School principal response to central office collapse in conflict zones: A multi-site case study

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Abstract

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The purpose of this dissertation was to examine how conflict influences the priorities, attitudes, and beliefs of school principals towards educational leadership and management during times of war. Four school principals who worked in conflict zones of varying geographic and cultural characteristics were interviewed using semi-structured protocols regarding their leadership and management practices in conflict conditions. Findings indicated that “special lessons in the home” – paid private tutoring of students by teachers – assume or maintain a prominent role in conflict zone school operations, perhaps to the detriment of regular school functions. Findings also indicated that in some cases financial considerations could impact teacher migration patterns which may be uneven across school systems in conflict. Subjects also indicated reactive rather than proactive concerns regarding their physical school facilities. More research is needed into issues regarding teacher migration in conflict zones and private tutoring to gain a fuller picture of motivations for conflict zone educational actors.
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 IDENTIFYING A RESEARCH PROBLEM CONCERNING EDUCATION IN CONFLICT ZONES – WHY THIS IS AN IMPORTANT AREA OF STUDY

Vlassenroot (2006) captures the importance of in-conflict study nicely:

“It has become conventional wisdom that research in conflict zones is impossible because of the high security risks . . . Such research, it is argued, should be limited to post-conflict situations or to situations where hostilities have ceased. The consequences of this argument should not be underestimated: knowledge and understanding of conflict regions tends to be reduced to pre-war levels and conflict dynamics, to be misunderstood or not known at all. The same security constraints provide many actors with the perfect excuse to no longer invest in conflict research, thus reducing the knowledge about contemporary conflicts” (p. 192).

Indeed, as Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2008) point out, there is now a large volume of literature around the study of post-conflict situations. However, literature on what is happening in conflict zones themselves remains scant. Post-conflict and conflict situations should not be confused, as people in the two situations have very different motivations, goals, and concerns. Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom (2008) identify two main challenges for those living in post-conflict areas, which are (1) economic recovery and (2) reducing the risk of relapsing into conflict. Obviously, in a conflict there is no “recovery” going on, and there is no worry about relapsing into a conflict as the conflict is already in progress. Similarly, refugee studies are not compatible with conflict studies. Russell (2002) describes refugees as those fleeing across international boundaries to escape persecution or danger of some manner; conflict zone study, in contrast, represents those who stay in a place during wartime, not those who leave.

Fitting into this is the framework established by education historian Bernard Bailyn (1961) that identifies three main motives historians of education use when choosing a research
topic, which, while not a study of education history, applies here. These motivations are (1) a need for research, (2) a knowledge gap about the field, and (3) problems concerning history, such as incomplete or missing data (Bailyn, 1961). There is a need for research as, besides the literature gap that exists, nearly half of all post-conflict situations lapse back into war (Collier, Hoeffler, & Soderbom, 2008). Considering the substantial financial resources that go into reconstruction efforts – the United States has allocated $53 billion for reconstruction in Iraq alone (British Broadcasting Company, 2010) – the stakes for properly understanding what happens in a conflict, so the post-conflict phase can be properly planned and reduce the risk of relapse – are enormous. Huge sums of those billions are poured into education and thus there is a need to understand what is happening during conflict times in public schools to better plan and shape the post-conflict phase. In this particular instance, the need is to better understand why outside actors (i.e., the military or some other non-educational organization) exert influence on schools, what value they see in influencing public education, and how they prioritize their actions in administering (directly or indirectly) a school system, and how the internal school actors in administration (principals) and faculty leadership respond to these shifting demands.

To better improve policy options and financial resource allocation, there is a need to undertake a study of administrative influence and school response to conflict conditions in public schools.

Second, there is a substantive knowledge gap about education in times of conflict. While obviously tying into the discussion of the literature gap, the knowledge gap about this subject is so basic that even existence claims around baseline topics such as whether schools as a whole are even open during times of conflict are relatively new. To the extent that this topic is covered at all in literature, it can often come with contradictory information – such as a report in Education
International (2008) that that universities had been closed in the Somali capital of Mogadishu which was contradicted by a US Department of State (2009) report two months later.

Consequently, there is a paucity of even just existence claims about education in conflict zones, let alone an explanatory or interpretive framework concerning what is happening inside schools during wartime. Certainly it is very poorly understood how and why external actors try to influence education in conflict, what they seek to gain from it, what they are trying to prioritize, and what value they see in education in occupied or influenced areas. As well, it is also poorly understood how administrators and faculties respond to such an abrupt shift in priorities and the involvement of non-educational (and, in many cases, foreign or at least non-local) actors into the education system. How do school priorities, values, and measured gains change? Why do they change? How do these various actors – both foreign and local – view “success” and what it takes to achieve it? When there are differences, how and why are they resolved?

Extrapolations will be made later in this chapter based on human resources literature. Considering the amount of policy hours and money that goes into this problem, the “knowledge gap” must be addressed through a better understanding of the conceptual frameworks concerning what higher-level administrators in conflict zones value and prioritize in schools. It must also be addressed through understanding how school-based administrators respond to these shifting values and priorities, and it is needed to provide a stronger foundation for the reconstruction phase of school administration. Existing literature and findings from this study show that school reconstruction does not start with a formerly closed school and a new staff (or returning staff), but typically instead is grafted on to a system that remained open with key staff who were in key
positions in that system, and must change things they are currently doing rather than just “starting over.”

Finally, a lack of reliable historical data concerning this phenomenon highlights the importance of its study based on Bailyn’s criteria. Wood (2006) highlights the problems facing researchers in conflict zones in this regard: “In conflict zones, the usual imperatives of empirical research . . . are intensified by the absence of unbiased data from sources such as newspapers, the partisan nature of much data compiled by organizations operating in the conflict zone . . .” (p. 373). Additionally, the military value of capturing/destroying government buildings where most educational data would be held compounds this issue. We have with this topic what seems to be a counterintuitive phenomenon – an occupying force of some nature taking a major role in shaping education policy, and generating responses and counter-responses among school leaders and personnel – yet it is not easily researchable due to security problems making access difficult; destruction of historical archives due to conflict; non-educational actors controlling access; the breakdown of traditional education structures (such as the notion that formal schooling must take place in a formal school building); and increased turnover rates of personnel and students in conflict situations all add a layers of complexity to data collection that has created multitudes of inaccuracies and inconsistencies.

Adapting Bailyn’s criteria to this field highlights its importance in three major ways. One, there is a need for the research as demonstrated by the huge numbers of policy hours, organizational utilization, and financial allocations that go into shaping post-conflict schooling out of the issues that happen during the conflict. Second, there is importance due to the expansive knowledge gap we have about the influences that occur between militaries and
administrators, which carry over for decades following a conflict; and third, problematic data
collection has yielded unreliable analysis about the problem in the present term.

1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The study is meant to answer the following main questions:

1. How does military conflict influence a school principal’s values, priorities, and strategies in
   school leadership?

2. How does military conflict influence a school principal’s values, priorities, and strategies in
   school management?

1.3 WHERE MIGHT CONFLICT ZONE EDUCATION BE EXPERIENCED?

   Utilizing the criteria set forth in the Tadic Appeals Judgment in relation to an
   internationalized armed conflict – in which an outside group or state influences or controls in
   some way, one of the combatants – we can identify several possible cases for research. Indeed
   the list could well be in the dozens, particularly with the onset of the Arab Spring. However, the
   dissertation attempts to generate conceptual frameworks that sample across unlike conflict areas
   rather than focus on one specific region. This necessitated the use of multiple cases that were
   varied based on a number of factors, including religion, population size, type of conflict, and
   geographic location of the case studies.

   While all of these conflicts have interlinking reasons and motivations behind them that
   cover all four areas, generally one aspect becomes a dominant theme in each of these conflicts.
Ultimately each case will represent a different conflict theme and vary across demographic and geographical settings.

1.4 **Overview of Conflict Zone Studies**

There is no literature-based definition for what conflict zone study, or conflict zone educational study, is. Consequently this section will construct one from international law. To be able to define conflict zone studies first requires one to define “conflict zone.” The term “conflict zone” or “war zone” is often used inappropriately, and its true definition tends to vary based, among other things, on political calculations.

International law makes distinctions between external and internal conflicts, a move which Stewart (2003) points out has been heavily criticized, and that by nature external, internationalized conflicts have internal elements. The definition this dissertation will use as “conflict” will be that of internationalized conflict. The *Tadic Appeals Judgment* – a decision by the UN-established criminal court prosecuting violations of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia – lays out a two-step criterion for whether a conflict can qualify as international in nature: (1) if another state intervenes in an internal conflict with soldiers, or (2) if some of the participants in an armed, internal conflict act are controlled by another state (Stewart, 2003).

What constitutes these measures has been debated for years and the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this dissertation; nonetheless, the *Tadic* framework is useful here for three reasons. One, it is a landmark legal decision in the field of conflict and was the first trial of a war criminal since Nuremberg; and, two, the decision is widely expected to serve as a foundation for future legal cases regarding conflict (Institution for War and Peace Reporting, 1999). Stewart (2003) also says it is the closest legal definition available for what makes an armed international
conflict. Thus, by using this decision, we have a legal-based argument to fence in what exactly constitutes a “conflict zone” and with it, its bureaucracy.

A study of education in conflict zones, then, would be some aspect of study of a school system where an internationalized armed conflict is taking place (or a period during which an internationalized armed conflict has taken place). This particular dissertation uses principals as the bounded case.

Internal struggles can be used as well. The 1949 Geneva Conventions spell out a definition of an internal armed conflict: (1) [the non-governmental actors] “possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, [is] acting within a determinate territory and [is] having means of respecting and ensuring respect for the conventions” (Human Rights Watch, 2004). As well, “[A]nother important indication is whether the government has deployed its regular armed forces against the insurgency” (Human Rights Watch, 2004).

Thus these two legal decisions and foundations – the 1997 Tadic decision, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions – spell out what is a conflict zone for purposes of study. The frameworks are necessary to set conflict zone study apart from other forms of violent settings, such as those of riots, high-crime areas, etc.

With conflict zone defined, we can move on to what entails a study of conflict zone education. This can be defined as any aspect of education – public, private, formal, or informal – that occurs within the framework of the 1997 Tadic decision defining internationalized armed conflict or the 1949 Geneva Conventions defining internal armed conflict. The scope of this dissertation is, obviously, far narrower than that. The focus is on administrative – primarily, principal – response to central office collapse and the empowering of new actors in the school system during conflict.
1.5 WHAT ASPECTS OF THIS PHENOMENON MIGHT BE EXAMINED?

Though often used interchangeably, leadership and management are different roles. Bennis, cited in Ambler (2008), among others, notes that a manager “... focuses on systems and structure; the leader focuses on people.” Bennis, cited in Ambler (2008) largely views the role of a leader as one who sets an agenda and formulates a vision, while a manager adheres to day-to-day administrative details. While the tone of such arguments can, incorrectly, portray the term “management” in a derogatory light, Kotter, cited in Ambler (2008) says that leaders and managers are part of “... two distinctive and complementary systems of action ... Both are necessary for success ...”. Kotter (cited in Ambler, 2008) further details his contrast by pointing out that management is about “coping with complexity” while leadership is about “coping with change.”

He also claims that managers deal with complexity by “... planning and budgeting, by organizing and staffing, and by controlling and problem solving ...” while leaders cope with change by “... setting a direction ... aligning people, and motivating and inspiring them to keep moving in the right direction” (Kotter, cited in Ambler, 2008). Zaleznik, cited in Ambler (2008), writes of a personality difference between managers and leaders with his claims that “[M]anagers embrace process, seek stability and control, and instinctively try to resolve problems quickly ... Leaders, in contrast, tolerate chaos and lack of structure and are willing to delay closure in order to understand the issues more fully ...”.

In the phenomenon of conflict zone education, aspects examined included school-based leadership and management response to the injection of non-educational actors into the organizational paradigm, as well as the interaction between these actors and school personnel. In
particular, qualitative study was done to examine educational and non-educational actor values, priorities, and strategies in conflict settings in two domains that this study will refer to as “Management” and “Leadership” domains regarding school administration.

The study investigates school principal response to central office collapse and corresponding shaping of attitudes, beliefs, and values through several domains of management and leadership. Mintzberg (2009) describes the role of a manager as consisting of three planes (information, people, and action) as well as four competencies (personal, interpersonal, informational, and actional). Managerial functions in the “information plane” include monitoring; being a nerve center; being a spokesperson; disseminating; designing; delegating; designating; distributing; and deeming (Mintzberg, 2009). Roles in the people plane include networking, representing, convincing/conveying, transmitting, and buffering, as well as energizing individuals, developing individuals, team building, and strengthening organizational culture (Mintzberg, 2009). Roles in the action plane include handling disturbances, managing projects, building coalitions, and mobilizing support (Mintzberg, 2009).

Competencies to be examined through Mintzberg’s framework include the personal competencies of managing the self, internally and externally; and scheduling (Mintzberg, 2009). Interpersonal competencies include leading individuals, groups, and the organization, as well as administering and linking the organization (Mintzberg, 2009). Informational competencies include verbal and nonverbal communication, plus analyzing; actional competencies include designing and mobilizing (Mintzberg, 2009).

Kotter’s work (1990) on leadership will be used to examine how conflict shapes principal attitudes, beliefs, and values towards. These features will include direction setting, aligning people, motivating and inspiring (Kotter, 2001).
Qualitative research techniques were used to examine what shapes executive decisions regarding priorities, values, and strategies in times of conflict, how these decisions are made, why they are made, and how school-based leadership interacts with non-educational leadership and management, and why and how this affects school-based decisions across these domains. As well, what shapes school-based administrative and faculty perceptions of these factors on student performance, as well as the reasons behind these perceptions. How and why do school-based and non-educational actor-based priorities and values differ? How and why does this manifest itself in administrative practice? What are the connections to teaching and learning? How and why does this set a foundation for the reconstruction activities that follow? How and why do the different environments interact to form micro- and macro-organizational cultures, and what is the effect on administrative practice? What is conceptualized as “management” and “leadership” in a conflict zone school system, and how and why are what are considered to be “best practices” performed and judged? What impact do these expectations have on administrative practice and teaching and learning?

1.6 CONNECTIONS TO LITERATURE

This work sits at the intersection of three different literature bases – sociological research on bureaucracy, organizational behavior, and educational change. In sociology and organizational behavior, research on the importance of status proved to be particularly noteworthy. Newstrom & Davis (2002) highlight education and job level as major sources of higher status in a community. They also describe status as “. . . a mark of the amount of recognition, honor, and acceptance given to a person” (Newstrom & Davis, 2002, p. 88). As well, “Within groups, differences in status apparently have been recognized ever since
civilization began” (Newstrom & Davis, 2002, p 88). In a conflict zone, as unemployment and poverty become commonplace, people increasingly have to look beyond financial measures to attain some sort of status in these areas. It could be extrapolated then that the use of status symbols rather than financial gain become a source of “measuring” who is acquiring and losing status in a particular conflict zone – perhaps stable employment can turn into a status symbol as Newstrom & Davis (2002) cite, as it can be scarce, though these authors were not referring to conflict areas.

In a conflict zone, distinctions need to be drawn as the entire population may not be seeking to achieve the particular status symbol offered by working for whichever group happens to be in charge, and indeed, refusing cooperation may be a status symbol itself among some populations. The perceived use of status and underlying motivations, and how these shape priorities, interactions, and strategies of school principals, were a major source of study for this dissertation.

Literature on bureaucratic resilience helps to shape an idea of what characteristics such principals may already have. Farrell’s Exit-Voice-Loyalty-Neglect theoretical model of responses to job dissatisfaction depicts a quadrant matrix that plots worker response to job dissatisfaction along a constructive/destructive x-axis and a passive/active y-axis. Workers who respond constructively but passively are placed in the loyalty quadrant, in which they typically behave by “passively but optimistically waiting for conditions to improve, including speaking up for the organization in the face of external criticism and trusting the organization and its management to ‘do the right thing’” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009, p. 91).

Indeed, building on the idea that to some (and perhaps many) in a conflict zone, rejection of cooperation would be seen as a status symbol, Farrell’s model places those who would be
destructively and actively unhappy in the “exit” quadrant, and these workers respond by “directing behavior toward[s] leaving the organization, including looking for a new position as well as resigning” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009, p. 91). Workers in the “voice” quadrant, in a conflict zone, will tend to dribble off into either the “exit” or “neglect” quadrant as “voice” in wartime tends to get people noticed in a negative fashion. Finally, workers who are passive but destructive are placed in the “neglect” quadrant (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009). These workers respond to job dissatisfaction by “allowing conditions to worsen, including chronic absenteeism or lateness, reduced effort, and increased error rate” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009, p. 91). Thus, with other study of bureaucratic resilience as well, we can paint a portrait of how administrators in this field are likely to behave and use that as a foundation for our exploration into the shapers of priorities, values, and strategies among this sample. They are unlikely to be destructively and actively dissatisfied.

As well, anthropology of war literature played a major role in this dissertation. Military organizations are often a focus of anthropological study in conflict zones, and to understand a society in unstable times one often needs to understand the relationship between war and military (Otterbein, 2009). Often, the beginning point of an anthropological study of war are the reasons behind the war, the goals of the combatants, the structure of the organizations involved, and the weapons/strategies the combatants are using (Otterbein, 2009). From this it can be inferred that any understanding of conflict zone education will be prominently affected by the type of war being waged (large-scale, guerilla, coup, etc), what factions are in control, and what types of weapons and fighting are involved (large-scale invasion vs. insurgents firing small-scale rockets into a neighborhood, etc). This literature provided a foundation for understanding how the type of conflict and its intensity is impacting the remaining society and influencing its priorities and
values, which could then be interplayed with research on bureaucratic resilience, organizational change, and sociological status to provide the framing literature for this dissertation.

1.7 CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THIS RESEARCH

From a theoretical perspective, this research hopes to help establish conflict zone education as a separate literature from neighboring fields by demonstrating that the experiences educators and officials go through in conflict zones is entirely distinct from that which happens in other fields, such as refugee and reconstruction education. As such, these educators have entirely different concerns, motivations, needs, and priorities that need to be identified and researched and conceptualized.

Additionally, this research can make a contribution in providing a framework to better understand how actors outside education conceptualize priorities and values when they find themselves participating in school or central office administration. This is becoming an increasingly important field in the United States with the rise of charter schools, for-profit educational institutions, and corporations into the larger field of district-wide and government school administration. Being able to use this research as a cross-reference to generalize about motivations of non-educational actors working in education may help researchers gain a common reference point in understanding how these people generate their ideas about values and priorities in educational administration, and how they conceptualize issues concerning teaching and learning within these prisms.

As well, considering the larger literature gap concerning experiences of students within conflict zone educational settings, the research can contribute by providing a framework through which western officials can extrapolate the educational experiences of principals, teachers, and
students in conflict zones. Understanding the priorities and values of those in charge of the system will shed light on the goals that drove teaching and learning in these places.

From a practical standpoint, the research can offer contributions to international aid agencies and policymakers seeking a reference point to understand how school systems operated during times of conflict, and then using this understanding as a base from which to perform needs analysis and create a proper starting point for the planning of reconstruction operations. Additionally, reconstruction planners can use this research as a way to further understand the different perspectives conflict zone educators bring to reconstruction operations and use this to enhance professional development and other policy options as these experiences are far different than that which refugee educators went through.

Additionally, advisors and planners can use this work as a means through which to understand non-educational actor concepts of school systems to better enhance operations during wartime. Understanding these priorities will allow better design of school policy in that these policies can become more compatible with existing military, economic, and other concurrent wartime policies which literature shows always take precedence over education. Furthermore, existing aid agencies can use this information in the operational theater to actively understand military and other priorities and embed school policies with these frameworks. Psychologists and sociologists can use this research to better understand the experiences of students who arrive at western schools from conflict areas. Understanding the values and priorities of their teachers and administrators – and with it, understanding the pressures students were under and what was considered to be “success” in that environment – will help plan appropriate educational activities and introductory / transitory experiences for these students when they arrive in new schooling systems.
The audience for this research, accordingly, are researchers who study reconstruction operations, as they need to understand the administrative and school operations foundation from which they are building their own research on; policy planners who study interactions between non-traditional educational organizations (such as for-profit companies) and public schools; policy makers planning reconstruction operations; and psychologists and sociologists who plan educational policies for immigrant and refugee students coming from unstable areas of the world.

1.8 Knowledge Gap

The knowledge gap that this study attempts to fill comes in several areas. The first is what shapes school-based administrative priorities in a conflict zone. Literature and incident review indicates that the primary driver is not safety and security, which would seem to be counterintuitive considering that this education is occurring during hostilities. If safety is not driving administrative practice in these schools, what is? What are the main priorities of principals at conflict zone schools? What are the forces and influences that have led these principals to adopt these priorities? Why accept these priorities, and not reject them and join Farrell’s “exit” quadrant?

Second, what are the values of conflict zone education? How are administrators setting these values, and why are these values being emphasized instead of others? What does a principal want a graduate of one of his or her schools to look like? How does this compare and contrast with how the new central office administration (who may well not have any education background at all) view what a graduate of one of these schools should look like? How do the principals manage this tension with the central office, if it exists? How and why does the central office respond to this? How does the central office try to transmit their own version of values and how do principals interpret this and pass it along to teachers and students? What strategies
do the central office and building principals use to shape and transmit organizational culture and climate, and when there is a conflict between these cultural goals, how and why is it resolved (if it is)? When there are competing or unstable directives regarding these measures from the central office – for instance, if power changes frequently, or if a military officer gives an order to a principal that is a contradiction of what the civilian Ministry of Education has ordered – how and why does the principal resolve this tension? Which orders win and get implemented, and why?

Third, the study looks at how conflict shapes and impacts administrative strategies in the school regarding management and leadership practices, and to draw a generalized framework for how principals shape their management and leadership in response to conflict zone pressures. This involves not just dealing with people in a teaching and learning environment (which as stated previously will be studied through a leadership framework), but also the day-to-day functionality of the school (as seen through a management framework) through facilities, procedural, and security measures, as well as financial issues. How and why are conflict pressures impacting principals as they perform these tasks?

Finally, quite often in cross-cultural educational literature concerning refugees, post-conflict reconstruction, etc., emphasis is often placed on study of one particular group or location (ie, “Kurdistan” or “Rwanda”). This study attempts to generate conceptual frameworks that can be generalized across conflicts, rather than focusing on one conflict or location specifically. Thus, the unit of analysis is conflict and not a group. To this end, case studies chosen vary in terms of geographic location, population, religion, and type of conflict to generate a variety of principal experiences to collect data on.
2.1 JOB SATISFACTION IN CONFLICT ZONES

There is little literature regarding employee job satisfaction when an organization’s top leadership does not have the success of organizational goals as a priority. However, Farrell’s Exit-Voice-Loyalty-Neglect theoretical model of responses to job dissatisfaction depicts a quadrant matrix that plots worker response to job dissatisfaction along a constructive/destructive x-axis and a passive/active y-axis. Workers who respond constructively but passively are placed in the loyalty quadrant, in which they typically behave by “passively but optimistically waiting for conditions to improve, including speaking up for the organization in the face of external criticism and trusting the organization and its management to ‘do the right thing’” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009, p. 91).

It would seem contrarian to believe that many local workers would be happy working under conflict zone conditions, with the introduction of outside factors and actors which or who could easily be suspected of trying to change traditional norms and cultural values (such as the 2003 de-Ba’athification efforts of the US army in post-invasion Iraqi education). However, Farrell’s model places those who would be destructively and actively unhappy in the “exit” quadrant, and these workers respond by “directing behavior toward[s] leaving the organization, including looking for a new position as well as resigning” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009, p. 91).

Consequently, it is realistic to perceive a wartime bureaucratic model that perseveres in the face of unpleasant working conditions as employees upset with the changes conflict has brought to simply leave at some point, either quickly or over a short period of time; at this point, those in the bureaucracy who are actively and destructively unhappy are simply gone from the
school. This would ironically serve as a factor stabilizing the status quo despite conflict, since those most likely to be disruptive or de-stabilizing agents are no longer a part of the system. The other form of employees in Farrell’s model who might actively protest their dissatisfaction – those who are actively but constructively dissatisfied – fall into Farrell’s “voice” quadrant. These workers attempt to “. . . improve conditions, including suggesting improvements, discussing problems with superiors, and undertaking some forms of union activity” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, p. 91). Obviously, this is a western description of how workers in this quadrant might respond, as political conditions in repressive systems are not as tolerant of such expressions as they are in the West. Those agitating for unionization are probably far more likely to simply exit the organization and join the resistance. However, conflict zone school employees in the “voice” quadrant likely try to improve conditions, at least for themselves, through the other manners suggested.

Additionally, the nature of a living in a conflict zone would seem, psychologically, to discourage workers from remaining in the voice quadrant: in a conflict zone, those with “voice” tend to be noticed by those with guns, and often the civilian objective is simply to stay out of sight and out of mind of the authorities. Anecdotally it would seem that, in a conflict zone, the “voice” quadrant of Farrell’s model is heavily discouraged and that workers there will dribble off into neighboring quadrants will either shift from active to passive (and thus move to the “loyalty” quadrant) or that they will remain active but move from constructive to destructive (and thus move to the “exit” quadrant and leave the organization).

Finally, workers who are passive but destructive are placed in the “neglect” quadrant (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009). These workers respond to job dissatisfaction by “allowing
conditions to worsen, including chronic absenteeism or lateness, reduced effort, and increased error rate” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009, p. 91).

Consequently, in a conflict zone, we see those who are actively dissatisfied with the organization will simply leave, while those who are passively dissatisfied will likely remain but with different motivations. The key point is that with workers who are expressing their dissatisfaction through loyalty or neglect is that neither group is doing anything to actively cause change. The loyalty group is “. . . waiting for conditions to improve” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009, p. 91) while the neglect group is “. . . allowing conditions to worsen . . .” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, p. 91). Thus, in a conflict zone, we can conceptualize a bureaucratic model that is resilient because those who are actively dissatisfied have simply left, and those remaining – whether constructive or destructive – are passive and are not instigating any change efforts. Thus, the resiliency is due to the attrition of actively dissatisfied employees, leaving a bureaucracy prone to status-quo or passive approaches to change.
John Kotter’s (1996) eight-step change process would also seem to provide a framework for the apparent resilience of the bureaucracy in schools that stay open in conflict conditions. Kotter (1996) has outlined an eight-stage process of lasting organizational change in schools that...
must be followed sequentially. While the first step is “creating a sense or urgency” – and certainly the breakout of a war would qualify – the seven other steps are the presence of a guiding coalition to lead the change, development of a vision and strategy, communication of this change vision, empowering staff, generating short-term wins, consolidating gains and producing more change, and anchoring changes in the culture (Kotter, 1996). The implication is that conflict, while a major event, on its own is not nearly enough to generate large-scale and lasting organizational change in a school. Conflict itself is also a temporary, and not lasting, event. This would seem to underscore the resilience of the bureaucracy in the face of war, as with this framework it would seem conflict does not do much to create conditions for large-scale organizational change.

**Kotter’s Eight-Step Change Process**

*Step one.* Establish a sense of urgency.

*Step two.* Create a guiding coalition.

*Step three.* Developing a vision and strategy.

*Step four.* Communicating the change vision.

*Step five.* Empowering employees for broad-based action.

*Step six.* Generating short-term wins.

*Step seven.* Consolidating gains and producing more change.

*Step eight.* Anchoring new approaches in the culture.

Figure 2.2. John Kotter’s eight-step change process.

At this point it is appropriate to note that based on the literature, it would seem that in a conflict zone educational bureaucracy, levels of job dissatisfaction are probably greatly higher than levels of job satisfaction. It is common to have high unemployment in conflict zones – the World Bank reported that Iraqi unemployment plus underemployment in 2004 was 65% (Hong, 2010), while a joint effort by the International Rescue Committee and Afghanistan Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs put the unemployment and underemployment rate in Afghanistan at 55% in 2003 (Masum, n.d.). In reality, conflict zone “official” employment rates such as these often are accompanied by “unofficial” employment rates that are far higher than the official figures. While this might lead to an intuitive assumption that job satisfaction would occur just from having a paying position in such a negative employment environment, the research indicates that this is not the case. Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi (2009) note that “… pay is positively, but relatively weakly, related to job satisfaction. This relationship appears to hold in almost all nations” (p. 95). One researcher found “… no significant difference when he compared the overall well-being of the richest people on the Forbes 400 list with that of Maasai herdsmen in East Africa” (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009, p. 90).

Research also indicates a moderately positive correlation between worker productivity and job satisfaction, and this is generalizable across cultures (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009). In particular, reverse causality (the opposite of the old maxim a happy worker is a productive worker) may also be true. At this point we can see the effect on a conflict-zone educational bureaucracy as well. If the bureaucracy is made up largely of workers in the loyalty quadrant who are waiting for something to happen, and workers in the neglect quadrant who are allowing something to happen – both groups on the passive continuum – it can be surmised that as a whole the group is not very productive. With this correlation between productivity and satisfaction, and
the lack of productivity implied, we can again see a passively dissatisfied group of workers disinclined to take any action to initiate change in the organization.

Supporting this framework is the autocratic conceptual model of management highlighted by Newstrom and Davis (2002). Pointing out that the basis of this model is managerial power, the focus of those in charge tends to be authority, while worker focus tends to orient around obedience to those in charge (Newstrom & Davis, 2002). The psychological result on the part of the workers becomes dependence on the boss, while worker needs are met by the organization only at a subsistence level, and worker performance is minimal (Newstrom & Davis, 2002).

The model pertains directly to bureaucratic resilience in conflict zones, as the authors specifically point out that “[T]hose who are in command must have the power to demand ‘you do this – or else’” (Newstrom & Davis, 2002, p. 34). It would seem that this is directly comparable to the psychological environment that would exist in a conflict zone educational bureaucracy, where, in these particular sites, power cultures dominate. In such an intimidating environment, it is easy to see how obedience to this authority would become a major factor in a worker’s mind, as the model suggests. Official wages and benefits are minimal; it is common in a conflict zone for workers to go months without being paid an official salary – and performance becomes minimal as well. The authors point out that “They [the workers] are willing to give minimum performance – though sometimes reluctantly – because they must satisfy subsistence needs for themselves and their families” (Newstrom & Davis, 2002, p. 34).

As mentioned earlier, though the relationship between salary and job satisfaction does not have a strong positive correlation, if one wants a paying job in a conflict zone there are few other choices. While western nations often have teacher shortages, developing nations often have different staffing conditions; while the salary is considered low even there, the high
unemployment rates plus the stability offered by holding a government job combine to make such positions attractive to the workforce. This overall job scarcity could likely create conditions that lead to aspects of the “dependence on the boss” that Newstrom and Davis speak of in the model; with few other options to turn to, it is possible that employee sensitivity to the boss’s whims can help reinforce the obedience orientation the model speaks of. Consequently, these external factors of a developing world economy, potential foreign occupation, and lawless security environment could inadvertently reinforce an authoritarian management model in such settings. The authors mention that such a model “[... can be useful under some conditions, such as organizational crises” (Newstrom & Davis, 2002, p. 34) that would exist in a conflict zone. Further reinforcing the model is the potential of a military hierarchy or outside force taking over at the top of the educational bureaucracy and exerting influence, either formally or informally, and bringing with it a traditional military discipline structure that is strongly aligned to ideas of authority and obedience which might not be found in traditional civilian bureaucratic structures.

In sum it would seem that external factors beyond the educational bureaucracy, but inherent to conflict affect the system. The nature of leadership flux reinforces an autocratic model that sees power and authority as central tenets of leadership. Workers need the job and are dependent on authorities. Such motivations lead to minimum performance levels.

It should also be pointed out that while traditionally there may be some links between the autocratic management paradigm and McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y assumptions, it is possible the unique characteristics of a conflict zone environment override those links; the potential physical and psychological intimidation implied by conflict may do more to reinforce an obedience orientation among the bureaucracy than any sort of Theory X assumptions among management.
Paired with Farrell’s model, we can see a theory of wartime bureaucratic resiliency beginning to take shape. There would appear to be a natural link between Farrell’s concepts of neglect and loyalty with Newstrom and Davis’s ideas on workplace obedience and dependency that gain strength particularly in a conflict environment. With conflict potentially exacerbating the tendency of dissatisfied workers to exit an organization, leaving passive workers in their wake, we see a workforce left in the bureaucracy that may be extraordinarily prone to accepting the obedience orientation that Newstrom and Davis speak of. This fits in nicely with what a command organization such as a military, entering the top of an organization (whether formally or informally) may naturally expect even though they may try to foster an entirely different workplace environment.

Newstrom and Davis (2002) make the claim that the autocratic model is “intensely” disliked by many employees (p. 34); if we accept this statement as driver of job dissatisfaction, we can see many conflict-zone educational bureaucrats entering Farrell’s “neglect” quadrant, where they become passively destructive and begin adopting behaviors such as lateness, absenteeism, shoddy work, etc., which can certainly be placed in the category of “minimum performance” that the authors imply is the standard performance result of the autocratic management paradigm.

The external economics of conflict encourage a dependency on management, which provides subsistence level wages and benefits in return. The wages are often a result of the minimum performance (Newstrom & Davis, 2002). Consequently, all of these factors come together to create a bureaucracy that, despite the chaos going on around it, is inherently stable and resilient: the actors left in the organization are passive; they are dependent on the organization (and thus are obedient) because they have few other options to go to for their
livelihoods; and their powerful (at least physically) bosses primarily want obedience, which these workers are willing to give. Performance is not high, but that does not appear to be a priority in the autocratic model, and nor is it a priority for workers in the loyalty and neglect quadrants.

The theory of Organizational Behavior Management, and specifically, the concept of punishment within this theory, also appears to be an important factor in conflict-zone bureaucratic resiliency. The theory provides a specific definition of punishment: “. . . the administration of an unfavorable consequence that discourages a certain behavior” (Newstrom & Davis, 2002, p. 113). It differs from negative reinforcement in that the latter involves withholding an unfavorable consequence, while punishment adds one (Newstrom & Davis, 2002). Newstrom and Davis (2002) warn that punishment alone does not clearly encourage any type of advantageous behavior; it can lead to intense dislike towards authority on the part of the workers; and workers may not know what part of their behavior is what is being punished. Consequently, in an effort to avoid (potentially deadly) punishment, workers may seek to avoid being noticed at all – and thus trying to “fit in” to established norms as much as possible – in a conflict setting, further reinforcing the bureaucratic resilience that occurs. Some workers may even prefer to simply exit than get noticed in a negative light.

2.2 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE LITERATURE AND THIS STUDY

“Organizational change” is a diverse literature base that can include elements of many existing literatures, such as organizational development, organizational transformation, and organizational behavior. French, Bell, & Zawacki (2006) distinguish between organizational transformation literature and organizational development literature. Organizational transformation seeks to create (or investigate) “. . . far-reaching changes in an organization’s
structures, processes, culture, and orientation to its environment . . . [it] applies behavioral science theory and practice to effect large-scale, paradigm-shifting organizational change. An organizational transformation usually results in totally new paradigms or models for organizing and performing work” (French, Bell, & Zawacki, preface). Levy and Merry, quoted in French, Bell, & Zawacki (2006), describe organizational transformation as “. . . a multidimensional, multi-level, qualitative, discontinuous, radical organizational change involving a paradigmatic shift” (p. 28).

Conflict-zone education breaks many traditional paradigms of existing educational study and practice. For instance, traditional education study and practice assumes that qualified and licensed staff hold positions of key administrative power and instruction; this is not necessarily true in a conflict zone. Traditional study assumes that schooling is taking place inside a dedicated or purpose-built school or educational facility; this is not necessarily true in a conflict zone.

Porras & Silvers (2006) point out that organizational transformation centers around organizational beliefs, vision, mission, and purpose, which again serves to inform this study as, in a traditional sense, the underlying assumption is that all of these were educational in nature, even if they were of a radically different direction than what came before; this is not necessarily true in a conflict zone, where, for example, erasing the glorification of a past regime or indoctrinating the beliefs of a new group of rulers may be the paramount vision for the educational system.

Within organizational behavior, discussion of informal and formal groups can help inform this dissertation by providing a framework through which to view the issues of group emergence, status, monitoring, and influence of various teams and groups inside a conflict zone.
school system, such as which employee groups gain dominance in unstable conditions.

Organizational behavior also has a subset of employee stress literature that can be used to inform this dissertation. Elements of this include physiological, psychological, and behavioral results that impact workplace performance, the study of which can help identify and analyze pressures unique to conflict zone situations that administrators are dealing with and undergoing that may serve to explain priorities, behaviors, and motivations in their performance. As well, discussion of resistance to change can help inform the dissertation by providing the structure to understand major categories resistance tends to fall into. These can include logical (economic costs, time required, etc), psychological and emotional (fear of the unknown, dislike of managers, etc), and sociological or group factors such as opposing group values, parochialism, etc (Newstrom & Davis, 2002).

Additionally, organizational change literature provides a framework through which to analyze how conflict-zone schools are being shaped and altered. Robbins, Judge & Sanghi (2009) discuss factors forcing change, and individual and organizational factors that resist change. These six domains for forcing change are (1) nature of the workforce, (2) technology, (3) economic shocks, (4) competition (as with rebels etc), (5) social trends, and (6) world politics (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009). These can help shape a conceptual framework for what is motivating the non-educational actors as they influence a school system, while the sources of individual and organizational resistance to change – which Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi (2009) identify as [individual] habit, security, economics, fear of the unknown, and selective perception, and [organizational] inertia, limited focus, and threats to established expertise, power relations, and resource allocations – can help provide a conceptual starting point for understanding how the
entrenched forces in a school system are going to perceive the changes (and, if they resist, where some of that resistance may come from).

### 2.3 Strengths and Limitations from the Application of Organizational Theory to Organizational Life in Conflict Zones

French, Bell, & Zawacki (2006) point out that the study of organizational transformation is a fairly recent development of the last 15-20 years, and in many ways is an offshoot of traditional study of organizational development. Organizational development literature, however, tended to be constructed with a practical orientation around creating and studying organizational improvements and efficiencies. This dissertation is not a study of efficiency or improvement, and so there is a mismatch between the aims of the literature and what is happening in conflict zones. Similarly, traditional organizational theory and development study tended to focus more on superficial issues such as workplace variables that could be controlled or manipulated (Porras & Silvers, 2006), while this is a study that involves perceptions of values, strategies, and goals that cannot be controlled for. Another limitation is that, from a macro perspective, there is the potential for major tension between the organization’s top leadership and the middle and lower-level leadership. It can be questioned, for instance, if education is the “primary activity” of the educational organization under direct or indirect military rule/influence. There is little organizational theory literature that addresses the issue of having top management that does not, at some level, have the successful pursuit of the organization’s major goals as a top priority – or what happens when the top management sets goals that are incompatible with the mission of the organization.
2.4 OTHER BODIES OF THEORY AND THIS PHENOMENON

Levy & Merry, cited in French, Bell, & Zawacki (2006), draw on family therapy literature to discuss organizational change. While this literature base will not be drawn on for this dissertation, it is used as an example to highlight the wide range of literature that can be used in helping to frame insights into conflict zone education.

The study of affect in organizational and judgment contexts is helpful in this dissertation. Barsade & Gibson (2007), as described in Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi (2009), describe affect as encompassing both emotions and moods. Though the relevant literature base for this topic tends to speak of teacher emotion, it is important to consider the concept of affect as a whole for this dissertation. Frijda (1993), as reported in Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi (2009), points out that emotions tend to be brief feelings directed at a person or event. Weiss & Cropanzano say that moods tend to be longer in duration and more general in concept (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 1996). As a major aim of this dissertation was to identify overarching priorities, values, and strategies among conflict-zone administrators, and how and why these are being formed, it can be assumed that these were developed over a period of time and not as snap reactions to specific events or people, though this very likely had influence.

Weiss and Cropanzano developed Affective Events Theory (AET) to try and show the links between affect and job performance (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009). The conceptual model shows how work environment, work events, personal dispositions, and emotional reactions all interface with job satisfaction and performance. This literature on affect and teacher emotions helped form the frame through which the development of administrator priorities, values, and strategies was viewed. This literature can provide indications for what impacts
teacher emotions during conflict and how these interact with models such as Farrell’s to predict employee behavior in a conflict zone school.

As well, literature on the anthropology of war helped frame this dissertation. Understanding military objectives provides a framework for how external actors are viewing schools and how this might influence dominant actors’ policies and beliefs about schooling. Otterbein (2009) highlights how the study of war and military are important to understanding a society. Otterbein (2009) also points out that the starting point for an understanding of war is the goals and reasons for the war, the structures of the entities involved, and the weapons and strategies involved. This can have a profound effect on how schools and principals are functioning in a conflict zone, and this literature can help map a conceptual framework that can be used through which to understand some of these ideas.

History of education literature, specifically around conflict periods, was also used to help frame the dissertation. A survey of this literature shows wide and varied means of influence that military actors use when managing school systems in conflict. Connolly (2000), for example, discusses how the Red Army played a direct role in reshaping East German education through their military occupation, and, interestingly, makes the argument that the decentralized nature of the previous East German system – in contrast to that found at the same time in Poland and Czechoslovakia, which were centralized – made “Sovietization” far easier. In contrast, document analysis involving the history of the American occupation in Iraq shows a largely financial and curricular means of influencing education in that country.

Indeed, history of education literature is important in that it can provide a frame to show the motivations of the various military actors involved regarding school systems – an independent study researcher did in 2010 regarding Russian forces in the Caucasus, through
literature and document analysis, found seven major domains of military interest in schooling in occupied lands: (1) curriculum, (2) staffing, (3) communications, (4) economics, (5) symbolism, (6) security, and (7) logistics. In such instances, history of education literature and anthropology of war literature can often blend together to form a framework that can help gain insight into what motivations are shaping each set of actors priorities, values, and strategies of a school system.

As well, religious literature, particularly around Islamic education, helped frame this dissertation. While this study is a cross-region sample that is only partially concentrated in Islamic lands, this particular religion has had great influence across all of the continents this study conducted field research in, and thus it is important to understand how historical foundations have shaped current systems, and how conflict is interacting with that. Kahn (1981) and Kraan (1984) have discussed the intertwining of religious and secular education in the Islamic world, and how, to Muslims, all education is religious in nature.

As well, social stratification literature helped form a lens through which to construct the conceptual frameworks in the dissertation, particularly around bureaucracy (already discussed) and Islamic social stratification, again for the historical foundations of how various actors are “fitting into” an overall societal scheme and how this may be influencing their priorities, values, and strategies, especially when interacting with those from a completely different stratification system.

2.5 THE INTERACTION OF EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT IN CONFLICT ZONES

It could be argued that conflict-zone education systems must be decentralized in order to be able to function in their environments, as the central office has collapsed or otherwise been
incapacitated. With the military assuming either direct or indirect command – and lacking the specialized management personnel needed to make sophisticated educational decisions – this independence (or lack of discipline as Weber might view it) allows the school the freedom necessary to make snap decisions to keep the school functioning. When outside actors fill the vacuum during central government collapse, where will the school move if the building is damaged? Who do you hire when five teachers leave and become refugees? If a principal has to wait for answers from a positioned authority a thousand miles away, a bad problem becomes worse.

However, this independence only goes so far, as the resilient nature of the bureaucracy serves as a glue to hold all the schools to within a certain operating standard. We see a divergence between the macrobureaucracy (the bureaucracy of the overall school system) and the microbureaucracy (the bureaucracy of individual actions in schools). The military authority that moves to the head of the macrobureaucracy is, to be sure, a bureaucracy in every sense of Weber’s definition. It is just one that in nearly all cases will be completely unsuited to lead an educational system, and one that is likely ill-suited to allow the followers (the individual schools) to meet Weber’s definition of discipline since the military authority will unlikely be able to communicate sophisticated educational directives. The habits and routines embedded into the culture of the microbureaucracy then take over to ensure functioning of the school system along familiar lines, as generally, those staff still are specialized and qualified, or at least there remain some on staff who are. Those involved in the microbureaucracy run the school based on previous patterns, with little innovation except in survival situations (such as the school building being taken over, in the example above). The macrobureaucracy, pursuing completely different objectives (security-oriented rather than education-oriented), leave education decisions largely to
the microbureaucracy and existing structures as long as they don’t interfere with security. The end result is stagnation, as without viable educational leadership in the macrobureaucracy, the system cannot move forward.

It can also be speculated that conflict-zone principals suffer from availability bias. Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi (2009) define availability bias as “. . . the tendency for people to base their judgments on information that is readily available to them” (p. 169). The authors go on to explain that “Events that evoke emotions, that are particularly vivid, or that have occurred more recently tend to be more available in our memory” (p. 169). It is difficult to conceptualize an educational situation more emotional or vivid than being in a conflict zone. Consequently, conflict zone principals and administrators could show evidence (and perhaps substantial evidence) of this bias affecting their judgment and role, accentuated by the security degradation and the potential for severely increased sanctions for non-compliance with authorities.

Organizational stress also plays a role in how school systems respond to their environment in times of conflict. Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi (2009) discuss two types of stressors in changing an organization – challenge stressors (associated with workload, time, etc) and hindrance stressors (politics, bureaucratic hurdles, confusion over roles, etc). Though this is a new area of study, Podsakoff, LePine, & LePine, cited by Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi (2009), argue that hindrance stressors produce more strain than challenge stressors. It could be argued that principals in conflict zones face far more hindrance stressors than challenge stressors, particularly since document analysis does not show, at this point, any sort of major academic performance target interest on the part of the non-educational actors. Additionally, Cooper & Payne (1978), Parasuraman & Alutto (1984), and Hart & Cooper (2001), as cited in Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi (2009), discuss three sources of organizational stress: task demands, role
demands, and personal demands. Hindrance stressors coupled with unclear task demands could cause significant directional confusion on the part of conflict-zone principals, with significant role ambiguity (who is my boss – the Ministry of Education or the military?) and cultural differences arising between interpersonal demands all collect to form significant organizational stress featuring major task incoherence, role incoherence, and cultural miscommunications.
Chapter 3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 DESIGNING A STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN CONFLICT ZONES

Vlassenroot (2006) comments on “. . . the conventional wisdom that research in conflict zones is impossible because of the high security risks” (p. 191). Pointing to successful studies in Somalia, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Afghanistan, among others, Vlassenroot (2006) says that these studies “. . . have successfully challenged the conventional wisdom about the possibility to do research in places where accessibility is limited by security constraints” (p. 191) and that most of these studies were highlighted by researcher use of “. . . flexible research methodologies, knowledge of the context and networks of local contacts” (p. 191). Based on his own research in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Vlassenroot (2006) explains his definition of a “flexible research methodology” as the extensive use of qualitative interviews, with the goal of “. . . collecting as many different accounts as possible. The aim of this method was mostly to come to a deeper insight into how people understand their changing political, social, cultural, and economic environment and how they try to deal with it” (p. 191). Specifically, he points to the interactionist approach of qualitative research, which Jacquemin (cited in Vlassenroot, 2006) says “considers the respondents as experiencing subjects who actively construct their social worlds, and the primary issue here is to generate data which give an authentic insight into people’s experiences.” Vlassenroot’s study in the eastern Congo used a series of semi-structured interviews with a wide range of mid-level bureaucrats and “grassroots” actors which he identified using a chain or snowball sampling technique, focusing on respondent strategies since the start of the war and how the respondent came to make or choose these strategies related to the study questions.
Indeed, qualitative research has, traditionally, frequently been used to study organizations in conflict zones. Otterbein (2009) points out that anthropologists have studied war for nearly 200 years, using a variety of qualitative techniques including ethnography, case study, cross-cultural study, and historical analysis, among others. Wood, in her two-year study of the El Salvadoran civil war, used five case studies and interviews with 200 officials and locals of varying ranks, along with meeting observation (Wood, 2006). She states her “. . . principal research method was that of the semi-structured interview in which [I] asked open-ended questions from a prepared list and pursued topics in-depth as seemed appropriate and relevant. Returning several times to interview many respondents was essential to the quality of information eventually gathered” (Wood, 2006, p. 375).

As Vlassenroot did with his study, a network chain approach to sampling is necessary in designing conflict zone study for a variety of reasons, including those related to security and culture. Wood also used this technique in her study:

“Thus prospective interviewees were identified through the construction of several parallel and evolving networks of contacts (urban and rural, insurgent-affiliated and government supporting, and rural residents who supported neither side). In the circumstances of political violence and polarization, I did not attempt to construct representative samples of local respondents but did my best to interview members of a wide variety of organizations, both those affiliated with the government and those affiliated with the opposition. Local priests and nuns introduced me to a variety of local residents, including people who supported neither side (otherwise not easily identified). (Wood, 2006, p. 375).

As this study compared and contrasted four cases, it was necessary to find four principle fixers in each setting and utilize them in securing participants. Skrubbeltrang (2015) defines the role of a fixer as “. . . a local person hired to help with logistics, contacts and translation . . .”. Fixers also facilitate the supply of study participants in difficult-to-research locations. The researcher already had an extensive network in a variety of conflict zones to draw upon for this study, and
at any rate, as Wood (2006) points out, finding willing participants in a conflict zone is not terribly difficult:

“My inquiries met with the enthusiastic collaboration of many residents of the casestudy zones (and of nearly all those approached in San Salvador as well), irrespective of class, occupation, or political affiliation. Residents acted on a willingness (perhaps even a need in some sense) to discuss with an outside researcher their own history and that of their families and communities.” (Wood, 2006, p. 376).

Thus, the four cases were organized around contrasting geographic and conflict types, utilizing fixers to recruit case schools / principals and facilitate the appropriate permissions from relevant authorities.

The use of a fixer to facilitate a study sample has a lengthy history across disciplines and is a common factor in conflict zone research. North, cited in Murrell (2014), states that “there is a network [of fixers] in every established conflict zone.” (p. 90). Skrubbeltrang (2015) notes that though there is discussion among researchers in sensitive areas regarding fixer bias in channeling information to the researcher, fixers are in fact largely a foundation that makes such work possible and not a disruptive force between data and researcher. Fixer is an informal profession and are usually hired for one-off or singular jobs, which is how they will be used in this study. ABC News, for instance, does not have a central database of fixers and instead uses word-of-mouth and personal recommendations to screen and hire fixers (Murrell, 2014). Word-of-mouth from trusted personal sources will be the utilized method of finding fixers in the study sites, in line with this tradition.

Due to severe telecommunications and logistical difficulties, telephone interview was the primary source of data collection. As the literature points out, despite the security and logistical challenges, designing a study of organizational experience in conflict zones relies on Vlassenroot’s (2006) formula of flexible methodology, knowledge of context, and networks of
local contacts, all of which are interconnected. While there are extensive challenges involved, many of the perceived challenges of conducting research in conflict zones are based on fallacies and misperceptions. Vlassenroot (2006) even argues that insecurity is not a hindrance, but rather, the researcher’s own ability to adapt to conflict zones is what will make or break a particular study. Consequently, the design of this study depended first on the reliability of tested local contact networks and enthusiasm of local power brokers, and then on the application of “flexible research methodologies” in the qualitative tradition that emphasize lived experiences from the actors involved.

3.2 SOURCES OF DATA

Four secondary school principals were interviewed from four distinct societies that had experienced conflict in the last five years. The sites differed in the type and nature of the conflict. Additionally, the nature of the combatants also differed among sites.

3.3 CONCEPTUAL EQUIVALENCE IN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE EDUCATION IN CONFLICT ZONES

Researcher has several years’ experience conducting education research internationally including in conflict zones. Construct equivalence was addressed through the “job duties” of a secondary school principal, which were similar across these contexts. Principals may set or work to achieve different objectives and goals for their schools, staff, and students, but this is common in schools around the world and is not an indicator of a lack of construct equivalence. Measurement equivalence was addressed in the choice of interview as the instrument of data collection. Participants are from contexts that prioritize oral traditions over written ones, and
investigator’s own experience in conflict zones had indicated written documents can be of questionable reliability. Furthermore data collection methods were the same for all respondents.

3.4 RESEARCHABLE QUESTIONS IN A CONFLICT ZONE

Richards (2006) points out that “[Q]ualitative research is usually not pre-emptive” (p. 73). As such, qualitative research differentiates itself in that the study does not have a hypothesis that dictates the form and quantity of data to be collected (Richards, 2006). Merriam (2009) adds that “A qualitative design is emergent. The researcher usually does not know ahead of time every person who might be interviewed, all the questions that might be asked, or where to look next unless data are analyzed as they are being collected” (p. 169). Consequently, the “researchable questions” for this study changed and evolved over time, particularly as in qualitative research, analysis is done as inquiry proceeds.

It may be helpful to look at this question from the other angle as well – what is not researchable. Wood (2006) explains that unresearchable questions in conflict zones tend to be “politically sensitive” questions in areas that are under “uncontested” control of one side or another, and that asking these questions could be “dangerous” for participants and, potentially, the researcher (p. 375). She goes on to explain how contested areas are, counterintuitively, often safer for a researcher:

The reason is that a military and political stalemate of sorts prevailed in the case-study areas in the latter half of the war, a political space that reflected the inability of the government to re-impose the hegemony of security forces and landlords but also the inability of the insurgents to prevent government troops from controlling the area. In the shadow of that stalemate in the conditions of this particular war, rural residents with a variety of political
loyalties could live and work, and field research on patterns of collective action was possible. (p. 376).

However, a major difference between this study and that of Wood’s is that this was not a study of politics, nor is this dissertation a critical study that is trying to empower or critique a particular society or power structure. Consequently, many of the questions that the presence of conflict would make risky or unresearchable are beyond the scope of this study regardless. It is important however to understand what Wood means by her use of the term “uncontested” – she does not mean “out of conflict” but rather that an area is still in a conflict zone, but under firm control of one side or another. For instance, the Chechen capital of Grozny is in a conflict zone now but it is not contested – Russian security forces are firmly in control and this has a certain effect on how respondents would respond to interview protocols, whereas in an area under fluid control Wood is claiming that respondents have more freedom to respond. It is uncertain this is still the case in today’s “YouTube” era – which did not exist during Wood’s field study or as recently as 2006 when she wrote this article – as networks such as al-Jazeera have documented civilians making political comments in areas under fluid control during the Arab Spring that have come back to haunt them once one side gained the upper hand over a town or village.

Nonetheless, the literature paints a convincing portrait of qualitative interviews being a preferred method of investigation in conflict zones and of organizational experience, and aside from politics there seems to be nothing in the literature that would indicate questions about educational issues, leadership, or administration would be out-of-bounds in these particular case studies, as environment was a factor in selection. While such questions can have political overtones, the fact that this is an interpretive study rather than a critical one would, in connection with properly designed interview protocols, make almost all topics that would be open to
investigation in a non-conflict study site doable and appropriate in a conflict zone site. Questions about priorities, values, strategies, as well as perceptions and interpretations all are accepted forms of conflict zone research and have been applied in the past.

The interview protocols that were developed were submitted for multiple culture and sensitivity checks utilizing local people at each site with an education background. Feedback from the culture and sensitivity checks was very much in line with literature regarding appropriate and inappropriate questions in conflict zone study and indicated that educational questions that were non-political in nature were appropriate and these protocols met that criteria.

One particular issue in developing interview protocols is the lack of educational infrastructure and international-standard administrator development programs at research sites means that participants did not have a substantial comprehension regarding terms and research concepts of leadership and management. Questions were thus shaped in a way to avoid using jargon as much as possible.

3.5 APPROPRIATE METHODOLOGY FOR THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This was a qualitative multisite case study. The case study approach fits in historically with the literature bases this study is drawing from, which lie, among other disciplines, in anthropology and sociology. Merriam (2009) points out that “[M]odern case study research has antecedents in anthropology, sociology, and psychology” (p. 39). Merriam’s (2009) description of qualitative research characteristics show that it is a logical fit for a study with the goals of this dissertation. The purpose of the topic of study is to investigate how and why principals, administrators, and educational actors are shaping and forming their priorities, values, and strategies towards a wide range of school operations, and how conflict is influencing that. Merriam (2009) cites as a goal of qualitative investigation “understanding, description,
discovery, meaning, [and] hypothesis generating” (p. 18) as opposed to quantitative goals of “[p]rediction, control, description, confirmation, [and] hypothesis testing” (p. 18). As well, this proposed study features the researcher as the primary instrument of data collection, and has inductive and comparative method as the primary mode of analysis, consistent with Merriam’s (2009) characteristics of qualitative study.

The purpose of choosing a multicase study is that is the study was an examination of a bounded case – principals – and how conflict is shaping their responses and priorities, values, and strategies, as well as their interactions with other educational actors. The study fits Merriam’s (2009) description of the “special features” of case study design: it is pluralistic, in that it focuses on “. . . a particular situation, event, program, or phenomenon. The case itself is important for what it reveals about the phenomenon and for what it might represent” (p. 43).

Data collection techniques involved lends itself to “rich thick description” that “. . . include as many variables as possible and portray their interaction, often over a period of time” (Merriam, 2009, p 43). Additionally, this study will be heuristic in that, it is hoped, “Previously unknown relationships and variables can be expected to emerge from case studies leading to a rethinking of the phenomenon being studied. Insights into how things get to be the way they are can be expected to result from case studies” (Merriam, 2009, p. 44). Stake (2003) also highlights this method’s applicability to seeking out distinct meanings held by people in a certain case, and Yin (2006) notes that this method is particularly applicable for explanatory cases and where one particular instance is under investigation (such as conflict).

It can also be helpful to view this study in terms of what it is not trying to accomplish. This is not a critical research study as no attempt is going to be made to challenge, transform, or empower readers. While some forms of narrative analysis may be involved – it is likely during
the interview process that this will be generated – this is not, primarily, a study that will use stories as a primary source of data collection. While elements of ethnography and grounded theory are also present, the amount of interaction between researcher and subject is far less than what is typically required for ethnography, and does not seek to form a practical, specific application of the generated conceptual framework often found in grounded theory. Additionally the use of telephone eliminates the use of visual cues. Multisite case study, according to Stake (as cited in Merriam, 2009), seeks to “investigate a phenomenon, population, or general condition” (p. 445) which fits the general purpose of this study, and supports the aim of a nonrandom sample that seeks to go across conflict zones, varied by demographic and conflict conditions.

Furthermore, qualitative study seems particularly appropriate for both the study organizational experience and conflict zones. The comments of Otterbein (2009), Wood (2006), and Vlassenroot (2006) among others regarding the appropriateness of qualitative research in conflict zones has already been covered earlier in this dissertation. Similarly, qualitative research has an established tradition in the investigation of organizational experience. French, Bell, & Zawacki (2006), and Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson (2005) discuss the role of applied behavioral sciences in the study of organizational experience. Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson (2005) point out that behavioral scientists borrow from, among other fields, theories from qualitative traditions in anthropology, sociology, and social psychology, while Levy and Merry (cited in French, Bell, & Zawacki) specifically describe the study of organizational transformation as “qualitative” (p 28). While the history of the study of organizational behavior and transformation has included ample study in both the qualitative and quantitative traditions, a framework for qualitative, interpretive, and descriptive case study of organizational experience
and transformation is clearly mainstream in this area and appropriate for use here. Consequently, there is extensive historical use of qualitative case study in the two major fields studied here, and the method fits the type of data that was collected.

3.6 Strategies for Providing Rich Data Sources and Analytic Approaches

Stake and Yin, in two different works cited in Tellis (1997), identifies interviews as one of the major sources of evidence used in case studies. This was the primary approach used in this study, along with some narrative analysis. This fits in with qualitative traditions, conflict zone study, and organizational study. Congruent with past research into conflict zones, semi-structured interview was the primary mode of data collection. Merriam (2009) describes interview as necessary for recalling catastrophic events, “. . . such as a nuclear or natural disaster” which “cannot be replicated” (p. 88). Certainly, the events of a conflict as lived through by a school principal fits into that category. Unstructured interviews were also used in line with Vlassenroot’s (2006) emphasis on the need for flexible research methodologies to produce successful conflict zone research. Concentrated around Patton’s (as cited in Merriam, 2009) six types of questions – experience / behavior, opinion / values, feeling, knowledge, sensory, and background / demographic – as well as Strauss, Schatzman, Bucher, and Sabshin’s (as cited in Merriam, 2009) four major categories of hypothetical, devil’s advocate, ideal position, and interpretive – resulted in rich data sources. Elements of narrative analysis were used in conjunction with both interview and observation.

There will be no document analysis used in this study. Grady (1998) speaks of document analysis as an important contributing technique to qualitative analysis for when subjects are no longer available for interview, or events no longer available for observation. The context of the
study sites makes document analysis an impractical data gathering technique. The principals involved are still there and available for interview; however, the sites in question have cultures that are oral in tradition and the schools are operated in a far different way than in the West. Though “[W]estern discourse has come to prioritize the written word as the dominant form of record keeping . . .” (Hanson, n.d.), the sites being studies are not Western. There are no school newsletters or school web sites that can be analyzed, technological problems limit (if not eliminate) the amount of internal and external e-mail among staff, and corruption issues mean that quantitative data (for example, attendance figures) should be treated as unreliable.

Analytically, the coding and categorical comparative schemes described by Merriam (2009) was followed as well as the two-step process of within-case followed by cross-case analysis to seek abstractions and concepts across cases. As well, content analysis was used to explore the nuances of setting, terminology, meanings, and other symbolism that may be important to understanding education in conflict zones, particularly considering the politically charged environment and the fact that “de-somethinging” a curriculum is often a goal of non-educational actors supervising these fields (ie, “de-Baathification” etc).

Additionally, a hybrid approach to analysis is used that closely anchors findings and discussion claims to literature warrants. Fontes (2008) writes that “People from cultures that rely on indirect communication are more likely to suggest and imply rather than ask directly, and they depend on others to infer what they mean from what they are saying (or not saying).” (p. 232). Fontes (2008) adds that “[c]learly, there are many opportunities for miscommunication when direct communicators and indirect communicators interact.” (p. 232).

Consequently comments by participants must be analyzed contextually rather than just taken literally at face value. To minimize these potentials for misinterpretation, the dissertation
makes heavy use of existing literature warrants to explain context in the findings and discussion sections instead of just relying on the researcher’s perceptions. Additionally, heavy use of literature to augment and triangulate this dissertation’s findings and discussion helps place these findings in a larger existing context of conflict zone school operations.

3.7 PROTOCOLS AND FRAMEWORK

The study investigated school principal response to central office collapse and corresponding shaping of attitudes, beliefs, and values through several domains of management and leadership. Mintzberg (2009) describes the role of a manager as consisting of three planes (information, people, and action) as well as four competencies (personal, interpersonal, informational, and actional). Managerial functions in the “information plane” include monitoring; being a nerve center; being a spokesperson; disseminating; designing; delegating; designating; distributing; and deeming (Mintzberg, 2009). Roles in the people plane include networking, representing, convincing/conveying, transmitting, and buffering, as well as energizing individuals, developing individuals, team building, and strengthening organizational culture (Mintzberg, 2009). Roles in the action plane include handling disturbances, managing projects, building coalitions, and mobilizing support (Mintzberg, 2009). See Table 3.7.1.

Competencies examined through Mintzberg’s framework included the personal competencies of managing the self, internally and externally; and scheduling (Mintzberg, 2009). Interpersonal competencies included leading individuals, groups, and the organization, as well as administering and linking the organization (Mintzberg, 2009). Informational competencies included verbal and nonverbal communication, plus analyzing; actional competencies included designing and mobilizing (Mintzberg, 2009).
Kotter (1990), meanwhile highlights several areas of leadership that this study examined and how conflict shapes principal attitudes, beliefs, and values towards. These features in the study included direction setting, aligning people, motivating and inspiring (Kotter, 2001). Kotter defines leadership as “. . . a set of processes that creates organizations in the first place or adapts them to significantly changing circumstances” (p. 25). Such criteria clearly applies to principal functions in a conflict zone school.

It was expected, ultimately, that the heart of this study emerged to be in the management domain. Kotter (1996) defines management as “. . . a set of processes that can keep a complicated system of people and technology running smoothly.” (p. 25). Mintzberg (2009) highlights a literature gap on management, and an academic bias towards studying leadership, saying that “A half century ago Peter Drucker (1954) put management on the map. Leadership has since pushed it off the map.” (p. 1). Though academic literature frequently distinguishes between leadership and management, Mintzberg argues that they are effectively the same: “. . . leadership cannot simply delegate management; instead of distinguishing managers from leaders, we should be seeing managers as leaders, and leadership as management practiced well” (p. 9).

Traditional concepts of principal practices in the regions being studied have placed heavy emphasis on the school principal’s role as manager rather than leader; schools are typically not allowed or expected to formally form their own organizational vision, and motivational tactics tend to be coercive rather than motivational and inspiring. This is very much in-line with the power culture that dominates the settings. It is unlikely that the principals have spent much time reflecting on their leadership practice, or even that they consider the practice of Kotter’s definition of leadership as part of their job description, while in contrast they reflected and commented extensively on many aspects of Mintzberg’s framework of management.
Through these two leadership and management frameworks, the study will examine what shapes executive decisions regarding priorities, values, and strategies in times of conflict across these domains of leadership and management, when the normal organizational structure of a school system is incapacitated or compromised. How are these decisions around leadership and management, then, made? Why they are made? How does school-based leadership and management interact with non-educational leadership and management, and why and how does this affect school-based decisions across these domains?

Table 3.1. Mintzberg’s Roles of Managing

Framing the job and scheduling the work

<table>
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<th>Information plane</th>
<th>Internal</th>
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<td>People plane</td>
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<td>Energizing individuals</td>
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<td>Building teams</td>
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<td>Action plane</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Managing projects</td>
<td>Building coalitions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Handling disturbances</td>
<td>Mobilizing support</td>
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Table 3.2. Mintzberg’s Competencies of Managing

A. **Personal Competencies**
   1. Managing self, internally (reflecting, strategic thinking)
   2. Managing self, externally (time, information, stress, career)
   3. Scheduling (chunking, prioritizing, agenda setting, juggling, timing)

B. **Interpersonal Competencies**
   1. Leading individuals (selecting, teaching/mentoring/coaching, inspiring, dealing with experts)
   2. Leading groups (team building, resolving conflicts/mediating, facilitating processes, running meetings)
   3. Leading the organization/unit (building culture)
   4. Administering (organizing, resource allocating, delegating, authorizing, systematizing, goal setting, performance appraising).
   5. Linking the organization/unit (networking, representing, collaborating, promoting/lobbying, protecting/buffering).

C. **Informational Competencies**
   1. Communicating verbally (listening, interviewing, speaking/presenting/briefing, writing, information gathering, information disseminating)
   2. Communicating nonverbally (seeing [visual literacy]), sensing [visceral literacy])
   3. Analyzing (data processing, modeling, measuring, evaluating)

D. **Actional Competencies**
   1. Designing (planning, crafting, visioning)
   2. Mobilizing (firefighting, project managing, negotiating/dealing, politicking, managing change).


3.8 **LIMITATIONS**

Researching in conflict zones has some implications on methodology. The participants in this site were from high-context cultures. The University of the Pacific (n.d.) identifies some characteristics of high-context cultures:
“Relationships depend on trust, build up slowly, are stable. One distinguishes between people inside and people outside one's circle . . . how things get done depends on relationships with people and attention to group process.”

One of the limitations of this study was that it was done through telephone, which limited the amount of time researcher had to build up trust with participants. A longer study time period with extensive face-to-face contact would be the sort of behavior expected in a high-context culture and conceivably could have yielded richer data. The use of a fixer was absolutely essential in gaining access; however, the fixers likely used a choice of convenience of a participant they knew from inside their own circles. The researcher effectively cedes control over sample construction to fixers in conflict zone research.

The University of the Pacific (n.d.) also highlights some characteristics of interactions in high-context cultures:

“High use of nonverbal elements; voice tone, facial expression, gestures, and eye movement carry significant parts of conversation; verbal message is implicit; context (situation, people, nonverbal elements) is more important than words. Verbal message is indirect; one talks around the point and embellishes it. Communication is seen as an art form—a way of engaging someone. Disagreement is personalized. One is sensitive to conflict expressed in another's nonverbal communication. Conflict either must be solved before work can progress or must be avoided because it is personally threatening.”

The implications of this in data collection are immense. A reply to a particular question may not actually be the reply even though the words say it is. Researcher must interpret participant replies through context to gain meaning. A participant in a high-context culture may say “yes” but not mean “yes” at all. This can lead to imperfect analysis or send the researcher down unfruitful avenues of inquiry, or at worst, lead to incorrect findings because context has been misinterpreted. High-context cultures are also conflict-averse and participants may agree to something or give a particular reply not because it is actually true but because they believe the
researcher wants to hear it, or they do not want to create what they perceive to be an unpleasant situation by giving the researcher an unexpected reply. As these were long-distance telephone interviews, other aspects of communication, such as visual, were not recorded. High-context cultures can be difficult for outsiders to research because an outside researcher lacks implicit cultural knowledge and it can be difficult to build the relevant relationships quickly. The researcher’s interpretations of these findings are just that – an interpretation based on context.
Chapter 4. FINDINGS

4.1 SPECIAL LESSONS IN THE HOME

It appears a key driver of principal behavior in conflict zones are “special lessons in the home,” or teachers engaging in paid private tutoring of students outside of school hours. Hallak (2007), cited in Bray, writes:

“Private tutoring is a phenomenon that has escaped the attention of researchers, educational planners, and decision-makers. Very little is known about its scope, scale, and effects on pupil’s achievement and equality of opportunities. Because of its size in a number of countries, and due to its nature – that of a private service oriented at improving academic performance – private tutoring has important implications for the educational system as a whole that cannot be ignored by education policies.” (p. 7).

Every participant in the sample confirmed that engaging in this activity was widespread among staff in their geographic area. However, participants would only acknowledge this after the specific subject was brought up by the investigator. Once the investigator said that he had heard this was happening in the area but not at the participant’s specific school, all subjects confirmed that this was happening regionally. Only one said it was happening at his particular school site (replying “here too,” in an emphatic tone). The investigator did not ask subjects directly if teachers at a particular site were engaging in paid private tutoring but instead brought up the topic generally, and gave respondents an opportunity to comment in detail if they wished. None wished to comment other than confirming that what they perceived to be large numbers of staff in the region were engaging in paid private tutoring of students during non-school hours, and that this predominantly occurred in three subject areas: languages, math, and science, particularly in upper years.

After-hours paid private tutoring – or special lessons in the home – are not Western-style private tutoring lessons. Bray (2007) confirms this and writes that supplemental private tutoring
is prevalent in most geographic regions of the world except for North America, Western Europe, and Australia. Biswal (1999) highlights “. . . teachers are engaged in providing private tutoring to the students for a fee” (p. 222) in developing economies. *The Economist*, cited in Biswal (1999), wrote:

“If you visit a village school in India on any given day, there is a good chance that nobody will be there . . . Where teachers are absent, some may be doing quite different jobs while continuing to draw their government salary; but a good many are teaching in smaller groups, privately for a fee . . . The problem is lack of accountability . . . Teachers are paid by state governments. Government inspectors do not supervise them effectively; in many states they seem to settle for collecting bribes from teachers . . . Illiterate villagers are used to seeing their schools empty for much or all of the time; they know and expect no better.” (p. 20-23).

Thus there is evidence that not only are teachers privately tutoring their own students, but they are sometimes derelict in their official responsibilities and doing this during normal class time. This is not unique to conflict zones. *Haaretz* newspaper (2013) stated that nearly half of Israeli students were receiving private-tutoring, but the Israeli Ministry of Education’s own figures put that figure at 70 percent. One person involved in Israeli private tutoring disputed *Haaretz*’s figure of nearly half, saying that if true it could only be because the other half were too poor to pay for the lessons (*Haaretz*, 2013). This private tutoring model is not students tutoring students or university grads holding small after-school lessons; the dominant model is students going to their teacher’s house for after-school lessons or vice versa (*Haaretz*, 2013). The direct involvement of school-based teachers is similar to what the participants alluded to in this study. Special lessons in the home appear to be so widespread in some parts of the world that it is appears to be an “unspoken expectation” of the teaching profession.

This is apparently a very lucrative income stream for school-based teachers in developing systems. To gain a sense of the finances involved, Crotty (2013) reported that one private tutor in South Korea – apparently just a tutor and not also a schoolteacher – made $4 million USD in
hypothesizes that wage differentials and a lack of monitoring encourages teachers to supplement their salaries with income earned from conducting special lessons in the home.

The study participants appeared to be deeply reluctant to discuss this topic, and only acknowledged it after, apparently, realizing that the investigator knew about this topic. Special lessons in the home are regulated or illegal in multiple jurisdictions (Bray, 2007). It is unknown the legal status of special lessons in the home at participant sites as it is difficult to ascertain what laws are being enforced in conflict zones and which are not. However, the reluctance to speak about this issue could indicate awareness on the part of the participants of potential legal, employment, or other consequences from discussing details of special lessons in the home happening in a school or being conducted by teachers that the participants supervise.

Furthermore, there is evidence that special lessons in the home are perceived negatively by communities. Though Biswal (1999) writes that “[U]sually villagers (people) in developing countries do not consider private tutoring wrong or an act of corruption by teachers.” (p. 223), Hallak and Poisson (2007) elaborate by highlighting the negative role of university admissions in this process of private tutoring, across geographic regions:

“... in some cases it [paid supplementary tutoring] has become a source of distortion that adversely affects mainstream education (curriculum taught, school hours, both student and teacher behaviour, etc.) and the goal of equality of opportunity in education. ... According to a recent comparative study undertaken by the IIEP on teacher codes of conduct in South Asia, private tuition is thus regarded as a major source of unethical behaviour in Bangladesh, India and Nepal (Khandelwal, 2003). This is particularly obvious in countries in which private tutoring is offered on a large scale at the end of secondary education to assist students to pass entrance exams to higher education. This is true in many former Soviet states, due to the direct interference of teachers and professors both in private tutoring and in selection committees for entrance to higher education... (p. 258).
This would also seem to contradict the claim that paid private tutoring by staff is seen as normal, ethical behavior. At any rate, this potential for special lessons in the home to distort academic integrity is potentially pronounced. Klitgaard (1991) defines corruption as “Corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability.” Biswal (1999) implies direct teacher manipulation of the market in developing systems, proposing that teachers are “… hardly held accountable for their actions. This gives rise to a situation where the teachers try to extract the students’ consumer surplus by shirking at school and supplying tutoring outside the school for a fee.” (p. 223). What Biswal’s (1999) research is implying is that teachers refuse to teach or do just the bare minimum and instead charge the students for material outside of the classroom.

Considering the widespread prevalence and “open secret” nature of special lessons in the home, it would seem there is a failure to monitor or implement relevant law or policy on the part of school administrations. Literature is scant on why this occurs. Bray (2007) writes of the difficulties in collecting actionable data on this issue:

“. . . private supplementary tutoring is beyond the reach of most government data-collecting systems. Tutors are often unwilling to declare their earnings, and families may be reluctant to declare their expenditures. Processes of teaching and learning may also be unmonitored. Many government officials prefer not to investigate private supplementary tutoring because it is a complex area for which they might be pressed to take some responsibility; and researchers lack the authority to demand information on activities which take place behind closed doors.” (p. 18)

Thus it is possible that there is a reluctance by leaders to pursue the issue with no “smoking gun.” This lack of transparency further indicates, at minimum, an apparent uneasiness with discussing special lessons in an open or transparent way.

Furthermore there are instructional leadership implications in conflict zones from these findings and literature. It would seem to indicate that it would be incorrect to closely relate instruction with physical classroom facilities in many locations, including conflict zones. The
prevalence, and perhaps even primacy, of private tutoring and its interaction with schooling indicates that there is robust and extensive educational activity happening in conflict zones outside of physical facilities. UNICEF (1998) in fact links partial collapse in public education with a rise in private tutoring. These special lessons in the home also appear to be directly linked to school curriculum and assessment. Bray (2007) writes that private tutoring can be particularly evident in teacher-centered schooling systems where examination success can be influenced by private expenditure.

It also appears that special lessons in the home can turn into an alternative method for curriculum delivery, providing an instrument for state-sponsored instruction when physical-facility centered instruction has substantially weakened or collapsed. This also potentially opens to redefinition the traditional teacher-student relationship in conflict zones; if students are paying for instruction outside the home, they are in effect customers and the teacher a service provider, though Biswal (1999) highlights the role of coercion in this relationship as class teachers often also mark exams for their students, enhancing the teacher’s hold on market share for his or her lessons.

Bray (2007), for instance, cites teachers deliberately slowing down their curriculum delivery to create a market for their services. Bray (2007) also highlights examples from Southeast Asia of teachers deliberately blackmailing and failing students who do not subscribe to private tutoring services. A case study highlighted by Bray (2007) says:

“Pupils pay a daily fee direct to the teacher for each lesson. ‘We don’t like the system,’ complains one parent, ‘but we have no power to change it.’ Parents know that many teachers deliberately omit coverage of some parts of the curriculum during the school day in order to ensure a market for supplementary tutoring. Parents realize that if their children do not take the supplementary classes, they will probably be asked to repeat the grade next year . . . (p. 38).
Special lessons in the home can even take the form of exam sales and exam answer memorizing. Biswal (1999) highlights that a source of teacher power over supplemental lessons is that in many cases they also develop and mark exams. This also influences mainstream school operations; teachers engaging in extensive supplementary lessons may prefer to be placed in higher grades, where there are more high-stakes examinations (Bray, 2007). In some locales, it is apparent exam-based and mark-based university entrance structures provide an unintended effect of giving extensive leverage to teachers to engage in coercion and blackmail. This can sometimes lead to a scramble among teachers to teach the highest year level courses since those have the most impact on university entrance, and thus teacher leverage is at its maximum and these tutoring sessions can command the largest fees. A case study from one African country by Vimpany (as cited in Bray, 2007) highlights:

“The headteacher is under considerable pressure to allocate the ‘best’ jobs to certain teachers. The best jobs are seen as the ones which will guarantee most money . . . [t]he other subjects and the other grades suffer from varying degrees of neglect.”

It is unclear what this “pressure” on headteachers or principals is. However, it seems evident that social and economic pressures related to special lessons in the home at minimum indirectly influence timetabling decisions by principals.

Thus we apparently have conditions in place in conflict zones for a variety of pressures on principals related to special lessons in the home from student examination marks, parental pressures, lucrative financial opportunities for staff, and attendance concerns that are driving their decision-making. Conflict apparently exacerbates but does not initiate these drivers.
4.2 FACTORS OF STAFF TURNOVER

USAID (2014) has identified five key areas in which teachers are affected by conflict in literacy education:

• Teachers may be displaced and have high levels of mobility and absenteeism in response to the security situation and immediate needs of their families.

• Teachers’ own education or professional development may be disrupted, particularly in the context of protracted conflict, resulting in low levels of education or training. This may result in limited knowledge about the core components of literacy and effective literacy pedagogy.

• Teachers may be directly targeted at one time or another during conflict and may require psychosocial supports.

• As a result of displacement, teachers’ first or additional languages may differ from the language(s) of instruction or the first language(s) of students.

• Teachers play an important role in exacerbating or alleviating the impact of conflict or crisis on learners. (p. 12).

However, none of the principals in this study identified teacher turnover as a major problem for their schools. Asked directly about staffing concerns, no principal said that he was worried
about an exodus of teachers or finding suitable replacements should a teacher leave. None expressed any worry over future open positions or expressed concern that vacancies are hard-to-fill. This would indicate that issues of staffing do not play a large role in shaping their decision-making or priorities during conflict. There could be some characteristics of this particular study sample that account for that as it appears teacher migration may not be a commonality across conflict zone teaching staffs but just perhaps some.

Furthermore, there is evidence cautioning against an assumed link between teacher absenteeism, migration, and conflict. The previous section discussed the role of special lessons in the home in teacher absenteeism. Furthermore, a USAID (2014) report on literacy and conflict zones stated that “Teacher absenteeism is rampant . . . [i]n Afghanistan we tried to get staff from local communities. They don’t leave when security gets worse, so it’s more sustainable” (p. 42). Another report quoted a principal (not involved in this study but located in a conflict zone) saying:

“ . . . Despite the wars, famine and displacement, students and staff still turned up to classes. When our classes were destroyed, we taught under the trees. We refused to close our doors because you never know when war will end . . . " (Guardian, 2013).

This indicates that poor security does not have a universal effect on teacher staffing. There could be a significant sample effect on these responses. It must be noted that a sample limitation of this study is that all four sites were in government-controlled areas. The sample principals also represented what could be conceived as a high-income student population in their areas, as their facilities are located in upper-income parts of their respective localities. This can be a major influence on teacher migration patterns, and it is likely the study sample construction produced findings that cannot be generalized across conflict (or can only be generalized across
certain samples in conflict). For instance, Cote d’Ivoire saw a “brain drain” of sorts in education from north to south, when during its civil war, the government (based in the south) stopped paying salaries to teachers in the north, in rebel-controlled territory (Sesnan, 2011). There was thus a major migration of teachers from north to south, while schools in the south continued mostly as normal (Sesnan, 2011). While all of Cote d’Ivoire was a conflict zone, teacher migration was not a uniform factor in schools. Somalia had a teacher shortage that actually led to several regions successfully recruiting foreign teachers from more stable countries to come and teach in secondary schools there (Mononye, 2011). Apparently a major factor in the Somali teacher shortage was financial. The low-paid teacher positions could not compete with the flood of NGOs, the lure of employment overseas, and monies in other professions (Mononye, 2011). Somali systems tended to lure foreign recruits with salaries in the $200-$300 USD per month range while Somalis themselves made $90 USD per month (Mononye, 2011). A few hundred US Dollars was apparently enough to overcome security concerns for these foreign teachers, leading to questions of how intense a factor security really is in teacher migration patterns in conflict zones. While it certainly plays a role for some, there is certainly ample evidence that financial concerns play a major role as well and that this security effect is not uniform across conflict-zone teachers in general. Thus it would seem that findings of teacher migration may vary depending on the demographic and political situation of the participants and sites in the sample.

In the four sites under study, it could be wondered what impact special lessons in the home play in teacher compensation and teacher migration. Research shows that languages, mathematics, and science teachers are in higher demand (Bray, 2007). If a part of the theoretical framework for special lessons in the home is that principals face pressure to put the “best”
teachers in the higher year levels, where higher private tuition fees can be earned, it would stand to reason that these “best” teachers are not necessarily the ones who are suffering financially and are most prone to teacher migration. It would also indicate that these teachers are also able to tap into a wide network of community members for support. One NGO, speaking about returning refugees and IDPs, put it “. . . if people had networks in the city they would not have left the city in the first place” (DIS & NL, 2014, p. 43). As school supervisor, the principal controls timetabling and thus what teachers get choice year levels and sometimes subjects. Teachers without access to certain year levels and subjects may find it difficult to supplement income with a robust schedule of special lessons in the home – leaving them to more or less rely on their meagre base salaries and making them more prone to leave. Considering the importance of examination marks and concern over parental reactions, it stands to reason a principal would put who he or she perceives as the “best” teachers in subjects where that is a concern – which principals indicated were languages, math, and science. A principal also might not consider it much of a loss if he has already taken care of who he perceives as his “best” teachers. Thus there could easily be a substantial economic incentive for some teachers to migrate from one school – but not others. When the principals in this study said teacher turnover was not a major factor driving their leadership, this may not mean that they are not losing any staff. They could also view the question in terms of who they perceive to be key staff.

4.3 STUDENT ENROLMENTS AND ATTENDANCE

Principals did cite student attendance as an issue they prioritize during conflict periods. Principals indicated that there were some conflict-specific reasons driving attendance problems, particularly for boys.
It is important to distinguish between the terms enrolment and attendance. For the purposes of this study, an enrolment is the registration of a particular student and payment of fees to join the student body of a school. Attendance, for this study, refers to the regular participation in school classes of those already enrolled. Consequently this question was about school attendance patterns of those students already enrolled and participating in schooling.

The distinction becomes important to understand context around the comments of the principals that girls’ attendance, in their view, was better than that of the boys’. Other literature has well-documented problems and issues regarding girls’ enrolments, but the topic of attendance and scholastic performance of female students who are already regularly enrolled has scant literature behind it.

At one site, schools faced significant competition for enrolments from informal Qu’ranic schools (private schools that are operated by an Islamic group) that, in addition to religion, also taught language and mathematics (Moyi, 2012). A majority of children at this site reported they had been enrolled in the Qu’ranic schools (Moyi, 2012). There was an enormous disparity in enrolments between rural and urban areas, and between wealthy and poorer families, in favor of wealthy and urban families (Moyi, 2012). Thus it seems enrolment and attendance challenges can actually come from private school competition or socioeconomic gaps rather than just conflict.

As a primary issue principals reported significant efforts in dealing with the issue of security checkpoints and its impact on school attendance. A report commissioned by the World Council of Churches (2013) at one conflict site stated:

... children lack protected access to education and face a range of dangers and obstacles on their way to and from school. They must travel long distances and are confronted with long delays and harassment during searches at military checkpoints
along the Barrier and within the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. They must navigate around other types of closure obstacles and pass through closed military zones while being exposed to the risks of settler and military violence on their school commutes. (p. 6).

Urban centers could be particularly at risk. In one conflict setting, not in this study, where a provincial city was placed under siege, the government army conducted numerous “mop-up” operations (Dispatches from Chechnya, 2000). These resulted in hundreds, possibly thousands, of youngsters disappearing, causing anxiety for parents wondering whether to send their children to study at the higher education institutes in Grozny (Dispatches from Chechnya, 2000). The Vice-Rector of the State Oil Institute cited that as a particular concern facing his university. “The biggest problem here is that our students keep getting detained at the blokposti when they travel to and from school. [The Russians] say they are suspected of rebel activity. I have to go and personally intervene each time . . . Thank God none of our students have disappeared permanently” (Weir, 2002). Another source there said that parents physically escort their adult children to university classes in order to safely navigate through the checkpoints, and even this is not always successful (Dispatches from Chechnya, 2001). One university began operating a special bus for students (primarily young men) to deal with the blockposti problem (Warren, 2002). All participants in this study were familiar with checkpoints and reported anxieties and concern over student welfare, and said that checkpoints were a significant hamper on student attendance. One principal reported that at one time, the army placed his town under a 24-hour curfew but attempted to make exceptions for students and staff to report to school. The army made passes to give the students. Nobody showed up to school anyways. The principal said he stood just inside the gate the entire morning to see if any students would come and blamed student and parent anxiety over having to pass through the checkpoints as the reason for no
attendance. There is also literature surrounding girls’ issues when passing through checkpoints including that of abductions (Moyi, 2012).

Consequently, it appears a major influence on principals in conflict zones are attendance problems generated or exacerbated by checkpoints or blockposts in the area. Parents became terrified that their children would “disappear” at these checkpoints, and this depresses attendance. Security checkpoints can be set up by formal or informal militaries or militias as a means of controlling who can enter and exit a specified area; urban schools can often be inside one of these areas. Students can “disappear” at these checkpoints when going to and/or from school which apparently plays a significant role in shaping parental attitudes towards school attendance during times of conflict. Secondary school male students could be particularly vulnerable as they are the same demographic as the opposition, whomever the opposition may be. There is literature (Moyi, 2012) highlighting that abducted boys can end up being soldiers while girls could be abducted to do domestic chores.

That being said, participants did not articulate strategies for this issue beyond verbal encouragement to try and lift student attendance numbers of those already enrolled. Though as cited above literature discusses principals in other locales even doing things like chartering buses to shepherd students through checkpoints – still unsuccessfully at times – these study principals apparently did nothing of the sort, though two did report giving consideration to organizing specialized transport (investigator cited it as an example and subjects responded positively – it is unclear if they actually considered it or were just responding to the prompt). The lack of action could be indicative of a lack of principal accountability on attendance issues – no participant stated that he was held accountable for attendance issues – or the knowledge that special lessons in the home would still make sure students were prepared for formal examinations. It is clear
that student attendance is impacted in some way by military checkpoints during conflict times, and that principals treat this as a priority – yet there does not appear to be an organized course of action or plan of liaising with the military on these points. It appears to be a very reactive process rather than a proactive one. Nor did principals state they suffered any kind of sanction or penalty for low attendance numbers. No principal stated that he was accountable or faced any tangible professional consequences for low or non-existent attendance.

Additionally, it also must be highlighted that attendance woes existed in these schools pre-conflict. While the checkpoints may be a new factor, they are not an initiating factor. Wealth and socio-economic factors also are at play; in one site studied, this had a significant impact on attendance (Moyi, 2012). Additionally it is difficult to know what actual figures are. At another conflict site, though outside this study, rumor persisted that girls were not going to school because of attacks by radicals, but when authorities arrived, they found only 30 children in the town of 12,000 were not going to school (Lokshina, 2009).

Lokshina (2009) also describes the quality of village education in one site, and its link to attendance:

“As for the question of education, the real problem is not that there are children who don't go to school, but that even those who do go to school have no chance of getting a decent education. The teachers are recent graduates of the very same local school with precious little experience. They speak to the children in Dargin, but the textbooks are in Russian. The children learn to read out the syllables, but they don't actually understand what they're reading. They learn basic arithmetic, and that is about as far it goes. The better-off families try and send their boys, especially their older sons, to boarding school or to relatives in the towns of Makhachkala, Buinak and Kaspisisk. If the boys have certificates proving that they've had nine years of schooling, schools in the towns usually reluctantly accept them into the sixth year and try to help them catch up, though they are probably more like third year students. Village families don't send their daughters away to study. There is not enough money to go around, and they need helping hands at home. While this is certainly sad, the same is true of many villages in the North Caucasus.” (2009)
Note that the girls at this site were apparently still going to school – they are just not sent away to a boarding school of theoretically better quality. Additionally, while there is evidence that formal school enrolments among girls can be lower to somewhat lower for girls than boys, research has shown that this is not the case for special lessons in the home in many developing settings (Bray, 2007, p. 45).

Though there is ample literature bemoaning the poor quality of education in conflict zones, and lack of attendance, there is scant research stating that any students actually fail or are held back, except if they fail to pay for special lessons in the home. At one participant site there was even a government policy banning student retention entirely, while at another site a principal complained about informal pressures placed on schools to make sure all students pass. While subjects stated that attendance was important and genuinely sounded like they believed that, they did not cite attendance as an accountability measure on their own performance or that of their schools.

This, again, potentially leads back to special lessons to the home. The checkpoint issue is resolved entirely for parents if the teachers are coming to the home rather than the students are going to the school. In-facility attendance could be perceived as not nearly as important for schools if students are receiving lessons through alternate means, particularly if transport to and from school is dangerous. Attendance may also be redundant to the students and there is literature citing an inverse relationship between in-school attendance and prevalence of special lessons in the home (Hussein, 1987). Hussein (1987) wrote about Arab students in Kuwait: “Tutoring has caused a great lack of interest on the part of students. They have reached the point of thinking that as long as they can pay someone who will show them how to pass their
examinations, they do not need to attend school classes except when they are required to do so by school regulations.” (p. 92).

Hussein (1987) also wrote:

“In particular two months before the school year finally ends [the students] stay at their homes in the morning and attend tutorial institutes in the afternoons. This cripples the school system. A second group of pupils comes to school just to avoid being questioned by the school administration but shows no interest when there. These two groups affect the third group, which is small, of those students who attend intending to learn. This group cannot find a suitable atmosphere to learn because of the behaviour of the class as a whole and also the fact that the teacher is disturbed by the abnormality of the situation” (p. 92).

Bray (2003) cites similar findings from the Sri Lanka Ministry of Education, who cited that many students lacked focus because school lessons had already been covered by a private tutor and that many students felt the quality of the tutors was higher than that of the teachers. It is certainly conceivable that this would negatively impact attendance of students already enrolled.

Consequently it seems conflict may exacerbate an attendance issue rather than initiate one, and special lessons in the home are having an enormous impact on attendance though in unclear ways. If students and families are already receiving what they perceive to be higher-quality, exam-oriented instruction through special lessons in the home, and school authorities are not enforcing attendance policies, then incentive for parents to send a son or daughter through a military checkpoint to attend a lesson already covered by the tutor is going to be zero. There is very little research linking student enrolments to special lessons in the home. If special lessons in the home went away, a question one might ask, would attendance in schools increase or would these families and students withdraw from formal schooling and seek education elsewhere? Thus special lessons in the home could both conceivably impact attendance negatively while at the same time impacting enrolments positively. The teachers are already tutoring their own pupils and their incentive for student attendance would appear to be lacking. The principals
indicated that they did care and wanted to improve attendance. However, knowing the checkpoint situation and that students are receiving instruction anyways, appear unable or unwilling to influence the situation. There appear to be limits to just how far they will act on this situation.

4.4 All About Marks

All principals stated that ensuring good exam marks was a key priority and a tangible indicator of if they were succeeding in their mission. Respondents also indicated that it appeared to be a primary driver of parental behavior as well; all principals stated a belief that numerous parents would be in their offices to complain if student marks were not, in the words of one, “high enough.” Principals seemed to indicate avoiding parental complaints about their school was also a priority to them and that avoiding these complaints was best accomplished by ensuring high marks for students. Discussion of other key performance indicators was very limited on the part of the subjects. Participants did not bring up or discuss a school mission statement or core values (or stated that high marks on exams was the mission statement). Principals did not discuss School Improvement Plans or mandated Key Performance Indicators as any driver behind their actions. Virtually all talk of reform or school improvement that would be present in a Western system was absent from these interviews. Participants placed the vast bulk of their responses about data around student marks and classroom behavior. However, there appeared to be little depth to it, and principals did not articulate or discuss any plan of addressing student mark deficiencies or promoting successes. Decision-making did not appear to be data driven except for high-stakes exam results which are analyzed in unclear ways. Additionally, no principal was able to respond to questions about student role models or bullying in schools.
Interestingly, however, principals seemed to make a distinction between “good school” and “good students.” When asked how they knew if the school was being successful, principals pointed to student marks on exams. But when asked what makes a good student, every principal shifted focus and discussed character traits. The participants were not speaking in the context of good classroom behavior but rather qualities such as honesty, integrity, etc. Collaboration also seemed to be important; two principals said that good students help other students, while one said that a good student helps run the class. Additionally, interestingly, in-building attendance did not figure into any subject’s definition of a good school or student.

For student behavior, all four participants stated that well-behaving students earned verbal praise. Two principals stated that well-behaving students got certificates and all principals expressed an interest in publicly recognizing well-behaving students. However, positive behavior management strategies did not go beyond praise or public recognition. Existing research cites a strong tradition of negative behavior management that includes corporal punishment in many contexts including subject sites. Though in many settings corporal punishment has been banned, regular teachers have been reported to administer it regularly in a large number of government schools (Tao, n.d.). At one site, UNICEF (n.d.) cited a report from 2007 by the Indian Ministry of Women and Child Development calling corporal punishment “rampant in every single district of the country” and stating that 73 percent of boys and 65 percent of girls were likely to experience it (UNICEF, n.d.). The report also stated that “Corporal punishment in both government as well as private schools is deeply ingrained as a tool to discipline children and as a normal action. But most children do not report or confide about the matter to anyone and suffer silently.” (UNICEF, n.d.). This despite government policy stating “corporal punishment will be firmly excluded from the educational systems.” (UNICEF,
As well, the report stated that, in practice, legal options are usually resorted to only in case of extreme corporal punishment. (UNICEF, n.d.). While there is evidence that teacher frustrations lead to increased use of corporal punishment (UNICEF, n.d.), it is evident that corporal punishment and negative behavior management are deeply ingrained as a cultural and professional norm in the site societies. Yet, principals did not acknowledge corporal punishment as occurring to the interviewer. It is certainly possible that it is not happening at their schools; however, it is also possible they did not want it known, and that admitting it could be the same as admitting a prohibited practice or a major violation of policy to an international researcher (as with special lessons in the home). Interestingly, Miethe & Lu (2005) link industrialization and a decrease or ban on corporal punishment, pointing out that in the industrialized nations, only the United States and Japan still allow capital punishment.

There also appears to be extensive mark orientation from the study participants. Nestvogel (1995), visiting a country in the same region as one study site, noted:

In the 7th grade, we no longer have the problem of an overcrowded classroom. Here only 5 girls sit at their desks and repeat what the teacher reads to them: "This is a book." - "This is a book." "It is on the table." "It is on the table." Afterwards they start reading full paragraphs from their books. But mostly they are not reading but reciting by heart - the only way to succeed in the final examinations at the end of each school year. (p. 208).

Nestvogel (1995) also noted that, in her region of study, “very prestigious schools excel in a high rate of passed examinations.” Observing a regional site, Nestvogel (1995) also mentioned:

“One day, I asked the director of one of the best Protestant secondary schools . . . about the reasons for his school being so successful. The pastor, very vivid and self-assertive, explains that it is based on three factors: qualified teachers (whom he wins over from
government schools), additional lessons if necessary, and a strict discipline which can even include corporal punishment. (p. 208).”

Nestvogel (1995) concluded by saying “One can conclude that replacing school drill by more creative educational methods and means is a luxury which the rich industrialized countries can afford, but which most 'Third World' countries do not dare or cannot afford to engage in” (p. 210).

The conceptual framework of “good school expectations” outlined through Nestvogel’s study seems to closely align with principal perceptions in conflict zones and would thus serve as drivers of instructional leadership at conflict zone: High marks on exams, additional lessons if necessary, and strict discipline. It also appears to align with a conductive environment for special lessons in the home – which may be what Nestvogel’s subject was alluding to when he credited “additional lessons if necessary” as a major criteria of his school’s success.

4.5 PHYSICAL FACILITIES

The condition of, and appeal of, physical facilities were a driver of school principal responses to conflict but in inconsistent ways. This could be related to duration of conflict. Counterintuitively, two principals reported significant improvements in their physical facilities that were funded externally through members of the diaspora living abroad. It appeared that conflict can apparently provide opportunities for principals to tap into non-traditional funding structures to reinvigorate physical facilities. These two principals were in conflict that had been “hot” for the longest duration of time in the sample. However, they did not actively initiate a fund-raising drive, and it appears they may have been “recipients of opportunity” or passive receivers instead of active participants in generating funds for facility upgrades.
The other two principals were involved in periodic or shorter conflict time periods. They did not cite major damage to their schools though stated anxiety over the potential of damage from active or random firefights occurring to their facilities, as well as nervousness over the uncertainty of the political situation. Principals did not criticize or disparage their facilities – whether this was because they genuinely felt the facilities were adequate or did not want to insult their buildings to the researcher is unclear. It is also unclear how the subjects perceive the link between physical facilities and educational attainment.

While these subjects did not apparently have significant concerns about their physical facilities – it appeared the concern was more over potential future problems than existing current ones – or these concerns were not a driver of their decision-making, there is ample evidence in literature concerning military interest in, and occasional occupation of, school buildings during conflict. The Russian example in the Caucasus highlights significant concern over preachers coming into the area from the Middle East or Pakistan and setting up their own schools to promote extremism. These preachers appear to operate at schools in three- to six-month rotations (Blandy, 2000). Many times these preachers can use their particular medrassah to entrench and expand their own agendas, creating, essentially, a power base for themselves out of the school system. One preacher in particular utilized this to great effect, a man named Magomed Bidzhiyev. He was rejected by mainstream Islam in Dagestan and thus began to organize his own educational institutions (Blandy, 2000). Bidzhiyev’s groups then sent groups of students outside the area for further training, normally in the Middle East, also in three- to six-month periods; at the end of this time, they came back to Dagestan ready to fight for the “cause.” This quite obviously came to the attention of the Russian army. Say Bobrovnikov, Navruzov, & Shikhaliev (2010):
“Between 1997 and 1998, the movement got involved in the Russian-Chechen military conflict and was crushed by the Federal Army . . . All of the Wahhabi madrassas, newspapers, and organizations in Dagestan were shut down.” (p. 147).

Thus it would seem that while there is military interest in conflict zone schools, in the general sense, this would not seem to focus on existing government or government-aligned secondary schools, in the specific sense, which would thus exclude the subjects in this study except in cases where randomness or accidents impact their physical facilities.

Similarly, schools as in the example above frequently import material, information, and propaganda that is at odds with the government school curriculum, as happened in the Caucasus. However, the composition of this subject sample rules that out as an issue affecting principals in government or government-aligned secondary schools. Nonetheless the phenomena is not restricted to just the Russian Caucasus as events from Southeast Asia to West Africa show. Thus, while school buildings in the general may be of interest to the military, data and existing research seem to indicate it is particular types of schools that are of interest to them, and not necessarily government or government-aligned schools in government territory.

There is also ample literature concerning the capture of physical school facilities for military purposes by multiple factions, such as for detention centers and logistical facilities. Prague Watchdog (2001) reported the boarding school in the middle of one town was being used as an army command center, with the boarding students moved to tents (also thus implying that the school was still functioning – as the boarders still needed to be present at the school). Venzke & Ibrahim (2002) report:

“According to a report from ITAR-TASS, 50 kg of cesium-137 was found on the site of the former No. 38 school in Grozny. Chechen rebel commander Shamil Basayev
reportedly used the site to fill mortar shells with radioactive material. According to the report, the maximum radioactive background in the grounds of the ruined school building reaches 100 roentgen. (p. 19).”

The US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, Ft. Leavenworth, KS (1999), published:

“. . . Chechens deployed in the vicinity of a school or hospital, fired a few rounds, and quickly left. The Russians would respond by shelling the school or hospital, but usually after the Chechens had gone. Civilians consequently viewed this action as Russians needlessly destroying vital facilities and endangering their lives, not realizing who had initiated the incident . . .”

Despite the destruction these events bring, It seems that, perhaps paradoxically, the longer a conflict lasts, the more opportunity there is for principals to upgrade their facilities due to increasing numbers of at-large refugees migrating to better circumstances elsewhere and then sending remittances “back home,” or through government reconstruction. Caucasian Knot (2015) writes how an attacked school in Grozny, which was the oldest in the city, was completely rebuilt and refurbished:

“In Grozny, the school No. 20 affected during the militants' attack on the city on December 4, 2014, has resumed classes in the restored building.

Today, the period of the New Year holidays in secondary schools has come to the end, and schoolchildren go to schools again. In Grozny, the school No. 20 also welcomes schoolchildren. This was announced by an official of the Chechen Ministry of Education.

According to the official, about 800 children went to the school No. 20, and it employed about 40 teachers. When the school was closed, the schoolchildren and teachers were transferred to two other educational institutions located in the same district of the city: the Grozny Lyceum No. 1 and the neighbouring school No. 67.

According to the Chechen Ministry of Education, the school No. 20 used to be one of the oldest schools in the city, and it was located in the building constructed in the middle of the past century. After the capital repair, the school got a new design of the facade, new equipment, and furniture.”
There is, however, no evidence from this study to suggest that principals turn into “fund-raisers,” actively campaign for facility upgrades, or allow potential future damage concerns drive their decision-making. There was no evidence from this study that principals have some kind of emergency action plan they use in regards to physical facilities in case of attack or other wartime function.

4.6 LACK OF PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT – BUT NO PARTICULAR NEED EXCEPT “CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT”

Responding to questions about professional development of staff, all principals stated that there was no training for staff during the conflict. This was an intriguing reply because in all sites there remained a robust roster of NGOs and aid agencies, though perhaps not well-known, that remained in the region and theoretically could have provided services to schools. However, when asked for specific professional development needs, the principals did not state there was a particular need for any except, for some teachers, in “class management,” “behavior management,” or “to motivate the students.” The subjects did not mention any need for training of teachers in grief counselling, emergency management, student psychology, or any other issue one might readily associate with conflict. When asked who provides this training to teachers who needed support with “classroom management,” principals stated this was done normally done internally through discussion. These did not appear to be formal, structured professional developments, but rather side chats with a particular staff member. Responses were mixed as to discussion with which staff member and appeared to depend on who was the teacher in question. But these strategies did not appear to conform with organized professional development or a formal system of support.
Considering the principals’ statements about behavior management needs, and the lack of focus from NGOs on this topic, there could be a clash between what principals and NGOs consider to be professional development. Silova (2008), speaking specifically about the Soros Foundation and the Open Society Institute, identifies “three broad phases of strategic development within the educational programming of OSI and its national foundations” (p. 52). These are implementing demonstration projects, ensuring sustainability of demonstration projects, and getting involved in national education policymaking through a combination of a variety of methods (Silova, 2008). It is conceivable that if a “demonstration project” does not match what a principal feels the needs of his school are, it would not be considered professional development. As examples of “demonstration projects,” Silova (2008) highlights early childhood education, civic education, basic education, and extracurricular activities. None of these are congruent with the exam mark orientation of the participants at study sites, nor does it appear to match the conceptual framework of high exam marks, additional lessons if necessary, and strict discipline” that are seen as the markers of a “good school.”

Silova and Steiner-Khamsi (2008) reviewed educational reform packages across the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Mongolia and identified several similarities. These were (1) reduction of public expenditure on education; (2) Increase of private spending on education; (3) Decentralization of education finance and government; (4) Rationalization of school staff and reorganization of schools; (5) Increase of internal efficiency by reducing “wastages” and leakages; (6) Education extension to eleven or twelve years; (7) Introduction of curriculum standards / outcomes-based education; (8) Standardized assessment systems (centralized university entrance examinations); (9) Market-driven textbook provision; (10) Increased educational choice (private schools); (11) Student-centered learning; (12) Community schools;
(13) Girls’ education (increasing enrolments in several Islamic countries); (14) Introduction of conflict resolution / peace education; (15) Emergence of private, “Turkish” schools (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008).

Reform rather than staff professional development appears to be the focus of these similarities. One common reform identified – centralized university entrance examinations – would seem to actually strengthen the role of special lessons in the home. Implementation of student-centered learning has been very inconsistent; teachers generally embrace the concept of student-centered teaching in PD sessions, but implement it only selectively (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008). Group work is done to consolidate knowledge already provided by the teacher, not to generate new knowledge, and independent student research is limited due to lack of resources (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008). It would seem that a general reform package consists of a lot of administrative and governance reform, along with empowering market-based or private choices, with very little in the way of professional development for teachers. Considering the presence of NGOs but belief among the principals that there is little professional development occurring, in this context it seems that there may be a lot, or even extensive, interaction between conflict zone schools and local NGOs without much in the way of professional development. This and the potential clash of what makes a good school – high exam marks, additional lessons if necessary, and strict discipline are unlikely to be the agenda of an international NGO – could explain participant responses.

4.7 “KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT”

When asked about contact with the military, some subjects needed more clarification of what “military” meant. Researcher re-defined it as “army.” At that point, all subjects stated they
had little to no contact with the military and stated that the military did not interfere with day-to-day school operations.

Literature indicates this is not consistent across conflict zones as there are ample and specific examples from other locations of principal-military (or militia) interaction. Again, it is important to highlight the composition of the subject sample as a possible explanation - these subjects were all located in government-controlled areas to some extent, and served upper socio-economic status students and families. These were not principals serving refugees or Internally Displaced Persons – this was a study about those who stayed in a conflict area, not those who left or were returning.

Interestingly, literature on the security situation in several sites shows this lack of principal-military interaction might not be taken as unusual. It appears that in the sites, the military lacked enough control to be an influential presence, and were subjected to attacks themselves. In the vacuum, a wide array of clans, militias, rebel sympathizers, private security forces, and others were prevalent forces in society and appeared to have far more interaction with civilians than the national army did. One report at one study site put it:

"Regarding security developments . . . [e]ven if there are . . . [army] forces and police, at the level of the district the [district commissioner] with his militia still has the power, and it depends on him if he collaborates with the government or if he is the government. According to UNDSS these militias are technically not clan militias since there is a certain clan mix, but in reality they are clan-based. However, these militias are to be seen as security forces rather than clan militias. In addition to the [district commissioner’s] militias there are police forces, security forces and a number of private security companies providing security services operating in the city. Many private citizens are hiring security companies for escort and protection, including Diaspora . . . politicians, judges and business people. (DIS & NL, 2014, p. 15)"

This could indicate a lack of interaction with the military because the military simply does not have control or has been muscled out of particular neighborhoods. Another NGO at one study
site reported frustration at inability to start a project, because the project was dependent on a police presence overnight and the police did not feel safe enough to do so and thus refused to report (DL & NIS, 2014).

There also appeared ample reason for principals to discourage having the military around as this apparently invited attack at one study site. One example was that tea-sellers were being targeted at one site because soldiers liked to gather at their shops and stalls on their breaks (DL & NIS, 2014):

“UNDSS explained that there has even been an increase in the targeted killings of ordinary civilians. Tea shop owners for instance are at risk, and besides at the place where tea is sold, soldiers gather and they are also targets (p. 20).”

Additionally, the police feel insecure themselves:

“Regarding the police a Diaspora researcher . . . explained that nobody respects the police force. First of all the police is afraid of doing its job and there are police officers who extract money from the people. Thus, local people are losing faith in the police and in general they do not approach the police, even when they may have a serious case to file, such as rape. It was added that it is easy to bribe the police and that the police is afraid when it comes to assist people who are threatened . . . The police is not even able to protect itself. Today there is a tendency for self-reliance, to keep your mouth shut and ‘no-go-out’ in the evenings (DL & NIS, 2014, p. 39).”

From a different study site:

“Police are largely ineffective at deterring crime and need significant training. They lack communication equipment, weapons, and vehicles; this severely limits their capacity to respond. Many gendarme and police stations outside of [location] have just one vehicle for the entire security force and often must receive calls via cell phone to attempt to respond to emergencies. The judicial system is ill-equipped to process and incarcerate criminals. Any response is slow and limited generally to writing a report. (OSAC, 2014, p. 5).”

Police can be targets themselves in conflict zones:

“the number of attempted murders of law enforcement personnel really increased last year” (Vatchagaev, 2009).
Consequently, it would seem that principals may have ample motivation to keep the national army or police force away, both out of their ineffectiveness and the potential to become a target themselves. It would also seem that the potential exists for the government security to not have pre- eminent control over neighborhoods and that other security forces have dominance over the territory particular schools are in. It is possible that principals may interact or be influenced more by these informal security teams than by the national ones.

This is further supported by literature claiming that “clan protection” – not army or police protection – is paramount for personal security:

“For IDPs or people from other areas . . . clan and Security and protection . . . is very important. However if you belong to one of the major clans and you have grown up in [town], it is different because you have the protection of your clan (DIS & NL, 2014, p. 35).”

Furthermore, it appears that violent acts against schools such as forced abductions, attacks, etc, are predicated on terrorist or rebel full control of a particular area. That condition never existed in any of the sites for this study.

Indeed, there are examples of military-principal interaction with Internally Displaced Persons populations in many sources. Furthermore, principals did detail some violent acts – including one who claimed he was shot at in his office – but that this was not by a military officer. Thus it would appear that school principals probably do have interactions with varying actors related to conflict though whether they are “soldiers” or not is open to interpretation. However principals did not appear to be operating under any sort of fear of the military or a military sanction. It should be noted that these environments are not liberal democracies; the school principals have lived in environments that, pre-conflict, could be classified as
authoritarian or oppressive. It could be that having the military around is just another strong authority figure that they have grown accustomed to.

Put in context principals appear to have interpreted this question as meaning direct military interference with day-to-day school operations, which they say is not happening at their sites, as opposed to just interactions – particularly since they mentioned the issue of the checkpoints and blockposts in regards to student attendance. Other forms of indirect interaction were not accounted for. It also seems that clans and local non-military personal protection could possibly supersede the importance military protection (DIS & NL, 2014).

As well, participants may have been reluctant to fully air their views on this topic:

“The Diaspora researcher . . . also stated that people might wish to present themselves as more cosmopolitan and modern and not necessarily wanting to share points of views on clans to westerners.” (DIS & NL, 2014, p. 37).

Furthermore, it may be that when the military does get involved in education, they may do so at a higher level than that of school principal. The Soviet military saw a security justification in their intervention into post-war East German curriculum, which Connelly (2000) notes was unique to that context; however the Soviet military played virtually no role in Polish or Czechoslovak education. This is similar to other military movements in the past, such as America’s own de-Ba’athitization and de-Talibanization movements in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. Curriculum is generally the purview of the Ministry and individual schools do not typically have any influence on it, and thus a military interested in curriculum revisions would not make interaction with principals a priority. When the Red Army did intervene, as in the East German example, they created an entire department called SVAG that was tasked with rebuilding and running East German education (Connelly, 2002). “An agency as exalted as SVAG did not get its hands dirty in the nitty-gritty of day-to-day administration, and contented itself with sporadic
interventions . . .” (Connelly, 2000, p. 42). While there was interest in the universities by the
Soviet military (Connelly, 2000), it seemed that did not extend into individual secondary schools.
Chapter 5. DISCUSSION

5.1 A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF TEACHING & LEARNING IN CONFLICT ZONES

It appears there is an enormous “side economy” in conflict zone education that plays a major influence in shaping principal decision-making, and, in effect, forms the conceptual framework of teaching and learning in these regions that principals must supervise and manage. This apparently forms the main part of the engine driving the leadership and management strategies of school principals in conflict zones. The centerpiece of this conceptual framework of teaching and learning is special lessons in the home.

Research indicates the prevalence of special lessons in the home increase as a student gets older. Dang (2006) notes that “. . . the trend to attend private tuition is stronger at higher education levels.” (p. 1). Dang (2006) also writes that there is no evidence of a gender imbalance in private tutoring expenditures, ie the gender gap does not exist in special lessons in the home. This is congruent with findings by Bray (2007). Dang (2006) also found some evidence that some particular demographics may spend less on tutoring at the primary levels, but in the context of her study site this disappeared by lower secondary. Das and Das (2013) also found that attendance at special lessons in the home is spread across abilities and is not just a feature for those academically inclined or seeking remedial help. Literature indicates the number of students involved in special lessons in the home is mainly a feature of secondary education and increases with year level. Sujatha (2014) writes that:

“Though private tutoring is prevalent at all levels of education it is preponderant in secondary education mainly because performance in public examinations is an important aspect to meet increased competition for entering into desired academic streams and thereby to higher, technical, and professional education, etc.”
As respondents all indicated that special lessons in the home were particularly pronounced in the higher year levels, and literature findings match this, it is typical that a larger number of Year 12 students would be taking special lessons in the home in comparison to Year 8 students. Further study indicates that demand for special lessons in the home is centered mainly around three subject areas: language, mathematics, and science (Bray, 2007).

Supply and demand can explain the interest in language, mathematics, and science. These subjects are apparently the main income-generators for teachers and the students and families are willing to pay for special lessons in these areas, but not for other subject areas or in lower year levels. There is clearly some kind of excess value that teachers and families attach to language, mathematics, and science courses in upper secondary schools in conflict zones that other subjects and year levels do not share. This is further supported by the findings that private lesson customers are not isolated, academically, to either end of the bell curve. As well, additional evidence at one particular locale used in this study, though a different region, showed that 91.7 percent of parents felt that paying for special lessons in the home were mandatory at school (Hellen, 2011). This indicates that teachers have the leverage and that students and families perceive the consequences of failing these three subjects to be more than the cost of paying for the lessons. These three subjects are apparently strongly linked to university entrance examinations in the developing world. Jayachandra (2014) writes:

“One likely reason for the prevalence of tutoring in developing countries (as well as developed countries in East Asia) is that there are high-stakes end-of-year exams that determine whether a student can continue her studies and how high-caliber a school she can attend.” (p. 190).

There is exhaustive evidence linking university graduation to future salary in the developing world. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2013) demonstrates a repeated, clear link that university graduates benefit from higher salaried employment and
reduced risk of unemployment. Thus we can potentially see the nature of the leverage that language, mathematics, and science teachers have over students and families: As they control marks, and sometimes even exam writing, a student’s potential to enter university is almost completely dependent on their language, mathematics, and science teachers. Faculty in these areas have the students, figuratively, over a barrel.

There is also apparently a lack of teacher accountability for professionalism. There is documentation concerning major teacher absenteeism from physical facilities during school hours (Patrinos, 2013). While there is some evidence that special lessons in the home could be occurring at these times, or even on school grounds (ie, teachers leaving their scheduled classes to teach private lessons in another part of the building), the same literature notes a lack of consequences for teachers for absenteeism (Patrinos, 2013). The lack of any administrative action on widespread teacher absenteeism could be indicative that principals do not feel that this absenteeism is disruptive enough to educational operations or goals to warrant significant attention. There is also evidence that principals sometimes have similar rates of absenteeism (Patrinos, 2013).

Considering the close link between special lessons in the home and access to school curriculum to be able to influence exams, termination would be a powerful perceived sanction for teachers. Schools and systems are just not punishing absenteeism and must feel it is just not disruptive enough to their mission to warrant termination. This could be indicative that special lessons in the home are superseding in-class instruction in importance, or even administrative support for special lessons in the home. This is further supported by the lack of administrative action on student absenteeism. While there is evidence that attendance problems at conflict zone schools is exacerbated by military checkpoints, there is also clear evidence that conflict did not
start these problems. Literature has also identified a destabilizing link between in-school attendance and the prevalence of special lessons in the home (Hussein, 1987). Considering the leverage equation between teachers and students regarding passing language, mathematics, and science, it would be illogical that there would be such widespread absenteeism in the physical facilities unless something else was replacing in-school instruction, and that something else was perceived by principals to be equal to or exceeding the importance of the in-school lessons.

Through the emphasis on marks, examinations, and tolerance of special lessons in the home particularly in university-preparation sensitive year levels, it seems clear that university entrance pathways are a primary objective driving school principal behavior in conflict zones, it is unclear what the motivation is. There is no evidence that school principals were engaging in any sort of data-driven decision making as perceived in the West – ie, there were no committees analyzing exam results and then making recommendations for improvement. Nestvogel (1995) highlighted a link between local perceptions of good schools and high university entrance marks, and thus it is conceivable that the more students who go to university, the higher regard the principal is held in. There is clearly a financial benefit to the faculty as well that may serve as social pressure on a principal.

With the finding that the formula Nestvogel (1995)’s subject identified for “good schools” are (1) high exam marks, (2) additional lessons if necessary, and (3) strict discipline, we note both that student and staff attendance is missing, and that this prescription could explain the accountability pressures on principals themselves. Of that three criteria, two are geared around high exam marks – additional lessons if necessary serving to support and make possible high exam marks. Thus if principals themselves are accountable for exam marks – assuming in language, mathematics, and science – it would stand to reason that, given their other challenges,
they may be willing to tolerate special lessons in the home or even encourage them as a way to meet their goals.

This framework also explains how other issues, such as student and staff absenteeism, might snowball in conflict. If special lessons in the home are tacitly encouraged, and attendance unmonitored, the incentive for students to brave the checkpoints becomes zero. The checkpoints possibly cause special lessons in the home to increase and attendance to decrease. There is also wide evidence that the third criteria of “good schools” – strict discipline – can also depress student attendance. Corporal punishment as a depressor of student attendance and damaging to student learning and motivation (Ahmad, Said, & Khan, 2013). This includes jurisdictions popularly presumed to accept corporal punishment. “Strict discipline” is also something that is unnecessary in the private confines of a personal home, perhaps adding to the allure of special lessons in the home for students.

Thus, university admissions serve as the ultimate driver of students and the mission of the conflict zone school, to be accomplished through examination marks. Special lessons in the home are the vehicle through which this objective is primarily achieved. These special lessons in the home can supersede the importance of in-school lessons as evidenced by inconsistent attendance from both teachers and students (and allegedly headmasters) that goes unpunished by governance systems. Teachers have financial incentives to launch special lessons in the home which conflict serves to enhance. Military checkpoints and other activities serve to bolster the appeal of special lessons in the home, perhaps even making them a necessity in some circumstances, by creating special dangers for students on transport to and from school. Students, seeking clear path to graduation and university, pay the fees, perhaps entering into a customer-client relationship with the teacher.
Figure 5.1. Conceptual framework of teaching and learning in conflict zones

Driver: Creation of university entrance pathways

Vehicle: Strong examination performance from students in languages, mathematics, and science

Instrument: “Best” teachers chosen for “most important” year levels and subjects

Action: “Special lessons in the home” in these subjects ensure success through all means necessary, superseding regular class instruction if deemed appropriate

Monitoring: Malleable, focused on result to the exclusion of process

Other teachers deemed non-essential; de-prioritized and neglected
5.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR STAFFING IN CONFLICT ZONE SCHOOLS

While research is inconsistent on the impact and effect of teacher migration and staffing issues in conflict zones, there is very little research that attempts to classify these teacher shortages based on subject area or grade level.

Extensive literature appears to assume that teacher migration and shortage are a result of deteriorating security in conflict zones or other factors such as low government salaries and lack of prestige in the profession. This was not fully supported by findings from this study which show alternative income generation is possible in conflict zone schools, and that the lure of this income can overcome security obstacles. Findings from this study and document reviews indicate that the subject is much more nuanced and can drive principal decision-making in untraditional ways.

Additionally there is little in the literature about what constitutes a principal’s view of a “best” teacher. There is very little literature concerning how school principals conduct teacher appraisals in conflict zones or developing world settings. Considering the formula of a good school means high exam marks, additional lessons if necessary, and strict discipline, that framework would seem to indicate that principals in conflict zones view their “best teachers” as those who can achieve high exam results – through whatever means necessary – and engage in extensive special lessons in the home. There is also evidence that in power cultures, appraisal criteria can be based on politics rather than job performance (Linstead, Fulop, & Lilley, 2004).

However, the exhaustive nature of special lessons in the home mean that “additional lessons if necessary” are likely a perk and not a burden on teachers. This is not an altruistic requirement on teachers but apparently a major financial incentive. Hellen (2011) also found that 86.7 percent of teachers at the study site wanted special lessons in the home to continue,
indicating that teachers felt they were receiving some major benefit from it that justified the additional hours. Jayachandra (2014) highlights five explanations for teachers tutoring their own students:

First, there may be a smaller supply of educated non-teachers who can serve as tutors in developing countries. Second, teachers may have a stronger desire to supplement their regular salary because they are poorer. Third, less monitoring of teachers by supervisors and parents might result in more scope for rent-seeking by teachers, which in turn would increase their interest in providing tutoring. Fourth, banning tutoring by teachers, which rich countries such as Singapore have done, might be less feasible in poor countries, perhaps because of stronger political clout of government teachers or the inability to enforce Fifth, governments sometimes view tutoring as a way to boost the income of teachers and thereby attract and retain better teachers. In fact, a few countries have banned other tutors and granted government teachers the exclusive right to offer tutoring for this reason.” (pps. 190-191).

The principals have leverage over teachers as well, through their control of timetabling. A major feature of such special lessons in the home, as Jayachandra (2014) and others have pointed out, is that the teachers are tutoring their own students. The determinant of that is of course the school principal through timetabling decisions. How the principal determines which teacher gets which “market territory” can be analogous to principal decisions about the “best” teachers. As teachers are tutoring their own students it can be inferred that it is not accepted for another teacher or tutor to “muscle in” on the teacher’s “territory” (ie, class). Thus principal timetabling decisions in a conflict zone context have far more ramifications and undertones to them than they would in a Western setting and can serve to set a professional hierarchy in conflict zone schools.

Sampling also apparently plays a major factor in a conceptual framework of conflict zone school staffing. While there is literature around teacher migration, there is a literature gap around what types of teachers are migrating. While research has indicated that financial reasons play a role in teacher migration, particularly low government salaries, this study and existing research around special lessons in the home show that the “best” teachers, provided they are in
language, mathematics, or science, have robust additional income beyond their government salaries as well as professional and personal support networks. Considering the lack of concern respondents showed over staff turnover, it would seem these teachers would have little incentive to move on, unless directly threatened, as they have already carved out their “territory” and migrating would mean having to compete with another teacher for market share, when that teacher is already entrenched in the community and has his or her own professional and personal networks. The supply of students needing to pass university exams is not infinite. There is ample financial motive for teachers of particular year levels and particular subjects not to migrate at all, while there could be ample motive for other year level teachers of non-essential subjects to migrate in search of better pay. With research establishing the link between a decrease in stability and an increase in proliferation of special lessons in the home (UNICEF, 1998), it would seem that conflict actually increases the strength and financial position of certain teachers – thus they may actually benefit from conflict conditions. Others, teaching non-essential subjects and now facing major attendance issues in schools, have no to limited market for special lessons in the home and may find their financial situations dependent on the government salary. For them migration becomes a real option. One example comes West Africa, where the Government stopped paying salaries in rebel-held territories. The rebels could not afford to do it on their own. Those dependent on a government salary were forced to migrate but there is very scant literature on what happened to those living in that area who had ample auxiliary income through special lessons in the home.

Thus a conceptual framework of conflict zone staffing may see stability in the roles of upper-level secondary, in languages, mathematics, and science, with fluidity in other roles.
Additionally, sampling characteristics may play a large role in understanding teacher migration. The participants in this study were in government territory that, while unstable, never formally left government control. However, even in a formal transition this would seem to underpin this conceptual framework – the supply of available tutors to engage students in exam preparation shrinks, and if physical facilities are threatened, that empowers special lessons in the home. It would seem that the stature and services of a certain group of teachers would be enhanced but others could find the transition destabilizing.

More research is needed to identify why these teachers have stayed in the profession, and also to characterize them by subject area and year level. It would be intriguing to see findings about how many long-service veterans are upper secondary teachers in languages, mathematics, or science. Silova & Steiner-Khamisi (2008) note about teacher demographics in NGO regions that “. . . one-third to one-quarter of teachers have been in public service for more than twenty years and thus are eligible for retirement.” (p. 32).

Additionally, the common reform of standardized assessments and centralized university examinations also seems to strengthen the role of special lessons in the home. There is numerous literature linking university admissions with future salary (OECD, 2013). The shortest path between two points is a straight line: If the aim of the student and his/her family is university entrance, perceptions of “good schools” are that they have high exam marks, increased centralization may, in turn, create a new “target” for students to shoot for that is unaligned with an outcomes-based curriculum and create renewed purpose for special lessons in the home.

Literature on how school principals in conflict zones conduct teacher appraisals or decide who are the “best” teachers worthy of higher-level year level classes is extremely scant. However a question becomes – if, as Jayachandra (2014) writes, [t]eachers appear to be
distorting their effort in order to generate demand for tutoring classes.” (p. 191), what is the incentive for the principals to allow this?

Table 5.1. Impact comparison of “special lessons in the home” to awarded (“best”) and non-awarded (“not best”) teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Best” teachers</th>
<th>“Not best” teachers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Significant financial gain; income from special lessons may surpass salary</td>
<td>Reliant on salary for livelihood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal professional recognition</td>
<td>Little or no professional recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scheduling freedom, including opportunities to miss school without penalty</td>
<td>No advancement possible due to market cornering by “best” teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major expansion and development of professional networks through marketing a high-demand, low-supply service; personal network enhanced</td>
<td>Professional network remains underdeveloped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic pressure to migrate significantly reduced</td>
<td>Economic pressure to migrate potentially increased through lack of additional income and job advancement opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potential surplus of applicants in certain subjects best-positioned to receive special lessons in the home</td>
<td>Potential shortage of applicants in certain subjects deemed “non-essential” to strong student exam performance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3 NGO Disconnects

There appears to be a major disconnect between NGO priorities in educational reform and the realities of teaching and learning in conflict zones. Of the eleven reforms that Silova & Steiner-Khamsi (2008) identify as common across reform, they write “We can only speculate about why governments and large international donors have ignored in-service teacher training, because few studies have been carried out on the subject” (p. 32).

Interestingly, Silova and Steiner-Khamsi (2008) highlight the production new textbooks, including some in the English-language, as a rare example of a reform that has been sustained over time. The production of new texts and new teaching materials was even allowed in what were perceived to be extremely authoritarian environments (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008). This leads to some interesting questions as to why this has occurred and been sustained, since there is no evidence at all that schools in these locations are turning out a critical mass of students fluent enough in English to be able to use such textbooks, nor teachers who are fluent enough in English to make use of them.

In fact Silova & Steiner-Khamsi (2008) speculate that one reason large international donors ignore in-service teacher training is because teachers are a “lost generation, not worth investing in” (p. 32). There are other issues related to low salary and lack of prestige that lead to large retention and recruitment problems (Silova & Steiner-Khamsi, 2008). It could be speculated that one reason this specific reform has found continued support is because it actually strengthens the demand for special lessons in the home. Using Klitgaard’s (1991) definition of corruption as monopoly + discretion – accountability, we can see how this particular reform could appear to significantly enhance teacher monopoly on study materials by restricting the supply and/or circulation of study aids and materials for students in the local language. The
ability of the students to study independently becomes highly restricted due to a lack of comprehensible materials for them and they thus become even more dependent on the teacher. Teachers, retaining their positions at the school, still have access to older materials in the local language that can be used for special lessons in the home. Additionally, where non-English textbook reform has been implemented, it can often be a very messy and inefficient process in practice. This has been from a combination of government inexperience and incompetence as well as issues in the schools. Mohammad & Kumari (2007) identify the study of textbook use by teachers as highly significant due to students’ inability to access study materials beyond the school textbook. Thus, for students, the end result of botched textbook reform was a lack of material entirely, or use of non-aligned materials in class, which also served to greatly enhance teacher monopoly on subject materials. Mohammad and Kumari (2007) cite, for instance, poor government coordination in textbook distribution that limits the number of textbooks provided and can also result in books not arriving in time.

Interestingly, the common reform package did not seem to include any sort of program geared towards changing community perceptions of “good schooling.” Additionally, there is a literature gap between perceptions of the teaching profession and coercive private lessons in the home. While there is voluminous literature discussing the low regard of the teaching profession and citing this as a potential cause for teacher migration in distressed settings, there is very scant literature exploring this relationship between teachers using coercion and blackmail against children for personal profit while simultaneously physically beating students under their care through corporal punishment, and society’s low perception and regard of teachers in conflict or developing contexts. This could serve as a significant depressant on teacher recruitment if the
populace equates choosing the teaching profession with the blackmailing and physical abuse of children.

Additionally, there is also a literature gap on what happens if a principal does not have enough teachers in non-essential subjects, defined for this study as subjects beyond languages, mathematics, and science. Such study would further enhance understanding of the issue of teacher migration in conflict and drivers for staffing decisions by principals.

Outcomes-based education, in particular, has struggled to gain widespread acceptance in first-world countries such as Australia (Donnelly, 2007). Huge acceptance issues could be anticipated in less developed educational infrastructures. In such a system, which may to those unfamiliar with the language education, cause confusion over the point and families may resort to special lessons in the home feeling they need to keep their children “on track” for university admittance.

Additionally, Silova & Steiner-Khamisi (2008) discuss what they call “donor logic” and “NGO logic” (p. 5) at work in NGOs and large aid agencies. In such a context, aid allocations are based more on what the donors have to give rather than actual on-the-ground needs (Silova & Steiner-Khamisi, 2008). Fafchamps & Owens (2009) found that success in attracting funds from international donors was heavily dependent on networking rather than on-the-ground needs analysis. Ilon (2008) elaborates:

“While the reasons for supply of aid are varied, certainly furthering the institutional or national strength of the donor is a primary consideration. While NGOs may not entirely voice this agenda, NGOs are increasingly linked to the economic and political motives behind such aid” (p. 16).

Ilon (2008) continues:

“First, NGOs are often required to act as policy agents of donor organizations. Whereas local communities may have identified specific needs, these needs do not always coincide with the goals of the donor. For example, a local community may need better local health
facilities while the donor may be motivated by a desire to show immediate health results, such as HIV testing, in order to justify their spending and legitimize further funding. Immediate results may conflict with long-term institution building and the NGO is left to negotiate between the two. Known as the “principal-agent” problem in Economics discipline, the result is that recipient needs are mitigated by the actions of the agent (NGO) in order to maintain a relationship with the donor.”

Thus it would seem that despite a huge emphasis on NGO reform in conflict, post-conflict, and developing world settings, this driver of special lessons in the home is unchecked because of conflicting agendas set outside the target regions. This, plus the inherent “hidden” nature of special lessons in the home that make it difficult to identify or collect data on, which Bray (2007) comments on, would seem to set conditions for “shadow education” to flourish untouched by NGO reform. This is exacerbated by the identified trends to de-emphasize, or even completely ignore, in-service teacher training by supersized aid organizations.

Silova and Steiner-Khamsi (2008) also comment on the “absurdity of universal benchmarking and target setting” (p. 16) that governments must comply with regardless of actual realities or relevance in order to receive funding. Consequently, to receive money, reform was centered around externally set targets that may or may not have had any relation to what was actually happening in schools – and they certainly do not as far as special lessons in the home go. Considering the strong incentives many actors seem to have in protecting the status of special lessons in the home as a primary driver of teaching and learning in conflict zones, it seems unlikely that major reform will succeed unless this issue begins to be addressed specifically by large donors and large NGOs.

There may also be a profound communication difference at play. Schein (2010) writes about subcultures in organizations that:

“[t]he difficulties of communication across these boundaries arise not only from the fact that the functional groups have different goals but also from the more fundamental issue that the very meaning of the worlds they use will differ. The word “marketing” means product development to the engineer, studying customers through market research to the project manager, merchandising to the salesman, and constant change in design to the manufacturing manager (Dougherty, 1990) . . . they often attribute disagreement to personalities and fail to notice the deeper shared assumptions that color how each function thinks” (p. 56).

The concept of private tutoring could mean something completely different to an NGO worker who grew up in Western Europe compared to a conflict zone teacher. There is the possibility that aid workers et al are, in fact, hearing about special lessons in the home but due to their own very different personal and professional histories, have just missed the significance and implications entirely. “Qualified teacher” is another example. “War” and “conflict” could also mean something completely different to a European, American, Australia aid worker, etc. Coming from a location that has never actually seen war in their lifetime, they may have very different connotations of what that “looks like” on the ground than what actually happens and may make assumptions, particularly around the closure of school systems and teacher migration, based on these assumptions.

5.4 FIGHT, FLIGHT, OR NEITHER – CONCEPTS OF “SAFETY”

More research is needed on why people choose to migrate from a conflict zone. Evidence from this study and existing literature has shown that “flight” is not a universal response and seemingly in the most unstable of locations, financial pressures and/or incentives can overcome security concerns.

Berkman (2010) identified a significant link between the presence of social networks and systolic blood pressure during times of challenge. Those with support still saw increases in blood pressure but not nearly to the extent as those who had no support (Berkman, 2010). Those
with significant networks may not have a fight-or-flight response to stress triggered as quickly. As one report said, “. . . they would not have left the city if they had networks.” (DL & NIS, 2014, p. 43).

The migration process in conflict zones itself is a significant stressor. Stuker, Uddo, Brailey, & Allain’s study (1997) of asylum seekers in Australia found:

“Anxiety scores were associated with female gender, poverty, and conflict with immigration officials, while loneliness and boredom were linked with both anxiety and depression. Thirty subjects (79%) had experienced a traumatic event such as witnessing killings, being assaulted, or suffering torture and captivity, and 14 subjects (37%) met full criteria for PTSD. A diagnosis of PTSD was associated with greater exposure to pre-migration trauma, delays in processing refugee applications, difficulties in dealing with immigration officials, obstacles to employment, racial discrimination, and loneliness and boredom.”

Stuker et al (1997) also wrote that “current procedures for dealing with asylum-seekers may contribute to high levels of stress and psychiatric symptoms in those who have been previously traumatised.” Importantly Stuker et al (1997) also noted that “. . . the most frequent PMLD [post-migration living difficulties] were “no permission to work” (38.6%) and “poverty” (34.5%).” This would seem to imply both an enormous financial risk to conflict-zone teachers seeking to migrate, and that migration can actually compound problems for teacher migrants.

The lack of concern from principals about turnover and lucrative opportunities available for select teachers through private tutoring, as well as relevant literature, indicate that in some instances financial considerations can top security concerns for teachers in conflict zones. It could also be that they consider migrating to be a more dangerous course of action than staying. Neither fight nor flight appears to be kicking in for many teachers or principals. Regardless, the concept of teacher migration is far more nuanced and complex than the simple equation of war equals attempted migration thus it would seem that staffing drives principal decisions in conflict around the concept of special lessons in the home rather than staffing shortages due to conflict-
induced migration issues. There are significant financial considerations as well as personal networks to be taken into account. For principals, the balance between essential and non-essential teachers appears to be unclear but it would be logical to assume that the “best” teachers are taken care of through timetabling decisions in regards to special lessons in the home. Criteria for what constitutes “best” teachers is unlikely to be based on merit and can vary significantly from criteria developed by donor organizations and NGOs.

5.5 The influence of clans, personal relationships, & organizational culture

A sampling implication of this study that could have impacted results. All participants came from societies that the World Values Survey (2015) rank as being very strong on traditional values and survival values. This can have a significant impact on how participants view bureaucracy and thus shape their responses in conflict zones and perhaps provide a partial explanation for the permissive attitude by principals towards special lessons in the home.

Interestingly, the findings indicate an unclear bureaucratic structure in conflict zones. Jreisat (2001), in Farazmand, writes:

“Certain traditional values, when rigidly practiced, tended to create incompatibilities with elements of the rational and impersonal characteristics of bureaucratic management . . . [t]his is why political leaders are able to permissively subordinate universal rules of bureaucracy to particularistic considerations in the conduct of public affairs” (p. 1164).

Jreisat (2001), in Farazmand, adds that “. . . Arab bureaucracies have substituted routine work, self-serving behavior, and survival techniques to risk-taking management.” (p. 1164). Jreisat (2001), in Farazmand, defines “survival techniques” as “avoidance of responsibility, apathy, or
inaction . . .” (p. 1164). Jreisat (2001), in Farazmand, also notes the collective nature of these societies, as opposed to individual nature, also are reflected in bureaucratic management:

“Collectivism usually breeds particularistic forms of policy making and decision making processes; therefore ‘collectivism’ becomes a managerial euphemism for favouritism and nepotism in public organizations. Under such conditions, universal rules of merit, equality, and concern for administrative performance are overridden by obligations to family and loyalty to kin group.” (p. 1159).

Mbaku (1996) writes:

If bureaucrats discover they can earn more income from providing services to groups seeking state favors than from their regular (public) jobs, they may pay more attention to the demands of such interest groups than to the proper enforcement of state laws and regulations and the effective implementation of national development plans. In societies where civil service compensation levels are relatively bow, a significant part of the public employee’s total compensation may be derived from engagement in outside activities, resulting in a significant increase in bureaucratic corruption (Mbaky 1991a).

Mbaku (1996) further adds:

“Jacob van Klaveren believes that a corrupt bureaucrat regards his office as a business from which he is able to extract extra-legal income. As a result, the civil servant’s total compensation “does not depend on an ethical evaluation of his usefulness for the common good but precisely upon the market situation and his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve” (Klaveren 1990;)

Mbaku (1996):

Indeed, in a study of the Yucatan, Margaret Goodman (1990: 642—43) found that corruption did not benefit efficient producers, but instead protected incompetent entrepreneurs. The firms that survived under institutionalized corruption were those that had become efficient at rent seeking, not at properly and effectively servicing their markets. The expertise that improved their ability to survive was their knowledge of the political process, who to bribe, and how to effectively manipulate the political system to their advantage. In addition, Goodman found that corruption in the Yucatan did not ensure new groups or entrepreneurs opportunities to enter the market. Instead, corruption allowed the old and more established groups to totally dominate and monopolize markets.”
Literature on fraud examination indicates the most prevalent way that frauds are initially detected are from tips (40.2%), management review (15.4%), internal audit (13.9%), or by accident (8.3%) (Wells, 2011).

However, interestingly, the most frequent anti-fraud detection utilized are external audits or the issuance of codes of conduct (Wells, 2011). This is significant when put in context of clan behavior; there is tremendous pressure on group members to conform, significantly raising the societal pressure to not be a tipster. Thus if tips are not forthcoming and management is the problem, and will be uncompliant with an internal audit, it would seem the potential for special lessons in the home to run unchecked through conflict zones barring an outsider discovering it by accident and being willing to try and do something about it is quite high. It does not appear that principals would be inclined to disclose it facing these pressures.

Organizational change literature would also indicate this is unlikely. John Kotter (1996) identifies “creating a sense of urgency” as the first step in creating lasting organizational change. Findings from this study as well as established literature fail to identify a source of urgency for creating change in school operations for conflict zone schools. Findings and literature demonstrated a reluctance (at minimum) on the part of the military to engage in day-to-day school operations, and there is no evidence that other actors routinely engage in day-to-day operational interference of schools. Additionally the reform package from NGOs can actually strengthens the status quo in some areas and in most others appears to have limited reach, and no sanction for noncompliance. It does not appear that a framework is in place from organizational change perspectives that would influence change regarding special lessons in the home.

Weiner (2014) writes about clans and the collapse of the state:
people are forced to look to other institutions to address their social and legal problems, and the most enduring such organization in human history is the extended family, the clan—for which group loyalty trumps individual rights.”

Weiner (2014) also speaks of the lack of individual autonomy in clan structures:

“In each case, persons living within its system of governance lack what the Palestinian Intellectual Hisham Sharabi in his book Neopatriarchy called “the individual’s claim to autonomous right.” In the rule of the clan, the individual is submerged within the muscular group and corporate associations that maintain the society’s legal and political order.”

Weiner (2014) has identified three phenomena when discussing rule of the clan:

“First, and most prominently, by the rule of the clan I mean the legal institutions and cultural values of societies organized primarily on the basis of kinship—societies in which extended family membership is essential for social and legal action and in which individuals have little choice but to maintain a strong clan identity (the nuclear family, an agent of psychological individualization, is a substantially different social institution) . . . These societies possess the outward trappings of a modern state but are founded on informal patronage networks, especially those of kinship, and on traditional ideals of patriarchal family authority . . . Third, and most broadly, by the rule of the clan I mean the antiliberal social and legal organizations that tend to grow in the absence of state authority or when the state is weak, including in modern democracies where the writ of government fails to run. These groups include associations dedicated to unlawful activity, such as petty criminal gangs, the Mafia, and international crime syndicates, such as the drug gangs of Mexico—which in their cultural markers of solidarity, their lack of opportunity for exit, and their feuding patterns look and act a great deal like traditional clans.”

Thus we can see the role of the clan, or at least a clan mentality, in conflict zone schools. If as the findings of this study and previous literature indicated, clan relationships or other non-military security relationships supersede the importance of the central military or government, staff in conflict zone schools may be dependent on non-state actors for their protection and well-being. The consequences for upsetting somebody in the right “clan” could be enormous and
have far greater implications in a conflict zone since processes of fair mediation do not or no longer exist.

The relationship goes both ways; a principal may be very reluctant to upset a teacher who is a member of an allied clan for the same reason. Principals may have little choice but to maintain these patronage networks, as already identified in the discussion of special lessons in the home. If these patronage networks get disrupted, in the uncertainty of conflict and absent a strong central government or military to serve as arbitrator, the replacement could be far worse for the principal. Importantly Weiner (2014) highlights the lack of an exit point. If one wants to stop this activity, but fails – considering the high potential cost of migration, what does one do? In such settings it could be better to just go along to get along. This is reinforced by Newstrom & Davis’s (2002) conception of the autocratic organization in which power serves as the basis, with a managerial and employee orientation of authority and obedience with dependence on the boss. The result is minimum and subsistence performance, instead of passion and commitment to professional goals (Newstrom & Davis, 2002). In conflict zones there just may not be a safe way for a principal to run an intervention into illegal activity, or for a teacher to back away from one.

Schein (2010) writes that “[c]ulture arises through shared experiences of success. If first-line supervisors discover ways of managing their subordinates that are consistently successful, they will gradually build up a set of shared assumptions about how to do their job . . .” (p. 56). Considering how pervasive special lessons in the home are throughout education in developing contexts, it stands to reason that principals view this as a successful way to reach their goals. This microculture of teachers who are the “best” and thus form the bulk of the team that delivers
special lessons in the home appear to form the engine of teaching and learning functions in the school, likely because they are perceived as successful teachers with a successful methodology.

This appears to be a results-orientation rather than a process-orientation. With the documented coercion, potential falsification of records, and so on, it appears that as long as the target of high exam marks is reached, both the how that happened and the authenticity of the marks are not questioned. Perhaps we can speculate about how this was reached and the authenticity of the marks which could lay behind the lack of findings about data-driven decision making at the schools. They are, in their perceptions, being successful and so will be reluctant to change tack especially in a high-volatility environment where school decisions apparently can have ramifications beyond the classroom. It would seem that in the exit-loyalty-voice-neglect framework, voice is not an option, leaving loyalty and neglect for those not leaving or migrating.

Additionally, Linstead, Fulop, & Lilley (2004) draw a link between power cultures and the seven bases of power by French and Raven, discussed in Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson (2001). The seven bases of power, as identified by French and Raven in Hersey, Blanchard, & Johnson (2001), are coercive power, connection power, reward power, legitimate power, referent power, information power, and expert power. In a power culture this can play out as (Linstead, Fulop, & Lilley, 2004):

**Reward Power:** Rewards for supporting key power figures

**Coercive Power:** Mistakes punished if they threaten a key power figure

**Legitimate Power:** Rules can be broken by key figures

**Referent Power:** Strong, uncompromising, charismatic behavior from key figures. Low support for those who are not a key person.
**Expert Power:** Evaluation standards are based on political rather than performance criteria.

**Information Power:** Information valued only for personal goals

**Connection Power:** Networking is vital

Based on this framework, a model starts to emerge about management role in the proliferation of special lessons in the home. Timetabling could be used as a way to reward favored staff, while punishment is meted out only if a principal is threatened. Determinations of “expertise” and favored staff are not based on teaching performance but instead service to the principal.

Conceptual confusion regarding legitimate power could lead to a belief that principals have power to disregard or not enforce regulations or bans on special lessons in the home. Networking is vital to build up a market, and information (such as curriculum knowledge, etc) is only valued in the name of self-service. Additionally, Harrison, cited in Linstead, Fulop, & Lilley (2004), linked power cultures with high levels of centralization at the top in an organization (ie, with a school principal) along with low levels of formalization, defined as the extent to which rules, policies, and procedures are followed in an organization.

This could also be an explanation for the seeming lack of detailed planning regarding data analysis and school improvement from the findings. Mapping these examples onto the seven bases of power paints a picture of an organization where the school principal sets the agenda for his own school with, seemingly, minimal interference, and written rules and procedures are not necessary as the principal makes all decisions. There well might be no merit culture here based on performance, only based on personal loyalty and usefulness to the school principal.
Accordingly, this reinforces that the principal does find some utility in allowing groups of
teachers to practice special lessons in the home, and that this utility outweighs any ethical
concern, worries about community perceptions, or fear of sanction from the government or
outside actors.

5.6 METHODOLOGY NOTES

Researching in conflict zones has some implications on methodology. The participants in
this site were from high-context cultures. The University of the Pacific (n.d.) identifies some
characteristics of high-context cultures:

- Relationships depend on trust, build up slowly, are stable. One distinguishes between
  people inside and people outside one's circle . . . [h]ow things get done depends on
  relationships with people and attention to group process.

- One of the limitations of this study was that it was done through telephone, which limited
  the amount of time researcher had to build up trust with participants. A longer study time period
  with extensive face-to-face contact would be the sort of behavior expected in a high-context
  culture and conceivably could have yielded richer data. The use of a fixer was absolutely
  essential in gaining access; however, the fixers likely used a choice of convenience of a
  participant they knew from inside their own circles. The researcher effectively cedes control
  over sample construction to fixers in conflict zone research.

- The University of the Pacific (n.d.) also highlights some characteristics of interactions in
  high-context cultures:

  “High use of nonverbal elements; voice tone, facial expression, gestures, and eye
  movement carry significant parts of conversation; verbal message is implicit; context
  (situation, people, nonverbal elements) is more important than words. Verbal message is
indirect; one talks around the point and embellishes it. Communication is seen as an art form—a way of engaging someone. Disagreement is personalized. One is sensitive to conflict expressed in another's nonverbal communication. Conflict either must be solved before work can progress or must be avoided because it is personally threatening.

The implications of this in data collection are immense. A reply to a particular question may not actually be the reply even though the words say it is. Researcher must interpret participant replies through context to gain meaning. A participant in a high-context culture may say “yes” but not mean “yes” at all. This can lead to imperfect analysis or send the researcher down unfruitful avenues of inquiry, or at worst, lead to incorrect findings because context has been misinterpreted. High-context cultures are also conflict-averse and participants may agree to something or give a particular reply not because it is actually true but because they believe the researcher wants to hear it, or they do not want to create what they perceive to be an unpleasant situation by giving the researcher an unexpected reply. As these were long-distance telephone interviews, other aspects of communication, such as visual, were not recorded. High-context cultures can be difficult for outsiders to research because an outside researcher lacks implicit cultural knowledge and it can be difficult to build the relevant relationships quickly. The researcher’s interpretations of these findings are just that – an interpretation based on context.

It was not expected at the launch of this study that the topic of illegal or unethical behavior on the part of school staffs would be a discussion topic, let alone a centerpiece finding and the heart of what was driving the study. This has a central impact on planning for a study of conflict zone education as researcher must take into account the various safeguards and reporting mechanisms that go along with the study of illegal activity.
5.7 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Considering the dearth of literature concerning special lessons in the home yet the major importance they hold in school operations in conflict zones, substantial more research is needed to better understand how this impacts school operations on a local level, as well as the interaction between government and NGO/aid agency policy. Current literature is scant on the scale of the finances involved as well as the links to student performance.

With the emphasis that appears to be placed on exam performance, further research is needed on how principals conduct teacher appraisals, and what criteria are used. Research is very limited on this issue. Research both on instruments and how these instruments are put into practice would be a welcome addition to the body of knowledge.

Additionally, greater knowledge into teacher migration, in the forms of categorizing teacher subject levels, year levels, and reasons for leaving, would serve to clarify our understanding of the special lessons in the home phenomenon and shed more light on the financial and security-related aspects of staffing in conflict zones, and how principals respond to this.

More research into conflict zone school finance would also serve as fruitful to identify further cash flow systems that may be of interest for other actors involved in education.

Importantly, further study about how clans and other non-government or non-military actors interact with the education process would be helpful to further understand the pressures being placed on school principals.

Finally, it would be recommended for more study into conflict zones themselves. As noted earlier, refugees and post-conflict situations often get put under the same umbrella as conflict zones, but the reality is that people who leave a conflict zone, and those who stay
behind, have very different motivations and personal situations which the findings on special
lessons in the home and personal networks in this study serve to underline. How can these
differences be better defined, psychologically, economically, and socially? What is the
difference between a student who migrates and one who stays behind? Such research can be
used to better differentiate services offered from NGOs and government agencies to better serve
these populations.

Fitz-Enz (2010) describes a staircase that he calls the disengagement-to-departure process
for employees. The top of this staircase is “start the new job with enthusiasm” and then each
descending step represents disengagement: question the decision to accept the job, think
seriously about quitting, try to change things, resolve to quit, consider the cost of quitting,
passively seek another job, prepare to actively seek (other employment), actively seek (other
employment), get new job offer, quit to accept new job, or quit without a job, or stay and
disengage (Fitz-Enz, 2010, p. 132). Further research to map this process on to the Exit-Voice-
Loyalty-Neglect response of employee dissatisfaction (Robbins, Judge, & Sanghi, 2009) could
yield more insights into how the process of teacher migration unfolds (or does not unfold). What
is the tipping point in a conflict zone that leads an employee to stay or migrate? How is that
decision reached?

Another important avenue for further research centers around community response to
special lessons in the home and coercion. Why is this accepted? While issues of leverage have
been discussed in this analysis, Hoffman & Ford (2010) discuss the concept of corporate social
legitimacy. This is achieved when an organization convinces a community that it has achieved
competence and community (Hoffman & Ford, 2010). This is done by showing that an
organization can accomplish its goals (Hoffman & Ford, 2010). The second piece, community,
is when the organization demonstrates that it is a responsible member of the community (Hoffman & Ford, 2010). What are perceptions of this in a conflict zone, and how does that interplay with school operations?

Ackroyd & Thompson (1999) distinguish between organizational resistance and organizational misbehavior. Additionally, organizational misbehavior is not necessarily correlated to job dissatisfaction. Ackroyd & Thompson (1999) explain that organizational misbehavior encompasses a wide umbrella from committed, enthusiastic employees misappropriating time to hostile employees engaging in financial theft from an organization. Ackroyd & Thompson (1999) also developed a matrix for dimensions of misbehavior. Vardi & Weitz (2004), in Richards (2008), discuss some challenges of studying organizational misbehavior, namely, that upper management is not very interested in studying it and perhaps even less interested in having findings become public. Further research into organizational misbehavior and its link to job satisfaction and management behavior, may prove fruitful to help establish a conceptual framework for the proliferation special lessons in the home in conflict areas and the developing world.

Finally, additional research into the ethical foundation of conflict zone staff would better help to frame decision-making. Linstead, Fulop, & Lilley (2004) identified five main objections to business ethics. These are psychological egotism, Machiavellian concerns, Legal-moral, Agency arguments, and Cultural relativism (Linstead, Fulop, & Lilley, 2004). There does not appear to be much legal-moral foundation in conflict zone schools, but perhaps a Machiavellian orientation of the ends justifying the means as well as psychological egotism that complements power cultures. How this shapes ethical decision-making and standards in conflict zones would further assist in understanding additional factors to principal decision-making in these contexts.
Power cultures would also seem to include psychological egotism, as in acting morally is justified to advance the boss or organization only.
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APPENDIX A

Interview Protocols

1. Communicating and controlling
Q1. What, to you, is communication?
Q2. How do you collect information about your school?
Q3. How do you send information to staff?
Q4. How do you send information to parents and people outside the school?
Q5. Give an example of how you normally saw news about your school.
Q6. Give an example of how you normally heard news about your school.
Q7. Give an example of what kind of work-related news you listened for.
Q8. What types of [work-related] news did you typically receive from your colleagues from other schools?
Q9. What types of people from outside the school gave you information or news (ie, other principals, government officials, parents, etc)? Give an example.
Q10. Did this group of people change during the conflict?
Q11. What roles did you consider to be important specialist positions (phrasing of italics may be changed to “positions that required special knowledge to do”) in your school?
Q12. Give an example of this kind of work.
Q13. Give an example of how you shared news with colleagues and stakeholders.
Q14. Which staff position do you think you communicate with most often?
Q15. What is your definition of influence?.
Q16. Give an example of how you influence staff.
Q17. Describe your decision-making style.
   • Ask for examples
Q18. Describe how you give out resources.
   • Ask for examples
Q19. What are your priorities for staff?
   • Ask for examples
2. Leading and linking
Q1. Describe professional development.
Q2. How can a principal improve staff performance?
Q3. What do you think is a teacher’s most important job?
  • Give an example
Q4. Give an example of a team (ie, a committee) in your school, and the work they did.
  • Ask for multiple examples
Q5. What did you consider to be your important professional relationships outside the school?
Q6. How did you form these links?
Q7. What sort of work do you do with these colleagues?
Q8. Describe the kinds of activities and events outside the school you represented the school at.

3. Doing and dealing
Q1. Describe your management philosophy.
  • Ask for examples
Q2. What are your top priorities for the school?
Q3. Why?
Q4. What is your philosophy on handling problems between staff?
  • Give an example of this.
Q5. How do you convince people to agree with you?
  • Give an example of this.
Q9. Give an example of a project that needed to be done quickly.
Q10. What strategies did you use to handle this?
Q11. Give an example of a project you opposed, or that you know of another principal opposing.
Q12. What did you do to oppose this project?

4. Direction setting and aligning
Q1. Describe a successful student (no names please).
Q2. Why is this student successful?
Q3. What do you do to help this student be successful?
Q4. What do you expect of students?
   • Give an example

Q5. How did you communicate it to students, teachers, and people outside the school?
   • Give an example

Q6. How do you know if these students, teachers, and people understand?

Q7. What do you do if people are not listening?

Q8. Who has to approve the rules for your school?

Q9. How have these rules and expectations changed over time?

Q10. Give an example of this.

Q11. What were the priorities?

Q12. Describe why these were the priorities.

Q13. Who assists you, informally?

Q14. Why do these people assist you?

5. Motivating and inspiring

Q1. What, to you, is motivation?

Q2. What, to you, is inspiration?

Q3. Describe an energetic teacher (no names please for all).

Q4. Describe an energetic staffer.

Q5. Describe a lazy teacher.

Q6. Describe a lazy staffer.

Q7. How does a teacher or staffer know he or she is doing well?

Q8. What needs do teachers have?

Q9. What needs do students have?

Q10. Describe your role model.

Q11. Who do you think is a role model for:

   - For Staff
   - For Students
   - For External stakeholders

Q12. Describe an anti-role model for yourself

Q13. Who do you think is an anti-role model for:
- For Staff
- For Students
- For External stakeholders

Q14. What do you like about your job?
Q15. What do you think your staff likes about its job?
Q16. What do the students like about school?
Q17. How do you know when you have had a good day?
Q18. How do teachers know when they have had a good day?
Q19. How do students know when they have had a good day?
VITA

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