Architecture and Nation-building in Mid-20th Century Urban Turkey and Iraq

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Introduction

The premise of this thesis is locate parallels and differences of foreign involvement in Ankara and Baghdad’s architecture during the development of each state’s nationalisms. In doing so, it will examine how foreign-originated modern architecture was modified in each case to fit its local context. I chose to focus on slightly different time periods in the two cities—the 1930s in Ankara and the 1950s in Baghdad—since these were defining periods of urban planning and nationalism-formulation in each. They are also periods that demonstrate well how modernity and nationalism were realized in the built environment. The degree to which architectural modernism was modified in each case was determined by the transmission of new ideas to Turkey and Iraq, education of and communication between foreign and local architects and the influence of nationalism. The history of modern Turkey and Iraq are very different, but architecture helps demonstrate two unique yet not entirely inseparable experiences of modernity in the post-Ottoman Middle East.

With the coming of modernity and the threat of European imperialism in the Ottoman Period, Turkey, as the home of the empire’s administration, and Iraq, then as the three provinces Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, underwent varying degrees of modernization reforms, beginning in the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876). Ottoman elites who implemented such reforms were influenced by the Orientalist attitudes of their European counterparts had towards Ottoman elites and their subjects, as well as subjects of European imperial rule. Ottoman elites did not fully accept such ideas, but did search for weaknesses in the administration and military forces of the empire that could be changed to prevent further territorial and population loss to European powers. Such a search
spread ideas of modernity and nationalism to a growing intelligentsia who, in the last decades of the empire, discussed the relationship between reforms, social changes, religion and national identity. An essential question in developing Turkish nationalism, and one that continued well beyond the end of the empire, was whether it was possible to be modern without completely abandoning Turkish and Islamic identities. Political elites of the Late Ottoman Empire and early Turkish Republic were quite removed from the “average” subject and citizen. In producing the ideal citizen, the state both drew upon an assumed folk culture of Anatolian Turks and imposed it on individuals, starting in the 1920s and 30s, through educational programs teaching the newly-reformed Turkish language, and mass-participation public events on national holidays and monuments. In Iraq, such a tidy national identity was never created. The new state of Iraq was put together under British rule after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the First World War, and its cities’ inhabitants, much like Turkey’s at the time, had a diverse mix of languages and religions. During the protectorate years, a nationalist movement grew, inspired by pan-Arab and anti-imperial movements in the region. In both cases, national identity was a main concern for the authoritarian regimes in power, and the sources of such an identity were numerous, and at times, contradictory.

One major task of political elites in both cases was to develop a kind of ‘local’ modernity, and this project included the built environment. In the case of architecture, modernism embodied the principles of modernity and was also a style.¹ This paper focuses on modernity as a contested idea: on the one hand, feasible in Muslim countries

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¹ I define modernism as a style that emphasizes right angles, vertical and horizontal lines, display of materials and little ornamentation, the machine aesthetic and architect Louis Sullivan’s idea that “form follows function.”
through top-down reforms, on the other “a [...] doubt about the universalistic claims and aspirations of modernization theories.”

Thus modernization as a success story varies from the perspective of social and political elites to the broader population who were objects of reforms. Local and foreign architects both sought a modernism that also espoused a culture that represented the nation and promoted its values. Both were engaged in this endeavor that was a very mutual exchange of culture and art but at the same time always affected by aspects of Western hegemony like Orientalism and colonization. This paper examines the role of the architect in mediating ideas of nationalism between the state and citizens, with a focus on city planning. Different planners and architects viewed existing cities as “Islamic” or “traditional” and their plans as “modern,” demonstrating that modernization and nationalism were not abstract, but affected their work and were intended to be implemented to shape citizens. It is significant that modernism changed between the 1930s and 1950s, affected in part by the Second World War, the transformation of which will be addressed in the following sections.

I. Research Questions

My questions center around the conceptions of modern architecture in mid-20th century Turkey, Iraq, Germany and Great Britain and the role and effect of urban planning and building design in shaping the citizen in Turkey and Iraq. What were the motivations of Western European and American architects to work in Turkey and Iraq? How did foreign and local architects view the projects they were working on, whether in

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collaboration or separately? From government-sponsored competitions and commissions, what can be inferred about the official history of the state and the paradigm of the ideal citizen? Were private commissions similar or different in this respect? How does attention paid to or not paid to public housing reflect the problem of populism in the cases of Turkish and Iraqi nationalisms? James Scott differentiates between modernity and ‘high modernity,’ “a particularly sweeping vision of how the benefits of technical and scientific progress might be applied—usually through the state—in every field of human activity.”

The plans examined were both part of larger state projects to legitimate and express the power of the state and bring citizens into a modern way of life. In what ways did such a high modernism succeed or fail? Sandy Isenstadt and Kishwar Rizvi identify the “burden of representation” of buildings in the Modern Middle East, given the state projects that create a homogenous national identity that attempts to unite all citizens while including and excluding certain histories in nationalist discourse. How do the projects in these two cases take on this burden of representation and what are their effects?

To address these questions, this thesis mainly examines the work of Hermann Jansen (1869-1945), the German planner of Ankara, and Constantinos Doxiadis (1914-1975), the Greek planner of Baghdad. I also include work of earlier and later architects, planners and firms in Turkey and Iraq when relevant. In addition, it considers both

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realized and unrealized plans and buildings since the focus is on the intention as much as the results.

Looking at this project in a broad scope, this thesis is concerned with the intersection of modernization and city planning. Until the mid-20th century, modernization was seen as a solution to problems. Such an approach worked to some extent, did not meet all of its goals, created unexpected problems or, often, a combination of all three. Modernization in the Middle East has demonstrated distinct challenges including the development of political problems. Modernity in the Middle East has had unique characteristics—later industrialization, implementation of modernization programs, rise of an urban population in the 20th century, authoritarian government and coups resulting in military rule—that has affected its architectural culture.⁵

II. Rationale of the Study and its Significance

In these two cases, this thesis highlights not only similarities, but also differences, such as Turkey’s closer contact with Europe, and Iraq’s experience of British colonization as a mandate. Since these architects were very mobile and in communication with each other, it will emphasize the connections between them and how their works exist as evidence of a fluid cultural and artistic conversation.⁶ This project will address the issues of designing modern architecture “outside” of the West and problematize the binary of “West” and “non-West” that is still very present in Near and Middle Eastern

⁵ Peter Sluglett, “Introduction,” in The Urban Social History of the Middle East, 1750-1950 (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 2008).
Studies and the humanities and social sciences in general.\textsuperscript{7} This study fills a gap in comparison of parts of the former Ottoman Empire, specifically Turkey and the Arab World. Little work has been done on modern Iraqi architecture and urban planning, and none comparing modern Iraqi and Turkish architecture.

\section*{III. Literature Review}

This project draws from three theoretical fields: methodologies of Art and Architectural History, methodologies of Near and Middle Eastern Studies and nationalism theory. For Art and Architecture History it mainly references scholars such as G.B. Nalbantoğlu, Janet Abu-Lughod, Sibel Bozdoğan, Esra Akcan and Nezar Alsayyad. The primary scholars of 20\textsuperscript{th} century Turkish architecture are Sibel Bozdoğan, who identifies ways in which the government in the Early Republican Era controlled and produced its definition of national identity through the built environment, and Esra Akcan, who identifies architecture between Germany and Turkey as a conversation between the two, albeit not one on equal terms. There is less of a comprehensive body of works on 20\textsuperscript{th} century Iraqi architecture, thus sources are used on a variety of smaller topics, including Caecilia Pieri’s work on Baghdad in the first half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Panayiota Pyla’s writing on Constantinos Doxiadis and Chadirji’s own works on architectural education and regionalism. It also uses Lawrence Vale’s work on capital cities and nation building. For methodologies of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, this project references Timothy Mitchell’s work on colonialism and modernity and Zachary

\footnote{\textsuperscript{7} See Gulsüm Baydar Nalbantoğlu, “Beyond Lack and Excess: Other Architectures/Other Landscapes” \textit{Journal of Architectural Education} 54:1 (Sept 2000): 20-27.}
Lockman’s on Orientalism. Regarding theory of nationalisms, Eric Hobsbawm’s idea of invented tradition is pertinent to my argument since statesmen and architects drew on influences far removed, either temporally or geographically, from the urban dweller that they wanted to shape into the ideal citizen.
Modernism in Ankara

Introduction

This chapter examines the role of the architect in mediating ideas of nationalism between the state and citizens, primarily through city planning. According to Lawrence Vale, the modern capital was a combination of the principles of modernism (rationality, functionality and harmony with the surrounding environment) and modernity (rationalism and secularism). As in the Paris model, modern capitals were designed for more efficient government control, to celebrate the culture of the nation and to impress the observer with power of the state.\(^8\) He elaborates:

the architecture of such government buildings, though erected in the name of ‘national identity’ and ‘national unity,’ is intimately tied to political forces that reinforce existing patterns of intercultural dominance and submission. [...] What is put forth by the government leaders and their architects as ‘national’ most often contains significant biases towards preserving or advancing the hegemony of a politically ascendant sub-national group. Moreover, what is termed ‘national’ identity is also closely tied to both international identity and to the personal identities of the architects and sponsoring politicians.\(^9\)

In Turkey’s case, the sub-national group was the Republican People’s Party (\textit{Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi}, or CHP), led by the founder and first President of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. There had been considerable European influence in the architectural culture of Istanbul, and this continued with the founding of the Republic in 1923 and the designation of its new capital, Ankara, in the same year. By examining the plan of Ankara commissioned by the government in the early years of the Republic, the hegemony described by Vale is apparent in a plan that, following Kemalist ideology,

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drew on the culture of an imagined Turkish People (*halk*) without giving voice to citizens or allowing dissent from the official ideology.\(^{10}\) As in other new nation-states of the early 20\(^{th}\) century, national identity was bound up in language and ethnicity; Turkish national identity was primary and other identities secondary, thus non-Turkish communities within Turkey were not recognized by or were regarded ambivalently by the state and at times faced hostility (socially or by the state).\(^{11}\) Despite the strict secular nature of Kemalism and the Early Republican government, non-Muslim communities were not seen as completely Turkish. The hegemonic projects of the state and the difference between the state’s conception of a Turkish people and the diversity of citizens demonstrate discord between the concepts of statism and populism within Kemalism.

The search for a ‘vernacular modern’ style is demonstrated in early Republican architecture as a continuation of Ottoman elites’ efforts to build structures that impressed local subjects and foreign diplomats. In the 19th century, the ceremony and architecture of courts worldwide were homogenizing into an international court culture influenced by European culture.\(^{12}\) Architecture commissioned by elites from the mid-19\(^{th}\) century on demonstrates a variety of styles that broke from the Ottoman Classical style associated with Mimar Sinan. This reflects the endeavor to appear powerful and competitive to visiting dignitaries and resulted in a combination of Ottoman and European Beaux-Arts


\(^{11}\) By that I mean non-Turkish speaking or non-Sunni Muslim.

style, one example being Dolmabahçe Palace.\textsuperscript{13}

The stylistic movements from the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century to the 1950’s show a shift back and forth between Ottoman and European influences in an effort to find a national idiom that reflected first Ottoman then Turkish identity and mastery of modernism.\textsuperscript{14} In this sense, the monuments commissioned by the Late Ottoman and Early Republican administrations are similar to the elites’ intent to prove their power to other regimes, resulting in a tension between what is perceived as ‘modern’ and ‘Turkish.’ An acceptable fusion of premodern/local and modern/international was both a goal of elites and their architects because it meant that such a combination was possible, such elements did not conflict, and if the built environment could be ‘modern Turkish’ so could its inhabitants. It is also significant that it was exceptional among other buildings commissioned at the same time; the style in vogue was actually neo-Ottoman, suggesting a need to return to a greater Ottoman past in light of troubled times.\textsuperscript{15} Both Western-influenced and neo-Ottoman architecture demonstrate the wide range of style with which late Ottoman architects were experimenting and both of these styles influenced the architectural culture of the early republic.

Ottoman Revivalist, or First National Style (1920s) consisted largely of Western classical buildings with some Ottoman facades, functionally and stylistically the opposite

\textsuperscript{13} Mimar Sinan (1489-1588) was the Ottoman architect responsible for the development of Classical Ottoman style. The Dolmabahçe Palace (1856) demonstrates a change from Classical Ottoman to Western-influenced, particularly Beaux-Arts, plan and style. Beaux-Arts style, constituted by historical and eclectic design on a monumental scale, was developed in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century at the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris.


\textsuperscript{15} Kuban, 66.
of the Dolmabahçe and more in line with the neo-Ottoman style mentioned above. The style was most popular at the time of the founding of the republic and declined at the end of the 1920s. Commissions were increasingly given to Europeans, and most directors of the principle architectural and engineering schools were European. Such schools favored mastering European techniques and styles before Turkish ones. Vedat Tek (Bey) (1873-1942) and Kemalettin Bey (1870-1927) underwent advanced training in Europe—at École des Beaux-Arts in Paris and Charlottenburg Technische Hochschule in Berlin, respectively—and made significant contributions to First National Style, eventually holding senior positions in major Turkish institutes.¹⁶

Architects in the Early Republican Period (1923 through roughly 1950) generally built for wealthy, private clients or government projects, making ideology part of the built environment. The publication of the 1933 essay by architects Behçet and Bedrettin Türkiye İnkilap Mimarisi, or ‘Turkish Architectural Revolution,’ heralded a break from existing styles in the same spirit of the inkilap, or revolution, with which the state broke from Ottoman culture.¹⁷ What was considered ‘Turkish architecture’ demonstrates the ongoing influence of European (and starting in the 1950s, American) architecture movements, the semi-elite position of architects between government and the broader public and the contested definitions of who and what was ‘Turkish.’ In the late Ottoman Period, Turkish architectural students, from elite families, often went to Western Europe to receive their training. In 1882, the painter and Ottoman statesman Osman Hamdi Bey

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¹⁶ (Isenstadt, book intro, 13).
¹⁷ Sibel Bozdoğan, Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic (Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 2001). 59-60. İnkilab and devrim, both mean ‘revolution,’ the former being of Arabic origin and the latter Turkish and thus used in Kemalist ideology as one of its ‘Six Arrows’ (devrimcilik = revolutionism or reformism).
opened the School of Fine Arts in Istanbul in 1883. It was changed to an academy in 1928 and renamed the Academy of Fine Arts. The institution brought in many European architects to teach and its curriculum had a foundation in western Classical and Beaux-Arts traditions.¹⁸

The period from the late 20s to the beginning of the Second World War (about 1928-1937) displayed a drastic change in style, much more affected by European architecture. One of Atatürk’s own homes in Istanbul was built in a stream-lined, ship-like style, the industrial aesthetic of 1930s modernism and of Early Republic urbanity. The house has no discernable Ottoman or local characteristics. Other examples in Ankara include the industrial-looking National Opera and Ballet, which was designed in 1933, and the Ismet Pasha Institute for Girls, designed by Swiss architect Ernst Egli and completed in 1930. Many European architects fled Germany that this time and were welcomed to work and teach in Turkey, bringing with them both fascist and Bauhaus ideology and style. The Second National Style characterizes architecture of the late 30s to late 40s and reflects more serious attempts to achieve a modern, Turkish style. Rather than embellishing a Western-style building with an Ottoman roof or facade, architects reconsidered what was ‘local’ architecture and how it could be developed to fit a rational, urban lifestyle.

¹⁸ Architectural education changed dramatically from the end of the Empire to the first decades of the new Republic. Students generally went to Europe to receive training, and there was not an architectural school in Istanbul until the foundation of the “School of Fine Arts” (“Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi” or today’s Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University) in 1882. Many senior faculty were European: one example being German Bruno Taut, who was the head of the architectural section of the Academy in the 1930s. See Sibel Bozdoğan, “Against Style: Bruno Taut’s Pedagogical Program in Turkey, 1936-1938” in Stanford Anderson and Martha D. Pollak, The Education of the Architect: Historiography, Urbanism, and the Growth of Architectural Knowledge: Essays Presented to Stanford Anderson (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1997).
As with architectural style, European-influenced city planning was influential in Istanbul well before 1923. Several modern plans were made for Istanbul in the 19th and early 20th century; even if they were not implemented, one can still see the direction in which planning the city was going. Sultan Abdülhamit II’s ambassador to Paris, Sali Münir Çorlu, contacted Beaux-Arts trained Parisian architect Joseph Antoine Bouvard to request a master plan for Istanbul in 1902. Bouvard, being too busy to visit, ordered photographs of the city. At that point there was presence of Beaux-Arts architecture and some of its planning strategies had been applied to major street arteries. Zeynep Çelik has argued, “Whether Bouvard was acquainted with the Turkish-Islamic fabric of the city and the Europeanizing transformations that it sustained in the second half of the 19th century is doubtful. Besides, such a sympathetic familiarity was not sought by the patrons. The desired image was that of a European city.” Bouvard’s absence suggests that his familiarity with the city was not as important as providing a copy of a European city that fit in easily among Istanbul’s most iconic structures. (Fig 1) The most noticeable difference between new plans such as Bouvard’s and existing cities in the region is that the former consist of wide, straight boulevards that evenly divide blocks of buildings whereas the later in plan appear more haphazard, crowded and difficult to navigate by modern vehicles, but have social value in their own context. These qualities also contributed to an Orientalist view by Europeans and by Ottoman elites of the

19 Bouvard was Inspector General of the Architectural Department of the City of Paris in 1900 and chief of the Architectural Department of the 1900 World Exposition.

Fig. 1 Joseph Antoine Bouvard: “Preliminary Draft, Hippodrome,” 1902. (Photo: Çelik, 344)

“traditional” city and raised the question of whether it could be modernized, and if so, how. This reflects the larger question of how to be modern without losing Ottoman, and then Turkish, identity. The Ottoman administration had ordered such a plan to demonstrate that Istanbul was on par with other major world cities, and so did the new Turkish government. Other planning revolved around new city utilities and types of transportation. Plans tended to be piecemeal until French planner Henri Prost (1847-1959), consultant for the Public Works office of Istanbul Municipality between 1936 and 1951, made the Istanbul Master Plan in 1937, the first comprehensive plan for the city.  

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Herman Jansen’s invitation to plan Ankara was part of a larger movement of architects, many German and/or Jewish, who left Europe due to the volatile political situation. They brought with them both Bauhaus modernist style—notably in the work of Bruno Taut—and the fascist style of Germany.

**Hermann Jansen and the Garden City Ideal**

Angora, later renamed Ankara, was a provincial town in the heart of Anatolia known for its Angora wool and was used as a military stronghold during the War for Independence following the First World War. It was chosen by Mustafa Kemal as the new Turkish capital in 1923, and plans to develop the city were soon underway. In 1924, German architect M. Heussler made a partial city plan featuring a wide, two-kilometer road, now Cumhuriyet (Republic) Boulevard, leading from the entrance of the citadel to the train station. In 1928, the government held a competition, restricted to German and French participants, for a larger plan of Ankara. Fellow German Hermann Jansen won the competition to plan Ankara in 1929.\(^{22}\) The plan continued some of Heussler’s ideas and was approved in 1932.”\(^{23}\)

The idea of the *garden city* was quite popular in Europe in the early 20th century, having originated in Britain and taken on somewhat different forms in other countries.

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such as the *Siedlung* in Germany. The garden city was seen as a cleaner, healthier alternative to the industrialized city and combined the positive elements of both city and rural life (Fig 2). Herman Jansen had worked in his home country of Germany and was exposed to this idea before he was invited to Turkey. Born in 1869 in Aachen, where he was educated, Jansen moved to Berlin in 1897. There he had completed the prize-winning project (albeit unimplemented) for the master plan of the greater Berlin area in

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24 Akcan, see Chapter One: “Modernism from Above.”
25 “The term *garden city* was launched in England in *Tomorrow! A Peaceful Path to Real Reform* (1898), by Ebenezer Howard (1850-1928), and it was popularized by the revised version, *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, published in 1902.” Then in Germany it was translated to *Gartenstadt* (garden city) but *Gartensiedlung* (garden residential settlement) and then *siedlung* took hold. The German term both refers to the ‘new town’ of Howard’s theory as well as “collective housing settlements in the extended borders of an existing city, indicating that a transformed meaning had emerged during the process of translation.” Ibid, 34-38.
1909. Since Berlin was a pre-existing city, Jansen used German garden city and principles of Sitte as a solution to urban problems.\textsuperscript{26} Austrian architect and city planner Camillo Sitte was skeptical of modern city planning being too technical and divorced from the needs of urban dwellers, so he emphasized public space as a way to mediate traditional, artistic with modern methods.\textsuperscript{27} Camillo’s ideas parallel the siedlung’s emphasis on open spaces between different sections of the city and he questions the priority of standardization over local characteristics and needs, an issue that became contested in architecture in Turkey in the 1930s and 1940s. In Berlin, Jansen aimed to make existing urban spaces less dense, build new neighborhoods based on class-divisions and add outer suburbs closer to the garden city ideal.\textsuperscript{28} According to Esra Akcan, “Even though Turkey had not experienced the problems associated with industrialization, which had motivated the garden city theory in the first place, Jansen and the Turkish authorities found this model appropriate.”\textsuperscript{29} Thus using this model was a government decision whose resulting character was alien to Ankara and Turkey in general. Implementation of modernism in Turkey in the 1930s would make Ankara appear totally new and “un-Ottoman.” This approach prompted Turkish architects to search for a Turkish modernism. Jansen’s plan was put into practice on July 27, 1932. His contract was eventually extended to 1939, when his participation came to an end. During this ten-year span

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 41.
\textsuperscript{28} Akcan, 41-42.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, 50.
Jansen never lived in Turkey, but he visited once or twice a year, according to his contract.\(^\text{30}\) (Fig. 3)

**Fig 3.** Ankara as it was in 1928 with irregular street pattern and mixed-use land; Jansen plan showing city divided by function, 1928. (Images: Kezer, “Contesting Space in Early Republican Ankara”; Akcan, *Architecture in Translation: Germany, Turkey & the Modern House.\(^\text{30}\))

Jansen’s aim was for Ankara to be the third “magnet” in Ebenezer Howard’s book—the town-country—having all of the positive qualities of both the town and the country. Such a plan was utopian of course, and only included the positive aspects of the town and country without foreseeing any of the negative ones. In the end, Jansen’s plan for Ankara was not fully implemented due to disagreements and intervention by bureaucrats and he requested his name taken off the project. The completion of the plan was carried out

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\(^{30}\) Akcan, 44.
under the direction of fellow German Clemens Holzmeister. Jansen’s work in Turkey, however, did not end in Ankara: he made plans to develop many other Turkish cities, including one for Adana in the mid-late 1930s that closely embraced the ideas of Siedlung blocks. Unfortunately only a small part of the plan was implemented due to financial restraints caused by World War II. Similarly, in Ankara, the incomplete state of construction of major parts of into the late 1940s was due to lack of government finances available to complete the new city in a timely manner.

The results of construction in the 1930s leave parts of the old city ‘behind,’ in a sense, recognizing the Citadel’s place in the Anatolian past and animating the new, modern part of Ankara, Yenişehir. This “New City” represented the New Turkey: workers and inhabitants here were active participants in the nation-building project. The main square of the new city center was called Ulus, or ‘nation state,’ while its official name was Hakimiyet-i Milliye, or ‘national sovereignty [square].’ Yenişehir was constructed south of the old city and separated from it by the modern railroad; the train brought foreign visitors and new inhabitants alike straight to the new city center. Ulus contained the Grand National Assembly and ministerial buildings, and moving south along Atatürk Boulevard one encountered banks, Gençlik (Youth) Park—included in the Jansen plan, but not built until 1943, the National Opera and Ballet, educational institutes, the Ethnography Museum, the Turkish Hearths headquarters, and, finally, the Ministerial Complex. If Ankara was the heart of Anatolia, from which the blood of the

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32 Ökesli, 62.
nation flowed to other cities and principalities, Ulus Square was the heart and Atatürk Boulevard was the “main artery.” There was an existing commercial area of shops and banks around Ulus that was expanded and moved south as new commercial districts and private homes, built for members of the government administration and their families, germinated around the Boulevard.34 (Fig 4.)

Fig 4. Present-day map of Ulus, Ankara. (Image: Cross and Leiser, A Brief History of Ankara.)

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34 Cross and Leiser, 73-74.
Since Ankara was the new capital, more attention was paid to government families’ housing than other types of housing. Jansen’s plan stipulated that the population should not exceed 300,000. Large numbers of citizens from rural Anatolia began to immigrate, and due to the shortage in public housing, built their own housing that became known as gecekondu, which means “night built.” This term comes from that fact that they were constructed overnight, when public authorities could not stop them. Zeynep Kezer identifies the gecekondu as a “third Ankara” outside of the citadel and the planned city, “lying at the gap between unrealized visions and displaced institutions.” The preservation of village family ties in these informal neighborhoods within the new urban centers contested the state’s promotion of the one nuclear family per home lifestyle.

Gecekondu neighborhoods were an unforeseen product of modernization in Turkish cities in the 20th century that exposed the weakness (or ambivalence) of the local administration to illegal settlement and lifestyles not promoted by the Kemalist state. Whereas Kemalist media had compared modern cities and lifestyles to traditional and villages ones, the traditional family ties and glaringly non-modern housing types associated with gecekondu provided new sites of difference within the city. The existence of these settlements demonstrates one failure of modern city planning: to predict population shifts and respond to them accordingly. It also demonstrates the small role of the urban dweller

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35 Akcan, 45.
in official planning, suggests that the populism of Kemalism was less powerful than its statism and begs the question of who the architect is in the modern city.

**‘Old vs. New’ in ideology, architecture and popular culture**

The contrast between old and new, traditional and modern and Ottoman and Turkish in Ankara was by no means a coincidence, but intentional.\(^38\) Popular publications juxtaposed newly developed Ulus and Yenişehir with the Citadel, which had a steep terrain and a dense population that prevented it from being developed. Despite the existence of Angora before the Turkish Republic, in the 1920s and 30s, Ankara was hailed by popular Turkish publications as “the first city ever to be built out of nothing.”\(^39\) According to Kyle T. Evered, early descriptions of the new capital emphasized:

prominently remote and nonurban characteristics. As in creation myths of Washington D.C., Canberra, or Brasilia, Ankara’s genesis is represented as the awesome visitation of modernity’s supreme expression (i.e., a nation-state’s capital city) to an indefinite space that was both rural and premodern in form and character. In Ankara’s story, as in others, there is a writing not of one national history but of two; one is that of the essential and premodern nation, and another is that of the struggle and advent of the nation into its present, modern form.\(^40\)

Thus Ankara was strategically pictured at times as totally new to distance it from its Ottoman past and make it a product of modernity, while at other times its long history as part of world empires was emphasized to give the new Turkish state ownership of its territory. Popular journals such as *La Turquie Kemaliste*, including its series *Ankara Construit*, transmitted images of the urban environment in a certain way to the broader

\(^{38}\) Akcan, 46.


\(^{40}\) Kyle T. Evered, 329.
Village life and specifically religious values—notably regarding dress and family—were contrasted with urban life and a ‘modern lifestyle’—such as driving a car, wearing Western clothing, education of girls—with a clear preference for the latter. It affected how citizens should view their urban environment and conduct themselves in public and private. It ran from 1934-48 and featured articles in French, English, German and Turkish, suggesting its publishers aimed to engage with both an international and an educated Turkish readership. Besides contrast of new and old within Ankara and between urban and rural Turkey, Ankara and Istanbul were also contrasted in media. Countless literature was available on the appropriate way to engage in modern, urban activities, how to dress, how men and women should interact, and so on. Such literature was produced to train Turks to be ideal citizens. The production of such contrasts was not limited to the sphere of behaviors and was not a new phenomenon in Turkey.

This juxtaposition of ‘old’ and ‘new’ parts of cities in the Islamic world was also present in cities of the Maghreb under French colonization and in Egypt with the 19th century “medievalization” of “Old Cairo.” It created the association of an “authentic” local style as static and medieval. This brings up the question of identification and interpretation of existing forms and styles as traditional, since intellectuals, statesmen and architects of the Early Republic sought a national identity that was simultaneously traditional and modern. That is not to say traditional as the opposite of modern, but as something distinctly Turkish that was compatible with modernity. Thus some aspects of

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traditional life—such as the fez, polygamy, Arabic script—were negative and should be cast aside, while others—such as Turkish language through the Latin alphabet, rural Anatolian houses as Turkish urban houses—were positive and should be preserved in modern life. Incorporation of these elements into a modern Turkish idiom does not render their origin irrelevant but rather subsumes them into the narrative of a national history.

City plans after Jansen’s and Prost’s were increasingly larger, razed existing cityscape and continued an authoritarian tradition of building. However, individual projects were increasingly carried out by Turkish architects whose aims were to design with local surroundings and building traditions and official Turkish history in mind. Sedad Hakki Eldem, who is recognized as the father of a modern Turkish architecture, an instructor at Mimar who a seminar on Turkish national architecture, gradually became hostile to the activity of foreign architects in Turkey. In an article in the journal Arkitekt in 1940, he accused them of not understanding “national characters,” using Turkey as a place in which to conduct “experiments,” and not helping to create a “native style,” but rather delaying it. He did not deny the “need for foreign experts,” but rather encouraged consulting them for “training and education” only. This attitude marks a significant shift in the way Eldem thought about himself as not just an architect from Turkey, but a Turkish architect producing for a Turkish people in a Turkish state. At the same time, by the 1950s, a new kind of modernism, “International Style” was identified. It was associated with the United States and considered a kind of style that superseded all geographical and cultural differences and could be built anywhere, thus the name. Hilton Hotel in Istanbul is the best example of the style in Turkey, and demonstrates firstly, that

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the strengthening of Turkey’s (and Istanbul’s) image as modern through acquiring American projects, and secondly, that the competition for influence between the US and Russia in the Middle East extended to building projects.\(^4\) (Fig 5) The Cold War would also be a significant factor in architecture of Baghdad in the 50s.

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\(^4\) For more on the Istanbul Hilton Hotel, see Sibel Bozdoğan, “Democracy, Development, and the Americanization of Turkish Architectural Culture in the 1950s” in Isenstadt.
Modernism in Iraq

Introduction

In his book, Modern Architecture and the End of Empire, Mark Crinson critiques the claim that modernist architecture was an ‘international style,’ applicable in a uniform way in any context, by examining how architecture was a part of imperialist and colonialist projects and continued to carry such meaning even after the end of empire. “Perhaps it might be better,” he writes, “to speculate that where modernism was not a disavowal of imperialism, it was actively deployed as a way of improving the functions of the colonial city, treating the colonies as a laboratory of modernity […]” According to Crinson, architecture is inseparable from its political and historical context: thus modernist architecture was shaped by both the decline of Western European empires and the beginning of a postcolonial history, as well as the rise of the US as the major world power—as demonstrated by American influence in architecture in both Turkey and Iraq in the 1950s. Commissions for a new city plan and individual projects by modernist architects in Iraq in the 1950s were used to legitimate the British-installed Hashemite dynasty. At the same time, young Iraqi artists and architects were experimenting with modernism, combining it with local culture and history. This chapter will look at Baghdad after the Ottoman Empire and the British protectorate, in a decade of sudden oil wealth and rapid development, which was cut short by the 1958 coup. Through analysis of the Doxiadis Plan for Baghdad in particular it will argue that such projects demonstrate an attempt to adjust the International Style to the local context—which was generally a failure in terms of socio-cultural understanding and a partial success in terms of climate,

as there was a new interest in “Tropical Architecture”\textsuperscript{46} It will also assert that these projects mainly served political elites. After the coup, modernism lived on in the architecture of local architects who had been educated in the West and were influenced by anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and Iraqi nationalism.

As in Turkey in the Early Republican Period, there was a strong relationship between political ideology and city planning in post-mandate Iraq. This chapter examines the shift from projects commissioned by British architects before and during the mandate period in Iraq (1920-1932) to those mostly executed by European architects after independence and under Hashemite rule until 1958. Like in Turkey in the 1930s, the biggest names in modernism were called to Baghdad to replan parts of the city and introduce citizens to the experience of its newest assets, such as the opera house and the sports stadium. In a country now flush with money from increased oil revenues, the newly created Iraqi Development Board and the visiting architects envisioned a Baghdad on par with other modern cities around the world while returning to its roots as a center of empire, faith and learning.

Unlike Ankara, Baghdad was not a provincial town, but a large urban center with a long history. Located near ancient Babylon and the Sassanid capital Ctesiphon, the site on the Tigris River was chosen by caliph Al-Mansur to replace Damascus as the capital of the Abbasid Empire in 762. Baghdad was built according to a circular plan, as was the

tradition in Persian Sassanid cities.\textsuperscript{47} (Fig 6.) Baghdad became the intellectual capital of the Islamic world, helping make possible what is now known as the Islamic Golden Age.\textsuperscript{48} This continued until the Mongols invaded and sacked Baghdad in 1258, ending the Abbasid Empire. Baghdad never fully recovered, functioning as a capital of subsequent Turkic Empires until it became a provincial Ottoman capital from the 16\textsuperscript{th} to 19\textsuperscript{th} century, far from the center of the empire in Istanbul.

The 1950s were not the first period of urban planning in Baghdad. The Ottoman governor Midhat Pasha sought to change the city from a “provincial backwater” by

\textsuperscript{47} Mentioned in several essays in Pedro Azara, \textit{Ciudad Del Espejismo: Bagdad, De Wright a Venturi = City of Mirages, Baghdad, from Wright to Venturi} (Barcelona: Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, 2008), and in Caecilia Pieri, \textit{Baghdad Arts Deco: Architectural Brickwork, 1920-1950} (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2010).

\textsuperscript{48} The period 7\textsuperscript{th}-13\textsuperscript{th} century AD in which the Islamic Caliphate was expanded, reaching from Spain to Central Asia, and wherein there was a flourishing of the arts, sciences and philosophy.
introducing the first central post office, industries like the first modern printing works, a technical training college, steamboats and a horse-drawn tramway. At the beginning of the 20th century, Baghdad consisted of four parts: historical Rusafa on the east bank; Karkh, opposite on the west bank; to the northeast, Adhamiya; and opposite to the west, Kadhimiya—the latter two centered around two important Islamic shrines. Streets were generally narrow, twisting and shaded to protect from summer heat and sandstorms. Thoroughfares were designed in the late 19th century for increasingly motorized traffic, and the first “truly linear street,” Rashid Street, was constructed and long served as Baghdad’s main boulevard.

The early 20th century witnessed German and British competition for influence in Mesopotamia, one example being the Berlin-Baghdad railroad. After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the First World War, three former Ottoman provinces—Mosul, Baghdad and Basra—were combined into the Kingdom of Iraq as a British protectorate under a League of Nations Mandate in 1921. In the same year, the British established a constitutional monarchy and installed Faisal as king, starting a period of rule by the Hashemite dynasty. The Hashemites were Sunni while the majority of Iraqis were Shi’a, suggesting a lack of understanding of local society by the British administration.

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49 Pieri, 21.
50 Ibid, 23.
51 Ibid, 21. Rasheed Street was the “first modern street for automobile passage, which started in 1908 as Khalil Basha Jadasi (the street of Khalil Basha) after the Ottoman governor. Then, upon completion by the British, it took the name of New Street, which was finally changed to Rasheed.” Ghada M. R. Al Siliq, “Baghdad, Images and Memories” in Azara, 65.
Additionally, this issue of majorities and minorities within the new state, as in Turkey, prompted the question of a national Iraqi identity. Continuing British authority was met with different levels of acceptance, tolerance or rejection by various communities and their leaders for the duration of the protectorate and until 1958.

In the 1920s, the British undertook some city planning projects, such as erecting levees to prevent flooding—the first of these having been erected by Ottoman governor Nazım Pasha on the eastern bank in 1911. New departments were established for such projects and for transportation; new bridges, telephone access, and postal service were introduced and access to other countries by train, highway and plane became possible. For the first time, street numbering and the grid plan were applied in Baghdad. Replanning was necessary due not only to the implementation of modern transportation but also because immigration to cities in Iraq began to increase and consisted largely of poor pilgrims or peasants who constructed *sarifa* or *kukh*, makeshift huts of mud and reeds. Such demolition and straightening of old street layouts and implementation of grid plans changed the layouts of houses and the general character of urban life. Middle and upper class families started moving to newly constructed neighborhoods that were based on income level, shifting away from neighborhoods grouped by religious/ethnic identity. Streets became more open, and privacy decreased: rather than opening inward to a courtyard, houses opened outward with large glass windows.

In discussing these developments, Ghada M. R. Al Siliq states that, “[n]ew

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54 There were considerable Kurdish, Turcoman and Jewish populations (the latter particularly in Baghdad).
55 Pieri, 32.
56 Ibid, 38.
suburbs appeared in the 30s […] which were planned according to western planning approaches like the garden city and grid iron planning that appeared outside the historical part (walled city), marking a clear change in the image of Baghdad as they had a new layout which did not previously exist.” Such neighborhoods drew the city’s wealthiest families, a significant shift from “traditional neighborhoods in which rich and poor people lived together.”

This demonstrates how modern building styles as well as ways of living were only accessible by economic elites. According to Pieri, “[i]t was also common for wealthy families to buy European house designs from local real estate agents who brought them from Europe, and then use local craftsmen for the construction.”

Thus there were prerequisites for entry into a modern lifestyle that did not include everyone involved in its production.

New institutions, built mainly by British architects, tended to be classical in style while adopting historical elements for decoration, referencing Mesopotamian and Abbasid civilizations. This tendency continued for the next several decades in modernist buildings by foreign and Iraqi architects alike, until the 1960s and 70s with the work of such architects as Rifat Chadirji and Mohamad Makiya. It is also worth noting that the British architects working in Iraq at this time, such as James M. Wilson, had come “with the military campaign departing India” (where he had worked as an assistant to Edwin Lutyens in Delhi), connecting Iraq to the larger empire and formally colonized

58 Ghada M. R. Al Siliq, 65.
60 Pieri, 33. See University of Ahl al-Bayt, built in 1922-23 at Adhamiya by Wilson, in collaboration with Mason and Turne, 1924, and the Baghdad Archaeological Museum (now the Baghdad Museum), inaugurated by Gertrude Bell in 1926.
Wilson and Harold Mason had both studied at the Liverpool School of Architecture, where Makiya would also go on to study, and both architects were responsible for all major government and most major civil buildings until 1935. Under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, Iraq achieved a greater level of independence and became a kingdom in 1932, but allowed Great Britain to intervene in the event of war, which affected the relationship between the two countries from that point onward. The next three decades saw a series of military coups ended by a brief British military occupation in 1941, the failure of the Portsmouth Treaty (1948) and Baghdad Pact (1955) and growing nationalism, affected particularly by movements in the Arab world and Iran. In 1958, a coup, known as the July 14th Revolution, led by General Abd al-Karim Qasim overthrew the monarchy. Those responsible for the coup were critical of the relationship between the Hashemite dynasty and its western allies, advocated Nasser's pan-Arabism and envisioned a more independent Iraq. The Kingdom of Iraq became the Iraqi Republic.

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61 Al Siliq, 64. Also see Paula Sanders, *Creating Medieval Cairo*. She draws attention to the lack of sources that focus on the impact the British colonial project in South Asia had on its officers and local administration in Egypt, which should be kept in mind in this case too. Mark Crinson's book looks at the center of empire in relation to various modernist colonial cities (i.e., Chandigarh, Baghdad).

62 Crinson, 29.

63 Tripp, 65.

64 Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact in 1959. Ibid, 159.

65 Ibid, 139-142.

66 Magnus T. Bernhardsson identifies the term ‘nostalgic nationalism’ in describing the difficulties of using oral narratives to write the history of 1950s Iraq: ‘The first challenge is how to reconcile the historical memory of what is almost always presented as a progressive, revolutionary, utopian 1950s Iraq, with the reality of the political violence, corruption, and unequal distribution of wealth in the same period. Secondly, the nationalist ideology of the time highlighted the inclusive nature of Iraqi society, whereas in practice large segments of the population were excluded from
Oil and the Iraqi Development Board

In the 1950s, the Iraqi government allocated significant resources for the development of a modern capital. Oil had been discovered in Kirkuk in 1927, the first pipeline was opened in 1935 and in 1952 an agreement was reached between the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) and the Iraqi government to share profits on a 50-50 basis.\(^{67}\) Nuri Al-Sa’id, who served seven terms as Iraq’s Prime Minister and was criticized by some as pro-British, established the Iraqi Development Board (IDB) to administer 70 percent of the oil income for infrastructure development.\(^{68}\) Resources went mostly to urban elite and non-urban landed interests rather than to a rapidly rising urban population, leading to peasant rebellions.\(^{69}\) Despite the change in oil revenue allocation, production

\(^{67}\) Tripp, 124-5. “This agreement was the framework for a dramatic development of the oil industry and for a fourfold increase in Iraqi oil production between 1951 and 1958 (with a sixfold increase in government revenues), due in large part to the growing world demand for oil.” Bernhardsson, “Visions of Iraq: Modernizing the Past in 1950s Baghdad” in Isenstadt (81-96), 37: “‘The new agreement […increased] government oil revenues from 5.3 million Iraqi dinars in 1950 to almost 50 million dinars in 1953.’” (Cited from Yusuf Sayigh, The Economies of the Arab World (London: Croom Helm, 1978).)

\(^{68}\) Tripp. Members were technical experts, including one British and one American member. It was intended to be free of “partisan and personalized politics.” (133-4) “Since 1952, the DB lost its independence and recommendations had to be approved by the minister of development. The plans and fund allocation in rural Iraq actually abandoned land already in use and opened up new land for cultivation. The DB invited economist Lord Salter to help, and his 1955 report criticized land use and recommended focusing spending on “housing, health, clean water systems and education in order to bring more immediate benefits to wider sections of the population.” His advice was taken, but fewer resources than planned were allocated to these areas, and “landed interest gained the most benefits.” (125)\(^{69}\) Pieri. “Although the figures are approximate, due to the somewhat inexact statistical methods employed by the government between 1927 and 1935, the population seems to have grown from 130,000 inhabitants in 1920 to 218,000 in 1930, over 250,000 in 1931, 358,840 in 1935, and 750,800 in 1936.” And there was an increase in enrolled students and building permits issued. (37-38) Bernhardsson cites the population of
was still strongly linked to the industry as a British venture and development of cities in Iraq as British projects. The IPC released films such as *The Third River*, in 1952 in English, and *A More Beautiful Capital* (‘Asemato Ajmal) in 1955 in Arabic, which promoted oil production in Iraq and emphasized that the oil industry was essential to enable the country to continue to “acquire the trappings of the 21st century.” With depictions of ruins and monuments, *The Third River* includes Babylon, Assyria, the Sassanians and Abbasids in its history of Iraq, which would continue to be incorporated in the discourse and imagery of Iraqi nationalism after the coup, notably under Saddam Hussein’s regime. It also emphasizes Roman and Byzantine history to support the Western claim to Mesopotamia. This film also utilizes the “old vs. new” discourse of the Kemalist regime in Turkey; the narrator remarks that, “the oldest techniques are practiced side-by-side with the new” while images of farmers working their land with donkey-pulled plows are shown after those of industrial architecture.²¹ (Fig 7.)


²¹ Ibid.
Water is essential to this traditional way of life, as oil—the third river—is equally essential to life in Iraq’s modern cities. This film was probably intended for a British or elite Iraqi audience, whereas the Arabic-language *A More Beautiful Capital* demonstrated the benefits of the modernization of their country to Iraqis and used the same kinds of urban/rural and modern/traditional comparisons as *The Third River*. Thus the IPC invested in propaganda to convince Iraqis that the British company was essential to the well being of Iraq.

By the 1950s the population in Baghdad reached one million inhabitants, thus the IDB decided to focus many of its resources on developing the city. Despite the
availability of trained Iraqi architects—for example, in 1937, the position of government architect was given to Ahmad Mukhtar, who had attended University of Liverpool—all major projects were given to foreign architects.  

In 1954, the IDB commissioned a British firm, Minoprio, Spencely, and Macfarlane to prepare the master plan of Baghdad, which was completed in 1956. There was then, however, a significant shift away from British architects. A young architect Nizer Ali Jawdat, used his political connections to influence the IDB to approach the world’s best-known architects, rather than British architects who had typically received commissions. Rifat Chadirji, who would later become one of the fathers of a modern Iraqi style, was a young IDB employee at the time and also insisted the board invite “the best.” Among the individuals and firms who were invited to work in Baghdad in the 1950s were: Greek architect and town planner Constantinos Doxiadis, who did the Plan for Baghdad; American architect Frank Lloyd

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73 Lefteris Theodosis, “Containing Baghdad: Constantinos Doxiadis’ Program for a Developing Nation,” in Azara, 169.
74 Bernhardsson, “Faith in the Future”: “One [young architect], Nizer Ali Jawdat, happened to be the son of the influential politician Ali Jawdat Al-Ayubbi, who served as prime minister on several occasions, including during 1957. According to Louss McMillen, Nezar convinced his father that it would be more ‘advantageous to the country to engage some of the world’s great architects to do their projects rather than the old line British engineering firms left over from the days of the British protectorate.’” (86-87) Mina Marefat, “The Universal University: How Bauhaus Came to Baghdad” in Azara: “Significantly, Nizar Ali Jawdat, son of Iraq’s ambassador to the United States, was a student of Walter Gropius at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Design. He married fellow student Ellen Bovey and returned with her to Iraq where they began architectural careers not long before the Development Board embarked on its building program. By 1957, Nizar’s father was prime minister under King Faisal II. (2) Chadirji later recalled: “When I saw the list of who they are commissioning to do buildings…it was all by old-fashioned British architects, mostly third-rate…I made an appointment to see the Minister of Planning, with my colleague [Kahtan] Awni… ‘You are inviting people to design prestigious buildings and spending money. Why not invite the best?’ So he said, ‘Who are the best?’” Most of the architects who agreed to building Baghdad were on the list Chadirji submitted to the planning minister.” (2-3)
75 Marefat, 3.
Wright, who did the Plan for Greater Baghdad and Opera House; Spanish architect Jose Luis Sert, who did the US embassy; German architect and educator Walter Gropius and Boston-based The Architectural Collaborative (TAC), who did Baghdad University; Italian architect and designer Gio Ponti, who did the Development Board Offices; Finish architect Alvar Aalto, who did the Baghdad Art Museum; and French-Swiss architect Le Corbusier, who did the gymnasium and stadium. After the 1958 coup, such projects were generally discontinued; the only ones that were realized were Gropius’s University and Le Corbusier’s gymnasium.76 (Fig 8)

Fig 8. Projects of 1958, including Walter Gropius and TAC’s Baghdad University. (Image: Mina Marefat, From Bauhaus to Baghdad: the Politics of Building the Total University.)

Doxiadis’ Plan: Ekistics, anti-Communism and Orientalism

Although each of these architects’ projects are fascinating in themselves and deserve further research, the Doxiadis plan is the most expansive in terms of his vision for Baghdad and his methodology. He studied in Athens and Germany, and then, worked

76 Unrealized, but part of the project was later carried out under Saddam Hussein. See “Saddam Hussein Sports Complex (1955-1965, 1979-1983)” in Azara, 296.
in the Greek government from 1945 to 1951, “first as the coordinator of postwar reconstruction and then as the administrator of the Marshal Plan in Greece, was well known in American and international development circles, and he was recommended to the Iraq Development Board by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.” After leading the reconstruction effort in Greece, Doxiadis was involved in the missions of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in Syria and Jordan in 1954. Since he had barely started a private practice, what reason was there for him to design in Baghdad, when all of the other architects commissioned were well established in their field? Pyla infers that his “Greek background […] rendered him free of ‘imperialist stigma’ and distinguished him from most of the other Western consultants, advisers, and technicians who were streaming into Iraq.” Thus he was chosen by the IDB in order to assuage popular concerns that the government was not accountable to the population at large and fears of the government and its Western allies about similarities between Iraq and Russia and Nasser’s newly independent, Soviet-allied Egypt. According to Pyla, the Doxiadis’ Plan for Baghdad has two major goals, the first being to use formal and social experiments to build the modern nation state, and the second to show that Baghdad was an important city in reformulation of modernism in the postwar world. As with Ankara, Baghdad was a site of experimentation with modernism outside of its birthplace in Europe. On the other hand, British and anti-

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78 Theodosis, 168.  
79 Pyla, 97.  
80 Ibid.  
81 Ibid, 98.
communist influence during and after the protectorate favored the vision of an Iraqi modernism through the eyes of foreign architects.

Doxiadis had also developed a methodological approach he called *Ekistics* that supposedly made his plans objective and free from political bias.\(^82\) This approach was multidisciplinary and had two goals: “to reject the ethos of the individual signature-designer and to emphasize the necessity of addressing basic human needs, well beyond functionalist of technological concerns [; secondly] to reinvent architects and planners as development experts by emphasizing the significance of the physical environment in promoting socioeconomic development in the post-World War II era.”\(^83\) Thus Doxiadis’s ties to the Marshall Plan and Western bloc countries and support from the IDB suggest that his approach to planning in Baghdad could not be “apolitical.” Doxiadis’ claims to “scientific neutrality” is weak on three points: his political relationships, his unfamiliarity with Baghdad’s climate, culture and building types and the kind of ‘universalism’ upon which Ekistics was based. Regarding his assertion that his method and plan was applicable to any society, communist and capitalist alike, and superseded any kids of religious or ethnic differences in one society, Doxiadis’ method was based on his experience in Greece, and the assumption that the neat divisions and subdivisions of society and space could translate exactly to the Iraqi context, despite the intent of “cultural sensitivity,” is clear. His writing presents certain hypothetical problems of all cities and of ‘Man,’ and presents sure solutions.\(^84\) In *The Order of Things*, Michel

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\(^82\) Pyla, 99.

\(^83\) Ibid.

Foucault critiques this kind of categorization as subject/culture/time specific and thus incapable of objectivity. In the case of Baghdad, ‘traditional’ areas of the city that had value in their own context were in danger of being categorized as disorderly or undesirable by Doxiadis’ plan that “suffered from a preoccupation with an aesthetic of order.” This also demonstrates the assumption of high modernism that modern science can fix all problems and the uniformity of modernism that continued in the 1950s with International Style, even though Doxiadis’ houses are an effort to reconcile a European-originated form with the hot Iraqi climate.

Doxiadis’ plan was based on his concept the _Dynapolis_, that “theoretically allowed for indefinite urban expansion, [although he] set the ideal population limit of the future Iraqi capital at three million inhabitants—about three times larger than the 1958 population.” The plan was “defined by an elongated rectangle oriented along the main northwest-southeast axis of the river.” (Fig 9) According to Crinson, the _Dynapolis_ “echo[ed] the open-ended logic of ‘linear city’ concepts” that he associated with the 1882 Ciudad Lineal of Arturo Soria y Mata’s 1882 Ciudad Lineal near Madrid, Tony Garnier’s Cité Industrielle of 1901 as well as the Soviet examples from the 1930s. Thus Doxiadis

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85 Pyla, 102.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Crinson, 7.
had close familiarity with modernist architecture, but not with the history of the city he was replanning. All parts of the plan were connected to the rectilinear pattern that had a commercial center at its core, surrounded by 19 residential sectors with smaller neighborhoods subdivided inside. A new road system provided easy access out of the city to the country. Industrial districts were relegated to the edges of the city.  

Doxiadis’s city plan, like Jansen’s, divided the city by function, then within residential sectors by class rather than ethnic or confessional identity, suggesting that there was a goal to secularize and homogenize populations, while maintaining economic

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89 Ibid, 8-9.
In discussing this plan, Crinson observes that one part of the “Western Baghdad Development Scheme” was to house a population of 100,000, and unlike the growth projected in the master plan, “each sector had a rather static quality with a predetermined size and prescribed dimensions for each plot, roads, and public areas. This was the firm’s tactic for preserving each sector’s human scale even in an ever growing urban environment,” and his rationale for this system was “the smaller class […] communities of Baghdad corresponded to sizes found in Iraqi towns and villages” whereas the larger ones corresponded to “new phenomena necessitated by advanced transportation and communication technologies.” He attempted to preserve certain parts of local culture that fit into a modernist plan (village size), while leaving out others that did not (grouping by ethnicity or religion). According to Crinson, Doxiadis’ “attempt at social engineering” conflicted with and also attempted to accommodate government requirement that different classes not live in the same neighborhood and that the plan help “eliminate sectarian and tribal divisions.” This disagreement between the architect and government demonstrates one difficulty of implementing such high modernist projects and of the uncertainty of what an Iraqi identity should be. It also exemplifies the paternalist attitude present both in many colonial and city planning projects, due to the lack of a role of inhabitants in planning. The ideas of Doxiadis and of the government about different group interactions did not leave multiple possibilities, but were grounded

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90 Notably, this was not a totally new trend as wealthier families had been moving to new neighborhoods with more modern kinds of houses for the past few decades.  
91 Ibid, 10-11.  
92 Ibid, 10-12.
in a view of what must happen.\textsuperscript{93}

Doxiadis’ plan was plagued by his lack of familiarity with Baghdad. One weakness of the plan, according to Crinson, was its failure to acknowledge the “social value” of Baghdad’s existing urban characteristics, such as its density or the covered and twisting small streets of its souks.\textsuperscript{94} In one effort to maintain ‘authenticity,’ Doxiadis included the “gossip square”—open spaces at the end of streets where women could gather to, of course, gossip—in an attempt at “cultural sensitivity” that clearly misunderstood the use of public space and employed gender stereotyping.\textsuperscript{95} In one individual neighborhood plan, the mosque is at the center of the map and listed as the first number in the key. (Fig 10) Thus the plan to some extent assumes that particular

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\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Plan_of_Community_Sector_in_West_Baghdad}
\caption{Plan of Community Sector in West Baghdad (Constantinov A. Doxiadis Archives, Human sector in Western Baghdad, Slides0332)}
\end{figure}

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\item An example of inclusiveness of inhabitants in planning is Egyptian Hassan Fathy’s project \textit{New Gourna}, which he built 1946-52 and which ultimately failed. (See his book \textit{Architecture for the Poor: An Experiment in Rural Egypt} and Timothy Mitchell’s \textit{Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity}.) Afterwards he came to Iraq to collaborate with Doxiadis on part of his plan south of Baghdad in Musayyib.\textsuperscript{94} Crinson, 9.
\item Pyla, 107.
\end{itemize}
communities are Muslim (not Christian or Jewish) and that this is a primary identity. This demonstrates the challenge of maintaining ‘traditional’ elements while not, as mentioned earlier, maintaining sectarian or tribal divisions. This particular plan also includes ‘traditional’ elements like public baths, coffee houses and new elements like a public park and open-air theatre).\textsuperscript{96} Therefore the general plan is indistinguishable from a plan of a different city by a modernist architect of this period, and its distinctive characteristics exist only at the micro level. Notably, this was the case with many classical and then modernist buildings in Baghdad that were indistinguishable from their Western counterparts except for their superficial decoration. So modernism was still an essentially international style. Furthermore, Doxiadis’ proposal itself did not reflect the specific demographic dynamics of Baghdad; for example, most of the Jewish population immigrated to Israel after 1947, and there was a significant movement of migrants from rural areas to the city, including Christians and Kurds from the north and Shias from the south. The plan ignores existing tribal, nomadic, ethnic, religious, and other groupings and uses vague references like “‘proper’ grouping among different communities that would allegedly create ‘a healthy community spirit.’” “The irony in this particular case,” says Crinson,” is that Ekistics was framed precisely as a rejection of aesthetic preoccupations in favor of what were considered as more basic human needs.”\textsuperscript{97}

The National Housing Program of Iraq was begun and the first phase was a five-year plan called the Basic Foundation Program to respond to the most pressing needs of the population. Plans were made for the major cities of Baghdad while Fathy planned rural settlements south of Baghdad in Musayyib. The issue of housing acquired political

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid, 104.
\textsuperscript{97} Crinson, 12.
significance and the new State was urged to manifest progress in a ‘readable’ way, especially for the lower-income classes.\textsuperscript{98} Housing, like Jansen’s, focused more on developing wealthier neighborhoods, at a time when most of the population that had migrated to Baghdad from rural areas were building mud-and-stick housing, resulting in slums.\textsuperscript{99} Houses in Baghdad had (in addition to being integrated into a socially important alley-way system) featured \textit{shanashil}, which reduced heat and light and gave inhabitants privacy. The inner courtyard also provided privacy while allowing access to the outside and helping cool the house.\textsuperscript{100} In trying to transform the ‘traditional Baghdad house’ into a modern house, Doxiadis left out or altered elements that had evolved to help cool the interior. As Pyla notes, he “pushed the courtyard to the side of back of each unit, thereby losing any of the traditional courtyards’ climatic benefits and secluded qualities.”\textsuperscript{101} (Fig 11) Doxiadis Associates (DA) also reinterpreted wooden window screens with reinforced concrete that did not increase wind pressure, decrease sunlight or provide privacy.\textsuperscript{102} This demonstrates a misunderstanding of local architecture and an assumption that one housing form was applicable in Baghdad without needing much adjustment.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{98} Theodosis, 168.
\textsuperscript{99} Nooraddin, 65. “In the 1950s, Baghdad had some 44,000 \textit{sarifa} (reed and mud houses) which accounted for about 45 per cent of the total number of houses in the city.”
\textsuperscript{100} Al Siliq, 63.
\textsuperscript{101} Pyla, 108.
\textsuperscript{102} Crinson, 15.
\textsuperscript{103} Pyla, 110. See Doxiadis Associates, “The National Housing Program of Iraq.”
Doxiadis’ plan had the potential to change Baghdad dramatically and address social changes, but after the coup the new government cancelled his project in May 1959. Doxiadis was disappointed but went on to apply his methodologies to plan Islamabad, Pakistan in the 1960s. By that time, DA had completed construction of hundreds of units in western Baghdad and a few in the northeast side of the city which are still referred to as Doxiadis’s houses. “Between 1961 and 1963,” says Hoshiar Nooradin, “many of the squatter settlements were eliminated and their inhabitants moved to two large housing projects on the edge of the city at al-Nur and Madinat al-Thawra. Both were a direct result of Doxiadis’s planning proposals.”

His plan for Baghdad showed greater sensitivity to old parts of the city, some of which were left alone, which was not the case

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104 Nooradin, 66-67.
in the eventual plan that was implemented in the 1970s. According to Crinson, the new republic had “socialist leanings” and modernizers became “more self-conscious in their anti-Western claims […] leaving no room for the kind of universalism Doxiadis advanced.”

This chapter, however, demonstrates that the plan was not objective or free of political motivations, and is critical of whether ‘universalism’ exists, and if so, whether it is beneficial to employ it in planning. The 1950s and especially the following few decades in Baghdad were a time of unbridled creativity of Iraqi artists and architects such as Makiya and Chadirji, who built projects that have been identified as successfully “Iraqi modern.” Doxiadis’ plan, and the other plans commissioned by the IDB, although never fully implemented due to the coup, demonstrate some challenges of building modernist projects outside of Europe and North America and reflect an outsider’s perspective on what “Iraqi” meant. After this brief period of vigorous planning in the 50s, Iraqi architects, notably Rifat Chadirji and Mohamed Makiya, were faced with the same question of expressing national identity through architecture.

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105 Crinson, 10.
Conclusion

By looking at capital city planning during a crucial point in the development of nationalism in the case of Turkey and Iraq this thesis draws conclusions about architectural modernism in the Middle East. In Turkey’s case, modernism was introduced on a large scale earlier than in Iraq. It also was developed in an independent state and connected closely and intentionally to nationalist discourse. Building a new capital nearly from scratch allowed the Kemalist government to ensure that its ideology was imbued with modernity that was in turn expressed in the built environment. For example, the 1933 essay “Turkish Architectural Revolution” announced the same break from the Ottoman past as Atatürk’s government proclaimed. Architecture was both an expression of ideology as well as a means to train Turks to be ideal, modern citizens. That plans like Bouvard’s, Jansen’s and Prost’s went partially or even fully unrealized demonstrates a trend in Turkish architecture of foreign architects being commissioned, then, for one reason or another—economic conditions, disagreements—the project continuing without them or not at all. Planning in Turkey in the 20th century has generally favored ever-larger development with little regard to existing buildings and preservation of older, traditional neighborhood streets and types. Somewhat ironically, even the best examples of Turkish modernism no longer exist due to newer development.

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In Baghdad’s case, modernist architecture was introduced at first in smaller ways, like in Istanbul, but through British imperialism. By the 1950s, architects like Rifat Chadirji and Mohamed Makiya were returning to Iraq to start their own firms in Baghdad, which, in the 1960s and 1970s, produced modernist buildings that used local building materials and directly referenced Abbasid and Sassanian architecture. (Fig. 12)

Architectural education also developed several decades behind Turkey. According to Chadirji, architectural students at Iraqi institutions created modernist projects that failed

to incorporate local architectural elements to fit into their surroundings, adjust to the climate, or both.\textsuperscript{108} Thus modernism persisted beyond the total independence of Iraq from the British Empire, but Iraqi architects still faced the same questions of how to blend modernism with Iraqi history, architectural culture and climate. Under Saddam Hussein’s regime, architecture, particularly that of monuments, was used to link Iraqi history to the great civilizations of Mesopotamia, before and after the spread of Islam, and to enforce Ba’athist ideology.\textsuperscript{109} In the late 1970s, it was Saddam Hussein who imprisoned Chadirji due to the architect’s family’s politics, then released him and gave him unlimited resources to practice.\textsuperscript{110} In such an environment projects have little independence from the government. Unfortunately, military coups, regime changes, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Gulf War (1990-91) and US invasion in 2003 have made an unstable environment hostile to new development and unappealing to young Iraqi architects and foreign investment. The exception, of course, is semi-autonomous Kurdistan, the existence of which challenges the legitimacy of the state.

One issue examined in this project is the relationship between the state, architects and the broader population in the development of high modernist projects. One key factor that hindered the successful realization of these plans discussed here were disagreements between architects and the state. Both plans used social engineering to try to change


\textsuperscript{110} Hugo Lindgreen, “When Saddam’s the Client.” Interview. NY Times. 18 May 2003. \url{http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/18/magazine/18QUESTIONS.html}
society. Beyond that, in Turkey one main obstacle was the unexpected outcome of gecekondu neighborhoods. In Iraq the issue was a lack of understanding of local culture and environment and a regime change. In both cases it could be argued that the root of the problem was lack of accountability to the broader public, but in high modernist projects imply that those in charge of projects know best. It is important to acknowledge the successes of modernization, particularly in the case of Turkey, where it cannot be denied that parts of its modern state-building project, like educational reforms, greatly benefited society at large. Iraq underwent similar reforms to those from the Ottoman period, during the Mandate and after, but political instability negatively affected its ability to solve the issue of sarifa neighborhoods. Thus the regimes’ interest in and ability to address and solve social problems was a key factor in the development of city plans and a modernism that espoused national identity and addressed local climate concerns.

By the 1960s, there was a critique of modernism among architects in both the West and the Middle East. Jane Jacobs’ 1961 publication The Death and Life of Great American Cities provided a critique of planning as functional based on visual order, not on a social order.\textsuperscript{111} Bernard Rudofsky’s 1964 exhibition Architecture Without Architects examined “non-pedigreed” architecture, emphasizing average people as architects rather than the eminent architects chosen for the projects included in this paper.\textsuperscript{112} He also provided examples of dwellings that built into, around and with the environment. Such criticisms brought the question of who should design and build, and how, into the


spotlight within modernism. These are a few examples of criticism that questioned the basis of high modernist projects and laid the framework for postmodern architecture. During the same period, architects like Eldem and Chadirji criticize modernism from a different perspective and voiced the desire to return to traditional building materials and methods, still without abandoning modernism.

Questions for further research

Since the time allowed for a master’s thesis is not sufficient to cover this comparative topic in its potential depth, many examples and points of discussion had to be excluded. If this project would be continued in the future, it could compare Turkey and Iraq during a longer and similar period, perhaps the 1930s-1950s, to look at how the changes in modernism and regional politics affected both cases. Examples that could be examined in more detail include Henri Prost’s Plan for Baghdad in the 1930s-1950s and Walter Gropius’ realized Baghdad University Project in the 1950s. One area that was excluded but is deserving of greater attention is the development of archaeology and museums in both countries in connection to nationalism. Comparatively little research has been done on modern architecture in Iraq, so there is much potential there, but the difficulties of primary research in the country today are numerous. Although much information was excluded here, the two plans that were examined demonstrate that further comparative research on Turkey and Iraq is a worthwhile pursuit and would contribute to the areas of Near and Middle Eastern Studies and Art and Architectural History.
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