of encouraging women’s political participation, gender quotas may exacerbate existing biases against
women if female politicians are perceived as violating appropriate gender roles (Goldin, 2002; Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). There is anecdotal evidence from Lesotho that supports this observation. The main gender advocacy group in the region reports:

[Quota recipients] repeatedly stated that a challenge for women in politics or desiring to enter politics is the beliefs and attitudes of society… All respondents during the interview process (both male and female) attested to attitudes, culture and beliefs being a major challenge for women’s authority. Women respondents noted the intense verbal abuse they underwent when visiting the districts and promoting women’s involvement (GenderLinks, 2011: 10).

In this instance, female constituents may believe their new female representatives are behaving inappropriately, causing them to avoid association or contact with these women. There is some evidence, both experimental dating back to the seminal Goldberg paradigm (Goldberg, 1968) and observational (Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2010: 113), suggesting that under some circumstances cultural norms around appropriate gender roles may be most intractable among women. Again there is anecdotal evidence of this occurrence in Lesotho, as one gender rights activist in the country notes:

Before women were not allowed to stand in front of people or be a part of any development in the community - so they are still shy. Our culture has a lot to do with that. You find that in the communities, we see men as leaders, as people who bring about change. Our culture plays a major role in all of this and women are the ones sometimes who hold these beliefs the strongest.¹⁶

Rethabile Pholo, who helped coordinate the 2005 local elections through Lesotho’s Independent Electoral Commission, concurs, noting:

¹⁶Interview with Malepota Mafeka, then Country Director, Lesotho Gender Links, interviewed by author, Maseru, Lesotho, February 8th, 2013.
When you go to the villages, you will see that the women still have deeply held religious beliefs, often more so than the men. When the quota law was passed in 2005 women still had the same legal rights as minors under federal law in this country. This changed in 2006, but you see that in the villages under customary law, women may still consider themselves as minors, first under the authority of their fathers and later their husbands.\(^{17}\)

One question from the 2003 Afro-barometer survey, two years before the quota’s adoption, also reveals that gender biases may be most pronounced among Basotho women. In this survey round, 44 percent of male respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: “Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so,” while 56 percent agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: “In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.” Surprisingly, among female respondents, 62 percent either agreed or strongly agreed that women should remain subject to traditional laws, while only 38 percent either agreed or strongly agreed in the principle of women’s equal rights. In sum, two years prior to the quota policy, gender biases around traditional gender roles appeared most pronounced among female citizens.

Whether the reserved district quota caused a women-led backlash against female representation in general is not directly testable in this chapter, but in Chapter 5, I measure differences in gender role stereotypes, as well as taste and statistical discrimination against female leaders across formerly reserved and unreserved electoral divisions. Related directly to women’s political engagement, however, it is not immediately clear why selection procedures for female representatives should affect their function as role models (either positively or negatively), and in the exclusive presence of this mechanism there should be no difference in women’s political engagement under quota-mandated

\(^{17}\)Interview with Rethabile Pholo, Independent Electoral Commission program manager and Gender Links consultant, interviewed by author, Maseru, Lesotho, February 24th, 2014.
3.3 Measures and Methods

3.3.1 Data and Dependent Variable Specification

To measure the impact of living in a reserved ED, I rely on Afro-barometer survey data, which includes a nationally representative, random, stratified probability sample of approximately 1200 Basotho. The 2008 Afro-barometer survey measures the impact of living in a reserved ED for three years. This research specifically employs the local-level Afro-barometer data, which identifies the village of each respondent. Respondents are located in 577 villages as identified by Afro-barometer survey administers. I construct an original dataset by merging the Afro-barometer results with data collected from Lesotho’s Independent Electoral Commission in Maseru to identify the gender of each village’s community councilor and whether the village was in a formerly reserved ED. I list-wise delete observations for which I cannot definitively identify the councilor’s gender and ED reservation status. This happens, for instance, when there are two villages with the same name in the village census list, and I cannot identify which one corresponds with the respondent’s residence as identified by the Afro-barometer data. This narrows my total observations from 1200 to 897. The rate of missingness across other relevant variables is relatively minimal (between 0 - 7 percent), but I choose to use Amelia II for R to impute missing values rather than list-wise delete remaining observations.\footnote{See Honaker et al. (2012).}

For a robust analysis, I use five attitudinal and behavioral measures of political engagement. I choose not to aggregate these measures into a single index because each
measure taps into a theoretically distinct form of political engagement that may provide evidence to adjudicate between the causal mechanisms described above. The first three measures relate to political attitudes. Of these, the first two measure different aspects of external political efficacy - the individual perception that governmental institutions and authorities are responsive to citizen influence (Balch 1974). Measures of external political efficacy are of theoretical interest as their presence has been related to citizens’ increased political participation and increased perceptions of democratic legitimacy (Abramson 1983; Atkeson & Carrillo 2007).

The first question asks the respondent, “How likely is it that you could get together with others and make your elected community councilor listen to your concerns about a matter of importance to the community?” The second question is related, but conceptually distinct and asks, “How much of the time do you think the elected community councilors try their best to listen to what people like you have to say?” The final attitudinal question reads, “How interested would you say you are in public affairs? You know, in politics and government.” All question responses are on a four-level Likert-type scale with higher responses indicating greater degrees of external political efficacy and interest in politics respectively.

The second set of dependent variables involves two types of political behavior. The first question reads: “When you get together with your friends or family, would you say you discuss political matters: never, occasionally, or frequently?” The final question asks, “During the past year, how often have you contacted a community councilor about some important problem or to give them your views?” Responses here are coded as dichotomous outcomes indicating that the respondent either contacted his/her councilor once or more in the previous year or did not contact him/her at all. Full details on
3.4 Results

In the population of community councilor positions in Lesotho, 29.1 percent are quota-mandated women, 26.3 percent are non-quota-mandated women, and 44.6 percent are men. The Afro-barometer sample of respondents living in these districts closely mirrors the population of leadership groups: 31.7 percent of respondents in the sample live in a reserved ED, 23.3 percent lived in an unreserved ED that elected a female councilor, and 44.9 percent live in an unreserved ED that elected a male councilor. The distribution of the population of councilor characteristics across electoral divisions and the corresponding respondent sample within those divisions are statistically indistinguishable.¹⁹

3.4.1 The Reservation Effect

Table 3.1 lists the mean values of the five dependent variables in the reserved and unreserved electoral divisions respectively. It also displays the difference in means between these two groups, which can be interpreted as the quota’s average treatment effect (ATE) on each measure of political engagement and the 95 percent confidence interval that brackets this estimate. The ATEs and associated confidence intervals are simulated and calculated through randomization inference based on the principles of cluster random assignment as described in Gerber & Green (2012: 80) with respondents clustered within EDs. The final column shows the p-values associated with the one and two-tailed significance tests for the quota’s average treatment effects across measures. Table 3.2

¹⁹Pearson Chi-squared test p-vale = 0.997
lists these values among male and female respondents respectively. ATEs that achieve traditional statistical significance ($p \leq 0.05$ for a two-tailed test) are indicated in bold.

Table 3.1

Table 3.2

Table 3.1 reveals a statistically significant average treatment effect (for a one-tailed test) for the second measures of external political efficacy and the measure of political interest. Interestingly, Table 3.2 reveals there are significant differential effects by gender. First, men appear to be significantly more politically engaged than women across all five measures. Further, contrary to the findings of previous work, the presence of a gender quota actually reduces women’s political engagement. The top panel of Table 3.2 shows that women report significantly less external political efficacy and less interest in politics when living in a district reserved for a female councilor, whereas only the political interest variable is statistically significant and negative within the male split sample.

Among women, the ATE for the first measure of external political efficacy (“Can you make councilors listen?”) is a decrease of 0.31 on a four point scale. To measure the standardized effect size, I divide the ATE by the standard deviation of the control (unreserved) group to reveal that the quota caused a decrease of 0.28 standard deviations. The ATE for the second measure of external political efficacy (“Do councilors try to listen?”) is -0.23, which equates to a standardized effect size of -0.22 standard deviations. Finally, the political interest variable has a ATE among women of -0.47, which is equivalent to a decrease of 0.38 standard deviations. The equivalent ATE among men
for this variable is -0.38 on the four point scale with an associated standardized effect size of -0.35 standard deviations.\textsuperscript{20}

As an additional modeling consideration, I use a series of regressions to model the quota’s effect on each outcome variable. This allows me to add the covariate of age to test for heterogenous treatment effects across age cohorts.

The response categories for the five measures of political engagement are all ordered, except for the dichotomous outcome indicating whether the respondent contacted his/her community councilor in the past year. I use ordered logistic model specifications for the former and a logistic specification for the latter. I employ the clmm2 function in R’s ordinal package to fit all cumulative link mixed models with random effects at the ED level.\textsuperscript{21} Goodness of fit measures and a discussion of ED random effects are included in Appendix \textsuperscript{3}.\textsuperscript{22} I use hierarchical linear modeling to allow the intercepts for each electoral division to vary randomly on the assumption that measures of political engagement may be clustered by electoral division.

Table \textbf{3.3} and Table \textbf{3.4} present model results among female and male respondents respectively. Each column lists the effect size for each respective measure of political engagement. The first row shows the causal effect of living in a reserved ED. In order to test for observational effects by age, the next two rows display the coefficients of whether the respondent is under 25 years old and an interaction term with this variable and reserved ED residence. In all the tables that follow, coefficients that achieve traditional statistical significance ($p \leq 0.05$) are indicated in bold.

\textsuperscript{20}Researchers typically characterize standardized effects of less than 0.3 standard deviations as small, between 0.3 and 0.8 as moderate, and above 0.8 as large (Gerber & Green 2012: 70).
\textsuperscript{21}Christensen (2013).
\textsuperscript{22}The results presented here also hold under a fixed-effects model specification.
Confirming the results from the ATEs calculated through simulation and randomization inference above, the reservation effect is statistically significant for all three attitudinal measures of political engagement among women. Women in reserved EDs report feeling significantly less likely that their (female) councilors want to listen to their concerns or that they can get together with others in the community to make their councilors listen to important issues. Living in a reserved ED also reduces women's general interest in politics. The two behavioral measures, whether the respondent contacted her councilor during the previous year and how often she discusses politics, do not achieve statistical significance suggesting that negative attitudes have not translated into decreased political behavior. Among men, living in a reserved ED is associated with less interest in politics, but residence has no other significant effect on political engagement. The interaction term of the under 25 cohort is not associated with any change in political engagement among either men or women in reserved EDs, suggesting that age is not a salient determinate of engagement with local politics in the presence of a quota-mandated female councilor.

The substantive effects of the significant variables are also noteworthy. I use the model results to simulate predicted probabilities for each measure of political engagement. In an average council, compared to her counterpart in a unreserved ED, a woman in a reserved ED is 60 percent (a move from 10 percent to 16 percent) more likely to report that she cannot make her (female) councilor listen to her concerns and 21 percent less likely to report that she is very likely to make her councilor listen (a move from
57 percent to 45 percent). Further, in an average council, a woman in a reserved ED is 31 percent more likely to think that her community councilor never does her best to listen to her concerns (a move from 35 percent to 46 percent) and 36 percent less likely to report that her councilor always does her best to listen (a move from 11 percent to 7 percent) as compared to her counterpart in an unreserved ED. Finally, in an average council, a woman in a reserved ED is 78 percent more likely to report that she is not at all interested in politics compared to a woman in an unreserved ED (an increase from 18 percent to 32 percent) and 34 percent less likely to report that she is very interested in politics (a decrease from 56 percent to 37 percent). Confirming the results from the split sample ATE calculations above, this effect is also statistically significant although somewhat attenuated among male respondents. A man in a reserved ED is 64 percent more likely to report that he is not at all interested in politics (an increase from 11 percent to 18 percent) and 20 percent less likely to report that he is very interested in politics (a move from 70 percent to 56 percent) as compared to his brother in an unreserved ED.

In sum, it appears that quota-mandated female representation has deleterious effects on women’s attitudes towards the local political process and their role in it. Surprisingly, these effects are most apparent among female respondents and somewhat less pronounced among their male neighbors. Interestingly, however, the quota’s effects on public attitudes have not extended to shifts in public behavior. Both male and female respondents have similar levels of political discussion and contact their councilors to the same degree across reserved and unreserved EDs.
3.4.2 Explaining the Reservation Effect

The above analysis does not reveal whether the councilor’s gender is causing women to become less engaged with local politics or whether it is the compulsory nature of the quota that is causing political apathy. Whereas the average reservation effect allows for causal inference because of the random nature of the quota assignment, the comparison between residents in reserved EDs and those that voluntarily elected a female councilor is problematic because these two subgroups are neither randomly assigned nor observably identical. The analysis above does not reveal whether the reservation effect is due to a general dislike of the mandatory quota (and its recipients) across all reserved EDs, or whether it is an effect of general taste discrimination against female councilors in reserved EDs that would have preferred to have a male councilor. Further, the latent propensity to elect female councilors in the absence of the quota is not directly observable in the reserved EDs, so it is not possible to directly differentiate between these competing explanations.

This problem can also be framed through concepts familiar to researchers who utilize experimental methods. The treatment in this policy experiment is the realization of the quota policy and this has the downstream effect of female representation in reserved EDs. This research is able to test for the causal effects of citizens’ exposure to quota-mandated female councilors, but it offers less direct insight on the effects of female representation in the absence of a quota. Measuring the quota’s effect as a proxy for female representation (as done in the extensive research from India) is complicated by the fact that Basotho citizens in unreserved districts elected female councilors on their own volition causing a case of one-sided non-compliance within the control group.23 In this section, I use

23Under this conceptualization, the subset of the control group that elected female councilors would be considered “always-takers” because they always take the treatment of female representation regardless
the two control subgroups to my advantage to gain leverage on the observational effects of the quota while holding female representation constant. I do this by identifying a measure to test for the latent propensity to elect female councilors within the treatment group, and then examine the quota’s effect between comparable subsets of observations that both elected (and arguably wanted to elect) female councilors.

One question from the 2003 Afro-barometer survey (two years prior to the adoption of the quota law) reveals a way to identify areas where citizens may have been more or less likely to elect female councilors without the quota. This question asks respondents how often they have contacted a traditional leader during the previous year “for help to solve a problem or to give them your views.” Respondents could indicate on a four point Likert-type scale that they had never contacted a traditional leader, done so only once, done so a few times, or had done so often during the previous year. Traditional leaders’ presence in their communities prior to quota adoption varies systematically with whether citizens in the unreserved EDs elected male or female councilors two years later. Perhaps unsurprisingly, citizens living in EDs with high average levels of contact with traditional leaders were more likely to elect male councilors than those in EDs with average reported low contact. Table A3.1 and Table A3.2 in Appendix 4 show the systematic variation in this measure by control subgroup. Importantly, responses to this 2003 survey question are not correlated with the assignment of the quota policy (see Table A3.1).

Table 3.5 shows the ATEs within a subset of observations from the 2008 Afro-barometer data that contain residents in reserved EDs with one standard deviation below the mean reported contact with traditional leaders (as identified from the 2003
data) and residents in unreserved EDs that voluntarily elected female councilors. Respondents in these groups arguably had similarly high latent propensities to elect female councilors prior to the quota’s implementation. Those in the control group went on to do so and those in the treatment group likely would have done so even in the absence of the quota. Given the infrequency of sampling in the same areas across Afro-barometer survey years, there are a limited number of observations that fall into the included subset of the treatment group. Because of this, I calculate the average treatment effects grouping male and female respondents together.\textsuperscript{24}

Table 3.5

Despite the limited number of observations in the treatment group, the three attitudinal variables still either achieve traditional statistical significance or come close to it. Testing whether there is indeed a negative effect, the first measure of political efficacy achieves significance at the 0.01 level and the second measure achieves significance at the 0.09 level. The measure of political interest achieves significance at the 0.13 level.\textsuperscript{25}

These results generally indicate the persistence of the reservation effect when holding female representation constant. By comparing arguably similar sample populations in treatment and control conditions, I find evidence that it is not the councilor’s gender, but rather the selection mechanism through which she achieves office that causes her constituents to feel more disengaged from the political lives of their communities.

\textsuperscript{24}Again, it should be emphasized that this test is observational, as the latent propensity to elect female councilors was not randomly assigned.

\textsuperscript{25}When estimating the ATEs through the model-based approach described above, the results are similar. The first measure of political efficacy achieves significance at the 0.03 level and the second measure achieves significance at the 0.11 level. The measure of political interest achieves significance at the 0.16 level.
3.4.3 Alternative Explanations

Two alternative explanations emerge that may explain this chapter’s results. First, it is possible that citizens’ political apathy in reserved EDs stems from experiencing a political process that was somehow objectively less interesting. For instance, this might occur if elections in reserved EDs were not as fiercely contested as elections in open districts. Empirically this appears not to be the case. The 2005 election data reveal that 8.2 percent of the 1285 community councilor positions across electoral divisions went uncontested and these elections were distributed evenly across the three subgroups of councilors. Male councilors were elected without competition in 8 percent of EDs; and women won uncontested in 7.8 percent of unreserved EDs and 8.8 percent in reserved EDs.

The 2005 election data also contains information on how many votes the winning candidate received (but not the margin of victory). This measure is also distributed evenly across councilor type. Winning male councilors received an average of 160 votes and winning female councilors received an average 162 votes in unreserved EDs and 159 votes in reserved EDs, suggesting that voter turnout was similar across ED type. In sum, female contestants in reserved EDs had elections observationally similar to both their male and female colleagues in unreserved electoral divisions.

A second alternative hypothesis relates to electoral competition and the real or perceived competence of councilors (or lack thereof) in reserved EDs. The restrictive nature of the quota limits the number of potential candidates in reserved EDs so there is a higher likelihood that less competent leaders will attain office. When citizens be-

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26 A survey of then-councilors in Lesotho, however, reveal that male and female councilors have similar levels of education, although they do not distinguish between female councilors that were elected in reserved versus unreserved districts (Morna & Tolmay 2007: 122). Additionally, the 2008 Afrobarometer asks citizens to judge their community councilors on a series of qualifications, including their
lieve their councilors are ineffective, they may become less interested in local politics. Further, assuming there is at least some degree of taste discrimination against female leaders in Lesotho, women that win in unreserved EDs may be more competent than their male competitors to make up for this sexism penalty. This is not the case in the unreserved EDs and immediately after the creation of the councils in 2005 there may have been more open seats reserved for women than there were experienced local female community leaders.

I am able to test this possible explanation through a series of questions from the 2008 Afro-barometer survey, which asks respondents to evaluate the performance of their community councilors on a series of tasks that fall within their purview. These questions follow the format:

“What about local government? I do not mean the national government. I do not mean the central government. I mean your community council. How well or badly would you say your local government is handling the following matters...”

The survey enumerators then asked about a series of specific local government tasks, such as: “maintaining local market places,” “keeping our community clean (e.g., refuse removed),” “making the Council’s program of work known to ordinary people,” “providing citizens with the information about the Council’s budget (i.e. revenues and expenditures),” “guaranteeing that local government revenues are used for public services and not for private gain.” Table 3.6 shows the quota’s average treatment effect across this range of performance indicators. Interestingly, citizens (both male and female) report that councilors in reserved EDs perform better across these indicators than councilors in

level education and their experience at managing public service programs. There is no statistically significant difference between reserved and unreserved EDs across these qualification indicators.
unreserved EDs - differences that at times reach statistical significance. Further, there are no systematic differences in the way male and female respondents answer these questions (tables not included).

Table 3.6

These findings are indeed noteworthy in their own right: on average male and female respondents believe their councilors in reserved EDs perform just as well - or in some cases significantly better than their counterparts in unreserved EDs. Despite this, male and female respondents express less interest in politics in reserved EDs and female citizens in particular report lower levels of political efficacy under quota-assigned female leadership. Take together, these results indicate that the stigma of receiving one’s position through an exclusionary affirmative action measure persists despite the public perception that councilors are performing well. Although only speculative, these findings provide suggestive evidence that the negative attitudinal reactions quota recipients experience from their female constituents may only exist in the short term and may dissipate over time. Indeed, the evidence from a similar policy experiment in India suggests that the positive symbolic effects of quotas may take two electoral cycles to realize (Bhavnani 2009; Beaman et al. 2009).
3.5 Discussion

3.5.1 Interpreting the Reservation Effect

This research has found that women are significantly less engaged with politics in electoral divisions reserved for female representatives on several attitudinal dimensions. Further this negative reaction against quota-mandated women holds when comparing this group to women elected via regular electoral rules. Although an exhaustive test of potential mediators is beyond the scope of this paper, a review of the evidence relating to the mechanisms discussed in Section 3.2 is informative.

I find no evidence that female constituents view their community councils as more open, accessible, and legitimate when they have a female representative. There is also no evidence that female representation, quota-mandated or not, increases female constituents’ political engagement because women perceive female councilors as better able to substantively represent their interests. It also does not appear that female community councilors act as role models to younger cohorts of women (at least in the short term), as younger women do not appear to be distinct from their mothers across the various measures of political engagement.

The question then remains: why do female citizens report strong negative reactions against female beneficiaries of Lesotho’s affirmative action policy? First, my findings fit well with the theories advanced by Norris (2008) and Kittilson & Schwindt-Bayer (2010, 2012), which claim that exclusionary political institutions, as compared to power-sharing and inclusionary institutions, cause citizens to view politics and political officeholders with skepticism.

This discussion is particularly relevant to the case of Lesotho for at least two reasons:
First, this particular quota design prohibits men from competing in a significant number of local electoral divisions, which some Basotho perceived as unfair. In 2005, a Mosotho man unsuccessfully challenged the electoral rule’s constitutionality in the Lesotho High Court claiming the law violated his right to run in his electoral division. Second, the impetus for Lesotho’s quota came largely from the South African Development Community (SADC), a regional body comprised of fifteen Southern African states, rather than from domestic groups. The somewhat valid perception that the quota’s implementation was a policy dictated to Lesotho rather than one that originated from a sustained grassroots effort furthered perceptions of the law’s illegitimacy. For instance, Tsepo Molefe, the denied candidate that challenged the law’s constitutionality directly cited the imposed nature of the law, stating: “The government needs to come and explain to the people why it is important for women to participate. There was no consultation. We were just told: it has to be done.”

This explanation alone, however, does not totally account for the particularly negative reaction women express toward quota-assigned female councilors, suggesting that the inclusivity/exclusivity argument may be gendered. For instance, even the policy’s beneficiaries expressed concerns about the law’s legitimacy, as one quota-mandated councilor stated: “I think in the future we should just have open elections. We don’t want a quota. Women should stand on their own feet . . . for our creditability it is important to stand on our own and win.”

My findings also support theories from scholars of affirmative action policies in other fields, such as school admissions and hiring practices. First, Aberson (2003) finds that

27 Interview with Tsepo Molefe (Morna & Tolmay 2007: 68).
28 Interview with Mathato Mantso, councilor in a reserved ED in Lesotho’s Khomokhoana Council (Morna & Tolmay 2007 169).
both in-group and out-group members in America report greater support for affirmative action when justifications were provided for the policy - something that did not happen when the quota was adopted in Lesotho. Earlier work examining race-based affirmative action policies in the United States also finds that in the absence of such explanations, attitudes towards the policy depend on individuals’ assumptions about the existence of racism rather than their levels of hostility toward the policies’ beneficiaries (Stoker, 1998). Applied to the case of Lesotho, these studies would rightly suggest that in rural Sesotho society, in which women’s marginalized status is codified in customary law, when the quota was implemented without local buy-in or discussion, the policy generated negative unintended attitudinal reactions towards its beneficiaries.

Second, the literature on affirmative action sheds light on the puzzling finding that female citizens have stronger negative reactions towards the policy than male citizens. Although studies from the United States suggest that women overwhelmingly endorse gender-based affirmative action much more strongly than do men and have stronger support for stricter preferential policies (see Crosby et al. (2006) and Harrison et al. (2006) for reviews), several studies note that support for affirmative action is based on individual-level identities. For instance, pulling from social identity theory, Linnehan et al. (2006) and Lowery et al. (2006) show that individual support for race-based affirmative action are related to the individual’s level of identification with his or her own race or ethnic group. Similarly, Konrad & Spitz (2003) and Martins & Parsons (2007) find evidence that women’s support for sex-based affirmative action policies are related to women’s beliefs that they are part of a marginalized group. Again, we see how these theories are applicable to the case of Lesotho. As noted in Section 3.2 and discussed in greater length in [2], two years before the quota policy’s implementation,
Basotho women actually reported stronger support for the continued traditional role of women as compared to male respondents, suggesting, perhaps unsurprisingly, that most Basotho women do not have the type of feminist identities that would predict support for preferential treatment of women.

Finally, support for different types of affirmative action policies relate to the previous discussion of inclusionary and exclusionary political institutions. For instance, Cropanzano et al. (2005) find that African Americans show greater support for race-blind affirmative action policies (such as targeted recruiting, but no preference in hiring), rather than race-conscious policies that explicitly give preference based on race (such as tie-breaking policies or quotas). The authors argue that race-conscious affirmative action policies contain a tacit threat to the self-image of the historically underrepresented group because they carry the message that potential beneficiaries lack certain relevant qualifications.

In sum, taken together these theories provide a unified and nuanced explanation for the findings presented here. Both my quantitative results as well as my qualitative research in Lesotho suggest that the exclusionary nature and perceived illegitimacy of the quota law created a backlash against the quota’s beneficiaries. Further, in a country in which women have been socialized to accept male authority, female citizens expressed the strongest negative reactions against beneficiaries of the quota policy. Indeed, this is a common narrative in Lesotho. Alice Ranthimo, who worked with councilors during this period, notes: “The quota gave female villagers the impression that the councilor didn’t belong there; that she was just put there - and this often led to judgment and dismissal.”

29 Interview with Alice Ranthimo, program officer, Gender Links Lesotho, interviewed by author, February 10th, 2014.
3.5.2 External Validity and Theoretical Relevance

Like all research utilizing experimental methods, the three empirical chapters of this dissertation sacrifices external validity for increased internal validity. Nevertheless, the findings presented in this chapter add insight to the larger theoretical literatures on gender quotas, women’s descriptive representation, and female citizens’ propensity to involve themselves in the political lives of their communities.

As noted throughout this dissertation, affirmative action measures for women in politics have become incredibly popular in the last two decades, as various types of quotas have been implemented to correct for the historical underrepresentation of women. Again, although Lesotho and India are the only two countries in the world that have experimented with single-member districts in which women entirely replace would-be male candidates – and are therefore the most exclusionary type of quota policy, many other countries have adopted different types of reserved seat quotas at both the national and subnational level. While not replacing potential male candidates, these quota policies often create additional seats for women either in a post-hoc manner appointed by political parties or in additional single-member constituencies that overlap with representatives elected via non-gender-specific rules. In 2013, for instance, both Kenya and Zimbabwe implemented such measures at the national level.\textsuperscript{30}

Whereas women have almost never won a majority of seats in an electoral body by winning a sizable number of open seats in addition to quota-assigned seats, this trend has happened, albeit to a lesser degree on frequent occasions.\textsuperscript{31} In quota systems that

\textsuperscript{30}In Kenya, “women’s districts” are cobbled over other open districts in a first-past-the-post system, so citizens vote both for their MP in an open seat and their female MP in a “women’s district.” In Zimbabwe, an additional 30 percent of seats are appointed proportionally by political party vote share.

\textsuperscript{31}In addition to sub-nationally in Lesotho during the period of the reserved ED quota, this also describes the current makeup of the Andorran and Rwandan parliaments.
have both gender-specific and non-gender-specific electoral rules, women do typically win some unreserved seats - suggesting that testing for the effects of female representation through different selection mechanisms has important implications to other countries that have experimented with reserved seat quota policies.

Whereas the way that constituents relate to their representatives is certainly different in national compared to local politics, the findings here may provide insight into how “quota women” are perceived by their constituents more broadly. Policies that add women to elected bodies rather than creating a scenario in which they replace men are by nature inclusionary, rather than exclusionary, but still allow citizens to potentially associate these women with the stigma of being affirmative action beneficiaries. Future work might test whether the negative reactions that I find in Lesotho extend to more inclusionary instances in which women who attain office via quotas are still easily identifiable. This is a testable implication that will provide insight as to whether the findings presented here are best explained by the stigma effect or the inclusion versus exclusion effect.

Importantly, this chapter also provides insight to a decade’s worth of research that has emerged from the Indian case. After nearly two decades of the affirmative action policy, the positive substantive and symbolic results are firmly established. At least three theoretically salient explanations emerge when attempting to reconcile this body of work with the findings presented here.

First, it is very possible that the positive symbolic effects of gender quotas take more than three years to realize. Given that there were no studies of the Indian quota immediately following its adoption, this chapter’s results could indicate a short-term negative reaction to the quota that would dissipate and eventually turn into positive
reactions as the quota became more established and accepted as a legitimate and fair electoral rule over time. Indeed, several studies from India have found that the reported positive symbolic effects take two electoral terms to realize (Bhavnani, 2009; Beaman et al., 2009, 2012a).

Second, it is possible that the perceived source of Lesotho’s quota policy in particular caused a negative reaction among citizens. If Basotho citizens perceived the quota as an external attempt to shape policy or as a policy originating from a domestically unpopular regime (see Bush & Jamal, forthcoming), this may have caused negative reactions towards the policy’s beneficiaries. Third, in India, women seldom win in unreserved districts causing researchers to methodologically conflate the quota policy with female representation. The Lesotho case, however, allows one to parse out the effects of gender and electoral rules - but, of course, it is also likely part of the explanatory story. In Lesotho, the fact that a significant number of women won in unreserved electoral districts suggests that both the stigma effect and the effect of exclusionary institutions may have been heightened, as the justifications for the affirmative action policy are less immediately apparent to ordinary citizens. Parsing out the relative weight of each of these explanations is certainly an area of future research that would lend itself well to creative comparative or experimental approaches.

3.6 Conclusion

The popularity of electoral gender quotas as a way of integrating more women into formal political power structures has increased dramatically in the last two decades. Scholarly work aimed at understanding the varied potential impacts of an increase in women’s descriptive representation has grown in tandem. This chapter has examined
one facet of this growing research agenda, specifically, the ways in which electoral gender
quotas foster female citizens’ engagement with local politics. The results presented here
provide new evidence on the ways citizens react to exposure to female politicians, those
elected via a mandatory gender quota that gives absolute preference on gender and those
elected through the same electoral rules as men. Counterintuitively, I find evidence that
all citizens express less interest in politics and that female citizens in particular express
lower levels of political efficacy under a quota-assigned female representative. Using im-
lications from the policy experiment, I argue that the perceived preferential treatment
from the quota policy rather than the councilor’s gender or the perceived competence of
quota-mandated representatives is the key determinate in affecting women’s engagement
with local politics.

The implications of these findings speak to the broader comparative study of gender
quotas - most notably through the mediators that may be at play. My results suggest
that the causal effect of the quota is likely related to the hyper-exclusionary nature of
the quota policy, a stigma surrounding the policy’s beneficiaries, or both. Whereas the
former explanation is most relevant in comparison to the Indian case, the later is an effect
that can potentially apply to more inclusionary types of quotas in which women are still
visibly given preferential treatment. Testing the competing implications that arise from
these potential mediators in different cases is a fruitful area for future research.

The research presented in this chapter as well as the two empirical chapters that
follow represent the first studies that can compare another policy experiment case to
the large literature that has emerged from a similar subnational experiment with reserved
districts in India. Contrary to the broad consensus from the Indian case, the findings
presented here have less than sanguine implications for the likelihood that compulsory
quotas will positively shift women’s political attitudes and behavior, at least in the short term. This leads to at least four policy-relevant conclusions that give some leverage on understanding when quotas might produce unintended negative consequences.

First, quotas are more likely to be symbolically successful in electoral systems in which women cannot be uniquely identified as having benefitted from the policy (for instance, by integrating more women into top spots on party lists in proportional representation systems). Second, local consultation and by-in from domestic groups will likely increase the possibility that the quota policy is well-received. Third, greater insistence on the longevity of reserved single member districts may normalize this policy as an appropriate electoral rule, which in turn may lead to the positive symbolic effects that have been demonstrated in India. Fourth, quotas are likely to be more successful when implemented in systems in which it is historically clear that women experience discrimination in open competition with men, as it will provide citizens with a historically grounded justification for preferential policies based on sex. Given the continued rapid pace of quota adoption, the nuances of the effects of different types of affirmative action policies for women in politics are important areas of future research.
## Associated Tables

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<th>Total Sample:</th>
<th>Mean Reserved</th>
<th>Mean Unreserved</th>
<th>ATE (95% CI)</th>
<th>p-values: 2-tailed</th>
<th>1-tailed</th>
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<td>Can you make councilors listen?</td>
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<td>3.17</td>
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<td>1.94</td>
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ATEs with significance of \( p < 0.05 \) indicated in **bold**.

Table 3.1: Total sample reservation ATEs.
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<th>Mean Unreserved</th>
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<td>2.00</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.44, 0.00)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>3.02</td>
<td>-0.47</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.75, -0.20)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.20, 0.10)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted councilor</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.14, 0.07)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Split Sample:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male Respondents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you make councilors listen?</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.14, 0.40)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do councilors try to listen?</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.30, 0.16)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.66, -0.12)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.27, 0.09)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted councilor</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14, 0.09)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ATEs with significance of $p < 0.05$ indicated in **bold**.

Table 3.2: Split sample reservation CATEs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>-0.58</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Under 25)</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.78</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cut points:

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0.63</th>
<th>0.62</th>
<th>0.64</th>
<th>0.42</th>
<th>0.69</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Random Effects: St. Dev.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>1013.35</td>
<td>1037.94</td>
<td>993.97</td>
<td>896.23</td>
<td>475.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>1041.54</td>
<td>1066.13</td>
<td>1022.16</td>
<td>920.39</td>
<td>495.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-499.68</td>
<td>-511.97</td>
<td>-489.98</td>
<td>-442.12</td>
<td>-232.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**. Standard errors are listed below coefficients in parentheses.

Table 3.3: Female split sample: Reservation effect on respondents' political engagement. Councilor contact is specified as a logistic regression, all other models are ordered logistic regressions. Models are multi-level with random effects specified at the community council level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>-0.61</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Under 25)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cut points:
0|1                      
1|2                      
2|3                      
3|4                      

Random Effects: St. Dev.  
AIC  
BIC  
Log Likelihood  
Num. obs.  

Coefficients with p < 0.05 in **bold**. Standard errors are listed below coefficients in parentheses.

Table 3.4: Male split sample: Reservation effect on respondents’ political engagement. Councilor contact is specified as a logistic regression, all other models are ordered logistic regressions. Models are multi-level with random effects specified at the community council level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Reserved</th>
<th>Mean Unreserved</th>
<th>ATE (95 % CI)</th>
<th>p-values:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ATE)</td>
<td>2-tailed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(95 % CI)</td>
<td>1-tailed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sample:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can you make councilors listen?</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td><strong>-0.96</strong></td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.74, -0.27)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do councilors try to listen?</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>-0.53</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.16, 0.07)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>3.19</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.85, 0.01)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.64, 0.39)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted counselor</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>0.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.45, 0.24)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ATEs with significance of $p < 0.05$ indicated in **bold**.

Table 3.5: Estimates of ATEs using pre-existing traditional contact as a measure for the latent propensity for female representation: Sample includes reserved EDs and unreserved EDs with a high latent propensity for female representation (low pre-existing levels of contact with traditional leaders).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Reserved</th>
<th>Mean Unreserved</th>
<th>ATE (95 % CI)</th>
<th>p-values: 2-tailed (1-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance: market maintenance</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.16 (-0.03, 0.35)</td>
<td>0.11 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance: comm. cleanliness</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td><strong>0.24</strong> (0.03, 0.45)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance: make work known</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.13 (-0.08, 0.35)</td>
<td>0.23 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance: info on budget</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td><strong>0.29</strong> (0.08, 0.50)</td>
<td>0.01 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance: public benefit</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.15 (-0.07, 0.38)</td>
<td>0.18 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ATEs with significance of $p < 0.05$ indicated in **bold**.

Table 3.6: Estimates of ATEs of performance indicators between reserved and unreserved electoral divisions.)
Appendices
.1 Electoral Division Random Effects

To account for the hierarchical nature of the Lesotho data, I employ mixed-level models with random effects at the electoral division (ED) level. Random effects by ED vary across model specifications from highly statistically significant to having very little observable differences across EDs. To maintain consistency across models, I include random effects across model specifications. Figure A3.1 plots a sample of ED effects for dependent variables in which reservation status proved statistically significant.

The two upper graphs plot the ED effects for the two measures of external political efficacy for female respondents. Likelihood ratio test obtained with anova techniques produce a p-value of 0.069 for the first measure (upper left hand plot) and 0.328 for the second measure (upper right hand plot). The bottom two panels show the ED effects for respondents’ interest level in politics for male and female respondents respectively. The corresponding p-value for the ED random effects is 0.027 for female respondents and 0.002 for male respondents.\footnote{The anova tests whether standard deviation of ED random effects ($\sigma$) is equal to zero. Since $\sigma$ is on the boundary of the parameter space (a variance cannot be negative), it is often argued that a more correct p-value is obtained by halving the p-value produced by the conventional likelihood ratio test, in which case ED random effects would be significant across a greater number of models. (Christensen, 2012: 4).}
.2 Preexisting differences in future unreserved EDs in level of contact with traditional rulers
### Table A3.1: Difference in means from the 2003 Afro-barometer data for respondents living in future unreserved EDs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Unreserved EDs</th>
<th>Mean Unreserved EDs</th>
<th>Difference (SE)</th>
<th>t-test p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male Councilors</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td><strong>0.23</strong> (0.06)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Councilors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences of means with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table A3.2: Afro-barometer 2003 data: sample of respondents living in future unreserved EDs. Higher values indicate more frequent contact with traditional leaders. Model of residence in a future male-led ED is specified as a logistic regression. Model is multi-level with random effects specified at the ED level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Residence in ED with male councilor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact with</td>
<td>-0.26 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>traditional leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut points:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Effects:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev.</td>
<td>11.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>221.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-102.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>519</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences of means with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**
Chapter 4

Women, Electoral Gender Quotas, and the Chieftaincy

Note: A version of this chapter is forthcoming in The Journal of Policy Analysis and Management.

Introduction

In this chapter, I turn my attention to the ability of quota recipients to translate their presence in decision-making bodies into political influence. Despite its unsystematic treatment in the gender quota literature, a number of case studies have suggested that women’s physical presence in politics has not usurped the de facto power of traditional male elites. This occurrence is perhaps most likely at the level of local governance. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, the historical importance of patrilineal chiefs in structuring community life suggests that male-dominated power structures may be most entrenched at the village level in comparison to more recently formed national legislatures.

Here I examine how Lesotho’s quota policy interacts with the power base of local traditional leaders. In sum, I find that the perceived influence of traditional leaders is significantly dampened in electoral divisions reserved for women, suggesting that quotas
have allowed women not only *de jure* but *de facto* leadership roles in these communities.

I offer hypotheses about the mediating factors that may be causing this effect, but the lack of heterogeneous treatment effects within different demographic subgroups suggests that multiple mediators are likely at play.

This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 offers a brief background of the chieftaincy in Lesotho. Section 4.2 reviews the relevant literature examining how quotas for women in local politics might interact with traditional power structures in newly decentralized contexts. Section 4.3 outlines the theoretical framework of this chapter to understand the possible strategic and gendered interactions between traditional authorities and local councilors. Section 4.4 introduces the data and methods used to measure the impact of the quota law. Section 4.5 presents the model results and robustness considerations. It also assess the possibility of heterogeneous treatment effects in areas where chiefs had previously high or low levels of influence prior the quota. Section 4.6 offers a discussion of the findings in relation to the theoretical framework and the final section concludes.

### 4.1 Traditional Leaders in Lesotho

As in most African countries (Lund, 2006), the chieftaincy has historically been interconnected with the governance structures of Lesotho. By law, Lesotho’s upper parliamentary house is composed of 22 high-level chiefs and eleven non-chiefs appointed by the King. Lesotho’s King (a direct descendant of King Moshoeshoe I, Lesotho’s founding Paramount Chief) also serves as the current Paramount Chief of Lesotho. There are also over 1000 lesser chiefs, who have traditionally served as the main form of governance at the village level (Quinlan & Wallis, 2003: 148). Indeed in the first round
of the Afro-barometer Lesotho survey, over 99 percent of respondents reported having a traditional leader, chief, or headman (Logan 2009: 109).

The chieftaincy’s role in structuring local governance in Lesotho predates colonial control, but the authority of chiefs was first put into writing by the British as a way to formalize customary law. Among other things, the written code requires that chiefly lineage be patrilineal. This tradition was recently upheld by the Lesotho High Court, which ruled that the sole daughter of a deceased Paramount Chief could not inherit his title. Patrilineal heritage, however, is not as strictly observed among lesser chiefs, and a limited number of female village-level chiefs exist, although they have less standing than their male counterparts by customary law (Petlane & Mapetla 1998: 250). Lesotho then by many accounts is similar to other southern African experiences with traditional authorities (Beall et al., 2005; Beall, 2004; Molutsi, 2004) that are largely structured around patriarchal authority, which tend to limit the leadership roles of women.

The chieftaincy serves myriad functions in structuring rural Sesotho life. Chiefs have de facto authority over land allocation, grazing control, burial grounds, and the maintenance of minor roads. They also serve as the primary source of conflict resolution, both in major disputes, for instance over livestock and land, as well as more mundane policing and judicial functions, including arbitrating family disputes (Quinlan & Wallis, 2003: 170). In the lead up to the devolution of local authority to community councilors in 2005, the proposed division of responsibilities between the two groups was not clearly defined, causing one observer to note: “people are not yet very clear on the distinction between the functions of the proposed Community Councils versus those of the chief (Shale 2005: 4).” In council focus groups conducted in the country two years after the quota’s adoption, participants reported that the opaque delegation of responsibilities
had caused tensions between the two groups, as Morna & Tolmay (2007: 117) note:

One councilor commented: ‘working with the chiefs is very difficult because there is a lack of understanding about the roles and responsibilities of both the chiefs and councilors’... [Council focus group] participants complained that at best there is a lack of support and at worst obstruction by chiefs. Complaints included the fact that chiefs continue to levy charges on the community and in some cases intentionally misallocate land belonging to community members to sabotage councilors.

In short, decentralization in Lesotho has created a new local governance system that is rife with power-sharing tensions between selected traditional leaders and elected councilors.

4.2 Subnational Gender Quotas, Decentralization, and Traditional Leaders

For the most part, the gender quota literature and the literature on decentralization and traditional influence have not met. Both these literatures, however, add insight to possible power dynamics between newly implemented gender quotas and the entrenched influence of traditional elites in structuring local governance.

The gender quota literature concerning the extent to which the de jure power of quota recipients has translated into de facto power has for the most part examined parliamentary politics (see Bauer (2012) for a review on African experiences). With a few notable exceptions, quotas that reserve parliamentary seats for women are often criticized for creating an additional vote bank for ruling parties without allowing quota recipients actual decisionmaking authority (see, for instance, Panday (2008) on Bangladesh, Meena (2004) on Tanzania, and Longman (2006) on Rwanda). In these cases, a reserved seat
system, including those with special districts for women, can leave quota recipients not only in practice but also in the public perception as lesser politicians.

In large part because of a lack of data, there has been less research on gender quotas at the local level, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. What research there has been often mirrors the lessons from parliamentary politics in relation to reserved seat systems. For instance, Kawamara-Mishambi & Ovonji-Odida (2003) document local quota provisions in Uganda in which new seats for women have been added onto local councils to avoid a situation where women might unseat male councilors. The authors argue that in districts where women have been detached from normal arenas of competition, they are often treated as lesser politicians. Lesotho’s subnational quota system, however, provides a unique case in which reserved electoral divisions do unseat potential male councilors thereby offering a test of the effects of female leadership in an instance in which they are not redundant to their male equivalents.

As throughout this dissertation, the most relevant work on quotas in subnational governments has come from India, specifically because the Indian local-level quota design also allows for causal analysis. Driven primarily by economists, a great deal of research has emerged demonstrating largely positive female leadership effects. There is evidence that female leaders have different policy preferences than male leaders (Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004); that female citizens participate more in village meetings under female leadership (Beaman et al., 2010; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2003; Deininger et al., 2011); that female candidates are more likely to run and win in reserved districts after quotas have been removed (Bhavnani, 2009); that citizens in reserved districts have less bias against female leaders (Beaman et al., 2009); and that female leaders may act as role models for young girls in their communities (Beaman et al., 2012a). The female
leadership effect on traditional influence in reserved districts, however, has yet to be systematically addressed in the Indian case, although some anecdotal evidence suggests that informal governance structures have a great deal of influence in selecting which women run (often uncontested) in reserved districts (Pur 2002: 4285). A second relevant literature relates to the ways decentralization has affected the influence of traditional elites as a source of local public authority. Theory building work on the role of the chieftaincy in newly emerging African democracies notes the challenges faced when new political actors are introduced onto existing political, economic, and social systems (see: Williams (2004); Murray (2004) on South Africa; Englebert (2002) on Uganda; de Sousa Santos (2006) on Mozambique; and Muriaas (2011) on Uganda, Malawi, and South Africa). The results here are mixed and demonstrate that these new power-sharing dynamics are not always deleterious for democratic outcomes. For instance, using Afro-barometer data from 15 countries on the continent, Logan (2009) notes that respondents’ evaluations of newly decentralized local authorities and hereditary chiefs are positively linked, indicating that rather than being a zero-sum game over control of local power and resources, “local traditional leaders appear to draw their sustenance and legitimacy from the same well as elected officials (Logan 2008: iii).” A related literature examines whether the type of relationship that exists between local politicians and traditional leaders affects the local provision of public goods. Documenting these empirical effects, however, proves difficult in large part because of the difficulties associated with measuring the influence of traditional leaders or other types of unelected patrons in local politics. In theory, closer relationships between local councilors and chiefs could indicate that councilors are benefitting from chiefs’ clientelistic networks to buy votes and ensure future electoral support. In such instances, patronage-
based redistribution may come at the expense of public goods provision (Wantchekon, 2003; Keefer, 2005; Bratton, 2008; Collier & Vicente, 2012; Van de Walle, 2003, 2012). Baldwin (2013), however, finds that closer ties between chiefs and local MPs in single-member constituencies in Zambia are beneficial to the public provision of education because chiefs “serve as a technology by which resources are delivered to communities” and further that citizens vote for MPs backed by local chiefs because they recognize these welfare benefits.

Whereas fiscal responsibilities have not been devolved to community councils in Lesotho to the same extent as in other recently decentralized countries, there is anecdotal evidence that conflictual relationships between chiefs and councilors are likely detrimental to local service delivery - and further that the propensity for these types of conflicts are gendered. For instance, Morna & Tolmay (2007: 118), who provide the only interview and focus-group based account of local government in Lesotho during this time, relate the experience of one female councilor:

She [a female councilor] alleges that she faces resistance from some of the men who work closely with the chiefs. The biggest problem she has faced as a councilor is the poor turn out at pitsos (public gatherings), that she has organized through the chief whom she relies on to send out invitations. She is convinced that the chief is not sending the invitations out in time. It is at these meeting that people are given information. Poor participation hinders her ability to perform optimally.

Finally, to date, neither the gender quota literature nor the decentralization literature has directly empirically addressed the relationship between gender quotas at the subnational level and the influence of traditional leaders. To my knowledge, the research presented in this chapter is the first to do so.
4.3 Why Should Quotas Matter?

How might a quota policy requiring only female candidates in local electoral divisions affect the public authority of the chieftaincy? The literatures outlined above suggest several possibilities.\(^{33}\)

A first explanation relates to the nature of the quota law itself. A quota policy that constrains local elections to only female candidates makes the state’s presence in local politics much more visible than in the absence of such a policy. A constrained subset of potential candidates not only limits chiefs’ ability to mobilize support around a particular desired (male) candidate before the election, but the quota may also reveal to citizens the general inability of chiefs to control local elections. Thus the state’s role in visibly and dramatically shaping local elections may decrease the perceived influence of traditional leaders in reserved EDs.

A second set of explanations considers that the power-sharing dynamics between chiefs and councilors may be gendered. This is possible in both directions. Given that the chieftaincy is predominately male, male councilors and traditional leaders may be more likely to work together to uphold the patriarchal power structures of local governance. This is likely not an overt decision, but chiefs may be more comfortable working with male councilors than what they consider the more unseemly act of working with a female representatives. In this scenario, chiefs are more likely to work with newly elected male councilors, and they may also decide to support particular male candidates prior to the election.

\(^{33}\)It is important to note that chiefs are not barred from running in local elections, but in practice this does not happen. There has been no recorded instance of this occurrence by Lesotho’s Independent Electoral Commission and these two domains of public authority (chiefs versus councilors) are largely considered separate by Basotho citizens. As one citizen told me: “Chiefs are chiefs and councilors are councilors - why should a chief try to be a councilor?”
The preference of chiefs to work with male councilors rather than female councilors is made more likely by the fact that one of the central duties traditionally assigned to chiefs and recently devolved to councilors is the allocation of livestock grazing rights, particularly of cattle. Because herding is a duty undertaken exclusively by men in Sesotho society, chiefs may be more willing to work with other men in this realm of rural life rather than what they perceive as the more unnatural alliance of working with women on issues of cattle grazing.\[34\] On this, Morna & Tolmay (2007: 117) report the following observations from their focus groups:

One of the most contentious issues is that chiefs no longer have jurisdiction over the distribution of land. Because the transfer of powers from chiefs to local government is so recent, the impact of a traditional system that theoretically has little power, but in practice exercises tremendous sway, is a contentious issue, especially for women councilors... A male councilor explained that for a long time the grazing lands have been controlled by the chiefs and the men. In the women-only constituencies, when women try to control these lands, the men challenge them.

When Basotho citizens see a female councilor involved in the allocation of grazing land, it may undermine the traditional notion that this is a male domain, which may indirectly call into question the patriarchal power structures on which chiefs base their authority. On the other hand, when male community leaders make these decisions, it does not upend the traditional patrilineal authority of chiefs in the same way. These observations suggest that the influence of traditional authorities (both real and perceived) will remain high when chiefs have the same constituencies as male councilors, but may weaken in electoral divisions reserved for women.

A countering argument, however, is also plausible. Given women’s historically weak

\[34\] On this point, refer to Ferguson (1990) and Murray (1981), the seminal anthropological studies on cattle, gender, and local authority in Lesotho.
position in Sesotho society, female councilors might be more likely (or perceived to be more likely) to hand governing authority over to traditional leaders. In this instance, chiefs might back female candidates prior to the elections, as they know women will be less of a threat to their monopoly on public authority. Although there have been no recorded instances of women handing over their positions to men in reserved districts wholesale \cite{Morna2007}, after elections chiefs may have an easier time assuming some of the responsibilities of female councilors and maintaining governing influence in their communities. Anecdotal evidence from \cite{Morna2007} also suggests that this might be occurring in some districts:

A participant in the Lesotho civil society focus group added: ‘Women are trapped in a cultural boundary. They are not supported by the chiefs or the community who believe that they are not good decisionmakers; that they can’t drive development. They accept whatever the elders say.’

Under this scenario, chiefs are more likely to maintain \textit{de facto} authority under female representation, as women become relegated to the status of tokens.

If the last explanation is at play, the presence of the quota should not affect the perceived local authority of traditional leaders (or might even increase it). The first two explanations in this section rely on slightly different mediators - the first emphasizes the restrictive nature of the quota policy itself and the second emphasizes the effect of female representation. However, under both of these explanations, I expect to find decreased levels of perceived traditional influence in reserved electoral divisions. Although a complete testing of mediators is beyond the scope of this research, Section \ref{sec:4.5} presents preliminary evidence in an attempt to adjudicate between the explanatory power of these potential causal explanations. To do this, I measure localized levels of chiefs’ authority
prior to the quota. I expect that in areas where chiefs previously had high levels of public authority, citizens will be more likely to perceive this group as losing influence when they see a woman stepping into the policymaking domain - providing evidence for a female leadership effect. However, in areas where chiefs were less active in communal governance prior to the quota, this explanation makes less sense. Further, the hypothesis that considers the state’s presence as delegitimizing chiefs’ authority is most plausible in areas with an inactive or moribund chieftaincy. In contrast, this explanation is less plausible in areas where the chiefs’ authority is deeply embedded in local governance structures.

4.4 Measures and Methods

4.4.1 Data and Dependent Variable Specification

To measure the impact of living in a reserved ED, I again rely on the 2008 Afrobarometer survey data, which includes a nationally representative, random, stratified probability sample of approximately 1200 Basotho, which I describe at length in Chapter 3. The dependent variable in this chapter takes a question from the 2008 Afrobarometer survey, which reads: “How much influence do traditional leaders currently have in governing your local community.” The response categories on a Likert-type scale are “none,” “a small amount,” “some,” or “a great deal.” Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of responses to this question by response category and respondents’ ED type.
The distribution of responses here is revealing. Respondents in EDs reserved for women are 18 percent less likely (moving from 51 percent to 42 percent) than those in unreserved EDs to report that traditional leaders have a great deal of influence in their local communities. Conversely, respondents in reserved EDs are 33 percent more likely (moving from 18 percent to 24 percent) to report that traditional leaders have a small amount of influence in their communities. The difference between the “great deal” response category by ED reservation status is statistically significant at the 0.01 level, and the “small amount” response category at the 0.04 level.³⁵

### 4.5 Results

#### 4.5.1 The Reservation Effect

Table 4.1 shows the mean perceived traditional influence on the four-point scale for the reserved and unreserved groups (with higher values associated with greater levels of perceived traditional influence). The difference between these groups can be interpreted as the average treatment effect - in this case 0.2 on the four-point scale. I simulate and calculate the associated 95 percent confidence intervals around this estimate based on the principles of cluster random assignment (Gerber & Green, 2012: 80) with respondents clustered within EDs. Using this method, I find that the ATE is bracketed by a confidence interval of a true effect size ranging from -0.37 to -0.03. To measure the standardized effect size, I divide the ATE by the standard deviation of the control (unreserved) group to reveal that the quota caused a decrease of 0.2 standard deviations on

³⁵Calculated through Welch Two Sample t-tests.
the scale of perceived traditional influence.\footnote{Researchers typically characterize standardized effects of less than 0.3 standard deviations as small, between 0.3 and 0.8 as moderate, and above 0.8 as large \cite{Gerber_2012}.}

The second row of Table 2 shows the ATE calculated on a dichotomous response variable in which the highest category, “a great deal of influence,” is coded as one and all other values are coded as zero. The ATE here, which also achieves traditional statistical significance, is easier to interpret. Confirming the descriptive statistics in Figure 4.1, exposure to a quota-mandated leader causes a nine percentage point drop (associated with a 18 percent decrease) in the number of respondents who feel their traditional leaders have a great deal of influence in local governance.

Table 4.1

4.5.2 Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

The analysis above does not reveal whether the reservation effect is due to the restrictive selection mechanisms mandated by the quota policy, or whether it is a result of chiefs having to work with a female councilor when they would have preferred a male councilor. Whereas the cumulative reservation effect allows for causal inference because of the random nature of the quota assignment, comparisons between residents in reserved EDs and the two respective control subgroups (male-led unreserved and female-led unreserved EDs) are problematic because these groups are neither randomly assigned nor observationally identical.

In this section, I offer a way to gain leverage on the power of each of these respective mediators by measuring heterogeneous treatment effects among subsets of respondents
living in areas with respectively active and inactive chiefs prior to the quota. I do this based at the following logic: I expect that chiefs in reserved EDs that had high levels of public authority prior to the quota lost their ability to mobilize votes around a preferred (male) candidate to a greater degree than in areas where they had low levels of pre-existing authority. Indeed, empirically this is the case. Recall from Chapter 3 that areas with oft-contacted chiefs prior to the quota were significantly less likely to elect female councilors on their own volition than areas with seldom-contacted chiefs. Further areas with influential chiefs are more likely to house citizens with heightened beliefs about the importance of patriarchal power structures. In these areas, the experience of having a quota-mandated female community representative (especially dealing in the domain of grazing rights) may be seen as more shocking, causing citizens to reevaluate the chiefs’ role in local governance to a greater degree than an areas where the local chief had less of a presence in the community prior to the quota. Therefore, if the female representation mediator is at play, I expect the quota’s ATE to be highly pronounced among the subset of respondents living in active chieftaincies.

In Section 4.2 I also hypothesized that the quota law may have delegitimized the chiefs’ authority when the strict stipulations of the policy revealed to citizens the ability of the state to control local elections in a way that superseded the chiefs’ prerogative. The ability of the state to so quickly delegitimize the entrenched authority of local chiefs, however, seems most plausible in areas with an already inactive or moribund chieftaincy. Therefore, if this mediator is at play, I expect the quota’s ATE to be especially pronounced among citizens in areas where the chief was not previously highly involved in communal governance.

One question from the 2003 Afro-barometer survey round, two years prior to the
quota’s adoption, asked respondents how often they contacted a traditional ruler during the previous year “for help to solve a problem or to give them your views.” Respondents could indicate on a four point Likert-type scale that they had never contacted a traditional ruler, had done so only once, had done so a few times, or had done so often during the previous year. This observed variation in traditional leaders’ presence in their communities prior to quota adoption, as measured by contact with their subjects, provides a useful way to test for conditional reservation effects in communities with respectively high and low preexisting levels of traditional influence. Importantly, responses to this 2003 survey question are not correlated with the assignment of the quota policy (see Table A3.1), and the measure therefore allows for the separation of subgroups within both the future reserved and unreserved EDs with arguably high or low levels of preexisting traditional influence.

To create a subset of EDs (both reserved and unreserved) with high preexisting levels of traditional influence, I select only council areas from the 2003 survey with a modal response indicating residents had contacted a traditional leader often during the previous year.\textsuperscript{37} I then select residents in these same council areas from the 2008 data to create a group of respondents who lived in an area with a oft-contacted chief prior to the instigation of the quota policy. Conversely, to create a subset of observations with low levels of preexisting traditional influence, I select a subset of EDs (again both reserved and unreserved) from the 2003 data with the modal response of never having contacted a traditional leader in the previous year. I include respondents with residence in these

\textsuperscript{37}Unfortunately, specifying to the level of electoral division is not possible from the 2003 to the 2008 data, as Afro-barometer staff did not sample enough of the same villages to disaggregate at this level. I therefore select respondents who are in the same council area. However, given that chiefs’ wards do not directly correspond with electoral divisions it is likely that chiefs’influence is spatially clustered to include surrounding villages.
council areas from the 2008 data to create a subset of respondents living in areas with seldom-contacted chiefs prior to the quota.

I use a series of regressions with treatment by covariate interactions to model potential treatment effect heterogeneity within subgroups with respectively high and low levels of pre-existing traditional contact. To account for the nested structure of individuals within EDs, I use an OLS specification of hierarchical linear modeling with random intercepts at the ED level. Model 1 of Table 5.3 first shows the calculation of the quota’s ATE under this specification, which is identical to the estimate calculated through randomization inference presented above. Model 2 and Model 3 show the conditional average treatment effects (CATEs) within the subgroups for areas with respectively high and low levels of reported citizen contact with chiefs prior to the quota policy.

Table 4.2 here

There do not appear to be heterogeneous treatment effects in areas with either high or low pre-existing levels of chiefly contact, as neither interaction term is statistically significant. Further the p-values associated with the corresponding F-tests comparing Model 1 to Model 2 and Model 3 are respectively 0.64 and 0.96, indicating the presence of an interaction term does not identify significant CATEs for these particular subgroups. The lack of heterogeneous treatment effects within these respective subgroups suggests that, as is often the case in social science research, more than one mediator is likely

38 This null finding is robust across a series of grouping specifications from the 2003 contact variable.
causing the quota policy to change the way citizens view the influence of their local traditional leaders. I discuss the implication of this further in Section 4.6.

### 4.5.3 Robustness Considerations

Although the quota was randomly assigned, as a robustness consideration I also use a series of regression models to test whether the average treatment effect holds when controlling for additional pre-treatment covariates that might also affect the way citizens perceive the influence of their local traditional leader. I control for respondents’ age, sex, education, poverty level, religiosity, and urban/rural residence. The results from Model 2 indicate that, unsurprisingly, chiefs are perceived to have more influence (and by all accounts indeed have more influence) in rural communities compared to urban communities. Including this variable as a covariate somewhat attenuates the quota’s average treatment effect, but the ATE maintains its statistical significance at the 0.08 level. Further, the results of Model 3 show that including other demographic covariates does not significantly reduce the quota’s effect nor improve model fit - and the quota’s ATE again maintains its significance at the 0.08 level.

Table 4.3 here

An additional robustness check accounts for the potential non-random missingness of the observations I list-wise delete because I cannot definitely identify their village reservation status. Here I conduct an extreme bounds analysis, first grouping these approximately 200 observations in the control group and then in the treatment group.
My findings remain relatively robust to these considerations as well. Grouping all missing observations in the control group results in an ATE with a p-value of 0.01. Conversely, grouping these observations in the treatment group results in an ATE with a p-value of 0.07. Finally, a series of regression models (not presented) with covariate by treatment interactions reveal that there are no statistically significant heterogeneous treatment effects among the various demographic subgroups I control for in Table 4.3.

4.5.4 Alternative Explanations

As also discussed in Chapter 3, one alternative explanation relates to voting patterns and elections results. If citizens were more or less likely to vote across district types in the 2005 local elections, this might have affected these citizens’ perceptions of the successful candidates’ authority. If, for instance, voter turnout were higher in reserved EDs because the unique nature of the quota law drew more attention to these elections, then successful quota-mandated candidates might be seen as having more authority than in areas were turnout was low. The 2005 election data, however, reveals that this is unlikely. The election results recorded by Lesotho’s Independent Electoral Commission contain information on how many votes the winning candidate received (but not the margin of victory). This measure is distributed evenly across leadership type. Winning male councilors received an average of 160 votes and winning female councilors received an average 162 votes in unreserved EDs and 159 votes in reserved EDs, suggesting that voter turnout was similar across ED type.
4.6 Discussion

4.6.1 Evaluating Mediators

In sum, I find that the influence of traditional authorities is significantly diminished in electoral divisions reserved for only female candidates, and that this effect is equally pronounced in EDs in which the chieftaincy had both a strong and weak presence prior to the quota’s adoption. Although a complete testing of mechanisms is beyond the scope of this chapter, a review of the hypotheses outlined in Section 4.3 is useful.

First, I have not found evidence that chiefs benefit from quota-mandated female representation because women present less of a threat to their monopoly on local authority. To the contrary, citizens perceive chiefs as losing authority under this scenario. An additional hypothesis presented in Section 4.3 suggested that the restrictive nature of the quota policy might have a delegitimizing effect on chiefs’ authority. Under this account, I expected that citizens in areas with an inactive or moribund chieftaincy would be more likely to accept the new role of the state and, hence, the governing influence of female councilors. A second explanation posited that chiefs prefer to share governing responsibilities (when they must) with other men and that chiefs’ relationships with female councilors are more likely to be defined by conflict. Under this scenario, I expected that the reservation effect would be the most pronounced in areas with an influential chief prior to the quota because it is in these areas in which chiefs should have gotten their preferred candidates in unreserved EDs and felt the limitations of the quota most severely in reserved EDs.

I find no statistically significant heterogeneous treatment effects among citizens in areas with respectively oft or seldom-contacted chiefs prior to the quota. This suggests,
although certainly far from proves, that both of these mediators may be at play. Future studies might use experimental approaches to test the implications of these potential mediators more fully.

4.6.2 Public Sentiment toward Traditional Leaders

One additional policy-relevant question from the 2008 Afro-barometer asks respondents their opinions on the influence of traditional leaders in their communities. The question reads: “Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders have in governing your local community should increase, stay the same, or decrease?” Respondents could indicate on a five-point scale that the influence of traditional leaders should “decrease a lot,” “decrease somewhat,” “stay the same,” “increase somewhat,” or “increase a lot.” Table 4.4 reveals that there is not a statistically significant difference between citizens’ responses in reserved and unreserved electoral divisions, despite the perceptions that traditional leaders have lost influence in the former. This seems to indicate that even though citizens believe that chiefs are losing influence in electoral divisions reserved for female councilors, they accept the changing nature of local governance.

Table 4.4

4.6.3 Perceived versus Real Influence

Ideally this chapter would have examined whether the quota affected the real - rather than perceived - influence of traditional leaders in governing their local communities.
The ability to empirically measure and collect reliable data on the ways in which traditional patrons influence local governance in new democracies, however, proves difficult, and recently has led researchers to develop clever identification strategies, including experimental approaches, to empirically document this phenomenon (see, for example: Wantchekon 2003; Baldwin 2013).

This chapter, in contrast, examines the way citizens perceive the influence of local chiefs, which is an important contribution to our understanding of the changing roles of traditional leaders in decentralized contexts for at least two reasons. First, it is quite possible that Basotho citizens are apt perceivers of the actual influence of chiefs in their communities. As noted, over 99 percent of Basotho report having a local traditional leader. This means that when respondents were asked “how much influence do traditional leaders have in governing your local community” - they could respond factually, rather than hypothetically.

Second, even if perceived influence is not a proxy for real influence, perceptions of the public authority of traditional leaders in new democracies have important implications for the democratic legitimacy of recently decentralized institutions. If, as some scholars have argued, the chieftaincy constitutes an inherently non-democratic or anti-democratic form of governance (Mamdani 1996) that consistently excludes the voices of youth and women (Beall 2005; Molutsi 2004), than we might imagine that decreased perceptions of the chiefs’ authority may increase the democratic legitimacy of recently decentralized governance structures. However, if the popular perceptions of the chieftaincy and new local authorities are positively linked (Logan 2009), than a decrease of the former has less obvious implications on the public commitment to local democracy. This chapter does not attempt to adjudicate between these competing expectations regarding how
the loss of perceived traditional influence translates into support for local democratic institutions, however, it adds to this literature by examining the antecedents of changing popular perceptions of traditional authority.

Conclusion

As noted throughout this dissertation, the popularity of electoral gender quotas as a way of integrating more women into formal political power structures has increased dramatically in the last two decades, at both the national and subnational levels, in every region of the world. Countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Albania, Mexico and South Sudan have all adopted subnational electoral gender quotas in the last ten years. In tandem, scholarly work aimed at understanding the varied potential impacts of quotas has also expanded rapidly. This chapter contributes to a growing dimension of this research agenda: the extent to which quota policies have allowed women to turn their new *de jure* political positions into *de facto* political authority.

My contribution here examined how quota-mandated female representation affects the way citizens perceive the influence of local traditional elites. The case of Lesotho, by many accounts, is similar to most rural communities in sub-Saharan Africa, in which hereditary chiefs selected along agnatic lines continue to be the main source of local public authority. Whereas a great deal of work remains to be done on this question, Lesotho’s policy experiment provides distinctly causal evidence that, rather than being relegated to the status of tokens, citizens see quota-mandated female leaders as filling governing spaces that were traditionally assumed by the predominately male chieftaincy - and that this is true in both previously active and inactive chieftaincies. Further, citizens in these districts do not appear to lament this loss of traditional authority,
which indicates a certain level of acceptance of the women who have assumed political authority via quotas.

The results presented here are somewhat surprising in lieu of the previous chapter’s findings. Although women are less engaged with local level politics under quota-mandated female representation, the implications from this chapter suggest that both men and women recognize the governing spaces that quota-assigned women occupy, even if female citizens may do so somewhat begrudingly. Taken together, these findings suggest that citizens’ attitudes in direct reference to female councilors may invoke different reactions than those that indirectly assess the implications of female representation. The ways in which citizens explicitly view quota-mandated female representatives versus the implicit reactions these councilors may invoke is the subject that I now turn to in Chapter 5.
Figures and Tables

Figure

How much influence do traditional leaders currently have in governing your local community?

![Bar chart showing distribution of responses in reserved versus unreserved electoral divisions.](image)

Figure 4.1: Dependent variable: distribution of response categories by reserved versus unreserved electoral divisions. Error bars show 95 percent confidence intervals around estimates.

Tables
Table 4.1: Reservation average treatment effect. Higher values equate to higher levels of perceived traditional influence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Reserved</th>
<th>Mean Unreserved</th>
<th>Difference [95 percent CI]</th>
<th>p-values: 2-tailed</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceived ord. scale traditional influence</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>-0.20 [-0.37, -0.03]</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived “great deal” of traditional influence</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-0.09 [-0.17, -0.02]</td>
<td>0.03 (0.02)</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences with significance of \( p < 0.05 \) indicated in **bold**.

Table 4.2: Model-based estimates of conditional average treatment effects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Coef [95 % CI]</th>
<th>Model 2: Coef [95 % CI]</th>
<th>Model 3: Coef [95 % CI]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>3.07 [2.98; 3.16]</td>
<td>3.08 [2.99; 3.18]</td>
<td>3.10 [2.99; 3.21]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>-0.20 [-0.37; -0.03]</td>
<td>-0.20 [-0.38; -0.02]</td>
<td>-0.20 [-0.41; 0.01]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High 2003 contact</td>
<td>-0.09 [-0.36; 0.19]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High contact * Quota</td>
<td>0.07 [-0.41; 0.54]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low 2003 contact</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.08 [-0.26; 0.11]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low contact * Quota</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.02 [-0.32; 0.36]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AIC 3003.11 3010.23 3011.19
BIC 3022.70 3039.61 3040.58
Log Likelihood -1497.55 -1499.11 -1499.60
Deviance 2995.11 2998.23 2999.19
Num. obs. 990 990 990
Num. groups: ED 155 155 155
Variance: ED (Intercept) 0.04 0.05 0.04
Variance: Residual 1.16 1.16 1.16

Differences with significance of \( p < 0.05 \) indicated in **bold**.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1: Coef [95 % CI]</th>
<th>Model 2: Coef [95 % CI]</th>
<th>Model 3: Coef [95 % CI]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>3.07 [2.98; 3.16]</td>
<td>2.76 [2.60; 2.92]</td>
<td>3.33 [2.54; 4.14]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>-0.20 [-0.37; -0.03]</td>
<td>-0.14 [-0.30; 0.02]</td>
<td>-0.13 [-0.29; 0.02]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>0.38 [0.21; 0.55]</td>
<td>0.40 [0.23; 0.58]</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.05 [-0.18; 0.09]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.04 [-0.15; 0.06]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>-0.09 [-0.15; -0.04]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.03 [-0.21; 0.14]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>3003.11</td>
<td>2990.46</td>
<td>3013.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>3022.70</td>
<td>3014.95</td>
<td>3062.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-1497.55</td>
<td>-1490.23</td>
<td>-1496.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>2995.11</td>
<td>2980.46</td>
<td>2993.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. groups: ED</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: ED (Intercept)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: Residual</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Model-based robustness considerations. Values that achieve statistical significance of $p \leq 0.05$ are indicated in bold. See Appendix A2.1 for variable coding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean [95% CI]</th>
<th>Mean [95% CI]</th>
<th>Difference [95% CI]</th>
<th>p-values: 2-tailed</th>
<th>p-values: 1-tailed</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Should traditional influence increase?</td>
<td>4.37 [-0.12, 0.18]</td>
<td>4.34 (0.34)</td>
<td>0.03 [0.69]</td>
<td>990</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Differences with significance of $p < 0.05$ indicated in **bold**.

Table 4.4: Reservation average treatment effect on whether local traditional influence should increase. Higher values equate to stronger levels of agreement that traditional influence should increase.
Appendices
## 1 Missingness Diagnostics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Complete Data</th>
<th>Mean Sample Data</th>
<th>Difference (SE)</th>
<th>T-test p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent rural</td>
<td>0.740 (0.018)</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>1.920 (0.035)</td>
<td>1.907</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty level</td>
<td>2.593 (0.054)</td>
<td>2.593</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>2.235 (0.031)</td>
<td>2.230</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>3.034 (0.052)</td>
<td>3.048</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>0.785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>41.508 (0.787)</td>
<td>41.363</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived traditional influence</td>
<td>3.023 (0.047)</td>
<td>3.017</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>3.913 (0.016)</td>
<td>3.914</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A4.1: Missingness Balance Diagnostics: \( n = 1200 \) for complete data set and \( n = 990 \) for data used in the included analysis. Values that achieve statistical significance of \( p \leq 0.05 \) are indicated in bold. See Appendix A2.1 for variable coding.
Chapter 5
Quotas and Explicit and Implicit Gender Bias

Introduction

The final empirical chapter of this dissertation examines whether quotas reduce both explicit and implicit citizen bias against female representatives. Advocates of electoral gender quotas claim the ability of quotas to reduce gender bias in politics as one of the most significant justifications for quota adoption. The argument is as follows: in countries in which women have not made significant gains in descriptive representation, two deleterious cycles lead to continued underrepresentation. First, if voters do not experience female representatives, they are not aware of women’s governing capabilities and thus they will continue to vote for men as “safe bet” candidates. In such scenarios, the demand for female representatives will remain low, as voters are hesitant to promote members of an ascriptive group with limited political experience. Second, if young women and girls do not grow up with the experience of a female representative, they will be less likely to aspire to these roles themselves - and thus the supply of potential female candidates will also remain low.

Mandatory gender quotas are often justified as ways to end these vicious cycles.
By explicitly promoting women in the electoral process, quotas fast track women’s descriptive representation in the hopes that they will both reduce voter’s traditional bias against female representatives (i.e. increase demand) and also that the first cohort of female representatives will act as role models to younger generations of women who might aspire to political office in the future (i.e. increase the supply).

Through Lesotho’s policy experiment I am able to test whether six years of exposure to quota-mandated female councilors caused citizens to reduce both their explicit and implicit bias against female representatives. In this chapter, I first use the most recent 2012 Afro-barometer data to test whether the quota policy reduced citizens’ explicit self-reported gender bias in reserved electoral divisions. I test whether citizens in reserved EDs report less explicit bias against female political representatives as well as reduced gender bias in other spheres of public and private life. I then report the results of a series of field experimental tests I employed in Lesotho in early 2014 to test for changes in implicit gender bias after exposure to female councilors in reserved electoral divisions.

In sum, I find that the quota had little effect in the aggregate. Cumulatively, there is no difference between formerly reserved and unreserved electoral divisions on all included explicit or implicit bias indicators. One demographic subgroup, however, does consistently appear to have been affected by the quota policy. Young women under the age of twenty-five years are less likely to report that men should be elected to political positions over women and, conversely, are more likely to report that women should have equal rights to political representation. The decreased bias by this measure, however, does not extend to reduced explicit bias along other dimensions – and if anything the quota appears to have exacerbated more broad-based indicators of gender bias among respondents under the age of twenty-five, both young men and women.
Relating to implicit bias, again I do not find an average treatment effect among the whole sample of respondents, but I do find that young women are less likely to implicitly associate men with leadership tasks and women with domestic tasks. This finding suggests that changes in explicit political bias among young women may be related to changes in implicit stereotypes around appropriate gender roles. Further, the conditional average treatment effects apparent among young women related to measures of both explicit and implicit political bias suggest that this demographic group is the most prone to the positive symbolic benefits of female representation - at least in the political sphere.

This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 reviews the literature on female leadership, symbolic representation, and gender bias. Section 5.2 offers hypotheses relating quota-mandated exposure to female representatives to changes in both explicit and implicit gender biases. Section 5.3 reports the data and empirical strategies I use to measure explicit bias and reports these results. In Section 5.4 I detail the field experimental data and methods I use to test for change in implicit biases and I report these findings here. Section 5.5 offers a discussion of the findings from Lesotho - again with a particular focus on how these results speak to the broad evidence that has emerged from India, as well as their more general implications. The final section concludes.

5.1 Female Representation, Quotas, and Gender Bias

As referenced throughout this dissertation, political representation theorists have developed a significant body of literature largely affirming the symbolic benefits of including historically underrepresented groups in political decision-making (Pitkin, 1967; Mansbridge, 1999; 2005; Phillips, 1995; Williams, 1998; Young, 2000). For instance, in
her influential piece on representation, Jane Mansbridge notes that when certain groups have been historically marginalized:

The ascriptive character of one’s membership in that group carries the historically embedded meaning: ‘Persons with these characteristics do not rule’ with the possible implication, ‘persons with these characteristics are not able to (fit to) rule.’ (Mansbridge 1999: 648).

Related specifically to women’s descriptive representation, when a governing body has been historically comprised of men, it signals to citizens that women lack the necessary capabilities to govern and that politics is not a suitable sphere for women. These internalized beliefs about women’s lack of capabilities and political appropriateness results in individual-level gender biases that are not easily changed.

To date, more research in political science has examined women’s political engagement under female representation (see Chapter 3 for a review) rather than how more women in public office affects citizens’ gender biases. Examining this relationship is particularly complicated by the difficulty in demonstrating causality from correlations in gender-egalitarian attitudes and high levels of women in politics. For instance, Paxton & Kunovich (2003) argue that ideology plays a strong causal role in promoting women in politics, but do not find evidence that there is a reciprocal effect; that is, that women in politics promote gender-egalitarian attitudes. Whereas, Alexander (2012) presents evidence that women’s increased presence in political bodies encourages the popular perception that women can effectively govern, promoting a virtuous cycle of increased descriptive and symbolic representation.

Most studies in political science focus on explicit attitudes and behavior as outcome variables. Related to gender-egalitarian attitudes, these types of explicit bias are likely
most pronounced in societies in which gender roles have yet to be socially challenged. In such instances, citizens may find it perfectly natural to report that men are more suited for the public sphere and women more suited for domestic tasks. Recent work on social inclusion (largely driven by social psychologists and behavioral economists), however, has differentiated between self-reported bias and more subtle forms of implicit bias (Hofmann et al., 2005). Different from self-reported beliefs or preferences, implicit biases are unconscious mental processes, suggesting that actors do not always have intentional control over the mechanisms that motivate their actions and beliefs (Greenwald & Krieger, 2006: 946). Although explicit biases often dissipate as women’s rights groups spread awareness about the importance of equality and early cohorts of women enter into non-traditional spheres, implicit biases are often more intractable (Bertrand et al., 2005).

Because the Indian policy experiment is able to provide distinctly causal evidence, as throughout this dissertation, the resulting body of work provides the most informative and relevant evidence relating gender quotas to explicit and implicit bias. Several recent studies have investigated changes in citizens’ attitudes following exposure to female leaders in India – and cumulatively report that female leadership at the village level reduces gender bias. Beaman et al. (2009) measure explicit discrimination and implicit biases among Indian villagers and find that among male villagers, quotas improved the perceived effectiveness of female leaders. The authors also find that male villagers implicitly associate women with domestic rather than leadership tasks less after one reservation cycle of female leadership. Because of the relevance of this work, with the

39But see Beaman et al. (2009: 1532). Studies of implicit bias have emerged on topics as diverse as voting behavior in American presidential elections (Arcuri et al., 2008) to math and gender stereotypes among American elementary school children (Cvencek et al., 2011).
authors’ permission, this chapter in part replicates the research design and experimental tasks conducted by Lori Beaman, Raghabenda Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande and Petia Topalova in India to test whether the evidence from India extends to the way Basotho citizens reacted to quota-mandated female representation in Lesotho.\footnote{Specifically, I adapted Beaman \textit{et al.} (2009)’s Goldberg-paradigm experiment, which uses tape-recorded speeches of hypothetical male and female community councilors. I also adapted the gender-occupation IAT developed by the authors. I expand on these experimental tasks in Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 below.}

Also, examining the Indian case, Pande & Ford (2012) present evidence that voters use new information about how female politicians perform to update their beliefs about the ability of women to be effective leaders. Further Beaman \textit{et al.} (2012a) present evidence that female leadership positively influences adolescent girls’ career aspirations and educational attainment in reserved districts. The authors claim that having a female village leader creates a role model effect for the young girls in their districts. In addition, although not explicitly testing citizen attitudes, Bhavnani (2009) finds that women are more likely to win in unreserved districts after the quota has been removed in part by reducing gender bias within political parties as party leaders learn that women can effectively govern and are therefore electable candidates.

Specific to African experiences, several case studies have also detailed the largely positive symbolic effects following the rapid proliferation of gender quotas across the subcontinent. These studies have documented how quotas have changed political cultures to be more inclusive of women’s perspectives and how quotas may legitimize women’s presence in nontraditional spheres more broadly (see Bauer, 2012 for a review). For instance, Johnson \textit{et al.} (2003) argue that affirmative action measures for women in local government in Uganda have led to positive changes in citizens’ attitudes towards the appropriateness of including women in community leadership. Further, using over
a decade of ethnographic research to examine the impact of the highly lauded Rwandan parliamentary gender quota. Burnet (2011) finds a diffuse role model effect. She argues that even though the agency of legislators is muted in an authoritarian state, "gender quotas and the increased representation of women in the political system have encouraged women to take leading roles in other areas of Rwandan society" (Burnet, 2011: 315).

Whereas studies of women in politics largely demonstrate that women’s increased presence leads to positive symbolic effects, the social psychology and business management literatures have demonstrated less sanguine effects resulting from women’s advancement in the corporate world. Several experimental studies have demonstrated that evaluators penalize women for their success in business leadership (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Eagly, 2007; Heilman & Okimoto, 2007). Most of this research pulls from role congruity theory, suggesting that respondents evaluate female leaders negatively when they break female stereotypic attributes. This trend is often most pronounced when women occupy positions in which prescriptive attributes associated with women - for example, nurturing, socially sensitive, and communal qualities - are counter to the agentic leadership attributes typically ascribed to men (Eagly & Karau, 2002).

There is some evidence, however, that these biases may be malleable. Duehr & Bono (2006), for instance, find that respondents with positive past experiences with female managers tend to rate women higher on management characteristics. Further, Dasgupta & Asgari (2004) find that students in American colleges with a higher proportion of female professors are more likely to associate women with professional activities. Although establishing causality in observational settings proves difficult, these studies suggest that explicit and implicit bias may decrease as exposure to counter-stereotypic
women increases.

Finally, as described at length in Chapter 3, a sizable literature has examined predictors of attitudes toward the beneficiaries of affirmative action policies in employment and education; however, the gender quota literatures in political science and economics have yet to seriously examine the extent to which affirmative action measures that give female candidates preferential treatment have different symbolic effects as compared to the symbolic benefits that result from women who achieve office without these measures.

5.2 How Quotas Affect Bias

The literatures outlined above point to at least three theoretically distinct, though not mutually exclusive, causal processes relating the political representation of previously excluded groups to bias-related attitudes among both in-group and out-group members.

Political economists predominately classify bias as the result of two distinct types of discrimination. Gary Becker (1957) originally conceptualized “taste discrimination” as stemming from individuals’ ideological preferences – that is, citizens discriminate because they have a certain “taste” or preference for members of one group over another. Related to women’s descriptive representation, in its most blatant form, taste discrimination occurs when voters promote men over women due to explicitly-held sexist preferences (either hostile or benevolent), often deeply rooted in historical social inequalities. Statistical discrimination, by contrast, occurs when parties or citizens believe that members of a marginalized group cannot win elections and do not vote for members of this group because they do not believe these candidates are electable. This form of discrimination also stems from perceptions that the historically excluded group will not be effective leaders – although it differs from taste discrimination because it is
rooted in a lack of information about the underrepresented group, rather than from an
innate preference for members of one group over another.41

Social psychologist have added further nuance to economists’ conceptualizations of
taste-based discrimination against women. Separate from either hostile or benevolent
sexism, Eagly & Karau (2002) develop a theory of role congruity to explain how social
sterotypes affect gender biases, which they explain concisely as follows:

A potential prejudice exists when social perceivers hold a stereotype about a so-
cial group that is incongruent with the attributes that are thought to be required
for success in certain classes of social roles. When a stereotyped group member
and an incongruent social role become joined in the mind of the perceiver, this
inconsistency lowers the evaluation of the group member as an actual or potential
occupant of the role. In general, prejudice toward female leaders follows from the
incongruity that many people perceive between the characteristics of women and
the requirements of leader roles (Eagly & Karau, 2002: 574).

These three processes through which bias may be formed and perpetuated – taste
discrimination, statistical discrimination, and role congruity – lead to slightly different
expectations about how increased exposure to female leaders will affect individual-level
gender biases.

First, by changing the historically constructed belief that women hold a socially
inferior place to men, exposure to quota-mandated female representatives may reduce
citizens’ taste discrimination. Because taste discrimination relates to citizens’ explicit
preferences for their political representatives to have certain ascriptive characteristics,
changes here are likely observed in the way citizens explicitly report gender egalitar-

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41 These two forms of discrimination are, of course, related. Even small amounts of initial taste dis-
   crimination can lead citizens to initially vote more men into office, which may lead to statistical
discrimination as voters have less information about the capabilities of women to effectively govern.
The potential for this occurrence is most likely in first-past-the-post electoral systems in which votes
are more likely to be “wasted” on less competitive candidates and voters are more concerned about
choosing candidates that they believe have a reasonable chance at winning a majority of votes.
ian (or inegalitarian) attitudes. Additionally, increases in female representation, quota mandated or not, are often accompanied by domestic, regional or local women’s rights groups promoting the message that inegalitarian attitudes are not socially acceptable. In these instances, I expect quota-mandated female representation to decrease constituents’ self-reported gender bias.

Given, however, that beliefs about women’s place in society are often deeply historically rooted and manifested daily in individual interactions, it is possible that increases in female leadership may cause antithetical reactions toward women holding these positions. In such instances, gender quotas may exacerbate existing biases against women if female politicians are perceived as violating social norms and potentially reducing the value of traditionally male activities (Goldin, 2013). As a result, quotas may precipitate a backlash against female leaders and strengthen taste-based discrimination (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Boisjoly et al., 2006; Evans, 2003; Heilman et al., 1998; Matheson et al., 2000; Resendez, 2002). In such instances, quota-mandated female leadership will cause citizens to report increased levels of gender bias.

Slightly different implications emerge, however, if citizens alter their biases through changes in statistical discrimination. This process implies that quota-mandated exposure to female representatives causes citizens to update their beliefs about the abilities of women to effectively govern. Whereas risk-adverse voters may not have voted for female candidates in the past because they did not know whether women could perform as well as men, being forced to see a woman as a community representative gives new information about the capabilities of women in the political sphere. In this scenario, bias originally appears because gender becomes a cognitive shortcut that signals to the observer that the candidate is either part of an ascriptive group that are effective
representatives (in this case, men) or part of an inexperienced and thus potentially ineffective group (in this case, women). Changing the cognitive shortcut that women are inexperienced and thus ineffective representatives may cause citizens to reduce their political gender biases. Measuring changes in statistical discrimination after a full six-year term of the quota policy is appropriate, given that time on the job may have increased female councilors’ confidence and competence in reserved EDs, and citizens may be aware of this improvement and evaluate quota recipients accordingly (Geissel & Hust, 2005). Of course, if quota-mandated female councilors performed on average worse than male councilors, voters will not update their perceptions and statistical discrimination may persist or even worsen.

As I describe at length below, to test whether the quota reduced statistical discrimination, I asked villagers to judge the performance and overall effectiveness of a hypothetical councilor through a tape-recorded speech, which I rotated at random to be read by either a male or female voice. This Goldberg-paradigm exercise allows me to gauge how the quota affected the implicitly perceived effectiveness of female councilors in previously reserved electoral divisions.

Finally, role contiguity theory predicts that exposure to female councilors will affect gender bias by putting citizens into contact with counter-stereotypical women. In contrast to statistical discrimination, role contiguity theory predicts that female representation allows citizens to update their beliefs about the appropriateness of women in the political sphere rather than the capabilities of women to effectively govern. To test for changes in gendered implicit associations, I administer an experimental test typically employed in social psychology, but rarely used in political science. Following Beaman et al. (2009, 2012b), I test for differences in gender stereotypes across
reserved and unreserved electoral divisions through laptop-based Implicit Association Tests (IATs). Specifically, I administer an activity-based IAT to examine implicit bias in gender stereotyping of occupations. This test assesses whether villagers exposed to quota-assigned councilors are less likely to associate women with domestic life and men with leadership activities. If the quota affected citizens’ gender biases through changes in associated gender roles, then I expect that citizens in previously reserved electoral divisions will have weaker male/leader and female/domestic implicit associations than citizens in unreserved electoral divisions.

In addition to these three processes through which bias may be exacerbated, sustained, or reduced there are individual-level evaluator characteristics that may moderate the extent to which these processes take place. For the purposes of this study, the most immediately salient potential moderating features are the observers’ age and gender, which may affect how she or he reacts to quota-assigned female representation.

Studies relating the evaluator’s gender to reactions toward female leaders reveal mixed findings (see Rudman & Phelan (2008) for a review). For instance, studies conducted in Western countries often find that the gender gap is most pronounced in men’s evaluations of female leaders (Rudman & Kilianski, 2000; Carpenter, 2001; Carli & Eagly, 2001), but that these evaluations may be more immediately malleable relative to how women evaluate other women (Eagly & Karau, 2002, 589). However, as suggested in Chapter 3, other studies have indicated that cultural norms around appropriate gender roles may be most intractable among women in societies in which male-dominated economic and political power structures have yet to be socially challenged (Goldberg, 1968; Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2010, 113). The findings presented in Chapter 3 suggested that Basotho women were more likely to report antithetical reactions toward female rep-
resentatives, in particular toward female beneficiaries of the quota policy - and therefore whereas the cumulative evidence from other cases is less conclusive, I expect that quota-mandated female representation may exacerbate explicit gender biases among female respondents more so than among male respondents.

Age is another salient evaluator feature that might predict the malleability of respondents’ explicit and implicit gender biases. Younger cohorts of both men and women are likely to hold more tractable bias-related attitudes, as socially constructed gender roles are not as fully crystallized by social experiences as among older generations. This may be particularly pronounced among young women, as young women and girls may realize the symbolic and substantive benefits of emulating successful women. Indeed, evidence from the Indian case shows that female leaders act as role models to young girls in their communities in ways that positively influence adolescent girls’ career aspirations and educational attainment in reserved districts (Beaman et al. 2012a).

The ethnographic accounts given by Ferguson (1990) and Murray (1977, 1981) indicate that the intersection of age and gender may be particularly relevant to how young Basotho women conceptualize traditional gender roles. In particular, Ferguson (1990: 159) describes at length how customary practices that have evolved around the keeping of livestock (what he calls “the Bovine Mystique”) have been historically shaped by the desire of male Basotho migrant laborers to create a symbol of their presence in their home village in absentia through cattle as well as invest in an asset that is not easily transferred to mitigate the immediate needs of the household. Older generations also benefit from the “Mystique,” as they are able to legitimately lay claims to the migrant worker’s cattle through extended payments of bride wealth (bohadi), which are often lifelong. Young women then have the least to gain from the “Mystique” and therefore
have the most objective interest in abandoning traditional conceptions of gender roles and embracing Western notions of gender equality. In light of the particular importance of age and gender in Sesotho society and the evidence from quota experiences elsewhere, I expect exposure to quota-mandated female councilors to reduce explicit and implicit gender bias to a greater degree among younger cohorts of respondents in general and younger female respondents in particular.

Finally, as I explored at length in Chapter 3, women who achieve office through affirmative action policies may invoke different public reactions as compared to women that achieve office in open competition with men. Again, this may be particularly important because the quota policy in Lesotho, as in India, restricts the opportunities available to men, which might foment a backlash against the quota’s beneficiaries. This may be observable in how citizens report explicit bias as well as how they perceive the effectiveness of female representatives. For instance, citizens may doubt the effectiveness of quota-mandated representatives if they believe the quota policy promoted women who would not have been able to achieve office on their own merit (see Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1999). I therefore expect gender biases to be more rigid and the propensity for backlash effects to be stronger under quota-mandated representation as compared to non-quota-mandated female representation. Unfortunately, given data limitations I am not able to identify a measure for the preexisting propensity for female representation in this survey round; however, I discuss the empirical implications of making comparison with a control group of openly elected male and female leaders in Section 5.5.
5.3 Explicit Bias

5.3.1 Data and Empirical Strategy

The previous two chapters of this dissertation used data from the 2008 Afro-barometer survey in Lesotho in order to test for the more immediate effects of the 2005 quota law. This chapter, however, uses the most recent 2012 Afro-barometer survey data from Lesotho. This survey round was conducted from mid-November to early December of 2012, just over one year after the October 2011 local elections in which the reserved ED quota law was repealed. Therefore, survey enumerators for the 2012 Afro-barometer asked Basotho citizens in formerly reserved EDs bias-related questions in a context in which they had experienced quota-mandated female councilors for six years followed by one year of a non-quota-mandated councilor.42

In order to identify which observations were in previously reserved electoral divisions, I follow the same procedure that I describe in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 when preparing the 2008 data. Again, I use data collected from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in Maseru, which groups villages by electoral division and identifies the reservation status of each ED. I merge these data with the local-level Afro-barometer data, which also identify the village name and larger administrative district associated with each observation. As I experienced when merging the 2008 data, in some cases, there are observations for which I cannot definitively identify the reservation status associated with a particular village name. This most often occurs when the village name has an

42Unfortunately, the local authorities also redistricted the boundaries of local electoral division between the 2005 and 2011 electoral cycles, making it difficult to compare whether female councilors were more or less likely to win in EDs after the quota law was removed. However, Tang [2014] is able to reconstruct EDs to conduct this analysis and finds that female candidates were more successful in EDs that had been previously reserved. Separately, whereas in Chapter 4 I test for attitudes related to traditional authorities from the 2008 survey, these questions were not included in the 2012 survey round.
alternate spelling on the IEC village list, or when there are multiple villages with the same name and I cannot definitively identify which village the Afro-barometer survey enumerators visited. This limits my total number of observations from 1197 to 996, a loss of sample size of 17 percent. As I do for the 2008 data in Chapter [4] in Appendix [1] of this chapter, I present balance statistics comparing the model data with the complete Afro-barometer data to demonstrate that the missing observations between the two do not introduce bias into the analyses presented here.

The 2012 Afro-barometer survey includes three questions that specifically ask citizens to report their explicit biases towards female political leaders and toward women and girls more broadly. The three questions are each structured by presenting respondents with two statements and asking the respondent whether she or he “strongly agrees with Statement 1,” “agrees with Statement 1,” “agrees with Statement 2,” or “strongly agrees with Statement 2.” The three statement pairs are as follows:

**Explicit bias question 1:**

Statement 1: Men make better political leaders than women, and should be elected rather than women.

Statement 2: Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.

**Explicit bias question 2:**

Statement 1: In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.

Statement 2: Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.

**Explicit bias question 3:**

Statement 1: If funds for schooling are limited, a boy should always receive an
education in school before a girl.

Statement 2: If funds for schooling are limited, a family should send the child with the greatest ability to learn.

I recode the ordering of the second statement pair so that higher values are associated with more gender egalitarian attitudes across all three measures of explicit bias. Table 5.1 reveals that unsurprisingly all three bias indicators are positively correlated.

Table 5.1 here

5.3.2 Explicit Bias Results

Figure 5.1 shows the distribution of response categories to each of the three questions for respondents living in previously reserved and unreserved electoral divisions. Table 5.2 shows the average treatment effect of the quota policy for each of the three bias indicators on the four-point Likhart-type scale. As is also apparent from Figure 5.1, the quota did not have a statistically significant treatment effect across each of the three measures. Additionally, Table 5.3 shows the average treatment effect respectively for a split sample of male and female respondents. Again, it appears that six years of exposure to quota-mandated female community councilors did not affect the aggregate self-reported gender biases expressed by either male or female respondents.

Figure 5.1 here

Table 5.2 & Table 5.3 here
To assess whether the quota had an effect specifically on younger cohorts of respondents, I use treatment by covariate interactions to identify model-based estimates for male and female respondents under twenty-five years old. Given that the Afro-barometer survey includes only respondents over eighteen years old, this age cutoff means that the youngest respondent in this group would have experienced the quota-mandated female councilor from the ages of eleven to seventeen and the oldest in the group from the ages of seventeen to twenty-four. Table 5.4, Table 5.5, and Table 5.6 show the model-based estimates of the quota’s average treatment effect for each of the three bias questions respectively, as well as the covariate by treatment interaction effects by gender and age for each measure. Additionally, Table A5.2 in Appendix 1 lists the actual values for each respondent demographic subgroup, which is helpful in interpreting the baseline values and magnitude of the respective conditional average treatment effects (CATEs).

The model-based estimates of the quota’s CATEs for different demographic subgroups reveal that whereas the quota did not have a cumulative treatment effect on the whole sample, it did have a pronounced effect among specific cohorts of respondents. Table 5.4 reports the quota’s conditional average treatment effects on self-reported gender bias in politics. The treatment by covariate interaction term in Model 2 reveals that the quota did produce a CATE significant at the 0.07 level among respondents under twenty-five years old. The associated standard effect size is an improvement of
0.23 standard deviations on the four-point scale. Further Model 3 and Model 4 test whether the under twenty-five CATE is driven primarily by young men or young women. Model 3 reveals that the CATE achieves traditional statistical significant (at the 0.05 level) when the under twenty-five cohort is further subset to include only female respondents - but does not achieve statistical significance among young male respondents. The effect size of quota-mandated exposure to female leaders among women under the age of twenty-five is associated with a standardized effect size of 0.29 standard deviations.

To further visualize the treatment effect among young women, Figure 5.2 shows the distribution to the response categories to this question for young women in reserved and unreserved electoral divisions respectively. A young woman living in a reserved ED is 30 percent more likely (moving from 57 percent to 74 percent) to report that she strongly agrees “women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men” and 35 percent less likely (moving from 17 percent to 11 percent) to strongly agree that “men make better political leaders than women, and should be elected rather than women.”

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43 This is calculated by dividing under twenty-five CATE of 0.27 (see Table A5.2 in Appendix 1) by the standard deviation of the control group, which in this case consists of individuals under the age of twenty-five living in unreserved electoral divisions.

44 The wording of this question in the context of the restrictive reserved ED quota, could be slightly confusing - as some respondents might have interpreted the first statement “women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men” to mean that men should have the same chance as women - which under the quota policy, they did not. However, given that the statement is paired with an opposing statement “men make better political leaders than women, and should be elected rather than women,” I interpret this question to reveal the level of bias against women, rather than a rejection of bias (exclusion) against men.
Related to whether women should have equal rights more generally, the model-based estimates from Table 5.5 again reveal that the quota had no average treatment effect within the whole sample or specifically among either male or female respondents.\textsuperscript{45} Again, a conditional average treatment effect emerges for the under twenty-five cohort for this indicator, but somewhat counter-intuitively goes in the opposite direction than the first bias indicator. Respondents under twenty-five years of age have greater levels of broad-based gender bias in previously reserved electoral divisions as compared to their counterparts in previously unreserved EDs. In the male and female split sample models, Models 3 and 4 reveal that this effect is again more pronounced among young women, although it does not reach traditional statistical significance for either gender’s subsetted group. Additionally, it is important to remember that these split sample estimates reveal the quota’s effect within demographic groups rather than between demographic groups - and in 2012, young women are more likely to hold progressive beliefs about the traditional role of women as compared to young men in both previously reserved and unreserved electoral divisions.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Age Group} & \textbf{Gender Bias} \\
\hline
25-34 & 2.17 \\
35-44 & 2.38 \\
45+ & 2.93 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Gender Bias by Age Group}
\end{table}

Finally, Table 5.6 shows that the quota produced no statistically significant conditional average treatment effects across age and gender cohorts related to bias in educating

\textsuperscript{45}It is important to note that women are significantly more likely than men to report that women should have broad-based equal rights. Interesting, this reveals a distinct change from the results of this question from 2003 Afro-barometer survey presented in Chapter 3 in which women expressed more reactionary views than men by this measure.

\textsuperscript{46}Young men in reserved and unreserved EDs have a mean value on the four-point scale of 2.17 and 2.38 respectively - and young women have mean values in reserved and unreserved EDs of 2.50 and 2.93 respectively.
young girls. This question, however, should be interpreted with the specific context of Lesotho in mind. Because the majority of Basotho depend in part on subsistence agriculture and cattle herding, young boys are often taken out of school early to work in the fields or, more commonly, to work tending cattle (called herdboys or Molisana). Further, South African mining companies have been the largest employer of young Basotho men historically, often employing boys beginning in their mid-teenage years. These two features of Lesotho’s labor market have lead to a culture in which boys typically are not given priority in education over girls - counter to the trend of male preference in education that is common in other poor rural economies in Africa and elsewhere. Indeed, as noted in Chapter 2, in large part because boys are more likely to interrupt their schooling out of economic necessity, Basotho women have higher literacy rates than Basotho men and counter to the experiences of most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, more girls than boys are enrolled in primary and secondary schools (UNESCO, 2012).

Table 5.6 here

The fact that the quota reduces gender bias in politics among young women, but appears to exacerbates gender bias among young people in general under a more broad-based conception of women’s rights is puzzling. This is particularly so given that these three bias indicators are positively correlated within the whole sample (see Table 5.1) suggesting that this trend is not apparent among other demographic subgroups. I explore the implications of these findings further in Section 5.5, but first turn to analyzing the quota’s effect on measures of implicit bias.
5.4 Implicit Bias

The remaining empirical work of this chapter turns from measuring changes in self-reported explicit bias to more subtle forms of implicit gender bias. To do this, I conducted two field experimental tests in Lesotho in February and March of 2014 in approximately 100 field sites across the country. Because randomization was assigned at the level of the electoral division, I gained the most statistical power by maximizing the number of field sites I visited rather than the number of respondents per field site. Increasing the number of subjects per cluster has little effect on the treatment effect standard error because it does little to reduce the variance of the cluster-level outcomes (Gerber & Green 2012: 83).

I selected which electoral divisions to visit by selecting my sites through R’s random number generator from the complete list of electoral divisions in eight out of Lesotho’s ten main administrative districts. I conducted these tests with assistance from the Lesotho branch of a regional gender advocacy group, Gender Links. My two local research assistants from this organization, Alice Ranthimo and Thabiso Andrew Leche, provided invaluable translation assistance, in-depth local knowledge, and logistical support as we conducted these tests. I provide further information on the research design and logistics of the field experiments in Appendix 3 and Appendix 4.

As noted, I randomly selected my field sites across eight out of the ten large administrative districts in the country - but excluded the two far eastern districts of Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek, which were difficult to access from the capital, Maseru. Given Lesotho’s small size, I was able to conduct field tests in 80 percent of the country’s geographic districts - but it should be noted that Mokhotlong and Qacha’s Nek are particularly remote and mountainous areas. Whereas the Afro-barometer data is a random
sample across the whole country, the results from the implicit bias tests include a sample in which the lowland areas are somewhat overrepresented as compared to a whole county sample. However, given that the quota was randomly assigned within each of the ten large administrative districts, excluding these two districts does not threaten the internal validity of the research design or introduce bias when estimating the quota’s treatment effect.

5.4.1 Hypothetical Leader Vignettes

I first seek to test whether citizens change their implicit perceptions of the effectiveness of female leaders after they have been exposed to female community councilors through the quota policy. To do this, I asked villagers to judge the overall effectiveness of a hypothetical councilor dealing with a common community issue (repairing the local water pump) through a tape-recorded vignette. I worked with my local community partner, Gender Links, to adapt the speech used by Beaman et al. (2009) in India to be an appropriate representation of a community council meeting in Lesotho. When presenting the tape-recorded vignette to villagers, I rotated at random the councilor’s response to a citizen complaint to be read in Sesotho by either a male voice or a female voice. The full vignette transcript is included in Appendix 3. After the respondent heard the vignette, she or he assessed how the hypothetical (male or female) councilor handled the villager’s complaint on a five-point Likhart scale with the possible response categories of: very ineffectively, somewhat ineffectively, so-so, somewhat effectively or very effectively.

This experimental exercise falls under the seminal Goldberg paradigm, a social psychology tool to test whether evaluators perceive differences in the effectiveness of a
speech based on the ascriptive characteristics of the speaker. Because everything about the speech is identical except for the gender associated with the speaker’s voice, the difference between speech evaluations can be attributed to the gender of the speaker.

Because this exercise involves two treatments - the quota treatment assigned by the policy experiment as well as the alternating speech assigned by my research team - I model the ATE of the quota through a treatment-by-treatment interaction. That is, I model whether being exposed to a quota-mandated female councilor changed the perceived effectiveness of female leaders by interacting residence in a previously reserved ED with whether the evaluator heard a speech with a female voice. Table 5.7 shows these model results as well as the same model specifications conducted on split samples of male and female respondents respectively. Finally, Models 4 and 5 of Table 5.7 show the three-way interaction between hearing a female voice, age cohort, and quota residence for the male and female split sample to test for conditional average treatment effects among young men and young women respectively.

Table 5.7 here

I find that the quota had no statistically significant average treatment effect on the way Basotho citizens perceived the implicit effectiveness of female versus male leaders. Further, this non-finding extends to different demographic subgroups, suggesting that in Lesotho exposure to quota-mandated female representatives is not related to changes in explicit gender bias through changes in implicit beliefs about women’s capacity as effective local representatives.
Finally, I seek to test whether exposure to quota-mandated female councilors changed constituents’ implicit stereotypes around appropriate gender roles. To do this, I administered experimental tests typically employed in social psychology, but rarely used in political science to test for implicit biases against historically marginalized groups. Following Beaman et al. (2009), I tested for differences in gender stereotypes across reserved and unreserved electoral divisions through a series of Implicit Association Tests (IATs). The IAT is an experimental method that relies on the idea that respondents who more easily pair two concepts in a rapid categorization task, more strongly associate those concepts and that this may reveal associative information respondents are either unwilling or unable to report (Nosek et al. 2007).

With the authors’ consent, I adapted the IATs used by Beaman et al. (2009, 2012b) from their work in rural India to be suitable for use in Lesotho. This test assesses whether villagers exposed to quota-mandated female councilors for six years are less likely to associate women with domestic-related words and men with leadership-related words. The IAT records response times as each prompt is presented on the screen to measure strength of association based on the assumption that making a response is easier when items that the respondent considers as closely related are on the same side of the screen and share the same response key.47

The IAT I employed uses audio and pictorial prompts that does not assume literacy or familiarity with computers, as the respondent is only required to push two keys on a keyboard. Specifically, the laptop-based test uses images of a Mosotho man

47I created these IATs through the program Inquisit by Millisecond Software. More information about the software can be found at http://www.millisecond.com/. While in country, my research assistant, Alice Ranthimo, translated and recorded the English-version of the test to Sesotho.
and a Mosotho woman and pictorial or auditory prompts (in Sesotho) associated with leadership or domestic concepts and male and female Sesotho names. The eight words associated respectively with the leader and domestic prompts, as well as the two main images associated with the domestic and leadership categories, are designed to be gender neutral - so that the associations remain with the larger concept and not with a concept that has a further gendered association. For instance, the word “home” is one word from the domestic category because it is gender-neutral, but the word “cooking” is not, because it is a domestic task that is undertaken primarily by women.

The test consists of five blocks to test for differences in quickness of association between the stereotypical (men-leadership, women-domestic) block and the non-stereotypical (women-leadership, men-domestic) block. A further description of the five blocks of the IAT test is included in Appendix 4. This appendix also includes a screen shot from the IAT, the English translated list of leadership and domestic category words, and images of participants taking the IAT at three field sites.

Participants took a basic gender-taste Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT) as a warm up to boost familiarity with the test’s instructions prior to taking the main gender-occupation IAT. The main tests typically took between five to ten minutes to complete. To further ensure that the respondent was taking the test correctly, the test stopped automatically if the respondent averaged over six seconds response time. If the respondent pressed the wrong key, he or she was instructed to press the correct key; however, the test also stopped automatically if the respondent answered incorrectly to over 50 percent of associational tasks in any given block.48

The IAT measures bias through a D-score, which captures the normalized differ-

48I compensated participants with 20 Maloti (equivalent to 2 USD) for completing both the hypothetical leader vignette task and the IAT, a sizable sum in most areas I visited.
ence in mean response time between the non-stereotypical and stereotypical test blocks (Greenwald et al., 2003). A higher D-score indicates a stronger implicit stereotype - in this case a stronger association of men with leadership and women with domestic life. Typically researchers classify a D-score ranging from -0.15 to 0.15 to indicate that the test taker has no bias, 0.15 to 0.35 to indicate slight bias, 0.35 to 0.65 to indicate moderate bias and a D-score greater than 0.65 to indicate strong bias.49

Table 5.8 shows the quota’s average treatment effect between formerly reserved and unreserved electoral divisions as well as the conditional average treatment effects for the split samples of male and female respondents. Again, I find no statistically significant treatment effects either within the whole sample or within the male and female respondents separately.

Table 5.8

As above, I test for potential conditional treatment effects within age cohorts through model-based estimates of treatment by covariate interactions. Model 3 of Table 5.9 again reveals the conditional average treatment effect among female respondents under twenty-five.

Table 5.9

Here, the quota appears to have significantly weakened the extent to which young women (but not young men) implicitly associate women with the home and men with

49More information about IATs and many practice tests are available at: implicit.harvard.edu
public leadership. Young women in previously unreserved EDs have a mean D-score of 0.29 compared to young women in previously reserved EDs, who have a D-score of 0.18, which is associated with standardized effect size of 0.22 standard deviations. As a robustness check, I simulate the CATE and 95 percent confidence through the principles of clustered random assignment. The resulting CATE estimate, -0.11, is bracketed by a 95 percent confidence interval from -0.225 to -0.001.

5.5 Discussion

In sum, measured respectively one and slightly over two years after the policy’s removal, I find that the six-year reserved ED quota did not universally cause citizens to change their explicit or implicit gender biases. I do, however, find that the quota policy caused explicit and implicit reactions specifically among young women under the age of twenty-five. Young women in reserved EDs are more likely to report that women are equally suited for political leadership and are less likely to implicitly stereotype men with public leadership and women with domestic life. Despite this, I also find evidence that young people in general - both men and women together, but neither group separately - report increased explicit bias against a more general indicator of women’s rights as compared to their counterparts in previously unreserved EDs. Taken together, these findings suggest that women’s equality in one dimension, politics, may not have positive externalities on gender egalitarian attitudes more broadly.

In Section 5.2 I presented expectations drawn from the political economy and social psychology literatures on taste-based discrimination, statistical discrimination and social role contiguity to explain the perpetuation of gender biases. Here it is helpful to review how the evidence from Lesotho’s policy experiment fits with the implications from each
of these theoretically distinct processes.

First, I find that being in the constituency of a quota-mandated female representative reduced young women’s explicit taste discrimination against female leaders. The youngest women in this cohort experienced quota-mandated female representation from the age of eleven and the oldest from the age of seventeen. My evidence suggests that growing up with a female community leader signaled to these young women and girls that women should not be barred from the political life of the community. The quota, however, did not reduce explicit political taste-based discrimination, but also did not increase it, among other demographic groups. Related to statistical discrimination, I do not find that the quota reduced the implicit effectiveness that citizens associate with male representatives relative to female representatives. This finding extends to the total sample of respondents as well as specific age and gender cohorts.

My field experimental research does support the implications from role congruity theory among young women discussed in Section 5.2. Quota-mandated female representation appears to have lessened traditional male/leader and women/domestic stereotypes among young women. As stereotypes can be a powerful tool as voters form preferences about particular candidates, increased encounters with powerful women may reduce voters’ prejudice towards female politicians (see de Paola et al., 2010) and this may, in part explain, why this group also reports less explicit political gender bias. Again, however, I note that the reduction I find in both explicit and implicit bias relate specifically to actors in the political sphere. I find no evidence that exposure to female representatives through this particular quota policy reduced more broad-based forms of gender bias in other realms of public and private life.

One issue that this chapter has not explicitly tackled is the extent to which quota-
induced changes in young women’s explicit and implicit gender biases are related to how female leaders achieve office. Because of the infrequency of sampling the same EDs across survey years, there are not enough observations to use the measure of latent propensity for female representation that I developed in Chapter 3 to measure differences in bias between comparable subgroups of quota-mandated and non-quota-mandated female councilors.

The fact that the control group in this study consists of both male and female community councilors has important implications. First, the conditional average treatment effects that I find among young Basotho women likely underestimate the pure “female leadership” effects that might appear if the control group were made up of entirely men (or almost entirely men, as in the Indian case). Second, the fact that young women under twenty-five report reduced explicit political bias and reduced gender-stereotyped associations suggests that a backlash to the quota policy itself is not at play in the same way that was revealed in Chapter 3 when examining women’s reduced political engagement. Again, it is important to note that this point relates only to backlash in the political sphere - and the curious finding that young people in previously reserved EDs are more likely to espouse broad-based inequitarian attitudes than young people in unreserved EDs suggests that a backlash against the quota may have spilled over into non-political gender bias - a claim I hope to test in future research.

As discussed at greater length in the introductory chapter, the gendered dynamics of rural life in Lesotho helps one interpret these contradictory findings. Because for most of Lesotho’s recent history, a high proportion of able-bodied men were employed in South African mines, women were often left as household heads and informal managers in their communities. Despite the fact that by necessity for most of the 20th century women were
often *de facto* community leaders while the able-bodied men were away, women were by most other measures until quite recently literally second-class citizens. This particular facet of Sesotho economic history in part explains why implicit and explicit gender biases around women’s political rights are more malleable at the individual level than perceptions of women’s place in customary law. Because women have been most often responsible for the day-to-day management of their communities for most of Lesotho’s recent history - local politics is likely an area that is less contentious, and around which biases are more malleable, as compared to attitudes around more broad-based gendered dimensions of customary law, which dictate aspects not only of public, but also of private life in Sesotho culture.

Reading the evidence presented in this chapter with the findings from Chapter 3 leads to at least two interpretations. In Chapter 3 I find that women (with no distinction across age cohorts) are less politically engaged when they are represented by a quota-mandated female councilor three years after the adoption of the quota policy - yet, in this chapter I find that young women in reserved EDs change their explicit and implicit biases toward women in the political sphere after the full duration of the councilors’ six-year term. This could indicate the increased symbolic benefits of the quota over time, the particular potency of these benefits among younger cohorts of women, or some combination of the two.\(^{50}\)

Understanding the social, political and economic context in which the quota policy was introduced in Lesotho provides insight on the external validity of both the Indian and Lesotho cases. Related to the findings presented by Beaman *et al.* (2012a), I also find that the quota has some of the most pronounced effects on the attitudes of young

\(^{50}\)Unfortunately, the bias questions were not asked in the 2008 Afro-barometer survey round.
women who experienced female representatives during their adolescence. However, I do not find that this effect extends to broader sample-wide reductions in either explicit taste-based discrimination or implicit statistical or role-contiguity-based discrimination. As noted through this dissertation, my findings from Lesotho are in agreement with some studies from the Indian case that find that the quota law takes two electoral cycles before its symbolic benefits are fully realized. Unfortunately, because of the change in Lesotho’s quota policy in late 2011, it will be impossible to make long term comparisons between the two cases.

5.6 Conclusion: Loose Ends and Larger Ambitions

The findings in this final empirical chapter point to several possible extensions of this research. First, in future work I hope to develop a novel way to measure differences in gender bias between constituents of quota-mandated and non-quota-mandated female councilors, while maintaining the empirical power of the policy experiment, as I do in Chapter 3. Second, the fact that there have been significant improvements in the way women respond to questions about traditional bias between 2003 and 2012 suggest that the quota may have produced spillover effects - either directly through villagers in other EDs encountering more female councilors or indirectly through the general debate around women’s rights that has become especially pronounced throughout the SADC region in the last ten years. In future work, I hope to explicitly model the quota’s potential spillover effects through the geographic coordinates provided by the Afro-barometer data. These data will allow me to test whether spillover effects are a

51 Although I do not find, as they do, that this changes bias in education - although as described earlier, gender bias in education is more pronounced in India than it is in Lesotho.

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function of citizens’ proximity to EDs reserved for female councilors.

As a final extension of this work, I am currently collaborating with Belinda Tang, an economist at the National Bureau of Economic Research (and the only other scholar that I am aware of doing research based on Lesotho’s policy experiment) to examine how the quota affected women’s political opportunities in reserved EDs after the policy was removed. Using data from the 2005 and 2011 local elections, Tang (2014) finds that women are more likely to stand for and win community councilor positions in electoral divisions that were previously reserved by the quota. Similar to research conducted by Rikhil Bhavnani (2009), we are currently in the process of combining Belinda’s work with the research from this chapter to study how the quota law might have affected the electoral prospects of women in local elections after the quota was removed.

This work in combination with the findings from the previous two chapters reveal that Lesotho’s quota law produced symbolic effects both intended and unintended by the policy’s advocates. Further, the cumulative findings of this dissertation reveal that, at least in the short term, female citizens have the strongest reactions toward female representatives, either positively or negatively. I now turn to the conclusion chapter, in which I attempt to synthesize the findings from this dissertation’s three empirical chapters, both to interpret how in combination they speak to the Lesotho’s quota experience and how the general lessons from this case speak to our broader knowledge of the symbolic representation of historically marginalized groups.
Associated Tables and Figures

Figures

Response Distributions: Bias Indicators

**Political Bias**

- Strong Agree 1
- Agree 1
- Agree 2
- Strong Agree 2

**Traditional Bias**

- Strong Agree 1
- Agree 1
- Agree 2
- Strong Agree 2

**Education Bias**

- Strong Agree 1
- Agree 1
- Agree 2
- Strong Agree 2

Figure 5.1: Three explicit bias indicators from 2012 Afro-barometer data: distribution of response categories in previously reserved versus unreserved electoral divisions.
Female Respondents Under 25:
Statement 1: Men make better political leaders than women, and should be elected rather than women.
Statement 2: Women should have the same chance of being elected to political office as men.

Figure 5.2: Young women’s self-reported political bias: distribution of response categories in previously reserved versus unreserved electoral divisions.
### Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political Bias</th>
<th>Traditional Bias</th>
<th>Education Bias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Bias</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional Bias</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Education Bias</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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Table 5.1: Correlation matrix of three bias indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Reserved</th>
<th>Mean Unreserved</th>
<th>ATE (95 % CI)</th>
<th>p-values: 2-tailed</th>
<th>p-values: 1-tailed</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sample:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Bias</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.17, 0.17)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional Bias</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.20, 0.20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Bias</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.06, 0.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ATEs with significance of $p < 0.05$ indicated in **bold**.

Table 5.2: Total sample reservation ATEs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Reserved</th>
<th>Mean Unreserved</th>
<th>ATE (95 % CI)</th>
<th>p-values: 2-tailed (1-tailed)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Split Sample: Female Respondents</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Bias</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(-0.26, 0.21)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional Bias</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.72</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Split Sample: Male Respondents</strong></td>
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<td>2.94</td>
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<td>0.77</td>
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<td>(0.38)</td>
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<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.57</td>
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ATEs with significance of $p < 0.05$ indicated in **bold**.

Table 5.3: Split sample reservation CATEs.
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<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>Male</td>
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<td>(Intercept)</td>
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<td>3.17</td>
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<td>[2.96; 3.15]</td>
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<td>[-0.43; 0.10]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.23</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.06; 0.40]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Female)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.40; 0.26]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Und. 25</td>
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<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>[-0.32; 0.24]</td>
<td>[-0.26; 0.31]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.50</td>
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<td>AIC</td>
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<td>Num. obs.</td>
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<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.27</td>
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Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**

Table 5.4: Political bias: model-based estimates of conditional average treatment effects by age and gender
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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Model 1 Total</th>
<th>Model 2 Total</th>
<th>Model 3 Female</th>
<th>Model 4 Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>2.39 (2.25; 2.52)</td>
<td>2.53 (2.41; 2.64)</td>
<td>2.66 (2.51; 2.81)</td>
<td>2.39 (2.23; 2.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>0.04 [−0.23; 0.31]</td>
<td>0.11 [−0.12; 0.34]</td>
<td>0.09 [−0.22; 0.39]</td>
<td>0.14 [−0.17; 0.46]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.33* [0.15; 0.52]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Female)</td>
<td>−0.09 [−0.45; 0.28]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Und. 25</td>
<td>0.10 [−0.12; 0.33]</td>
<td>0.27 [−0.05; 0.58]</td>
<td>−0.01 [−0.32; 0.29]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Und. 25)</td>
<td>−0.43 [−0.84; −0.01]</td>
<td>−0.51 [−1.10; 0.07]</td>
<td>−0.36 [−0.95; 0.23]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>3375.16</td>
<td>3385.19</td>
<td>1692.00</td>
<td>1696.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>3404.58</td>
<td>3414.62</td>
<td>1717.26</td>
<td>1721.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>−1681.58</td>
<td>−1686.60</td>
<td>−840.00</td>
<td>−842.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>3363.16</td>
<td>3373.19</td>
<td>1680.00</td>
<td>1684.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. groups: ED</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: ED</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: Residual</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in bold

Table 5.5: Traditional bias: model-based estimates of conditional average treatment effects by age and gender
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Total</th>
<th>Model 2 Total</th>
<th>Model 3 Female</th>
<th>Model 4 Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[3.35; 3.52]</td>
<td>[3.44; 3.58]</td>
<td>[3.49; 3.67]</td>
<td>[3.34; 3.55]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.12; 0.22]</td>
<td>[-0.13; 0.15]</td>
<td>[-0.16; 0.21]</td>
<td>[-0.23; 0.19]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td><strong>0.13</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.01; 0.25]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Und. 25</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.18; 0.09]</td>
<td>[−0.24; 0.12]</td>
<td>[−0.24; 0.18]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Female)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.21; 0.26]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Und. 25)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.05; 0.48]</td>
<td>[−0.14; 0.53]</td>
<td>[−0.16; 0.65]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>2466.65</td>
<td>2470.41</td>
<td>1143.19</td>
<td>1324.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>2496.07</td>
<td>2499.83</td>
<td>1168.46</td>
<td>1350.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-1227.32</td>
<td>-1229.20</td>
<td>-565.60</td>
<td>-656.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>2454.65</td>
<td>2458.41</td>
<td>1131.19</td>
<td>1312.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. groups: ED</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: ED</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: Residual</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**

Table 5.6: Education bias: model-based estimates of conditional average treatment effects by age and gender
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Total</th>
<th>Model 2 Female</th>
<th>Model 3 Male</th>
<th>Model 4 Female</th>
<th>Model 5 Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>3.86*</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>3.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[3.36; 4.35]</td>
<td>[3.30; 4.53]</td>
<td>[2.97; 4.63]</td>
<td>[3.66; 4.75]</td>
<td>[3.06; 4.61]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.71; 0.64]</td>
<td>[-0.98; 0.92]</td>
<td>[-1.08; 1.00]</td>
<td>[-0.85; 0.35]</td>
<td>[-0.94; 0.65]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fem. Voice</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-0.43; 0.87]</td>
<td>[-0.46; 1.17]</td>
<td>[-1.08; 1.28]</td>
<td>[-0.28; 0.89]</td>
<td>[-0.68; 0.89]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Und. 25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.01</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.86; -0.17]</td>
<td>[-0.91; 0.69]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Fem. Voice)</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.11; 0.65]</td>
<td>[-1.41; 0.99]</td>
<td>[-1.77; 1.15]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Fem. Voice * Und. 25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>[-1.38; 1.38]</td>
<td>[-2.31; 0.77]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>334.04</td>
<td>165.18</td>
<td>176.94</td>
<td>160.23</td>
<td>177.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIC</td>
<td>349.73</td>
<td>176.77</td>
<td>188.41</td>
<td>173.75</td>
<td>191.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-161.02</td>
<td>-76.59</td>
<td>-82.47</td>
<td>-73.12</td>
<td>-81.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deviance</td>
<td>322.04</td>
<td>153.18</td>
<td>164.94</td>
<td>146.23</td>
<td>163.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. obs.</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. groups: ED</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: ED (Intercept)</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance: Residual</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**

Table 5.7: Implicit councilor effectiveness bias: model-based estimates of treatment by treatment interactions of ATE and CATEs by age and gender
### Table 5.8: D-score responses to IATS: Total sample ATE and split sample reservation CATEs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Reserved</th>
<th>Mean Unreserved</th>
<th>ATE (95 % CI)</th>
<th>p-values: 2-tailed</th>
<th>(1-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sample</strong></td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.004 (-0.057, 0.056)</td>
<td>0.89 (0.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Split Sample:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.009 (-0.062, 0.079)</td>
<td>0.82 (0.41)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Split Sample:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Respondents</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0.010 (-0.081, 0.103)</td>
<td>0.83 (0.42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ATEs with significance of $p < 0.05$ indicated in **bold**.

### Table 5.9: D-score responses to IATS: Model-based estimates of age and gender CATEs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Total</th>
<th>Model 2 Total</th>
<th>Model 3 Female</th>
<th>Model 4 Male</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Intercept)</strong></td>
<td>0.14 (-0.20; 0.20)</td>
<td>0.16 (-0.10; 0.21)</td>
<td>0.17 (-0.11; 0.23)</td>
<td>0.14 (-0.23; 0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota</td>
<td>0.01 [-0.07; 0.09]</td>
<td>0.02 [-0.05; 0.09]</td>
<td>0.04 [-0.04; 0.12]</td>
<td>0.00 [-0.11; 0.12]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.06 [-0.03; 0.15]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Und. 25</td>
<td>0.05 [-0.05; 0.15]</td>
<td>0.13 [-0.01; 0.24]</td>
<td>-0.01 [-0.16; 0.15]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Female)</td>
<td>0.00 [-0.12; 0.12]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I(Quota * Und. 25)</td>
<td>-0.06 [-0.19; 0.07]</td>
<td>0.17 [-0.33; 0.00]</td>
<td>0.03 [-0.18; 0.23]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AIC</th>
<th>BIC</th>
<th>Log Likelihood</th>
<th>Deviance</th>
<th>Num. obs.</th>
<th>Num. groups: ED</th>
<th>Variance: ED (Intercept)</th>
<th>Variance: Residual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-67.72</td>
<td>-52.03</td>
<td>39.86</td>
<td>-79.72</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-65.55</td>
<td>-49.86</td>
<td>38.77</td>
<td>-77.55</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-39.27</td>
<td>-27.68</td>
<td>25.63</td>
<td>-51.27</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-10.08</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>11.04</td>
<td>-22.08</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients with $p < 0.05$ in **bold**.
## .1 Missingness Diagnostics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Complete Data</th>
<th>Mean Sample Data</th>
<th>Difference (SE)</th>
<th>T-test p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent rural</td>
<td>0.747 (0.019)</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discuss politics</td>
<td>2.037 (0.032)</td>
<td>2.040 (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty level</td>
<td>2.728 (0.008)</td>
<td>2.721 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>0.896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>3.186 (0.069)</td>
<td>3.188 (0.069)</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in politics</td>
<td>3.089 (0.049)</td>
<td>3.109 (0.049)</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>42.018 (0.800)</td>
<td>41.748 (0.800)</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>3.857 (0.025)</td>
<td>3.846 (0.025)</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.671</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A5.1: Checks for random assignment of missingness from 2012 Lesotho Afro-barometer data. 

\( n = 1197 \) for complete data set and \( n = 996 \) for data used in the included analysis. Values that achieve statistical significance of \( p \leq 0.05 \) are indicated in bold.
.2 Mean Values of IAT Bias by Age, Gender and Reservation Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age &amp; Gender Group</th>
<th>Political Bias</th>
<th>Traditional Bias</th>
<th>Education Bias</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 Male Reserved</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 Male Unreserved</td>
<td>2.96</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>3.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 25 Male Reserved</td>
<td>2.92</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 25 Male Unreserved</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 Female Reserved</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 25 Female Unreserved</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 25 Female Reserved</td>
<td>3.01</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 25 Female Unreserved</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A5.2: Mean values of IAT bias (D-score) by age, gender and reservation status

.3 Hypothetical Leader Vignette

The following is the English translation of the hypothetical vignette experimental task:

READ OUT (research assistant): You will hear a tape-recorded speech from a nearby village meeting. We will ask you some questions on the effectiveness of the leader. There are no right or wrong answers. Please answer each in terms of your own reactions.
VILLAGER: The borehole of our village is not functioning. The repairing job of the borehole in your locality has been done partially, but the same work at a neighboring village has been completed.

COUNCILOR: For repairing of boreholes maximum amount of funds of the council is being drained out. As a result of which, other work cannot be done. From the next stage you, the people, should take mental preparations that the minor repairing jobs of the boreholes will not be done by the council. I mean that if the work involves a large amount of money, for example, if a pipe is needed then it involves the money above 250 Maloti, this type of work will be done by the council. But for the minor repairing jobs the people have to take initiative to collect subscriptions to do this. In the future, the plan of the council will be plans with equal sharing. The government will not provide all the money. The government will provide some amount of money and the rest will have to be borne by the people either by giving labor or helping financially. In this way the work of the council has to be done. Suppose a village road has to be constructed, then the people of the village will do the earthen work and the council will supply the equipment. Therefore the people will now share the jobs, which the council did mostly. Then the total work can be made with success. So in the next stage, preparation has to be taken. I would now like all villagers to approve the village budget.

.4 Further Description of IAT Test

This description is adapted from Project Implicit at implicit.harvard.edu.
The IAT is consists of five parts or blocks. The respondent starts with her fingers on the “e” and “i” keys of the laptop, which she must use to indicate whether the auditory or pictorial prompt is on the left (“e”) or right (“i”) side of the screen.

In the first block, the respondent sorts words relating to the concepts (e.g., leadership, domestic life) into categories. If the category “Leader” was on the left, when the respondent hears an authority prompt of a leadership word, she should press the “e” key on the left side of the screen.

In the second part of the IAT, the respondent sorts male and female Sesotho names with an image of a male or female Mosotho. So if the women’s image was on the right, and the respondent heard a woman’s name, she would press the “i” key.

In the third part of the IAT the categories are combined and the respondent is asked to sort both occupations and names to the appropriate column. So if the image categories on the left hand side are “Leader”/“Woman” then the categories on the right hand side will be “Home”/“Man”. It is important to note that the order in which the blocks are presented varies across participants, so some respondents will do the “Leader”/“Woman”, “Home”/“Man” block first and other people will do the “Leader”/“Man”, “Home”/“Woman” block first.

In the fourth part of the IAT the placement of the concepts switches. If the category “Leader” was previously on the left, now it would be on the right. Importantly, the number of trials in this part of the IAT is increased in order to minimize the effects of practice.

In the final part of the IAT the categories are combined in a way that is opposite what they were before. If the category on the left was previously “Leader”/“Woman”, it would now be “Leader”/“Man”.

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The IAT score is based on how long it takes the respondent, on average, to sort the words in the third part of the IAT versus the fifth part of the IAT. The respondent has an implicit association of men with leadership if they are faster to categorize words when Men and Leader share a response key and Women and Home share a response key, relative to the reverse.

Below is the list of words that the respondent hears to associate it with its respective appropriate image on either the left or right hand side of the screen. In Sesotho, the words in these categories are on average approximately the same length and one group of words does not take longer to read out than the other.

**Leadership Words (translated from Sesotho)**

Councilor, public gathering (*pitso*), govern, chairperson, voting, leader, campaigning, director

**Domestic Words (translated from Sesotho)**

Home, parents, children, family, marriage, wedding, relatives, spouse
Gender-Occupation IAT screenshots

**Stereotypical Block**

“Lelapa” (“home” in Sesotho)
  or
“Ntolo” (a female Sesotho name)

“Pitso” (“village meeting” in Sesotho)
  or
“Tsepo” (a male Sesotho name)

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**Figure A5.1:** Sample screen shots from Gender-Occupation IAT (English translation): Stereotypical block (female/domestic and male/leader)
Counter- Stereotypical Block

“Pitso” (“village meeting” in Sesotho) 
or 
“Ntolo” (a female Sesotho name)

“Lelapa” (“home” in Sesotho) 
or 
“Tsepo” (a male Sesotho name)

Figure A5.2: Sample screen shots from Gender-Occupation IAT (English translation): Counter-stereotypical block (female/leader and male/domestic)
Sample Participants Taking IATs in Three Field Sites

Figure A5.3: Female respondent taking laptop-based IAT

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Figure A5.4: Young female respondent taking laptop-based IAT
Figure A5.5: Male respondent taking laptop-based IAT
Chapter 6

Conclusion: Gender Quotas and the Politics of Inclusion

This dissertation had two main goals: first to systematically examine how one gender quota policy affected several dimensions of citizens’ attitudes and behavior toward female representatives in one country - and second to situate Lesotho’s experiences into the larger discussion on gender quotas, female leadership, and symbolic representation.

Related to the first goal, this dissertation’s three empirical chapters have pulled from social psychology, economics, comparative and American politics, feminist political theory, and business and public management literatures to empirically test and interpret the effects of Lesotho’s policy experiment on citizens’ attitudes and behavior. This endeavor revealed the following individual-level effects: In Chapter 3, I found that having a quota-mandated female representative either had no effect on or actually reduced women’s self-reported external political efficacy and interest in local politics. Using implications from the policy experiment, I presented evidence that these adverse reactions stemmed from a rejection of the hyper-exclusionary nature of Lesotho’s particular quota policy and the stigma that it created around the policy’s beneficiaries.

In Chapter 4, I tested for changes in the way citizens perceived the governing influence of local traditional elites when these elites must share their political power with quota-
mandated representatives. Here, I found that the quota, by promoting women’s visible role in local politics, challenged the way citizen across all demographic groups perceived the influence of their local chiefs in structuring local governance.

Finally, in Chapter 5, I found that six years of exposure to quota-mandated female representatives did not change general public perceptions of women’s cultural or political rights, nor did it broadly affect citizens’ implicit biases in favor of male leadership. I did, however, discover pronounced effects specifically among young women under the age of twenty-five, who as a group, after six years of exposure to female representation through the use of quotas, were both more likely to express explicit egalitarian attitudes about women’s political rights as well as hold stronger implicit associations of women with community leadership positions. Importantly, however, the symbolic benefits of the quota did not spill over into improvements in public perceptions of women’s rights in non-political spheres.

Taken together, these findings reveal an important dimension of the debate around gender quotas. In short, whereas some of the positive symbolic effects of an increased number of women in politics may exist when women are elected through quotas, other intended benefits may not. Citizens may view the immediate ramifications of a quota policy’s preferential treatment of women harshly even if they also implicitly form beliefs based on the increased number of women in politics; the intended downstream effect of the quota. In Lesotho, the hyper-exclusive nature of the reserved district quota invoked explicit short-term negative reactions toward the women who achieved political office through the policy, but at the same time changed the gendered dynamics of local governance in ways that citizens may not have necessarily attributed to the quota. These changes, in turn, led to localized positive externalities related to young women’s
perceptions of women’s political legitimacy and all citizens’ perceptions of women’s presence in local governance vis-a-vis the governing influence of local chiefs.

In the October 2011 elections, Lesotho removed the reserved district quota and instead adopted a system in which an additional 30 percent of seats were added onto each council for only female councilors. These seats are now filled through a parallel system; voters have a separate ballot to select a political party when they vote for their constituency-based councilor and women are assigned to the additional seats based on the percentage of the vote share each party receives in each council area. These women, however, are not connected to constituencies, leaving their function on the councils somewhat vague. Similar to accounts from other quota systems in which women have been added to governing bodies through additional seats to avoid situations in which they might unseat male councilors, this had led to popular claims that the women who fill these seats are redundant and, therefore, secondary or lesser politicians.

From this, we see how Lesotho’s new quota design solves some problems citizens and councilors experienced with the reserved district quota - for instance, women’s decreased political engagement discussed in Chapter 3 - but has led to other unintended negative reactions. Lesotho’s experience is part of a seemingly intractable problem for quota advocates. Without the presence of quotas, majoritarian or plurality-based electoral systems are the least conducive to high numbers of women in office, as taste and statistical discrimination have given men a historical advantage when citizens are only allowed to choose one candidate. This had led women’s rights groups to bemoan the low number of women that achieve office under these electoral rules; however, mandating demographic requirements for candidates in single-member constituencies is difficult to justify as democratically legitimate.
Integrating more women into top spots on party lists is a straightforward way to ensure greater numbers of women in proportional representation systems. Redistricting constituencies so that ethnic or racial minorities constitute the majority of voters in certain electoral districts can diversify legislative bodies in majoritarian systems. But because women are not geographically concentrated, devising appropriate gender quota policies in majoritarian or plurality systems is an issue that quota advocates in many countries are still grappling with - and one to which there remains no consensus on best practices.

The problem of appropriate quota design in majoritarian systems is made more complicated by the fact that many, if not most, of the countries that have passed gender quotas in the past twenty years are not known for being exceptionally progressive on gender issues. On the contrary, countries with some of the worst gender parity records in the world have reserved seat quotas provisions in majoritarian or plurality-based electoral systems. For example, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan and Somalia all hold general elections with single-member districts and reserve separate parliamentary seats for women - yet remain in the bottom 25 percent of countries ranked according to gender equality (UNDP 2013: 159).

This seeming contradiction stems from the fact that many countries do not adopt quotas as a serious means of tackling gender disparities, but rather do so for a host of political reasons discussed in Chapter 1. Putting more women into political office is an act that is different from a sincere effort to change real decision-making authority in existing power structures. Whereas the former may offer benefits to political elites, including international praise and increased foreign aid, the latter is costly to those that benefit from the status quo - and states have been historically very resistant to
make meaningful shifts of this sort. This is because serious gender equity concerns remain countercultural in most societies around the world, as they challenge the interests of individual men and the patriarchal privilege on which many political groups either explicitly or tacitly base their authority. For instance, when applied to women’s role in the policymaking process, shifts in the genuine ability of female politicians to challenge misogynistic policies, such as male-based property rights, land rights, and inheritance laws, by their very nature challenge the traditional power of men and the material benefits this power allows.

Careful observers of global gender quota adoption recognize that all quota systems in all countries of world are not likely to allow the holders of these seats the power to challenge patriarchal structures in ways that would substantively benefit the well-being of women; however, many in this group have argued that women’s mere presence in decision-making bodies carries important symbolic meaning, a characteristic that is valuable in its own right. Even when women hold only *de jure* rather than *de facto* political power, increases in women’s descriptive representation send the symbolic message that politics is a sphere that should not exclude women; that women are capable of political leadership, rather than constituting a group always led by others.

This claim of symbolic meaning, however, is challenged if citizens are aware of the different gendered and non-gendered electoral rules that promote women to public office. If women are always seen as the beneficiaries of special treatment, the positive effects expressed above may be mitigated. Citizens do see women in the halls of power, but the benefits of this may be counteracted either by open hostility toward the quota policy or by public sentiments that women in these positions are redundant or inferior to politicians that are perceived as achieving office on the basis of their merit.
With these potentially negative effects in mind, policymakers often introduce reserved seat quotas as short-term “training grounds” for women. After women gain experience through these special seats, the argument goes, they are expected to be able to compete for and win non-gender-specific seats. These dynamics, however, rarely unfold in practice. For example, in Uganda, the first African country to adopt a reserved seat parliamentary gender quota in 1989, women have won fewer and fewer of the general constituency seats in each electoral cycle. Over time, the 30 percent reserved seat quota has created a ceiling rather than a floor for women’s descriptive representation. Political parties encourage female candidates not to run in general constituency seats, but to instead remain in the separate sphere of electoral competition reserved for women so as to not challenge incumbent men. Even Uganda’s Parliamentary Speaker, Rebecca Kadaga, who is one of the most senior and influential MPs in the Ugandan parliament has not been able to “graduate” from a women’s district seat to a general constituency seat.

The creation of a permanently dual system of electoral rules has led to de facto separate male (“regular”) and female (“special”) selection procedures, and this has questionable implications regarding the symbolic message that it sends to citizens. The permanent dual system implies: yes, women can lead, but they need permanent special help to get there. In the end, the stigma associated with affirmative action seats may counteract the positive symbolic meaning associated with the seat holder’s gender.

In the case of Lesotho, the reserved district quota sent another set of opposing signals. On the one hand, by including more women in governance structures, the quota may have made the community councils appear more inclusive and democratically legitimate. On the other hand, the particular nature of this quota policy was to promote women
through the absolute exclusion of men in certain districts - which many citizens viewed as exclusive and democratically illegitimate. Taken together, I find that these mixed signals caused female citizens in particular to retrench from the political process, but at the same time altered the public perception of women’s role in politics more broadly - both in the way all citizens evaluated the power-sharing dynamics between female councilors and traditional local elites as well as the way young women changed their explicit and implicit gender biases.

India’s subnational quota is currently the only case in the world where both of the above mediating processes are still present; that is, both the potential stigma of affirmative action and the exclusive nature of the reserved district quota. The former of these two mediators, however, describes a feature of reserved seat quotas that is relevant to the dozens of countries that have adopted these measures at either the national or subnational level in the last twenty years. This reveals a testable implication: if the individual-level attitudes that I find in Lesotho are observable in other reserved seat systems, the stigma effect likely exists even in more inclusive quota regimes.

Perhaps most directly, Lesotho’s quota experience tests whether the broad evidence that has emerged from the similar policy experiment in India is portable to another country with a distinct political, economic, and cultural context. In some ways, I find evidence that is well aligned with the findings from India, but in others areas I do not. Unlike the extensive work from India on the subject, I do not find that female citizens are more politically engaged when the local representative position in reserved for a woman. Tang (2014), however, does find that women in previously reserved districts in Lesotho are more likely to run for and win local councilor positions after the reservation has been removed - evidence that is in line with the findings both Beaman et al. (2009)
and Bhavnani (2009) report from two different Indian states. Belinda Tang and I are working to publish these results along with the findings I present in Chapter 3 to bring Lesotho’s experience greater scholarly attention.

In Chapter 5, I replicate the IATs used by Lori Beaman, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, and Petia Topalova in Western Bengal and, although my sample size is considerably smaller than theirs, my results point in a slightly different direction. Beaman et al. find that men’s implicit biases are more tractable than the way women implicitly evaluate other women. My findings suggest that exposure to female community leaders does not change men’s implicit associations, but rather affects the way young women implicitly conceive appropriate gender roles. Although not related to bias, my finding that young women are especially susceptible to the positive symbolic benefits of female representation relates to Beaman et al.’s research (2012a), which suggests that female representatives act as role models in ways that positively influence the educational attainment and career aspirations of young women and girls in their rural Indian communities.

Comparing the results from India to those that I present here suggests several theoretically interesting possibilities that might explain the areas where our results differ. First, it is very possible that the positive symbolic effects of gender quotas take more than three or even six years to realize. Given that there were no studies of the Indian quota immediately following its adoption, the negative results I find in Chapter 3 could indicate initial resentment to a new policy that would dissipate over time as the quota became seen as a more legitimate electoral rule.

Further, India adopted its reserved district gender quota law in 1993, but in most states did not implement it into the local authorities until the following electoral cycle in
1998. This allowed the policy’s stakeholders and women’s rights groups in the country five years to build awareness about the new law in order to justify its legitimacy in ways that did not happen in Lesotho. Additionally, in India, women had low levels of local representation prior to the quota law and still seldom win in unreserved districts, providing a visible and historical justification for the quota. In Lesotho, by contrast, the fact that a significant number of women won in unreserved electoral districts suggests that both the stigma effect and the effect of exclusionary institutions may have been heightened, as the justifications for the affirmative action policy were less immediately apparent to ordinary citizens.

In the context of Lesotho, I report negative, positive, and null findings relating the country’s policy experiment to public perceptions of women’s legitimacy, effectiveness, and appropriateness in local politics. Whether this particular quota experiment was “worth it” to promote more inclusive governance structures is beyond the purview of this dissertation. Similarly, the question of how policymakers in majoritarian systems should best pursue the admirable goal of including more women into their political structures is not this dissertation’s goal - but these are both worthy points of discussion for gender quota advocates both inside and outside of academia.

Gender equity remains an elusive goal for most of the developing world, and indeed most parts of the developed word. Few countries have reached the most advanced state of institutionalized gender parity, which we might conceptualize as the following: gender equality in political representation (though not necessarily through quotas); female representatives’ ability to act as autonomous decision-makers in the policy-making process; high incentives among both male and female politicians to promote gender equity policies, as issues that disproportionally affect women are salient topics of policy reform;
and the popular perception that women are equal to men in their political capabilities. With the possible exception of the Scandinavian countries, most states fail to meet all of these criteria.

Electoral gender quotas have become an increasingly popular way of addressing the most visible and the most easily remedied of these issues: the physical presence of women in political office - yet the ability of quotas to spark a transformation that addresses other systemic dimensions of gender inequality is limited. The underrepresentation of women in the political sphere is usually a symptom of much larger and more intractable issues of gender inequality and remedying one of these dimensions is unlikely to address the others without additional policies in place.

Although there is an increasing amount of quantitative work and a great deal of descriptive evidence on this subject, the efficacy of electoral gender quotas remains understudied, particularly in the field of political science and by American scholars. The number of scholars interested in this subject, however, is growing - and this dissertation is part of a broader research agenda, which seeks to empirically test the efficacy of quota laws on different dimensions of women’s political representation. This research is particularly salient as new countries continue to adopt gender quotas at both the national and local level every year. Quotas, then, have become a particularly relevant dimension of women’s political representation - and understanding the nuances through which different types of quota polices interact with different political systems to shape the representative processes is an important theoretical step in understanding the politics of inclusion.
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