The delegitimization of women’s claims of ingroup discrimination: Consequences for women who claim

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Abstract

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The rectification of gender discrimination largely depends on how people respond to women who claim to have experienced it. This dissertation examines whether people respond more negatively to a woman who claims to have experienced ingroup discrimination, discrimination perpetrated by another woman, than to a woman who claims to have experienced outgroup discrimination and why. In Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4, a woman who claimed ingroup discrimination was perceived to have experienced less bias than a woman who claimed outgroup discrimination. Study 4 additionally demonstrated that the decrease in bias perceived was due to the discrimination violating people’s prototype of discrimination. In Study 2b, however, the type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) did not affect how much discrimination was perceived. Additionally, in Studies 1 and 4, a woman
was perceived as more of a complainer when she claimed to have experienced ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination, though type of discrimination claimed did not affect how much she was perceived as a complainer in Studies (2, 2b, and 3). A meta-analysis of the effect of type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on perceptions of the woman as a complainer did reveal an effect, indicating that there is a small effect which the individual studies may have lacked the statistical power to detect. Additionally, Study 4 demonstrated that claiming ingroup (vs outgroup) discrimination led a woman to experience other negative outcomes, specifically to be less likely to have her claim investigate and to be perceived as less professionally competent. This work demonstrates that women who experience discrimination at the hands of a female supervisor find themselves in a difficult position because of the harsh consequences they will experience if they claim.
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Chapter I: Introduction

Since the passing of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the burden for rectifying discrimination increasingly falls of the party who experienced it (Nielson & Nelson, 2005; Nielson et al., 2008). This means that rather than organizations being held accountable and audited for discriminatory practices, individuals must file a claim of discrimination with either the EEOC or a state and local Fair Employment Practices Agency (FEPA) as a mandatory precursor to filing employment discrimination claim in court. The fact that the burden for filing discrimination claims falls on the individuals who experience discrimination means that the psychological factors that shape the decision to file a complaint are important to understand.

One factor that powerfully influences the decision to file a claim of discrimination is threat of negative consequences as a result of filing. Claimants can experience negative consequences for filing a claim of any type of discrimination but the outcomes they experience may be more severe when they claim discrimination that could be perceived as implausible. One type of discrimination that may be seen as implausible is discrimination perpetrated by another member of your own group. But members of protected groups do sometimes show biases against other ingroup members (Ashburn-Nardo & Johnson, 2008; Ayers, Vars, & Zakariya, 2005; Jost, Pelham, & Carvalho, 2002; Lynn et al, 2008). And, discrimination perpetrated by female managers is becoming increasingly well documented. There is a growing body of work demonstrating that women in positions of power do discriminate

However, we know little about the consequences experienced by the women who experience this type of discrimination. In particular, we do not know whether women who claim discrimination perpetrated by another member of their group are more severely penalized because the claim is perceived as less legitimate.

In the present research I examine whether women experience more negative outcomes, i.e. are more likely to result in negative interpersonal and professional consequences and are less likely to have their claim investigated, when they file discrimination claims against a female rather than a male supervisor. I propose that their claims of ingroup discrimination will result in these more negative consequences because evaluators will be less likely to believe that discrimination occurred. Finally, I examine several possibilities for why (violates prototype of discrimination, violates prototype of perpetrator, or is perceived as relational conflict not worthy of formal investigation) evaluators may fail to recognize this form of discrimination when it is claimed.

**Prevalence of Ingroup Discrimination**

At first glance, it may seem that ingroup discrimination by female leaders is not an important issue because it is rare and generally women promote the advancement of other women. This perception is reasonable because all things being equal, people tend to favor members of their ingroup over members of their outgroup (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; for a review see Hewstone, Rubin, &
Willis, 2002). Consistent with this notion, both psychologists and sociologists have theorized that not only will female leaders not discriminate against the women underneath them but also serve as gatekeepers actively promote and shepherd the advancement of other women (Cohen & Huffman, 2007; Eagly, 2007; Nelson & Bridges, 1999). This perspective, known as the women as “agents of change” perspective, posits that women would not engage in ingroup-directed discrimination because they are motivated to promote the status of their own group (Cohen & Huffman, 2007).

Consistent with this perspective, there is a good deal of evidence showing that having women in leadership often benefits other women in their organization. For one, there is evidence that having more female leaders reduces the gender pay gap (Hultin & Szulkin, 2003). In a study of Swedish workers, the wage gap between male and female workers was lower in firms with a greater proportion of female managers. Other work shows that the presence of more female managers makes it more likely that other women will be hired into management (Cohen, Broshak, & Haveman, 1998). The benefits of female leaders also can extend to other women outside of the immediate work environment. For example, law firms with corporate clients with more female leaders show an increase in female partners (Beckman & Phillips, 2005). Notably, the bulk of this evidence shows improvement in women’s outcomes that could be due to the indirect effects of having more women in leadership positions (e.g. less bias from the male leaders due to their presence). In sum, there is evidence that at the organizational level, the presence of female leaders benefits the advancement of other women the organization.
At the individual level, the evidence for whether individual female leaders serve as agents of change who are less likely to discriminate against the women underneath them is murkier. When looking at the direct effects of female managers on the salaries of women underneath them, sociologists have found no overall benefit for women who work underneath female managers (Penner, Toro-Tulla, & Huffman, 2012; Srivastava & Sherman, 2015). In a longitudinal study of the personnel records of workers in an information services firm where managers have substantial control over their salary increases, women who directly reported to female managers did not get larger salary increases than those who worked for men. Additionally, women who work underneath female supervisors do not report receiving more support or more opportunities to advance (Stainback, 2007; Maume, 2011). In an analysis of a nationally representative data set, female employees reported receiving less job-related support, i.e. acknowledgement of the work they did, and opportunity to advance within their organizations when they had a female rather than a male supervisor (Maume, 2011). Interestingly, male employees actually reported receiving more job related support and having more opportunities to advance when they had a female than a male supervisor.

And there is evidence that when female managers’ identity is threatened they can actually discriminate against women who work underneath them more than male managers. For example, low-achieving women (women in the bottom quartile of performance ratings) who switched to high achieving female managers experienced salary penalties relative to low-achieving men who completed the same switch (Srivastava & Sherman, 2015). This discrimination from high achieving
female supervisors with lower achieving women working for them is consistent with the idea that women discriminate when they experience value threat—a form of identity threat that emerges when one fears being negatively evaluated through association with a low achieving ingroup member (Duguid, 2011, Duguid, Lloyd, & Tolbert, 2012). Value threat emerges in situations in which ones’ group is underrepresented.

Other evidence from the psychology literature shows that ingroup discrimination can emerge when women attain positions of power in male-dominated contexts, which produce identity threats. For example, female full professors in the Netherlands, where women are profoundly underrepresented in faculty positions, report that female PhD students are less committed to the field than male PhD students, even though the female students’ ratings of their own commitment did not differ from male students’ and male professors do not show this bias (Ellemers, van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 2004). Similarly, women who reviewed NSF Economics Program grant applications (a field where women are underrepresented) rated proposals with female PIs more negatively than men rated these proposals—even when controlling for proposal quality (Broder, 1993). Surprisingly, male reviewers did not show this bias. Additionally, women have been observed to more favorably evaluate male than female leaders in male-dominated contexts (Garcia-Retamero & Lopez-Zafra, 2006). More recently, female primary investigators in science laboratories exhibited as much bias in favor of a male over a female candidate for a lab manager position as their male counterparts (Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012). And
when weakly gender identified women advanced to leadership positions in male-dominated contexts, they behaviorally favored male subordinates over female subordinates (Kaiser & Spalding, 2015).

That women in male-dominated contexts would fail to directly benefit the women underneath them or even discriminate against them is in line with the “cogs in the machine” perspective. In contrast with the theory that early generations of women would be “agents of change” to improve conditions for those who followed them, this theory contends that female leaders serve as “cogs in the machine” who perpetuate bias right along with the rest of the cogs when they ascend in to management roles in male-dominated fields (Maume, 2011). This perspective contends that women who ascend to leadership positions tend to do so in environments in which female leaders are in the minority and have more fragile status than their male counterparts. As a consequence of their fragile status and their visibility as token women, they may distance themselves from other members of their group and fail to advocate on their behalf. Because many female leaders advance male-dominated contexts that are likely to induce identity threats, they may discriminate against other women more often than people realize.

Another factor that makes discrimination by female managers against other women potentially more problematic is that even in male dominated fields and organizations women are disproportionately likely to work underneath women rather than men (Reskin & Roos, & Kmec, 1999, Gallup, 2001). That is, due to gender segregation in the workplace, women are more likely to have female supervisors than men, which could allow many opportunities for this type of discrimination to
In sum, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that female leaders do sometimes discriminate against other women. And the contexts in which many female leaders advance can create just the right petri dish for this type of discrimination to grow.

**Consequences as a Result of Claiming Discrimination**

Claiming discrimination is a necessary step for women who want to receive either legal or financial retribution for the discrimination they experience (Nielson & Nelson, 2005; Nielson et al., 2008). Their best shot at having the discriminatory act reversed, i.e. being retroactively awarded a promotion or raise or receiving compensatory damages, they can experience economic gains as a result of claiming discrimination (Burstein & Edwards, 1991). In spite of the pivotal role women’s actions play in rectifying discriminatory treatment, few women actually file formal claims of discrimination (Bumiller, 1988; Kessler, Mickleson, & Williams, 1999).

A major contributor to women’s hesitancy to claim discrimination is the negative consequences they experience as a result. Women are sensitive to the risks associated with claiming discrimination (Swim & Hyers, 1999) and are less likely to report it when as they are concerned about experiencing social sanctions (Good, Moss-Racusin, & Sanchez, 2012; Kaiser & Miller, 2004). Members of devalued groups who claim discrimination risk being viewed as troublemakers or experiencing backlash (Bergman, Langhout, Palmieri, Cortina & Fitzgerald, 2002; Crosby, 1993; Kaiser & Miller, 2001, 2003). In particular, those who claim to have experienced discrimination are viewed as more of complainers than those who do
not (Kaiser & Miller, 2001). And, they are viewed as complainers for claiming
discrimination even when the discrimination they experienced was exceedingly
blatant. Further, they were perceived more negatively than those who blamed their
negative outcomes on other external, e.g. the difficulty of the test, or internal, e.g.
their lack of effort, causes, suggesting that there is something specific about claiming
discrimination that leads to being viewed negatively. Other work has similarly
demonstrated that blaming negative outcomes on discrimination results in negative
interpersonal consequences (Garcia, Reser, Amo, Redersdorff, & Branscombe, 2005;
Stangor et al., 2003).

There is evidence that women may be even more hesitant to claim
discrimination by a female supervisor than by a male one (Hirsch & Kornrich, 2008).
Women in departments with more female supervisors were less likely to file claims
of discrimination. Interestingly, however, the same study found that claims of
discrimination filed in departments with female supervisors were more likely to be
validated when the evidence to support them was examined. This suggests that
women with female supervisors may have a higher threshold of evidence at which
they are willing to claim discrimination.

**Consequences of Claiming Ingroup Discrimination Harsher Because Less
Discrimination is Perceived**

One potential explanation why women could be especially hesitant to claim
discrimination perpetrated by another woman because the actual consequences they
experience are more negative than when they claim discrimination perpetrated by a
man.
I propose that women will be more likely to experience more negative consequences when they claim ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination because ingroup discrimination is less likely to be recognized as bias. There are several potential explanations for why a woman who claims discrimination against a female supervisor may be less likely to be perceived to have experienced discrimination.

**Violates prototype of discrimination.** One explanation is that discrimination that is perpetrated by a female supervisor against a woman is unlikely to be recognized because it violates people’s prototype of discrimination (Baron et al., 1991; Inman & Baron, 1996). People have expectancies of what discrimination looks like and what form it takes and compare observed actions to this expectancy when determining whether they were discriminatory (Baron et al., 1991; Flournoy et al., 2002; Harris et al., 2004; Inman & Baron, 1996; Morera et al., 2004; O’Brien, Kinias, & Major, 2008; Rodin et al., 1990). The prototypes, or expectancies, that people have for the format of discrimination have several features. One component of the discrimination prototype is that people expect discrimination to be enacted by a member of a high status group against a member of a lower status group (Inman & Baron, 1996; Rodin et al., 1990). For example, participants were more likely to view the treatment described in vignettes as sexist when they described actions enacted by a man against a woman than when they described behavior by a woman against another woman (Baron et al., 1991). Rodin et al. (1991) refer to the failure to recognize discrimination perpetrated when the
perpetrator lacks higher status than the target of discrimination as the "status asymmetry hypothesis".

Another feature of discrimination prototype is that people expect discrimination to occur against someone who is negatively stereotyped in the domain in which they experience discrimination (O’Brien, Kinias, & Major, 2008; Simon, Kinias, O’Brien, Major, & Bivolaru, 2013). Both observers and victims of discrimination were more likely to attribute negative treatment (rejection after a job interview) to discrimination when the job was in a domain in which the victim was negatively stereotyped, e.g. nursing for men and computer programming for women. That is, when a man experienced negative treatment in nursing, it was more likely to be viewed as due to discrimination than when a woman experienced negative treatment in nursing. The opposite pattern was observed when a woman experienced negative treatment. She was more likely to be perceived as having experienced discrimination when the job was in a domain in which women were negatively stereotyped. People may fail to perceive discrimination towards women when it occurs in a domain is stereotypically female.

Violates prototype of perpetrator. People also hold prototypes of who perpetrates discrimination. Women may not fit people’s expectation of the perpetrator of bias regardless of whether the target of that bias is another woman or a member of another group, e.g. a racial minority. Women could be perceived as less likely than men to perpetrate discrimination because they are members of a low status group and all members of low status groups are perceived as less likely to perpetrate discrimination (Inman & Baron, 1996). Alternatively, they could be
perceived as less likely to perpetrate discrimination because of the “women are wonderful” stereotype, the tendency of people to see women as having more positive attributes (including niceness and morality) than men overall (Eagly & Mladinic, 1994; Goodwin & Fiske, 2001). If women are seen as nicer and more moral, they may thus be perceived as incapable of perpetrating bias. Therefore, people may fail to detect ingroup discrimination simply because it is perpetrated by a woman.

The perception that women are less likely than men to discriminate may be due to women actually discriminating less than men. To the extent that people are aware that women are generally more egalitarian than men, they should expect a female supervisor to be less likely to engage in discrimination of any sort, including ingroup directed discrimination. And there is evidence that women are less likely to discriminate than men in general. Women score lower than men on both implicit (Nosek et al., 2007) and explicit measures of racial prejudice (Ekehamer, Nilsson, & Sidanius, 1987). According to Social Dominance Theory, this gender difference in the tendency to discriminate can be attributed to men’s greater sociobiological orientation towards anti-egalitarianism. And indeed, women consistently score lower than men on measures of Social Dominance Orientation, which is associated with discrimination (Pratto et al., 1997; Sidanius et al., 2000; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1994; Sidanius et al., 1995; Sidanius, Pratto, & Rabinowitz, 1994).

Violates expectations of ingroup. An alternative possibility is that people fail to recognize discrimination perpetrated by a female supervisor against a woman
because it violates people's expectations about how people treat other members of their own ingroup. People may hold this expectation because under many circumstances people do indeed tend to confer more advantages to members of their own groups. This explanation has its roots in Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). According to this theory, people are particularly sensitive to conflict that occurs between a member of an ingroup and an outgroup because it is more common and costly than conflict between two ingroup members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1978). The support for this viewpoint comes from minimal group studies, in which participants who are placed in arbitrary groups are more likely to confer material advantages to members of the ingroup than to members of the outgroup (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Brown et al., 1992; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992) and also studies demonstrating that women do indeed show biases in favor of their own group (Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). Even in identity threatening environments some women, in particular those who are strongly identified with their group, respond to these threats by bolstering their support for ingroup members (Derks et al., 2011; Kaiser & Spalding, 2015).

If people expect women to favor other women because they are members of the same ingroup, then they may give female managers the benefit of the doubt when considering their potentially discriminatory behavior towards female subordinates. They may tend to infer that their behavior cannot be discriminatory because it is directed at another ingroup member and must be due to other factors or motivations other than discrimination.
**Perceived as relational conflict.** Claimants of ingroup discrimination may also be perceived to have experienced less discrimination because the underlying dispute is interpreted as due to relational conflict rather than discrimination based on group membership. Relational conflict is a construct from the management literature that is defined as tension between coworkers that is due to emotional tensions and disagreements rather than disagreements over objective choices (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1995). To the extent that any conflict between two women is perceived as a relational and therefore interpersonal dispute, it is likely to be perceived as a dispute that should be resolved interpersonally rather than via official company or legal mechanisms. One strategy organizations have used effectively to deflect formal claims of discrimination is to reframe these claims as interpersonal conflicts between the manager and supervisee (Edelman, Ehrlanger, & Land, 1993; Edelman, Fuller, & Mara-Drita, 2001). By portraying the conflict as interpersonal in nature (rather than group membership) organizations make it less likely that claimants will pursue formal legal action. In this work, I investigate the possibility that women's ingroup discrimination claims may be inherently more likely to be perceived as due to relational conflict than their claims of outgroup discrimination. And that because of this perception, outside evaluators will be less likely to believe that the claimant has experienced discrimination.

There is, in fact, evidence that conflicts between women in the workplace are interpreted as more interpersonally damaging than conflicts between either a man and a woman or a man and a man (Sheppard & Aquino, 2013). In their study, Sheppard and Aquino described the same conflict as having occurred either
between two women, between a man and a woman, or between two men. They found that when the conflict was described as having occurred between two women, the parties in the conflict were perceived as having more negative job related attitudes, i.e. job satisfaction, turnover intentions, and commitment to the organization. Additionally, and more crucially, they found that when the conflict was described as between two women, participants perceived that the relationship between the combatants would be less likely to repair their relationship and to work effectively together in the future. These researchers theorize that these results are due to the “catfight” stereotype, the stereotype that women have difficulty interacting with one another effectively and have more severe interpersonal conflict than men.

The stereotype about the negativity of women’s interactions could be an offshoot of stereotypes about women's greater emotionality and relationship orientation in general. Women are consistently stereotyped as more emotional than men (Plant, Hyde, Keltner, & Devine, 2000; Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Bee, Broverman, & Broverman, 1968; Ruble, 1983; Williams & Best, 1990), and indeed are more likely than men to express most emotions (except anger) (Fabes & Martin, 1991; Grossman & Wood, 1993). Additionally, women are stereotyped to be more communal and relationally oriented than men (Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000). And women are in fact more likely than men to fill their need for interdependence through relationships as opposed to group memberships (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999; Seeley, E. A., Gardner, W. L., Pennington, G., & Gabriel, 2003). Although both emotionality and relational orientation can be positive traits, e.g. can lead women to
have greater intimacy in their relationships than men, it is possible that they also lead people to believe that women’s interpersonal conflicts are particularly likely to be messy and interpersonally complicated in nature. It may be that women’s relationships with female bosses are perceived as particularly good when the going is good and particularly bad when the going is bad.

Other survey work provides evidence that when the relationships between female employees and supervisors turn sour, they turn quite sour, indeed. In a 2010 survey of 142 (137 female) legal secretaries, 0 of the 142 claimed to prefer working for female rather than male partners (Batlan, 2010). When probed for further comments, many respondents stated that female attorneys “made life hell” or “acted like you were their slave”. Another secretary stated “I am a female legal secretary, but I avoid working for women because [they are] such a pain in the ass!” In spite of these strong statements and the nearly universal preference for working for a male attorney, none of the comments mentioned in the study invoked the term “discrimination” or “discriminatory” when describing the poor treatment from these female supervisors. These results suggest that even when female bosses are perceived as negative and conflict creating, their actions may still not be viewed as discrimination but rather as relationally motivated.

If people perceive that women’s claims of ingroup discrimination are the result of emotionally-motivated relational conflict, they may perceive the claim of discrimination as less well-reasoned, valid, and based on actual evidence. As a result, people may be less likely to conclude based on viewing a complaint of discrimination by a woman against a woman that discrimination actually occurred.
In fact, managers often reframe claims of discrimination interpersonal rather than legal issues in order to effectively discourage those with discrimination grievances from pursuing formal claims of discrimination (Edelman, Ehrlanger, & Land, 1993; Edelman, Fuller, & Mara-Drita, 2001). Seeing a claim of discrimination as due to interpersonal problems could similarly persuade external evaluators that a claim lacks legal merit. If this is the case, people would fail to recognize this type of discrimination not because they think women are nice generally or that they are nice to one another but rather because they think that women’s conflicts among each other are interpersonal and ultimately unworthy of serious consideration.

**Hypotheses**

Hypothesis 1: When a woman claims ingroup discrimination she will experience more negative consequences (be seen as more of a complainer, be seen as less professionally competent, and be less likely to have her claim investigated) than when she claims outgroup discrimination. Hypothesis 2: When a woman claims ingroup discrimination less discrimination will be perceived to have occurred than when she claims outgroup discrimination. Hypothesis 3: Perceived discrimination will mediate the relationship between type of discrimination claimed and the negativity of consequences experienced. Hypothesis 4: The extent to which ingroup discrimination violates the prototype of discrimination, violates the prototype of a perpetrator, or is perceived as due to relational conflict will mediate the relationship between type of discrimination and perceived discrimination (see Figure 1).
Chapter 2: Study Methods and Results

Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 was twofold. First, it was to test whether evaluators would perceive a woman claiming discrimination from an ingroup member as more of a complainer than a woman claiming discrimination from an outgroup member. Second, it was to see whether people viewed a woman claiming ingroup discrimination as more of a complainer because less discrimination was perceived to have occurred.
Method

Participants

One hundred seventy-four participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and compensated $.50 for participation. The target number of participants was selected to be able to detect a moderate effect size \( d = .5 \) between conditions at a power level of .8. Data from 166 participants were analyzed (\( N \) per cell = 91, 75) eight participants were eliminated for failing to complete a screener item designed to detect attention and one was excluded for not reporting gender. Just over half of participants (54.2%) identified as male. Participants were predominantly White American (\( N = 128 \)). The remainder identified as Latino/Hispanic American (\( N = 6 \)), Native American (\( N = 1 \)), Asian American (\( N = 14 \)), African American (\( N = 13 \)), other (\( N = 4 \)). The average participants’ age was 32.46 (\( SD = 12.35 \)).

Procedure

Participants evaluated a female employee’s discrimination complaint against a company. In the complaint the employee (described as Chelsea) described having been passed over by a supervisor for promotion in favor of a male coworker with less experience and lower revenue numbers. The supervisor was a woman named Rachel (in the ingroup discrimination condition) or a man named Steven (in the outgroup discrimination condition (see Appendix A: Study Materials).

Participants then evaluated whether they believed the employee was a complainer using a five item scale \( \alpha = .91 \); “The employee filing the report is irritating”; “The employee filing the report is a troublemaker.”; “The employee filing
the report is argumentative."; “The employee filing the report is hypersensitive,” all scored on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree) (Kaiser & Miller, 2001).

Participants evaluated whether the employee had experienced discrimination using a four item scale: “The supervisor’s decision was due to bias.”; “The supervisor favored the male candidate due to his gender.”; “Chelsea was denied the promotion because of sex discrimination.”; and “I do not think this event was an instance of sex discrimination. (reverse-coded)”. All items were on scales from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree), α = .90.

All participants correctly identified the name of the supervisor, which served as the manipulation check.

**Results**

**Employee as a Complainer**

A 2 (Participant Gender) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed a main effect of gender of perpetrator $F(1, 163) = 5.08, p = .03$. Because participant gender did not interact with the other independent variables $F(1, 163) = .08, p = .78$, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses.

An independent samples t test revealed that the female employee was seen as more of a complainer when she the gender of the perpetrator was female ($M = 2.54, SD = .97$) than when the gender of the perpetrator was male ($M = 2.20, SD = .73$), $t(165) = -2.54, p = .01, d = -.41, 95\%$ CI for the difference [-.58, -.06].

**Perceived Bias**
Using the same analytic approach for perceived bias, a 2 (Participant Gender) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed main effects of participant gender $F(1, 163) = 5.08, p = .03$ and gender of perpetrator $F(1, 163) = 15.73, p < .001$. Because participant gender did not interact with the other independent variables, $F(1, 163) = .80, p = .37$, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses.

An independent samples t-test revealed that, when the employee claimed discrimination perpetrated by a female supervisor, she was perceived to have experienced less discrimination ($M = 2.95, SD = .73$) than when she claimed discrimination from a male supervisor, ($M = 3.38, SD = .56$), $t(165) = 4.22 \ p < .001, d = .63, 95\% \ CI$ for the difference $[.22, .66]$.

**Test of Mediation**

In order to examine whether perceptions that the employee had experienced less bias mediated the relationship between the gender of the perpetrator and the perception of the employee as more of a complainer, I used the Preacher and Hayes PROCESS macro (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). I estimated 95% confidence intervals for the direct, indirect, and total effects using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. There was a significant indirect effect of type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on perceptions of the employee as a complainer via perceived discrimination, $B = .31, 95\% \ CI [.13, .51], p < .001$. This suggests that the increase in perceiving the employee as a complainer when she files a claim against a female supervisor, rather than a male supervisor, is in part explained by perceptions that the employee experienced less bias when the supervisor was female. However, the
indirect effect of the alternative model with perceived discrimination as the mediator of the effect of gender of perpetrator on perceptions of the employee as a complainer was also significant $B = -0.14, 95\% \text{ CI } [-0.30, -0.04], p = .02$. When measuring mediation cross-sectionally, such as in this study, it is often not possible to rule out alternative causal models.

**Discussion**

Study 1 provides support for the hypothesis that when a woman claims ingroup discrimination (discrimination by a female supervisor) she experiences more negative interpersonal consequences (i.e. is viewed as more of a complainer) than when she claims to have experienced outgroup discrimination (discrimination by a male supervisor). It also provides support for the hypothesis that when a woman claims ingroup discrimination, she is perceived to have experienced less discrimination. Additionally, it provides initial support that the more negative interpersonal consequences experienced when a woman claims ingroup discrimination are in part because less discrimination is perceived. These findings suggest that the backlash women experience as a result of claiming discrimination is even more severe when the discrimination they claim was perpetrated by another woman (rather than a man) and that they are even less likely to have their claims validated. Interestingly, the effect of type of discrimination claimed was not affected by the gender of the participant. This is consistent with previous work that shows that even though women's mean levels of prejudice are lower than men's (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Brown et al., 1992), the effect of prototypes of discrimination is symmetrical across the groups (Inman & Baron, 1996).
Study 2

Study 1 demonstrated that women are viewed more negatively (as complainers) when they claim to have experienced ingroup discrimination than when they claim to have experienced outgroup discrimination. Additionally, it provided some initial evidence that this may occur because she is perceived to have experienced less discrimination. This evidence, however, came from a cross-sectional, measurement of mediation design and determining the causal path from this type of design is inherently problematic (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). In order to more confidently understand whether women who claim ingroup discrimination are viewed more negatively than those who claim to have experienced outgroup discrimination because they are perceived to have experienced less discrimination, in Study 2, I manipulated the mediator (perceived discrimination) by providing evidence, in the form of a statement from the supervisor, of how likely it was that discrimination had occurred. If the effect of type of discrimination on negativity towards a woman who claims discrimination disappears when discrimination has obviously occurred, that provides evidence for the proposed model.

Method

Participants

Three hundred seventy-five participants were recruited from the University of Washington subject pool in exchange for partial course credit. The number of participants was selected to be able to detect a moderate effect size ($d = .5$) for the interaction at a power level of .8. The data from 341 participants ($M_{age} = 19.11, SD$
were analyzed; 34 participants were eliminated due to failing a screener item intended to detect attention. One was removed for failing to report gender. Participants were mostly female (63.2%, N = 215). Participants were predominantly White American (N = 140) and Asian American (N = 128). The remainder identified as Latino/Hispanic American (N = 19), Native American (N = 4), African American (N = 16), other (N = 29), or did not report (N = 5).

**Procedures and Measures**

Study 2 used similar procedures to Study 1. This time they evaluated the complaint file of an employee who was claiming to have experienced discrimination. The file contained the same complaints as in Study 1. The gender of the supervisor was again manipulated in the complaint.

In order to manipulate perceived discrimination, the file for the claim also contained “supplemental information.” This supplemental information included a form, ostensibly completed by the employee’s supervisor in response to the complaint. In the response, the supervisor gave an explanation for why he or she had selected the male candidate for the position instead of the claimant. In the low evidence of discrimination condition, the supervisor stated, “I selected Alan Matthews for the position because I believed he was the better candidate for the job and had a stronger work record.” In the ambiguous evidence of discrimination condition, the supervisor made a statement that described having selected the male candidate because she thought he was higher on stereotypically male leadership traits (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Koenig, Eagly, Mitchell, & Risitikari, 2011) but did not
specify whether she thought he had those traits because he was a man, “I selected Alan Matthews I thought we needed someone who would be assertive and viewed as a leader by others.” Finally, in the blatant evidence of discrimination condition, the supervisor stated, “I selected Alan Matthews for the position because I believed that we needed someone who would be assertive and viewed as a leader by others. Men are generally more likely to earn the respect of others.”

After reviewing the claim file, participants completed the same measure of Perceptions of the Employee as a Complainer ($\alpha = .82$) and Perceived Discrimination ($\alpha = .82$) as in Study 1.

All participants correctly identified the name of the supervisor, which served as the manipulation check.

**Results**

**Employee as Complainer.** A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) x 3 (Evidence of Bias) ANOVA revealed only the expected main effects of discrimination strength $F(1, 328) = 11.68, p < .001$ and participant gender $F(1, 328) = 17.46, p < .001$. Because participant gender did not interact with the other independent variables, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses, lowest $p = .30$.

A 2 (Type of Discrimination Claimed) x 3 (Evidence of Bias) ANOVA was conducted to analyze data. It revealed only a main effect of discrimination strength, $F(2, 334) = 17.83, p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .10$. Bonferroni posthoc tests revealed that the employee was seen as less of a complainer when there was blatant evidence of
discrimination (see Table 1 for means and standard deviations) than when there was weak evidence of discrimination, \( p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI for difference } [.27, .72] \) or ambiguous evidence of discrimination, \( p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI for difference } [.27, .72] \).

There was no difference in how much the employee was seen as a complainer when the evidence of discrimination was weak vs. ambiguous, \( p = .99, 95\% \text{ CI for difference } [-.21, .22] \).

Counter to expectations, the type of discrimination did not affect how much the employee was seen as a complainer \( F(1, 334) = .65, p = .42, \eta^2 = .00, 95\% \text{ CI for difference } [-.21, .09] \). Nor was there the hypothesized type of discrimination by evidence of bias interaction \( F(2, 334) = .19 p = .83, \eta^2 = .00 \).

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female Perpetrator</th>
<th>Male Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M</td>
<td>SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence of</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Discrimination</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blatant</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Perceived Bias.** A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) x 3 (Evidence of Bias) ANOVA revealed only a gender of perpetrator x evidence of bias interaction \( F(1, 328) = 4.30, p = .01 \). Because gender of
participant nor did not interact with the other independent variables, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses, lowest $p = .51$.

A 2 (Type of Discrimination Claimed) x 3 (Evidence of Bias) ANOVA was conducted to analyze data. Consistent with hypotheses, there was a main effect of evidence of bias, $F(2, 334) = 105.63, p < .001, \eta^2 = .39$. Bonferroni posthoc tests revealed that participants perceived more bias when blatant evidence of bias was present than when there was weak, $p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI for difference } [.99, 1.48]$ or ambiguous discrimination, $p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI for difference } [1.12, 1.61]$ (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations). However, there was no difference in the amount of bias perceived in the weak vs. ambiguous discrimination conditions ($p = .16$) and the means were in the opposite of the predicted direction. This suggests that the ambiguous evidence of discrimination manipulation did not effectively get participants to see greater evidence of bias than in the weak evidence of discrimination conditions.

As in Study 1, there was effect of gender of perpetrator $F(1, 334) = 16.66, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05$. Overall, participants perceived less bias when evaluating a claim of discrimination perpetrated by a female supervisor than a claim of discrimination perpetrated by a male supervisor.

These main effects were qualified by an evidence of bias x gender of perpetrator interaction $F(2, 334) = 5.86, p = .003, \eta^2 = .03$. Pairwise comparisons showed that when participants had seen blatant evidence of discrimination, they perceived the same amount of discrimination whether the claim was against a male or female perpetrator, $p = .63, d = .00, 95\% \text{ CI for the difference } [-.37, .22]$. However,
when they had seen ambiguous evidence of discrimination in the file, they perceived more discrimination when the perpetrator was male than when the perpetrator was female, $p < .001$, $d = .72$, 95% CI for the difference [.28, .84]. Similarly, when they had seen weak evidence of discrimination in the file, they perceived more discrimination when the perpetrator was male than when the perpetrator was female, $p < .001$, $d = .64$, 95% CI for the difference [.24, .79].

Table 2

*Study 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Bias as a Function of Gender of Perpetrator and Evidence of Discrimination*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence of Discrimination</th>
<th>Female Perpetrator</th>
<th>Male Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blatant</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Discussion**

Study 2 demonstrated that a woman who claimed ingroup discrimination was perceived to have experienced less bias than woman who claimed outgroup discrimination, only when the evidence of discrimination was weak or ambiguous. When the evidence of discrimination was blatant, the type of discrimination (ingroup or outgroup) that a woman claimed made no difference in how much bias she was perceived to have experienced. This suggests that when there is no smoking
gun evidence of discrimination, which is typically the case with discrimination claims, evaluators use the gender of the alleged perpetrator as one of the cues to determine whether the behavior described in the claim was indeed discrimination.

Surprisingly, Study 2 did not demonstrate that claiming ingroup discrimination led a woman to be perceived as more of a complainer than claiming outgroup discrimination. Nor did perceived bias mediate the relationship between type of discrimination claimed and how much a woman was viewed as a complainer.

One potential reason why the type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) did not affect perceptions of the employee as a complainer in Study 2, as it did in Study 1, is that the participants were less experienced in the workplace and thus had fewer expectations about workplace discrimination. Notably, the participants in Study 2 were university students with an average age of 18, in contrast with the participants in Study 1 who were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and had an average age of 32. It is possible that the participants in Study 2 were not as sensitive to differences in claims of discrimination because they lacked real world experience in organizations in which these types of claims are made.

**Study 2b**

The goal of Study 2b was to again attempt to investigate whether women who claim ingroup discrimination are viewed as more of complainers than those who claim outgroup discrimination because they are perceived to have experienced less discrimination. In Study 2b, I again manipulated the mediator by varying the amount of evidence that discrimination had occurred, but, like in Study 1 but not in
Study 2, I recruited participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, in an effort to get participants with more work experience and thus exposure to workplace discrimination. Additionally, because there were no differences between the ambiguous and the weak evidence of discrimination conditions in Study 2, I eliminated the ambiguous condition from the design for Study 2b.

**Method**

**Participants**

Two hundred ten participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and compensated $.50 for participation. The number of participants was selected to be able to detect a moderate effect size ($d = .5$) for the interaction at a power level of .8. The data from 205 participants ($M_{age} = 33.43$) were analyzed ($N$ per cell = 52, 54, 51, 48); five participants were eliminated due to failing a screener item intended to detect attention. Participants were 56.6% male; 43.4% female. Participants were predominantly White American ($N = 152$). The remainder identified as Asian American ($N = 13$) Latino/Hispanic American ($N = 13$), Native American ($N = 3$), African American ($N = 19$), or other ($N = 5$).

**Procedures and Measures**

Study 2b used similar procedures to Study 2. They again reviewed the file of a female employee who had filed a complaint of discrimination to her company against her supervisor. The type of discrimination claimed (ingroup vs. outgroup) was manipulated by the supervisor’s name listed in the employee’s complaint, though I used a different name in this study to ensure the effects were not an artifact
of the particular names used in Studies 1 and 2 (for study materials see Appendix A).

After reviewing the claim file, participants completed the same measure of Perceptions of the Employee as a Complainer ($\alpha = .94$) and Perceived Discrimination ($\alpha = .94$) as in Study 1 except that in this study these were measured on a 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree) scale as opposed to the 1 to 5 scale used in the first two studies. This change was made in an attempt to reduce the impact of any ceiling effects and to maximize variability and will be used in the remainder of the studies.

At the end of the study participants completed a manipulation check to see whether they correctly identified the gender of the perpetrator of discrimination. In the male supervisor conditions, three participants incorrectly identified the supervisor as female; in the female supervisor conditions, three participants incorrectly identified the supervisor as male. Including or excluding these participants did not affect any of the analyses, so they were included in the data.

**Results**

**Employee as complainer**

I conducted a 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) x 2 (Evidence of Bias) ANOVA to look for interactions by participant gender. Gender did not interact with the other independent variables (lowest $p = .18$), so I collapsed across participant gender for the rest of the analyses.

A 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) x 2 (Evidence of Bias) ANOVA revealed only a main effect of discrimination strength. Participants who viewed
blatant evidence of discrimination in the claim file perceived that the employee as less of a complainer \((M = 2.20, SD = 1.30)\) than those who viewed weak evidence of discrimination \((M = 3.10, SD = 1.42)\), \(F(1, 201) = 21.69, p < .001, \eta^2 = .10\). Counter to expectations, the gender of perpetrator of discrimination \(\times\) evidence of bias interaction was not significant, \(F(1, 201) = .68, p = .41, \eta^2 = .00\). Nor was there a main effect of the gender of perpetrator on seeing the employee as a complainer, \(F(1, 201) = .05, p = .82, \eta^2 = .00\). Participants did not see the employee as more of a complainer when the perpetrator of discrimination was male \((M = 2.69, SD = 1.38)\) than when she was female \((M = 2.62, SD = 1.50)\); for a full table of means and standard deviations see Table 3.

Table 3

*Study 2b: Means and Standard Deviations of Employee as a Complainer as a Function of Gender of Perpetrator and Evidence of Discrimination*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evidence of Discrimination</th>
<th>Female Perpetrator</th>
<th>Male Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(SD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>1.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blatant</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Perceived Bias**

I conducted a 2 (Gender of Participant) \(\times\) 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) \(\times\) 2 (Evidence of Bias) ANOVA to look for interactions by participant
gender. Gender did not interact with the other independent variables (lowest $p = .09$), so I collapsed across participant gender for the rest of the analyses.

A 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) x 2 (Evidence of Bias) ANOVA revealed only a main effect of discrimination strength. Participants who viewed blatant evidence of discrimination in the claim file perceived that the employee had experienced more discrimination ($M = 5.91, SD = 1.22$) than those who viewed weak evidence of discrimination ($M = 4.20, SD = 1.31$), $F(1, 201) = 91.77, p < .001, \eta^2 = .31$. Counter to expectations, the gender of perpetrator of discrimination x evidence of bias interaction was not significant, $F(1, 201) = 1.33, p = .25, \eta^2 = .01$. Nor was there a main effect of gender of perpetrator on perceived bias, $F(1, 201) = .42, p = .52, \eta^2 = .01$. Participants perceived no more bias when the perpetrator of discrimination was male ($M = 5.10, SD = 1.45$) than when the perpetrator was female ($M = 5.01, SD = 1.60$) (for a full table of means and standard deviations see Table 4).

Table 4

*Study 2b: Means and Standard Deviations of Perceived Bias as a Function of Gender of Perpetrator and Evidence of Discrimination*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Female Perpetrator</th>
<th>Male Perpetrator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>1.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blatant</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion

Study 2b did not replicate the results of Studies 1 and 2 or support any of the hypotheses. A woman who claimed ingroup discrimination did not experience more negative consequences (was not perceived as more of a complainer) than one who claimed outgroup discrimination.

In particular, it did not support Hypothesis 2, which was supported in Studies 1 and 2. A woman who claimed ingroup discrimination was not perceived to have experienced less bias than a woman who claimed outgroup discrimination. The effect of blatant evidence of discrimination on perceived bias did not depend on the gender of the perpetrator, as it did in Study 2.

Finally, like Study 2, Study 2b did not provide evidence that perceived bias mediated the relationship between type of discrimination claimed and the negative consequences experienced. Manipulating perceived bias did not turn off the effect of the gender of the perpetrator on the extent to which the employee was seen as a complainer.

The difference in findings between Study 2 and Study 2b was surprising because the methods used were similar. Potentially, Study 2b failed to replicate the anticipated interaction effect on perceived bias because it was administered online, rather than in a lab setting like Study 2, which can lead to weaker effects.

It was also unexpected that Studies 2 and 2b did not replicate the effect of the type of discrimination (ingroup or outgroup) on perceptions of the employee as a complainer. However, Studies 2 and 2b added an explanation statement from the supervisor, which was not present in Study 1. It is possible that having any
statement of explanation from the supervisor washes out differences in perceptions of the employee as a complainer.

**Study 3**

Given the inconsistent findings of Studies 1-2b, the first set of goals for Study 3 was to re-test whether evaluators would perceive a woman claiming discrimination by an ingroup member as more of a complainer than a woman claiming discrimination from an outgroup member and whether less bias was perceived when she claimed discrimination by an ingroup member than an outgroup member. At the end of this document, I include a meta-analysis of the results of all of the studies to better evaluate the size and direction of the effect of type of discrimination (ingroup or outgroup) on perceptions of the employee as a complainer.

The other goal of Study 3 was to test one possibility for why less bias is perceived when a woman claims ingroup versus outgroup discrimination. There are several potential theoretical reasons why less bias may be perceived when a woman claims ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination. One potential explanation is that when the two parties involved in the claim are both women, the conflict is more likely to be attributed to relational conflict (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1995), i.e. tension between coworkers that is due to emotional tensions and disagreements rather than disagreements over objective choices. Because women are stereotyped as more emotional (Plant et al., 2000; Rosenkrantz, et al., 1968; Ruble, 1983; Williams & Best, 1990) and more communal than men (Eagly, et al., 2000), people may be more likely to assume that any dispute between two women, including a
discrimination claim, is more relational in nature. Because framing discrimination claims as due to interpersonal conflicts is an effective way to prevent their further pursuit (Edelman, Ehrlanger, & Land, 1993; Edelman, Fuller, & Mara-Drita, 2001), I expect that the perception that an ingroup discrimination claim is more due to interpersonal conflict will cause it to be perceived as less legitimate (i.e. due to objective bias).

In Study 3, I examine this possibility by looking at the language that people use to describe the dispute underlying the discrimination claim. Because relational conflict is closely related to the extent to which a dispute is viewed as due to emotional conflict, in order to measure this, I had them describe the incident involved in the claim and evaluated the extent to which they used emotion language to describe the conflict using the affective processing dictionary of the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count program (LIWC; Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzalez, & Booth, 2007). Due to the complexity of this measurement method, I will give more details in the results section.

Method

Participants

One hundred thirty-one participants were recruited via the University of Washington’s Participant Pool in exchange for partial course credit. The number of participants was selected to be able to detect a moderate effect size ($d = .5$) between conditions at a power level of .8. Data from 118 participants were analyzed ($N$ per cell = 63, 55); twelve participants were eliminated for failing to complete a screener item designed to detect attention, and one was excluded for not reporting gender.
Around two thirds of participants (65.5%) identified as female; the rest identified as male. Participants were predominantly Asian/Asian American (N = 50) and White American (N = 40). The remainder identified as Latino/Hispanic American (N = 10), African American (N = 3), other (N = 10), or did not report (N = 5). The average participants’ age was 19.92 (SD = 3.19).

Procedures and Measures

Study 3 used a similar procedure to Study 1. They again reviewed the file of a female employee who had filed a complaint of discrimination to her company against her supervisor. The type of discrimination claimed (ingroup vs. outgroup) was manipulated by the supervisor’s name listed in the employee’s complaint.

After they reviewed the file, they were asked to describe the incident that had taken place in their own words (“Please describe the incident described in the claim in your own words, including your impression of what happened between the employee and the supervisor”). They then completed the same measure of Perceptions of the Employee as a Complainer (α = .85) and Perceived Discrimination (α = .93) as in Study 1.

Results

Employee as Complainer

A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed a main effect of gender of participant, $F(1, 115) = 5.40, p = .02$, $\eta^2 = .05$ and a marginal main effect of gender of perpetrator, $F(1, 115) = 2.90, p = .09$, $\eta^2 = .03$. Because gender of participant nor did not interact with the gender of perpetrator, $F(1, 115) = .01, p = .94$, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses.
Counter to predictions, perceptions of the employee as a complainer did not differ depending on whether the perpetrator of discrimination was male \((M = 2.86, SD = 1.15)\) or female \((M = 3.07, SD = 1.24)\), \(t\) (117) = -.89, \(p = .38\), \(d = -.18\), 95% CI for the difference \([- .70, .26]\) (for a table of intercorrelations between measures see Table 5 in Appendix B).

**Perceived Bias**

A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed only a main effect of gender of perpetrator \(F(1, 115) = 14.39, p < .001, \eta^2 = .11\). Because gender of participant nor did not interact with the gender of perpetrator, \(F(1, 115) = 2.40, p = .12\), it was eliminated from subsequent analyses.

Consistent with predictions, participants perceived more bias when the perpetrator of discrimination was male \((M = 5.52, SD = 1.06)\), than when the perpetrator of discrimination was female \((M = 4.28, SD = 1.51)\), \(t\) (117) = 4.44, \(p < .001\), \(d = .95\), 95% CI for the difference \([.69, 1.80]\).

**Use of Emotion Language**

The use of emotion language was analyzed using the LIWC program (Pennebaker, et al., 2007). This program takes a given body of text (in this case the description of the discrimination incident) and indexes it against a dictionary of words that are related to a category and generates a frequency count. For this study, I used the affective processes default dictionary which includes words related to emotions and emotion processes (e.g. Happy, cried, angry, abandon) because it most closely mapped to construct of seeing the conflict between the two parties involved in the incident (supervisor and claimant) as due to a relational, and thus emotional,
conflict. People use more emotion words to describe emotional events than they do to describe neutral events (Kahn, Tobin, Massey, & Anderson, 2007). Therefore, I hypothesized participants would use more emotion words when describing a dispute they perceived as resulting from an emotional conflict between two people than when describing a dispute resulting from an objective experience of discrimination. Specifically, I expected that the use of emotion language to describe the incident that took place between the supervisor and the employee would capture the perceived emotionality of their dispute. Participants used just over four, ($M = 4.08, SD = 2.48$) emotion words on average when describing the incident.

A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed no significant effects. Because gender of participant nor did not interact with gender of perpetrator, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses, $F(1, 114) = .03, p = .86$.

Consistent with predictions, participants used more affective language when describing the incident that took place between the employee and the supervisor when the claim was against a female perpetrator ($M = 4.37, SD = 2.68$) than when it was against a male perpetrator ($M = 3.39, SD = 1.75$), $t(117) = -2.35, p = .02, d = -.43, 95\% \text{ CI for the difference } [-1.81, -.15]$.

**Test of Mediation**

To examine whether less bias was perceived when the gender of the supervisor was female rather than male was because the claim was more likely to be perceived as due to relational conflict, I looked at whether use of affective language mediated the relationship between the gender of the perpetrator and perceived
bias. I used the Preacher and Hayes PROCESS macro (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). I estimated 95% confidence intervals for the direct, indirect, and total effects using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. There was not a significant indirect effect of type of use of emotion language (ingroup or outgroup) on perceptions of the employee as a complainer via perceived discrimination, $B = .07$, 95% CI [-.02, .25], $p = .18$. This does not demonstrate that the effect of the gender of the perpetrator is explained by the increase in the use of emotion language.

**Discussion**

Study 3, like Studies 2 and 2b, found no effect of the type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on perceptions of the woman who claimed as a complainer. A woman who claimed ingroup discrimination did not experience more negative consequences (was not perceived as more of a complainer) than one who claimed outgroup discrimination. Again, I will conduct a meta-analysis to assess this hypothesis at the end of this document, but the inconsistent support of this hypothesis suggest that either the effect is smaller than initially observed or may be moderated by individual or contextual differences.

Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, the results of Study 3 supported Hypothesis 2. A woman who claimed ingroup discrimination was perceived to have experienced less bias than a woman who claimed outgroup discrimination. Additionally, Study 3 provided some initial evidence for how the conflict that led to the claim of discrimination is perceived differently when a woman claims ingroup (rather than outgroup) discrimination. When a woman claimed ingroup discrimination, participants used more emotion words to describe what had
happened between the two parties (the supervisor and the employee). This potentially suggests that the claims of ingroup discrimination are more likely to be perceived to have stemmed from relational conflict, rather than a conflict based on objective grievances.

Counter to expectations, however, the extent to which the underlying incident was described using emotion words did not explain the effect of the type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on the amount of bias that was perceived. One possible explanation for why the use of emotion words did not predict the amount of bias perceived is that the increase in emotion words used when describing a claim of ingroup discrimination was not due to perceiving the underlying conflict as more relational. This measure may have tapped into another construct rather than how much the claim was perceived to have stemmed from relational conflict. For example, the participants themselves may feel more upset or surprised when they view an incident of ingroup discrimination than when they view an incident of outgroup discrimination. And, the construct that it actually measures may be unrelated to the amount of bias perceived. In order to better isolate the effect of a claim of ingroup discrimination (vs. outgroup discrimination) on perceptions that the claim was filed due to relational conflict rather than objective discrimination, I measure this construct more directly in Study 4.

**Study 4**

Studies 1-3 provided mostly consistent evidence that when a woman claims ingroup discrimination, she is perceived to have experienced less bias than when she claims outgroup discrimination. They did not, however, consistently support the
hypothesis that consequently experiences the more negative consequence of being perceived as more of a complainer. Nor did they provide clear evidence as to why less discrimination is perceived when a woman claims ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination.

Study 4 had two primary goals. The first goal was to examine whether a woman experiences relatively more negative consequences above and beyond being perceived as more of a complainer when she claims ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination. One likely outcome is that the claim will be less likely to be investigated when it is a claim of ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination. Another likely outcome is that a woman who claims ingroup discrimination will suffer consequences to her professional (rather than personal) reputation. In particular, a woman who files a claim of ingroup discrimination may be perceived as professionally competent and worthy of future advancement than a woman who files a claim of outgroup discrimination. In this study, I added measures of each of these negative outcomes in addition to the measure of perceptions of the employee as a complainer.

The second goal of Study 4 was to investigate which of several possible reasons explain why less bias is perceived when a woman claims ingroup discrimination rather than outgroup discrimination. In particular, it investigated three potential explanations for why less bias may be perceived: one, that less bias may be perceived because a discrimination by a female perpetrator against a woman violates the prototype of discrimination (i.e. the expectation that discrimination is something inflicted by a member of high status group against a
member of a low status group), two, that less bias is perceived because a female perpetrator violates the prototype of a perpetrator (i.e. the expectation that women do not discriminate against anyone, regardless of whether they are ingroup members), and three, that less bias is perceived because the claim is perceived as being due to a relational conflict rather than a legitimate claim of group-based discrimination. Directly measuring the perception of the claim as due to relational conflict should provide a cleaner measure of this construct than the word count used in Study 3.

To assess these possibilities, participants completed measures of the three potential mediators in order to test whether they explained the effect of type of discrimination claimed on perceived bias.

**Method**

**Participants**

Two hundred two participants were recruited via the University of Washington participant pool in exchange for partial course credit. Data from 181 participants were analyzed ($N$ per cell = 89, 92); 21 participants were eliminated for failing to complete a screener item designed to detect attention. The number of participants was selected to be able to detect a moderate effect size ($d = .5$) between conditions at a power level of .8. Participants were predominantly female (60.8%). Most participants were either Asian/Asian American ($N = 88$) or White American ($N = 75$). The remainder identified as Latino/Hispanic American ($N = 4$), African American ($N = 5$), other ($N = 4$), or did not specify ($N = 5$). The average participants’ age was 18.90 ($SD = 1.09$).
Procedures and Measures

Study 4 used a similar procedure to Study 1. They again reviewed the file of a female employee who had filed a complaint of discrimination to her company against her supervisor. The type of discrimination claimed (ingroup vs. outgroup) was manipulated by the supervisor’s name listed in the employee’s complaint.

After reviewing the claim file, participants completed the same measure of Perceptions of the Employee as a Complainer ($\alpha = .93$) and Perceived Discrimination ($\alpha = .97$) as in Study 1. They additionally completed measures of the three potential mediators of the effect type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on perceived bias (violates prototype of discrimination, violates prototype of perpetrator, and claim perceived as due to interpersonal conflict), as well as measures of willingness to investigate the claim and their perception of the employee’s professional capability.

Perceptions that the claim violated the prototype of discrimination, i.e. the expectation that gender discrimination is something perpetrated by a man against a woman was assessed with two items; “The supervisor wouldn’t discriminate against a woman.” and “The supervisor was unlikely to be biased against a woman.” ($\alpha = .65$).

Perceptions that the discrimination violated the prototype of a perpetrator, i.e. that a woman wouldn’t discriminate against anyone was measured with three items; “The supervisor wouldn’t discriminate against anyone.”, “I believe this supervisor is capable of behaving in a discriminatory way. (reverse-coded)” and “This supervisor is capable of being biased.” ($\alpha = .77$).
The extent to which the conflict in the claim was perceived as an interpersonal conflict was measured with three items; “The supervisor and the employee were just having a personal conflict.”, “The supervisor and the employee were being dramatic.”, “The supervisor and the employee can’t work together effectively.” (α = .67).

Perceptions of the claim’s worthiness of investigation were measured with three items; “The claim being filed by the employee is important.”, “The claim should be investigated thoroughly.”, and “I don’t believe the claim deserves to be investigated” (reverse-coded) (α = .85).

Perceptions of the employee’s professional capability was measured with seven items, “The employee is capable of carrying out independent tasks.”, “The employee is competent.”, “The employee is conscientious.”; “I would be willing to work with this employee in the future.”, “This employee is capable of working with other people.”; “This employee has a good chance of advancing.”; “This employee is capable of leadership.” (α = .78).

All items of all measures were measured on a scale from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).

**Results**

**Employee as Complainer**

A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed only an effect of gender of perpetrator $F(1, 177) = 6.50, p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .04$. Because gender of participant nor did not interact with the other with gender of perpetrator, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses $F(1, 177) = .29, p = .59$. 
Consistent with predictions, participants thought the employee was more of a complainer when the gender of the perpetrator was female ($M = 3.57, SD = .95$) than when the gender of the perpetrator was male ($M = 3.18, SD = .90$), \(t(179) = -2.83, p = .005, d = -.38, 95\% \text{ CI for the difference } [-.66, -.12]\).

**Claim’s Worthiness of Investigation**

A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed only a marginal effect of gender of perpetrator \(F(1, 177) = 2.89, p = .09, \eta^2 = .02\). Because gender of participant nor did not interact with gender of perpetrator, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses, \(F(1, 177) = .12, p = .73\).

Participants perceived the claim as marginally less worthy of investigation when the perpetrator of discrimination was female ($M = 5.40, SD = 1.28$) than when the perpetrator was male ($M = 5.75, SD = 1.08$), \(t(179) = 1.96, p = .05, d = .28, 95\% \text{ CI for the difference } [.00, .69]\).

**Perception of Professional Competence**

A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed only a main effect of gender of perpetrator, \(F(1, 177) = 3.92, p = .05, \eta^2 = .02\). Because gender of participant nor did not interact with gender of perpetrator, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses, \(F(1,177) = 1.16, p = .28\).

Consistent with predictions, the employee was perceived as less professionally competent when the gender of the perpetrator was female ($M = 4.11, SD = .88$) than when the gender of the perpetrator was male ($M = 4.41, SD = 1.03$), \(t(179) = 2.15, p = .03, d = .31, 95\% \text{ CI for the difference } [.03, .59]\).

**Perceived Bias**
A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed only a main effect of gender of perpetrator $F(1, 177) = 5.66, p = .02, \eta^2 = .03$. Because gender of participant nor did not interact with gender of perpetrator, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses, $F(1, 177) = .53, p = .47, \eta^2 = .00$.

Consistent with predictions, participants perceived less bias when the gender of the perpetrator was female ($M = 4.03, SD = .1.1$) than when the perpetrator of discrimination was male ($M = 4.43, SD = .86$), $t (179) = 2.67, p = .008, d = .41, 95\% CI$ for the difference $[.10, .68]$.

**Potential Mediators of Effect on Perceived Bias**

**Violates prototype of discrimination.** A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed only main effect of gender of perpetrator $F(1, 177) = 29.13, p < .001 \eta^2 = .14$. Because gender of participant nor did not interact with the gender of perpetrator $F(1, 177) = .05, p = .82$ it was eliminated from subsequent analyses.

Consistent with predictions, participants perceived that the discrimination in the claim violated the prototype of discrimination more when the gender of the perpetrator was female ($M = 4.27, SD = .93$) than when the perpetrator of discrimination was male ($M = 3.52, SD = .83$), $t (179) = -5.73, p < .001, d = .85, 95\% CI$ for the difference $[-1.01, -.50]$.

**Violates prototype of perpetrator.** A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed a marginal main effect of gender
of perpetrator $F(1, 177) = 2.80, p = .10, \eta^2 = .02$, but no main effect of gender of participant $F(1, 177) = 1.04, p = .31, \eta^2 = .01$. However, there was a significant gender of participant x gender of perpetrator interaction, $F(1, 177) = 4.78, p = .03, \eta^2 = .03$. The gender of the perpetrator mattered for female participants’ perception of how much the perpetrator violated the prototype of a perpetrator. The male perpetrator especially matched (i.e. did not violate) female participants’ prototype of a perpetrator, $F(1, 177) = 9.55, p = .002, 95\% \text{ CI for the difference} [-90, -.20]$, but male participants saw the male and female perpetrator as equally prototypical, $F(1, 177) = .11, p = .74, 95\% \text{ CI for the difference} [-.37, .51]$.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study 4: Means and Standard Deviations of Violating Prototype of Perpetrator as a Function of Discrimination Type and Participant Gender</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female Perpetrator</td>
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<td>$M$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participant Gender</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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</table>

**Perceived as relational conflict.** A 2 (Gender of Participant) x 2 (Gender of Perpetrator of Discrimination) ANOVA revealed no significant effects. Because gender of participant nor did not interact with the gender of perpetrator, it was eliminated from subsequent analyses, $F(1, 177) = .01, p = .93$. 
Counter to predictions, participants did not perceive that the claim was due to an relational conflict more when the perpetrator of discrimination was female ($M = 3.58, SD = .90$) than when the perpetrator of discrimination was male ($M = 3.63, SD = .85$), $t(179) = .38, p = .70, d = .06, 95\%$ CI for the difference [-.31, .21].

**Test of mediation.** In order to assess whether any of the potential mediators (violates prototype of discrimination, violates prototype of perpetrator, or perceived as due to relational conflict) accounted for the effect of type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on the amount of bias perceived, I used the Preacher and Hayes PROCESS macro (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). I simultaneously entered all of the potential mediators and estimated 95\% confidence intervals for the direct, indirect, and total effects using 10,000 bootstrapped samples. I used a multiple mediation model, rather than a multiple moderated mediation model with participant gender as a moderator, because it matched the theoretical model being tested and because participant gender consistently has not moderated the effect of type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on perceived bias.

Consistent with hypotheses, there was a significant indirect effect of type of discrimination claimed on perceived bias via violating the prototype of discrimination, $B = -.32, 95\%$ CI [-.64, -.21], $p < .001$. When the claim was of ingroup discrimination, participants rated the perpetrator as less likely to perpetrate discrimination against another woman $t(179) = -5.7, p < .001, d = .85$. And this partially explained the effect of type of discrimination on perceived bias.
Also consistent with predictions, there was a significant indirect effect of type of discrimination claimed on perceived bias via violating the prototype of a perpetrator of discrimination, \( B = -.10, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.53, -.15], p = .02, d = .34 \). When the claim was of ingroup discrimination, participants rated the perpetrator as less likely to perpetrate discrimination against anyone, \( t(179) = -2.28, \ p = .02 \). And this partially explained the effect of type of discrimination on perceived bias.

Counter to predictions, there was no indirect effect of the gender of the perpetrator of discrimination on perceived bias via perceiving the conflict described as more relational (rather than due to group membership), \( B = .00, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.03, .03], p = .70 \). The type of discrimination claimed did not affect the degree to which the conflict described was perceived as relationally motivated \( t(179) = .38, \ p = .70, d = .06 \).

**Discussion**

Study 4 provided further evidence that a woman who claims ingroup discrimination is perceived as more of a complainer than a woman who claims outgroup discrimination. Additionally, Study 4 demonstrated that the more negative consequences women experience as a result of claiming ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination are not limited to being perceived as more of a complainer. A woman who claimed ingroup discrimination was also perceived as less professionally competent than a woman who claimed outgroup discrimination. Further, she was less likely to have her claim perceived as worthy of investigation after claiming ingroup discrimination than after claiming outgroup discrimination.
These findings show when a woman claims discrimination perpetrated by another woman, she is risking her professional reputation and opportunities for future advancement even more than a woman who claims discrimination perpetrated by a man. Additionally, they show that women are less likely to receive the main benefit of claiming discrimination—some sort of compensation or retribution based on an investigation—when they claim ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination.

Study 4 also provided hints about why less bias is perceived when a woman claims discrimination perpetrated by an ingroup member than an outgroup member. It demonstrated that the reduction in perceived bias when a woman claims ingroup (vs. outgroup) discrimination is in part because it violates the prototype of discrimination, i.e. the expectation that gender discrimination is something perpetrated by a man against a woman. One caveat, however, is that the measure of the violation of the prototype of gender discrimination may also have captured the construct of perceived bias. Perceived bias and violation of the prototype of discrimination were non-trivially correlated, $r(179) = .54$, $p < .001$. Due to the measurement of mediation methodology used in this study, it is difficult to know whether this correlation represents a causal mediation or duplicate measurement of the same construct.

Study 4 also demonstrated that the reduction in perceived bias when a woman claims ingroup (vs. outgroup) discrimination is in part because ingroup discrimination violates the prototype of a perpetrator of discrimination, i.e. women are not expected to discriminate against anyone. This mediation pattern is somewhat difficult to interpret because a female perpetrator only violated the
prototype of a perpetrator for female, not male, participants. Female participants viewed a male perpetrator of discrimination as more prototypical than male participants did, and female but not male participants saw the male supervisor as more likely to discrimination in general than the female supervisor. This difference may be due to women having a more crystalized idea of who perpetrates discrimination due to greater experiences with sexism than men or due to men’s ingroup biases that make them less likely to see a member of their own group as a perpetrator of discrimination.

Contrary to expectations, perceiving the conflict between the claimant and the perpetrator as due to relational conflict did not explain the relationship between the type of discrimination claimed (ingroup vs. outgroup) and the amount of bias perceived. The same amount of relational conflict was perceived regardless of whether the woman's claim was filed against a male or female supervisor.

Meta-Analysis of Perceptions of Employee as a Complainer

To further examine whether a woman who claims ingroup discrimination is perceived as more of a complainer than a woman who claims outgroup discrimination with greater power than in the individual studies, I conducted a meta-analysis from the five studies using the approach and macros from Lipsey and Wilson (2001).

The homogeneity analysis did not reveal a significant difference in the effect size between conditions ($Q_s = 7.92$, $df = 4$, $p = .09$), but because it approached significance, I used a random effects model. The meta-analysis with 1010
participants revealed a small effect of the type of discrimination claimed ($d =-.21, z =- 2.35, p = .02$). This demonstrates that a woman who claims ingroup discrimination is perceived as somewhat more of a complainer than a woman who claims outgroup discrimination.

**Meta-Analysis of Perceived Bias**

To more definitively determine whether a woman who claims ingroup discrimination is perceived to have experienced less bias than a woman who claims outgroup discrimination with greater power than in the individual studies, I conducted a meta-analysis combining the results from the five studies using the same analytic strategy as for the meta-analysis of perceptions of the employee as a complainer.

The homogeneity analysis revealed that the effect size varied between conditions ($Q_{E} = 28.75, df = 4, p < .001$), so I used a random effects model. The meta-analysis with 1010 participants revealed a moderate effect of the type of discrimination a woman claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on the amount of bias perceived ($d = .44, z = 3.07, p = .002$). This effect size is similar to the average effect size in top social psychology journals in the past year (Fraley & Vazire, 2014). This shows that a woman who claims ingroup discrimination is indeed perceived to have experienced less bias than one who claims outgroup discrimination.

**Chapter 3: General Discussion**

The experiences of members of devalued groups who claim discrimination
matter because claiming discrimination is the primary mechanism at their disposal for rectifying unfair outcomes when they receive them. This research examined whether women who experience discrimination at the hands of female (rather than male) managers are in a particularly bad position because they experience harsher consequences if they do claim discrimination when they experience it. I theorized that a woman who claims ingroup discrimination would be perceived to have experienced less bias and therefore would experience more negative interpersonal and professional consequences as a result than a woman who claims outgroup discrimination.

**Negative Consequences as a Result of Claiming**

There was inconsistent evidence about whether a woman who claimed ingroup discrimination was perceived as more of a complainer than one who claimed outgroup discrimination. In Studies 1 and 4 a woman was perceived as more of a complainer when she claimed ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination. However, in Studies 2, 2b, and 3, the type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) did not affect how much a woman who claimed was seen as a complainer.

It is also possible that the effect of type of discrimination on perceptions of the employee as a complainer in Studies 2 and 2b differed from the results in the other studies because of the presence of a statement from the supervisor in the file. In Studies 2 and 2b, I attempted to manipulate perceived bias by providing a statement from the supervisor that either demonstrated evidence of bias or
provided weak/ambiguous evidence of bias. In these studies, participants viewed an explicit statement from the supervisor that either provided clear evidence of bias or weak/ambiguous evidence of bias. When the explanatory evidence was present, a woman who claimed ingroup discrimination was not seen as more of a complainer regardless of whether there was weak or strong evidence that discrimination had occurred. It is possible that no differences were observed because the presence of any statement gave participants information other than the gender of the perpetrator in the claim on which to base their impressions of the claimant. It is less obvious why the effect of type of discrimination (ingroup or outgroup) on perceptions of the claimant as a complainer did not replicate in Study 3. The mixed results may potentially indicate an effect that is real but small and thus difficult to replicate consistently without substantially increased power. Consistent with this notion, a meta-analysis of the effect of type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) did reveal small but existing effect.

In Study 4, I also extended beyond perceptions of the employee as a complainer to examine the effect of claiming ingroup (vs. outgroup) discrimination on other negative consequences women may experience, above and beyond being seen as a complainer, when they file discrimination claims. Study 4 demonstrated that when a woman claims ingroup discrimination, she is also perceived as less professionally competent and thus may be less likely to professionally advance in the future. It also provided a hint that a woman may be less likely to have her claim investigated when she claims ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination.
Impact on Perceived Bias

In four out of the five studies, I provided support for the hypothesis that women who claim to have experienced ingroup discrimination are perceived to have experienced less bias than those who claim outgroup discrimination. In Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4, a woman who claimed to have experienced ingroup discrimination was perceived to have experienced less bias than a woman who claimed outgroup discrimination. In Study 2b, however, there was no difference in the amount of bias that a woman who claimed ingroup discrimination was perceived to have experienced relative to a woman who claimed outgroup discrimination.

It is difficult to know why Study 2b did not show the same effect of the type of discrimination a woman claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on how much bias she was perceived to have experienced. The methods in Study 2 and Study 2b were nearly identical, with the exception of the omission of the ambiguous discrimination condition in Study 2b. The population for these two studies did vary, as Study 2 used college students with an average age of around 18 and Study 2b used workers recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk with an average age around 33. One possibility is that the added work and life experience of the older workers had made them more receptive to any explanation from the supervisor, which therefore washed out the effect of type of discrimination claimed in Study 2b but not Study 2. Another possibility is simply that there is a real but somewhat small effect of type of discrimination claimed (ingroup or outgroup) on perceived bias that means that it can sometimes be difficult to replicate without substantial power. The meta-analysis
of the effect of type of discrimination claimed on perceived did suggest that there was a moderate but real effect.

It is important to note that both in Study 2 and 2b when there was blatant evidence of discrimination, a woman who claimed ingroup discrimination was not perceived to have experienced less bias. This suggests that when claims are not contested or have cut and dry evidence, the gender of the perpetrator may not affect the outcomes women experience as a consequence of claiming.

Additionally, Study 1 provided cross-sectional evidence that the increase in being perceived as a complainer that a woman experienced when she claimed ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination due to the decrease in perceived bias. However, in Studies 2 and 2b, in which I attempted to manipulate the mediator by providing evidence of discrimination, did not support this causal model. Thus, these studies due not consistently support the hypothesis that a woman who claims ingroup discrimination is perceived as more of a complainer because she is perceived to have experienced less bias.

Why Ingroup Claims are Delegitimized

Study 3 examined one potential mediator that could explain why less bias is perceived when a woman claims ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination. In particular, I proposed that women’s claims of discrimination against female supervisors could be more likely to be perceived as due to relational conflict than claims against male supervisors. Participants described the conflict between the supervisor and the employee using more emotion words when the supervisor was
male than when the supervisor was female. This increase in the use of emotion language, however, did not explain why less bias was perceived to have occurred, potentially because the use of emotion language could have multiple causes and may not be the best measure of this construct.

Study 4 tested several potential explanations for why less bias may be perceived when a woman claims ingroup discrimination than when she claims outgroup discrimination. In this study, I measured three potential mediators (violates prototype of discrimination, violates prototype of perpetrator, and reason underlying claim is relational conflict) that might explain why less bias is perceived when a woman claims ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination. The results demonstrated that less bias is perceived because ingroup discrimination violates people’s prototype of discrimination itself, that is their expectation that a female supervisor would not discriminate because a woman would not discriminate against another member of her own group. It also provided support that less discrimination is perceived because it violates people’s prototype of a perpetrator of discrimination, that is their expectation that women are less likely to be perpetrators of discrimination than men.

Study 4, like Study 3, did not support the hypothesis that when a woman claims ingroup discrimination less bias is perceived because the motivation underlying the claim is perceived to be more due to relational conflict when the claim than when she claims outgroup discrimination. Thus, it appears that the differential in perceived bias is due to the non-prototypical nature of the
discrimination and perpetrator in a claim of ingroup discrimination rather than due to discounting of the claim due to differences in the perception of the relationship between the two parties involved.

**Implications for Women Who Experience Ingroup Discrimination**

The heightened consequences that women experience for claiming ingroup discrimination are problematic because they could deter women from claiming ingroup discrimination when they experience it. We know that the fear of negative consequences can deter members of low status groups from claiming discrimination (Stangor, Swim, Allen, Sechrist, 2002). For example, in one study, women and Blacks who received a failing grade were less likely to say that it was due to discrimination when they had to report it publically, in front of the outgroup, than when they could report it privately (Stangor, Swim, Allen, Sechrist, 2002). Majority group members (men and Whites), in contrast were equally likely to report having experienced discrimination publically and privately. If women refrain from claiming ingroup discrimination when they experience it due to fear of penalties, this discrimination likely goes even more underreported than outgroup discrimination. This underreporting may be compounded further because women fail to detect ingroup discrimination when they experience it. As illustrated in Study 4, discrimination perpetrated by another woman violates women’s expectation that women do not discriminate, which could make it difficult for them to even recognize when they are the target of ingroup discrimination.

It is a problem if women underreport ingroup discrimination because they will miss out on the emotional and financial benefits that claiming could bring them. Women who claim discrimination can experience psychological benefits for doing
so. In particular, women who confront discrimination can avoid the guilt and rumination women experience when they fail to confront discrimination (Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Hill, 2006; Swim & Thomas, 2006). Additionally, confronting sexism is associated can lead to greater feelings of self-worth and empowerment (Swim & Thomas, 2006; Gervais, Hiliard, & Vescio, 2010). In one study, women who reported they would be more likely to confront an online interaction partner who made a sexist statement also reported higher levels of self-esteem, as well as self-ratings of competence and empowerment (Gervais et al., 2010).

Women who claim discrimination can also benefit materially. That is, by discriminatory act reversed, e.g. being retroactively awarded a promotion or raise, or receiving compensatory damages, they can experience economic gains as a result of claiming discrimination (Burstein & Edwards, 1991). And when victims’ claims of discrimination are successful, they do experience lasting benefits in terms of greater compensation and salaries. In order to achieve these benefits, the claim must be investigated, fit within an appropriate legal framework, and perceived as legitimate. So, women who experience discrimination at the hands of a female superior may find themselves in a difficult position in which they fear claiming discrimination because they will experience especially harsh repercussions, yet by not claiming they miss out on the potential for remuneration.

Societal Implications

The increased penalties a woman experiences for claiming ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination are also problematic societally. If women hesitate to claim ingroup discrimination or are unlikely to recognize it when they experience it,
it increases the likelihood that discrimination and inequality will persist in organizations and society. Claims of discrimination can reduce future instances of discrimination within an organization. Following confrontation, perpetrators of discrimination are less likely to discriminate in the future (Czopp Monteith, & Mark, 2006). Discrimination claims are also effective at an organizational level. Following a discrimination lawsuit, companies become more diverse than they were before the lawsuit, indicating a switch to more egalitarian practices (Kalev & Dobbin, 2006). Thus, if women underreport ingroup discrimination it will weaken these mechanisms for discrimination reduction.

The underreporting of ingroup discrimination could also contribute to the societal persistence of gender disparities in compensation and advancement to leadership positions. Given the legal importance of discrimination claims in holding organizations accountable for discriminatory practices, it is troubling if a substantial subset of discrimination is unlikely to be reported.

The combination of the prevalence of ingroup discrimination, in part due to the male-dominated environments in which many female leaders advance, and the reluctance to believe it is an issue could be one of the keys to understanding the mystery of why women’s advancement has stalled even though some women have been in leadership positions for a long time. For example, the first female senator was elected in 1932 and the first female Fortune 500 CEO took leadership in 1972 (Catalyst, 2010). Yet today, women hold only 5.2% of fortune 500 CEO positions and hold only 16.9% of seats on corporate boards, and occupy 10% of seats on the United States senate (Catalyst, 2014).
The presence of female leaders was expected to reduce bias against other women who sought to advance in the organization both because their presence would reduce their male colleagues’ willingness to discriminate (Kanter, 1977) and because they would be less likely to discriminate themselves (Cotter et al., 1997). Given that the male-dominated, identity threatening environments in which many female leaders advance lead some female leaders to perpetrate discrimination (Ellemers, van den Heuvel, de Gilder, Maass, & Bonvini, 2004; Derks, Ellemers, van Laar, & de Root, 2011) and that women who experience this type of discrimination are left without recourse, the presence of female leaders may not be nearly as beneficially as previously considered. And could explain why the presence of some women in high leadership positions has not quickly snowballed to the presence of many.

**Conclusion**

I provided evidence that women who claim ingroup discrimination experience more negative interpersonal, professional, and investigatory consequences than those who claim discrimination by an outgroup member. I also provided some evidence that they experience these consequences because they are perceived to have experienced less bias. Additionally, I explored why women are perceived to have experienced less bias when they claim ingroup rather than outgroup discrimination. Further research is needed to better understand how to make ingroup discrimination more recognized and less discredited when women claim it. There remains a need to find ways to recognize ingroup discrimination as a phenomenon in order to attenuate the negative outcomes that women and members
of other devalued groups experience as a result of it.
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culturally. Sage Publications, Inc.
Appendix A: Study Materials

Study 1: Instructions

In this study, you will first view a series of reports related to an incident that took place in an organization. You will then be asked to answer a series of questions about your evaluations of that incident. Please read the incident report carefully before proceeding.

Study 1: Claims

Claim of Ingroup Discrimination:

**Internal Complaint Report**
_____ Corporation

**Employee Name:** Chelsea Albright  
**Employee Position:** Financial Services Associate  
**Employee Supervisor:** Rachel Miller  
**Employee Complaint:**
I was recently up for a promotion to become the Assistant Financial Services manager. My supervisor, Rachel Miller, passed me over for the position in favor of my coworker Alan Matthews.

I have been with the company for 6 years, twice as long as Alan, and I have earned more revenue each of the past three years that he has been here.

I believe that I was passed over for this promotion in favor of Alan because my supervisor was biased against me due to my gender.
In this study, you will first view a series of reports related to an incident that took place in an organization. You will then be asked to answer a series of questions about your evaluations of that incident. Please read the incident report carefully before proceeding.

Claim of Ingroup Discrimination:

Internal Complaint Report
____ Corporation

Employee Name: Chelsea Albright
Employee Position: Financial Services Associate
Employee Supervisor: Rachel Miller
Employee Complaint:

I was recently up for a promotion to become the Assistant Financial Services manager. My supervisor, Rachel Miller, passed me over for the position in favor of my coworker Alan Matthews.

I have been with the company for 6 years, twice as long as Alan, and I have earned more revenue each of the past three years that he has been here.

I believe that I was passed over for this promotion in favor of Alan because my supervisor was biased against me due to my gender.

Claim of Outgroup Discrimination:

Internal Complaint Report
_____ Corporation

Employee Name: Chelsea Albright
Employee Position: Financial Services Associate
Employee Supervisor: Marcus Miller
Employee Complaint:
I was recently up for a promotion to become the Assistant Financial Services manager. My supervisor, Marcus Miller, passed me over for the position in favor of my coworker Alan Matthews.

I have been with the company for 6 years, twice as long as Alan, and I have earned more revenue each of the past three years that he has been here.

I believe that I was passed over for this promotion in favor of Alan because my supervisor was biased against me due to my gender.

---

**Study 2: Supervisor Response**

Supervisor response: Low Evidence of Bias

**Supervisor Name:** Rachel Miller  
**Position:** Financial Services Manager
I selected Alan Matthews for the position because I believed that he was the better candidate for the job and had the stronger work record.
Supervisor response: Strong Evidence of Bias

**Supervisor Name:** Rachel Miller  
**Position:** Financial Services Manager

I selected Alan Matthews for the position because I believed that we needed someone who would be assertive and viewed as a leader by others. Men are generally more likely to earn the respect of others.
Supervisor response: Ambiguous Evidence of Bias

**Supervisor Name:** Rachel Miller  
**Position:** Financial Services Manager

I selected Alan Matthews for the position because I believed that we needed someone who would be assertive and viewed as a leader by others.
**Appendix B: Tables**

*Table 5. Intercorrelations Between Measures (Study 3)*

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<tr>
<td>1. Perceptions of employee as complainer</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Perceived bias</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Affect word count</td>
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<td>.18*</td>
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* p < .05  
**p < .01
Table 7. Intercorrelations Between Measures (Study 4)

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<td>2. Professional competence</td>
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<td>3. Worthiness of investigation</td>
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<td>4. Perceived bias</td>
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<td>.25**</td>
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<td>5. Violates prototype of discrimination</td>
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<td>-.37**</td>
<td>-.55**</td>
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<td>6. Violates prototype of perpetrator</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>-.27**</td>
<td>-.31**</td>
<td>-.50**</td>
<td>.51**</td>
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<td>7. Claim due to relational conflict</td>
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* *p < .05

** *p < .01