Modes of Communist Rule, Democratic Transition, and Party System Formation in Four East European Countries

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Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor
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Preface

One of the most influential accounts of party system formation in western democracies has emphasized the effects of pre-existing social conditions on the development of party systems. It has been argued that contemporary party systems structurally reflect the social divisions extant at the time of mass enfranchisement. Since universal suffrage is one of the most characteristic institutional features of liberal democracy, this theory suggests that pre-democratic conditions exert a decisive weight upon democracy that comes to replace authoritarianism, particularly as far as the structure of the emerging party system is concerned. The goal of this analysis is to test this theory, which appears to be quite instrumental when applied to western political realities, by examining its applicability to the study of the post-communist polities of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The problem has already received some coverage in the ongoing debate on the emerging party systems, but many questions remain unanswered. In particular, the most explicit attempt so far to open a "Rokkanian perspective" on party system formation in Eastern Europe has been focused on the "survivals" from pre-communist political conditions. Of course, it cannot be denied that greater or lesser amounts of persistence of the old parties exert some impact on the processes of party system formation. These parties, however, do not dominate the political landscape in any of the new democracies. To build a more comprehensive explanatory model, it is therefore necessary to shift the focus of analysis to more general patterns of pre-democratic development, falling under the umbrella category of the mode of communist rule. It is hypothesized that the mode of communist rule, if theoretically reconstructed as a sequence of political choices made under structural constraints specific for political regimes of this type, explains cross-national variance among the emerging party systems of post-communist democracies. This hypothesis, influenced by the "structured contingency" approach
developed for the study of democratization in Latin America, requires undertaking in-depth analyses of several cases of post-communist democratic transitions. Such analyses will be provided for the cases of Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic.

For the past several years, specialists on post-communist politics have been looking at the role played by the "Leninist legacies" in structuring the fields of political alternatives with considerable controversy. Some analysts tend to consider this role as negligible. They assume that post-communist Europe, being in the midst of a profound political and economic transformation, has little if anything to owe to the communist regimes. But the predominant, although not necessarily well-articulated, assumption is that the legacies of the past cannot be easily discounted by those striving to attain a better understanding of the present. The major difficulty with operationalizing this approach stems from the fact that while the communist regimes were by no means ignored by the political science community during the decades of these regimes' existence, their collapse forced the scholarship on the subject into a "bout of soul-searching." On the one hand, the once dominant totalitarian model has been accused of being a misleadingly static concept incapable of explaining, and hence predicting, the process of political change under communism. On the other hand, the alternative "modernization approach" to the study of the Soviet Union and other East European countries has been denounced for misinterpreting the harsh realities of communism in rationalistic, optimistic terms invented by western social scientists. To be sure, the purpose of this study is not to suggest a new grand theory that would eliminate gaps in theoretical understanding produced by the turbulent state of the field. But giving some consideration to the relevant theoretical problems appears to be necessary.

The difficulties evident with both the totalitarian model and the "modernization approach" may be related to the fact that they were not sensitive to observable differences among the communist regimes. The former model, with its vision of these countries' societies as being atomized by the combination of repressive and highly centralized state activities, obviously left little space for any appreciation of the specificity of individual polities. The latter approach, with its theoretical fascination coming
largely from the theories of convergence, also concentrated on similarities in occupational and status structures engendered by modernization rather than on those differences which, as the logic of this approach implied, could be expected to gradually lose their significance. True, many scholars objected to generic characterizations of the East European polities, citing a range of reasons from the diverse patterns of interest articulation and institutions observable in the region\textsuperscript{11} to cultural differences.\textsuperscript{12} Generally, however, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the theoretical models which dominated the field of Sovietology before the start of the processes of democratization tended to emphasize the discontinuity between the communist regimes, viewed in a relatively uniform way, and their obviously diverse predecessors. In this sense, the current tendency to discount the continuity between the communist dictatorships and the emerging democracies appears to be entrenched in the intellectual history of the field. It must be stressed that the theoretical vision that underlies this study breaks with this tradition.

Of course, no claim is made that communist regimes in different countries had little in common. Their similarities, stemming from such fundamental properties as monopolistic political control and the command economy, were sealed by the Soviet military hegemony in the region. It is assumed, however, that the mode of operation available to the communist regime in each of the East European countries was strongly conditioned by the specific environments intrinsic to the given society. These environments not only persisted through the period of communist rule, but they also influenced the regime itself, making it respond to societal challenges and pressures with a specific combination of adaptive measures and overt political repression. Furthermore, these environments, even though transformed as a result of the regime's activities, played a significant role in shaping both the process of democratization and the institutional architecture of the emerging post-communist polity. Thus, the theoretical perspective of this study may be best characterized as that of continuity.

The notion of continuity, of course, is too general to be immediately applied to the specific subject matter of this study. To make such an application possible, it is necessary to introduce those concepts which are expected to be instrumental in examining the preconditions for post-communist party system forma-
tion. Since the most inclusive answer to the question "what are political parties?" might be that they perform the function of communication between the elite and the masses, it is only logical to place these two principal political actors, and country-specific patterns of interaction between them, at the center of the analysis. In broad terms, any relationship between the ruled and the rulers may be described as a combination of conformity and dissent. While the elite engages itself in the process of "authoritative allocation of values," the masses either conform to or dissent from the rulers' ideological goals and/or policy objectives. Due to their authoritarian nature, the communist regimes embarked on massive institution-building efforts intended to carry the government writ into the farthest corners of the polity. At the early phases of the regimes' existence, the scope and effectiveness of these efforts were contingent upon the level of popular support to the communist party at the moment of its advent to power. For the sake of brevity, this factor will be further called the "level of communist support."

The heuristic payoff of employing the level of communist support as the basic variable is twofold. First, and most important from the theoretical perspective accepted in this study, it allows for establishing a structural linkage between the mode of communist rule and the pre-communist political conditions in the country. Second, since in several countries the communists came to power after evoking relatively free elections, it allows for introducing a reasonably large amount of the quantitative data into the analysis of specific cases. At this point, it is still feasible to speak of the level of dissent in terms of the numbers of votes cast for non-communist parties. Of course, this becomes impossible as soon as the study starts to deal with the established communist regimes. However, the presence or absence of mass political protest against the regime, as well as the presence or absence of meaningful dissident movements in the given country, keeps us informed about the overall balance between conformity and dissent in the popular attitude towards the regime. It is also worth taking into consideration that the manifestations of dissent did not remain without response from the regime. Hence, the level of reform liberalization before the beginning of political transformation is considered as an important variable. Finally, during the initial phase of transition to democracy the relationships between the dissatisfied masses and the elite are expected
to be conditioned by the role played by the radical reformers within the top communist leadership.

Related to the basic notion of continuity, this study examines the impact of the identified factors upon the processes of post-communist party system formation. The choice of comparative referents is motivated by the need to increase the variation of the basic variables. It must be mentioned that, for the sake of case comparability, Russia and the Czech Lands are considered as nation states directly succeeding the former Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, respectively. Any discussion of questions related to the disintegration of the quasi-federal communist states is largely avoided, and the cases of other successor states (the former Soviet republics other than Russia, and Slovakia) are not discussed at any length. While it cannot be denied that this results in some loss of information relevant to the purposes of the study, the strategy of cross-national comparison of whole political systems unambiguously requires that the units of analysis be uniform, which cannot be achieved in any other way but by treating them as nation states without further qualifications.15

The case studies are preceded by an introductory section explicating several theoretical assumptions about the process of party system formation in post-communist democracies. The rationale for discussing this subject matter is that, while the process is hypothesized to be rooted in the pre-existing conditions, it is also necessary to examine the impact of those conditions which arise as a result of transition to democracy. To achieve this, the introductory section of the analysis addresses the following major questions: What are the likely initial configurations of the fields of ideological and political alternatives that emerge in the transformative polities? In what way does the introduction of free electoral practices shape the development of party systems? These questions grow in their importance as soon as a case study starts to deal with the process of transition to democracy, and they become absolutely unavoidable with the first free elections held in the country under consideration. Clearly, the impact of democratic conditions should be examined in a theoretically elaborated and methodologically uniform way. The goal of the introductory section of the study is to provide the adequate analytical tools for meeting this requirement.

Choosing Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria and the Czech Lands as comparative referents requires a word of caution re-
garding the comparability of electoral outcomes in these four countries. All of them employ electoral systems that include elements of proportionality. In some important respects, however, these systems are distinctively different. The data used in this analysis will represent, unless otherwise stated, the results of the elections to the Hungarian parliament, the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), and the Czech National Council. In Bulgaria, the Grand National Assembly (1990) had been elected under different electoral rules than the parliament, Sobranie, first convened in 1991.

"Pure" proportional representation systems have been in use in the Czech Lands, and in Bulgaria since 1991. The 1990 elections to the Grand National Assembly of Bulgaria were held under a mixed system, with half the deputies elected by a proportional formula and the other half by a majority system in single-member districts. A similar system has been employed in the Duma elections in Russia, with the only difference being that there, a plurality formula has been used in single-member districts. Obviously, it is the distribution of votes cast for party lists which is relevant to this analysis. The Hungarian electoral law is one of the most complex systems based on hybrid principles. Three different formulae are used to allocate a total of 386 seats in the national parliament. 176 seats are distributed among single member districts through a majority formula with the runoff. A maximum of 152 seats are distributed among candidates from parties that have established regional party lists. Each of the twenty regions is assigned a number of mandates that are allocated through a proportional representation formula. At least 58 seats are distributed among parties that have established national party lists. These seats, however, are allocated not by a proportional formula properly, but in proportion to the parties' so-called residual votes (those votes that are not enough to gain a seat either in a single member district or in a regional contest). From this description, it appears that the only data useful for this analysis are the results of elections by regional party lists.

The comparative nature of this analysis entails certain chronological limitations on the scope of the case studies. In each of them, the examination of post-communist developments is limited to the period between the event of regime change, often but not necessarily coinciding with the earliest free parliamentary elections, and the second free elections held in the given country.
As a result, the upper chronological limits for the case studies are set at different points: in the case of Hungary, the May-June 1994 elections; in the case of Russia, the December 1995 elections; and in the case of the Czech Lands, the June 1992 elections. It is assumed that the period of time between the 1990 and 1991 elections in Bulgaria was insufficiently long to allow for considering the latter elections as the “second” ones properly. Therefore, the analysis of the case of Bulgaria is extended to the December 1994 elections.

Party system formation in post-communist democracies: theoretical and methodological problems

The emerging fields of ideological and political alternatives

The well-established party systems of the west are widely viewed as structured along ideological lines. For instance, the contrast between socialist and non-socialist ideological tendencies, or the “leftists” and the “rightists,” is commonly taken as the major point of reference in characterizing west European political parties. The role played by ideologies in the processes of post-communist party system formation is also expected to be important. In the communist regimes, ideology was essential for preserving a stable and consensual political order. One would be denied a political role under these regimes if one could not or would not manipulate the language of ideology. Moreover, it was often through the ideological code of communication that political differences of opinion were expressed, and one had to be aware of the subtle distinctions and nuances of that code to catch the differences. At the same time, dissident groups and mass anti-communist movements viewed challenging the official ideology as one of their major tasks, and defined themselves primarily in that idiom. Hence ideological pluralization emerges as an important prerequisite for regime change, and maintaining a highly ideological style of political communication in the process of transition to democracy. Members of the new political elites, trained in the language of ideological discourse, continue to be most alert and sensitive to messages which have an ideological cast. But what makes the rank and file listen to these messages?

At least in theory, they have to. In democratic societies, ideology has a merit of minimizing the costs of collecting infor-
mation relevant to the voter’s choice. Nearly all post-communist democracies have developed very fragmented multi-party systems. Individual parties are in the state of formation. At the same time, the intensity of political conflicts makes ideological debates quite salient at any given phase of political development. Many students of voting behavior in western Europe have convincingly argued that all these peculiarities account for the increased impact of ideology on the political life.24 Ideologies offer an organizing principle that can simplify complex choices: if the parties are arrayed along an ideological continuum, no matter what kind of continuum it is, it becomes relatively easy to decide which is the nearest alternative in a run-off election or when a candidate from one’s most preferred party is not available. In post-communist democracies, the utility of ideology appears to be further increased by the fact that, while it may be more or less easy to learn what party is in power, identifying the "true opposition" is often a puzzling task. With a number of parties attacking the government for different reasons, ideology may be instrumental in solving this puzzle. Ranging opposition parties along an ideological axis, voters may decide who is closer to the government and thus deserves to be rewarded or punished at the polls.

In his influential analysis of 1992, Herbert Kitschelt argued the emerging party systems of Eastern Europe would be structured in a way different from the party systems of the west. According to Kitschelt, instead of the "left-wing" and "right-wing" political parties, two major types of organizations would dominate the political arenas of the transformative societies: on the one hand, redistributive, authoritarian, nationalist parties; on the other hand, pro-market, libertarian, cosmopolitan parties.25 A less theoretically sophisticated and more empirically oriented analysis of political dissent in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union could result in the same conclusion. The dominant discourse of anti-communist proto-oppositions was imbued with references to the universal rights of man and citizen, with the "west" representing the way in which these rights should be protected.26 At the same time, nationalism emerged as one of the major foes of the communist experiment. Universalism of the official ideology was not uncommonly criticized as a threat to the particularity of the national potential, based on its distinctive patrimony. For this variety of anti-communist discourse, the notion
of individual rights was rather irrelevant. Instead, it celebrated the individual only as an extension of the nation. 

Arguably, these different approaches could result in the emergence of two major ideologies of post-communism. One of them emphasizes such values as political liberty and market economy, while another focuses on preserving the strong national state capable of taking care of its citizens. In this analysis, it is assumed that the major ideological polarization which emerges in transformative societies is, indeed, between two trends identified by Kitschelt. For the sake of convenience only, these varieties will be referred to as "liberal" and "nationalist" ideologies. It must be stressed that "liberal" and "nationalist" ideological tendencies are generalized categories, which means that the country-specific phenomena to which these categories can be applied are not necessarily identical. In particular, some "nationalists" may be more redistributive, others more authoritarian, and still others more nationalist than their counterparts in different socio-cultural and political contexts. From this perspective, the term definitely simplifies the reality. This disadvantage, however, cannot be totally avoided. In comparative research, generalized cross-national categories serve as most important cognitive tools. For example, the Socialists in France are clearly not the same as the Laborites in Britain, which does not prevent us from labeling them as social democrats or left-wingers, and drawing comparisons based on these apparent simplifications.

Of course, one may object that not all post-communist party systems may be expected to be well-structured along this ideological axis. Even in well established democracies like Belgium, Canada, and the Netherlands, national and language divisions are important bases for parties. In multiethnic societies, people tend to support those parties which, in their view, are likely to defend their own community and ethnicity, often disregarding these parties' ideological stances. Ethnicity also exerts its influence upon the nature of emerging ideological alternatives. In Estonia, for instance, ethnic Estonians are pro-market and pro-western, but they are at the same time authoritarian in sense of their rejection of full political citizenship for the Russian minority. In none of the countries that are to be examined in this study, do "titular nationalities" comprise less than 80 per cent of the population. This allows us to disregard the effects of multi-ethnicity on the structuring of the fields of ideological alterna-
tives.

A much stronger point against Kitschelt's conceptualization may be made on the grounds that, notwithstanding the theoretical reasons to expect the emergence of party systems structured along the "liberal-nationalist" ideological axis, the empirical evidence insufficiently supports this theory. In particular, one may cite the increasingly important role played by communist successor parties in many of the post-communist democracies. Traditionally perceived as a part of the "left," these parties tend to sideline both the "nationalists" and the "liberals," thus contributing to the emergence of party systems that are similar to what is observable in the west. The major difficulty with this seemingly convincing argument is that the very "leftism" of communist successor parties cannot be taken for granted. In the well-established democracies of the west, the fields of ideological and political alternatives almost naturally coincide. At least some cases of transformative politics, however, do not fit into this pattern.

One of the most impressive varieties of party change is abrupt change in ideology. Such events are rare and unusual, the German Social Democratic Party's shift to the right in 1959 being the stellar example. Political parties in stable democracies do change, but only slowly and gradually. This makes the cases of abrupt party change in the countries experiencing transitions to democracy very topical. It stands to reason to expect that, in the turbulent institutional and social environments of post-communist transformations, the ideological change of political parties is better exposed to scientific observation and analysis than anywhere else. The major problem here is that those formations which enter the political arenas of new democracies often can be referred to as political parties only in a very limited sense. Rather, the vast majority of these formations are groups of notables, political clubs, or loose political coalitions.

This tends to decrease the comparative utility of the cases of party system formation in the transformative societies, but with one significant exception. Those formations which at least partly inherit the organizational resources of the former authoritarian regimes are neither small in terms of their memberships nor lack internal structures which would qualify them as political parties properly. Such organizations are active on the political arenas of the majority of new democracies. These parties are not
equally resourceful in all transitional societies, however. Military dictatorships and traditional regimes had little, if anything, to contribute to party formation. Even in those South European and Latin American countries where pro-government political parties did exist, they often did not take any clearly defined ideological stance, adhering to vague mixtures of nationalist and anti-communist ideas. In this respect, the ruling communist parties of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were entirely different.

In the communist regimes, the ruling parties played key roles in the functioning of the political systems. The state was never independent from the party, with party organs being created in all arms of the bureaucratic apparatus and party members occupying responsible posts at all levels of that apparatus. These posts could be achieved exclusively through nomenklatura, the party-based nomination system.\(^{32}\) The intervention of party and administrative structures, however, did not prevent the Communist parties from maintaining relatively mass memberships. The Communist party had not been intended to embrace the whole population, and party admission standards were normally rather strict. At the same time, however the party never coincided with the bureaucratic apparatus. This would be inconsistent with the party’s claim not only to guide the workers and farmers, but also to represent them, a claim of crucial importance for understanding the role played by the official ideology in regime legitimization under state socialism. Marxism-Leninism, perceived as the expression of the consciousness of the working class, not only justified continuing party dominance, but provided the key for the implementation of policy designed to reach the ideologically prescribed goal of communism.\(^{33}\)

The ruling Communist parties were not only well-organized and relatively large in terms of their memberships (that is possessing some properties that obviously contributed to their survival into the period of democratic transition), but they were also ideologically cohesive. Some of them adhered to the communist orthodoxy until the very eve of regime change (for example, in Czechoslovakia). In those countries where the process of political transformation was initiated or at least tolerated from above, like in the Soviet Union or in Hungary, the Communist parties demonstrated more ideological flexibility. Even in these cases the official ideology remained an important structural
factor that both shaped the reform and defined its limits.\textsuperscript{34} Therefore, in all post-communist democracies we may observe political actors that, once exposed to an especially strong external pressure, have to redefine their ideological stances.\textsuperscript{35} Directions of their ideological shifts are important not only in themselves, but they may be reasonably expected to bear heavily on the emerging structure of party alternatives. There is no apparent reason to believe that communist successor parties cannot accept either "liberal" or "nationalist" ideological stances. In such cases, these parties' "primary" ideological identities, still residually expressed in their public rhetoric, symbols, and labels, may be expected to gradually lose their significance. Of course, it cannot be denied that under certain conditions, different dimensions of ideological polarization may occur—for instance, a more familiar "left-right" dimension. These alternative dimensions may be of marginal importance, or they may dominate the landscape of emerging party systems. In this respect, a justifiable research strategy would be not to ignore the salience of these dimensions for the sake of theoretical consistence, but rather to examine those country-specific factors which have facilitated their emergence, and probably impeded the emergence of the "liberal-nationalist" ideological axis.

\textit{Voting behavior in post-communist democracies}

In the normative theories of democracy, however different these theories may be in their approaches, parties have been traditionally viewed not only as the principal instrument of governing, but also as "the central intermediate and intermediary structures between society and government."\textsuperscript{36} Consequently, political parties are expected to emerge and change, adapting themselves to accord with their changing societal environments, or to become extinct if they fail to adapt. Electoral rewards and punishments are considered to be instrumental in providing the major incentives for the process of party system formation.\textsuperscript{37} In this study, it is assumed that the electorates not only profoundly influence the structure of the field of party alternatives, but also do so in ways that are essentially similar in all post-communist democracies. Thus, a model of voting behavior employed in this analysis should be explicated.

Voting behavior in eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union has received some coverage in the political science literature, mostly in form of the case-studies of individual elections. While this research has not produced a theoretical model capable of embracing the peculiarities of voting behavior in the post-communist democracies, the major findings are by no means irrelevant to the problem of model building. In particular, it has been clearly demonstrated that the existing approaches to the study of voting behavior, based largely on observations of western politics, are often inapplicable to post-communist realities. The theory of party identification, which has resulted from a seminal study of voting behavior in America and continues to dominate the ongoing debate in the field, obviously has little to say about post-communist societies. In this theory, long-standing affective attachments to parties are considered to provide voters with a parsimonious way of understanding political issues and a basis for making voting decisions. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, this may explain the vote for the revived "historical" parties and for communist successor parties, but only partly, while the vote for other parties remains unexplained. The lack of affective attachments to political parties thus severely reduces the possibility of employing this theory on the aggregate level of analysis.

Yet another theory of voting behavior in the west has emphasized the influence of social cleavages on the development of party systems. This theory contends that voting is primarily an expression of social affiliation and the well-established values and interests associated with it. These social affiliations alone are said to explain quite convincingly voters' choices, particularly in western Europe, provided that voting shares of parties with similar social clienteles are aggregated. But the evident lack of a differentiated basis of interests in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union questions the validity of the attempts to connect party choice with existing socio-economic divisions. This is not to say that the electoral support for individual parties in post-communist societies is unlikely to be concentrated among particular social groups. What is lacking is the stability of connections between social groups and political parties. Previously atomized by the disaggregation of social resources characteristic of the communist regimes, social groups are still in the process of formation and, correspondingly, in search for their political identities.
The third approach to electoral behavior in the west has emphasized the impact of issues on voting decisions. More than the theories discussed above, this approach is consistent with the normative theories of democracy, picturing the voter as a responsible, well-informed and politically interested actor, capable of making independent judgments on whether the politicians should be rewarded or punished at the polls. According to some research, issue voting occurs most frequently during periods of social and economic turmoil, when the policy options tend to be relatively distinct, and under the conditions when the strength of forces that inhibit volatility (such as party identification or class bases of voting) is reduced. From both perspectives, issue voting is even more likely to take place in transformative societies than in the west. The problem is that the typical voter in these societies is even less similar to the classic democratic citizen of normative theories than his or her western counterpart. The Downsian image of issue voting as of the final result of a sophisticated decision calculus simply does not match the harsh realities of post-communism.

There are, however, theories that suggest that voting behavior is rational, but do not make high demands of the voters' political sophistication. These theories emphasize the weight exerted upon the voters' decisions by their evaluations of government economic performance, and the impact of economic outcomes, either for the society as a whole or for an individual voter, on his or her choice. The theories under discussion do not assume that the electorate's understanding of economics is any more sophisticated than its understanding of politics. Instead, it is assumed that the electorate simply punishes the government for perceived economic ills. The mass public reacts to policy outcomes, social conditions, and economic circumstances even when unaware of government activities that contribute to those end states. This type of voting behavior is conventionally referred to as economic retrospective voting. Those Downsian voters who look ahead and choose between alternative futures display a pattern which is called prospective voting behavior. The actual act of voting may be described as a mixture of these two "pure types," but the balance is always shifted in favor of one of them.

In a recent analysis, it has been suggested that voting behavior in post-communist polities, in contrast to the well-established democracies of the west, is primarily prospective:
"People do not punish governments because of past losses of income, but reward parties basing on future expectations about personal gain from the policies promised by parties in electoral campaigns." This is said to result from introducing into the voter's calculus those assets that have been acquired under the former regime, and that are only differentially convertible into new political resources. This hypothesis, however theoretically elegant it is, is rather questionable. First, it remains to be explained why the voters in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are more likely to invest their already limited individual resources in collecting tremendous amounts of politically relevant information (which appears to be a necessary prerequisite for introducing party programs, issue positions etc. into the calculus) than their western counterparts. Second, even if such a use of time is affordable, the utility of these calculations for the rational voter may not be taken for granted, given the extremely high levels of social and political uncertainty in transformative societies. Third, the empirical evidence from post-communist democracies does not suggest that the voters are inclined to disregard their past losses of income in favor of future expectations. For example, a thorough analysis of voting behavior in Poland estimates that stronger economic growth and lower unemployment since the spring of 1992 would have significantly increased the support for the pro-government parties in the 1993 parliamentary elections.

In this analysis, a less demanding view of the rational voter is accepted. It is held that voters operate on a brutally simple assumption that governments should be blamed for economic ills, and that opposition should be rewarded if government perceptively does not fare well at managing the economy. It is also assumed that this pattern of voting behavior profoundly affects the ideological evolution of political parties, making them shift to this or that segment of the ideological spectrum in order to increase their electoral gains. Of course, the degree of voters' freedom in expressing their ideological preferences is not expected to be unlimited. In accordance with the logic of party system formation suggested by the theory of Lipset and Rokkan, it is assumed that, in the course of time, party systems stabilize and tend to "freeze." From this perspective, the period between the "founding" elections, viewed by the voters as a referendum on the former regime, and the "second" elections, in which they
have to choose between competing post-communist political actors, is assumed to be of critical importance for the process of party system formation. Arguably, it is after the "second" elections that the "freezing" of a party system starts.

Methodological implications

The theoretical assumptions stated above have several important implications for the methodology of the case-studies. Related to the expected configurations of the post-communist fields of ideological alternatives, it appears to be insufficient to examine anti-communist dissent without giving consideration to the ideological trends represented by various proto-opposition groups. These groups, however small in terms of membership or politically impotent vis-à-vis the regimes, are nevertheless important for understanding the origins of those ideologies which currently dominate the political landscape of the region. In particular, the early manifestations of the "liberal" and "nationalist" ideological trends deserve close attention. Correspondingly, it is necessary to focus the studies of democratic transitions on the interplay of political forces that allows the representatives of this or that ideological tendency to play the lead within the camp of reformers. This includes not only the activities of the reformers themselves, either outside of the ruling parties or within them, but also the attempts of the ruling parties' conservative wings to split the reformers by providing political support to certain groups while trying to sideline others. The resulting compositions of the ideological spectra of opposition may be expected to bear heavily on the post-communist party systems.

The use of the "retrospective economic" model of voting behavior brings about several methodological consequences for this analysis. First, and most important, political parties are considered as "vote seeking" rather than as "office seeking" or "policy seeking" agencies. While this approach certainly may be misleading if employed for the focused study of individual parties, explicating the logic of party system formation requires some uniform vision of party goals. Of course, the expressed will of the electorate may find no expression in policy outcomes or distribution of government positions. In this sense "office seeking" and "policy seeking" parties may be successful without winning many votes. The lack of electoral support, however,
severely reduces such parties’ capacity to establish themselves as important actors within the emerging party system. From the perspective of this analysis, their success in achieving other goals cannot be considered as a significant factor.

Second, the “retrospective economic” model of voting behavior has little to do with the breakdowns of the vote by region, class, education etc. Instead, the aggregate totals of the vote for different ideological tendencies are used as the major source of statistical information relevant to this analysis. While it cannot be denied that at least some of the emerging parties address their ideological appeals to specific groups rather than to the society as a whole, and occasionally succeed in creating stable clientelist networks on the societal level, the very stability of such networks makes them scarcely relevant to the goals of this study. In a way, the emerging bases of party support (such as the peasant base of the Christian Democratic People’s Party in Hungary or the provincial working-class base of the Liberal Democratic party of Russia) parallel the “normal vote,” a concept introduced in American political science to reflect the share of the vote that would be produced by electors behaving in accordance with their party identification in a situation when short-term forces exerted no effect. The analytical utility of the “normal vote” in America is, no doubt, much higher than in any of the post-communist democracies. It is important to note that even in America, it is not the “normal vote” but rather deviations from it which have become the focal point of electoral studies. Such deviations may be registered and measured on the aggregate level of analysis. This is what the “retrospective economic” model of voting behavior allows.

Finally, it must be mentioned that the methodology of this study exerts some weight upon the way in which the impact of institutional factors upon the process of party system formation is treated. This impact has received extensive coverage in political science literature. For instance, it has been demonstrated that parties in presidential systems are not characterized by a high degree of ideological or organizational rigidity and therefore should be “diffuse and internally diverse,” that proportional representation systems tend to reduce the flexibility of political parties, etc. These and many other findings, however important they are for the development of the field, are only marginally relevant to this analysis. One reason is that the pro-
cess of party system formation starts in largely "institution-free" environments. Moreover, the impact of already established institutions takes time to be felt. Say, the strong presidency adopted in Russia could not directly influence the structure of party competition simply because no presidential elections had been held in the country in 1993-95.

Yet another, and more important, reason is that this study addresses questions different from those already answered in the body of literature on the institutional factors of party system development. The existing literature shows how institutional constraints make parties change more or less slowly, displaying greater or lesser degrees of ideological cohesion. But these constraints do not—and obviously cannot—explain the directions of parties' ideological change. Meanwhile, it is not the very fact of change but precisely its direction which defines the places occupied by individual parties within the fields of political alternatives, and thereby, meaningfully influences the structures of the fields. This is not to say that institutional factors should and will be ignored in this analysis. But it is necessary to renounce making these factors a reservoir of ready explanations, easily attainable at the expense of those variables which have received less scholarly attention but may be important for the study of post-communism.

The case of Hungary

Mode of communist rule

The rise to power of the Hungarian Communist Party cannot be understood without reference to the Soviet occupation of the country. In the fall of 1944 when the Soviet army entered its territory, there were less than 3,000 Communists in Hungary. The Communists, however, had a dominant position in the local and central organizations that emerged in the wake of the advancing Soviet army. In December 1944 the members of the party leadership, most of whom had lived in exile in the USSR until that time, met in Debrecen and established a Provisional National Assembly composed of a Communist-controlled coalition of four parties and a Provisional Government. In January 1945, under the aegis of the Communist Minister of Agriculture, Imre Nagy, the long-waited land reform was carried out. This reform elimi-
nated the large estate-owner and made the smallholder the dominant social figure in the village. In autumn 1945, the Communist Party had a peasant membership of some 150,000 members. This, however, did not prevent the party from a humiliating defeat in the November 1945 parliamentary elections, when the Smallholder Party obtained 57 per cent of the vote. The Social Democrats received 17.4 per cent, and the Communists only 17 per cent. Under the pressure from the Soviet occupation authorities, the leaders of the Smallholders agreed to continue to work within the Communist-led coalition. In the course of the following two years, this pressure was increasingly strong. After a number of arrests made by the Soviet security forces in early 1947, those Smallholder leaders who resisted the Sovietization of Hungary, including the Prime Minister, were expelled from their own party. This virtually eliminated the organizational axis of anti-communist opposition in Hungary.

The August 1947 elections were marred by many irregularities. Even under these conditions, the Communist party obtained only 22.3 per cent of the vote (the Social Democrats 14.9 per cent, the reshuffled Smallholders 15.4 per cent). The parties of the Communist-led coalition, however, held the majority of seats in the parliament. The new government therefore encountered no opposition when it adopted and proceeded to implement the Communist program for Hungary's socialist development. In the fall of 1947 a campaign against "reactionary parties" resulted in their dismemberment or dissolution. The Social Democratic Party was absorbed by the Communists to form the new ruling Hungarian Working People's Party in June 1948. A single-party system effectively emerged and was legitimized by the 1949 Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic. It must be kept in mind, however, that the mass base of support for the communist regime in Hungary was apparently insufficient even at the moment when the regime established itself. The attainment of power was guaranteed primarily by the occupation forces. While there seems to have been a radical potential in several non-communist parties of 1945-47 that was inadequately reflected in their leaderships' policies, it appears highly unlikely that the majority of Hungarians would have voluntarily embraced the communist form of political radicalism in the late forties.

The regime of Mátyás Rákosi was unusually repressive
even by the standards of Stalinism. The overall number of people arrested, imprisoned in labor camps and exiled internally was reported to have been about 150,000 or 1.5 per cent of the population.\textsuperscript{62} When Stalin's death in March 1953 had ushered in the "thaw," a period of cautious liberalization in the Soviet Union, the Eastern European Communists soon found themselves in a state of uncertainty. Pressured by the new leaders in Moscow and in order to soothe the internal tensions, Rákosi grudgingly acknowledged some of his "mistakes." The implementation of the program of reforms had been started by new Prime Minister, Imre Nagy. But in 1955, he had been ousted from office and expelled from the party. The apparent victory of party conservatives, however, did not result in the return to the terrorist methods. Rákosi was eventually forced to resign as general secretary of the Hungarian Working People's Party. On 23 October 1956, a huge crowd of initially peaceful demonstrators assembled in Budapest to demand radical political change. This launched the events commonly referred to as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.\textsuperscript{63}

Street fighting broke out in the capital of the country between demonstrators and opposing Soviet-Hungarian forces. As soon as the Soviet troops withdrew from Budapest Nagy was returned to the premiership. On 1 November he proclaimed Hungary's neutrality and a number of measures including the intention to hold free multiparty elections. Two former Smallholder leaders entered the government, and this and some other pre-1949 parties (such as the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats) set up founding committees. The former ruling party, hastily renamed the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party to symbolize its break with the past, virtually disappeared. A dissident communist György Lukács, who had been Minister of Culture in the Nagy government, estimated: "Communism in Hungary has been totally disgraced. Collected around the party will probably be the small groups of progressive intellectuals and a few young people. . . . In free elections the Communists will obtain 5 per cent of the vote, 10 per cent at the most."\textsuperscript{64} On 3 November 1956 the Soviet armed forces invaded Hungary and crushed the rebellion. The new government, headed by the first secretary of practically non-existing Socialist Workers' Party János Kádár, came to Budapest on the next day.

The early period of Kádár's rule was characterized by the
use of force against the opposition. According to estimates, 200,000 people were arrested, 2,000 executed and many thousands deported to the Soviet Union. However, the re-establishment of the communist regime in Hungary could not be achieved solely by means of repression. In June 1957, at the first conference of the revived ruling party, Kádár introduced his "alliance policy." According to this policy, any office—except for party functions—could be held by a non-party person. All who were "loyal to their homeland," regardless their family backgrounds, past activities, or personal philosophies, were invited to participate in Hungary's socialist reconstruction. To emphasize the moderation of the regime, the pre-1956 slogan "Whoever is not with us is against us" was replaced by a much more inclusive phrase "Whoever is not against us is with us." Prior to 1962, however, Kádár had little opportunity to implement this conciliatory policy because it confronted the resistance of "dogmatists," a group of influential party officials who disapproved of any kind of liberalization.

It was only in November 1962 that the "alliance policy" received the official sanction of the party congress. Amnesty was granted to the participants in the 1956 uprising. The new movement of liberalization also brought about a reduction in the number of forced labor camps, a relaxation of travel restrictions, and an end to the jamming of western radio stations. The number of political arrests began to reduce, dropping to zero by the end of 1966. In the same year, the publication of "those works that are ideologically debatable and more or less in opposition to Marxism and socialist realism, as long as they possess humanistic values and are not politically hostile" was officially endorsed. Thus, the regime set the stage for a general decrease in the level and intensity of interference in cultural affairs. In 1967 it was not an exaggeration to characterize Hungary as one of the most liberalized communist regimes. After the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, Hungary was probably unique in the level of freedom enjoyed by its citizens among the countries of the Soviet bloc. Political opposition in the western sense of the word was prohibited. But the relative freedom of artistic and scientific expression allowed for voicing some criticism of the regime.

Beginning in the mid-sixties, a group of politically loyal Hungarian writers, including a prominent novelist Gyula Illés, started to cautiously criticize the regime. Ideologically, they rep-
resented the "populist" tradition of the Hungarian social thought. The "populists" of pre-communist Hungary were inspired both by nationalism and by the anti-capitalist left. They stood for land reform and for the creation of a new social elite, recruited from the peasantry, which was regarded as the only embodiment of the genuine Hungarian character. For the "populists," liberal parliamentarism meant, first, a danger for the traditional values, and second, the reservation of the power monopoly of the alien (for instance Jewish) groups. They were for some "third road" between capitalism and socialism. Their ideal was the formation of cooperatives based on private farming in agriculture, private ownership and a free market in small-scale industry, and nationalization of the banking system and big businesses. Of course, the heirs of this ideology in communist Hungary could not explicitly adhere to this "program." Instead, the focus of their moderate criticism was that while there had been improvement in social and economic conditions, the regime had not nurtured traditionally Hungarian moral values. The government, they said, had destroyed the traditional communities and had prevented open debate of vital national questions, including the rising level of suicide and alcoholism, and the failing birthrate. Furthermore it had not taken responsibility for the Hungarian minorities outside the country. 

In the seventies, much more radical varieties of political dissent emerged in Hungary—the "Budapest school" and the "Democratic opposition." The ideology of the former originally drew heavily on the unorthodox Marxism of György Lukacs, and on the ideas of the west European New Left. In 1973, the leaders of the group were expelled from the party and lost their professional positions. Some of the dissenters had been allowed to settle in the west without having to severe relations with their home country. Others were to join the hard core of the "Democratic opposition." This group formed in 1977 around disgruntled intellectuals who had come, for one reason or the other, into conflict with the regime. Almost all of them were leftist-critical Marxists, liberal socialists, and even Maoists. The principle that united them into a rather poorly organized group was, however, that of the human rights. Eventually, they abandoned the extreme leftist approach and became a group with, in an American sense, left liberal views. The group had issued several samizdat periodicals. Its main activity was directed at documenting illegal and uncon-
stitutional acts of the Hungarian authorities. This shift toward defending individual political rights obviously accounts for the fact that, since the mid-eighties, their political ideal had been a western-type parliamentary democracy with a strong welfare state rather than this or that variety of "reformed socialism." The sociological composition of the core of the "Democratic opposition," which never exceeded 300 people, was marked by Budapest philosophers, sociologists, and economists, with a significant proportion being of Jewish origin.

The regime's policy towards the "Democratic opposition" was ambiguous. The state security police periodically harassed the leading dissidents by searching their apartments for illegal literature, prohibiting their publications, and limiting their access to some jobs. These restrictive measures, however, were fairly limited in comparison to other East European countries and the Soviet Union. The existence of a semi-legal opposition, being of little danger to the regime, played a great role in providing it with a favorable image in the international press. Indeed, in the post-1956 period the Hungarian style of communism had been often depicted as the "merriest barrack in the bloc," to convey such factors as the lack of widespread police brutality, and a generally much higher level of cultural freedom than in other Warsaw Pact countries. It was not unusual to explain these relatively liberal traits with reference to the fact that after the 1956 uprising, the Hungarian leaders appeared to have realized that a more pragmatic and less confrontational approach to a manifestly anti-communist, even though pacified, society might yield considerable benefits.\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{Democratic transition}

Most of the Kádár era was remarkable for its political stability. The first signs of growing tension appeared in the mid-eighties. The regime could not solve the economic crisis which had lasted more than five years. The moderate but continuous rise in the standard of living had stopped by 1978.\textsuperscript{74} In 1985, some very limited political reforms were launched. Authorities allowed the nomination of independent candidates at that year's parliamentary elections, and about forty of them were finally elected after a bitter fight against the local communist party apparatus.\textsuperscript{75} While the membership of the parliament remained
predominantly communist, the new legislative body exhibited some degree of independence.\textsuperscript{76} The major incentive for change, however, came from within the ruling party, when a group of so-called reform communists started to form. The leading figure of the reformers was Imre Pozsgay, who had been elected to the Central Committee of the party in 1980. He was also general secretary of the Patriotic People’s Front, which had been a satellite organization of the party since the fifties but which was becoming increasingly transformed into the reformers’ political vehicle under the leadership of Pozsgay. Other leading figures of the reformers were the former secretary for economic affairs of the Central committee Rezső Nyers, and Miklós Németh. It was not until May 1988, however, that the leading reformers could enter the top leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party. By and large, the party remained controlled by its conservative wing led by Kádár himself. Characteristically, the political manifesto of the reformers, “Reform and Democracy,” had been spread like a samizdat publication in 1987.\textsuperscript{77}

The lack of their own political resources pushed the reformers towards opposition groups outside the party. Of those two ideological tendencies which dominated the Hungarian dissent by that time, the radicalism of the “Democratic opposition” was clearly incompatible with the “reform communism” of Pozsgay, at least in its early formulation. Moreover, contacts with the outspoken members of the opposition could severely damage Pozsgay’s party reputation. The “populist” writers, whose revolt against the cultural policy of Kádár’s regime at the 1986 Congress of the Writers’ Association of Hungary marked their increasingly critical attitude towards the single-party rule, were much more credible partners. They were not only unnoticed in overtly antigovernment activities and suspicious connections with the west, but also acceptable ideologically. In fact, they could not even be accused of advocating the capitalist restoration, a scarecrow for party conservatives. The economic model of the “populists,” with its emphasis on cooperatives, small landowners, and workers’ councils, could be labeled “Hungarian way socialism.”

In September 1987, Pozsgay participated in the meeting at Lakitelek which effectively gave birth to the political movement known as the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The first leader of the movement, Zoltán Biró, had a close personal connection with Pozsgay.\textsuperscript{78} In the fall of 1987 the “Democratic opposition” was
still disorganized, and the reformers within the ruling party had no forum of their own. Up to June 1988, therefore, all critical forces lined up behind the new-formed movement. Its membership grew to over six thousand in less than a year. One of the most massive successes of the Forum was the so-called Transylvania demonstration (27 June 1988), intended to make the government take up the issue of the sufferings of the Hungarian minorities outside Hungary, and especially in Romania. The demonstration, which involved more than 100,000 protesters, was permitted by the authorities. In contrast, the demonstrations of the "Democratic opposition" in June-November 1988 were small (a few hundred people at most) and banned or dispersed by the police.

For the reformers, the emergence of mass political actors was instrumental not only in pushing the party leadership towards political reform, but also, and more importantly, in promoting the gradual radicalization of the rank and file members of the party. The "putsch" against the leadership at the May 1988 party conference would not have been as successful without the anger of the delegates elected by the local party committees. The conference, which assumed the role of a party congress, removed Kádár from the post of general secretary and even ousted him from the Political Committee, the topmost organ of the party. Instead, he received the purely ceremonial position of Party President. Nyers and Pozsgay were elected to the Political Committee, while eight members of that body, five of them old and trusted cronies of Kádár's, were ousted. The intermediate winner of the game, however, was hard-line Communist Károly Grösz, who became general secretary. For several subsequent months, Grösz desperately tried to "stabilize" the situation in the country, undermining his own authority and the prestige of the party. In January 1989, Pozsgay was confident enough to launch a new offensive, making a statement that what happened in Hungary in 1956 was not a counter-revolution but a "national uprising." This evaluation of the 1956 events, accepted by the Central committee in February, did not come alone. The Central Committee accepted the multiparty system as well. In late June, Grösz was replaced as party leader by a collective presidency consisting, in addition to Grösz himself, of three noted reformers—Pozsgay, Nyers and Prime Minister Németh.

By that time the core of the emerging multiparty system
had been already formed. The Hungarian Democratic Forum was still the largest and most influential of opposition groups. However, the "Democratic opposition" also began its political activity on an organizational level, founding its umbrella organization, the Network of Free Initiatives, on 1 May 1988. By late autumn, when it transformed itself into the Alliance of Free Democrats, its membership reached 1,500. The Federation of Young Democrats was originally founded in March 1988 as a radical youth organization. It survived accusations of "anti-state and anti-socialist conspiracy," and established itself as a relatively well-known political group mainly because the personal popularity of its leader Viktor Orbán, perhaps the only charismatic figure of the Hungarian anti-communist opposition. Ideologically, the Young Democrats were close to their older counterparts of the "Democratic opposition," but lacked the latters' leftist and dissident backgrounds. In 1988-89, so-called nostalgic parties, which had existed in pre-communist Hungary and which had briefly reemerged in 1956, once more entered the political arena. The Independent Smallholders Party and the Christian Democratic People's Party (successor to the short-lived Democratic People's Party which had contested the 1947 elections and was associated with the name of József Cardinal Mindszenty, one of the most charismatic figures of the 1956 uprising) reassumed their predominantly nationalist-conservative ideological stances. The Hungarian Social Democratic Party, in contrast, did not turn back to its tradition and initially tried to build up a left-liberal, middle-class party. The revived Social Democrats suffered from an ongoing leadership crisis, which definitely damaged the image of the party.

In March 1989, the Opposition Roundtable, including these and several less significant political groups, had been established. A very loose political coalition, the Roundtable was nevertheless instrumental in providing all the anti-regime forces with an opportunity to coordinate their efforts. On 15 March 1989 more than one hundred thousand people took part in a demonstration of the opposition in Budapest. Yet another huge demonstration took place on 16 June, at the ceremony of the reburial of Imre Nagy. Both the rise of mass pro-democratic movement and the coming visit of U.S. President George Bush made the Communists begin negotiations with the Opposition Roundtable in June 1989. The "old" political forces were repre-
sented by the delegation of the ruling party led by Pozsgay, and by the organizations of interest representation like the official trade unions and the former League of Young Communists. The parties of the negotiations easily agreed upon calling Hungary a republic instead of the earlier People’s Republic, amending the Constitution so that it would be suited to representing the multiparty system, and holding free parliamentary elections.

The greatest debate ensued around the issue of introducing the institution of presidency in Hungary. The originally uniform stand of the Opposition Roundtable was that a parliamentary democracy and not a presidential system should be built in Hungary. While the election of the president by parliament was considered to be acceptable for the opposition, it strongly opposed the idea of directly elected presidency. The ruling party, in contrast, stressed that the presidential election should take place as soon as possible, that is, before the parliamentary elections. It was said that this would secure the stability of public authority. The actual reasons for the ruling party’s pro-presidential stance were quite pragmatic and obvious: at that moment, the only person who could win the presidential race in Hungary was Pozsgay. One of the most enigmatic moments of the Hungarian negotiations ensued. Unexpectedly, the Christian Democrats, the Smallholders, and a couple of other groups which were politically and ideologically close to the Hungarian Democratic Forum, agreed to accept the early election of the president by plebiscite. The Forum itself acted in this issue as the “pointer of scales,” but finally also opted for the presidency. The Free Democrats, the Young Democrats, the Social Democrats, and several other groups continued to resist the idea of an early presidential election. This practically split the Opposition Roundtable. The Forum and its allies held the view that the results hitherto accomplished should not be risked, and on 18 September signed the pact with the regime. Other political parties of the opposition not only declined to do so but also began a campaign for a referendum on those questions which, in their view, were not settled by the pact.

All these developments took place against the background of the organizational decline of the ruling party. On the one hand, its activities on the local level became increasingly nonexistent, and its membership declined. On the other hand, it became factionalized, with the Ferenc Münich Society and a
couple of other groups representing the hard-liners and the Movement for Democratic Hungary, led by Pozsgay, and so-called Reform Circles, representing the reformers. In early October 1989, the Reform Circles forced the leadership to call an extraordinary party congress which apparently resulted in a decisive victory of Pozsgay and his allies. The party changed its name to the Hungarian Socialist Party, totally abandoned the communist ideology, and adopted a moderate social democratic program written in compliance with west European standards. However, the continuity of the membership was not automatic, and in the meantime the parliament banned party activity at workplaces. Many party members, especially among the workers, used this opportunity to cut their connections with the discredited regime altogether. The nomenklatura system collapsed, and the party became disorganized. The new Hungarian Socialist Party (hereafter referred to as the Socialists) had less than twenty thousand members at the beginning of November 1989, and no more than fifty thousand by March 1990. In the referendum of 26 November the voters rejected the idea of holding an early presidential election (although by a tiny margin), thus ruining Pozsgay's hopes of retaining a strong power position in post-communist Hungary. At that time, opinion polls began to predict the victory of the opposition at the parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 1990.

The groups of hard-liners, declaring that they were still communists, did not give up. They appealed to the party cells and party committees not to dissolve themselves but to keep their organizations and to restore the party from below. This appeal proved to be attractive for a relatively large number of people, which testified that, however small, some mass base of communism still existed in Hungary. The revived Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party held its congress in December 1989 and easily exceeded the Socialists in membership, comprising as many as about 100,000 members at that moment. It was still the largest party in the country, but it did not have many supporters beyond its own members and was totally devoid of any influence on the decision making process.

The disintegration of the Communist party and the virtual collapse of the regime made the major actors of opposition redefine themselves ideologically. Much of the strength of the Democratic Forum came from its image of a moderate move-
ment, connected with the pro-reform forces within the regime and thus capable of achieving compromises. The utility of these assets, however, became increasingly questionable in late 1989. The Forum began to perform poorly in public opinion polls, its support dropping from 26 per cent in September to 20 per cent by the end of the year. At the same time, the Free Democrats jumped from less than 10 to 20 per cent.90 The major political action which explained this spectacular political breakthrough was the referendum campaign, successfully organized by the Free Democrats together with the Young Democrats. During the campaign, they located themselves ideologically to the right of the Forum and attacked it for its communist connection. The Forum, not entirely without reason, was portrayed as a crypto-communist party, Pozsgay’s invention to prepare himself for the collapse of communism, and as the equivalent to communist “fellow travelers” of the late forties. The Peasant Party of that period was, indeed, a gathering of left-wing “populist” writers advocating the “third way.”

Responding to this critique, the Forum had to redefine itself as a genuinely rightist, anti-communist party.91 The nationalist core of its ideology remained unchanged, but the outdated notion of the “third way” had to be abandoned. Much of the credit for the success of this ideological shift should be given to a politician who made an impressive showing at the Summer 1989 negotiations,92 and was subsequently elected as the President of the Forum, József Antall. An historian whose father was a leading official in pre-communist Hungary, he had little to do with the “populist” writers who had founded the Forum. He and the circle around him had some aristocratic connections and not implausibly depicted themselves as Christian Democrat conservatives, ideologically close to the German Christian Democratic Union. Antall cut off the left “populist” wing from the Forum and moved to the right. Moreover, the Forum started to accuse the Free Democrats of being a basically leftist party. This accusation did not lack some plausibility, taking into account that the leaders of the Free Democrats had leftist backgrounds, and many of them came from nomenklatura families. To avoid being beaten in their own game of anti-communism, the Free Democrats chose to portray themselves as right-wing libertarians, with an overtly free-market economic stance which, under the East European conditions, meant a speedy transformation to a market economy.
With slight overstatement, Elemér Hankiss defined this variety of post-communist ideology as "nineteenth-century conservative liberalism."93

Post-communist developments

The results of the March 1990 elections reflected both the superior political resources of the Democratic Forum, stemming from its role of the major force of anti-communist opposition in 1987-89, and the success of its ideological shift to the right.94 The "founding" elections, viewed by many voters as a referendum on the failing one-party regime, could not but result in rewarding a party which had succeeded in building the image of the opposition. From this perspective, the vote for the Forum was primarily a vote against the old system, and it was not surprise that Antall's party had been most evenly supported by all social groups and all regions of Hungary. The Forum won with 24.71 per cent of the vote. The victory of the Forum decided the fate of the nostalgic right-wing parties whose ideological niche turned out to be occupied by the newcomer. The Smallholders (11.76 per cent), who placed the issue of restitution at the core of the pre-election rhetoric, found themselves to be frozen into their sectional, predominantly rural, elderly, and poorly educated subelectorate. Much the same could be said about the Christian Democrats (6.46 per cent), but an additional factor should be added: quite predictably, most of the party's supporters were church-attendees. Jointly, the "nationalist" parties mustered about 43 per cent of the vote. Translated into parliamentary seats, this result gave them an absolute majority in the parliament.

The well-educated urban population more commonly voted for the Free Democrats (21.38 per cent of the vote) and, particularly in younger age groups, for the Young Democrats (8.94 per cent). Jointly, the "liberal" parties polled 30.32 per cent of the vote. The Social Democrats, who on the eve of the elections went back to tradition and tried to appeal to the old working class constituency, or to the "worker with the hammer in his hand" as they put it, lost badly with 3.55 per cent of the vote, which did not allow them to enter the parliament. Communist successor parties also failed. The Socialists won 10.89 per cent of the votes cast for regional party lists, and the failure of all but one of their individual candidates in single-member districts was a humiliating de-
feat. Even Pozsgay lost the election to a representative of the Young Democrats. The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party received only 3.86 per cent of the vote, which clearly revealed that it had a very sectional and limited support base. Smaller parties, none of which entered the parliament, jointly polled 8.63 per cent. Notably, the Hungarian People's Party of the left-wing "populists," ideologically close to the position taken by the Democratic Forum at the moment when it was founded, gained as little as 0.76 per cent of the vote.

The coalition government of the Forum, the Smallholders and the Christian Democrats took office in May 1990. As important as the creation of this relatively stable government, was the agreement (or "pact") reached by Antall with the forefront of the new parliamentary opposition, the Free Democrats, about the election of a president, the principles of the amendment of the Constitution, and a code of parliamentary practice and procedures. In particular, it was agreed that the president of Hungary would be elected by the parliament and that it would be a Free Democrat, Árpád Göncz. The attempt of the Socialists, who were excluded from the "pact," to change the course of events by organizing a referendum on the presidency in July 1990 turned out to be a complete fiasco, with a turn-out of only 14 per cent, as a result of which the referendum was declared invalid. On 3 August Göncz was elected as the President of Hungary. This, by and large, completed the process of post-communist institution building, which had, thus, been smoother in Hungary than anywhere else in Eastern Europe.

Apparently, the government was in good position to implement its program of economic reforms, based on the philosophy of "gradualism" advocated by Antall. This philosophy held that, on the one hand, the progress in reforming the economy already made under the communist rule made "shock therapy" unnecessary; on the other hand, speedy introduction of a free market could undermine social stability in the country and ought to be balanced by social policies. While the rhetoric of the government continued to display its adherence to "historical tradition," it very largely excluded the extreme right-wing "populists" led by the vice-president of the Forum István Csurka. In 1993, he and his closest supporters were expelled from the Forum and proceeded to form their own party, the Hungarian Life and Justice Party.
For a short time, it was conventional to view Hungary as a success story of post-communist transformation. But before long it became clear that the government’s “gradualism” could not save the Hungarian population from depressed living standards. The deepening economic crisis resulted in high inflation rates and rapidly rising unemployment. The first signs of mass dissatisfaction with the policy of the government were political apathy, alienation from politics, and pessimism. The parties of the opposition, however, not unreasonably expected that the decline of the government’s popularity could bring them political gains. The conciliatory air of 1990 disappeared.

The Free Democrats, whose initial willingness to cooperate with the government was clearly manifested by their “pact” with the Democratic Forum, became increasingly critical of the government and tried to establish themselves as the major force of the opposition. The strategy chosen by the leadership of the party to achieve this goal was quite straightforward, at least in terms of the party’s ideological evolution. Evidently perceiving the deprivation of the population as the major source of mass support to the opposition, the Free Democrats abandoned their purely free market stance and started to advocate "social liberal" policy, recognizing the need for a government redistributive role and a "social compact" between employers and employees. One of the most important effects of this ideological shift was that it opened the door for possible cooperation with the Socialists. With the election as party president of Iván Petö in 1992, the social democratic aspects of the Free Democrat’s program became especially evident. This strategy, however, proved to be unsuccessful. From mid-1992 into 1993, the Young Democrats were well ahead of other opposition parties in public opinion polls.

In contrast to the Free Democrats, the Young Democrats did not just change their ideological stance. Their charismatic leader Orbán consistently supported "liberal" principles, standing for a free market system with a minimal role for state redistribution, speedy privatization and limited attention to social policy. As an opposition party, the parliamentary strategy of the Young Democrats was to sharply oppose major policies of the government such as restitution. The popularity of the Young Democrats, shown by public opinion polls, steadily grew, reaching its peak in April 1993. At that time, the party was leading with 38 per cent of those respondents who had chosen a party
and 25 per cent of the polled sample (for the Socialists, the numbers were 16 and 10 per cent, respectively). In summer 1993, polls started to show some modest decline in public support to the party. A group of party members led by its deputy chairman Gábor Fodor claimed that, in order to overcome this trend, the party had to be more sensitive toward the needs of economically deprived population. Related to this ideological stance, they advocated closer cooperation with the Free Democrats and did not exclude the possibility of a coalition with the Socialists. Orbán, however, not only strongly resisted all these ideas, but also became evidently inclined towards cooperation with the Forum. As a result, the Young Democrats split in October 1993. Fodor and some other party and parliamentary leaders joined the Free Democrats. This split on the eve of the elections could not but severely damage the party’s appeal to the voters. But even more importantly, Orbán’s inclinations towards the Forum, though provoked by an intraparty controversy, undermined the Young Democrat’s role of the leading force of the opposition.

The history of the Hungarian Socialist Party between 1990 and 1994 is generally one of success. Its parliamentary faction pursued a cautious but increasingly more articulate opposition role and was building ties to the Free Democrats. This was essential for the success of the Socialists’ attempts to break the political quarantine and to establish the image of a responsible opposition party which totally departed from its past. The Socialists also managed to gain international recognition by receiving associate status in the Socialist International. It was not until late 1993, however, that the party started to lead in public opinion polls. The fragmentation of the Young Democrats and the tactical mistakes made by their leadership definitely contributed to the rise of other opposition parties. But why was it the Socialists, and not the Free Democrats or, say, the extreme right of the Hungarian Life and Justice Party, who managed to take advantage of the Young Democrat’s disarray?

An easy answer would be that the electorate became nostalgic about the relative prosperity of the Kádár era and thus chose to support the Socialists as the representatives of that period. Indeed, Hungarians expressed more positive views of the old regime than other East Europeans as early as in the spring of 1993. At the same time, however, they were inclined to vote for the overtly pro-market Young Democrats. This suggests that the
positive view of the old regime is not necessarily convertible into a vote for communist successor parties. For such conversion to take place, special conditions are needed. In order to understand these conditions, it is important to give some consideration to the program of the Hungarian Socialist Party in the 1994 elections.\textsuperscript{104}

The program gave some coverage to those issues which could be viewed as traditionally socialist ideological domain, like labor protection. It made perfectly clear, however, that there could be no going back: not only socialism as a goal was unambiguously abandoned, but also nearly any redistributive role on the part of the state was rejected. Instead, the program emphasized the need to arrest economic decline by means of effective macroeconomic regulation and accelerated privatization of state property. A key plank of the program was cutting bureaucratic expenditure. While the Socialists referred to their program as a social-liberal one, it was apparently more liberal and less social than the election program of the Free Democrats, who recognized the continued need for a government redistributive role. In foreign policy, the program expressed strong commitment to integration with the European Union and improving ties with NATO. By adopting this program, the Socialists established themselves as the leading force within the “liberal” segment of the Hungarian political spectrum, occupying the space which was provided by the retreat of the Free Democrats to “social responsibility,” as well as by the fragmentation of the Young Democrats.

The ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum found itself in decay, particularly after the death of Antall in 1993 but not entirely because of his death. Rather, the economic conditions spoke against the Forum. Ideologically, the ruling party continued to emphasize “conservative Christian and national” values. This was combined with heavily anti-communist rhetoric, which indicated the government’s intention to play on the fears of restoration of the old regime. The Christian Democrats, the weakest partner in the coalition, had no will to retreat from their backward-looking “Christian philosophy,” which perceivably could result in the demise of their stable, though small, constituency. The Smallholders, also treated by Antall as junior partners of the government, split as early as in 1992 with the radical right-wing “populist” faction led by József Torgyán breaking the relationship with the government. Since then several; Small-
holder Parties were founded. Eventually, Torgyán’s faction succeeded in establishing itself as the most significant among them, both in terms of membership and voter support. The Smallholders and the Hungarian Life and Justice Party represented the most articulated “nationalist” (that is, redistributive-authoritarian-nationalist) ideological stance in the 1994 elections. The Hungarian Life and Justice Party, in particular, was the only party which demanded that privatization be stopped and the redistribution of already privatized assets be launched.

The May 1994 parliamentary elections resulted in the spectacular defeat of the Democratic Forum, which received 11.74 per cent of the vote. The Smallholders, with 8.82 per cent, also experienced some decay in voter support. The Christian Democrats, with their 7.03 per cent, were the only party of the coalition to slightly improve their results in comparison to the 1990 elections. The Hungarian Life and Justice Party did not make it into the parliament, for it received only 1.59 per cent of the vote. Jointly, the “nationalist” parties polled 19.18 per cent. The reorganized Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, which contested the elections under the label “Munkáspárt” (Labor or Workers’ Party), received 3.19 per cent of the vote. This miserable result suggests again that “Kádár nostalgia” cannot account for the success of the Socialists. In fact, it was the Munkáspárt rather than the Socialists that was really nostalgic for the era of state socialism. The Socialists themselves, with their 32.99 per cent of the vote, received a result exceeding that of the Democratic Forum in the previous elections. Both the Free Democrats and the Young Democrats, with 19.74 and 7.02 per cent of the vote respectively, fared worse than in 1990. Overall the “liberal” parties, including the Socialists, polled 59.75 per cent of the vote. Translated into parliamentary seats, these electoral outcomes enabled the socialists to form a one-party government. However, they chose to form a coalition with the Free Democrats, thus emphasizing once more the “liberal” nature of their new ideological stance.

The Case of Russia

Mode of communist rule

In November 1917, revolutionary troops and workers’
militias (the Red Guards) overthrew the Provisional Government of Russia and established the new government chaired by Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party of the Bolsheviks. Power came to the Bolsheviks not so much because they had widespread popular support but because the majority had lost confidence in the Provisional Government. Elections to the Constituent Assembly, held briefly after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, gave them only 25 per cent of the vote; it was the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, claiming to represent the Russian peasants, which gained the majority of seats in the Assembly. After one day in session, the Constituent Assembly was closed by the Red Guards.

In 1918-21, the Bolsheviks had to face several years of bitter civil war against a combination of forces bent on their overthrow. The period of the civil war was of crucial importance both for establishing the rule of the Bolsheviks over the most part of the territory of the former Russian Empire, which in late 1922 resulted in the formation of the new quasi-federal structure named the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and for consolidating the institutional structure of the communist power system. On the one hand, this structure was characterized by the absolute political domination of the Communist party. On the other hand, the communists exercised their power not directly but through the network of the Soviets which, in the official discourse of the regime, appeared as democratic representative bodies enjoying the totality of state power in the country. This accounts for the survival of electoral practices, though obviously without real political choice, through the whole period of the communist rule in Russia.

The highly repressive nature of the communist regime in the Soviet Union became especially evident in the thirties, forties, and early fifties. This period of political murder ended soon after Joseph Stalin’s death in 1953. Very limited liberalizations, so-called “thaws” which briefly occurred under Stalin’s successor Nikita Khrushchev (roughly 1956 to 1957 and 1961 to 1962), apparently resulted from the needs of the Communist party apparatchiks who felt themselves understandably insecure in the atmosphere of the permanent purge rather than from the expressed discontent of the population.

One of the effects of the “thaws” was the increased level of freedom of artistic expression in the early sixties. For instance,
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s novella about prison camp life, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, could be published only in the relatively relaxed year of 1962. After Khrushchev had been ousted from office in late 1964, even this partial liberalization was over, but not without leaving a trace. The rise of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union may be directly related to frustrations experienced in the artistic circles after the return to greater limitations on expression. An event of watershed importance in the dissident movement was the Siniavskii-Daniel Trial of February 1966.\(^{113}\) Both the celebrated trial and the subsequent imposition of prison sentences on Siniavskii and Daniel, Soviet writers who had published their works under pseudonyms abroad, stirred liberal sentiment among Russian intellectuals, especially in Moscow and Leningrad. Many Soviet dissidents dated their participation in the movement from the time of the trial.

While the dissident movement had attracted wide publicity in the west, it was neither mass nor well-organized.\(^{114}\) Rather than an actual political movement, it was a collection of individuals and tiny groups who, for very different reasons, had chosen a variety of forms of manifested discontent. Consequently, one of the marks of the dissident movement was its great ideological diversity. Some of the dissidents stressed religious freedom; members of minority nationalities protested against restrictions imposed on them by the Russian majority. Among the ethnically Russian dissidents, however, the mainstream ideological trend could be described as paralleling the views of western European liberals and social democrats. The most prominent of that trend was physicist Andrei Sakharov, who in 1970 founded the Moscow Committee on Human Rights.\(^{119}\) The major concerns of the Committee were freedom of expression and intellectual freedom, which were considered by the dissidents as the principal “democratic” rights. Some attention had also been paid to other legal and political rights. It was usual for the dissidents of the main stream to define themselves as *pravozashchitniki* (right defenders). In 1976, the Moscow Branch of the Public Group to Promote the Fulfillment of the Helsinki Accords had been created to become the most well-known dissident group.

The regime’s attitude towards the dissident movement was generally intolerant, although the level of repression varied over time. In the late sixties and early seventies, scores of dissidents had been sent to prison or labor camps. Many of them lost
their jobs and experienced such forms of long-term harassment as repeated house searches, frequent summons for questioning and surveillance by secret-police operations. In addition, forced incarceration in psychiatric hospitals had been widely used against the dissidents.\textsuperscript{116} It was not until the late seventies, however, that the regime started a decisive offensive to eliminate the dissident movement altogether. The crackdown at that time had been thought to be connected with the Soviet hosting of the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980 and perhaps with the low level of western protest against the treatment of dissidents due to the distractions of Iran and Afghanistan. For his dissident views, Sakharov earned “internal banishment” from Moscow to the city of Gorky in 1980. Other important dissidents were either imprisoned or sent to the west. These highly repressive policies were strongly reinforced after Yuri Andropov, formerly the chief of the state security police, came to power in 1982. As a result, the dissident movement lost most of its participants and ceased to exist as an observable factor of the Soviet political life.

It must be mentioned that not all of the dissidents adhered to the mixture of liberal and social democratic ideas confessed by Sakharov and his followers. There were also individuals who could be called the extreme right. They favored a more authoritarian, traditional state, and their ideology was profoundly nationalist. For example, Solzhenitsyn thoroughly rejected Marxism-Leninism but was not completely comfortable with western-type democratic views either. He believed that Russia was not yet ready for democracy and advocated a kind of benevolent authoritarianism after the fall of the communist rule in the country.\textsuperscript{117} Less celebrated representatives of this ideological trend sometimes articulated even more radical stances with strong overtones of anti-Semitism.\textsuperscript{118} However, the prominent role of the intellectuals of Jewish origins within the dissident movement, as well as the manifestly pro-democratic and pro-western orientation of the most important dissident groups, made political dissent an inappropriate niche for Russian nationalists. Their political survival in the Soviet Union was primarily due to the fact that the regime’s attitude towards nationalism was often tolerant and sometimes even supportive.

Similar to the pro-democratic movement, the new Russian nationalism emerged within artistic circles. During the Khrushchev period a setback for liberal-minded intellectuals had
occurred with the formation of the Union of Writers of the Russian Federation in 1958, under the leadership of Leonid Sobolev. Being a hard-line Stalinist himself, Sobolev offered some support to those writers who started to articulate an increasingly nationalist ideological stance. In particular, these writers had been allowed to establish their control over two “thick” literary journals, Molodaia Gvardiia and Nash Sovremennik. On the pages of these journals, Brezhnev’s détente policy was depicted as leading Russia on a “ruinous western path” that would end with the “bourgeoisification of Russia.” The nationalists expressed ideas about the uniqueness of Russians and the Russian spirit and their moral superiority over a degenerate western liberal democracy and capitalism. Some high-ranking communist officials such as Aleksandr Yakovlev tasted defeat at the hands of the nationalists who were clearly protected by some factions of the top communist leadership. After Yakovlev’s article against Russian nationalism had been published in 1972, he was sent to “diplomatic exile” and spent ten years as a Soviet ambassador to Ottawa.

During the seventies and the early eighties, the Soviet literary scene had become increasingly dominated by so-called village prose writers (derevenschiki). The message of many of their works was that only a return to the unspoiled Russian rural past could save the country from moral and physical ruin. Different problems confronted by the Soviet Union, from alcohol abuse to environmental pollution, were all implicitly blamed on the communists and, much more explicitly, on the western influences Russia had undergone. In 1983, at the same time the dissident movement was crushed by the regime, the nationalists obtained a kind of legal status under the Pamyat’ (Memory) Society of History and Literature Amateurs.

Democratic transition

When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March 1985, his reformist agenda which eventually led to the collapse of the communist regime took some time to develop. His acceptance speech promised that the strategy worked out at the 26th Party congress of 1981 would remain unchanged: a policy of the “acceleration of the country’s socioeconomic development [and] the perfection of all aspects of the life of the society.” In the early months of Gorbachev’s rule, roughly from March 1985 to
the summer or fall of 1986, the key issue was the acceleration of economic growth. This, Gorbachev claimed, was quite feasible if the reserves that existed throughout the economy were properly utilized and, more importantly, if the “human factor” was called more fully into play.

In particular, the activation of the “human factor” was expected to be achieved by means of an anti-alcoholism campaign, whose most fervent booster was Gorbachev’s then-close politically, Yegor Ligachev. This campaign could not but appeal to the Russian nationalists like derevenschiki, who had been making anti-alcoholism a central theme of their works. In 1985 and early 1986 Gorbachev appeared to have assented to the attempts of Ligachev to co-opt Russian nationalist sentiment in support of a program of discipline in the workplace and of cautious economic reform. As a result, groups of nationalists started to emerge in many Russian cities; not only did they encounter few restrictions, but they seemed to enjoy even the support of the authorities. Some of these groups called themselves “anti-alcoholic movements,” while others adopted the name of Pamiat’. For example, the first group with a distinctively political agenda which emerged in Novosibirsk since 1921 was the Pamiat’ Historical and Patriotic Association, founded as early as in February 1986. Some of these nationalist groups were moderate, while others displayed a xenophobic and, occasionally, anti-communist attitude, viewing the regime as the marionette of a worldwide Judeo-Masonic conspiracy.

During the summer and fall of 1986, Gorbachev broke sharply with the policies pursued earlier and initiated his new strategy. One is compelled to ask why Gorbachev chose to change course. A possible explanation would be that if he was going to emerge as the dominant force in Soviet politics—and he clearly had such an intention—he needed a defining program that would enable him first to isolate and then to remove his powerful competitors in the party leadership, such as Ligachev. In both drafting and implementing his new strategy, Gorbachev heavily relied on Aleksandr Yakovlev. In the summer of 1986, Gorbachev and Yakovlev undertook to move a number of deliberately selected intellectuals into the editorships of certain major publications, and to other prominent positions in the media, the artistic unions, and academia. This effectively started the policy of glasnost’ (openness).
The leading themes of glasnost', such as public discussion of the purges of the early Soviet period or the 1932-33 famine that Stalin had brought about, had a ruinous effect on the official ideology. However, neither Yakovlev himself nor his appointees were inclined to replace it with a version of Russian nationalism promoted in the early months of Gorbachev. Some of the "fathers of glasnost'"; like playwright Mikhail Shatrov, were "neo-Leninists" who wanted to "update" and "modernize" the system but, at the same time, to keep it indisputably communist, in vigorous competition with the capitalist west. The number of such true-believing "neo-Leninists" was, however, quite small. From the very beginning they had to be heavily supplemented by those intellectuals who, being "opportunistic"\(^{130}\) rather than committed to any specific ideological cause, soon found themselves en route to western-style liberal stances. In many respects their critique of the communist regime was similar to what had been once advocated by the liberal dissidents. In December 1986, Sakharov was released from internal exile in Gorky and for some time joined the ranks of the Gorbachevites.

Gorbachev's next step in implementing his new strategy was to support the growth and spread of informal groups.\(^{131}\) By this, Gorbachev and Yakovlev apparently thought to create a "civil society," a collection of social movements that would aggressively support the reformist course of the party leadership. While some of the informal groups were manifestly apolitical, like those related to the members' hobbies or cultural interests, others became politically active as early as 1987. Normally, these groups avoided direct confrontation with the regime, and indeed, many of them were housed in Communist party buildings. This did not prevent them from articulating increasingly pro-democratic ideas. Such groups as Democratic Perestroika, Civic Dignity, and Democracy and Humanism, advocated the establishment of free trade unions, the end of centralized control over school curricula and textbooks, freedom of religion, abolition of restrictions on travel and emigration, etc.\(^{132}\) Some of these groups, like Democracy and Humanism, included former dissidents as well as new, young activists.

In May 1988, the members of Democracy and Humanism launched the Democratic Union, the first of a new generation of Russian political parties in almost 70 years. Although ideologically heterogeneous and very small in terms of its membership,
Democratic Union activists became famous for their militant appeal for democracy. A harbinger of future parties was the emergence of the informal movement *Memorial*, which was organized by members of the Moscow *Perestroika* club in August 1987. While the originally proclaimed goals of *Memorial* included a thorough re-examination of the illegal repression of the past and the erection of a monument to the memory of Stalin's victims, it soon established itself as the forerunner of pro-democratic informal groups. In particular, *Memorial* was joined by Sakharov. As a result of the rise of informal groups, the liberalizing effort from above had been supplemented by a pro-democratic movement from below. But by 1988, the majority of the informal groups had neither sufficient political resources nor will to challenge Gorbachev's leadership. It was not until 1989 that to be a "democrat" in Russia started to mean something other than being a Gorbachevite.

By early 1987, it became clear to the conservative faction of the communist leadership that Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and their allies had launched a sweeping strike directed largely against them. The residual strength of this faction stemmed primarily from the prominent position of its leader, Ligachev, within the party apparatus. However, as long as the party conservatives felt it necessary to widen their support base by appealing to the mass public, they relied either on the "true communists" (like the infamous Nina Andreeva) or on the nationalists. In July 1987, Ligachev expressed his sympathy with the views of the leadership of the Writers' Union of Russia, which comprised both ideological tendencies. As a result of Ligachev's support, the nationalists managed to retain control of such important publications as the weekly *Literaturnaiia Rossiia*, and the monthly "thick" journals *Moskva* and *Nash Sovremennik*. Poet Stanislav Kunyaev, who was appointed as the chief editor of the latter journal, articulated not only undeniably nationalist, but also anti-Semitic ideas.

By promoting such personnel solutions in the media, Ligachev obviously tried to counterbalance the earlier moves of his major political rivals, Gorbachev and Yakovlev. While the efforts of the conservative wing of the leadership to change the direction of *glasnost* failed, they contributed to the activation of the informal nationalist groups. The affiliate organizations of *Pamiat* had been created in 30 cities, and attracted considerable attention in the media due to actions like a demonstration in Moscow in May
1987. Ligachev’s support was also not without influence on the ideological agenda of the Russian nationalists. While some of them continued to hold a negative view of the Bolshevik revolution, of Lenin, and of the official ideology, they were inclined to support the hard-line Communists rather than the “democrats.” Hostility towards the contemporary west—both towards its perceived geopolitical ambitions and towards its execrated “mass culture”—as well as towards the idea of a market economy (which, even for many originally anti-communist nationalists, was incompatible with the Russian national spirit) served as a bond conjoining the remaining “true communists” and the nationalists.

The 1989 elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union were held in a country where only one political party, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was officially recognized, and under a system which allowed the non-competitive allocation of many seats to the representatives of the party and several party-dominated organizations, such as the Komsomol and official trade unions. By holding these elections, Gorbachev further strengthened his position vis-à-vis the party apparatus, which was clearly indicated by the fact that it was only in September 1989 that Gorbachev succeeded in establishing full control over the Politburo. In particular, through his election to the Chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet in May 1989, Gorbachev guaranteed himself against removal as national leader by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. With the introduction of the presidency elected by the Congress of People’s Deputies, Gorbachev gained additional executive powers which did not stem from his position within the party. Simultaneously, however, the 1989 elections produced a result that was scarcely desirable for Gorbachev. Namely, they secured political independence for those of his recent allies who advocated a more radical political agenda than Gorbachev was ready to adopt.

At the end of July 1989, 388 of the 2,250 elected members of the Congress of People’s Deputies announced their intention to join a new parliamentary faction, the Interregional Group. The platform adopted at the faction’s founding conference advocated revoking the party’s monopoly on power, the granting of full rights to the elected soviets, and the right of citizens to form political organizations. The five chairmen of the Interregional Group included Sakharov, two Moscow intellectuals who owed
their political prominence to glasnost', and, most notably, Boris Yeltsin. A party apparatchik from the periphery, Yeltsin had been brought to Moscow and appointed as the first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee in 1985. After taking this prominent position, he acquired immense popularity among Muscovites by his attacks on special privileges for the nomenklatura. Yeltsin clashed sharply with Ligachev on this issue at the 27th Party Congress in early 1986. At that time he was considered a natural ally of Gorbachev.

It soon became clear that Yeltsin's anti-privilege campaign went too far. In October 1987, he was removed from the top leadership and, up to early 1989, led "the existence of a political outcast, surrounded by a vacuum." His political career seemed to be finished. But there was one asset which he still possessed, his popularity. After winning 90 per cent of the vote in his Moscow district, Yeltsin triumphantly re-entered the Russian political arena as the only genuinely charismatic figure. Having Yeltsin in their camp was, therefore, quite beneficial for the "democrats," especially after the death of Sakharov in late 1989 which left them without a recognized leader. On the other hand, Yeltsin, who lacked any coherent political program, found it useful to borrow one from his new allies. Henceforth, he would begin to emphasize human and religious rights, as well as the familiar theme of social justice.

Independent political mobilization grew throughout 1989 as live television coverage of the activities of the Interregional Group injected new issues for political discussion and protest. Outside of the Congress of People's deputies, Memorial and the Moscow Popular Front, a coalition of pro-democratic informal groups, hosted almost daily mass meetings in Moscow to influence the course of reforms. For Gorbachev, who by the fall of 1989 had finally managed to establish control over the top party leadership, this mobilization was not only unnecessary but also dangerous. As a result, he shifted to a more conservative political stance, which was symbolized by his criticisms of the "excesses of glasnost" in October 1989. This very cautious attack not only failed to consolidate his position but also provoked the new offensive of the "democrats."

First, the "democratic wing" of the Communist Party, feeling itself betrayed by Gorbachev, started to break off. In January 1990, the Democratic Platform in the CPSU had been estab-
lished to promote the program close to that of western-style Social Democracy.\textsuperscript{140} Second, and more significant, the leaders of the "democrats" managed to create an electoral alliance, Democratic Russia, which united informal groups all over the country. Both organizationally and ideologically, this new alliance was directly connected with the Interregional Group.\textsuperscript{141} The principal goal of Democratic Russia was to achieve the election of "democrats" to the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, as well as to local soviets, in the upcoming March 1990 elections. The alliance's platform expressed its will to defend "the ideas of Andrei Sakharov" which it summarized as a commitment to "freedom, democracy, the rights of man, a multiparty system, free elections, and a market economy."\textsuperscript{142}

The March 1990 elections were generally successful for the "democrats,"\textsuperscript{143} especially in large cities. Candidates backed by Democratic Russia won 55 of 65 seats allotted to the Moscow province, and 25 of 34 seats allotted to the Leningrad province in the Congress of People's Deputies of the Russian Federation. They also established their control over the City Councils of Moscow and Leningrad. In smaller cities and in the rural constituencies, the "democrats" were less successful, and many party apparatchiki still managed to make it into the Congress. Their power positions in the vast periphery of the country also remained largely untouched.\textsuperscript{144} It was only with a tiny margin of four votes that Yeltsin was elected as the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation on 29 May 1990. Two weeks later the "democrats" achieved one of their major political goals when they made the Congress vote overwhelmingly in favor of a declaration of sovereignty of Russia.\textsuperscript{145} Following this declaration, the Soviet "center"—that is, Gorbachev—found itself badly weakened politically. The locus of power started to shift from the Kremlin to the Russian White House, then the residence of the Supreme Soviet of Russia.

Under heavy pressure from the "democrats," Gorbachev was forced to acquiesce in February 1990 in rescinding Article Six of the Soviet Constitution (the Article which legally mandated the Communist Party's leading role). This accelerated the process of party formation in Russia.\textsuperscript{146} The idea of creating a democratic party that would effectively challenge the authority of the Communists first emerged in late 1989. The most important initiative to create such a structure came from Nikolai Travkin, a
prominent member of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU. The organizing committee of the Democratic Party of Russia, chaired by Travkin, was established in Moscow in May 1990, and the party soon had visible support in the regions of Russia where several branches were created in the summer and fall of 1990. Many local pro-democratic informal groups and movements joined Travkin's party. Consciously trying to expand the party's original base in the liberal intelligentsia, activists successfully recruited many former functionaries of the Communist Party.

Travkin's attempt to create a nationwide democratic organization did not go unchallenged. At least two other parties competed with the Democratic Party for political influence and membership in this effort—the Social Democratic Party of the Russian Federation, founded in May 1990, and the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, which emerged in November 1990 as a result of the transformation of the Democratic Platform. There were also small political parties nearly synonymous with their leaders, like Viktor Aksyutchits's Russian Christian Democratic Movement and Mikhail Astaf'ev's Constitutional Democratic Party (the only new generation Russian party that claimed to be a revived pre-1917 organization). Programmatically, these parties did not differ much from each other, adhering to what may be defined as a "mainstream democratic ideology": their declared common goal was to dismantle the Soviet "totalitarian" system and to replace it with a democratic, representative, and accountable government. They also supported a law-based state and a civil society with guarantees of individual freedoms and rights, and market reforms.147 Due to the exceptional organizational skills and energy of Travkin, however, his Democratic Party was well in the lead by the fall of 1990.

The organizational structure of the Democratic Party was designed to fight a trench war against the Communists. Although the party aimed to secure multiparty elections at the earliest possible moment, Travkin based his party on democratic centralism and exercised strict discipline over the activities of its members. The majority of "democratic" leaders in Moscow and Leningrad, however, feared the emergence of what they called "populist dictatorship" within the party and strongly criticized Travkin's drive to create a new "political vanguard." In order to counterbalance this perceived danger, Moscow and Leningrad "democrats" initiated the formation of a new political movement.
Although Democratic Russia's electoral campaign proved to be successful, it did not lead the alliance to transform itself into a stronger organization. In fact, the alliance effectively ceased to exist after the 1990 elections, only to be resurrected in the fall of that year as a loosely structured coalition of "democratic" parties, groups, and individuals. The founding congress of the Democratic Russia movement was held in Moscow in October 1990.\(^{148}\)

The founders of the movement considered its loose structure to be both more democratic and more suitable to existing political conditions in Russia. They claimed that the most important advantage of such an organizational structure was that it mobilized those Communist party members who were sympathetic to Yeltsin but still reluctant to leave the party. The major target of the founders of Democratic Russia, who felt themselves increasingly isolated from "democratic" activists in the periphery, were members of Travkin's party. Not surprisingly the debate between Travkin and his opponents in the organizing committee resulted in his temporary withdrawal from the movement. The Democratic Party rejoined Democratic Russia only in January 1991. Other "mainstream democratic" parties were not sufficiently strong to stay away from the movement. Thus, by early 1991 the core organization of the "liberal" segment of the emerging political spectrum had been finally formed.

For the "nationalists," the results of the March 1990 elections were as the heaviest blow they ever experienced. In December 1989, they created an umbrella body called the Bloc of Russian Public-Patriotic Forces. After publishing a list of sixty-one candidates living in Moscow who supported its program, the bloc campaigned actively for their election.\(^ {149}\) None of these candidates managed to win. In the elections dominated by the anti-politics of opposition to the communist regime, the "nationalists" who were at best ambiguous about the continued political hegemony of the Communist Party, and frankly critical of political pluralism and the market, were doomed to failure. As a result, the "first-generation nationalists" once supported by Ligachev temporarily disappeared from the political arena.

The "second-generation nationalists," who made their appearance in early 1990, were different not only in their ideological stance but also, and more importantly, in their source of support from within the regime. This time support to the "nationalists" came from a team of Gorbachev's close collabora-
tors who from the mid-1990 exerted increasing influence upon their vacillating leader, pushing him towards a more anti-democratic stance. In March 1990 the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, was founded in Moscow. At first glance, the new party did not differ much from other “mainstream democratic” parties which mushroomed in the country. One could notice, however, that Zhirinovsky’s party stood for abolishing the union republics and for creating a unitary state instead of the Soviet Union. In June 1990, the Liberal Democratic Party became a founding member of the so-called Centrist Bloc.

Soon it became clear that the new bloc, most of the members of which were political non-entities, enjoyed a quite extraordinary degree of attention at the top of the Soviet hierarchy. On 29 October the leaders of the bloc were granted a three-hour audience by Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov and the following day they were received by Anatolii Luk’ianov, then deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. During the period of Gorbachev’s “shift to the right” in October 1990 through April 1991, the Centrist Bloc (later renamed into the Committee of National Salvation) openly advocated the implementation of those measures which were highly desirable for the conservatis within Gorbachev’s inner circle, such as the imposition of presidential rule and the state of emergency throughout the Soviet Union, and the replacement of elected officials in several union republics, including Russia. It was not unusual to view Zhirinovsky’s party, as well as the “centrists” as a whole, as a “carefully conceived and orchestrated operation enjoying the support of the KGB and of conservative elements in the CPSU and armed forces.”

More than the 1990 republican and local elections, the June 1991 presidential election in Russia was conducted along partisan lines. However, competing parties as such were largely absent. Yeltsin was the only candidate nominated and supported by Democratic Russia. But his running mate, Aleksandr Rutskoi, was still a member of the Communist Party. The CPSU itself produced as many as four candidates, representing different ideological trends within the disintegrating party. The most prominent of these competitors, consistently supported by the top party leadership, was the perceivably moderate and pragmatic former Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Ryzhkov. Vadim Bakatin, with his apparently more pro-democratic stance,
sought to attract the votes of the liberal intelligentsia frustrated by the radical political reformism of Democratic Russia. Two other candidates, in contrast, represented varying versions of profoundly communist rhetoric, with Al'bert Makashov adhering to the traditional values of the Soviet system, and Aman-gel'dy Tuleev advocating a somewhat more updated approach which emphasized social justice. Finally the competition was joined by Zhirinovsky, the only candidate whose ideological stance was distinctively "nationalist." During the campaign Zhirinovsky advocated the abolition of union republic and other national-territorial units, and promised to defend Russians and the Russian-speaking population over the whole territory of the USSR. It was, in fact, in his bid to become Russian president that Zhirinovsky attracted widespread media attention.

The results of the election clearly indicated that, for the majority of the voters, it was a referendum on the communist regime. Yeltsin won the election with 57.3 per cent of the vote. Pro-communist candidates fared poorly. Ryzhkov, despite the enormous efforts on his behalf by the party apparatus, received 16.9 per cent of the vote, Tuleev 6.8 per cent, Makashov 3.7 per cent, and Bakatin 3.4 per cent. Surprisingly for many observers, Zhirinovsky with 7.8 per cent of the vote managed to capture third place in the election, behind only Yeltsin and Ryzhkov. Almost immediately, Zhirinovsky launched his campaign to be elected president of the USSR (although the directly elected presidency has yet to be introduced in the Soviet Union).

Yeltsin's overwhelming victory did not, however, lead to the consolidation of Democratic Russia. Quite the reverse. Efforts to create a strong party in place of the movement were renewed by Travkin and his lieutenants in the periphery. In particular, Travkin tried to merge his Democratic Party with the Social Democrats and the Republicans. Once formed, such a party could literally embrace the entire membership of Democratic Russia outside Moscow. This alliance never materialized, largely due to the ambitions of Travkin and other parties' leaders. At the same time Yeltsin's victory helped him to garner loyal support of the old political, managerial, and administrative elites. Strongly reluctant to join Democratic Russia, which appeared to be too radical and thus hostile to their own interests, they sought alternative political organizations. One such alternative was the Movement for Democratic Reforms, created by a group of promi-
ment "democrats," like Gavriil Popov and Anatolii Sobchak on the one hand, and former allies of Gorbachev like Aleksandr Yakovlev on the other. Another option was the pro-democratic wing of the Communist Party, which on 18 July 1991 started to break off as the Democratic Party of Russian Communists led by Rutskoi. On 2 August, the new party held its organizing conference. Four days later Rutskoi was expelled from the CPSU.\textsuperscript{154}

For the ruling Communist Party, the developments of 1989-91 could bring about nothing but decay. The membership of the party started to drop alarmingly. In 1989-90, it fell by 1.3 per cent,\textsuperscript{155} whereas at the July 1991 plenum of the Central Committee Gorbachev reported that the party had fallen by 4.2 million in the eighteen months from the beginning of 1990, a reduction of 21.8 per cent.\textsuperscript{156} At the same time, the party became increasingly factionalized. In addition to the Democratic Platform, which left the party to become the Republicans, and to Rutskoi's Communists for Democracy, a number of factions of more conservative orientations emerged: the Marxist Platform in June 1990, the Bolshevik Platform in July 1991, and several others.\textsuperscript{157} The most important of them was the so-called Communist Initiative Movement, which had played a significant role in the establishment of the Russian Communist Party. The movement adopted overtly anti-democratic positions, criticizing social democratic tendencies within the party and the course of recent policy and harking back to the workers' movement as the lodestar for policy direction.\textsuperscript{158}

It must be stressed, however, that the party did not formally split, and indeed, it retained a fairly large membership up to August 1991. While its decay was especially evident in Moscow, the vast majority of decision-makers in the Russian periphery were still Communists, and high party officials (if not the first secretaries of provincial party committees) continued to head many local executive bodies. In this sense, the CPSU continued to serve as the organizational axis of the national political executive, and the leaders of pro-democratic parties and movements viewed undermining the strength of the Communist Party as their primary task. There was a widespread expectation that a coalition of democratic parties would challenge the CPSU during the next parliamentary elections and probably win. The attempted coup of August 1991, however, changed the whole structure of strategic choices available to the major political actors.\textsuperscript{159}
While some of the circumstances of the coup attempt remain uncertain, it seems that as an organizational entity the Communist Party was not a prime mover in it. Of course the leaders of the coup were all party members, but none of them was in the Politburo at that time. Preparations for the coup also do not seem to have taken place within the organizational structures of the party. Clearly, however, the Communist Party failed to come out in support of a restoration of constitutional order, and in the popular perception, the leaders of the coup represented the party apparatus. In this context, punitive action against the party was popularly accepted with equanimity. On 23 August, Yeltsin suspended the activities of the Communist Party in Russia, and two days later he ordered the nationalization of party property within the Russian Federation. On 6 November, Yeltsin issued a decree banning the Communist Party on Russian territory. Party organizations in institutions and bodies of all sorts were dissolved.

These actions strengthened the political position of Yeltsin in two major respects. First, they allowed him to institutionalize the exclusive dependence of the executive bodies all over the country on the Russian presidency. Second, by banning the Communist Party, Yeltsin sharply reduced his dependence on the leaders of the "democratic movement." They were among the first to come out in support of Yeltsin's decree banning the Communist Party; yet its collapse meant that the task of its counterparts—in the form of democratic parties—had been largely accomplished. When, in November 1991, the Congress of People's Deputies gave Yeltsin extraordinary powers to promote a program of radical economic reform, none of the leading "democrats" had been invited to participate in drafting and implementing this program. Instead this task had to be accomplished by a team of individuals who owed their promotions exclusively to their connections and personal loyalties to Yeltsin. In particular, this team included a group of youthful Moscow economists led by Yegor Gaidar, the principal drafter of the program of "shock therapy," and a number of people picked up by Yeltsin during his long way to power from the provincial party committee in Sverdlovsk (like Oleg Lobov) to the Congresses of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union and Russia (like Sergei Shakhrai). In the periphery, Yeltsin chose to maintain close ties
with the existing administrative elites rather than to promote the activists of Democratic Russia and other new organizations. Yeltsin's policy left the "democrats" in a rather paradoxical situation. While their principal programmatic goals were apparently achieved, they were not closer to the real decision-making process than they had been under the communist rule. Therefore, the major incentives for joining the "democratic movement" vanished and the membership of Democratic Russia and other organizations started to fall. In early 1992 the "democratic movement" was virtually invisible on the Russian political arena. The earliest attempt to revitalize Democratic Russia by establishing its connection with Yeltsin's new team had been undertaken in July 1992, at a meeting called the Forum of Democratic Forces. In addition to Democratic Russia and its affiliates, participants in this meeting included Gaidar, a number of other reform economists who at that time held ministerial positions, and some other members of Yeltsin's "inner circle." This Forum, in late November renamed Democratic Choice, officially aimed to consolidate the "democrats" and thereby reinvigorate popular support for liberal economic reform. Some of the leaders of Democratic Russia, so-called "pragmatists," agreed to justify the Gaidar's program of free prices, unregulated markets, and rapid and comprehensive privatization as the only possible path for Russia. They also advocated the policy of establishing close strategic partnership with the United States pursued by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, one of the founders of Democratic Choice.

While the attempt to create Democratic Choice was important as a blueprint for new organization, it took some time to effectively connect the government with Democratic Russia. It was only in July 1993 that the organizing committee of the "governing party," now called Russia's Choice, was formally established. The overtly pro-governmental position of the new formation was apparently not very attractive for several "democratic" parties. The Movement for Democratic Reforms, the Republicans, and the Social Democrats preferred to retain their organizational independence. Their leaders became increasingly critical of Yeltsin's policies. The major challenge to the government, however, came not from this moderate and inconsistent opposition within the "democratic" camp, but from the "nationalists."
In late 1991, a number of political formations previously associated with the “democratic movement” shifted towards the “nationalist” segment of the political spectrum. In November, the Democratic Party of Russia, the Christian Democrats, and the Constitutional Democrats sharply opposed the dissolution of the Soviet Union and started to advocate its maintenance as a federation, and an indivisible Russia. These three parties quit Democratic Russia and created a short-lived alliance, People’s Accord. After the start of radical economic reform, these “third generation nationalists” rejected Gaidar’s strategy and blasted the very concept of price liberalization. They were joined in this critique by vice-president Rutskoi, whose Democratic Party of Russian Communists, now called People’s Party Free Russia, emerged as one of the largest political parties of the Russian Federation.

In early 1992, Rutskoi articulated the ideological tenets of his self-proclaimed “centrism” in three programmatic essays offering nationalism, democracy, and social protection of the population as its founding principles. Nationalism was presented as a belief in the unitary nature of Russia and active protection of ethnic Russians in the former Soviet Union; democracy was defined as the freedom of political competition but with a very strong emphasis on law and order; the social protection of the population was formulated as a criticism of the government’s economic policies. In June 1992, Rutskoi’s party and the Democratic Party joined a pressure group of the directors of state enterprises, the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs led by former high-level CPSU official Arkadii Volskii, to form the Civic Union. Ideologically the new formation represented a moderate “nationalist” alternative to the radical reformism of Yeltsin and Gaidar. On the one hand, the leaders of the Civic Union expressed their will to continue to implement market-oriented economic reforms and to strengthen the country’s democratic institution. On the other hand, they subordinated these goals to creating strong Russian statehood, and rejected the government’s policies as inconsistent with this top priority.

In the fall of 1992, the “nationalists” of a much more radical variety launched their own coalition, initially called the Right and Left Opposition and later renamed as the National Salvation Front. The new entity brought together the “first-generation nationalists” like derevenschiki Valentin Rasputin and Vasilii Belov, the “third-generation nationalists” like Aksyuchits and Astaf’ev,
committed Stalinists like Mokashov, and a number of more moderate (but, at the same time, more nationalist) communists like Gennadii Zyuganov. The Front’s leaders did not attempt to conceal their organization’s “system-destroying” aims. They portrayed Yeltsin and his government as traitors who had allied themselves with western intelligence agencies, black marketeers, the Mafia, and other anti-national forces. Correspondingly, they viewed undermining Yeltsin’s power by any possible means as their primary task. In late October, Yeltsin responded by disbanding the Front, asserting that the group threatened the fundamentals of the Russian constitutional system. However, the leaders of the Front stated publicly that they were going to ignore Yeltsin’s decree as unconstitutional, and continued their activities. At the beginning of February 1993 the Front announced that it had formed a “shadow patriotic government” of Russia.

Apparently, the Civic Union and the National Salvation Front had very little in common. The versions of “nationalist” ideology articulated by these two groups were distinctively different, as were their attitudes toward Yeltsin and his government. A closer examination, however, shows that in one very important respect both groups displayed striking similarity: both more or less explicitly assumed that the course of government could not be changed by democratic means. The Civic Union based its strategy on lobbying, trying to make a deal with Yeltsin. Indeed, this strategy was not unrealistic throughout late 1992 and early 1993, as Yeltsin sought an accommodation with the directors of state enterprises and other managerial elites. In late October 1992, Yeltsin publicly stated that he was ready to reach a compromise with the Civic Union on the government’s economic program. In November, a joint program that had been drafted and accepted by the government and the Civic Union was announced. Although the agreement collapsed on 26 November, it was in part due to the lobbying of the Civic Union that three industrialists were included into the government. Most notably, one of them was Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. This most spectacular success of the Civic Union, however, turned out to be its last.

In early March 1993, the Congress of People’s Deputies of Russia, chaired by Ruslan Khasbulatov, passed a resolution that allowed the Supreme Soviet to repeal Yeltsin’s decrees by a simple majority vote, and a constitutional amendment mandating
the automatic impeachment of the president if he were to attempt to dissolve the parliament. In response, Yeltsin declared "special rule" on 20 March, which indeed put the question of impeachment on the parliamentary agenda. The Civic Union faction was split on this issue. The moderate members of the coalition were reluctant to go that far in their confrontation with Yeltsin. Rutskoi, however, sided with the parliamentary majority, evidently in the hope that Yeltsin would be impeached and power transferred to him. This effectively started the process of disintegration of the Civic Union. Rutskoi discarded the image of a "centrist" leader seeking political compromise in favor of the leadership of the radical opposition. The Democratic Party of Russia, as well as many leading members and provincial branches of Rutskoi's own party, left the Civic Union, which effectively ceased to exist as a major political force by mid-summer 1993.

Both Rutskoi and Khasbulatov, on the one side, and Yeltsin, on the other, engaged in unrestricted, potentially violent struggle for dominance which left them no choice but to revert to mass political mobilization. Consequently the National Salvation Front emerged as a major participant in intra-elite conflict. Ideologically, no difference could be observed between the leaders of the Front and their new allies, Rutskoi and Khasbulatov. After Yeltsin dissolved the parliament and suspended Rutskoi as vice-president, Rutskoi made a decisive step toward armed confrontation by issuing arms to the most militant elements of opposition. This resulted in the armed uprising of 3 October 1993 and military intervention into the conflict. The uprising failed. Rutskoi, Khasbulatov and many other leaders of the "nationalist" opposition were arrested; the National Salvation Front and People's Party Free Russia were banned; other opposition parties found themselves in disarray. The only exception was Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party, which participated neither in the National Salvation Front nor in the uprising and thus, perhaps unexpectedly for Zhirinovsky himself, was left in the position of being able to monopolize the "nationalist" segment of the political spectrum.

Communist successor parties started to emerge in Russia immediately after the CPSU had been banned. The Socialist Party of Working People, founded in October 1991, undertook the earliest attempt to claim the parentage of the former ruling
party, most probably in the hope of getting back some of its assets. Ideologically, the party indicated its commitment to a sort of "Eurocommunism." A party convention in December 1991 dropped the phrase "dictatorship of proletariat" from its program and adopted a declaration of respect for human rights, a mixed economy, and a multiparty system. In addition, the leaders of the party called for a thorough investigation into the past errors of the CPSU. Such a moderate ideological stance was expected to attract those former Communists who adhered to the line of Gorbachev's perestroika. Although the party was overrepresented at the Congress of People's Deputies and had some access to the media, it failed to build effective grassroots ties. Its membership, relatively large in early 1992 (the party claimed 80,000), gradually declined. This indicated that the ideological choice made by the leaders of the party was incorrect.

Some other successor parties were even smaller and more shadowy than the Socialist Party of Working People. But the largest, the Russian Communist Workers' Party, in early 1993 appeared to be something of a mass party, claiming more than 150,000 members. Founded in November 1991, the origins of the party could be traced to the Communist Initiative Movement, once the most radical anti-Gorbachev faction within the CPSU. The party's program aimed at establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat based on workers' self-management, Marxist-Leninist ideology, and a planned economy. The statute of the party emphasized that its membership had to be mostly drawn from the workers and that party cells had to be at the workplace, not residential. In reality, the party did not have any significant industrial influence. The only cleavage likely to characterize the party had more to do with demography than with politics-most of its active members were aged pensioners who longed for the ideological environment of their youth.

Towards the middle of 1992, the Russian Constitutional Court began to hold hearings on the status of the banned CPSU. The Court took no decision on the unconstitutionality of the Communist Party, arguing that it had gone out of existence a year earlier, and upheld Yeltsin's action with regard to the central organs of the party but not to those at the local level. This decision ignited a comprehensive campaign to revive the Communist Party. Beginning in January 1993, local party conferences were conducted in nearly every region of Russia. This process cul-
minated in the "revival-unification" Congress of Communists in February 1993. Six hundred and fifty-one delegates representing more than 500,000 newly registered Communist Party members attended, making the revived Communist Party of the Russian Federation immediately the largest political party in Russia. The organizational basis for the party was provided mostly by "independent" committees, established after the Constitutional Court's decision and not connected with the Russian Communist Workers' Party or any other group. When invited to join the new formation, the Communist Workers' Party refused, although a lot of individual members eventually did so. In fact, the two leading Russian communist parties were set against each other. Partly, this confrontation stemmed from the personal ambitions of the parties' leaders. But there was also a significant ideological difference between these two formations.

While the leadership of the Communist Workers' Party steadily adhered to the values of Marxism-Leninism, the leader of the new party, Zyuganov, displayed a much higher level of ideological flexibility. In late 1991, he and his Council for Popular-Patriotic Forces of Russia were more nationalist than communist in their basic orientations. Zyuganov participated in the Russian National Assembly, led by an extreme nationalist and anti-Semitic Aleksandr Sterligov, and later was one of the co-chairmen of the National Salvation Front. The leaders of the Communist Workers' Party therefore had some reason to accuse Zyuganov of "conscious and unconscious complicity with anti-communists, deviations from the class position, and liquidationist activity." It was only on the eve of the "revival-unification" Congress that Zyuganov started to stress the necessity of foregoing the "ideological innocence" of the Communists. When elected as the chairman of the Executive Committee of the new party, Zyuganov stated that he planned to set up a "broad state-patriotic bloc" capable of replacing "anti-national" Yeltsin's government with a "patriotic" one. This time, however, his nationalism was rather cautious. A radical shift from communism to nationalism was clearly unacceptable for many members of the Communist Party, bred in the traditions of "socialist internationalism."

By electing Zyuganov as its single leader, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation revealed that it was going to move towards the "nationalist" segment of the political spec-
trum. But this could not happen overnight. In order to maintain its mass membership, the party had to preserve its image of a party of "true communists," even though Zyuganov was likely aware of the fact that in the long run, it was essential to attract the support of those voters who favored the idea of strong Russian statehood. Both the Russian Communist Workers' Party and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation were initially banned after the October 1993 uprising in Moscow. But if the former boycotted the December 1993 parliamentary elections, calling for a campaign of "civic disobedience," the latter easily collected 100,000 signatures of its supporters and was added to the Justice Ministry's list of registered parties. Quite expectedly, the Socialist Party of Working People failed to collect the necessary number of signatures. Zyuganov's party was thus the only communist successor party contesting the elections.

After two years of radical economic reforms, the Russian parliamentary elections of December 1993 obviously could not be viewed as a referendum on the former regime. Rather, the voters were provided with an opportunity to express their attitudes towards the policy of marketization. They could support this policy by voting for pro-governmental parties, or express their dissatisfaction by voting for the opposition. In fact, the choice was not that easy because the elections were contested by two clearly pro-government parties with distinctively different ideological platforms, and a similar split occurred within the camp of the opposition. In other words, the vote for pro-government parties did not necessarily coincide with the vote for parties with manifestly "liberal" ideological stances. We shall see, however, that this put only a marginal impact upon the final distribution of the vote on the aggregate level.

The party which most visibly combined a pro-government orientation with a "liberal" ideological stance was Russia's Choice led by Gaidar and supported by a number of other senior government officials both in Moscow and on the periphery. Another party of this kind was the Movement for Democratic Reforms, led by the former "democratic" mayor of Moscow and by the acting mayor of St. Petersburg. The third major "liberal" party contesting the elections was Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc (Yabloko). Grigoriy Yavlinsky owed his popularity to the "500-day" economic program published in 1990. This program, widely publicized by the "democratic" media, was nearly
accepted as a blueprint for the radical economic reform in the Soviet Union, but finally rejected by Gorbachev as he shifted to the right in the fall of that year. In late 1993, Yavlinsky criticized the government, claiming that Gaidar’s market reforms were basically right for Russia, but failed because they were not conducted professionally. Due to this critique, Yavlinsky emerged as the leader of the “democratic alternative” to the government. The regional network for Yabloko was provided by two minor “mainstream democratic” parties, the Social Democrats and the Republicans.

The parties of the “nationalist” segment of the political spectrum were also divided in their attitudes toward the government. On the eve of the electoral campaign, a Deputy Prime Minister and Yeltsin’s close collaborator, Shakhrai, announced the creation of his Party of Russian Unity and Accord. While the core of the party’s program was the improvement of relations between Moscow and the periphery of Russia, it also stood for “conservative values,” understood as the preservation of the Russian state and the rebirth of old Russian traditions, and favored a stronger role for the state in economic management. Two other moderately “nationalist” parties were the rump Civic Union, now renamed the Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress, and the Future of Russia-New Names (Budushchee Rossii-Novie Imena), ideologically close to the Civic Union, which was one of the sponsors of the organization. The most radical of moderate “nationalists” was the Democratic Party of Russia. Its campaign was shaped not only by Travkin, but also, and perhaps primarily, by a typical “third-generation nationalist,” Stanislav Govorukhin, a filmmaker who had turned from support for the “democrats” to a more nationalist stance. While the program of the Democratic Party echoed that of the Civic Union, the major point of Govorukhin’s eloquent TV speeches was his critique of the Yeltsin’s government, which was accused of being basically communist, corrupt, and unprofessional.

The only party which combined an unmistakably “nationalist” ideological stance with clearly anti-government position was Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party. His spectacular geopolitical designs, which he claimed would remove the threat to the Russian state forever and restore Russia as a great power, attracted a lot of publicity both in Russia and abroad. Zhirinovsky also promised to restore the economy “in a very
short time" by rejecting the "ruinous" economic course of the
government. In his view, this could be achieved by strengthen-
ing the state sector, limiting privatization, banning unemploy-
ment, and increasing the sale of weapons on the world market.
The Liberal Democratic Party stood for establishing a strong
presidential regime in Russia which, Zhirinovsky claimed, was
necessary both for fighting organized crime and for avoiding the
danger of the country's disintegration.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation also em-
phasized its commitment to strong Russian statehood and sought
to distance itself from the ideals of the past. However,
Zyuganov's pre-electoral rhetoric was overcautious, obscured
with quasi-academic terminology, and generally vague. Con-
sciously avoiding sharp issues, Zyuganov stressed such values as
labor, justice, "civic peace," and prosperity for everyone rather
than for the few. The major ally of the Communists, the Agrarian
Party of Russia, was often characterized as a rural subdivision of
Zyuganov's party. In fact, the Agrarians were a lobby of state
agricultural managers whose clientelist networks provided the
party with a solid basis. Organizationally, therefore, the Agrari-
ans were not a communist successor party. Their ideological
stance, however, did not differ much from that of the Commu-
nists. The elections were also contested by a number of corpo-
ratist and interest groups without any identifiable ideological
standing. The most salient among these groups was a movement
unpretentiously called the Women of Russia.

The electoral outcomes clearly demonstrated that the vot-
ers who, for whatever reasons, chose to reward the government,
did so by casting their votes for the most clearly pro-government
party with the most easily identifiable "liberal" ideological stance, Russia's Choice (15.51 per cent of the vote). The Move-
ment for Democratic Reforms, which was no less "liberal" than
Gaidar's party but lacked its status of "governing" party, re-
ceived only 4.08 per cent of the vote. The vote for Shakhrai's pro-
government "nationalists" (6.76 per cent) approximately
matched the vote for Yavlinsky's "democratic alternative" (7.86
per cent). Jointly, three pro-government parties (Russia's Choice,
the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, and the Movement for
Democratic Reforms) polled 26.35 per cent of the vote. The ag-
eggregated vote for three "liberal" parties (the same without the
Party of Russian Unity and Accord but with Yabloko) was only
slightly different, 27.45 per cent. Among the "nationalist" parties, the voters most unambiguously supported the Liberal Democratic Party, which received 22.92 per cent, the largest share of the vote. The Communists and the Agrarians received 12.40 and 7.99 per cent of the vote, respectively. Moderate "nationalist" parties of the opposition fared poorly. Only one of them, the Democratic Party (5.52 per cent) managed to pass the five per cent barrier and thus obtained Duma representation. The Civic Union and the Future of Russia-New Names lost badly, with 1.93 and 1.25 per cent of the vote, respectively. Jointly, the opposition (six parties listed above plus Yabloko) received 58.62 per cent of the vote; the aggregated result for the "nationalists" (the same six parties plus the Party of Russian Unity and Accord) was 57.52 per cent.

These disasters for Yeltsin and his team results were partly smoothed by the fact that Russia’s Choice fared better than any other party in single-member districts (as many as thirty deputies elected in these districts joined Russia’s Choice, while just sixteen joined the Communists, twelve joined the Agrarians, and five the Liberal Democrats). This enabled Russia’s Choice to create the largest parliamentary faction. Even after this adjustment, however, the majority of seats in Duma belonged to more or less radical opposition-minded parties and individuals. This, however, did not result in any significant alteration of the government’s policy, which obviously stemmed from the new Constitution adopted in a referendum held simultaneously with the December 1993 elections.

The Constitution provided the president with a central role in defining the "basic directions of domestic and foreign policy." In particular, the president had the right to appoint the prime minister, and (on his nomination) to appoint and dismiss deputy premiers and other ministers. The Duma could for its part reject nominations to the premiership, but after the third such rejection it would be automatically dissolved. The Duma could also be dissolved if it twice voted a lack of confidence in the government when the matter was raised by the prime minister.179 While the Constitution stated that the new Duma could not be dissolved during the first year after the elections, the risk of continuing deadlock once the president was faced with an absolute majority in the Duma remained. Given the president’s sweeping constitutional powers and the personality of Yeltsin, such a dead-
lock would promise nothing good for the Duma. Under these conditions, the major factions of the Duma (including the Communists and the Liberal Democrats) did not dare to reject Chernomyrdin as prime minister. This enabled Chernomyrdin, while publicly rejecting "market romanticism" of Gaidar, to continue Gaidar's policy of tough budgetary control and forced privatization. This policy, rather successful in terms of slowing the pace of inflation, resulted in the dramatic decline of living standards in Russia, especially in 1995.¹⁸⁰

Dissatisfied with the results of the elections, Gaidar left Chernomyrdin's government on 16 January 1994. Russia's Choice did not go into opposition, however, but continued to support the government in the Duma. In June, Russia's Choice transformed itself into a "full-fledged" political party, Russia's Democratic Choice, and adopted a program that supported reducing the role of the state in the economy, cutting military spending, lowering taxes, and expanding market reforms in the agricultural sector.¹⁸¹ In December, several leading figures of the party split with the government over its policy in the North Caucasian republic of Chechnya.¹⁸² But Russia's Democratic Choice still supported the government on many other issues, primarily on economic policy. In contrast, Yabloko opposed the government on all fronts, thus justifying its claim to be the major "democratic alternative" to Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin. For example, the expressed will of Vladimir Lysenko, one of the founders of the Republican Party of the Russian Federation, to maintain close ties to Yeltsin caused his expulsion from the Yabloko parliamentary faction. As a result, a part of the Republicans left Yabloko to restore their own organization. In the fall of 1995, the rump Republican party joined a new electoral bloc, named "Pamfilova-Gurov-Vladimir Lysenko."

Yet another, and totally new, pro-democratic party had been created in February 1995 by Boris Fyodorov, who served as finance minister in the Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin government from December 1992 until January 1994. Fyodorov's "right-liberal" party, named Forward, Russia!, had been described by its founder as a "liberal plan for Russia" that included rapid economic reform but also called for "law and order" and "strengthening a unitary and indivisible Russia."¹⁸³ In particular, Forward, Russia! backed the use of force to stop the secession of Chechnya but criticized Chernomyrdin's economic policies as in-
sufficiently radical, thus serving as a sort of mirror reflection of Russia’s Democratic Choice. Finally, the description of the “liberal” segment of the recent Russian political spectrum would be incomplete without mentioning the Workers’ Self-Government Party, led by the eye surgeon Svyatoslav Fyodorov. The party’s founder, who received wide publicity in the late eighties for the effective management of his clinic (which was considered as a success story of perestroika), developed a program that advocated mass creation of joint stock companies to guarantee workers a share of profits, removal most taxes and ban of exports of most raw materials. While denying any redistributive role on the part of the state, this program explicitly appealed to the idea of social justice, thus trying to fill what could be called a “left-liberal” political niche. Neither Forward, Russia! nor the Workers’ Self-Government Party had any sufficient organizational basis, especially in the periphery of Russia, deriving their appeal primarily from the personalities of their leaders.

Despite this striking ideological and organizational diversity of the “democratic” camp, none of the “liberal” parties supported the government fully and unconditionally. In April 1995, Chernomyrdin announced that he would lead a new “center-right” electoral bloc, pretentiously labeled Our Home Is Russia. The bloc, joined by several cabinet members and other key figures in the government apparatus, as well as by high-ranking officials in most provinces of the country, had been unanimously qualified as the “party of power” by Russian political observers. The only prominent party politician who took part in the founding of Our Home Is Russia was Shakhrai with his Party of Russian Unity and Accord. In August, however, he left the bloc, citing such reason as his failure to agree with Chernomyrdin on the number of seats for his party on the bloc’s party list. While several regional branches of Shakhrai’s party, as well as of Russia’s Democratic Choice, nevertheless defected to Our Home Is Russia, the major source of the bloc’s political influence was obviously Chernomyrdin’s power over the vast bureaucratic apparatus of the country. One of the consequences of this situation was that Our Home Is Russia, trying to attract as many local “bosses” under its umbrella as possible, failed to define itself ideologically. In fact, Chernomyrdin’s bloc lacked any coherent ideology, substituting for it with vague calls for “stability” and a government of “professionals” who would lead without
"shocks" and "experimentation." At the same time, the bloc's status as the "governing" party clearly associated it with the policy of forced marketization started by Gaidar, thus defining Our Home Is Russia as a "liberal" party better than any declaration of its leaders.

In early 1995, it was expected that Chernomyrdin's bloc would be complemented with a "center-left" alliance led by Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin. One of the leaders of the Communists in 1993, Rybkin then defected to Yeltsin's political camp and tried to represent its "social-democratic" wing. In this capacity, he would be a perfect leader for an alternative "party of power," in a way reminiscent of the role played by Shakhrai's party in the 1993 elections. However, Rybkin's failure to secure the participation of the Agrarians and the trade unions, which were to form the basis of his bloc, resulted in the emergence of just another overtly pro-government group, with the same appeals to "stability" which were characteristic of Our Home Is Russia.

The "nationalist" Duma opposition to the government was represented primarily by the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Soon, however, it became clear that the party's rejection of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin was not as unbending as one could expect from the pre-electoral rhetoric of Zhirinovsky. In fact, the Liberal Democrats supported the government on several important issues, especially on Chechnya. On the other hand, major opposition parties (most importantly, the Communists) treated Zhirinovsky as an unpredictable, insufficiently serious, and dangerously radical politician, ruling out any cooperation with the Liberal Democrats in the Duma. Under these conditions, several prominent Russian public figures attempted to create political parties which, being explicitly "nationalist," could serve as either radical or moderate alternatives to Zhirinovsky's party.

One of these attempts had been undertaken by Rutskoi, released from jail in February 1994 under a Duma-granted amnesty. The former vice-president believed that Zhirinovsky had been able to steal his support in the 1993 elections only because he (Rutskoi) had been stuck in prison. To correct this "mistake," Rutskoi launched the Derzhava (Great Power) social-patriotic movement. Ideologically, Derzhava combined anti-communism with nationalism, thus indeed replicating Zhirinovsky's public rhetoric. But unlike Zhirinovsky, Rutskoi endorsed Orthodox Christianity as the moral foundation of his po-
litical beliefs, and actively employed the vocabulary of the "first-generation" nationalists.\textsuperscript{191} Initially, Rutskoi planned to build \textit{Derzhava} on the basis of his People's Party Free Russia, renamed into the Russian Social Democratic People's Party soon after its leader's release from prison. This plan failed as many regional organizations, dissociating themselves from the perceived radicalism of Rutskoi, split away from the party to create the Social Democratic Union.

This development forced Rutskoi, who was desperately trying to create a strong network of movement cells in the periphery of Russia, to rely upon a variety of nationalist groups, from the remnants of \textit{Pamiat'} to "third-generation" nationalists like Aksyutchits and Astaf'ev. Several defectors from the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, including its major campaign organizer in 1993, Kobelev, also joined the movement. The lack of a stable organizational basis played a fatal role in the history of \textit{Derzhava}. In the fall of 1995, a number of prominent "first" and "third-generation" nationalists within its ranks, dissatisfied with their placement on the party list, not only left the movement but also accused Rutskoi and Kobelev of filling the list with the names of criminals.\textsuperscript{192} For a party which based its public rhetoric on "Christian morality" and promised to fight crime, these accusations, widely disseminated by the pro-reform media, resulted in a disastrous loss of image.

In November 1994, Travkin resigned as chairman of the Democratic Party of Russia and its Duma faction. The latter position came to Govorukhin, and the former to Sergei Glaz'ev, an economist who served as minister of foreign economic relations from 1992 until 21 September 1993, when he resigned to protest Yeltsin's dissolution of the Supreme Soviet. This distribution of power within the Democratic party effectively meant the beginning of its split into two political entities.\textsuperscript{193} Govorukhin, by that time a leading figure in the "patriotic camp," founded his own political movement of an overtly nationalist ideological stance. The movement, called the Bloc of Stanislav Govorukhin, was obviously expected to capitalize on its leader's personal charisma. After the collapse of \textit{Derzhava}, it was also joined by several other leading nationalists. Glaz'ev, however, preferred to contest the elections under the ticket of the Congress of Russian Communities, a political coalition led by Yurii Skokov, a noted representative of the military-industrial complex, and Lieutenant General
(retired) Aleksandr Lebed’.

As the commander of the 14th Russian Army in Moldova, Lebed’ received immense publicity for his defense of the interests of the Russian-speaking minority in the country, as well as for his outspoken criticisms of the “anti-patriotic” policies of Yeltsin. A charismatic leader with dynamic oratorical skills, Lebed’ was expected to complement Skokov’s political experience and financial resources, while the presence of Glaz’ev on the list of the Congress of Russian Communities had to symbolize the party’s commitment to the strategy of gradual economic reforms. The regional network for the coalition was provided by a variety of groups, including not only several organizations of the Democratic party of Russia, but also by the Socialist Party of the Working People and, in some cases, by radical “first-generation” nationalists. Generally, however, the Congress of Russian Communities emerged as a “moderate” nationalist party, led by “patriotic professionals” and open for cooperation both with the opposition and with the ruling elite.

The ideological evolution of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in 1994-95 was characterized by its gradual rejection of Marxist orthodoxy, accompanied by the party’s shift towards a “nationalist” ideological stance. While consistently attacking Yeltsin’s economic policy, the party expressed its support for some types of private property, a mixed economy, and pluralistic political institutions. At the same time, the party’s third congress, held on 21-22 January 1995, adopted a program that called for removing the “party of national betrayal” from power, strengthening Russia’s position on the world stage, and pursuing its traditional interests. As a philosophical basis for this program, Zyuganov endorsed the Eurasian concept developed by the Russian “white” émigrés in the late twenties and actively exploited by the ultra nationalist press in 1987-92. He insisted that first the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union comprised Eurasian civilization, with its distinctive “spiritual basis” provided by such values as communality (obshchinnost’), egalitarian traditions, and patriotism. Depicting the current situation in the country as its “spiritual occupation” by the puppets of the west, Zyuganov claimed his own party to be the only “truly national” force capable of conducting the policy of “national salvation.” One element of Zyuganov’s emphasis on ethnic Russian culture was his benevolence toward the Orthodox Church. While
several prominent party activists were not entirely happy with
the rhetoric of Russian patriotism adopted by Zyuganov, the
party’s leader was generally successful in making a connection
between Marxism and the preservation of Russian traditions.\textsuperscript{199}

In contrast, the Russian Communist Workers’ Party re-
mained firmly committed to the ideas of communism, still advo-
cating exclusively state property on the means of production, So-
viet power, and “proletarian internationalism.” As a result of
this deep ideological difference, the major communist successor
parties failed to create a viable electoral bloc.\textsuperscript{200} While the Com-
munist Party of the Russian Federation contested the 1995 parlia-
mentary elections under its own label, the “communist radicals”
created a coalition named Communists-Workers’ Russia-For the
Soviet Union. The major force beyond this coalition was, of
course, the Russian Communist Workers’ Party.

Two other perceivably “left-wing” parties that contested
the elections were the Agrarian Party of Russia and Power to the
People. In fact, both groups articulated more or less “nationalist”
ideological stances. The Agrarians, apparently impressed with
Zyuganov’s synthesis of socialism and nationalism, tried to go
even further in the same direction, depicting the collective farms
as a “truly national” institution rooted in the Russian traditions
of communality, and peasantry as the most authentic bearer of
“national spirit.”\textsuperscript{201} The Agrarians’ appeal to the rural popula-
tion, however, was severely damaged both by the restoration of
the Communist Party cells in the countryside (which actually
ousted the Agrarians from the niche occupied by them in 1993),
and by the vagueness of the party’s opposition status: two promi-
nent members of the party served as ministers in Chern-
omyrdin’s government. The leaders of Power to the People
were Sergei Baburin, a prominent nationalist who had articulated
explicitly anti-communist views in 1992 and early 1993, and the
former Soviet prime minister Ryzhkov.\textsuperscript{202} This “alliance of con-
venience,” apparently based on its participants’ hopes to capital-
ize on combining the modest organizational resources of
Baburin’s Russian All-People’s Union with the perceived (or mis-
perceived) personal popularity of Ryzhkov, proved to be unliv-
able as the former prime minister, far from embracing the radical
ideological stance of his collaborator, preferred to praise the
achievements of his administration. Many Russian voters had
reason to view these achievements as virtually non-existent.
The December 1995 parliamentary elections in Russia were contested by 43 political entities. As many as 25 of them, created on the eve of the election campaign in order to allow their leaders to attract more publicity which would help them to win in single-member districts, failed to receive 0.99 or more per cent of the vote each. Jointly, these dwarf parties polled about 7 per cent of the vote. Among the remaining 18 parties, only four managed to clear the five per cent threshold and thereby obtain parliamentary representation by party lists. For the purpose of this study, it is nevertheless important to calculate the shares of the vote cast for each of the ideological tendencies. The electoral returns of all the eighteen parties, however insignificant these returns are from the point of view of the final distribution of seats in the Duma, should be therefore introduced into analysis. It must be noted that the major organizations of interest advocacy, lacking both coherent ideological stances and consistent attitudes towards the government’s policies, jointly received 7.55 per cent of the vote (Women of Russia-4.61 per cent, the Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia-1.55 per cent, and the Ecological Party Kedr-1.39 per cent).

Among those parties which more or less explicitly advocated the continuation of radical economic reforms, Our Home Is Russia with its 10.13 per cent of the vote turned out to be most successful. The bloc of Ivan Rybkin received only 1.11 per cent, which clearly indicated that its leader failed to create a viable political organization. Jointly, the “parties of power” polled only 11.24 per cent of the vote. The electoral performance of the parties of “democratic alternative” was also disappointing. Only one of them, Yabloko (with 6.89 per cent of the vote), cleared the five per cent threshold, followed by the Party of Workers’ Self-Government (3.98 per cent), Russia’s Democratic Choice (3.86 per cent), Forward, Russia! (1.94 per cent), and the bloc of Pamfilova-Gurov-Vladimir-Lysenko (1.6 per cent). The share of the vote jointly received by these parties—18.27 per cent—was nevertheless larger than that of the “parties of power.”

The Liberal Democratic Party of Russia received only 11.18 per cent of the vote, thus failing to repeat the stunning success achieved by Zhironovsky in 1993. The elections demonstrated that, despite the widely publicized outstanding personal qualities of the Congress of Russian Communities leaders, the party’s “moderate” nationalism was not very appealing to the
voters. Only 4.31 per cent of them supported the Congress. The disarray of Derzhava, as well as the exclusively personal nature of the Bloc of Stanislav Govorukhin, resulted in these parties' electoral failures—they received 2.57 and 0.99 per cent of the vote, respectively. The Argrarian Party of Russia (3.78 per cent of the vote) and Power to the People (1.61 per cent of the vote) paid dearly for both the lack of organizational stability and the vagueness of their ideological stances.

Apparently, the only party which had sufficient organizational resources to capitalize on the weakness of other opposition parties was the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. With 22.3 per cent of the vote, Zyuganov's party emerged as the ultimate winner of the elections. This victory, however, would be unthinkable without the party's consistent evolution towards the "nationalist" segment of the ideological spectrum. Suggestively enough, the Communists-Workers' Russia-For the Soviet Union, with its manifested adherence to the communist orthodoxy of the past, received only 4.53 per cent of the vote. Jointly, the radical opposition parties (two communist parties, the Agrarians, Power to the People, the Bloc of Stanislav Govorukhin, Derzhava and the Liberal Democrats) won 46.96 per cent of the vote, while the combined vote for the "nationalist" parties (the same without the Communists-Workers' Russia-For the Soviet Union but with the Congress of Russian Communities) equaled 46.74 per cent. Comparing these results with the electoral outcomes of 1993, one may notice that the proportions of the vote cast for the major ideological tendencies have not changed dramatically. The logic of this analysis implies that this may be explained with reference to the absence of effective policy change as a consequence of the 1993 elections, which resulted in a sort of "freezing" of voter preferences. The balance of power within the "nationalist" camp, however, dramatically shifted in favor of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

The cases of Bulgaria and the Czech Lands

Modes of communist rule

The cases of Bulgaria and the Czech Lands display several important similarities. One of these similarities is that in both countries, the initial level of communist support appears to
be higher than in Hungary or in Russia. Speaking of the Czech Lands, such a conclusion may be based on the "firm" electoral data. During the second world war, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia established itself as the leading force of the anti-Nazi resistance movement. The first post-war parliamentary elections, held in May 1946, were recognized by both Czech and foreign observers as being freely conducted by secret ballot. These elections were a big success for the Communist Party, which won 38 per cent of the vote (40 per cent in the Czech Lands). Refraining from an attempt at violent revolution on the Soviet pattern, the party, with the sanction of the Soviet Union, opted for a more moderate course, more in line with the deeply entrenched democratic values of the country. This found its expression in the notion of the "national path to socialism," which included a multiparty system; freedom of the press, scholarship, and cultural life from government control; and a mixed economy. In February 1948, however, the "national path to socialism" was abandoned in favor of the seizure of power through the use of extra-parliamentary pressures. The resulting system of "people's democracy" was not very much different from those established in other East European countries.

In Bulgaria, the initial level of communist support cannot be measured as precisely as in Czechoslovakia. No genuinely free elections took place in the country after the end of the Second World War. While the elections of November 1945 gave a huge majority (86 per cent) of the vote to the Communist-led Fatherland Front, the opposition abstained from that elections. In this case, however, it was not entirely clear whether the opposition was deterred from participating in the elections because of the threat of police terror (as the leaders of the opposition claimed) or because they overestimated the support they could hope to receive from western allies. In fact, the Bulgarian Communist Party, like its Czechoslovak counterpart, played the lead in the resistance movement during the war. Its political influence was enhanced by the generally pro-Russian sentiment of the Bulgarian public, and it was well-organized and relatively strong in number. In contrast, the non-communist parties were small, factionalized, and some of them were discredited by their collaboration with the highly unpopular pro-German regime during the war. Under these conditions, the Communists easily sidetracked the opposition and were effectively in complete control of the sit-
uation in the country since September 1944.

In the early 1950s through the mid-1960s, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria displayed remarkably similar patterns of political development. In both countries, the struggle for power which occurred in the Soviet Union in 1953-57 resulted in the rise of new party leaders, Antonín Novotný in Czechoslovakia and Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria. Both men were relative newcomers to the highest party circles, and both pursued courses that involved a minimum of de-Stalinization, as far as it was required by Moscow, and avoided any serious relaxation of the system. Both faithfully, and in case of Bulgaria sometimes almost comically, followed the patterns of behavior set in Moscow. After the collapse of the communist rule in Bulgaria, Zhivkov was charged with wanting to make his country the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union. Even if these charges were exaggerated, Bulgaria was the model satellite. In this capacity, Zhivkov’s regime survived through the sixties, seventies, and eighties.

No meaningful mass protest against communist rule occurred in Bulgaria before the late eighties. There were few Bulgarian dissidents, and those who dared to criticize the regime were either severely harassed by the state security police or forced to leave the country (even this, however, did not put them out of the reach of the Bulgarian secret services). In the mid-1980s, Zhivkov launched his “regenerative process,” a euphemism for the attempted bulgarization of the country’s ethnic Turks. But it was only by 1988-89 that mounting frustration and the changes elsewhere in Eastern Europe led to the emergence of several proto-opposition groups exploiting the anti-Turkish campaign as well as questions such as environmental degradation. These organizations included the environmental club Ecoglasnost, independent trade-union Podkrepa and several less significant others. Ideologically, they were similar to the early “informal” groups in Russia, initially exposing their opposition to specific policies pursued by the regime rather than to its fundamental principles. By 1989, some of these groups accepted rather clearly defined anti-communist stances, starting to advocate parliamentary democracy and transition to a market economy. At the same time they accused Zhivkov’s regime of the betrayal of the national interests of the country, not unrealistically referring to the elderly leader as to the puppet of Moscow. The lack of political resources on the part of these groups was, however, ob-
Both the level of the regime's self-confidence and its willingness to follow each step made in Moscow were demonstrated in July 1987, when Zhivkov himself enlisted a reform proposal parts of which, taken at face value, involved real systemic change. This attempt to repeat the sham de-Stalinization of the fifties was quickly abandoned as soon as Zhivkov realized that Gorbachev really meant what he was talking about. Zhivkov then relapsed into political conservatism, claiming that the April Plenum of 1956 (which marked the most decisive step in Zhivkov's advent to power) had been the real turning point of reform and that there was no real need for another one.

While the mode of conduct of Novotný in the late fifties and early sixties was much the same as that of Zhivkov, the societal pressures upon the communist leadership turned out to be stronger. The line of symbolic de-Stalinization, adopted by Novotný after the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, did not allow him to eliminate the early signs of moderate discontent which became evident in 1963, during the congresses of Slovak and Czechoslovak writers. The central theme of the sessions was the damage done to the literature during the period referred to as the "cult." The party leadership vigorously attacked the writers, but did not manage to prevent them from articulating their cautious criticisms of the regime in the media. Several newspapers and journals became forums of the expression of critical views not only by artists, but also by other intellectuals, including philosophers, historians, economists, and sociologists. There was also some observable student unrest in the country. Novotný reacted with repeated assertions of the party's leadership role, constant demands for loyalty, and some limited repressive action against heretical ideas and their bearers. Some other top party officials, however, used the discrediting of Novotný as a pretext for challenging his leadership. In January 1968, Novotný resigned as first secretary of the Communist Party in favor of Alexander Dubček. This marked the beginning of the process which came to be known as the Prague Spring.

In retrospect, the Prague Spring appears as a moderate reform attempt very much reminiscent of the early phase of glasnost' in the Soviet Union. It was initiated and conducted exclusively from above and, in sharp contrast to the 1956 events in Hungary or in Poland, was not accompanied by any significant
mass political action. In the forefront were the creative artists and the scholars in the humanities and the social sciences, who criticized the Soviet model of socialism in the media. Almost nobody, however, rejected the idea of socialism as such. Two proto-opposition groups which emerged in the process of the Prague Spring, the Club of Non-Party Engagés and Club 231, were small and sought to obtain legitimacy under the auspices of the Communist-led National Front. The idea of introducing a multiparty system in the country was not widely discussed. Generally, both the reformers and the public viewed the process as an endorsement of the notion of the "national path to socialism," this time labeled "socialism with a human face." Nevertheless, in August 1968, the Soviet and allied troops invaded Czechoslovakia in order to stop what they claimed was a "counterrevolutionary coup." Many leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, most notably Dubček, were arrested and then forced into negotiations with Moscow.

The Czech and Slovak peoples reacted to the invasion in virtual unanimity, condemning it and expressing their feelings in a spontaneous and widespread resistance. But, in contrast to the 1956 events in Hungary, this resistance was non-violent, and it created a remarkable solidarity of people and leaders of Czechoslovakia. Dubček and another Communist leader, Czechoslovak President Ludvík Svoboda, emerged as national heroes, and to oppose the invasion virtually meant to pledge loyalty to them. The Communist Party, at its 14th Congress (which took place in the aftermath of the invasion), condemned the invasion and demanded the withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact troops. Although the context of politics had been fundamentally changed by the occupation, the Soviet Union was unable to impose its will fully and immediately on the occupied country. It was only in April 1969 that Dubček, under heavy pressure from Moscow, yielded and resigned as first secretary of the party. He was replaced by Gustáv Husák, a victim of persecution under Novotný and a supporter of the January reform movement. Despite this record, Husák became instrumental in implementing the policy of "normalization" actively supported by the Soviet Union.

The campaign of "normalization" started with the systematic replacement of party functionaries, especially at the regional and district levels, and of leading figures in the mass associations, party and government institutions, and the media. Free-
dom of expression was limited by the banning of reformist jour-
nals, the removal of editors from the key newspapers, and tighter
control and censorship of the media. By the fall of 1969, the lead-
ing reformers were expelled from the Central Committee.
Dubček resigned from the party leadership in January 1970, and
in June, he was expelled from the party. By mid-1970 Husák had
thus achieved a kind of domestic stabilization. This achievement,
however, had come at a high price. The mass public, firmly sup-
portive of the communist leadership in late 1968, now viewed the
regime as a product of foreign occupation. These patriotic senti-
ments were further strengthened by the fact that large numbers
of middle-rank party officials, scholars, and artists had lost their
jobs and seen their careers broken as a result of purges conducted
by Husák. In the early seventies, small dissident groups ap-
peared, often led by expelled party members. Many of these
groups collapsed with the arrest of their members and subse-
quent trials. The most important of them, Charter 77, survived
up to the collapse of communism. Ideologically, Charter 77 was
similar to the Hungarian “Democratic Opposition.” Many of the
Czech dissidents were leftist, displaying a variety of radical
stances from “Haideggero-Marxism” to Trotskyism. At the same
time, the Charter had no stated political agenda other than pro-
tecting the population from police terror. In addition to the dissi-
dent movement, the Catholic Church began to reawaken, with its
primate František Cardinal Tomášek, becoming an outspoken
critic of the regime.

The authorities were unequivocally hostile towards the
dissidents, who therefore faced permanent harassment and ar-
rests. Husák’s regime was definitely one of the most repressive
in Eastern Europe. Unlike Zhivkov, Husák from the very begin-
ing displayed skepticism and distrust about Gorbachev’s poli-
cies. The Communist Party structure and leadership were com-
pletely defined by the process of “normalization,” with its rigid
orthodoxy. Glasnost’ was no issue, because any admission of crit-
icism was bound to mean giving expression to critics of the 1968
invasion. Mikloš Jakeš, who had taken over Husák’s duties as
general secretary in December 1987, represented stagnation not
change in the leadership, having been as much part of
“normalization” as Husák himself.
Democratic transitions

In the late eighties, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia displayed quite similar patterns of development again. In both countries, the communist leadership was firmly controlled by the conservatives. While perestroika in the Soviet Union caused some activation of dissident activities in Sofia and in Prague, the dissidents were apparently too weak to challenge the authorities. And in both countries long-awaited political change occurred almost simultaneously in November 1989. In Bulgaria, leadership change took the form of a “palace coup” prepared by the foreign minister, Petur Mladenov. On November 10, Zhivkov was forced to resign as general secretary. The new leadership pledged to welcome and promote the development of pluralism in the country and to respect the rule of law. In early 1990, the Communists reconstituted themselves as a “democratic party of the left,” proclaimed a commitment to a market economy, and adopted the name Bulgarian Socialist Party.

Meanwhile, opposition groups which started to proliferate after Zhivkov’s replacement created a coalition, the Union of Democratic Forces led by Zhelyu Zhelev, an academic philosopher who had been prosecuted under the old regime. In addition to Ecoglasnost and Podkrepa, the Union included thirteen other groups. The largest of them, the Social Democratic Party, claimed to be a revived pre-communist party. In fact, it did not pay much tribute to the traditions of the Bulgarian working class movement. Rather, the Social Democrats emerged as a moderate liberal party in a west European sense, advocating a speedy transition to a market economy. Many intelligentsia-based factions of the Union of Democratic Forces, such as the Club for the Support of Democracy, were overtly “rightist” in their ideological stances. Some of them even proposed the country’s reversion to monarchy. The Union quickly showed its ability to stage mass demonstrations in Sofia, and its leaders gained the agreement of the ruling party to enter into roundtable negotiations on the future of the country. This negotiations resulted in scheduling elections to a Grand National Assembly, which had been agreed to function as both a parliament and a constituent assembly, for June 1990.214

In Czechoslovakia, the major incentive for change apparently came from below. Although for most of 1989 police repression prevented open opposition, protest strikes and mass demon-
strations erupted throughout the country after police had brutally suppressed a student demonstration on 17 November. These massive displays of public sentiment led to a political crisis, and the communist leadership resigned on 24 November. Government officials repeatedly met with the representatives of the opposition and, under mounting public pressure that culminated in a general political strike, virtually capitulated. In a new government, formed in early December, the Communists did not hold a majority of seats. Soon after that, Husák finally resigned as the president of Czechoslovakia. He was succeeded by a prominent dissident, the playwright Václav Havel. Dubček was elected as the chairman of the Federal Assembly. The Communist Party found itself in complete disarray, with thousands of individual party members leaving it and entire basic organizations abolishing themselves. By June 1990, the party’s membership fell from 1.7 million to nine hundred thousand. The party now presented itself as committed to democratic pluralism, but the main thrust of its subsequent policy was to temper the acceptance of market economic reforms with the protection of the rights of the working people.

The major anti-communist political force of the Czech Republic was the Civic Forum, which had first emerged in the autumn of 1989. Its leading core of activists comprised long-term dissidents of Charter 77 and other human rights groups. There was also a massive influx of new members, both previously inactive citizens and those who had been communists until 1989. The Civic Forum avoided describing itself as a political party. At first some even denied that it would play any political role, such as participating in elections, but would rather act as a forum for spiritual regeneration and social reeducation. Correspondingly, the Civic Forum did not advocate any specific political program, claiming to represent the whole of society against communist rule, and tending to imply that sectional interests were somehow of inferior moral worth. As in Hungary, a number of “historical” parties made their second appearances. These included the Christian Democrats (People’s Party), the Social Democrats, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Party (a middle class liberal party once led by Czechoslovakia’s last non-communist president before Havel, Jan Beneš). All these parties, the Civic Forum, and the Communists contested the parliamentary elections in June 1990. Once again, the schedules of democratic tran-
sition in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia coincided.

Post-communist developments

Having reached this point, however, the two countries went increasingly in different directions. In Bulgaria, the elections demonstrated that the Socialists, with their 47.15 per cent of the vote, retained their status as the largest party of the country. The Union of Democratic Forces received 36.20 per cent of the vote. This disappointing result forced the Bulgarian Democrats to decide to either accept the role of opposition or agree with the Socialists' proposal to join the government as a minor coalition partner. In fact, the Union of Democratic Forces chose to use parliamentary boycotts, street demonstrations and worker strikes against the government. Exposed to this pressure, the Socialist government resigned in November 1990, and was replaced by a coalition government composed of the Democrats, Socialists, and independents. This government started to implement a program of market economic reform.

In the Czech Lands, the largely discredited and disoriented Communist Party managed to receive 13.24 per cent of the vote. The clear winner of the elections was the Civic Forum with 49.50 per cent. The "historic" parties fared poorly: the Christian Democrats received 8.42 per cent of the vote, the Social Democrats 4.11 per cent, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Party 2.68 per cent. The government, formed by the Civic Forum with some participation of the Christian Democrats and other groups, adopted the radical "shock therapy" strategy and began putting it into practice in January 1991. The choice of this strategy, rather than of the "gradualism" advocated by many Czech politicians and economists, was largely due to finance minister Václav Klaus who was elected chairman of the Civic Forum in the fall of 1990.

The post-electoral developments in Bulgaria brought about increased polarization between the Socialists and the Union of Democratic Forces. The latter won the October 1991 parliamentary elections by a narrow margin, gaining 34.36 per cent of the vote against 33.14 per cent polled by the Socialists. This enabled the Union of Democratic Forces to form its government under Filip Dimitrov, and to continue to implement the reform policies encouraged by the International Monetary Fund,
based on strict monetarism and reducing both the budget deficit and inflation. In the course of 1992, there was some promise of distant economic improvement, but the immediate impact of the reforms was painful for the majority of the population. Inflation was rising very sharply, and the unemployment rate exceeded ten per cent. Dimitrov’s government combined its strong commitment to “neo-liberal” economic policies with a rigidly anti-communist ideological stance. For instance, Bulgaria became the first East European country to prosecute the topmost former regime leaders.  

Under these conditions, the Socialists had little incentive to break with their past. First, they already enjoyed a fairly large electoral base, which could be only undermined by an abrupt change in ideology. Second, they could reasonably hope to receive electoral gains from the perceived poor economic performance of the government, but this urged them to preserve their ideological identity vis-à-vis the Democrats. In late 1991, the Congress of the Bulgarian Socialist Party ultimately rejected the demands of the “radicals” within the party’s ranks to adopt a program of “west European style” Social Democracy, and elected the leadership mostly composed of the “left-overs” from the Zhivkov era. 

In December 1992, Dimitrov’s government collapsed after the Turkish-based Movement of Rights and Freedoms withdrew its support for the Union of Democratic Forces. The non-party government of Lyuben Berov was conditionally supported by the Socialists and the Movement of Rights and Freedoms. This legislative coalition of convenience accounted for the further “freezing” of the Socialists’ ideological positions. In 1991 and 1992, the Socialists occasionally supported extreme nationalists and displayed certain, though not very salient, nationalist inclinations. For the sake of cooperation with the Movement of Rights and Freedoms, these inclinations had to be tempered. As a result, by 1994 the Bulgarian Socialist Party remained much more “communist” than its counterparts in Hungary and Poland. In this capacity, the Socialists won 52.1 per cent of the vote in the December 1994 parliamentary elections. The Union of Democratic Forces lost the elections badly with 28.7 per cent of the vote. The new government formed by the Socialists has been initially supported by the Movement of Rights and Freedoms, and then by a smaller party, the Bulgarian Business Bloc.
In February 1991, the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia split into two parties. The rapid polarization of the Forum started after Klaus came to its leadership. Klaus vowed to transform the movement into a political party with a well-defined structure, a registered membership, and a political philosophy characterized by a strong commitment to free market principles and adherence to Christian national, right-wing values. This tendency was opposed by a number of prominent leaders of the Civic Forum, mostly former dissidents (Klaus himself lacked any dissident backgrounds). This faction advocated maintaining a loose organizational structure and combining market economic reforms with a higher degree of social responsibility on the part of the government. As a result of the split, two major parties emerged from a Civic Forum body—the Civic Democratic Party led by Klaus, and the Civic Movement with some leading personalities of the 1989 revolution. Some of them later left the Civic Movement to establish the Civic Democratic Alliance, a party with a political program fairly similar to that of the Civic Democratic Party. This completed the process of disintegration of the Civic Forum. One could observe that it disintegrated basically along the “left-right” ideological axis, with the Civic Democratic Party (later known as the Civic Democratic Party-Christian Democratic party) representing a traditionally right-wing, that is, pro-market-authoritarian-nationalist ideological stance, and the Civic Movement gravitating towards a redistributive-libertarian-cosmopolitan position. The same axis of polarization became characteristic of the Czech party system as a whole.

Right-wing parties that emerged outside the Civic Forum were the “historic” Christian and Democratic Union-People’s Party, and the Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, the party of the extreme right. Within the “left” segment of political spectrum, in addition to the Social Democrats, there was the newly established Liberal Social Union, a coalition of socialist intellectuals, agrarian workers and managers, and the “greens.” The major successor to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in the Czech Lands, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, also retained its status of a left-wing party. Notably, it was the only major communist successor party outside the former Soviet Union that did not drop the word “communist” from its name, and failed to adopt a social democratic program. Indeed, such shift could result in alienating the
already existing, though not very large, subelectorate of the party, while it was far from being clear that this gap would be refilled by more moderately inclined left-wing voters. In fact, such voters had two different options—the Social Liberal Union and the Social Democracy. Under these conditions, the strategy of ideological immobility chosen by the leadership of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia appeared to be quite rational. This strategy could only fail if the Social Democrats shifted to the left, a tendency that actually occurred in 1993-94.

In contrast to almost all other cases of radical economic reform, the efforts of Klaus were largely successful from the very beginning.  

Although only five to six per cent of prices remained state-controlled by the fall of 1991, the price explosion that many feared had not materialized. The inflation rate had risen to about 55 per cent in 1991, but still far from being runaway. And, despite Klaus’s tough talk, the government had not been as draconian on wages as it had threatened and was trying to avoid factory closures involving massive layoffs. According to one account, by the end of 1992 the Czech Lands had a “balanced budget, a trade and current account surplus, Eastern Europe’s lowest inflation rate (under twelve per cent), a stable currency, and an unemployment rate (2.5 per cent) that is less than half that of the United States.”

The model of voting behavior employed in this analysis suggests that this economic success story, translated into electoral outcomes, had to work against the parties of the left. Indeed, the June 1992 elections resulted in the victory of the Civic Democratic Party-Christian Democratic Party (29.73 per cent of the vote). Other right-wing parties, not so closely associated with Klaus, also obtained parliamentary representation. Jointly, the major parties of the right (Klaus’s party, the Civic Democratic Alliance, the Christian Democrats-People’s Party, and the Republicans) polled 47.92 per cent of the vote. For the Civic Movement, the 1992 elections brought nothing but bitter disappointment. With 4.59 per cent of the vote, it failed to make it into the parliament. The Social Democrats received 6.53 per cent of the vote, and the Liberal Social Union 6.52 per cent. The Communists, with 14.05 per cent of the vote cast for the Left Bloc (which the Communists led), emerged as the strongest party of the left. Jointly, the major left-wing parties received 31.69 per cent of the vote. The results of the elections further consolidated the “left-right” axis of the emerging party system.
Conclusion

The analysis of party system formation in Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria, and the Czech Lands supports the hypothesis that the emerging structures of political alternatives are rooted in the pre-democratic conditions, reflecting not only the interplay of political forces during the periods of transition to democracy, but also a number of factors falling under the category of the mode of communist rule. Some of these factors are country-specific. The theoretical implications of their introduction into this analysis are therefore negligible, even though the case-studies would be incomplete without identifying these factors. To meet the methodological requirement of the "conceptual homogenization of the heterogeneous field," it is essential to focus on those variables which are salient in all the cases under consideration. Thus, the patterns of causation which result in the emergence of certain types of party systems should be explicated in a more generalized form than has been done in the case studies.

The first factor salient in the case of Hungary was the low level of support to the Communists at the time of their advent to power. This factor accounts for the initially repressive nature of the communist regime, resulting in the mass uprising of 1956. The events of 1956 made the regime change its policies in favor of introducing relatively high level of liberalization, which brought about two major consequences. On the one hand, the Hungarian proto-opposition on the eve of regime change was more well developed and ideologically diverse than in other countries of the Soviet bloc, except Poland. On the other hand, the communist leadership with its outstanding, by the standards of the region, record of liberalization felt little incentive to undertake more radical political reforms from above, and the ruling party was largely controlled by the opponents of radical change. Under these conditions, the "democratic reformers" chose to rely upon mass political pressure, which could be provided by their cooperation with political opposition. Further, they chose to establish links not with the "liberal" variety of the opposition, which was apparently too radical and irresponsible, but rather with its more moderate "nationalist" variety. This provided the "nationalists" with superior organizational resources which were eventually converted into their victory in the "founding elections." As a re-
result, the initial composition of the party system was characterized by the domination of the “nationalist” parties, with a relatively strong “liberal” opposition and the major communist successor party open to ideological options. In 1992-93, when it became increasingly clear that the voters were going to punish the “nationalist” parties for their perceived mismanagement of the economy, several wrong ideological choices and organizational mistakes made the leading “liberal” parties not effectively representative of this segment of the ideological spectrum. These developments resulted in the emergence of a party system structured along the “liberal-nationalist” ideological axis, with the major communist successor party constituting the core element of the “liberal” segment of the political spectrum.

In Russia, the formation of the communist regime was accompanied by a bitter civil war. When finally established, the regime maintained its highly repressive nature for several decades, vigorously uprooting any form of organized opposition or public discontent. The political liberalizations of the late fifties and the early sixties stemmed from the needs of the party apparatus rather than from societal pressures, and the embryonic “liberal” proto-opposition was severely harassed and finally almost eliminated by the authorities. The “nationalists” were tolerated, but the level of criticism available to them was very low. Under these conditions, the process of reforms could only be started by the dominant faction within the communist leadership. In order to mobilize support for its course, this faction chose to stimulate the emergence of “liberal” ideological elite. This elite proved to be instrumental in mobilizing mass support for the reform. Consequently, however, the “liberals” distanced themselves from the communist leadership and emerged as the major force of independent political mobilization. After the abortive attempt to consolidate the regime by means of coup d’etat, the Communist Party was banned, and the new government announced its commitment to “liberal” ideology. Disastrous economic results of this government’s policy strengthened the “nationalist” segment of the political spectrum, which led to the victory of the “nationalists” in the 1993 elections. Under these conditions, the major communist successor party had a strong incentive to shift towards the “nationalist” ideological stance. Since Russia’s constitutional design did not allow for translating expressed voter preferences into meaningful policy outcomes,
1995 resulted in another victory for the "nationalist" parties. This time, however, it was the major communist successor party which emerged as the strongest representative of the "nationalists" within the party system structured along the "liberal-nationalist" axis.

Both in Bulgaria and the Czech Lands, the level of popular support to the Communist parties at the time of their victories was rather high. To consolidate their power, however, the Communists had to pursue different strategies. In Czechoslovakia, the Communists had to confront well-organized opposition and thus formulated the program of the "national path to socialism" to preserve their popularity. The reincarnation of this program, "the socialism with a human face," played an essential role in the reform process of 1968. When this reform attempt failed under external pressures, the Communist Party largely lost its support base in the country. After the Soviet Union withdrew its support from the unpopular regime, it had no choice but to capitulate. The electoral appeal of the major communist successor party has been reduced to a relatively small subelectorate, apparently consisting of those voters who tend to identify themselves either with the former regime or with the historic image of the workers' movement. In Bulgaria, the Communist Party practically monopolized power as early as in 1944. Consequently, it did not have any reason for seeking to preserve its popularity by mobilizing the mass public. This resulted in the emergence of a very stable regime, consistently committed to the communist orthodoxy and strongly reluctant to undertake any reform efforts. The only way to replace this regime in the changed external environments was, therefore, a palace coup d'etat. Even after this happened, the major communist successor party still played the lead in the process of democratization up to the "founding" elections. In both countries, low levels of regime liberalization practically excluded the emergence of ideologically diverse proto-oppositions. The resulting party systems may be characterized as structured along the "left-right" ideological axis. The roles played by communist successor parties, as well as the overall balances of forces within the emerging party systems, are very different. This may be partly explained with reference to the varying levels of economic success during the initial phases of marketization in the two countries.

Thus, such variables as the level of communist support,
the presence or absence of mass political protest against the regime, the scope of dissident activity, the level of regime liberalization, and the role played by radical reformers within the top communist leadership, emerge as important factors of post-communist party system formation in all the examined cases. The level of communist support opens the sequence of causal relationships, within which each following variable appears to be dependent on the previous one. Reconstructing such patterns of causality is essential for theory building with comparative method. It must be kept in mind, however, that social and political phenomena tend to be "overdetermined," with two variables within the system often explaining the same part of variation of the dependent variable. Ignoring the "overdetermined" nature of social phenomena may result in vast misunderstandings. For instance, one of the most easily observable regularities suggested by this analysis is that the level of communist support, as registered on the eve of communist rule, provides us with an immediate insight into the post-communist structure of political alternatives. Indeed, in Hungary and Russia, the emerging party systems are structured along the "liberal-nationalist" axis, while in Bulgaria and the Czech Lands, major political parties may be better characterized as either "leftist" or "rightist" in their ideological orientations. Postulating such a regularity as a causal relationship would, however, involve a tremendous loss of information about other important factors, thus reducing the theoretical value of this generalization to negligibility.

The approach employed in this study has focused on the whole patterns of causality rather than on those individual factors which constitute them. These patterns, viewed as links between the pre-communist conditions and the processes of democratic institution building, are very important for understanding the continuous nature of social and political development in the region. Of course, the notion of continuity does not deny the importance of political crises experienced by the countries of Eastern Europe. In fact, such crises—from the communist takeovers to mass protest movements to, eventually, the processes of transition to democracy—appear to be very salient within the patterns of causality discussed here. This provides us with an additional confirmation of the validity of the proposed "Rokkanian" perspective on post-communist party system formation.

In 1989-90, many students of post-communist party sys-
tems were inclined to analyze them, as András Körösényi put it, in terms of either "revival of the past" (the past being understood as the pre-communist political experiences) or the "new beginning." The past was not revived, at least in this sense. Even where the "historical" parties have managed to make their second appearances, they are not the principal political actors. But, as we have seen, the notion of the "new beginning" also turns out to be misleading. Instead of being whole new phenomena representing complete break with communism, the emerging party systems tend to be shaped by the modes of communist rule, and by the modes of democratic transition contingent upon them. From this perspective, post-communist societies follow in steps of the western countries. Like their predecessors on the path to democracy, the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union build their competitive political systems against the backgrounds of pre-existing, largely authoritarian conditions. These conditions are not eliminated, but rather transformed into new political realities.

NOTES


6 For example, there was a widespread expectation that the processes of democratic institution building in Eastern Europe would reflect the traditional patterns from the pre-communist era. See Bill Lomax, "Hungary," in Stephen Whitefield (ed.), *The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).


31 See Arthur W. Turner, "Postauthoritarian Elections: Testing
Expectations about "First" Elections," in Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (October 1993).


47 Fiorina, Retrospective Voting, p. 195.


54 On the political consequences of electoral laws, see Maurice Duverger, "What is the Best Electoral System?," in Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System:

55 See Kitschelt, "The Formation of Party Systems."

56 Peter A. Toma and Ivan Völgyes, Politics in Hungary (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1977), p. 4.


77 On the power struggle within the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, see George Schöpflin, Rudolf Tökés, and Ivan Völgyes, “Leadership Change and Crisis in Hungary,” in Problems of Communism, Vol. 37, No. 5 (September-October 1988).


79 Heti Világgazdaság (Budapest), 12 November 1988, p. 51.


81 See Schöpflin et al., “Leadership Change in Hungary.”


See András Bozóki, “Political Transition and Constitutional Change in Hungary,” in Bozóki et al. (eds.), *Post-Communist Transition*.

In addition to the most controversial problem of the timing and the procedure of the presidential election, these questions included: 1) the dissolution of the Workers’ Militia, a paramilitary wing of the Communist Party; 2) the banishment of party activity from workplace; 3) the introduction of the financial accountability of the Communist Party. All these demands of the radical opposition, however, were fulfilled by the parliament before the plebiscite, which suggested the centrality of the problem of presidency for the communist leadership.


Personal communication with László Bruszt, March 1994.


114 On the dissident movement in the former USSR, see Liudmila Alekseeva, Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious and Human Rights (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan


120 See Dunlop, *The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism*, pp. 227-33, 335-44.


For an argument that Ligachev was not a conservative but part of the consensus with Gorbachev, see Jeffrey Surovell, "Ligachev and Soviet Politics," in Soviet Studies, Vol. 43, No. 2 (March-April 1993). Even if Ligachev was part of such consensus, he was definitely at its very cautious end.


See Sakwa, Gorbachev and His Reforms, pp. 18-19.


Sovetskaia Molodëzh’ (26 January 1990), p. 2.


Argumenty i Fakty (Moscow), 16-22 June 1990, p. 1.


151 Moskovskie Novosti (Moscow), 29 April 1990, p. 1.


158 On the Communist Initiative Movement, see Orttung, “The Russian Right.”


163 Michael Urban, “December 1993 as a Replication of Late-


165 See Pravda (30 January 1992), pp. 1, 3; and 8 February 1992, pp. 3-4; and Nezavisimaia Gazeta (Moscow), 13 February 1991, pp. 1, 3.


171 Rossiiskie Vesti (Moscow), 10 April 1993, p. 2.


For the basic economic indicators, see *OMRI Daily Digest*, 5 January 1996, p. 1.


See Nicholas Dima, “Russia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya,” in *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer 1995).


See, for example, *Novaia Sibir’* (Novosibirsk), 7 August 1995, p. 3.


*Segodnia* (Moscow), 4 April 1995, p. 2.
For an exposition of Rutskoi’s recent political ideas, see Aleksandr Vladimirovich Rutskoi, *Obretenie Very*, (Moscow: 1995).

For a rather comprehensive, even though politically biased, history of Derzhava written by a “first-generation” nationalist, see *Russkii Vostok* (Irkutsk), No. 18, September 1995, pp. 1-2.

See *Segodnia* (Moscow), 8 August 1995, p. 2.

See interview with Glaz’ev in *Zavtra* (Moscow), No. 40, October 1995, pp. 1, 3.

*Delovoi Mir* (Moscow), 8 April 1995, p. 2.


See interview with Viktor Anpilov in *Novaia Sibir’*, 16 November 1995, p. 3.

For an exposition of the Agrarians’ ideological discourse, see V. G. Gelbras et al., *Kto est’ Chto: Politicheskie Partii i Bloki, Obshchestvennye Organizatsii*, (Moscow: Ministerstvo Ekonomiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii), 1994, p. 12.


For a brief description of all these entities, see *Argumenty i Fakty*, 7 December 1995, pp. 8-9.


226 See Leghters, Eastern Europe, pp. 387-394.

227 On the early phase of Klaus's reforms, see Karel Dyba and Jan

228 Brown, *Hopes and Shadows*, p. 137.


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