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Mind in Dispute: The Section on Mind in Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi

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This dissertation is an in-depth study of the dispute on the doctrines regarding the structure of mind as recorded in the fourth century CE Abhidharma work, the *Tattvasiddhi (成實論, TatSid hereafter) by Harivarman. Despite the specific differences among the various Buddhist Abhidharma analyses of mind, in general they can be divided into two major positions. Some propose that mind is composed of consciousness (citta or vijñāna) and various numbers of mental factors (caitasika or caitta), which are mental phenomena that are different from but associated (saṃprayukta) with consciousness. Others oppose the existence of caitasikas as entities separate from consciousness; instead they suggest that caitasikas are not different from citta by nature but are only citta in different modes. In chapters 60-67, the TatSid records arguments representing both sides of the dispute. The present study consists of an annotated English translation (chapter
5) of chapters 60-67 of the TatSid as well as detailed analyses of and comments on each of the arguments for or against the notions of “mental factor” (*caitasika*) (chapter 2) and “association” (*samprayoga*) (chapter 3). The study also includes a general introduction (chapter 1), and in the introductory sections in chapters 2 and 3 extensive surveys of the origins and development of the two interconnected doctrines regarding *caitasika* and *samprayoga* in the sūtras, Abhidharma, and Yogācāra texts.

Unlike previous scholarship on the TatSid, which views the work primarily from the perspective of doctrinal history and investigates the sectarian or school affiliations of its arguments, the present study is based firstly on the textual and philological examination of the work itself as well as the texts quoted in it. This textual investigation reveals that Harivarman and the TatSid have a close relationship with the Sarvāstivāda lineage, and the doctrinal positions of Harivarman regarding the structure of mind bear great affinities with those of the so-called Dārśāntikas as recorded in other Abhidharma texts. In addition, by comparing extensively the cited texts and the doctrinal positions in the arguments of the TatSid with the sūtras and extant Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts, this study also demonstrates how Buddhist teachers differed in their understanding of fundamental Buddhist doctrines and also how doctrines changed throughout history.
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<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Āṅguttaranikāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Abhidharmasamuccya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASBh</td>
<td>Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abhidh-av</td>
<td>Abhidhammāvatāra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKBh</td>
<td>Abhidharmakośabhāṣya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BHSD</td>
<td>Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Critical Pāli Dictionary</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Dīghanikāya</td>
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<td>DĀ</td>
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<td>Dhs-a</td>
<td>Dhammasaṅgani atthakathā (= Atthasālinī)</td>
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<td>MĀ</td>
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<tr>
<td>MVŚ</td>
<td>*Mahāvibhāṣāśāstra</td>
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<td>MW</td>
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Chapter 1. Introduction

Prologue

Scholastic debates concerning the structure of mind comprise an especially noteworthy facet of Buddhist philosophical speculation. Those recorded in the fourth century Buddhist Abhidharma text, the *Tattvasiddhi* (成實論, TatSid hereafter), though to date understudied, have the potential to shed much light on the nature of early Buddhist scholastic inquiry concerning this topic. Here the term “scholastic” is intended to refer to a flavor of Buddhism that is mainly focused on the understanding and interpretation of Buddhist teachings and doctrines, contrasting with the other emphases or aspects of Buddhism such as monastic rules, meditation practices, and religious rituals.\(^1\) The division of Buddhist literature into three “baskets” (*piṭaka*) in part reflects these differentiated interests; the *vinaya-*piṭaka focuses on monastic rules, the *sūtra-*piṭaka is more practice-oriented, and the *Abhidharma-*piṭaka deals with doctrinal issues. Most of the contents of the *Abhidharma-*piṭaka can be safely labelled with the western term “philosophy” in the sense of a vigorous pursuit of knowledge and understanding, involving logical argument and interpretation of and commentary on the Buddha’s teachings contained in sūtra and vinaya literature. The TatSid is an encyclopedic Abhidharma text that was intended to cover all major teachings and doctrines that were discussed and debated among Buddhist teachers of its time, and the nature of mind is one of the central topics discussed in that work.

From its very beginning, Buddhism considered mind as playing a central role in the suffering of sentient beings, proposing that one can only attain liberation from suffering by the application of practices of training and purification of the mind. Early sūtra texts contain abundant teachings on how to tame the mind, that is, how to rid it of defilements that are obstacles to liberation and how to develop positive mental qualities contributing to enlightenment and liberation. However, the sūtras never explicitly clarify what the nature of those positive and negative mental qualities really are. Are they separate entities

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\(^1\) On scholasticism in general, see Cabezón 1998; also Cabezón 1994.
Chapter 1. Introduction

that can be connected to and detached from mind or consciousness? Or, are they just consciousness itself appearing merely in different modes of functioning? Since the sūtras do not provide answers to such questions, later Buddhist teachers proposed various theories to account for the mind-training practices taught in the sūtras. Regarding the structure of mind and the nature of mental qualities, the various opinions of Buddhist teachers can be characterized generally as falling into two camps: some teachers propose that mind consists of consciousness (citta or vijñāna) itself and a number of entities as “mental factors” (caitta or caitasika) that are “associated” (samprayukta) with consciousness; other teachers disagree with the “mental factor” and “association” theory, and argue that the so-called “mental factors” are nothing but consciousness itself in different modes. Debates between teachers of these two positions can be traced back to the early period when the sūtras were compiled, but the Abhidharma texts of different schools further record numerous arguments offered on both sides of the debate, and among Abhidharma texts, the TatSid preserves the most comprehensive record of such things.

The TatSid is an Abhidharma treatise extant only in Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation and no record of this treatise or of its author Harivarman (訶梨跋摩) is found in any extant Indian source. According to the Chinese accounts, Harivarman is a Buddhist teacher ordained and trained in the Sarvāstivāda tradition, and probably in the lineage of teachers who are called “Dārṣṭāntikas.” He is well versed in teachings of different schools of his time, but he is disappointed with the Abhidharma theories current in his day. He feels that those theories stray away from the original teachings of the Buddha. In order to persuade his contemporaries to return to the “original teaching,” and to promote what he considers the correct teaching of the Buddha, he wrote the TatSid.

The TatSid is an ambitious work that is intended to cover systematically all the major teachings of Buddhism. It has 202 chapters, each of them dealing with a specific doctrinal topic, and all the chapters are organized according to the teaching of the four noble truths. The two purposes of Harivarman, namely, to promote his understanding of Buddhist teachings and to argue against the opinions of other teachers, shape the architecture of the TatSid, and determine that the TatSid contains both exegetical and polemical contents. Most often, Harivarman’s doctrinal positions are different from those of other major
Abhidharma schools such as Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, Pāli Abhidhamma, as well as the Yogācāra tradition, and, as a result, the chapters in the TatSid provide a fresh perspective on doctrinal points that have a long developmental and textual history. Moreover, the various texts cited in the TatSid, especially sūtras quoted in its arguments, are sometimes interestingly different from the extant sūtra collections available to us today. These characteristics of the TatSid provide us the opportunity to study the development of Buddhist texts and Buddhist doctrines within a particular historical setting, and this is precisely the objective of the present study.

1.1 The Importance of the *Tattvasiddhi and Past Scholarship on This Text

1.1.1 The Importance of the *Tattvasiddhi

The *Tattvasiddhi is a Buddhist Abhidharma, or philosophical treatise, composed around the third or fourth centuries CE. Its composition comes in the middle of one of the most prolific periods of intellectual innovations in Buddhist history, a period when the Sarvāstivāda and the Pāli Theravāda Abhidharma systems had become well established and influential, the Mahāyāna movement(s) were becoming more and more popular, and the new Yogācāra movement was beginning to coalesce but had not yet come to maturity as it would a few decades later in the works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (both ca. the 5th century CE), the two most important early Yogācāra philosophers and commentators. Many Buddhist teachers from different groups and geographical regions were debating concerning different understandings of sūtras, and were also arguing with each other for or against newly established philosophical doctrines. The author of the TatSid, Harivarman, is very knowledgeable about, and very critical of, the Abhidharma systems of his period, and records extensively in the TatSid both arguments and rejoinders from teachers with different opinions regarding the issues disputed. The texts quoted and mentioned in the TatSid include early sūtra materials as well as references to positions that can be traced in various Abhidharma treatises of different teachers and schools. These records make the TatSid a rich source of early Buddhist textual materials, and

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2 Sections 1.5 and 1.6 will introduce the author Harivarman and the contents of this text in greater detail.
hence make it a good candidate for textual and philological investigations. Furthermore, this treatise was translated into Chinese around 411-412 CE, which is significantly earlier than the translations of the two other Chinese translators of Abhidharma texts: about 150 years earlier than Paramārtha (真諦),³ and more than 200 years earlier than the translations by Xuanzang (玄奘).⁴ As we know the transmission of such texts is usually accompanied by constant revision and expansion. Because of its relatively earlier translation date, the TatSid provides a special “snapshot” of the period when many textual and doctrinal issues were still being debated among Abhidharma teachers, and the records of textual inconsistencies and doctrinal controversies are preserved and not yet filtered and revised as they are in later texts and even in early texts preserved today, such as the Pāli texts, which have been heavily edited. Thus, the textual materials preserved in the TatSid, together with the texts that precede and follow it, provide an extremely valuable historical frame of reference for the history and development of Buddhist texts and doctrines.

The TatSid is organized according to the principle of the four noble truths.⁵ It has an introductory section, and four sections corresponding to the truths of suffering, the origin of suffering, the cessation, and the path. The section on the truth of suffering is further divided into five subsections corresponding to the five aggregates (skandha): material form (rūpa), consciousness (vijñāna), apperception (saṃjñā), feeling (vedanā), and volitional formations (saṃskāra).⁶ Each subsection extensively records issues regarding the corresponding aggregate (skandha) as discussed and debated among various Buddhist teachers. The present work is a study of the subsection on consciousness or mind (vijñāna 識) in the TatSid, or more specifically, chapters 60-67 in the subsection recording arguments concerning “mental factors” (caitasika/caitta 心所) and “association” (samprayoga 相應). In brief, these two terms are central to the analysis of the structure of mind: on the one hand, some teachers believe that mind can be analyzed into mind or

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³ Paramārtha translated Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa in the year 564 CE.
⁴ Xuanzang’s translations of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts were mostly made between 650 and 660 CE.
⁵ For a more detailed description of the structure of the TatSid, see section 1.4 below.
⁶ Note that in the TatSid the five skandhas are listed in a different order from other Buddhist texts. This is probably because Harivarman understands the five skandhas as describing a cognitive sequence: rūpa[+eye]→vijñāna→samjñā→vedanā→saṃskāra. See TatSid 67.4.
consciousness itself (*citta* or *vijñāna*), and a number of mental factors (*caitasika/caitta*) that are associated (*samprayukta*) with it. On the other hand, other teachers reject the very notion of “mental factors” and “association,” and argue that mind is not analyzable into *citta* and *caitasikas*; instead there is only *citta* itself, all those so-called *caitasikas* are nothing but *citta* in its different modes. The chapters studied in the present project record about fifty arguments from both sides of the dispute. Some arguments quote sūtra passages, while others utilize logical reasoning to support their positions and argue against the opponent’s positions. These arguments not only focus on the analysis of mind but also relate it to other issues such as the distinctions between different versions of texts, the veracity of different interpretations of Buddhist theories of causation, cognitive process, religious practice, and so forth. This study is designed to analyze the arguments in the text of TatSid concerned with the various doctrinal positions regarding the concepts of *caitasika* and *samprayoga*, tracing their historical development with due regard to other sūtra and Abhidharma texts preserved in Pāli, Sanskrit, and Chinese languages.

### 1.1.2 Past Scholarship on the *Tattvasiddhi*

After its translation by Kumārajīva in the early fifth century CE, for about two hundred years the TatSid was very popular in China. Historical accounts have recorded nearly one hundred teachers who were known for their study and teaching of the TatSid, and at least two dozen commentaries on it were written. However, in the seventh century, Xuanzang’s systematic introduction and translation of Indian Yogācāra and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts into China brought the study of the TatSid to an abrupt end. After that no study of this treatise was mentioned in Buddhist historical accounts, and all the commentaries written by Chinese Buddhist teachers were lost. Since this text is now extant only in Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation, no manuscript of this text in any Indic language has been found, and all of its early Chinese commentaries are lost, the study of this text would be extremely difficult. This perhaps explains the scarcity of modern scholarship on this text. To date, there are only two monographs dedicated to the study of this text (Fukuhara 1969, Katsura 1974), and these two studies focus mostly on the doctrinal

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7 See section 1.4 for a more detailed discussion of the TatSid’s transmission in China.
issues, paying little attention to the textual issues. In the 1970s, N. Aiyaswami Sastri translated the Chinese text into Sanskrit and English (Sastri 1975, 1978), representing decades of work on this text. However, Sastri’s understanding of the Chinese text is not always accurate. In addition, although he compares the text of the TatSid with other Buddhist texts, primarily with those in Pāli and Sanskrit, he does not pay enough attention to important texts such as the Āgamas and the Abhidharma texts in Chinese translations. Therefore, much more remains to be done in the study of this text.

Even though the TatSid is little studied in modern Japan, there have been valuable contributions in the past century. There are three Japanese translations of the TatSid (Ui 1933, Koyo 1975, Hirai et al. 1999-2000), among which the earliest one by Ui Hakuju 宇井伯壽 remains the most valuable one even today because of its notes on textual, historical, and doctrinal issues. However, none of these Japanese translations presents an in-depth study of the text. In the case of difficult passages in the text, most Japanese translators simply follow the original Chinese translation, adding modern punctuation, gloss verbs and nouns with corresponding Japanese forms, and sometimes mark Kanji with Japanese pronunciation. Strictly speaking, such methods represent a gloss rather than a translation of the original text. Therefore, these translations are far from sufficient for a detailed textual study of the TatSid.

Aside from the monographs and translations, several authors have discussed issues related to the TatSid in their studies of Buddhist history or of Abhidharma texts and doctrines. A search in the INBUS database yields a few dozen articles related to the TatSid, most of which discuss certain doctrinal points and try to locate the TatSid in the context of different schools of Abhidharma. For example, Yinshun (1981a:573-92) considers this text in the context of the development of Abhidharma, Mizuno Kōgen (Mizuno 1931) discusses the possible connection between the TatSid and the so-called Dārṣṭāntikas, and Tokoro Rie (Tokoro 1990a, 1990b, 1990c) presents a series of articles discussing the TatSid and its possible relation with the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas. These studies do no pay enough attention to textual issues before dealing with doctrinal and historical issues. In other words, the TatSid as a source of textual materials has not yet received the attention it deserves. The present study will present first the research on the textual materials, and with this solid foundation, the research on specific doctrinal and
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historical issues such as mental factors and association will yield better in-depth insights.

1.2 Theories of Mind in Buddhism and the Dispute of “Mental Factors” and “Association”

The concept of mind occupies a central position in both theoretical and practical perspectives in Buddhism and is a perennial focus of inquiry in its history over two and a half millennia. As is stated in the beginning of the Pāli Dhammapada, “All phenomena are preceded by mind, have mind as their leader, are made by mind.” Also, in the verse that is described as summarizing the essence of the Buddha’s teaching, “The avoidance of all evil; the undertaking of good; the cleansing of one's mind; this is the teaching of the awakened ones.” Hence, it is no surprise to see that most Buddhist teachings in some way are connected to the interpretation of mind and methods of its purification and cultivation.

However, in Buddhist texts from different historical periods and different traditions, we can find different ideas and theories concerning the mind. Mind is a fluid concept that undergoes change throughout Buddhist history. As a result, we cannot attempt to determine a single interpretation of mind that applies to all Buddhists in all periods nor can we assume that the different interpretations of mind all assume or are based upon the same concept of mind. Hence, we must make clear that a particular interpretation represents a certain teacher or a certain group in a specific historical period. Furthermore, since Buddhist theories of mind, like all things, arose though various causes and conditions, we must make clear the reasons why and purposes for which ancient teachers developed their ideas and took certain positions.

How is mind structured? This is the basic and central question that the two competing theories of mind are debating in the TatSid. Before we discuss in more detail the doctrinal dispute, we need to clarify three key terms that are central to the mind.

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8 Dhp 1, verse 1: manopubbaṅgā dhammā, manoseṭṭhā manomayā. K. R. Norman (Norman 1997: 1) translates dhammā as “mental phenomena,” which is an interpretation perhaps influenced by later commentaries. The term dhammā can be used to refer to all “phenomena,” “mental” and “physical” alike, and, even though this verse refers to “mind,” it is possible that its intention is to refer to experience in general.

theories: mind or consciousness (*citta*, *vijñāna*, and *manas*), mental factors (*caitasika*), and association (*samprayoga*).

In English the words “mind” and “conscious” are more or less synonyms. However, “mind” is more general and can be used as an umbrella term to refer to all the mental aspects of a sentient being. “Consciousness” usually refers to three aspects of a sentient being’s experience. First, it means “being conscious,” in contrast to “unconscious” states such as dreamless sleep, coma, or death. According to John Searle, this is a state that begins every day when we awaken from a dreamless sleep, continues throughout the day, and temporarily stops when we enter deep sleep again. This is a state of sustained alertness and awareness in general. Second, when a person cognizes an object, we say that the person is “conscious of” the object. This is the perceptual experience of the awareness of a specific object or content. Third, when we say somebody does something “consciously,” we mean that the person performs an activity with deliberation. Although in English we use the same word “conscious” in all these circumstances, still we can distinguish different aspects of mental experience by the context.

Likewise, Buddhists have also noticed the different aspects of mental experience, and in early Buddhist literature, they use different terms to describe more precisely those aspects of mind. In the early sūtras, or the earliest stratum of Buddhist texts consisting of discourses attributed to the Buddha and his major disciples, there are three terms, namely, *citta*, *vijñāna*, and *manas*, which can be understood as representing three aspects of “mind.” In a general sense, all three Indic terms can be understood as corresponding to the English word “mind,” but they are used in different contexts. In brief, *citta* identifies an individual sentient being and differentiates it from other beings. In this sense, *citta* is the identity bearer and carries the traits and characteristics of a being, and it also maintains the continuity of the identity of a sentient being. Moreover, *citta* is described in the sūtras as more passive. It is always said that *citta* is polluted and one needs to practice to make it purified; the other two terms are never used in this context. The more active aspects of mind are represented by the terms *vijñāna* and *manas*. In descriptions of a cognitive process, as, for example, when a person perceives an object, the word *vijñāna* is

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10 Searle 1998:40-1: “By ‘consciousness’ I mean those states of sentience or awareness that typically begin when we wake up in the morning from a dreamless sleep and continue throughout the day until we fall asleep again.”
always used; in other words, *vijñāna* is the perceptive aspect of mind. In descriptions of the mind performing good or bad actions, it is always the term *manas*, which indicates that *manas* is understood as the agent of mental actions.

Nonetheless, despite their different shades of meaning and their different usages in different circumstances, sometimes in the sūtras they are used indiscriminately as synonyms, which indicates that when used in a general sense as “mind,” they have the same referent. Moreover, it should be emphasized that in early Buddhism mind is understood as always intentional, which means it must have an object. This can be derived from the verbal roots of the three terms for “mind”: *citta* is from √*cit* and *vijñāna* is from √*jñā*, both meaning “to know” while *manas* is from √*man*, which means “to think.” Because both of these mental actions of knowing and thinking require specific contents, “mind” or “consciousness” as represented by these three terms always requires an object. In this sense, no matter how the mind is understood, whether as an identity and traits bearer, or perceptive consciousness, or the agent of action, the perceptive element always exists.

Aside from the three terms for “mind” or “consciousness,” various Indic terms that identify different mental functions and properties are found scattered throughout the early sūtras. The following are some examples of such mental terms:

- Basic cognitive experience and mental functions: contact (*sparśa*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), attention (*manaskāra*), and so forth.
- Wholesome mental qualities that one should develop: faith (*śraddhā*), strength (*vīrya*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), insight (*prajñā*), tranquility (*praśrabdhi*), equanimity (*upekṣā*), and so forth.
- Unwholesome qualities that one should eliminate: lust (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), ignorance (*avidyā*), conceit (*māna*), doubt (*vicikitsā*), wrong view (*drṣṭi*), and so forth.

Although very frequently used in the sūtras, these mental terms are never explicitly defined in terms of their nature and ontological status. If one inquires about the mental
phenomena to which these mental terms refer, and more importantly, about the relationship between “mind” in general (citta, viññāna, and manas) and these mental phenomena, there is no explicit answer given in the early sūtras.

However, these terms and the mental phenomena they represent are extremely important for both Buddhist theorists and practitioners. As mentioned above, Buddhists believe that the causes of suffering lie in a being’s mind, and, in order to be liberated from suffering, one has to understand his own mind better, and make efforts in practice to decrease and eliminate those unwholesome qualities and to cultivate and develop wholesome qualities. For these purposes, one has to make clear how mind is structured, what these basic wholesome and unwholesome mental qualities are, and how these qualities are related to “mind” or “consciousness.” Because these questions are not explicitly answered in the sūtras and in order to account for or justify their mind-training practice more clearly and coherently, Buddhist followers had to create a theory of mind partly based on their understanding of the teachings in the sūtras and partly based on their own experience, especially introspective experience in meditation experience. This is exactly what those Buddhist scholastic philosophers, or Abhidharma teachers, have done.

As always happens, people have different opinions on the same issue. In Buddhist communities, teachers had different interpretations of and opinions regarding the teachings of mind and mental phenomena mentioned in the sūtras, and proposed two contrasting models of mind. Some teachers proposed that, aside from consciousness itself (citta or viññāna), there are a few dozens of elementary mental phenomena, which exist as real entities, meaning that they cannot be further analyzed or reduced to more elementary parts. Together with consciousness, these mental phenomena are the elemental constituents of a being’s mind and are referred to as “mental factors” (caitasika) that always occur accompanying consciousness in a relationship of “association” (samprayoga). On the other hand, some other teachers rejected such mental factors as distinct entities apart from consciousness. Instead, they proposed that these so-called “mental factors” are not actually things different from consciousness but are in their nature precisely consciousness manifested in different modes. As a result, for these teachers, since there are no mental factors, there is also no association between mental factors and consciousness. This is precisely the dispute upon which the present study
Similes may help us to understand the two positions more clearly. For the supporters of the “mental factor” theory, mental factors are just like minerals and metals in the physical world: there are numerous different kinds of minerals that exist as real material in the world and sometimes combine assisting one another to achieve a common purpose. For those teachers who reject the concept of mental factors as real entities, mental phenomena are like different utensils made of the same material. For example, gold can be made into rings, chains, bowls, bracelets, and so forth; all these things are gold by their nature but appear in different forms, and, because of their different forms, they can serve different functions. In a similar way, mental phenomena such as feeling, apperception, volition, and so forth, are nothing but consciousness by nature, but, since they are different modes of consciousness, they can perform different activities and functions.

Supporters of the existence of mental factors propose different lists of mental factors, but all lists that are preserved have a similar structure consisting of several classes:\footnote{Readers interested in the details of the mental factors can consult the tables in section 2.1.2 for the lists from three major Buddhist traditions.}

- Universal mental factors: mental factors that occur in every moment of consciousness, including mental phenomena such as the contact (sparśa) between consciousness and its object, as well as feeling (vedanā), apperception (samjñā), volition (cetanā), attention (manaskāra), and so forth.
- Wholesome mental factors: mental phenomena that are morally wholesome, such as faith (śraddhā), energy (vīrya), mindfulness (smṛti), concentration (samādhi), insight (prajñā), and so forth.
- Unwholesome mental factors: mental phenomena that are morally negative and will cause suffering, such as lust (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), ignorance (avidyā), conceit (māna), doubt (vicikitsā), and so forth.

These lists of mental factors are actually collections of mental terms gathered from the sūtras, which are then reorganized and classified according to their functions and
properties. These lists have great significance in Buddhist practice since Buddhists believe that the causes of suffering and liberation lie deep in the mind, and can be identified with these negative or positive mental factors. Thus, the purpose of practice is to reduce the activity of these negative mental factors, ultimately eliminating them all together, and to cultivate and increase the positive mental factors that can lead to liberation.

The opponents of mental factors do not believe that these mental phenomena exist as separate and real entities. Although still acknowledging that these mental terms represent mental states or activities, they propose that each of these terms is essentially consciousness in a different mode. Nonetheless, these teachers who oppose “mental factors” would agree that practice entails reducing and eliminating negative modes of consciousness and eventually attaining liberation from them.

Moreover, as for the relationship between mental factors and consciousness, the supporters of the mental factor theory propose that they are “associated” (samprayukta) with one another and with consciousness, and this relationship of “association” (samprayoga) is defined by the following characteristics:

- Mental factors occur with consciousness at the same time; they arise together, function together, and cease together. In other words, mental factors and consciousness always occur simultaneously.
- Mental factors and consciousness have the same sense faculty (indriya) as their basis. For example, in a moment of visual consciousness, both the mental factors and the consciousness at this moment are based on the sense faculty of eye.
- Mental factors and consciousness have the same object. In the example of the moment of visual consciousness, visual consciousness has form as its object, and all the other accompanying mental factors such as contact, feeling,apperception, attention, volition, and so forth, are all coordinated and have the same form as their object.

Buddhist teachers also use similes to illustrate this association relationship between consciousness and mental factors. They propose that such a relationship is like a bundle
of reeds. A single reed cannot stand by itself but can stand as a bundle only when many reeds are bundled together. Just as reeds in a bundle support each other, so also consciousness and mental factors support each other in performing mental functions and activities.

Thus, according to the supporters of the mental factor theory, “mental factors” by definition exist as entities distinct from consciousness and yet are associated with it. On the other hand, Harivarman and certain other Buddhist teachers reject this definition of “mental factors” and argue that there exist no mental phenomena distinct from consciousness itself. Since these so-called “mental factors” are nothing but different modes of consciousness, as a result, there is no relationship of association.

The section on mind in the TatSid preserves more than fifty arguments from both the supporters and the opponents of the theory of mental factors and association, and most of them are not found in other extant Abhidharma texts. This fact makes this section in the TatSid an invaluable source for tracing the early stages in the development of Buddhist theories of mind. However, before discussing in more detail the text of the TatSid, the next section 1.3 will introduce the author Harivarman based on available Chinese sources. Section 1.4 will discuss in more detail the TatSid and its arguments.

1.3 The Author Harivarman

As mentioned previously, the *Tattvasiddhi* is only extant in Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation, and no Indic manuscript of this treatise has been found, and there is no record of the author Harivarman in any extant Indic source. What little information there is about the author and the text comes from Chinese sources. Only one short biography of Harivarman survives, supplemented by a number of references to him and to the TatSid scattered in Chinese materials dated from the fifth to seventh centuries CE. Most of the Chinese accounts do not identify their Indic sources, and they sometimes contradict each other. As a result, the information given in these accounts is questionable. The Chinese accounts of Harivarman have been thoroughly studied by previous scholars, namely, Yinshun (1981a), Fukuhara Ryōgon (Fukuhara 1969), Ui Hakuju (Ui 1933), and Katsura
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Shōryū (Katsura 1974).

1.3.1 Date and Life

According to the biography by Xuanchang (玄暢 416-484 CE), Harivarman was born in the nine hundredth year after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa, which corresponds to approximately 263 CE. However, different dates are given in other Chinese sources. Senrui (僧叡 ca. 4th-5th century CE), a prominent student of Kumārajīva and the first Chinese to teach the TatSid after Kumārajīva’s translation was made, wrote in his preface to the TatSid that Harivarman’s date is 890 years after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa. Another preface to a Chinese commentary on the TatSid states that Harivarman was “[born] more than 800 years after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa.” Nonetheless, these accounts agree with each other in general and place Harivarman’s birthdate around 250 CE.

In addition to these records, indirect evidence also provides an approximate date for Harivarman. First, according to the historical records of Kumārajīva’s life, Kumārajīva obtained the TatSid no later than 384 CE. Hence, it is reasonable to estimate that Harivarman lived between 250-350 CE. Moreover, according to Xuanchang’s biography, Harivarman was a student of a Sarvāstivāda master named *Kumāralāta (究摩羅陀). This *Kumāralāta may be the teacher identified as a Dārṣṭāntika who was also later considered the first “Sautrāntika.” According to the records of the lineage of Sarvāstivāda teachers and Xuanzang’s records, Kumāralāta likely lived soon after

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12 No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 11) T55, p78c3-4: 訶梨跋摩者。宋稱師子鎧。佛泥洹後九百年出。
13 According to Ui Hakuju, Kumārajīva and his disciples date the Buddha’s nirvāṇa to the year 637 BCE. Ui 1917: 43. Cited in Katsura 1974:15.
14 Sengrui’s preface to the Tatsid is lost. This passage is quoted by Jizang (吉藏) 549-623 CE: No. 1852 三論玄義 (卷 1) T45, p3b17-19: 昔羅什法師翻成實論竟。命僧叡講之。什師沒後。叡公錄其遺言。製論序云。成實論者。佛滅度後八百餘年。罽賓小乘學者之匠鳩摩羅陀上足弟子訶梨跋摩之所造也。
15 The commentary itself was lost, but the preface was preserved in an anthology of Chinese Buddhist writings. No. 2103 廣弘明集 (卷 20) T52, p244a12-14: 自佛滅之後八百餘年。中天竺國婆羅門子名訶梨跋摩。梁云師子鎧。
16 Another record by Jizang (吉藏) in his Dasheng Xuan Lun (大乘玄論 The Treatise on the Profundity of Mahāyāna) says that Harivarman lived 700 years after the Buddha’s nirvāṇa. No. 1853 大乘玄論 (卷 5) T45, p65b2-3: 成實論主。從曇無德部出。出於七百年。名訶梨跋摩。The above cited passage from Jizang’s Sanlun Xuan Yi (三論玄義 The Profound Meanings of the Three Treatises) indicates that he is familiar with Sengrui’s (僧叡) record of 890 years after the Buddha; hence, as Yinshun (1981a: 574) notes, it seems likely that this reference to “700” is a scribal error for “900.”
17 This is Ui Hakuju’s observation. Ui 1933: 8.
18 No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 11) T55, 78c9-10: 遂抽簪革服為薩婆多部達摩沙門究摩羅陀弟子。
19 No. 2087 大唐西域記 (卷 12) T51, p942a9-16: 尊者童受論師…呾叉始羅國人也…即經部本師也。
Aśvaghoṣa, perhaps around 120-250 CE, and the same lineage record places Harivarman later than Āryadeva but earlier than Vasubandhu. It is estimated that Āryadeva lived between 170-270 CE, and Vasubandhu likely lived from 350-430. Hence, these records also support the estimate that Harivarman likely lived between 250 and 350 CE.

Xuanchang’s biography provides the following information about Harivarman’s life. He was born in central India (中天竺) in a Brahmin family (婆羅門子). In his youth, he learned the Vedas and other sciences, and later he was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda order (薩婆多部) and became a student of the “monk of doctrine” (*dharmaśramaṇa 達摩沙門). *Kumāralaṭa taught him the “great Abhidharma of Kātyāyana (迦旃延) with thousands of gāthās,” probably the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text Jñānaprasthāna. Having fully learned this work, Harivarman was unsatisfied and disillusioned with Abhidharma. He then spent several years studying the entire Tripitaka and traced all the different teachings of the “five sects” (五部) and “nine branches” (九流 *srotas) back to their common origin. Thereafter, he engaged in debates with other Buddhist teachers and tried to persuade them to return to the original Buddhist teachings. Those teachers were reluctant to abandon their sectarian doctrines. As a result, Harivarman became unpopular among them. However, the Mahāsāṅghikas (僧祇部) in the city Pāṭaliputra (巴連弗邑), who also claimed that their doctrines were the origin of the “five sects,” heard about Harivarman and invited him to live with them. There Harivarman studied Mahāyāna (方等 vaipulya) and the teachings of all traditions. He wrote the *Tattvasiddhi, in which he investigated and criticized the different doctrines from various traditions, especially Kātyāyana’s Abhidharma system. Harivarman’s stated purpose in writing this work was to “eliminate confusion and abandon the later

22 Ui 1933: 8.
23 Florin Deleanu’s extensive investigation of Vasubandhu’s date is the most convincing one to date. (Deleanu 2006:186-194).
24 No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 11) T55, p78c1-79b25.
25 The “five sects” are likely the five Buddhist sects with their own vinayas and monastic orders. The “nine branches” is likely a non-specific term referring to multiple groups. See the discussion below.
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developments, with the hope of returning to the origin” (除繁棄末慕存歸本). The biography concludes with a record of Harivarman’s victorious debate with a Vaiśeṣika teacher, from which he earned a great reputation.

Xuanchang (玄暢 416-484 CE), the author of this biography, lived in the period when the study of the TatSid was very popular in China. Since he was not a direct student of Kumārajīva, it is likely that he obtained his information from commentaries on the TatSid circulating in that period and not from Kumārajīva himself. Since the information in these Chinese commentaries may be traced back to Kumārajīva and his students, it is also likely that the information had an Indic source.

There are few things that are noteworthy in this biography. First, it states that Harivarman was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda order (薩婆多部) and that his teacher was *Kumāralāta (究摩羅陀), who was likely the teacher believed to be the “original teacher of the Sautrāntikas” (經部本師) and also referred to as a “Dārṣṭāntika” (譬喻師). Traditional sources present several views about the Sautrāntikas. For example, according to Xuanzang’s student Puguang (普光), the Sautrāntikas, who claim that sūtras are the ultimate authority, separated from the Sarvāstivādins, who believed that reasoning should be the authority. Kuiji (窺基), another student of Xuanzang, states that the Sautrāntikas originated from the Dārṣṭāntikas and that Kumāralāta was the first Sautrāntika.

Thus, these sources present the following information:

1. Kumāralāta was a teacher in the Sarvāstivāda order;
2. He was called a “Dārṣṭāntika;”
3. He was also the first “Sautrāntika” teacher.

The fact that the accounts apply all three terms “Sarvāstivāda,” “Dārṣṭāntika,” and “Sautrāntika,” to the same person suggests that these terms are not mutually exclusive, and their meanings overlap. According to Kuiji, the Dārṣṭāntikas likely received this

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26 For a discussion of the Chinese commentaries on the TatSid, see 1.4.3.
27 No. 2087 大唐西域記 (卷 12) T51, p942a9-16: 尊者童受論師…呾叉始羅國人也…即經部本師也。No. 1821 俱舍論記 (卷 2) T41, p35c4-7: 鳴婆邏多。此言童首。造詮諸論。於經部中造喩鬘論。癡鬘論。顯了論等。經部本從說一切有中出。以經為量名經部。執理為量名說一切有部。No. 1830 成唯識論述記 (卷 3) T43, p274a7-14: …此破日出論者。即經部本師。佛去世後一百年中。北天竺餓叉翅羅國有鳴婆邏多。此言童首。造九百論。時五天竺有五大論師。喻如日出明導世間名日出者。以似於日。亦名譬喻師。或為此師造喩鬘論集諸奇事。名譬喻師。經部之種族。經部以此所說為宗。當時猶未有經部。經部四百年中方出世故。
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name because they were renowned for using examples or stories in their teachings. The name “Sautrāntika” indicates that such a teacher claims to take only the sūtra teachings, or the “original teachings of the Buddha,” as the ultimate authority. Thus, these two names indicate styles of teaching and opinions about which Buddhist texts are authoritative and should not be assumed to be names for Buddhist sects that maintained a distinct vinaya collection and ordination lineage. However, certain teachers labeled with these names do appear to have had certain doctrinal proclivities and characteristic doctrines, most notably, the teachers Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva as recorded in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (MVŚ). Furthermore, chapters 60-67 of the TatSid contain many passage that indicating that Harivarman’s doctrinal positions regarding “mental factors” and “association” almost always agree with those of Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva as recorded in the MVŚ. Given that Harivarman’s teacher *Kumāralāta was labeled both a “Dārṣṭāntika” and a “Sautrāntika,” it may appear reasonable that Harivarman’s doctrinal positions agree with those of the Dārṣṭāntikas and that Harivarman maintained an attitude of “returning to the origin,” which could be associated with the label “Sautrāntika.” However, in my reading of the section on mind in the TatSid, I do not find any explicit statement by Harivarman that rejects the authority of Abhidharma, and he even agrees with the Ābhidharmikas, or teachers who are explicitly affiliated with a certain Abhidharma tradition, on some doctrinal points. This indicates that we may not simply label Harivarman as a “Dārṣṭāntika” or a “Sautrāntika.” The next section 1.3.2 will discuss in more detail the school affiliation of Harivarman.

Xuanchang’s biography also says that Harivarman learned the “great Abhidharma of Kātyāyana (迦旃延), which has thousands of gāthās.” That Abhidharma work is likely the *Jñānapratsthāna*, which came to be considered the most important treatise among the Sarvāstivāda canonical Abhidharma texts. The voluminous Sarvāstivāda *Vibhāṣā*, of which there are three versions extant in Chinese translation, is a detailed commentary on this treatise. Thus, Harivarman is presented as well learned in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, which can be confirmed by his references to Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma

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28 See the quotation in footnote 27 above.
29 For further discussion of Kumāralāta, see Yinshun 1981a:535-40.
texts and the numerous Abhidharma doctrines he quotes and criticizes in the TatSid.

The biography also mentions that Harivarman had contact with the Mahāsāṅghikas (僧祇部) as well as familiarity with Mahāyāna (方等 vaipluya). Moreover, he is described as aware of all the various teachings of his age but critical of most of them because he considered them later developments and not the “original” Buddhist teachings. He is described as intent upon persuading his contemporaries to abandon these later, developed teachings and return to the early sūtras, which he thought represented the original teachings of the Buddha. As a result, he was marginalized by Buddhists of the Sthavira traditions and had to find companionship in the Mahāsāṅghika community. Although the biography suggests that Harivarman earned a great reputation in India by defeating a Vaiśeṣika teacher in debate and was honored by the king, there is no account of this feat nor any record of the TatSid found in any Indic source. As a result, it is certainly possible that the introduction of the TatSid into China was a result not of its importance in India but rather a result of Kumārajīva’s isolated effort that reflects merely his own preference.

1.3.2 Harivarman’s School Affiliation

The school affiliation of Harivarman is a very thorny issue that has bothered Buddhist scholars for hundreds of years. Jizang (吉藏 549-623 CE), a Chinese master who is considered the founder of the Sanlun School (三論宗 “The School of Three Treatise”), criticized the doctrines of the TatSid extensively in his works. In his Profound Meanings of the Three Treatises (三論玄義), he lists several opinions about Harivarman’s school affiliation:

Question: As Harivarman rejects the eight skandha [of the Jñāna prasthāna] and criticizes the five sects, then what is the doctrine that the *Tattvasiddhi school relies on?
Answer: Some say that [he] chooses and follows those who are right and records whoever is superior. [He] discards those inferior [teachings] of

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30 For a list of the places in the TatSid that mention the titles of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts and give quotations from them, see U1 1933: 6.
31 No. 1852 三論玄義 (卷 1) T45, p3b24-c1: 間跋摩既排斥八犍。陶汰五部。成實之宗正依何義。答有人言。擇善而從。有能必錄。棄眾師之短。取諸部之長。有人言。雖復斥排群異。正用曇無德部。有人言。偏斥毘曇。專同譬喻。真諦三藏云。用經部義也。椷覺舍論。經部之義多同成實。
different teachers and adopts the superior [teachings] from different sects. Others say that though he rejects all different [teachings], he mainly adopts [the teachings of] the Dharmaguptaka sect (曇無德部). Others say that [he] criticizes extensively the Abhidharma, and agrees specifically with the Dārṣṭāntikas.

The Tripitaka master Paramārtha (真諦三藏) says that [Harivarman] adopts the meanings of the Sautrāntikas (經部). When the Abhidharmakośa is examined, those meanings attributed to the Sautrāntika sect mostly agree with the *Tattvasiddhi*.

In this passage, Jizang lists four opinions on the school affiliation of the TatSid:

1. Not affiliated with any specific sect. It is an eclectic work that adopts from many different sources teachings considered by Harivarman to be correct.
2. Harivarman adopts the doctrines of the Dharmaguptaka sect.
3. Harivarman is a Dārṣṭāntika and criticizes the Abhidharma teachers.
4. According to Paramārtha, by comparing the records of the Sautrāntika positions in the Abhidharmakośa with the positions in the TatSid, it is clear that Harivarman is a Sautrāntika.

In another place, Jizang also records another opinion that (5) the TatSid emerged from the Bahuśrutīya sect (多聞部). And Jizang also notes that in Kumārajīva’s time some Chinese considered (6) Harivarman a Mahāyānist and the TatSid a Mahāyāna text.

Katsura Shōryu (Katsura 1974:29) has also noticed that in addition to these positions regarding Harivarman and the TatSid’s school affiliation, Fukuhara Ryōgon (Fukuhara 1969: 25-52) in his study of the TatSid offers more positions: (7) Harivarman is a Sarvāstivādin; and (8) he is a Mahāsāṅghika.

Both Fukuhara and Katsura take the same approach as the ancient Chinese Buddhist historians to the issue of the school affiliation of Harivarman and the TatSid: they examine the doctrinal positions of Harivarman as laid out in the TatSid and compare them with those recorded in the Abhidharma texts and in Buddhist doxographical accounts.

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32 偏斥毘曇 can also be understood as “he is inclined to criticize the Abhidharma.”

33 No. 1852 三論玄義 (卷 1) T45, p9a8-17: 至二百年中。從大眾部內又出一部。名多聞部。大眾部唯弘淺義棄於深義。佛在世時有仙人。值佛得羅漢。恒隨佛往他方及天上聽法。佛涅槃時其人不見。在雪山坐禪。至佛滅度後二百年中。從雪山出覓諸同行。見大眾部唯弘淺義不知深法。其人具足誦淺深義。深義中有大乘義。成實論即從此部出。時人有信其所說者。故別成一部。名多聞部。

34 No. 1852 三論玄義 (卷 1) T45, p3c17-20: 或有人言。此論明於滅諦。與大乘均致。羅什聞而歎曰。秦人之無深識。何乃至此乎。吾常疑其普信大乘者。當知悟不由中。而迷可識矣。
And by such comparisons, they reach the same conclusion, namely, that Harivarman’s positions agree mostly with the Bahuśrutīyas (多聞部). Fukuhara (Fukuhara 1969: 25-52) examines all the accounts and finds that the TatSid has doctrinal positions shared with all of the schools mentioned. His conclusion that Harivarman was a Bahuśrutīya is mainly based on the account from the translator Paramārtha (真諦 499-569 CE), and he believes that Paramārtha’s account came directly from India and hence must be more reliable (51). Katsura (1974: 29-49) examines the ten points of controversy discussed in the introduction section of the TatSid. finds that on these ten issues only the Bahuśrutīyas, the Prajñāptivādins, and the Theravādins have no disagreement with Harivarman. But the Prajñāptivādins and the Theravādins have issues other than these ten that disagree with Harivarman. Thus, the Bahuśrutīya is the only option left.

I would suggest that such a quest for a school affiliation is based on an unjustified notion of “school,” and hence unfruitful. I want to draw attention to one sentence in Xuanchang’s biography of Harivarman, which records that Harivarman spent several years studying the tripiṭaka extensively, investigated the origin of the “nine branches” of Buddhist teachings, and realized that “the [division] of the five sects (部 *nikāya) founded the base for the flow of the branches (五部創流盪之基), and that Kātyāyana started the partisan competition (迦旃啟偏競之始).” Here, Xuanchang differentiates two notions regarding Buddhist groups, namely, “sects” (部 *nikāya) and “branches” (流 *srotas). Apparently, the five “sects” refer to the five Buddhist sects that have their own monastic ordination orders based on their own Vinaya lineages. As Yinshun (2000b: 138-9) has noticed, the knowledge of the division of the five sects after Upagupta has been noted in a few Chinese translations of Indic texts and works written by Chinese monks. The five sects are the Mahāsāṅghika, Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Kāśyapīya, Kṣapāyana, and Mahāsāṃghika.

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35 The ten points of controversy discussed in the introductory section of the TatSid are: (1) Do the past and future exist? (2) Does all exist? (3) Is there an intermediate existence (antarābhava) between death and rebirth? (4) Are the four truths understood successively or simultaneously? (5) Can an Arhant relapse? (6) Is citta by nature pure and radiant? (7) Are anuśayas associated with citta? (8) Does past karma exist? (9) Is the Buddha included in the saṅgha? (10) Does a “person” (pudgala) exist?

36 No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷 11) T55, p78e19-21: 遂乃數載之中。窮三藏之旨。考九流之源。方知五部創流盪之基。迦旃啟偏競之始。“Partisan competition” (偏競) likely has the sense of identifying oneself with a certain group or school, in competition with other groups.
and Mahiśāsaka. Their respective vinayas are extant in Chinese translations. Aside from the five sects, Xuanchang also mentions nine “branches” (*srotas). The number “nine” is not likely to be used as an exact number, because in Chinese the number “nine” can be understood as a general term meaning as “quite a few.” So it appears that Xuanchang believes that in Harivarman’s time there were five Buddhist Vinaya sects and several more “branches” or schools that disagreed with each other. This might not be an exact description of the situation in Harivarman’s time, but there is no doubt that at that time the Buddhist community already had a number of groups disagreeing and arguing with each other upon doctrinal issues. Xuanchuang suggests that Harivarman was disillusioned with these divisions, studied all the Buddhist texts available, and believed that he had found the origin of all the sects and branches.

Any attempt to reconstruct the early history of these five Vinaya “sects” and various “branches” quickly reveals that the history of Buddhist groups is very complicated, far more complicated than the simple picture presented even in a comparatively early doxographical text such as the Samayabhedoparacanacakra attributed to the Sarvāstivāda master Vasumitra. Traditional Buddhist historians such as Vasumitra failed to recognize the difference between Vinaya sects and doctrinal schools, and combined these two categories in their accounts. In addition, doctrinal schools may be congruent with Vinaya sects, as, for example, in the case of the Sarvāstivādins. Furthermore, the term “doctrinal school” might be inaccurate in the case of labels such as Sarvāstivāda and Vibhajyavāda, especially in the early period. Respectively, these two names literally mean “those associated with the doctrine that everything exists” and “those associated with discrimination” and would at most suggest perhaps types of Buddhist teachers who held certain doctrinal positions or approaches. It is entirely possible that in the earliest period such teachers did not constitute formal groups or schools but were just loosely described by these names. Other later names such as the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas may also be such loose descriptors. However, disputes and debates among the various teachers may have intensified over time, resulting in clearer distinctions among doctrinal positions, which together with certain other social factors may have led

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37 For a survey of Vinaya literature, see Prebish 1994. For more extensive studies of the Vinaya texts, see Yinshun 印順 1988a: 66-88, 105-462; also Hirakawa 1999-2000.
Furthermore, as Xuanchang in his biography of Harivarman records, Harivarman blames Kātyāyana as the first one who started the “partisan competition” (迦旃啟偏競之始). It is interesting to note that among the extant Abhidharma/Abhidhamma texts, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts appear to be more overtly polemical and record disputes between the Sarvāstivādins and teachers of other groups, most notably in the Vijñānakāya and the *Mahāvibhāṣā, which is a commentary to the Jñānapрастhāna attributed to Kātyāyana, or Kātyāyanīputra. It also appears that the Sarvāstivādins were more likely to identify their opponents by mentioning the names of teachers and groups, while the Kathāvatthu, the only polemical Pāli Abhidhamma text, does not contain the names of opponents. So Xuanchang’s characterization of Harivarman’s view, namely, that the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas initiated this practice of debate that classifies positions by the names of teachers and groups would appear to be consistent with the extant texts. And, we might view accounts of Buddhist teachers, sects, and schools in works such as the Samayabhedoparacanacakra and the *Mahāvibhāṣā as not simply passively recording history but instead actively creating, at least in the minds of the compilers and readers, sects and schools that accord with the names used. For example, the Dārṣṭāntikas, according to Kuiji, were teachers who liked to use stories in their teachings, and this style of teaching may not be related to specific doctrinal positions. However, in the MVŚ the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhasikas singled out the Dārṣṭāntika teachers Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva, and attacked their doctrinal positions. By doing so the Vaibhāṣikas actually turned the term “Dārṣṭāntika” from a style classifier into a group identifier. If such a group identifier were then accepted and became a convention, the group would come to exist and be understood as an actual historical entity by later historians.

From this perspective, any attempt to determine the “school affiliation” of Harivarman is doomed to failure simply because we cannot be certain about the history of those “schools” with which we might attempt to affiliate him. These names that were understood as schools in the Abhidharma texts were actually fluid and changing throughout history. The method that Fukuhara and Katsura adopted of comparing his doctrinal positions with characteristic doctrines of schools recorded in traditional Buddhist history and Abhidharma texts is based on the same presupposition held by the
ancient Abhidharma teachers, namely, that school labels refer to specific historical groups with distinct doctrinal positions. Although these later views constitute important historical data in their own right for the period in which they were formed, they cannot be expected to yield accurate historical descriptions of an earlier period.

Nonetheless, it is still possible to say something about Harivarman’s affiliation. First of all, according to the biography, he was ordained in the Sarvāstivāda order and was thus a Sarvāstivādin at least in vinaya lineage or monastic affiliation. However, he did not subscribe to the doctrine that “all dharmas exist all the time.” Moreover, Harivarman’s teacher Kumāralāta was labeled a Dārṣṭāntika and in fact many of Harivarman’s opinions in the TatSid agree with those of teachers such as Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva whom the MVŚ labels as Dārṣṭāntikas. Thus, he can at least in part be considered a Dārṣṭāntika, provided the label is understood not as a sect or a separate doctrinal school but as describing certain teachers within the Sarvāstivāda order who shared some common doctrinal positions.

1.4 The *Tattvasiddhi

1.4.1 Kumārajiva’s Translation

A brief postscript to the Chinese translation of the *Tattvasiddhi, which was apparently added by the Chinese editor of the translation, records vividly how the treatise was translated:

In the thirteenth year of the Great Qin (大秦) Hongshi (弘始) era, when the year star (i.e. Jupiter) was in the constellation of Shiwei (豕韋), on the eighth day of the ninth month, the Shangshuling (尚書令 a title of a court official) Yaoxian (姚顯) requested that Kumārajīva translate this treatise. [The translation] was not finished until the next year on the fifteenth day of the ninth month. The foreign dharma master (法師) Kumārajīva (拘摩羅耆

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38 The postscript is not present in the Taishō edition of the TatSid but is preserved in the Chu Sanzang Ji Ji (出三藏記集) composed by Sengyou (僧祐 445-518 CE), which is a collection of prefaces and postscripts from Buddhist texts.

39 No. 2145 出三藏記集 (卷11) T55, p78a7-10: 大秦弘始十三年歲次豕韋九月八日。尚書令姚顯請出此論。至來年九月十五日訖。外國法師拘摩羅耆婆手執胡本口自傳譯。曇晷筆受。
Yinshun (2000a: 196) suggests that “Tan’gui (曇晷)” is likely a scribal error for “Tanying (曇影),” a prominent student and assistant of Kumārajīva. The biography of Tanying in the *Biographies of Prominent Monks* (高僧傳 T2059) contains the following record:42

[Yao]xing (姚興 366-416 CE, an emperor of the Later Qin (後秦)) ordered [Tanying] to reside in the Xiaoyao Garden to assist Kumārajīva in the translation of sūtras. The first translation [with which he was involved] was the *Chengshilun* (成實論 the *Tattvasiddhi*), in which the questions and answers within debates are all presented back and forth, one after another. [Tan]ying disliked the disjointedness of [the text], so [he] organized [it] into five parts (五番). When it was finished, [he] presented [it] to Kumārajīva. Kumārajīva said, “Great! You have understood my intention very well.”

This passage presents a detail describing Tanying’s role in the translation of the TatSid. He noticed that the TatSid contained many arguments presented by different parties in debates, which were “disjointed” (支離) and difficult to track, and as a result he organized the text into five parts (五番).43 This record confirms that Kumārajīva’s assistant in the translation of the TatSid was Tanying (曇影).

In addition, a later commentary of the TatSid notes that the translation had two
In the thirteenth year of the *Hongshi* era under the reign of the *Qin* emperor Yaoxing, *Shangshuling* Yaoxian requested that the dharma master translate this treatise. There was an audience of 300 people. It was received and written down by [Tan]ying. When it was first translated, before the Chinese was corrected, the monk DaoSong (道嵩) made [it] public. When the text was revised, the previous version had already circulated widely. As a result, both versions circulated. The previous version has the [term] *nianchu* (念處) for *smṛtyupasthāna*, while the latter version has *yichu* (憶處).

This passage provides more details on the translation. It notes that the translation process was something like a public class: Kumārajīva translated the treatise orally in front of an audience of 300 people, and Tanying wrote it down. After that, the written text was further revised and polished. However, it appears that the monk DaoSong (道嵩) was too eager and published a draft of the translation before it was revised. As an example of difference between the draft and the final version, this record cites the translation of one term: for the word *smṛtyupasthāna* in the original, the draft version has *nianchu* (念處), while the final revised version has *yichu* (憶處).

It is not clear how accurate this record is regarding the translation and circulation of the text. A search of the Taishō edition of the TatSid indicates that both *nianchu* (念處) and *yichu* (憶處) occur in the text.45 *Nianchu* (念處) is the standard term used by Kumārajīva to translate *smṛtyupasthāna*, and *yichu* (憶處) never occurs in his other translations. The fact that both *nianchu* (念處) and *yichu* (憶處) are present in the Taishō edition conflicts with the record of this commentary and makes difficult to determine whether the Taishō edition represents the draft or the final version of the translation. The

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44 This passage is from Zhizang’s (智藏 458-522 CE) *Chengshihun Dayi Ji* (成實論大義記), a commentary to the TatSid. This commentary has been lost, but this passage has been quoted in a commentary on the *Sanlun Xianyi* (三論玄義) composed in Japan in the thirteenth century CE: No. 2300 三論玄義検幽集 T70, 418a7-16: 案大義記初卷序論緣起云。眾無部此士不傳。成實一論。制作之士名訶梨跋摩梁語師子鎬。又云。秦主姚興弘始十三年尚書令姚顯請者波法師於長安始譯此論聽衆三百。亦影筆受。其初譯國語未暇治正而沙門道嵩便齋宣流。及改定前傳已廣。是故此論遂兩本俱行。其身受心法名念處者前本也。名為憶處者後本也。今檢論本或有二十卷或有十六卷。

45 忆處 occurs in chapters 19, 185, 187; 念處 occurs in chapters 5, 17, 18, 21, 60, 65, 82, 116, 183, 184, 187, 188, 189; and in chapter 186, there is one case of 念念處.
Chapter 1. Introduction

TatSid in the Taishō edition (T1646) is based on the 2nd Edition of the Korean Canon (高麗藏再雕版 1236-1251), collated and compared with the same text in the Zifu Canon (資福藏 ca.1241-1252), the Puning Canon (普寧藏 1277-1290), the Jingshan Canon (徑山藏 1589-1712), the Chongning Canon (崇寧藏 1080-1112), and the Shōsō-in (正倉院) Manuscript Collection (739-740). In this study, the Taishō edition of the text is compared with the Zhonghua Dazangjing (中華大藏經) edition, which is also based on the 2nd Edition of the Korean Canon (高麗藏再雕版), and was edited through comparison with several other editions of the Chinese canon: the Fangshan Stone-Carved Canon (房山石經 ca. 1095), the Zifu Canon (資福藏), the Jin Canon (金藏 ca.1139-1172), the Qisha Canon (碕砂藏 1216-1322), the Puning Canon (普寧藏), the Southern Canon of the Yongle Era (永樂南藏 1413-1420), the Jingshan Canon (徑山藏), and the Qing Canon (清藏 1735-1738). In chapters 60-67 of the TatSid, which are examined in the present project, no significant variations are found between the Taishō and the Zhonghua editions. A couple of minor variations, which do not affect the meaning of the text, are noted in the footnotes to the translation presented in chapter 5.

Regarding the different translations nianchu (念處) and yichu (憶處), in the sections studied (chs. 60-67), the term corresponding to smṛtyupasthāna in all cases is nianchu (念處), and yichu (憶處) is not found. Moreover, since yichu (憶處) only occurs in three chapters of the text and nianchu (念處) in thirteen chapters, it is possible, as Fukuhara concludes, that the widely circulated version of the TatSid is the so-called “draft” version.

1.4.2 The Title

Kumārajīva translated the title of text as Chengshilun (成實論) “the treatise that accomplishes reality.” Because no Indic reference to this text remains, the original Indic

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46 Deleanu includes an extensive survey of the Chinese editions of the Buddhist canon. See Deleanu 2006: 112-9; 130-1.
47 This is the opinion of Fukuhara (1969: 5), but he does not notice that 憶處 also occurs in the Taishō version.
title is uncertain. Some scholars reconstruct the title as Satya-siddhi. However, the more common translation of the term satya in Chinese is di (諦) “truth,” so if the title were Satya-siddhi then the Chinese translation of the title would more likely be Chengdilun 成諦論 instead of Chengshilun 成實論. Katsura (1974: 1) suggests that La Vallée Poussin’s rendering *Tattvasiddhi appears to be more suitable, because in the translation of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Kumārajīva translates tattva as shi 實 “reality,” and satya as di 諦 “truth.”

Recently, Yao Zhihuan (Yao 2005: 98) has noticed that in a thirteenth century commentary to the Sanlun Xuanyi (三論玄義 Profound teachings of the Three Treatises) written in Japan, the author Chōzen (澄禪 1227-1307 CE) quotes an early commentary on the TatSid, which records the original Indic title:

The Chengshilun’s (成實論) complete Indic Sanskrit title is preserved; it should read shenajia (闍那迦) bolouwu (波樓侮) youpotishe (優婆提舍). Shenajia (闍那迦) is also called piliu (毘留), translated as cheng (成 accomplished); bolouwu (波樓侮) is also called yetaba (夜他跋), translated as shi (實 reality); youpotishe (優婆提舍 upadeśa) is translated as lunwen (論文 treatise text).

This passage gives a transliteration of the Indic title as shenajia-bolouwu-youpotishe (闍那迦波樓侮優婆提舍). The last part is clearly the standard rendering of upadeśa, but it is much more difficult to reconstruct the original Indic terms from the first two parts, which correspond to the Chinese chengshi (成實 the accomplishment of reality). Yao Zhihua (Yao 2005: 98) suggests that it is janaka-parama. Even though janaka phonetically matches 闍那迦, parama does not match 波樓侮, in which lou 樓 more likely corresponds to ru or lu, and 侮 more likely corresponds to mu. Furthermore, since the meaning of janaka-parama does not match the meaning of “accomplishing reality” well, janaka-parama is not likely as the original title of the text.

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49 Chōzen 澄禪 (1227-1307) No. 2300 三論玄義檢幽集 T70, p417c1-5: 四論玄第十成壞義云。成實論具存天竺之正音應云闍那迦波樓侮優婆提舍也。闍那迦亦名毘留此翻為成。波樓侮亦名夜他跋翻為實。優婆提舍翻為論文。
Willemen (2006) proposes another reconstruction of the title. He suggests that shenajia 阇那迦 is an abbreviated form of Jñānakāya, bolouwu 波樓侮 corresponds to prodbhūta, so the reconstructed title should be Jñānakāyaprodbhūtopadeśa. However, this theory cannot account for the sentence “Shenajia (闇那迦) is also called piliu (毘留), translated as cheng (成 accomplished).” So Willemen suggests that the sentence is incomplete due to a scribal mistake, and the full sentence should be like 闇那迦[翻為智身。波楼]亦名毘留此翻為成。“Shenajia (闇那迦 *jñānakāya) is [translated as zhishen (智身 body of knowledge). Bolou (波樓)] is also called piliu (毘留), translated as cheng (成 accomplished).”

Willemen’s reconstruction too is unsatisfactory. First, the transliteration shenajia 阇那迦 also occurs in Kumārajīva’s translation of Nāgārjuna’s *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (大智度論 T1509), in which shenajia 阇那迦 is a personal name for a “medicine king” (藥王 bhaisajyarāja).50 In a Sanskrit-Chinese glossary made in the Tang dynasty (T2130 翻梵語), the name of this particular medicine king is rendered “accomplishing work” (成事).51 Thus, it is likely that Shenajia (闇那迦) does indeed mean “accomplish” and is not a transliteration of jñānakāya. Possible transliterations corresponding to Shenajia (闇那迦) include janaka, canaka, or jñāna, but, since none of these has the meaning “accomplish,” the Indic equivalent for this part of the title is still uncertain. As for the next part bolouwu (波樓侮), if Willemen’s reconstruction of the first part as jñānakāya is incorrect, then the bolouwu (波樓侮) also cannot be prodbhūta. It is more likely a transliteration for something like *palumu, but other than parama, which is not likely as an equivalent, it would be difficult to find another Indic word that resembles *palumu and has the meaning “reality.” Further research is needed to solve the mystery of the title. Thus, this study will follow Katsura and simply use the title *Tattvasiddhi.

50 No. 1509 大智度論 (卷 8) T25, p118c3-5: 復次九十六種眼病。闇那迦藥王所不能治者。唯佛世尊能令得視。
51 No. 2130 翻梵語 (卷 4) T54, p1008c14: 阇那迦藥王(譯曰成事)。
1.4.3 Study of the *Tattvasiddhi in China and Japan

Following Kumārajīva’s translation, the TatSid was first taught by Sengrui (僧叡 or 僧睿, ca. 4th-5th c. CE), one of Kumārajīva’s prominent Chinese students. The biography of Sengrui in the Biographies of Prominent Monks (高僧傳)\(^{52}\) records one anecdote concerning the TatSid:\(^{53}\)

Later Kumārajīva translated the TatSid and commanded Sengrui to teach it. Kumārajīva said to Sengrui, “Seven places in this polemical treatise refute Abhidharma, but [they were] expressed implicitly. One would have to be a genius to understand them without asking.” Sengrui expounded the profound and subtle [teachings of the treatise] without consulting Kumārajīva, and [his teaching] agrees with [Kumārajīva’s understanding]. Kumārajīva exclaimed, “Meeting you in my [career of] transmitting and translating Buddhist sūtras and treatises leaves me really no regret!”

This story suggests that TatSid began to be studied and taught immediately after Kumārajīva finished the translation. Moreover, it would appear that at least part of the reason Kumārajīva and his students studied this treatise was because it contains criticism of Abhidharma. Kumārajīva is known as a promoter of Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka tradition, and the main target of criticism in the Madhyamaka tradition is the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. However, in Madhyamaka texts, the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma positions were not always clearly stated. As a result, it is understandable that Kumārajīva would use the TatSid as a textbook for his students to study Abhidharma in a critical way, namely, to know and understand the Abhidharma theories and positions without agreeing with them. It would appear that Sengrui understood his intention very well. Nonetheless, two other students of Kumārajīva were more renowned for their study and teaching of the TatSid:\(^{54}\) Sengdao (僧導 362-457 CE) and Sengsong (僧嵩 date unknown).

After Kumārajīva died, Sengdao (僧導) was stationed primarily in the city Shouchun

\(^{52}\) Compiled around 519 CE by Huijiao 慧皎 (497-554 CE).
\(^{53}\) No. 2059 高僧傳 (卷 6) T50, p364b7-11: 後出成實論令叡講之。什謂叡曰。此諍論中有七處文破毘曇。而在言小隱。若能不問而解可謂英才。至叡啟發幽微果不諮什而契然懸會。什歎曰。吾傳譯經論得與子相值。真無所恨矣。
\(^{54}\) The following discussion of the study of and commentaries on the TatSid depends mainly on Tang 1955: 720ff.
Chapter 1. Introduction

55 and wrote a commentary on the TatSid. Several of his students also became famous for their studies of the TatSid, the most prominent being Daomeng (道猛 413-475 CE). Because this lineage of the study of the TatSid began with Sengdao (僧導) and was centered in Shouchun (壽春), it is called the “Shouchun lineage” (壽春系). Kumārajīva’s other student, Sengsong (僧嵩), worked in Pengcheng (彭城) and was likely the one who circulated the unrevised draft of the translation. Thus, he initiated the “Pengcheng lineage” (彭城系) of the TatSid. His student Sengyuan (僧淵 414-481 CE) was also renowned for his study of the TatSid, and he had four famous students: Tandu (曇度 ?-489), Huiji (惠紀 date unknown), Daodeng (道登 412-496), and Huiqiu (惠球 431-504).

During the remainder of the Southern and Northern dynasties (南北朝 420-589), the following Sui (隋 581-618) dynasty, through early Tang (618-690) dynasty, the study of the TatSid was very popular in China. Ui Hakuju (Ui 1933: 17-9) has listed nearly one hundred teachers who were known for their study and teaching of the TatSid, many of whom also wrote commentaries on the text. Tang Yongtong (Tang 1955: 728-10) collected the titles of twenty-four such commentaries mentioned in the historical records of this period. Unfortunately, all of these commentaries have been lost.

Certainly, the TatSid became a popular and important text, but it should also be mentioned that most of the teachers renowned for their study of the TatSid were also teaching other sūtras and treatises. Even though some of these teachers were called “Chenshi masters” (成實師), one should not assume that in the early period there was a separate school dedicated to the study of the TatSid alone. As Tang Yongtong has observed (Tang 1955: 718-9), it is only after Jizang (吉藏 549-623 CE), who in his works fiercely attacked the TatSid from a Madhyamaka perspective, that people began to have the impression that there existed a separate school centered on the TatSid, and thus the term “Chengshi School” (成實宗) appeared.

Perhaps partly due to Jizang’s criticism, the TatSid came to be widely acknowledged

55 Now, Shou County (寿县) in Anhui Province.
56 Now, XuZhou (徐州) city in Jiangsu Province.
as a “Hīnayāna” text, and its study became less and less popular when most Buddhists in China identified themselves as “Mahāyānists.” Also, during the Tang dynasty, new Chinese Buddhist schools such as Huayan (華嚴宗) and Chan (禪) were gaining more popularity, and, more importantly, the large number of Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts Xuanzang had brought back from India attracted more attention among those who were interested in Abhidharma studies. So the TatSid, as an old translation of “Hīnayāna” Abhidharma not associated with any particular school lineage, fell into oblivion. As Hirai Shunei (Hirai et al. 1999-2000: 31) noticed, the last record of the study of the TatSid states that Xuanzang had studied the TatSid with Daoshen (道深) in the year 622 CE before he went to India. After that, no study of the text is mentioned in the biographies of Chinese Buddhists.

During the Tang Dynasty, the TatSid was transmitted to Japan. In the era of the Tenmu emperor (天武天皇 673-686), the monk Daozang (道藏) from Baekje (百濟, a kingdom on the Korea peninsula), a monk of the Sanlun School (三論宗), came to Japan and first taught the TatSid there. He also wrote a commentary on the TatSid. However, the study of the TatSid in Japan has always been subsumed under the Sanlun School (三論宗), or the Chinese tradition of the Madhyamaka, and never constituted a separate school by itself. After Daozang, no new commentary on the TatSid was written in Japan. During the Kamakura period (鎌倉時代 1185-1333), with the new Buddhist movements such as the Pure land, Zen, and Nichiren, the study of the TatSid gradually disappeared completely. Daozang’s commentary to the TatSid, together with all the Chinese commentaries, were all lost in Japan as well.

1.4.4 Structure of the *Tattvasiddhi and the Section on Mind
The *Tattvasiddhi in the Taishō edition (T1646) has sixteen fascicles (巻), but some early Chinese catalogs record different numbers of fascicles such as fourteen, twenty,
twenty-four, or twenty-seven.\textsuperscript{59} This is understandable because the number of fascicles varies depending on the size of the written characters, the size of the pages, and how many pages were bound in a fascicle (卷). However, all catalog records unanimously agree that the TatSid has 202 chapters (品). Moreover, as mentioned earlier, a biographical record claims that it was Kumārajīva’s Chinese student Tanying (昙影) who divided the chapters into five sections (聚 skandha).\textsuperscript{60} Historical records do not provide further details about the text and its translation, so it is not clear whether the order of the individual chapters reflects the Indic original, or whether the chapter titles were added or changed by the translators.

The TatSid translation as extant is organized according to the principle of the four noble truths. It consists of an introductory section (發聚), and four more sections corresponding to the four truths, with each section (except for the section of the truth of cessation) containing several sub-sections. The following is a brief list of the contents of the five sections:\textsuperscript{61}

I. Introduction (發聚) (chapters 1-35)
   1. The three treasures of Buddhism (三寶) (1-12)
   2. Introduction to the treatise and its content (13-18)
   3. Ten points of controversy (19-35)

II. The truth of suffering (苦諦聚) (36-94)
   1. Form (rūpa 色) (36-59)
   2. Consciousness (vijñāna 識) (60-76)
   3. Apperception (saṃjñā 想) (77)
   4. Feeling (vedanā 受) (78-83)
   5. Volitional formations (saṃskāra 行) (84-94)

III. The truth of origin (集諦聚) (95-140)

\textsuperscript{59} No. 2157 貞元新定釋教目錄 (卷 6) T55, p810a9: 成實論二十巻或二十四或二十七或十六或十四…
\textsuperscript{60} See chapter 1, footnotes 42 and 43.
\textsuperscript{61} The list presented here mainly follows Katsura 1974:4-5.
Chapter 1. Introduction

1. Karma (業) (95-120)
2. Defilements (煩惱 kleśa) (121-140)

IV. The truth of cessation (滅諦聚) (141-154)

V. The truth of the path (道諦聚) (155-202)

1. Concentration (定 samādhi) (155-188)
2. Insight (慧 prajñā) (189-202)

The present study focuses on the mind (or consciousness vijñāna) sub-section within section II, whose contents are as follows:

II.2 Consciousness (識 vijñāna)

Chapter 60. Proving the non-existence of mental factors (立無數品)
Chapter 61. Proving the existence of mental factors (立有數品)
Chapter 62. Refuting the non-existence of mental factors (非無數品)
Chapter 63. Refuting the existence of mental factors (非有數品)
Chapter 64. Illuminating the non-existence of mental factors (明無數品)
Chapter 65. There is no association (無相應品)
Chapter 66. Proving the existence of association (有相應品)
Chapter 67. Refuting association (非相應品)
Chapter 68. There are multiple consciousnesses (多心品)
Chapter 69. There is one consciousness (一心品)
Chapter 70. Refuting multiple consciousnesses (非多心品)
Chapter 71. Refuting one consciousness (非一心品)
Chapter 72. Illuminating multiple consciousnesses (明多心品)
Chapter 73. Consciousness stays temporarily (識暫住品)
Chapter 74. Consciousness does not stay (識無住品)
Chapter 75. Multiple consciousnesses arise simultaneously (識俱生品)
Chapter 76. Consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously (識不俱生品)
These seventeen chapters can be reorganized into five groups according to the topics discussed:

Chapters 60-64, on mental factors (*caitasika*)
Chapters 65-67, on association (*samprayoga*)
Chapters 68-72, on the multiplicity of consciousness
Chapters 73-74, on the momentariness of consciousness
Chapters 75-76, on whether multiple consciousnesses can occur simultaneously

Each major topic contains the arguments of both Harivarman and his opponents, but each chapter only records the arguments of one side. For example, in the group of chapters on the topic of mental factors (*caitasika*), chapter 60 lists Harivarman’s arguments against the notion of *caitasika*, chapter 61 lists the opponent’s arguments for the existence of *caitasikas*, chapter 62 lists the opponent’s refutation to Harivarman’s arguments in chapter 60, chapter 63 lists Harivarman’s refutation of the opponent’s arguments in chapter 61, and finally chapter 64 lists some further arguments from Harivarman to support his conclusion that *caitasikas* do not exist. In the case of topics that are not so complicated, for example, the last group including chapters 75 and 76, there may be only two chapters that list the arguments of Harivarman and his opponent separately.

The present study focuses on the first two inter-related topics of mental factors (*caitasika*) and association (*samprayoga*) discussed in the first two groups, chapters 60-64 and 65-67. The original organization of the arguments of the two sides of the dispute is complex. For example, the opponent’s refutation to an argument of Harivarman in chapter 60 is listed in chapter 62, and Harivarman’s rejoinder is listed in chapter 64. In this way the relevant arguments regarding one doctrinal point appear in different chapters and are hard to follow. In the following chapters, in order to make the text clear and easy to follow, the arguments in these chapters will be reorganized around each doctrinal point, with relevant arguments from different chapters placed together. However, in the translation of the original text, the original order of the arguments will remain intact.
1.4.5 Textual Lineage

As mentioned in previous sections, it makes little sense to consider Harivarman’s doctrinal positions in terms of a specific school affiliation. However, by comparing different versions of a text or by noting references to other texts, it may be possible to trace the preservation and transmission of texts, and understand the development of these texts as well as of the doctrines contained in them. In the TatSid, both Harivarman and his opponents quote numerous early sūtras as scriptural authority in their arguments to prove their own positions and argue against the other side. Fukuhara (1969: 18-22) has identified seventy sūtras that are quoted in the TatSid. In the present study of chapters 60-67, sūtra references have been identified, and when there are differences among the version(s) preserved in the Chinese Āgamas and the Pāli Nikāyas, the versions quoted in the TatSid almost unanimously agree with the Chinese version(s). The following list gives the location of such sūtra references in chapters 60-67 of the TatSid:

60.12: The sūtra passage quoted (SĀ no. 294) by Harivarman has the phrase “internally there is the body with consciousness” (*antardhā savijñānah kāyah 內有識身), but the parallel Pāli version (S II 23-4) has only kāya, and an extant Sanskrit fragment of the sūtra has savijñānah kāyah but not *antardhā.

65.26: The sūtra quoted in the TatSid on the seven bodhyaṅgas has an extra sentence that is absent in the Pāli version (S V 312-3, 331-3), but exists in the Chinese SĀ nos. 281, 810 and the quotation in the Dharmaskandha.

65.30: The name of the seventh purification 行斷知見淨 *pratipadāprahānajñānadarśanaviśuddhi is the same as the one in the Chinese MĀ but different from ūnaddasanavisuddhi in the Pāli and the Chinese EĀ versions.

65.31: The sūtra quoted 因緣經 *Hetupratyaya occurs only in the SĀ (no. 334) and has no parallel in the Pāli Nikāyas.

66.1: The sūtra quoted has an expanded formula of the view of personal-existence (satkāyadrṣṭi), which exists in the Chinese SĀ (no.109) but not in the Pāli Nikāyas.

66.2: The Manusya-sūtra quoted is present in the SĀ and is the same as the one quoted in the AKBh, but this sūtra has no Pāli parallel.
66.4: The sūtra quoted has a phrase 智相應 *jñānasamprayukta that is present in the Chinese MĀ (no.186), the Saṅgītiparyāya, and the Dharmaskandha, but is absent in the Pāli parallel (M I 320).

It should be noted that in these seven cases, three sūtras are also found to be quoted by Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, and the versions quoted in the Abhidharma texts agree with both the versions preserved in Chinese Āgamas and the TatSid. The other three are not quoted in other Abhidharma texts, and the versions quoted in the TatSid agree with the versions in the Chinese SĀ or MĀ, but not the Chinese EĀ and Pāli versions. Since the Chinese SĀ and MĀ would appear to be associated with the Sarvāstivāda school, these six sūtra quotations suggest that Harivarman and his opponents base their arguments on a Sarvāstivāda lineage of sūtra texts. This would accord with Harivarman’s biography, which states that he was ordained and educated in the Sarvāstivāda monastic order.

However, there is one case in which the sūtra quoted in the TatSid does not agree with the Sarvāstivāda version but agrees with the Pāli version: the sūtra quoted in 67.22, in which the Chinese SĀ version and the version quoted in the MVŚ include a key word samādhi, which is missing in both the Pāli version and the version quoted in the TatSid. It is possible that since the word samādhi in the passage would determine the doctrinal position as that of the Sarvāstivādins, Harivarman followed a version of the sūtra that would support his position and yet differs from the Sarvāstivāda version.\(^\text{62}\)

Aside from the sūtra quotations, many of the arguments recorded in the TatSid can find parallels or similar arguments in other extant Abhidharma texts. These parallels indicate that the arguments listed in the TatSid are likely not invented by Harivarman; perhaps he had learned them from his teachers and during his study of early Abhidharma texts. All these parallels are marked and compared in the translation and discussion in chapters 2-3 and 5.

In order to better understand the arguments in the TatSid, we need to understand first the Abhidharma style of argument, which in turn requires knowledge about Abhidharma

\(^{62}\) For more detail on this sūtra quotation, see the translation of 67.22 in chapter 4, and the discussion in 3.4.9.
in general. The next section, 1.5, provides a general introduction to Abhidharma and a brief introduction to Abhidharma styles of argument.

1.5 General Background: Buddhist Abhidharma

Despite the common characterization of early Buddhism as comprising two major traditions, namely, the northern and the southern traditions, both textual and epigraphical evidence from the early period provides evidence of many groups. According to later Buddhist historical records, these groups had their own collections of canonical and post-canonical texts, but most of these early Indian Buddhist texts have been lost. Today the only extant complete collection of canonical texts in an Indic language is that in Pāli. A large number of early Buddhist texts have been preserved in Chinese translation, and these texts have been related to a number of Buddhist sects or schools such as the Sarvāstivāda, Dharmaguptaka, Sammatīya, and so forth.

Historical and textual sources refer to Buddhist textual collections consisting of different numbers of parts, but many comprise three (tripiṭaka/tipiṭaka): (1) vinaya, or texts related to monastic rules; (2) sūtra, or discourses attributed to the Buddha himself or his major disciples; and (3) abhidharma or treatises on Buddhist doctrines. The term abhidharma has many meanings, and among these two are more emphasized within the two major traditions. In the northern tradition, the meaning “concerning dharma” is the dominant interpretation of the term, while in the Southern tradition Abhidhamma is understood as “distinguished teaching.” Nevertheless, both in the Buddhist community and in modern scholarship the term “Abhidharma” is generally used in three senses: (1) Abhidharma as a method of exegesis; (2) Abhidharma as a genre of literature; and (3) Abhidharma as a philosophical system.

From a historical perspective, Abhidharma as a method of exegesis is no doubt the

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63 The *Mahāvibhāṣā* gives a long list of meanings for the term abhidharma. See T No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 1) T27, p4a-c.

64 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya verse 1, p.2:10-11: *tad ayaṃ paramārthhadharmam vā nirvāṇam dharmalaksanam vā pratyabhimukho dharma ityabhidharmacah.* Here, the interpretation of the prefix abhi is pratyabhimukho “facing toward,” hence, “regarding, concerning.” See also Norman 1983: 97.

65 Dhs-a, p.2: *tattha kenaśṭhena abhidhammo? dharmatirekadhhammavisesaththa. atirekavisesathhadipako hettha abhi’saddo.* Buddhaghosa points out that here the prefix abhi is taken as the same as the prefix ati “superior.”
earliest one among these three senses. In the early stratum of Buddhist literature, which is roughly represented by the Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas that are available to us today, the Buddha’s teaching (dharma/dhamma) is said to have nine parts or “limbs” (aṅga).\(^66\) Some later sources expand the list to twelve aṅgas.\(^67\) Among these aṅgas, three can be understood as styles or methods of exegesis: namely, vyākaraṇa/veyyākaraṇa, vedalla/vaipulya, and upadeśa. Vyākaraṇa/veyyākaraṇa means analysis and explanation.\(^68\) The aṅga vedalla in the Theravāda tradition is understood as “question and answer,” while the corresponding vaipulya in the Northern tradition means “explain extensively.”\(^69\) The upadeśa is a later addition to the list of aṅgas. It means “extensive exposition” or “commentary.”\(^70\) Obviously, the meanings of these three aṅgas overlap in that they are all forms of “explanation” or “exposition.” In other words, these terms reflect various styles and methods of exegesis of the Buddha’s teachings within early Buddhism, and they would correspond to Abhidharma in the sense of “regarding/referring to/concerning dharma.” Some Japanese scholars propose that the origin of Abhidharma is related to the style of question and answer, “dialogues concerning doctrine” (dharmakathā),\(^71\) which can also be understood in terms of these three aṅgas as styles and methods of exegesis.

Abhidharma literature as the third “basket” (piṭaka) in the Buddhist canon is generally acknowledged to be a later addition to the other two piṭakas of sūtra/sutta and vinaya. In some early sūtras, the term mātrkā/mātikā is used in reference to the three divisions of Buddhist teaching.\(^72\) Mātrkā/mātikās are lists of doctrinal topics used by Buddhists in their memorization and recitation of the Buddha’s teachings. In the Pāli

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\(^{66}\) V III 8, 9; M I 133; A II 7, 103, 178, 185; A III 86, 87, 88, 177, 361, 362; A IV 113. The list of nine aṅgas can also be found in the following Chinese sources: 大集法門經 (*Samgītisūtra*) T1 p227b; 佛說法集經 (*Dharmasamgītisūtra*) T17, p612a; 本事經 (*Itivṛttaka*) T17 p679b, 684a, 697c.

\(^{67}\) No. 212 出曜經 (卷 6) T04, p643b; No. 1463 眞尼母經 (卷 3) T24, p818a; No. 1451 基本説一切有部毘奈耶雜事 (卷 38) T24, p398c; No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 12) T26, p981b; No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 126) T27, p659c; No. 1562 阿毘達磨末義論 (卷 44) T29, p594c; No. 1646 成實論 (卷 1) T32, p244c; No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 25) T30, p418b. See Lamotte 1988a: 143-7 for a discussion of the nine and twelve aṅgas.

\(^{68}\) Vyākaraṇa can also mean “grammar” or “grammatical analysis.” For a detailed study of the term, see Maeda Egaku 前田惠學 1964: 281ff. Also Yinshun 印順 1988a: 519-39.

\(^{69}\) Maeda Egaku 前田惠學 1964: 389ff.


\(^{71}\) Cox 1995:8, 17n29.

\(^{72}\) A II 147, 148, 169, 170: dharmadharā vinayadharā mātikādharā. T No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 52) T01, p755a17: 比丘持經，持律，持母者。
tradition, these lists are believed to be predecessors of early Buddhist Abhidharma literature.\textsuperscript{73} And indeed some early Abhidharma texts are organized on the basis of these lists, such as the Dhammasaṅgani and the Vibhaṅga of the Theravāda tradition, and the Dharmaskandha and the Saṅgītiparīyāya of the Sarvāstivāda tradition. However, with the further development of Abhidharma, texts no longer followed the structure of the mātrkā/mātikā lists. From the first century BCE onward, many Abhidharma treaties were associated with Buddhist schools, and today there are two sets of nearly complete canonical Abhidharma texts: the seven books of the Sarvāstivāda tradition and the seven books of the Theravāda tradition. In addition to these canonical texts, other Abhidharma texts are preserved that discuss teachings in the canonical texts, or to develop their own new doctrines.

With the development of the Abhidharma texts, teachers of different Buddhist groups developed their own interpretations and philosophical systems. The Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda canonical texts record the interpretations of their teachers, but, aside from certain texts that are preserved in Chinese translation, most original texts of other groups are lost. These later Abhidharma texts contain records of disputes among teachers of different schools, and the TatSid as one such text can provide information about the disputes among Abhidharma teachers.

The TatSid also reflects all three senses of the term Abhidharma:

1. It contains quotations from numerous early sūtras, and both Harivarman and his opponents utilize different methods of exegesis to build their arguments that are based on these sūtra passages.

2. Harivarman’s biography indicates that he studied Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts. In the TatSid, a number of positions can be identified as representing different Abhidharma traditions. Moreover, in a number of places, Harivarman mentions the names of Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts.\textsuperscript{74}

3. The TatSid proposes a well-developed and coherent Abhidharma philosophical system that is different from those of the Sarvāstivādins, the Theravādins, and the


\textsuperscript{74} See Ui 1933: 6. In chapter 135, Harivarman mentions the Abhidharma-kāya (阿毗曇身), which is an epithet for the Jñānaprasthāna; chapters 104, 110, 134 mention the “six feet” (六足) of Abhidharma, which are the six canonical Abhidharma texts of the Sarvāstivāda tradition.
Therefore, there is little doubt that the TatSid can be considered an Abhidharma text. In order to clarify the often complex arguments in the TatSid that are relevant to the present study, it will be helpful to note the different styles of Abhidharma exegesis that it employs. Some chapters in the TatSid bear the characteristics of early Abhidharma methods. For example, chapter 18 *Dharmasaṃgraha (法聚品) preserves a mātrkā, or list of topics, that is very similar to those preserved in early Abhidharma texts such as the Pāli Dhammasaṅgaṇī, the *Śāriputrābhidharma, and the Dhātukāya. In such mātrkās or lists of topics are not only a way of organizing Buddhist teachings, which help Buddhists in their memorization and recitation of texts, but also a way of generating new doctrines and systems through the analysis and combination of categories within the mātrkā lists. With regard to the dispute on “mental factors” (caitasika) and “association” (samprayoga), it is very likely that these two terms, especially the latter one (samprayukta in the mātrkā), may have gained its meaning as “association” in the Abhidharma philosophical sense through the development of the mātrkā list. Also scattered throughout the TatSid are exegeses in the style of questions and answers. For example, the chapter 78 on the aggregate of feeling (vedanāskandha) starts with a question, “What is feeling?” (問曰云何爲受), and immediately following the question is the definition of vedanā: “pleasant, unpleasant, and neither pleasant nor unpleasant.” This is exactly the same method of exposition that occurs in the early Abhidharma texts such as the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and the *Śāriputrābhidharma.

However, most of the chapters in the TatSid are polemical, which means that they record arguments of different parties on specific doctrinal issues. These arguments also follow the Abhidharma tradition of debate, and can be classified into two types:

1. Scriptural (āgama) arguments, which are arguments based on passages from authoritative discourses (sūtra) attributed to the Buddha and his major disciples.

2. Philosophical reasoning (yukti), which are arguments not based on scriptural

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75 For more detailed discussions of mātrkās, see Frauwallner 1995; Gethin 1992.
76 See the detailed discussion of the development of the notion of “mental factor” (caitasika) in 2.1, and the development of “association” (samprayoga) in 3.1.
77 No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p281c17: 問曰云何為受。答曰。苦樂不苦不樂。
authority but on logical reasoning grounded in common sense or in basic presuppositions accepted by all the parties in the debate.

Both of these two types of arguments can be found in the TatSid. For example, in 61.10, the opponent quotes a sūtra passage that contains the term caitasika and argues that the doctrine of “mental factors” was taught by the Buddha himself. Similarly, in 66.4 a sūtra passage containing the term “associated” (samprayukta) supports the argument that the Buddha taught the doctrine of association. These two are direct scriptural (āgama) arguments. The TatSid also contains arguments not based on sūtra teachings but on common sense and logical reasoning. For example, in 65.11, when arguing that there are no other mental phenomena that exist simultaneously with consciousness, Harivarman uses the common-sense example of one person seeing another person: at the moment that the eye sees, there is no discrimination of whether the other person is an enemy or a friend. In other words, in our daily experience, in the first moment that the eye sees another person, the mind does not yet discriminate whether this person is an enemy or a friend. Such discriminations occur in the following moments. In 61.12, the opponent argues that consciousness (citta or vijñāna) is different from mental factors such as feeling (vedanā), because they have different functions just as water and fire are different because of their different functions. In 63.13 Harivarman responds that the different functions of these mental phenomena simply reflect consciousness in its different modes (citta-visēsa); by nature, they are all consciousness (citta). These two are arguments by reasoning (yukti).

However, in the TatSid, these two methods of argument are usually mixed together. Because the doctrines of “mental factors” (caitasika) and “association” (samprayoga) are developed within the Abhidharma traditions and not directly taught in early sūtras, the majority of the arguments in chapters 60-67 involve a sūtra passage that mentions certain mental phenomena, with both sides of the dispute interpreting the sūtra passage in a way that favors their own positions. A good example is the sūtra passage that describes the cognitive process:

Depending on eye and form, eye-consciousness arises; the coming together of the three (namely, the eye, the form, and eye-consciousness) is contact (sparśa)…
In 60.13, Harivarman quotes this passage and argues that, in this description of the cognitive process, the Buddha does not mention any “mental factor.” And if mental factors existed apart from consciousness, as the opponent suggests, at the moment of contact there should more than simply the three things of eye, form, and consciousness. But the Buddha only mentions three things in this passage; therefore, mental factors do not exist. By contrast, the opponent argues in 62.3 that the Buddha mentions consciousness alone because it is the most prominent or superior dharma among all mental phenomena. Furthermore, in 62.4 he adds that because people in the world are more familiar with consciousness than mental factors, in such cases the Buddha mentions consciousness alone, but this does not mean that mental factors do not exist.

Moreover, sometimes one side of the dispute examines the opponent’s position and argues that such a position would lead to a conclusion that contradicts a well-accepted Buddhist teaching. For example, in 66.3, the supporter of caitasika and samprayoga points out that, since in Harivarman’s opinion there are no caitasikas that exist together with citta, at one moment only material forms (rūpa) can coexist with citta. As a result, there should be two and not five aggregates (skandha), and this obviously contradicts Buddha’s teaching. Harivarman answers in 67.2 that the Buddha’s teaching of five skandhas does not necessarily mean that these five must occur all together: just as when people say that a person has feelings, this does not mean that the person has three kinds of feelings, namely, pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral, all at once.

The many arguments in the TatSid, back and forth from different sides, can be extremely complicated, but they are all based on the basic Abhidharma styles of argument that use scriptural (āgama) and logical reasoning (yukti).  

1.6 Methodology

The research in the present project is conducted from three perspectives:

(1) Textual criticism and philological analysis

(2) Doctrinal and philosophical interpretation

78 For a more detailed discussion of Abhidharma exegesis methods, see Cox 1995: 10-16.
(3) Historical analysis

These three aspects are based on the model that a text is a vehicle that carries meanings, and meanings imply intentional mental states such as beliefs, desires, intentions, and so forth, that are superimposed on the words and sentences of the text. For a text such as the TatSid that has a long history, the intentional states that are carried in the text are complex: the text available to us is not a product of one person at one time but instead has been reworked by many people through different historical periods, in different geographical areas, and in different cultures. The method of textual criticism attempts to trace the changes of the texts in history, and analyze the possible factors that may have influenced these changes. The philological method attempts to read the text and understand it with regard to relevant historical and cultural contexts. Moreover, since the TatSid is an Abhidharma text that records disputes on many philosophical issues, it needs to be read from a philosophical perspective with regard to the interpretation of the doctrines discussed in the text. Finally, both the text itself and the doctrines it presents are historical, which means that they are determined by their historical context and change in different historical periods. Accordingly, research on both the text and the doctrines contained within it should consider their historical dimension. In brief, in the present study of the TatSid’s section on mind, the “philological” method refers to the close reading of the text and comparisons with all other extant texts that are relevant to a specific topic. The “philosophical” method takes the doctrines presented in the texts as ancient philosophers’ attempts to understand a specific issue, in this case, the structure of mind, and analyzes the presuppositions and logic of the positions and arguments within the texts. And lastly, the “historical” method is the attempt to determine changes in both the texts and the doctrinal positions over a period of time by comparing accounts in texts of different historical periods. All these aspects of the study are inter-related and cannot be easily separated.

An example may better demonstrate the methods used in the present study. In 60.13, Harivarman cites the sūtra passage that describes the cognitive process:

Depending on eye and form, eye-consciousness arises; the coming together of the three (namely, the eye, the form, and eye-consciousness) is contact (sparśa); depending on sparśa there is feeling (vedanā), apperception
\( (\text{samjñā}), \) volition (\text{cetanā}), and so forth.

The Chinese translation of the passage contains no textual problems. Kumārajīva’s translation is clear and easy to understand, and there are no variants in the extant Chinese versions of the TatSid. However, there is a textual problem in the quoted sūtra passage. In the TatSid chapter 85, Harivarman points out that there are two versions of the description of the same cognitive process: one is the version cited above, the other version is as follows:

Depending on eye and form, eye-consciousness arises; the coming together of the three gives rise to contact (\text{sparśa}); depending on sparśa there is feeling (vedanā)...

An examination of the extant Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas reveals that the Chinese \textit{Samyuktāgama} contains both versions of the passage, while the Pāli Nikāyas contain only the first version. Moreover, the second version is also attested by a quotation in the \textit{Abhidharmakośabhāṣya}. Through these textual facts, we may conclude that: (1) The Pāli Nikāyas may have been edited or redacted in a way that the textual inconsistencies were removed; (2) Harivarman likely shares the same lineage of sūtra texts with the Chinese SĀ and the AKBh, which are all related to the Sarvāstivādins. These tentative conclusions can be drawn from textual investigation.

Furthermore, this textual issue is closely related to a doctrinal issue. The Sarvāstivādins subscribe to the theory of “mental factors” (\textit{caitasika}), and in their system contact (\textit{sparśa}) is a kind of \textit{caitasika} that has its own nature, which is distinct from consciousness (\textit{citta} or \textit{vijñāna}). The first description of the cognitive process states that “the coming together of eye, form, and consciousness is contact,” which apparently contradicts the theory that contact (\textit{sparśa}) is a real entity different from \textit{citta}. In the second version of the sūtra passage, \textit{sparśa} would more easily be understood as an entity separate from \textit{citta}. This suggests that a doctrinal position may have influenced the adoption of a certain version of a text. It is also possible that the second version of the passage was a later interpolation informed by a sectarian intention.

Moreover, the sūtra materials are supposedly earlier than Abhidharma texts, and the
Abhidharma philosophical theories are assumed to have developed gradually through centuries. The textual discrepancy regarding this sūtra passages reveals that sūtra texts are not as stable as most Buddhist followers believe. It also shows how the changes in texts are closely related with developments of philosophical doctrines. Later chapters will include numerous examples that demonstrate how a slight difference in versions of a text influences a Buddhist teacher’s doctrinal position and the philosophical arguments, and also examples of doctrinal positions that influence the adoption of certain forms of a text. In contrast to many other early texts whose textual and historical inconsistencies were filtered out and “corrected” by later authors or redactors, the relatively early date of the Chinese translation of Harivarman’s TatSid makes it a rare textual treasure that may help us understand better the history of Buddhist texts and doctrines.

In summary, this study of the *Tattvasiddhi* will begin by examining the text itself and comparing available documents to trace possible changes within the text. Next, the text will be translated from Chinese into English, and the tools of textual criticism and philology will be used in the reading and understanding of the text. The doctrinal points and arguments recorded in the text as well as the logic and philosophical presuppositions underlying the arguments will be clarified. Moreover, by comparing the text with other relevant texts from different historical periods and affiliated with different traditions, the text as well as the doctrinal points and arguments that it presents will be placed in historical context, and if possible, attempts will be made to trace their origins and development.

This study of the section on mind in the TatSid consists of two main parts. Part I contains the main body of this study, which has three chapters (2-4). Chapter 2 investigates the notion of “mental factors” (*caitasika*) in Abhidharma texts. It first traces the possible origin of this notion in early sūtras and Abhidharma materials and introduces different opinions on this issue in different Abhidharma schools. Next, it discusses and comments on the arguments regarding mental factors in chapters 60-64 in the TatSid. Chapter 3 discusses the issue of “association” (*samprayoga*). Following the same method as in the previous chapter, it first traces the origins of this notion in the sūtras and early
Abhidharma texts, and introduces different opinions on association among different Abhidharma schools and teachers. Then the chapter discusses and comments in detail on the arguments about association in chapters 65-67 in the TatSid. Finally, chapter 4 presents some concluding remarks regarding the dispute of the doctrines of “mental factors” and “association.” The last part, chapter 5 of the study, is an annotated English translation of Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation of TatSid chapters 60-67 with detailed footnotes dealing with textual and some doctrinal issues in the text.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on Mental Factors (caitasika)

2.1 Introduction

Chapters 60-64 of the *Tattvasiddhi* (TatSid) deal with the issue of mental factors (caitta/cetasika P. cetasika). Mental factors, or mental concomitants, are proposed by some early Abhidharma teachers as a class of mental phenomena that are different by nature from consciousness (citta or vijñāna). Caitasika is a fundamental category in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and the Theravāda Abhidhamma to account for the rich content and properties of mental states; it is also an important part of the Yogācāra theory of mind, which in large part is derived from the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. On the other hand, there are teachers of the so-called Dārṣṭāntikas and the later Sautrāntikas who argue against the notion of mental factors as entities different from consciousness. The dispute between these two parties regarding the issue of mental factors was no doubt very influential, and it was well documented in Abhidharma texts such as the *Mahāvibhāṣāstra* (MVŚ). Harivarman dedicated five chapters (60-64) in the TatSid to it, and three more chapters (65-67) to the closely related topic of association (saṃprayoga),¹ which even can be considered an integral part of the same dispute. This chapter will briefly introduce the formation of the notion of mental factors in early Buddhism, and the full-fledged theory of mental factors in the Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra Abhidharma systems, as well as the doctrines of the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sautrāntikas who oppose the notion of mental factors as phenomena different from consciousness. This introduction will provide the necessary background for an understanding of Harivarman and his opponent’s arguments recorded in these chapters of the TatSid.

2.1.1 The Term “caitasika” in Early Sūtras

There are two terms in Pāli and Sanskrit Abhidharma texts that denote the notion “mental factor.” The Sanskrit term caītta, which is a derivative from the word cītta, does not

¹ Chapter 3 of the present study is dedicated to the notion of “association” and TatSid chs. 65-7.
occur in Pāli suttas, commentaries, or Abhidhamma texts. In Pāli, the word used as “mental factor” is exclusively cetasika (corresponding to Skt. caitasika), which is a derivative of the word cetas (P. ceto), a term used as a synonym for citta in the suttas. From the Chinese translations, it is not clear exactly which term was used in their Indic originals, and in the Sarvāstivāda Sanskrit texts caitta and caitasika are used interchangeably. Because in the Pāli suttas only the term cetasika is used, for convenience in my translation I will use mainly the term caitasika, the Sanskrit form equivalent to the standard Pāli term cetasika. But I will also use caitta occasionally when it is necessary in the discussion, and the form cetasika with references from Pāli texts.

In early sūtras the word caitasika is used as an adjective referring to “mental phenomena” in contrast to physical phenomena. For example, in the following sutta passage, the Buddha says:

Monks, there are two kinds of pleasure. What two kinds? Bodily (kāyika) pleasure and mental (cetasika) pleasure.

And also:

Monks, there are two kinds of illness. What two kinds? Bodily illness and mental illness.

There are also cases where cetasika is used as a neuter noun:

And what is the miracle of telepathy? Here, a monk reads the minds (citta) of other beings, of other people, reads their mental states (cetasika), their thoughts (vitakkita) and ponderings (vicārita).

Here, the word cetasika is a noun in the singular and most likely refers to a “mental state.”

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2 See Johansson 1965: 179-82. Johansson (182) notices that cetas is used mostly as a synonym for citta but emphasizes its “instrumental, cognitive, meditative, and supernatural functions.”
3 In the following discussion of the term caitasika in early sūtra texts, I mainly follow Mizuno Kōgen’s observations (Mizuno 1964: 215-220).
4 A I 81: dvemāni, bhikkhave, sukhāni. katamāni dve? kāyikañca sukhaṃ cetasikanāca sukham.
5 A II 142-3: dvem, bhikkhave, rogā. katame dve? kāyiko ca rogo cetasiko ca rogo.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on caitasika

It still does not have the meaning of a mental phenomenon separate from consciousness (citta).\(^7\)

However, there are a few cases in the Chinese Āgamas in which the term caitasika or caitta is likely used in the sense of a “mental factor.” For example, as Mizuno Kōgen has observed, in this passage in the Chinese MĀ, caitasika in the phrase 心心所有法(*citta-caitta-dharma or *citta-caitasika-dharma) likely means “mental factors”:

> If [a person] at the moment of death gives rise to wholesome citta [and] caitasikas that are associated with right view, because of this and conditioned by this, on the dissolution of the body [his] life ceases, [and] he is born in a heaven of good destination.\(^8\)

But in the corresponding Pāli sutta, the term cetasika does not occur.\(^9\) Similarly, in another sūtra in the Chinese SĀ, the term 心法 (caitta or caitasika) is also obviously used with the sense of a “mental factor,” but this sūtra is absent in the Pāli Nikāyas:

> Depending on the two conditions, eye and form, there arise citta and *caitta; vijñāna, sparśa, as well as vedanā and samjñā, and so forth, arise together [with them]. [They] all have causes, [and they are] not I, nor mine …\(^10\)

Moreover, aside from the fact that neither of these aforementioned Chinese passages using caitasika as “mental factor” has a parallel in Pāli, there is no extant Abhidharma text, including our *Tattvasiddhi, that quotes these two passages as an Āgama proof for the existence of caitasikas. Therefore, as Mizuno has suggested, perhaps we can conclude that these two passages are very likely post-Āgama developments.

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7 PTSD s.v. cetasika suggests that here citta-cetasika means “mind and all that belong to it, mind and mental properties.”

8 MĀ no. 171, 分別大業經. T No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 44) T01, p708b20-22: 或復死時生善心。心心所有法正見相應。彼因此緣此。身壞命終。生善處天中。It should be noted that in this passage it is said that the wholesome citta-caitasikas are “associated” (相應 *samprayukta) with right-view (samyag-dṛṣṭi), which indicates that the composer(s) or redactor(s) of this sūtra already have the notion of “association” (samprayoga) together with the idea of caitasika as “mental factor.” “Association” is another topic of controversy discussed in chapters 65-67 of the *Tattvasiddhi, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter (ch. 5).


10 SĀ no. 307. T No. 99 非我所 二種緣 生於心心法 識觸及俱生 受想等有因 非我非我所 ...
On the other hand, in the Pāli suttas, the term cetasika is never used in the sense of a “mental factor.” Mizuno (1964: 216-7) notices that in the Katthāvatthu, a verse is quoted as an Āgama proof for the position that cetasikas are separate dhammas, in which the term cetasika is in plural form and obviously means “mental factors.” But this verse is absent in all extant Pāli Nikāyas. Hence, the usage of the term cetasika in Pāli sutta materials confirms our observation in the case of the Chinese Āgama references that caitasika does not mean “mental factor” in the earliest stratum of Buddhist texts.

However, a passage in the Kāmabhū sūtra in the Pāli Saṃyutta Nikāya and the Chinese SĀ, both of which contain the term caitasika, is quoted in several Abhidharma texts, including the *Tattvasiddhi,13 as a canonical proof that the term is used as a “mental factor” in the sūtra in reference to mental phenomena such as saṃjñā and cetanā (or vedanā in the Pāli version). In the sūtra, the elder Citra (Pāli Citta) asks the bhikṣu Kāmabhū about “formation” (行, Skt. saṃskāra, P. saṅkhāra). Kāmabhū answers that there are three kinds of formations: bodily, vocal, and mental. The passage in question in the Chinese translation of the SĀ reads as follows:

[Kāmabhū] answers, “Saṃjñā and cetanā are mental-factor dharmas (心數法 *caitasika-dharma). [They] depend on citta, belong to citta, and function based on citta. Therefore, saṃjñā and cetanā are mental formations (citta-saṃskāra).”

In the Pāli parallel, the two mental formations mentioned are saññā and vedanā instead of saṃjñā and cetanā.15 Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya also quotes the passage with

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11 Pāli suttas here refers to the suttas in the four major Nikāyas and also to some early texts included in the Khudaka Nikāya such as the Sutta-nipata and the Dhammapada.
13 See below *Tattvasiddhi 61.4, 61.10.
14 SĀ no. 568, T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 21) T2, p150a29-b1: 思是心數法。依於心屬於心想轉。是故心想名為意行。The meaning of 想轉 here is uncertain. In some other Chinese editions, it is 相轉 or 相縛 (See T2 p150n10,11). Perhaps it is a translation of paṭibaddha “bound to.”
15 S 41.6 (IV 293): saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā. ete dhammā cittapattiḥaddhā, tasmā saññā ca vedanā ca citasankhāro.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on \textit{caitasika}

the two \textit{citta-samskāras samjñā} and \textit{vedanā},\footnote{AKBh p.24.13-4: ‘samjñā ca vedanā ca caitasika eṣa dharmācittānvāyavāccittanisīrita iti sūtre vacanātsarāgacittādi vacanācca.’} which is interestingly different from the SĀ. By comparing the Chinese passage with the corresponding Pāli version, we can see that the Chinese term for “mental factor” (心數法) is likely translating \textit{caitasika} (P. \textit{cetasika}), which means that the sense of the term here is based on an Ābhidharmika interpretation of the term as a “mental factor” per se. We can also see later in the *Tattvasiddhi that such an interpretation of this passage is exactly what Harivarman’s opponent proposes (see TatSid 61.10). However, the Pāli version suggests that the term \textit{cetasika} would be more properly understood as a simple adjective meaning “mental,” and this is precisely how Harivarman interprets it (TatSid 63.8).

Furthermore, as noticed by Mizuno (1964: 219), in an early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text, the *\textit{Pañcavastukaviṭṭhāsā}, the author Dharmatrāta specifically notes that this teaching of \textit{caitasikas} is from a “Sarvāstivāda sūtra” (薩他筏底契經).\footnote{T No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T28, p994a24-6: 薩他筏底契經中言。復有思惟。諸心所法依心而起繫屬於心。又舍利子問俱胝羅。何故想思說名意行。俱胝羅言。此二心所法依心而起繫屬於心。} This indicates that the Abhidharma teachers noticed that sūtra collections affiliated with different Buddhist groups may differ in passages important for certain doctrinal points.

\textbf{2.1.2 Lists of Mental Phenomena in the Sūtras and Early Abhidharma Texts}

We have seen that the term \textit{caitasika} in early sūtras should be understood as the adjective “mental,” and the notion of “mental factors” as mental phenomena different from consciousness was not explicitly raised in this period. However, in the early Āgamas and Nikāyas we find lists enumerating a wide range of mental phenomena that reflect the introspective character of early Buddhist doctrines and practice. The sophistication of these lists shows that Buddhist psychoanalysis reached such a depth and sophistication that surpasses even modern Western psychology to some extent. On the other hand, such an analysis of minute mental phenomena in the sūtras also poses a challenge to later Buddhist commentators and teachers: precisely what is the nature of these mental phenomena? Are they different from consciousness, or do they represent just different aspects or modes of it?

\footnote{AKBh p.24.13-4: ‘samjñā ca vedanā ca caitasika eṣa dharmācittānvāyavāccittanisīrita iti sūtre vacanātsarāgacittādi vacanācca.’}
\footnote{T No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T28, p994a24-6: 薩他筏底契經中言。復有思惟。諸心所法依心而起繫屬於心。又舍利子問俱胝羅。何故想思說名意行。俱胝羅言。此二心所法依心而起繫屬於心。}
In chapter 61 of the TatSid, Harivarman’s opponent uses several such lists of mental phenomena as scriptural proofs for his arguments supporting the position that these phenomena are mental factors different from consciousness by nature. As one example, the five aggregates (skandha), one of the most prominent lists in early Buddhism, places physical and mental phenomena into five categories: form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), apperception (samjñā), volitional formations (samskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna). In these five categories, if we put aside (material) form (rūpa), and consciousness (vijñāna), which is considered citta itself, what are the natures of the other three categories of mental phenomena, namely, feeling (vedanā), apperception (samjñā), and volitional formations (samskāra)? Since they are listed as separate categories aside from vijñāna, does this imply that they are phenomena different from consciousness? We will see in 61.5 Harivarman’s opponent citing the five aggregates as scriptural proof to show that samjñā and vedanā should be taken as different from consciousness, while Harivarman argues in 63.4 that they are just different modes of consciousness and not different from it by nature.

The five aggregates are mentioned in another sūtra passage that is quoted in the TatSid in relation to a cognitive process:

Depending on the eye and form (rūpa), eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact (sparśa). With contact as condition there is feeling (vedanā).…

Within the cognitive process of seeing an object by the eye, this passage introduces the mental phenomenon of contact (sparśa), which is defined as the meeting of the three, namely, the eye, forms as the object, and eye-consciousness. Once more the commentators face the question, what precisely is contact? Does it differ from consciousness, or is it just a special mode of consciousness?

Another example list of mental phenomena is the so-called dhyāna-aṅgas, which

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18 Hamilton 1996 is an in-depth study of the five skandhas.
19 M I 111: cakkhuñcāvuso, patice ca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānam, tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā… Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (Bodhi and Ñanamoli 1995: 203). This is a problematic passage. See the detailed discussion regarding 60.13, 61.6, 62.10, and 63.5.
20 It should be noted that the term dhyānanga/jhānanga does not occur in the early sūtras. It was coined later in commentaries and Abhidharma texts.
are experienced in states of absorption (dhyāna/jhāna). The first dhyāna is accompanied by applied thought (vitarka/vitakka), sustained thought (vicāra), rapture (prīti/pīti), and pleasure (sukha). Sometimes the list also includes the one-pointedness of mind (cittaikāgratā/cittekaggatā).\(^21\) Here, one can raise the same question of whether these mental phenomena are different from citta, or just citta in its different modes.\(^22\)

Similarly there are abundant other mental phenomena listed in early sūtras. The following are some examples of the lists that are related to Buddhist doctrines such as dependent origination and Buddhist practice.

◇ The twelve-linked dependent origination formula:

Conditioned by ignorance (avidyā), there is volitional formations (saṃskāra); conditioned by volitional formations, there is consciousness (vijñāṇa); conditioned by consciousness, there is name-and-form (nāma-rūpa); conditioned by name-and-form, there is the six-fold base (sādāyatana); conditioned by the six-fold base there if contact (sparśa); conditioned by contact there is feeling (vedanā); conditioned by feeling there is craving (trṣṇā); conditioned by craving there is clinging (upādāṇa); conditioned by clinging there is being (bhava); conditioned by being there is birth (jāti); conditioned by birth there is aging and death (jarāmaraṇa) … \(^23\)

In this list of twelve factors with the exception of consciousness itself (vijñāṇa), the six-fold base (sādāyatana) as the faculties of mental experience, and the last three factors, being (bhava), birth (jāti), and aging-and-death (jarāmaraṇa), which are states of being, all the other factors are either mental phenomena themselves, such as ignorance (avidyā), volitional formation (saṃskāra), contact (sparśa), feeling (vedanā), craving (trṣṇā), clinging (upādāṇa), or categories that can be understood as including mental phenomena,

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\(^{21}\) E.g. S IV 262: vivicceva kāmehi vivicce akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajam pitisukhaṃ paṭhaman jhānam upasampajja viharāmi.

\(^{22}\) In 66.6 Harivarman’s opponent quotes the five dhyāna-āṅgas as a scriptural proof, and argues that they are caitasikas associated with citta in the first dhyāna.

\(^{23}\) E.g. M I 263: iti kho, bhikkhave, avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā, saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ, saḷāyatanaapaccayā phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā, taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ, upādānapaccayā bhavo, bhavapaccayā jāti, jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomassupāyāsā sambhavanti. Evame tassa kevalassa dukkhakhandhassa samudayo hoti. There are a number of variations in the number of these factors in different sūtras. The twelve-linked formula is the one adopted by later commentaries as the standard formula. For an extensive study of dependent origination in early Buddhism, see Saigusa 2000.
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namely, name-and-form (nāma-rūpa).

◊ Early sūtras also list a large number of mental qualities that are described as essential in Buddhist religious practice. They are classified under a number of categories, for example:

- The four applications of mindfulness (smṛty-upasthāna/sati-paṭṭhāna) regarding body, feeling, mind, and dhammas
- Five faculties (indriya) and powers (bāla): faith (śraddhā), strength (vīrya), mindfulness (smṛti), concentration (samādhi), and insight (prajñā)
- Seven factors of awakening (bodhyaṅga): mindfulness (smṛti), discrimination of dharma (dharma-vicaya), strength (vīrya), rapture (prīti), tranquility (praśrabdhi), concentration (samādhi), and equanimity (upekṣā)
- The noble eight-fold path (āryāṣṭāṅgamārga): right view (saṃyak-dṛṣṭi), right intention (saṃyak-saṅkalpa), right speech (saṃyag-vāk), right action (saṃyak-karmānta), right livelihood (saṃyag-ājīva), right striving (saṃyag-vyāyāma), right mindfulness (saṃyak-smṛti), right concentration (saṃyak-samādhi)

These lists of positive mental qualities are later included in a meta-list called factors that contribute to awakening (bodhipakṣya).24 We will see below that both Harivarman and his opponents quote these lists of mental phenomena or qualities that appear in the sūtras within their arguments for or against the doctrine of mental factors.25

◊ There are also quite a few lists of negative mental phenomena or qualities that are proposed as the causes of suffering, or as obstacles on the path of practice, which one should strive to eliminate. The following are a few examples of such lists of negative mental qualities:

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24 Gethin 2001 presents an extensive and in-depth study of the thirty-seven bodhipakṣas.
25 See 60.3, also 65.26-27 as arguments for “association of mental factors and consciousness.”
Chapter 2. The Dispute on caitasika

- 10 Fetters (saṃyojana): (1) view of personal-existence (sātkāyadrṣṭi/sakkāyadṛṣṭi); (2) doubt (vicikitsā/vicikicchā); (3) wrong grasp of behavior and observances (silavratāparāma/sīlabbatāparāma); (4) sensual desire (kāmacchanda); (5) ill-will (vyāpāda/byāpāda); (6) lust for form (ruparāga); (7) lust for the formless (arūparāga); (8) conceit (māna); (9) restlessness (auddhatya/uddhacca); (10) ignorance (avidyā/avijjā)²⁶

- 5 obsessions (paryavasthāna/paryuṭṭhāna): (1) sensual lust (kāma-rāga); (2) ill-will (vyāpāda/byāpāda); (3) dullness and drowsiness (styāna-middha/thīna-middha); (4) restlessness and remorse (auddhatya-kaukṛtya/uddhacca-kukkucca); (5) doubt (vicikitsā/vicikicchā)²⁷

- 7 underlying tendencies (anuśaya/anusaya): (1) sensual lust (kāma-rāga); (2) aversion (paṭighā); (3) views (drṣṭi/dīṭṭhi); (4) doubt (vicikitsā/vicikicchā); (5) conceit (māna); (6) lust for existence (bhava-rāga); (7) ignorance (avidyā/avijjā)²⁸

The lists quoted here are just some examples and not exhaustive. There are still more lists on each general topic scattered throughout early sūtra texts, which contain terms describing different mental phenomena, but these lists are sufficient to show the sophisticated analysis of mind in early Buddhism. In summary, all the mental phenomena listed in the sūtras can be roughly classified in the following categories:

1. Fundamental cognitive experience and mental functions, such as the contact (sparśa) gives rise to feeling (vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā), and volitional formations (saṃskāra). The latter three also constitute three of the five skandhas.

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²⁶ For example, A V 17. The English translation of terms follows Bodhi 2012: 1350. There are also lists of three and seven saṃyojana. See PTSD s.v. saṃyojana.
²⁷ A V 323. SĀ no. 926, No. 99 杂阿含經 (卷 33) T02, p235c21-236a11. The English translation of terms follows Bodhi 2012: 1560. Note that the term used in this sūtra is a verb form pariyyuṭṭhita. The noun form pariyyuṭṭhāna is used in A V 156-7, but the list there has ten items, which are different from the five items quoted here. The latter sutta does not have a Chinese parallel.
²⁸ A IV 9. Chinese EĀ 40.3, T No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 34) T02, p738c23-25: 一者貪欲使。二者瞋恚使。三者憍慢使。 四者癡使。 五者疑使。 六者見使。 七者欲世間使。 The Chinese list has a different order. The English translation follows Bodhi 2012: 1003. As noted in PTSD s.v. anusaya, this seven-item list is a collection of anusayas mentioned separately in passages scattered in earlier sūtras. In later Abhidharma texts, the items in the list are either combined or further divided to make lists of six or ten anusayas. TatSid adopts a list of ten anusayas, which likely follows the standard list in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma.
2. Positive mental qualities that one should cultivate and develop, and by developing these qualities one ultimately reaches nirvāṇa. These qualities include the applications of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna), five faculties (indriya) and powers (bala), seven factors of awakening (bodhyāṅga), the eight-fold path (āryāṣṭāṅga-mārga), and so forth.

3. Negative mental qualities that one should suppress and eliminate. These are fetters (saṃyojana), obsessions (paryavasthāna/paryuṭṭhāna), underlying tendencies (anuśaya/anusaya) and so forth.

All of these various mental qualities and phenomena are scattered, unorganized, and unsystematized in the early sūtra texts. This is understandable given the literary form and purpose of the sūtras. In the early sūtras or discourses, each sūtra usually deals with one specific topic. In a typical scene, someone, for example, a monk or a lay person, encounters a certain problem and then goes to the Buddha and asks for help. The Buddha analyzes the situation, points out where the problem lies, and then offers a method of practice that will solve the problem. The teachings of different mental phenomenal are in accordance with the specific topic each sūtra treats. Because of the extensive variety of topics treated in different sūtras, it is understandable that the mind is analyzed from so many different perspectives in relation to so many mental phenomena.

In the later stage of the compilation of the sūtras, Buddhist teachers collected together these scattered lists, and already started to organize and systematize them. For example, the Samyukta Āgama and the Pāli Samyutta Nikāya are collections of sūtras dealing with a vast variety of topics, but short sūtras are collected and grouped in such a way that sūtras dealing with similar topics are put together, and the groups of sūtras are organized in accordance with a certain “list of lists,” or māṭrkā (P. māṭikā), which is a mnemonic list of topics.29 The SĀ is organized according to a māṭrkā with the following topics:30

(1) Aggregates (skandha); (2) bases (āyatana); (3) dependent origination

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29 For a study of māṭrkā/māṭikā, see Gethin 1992.
30 This māṭrkā of the Samyukta-āgama is recorded in the Yogācārabhūmi. See Yinshun 印順 1983:10; 1988a: 632.
When the sūtras are grouped and organized, the lists of mental phenomena are also collected and organized accordingly. Actually, as early as in the Pāli Majjhima Nikāya, we can already see an early attempt to organize mental phenomena. In the Anupada Sutta, the Buddha describes how Sariputta analyzes his own mental states when he enters the first jhāna:

And the states in the first jhāna—applied thought (vitakka), sustained thought (vicāra), rapture (pīti), pleasure (sukha), and one-pointedness of mind (cittekaggatā); contact (phassa), feeling (vedanā), perception (saññā), volition (saṅkhāra), and mind (citta); zeal (chanda), decision (adhimokkha), energy (vīriya), mindfulness (sati), equanimity (upekkhā), and attention (manasikāra)—these states were defined by him one by one as they occurred.31

This list of sixteen mental states is actually a concatenation of several shorter lists from early sūtras: the first five are the dhyāna-aṅgas; from contact (phassa) to mind (citta) is a combination of the list of cognitive process plus the latter part of the five skandhas. The remaining six states are either from other lists such as the factors of awakening (bodhyaṅga), or are mentioned individually in the sūtras.

This way of gathering and organizing lists of mental phenomena continues in early Abhidharma texts. One prominent example of such an early attempt is in the Pāli Dhammasaṅgaṇī. In the chapter on the “genesis of consciousness” (cittuppādakaṇḍa), a long list enumerates the many mental states that accompany each type of consciousness. The list is too long to be quoted here, but it is sufficient to point out that this long list is a concatenation of a number of short lists from the sūtras such as the skandhas, dhyānāṅgas, indriyas, aṣṭāṅgamārga, as well as a number of items that are not from the sūtras but developed in Abhidhamma texts.32 A similar list can also be found in the early

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32 See Mizuno 1964: 258 for a discussion of the list in more detail.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on caitasika
Northern Abhidharma text the *Śāriputrābhidharma.33

2.1.3 Caitta/cetasika	   in	   the	   Sarvāstivāda	   Abhidharma	   and	   Theravāda	  
Abhidhamma
In early Abhidharma texts, the term caitasika is still used as an adjective as in the early
sūtras.   For   example,   in   the   early   Sarvāstivāda   canonical   Abhidharma   text   the
Abhidharmavijñānakāya, a number of mental phenomena, such as little desire (*alpecchā
少欲), shame (*hrī 羞慚), and underlying mental tendencies (anuśaya 随眠), are qualified
with the adjective *caitasika (心所有).34 Also, the gathering and organizing of names of
mental phenomena scattered   in   the   sūtras   continues.   However,   although   the   individual  
mental phenomena and some shorter lists are mentioned throughout different parts of the
sūtra   texts,   a   long   list   gathering   nearly   all   such   phenomena is relatively novel, and
Buddhist teachers and commentators had to find the proper position for the newly
assembled list within the well-established  lists  from  the  sūtras  such  as  the  five skandhas,
twelve

āyatanas,

eighteen

dhātus,

twelve-factored

dependent

origination

(pratītyasamudpāda), and so forth. Also it should be noted that in early Abhidharma the
usage   of   the   term   “dharma”   (P.   dhamma)   has   had   a   semantic   shift:   the   term   can   be  
understood as   having   various   meanings   in   the   sūtras   as   “teaching,”   “good   conduct,”  
“truth,”  “nature  or  quality,”  “law  or  order,”  or  “state  or  thing.”  As  Gethin  proposes  that  
among   these   meanings   “nature   or   quality”   is   the   basic   one,   and   the   list   of   mental  
phenomena   given   in   the   sūtras   as   “dharmas”   should   be   understood   as   mental   qualities
(Gethin 2004: 521). But  in  Abhidharma  the  term  “dharma”  began to be used more in the
sense   of   “constituent   element,”   which   bears more ontological emphasis than in the
sūtras. 35 Accordingly, the analysis of mind in terms of lists of mental phenomena

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No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 1) T28, p526c4-11: 云何法入。受想行陰。若色不可見無對。若無為。是名法
入。云何法入。受想思觸思惟覺觀。見慧解脫無貪無恚無癡。順信悔不悔悅喜心進心除。信欲不放逸。念定心
捨疑怖使。生老死命結。無想定得果滅盡定。身口非戒無教。有漏身口戒無教。有漏身進有漏身除。正語正業
正命正身進正身除智緣盡非智緣盡決定法住緣。空處智識處智不用處智。非想非非想處智。是名法入。See the
discussion of the caitasikas in the *Śāriputrābhidharma in Mizuno 1964: 273-284.
34 No. 1539 阿毘達磨識身足論 T26, p535c27: 少欲是何法。是心所有法與心相應。p536a11-2: 羞慚是何法。是
心所有法與心相應。p578b13-4: 欲界繫見苦所斷心所有隨眠。
35 For  a  general  survey  of  the  shift  of  emphasis  in  the  “dharma  theory,”  see  Bronkhorst 2009:61-114. Also Cox 2004
discusses the ontological emphasis on dharmas in the  Sarvāstivāda  school.

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consists part of the analysis of the world as consists of “dhammas.”

In extant early Abhidharma texts from different traditions, we can see that this long list that nearly exhaustively collects mental phenomena is uniformly included in the saṃskāra-skandha among the five skandhas, the dharma-āyatana in the twelve āyatanas, and the dharma-dhātu in the eighteen dhātus. Such assignments are also attested in the TatSid 61.3. A good example is the early Northern Abhidharma text Dharmaskandha, in which the dharma-āyatana in the twelve āyatanas is defined as follows:

Thus all dharmas of the past, present, and future, are referred to as dharma-āyatana, and also referred to as “to be known” (*jñeya), to be well achieved (*samudāgamya). What are these [dharmas]? Namely, feeling (vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā), volition (cetanā), contact (sparśa), attention (manaskāra), purpose (chanda), determination (adhimokṣa), mindfulness (smṛti), concentration (samādhī), insight (prajñā), faith (śraddhā), energy (vīrya), applied thought (vitarka), sustained thought (vicāra), heedlessness (pramāda), heedfulness (apramāda), wholesome roots (kusala-mūla), unwholesome roots (akuśala-mūla), undetermined roots (avyākṛta-mūla), all the fetters (saṃyojana), bindings (bandhana), underlying tendencies (anuśaya), secondary defilements (upakleśa), obsessions (paryavasthāna), all kinds of knowledge (jñāna), all views (dṛṣṭi), all kinds of complete comprehension (abhisamaya), possession (prāpta), equipoise of non-conception (asaṃjñāsamāpatti), equipoise of cessation (nirākāra), state of non-conception (āsamanāñika), vitality (jīvita), homogeneous character (sabhāgatā), possession of the substratum (*āśrayaprāpta or *upadhiprāpta), possession of the given entity (*vastuprāpta), possession of the basis (*āyatana-prāpta), birth (jāti), old age (jarā), continuance (sthiti), impermanence (anityatā), name set (nāmakāya), phrase set (padakāya), syllable set (vyañjanakāya), space (ākāśa), cessation resulting from consideration (pratisamkhyaṇirodha), cessation not resulting from consideration (apratisamkhyaṇirodha), and the remaining [things] which are known by the faculty of mind (mano-indriya), cognized by mind-consciousness (manovijñāna), …are referred to as dharmas, dharma-dhātu, and dharma-āyatana, …

This list is supposed to include all possible dharmas that are capable of being objects

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36 No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 10) T26, p500c16-25: 如是過去未來現在諸所有法。名為法處。亦名所知。乃至所等證。此復云何。謂受想思觸作意欲勝解。信精進念定慧。尋伺放逸不放逸。善根不善根無記根。一切結縛隨眠隨煩惱纏。諸所有智見現觀。得無想定滅定無想事。命根眾同分。住得事得處得。生老住無常。名身句身文身。虛空擇滅非擇滅。及餘所有意根所知意識所了。所有名號。異語增語。謂名法。名法界。名法處。名彼岸。
of manovijñāna, and all from the first item vedanā to the item abhisamayā are mental phenomena. Moreover, in the skandha chapter of the same treatise, the samskāra-skandha is defined as of two kinds: samskāra dharmas that are associated with citta (cittasaṃprayukta), and samskāra dharmas that are dissociated from citta (cittaviprayukta).  

The samskāra dharmas that are associated with citta (cittasaṃprayukta) are defined as the following:

What is the saṃskāra-skandha that is associated with citta? Namely, volition (cetanā), contact (sparśa), attention (manaskāra), and so on up to all kinds of knowledge (jñāna), views (drṣṭi), complete comprehension (abhisamayā), and as well as other dharmas of the same kind which are associated with citta, are referred to as cittasaṃprayukta-samskāra-skandha.

This passage regarding samskāra-skandha appears to be based on the previously quoted passage concerning dharma-āyatana, or the list of all dharmas that can be objects of mano-vijñāna, since it defines the samskāra-skandha by referring to a standard list of dharmas that starts from cetanā and ends at abhisamayā among the dharmas that are associated with citta within the dharma-āyatana list. It should be noted that the two items preceding cetanā, namely, vedanā and saṃjñā, are omitted from this definition of samskāra-skandha because they are each separate skandhas among the five skandhas. As a result, they would not be included in the samskāra-skandha. In this passage on

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37 No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 10) T26, p501b16-17: 云何行蘊。謂行蘊有二種。一心相應行蘊。二心不相應行蘊。
38 No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 10) T26, p501b17-20: 云何心相應行蘊。謂思觸作意。廣說乃至。諸所有智見現觀。復有所餘如是類法。與心相應。是名心相應行蘊。
39 Yinshun 印順 1981a: 131 suggests that this part of the Dharmaskandha which defines the dharma-āyatana and the saṃskāra-skandha was revised in a later time because of the influence of the new pañca-vastu categories. However, in the early Vibhajyāvādin Abhidharma text *Śāriputrābhidharma, the definitions of the dharma-āyatana and the samskāra-skandha are very similar to the Dharmaskandha. No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 1) T28, p526c4-11: 云何法入。受想行陰。若色不可見無對。若無為。是名法入。云何法入。受想思觸思惟覺觀。見慧解脫無貪無恚無癡。順信悔不悔悅喜心進心除。信慇不放逸。念定心捨疑怖使。生老死命結。無想定得果滅盡定。身口非戒無教。有漏身口戒無教。有漏身進有漏身除。正語正業正命正身進正身除。智緣盡非智緣盡決定法住緣。空處智識。處智不用處智。非想非非想處智。是名法入。
Chapter 2. The Dispute on *caitasika*

*saṃskāra*-skandha, it is clear that the compatibility between the old Buddhist category of the five *skandhas* and the new category of *cittasamprayukta* is not so neat: the latter includes *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and part of the *saṃskāra*-skandha, namely, only *cittasamprayukta*-saṃskāra-skandha. Some Japanese scholars suggest that the introduction of the *samprayukta* and *viprayukta* division into the *saṃskāra*-skandha could have been a major factor that influenced the establishment of the five-category (*pañca-vastu*) classification system.\(^{40}\)

In the early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma treatise the *Prakaraṇapāda* attributed to Vasumitra, all dharmas are classified according to five categories: form (*rūpa*), consciousness (*citta*), mental factors (*caitta/caitasika*), factors dissociated from *citta* (*citta-viprayukta*), and the unconditioned (*asamskṛta*). The *caitasikas* are defined as follows:

> What are *caitasika*-dharmas? They are phenomena (*dharma*) associated with *citta*. What are they? Feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formation (*saṃskāra*), contact (*sparśa*), attention (*manaskāra*), purpose (*chandas*), determination (*adhimokṣa*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), insight (*prajñā*), faith (*śraddhā*), energy (*vīrya*), applied thought (*vitarka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), heedlessness (*pramāda*), heedfulness (*apramāda*), wholesome roots (*kuśala-mūla*), unwholesome roots (*aśamksra-mūla*), undetermined roots (*avyākṛta-mūla*), all the fetters (*samyojana*), bindings (*bandhana*), underlying tendencies (*anuśaya*), secondary defilements (*upakleśa*), all kinds of knowledge (*jñāna*), all views (*dṛṣṭi*), all kinds of complete comprehension (*abhisamaya*), and other dharmas of similar type which are associated with *citta* are in general named *caitasika* dharmas.\(^{41}\)

This list of mental phenomena in this passage is no doubt a compilation from shorter lists scattered in the sūtras, and it also closely resembles similar lists in early Abhidharma texts such as the *Dharmaskandha*, the *Śāriputrābhidharma*, and the Pāli *Dhammasaṅgani*. However, in this passage this list is named with a new category: *caitta* or *caitasika*, which is no longer an adjective, as it was used in the sūtras, but a noun.

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\(^{40}\) Sakurabe 1969-71; also Fukuda 1997b. See also Cox 2004: 553.

\(^{41}\) T26, p692b29-c5: 心所法云何。謂若法心相應。此復云何。謂受想思觸作意欲勝解念定慧信勤尋伺放逸不放逸善根不善根無記根。一切結縛隨眠。隨煩惱纏。諸所有智。諸所有見。諸所有現觀。復有所餘如是類法與心相應。總名心所法。
meaning “mental factors,” or phenomena “associated” (*samprayukta P. *samppayutta) with citta. Here, we can see early Abhidharma exegesis at work: items scattered in different sūtras are collected and reorganized, and in this process a new theoretical framework is also gradually established. Finally, the reorganized list is subsumed under the new category of caitta or caitasika that did not exist in the earlier sūtra texts.

We can also observe a similar development of the notion of cetasika in the Pāli texts, though in the Theravāda tradition, it appears much later than in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. As mentioned previously, in the early Pāli Abhidhamma text, the Dhammasaṅgani, there is a long list of mental phenomena similar to lists in early Northern Abhidharma texts such as the Dharmaskandha and the *Śāriputrābhidharma, and the categories cittasampayutta and cittavippayutta also appear in its mātikā. In the Vibhaṅga, the saṅkhāra-khandha is said to be exclusively citta-sampayutta, associated with citta.\(^{42}\) However, the term cetasika did not become a separate category as “mental factor” even in the 5th century CE Visuddhimagga.\(^ {43}\) Only in the Abhidhammāvatāra, an Abhidhamma manual of Buddhaghoṣa, who is slightly later than Buddhaghoṣa, does the term cetasika become a separate category as “mental factors”\(^ {44}\) in the four-fold division of all dhammas as citta, cetasika, rūpa, and nibbāna.\(^ {45}\) This four-fold division was adopted by the 12th century Abhidhamma manual Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha by Anuruddha, which is perhaps the most widely studied Abhidhamma introductory manual today.\(^ {46}\)

Moreover, in early Abhidharma texts, the caitasikas are not only gathered together and assigned to a new category as “mental factors” separate from citta, but they also

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\(^{42}\) Vibh 40: *katamo saṅkhārakkhandho? ekavidhena saṅkhārakkhandho cittasampayutto.*

\(^{43}\) The discussion of mental factors in the Visuddhimagga (XIV.133-184) appears under the section of saṅkhāra-khandha, and it follows closely the Dhs with regard to the classification of eighty-nine cittas and those dhammas that are associated with each citta. The term cetasika is not used here as a noun meaning a “mental factor.”

\(^{44}\) Abhidh-av 16: *thatha cittasampayuttā citte bhavā vā cetasikā.*

\(^{45}\) Abhidh-av 1: *cittaṃ cetasikam rūpaṃ nibbānan ti niruttaro, catudhā desayā dhamme catusaccappakāsano.* Pāli texts available to us now do not provide sufficient evidence on the development of doctrines in the commentarial and Abhidhamma tradition. It is possible that Buddhadatta’s usage of the term cetasika might be influenced by northern Abhidharma thought, but we do not have any evidence to prove that.

\(^{46}\) The *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* has at least two English translations (Nārada 1979; Bodhi 1999), and its commentary is also translated in to English (Gethin 2002).
begin to be classified and systemized according to different themes. We have seen above that in the sūtras mental phenomena are grouped in accordance with their applicability to specific circumstances. For example, vedanā, samjñā, samśkāra, and vijñāna are mentioned together as the four non-material skandhas; sparśa is said to give rise to vedanā, samjñā, and cetanā; the five dhyāna-aṅgas always occur together in the descriptions of the dhyānas; the positive mental factors such as the five balas and indriyas, the seven bodhyaṅgas, the aṣṭāṅgamarga, and so forth, and the negative mental phenomena such as the samyojanas, paryavasthānas, anuśayas, and so forth, are for the most part mentioned in groups in the sūtras. In early Abhidharma texts, these mental phenomena are gathered together and to a certain extent retain their grouping in new and longer lists. For example, in the early Pāli Abhidhamma text, the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, when mental phenomena are listed as associated with a certain citta, it appears that the text simply includes lists from the sūtras with only minor adjustments and then mechanically places them together. As a consequence, there are numerous overlapping categories and repetitions in the new list. With the development of Abhidharma, Buddhist teachers appear to have noticed this problem, and began to remove the repetitions from the list. For example, the previously quoted list of mental phenomena in the dharma-āyatana list in the Dharmaśākandha is obviously neater in this respect as compared to the list in the Dhs. Further, in the aforementioned lists in the Dharmashākandha and the Prakaraṇapāda, the lists are free of repetition.

Nevertheless, in the new, cleaned-up single list of mental phenomena, still some grouping features remain. For example, the items in the list in the first chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda can be roughly divided into the following groups:

General cognitive functions: Feeling (vedanā), apperception (samjñā), volitional formation (samśkāra), contact (sparśa), attention (manaskāra)

47 See the discussion of examples of these group lists in 2.1.2.
48 See a discussion of this feature in the Dhs list of cetasiskas in Mizuno 1964: 258-9.
49 In the Visuddhimagga, when discussing the citta-sampayutta-sankhāra dhammas, Buddhaghosa eliminates the repetition in the Dhs list even though he follows its structure. As a result, he gives only a condensed list of mental factors. See e.g. Vism XIV.133.
50 However, a few synonyms (from the later Abhidharma perspective) do appear in the list such as drṣṭi and prajñā. See Mizuno 1964: 274-5.
51 See the translation of the list on page 61.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on *caitasika*

Morally undetermined: purpose (*chandas*), determination (*adhimokṣa*)

Positive factors: mindfulness (*smṛti*), concentration (*samādhi*), insight (*prajñā*), faith (*śraddha*), energy (*vīrya*), applied thought (*vitarka*), sustained thought (*vicāra*), heedfulness (*apramāda*), wholesome roots (*kuśala-mūla*), all kinds of knowledge (*jñāna*), all views (*drṣṭi*), all kinds of complete comprehension (*abhisamaya*)

Negative factors: heedlessness (*pramāda*), unwholesome roots (*akuśala-mūla*), all the fetters (*saṃyojana*), bindings (*bandhana*), underlying tendencies (*anuśaya*), secondary defilements (*upakleśa*)

The implicit grouping feature of the mental phenomena in the list inevitably leads to later explicit classifications of the *caitasikas*. In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, the first group of *caitasikas* that is singled out as a distinct class is the universals (*mahābhūmika*). In the *Jñānaprasthāna*, when the *saṃprayukta-hetu* is defined, it states that this type of cause applies specifically to these ten dharmas: *vedanā*, *samjñā*, *cetanā*, *sparśa*, *manaskāra*, *chanda*, *adhimokṣa*, *smṛti*, *samādhi*, and *prajñā*.

These ten dharmas are exactly the ten *mahābhūmikas* in later Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, though the term *mahābhūmika* is not yet used in the *Jñānaprasthāna*. In the relatively later Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, such as the part of *Dhātukāyapāda* and chapter 4 of the *Prakaraṇapāda* containing lists of *caitasikas*, these classes of mental factors are mentioned:

- 10 *mahābhūmikas* 十大地法
- 10 *kleśamahābhūmikas* 十大煩惱地法

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52 No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p920c6-10: 云何相應因。答受與受相應法。為相應因。受相應法與受。為相應因。想思觸作意欲勝解念三摩地。慧與慧相應法。為相應因。慧相應法與慧。為相應因。是謂相應因。

53 The MVŚ tries to explain why the JP mentions only the ten *mahābhūmikas* in the definition of *samprayukta-hetu*: No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80b3-8: 問何故但說十大地法為相應因。非餘法耶。答是作論者意欲爾故乃至廣說。有說應說而不說者當知此義有餘。有說若法一切界一切地一切趣一切生一切種一切心可得者。此中說之。餘法不爾故此不說。

54 *Dhātukāyapāda*, T No. 1539 阿毘達磨識身足論 (卷 16) T26, p614b12-14: 有十大地法。十大煩惱地法。十小煩惱地法。五煩惱。五見。五觸。五根。五法。六識身。六觸身。六受身。六想身。六思身。六愛身。Chapter 7 of the *Prakaraṇapāda* has the same content. However, Xuanzang’s translation of the Prakś includes the class of ten *kuśalamahābhūmikā* (十大善地法) after the first ten *mahābhūmikas*, but this class is absent in Guṇabhadra’s translation Prākś (No. 1541 眾事分阿毘曇論 (卷 2) T26, p634a). Yinshun (1981a: 147-61; 162-5) proposes that chapter 4 of the Prakś was not a work by Vasumitra but was made by Sarvāstivāda teachers later than him, and he suggests that *kuśalamahābhūmikā* in Xuanzang’s translation was a later interpolation following the MVŚ.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on caitasika

- 10 parittakleśamahābhūmika 十小煩惱地法
- 5 kleśas 五煩惱
- 5 drṣṭis 五見
- 5 sparśas 五觸
- 5 indriyas 五根
- 5 dharmas 五法

In the *Mahāvibhāṣā, mental factors are classified differently. They are divided into seven classes:55

- 10 mahābhūmikas 大地法
- 10 kleśamahābhūmikas 大煩惱地法
- 10 parittakleśamahābhūmikas 小煩惱地法
- 10 kuśalamahābhūmikas 大善地法
- 5 akuśalamahābhūmikas 大不善地法
- 3 nivṛtāvyākṛtamahābhūmikas 大有覆無記地法
- 10 anivṛtāvyākṛtamahābhūmikas 大無覆無記地法

About one century after the completion of the Sarvāstivāda *Mahāvibhāṣā, Dharmaśreṣṭhin wrote a concise Abhidharma manual called *Abhidharmahrdaya.56

According to Yinshun, Dharmaśreṣṭhin is perhaps a Sarvāstivāda teacher with some Dārṣṭāntika proclivities.57 Therefore, it is understandable that in the *Abhidharmahrdaya

55 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p220a-b: 復次此中因說心所。應說大地等法。謂大地法有十種。一受。二想。三思。四作意。五勝解。八念。九三摩地。十慧。大煩惱地法亦有十種。一不信。二懈怠。三放逸。四掉舉。五無明。六忘念。七不正知。八心亂。九非理作意。十邪勝解。… 小煩惱地法有十種。一忿。二恨。三覆。四惱。五諂。六誑。七憍。八慳。九嫉。十害。大善地法有十種。一信。二精進。三慚。四愧。五無貪。六無瞋。七無害。八施。九不放逸。十不害。大不善地法有五種。一無明。二惛沈。三掉舉。四無發。五無記。大有覆無記地法有三種。一無明。二惛沈。三掉舉。大無覆無記地法有十種。即前大地等十法。

56 The dating is based on Yinshun’s (1981a:488-9) study. Some Japanese scholars such as Yamada Ryūjō 山田龍城 propose that the *Hṛdaya is earlier than the Vībhaṣā, but Yinshun (1981a: 470-5) argues that their dating is due to misinterpretation of certain Chinese historical records.

57 Yinshun 印順 1981a: 487-91. Yinshun also argues that the *Abhidharmahrdaya is based on the
the classification of the *caitasikas does not follow the *Mahāvibhāṣā. About one century later, Dharmatrāta wrote a new commentary to the *Abhidharmahṛdaya, named *Miśrābhidharmahṛdaya 雜阿毘曇心論. Dharmatrāta re-worked the *caitasika lists and the classes so that they return more or less to the Vaibhāṣika system. In the *Miśrābhidharmahṛdaya, the classification of *caitasikas is as follows:58

- 10 mahābhāmikas 十大地法
- 10 kuśalamahābhūmikas 十善大地法
- 10 kleśamahābhūmika 十煩惱大地法
- 2 akuśalamahābhūmikas 二不善大地法
- 10 parīttakleśamahābhūmika 十小煩惱大地法

Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya adopts Dharmatrāta’s classification of *caitasikas in the *Miśrābhidharmahṛdaya with some minor adjustments:59

- 10 mahābhāmikas 十大地法
- 10 kuśalamahābhūmikas 十大善地法
- 6 kleśamahābhūmika 六大煩惱地法
- 2 akuśalamahābhūmikas 二大不善地法
- 10 parīttakleśabhūmika 十小煩惱地法
- 4 anityatas 四不定

Later works such as Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra closely follow the *Abhidharmakośa with only minor adjustments. Table 2.1 gives the list of *caitasikas according to the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.

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58 No. 1552 雜阿毘曇心論 (卷 2) T28, p881a-882a. See also Mizuno 1964: 299-300.
59 AKBh verses 2.23-27, pp.54.11-57.9.
### Table 1 Sarvāstivāda classification of mental factors according to the Abhidharmakośa

| 1. Universals (mahābhūmika) |  
|-------------------------------|---|
| (1) vedanā (feeling), (2) cetanā (volition), (3) saṃjñā (apperception), (4) chanda (purpose), (5) sparśa (contact), (6) prajñā (insight), (7) smṛti (mindfulness), (8) manaskāra (attention), (9) adhimokṣa (determination), (10) samādhi (concentration) |  

| 2. Wholesome universals (kuśalamahābhūmika) |  
|---------------------------------------------|---|
| (1) śraddhā (faith), (2) apramāda (heedfulness), (3) praśrābdhi (calm), (4) upekṣā (equanimity), (5) hrī (shame), (6) apatrāpya (regard to consequence), (7) alobha (lack of greed), (8) adeṣa (lack of hatred), (9) avihimsā (non-hurting), (10) vīrya (energy) |  

| 3. Universal defilements (kleśamahābhūmika) |  
|---------------------------------------------|---|
| (1) mohā (delusion), (2) pramāda (negligence), (3) kauśīdya (slackness), (4) āśraddhya (lack of faith), (5) styāna (sloth), (6) auddhatya (restlessness) |  

| 4. Unwholesome universals (akuśalamahābhūmika) |  
|---------------------------------------------|---|
| (1) āhrīkya (shamelessness), (2) anapatrāpya (disregard to consequence) |  

| 5. Minor defilements (parīttakleśamahābhūmika) |  
|---------------------------------------------|---|
| (1) krodha (anger), (2) upanāha (ill-will), (3) śāṭhya (treachery), (4) īrṣyā (envy), (5) pradāśa (vexation), (6) mrakṣa (concealment), (7) mātsarya (miserliness), (8) māyā (deceit), (9) mada (pride), (10) vihiṃsā (cruelty) |  

| 6. Indeterminate (aniyata) |  
|---------------------------------------------|---|
| (1) kaukṛtya (regret), (2) middha (torpor), (3) vitarka (applied thought), (4) vicāra (sustained thought), (5) rāga (lust), (6) pratigha (aversion), (7) māna (conceit), (8) vicikitsā (doubt) |  

In the Pāli Abhidhamma, the development of the classification of the cetasikas is less complicated. There is no explicit classification of cetasikas in the seven Pāli canonical Abhidhamma texts and their commentaries (aṭṭhakathā). Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga follows the Dhammasaṅgani and also does not include a cetasika classification. Only in

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60 Adopted with slight alterations from pp. 44-5 in Dhammajoti 2007b.
61 Or more likely, there is not enough extant textual evidence to show the Pāli Abhidhamma system’s development.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on caitasika

Buddhadatta’s manual Abhidhammāvatāra are the cetasikas divided into three classes: universal factors (sabbacitta-sādhāraṇa), wholesome factors (kusala), and unwholesome factors (akusala). Buddhadatta’s system was further refined in Anuruddha’s Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, which became the most popular and standard system in the Theravāda tradition. Table 2.2 shows the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha cetasikas and their classification.

Table 2 Mental factors in the Pāli Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Universals (sabbacittasādhāraṇa) that occur with all consciousness (7)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) phassa (contact), (2) vedanā (feeling), (3) saññā (apperception), (4) cetanā (volition), (5) ekaggatā (one-pointedness), (6) jīvitindriya (life-faculty), (7) manasikāra (attention)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Particulars (pakiṇṇakā) arise in particular circumstances (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) vitakka (applied thought), (2) vicāra (sustained thought), (3) adhimokkha (decision), (4) viriya (energy), (5) pīti (joy), (6) chanda (purpose)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Unwholesome (akusala) mental factors (14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) moha (delusion), (2) ahirika (shamelessness), (3) anottappa (disregard for consequence), (4) uddhacca (restlessness), (5) lobha (greed), (6) diṭṭhi (view), (7) māna (conceit), (8) doṣa (hatred), (9) issā (envy), (10) macchariya (miserliness), (11) kukkucca (regret), (12) thīna (sloth), (13) middha (topor), (14) vicikicchā (doubt)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. Beautiful (sobhana) mental factors (25)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The beautiful universals (sobhanasādhāraṇa) (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) saddhā (faith), (2) sati (mindfulness), (3) hiri (shame), (4) ottappa (fear of wrong doing), (5) alobho (non-greed), (6) adoso (non-hatred), (7) tatramajjhattatā (neutrality), (8) kāyapassaddhi (tranquility of the body), (9) cittapassaddhi (tranquility of consciousness), (10) kāyalahutā (lightness of body), (11) cittalahutā (lightness of consciousness), (12) kāyamudutā (malleability of the body), (13) cittamudutā (malleability of the consciousness), (14) kāyakammaññatā (wieldiness of the body), (15) cittakammaññatā (wieldiness of the consciousness), (16) kāyapāguññatā (proficiency of...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

62 Adopted with slight alterations from Bodhi 1999: 79-91. Most of Bodhi’s translations are preserved here because the Pāli terms may have different shades of meanings from the corresponding Sanskrit terms. A comparative study of the terms will be a separate project.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on \textit{caitasika}

The abstinences (\textit{virati}) (3)

(1) sammāvācā (right speech), (2) sammākammanta (right action), (3) sammā-ājīva (right livelihood)

\textbf{Illimitables (\textit{appamaññā}) (2)}

(1) karuṇā (compassion), (2) muditā (appreciative joy)

\textbf{Non-delusion (\textit{amoha}) (1)}

(1) paññā (insight)

\textbf{2.1.4 Mental Factors in the Yogācāra Tradition}

The most significant difference between the Yogācāra system and other Ābhidharmika systems such as the Sarvāstivāda and the Theravāda is that it proposes that multiple consciousnesses can occur simultaneously on different levels of mind. On the other hand, despite the drastically different mind model, the Yogācāra tradition has adopted many doctrines from the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. For example, in the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi}, we can see that the Sarvāstivāda five-category division of all dharmas as \textit{rupa}, \textit{citta}, \textit{caitta/caitasika}, \textit{cittaviprayukta}, and \textit{asamskṛta} is employed,\footnote{For example, the discussion of \textit{dharmadhātu} in the Basic Section of the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} lists fifty-three \textit{caitasikas}, two \textit{dhammāyata-pannāpaṇṇa rūpas}, twenty-four \textit{viprayuktas}, and eight \textit{asamskṛtas}. No doubt this is based on the Sarvāstivāda \textit{pañcavastu} division since most \textit{rūpas} and all \textit{cittas} are already included in the other seventeen \textit{dhātu}s. \textit{YBh} p. 68.12-69.7. Also, in the relatively later part the \textit{Bodhisattvabhūmi Viññāyaka} in the \textit{Viññāyakasamgraha}, the Sarvāstivāda \textit{pañcavastu} are explicitly used in the analysis of the Yogācāra \textit{pañcadharma}. No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷72) T30, p697c5-7: 領如是五事。幾色幾心。幾心所有。幾心不相應行。幾無為。答相通五種。名唯心不相應行。分別正智。通心及心所有。真如唯無為。}

\textbf{64} \textit{Caitasika} is defined in a text later than the \textit{YBh}: No. 1602 顯揚聖教論 (卷1) T31, p480c29-481a2: 心所有法者。謂若法從阿賴耶識種子所生。依心所起。與心俱轉相應。 \textit{Caitasika} refers to dharmas that arise from seeds in the \textit{ālaya-vijnāna}, depend on \textit{citta}, function together with \textit{citta}, and are associated [with \textit{citta}]. In this definition, except for the reference to the Yogācāra notion of “seed,” all other aspects of \textit{caitasika} are the same as in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. See Mizuno 1964: 210.

\textit{caitasika} is considered a separate category of dharmas apart from \textit{cittas}. Although I have not located a formal definition for the term \textit{caitta/caitasika} in the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi},\footnote{Caitasika is defined in a text later than the \textit{YBh}: No. 1602 顯揚聖教論 (卷1) T31, p480c29-481a2: 心所有法者。謂若法從阿賴耶識種子所生。依心所起。與心俱轉相應。 \textit{Caitasika} refers to dharmas that arise from seeds in the \textit{ālaya-vijnāna}, depend on \textit{citta}, function together with \textit{citta}, and are associated [with \textit{citta}]. In this definition, except for the reference to the Yogācāra notion of “seed,” all other aspects of \textit{caitasika} are the same as in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. See Mizuno 1964: 210.} this term appears to be used in exactly

the body), (17) \textit{cittapāguññatā} (proficiency of the consciousness), (18) \textit{kāyujjukatā} (rectitude of the body), (19) \textit{cittujjukatā} (rectitude of the consciousness)
Chapter 2. The Dispute on caitasika

the same sense as in the Sarvástivāda Abhidharma texts. Furthermore, the Yogācāra system also has a theory of association (samprayoga) very similar to that of the Sarvástivādins, which will be discussed in the next chapter. In other words, the Yogācāra system has a notion of caitasikas as “mental factors,” which does not differ significantly from the Sarvāstivāda category of caitasika.

The earliest record of the Yogācāra list of the caitasikas occurs in the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi. In the Manobhūmi, under the rubric that describes those phenomena that are the company (sahāya) of consciousness, it gives a list of fifty-one caitiṣṇāḥ, which are presented as a single, unclassified list similar to the previously mentioned lists in the Dharmaskandha and the *Śāriputrādbhādharma. However, in another subsection of the Manobhūmi, the treatise classifies the fifty-one caittas into several groups according to the following four criteria.67

65 For more detailed discussions of the lists of caitasikas in the YBh, see Shimizu 1979; 1981; 1982; Mizuno 1964: 318-322; 328-335.
66 YBh (Bhattacharya 1957) p.11.14-21: sahāyaḥ katamaḥḥ/ tadyathā / manaskāraḥ sparśo vedanā sanjñā cetanā chando’dhimokṣaḥ / manaskāraḥ sparśo vedanā sanjñā cetanā. 67 YBh (Bhattacharya 1957) p57.8-17: tatra cittacaitasakalāpe cittaṃ copalabhyate caitasāśca tripañcāśad upalabhyante / tadyathā manaskārādāyo vitarkavicāraparyavasānāḥ yathānirdiṣṭhāḥ / esām caitasānām dharmāṇāṃ kati sarvatva citta upadhyate sarvabhūmike sarvabhūmike sarvadā sarveva / āha / pañca manaskārādāyo vitarkavicāraparyavasānāḥ / kati kāśa eva na sarvatva api tu sarvabhūmike na sarvadā sarveva / śraddhādayo prajñāvasānāḥ / kati kluṣṭa eva na sarvatva api tu sarvabhūmike na sarvadā sarveva / rāgādayaḥ samprajanyaparyavasānāḥ //
(1) Whether or not the caitta occur in cittas of all three moral qualities (sarvatra citta), namely, wholesome (kuśala), unwholesome (akuśala), and morally neutral (avyākṛta).

(2) Whether or not they occur in all levels of existence (sarvabhūmike). According to the commentaries, there are two different interpretations for this category. First, the term bhūmi refers to the four dhyānas in the rūpadhātu, the four samāpattis in the arūpyadhātu, and plus the kāmadhātu totaling nine bhūmis; another explanation states that bhūmi here refers to the sarvitarkā savicārā bhūmi, the avitarkā vicāramātrā bhūmi, and the avitarkāvicārā bhūmi, the three stages of meditation in the Yogācārabhūmi.

(3) Whether or not they occur all the time (sarvadā);
(4) Whether or not they always occur together with other members of the same group (sarve).

With the different combinations of the four criteria, the fifty-one caitasikas are divided into five groups:

(i) Occurring in cittas of all moral types (sarvatra citta utpadyante), all levels of existence (sarvabhūmika), all the time (sarvadā), and always together with each other in the same group (sarve).

(ii) Occurring in cittas of all moral types (sarvatropadyante), all levels of existence (sarvabhūmike), not all the time (na sarvadā), not together with other caittas in the same group (na sarve).

(iii) Occurring only in wholesome cittas (kuśala na sarvatra), all levels of existence (sarvabhūmike), not all the time (na sarvadā), not together with other caittas in the same group (na sarve).

(iv) Occurring only in defiled unwholesome cittas (kliṣṭa eva na sarvatra), not all levels of existence (na sarvabhūmike), not all the time (na sarvadā), not together with other caittas in the same group (na sarve).

(v) Occurring in cittas of all moral types (sarvatra), not all levels of existence (na...
Chapter 2. The Dispute on *caitasika*

*caitasika*), not all the time (*na sarvadā*), not together with other *caitasika* in the same group (*na sarve*).

However, the criteria used in this part of the YBh for the grouping of the *caitasika* were not considered sufficiently clear, and a new classification of the *caitasika* was proposed. In a later part of the YBh, the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, the same *caitasika* are classified in a new way into two major classes: universals (*sarvatraga* 遍行) and non-universals (*asarvatraga* 不遍行). The latter is further divided into superior non-universals (*pranīta-asarvatraga* 勝不遍行), wholesome (*kuśala*), and defiled (*kliṣṭa*); the defiled are further divided into deffilements (*kleśa*) and minor deffilements (*upakleśa*). 68

This new classification system of *caitasika* becomes more influential in later Yogācāra texts. Treatises and commentaries after the *Yogācārabhūmi* divide the fifty-one *caittas* into six groups under the following six categories: 69

1. universals (*sarvatraga* 遍行)
2. particulars (*viniyata* 別境)
3. wholesome (*kuśala* 善)
4. deffilements (*kleśa* 煩惱)
5. minor deffilements (*upakleśa* 隨煩惱)
6. indeterminates (*aniyata* 不定)

These six classes are actually a slightly revised version of the classification of *caitasika* found in the later part of the YBh with the “superior non-universals”

68 No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 55) T30, p601c10-13: 問諸識生時。與幾遍行心法俱起。答五。一作意。二觸。三受。四思。五想。問復與幾不遍行心法俱起。答不遍行法乃有多種。勝者唯五。一欲。二勝解。三念。四三摩地。五慧。p602b13-17: 問善法...何等為自性。答謂信慚愧。無貪無瞋。無癡精進。輕安不放逸。捨不害。如是諸法名自性善。p603a9-10, 21-22: 過分諸染污法二相所顯。一本煩惱。二隨煩惱。...問煩惱自性有幾種。答有六種。一貪。二瞋。三無明。四慢。五見。六疑。p604a13-15: 過分隨煩惱自性云何。謂忿恨覆惱。嫉慳誑諂。憍害無慚。無愧惛沈。掉舉不信。懈怠放逸。忘念散亂。不正知惡作。睡眠尋伺。

69 E.g. Trimsikā verse 9: sarvatragair viniyataḥ kuśalaiś caitasair asau, samprayuktā tathā kleśair upakleśais trivedanā.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on caitasika

(*pranīta-asarvatraga 勝不遠行) becoming “particulars” (viniyata 別境) and a new class of “indeterminates” (aniyata 不定). This six-fold division of caitasikas eventually becomes the standard in the Yogācāra tradition and is followed by most later Yogācāra texts in India and China.\(^\text{70}\) Furthermore, these six types match the previously mentioned early five categories in the YBh quite well.\(^\text{71}\) (1) (2) (3) and (6) correspond exactly to (i) (ii) (iii) and (v) respectively, and (4) and (5) equals (iv) in the early caitasika classes of YBh.

Finally, if we compare the Yogācāra classification of the caittas with the classical Sarvāstivāda classification system (see the discussion in 2.1.3), we can observe close and undeniable resemblances between these two classification systems:\(^\text{72}\) the ten caittas in the Yogācāra universals (sarvatraga) and particulars (viniyata) correspond to the Sarvāstivāda mahābhūmikas; the Yogācāra wholesomes (kuśala) correspond to the Sarvāstivāda kuśalamahābhūmikas; the Yogācāra defilements (kleśa) correspond to the Sarvāstivāda kleśamahābhūmikas; and the Yogācāra minor defilements (upakleśa) roughly correspond to Sarvāstivāda parittakleśamahābhūmikas together with its two akuśalamahābhūmikas; and finally the Yogācāra indeterminates (aniyata) roughly correspond to the category of aniyatamahābhūmikas of Sarvāstivāda. Table 2.3 gives the list of the fifty-one caittas in the YBh and the corresponding classifications in the two Yogācāra systems and the Sarvāstivāda system.

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\(^{70}\) This six-fold division of caitasikas can be found in Asaṅga’s Prakaranāryavācā, No. 1602 显揚聖教論 (卷 1) T31, p481a; Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka, No. 1612 大乘五蘊論 (卷 1) T31, p848c; Vasubandhu’s Śatadharmapratikāśamukha, No. 1614 大乘百法明門論 (卷 1) T31, p855c; and so forth. Mizuno (1964: 324-28) has noticed that in Paramārtha’s translation of Vasubandhu’s Trīṃsikā, the class of indeterminates (aniyata 不定) is absent. It is likely that the aniyata class was separated from the upakleśa class at a relatively late date.

\(^{71}\) The correspondence of these two classification systems is pointed out in the CWSL: No. 1585 成唯識論 (卷 5) T31, p26c27-p27a8: 謂諸心所名義無異而有六位種類差別。謂遍行有五。別境亦五。善有十一。煩惱有六。隨煩惱有二十。不定有四。如是六位合五十一。一切心中定可得故。緣別別境而得生故。唯善心中可得生故。性是根本煩惱攝故。唯是煩惱等流性故。於善染等皆不定故。然瑜伽論合六為五。煩惱隨煩惱俱是染故。復以四一切辯五差別。謂一切性及地時俱。五中遍行具四一切。別境唯有初二一切。善唯有一。謂一切地。染四皆無。不定唯一。謂一切性。

\(^{72}\) See the comparison of the two caitasika classification systems in Lusthaus 2002: 550-1 (Appendix three).
Table 3 The *caittas* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, two *Yogācāra* classifications, and the corresponding *Sarvāstivāda* classification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>caittas</em> in the YBh</th>
<th>YBh classification</th>
<th><em>Trīṃśikā</em> classification</th>
<th>correspondence with Sarvāstivāda classification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) attention (<em>manaskāra</em>, 作意)</td>
<td><em>sarvatra citta utpadyante,</em></td>
<td><em>sarvatraga</em></td>
<td>= mahābhūmika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) contact (<em>sparśa</em>, 触)</td>
<td><em>sarvatraga</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) feeling (<em>vedanā</em>, 受)</td>
<td><em>sarvabhūmike,</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) apperception (<em>samjñā</em>, 想)</td>
<td><em>sarvadhā, sarve</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) volition (<em>cetanā</em>, 思)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) purpose (<em>chanda</em>, 欲)</td>
<td><em>sarvatrotpadyante,</em></td>
<td>viniyata</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) determination (<em>adhimokṣa</em>, 胜解)</td>
<td><em>sarvabhūmike,</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) mindfulness (<em>smṛti</em>, 念)</td>
<td><em>na sarve</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>(9) concentration (<em>samādhi</em>, 三摩地)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(10) insight (<em>prajñā</em>, 慧)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(11) faith (<em>śraddhā</em>, 信)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(12) shame (<em>hrī</em>, 慚)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(13) regard for consequence (<em>apatrāpya</em>, 愧)</td>
<td><em>kuśala na sarvatra,</em></td>
<td>kuśala</td>
<td>≈ kuśalamahābhūmika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14) lack of greed (<em>alobha</em>, 無貪)</td>
<td><em>sarvabhūmike,</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(15) lack of hatred (<em>adveṣa</em>, 無瞋)</td>
<td><em>sarvadhā, sarve</em></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(16) lack of delusion (<em>amoha</em>, 無癡)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(17) energy (<em>vīrya</em>, 精進)</td>
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<td>(18) tranquility (<em>praśrabdhi</em>, 輕安)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(19) heedfulness (<em>apramāda</em>, 不放逸)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(20) equanimity (<em>upekṣā</em>, 择)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(21) non-hurting (<em>ahiṃsā</em>, 不害)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(22) lust (<em>rāga</em>, 貪)</td>
<td><em>kliṣṭa eva na</em></td>
<td>kleśa</td>
<td>≈ kleśamahābhūmika</td>
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<tr>
<td>(23)</td>
<td>aversion (<em>pratigha</em>, 忿)</td>
<td>saṅkarṣaṇa, na sarvāḥ, na sarvatā, na sarvabhūmike, na sarvadā, na sarvareṇaḥ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(24)</td>
<td>ignorance (<em>avidyā</em>, 無明)</td>
<td>akuṣalabhaṁśānivṛti, parīttakleṣamahābhūmika</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>conceit (<em>māna</em>, 慢)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>wrong view (<em>draṣṭi</em>, 見)</td>
<td>akṣara, na sarvabhūmike, na sarvadā, na sarvareṇaḥ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>doubt (<em>vicikitsā</em>, 疑)</td>
<td>upakleśa</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(28)</td>
<td>anger (<em>krodha</em>, 忿)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>ill-will (<em>upanāha</em>, 恨)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(30)</td>
<td>concealing (<em>mraka</em>, 覆)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(31)</td>
<td>vexation (<em>pradāśa</em>, 惱)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(32)</td>
<td>envy (<em>īrsyā</em>, 嫉)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>miserliness (<em>mātsarya</em>, 慳)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>deceit (<em>māyā</em>, 諂)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(35)</td>
<td>treachery (<em>śāṭhya</em>, 諄)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>pride (<em>mada</em>, 慄)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>cruelty (<em>vihīṃsa</em>, 害)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>lack of shame (<em>ahrīkya</em>, 無慚)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>disregard for consequence (<em>anapatraṇa</em>, 無愧)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>sloth (<em>styāna</em>, 懶)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>restlessness (<em>auddhatya</em>, 掉舉)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>faithlessness (<em>āśraddha</em>, 不信)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>laziness (<em>kausīḍya</em>, 懶怠)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>negligence (<em>pramāda</em>, 放逸)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>forgetfulness (<em>muṣitaṁśrītī</em>, 忘念)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>distraction (<em>adhikṣepa</em>, 散亂)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2.1.5 Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika Teachers who are Against the Doctrine of Mental Factors

The previous sections (2.1.2-4) discussed the theories of mental factors in Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra texts. In contrast to these Abhidharma doctrines that mental factors (caitta/caitasika) are phenomena different from but associated (ṣamaṃprayukta) with consciousness (citta), some teachers even as early as in the pre-Vibhāṣā period proposed that mental phenomena such as vedanā and samjñā do not exist as dharmas apart from consciousness. Regarding the *Tattvasiddhi, it is obvious that the author Harivarman holds a position that is strongly critical of the Sarvāstivāda caitasika theory. In the Northern traditions, the Sarvāstivādin attribute such a position to the Dārṣṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas;73 in the Southern tradition, a record in the Kathāvatthu commentary proposes that the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas hold a similar position.74

On a number of occasions, the *Mahāvibhāṣā records that the Dārṣṭāntikas (譬喻者)75 hold the doctrine that caittas/caitasikas are not separate dharmas different from

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(47) absent-mindedness (asamprajanya, 不正知)</th>
<th>(48) regret (kaukṛtya, 惡作)</th>
<th>(49) torpor (middha, 睡眠)</th>
<th>(50) applied thought (vitarka, 寻)</th>
<th>(51) sustained thought (vicāra, 伺)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sarvatra, na sarvebhūmike, na sarvadā, na sarve aniyan</td>
<td>≈ aniyatamahābhūmika</td>
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</tbody>
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73 MVŚ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 127) T27, p661b: 覺天所說...心所即心。 “The [Dārṣṭāntika teacher] Buddhadeva says that … caitta is citta.” *Nyāyānusāraśāstra, T No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p394c: 有譬喻者說唯有心無別心所。“Some Dārṣṭāntikas say that there is only citta, and there is no caitta different from [it].” For a recent review of studies regarding the Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika, see Krizter 2003a. Also Cox 1995: 37-41; Katō 1989; Dhammajoti 2007a: 5-40; Yinshun 1981a: 355-407, 528-610.


75 Dārṣṭāntikas are teachers within the Sarvāstivāda tradition who take sūtras as the higher authority in contrast to
citta.\textsuperscript{76} Instead, they propose that citta and caitasikas occur successively one after another and cannot occur simultaneously, i.e. there is no simultaneous relationship association (samprayoga) among them as defined by the orthodox Sarvāstivādins.\textsuperscript{77}

Furthermore, different positions are attributed to different teachers even within the Dārṣṭāntikas. The *Mahāvibhāṣa* refers to two Dārṣṭāntika masters, Bhadanta Dharmatrāta (大德法救) and Buddhadeva (覺天), who maintain theories of caitasika that are slightly different from each other.\textsuperscript{78} Dharmatrāta is a prominent Dārṣṭāntika master within the Sarvāstivāda tradition.\textsuperscript{79} According to the *Mahāvibhāṣa*, Dharmatrāta proposes that citta and caitta are different dharmas; however, both citta and caitta are nothing but cetanā (思) in different modes with different names:

Bhadanta Dharmatrāta says that … caitasika-dharmas are not the same as citta.\textsuperscript{80}

Bhadanta Dharmatrāta says thus: citta and caitasika are different modes of cetanā (*cetanā-viśeṣa*).\textsuperscript{81}

And according to Yinshun and Dhammajoti, based on a passage in the *Ārya-Vasumitra-samgrhīta*,\textsuperscript{82} Apparently, Dharmatrāta believes that only three dharmas...
are proper caitasikas, namely, vedanā, saṃjñā, and cetanā. All other caitasikas in the Sarvāstivāda system, according to Dharmatrāta, are nothing but different modes of cetanā. As Dhammajoti points out, here in Dharmatrāta’s interpretation, cetanā likely means general “mental activity” instead of the specific dharma of “volition” in the Āhbidharmika sense. And the reason the Dārṣṭāntikas propose only these three dharmas as caittas is perhaps that these three are enlisted in the standard list of five aggregates aside from material form (rūpa) and consciousness (vijñāna).83

Dharmatrāta also thinks that citta and caitasikas cannot occur simultaneously but only occur successively, one after another:

Some say that caitasikas arise successively and not simultaneously, such as the Dārṣṭāntikas. The Bhadanta [i.e. Dharmatrāta] also says, caitasikas arise one after another and not simultaneously, just as many merchants passing through a narrow path, [they] have to pass through one by one, not by two or more [simultaneously]. Čaitasika-dharmas are likewise: [they] arise one by one from their individual character of birth (*jāti 生相), and it is definitely impossible [for them] to arise simultaneously in an assemblage.84

In this passage, Dharmatrāta compares the mind to a band of merchants passing a narrow path: just as a path allows only one merchant to pass at a time, the mind at one moment can have only one instance of citta, and no two cittas can occur simultaneously.

However, the *Mahāvibhāṣā also records that Dharmatrāta proposes that consciousness (vijñāna) occurs simultaneously with feeling (vedanā), and so forth, and the relationship of association (samprayoga) means companionship (同伴侶) between consciousness and caitasikas:

The Bhadanta says, consciousness together with vedanā, and so forth, arise as one assemblage (一和合, *sāmagrī). Just as consciousness is one [entity], vedanā, and so forth, [each] is also one [entity]. Hence, there is no fallacy [of two cittas arising simultaneously].85

84 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p493c-494a: 諸心所法次第而生。非一時生。如喻喻者。大德亦說。諸心所法次第而生。非一時生。如多商侶過一狹路。要一一過非二非多。諸心所法亦復如是。一一各別生相所生。必無一時和合生義。The English translation depends in part upon Dhammajoti’s translation. Dharmatrāta 2007a: 114-5.
85 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 10) T27, p50a: 大德說曰。心與受等一和合生。如心是一受等亦一。故無
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The Bhadanta says, companionship (同伴侶, samprajñā) is the meaning of association (相應, *samprayoga*). *Citta* and *caitasika* contain each other, arise simultaneously, and grasp the same object; this is association.\(^{86}\)

These two passages apparently contradict the passage quoted earlier, which suggests that Dharmatrāta claims that *citta* and *caitasika* arise sequentially instead of simultaneously. Yinshun thinks that the latter two passages are mistakenly attributed to Dharmatrāta by the compilers of the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.\(^{87}\) However, after carefully examining the passages together with the passage in the *Ārya-Vasumitra-saṃghṛti*,\(^{88}\) Dhammajoti proposes that these passages can be understood in such a way that, in Dharmatrāta’s view, *caitasika* dharmas such as feeling (*vedanā*), recognition (*saṃjñā*), and mental activity (*cetanā*) all have the element of cognition (*vijñāna*) within them. Therefore, although consciousness (*vijñāna*), *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* arise sequentially, in each moment of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* the element of *vijñāna* always exists. Hence, these two passages do not contradict other positions attributed to Dharmatrāta.\(^{89}\)

Another Dārṣṭāntika master, Buddhadeva,\(^{90}\) holds a slightly different view concerning *caitasikas*. He proposes that *caitasikas* are nothing but different states or modes of *citta* (*citta-viśeṣa*):

The Venerable Buddhadeva states thus: the nature of all *citta* and *caitasikas* is *citta*.\(^{91}\)

Buddhadeva states that material forms (*rūpa*) are nothing but [the four] great elements (*mahābhūta*); *caitasikas* are the same as *citta*. He says that derivative forms are different modes of the great elements, and *caitasikas* are different modes of *citta*. For what reason does he say this? [He makes these statements] based on the sūtras … in the sūtra it is said, “What is

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\(^{86}\) No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p81a: 大德說曰。同伴侶義是相應義。識與心所互相容受俱時而生。同取一境乃至心。

\(^{87}\) Yinshun 印順 1981a: 255.

\(^{88}\) See footnote 82 above.

\(^{89}\) Dhammajoti 2007a: 120.

\(^{90}\) Except for the few quotations in the MVŚ that identify him as a Dārṣṭāntika within the Sarvāstivāda tradition, there is no further biographical information about Buddhadeva.

\(^{91}\) No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T27, p8c: 尊者覺天作如是說。諸心心所體即是心。
Chapter 2. The Dispute on *caitasika*

*samādhi?* It is the wholesome one-pointedness of consciousness.” Because of this [he] says *caitasika* are *citta*.

Question: then how does he establish *dhātus*, *āyatana*, and *skandha*s?

Answer: He states thus: … As for the [five] *skandha*s, the four *mahābhūtas* are established as the *skandha* of *rūpa*, and concerning those different modes (*avastha-viśeṣa*) of *citta*, some are named *vedanā*, some are named *samjñā*, some are named *cetanā*, some are named *vijñāna*; thus are the four *skandha*s established.92

Buddhadeva’s position appears to be different from that of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta, but actually their positions are quite similar. While disagreeing with the Vaibhāṣikas on the number of *caitasika* dharmas, Dharmatrāta seems to agree with them that *citta* and *caitasikas* are different, though by nature all *citta* and *caitasikas* are nothing but *cetanā*.

Buddhadeva explicitly denies that *caitasikas* are a category of dharmas separate from *citta* but contends that *caitasikas* are simply *citta* in different modes of existence (*avastha-viśeṣa*). He argues for this position based on a definition of concentration (*samādhi*) in the sūtra. In both the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda Abhidharma systems, *samādhi* is a *caitasika* different from but associated with *citta*. As in the passage by Buddhadeva quoted above, *samādhi* is defined in the sūtra as one-pointedness of *citta* (*cittasyaikāgratā*),93 namely, a state in which the mind is focused on one object; it is not something different from *citta*, which exists associated with *citta* as proposed by the Ābhidharmaikas.

The same principle also applies to other dharmas such as *vedanā*, *samjñā*, and *cetanā* among the five *skandhas*: they are all different states or modes (*avastha-viśeṣa*) of *citta*. Nevertheless, to say the *caitasikas* are *citta-viśeṣa* is actually not much different from saying that all *citta* and *caitasikas* are *cetanā-viśeṣa*. In this

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92 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 127) T27, p661b: 觉天所說色唯大種。心所即心。彼作是說。道色即是大種差別。心所即是心之差別。彼何故作是說。依契經故。如契經說。眼肉團中。若內各別堅性堅類。近有執受名內地界。乃至各別動性動類。近有執受名內風界。彼依此經故說造色即是大種。又契經說云何等持。謂善心一境性。由此故說心所即心。問彼復云何立界處蘊耶。答彼作是說諸四大種。有是能見。有是所見。乃至有是能觸。有是所觸。諸所見者立為眼界。諸所見者立為色界。乃至諸所觸者立為觸界。心中有依眼根。乃至有依意根。依眼*<661c>*根者立眼識界。乃至依意根者立意識界。即六識身無間已滅立為意界。即心差別有名為受。有名為想。有名為思。並三無為立為法界。如界處亦爾。蘊者。諸四大種立為色蘊。諸心差別有名為受。有名為想。名為思有名為識。立為四蘊。AKBh (verse viii-9, p.440) mentions this position but does not attribute it to Buddhadeva: *avasthāviśeṣo'pi hi nāma cetasaścaitasiko bhavati*. See also Dhammajoti 2007a: 97.

93 M no. 44 Culaivedalla Sutta, (I 301): yā kho, āvuso visākha, cittassa ekaggatā ayaṃ samādhi. MĀ no. 210 法廬比丘尼經, No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 58) T01, p788c24-5: 若善心得一者。是謂定也。Note that the Pāli version does not have the word “kusala” while the MĀ has 善“kusala,” which is the same as the passage quoted in the MVŚ. Also in the TatSid ch. 155, 道業聚定論中定因品第一百五十五, No. 1646 成實論 (卷 12) T32, p334b: 心住一處是三昧相。AKBh p.54.23-4: *samādhīsittasyaikāgratā*. See also Kritzer 2005: 384-5.
sense, Dharmatrāta’s and Buddhadeva’s positions regarding *caitasika* are more or less the same but only phrased in different ways. Below in the discussion of the arguments in the *Tattvasiddhi* we will see that Harivarman’s position regarding *caitasika* is almost exactly the same as Buddhadeva’s position as recorded in the MVŚ.

The influence of the Dārṣṭāntikas continues in Buddhist history after the *Mahāvibhāṣā*. Both Vasubandhu’s *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra* record the teachings of Śrīlāta, the Sautrāntika master of early 5th century CE. His opinion regarding the *caittas* appears to be very similar to that of Dharmatrāta: there are only three *caitasikas*, namely, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā*; *citta* and *caitasikas* arise sequentially and not simultaneously; and in each moment of a *caitasika*, there is always the element of cognition (*vijñāna*). 94

### 2.2 Caitasika in the *Tattvasiddhi*

In the *Tattvasiddhi*, Harivarman dedicates five chapters (60-64) to the issue of *caitasika*, and three chapters (65-67) to the closely related issue of association (*saṃprayoga*). From this we can see how important Harivarman considers these issues to be and how heated the debate was among different teachers of that time. Also, as mentioned earlier, Harivarman opposes the Ābhidharmika theory of *caitasikas* as “mental factors” that are different from *citta*. At the beginning of chapter 60 in the *Tattvasiddhi*, he defines *citta* as a dharma that is capable of taking an object (60.1); 95 and because feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), and volitional formation (*saṃskāra*) all take their corresponding objects, they are all *cittas* in different modes (*citta-viśeṣā 心差別*) (60.2-3). As seen earlier in 2.1.5, this is exactly the same position attributed to the Dārṣṭāntika master Buddhadeva in the MVŚ.

Regarding the term *caitta/caitasika*, apparently Harivarman conforms to its meaning in the sūtras, where it is used as an adjective meaning “pertaining to mind” or “mental,” or as a noun meaning “mental state.” 96 In chapter 63, he explicitly defines *caitasika* as “dharmas born depending on *citta*,” which is basically an etymological analysis of the

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95 Also in TatSid chapter 18, No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252b: 心法者能缘是也.
96 See section 2.1.1.
term *caitta* or *caitasika*: *caitta* is a derivative from *citta*, *caitasika* is a derivative from *cetas*, and they both mean “mental” or “things belonging or pertaining to mind.” Based on this analysis of the term, he further states that since one moment of *citta* arises depending on the previous moment of *citta*, the latter moment of *citta* should be called *caitta* or *caitasika* in contrast to the previous moment of *citta* (63.8 and 63.12). Therefore, Harivarman’s position regarding the term *caitasika* indicates that he is not against using the term *caitta/caitasika* to refer to the numerous mental phenomena mentioned in the sūtras, but he does not understand these mental phenomena as dharmas different from *citta* as the Ābhidhamikas do. Instead, he understands them as *citta* by nature, which occurs in different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*).

As for a list of *caitasikas*, the *Tattvasiddhi* contains discussions of several dozen mental phenomena scattered throughout different parts and chapters. Apparently, there is no strict classification of *caitasikas* as in the later Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra texts. Mizuno (1964: 338-9) counts all *caitasikas* mentioned in the *Tattvasiddhi* at forty-nine dharmas as follows:

From the section on the five *skandhas* (chs. 77, 78, 84-93):

(1) *saṃjñā* 想 (2) *vedanā* 受 (3) *cetanā* 思 (4) *sparśa* 觸 (5) *manaskāra* 念 (6) *chandas* 欲 (7) *prīti* 喜 (8) *śraddhā* 信 (9) *vīrya* 勁 (10) *smṛti* 憶 (11) *vitarka* 覺 (12) *vicāra* 観 (13) *apramāda* 不放逸 (14) *alobha* 不貪 (15) *adveṣa* 不嗔 (16) *amoha* 不癡 (17) *praśrabdhi* 猛 (18) *upekṣā* 捨

From the section on *kleśas* (chs. 122-133):

(19) *lobha* 貪 (20) *dveṣa* 嗔恚 (21) *avidyā* 無明 (22) *māna* 慚慢 (23) *vicikitsā* 疑 (24) *satkāya-dṛṣṭi* 身見 (25) *antagrāha-dṛṣṭi* 邊見 (26) *mithyā-dṛṣṭi* 邪見 (27) *dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa* 見取 (28) *śīlavrata-parāmarśa* 戒取

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97 Also in TatSid ch. 18, No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252b. 心數法者若識得緣即次第生想等是也.
There are a few points that can be noted from this list of *caitasika*. First, in accordance with the parts and chapters in the treatise in which these *caitasika* are discussed, they are roughly grouped as (i) morally neutral and wholesome (1-18), (ii) *kleśa* (19-28), and *upakleśa* (29-49). As for the first group (1-18), Harivarman does not explicitly divide them into subgroups such as *mahābhūmika* or *sarvatraga* as in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra texts. Second, in the *upakleśa* group, items (38-49) are not included either in the Sarvāstivāda or in the Yogācāra *caitasika* systems. These mental phenomena occur scattered in the sūtras, and some of them are gathered in some early Abhidharma texts such as the *Vibhaṅga*, the *Śāriputrābhidharma*, and the *Dharmaskandha*.\(^{98}\)

From these observations, we can probably speculate that Harivarman is likely depending upon a proto-Abhidharma tradition, which is similar to the stage of development presented in the early Abhidharma texts such as the *Vibhaṅga*, the *Śāriputrābhidharma*, and the *Dharmaskandha*, and not a fully developed, sophisticated *caitasika* classification system comparable to those of the Sarvāstivāda and the Yogācāra texts. But this does not mean that Harivarman has no knowledge of the *caitasika* systems in these Abhidharma traditions. For example, in the TatSid chapter 138, Harivarman quotes an opponent who mentions the list of the ten *akuśalamahābhūmikas* and states that these ten *caitasikas* are always associated with all defiled *cittas*. Harivarman answers that for him association means *citta* arises sequentially after the previous *citta*; hence, it is

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\(^{98}\) Mizuno 1964: 339.
impossible for these ten caitasikas all to occur simultaneously with a defiled citta.\textsuperscript{99} As seen in 2.1.3, the caitasika class akuśalamahābhūmika is a relatively late development in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system after the first establishment of the ten mahābhūmikas in the Jñānaprasthāna. This suggests that even with full knowledge of the developed Vaibhāṣika caitasika classification system, Harivarman has no intention of adopting it into his system. This is likely because the Vaibhāṣika caitasika classification is based on the citta-caitta association theory, which Harivarman does not accept, and the division of the caitasika classes is based on the analysis of the caitasikas that exist in specific types of cittas. If one rejects this theoretical foundation, as Harivarman does, it is senseless to classify caitasikas as mahābhūmikas, and so forth. Therefore, it is reasonable that Harivarman does not analyze the caitasikas into more detailed analytical categories.

However, some later commentators on the TatSid seem not to be satisfied with the absence of a more detailed classification and make an attempt to analyze and further classify the caitasikas listed in the TatSid. A prominent example is the Chinese scholar monk Huiyuan (慧遠, 334-413 CE). In his Dasheng yi zhang (大乘義章), he lists thirty-six caitasikas gathered from the TatSid, and divides them into four classes: (1) universal (通數); (2) wholesome (善數); (3) unwholesome (不善數); and (4) morally neutral (無記數).\textsuperscript{100} Moreover, because in the TatSid system these caitasikas are not mental factors accompanying cittas but cittas themselves, the criterion for the division of caitasika classes is no longer based on the theory of association but rather on the occurrence of these cittas in different realms of existence and their moral qualities. For example, according to Huiyuan, the first class of caitasikas of ten “universals” (通數) can

\textsuperscript{99} No. 1646 成實論 (卷 11) T32, p323a13-23: 論者言一切煩惱多十使所攝。是故當因十使而造論。十使者。貪恚慢無明疑及五見。問曰。十煩惱大地法。所謂不信懈怠忘憶散心無明邪方便邪念邪解戲放逸。是法常與一切煩惱心俱。此事云何。答曰。先已破。相應但心法一一生。是故不然。又此非道理。何以知之。或有不善心與不善信俱。或有不善心而無信。精進等亦如是。故知非一切煩惱心中有此十法。又汝說睡掉在一切煩惱心中。是亦不然。若心迷沒爾時應有睡。不應在調戲心中。有如是等過。

\textsuperscript{100} No. 1851 大乘義章 (卷 2) T44, p493a7-11: 成實法中。心數不定。攝末從本。有三十七。隨末別論。則有無量。云何從本有三十七。如彼論說。通數有十。思觸念欲喜信懇覺觀憶。前四後一。與毘曇同。餘五別異。...p493a25-27: 以此十種處遍三界體通三性故名通數。善數有十。通前二十。所謂定。慧。無貪。瞋。癡。慚。愧。猗。捨。及不放逸。...p493b10-15: 不善之中數有十四。通前合為三十四也。何者十四。十使煩惱相從為六。五見之心。合為五見。即以為一。貪瞋癡慢及與疑使。復以為五。通前六也。十纏之中。別數有五。謂無慚。愧。悔。掉。及覆。通前十一。...p493b20-21: 六垢之中有諂及誑。通前十三。...p493b25-: 加其放逸。通前十四。不善如是。無記有三。謂識想受。彼宗之中行前三心。唯無記故。以此通前。為三十七。See also Mizuno 1964: 337-8.
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occur in all three realms of existence (i.e. *kāma*-, *rūpa*-, and *arūpya-dhātu*), and the nature of these *caitasikas* (which are also *cittas*) can be morally wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral (*kuśala*, *akuśala*, and *avyākṛta*). Even though such attempts to classify the *caitasikas* mentioned in the TatSid may be considered acceptable as doctrinal development of the TatSid system, it must be noted that such developments are not explicitly present in the text of the TatSid itself, and no doubt they are influenced by other systems such as those in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra traditions.

Having surveyed the background of the dispute of the *caitasikas*, next we will look at the arguments in the *Tattvasiddhi*’s chapters 60-64. In chapter 60, Harivarman proposes his position, namely, there are no *caitasikas* aside from *citta*, and then he lists a number of arguments, mainly quoting the sūtras, to support his position. In chapter 61, an unnamed opponent proposes the position that there are *caitasikas* different from *citta*, and quotes a number of sūtras to support his position. In chapter 62, the opponent refutes Harivarman’s arguments presented in chapter 60, and in chapter 63, Harivarman refutes the opponent’s arguments presented in chapter 61. Finally, in chapter 64, Harivarman answers the opponent’s refutation of his arguments in chapter 62.

The next two sections (2.3 and 2.4) will discuss in detail the arguments from both sides as presented in chapters 60-64. However, because in the original text an argument and its refutation from the other side of the dispute are scattered in different chapters, it is difficult for the reader to track the arguments and their respective refutations. Hence, the next two sections will reorganize the arguments in these chapters and group the relevant arguments and refutations together. Section 2.3 will discuss Harivarman’s arguments proposed in chapter 60, the opponent’s refutation to these arguments in chapter 62, and Harivarman’s rejoinder to those refutations in chapter 64. Section 2.3 will discuss the opponent’s position and arguments presented in chapter 61, and Harivarman’s refutation in chapter 63. However, chapter 5 presents a more literal translation of the text, and the arguments there are presented in their original order.

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Chapter 2. The Dispute on caitasika

2.3 Harivaran's Arguments against caitasika, the Opponent's Refutations, and Harivaran's Rejoinders

2.3.1 Harivaran’s Argument 1 (60.1-3, 62.1, 64.1)

(60.1-3) Harivaran begins chapter 60 by stating that (60.1) the three terms citta, manas, and vijñāna have the same denotation and refer to the same thing. Then he defines citta as “a dharma that can take objects (ālambana).” His opponent immediately challenges this definition (60.2), stating that if this is the case, those caitasika dharmas such as vedanā, samjñā, saṃskāra, and so forth, all should be citta because they all function by taking objects. Harivaran answers (60.3) that this is exactly the case: vedanā, samjñā, and saṃskāra are citta by nature but only in different modes (citta-viśeṣa). Then he gives several examples to show that dharmas such as mindfulness (smṛti), insight (prajñā), and concentration (samādhi) are referred to by different names on different occasions. He concludes that all these mental phenomena are nothing but citta.

(62.1) The opponent answers with a quotation from a sūtra, in which the three mental phenomena vedanā, samjñā, and saṃskāra, which constitute three of the five skandhas, are defined by their “characteristics” (*lakṣana, 相): to cognize (vijñānāti) is the characteristic of vijñāna; to experience (vedayati) the unpleasant and pleasant is the characteristic of feeling (vedanā); to perceive (sañjānāti) is the characteristic of apperception (samjñā); to initiate action (abhisamkaroti) is the characteristic of [volitional] formation (saṃskāra).

(64.1) Harivaran apparently answers this challenge by citing the etymological analysis of the key terms: vijñāna is from the root ājñā “to know,” vedanā is from the root āvid which can also mean “to know,” and samjñā is also from the root ājñā. As a result, to be conscious of (*vijñānāti) an object, to experience pleasant or unpleasant feelings (*vedayati), and to perceive (*sañjānāti), all basically mean “to know;” hence, there is no difference in their functions or characteristics.

Comments:
(60.1) At the beginning of 60.1 Harivarman states that *citta, manas, and vijñāna* are synonyms. This represents an old tradition in Buddhism that can be traced back to early sūtra texts. However, careful reading of the sūtra texts reveals subtle differences among these terms. Also, with the development of Buddhist doctrines, especially in the Yogācāra system, these terms gained new meanings and new ontological statuses. This issue is not central to the dispute concerning *caitasika*, but I will discuss it in more detail in a separate study of the development of Buddhist mind models.\(^{102}\)

The definition of *citta* as a “dharma that can take objects” is quite interesting because I do not find any parallel for this definition in Northern Abhidharma texts, but it is very close to the definition in the Dhs-a.\(^{103}\) It would appear that Harivarman is very knowledgeable of doctrines from various Buddhist groups and does not restrict himself to one doctrinal school but adopts doctrines that he considers reasonable regardless of their source.

(60.3) As mentioned previously in 2.1.5, Harivarman here holds the same position as Buddhadeva, the Dārṣṭāntika master recorded in the MVŚ: specifically, dharmas such as *vedanā, samjñā, and sanskāra*, which are taken as *caitasikas* (or a collection of *caitasikas* in the case of *sanskāra*) in the Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra systems, are nothing but *citta* in its different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*).

Harivarman’s etymological analysis of the terms *vijñāna, vedanā, and samjñā* provides more in-depth information about the so-called Dārṣṭāntika position regarding *caitasika*. I do not find any parallel to this in any other Abhidharma texts. The message conveyed here is that *vijñāna, vedanā, and samjñā* are basically all forms of “knowing” because all these terms are derived from roots that have the meaning “to know.” This resembles the discussion of Bhadanta Dharmatrāta’s position in 2.1.5,\(^{104}\) which proposes that for each moment of mental activities such as *vedanā, samjñā, and cetanā*, there is always the element of consciousness (*vijñāna*). From this perspective, Harivarman’s etymological analyses of the relevant terms here can be seen as supporting such a

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\(^{102}\) These three terms are briefly discussed in the conclusion chapter 5.1. Johansson 1965 is an indepth investigation of these terms in the Nikāyas. A separate study of these terms in Abhidharma texts is planned.

\(^{103}\) Dhs-a 112: *ārammaṇaṃ cintetā ti cittan ti*.

\(^{104}\) See the discussion of Dharmatrāta on page 79.
position.\textsuperscript{105} However, Harivarman does not perform a similar etymological analysis on the term \textit{samskāra}, which the opponent has defined as “to initiate action” (\textit{abhisaṃkaroti}) in 62.1. Perhaps Harivarman finds it difficult to extract a sense of “knowing” from the root \textit{\textsl{\textit{kr}}} “to do” and dodges this issue.

From 60.4 to 60.10 Harivarman quotes ten sūtra passages to prove his position that there are no \textit{caitasika} dharmas different from \textit{citta}. However, the opponent only answers four as given in 60.4, 5, 12, and 13. Apparently, the opponent assumes that by refuting 60.5, he has effectively refuted all of Harivarman’s arguments in 60.5-11. Therefore, for the sake of brevity, I will list 60.4 as Harivarman’s argument 2, 60.5-11 as argument 3, and 60.12 and 60.13 as arguments 4 and 5 respectively.

\textbf{2.3.2 Harivarman’s Argument 2 (60.4, 62.2, 64.2)}

(60.4) Harivarman quotes a sūtra passage stating that \textit{citta} is liberated from three kinds of taints (\textit{āsrava}): sensual desire (\textit{kāma}), existence (\textit{bhava}), and ignorance (\textit{avidyā}). He then states that if there were \textit{caitasikās} different from \textit{citta}, as the Ābhidharmikas suggest, the sūtra passage should have mentioned \textit{caitasikās} and not \textit{citta} alone.

(62.2) The Opponent answers by quoting another sūtra passage, which states that insight (\textit{prajñā}) is liberated by removing ignorance (\textit{avidyā}). This means it is not the case that the sūtras mention only \textit{citta}.

(64.2) Harivarman answers the opponent’s challenge from three perspectives. First, he clarifies his own mind model, in which mind is an aggregate (*\textit{rāṣi} 聚) with \textit{citta}, defilements (\textit{kleśa}), and ignorance (\textit{avidyā}) all connected or integrated (*\textit{samprayuktā} 相應) as a whole. Based on this model, both \textit{citta} and \textit{prajñā} are themselves instances of such aggregates, which subsumes various mental states, and it is nonsensical to say that

\textsuperscript{105} This is also the position Sue Hamilton (1996: 91-95) suggests in understanding the cognitive process described in early sūtras and the relationship between \textit{vijñāna} and \textit{vedanā}, \textit{saññā}, and \textit{paññā}. See more detail in the next chapter (ch.5) regarding the doctrine of association (\textit{samprayoga}). In other words, if we put aside later commentaries and Abhidharma interpretations and read early sūtras by their face value, we can indeed find in early sūtras passages suggesting a similar position to those of Dharmatrāta, Buddhadeva, and Harivarman.
citta is polluted by kleśa and that prajñā is polluted by avidyā. In other words, when there is defilement, there is always ignorance existing as an integral constituent of the aggregate (*rāṣi) of citta. If so, then stating that citta is liberated by removing defilements, and prajñā (which is part of citta in this model, and characterizes certain instances of cittas when it is in a dominant position in the citta aggregates) is liberated by removing ignorance is also nonsensical, because in these cases one cannot separate clearly citta from prajñā, and kleśa from avidyā.

Second, Harivarman proposes that the sūtra stating that citta is liberated by removing defilements and prajñā is liberated by removing ignorance is a non-definitive (neyārtha 不了義) sūtra, which means that we should not accept the teaching at face value but must seek the hidden meaning that is not explicitly stated. He quotes another sūtra passage to support this point. It is said in the sūtra that citta is liberated from three kinds of taints (āsrava): sensual desire (kāma), existence (bhava), and ignorance (avidyā). Since ignorance is a kind of āsrava from which citta can be liberated, then it is nonsensical to say that only prajñā is liberated from ignorance. In this case, we should understand the two kinds of liberations as two stages: the liberation of citta from defilements means a practitioner attains the abandonment by prohibition (遮斷 *saṃvara-prahāṇa or *vikkhambhana-prahāṇa), which temporarily suppresses the functioning of the defilements; and the liberation of prajñā from ignorance is the ultimate, complete elimination (畢竟斷 atyanta-prahāṇa), because ignorance is the cause of all defilements.

Finally, Harivarman argues by reductio ad absurdum. If it is the case that citta and prajñā are different dharmas as the opponent proposes, given that citta is liberated from defilements and prajñā is liberated from ignorance, then there are other sūtras that state that one should eliminate negative qualities such as anger, and so forth. In these cases, what is the thing from which anger, and so forth, are removed?

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106 E.g. D I 84: tassa eva jānato evam passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, bhavāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, avijjāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati. This formula occurs frequently throughout Pāli Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas.
107 We can supplement details of this teaching from the passage in TatSid chapter 187. No. 1646 成實論 (卷 15) T32, p358b17-23: 若經中說修行斷貪。是說遮斷。何以知之。色等外欲中生貪。若得止樂則不復生。如經中說。行者得淨喜時捨不淨喜。若說無明斷是究竟斷。何以知之。無明斷故餘等煩悩斷滅無餘。經中亦說離貪故心得解脫是名遮斷。離無明故慧得解脫是畢竟斷。
Chapter 2. The Dispute on *caitasika*

Comments:
Here, the controversy is related to two terms from the sūtras: *cetovimutki* (P. *cetovimutti*) and *prajñāvimukti* (P. *paññāvimutti*). Harivarman in 60.4 quotes a sūtra passage, which states that *citta* is liberated from three taints (*āsrava*). It should be noted that in this passage the sūtra only mentions *citta*. His argument is that if there were *caitasikas* aside from *citta*, the sūtra should mention not only *cetovimukti* but also *caitasikavimukti*. Then his opponent quotes another sūtra passage (62.2) to show that actually this is exactly the case: indeed, a sūtra mentions another kind of *vimukti*, namely, *prajñāvimukti*, and in the opponent’s system, *prajñā* is a *caitasika*. Apparently, Harivarman considers this a significant challenge since he dedicates a very long passage (64.2) to his response, which is rare in the TatSid. First he proposes his own model of mind, in which mind is not analyzed into separate *citta* and *caitasikas*, but all those mental phenomena such as *citta*, *kleśa*, and *avidyā*, are unified as a whole aggregate (*rāśi 聚*). The implication is that both *citta* and *prajñā* as instances of such aggregates include all of these constituent elements, and they are not distinguishable because they are both *rāsīs*, so that it would be nonsensical to say that *citta* is liberated only from *kleśas* and *prajñā* is liberated only from *avidyā*.

Harivarman apparently considers the passage quoted by the opponent to be from an authentic sūtra even though he rejects the opponent’s interpretation of it. Therefore, adopting an accepted exegetical maneuver, he says that this sūtra should not be understood in the explicit and definitive sense (*nītārtha 了義*) but rather in the non-definitive and implicit (*neyārtha 不了義*) sense. He points to the sūtra passage he quoted in 60.4, which states that *citta* is liberated from three *āsravas*: *kāma*, *bhava*, and *avidyā*. Since *avidyā* is explicitly mentioned as one *ārava* from which *citta* is liberated, then it is wrong to say that only *prajñā* is liberated from *avidyā*. This proves that the sūtra passage quoted by the opponent in 62.2 must be understood in a non-literal way. Harivarman proposes that we should understand the two *vimuktis* as two stages on the path of liberation: *cetovimukti* is the stage in which the practitioner temporarily suppresses the defilements by meditation, while *prajñāvimukti* is the stage in which all
defilements, including avidyā, are ultimately eliminated.

Finally, Harivarman criticizes the opponent’s position that prajñā is a caitasika that is different from citta by extending the opponent’s rationale of reading the sūtras literally. He observes that it is said in the sūtra that citta is liberated from kleśas, and prajñā is liberated from avidyā, but sūtras also mention that one should be liberated from other negative mental qualities such as anger, and so forth. Given the opponent’s claim that two different things are liberated from two different negative mental qualities, we should also expect there exists something different from citta and prajñā that can be liberated from yet further negative mental qualities such as anger. But the sūtras do not state that anger is removed from something other than citta, in the same manner we should not take citta and prajñā as different things.

Harivarman and his opponent’s exchange regarding the meaning of cetovimukti and prajñāvimukti intertwines textual and exegetical issues with doctrinal issues and hence does little to clarify their disagreement concerning the issue of citta and caitasikas. A careful examination of the two terms in the sūtras reveals that their meanings are not neatly defined. However, past efforts made by both ancient Buddhist commentators and some modern scholarship to understand terms of this kind are based on two fundamental assumptions. (1) Each of these terms has a specific and distinct technical meaning. In other words, each term in the texts of all periods corresponds to a specific notion and different terms must refer to different things. (2) The sūtra texts, in this case the Pāli Nikāyas, constitute a closed corpus that has an underlying coherent doctrinal system. This implies that although in the sūtras the doctrinal system was not explicitly spelt out clearly as in the Abhidharma texts, one can take these sūtra texts as a reliable source of such an early doctrinal system, and by careful reading of the sūtras and piecing together the fragments scattered throughout the Nikāyas, one can reconstruct the whole picture of the system hidden in the sūtras. However, in his investigation of the dispute concerning whether meditation is necessary for enlightenment, which is an issue closely related to the two notions cetovimukti and prajñāvimukti, Richard Gombrich (1997: 96-134) has attempted, and I think quite convincingly, to show that both of these two

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108 See de Silva 1978 for a detailed survey of these two terms and other relevant notions in the Pāli Nikāyas.
assumptions are problematic. He suggests (Gombrich 1997: 116-7) that in the most common formula describing the final liberation containing the two terms: “with the destruction of the taints, he realized for himself with direct knowledge, in this very life, the taintless liberation of mind, liberation of insight, and having entered upon it, dwelled in it.” cetovimutti and paññāvimutti “refer to the same thing.” Also we should understand in these cases the term citta/ceto and paññā not as technical terms, but just general terms meaning “mind” and “understanding.” In other words, it is not necessarily true that each term used in the sūtras has a specific technical meaning.

On the other hand, it is also true that there are passages in the sūtras using the terms cetovimukti and prajñāvimukti, which appear to have specific technical meanings. For example, in a passage in the Aṅguttara Nikāya these two types of liberations are defined as follows:

[T]hrough dispassion for passion (rāga-virāga) there is liberation of the mind; through dispassion for ignorance (avijjā-virāga) there is liberation by insight.

Gombrich (1997: 113n12) notices that this passage is awkward because raga-virāga is a tautology, and avijjā-virāga is “nonsensical.” He suggests that such a dichotomy of cetovimutti and paññāvimutti is a product of “scholastic literalism” and debates among Buddhist teachers holding different opinions. In other words, this awkward passage that clearly defines cetovimutti and paññāvimutti is likely a later addition to the canon by the compilers of the sūtra texts in the belief that each term used in the sūtra should have a specific and distinct meaning (in Gombrich’s terms, “scholastic literalism”), and also for the purpose of providing scriptural proof for their position in the doctrinal debate.

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109 E.g. D I 156; M I 35-6; S II 214; A I 107: āsavānaṃ khayā anāsavāṃ cetovimuttim paññāvimuttim dītheva dhamme sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja viharati. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation with slight adjustments (Bodhi 2012: 206).

110 Gombrich argues that there are several redundancies in this sentence: anāsavāṃ is redundant after the phrase āsavānaṃ khayā, and two of the three absolutes abhiññā sacchikatvā upasampajja are redundant. Therefore, it would be reasonable to conclude that cetovimuttim and paññāvimuttim must refer to the same thing.

111 Gombrich (1997: 119-20) also gives several other examples to show that cetovimutti and paññāvimutti have the same referent.


113 Gombrich 1997: 97, 110ff. Gombrich also analyzes other examples involving paññāvimuttī.
From this perspective, I suggest that the debate between Harivarman and his opponent regarding cetovimukti and prajñāvimukti confirms Gombrich’s observation to some extent. First of all, in 60.4 Harivarman quotes a sūtra passage stating that citta is liberated from three āsravas. In this passage, only citta is mentioned and prajñā is absent. In 62.2, the opponent answers by quoting another sūtra passage stating that prajñā is liberated by removing avidyā. On the basis of Harivarman’s paraphrase of this sūtra passage in 64.2, we can be certain that the sūtra passage quoted here by the opponent is exactly the “awkward” passage Gombrich mentioned and suggested was dubious as a later addition to the canon. Indeed, Harivarman also challenges the surface meaning of the sūtra passage. Even though he is not willing to claim that it is spurious, he still suggests that one should not accept the passage’s literal meaning and offers an alternative interpretation for the passage, in which he understands the cetovimukti and prajñāvimukti as two different stages of the path to liberation.

2.3.3 Harivarman’s Argument 3 (60.5-11, 62.3-7, 64.3-6)

In 60.5-11, Harivarman actually follows the same rationale as in 60.4. He quotes a sūtra passage and points out that in each case the Buddha only mentions citta and does not mention caitasikas; therefore, caitasikas do not exist. Because the opponent responds to all of these passages as a whole, I include here all of these arguments in 60.5-11 under Harivarman’s argument 3.

(60.5) It is said in the sūtras that when the Buddha knows that a being’s mind is ready, he will teach the four noble truths. No caitasika is mentioned in this sūtra.

(60.6) It is also taught in the sūtras that because of the defilement of mind (cittasamkleśa), there is the defilement of sentient beings (sattvasamkleśa); because of the purity of mind (cittavyavadāna), there is the purification of sentient beings (sattvaviśuddhi). Again no caitasika is mentioned in this sūtra.

(60.7) It is also said in the sūtras that when a bhikṣu enters the fourth dhyāna and attains the purified, unmovable mind, then he knows as it is (yathābhūta) the four noble truths.
(60.8) In the twelve-linked dependent origination taught in sūtras, it is said, conditioned by volitional formation (*samskāra*), there is consciousness (*vijñāna*). No *caitasika* is mentioned.

(60.9) The sūtras also taught that a person consists of six *dhātu*; among the six only *vijñāna* is listed as a *dhātu*, and no *caitasika* is mentioned.

(60.10) It is also said in the sūtra that nothing changes more easily (*laghu-parivarta*) than mind.

(60.11) There is also a simile taught in the sūtra that a being is like a city while the mind is the lord of the city.

In each of the sūtra passages quoted above, the Buddha presents a doctrinal point regarding mind (*citta* or *vijñāna*), and *caitasikas* are never mentioned. Harivarman argues that because in all these sūtras the Buddha does not mention *caitasika*, they do not exist.

In 62.3-7, the opponent raises a series of explanations for the fact that the Buddha does not mention *caitasikas* in these sūtras.

(62.3) The Buddha mentions only *citta* because it is superior.

(62.4) People in the world are more familiar with *citta* but not *caitasikas*.

(62.5) There are teachings in the sūtras that are non-exhaustive. In other words, something might be left out as in the case of the *caitasikas* here.

(62.6) The opponent gives an example to show that in some cases the sūtra teaches non-exhaustively. The Buddha mentions in a sūtra that if one can abandon one dharma, namely, greed (*lobha*), one is certain to reach the path of non-returner (*anāgāmin*). But actually one who reaches this path needs to abandon other *kleśas* in addition to *lobha*. In other words here, the Buddha does not give an exhaustive list of dharmas to be abandoned by an *anāgāmin* but rather emphasizes *lobha* alone.

(62.7) The opponent concludes by saying that this argument, namely, that the Buddha does not teach exhaustively and leaves *caitasikas* out, can be applied to all the passages mentioned by Harivarman from 60.5.

In 64.3-6, Harivarman answers and refutes one by one the opponent’s arguments in 62.3-7.
(64.3) Harivarman first answers 62.3, in which the opponent says that the Buddha only mentions citta because citta is superior. Harivarman asks the opponent, what is exactly the “superior meaning” (勝義) of citta that other caitasikas such as prajñā do not have?
(64.4) The opponent argues in 62.4 that the Buddha teaches only citta because people in the world are more familiar with citta but not caitasikas. Harivarman points out that people in the world are also familiar with pleasant and unpleasant feelings (vedanā). Why does the Buddha not teach vedanā in these cases but only citta?
(64.5) The opponent says in 62.5 that some sūtras teach unexhaustively and leave dharmas like caitasikas out. Harivarman asks why in all these cases only citta is mentioned and caitasikas are left out? In other words, why is there never a case in which the sūtra mentions caitasikas only and leaves out citta?
(64.6) Harivarman challenges the opponent’s example in 62.6 as demonstrating the non-exhaustiveness of teachings in the sūtra. Harivarman contends that we must understand this sūtra passage with regard to its specific context. In that sūtra, the Buddha was teaching for those who have excessive greed (lobha); therefore, the Buddha singles out lobha for them and says that if you can abandon this one dharma you will certainly reach the path of a non-returner (anāgāmin). Because this sūtra is taught for such a specific purpose and it is not expounding a general doctrinal point, one should not use it to prove a general doctrinal point. In other words, this passage cannot be a proper āgama to prove the existence of caitasikas.

Comments:
The arguments from both sides are clear and straightforward. Here, I would point out that among the four reasons the opponent gives in 62.3-6 for why the sūtras do not mention caitasikas, only the first one, namely, that citta is superior, appears in other Abhidharma texts such as the MVŚ and the *Nyāyānusāra. The TatSid provides perhaps the best record of the debate on the caitasika issue among the extant texts, and there are specific points and textual references preserved only in this text.
2.3.4 Harivarman’s Argument 4 (60.12, 62.8-9, 64.7)

(60.12) Harivarman quotes a sūtra with a parallel in the SĀ, which states that for a sentient being internally there is the body with consciousness (savijñānakā kāya), and externally there is name-and-form (nāma-rūpa). These two, namely, savijñānakā kaya and nāma-rūpa, constitute a dyad (dvayam). Also in this sūtra passage the Buddha refers to the sentient being as a “body with consciousness” (savijñānakā kāya) and does not mention any caitasikas.

(62.8) The opponent’s answer is based on the same sūtra and claims that the reference to “external” (nāma-rūpa) is equivalent to mentioning caitasikas, because in the Abhidharma analysis of the twelve bases (āyatana), caitasikas are included in the dharma-āyatana, the object of mano-vijñāna, both of which are included in nāma-rūpa.

(62.9) The opponent further states that actually there are three things mentioned in this sūtra passage: “the body with consciousness” (savijñānakā kāya) can be analyzed into (1) consciousness and the (2) body, which is equivalent to the faculties (indriya), and the (3) external name-and-form (nāma-rūpa), which are the external objects. So in total there are three things and not only two. Also in the sūtra the Buddha has used “all external signs” (外一切相 bahidhā sabbanimittā) in place of external nāma-rūpa, and these “all external signs” include caitasikas.

(64.7) Harivarman replies that to understand the external nāma-rūpa as including caitasikas is the opponent’s own speculation and is not the intention of the quoted sūtra. Here, the external nāma-rūpa should be understood as the objects (*ālambana) of mind.

Comments:

This round of exchanges between Harivarman and his opponent is fascinating in terms of both textual and doctrinal exegesis. In 60.12, Harivarman quotes a sūtra, very likely SĀ 294, 114 which states, for a sentient being “internally there is the body with consciousness (savijñānakā kāya), externally there is name-and-form (nāma-rūpa); these two are a dyad (dvaya).” Dependent on this dyad there is contact (sparśa), which is of six kinds in accordance with the six bases (āyatana). Harivarman points out that here the sūtra says

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114 SĀ no. 294, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 12) T02, p83c24-6: 愚癡無聞凡夫無明覆。愛緣繫得此識身。如是內有識身。外有名色。此二緣生六觸入處。
that the internal *savijñānaka kāya* and the external *nāma-rūpa* constitute a dyad, which precludes any other things such as the *caitasikas*. Moreover, He also points out that in referring to a sentient being the sūtra uses the term “body with consciousness” (*savijñānaka kāya*); again it mentions only *vijñāna* and not any *caitasika*.

The opponent answers (62.8) that actually the dyad mentioned in the sūtra does not leave out *caitasikas* because the “external *nāma-rūpa*” includes *caitasikas*. He also explains that they are called “external” because they are included in the *dharma-āyatana* within the category of twelve *āyatana*, and the *dharma-āyatana* is “external” in contrast to *mano-āyatana* which is “internal.” Here, the opponent, who is a supporter of *caitasikas*, understands *nāma-rūpa* as the material (*rūpa*) and the four non-material *skandha* (*vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna*) in the standard Abhidharma interpretation,115 and the four non-material *skandha* includes all *caitasikas*. Furthermore, when they are taken as objects of *manovijñāna*, they are included in the *dharma-āyatana*, which is external in contrast to the internal *manovijñāna*. The opponent also points out (62.9) that, although the sūtra mentions the internal and the external as a “dyad,” strictly speaking the “internal” *savijñāna kāya* can be further analyzed as the physical body and the six internal faculties (*indriya*). As a result, the “dyad” should not be taken as definitive but can be further analyzed into three. And the “external *nāma-rūpa*” represents the external objects (*ālambana*) of the *indriya*. In 62.9, the opponent quotes another sūtra, which uses “all external signs” (外一切相 *bahirdhā sarvanimitta*) in the place of “internal *nāma-rūpa*.” The opponent claims that in this case “all external signs” include *caitasikas*, which is basically the same argument as including *caitasikas* in the *dharma-āyatana*.

The sūtra quoted in 60.12 by Harivarman has a parallel in SĀ no. 294,116 in which the Buddha describes the cognitive process: dependent on the dyad of the “body with

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115 See, for example, AKBh 142.15-16: *aṁha nāmarūpamitī ko ‘rthaḥ? rūpaṁ vistareṇa yathoktam. nāma tvarūpīṇaḥ skandhāḥ*. Also Vism XVIII analyzes *nāma-rūpa* as “mentality and materiality” as Nāṇamoli (1956: 679-92) puts it.

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consciousness” (savijñāna kāya) and “name-and-form” (nāma-rūpa) there is contact, which occurs through the six bases (āyatana). In 62.8-9, the opponent follows the same analysis by placing nāma-rūpa and “all external signs” (bahirdhā sabbanimittā) within the dharma-āyatana as objects of mano-vijñāna. And in 62.8-9 the opponent is likely quoting two sūtras with parallels in the Chinese SĀ (nos. 198, 199).117 In these sūtras, the Buddha instructs Rāhula that in order to get rid of the “I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceit” (ahaṅkāra-mamaṅkāra-mānānusaya) in regard to both “the body with consciousness” (此識身 savijñāna kāya) and “all external signs (外境界一切相 *bahirdhā sarvanimitta), one should contemplate the six internal āyatanas (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) as well as the six external āyatanas (form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharmas). All of these whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, beautiful or ugly, far or near, are all not oneself (非我), not different from self (不異我), and not mutually inclusive (不相在).118 These two sūtras in the Chinese SĀ do not have exact parallels in Pāli; the closest are S no.18.21-22, 22.91-92.119 In these suttas, the opening opening is exactly same as the Chinese sūtras: Rāhula approaches the Buddha and the Buddha teaches him what to do in order to get rid of the “I-making, mine-making, and underlying tendency to conceive” (ahaṅkāramamaṅkārāmānānusayā) with regard to both “the body with consciousness” (imasmīnca savijñānake kāye) and “all external signs (bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu). But in the main body of the Pāli suttas, the Buddha states that one should analyze the five skandhas instead of the twelve āyatanas as in the Chinese SĀ sūtras. However, it should be noted that in the Chinese SĀ, two other sūtras (SĀ nos. 23-4)120 have the same content as the Pāli suttas in which “all external signs” are analyzed as the five skandhas.

Here, we see a textual issue that is connected with a doctrinal issue. Harivarman quotes a sūtra with a parallel in the SĀ sūtra no. 294, which mentions the dyad of the internal “body with consciousness” (savijñāna kāya) and the external “name-and-form”

117 T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 8) T2, p50c7-51a14.
118 Here, the English translation is based in part on Bodhi 2000: 948. For the last phrase, Pāli and Chinese versions have different readings.
119 S II 252-3, III 135-7.
120 T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 1) T02, p5a11-b25.
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(*nāma-rūpa*); the corresponding Pāli sutta (S no.12.19) agrees with the Chinese version at this point. Then in 62.8-9, the opponent quotes a sūtra with a parallel in SĀ 198-199, in which the dyad is not *savijñāna kaya* as opposed to *nāma-rūpa*, but *savijñāna kaya* as opposed to “all external signs” (*bahirdhā sarvanimitta*). Because of the parallelism of the two pairs, it is natural for a commentator to take *nāma-rūpa* and *sarvanimitta* as equivalent. But we also see the discrepancy in the analysis of the latter dyad: all the Pāli suttas analyze “all external signs” as the five *khandhas*, while the sūtra quoted by Harivarman and his opponent analyze the dyad in terms of the twelve āyatanas. The related doctrinal problem is the question of what exactly *nāma-rūpa* is. Apparently, there are different opinions. In 62.8-9 the opponent follows the standard Abhidharma interpretation that understands *nāma-rūpa* as the five *skandhas*: *rūpa* is *rūpa*-skandha, and *nāma* corresponds to the four non-material *skandhas*, which in turn include all the *caitasikas* in the Abhidharma system. But in 64.7, Harivarman summarily rejects this interpretation. He says that such an understanding of *nāma-rūpa* is only the opponent’s speculation (*samjñā-vikalpa* 憳想分別) and not what the sūtra intended. A proper understanding of *nāma-rūpa* equates it with the objects (*ālambana*) of mind (*心緣*).

The fact that all of the Pāli versions of the relevant sūtra uniformly analyze *nāma-rūpa* as the five *khandhas*, while the corresponding Chinese versions of the sūtra in the SĀ have both twelve āyatanas and five *skandhas*, indicates that the compilation of the Pāli *Samyutta Nikāya* is likely redacted, and possibly in accordance with Abhidhamma interpretations. The fact that the Chinese SĀ preserves both versions of the sūtra suggests that the sūtras were not necessarily uniform on this point. It is not unreasonable to assume that the compiler(s) of the Pāli *Samyutta Nikāya* may have made an effort to ensure that the suttas in the collection were uniform and coherent and, by doing so, may voluntarily or involuntarily have allowed later Abhidhamma doctrines to influence the choice of which suttas to include in the collection as well as their form.

Moreover, Harivarman’s suggestion that we should understand *nāma-rūpa* as the “objects of mind” (*心緣*) is intriguing given that almost all commentaries and Abhidharma sources interpret *nāma-rūpa* as an abbreviated form for the five *skandhas*, and even most modern scholars take this interpretation for granted without further
examined. However, as Sue Hamilton (1996: 125) has noticed, nowhere in the Sutta Piṭaka is nāma-rūpa defined in terms of the five khandhas. The only explicit definition of nāma given in the Sutta Piṭaka equates it with five mental phenomena of vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra, phassa, and manasikāra, and rūpa is defined as the four material elements and their derivatives. It is understandable that commentators would understand this particular definition of nāma-rūpa as implying the five skandhas, but, as Hamilton (1996: 123) points out, to understand nāma-rūpa as the five skandhas does not fit well in the context of the teaching of dependent origination. In the twelve-linked formula of dependent origination, nāma-rūpa is the fourth link which is dependent on viññāṇa; and in the Mahānidāna Sutta in the Dīgha Nikāya, dependent origination has only nine links, in which viññāṇa and nāma-rūpa are said to be inter-dependent. If nāma-rūpa is equivalent to the five khandhas, which already include viññāṇa as one khandha, how can it be dependent on viññāṇa which is a separate link in the chain of dependent origination?

Sue Hamilton (1996: 126-7) suggests that the explanation of nāma-rūpa in the Mahānidāna Sutta is especially helpful for an alternative understanding of nāma-rūpa. The passage is so important that I think it worth quoting in full here:

“It was said: ‘With nāma-rūpa as condition there is contact (phassa).’ How that is so, Ānanda, should be understood in this way.

“If those qualities (ākāra), traits (liṅga), signs (nimitta), and indicators (uddesa) through which there is a designation (paññatti) of the body of name (nāma-kāya) were all absent, would verbal impression (adhivacana-samphassa) be discerned with regard to the body of form (rūpa-kāya)?”

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122 M I 53: vedanā, saññā, cetanā, phasso, manasikāro -- idāṃucchāvuso, nāmaṃ; cattāri ca mahābhūtāni, catumātika mahābhūtānaṃ upādāyariṇaṃ -- idāṃucchāvuso, rūpaṃ. iti idānaṃ nāmaṃ idāna rūpaṃ -- idāṃucchāvuso, nāmarūpaṃ.
123 D II 62: nāmarūpapaccayā phasso ti iti kho panetāṃ vuttam, tadānanda, imināpetam pariyāyena veditabham, yathā nāmarūpapaccayā phasso. yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi udāsehi nāmakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu tesu liṅgesu tesu nimittesu tesu udāsesu asati api nu koh rūpakāye adhivacanasamphasso paññāyetha ti? no hetam, bhante. yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi udāsehi rūpakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu ... pe ... tesu udāsesu asati api nu koh nāmakāye paññāyethā yathā paññāyethā ti? no hetam, bhante. yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi udāsehi rūpakāyassa paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu ... pe ... tesu udāsesu asati api nu koh adhivacanasamphasso vā paññāyethā ti? no hetam, bhante. yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi udāsehi nāmakāyassa ca rūpakāyassa ca paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu ... pe ... tesu udāsesu asati api nu koh paññāyethā ti? no hetam, bhante. yehi, ānanda, ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi udāsehi nāmakāyassa ca rūpakāyassa ca paññatti hoti, tesu ākāresu ... pe ... tesu udāsesu asati api nu koh phasso paññāyethā ti? no hetam, bhante. tasmāthānānānaṃ esa samudaya esa paccayo phassassa, yañīdām nāmarūpaṃ. English translation depends in part upon Bodhi 1995: 59 with some adjustments of the key terms according to Hamilton 1996: 126.
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a designation of the body of form (rūpa-kāya) were all absent, would sensory-impression (paṭigha-samphassa) be discerned with regard to the body of name (nāma-kāya)?”
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a designation of the body of name (nāma-kāya) and the body of form (rūpa-kāya) were all absent, would either verbal impression or sensory impression be discerned?”
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“If those qualities, traits, signs, and indicators through which there is a description of nāma-rūpa were all absent, would contact (phassa) be discerned?”
“Certainly not, venerable sir.”
“Therefore, Ānanda, this is the cause, source, origin, and condition for contact (phassa), namely, nāma-rūpa.”

This passage describes how nāma-rūpa functions as the condition for contact (sparśa, P. phassa). Here, contact is analyzed as having two components: verbal or conceptual impression (adhivacana-samphassa) and sensory impression (paṭigha-samphassa). Also, nāma-rūpa is analyzed into nāma-kāya and rūpa-kāya. Here, I think we should understand kāya as used in compound-final position to denote a multitude of factors taken as a whole; nāma-kāya then means nāma in its multitude taken as a whole. So that nāma-kāya and rūpa-kāya have no significant difference from nāma and rūpa used alone. The statement that “through those qualities (ākāra), traits (liṅga), signs (nimitta), and indicators (uddesa) there are the designations (paññatti) of nāma and rūpa (yehi ākārehi yehi liṅgehi yehi nimittehi yehi uddesehi nāmakāyassa/rūpakāyassa paññatti hoti)” strongly suggests that nāma and rūpa do not refer to the four non-material khandhas and the rūpa-khandha respectively as most commentators understand them. Instead, they constitute the abstract “blueprint” of an individual, which is constructed through “qualities (ākāra), traits (liṅga), signs (nimitta), and indicators (uddesa),” namely, “all signs” (sarvanimitta) as objects of consciousness. As Sue Hamilton puts it (1996: 127):

Rather than representing ‘mind’, nāma provides an abstract identity for the

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124 Sue Hamilton (1996: 49) suggests that paṭigha-samphassa is the contact of the five sensory faculties with their objects, and adhivacana-samphassa is the “metaphorical” contact of the manodhātu with its objects.
individual. And we arrive at a meaning which is also the literal meaning of the word nāma: the individual's 'name'. This is not mere name, but, rather, 'name' as the entire conceptual identity of the individual. Rūpa provides 'form' or recognisability to the individual in the sense of giving shape to that abstract identity which, eventually, is apperceivable by means of sensory impression.

In other words, we should understand nāma-rūpa more in its literal meaning “name-and-form” rather than as the five skandhas. In the context of the chain of dependent origination, this name-and-form is the prototypical identity of an individual, and, in a more general sense, nāma-rūpa is the name-and-form of any object of mind.\textsuperscript{125}

Now let us return to the issue of the “internal body with consciousness (savijñāna kāya)” and “external name-and-form (nāma-rūpa)” about which Harivarman and his opponent are arguing. We have seen that the opponent suggests that the external nāma-rūpa includes caitasikas, which follows the Abhidharma interpretation that nāma-rūpa is equivalent to the five skandhas, in which the skandhas of vedanā, saṃjñā, and saṃskāra account for all the caitasikas. But Harivarman points out that this is merely the opponent’s speculation and has no basis in the sūtras. Rather, he suggests that we should understand nāma-rūpa as “objects of mind (心緣),” or more precisely “what the mind takes as its objects,” namely, the name and form of the object. In this light, the meaning Harivarman proposes is very close to what Sue Hamilton has observed in the sutta: nāma-rūpa is the name-and-form of an object of mind.\textsuperscript{126}

\subsection*{2.3.5 Harivarman’s Argument 5 (60.13, 62.10, 64.8)}

(60.13) Harivarman quotes a statement in the sūtra regarding the generation of contact (sparśa) to prove that there are no caitasika dharmas. It is taught in the sūtras that,

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\textit{This understanding of nāma-rūpa as ‘name-and-form’ resonates the meaning of this term in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. See Hamilton 1996: 121-3. Also Reat 1990: 70-79.}\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textit{According to Sanghabhadra, the Sautrāntika master Śrīlāta defines nāma as “that which leads to the completion of a specific sentient being’s continuum of existence.” (No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 29) T29, p502c: 上座意謂順成彼彼有情相續。故說為名。是能為因。順成彼義。) The sentence is awkward and hard to understand, but it likely means what Sue Hamilton calls the “abstract blueprint” of a sentient being. If so, then what Śrīlāta says would refer to the meaning of nāma-rūpa in the context of dependent origination. Harivarman’s interpretation is more general and concerns all possible objects. Both of these interpretations represent aspects of the meaning of nāma-rūpa that we can deduce from sūtra texts but do not fit within the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system.}\end{flushright}
depending on the sense faculty eye, with regard to the object form (rūpa), there is eye-consciousness (cakṣu-vijñāna); the coming together (saṅgati) of the three is contact (sparśa), and depending on contact there are feeling (vedanā), and so forth. Here, the sūtra states that the coming together of three (namely, the sense faculty, the object, and the corresponding consciousness) is sparśa. If there were caitasikas, the number should be more than three.

(62.10) In response, the opponent apparently uses an argument similar to 62.3 and 62.5. In 62.3, he proposes that the Buddha only mentions citta in his teachings because citta is superior, and in 62.5 he suggests that sometimes the teachings in the sūtras are not exhaustive, some dharmas are left out. Here, the statement about contact (sparśa) is similar: because sparśa gives rise to vedanā, and so forth, it is more important than other caitasikas in this particular context. Therefore, the sūtra only mentions sparśa and leaves out the other caitasikas.

(64.8) Harivarman responds that the opponent’s argument in 62.10 is subject to a major error. He points out that according to the opponent’s Abhidharma doctrine, and hence the case in Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra systems, sparśa, vedanā, and so forth, as caitasikas are associated (saṃprayukta) with citta, and, in all those Abhidharma systems, association (saṃprayoga) means they occur all simultaneously. If so, then sparśa, vedanā, and so forth, must occur simultaneously. Why then does the sūtra state that sparśa is the cause of vedanā, and not the other way around, that is, that vedanā is the cause of sparśa?

Comments:

This round of exchanges is focused on the sūtra passage regarding contact (sparśa). There is no doubt that both Harivarman and his opponent consider the sūtra passage describing the arising of contact (sparśa) to be extremely important. Harivarman uses it here as a scriptural proof (āgama) for the non-existence of caitasikas, and later in 61.6 the opponent quotes this same passage to prove that caitasikas exist as dharmas separate from citta. Moreover, since sparśa has a pivotal position in the process of cognition as described in the sūtra, it is understandable that the commentators feel compelled to explain it. The TatSid has a separate chapter devoted to sparśa (ch. 85). However, in this sūtra passage describing the arising of sparśa in the cognitive process, there is a serious
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textual problem that is correlated to the two opinions concerning whether or not sparśa is a real individual dharma (dravya) or just a designation (prajñapti). And this textual problem is noticed by both Harivarman and his opponent. In the TatSid chapter 85, the opponent points out the discrepancy regarding sparśa in the sūtras:127

There are two kinds of sparśas mentioned in the sūtras: (1) the coming together of three things [is] sparśa; [and] (2) because of the coming together of the three things, there is sparśa.128 Therefore, one should know that there are two kinds of sparśa: one has self-nature (*svabhāva), and one is a designation (prajñapti).

This problem concerning the arising of sparśa is already present in the Chinese Saṃyukta Āgama. In total, twelve sūtras129 in the SĀ contain a passage describing the arising of contact in the cognitive process. Eight130 of these present the passage in form (1) mentioned by the opponent in this passage in the TatSid:

The eye (cakṣu), taking form (rūpa) as object, gives birth to eye-consciousness (cakṣu-vijñāna); the coming together of the three things [is] contact (sparśa).131

The other four cases present the passage in form (2):

Depending on the eye and form there arises eye-consciousness; the coming together of the three things gives birth to (生) contact.132

Here, “the coming together of the three things gives birth to contact” most likely corresponds to “trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātāt sparśaḥ” as attested in the AKBh. This formula in

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127 No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p286c: 又經中有二種觸。一三事和合觸。二三事和合故觸。故知觸有二種。一有自體。二是假名。Tripāṭhi 1962: 207n226 notes that the Arthaviniścaya Sūtra commentary also refers to the same problem.
128 Vasubandhu’s AKBh also mentions the variant readings in the sūtra regarding the different definitions of sparśa, but the passage he quotes is an expanded version: p.143.20-23: ye punah saṃnipātādanyam sparśamāhusta etatsūtram katham pariharanti “iti ya esam trayāṇāṃ saṃgatiḥ saṃnipātaḥ samavāyaḥ sa sparśa” iti. na vā evam paṭhanti. kim tarhi? “samgathāḥ saṃnipātaḥ samavāyad iti paṭhanti.Apparently, he adopts the second reading in his own definition of sparśa: AKBh p132.10: trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātāt sparśo bhavati.
131 眼緣色。生眼識。三事和合觸。No. 99 雜阿含經 T02, p54a, 55a, 55c, 72c, 87c, 88b.
132 眼緣及色。生眼識。三事和合觸。No. 99 雜阿含經 T02, p18a, 74b, 117c, 144b.
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form (2) occurs only in the Chinese SĀ and not in other Āgamas. And in the Pāli Nikāyas, the passage regarding *phassa* never occurs in form (2) but is uniformly in the form “*tinnam sangati phasso,*”\(^\text{133}\) which matches form (1) mentioned by Harivarman’s opponent. Among the four sūtras that follow form (2) in the Chinese SĀ, with the exception of SĀ sūtra no. 68, which does not have a parallel in Pāli, the other three are allegedly taught by the Buddha’s disciples rather the Buddha himself.\(^\text{134}\) Moreover, in the Pāli parallels to these three,\(^\text{135}\) the formulaic passage describing the cognitive process involving *sparśa* does not occur at all.

The formula in form (2), which has “the coming together of the three things gives birth to *sparśa*” (三事和合生觸), not only occurs in the Chinese SĀ but also in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts such as the *Dharmaskandha* and AKBh.\(^\text{136}\) Given that the Chinese SĀ is likely a text of the Sarvāstivāda tradition, and in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma *sparśa* is a *caitasika* as a real individual entity, they cannot accept the teaching that it is simply “the coming together of three things.” Therefore it is quite possible that the passages in the Chinese SĀ that follow form (2) are later interpolations with a sectarian partisan motivation.

Nevertheless, in these discussions in 60.13, 62.10, and 64.8, Harivarman and his opponent do not mention the different readings of the sūtra passage. Harivarman simply quotes the passage saying that the coming together of the three is *sparśa*, and if there were *caitasikas*, the Buddha would have mentioned them and the number would be more than three. In 62.10, the opponent does not challenge the sūtra passage Harivarman has quoted, but answers that the Buddha mentions *sparśa* alone because it is the most important *caitasika* in this circumstance. In 64.8, Harivarman does not answer the opponent’s argument in 62.10 directly, perhaps thinking that this argument has already been refuted in 64.3 and 64.6. Instead, Harivarman raises a new argument against the opponent’s position that *sparśa* is a separate *caitasika* that is associated (*samprayukta*)

\(^{133}\) M I 111-2, III 281-2, 285-6; S II 72-75; IV 32, 33, 86, 87, 90.

\(^{134}\) SĀ no. 276 by Nandaka, no. 460 by Ānanda, and no. 551 by Kātyāyana.

\(^{135}\) SĀ no. 276≈M no. 146; SĀ no.460≈S no.35.129 (IV 113); SĀ no.551≈S no. 22.3 (III 9).

\(^{136}\) *Dharmaskandha* No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 12) T26, p509a: 眼及色為緣生眼識。三和合故生觸。AKBh 132.10: *trayāṇāṃ saṃnipātāt sparśo bhavati.*
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with citta. Association means that the caitasikas and citta occur simultaneously, but the sūtra passage states explicitly that sparśa is the cause of vedanā, and so forth. In that case, how it is possible that they occur all simultaneously? This argument is based on a fundamental doctrine in the TatSid that a cause (hetu) and its effect (phala) cannot occur simultaneously; as a result, consciousness and other mental phenomena must occur successively in a sequence.\(^\text{137}\) The TatSid does not give further answers from the Ābhidharmikas on this question. The MVŚ records two Ābhidharmika answers: one resorts to a special concept of “leading power” (*anunaya-bala 隨順力) assigned to sparśa, which makes sparśa must precedes vedanā and not the other way around. The second answer the MVŚ gives is based on the Sarvāstivāda notion of “dependent origination regarding state” (āvasthaka pratītyasaṃuddāda). In brief, the theory proposes that in each moment of the cognitive process, all five skandhas exist. In other words, in each moment there are always viññāna and caitasikas. But since, in a specific moment in the cognitive process, there is a dominant factor that characterizes that moment, it is named after the dominant factor. For example, in the first moment when consciousness impinges on the object, the dominant factor is sparśa; hence, this moment is called sparśa. In this moment, caitasikas such as vedanā, saṃjñā and cetanā all exist but their functions do not constitute the primary activity, so that they are not mentioned. In the next moment, the mind experiences pleasant or unpleasant feelings from contact with the object. Even though other caitasikas such as sparśa, saṃjñā, and cetanā still exist, this moment is dominated by vedanā; hence, it is called vedanā.\(^\text{138}\) Vasubandhu in the AKBh

\(^{137}\) See TatSid 65.3-4, No. 1646 成實論 (卷 5) T32, p276b: 又因果不俱。識是想等法因。此法不應一時俱有。故無相應。又佛說。甚深因緣法中是事生。故是事滅生。又如穀子芽莖枝葉花實等現見因果相次。故有識等。亦應次第而生。Also 31.11, (卷 3) T32, p258c: 因果不得一時合故。The Sarvāstivādins consider the relationship between citta and caitasikas, as well as between one caitasika and other caitasikas, as representing the association cause (samprayoga-hetu), and this cause is a subset of the co-existent cause (sahabhā-hetu). Saṅghabhadra records in his *Nyāyānusāra that, similar to Harivarman, the Sthavira Śrīlāta also denies the existence of sahabhā-hetu and samprayoga-hetu. No. 1562 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 15) T29, p421b: 又上座說。諸行決定無俱生因。This is a position that has been attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the Abhidharmadīpa: Abhidh-dīpa p.47.13-48.2: dārṣṭāntikasya hi sarvamapratyakṣam paścānām viññānakāśātāmaśāvatvāvadyadā khalu caṇṭhārūpe vidyete tadā viññānamasat. yadā viññānaṃ sat, caṇṭhārūpe tadāsatī, viññānakṣaṇasthiyabhāve svārthopaladhyanupapateśca.

\(^{138}\) No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 23) T27, p120b: 問觸受俱起。何故此經但說觸緣受。不說受緣觸耶。答二雖俱起而觸緣受非受緣觸。隨順勝故。謂觸緣於受勝。非受於觸。如燈與明。雖復俱起。而明因燈在燈因明。此亦如是。後次此經中說分位緣起。前位名觸後位名受。故不宜責。問何故前位諸蘊名觸。後位諸蘊名受耶。答前位未能分別苦樂境界差別。但樂觸對種種境界。故說為觸。後位能了苦樂境界。避危就安故說為受。復次前說觸受雖復俱起。而觸於受隨順力勝故。觸為受因。非受為觸因。因前果後必然。故當為是。問何故觸順受勝非受順觸勝耶。答當要因觸境方受違順。非受違順方乃觸境。故觸於受順為勝。非於觸順為勝。此
also has a long discussion of the issue, and he agrees in general with the Vaibhāṣikas that sparśa should arise together simultaneously with vijñāna other caitasikas, but he does not mention the notion of āvasthaka pratītyasamudpāda.139 Thus, it would appear that this issue concerning sparśa was quite troublesome for the Vaibhāṣikas, particularly the sūtra teaching concerning the causation from sparśa to vedanā. That will be a topic of a separate study.

2.4 The Opponent’s Arguments for caitasika and Harivarman’s Refutations

In chapter 61 of the TatSid, Harivarman collects his opponent’s arguments for the existence of caitasikas, and in chapter 63 he attempts to refute those arguments one by one. But unlike his own arguments in chapters 60 and 64, he does not allow his opponent to offer counter arguments in response to his refutations. Perhaps he thinks, or he wants to suggest, that his refutations are definitive with no possible response. In the following, I will present each of the opponent’s arguments in chapter 62 accompanied by Harivarman’s refutation.

2.4.1 The Opponent’s Argument 1 (61.1-2, 63.1)

(61.1) The opponent argues that caitasika dharmas, which are different from citta and are associated (samprayukta) with citta, must exist because of their relationship of association (samprayoga) with citta. If caitasikas did not exist, then there would be no association. Since in fact there is association, then caitasikas must exist.

(61.2) The opponent continues with the argument of association. Assuming that Harivarman might answer that association should be understood as a relationship between one citta and another citta, the opponent quotes a verse from the Dharmapada in which the Buddha says that citta travels alone. He interprets “travels alone” as excluding the possibility that one citta can be accompanied by another citta because all cottas are of

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139 AKBh p.145.3-146.24.
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the same nature. But the verse does not exclude *caitasikas*, which are of a different nature from *cittas*, and association does exist between things of a different nature. The opponent uses a simile to demonstrate his point: just like a bhikṣu is referred to as alone even when there are other beings such as animals and beasts nearby, a *citta* is still referred to as alone when it is accompanied by *caitasikas*.

(63.1) Harivarman answers that the opponent’s argument supporting *caitasika* is based on a specific definition of association, namely, that association is the relationship between things of different natures (*citta* and *caitasikas*) that occur simultaneously. Harivarman denies that there is such a relationship in the case of mental events, and claims that the verse “*citta* travels alone” indeed excludes the existence of *caitasikas*.

Comments:
Here, the opponent builds his argument on the basis of the inter-dependence between the doctrine of *caitasika* and the doctrine of association (*samprayoga*). He argues that because there is a relationship of association between them, which is defined as a relationship between things of different natures and not things of the same nature, *citta* must be associated with something different from it by nature, namely, the *caitasikas*. This position is very close to the position of the Sarvāstivāда Vaibhāṣikas. In the MVŚ, the relationship of association (*samprayoga 相應*) is explicitly defined as the relationship between *citta* and the *caitasikas*.140

However, this inter-dependence of the doctrines of *samprayoga* and *caitasika* actually subjects the opponent’s position to circular reasoning: he defines *samprayoga* as a relationship between *citta* and *caitasika*, and then uses this relationship to argue for the existence of *caitasikas*. So logically this argument cannot stand. Moreover, by tying the doctrine of *samprayoga* to the doctrine of *caitasika*, the opponent puts both of them in danger: if either is refuted, the other will automatically be refuted. And this is exactly what Harivarman is trying to do.

In 63.1, Harivarman first proposes that there is no *samprayoga* relationship between dharmas, and the phrase “*citta* travels alone” should be understood literally, that is, there

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140 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80a17-8: 云何相應因。謂一切心心所法。
is just *citta* alone and no other dharmas simultaneously accompanying it. Therefore, there are no *caitasikas* that exist as mental factors associated with *citta*. He does not give the further details of his argument here perhaps because he presents detailed arguments against *samprayoga* in chapters 65-7, which will be discussed in chapter 5.

### 2.4.2 The Opponent’s Argument 2 (61.3, 63.2)

(61.3) The opponent argues that the existence of *caitasikas* as dharmas different from *citta* can be deduced from their affiliations with different categories of the five *skandhas*, twelve *āyatanas*, and eighteen *dhātus*. The technical term for a dharma’s inclusion in these categories is *samgraha* (攝). He argues that *citta* belongs to the *vijñāna-skandha*, the *mana-āyatana*, and the six *vijñāna-dhātus* plus the *mano-dhātu*; and *caitasikas* belong to the three *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*, the *dharma-āyatana* and the *dharma-dhātu*. In brief, *citta* is included in seven *dhātus*, one *āyatana*, and one *skandha*; and the *caitasikas* are included in one *dhātu*, one *āyatana*, and three *skandhas*. The opponent concludes that because *citta* and *caitasika* belong to different categories, they must be different dharmas.

(63.2) Harivarman points out that the method of “inclusion” (*samgraha*), which determines how a dharma belongs to or included in different categories such as the *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus*, was actually never taught by the Buddha. Since it was a creation of the *sūtra* compilers, it cannot be used as a proof for the existence of *caitasikas*.

**Comments:**

Harivarman is correct in saying that the *sūtras* never taught “inclusion” (*samgraha*). In the *sūtras*, it is common that the *skandhas*, *āyatanas*, and *dhātus* are mentioned in formulaic passages presenting the dharmas that are included in each category, but the *sūtras* never take the reverse approach, that is, to consider a dharma that is not mentioned in the formula and determine the categories to which this dharma belongs. The *sūtras* also never mention the relationships among category systems, for example, how the five
skandhas are related to the twelve āyatana, and so forth. In this sense, Harivarman is correct that the practice of analyzing dharmas and categories from the perspective of inclusion (samgraha) was developed later than the sūtras, that is, by the “Sūtra compilers.” As we have seen in the Samyukta Āgama/Samyutta Nikāya, and the Ekottarika Āgama/Āṅguttara Nikāya, the sūtras are organized and grouped more or less by the classification of their topics according to certain category systems, and the analyses of dharmas according to the category systems are further developed in Abhidharma texts, in which samgraha becomes an important method of interpretation. Abundant examples of the application of samgraha can be observed in early Abhidharma texts such as the *Śāriputrābhidharma and the Prakaraṇapāda.

In brief, here the opponent uses samgraha to argue for the existence of caitasikas. By contrast, Harivarman responds that samgraha is a later exegetical tool that did not exist in the age of early sūtras. Therefore, the opponent’s argument is invalid.

2.4.3 The Opponent’s Argument 3 (61.4, 63.3)

(61.4) The opponent quotes the sūtra, which states that caitasikas function depending on citta, and claims that, based on this sūtra passage, citta is the basis (*āśraya 依處) of caitasikas.

(63.3) Harivarman does not challenge the authority of this sūtra passage, but he offers a different interpretation of the notion of “basis.” He points out that, according to the sūtras, mano-vijñāna depends upon manas, and manas is an alternative term for citta; therefore, vijñāna, which is also a synonym for citta, must be said to depend on citta. As a result, the fact that one citta depends on another citta does not make it a caitasika in the sense of a “mental factor.”

Comments:

First of all, the sūtra passage that the opponent quotes appears in various forms in the extant collections of sūtras. There are discrepancies in the Chinese and Pāli versions of

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141 See Yinshun 印順 1981a: 79-83.
142 No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 20) T28, p661a-671b.
143 No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 2) T26, p697c-698b.
the sūtra concerning who gives the teaching and the caītasikas that are mentioned.\textsuperscript{144} However, Harivarman does not challenge this passage and hence agrees that this is a genuine sūtra passage. This indicates that perhaps Harivarman and his opponent may have access to a common source of sūtras.

Harivarman’s counter-argument that \textit{manas} is the basis of \textit{mano-vijñāna} is based on the teaching of eighteen dhātus in the sūtras, which states that depending on mano-dhātu as the faculty and dharma-dhātus as objects, there arises mano-vijñāna-dhātu. This teaching is acknowledged by all Buddhist schools. However, in the Abhidharma schools and the Yogācāra tradition, teachers have different opinions concerning what exactly \textit{manas} is: the Sarvāstivādins propose that \textit{manas} is the previous moment of \textit{citta} of any kind; the Theravāda Abhidhamma understands mano-dhātu as the specific moments in the cognitive process; and the Yogācārin proponents suggest that \textit{manas} is the defiled substratum of consciousness that constantly grasps the ālaya as the self. Here, Harivarman understands the notion of \textit{manas} in a way similar to the Sarvāstivādins.\textsuperscript{145}

It is also noteworthy that, in the sūtra passage quoted by the opponent, the term \textit{caītasika} is understood by the opponent as the noun “mental factor.” However, actually this term in this context is ambiguous: it can also be understood as the adjective “mental.”\textsuperscript{146} The opponent chooses to understand the passage in the sense that can support his own doctrinal position, while the passage itself does not contain the specific technical meaning.

\textbf{2.4.4 The Opponent’s Argument 4 (61.5, 63.4)}

(61.5) The opponent argues that if caītasikas do not exist as dharmas different from \textit{citta}, the number of the \textit{skandhas} would not be five. Because, in most Abhidharma systems, \textit{vedanā}, \textit{saṃjñā}, and \textit{saṃskāra} are understood as caītasikas, if they are nothing but \textit{citta},

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\textsuperscript{144} See the footnote in the translation of 61.4 in chapter 5.
\textsuperscript{145} In 63.8, Harivarman defines a caītasika as a \textit{citta} born from a previous \textit{citta} and states that the previous moment of \textit{citta} is \textit{manas} in the Sarvāstivāda perspective.
\textsuperscript{146} This is exactly how the Chinese translators understand this term. They translate caītasika here as “屬於心,” literally “belonging to \textit{citta}.” T No. 99 齊阿含經 (卷 21) T02, p150a29-b2: 想．思是意行。依於心．屬於心．依心轉。是故想．思是意行。
which is equivalent to *vijñāna*, then the five *skandhas* by nature should be only two: *rūpa* and *vijñāna*. But since the Buddha mentions five *skandhas*, *caitasikas* must exist as dharmas different from *citta*.

(63.4) Harivarman answers that the three *skandhas* of *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* are different modes of *citta* (*citta-viśeṣa*).

Comments:
In 60.1-4, Harivarman gives the same definition of the three *skandhas* as *citta-viśeṣas*, and in 60.4 he adds that in the same way as the single dharma of *smṛti* is mentioned under different names such as *smṛti-indriya*, *smṛti-bala*, *smṛti-bodhyaṅga*, and so forth, so also *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra* are just different names for different modes of *cittas*. This is exactly the position of the Dārṣṭāntika master Buddhadeva as recorded in the MVŚ.

However, Harivarman’s appeal to *smṛti* does not constitute a valid response to the opponent’s position. *Smṛti* is mentioned with different names in different lists among the thirty-seven bodhipakṣa dharmas, but it only occurs once within any given single list. In the case of the five *skandhas*, if *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, *saṃskāra*, and *vijñāna* are all *cittas*, then the same dharma occurs in the same list for four times, and the five *skandhas* ultimately should be only two as the opponent contends. Because the list of the five *skandhas* is so fundamental a teaching in Buddhism, for most Buddhists reducing them to only two is unacceptable. This is perhaps the reason why Dharmatrāta, the early Dārṣṭāntika master recorded in the MVŚ, proposes that not all the *caitasikas* in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system are unreal; instead, three *caitasikas* should exist as separate dharmas: *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *cetanā* (or *saṃskāra*) are *caitasika* dharmas that are different from *citta*.147

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2.4.5 **The Opponent’s Argument 5 (61.6-7, 63.5)**

(61.6) The opponent argues that *caitasikas* exist apart from *citta* because they arise in different ways. He quotes the sūtra passage that describes the cognitive process:

147 See the discussion in 2.1.5.
“Depending on the eye regarding the object of form, there arises eye-consciousness. The coming together of the three things is contact (sparśa). Depending on contact there arises feeling (vedanā).” He argues that this description indicates that consciousness (vijñāna) arises from two things: the eye (cakṣu) and the form object (rūpa). But feeling (vedanā), which is a caitasika, arises depending on three things: the eye, the object, and consciousness.

(61.7) The opponent further quotes the teaching of dependent origination as presented in the sūtras to demonstrate his point. He points out that, in the dependent origination formula, consciousness (vijñāna) depends on name-and-form (nāma-rūpa), but feeling (vedanā) depends on contact (sparśa). He suggests that this confirms his argument in 61.6 that, since vijñāna and caitasikas arise in different ways, they must be different.

(63.5) Harivarman points out that this sūtra passage describing the cognitive process not only cannot be used as proof for the existence of caitasikas, but it also actually demonstrates that the doctrine of caitasika cannot be correct. In the opponent’s system, caitasikas are dharmas associated (saṃprayukta) with citta, and citta and caitasikas all occur simultaneously. If this is the case, then when citta (=vijñāna) arises there must be caitasikas accompanying it simultaneously, and it would be impossible to say that two things give rise to vijñāna and three things give rise to caitasikas. It is more reasonable to understand that vijñāna and saṃjñā, and so forth, are all mental events as cittas, and this cognitive process is a successive sequence of cittas.

Comments:
There is no doubt that the models of the cognitive process and dependent origination pose a difficult problem for the Abhidharma caitasika theory. The sūtras explicitly mention that contact (sparśa) gives rise to other mental phenomena such as feeling (vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā), and volition (cetanā). And in the dependent origination formula, sparśa gives rise to feeling (vedanā), and in turn vedanā gives rises to craving (ṭṛṣṇā). In the Sarvāstivāda, Theravāda, and Yogācāra systems all these dharmas, sparśa, vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā, ṭṛṣṇā, are caitasikas. And according to the Abhidharma association (saṃprayoga) theory, all these caitasikas should occur simultaneously with consciousness (citta or vijñāna). In 64.8, Harivarman raises the same challenge against
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the Abhidharma caitasika theory, and the Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas answer with the
theory of “dependent origination regarding state” (āvasthaka pratītyasamudpāda).148

2.4.6 The Opponent’s Argument 6 (61.8, 63.6)
(61.8) The opponent argues that citta and caitasikas can be distinguished by their
different roles in their relationship of association. Citta is the basis, and caitasikas depend
on citta. They share the same object and occur in the same moment, but citta does not
depend on caitasikas. In this respect, citta and caitasikas are different; hence, the
caitasikas exist.
(63.6) Harivarman simply answers that the opponent’s argument is a repetition of his
argument with regard to association (samprayoga) given in 61.1, to which Harivarman
responded in 63.1. Basically the answer is that there is no such a relationship as
association; hence, the opponent’s argument is invalid.

Comments:
As Harivarman points out, the opponent here repeats the argument in 61.1, which is
presented in 2.4.1 on association (samprayoga), and also in chapter 5, also on association.

2.4.7 The Opponent’s Argument 7 (61.9, 63.7)
(61.9) The opponent cites the teaching of the four reliances (catvārī pratisaranānī 四依)
to prove the existence of caitasikas. Among the four reliances, the fourth one is the
reliance on knowledge (jñāna 智) instead of ordinary, discursive consciousness (vijñāna
識). The opponent argues that the Buddha teaches that one should rely on jñāna and not
vijñāṇa; therefore, jñāna and vijñāṇa must be different. Since jñāna is a caitasika,
caitasikas must exist.

148 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see 2.3.5.
(63.7) Harivarman answers that jñāna and vijñāna are actually two kinds of cittas. There is no fault in saying that one should rely on one the kind of citta as jñāna and should not rely on another kind of citta as vijñāna.

Comments:
The four reliances (pratisaraṇa) mentioned here are as follows:

(1) Teaching or doctrine (dharma), not a person;
(2) Meaning (artha), not the word (vyañjana);
(3) The sūtra of definitive meaning (nītārtha), not the sūtra of implicit meaning (neyārtha)
(4) Knowledge (jñāna), not discursive consciousness (vijñāna)

As noted in the footnote in the translation of 61.9, the four reliances are not found in the Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas, and, as observed by La Vallée Poussin (1988) and Lamotte (1988b), they only occur in texts pertaining to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika and Mahāyāna traditions. Here, the exchange between Harivarman and his opponent regarding the four reliances indicates that they both have access to a common northern textual source, which is different from the Southern Pāli collection of texts.

And once more in 63.7, Harivarman adopts the Dārṣṭāntika position of Buddhadeva that all so-called caitasikas are just different kinds of cittas. In this case, both jñāna and vijñāna are cittas. But he does not explain how jñāna and vijñāna differ from each other even though they are both citta by nature. The discussion of insight (prajñā) in the TatSid chapter 189 perhaps provides a clue. In that chapter, Harivarman defines jñāna (智) as the “true insight” (*bhūta-prajñā 真慧), which means jñāna is the knowledge that has the true reality (bhūta) of emptiness and non-self as its content. In contrast, vijñāna is the citta that takes worldly (laukika 世間) designations (prajñāpāti 假名) as its content. In other words, these two kinds of cittas differ by their content and not by their nature.

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149 No. 1646 成實論 (卷 15) T32, p360b10: 真慧名智。真者謂空無我。是中智慧名為真智。
150 No. 1646 成實論 (卷 15) T32, p360c11-2: 世間心緣假名。出世間心緣空無我。
2.4.8 The Opponent’s Argument 8 (61.10, 63.8)

(61.10) The opponent claims that the Buddha has mentioned the term caitasika. He quotes a passage presumably from a sūtra, which states that, because those dharmas are born from citta and depend on citta, they are called caitasikas.

(63.8) Harivarman appears to agree that there is such a passage, but he understands the term caitasika differently: he suggests that the term caitasika can refer to a dharma that is born from citta or one citta that arises depending on [a previous] citta. Apparently, in Harivarman’s understanding, caitasika is an adjective that means “from citta” or “dependent on citta.”

Comments:
The opponent’s argument is similar to the one presented in 61.4 and is based on the understanding of the term caitasika in the sūtra passage as a substantive noun means “mental factor.” By contrast, Harivarman’s answer is that the term should be understood as an adjective means “from citta” or “dependent on citta.” For a more detailed discussion of this term see 2.1.1, and for Harivarman’s understanding of this term, see 2.2.

2.4.9 The Opponent’s Argument 9 (61.11, 63.9-12)

(61.11) In this section, the opponent appears to step back from the position that the term caitasika refers to the noun “mental factor” in the sūtra. However, he argues that even if the Buddha never uses the term caitasika with the meaning (artha 義) “mental factor,” the sūtras never explicitly state that mental factors do not exist and only citta exists. He argues that, if one follows Harivarman’s rationale appealing to a doctrine that is not explicitly taught in the sūtras, then in the same manner one can claim that there only exist caitasikas and no citta, since the Buddha never presents this position either. Harivarman’s
rationale, as the opponent suggests, is to argue only based on explicit names or words (*vyañjana 名字) mentioned in the sūtras.  

(63.9) Harivarman agrees that in the sūtras it is never said that there are no caitasikas. Furthermore, he himself does not claim that caitasikas do not exist but understands caitasikas to exist in the sense that they are different modes of citta (citta-viśeṣa).

(63.10) Harivarman continues to challenge the opponent’s rationale that supports a doctrine based on what is explicitly taught in the sūtras. He suggests that the correct way is to judge an argument is by proper reasoning (*yukti). If a doctrine is reasonable, even it is not taught explicitly in the sūtra, one should understand the sūtras as if it were taught; if a doctrine is unreasonable, even when it is taught explicitly in the sūtras, still one should understand the sūtras as if it were not taught.

(63.11) Next Harivarman returns to the meaning (artha 義) of the Buddha’s teaching to which the opponent refers in 61.11. He proposes an analysis of the meanings of the terms citta and caitasika used in the sūtras. He states that mind is called citta because it accumulates, which is an etymological analysis of the term citta based on the root √ci meaning “to accumulate.” He further states that caitasikas such as vedanā, and so forth, all contribute to the accumulation of future existence, and in this respect these caitasikas are the same as citta. Therefore, they are all cittas.

(63.12) Finally, Harivarman repeats his definition of the term caitasika as in 63.8, which is also an etymological analysis of the term caitasika, namely, what is born from citta (=cetas) is a caitasika. Since both citta and caitasikas are born from citta, they are all caitasikas. He concludes that if one claims that caitasikas are different from citta, one should be able to analyze the meaning of the terms (*nāmārtha 名義) and determine the difference between them, but in fact one cannot. Hence, the occurrence of the term caitasika in the sūtras cannot be used as proof for the existence of caitasikas.

Comments:

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151 As noted in the translation of 61.11, this passage is difficult to understand and the interpretation offered here may not be accurate.
This round of exchanges is focused on the contrasting notions of name or word (*nāma or *vyañjana) and meaning (artha). At first the opponent seems to acknowledge that the term caitasika is not used in the sense of “mental factor” in the sūtras, but he points out that the Buddha has neither explicitly stated that there is only citta, nor that caitasikas do not exist. Apparently, here the opponent refers back to Harivarman’s arguments in 60.4-11, in which he gives a number of example passages in the sūtras where the Buddha mentions only citta and not caitasika. The opponent argues (61.11) that one should not deny the existence of a dharma solely on the basis of whether or not the name is used in the sūtras.

Harivarman agrees (63.9) at this point with the opponent that the term caitasika does not mean “mental factor” in the sūtras, and he repeats his definition of caitasika as “born from citta.” Then in 63.10 he states a very important principle of his exegesis: one should not argue simply on the basis of whether something is taught explicitly in the sūtras; instead one should argue by reasoning. Regardless of whether a doctrine is or is not taught in the sūtras, if it is reasonable, one should accept it, if it is unreasonable, one should reject it. This principle is likely a rephrasing of the second pratisaraṇa mentioned in 2.4.7: one should rely on the meaning or intention (artha) of a teaching rather than the words taught (vyañjana). As Lamotte (1988b: 13-4) has noted, even though the four pratisaraṇas were not formulated in full in the early sūtras, the notion that a teaching consists of meaning (artha P. attha) and words (vyañjana P. viyañjana or byañjana) and the possibility that one can catch the words but misunderstand the meaning has long been established in the early sūtras.

Nevertheless, it appears that both Harivarman and his opponent here agree on this principle. The opponent in 61.11 seems to accuse Harivarman of being too literal in interpreting sūtras, because Harivarman’s arguments in 60.4-11 are merely based on the fact that the term caitasika is not explicitly mentioned in the sūtras. However, in 63.10 Harivarman clarifies that he is not judging the validity of a doctrine by scriptural tradition (āgama) alone, rather he prefers evaluating by reasoning (yukti); when a doctrine is

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152 This formula occurs frequently in the Nikāyas describing the Buddha’s teaching: D I 87: so dhammaṃ deseti udikalyāṇaṃ majjhekal yāṇaṃ pariyoṣānakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ sabyañjanaṃ...

153 For example, D III 128-9: ayaṃ kho āyasmā atthaṃ hi kho micchā gaṅghāti vyañjanaṃ samma ropeti.
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reasonable, even it is not taught in the sūtras, it is still a valid teaching. From this it would appear that Harivarman does not restrict himself to particular scriptural or sectarian traditions, making it difficult to determine his school affiliation.¹⁵⁴

Next (63.11-12) Harivarman gives etymological analyses of the terms *citta* and *caitasika*. Apparently, he considers analyzing words in terms of etymology a proper way of reasoning (*yukti*). He argues that etymologically *citta* and *caitasika* refer to the same thing and they have no difference; therefore, *caitasikas* are *citta*, and one should not understand *caitasikas* as mental factors different from *citta*.

2.4.10 The Opponent’s Argument 10 (61.12-3, 63.13)

(61.12) The opponent states that dharmas are different if they have different functions (*所作* *kriyā*), just as water has the function of soaking, and fire, of burning. In the same way, *vedanā*, and so forth, function differently; therefore, *citta* and the *caitasikas* are different.

(61.13) The opponent continues by quoting a sūtra passage, which states that awareness (*覺*) arises in *citta*. From this he argues that awareness and *citta* function differently. Therefore, awareness, i.e. a *caitasika*, is different from *citta* since a *citta* should not give rise to another *citta* within itself.

(63.13) Harivarman answers that both of the opponent’s arguments in 61.12-13 can be answered in the same way as in 63.9-12: namely, since *caitasikas* are *cittas* in different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*), they have different functions. Also, since one moment of *citta* arises from the previous moment of *citta* and is not simultaneous with it, there is no problem that a *citta* arises within another *citta*.

Comments:

Apparently, here the opponent takes the functions (*所作* *kriyā*) of dharmas as the criterion to determine whether a dharma has its own identity and is different from other

¹⁵⁴ See the discussion of Harivarman’s school affiliation in 1.3.1.
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dharmas. On the other hand, Harivarman proposes that a dharma’s function cannot be used as the criterion to determine its identity: *cittas* have the same nature but exist in different modes (*citta-viśeṣa*) and hence have different functions. It should be noted that neither of the two parties in the dispute mentions notions such as “intrinsic nature” (*svabhāva*) and “real entity” (*dravya*), which are important categories in the later Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma analysis of dharmas. In this sense, perhaps we can say that the arguments recorded here reflect a relatively early stage in the development of Abhidharma systems in which notions such as *svabhāva* and *dravya* are not yet fully developed.¹⁵⁵

### 2.4.11 The Opponent’s Argument 11 (61.14, 63.14-5)

(61.14) The opponent quotes the same sūtra passage that Harivarman quoted in 60.6, which states that “a sentient being is defiled because of the defilement of the mind (*cittasamkleśa*); when the mind is pure (*cittavyavadāna*), the sentient being is pure (*viśuddhi*).” The opponent proposes that defilement or purification is determined by the presence of certain *caitasikas*. For example, when the *caitasika* ignorance (*avidyā*) is present, the mind is defiled; when the *caitasika* insight (*prajñā*) is clear, then the mind is pure. Without these *caitasikas*, there would be no cause for the defilement and purification of mind. Therefore, *caitasikas* must exist.

(63.14) Here, Harivarman merely asserts, without explanation, that it is not the case that the defilement and purification of the mind would be causeless without *caitasikas*. Perhaps 63.14 should be read as a continuation of 63.13, in which he states that different modes of *citta* do function differently. In other words, a defiled mind and a pure mind are different modes of *citta* that function differently, and the notion of different *caitasikas* is unnecessary as a reason for their difference.

(63.15) Harivarman concludes by reiterating his position that *caitasikas* do not exist because they have no characteristics that are different from *citta*. He points out further that the opponent’s notion of *caitasikas* as dharmas different from *citta* depends on the

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¹⁵⁵ For a discussion of these notions in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, see Cox 2004.
theory of association (saṃprayoga), but in fact there is no association. He also mentions that association will be the topic discussed in the following part of TatSid (chapters 65-67).

Comments:
It is noteworthy that Harivarman and his opponent quote the same sūtra passage to prove opposite positions. Harivarman quotes the passage in 60.6 as indicating that the defilement of the mind is the cause of the defilement of sentient beings, and the purity of mind is the cause of the purification of sentient beings. Because in this sūtra passage the Buddha does not mention mental factors at all, caitasikas do not exist. However, in 61.14, the opponent quotes the same passage but interprets the defilement (saṃkleśa) and purity (vyavādāna) of mind in terms of caitasikas such as ignorance (avidyā) and insight (prajñā). When defilements like avidyā are associated with citta, citta becomes defiled; when pure caitasikas like prajñā are associated with citta, citta becomes pure. The opponent argues that, without the existence of caitasikas, the defilement and the purification of mind would be causeless (無因 *ahetu), and hence absurd.

This is a good example that offers us an opportunity to see how scriptural tradition (āgama) is treated in the context of doctrinal innovation. Since the Abhidharma doctrine of mental factors (caitasika) does not exist in the early sūtras, proponents of the new doctrine must then project it into the sūtra texts since any position must be justified by both scriptural tradition (āgama) and argument (yukti). It also accords with the ostensible purpose of Abhidharma to provide a better account for and a deeper understanding of the old teachings in the sūtras. In this case, the Abhidharma theory of caitasika no doubt offers a more detailed account of the mechanism underlying the defilement and purification of a sentient being’s mind.

In 63.15, Harivarman appears to be quite confident that he has refuted the opponent’s position and there is no further need to discuss the issue of caitasika. As a result, he briefly recounts his position that caitasikas are just cittas and suggests that the discussion should move on to the related issue “association” (saṃprayoga), the next part of the TatSid and the topic of the next chapter.
Chapter 2. The Dispute on caitasika
Chapter 3. The Dispute on Association (samprayoga)

The previous chapter discusses the history of the concept of caitasika as well as the arguments regarding caitasika between Harivarman and the proponents of caitasika as recorded in the *Tattvasiddhi*. There the notion of “association” (samprayoga) is brought up repeatedly by the opponent in his arguments supporting caitasika.¹ Also, as noted earlier, “association” is a theory closely related to the theory of mental factors (caitta/caitasika); or, more precisely, these two theories are more or less mutually dependent. As a result, it is impossible to discuss caitasika without the notion of association, nor to discuss association without the notion of caitasika. In other words, these two notions are two aspects of the same issue, namely, the issue of the structure of mind.² However, these two theories still have their different emphases: the theory of caitasika appears more focused on the ontological status of mental factors as dharmas existing apart from citta, while the theory of association focuses more on the causal relationship between citta and caitasikas. Such a difference of focus makes it possible to discuss these two theories separately.

This chapter will discuss in detail the arguments between Harivarman and his opponents regarding the issue of association presented in chapters 65-67 of the *Tattvasiddhi*. Prior to the discussion of the specific arguments, in section 3.1 I will first survey the history of the theory of association and discuss the inception of the notion of association in early sūtras and its development in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, Theravāda Abhidhamma, and Yogācāra texts, as well as position of teachers who opposed the notion of association. Section 3.2 will introduce Harivarman’s theory of association, which is significantly different from other Abhidharma traditions. Section 3.3 will discuss Harivarman’s arguments against the Ābhidharmika theory of association in TatSid chapter 65, and section 3.4 will discuss the opponent’s arguments for the notion of association in TatSid chapter 66 as well as Harivarman’s refutation of each of them in

¹ See TatSid 61.1, 61.8, 63.1, 63.6.
² See 2.4.1.
3.1 Introduction

3.1.1 Inception of the Notion of Association in Early Sūtras

The standard term in Abhidharma texts for “association” is the nominal form samprayoga (P. sampayoga) or the corresponding past participle form samprayukta (P. sampayutta), which literally means “joined together.” Strictly speaking, this term in the sense of “association” or “associated” specifically in the case of citta and caitasikas does not occur in early sūtras. In TatSid 66.4, the proponent of association claims that this usage does occur, but a comparison with the corresponding Pāli version of the sūtra quoted shows that the term sampayutta in this sense is absent in the Pāli sutta, which suggests that the wording in the version of the sūtra quoted in 66.4 may have been influenced by a particular sectarian doctrinal position. In the Pāli Nikāyas the term sampayutta in this specific sense occurs in only one sutta in the Saṃyutta Nikāya (S no.51.20, V 276), the Vibhaṅga-sutta, where the term sampayutta clearly means “associated.” However, since this sutta has no parallel in the Chinese Āgamas, it is not a sutta transmitted in all areas or accepted by all Buddhist groups and may be influenced by later sectarian discussions.

The term samprayoga (P. sampayoga) does occur in sūtras with the meaning “association” or “union,” but it is used in a more general sense instead of the Abhidharma sense restricted to citta and caitasikas. For example, the most prominent usage of this term is in the explanation of the four noble truths, in which the truth of suffering is analyzed with the enumeration of eight kinds of suffering, and two of them are the suffering of association with those who are displeasing (appiyehi sampayogo dukkho) and the suffering of dissociation from those who are pleasing (piyehi vippayogo dukkho).
Thus, the term samprayoga in the early sūtras has a broader and more general sense, which can refer to the association or connection among any things or persons, and it is not used in the Abhidharma sense that is restricted to the association relationship only between citta and caitasikas.

Nevertheless, though the technical meanings for the terms samprayoga and samprayukta are not developed in early sūtras, some passages in the sūtras do imply that certain mental phenomena occur together with consciousness, and these passages can be seen as the inception for the later Abhidharma notion of mental factors and their “association” with consciousness. For example, in the Mahāvedalla-sutta, Sāriputta tells Mahākoṭṭhita that insight (paññā) and consciousness (viññāṇa) are conjoined (saṃsaṭṭha) and it is impossible to separate them from each other. And in the same way, feeling (vedanā) and apperception (saññā) are also conjoined with consciousness. Here, the term “conjoined” (saṃsaṭṭha) strongly suggests that these mental phenomena occur simultaneously with consciousness. There are also occasions where citta is described as having lust (sarāga), hatred (sadosa), or delusion (samoha). In this case the prefix sa- carries the sense of possession, which means that the mind possesses these traits, implying that each of the qualities (rāga, dosa, moha) can occur together at the same time with citta. Another example is the standard formula describing the practice of absorption (jhāna, Skt. dhyāna) meditation. When the practitioner has conquered the five hindrances of meditation, he enters and abides in the first dhyāna, which is accompanied by the applied thought and sustained thought (savitaraka savicāra), and with rapture and pleasure (prītisukha). These mental qualities enlisted in the description of dhyāna are later in

6 M I 292-3: yā cāvuso, paññā yañca viññāṇaṃ – ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā, no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na ca labbhā imesam dhammānāṃ vinibbhujiṭṭvā vinibbhujiṭṭvā nānākaraṇarām paññāpetum. yam haṃvuso, pājānātī tam vijānātī, yam vijānātī tam pājānātī. tasmā ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā, no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na ca labbhā imesam dhammānāṃ vinibbhujiṭṭvā vinibbhujiṭṭvā nānākaraṇarām paññāpetet. English translation Bodhi and Ñanamoli 1995: 293: “Wisdom and consciousness, friend—these states are conjoined, not disjoined, and it is impossible to separate each of these states from the other in order to describe the difference between them. For what one wisely understands, that one cognizes, and what one cognizes, that one wisely understands.”

7 M I 293: yā cāvuso, vedanā yā ca saññā yañca viññāṇaṃ – ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā, no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na ca labbhā imesam dhammānāṃ vinibbhujiṭṭvā vinibbhujiṭṭvā nānākaraṇarām paññāpetum. yam haṃvuso vedeti tam sañjānātī, yam sañjānātī tam vijānātī. tasmā ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā. na ca labbhā imesam dhammānāṃ vinibbhujiṭṭvā vinibbhujiṭṭvā nānākaraṇarām paññāpetet.

8 For example, D I 79-80; D II 299; M I 34, 59; S II 121; A III 4-7.

9 For example, D I 294: vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajām prītisukhaṃ
Chapter 3. The Dispute on *samprayoga*

Abhidharma systems called the limbs (*aṅga*) of absorption and are included in the *caitasika* lists.

Aside from the prefix *sa-*, there are two other terms, *sahagata* and *upasamhitā*, which are also used to describe the mind possessing or accompanied by certain qualities or traits. For example, in the *Mettāsahagata-sutta* of the *Samyutta Nikāya*, it is said that in the meditation of the four *Brahma-vihāras*, one should practice with a mind (*cetasā*) connected with (*sahagata*) loving-kindness (*mettā*), compassion (*karuṇā*), joy (*muditā*), and equanimity (*upekkhā*). Also in the *Vitakkasaṇṭhāna-sutta* in the *Majjhima Nikāya*, the Buddha says that from a certain sign (*nimitta*) one can have applied thought (*vitakka*) connected (*upasaṃhitā*) with inclination (*chanda*), with hatred (*dosa*), and with delusion (*moha*). Clearly in both of these cases *sahagata* and *upasaṃhitā* denote a relationship among mental phenomena that accompany each other and most likely occur simultaneously.

To sum up, though the terms *samprayoga* and *samprayukta* are not used in the sūtras as describing the specific association relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas* as in the Abhidharma texts, many examples in the early sūtras indicate the presence of the notion that certain mental phenomena can occur accompanying each other, which in turn could give rise to the later Abhidharma theory of association.

3.1.2 Development of the Notion of Association in Early Abhidharma

As discussed earlier, the early *mātṛkās* (P. *mātikā*) as “lists of topics” are probably one of the origins of Abhidharma texts. Regarding the notion of association (*samprayoga*), the *mātikā* preserved in the Pāli *Dhammasaṅgani* gives a glimpse of its early stage of

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*pāṭhamāṃ jhānāṃ upasampajja viharati.*

10 S V 115: *mettāsahagata cetasā ekaṃ disam pharitvā viharatha... karunāsahagata... muditāsahagata... upekkhāsahagata...* Bodhi 2000: 1607-8. SĀ no. 743, No. 99 鍾阿含經 (卷 27) T02, p197b23: 心與慈俱．

11 M I 119: *bhikkhu no yaṃ nimittaṃ āgamaṃ yaṃ nimittaṃ manasaśīlo upajjanti pāpakā akusalā vitakā chandūpasaṃhitāpi dosūpasaṃhitāpi mohūpasaṃhitāpi, tena, bhikkhave, bhikkhuṇā tamhā nimittā aññānimittā nimmattā manasi kātabbaṃ kuśalūpasaṃhitām.* MĀ no. 101 增上心經, No. 26 中阿含經 (卷25) T01, p588a10-12: 念相善相應。若生不善念者，彼因此相復更念異相善相應。令不生惡不善之念。彼因此相更念異相相應。Note here the Chinese does not have *chanda*, *dosa*, and *moha*, but has *kuśala* (善) connected (相應) with thoughts.

12 Again it should be noted that in the Abhidharma systems, the theory of association (*samprayoga*) is mutually dependent with the theory of *caitasika* as “mental factors.” As discussed in chapter 2, in the sūtras *citta* and *caitasika* are not clearly distinguished as two distinct categories, and it is not necessarily the case that that the connected coexistence of certain mental phenomena entails an association between *citta* and *caitasika* in the Abhidharma sense.

13 See 1.5.
development. In this *mātikā*, the relationship among different dhammas is analyzed through the method of association, which determines which dhammas can occur together. As observed by Yinshun (1981a: 82), in the *mātikā* of the *Dhammasaṅgani*, the term *sampayutta* is applied to the following eleven categories:

1. Three kinds of feelings (*vedanā*)
2. Cause (*hetu*)
3. Taint (*āsava*)
4. Fetter (*samyojana*)
5. Knot (*gantha*)
6. Flood (*ogha*)
7. Yoke (*yoga*)
8. Hindrance (*nīvaraṇa*)
9. Wrong grasp (*parāmāsa*)
10. Consciousness (*citta*)
11. Clinging (*upādāna*)
12. Defilement (*kilesa*)

Apparently, in this early *mātikā*, which at least in terms of its underlying prototype represents an early stage of Abhidharma analysis, the notion of association (*samprayukta* P. *sampayutta*) is not centered on consciousness (*citta* or *vijñāna*) alone; any mental phenomenon can be in association with any other dhammas accompanying it. And in the case of each of the mental phenomena, with the exception of *citta*, in the list that has dharmas associated with it, for the question “what are the dhammas associated with it?” the answer is always *vedanākkhandha*, *saññākkhandha*, *sañkhārakkhandha*, and *viññāṇakkhandha*, namely, the four non-material aggregates (*skandha* P. *khandha*).  

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14 Frauwallner (1995: 6-7) also discusses briefly this method of analysis.

16 Dhs 196: §1105: *katame dhammā āsavasampayuttā? tehi dhammehi ye dhammā sampayuttā vedanākkhandho*
Here, it is apparent that the four khandhas, including viññāṇa, are treated virtually equally, and they all can have a relationship of association with the mental phenomena listed in the mātikā.

However, in the same mātikā, in the group “more extensive pairs” (mahantara-dukaṃ), citta does receive some special treatment different from the other dhammas in the list. In this part of the mātikā, aside from the pair of categories of dhammas as associated with or dissociated from citta (citta-sampayuttā dhammā, citta-vippayuttā dhammā), seven additional pairs of categories regarding relationships between dhammas and citta are listed: 17

Dhammas that are conjoined (samsaṭṭha) with citta; detached (visaṃsaṭṭha) from citta.

Dhammas that are sprung (samuṭṭhāna) from citta; not sprung from citta.

Dhammas that are coexisting (sahabhuno) with citta; not coexisting with citta.

Dhammas that are revolving (anuparivattino) around citta; not revolving around citta.

Dhammas that are conjoined with and sprung from (samsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhāna) citta; not conjoined with and sprung from citta.

Dhammas that are conjoined with, sprung from, and coexist with (samsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhāna-sahabhuno) citta; not conjoined with, sprung from, and coexist with citta.

Dhammas that are conjoined with, sprung from, and revolving around (samsaṭṭha-samuṭṭhānanuparivattino) citta; not conjoined with, sprung from, and revolving around citta.

Table 3.1 gives the lists of dhammas under each one of these categories.

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saññākkhandha saññārakkhandha viññānakkhandho—ime dhammā āsavasampayuttā. Similarly §§1127, 1143, 1151, 1166, 1179, 1221, 1244. In the case of citta, p.209 §1191: katame dhammā cittasampayuttā? vedanākkhandho saññākkhandho saññārakkhandho—ime dhammā cittasampayuttā. And the Dhs (p.210) also gives a note for the exclusion of the viññānakkhandha: cittaṃ na vattabbaṃ citena sampayuttan ti pi citena vippayuttan ti pi. “citta is not to be said as associated with or dissociated from citta.”

Table 4 Lists of dhammas in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi that are related to cetasika\(^{18}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>cetasikā</th>
<th>vedanākkhandho</th>
<th>saññākkhandho</th>
<th>saṅkhārakkhandho</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cittasampayuttā</td>
<td>vedanākkhandho</td>
<td>saññākkhandho</td>
<td>saṅkhārakkhandho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cittasamṣatṭhā</td>
<td>vedanākkhandho</td>
<td>saññākkhandho</td>
<td>saṅkhārakkhandho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cittasamutṭhānā</td>
<td>vedanākkhandho</td>
<td>saññākkhandho</td>
<td>saṅkhārakkhandho</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[^{18}\text{Dhs p.209-11.}\]

These lists of dhammas in the table indicate that, among the special terms that are
applied to citta, “conjoined” (saṃsatṭha) is likely a synonym of sampayutta since the answer to the questions “What are dhammas conjoined with citta?” and “What are dhammas detached from citta?” are exactly the same as the answers regarding sampayutta and vippayutta.\footnote{Dhs p.210 §§1191-1194.} And the categories cetasikā, cittasampayuttā, and cittasamsatthā are equivalent because they all include the same dhammas. Similarly “coexisting” (sahabhuno) and “revolving around” (anuparivattino) are also likely to be synonyms, because dhammas classified as having these relationships with citta are exactly the same, namely, the three khandhas (vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra) plus bodily intimation (kāyaviññatti) and vocal intimation (vacīviññatti).\footnote{Dhs p.210 §§1197-1120.}

The last three composite categories in the table, namely, (1) dhammas that are conjoined with and sprung from (saṃsatṭha-samuṭṭhāna) citta, (2) dhammas that are conjoined with, sprung from, and coexist with (saṃsatṭha-samuṭṭhāna-sahabhuno) citta, and (3) dhammas that are conjoined with, sprung from, and revolving around (saṃsatṭha-samuṭṭhānānuparivattino) citta, also have the same list of dhammas as the categories of cetasikā and cittasampayuttā. In other words, these composite categories denote the following equivalent relationships:

\[
\text{Citta-saṃsatṭha-samuṭṭhānā} = \text{citta-sampayuttā} = \text{cetasikā} \\
\text{Citta-saṃsatṭha-samuṭṭhāna-sahabhuno} = \text{citta-sampayuttā} = \text{cetasikā} \\
\text{Citta-saṃsatṭha-samuṭṭhānānuparivattino} = \text{citta-sampayuttā} = \text{cetasikā}
\]

Thus, it would appear that these four special terms, namely, (1) conjoined (saṃsatṭha) with citta, (2) sprung (samuṭṭhāna) from citta, (3) coexisting (sahabhuno) with citta, and (4) revolving (anuparivattino) around citta, can be understood as constituting an analysis that also functions as a definition for the category of “association” (sampayutta). In other words, association with citta is analyzed as a relationship among dhammas that are “conjoined” (saṃsatṭha) with citta, “sprung” (samuṭṭhāna) from citta, and “coexisting” (sahabhuno) or “revolving around” (anuparivattino) citta. This can be seen as an early scholastic attempt to clarify and define the notion of sampayoga. Similar lists of
categories in the mātrakās can be found in northern Abhidharma texts such as the Prakaraṇapāda\textsuperscript{21} and the *Śāriputrābhīṣṭhāna.\textsuperscript{22}

To sum up, the categories in the Dhammasaṅgani that include the term association (sampayutta) suggest that the theory of association is still in a preliminary stage of development. At this stage, the relationship of association is not considered to be centered on citta or vijñāna alone, but can be applied to many other mental phenomena such as vedanā, āsrava, samyojana, kleśa, and so forth. On the other hand, even in this early stage, citta is featured prominently in the mātrakā, and thus an attempt is made to analyze how other dhammas are associated with citta.

With the development of Abhidharma, the status of citta is elevated, and the analysis of association becomes more focused on citta while associations with other mental phenomena gradually disappear in the mātrakā. As Yinshun (1981a: 81) has noticed, in the mātrakā preserved in the chapter 6 of the Prakaraṇapāda, only four other items aside from citta have the term samprayukta,\textsuperscript{23} while in the mātrakā in the *Śāriputrābhīṣṭhāna, only one item aside from citta has samprayukta.\textsuperscript{24} In other words, in the Abhidharma analyses of dharmas, the categories of citta-samprayukta and citta-viprayukta become increasingly more important than categories such as āsrava-samprayukta and vedanā-samprayukta.\textsuperscript{25}

Furthermore, in conjunction with the elevation in the status of the citta-samprayukta

\textsuperscript{21} No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 5) T26, p711b12-14: 心法。非心法。心所法。非心所法。心相應法。心不相應法。心俱有法。非心俱有法。隨心轉法。非隨心轉法。

\textsuperscript{22} No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 6) T28, p575b14-7: 心界。非心界。心相應界。非心相應界。心數界。非心數界。緣界。非緣界。共心界。非共心界。隨心轉界。心不隨心轉界。

\textsuperscript{23} No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 5) T26, p711b12-3: 心相應法。心不相應法。

\textsuperscript{24} For example, No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 1) T28, p528b29: 十二入幾心相應幾非心相應。p529a24: 十二入幾業相應幾非業相應。

\textsuperscript{25} However, in some extant Abhidharma texts the old method of analysis based on the old mātrakās is still found. For example, in the northern Abhidharma text, Dhātukāya, all mental phenomena such as the mahābhūmikas and kleśamahābhūmikas, and so forth, are analyzed according to whether each of them is associated with all other mental phenomena. As Frauwallner puts it (1995: 26-7), the Dhātukāya and the fourth chapter of the Prakaraṇapāda, as well as the Pāli Dhātukhathā, are likely "reworks" of the same old, original source.
category, the notion of caitta/caitasika as “mental factor” also achieved the status as a separate category in the Buddhist Abhidharma classifications. In the developed Abhidharma systems of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and Theravāda Abhidhamma, these two categories are identified with each other: those dharmas that are associated with citta (citta-samprayukta) are exclusively mental factors (caitta/caitasika), and mental factors are exclusively dharmas associated with citta. This identification of these two categories is clearly evident in the five categories of all dharmas (pañcavastu) in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text Prakaraṇapāda, which states that caitasika dharmas are those dharmas that are associated with citta. Similar in the Pāli Theravāda Abhidhamma tradition within Buddhadatta’s Abhidhammadvāvatāra where four categories of all dharmas are proposed, cetasika is also defined as those that are associated with citta.

3.1.3 Analyses of Association in the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Systems

In the Dhammasaṅgani mātikā, the category of sampayutta is analyzed with several terms representing categories either coinciding with, or overlapping with it, and the combination of these terms gives an approximate definition of sampayoga. However, the terms used in the Dhammasaṅgani mātikā are ambiguous and not clearly defined, and they represent a primitive stage in the development of the Abhidharma theory of association. Nevertheless, in the Kathāvatthu, a relatively later canonical Pāli Abhidhamma text, the term sampayutta is defined with seven more precise terms:

[Question:] Is it not the case that some dhammas are associated (sampayutta) with other dhammas?

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26 See the discussion of the development of the notion of caitasika in chapter 4, esp. 2.1 and 2.2.
27 No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 1) T26, p692b29-c1: 心所法云何。謂若法心相應。
28 Abhidh-av 16: tattha cittasampayuttā, citte bhavā vā cetasikā. It should be noted the Abhidhammāvatāra is a rather late work (around 5th century CE), and there is no textual witness extant in the Pāli tradition so we cannot be certain whether Buddhadatta was influenced by other sources.
29 For a discussion of this part of the Dhammasaṅgani’s mātikā, see p. 128ff.
[The opponent:] Certainly (āmantā).

[The Theravādin position:] Is it not the case that some dhammas are connected (sahagata) with, born together (sahajāta) with, conjoined (samsaṭṭha) with, arising together (ekuppāda) with, ceasing together (ekanirodha) with, having the same basis (ekavatthuka) with, and having the same object (ekārammaṇa) with some other dhammas?

Given the parallelism between the two sentences such that one has the term sampayutta, and the other has a train of terms describing the relationship between “some dhammas” (keci dhammā) with “some other dhammas” (kehici dhammehi), no doubt the second sentence is an elaboration of the first sentence, and the series of terms represents an expansion of the notion of sampayutta. The seven terms used here are “connected” (sahagata), “born together” (sahajāta), “conjoined” (samsaṭṭha), “arising together” (ekuppāda), “ceasing together” (ekanirodha), “having the same basis” (ekavatthuka), and “having the same object” (ekārammaṇa). A comparison of these seven terms with the four terms used in the Dhammasaṅgani mātikā, namely, “conjoined” (samsaṭṭha) with citta, “sprung” (samuṭṭhāna) from citta, and “co-existing” (sahabhuno) or “revolving around” (anuparivattino) citta, indicates that the terms in the Katthavatthu are not only more clear and specific but also add more theoretical elements that do not appear in the Dhammasaṅgani mātikā. For example, aside from the term “conjoined” (samsaṭṭha) which occurs in both texts, the two terms in the Dhs mātikā “coexisting” (sahabhuno) or “revolving around” (anuparivattino) have more or less the same meaning and they both correspond to the term “connected” (sahagata) in the Kv. The term “sprung from citta” (samuṭṭhāna) in the Dhs mātikā has no correspondent in the Kv, which instead includes four terms absent from the Dhs mātikā: “arising together” (ekuppāda), “ceasing together” (ekanirodha), “having the same basis” (ekavatthuka), and “having the same object” (ekārammaṇa). And in the Paṭṭhāna, the last canonical Abhidhamma book in the Pāli tradition, only these four terms are used to define the condition of association (sampayutta-paccaya).31 Thereafter, these four terms, or the four aspects of the relationship of association represented by these four terms, become the standard

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Chapter 3. The Dispute on samprayoga

definition of “association” in the Theravāda Abhidhamma tradition.32

In the northern traditions, the development of the notion of samprayoga/samprayukta appears to follow a similar course. As noted previously, the mātrkās of early Abhidharma such as the Prakaraṇapāda and the *Śāriputrābhidharma already contain hints of a preliminary analysis of samprayukta with terms such as *sahabhuva (俱有，共) and *anuparivartana (隨心轉). However, in contrast to the Pāli Abhidhamma tradition in which the analysis of sampayutta with the four standard terms is established in the canonical Katthāvatthu and the Paṭṭhāna, the standard analysis of samprayukta in the Sarvāstivāda tradition is not uniform within its seven canonical Abhidharma texts. The earliest account of samprayukta which is comparable to the form in the Paṭṭhāna occurs in the post-canonical and pre-Vibhāṣa treatise *Āryavasumitraśaṅgītisāstra.33 This treatise records ten interpretations of the meaning of samprayukta. But the Chinese translation of this treatise is so obscure that it is difficult to figure out what the interpretations are. Fortunately, the later Vibhāṣa compendia preserves quite a few positions regarding samprayukta, including many that appear in the ĀVS, and these provide a clearer view of the development of samprayukta in the early period of northern Abhidharma.

The MVŚ has a long passage discussing the meaning of samprayukta. Because it records a large number of positions that are important for our understanding of the formation of the Abhidharma samprayoga theory, a full translation of the passage is presented here:34

32 For example, this passage from the Kv is quoted in Buddhaghosa’s commentary to the Dhs, and sampayutta is defined with the four terms. Dhs-a 41-2: yopanāyaṃ tissupi padesu sampayuttasaddo tass’aittho. samaṃ pakārehi yuttá ti samprayuttā, katurehi pakārehi ti? ekuppādatādīhi. ‘nattthi keci dhammā keci dhammehi sampayuttāti? āmantā’ ti hi imassa pañhassa paṭikkhepe “nanu atthi keci dhammā keci dhammehi sahaṅgata sahajātā sampaññā ekuppādā ekanīrodhā ekavatthukā ekārammana” ti evam ekuppādatādānam vasena sampayogatho vutto. iti imehi ekuppādatādīhi samaṃ pakārehi yuttā ti sampayuttā. In the Visuddhimagga, Buddhaghosa quotes the Paṭṭhāna’s definition of sampayutta-paccaya: Vism XVII 94 (PTS ed. p539). In the later Abhidhamma manual, the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha, these four terms are used to define cetasika: Abhidh-s 6: ekuppādanīrodhā ca, ekālambanavatthukā, cetojuttā dvipaññāsa, dhammā cetasikā maññā.

33 This treatise is attributed to Vasumitra (婆須蜜), who is not likely to be the same person named Vasumitra associated with the Prakaraṇapāda. Yinshun (1981a: 389-393) suggests that this Ārya-Vasumitra is a Dārṣṭāntika master, and the later Sarvāstivādins confused him with the earlier Abhidharma master Vasumitra who is associated with the Prakaraṇapāda.

34 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80b25-81b3: 問相應是何義。答等義是相應義。問諸心所法或多或少。謂善心多不善心少。不善心多有覆無記心少。有覆無記心多無覆無記心少。欲界心多色
Chapter 3. The Dispute on samprayoga

Question: What is the meaning of samprayoga?
Answer: “To be equal” (等) is the meaning of samprayukta.

Question: Cittas are sometimes more [in number], and sometimes less, namely, [sometimes there are] more in wholesome cittas and less in unwholesome cittas. How could “to be equal” be the meaning of samprayukta?
Answer: (i) It is referred to as “to be equal” by being equal as real entities (dravya). If in one citta there are two vedanās and one samjñā, this situation may not be referred to as being equal; but if in one citta there is one vedanā and one samjñā, and this is also the case for other cittas, therefore, one says “to be equal” is the meaning of samprayukta.

(ii) Moreover, “being equal and not separated (不相離, *vinirbhāga)” is the meaning of samprayukta.

(iii) Moreover, “being equal and not different (不別異, *ananyathā)” is the meaning of samprayukta.

(iv) Moreover, “carrying together (等運轉, *samvāha)” is the meaning of samprayukta. Just as a chariot, which, when it operates, all its parts also

The other version of Vibhāṣā (T No. 1546, 阿毘曇毘婆沙論 (卷 10) T28, p65c6-66b15) has the same list of definitions of samprayoga with only slight differences in their order.
operate, and all together accomplish the same purpose, in a similar way, when the chariot of citta operates regarding an object field (境, viśaya), caitasikas are also operating and all accomplish together the same purpose. Therefore, [it] is referred to as samprayukta.

(v) Moreover, ‘having the same activity’ (等所作, *sama-kārya) is the meaning of samprayukta. Just as autumn pigeons come to the courtyard all at the same time, eat at the same time, and fly away at the same time, not before nor after [one another], so also citta and caitasika dharmas, which approach the object field at the same time, experience the object field at the same time, and leave the object field at the same time. Therefore, [they] are referred to as samprayukta.

(vi) Moreover, “being equally agreeable to each other” (等相順, *samaṃ anuguna or *anukūla) is the meaning of samprayukta. Just as people are referred to as being samprayukta by being agreeable to each other, citta and caitasika dharmas that are agreeable to each other are also [referred to as being samprayukta].

(vii) Moreover, “uniting together” (等和合, *samam prayukta) is the meaning of samprayukta. Just as the unification of water and milk is referred to as samprayukta, so also citta and caitasika dharmas united with each other are also [referred to as being samprayukta].

(viii) The elder *Vāśpa (霧尊者) says that samprayukta refers to equality in four respects: first, being equal regarding time (kāla 時分) because citta and caitasika are active at the same moment; second, being equal regarding basis (āśraya 所依) because citta and caitasika are active depending on the same faculty (indriya 根); third, being equal regarding the object (ālambana 所緣) because citta and caitasika are active taking the same object field (viśaya 境); and fourth, being equal regarding mode of function (ākāra 行相) because citta and caitasika are active having the same ākāra.

(ix) Moreover, equality in five respects is referred to as samprayukta: namely, the aforementioned four respects plus equality as a real entity (物體, dravya). Because citta and caitasikas are all individually real entities, [they] arise united together. Therefore, [they] are referred to as samprayukta.

(x) Moreover, the meaning of samprayukta is like a bundle of reeds (束蘆 naḍa-kalāpa). Just as individual reeds cannot stand by themselves but are able to stand only with many to form a bundle, similarly citta and caitasika need to be many and can function in the world depending on each other to receive and cause [karmic] results and take objects (所緣, ālambana).

(xi) Moreover, the meaning of samprayukta is like a combined rope (合索). Just as each thread cannot individually drag a log of wood but needs many threads combined to have the activity of dragging, similarly citta and caitasika [function together] as explained earlier.

(xii) Moreover, the meaning of samprayukta is like hands joined (連手).

35 AKBh p. 62.6-7: samprayuktaḥ samaṃ prayuktatvāt.
Just as a river torrent is difficult to cross by one person, and only many people with hands joined can cross, so also citta and caitasika [function together], as explained earlier.

(xiii) Moreover, the meaning of samprayuktā is like merchants (*sārtha 商侣). Just as many merchants together as companions can pass dangerous paths, similarly citta and caitasika [function together] as explained earlier.

(xiv) The elder Vasumitra says that “leading to the birth of each other” (相引生, *ākṣepa) is the meaning of samprayuktā. Question: if so, then because eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness (mano-vijñāna) lead to [the arising] of each other, should they be associated (samprayuktā)? Answer: they have different bases (所依, āśraya). [Only] those [dharmas] that have the same basis and lead to the arising of each other are associated (samprayuktā).

(xv) Moreover, “not being separated” (不相離, *vinirbhāga) is the meaning of samprayuktā. Question: if so, since the four great elements (大種, mahābhūta) are not separated, are they associated? Answer: they have no basis (所依, āśraya). Only those have [the same] basis and are also not separated are associated (samprayuktā).

(xvi) Moreover, “having an object” (有所緣, *sālambana) is the meaning of samprayuktā. Question: if so, since the six types of consciousness all have objects, are they associated? Answer: they have different bases (所依, āśraya). Only those having the same basis and have an object are associated.

(xvii) Moreover, “having the same object” (同所緣, *ekālambana) is the meaning of samprayuktā. Question: if so, when one of the five types of [sense] consciousness and the mind-consciousness (mano-vijñāna) have the same object, they should be referred to as associated. Moreover, multiple eye-consciousnesses should also be referred to as associated, like many sentient beings who look at the new moon all together. Answer: they have different bases (所依, āśraya). Only those having the same basis and have an object are associated.

(xviii) Moreover, “being constantly united” (常和合, *samṣṛṣṭa) is the meaning of samprayuktā. Question: if so, since the three things life (āyuḥ 壽), heat (uṣman 煉), and consciousness (vijñāna 識) are constantly united, are they associated? Answer: no they are not, because the two, life and heat, have no basis. Only those that have [the same] basis and are constantly united are associated.

(xix) Moreover, “being always born together” (恒俱生, *sahotpāda) is the meaning of samprayuktā. Question: if so, since the four great elements (大種, mahābhūta) are always born together, are they associated? Answer: they have no basis (所依, āśraya). Only those [dharmas] that have [the same] basis and are always born together are associated.

(xx) Moreover, “being born, staying, and ceasing together” (俱生住滅, *ekotpāda-sthiti-nirodha) is the meaning of samprayuktā. Question: if so,
those material forms (rūpa) that are revolving around citta (隨心轉色 *cittānuvartin rupa), cittas that revolving around citta (隨心轉心 *cittānuvartin citta), and conditioned [dharms] dissociated from citta (不相應行, citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra dharma) are all born, stay, and cease together with citta; are they associated? Answer: they do not have a basis.

Only those [dharms] that have [the same] basis, born, stay, and cease together, are associated.

Moreover, “having the same basis (āśraya), the same object (ālambana), and acting with regard to the same mode of function (ākāra)” is the meaning of saṃprayukta. Question: how [do you] know this is the case? Answer: how [do you] know it is not the case?

Moreover, “carrying out the same activity” (同作一事, *ekakārya) is the meaning of samprayukta. Question: if so, since patiences (忍, kṣānti) and knowledges (智, jñāna) have the same activity, are they associated? Answer: they are not born together (不俱生, *anekotpada). Only those [dharmas] that are born together, and carry out the same activity are associated.

The Bhadanta (大德) says that “being companions” (同伴侶, *sahāya) is the meaning of saṃprayukta. Consciousness (vijñāna) and mental factors (caitasika/caitta) contain (容受, *avakāśa) each other, are born together, and take the same object, and thus are associated.

The venerable Ghoṣaka (妙音) says that “having all the same basis (aśraya), the same object (ālambana), the same mode of function (ākāra), the same activity (kārya),” this is the meaning of samprayukta. Why? Conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharma) are weak by nature and can only perform a function by supporting each other; one never sees a single mahābhūmika dharma that performs a function by itself.

This passage starts by stating that saṃprayukta means “to be equal” (等 *sama). It is likely that here the Vibhāṣā commentators are following the old Indian commentarial tradition, whereby the commentary begins by analyzing the term itself. “To be equal” is likely an interpretation of the prefix sam- in the word samprayukta. The commentators understand sam- as *sama, which means “even, level,” and “same, equal.” Someone may ask, as the commentators presume, if samprayukta means “to be equal,” then in what way are things said to be equal? Is it that the number of caitasikas in various cittas are
equal? It is unlikely because in different cittas, such as wholesome or unwholesome cittas, the numbers and types of caitasikas are different. How then should one understand samprayukta as meaning “to be equal”?

In response, this Vibhāṣā passage lists twenty-four interpretations of samprayukta. These twenty-four interpretations can be divided into three groups: (1) i-ix continue the “to be equal” interpretation and list different answers to the question “to be equal to what.” (2) x-xiii contain four similes. (3) xiv-xxiv do not involve the analysis of the term samprayukta itself, but are descriptions of theoretical positions regarding samprayukta.

In group (1) i-ix, the text first answers the question of what it means “to be equal?” It says that “to be equal” should be understood in terms of status as a “real entity” (體 dravya), which means that in each moment of citta there can be only one instance of a certain type of caitasika such as vedanā, saṃjñā, and so forth. It is impossible that in one citta there exist two vedanās and one saṃjñā; that would be “unequal.” Caitasikas must be equal in number as dravyas such that there is only one vedanā, one saṃjñā, and so forth. Since dravya is a relatively late development in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system, the commentators here start the list of interpretations with this relatively new notion and frame the discussion with the later Vaibhāṣika mind model.

Interpretations ii-vii contain various interpretations of samprayukta. Except for vii, which is an etymological analysis of the term samprayukta, all the other interpretations, namely, “being equal and not separated” (不相離, *vinirbhāga), “being equal and not different” (不別異, *ananyathā), “carrying together” (等運轉, *saṃvāha), “having the same activity” (等所作, *sama-kārya), and “being equally agreeable to each other” (等相順, *samānuguṇa or *samānukūla), represent discrete, unconnected doctrinal positions. They resemble the list of terms in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi mālikā that are related to sampayutta, such as saṃsaṭṭha, saṃuṭṭana, sahabhuno, anuparivattino, and represent early, unsystematized attempts to understand samprayukta.

Interpretations viii-ix within group (1) represent the systemized and mature Vaibhāṣika position on samprayukta. The text attributes this position to the Abhidharma master *Vāṣpa (霧尊者), who proposes that samprayukta means citta and caitasika,

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which are equal in four respects: time (kāla), basis (āśraya), object (ālambana), and mode of function (ākāra). And in ix, the text adds that they should also be equal with regard to their status as real entities (dravya). These later become the standard Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma definition of *samprayukta*, which is followed by works such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra*, and the later *Abhidharmadīpa*.

Interpretations x-xiii within group (2), present four similes explaining *samprayukta*: reed-bundles, rope, joined hands, and a band of merchants. All of these similes show that a particular task must be performed by a collection of things as a whole, and each component cannot perform the task alone by its own force. In a similar way, *citta* and *caitasikas* cannot function alone without each other; they depend on each other to experience the results of karma, and cause future results, as well as to perform basic cognitive functions such as taking objects.

Interpretations xiv-xxiv within group (3) represent eleven positions or opinions regarding *samprayukta*, likely originating from different teachers. Some are attributed to a specific teacher; for example, xiv is the opinion of the elder Vasumitra, while xxiii is attributed to Bhadanta Dharmatrāṭa. And apparently, all of these positions are acknowledged as valid interpretations of *samprayukta*: all positions with the exception of the last two, xxiii and xxiv, are somehow confirmed with the full definition of *samprayukta* as presented in ix: *citta* and *caitasikas* should be equal with regards to time (kāla 時分), basis (āśraya 所依), object (ālambana 所緣), mode of function (ākāra 行相), and realy entity (dravya 體). For example, in xiv it enlists the elder Vasumitra’s opinion that *samprayukta* means “leading to the birth of each other” (相引生, *ākṣepa*). Then the passage raises a question: if so, eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness should also be associated because they lead to the arising of each other. The following answer resorts to the definition of *samprayukta* as being equal regarding five things: kāla, āśraya, ālambana, ākāra, and dravya. It picks up the relevant aspect of *samprayukta* that applies to this specific interpretation: things associated (*samprayukta*) with each other must have the same basis (āśraya). Because eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness have different bases, namely, eye-consciousness has the eye-faculty (indriya) as its basis, while mind-consciousness has mind-element (manas or mano-dhātu) as its basis, hence,
even though eye-consciousness and mind-consciousness mutually lead to the arising of each other, they do not meet all the five criteria of samprayukta. Therefore, they are not associated.

Interpretations xiv-xx as well as xxii are all presented in a similar way. They first present an interpretation regarding samprayukta, such as it means “not being separated” (不相離, *vinirbhāga), “having an object” (有所緣, *sālambana), and so forth. Then they raise some counterexample that seems to meet the description but should not be understood as associated, as for example the four material elements (mahābhūta), six types of consciousness, and so forth. Then the passage analyzes the counterexample for the definition of samprayukta presented in ix and points out that the example does meet a specific criterion in the definition, most frequently the criterion of having the same basis (āśraya). As a result, the counterexample does not stand. In other words, the passage shows that all the interpretations listed agree with the definition of samprayukta presented in ix, and they are logically equivalent but simply presented in different forms.

Interpretations xxi and xxiv present two versions of the definition of samprayukta with fewer criteria as compared to the full definition in ix. Interpretation xxi has only three criteria for samprayukta: possessing the same āśraya, ālambana, and ākāra. Interpretation xxiv, which is attributed to the Abhidharma master Ghoṣaka, has an additional criterion: activity (kārya). These “incomplete” definitions of samprayukta suggest that the “full” definition with five criteria as given in ix is likely an incremental product that assembles parts from different opinions of different teachers.

The position in (xxiii) attributed to the Bhadanta (大德) Dharmatrāta is interesting in that it appears to contradict a position previously attributed to Dharmatrāta. As discussed in 2.1.5, Dharmatrāta does not accept that citta and caitasika are separate entities but thinks that they are all varieties of cetanā (*cetanā-viśeṣa). It is then surprising that here the MVŚ attributes to him the opinion that association refers to the fact that consciousness (vijñāna) and caitasikas contain each other, are born together, and take the same object. This position appears to be quite similar to that of the Vaibhāṣikas. However, as noted in 2.1.5, Dharmatrātra also proposes that consciousness (vijñāna=citta) always accompanies other mental phenomena such as vedanā, samjñā, and so forth. Citta and the mental phenomenon it accompanies constitute an assemblage (一和合, *sāmagrī), and
the components of the assemblage such as *citta* and *vedanā* cannot be separated from each other as individual entities.\(^{40}\) It should also be mentioned that in the discussion of *samprayukta* in the ÁVS, this position of Dharmatrāta is the last one in the list of different positions, and possibly the one the composer of the ÁVS takes as the most authoritative position on *samprayukta*.\(^ {41}\) This may confirm Yinshun’s observation that the ÁVS is likely a work of the Dārṣṭāntikas.

To sum up, the twenty-four interpretations of *samprayukta* in the MVŚ suggest a possible course through which the Abhidharma theory of *samprayoga* was formed. As discussed in the previous two sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, the concept of *samprayoga* used specifically in relation to *citta* and *caitasikas* is not attested in the early sūtras, though there are certain notions or contexts that can be taken as marking the inception of this concept. And during the early period of Abhidharma, the mātikā of the Dhs and mātrkāś in the Prakaraṇapāda and the Dhātukāya as well as in the *Śāriputrābhidharma* represent early attempts to elaborate upon the concept of *samprayukta* with a number of terms such as *samsāttha*, *sahabhuno*, *anuparivattino*, and so forth. The twenty-four interpretations likely enmerged after these few canonical Abhidharma texts were composed since they do not contain similar interpretations, but they must be earlier or contemporaneous with the Vibhāṣā compendium since they are included in the MVŚ. Moreover, the MVŚ not only records these interpretations but also offers its own judgment: apparently, it agrees with the interpretation of the elder *Vāspa* (viii), which is also more or less equivalent to the elder Ghoṣaka’s position (xxiv, and the last one in the list). According to this interpretation, two things are associated with each other when they share the following properties:

1. time (*kāla*), they must occur simultaneously
2. basis (*āśraya*), they are based on the same faculty (*indriya*)
3. object (*ālambana*), they must have the same object

\(^{40}\) For details of Dharmatrāta’s position on *caitasika*, see 2.1.5; also Dhammajoti 2007a: 115.

\(^{41}\) No. 1549 尊婆須蜜菩薩所集論 (卷 3) T28, p738c: 或作是說。千義是相應義。識所適處各相開避。心所念法則有選數。Here 千 is likely a mistranslation of “companion” (*sahāya*). There are ten interpretations of *samprayukta* recorded in the ÁVS, which correspond closely to (xiv)-(xxiii) in the MVŚ. On the dating of the ÁVS and its relationship with the MVŚ, see Yinshun 印順 1981a: 380-87.
(4) mode of function (ākāra), they must function with regard to the same mode of function.

The composers of the MVŚ also note in (ix) that in addition to these four, (5) the property of equality as a “real entity” (dravya) should also be a criterion of sanprayoga because citta and caitasikas are different entities, and only different entities can be associated. This signifies the formal establishment of the theory of the five properties of association characterizing the Sarvāstivāda-Vaiabhāṣika tradition.

However, perhaps because certain doctrines relevant in the analysis of sanprayoga such as mode of function (ākāra) and being a real entity (dravya) are particular Kaśmīra Vaibhāṣika doctrines which may not be accepted by all Abhidharma teachers, Abhidharma texts later than the MVŚ contain analyses of sanprayoga that include only some of the five properties. For example, in Ghoṣaka’s *Abhidharmanmrtarasa, association is only said to be the interdependent relationship between citta and caitasikas.42 In Dharmārṣṭhin’s *Abhidharmahṛdaya, association is said to be the relationship between citta and caitasikas that depend on each other’s power, have the same object, and must be active simultaneously, never to be separated.43 And in Dharmatrāta’s *Miśrābhidharmahṛdaya, the analysis of sanprayoga is more or less in the same form as that presented in the Vibhāṣā: citta and caitasikas must have the same mode of function (行法 ākāra), basis (依 āśraya), time (时 kāla), and the same object (境界 *viṣaya which is equivalent to ālambana here). It also points out that citta cannot be associated with citta because two cittas cannot occur simultaneously, and a dharma cannot have a dependent relationship with its own self-nature (自性 svabhāva).44 This last point indicates that citta and caitasikas must have different self-natures and hence implies the Vibhāṣā position that the association relationship between citta and caitasikas...
must have the separate real-entity (dravya) property. Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya explicitly defines samprayoga as entailing equality in five respects: basis (āśraya), object (ālambana), mode of function (ākāra), time (kāla), and real entity (dravya). On this point, Vasubandhu follows closely the analysis of the Vibhāṣā. Similarly Saṅghabhadra in his *Nyāyānusāra also lists these five properties as the definition of samprayukta-hetu.

Finally, a comparison of the formalized analyses of samprayoga in the Pāli Abhidhamma and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma indicates that all four properties listed in the Pāli definition have parallels in the Sarvāstivāda definition: the Pāli items (1) a cetasika arises together with citta (ekuppāda) and (2) ceases together with citta (ekanirdodha) correspond to the Sarvāstivāda item of the same time (kāla); (3) cetasika and citta have the same object support (ekālambana) corresponds to the criterion of same object support (ālambana) in the Sarvāstivāda version; and the (4) same basis (ekavatthuka) corresponds to same basis (āśraya). Two items in the Sarvāstivāda definition, namely, the same mode of function (ākāra) and the property as real entities (dravya), have special doctrinal importance in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma but not in the Theravāda Abhidhamma. Therefore, it is no surprise to see them included in the Sarvāstivāda definition but not in the Theravāda one.

### 3.1.4 Association in Yogācāra texts

Section 2.1.4 demonstrated that the notion of caitta/cetasika as “mental factors” in texts of the Yogācāra tradition is very similar to that of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma system. Similarly, the theory of association (samprayoga) in Yogācāra texts, which claims that different cetasikas can occur simultaneously with citta, is also very similar to that of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. Following the list of the cetasikas, the Yogācārabhūmi

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45 AKBh verse ii.34, p.62.9-10: pañcabhiḥ samatāprākārair āśrayālambanākāralaṅkādravyasamatābhīḥ. keyaṃ samatā? yathaiva hyekaṃ cittānevaṃ caitta apekeākā iti.
46 No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 16) T29, p425c15-6: 但説相應。即知一切時依行相境事皆同。...p425c26: 由五平等義立相應因。
47 Both āśraya and vatthu mean “basis.” For vatthu (Skt. vastu) as “basis,” see, for example, Dhs §679 (p.148): kataman tāṃ rūpam cakkhasuphassassa vatthu? cakkaḥāyatanaṃ idan tāṃ rūpam cakkhasuphassassa vatthu.
48 For the meaning of ākāra in this context, see Miyashita 1978. For dravya, see Cox 2004.
states:49

...[Dharmas] of that kind (bhāgīya) [as caitasikas], are dharmas belonging to mind (caitasa), are together and associated (saḥabhūsamprayukta), and are called companions (saḥāya). [They] have the same object support (ekālambana), various modes of function (anekākāra), are coexistent (saḥabhū), function individually (ekaikavṛttaya), are determined by their own seeds (svabījaniyata), and are associated (samprayukta); [they] have modes of function (sākāra), have object supports (sālambana), and have bases (sāśraya).

This passage describes and analyzes how these caitasika dharmas are related to citta as its companions (saḥāya). First it defines a companion (saḥāya) of mind: a companion of mind (citta or cetas) is a dharma that belongs to mind (caitasa), and also occurs together with (saḥabhū) and is associated with (samprayukta) mind. Here, the term caitasa is a derivative from cetas, and it is etymologically equivalent to caitasika or caitta. As discussed in 2.1.1, the term caitasika in the sūtras should be understood as an adjective “mental” or “belonging to mind;” here in this passage from YBh, the term caitasa is likely used in a similar manner as caitasika in the sūtras, and should also be understood as meaning “mental” or “belonging to mind.”

The compound saḥabhūsamprayukta is especially interesting in this context. The two members of the compound, saḥabhū and samprayukta, represent two types of hetus in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system. The coexistent cause (saḥabhū-hetu) indicates the relationship between dharmas that occur together and cause the same result. The association cause (samprayukta-hetu) is a special kind of saḥabhū-hetu: citta and caitasikas must occur simultaneously and together they cause the mental phenomena of the next moment of the sentient being. In this sense all dharmas being samprayukta-hetus to each other must also be saḥabhū-hetus to each other, but not all saḥabhū-hetus are samprayukta-hetus. For example, dharmas dissociated from citta (citta-viprayukta) coexist with citta but are not associated with it; also the four material elements

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49 YBh (Bhattacharya 1957) p.11.19-21: evambhāgīyāḥ saḥabhūsamprayuktāḥ caitasā dharmāḥ saḥāya ity ucyante ekālambanaḥ anekākārāḥ saḥabhūva evaikaikavṛttayaḥ svabījaniyataḥ samprayuktaḥ sākārāḥ sālambanaḥ sāśrayāḥ // No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 1) T30, p280b18-21: 如是等輩。俱有相應心所有法。是名助伴。同一所緣非同一行相。一時俱有。一一而轉。各自種子所生。更互相應。有行相。有所緣。有所依。The list of caitasikas at the beginning of this passage is discussed in the previous chapter, section 2.1.4.
(mahābhūta) are coexistent but not associated with each other.\(^50\) From this perspective, the compound sahabhūsamprayukta here in this YBh passage indicates that the composer(s) of the YBh very likely were familiar with the sahabhū and samprayukta-hetus of the Vaibhāṣīka Abhidharma system and, by noting the companionship of these caitasika dharmas, also asserts their association (samprayukta) with citta, which in turn is also a special kind of coexistent (sahabhū) relationship.

Next, the passage deploys several technical terms analyzing such a companion (sahāya) relationship between these caitasikas and citta: (1) they have the same object (ekālambana); (2) have different modes of function (anekākāra); (3) are coexistent (sahabhū); (4) function individually (ekaikavṛtti), (5) are each determined by its own seed (svabījaniyata); and (6) are associated (samprayukta). The last term (6) samprayukta likely serves as the conclusion for all of the previous terms, which may indicate that the previous five terms constitute an analysis of different aspects or properties of the association relationship between citta and caitasikas. A comparison of these five terms with the analysis of samprayukta in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīka Abhidharma system presented in the MVŚ and the AKBh reveals similarities but also interesting differences. The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīka Abhidharma analyzes association with regard to five aspects:\(^51\)

(i) the same basis (āśraya)
(ii) the same object (ālambana)
(iii) the same mode of function (ākāra)
(iv) occur at the same time (kāla)
(v) both occur as real entities (dravya).

In the YBh passage several terms are more or less parallel to the items in the Sarvāstivāda list: (1) same object (ekālambanā) corresponds to (ii) the same object (ālambana); (3) coexistent (sahabhū) corresponds to (iv) occur at the same time (kāla); two terms in the YBh passage, (4) function individually (ekaikavṛtti) and (5) each

\(^{50}\) No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p81b6-8: ...於此應作是説。若相應因即俱有因。有俱有因非相應因。謂不相應俱有因是。...p81c11-2: 心與隨心轉不相應行為俱有因。隨心轉不相應行與心俱有因。...p82a10: 復次俱生四大種展轉為俱有因。

\(^{51}\) See the previous section 3.1.3 for more details about the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣīka analysis of association (samprayukta).
determined by its own seed (svabījaniyata), are logically equivalent to the Sarvāstivāda (v) occur as real entities (dravya).\textsuperscript{52}

However, the most significant difference in the YBh list of terms from the Sarvāstivāda list is the assertion that citta and caitasikas have different modes of functions (anekākāra), while the Sarvāstivāda analysis says that they have the same modes of function (ākārasamatā). Furthermore, in the later corresponding Viniścayagrahāṇī part of the Yogācārabhūmi, the Yogācāra commentator(s) gives a clearer definition of association that is very similar to the Sarvāstivāda definition:\textsuperscript{53}

Q: Why is it called association (*samprayoga)?
A: Because [citta and caitta] are equal with regard to real entity (*dravya事), place (*sthāna 處), time (kāla 時), and basis (*āśraya 所依).\textsuperscript{54}

This is almost an exact repetition of the Sarvāstivāda definition except for the item ākāra. Then why did the composers of the YBh not believe that citta and caitasikas have the same mode of function (ākāra)?

The different understanding of the notion ākāra is a complicated issue and deserves a separate study.\textsuperscript{55} In summary, the orthodox Sarvāstivāda Vaibhāṣikas claim that ākāra is nothing other than insight (prajñā).\textsuperscript{56} In his AKBh Vasubandhu defines ākāra as the summoning of the object by the objects’ mode or class (prakāra), which Saṅghabhadra claims to be a non-Vaibhāṣika position.\textsuperscript{57} This interpretation appears to understand ākāra

\textsuperscript{52} Cf. AKBh p.62.9-10: yathāiva hyekaṃ cittamevaṃ caittā apyeikaikā iti.
\textsuperscript{53} T No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 55) T30, p602a24-26: 問何故名相應。答由事等故。處等故。時等故。所依等故。
\textsuperscript{54} The Taishō edition of the MVŚ gives the last item as 所作, which would appear to be an obvious error for 所依.
\textsuperscript{55} There are several recent scholarly studies dedicated to the investigation of this concept in the Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra systems, most notably Dhammajoti 2007b: 348-62; also Chen 2007; Miyashita 1978.
\textsuperscript{56} No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 p408c25-409a11: 問言行相者自性是何。答自性是慧。應知此中慧是行相。亦是能行亦是所行。與慧相應心心所法雖非行相而是能行亦是所行。與慧俱有不相應行。及餘有法雖非行相亦非能行而是所行。
\textsuperscript{57} AKBh ii-34, p.62.6: sākārās tasyaivālambanasya prakārena ākaranāt. (This reading is confirmed in Yasomitra’s
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as the mental activity that takes an image of the object, and it applies to all citta and caitisikas instead of only prajñā. In Yogācāra texts, the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi defines sākāra as the fact that citta and caitisikas function over the same object with many different ākāras. Unfortunately, this leaves the concept ākāra unclear.

Some later commentators propose that ākāra is the subjective aspect (vijñapti) of a mental activity, while others propose that both the object aspect (相分), that is, the image of the object produced by mind, and the subjective aspect (見分), are ākāras, because both of these two aspects are vijñaptis. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these interpretations of ākāra represent the views of later commentators. In earlier Yogācāra texts such as the YBh, the reason why citta and caitisikas must have different ākāras is not explained. On the other hand, the Sarvāstivādins propose that ākāra is nothing but the insight (prajñā) mental factor, and, at any given moment, since citta and all caittas function with a single insight mental factor prajñā, they share the same ākāra. Thus, these different understandings of the notion of ākāra entail different definitions of association (samprayukta). The Sarvāstivādins think that ākāra, as the mental factor insight (prajñā), is a universal mental factor that occurs all the time and in all types of cittas. Every mental activity and state must engage in such insight and experience the result of this insight, and in each moment there can be only one insight mental factor. Therefore, when citta and caitisikas are associated, they must share the same insight, that is, the same ākāra. The early Yogācāra teachers certainly understand ākāra differently, but it is unclear exactly what their understanding of ākāra might be. If the later commentators are correct that in their system ākāra means vijñapti, which means

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AKVy p.141. Pradhan’s edition has an alternative reading.) Also vii-13, p.401.21: sarvēṣāṃ citta-caitātītānāmālambanagrahanaprakāra ākāra iti. Saṅghabhadra suggests that here Vasubandhu is following the position of some other school. No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 74) T29, p741b4-5: 此中經主依附他宗。作如是言。諸心心所取境類別。皆名行相。丫司多 states that here Vasubandhu is following the Sautrāntikas: AKVy p.629: evavu yuktam syād iti. sautrāntikatamatam. ālambanagrahanaprakāra ākāra iti.

58 No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 55) T30, p602a26-7: 間何故名有行相。答於一所緣作無量種差別行相轉故。

59 No. 1585 成唯識論 (卷 2) T31, p10a11-13: 此識行相所緣云何。謂不可知執受處何。是識見分。即是行相。識以了別為行相。于所緣作無量種差別行相轉故。故識行相即是了別。識之見分。

60 No. 1830 成唯識論述記 (卷 5) T43, p317b16-27: 證於所緣相分之上有了別行。即於相故。是識見分非是餘分。然行相有二。一者見分。如此文說。即一切見分皆有此行相。於所緣上定有。二者影像相分名為行相。於一切影像或有。或無。所緣不定故。於所緣上無行相。出二所緣緣體。又瑜伽等說同一所緣是也。今此但約諸識定有者說。或與小乘別體者說。是影像相為行相者。小乘同故。然唯初解無第二者。第八俱時五心所法。如何可說同一所緣不同一行相。故須二解。以影像相為行相者。由集量文。
“phenomenon” or “manifestation” of mind, and all mental phenomena including citta and caitasiskas are different vijnaptis, then citta and caitasiskas must have different ākāras.

Finally, following the list of fifty-one caitasiskas, the passage in the YBh gives three terms to characterize these companions (sahāya) of citta: they are “having mode of function” (sākārāḥ), “having object” (sālambanāḥ), and “having basis” (sāśrayāḥ). Again, a comparison of the various descriptions of association (saṃprayukta) in the Vibhāṣā suggests that these terms are all used to describe the association relationship. 61 Furthermore, these three terms also appear in Vasubandhu’s description of citta and caittas in the Abhidharmakośa. 62 These three terms emphasize that citta and caitasiskas are mental phenomena, which have these three characteristics distinguishing them from other non-mental phenomena such as physical, chemical, or biological phenomena in the world. Citta and caitasiskas as mental phenomena depend on either non-mental or mental phenomena (sāśraya), but unlike non-mental phenomena they must have an object (sālambana). Moreover, when they take their object, they take hold of it in a certain mode of function (sākāra), even though Vasubandhu or the YBh and the Vibhāṣā disagree on what the modes of function (ākāra) really are. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the notion of association (saṃprayukta) presented in the YBh has a close connection with the Sarvāstivāda theory of association.

In the Yogācāra text, the Abhidharmasamuccaya ascribed to Asaṅga who is also traditionally taken as the author, or the compiler, of the YBh, 63 there is a chapter dedicated to the topic of samprayoga. 64 In this chapter, samprayoga is said to be six-fold:

61 For example, No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T27, p10b18-20: 若法相應。有所依。有行相。有所緣。有警覺。此中說之。彼法不爾。是故不說。 Similarly p52a, 52b, 52c, 73a, 108b, 359a, 380c, 384c, 387b, 498a, 536a, 590c, 683a, 713c, 774c, 939a.
62 AKBh 2.34 (p.62-1-4) yathā cittaṃ mano 'tha vijñānānemekārthām / cittacaitasāḥ sāśrayālambanākārāḥ samparayuktāśca pañcādāḥ // ... AKBh (p.62.5-7): eko 'rthāḥ / ta eva hi cittacaitittāḥ sāśrayā ucyante indriyāśriatvatāt / sālambanā visayaūgraḥaṇāt / sākārāstasvālambanavāsamāpanyaṇa ākāranāt / saṃprayuktāḥ samaṃ prayuktāt / kena prakāreṇa samaṃ pratyakṣāt ityāhā //
63 For a discussion of the possible relationship between the YBh and the AS, see Bayer 2010: 24-7. On the uncertainties of the authorship and dating, see Bayer 2010: 37-9, and Deleanu 2006: 154-5.
64 The Abhidharmasamuccaya has two divisions (mūlavastu and viniscaya) with four chapters in each division. The chapter on samprayoga is chapter 3 (samprayogapariccheda) within the first division.
(1) Unseparated association (avīnīrīhāga-sanprayōga): all divisible material forms (sarveṣāṃ deśinām, literally “all those having parts”) have this unseparated association with regard to the location of their atoms (paramāṇudeśe). In other words, this “unseparated association” is a relationship between actual material forms (rūpa) and the presumed atoms (paramāṇu) of which they consist.

(2) Mixed association (miśrīhāva-sanprayōga): divisible material forms mix with each other at a level higher than atoms (paramāṇu-ūrdhva).

(3) Accumulative association (samavādhāna-sanprayōga): the accumulation of combined (samudāya) divisible material forms.

(4) Coexistent association (saḥabha-vā-sanprayōga): in one sentient being the five skandhas, eighteen dhātus, and twelve āyatanas exist simultaneously; they arise together, stay together, and cease together.

(5) Activity-performing association (kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-sanprayōga): things strive with regard to the same effort. Just like in the case of two monks, whatever one engages in, the other is always associated.

(6) Concurrent association (sāmpratipatti-sanprayōga): cittas and caitaśikas are concurrent with regard to the same object (ālamba).

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66 In the AS, atoms (paramāṇu) are not real entities (dravya). It is an abstract notion established as the limit of analysis of material forms. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷) T31, p675b: 如知此中極微無體。但由覺慧漸漸分析細分損減。乃至可析邊際。即約此際建立極微。為遣一合想故。又為悟入諸所有色非真實故。AS Li 2013 p246.4-5: 何等作事相應。謂於一所作事展轉展轉。如濁水中地水極微更互和合。No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷) T31, p675b9-10: 何等不相離相應。謂極微已上。一切有方分色更互和合。ASBh p47.16: tadyathā kaluse pānīye aprthivīparamāṇañām paramparam. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷) T31, p718a23-4: 如濁水中地水極微更互和合。 “Like in turbid water the atoms of water and earth are mixed with each other.”

67 AS Li 2013 p245.38: miśrīhāvasanprayōgasamantarāḥ paramāṇo (ūrdhva deśinām miśrīhāvāḥ). No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷) T31, p673b6-7: 何等和合相應。謂極微已上。一切有方分色更互和合。ASBh p47.16: tadyathā kaluse pānīye aprthivīparamāṇañām paramparam. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷) T31, p718a23-4: 如濁水中地水極微更互和合。 “Like in turbid water the atoms of water and earth are mixed with each other.”


70 AS Li 2013 p246.6-7: saṃpratipa[tr]samprayōgaḥ katamā? cittacaitasikānāṁ dharmāṇāṁ ekālambanā.
Chapter 3. The Dispute on *samprayoga*

The AS points out that this final variety of concurrent association has four qualities:72

1. It engages *citta* or *caitasikas* of different natures (*parabhāva*) and not of its own self-nature (*svabhāva*). In other words, *citta* cannot be associated with *citta*, *vedanā* cannot be associated with *vedanā*, and so forth.73

2. It engages *cittas* or *caitasikas* that do not conflict each other. For example, lust (*rāga*) cannot be associated with hatred (*dveṣa*), and wholesome (*kuśala*) cannot be associated with unwholesome (*akuśala*).74

3. *Citta* or *caitasikas* are simultaneous (*sadṛśakāla*); past or future *citta* and *caitasika* cannot be associated with present ones.75

4. *Citta* and *caitasika* associated must be of the same sphere (*dhātu*) and level of existence (*bhūmi*). For example, *citta* and *caitasika* of the sphere of sensual desire (*kāma dhātu*) cannot be associated with those of the sphere of form (*rūpa dhātu*), and *citta* and *caitasika* of the first absorption (*dhyāna*) cannot be associated with the second absorption.76

Furthermore, concurrent association has ten sub-types:

1. Constant concurrent association (*sarvatraga-samprayoga*):
   feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*samjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), contact (*sparśa*),

*sampratipatthi sa punah sampratipatizedamprayogah* No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b13-4: 何等同行相應。謂心心所於一所緣展轉同行。

72 In the newly discovered AS manuscript, aside from these four qualities of this type of *samprayoga*, there is an additional one listed as *samāṇāśrayayoḥ* "having the same basis." Since this quality is not listed in Xuanzang’s translations of the AS (T1605) or the ASVy (T1606), nor in the extant Sanskrit ASBh, it is very likely a later interpolation.


74 AS Li 2013 p246.7: *aviruddhyor na viruddhayoḥ*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b15: 不相違相應非相違。ASBh p47.21-2: *na viruddhayos tadyathā rāgadveṣaḥ koṣalākuśalayorvetyevamādi*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b3-4: 如食飲不相應。善不善不相應。如是等。

75 AS Li 2013 p246.7: *sadṛśakālayoḥ na visadṛśakālayaḥ*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b15: 同時相應非異時。ASBh p47.22-3: *na visadhīryos tadyathā vartamānānāgatayorvāt vartamānayorvā*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b4-5: 如現在去來不相應。

76 AS Pradhan 1950: p34.9-10: *sabhāgadhātubhūmikayor avisabhāgaḥ (dhaṭu)bhūmikayoḥ*. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b15: 同分界地相應非異分界地。ASBh p47.23-4: *na visadhīrayos tadyathā kāmāvacara-rūpa-śekacaryoḥ prathamadviṣayadhārābhūmikayorvetyevamādi*. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b6-7: 如欲色無色界不相應。初靜慮第二靜慮不相應。如是等。
attention (manaskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna), these five caitasikas and consciousness itself (citta) are always present in all occasions (sarva avastha) and cannot be separated from each other.\textsuperscript{77}

(2) Defiled constant (kliṣṭa-sarvatraga) concurrent association: the four types of defilements (kleśa) that are always associated with the defiled manas (kliṣṭa-manas).\textsuperscript{78}

(3) Sporadic (kādācitka) concurrent association: caitasikas of the category of wholesome (kuśala), such as faith (śraddhā), and so forth, also those of the category of defilements (kleśa) and minor defilements (upakleśa), such as lust (rāga), and so forth, all arise in citta occasionally and are not always present.\textsuperscript{79}

(4) Situational (āvasthika) concurrent association: some dharmas are associated with pleasant feeling, some are associated with unpleasant feeling, and so forth.\textsuperscript{80}

(5) Uninterrupted (avicchinna) concurrent association: association between citta and caitasikas in the case of a practitioner who has attained the mindless achievement (acittaka-samāpatti); citta and the caitasikas will be interrupted

\textsuperscript{77} AS Pradhan 1950: p34.10: sarvatragasaṃprayogastadyathā vedanā sanjñācetanāsparśamanaskārayānām. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b16-7: 復有一切遍行同行相應。謂受想思觸作意識。ASBh p47.25-6: sarvatragah sampratipattisamprayoga vedanāniṃ sanāni sarvāsvavasthāvesām vinānyonyamabhāvāt. No. 1606 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (卷 5) T31, p718b8-9: 由此六法於一切位決定相應。隨無一法餘亦無故。


\textsuperscript{79} AS Pradhan 1950: p34.12-3: kādācitkaḥ samprayogastadyathā citte śraddhādīnāṃ sarvāsvavasthāvesām caturbhīḥ kleśaiḥ samprayuktam ātmadṛṣṭy ātmasneheṇātmānāvyādhīyā ca. No. 1605 大乗阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p666a: 何等為意謂一切時緣阿賴耶識思度為性。與四煩惱恒相應。謂我見我愛我慢無明。Also Triṃśikā verse 6 (Buescher 2007: 147): kleśaiś caturbhīḥ saḥtam nivrtyāyaktāḥ sadā ātmadṛṣṭyātmamohātmamānasamajñitaiva.

\textsuperscript{80} AS Pradhan 1950: p34.13-2: āvasthikāḥ samprayogastadyathā citte śraddhādīnāṃ sarvāsvavasthāvesām caturbhīḥ kleśaiḥ samprayuktam ātmadṛṣṭy ātmasneheṇātmānāvyādhīyā ca. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b18-20: 復有非一切時同行相應。謂依止心。或時起信等煩惱隨煩悩法。

\textsuperscript{81} AS Pradhan 1950: p34.13-4: avicchinnāḥ samprayogah sasamprayogāyāḥ, evam duḥkhāyā aduḥkhāsukhāyāḥ. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b20-22: 復有分位同行相應。謂與樂受諸相應法。與苦受不苦不樂受諸相應法。與苦受不苦不樂受諸相應法。與苦受不苦不樂受諸相應法。與苦受不苦不樂受諸相應法。與苦受不苦不樂受諸相應法。與苦受不苦不樂受諸相應法。與苦受不苦不樂受諸相應法。

\textsuperscript{81} AS Pradhan 1950: p34.13-4: avicchinnāḥ samprayogah sasamprayogāyāḥ, evam duḥkhāyā aduḥkhāsukhāyāḥ. No. 1605 大乗阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b22-3: 復有無間同行相應。謂在有心位。
when he enters the mindless state and resume when he is out of the mindless state.\(^\text{82}\)

(7) Outsider (bahirmukha) concurrent association: association between the majority of citta and caitasikas pertaining to the realm of sensual desire (kāmapratisamprayuktā).\(^\text{83}\)

(8) Insider (antarmukha) concurrent association: association between the majority of citta and caitasikas in stages of concentration (samāhitabhūmi).\(^\text{84}\)

(9) Customary (ucita) concurrent association: association between citta and caitasikas of ordinary people (pārthagjanika) and of certain Buddhist disciples whether in training (āśaikṣa) or having completed their training (aśaikṣa).\(^\text{85}\)

(10) Uncustomary (anucita) concurrent association: association between transcendental (lokottara) and caitasikas and also between those citta

\(^{82}\) AS Pradhan 1950: p34.15: vicchinnāḥ samprayogā ’cittasamāpaṇantarthasya. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b23: 復有同門相應。謂無心生所間。For the distinction between “having mind” (sa-cittikāya) and “mindless” (acittaka), see YBH No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 13) T30, p345a6-12: 此中若具生因緣故 心便得生。名有心地。若遇不生心因緣故 心則不生。名無心地。分位建立者。謂除六位。當知所餘名有心地。何等為六。謂無心睡眠位。無想定位。無想生位。滅盡定位。及無餘依涅槃界位。如是六位。名無心地。See also Paul Griffiths’ study (1986) of mindless achievement in the Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda, and Yogācāra traditions.

\(^{83}\) AS Pradhan 1950: p34.15-6: bahirmukhah samprayogyā yadbhāyāsā kāma pratisamprayukṣā. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 3) T31, p673b23-4: 復有外門同行相應。謂多分欲界繫心心所。Rāhula and Boin-Webb translate bahirmukha and antarmukha as “extroverted” and “introverted,” which do not catch the meanings of these terms. Accord to the AS, all dharmas pertaining to the realm of sensual desire (kāma-dhātu) are bahirmukha, except for citta and caitasikas born from hearing and thinking about the Buddha’s teachings, and also citta and the caitasikas that accord with them. AS Pradhan 1950: 20: kathām vairāmukham kati bahirmukhānī kimaratam bahirmukha pariśā/ kāmapratisamprayuktām bahirmukhām sāyapayita buddhasāyaṃ śrutamayacintāmayatadanu-dharma-parigṛhitāṃ scittacaitasikān dharmān. catvāro dhāvāvā dwate dvā cayatane tadanyām caikṣedāsāvā avitarācāmābhīvinśāyājanārthām kathāmaratam nāyakatamaratmukhānī kāmapratisamprayukṣā/ bahirmukhāvapravayānārmatamkham catu dhātān sāyapayita dvā cayatanā tadanyāmeśāsāvāvā vitarācāmābhīvinśāyājanārthā. No. 1605 大乘阿毘達磨集論 (卷 2) T31, p668c: 云何外門。幾是外門。為何義故觀外門耶。謂欲界所繫法是外門義。除依佛教所生聞思慧及彼隨法行所攝心心所等。四界中乃至餘一分欲界所攝是外門。為何執著不離欲我故。觀察外門。雲何內門。幾是內門。為何義故觀內門耶。謂外門相違是內門義。除四界二處乃至餘一分是外門。為何執著離欲我故。觀內門。In summary, to determine whether a dharma is bahirmukha or antarmukha is to distinguish whether or not this dharma pertains to Buddhist teachings. In this context, it would appear that “insider” and “outsider” are more suitable translations.

This chapter of the AS is perhaps the most comprehensive and systematic analysis of samprayoga in Buddhist literature up to that time. The classification of samprayoga into six types is apparently a new theoretical development. No listing of these types as a whole appears in either Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma or other early Yogācāra texts, even though certain parts of the list, for example, the first two types of association in the AS, namely, the unseparated association (avinirbhāga-samprayoga), and the mixed association (miśrībhāva-samprayoga), may have been derived from the discussion of rūpa and paramāṇu in the YBh.\(^87\) Tracing the history of these six types of samprayoga is beyond the scope of the present study, but several points should be noted.

First, as noted previously in the discussion of both the Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma systems, samprayoga is a relation applicable exclusively to citta and caitasikas. And in the Sarvāstivāda system, sahabhū-hetu has a broader scope, covering not only citta and caitasikas but also rūpa and citta-viprayukta dharmas. However, here in this chapter of the AS, among the six types of samprayoga, the first five types all include material forms (rūpa). The first three types, namely, (1) unseparated association (avinirbhāga-samprayoga), (2) mixed association (miśrībhāva-samprayoga), and (3) accumulative association (samavadhāna-samprayoga), concern material forms (rūpa) in different levels of analysis. As in the analysis of samprayoga in the MVŚ,\(^88\) such application of samprayoga to the analysis of rūpa is significantly absent in the Sarvāstivāda texts. The fourth type of association in the AS, namely, (4) coexistent association (sahabhāva-samprayoga), is applicable to all five skandhas, twelve āyatanas,

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\(^87\) No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 3) T30, p290a23-b1: 又不相離有二種。一同處不相離。謂大種極微與色香味觸等。於無根處有離根者。於有根處有有根者。是名同處不相離。二和雜不相離。謂即此大種極微與餘聚集能造所造色處俱故。是名和雜不相離。又此遍滿聚色。應知如種種物石磨為末以水和合互不相離。非如胡麻綠豆粟稗等聚。

\(^88\) See the discussion of the twenty-four interpretations in the MVŚ in 3.1.3.
and eighteen dhātus. In other words, it includes all conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharmas of the world. Furthermore, the fifth type, (5) activity-performing association (krtyānuśṭhāna-samprayoga), emphasizes that things involved in such an association relationship must be engaged in the same undertaking. Again these five types of association are not limited to citta and caitasikas alone but have a much broader scope.

However, these five types of samprayoga share much in common with the notion of sahabhū-hetu in the Sarvāstivāda system. As it is stated in the MVŚ, sahabhū-hetu is applicable to all conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharmas.89 The MVŚ also explains at length that material elements (mahābhūta) are sahabhū-hetus for each other.90 Therefore, it is likely that the first five types of samprayoga in the AS are related to the Sarvāstivāda notion of sahabhū-hetu. As mentioned earlier, in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, samprayukta-hetu is a special kind of sahabhū-hetu that is applicable only to citta and caitasikas; in other words, all samprayukta-hetus are sahabhū-hetus, but not all sahabhū-hetus are necessarily samprayukta-hetus.91 From this perspective, these five types of samprayoga expand the scope of the Sarvāstivāda notion of samprayukta-hetu and make it equivalent to the Sarvāstivāda sahabhū-hetu. This is especially true of (4) coexistent association (sahabhāva-samprayoga), which qualifies samprayoga with sahabhāva, which is etymologically equivalent to sahabhū. Moreover, in the fifth type (5) activity-performing association (krtyānuśṭhāna-samprayoga), the AS offers the simile of two monks engaging in the same activity, which resembles the similes of a man relying on his staff and people crossing a river with hands joined given in the MVŚ: samprayukta-hetu emphasizes the function of the staff as a support, while sahabhū-hetu is what one can do with the support of the staff; similarly in the simile that many people cross a river with hands joined used to explain he meaning of samprayukta. In the case of samprayukta-hetu, the emphasis is on the fact that their hands are joined, while sahabhū-hetu emphasizes that with their hands joined the people have crossed the river.92 Thus, these five types of samprayoga

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89 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 17) T27, p85b22-5: 問俱有因以何為自性。答一切有為法已說自性。所以今當說。問何故名俱有因。俱有是何義。答不相離義是俱有義。同一果義是俱有義。相隨順義是俱有義。
90 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p82a10ff.
91 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p81b: 若相應因即俱有因。有俱有因非相應因。謂不相應俱有因是。
92 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p81b: 復次如執杖義是相應因。如執杖已有所作義是俱有因。復次如連手義是相應因。如連手已渡暴河義是俱有因。
appear to represent an attempt on the part of the author of the AS to incorporate the Sarvāstivāda notion of sahabhū-hetu into the new samprayoga typology.

Only the sixth type of association, namely, (6) concurrent association (sampratipatti-samprayoga), which is exclusively applied to the relationship between citta and caitasikas, corresponds to the samprayukta-hetu in the Sarvāstivāda system. This type of association is defined in the AS with the statement that citta and caitasikas are concurrent with regard to the same object (ālambana), which corresponds to ekālambana in both the Sarvāstivāda and the Yogācāra analyses of samprayoga. In the four qualities of this sampratipatti-samprayoga given by the AS, the first quality, (a) that citta or caitasikas can only be associated with citta or caitasikas of a different nature (parabhāva), corresponds to the characteristic of samprayukta-hetu in both the Sarvāstivāda system and the YBh, which requires that citta and caitasikas be real and separate entities (dravya). Quality (c) in the AS, which requires citta and caitasikas to be simultaneous (sadṛśakāla), corresponds to the ekakāla characteristic in both the Sarvāstivāda and the YBh definitions of samprayukta.

The second quality of sampratipatti-samprayoga mentioned in the AS, namely, (b) citta and caitasikas that are associated cannot conflict each other, is not included in the definitions of samprayukta in the MVŚ and the YBh. However, the notion that certain types of mental phenomena cannot coexist with each other, for example, lust (rāga) and hatred (dveṣa), is a very old idea, and is recognized in early Abhidharma analyses of mind, as in the meticulous lists of mental phenomena in the Dhs and the *Śāriputrābhidharma. Perhaps the MVŚ and the YBh take this notion for granted thus do not include it as a part of their definitions of samprayukta.

The fourth quality, namely, that (d) citta and caitasikas as associated must belong to the same sphere (dhātu) and level of existence (bhūmi), is absent in the MVŚ definition but corresponds to the requirement of identity of place (處等) in the YBh
Chapter 3. The Dispute on *samprayoga*

*Viniścayagrahaṇī* definition of *samprayoga*.\(^{95}\) This suggests that the AS has a closer relationship to the YBh than the MVŚ and the Sarvāstivāda system.\(^{96}\) However, a comparison of the AS’s analysis of *sampratipatti-samprayoga* with the definitions in the MVŚ and the YBh indicates that there is one item present in both the MVŚ and the YBh but significantly absent in the AS: that is, the requirement of the same basis (*āśraya*). The apparent equivalence of the *sampratipatti-samprayoga* to the more traditional notion of *samprayoga* in the MVŚ and the YBh makes one wonder if the absence of *āśraya* here in the AS is a scribal error. In fact, in the recently published, newly discovered Sanskrit manuscripts of the AS, a reference to the “basis” occurs in the compound “having the same basis” *samānāśrayayo*, which conspicuously stands between “are not conflicting” (*na viruddhayo*) and “simultaneous” (*sadrśakālayoḥ*) (Li 2013: 246.8). However, certain facts make it unlikely that the original AS text contained this item of *samānāśrayoḥ* in its analysis of the *sampratipatti-samprayoga*: namely, the newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript is quite late (10—11 century CE, Li 2013: 242), no reference to the “same basis” appears in Xuanzang’s translations of the AS and the ASVy, and it is also absent in the Sanskrit manuscript of the ASBh.\(^{97}\)

Finally, the list of ten subtypes of *sampratipatti-samprayoga* appears to be unique to the AS, and other earlier Buddhist texts do not appear to contain a parallel list. However, the contents of the list are not completely new. Items (i)-(iii) bear a marked resemblance to the three major classes or divisions of *caitasikas* in the YBh *Viniścayasaṃgrahani*:\(^{98}\) *sarvatraga* is the class of universal *caitasikas*; *kliṣṭa-savarga* contains the four defilements that are always associated with the defiled *manas*; and *kāḍācitka* is logically more or less equivalent to the general category of non-universals (*asarvatraga* 不遍行) in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahani*. In other words, here in the AS the three subtypes (i)-(iii) of *sampratipatti-samprayoga* analyzes the association relationship in terms of different classes of *caitasikas*, and the classification of *caitasikas* here in the AS generally follows

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\(^{95}\) See footnote 53 above.

\(^{96}\) The principle that *citta* and *caitasikas* associated with each other must belong to the same sphere and level of existence do exist in early Abhidharma texts, but this principle is not included in their definition of *samprayoga*.

\(^{97}\) The ASBh does not quote and explain every word in the AS but instead sometimes skips sentences with obvious meanings. However, in this part, the ASBh appears to explain all other words in this sentence except for *samānāśrayoḥ*. Therefore, it is very likely that the AS text on which the ASBh is commenting did not contain *samānāśrayoḥ* in this sentence.

\(^{98}\) See the discussion of the YBh classification of *caitasikas* in 2.1.4.
the classification system in the YBh *Viniścayasamgrahanī*.

The fourth subtype, namely, (iv) situational (*āvasthika*) concurrent association (*sampratipatti-samprayoga*), concerns the types of dharmas that can be associated in certain situations. For example, the other dharmas that can be associated with a pleasant feeling that is present. As noted earlier, in relatively later Abhidharma texts such as the MVŚ and the AKBh, discussions of association (*samprayoga*) are mostly focused on the relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*; the association between different types of *caitasikas* is acknowledged but not emphasized.\(^9^9\) However, earlier Abhidharma materials such as the *mātikā* in the Dhs discuss association in reference to many types of items such as *sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā*, *dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā*, and *adukkham-asukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā*, and so forth.\(^1^0^0\) The fact that the AS includes such a subtype of *sampratipatti-samprayoga* suggests that the author is very careful to include all available earlier materials and attempts to build a system that covers them all, even those materials that may have been neglected by the compilers of the MVŚ.

The remaining six subtypes of *sampratipatti-samprayoga* (v)-(x) do not concern *caitasikas* specifically but focus more on different states of mind, or more precisely, different stages of mind on the path of Buddhist practice. These states of mind are relevant to the analysis of *samprayoga* because each such state is a collection of *citta* and *caitasikas*, which are associated as a whole. In this respect these final six subtypes do not concern different types of association per se but different circumstances in which associations occur. For example, (v) uninterrupted (*avicchinna*) and (vi) interrupted (*vicchinna*) contrast the mental states of those who have attained the mindless meditation achievement (*acittaka-samāpatti*) with ordinary mental states. In the same manner, (vii) outsider (*bahirmukha*) and (viii) insider (*antarmukha*) distinguish mental states according to whether they are related to Buddhist meditation practice. And finally, (ix) customary (*ucita*) and (x) uncustomary (*anaucita*) contrast worldly (*laukika*) and transcendental (*lokottara*) mental states.

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\(^{99}\) See the discussion in 3.1.3, especially of the twenty-four interpretations of *samprayoga* in the MVŚ, most of which refer to *citta* and *caitasikas*.

\(^{100}\) Dhs 1. See the discussion of such lists in early Abhidharma in 3.1.2. There are eleven such categories in the Dhs *mātikā*. 

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To sum up, Yogācāra texts contain analyses of *samprayoga* that differ in their form and contents. There are apparent similarities in the analyses of *samprayoga* in the Basic Section and the *Viniścayagrahāṇī* of the YBh with those presented in the MVŚ and the AKBh, but also differences, such as the denial of the Sarvāstivāda position that *citta* and *caitasikas* share the same ākāra and the emphasis on place (*處*), which is not mentioned in the Sarvāstivāda texts. Also, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* a further attempt is made to build a more comprehensive system regarding *samprayoga*, which is apparently intended to cover all available earlier materials including early Abhidharma *mātrikās*, Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, as well as early Yogācāra materials preserved in the *Yogācārabhūmi*. And, as in the case of the notion of *caitasika*, certain teachers such as Harivarman deny the existence of a simultaneous relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*. The next section will discuss opinions that counter the Abhidharma notion of simultaneous association and specifically Harivarman’s position presented in the *Tattvasiddhi*.

### 3.1.5 "Non-Abhidharma" Interpretations of Association

Previous sections have presented the inception of the notion of association (*samprayoga*) in early sūtras, the diversity of opinions on the relationship of association, and the technical analyses of the association relationship among *citta* and *caitasikas* in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts, Theravada Abhidhamma texts, and Yogācāra texts. All three of these traditions share a common notion of *samprayoga*, namely, that it is (1) a relationship among *citta* and *caitasikas* as separate entities, and (2) associated *citta* and *caitasikas* must occur simultaneously. Though different teachers may have different opinions regarding certain doctrinal details, all those who accept these two basic criteria for *samprayoga* are seen as proper “Abhidharma” positions in the MVŚ. As discussed in section 3.1.3, the MVŚ compiles a list of twenty-four such positions.

Nevertheless, there are still teachers who reject the notion of association (*samprayoga*) as the simultaneous and mutually dependent relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas* as separate entities. In the beginning of the section in the MVŚ discussing the *samprayukta-hetu* and before presenting the list of the twenty-four interpretations, the
MVŚ lists four positions that it considers unacceptable to the Ābhidharmikas (阿毘達磨諸論師) and refutes each of them with the proper Abhidharma position regarding the issue of samprayoga. Therefore, the label “non-Abhidharma” has been adopted for these positions. The following are the four such positions that are listed and refuted in the MVŚ:

(1) Citta and caitasikas occur successively one after another rather than simultaneously. The MVŚ attributes this position to the Dārṣṭāntikas. The position described here is very similar to that of Buddhadeva (覺天) discussed in detail in 2.1.5, who denies caitasikas are dharmas different from citta, and proposes that they are nothing but different modes of citta. Because two cittas cannot occur simultaneously, they must occur successively, like a band of merchants passing through a narrow path. In brief, this position denies both core criteria of the Abhidharma theory of samprayoga: namely, (1) that citta and caitasika are separate dharmas existing as different entities (dravya) and (2) that citta and caitasika can occur simultaneously. And more importantly, this is exactly the position Harivarman holds and defends in the TatSid. Harivarman’s arguments against caitasika have been discussed in chapter 2, and his position on samprayoga will be discussed in more detail in the following sections 3.2-3.4 as well as in the translation of chapters 65-67 in the TatSid.

(2) Some teachers propose that samprayoga is a relationship between a dharma and its own self-nature (svabhāva 自性). According to the MVŚ, such teachers define samprayoga as a relationship of dharmas to be pleased or engaged (喜樂) with each other, and because nothing is “engaged” with a dharma to a greater extent than its own self-nature, a dharma is only associated (samprayukta) with

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101 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p79c7-12: 謂或有執心心所法。前後而生非一時起。如譬喻者。彼作是說。心心所法依諸因緣前後而生。譬如商侶涉嶮隘路。一一而度無二並行。心心所法亦復如是。眾緣和合一一而生。所待眾緣各有異故。

102 The MVŚ refutes this position in the name of the Ābhidharmikas. It says that each citta and caitasika has its own arising, staying, change, and cessation, so that, even if they arise as a whole (samagrī 合合), they are still separate. On the other hand, they also share the same basis (indriya 根) and the same object (ālambana 所緣); in this sense, they can be considered as a whole. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p79c12-18: 阿毘達磨諸論師言。心心所法依諸緣前後生。譬如商侶涉嶮隘路。一一而度無二並行。心心所法亦復如是。眾緣和合一一而生。所待眾緣各有異故。
its own self-nature. The Ābhidharmikas answer that only two separate things that occur together can be referred to as *samprayukta*, and a thing cannot be said to be associated with itself. For the Ābhidharmikas, to be pleased or engaged (喜樂) is a cognitive event, which must involve a subject (能緣) and an object (所緣 *ālambana*) as different dharmas.

(3) Some other teachers propose that a dharma and its self-nature are neither associated (*samprayukta*) nor not associated. They agree with the Ābhidharmikas that only different dharmas can be said to be associated (*samprayukta*), and a thing cannot be associated with its own self-nature. However, they still adhere to the aforementioned definition that *samprayoga* refers to dharmas that are pleased or engaged (喜樂) with each other, and, in this sense, a dharma and its self-nature cannot be said to be not associated. The Ābhidharmikas simply answer that, since no dharma can be said to be pleased or engaged with itself, this position concerning *samprayoga* does not make any sense.

(4) Some other teachers propose that if dharma A is supported by the power (力任持 *bala-upastabdha*) of another dharma B, then A is said to be associated (*samprayukta*) with B. Because *citta* is supported by *citta, citta* is associated with *citta*; also because *caitasikas* are supported by *citta, caitasikas* are associated with *citta*. However, because *citta* is not supported by *caitasikas, citta* would not be associated with *caitasikas*. Similarly because *caitasikas* are not supported by each other, they also would not be associated with each other. The Ābhidharmikas appear to agree to define *samprayoga* as “to be supported by another’s power” (力任持 *bala-upastabdha*), but they disagree that such a
relationship can exist between dharmas that occur asynchronously, or more precisely two *cittas* that occur in two consecutive moments. Moreover, the Ābhidharmikas propose that in the relationship between *citta* and *caitasika* as well as among various *caitasikas*, they all mutually support each other and are therefore all mutually associated with each other.\footnote{No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80a5-8: 阿毘達磨諸論師言。心與心所。心所與心。心所與心所。皆展轉力持而得生故。更互相應。一身二心不並起故。無相應義。}

Among these four positions enumerated and refuted by the Ābhidharmikas, only the first one is explicitly attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas, while the other three are not attributed to any specific teachers or groups. It also should be noted that while the first position coincides with the view of the Dārṣṭāntika master Buddhadeva, the interpretation of *samprayoga* that appears to represent that of the other Dārṣṭāntika master Bhadanta Dharmatrāta is included in the list of twenty-four interpretations, which are accepted as valid interpretations.

Moreover, the three unattributed, “non-Abhidharma” positions regarding *samprayoga* listed above appear only in Xuanzang’s translation of the MVŚ (Taishō No.1545) and not in the other Abhidharma texts, even in the earlier translation of the Vibhāṣā (Taishō No.1546). Thus, it is likely that this list of “non-Abhidharma” positions concerning *samprayoga* and the corresponding Ābhidharmika refutations were inserted relatively late into the Vibhāṣā in the course of its history of continuous revision and expansion.\footnote{There are three Chinese translations of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma Vibhāṣā: (1) T No. 1547 鞔婆沙論, translated by Śāṅghabhūti (僧伽跋澄) and Dharmanandi (道摩那提) in the late 4th century CE; (2) T No. 1546 阿毘曇毘婆沙論, translated in the 5th century CE by Buddhavarman (浮陀跋摩) and Daotai (道泰); and (3) T No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論, translated by Xuanzang in the 7th century CE. Among these three translations, (1) is only a translation of the commentary on one chapter in the Jānānaprasthāṇa; (2) and (3) are complete translations. (2) had 100 fascicles (卷) when the translation was completed, but unfortunately forty of them were lost in the turmoil of war, and only the first sixty fascicles survive today. Xuanzang’s translation has 200 fascicles. A comparison of the extant part of (2) with corresponding parts in (3) suggests that Xuanzang’s translation (3) is a revised and expanded version. For a recent study of the three extant Vibhāṣās and their relationship, see Chou 2008.}

In Abhidharma texts later than the Vibhāṣā, all the discussions about “non-Abhidharma” or anti-Abhidharma position regarding *samprayoga* are focused on position (1) in this list, which is attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas. As mentioned earlier, the issue of association is closely related to, or dependent on the notion of *caitasika*; those...
who deny the existence of caitasikas as mental factors different from citta will certainly deny the existence of association as the relationship between citta and caitasikas. Indeed, in Abhidharma texts after the Vibhāṣā, almost all discussions of this issue are concerned with whether or not caitasikas exist as real dharmas aside from citta, and there is virtually no record of the dispute specifically on the issue of samprayoga. In this respect, the *Tattvasiddhi is especially valuable because chapters 65-67 record a number of arguments for and against the Abhidharma notion of samprayoga that are not preserved in other Abhidharma texts. The next section (3.2) will present a survey of Harvarman’s position regarding samprayoga in the TatSid.

3.2 Harivarman’s Theory of Association in the *Tattvasiddhi
Earlier sections have demonstrated that in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra traditions association (samprayoga) is a notion closely related to, or more precisely interdependent with the notion of caitasika understood as mental factors. Because Harivarman does not agree with the Ābhidharmikas on the notion of caitasikas as dharmas that are “mental factors” different from citta, he will then necessarily reject the interpretation of samprayoga as the simultaneous association of citta and caitasikas. In chapters 60-64 of the TatSid, Harivarman argued against the existence of caitasikas as a category of mental phenomena apart from consciousness (citta) itself and refuted his opponents’ arguments for caitasika. In the next three chapters 65-67, he argues that samprayoga as proposed by the Abhidharma traditions, that is, as the simultaneous, interdependent relationship between citta and caitasikas, is not tenable and refutes his opponents’ arguments for it.

However, although Harivarman does not accept the notion of samprayoga in the developed Abhidharma sense, he does acknowledge that this term is used in the sūtras as well as in the proto-Abhidharma mātrkās and that it can be used to describe the relationship among mental phenomena. In TatSid 66.4, the opponent cites a sūtra containing the phrase “faith (śraddhā) with root (*samūlika) and associated with knowledge (*jñāna-samprayukta)” (有根智相應信), which the opponent uses to support his position that the notion of association (samprayukta) is already taught in the sūtra. In
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67.3, Harivarman acknowledges that this phrase is from a genuine sūtra,\(^{110}\) but he interprets the term *samprayukta* in a different way; he proposes that in this phrase the term *samprayukta* should be understood in a non-technical sense, which simply means that faith and knowledge are serving the same purpose. Here, Harivarman’s position is similar to Gombrich’s suggestion that each term in the sūtras cannot be assumed to have a distinct technical meaning.\(^{111}\) In the case of faith (*śraddhā*) and knowledge (*jñāna*), one should simply understand the phrase as indicating that *śraddhā* and *jñāna* are active in one’s practice and serve the same purpose, namely, liberation. Harivarman claims that one should not read too much into the text and assign the term *saṃprayukta* the technical meaning of simultaneous association, which is not originally intended in the sūtra text.

Nevertheless, in another occasion Harivarman does offer a technical definition for the term *samprayukta*. Chapter 18, *Dharmasaṃgrāha* (法聚), of the TatSid presents a mātrkā similar to the one in the Pāli *Dhammasaṅgī* and some other northern Abhidharma texts such as the *Śāriputrābhīdharma* and the *Prakaraṇapāda*, and this mātrkā includes items such as *citta-dhamma*, *caitasika-dhamma*, *citta-saṃprayukta-dhamma*, and *citta-viprayukta-dhamma*.\(^{112}\) In his commentary on these mātrkā entries, Harivarman defines *citta* as “what can take objects,” and *caitasika* is “[dharmas] such as *saṃjñā*, and so forth, which *citta* immediately produces once it takes the object.” These definitions are consistent with the definitions given in chapters 60 and 63 (60.1, 63.8, 63.12) that a *caitasika* is what is born from *citta*, and by nature it is also *citta*.\(^{113}\) Next, he defines *citta-saṃprayukta-dhamma* as “[dharmas] such as *saṃjñā*, and

\(^{110}\) A comparison of the Chinese and Pāli versions indicates that this phrase is textually problematic. See the discussion of this issue in 3.4.2.

\(^{111}\) Harivarman’s argument regarding the terms *cetovimukti* and *prajñāvimukti* is another example that would support Gombrich’s position criticizing Abhidharmic “scholarstic literalism.” See the discussion in 2.3.2.

\(^{112}\) The section in the TatSid mātrkā related to *citta*: No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252a: 心法. 非心法. 心數法. 非心數法. 心相應法. 心不相應法. 心共有法. 心不共有法. 隨心行法. 不隨心行法. All these terms also occur in the Dhs mātrikā (p5): *cittā dhammā*, *no citta dhammā*. *caitasika dhammā*, *acetasika dhammā*. *citta-saṃprayukta dhammā*, *citta-viprayukta dhammā*. Also passim in the *Śāriputrābhīdharma*, for example, No. 1548 舍利弗阿毘曇論 (卷 1) T28, p528b-529a: 心非心; 心相應非心相應; 心數非心數; 經非緣; 共心非共心; 隨心轉不隨心轉. And also in the *Prakaraṇapāda*, No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 5) T26, p711b: 心法. 非心法. 心所法. 非心所法. 心相應法. 心不相應法. 心俱有法. 非心俱有法. 隨心轉法. 不隨心轉法.  

\(^{113}\) No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252b17-8: 心法者能緣是也. 心數法者若識得緣即次第生想等是也. TatSid 60.1:成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252b-529a: 心非心; 心相應非心相應; 心數非心數; 經非緣; 共心非共心; 隨心轉不隨心轉. And also in the *Prakaraṇapāda*, No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 5) T26, p711b: 心法. 非心法. 心所法. 非心所法. 心相應法. 心不相應法. 心俱有法. 非心俱有法. 隨心轉法. 不隨心轉法.
so forth, that successively arise after citta has taken [its] object.”114 If compared with the definition of caitasika, it is clear that citta-samprayukta-dharma and caitasika-dharma are identical. In other words, Harivarman agrees with the Ābhidharmikas that caitasikas are precisely citta-samprayukta-dharmas, and the term samprayukta in its technical sense is applicable exclusively to citta and caitasika.

On the other hand, Harivarman’s definition of caitasika and citta-samprayukta-dharma as that which arises after citta takes its object clearly contradicts the Abhidharma notion of samprayoga as the simultaneous association of citta and caitasikas. According to the MVŚ, the notion of sequential arising is associated with the Dārṣṭāntikas,115 but, in the record of the MVŚ, Dārṣṭāntika masters such as Dharmatrāta and Buddhadeva explicitly claim that there is no samprayukta relationship among citta and caitasikas. In the TatSid, Harivarman uses the term samprayukta in the same way as the Ābhidharmikas to describe the relationship between citta and caitasikas, which are to be understood as subsequent occurrences of citta. Even though he accords with Buddhadeva’s notion of the sequential arising of mental events, he does not agree with Buddhadeva’s categorical denial of both caitasika and samprayoga as presented in the MVŚ. Harivarman understands caitasika to refer to mental phenomena such as saṃjñā and vedanā, and so forth; he does not say that caitasikas do not exist but only claims that they are nothing but citta. Regarding the terms “association” (samprayoga) or “associated” (samprayukta), Harivarman, like the Ābhidharmikas, uses them exclusively to denote the relationship between citta and caitasikas, that is, a relationship among various instances of citta. However, for Harivarman such a relationship is not simultaneous and does not involve mutual dependency; instead, it entails a sequential and one-way dependency of the latter moment of citta on the previous moment of citta. In this case, why does Harivarman use these terms in a way similar to the Ābhidharmikas but interpret them in a different way? The answer to this question might lie in Harivarman’s attitude towards the mātrkā.

As mentioned in chapter 1 (1.2), mātrkās (P. mātikā) are lists of topics or key terms

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114 No. 1646 成實論 (卷 2) T32, p252b18-9: 心相應法者謂識得縛次第必生如想等是也。
115 See the first “non-Abhidharma” position regarding samprayoga listed in the MVŚ discussed in 3.1.5.
used by early Buddhist teachers as a mnemonic tool to organize Buddhist teachings, and these lists played an important role in the formation of Buddhist Abhidharma doctrinal systems as well as of Abhidharma literature. Though one may find individual lists in early sūtras, combined lists that constitute the mātrkās per se did not occur in the sūtras. The mātrkās came to be associated in particular with Abhidharma, and, from this perspective, one might expect those teachers who deny the authority of Abhidharma and claim to adhere to the sūtras alone would also logically deny the ultimate authority of the mātrkās. However, even though there are references in Buddhist literature to teachers denying the authority of Abhidharma, the authority of mātrkās appears not to be denied in the same way. Harivarman presents his position regarding caitasika and samprayoga in an interesting way: instead of categorically denying caitasika, he carefully states that he only denies caitasikas as dharmas different from citta (e.g. in 63.15). Caitasikas do exist as samjñā and vedanā, and so forth, which are dharmas dependent on and born from the previous moment of citta (e.g. 63.8). As for samprayoga, though on occasion he plainly states that there is no association (65.1) as the Dārṣṭāntikas do in the MVŚ, in chapter 18 he also defines samprayukta as the necessary causal dependency of one moment of citta on the previous moment of citta. Moreover, his inclusion of the mātrkā and his commentary to it within chapter 18 of the TatSid strongly suggests that Harivarman takes this mātrkā as a genuine Buddhist teaching.

It has been noted previously that the term caitasika in the sūtras is mainly used in an adjectival sense as “mental.” Even when it is used as a noun, it only means “mental state” in the general sense, and in the sūtras it never has the meaning “mental factor” in the Abhidharma sense.116 However, in the aforementioned mātrkā, the meaning of the term caitasika in the entries cetasikā dhammā and acetasikā dhammā is unclear: it is never used in this way in the sūtras, and the mātrkā itself does not provide any hint that might clarify the term in this circumstance. It has also been noted that Harivarman interprets this term more as an adjective similar to the sūtras, while the Ābhidharmikas (both Theravādin and Sarvāstivādin, as well as the Yogācārins) understand it as “mental factor” in the Abhidharma way. In the case of the term samprayukta, the mātrkā itself provides

116 See the discussion of this term in 2.1.1.
several parallel terms such as conjoined (sāṃsaṭṭha) with, sprung (samuṭṭhāna) from, coexisting (sahabhūno) with, revolving (anuparivattino) around citta, and all these terms may be understood as synonyms or glosses on it and strongly suggest that in this mārka the term samprayukta may have already been assigned the meaning of simultaneous association. Harivarman interprets samprayukta as the sequential causal dependency between cittas, and the next two entries in the mārka that are related to samprayukta, at least in the version of the mārka in the TatSid, are *citta-sahabhūno dharmāḥ (心共有法) and *cittānuparivartino dhammā (隨心行法), Harivarman interprets the former as rūpa and citta-viprayukta dharmas that can coexist with citta simultaneously, and the latter as vocal and bodily unmanifested karma (avijñapti-karma 身口無作業), a notion that suggests Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma influence. It would appear that Harivarman is carefully distinguishing these two entries from samprayukta. Such a cautious attitude indicates that he takes this mārka very seriously, and makes an effort to massage out any possible contradictions with his own doctrinal position. The attitude of Harivarman towards this mārka would explain the careful treatments of the terms caitasika and samprayukta in the TatSid instead of a simple categorical denial.

On the basis of this introduction of Harivarman’s doctrinal position regarding samprayoga in the *Tattvasiddhi, the next two sections (3.3-4) will discuss and comment on Harivarman’s arguments against the Abhidharma notion of samprayoga (3.3), his opponent’s argument for simultaneous samprayoga, and Harivarman’s refutations of the opponent’s arguments (3.4) in greater detail.

3.3 Harivarman’s Arguments against Association

3.3.1 Harivarman’s Argument 1 (65.1)

(65.1) Harivarman begins chapter 65 by straightforwardly declaring his position regarding association (samprayoga): there is no dharma that is associated (samprayukta),

117 See the discussion of the development of the meaning of simultaneous association within the mārka in 3.1.2.
which means that nothing can be associated with other things. He further asks a rhetorical question: when there is no such thing as a caitasika, with what is citta associated (saṃprayukta)?

Comments: Apparently, this statement serves as a transition from the previous chapters on caitasika (chs. 60-64) to the discussion of association (saṃprayoga). In the previous chapters, Harivarman argues against the Abhidharma notion of independent and distinct caitasika, refutes his opponent’s arguments, and is confident that the issue of caitasika has been settled. So in the opening of this chapter, he takes the conclusion from the previous chapters as an argument against the closely related issue of saṃprayoga as understood by the opponent and states that, because there is no caitasika, citta cannot be associated with anything. As a result, saṃprayoga as an interdependent relationship between citta and caitasika as proposed by the Ābhidharmikas is impossible.

It is interesting to compare Harivarman’s argument against saṃprayoga here with his opponent’s argument for caitasika in 61.1. There the opponent states that, because citta and caitasikas are associated, that is, there is a relationship of association between them, if caitasikas do not exist, then there would be no association; but in fact there is association, and as a result there is caitasika (see discussion in 2.4.1). It is clear that for those who support the notions of caitasika and saṃprayoga as proposed in the Abhidharma traditions, these two notions are closely connected to each other and cannot be separated. And as mentioned previously, if one of these two notions is refuted, logically the other one will also be refuted. Here, in this argument, Harivarman’s refutation follows the same pattern. However, as mentioned previously, in another place in the TatSid, Harivarman proposes a different definition of association (saṃprayoga).\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{118} See the discussion in 3.2.
3.3.2 Harivarman’s Argument 2 (65.2)

(65.2) Harivarman states that the mode of function (*ākāśa 相) of mental phenomena such as feeling (*vedanā), and so forth, cannot be simultaneous.

Comments:
It is interesting that Harivarman here uses the phrase “the mode of function of feeling, and so forth,” instead of simply “feeling, and so forth.” The argument presented here is extremely terse, but it appears that Harivarman resorts to psychological introspection. The term “mode of function” (*ākāra) literally means “form” or “appearance,” which is what one sees by observation. This suggests that Harivarman is not taking a theoretical position that mental phenomena such as *vedanā, *saṃjñā and so forth cannot exist simultaneously, but instead is referring to the psychological experience that if one looks inside and observes one’s own mental activities, one cannot experience feeling (*vedanā) and other mental phenomena all at the same time. Saṅghabhadra also records such an argument in greater detail and attributes it to the Dārṣṭāntikas.\(^\text{119}\)

There are some Dārṣṭāntikas who claim that there is only *citta and no caitasikas separate from it because, if *citta and *saṃjñā occurred simultaneously, one could distinguish their different modes of function (*ākāra 行相). What is the mode of function that only *citta possesses while *saṃjñā lacks? Even seeking deep and far, one only hears the difference between the two names but never finds any recognizable difference in their nature (*svabhāva 體義).

This passage in the *Nyāyānusāra indicates that some teachers use not only scriptural (*āgama) and philosophical reasoning (*yukti) arguments but also psychological introspective experience in their argument against caitasika. Saṅghabhadra’s record shows that these teachers argue that if mental phenomena such as *citta and *saṃjñā can occur simultaneously, one should be able to distinguish them by their mode of function.

\(^{119}\) No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p395a1-4: 有譬喻者。說唯有心無別心所。心想俱時。行相差別。不可得故。何者行相唯在想有。在識中無。深遠推求。唯聞此二名言差別。曾無體義差別可知。
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(ākāra 行相), \(^{120}\) namely, their “form” or “appearance” that is recognizable in experience by observing one’s own mental activities. Here, Harivarman likely uses the same type of argument.

Harivarman in the TatSid does not give the opponent’s answer to this argument. However, in the *Nyāyānusāra, Saṅghabhadra records an answer likely taken from the Vaibhāṣikas: the difference between the nature and appearance of citta and caitasikas is so subtle that those of weak intellect are unable to distinguish them. \(^{121}\)

### 3.3.3 Harivarman’s Argument 3 (65.3-4)

(65.3) Harivarman introduces the important doctrinal position that cause (因 hetu) and result (果 phala) cannot coexist simultaneously. In Harivarman’s view, since, in the case of consciousness (citta or vijñāna) and other mental phenomena such as samjñā and so forth, citta (=vijñāna) is the cause of samjñā, then citta must precede samjñā and there cannot be simultaneous association (samprayoga) between them.

(65.4) Continuing the causation argument, Harivarman provides two proofs for the fact that causation is not simultaneous. First, he quotes the “profound teaching of causation” in the sūtra that causation should be defined by the statement, “when this arises, that arises,” and suggests that this teaching of the Buddha proves that causation is sequential and not simultaneous. Second, he uses an example from our daily life. In the case of plants such as grain, the sprout, stem, branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits, and so forth, grow out one after another. He suggests that consciousness and other mental phenomena should arise in the same manner as a causal chain instead of all arising together.

Comments:

Once again, Harivarman proposes the same doctrinal position as the so-called

\(^{120}\) ākāra is a difficult and troublesome term in Abhidharma texts. Having the same ākāra is one criterion in the Sarvāstivāda definition of samprayoga, while the Yogācāra definition of samprayoga states that dharmas associated have different ākāras. This term is discussed in 3.1.4. For a more in-depth study of this term, see footnote 55 above.

\(^{121}\) No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷11) T29, p395a19-24: 心心所法。共一境轉。生住滅等。分位是同。善不善等性類無異。體相差別。實難了知。非諸劣智能生勝解。故契經言。心心所法。展轉相應。若受若想若思若識。如是等法和雜不離。不可施設差別之相。故應於此發起正勤求生勝解了差別相。
Dārṣṭāntikas who deny that there are simultaneous causes, or sahabhū-hetu. In 65.4, he quotes the definition of causation in the sūtra as scriptural proof (āgama) for his position, but he gives only half of the sūtra definition of the formula of dependent origination in its short, abstract form. The full definition is as the following:

When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases.

Harivarman interprets this formula as implying only sequential causation. However, in the nine-linked causation chain presented in the Mahānidāna-sutta, the relationship between consciousness (vijñāna) and name-and-form (nāma-rūpa) is described in terms of a simultaneous mutual dependence, and another sūtra states that consciousness and name-and-form are like bundles of reeds that stand only when leaning on each other.

In other words, the teaching of dependent origination in the sūtras is not exclusively interpreted as referring only to sequential causation.

3.3.4 Harivarman’s Argument 4 (65.5-6)

(65.5) Harivarman quotes an opponent’s opinion that [citta and caitasika coexist] in the same manner as mental defilements (kleśa 煩惱) such as lust (rāga 貪), and so forth, and are coexistent causes (sahabhū-hetu 共因) as are material forms (rūpa 色).

Therefore, they should arise simultaneously. Harivarman answers that this is not correct,
because material forms (rūpa) do not entail cognition (*jñāna ṛ̣ṇ) and they cannot take objects whereas citta and caitasikas can take objects and can cognize. Since in one sentient being at one moment, only one cognition (Ṭ) can occur, the relationship between citta and caitasikas cannot be the same as between rāga and rūpa. In other words, citta and caitasika cannot coexist because in one being there cannot be multiple cognitions in one moment.

(65.6) Harivarman further clarifies his position that in one sentient being there can be only one cognition (*jñāna ṛ̣ṇ) in one moment. A sentient being is referred to as an individual because only one cognition occurs in each moment based on one physical body. If in one moment there were multiple caitasikas, and each caitasika entails cognition, there would be multiple cognitions in any given moment. Because for Harivarman an individual is determined by a single cognition, in the case of multiple cognitions there must be multiple individuals in one body, and this is unacceptable. Therefore, one moment of citta should not occur together with caitasika dharmas such as vedanā, and so forth.

Comments:

(65.5) The opponent appears to take kleśas such as rāga, and so forth, as coexistent causes like the four material elements (mahabhūtas) are to each other. In the same way, citta would coexist with caitasikas, and citta would be the cause of caitasikas. Harivarman answers that because for each citta and caitasika there is an element of cognition, but rūpa does not have cognition, the relationship between citta and caitasikas is not the same as the relationship between rāga and rūpa. Therefore, for Harivarman this comparison is invalid.

(65.6) In this passage, Harivarman argues by reductio ad absurdum: if citta and caitasikas can coexist as the opponent suggests in the previous passage (65.5) because each citta and caitasika has its own element of cognition (*jñāna ṛ̣ṇ), when they coexist in a sentient being’s body there would be multiple cognitions present in one moment in one body, and multiple individuals would coexist in one body, which is absurd. As a result, Harivarman concludes that citta and caitasika cannot coexist. This is a position similar to
the position of the Dārśāntika master Dharmatrāta recorded in the MVŚ, who also proposes that each citta and caitasika has an element of cognition.\footnote{See the discussion of Dharmatrāta’s position regarding caitasika in 3.1.5.}

The later Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika teacher Saṅghabhadra records the same argument in his *Nyāyānusāra*.\footnote{No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p396a11-5: 有餘復言。若心心所。其體各異。於一心品。應有眾多。能覺了用。故心所法應不異心。此亦不然。能覺了用。體唯一故。覺了謂慧。非心心所皆慧為體。如何令餘非覺了性成覺了體。故無斯過。} He also provides an answer to it from the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika perspective: in the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system, cognition (*jñāna*) is the specific caitasika, insight (prajñā 慧). In each moment, while citta and multiple caitasikas coexist, there can be only one instance of prajñā; therefore, there is no fault of multiple cognitions coexisting in one being. Here, the fundamental difference between the two mind models becomes apparent. Dharmatrāta and Harivarman propose a model in which mind is a series of moments of citta (each of them is also a caitasika in relationship to the previous moment of citta), and in each of these cittas an element of cognition is embedded as vedanā, saṃjñā, and so forth. But for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Ābhidharmikas, cognition is a separate caitasika, namely, the mental factor insight (prajñā), which is a universal mental factor (mahābhūmika) that exists in all cittas. Also for the Ābhidharmikas, one citta can have only one instance of each type of mental factor; for example, there can be only one vedanā, one saṃjñā, and so forth. So, in one moment of citta, there can be only one prajñā, while multiple other caitasikas such as vedanā, and so forth, coexist with it. Therefore, for the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Ābhidharmikas, the fact that multiple caitasikas coexist with citta will not lead to the absurd conclusion that multiple cognitions would occur simultaneously within one sentient being.
3.3.5 Harivarman’s Argument 5 (65.7)

(65.7) Here, Harivarman uses the example of the six types of consciousness to argue that citta and caitasikas cannot coexist. Both Harivarman and his opponent agree that in one moment there can be only one consciousness (citta or vijñāna). In the sūtras, consciousness (vijñāna) is said to be of six types: that arising from the eye (cakṣu), ear (śrotra), nose (ghrāṇa), tongue (jihvā), body (kāya), and mind (manas). Because they are all vijñānas, at one moment only one of them can function. Here, the opponent uses the Sarvāstivāda notion of the immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya 次第緣) to explain why it is so: the occurrence of each moment of citta (= vijñāna) must depend on an immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya 次第緣), and in one moment only one immediate condition can occur; hence, in one moment there can be only one citta. Therefore, among the six types of consciousness, only one of them can be active in one moment, which means they cannot arise simultaneously.

Harivarman next asks his opponent what obstacle, if any, prevents one immediate condition from giving rise to any one of the six types of consciousness in the next contiguous moment. Here, he does not give an explicit answer, but the context suggests that there is no such obstacle; in other words, one immediate condition can give rise to a moment of consciousness of any one type among the six.

Comments:
Here, Harivarman is using the opponent’s Sarvāstivāda argument to support his own thesis. The Sarvāstivādins propose that one moment of citta and the caitasikas associated with it immediately give rise to the next moment of citta with its caitasikas. In this process of causation, the previous moment of citta is the immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya) for the next moment of citta. They argue that at one moment there can be only one consciousness because every consciousness arises from one samanantara-pratyaya, and in one moment only one samanantara-pratyaya is

\[\text{atītasyāpyastitvāt isyate vaibhāṣikāḥ samanantarapratyayatvum.}\]
Harivarman appears to agree with this argument, but he interprets it in a way that favors his position regarding association. For Harivarman, all caitasikas are cittas by nature, and the principle that one samanantara-pratyaya, namely, an instance of consciousness, can give rise to a different type of consciousness, also applies to citta and caitasikas. Just as a moment of eye-consciousness can act as a samanantara-pratyaya and give rise to a mano-vijñāna, any citta, which is also a caitasika with regard to the previous moment of citta, can be a samanantara-pratyaya and give rise to a caitasika of any kind in the next moment. In the following sections 65.8 and 65.9, Harivarman continues to argue that the succession of cittas can be vijñāna→ samjñā… or vijñāna→vedanā …

However, if it is the case that in one moment there can be only one samanantara-pratyaya, then one may ask why there cannot be multiple samanantara-pratyayas. The MVŚ responds simply that that is simply the way it is (dharmatā: 法爾). in one moment, there is one assemblage (和合) of citta and caitasikas, and this assemblage acts as the samanantara-pratyaya for the assemblage in the next moment. It is simply the way it is (dharmatā: 法爾) that one assemblage gives rise to only one new assemblage; just as in the case of many people passing through a narrow path, or cows or sheep passing through a small pen gate, they must pass through one by one in a succession. However, logically this is not a satisfactory answer. The Sarvāstivādins claim that in one moment there can be only one citta because there can be only one samanantara-pratyaya; and then they claim that there can be only one samanantara-pratyaya because that one assemblage can only give rise to only one new assemblage because it is the way it is (dharmatā). This is a circular reasoning.

131 No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p919b: 何故無一補特伽羅非前非後二心俱生。答無第二等無間緣故。有情一一心相續轉故。
132 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 10) T27, p49b16-c6: 請心所法生必依止等無間緣。既無第二等無間緣。故必無一補特伽羅。非前非後二心俱生。此復應問。何故無第二等無間緣。故復答言。有情一一心相續轉故。謂有情心。法爾一一相續而轉。無二無多。此是展轉更相答義。有說。此文重答前問謂先問言。何故無一補特伽羅。非前非後二心俱生。今重答言。有情一一心相續轉。謂一一有情由法爾力。但有一心相續而轉。所以者何。未來心聚。必由現在和合故生。不和合則不生。現在但有一和合故。令未來心一一而起。猶如多人經於狹路。一一而過尚無二並。何況有多。又如牛羊圈門狹小一一而出。無二無多。如是有情未來心聚。依現和合一一而生。設現在世有多和合。為闡次者。則應一時有多心起。但無此事故。又由和合有先後故。假使先有修道和合。後見道者則應修道。先見道生但無此事故。先起見道。由此無一補特伽羅。非前非後。二心俱生。
133 Note that the simile is the same one used by the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ to argue that citta and caitasika cannot occur simultaneously: see 2.1.5.
As for the Yogācārins, they accept the Sarvāstivāda notion of samanantara-pratyaya and agree that the arising of a viññāna occurs through a samanantara-pratyaya, but they also propose that in one moment multiple consciousnesses can occur. The six types of consciousnesses can occur simultaneously, and in addition the two extra consciousnesses, namely, manas and the ālaya, can also occur together with them. Because they agree with the Sarvāstivādins that each instance of consciousness arises from a samanantara-pratyaya, so there must be multiple samanantara-pratyaya in one moment.

### 3.3.6 Harivarman’s Argument 6 (65.8-10)

In the following three passages (65.8-10), Harivarman quotes three sūtras to argue that, when consciousness is cognizing an object, other mental phenomena such as feeling (vedanā) or apperception (saṃjñā) cannot accompany it. Since all three passages apply scriptural proofs (āgama) to argue for the same position, they are treated as a group.

(65.8) Harivarman quotes a sūtra in which the Buddha teaches the bhikṣus that, when their eyes see an object, they should not grasp signs (nimitta) of the object. He points out that to “grasp signs” (nimittodgrāha) is what apperception (saṃjñā) does; in other words, this is the definition of saṃjñā. So, he argues that in this sūtra passage the Buddha acknowledges that at that moment there is eye-consciousness, which sees or cognizes the object, but denies that at the same moment there is saṃjñā. In his opinion, grasping signs (nimitta), that is, the occurrence of saṃjñā, happens only after one has seen the object. Therefore, Harivarman concludes that what actually occurs is a succession of events: the first moment is viññāna, the second saṃjñā, and so forth.

(65.9) Then Harivarman quotes another sūtra passage, which states that, when one sees form with the eyes, one explores form as productive of joy (somanassatṭhānīya), or

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134 The definition of samanantara-pratyaya in the YBh agrees with the MVŚ: No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 52) T30, p584b28-c2: 『復次云何等無間緣。謂此諸心心所無間。彼諸心心所生。說此為彼等無間緣。若此六識為彼六識等無間緣。即施設此名為意根。亦名意處亦名意界。』

135 However, this position of the Yogācāra tradition may lead to further doctrinal difficulties: can different types of viññānas be samanantara-pratyaya to each other? The CWSL has a long section discussing different opinions on this issue: No. 1585 成唯識論 (卷 4) T31, p20c-21c. See also the discussion of samanantara-pratyaya in Lusthaus 2002: 498-500.
grief (domanassaṭṭhānīya), or equanimity (upekkhāṭṭhānīya).\textsuperscript{136} Again in Abhidharma, feeling (vedanā) is that which experiences the three kinds of feelings.\textsuperscript{137} Harivarman uses this sūtra passage to argue that the Buddha teaches that consciousness (vijñāna) occurs first, and feeling (vedanā) follows. They do not occur simultaneously.

(65.10) Harivarman once again quotes from a sūtra stating that seeing is seeing, which he understands as meaning that when there is seeing, that is, cognition or consciousness of an object (vijñāna), there is seeing alone, and no other mental phenomena such as feeling (vedanā), and so forth, is present.

Comments:
Here, Harivarman uses three sūtra passages to show that the cognitive process consists of a sequential series of mental phenomena that starts with consciousness (vijñāna) of the object and is then followed by apperception (saṃjñā) or feeling (vedanā). When there is vijñāna, there is vijñāna alone, and no other mental phenomena such as saṃjñā or vēdanā accompanying it. The TatSid here does not record how the opponent would answer this challenge. However, as noted in chapter 2, the Ābhidharmikas do have an answer. For them, in each moment there must be one vijñāna accompanied by a number of caitasikas such as saṃjñā, vēdanā, sparśa, and so forth. But in the case of the cognitive process, at one moment one of the caitasikas always takes the dominant position. For example, when the mind first encounters the object, the dominant caitiska is contact (sparśa), and this moment is called sparśa; in the next moment, feeling (vedanā) dominates, and this moment is called vēdanā. In other words, the Ābhidharmikas can account for these sūtra passages within their theory of caitiska and samprayoga.\textsuperscript{138}

\textsuperscript{136} M no.137, III 216: cakkhuṇā rūpaṃ disvā domanassaṭṭhānīyam rūpaṃ upavicarati, domanassaṭṭhānīyam rūpaṃ upavicarati, upekkhāṭṭhānīyam rūpaṃ upavicarati. English translation based in part on Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (Bodhi 2001: 1067).
\textsuperscript{137} AKBh verse 1-14c (p10.13): vedanā 'nubhavaḥ. AKBh p10.14: trividha 'nubhavo vedanāśkandhaḥ sukho duḥkho duhhkhsukhāśca.
\textsuperscript{138} See the discussion in 2.3.5 and 2.4.5, esp. Chapter 2 footnote 137 with regard to the Vaibhāṣika theory of āvasthaka pratītyasamudpāda.
3.3.7 Harivarman’s Argument 7 (65.11-16)

In the next six sections (65.11-16) Harivarman argues that the five sense consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna) are not accompanied by mental factors such as samjñā, vedanā, cetanā, vitarka, vicāra. These six paragraphs constitute one argument.

(65.11) Harivarman proposes that by analyzing the five types of sense consciousness (pañca-vijñāna 五識) it will become clear that citta/vijñāna is not accompanied by other mental phenomena. He gives an example from common sense or daily experience, to prove his position. At the moment when one first sees a person, one cannot at the same moment grasp the signs (nimitta 相) of the person as an enemy, or a friend, or someone neutral. As mentioned earlier, to grasp the signs of an object is referred to as apperception (samjñā 想). So in Harivarman’s opinion, at the moment of seeing, that is, the moment of consciousness (citta/vijñāna), there is no apperception (samjñā), as when one sees a person in ordinary experience. Then he states that someone else (或有人) points out that, at the moment of seeing, no mental defilements (kleśa 煩惱) such as lust (rāga 貪), and so forth, exist, nor any volition (cetanā 思).

(65.12) Harivarman observes that in the Ābhidharmika’s systems, the five types of sense consciousness are without discrimination (nirvikalpa 無分別). If so, then in the five types of consciousness there should be no applied thought (vitarka 覺) nor sustained thought (vicāra 観). When one thinks and discriminates (*saṃ-ākāp), thought is initially gross (audārika 龜) and then becomes subtle (sūkṣma 細). For Harivarman, gross citta is vitarka, and subtle citta is vicāra, and these two cittas can only occur successively, not simultaneously.

(65.13) Harivarman continues with the topic of vitarka and vicāra. He quotes a verse from sūtras, in which the Buddha teaches that the root (mūla 本), or cause, of sensual desire (kāma 欲) is intention (saṃkalpa 思覺). If saṃkalpa is the cause of kāma, then these two cannot coexist simultaneously. And because, as demonstrated in the previous passage (65.12), vitarka is part of the process of saṃkalpa, accordingly at the moment the

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139 See the discussion of 65.8 in 3.3.6 above.
mind cognizes its object, which is the moment of consciousness (*vijñāna*)，*vitarka* has not arisen yet.\(^{140}\)

(65.14) Harivarman quotes an unnamed teacher who claims that apperception (*samjñā*) is found in all of the five types of sense consciousness. However, since according to the sūtra *vitarka* is caused by *samjñā*, and since Harivarman believes that cause and result cannot exist simultaneously, when there is *samjñā*, *vitarka* cannot exist.

(65.15) Continuing the previous argument in 65.14 and perhaps representing the views of the same unnamed teacher, this section states that in the five sense consciousnesses there is no apperception (*samjñā*), nor applied thought, (*vitarka*) nor sustained thought (*vicāra*), because these five consciousnesses cannot grasp the signs of man or woman, which is the function of *samjñā*, nor can they discriminate different kinds of feelings, which is the function or *vedanā*. To sum up, in these five sense consciousnesses there is no discrimination (*nirvikalpa*) at all.

(65.16) Harivarman quotes some unnamed teachers who propose that within the mind process, one moment of sense consciousness (any one of the five types) must be followed by a moment of mind-consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*). The reason for such a doctrinal position is the fact that the five sense consciousnesses have no discrimination. Discrimination is the function of mind-consciousness, and, if the five sense consciousness could discriminate, the following moment of mind-consciousness would have no purpose.

Comments:

(65.11) Once again in this paragraph, Harivarman appeals to common sense and ordinary experience instead of abstract, theoretical arguments. First he points out that in our daily experience, when one first sees a person, at that moment one has only visual cognition and does not grasp the signs (*nimitta*) of that person such as that the person is an enemy or a friend. This means that at the moment of cognition there is merely cognition, namely, the cognition of the object, and at this moment cognition is not accompanied by the

\(^{140}\) The cognitive process described in the sūtra as follows: eye and form (*rūpa*) give rise to eye-consciousness, the coming together of these three is contact (*sparśa*); because of *sparśa*, there is feeling; what one feels (*vedeti*), one apperceives (*sañjānti*); what one apperceives (*sañjānāti*), one thinks about (*vitakketi*)…See the full quotation in the footnote on the translation of 65.14.
grasping of other signs or properties of the object, such as whether the person is a friend or an enemy.

Next he quotes someone else’s opinion, which apparently he agrees with, stating that, at the moment of seeing, one has no defilements (*klesa*) such as lust (*rāga*), and so forth, and therefore also no volition (*cetanā*). Here, Harivarman defines *cetanā* as seeking (*prārthanā* 求), which is rather peculiar, because in extant northern Abhidharma texts, *cetanā* is unanimously defined as the formational action or intention of the mind (*cittābhisaṃskāra* 心造作). This Abhidharma definition of *cetanā* as *cittābhisaṃskāra* is based on the sūtra teaching that *cetanā* is identical with the aggregate of formation (*samāskāra*-skandha 行蘊), and *abhisaṃskāra* can be taken as a gloss on the term *samskāra*. Harivarman acknowledges that there is such a definition of *cetanā* in the sūtras since he quotes the passage containing this definition in chapter 84 of the TatSid and points out that the term *cetanā* is used as syntactically parallel with seeking (*prārthanā*) and wish (*praṇidhāna*).

In this sūtra passage, *cetanā*, *prārthanā*, and *praṇidhāna* are only three among approximately one dozen terms including *saṃjñā*, *vitarka*, *vāc*, and so forth. It is clear that although the terms in this long list are used as parallels syntactically, it is impossible to understand them as synonymous. The terms *cetanā*, *patthanā*, and *paṇidhi* may overlap in their meanings, but strictly speaking they are not synonyms, and Harivarman must have some reason for defining *cetanā* as *patthanā* (Skt. *prārthanā*) and *paṇidhi* (etymologically equivalent to Skt. *praṇidhāna*) in
contrast to the standard definition in the sūtras as well as most Abhidharma texts.

Although Harivarman does not explain why he offers this definition of *cetanā* in addition to the standard definition as *abhisamāskāra*, it might be related to at least two of his doctrinal positions:

1. For Harivarman *caitasikas* are nothing but different modes of *citta*, so *cetanā* as a *caitasika* is no doubt *citta* by nature. He points out in chapter 84 on *cetanā* that *manas* (= *citta, vijñāna*) is nothing other than *cetanā*.\(^{146}\) One should understand *cetanā* as *citta* in the mode of seeking (*prārthanā*), so it is not something different from *citta*.

2. It may also be related to Harivarman’s understanding of causation and dependent origination. As noted earlier, in the sūtras *cetanā* is equated with *sāṃskāra*, and *sāṃskāra* appears both as a *skandha* in the five *skandhas* and also the second link in the twelve-fold dependent origination. Harivarman understands *sāṃskāra* in both of these cases in a similar way. He understands the five *skandhas* as a description of the mental process: depending on eye and form (both are *rūpa*) there arises consciousness (*vijñāna*); then there arises the recognition of signs (*nimitta*) such as friend or enemy, which is apperception (*sāṃjñā*); one can then have pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral feelings (*vedanā*) in the apperceptions; the three types of feelings may generate three kinds of defilements (*kleśa*); and according to Harivarman, the *kleśas* are the *skandha* of *sāṃskāra*.\(^{147}\) In his interpretation of the twelve-linked dependent origination, Harivarman analyses the chain in terms of the operation of the mechanism of *kleśa* → *karma*: ignorance (*avidyā*) is *kleśa*, which leads to karma (= *sāṃskāra*); from these two arise successively consciousness (*vijñāna*), name-and-form (*nāma-rūpa*), the six bases (*āyatana*), contact (*sparśa*), and feeling (*vedanā*); from feeling arises craving (*trṣṇā*) and grasping (*upādāna*), and these two are *kleśas*, which in turn give rise to new karma as existence (*bhava*); from existence arises the birth of future consciousness (*jāti*) and aging and death (*jarā-maraṇa*).\(^{148}\) In the case of both the *skandhas* and dependent origination,

\(^{146}\) No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p286c3-7: 問曰。思與意為一為異。答曰。意即是思。如法句中說惡心所作所說皆受苦果。善心亦爾。故知意即是思。若意非即是思。何者為意業。意業名意行緣中。是故思即是意。

\(^{147}\) No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p251a16-20: 五陰者。眼色為色陰。依此生識能取前色是名識陰。即時心生男女怨親等想名為想陰。若分別知怨親中人生三種受是名受陰。是三受中生三種煩惱是名行陰。以此事起受身因緣名五受陰。

\(^{148}\) No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p251a25-b1: 是陰等法。云何當生。在十二時中故名十二因緣。是中無明是煩惱。行名為業。因此二事。次第生識名色入觸受。愛取二法是名煩惱。有名為業。未來世中初受身識名之為
Harivarman emphasizes that *samskāra* (=*cetanā*) is born from *kleśas*, which are consequences of feelings (*vedanā*). In contrast, although the Ābhidharmikas understand *samskāra* in the dependent origination in a way similar to Harivarman’s analysis here, they interpret *samskāra-skandha* as including another sense. For the Ābhidharmikas, *samskāra-skandha* is also the collection of dharmas that are not included in the other four *skandhas*. For the Sarvāstivādins, it consists of conditioned dharmas associated with *citta* (*citta-samprayukta*), namely, the *caitasikas* except for *sāmjñā* and *vedanā*, as well as conditioned dharmas dissociated from *citta* (*citta-viprayukta*). In the Pāli Abhidhamma, *saṅkhāra-khandha* consists only of *cetasikas* associated with *citta*. Thus, Harivarman’s definition of *cetanā* has at least two doctrinal benefits: (1) it avoids the issue of the multivalence of the Ābhidharmika interpretation of the term *samskāra* in the context of the *skandhas* and dependent origination; and (2) his understanding of *cetanā* as desire (*prāthanā*) or wish (*praniḥāna*), which are singular mental states, avoids possible confusion by identifying it with a term, namely, *samskāra*, which is interpreted by the Ābhidharmikas as representing a host of mental factors (*caitasika*). This would then be consistent with Harivarman’s position that there is no *caitasika* apart from *citta*. However, the reasons underlying Harivarman’s interpretation of *cetanā* require further study.

(65.12-13) In the next two sections, Harivarman discusses *vitarka* and *vicāra* and their relationship with intention (*samkalpa*), and argues that in the five sense consciousnesses there is no discrimination (*vikalpa*), so that in turn no *vitarka* and *vicāra*. Harivarman next clearly describes the relationship between *vikalpa* on the one hand and *vitarka* and *vicāra* on the other. Intentional discrimination (*samkalpa* 思惟分別) is a process that consists of *vitarka* and *vicāra*. When the mind is first applied to the object, it is gross (*audārika* 麁) and then becomes subtle (*sūksma* 細); gross *citta* is *vitarka*, and subtle *citta* is *vicāra*. And once again this position is identical with the one ascribed to the

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149 For example, AK Bh verse 3.21b (p.131.23): *samskārāḥ pūrvakarmaṇaḥ.*

150 In his study of *cetanā*, Mizunō (1964: 410-11) observes that Harivarman’s definition differs from that of others and points out that this position is the same as that attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ. However, as Sue Hamilton (1996: 72-4) points out, in the sūtras the meanings of *saṅkhāra* as a *khandha* and as a link in dependent origination have different connotations; the former means “volitional constituent” and the latter “formative activities.”
Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ.\textsuperscript{151}

This connection between \textit{vitarka} and \textit{samkalpa} is also attested in the sūtras. In the formula of the eight-fold noble path (\textit{aṣṭāṅgika-mārga}), the second \textit{ānga}, right-intention (\textit{samyak-samkalpa}), is defined as the intention (\textit{samkalpa}) for desirelessness (\textit{naiṣkramya}, \textit{P nekkhamma}), non-hatred (\textit{avyāpāda}) and non-cruelty (\textit{vihimsā}); but elsewhere in the sūtras, these three terms are also frequently associated with \textit{vitarka}.\textsuperscript{152} Moreover, as Rupert Gethin has noticed (2001: 194n16), in M II 28 it is said that the three kinds of \textit{sāṅkappa} cease without remainder in the second \textit{jhāna}. In the standard description of the \textit{dhyānas/jhānas}, the transition from the first \textit{dhyāna} to the second requires precisely this elimination of \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra}. Thus, Harivarman’s use of \textit{samkalpa} in his discussion of \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra} does have a basis in the sūtras.\textsuperscript{153}

The Sarvāstivādins also relate the grossness of \textit{citta} in relation to \textit{vitarka}, and the subtleness of \textit{citta} to \textit{vimāra},\textsuperscript{154} but they reject the position that \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra} are two modes of \textit{citta} that cannot occur simultaneously. Instead, they propose that they are two separate dharmas that can occur together with \textit{citta}. If so, how can grossness and subtleness coexist simultaneously in one \textit{citta}? The MVŚ answers that \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra} are not themselves \textit{cittas}, but that they are what make \textit{citta} gross or subtle. It gives several similes to show that one can experience a gross and subtle thing at the same time.\textsuperscript{155} Vasubandhu in his AKBh discusses the same issue, and he cites only one simile from the MVŚ, namely, that of ghee in cold water and under the sun. In such a situation, cold water and the heat of the sunshine are what make the ghee solid/gross or liquid/subtle, but they themselves are not ghee. One should understand \textit{vitarka} and \textit{vicāra} in the same way:

\begin{verbatim}
151 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p218c28: 謂或有執。尋伺即心。如譬喻者。
152 For example, M III 114: nekkhamnavitakko abyāpādavitakko avihimsāvitakko iti. 'evarūpe vitakke vitakkkassāmī' iti.
153 See also Mizuno 1964: 434.
154 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p218c7-8: 尋伺何差別。答心麁性名尋。心細性名伺。
155 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p219a13-b7: 問此中所說心麁細性顯何義耶。有作是說。此則顯心麁性細性。若作是說。尋伺應以心為自性。亦不相應。一物麁細不俱有故。有餘師說。此顯心麁時有尋性。心細時有伺性。若作是說。應顯尋伺非一心俱。心麁細時剎那別故。評曰。應作是說。此中顯示即一心中麁性名尋。細性名伺。若作是說。顯一心中有尋有伺。尋伺心麁細二法互不相違。答所作異故。尋伺麁細兩性遲鈍。共助一心故。雖麁細而不相違。問尋伺麁細其相如何。答如針鳥翮和束扌族。生受利鈍。尋伺亦爾。又如酢水等分相和置於口中。生識利鈍。尋伺亦爾。又如鹽麴等分相和置於口中。生識利鈍。尋伺亦爾。施設論說。如叩鍾鈴銅鐵器等。其聲發運。前麁後細。尋伺亦爾。法蘊論說。如天震雷人吹貝等。初大後微。尋伺亦爾。又作是說。如鳥飛空鼓翼翔翥。前麁後細尋伺亦爾。彼說皆顯尋伺不俱作用增時有前後故。有作是說。如以熟酥置冷水上。日光照觸。由水日故非釋非凝。如是一心有尋有伺。二力任持非麁非細。是故尋伺互得相應。尋令心麁伺令心細。
\end{verbatim}

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they can coexist simultaneously in one *citta* and are what make *citta* gross or subtle, but they are not themselves *cittas*. However, Vasubandhu himself appears to be not quite certain on this issue. After quoting the ghee simile, he points out that some other teachers think that grossness and subtleness are properties relative to each other, and they cannot coexist at the same moment. Vasubandhu appears to be inclined to the latter position.

(65.14) In this section, Harivarman quotes an unspecified “someone” (或有人), who claims that within the five sense consciousnesses there is apperception (*saṃjñā*) but no applied thought (*vitarka*). In 65.11, Harivarman has already shown that there is no *saṃjñā* in eye-consciousness, because at the moment of seeing a person, one cannot grasp the signs (*nimitta*) such as whether the person is a friend or an enemy. So Harivarman does not agree with the “someone” here in this passage. However, this “someone” is not totally wrong. Although he claims that there is *saṃjñā* in the five sense consciousnesses, he rejects *vitarka*, and his argument is based on a sūtra passage that describes a cognitive process in which *vitarka* is said to be born from *saṃjñā*. On this point Harivarman agrees with him: when there is *saṃjñā*, there is no *vitarka*.

(65.15) This section offers a conclusion to sections 65.11-14. In these previous sections, Harivarman argued that there is no apperception (*saṃjñā* 想), nor applied thought (*vitarka* 覺), nor sustained thought (*vicāra* 觀) in the five sense consciousnesses. In summary, there is no discrimination (*nirvikalpa* 無分別) in the five sense consciousnesses, that is, there is no discrimination of male or female, nor discrimination of pleasant or unpleasant feelings, and so forth.

(65.16) In this section, Harivarman uses his opponent’s own doctrinal position to argue against him. In the unnamed opponent’s opinion, within the cognitive process, one

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156 AKBh p.60.26-61.3: yathā ʼpsuniṣṭhyūtaṃ sarpiḥ sūryaraśmhibhirāparisṭūṣprṣṭam nātiśāyate nātiśāyate evamvitarkavicāraγācittam nātisūkṣmam bhavati nātyādārika mityubhayorapi tatrāti vāyāraḥ. evam tarhi  

157 AKBh p.61.3-13: ṛpeṣṣikī caudārikasūkṣmatā bhūmiprapāyahādityābhavāgrādvitarkavicārau syātām. nacaudārikasūkṣmātayā jātibhedaḥ yuktāḥ. aḥe punarāhū. vāksaṃskārā vitarkavicārāḥ sūtra uktāḥ. “vitarkya vicārya vācam bhāṣate nāvitarkyāvicārye”ti. tatra ye audārikāste vitarkaḥ ye sūkṣmāste vicārāḥ. yadi caikatra citte ‘nyo dharma audārikā nātisūkṣmākhi ʼi na vīrodha iti. na vāyavārod glazed yadi jātibhedāḥ svādvedānāsaṃjñāvāt. ekasyāṁ jātāu mārdvadhimārata mārdvadhimārataḥ ṛṣyapanna samabhavati. jātibhedo pyasti. sa tarhi vaktavyah. durvaco hyāvāvato mārdvadhimārataḥ vyājyate. naivaḥ vyakto bhavati. pratyekeṣām jātānāṃ mārdvadhimāratavāt. neva hi vitarkavicārāvekaḥ citta bhavata ityaparī. kathamīdānīṃ prathamaṃ mārdvadhimaṃ prathyakshānuḥ. bhūmitastat paṇcāṅgagayuktaṃ na saṃbhavati.  

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moment of consciousness of the five senses must be followed by a moment of mind-consciousness (mano-vijñāna 意識). Since the five sense consciousnesses cannot discriminate the object by themselves, they must be followed by a moment of mano-vijñāna, which will distinguish and recognize what the object is. This might be related to the mind-process theories of a number of different doctrinal traditions. In the Pāli Abhidhamma commentary tradition, there is a full-fledged mind-process (citta-vīthi) theory, which entails a mind-process (citta) with a strong object that makes a big impact on the consciousness, consisting of seventeen moments:158 (1) bhavaṅga, that is, the unperturbed continuum of passive, inactive bhavaṅga consciousness; (2) a vibration (calana) of bhavaṅga; (3) bhavaṅga interrupted (bhavaṅgupaccheda); then (4) the mind adverts to the sense-door of eye (dvārāvajjana), which leads to a moment of (5) eye-consciousness (cakkhu-viññāṇa), that is, the visual experience of the object. At this moment the mind is only aware of the object but does not know more about it. Following the eye-consciousness is mind-consciousness (mano-viññāṇa) (6) receiving (sampaticchana) the object as seen by the eye. Then there is the moment of (7) investigating (santīraṇa) consciousness, and after that the (8) determining (votthapana) consciousness, which recognizes the object and determines what to do about it. After the determination are several moments of active actions of consciousness called javana (running), which are karmically operative activities. The javanas can last for seven moments (9-15) if the impact of the object is strong enough. When the javanas are concluded, there can be two moments (16-17) of tad-āramaṇa (having the same object), which, as its name indicates, are two moments of citta that have the same object as the previous javanas. Commentators describe them as resembling an “after-taste” of the object. The tad-āramaṇas are very similar to bhavaṅga in the sense that they are both inactive and passive resultant consciousnesses, but, unlike the bhavaṅga, which has its own object, the tad-āramaṇas have the same object as the javanas. After the tad-āramaṇas, the mind falls back to the bhavaṅga state. In this context, it is important

158 Here the brief description of the mind-process is based on the Dhammasaṅgani-āthakathā (=Atthasālinī, Dhs-a 266-87, 400-1.) and the Visuddhimagga (Vism XIV 114ff; XVII 136ff), as well as the later Abhidhamma manual the Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha (chapter 4). This mind-process theory is not fully laid out in the Pāli canonical Abhidhamma texts, though there are plenty of hints indicating that such a theory might have been developed in the canonical Abhidhamma text Paṭṭhāna. See Cousins 1981.
that after moment (6) eye-consciousness, there must be a moment of mind-consciousness (mano-viññaṇa) which functions as the (7) receiving consciousness (sampaticchana).

Moreover, in the Yogācārabhūmi there is a mind-process theory which is simpler than the one in the Pāli commentaries. The Yogācārabhūmi mind-process is shorter and has only five stages: 159 (1) sudden occurring (aupanipātika); (2) investigating (paryēsaka); (3) determining (niścita); (4) defiled or pure (saṃkleśa and vyavadāṇa); and (5) continuous flow (naiṣyandika). In this process the first moment of (1) sudden occurring (aupanipātika) is a moment of five sense-consciousnesses, and the following moment of (2) investigating (paryēsaka) is a mind-consciousness (mano-vijñāṇa).

The details of these two mind-process theories in the Pāli and Yogācāra traditions are not significant here. It is sufficient to note that in both theories the moment of five-sense-consciousness must be followed by a moment of mind-consciousness (mano-vijñāṇa). Perhaps the opponent with whom Harivarman argues here is someone who holds a similar position regarding the mind’s cognitive process, and proposes that eye-consciousness must be followed by mind-consciousness since eye-consciousness cannot discriminate and only mind-consciousness can discriminate. Harivarman answers that, if this is the case, then this mind-process theory contradicts the citta-caitasika theory. In the opponent’s opinion, a citta (= viññaṇa), including eye-consciousness, must always be accompanied by caitasikas such as saṃjñā, vedanā, vitarka, and so forth. If so, there

159 YBh 10.1-7: tatra caksurviṣṇāṇa utpanne trīṇi cittāny upalabhyante yathā kramam apanipātikamaṃ paryēsakam niścitaṃ ca / tatra ca adyam caksurviṣṇāṇam eva / dvemanoviṣṇāne / tatra niścitaḥ cittāḥ param saṃkleśaḥ vyavadānāṃ ca draśṭavyaṃ / ittas tan niṣaṃdikaṃ caksurviṣṇānām apiśalākāśalam pravartitaṃ na tu suvikalpavasaṇaṃ tāvac ca dvāyor manoviṣṇānacaksurviṣṇānayoḥ kuśalatvaṃ vā kliṣṭatvam yāvat tan mano na-anayatra vikṣipitaṃ // yathā caksurviṣṇāṇa utpanna evam yāvat kāyaviṣṇāṇam veditavyam // Xuanzang’s translation: T No. 1579 瑜伽師地論 (卷 1) T30, p280a22-27: 復次由眼識生。三心可得。如其次第。謂率爾心。尋求心。決定心。初是眼識。二在意識。決定心後。方有染淨。此後乃有等流眼識。善不善轉。而彼不由自分別力。乃至此意不趣餘境。經爾所時。眼意二識。或善或染相續而轉。如眼識生。乃至身識。應知亦爾。Kuji has a long chapter dedicated to the five-consciousness mind-process theory. T No. 1861 大乘法苑義林章 (卷 1) T45, p252bff.

160 The MVŚ attributes this position to the so-called Yogācārin (瑜珈師), though it is not clear who exactly these Yogācārins are in the period of the MVŚ. (See Jonathan Silk’s study of this term in Silk 2000.) But the Vaibhāṣikas have a different opinion. They agree that there are cases in which a moment of mano-vijñāṇa can follow immediately a moment of one of the five types of sense consciousness, but it is not required. A moment of one of the five types of sense consciousness can be followed by a moment of any of the six types of consciousness. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 131) T27, p0682b: 問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間不現在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。若不爾者諸根識說。如彼說。苦根與苦根為因。等無間。增上。非所緣。若不爾者諸根識說。如彼說。苦根與苦根為因。等無間。增上。非所緣。No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 1) T28, p0992a: 如是諸色於六識中二識所識。謂眼及意先用眼識唯了自相。後用意識了自共相。謂彼諸色住現在時。眼識無間非定起意識。重了前色自相或共相。... 眼識無間非定起意識。於六識身容隨起一種。若眼識無間定起意識者。則苦根不应為苦等無間。苦根唯在五識身故。若爾便違根蘊所說。如說苦根與苦根為因等無間增上。
would be of no use for the following moment of mano-vijñāna.

Nevertheless, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas propose that the moment of citta after one of the five sense consciousness can be any type of the six, and not limited to mano-vijñāna. Such a position is based on a teaching in the Jñānaprasthāna, which states that the faculty of suffering (duḥkha-indriya) can be the immediate-cause (samanantara-pratyaya) of another duḥkha-indriya, and because duḥkha-indriya can only exist in the five sense consciousnesses and not in the mano-vijñāna, it is possible that a moment of sense consciousness can be followed by another sense consciousness. In other words, for the Vaibhāṣikas it is not necessary that one moment of five sense consciousness must be followed by a mano-vijñāna. So it is unlikely that the opponent of this section is a Sarvasivada-Vaibhāṣika teacher.

3.3.8 Harivarman’s Argument 8 (65.17-25)

In sections 65.17-25, Harivarman uses a number of examples, such as vitarka and vicāra, avidyā and prajñā, vicikitsā, smṛti, chanda and acchanda, and so forth, to show that different types of mental phenomena, especially those mental phenomena that have contradictory characteristics, cannot occur simultaneously in the mind.

(65.17) As Harivarman mentioned in 65.12, applied thought (vitarka) is a gross mode of thought, and sustained thought (vicāra) is a subtle mode of thought. Because a gross mode and a subtle mode of the same thing cannot coexist, in other words, they are mutually exclusive (相違), vitarka and vicāra cannot occur simultaneously in one citta as the Ābhidharmikas would claim. Harivarman then uses a simile to illustrate his point: when someone hits a bell, the first moment of sound is gross, which corresponds to vitarka, while, in comparison to the first moment, the sustained lingering sound of the bell is subtle, and this subtle sound corresponds to vicāra. In this simile, the subtle sound must follow the gross sound, and they cannot occur together. In the same way vitarka and vicāra cannot coexist simultaneously.

161 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 131) T27, p682b1-6: 問眼等五識展轉無間現在前不。答諸瑜伽師說。眼等五識展轉無間不現在前。皆從意識無間生故。阿毘達磨諸論師言。眼等五識展轉皆得無間而起。若不爾者違根蘊說。如彼說。苦根與苦根為因。等無間。增上。非所緣。
(65.18) Continuing with the topic of *vitarka* and *vicāra*, Harivarman uses daily experience to argue for his position. If there were *vitarka* and *vicāra* in the five sense consciousnesses, one should be able to distinguish them by introspection, and describe and specify their activities (*kriyā 業*). But in fact, no one can distinguish them in their experience. So Harivarman concludes that *vitarka* and *vicāra*, as different types of mental phenomena, or more generally, *citta* and *caitasikas* must occur successively and not simultaneously.

(65.19) Harivarman uses another pair of mental phenomena, ignorance (*moha* or *avidyā 痴*) and wisdom (*prajñā 慧*), as an example to demonstrate his position. He argues that *moha* and *prajñā* are two opposite types of mental phenomena, by nature they contradict each other; hence, they are mutually exclusive and cannot coexist in the same moment of mind. One cannot know and not know about the same object at the same time.

(65.20) Harivarman argues that doubt (*vicikitsā 疑*) is not a single moment of *citta* or *caitasika*. If one is uncertain whether a thing in the dark is a tree stump or a person, the mind is incapable of grasping the two objects of “a tree stump” and “a person” at the same moment. When one doubts, one must first think “this is a tree stump,” and in the next moment “this is a person.” The uncertainty or perplexity in this series of multiple moments of *cittas* is what Harivarman calls doubt. 162

(65.21) Next, Harivarman discusses the example of recollection (*smṛti 憶*). *Smṛti* is a mental activity that takes objects of the past. According to the Ābhidharmikas, *smṛti* is a universal *caitasika* that occurs in all *cittas*, including *cittas* taking present objects. If so, in a *citta* that takes a present object *smṛti* must be present, which according to its definition takes a past object. This indicates that this doctrinal position is self-contradictory. Therefore, *smṛti* cannot occur as a *caitasika* within a present *citta*.

(65.22) Harivarman continues with the discussion of recollection (*smṛti*). In this passage he uses a common experience as an example. When one recollects that such and

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162 There is a passage in the MVŚ that expresses a similar position regarding doubt (*vicikitsā 疑*). No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p547b15-24: 問若爾疑相應慧應不名智。於所緣境不決定故。答彼亦是智。一剎那頃於所緣境亦決定故。然此聚中疑勢用勝。令心於境多剎那中猶豫不決。說名疑聚。如三摩地一剎那中於境恒住。有時若與掉舉相應。令多剎那於境轉易說名為亂。又如有情若多貪者說名貪行。若多瞋者說名瞋行。若多癡者說名癡行。一一非不有餘煩惱。此亦如是故無有失。
such a person is a friend who had helped him before, after this recollection, joy (prīti 喜) arises in his mind. According to the Ābhidharmikas, smṛti and prīti are both caitasikas that can occur simultaneously in one moment of mind. Here, Harivarman points out that in our daily experience, these two happen successively within a mental process and not simultaneously. Therefore, they cannot coexist in the same moment of citta.

(65.23) Next, Harivarman discusses the pair of mental phenomena, inclination (*chanda) and non-inclination (*acchanda). He quotes a sūtra passage stating that, if the bhikṣus are inclined toward the Buddha’s Dharma, it will grow; if the bhikṣus are not inclined toward the Dharma, it will decrease. This implies that *chanda and *acchanda cannot occur simultaneously, that is, coexist in one citta.

(65.24) Then, Harivarman challenges the general principle of multiple caitasikas coexisting in one citta. He argues that if there were multiple caitasikas occuring together in one citta, for example, knowing and not-knowing, doubt and doubtlessness, faith and faithlessness, energy and slackness, and so forth, it would be a total disorder (*vaiśamya 錯亂).

(65.25) Harivarman further extends his opponent’s principle that caitasikas with opposite characteristics such as knowing and not-knowing can coexist. He argues that, if so, then in the same manner pleasant (sukha 樂) and unpleasant (duḥkha 苦) feelings should also coexist, and mental traits such as greed (lobha 貪) and anger (dveṣa 憤) should also occur together. But in some Abhidharma traditions, For example, the Pāli Abhidhamma tradition, sukha and dukkha cannot coexist in one citta, nor can lobha and doṣa coexist. In other words, the Ābhidharmikas are inconsistent with themselves on this principle. Harivarman points out that to be consistent in all these circumstances, one must accept that mental phenomena with opposite characteristics, such as knowing and not-knowing, and so forth, cannot coexist in one citta. Therefore, he concludes that there is no association (samprayoga) of citta and caitasikas.

Comments:
(65.17-18) Harivarman discussed the issue of vitarka and vicāra and the grossness and

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163 The mutual exclusiveness of these mental phenomena is evident in the list of Dhs.
subtleness of *citta* in 65.12, which presents the position that the five sense consciousnesses have no discrimination (*nirvikalpa*) because discrimination is a process of intention (*saṃkalpa*) consisting of the gross *vitarka* and the subtle *vicāra*. Here in this section, he discusses the issue from a different perspective: namely, because *vitarka* is the grossness of *citta*, and *vicāra* is the subtleness of *citta*, and a *citta* cannot be gross and subtle at the same moment, these two cannot coexist in one *citta*.

(65.20) Harivarman’s position that doubt (*vicikitsā* 疑) is not a single mental event but a series of *cittas* is unique among the Buddhist traditions. Almost all other traditions, the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, the Pāli Abhidhamma, and the Yogācārin, consider doubt to be a defilement (*kleśa*), which means it is an individual mental factor (*caitasika*).164 No other text proposes that doubt is a process rather than a single mental event.

(65.21-22) Apparently, Harivarman understands *smṛti* mainly in the sense of “memory” or “recollection.” The TatŚid’s chapter 91 is dedicated to *smṛti*.165 In that chapter he defines *smṛti* as “one knows what has been experienced in the past.”166 In the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika system, *smṛti* is one of the ten universal mental factors (*mahābhūmika* 大地法), which means it can occur in all *cittas*. As Collett Cox has pointed out (1992), in these circumstances *smṛti* appears to have two senses: retention and recollection. As a universal mental factor in the Sarvāstivāda system, it has more the meaning of “retention” or “mindfulness.” In other words, in the Sarvāstivāda perspective, *smṛti* is more than the memory or recollection of past objects but has a broader scope that can include objects of the past, present and future. Thus, Harivarman’s criticism of the Ābhidharmikas’ position is ineffective because, in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, *citta* and the universal *smṛti* associated with it must have the same object,167 regardless of whether the object is a past, present, or a future one. There would be no possibility that *citta* would have a present object, while *smṛti* has a past one.168

(65.24-5) Harivarman argues that mental phenomena with opposite characteristics

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164 For a detailed discussion of *vicikitsā* in all of these tradition, see Mizuno 1964: 587-93.
165 No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p288b6-26: 食品第九十一.
166 No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p288b7: 知先所是名為憶。
167 This is part of the definition of association (*samprayukta*). See the discussion of the definitions in 3.1, esp. 3.1.3.
168 For more detailed studies of *smṛti* in Abhidharma, see Cox 1992 and Jaini 1992; for *smṛti* in the Yogācāra texts see Griffiths 1992.
such as knowing and not-knowing, and so forth, should not coexist in one citta. Again this is a position attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ: 169

The Dārṣṭāntikas say that if a citta has knowledge (jñāna 智), then it does not have not-knowing (ajñāna 無知); if a citta has doubt (vicikitsā 疑), then it does not have determination (*niyāma 決定); if a citta has grossness, then it does not have subtleness. But the characteristics of dharmas as described by the Ābhidharmikas are like a messy forest: namely, in one citta are knowledge, not-knowing, and neither knowledge nor not-knowing; there are doubt, determination, and neither doubt nor determination; there are grossness, subtleness, and neither grossness nor subtleness.

In this passage in the MVŚ, the Dārṣṭāntikas take the same position as Harivarman. The basic principle is that mental phenomena with different or opposite characteristics should not coexist in one citta. All the examples that the Dārṣṭāntikas used in this MVŚ passage, namely, knowledge and not-knowing, doubt and determination, grossness and subtleness, are also used by Harivarman in sections 65.17-19. Such a position is understandable given that the Dārṣṭāntikas and Harivarman believe that all these mental phenomena are different modes of citta itself, when a citta is in the mode of knowing, it cannot be not-knowing, and when it is in a gross mode, it cannot be subtle. Here in this chapter of the TatSid, Harivarman does not give the Ābhidharmikas’ answer to this challenge, but an answer is recorded in the MVŚ: 170

The Ābhidharmika śāstra-teachers say, what fault can there be if one agrees that these dharmas arise together? This is because these caitasikas arise supported by each other, associated to one citta, and each has its individual characteristic (相) and function (用): knowledge (jñāna 智) is wisdom (prajñā 般若), not-knowing (ajñāna 無知) is ignorance (avidyā 無明), and the remaining caitasikas are neither knowledge nor not-knowing; doubt (vicikitsā 疑) is perplexity (*samādgha 猶豫), determination (niyāma 決定) is knowledge (jñāna 智), and the remaining caitasikas are neither doubt nor determination; what is gross is applied thought (vitarka 論), what is

169 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p547b24-9 鳴鳴者說。若心有智則無無知。若心有疑則無決定。若心有麁則無有細。然對法者所說法相如鬬叢林。謂一心中。有智有無知。有非智非無知。有疑有決定。有非疑非決定。有麁有細。有非麁非細。

170 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p547b29-c6: 阿毘達磨諸論師言。許法俱生斯有何失。謂諸心所展轉力生。一心相應。相用各別。智謂般若。無知謂無明。非智非無知謂餘心所。疑謂猶豫。決定謂智。非疑非決定謂餘心所。麁謂尋。細謂伺。非麁非細謂餘心所。如諸色法異類俱生。心所亦爾。故無有失。
subtle is sustained thought (*vicāra* 同), and the remaining *caitasikas* are what is neither gross nor subtle. Just as material forms of different kinds arise together, in the same way *caitasikas* can also arise together. Therefore, there is no fault.

This passage from the MVŚ shows the fundamentally different position of the Ābhidharmikas from the Dārṣṭāntikas. For the Ābhidharmikas, each one of the mental phenomena mentioned is a mental factor (*caitasika*), which is a real entity (*dravya*) having its own individual self-nature (*svabhāva*).\(^{171}\) So for the Ābhidharmikas, knowledge (*jñāna*) is the mental factor wisdom (*prajñā*), and not-knowing is the mental factor ignorance (*avidyā*); doubt (*vicikitsā*) is the mental factor perplexity (*samādigdha*),\(^ {172}\) and determination (*niyāma*) is the mental factor wisdom (*prajñā*); what is gross is the mental factor *vitarka*, and what is subtle is the mental factor *vicāra*. As all of these mental factors are individual dharmas of different natures, just as different kinds of material forms (*rūpa*) can coexist together in the world, in the same way all these different kinds of mental factors can coexist together in one *citta*.

However, a comparison of Harivarman’s arguments presented in 65.17-25 with the answer given in the MVŚ indicates that Harivarman’s arguments are based more on our ordinary experience and common sense. For example, in 65.17-8 he argues that *vitarka* and *vicāra* should not occur together just as gross and subtle sounds cannot occur together; in 65.19 he proposes that wisdom (*prajñā*) and ignorance (*moha*) cannot coexist; in 65.23 he suggests that desire and not desire cannot coexist. On the other hand, the MVŚ passage just quoted shows that the Ābhidharmikas’ answer is based mainly on their doctrine of *caitasikas* as real entities (*dravya*); because these *caitasikas* are real individual entities, they can coexist like different kinds of material forms (*rūpa*).

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171 This is one of the criteria in the definition of association (*samprayoga*) between *citta* and *caitasikas*. See the discussion in 3.1.3.

172 Here doubt (*vicikitsā*) is an interesting case. As seen in 65.20, Harivarman proposes that doubt is not a single mental event but a property of a series of *cittas*. But in the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma system, in their classification of *caitasikas*, *vicikitsā* is one of the major *kleśas* (*klesa*). Here in this passage, *vicikitsā* is said to be perplexity (*samādigdha*), which is not included in the list of *caitasikas*. Also, the MVŚ passage quoted in footnote 162 regarding the explanation of doubt shows a position very similar to the Dārṣṭāntika’s understanding of doubt as a property of the series of *cittas*. All of these interpretations suggest that in the period when the MVŚ was compiled, the sectarian division between the Ābhidharmikas and the Dārṣṭāntikas was not clear.
3.3.9 Harivarman’s Argument 9 (65.26-33)

In the following eight sections (65.26-33), Harivarman quotes eight lists of mental phenomena from the sūtras and suggests that these mental phenomena occur successively instead of simultaneously. Since all eight passages are scriptural (āgama) arguments for the same thesis, they are grouped together as one argument.

(65.26) In the sūtra passage regarding the development of the seven factors of awakening (bodhy-aṅga 菩提分), these seven factors are developed successively.

(65.27) In the sūtra, the eight-fold noble path (āryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga 八道分) is taught as a sequence.

(65.28) In the sūtra that presents the ten factors that start with being virtuous and ends with liberation, each of the preceding items in this list gives rise to the following one “naturally” (dharmatā): being virtuous (sīlavant 持戒) → no regret (avipratisāra 無憂悔) → joy (prāmodya 歡悅) in mind → rapture (prīti 喜) of mind → tranquility (praśrabdha 猗) of body → pleasure (sukha 樂) → mind concentrated (samādhiyati 攝) → knowledge [of things] as they really are (yathābhūta 實智) → disenchantment (nirveda 厭離) → liberated (*vimukta 解脫).

(65.29) The sūtra presents the eight thoughts of a great person (P. aṭṭha mahāpurisavitakk) as a causal sequence.

(65.30) The sūtra presents the seven aspects of purification as a sequence of practice.

(65.31) The sūtra describes the cognitive process as a sequence: eye takes form → delusion → craving → karma.

(65.32) The Mahānidānasūtra presents the sequence of nine mental dharmas starting with craving (tṛṣṇā 愛) and ending with suffering.

(65.33) The four stream-entry (srotaāpanna 須陀洹) dharmas are intended as a causal sequence.

Comments:
The lists given in these eight passages consist of mental phenomena that in most cases are considered by the Ābhidharmikas to be mental factors (caitasika). In each case, Harivarman’s argument is the same: each one of these lists should be understood as a
causal sequence with each item arising one after another. However, two lists he quotes are questionable: 65.29 the “eight thoughts of a great person” and 65.33 the “four stream-entry (srotaṅpanna 須陀洹) dharmas” are not presented explicitly as causal sequences in the sūtras. However, it is possible to interpret them as successive sequences by analyzing the possible relationship between the consecutive members in the lists. Or, it is also possible that Harivarman is quoting sūtras that are not presently extant.

3.3.10 Harivarman’s Argument 10 and Conclusion (65.34-5)

(65.34) Once again, Harivarman quotes the sūtra passage describing the basic cognitive process: when the eye takes a form (rūpa) object, eye-consciousness (vijñāna = citta) arises, and the coming together (saṅgati 和合) of these three is contact (sparśa 触). Harivarman argues that if caitasika arise together simultaneously with citta, then at this moment contact should not be the meeting of only three things: the eye, the form (rūpa), and consciousness (vijñāna). Rather, there should be more things involved because a number of caitasikas such as vedanā, saṃjñā, and so forth, are present in addition to the three.

(65.35) Harivarman concludes the chapter by stating that for these reasons he has proved that there is no association (samprayoga).

Comments:
This is exactly the same argument against caitasika presented in section 60.13. However, in 60.13 Harivarman argues against the existence of caitasikas as real dharmas apart from citta, while here he tries to show that at the moment of contact there are no caitasikas present as dharmas associated (samprayukta) with citta. As a result, although the argument is exactly the same, the point is slightly different.

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173 See the detailed discussion of this argument in 2.3.5, and the opponent’s argument for caitasika in 2.4.5.
3.4 The Opponent’s Arguments for Association and Harivarman’s Refutations

In chapter 66 of the TatSid, the opponent presents several proofs for the position that caitasika exist as dharmas associated with citta. In chapter 67, Harivarman refutes the opponent’s arguments. This section will arrange each of the opponent’s arguments together with Harivarman’s refutations so the reader may find it easier to follow.

3.4.1 The Opponent’s Argument 1 (66.1-3, 67.1-2)

In (66.1-3) the opponent argues that the teaching of the five skandha supports the position that citta and caitasika can coexist as associated. The basic argument is that the five skandha must exist simultaneously. In sections 66.1-2, the opponent quotes two different sūtra passages to support this position, and in 66.3 he argues on the basis of logical reasoning (yukti).

(66.1) The opponent quotes a sūtra passage describing the view of personal-existence (satkāya-drṣṭi), in which an ignorant worldly being perceives (samanupaśyatī) each of the five skandha as the self, or the self as possessing the skandha, or the skandha as in the self, or the self as in the skandha. The opponent points out that in the sūtra passage describing the view of personal-existence one takes feeling (vedanā) as the self and consciousness (vijñāna) as in the self, that is, vedanā. In this case, obviously the sūtra passage is describing a situation in which vedanā coexists with vijñāna. Even though the view that vedanā is the self and vijñāna (= citta 識心) exists within (or dependent on 依) this self as vedanā is wrong, the analysis still supports the position that vijñāna can exist simultaneously with vedanā, saṃjñā, and so forth.

(66.2) The opponent quotes a passage from the Mānusya-sūtra, which states that when the eye takes form (rūpa) as an object, eye-consciousness (cakṣu-vijñāna) arises; the coming together of the three gives rise to contact (sparśa); and born together (sahajāta 俱生) with sparśa are feeling (vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā), volitional formations (saṃskāra 行 = cetanā 思). Various names such as sentient being (sattva), god (deva), human being (manuṣya), and so forth, are based on these five dharmas, or skandhas. In this passage, it is clearly stated that the skandhas of vedanā, saṃjñā, and
saṃskāra arise together with sparśa.

(66.3) Continuing with the argument regarding the five skandhas, the opponent states that, if it were the case, as Harivarman claims, that citta and caitasikas can only arise successively one by one, then only one of the four non-material skandhas (vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna) among the five skandhas can exist at one moment. As a result, at any given moment only two skandhas would exist instead of five, namely, one citta/caitasika together with the material skandha (rūpa), and the three missing skandhas would exist only in the past or in the future. In this case, how can the sūtra say that a person exists with the five skandhas? Therefore, the correct understanding of the sūtra passage must be that the five skandhas all exist at the same moment, and mental factors (vedanā, saṃjñā, and saṃskāras) coexist and are associated with consciousness (vijñāna).

(67.1) Harivarman argues that the opponent’s understanding of the sūtra passage quoted in 66.1 is wrong, because an ignorant ordinary being (prthajana 凡夫) cannot correctly analyze all the phenomena and determine that “this is feeling (vedanā)” and “this is what consciousness (vijñāna) depends on.” For if one were able to analyze correctly and distinguish the five skandhas, this person would no longer an ordinary being but would already have realized the truth of the emptiness of self. An ordinary being only perceives the continuous series of consciousness (citta-santati 心相續) but cannot correctly distinguish the skandhas in the series. So the statement “vedanā is the self and vijñāna exists within this self” is only playing with words and is not based on an accurate analysis of existence. In this sense, the opponent’s statement is ignorant and deluded and hence not reliable.

(67.2) Harivarman answers the opponent’s argument in sections 66.2-3. According to the opponent, since the sūtra teaches that a person is called a person (pudgala 人) based on the five skandhas, the five skandhas must exist simultaneously. If they can only exist successively and not simultaneously, then at one moment there could be only two skandhas, rūpa and one of the four non-material skandhas, and this contradicts the sūtra’s teaching. As a result, the five skandhas must all exist at the same moment. Harivarman

174 AKBh p465.10: skandhesveva pudgakādhye.
answers that there is no problem in understanding the sūtra teaching as suggesting that a person is called a person based on the continuous series (santati 相續) of the five skandha\textsuperscript{s}. In other words, to understand a person as a successive series of skandha\textsuperscript{s} does not contradict the sūtra teaching that a person is called a person based on the five skandha\textsuperscript{s}. Next, Harivarman uses an example to illustrate his point. He points out that people in the world sometimes call a person pleasant, unpleasant, or neither pleasant nor unpleasant. But any given person would not have all the three kinds of feelings all at the same moment. So in the same manner there is no problem to call a person a person with regard to only two skandha\textsuperscript{s} at one moment.

Comments:
This exchange between Harivarman and his opponent regarding the sūtra passage involves two levels of analysis as carried out by an ignorant ordinary person. On the first level, the ordinary person analyzes a person in terms of the five skandha\textsuperscript{s}; on the second level, the ordinary person analyzes wrong view as taking one of the skandha\textsuperscript{s} as the self and assumes that vijñāna exists within or is identified with that skandha. In other words, the ordinary person has correctly analyzed a person into five skandha\textsuperscript{s} but incorrectly takes one of the five, for example, vedanā, as the self, and considers the other skandha\textsuperscript{s} such as vijñāna to exist within this self. The opponent considers the first level of analysis to be correct, but considers the second level of analysis regarding the self wrong. Therefore, even the ordinary person’s view regarding the self is ultimately incorrect; it is still possible to analyze a person into five skandha\textsuperscript{s} that coexist simultaneously, and one can mistakenly think that one of the five is the self and that the others exist within that self.

However, in Harivarman’s view, the ordinary person is wrong on both levels: he is not only wrong in taking one of the skandha\textsuperscript{s} as the self and thinking that the other skandha\textsuperscript{s} exist within that self, but he is also wrong in understanding a person as consisting of the five skandha\textsuperscript{s}. Harivarman proposes that the ordinary person does not understand the teaching of the five skandha\textsuperscript{s} but only blindly follows the words. For Harivarman, the correct understanding of the teaching of the five skandha\textsuperscript{s} recognizes that the four non-material skandha\textsuperscript{s} are actually individual moments of citta\textsuperscript{s} in a single
but continuous series of cittas (citta-santati 心相續). In other words, it is not necessary that all five skandhas exist together at the same moment in order to validate the claim that a being consists of the five skandhas; instead a being should be understood as a continuous series, and each moment in the series is one skandha. It is just like experiencing three types of feelings: pleasant, unpleasant, neither pleasant nor unpleasant. When one says that one has feelings, it does not necessarily mean that one experiences three kinds of feelings all at one moment.

3.4.2 The Opponent’s Argument 2 (66.4, 67.3)

(66.4) The opponent claims that since the term “associated” (samprayukta) occurs in the sūtras, the teaching of association must have existed in the sūtras. As an example, he cites a sūtra that mentions a special type of faith (śraddhā 信), which has a root (samūlika 有根) and is associated with knowledge (*jñāna-samprayukta 智相應).

(67.3) Harivarman answers that it is true that the term samprayukta does occur in the sūtras, but on these occasions the term does not have the meaning of “association” in the Abhidharma sense. He points out that, aside from mental phenomena such as faith and knowledge, in the sūtras other things are also said to be “associated.” For example, sometimes it is said that two bhikṣus are associated in the work of one task; other sūtras also refer to suffering that results from association with people that one dislikes (apriya-samprayoga-duḥkha 怨相應苦), and suffering that results from the separation from loved ones (priya-viprayoga-duḥkha 愛別離苦). Moreover, people in the world use the term samprayukta more often in the non-technical sense and, for example, say that material form (rūpa) is associated with other things. But in the strict Abhidharma sense, the term samprayukta is only applicable to citta and caitasikas, and rūpa cannot be associated in that sense with other dharmas. All of these examples indicate that, in the case of the sūtra passage regarding “faith associated with knowledge,” one should understand samprayukta in the non-technical sense; because faith (śraddhā) and knowledge (jñāna 慧 = prajñā 慧  wisdom) together can achieve the goal of liberation, the sūtra says they are associated.
Comments:
Here, the arguments are focused on the understanding of the term “associated” (samprayukta 相應). The opponent points out that this term occurs in the sūtras, and in cases such as “faith is associated with knowledge” this term indicates the association relationship between mental phenomena as proposed in the Abhidharma systems. But Harivarman argues that in the sūtras the term samprayukta is not only used with regard to mental phenomena but is also applied to the relationship among other things such as people and material forms. So he suggests that the term samprayukta in the sūtras not be understood in the Abhidharma sense as “association;” instead, it only means two different things are engaged in the same task and achieve the same goal. Here, two different strategies of sūtra exegesis are employed: the opponent, supposedly an Ābhidharmika, imposes the Abhidharma system on sūtra texts and understands terms in the sūtras in terms of their meanings in the Abhidharma system. In contrast, Harivarman proposes that the terms in the sūtras be understood as non-technical terms used in accordance with common sense.

3.4.3 The Opponent’s Argument 3 (66.5, 67.4)
(66.5) The opponent quotes a sūtra which states that feeling (vedanā 受), apperception (samjñā 想), and volitional formations (cetanā 思) all arise together (sahajāta 俱生) with contact (sparśa 觸) and concludes that there must be mental factors that occur simultaneously.
(67.4) Harivarman answers that it is true that such a statement occurs in the sūtras, but here the term “together” (俱) does not necessarily mean that these mental phenomena occur simultaneously. He uses two examples to demonstrate his point: (1) People in the world usually say that a teacher walks together (saha) with his students, even though the teacher is in the front and the students are following him behind; (2) in the sūtra it is said that as soon as the king Māṇḍhāṭr has a thought of heaven (sahacittopāda), immediately he arrives there. Harivarman proposes that in both cases the term saha (俱) does not
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denote a relationship of simultaneity but indicates a short distance in time between two occurrences. He also suggests that *saha* in the sūtra phrase “*vedanā, samjñā, and cetanā* arise together with *sparśa*” should be understood in this way: it means that *samjñā* arises immediately following *vijñāna, vedanā* arises following *samjñā, cetanā* arises following *samjñā*, and so forth. In other words, these mental phenomena should occur as a successive sequence instead of all at once.

Comments:

Once again, two different strategies in the exegesis of sūtras are employed. Here, the dispute is focused on the term “together” (*saha* 俱). The opponent, supposedly an Ābhidharmika, chooses to understand the term in a strict Abhidharma sense, and interprets the sūtra passage as saying that *sparśa* arises together, or simultaneously, with *vedanā, samjñā*, and *cetanā*. But Harivarman chooses to understand the term *saha* in a more or less loose and non-technical sense, in which the term can also indicate that things happen not simultaneously, but in a successive sequence separated by small temporal intervals.

Moreover, it is worth noting that the sūtra passage the opponent quotes with the sentence “arising together with contact (*sparśa*) are feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*samjñā*), and volition (*cetanā*)” occurs in only two sūtras in the Chinese *Samyuktāgama*, and not in the Pāli Nikāyas. Also among the extant sūtras containing a description of the cognitive process involving *vijñāna, sparśa, vedanā, samjñā*, and *cetanā* (sometimes also *tṛṣṇā*), there are significant discrepancies among the versions of the process presented in different sources. Three versions of the process can be found in Chinese and Pāli sources:

(1) The *Mānusyaka-sūtra* quoted in 66.2 and AKBh = SĀ no.306, also SĀ no. 273.175

Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness (*vijñāna*) arises; the coming together of the three is contact (*sparśa*); arising together (*sahajāta*) with contact are feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*samjñā*), and volition (*cetanā*).

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Chapter 3. The Dispute on samprayoga

(2) SĀ no.276, also SĀ no. 304, and nos. 326-329; S no.35.93:\textsuperscript{176}
Dependent on eye and forms, eye-consciousness (vijñāna) arises; the coming
together of the three is contact (sparśa); dependent on sparśa, there is feeling
(vedanā); dependent on sparśa, there is apperception (saṃjñā); dependent on
sparśa, there is volition (cetanā); dependent on sparśa, there is craving (tṛṣṇā).

(3) SĀ no.214, M no.148:\textsuperscript{177}
Dependent on eye and forms, eye-consciousness (vijñāna) arises; the coming
together of the three is contact (sparśa); dependent on sparśa, there is feeling
(vedanā); dependent on vedanā, there is volition (cetanā) or craving (tṛṣṇā).

In these three groups of texts, the first group (1) has only texts affiliated with the
Sarvāstivādins; therefore, the description saying that vedanā, saṃjñā, and cetanā arise
“together” (sahajāta) with sparśa is in accord with the Sarvāstivāda teaching. This group
of texts are likely influenced by the Sarvāstivāda doctrines.\textsuperscript{178}

Among texts in the groups (2) and (3), it should be noted that the Pāli M no.148
Chachakka-sutta in group (3) presents the cognitive process described as a successive
sequence (phassa→vedanā→taṇhā), and the Chinese SĀ no. 304 in group (2), which
states that both vedanā and tṛṣṇā arise from sparśa (sparśa→vedanā, sparśa→tṛṣṇā), are
actually parallel versions of the same sūtra, the Ṣaṭṭaṭka, with the similar content and
structure in their narratives but only different in some points of detail.\textsuperscript{179} Also the
Chinese SĀ no.214 in group (3) and the Pāli S no.35.93 in group (2) are parallel texts as

\textsuperscript{176} SĀ no.276, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p73c9-75c16: …緣眼色 。 生眼識 。 三事和合生觸 …
觸緣受 …觸緣想 …觸緣思 …觸緣愛。SĀ no. 304, T II p86c23-87a25: 云何六觸身。謂眼觸耳觸鼻觸舌觸身觸意觸。雲何六
受身。謂眼觸受。耳觸受。鼻觸受。舌觸受。身觸受。意觸受。雲何六愛身。謂眼愛。耳愛。鼻愛。舌愛。身
愛。意愛。S no.35.93 (IV 69): phuṭṭho, bhikkhave, vedeti, phuṭṭho ceteti, phuṭṭho sañjānāti.

\textsuperscript{177} SĀ no.214, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 8) T02, p54a27-8: 眼色因緣生眼識 … 此三法和合觸。觸已受。受已想。想已
想。M no.148 Chachakka-sutta (III 282): cakkhañca paṭicca rūpe ca uppañjati cakkhuviññānam, tinnam saṅgati
phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā tanhā.

\textsuperscript{178} Nevertheless, though in the Pāli suttas the term sahajāta is not used in this context, in Pāli Abhidhamma texts such
as the Kv this term is used as a synonym for sampayutta. See the discussion of these terms in section 3.1.3.

\textsuperscript{179} See Anālayo 2011: 838-40 for a comparative study of this sūtra. However, Anālayo does not notice this difference
in the descriptions of the cognitive process in the different versions of the text.
well. Such discrepancies regarding this cognitive process in these parallel texts strongly suggest that in the early period, even before these canonical sūtras were settled, the early reciters already had different understandings of this cognitive process. In other words, the dispute between Harivarman and his Ābhidharmika opponents presented here in the TatSid can be traced back to very early Buddhist teachers who recited and compiled different sūtra collections.

### 3.4.4 The Opponent’s Argument 4 (66.6, 67.5)

(66.6) The opponent uses the teaching of the five “limbs of absorbtion” (dhyānāṅga 禪枝) in the sūtras to demonstrate that caitasikas can occur simultaneously. Numerous sūtras teach that in the first dhyāna (初禪) there are five dhyānāṅgas: applied thought (vitarka), sustained thought (vicāra), rapture (prīti), pleasure (sukha), and concentration (samādhi).

(67.5) Harivarman acknowledges that indeed the sūtras teach the five dhyānāṅgas. However, he understands the teaching differently. He proposes that these five aṅgas should be understood as mental phenomena that can possibly exist in the level (bhūmi 地) of the first dhyāna, but the sūtras do not teach that they occur all at once in the same moment. It is just like the feeling example that Harivarman used in 67.2. There are three kinds of feelings in the realm of sensual desire (kāma-dhātu 欲界): pleasant, unpleasant, and neither pleasant nor unpleasant. When it is said that someone has feelings, it does not mean that the person has these three feelings all at once. Similarly, when the sūtra says that there are five dhyānāṅgas in the first dhyāna, it does not mean that all five aṅgas occur simultaneously. In fact, the sūtra passage describing the first dhyāna actually lists the aṅgas first and then mentions the name of the dhyāna as the level (bhūmi) of practice.\(^{180}\) In other words, the sūtras never explicitly state that these dhyānāṅgas occur simultaneously. Moreover, Harivarman points out that he has already argued elsewhere (65.12-3, 65.17) that two of these aṅgas, vitarka and vicāra, cannot occur together. To

\(^{180}\) The formula of the first dhyāna (D I 73-4): so viveceva kāmehi, vivecca akusalehi dhammehi savitakkaṃ savicāraṃ vivekajāṃ pītisukhaṃ pathamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati.
sum up, the teaching of the five dhyānāṅgas cannot be used as proof for the doctrine of caitasikas and association (samprayoga).

Comments:
It should be noted that the term dhyānāṅga (or P. jhānaṅga, 禪枝 or 禪支) never occurs in the Āgamas or Nikāyas but was coined by commentators in their exegesis of the sūtras. Similarly, the term bhūmi (地) is never used as “stage” or “level” of practice in the early sūtras preserved in the Āgamas and Nikāyas. As a result, it is clear that, even though Harivarman bases his arguments mainly on the teachings of early sūtras, he is also fluent in later commentarial and Abhidharma literature, and has no problem in using the more recent terminologys in his arguments.

3.4.5 The Opponent’s Argument 5 (66.7, 67.6-7)
(66.7) The opponent quotes the sūtra that mentions the four stations of consciousness (vijñāna-sthiti 識住) to argue that vijñāna can coexist with vedanā, samjñā, and so forth. He argues that the sūtra teaches that vedanā, and so forth, are stations of consciousness; if vijñāna does not exist simultaneously with vedanā, how can it be said to be stationed within vedanā? Therefore, vedanā, and so forth, are the support station (*āśraya-sthiti 依止住) for vijñāna. Furthermore, the fact that the sūtras do not teach that vijñāna is the station of vijñāna demonstrates that the understanding of station (sthiti 住) as support station (*āśraya-sthiti 依止住) is correct; since one vijñāna cannot coexist with another vijñāna, vijñāna cannot be said to be a “support station” of another vijñāna.

(67.6) Harivarman answers that the opponent’s understanding of vijñāna-sthiti as support-station (*āśraya-sthiti 依處) is wrong; instead, the “station” (sthiti 住/處) should be understood as “object-station” (*ālambana-sthiti 綠處). The opponent would object that, if sthiti were ālambana-sthiti, because vijñāna can take another vijñāna as its object, then there should be five vijñāna-sthitis instead of four. Harivarman answers that it refers to the “object-station” (*ālambana-sthiti) because that vijñāna only stays for a
very short moment, and immediately following it *vedanā*, and so forth, will arise, and then there will arise craving (*ṭṛṣṇā*). As stated in the sūtra, if there is craving, consciousness will be established; therefore, *vedanā*, and so forth, are called stations of consciousness (*vijñāna-sthiti*), but consciousness (*vijñāna*) itself is not a *vijñāna-sthiti*. Moreover, in other sūtras the Buddha has mentioned seven *vijñāna-sthitis*, among which *vijñāna* is considered a *vijñāna-sthiti*.

(67.7) Harivarman further points out that one should understand this sūtra passage in terms of its meaning rather than on the basis of the words alone. He uses an example to demonstrate his point: in the Dharmapada it is taught that one can cross a river (a metaphor for *saṃsāra*) by faith (*śraddhā* 信), but actually one is liberated by wisdom (*prajñā* 慧). This example shows that the teachings in the sūtras are not always explicit and exhaustive; therefore, one should consider the meanings of the teachings rather than just following the words.

Comments:

This exchange is focused on the teaching of the four stations of consciousness (*vijñāna-sthiti* 識住). The sūtras state that the four of the five *skandhas*, namely, *rūpa*, *vedanā*, *saṃjñā*, and *saṃskāra*, are the four stations of consciousness. However, like many key terms in the sūtras, no explicit definition nor any detailed explanation of the term *sthiti* (住 or 住處) is given in the sūtras. What does it mean that consciousness is stationed (*tiṣṭhati* P. *titthati*, literally “stands”) in *rūpa*, and so forth? And among the five *skandhas*, why is *vijñāna* itself excluded and is not considered a *vijñāna-sthiti*? Moreover, as Harivarman has pointed out in 67.6, in other sūtras the Buddha also mentions seven *vijñāna-sthitis*, in which the sixth *sthiti* is the base (*āyatana*) or realm of the infinity of consciousness (*vijñānānantyāyatana* P. *viññāṇānācāyatan* 識無邊處), which Harivarman understands as *vijñāna*; thus, *vijñāna* is considered a *vijñāna-sthiti* in this group of seven *sthitis*. If so, why is *vijñāna* included as a station of consciousness in the seven *vijñāna-sthitis* but excluded in the four *vijñāna-sthitis*?

Harivarman’s position regarding the last question is made clear in 67.7: he thinks that *vijñāna* is definitely a *vijñāna-sthiti* and should be included in both lists, but the first list,
namely, the list of the four viññāna-sthitis, is incomplete. As a result, he says that in some cases the teaching in the sūtras is incomplete, and one should not attempt to understand such sūtras on the basis of their words alone.\textsuperscript{181}

As for the meaning of the term sthiti in the context of the viññāna-sthitis, the MVŚ gives four explanations:\textsuperscript{182}

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For what reason is [a thing] referred to as a station of consciousness (viññāna-sthiti 識住)? The answers are:

(1) Because viññāna is stationed (*tiṣṭhati 住) in this thing, stays equally (*saṃ-√sthā 等住), stays close (*upa-√sthā 近住); therefore, it is referred to as viññāna-sthiti. Just as a place where horses, and so forth, are stationed is referred to as a horse-station, and so forth.

(2) Some say that because in such a thing consciousness is moistened by delight (nandi-upasecana 憫所潤), increases and expands, hence, it is referred to as a station of consciousness.

(3) Some say that because upon such a thing consciousness moistened by craving (trṣṇā-upasecana 愛所潤), grasps and does not let go, hence, it is referred to as a station of consciousness.

(4) Some say that because in such a thing tainted (sāsrava 有漏) consciousness, [or] consciousness engaged in grasping (*upādāna-upaga 隨順取), begins to attach (執著) to, stands firmly (*pra-√sthā 安住) and increases, hence it is referred to as a station of consciousness.

Among the four interpretations given in the MVŚ, the first one (1) is an analysis of the term viññāna-sthiti. It first glosses the term sthiti with verbs derived from the same verbal root √sthā “to stand” such as tiṣṭhati “stands” (住), *saṃ-√sthā “stays equally” (等住), and *upa-√sthā “stays close” (近住). Then, it analyzes the compound, and compares it to the compound “horse-station:” just as a horse-station is where horses are stationed, similarly a station of consciousness is where consciousness is stationed. This is an interpretation based on the literal meaning of the term viññāna-sthiti.

The second (2) and the third (3) interpretations are based on teachings in the sūtras.

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\textsuperscript{181} For a more detailed discussion of Harivarman’s position on distinguishing meaning (artha 義) and words (vyāñjana 名字), see section 2.4.9.

\textsuperscript{182} No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706b27-c3: 何因緣故說名識住。答識於此中住。等住近住故名識住。如馬等住名馬等住。有說。此中憙所潤識增長廣大故名識住。有說。此中愛所潤識攝受不離故名識住。有說。此中諸有漏識隨順取識生起執著。安住增長故名識住。
Interpretation (2) states that a station of consciousness is that in which consciousness is moistened by delight and hence increases and expands; this is a quotation from the sūtra that teaches the four viññāna-sūtra-sthitis. Interpretation (3) is not a direct quotation from sūtra but might be based on a sūtra passage regarding the nutriments (āhāra). That sūtra says that if there is lust (rāga), delight (nandi), and craving (taṇha) as nutriments (āhāra), consciousness “becomes established (patiṭṭhitā) there and comes to growth.”

Although the exact term viññāna-sthiti does not appear here, clearly it is implied by the terms “consciousness is established there” (patiṭṭhitam tattha viññānaṃ). So the third interpretation (3) in the MVŚ can be seen as based on the sūtras, and it is understandable that Harivarman adopts these two interpretations in his arguments in 67.6.

The last interpretation (4) in the MVŚ is likely related to the term “engaged” (upaga P. upaya), which appears in the sūtras in relation to the viññāna-sthitis. In the sūtra that teaches the four skandhas as four viññāna-sthitis, it is said that consciousness is “engaged” with each of them. The term used in Pāli is upaya, while in Sanskrit it is likely upaga. The verbal roots for these two terms, namely, √i and √gam, are synonyms meaning “to go,” so both upaya and upaga have the meaning “approaching, going toward” or “concerning.” Another possibility is that upaya may have come from a MIA form representing upaga. The Chinese translation of this term in the relevant sūtras in the SĀ is “concealed and stagnant” (封滞), which has a strong negative connotation. Such a connotation perhaps comes from the statement in the same sūtra that “one who is engaged

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184 Or, perhaps the sūtra upon which it is based is no longer preserved. I owe this observation to Professor Collett Cox (private communication, 3/25/2015).

185 S no.12.64 (II 101): kabaliṭṭhe ce, bhikkhave, āhāre atthi rāgo atthi nandi atthi taṇhā, patiṭṭhitam tattha viññānaṃ virūḷham. Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (2000: 600): “If, bhikkhus, there is lust for the nutriment edible food, if there is delight, if there is craving, consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth.” Same with the other three nutriments: contact (phassa), volition (cetanā), and consciousness (viññāna).

186 The PTS edition has upāya, but Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000: 1059n69) suggests that perhaps upāya is a better reading. The Sanskrit edition of the sūtra is not extant, but from the quotation in the AKbh it is likely upaga. AKbh p117.22: rūpapagā viññāna-pagā saṃjñopagā saṃskāropagā iti.

187 SĀ no.40, No. 99 鍾阿含經 (卷 2) T02, p9b1-2: 色封滯識住。受想行封滯識住。
is unliberated.”¹⁸⁸ This negative connotation is echoed in interpretation (4) in the MVŚ in which *upaga* is glossed with “grasping” (*upādāna-upaga* 隨順取), and because of the grasping or attachment, consciousness is established (*pratiṣṭhita*) in *rūpa*, and so forth. Neither Harivarman nor his opponent mentions this interpretation in their arguments.

In addition to these four interpretations of *vijñāna*-sthiti, the MVŚ also gives a list of five different types of stations (*sthiti*): (1) associated (*saṃprayukta* 相應) station; (2) coexistent (*sahabhū* 俱有) station; (3) support (*āśraya* 所依) station; (4) object support (*ālambana* 所緣) station; and (5) object field (*viṣaya* 所行) station.¹⁹⁰ In 66.7, the opponent suggests that the *sthiti* in *vijñāna*-sthiti should be understood as a support (*āśraya* 所依) station, while Harivarman argues in 67.6 that it should be understood as object support (*ālambana* 所緣) station. The interpretation of *sthiti* as *āśraya*-sthiti does not appear to be based on a sūtra reference and may simply result from the literal interpretation of the term *sthiti*, which is the first interpretation given in the MVŚ. In 66.7 the opponent asks, “if there is no association, how can *vijñāna* be stationed in *vedanā*, and so forth?” However, the quoted sūtra passage does not explicitly state that *vijñāna* stands (*tiṣṭhati*) in *rūpa*, but rather it says *vijñāna* “while standing (*viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ*) might stand (*tiṭṭhayya*) engaged with *rūpa* (*rūpavyām*), based upon *rūpa* (*rūpārammaṇaṃ*), established upon *rūpa* (*rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ*), with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion.”¹⁹⁰ In this passage only the term “established upon *rūpa* (*rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ*)” could be understood as suggesting that *vijñāna* is “stationed in *rūpa*.” But the parallel phrase “based upon *rūpa* (*rūpārammaṇaṃ*)” indicates that actually both *rūpārammaṇaṃ* and *rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ* are glossing the term “engaged with *rūpa* (*rūpavyām*)” in the beginning of the sentence. In other words, if *rūpārammaṇaṃ* and *rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ* are understood to be approximate synonyms for *rūpavyām*, and the term *upāya* (or *upaga*) has a negative connotation related to “grasping” (*upādāna*) or attachment, then *rūpārammaṇaṃ* and *rūpappatiṭṭhaṃ* would more likely mean that consciousness is taking *rūpa* as an object support and becomes

¹⁸⁹ No. 154 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706b24-5: 有多種識住。謂相應識住。俱有識住。所依識住。所緣識住。所行識住。
fixed on it. From this perspective, the term *vijñāna-sthiti* does not convey the ontological sense that *vijñāna* is standing within *rūpa*, instead it should be understood in the epistemological sense that *vijñāna* is taking *rūpa* as its basis and becomes fixed on it. Therefore, it would appear that Harivarman’s interpretation presented in 67.6 is more in accord with the sūtra. On the other hand, the opponent’s understanding of *vijñāna-sthiti* is more literal, but somehow misses the point of the sūtra. Moreover, regarding the dispute of *caitasika* and association (*samprayoga*), the opponent’s ontological understanding of the sūtra apparently supports the *citta-caitasika* association mind-model, while Harivarman’s epistemological understanding is more ambiguous and cannot be easily taken as supporting either position in the dispute.

Concerning the question of why consciousness itself is not included in the four *vijñāna-sthitis* but is included in the seven *vijñāna-sthitis*, the MVŚ gives several different opinions.\(^{191}\) The AKBh also records a number of arguments,\(^{192}\) and Saṅghabhadra also presents a long discussion of this topic.\(^{193}\) However, time does not permit a full discussion of these arguments here.

### 3.4.6 The Opponent’s Argument 6 (66.8, 67.8-9, 20)

(66.8) The opponent quotes a sūtra stating that dharmas that are with *citta* (心與法) are born from *citta*, and dependent on *citta*. This actually repeats the argument presented in 61.4 and 61.10, but here the opponent emphasizes the coexistent relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*, while in chapter 61 the opponent emphasized the thesis that *citta* and *caitasikas* are separate entities.

(67.8) Harivarman responds that the opponent’s understanding of this passage is wrong. The fact that *caitasikas* are dependent on *citta* should be understood in the context of the cognitive process: first, *citta* cognizes an object, and after that it gives rise to *caitasikas* such as *saṃjñā*, and so forth.

(67.9) Next, Harivarman points out that, even though the sūtras teach that *vedanā*,

\(^{191}\) No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 137) T27, p706c-707a.

\(^{192}\) AKBh p117.28ff.

\(^{193}\) No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 22) T29, p465aff.
and so forth, are dependent on *citta*, the dependent relationship is not like that between a painting and the wall on which it hangs. In other words, the dependent relationship does not necessarily denote the coexistence of *citta* and *vedanā*, and so forth.

(67.20) Later in chapter 67, Harivarman returns to this question again and says that it has already been answered earlier.\(^\text{194}\)

Comments:
The opponent’s argument here repeats those presented in sections 61.4 and 61.10, and Harivarman’s answer is also the same as in 63.8. However, here (67.9) Harivarman adds the simile of a painting and the wall, which does not occur in his earlier arguments. The relationship between a painting and the wall supporting it is a good depiction of the Ābhidharmika understanding of the relationship between *caitasikas* and *citta*: they must occur simultaneously, and *citta* supports the *caitasikas* as the wall supports the painting. But Harivarman points out that the relationship between *citta* and other mental phenomena is never presented in this way in the *sūtras*. Although he does not give further details in the passage, in the *sūtra* that contains the simile of painting and wall,\(^\text{195}\) it is clear that the intention of the simile is to delineate a causal relationship rather than an ontological, coexistent relationship. The simile in the *sūtra* reads as follows:\(^\text{196}\)

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Suppose, bhikkhus, an artist or a painter, using dye or lac or turmeric or indigo or crimson, would create the figure of a man or a woman complete in all its features on a well-polished plank or wall or canvas. So too, when the uninstructed worldling produces (abhinibbatento)\(^\text{197}\) anything, it is only form (*rūpa*) that he produces (abhinibbati);\(^\text{198}\) only feeling (*vedanā*) that he produces; only perception (*sañkhāra*) that he produces; only consciousness (*viññāṇa*) that he produces.
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\(^{194}\) Sections 67.8-9 answer 66.8, 67.9-19 deals with other topics, then in 67.20 Harivarman suddenly returns to the topic in 66.8. It is likely that there might be some confusion with the order of the passages in the text.

\(^{195}\) S no.22.100 (III 152). It corresponds to SĀ no. 267.


\(^{197}\) The Chinese SĀ has 楽著 “enjoys and attaches” instead of “produces.”

\(^{198}\) The sentence in the Chinese SĀ is “[the ignorant worldling] enjoys and attaches to *rūpa*; because [he] enjoys and attaches to *rūpa*, [he] gives rise to future *rūpas.*” (SĀ no. 267, T II 69c27: 楽著於色。樂著色故。復生未來諸色。) In accordance with the Chinese version, which appears to make more sense, the first verb is likely a form of *abhinandati* “be delighted in” instead of the *abhinibbatento* “produce” in the Pāli version.
The parallelism between the simile of painting in the first half of the passage and the doctrine given in the second half of the passage suggests an interpretation. First, it is clear that the painter represents the “uninstructed worldling,” namely, the subject or agent of samsāra, or more precisely the mind (citta) of the worldling. Second, this agent produces the five skandhas, which include the non-mental as rūpa, and the mental beginning with vedanā. Therefore, when Harivarman refers to “vedanā, and so forth,” he is referring to the four mental skandhas. It would be perhaps best to understand the simile as showing how the activities of citta (i.e. karma) causes future existence represented by the five skandhas, and this is the interpretation that Harivarman adopts in 67.8 and 63.8. As for what the wall or canvas means in the simile, the passage does not give explicit parallels in the second half of the passage. In any case, it is clear that the wall does not represent citta, and thus the opponent’s interpretation that it represents the fact that caitasikas are dependent on citta as a painting depends on a wall definitely does not appear to be supported by the sūtra passage itself.

3.4.7 The Opponent’s Argument 7 (66.10, 67.10, 67.21)

(66.10) The opponent states that because citta and caitasikas are weak (*daurbalya 贏劣) by nature, neither of them can work alone, and they have to depend on and assist each other to function properly with regard to an object. It is like bundles of reeds that must rely on each other to stand.

(67.21) Harivarman proposes a different understanding of the term “weak” (*daurbalya 贏劣). For the opponent, “weak” means that citta or caitasika cannot work alone and must assist each other, but Harivarman proposes that a thing is called “weak” because it perishes moment by moment and cannot abide for a prolonged period of time. Also, he suggests that citta and caitasikas cannot assist each other, because, in that case, citta and caitasikas would need to abide temporarily, but in fact one cannot observe that they abide. Moreover, if they were able to assist each other, the theory of association (samprayoga) would be redundant.200

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199 The Pāli commentary says that the wall represents samsāra with its three realms. See Bodhi 2000: 775n173.
200 It is uncertain what Harivarman means in this last sentence. For the Ābhidharmaikas, the relationship between citta
(67.10) In this passage, Harivarman answers the second part of the opponent’s argument in 66.10 concerning the simile of bundles of reeds. He argues that the bundle simile used by the opponent contradicts the teachings in the sūtra. In the simile, the bundles rely on each other equally and there is no difference in their status in the inter-dependent relationship; in other words, it is not the case that one of the two bundles dominates and the other is subordinate. But since the sūtras only teach that caitasikas are born from citta and dependent on citta, and not the other way around, it is clear that in their relationship citta dominates and caitasikas are secondary. If the opponent responds that citta is dominant and arises first, and caitasikas follow in dependence on it, this is virtually the same position that Harivarman supports, namely, citta arises first, and caitasikas follow, and, at the moment of citta, caitasikas have not yet arisen. Therefore, citta and caitasikas do not arise simultaneously and assist each other.

Comments:
In the Sarvāstivāda-Vaihāsika Abhidharma texts, the notion of “weak” (*daurbalya) is not limited to citta and caitasikas. In the MVŚ, “weak” can be applied to all conditioned (samskṛta 有為) dharmas, that is, dharmas that arise from causes and conditions. It is said that conditioned dharmas are weak by nature, just as a weak person must stand relying on others, but a strong person does not need to rely on others. Concerning why dharmas that arise from causes are weak, the MVŚ gives two opinions:

The term “weak by self-nature (svabhāva 自性)” means that conditioned dharmas (samskṛta-dharma 有為法) have a nature of arising from conditions (pratayaya 維法) established as their self-nature. Some say that because conditioned [dharmas] arise and cease so [they] are weak by

and caitasikas that assist each other is samprayoga; the “assistant power” (相助力) would not be something different from the capability of association. It appears likely Harivarman understands these two notions as different and mutually exclusive; otherwise, the phrase, “if one exists, the other…” would be redundant.

201 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 21) T27, p106a1-2: 有為法性羸劣故有因有作用故有果。如羸劣者依他而住非勇健者。
202 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 55) T27, p283b29-c9: 自性羸劣者。謂諸有為法從緣生性立自性名。有說。有為有生滅故自性羸劣。有說。有為從緣生故自性羸劣。如契經說。苾芻當知。色是無常。諸因諸緣能生色者亦是無常。色是無常因緣所起色云何常。受想行識亦復如是。由羸劣故諸有為法。或四緣生或三緣生或二緣生。尚無一緣獨能生者。何況無人。尚無一人獨令起住。何況無人。
self-nature. Others say that because conditioned [dhammas] arise from conditions, so [they] are weak by self-nature. As it is taught in the sūtra, “Bhikṣus, [you] should know, rūpa is impermanent, the causes and conditions that give rise to rūpa are also impermanent. How could rūpa that arises from impermanent causes and conditions be permanent?” Vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna are also thus. Because [they] are weak, some conditioned dharmas arise from four conditions, some from three, and some from two. There is no [dharma] that can arise from one condition alone, let alone without a condition. So, conditioned dharmas are weak by self-nature. Just like those who are weak by illness; some get up and stand supported by four people, some by three, some by two people. [A sick person] cannot get up and stand supported even by one single helper, let alone no supporter at all.

This passage from the MVŚ offers two opinions concerning why conditioned dharmas (samskrta-dharma 有為法) are “weak” (*daurbalya 贏劣): (1) conditioned dharmas arise and cease, or they are impermanent; (2) conditioned dharmas arise from conditions, or, in other words, their existence depends on other dharmas, like a sick person who can stand only if supported by others. These two opinions can be correlated with the diachronic and synchronous aspects of the teaching of dependent origination. The first opinion regarding the impermanence of dharmas emphasizes a temporal and successive, i.e. i.e. diachronic, relationship, while the second opinion emphasizes the inter-dependent relationship among dharmas and hence a simultaneous or synchronous relationship.

Since both citta and caitasika are conditioned dharmas, the idea that they are weak could be understood as a natural extension of the more general idea that all samskrta-dharmas are weak as shown in the MVŚ passage. It is obvious that in 66.10 the opponent adopts the second opinion in the MVŚ passage above, which proposes that a conditioned dharma cannot arise by itself but only functions with the assistance of other dharmas. This position is in accordance with the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika theories of the “coexistent cause” (sahabhū-hetu) and more importantly the “association cause” (samprayukta-hetu), which represent the two types of synchronous causation, with the later

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203 SĀ no.11, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 1) T02, p2a22-6: 鬱時。世尊告諸比丘。色無常。若因若緣生諸色者。彼亦無常。無常因無常緣所生諸色。云何有常。如是受想行識無常。若因若緣生諸識者。彼亦無常。無常因無常緣所生諸識。云何有常。S no.22.18 (III 23): rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, aniccaṃ. yopi hetu, yopi paccayo rūpassa uppādāya, sopi anicco. aniccasambhūtām, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ kuto nīccan bhavissati…
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a special instance of the former.\(^{204}\) The MVŚ also records several similes used by the Abhidharma teachers to explain the *samprayukta* relationship between *citta* and *caitasikas*, including the simile of the bundles of reeds that stand relying on each other.\(^{205}\)

By contrast, Harivarman’s opinion in 67.21 that “weak” means that a dharma is momentary and impermanent emphasizes the diachronic aspect of dependent origination, which is associated with the Dārśṭāntikas/Sautrāntikas in Abhidharma texts.\(^{206}\) For Harivarman, if two dharmas are said to assist each other, they must abide together temporarily, but in fact all mental phenomena perish moment by moment, and none of them can be observed to abide over time.\(^{207}\) So he concludes that it is impossible for *citta* and *caitasikas* to assist each other, and the opponent’s understanding of “weak” is incorrect.

In 67.10 Harivarman attacks the opponent’s argument that uses the simile of the bundles of reeds. He argues that, if it is the case, as the opponent argues, that *citta* and *caitasikas* assist each other like two bundles of reeds, which would entail that *citta* and *caitasikas* are in a mutually equal position in a synchronic or simultaneous causal relationship, then one would not be able to tell which one of them is dominant. How then can one account for the sūtra teaching that *caitasikas* are born from *citta* and dependent on *citta*, which explicitly asserts that *citta* is the dominant member in the relationship? This argument is not addressed in any extant Abhidharma text.

### 3.4.8 The Opponent’s Argument 8 (66.9, 67.11-19)

(66.9) The opponent quotes the sūtra saying that the minds of sentient beings have long been polluted by lust, hatred, and so forth, and argues that, if there were no association of

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\(^{204}\) See the discussion of the Sarvāstivāda theories of association in section 3.1.3. For the *sahabhū-hetu* and the dispute around it, see Dhammajoti 2007b:196-211.

\(^{205}\) The three similes used in the MVŚ to explain *samprayoga* are: (1) two bundles of reeds stand relying on each other; (2) many ropes joined to pull a log; (3) many people cross a river with hands joined. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷16) T27, p80b16-21: 問何故心心所法展轉為相應因。答展轉為因故。展轉力生故。展轉相引故。展轉相養故。展轉相增故。展轉相依故。如二蘆束相依而住。多繩相合能牽大木。多人連手能渡大河。有為諸法性羸劣故。展轉相依方辦事業義。 See also the discussion in 3.1.3.

\(^{206}\) This position is not explicitly attributed to the Dārśṭāntikas in the MVŚ. But Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānusāra* records the Sautrāntika master Srlātā’s arguments for such a position. See Dhammajoti 2007a: 152-3.

\(^{207}\) For a discussion of the Buddhist notion of momentariness with regard to mental phenomena, see von Rospatt 1995: 113ff.

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citta and caitasikas, it would be impossible for negative mental phenomena, that is, defilements as caitasikas, to defile citta. It should be noted that the same sūtra was quoted by the opponent in 61.14 to argue that caitasikas exist, and Harivarman also quoted it in 60.6 as a scriptural authority (āgama) to show that, since they are not mentioned in the sūtra, caitasikas do not exist.

(67.11-12) Harivarman answers that the opponent’s argument is unreasonable. He argues that if it were the case, as the opponent proposes, that the nature of citta is pure and only accidental defilements such as lust, hatred, and so forth, were associated with citta making it polluted, this would mean that something that is pure by nature can be polluted and changes its nature. This contradicts the doctrine that the characteristic mark, which is the manifestation of the nature, cannot be changed. In other words, if the nature of citta is pure, because the nature of a dharma cannot be changed, defilements such as lust, and so forth, should not be able to pollute citta.

(67.13) Harivarman then responds from a different perspective, pointing out that it is said in the sūtra quoted by the opponent that, because a sentient being’s mind is polluted, the sentient being itself is polluted. If it were true that this sūtra supports the doctrine that citta and defilements such as lust and so forth are associated with citta, then it should also support the position that the defilements are associated with sentient beings; but this is absurd. So if defilements cannot be associated with a sentient being, in the same manner they cannot be associated with citta.

(67.14-15) Harivarman then specifies his own theory on the process by which citta is polluted and liberated. He proposes that the pollution and purification of citta are not about individual moments of citta but describe the status of a continuous stream (santati) of citta. In a series of cittas, if there are cittas that are defilements, then this series of cittas is referred to as defiled or polluted; on the other hand, in a polluted series of cittas, when pure cittas arise, this series is called liberated.

(67.16-18) Harivarman uses the simile from the sūtra concerning clouds and fog that conceal the sun and the moon to illustrate the relationship between defilements and citta. He states that, even though clouds and fog are not directly associated with the sun and the

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208 See 2.4.11.
209 See 2.3.3.
moon, they can still conceal them. Likewise, defilements such as greed, and so forth, though not associated with \textit{citta}, can still pollute it.

The opponent points out that this simile is actually not consistent with Harivarman’s position, because in Harivarman’s theory both pure and defiled \textit{cittas} are moments in the series, and, since there can be only one \textit{citta} at one moment, these two kinds of \textit{cittas} cannot occur simultaneously. But in the case of clouds and fog covering the sun and the moon, they do occur simultaneously. So this is not a proper simile to support Harivarman’s position.

Harivarman answers in 67.18 that even though the two kinds of \textit{cittas} cannot occur at the same moment, defilements can obstruct \textit{cittas}. Therefore, there is no problem with the simile regarding his position.

(67.19) Harivarman concludes by restating his position that defilements are not associated with \textit{citta} but occur in the series of \textit{cittas} and can then be said to defile the stream of \textit{citta}.

Comments:

Sections 67.11-19 present a rather lengthy answer to the opponent’s statement in 66.9 that the sūtra teaching regarding the defilement of a sentient being’s mind supports the \textit{citta-caitasika} theory. The answer can be divided into four separate arguments:

(i) 67.11-12 is an argument that focuses on the nature of \textit{citta}: namely, if the nature of \textit{citta} is pure, then defilements would not be able to pollute it. The doctrine of “\textit{citta}’s original purity” (*\textit{citta}-\textit{prakṛti-pariśuddha} 心性本淨) is usually attributed to the Vibhajyavādins (分別說部),\textsuperscript{210} and also the Mahāsāṅghikas (大眾部).\textsuperscript{211} The Sarvāstivādins are against this doctrine, and the MVŚ dedicates a lengthy passage to refuting it.\textsuperscript{212} Apparently, on this point, Harivarman agrees with the Sarvāstivādins. In chapter 30 of the TatSid, Harivarman argues that it is not the case that the mind’s nature is

\textsuperscript{210} No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 27) T27, p140b24-6: 譏或有執心性本淨。如分別論者。彼說心本性清淨。客塵煩惱所染污故相不清淨。
\textsuperscript{212} No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 27) T27, p140b26-141a28: 為是彼執顯示心性非本清凈客塵煩惱所染污故相不清浄…
pure.\textsuperscript{213} Here in 67.11-2, Harivarman is likely refuting an opponent who is also a supporter of the “original pure citta” idea, and his strategy entails reductio ad absurdum: if it is true that citta is pure by nature, and the accidental defilements such as lust come to be associated with and pollute citta, then it means that something that has a pure nature can be polluted. However, this is unacceptable given the model of a dharma’s characteristic (*dharma-lakṣaṇa 法相).\textsuperscript{214}

(ii) Section 67.13 presents Harivarman’s second argument against the opponent’s use of āgama supporting association. Once more, he takes the strategy of reductio ad absurdum. The opponent quotes the sūtra passage stating that, when sentient beings’ minds are defiled, these sentient beings are defiled, and argues that “defiled” refers to those defilements such as lust, and so forth, that arise and become associated with citta. Harivarman points out that, if this is the case, then the same principle can be applied to the other subject in the quoted passage, namely, the sentient beings; thus, the sūtra should also be understood to claim that the sentient beings are defiled. So according to the same logic, it should be said that defilements are associated with the sentient beings. But in fact, it is never claimed that the sentient beings are associated with the defilement. So, this sūtra passage cannot be taken as a proper āgama proof for the doctrine of association.

Moreover, this round of arguments raises the issue of sūtra exegesis once again. The opponent, supposedly an Ābhidharmika, understands the sūtra passage more in relation to Abhidharma technical terms. For him, the notion of citta being defiled is equivalent to “being associated with defilements (i.e. caitasikas).” However, as Harivarman points out, if a technical sense of the term “defiled” is assumed in the passage, it could be applied to both citta and sentient being. But the opponent accepts the application of the term “defiled” in the Abhidharma technical sense only in reference to citta, and not in reference to “sentient beings.”

(iii) In 67.14-15, Harivarman explains how he understands the mechanism of the pollution of mind. For him, the “pollution” is the defilement of the “stream” of citta

\textsuperscript{213} No. 1646 成實論 (卷 3) T32, p258b2-20.

\textsuperscript{214} Saṅghabhadra records a similar argument from the Sarvāstivādins. No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 72) T29, p733b17-9: 又若說心以淨為性。後與煩惱相應位中。轉成染者應失自性。既失自性應不名心。故不應說心本性淨。有時客塵煩惱所染。For a more comprehensive study of the thought of the “original pure mind” in early Buddhism, see Yinshun 印順 1988b: 67-79; Mizuno 1997: 219-33.
instead of each individual moment of *cittas*. He proposes that if there are defiled *cittas* arising in a successive series of *cittas*, then the “stream” is defiled; and when there are purified *cittas* arising in the stream, it is liberated. If one understands it in this way, it would not be necessary to introduce the doctrine of association to account for the defilement and purification of *cittas*.

(iv) In 67.16-19, Harivarman uses the simile of clouds and fog as covering the sun and moon to argue that as clouds and fog that are not associated with the sun and the moon but can still obstruct their light, similarly defilements (*kleśa*) are not associated with *citta* but still can defile *citta*. Of course, as he has clarified in the previous passages, here too “defiled *citta*” actually refers to the defiled stream of *cittas*. But in 67.17, an unspecified opponent contends that this simile is not suitable for Harivarman’s theory of defilement because clouds and fogs exist simultaneously with the sun or moon. However, according to Harivarman, defilements are merely certain modes of *cittas* that may lead to future existence in *samsāra*;\(^\text{215}\) further, at one moment there can be only one *citta*, and two *cittas* cannot coexist. As a result, in Harivarman’s theory *citta* and defilements cannot occur simultaneously, which obviously contradicts the simile that clouds and fog coexist with the sun and the moon and conceal their light.

In 67.18, Harivarman responds briefly that, since defilements can act as obstacles (*antarāyika* 障礙), they are similar to clouds and fogs. Therefore, the simile is suitable. Since Harivarman does not give further details, it is difficult to understand precisely how the cloud/sun relationship parallels the defilement/*citta* relationship. However, perhaps he understands that, because defilements pollute the stream of *cittas* and prevent beings from achieving liberation, this is equivalent to obstructing a sentient being’s liberation. If so, the parallelism between the simile and Harivarman’s theory is more abstract than figurative.

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\(^{215}\) No. 1646 成實論 (卷 9) T32, p308c27-p309a1: 墮心行名為煩惱。問曰。何謂為堕。答曰。若心能令生死相續。是為墮。此墮心差別。為貪恚癡等。
3.4.9 The Opponent’s Argument 9 (66.11, 67.22-3)

(66.11) The opponent quotes a sūtra passage about the seven factors of awakening (bodhyaṅga 覺意) to prove that caitasikas exist and are associated with citta. The sūtra passage states that, when a practitioner’s mind is excited (uddhata 掉動), it is not suitable to practice three factors of awakening, namely, discrimination of dharmas (dharmapravicaya 擇法), energy (vīrya 精進), and joy (prīti 喜), because they may make the mind more excited. Instead, one should practice tranquility (praśrabdhi 猗), concentration (samādhi 定), and equanimity (upekṣā 捨), because they inhibit the arousal of mind. The sūtra also states that, when the mind is sluggish (līna 懈沒), it is not suitable to practice tranquility, concentration, and equanimity. Instead one should practice discrimination of dharmas, energy, and joy because they can arouse the mind. Mindfulness (smṛti 念) can be helpful in both cases.

(67.22) Harivarman responds that when the sūtra states that on a certain occasion one should practice three factors of awakening (bodhyaṅga), it does not mean that the three are practiced all together at the same moment. He quotes another sūtra to prove his point: in that sūtra, Śāriputra claims that he can enter and abide in a certain bodhyaṅga at will whenever he wishes. One should also understand the sūtra passage quoted in 66.11 in a similar manner: when the sūtra teaches that one should practice three bodhyaṅgas, it means the practitioner should practice one of the three at a time, and not all three of them together.

(67.23) Harivarman adds that in addition to the sūtra the opponent quoted in 66.11, in another sūtra the Buddha also presents the seven bodhyaṅgas as a progressive sequence that a practitioner should achieve one after another. Because this repeats the same āgama argument given in 65.26, Harivarman does not give further details here.

Comments:
The sūtra passage quoted by the opponent in 66.11 is rather ambiguous. It states that on certain occasions one should practice three of the seven bodhyaṅgas, but it does not explicitly state that these three bodhyaṅgas are to be practiced together at the same time. The ambiguity of this passage is even more apparent in the MVŚ, which notes that the
Dārṣṭāntikas use the same sūtra passage to argue for the opposite position. According to the MVŚ, the Dārṣṭāntikas quote this passage as follows:  

Since the bodhyaṅgas have proper and improper occasions to be practiced, therefore, one knows that caitasikas arise successively and not simultaneously.

But the Vaibhāṣikas answer that this passage should be understood as indicating that the three bodhyaṅgas are practiced together, and this is a proof that caitasikas do occur simultaneously.

As for the sūtra quoted by Harivarman in 67.22 regarding Śāriputra’s claim that he can enter the bodhyaṅgas at will, the MVŚ also records that the Dārṣṭāntikas use the same sūtra to argue that a practitioner enters the bodhyaṅgas one at a time and not multiple bodhyaṅgas simultaneously. Harivarman does not include his opponent’s answer to this argument, but the MVŚ records the following.

The Śāriputra-sūtra they (i.e. the Dārṣṭāntikas) have quoted does not necessarily exclude the meaning that [the bodhyaṅgas can] arise simultaneously. [It] states that Śāriputra knows well the minds that enter and leave the concentrations of the factors of awakening (*bodhyaṅga-samādhi 覺支定), [and he can] dwell in the *bodhyaṅga-samādhis at will (自在) as his mind wishes. That means that he can dwell in the bodhyaṅgas in accordance with the occasion (*kāla 時分) and not that the bodhyaṅgas arise separately one by one. Therefore, [this sūtra] cannot be a proof [for the position that the bodhyaṅgas are a progressive sequence].

Here, the Vaibhāṣikas argue that the sūtra does not mean that Śāriputra enters the bodhyaṅgas one at a time; rather it means that Śāriputra enters the “concentrations of the

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216 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p494a6-8: 彼作是說。覺支既有時非時修。故知心所次第而生。非一時起。
217 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p494a15-18: 問若諸心所有一時生。云何通彼所引契經。答前契經說。時非時修三覺支者。乃證心所非要次第一一而生。說三覺支一時修故。證諸心所有俱時生。
218 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p494a8-14: 又餘經說。舍利子言。我於七覺支定能隨意自在住。謂我欲於此覺支定日初分住。即便能住。若我欲於此覺支定日中分住。即便能住。若我欲於此覺支定日後分住。即便能住。彼作是說。既舍利子於七覺支隨所欲住。故知心所次第而生。非一時起其理決定。
219 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 96) T27, p494b21-4: 彼後所引舍利子經亦不定遮一時生義。謂舍利子。善知入出覺支定。於覺支定。隨心所欲能自在住。此依時分說住覺支隨意自在。不說別起一－－覺支。故不成證。Following this passage, the MVŚ gives a number of examples of different types of samādhis as different “occasions.”
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bodhyaṅgas” (*bodhyaṅga-samādhi 覺支定), and, in each of the samādhis, there can be multiple bodhyaṅgas present. In this regard, each samādhi is an “occasion” (*kāla 時分). So they argue that the sūtra claims that Śāriputra can enter at will different kinds of samādhis instead of individual bodhyaṅgas. So, they conclude that this sūtra cannot stand as an āgama proof for the Dārṣṭāntika position that each of the bodhyaṅgas arises individually and progressively.

However, this argument relies heavily on the term *bodhyaṅga-samādhi (覺支定) and interprets samādhi as an “occasion” (*kāla 時分) in which multiple bodhyaṅgas can occur. And indeed, the term samādhi is present in the version of the sūtra in the Chinese SĀ.220 However, since in the Pāli version of the sūtra, the key term samādhi is absent in this passage,221 it appears more reasonable to understand this passage as stating that Śāriputra dwells with a certain, that is, one of the seven bodhyaṅgas present. Moreover in 67.22, Harivarman does not mention samādhi when he quotes this sūtra. Once again, it appears that a doctrinal position may have influenced the selection of different versions of a text. The Chinese SĀ is likely affiliated with the Sarvāstivādins, so it is no surprise that it agrees with the MVŚ. In many cases, Harivarman uses texts close to the Sarvāstivāda versions, but here because the keyword samādhi is so essential to his argument that one might suspect that he was aware of and chose another version of the sūtra without the word samādhi.

Regarding Harivarman’s statement in 67.23 that in the sūtras the seven bodhyaṅgas are also taught as a progressive sequence, the MVŚ records that the Bhadanta Ghoṣaka (尊者妙音) uses the same sūtra passage to explain why the seven bodhyaṅgas are presented in this specific order,222 and it appears that the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas have no issue with this sūtra and the seven bodhyaṅgas as a sequential process.

220 SĀ no. 718. No. 99 杂阿含經 (卷 27) T2, p193b17-20: 此七覺分決定而得。不勤而得。我隨所欲。覺分正受。若晨朝時。日中時。日暮時。若欲正受。隨其所欲。多入正受。Here samādhi is translated as 正受.
221 S no.46.4 (V 71): īmesaṃ khyāham āvuso sattanam bojjhaṅgānaṃ yena yena bojjhaṅgena ākaṅkhāmi pubbhasamayaṃ viharituṃ tena tena bojjhaṅgena pubbhasamayaṃ viharāmi... 222 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 96) T27, p497a29-b14: 問何故七覺支中先說念覺支。乃至後說捨覺支耶。答隨順文詞巧妙次第法故。後次順隨說者受者輕便次第法故。尊者妙音作如是說。已見諦者。憶念先時所現觀事而為上首。修習覺支令漸圓滿。如契經說。彼於此法繫念思惟令不迷謬。起念覺支修令圓滿。念圓滿已於法簡擇籌量觀察起擇法覺支修令圓滿。擇法滿已發勤精進心不退屈。起精進覺支修令圓滿。精進滿已發生勝喜心不染著。起喜覺支修令圓滿。喜圓滿已身心猗適離惛沈故。起輕安覺支修令圓滿。輕安滿已身心悅樂得三摩地。
3.4.10 The Opponent's Argument 10 (66.12, 67.24-6)

(66.12) In this passage, the opponent first clarifies that this argument represents the view of certain treatise teachers (*śāstrācarya 論師), which implies that it is not based on sūtras. According to the śāstra teachers, a practitioner cultivates the factors contributing to awakening (bodhipākṣika 助菩提法) all at once and not separately.

(67.24) Harivarman first responds that this cannot be correct because, if one can practice all thirty-seven factors at the same time, then one can practice two factors of faith (śraddhā 信), and five factors of mindfulness (smṛti 念), and so forth. This is unacceptable, so the opponent’s argument must be incorrect.

(67.25-26) Harivarman then attacks the opponent’s position from another aspect. First, he tries to clarify what the opponent means by practiced “not separately” (不離) in 66.12. Harivarman suggests that the opponent interprets “to practice the bodhyaṅgas separately” (離修) to refer to achieving the factors one at a time, and the practitioner practices the factor on the occasion when he achieves it (隨得處修). The opponent disagrees but instead proposes that, when a practitioner enters a certain level of practice (bhūmi 地), such as the second dhyāna, multiple bodhyaṅgas are present at that level and the practitioner practices them all together and not separately. Harivarman responds in 67.26 that this cannot be correct because one cannot practice multiple dharmas in one moment of mind.

Comments:
The identity of the “treatise teachers” (*śāstrācarya 論師) mentioned by the opponent in 66.12 is unclear. In the Pāli Abhidhamma commentarial tradition, according to Buddhaghosa, when a practitioner has attained the purification by knowing and seeing (ñāṇadassana-visuddhi), that is, when one has attained the knowledge of the four paths of
stream-enterer, once-returner, non-returner, and arahat, the practitioner will fulfill the thirty-seven factors contributing to awakening (bodhipāksika P. bodhipakkhiya) all at once. In other words, all the thirty-seven factors are present simultaneously in this single moment. Although the view of these “treatise teachers” (*śāstrācarya 論師) agrees with that of the Pāli commentators such as Buddhaghosa, it is not at all certain that the opponent has these commentators in mind. First, the commentary only says that at that specific moment all thirty-seven factors are “fulfilled” (paripuṇṇa) and present, but does not mention that they are “practiced” (修). So strictly speaking, this position differs from that presented in 66.12, which states that the thirty-seven factors are “practiced at the same time” (一時修). Secondly, a number of northern Abhidharma texts also present the idea that multiple factors contributing to awakening (bodhipāksika) may occur simultaneously. For example, the MVŚ states that all thirty-seven factors may occur in the first dhyāna, and thirty-four of them can coexist in the same moment. The AKBh also quotes a sūtra saying that when one has practiced and fulfilled the eight-fold noble path (āryāṣṭāṅga-mārga), all remaining twenty-nine factors among the thirty-seven are also practiced and fulfilled. However, no extant sūtra has yet been identified for this passage quoted by Vasubandhu.

Thus, it is clear that many teachers believe that multiple factors among the thirty-seven bodhipāksikas can occur simultaneously within one moment of citta. For the supporters of caitasika and samprayoga, this would be a good argument in support of their position. As presented in 67.26, Harivarman’s response to this argument is simple and straightforward. Since it is widely accepted among Buddhist teachers that at one moment there can be only one citta, and since the practice of one of the factors among the thirty-seven is an instance of a certain type of citta, and since there cannot be thirty-seven

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223 Vism XXII.2 (PTS ed. p672): sotāpattimaggo sakadāgāmimaggo anāgāmimaggo arahattamaggo ti imesu pana catusu maggesu nāṇām nāṇādassanavisuddhi nāma.


225 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 96) T27, p497c8-9: 初靜慮中具三十七。唯三十四俱時現前。除三念住。

226 AKBh p385.7-8: tathā hyuktaṃ “āryāṣṭāṅge khatu mārga bhāvanāparipūri gacchati. catvāri smṛtyupasthānāṁ bhāvanāparipūriṁ gacchanti yāvat saṁti bodhiyānāṁ”?

227 La Vallée Poussin (1988: 1083n444) notes that this passage is similar to a passage in the M no. 118 the Ānāpānasati-sutta (III 87-8), but that sutta only states that when the four applications of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) are fulfilled, the seven factors of awakening (satta sambojjhānga) are also fulfilled. The remaining factors among the thirty-seven are not mentioned.
cittas all occur in one moment, so it is impossible for a practitioner to practice all the thirty-seven factors simultaneously.

Harivarman does not record any response from the opponent, but this should not pose a serious problem for the Ābhidharmikas since, in their opinion, the thirty-seven factors contributing to awakening are nothing but caitasikas by different names. Among the seven sets, there are quite a few caitasikas repeated, as Harivarman mentioned in 67.25; for example, faith (śraddhā 信) appears twice and mindfulness (smṛti 念) appears five times. However, the Ābhidharmikas have taken care of this issue: the Vaibhāṣikas reduce the thirty-seven factors to eleven or twelve “real entities” (dravya 實體); Vasubandhu proposes that there are actually only ten; and the Pāli commentary reduces the thirty-seven to fourteen factors. Since multiple caitasikas can coexist with citta, there is no problem in allowing multiple factors among the thirty-seven to coexist in a practitioner’s mind.

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223 No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 96) T27, p496a22-28: 問菩薩分法名有三十七。實體有幾耶。答此實體。有十一或十二。若以一切攝入覺支即七覺支。名既有七實體亦七信正思惟各一種正語業命。有說為二。正命即是正語業故。有說為三。正語業外有正命故。若說為二即唯十一。若說為三則有十二。AKBh p.383.21-384.1: vaibhaśīkānām ekādaśa: kāyavākkarmaṇorasmhinnatvā śīlāṅgāni dve dravye iti.

228 AKBh verse vi.67a-c (p.383.7-11): daśa dravyāṇi sarve bodhipakṣyāh. katamāni daśa? śraddhā viryaṃ smṛtyiḥ prajñā samādhiḥ prītyupekṣane praśrabhiḥśīlāṅgāni ity etāni daśa dravyāṇi.

Chapter 4. Conclusion

The previous chapters (2-3) discussed in detail the positions and arguments of Harivarman and his opponents regarding the issue of mental factors (caitasika) and association (samprayoga). Notes in the translation chapter (5) and the comments in chapters 2-3 focused mainly on textual, historical, and Buddhist doctrinal issues raised in the dispute. As a conclusion, this chapter will look beyond the minute textual, doctrinal, and historical details, and look at the “big picture” in terms of more general issues such as: What are the possible causes for the dispute, why do the parties in the dispute take their specific positions, and what we can learn from the dispute on mind? Section 4.1 in this chapter recapitulates briefly the main positions of the two parties in the dispute, and section 4.2 explores the possible causes and reasons for the different doctrines and positions among early Buddhist teachers.

4.1 Recapitulation of the Positions

The *Tattvasiddhi records more than fifty arguments from teachers of two camps arguing for or against the theory of mind involving the concepts of “mental factors” (caitasika) and “association” (samprayoga). On the one hand, supporters of the “mental factor” theory of mind argue that mental factors are real entities different from consciousness (citta or vijñāna), but they must exist interdependently with each other and with consciousness as well; this interdependent relationship is “association” (samprayoga). On the other hand, Harivarman, who is likely representing the so-called “Dārṣṭāntika” teachers, argues that “mental factors” such as contact, feeling, volition, lust, craving, mindfulness, concentration, and so forth are not entities separate from consciousness; instead, they are precisely consciousness in its different modes.

Most of the arguments in the TatSid involve so-called “scriptural” arguments, or quotations from early sūtras, offered as authoritative proof (āgama) for a particular position. However, because the doctrines of “mental factors” and “association” are neither explicitly taught nor rejected in the sūtras, both sides of the dispute have to use
sūtra passages in a tactical way: they choose passages from the sūtras that contain names of mental phenomena, and interpret the passage in a way that supports their own position. A good example would be the early Buddhist teaching of the five aggregates (skandha), which asserts that a sentient being consists of the five aggregates of form (rūpa), feeling (vedanā), apperception (samjñā), volitional formations (saṃskāra), and consciousness (vijñāna). Supporters of “mental factors” claim that aside from rūpa, which is material and non-mental, and vijñāna, which is consciousness itself, the other three skandhas, namely, vedanā, samjñā, and saṃskāra, are mental factors (caitasika) that are distinct from consciousness. Some even suggest that the aggregate saṃskāra is an umbrella category that includes all the mental factors that are not explicitly listed as skandhas. On the other hand, Harivarman and those teachers who reject the notion of “mental factors” deny that this is the correct understanding of the sūtra teaching of the five skandhas. Instead, they suggest that the sūtra teaching that a person consists of the five skandhas should be understood as denoting that a person is a continuous series of moments of consciousness (santati), and the skandhas of vedanā, samjñā, and saṃskāra are all consciousness (vijñāna) in different modes.¹

These arguments contained in the TatSid are sophisticated and logically well formulated in the context of the concerns of Buddhist teachers at the time. However, how should we, as modern readers two thousand years after the compilation of the texts, read and understand them? What are the possible causes that have led to the competing different models of mind and to the different understanding of the sūtras? The following section (4.2) offers three possible causes for the dispute from historical, doctrinal, and psychological perspectives respectively.

¹ This example is extracted from TatSid 65.3 and 67.2. See 3.4.1 for a more detailed discussion.
4.2 Possible Causes for the Dispute

4.2.1 The Ontological Shift from Sūtra to Abhidharma

Scholars have noticed that the early sūtras and the relatively later Abhidharma texts have different emphases in their concerns: the teachings in the sūtras are more focused on understanding how a person is a person in terms of the causal relations among mental phenomena, and they have minimal concern, or even dismiss the ontological question of what these phenomena really are. But the later Abhidharma, especially as developed in the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda traditions, has a strong emphasis on the ontological status of such mental phenomena and develop notions such as “self nature” (svabhāva) and “real entity” (dravya) that reflect these ontological concerns. It is helpful to understand the origin of the discrepancy between the two opinions regarding “mental factors” and the debate between them in the general background of the shifting concerns between the early stage of Buddhism represented in the sūtras and the later stage represented by the Abhidharma texts.

In a number of sūtras, ontological questions such as “Is the world eternal?” “Is the world infinite?” “Does a person exist after death?” “Is there a s/Self?” and so forth, are dismissed and left unanswered because thinking about such questions is said to be “unbeneficial, irrelevant to the fundamentals of the holy life, and does not lead to revulsion, to dispassion, to cessation, to peace, to direct knowledge, to enlightenment, to nirvāṇa.” Hence, the sūtras suggest that one should not indulge in these questions. In the case of the mental phenomena mentioned in the sūtras, there is never an explicit ontological question, such as “what is the nature of feeling (vedanā)?” and so forth. Instead, these mental phenomena are always described as a part of causal processes. For example, in the case of feeling (vedanā), the sūtras never specify its nature or indicate whether it is the same as or different from consciousness. Instead, vedanā is often defined as the three kinds of feelings (pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral) that lead to craving (trṣṇā), or as the products of the contact between the six senses and their objects. Also

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2 For example, Bronkhorst 2009:61-114; Ronkin 2005.
3 These are the “undetermined” (avyākatā) questions, for example, S IV 374ff. See Collins 1982: 131-8.
regarding the five *skandhas*, as Sue Hamilton (1996: xxiv) observes, the “analysis of the human being into five *khandhas* is not an analysis of what the human being consists of, but of those processes or events with which one is constituted that one needs to understand in order to achieve Enlightenment.” In other words, the mental phenomena are mentioned in the *sūtras* only because they are causally related to the human condition and religious practice, and not because the composers of the *sūtras* intended to establish an ontological system that exhaustively analyzes reality.

In contrast, it appears that Buddhist teachers engaged in the enterprise of Abhidharma were becoming more and more interested in exhaustive analysis and ontological issues. As mentioned in section 1.5, starting from the exegesis of the *sūtras*, early Buddhist teachers attempted to collect all the teachings from the *sūtras* and reorganize them according to certain principles. In the case of the mental phenomena scattered throughout the *sūtras*, Buddhist teachers first gathered them together, without concern for whether some items in the same list were actually the same by nature. The list in the Dhs provides a good example of this early type of list of mental phenomena (see 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 for the development of such lists). Over time, an attempt was made to eliminate repetition from the lists, which resulted in more condensed lists such as those in the *Śāriputrābhidharma, Dharmaskandha*, and *Prakaranapāda*.\(^5\) Probably at the same time, the term *caitasika*, which was used in the *sūtras* as the simple adjective “mental” or a noun “mental state,” came to be used as a name for a class of dharmas that are different from consciousness (*citta*), and thereby constituting yet another class of dharmas. This can be described as an “ontological shift” in the development of Abhidharma: Abhidharma teachers such as the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas were not only concerned with the causal relevance of the mental phenomena mentioned in the *sūtras* in the context of religious practice, but also engaged in the analysis of the world and the mind into fundamental and “real” constituents that cannot be further analyzed. The lists of mental phenomena became a significant reflection of this enterprise. Hence, items in a list such as feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*samjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), and so forth, came to be regarded as real entities as “mental factors” (*caitasika*), and the Abhidharma analysis of

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\(^5\) See the lists in 2.1.3.
mind became the analysis of the combination of these mental factors and their “association” (samprayoga) with consciousness (citta or vijñāna). Such a mapping of the structure of mind signifies the completion of an “ontological shift” from the practical concerns of the sūtras to the ontological concerns of the mature Abhidharma.

The origin of such an “ontological shift” in the development of Buddhist Abhidharma is still unclear. No matter how the ontological concern started, its consequence is significant: all extant Abhidharma traditions constructed ontological dharma systems that claim to represent an exhaustive analysis and classification of the world and all things in it including the mind along with all mental phenomena. However, such ontological dharma systems are not fully in accordance with the teachings in the sūtras because such concerns are alien to the sūtras, especially since, as mentioned above, an ontological quest of this kind is explicitly dismissed in the sūtras as unbeneﬁcial for one’s practice and liberation. In this light, it is understandable that someone who claims that the teachings in the sūtras are the ultimate authority would no doubt reject the notions of “mental factors” and “association.” Therefore, it would appear that the development of the ontological concern in Abhidharma acted as a cause for the different theories of mind and the debates among the teachers subscribing to these different theories.

4.2.2 The Hermeneutical Gap

In TatSid chapters 60-67 studied in the present project, most of the arguments involve different interpretations of speciﬁc sūtra passages. Both sides of the dispute quote passages from early sūtras to support their doctrinal positions, and sometimes the same sūtra passage is used by both sides to argue for opposite positions. It is clear that the development of Abhidharma, especially the establishment of mature Abhidharma philosophical systems, is relatively later than the early sūtra materials.6 As a result, the Abhidharma teachers interpret early sūtra texts in a way that is not necessarily consistent

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6 It should be noted that the extant sūtra collections are preserved and handed down by different traditions that also have their Abhidharma systems; thus, it is possible that some of the sūtra materials may have been inﬂuenced by Abhidharma thoughts both in their forms and their contents.
with the meaning of these texts in earlier periods. Hence, there is a “hermeneutical gap” between the early sūtra texts and the understanding of the sūtras espoused by Abhidharma teachers. This hermeneutical gap is another possible cause for the different positions in the dispute concerning “mental factors” and “association.” The following are two examples from the TatSid that demonstrate the “hermeneutical gap” and how it functions as a cause for doctrinal disputes.

Example 1.

In TatSid 60.12, Harivarman quotes a sūtra passage stating that for a sentient being, internally there is the body with consciousness (savijñāna kāya), and externally there is name-and-form (nāma-rūpa). Because this passage does not mention any mental factors (caitasika), Harivarman concludes that caitasikas do not exist. The opponent replies in 62.8-9 that “external name-and-form” (bahirdhā nāma-rūpa) should be understood as including all caitasikas. The TatSid does not explain why the opponent believes that nāma-rūpa includes all caitasikas, but in both the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma and the Theravāda Abhidhamma, nāma-rūpa is interpreted as the five skandhas: rūpa is the rūpaskandha, and nāma represents the four non-material skandhas of vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna. And in both of these two Abhidharma systems, vedanā, saṃjñā, and saṃskāra represent all the caitasikas. Apparently, the opponent in 62.8-9 understands the sūtra passage in terms of the Abhidharma doctrine of the five skandhas and their equivalence to nāma-rūpa.

In 64.7, Harivarman states that the opponent’s interpretation of the sūtra passage regarding nāma-rūpa amounts to erroneous “speculation” (*saṃjñā-vikalpa). Instead, one should understand nāma-rūpa as the objects (*ālambana) of mind. Section 2.3.4 of this study demonstrated that this interpretation of nāma-rūpa accords well with the explanation of the term in the Mahānidāna Sutta in the Dīgha Nikāya, which suggests that nāma-rūpa represents the “blueprint” of an individual as the object of consciousness (vijñāna) in the context of dependent origination, which is constructed through “qualities (ākāra), traits (liṅga), signs (nimitta), and indicators (uddesa).” Harivarman’s understanding of nāma-rūpa as “object of mind” is more suitable in the context of the sūtras, while the opponent’s interpretation that nāma-rūpa is equivalent to the five
skandhas is out of that context and more influenced by the Abhidharma theories.

Example 2.

In 66.7, the opponent cites a sūtra passage that mentions the four “stations of consciousness” (viññāna-sthiti) to argue that this sūtra passage supports the position that consciousness coexists with other mental factors such as feeling (vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā), and so forth. The opponent suggests that the term “station” (sthiti) in this passage has an ontological connotation, and one should understand mental phenomena such as vedanā as “support stations” upon which consciousness is stationed. In 67.6, Harivarman responds that the opponent’s understanding of “station” as “support station” is wrong; instead, “station” should be understood as “object station” (*ālambana-sthiti), which means that consciousness takes vedanā as it object and is fixed or attached to it. Apparently, Harivarman’s interpretation of the term “station” (sthiti) has a more epistemological connotation.

However, in the same sūtra where the viññāna-sthitis are mentioned, a passage that describes the relationship between consciousness (viññāna) and the other four skandhas indicates that the term “station” (sthiti) may be better understood in this epistemological sense:  

Consciousness, bhikkhus, while standing, might stand engaged (upaya) with form; based upon form (rūpārammaṇa), established upon form (rūpappatiṭṭha), with a sprinkling of delight, it might come to growth, increase, and expansion…

In this sentence, the syntactic parallelism of the three phrases “engaged (upaya) with form,” “based upon form (rūpārammaṇa),” and “established upon form (rūpappatiṭṭha)” suggests a parallelism in function as well. In the phrase “established upon form” (rūpappatiṭṭha) the term patiṭṭha (Skt. *prasthita) can be understood as glossing the term sthiti in viññāna-sthiti. Hence, both upaya and ārammaṇa should be understood as related

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to *sthiti*. Because *upaya* (in Sanskrit sources *upaga*) means “grasping” according to Chinese sources, and ārammaṇa also has the meaning of an epistemic “basis,” these two terms indicate that the *sthiti* in the *vijñāna-sthiti* more likely has an epistemological rather than an ontological connotation in this passage. Thus Harivarman’s interpretation of *vijñāna-sthiti* may be closer to the meaning of the term in its early sūtra context.

These two examples from the TatSid regarding interpretations of sūtra passages demonstrate the “hermeneutical gap” between the understanding of earlier sūtra texts and later Abhidharma doctrines. Sometimes Abhidharma teachers use their Abhidharma doctrines in their understanding of the passages from early sūtras, while other teachers, like Harivarman in these two examples, adopt an understanding that appears more consistent with the sūtra passage itself. Of course in their debates both sides would claim that their understanding is the correct and “original,” or “intended” teaching of the Buddha. Therefore, it would be understandable that the “hermeneutical gap” led to different doctrinal positions and debates among the teachers.

4.2.3 The Experiential Gap

Finally, it should be noted the debate between Harivarman and his opponents is about the subject of mind, which is something that everybody experiences every day. Even today modern disciplines of science such as psychology, cognitive science, and neural science that take mind as their subject still cannot fully understand what mind is or precisely how it works. Buddhist theories of mind are in large part based on the experience of introspection, or knowledge from the observation of one’s own mind. It is true that some theories are based on the teachings in the sūtras, but for Buddhists the sūtras also are records of the Buddha’s experiences; hence, all knowledge about mind in Buddhism is considered to come ultimately from introspection. However, knowledge that is based on introspection is inevitably subject to interpretation and may not reflect what is really happening. Thus, there is a gap between what we consciously experience and what is really happening in the mind, which might be designated as the “experiential gap.” And from this gap between what is experienced and what actually happens in the mind a
variety of interpretations of the mind and its activities arise. This process also helps to explain the centrality of debates over the veracity of different theories of mind proposed by various Buddhist teachers.

Many examples can be offered to illustrate the limit of introspection as a reliable source of our knowledge of mind. Jay Garfield (2011: 19) points out that most of us with normal eyesight have an experience that our entire visual field is colored, but in fact only the central 10% of the visual field is equipped with the proper cells for distinguishing colors, while the remaining 90% is black and white. The experience of the whole visual field as colored is actually “filled-in” by our mind, but this process of “filling-in” is beyond the scope of introspection: none of us would know that most of our visual field is actually black and white before modern biology revealed it to us. Thus, introspection may not be capable of providing reliable knowledge of even the very basic process of perception. Regarding the arising of feeling (vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā), and volition (cetanā) after contact (sparśa), it is not surprising that three different descriptions of the same cognitive process are presented in the sūtras as demonstrated in 3.4.3:

Version 1: feeling (vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā), and volition (cetanā) arise together (sahajāta) with contact (sparśa).

Version 2: dependent on sparśa, there is feeling (vedanā); dependent on sparśa, there is apperception (saṃjñā); dependent on sparśa, there is volition (cetanā). It is unclear from the sūtra passage whether these mental phenomena occur simultaneously.

Version 3: dependent on sparśa, there is feeling (vedanā); dependent on vedanā, there is volition (cetanā) or craving (trṣṇā).

These three descriptions of the same cognitive process do not reflect simply a textual issue but also reveal a deeply rooted “experiential gap,” namely, between what we can learn from introspection and what actually happens in the mind. If certain and unambiguous knowledge of mind were available through introspection, such variations in the texts regarding the cognitive process would be less likely. Certainly, disciplines such as cognitive science, neuroscience, and the philosophy of mind have much to contribute.
that would engage Buddhist theories of mind, but such a comparative discussion of theories of the mind and mental processes are beyond the textual, historical, and doctrinal scope of the present study.

4.2.4 Other Possible Causes of the Dispute

Aside from the aforementioned three possible causes for the dispute on mind among Buddhist teachers, there are also other factors that may have contributed to the formation of different theories and stimulated the teachers to engage in debates.

First of all, debate appears to have been an important method of education and learning in Buddhist community from its very beginning. The sūtras record numerous occasions when the Buddha teaches his students in a heuristic way, or his disciples learn from each other in the question-and-answer style. The most notable examples are the Mahāvedalla and Cūḷavedalla suttas in the Majjhama-nikāya (nos. 43 and 44). According to Seishi Karashima (Karashima 2015: 136-7), the term vedalla might originally have represented an “unusual” or “irregular” type of sūtras that records the questions and answers of the Buddha’s disciples and then became one of the nine or twelve limbs (aṅga) of Buddhist teachings (dharma/dhamma). In later times, these aṅgas were in some way understood as genres of Buddhist scriptures, and the vedalla aṅga might have been a source of Abhidharma.\footnote{See the discussion of the origins of Abhidharma in section 1.5.} Therefore, it would be natural to understand the style of question-and-answer as an integral component both in Abhidharma literature and in Buddhist monastic education. The debate tradition preserved in the Tibetan monastic education system may be a good example of this old tradition.\footnote{For a good description of the Tibetan debate training, see Dreyfus 2003: 195ff.} So the disputes recorded in the TatSid may have been the product of such debates held in the Buddhist monasteries of the time, and compilers of Abhidharma texts such as Harivarman recorded these debates so that they could be used in the teaching and training of their students. This is also the likely reason for Kumārajīva’s translation of the TatSid. Furthermore, such debates among teachers provided an active and creative intellectual milieu, which made possible the interaction among different opinions and doctrinal synthesis. Records of
different teachers and their positions in the MVŚ provide a vivid picture of the competitive intellectual milieu of the period, and the AKBh and the TatSid are two good examples of doctrinal innovation and synthesis within such a milieu.

Moreover, debates may also occur for reasons other than pure intellectual or educational concerns. As a social and historical institution, the Buddhist community could not exist without proper financial and political support. In other words, debates among teachers within the Buddhist community, or with non-Buddhist teachers may also have served the purpose of winning support or patronage. There are abundant examples in Buddhist history. An early example is the Pāli record of the third council held in the Pāṭaliputra, where the so-called Vibhajyavādins won over all other teachers of different “heretical” doctrinal positions and, with the support of the king, expelled 60,000 non-Vibhajyavādins from the community.10 This account of the council might be an over-exaggeration reflecting a sectarian-biased perspective, but no doubt there is a certain element of truth regarding the role of political authorities in doctrinal debates. Xuanchang’s biography of Harivarman also records a debate between Harivarman and a Vaiśeṣika teacher (see 1.3.1). Hence, in this respect, we cannot rule out the possibility that the debates recorded in the TatSid reflect the influence of their sociopolitical and economic environments, but again this is beyond the scope of the present study.

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10 Lamotte 1988a: 272-4 summarizes the Pāli accounts of this council.
4.3 Final Notes
The present study examined chapters 60-67 in the TatSid, and investigated the dispute between the supporters of the “mental factor” (caitasika) and “association” (samprayoga) theory of mind and those such as Harivarman who rejected this theory. More than fifty arguments from both parties were carefully read and analyzed, and parallels or similar positions were identified in extant Abhidharma texts. A comparison of the arguments and positions in these various Abhidharma texts suggests a probable course of historical development for these doctrines. Moreover, among the more than forty sūtra passages quoted in these arguments for which parallels were identified in the Chinese Āgamas and Pāli Nikāyas, eight of these passages were found to have differences between the Chinese and Pāli versions. In seven of these cases, the TatSid follows a version similar to Chinese versions, which suggests that Harivarman and his opponents were likely sharing a textual lineage related to the Sarvāstivāda tradition. These textual, philological, and historical investigations shed new light on the brief arguments in the TatSid and reveal historical connections not fully recognized in previous scholarship. Further, the TatSid provides invaluable first-hand evidence of an important period in the historical development of Buddhist texts as well as of the doctrines contained in these texts. The doctrinal topics selected for its chapter divisions and the arguments that it presents record the issues that were current in the 4th century CE as well as the variety of previous Abhidharma positions on these issues. Further, Harivarman’s critical evaluation of these positions indicates the direction in which later Indian scholastic investigations will proceed. Through an analysis of the arguments regarding caitasika and samprayoga in the TatSid, this study demonstrates that some of the later Abhidharma teachers are more concerned with the ontological status of mental phenomena, while Harivarman appears to be resistant to this “ontological shift.” Furthermore, this study also reveals how textual issues, such as different versions of a sūtra passage or different interpretations of the same passage, can be correlated with different doctrinal positions among Abhidharma teachers. These are all good examples of the “hermeneutical gap” between early sūtras and later Abhidharma teachers and doctrines. In this respect, the TatSid is a great textual

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11 See 1.4.5 for a summary of these differences in the sūtra passages.
treasure worthy of serious scholarly consideration that preserves invaluable historical information regarding the development of early Buddhist texts and doctrines.

The present study is concerned with only eight chapters (60-67) out of the seventeen (60-76) in the section on mind in the TatSid, and, given the limits of time, other important issues such as the multiplicity and momentariness of mind and the possibility of multiple consciousnesses occurring simultaneously have not been investigated. Taken as a whole, the various issues presented in Harivarman’s TatSid represent virtually the entirety of early Buddhist investigations of the mind and would provide the basis for a comprehensive study of early Buddhist theories of mind. Hopefully, this study will draw more attention to the TatSid than it has previously received, especially to its value as a textual source for studies of early Buddhism.
Chapter 5. Annotated Translation of Chapters 60-67 of the *Tattvasiddhi

Chapter 60. Proving the Non-existence of caitasikas

60.1 心意識體一而異名。若法能緣。是名為心。

*Citta*, *manas*, and *vijñāna* are the same in nature but different by name. If a dharma can take objects (*ālambana*), it is named *citta*.\(^1\)

60.2 問曰。若爾則受想行等諸心數法。亦名為心。俱能緣故。

[Opponent] challenges: If this is the case, then mental factors (*caitasika*) such as feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formations (*saṃskāra*) should all be named *citta* because they all can take objects.

60.3 答曰。受想行等。皆心差別名。如道品中。一念五名。念處。念根。念力。念覺。正念。精進等亦如是。又一無漏慧。而有苦習智等種種別名。又一定法。亦名為禪解脫除入。如是心一。但隨時故。得差別名。故知但是一心。

[Harivarman’s] answer: feeling (*vedanā*), apperception (*saṃjñā*), volitional formations (*saṃskāra*), and so forth, are all names for different [modes] of *citta* (*citta-viśeṣa*). For example, in the [thirty-seven] factors contributing to awakening (*bodhipākṣikā dharmā*), mindfulness (*smṛti*) as one [dharma] has five names: application of mindfulness (*smṛty-upasthāna*), the faculty of mindfulness (*smṛtīndriya*), the power of mindfulness (*smṛti-bala*), the awakening factor of mindfulness (*smṛti-sambodhyāṅga*), and right mindfulness (*saṃyak-smṛti*). In the same way, energy (*vīrya*), and so forth, [also have multiple names]. Moreover, the taintless insight (*anāsrava-prajñā*) as one [dharma] has various alternative names such as the knowledge of suffering (*duḥkha-jñāna*), the

\(^1\) This definition of *citta* is similar to the one given in the Dhs-a 112: ārammanāṃ cintetī ti cittan ti. No parallel has been located in the northern Abhidharma texts.
knowledge of origination (samudaya-jñāna), and so forth. Moreover, concentration (samādhi) as one dharma is also called absorption (dhyāna), liberation (vimukti), and the basis of victory (abhībhāvāyantana). In the same manner, citta as one [dharma], depending on different occasions, obtains various names. Therefore, one knows that [vedanā, and so forth.] are all the same citta.

60.4 所以者何。如經中說是人欲漏心得解脫。有漏。無明漏心得解脫。若別有心數。應說心數得解脫。

Why? As it is said in the sūtra, “Such and such a person’s mind is liberated from the taint of sensual desire (kāma), the taint of existence (bhava), and the taint of ignorance (avidyā).” If there are caitasikas aside from [citta], the sūtras should also say that the caitasikas are liberated.

60.5 又經中說。佛若知眾生歡喜心柔軟心調和心堪任得解脫。然後為說四真諦法。是中不說心數。

Moreover, as it is said in the sūtra, “When the Buddha knows that a sentient being’s mind is joyous, soft, tamed, and ready to be liberated, then he will teach him the Dharma of the four noble truths.” Here, the sūtra does not mention caitasikas.

60.6 又經中說。心垢故眾生垢。心淨故眾生淨。

Moreover, it is said in the sūtra, “When there is the defilement of mind (cittasaṃkleśa), there is the defilement of sentient beings (sattvasaṃkleśa); because of the purity of mind
(cittavyavadāna), there is the purification of sentient beings (*sattvaviśuddhi).*

60.7 又說。若比丘入四禪中。得清淨不動心。然後如實知苦聖諦集滅道諦。

It is also said [in the sūtra], “When a bhikṣu enters the fourth dhyāna, and attains the purified, unmovable mind, then [he] knows as it is (yathābhūta) the noble truths of suffering, origin, cessation, and the path.”

60.8 又十二因緣中。說行緣識。

Moreover, in the twelve-linked dependent origination, it is said that conditioned by volitional formation (sanskāra) there is consciousness (vijñāna).

60.9 又說六種為人。

It is also said that the six elements (dhātu) make up a human being.

60.10 又說輕躁易轉無過於心。

It is also said that nothing is more easily changing (*laghu-parivarta*) than mind.
Chapter 5. Translation

60.11 又經中說使詣城主。語其事實。語已還去。主名為心。

It is also said in the sūtra that a messenger approaches the lord of a city and tells him about the matter, and leaves after delivering the message. The lord is referred to as the mind.8

60.12 又說內有識身。外有名色。是名為二。又但說有識身。不說有心數。

It is also said that internally there is the body with consciousness (savijñānaka kāya), externally there is name-and-form (nāma-rūpa); this is referred to as the dyad.9 And [the sūtra] only mentions the body with consciousness (savijñānaka kāya), [and] never mentions the existence of caitasikas.

60.13 又說三事合故名觸。若有心數。不名為三。而實說三。故知但心無別心數。

It is also said that the coming together of three things is referred to as contact (sparśa).10 If there were caitasikas, [the number] should not be referred to as three. But in fact it

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8 The simile is in S IV 194-5, which corresponds to No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 43) T02, p0315c19-316a5: 譬如有邊國王，善治城壁，門下堅固，交道平正，於四城門置四守護，悉皆聰慧，知其來去。當其城中。有四交道，安置床榻。城主坐上。若東方使來。問守門者。城主何在。彼即答言。主在城中四交道頭，床上而坐。彼使聞已。往詣城主。受其教令。復道而還。南.西.北方遠使來人。問守門者。城主何在。彼亦答言。在其城中四交道頭。彼使聞已。悉詣城主。受其教令。各還本處。佛告比丘。我說斯譬。今當說義。所謂城者。以譬人身麤色。如篋毒蛇譬經說。善治城壁者。謂之正見。交道平正者。謂內六入處。四門者。謂四識住。四守門者。謂四念處。城主者。謂識受陰。使者。謂正觀。如實言者。謂四真諦。復道還者。以八聖道。The MV Ś also quotes this simile: No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 180) T27, p903a11-2: 復次心名城主如契經說。言城主者即有取識。9 SĀ no. 294, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 12) T02, p83c24-6: 愚癡無聞凡夫無明覆。愛緣繫得此識身。如是內有識身。外有名色。此二緣生六觸入處。A Sanskrit fragment of this sūtra reads (Tripāṭhī 1962: 140-44): avidyayā nivṛtasya bālasya tṛṣṇayā savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ samudāgataḥ. ity ayaṃ bhikkhave taṇhāya sampayuttassa evam dvayaṃ. Pāli S no. 12.19, II 23-4: avijjānīvaraṇassa bhikkhave bhāsatasu samayuttaṃ evam ayaṃ kāyo samudāgato / iti ayaṃ ceva kāyo bahiddhā ca nāmarūpam, itthetam dvayaṃ. Note that both the Chinese and Sanskrit versions have savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ while Pāli has only kāyo. Also the Chinese has “internally” (*ādhyātmika) which is absent in both Sanskrit and Pāli. It is likely that the sūtra quoted by Harivarman is very close to the Chinese SĀ. Saṅghabhadra quotes the sūtra identical to the version quoted here by Harivarman. No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 29) T29, p505a18-9: 謂契經說。內有識身。及外名色。二二為緣。諸觸生起。乃至廣說。See 2.3.4 for the discussion of the doctrinal significance with regard to 62.8-9 and 64.7.

10 This is the standard definition of contact (sparśa P. phassa) in the sūtras. E.g. SĀ no. 273, T No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p72c9-10: 三事和合觸。謂眼根、色、意識。M I 111: cakkhaṁ phassu, paticca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānam, tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā. However, as Harivarman records in TatSid chapter 85 on sparsa, there is an alternative version of this passage: No. 1646 成實論 (卷 6) T32, p286c21-3: 又經中有二種觸。一三事和合觸。二三事和合故觸。故知觸有二種。一有自體。二有假名。The alternative reading occurs only in the Chinese SĀ, e.g. SĀ no. 68, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 3) T02, p18a10-12: 三事和合觸。 Vasubandhu also records the two versions of the definition of sparsa in the AKBh p.143.20-23. This is another example that sectarian doctrinal positions may influence texts. See the discussion of this issue in 2.3.5.
only mentions three. Therefore, one knows that there are no caitasikas aside from citta.
Chapter 61. Proving the Existence of caitasikas

61.1 問曰。心異心數法異。所以者何。心心數法共相應故。若無心數則無相應。而實有相應。故知有心數法。

[Opponent] challenges: Citta and caitasika are different. Why? Because citta and caitasikas are associated with each other. If caitasikas do not exist, then there is no association. As in fact there is association, therefore, one knows that caitasikas exist.

61.2 汝意若謂心與餘心相應。是事不然。所以者何。經中說心獨行遠逝寢藏無形。是中但遮同性。雖與心數共行。猶名為獨行。如說比丘獨處雖有虫獸。以無類故。亦名獨處。故知心不與餘心相應。而實有相應。故知有數。

Your opinion is that if a citta associates with another citta, such a thesis is not correct. Why? The sūtra says that citta travels alone, departs far away, lies and hides itself, and has no form. Here, it only excludes [the association of things] of the same nature. Although [citta] is accompanied by caitasikas, still it is said to be travelling alone. In the same manner, although there are animals and beasts, still it is said that a bhikṣu dwells alone. Because there are no [other beings] of the same kind, he is referred to as alone. Therefore, one knows that a citta does not associate with another citta, but there is in fact association [with caitasikas]. Therefore, one knows that caitasikas exist.

61.3 又心七界一入一陰所攝。心數法一界一入三陰所攝。

Moreover, citta is included in seven dhātus, one āyatana, and one skandha. Caitasikas are included in one dhātu, one āyatana, and three skandhas.

11 Dhp verse no. 37.
12 Katsura (1974: 135n*) points out that the MVŚ and AKBh have the same classifications. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 16) T27, p80b22-4: 問相應因以何為自性。答一切心心所法。即攝三蘊一蘊少分。一處一處少分。七界一界少分。No. 1542 阿毘達磨品類足論 (卷 8) T26, p723c27: 心法七界一處一蘊所攝。... p723c29-724a1: 心所法一界一處三蘊所攝。AKBh p.11.17-8: vedanādayaḥ skandhāstraḥ vijñānāndahātuḥ ca dharmāyatanamo dharmadhātuḥ ca vijñānakṣandaḥ māna-āyatanaṃ sa ṣaḥ avijñānakṣandaḥ manodhātuḥ ceti. Basically citta belongs to the viññāna-skandha, the mana-āyatana, and the six viññāna-dhātus plus the mano-dhātu; and caitasikas belong to the vedanā, the samjñā, and the saṃskāra three skandhas, the dharma-āyatana and the dharma-dhātu.
61.4 又心是依處。數法依止。如經中說是心數法皆依心行。
Moreover, **citta** is the basis (*āśraya*), on which **caitasika**s depend. As it is said in the sūtra, **caitasika**s all function depending on **citta**.  

61.5 又若無心數則無五陰。是則不可。
Moreover, if there were no **caitasika**s, there would not be five **skandha**s. This is unacceptable.

61.6 又此二生異。從二生心。從三生數。如經中說。因眼緣色。生眼識。三事和合名觸。觸因緣生受。
Moreover, these two, [namely, **citta** and **caitasika**] arise differently. The arising of **citta** is from two [things], while the arising of **caitasika**s is from three [things]. As it is said in the sūtra, “Depending on the eye, regarding the object of form, there arises eye-consciousness. The coming together of the three things is called contact (**sparśa**). Depending on contact there arises feeling (**vedanā**).”

61.7 又說。名色集故識集。觸集故受集。
It is also said that from the origination of name-and-form (**nāma-rūpa**) there is the origination of consciousness (**vijñāna**), and from the origination of contact (**sparśa**) there

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13 This is likely a passage from SĀ no.568, T No. 99 杂阿含經 (卷 21) T02, p150a29-b2: 想．思是意行．依於心．屬於心．依心轉．是故想．思是意行．S IV 293: saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā ete dharmā cittapaṭibaddhā, tasmā saññā ca vedanā ca cittasaṅkhāro ca. In this passage, the term **cetasika** is ambiguous: it can be understood as an adjective meaning “belonging to **citta**” but also can be interpreted as a noun meaning “mental factor.” Clearly here, Harivarman’s opponent takes the latter interpretation, which makes this sūtra passage an āgama or scriptural authority for his position. It should be noted that this passage is attributed to the elder bhiṣu 伽摩 (Pāli Kāmabhū) and not to the Buddha himself. In a quote in the T1555 *Pañcavastuka vibhāṣā*, this passage was attributed to Kauṣṭhila (俱胝羅) instead of Kāmabhū. T No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T28, p994a26-7: 又舍利子問俱胝羅。何故想思說名意行。俱胝羅言。此二心所法依心起屬心。Mizuno Kōgen (1964: 218) proposes that this passage belongs to a relatively later stratum of the sūtra materials and has already been influenced by the emerging Abhidharma theories during the compilation of the Nikāya/Āgama.

14 Three **skandha**s—**vedanā**, **samjñā**, and **samskāra** are **caitasika**s. If there were no **caitasika**s, then there should be only two **skandha**s: **rūpa** and **vijñāna**.

15 This is the same sūtra passage quoted in 60.13. There, Harivarman uses this passage to argue that in this description of the cognitive process the sūtra does not mention **caitasika**, and, if there were **caitasika**, it should not state that the coming together of three things (the eye, the object, and the consciousness) is **sparśa**; there should be more than three.
is the origination of feeling (vedanā).\textsuperscript{16}

Moreover, \textit{caitasikas} associate with what they depend upon: [those things] which have the same object, and [those things] which are present at the same time.\textsuperscript{17} This is not the case with \textit{citta}. Because of these differences [between \textit{caitasikas} and \textit{citta}], one knows that \textit{citta} and \textit{caitasikas} are different.

Moreover, in the [teaching of] the four reliances (\textit{pratisaraṇa}), [it is said that one should] rely on knowledge (jñāna) instead of consciousness (vijñāna).\textsuperscript{18} If knowledge is [itself] consciousness, how can it be said to be relied on? Therefore, one knows that knowledge is not consciousness.

Moreover, the Buddha himself mentions the term \textit{caitasika}, stating that, because [they] are born from \textit{citta} and depend on \textit{citta}, they are called \textit{caitasikas}.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} Here, the opponent is quoting the links in the formula of dependent origination as given in the sūtras. I follow Katsura’s translation here (1974: 135). Also, Katsura points out that the order of \textit{nāma-rūpa} and vijñāna is different from the standard twelve-linked dependent origination formula. However, there are sūtras that emphasize the mutually inter-dependent relationship between these two links, e.g. the Mahānidāna Sutta in the Dīghanikāya (D II 55).

\textsuperscript{17} This is part of the standard Abhidharma definition of association (samprayoga). See the discussion in chapter 5 on association.

\textsuperscript{18} According to Étienne Lamotte (1988b) the four \textit{pratisaraṇas} are from the Catuhpratisaraṇasūtra, a relatively late sūtra that appears to exist only in Sanskrit and Chinese, and is quoted in the AK-vy p. 174: catvāriṃśāhaḥ bhikṣavah pratisaraṇāni. katamāni catvāri. dharmah pratisaraṇam na pudgalah. arthah pratisaraṇam na vyanjanam.

\textit{nītārthasūtraṃ pratisaraṇaṃ} na neyārthaṃ. jñānam pratisaraṇaṃ na vijñānam iti. They are also mentioned in the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts such as the AKBh and Saṅghabhadra’s *Nyāyānasūtra, the Mahāyāna Parinirvānasūtra, as well as the *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa attributed to Nāgārjuna. No. 374 大般涅槃經 (卷 6) T12, p401b27-9: 如佛所説是諸比丘當依四法。何等為四。依法不依人。依義不依語。依智不依識。依了義經不依不了義經。

\textsuperscript{19} There is no extant sūtra source that supports this claim. However, as noticed by Mizuno Kögen (1964: 219), in an early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text, the “Pañcavastuka” (Pāñcavastukāvibhāṣā), the author Dharmatīrītā specifically notes that a quote regarding the teaching of \textit{caitasika} was from a “Sarvāstivāda sūtra” (薩他筏底契經). T No. 1555 五事毘婆沙論 (卷 2) T28, p994a24-7: 薩他筏底契經中言。復有思惟。諸心所法依心而起繫屬於心。又舍利子問俱毘羅。何故想思
61.11 又佛不說此義。唯獨有心。而無心數。他人亦可言但有數而無心。汝若以名
字破數。我亦以名字破心。
Moreover, the Buddha’s teachings do not have this meaning (*_artha_), namely, “there is
only _citta_ and no _caitasika_.” [In the same manner,] some others may also say, “There is
only _caitasika_ and no _citta_.” If you refute _caitasika_ on the basis of whether its name-word
(*_vyayjana_) [appears or does not appear in that sense in a given _sūtra_], I can also refute
_citta_ on the basis of [whether its] name-word [appears or does not appear in that sense in
a given _sūtra_].\(^{20}\)

61.12 又所作異故。諸法相異。如水能浸漬。火能焚燒。如是受等所作異故。知有
異相。
Moreover, dharmas are different from each other because they have different functions
(*_kriyā_). For example, water can soak, and fire can burn. In the same manner one knows
that feeling (_vedanā_), and so forth, have different characteristics because [they] have
different functions.

61.13 又諸經中說。心中生覺。故知心數異心。不應心中自生心故。
Moreover, in the _sūtras_ it is said that awareness arises within _citta_;\(^{21}\) therefore, one
knows that _caitasikas_ are different from _citta_ because _citta_ cannot give rise to [another]
_citta_ within itself.

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\(^{20}\) This argument is not clear to me. It might be that someone challenges the authority of the _sūtras_ quoted to prove the
teaching of _caitasika_ and doubts they are from the Buddha himself. There is no _sūtra_ accepted by all Buddhist groups
that contains the term _caitasika_ in the required sense. In other words, the text-proponent is trying to refute _caitasika_ by
pointing out that in the _sūtras_ the term _caitasika_ is not a name for “mental factors.” Hence, the supporter of _caitasikas_
counteracts by saying that if you challenge my understanding of the term _caitasika_ in the _sūtras_, I can also challenge
the way you understand the term _citta_.

\(^{21}\) Katsura (1974: 136) translates 覺 as “awareness.” I am not sure what _sūtra_ passage is quoted here. I suspect here
Kumārajīva is translating the phase “vedanam vedyati,” because _vedanā_ is always the first example of _caitasika_ to be
mentioned (e.g. 61.12, 62.1). E.g. S IV 208: _so sukhaṃ ce vedanam vedyati, saññutto naṃ vedyati, dukkhaṃ ce
vedanaṃ vedyati, saññutto naṃ vedyati._
61.14 又如說心垢故眾生垢。心淨故眾生淨。若但是心。則垢淨無因。是人不以無明故垢。慧明故淨。應自垢自淨。此則不可。是故有心數法。

Moreover, as you have said, because of the defilement of mind (cittasamklesha), there is the defilement of a sentient being (sattvasamklesha); because of the purity of mind (cittavyavadana), there is the purification of a sentient being (*sattvaviśuddhi). If there is only citta, then defilement and purification have no causes. Such a person should not be defiled because of ignorance (avidya) [and] should not be pure because insight (prajña) is clear but should be defiled or pure [by citta] itself. This is not acceptable. Therefore, there are caitasikas.²³

²² The same sutra passage is quoted by Harivarman in the previous chapter. See 60.6.
²³ According to proponents of caitasika, whether or not a citta is defiled or purified depends on the type of caitasikas with which citta is associated. When citta is associated with defilements (kleśa), it is defiled; when it is associated with wholesome (kuśala) caitasikas such as insight (prajña) and free from defilements, it is purified. Therefore, according to supporters of caitasikas, without caitasikas, there would be no defilement and purification of mind.
Chapter 62. Refuting the Non-existence of caitasika

62.1 Even though you have said that that which can take objects is called citta, and different [modes] of citta are called caitasikas as in the case of [those dharmas] mentioned in the bodhipakṣa dharmas, this is not correct. Why? It is said in the sūtra, citta and caitasikas have different characteristics (*lakṣaṇa). To cognize (vijñāna) is the characteristic of vijñāna; to experience (vedayati) the unpleasant and pleasant is the characteristic of feeling (vedanā); to perceive (saññā) is the characteristic of apperception (saṃskāra); to initiate action (abhisamkaroti) is the characteristic of [volitional] formation (saṃskāra). Therefore, citta and caitasikas are different.

62.2 You said citta attains liberation. This is also not correct. In another sūtra it is said that insight (prajñā) attains liberation by removing ignorance (avidyā). [The sūtras] do not only claim that citta attains liberation.

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24 See 60.1-3.
25 These are the definitions of the four non-material skandhas given in the sūtra. SĀ no. 46, No. 99 杂阿含经 (卷 2) T02, p11c1-11: 諸覺相是受受陰。何所覺。覺苦.覺樂.覺不苦不樂。是故名覺相是受受陰。復以此受受陰是無常.苦.變易。諸想是想受陰。何所想。少想.多想.無量想。都無所有。作無所有想。是故名想受陰。復以此想受陰是無常.苦.變易法。為作相是行受陰。何所為作。於色為作。於受.想.行.識為作。是故為作相是行受陰。復以此行受陰是無常.苦.變易法。別知相是識受陰。何所識。識色。識聲.香.味.觸.法。是故名識受陰。復以此識受陰是無常.苦.變易法。S III 86: vedayatīti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'vedanā ti vuccati... sañjānātīti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'saññā ti vuccati... sañjñānātīti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'saṃskāra ti vuccati... vijñānātīti kho, bhikkhave, tasmā 'viññāṇan'ti vuccati.
26 See 60.4.
27 Here, the supporters of caitasika apparently refer to the two kinds of liberation: liberation of mind (cetovimukti) and liberation by insight (prajñāvimukti). SĀ no. 99 杂阿含经 (卷 26) T02, pl90b17-19: 離貪欲者心解脫。離無明者慧解脫。若彼比丘離貪欲。心解脫。得身作證。離無明。慧解脫。A I 61: rāgupakkhiṭṭham vā, bhikkhave, cittaṃ na vimuccati, avijjapakkhiṭṭham vā paññā bhāvīyati. iti kha, bhikkhave, rāgavirāgā ceto vimutti, avijjavirāgā paññāvimutti. It should be noted that here both Harivarman and the opponent interpret prajñāvimukti as “liberation of insight.” However, some later Abhidharma texts interpret it as “liberation by insight.” Cf. AKbh p.381.4-5: ... prajñāvimuktaḥ, prajñābhaleṇa kevalam klesāvaranavimuktaḥ. Gombrich (1997: 112) also understands it as “release by insight.” See the discussion of these two kinds of liberation in 2.3.2.
Chapter 5. Translation

62.3 又以心勝故但說心。
Moreover, [the sūtras] mention only *citta* because *citta* is superior.  

62.4 又世間人皆多識心。數法不爾。故佛偏說。
Moreover, because people in the world are more familiar with *citta*, and it is not the case for the *caitasikas*, therefore, the Buddha teaches more [about *citta*].

62.5 又佛經中有不盡語。此言是也。
Moreover, in the sūtras there are teachings that are non-exhaustive. The term *caitasika* is an example of this.

62.6 又如經說。汝等比丘。能斷一法。我保汝等得阿那含道。所謂貪欲。而實不偏斷。是事亦然。
Moreover, as it said in the sūtra, “Bhikṣus, if you can abandon one dharma, I guarantee you will reach the path of non-returner (*anāgāmin*). [This one dharma] is greed (*lobha*).” But in fact [an *anāgāmin*] does not abandon only [greed]. [The thesis of inexhaustive teaching] is also the case regarding the *caitasikas*.

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28 The same argument appears in the MVŚ: No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p548a13-5: 問何故名他心智。答知他心故名他心智。問此亦知他諸心所法。何故但名他心智耶。... p548a26-7: 復次以心勝故雖亦知心所。但名他心智。如王來等。Also No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p395b20-1: 識於諸處有勝功能。非諸心所。是故偏說。

29 No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 4) T02, p566b7-8: 随時。世尊告諸比丘。當滅一切。我證卿等得阿那含。云何為一法。所謂貪欲。諸比丘。當滅貪欲。我證卿等得阿那含。The *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa* also quotes this passage to argue for *vitarka* and *vicāra*. No. 1509 大智度論 (卷 17) T25, p186a21-5: 如佛說若斷一法我證汝得阿那含。一法者。所謂穢愛。實應說五下分結盡得阿那含。云何言但斷一法。以是人穢貪偏多。諸餘結使皆從而生。是故穢盡餘結亦斷。No parallel for this sūtra has been found in Pāli. The Dharmaskandha begins a sūtra quotation with this passage, but it then adds a long list of negative mental factors as dharmas to be abandoned. No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 9) T26, p494c13-15: 隨時世尊告苾芻眾。汝等若能永斷一切。我保汝等不還果。No parallel for this sūtra has been found in Pāli. The Dharmaskandha begins a sūtra quotation with this passage, but it then adds a long list of negative mental factors as dharmas to be abandoned. No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 53) T29, p641b25-6: 又如經說。若斷一法。我保汝得不還果。一法者。謂薩迦耶見。非唯斷此得不還果.
62.7 欢喜心等。皆以此答。
All such [sūtras as state, for example, that the Buddha knows beings’] joyous mind, and so forth, should also be answered in the same manner.\textsuperscript{30}

62.8 汝言内外二法。是亦不然。説外有名色。即説心數。以外入攝故名為外。
Your statement concerning the two dharmas as internal and external,\textsuperscript{31} this also is not correct. When it is said [in the sūtra] that there are external nāma-rūpa, it is equivalent to mentioning the caitasikas; [they] are called “external” because they are included in the external bases (āyatana).\textsuperscript{32}

62.9 又是中佛說三事。內有識身。即説識與根。外有名色。即是説塵。汝言説有識身。是亦不然。此經中説外一切相即是心數。
Moreover, in the passage in question the Buddha mentions three things: “the internal body with consciousness (savijñānaka kāya)” is equivalent to saying consciousness (vijñāna) together with the faculties (indriya); “external name-and-form” (nāma-rūpa) refers to [external] objects. You said [that the Buddha only] mentions the body with consciousness (savijñānaka kāya); it is not correct. “All external signs” (外一切相 bahidhā sabbanimittā) mentioned in the same sūtra\textsuperscript{33} are caitasikas.\textsuperscript{34}

62.10 汝言三事和合名觸。是事不然。觸與受等心數作因。是故獨説。
You said that the coming together of three things is referred to as contact (sparśa).\textsuperscript{35} This is not correct. Because contact functions as the cause for caitasikas such as feeling (vedanā), it is mentioned individually.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{30} See 60.5.
\textsuperscript{31} See 60.12.
\textsuperscript{32} This passage shows that the opponent is following a sūtra analyzing the internal-external dyad with the twelve āyatanas. But in the corresponding Pāli suttas (S no.18.21-22, II 252-3), the dyad is analyzed as one’s own five khandhas and other beings’ khandhas. This is also related to the next paragraph 62.9. See the discussion in 2.3.4.
\textsuperscript{33} Here, the sūtras quoted are SĀ no. 198-199 T No. 99 杂阿含經 (卷 1) T02, p50c7-51a14, which have no exact parallels in Pāli but corresponds to S no. 18.21, 22 (II 252-2); 22.71, 72 (III 79-80); 22.91, 92 (III 135-7); also passages in M no. 109 (III 18-9).
\textsuperscript{34} More precisely it reads, “all external signs include caitasikas.”
\textsuperscript{35} See 60.13.
\textsuperscript{36} Here, the argument is that when the sūtra says that the coming together of three things, namely, the object, the sense faculty (indriya), and consciousness, is contact (sparśa), the occurrence of all other caitasikas is implied. Because
Contact gives rise to feeling (缘触生受 phassapaccayā vedanā), in order to emphasize such causation, the sūtra mentions contact individually, but this does not exclude the existence of other caītasikas.
63.1 答曰。汝言以相應故有心數法。是事不然。所以者何。諸法獨行。後當廣說。故無相應。是心獨行。亦以此答。非遮同性。是遮數法。

[Harivarman’s] answer: 37 You said that because [there is] association, therefore, caitasikas exist.38 This is not correct. Why? [Because] each dharma functions alone. [This] will be explained in detail later.39 Therefore, there is no association. In the same manner, [I] would answer [your argument] regarding [the sūtra quotation] that citta “goes alone.”40 [The sūtra] is not excluding [other cittas] of the same nature; it is excluding [the existence] of caitasikas.

63.2 汝言攝異故有心數。是作經者。自立名字。佛經中不說相攝。是故非也。

You said that because [citta and caitasikas] are included (攝 *samgraha) in different [categories], therefore, caitasikas exist.41 The term [samgraha] was established by the compiler of the sūtras. The Buddha in the sūtras never mentioned inclusion [in different categories].42 Therefore, this is not correct.

63.3 汝言依處者。如汝意識依心。不以依故便名為數。如是心依於心。不得名異。

You said that [citta] is the basis (*āśraya) [of caitasikas].43 Just as you [agree] that

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37 The answers in this chapter likely represent Harivarman’s own position.
38 See 61.1-2.
39 Perhaps Harivarman is referring to his later arguments against his opponent’s position of association as a simultaneous relationship. In Harivarman’s system, association is a sequential relationship between two cittas, and at each moment there is only one citta; hence, citta “goes alone.” See TatSid chs. 65-67 and chapter 5 on association (samprayoga).
40 See 61.2. The opponent’s point is that the sūtra mentions citta only to exclude other cittas. In other words, in one moment there can be only one citta; therefore, the sūtra says, it “goes alone.” It does not exclude the existence of caitasikas that are associated with citta.
41 This is a refutation of 61.3, in which citta is included in seven dhātu, one āyatana, three skandhas. Caitasikas are included in one dhātu, one āyatana, and three skandhas.
42 Here, 相攝 is ambiguous. It could mean “mutual inclusion,” which can be understood as mutual inclusive relationships among different categories. It can also mean “inclusion by characteristics.” Sastri translate the phrase as *laksanaasamgraha (Sastri 1975: 160), which is closer to the second interpretation. For a discussion of the practice of “inclusion” regarding dharmas with their intrinsic nature in the Abhidharma context, see Cox 2004: 558-65.
43 See 61.4.
mano-vijñāna depends on citta,\textsuperscript{44} and [it] is not called caitasika because of such a dependence, in the same way a citta depends on citta and should not be named differently.

63.4 汝言無五陰者。是事不然。我以心差別故。有名為受。有名為想等。汝以心數別為三陰。我亦以心別為三陰。
You said that, [if there are no caitasikas,] there should not be five skandhas.\textsuperscript{45} This is not correct. Because there are different [modes] of citta (*citta-viśeṣa), I call some feelings (vedanā), some apperception (saṃjñā), and so forth. You take caitasikas separately as three skandhas; I take different cittas separately as three skandhas.\textsuperscript{46}

63.5 汝言生異。是事不然。若心與數法共生。何故言二生心三生心數。若但說心。則有此理。所以者何。是人先說識時。後說想\textsuperscript{47}等。
You said that [citta and caitasikas] arise differently.\textsuperscript{48} This is not correct. If citta and caitasikas arise simultaneously, why do [you] state that citta arises from two,\textsuperscript{49} and caitasikas arise from three?\textsuperscript{50} If [the sūtra passage] is talking about citta only, then it is appropriate. Why? [Because] one can speak of vijñāna first, then saṃjñā, and so forth.

63.6 汝言相應緣世故知有異。是先已破。無相應故。
You said that one knows that [citta and caitasikas] are different because of association, the object, and the time.\textsuperscript{51} This is already refuted because there is no association.

\textsuperscript{44} Mano-vijñāna depends on manas, and manas is citta.
\textsuperscript{45} Refuting the opponent’s argument in 61.5.
\textsuperscript{46} Namely, the skandhas of vedanā, saṃjñā, and samskāra. Here, the definition of these three as citta-viśeṣas repeats Harivarman’s argument in 60.1-3.
\textsuperscript{47} K has 想 here, but all other editions have 想.
\textsuperscript{48} See 61.6.
\textsuperscript{49} These two are the object and the sense faculty.
\textsuperscript{50} The example in 61.6 is that the coming together of three things, the object, the faculty, and consciousness, is equivalent to the caitasika “contact” (sparśa). Indeed, this passage is problematic within the citta-caitasika mind model. According to this model, citta and caitasikas occur simultaneously. But this sūtra passage explicitly states that the object and sense faculty give rise to the consciousness (vijñāna), the coming together of these three gives rise to contact (sparśa), and depending on contact there arises feeling (vedanā). In this process, consciousness, contact, and feelings depend upon one another in sequence, and they occur successively rather than simultaneously.
\textsuperscript{51} See 61.8.
63.7 You have argued [by quoting] the reliance on knowledge (jñāna) instead of consciousness (vijñāna).\(^{52}\) I say that there are two kinds of cittas: one is called knowledge (jñāna), and one is called consciousness (vijñāna). Therefore, [one] should rely on citta that is jñāna, and not citta as vijñāna.

63.8 You said that the Buddha has taught that a dharma that arises depending on citta is called caitasika.\(^{53}\) A dharma that is born from citta is called caitasika. Because a citta arises depending on [the previous] citta, therefore, it is referred to as a caitasika.\(^{54}\)

63.9 You said that the Buddha never teaches that there are no caitasikas.\(^{55}\) I too do not say that there are no caitasikas. [I] only say that because there are different modes of cittas (*citta-viśeṣa), they are called caitasikas.

63.10 Moreover, if [something] is reasonable, [even it] is unspoken, [still it can] be referred to as spoken. If it is unreasonable, even when it is explicitly spoken, [still it should be taken as] not spoken. Therefore, [you] should not take [whether it is] mentioned explicitly as a proof.\(^{57}\)

63.11 又我等當說心心數法名字義。以集起故名心。受等亦能集起後有。相同於心。故名為心。

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\(^{52}\) See 61.9.  
\(^{53}\) See 61.10.  
\(^{54}\) Here, Harivarman is taking the term caitasika not as the noun “mental factor” in the Abhidharmic technical sense but in its original meaning in the canonical texts, in which it is an adjective meaning “belonging to citta” or “related to citta.” See the discussion of this term in 2.1.1.  
\(^{55}\) See 61.11.  
\(^{56}\) Although all editions have 可說 here, by context there should be only 說.  
\(^{57}\) See 61.11.
Moreover, we should discuss the meanings of the terms citta and caitasika. [The mind] is named citta because it accumulates. In the same way, citta, feeling (vedanā), and so forth, can also accumulate [and] give rise to future existence. Therefore, [they also] should be referred to as cittas.

63.12 又心與心數。俱從心生。故名為心數。若人但說有心數法。是人應說數法名義。而實不可說。是故非因。

Moreover, both citta and caitasika are born from citta; therefore, [they are all] called caitasikas. If someone says, “There are only caitasika dharmas,” such a person should clarify the meaning of the name (*nāmārtha) caitasika. But in fact [he] cannot state [the difference]. Therefore, this is not a proof [supporting caitasika].

63.13 汝言作異及心生覺。皆以此答。所以者何。我以心差別故。所作業異。亦心中生心。名心生覺。

You said that [citta and caitasikas] have different functions (*kriyā) and also [said that] awareness arises within citta. Both of these should be answered in [the same] way. Why? I [propose] that because [citta and caitasikas] are different modes of citta (citta-viśeṣa), therefore, [they] function differently. Also, [when] a citta arises from within [the previous] citta, [it] is referred to as awareness arising [within] citta.

63.14 汝言垢淨無因。是事不然。雖無數法。而有垢淨。

You said that, [if there were no caitasikas], the defilement and purification [of citta] would have no cause (*ahetu). This is not correct. There are defilement and

58 This is an etymological interpretation of the term citta as based on the root ‘cī.
59 Once more, this is Harivarman’s refutation of the opponent’s argument on the basis of the names given in 61.11. He argues that caitasika means “born from citta,” and both citta and caitasika are born from citta; therefore, they both can be called caitasikas. If someone says that caitasika means only “mental factor,” then he must clarify the difference between caitasika as “mental factor” and caitasika as citta. However, Harivarman argues that, by the etymological interpretations of the meanings (*nāmārtha) of citta and caitasika, one cannot find any difference; hence, one should not understand caitasika as something different from citta.
60 See 61.12.
61 See 61.13.
62 Namely, according to the same arguments in 63.9-12.
63 See 61.14.
purification [of citta] even without caitasikas.\textsuperscript{64}

63.15 又無異相故。無心數法。所以者何。汝以心相應故。名為心數。相應法無。後當廣說。故不從心別有數法。 Moreover, because [citta and caitasikas] do not have different characteristics, therefore, there are no caitasikas. Why? You [believe that mental factors exist] and are named caitasikas because [they] are associated with citta. [I] will discuss later in detail the fact that there is no association.\textsuperscript{65} Therefore, there are no caitasikas different from citta.

\textsuperscript{64} Perhaps here, Harivarman means that both defilement and purification of mind are different modes of mind (citta-viśeṣa); therefore, we do not need separate caitasikas to account for them.

\textsuperscript{65} See the following TatSid chapters 65, 66, and 67.
Chapter 5. Translation

Chapter 64. Illuminating the Non-existence of *caitasikas*

64.1 You have stated that *caitasikas* exist because their characteristics are different [from *citta*]. This is not correct. Why? [Concerning the meanings,] “to be conscious of” (*vi-√jñā* 識) and “to experience” (*√vid* 覺), the various characteristics [of these two] have no difference. When *citta* is conscious of form (*rūpa*), it is called awareness and is also called apperception (*samjñā*), and so forth. As people in the world say, when you are conscious of a person, it is called knowing; experiencing pleasant and unpleasant feelings is also knowing. Therefore, consciousness (*vijñāna* 識) is feeling (*vedanā* 受) and apperception (*samjñā* 想). If these various dharmas have definite, different characteristics, they should be specified now. But in fact they cannot be specified. Therefore, [*citta* and *caitasika*] are without different characteristics.

64.2 You said that insight attains liberation, [by abandoning ignorance, and so forth]. This is not correct because [such a statement] is groundless. When a *citta* is defiled, there is also ignorance (*avidyā*). In this aggregate (*rāśi*) of *citta*, defilements (*kleśa*) and ignorance

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66 See 62.1.
67 See 62.2.
68 T No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 72) T27, p371b9: 識是積聚義.
(avidyā) are all connected.\textsuperscript{69} If [one] says ignorance contaminates insight (prajñā), and defilements contaminate citta, this also is groundless.\textsuperscript{70} Thus, it is also groundless [to say] that by abandoning ignorance insight attains liberation, and by abandoning defilements citta attains liberation. Moreover, [this sūtra] is a non-definitive (neyārtha) sūtra. As it is said in the sūtras, by abandoning three taints (āsrava) citta attains liberation,\textsuperscript{71} therefore, one knows that citta also attains liberation from ignorance. When [the sūtra] says that citta attains liberation from defilements, this refers to the abandoning by prohibition (遮斷 *samvara-prahāna or *vikkhambhana-prahāna); when [the sūtra] says that insight attains liberation from ignorance, this refers to the complete elimination (畢竟斷 atyanta-prahāna).\textsuperscript{72} If it is citta that attains liberation from defilements, and it is insight that attains liberation from ignorance, then what are the things that are liberated from anger, and so forth? [If this is the case, you] should have a proper answer to it, [but you do not.] One should know that nothing attains liberation other than citta. Therefore, there is only citta.

64.3 汝言以心勝故但說心者。心有何勝義。而慧等法無。

You said that because citta is superior, therefore, only citta is mentioned.\textsuperscript{73} [If so] what is the superior meaning that citta has and other dharmas like insight (prajñā) do not have?

64.4 汝言人多識心故但說心者。世間人亦多識苦樂。應說受等。

You said that because people are more familiar with citta, therefore, [the sūtras] mention only citta.\textsuperscript{74} People in the world are also familiar with pleasant and unpleasant [feelings] Therefore, [the sūtras] should also mention feeling (vedanā), and so forth, [in these cases, but in fact they are not mentioned.]

\textsuperscript{69} Here, the Chinese translation uses 相應 “association,” which is the notion Harivarman is trying to refute; therefore, it is translated as “connected.” Sastri (1978: 131) translates it as “integrated.”
\textsuperscript{70} Perhaps here, Harivarman means that there is no teaching in sūtras that can support such a statement.
\textsuperscript{71} See 60.4.
\textsuperscript{72} See also chapter 187. No. 1646 成實論 (卷 15) T32, p358b17-23: 若經中說修止斷貪。是說遮斷。何以知之。色等外欲中生貪。若得止樂則不復生。如經中說。行者得淨喜時捨不淨喜。若說無明斷是究竟斷。何以知之。無明斷故貪等煩惱斷滅無餘。經中亦說離貪故心得解脫是名遮斷。離無明故慧得解脫是畢竟斷。
\textsuperscript{73} See 62.3.
\textsuperscript{74} See 62.4.
64.5 You said that the sūtras have left out some teachings. Then why do [the sūtras] not mention caitasikas alone [and leave out citta], but instead mention citta alone [and leave out caitasikas]?

64.6 You said but abandon one dharma. This teaching has a condition. The Buddha teaches one such dharma for those beings who have excessive defilements that cover [their] minds. By abandoning this [single] dharma, all other [dharmas] will be automatically abandoned. Therefore, this is not a proof [for caitasikas].

64.7 You said because the sūtra mentions nāma-rūpa, it is equivalent to mentioning caitasikas. This is your own speculation (samjñā-vikalpa), and this is not what the sūtra means. In contrast to your own speculation, why not say that [the Buddha] was teaching about the objects (*ālambana) of the mind using nāma-rūpa, which is more proper?

64.8 You said that contact with the objects is a cause. This teaching is not a cause. If contact is the cause, then [the sūtra] would clearly say it. Why don’t you say [the Buddha] was teaching about the objects? Therefore, there is no separate dharma.

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75 See 62.5.
76 See 62.6.
77 This means that this teaching should be understood within a specific context.
78 All the editions have 名相 here. I suspect that one of the two “名相” in this passage is a scribal error from “名色.” This passage should be a response to 62.8-9, in which the opponent says “When it is said [in the sūtra] that there are external nāmarūpa, it is equivalent to mentioning the caitasikas (説外有名色。即說心數。) and ‘external nāma-rūpa’ referring to [external] objects”(外有名色。即是說塵。).
79 Kumārajīva translates samjñā-vikalpa as 憶想分別. See Karashima 2001: 332.
80 This passage is difficult to understand. However, Sue Hamilton’s study of nāma-rūpa is enlightening on this issue. See the discussion in 2.3.4.
You said that contact (sparśa) functions as the cause for caitasikas such as feeling (vedanā), and so forth.\(^\text{81}\) Such a statement commits a major error. [In your opinion] both [sparśa and vedanā] are [caitasika] dharmas associated [with citta],\(^\text{82}\) but [you] say sparśa is the cause for vedanā, and so forth; [you do] not [say that] vedanā, and so forth, are the causes for sparśa. Because of such faults as these, there is only citta, and no separate caitasikas.

\(^{81}\) See 62.10.

\(^{82}\) This means that they both occur simultaneously with citta.
無相應品第六十五

Chapter 65. There is no Association (samprayoga)

65.1 無相應法。所以者何。無心數法故。心與誰相應。
There is no associated dharma (samprayukta-dharma). Why? Because there is no caitasika dharma, with what is citta associated?

65.2 又受等諸相不得同時。
Moreover, the modes of function (*ākāra 相) of feeling (vedanā 受), and so forth, cannot be simultaneous.

65.3 又因果不俱。識是想等法因。此法不應一時俱有。故無相應。
Also cause (hetu 因) and result (phala 果) cannot occur together.83 Consciousness (vijñāna 識) is the cause of dharmas such as apperception (samjñā 想), and so forth. These dharmas should not all occur together in the same moment. Therefore, there is no association.

65.4 又佛說甚深因緣法中。是事生。故是事得生。又如穀子牙莖枝葉花實等現見因果相次。故有識等。亦應次第而生。
Moreover, the Buddha teaches the profound (gambhīra)84 doctrine of dependent origination (prātītyasamutpāda): when his thing arises, that thing arises.85 It is also like a grain plant: one sees that its seed, sprout, stem, branches, leaves, flowers, fruits, and so forth, appear one after another as causes and results. In the same manner, consciousness (vijñāna), and so forth, should also arise successively.

83 This is an important thesis attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the MVŚ. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 52) T27, p270a10-15: 謂或有執。諸法生時漸次非頓。如譬喻者。大德說曰。諸法生時次第而生無並起義。如經狹路有 多商侶一一而過。尚無二人一時過義。況得有多。諸有為法亦復如是。一一從自生相而生。別和合生理不俱起。
Saṅghabhadra records that the Sthavira Śrīlāta holds the same doctrinal position: No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 15) T29, p421b18-19: 又上座說。諸行決定無俱生因。
84 D II 55: gambhīro cāyaṃ, ānanda, paṭiccassamuppaṭā gambhīrāvabhāso ca.
85 This is half of the “abstract formula” of dependent origination (e.g S II 28): imasmīṃ satī idaṃ hoti, imass’ uppādā idaṃ uppaṭṭhāti; imasmīṃ asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati. See Bodhi 2000: 552, 730n14, 744n59.
65.5 若汝意謂如貪等煩惱。與色共因。應俱俱生者。是事不然。色無了知。不能緣故。心心數法。有緣有了。是故一時不應俱有。無多了故。

If you think that [citta and caitasika are coexistent] in the same manner as defilements [such as] lust (rāga), and so forth, are coexistent causes (sahabhū-hetu 共因) as are forms (rūpa), [and they all] should arise simultaneously, this is not correct. Forms have no cognition, because they cannot take objects. Citta and caitasikas have objects and have cognition; therefore, [they] should not coexist at the same moment because there are no multiple cognitions [in one moment and in one body].

65.6 又以一身。名一眾生。以一了故。若一念中。多心數法。則有多了。有多了故。應是多人。此事不可。故一念中。無受等法。

Moreover, on the basis of one body, one is referred to as one sentient being because [a sentient being has] only one cognition. If in one moment there are multiple caitasikas, then there should be multiple cognitions; multiple cognitions means there should be multiple persons. This is unacceptable. Therefore, in one moment of thought there are no [caitasika] dharmas such as feeling (vedanā), and so forth.

65.7 又何故六識不一時生。問曰。諸識皆待次第緣生。故不一時。答曰。以何障故。一次第緣不得次第生六識耶。當知先因後果次第生故。

Moreover, why do the six types of consciousness not arise simultaneously? [The opponent] answers: Because each consciousness (vijñāna) arises depending on one immediate condition (samanantara-pratyaya 次第缘); therefore, [they] cannot arise

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86 Kumārajīva translates sahabhū-hetu 共因. No. 1509 大智度論 (卷 17) T25, p187a28-9: 復有六因。相應因。共因。相似因。緣因。報因。名因。

87 No discussion proposing that the caitasikas such as rāga are sahabhū-hetus with rūpa has been located in the extant Abhidharma texts.

88 Saṅghabhadra records in the *Nyāyānusāra the same argument attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas: No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 11) T29, p396a11-5: 有餘復言。若心心所。其所異別。於一心品。應有眾多。能覺了用。故心所法。應不異心。此亦不然。能覺了用。體唯一故。覺了謂慧。非心心所皆慧為體。如何令餘非覺了性成覺了體。故無斯過。

89 Here Harivarman’s argument is that, just as the six types of consciousness do not arise simultaneously, so also citta and caitasikas do not arise simultaneously.
simultaneously. [Harivarman] asks: Due to what obstacle does one immediate condition not produce one of the six types of consciousness in the immediate next moment? One should know that in the case of immediate conditions, the preceding cause and the following consequence always arise in immediate succession.

Moreover, it is said in the sūtra, the eyes see forms but do not grasp [their] signs (nimitta 相); grasping signs is the activity of apperception (saṃjñā 想). If the Buddha accepts the activity of consciousness (vijñāna) but rejects the activity of apperception, one should know that there are cases in which consciousness exists without apperception. When a person grasps [an object’s] signs, grasping [the signs occurs only] after seeing [the object]; it does not occur at the same moment as seeing [the object]. Therefore, one knows that consciousness (vijñāna), [apperception (saṃjñā)], and so forth, arise in succession.

Moreover, as it is said in the sūtra, “Having seen form (rūpa) with the eye, one explores (upavicarati) [a form] productive of joy, [and so forth]” Here again, [the sūtra] mentions the activity of consciousness first [and] afterward mentions feeling (vedanā), and so forth.

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90 No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p919b21-3: 何故無一補特伽羅非前非後二心俱生。答無第二等無間緣故。有情一一心相續轉故。No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 10) T27, p49b16-21: 謂心心所法生必依止等無間緣。既無第二等無間緣。故必無一補特伽羅。非前非後二心俱生。此復應問。何故無第二等無間緣。故復答言。有情一一心相續轉故。謂有情心。法爾一一相續而轉。無二無多。此是展轉更相答義。

91 For example, SĀ no. 279, No. 99 雖阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p76b4-6: 多聞聖弟子眼見色。不取色相。不取隨形好。任其眼根之所趣向。常住律儀。S IV 112: etha tumhe, bhikkhave, indriyesu guttadvārā viharatha. cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā mā nimittaggāhino ahuvattha, mānubyañjanaggāhino.

92 AKBH verse 1-14d (p.10.16): saṃjñā nimittodgrahanātātmikā.

Chapter 5. Translation

65.10 又經中說。見是見等。故知非一切心盡有受等。
Moreover, it is said in the sūtra that seeing is seeing, and so forth.\(^{94}\) Therefore, not all cittas have feelings, and so forth.

65.11 又以五識相是事可明。所以者何。若人於眼識中。不能取怨親相及平等相。是則無想。亦無憂喜。無分別故。或有人說。是中亦無貪等煩惱。故知無思。能求後有。故名為思。此後當說。故知五識亦無思也。
Moreover, the fact that [there is only citta without associated caitasikas] can also be clarified by the characteristics of the five types of consciousness. Why? If a person in eye-consciousness cannot grasp the characteristics of enemy, friend, or neutral, then there is no apperception (saṃjñā 想) [in eye-consciousness]; there are also no pleasant or unpleasant [feelings], because there is no discrimination. Some others say, in this [eye-consciousness] there are also no defilements (kleśa 煩惱) such as lust (rāga 貪), and so forth; therefore, one knows that there is no volition (cetanā 思)\(^{95}\) since that which desires (*prārthayate 求) future existence is called cetanā. This will be discussed later.\(^{96}\) Therefore, one knows that within the five types of consciousness there is no volition.

65.12 又汝等五識不能分別。此中云何當有覺觀。思惟分別。先麁後細。故名覺觀。
Moreover, you [believe] that the first five types of consciousness cannot discriminate (*nirvikalpa). [If so,] how can there be applied thought (vitarka) and sustained thought (vicāra) in them?\(^{97}\) When [citta] thinks and discriminates,\(^{98}\) at first it is gross, then it is

\(^{94}\) Sastri’s Sanskrit reconstruction (Sastri 1975: 163): sūtre dṛṣṭir darśanam iti. The sūtra quoted here is uncertain. One candidate might be the Chabbisodhana-sutta, M no.112, III 29: diṭṭhe diṭṭhavāditā, sute sutavāditā, mute mutavāditā, viññāte viññātavāditā. Corresponds to MĀ 187 說智經, No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 49) T01, p732b28-c1:賢者。世尊說四說。云何為四。一曰見見說。二曰聞聞說。三曰識識說。四曰知知說。Collett Cox (private communication 6/19/2014) suggests that this statement may simply mean "seeing is seeing," namely, seeing is seeing, and is not associated with other dharmas such as feelings, and so forth.

\(^{95}\) Mizuno observes that such a position can be attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas, Vātsīputrīyas, Pāli Theravādins, and the Śāriputrābhidharma. Mizuno 1964: 86-89. See also Katsura 1974: 140n**.

\(^{96}\) TatSid chapter 84 is dedicated to the discussion of cetanā 思. In that chapter, Harivarman defines cetanā as "wish, desire" ("prāṇidhāna 須, "prārthāna 求"). p286a11-2: 問曰。何等為思。答曰。願求為思。As Katsura (1974:140n****) points out, the Sarvāstivādins suggest that the first five types of consciousness are nirvikalpa, and mano-viññāna can be either savikalpa and nirvikalpa. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 72) T27, p374b5-8: 問此六識身幾有分別。幾無分別。答前五識身唯無分別。第六識身或有分別。或無分別。且在定者皆無分別。不在定者或有分別。計度分別遍與不定意識俱故。It should be noted that the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma

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system defines three types of discriminations (vikalpa): svabhāva-vikalpa 自性分別, abhinirūpaṇa-vikalpa 計度分別, and anusmaraṇa-vikalpa 随念分別. The first is vitarka and vicāra, the second is the non-concentrated discernment, and the third is mindfulness associated with the mano-vijñāna. Since the first five types of consciousness have only the first type of discrimination and lack the latter two types, they are said to be nirvikalpa. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p219b7-12: 此中略有三種分別，一分自性分別。謂尋伺，二隨念分別，謂意識相應念。三推度分別。謂意地不定慧。欲界五識身唯有一種自性分別。雖亦有念而非隨念分別。不能憶念故。雖亦有慧而非推度分別不能推度故。AKBh p22.20-21: trivīdāḥ kila vikalpaḥ, svabhāvābhinirūpaṇaṃsmarāṇavikalpaḥ. tadesāḥ svabhāvavikalpaḥ 'tīti. netarau tasmād vikalpakā ityucyante.

98 Here I suspect 思惟分別 “think and discriminate” is a translation of samkalpa, but this cannot be confirmed in other places in the TatSid or in Kumārajīva’s other translations.

99 Namely, gross citta is called vitarka, and subtle citta is called vicāra. This is a position attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas in the *Mahāvibhāṣa. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p218c28: 謂或有執。尋伺即心。如譬喻者。100 This is a very popular verse in northern Buddhist literature. It appears in the 四十二章經, the very first Buddhist text translated into Chinese in the 1st century CE. In this text, the verse is attributed to the past Buddha, Kāśyapa. T No. 344 四十二章经 (卷 1) T17, p0723c2-5: 欲我知汝根，意以思想生。於我不是相，即爾而不生。佛行道間之謂沙門曰。記之。此迦葉佛。流在俗間。It is also included in the Chinese Dharmapada (法句經  ch. 32 愛欲品, T No. 210 法句經 (卷 2) T04, p075b10-1: 欲我知汝本。意以思想生。我不思惟汝。則汝而不有。No. 213 法集要頌經 (卷 1) T04, p078a2-3: 慾我知汝根意以思想生 我不思惟汝則汝而不有。The early Abhidharma text, the Dharmaskandha, also quotes this verse (Xuanzang’s translation: T No. 1537 阿毘達磨法薃足論 (卷 6) T26, p482c5-6: 欲我知汝本。汝從分別生。我更不分別。汝復從誰起。Udānavarga 2.1: kāma jānāmi te mūlam samkalpāti kāma jāyase, na tvām samkalpasyāmi tato me na bhavisyasti. Mahāvastu 3.190: kāma jānāmi te mūlam samkalpāti kāma jāyase; na kāmam kalpayisāmi tato me na bhavisyasti. However, this verse is not included in the Pāli Dharmapada, but it does appear in the Niddesa and the Jātaka in a slightly different form (Nidd I 2, 28; Ja III 450): addasāṃ kāma te mūlam, sankappayissāmi, evaṃ kāma na hohisti.

101 Note that here Kumārajīva translates samkalpa as 思惟, which uses the same character 覺 as in his translation of vitarka.

102 The referent of this “someone” is not specified by Harivaran.

103 Probably here the “someone” is following sūtra passages like M I 111-2: cakkhuñ c’āvuso pañci ca uppajjati cakkhuvihiññānaṃ, tiṇṇam sanātini phasso, phassaccayāvadā, yam vedeti tam saññāna, yam saññāna tam vitakketi, yam vitakketi tam papiñci. … No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 28) T01, p604b1-5: 尊者大迦旃延告諸比丘。諸賢等共勸我所說。諸賢，緣眼及色。生眼識。三事共會。便有更觸。緣更觸便有所覺。若所覺便想。若所想便思。
65.15 Therefore, [one] should accept that the five [sense] types of consciousness have no apperception (saṃjñā), nor applied thought (vitarka), nor sustained thought (vicāra). Why? In the five types of consciousness, there is no discrimination of male or female, nor discrimination of feeling, and so forth. What can be discriminated in [them]?

65.16 Moreover, you said that mano-vijñāna inevitably arises immediately after the five types of consciousness, because the five types of consciousness have no discrimination (nirvikalpa). If the five types of consciousness have discrimination, why is it necessary that mano-vijñāna arise immediately afterward?

65.17 Moreover, applied thought (vitarka) and sustained thought (vicāra) should not arise within the same [moment] of citta, because grossness and subtleness are mutually exclusive. As in the simile of ringing a bell, the initial [gross] sound is vitarka, and the
remaining [subtle] sound is \textit{vicāra}.\footnote{This means that gross sound and subtle sound cannot coexist. According to the MVŚ, this simile is from the \textit{Prajñaptiśāstra}. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p219a7-9: 施設論說。如叩錘鐘銅鐵器等。其聲發運。前途後細。尋伺亦爾。} Likewise, in the simile [the gross sound and the subtle sound are mutually exclusive].

\textit{Prajñaptiśāstra} No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p219a7-23: 尋伺何差別。答心麁性名尋。心細性名伺。是謂差別。問何故復作此論。答欲令疑者得決定故。謂此二法展轉相似。見多尋者世人共言。此是多伺。見多伺者世人共言。此是多尋。或有生疑此二體一。欲令彼疑得決定故。顯此二種自體各別故作斯論。問此中所說心麁細性顯何義耶。有作是說。此則顯心麁性細性若作是說。尋伺應以心為自性。亦不相應一物麁細不俱有故。有餘師說。此顯心麁時有尋性。心細時有伺性。若作是說。應顯尋伺非一心俱。心麁細時剎那別故。評曰。應作是說。此中顯示即一心中麁性名尋。細性名伺若作是說。顯一心中有尋有伺。尋令心麁伺令心細。問云何一心麁細二法互不相違。答所作異故。尋性猛利。伺性遲鈍。共助一心故。虧麁細而不相違。}

\textit{Prajñaptiśāstra} No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 42) T27, p219a7-23: 施設論說。如叩錘鐘銅鐵器等。其聲發運。前途後細。尋伺亦爾。
Chapter 5. Translation

65.22 又若念此人是我知識。曾利益我。念已生喜。是事云何。在一心中。
Moreover, if [one] considers that this person is my friend who had helped me. After considering [thus], joy arises. How can [all] these thoughts occur in one citta?

65.23 又欲不欲。云何在一心中。如經中說。若諸比丘樂欲我法。法則增長。若不樂欲。法則損滅。云何當在一心中。
Moreover, how can inclination (*chanda) and non-inclination (*acchanda) occur in one citta? As it is said in the sūtra, if the bhikṣus desire my Dharma, it will grow; if [they] do not desire it, the Dharma will decrease. How can [desire and not desire] occur in one citta?

65.24 又若一心中有心數法。法則錯亂。所以者何。於一心中。有知不知疑不疑信不信精進懈怠。如是等過。
Moreover, if there are caitasikas in one citta, [these] dharmas would be in disorder (*vaiśamya 錯亂). Why? Because [if this were the case,] within one citta there would be the fault of the coexistence of knowing and not-knowing, doubt and doubtlessness, faith and faithlessness, energy and slackness, and so forth.

65.25 又一切心數應盡在一心中。以何障故。苦樂貪恚等。不在一心中。若汝謂苦樂等相違故不在一心中者。知不知等亦相違故。不應在一心中。故無相應。
Moreover, [if there were association], all caitasikas should occur in one citta. What can

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110 Here, the translation follows Kumārajīva and renders smṛti as “recollection” (憶). The term smṛti can also be translated as “mindfulness,” which is adopted in other parts of this study. See the discussion of these two senses of this term in 3.4.8 regarding 65.21.

111 According to the Sarvāstivādins, memory entails becoming familiar with an object and having knowledge of a similar kind in later citraas. No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p919b23-5: 補特伽羅。既不可得。又無前心往後心。理何緣能憶本所作事。答有情於法。由串習力。得如是同分智。隨所更事。能如是知。See also MVŚ No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 12) T27, p55cff; AKBh p472ff.

112 The intended opponent here is uncertain.

113 This sūtra passage could not be identified.
prevent pleasant (*sukha* 楽) and unpleasant (*duḥkha* 苦) [feelings], greed (*lobha* 貪) and anger (*dveṣa* 悅), and so forth, from occurring in one *citta*? If you say that because pleasant and unpleasant [feelings], and so forth, are mutually exclusive, they do not occur in one *citta*, knowing and not-knowing and so forth, are also mutually exclusive, [and they also] should not occur in one *citta*. Therefore, there is no association.\(^{114}\)

Moreover, in the sūtra on the seven factors contributing to awakening (*bodhyaṅga 菩提分*), the Buddha presents [them] as a succession of *caitasikas* [as follows]: “When a bhikṣu is in the course of the four applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupāsthāna* 念處), at that time he practices the awakening-factor of mindfulness (*smṛti 念*). [His] mind is in mindfulness, and discriminates (*pravicayate 簡摳*) dharmas. Because of the discrimination of dharmas (*dharmapravicaya*), energy (*vīrya 精進*) arises. Because of the power of energy, [he] can accumulate wholesome dharmas, and pure joy (*prīti 喜*) arises in [his] mind. Because joy arises in [his] mind, [he] attains tranquility (*praśrabdhi 猶*). Because of the attainment of tranquility, [his] mind is concentrated (*samādhiyati 摄*). When the mind is concentrated, he attains [the awakening factor of] concentration (*samādhi 定*). Because of the attainment of concentration, [he] is able to abandon greed and sorrow. Because of the abandoning of greed and sorrow, [that is, as a result of this succession of practices], one knows that *caitasikas* arise one after another.”\(^{115}\)

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\(^{114}\) MVŚ attributes this argument to the Dārṣṭāntikas. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 106) T27, p547b24-9. 聞喻者說。若心有智則無無知。若心有疑則無決定。若心有麁則無有細。然對法者所說法相如樹叢林，謂一心中。有智有無知。有非智非無知。有疑有決定。有非疑非決定。有麁有細。有非麁非細。如諸色法異類俱生。心所亦爾。故無有失。

\(^{115}\) This is a description of the seven awakening-factors as a progressive process. SĀ no. 810. No. 99 難阿含經 (卷 29) T02, p208b13-29: 阿難白佛。如是修習安那般那念。令四念處滿足。云何修四念處。令七覺分滿足。佛告阿難。
65.27 又八道分經中。亦次第說。若得正見。則從正見生正思惟乃至正定。
Moreover, in the sūtra on the eight-fold noble path, [the Buddha] teaches it as a successive process: “If [one] attains right-view (samyag-drṣṭi 正見), then from right-view arises right-intention (sanyak-saṃkalpa 正思惟), and so on up to right concentration (sanyak-saṃādhi 正定).”

65.28 又次第經中。佛語阿難。持戒之人。不應願欲。心無憂悔。持戒人心法無憂悔。無憂悔者。不應願欲。心得歡悅。心無憂悔。法應歡悅。歡悅則心喜。心喜則得身猗。身猗則受樂。受樂則心攝。心攝則得實智。得實智則厭離。厭離則解脫。故知心法次第而生。
Moreover, in the sūtra on the succession (次第) [of dharmas], the Buddha said to Ānanda, “A person who is virtuous (sīlavant 持戒) should not exert the volition (不應願欲 P. na cetaṇāya karaṇīyaṃ) to have no regret (avipratisāra 無憂悔) in [his] mind. For a virtuous person, it is natural (dharmatā 法) that there is no regret [in his mind]. When there is no regret, [he] should not exert the volition to have joy (prāmodya 歡悅) in [his] mind. …

若比丘身身觀念住。念住已。繫念住不忘。爾時方便修念覺分。修念覺分已。於法選擇思量。修定歡喜。修精進已。則心歡喜。心喜則得身猗。身猗則受樂。受樂則心攝。心攝則得實智。得實智則厭離。厭離則解脫。故知心法次第而生。
Also SĀ no. 281. No. 99 杂阿含經 (卷11) T02, p77c19-78a8. For Pāli parallel passages see S V 312-3, 331-3. Harivarman also quotes the same passage in chapter 17. No. 1646 成實論 (卷2) T32, p251c29-252a8. It should be noted that, near the end of the passage quoted here, there is the sentence 得定故能捨貪憂: “Because of the attainment of concentration [he] is able to abandon greed and sorrow.” This sentence is absent in the Pāli parallels but present in the SĀ version. Therefore, it is very likely that Harivarman is quoting the Sarvāstivāda SĀ. For a study of the seven awakening factors as a process, see Gethin 2001: 168-72. The northern Abhidharma text Dharmaskandha also quotes this sūtra. No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷8) T26, p491b9-c2.

116 SĀ no. 749. No. 99 阿毘阿含經 (卷28) T2, p198b19-21; 若起明為前相。生諸善法。時懺愧隨生。懺愧生已。能生正見。正見生已。起正志正語正業正命正方便正念正定。次第而起。S V 1-2: vijjā ca kho bhikkhave pubbangamā kusalānām dhammānām samāpattiyā anudeva hirottappaṃ. vijjāgatasssa bhikkhave yuddasavo sammaṭṭhitī pahoti. sammaṭṭhitissā na saṁsaṅkāppo pahoti. saṁsaṅkappassā na saṁsāvācā pahoti. saṁsāvāccassā sammaṭṭhāpana pahoti. saṁmaṭṭhāpanassā saṁmaṭṭhāvito pahoti. saṁmaṭṭhāvissassā saṁmaṭṭhāmocanā pahoti. saṁmaṭṭhāmomassā sammaṭṭhati pahoti. sammaṭṭhatissā sammaṭṭhānādiyi pahoti. saṁmaṭṭhāpattipā ṭaṅkāpam. Modern Western scholarship generally does not accept the progressive aspect of the eight-fold noble path. For example, Gethin (2001: 207-212) tries to account for the strange order of the eight āṅgas in terms of the standard gradual path of sīla, samādhi, and prajñā by saying that the eight āṅgas are simultaneous as the “consummation of the development of sīla, samādhi, and prajñā” (212). Peter Masefield (1986: 37-45) offers an explanation that the eight-fold path is restricted to those who have realized the four noble truths and attained dharmacaksu, namely, who are nobles (ariya).
mind. For when [one] has no regret in [his] mind, it is natural there is joy. When there is joy, there is rapture (prīti 喜) of mind. When there is rapture of mind, there is the tranquility (prasārabdha 睹) of body. When there is tranquility of body, [he] experiences pleasure (sukha 樂). When he experiences pleasure, [his] mind will be concentrated (samādhiyati 攝). When [his] mind is concentrated, [he] attains the knowledge [of things] as they are (yathabhūta 實智). Having attained the knowledge as things really are, there is disenchantment (nirveda 厭離) [with regard to worldly objects]. Being disenchanted [with regard to worldly objects], [he] is liberated (*vimukta 解脫).” Therefore, the caitasikas arise one after another.¹¹⁷

65.29 又八大人覺中，亦次第說。若比丘行少欲則知足，知足則遠離，遠離則精進，精進則正憶念。正憶念則心攝。心攝則得慧。得慧則戲論滅。

Moreover, in the sūtra on the eight thoughts of a great person (P. attha mahāpurisavitakka), [the Buddha] also teaches [the eight thoughts] as a sequence: “If a bhikṣu has few desires, [he will] be content; being content, [he will] resort to solitude; having resorted to solitude [he will] be energetic; being energetic, [he will] be mindful in the right way; being mindful in the right way, [his] mind will be concentrated; [with his] mind concentrated, [he will] attain wisdom; having attained wisdom, proliferation (prapañca) will cease.”¹¹⁸

65.30 又七淨中。亦次第說。戒淨為心淨。心淨為見淨。見淨為度疑淨。度疑淨為

¹¹⁷ The sūtra Harivarman quoted here corresponds to Pāli A 10.2 (V 2-4) and MĀ no. 43. No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 10) T01, p485b22-25: 阿難。持戒者不應思。令我不悔。阿難。但法自然。持戒者便得不悔。阿難。有不悔者不應思。令我歡悅。阿難。但法自然。有不悔者便得歡悅。阿難。有歡悅者不應思。令我喜。阿難。但法自然。有歡悅者便得喜。阿難。因歡悅便得喜，因喜便得止，因止便得樂，因樂便得定心。阿難！多聞聖弟子有定心者便見如實、知如真，因見如實、知如真便得厭，因厭便得無欲，因無欲便得解脫。因解脫便知解脫。In the Pāli version of the sutta, the order of the ten factors is reversed in its summary part. Also in the Pāli version, the audience consists of unnamed bhikṣus, while in the Chinese version the interlocutor is Ānanda. Apparently, Harivarman here is quoting a version of the sūtra closer to the Sarvāstivāda MĀ. The sequence of the ten factors is also listed in A 10.1 (V 1-2) and MĀ no. 42, No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 10) T01, p485a-b. See also Bhikkhu Bodhi’s translation (Bodhi 2012: 1340-1).

¹¹⁸ A 8.30 (IV 228-9). This corresponds to several Chinese translations: MĀ no. 74. No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 18) T01, p540c. EĀ ch.42 no.6. No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 37) T02, p754a. There is also a very early separate translation by Zhiyao 支曜 in the second century CE: No. 46 阿那律八念經 T01, p835c. However, in all these sūtras, the eight items are given in a list that does not include any reference to the causal connection between each consecutive item.
道非道知見淨。道非道知見淨為行知見淨。行知見淨為行斷知見淨。

Moreover, in the [sūtra on] the seven purifications, [they are] also taught as a sequence:
“Purification of virtue is for the sake of purification of mind; purification of mind is for
the sake of purification of view; purification of view is for the sake of purification by
overcoming doubt; purification by overcoming doubt is for the sake of purification by
knowledge and vision of what is and what is not the path; purification by knowledge and
vision of what is and what is not the path is for the sake of purification by the knowledge
and vision of practice; purification by the knowledge and vision of practice is for the sake
of purification by the knowledge and vision of the abandoning of practice.”

65.31 又因緣經中。亦次第說。因眼緣色。生癡分濁念。是中癡即無明。癡者所求
為愛。愛者所作名業。如是等。

Moreover, in the sūtra on causes and conditions, [the Buddha] also teaches [causes and
conditions] as a sequence: “Because the eye takes forms as its objects, there arises an
impure thought of the nature of delusion (moha 癡). Here, delusion is ignorance (avidyā
無明). What the deluded seeks is craving (trṣnā 愛), what craving makes is called karma
(karma 業),” and so forth.  

65.32 又大因經中。亦次第說。愛首九法。因愛生求。因求故得。因得故挍計。因
挍計故生染。因染故貪著。因貪著故取。因取故生憤心。因憤心故守護。因守護故
便有鞭杖詰詰諸苦惱等。

Moreover, in the Mahānidāna-sūtra, [the Buddha] also teaches the nine dharmas
beginning with craving as a sequence: “Because of craving (愛), there arises seeking (求);
because of seeking, there is acquisition (得); because of acquisition, there is
decision-making (挍計); because of decision-making, there arises lustful desire (染); because of lustful desire, there is attachment (貪著); because of attachment, there is appropriation (取); because of appropriation, there arises avarice (慳); because of avarice, there is the guarding (守護) [of possessions]; because of the guarding [of possessions], there arises suffering [resulting from the] whip, stick, quarrels, arguments, and so forth.”

Moreover, [in the sūtra on] the stream-entry (srotāpañña 須陀洹) dharmas, [the Buddha] also presents them as a sequence: “Because of [one’s] association with good companions, [one] is able to hear the true Dharma; because of hearing the true Dharma, [one] is able to generate right attention; because of right attention, [one] can practice the path.”

Moreover, as it is taught in the sūtra, “Because the eye takes form (rūpa 色) as its object, there arises eye-consciousness; the coming together (saṅgati 合) of the three is called

122 D II 58-9: iti kho Ānanda vedanā ya paticcā tanhā, tanhā paticcā pariyesanā, pariyesanam paticcā lābbho, lābbham paticcī vinicchayo, vinicchayam paticcā chanda-rāgo, chanda-rāgam paticcā ajjhosānam, ajjhosānam paticcā pariggaho, pariggaham paticcā macchariyaṃ, macchariyam paticcā ārakkho, ārakkhādikaraṇam danḍadāna-saṅgati-dāna-kalahavivāda-vivāda-pesuṅña-ārakkho, ārakkhādikaraṇaṃ. There are several Chinese translations: DĀ no. 13 大緣方便經 No. 1. 長阿含經 (卷 10) T01, p60a; MĀ no. 97 大因經 No. 26 中阿含經 (卷 24) T01, p578b; the very early translation by Anshigao 安世高, No. 14 人本欲生經 T01, p242a; and a late translation by Shihu 施護, No. 52 大生義經 (卷 1) T01, p844c. There appear to be no significant differences in this passage among all the versions. This translation mainly follows Walshe’s (1995:224-5) understanding of the Pāli terms.

123 The four srotāpañña dharmas are given in SĀ no. 1125. No. 99 難阿含經 (卷 41) T02, p298c-4: 與時。世尊告諸比丘。有四種須陀洹道分。親近善男子。聞正法。聞正法故能生正念。正念因緣。能修行道。S V 404, 410: cattārimāni, bhikkhave, sotāpattiyaṅgāni. These four dharmas are also explained in two early Abhidharma texts, the Dharmaskandha and the Saṅgītiparyāya. No. 1537 阿毘達磨法蘊足論 (卷 2) T26, p458b-c; No. 1536 阿毘達磨集異門足論 (卷 5) T26, p458b-c; No. 1536 阿毘達磨集異門足論 (卷 6) T26, p393a: 四預流支者。一親近善士。二聽聞正法。三如理作意。四法隨法行。No sūtra appears to state explicitly that these four dharmas constitute a sequence; however, logically it is possible to understand the four items as a chain with the latter items dependent on the immediate preceding ones.
contact (sparśa 觸).” If citta and caitasikas all arise simultaneously, then there would be no coming together of [only] three things. If one claims that they occur one after another, then there is the coming together of three things.124

65.35 以是等緣故無相應。
For these reasons, there is no association (samprayoga).

124 This repeats the argument in 60.13.
Chapter 5. Translation

有相應品第六十六

Chapter 66. Proving the Existence of Association

66.1 前曰。有相應法。所以者何。若人見受是神。識心依之。以相應故。想陰等亦如是。若無相應。何由有此。

[The opponent] argues: there are dharmas that are associated (samprayukta). Why? [The sūtra teaches that] when someone perceives (anupaśyati 見) feeling (vedanā 受) as the self (ātman 神), viññāṇā, that is, citta, depends on it because of association. The same is true of the aggregates (skandha 陰) of apperception (saṃjñā 想) and so forth. If there is no association, how can it be like this?\(^\text{125}\)

66.2 又人經中說。因眼緣色生眼識。三事和合生觸。共生受想行等。於是法中。有種種名。所謂眾生天人男女大小。如是等名。皆因諸陰。

Moreover, in the Mānusyaka-sūtra,\(^\text{126}\) [the Buddha] states: “Depending on the eye,

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\(^{125}\) Here, the opponent is likely quoting SĀ no. 109 (No. 99 譯阿含經 (卷 5) T02, p34a24-35a16), which has an expanded explanation for the formula regarding the view of personal-existence (sakkāya). The basic formula is as follows (No. 99 譯阿含經 (卷 5) T02, p34b13-14): 愚癡無聞凡夫見色是我。異我。我在色。色在我。見受。想。行。識。是我。異我。我在識。識在我。This basic formula of sakāṣayaddiṭṭhi also occurs passim in the Pāli Nikāyas (e.g. M III 17-8, S III 3-4, 46, 57, S IV 287, A II 214-5): assutavā puthujjano ... rūpaṃ attato samanupassati rūpavantam vā attānaṃ attani vā rūpaṃ rūpasmīn vā attānaṃ. vedanāṃ attato samanupassati vedanāvantam vā attānaṃ attani vā vedanāṃ vedanāya vā attānaṃ; saññāṃ attato samanupassati saññāvantam vā attānaṃ attani vā saññāṃ saññāya vā attānaṃ; saññāhāre attato samanupassati saññāhāravantam vā attānaṃ attani vā saññāhāre saññāhāresu vā attānaṃ; viññāṇām attato samanupassati viññāṇavantam vā attānaṃ attani vā viññāṇam viññāṇasmīn vā attānaṃ. However, the sentence “若人見受是神。識心依之” indicates that here the opponent quotes the expanded version of the formula as in the SĀ no.109, which does not exist in the Pāli Nikāyas. (The expanded version does however occur in the Pāli Paṭisambhidāmagga 143-9.) The expanded version analyzes the wrong views as entailing the perception of each of the five skandhas as the self, or the self as possessing the skandha, or the skandha as in the self, or the self as in the skandha. The sentence quoted is in the paragraph analyzing the skandha of consciousness (viññāṇa), in reference to the phrase “consciousness in the self” (attānaṃ viññāṇaṃ). No. 99 譯阿含經 (卷 5) T02, p34a26-8: 時何見我中識。謂色是我。識在中住。受。想。行在我。識在中住。是名我中識。帕祇148: kathāṃ attani viññāṇaṃ samanupassati? idhekaccu rūpaṃ ... vedanāṃ ... saññāṃ ... saññāhāre attato samanupassati. tassa evaṃ hoti “ayaṃ kho me attā. imasmiha pana attani idam viññāṇa nīti. attani viññāṇaṃ samanupassati. The commentator (Sāriputra in SĀ no. 109) explains that in this phrase the “self” refers to the four skandhas other than viññāṇa: namely, rūpa, vedanā, saññā, and saṃskāra. An ignorant worldly being takes one of the four, in this case vedanā, as the self, and thinks that viññāṇa exists within this “self,” namely, vedanā. The opponent builds his case here based on the understanding that even though the sūtra is describing a wrong view regarding vedanā and viññāṇa, nonetheless the sūtra’s description of the situation suggests that vedanā and viññāṇa, as well as all the other skandhas, can coexist simultaneously. And, if they can coexist, they are associated.

which takes form (rūpa) as its object, there arises eye-consciousness (cakṣu-viśeṣa); the coming together of the three things gives rise to (生) contact (sparśa), arising together (sahajāta) are feelings (vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā), volitional formations (saṃskāra) and so forth. Regarding these dharmas there are various names, namely, ‘sentient being’ (sattva 眾生), ‘god’ (deva 天), ‘human being’ (manuṣya 人), ‘man’ (puruṣa 男), ‘woman’ (女), ‘old [person]’ (jīva 大), ‘young [person]’ (jantu 小), and so forth.” Such names depend on the [five] skandhas.

66.3 若說心心數法次第生者。則因二陰有人。不應因五陰。所以者何。不可因去來陰得名為人。汝言現在無五陰者。云何說因五陰名人天等。而此中說因諸陰。非但二也。故因五陰有眾生名。

If [you] claim that citta and caitasikas arise in succession, then a person should only depend on two skandhas instead of five skandhas. Why? Because [one] cannot attain the name “person” in dependence [only] on past and future skandhas. You state that the present moment does not have [all] five skandhas; how can it be said that “god” (deva), “human being” (manuṣya), and so forth, are named in that way in dependence on five skandhas? But [the sūtra] states that they depend on the [five] skandhas, not on only two. Therefore, the names “sentient being” (sattva), and so forth, depend on five skandhas.

66.4 又經中說有相應語。謂有根智相應信。

Moreover, the term “associated” (saṃpraya) is mentioned in the sūtras. For example, [the sūtra has mentioned that] faith (śraddhā 信) has a root (*saṃśāla 有根) and is associated with knowledge (*jñāna-saṃpraya 智相應).
66.5 又經中說。觸即與受想思俱生。
Moreover, it is mentioned in the sūtra that contact (sparśa 触) arises together (sahājāta 俱生) with feelings (vedanā 受), apperception (saṃjñā 想), and volitional formations (cetanā 思).

66.6 又說五枝初禪。
And also [some sūtras] state that the first dhyāna has five factors (āṅga).

“associated with knowledge” which is absent in the Pāli version. In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, this phrase constitutes part of the definition of the faith in Buddha, which is one of the four 證淨 avetaya-prāśādas (No. 1536 阿毘達磨集異門足論 (卷 6) T26, p393b7-9): 四證淨者。如契經說。成就四法名預流。何等為四。一佛證淨。二法證淨。三僧證淨。四聖所愛戒。三僧證淨。四聖所愛戒。... p393b12-5: 彼以此相隨念諸佛。見為根本證相應諸信性。現前信性隨順印可。愛慕愛慕性心澄心淨。是名佛證淨。Similarly No. 1537 阿毘達磨法頌足論 (卷 2) T26, p461c-462a. Yinshun (Yinshun 印順 1981b: 302-310) points out that avetaya-prāśāda originally should be abhedya-prāśāda, which is the definition of faith (śraddhā). In the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, these four purities are attainments of the srotāpānṇas, which means that they must be accompanied by proper noble knowledges and are therefore 智相應 “associated with knowledge.” However, as Yinshun observes, in early sūtras and also in Yogācāra texts, such types of faith are not necessarily only related to the noble srotāpānṇas but also occur in ordinary beings. This may explain why the phrase 智相應 “associated with knowledge” is present in Sarvāstivāda texts while absent in the Pāli versions and some other earlier sūtras.

In 66.2, the opponent quotes the Māņusyaka-sūtra, which contains this statement; there is no exact Pāli parallel to this sūtra. However, regarding the cognitive process involving consciousness (vijñāna), contact (sparśa), apperception (saṃjñā), volitional formations (cetanā), and sometimes also craving (trṣṇā), there are some textual discrepancies that have great doctrinal significance. A few sūtras in the Āgamas and Nikāyas contain the same or similar statements indicating that vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā, and trṣṇā all exist simultaneously: for example, SĀ no. 273, No. 99 鍼阿含經 (卷 11) T02, p72c8-10: 比丘。譬如兩手和合相對作聲。如是緣眼.色。生眼識。三事和合觸。觸已受。想。思。In the partial Pāli parallel for this sūtra, although it is not explicitly stated that sparśa arises together (sahājāta) with vedanā, saṃjñā, and cetanā, it does say that the activities of feeling, thinking, and apperceiving all follow contact (P. phassa) (S no.35.93 (IV 69)): phuttho, bhikkhave, vedeti, phuttho ceteti, phuttho saṅjānāti (the same phrase occurs in SĀ no.276, T II 73c9-75c16, and also SĀ sūtra Nos. 326, 327, 328, and no. 329 regarding trṣṇā). However, some sūtras describe these mental phenomena as arising as a successive sequence: for example, in the Pāli version of the famous “six sixes” (saṭsatka, P. chchākka) sūtra, it is said that depending on eye and form there is eye-consciousness, the coming together of the three is contact (phassa), depending on phassa there is feeling (vedanā), depending on vedanā there is craving (taṇhā) (M no.148, (III 282)): cakkhuṇca paṭiccā rūpe ca uppaṭijāti cakkhuvinīhanām, taṇṇaṁ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, vedanāpaccayā taṇhā. (The Chinese version of this 六六 sūtra, SĀ no. 304, T II p86c23-87a25, states that both vedanā and taṇhā depend on sparśa.) A similar sequence is described in SĀ no.214, No. 99 鍼阿含經 (卷 8) T02, p54a27-8: 色因緣生眼識 … 此三法和合觸已受。受已思。思已想。The Chinese SĀ has two sūtras stating that sparśa occurs together with vedanā, saṃjñā, and cetanā, but in Pāli the term “arise together” (saḥajāta) is never used in this context, even though the claim that vedanā, saṃjñā, and cetanā are all dependent on sparśa might be understood as implying that they occur together. In summary, sūtras in both Chinese and Pāli preserve two versions of this description of the cognitive process: one version says that vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā, and so forth, arise simultaneously with sparśa; while the other version says that they arise as a sequence one after another. Here, the opponent is likely quoting from a text similar to the Sarvāstivāda SĀ. See the discussion in 3.4.3.

The five dhyāna-āṅgas (vīraka, vicāra, pīṭha, sukha, samādhi) occur frequently in the Nikāyas and Āgamas. For example, in D I 74-75 it is said that all these five āṅgas are present in the first dhyāna; the second dhyāna has pīṭha, sukha, and samādhi; the third dhyāna has sukha, and samādhi; and the fourth dhyāna has only samādhi accompanied by upeksā.
66.7 Also, it is said that the states of consciousness are the stations (sthiti) of wisdom (vijñāna). If there is nothing with which vijñāna is associated, how can it be stationed in dharmas such as vedanā, and so forth? Here, “station” (sthiti 住) means what supports as a station (*āśraya 依止住). Why? [The sūtra] does not state that vijñāna is the station of vijñāna.133

66.8 Also, in the sūtra that dharmas that are with citta are all born from citta and depend on citta.134

66.9 Also, beings’ minds have long been polluted by greed, anger, and so forth. If there is no association, how are they able to contaminate...
66.10 又心心數法性羸劣故。相依能緣。喻如束竹相依而立。
Moreover, because *citta* and *caitasikas* are weak by nature, [they] can take objects depending on each other. It is analogous to [two] bundles of reeds that stand relying on each other.\(^{137}\)

66.11 又經中說。心掉動時。不宜三覺。謂擇法精進喜。更增動故。宜三覺意。謂猗定捨。止發動故。若心懈沒。則不宜三覺。謂猗定捨增退沒。故宜三覺意。擇法精進喜。能發起故。念能俱調。
Moreover, it is mentioned in the *sūtra* that, when [a practitioner’s] mind is excited (*uddhata* 掉動), it is not suitable to practice three awakening factors (*bodhyaṅga* 覺意), namely, discrimination of dharmas (*dharmapravicaya* 擇法), energy (*vīrya* 精進), and joy (*prīti* 喜), because [they] may [make the mind] more excited. [In such a case] it is suitable to practice three awakening factors, namely, tranquility (*praśrabdhi*猗), concentration (*samādhi* 定), and equanimity (*upekṣā* 捨), because [they] can stop the arousal. If [one’s] mind is sluggish (*līna* 懈沒), it is not suitable to practice three awakening factors, namely, tranquility, concentration, and equanimity, [because they] can [make the mind] more sluggish. [In such a case] it is suitable to practice three awakening factors, namely, discrimination of dharmas, energy, and joy, [because they] can arouse...
66.12 又論師言。一時修習助菩提法。不得相離。

Moreover, certain treatise teachers (*śāstrācarya 論師) state that [one] should practice the factors contributing to awakening (bodhipākṣika 助菩提法) all at once and not separately.
66.13 故知有相應。
Therefore, one knows that there is association.

藐三菩提法。於念念中。皆悉具足。
No. 220c 大般若波羅蜜多經 (卷 466) T7, p359a27-b1: 則時具壽善現白佛言。世尊。云何菩薩摩訶薩行深般若波羅蜜多時。一心現起則能攝受六波羅蜜多。亦能攝受四靜慮四無量無色定。亦能攝受三十七菩提分法。No. 1604 大乘莊嚴經論 (卷 13) T31, p657c16-7: 第七地名得覺。菩薩住無相力。能念念中修三十七覺分故。
Chapter 67. Refuting Association

67.1 You said that one perceives feeling (vedanā) as the self, [and so forth]. This is not correct. An ordinary person (prthagjana 凡夫) comes to this [wrong] view by ignorance and delusion. [He] cannot distinguish, “This is feeling, this is what vijñāna depends on.” If this person can distinguish in this way, he can also enter emptiness. The [ordinary] person sees the continuous series of consciousness (citta-santati 心相續), and cannot make the distinction [of the skandhas] but only attaches to words (*vacana), so he makes such a statement. This is an ignorant and deluded statement and not reliable.

67.2 You said that one is called a “person” (pudgala 人) based on the [simultaneous] five skandhas. One is called a “person” based on the continuous series (santati 相續) of the five skandhas; therefore, it is said that [a person] is the skandhas. Just as people in the world say someone [feels] pleasant, unpleasant, and neither pleasant nor unpleasant; [such a person] cannot have all these three feelings simultaneously. In the same manner, the skandhas [cannot occur simultaneously].

67.3 You said there is wisdom corresponding to faith. In the sūtras it also says that other things correspond. As stated, two monks agreed on one thing. You said that hate corresponds to suffering. Love is different from suffering. Your doctrine is not corresponding. This is with the common practice. Faith and faith is not the same thing. This is in accordance with the knowledge. It is in accordance with one thing. Therefore corresponding.

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140 See 66.1.
141 One who can correctly analyze the five aggregates should enter the truth of emptiness.
142 See 66.2.
You mentioned faith (śraddhā) that has a root and is associated with knowledge [as a proof for association]. But in the sūtras, other things are also mentioned as associated. For example, [the sūtra] says that two bhikṣus are associated with regard to a single task. [Other sūtras] also mention suffering from the association with people one dislikes (apriya-samprayogaduḥkha) and suffering from the separation from loved ones (priya-viprayogaduḥkha). In your system, form (rūpa) cannot be associated [with other things], but [people] conventionally also refer to it as associated [with other things]. In the same manner, faith and knowledge are also [referred to as associated]. [One with] faith can have faith in [the teaching of] impermanence, and so forth, wisdom (prajñā) follows understanding, [and these two] together achieve the same goal. Therefore, they are referred to as associated (samprayukta).

67.4 汝言從觸即有受等俱生。是事不然。世間有事雖小相遠亦名為俱。如言與弟子俱行。亦如頂生王生心即到天上。是事亦然。凡夫識造緣時。四法必次第生。識次生想。想次生受。受次生思。思及憂喜等。從此生貪恚癡。故說即生。

You said that [according to the sūtra], from contact (sparśa), feelings, and so forth, arise together (俱). This is not correct. In the world, there are things that are also referred to as “together” even though they [occur] slightly apart [from one another in] time (小相遠).

Just like the statement that [a teacher] walks together with [his] students or the king Māndhātṛ immediately arrives at the heaven as soon as he has the thought (sahacittopādād rājā māndhātā ... āgatya 生心即到), [in these two cases “together”

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143 See 66.4.
144 In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, samprayukta-hetu is only applicable to citta and caitasika.
145 Although all the Chinese editions have two 思 here, the second 思 would appear to be a superfluous copy error; it breaks the four-character pattern, and grammatically it makes no sense in the sentence.
146 See 66.5.
147 This interpretation of the term saha 俱 also occurs in the MVŚ: No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 161) T27, p818b16-8: 間若爾何故說俱行耶。答於前後義俱聲亦轉。如世尊說。曼馱多王起此想俱即便墮落。Saṅghahadra also discusses this meaning of saha in the *Nyāyānusāra: No. 1562 阿毘達磨順正理論 (卷 13) T29, p403b4-8: 曼馱多等。契經俱言。理實應顯無間起義。以非愛業與非愛果。決定不應同時生故。又彼經說第五轉故。如彼經說。曼馱多王悪心起故。俱時墮落。此顯後時方墜落義。But both the MVŚ and the *Nyāyānusāra use the example that the king Māndhātṛ has an evil thought and immediately falls back to the human world from heaven, while Harivarman’s example refers to the king’s ascent to heaven. For the story of the King Māndhātṛ, see MĀ no. 60 四洲, T I 49b10-496a14; Divy no. 17 Māndhātāvadāna (Cowell and Neil 1886: 200-28; Vaidya 1959: 125-141); J no. 258 Māndhātūjātaka (II 310-4).
(saha 俱) indicates a very short interval in time.] It is the same in this case [of sparśa and vedanā, and so forth]. When an ordinary being’s consciousness takes an object, four dharmas must arise in succession: apperception (samjñā 想) arises after consciousness (vijñāna 識), feeling (vedanā 受) arises after samjñā, volitional formations (cetanā 思) arise after vedanā, and after cetanā, unpleasantness and pleasantness (duḥkha sukha 憂喜), and so forth, and from these arise greed, hatred, ignorance. Therefore, it is claimed that [they] arise immediately.

67.5 汝言五枝初禪。是禪地中有此五枝。非是一時。如欲界三受。所以者何。以先說法後說地故。又覺觀不得相應。先已答。You mentioned the first dhyāna, which has five factors (āṅga) [as a proof for association].148 [This means that] in the level (bhūmi 地) of this dhyāna, there are such five factors; [it does not mean that] they are simultaneous. It is just like the three types of feelings in the realm of sensual desire (kāma-dhātu).149 Why? Because [the sūtra] mentions the [āṅga] dharmas first, then mentions the level (bhūmi). Furthermore, as [I] have answered earlier, vitarka and vicāra should not be associated.150

67.6 汝言識處者。此經中說識緣處。不說依處。何以知之。即此經中說識緣色喜潤故住。汝雖言若識緣識住。則應有五識處。是事不然。所以者何。是識時少。識識事已。心生想等。是中起愛。起愛因緣。說名識處。是故不說識是識處。又七識處中亦說識是識處。You mentioned the stations of consciousness (vijñāna-sthiti 識處) [as a proof for association].151 [But] in this sūtra, [the Buddha] mentions [the four vijñāna-sthitis] as the object-stations (*ālambana-sthiti 緣處) of vijñāna, not as the support-stations

148 See 66.6.
149 In 67.2, Harivarman uses feelings as an example to show that saying that someone has feeling does not necessarily mean that all three kinds of feeling must occur at once.
150 Harivarman has argued in 65.12-13 and 65.17 that vitarka and vicāra cannot occur simultaneously. Vitarka and vicāra are two of the five dhyāna-āṅgas.
151 See 66.7. In this passage, Kumārajīva translates sthiti as 處, which is slightly different from 66.7, where he translates it as 住 and 住處.
How is this known? In the same sūtra, it is mentioned that viññāṇa takes form (rūpa) as its object (ālambana) and is stationed in it because [form] is moistened with delight (nandi-upasceca 喜潤). You may argue that if a viññāṇa can also take [another] viññāṇa as its object, [then viññāṇa should also be referred to as a]

station of consciousness (viññāṇa-sthiti), and then there should be five viññāṇa-sthitis.

This is not correct. Why? Viññāṇa exists only a short time. Having cognized an object, it gives rise to apperception (saññā 想) and so forth, and from them there arises craving (ṭṛṣṇā 愛). Because if there is craving, [consciousness is established,] it is called viññāṇa-sthiti.

Therefore, viññāṇa is not said to be a viññāṇa-sthiti. Moreover, in the [teaching of] seven viññāṇa-sthitis, viññāṇa is also referred to as a viññāṇa-sthiti.
67.7 又應思此經。勿但隨語。如說信能度河。是言不盡。而實以慧得度。是亦應爾。

Moreover, [you] should consider [the meaning] of the sūtra and not simply follow [its] words. For example, [a sūtra] states that [one] can cross a river by faith (śraddhā 信). In such a case, the words are not exhaustive. In fact, one is liberated by wisdom (prajñā 慧). It should also be understood in the same manner in this case [regarding the four vijñāna-sthitis].

67.8 汝言心數依心。是事不然。先心識事後生想等故。

You mention [the sūtra teaches that] caitasikas rely on citta [as a proof for association]. This is not correct. Citta cognizes the object first, then gives rise to apperception (samjñā), and so forth.

67.9 又經中說。受等依心。非如彩畫依壁。是名心數依心。

Moreover, it is said in the sūtra that feelings (vedanā), and so forth, depend on citta. It is not like the case of colorful paintings that “depend on” the wall. [One should understand the statement that] “caitasikas depend on citta” in this way.

67.10 汝言心數相依如束竹者。與經相違。若俱相應。何故心數依心。而心不依數。

若汝謂心先生。大故。數法依止。則成我義。以心生時。無數法故。

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156 This is from the Dharmapada. No. 210 法句經 (卷 1) T04, p560c8: 信能度河 其福難奪.
157 See 66.8.
158 S no. 22.100 (III 152): sayyathāpi, bhikkhave, rajako vā cittakārako vā rajanāya vā lākāya vā haliddiyā vā niśīyā vā maṇijethiyā vā surānāthye phalake vā bhūtīyā vā dussattaṭṭhe vā iṭhitirāpam vā puri sarāpam vā abhinimmineyya sabaṅgamapaccagāmini; evameva kho, bhikkhave, assutavā pilhujano rūpāṇāvah abhinibbattento abhinibbatteti, vedanañño eva ... pe ... sañjñāñño eva ... sañkhāreyeva ... viññāṇñño eva abhinibbattento abhinibbatteti. SĀ no. 267, No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 10) T02, p69c23-70a3: 譬如畫師畫師弟子。善治素地。具眾彩色。隨意圖畫種種像類。如是比丘。凡愚眾生不如實知色。色集色滅色味色患色離。於色不如實知故。樂著於色。樂著色故。復生未來諸色。如是凡愚不如實知受想行識。識集識滅識味識患識離。不如實知故。樂著於識。樂著識故。復生未來諸識。當生未來色受想行識故。於色不解脫。受想行識不解脫。我說彼不解脫生老病死憂悲惱苦。The simile also appears in S no. 12.64 (II 101-2). SĀ nos. 377, 378 (T II 103b18-19, b29-c2).
159 The simile in the sūtra identifies citta with the painter rather than with the wall. Note the puns in the narrative: 畫師 “painter” (citrakāra/cittakāra) and 種種 “various” (citra/citta) are playing with the pun citra and citta. In MIA languages such as Pāli these two words are spelt in the same form citta. From this it is certain that this sūtra was composed originally in a MIA language. Also 集 "accumulation" is based on a psudo-etymology of citta as from √ci “to accumulate.” The Pāli commentary understands the painter as representing karma. See Bodhi 2000: 775n174.
You mention that *caitasikas* depend on each other like bundles of reeds [as a proof for association]. This contradicts the *sūtra*. If *caitasikas* and *citta* are associated with each other, why [does the *sūtra* state that] *caitasikas* depend on *citta*, but not vice versa? If you say that *citta* arises first because it is prominent, [and] *caitasikas* depend on [it], then [this is tantamount to] my thesis because when *citta* arises there are no *caitasikas*.

67.11 汝言煩惱染心故知相應。此無道理。若心先淨。貪等來污。是即淨法可污。則害法相。
You said that because defilements contaminate *citta*, one knows that there is association. This is unreasonable. If *citta* is first pure, and greed, and so forth, come and contaminate [it], then a pure dharma can be polluted, which contradicts the characteristic of the dharma (*dharma-lakṣaṇa* 法相).

67.12 亦如先說。心性本淨。客塵來污。彼應答此。若心本性淨。貪等何為。
Also as mentioned earlier, [some suggest that] *citta* is pure by nature and accidental defilements (*akasmā-kleśa* 客塵) come and contaminate it. One should answer thus: if *citta* is pure by nature, what can greed, and so forth, do [to *citta*]?

67.13 如言心垢故眾生垢。心淨故眾生淨。然則眾生亦應相應。若眾生不可相應。貪等亦不相應。
As it is said [in the *sūtra*], when [their] minds are defiled, sentient beings are defiled; when [their] minds are purified, sentient beings are purified. In that case, a sentient being should also capable of being associated [with defilements]. If a sentient being is not

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160 See 66.10. Section 67.10 contains the answer to the second half of 66.10; the first half of 66.10 is answered in 67.21.
161 See 66.9.
162 See chapter 30.
163 Here Harivarman holds a position similar to that of the Sarvāstivādins. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 27) T27, p140b24-c9: 復次為止他宗顯正義故。謂或有執心性本清。如分別論者。彼說心本性清浄客塵煩惱所染污故相不清浄。為止彼執顯示心性非本清浄客塵煩惱所染污故相不清浄。若心本性清浄客塵煩惱所染污故相不清浄者。何不客塵煩惱本性染污與本性清浄心相應故相不清浄。若客塵煩惱本性染污雖與本性清浄心相應而相不不清浄。亦應心本性清浄不由客塵煩惱相不清浄。義相似故。又此本性清浄心為在客塵煩惱先生。為俱時生。若在先生。應心生已住待煩惱。若爾應經二刹那住。有違宗失。若俱時生。云何可說心性本淨。汝宗不說有未來心可言本淨。為止如是無異執及顛宗無顛倒理故作斯論。
164 See 60.6 and 61.14.
capable of being associated [with defilements], greed, and so forth, also are not associated [with citta].

67.14 以心相續行中。生垢等心。汚諸相續。故說染心。In the continuous series (santati 相續) of citta, there arise defiled cittas that contaminate the series [of citta]. Therefore, it is referred to as polluted citta.

67.15 如說從染心得解脫。是心相續中。若淨心生。名得解脫。是事亦然。In the same way, when citta is said to be liberated from defilements, pure cittas arise in the continuous series of citta; thus, it is called liberated. This case, [i.e. the purification of mind,] is the same [as the defilement of mind].

67.16 如雲霧等雖不與日月相應。亦能為翳。貪等亦然。雖不與心相應。亦能染污。又煙雲霧等能蔽日月。故名為翳。貪等亦爾。能障淨心。故名為污。

It is like clouds, fog, and so forth, although [they] are not associated with the sun and the moon, still [they] can conceal [the sun and the moon]. In the same way, greed, and so forth, although not associated with citta, still can contaminate [citta]. Also smoke, clouds, and fog can conceal the sun and moon and hence are referred to as “concealments” (*upakleśa 翳). Greed, and so forth, can obstruct pure citta and hence are referred to as defilements (kleśa 汚).165

165 This is a simile from a sūtra. A no.4.50 (II 53): cattārome, bhikkhave, candimasūriyānaṃ upakkilesā, yehi upakkleśekhi candimasūriyā na tapanti na bhāsanti na virocanti. katame cattāro? abbhā, bhikkhave, candimasūriyānaṃ upakkleśā, yena upakkilesena upakkleśhī candimasūriyā na tapanti na bhāsanti na virocanti. ahikā... dhūmo rajo... rāhu, bhikkhave, asurindo candimasūriyānaṃ upakkileśa, yena upakkilesena upakkleśhī candimasūriyā na tapanti na bhāsanti na virocanti.

EĀ no. 28.2 No. 125 增壹阿含經 (卷 20) T02, p650a9-13: 世尊告諸比丘。今日月有四重翳。使不得放光明。何等為四。一者雲也。二者風塵。三者烟。四者阿須倫。使覆日月不得放光明。是謂。比丘。日月有此四翳。使日月不得放光。明。何等為四。一者雲也。二者風塵。三者烟。四者阿須倫。使覆日月不得放光。明。是謂。比丘。日月有此四翳。使日月不得放光。明。

JP No. 1544 阿毘達磨發智論 (卷 1) T26, p922b13-20: 世尊亦說。苾芻當知。此日月輪五翳所翳。不明不照。不廣不淨。何等為五。一雲。二烟。三塵。四霧。五曷邏呼阿素洛手如日月輪。非與五翳相合相應相雜彼翳未離。此日月輪。不明不照。不廣不淨。彼翳若離。此日月輪。明照廣淨。如是非此心與貪瞋癡相合相應相雜。而貪瞋癡未斷。心不解脫。貪瞋癡斷。心便解脫。
67.17 問曰。雲霧日月。在一時中。煩惱與心不如是。故此喻非也。

[The opponent] challenges: clouds, fog, the sun, and the moon can occur simultaneously.
[But in your system,] defilements and citta are not [simultaneous]. Therefore, this simile
is not appropriate.

67.18 答曰。障礙同故。是事已成。故無咎也。

Answer: Because [both clouds, and so forth, and defilements] can obstruct, hence [the
simile] is successful [in showing the similarity]. Therefore, there is no fault.

67.19 是煩惱能污心相續。故名為染。

Because defilements can contaminate the continuous series of citta, they are named
contaminants (anuśaya 染).

67.20 汝言數從心生依止心者。是事先答。

You mention that caitasikas are born from citta and depend on citta [as a proof for
association]. I have already answered this. 166

67.21 汝言心心數法性羸劣者。以念念滅。故名羸劣。非相助故。能行於緣。若相
助者。應得暫住。而實不見。有相助力。何用相應。

You said that citta and caitasikas are weak (*daurbalya 贏劣) by nature [and they must
assist each other in taking objects]. [Citta and caitasika] are referred to as “weak”
because [they] perish moment by moment, not because [they] must assist each other to

Note that A 4.50 and EĀ 28.2 both list four concealments (upaklesa P. upakkilesa), while the JP contains five. It is
likely that the JP and the MVS follow the sūtra from the Sarvāstivāda EĀ, which is not extant now. We are not sure
which version Harivarman follows because he does not give a list.

166 See 66.8.

167 This argument of the opponent was answered in 67.8 and 67.9. Similarly, in 67.21 Harivarman answers 66.10 once
again. It is unclear why Harivarman responds to these arguments twice.

168 This passage answers the first half of the opponent’s argument in 66.10. The second half is answered in 67.10.

169 Chapters 73 and 74 of the TatSid record arguments concerning whether citta is momentary. Apparently,
Harivarman’s position is that citta is momentary, and it cannot abide even temporarily.

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be able to function with regard to an object.\textsuperscript{170} If [they] assist each other, [they] should be able to abide temporarily. But in fact, [we] do not find [that they can abide]. [Also, if they] have the power to assist each other, what is the use of association?

67.22 汝言覺意相宜。是說隨時應修三覺。非一念中。如舍利弗言。我於七覺。自在能入。若心掉動。爾時應修猗等三覺。

[The sūtra] you have quoted teaches the proper practice of the bodhyaṅgas,\textsuperscript{171} that is to say, [the practitioner] should practice three bodhyaṅgas according to suitable occasions, not in the same moment. As it is said by Śāriputra, “I can enter the seven bodhyaṅgas at will.”\textsuperscript{172} When citta is excited, at that time [one] should practice three bodhyaṅgas such as tranquility, and so forth.

67.23 又佛亦說覺法次第。

Moreover, the Buddha also teaches the [seven] bodhyaṅgas as a sequence.\textsuperscript{173}

67.24 汝言一時修菩提分。是事不然。若一時修三十七品。則應一時並修二信及五念等。

You said that [one can] practice the [thirty-seven] bodhipākṣikas all at once;\textsuperscript{174} this is not correct. If [one can] practice the thirty-seven bodhipākṣikas all at once, [he] should

\textsuperscript{170} The MVŚ records two opinions on this notion of being “weak” (*daurbalya 嬴劣). Harivarman adopts the first opinion and attacks the second one concerning the relationship between citta and caitasika. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 55) T27, p283b29-c9: 自性嬴劣者。謂諸有為法從緣生性立自性名。有說。有為有生滅故自性嬴劣。有說。有為從緣生故自性嬴劣。如契經說。苾芻當知。色是無常。諸因諸緣能生色者亦是無常。既是無常因緣所起色云何常。受想行識亦復如是。由嬴劣故諸有為法。或四緣生或三緣生或二緣生。尚無一緣獨能生者。何況無緣。故有為法自性嬴劣。如嬴病者。或四人扶或三人扶。或二人扶方能起住。尚無一人獨令起住。何況無人。

\textsuperscript{171} See 66.11.

\textsuperscript{172} SĀ no. 718. No. 99 雜阿含經 (卷 27) T2, p193b15-22: 尊者舍利弗告諸比丘。有七覺分。何等為七。謂念覺分。擇法覺分。精進覺分。喜覺分。猗覺分。定覺分。捨覺分。此七覺分決定而得。不勤而得。我隨所欲。覺分正受。若晨朝時.日中時.日暮時。若欲正受。隨其所欲。多入正受。譬如王大臣。有種種衣服。置箱簏中。隨其所須。日中所須。日暮所須。隨欲自在。

S no.46.4 (V 71): sattime āvuso bojjhāgā. katame satta. sattasambojjhango. dhāmmavīcayas. viriya°. pīti°. passaddhi°. samādhi°. upekkhasambojjhango. ... imevaṃ kho vaḥ sambojjhāsamatānām bojjhāgānānāṃ yena yena bojjhāgānena ākatikhamī pūbbhaṃsamaṇyo viharitum tena tena bojjhāgānaṃ pūbbhaṃsamaṇyo viharāmi... MVŚ records this as an argument for the position that the bodhyaṅgas cannot coexist. No. 1545 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (卷 95) T27, p494a8-14: 又餘經說。舍利子言。我於七覺支定能隨意自在住。謂我欲於此覺支定日初分住。即便能住。若我欲於此覺支定日中分住。即便能住。若我欲於此覺支定日後分住。即便能住。彼作是說。既舍利子於七覺支隨所欲住。故知心所次第而生。非一時起。其理決定。

\textsuperscript{173} This repeats the same argument as in 65.26.

\textsuperscript{174} See 66.12.
practice at the same time two faith factors, five mindfulness factors, and so forth.\textsuperscript{175}

67.25 若汝意謂隨得處修即是離修。又隨地所得如二禪等。故名不離。
If you think that “to practice separately” (離修) means that [one] practices [the bodhyaṅgas] according to the place [where one] attains [them], actually [one practices them] according to the level (bhūmi 地) [in which one] attains [them], such as the second dhyāna, and so forth, [and all the bodhyaṅgas are present in such levels]. Therefore, [it is in this sense that the bodhyaṅgas] are referred to as not [practiced] separately.\textsuperscript{176}

67.26 又一時三十七品。則無道理。所以者何。一念不得修多法。
Then it would be unreasonable [to say] that the thirty-seven bodhipākṣikas occur all at once. Why? [One] cannot practice multiple dharmas in one moment.

\textsuperscript{175} See 60.3. Faith (śraddhā) is both a faculty (indriya) and a power (bala). Mindfulness (smṛti) is included in five categories: smṛty-upasthāna, indriya, bala, bodhyaṅga, and samyak-smṛti.

\textsuperscript{176} This sentence is difficult to understand, and the interpretation offered here may not be correct. Ui (1929: 153) simply glosses the words in Japanese and does not offer any additional comments. Both Katsura (1974: 143) and Sastri (1978: 141) skip this sentence in their English translations. Sastri (1975: 171) reconstructs the Sanskrit as follows: yannanyase yathāprāptisthānaṃ [kiṅcit] bhāvayatīti. sa evā[nyasya] bhāvanāviyogaḥ. dvayo dhyānādīvadanyalabdhavāsāt tu aviyoga ucyate.
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http://gandhari.org/

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http://cbeta.org/

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