Modern Friendship: The “New Turkey” and Soviet Cultural Diplomacy, 1933-1934

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In the interwar period, the Soviet Union and Turkey embarked on an unprecedented partnership, characterized by high profile economic, diplomatic, and cultural exchanges. The enthusiasm of these interactions surprised contemporaneous foreign observers and contemporary scholars alike, who underscored the ideological untenability and superficiality of the relationship. In contrast, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that Soviet-Turkish relations were a multidimensional affair, by exploring the public discourse produced by its Soviet participants. That is, how did Soviet commentators portray the Kemalist “new Turkey,” and articulate and celebrate their interrelationship? Why did Soviet discourse endorse Turkish modernity—widely, effusively, and at considerable costs? Who were the primary audiences of this message?

This thesis concentrates on a particularly lively moment of interaction: the 1933 Soviet delegation to Ankara’s 10th anniversary celebrations and the film it inspired, Sergei Iutkevich’s Ankara—Heart of Turkey (Ankara—Serdtse Turtsii, Türkiye’nin Kalbi—Ankara). Drawing on
the historiography of the interwar conjuncture, Russian Orientalism, and Soviet cultural diplomacy, this thesis argues that the Soviet emphasis on the “new Turkey’s” modernity (notably void of Marxist-Leninist overtones) created a neutral discursive space for furthering their geopolitical concerns, without exacerbating ideological incompatibilities. Secondly, the Soviet Union’s endorsement of the Kemalist project must be understood as an extension of Soviet cultural diplomacy: the campaign to broadcast and propagate its own scientific, industrial, and cinematic accomplishments. By linking the Soviet and Turkish legacies—and their shared modernization experiences—Soviet observers advertised the Soviet Union as an alternative model to the Western-capitalist order, and established themselves as longtime sympathizers, witnesses, sponsors, and “friends” of the “new Turkey.”
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I. INTRODUCTION

On October 26, 1933, the Turkish ship İzmir sailed into the Bosporus, flanked by two Red Navy cruisers and a formation of Turkish warplanes. The ships were escorting a delegation of 21 Soviet representatives, in transit to attend Turkey’s 10th year anniversary celebrations. Their arrival was met with considerable fanfare. Standing on the deck of the İzmir, the delegates waved to dozens of boats sailing alongside them, each adorned with Soviet and Turkish flags. On the shore, crowds applauded under banners reading “Welcome, Dear Friends” in Russian. An orchestra played the Soviet “Internationale,” punctuated by artillery salutes. This enthusiastic scene—a visual manifestation of diplomatic and military partnership—dominated headlines in the Soviet and Turkish press, and was documented by crew of filmmakers. This footage later featured in the binational film production, Ankara—Heart of Turkey.¹

The Soviet delegation’s participation in Turkey’s 10th year anniversary celebrations—the first time members of the Politburo traveled to a foreign country—marked a highpoint in Soviet-Turkish interwar relations, when both countries redefined their centuries-long imperial rivalry and embarked on a dynamic partnership. Despite their significant ideological and cultural differences, the Soviet Union and Turkey became each other’s principle partners, carving out opportunities for intellectual, economic, and cultural contact. The Soviet envoy to Turkey in 1933—and the film produced about the occasion—was a particular vibrant moment in this exchange. The enthusiasm of these interactions puzzled contemporaneous foreign observers and contemporary scholars alike, who underscored the ostensibly insurmountable ideological differences.

¹ In Russian, the film was titled Ankara—Serdtse Turtsii and in Turkish Türkiye’nin Kalbi—Ankara. Hereafter, the film will be referred to as the Heart of Turkey.
incompatibilities between the two countries; namely, the Kemalist regime’s ardent anti-communism and Soviet visions of international revolution.

Yet in spite of these uncomfortable realities, both countries were vocal about their “friendship” and their meetings were characterized by impressive pageantry. In the existing scholarship, little attention has been paid to this rhetorical performance and the meaning it had for its participants. Rather than discount the enthusiasm of Soviet-Turkish relations, this thesis will seek to understand its message and function, primarily from the Soviet perspective. That is, how did Soviet observers portray the “new Turkey,” and rationalize, articulate, and celebrate their interrelationship? Why did Soviets discursively endorse Turkish modernity—publically, enthusiastically, and at considerable costs? Who were the primary audiences of this message, and what purpose did it serve?

This thesis will present two main arguments. First, the Soviet emphasis on the “new Turkey’s” modernity (notably absent of Marxist-Leninist overtones) created a neutral discursive space for furthering their geopolitical concerns, without exacerbating the ideological incompatibilities endemic in Soviet-Turkish relations. Secondly, the Soviet Union’s public endorsement of the Kemalist project can be understood as an extension of the Soviet Union’s “cultural diplomacy” and campaign to broadcast its own accomplishments. By linking the Soviet and Turkish legacies—and their shared experiences with rapid industrialization, anti-imperialism, and expansive social engineering—Soviet observers were positioning the Soviet Union as an alternative model to the dominant Western-capitalist order, and establishing themselves as longtime “friends” of Turkey—in contrast to the West’s purported derision and manipulation. This message was directed toward Turkish, Western, Eastern, and domestic audiences.
To begin, this thesis will discuss its contribution to, and relationship with, two main bodies of literature, the historiography of Soviet-Turkish relations and the “interwar conjuncture.” Until recently, historians of Soviet-Turkish relations have emphasized the sheer necessity and shallowness of the relationship, failing to address the multidimensional exchanges that took place between the late 1920s and mid-1930s. Secondly, this thesis will draw from notions of the “interwar conjecture,” a period when countries around the world underwent similar processes of modernization, despite their ideological and geographic disparities. By exploring Soviet-Turkish parallels during the “interwar conjuncture” and fleshing out the discursive contours of the relationship, this thesis seeks to demystify the enthusiasm of Soviet-Turkish relations and allow for a reconceptualization of the events that occurred over the course of their partnership. Following the literature review, this thesis will discuss its terminology and sources, validating the use of Turkey’s 10th year anniversary as an ideal moment for study. A summary of the circumstances surrounding the event—namely, the Soviet delegation to Turkey in 1933 and the production of the *Heart of Turkey*—will demonstrate the texture of Soviet-Turkish relations and situate the resulting Soviet discourse in its particular historical context.

Chapter 1 will then elucidate Soviet portrayals of the “new Turkey,” through an analysis of Soviet discourse in the early 1930s. These portrayals will be framed in the long durée of Russian Orientalism and *osmanistik* traditions. Tracing the evolution of Russian Orientalism reveals that the Soviet preoccupation with Turkey was not a new phenomenon. Rather, it was rooted in centuries of mutual study and burgeoning Russian academic criticism of Western exoticism of the East. While many scholars have documented Soviet attempts to modernize its

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2 The notable exception is the recent work of Samuel Hirst, who has elucidated many of the Soviet Union and Turkey’s interwar parallels, particularly their shared anti-Westernism. His work will be discussed in the literature review.
own “backward” Orientals and peasant population, this chapter will posit that in their discourse, Soviet commentators positioned Turkey as the end result of that process: a model of the modern Eastern state. After discussing the vocabulary employed in the portrayal, this chapter will demonstrate that Soviet depictions of the “new Turkey” endorsed and built upon the Kemalist regime’s own self-description, employing similar motifs of industry and progress. For Soviet commentators in the early 1930s, Turkey was completely reborn from its imperial past, industrialized, emancipated (as evinced in the liberated Turkish woman), and purely “Turkish.” These ideas coalesced in Soviet portrayals of Ankara, which positioned the city as a site and symbol of Turkish modernity. After comparing these constructs with contemporaneous articles in American and French media (which emphasized the continuity between Ottoman and Republican Turkey), this chapter will argue that the Soviet embrace of Turkish modernity created an ideologically neutral—yet nonetheless powerful—discursive space for articulating Soviet-Turkish relations and its geopolitical goals. Within this space, Soviet speechmakers, writers, and filmmakers emphasized the commonalities between Turkey and the Soviet Union, and their shared experiences with modernization and anti-imperialism.

Chapter 2 will demonstrate that Soviet depictions of the “new Turkey” were closely linked to Soviet cultural diplomacy—the overarching effort to broadcast Soviet accomplishments, and legitimize and propagate the “Great Socialist Experiment” abroad. After explaining the goals and methods of Soviet cultural diplomacy, this chapter will analyze the rhetorical framing of Soviet-Turkish relations as a “friendship,” articulated in intensely interpersonal terms. Soviet discourse in the early 1930s linked the Soviet and Turkish legacies, contending that Turkey’s 10th year anniversary was equally a celebration of the Soviet Union’s revolutionary past. As Turkey’s oldest “friends,” Soviet observers placed themselves in three
loose roles, taking the titles of sympathizer, witness, and sponsor. As sympathizers, the Soviets ostensibly understood Turkey better any other foreigner could—thanks to a long running sympathy for the revolution and reforms of the Turkish cause. Secondly, Soviet discourse reminded viewers and readers that the Soviet Union was the first to recognize Turkish independence, becoming a witness to Turkey’s complete transformation under the Kemalist reforms. Lastly, Soviet discourse stressed the Soviet Union’s position as a sponsor of Turkish economic, scientific, and cultural development, through a storied history of binational exchange. In addition to lauding the extent of Soviet influence, this message was to convince Eastern audiences (e.g. in Iran and Afghanistan) of the value of Soviet friendship. In essence, the “new Turkey” was fashioned into a Soviet success story—a model that could assumedly be exported to the Soviet Union’s other friends. However, this friendship was inherently asymmetrical, and predicated on the Soviet Union’s senior position in the relationship.

In conclusion, this thesis will detail the events leading to the collapse of Soviet-Turkish friendship. As World War II (1939-1945) approached—and Soviet and Turkish interests diverged in the Black Sea and European geopolitical theaters—the discursive justification for the Soviet-Turkish relationship became increasingly untenable. Although their friendship was limited to the interwar period, it can be viewed as a staging arena for Soviet cultural diplomacy, arguably setting precedents that reverberated into the Cold War (namely, the concentrated export of Soviet “soft” culture to the “Third World”). Lastly, Soviet discourse in the early 1930s demonstrates that visions of modernity held immense diplomatic capital in the interwar period.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

In the early 20th century, the Ottoman and Tsarist Russian empires collapsed dramatically, giving rise to their Turkish nationalist and Bolshevik predecessors. Nearly
overnight, their 400-year rivalry underwent an abrupt reversal.\(^3\) Upon gaining control of the country’s foreign policy, the Bolshevik government published the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, renounced the “Russian capitalist” claim to Ottoman territory, and condemned all efforts to dismember the Ottoman Empire.\(^4\) Eager to shake off the fetters of World War I (1914-1918), the Bolsheviks ceded Kars, Ardahan, and Batumi to Ottoman jurisdiction, and remained outspoken against the Allied move to create an Anatolian “rump” state during the 1920 Sevrès negotiations. In his first letter to Moscow, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk, 1881-1938), the leader of the Turkish independence forces, promised Ankara’s support in the “fight against the imperialist governments for the liberation of all oppressed peoples.”\(^5\) Kemal attempted to curry his neighbor’s backing by endorsing Russian Bolshevism (which contained “the most exalted principles and rules of Islam”) and by establishing a puppet communist party to subvert his leftist rivals.\(^6\) On March 16, 1921, the Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood was signed in the Soviet capital, opening the door for future cooperation and solidifying their shared borders.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) Additionally, there is evidence that the Bolshevik military provided intelligence to Ankara. In one instance, Kemalist authorities were tipped off about the allegiances of Mustafa Saghir, an Indian-born British spy who was infiltrating Ankara’s leadership circles. Saghir was arrest in 1921 and eventually executed. Bülent Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920-1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 31.
Observing from Europe and the United States, Western commentators emphasized the superficiality of the relationship, discrediting the alliance of such an “odd couple.” In 1923, historian Arnold Toynbee wrote, “Being a mariage de convenance…the Turks have not been looking to Russia for anything but munitions…they have not been learning her language, studying in her universities, buying her goods, or imbibing her culture.” The Georgetown political scientist Baron S. A. Korff was confident that a faux friendship between the “Slav Colossus” and Turkey could not mend “centuries of strife and enmity:” “The Western powers were amazed at this spectacle…One may be quite sure, however, that there is not much love lost between them…[their union is] a temporary expedient, as a ‘marriage de raison’ and not ‘d’amour’…[it] will later easily crumble to pieces.” Even after a decade of Soviet-Turkish partnership, foreign observers utilized identical tropes.

Furthermore, much of the existing historiography has perpetuated these early sentiments, uncritically dismissing the partnership as a historical fluke. For instance, William Hale describes the Soviet-Turkish relationship only in negative terms—that is, by the mischief the Soviets didn’t do. He writes, “Russia, the traditional enemy, was too isolated, and too convulsed by internal upheavals, to represent a serious threat to Turkey’s security until the end of the 1930s.” Alvin Rubinstein describes the interwar period as a “friendly interregnum,” yet reaffirms that Turkey’s

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10 In a 1933 *Foreign Affairs* article, Hans Kohn wrote, “A close friendship unites Turkey with the Soviet Union…This is in no way [implies] any community of ideas…It was purely a community of interests that brought together the Soviet Union and the countries of western Asia.” Hans Kohn, “Ten Years of the Turkish Republic,” *Foreign Affairs* 12:1 (1933): 152. The French author Jean Kervil wrote, “As for the Soviet friendship, it is above all of a pecuniary order and only rubles…” Jean Kervil, “Dix ans de République Turque,” *Frontières: revue de politique étrangère* 10:3 (1934), 277.

drive toward a modern, democratic state had no room for Soviet influence. This trend is skewed by the preponderance of works focusing on the early years of the relationship, when the Bolshevik government and Turkish nationalists were both beset by foreign powers.

Bülen Gökay credits a “common aim of undermining British designs in the [Caucasus]” for creating the “unholy alliance.” To Gökay, fears of capitalist encirclement, a neo-Byzantine Grecian state, and British control of the Turkish Straits—a “primarily negative objective”—drove the Bolsheviks into partnership with the Turkish independence movement. This strain of scholarship, in which Gökay is the most prolific contributor, effectively elucidates the realism of early Soviet foreign policy, dispelling notions that Soviet actions were driven solely by ideology. These actualities challenge assumptions that the Bolsheviks ever held any quixotic dreams for a communist Turkey, as indicated by Hale, or that there was a marked shift from an ideologically to pragmatically driven foreign policy under Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin (1922-1953). Additionally, Gökay’s emphasis on Soviet practicality explains the seemingly bipolar strategy of supporting foreign communist movements, while simultaneously collaborating with the nationalist governments that those movements intended to subvert.

14 Ibid., 166.
16 Hale writes, “Until early in 1921, the Soviet leaders seem to have believed that pro-communist forces could take over in Turkey…they were rapidly disillusioned, however.” Hale, 50. Although Kapur does not posit a clear division between idealism and pragmatism, he ends his study in 1927, predicated on the notion that, “the year 1927…saw the definite consolidation of power of Stalin, who, while continuing to indulge in the making of revolutionary statements, accepted the outside world in the shape in which it presented itself and made efforts to operate within the confines of that reality.” Harish Kapur, *Soviet Russia and Asia 1917-1927: A Study of Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan* (Geneva: Michael Joseph Limited, 1966), 14.
17 Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey*, 28. This dual policy in most clearly evinced in the 1920 “Black Sea Incident,” when the leadership of the Moscow-backed Turkish Communist Party (directed by Mustafa Subhi) disappeared mysteriously after setting sail from Trabzon. Tellingly, Subhi’s mysterious death caused hardly a ripple in Turkish-Bolshevik relations—despite strong evidence that Ankara was involved in foul play.
However, after describing Turkey’s 1925 anti-communist push, much of the literature on Turkish-Soviet relations becomes rather vague, or drops off completely until the arrival of World War II. The exchanges and dialogues of the late 1920s and 30s are almost entirely elided, or the narrative is reduced to a handful of key diplomatic moments, such as the 1936 Montreux Convention (which redrew the Turkish straits regime in ways unfavorable to Moscow). This thesis contends that an examination of Soviet-Turkish cultural and interpersonal entanglements in the 1930s can nuance the “marriage of convenience” trope that dominates the historiography. During the 1933 delegation to Turkey, both Soviet and Turkish interlocutors delivered striking rebuttals to the perspective of Toynbee and Korff. A writer in Izvestiia argued, “Soviet-Turkish friendship is not the result of diplomatic engagement or political opportunism. It came about through…the battle of two nations for independent existence and the struggle to build their own lives.”\(^{18}\) Pravda quoted Akşam, “…the sincerity…between our countries exceeds the bounds of [diplomatic] protocols and declarations.”\(^{19}\) While these statements should not necessarily be taken at face value, they do not deserve immediate and jaundiced dismal. Rather, they represent the public affirmation of Soviet-Turkish affinity that characterized the multidimensional exchanges of the interwar period.

A. K. Sverchevskaia, in his work Soviet-Turkish Cultural Relations, 1925-1981 (Sovetsko-turetskie kul’turnye sviazi\(\)), provides the most definitive history of these exchanges, in literature, film, music, and drama. Sverchevskaia demonstrates that Soviet-Turkish interactions were diverse affairs, involving contacts between a range of diplomatic and artistic elite.\(^{20}\) However, Samuel Hirst’s 2012 dissertation and derivative journal articles are the most analytical

\(^{18}\) “Desiat’ let turetskoi respubliki,” Izvestiia, October 28, 1933.
\(^{19}\) “Turetskaia pechat’ goriacho privetstvuet sovetskuiu delegatsiu,” Pravda, October 29, 1933.
approach to the Soviet Union and Turkey’s interwar relationship. Drawing from both Turkish and Russian language archives, Hirst’s work convincingly contends that, “In the post imperial period, Soviet and Turkish politics were not only parallel but also intersected and were developed in tandem.” 21 Hirst argues that “a shared anger with Western power” was the core of Soviet-Turkish partnership in the 1930s, buttressed by a shared sense of marginalization on the European periphery, a nascent notion of Eurasian compatriotism, and an intertwined doctrine of statism.22 This thesis seeks to contribute to Sverchevskaya and Hirst’s important work, by honing in on Soviet discourse surrounding one particular event: the 1933 Soviet delegation to Turkey. Beyond simply adding more historical details, this thesis shifts its focus away from Hirst’s overarching “anti-Westernism” explanatory framework, to explore the content and significance of Soviet discourse in a particular moment. That is, how—and why—did the Soviet Union enthusiastically endorse the Kemalist project in its print and visual media?

This project is predicated on the argument that Turkey and the Soviet Union recognized parallels in their interwar development and goals, in addition to their geopolitical interests. As such, it draws on notions of an “interwar conjuncture,” as postulated by scholars such as David Hoffman and Stephen Kotkin. Both argue that the trials and scale of World War I sparked a worldwide process of mass mobilization, industrialization, and the incorporation of the social sciences and rationalism into governance. In his book Cultivating the Masses, Hoffman normalizes the Soviet experience in its international context, arguing that a comparison of Soviet state interventionism with that of its liberal and fascist neighbors, “allows us to move beyond

explanations that attribute all aspects of Soviet social intervention to socialist ideology.”

During the same decades, governments in Europe, the United States, and Japan pushed initiatives that gave the state an unprecedented hand in shaping public health, reproductive policies, social welfare, and propaganda. Nevertheless, there was considerable variation in these processes and the Soviet Union (and Turkey, I argue) emerged as a “particularly virulent” model of rapid societal transformation. Stephen Kotkin describes this period of intense change as a “competition of modernities:” various models of economic, societal, and political development, as exemplified by certain states.

This thesis contends that Soviet-Turkish relations must be understood within this context. On remarkably similar timelines, the Soviet Union and Turkey distinguished themselves by the pace and scope of their post-war change, restructuring religion, clothing mores, language, gender, industry, etc. Yet while much has been written about the modernization effort of both countries, there has been little systematic literature comparing the Soviet and Turkish interwar experiences, and for the purpose of this thesis, how they conceived of each other’s metamorphoses. One exception is the scholarship of Adeeb Khalid, who aptly summarizes Soviet-Turkish interwar parallels:

Both the Soviet and the Kemalist regimes originated from the same phenomenon, the collapse of the European imperial order in the flames of World War I…both pursued shock modernization programs that involved mass mobilization, nation and state building, political centralization, as well as attempts at radical interventions in the realms of society and culture…Finally, both regimes produced an official historiography that

24 Ibid., 4.
25 For his categories, Kotkin chooses the “American model, the British and French parliamentary-imperial models, and the various mobilization models—whether Italian fascist, Nazi, imperial Japanese, or Soviet socialist.” With the onset of the Cold War, these options were reduced, and in large part, revolved around the American-capitalist and Soviet-socialists systems. Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture,” Kritika 2:1 (2001), 163.
shared many elements...a larger-than-life founding figure;...and a clear break from the past...26

However, Khalid continues, “These two official historiographies located themselves in different narratives—of class and nation—and were therefore quite hostile to comparison with each other.”27 The findings of this thesis contradict this notion. In the early 1930s, when Turkey and the Soviet Union were at the pinnacle of their interwar self-reimagining, they actively and publically drew connections between themselves. Although the ideologies and processes behind these changes were diverse, Soviet and Turkish interlocutors focused on and celebrated their apparent similarities. This thesis seeks to make an intervention in the “interwar conjuncture” literature, by elucidating a Soviet conception of the “new Turkey’s” modernity and the function these portrayals played. In doing so, this thesis will examine how modernity became a concept with diplomatic cachet, utilized by Soviet commentators to in the interwar period to articulate Soviet-Turkish relations and promulgate their own “brand” of modernity.

Terminology

Before engaging this project’s scope and sources, it is necessary to define a number of terms, such as “modernity” and “modernization.” Like many scholarly terms, “modernity” (and derivatives such as modernities, alternate modernities, tangled modernities, etc.) have been employed in numerous and often imprecise ways, making their use somewhat fraught. For instance, “modernity” is associated with the oft-criticized modernization theory of American political thought or grouped with the European colonial project.28 However, this thesis does not seek to engage this debate, or discuss the pros and cons of humanity’s supposed transition from

27 Ibid., 234.
28 For a discussion of these various (mis)uses of the term “modernity,” see: Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, and History (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 113-152.
pre- to mid- to post-modernity. Rather, this thesis employs “modernity” in a rather simple way, as a descriptive, rather than an analytical term. In the following pages, modernity refers to the historical projects—visions of the economic, social, and political future—pursued by actors and states. Although the specific term “modernity” is not employed their discourse, Soviet and Turkish commentators spoke at length of transforming their countries into “modern,” “civilized,” and “successful” states—an admittedly ambiguous and subjective aim. Thus, “modernity” will be used as a convenient (if imperfect) label for referring to these goals—a state of being and becoming “modern.” “Modernization” will refer to the various processes necessary for the fruition of this goal (e.g. electrification, industrialization, rationalization, female emancipation, etc.). While there is some overlap in these general terms, it is useful to draw a distinction between methods and goals.

*Primary Source Material*

In order to consolidate the scope of its primary source material, this thesis will concentrate on Soviet visual and print productions created in the weeks surrounding one instance of exchange: the Soviet delegation to Ankara in late October, 1933. This visit is particularly apt for study because it occurred during the zenith of Soviet-Turkish relations, when Soviet discourse reflected on a decade of interaction and presented a vision of future cooperation. In addition to tracing the itinerary of the delegation and anniversary events, Soviet newspapers such as *Pravda, Izvestiia, Krasnaia Zvezda*, and (to a lesser extent) *Vecherniaia Moskva* published intergovernmental telegrams, speeches by Turkish and Soviet officials, retrospectives on Soviet-Turkish exchange, and discussions of the “new Turkey’s” culture, history, economy, and sciences.29 Drawing from multiple strata of Soviet elite society, these sources marshal more than

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29 As with the bulk of Soviet media, these four major newspapers were organs of the Soviet government. In the early 1930s, *Pravda* was managed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party (KPSS), *Izvestia* by the
a journalistic perspective. Academics, diplomats, scientists, filmmakers, politicians, and writers from across the Soviet Union contributed dozens of articles on the occasion, providing a rich sample of the era’s broader discourse. Additionally, this thesis analyses other works (such as memoirs and travelogues) produced during the period, particularly those excerpted and referenced by the Soviet press. The most notable of these productions is the Heart of Turkey, which provides a compelling opportunity for visual interpretation. By way of contrast, this thesis will also source contemporaneous French and American periodicals. Lastly, several document collections allow a glimpse at internal Soviet correspondence.

Lastly, a word on names and transliteration. The Library of Congress system is used for transliterating Russian documents and person names (with patronymic and dates, when known). In contrast, contemporary scholars’ names are rendered as they appear in their publications (e.g. A. K. Sverchevskaiia). Turkish names and places are written as they are, in Turkish characters. Mustafa Kemal is referred to as “Atatürk” somewhat anachronistically,

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, Krasnaia Zvezda by the Ministry of Defense, and Vercherniaia Moskva by the Moscow Committee of the KPSS. With few exceptions, there was little variation in their coverage of Turkey’s 10th anniversary and Voroshilov’s delegation. Izvestiia and Pravda published the most detailed articles, both from contributors and from their own special correspondents embedded within the delegation. Unsurprisingly, Krasnaia Zvezda focused on military matters. Vecherniaia Moskva, whose content was largely local to Moscow, published the least amount of coverage, saying little about the “new Turkey” and its features. In articles pertaining to the delegation’s movements, the four newspapers frequently published identical articles sourced from the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS).

Soviet-Turkish interactions during the interwar period occurred principally among elite political and artistic circles. In both countries, the line between discourse producers—academics, journalists, artists, etc.—and government employee were blurred. Because this study focuses on officially sanctioned public discourse, the sources analyzed are heteroglossic: reflecting variations of both individual and “official” perspectives. For example, Iutkevich was the Heart of Turkey’s principle director, yet the production was also the offspring of the Soviet and Turkish governments, as well as the Turkish composers and artists involved. Though produced in the Soviet Union by Soviet filmmakers, the parameters of the film were limited to those approved and facilitated by their host, the Turkish government. Will this does not automatically discount the “subjectivity” of the actors involved, this filter of government approval (if not censorship) deserves notation.

The main exception is S. Raevskii. At this time, his full name and dates have eluded extensive research.
because the majority of events described occurred prior to the 1934 Surname Law.\footnote{The Surname Law was signed on June 21, 1934, requiring all Turkish citizens to adopt surnames. Mustafa Kemal famously chose the name Atatürk, meaning, “Father of the Turks.”} This thesis' usage of “Atatürk” is meant to reflect contemporary conventions.

### III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT, 1933-1934

In order to provide a historical context for Soviet discourse in the early 1930s, this section will trace the history of the Soviet delegation, *Heart of Turkey*, and Soviet-Turkish geopolitical concerns of the period. Soviet newspapers published daily updates on the Soviet delegation’s progress, allowing a detailed reconstruction of their route. Even if one ignored its geopolitical significance, the journey would be notable for its persistent pageantry. At every step of their itinerary, Turkish crowds welcomed the Soviet delegation with banners, parades, standing ovations, rifle salutes, and the Soviet and Turkish national anthems. At near daily receptions, the men received honors and the women flowers, bookended by long speeches trumpeting friendship, peace, and industry. Although the following account will elide these details for the sake of brevity (and to avoid a tedious list of brunches and toasts), it is important to keep their animated tenor in mind. Secondly, this section will present a short background to the *Heart of Turkey*, including its production timeline and an outline of the film’s contents.

Despite their intertwining histories and shared thematic concerns, there are revealing discrepancies between the film and the delegation’s activities. For instance, the film focuses exclusively on the delegation’s arrival in Istanbul and their participation in Ankara’s 10\textsuperscript{th} year anniversary celebrations. Although they were likely filmed, the bulk of the delegation’s experiences are omitted by the filmmakers, in favor of an Ankara-centric storyline. The potential meaning of these divergences will be discussed. Additionally, the filming process reveals the
preeminent place of cinema in Soviet cultural diplomacy, and the binational artistic networks that enabled (and emerged from) the *Heart of Turkey*’s production.

*The 1933 Soviet Delegation to Turkey*

The 1933 Soviet delegation was not an isolated event. Rather, it was a highpoint in the midst of a decade of Soviet-Turkish encounters, and the second half of an exchange with the Kemalist government. A year prior, in the spring of 1932, Prime Minister Mustafa İsmet İnönü (1884-1973) and Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü (Aras, 1883-1972) led a Turkish delegation to Moscow for the city’s May Day celebrations. The delegation was received in grand style, welcomed by a cavalry guard, the press, and an orchestra. According to the *New York Times*, policemen held back crowds of onlookers that stretched for miles. In the days that followed, the 34 Turkish delegates were treated to receptions, evening balls, and tours of Soviet industrial sites. The delegates’ stays lasted from two weeks to several months.

The reciprocal Soviet delegation, formed by the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) and the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK), was led by Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov (1881-1969), Commissar of Defense. Prominent delegates included Semen Mikhailovich Budennyi (1872-1959), Lev Mikhailovich Karakhan (1889-1937), Gleb Maksimilianovich Krzhivzhanovskiyi (1872-1959) and Andrei Sergeevich Bubnov (1884-1938). In addition to

33 In fact, this pairing can be somewhat misleading. Some observers noted that the Turkish 1932 delegation was responding the Soviet Foreign Commissar Maksim Maksimovich Litvinov’s (1876-1951) 1931 visit to Ankara. “Soviet Greets Turks on Arrival at Odessa,” *New York Times*, April 27, 1932.
34 Several of the men who hosted the Turkish delegation, including Lev Karakhan and Inspector of the Calvary Semen Budennyi, later joined the reciprocal delegation to Turkey. “Soviet Welcomes Turks with Pomp,” *New York Times*, April 29, 1932.
37 At the time of their journey to Ankara, Voroshilov was the Peoples Commissar of Defense, Budennyi was the Inspector of the Cavalry, Karakhan was the Deputy of the National Commissariat for Foreign Relations, Krzhivzhanovskiyi was the Chairman of the All-Union Council of Scientific-Engineering and Technological
other high-ranking officials, they were joined by the Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Hüseyin Ragıp (Baydur, 1890-1955), the wives of several ministers, correspondents from Pravda and Izvestiia, and of course, the Lenfil’m crew. The delegates were a comprehensive cross-section of the Soviet ruling apparatus, representing everything from military to educational concerns. Their diversity is an indication of the multidimensional nature of Soviet-Turkish interwar relations.

The delegation departed from Moscow’s Kursk train station on October 23, surrounded by members of the Soviet administration and the Turkish embassy. The delegation traveled to Turkey via Ukraine, stopping in Khar’kov and Sevastopol, which was draped in Soviet and Turkish flags for the occasion. Columns of workers and sailors spilled into the station square, along with members of the local government and a small cohort of Turkish ministers. The Turkish cadre had sailed into Sevastopol two days prior on the İzmir—the boat that would carry the combined party to İstanbul. Together, the Soviet and Turkish guests were given tours of the port’s defenses, Black Sea Fleet, and recently erected Lenin statue. Towards evening, they boarded the İzmir and set sail, escorted by two destroyers, two cruisers, and a contingent of warplanes.

As the İzmir sailed into the Bosporus—the scene described in the introduction—it was met halfway by two Turkish destroyers and a ship carrying İstanbul’s civil administrators. Iakov

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Societies, and Bubnov was Commissar of Education. Karakhan replaced Iakov Surits as the Soviet ambassador to Turkey in 1934, though his connections with the Turkish government dated to the Brest-Litovsk treaty. Notably, Voroshilov and Budennyi were among the few remaining marshals and commanders who survived Stalin’s 1938 purge of the military. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 212.

38 “Ot’ezd sovetskoi delegatsii v Turtsiu,” Pravda, October 24, 1933.
39 The destroyers and airplanes eventually detached from the convoy and returned to port, while the cruisers (the Profintern and Chervonaia Ukraina) stayed for the remainder of the journey. “Sovetskaia pravitel’stvennaia delegatsiia obyla iz Sevastopolia v Stambul,” Krasnaia Zvezda, October 26, 1933. Boris Izakov, “Torzhhestvennaia vstrecha v Stambule,” Pravda, October 28, 1933.
Zakharovich Surits (1882-1952), the Soviet ambassador to Turkey, was impressed by the welcome shown to the Soviet delegation. Surits wrote to Narkomindel, “The reception…exceeded all of my expectations. In all of my 10 years here, I never saw anything quite like it, toward either foreign guests or Turkish figures, with the exception, perhaps, of Kemal Paşa.” Upon disembarking, the delegation was whisked in automobiles to the famous Pera Palace hotel and given a tour of the city’s major mosques. Then, “under the blast of the orchestra, shouts of the youth, and applause of those gathered, the train left for the capital of the new, free Turkish republic—Ankara.” Approaching Ankara, the train was buzzed by yet another group of airplanes and “irrespective of the late hour” the Soviets drew the attention of thousands of residents. Boris Romanovich Izakov (1903-1988), the embedded journalist from Pravda, recounted, “Greeting the Soviet delegation was one of the central moments of the [anniversary] festivities.” Soviet papers were happy to report that the Turkish government had erected “a grandiose, red, triumphant gate” in the center of Ankara, on which was written, “The USSR—Turkey’s old friend. Turkey is always true to its old friends.”

For the next several days, the delegates split their time between receptions (in the Ankara Palace hotel, Presidential Palace, and Soviet embassy), and tours of Ankara’s rail lines, military, and surrounding industrial projects. Furthermore, they attended the opening of several new

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41 The Pera Palace hotel was a landmark in the “Europeanized” Beyoğlu district. The mosques visited included the Hagia Sophia and Sultan Ahmed Mosque.
43 Boris Izakov, “Vnushitel'naia demonstratsiia druzhestvennykh otnoshenii,” Pravda, October 29, 1933.
44 S. Raevski, “Blestiashchii parad, Rech’ Gazi Mustafy Kemal’-pashi,” Izvestiia, November 1, 1933. Not surprisingly, this monument to Soviet-Turkish “friendship” is also featured in the Heart of Turkey.
45 “Pribytie sovetskoi delegatsii v Ankare,” Izvestiia, October 29, 1933. For Atatürk’s welcome speech, see: “Rech’ Gazi Mustafy Kemal’-pashi,” Pravda, October 30, 1933.
institutes, a dinner at the “Army House,” and perused exhibitions on life in the young republic. On October 29, the day of the anniversary ceremony and celebration kick-off, Voroshilov rode alongside İnönü in Atatürk’s convoy and joined other delegates on the state podium. From this standpoint, they observed Atatürk’s speech (translated and published in its entirety in Izvestiia, Pravda, and Krasnaia Zvezda) and the ensuing parades, fireworks, airshows, and military demonstrations on Ankara’s racetrack. The festivities included the gifting of three Soviet warplanes, which arrived that morning.

On October 31, the delegation visited an exhibition of Turkey’s industrial development (hosted in the school of commerce) and an exhibit on Turkish culture (in the women’s institute). The following day, they were introduced to Ankara’s most ancient and most recent icons: the medieval Ankara Castle and the under-construction Çubuk dam.

Raevskii, “Blestiashchii parad.” The concluding line of this speech, “How happy is the one who says ‘I am Turkish’ (Ne mutlu Türküm diyene),” was the origin of the popular republican era slogan. Meanwhile, in Soviet Batumi, the Turkish consulate invited officials from across the Southern Caucasus to attend an anniversary celebration. “Priem v turetskom konsul’stve v Batume,” Izvestiia, November 1, 1933.

“The building openings included an agricultural institute and the İsmet Paşa hospital and medical school. On October 31, the delegation visited an exhibition of Turkey’s industrial development (hosted in the school of commerce) and an exhibit on Turkish culture (in the women’s institute). The following day, they were introduced to Ankara’s most ancient and most recent icons: the medieval Ankara Castle and the under-construction Çubuk dam.

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48 “Dar pravitel’stva SSSR—3 samoleta,” Izvestiia, October 30, 1933. The Soviet pilots who had flown the planes to Ankara were later given medals, at a special ceremony. “Chestovanie sovetskoi delegatsii,” Izvestiia, November 1, 1933.

49 “Sovetskaia pravitel’stvennaia delegatsiia na puti v Izmir,” Izvestiia, November 4, 1933.

50 “Predstaviteli SSSR ob’ezzhaiut Turtsiu,” Izvestiia, November 5, 1933.
festivities continued, as the Turkish “guests” were escorted through their own round of speeches, receptions, and city tours.  

Over the course of these three weeks, Soviet newspapers detailed every step taken by the envoy, and continued to publish their impressions of the “new Turkey” throughout November. These public statements stressed the connections cemented by the delegation, and even in private correspondence, Surits remarked, “Without exaggeration, it can be said that these last two weeks of work in the relationship surpassed the results that previously took years…but the visit brought us no less benefits, if not more, than it did Turkey.”

_Ankara—Heart of Turkey_

During the interwar “conjuncture,” cinema was both a symbol of modernity and powerful medium for asserting the states’ agenda and image, domestically and abroad. Beginning with the Russian Civil War, the Bolsheviks harnessed film as an “agitational” tool, laying a foundation for the USSR’s colossal film industry. Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet write, “The enormous potential of film to influence minds was very much understood” in early Republican Turkey, yet the funds and expertise necessary for mounting a national film effort were lacking. In this context, the _Heart of Turkey_’s success is hardly surprising—allowing the Soviet Union to flex its cultural diplomacy, while providing Turkey a ready-made (and Soviet bankrolled) propaganda film.

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53 David Gillespie, _Early Soviet Cinema: Innovation, Ideology and Propaganda_ (London: Wallflower Press, 2005), 5. Even up to its collapse, cinema was the crown jewel of Soviet culture, and a critical mouthpiece for ideologically educating its population and waging the “soft power” war with the United States. For an excellent discussion of the Soviet film industry during the Cold War, see: Kristen Roth-Ey, _Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire that Lost the Cultural Cold War_ (London: Cornell University Press, 2011).

The proposal process leading up to the *Heart of Turkey*’s production lasted over a year, and went through several iterations. The plan to shoot a film in Turkey was first hatched by Soviet director Sergei Iosifovich Iutkevich (1904-1985) and screenwriter Natan Abramovich Zarkhi (1900-1935).\(^{55}\) Beginning in 1931, both artists conceptualized a screenplay that would counteract the colonial romanticism and exoticism of films such as Raoul Walsh’s the *Thief of Baghdad* (1924) and Joe May’s the *Indian Tomb* (1921), and the novels of Claude Farrère.\(^{56}\) In 1933, Zarkhi made an exploratory journey to Turkey, to conduct research for the film. The Turkish government provided Reşat Nuri (Güntekin, 1889-1956) as a guide and translator. In Turkey, Zarkhi familiarized himself with the short history of Turkish cinema, and with Nuri and Muhsin Ertuğrul’s (1892-1979) help, visited historical sites, collected documentary film materials from the early 1920s, and sampled examples of Turkish music.\(^{57}\) In an interview with *Kino*, Zarkhi expressed a responsibility to build “the cultural connection between the corresponding worlds of Soviet and Turkish art,” and laid out his vision of a film that would artistically depict the strength and heroism of the Turkish independence movement.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{56}\) Abdul Guseinov, *Turetskoe kino: istoriia i sovremennye problemy* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 33. Katerina Clark demonstrates that Turkish authors and artists (particularly communists) were making similar efforts, writing satires and rebuttals to exoticized British and French literary depictions of their country. Ferrère and Pierre Loti were regular targets of Soviet authors and Nazım Hikmet, for instance. Katerina Clark, “European and Russian Cultural Interactions with Turkey: 1910s-1930s,” *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East* 3:2 (2013), 201-213.

\(^{57}\) Muhsin Ertuğrul—often dubbed the “founder of Turkish cinema and theatre”—had spent two years in the USSR, working with Konstantin Sergeievich Stanislavski (1863-1938) and Vsevolod Emilevich Meyerhold (1874-1940). While in the Soviet Union, he also directed two productions of his own, *Tamilla* (1925) and *Spartacus* (1926). Ertuğrul first traveled to the USSR on the urging of Nazım Hikmet (Ran, 1902-1963), a poet and communist who spent years of his life (and eventually died) in the Soviet Union. Hikmet’s devotion to Marxist-Leninism and political activism often landed him in Turkish prisons, even during the height of Soviet-Turkish partnership, making him an interesting example of the ideological tension between the allied countries. For more on Ertuğrul, see: Rekin Tesoy, *Turkish Cinema* (İstanbul: Oğlak, 2008) and Abdul Guseinov, *Mukhsin Ertugrul v teatre i kino* (Moscow: Nauka, 1990). For more on Hikmet, see: Seaime Göksu and Edward Timms, *Romantic Communist: The Life and Work of Nazım Hikmet* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).

\(^{58}\) “Fil’ma o Turtsii,” *Kino*, January 28, 1933.
By June, Zarkhi and Iutkevich produced the screenplay, “The Man Who Did Not Kill” (Chelovek, kotoryi ne ubil). Iutkevich chose the title as a rebuttal to Farrère’s The Man Who Killed (L’homme qui assassina), which he viewed as an embodiment of “Western oriental prose: the exoticism of lifestyles, outlooks, characters, and relationships—salacity and cruelty.”

Iutkevich and Zarkhi’s screenplay told the story of Hikmet, a young believer in the Ottoman Empire’s “Europeanization.” However, when Hikmet is betrayed by treacherous Tsarist Russian officers, he comes face-to-face with the dangers of imperialism. Eventually, Hikmet is saved by Bolshevik sailors, and a new era of revolutionary Turkish-Bolshevik partnership is born. Boris Zakharovich Shumiatskii (1886-1938), head of the Soviet film industry, described the screenplay to the Orgburo as an allegory of Turkey’s successful war against imperialism, with the Soviet Union at its side. In early September, Iutkevich’s film crew sailed to Turkey and began production. However, their efforts were frustrated by delays—Turkish government reviewers were hesitant to fully endorse the screenplay, uncomfortable with its overtly “revolutionary subject.”

Fearing that the delays would prove permanent, Iutkevich decided to capitalize on the Soviet delegation’s rapidly approaching visit, and pitched a documentary about Soviet-Turkish “friendship” and Turkey’s postwar transformation. After receiving approval from Surits and the Turkish government, Iutkevich and the director Lev Oskarovich Arnshtam (1905-1979) quickly

59 Ibid., 86.
60 Zarkhi and Iutkevich chose to name their protagonist “Hikmet” as an homage to Nazım Hikmet, the poet. Sergei Iutkevich, “Desiat’ lenfil’movskikh let, ili Chemu ia nauhilsiaia na ulitse Krasnykh Zor’,” in vol. 2 of Sergei Iutkevich: Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh, ed. M. Z. Dolinskii and V. E. Valerius (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1991), 85.
62 Sverchevskaia, 35.
drafted the *Heart of Turkey*. Iutkevich’s crew joined Voroshilov’s delegation on its journey to Ankara, and remained in country for several months, shooting over 8,000 meters of film. In Turkey, Iutkevich served as a representative of the Soviet film industry; in a special showing, he introduced Atatürk and the Ankara elite to examples of Soviet cinema. Iutkevich reported an enthusiastic reception, and boasted that the clips convinced the audience of the mastery of Soviet cinema and industry.

With the exception of speeches given by Atatürk and İnönü, the *Heart of Turkey* is a silent film, overlain with “national Turkish music,” composed by Osman Zeki Üngör (1880-1958), Ekrem Zeki Ün (1910-1987) and Cemal Reşit Rey (1904-1985). The *Heart of Turkey* is roughly one hour long and consists of three interwoven components. The first documents the experiences of the Soviet delegation, from their colorful arrival in the Bosporus to the anniversary parade. The second component of the film depicts the anniversary festivities through the eyes of two idealized characters, an old partisan from the countryside and a teenage, patriotic female. The dialogue of these characters provides a commentary on Turkish

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63 Iutkevich, “Desiat’n lenfilmovskikh let,” 87.
64 In addition to Arnshtam, Iutkevich’s crew included cameramen Zhozef Kliment’evich Martov (1900-1972) and Vladimir Abramovich Rapoport (1907-1975), and soundman Il’ia Fedorovich Volk (1893-1975). “8,000 metrov o Turtsii: Sovetskii kinofil’m,” Vercherniaia Moskva, December 27, 1933.
65 Sergei Iutkevich, “Volshebnitsa montazhnogo stola,” introduction to Zhizn’ moia – kinematograf, by Esfir’ Il’ichna Shub (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1972), 16. Among the films shown were Boris Barnet’s 1933 *The Outskirts* (Okraina), Esfir’ Shub’s 1932 *Komsomol—Leader of Electrification* (Komsomol—shef elektrifikatsii), and his own 1932 *Counterplan* (Vstrechnyi) and 1931 *Golden Mountains* (Zlatye gory).
66 The *Heart of Turkey* opens with a prologue, in which İsmet İnönü delivers a short speech directly to the filmmakers. İnönü thanks the Soviet delegates, and stresses the significance of the Soviet-Turkish alliance. He is translated in Russian, “As we know, and as the whole world knows, the foundation of our foreign policy is the Turkish Republic’s friendship with the Soviets!” Iutkevich, *Ankara—Serdise Turtsii*, 1934.
67 The partisan was played by the famous Turkish actor İbnüreffik Ahmet Nuri Sekzinci (1874-1935). For the role of the girl, the filmmakers chose the daughter of one of the guards of the Soviet embassy, Fatma Hasan. Interestingly, the girl is the only character in the film who is recorded speaking Russian. See: Ekrem İşın, ed., *Ankara: Kara Kalpakli Kent 1923-1938* (İstanbul: İstanbul Araştırmaları Enstitüsü, 2009), 364., and Guseinov, *Turetskoe kino*, 36.
advancements during a decade of growth.\textsuperscript{68} Lastly, the filmmakers include montages of Ankara’s freshly constructed hospitals, institutes, factories, libraries, and industrial infrastructure.\textsuperscript{69} For this fact alone, the film is a valuable—and relatively untapped—source for historians of the early Republican period.

\textit{Soviet-Turkish Geopolitical Interests in the mid-1930s}

Before analyzing Soviet discourse surrounding Turkey’s 10\textsuperscript{th} year anniversary, it is necessary to reaffirm that tangible geopolitical concerns were of course central to Soviet-Turkish relations in the interwar period. Although this thesis examines the discursive contours of the relationship—produced through subjective, enthusiastic sentiments about anti-imperialism, modernity, and friendship—it does not dismiss the geopolitical goals of Soviet-Turkish relations. Although these “hard” interests are generally unrepresented in Soviet public discourse, they comprised the conversation behind closed doors. For instance, when recapping the delegation’s experiences to Narkomindel, Surits rationalized Turkey’s enthusiastic welcome in the framework of international relations—that is, what each party had to gain from the talks. For example, Surits reported that the Turkish government was seeking to procure Soviet support for the Balkan pact (signed in 1934 to resolve border disputes between Turkey, Greece, and several Balkan nations), drum up Soviet economic aid, and draw the attention of the international community. Surits was aware that Turkey had an interest in playing the “Soviet card” to strengthen its hand with Western countries and the League Nations.\textsuperscript{70} Additionally, in the early 1930s, both states

\textsuperscript{68} In this sense, the \textit{Heart of Turkey} is not a documentary in the Soviet \textit{kino-pravda} (cinéma vérité) style, which was the subject of much debate in Soviet film circles. By blending documentary footage with dramatized recreations and fictional characters, Iutkevich was taking the side against “pure” documentalism.

\textsuperscript{69} When the \textit{Heart of Turkey} eventually crossed the Atlantic, the \textit{New York Times} described the movie as a travel film, providing a vicarious excursion to Turkey. “Persons desirous of seeing the bright side of modern Turkey, but hesitant as to spending the money necessary for a trip…may find a good substitute at the little Acme Theatre in Union Square.” “The Screen: A Soviet Newsreel,” \textit{New York Times}, September 3, 1934.

\textsuperscript{70} “Pis’mo Polnomochnogo Predstavitelia SSSR v Turtsii v Narodnyi Komissariat Inostrannykh Del SSSR, November 10, 1933,” 623-627.
had agreements to limit naval forces in the Black Sea; Turkey sought Soviet consent before joining the League of Nations in 1932 (the Soviet Union join two years later); and the Soviet Union possessed special access to the Turkish straits.\textsuperscript{71} Indeed, the presence of Soviet warships accompanying Voroshilov’s delegation into the Bosphorus was a political statement in itself. The optics of Soviet naval power in the Turkish straits was a potent symbol of Soviet-Turkish geopolitical cooperation, and their mutual rights to the Mediterranean and Black Seas.\textsuperscript{72} Lastly, the Turkish and Soviet armies engaged in limited cooperation and training exchanges.\textsuperscript{73} However, the geopolitical realities of Soviet-Turkish relations have been described at length in other works, many of which were already mentioned in the literature review. According to the conceit of this thesis, these lists of treaties and accords do not convey the entire story.

\section*{IV. CHAPTER I: Turkish Modernity and Ankara in the Soviet Imaginary}

\textit{Russian Orientalism and the “new Turkey”}

Following the publication of Edward Said’s influential \textit{Orientalism} in 1978, numerous scholars have built upon and critiqued Said’s framework, applying his ideas to other geographic and historical contexts.\textsuperscript{74} As a part of this broader trend, there have been a rash of works exploring Russia’s history of interactions with Orientalism and “Orientalism”—as both a subject

\textsuperscript{71} Erel Tellal, “Relations with the USSR,” in \textit{Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents}, ed. Baskın Oran (Salt Lake City, Utah: The University of Utah Press, 2010), 190-191.

\textsuperscript{72} In fact, a squadron of Soviet vessels (one cruiser, two destroyers, and a number of submarines) had sailed into İstanbul four days prior to Voroshilov’s delegation. The Soviet sailors enjoyed a reception with the İstanbul city government, and placed a wreath on a memorial to the Turkish Republic. “Sovetskaia eskadra v Stambule,” \textit{Pravda}, October 24, 1933; Boris Efimov, “Sovetskaia eskadra v Stambule: demonstratsiia sovetsko-turetskoi druzhby,” \textit{Krasnaia Zvezda}, October 23, 1933.

\textsuperscript{73} During the Soviet delegation’s visit, they received unparalleled tours of Turkey’s military establishment, which was as “good as any European army,” according to Voroshilov. “Tov. Voroshilov o vysokikh kachestvakh turetskoi armii,” \textit{Pravda}, November 1, 1933. Additionally, Turkish pilots received training in the Soviet Union the following year. “Turetskie letchiki v bolshevskoi trudkommune,” \textit{Izvestiia}, May 5, 1934. For further Soviet praise of Turkish armed forces (and a dismissal of their Ottoman predecessors), see: “Vooruzhennye sily turetskoi respubliki,” \textit{Krasnaia Zvezda}, October 30, 1933.

of Western exoticization and contributor to that same discourse.\textsuperscript{75} For centuries, Western travelers and writers lumped Russia into the despotic, Asiatic east—a realm of tyranny, backwardness, and cheap imitations of European civilization.\textsuperscript{76} Simultaneously, the Russian Empire applied these pejoratives to its own Orient, harnessing the creation of difference as a means of extending its hegemony in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Russian Far East.\textsuperscript{77} Since the westernizing reign of Peter the Great, Orientalism (vostokovedenie) was established as an academic discipline, producing knowledge about the “Eastern” nations residing within—and around—the empire’s borders. Naturally, the Ottoman Empire was one of the prime targets of Russian interest, and descriptions of Ottoman Turkey figured heavily in both scholarly and popular literature.\textsuperscript{78} In the 1820s, osmanistika appeared as an official, independent branch of Orientalist science.\textsuperscript{79}

The historian Victor Taki demonstrates that for much of its history, Russian academic Orientalism closely followed French and British models (and adopted its vocabulary) in articulating a sense of superiority vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, histrionic images of

\textsuperscript{75} For the purpose of this chapter, Orientalism (without quotation marks) will refer to the academic discipline, comprised of ethnographers, philologists, and other scholars whose subject was the Orient—a constantly fluctuating designation representing the “East.” In contrast, “Orientalism” will refer to the essentializing portrayal of the Orient as a timeless, exotic, and backward Other, cast in opposition to “Occidental” rationality. Since Orientalism, the term has become a pejorative, necessitating the distinction between Orientalism as a discipline, and “Orientalism” as an otherizing discourse.


sultans, harems, and hookahs—long a staple in British and French productions—dominated popular Russian depictions of Ottoman Turkey. As in Said’s original conception of “Orientalism,” Taki argues that Russian portrayals of the Ottomans as backward and exotic was a means of reinforcing Russia’s own civilization and rationality. “The symbolic construction of a rival empire as the ‘Orient’ served to sustain the representation of Russia as part of ‘Europe’ against claims to the contrary.”

For the Russian Empire, the majority of whose territory lay in Asia, emphasizing its “Europeanness” was an important component of the empire’s identity. In 1836, the philosopher Petr Chaadev famously declared, “We live in Europe’s East, but this fact does not make us Eastern.” However, this relationship was fraught with ambiguity. Russian perceptions of the Orient—and the Ottoman Empire—were hardly monolithic, and differed greatly over the centuries. For example, particularly after Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War, numerous groups in Russian history criticized Westernization, and appealed to the empire’s unsullied, Asian heritage—positing brotherhood with the “Turks, Tatars, and other Asian nations.” In fact, certain Russians chastised the Ottoman Empire’s 19th century attempts at Westernization, accusing the Ottomans of exchanging their traditional morality for ill-fitting European extravagance.

However, throughout most of the 18th and 19th centuries, Russian discourse filtered Ottoman Turkey through a European-style, “Orientalist” lens. Russia’s Black Sea neighbor was

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80 Ibid., 323.
81 The image of Russia as an insecure, Asian-European hybrid is a cliché that persists even in today’s media depictions. Notably, the same is often said of Turkey, the eternal “bridge between East and West.”
83 Konstantin Leontiev, Vostok, Rossiia i Slavianstvo (Moscow: Eksmo, 2007), 606-607, quoted in Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, 233. These moments occurred most dramatically during the Westernizer-Slavophile debate in the 1840s, yet resurfaced following Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War in 1856.
84 Taki sees this as a component of Russian “Occidentalism,” which interacted with “Orientalism” in paradoxical and often contradictory ways. Taki, 348.
concurrently menacing, marginal, superstitious, and terminally diseased. According to Vera Tolz, this tendency underwent a remarkable shift in the 1890s that lasted into the Soviet period. As a result of nationalization (growing pride in Russia’s scientific accomplishments) and internationalization (more frequent interaction with Western Orientalists), Russian academics became increasingly critical of European Orientalism. A new generation of scholars, such as Vasilii Vladimirovich Bartol’d (1869-1930), Nikolai Yakovlevich Marr (1864-1934), and Sergei Fedorovich Ol’denburg (1863-1934), excoriated European prejudices, which they linked to Western imperialism in Asia. Bartol’d mocked the West’s predilection for seeing the East in “theatrical costumes” and Ol’denburg questioned the legitimacy of Orientalism as a valid endeavor—after all, there was no such thing as academic Occidentalism. In 1919, Ol’denburg argued, “[The Westerner] understands the East poorly, because he is solely preoccupied with the achievements of his own civilization and is therefore blind to the great and exciting culture of the East.” These “anti-imperial” scholars eventually became major players in Soviet academe, informing the state’s nationality policy and accompanying delegations to Turkey during the interwar period.

This context helps to explain the Soviet Union’s embrace of the “new Turkey.” Beyond geopolitical interests, Soviet interest in Turkey’s affairs rested on centuries of Russian fascination with Ottoman Turkey and the Near East (Blizhnii Vostok). In both academic and

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85 In fact, it was Tsar Nicholas I (1796-1855) who is credited with coining the Ottoman Empire’s notorious “sick man of Europe” appellation.
86 Tolz sees these scholars as pre-Said Saidians, who were the original proponents of the ideas made famous by Orientalism. Vera Tolz, “European, National, and (Anti-)Imperial: The Formation of Academic and Oriental Studies in Late Tsarist and Early Soviet Russia,” Kritika 9:1 (2008), 72.
88 For the influence of ethnographers and philologists (including the individuals mentioned) on Soviet nationality policy, see: Francine Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2005).
public discourse (spanning thousands of publications), the empire’s Black Sea neighbor loomed large in the Russian imagination. Although these depictions (and the comparisons drawn between the two warring empires) were often derogatory or pandering, they demonstrate the intense attention paid to developments within the Ottoman Empire, and a fascination with Ottoman life. When Kemalist Turkey and the Soviet Union replaced their imperialist predecessors, this mutual interest did not evaporate. Three points support this sense of continuity. First, the scholars and thinkers who reoriented Russian and Soviet Orientalism from its Western roots assumed prominent positions in Soviet society. Secondly, much of the interwar Soviet public were formerly imperial subjects—there is no reason to believe that their interest in Turkey died with the Ottoman Empire. A small piece of a larger puzzle, this may clarify the enthusiasm of Soviet discourse in 1933. Lastly, Tolz’s research on the late imperial academy demonstrates that Russian “anti-Orientalism” predated the Bolshevik revolution, and the subsequent inculcation of Marxist-Leninist ideology into Soviet life. Arguably, this contributed to the Soviet ability to articulate Soviet-Turkish relations and endorse the modernity of the Kemalist project in non-Marxist-Leninist terms.

Many scholars have explored how the Soviet Union conceived of its own Oriental subjects, as societies in want of socialism and modernity. The Soviet rejection of Western “Orientalism” did not entail a wholesale tolerance of traditional life. Rather, the Soviet project rejected “Orientalist” exoticism and racial condescension, while maintaining its civilizing mission (albeit cast in communist terms). Paul Stronski, in his history of Soviet Tashkent, writes, “Sovietization in Central Asia…was meant to ‘modernize,’ ‘civilize,’ and ‘free’ the Uzbek people from the allegedly negative aspects of their past and push them into a happy Soviet
Farbod Honarpisheh traces this impulse in Soviet cinema and its representations of the Orient. Soviet film depicted the “progressive discourse of (historic) time and industrial modernization, as well as an ideology of the Soviet mass,” being brought to bear on the Soviet Union’s far-flung peoples and peasantry. Through education (particularly of women), mechanized transportation, and industrial production, the Soviet Union could rapidly advance its Orient along the teleological path toward modernity. Within this context, Soviet depictions of the “new Turkey” as a modern and industrialized state are quite remarkable, and largely unexplored by the current historiography. In the *Heart of Turkey*, Turkey’s modernity is never questioned. Rather, we see an Oriental state that has transitioned from its religious and imperialist past into the modern world. Taken in conjunction with Honarpisheh’s reading of Soviet cinematic “Orientalism,” Turkey’s modernity can be read as an unstated model for Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the existing literature, there are many examples of Soviet modernizers dismissing Oriental mores, and chiding the East’s backwardness. Yet in the case of Turkey in the early 1930s, we see the Soviet Union endorsing the modernity of an Eastern nation, publically and enthusiastically. The following section will explore the texture of these depictions.

**Endorsing the Kemalist Project and Depicting the “New Turkey”**

In the interwar period, Soviet discourse drew from the “anti-Orientalist,” yet modernizing impulse of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The language employed was shared by the

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91 One exception is the scholarship Rasim Dirsekhon Ors, who curates Soviet depictions of the Turkish republic (and Atatürk in particular) from the early Soviet press. Ors’ work is primarily descriptive, yet he successfully demonstrates the attention Bolshevik journalists and satirists paid to the young Turkey’s struggle against imperialism and the legacy of the sultanate. Rasim Dirsekhon Ors, *Ruskie, Atatürik i rozhdenie Turetskoj Respubliki v zerkale sovetskoi pressy 1920-kh godov* (Moscow: Izdatel’stro “Ves’ Mir,” 2012).
Soviet and Kemalist projects: the rapid transformation of a revolutionary, “backward”
agricultural society to a modern, industrial powerhouse. In his 1930 architectural manifesto, El
Lissitskii (né Lazar’ Markovich Lisitskii, 1980-1941) presented a mission to Soviet artists and
ingenieurs, rallying their skills in support of the Soviet project:

To be effective and to fulfill our mission in the world, we must strive to accelerate the
rate of growth, to force the pace. This can only be accomplished if we do not limit
ourselves to what we have inherited, but, instead, completely reconstruct it…We are
rebuilding industry, we are rebuilding agriculture. This restructuring of production
creates a new conception of life…92

With few modifications, these words could easily have been drafted in Kemalist Turkey. During
the interwar period, both states engaged in wholesale reform and industrialization, through state-
led social and economic engineering. Interlocutors in both countries recognized these
similarities (superficial or otherwise), and spoke extensively about the natural logic of the
Soviet-Turkish partnership.

In 1933, Soviet observers presented their audiences (Western, Eastern, Turkish, and
domestic) with the image of a “new Turkey,” completely reborn in the modern age. In their
discourse, Soviet commentators endorsed the Kemalist project, drawing parallels between the
experiences of both countries. Although geopolitical concerns were an integral component of the
dlegation’s purposes in Turkey, they are notably absent in Soviet public discourse. The primary
concerns of Soviet and Turkish political strategists—namely, the ever-present “question of the
straits”—did not disseminate into Soviet periodicals, speeches, or the Heart of Turkey. Yet most
strikingly, Soviet depictions of the “new Turkey” are devoid of Marxist-Leninism or socialist
ideology. At no point is “bourgeois” Turkey located on the path to communism or in the thralls

92 El Lissitzky, Russia: An Architecture for World Revolution, trans. Eric Dluhosch (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The
M.I.T. Press, 1989), 27. Originally published as Russland, Die Rekonstruktion der Architektur in der Sowjetunion,
in 1930.
of class struggle. In fact, when Turkey’s “peasant-workers” enter Soviet descriptions—generally as participants in the throngs welcoming the delegation—their contentment and respected place in Turkish society is emphasized. The subject of Turkish communism (and the Kemalist state’s zero-tolerance policy towards its adherents) is never broached.

Rather, Soviet depictions focus on Turkish modernity, framed around long lists of the young republic’s successful reforms. After discussing the specific terminology employed by Soviet discourse, this chapter will elucidate the Soviet Union’s discursive construction of the “new Turkey” in 1933. For Soviet observers, the “new Turkey” was industrial, emancipated, and patently Turkish. In juxtaposition with İstanbul, these traits were located in Ankara, universally cited as a symbolic representative of the greater Kemalist project. These depictions will then be contrasted with expressions of European and American skepticism, published in Western periodicals in the same year. In conclusion, this chapter will argue that Soviet portrayals of the “new Turkey” opened a “discursive safe space” for Soviet-Turkish relations, placing an effective—yet ultimately temporary—patch on their ideological and geopolitical misalignments.

In Soviet discourse, the word “Turkey” seldom appeared without an appellation. Rather, Soviet speechmakers and writers bestowed the country with a string of adjectives connoting its transformation. Atatürk’s Turkey was modern (sovremennaia), genuine (nastoiashchaia), independent (nezavisimaia), young (molodaia), free (svobodnaia), and of course, friendly (druzhestvennaia). With this vocabulary, Soviet observers emphasized Turkey’s freedom from imperial interference, privileged relationship with the Soviet Union, and simultaneous progression into the modern world and resurrection of its pre-Ottoman Turkish heritage. However, “new Turkey” was the most common title in Soviet discourse. Although European and American discourse employed the same term in the 1930s, Western articles and speeches
regularly identified continuities between the “old Turkey” and the new. In contrast, Soviet observers, including the creators of the *Heart of Turkey*, emphasized the rupture of Turkish independence. The Gazi’s new nation was described as *tabula rasa*, seamlessly cleaved from its Ottoman heritage. Like Ankara, the “new Turkey” was wrested “inch by inch from the harsh Anatolian earth.”\(^93\) When the infrastructural or cultural remnants of the Ottoman Empire are mentioned, they are burdens that have been successfully shorn. In agriculture, industry, and science, the “new Turkey” did not improve upon Ottoman methods. Rather, it rebuilt itself from scratch—much like the Soviet Union.

During the weeks before and after Turkey’s 10\(^{th}\) year anniversary, Soviet newspapers published articles highlighting their ally’s development. In *Izvestiia*, Karakhan presented a list of Turkey’s reforms:

…the liquidation of the sultan and the caliphate, the establishment of the republic…, the emancipation of women, the separation of church from state, the laicization of schools, the clothing reform, the introduction of the Latin alphabet, and finally…the continuing fight for the creation of national industry, and for economic independence…\(^94\)

Accompany articles detail specific instances and indicators of Turkish growth. For example, rail and telegraph lines connect the remotest corners of the nation, more than 30 cities are wired for telephones, freshly-built schools are enrolling thousands of girls, and industrial output is soaring.\(^95\) These claims are supported with tables and figures, presenting a “before-and-after” snapshot of Turkey for Soviet audiences.

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\(^93\) Iutkevich, *Ankara—Serdtse Turtsii*.


\(^95\) “Narodnoe Obrazovanie” and “Transport, telegrafnaia i telefonnaia sviaiz,” *Izvestiia*, October 28, 1933.
This emphasis on Turkey’s material and industrial infrastructure—the primary symbols of interwar modernization—characterized the *Heart of Turkey*. In the climax of the film, the Soviet delegation listens to Atatürk’s anniversary speech. Although the majority of the speech remains untranslated for Russian viewers, Atatürk’s words are supplemented by images of industrial progress—newly smoking silos, whirring textile machines in the Yüniş factory, and the half-completed Çubuk dam. Through a time-lapse of a construction site—in which a building materializes into existence—the viewers are incorporated into the “new Turkey’s” development.

Additionally, the film is rife with hallmarks of Turkish industrialization, such as railroad tracks, airplanes, and tanks. In scenes of mechanical locomotion, the film’s soundtrack is replaced with the sounds of engines, gears, and whistles. In one Soviet article, these sounds become a mouthpiece for Soviet-Turkish friendship: “With the rumble of plane engines…the workers of Soviet Ukraine sounded a hello to the Turkish nation, celebrating the tenth year of their emancipation…”96 This aesthetic veneration of modern machinery was an homage to Turkish development, as well as a feature of interwar futurist and modernist art, which had a strong presence in the Soviet avant-garde and socialist realism.97 Honarpisheh writes, “It is…the imagery of technology that [is] the most fervent utopian thrust in Soviet cinema…[Locomotives and airplanes] particularly were invested with liberating and transformative significance.”98 In Turkey too, industrial and technological iconography represented “the material bases of ‘civilization’ that generations of Turkish reformers longed for…a linear path of progress along which Turkey aspired to march.”99 The *Heart of Turkey* and other Soviet productions affirmed

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97 In the *Heart of Turkey*, Lutkevich’s team even included shots of their own equipment in action, such as their video cameras and sound recorders. This celebration of film technology is evident in other Soviet films from the time period, such as Dziga Vertov’s 1929 “documentary” *Man with a Movie Camera (Chelovek s kino apparatom).*
98 Honarpisheh, 195.
the “new Turkey’s” progress and status as an industrial nation. Where ideological bonds were absent (or in opposition), a shared experience with rapid modernization—as a badge of modern civilization—was used to fill the vacuum. In this way, members of the Soviet elite articulated Soviet-Turkish relations through the language and iconography of modernity—symbols and processes which would have been familiar to audiences in both countries.

The Soviet endorsement of the “new Turkey” is clearest in its depictions of Ankara, as both a site and symbol of Turkish modernity. From the 1933 Soviet perspective, Ankara and the “new Turkey” were synonymous. In contrast, İstanbul was a stand-in for imperial extravagance, foreign meddling, and historical obsolescence. In many ways, Soviet observers were drawing from (and building upon) a pre-existing template, propagated by the Kemalist regime itself. In publications such as La Turquie Kemaliste, the Turkish government had long positioned Ankara’s incorruptibility and newness against İstanbul, which it associated with westernization, Islam, and other “impediments that had to be expurgated.”

Iutkevich was not the first to designate Ankara the “heart of Turkey.” In early republican discourse, Ankara was simultaneously the heart, unity, mother, and future of the nation, while İstanbul was the dusty past.

Ankara’s preeminence in Soviet discourse is clearly distilled in the Heart of Turkey. Although the 1933 Soviet delegation spent less than half of their stay in Ankara, the film omits those segments and leads viewers to believe that Ankara was their only destination. After capturing the delegation’s arrival by sea, an intertitle informs viewers, “That very same day, the Soviet delegation left [İstanbul] for Ankara!”

Whereas the delegation was given a tour of

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101 Bozdoğan, 68.
102 Iutkevich, Ankara—Serdise Turtles.
İstanbul’s major sites, the audience sees İstanbul only at a distance, from the deck of the İzmir. Soon, they are transported directly to Ankara by the image and sound of a locomotive. This is a critical message of the film. By eschewing İstanbul (not to mention İzmir, Bursa, etc.), the filmmakers were making an unequivocal statement in favor of the “new Turkey,” and its symbolic heart: Ankara. In Iutkevich’s eyes, İstanbul “[could not] be dear to a Soviet citizen,” while Ankara was “a fascinating city.” This Ankara-centrism—and ambivalence toward İstanbul—is replicated in the print discourse surrounding the delegation.

The author and journalist Lev Veniaminovich Nikulin (1891-1967), in an article for Izvestiia—and later in his 1935 travel memoir Stambul, Ankara, İzmir—locates Ankara and its citizens on an “entirely different planet” as the Ottoman capital. While Nikulin associates İstanbul with overgrown cemeteries—an Asian “city of the dead”—Ankara is modern, fresh, and “the real Turkey.” This binary is perpetuated through a series of sentimental juxtapositions, contrasting the minarets of “old İstanbul” with the tall telegraph poles of Ankara, and the dank alleys of “old Turkey” with the illuminated boulevards of the new. Nikulin reiterates that, “Here, and not there ([İstanbul]) is the real Turkey…because it is here that the new and independent Turkey was born.” S. Raevskii, an Izvestiia correspondent in 1933, argued that “in the new, strong, and national Turkey,” İstanbul should be converted into a “city-museum.”

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103 RGALI, f. 3070, op. 1, d. 503, 1, 12, quoted in Hirst, “Eurasia’s Discontent,” 218.
104 “S. I. Iutkevich to E. I. Shub i P. M. Atashevoi,” November 29, 1933, in Shub, 421. In his letter, Iutkevich also expresses some of the inconveniences of filming in Turkey: a dearth of professional actors and linguistic challenges. He is amused to relay that in Turkey, the word bardak means “drinking glass.” In Russian, bardak can mean a brothel.
106 Ibid., 89.
108 Nikulin, Stambul, Ankara, İzmir, 89.
109 Raevskii, “Massovaia demonstratsiia sovetsko-turetskoi druzhby.”
In contrast, Nikulin, Raevskii, and other Soviet guests validated Ankara’s modernity through lists of its amenities: asphalt, electric lights, movie theatres, secular schools, and so on.

The *Heart of Turkey* visually contrasts crumbling villages with Ankara’s modernist architecture, alternating between halting “Oriental” music and optimistic symphonies. Held against the bleak stone villages and smoky alleys of “old Turkey,” Ankara’s metamorphosis into a modern state is rendered doubly clear.110 First from an aerial view, and then through a montage of buildings, viewers are taken on a tour of Ankara’s modernist architecture and broad avenues. Since becoming Turkey’s capital 10 years prior, Ankara was a physical representation of the Turkish modernist movement. Bozdoğan writes, “Architecture in early Republican Turkey can be looked at as a literally ‘concrete’ manifestation of [the Kemalist] vision.”111 One-by-one, the *Heart of Turkey* introduces the viewer to examples of modernist architecture, including the Ethnographic Museum, Ministry of Healthcare, National Assembly, İsmet Paşa Women’s Institute, and various scientific buildings. Finally, we see the Soviet embassy, one of city’s earliest and most “extreme” modernist buildings.112

Indeed, the Soviet Union and Turkey shared similar functionalist and modernist preoccupations, even hiring many of the same architects throughout the 1930s.113 Soviet visitors

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110 This trope, the “old versus the new” was employed extensively by the Kemalist regime’s own representations of Ankara. Bozdoğan, 67.
111 Ibid., 6.
113 In one of the paradoxes of Turkey’s simultaneous pursuit of Westernization and “Turkification,” many of the architects who designed Ankara’s modernist buildings were from Germany and Central Europe. Interestingly, a number of these architects—such as Bruno Taut, Wilhelm Lihotzsky, and Margarete Schutte-Lihotzky—also spent time in the Soviet Union, working on “utopian” projects in the 1930s. While this connection alone is not inherently meaningful (except, perhaps, as an avenue further research), it demonstrates a shared Turkish-Soviet predilection for the functionalist and modernist architecture of the period. *Sotsgorod: The Problem of Building Socialist Cities*, DVD, directed by Anna Abrahams; New York: First Run, 1995. Turkey eventually invited hundreds of Jewish scholars fleeing Nazi Europe to resettle in Ankara and Istanbul. These architects, engineers, etc. became teachers in the republic’s young institutions, and made an important impact on Turkey’s academic culture. See: Arnold Reisman, *Turkey’s Modernization: Refugees from Nazis and Atatürk’s Vision* (Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, 2005).
were quite taken with Ankara’s modern architecture, and reveled in its rejection of Ottoman forms. In Atatürk’s Presidential Palace, the pinkish Çankaya Köşkü, Nikulin detected “no hint of oriental splendor, nothing in common with the kiosks of Ottoman palaces…where are the marble and crystal canopies…of İstanbul’s DolmaBahçe Palace? Yes, this is a different country, or rather, a different epoch.”114 In Ankara’s pantheon of modernist architecture, the İsmet Paşa Girls’ Institute was a shining example—and a model for the army of Girls’ Institutes that would be built in later decades. In Nikulin’s mind, the institute would not look out of place in Berlin, Paris, or Moscow.115 The institute’s aesthetic modernism was compounded by its purpose: producing modern women, through training in proper nutrition, table manners, cooking, and other domestic and academic subjects.116 From a Soviet perspective, the İsmet Paşa’s Girls’ Institute was the symbolic “hearth of the liberated Turkish woman,” and as such, a testament to Ankara’s modernity.117

The “liberation” of the Turkish women was a persistent motif in Soviet depictions of the “new Turkey” and observers in both countries drew parallels between anti-veiling campaigns in Soviet Central Asia and Kemalist Turkey. In both contexts, efforts to de-veil and educate Muslim women became a principle arena for debating questions of religion, power, and citizenship.118 Deniz Kandiyoti, in “Gendering the Modern,” writes, “…the modernity of the

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115 Ibid., 95.
118 Ayça Alemdaroğlu provides the following summary: “In fact, the Kemalist elite considered veiled women to be an obstacle to the civilizing process, and aspired to introduce comprehensive reforms that reinforced legal changes in women’s position in society: the education of girls became mandatory; the participation of women in the labour market was encouraged, polygamy was abolished; and universal suffrage was mandated. However, despite these developments, the nationalist discourse imposed on women the duty of enlightened motherhood and ‘rationalized’ housekeeping, which provided the ultimate justification for their education.” Ayça Alemdaroğlu, “Politics of the Body and Eugenic Discourse in Early Republican Turkey,” *Body & Society* 11:61 (2005), 66.
new [Turkish] state was most eloquently signaled through images of women that became central to the iconography of the regime—parading in shorts and bearing the flag, in school or military uniform, or in evening dress...”

This statement could be seamlessly reproduced in the Soviet context, where the emancipation of women was central to the Bolshevik and then Soviet platform. In both countries, this “gendered modernity” was a variegated and controversial process—often placing women in new constraints and relegating them to “modern,” yet still unequal power structures. These processes have been the subject of an extensive body of literature, yet for the purposes of this thesis, it is sufficient to note that Soviet observers portrayed the “new Turkey” through a gendered framework.

In both print and visual depictions, the “new Turkey’s” transformation was evinced by its women. In the Heart of Turkey, long scenes portray healthy and cheerful women in lab coats, doing calisthenics in the sun, posing with their children in Ankara’s parks, and playing saxophones and violins. In nearly every scene, the women are unveiled and in Western clothing. Moreover, Iutkevich’s choice of a female to represent Turkey’s new generation is a revealing one. The unnamed character is a young patriot, dressed in a uniform, beret, and neck


120 For a comparison of Turkey, Iran, and the Soviet Union’s handling of gender reform and de-veiling, see: Adrienne Edgar, “Bolshevism, Patriarchy, and the Nation: The Soviet ‘Emancipation’ of Muslim Women in Pan-Islamic Perspective” Slavic Review 65:2 (2006): 252-272. Also, see: Vertov’s 1934 Three Songs about Lenin (Tri pesni o Lenine), which is explicit about Lenin’s role in saving Central Asia women from their dark “prisons,” via literacy, employment, and ideology.


122 The only exceptions are the female zeybek dancers, who are nonetheless sporting makeup and contented smiles.
handkerchief. Tellingly, she is a leader. Flanked by trumpets, drums, and flags, the girl welcomes Turkey’s youth to Ankara’s anniversary celebrations, as their trains converge in the capital. In this way, Iutkevich’s character is akin to the prolific trope of the nation as woman or goddess (for example, the French Marianne, Mother India, and in the Russian and Soviet context, *Rodina Mat’*). Yet, in Iutkevich’s portrayal, “Mother Turkey” is not a mother—she is a youth, in keeping with Soviet portrayals of Turkey as dynamic, fresh, and as we shall see, immature.

In Soviet print discourse, Turkey was represented in similarly gendered terms. In addition to being one of the greatest victories of the “new Turkey,” the liberation of the Turkish woman served as an allegory for the country’s escape from the “net of imperialism and fanaticism.” Reflecting on Ankara’s anniversary celebrations, Raevskii wrote, “In this grandiose demonstration, new Turkey’s women are participating right alongside the men. This speaks louder than words about the wonderful results…of Turkey’s emancipation and the close of the obsolete, old regime.” The veil was a representation of the old Turkey: dark, isolating, unhygienic, and in the early 1930s, a receding shadow. For Nikulin, the persistence of the veil in Ankara’s old quarters was the last foothold of the Ottoman Empire. In the *Heart of Turkey*, veiled women are seen walking through “old Turkey,” in a scene depicted as a flashback to the imperial era—the juxtaposition with Ankara’s learned and youthful female denizens is clear. Besides these figures, there is only one other subset of women in the film: young zeybek dancers.

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123 A wardrobe undeniably reminiscent of those worn in the Soviet Komsomol.


125 Raevskii, “Blestiashchii parad.” Esfir’ Il’inichna Shub (1894-1959), a Soviet filmmaker, was pleased to report that Turkish women worked together with men in Ankara’s tobacco and cement factories, and bathed unashamedly in the sea. Shub, 347-353. Shub, a colleague of Iutkevich, intended to direct a second film about Turkey, *New Turkey on the Move (Idet novaia Turtsiia)* in 1934. The film never materialized, a missed opportunity that Iutkevich blames on the “whims of a producer.” The degree this failure was a reflection of Soviet-Turkish relations is unknown and demands archival research. Iutkevich, “Volshebnitsa montazhnogo stola,” 17.

126 Nikulin, “Ankara.”
After their arrival to Ankara, Iutkevich depicts the Soviet delegation on a hill above Ankara, applauding a performance of zeybek dancing.\textsuperscript{127} Although the bulk of the film buttresses Turkey’s modernity, an intertitle introduces viewers to the “old, excellent art of the country.”\textsuperscript{128} While the men strike poses with swords, the women are in a half-circle, cheering and playing music. The camera repeatedly returns to a smiling, pretty woman in Anatolian folk dress—a symbol of Turkey’s pure, Anatolian heritage. Although never shown in tandem, these two women—the young patriot and zeybek dancer—represent Turkey’s modern future and pre-Ottoman, noble heritage.

In 1933, Soviet discourse reflected one of the early Republic’s persistent tensions: the dual pursuit of modernization (often indistinguishable from Westernization) and the creation of a Turkish nationalism. Following the country’s independence, the Kemalist regime rewrote notions of ethnicity, history, language, and “Turkishness,” a process accelerated by the 1923 population exchange (\textit{mübadele}) with Greece. By way of creating a unified, national Turkish identity, Kemalist reformers famously purged the Arabic and Persian vocabulary from the Turkish language, in a systematic pursuit of \textit{Öztürkçe}—“pure” Turkish. Additionally, in 1928, Turkey abandoned the Arabic-based Ottoman script in favor of its current Latin alphabet.\textsuperscript{129} Reformers in the early Republican period postulated a pre-Islamic Turkish civilization, with ancient roots in Anatolia far pre-dating the Ottoman Empire. In the 1930s, these notions took a eugenic turn, as state-sponsored scientists asserted the superiority of the Turkish race, and

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item Even the Western Anatolian zeybek dance came under the scrutiny of the early Republic’s modernizing impulse, as seen in attempts to “refine” zeybek through the introduction of Western clothing, choreography, and “orderliness.” Arzu Öztürkmen, “Modern Dance Alla Turca: Transforming Ottoman Dance in Early Republican Turkey” \textit{Dance Research Journal} 35:1 (2003), 38-60.
  \item Iutkevich, \textit{Ankara—Serdise Tursii}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
posited that Turkish was the Ur language, from which all others descended.\textsuperscript{130} As part of the clothing reforms, the regime discouraged ethnic costumes and Anatolia’s historic diversity—comprised of Armenians, Greeks, Lazes, Caucasian peoples, etc.—were actively subsumed into the Turkish moniker.

Intriguingly—particularly given the fervent nationalism of the reforms—Soviet observers in 1933 endorsed these ideas. In routing the imperialist aggressors, one article credited Atatürk with “restoring Turkey to her ethnographic limits.”\textsuperscript{131} In 1932, Nikolai Marr, the respected philologist, traveled to Turkey in a delegation of Soviet academics, along with Bartol’d, Anatolii Vasil’evich Lunarcharskii (1875-1933), and Aleksandr Nikolaevich Samoilovich (1881-1940). In a conversation with Atatürk that lasted 12 hours, Marr could not contain his enthusiasm for the Turkish project. Checking himself, Marr said to the Gazi, “Please forgive my vehemence. I am a scientist, and at the same time a dervish, possessed by science!” Marr argued that from the archeological evidence, “it [was] possible to establish as fact the existence of Turkish culture predating the cultures of Rome and Hellas on the shores of the Marmara and Aegean Seas.”\textsuperscript{132} Sharing the sentiment of many of his colleagues, Marr lamented the Western preoccupation with Persian and Arabic (which he deemed “dead” languages), while neglecting Turkish.\textsuperscript{133} Soviet commentators lauded the reformers’ return to a “democratic language,” whose deeper, simpler, and clearer vocabulary had paved the way for a national literature available to the masses—just as it had in Baku.\textsuperscript{134} One unnamed Soviet writer explained the education of women as a return to Turkey’s ancient customs—assumedly, prior to its corruption by foreign Islamic elements.\textsuperscript{135}

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\textsuperscript{130} Alemdaroğlu, 63.
\textsuperscript{131} “Desiat’ let turetskoi respubliki.”
\textsuperscript{132} Nikulin, \textit{Stambul, Ankara, Izmir}, 111.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{134} D. Magazinnik and Mikhail Mikhailov, “Iazyk i literature sovremennoi Turtsii,” \textit{Izvestiia}, November 11, 1933.
\textsuperscript{135} “Narodnoe obrazovane.”
\end{flushleft}
In his book *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey*, Şener Aktürk uses Turkey as an ideal example of the anti-ethnic regime—a system where ethnicity is not addressed in state policy and the “goal is the assimilation of people from many different ethnic backgrounds into a common national culture.”\(^\text{136}\) In contrast, the Soviet Union epitomized a multi-ethnic regime, by incorporating ethnic categories into its constitution, instituting a system of “affirmative action,” and structuring many administrative and geographic boundaries along ethnic lines.\(^\text{137}\) Despite the seeming differences between these categories, and hence, between Soviet and Turkish nationality policy, there are many parallels at a more granular level. In many of the Soviet Union’s republics—particularly in Central Asia—the Soviet state actively created and consolidated nationalities, by codifying their languages and drawing boundaries along constructed ethnic lines. National identity was depicted as a crucial stepping-stone from backwardness to communism, and could be accelerated through Soviet science.\(^\text{138}\) After engineering nationalities, these were brought into the multi-ethnic empire fold. From this perspective, the Soviet enthusiasm for Kemalist notions of “Turkishness” become clear. At least at a superficial level, the Soviet state was engaged in much the same project: providing literacy to the masses, encouraging the growth of “national” languages, and consolidating “minor” nations into larger categories.

However, it is important to reiterate that Soviet discourse did not frame Turkish nationalism in the same terms—as a necessary step on the path toward communism. If these

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\(^{136}\) Şener Aktürk, *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 17.

\(^{137}\) Ibid., 15. The third option, exemplified by Germany, is the mono-ethnic regime, where citizenship and ethnicity have been historically linked and exclusionary. For the origin of the Soviet Union’s “affirmative action” designation, see: Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2001).

observations were made, it did not enter the public articulation of Soviet-Turkish relations. Additionally, the Soviet and Turkish elite rarely evoked the common origins between Turkey and the Turkic peoples of Central Asia. Although Marr and his colleagues were Turcologists, there were no delegations of Turkic peoples sent to Turkey, and as far as I am aware, Turks did not travel to Central Asia on official exchanges.\textsuperscript{139} While this may seem like a missed opportunity, historical fears of pan-Turkism help to explain why these bonds were not pursued by the Soviet state. Although historians such as Khalid and Reynolds have demonstrated that pan-Turkism was never a legitimate threat to the Russian Empire or Soviet Union, fears of pan-Turkic collaboration and Turkish interference in Central Asia gripped the ruling elite’s imagination.\textsuperscript{140} For this reason, Soviet discourse is largely absent of statements elucidating Soviet-Turkish cross-national ethnic ties, as might otherwise be expected.\textsuperscript{141}

The Soviet embrace of the Turkish nationalizing project is particularly striking when compared to the criticism extended by Western publications during the same period. In his \textit{Foreign Affairs} article, “Ten Years of the Turkish Republic,” Hans Kohn writes, “The Turkish Republic has produced its own scientific theory, or perhaps it would be correct to say its own legend, regarding the past of the Turkish race, and it has seen to it that this is taught as dogma in the Turkish schools. This too is a mere youthful imitation of other nations.”\textsuperscript{142} Jean Kervil presents a similar perspective to his French audience, in the journal \textit{Frontières}. According to Kervil, Turkey “faithfully copies the evolutions of Europe,” including, regrettably, the “boldest

\textsuperscript{139} The only explicit connection made in 1933 occurred when the Soviet Academy of Sciences sent Turkey a collection of works concerning Altaic cultures. This present will be discussed in the next chapter, in the context of Soviet cultural diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{140} See: Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, \textit{The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983). For Khalid and Reynold’s arguments, see: “Backwardness and the Quest for Civilization” and \textit{Shattering Empires}.

\textsuperscript{141} For example, it is unlikely that the \textit{Heart of Turkey} was ever shown in Central Asia. Unfortunately, there is not enough published data to confirm or deny this supposition.

\textsuperscript{142} Kohn, 148.
absurdities” of German racial theory and racist nationalism. “The Turks, it seems, scattered throughout the entire world, in Europe, in Russia, in Persia, in China…Is this the thesis of extremist minorities? Not at all. It is, on the contrary, espoused…by the official party…”

Like the Soviet Union, observers in the United States and Europe documented Atatürk’s reforms and Turkey’s attempted entrée into the modern world, particularly in the weeks and months surrounding the Turkish anniversary. Although this survey is hardly comprehensive, there is a palpable difference in tone between Western and Soviet discourse. First, European and American articles emphasized Turkey’s unflattering borrowings from Western civilization, while the Soviet press concentrated on Turkish self-reliance. Kohn considers Turkey’s reforms an imitation, urging readers not to forget that “it is from the west that the east has learned his new will to self-assertion; and it is by means which are in use in the west that the east is now striving to liberate itself from the domination of the more advanced nations.” Although Kervil acknowledges Turkey’s industrial progress and social reforms, he sardonically thanks Allah for turning Turkey into Muhammad’s paradise. The Fribourg University professor Max Turmann detects European influence in Turkey’s material, intellectual, and moral life, and argues that Turkey’s contemporary successes are due to the “generosity of its creditors, who abandoned 92% of its debts.” Turmann is nonetheless impressed by the liberated status of Turkey’s women, and reprimands Switzerland and France for allowing themselves to lag behind Turkey in this regard.

Additionally, Western writers emphasized the continuity in Turkish society. Despite ten years of reform, the argument read, Turkey was ultimately unchanged. J. Walter Collins, writing

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143 Kervil, 276.
144 Ibid., 277.
145 Kohn, 151.
146 Max Turmann, “Un pays qui s’est transformé en dix ans,” L’Ouest-Éclair, November 27, 1933.
for the New York Times, stresses this continuity. Although the “Turk is fast learning to compete—often successfully—with the foreigner,” his modernity is surface-level. Turkish families now possess modern amenities, yet they rarely use them, choosing instead to sit on divans, go to the hamam, flatter each other for hours, and gender segregate their homes. Later, after the Heart of Turkey reached the United States, the Pittsburgh Press published a United Press article, stating, “It is, as yet, only a very thin layer of the nation that has been impregnated with the reforms of the Kemalist regime. Conditions…of the nine or ten million peasants, have undergone hardly a change. Their work and life differs very little from that of the times of Suleyman the Great.” In this way, Turkey’s reformers—often compared to Mussolini—were aping Europe, and despite many successes, remained fundamentally the same.

Particularly when compared to Western skepticism, the Soviet endorsement of the Kemalist project—even its most nationalistic tendencies—gratified the Turkish regime. In their discourse, Soviet commentators portrayed Turkey as an industrial, thoroughly modernized country. Rather than an aberration, this depiction rested on a legacy of “anti-Orientalist” scholarship from the late imperial period. In the early 1930s, the Kemalist and Soviet projects aligned, both in their goals and in the language they used to express them. Soviet speechmakers, writers, and filmmakers articulated Soviet-Turkish relations through this lens, creating an ideologically neutral—yet powerful—common vocabulary. The next chapter will explore how this conception of a shared modernity was mobilized in Soviet cultural diplomacy, as a means of extending, legitimizing, and broadcasting Soviet influence abroad.

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148 “‘Ankara, Heart of Turkey,’ Film is Hit with Natives,” Pittsburgh Press, October 1, 1934.
V. CHAPTER II: Friendship, Sponsorship, and Soviet Cultural Diplomacy

_Soviet Cultural Diplomacy in the Interwar Period_

In the early 1930s, the Soviet Union was at the height of its international appeal. The first Five Year Plan was yielding world-record industrial growth; the country was normalizing its diplomatic relations with Western Europe and the United States (which recognized the Soviet Union in 1933); Soviet arts drew international appreciation; and the most violent Great Purges and “Great Fatherland War” still hung in the future.\(^{149}\) Meanwhile, the West faced economic collapse, unemployment, and shrinking GDP figures. Whereas the “anarchy of the market seemed to be destroying the West…the rationality of the Plan was creating a new world in the East.”\(^{150}\) Beginning in the 1920s, the Soviet Union had created an extensive apparatus for broadcasting these accomplishments abroad, welcoming intellectuals, diplomats, and workers’ delegations from around the world. Organizations such as the All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (_Vsesoiuznoe obshchestvo kul’turnoi sviazi s zagranitsei_, VOKS) and Intourist presented their guests an optimistic and ideal society, touting the successes of the Great Socialist Experiment. For the Soviet Union in the interwar period, more than national prestige was at stake. Rather, the entire socialist system was predicated on its innate superiority over capitalism. To demonstrate the viability of the Marxist-Leninist project, the

\(^{149}\) Of course, beyond the Soviet metropole and international limelight, life was hardly stable. Collectivization-induced hardships racked Central Asia, the Ukrainian famine of 1932 and 1933 killed millions, and periodic purges struck artists, filmmakers, and party members. David-Fox writes, “Profound and troubling questions are raised by the central fact that the height of Western admiration…coincided most [sic] repressive phase of Soviet communism—the Stalinist 1930s.” Michael David-Fox, _Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921-1941_ (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 2. For an anthology of these events, see: Bohdan Klid and Alexander J. Motyl, eds., _The Holodomor Reader: A Sourcebook on the Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine_ (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 2012).

Soviet Union had to establish itself as a model of economic, social, and ideological development—an alternative to that of the capitalist West.

From the early days of this project, the Turkish elite were a primary audience of the Soviet Union’s missionary impulse. Soon after VOKS’ creation in 1925, Turkish industrial experts and “representatives of Turkish women” accepted invitations to visit the Soviet Union. Ol’ga Davydovna Kameneva (1883-1941), the first head of VOKS and Lev Trotsky’s sister, welcomed the delegates, saying, “…the [revolutionary] Turkish nation, perhaps more than any other, will be able to understand…our revolutionary conquests, our new legislation, our way-of-life, and all of our accomplishments in cultural and societal life.”

What followed was an intense period of Soviet aid to Turkey and active “cultural diplomacy,” a term defined by David-Fox as “the systematic inclusion of a cultural dimension to foreign relations, or the formal allocation and resources to culture within foreign policy” and “the entire complex of missions the Soviet Union directed at the foreigners classified as members of the intelligentsia, both inside and outside of the USSR.” Writing in 1960, Frederick Barghoorn takes a more forceful position, labeling this facet of Soviet foreign policy a “cultural offensive”—a project designed to expand the power of the Soviet Union by exploiting fears of war, disseminating a positive image of the Soviet project, and gaining prestige with foreigner governments.

Insightfully, Baghoorn locates Soviet cultural diplomacy beyond a straightforward pitch for communism. Instead, he argues that the Soviet “cultural offensive” was most effective when elevating and flattering the prestige of other countries:

It seems likely…that the communists reap their richest rewards…not by display of their own achievements but by courteous and sympathetic appreciation of other

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151 TsGAOR, f. 5283, op. 4, ed. khr, 7 (1), l. 104, quoted in Sverchevskaia, 16.
152 David-Fox, 14; 16.
countries…this is a formula certain to win friends, particularly among peoples and groups…that have not overcome their resentment against colonialism.\textsuperscript{154}

Although Barghoorn’s book addresses Soviet-Turkish relations only momentarily—when referring to athlete exchanges in the 1950s—this description provides an apt model for understanding the utility behind Soviet depictions of the “new Turkey.”

Chapter 1 of this thesis demonstrated that Soviet discourse aligned with the Kemalist regime’s own propaganda, legitimizing notions of a Turkey as modern, industrial, yet consummately “Turkish” state. This chapter will build upon this argument, by probing the self-referential and self-promotional utility of Soviet discourse. While testifying to the “new Turkey’s” modernity, Soviet observers linked the Soviet and Turkish legacies. Essentially, Turkey’s narrative of development was intertwined with—and an offshoot—of the Soviet Union’s. Turkey’s anniversary celebrations were therefore equally a celebration of Soviet influence in Turkey and a reflection of the Soviet Union’s own advancements. Secondly, Soviet observers emphasized their own role in initiating, fostering, and preserving Turkey’s accomplishments, as longtime sympathizers, witnesses, and sponsors of the Kemalist regime. Although this “friendship” (\textit{druzhba}) was framed in remarkably interpersonal terms, it was not one of parity. In the technology, science, and art, the Soviet Union was the teacher, sponsor, and role model, while Turkey was the beneficiary. Lastly, this chapter will argue that the public narrative of Soviet-Turkish “friendship” was directed toward four main audiences: Turkey, the “West,” the Soviet Union’s Eastern neighbors, and the Soviet citizenry. Underlying each message was an attempt to project an image of the Soviet Union as an advanced, influential, trustworthy, and \textit{friendly} state.

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 20-21.
This chapter will begin with a brief analysis of the vocabulary employed in the Soviet Union’s cultural diplomacy toward Turkey—namely, *druzhba*. Then, this chapter will discuss the three self-attributed “roles” Soviet observers claimed for themselves in the discourse surrounding Turkey’s 10th year anniversary: sympathizer, witness, and sponsor of Turkish developments. In conclusion, this chapter will discuss the multidirectionality of this discourse, and its implications for our understanding of Soviet-Turkish relations and, more broadly, Soviet interwar cultural diplomacy.

*Interpreting the Interpersonal Lexicon of Soviet-Turkish Relations*

On October 27, soon after arriving in Ankara, the Soviet delegation settled into the Ankara Palace hotel. İnönü and Voroshilov inaugurated the welcome reception with short speeches, praising one another’s countries, leaders, and citizenry. The speeches were fairly typical of those delivered by the guests and hosts throughout their stay—focusing on industry, cooperation, peace, and development. Additionally, they embodied the interpersonal framing of Soviet-Turkish relations, and in particular, the centrality of the word “friendship.” Combined, İnönü and Voroshilov used the terms “friendship” and “friendly” 30 times in their short addresses. In Soviet discourse in 1933, Turkey and Soviet Union were anthropomorphized as two dear friends, who struggled together through all odds. Among other superlatives, this “friendship” (*druzhba*) was sincere (*iskrenniaia*), genuine (*podlinnaia*), deep (*glubokaia*), close (*tesnaia*), and heartfelt (*prochuvstvovannaia*).

In Soviet cultural diplomacy, the word *druzhba* was applied liberally. Foreign visitors to Moscow were dubbed “friends of the Soviet Union” and “friendship treaties” were signed with

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Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia, Germany, and of course, with Turkey.\textsuperscript{156} David-Fox, drawing from Carl Schmitt’s famous “friend-enemy” conception of international relations, argues that Soviet policymakers viewed foreigners on a graded scale between “enemy and friend.” In his discussion of West-Russian cultural encounters, David-Fox writes, “On both sides, an evolving, yet surprisingly formal, code of “friendship” assumed importance, and the Soviet side ensured that its most fundamental precondition was public praise for the Soviet experiment.”\textsuperscript{157} This dynamic is relevant for this chapter’s analysis of Soviet cultural diplomacy in Turkey. Although much of the enthusiasm about Soviet-Turkish 	extit{druzhba} was surely genuine—and, as the previous chapter demonstrates, informed by perceptions of a shared experience with modernization—there were preconditions. Soviet-Turkish relations were predicated on cultural, scientific, and economic connections, in which the Soviet Union was the dominant partner. Understanding this contingency to Soviet-Turkish 	extit{druzhba} helps to explain its enthusiasm in the early 1930s, and its disintegration following World War II. As Stalinism entered its most caustic and xenophobic phases and Turkey turned increasingly West, the preconditions of Soviet-Turkish 	extit{druzhba} were violated.

\textit{The Soviet Union as Sympathizer, Witness, and Sponsor}

Amidst three days of parades, ceremonies, and street side theater performances, Ankara’s 10\textsuperscript{th} year anniversary celebrations climaxed on October 29, when Atatürk ascended the parade ground stage. Dressed in a tuxedo and extinguishing a cigarette, Atatürk approached the podium

\textsuperscript{156} 	extit{Druzhba} had been a public fixture in Soviet-Turkish relations since its official inception with the 1921 Turco-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood, later, the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. Other interwar Soviet “friendship treaties” include: the 1921 Iranian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, the 1921 Agreement between the RSFSR and the Mongolian People’s Republic Concerning Establishment of Friendly Relations, the 1921 Treaty of Friendship between the Ukrainian SSR and Turkey, and the 1926 German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. Robert Slusser and Jan Triska, \textit{A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957} (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959), 1-529.

\textsuperscript{157} David-Fox, 3.
and delivered his anniversary speech—one of the most famous in Turkish history. Speaking over one of Iutkevich’s audio recorders, Atatürk conjured a teleological mission of progress. Although Turkey had “accomplished great things” in the last decade, its brightest period lay ahead. Turkey was on a linear path toward modernity, civilization, and prosperity:

We are going to advance our country to the level of the most prosperous and the most civilized countries of the world... We shall attempt to raise our national culture above the level of contemporary civilization. Therefore, we think and shall continue to think not according to the lethargic mentality of past centuries, but according to the concepts of speed and action of our century... And because the torch the Turkish nation holds in her hand and in her mind, while marching on the road of progress and civilization, is positive science.158

As Atatürk spoke these words to the gathered masses, Voroshilov’s delegation stood only a few feet to the Gazi’s left—the only foreigners on the stage.159 These optics likely made an impression on the Heart of Turkey’s Soviet audience. Whether premeditated or not, the sentiment of Atatürk’s speech held its own meaning to Soviet observers. Who better to help the Turks “raise their national culture” than the Soviets, who were taking the same bounds toward modernity? Turkey was on the rails toward greatness—and it was the Soviet Union that would help it get there.

In fact, according to some listeners of Atatürk’s speech, it was the Soviet example that had placed Turkey on that path in the first place. Contributors to the Soviet press and the delegates in Turkey perceived a direct connection—and lineage—between the October Revolution and Turkey’s eventual independence. In their writings and speeches, they argued that the Bolshevik victory over imperialism paved the way for all Eastern independence

159 Boris Izakov, “Privetstvennaiia demonstratsiia sovsism delegatam,” Pravda, October 31, 1933.
moments, Turkey’s included. On October 28, the front page of Izvestiia declared, “The fact…that new, young Turkey is celebrating the tenth year of its existence today was made possible only because…of the triumphant proletarian revolution in Russia…which blasted the strength of imperialism and created new conditions for the development of formerly dependent and oppressed nations.” The Turkish project was enabled, and inspired by, the anti-imperial accomplishment of the Bolsheviks.

Starting with this auspicious beginning, Soviet commentators established their country as a sympathetic kin to Turkish history. In the discourse generated around Turkey’s anniversary celebrations, Soviet observers located Turkey and the Soviet Union in the same anti-imperial primordium. Both countries had broken the hold of foreign powers, their imperial despots, and the clergy. Turkey and the Soviet Union were not considered successors of the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Instead, they were conquerors who had liquidated the tsar and sultan’s regimes, who then struggled together against common imperialist foes. Thanks to this shared anti-imperialist heritage and shared modernization objectives, Soviets possessed a unique understanding of the new Turkey’s trials and accomplishments. Nikulin, the journalist and author, argued, “[The Soviet traveler in Turkey] sympathizes with much that an ordinary foreign tourist doesn’t understand. We understood [Turkey’s] fight for political independence, and we understand her latest phase—[the] fight for economic independence.” Apparently, these similarities were so keen that while exploring Ankara’s modern quarters, Nikulin had to remind himself that he was not at home in the Soviet Union.

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162 Nikulin, “Ankara.” In contrast, Nikulin pokes fun at the (presumably Western) “lover of oriental charms” whose nostrils seeks the fragrant “Asian bazaar” of old Turkey.
163 Nikulin, Stambul, Ankara, Izmir, 94.
Soviet audiences were introduced to a long narrative of mutual understanding, with the Soviet Union as an affirming witness to the Turkish project; the Soviet Union had been at Turkey’s side since the beginning. In Izvestiia, Karakhan echoed the statements made by other delegates, “We in the USSR, have always paid deep attention—and continue to pay attention to—Turkey’s successes in various economic, cultural, and scientific fields.” The Soviet Union was Turkey’s “oldest and most genuine” and the first to recognize Turkish independence. Soviet speechmakers reminded listeners that the Bolsheviks supported Atatürk’s forces with equipment, rubles, and moral support, even before Turkey’s inception. Again, Ankara served as the site and symbol of the “new Turkey,” and the longtime Soviet presence in the city represented an unwavering friendship. In the Heart of Turkey, Iutkevich points to this legacy, informing viewers that the Soviet embassy is “one of the oldest buildings of new Ankara.” In this instance, the Heart of Turkey was not embellishing. Established in 1921, the Bolshevik embassy was Ankara’s first. This symbol of official recognition was particularly salient when compared to the Western powers’ general ambivalence to the city, nostalgia for İstanbul, and refusal to relocate their embassies to the new capital; Britain did not move her embassy until 1929.

Zeynep Kezer, an urban historian, writes, “By refusing to move to Ankara, foreign governments were signaling, in no uncertain terms, that they did not regard Turkey to be their peer in the international arena. Nothing could be a worse blow for the nationalists…” Conversely, the Bolshevik’s early embrace of the city was arguably a major contribution to Soviet-Turkish interwar partnership.

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164 Karakhan, “Sovetskii Soiuz i Turtsiia.”
165 Iutkevich, Ankara—Serdishe Turtsii.
166 To encourage the relocation to Ankara, the Turkish government extended free land to embassies, and began to isolate the İstanbul diplomatic scene, politically and economically. Britain’s reticence to acknowledge the new Turkish capital was a major sticking point between the two countries. Kezer, 87-88.
167 Ibid., 87.
A decade later, Soviet commentators wanted to make sure that Turkey did not forget who its original supporters were. At a reception in Atatürk’s Presidential Palace, Surits, who had been in Turkey since 1923, described himself and his embassy colleagues as “living witnesses” to Turkey’s “path of progress.” The journalist Raevskii, who first traveled to “free Turkey” four years prior, established himself as a firsthand observer of Ankara’s transformation from a dream to a reality. Where there used to be miles of vacant lots, freshly demarcated by asphalt roads, there was now a city. “Moreover, a modern, well-equipped city… With the exception of the Soviet Union, loftier sites cannot be seen anywhere in Europe.”

Soviet discourse in 1933 stressed the Soviet presence in Ankara, detailing lists of seesawing exchanges between Moscow and Ankara—of which the 1933 delegation was merely the latest (though a particularly bright) example. Each delegate to Ankara—whether a musician, politician, publicist, linguist, athlete, soldier, or economic specialist—was a witness to Turkey’s growth and representative of “Soviet-Turkish friendship.”

Additionally, the speechmakers, writers, and filmmakers involved in the delegation were clear that Soviet support for Turkey went beyond sympathy. In industry, technology, science, and cinema, Soviet commentators established the Soviet Union as the “new Turkey’s” sole sponsor. While praising Turkish economic independence, Soviet participants emphasized their own role in enabling—and serving as a model for—Turkish growth. In this way, economic aid complemented Soviet cultural diplomacy. Particularly in the case of Turkey—where Soviet aid was generally interest free and with few long-term trade guarantees—the motivation was not economic profit. By outfitting the Kemalist government with Soviet industrial equipment and

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170 Karakhan, “Sovetskii Soiuz i Turtsia.”
savvy at great cost, the Soviet regime was proclaiming its status as an international model, a
superior alternative to capitalism, and a valuable friend.

The first period of Soviet economic aid occurred during the Turkish War for
Independence (1919-1923), in the form of weapons, manufacturing equipment, and rubles. The
amount of aid delivered by Moscow was likely around 10 million gold rubles, although there is
scholarly disagreement and archival contradictions about the exact figure.171 The 1933
delagation to Ankara occurred during the second peak of Soviet-Turkish economic cooperation,
and signified a major expansion of Soviet involvement in Turkey’s economy. A year prior,
during the Turkish delegation’s visit to Moscow, İnönü and Stalin had agreed on an $8,000,000
credit deal, in which the Soviet Union would sell Turkey industrial equipment, interest free.172
At the time, this was the largest grant ever extended by the Soviet Union, and the largest ever
received by Turkey. In both periods, the size of the Soviet aid packages is a testament to the
prominence accorded to Turkey by Soviet policymakers. Moreover, they occurred in moments
of fiscal stress in the Soviet Union. In 1923, the young Soviet Union was still reeling from the
economic devastation of the Russian Civil War (1918-1922), and in 1932 the “Soviet Union was
failing to meet payments on its own import of industrial goods from abroad.”173 In fact, the
Soviet Union was purchasing much of its own equipment from the United States, while
advertising itself to Turkey and others as an industrial innovator and equipment provider.174 Yet
despite these difficulties, the Soviet economy in the early 1930s appeared to be outperforming its
Western counterparts, notwithstanding the worldwide effects of the Great Depression.175

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172 According to one American correspondent, the Soviet Union offered even more credit, exceeding what was
deemed necessary by the Turkish regime. “Russia Gives Turks $8,000,000 Credit,” *New York Times*, May 8, 1932.
174 Baghoorn, 53.
175 Mark Edele argues that beneath the figures of growth, the Soviet economy was actually underperforming and
defined by scarcity. Among other existential defects, Edele points to policy fragmentation, graft, inconsistency,
This detail was not lost on Turkey’s policy makers. “The economic crisis of the thirties in the capitalist world…gave a sharp impetus to state intervention in Turkey…The Soviet Union, with its system of state control, seemed to have escaped the crisis, and the Kemalists saw it as a model that might usefully be copied in certain areas of the economy.”\textsuperscript{176} Observers in the Soviet Union were aware of this potential, and actively encouraged an expansion of Turkish industry, predicated on the Soviet model. In 1933, Karakhan was adamant that “Turkey cannot be indifferent to successes of the Soviet Union, in both the completion of the first Five-Year Plan and the implementation of the second. These successes amplify the international significance of the USSR…and are broadening the cooperation between the two countries.”\textsuperscript{177} Accordingly, Moscow invited delegates of Turkish politicians and economic experts to tour collective farms (kolhozy) and industrial complexes across the Soviet Union. Soon, Soviet engineers were helping Turkey to develop its own Five-Year plan—the first outside of the Soviet Union. In March 1933, the Commissariat of Heavy Industry created the Turkstroi division, in order to manage the export of industrial equipment, train Turkish specialists, and oversee the construction of textile plans in Nazilli and Kayseri.\textsuperscript{178} Additionally, Turkstroi was intended as a channel for intergovernmental dialogue, economic exchange, and an assurance that Turkey use Soviet credit only for purchasing equipment originating in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{179} Hirst, convincingly tracing the parallel growth of Soviet and Turkish statism, writes, “State-led development on the European inadequate supply, prison labor, and a culture of personal favors. Of course, many of these problems were unknown to outside observers, and never penetrated through the state’s propagandistic veneer of success. Mark Edele, \textit{Stalinist Society, 1928-1953} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 193-210.\textsuperscript{176} Feroz Ahmad, \textit{The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975} (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), 3.\textsuperscript{177} Karakhan, “Sovetskii Soiuz i Turtsiia.”\textsuperscript{178} Hirst, “Europa’s Discontent,” 242.\textsuperscript{179} “Pis’mo Zamestitelia Narodnogo Komissara Inostrannyykh Del SSSR Polnomochnomu Predstaviteliu SSSR i Turtsiia Z. Suritsu, March 27, 1933,” in vol. 16 of \textit{Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR}, ed. F. P. Dolia et al. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literature, 1970), 199.
periphery was not new, but this was the first time that it had been so prominently collaborative.”

In their writings and speeches, Soviet observers in 1933 emphasized the centrality of Soviet aid in Turkish industry, and contrasted their support with the West’s supposed obstruction. Several articles in the Soviet press refer to an unnamed international economic conference, where Western delegates demanded a cessation of Turkish industry, in order to preserve its agricultural heritage. The Soviet argument had traction with the Turkish leadership. İnönü was frustrated with the West’s disinterest, and claimed that the Soviet Union was “the only country that supported the Turkish state’s program of industrialization.”

Despite Turkey’s increasing economic independence, Soviet commentators warned Turkey that the battle was not yet won. Only through a closer relationship with the Soviet Union could Turkish leaders avoid the threat of “foreign capital influence” and economic instability.

For Soviet commenters in 1933, economic partnership went hand-in-hand with scientific exchange. In the interwar period, Soviet cultural diplomacy was not solely the purview of VOKS and Intourist. Rather, “culture” was interpreted broadly to include scientific and academic exchange. During the interwar period, the Soviet Union sought to establish itself as a world scientific leader; in fact, Stalinist society was predicated on the notion of the socialist project as a rational, scientific reordering of human life. Under the Bolshevik and then Soviet government, academic, scientific, and health establishments were subsumed under the state apparatus, and became instruments for the implementation of the state’s agenda.

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181 Among others, see: Karakhan, “Sovetskii Soiuz i Turtsiia” and Nikulin, “Ankara.”
183 “Desiat’ let Turetskoi Respubliki.”
the Academy of Sciences and Ministry of Health played an active role in cultural diplomacy. To paraphrase Atatürk, the Soviet Union was the promethean “torchbearer of positive science.” Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey and the Soviet Union engaged in several instances of scientific exchange. The Soviet discourse surrounding Turkey’s 10th year anniversary referred to these moments in their narrative of Soviet-Turkish relations, and called for further cooperation between Soviet and Turkish scientists. However, as in previous examples, this cooperation was implicitly unidirectional: Turkey had much to gain from Soviet science.

Soviet discourse in the early 1930s was complimentary of the advancements Turkey had already taken in the sciences. The *Heart of Turkey* leads viewers through Turkey’s newly constructed scientific and medical institutes, where young men and women glide between rows of beakers and lab equipment. In a public telegram to the Turkish government, Aleksandr Petrovich Karpinskii (1847-1936), the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, congratulated Atatürk for laying a “solid foundation for the development of science,” and expressed his hopes for continued contacts between Turkish and Soviet scientists. Samoilovich, a turcologist and first chairman of the Academy of Sciences’ Kazakh branch, articulated similar sentiments. In an interview with *Izvestiia*, Samoilovich enumerated Ankara’s growing academic infrastructure (including a science academy and library, central museum, and state archive), and expressed the Leningrad All-Union Academy of Sciences’ desire to build a library of Soviet scholarship in Turkey. Perhaps as a step toward that goal, the academy’s anthropology and ethnography institute sent Turkey an anniversary present that included 240

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185 Barghoorn, 32.
works on Altaic cultures, photography albums, copies of documents from the Hermitage, and images of the Soviet Union’s Turkic peoples.\textsuperscript{187}

The Turkish 10\textsuperscript{th} year anniversary coincided with the publication of *Agricultural Turkey* (*Zemledel’cheskaia Turtsiia*), a tome compiled by Petr Mikhailovich Zhukovskii (1888-1975) as the result of three excursions to Anatolia. Between 1925 and 1927, with the help of scientists from the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture, Zhukovskii’s team collected botanical samples, as well as topological, geological, climatological, and ethnographic data. The end result is an illustrated and remarkably detailed work, which Zhukovskii hoped would provide Turkey with a “useful, practical, and theoretical basis for developing effective crop production.”\textsuperscript{188} In 1933, the tome was incorporated into the Soviet Union’s celebration of Turkish independence, both physically (Karakan presented a copy to the rector of Ankara’s agriculture institute) and discursively. Soviet newspapers published advertisements, reviews, and a retrospective by the author. Speaking with *Izvestiia*, Zhukovkii delivered a list of Soviet scientific accomplishments, and their potential contribution to Turkey’s agricultural, technological, and economic development. Additionally, he laid out a vision for cultivating new crops in Anatolia, which could capitalize on the region’s climate and soil.\textsuperscript{189} For Zhukovskii, Soviet science could fill in the gaps in Turkey’s agriculture and open a new era of research in the country.

In his review of *Agricultural Turkey*, Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov (1887-1943), president of the All-Union Geographic Society, was fervent about the responsibility—and unique ability—of Soviet scientists to unlock the cultural and biological riches of Turkey. Whereas the Western

colonialists had exploited Anatolia, Vavilov sees a Soviet role in reconstructing and modernizing
Turkish agriculture practices. This anti-Western tone is amplified when Vavilov repeatedly
emphasizes the Anatolian origins of many of Europe’s own crops—“facts which were first
determined by Soviet science.”190 Zhukovskii’s book proved the contributions of Soviet science,
both for Turkey and the international scientific community.

In his introduction to the book, Karakhan situates Zhukovskii’s expeditions into a larger
narrative of Soviet-Turkish scientific exchange, informing readers that Turkish scientists have
traveled throughout the Soviet Union and top Soviet academics made research expeditions to
Turkey.191 Notably, there is an asymmetry in each of these exchanges. Turkish delegates were
invited to learn from the Soviet Union, while Soviet delegates sought to learn about Turkey. In
Soviet discourse, Soviet scientists were the experts, advisors, and researchers, while Turkish
scientists were the students. Although never put in these frank terms, the unidirectional nature of
Soviet-Turkish scientific exchange demonstrates self-aggrandizing and missionary quality of
Soviet “scientific cultural diplomacy” in Turkey.

This disparity is also seen in the Soviet Union’s artistic and musical outreaches.

Following his fact-finding journey to Turkey, Zarkhi spoke to Kino about the rudimentary
quality of the young Turkish film industry’s studios, actors, editing skills, and film equipment.
However, what Turkey lacked in expertise, it compensated for with passion and hunger for
cinema. Zarkhi reported that Soviet films had a tremendous influence on Turkish cinema, and
Turks were eager for further exposure to the Soviet Union’s principle art form. Zarkhi’s
statements seem somewhat exaggerated—a doubt that is confirmed when he admits that beyond

190 Nikolai Vavilov, “Rol’ sovetskoi nauki v izuchenii sel’skogo khoziaistva Turtsii,” Izvestiia, October 30, 1933.
191 Karakhan, “Sovetskiii Soiuz i Turtsiia,” introduction to Zemledel’cheskaia Turtsiia: Aziatskaia chast’—Anatoliia,
by Petr Zhukovskii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo kolkhoznoi i sovkhoznoi literatury, 1933), xv.
Road to Life (Putevka v zhizn’), Turkish cinemas screened few Soviet films. Nonetheless, Zarkhi’s optimism in Turkish interest remains intact and he concludes, “Turkish theatre is waiting for our plays; [Turkish] cinematography is waiting for our pictures; Turkish writers are translating Soviet authors and want their works to be translated into Russian.” Zarkhi’s conversation about Turkish cinema is equally (if not predominantly) a discussion of Soviet film, and the contribution it can make to the “various branches of Turkish art.” Zarkhi was quite taken with “modern Turkey” (sovremenaia Turtsiia), and returned to the Soviet Union with a self-appointed commission to elevate Turkish cinema.

Although Zarkhi’s vision of The Man Who Did Not Kill never materialized, the Heart of Turkey represents a unique moment in the history of Soviet film and cultural diplomacy. To my knowledge, it was the first feature-length documentary shot outside of the Soviet Union, and the first produced in conjunction with a foreign government. As such, the Heart of Turkey is an underrepresented hallmark of Soviet cinema, in both English and Russian language scholarship. Beginning in the Russian Civil War, film was the powerhouse of Bolshevik, and then Soviet, culture. Lenin himself provided the industry with an enduring slogan, when he famously stated, “Cinema for us is the most important of the arts.” Particularly in its earlier decades, Soviet cinema was regarded “not as an entertainment medium, but primarily as a specific means of

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192 Directed by Nikolai Vladimirovich Ekk (1902-1976), Road to Life was the first Soviet feature length sound film, and one of the Soviet Union’s early cinematic successes abroad. For the film (which was released in 26 countries), Ekk won the Best Director award at the 1932 Venice Film Festival. Peter Rollberg, Historical Dictionary of Russian and Soviet Cinema (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2009), 210. That said, the Soviet Union had an indirect influence on Turkish cinema. Many of Turkey’s filmmakers were educated in the Soviet Union, and although French, German, and American films were the staples in Turkish cinemas, the Soviet influence was clear to observers at the time. In a report for the State Department, Eugene Hinkle, a secretary in the American embassy in Ankara, wrote, “Among foreign film techniques, it is undoubtedly the Russian type of film which has made the greatest appeal in Ankara… Turkish scenario writers and directors have imitated Russian methods.” Eugene Hinkle, “The Film in Government Propaganda, 1930,” in US Diplomatic Documents on Turkey: The Turkish Cinema in the Early Republican Years, ed. Rifat Bali (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2007), 40.
193 “Film’a o Turtsii.”
194 Ibid.
195 Roth-Ey, 25.
channeling ideas and images to the viewer: an instrument of propaganda.” In 1928, the Party Conference on Cinema solidified this policy: “Hence the socio-political content of Soviet cinema amounts to propaganda through the depiction of the new socialist elements in the economy, in social relations, in everyday life and in the personality of man…to the dissemination of general knowledge and international education of the masses…” This conception of “the masses” included the entire planet. Through cinema, the Soviet Union could export its cultural and ideological influence—“the royal road to the radiant future for not only Soviets, but for people everywhere.” Although cinema had been under party control since 1929, the early 1930s saw increasing regulation of the film industry, its incorporation into the cultural diplomacy apparatus, and the codification of “socialist realism.” The Heart of Turkey was produced in the midst of these changes, when cinema was increasingly censored (often by Stalin himself) and employed as an instrument of state policy.

After receiving Moscow’s approval, Iutkevich brought the Heart of Turkey to Ankara in March 1934. The film was first screened in Atatürk’s residence, and then two days later, before members of the Meclis. Turkish reviewers declared the film a resounding achievement—“creating pride in the heart of every Turk”—and upon Atatürk’s instructions, it was shown in theatres, schools, and public squares across Turkey. In the Soviet Union, the Heart of Turkey premiered in front of audiences in Moscow, Leningrad, Karkh’ov, and Gorki. Tellingly, the

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196 Gillespie, 6.
198 Roth-Ey, 5.
199 This tightened control was evinced in the number of films released annually. In 1930, a record of 128 films hit the Soviet screen. In 1933, when Iutkevich traveled to Ankara, that number had dwindled to 29. Maya Turovskaya, “The 1930s and 1940s: Cinema in Context,” in Stalinism and Soviet Cinema, ed. Richard Taylor and Derek Spring (New York: Routledge, 1993), 44.
201 From Milliyet, quoted in Svechevskaia, 37. Işın, 364.
VOKS-organized, Moscow premiere was a cultural diplomacy event on its own. The foyer of the theater was an exhibition of Turkish culture, complete with musicians, dancers, and posters of the “new Turkey.” The walls boasted photographs of Voroshilov’s delegation posing with Turkish ministers, commemorating the delegation’s success. In addition to Turkish cadets and doctors training in Moscow, the Turkish, Afghan, and Iranian ambassadors attended as guests of honor. From the composition of this audience, we can deduce some of the Heart of Turkey’s intended message. Beyond glorifying the Soviet-Turkish friendship and Turkey’s Soviet-sponsored modernity, the film was a proposition: with the loyal friendship of the Soviet Union, the future of its Eastern neighbors was bright. Soviet friendship was open to Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan, and its benefits were clearly recognizable: modernity, industry, and a rebuff against the imperialist West.

In the Soviet press, the Heart of Turkey was hailed as an example of Soviet influence abroad. Zarkhi, Vitkin, Iutkevich, and others were confident that the film would have a positive impact on Turkey’s cinema industry. Soviet newspapers published snippets from Turkish reviews that affirmed the inspirational quality of Soviet cinema. The newspaper Kino published Turkish press excerpts thanking the Soviets for documenting the 10th year anniversary and hailing Iutkevich’s keen understanding of the event. In an unnamed periodical, a Turkish writer contrasted the realism and patriotism of Soviet cinematography with the French style emulated by Turkish filmmakers. “[The Heart of Turkey] demonstrates to our ‘national’ film companies, such as İpek Film—that plague us with ‘Vue Parisian’ and its nudes—that authentic images of our national life can yield huge artistic results.” Kino attributes Milliyet with writing, “We consider the film…an unfinished album. Sometime, when we produce our own screenwriters,

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203 Ibid.
we will create films like Heart of Turkey ourselves...”204 For Soviet commentators, this was the true measure of the Heart of Turkey’s success. Strictly speaking, Soviet cinematic influence in Turkey had nothing to do with communism. Rather, the affirmation of Soviet culture was an end in itself, and provided an opportunity to demonstrate the international influence of Soviet cinema, to both Eastern, Western, and domestic audiences.205

In the early 1930s, as Turkey sought further engagement with the League of Nations, trade deals with the United States, and greater control over its waterways, publically reinforcing the natural logic—and common anti-Western roots—of the Soviet-Turkish relationship took a central role in Soviet cultural diplomacy. In the discourse surrounding Turkey’s 10th anniversary celebrations, the Soviet Union enthusiastically celebrated their neighbor’s accomplishments and endorsed the Kemalist regime. This image of the “new Turkey” as a modern, industrialized, and well-managed global player was linked to the Soviet Union’s own successes, beginning with the October Revolution. In the Soviet narrative, the Soviets were longtime sympathizers, witnesses, and sponsors of Turkey’s development, with a unique understanding of Turkey’s history, ecology, and economy. In contrast, the West was actively attempting to stunt Turkey’s growth, having failed to dismember Anatolia ten years prior. In sum, the Soviet Union was Turkey’s oldest and most genuine friend and a potential model for Turkey’s industrial, scientific, and cultural growth. Turkey was the Soviet Union’s most stable, enduring interwar partner, and in

204 “Pechat’ o fil’me,” Kino, May 19, 1934. For additional quotes, see: “Uspekh sovetskikh fil’mov v Turtsii,” Vecherniaia Moskva, April 28, 1934.

205 Unfortunately, the impression made by the Heart of Turkey on ordinary people in Turkey and the Soviet Union is unknown. The published impressions of journalists and statesmen were complimentary, but there is no data on audience figures or opinions. In the Soviet Union, this is the case for nearly all films produced in the 1920s and 30s. Maya Turovskaya, 41. In the West, the film apparently did not make much of a splash. The New York Times viewed the film as a convenient travel documentary of Turkey and the British Cinema Quarterly published a brief, yet negative dismissal (the Heart of Turkey “is even less successful than many American travelogues”). “The Screen: A Soviet Newsreel.” Ludo Patrin, “The Film Abroad: Activity in Belgium,” Cinema Quarterly vol. 2 (1933), 233.
1933, Soviet observers saw real potential for mutual support across the Black Sea region and the Caucasus.

From the content and media of this message, it is possible to postulate several broad audiences of the Soviet message, in addition to the Kemalist elite. To Western states, the Soviet Union’s ostensible sponsorship of Turkey was a matter of legitimacy. With Turkey as an ally—and potential protégé—the Soviet Union could claim primacy as a regional power and economic model. There was no greater validation of the Great Socialist Experiment than its reproducibility abroad. To Eastern states—such as Afghanistan, Iran, and China—Soviet observers were signaling the value of their friendship. Turkey’s modernity, ostensibly a beneficiary of Soviet sponsorship, was available to the nations of the East and those formerly colonized. By asserting the international influence of their country, members of the Soviet elite were also reinforcing the desirability of the Soviet system at home. Domestic audiences could be thankful for living in an increasingly powerful country.

In the months before and after Turkey’s anniversary celebrations, Soviet commentators were optimistic about the success of Soviet cultural diplomacy in Turkey. Writing to the Soviet representative in Tehran, Karakhan described Turkey’s intense interest in studying the Soviet Union’s economy, party structure, military, and society. For the next several years, Soviet-Turkish economic and cultural exchanges continued unabated. For example, in 1934, Turkish composers (including many who were involved in the Heart of Turkey) played concerts in Moscow, Turkish pilots attended training courses across the Soviet Union, and Soviet economic

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advisors made extended travels in Turkey. In 1935, the Kayseri textile plant opened and the Turkish Five Year plan appeared to be a success. That year, a large delegation of Soviet composers played 23 concerts across Turkey and partied in Atatürk’s “dacha.” In his memoirs, Dmitri Dmitriyevich Shostakovich (1906-1974) recounted the experience: “[Atatürk] arranged endless receptions for us. All the men received inscribed gold cigarette cases and all the women got bracelets. They fussed over us greatly. Turkey’s musical life was in an embryonic stage then...[the tour] got a lot of coverage in the Soviet papers.” Shostakovich’s statement demonstrates the continued enthusiasm of Soviet-Turkish relations, and the enduring goal of raising Turkish cultural through exposure to superior Soviet arts.

However, this edifice soon collapsed. As geopolitical events drove a wedge between Soviet and Turkish interests, the viability of their partnership was called into question. When Turkey turned increasingly West—eventually becoming a beneficiary of the Marshall Plan—the contingencies of Soviet friendship were violated. Once unseated from its privileged position of sponsorship, the Soviet Union’s interests in Turkey dwindled. These circumstances will be delineated in the following conclusion.

VI. CONCLUSION

Ultimately, the discourse of Soviet-Turkish friendship—despite its effusiveness and complexity—was not sufficiently durable to survive the changing political climate of the late 1930s. In the Soviet Union, the years of “relative calm” following the first Five Year plan gave

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210 Dmitri Shostakovich, Testimony: The Memoirs of Dmitri Shostakovich, ed. Solomon Volkov (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 113. Shostakovich’s recollections of Turkey last a mere page, and reflect the bitterness he later expresses at being made into a puppet of the government’s cultural diplomacy. At times, Shostakovich’s work was banned in the Soviet Union, yet he was simultaneously forced by the regime to perform in abroad.
way a “re-escalation of repression [culminating] in the blood-letting of the Great Terror,” in 1937 and 1938. The resulting upheaval disrupted the Soviet power structure; centralized state power in Stalin’s hands; tightened the country’s already limited artistic freedoms; and created a paranoia of real and imagined state enemies, domestically and abroad. In Turkey, the state’s foreign policy reoriented toward Britain and France, driven by fears of Fascist Italian aggression and a long-running desire to revisit the Lausanne straits regime. In 1936, the Montreux Straits convention signaled cracks in the Soviet-Turkish relationship, while contributing toward Turkish-British rapprochement. Discontented with the conference’s results (which reduced its special privileges in the straits), the Soviet Union proposed to manage construction of the straits fortifications, and asked that Turkey block passage to anti-Soviet naval forces. The agreement never came to fruition.

The next several years further chipped away at Soviet-Turkish relations. As World War II drew near, both countries sought alliances with other powers, unravelling their mutual-dependence and conception of common goals. Among other factors, Turkey signed economic agreements with Britain (including the coveted contract for the straits fortification); Germany became Turkey’s principle trading partner and lender; the Soviets signed the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; and Soviet territorial pretensions in Romania exacerbated Turkey’s anxieties of instability in the Balkans. In 1939, the Soviet Union and Turkey failed to sign a mutual non-aggression pact, unable to chart an agreement that did not violate their loyalties to other states.

Over the course of World War II, despite its neutrality, Turkey drifted increasingly toward the

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211 Edele, 8.
212 Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 67-68.
213 Tellal, 192. The final blow to the agreement was landed when the Soviet Union denied Turkey’s counter request of Soviet military support in the event of a Mediterranean naval attack.
West’s “sphere of influence.” Following the conflict, the Soviet-Turkish relationship imploded completely. Driven by a sense of post-war entitlement and Stalin’s expansionist policies, the Soviet Union demanded a slice of territory on the Soviet-Turkish border, prompting Western intervention on Turkey’s behalf. As a result, the Turkish-Soviet Treaty on Friendship and Neutrality prematurely ended in March, 1945. Turkey became a recipient of the Marshall plan, and until its collapse, the Soviet Union and Turkey occupied opposite halves of the Cold War divide.  

The fate of the Heart of Turkey mirrors this divergence. After intense screening in the mid-1930s, the Heart of Turkey faded into obscurity—evading the attention of even most Soviet cinema historians. A number of Turkish films sampled clips from the Heart of Turkey’s Ankara scenes, yet the complete, Turkish language copy of the film eventually disappeared altogether. In 1969, a Russian language copy (gifted by the Soviet Union) aired on Turkish television. Mid-way through the screening, the film was cut by censors, who summarily banned the Heart of Turkey as communist propaganda for nearly forty years. Clearly, the former congeniality of Soviet-Turkish relations had become a source discomfort for the now NATO member state.

Like the Heart of Turkey, the vibrant exchanges of the late 1920s and 1930s have left only a passing impression on Soviet historiography. With the relationship’s ignominious end in

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215 In fact, historians such as Jamil Hasanli and Vladislav Zubok argue that Soviet aggression in Turkey and Iran was ground-zero for the Cold War. Zubok writes, “Stalin’s pressure on Iran, combined with his belligerence toward Turkey, put the Soviet Union on a collision course not only with the Truman administration, but with broad segments of the American public.” Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 45. Also, see: Hasanli, xii-xiv.

216 Apparently, the Soviet consulate in Istanbul occasionally still showed the film to its guests. In a memoir article, Iutkevich recalls reading about one such 1966 screening in the pages of Pravda. Iutkevich, “Desiat’ lenfil’movskikh let,” 90.

mind, Soviet-Turkish partnership in the interwar period stands out as an improbable historical oddity. Yet, without the geopolitical clamor preceding World War II, it is conceivable that the enthusiasm of Soviet-Turkish relations could have thrived unabated. This thesis has demonstrated that for Soviet participants, Soviet-Turkish relations were not a fluke or superficial “marriage of convenience.” Rather, Soviet print and visual discourse in the early 1930s celebrated a common experience of modernization and anti-imperialism, bridging ideological incompatibilities and endorsing the project of Kemalist modernity. Soviet commentators spun Soviet-Turkish encounters into an interpersonal narrative of friendship. Without necessarily discounting its sincerity, this relationship clearly held utility for both parties. For Soviet participants, the relationship was an opportunity to broadcast their accomplishments abroad and advertise the benefits of their friendship. Namely, Soviet sponsorship and notions of modernity.

In Soviet-Turkish interwar relations, we see that modernity was a diplomatically powerful (if ambiguously articulated) transnational concept. By affirming Turkey’s modernity (particularly in contrast to Western ambivalence), Soviet discourse strengthened the relationship, supported its principal ally, and positioned itself as an influential, superior power. In many ways, the Soviet-Turkish relationship reflects patterns that emerged during the Cold War, a global order that pitted Soviet and American modernities in opposition.218 Arguably, the precedent of Soviet-Turkish interwar relations can inform our understanding of the Soviet Union’s other “Eastern” friendships. For example, Soviet discourse dubbed Sino-Soviet relations as the “Great Friendship,” employing similarly interpersonal terms and networks of exchange and sponsorship.219 Scholars such as Lorenz Lüthi have credited ideology with

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dictating the Sino-Soviet relationship’s beginning and end. Perhaps, the Soviet-Turkish friendship—and the discourse it produced—can illuminate additional, not strictly Marxist-Leninist mechanisms of Soviet foreign policy.

This thesis project also provides a groundwork for future research. The most obvious opportunity is an exploration of the Turkish side of the story: essentially, a reversal of this thesis’ research questions. How did Turkish discourse represent the Soviet Union and their interrelationship? What purpose did the Soviet presence at the 10th anniversary celebrations serve for the Turkish hosts? Additionally, the interpersonal tone of Soviet-Turkish interwar relations begs further exploration of the personal relationships among its elite participants. To what extent did official friendship rest on (and emanate from) personal connections?

Exploring these networks—and their discursive and material footprints in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe—offers a promising seedbed for comparative and transnational inquiry. The Soviet-Turkish interwar partnership, and the discursive sinews that held it together, must figure prominently in this endeavor.

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221 Hirst has explored these networks in the lives of İnönü and Georgii Vasil’evich Chicherin (1872-1936), whose career as Commissar of Foreign Affairs ended prior to this thesis’ chronological scope. Hirst, “Eurasia’s Discontent.”

222 Intriguingly, Turkey and Russia are currently entering a second phase of cooperation, unprecedented since the 1930s. Russians are the largest demographic of tourists in Turkey, encouraged by visa-free travel; Russia is Turkey’s third largest export market, and a major source of natural gas and oil; Turkish contractors worked on projects for the Sochi Winter Olympics (over 40% of Turkish international contracts takes place in former Soviet states); and freshly penned $100 billion trade and nuclear energy deals are making international headlines. As in the interwar period, both regional powers are putting aside political differences (particularly regarding the conflict in Syria) to foster partnership.
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