Post-Communist Transitions:
The Rise of the Multi-Party Systems in Poland and Ukraine

By Andrii Deshchytia
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Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor
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<td>AK</td>
<td>Home Army (Armia Krajowa)</td>
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<td>DPU</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Ukraine (Demokratychna partia Ukrainy)</td>
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<td>DSU</td>
<td>Political Union for State Independence of Ukraine (Derzhavna samostiinist' Ukrainy)</td>
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<td>FPD</td>
<td>Democratic Right Wing Forum (Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej)</td>
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<td>KLD</td>
<td>Liberal-Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny)</td>
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<td>KNDS</td>
<td>Congress of National-Democratic Forces (Kongres nacional'no-demokratychnykh syl)</td>
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<td>KOR</td>
<td>Workers Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow)</td>
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<td>KPN</td>
<td>Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej)</td>
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<td>KPSS</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Komunistichieskaia Partia Sovetskogo Soiuza)</td>
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<td>KPU</td>
<td>Communist Party of Ukraine (Komunistychna partia Ukrainy)</td>
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<td>KSS</td>
<td>Social Self-Defense Committee (Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej)</td>
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<td>Social Self-Defense Committee - Workers Defense Committee (Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej - Komitet Obrony Robotnikow)</td>
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<td>OKP</td>
<td>Civic Parliamentary Club (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OUN</td>
<td>Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>“Center” Alliance (Porozumienie Centrum)</td>
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<td>PDVU</td>
<td>Party for the Democratic Revival of Ukraine (Partii demokratychnoho vidrozhennia Ukrainy)</td>
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<td>PPPP</td>
<td>Polish Beer-Lovers’ Party (Polska Partia Przyjaciol Piwa)</td>
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<td>PPS-Rd</td>
<td>Polish Socialist Party- Revolutionary Democracy (Polska Partia Socjalistyczna-Rewolucyna Demokracja)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)</td>
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PUS  Polish Social-Democratic Union
(Polska Unia Socjaldemokratyczna)

PZPR  Polish United Worker's Party
(Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza)

PZU  Green Party of Ukraine (Partia zelenych Ukrainy)

ROAD  Civic Movement -- Democratic Action
(Ruch Obywatelski -- Akcja Demokratyczna)

Rukh  Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika
(Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy za perebudovu or NRU)

SD  Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne)

SdRP  Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland
(Socjaldemokracja Rzeszypospolitej Polskiej)

SLD  Alliance of the Democratic Left
(Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej)

SPU  Socialist Party of Ukraine
(Socialistyczna partii Ukrainy)

STU  Union of Working-People of Ukraine for Socialist
Reconstruction
(Spilka trudiaschchykh Ukrainy za socialistychnu
perebudovu)

SURiS  Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union
(Spilka ukraïns'kykh robitnykiv i selian)

TUM  Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society
(Tovarystvo ukraïns'ko movy imeni Tarasa
Shevchenka)

UD  Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna)

UHH  Ukrainian Helsinki Group
(Ukraïns'ka Hel'sins'ka hrupa)

UHS  Ukrainian Helsinki Union
(Ukraïns'ka Hel'sins'ka Spilka)

UKhDP  Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party
(Ukraïns'ka khrystiyans'ko-demokratychna partiia)

UNP  Ukrainian National Party
(Ukraïns'ka nacional'na partiia)

URP  Ukrainian Republican Party
(Ukraïns'ka respublikans'ka partiia)

VR  Supreme Council, Ukrainian Parliament
(Verkhovna Rada)

ZChN  Christian National Union
(Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe)

ZSL  United Peasant Party
(Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe)
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Post-Communist Transitions:
The Rise of the Multi-Party Systems in Poland and Ukraine

By Andrii Deshchytysia

The countries of Eastern Europe have recently faced serious challenges in the process of transition from totalitarian communist regimes with state-controlled economies to free-market pluralistic democracies. Dramatic political change began in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s after three years of Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost. The Polish "round table" discussions of 1988-89 signalled the initiation of new politics in the former Soviet bloc countries. Over the next few years the situation changed to such an extent and so unpredictably that even now it is still difficult to say what the results of the new East European "revolutions" will be. Nevertheless, some things are clear: in addition to beginning the aforementioned move toward a western-style democracy with a market economy, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR has both reshaped the international order and led to the emergence of new values and new political institutions in Eastern Europe.

Certain countries, namely Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, have been proceeding through the transition to a market economy and a democratic political system rapidly. They have emerged as more advanced than countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Belarus, which have been less successful in post-totalitarian development. Different aspects of post-communist development in Eastern Europe have become the subject of a vast amount of current scholarly research.¹ Some recent studies on the East European transitions have focused on the problem of looking for a pattern that could apply to all post-communist transitions and stand as a universal recipe or model for a peaceful and painless transition.²

Finding such a model is not an easy task due to the complex nature of the transitions. Transitions can be similar and yet manifest certain differences. If we compare only the results of each individual country's reforms after a lapse of five years, we find remarkable differences among the former "socialist"
countries in almost all spheres of political, economic, and social life. If, however, we analyze the specifics of each country’s developmental path, we find that the patterns of development are to some extent uniform, with a number of smaller tactical differences. Why then do countries which followed seemingly common routes to achieve change now find themselves in drastically different situations?

The answer to this question lies in each country’s “starting point.” By this, one should understand the political, economic, social, and cultural conditions that each country inherited from the previous regime. Proving this point would require a comparative study of all East European countries. Such a study has not yet been attempted. Furthermore, time is needed to allow for more stabilization and for the countries’ new situations to become clarified. Only with time will prime conditions for scholarly research emerge: the availability of complete access to communist party archives, KGB documents, opposition materials, and private collections.

Although framed within the larger question of the importance of a starting point, the aim of this study is to analyze Poland and Ukraine in order to examine the transition from totalitarian communist regimes to western-style democracies, with special reference to the formation of pluralist political party systems.

An examination of Poland and Ukraine, moreover, is a comparison of two different blocs: Poland as a former part of the broader Soviet bloc and Ukraine as a former part of the Soviet Union. The differences between these two blocs were always significant. Poland, as other countries of the Soviet bloc, experienced domination by the Soviet Union for a period of forty years, but enjoyed a relatively high degree of sovereignty; it had more similarities than differences with other former socialist countries when changes began in the late 1980s. Ukraine, by contrast, belonged to a different, though related, system under virtually absolute control from Moscow. It should also be noted that Ukraine gained independence only in 1991; before that time it had developed as an integral part of the Soviet Union, directly influenced by developments that took place in Moscow.

All of the countries within the Soviet sphere learned how to cope with the communist system, developing new methods and tactics for future opposition activities. Polish society,
however, had better access to information coming from outside the Soviet system and was more advanced in making use of this information. Ukraine, by contrast, being behind the "iron curtain," did not have access to such information and was able to access it only partially, mostly by simply repeating and copying Polish practices.

Before turning to the analysis of the socio-political developments in Poland and Ukraine during the communist period, it is necessary to define a point of comparative reference for these two countries' recent developments. Undoubtedly, Poland and Ukraine had much in common in the past, and, according to Ivan Rudnytsky, "...when surveying the record of Polish-Ukrainian interaction, one is often struck by the great similarity in attitudes and behavior of the two communities." After World War II, both states found themselves under the *regime nouveau.* The communist regimes introduced in Eastern Europe were characterized by one common trait in all countries: the similar form of interaction between the regime and the opposition. It is this regime-opposition interaction in Poland and Ukraine which will be examined in this paper. Although an interplay between an opposition and those holding power is common also to democratic societies, the nature of this process was different in the "socialist democracies." The main difference was the mechanism allowing the opposition to come to power. Whereas in western-style democracies elections serve as the main mechanism to change governments, in the Soviet-type communist regimes, not only was the opposition unable to take part in elections, but political freedoms were also limited or in many cases non-existent.

Political, economic, and cultural conditions as well as the nature of regime-opposition interaction were different in Poland and Ukraine. Sometimes the regime's level of tolerance for the opposition was high while on other occasions the regime oppressed it.

Three distinct time periods divide this examination of regime-opposition relations in Poland and Ukraine. The first is the communist period, from the end of the 1940s to the early stages of *perestroika* in 1986. The second time period, from 1986 to 1989-90, is distinguished by the birth, or in some instances renewal, of mass political organizations. The third period, from 1989-90 to the present, has witnessed the rise of multi-party
systems and the formation of a juridical basis for the parties' activities.

This monograph will first describe the general characteristics of both societies during the communist period and then will concentrate primarily on political developments in the period between 1989 and 1994. These dates were crucial for both Poland and Ukraine. In 1989, round table negotiations between the ruling Polish United Worker's Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR) and Solidarity, the opposition movement, led to the first semi-free elections in Poland and the formation of its first non-communist government in forty years. In Ukraine, 1989 was the year when the mass opposition movement the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika (Narodnyi Rukh Ukrainy za perebudovu, NRU or Rukh) was formed. At that time limited liberalization of society was allowed when the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (Komunistychna partiiia Ukrainy, KPU) Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi was replaced with the more reformist Volodymyr Ivashko.

Over the next five years political transformations and economic reforms reshaped Ukrainian and Polish societies. These processes continue today, although some stabilization in the political sphere has now been achieved. In Poland, this stabilization was marked with a new election law, adopted in 1993. This law allows only those parties with more than 5 percent of electoral support to hold seats in parliament. In Ukraine, stabilization has not occurred to the same extent as in Poland. It can be argued, however, that Ukraine has achieved a certain degree of stability in relation to other countries of the former Soviet Union.

The same understanding of opposition-regime interaction is also useful for understanding the rise of new political parties. The vast majority of currently existing parties in Poland and Ukraine were formed during 1990-91, but they trace their roots to either the regime or the opposition of the previous period; consequently they can be divided into post-opposition and post-regime parties. Undoubtedly, the programs of the new Polish and Ukrainian parties, as well as the regime's and opposition's tactics and aims in the recent past, have been different. These differences were the result of each society's ability, or inability, to develop independent political action in

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conditions of communist organizational monopoly.

The Communist Period

Ukraine and Poland have shared certain features throughout a millennium of historical development.9 The medieval ages were marked by mutual influence and parallel developments. Almost at the same time in the ninth century, both Poland and Ukraine established proto-states, accepted Christianity, and practised frequent marriage alliances between members of the ruling Piast and Rurik dynasties. From about 1350, and for the next 300 years, the two peoples lived together in one state, which became known as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth after the Union of Lublin in 1569. At this time, however, the Poles were in a more favorable position than the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, both states subsequently went through periods of decline, allegorically called the Potop (Flood) in Poland and the Ruina (Ruin) in Ukraine and fell under the domination of the larger Romanov and Habsburg empires by the end of the eighteenth century, sharing the fate of occupation and division. Most of Ukraine and the major portion of Poland were absorbed by the Russian empire; the rest of the Polish state (except the western part which went to Prussia) and the western Ukrainian territories were absorbed by the Austrian empire.

Although the states' past developments were very similar, the principal difference between them, namely the ability to achieve and maintain the status of a modern state, arose in the twentieth century. Both the Polish and Ukrainian national movements were able to establish national states after the collapse of the Habsburg and Romanov empires in 1918. The Poles, however, were successful in preserving state integrity for two decades (in 1939 Poland was occupied first by the Nazis and then by the Soviets), thus creating the modern Polish nation. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, lost their independent state soon after its proclamation in 1918 and were divided between the new Polish state (western Ukraine) and the Soviet Union (the central, eastern, and southern regions).10 Ukraine's struggle for independence remained on the political agenda for some activists, however, who advocated statehood for the next several decades until Ukraine gained independence in 1991.11

The forty years after World War II were marked by
another element of commonality: both Poland and Ukraine came under Soviet hegemony which included communist ideology and only quasi-independence from Moscow. These conditions, especially Moscow's control, influenced the aims and programs of the opposition movements in both states. The role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Kommunisticheskaia Partiiia Sovetskogo Soiuza, KPSS), as well as its lack of tolerance for any opposition, also affected developments inside the KPU and the PZPR. Because the opposition in Poland was more active and its demands were more advanced, it is best to start by examining post-World War II developments in Poland.

The communist regime in Poland was imposed by the Red Army in the mid 1940s following the defeat of Germany. This new occupation regime received mixed reactions from the Poles, and a slow "process of organic rejection"¹² began almost immediately within Polish society. The most common demands raised by the opposition included more sovereignty, i.e. a reduction of control by the Soviet Union, and more limitations on the power of the ruling communist party. These demands formed part of the agenda of the Polish opposition throughout the communist period; when Polish society faced the crisis of 1989, its previous experience of struggle with the regime thus made the likelihood of its success greater.

From the late 1940s, the Polish communist regime was constantly challenged by the opposition.¹³ The methods and tactics of this struggle varied. Initially, there was military resistance conducted by the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK). By the 1950s, demonstrations and strikes proved more effective. Some unrest was local, such as Poznan in 1956 and Gdansk in 1970, while some spread all over Poland, as did the "spring of 1968." Whether local or national, the resistance was known across Poland and found overwhelming public backing.

The Polish opposition gained enormous experience from these conflicts which allowed it to test methods and tactics of protest that were to prove essential for future developments.¹⁴ After it became evident that a change of regime could not be achieved without the threat of Soviet invasion, as in Hungary in 1956 or Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Polish opposition chose to undertake the democratization of public and political life within the constitutional and legal framework of the time. The formation of Solidarity, the opposition trade union organization,
in 1980 is the best example of this new strategy.  

The Solidarity movement marked an interesting and important stage in the development of the Polish opposition. Before the era of Solidarity, there had already been a rise of social unrest. In 1976, for example, the Workers Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników, KOR), was formed (later renamed Social Self-Defense Committee [Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej, KSS] and known as KSS-KOR). Formed by Polish intellectuals, KOR was the most significant phenomenon of the time as it became the first mass opposition movement to bring together both workers and the intelligentsia. From that point on, both groups began to voice the same demands. Solidarity, with ten million members, transformed the character of the Polish opposition and instilled a desire among the Poles to change the regime.

On 13 December 1981, martial law was introduced in Poland, driving Solidarity underground. Here again the Poles proved that they had learned from their earlier experiences and were, therefore, able to continue protesting effectively underground. This period was significant for the opposition for another reason. During martial law in the 1980s, the Polish opposition crystallized, and a group of charismatic political leaders, including Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuroń, and Lech Wałęsa, became prominent in Polish society. Their activities fanned anti-communist ideas among the public and served as an example for future struggles. They worked out new methods and tactics with which to pressure the regime. A new concept of social development known as “the new evolutionism” was proposed by Adam Michnik, who emerged as the leading theoretician of the opposition in the late 1980s.

Paradoxically, the banning of Solidarity under martial law did not destroy it, but strengthened and increased its popularity. Some scholars even argue that “martial law saved Solidarity.” Solidarity activists went underground and created a network of unofficial union cells and publications. Underground literature, produced in Poland, was distributed around the country, uniting the people and preparing them for active resistance to the regime. According to some estimates, from the imposition of martial law in late 1981 until the end of 1987, more than 1,500 unofficial newspapers and magazines and nearly 2,400 uncensored books and brochures were printed.
Religion also played a significant role in Poland during the communist era. The Catholic Church, the dominant church in Poland, was a unifying factor in Polish society. It was the largest organization in Poland independent of the PZPR and had an established network of parishes and educational institutions. Furthermore, the Catholic Church had enormous moral authority in the country and stood in opposition to the communist regime. The Church's role increased further after the Polish Cardinal Karol Wojtyła became Pope on 16 October 1978. Strikes and demonstrations organized by Solidarity in 1980-81 were inaugurated by a Catholic mass and supported by the Polish clergy, thus giving testimony to the importance of the Church's support for Solidarity.

Although it developed along the same pattern, the opposition movement in Ukraine was less intensive and active than that in Poland. This was due to a more oppressive political atmosphere and to the severity of the communist regime. After 1922, when most of Ukraine was absorbed into the Soviet Union, the regime clamped down on all opposition movements. The mass mobilization and armed resistance to Soviet rule which marked the period of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-21 were suppressed and reference to them was prohibited. The Ukrainian intelligentsia and nationally-minded intellectuals were eliminated during Stalin's purges of the 1930s. In addition to the purges, the artificial famine of 1932-33 resulted in a drastic decrease in the Ukrainian rural population and a quelling of its potential for resistance. The situation was different in western Ukraine, which between 1919 and 1939 was part of the Polish state and therefore enjoyed a relatively high degree of political pluralism. In this period a number of Ukrainian nationalist organizations were formed, such as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv, OUN), that resisted first Polish and then Soviet rule from 1942-53. Nevertheless, the Soviet regime was able to crush Ukrainian armed resistance and to deport thousands of its members and supporters to Siberia.

Soviet propaganda and the secret police did everything possible to destroy people's memory about periods of resistance in the past and labelled such movements collaborationist in order to prevent the possibility of future unrest. Any nationalist activity, whether on the official or unofficial level, was
immediately and severely crushed. In contrast to Poland, where such incidents received public attention, Ukrainians were kept ignorant of current political developments as well as past events and actions.

Nevertheless, the opposition in Soviet Ukraine managed to operate even under such severe conditions. The character, nature, and methods of the opposition were different from those in Poland. The common element for both, however, was a desire to alter, or if possible do away with, the existing regime. After the defeat of the national resistance in the 1950s, the Ukrainian intelligentsia shrank to minuscule pockets of creative opposition. The peak of its development after the Second World War was during Khrushchev’s “thaw” of the 1960s. At that time, a group of young and talented artists and academics, known later as the shestydesiatnyky (the generation of the 1960s), became active on the political and social scene. This was the beginning of a broader dissident movement. Political liberalization in the 1960s provided an opportunity for the dissident movement to openly voice demands for cultural autonomy for Ukraine, an end to russification policies, and increased exposure of Ukrainians to their national language, culture, and history. The most eloquent version of these demands was presented by the literary critic Ivan Dzyuba in his book Internationalism or Russification?: A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem.

With Khrushchev’s removal from office and replacement by Leonid Brezhnev in 1964 and Petro Shelest’s replacement as Ukrainian Communist Party leader by the more hardline Volodymyr Shcherbytsky in 1972, a period of mass arrests and complete proscription of any opposition began. Two waves of arrests, 1965-67 and 1972-73, almost paralyzed the dissident movement in Ukraine.

During the 1970s, the Ukrainian opposition began to apply new tactics in confronting the oppressive conditions imposed by the regime. Realizing that the demands of the 1960s were even less likely to be achieved under the new conditions, the opposition raised the question of the defense of human rights following the Soviet Union’s signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. Thereafter, members of Soviet dissident movements formed public groups to promote the implementation of the Helsinki Accords, whose main focus was on human rights. The Ukrainian opposition also formed the Ukrainian Helsinki Group
(Ukrains’ka Hel’sins’ka hrupa, UHH), which consisted mostly of former shestydesiatnyky. It is important to note that the UHH, despite being the only organized opposition in Ukraine, was nevertheless part of the all-Union dissident movement and shared its demands. As a result, Ukrainian nationality issues were only a part of the UHH’s concerns. Its activity was limited, however, and its membership never exceeded forty.\textsuperscript{28}

In 1986, as perestrojka was getting underway, Ukrainian society, in contrast to Polish, was completely unaware of any unofficial activities. It was not prepared for massive protest and to a great extent remained obedient to the regime. Neither the shestydesiatnyky nor the dissidents of the 1970s were able “to establish Solidarity-style links with the working-class.”\textsuperscript{29} In contrast to the vast amount of unofficial literature circulated in Poland, the Ukrainian opposition, specifically the UHH, was only able to produce 30 declarations and proclamations, 18 memoranda, and 10 bulletins.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, dissidents did not have the experience of political struggle because of frequent arrests and long-term exile.\textsuperscript{31}

The tolerance of the opposition by the respective communist parties, the KPU in Ukraine, and the PZPR in Poland, varied. The PZPR’s main task - to preserve power and a Soviet-style regime - put it under constant pressure from the KPSS on one side and internal opposition on the other. After World War II, the PZPR was under virtually absolute control from Moscow. In the 1950s, especially with Władysław Gomułka’s return to power in 1956, the PZPR was able to change its policy and began calling for greater sovereignty and liberalization within the party and society. Later, in the 1970s, Edward Gierek, the new PZPR first secretary, extended this process, and almost all of Polish society became “totally reoriented toward the West.”\textsuperscript{32} The process of political liberalization did not develop easily although the opposition was able to gain some achievements by constantly pressuring the regime. Under this pressure the PZPR also started its own transformation. The most visible period of internal party changes was during the 1970s, when a significant number of the intelligentsia who were members of the PZPR sympathized with the opposition and even signed petitions in its defense - the “Manifesto of 59” in 1975 and the “Memorandum of 14” in 1977.\textsuperscript{33} Many PZPR members openly supported KSS-KOR and later Solidarity; some eventually even renounced their party
membership and joined these organizations.\textsuperscript{34}

A new stage in the development of the PZPR came with Wojciech Jaruzelski’s ascent to power and the imposition of martial law in 1981. Jaruzelski’s first years in office were marked by a restructuring of the opposition and a strengthening of the regime. But very soon the PZPR leadership realized the futility of this policy and started discussing new strategies. The beginnings of \textit{perestroika} only highlighted the crisis within the PZPR and subsequently led to its dissolution in 1990.\textsuperscript{35}

The Communist Party of Ukraine also experienced various stages of development and relative tolerance of the opposition. Since the 1930s, the KPU had been dependent on KPSS decisions. However, in the view of one scholar, the KPU’s 1954 Congress “marked a turning point in the history of Ukraine. It saw the emergence of a new Ukrainian political elite.”\textsuperscript{36} Since that time some of Shelest’s colleagues expressed views about Ukrainian cultural autonomy and called for Ukraine to be treated as an equal to other Soviet republics. Some scholars saw this policy as the rebirth of Ukrainian national communism which had been defeated in the 1920s.\textsuperscript{37} Although the degree of political liberalization introduced by the KPU did allow for some dissident activity, the KPU never addressed the problem of democratization, legalization of the opposition, or secession from the USSR, all of which were sought by the dissidents.

Ukrainian society stagnated further with the election of Volodymyr Shcherbytsky as the new first secretary of the KPU in 1972. As Brezhnev’s protege, Shcherbytsky represented the hardliners within the communist party. He created a strong bureaucratic and conservative communist network, stifling opposition both in society at large and inside the party. During the 1970s he deposed those party leaders who had been loyal to Shelest’s policies. The situation did not improve during the early 1980s or even during the first years of \textit{perestroika};\textsuperscript{38} Ukraine continued to be the most oppressed Soviet republic up to the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Perestroika} and the Beginning of Mass Politics

A new period in East European politics started in 1986 when Gorbachev announced his policies of \textit{perestroika} and \textit{glasnost}.\textsuperscript{40} In Ukraine, as well as in other communist countries, an
interesting new phenomenon started to emerge at the end of the 1980s in the form of mass political movements. During a relatively short period of time, approximately two to three years, Ukrainian society, which was undoubtedly in a state of stagnation, was able to organize a wide grassroots national-democratic movement, known as The People's Movement for Restructuring - Rukh. It is still difficult to explain how something like this could emerge in a totalitarian system with such a low level of popular mobilization and a severe regime.\textsuperscript{41} Because Rukh was more active in western Ukraine, which was incorporated into the USSR only during World War II, the answer might be found partly in local surviving witnesses with memories of previous resistance or else the fact that western Ukraine contained the more nationally conscious groups; this question still needs detailed investigation, however.

In Poland, this period was also marked by populism, but it was characterized by a renewal of previous Solidarity links rather than the establishment of a new movement. After a few years of underground activity, Solidarity reappeared in the political arena in the late 1980s. This time political demands for democratization and regime change assumed priority on its agenda. These desires were expressed in the vast amount of literature published and written by the opposition. They were also supported by the majority of Polish society. The most significant characteristic of Polish society of the second half of the 1980s was the clear division between “us and them,” between those who supported the regime and those who opposed it. According to public opinion polls conducted in Poland at the end of the 1980s, only 10 percent of the population supported the communist regime.\textsuperscript{42} Such a situation was not only favorable for opposition activities, but also forced the regime itself to think about massive reforms in the economy, politics, and social life and about giving more concessions to the opposition.

To a great extent the reactivation of Solidarity became possible because of a transformation inside the PZPR, which was acquiring more sovereignty with the deepening of perestroika. Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had become the first secretary of the PZPR in 1981, tried to implement some economic and social reforms during his first years in office. At the end of the 1980s, however, it became evident that Polish society needed full-scale reforms and not simply the implementation of half-measures.
The economy was in a catastrophic state. Shortages of food products, low salaries, and high inflation fuelled unrest in society. Consequently, pro-reform leaders in the PZPR, especially Jaruzelski, Prime Minister and later First Secretary of the PZPR Mieczysław Rakowski, and Minister of the Interior Czesław Kiszczak, started negotiations with the Church, as a universally respected organization, along with some leaders of the opposition about uniting efforts to stabilize the situation.

As a result of these discussions, round table negotiations between the regime and opposition leaders were held at the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989. It was a sign of the PZPR’s debility as well as its inability to conduct further reforms and keep society under control. Furthermore, it was the beginning of the end of communist domination in Poland. Round table talks resulted in the legalization of Solidarity and the decision to hold parliamentary elections to the Sejm and a re-established Senate in June 1989. According to the agreement made during the round table negotiations, 65 percent of all seats in the Sejm were reserved for the PZPR and its allies, the United Peasant Party (Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe, ZSL) and the Democratic Party (Stronnictwo Demokratyczne, SD), and the remaining 35 percent were to be contested by any other contenders.

The June 1989 elections in Poland were the last Soviet-style elections to be conducted. The united opposition, which was called the “Wałęsa team,” came to power as a result of these elections, and the communist regime was overthrown in Poland shortly afterwards. The results were a significant victory for the opposition. Solidarity won all the unreserved seats in the Sejm and 99 of 100 seats in the Senate. As a result of the new set of blocs in the parliament, in the fall of 1989 a new government, the first non-communist government in forty years, was formed by one of Solidarity’s leaders, Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

These elections also marked the birth of a multi-party system in Poland. The triumph of the united opposition was to some extent a catalyst for its fragmentation and for the formation of new organizations, mostly parties, out of the formerly unified Solidarity. The PZPR also started to change its policy after the elections. It was obvious that communist ideology lacked credibility. In addition, the first sessions of the parliament showed that the PZPR’s allies, the ZSL and the SD, no longer wanted Poland to play the role of a mere communist satellite. On
many questions, members of parliament from the ZSL and the SD were in unanimous agreement with the former opposition. Moreover, many of them even switched allegiance to the Solidarity bloc in the Sejm. The biggest setback for the PZPR as a political force was its inability to form a government after the elections. Even the pro-reform Kiszczak was unable to manage this task, and the PZPR was forced to give up its power to Solidarity and face internal discussion about its future in the fall of 1989.

In Ukraine, this same period was marked by the existence of fermenting ideological differences within the communist system rather than by a clear political division between the regime and the opposition. The polarization of society and the political arena was accelerated by the release of documents revealing the atrocities conducted by the Stalin regime, by criticism of Brezhnev’s bureaucratic stagnation, by information about the lamentable state of national culture, and by other measures resulting fromglasnost policy.

However, in contrast to Poland, where the opposition was already fighting to legalize Solidarity, in Ukraine the mass opposition was just emerging. This process started with the release of political dissidents in 1987-88 in connection with Gorbachev’s perestroika. After their release, Viacheslav Chornovil, the Horyn’ brothers (Mykhailo and Bohdan), Mykhailo Osadchy, Stepan Khmara, and others initiated a national movement in western Ukraine; they established unofficial newspapers and magazines and organized unofficial meetings, demonstrations, and strikes. In July 1988, they formed the Ukrainian Helsinki Union (Ukrains’ka Hel’sins’ka Spilka, UHS) as a continuation of UHH. This became the first organized opposition structure in Ukraine in the late 1980s.

At approximately the same time other unofficial organizations appeared throughout Ukraine, especially in the capital city of Kyiv and in western Ukraine. Although their programs were characterized by cultural demands, they were also involved in politics and formed the basis for future parties. The most popular among them were the Taras Shevchenko Ukrainian Language Society (Tovarystvo ukrains’koi movy imeni Tarasa Shevchenka, TUM), which protested against russification and promoted the development of the Ukrainian language, culture, and history; the Memorial Society (Tovarystvo
“Memorial”), which advocated de-stalinization and democratization; the Green World Association (Zelenyi svit), which was formed in response to the Chernobyl disaster for the purpose of initiating an ecological movement in Ukraine; and a few youth organizations like Kyiv’s Community (Hromada), L’viv’s Lion Society (Tovarystvo Leva), and the Students’ Union (Students’ke bratstvo).

The idea of a broad united front against the regime appeared among the leaders of unofficial opposition organizations. This idea was fulfilled by Kyiv’s intelligentsia, especially members of the Writer’s Union, from whom came the initiative to create Rukh. This organization, like Solidarity in Poland, became the biggest oppositional force in Ukraine at the end of the 1980s. However, in contrast to the 10 million Solidarity members among just over 30 million Poles, Rukh had only 500,000 members in a country of 52 million in 1990. In this context it is interesting to observe the process of Rukh’s rapid radicalization.

The Rukh program was published first in the Writer’s Union’s weekly in February 1989 and was very moderate in tone. Rukh admitted the leading role of the KPSS and KPU in society and announced its support of the communist party’s efforts to fulfil perestroika, which was manifested in the name of the organization up until 1990. During the next two years, Rukh’s mandate evolved and Rukh began advocating an independent Ukrainian state and anti-communism. This shows the speed of the political changes in the former Soviet Union and particularly in Ukraine during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Because these processes were so dynamic, Ukrainian society had to adapt quickly to the political struggle, and, as a result, often neglected many other aspects of national and political development.

The KPU also underwent changes although they were less dynamic and significant than those experienced by its Polish counterpart, the PZPR. First of all, it should be recalled that the KPU was part of the KPSS, to a large extent the KPSS’s agent and executor of decisions in Ukraine. Although the KPU had its own program, statutes, and structure, there was no separate KPU membership for the KPSS. The KPU was so conservative that, even though it was traditionally completely loyal to Moscow’s policies, its leaders considered Gorbachev’s reforms too radical.
During the most intensive period of _perestroika_, when political developments in other Soviet republics, especially the Baltic states, were unfolding rapidly, Ukraine continued to be relatively quiet.\(^{57}\) The situation changed in the fall of 1989, when the conservative first secretary of the KPU, Shcherbytsky, retired and was replaced by the more pro-reform leader Volodymyr Ivashko.

In addition, the KPU was affected by factionalism inside the party. As in the case of the KPSS, after the first few years of _perestroika_, the communist party divided into “reformers,” those who backed Gorbachev’s policy, and “hardliners,” those who considered Gorbachev a traitor to communist principles and preferred a return to orthodox principles. The same process occurred within the KPU. At the end of 1989, the reformers formed a faction inside the KPU, eventually to be known as the Democratic Platform (Demokratychna platforma), with demands for further political and economic reforms and more far-reaching democratization. They also demanded changes to the KPU program and statute to allow factions in the party, the possibility of creating a national communist party, and amendments to paragraphs six and seven of the Soviet constitution which guaranteed the leading role of the communist party. At the beginning of 1990, the Democratic Platform published an appeal to members of the KPSS in the newspaper _Holos_ explaining the main principles of their program and announcing their desire to form a new party.\(^{58}\)

The hardliners filled the other wing of the communist party, forming less numerous, but more vociferous orthodox-communist organizations. In February 1990, for example, the constituent congress of the Union of Working-People of Ukraine for Socialist Reconstruction (Spilka trudiaschychkiv Ukrainy za socialistychnu perebudovu, STU) was held in Kyiv. Their demands were partly conservative and they backed the idea of a “sovereign socialist Ukraine” in “the renovated Soviet Union.” However, other organizations of this vein, like the Public Committee for the Defense of Lenin’s Monuments and the Ukrainian republican branch of the all-Union association Unity for Leninism and Communist Ideals, demanded a return to Soviet-style communism with no democratic reforms and no rights for national independence.\(^{59}\)

This stage of political development in Ukraine ended with the elections to the parliament in March 1990. The outcome
of the elections, however, was different from the Polish case. The Ukrainian opposition, like the "Wałęsa team" in Poland, entered the election campaign as a united democratic bloc - Rukh. Yet the KPU was in a much more favorable position than the PZPR. As mentioned earlier, Ukrainian society in general was not prepared to reject the KPU. With the possible exception of western Ukraine and Kyiv, the electorate was not ready for an open confrontation with the regime because of continuing fear of the KGB and police. Moreover, the communist party continued to maintain mechanisms of public control: the mass media was censored by the KPU and access to printing facilities was limited.

Despite these obstacles, the opposition was able to perform well in the elections although not well enough to overthrow the regime. Rukh obtained almost one third of the seats in the 450-seat parliament and continued its oppositional activity in the parliament forming the official opposition People's Council (Narodna Rada), led by academician Ihor Iukhnovs'kyi. This was a major achievement because the opposition was often able to influence the parliament's decisions. Such significant laws as the proclamation of sovereignty and later independence were to a great extent the result of the opposition's constant activity in parliament.

The parliamentary elections in Poland and Ukraine in 1989 and 1990 respectively became crucial for the future of the transition in both countries. The literature on transitions to democracy argues the importance of ousting the regime from power by a united opposition and the formation of a new government. Once this has occurred, the opposition rapidly fragments, laying the basis for the development of a party system and further democratic reforms. Whereas in Poland Solidarity followed this pattern perfectly, in Ukraine Rukh was unable to take power; indeed it started to fragment shortly after the elections and weakened as a united force. This difference had an enormous impact on the political and economic development in both countries. The new Polish government rapidly began to implement reforms; in Ukraine, however, the regime, although weakened by the opposition, remained in power and opposed further radical reforms.

The Rise of the Multi-Party Systems

The third period, or the post-communist transition, in
Poland and Ukraine began after the 1989 and 1990 parliamentary elections respectively. One of the distinctive features of this period was a deeper divergence between both countries in the political, economic, and social spheres. As noted, the Ukrainian opposition started to fragment shortly after the 1990 elections, creating a basis for new parties. Although the KPU declined in popularity, the party managed to survive a general disillusionment with communist ideology over the next few years.

The Polish opposition, by contrast, achieved power, formed a government, and initiated democratic reforms. But it likewise started to fragment after the 1989 elections. As a result, during the next two years its splinter parties filled the political spectrum, from the extreme right to the extreme left, with more than 100 political parties and organizations. The regime, represented by the PZPR and its allies the ZSL and SD, disappeared. New political parties were formed out of the PZPR, ZSL, and SD. The relationship between government and opposition assumed the form characteristic of western democracies.

Most scholarly works on the formation of the multi-party system in Poland agree that this process started with the first major split within Solidarity during the presidential campaign of 1990. But even earlier, during the discussions in the fall of 1989 over the future of Solidarity's representation in the parliament, there were visible signs of deep diversities within the opposition camp. All agreed on the need for reforms, but on other issues there was a lack of unity among the members of the Solidarity coalition in the Sejm known as the Civic Parliamentary Club (Obywatelski Klub Parlamentarny, OKP). Differences arose over three main issues: the presidential elections (should the opposition offer just one candidate?), the new parliamentary election (was it necessary to hold new elections immediately as the previous elections had not been fully democratic?), and de-communization (should all former PZPR members be fired from their positions and face legal process for their previous activities?). Although there were several possible solutions to these issues (Adam Michnik, for example, was absolutely against the division), the split in the opposition did not occur until the beginning of the presidential campaign the following year. This division, into a Wałęsa and a Mazowiecki camp, was preceded by
the so called "war at the top" initiated by Lech Wałęsa in May 1990. Originally Wałęsa began by criticizing the Mazowiecki government's policies, but eventually the criticism evolved into personal attacks and ultimately precipitated the breakup of Solidarity.

In May 1990, the "Center" Alliance (Porozumienie Centrum, PC) was formed to promote Lech Wałęsa's presidential campaign. This was a signal for other groups and political leaders from the Solidarity movement to establish their own parties or political organizations. In June, Jacek Kuroń initiated the Civic Movement - Democratic Action (Ruch Obywatelski - Akcja Demokratyczna, ROAD), which recruited supporters from the OKP and thus further diminished Solidarity's representation in the parliament. In December 1990, after the presidential elections (which Wałęsa won), Mazowiecki's supporters held the founding congress of the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna, UD). In May 1991, the UD held a joint congress with the ROAD and Aleksandr Hall's Democratic Right Wing Forum (Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej, FPD), the result of which was the creation of a new political party under the same name, the Democratic Union.

To present a complete picture, it is necessary to mention the emergence of other political parties which also made up the opposition, but never joined Solidarity or the "Wałęsa team." In general they were politically more radical than Solidarity, and their desire to form parties came earlier. The first such party, with a clear anti-communist and anti-Soviet orientation, was the KPN, formed by Leszek Moczulski as early as 1978. Subsequently, because of the rise of Solidarity and the imposition of martial law, it became less active on the political scene and reappeared only at the end of 1989. At approximately the same time, in October 1989, W. Chrzanowski and A. Macierewicz formed the Christian National Union (Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe, ZChN), which rapidly gained mass support and became one of the more popular political parties represented in the parliament. In November 1989, a number of people who felt that they were under-represented in the "Wałęsa team" founded the Liberal-Democratic Congress (Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny, KLD), the party of future Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki.

These were the main divisions within the opposition. The
establishment parties, the PZPR and its allies the ZSL and SD, also underwent changes. The ZSL changed its name and became the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL), claiming the legacy of the pre-1947 party with the same name. The SD, after obtaining only one seat in the Sejm, quickly collapsed and became marginalized. The PZPR's popularity dropped drastically after the elections, and the party leadership held an intensive debate on future tactics and programs at the end of 1989. These discussions led to the final PZPR congress held in January 1990.

The congress had two main results. First, Polish communists recognized the decline of their party's popularity and the demise of communist ideology. Thus a decision was made to dissolve the PZPR. Second, a new party, the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, SdRP), was formed out of the PZPR and dissociated itself from the PZPR's heritage, although claiming to be its direct successor. Under its new name the party also adopted a new program and constitution. The SdRP broke with the Leninist tradition of democratic centralism and allowed the formation of different factions within the party. It also permitted the "total abandonment of Communism - embracing parliamentary democracy and a market economy, national will as the only legitimation of power, [and] identification with the Polish socialist tradition..." The leadership of the party was put into the hands of younger leaders, such as Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leszek Miller.

These were the major events of the first two years of the development of a multi-party system in Poland following the crucial June 1989 parliamentary elections. They marked the beginning of what has become a successful multi-party system. During the next few years, the number of newly established political parties grew rapidly, reaching more than 100 parties and party-like political organizations by June 1991, and more than 200 by 1993. Most of them were structurally weak, inactive in political debates and elections, small in membership, and referred to as "couch parties," i.e., they could organize their party congresses in a simple living room. Although it would be unfair to neglect them completely, they had little influence on political developments or public opinion. Only some fifteen larger parties "could count upon devoted cadres, organizational networks,
experience, financial resources, and a more or less definite milieu of followers.”

One hundred and eleven political parties participated in the first free Sejm elections of October 1991. Of the 27 that were able to register on the all-national electoral list, only 18 actually obtained seats and formed parliamentary blocs (see table 1).

Table 1: The Largest Polish Political Parties in 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Date of Foundation</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Seats in Sejm</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>2 Dec 1990</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPN</td>
<td>1 Sept 1979</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>5 May 1990</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZChN</td>
<td>28 Nov 1989</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>12 May 1990</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLD</td>
<td>Fall 1989</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPPP</td>
<td>Fall 1990</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Others and unaffiliated | - | - | 94 |

Source: Compiled from *Partie i ugrupowania polityczne — vademecum* and *Informator o partiach politycznych w Polsce* (Warsaw: PAP, 1991).

In Ukraine after the 1990 parliamentary elections, the KPU’s activities were not only different from those of the PZPR, but they were also decisive for the course of the post-communist transition in Ukraine. The KPU did not dissolve itself as did the PZPR; moreover, it has managed to maintain the same ideology and structure right up to this writing, despite a brief period between 1991 and 1993 when it was abolished.

As noted, as an integral part of the KPSS, the KPU not only depended on Moscow’s political decisions, but developed according to the processes occurring within the party, such as the division of reformers and hardliners, and in society in general, such as the decline of communist ideology. After the first years of perestroika, the popularity and prestige of the communist party dropped, yet the KPU continued to be the largest political force
in Ukraine, with 3,302,221 members in January 1989. 80 Some efforts to transform and democratize the KPU were attempted by the reformers, but they were unsuccessful. After several attempts to reorganize and democratize from within, the democratic-minded element of the KPU, the "Democratic Platform," decided to leave the party altogether in July 1990 and organize a separate political organization. 81 This move affected the KPU's development in two ways. First, most of the reformers were intellectuals; with their rejection of the KPU, the communist party's intellectual level dropped drastically. Next, and more importantly, by withdrawing from the Party, the pro-reform elements abandoned the possibility of changing it internally. Thus the conservative nature of the KPU did not change; if anything, it became even more resistant to change. The Democratic Platform, by contrast, changed all the principles, rules, and ideological approaches it had inherited from the KPU and became the basis for a new political party, liberal in orientation, The Party for the Democratic Revival of Ukraine (Partiia demokratychnoho vidrodzhennia Ukrainy, PDVU), the founding congress of which was held in December 1990. 82

The KPU subsequently disappeared from the political scene in 1991 for a period of two years, not, however, of its own volition, but because of a conjuncture of circumstances. August 1991 saw the unsuccessful coup in Moscow against Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies. Ideologically, the attempted coup was backed by hard-liners in the KPSS, a circumstance which the democratic forces in Russia, particularly Russian President Boris Yeltsin, interpreted as a reason to disband the communist party and its activity in Russia. 83 Almost the same scenario occurred in Ukraine. However, once the KPSS had been outlawed in Russia, the KPU, although sympathetic to the Moscow coup, quickly changed its orientation to prevent the spread of the anti-communist upheaval into Ukraine. Communist deputies in the Ukrainian parliament endorsed the Act Proclaiming the Independence of Ukraine on August 24, supported the Supreme Council's Presidium decree on the immediate suspension of the KPU and the nationalization of all its property, and adopted a new ideology, namely espousing the idea of Ukraine's national rebirth and state-building. These measures enabled KPU members to protect their positions, privileges, and influence. Although the KPU was formally disbanded, its members
continued to stay in power. Some KPU members in the parliament and government gave up their membership in the party, but the majority "quietly" became non-communists while preserving their positions and maintaining previous networks. Moreover, Leonid Kravchuk, the chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament and later the first president of Ukraine, "painted himself as the foremost defender of Ukrainian independence" and "found nationalism was clearly the only response that would have preserved his credibility under post-coup conditions." This shift completely rearranged and confused the existing political spectrum and caused problems for further democratic developments in Ukrainian society.

The process of re-establishing the KPU in the political scene began almost immediately after August 1991. In October 1991, those former communists who were between the reformers and hardliners formed the Socialist Party of Ukraine (Sotsialistystychna partiia Ukrainy, SPU) with Oleksander Moroz at its head. During the next two years, the SPU alone represented the left wing in the Ukrainian political arena and claimed to be the largest party of that time with 50,000 members. The situation changed in 1993, when the Supreme Council, in its Resolution of May 14, allowed "citizens of Ukraine, who favor communist ideas, to form party organizations in accordance with the present Ukrainian legislation in force." Those former communists who were disillusioned with their membership in the SPU decided to restore the KPU. In October, 1993, the "new" KPU (according to the existing law it was impossible to re-establish the pre-1991 communist party) reappeared on the Ukrainian political scene and was officially registered as a political party. Although officially a new party, it nevertheless claimed to be the successor of the old KPU. Moreover, the majority of its 120,000 members were former members of the KPSS, and the "new" party simply duplicated old communist ideology. Its leadership was new and in the hands of younger leaders, such as First Secretary Petro Symonenko and Secretary Oleksander Kotsiuba, both in their forties (KPSS leaders previously came from the older generation). Maintaining the old communist network and a good organizational structure and employing the tactic of pure criticism of "the capitalist restoration," which was blamed for all the difficulties of the transitional period but especially for economic hardship, the KPU
achieved major success in the March 1994 parliamentary elections, obtaining more than one third of the seats. Thus far the KPU activity in the parliament has been directed toward preserving Soviet power in Ukraine and attempting to repeal the decree which suspended its activity in 1991.

Opposition development in Ukraine took on almost the same character as in Poland, except for one important difference regarding the circumstances of its fragmentation. The Ukrainian opposition, which had united during the parliamentary elections of 1990, was unable to topple the communist regime as in Poland. But, as in Poland, its fragmentation began soon after the 1990 elections.

1990 was a crucial year for the rise of the multi-party system in Ukraine. Thirteen major political parties held founding congresses that year. Most of the new parties originated from Rukh. These included the Ukrainian Republican Party (Ukrains'ka respublikans'ka partiia, URP), the Green Party of Ukraine (Partiia zelynykh Ukrainy, PZU) and the Democratic Party of Ukraine (Demokratychna partiia Ukrainy, DPU) (see table 2).

### Table 2: Major Political Parties in Ukraine in 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Date of Foundation</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Seats in VR 1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UKhDP</td>
<td>13 Jan 1989</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNP</td>
<td>21 Oct 1989</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSU</td>
<td>8 April 1989</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URP</td>
<td>30 April 1990</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PZU</td>
<td>30 Sept 1990</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDVU</td>
<td>2 Dec 1990</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPU</td>
<td>16 Dec 1990</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPU</td>
<td>26 Dec 1990</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others and unaffiliated</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some radical groups such as the Ukrainian Christian Democratic Party (Ukrains‘ka khrystyans‘ko-demokratychna partiia, UKhDP), the Ukrainian National Party (Ukrains‘ka nacional‘na partiia, UNP), and the Political Union for State Independence of Ukraine (Derzhavna samostiinist‘ Ukrainy, DSU) crystallized from the opposition without having had previous organizational affiliation with Rukh and were at a more advanced stage of party building.

Although these parties held founding congresses, they continued to have links with Rukh, especially in organizing mass actions such as supporting the referendum on independence in December 1991. However, some leaders of the newly established parties questioned the future of Rukh as an umbrella organization. These discussions continued throughout 1990 and 1991, but the division of Rukh did not come about until the presidential campaign in 1991, held on the same day as the referendum on independence. If the opposition was unable to reach a decision on a single presidential candidate out of the six who vied for the position, they were at least able to reach unanimous agreement to endorse independence. In the presidential elections, Leonid Kravchuk, former chief of ideology of the KPU, was elected as Ukraine’s first president since 1917.

The theoretical differences among the opposition leaders on the eve of the presidential elections set the stage for the organizational split of Rukh. The main catalyst for the formal split was the question of cooperation with the president. In 1992, Leonid Kravchuk, who switched his allegiance from communism to nationalism, suggested cooperation with some opposition leaders. He invited Ihor Iukhnovs‘kyi, the head of the official opposition in parliament, Mykola Zhulynskyi, Viktor Pynzenyk, and even former dissident Ivan Dzyuba to join the government. Their agreement with Kravchuk’s proposal released the tensions which were to result in the split of Rukh, weakening not only this organization but also the effectiveness of the entire opposition. Those political leaders who supported cooperation with the government and president, such as Mykhailo Horyn and Larysa Skoryk, formed a front of political parties and organizations known as the Congress of National-Democratic Forces (Konhres natsional‘no-demokratychnykh syl, KNDS). KNDS was supposed to unite new parties on the basis of state-building. Furthermore, it intended to back the president’s policies.
Ironically, this led not to the unity, but to the division of the opposition and to the formation of a parallel structure to Rukh. Since that time, the opposition has been unable to present a united front. The ruling party, on the other hand, made some insignificant political changes which enabled it to stay in power.

During the Rukh congresses in 1992-93, the existing political parties that continued to maintain ties with Rukh initiated their own policies, which often came into opposition with those of Rukh. The nationalist faction of Rukh, mostly active in western Ukraine, formed its own “Rukh” under the leadership of political activist and deputy-mayor of L’viv Volodymyr Parubii and Valentyn Moroz, a former dissident and emigre in North America. Although Rukh under Viacheslav Chornovil’s leadership still claimed to be the biggest opposition organization with 50,000 members in 1992, it was no longer as strong or popular as in previous years.96

The process of forming new political parties in Ukraine continued after Rukh’s split, although the number of political parties did not grow as dramatically as it did in Poland. Most new parties, as in the Polish case, were weak and unorganized with little influence on politics and society. In 1993, there were more than 30 registered parties, all of which took part in the March parliamentary elections. No more than ten were able to gain seats in the new parliament, however.97 Nevertheless, the first step was taken toward the formation of democratic-style competition among the parties, and one should expect a continuation of this process.

Conclusion

The consolidation of a strong multi-party system in Poland and Ukraine depends on future circumstances. However, to this point, both countries have demonstrated the beginnings of democratic political development. The formation of new political parties is an important sign of future democratic development because parties are of vital importance in the building of a democratic system - they are the chief political structures connecting national level elites with local leaders, various interest groups, and the mass public. Furthermore, they are crucial for “providing constitutional channels for citizen participation, control of elites, interest aggregation, conflict management,
competition maximization, policy innovation, and system consensus.\textsuperscript{98}

The comparison of these two states shows that Poland is more advanced in this process. To a great extent this is the result of prior experience, different "starting points," and developments during the political and economic transition from communism to democracy.

By contrast, as of this writing, Ukraine has not yet reached a political equilibrium due to a particularly weak opposition at crucial moments and a low level of political experience among the general population. The differences between western Ukraine, incorporated into the Soviet Union only in 1939-45 and more advanced in its national revival, and the rest of Ukraine have also contributed to the difficulty of maintaining a united opposition and forming new parties and organizations. The new parties' aims and programs, being based on the level of political activity and national consciousness of particular regions, have differed across Ukraine.\textsuperscript{99}

The results of the post-communist transformations in Poland and Ukraine have varied. It becomes evident, however, if one uses the regime-opposition interaction as the basis of comparison, that the nature of the development was the same in both cases during the crucial stages of transition. Namely, in the first post-communist elections, the opposition was represented by a mass political force: Solidarity in Poland and Rukh in Ukraine. In Poland, Solidarity was able to come to power; in Ukraine, the opposition did not achieve such success. This was a result of the opposition's constrained development during the Soviet era as well as the nature of the tasks on the political agenda. Nation and state-building processes were not questioned in Poland. In Ukraine, however, they were fundamental. The problem of national revival and the struggle for independence diverted emphasis away from other issues.

The communist regime's tolerance of opposition was also different in Poland and Ukraine. Although the PZPR and the Polish communist government were linked to Moscow, they nonetheless enjoyed some autonomy. One Polish writer described the situation at the time as follows: "... although the [Polish] state is not fully sovereign, in a specific form it does exist and occasionally can exercise a limited sovereignty."\textsuperscript{100}

In Ukraine, by contrast, the KPU and the regime were not
only completely dependent on Moscow, but in many cases conducted a much more severe policy than they were obliged to as part of both the KPSS and the Soviet-style regime. Although there were some periods of political liberalization, particularly during the Shelest period, the regime’s level of tolerance for opposition in Ukraine was much lower than in Poland. After Shcherbytsky’s accession to power in 1972 and his introduction of a more repressive regime, Ukrainian opposition activity came to a standstill.

The opposition in Poland and Ukraine have developed along the same lines during the post-communist transitions, namely, in the existence of mass movements (Solidarity and Rukh), their participation in the first post-communist elections as a united force, and in the fragmentation and formation of new parties. However, the communist authorities, represented by the PZPR in Poland and the KPU in Ukraine, acted differently in each state. The PZPR realized its weakness and inability to conduct reforms and dissolved itself; the KPU, in contrast, with some minor changes was able to maintain power throughout the transition period.

Nevertheless, the post-communist transition is still underway in both societies. The formation of multi-party systems is not over although this process has now turned from the establishment of new parties to the clarification of their programs and political orientations. However, the new political party systems are still fragmented and fragile. It is, therefore, important to adopt legislative measures to reinforce them because the future of democracy in both states will depend on how soon the parties will be ready to engage in the sort of competitive party politics essential for western-style democracies.

NOTES


3 There is no study on general East European transitions although there are works on specific countries. See, for example, Jacques Coenen-Huther and Brunon Synak (eds.), *Post-Communist Poland: From Totalitarianism to Democracy?* (Commack, N. Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 1993); and Alexander J. Motyl, *Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).

4 The periods of resistance against the Soviet regime, especially the crushing by Soviet military forces of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the 1968 uprising in Czechoslovakia, served as examples of the impossibility of regime-change without the threat of Soviet aggression and raised the question of the necessity of adopting peaceful methods for regime opposition.

6 The Soviet communist regime was introduced in Ukraine in the 1920s, but it was limited to eastern and central Ukraine. Western Ukraine was completely brought under Soviet control only in the 1940s.

7 Many new approaches to the problem of post-communist periodization have appeared recently in scholarly works. One was introduced by Zbigniew Brzezinski in his book *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1989). The author proposes four phases of transformation: communist totalitarianism, communist authoritarianism, post-communist authoritarianism, and post-communist pluralism without time specification.


9 For a detailed analysis of Polish-Ukrainian co-existence, see Potichnyj (ed.), *Poland and Ukraine*.

10 Small areas of today’s Ukrainian state were included in Czechoslovakia (Transcarpathia) and Romania (northern Bukovina and parts of Bessarabia).

11 For a comprehensive historical development of Ukraine and Poland, see, for example, Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); and Norman Davies, *God’s Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 volumes (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1982).


13 For a detailed analysis of Polish society during the post-war period, see Abraham Brumberg (ed.), *Poland: Genesis of a Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1983).


20 Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure*, p. 120.

21 For a detailed discussion of Church activity in Poland during the Soviet period, see Christopher Civic, “The Church,” in Brumberg (ed.), *Poland*, pp. 92-108.

22 *Robitnychi straiky*, pp. 5-16, 111-113.


First Secretary of the KPU Petro Shelest frequently expressed opinions in favor of the decentralization of the Soviet economy and more autonomy for Ukraine in the USSR. Such views led to his removal in 1972. See *Za shcho usunuly Shelest?: dokumenty* (n. p.: Suchasnist', 1973). Levko Lukianenko, a lawyer, was arrested for his part in the 1961 formation of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Union (Spilka ukrains'kykh robitynykiv i selian, SURiS), a party which demanded Ukraine's secession from the USSR on the basis of the Soviet constitution. See "L. Lukyanenko to the USSR Procurator-General Rudenko (1964)," in Michael Browne (ed.), *Ferment in the Ukraine* (Woodhaven, N. Y.: Crisis Press, 1973), pp. 33-42.


Bohdan Nahaylo, "Ukrainian Dissent and Opposition after..."

31 At the beginning of the 1980s, the UHH had 40 members, 22 of whom were in exile with between 9 and 15 year terms of imprisonment. Six UHH members were forced to emigrate and four died in the Gulag from conditions of confinement. Data from Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine, p. 57.


39 On the KPU’s development on the eve of perestroika, see Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine, pp. 42-52.

41 On the history of Rukh, see Oleksii V. Haran', Ubyty drakona: z istorii Rukhu ta novykh partii Ukrainy (Kyiv: "Lybid", 1993).


44 Later, in the 1990s, everybody would claim his or her decisive role during the transition period. In a letter to the Polish emigre monthly Kultura, for example, Kiszczak’s wife pointed to the importance of her husband’s role in the destruction of the communist system in Poland. This is mentioned in Andrzej Walicki, “From Stalinism,” p. 99.

45 Neither the opposition nor the regime were unanimous about round table discussions. The extreme right wing of the opposition, represented by the Confederation of Independent Poland (Konfederacja Polski Niepodlegiej, KPN), and the extreme leftist supporters of the regime (who later formed the Polish Socialist Party-Revolutionary Democracy [Polska Partia Socjalistyczna-Rewolucjna Demokracja, PPS-RD]) did not participate in the negotiations. See Walicki, “From Stalinism,” p. 107.


51 Kuzio and Wilson, *Ukraine*, pp. 65-79.

52 Previous attempts made by political activists in 1988-89 to launch popular fronts in L'viv, Kyiv, and smaller cities were unsuccessful. For more on this, see Haran', *Ubyty drakona*, pp. 9-17.


55 Rukh members were often simultaneously members of the KPU. Thus, among the 1100 delegates to the inaugural congress of Rukh, which took place from 8-10 September 1990 in Kyiv, 228 were members of the KPU. Data cited in Kuzio and Wilson, *Ukraine*, pp. 110-11.


59 These organizations were formed by the extreme hardliners in response to the destruction of Lenin's monuments and the closure of Lenin and communist party museums, a process which spread across the Soviet Union along with the general decline of communist ideology in the late 1980s.

60 Although the dominant role in the election campaign was played by members of NRU-Rukh, other organizations with a democratic orientation also joined this bloc. The name Rukh was taken for tactical purposes as NRU-Rukh was the biggest and most popular oppositional organization at that time and thus the name was easily recognizable.


66 Ibid., p. 41.


71 In his memoirs, the last First Secretary of the PZPR, Mieczysław Rakowski, noted that the dissolution of the communist party was carried out to facilitate future reforms and a better future for the Motherland. On the process that led to the last PZPR Congress, see Mieczysław F. Rakowski, Jak to się stało (Warsaw: Polska Oficyna Wydawnicza "BGW," 1991).

72 Actually two parties were formed at the last PZPR Congress. The larger one, the SdRP (60,000 members in April 1990), was developed more successfully and became one of the main components of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD), the coalition which obtained the largest number of seats in the 1993 parliamentary elections. The smaller party (3,000 members), the Polish Social-Democratic Union (Polska Unia Socjaldemokratyczna, PUS), was led by Tadeusz Fiszbach and represented, in the main, an "ideological continuity of the previous regime." Unable to gain popular support, however, it soon disintegrated. See Piotr Ogrodziński, "Czy ostateczny koniec dla lewicy w Polsce?" in Więź (Warsaw), No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 48-56.


74 Cited in Walicki, "From Stalinism," p. 115.

75 For a list of registered parties up to June 1993, see Appendix A in Stanisław Gebethner (ed.), Polska scena polityczna a wybory: praca zbiorowa (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Fundacji Inicjatyw Społecznych "Polska w Europie," 1993), pp. 261-68.

76 Thus, for example, the Polish Beer-Lovers' Party (Polska Partia
Przyjaciel Piwa, PPPP), without having a real political program, was able to obtain sixteen seats in the Sejm in the October 1991 elections. By June 1993, however, thirteen of PPPP’s representatives had switched to other parliamentary blocs and shortly thereafter the party dissolved itself.


The SLD is a parliamentary coalition of the post-PZPR forces: trade unions, independent intellectuals, and the SdRP are its main components. Among the SLD members of the Sejm, 38 belong to the SdRP. The composition of the other members is not given.

Date from Kuzio and Wilson, Ukraine, p. 43.


A few days later, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the KPSS although he kept the position of the president of the USSR for the next few months and recommended that the Central Committee dissolve the communist party. This was a sign of the end of the KPSS. It also showed the incapability of the KPSS and the Soviet government to control the situation in the USSR, which consequently led to its dissolution in December 1991.


Motyl, Dilemmas of Independence, pp. 48-49.
After the next parliamentary elections in 1994, Oleksander Moroz was elected head of the parliament.


Ukr-Inform, Kyiv, (12-4-1994).


Rukh is not included in this table because it was registered as a political movement and has not transformed into a party up to this writing. In the parliament, however, Rukh has become the core of the opposition, Narodna Rada, consisting of 125 members. The KPU is also not included because it was not registered as of July 1991 and was disbanded in August of the same year and therefore was officially not represented in the parliament.


For a detailed account of this issue see Iurii Badz’o, *Vlada-opozytsiia-derzhava v Ukraini s’ohodni: dumky proty techii* (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 1994).

96 Mykhailo Horyn’, “Politychna sytuatsiia v Ukraini i zavdannia URP na suchasnomu etapi,” in Respublikanets’ (L’viv), No. 4 (March 1993), pp. 3-7.


99 So far only one work has appeared comparing the programs and activities of political parties in western and eastern Ukraine. See Clem, “The Development of Local Party Organizations in L’viv and Donets’k, Ukraine,” (unpublished article, 1994).

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