Nation, State, and Economy in Central Asia: Does Atatürk Provide a Model?

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The Donald W. Treadgold Papers publication series was created to honor a great teacher and great scholar. Donald W. Treadgold was professor of history and international studies at the University of Washington from 1949 to 1993. During that time, he wrote seven books, one of which — Twentieth Century Russia — went into eight editions. He was twice editor of Slavic Review, the organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and received the AAASS Award for Distinguished Contributions to Slavic Studies, as well as the AAASS Award for Distinguished Service. Professor Treadgold molded several generations of Russian historians and contributed enormously to the field of Russian history. He was, in other ways as well, an inspiration to all who knew him.

The Treadgold Papers series was created in 1993 on the occasion of Professor Treadgold’s retirement, on the initiative of Professor Daniel Waugh. Professor Treadgold passed away in December 1994. The series is dedicated to the memory of a great man, publishing papers in those areas that were close to his heart.

Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor
The Central Asian republics of the former USSR, like other post-communist states, are beset with numerous crises. These states must invigorate their near-moribund economies, remedy severe environmental problems, manage inter-ethnic relations, and incorporate new forces, actors, and demands into the political system. They are severely handicapped in accomplishing these tasks since they are politically underdeveloped, meaning they lack the political institutions capable of managing a diverse set of political demands and engaging in policy innovation necessary for modernization. Central Asians must build their new states from scratch, which means devising new constitutions and effective institutions within the state and autonomy vis-a-vis foreign powers. As the experience of post-colonial states demonstrates, this is no mean task.

Moreover, states need underpinning from the population, a source of legitimacy. In the modern world, most vividly perhaps in certain post-communist states, nationalism functions as this buttress, the glue that binds the population of a given territory together. In particular, the development of nationalism is indispensable for new states, ones that are not "historical nation-states" and therefore may have weaker claims to legitimacy. One Kazakh writer notes, "The independence of a young state depends upon the political stability of society, the unity of the nation in its aspirations, its devotion to a common national idea." These sentiments are echoed in much of the scholarly writing on nationalism, in particular the important role that cultural unity and national myths and symbols play for new, developing states.

Unfortunately, Central Asians, lacking well-established national traditions linked with any historical state or popular movement, as well as ethnic homogeneity, are handicapped on this score as well. In fact, it was the Soviets who carved out the current borders of these republics, and the Soviets who played an important role in the early stages of nation-building, including the construction of written languages, national myths, and educational systems. Despite these efforts, however, tribal or clan identities, in addition
to the supernatual identity of Islam, remain powerful as compared with a "national" identity based more upon sentiment toward those residing in one's own republic. Leaders in these states must therefore pursue state and nation-building in order to secure their own positions, as well as the position of their republics.

How can this be done? In order to answer this question, many Central Asian leaders have begun to search for and speak about different "models" of development. Particular attention has been given to the Chinese, Korean, and (contemporary) Turkish models. Without going into great detail at this point, what is notable is that each is predicated upon a strong state with a national base. Any serious effort to model contemporary Central Asia on these modern states, however, would be putting the cart before the horse because Central Asians lack the very prerequisite—strong nation-states—necessary for these developmental paths.

This monograph will suggest that one might find some answers to questions of state and nation-building by examining the reforms of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish Republic. This is not to say that Atatürk's reforms were a cure-all, or that his legacy did not create new problems. However, his was a success story compared with many of his contemporaries, and his efforts helped transform the "Sick Man of Europe," made even sicker by war, into a stronger, more developed state based upon Turkish nationalism. Among his accomplishments were the creation of a modern, secular republic and a political party as an agent of modernization, numerous social reforms, and the replacement of old forms of loyalty and identity with one based upon loyalty to the Turkish nation. Despite these accomplishments, Atatürk and his state and nation-building efforts remain relatively neglected in the study of comparative politics.

The general issues of state and nation-building have also been given inadequate attention in much of the literature on post-communist transitions. The emphasis in the sage advice of the IMF and Western governments is that all states should liberalize and democratize, which, it is assumed, will lead to economic growth and stability. By this point, however, it should be obvious that this simple equation does not work out quite so easily.

One major shortcoming of this viewpoint is that it fails to take both state-building and the state itself seriously as a necessity for social stability and policy implementation. If there is no authority to manage the diverse demands unleashed by the collapse of the old system and capable of making and implementing authoritative
decisions, there will be neither growth nor stability. Moreover, this authority need not be democratic. Borrowing from Samuel Huntington, what may really matter is the degree of government, not its type. In fact, one could raise questions about the feasibility (and prudence) of democratizing these largely traditional societies. A multi-party political system could easily degenerate into clan, tribal, or ethnic battles, a result not unlike that currently in Tajikistan. This is the argument made by authoritarian leaderships in Central Asia, and this claim needs to be taken very seriously because as of yet there are no other clear lines of cleavage in these societies that could form the basis for a multi-party system.

Moreover, while nationalism receives much attention as a divisive force in the post-communist transitions, it is often overlooked as a necessary source of political community and legitimacy. Nationalism, a political expression of commonality among the citizens of the state, must be cultivated in order to develop viable, secure states. Of course, nationalism can assume many forms, some more constructive than others. The point, however, is that rather than making a blanket statement that there should be both a smaller state and less nationalism, one should note that what is really needed is an effective, authoritative state that can claim to be representative of the national community. This is what Atatürk built in Turkey, and it is something that is urgently needed in Central Asia.

Before proceeding, two caveats are in order. First, foreign blueprints can not be imported wholesale into a new environment. Local contexts and traditions must be taken into account. This statement, while perhaps obvious to those sensitive to particular historical and cultural conditions, is not always heeded, most particularly by those pushing for the Western model of democracy for all. It is apparent that this would have great difficulty working in Central Asia, where conditions are very different from those that facilitated the gradual development of Western systems. However, states can learn from others' experiences and selectively adopt and adopt approaches that have been successful elsewhere. What is needed, therefore, are more careful comparisons that take into account the current conditions of Central Asian states.

Secondly, any comparison among countries—especially those divided by decades as well as miles—is fraught with problems. Conditions will never correspond exactly, and differences must be taken into account as much as similarities. Comparisons must therefore be used with circumspection, but they are necessary if one is to engage in comparative politics and learn from historical experience.
I hope, in what follows, to demonstrate that re-examination of Atatürk’s Turkey, while far from providing all the answers, will nonetheless serve to inform the way we think about state and nation-building, both in general and in the Central Asian context.

**Why Atatürk?**

After gaining independence, many in Central Asia began to look to Ankara as a source of aid, a model for development, and leadership for a new international Turkic community. Western officials, in particular those from the United States, pushed the model of a secular, democratic Turkey as a means to limit any possible spread of Iranian-inspired political Islam. For its part, the Turkish leadership viewed Central Asian independence as a geo-political windfall, an event that would provide Turkey with a new sphere of influence and new global importance. Turkey rushed to establish diplomatic ties, aid programs, and cultural exchanges, hoping to be a mentor for the Muslim and Turkic peoples of Central Asia by setting an example of a secular, industrialized, democratic republic.

However, it soon became apparent that Turkey, with its own share of problems, lacked the resources to be the savior of Central Asia as well as a basic familiarity with the region. As one analyst remarked, “Given the complete absence of interaction between the modern state of Turkey and these former Soviet republics until their independence, Turkish and Western expectations appear to have been born of ignorance.” More to the point, perhaps, Central Asian states could not suddenly develop into the Turkey of the 1990s. The former still had to tackle a number of basic development problems that had been solved—more or less—in Turkey. In addition, the more liberal and democratic aspects of Turkish politics offered limited appeal to Central Asian elites, who preferred to retain many elements of authoritarianism. Concluding therefore that Turkey had little to offer, Central Asian sycophants began to heap praise on other states’ “models” in efforts to secure more aid.

While Central Asian states may be unable to constitute themselves in the image of contemporary Turkey, they can, perhaps, learn from the Turkish development path. This has been mentioned many times by Central Asian officials. Islam Karimov, President of Uzbekistan, stated quite clearly, “I say unambiguously that the Turkish path of development is more acceptable to us...as a secular civilized path of societal development.” Mufti Muhammad Yusuf Muhammad Sedik, head of the Spiritual Council of Central Asian
Muslims, echoed this sentiment, claiming “We have a natural sympathy for the Turkish way of development, which is characterized by a secular form of power, economic reforms, and Islam.” Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Akejan Kajigeldin, during a visit to Ankara, declared that, “We will never forget Atatürk. We take him as a model forever.”

Why this attention to Atatürk and the Kemalist path of development? Part of the answer is rooted in the cultural-linguistic-religious bond between the two areas. However, it is clear that cultural affinity alone is an insufficient basis for a model, as Turks are learning today. However, one could point to some features of the political culture in Central Asia that favor an approach in the manner of Atatürk. Among these aspects are the traditional authoritarianism and personalism in Central Asian politics, a feature noted by many observers and perhaps an aspect of “Oriental despotism.” This may be rooted in the socio-economic structure of society, as well as in family mores, which are hierarchical, centralized, and patriarchal. The powers of the state traditionally were very concentrated, and étatism has been the preferred means of development. Western or liberal ideas therefore may find little resonance in local cultures. Thus, to the extent that one would want to build upon indigenous traditions, values, or institutions, the Atatürk model, combining strong state authority with an étatist development strategy, would seem to hold promise.

There are also similarities in the basic social, political, and economic structure of society, ones often overlooked by those advocating the “Turkish path.” These underlying, more “material” aspects, are fundamental to any discussion of state and nation-building. Among many relevant similarities between Turkey circa 1920 and Central Asia circa 1996 are experience with empire, pre-industrial economic development, acute social and economic crisis, and a large gap between the political elite and the rest of the population.

Both modern Turkey and Central Asia emerged from the ruins of empire. True, there are obvious differences: Turkey was “the center” (although not the most developed area) and Central Asia was clearly the “periphery.” However, for our purposes two similarities are paramount. First, political and economic institutions were integrated into an imperial structure. The disintegration of this structure left a vacuum, one that had to be filled either by creating or re-fashioning political institutions and economic enterprises to serve the new “nation-state.” Prior to 1920, there was no Turkish state or economy, just as there were no exclusively Kazakh or Uzbek
ones before 1991. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the "na-
tional" idea was weakly developed among the population. In Otto-
man Turkey, Anatolian Turks identified themselves as Ottomans,
Muslims, or perhaps members of a larger pan-Turkic community;
identity as a simple "Turk" did not exist because their was no greater
"Turkish" political community. Atatürk therefore had to construct
a "Turkish" identity, which also meant separating it from its con-
nections to pan-Turkism or Islam. In Central Asia, the old supra-
national identity, "Soviet," is no longer stressed, but for years the
idea of a common Soviet man helped hinder development of a "na-
tional" idea. Now Islam has emerged as a potent supranational
force as well, one that could compete for loyalty with the new states.
Moreover, local (mahalla) identities, as in Anatolian Turkey, remain
in place, and competition among different regions or clans could
obviously hinder efforts to forge a new national identity. Thus, the
Kemalist emphasis on nationalism—and its attendant strong role
for the state—is something that appeals to the immediate needs of
Central Asian elites.

A second set of issues relates to the level of economic de-
development. In the 1920s, Turkey (with the exception of the Istanbul
area) was a pre-industrial society, one in which the majority of the
people were employed in agriculture. This has numerous impli-
cations. First, borrowing from Gellner, one can equate pre-modern
with pre-national, meaning that nationalism can be viewed a prod-
uct of modernization. The lack of social communication and wide-
spread access to education therefore hampered development of a
national identity. Economic modernization was therefore a neces-
sity if one was to bring a feeling of "Turkishness" into existence.
Second, underdevelopment led to social schisms, particularly be-
tween the European-oriented, urban Istanbul elite and peasants liv-
ing in Anatolia. Given the disparity between these groups, how
could one define a "Turk"? This was a real question that Atatürk
had to consider, and ultimately he had to push the bulk of the popu-
lation to accept a vision of Turkey as a part of the Western world.
Third, underdevelopment contributed to the rise of étatism as a de-
development strategy. There was almost no national bourgeois or
private capital to serve as a midwife to economic modernization,
and experiments with liberalism and gradualist policies in the 1920s
produced only modest results. However, Turkey was able to ex-
plot the "advantages of backwardness" and the devlet baba (father-
state) assumed the leading role as the pioneer and director of na-
tional development, as it had before World War I as well. Under-
development therefore favored a strong role for the state in the modernization process.¹⁶

In Central Asia, with the exceptions of the cities and northern Kazakhstan (both heavily Russified), at best one can point to maldevelopment, engineered by the Soviets in their quest to rationalize economic life through collective enterprises. However, for the most part these too are rural societies,¹⁷ woefully underdeveloped by modern standards, and perhaps even by the standards of 1920. Central Asians themselves even use the word "traditional" to describe the level of socio-economic development.¹⁸ Moreover, since independence one can speak of a "primitivization" of the Central Asian economies—a process of de-industrialization, re-agrarianization, and an expansion of traditional sectors at the expense of more modern ones.¹⁹ The implications mirror those discussed above. The lack of a developed, integrated, "national" economy hampers the development of inclusive nationalism. Instead, underdevelopment may help support particularistic, local identities that tend to be intolerant toward outsiders. This feeds into the cultural differences between urban and rural residents, each of whom have different priorities and a different vision of the "nation."²⁰ On this particular point it is interesting to note that years ago Kazakh writer Abay Kunanbaev (1845-1904), revered as a leading figure for the Kazakh people, claimed that traditional, rural Kazakh culture was unsuitable to modernization, and that modernization ("à la Atatürk") would require strong political authority to break down old structures, mindsets, and viewpoints.²¹ Finally, in terms of strategies of economic development, it is clear that the sheer size of the project to (re)develop Central Asia will require a large state role. Urgent needs include the creation of transportation and communication networks, the development of financial institutions, the re-structuring of industry and agriculture, as well as providing a legal and institutional basis for the adoption of needed reforms. Moreover, judging from the experience of other Third World oil exporters, the state will have a leading role, if not an actual monopoly ownership, in the development of oil and gas fields, upon which high hopes for economic recovery have been placed. Overall, the pivotal role of the state in any future economic scenario for Central Asia economy has been acknowledged by all leaders in Central Asia, regardless of the favored pace of reform and often to the chagrin of would-be rapid liberalizers.²²

Another commonality is the existence of severe socio-economic crisis. Turkey had been at war for a decade prior to the establish-
ment of the republic in 1923, and prolonged fighting had taken its
toll on the economy and social fabric. Compounding these diffi-
culties were the loss of the more developed parts of the empire, as
well as Greeks and Armenians who had played a large role in the
economic life of the empire. Foreign powers were also viewed as a
potential menace, one that could easily interfere with nation and
state-building efforts. To the first leaders of the Turkish Republic,
the depth of the crisis justified not only state intervention in the
economy, but also firm political guidance and control to ensure the
stability and survival of the state. Democracy, as Atatürk concluded
after two brief, controlled experiments with a two-party system in
1925 and 1930, was potentially too disruptive. Order and control
were needed to manage the numerous problems facing Turkey and
achieve national consolidation.

The new Central Asian states, like the other former republics
of the USSR, have found independence a bittersweet experience, as
the first years of statehood have been accompanied by an acute socio-
economic crisis. Output, incomes, and living standards are down,
whereas inflation, social inequality, and unemployment are up. The
drop in GDP is illustrated in Table 1, which shows that all Central
Asian states save Uzbekistan have fared worse than Russia during
the immediate post-Soviet period.

Table 1 Growth Rates in Central Asia

GDP Growth Rate (per cent)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
<td>-13.0</td>
<td>-15.6</td>
<td>-25.0</td>
<td>-9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>-9.1</td>
<td>-15.8</td>
<td>-16.3</td>
<td>-26.5</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>-30.0</td>
<td>-27.6</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>-12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-6.0*</td>
<td>-15.0*</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-11.1</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
<td>-8.7</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1996), p. 175; * data from Stanislav Zhukov, “Economic Develop-
ment in the States of Central Asia,” in Boris Rumer, ed., Central Asia
in Transition: Dilemmas of Political and Economic Development (Armonk,
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 107. These were unavailable in the
World Bank report.
One can find an explanation for these data in a number of variables: loss of intimate trade links with other former republics, loss of subsidies from the center (which accounted for 10-20 per cent of each state’s GDP), the civil war in Tajikistan and the spread of refugees into neighboring states, exodus of skilled personnel (primarily Europeans), radical changes in price structures, and absence of effective economic and political institutions. These severe economic problems have made it difficult for new states to win the loyalty of their people, and create potential for social unrest. As a consequence, the watchword in Central Asia has been stability, which is deemed necessary to overcome the crisis and prevent civic disorder. Politicians and publics have put first priority on settling economic concerns, with the result that democracy is viewed by many as something that may be too troublesome given current conditions. In the words of the President Karimov of Uzbekistan, "economics must be placed above politics." As was the case in Atatürk’s Turkey, the assumption is that the state must play the guiding role in leading the country out of crisis.

Finally, in both cases one also finds a historical dichotomy between an entrenched, patrimonial, powerful elite and a passive, unmobilized population. Historically, Turkish politics had been one of absolute rule, a domain of only the military, civil, and religious elite. The masses had no rights, no independent organizations, no say. Even the “revolutionary” movement of the Young Turks was decidedly urban and upper class in its origins. This changed a bit during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), when Atatürk appealed to the “will of nation” and various “defense of rights” associations to vanquish the foreign invaders and in so doing he established his movement as the rightful claimant of power. Even so, however, it is clear both that Atatürk’s movement was elite-dominated and that there was no social mobilization or consensus in favor of many of his reform efforts. The construction of the Turkish nation-state was therefore very much an elite-driven project, and Turkish identity itself largely the product of elite efforts.

Similarly, contemporary Central Asia was long dominated by communist apparatchiks, who formed a new sort of clannish, corrupt elite, in some ways not unlike the khash who had formerly ruled in the area. Spontaneous mass mobilization was anathema to Soviet authorities, and it is questionable if the socio-economic conditions would have made it even possible. Independence occurred
largely by default; there was no mass movement to push for it, although there was some mobilization and organizational development after the advent of glasnost. There has also been no substantial turnover in the elite, and no far-reaching social mobilization after independence. Post-communist transformation is clearly envisioned—at least by the current elite—as something that they must lead to ensure that it is done "properly," and there is little movement "from below" to challenge the status quo.

The question, however, is how successful would-be Central Asian nation builders can be in transferring their vision to a socially passive population to which they are not especially well-connected. This transferal, however, is crucial in the development of national identity, the final step in Hroch's three-stage scheme of national development. However, it may also entail certain risks, since nationalism could require or lead to social mobilization that could challenge the existing elite. The job of "(re)making" Turkmen, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Tajiks must therefore be carefully managed, and in the latter case one sees the results of failure.

Of course, Atatürk's model is not the only one that has been the subject of discussion among Central Asians and outside observers. Another that has figured prominently in the discourse is the Chinese or "East Asian" model. Of course, in many key respects it has similarities with the Atatürk model: authoritarian politics with étatist economic policies. One could also point to the role of one man (often a former military leader) as the institution builder and catalyst for modernization (this is most apparent in the persons of Chaing Kai-shek and Syngman Rhee). Under this "model," the state is a primary economic actor, and it uses its strong position vis-à-vis social actors to crush or co-opt any dissent. Any reform is carefully controlled from above. The Chinese case is frequently cited as one appropriate for the tastes of Central Asian elites, since the Chinese have managed to achieve impressive economic growth while resisting pressure for democratization.

However, there are convincing reasons to believe that Central Asia will be unable to follow the "East Asian" path. In the first place, the starting points are different: Korea's and Taiwan's experience with Japanese colonialism left them with a relatively highly developed infrastructure, a well-educated population, and a reformed agricultural sector; the Chinese economy on the eve of reform did not have the large subsidies or safety net present in the former Soviet Union, as well as shallower central planning. Central Asia does not have the infrastructure requisite with a modern
country, its human capital is largely unprepared for transition\textsuperscript{28}, it has a large agricultural sector in need of overhaul,\textsuperscript{29} and the economy has collapsed due to the sheer inability to maintain prior levels of subsidies and social welfare.

In addition, it would be rather facile to attribute the success of East Asia to authoritarian regimes or a go-slow approach to reform. A variety of other factors may also be of significance. In the cases of South Korea and Taiwan, these include US economic and military aid, favorable timing in entering world markets, an ideal geographic location for export, capable bureaucracies, and, perhaps most importantly, a strategy of export-led growth fueled by state direction and resources. In China, special conditions include an exceptionally high savings rate, the fact that reforms did not commence amid a severe crisis, and connections with overseas Chinese, most importantly those in Hong Kong. Again, exports were the engine of growth.

Central Asia has none of these advantages. Most obviously, it is a landlocked region, meaning that export-led growth, for the foreseeable future, is an impossibility. Even if its most important resources, oil and gas, are developed, Central Asia is far more likely to remain a supplier of raw materials than an industrial juggernaut. These states also are not likely to be the recipient of substantial foreign assistance, have no diaspora on which to draw, and face the daunting and immediate task of stabilization and far-reaching reform. In addition, capable state structures must be built from an only partially destroyed Party-state. This is also likely to handicap these states and prevent a “Central Asian miracle.” Finally, one very clear difference with East Asia is the compelling need for nation-building in order to win legitimacy for the state and its elites. East Asians, dwelling primarily in historically defined nation-states, had no such problem.\textsuperscript{30}

On balance, therefore, the Atatürk model would seem to offer more potential than any East Asian approach. As will be discussed shortly, it offers a way to pursue nation-building, state construction, and economic development in a relatively short time frame. These are also the tasks facing Central Asian leaders, and in many respects they have a similar starting point as Atatürk.

Before closing this section, however, it is worth mentioning some key differences between Atatürk’s Turkey and today’s Central Asian states that may complicate the task for state and nation builders in Central Asia. One is that Atatürk’s springboard to power was war, an ideal opportunity for him to create a sense of national
identity and patriotism. Moreover, after winning the war against the Greeks and their Western allies, he had the credibility needed to pursue an ambitious program, as well as a new elite, the military, that could overcome old guard opposition. In Gellner's terms, the Turks were successful Decembrists, and the Western-oriented military elite would play a key role in safeguarding the secular republic (if not always democracy) from domestic opponents on both the Left and the Right. Central Asian states were not "lucky" enough to emerge as victors in war, and there is little for "Kazakhstani" or "Kyrgyzstani" patriotism to stand upon. Moreover, there is no new elite—military or otherwise—powerful enough to overcome the still-entrenched nomenklatura.

Secondly, and probably more importantly, Central Asian states are ethnically diverse and confront the challenges of nation-building at a time of global ethnic revival. True, Turkey was and is a multi-ethnic state, and the problems caused by this predicament are painfully obvious. Atatürk attempted to solve the problem by creating a minimalist, political definition of a "Turk" and guaranteeing rights for religious minorities. The most divisive issues were "consigned to oblivion" in an effort to create an inclusive identity based primarily upon language and loyalty to the state.

In Central Asia, there is profound ethnic and linguistic diversity, as can be seen in Table 2. This is due both to the relatively capricious drawing of republic borders by Soviet authorities, as well as immigration by Europeans, whose skills were needed in order to pursue Soviet-style development in Central Asia. Given the almost universal resurgence of ethno-politics and the potential for inter-ethnic competition over limited resources, this demographic fact presents a significant challenge to Central Asian governments. Today, "minimal" issues such as language are at the heart of inter-ethnic disputes in the region. Papering them over and/or pursuing policies of assimilation, which is what occurred in Turkey with respect to the Kurds (rather unsuccessful assimilation, one might add), may be difficult to do, especially given the power of Russia and interest in the fate of the nearly 10 million Russians still residing in Central Asia. The alternative is to create kazakhstantsy, kyrgyzstantsy, etc.; that is, a "new" group of people whose political identity and loyalty would rest with the civil state, not ethnic ties. This oft-discussed theoretical problem—how to fashion civic nationalism in multi-ethnic states—is very real and pressing in Central Asia, and may well be the greatest question facing these states.
Table 2 National Composition of Central Asian States
(in per cent)

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<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajiks</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmen</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Pop. | 17,376,615 | 4,769,877 | 6,155,474 | 4,075,316 | 23,089,261 |

— denotes less than one percent. Not listed are numerous other nationalities and ethnic groups (Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars, Jews, Karakalpaks, Koreans, etc.) that also inhabit the region.


Third, today’s Central Asian states are more constrained by the international environment. Their economic and security ties with Russia make them heavily (inter)dependent, and Russia continues to cast a long shadow across the “near abroad” as it seeks to protect its strategic, economic, and cultural interests. Central Asian leaders must pursue a carefully balanced policy, since excessive nationalism, or forms of nationalism that promote discrimination or explicit anti-Russian sentiment, may prompt a response from the north. In many respects, the sheer potential of Russia—not to mention Moscow’s forays into the internal politics of individual states—limits the sovereignty of Central Asian states. At the same time, Central Asians are aware of the need for foreign investment from elsewhere in order to decrease dependence upon Russia and to acquire the know-how they need to extract their energy and mineral resources. Several analysts have noted how this task is fundamental for the economic and political viability of these states. In turn, greater involvement with the world economy and, in particular, the need to meet IMF and World Bank criteria for stabilization and development loans, may also limit Central Asian options with respect to economic policy. Autarky and anti-imperialist rhetoric are therefore less of an option than they were for Atatürk’s Turkey,
which was largely free of international pressures once the Allied armies departed in 1922. Thus, in Central Asia greater attention will have to be paid to the interests of outside actors and how they may be able to shape strategies of development.

The Secrets of Atatürk’s Success

After establishing that there are appropriate bases for comparison, my next task is to uncover what accounts for Atatürk’s achievements. Fortunately, the Kemalist reform program has been thoroughly described and analyzed elsewhere. My objective is more modest: to describe the main features and examine what factors and strategies underline its “success”.

First, one should recognize that although Atatürk is commonly considered a reformer, the changes he initiated produced, in many respects, a revolutionary transformation in Turkey. As one journalist described it, the nation had “its skin turned inside out.” Old loyalties, structures, and identities were destroyed, and in their place new ones were created. In the lexicon of modernization theory, a traditional society—in political, economic, social, and cultural terms—was transformed into one with significant trappings of the modern world.

The scope of these changes is captured in the six tenets of “Kemalist ideology”: nationalism, republicanism, secularism, revolutionism, étatism, and populism. Under Atatürk’s leadership, old forms of political identification based upon empire, religion, or pan-ethnic ties were replaced by ones that emphasized loyalty to the state, a distinctly “Turkish” political community based upon residence within the state’s borders and connected by a common language, culture, and ideal. This was to be a source of pride, exemplified in Atatürk’s statement, “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene (How happy I am to be a Turk).” New national myths were created about the people of Anatolia, ostensible descendants of the Sumerians and Hittites and other great civilizations (notably not the Hellenistic Byzantines). These efforts helped extend the roots of the citizens of the republic in the soil they inhabited as well as emphasize a pre-Islamic past. The new nation-state became the focal point for political beliefs and attitudes.

As a reflection of the power and greatness of the nation, sovereignty was transferred from the sultan to the people and their representatives in the national assembly. In other words, Turkey would be a republic, and its new leaders took inspiration from the
republics of Western Europe, especially from France. The new Turkey would also be a secular state, as the caliphate was abolished, religious schools closed, and Islamic law replaced by a new civil code. Revolutionism entailed change in cultural and social outlook, in particular an emphasis on education and rational thought, orientation to the West through adoption of the Latin script, and even seemingly trivial minutiae such as a prohibition of the fez, which for Atatürk was a pernicious symbol of backwardness. Étatism included not only the expansion of the state into the economy and economic development, but expansion into all facets of life in order to bolster political authority and spread the new nation-state centered political culture to the masses. Populism was a belief that the Turkish nation was an organic whole, composed of closely interdependent, not competitive, occupational groups. This tenet helped justify state corporatist policies as well as the existence of a single party system for much of the Atatürk period. The Republican Peoples' Party (CHP), a successor to the "defense of rights" organizations, would represent and lead the nation to the modern world.

One could, of course, go into more detail about various aspects of specific reforms, but our purpose is different. Our question is why was Atatürk a successful reformer, one who was able to produce a widespread transformation and at the same time ensure political and social stability?

One answer is that his gradual, flexible approach to reforms, what Huntington calls a "Fabian" strategy, accounts for his success. Gellner notes how Atatürk's program lacked a coherent, totalizing ideology like Marxism, and this "doctrinal thinness" gave Kemalism a pragmatic character that contributed to its eventual success. Although Atatürk was clearly ambitious, he did not do everything at once, knowing he would encounter too much opposition. Instead, reforms were made sequentially, from ones with the least potential opposition to those with more opponents. Creating a national community came first, as he rallied conservative rural elements to his cause by portraying it as one to liberate the sultan from foreign control. Nationalism, therefore, was simply patriotism in its purest sense, devotion to the patrie, and it had no connection to the form of the political community. That more divisive issue was saved for later, after it became apparent how the sultan had compromised himself and that many would agree that sovereignty rightfully belonged to the components of the nation, the people themselves. A new political party was organized, the
capital moved, and a republic declared in 1923, thereby making a significant break with the Ottoman past. The religious significance of the caliphate the Islam’s role in society, however, was not tackled until the next year, after the establishment of the republic was assured. Social reforms followed, and the culmination of this movement was the introduction of étatist economic development plans in the 1930s. By dealing with each set of issues separately—a conscious choice on his part—Atatürk was able to isolate and eliminate a series of opponents and in turn accumulate his own supporters interested in further reform. In a sense, reform itself became an independent variable, creating new groups interested in introducing still more reforms.

The success of the gradualist approach, however, still begs the question of how he was able to minimize and overcome opposition. One answer might be that the old system had completely discredited itself. While it certainly did have its failings, it also had its proponents, particularly within the Islamic establishment, as well as the peasants who knew of nothing better and could be expected to defend the old order. Why did Atatürk prevail over these groups?

One answer is that he was able to concentrate power and implement reforms in a “blitzkrieg” manner before opponents could mobilize. As Huntington argues, reform in a traditional society requires, first and foremost, the creation and concentration of power. This is necessary in order to penetrate society and to implement reforms. An ideal form for modernization therefore is a single party, an institution capable of concentrating power, pursuing policy innovation, and assimilating new groups into the political system. More competitive systems, while perhaps more capable of expanding or distributing power, will be less likely to concentrate it and thus are less likely to succeed in promoting reform or stability.

These assertions are supported by the Turkish case. Kemalist Turkey was a state in which there was no legal opposition (with brief exceptions), ceremonial elections, a single party with tight discipline accountable to a tiny elite, and a lack of civil liberties. Experiments with an “official” opposition, in 1925 and 1930, went awry. In response, the CHP-dominated state (ab)used a sweeping Law on Maintenance and Order to defend itself and squash any real or suspected opponents. Thousands were arrested, hundreds executed. It became, in the words of one scholar, a dictatorship with “totalitarian tendencies.” Such rather controversial labels aside, Huntington’s lesson is unambiguous: “Interests of reform run
counter to interests of more widespread participation. The broadening of political participation would have brought more conservative groups into politics and turned the balance against the reformers. Socio-economic progress was dependent upon limits to political participation and equality.

By keeping power concentrated, Atatürk and his allies were able to control the public agenda and pass reforms expediently, before popular mobilization could occur. His program became a series of fait accomplis. For example, the proclamation of a republic was done while leading opponents were out of the capital, and it provoked outrage in some newspapers in Istanbul, who were subjected to an inquiry about whether they had committed treason. In effect, Atatürk exploited the political passivity and "communications bifurcation" existing in Turkish society. In the words of one scholar, "The lack of communications between elite and mass was a vital factor which he [Atatürk] used to simplify his task and equate it with his resources." Control was established, and only after the transformation had occurred could ideas like democracy be countenanced.

While there were certain benefits of an elite-driven "revolution," there were also limits. Not only were policies made by elites, but their effects were largely restricted to urban, middle and upper class Turks, and to the higher intellectual or ideological institutions. The simple peasant, who had never worn a fez and could not read, was relatively unaffected in the initial years of the reforms. His relations with political authorities did not, on the whole, change: he was still more "subject" than "citizen," albeit now to a formally secular, republican order. He was never mobilized in service of a particular cause, nor was his opinion ever consulted. Thus, there was little risk that Atatürk's reforms would spark reaction from below in the countryside.

Just as importantly, there was no basic change in ownership relations in the countryside, where most of the people lived. Atatürk's revolution was therefore not, in Marx's or Skocpol's terms, a true "social" revolution that upset the basic socio-economic order. This point bears emphasis, however, because it meant that there was little mobilization of the conservative, land-owning interests in the countryside, potentially the most powerful source of opposition to modernization. Since things were kept largely as they were—at least in a material sense—these groups, both rural elites and peasants, were less likely to offer active opposition.

Finally, one must recognize that Atatürk and his movement
did not appear from thin air. The need for reform and modernization had been recognized for almost a century before, and the Tanzimat reform movement, the Committee for Union and Progress, and other organizations of the "Young Turks" are rightly viewed as precursors to Atatürk. They helped to inspire the ideas and provided the manpower needed to challenge the prevailing status quo. Their efforts also helped create divisions within the elite that gave Atatürk the "breathing space" necessary to put forward new ideas. Combined with the debacle of World War I, this helped set up an ideological, cultural, and institutional context ready for reform.

On the whole, what are the lessons? Judging from Atatürk’s experience, one should use dictatorial powers to pursue reforms gradually, minimizing disruption to those strata of the socio-economic order that could offer the most resistance. Moreover, there should be some historical continuity, so that one has an ideological as well as personnel base on which to draw. Compare this with the standard advice given to post-communist states: democratize, decentralize, and pursue rapid reform that will transform basic socio-economic relations. All this, it is assumed, requires a clear break with the past and importation of new ideas and institutions. I have already argued why this latter path may be inadequate to solve the pressing needs of Central Asian states. Perhaps something akin to Atatürk’s program will prove to be more promising.

Envisioning the Path for Central Asia

In order to explore this issue, one needs to answer three analytically distinct yet inter-related questions. First, do the "objective" conditions in Central Asian states favor the Atatürk model of centralization, authoritarianism, and étatism? Second, is this politically possible, meaning does it correspond with the affinities of the current crop of political elites? Third, if this course is pursued, what are the prospects for its success? To preserve some degree of analytical clarity, I propose to break down the "Atatürk program" into three components: definition of the nation, construction of state authority, and economic development.

Nation-Building

For Atatürk, construction of a national political community
was the first task, since before 1920 Turks had known only the Ottoman Empire and there had been little development of a "Turkish" national idea. Nation-building meant not only demarcation of citizenship and borders but also the articulation of the criteria that would bind the people together as a political community. The aim was to legitimize the authority of the new Turkish state while at the same time preventing the marshaling of forces for restorationism by raising the nation, the people, to supreme status. Moreover, the new elite wanted to bolster social cohesion, which would be necessary for later reforms.

What is noteworthy about these efforts is that nation-building, commonly assumed in the contemporary literature to be a formidable task, was relatively easy for Atatürk. The old order had been discredited. Turkey's backwardness was conclusively demonstrated, and there was an elite consensus that modernization would be necessary. Modern, for Atatürk and his cohorts, meant Europe, a collection of nation-states, whose strength derived not only from high technology but also effective political institutions and popular fealty to a national idea. Turkey, if it was to survive, would have to follow the same path.

There was, unlike more recent cases, little dispute about the basis of Turkish nationality. First of all, Turks would live in Turkey, which implicitly disavowed any irredentist or pan-Turkic claims. Secondly, they would be loyal to the state. Third, they would speak Turkish. This last requirement, one that could be construed as part of an "ethnic" definition of nation, was also non-controversial. The Greeks had been kicked out of the country after the Turkish War of Independence, the Armenian problem had been euphemistically "eliminated" during World War I, and the borders had been drawn in a manner so that modern Turkey would not include a substantial Arab population. The exception, of course, was the Kurds, then (as now) politically marginalized. These "mountain Turks," as they were officially known for years, lived in the most inaccessible and least developed region of the country. If they were thought about at all, the assumption was that they would succumb to Turkification as state power grew. However, for the overwhelming majority of people living in the new republic, language was a "natural" marker of national identity, and, in principle, entry to the Turkish nation was open to any willing to profess loyalty to the state and learn the language.50

Leaders in Central Asian states continue to face the same task of nation-building and have similar objectives. National borders
were less carved out than inherited from the Soviet era, but there has been remarkably little controversy about them and all borders have been officially recognized. Citizenship was extended to all residents as well, although some preferred not to apply and instead sought citizenship with another state (usually Russia). These aspects of nation-building were relatively simple and straightforward. More complex has been finding common affective or cultural ties that can bind the citizens of the state together. In other words, what attributes, aside from geographic space, do the various nations (read: peoples) of Central Asia have?

This is not an easy question to answer. These are not historically developed nation-states, and many of the myths promulgated by Soviet authorities have to be re-written or scrapped altogether. Moreover, they may be less appropriate for independent nation-states than constituent republics of a “fraternal” country. In addition, there is no great cause that can be used to rally the people. The idea of independence itself never produced a popular movement, as it did in the Baltics or Ukraine, and this notion may, for many, be less of a source of pride than of regret, since the first years of independence have been accompanied by unprecedented hardship for most people in Central Asia.

What about language, Atatürk’s “uncontroversial” option? Unfortunately, this too is problematic in Central Asia. In today’s environment, particularly in the post-Soviet space, language is at the heart of ethno-politics; it is the marker of identity. Efforts to reclaim one’s native tongue, along with one’s history, were at the heart of nationalist movements throughout the USSR, including those in Central Asia. In the post-Soviet period, attempts to define a nation linguistically are sure to polarize linguistically divided societies and elicit calls of discrimination or “social apartheid.” In Central Asia, many consider de-Russification, implicitly meaning “Kazakhification” or “Kyrgyzification” a central task. Because an overwhelming majority of Europeans living in Central Asia do not know Central Asian languages, changes in language status inevitably will produce a profound social transformation. This is a very provocative issue, and some efforts have been made to temper new language laws by granting official recognition to other languages, especially Russian. Nonetheless, due to feelings that they are unwelcome outsiders in the region, as well as to economic and family concerns, minorities (especially Russians) have left in large numbers.

Despite the fact that many conditions work against a more
benign civic definition of the nation and that there is some sentiment favoring ethnopolitics (Kazakhstan for [ethnic] Kazakhs!), Central Asian leaders in general have resisted the temptation to define the political community in ethnic terms. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, President Askar Akayev vetoed a measure declaring that the land belongs to the "Kyrgyz people (narod)," favoring instead the object "people of Kyrgyzstan." Natsionalnost' is also no longer a category on the Kyrgyz passport. Akayev has also called for creation of a more inclusive national ideal, modeled after the "American dream," and a nation-wide patriotic movement for the well-being of the country. Kyrgyzstan's joining of a customs union with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan can also be interpreted as a move to reassure ethnic Russians that ties to Russia will be preserved.

In Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbaev in Kazakhstan, recognizing the demographic (60 per cent of the population is not Kazakh) and geographic (the long border with Russia) reality, has eschewed advocacy of nationalism based upon ethnicity. He has on many occasions declared his commitment to "nationalism by soil" as opposed to "nationalism by blood," and he has spoken out against discriminatory practices against the Russian speaking population. He has sponsored an advisory Assembly of Peoples to facilitate inter-ethnic communication and understanding. He has attacked extremists on both sides, and positioned himself as one who can prevent bloodshed and the possible break-up of the state. Of course, this has been a difficult line to tow, and there are mounting pressures on him to right past wrongs and defend the Kazakh nation. Many critics in fact accuse him of practicing ethnopolitics favoring Kazakhs with respect to property distribution and cadre policy. Nonetheless, most Russians recognize Nazarbaev as being preferable to many alternatives. Notably, surveys repeatedly show that most citizens of Kazakhstan are satisfied with the current state of inter-ethnic relations and expect conditions to remain calm.

Of course, various efforts by state leaders to manage inter-ethnic relations may do little more than paper them over. Ethnicity still matters. As two Kazakh writers note, the Soviet definition of ethnicity and the category of natsionalnost' make construction of a political definition of the nation very difficult. "National" identification and state identification (citizenship) were completely different categories. Now, in the post-Soviet environment, ethnicity serves as the basis for mobilization, so that any economic, environmental,
social, or political question can take on an ethnic character. This has especially been true on questions of economic reform, on which some groups argue that others will be more privileged to take advantage of marketization. On the whole, finding common ground, as a people inhabiting a single country, becomes very difficult.

Moreover, because of the economic crisis, the state is largely unable to "buy" the loyalty of its citizens and create an instrumental political nationalism. Many, especially minorities, may find it difficult to answer the question "Why should I be loyal to the state?". As long as fealty lies elsewhere—whether with an entity beyond the borders of the state or with one's locality—the integrity of the state is far from assured.

This is not to say that state leaders have not made appeals to win the loyalty of the people, create new myths, or instill a sense of national pride. For example, in Kyrgyzstan the one thousand anniversary of "Manas," the legendary warrior founder of the Kyrgyz people, was celebrated with heavy state sponsorship. In Uzbekistan, 1996 was declared the "Year of Tamerlane (Timur)," who is hailed by the current political elite as the greatest "Uzbek" hero. Other, less well-known figures have also been rediscovered as exemplars of national greatness. In Kazakhstan, elaborate celebrations have been held to mark the various times the Kazakh "hordes" (juz) were united. These efforts are designed to weaken horde or clan identity, which contributes to regional struggles among the Kazakh political elite and undermines national unity. Widespread symbolic manifestations of "national pride" include the re-naming of streets and efforts to "purify" the local language from Russianisms.

More generally, leaders in each state have tried to develop a particular niche to differentiate their state and "nation" from their neighbors. Kyrgyzstan's more liberal authorities, perhaps inspired by the country's mountainous terrain, have aspired to be the "Switzerland of Central Asia," a stable, liberal, peaceful place that will attract foreign investors. Turkmenistan's abundant gas reserves (and desert) have prompted the moniker the "Kuwait of Central Asia." Of course, these various "niches," more labels than reality at this point, are rooted primarily in the economic sphere. Nonetheless, it also says something important about identity: if we aim to be like the Swiss, then our states and citizens should be liberal, tolerant, dynamic, and modern. If we are to be like Kuwait, one would expect more respect for Islamic and patrimonial traditions, as well as more centralized authority.

The contrast between "niches" is more culturally based if we
consider Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In the former case, demographics and geography work toward a more inclusive, almost fused identity. Nazarbaev trumpets his country as a bridge between the East and West, and has been eager to (re)integrate with Moscow. Moreover, the traditional, Kazakh culture had weak Islamic traditions, since there was no settled center of Islamic learning or culture. This fact, combined with the strong presence of Orthodox Christians, means that Kazakhstan cannot easily assume an Islamic cast. In contrast, Central Asia’s major Islamic centers, Samarkand and Bukhara, are located in Uzbekistan. In addition, because Uzbeks gave up the horse for the plow in the sixteenth century, they developed a different political economy as well as cultural traditions, including the most richly developed history and language in the region. Finally, because Uzbek areas were among the last to be formally incorporated into the Russian empire and they did not receive as much Russian colonization, Uzbek leaders can claim to be guardians of a “purer” “Central Asian” culture. Thus, when charting out the ground for the Uzbek nation, Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov has embarked upon a more “Central Asian” path that celebrates past civilizations and also selectively incorporates Islam. This basic difference in nation-building also manifests itself in the political rivalry between Nazarbaev and Karimov, with the latter deriding the former’s (re)integration schemes as “sheer gibberish” and aiming to re-establish the Soviet Union.

All of these moves might help provide the people with a greater sense of their own history or place in the world, ultimately contributing to the building of a stronger national identity and political community. However, this strategy can run into numerous problems, often tied to the selection of a particular hero. For example, Tamerlane was a ruthless despot, who slaughtered and enslaved fellow Central Asian peoples and built towers with the skulls of his opponents. Is this an appropriate father-figure for the Uzbek people? And if the Kyrgyz are all somehow the “children of Manas,” what message does this send to the Uzbeks and Russians living on Kyrgyz soil? Of course, would-be nation-builders do face a limited range of options: the current states lack “heroes” of recent memory because previously they did not exist as states. This, of course, has not prevented the rise of a cult of personality around President Sapamurad Niyazov, or “Türkmenbashı,” (father of all Turkmen), or reverence for Sharaf Rashidov, the former communist party chief better known for corruption than as a champion of Uzbek nationalism. Perhaps the “best” choice of national figure (from a liberal
standpoint) is that of Abay Kunanbaev, who envisioned multiculturalism as a progressive, enriching influence on Kazakh culture. Although he was appropriated by Soviet authorities because of his "international" or "fraternal" outlook, the main street in Almaty still bears his name and his writings have been the subject of extensive academic discussion. If his more pluralist vision of the nation can be engrained in popular consciousness, perhaps the Kazakh leadership will be able to create new "kazakhstantsy" who feel a higher sense of identity with the state than with their ethnic group.

Is there any evidence that this is, in fact, occurring? In other words, to what extent do people actually feel a sense of political community with their fellow citizens? Evidence from two surveys conducted in the summer of 1995 in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan present a mixed picture. When asked about their feelings of being a citizen of Kazakhstan, many were proud (22.9 per cent) or content (40 per cent), whereas very few were not content (2.7 per cent) or ashamed (1 per cent). However, thirty per cent claimed that they were indifferent, and this figure rose to almost fifty per cent in the northern, heavily-Russified regions. Not surprisingly, in this region 79 per cent also claim that conditions have deteriorated since independence, far higher than in other areas. Thus, there is still much to be done in Kazakhstan to build an inclusive political community.

In Kyrgyzstan, a narrow plurality of respondents (35.2 per cent) claimed that being a citizen of the state had more meaning to them that their national (ethnic) affiliation (23.2 per cent). Almost a third (31.7 per cent) claimed both were important. The impression that one has from these data is that there has been some progress in forming an inclusive political community in Kyrgyzstan, although it is notable that minorities were slightly less prone to identify with the state. One could further hypothesize that feelings of identity with the state will grow over time, since people will accept the existence of the new state and (re)socialization will occur. On the other hand, continued crisis may lead to more frustration and inter-ethnic competition, causing the breakdown of any semblance of community.

These two findings stand in contrast to a smaller-scale survey conducted in Uzbekistan in the fall of 1994. Data from this survey reveal that ethnic Russians in Uzbekistan feel much more threatened by nascent "Uzbekification" and were more likely to claim (in comparison with Russians in Kazakhstan) that they were being
"forced" to emigrate. More generally, many Russians in Uzbekistan have opted for Russian citizenship instead of Uzbek citizenship (dual citizenship is prohibited), and surveys in 1991-1992 found that a plurality (43 per cent) wanted to leave the country. Reasons for these feelings could be the fact that Russian has no official status within Uzbekistan, as well as a state policy which has tended to eschew re-establishment of close ties with Russia, unlike the case in Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan.

The nation, of course, rarely rises on its own. Agents must articulate and promulgate a vision that achieves widespread acceptance. In modern times, this agent has been the state. In other words, states make nations, not the other way around. Thus, state-building must exist as a parallel project with nation-building. State-building means the construction of institutions—the creation of power, in short—to enact and enforce political decisions. It is to this task that we now turn.

State-Building

State construction in Atatürk’s Turkey was a classic example of a “revolution from above.” New state structures were imposed, often in a rather heavy-handed manner, on the population by centralized, authoritarian powers. It is important to note here, however, that the early Turkish Republic was not a classic personalized dictatorship. True, Atatürk was “the” leader, but hand-in-hand with state construction went the development of the Republican Peoples’ Party. Some observers even discussed the rise of a “Party-state.” In line with Huntington’s formula, the Republican People’s Party was the agent of modernization, developing and implementing state policy, recruiting new leaders, incorporating new interests, and socializing the population. It penetrated into a still largely traditional society in order to expand state power. In concrete terms, this meant exercising control over local governments and schools, building patronage networks with Ankara as the pinnacle, organizing development projects, and promulgating the tenets of Kemalism.

In addition to penetration, the other watchwords were centralization and control. Power was concentrated at the top, among Atatürk and his cadre of close advisers. While there was a National Assembly, there was little power-sharing in actual practice. Opposition was either co-opted or crushed. Those who questioned the course being taken could find themselves accused of treason. Such a path was necessary, according to its advocates, in order to push
through reforms quickly and maintain social stability.

This strategy has much to offer the elites of Central Asia. It provides a means for the leadership to define all aspects of social development—definition of the nation, form of the state, course of economic development—while retaining control. It also offers a mechanism for building state capacity to extract resources and implement policy. It fills an authority vacuum and expands the autonomy of state elites. While this could obviously be used in conjunction with a very conservative approach to social change, it could also serve the needs of reformers. Gregory Gleason, echoing what Huntington wrote decades earlier, argues that centralization of power gives a certain advantage to reformers. The reason is that reform must go forward in piecemeal steps, and at each juncture individuals and groups can re-organize to defend the status quo. Reformist leaders therefore must be able to move faster and resort to surprise to achieve their goals. Eventually, they may be forced to limit participation, remove transparency of decision-making, and strip power away from more conservative government organs, such as parliaments. The irony is that non-democratic means can be justified as means to preserve democracy, as has arguably been done by Akayev in Kyrgyzstan.

Does one in fact see a general trend toward penetration, centralization, and control in Central Asia? Although there are differences among the states, which I will discuss below, there are some commonalities that correspond closely to the “Atatürk model.” These include: strong presidentialism with rule by decree; elections of dubious fairness; the lack of an independent judiciary; moves to limit the power of parliament; prohibitions on opposition activity; construction of patronage networks through local hakims; and state control over the media. Overall, one can speak of “authoritarian national consolidation” throughout the region, a process whose “siren sound” is “revolution from above.”

These developments should hardly be surprising. Aside from traditional cultures—whose effects are always difficult to demonstrate—one can mention a variety of “causes” that point to non-democratic outcomes. Among these factors are: lack of previous experience with democracy, a population that lacks political efficacy, widespread social and economic crisis, potential for inter-ethnic or regional conflicts, lack of mediating institutions between the state and citizens (civil society), and the relatively unassailable position of the nomenklatura. Most important is the fact that independence was not accompanied by a revolution in Central Asia. As a
consequence, current state institutions largely are built from Soviet ones. Flags and letterhead have changed more easily than personnel or style of government. Current elites therefore have emphasized order over democracy.

There are, of course, national variants. The state that probably mirrors Atatürk’s Turkey the most is Uzbekistan. The dominant figure in Uzbekistan’s political life—perhaps in all facets of life in Uzbekistan—is President Karimov, the former first secretary of the republican Communist Party. He was elected to his current post in 1991 under elections of very dubious validity, and extended his term to 2000 in a March 1995 referendum in which he won, Soviet-style, with 98 per cent of the vote. In 1992, he banned the “Erk” (Freedom) Party and the “Birlik” (Unity) Movement, and their leaders were forced into exile in the West. Another opposition movement, the Islamic Rebirth Party, has been similarly banned. Nominal opposition is allowed but is tightly controlled, recalling both the East European experience of “Popular Fronts” and Atatürk’s experience with a crypto-opposition party of his own design. Karimov’s power base is the Peoples’ Democratic Party, the re-named Communist Party that has changed its focus from Marxist-Leninism to Uzbek nationalism, but contains most of the same personnel. To the extent that this institution has been preserved, Karimov has not had to truly engage in state-building from scratch: an institution that had already penetrated deeply into society was readily available. As was the case under Soviet rule, power flows down through the structures of the Party-state. The national legislature possesses little power, there is no independent court to countermand presidential directives, and regional officials are answerable to Karimov alone, who can sack them if they begin to become too ambitious. The state also continues to control the media and all other social institutions.

Karimov, in a manner similar to Atatürk, justifies his authoritarian policies as necessary to maintain order during a time of arduous socio-economic conditions that could spark violent conflict. He has promoted a “cult of stability,” pointing to neighboring Tajikistan as an example of what can happen without strong authority to prevent regional and ethnic breakdown. He has also used his powers of appointment to shuffle local and regional officials to undermine the development of clan networks, a rival force to “Uzbek” national identity. Playing to the more affective side of the population, Karimov has also tried to wash away memories of his own nomenklatura past by carefully appropriating Islamic and national symbols in an effort to bolster his legitimacy and co-opt po-
tential mobilization against him. One example is the promotion of Timur as the Uzbeks' greatest hero, who, not coincidentally, shared many of the methods and aspirations of Karimov. In the political discourse, preservation of Vatan (the motherland) is linked with the fate of the current leadership, the guardians of the Uzbek nation.

A similar path has been followed in Turkmenistan, although in this case one sees much more the rise of a Stalinesque cult of personality around the President. Like Karimov, Niyazov is a former communist first secretary who has become the "father" of his nation, literally as he created the title "Turkmenbaşy" for himself. All public references to him must include this title. He is omnipresent in Turkmenistan: in the media, on the walls of offices, on all currency, in grade-school primers. Like Karimov, he controls all aspects of political life in the country. He appoints regional officials, nominates members of the Magilis (Assembly), and tolerates no dissent or opposition. Western-style democracy is equated with instability, and Niyazov takes great pride in the fact that his state remains an "island of stability" where the people are happy, although there is plenty of reason to doubt the latter claim. He has announced that Turkmen will find their own path, one "not according to the demands of some sort of classic, democratic formulas or prescriptions worked out in some prosperous Western country." Some forecast that his regime is likely to remain the most stable in the area, due to the iron fist as well as plentiful oil and gas reserves, but it is, in Huntington's terms, far more traditional than modern. The only institution that has emerged is the cult around the President, and it is uncertain how long this can be maintained.

In Tajikistan, it is apparent that the current President, Imomali Rakhmonov, another former communist official, would like to establish an authoritarian order. The catch, of course, is that there is precious little order in the country, since the collapse of Soviet rule precipitated a power struggle among national-democrats, Islamists, and communists. For the time being, the latter prevails, and Rakhmonov enjoys significant Russian and Uzbek support as the best guarantor of order for Tajikistan. He has been formally elected President and in February 1995 elections for a parliament were held. In both cases, however, gross irregularities were reported. The press is tightly controlled, various public organizations have been banned under the pretext that they are a threat to public order, and there has been little progress in developing political pluralism. Should
the opposition be completely subdued, there is little doubt that Tajikistan will follow in the footsteps of the previously discussed cases.

Rulers in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been a bit more liberal in their methods, although it would be a mistake to call either state fully democratic. In Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev has declared that the first task of the state must be to consolidate society and develop a sense of Kazakh patriotism. The appropriate means to this end, in his view, is a state with a strong president who can assure stability while managing (limited) pluralism. Opposition is allowed, but only within certain limits. Since the adoption of a new constitution in 1995, monitoring of public activity has made it even more difficult for non-government groups to form and express demands to political authorities. Laws prohibiting the fueling of ethnic hatred are liberally applied to nationalist groups, such as Azat and Alash for Kazakhs and Edinstvo and Kazachestvo for Slavs, which have been particular targets for state harassment and repression. The Communist Party, the most organized opposition group, has also been the object of a government clampdown on civic activity. Other movements have been co-opted by the elite, either becoming part of the nomenklatura system or given a sanctioned voice as an "official" opposition. An example is the environmentally oriented Nevada-Semipalatinsk, formerly led by the well-known writer Olzhas Suleimenov. Suleimenov was appointed to head the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan, a "pro-government, opposition" party designed to further Nazarbaev’s aim of fostering national and ethnic harmony. However, after Suleimenov began to spread his wings a bit too much and advocate policies not favored by Nazarbaev, he was sent to Rome as the Ambassador to Italy. Meanwhile, Nazarbaev has consolidated his own position by creating the Peoples’ Unity Party of Kazakhstan, essentially a collection of more liberal elements from the old Communist Party.

In general, however, Kazakhstan shares with its neighbors the tendency toward a centralization of powers in the president’s hands. In April 1995, a referendum extended his term of office until 2000, which Nazarbaev interpreted as a decisive no to “trouble and tremors in society.” A slew of decrees have expanded presidential powers vis-à-vis parliament. Parliament itself has twice been disbanded (in December 1993 and March 1995) due, respectively, to deadlock and electoral irregularities. While it has not been in session, Nazarbaev has exercised his extensive constitutional power to rule by decree, and clearly favors this method as more effective. His
attitude toward the legislature, expressed in an interview, is that representatives are prone to engage in "meaningless debates" and their intransigence prevents him from getting things done.\textsuperscript{81} Elections for a new bi-cameral legislature were held in December 1995, dominated by pro-presidential candidates due to an opposition boycott.

However, events in parliament may no longer matter, since the importance of political parties and parliaments in making laws is minimal. Akhan Bazhanov, the leader of the Peoples' Unity Party, declared that his party has no interest in exercising power (??!!) and like all other parties in the country it lacks the political maturity to assume leadership.\textsuperscript{82} Moreover, the August 1995 Constitution, approved by 89 per cent of voters in a referendum, gives the President the power to issue decrees with the force of law and a later, additional decree gave him the right to annul any existing law. Again, the widespread refrain is that order and authority will be necessary to transform Kazakhstan, and that the state must have the power to balance competing demands and close the door to extremists who would use freedom to create conflict.

Kyrgyzstan remains a relative outlier, a "bulwark of democracy in the region" in the words of US Vice President Al Gore.\textsuperscript{83} Under the stewardship of President Akayev, Kyrgyzstan had established for itself a reputation as the most democratic state in the region. Akayev, although a former member of the communist party, rose to power as a compromise candidate between party factions in 1990. Since 1991, he has helped put through a number of liberalizing political and economic reforms. Despite the fact that violence broke out in Osh between ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in 1990, groups have been free to organize and press their agendas. Kyrgyzstan's parliament, unlike the others in the region, has not been a rubber-stamp for the president, and presidential powers remained, until recently, relatively limited.

However, as the economic crisis worsened and discontent and opposition grew, particularly from the vested interests of the old \textit{nomenklatura} who were threatened by continuing liberalization, Kyrgyzstan's shine became tarnished. Rather than suffer the fate of Gorbachev, Akayev disbanded parliament, the center of opposition activity, in September 1994, calling it an "outdated Soviet relic." The constitutionality of this move was, however, highly debatable, and it was a harbinger of more efforts to strengthen the power of the presidency. In October 1995, Akayev called for new elections — a move of very dubious legality. He was re-elected in December
in elections of questionable fairness, since the opposition candidates had little time to prepare, press coverage was biased in favor of Akayev, and three candidacies had been disqualified by the Electoral Commission a mere nine days prior to voting. Afterwards, constitutional amendments were passed that significantly embellished Akayev’s powers. These included: the power to appoint the prime minister, all members of the Cabinet, and a wide variety of other state officials with limited parliamentary oversight; greater veto power; and powers to disband parliament. He argued for these powers by comparing his previous position with that of the Queen of England, and maintained that these amendments would reflect on-going changes in society, overlooking the fact that the constitution had been adopted only a year and a half earlier. The justification, which echoes those of more authoritarian Central Asian leaders, is that the vacuum of power must be eliminated in order to push forward with reforms. In Akayev’s case, this claim may be a bit more credible given his previous record and the fact that the February 1995 parliamentary elections failed to produce a pro-reform body. However, critics might wonder if democracy can in fact be preserved by un-democratic methods.

Taken as a whole, the impression one gets is that Central Asian leaders endorse the basic premise behind the Atatürk model: power must be created and centralized in order to re-shape society in accordance with the new elites’ wishes. Moreover, this is not a sentiment found only at the pinnacle of power. Surveys connected with the Democracy and Local Governance Project, which were conducted in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan in 1993-1996, found that local elites in these Central Asian states ranked as the most un-democratic among local elites surveyed in 41 different countries. Measurements of democracy included assessments of pluralism and the importance of minority rights and political equality. These results, of course, should hardly be surprising given the lack of turnover of the Soviet-era elite. The point, however, is that authoritarianism in the region is not merely the result of presidential preference. This fact is an important constraint to nurturing democracy in the region, particularly since there is no sizable movement from below to challenge the prevailing authorities.

This leads to another consideration: the extent of an authoritarian ethos within society. If present, this could provide a source of stability, if not legitimacy, for the current systems. In other words, does the public accept the argument that the political system must be tightly controlled and that democracy, perhaps, can come later
once more pressing issues have been settled? Evidence from the previously cited survey in Kazakhstan suggests that the answer is rather difficult to determine. When asked whether a dictatorship is necessary in today's circumstances, a majority (56 per cent) said no (36 per cent said yes). Respondents were more evenly split on the proposition that it is necessary to limit civil and political rights in order to have order and discipline (44 per cent agree, 45 per cent disagree). Also telling is the finding that a near majority of respondents (47.7 per cent) were not satisfied with the level of political and civil freedom in Kazakhstan. These results appear to point to the existence of a sizable number of Kazakhstaniis harboring a more "democratic" orientation.

On the other hand, a plurality (41.3 per cent) claim that Kazakhstan is a democracy and an overwhelming majority (81 per cent) approve of the performance of Nazarbaev. When asked what they liked best about Nazarbaev, the most popular response (35.3 per cent) was that he had maintained stability in the country. These data reveal that Kazakh definitions of democracy may differ significantly from those in the West, where the consensus is that Kazakhstan's system is authoritarian. If, for people in Kazakhstan, the current system satisfies the requirements of democracy, perhaps it will acquire popular, diffuse legitimacy. As for Nazarbaev's approval rating, not only does this perhaps legitimize his approach, but it shows that people will tolerate an authoritarian ruler if he can produce results.

One important aspect of the regime's performance is maintaining social peace. On this score, Central Asian governments, with the exception of Tajikistan, have done rather well, defying those who had predicted a wave of civil unrest in the region. Another area of great concern is economic stabilization and development, which will also affect the prospects for social stability. Let us therefore turn to this topic with reference to the "Atatürk model."

Economic Development

Developing a national idea that is accepted by the population and authoritative state structures are formidable challenges for Central Asian leaders. However, their own position, as well as the very independence of their states, will remain precarious if they are unable to restructure and modernize their economies and begin to produce economic growth.

 Atatürk had a similar task, although for him economic devel-
opment was not merely about economics, since development would force Turks to make a break with their past and embrace a new, more "modern" outlook. As early as February 1923 the Turkish leadership showed that it recognized the importance of the economy by convening the "First Turkish Economic Congress". Its often disparate resolutions were incorporated into the program, and it formed the basis for later Turkish economic policy.

The basic issue of debate of that time, the same one that has reappeared in Central Asia, is the choice between liberalism and state intervention in the economy.86 Initially, the Turkish leadership decided upon a mixed approach, although in practice it was far more étatist than laissez-faire. It was liberal in the sense that private property would be the basic form of ownership. However, it was very illiberal with respect to the question of state intervention. The most important state projects were railway construction, establishment of various monopolies (tobacco, sugar, alcohol), and organization of financial banks. Low interest loans were also granted by the state in order to foster the growth of a "national" bourgeoisie, needed to replace the Greek and Armenian merchant class. Import tariffs were eventually raised to protect fledgling Turkish industries, and after agricultural prices plummeted in 1929-30, autarky became more and more a practical necessity. Gradually, the state, under the guise of the now official policy of étatism (devletçilik) adopted at the Republican People's Party congress of 1931, began to assume responsibility for creating and running industries for which the private sector could not accumulate the necessary capital. These included steel, chemicals, textiles, and cement. The state also intervened in the agricultural sector by regulating prices, and, following the Soviet Union's example, engaged in a modest amount of economic planning. By the second half of the 1930s, in line with the recovery of the world economy, Turkey's GDP began to rise steadily.

If such an approach allowed Turkey to weather the storm of the Great Depression and develop the basis for a modern economy, could not the same be applied to Central Asia, caught in its own economic maelstrom? Moreover, would not this policy be consistent with the concentration of political power and the goal of many to pursue very controlled reform?

Before proceeding further, one should mention that it is problematic to treat all Central Asian states as if they were economically the same. As we saw in the case of the construction of political institutions, there will be national variations. Moreover, the economic endowments of states differ: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
possess vast energy reserves that give them far more potential for growth than resource-poor Kyrgyzstan; Kazakhstan is far more industrialized than Tajikistan or Turkmenistan; Uzbeks, according to some, have more of an entrepreneurial culture than other peoples of Central Asia. States are limited by the hand they are dealt, meaning that their economic future will not be determined solely by government policy or emulation of a particular model. Moreover, policies will necessarily have to differ to take local conditions into account. However, commonalities may still be sought, and one may find that the basic tenets of the Atatürk economic model are being put in place by state authorities.

Judging from what has occurred in Central Asia to this point, it would appear that many do in fact endorse this type of approach, although, again, there are variants and exceptions. The clear outlier is Kyrgyzstan, where liberalization and marketization have been pursued at a rapid rate. According to World Bank data, by the end of 1995, the private sector in Kyrgyzstan accounted for over 40 per cent of GDP, and its degree of liberalization is only slightly lower than that of the Visegrad countries.77 No other state in Central Asia comes even close to such figures. The state has largely divested itself of involvement in the economy, often selling assets at prices well below market value. Moreover, following the advice of international “experts” Kyrgyzstan has pursued a tight money policy, with the result that it enjoys the lowest inflation in the region. Foreign investment has also been eagerly courted to upgrade Soviet-era technology and develop the country’s mining industry. In many respects, Akayev has attempted to pursue an economic policy diametrically opposed to the “Atatürk model.”

Unfortunately, this has not been accompanied by a dramatic economic turnaround. National income has dropped on average 18% a year since independence, living standards have plummeted, and de-industrialization is occurring, as factories have quit producing and workers are forced to make a living in agriculture.78 Of course, it is impossible to say definitively that government policies have “caused” these problems. Among other factors, the loss of trade ties and subsidies from the center, as well as price shocks (particularly increases in energy prices), have dealt a serious blow to the Kyrgyz economy. However, one could lay some of the blame on the chosen economic strategy. Specifically, as the head of Kyrgyz Academy of Science argues, the state willfully chose to abandon the state sector, virtually giving it away in an ill-fated attempt to create a new class of owners. Capitalism was not allowed to evolve,
and the market was not allowed to function freely, since "buyers" received enterprises at a fraction of assessed cost. By assuming that the state sector is inherently doomed, the government ultimately created a self-fulfilling prophecy through "reckless" privatization. Creating new forms of property, rather than productive sectors, has been the thrust of policy. The corrective, according to this economist, is a stronger state role in the economy, including financing of the state sector, a slowdown in privatization, and "management" of nascent market forces. In other words, a little more Atatürk and a little less Friedman would not necessarily be a bad thing at this stage of the transition.

Other states, while not avoiding a severe economic downturn, have been more reticent to experiment with reforms. The most conservative state, in this respect, is Turkmenistan, whose economy is highly controlled by Nizayev and his clan. World Bank data barely register any liberalization, and private sector output is less than 20%, lower than all other former Soviet republics save Belarus. The economy is at the mercy of Niyazov's muddleheaded whims: because he wants Turkmenistan to be self-sufficient in food (a major task given the arid conditions in the country), Turkmenistan does not import food products until the population is on the brink of starvation and/or rioting. Investment, such as it is, is concentrated in the oil and gas industries, as well as in the construction of Ceaucescu-like monuments to Turkmenbaşı. Despite the fact that the bulk of Turkmen live under subsistence conditions, the nation's economy has not experienced total collapse, and could have done better had other former republics, especially Ukraine, paid Turkmenistan for gas imports. The leadership has staked its and the country's future on its energy deposits, although it is a very open question how the proceeds from these resources will be distributed. For the moment, perhaps it would be safer to say that the political economy of Turkmenistan looks more like Ottoman Turkey than any period under the Turkish republic.

In Kazakhstan, Nazarbaev has launched a "strategy of rapid development," but one should not be fooled by the choice of adjective into thinking that this is something akin to Poland's "shock therapy". For Nazarbaev, this means strengthening—not weakening—the role of the state in the economy, including ownership, planning, and providing guarantees to foreign investors. There has been limited privatization, particularly of small businesses, but enterprise autonomy is limited and the state continues to assume a primary role in managing the overall economy, reflecting a belief
that the predominance of the market would lead to chaos. Nazarbaev and his circle have been particularly loath to privatize land, fearing that ethnic Russians (generally better off than ethnic Kazakhs) would be favored and that this could provoke resentment from the still largely rural Kazakhs. There has been some liberalization, especially on price controls, although through 1995, according to the World Bank, the overall level of the liberalization is equal to that of Ukraine, generally recognized as a reform laggard. Trade has grown, as the government has gradually opened the country to the world market. Foreign investment has also been eagerly courted in an effort to make up for a dearth of domestic funds for investment.

The elements of marketization in Kazakhstan’s new economic course have produced the expected effects: inflation, initial drops in growth, declining living standards, and a threat of widespread unemployment. Reflecting upon the initial reform experience, Erik Asanbaev, Kazakhstan’s vice-president, suggested that the country might have been better off had the state assumed a yet stronger role in managing the transition. Specifically, he pointed to the need to preserve state ownership over most of the economy, which, in fact, is the case in Kazakhstan today. Assuming this view is widely shared in the leadership, the course of gradual reform in Kazakhstan may become even more gradual. On this point it may be worth noting that according to the 1995 survey previously mentioned, 62 per cent of those queried approve of small reforms in stages (27 per cent prefer a rapid transformation) and more prefer state control over the entire economy (48 per cent) than little or no state control (38 per cent). Judging from these data, maintenance of étatist policies seems a likely bet.

Finally, the Uzbek experience with reform has its own particular features. Chief among these is that fact that the collapse in production has not been nearly as precipitous as it has been elsewhere. According to CIS data, from 1991 to 1994 Uzbekistan experienced only a 2 per cent drop in industrial production, and a 6 per cent drop in agriculture. Of course, one could point to a myriad of reasons for this, including domestic resources (especially energy), the most fertile land in the region, and perhaps more of an entrepreneurial culture, although this would overlook the debilitating legacy of the cotton monoculture as well as the fact that subsidies from the center accounted for a higher percentage of Uzbekistan’s GDP (19.4%) than any other Central Asian state. Uzbekistan was therefore not in an especially privileged position after the breakup
of the USSR. Thus, one might imagine that government policies may have something to do with this (relative) "success."

Karimov has tried to fashion an "Uzbek" model of development, one that takes into account the particular conditions of the country. What this means in concrete terms is an evolutionary path to the market, with the state as the prime instigator and controller of reforms. The refrain is that too quick a transformation will produce chaos, and Karimov has no trouble pointing to neighboring states as evidence of this. Although one of his mottoes is "economics above politics," one might wonder if he has not got it the other way around, since his economic "program" is predicated upon the supremacy of law and order and a strong state structure to develop programs and implement decisions.

It should be noted that Karimov is not an absolute opponent of reforms. Indeed, by 1995, Uzbekistan enjoyed a higher percentage of private sector output as percentage of GDP (30 per cent) than Kazakhstan, and had a roughly similar level of liberalization. Reform has, however, been carefully controlled, with the prerequisites being relative socio-economic stability and consolidated political power. Uzbekistan also has only just begun to tackle the more difficult problems of large-scale industrial privatization, and there has yet to be any substantial development on the question of land reform. Still, according to one report, Karimov has gradually managed to win the respect of the international financial community, who, even if not approving of his authoritarian methods, recognize some positive results.95

Thus far, can one ascertain any general patterns or lessons? One is that there is no comprehensive "Central Asian" approach to economic questions. Another is that many leaders may be impelled to re-fashion their policies, meaning that there has been no final decision in favor of any particular "model". However, significant components of the Atatürk program have been adopted, especially in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, whose leaders also echo the concerns voiced by Atatürk years ago. Moreover, judging from the results thus far, the Atatürk model, or, maybe more accurately, Karimov's version of it, is associated with better economic performance than are those endorsing a rapid move to free markets. Again, this need not mean that government policy is responsible for success or failure, but some in Central Asia appear to be drawing this lesson.

What can we say about the socio-economic aspects of the current transformation, especially with respect to a genuine social revo-
lution or transformation? You will remember that in Atatürk's case, amid all the other changes, there was little transformation of underlying socio-economic relations between landowners and peasantry, both of which, had they been mobilized, could have doomed his programs. In Central Asia, like in other former republics, there has been little done to undermine the position of the political and economic elites of the ancien régime. There has been little turnover among political officials, and managers have been privileged actors in the privatization that has occurred. In Central Asia a whole new group of "political capitalists" has emerged, individuals able to use their connections with the old system to gain exalted positions and wealth under the new system, which in turn allows them continued political power.96 Slogans have changed much more than the elite themselves. This has even been the case in Kyrgyzstan, and is justified by Akayev on pragmatic grounds.

Indeed, many key positions are still occupied by the 'old guard.' If you do not keep the reality of the situation in mind, however, you can destroy everything. Let's say I appoint a democrat, but he is not accepted in the region. He will be rejected. Everything will stop. The reforms will stop. It is easier for me to direct a conservative akim [head of local government] than to appoint a democrat and then suffer because the people do not understand or accept him.97

On this score, similarities with Atatürk are apparent: one should not try to challenge vested interests, lest they mobilize forces against you. What this example also reveals, however, are the clear limits to reform in cases where the central authority has yet to establish clear, unassailable position. In Akayev's case, we have seen that he has recently begun to follow the path of other Central Asian leaders and attempt to centralize authority in his own person, albeit in the name of greater reform and democracy.

Another aspect of the chosen economic strategy relates directly to the nation-building process. This is the phenomenon of "ethno-privatization." This means that an important consideration in privatization is the ethnic, or even the tribal, identity of the beneficiary. Because non-titular peoples have historically had a leading economic role in these states, they would likely be in a privileged position in an open, unfettered market. Realization of this fact has produced reticence by many leaders to move ahead swiftly with reform. In some cases, the dilemma is resolved by state "help" de-
signed to advantage the titular peoples. "Ethno-privatization," usually a subset of the more well-known "nomenklatura privatization," is often the result. As one observer explains:

The development of market relations appears to be a stimulant for each ethnic community's efforts to create its own group of proprietors, its own national bourgeoisie. This explains why governments pursuing their national interests are in no hurry to pursue economic reforms and prefer to use the levers of 'state capitalism'. Any other variant would lead to the emergence of a non-indigenous bourgeoisie in the region.

The state therefore is creating a "national" economy in two distinct senses, politically and ethnically. The latter aspect, of course, is far more divisive and could lead to great tensions as Russians (and others) try to protect their positions. Notably, the Kemalist state also took the lead in forming a "national" bourgeoisie, but this was unlikely to cause controversy as the non-Turkish economic elite—Armenians and Greeks—were either decimated during the war or re-settled afterwards.

Finally, all options for overcoming the economic crisis and modernizing the economy in Central Asia are associated with the goal of attracting foreign investment or assistance. These states, and their citizens, simply do not have the capital necessary for the massive overhaul and investment needed to develop energy and mineral resources, diversify agriculture, or make existing factories efficient and competitive. This question is fundamental to all discussions of economic development in the region, and foreign investment has begun to trickle in.99

What political effects is this likely to have? Will outside influence limit the ability of these states' leaders to pursue authoritarian politics? To this point, the answer is no. In fact, the need to court foreign investment is often used by authoritarian rulers to justify their "cult of stability." As for Western governments and businesses, while there is much rhetoric about the need to support democracy (which seems to have acquired a rather loose meaning), the lure of geo-political advantage and profit has been decisive in affecting policy. Karimov's new image as a guarantor of stability (and, therefore, of investments) is a case in point. One recent report suggested that the West has abandoned the "stick" of human rights, showering praise on the apparent "turnaround" in Uzbekistan's human rights record.100 As for international lenders, most disperse their funds in accordance with economic criteria, not progress toward
democracy.

What about Russia, which casts a very long (and occasionally dark) shadow over Central Asia? What combination of policies are Russian policymakers likely to favor? The overriding Russian interest has been clear since the collapse of the USSR: stability. This means no more Tajikists or Afghans, in particular no spread of Islamic fundamentalism or emergence of conflicts that would threaten Russians in Central Asia or Russian interests there. Since this goal corresponds well with those held by Central Asian leaders, it is fair to say that Moscow does not object to the policies in place in the region, provided that they do not lead to anti-Russian nationalism or attempts by Central Asians to break out of the Russian sphere of influence. To this point, there is little indication of either happening, and having leaders such as Nazarbaev or Karimov in power may in fact be Moscow’s best hope for continued stability. As for democracy, even Russian liberals largely have concluded, f la Karimov, that it could lead to internal disintegration.101

Prognosis

The ultimate question, however, is will the courses adopted by Central Asian authorities produce the desired results, namely national, political, and economic development? Publics and elites may both like various aspects of “revolution” or “development” from above, but this alone is no guarantee of success.

Certainly one can point to other “Asian miracles” where state-led growth has occurred, although a variety of other factors not present in the cases of Central Asia may be the true “causes” of success. In short, “regime type” may be too simple and crude an indicator to capture the determinants of economic performance.

However, some comparative studies have suggested that the initial stages of economic reform should be accompanied by strong executive authority, which should then yield to more inclusive politics as coalitions are built with the beneficiaries of reform.102 In Huntington’s terms, power must be centralized before it can be expanded or dispersed, and this is precisely what occurred in Turkey, although the process was completed after Atatürk’s death. Thus, there may be some basis for thinking this strategy might succeed, provided that power is used to implement the needed reforms.

At this point, is there any evidence from Central Asia to support these claims? A comparison between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan is perhaps instructive, although one might not want to
make a definite conclusion from these two cases. Uzbekistan has
done well economically, has a relatively powerful state structure,
and has maintained social stability throughout the difficult transi-
tion period. Kyrgyzstan, while also stable, has been one of the worst
economic performers in the region. More telling, however, is the
fact that Akayev has had to resort to more heavy-handed methods
in order to ensure his own power and reform path. In a very inter-
esting statement, Akayev, who initially tried to foster an image as a
lily-white democrat, conceded that Western parliamentary systems
were taking root with tremendous difficulty in all post-Soviet states,
including his own. His answer is that institutions must reflect the
on-going reality in society, and must be able to cope with the cur-
rent difficult situation. Judging from his own actions, an effec-
tive alternative to Western institutions is a strong president who is
able to dominate parliament, control appointments of state officials,
and, when necessary, make rather demagogic appeals to Central
Asian publics who have never said “no” to more concentration of
power.

One cannot, of course, advocate authoritarianism without
prompting a cacophony of critics who will point to the dangers of
such a course. Let me deal with three possible objections:

1. Authoritarianism will inevitably lead toward ethnocracy.
In other words, authoritarian governments will not respect the rights
of minorities and fashion policies to benefit members of their own
particular group. Experience from a variety of states in Africa and
Asia would confirm this hypothesis.

2. There is no guarantee that authoritarian leaders will pur-
sue reforms or policies that will generate growth or otherwise ben-
efit society. After all, if they are only accountable to themselves or
a narrow constituency, policies inevitably will be designed to serve
narrow interests. With this sort of concern in mind, Haggard and
Kaufman qualify their conclusion that political institutions must
remain “accountable to the interests and aspirations of competing
social and economic interests.” This is a caveat worth consider-
ing. In short, one must take into account the proclivity for power to
corrupt.

3. It is immoral and/or presumptuous to assume that
authoritarianism could ever be the “proper” path for any society.
Despite democracy’s difficulties, it is the preferable approach and
can work, if given a proper chance.

I shall turn first to the claim that authoritarian politics will lead to ethnically exclusive politics, which are objectionable both from a human rights perspective and due to the fact that they are likely to cause civil unrest. The tragedies of Rwanda and Burundi, as well as earlier examples in Nigeria, Sudan, Iraq, and Burma, can be used to marshall evidence for this claim. However, I think that there need not be an inherent link between the two types of policies, and, in addition, certain features of Central Asia work against such a connection.

One needs to make a distinction between politically exclusionary policies and ethnically exclusionary policies. Just because a government does not allow political pluralism does not mean that it must be composed of one ethnic or national group or adopt policies favoring only one particular group. One could imagine that consociational forms that in no way involve public input could arise between various elites. This has been in the case in Central Asia, especially in multi-ethnic Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where Russians are better represented in the presidential apparatus than in legislatures. Democracy, particularly majoritarian variants, could actually produce more ethnic exclusivity, particularly when nationalism appears to be the most potent mobilizing force. This has been the case in Kyrgyzstan, where the 1995 parliamentary elections produced a parliament that is almost 90 per cent ethnically Kyrgyz. Thankfully, the uglier side of nationalist politics has largely been absent in Central Asia, due in part at least to actions from above.

Of course, current arrangements may be fragile arrangement and poorly institutionalized. Moreover, there may be great temptation for the dominant group to push the other out in order to expand its own power and patronage networks. Some point to creeping Kazakhification or Akayev's tendency to favor northern Kyrgyz over their southern counterparts.

However, there may be limits to how far minorities, especially Russians, can be pushed. One factor that must be considered is demographic reality. Ethnic Kazakhs are not even a majority in their own homeland, and Kyrgyz barely are. Any anti-Russian or anti-"outsider" campaign would only invite mass upheaval, a fact well recognized by all leaderships in the region. Moreover, geopolitical realities limit the potential for anti-Russian policies. Moscow takes great interest in the fate of Russians in the near abroad, and ethnic exclusionary policies would be likely to provoke a re-
sponse. Central Asian leaders cannot risk this because of Russia’s overwhelming power and their dependency. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Europeans throughout Central Asia, as well as Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan, largely occupy a privileged economic position, which gives them a source of power and, in a sense, “protection” from malevolent action from above. Russians, a relatively skilled group now in short supply due to emigration, are finding expanded opportunities because they are needed in their current countries. Continued out-migration is something Central Asian leaders cannot countenance, since it would be a detriment to the economy and also eliminate a potential counter-balance against pressures for Islamization. Of course, to the extent that “ethnoprivatization” is being pursued, this could change the situation. However, for the time being there are significant factors that inhibit the growth of ethnic exclusionary politics. Moreover, continued control from the top may be the best guarantor that these policies do not develop.

The second objection, in essence, is that competent, responsible strongmen are likely to be a short supply. For every Atatürk there are dozens of Nimierys, Somozas, and Papa Docs, and one could easily imagine that the notorious corruption and “neo-traditional” forms of government in the late Soviet period in Central Asia will continue if democratic institutions are not formed to check state power. Turkmenistan could be pointed to as a case in point, although it is worth mentioning that no post-communist state, no matter how democratic, has managed to avoid corruption, “nomenklatura” privatization, or charges that it is not responsive to popular needs. This is not to say, of course, that they are all the same, and in fact the best performers, by a variety of measures, have been those that have moved ahead fastest with political and economic reform.

However, this does not necessarily mean that the formation of more democratic systems will be more reformist or responsive in Central Asia. Instructive is the case of 1995 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan. In the freest elections in the region, large numbers of conservatives (and overwhelmingly ethnic Kyrgyz as well) were put into office, prompting Akayev to seek additional powers to circumvent parliament and “save” chances for reform. Relying upon parliamentary bodies, likely to be dominated by local elites with non-democratic attitudes, may not provide a better solution. Moreover, one can point to the fact that Akayev, Nazarbaev, and (to a far lesser extent) Karimov have subjected their rule and programs to
popular approval, and they have received overwhelming endorsements, although it is true that the conditions under which these presidential referendums were not entirely fair. Nonetheless, surveys point to the fact that both Akayev and Nazarbaev are supported by overwhelming majorities from all ethnic groups. To the extent that current forms of governance receive implicit popular support, although it is unlikely one would find such a result in Tajikistan or Turkmenistan, one can argue that the system is responding, in some sense, to popular preferences, which are largely geared toward maintenance of order.

The third objection stems in part from the other two. Democracy is the more humane or "moral" form of government, and therefore should not be cast aside lightly. Authoritarianism cannot be condoned or justified. Certainly, the more odious practices of Niyazov or Karimov are not easy to justify, and I will not attempt to do so. However, it is too simplistic to view the choice between "moral" or "immoral" forms of government. In the context of post-communist Central Asia, a variety of other goals must be considered, such as the construction of nation-states, effective political institutions, and modernization, while at the same time preventing social upheaval. These are formidable tasks, and current conditions will provide little room for democracy to consolidate itself. Moreover, given the political realities, most importantly the gulf between the unmobilized masses and a non-democratic elite with a virtual monopoly on political and economic power, democracy is not a realistic alternative. In fact, given the current consolidation of forces, in which a modernizing, largely urban elite is confronted with a tradition-oriented countryside, strict enforcement of democratic procedures could produce more reactionary or anti-reform governments (an "Algerian" scenario). Cast in this perspective, current trends may not seem quite as objectionable.

Conclusion

This study has examined the various approaches that have been undertaken to solve some of Central Asia’s more vexing problems: nation-building, construction of state authority, and economic development. These clearly are on-going tasks, making it difficult to posit a firm conclusion. Nonetheless, we should be in a better position to answer the question originally posed: does Atatürk provide a model for the region?

Evidence on this point suggests a cautious yes, at least to the
extent that many of the underlying conditions and needs are similar, and the fact that Central Asian leaders are in many ways emulating his strategies. This is most clear in steps toward authoritarianism and their attendant justifications. There are also moves toward political definitions of the nation (most clearly in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan), efforts to limit the influence of Islam, and étatism in the economic sphere. One could also mention some experiments with language reform that recall Atatürk’s change of the Turkish alphabet to Latin (a.k.a. “Western” or “modern”) script. Leaders are also very much aware of the need to build a national political community, recognizing this as a prerequisite to further development. They are also, for the most part, by choice or by circumstances, committed to a policy of gradualism in terms of socio-economic reform, although one might wonder if “reforms” will ever be as far-reaching as they were under Atatürk.

However, one major constraining difference comes repeatedly in any discussion of Central Asia: ethnic diversity. In terms of discourse on nation and ethnicity, one can no longer, as Atatürk did, assume that language can be a “neutral” defining characteristic of a political community. Not only do Russians (and others) not know the new, official languages, but their identity is not likely to be easily malleable. Constructing multi-ethnic, inclusive myths or symbols is obviously not easy, and the current crisis makes instrumental acceptance of the national community problematic. More forceful attempts at assimilation would create only greater problems. As of yet, no definitive way has been solved to resolve this impasse.

Moreover, the problems of ethnic diversity feed into the efforts of state construction and economic development. In both states, fears that too much liberalization will allow one group to dominate the other has justified the often heavy-handed role of the ostensibly “neutral” state. Ironically, today’s claims of Central Asian authoritarian leaders echo those of the English liberal John Stuart Mill, who claimed that democracy is “next to impossible” in multiethnic societies and completely impossible in linguistically divided countries. Fears of conflict are thus used to justify nondemocratic practices and a “revolution from above.” The reality, of course, is that no real revolution is occurring. The preferred course has been to manage incremental change, lest a sudden transformation produce centrifugal forces. Bold reforms are deemed impolitic.

Fundamentally, what may be required is reconsideration of how the nation-state should be constructed. Prior orthodoxy was
that the failure to build a homogeneous national identity will lead to fragmentation and the ultimate collapse of the state. One nation, one state was the simple formula. Today’s world, however, is far more complex. In Central Asia, pluralism and multiple layers of identity reign. Campaigns to (re)create the nation are problematic. The solution may be to accept and manage pluralism, and some hope for the emergence of “unity in diversity” within Central Asian states.\textsuperscript{111}

This will be an elusive goal, but there is material from which this can be woven in Central Asia. The region does have a rich history of multi-culturalism and multi-lingualism, a fact recognized by past figures such as Abay Kunanbaev as well as in more contemporary treatments. There was no nation-state in the modern sense in Central Asia. Local khanates were not formed strictly from one ethnic community, and ethnic criteria were not a prime consideration in the formation of a ruling elite. If this history can be resurrected and built upon by nation-builders in the region, one would have greater reason to be optimistic about the future of these troubled states.

Notes

\textsuperscript{1} Robert Jackman argues that state power is often a function of age and legitimacy, and the latter element may depend crucially upon strong feelings of nationalism, particularly when more instrumental means are not available. Thus, for Central Asian states, lacking longevity and instrumental means (i.e. economic growth) to legitimate themselves, the cultivation of nationalism or affective feelings for the state is a central task. See Robert Jackman, Power Without Force (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).


\textsuperscript{4} See Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in

5 An exception is Huntington, Political Order, who uses him as an example of the successful "Fabian" reformer. An earlier work, completed during the time that political development was more in vogue among students of comparative politics, also pointed to the success of the Turkish case. See Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).

6 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1968).


8 Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey’s Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States," in Middle East Journal Vol. 47, No. 4 (Autumn 1993), p. 595. See also Gareth Winrow, Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1995). Indicative is a statement made by the Kyrgyz foreign minister to her Turkish counterpart, "When we got our independence, you gave us inspiration. Turkey was our horizon. When we looked at Turkey, we thought we would one day be like you. (But now) What has happened to you?" International Herald Tribune, 14 June 1996, p. 1.

9 This is not to say that Turkey is a liberal democracy. It still has a long way to go, in particular on questions of human rights and freedom of speech. However, in most respects it is far more democratic than states in Central Asia.


11 Hurriyet, 6 March 1997, p. 33.

12 For more on this, see Gleason, "Indigenous Democracy." This long-
held observation has been confirmed not only by public opinion surveys in the post-Soviet period, but also, perhaps more significantly, by surveys of local elites conducted by the Democracy and Local Governance project. In fact, local leaders in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan rank as the least democratic of 41 countries studied by this international research project. These data, for which I must thank Henry Teune, will be discussed later in the text. The classic source for "Oriental despotism" based on the needs of a "hydraulic society," can be found in Karl Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1957).

13 This characterization obviously would apply better to those living in rural areas, since those living in the cities have partially adopted more "modern" values. However, because the majority of Central Asian peoples continue to live in rural areas or are recent migrants to the cities, these mores continue to exert a strong influence.


16 This follows the pattern of other "late developers." The classic reference for this phenomenon is Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962).

17 Data from 1994 show that only in Kazakhstan did the majority (59.3 per cent) reside in urban areas. The urban populations elsewhere were 41.2 per cent for Uzbekistan, 44.9 per cent for Turkmenistan, 38.8 per cent for Kyrgyzstan, and 32.2 per cent for Tajikistan. Data from *World Bank Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1996), p. 175.


21 This is most clearly expressed in his work Words of Edification (Slovo nazudaniia).

22 Even President Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, one of the more "liberal" of the leaders, acknowledged that the main variable in the strategy of economic transformation must be to strengthen the role of state in order to make necessary, strategic decisions. President Karimov of Uzbekistan echoes these sentiments, arguing that the state must be the main reformer and not surrender the levers of power. (Koychuev, Postsovetskaia tsentral'naia aziia, pp. 9-10.).

23 For more on relations between rulers and ruled in Ottoman Turkey, see Frank Tachau, "The Political Culture of Kemalist Turkey," in Landau, ed., Atatürk, pp. 61-62.

24 The presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan all formerly ran the republic-level communist party organizations. The current president of Tajikistan is unabashedly a former communist official. Only in Kyrgyzstan has there been real turnover at the very top. On lower levels, there has been change in faces (as locals replace ethnic Russian officials), but less change of substance.


26 See Yasutami Shimomura, "The Experiences of Transitional Economies in East Asia: Implications for Central Asia," in Rumer, Central Asia in Transition. This volume is actually part of a larger project, "Implementing a Market Economy in Central Asia: Implications from the East Asian Experience," directed by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.


28 Central Asians are prone to point to human capital as a source of
comparative advantage, citing high literacy as well as some familiarity with the basic requirements of a modern economy. More telling has been the flight of qualified specialists (predominantly Russian) from the region, and anecdotal evidence from those working in the region that people in Central Asia often lack the basic skills necessary to build and maintain a market economy.

29 Of course, so did China. The difference is that breaking up collective farms and supporting a class of independent farmers has proven to be impossible in the former Soviet Union, due to political obstacles as well as a shortage of resources for would-be farmers. Launching a Chinese-style agriculture-first reform would be very difficult, and in fact agricultural reform has been given a rather low priority throughout the region.

30 The one exception might be Taiwan, on which the Nationalist forces from the mainland had to construct myths (as well as transplant a political system) in order to legitimate themselves as the "true" China.

31 Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), p. 82. The Decembrists were a group of military officers who pushed for creation of a Russian constitution in 1825.


33 For more on the importance of energy resources and the on-going "pipeline politics" of the region, see Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).


36 As anyone who has traveled in Turkey outside of the major cities or wandered through the urban shanty towns can testify, however, Turkey is still far from being a completely "modern" country on par with
those in Western Europe.

37 It is worth mentioning that this is not, formally at any rate, an ethnic definition of the nation. All people residing in Turkey were deemed “Turks.” However, this did not preclude policies of Turkification to ensure that all people in Turkey were in fact connected by a common language, culture, and idea.


40 As an aside, one could think of this as something akin to policy cycling/coalition formation often found in spatial models of political bargaining.

41 Huntington, *Political Order*, pp. 140-147.


43 Huntington, *Political Order*, p. 376.


46 This point is made by Zürcher, *Turkey*, and also by S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Kemalist Regime and Modernization: Some Comparative and Analytical Remarks,” in Landau, ed., *Atatürk*, p. 15.


48 This is emphasized by Dumont, “Origins.”

49 One must recognize, of course, that conditions do vary from state to state. Any endorsement of a “model” for all of Central Asia that ignores the differences among the states would be problematic. In order to address this concern, I will supplement a discussion of general features with examination of salient characteristics of individual states.
In this respect, one can see that Turkish nationality is analogous to French nationality: you can "become" Turkish, at least officially. This is in contrast, for example, with definitions of the German nation, into which one is born.


An excellent study of the emergence of nationalism in Central Asia is James Critchlow, *Nationalism in Uzbekistan: A Soviet Republic's Road to Sovereignty* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991). In this work, great stress is laid upon efforts to prevent Russification and promote the use of the Uzbek language.

Such was the case in the Baltic states, where language requirements were stipulated in citizenship laws.

For example, Russian is the recognized language of inter-ethnic communication in Kazakhstan, and in March 1996 in Kyrgyzstan Russian was eventually raised to equal status with Kyrgyz. In addition, there are plans for a "Slavic" university in Bishkek.

According to Russian data, from 1990-94 612,181 people emigrated from Kazakhstan, 394,063 from Uzbekistan, 229,345 from Tajikistan, 231,944 from Kyrgyzstan, and 45,791 from Turkmenistan. Of these, about 70 per cent are ethnic Russians. See Cythnia Buckley, "Exodus? Out-Migration from the Central Asian Successor States to the Russian Federation" in *Central Asia Monitor* No. 3 (1996), pp. 16-22. These numbers may capture only a fraction of the total. For example, Kazakhstan sources report a total of 973,300 emigrants—almost 6 per cent of the population—from 1990-1994. See Stanislav Zhukov, "Economic Development in the States of Central Asia," in Rumer, ed., *Central Asia in Transition*, p. 113.


For example, in a survey of 1,500 Kazakh citizens conducted in July 1995 by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 71 per cent of the total population (84 per cent of Kazakhs, 60 per cent of Russians) believe that relations among national groups will remain stable for a long time. Similar data can be found in earlier surveys in which small minorities (under 3 per cent) classify relations as tense or conflictual and growing numbers express tolerant and inter-group trust. I thank Gwenn Hofmann for providing me access to the IFES data. Other surveys are reported by Berk Abdygaliev, "Russkie v Kazakhstane: Problemy, mify, i real'nost'." *Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo* Vol. 1, No. 2 (1995), pp. 73-80, and Ainur Elebaeva, *Razvitii mezhetnicheskikh otnosheniy v novykh nezavisimyh gosudarstvakh Tsentr'al'noy Azii* (Bishkek: Ilim, 1995), p. 238.


For more on this notion, see T. Kouchuev and A. Brudny, *Nezavisimy Kyrgyzstan: tretii put'* (Bishkek: Ilim, 1993).

Russian settlement of Kazakh lands began in the 18th century, and was stepped up in the 19th century and during Khrushchev's "Virgin Lands" Project. In contrast, Russians formally conquered many of the "Uzbek" khanates in the late 19th century: Tashkent fell in 1865, Bukhara in 1868, Khiva in 1873, and Khokand in 1876. Reflecting the fact that these lands were not heavily Russified, Uzbek lands were the center of activity to form an independent "Turkestan" after the Bolshevik Revolution.

It is worth noting that because of the significant Uzbek minorities in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, celebrations of Uzbek greatness make others in Central Asia rather uneasy.


See a series of articles devoted to his social and political writings in *Mysl'*(Alma-Aty), No. 7 (1995).
The two surveys are those by IFES in Kazakhstan and one conducted by Info-Rex Ltd. of Bishkek, a sociological-marketing research group, in Bishkek. I thank Vladislav Pototsky for providing me with some data from the Krygyz survey (n= 1000).

This notion was frequently conveyed to the author in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during a research trip there in the summer of 1996.

Some results are reported in Martha Brill Olcott, "Demographic Upheavals in Central Asia," Orbis, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Fall 1996), pp. 546-547. The sample size was 86 (56 Russians) in Uzbekistan and 102 (72 Russians) in Kazakhstan. The source for more data is Nadezhda Lebedeva, Novaia Russkaia diaspora (Moscow: Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 1995).

Zürcher, Turkey.

Gleason, "Indigenous Democracy."

Ibid.

The day after the referendum, Uzbek Radio boasted that the entire nation "unanimously" voted to extend Karimov's term. This was done days before the official results were announced.

His most recent political treatise is entitled Stability and Reform. It argues that strong executive authority is a prerequisite to any successful reform.

In December 1994, all 50 candidates for the 50 seats in the Magilis were elected with 76 per cent to 100 per cent of the vote. Turnout was 99.8 per cent, according to official figures. Opposition was forbidden. This election was perhaps the most "Soviet" of all post-Soviet elections.

Periodic demonstrations protesting the lack of food supplies have broken out, but they have been quickly and forcibly handled by the police.

For a more critical assessment of Niyazov’s strategy, see the interview with former foreign minister Avdy Kuliev in *Transition* (Prague), 17 May 1996, pp. 34-38.


For more on the rather negative reaction of Akayev to the new parliament, see Ian Pryde, “Kyrgyzstan’s slow progress to reform,” in *The World Today*, Vol. 51, No. 6 (June 1995), pp. 115-118.


This section borrows heavily from Zürcher, *Turkey*, pp. 203-208.


According to 1995 data, the industrial workforce dropped from 27.9 per cent of the total to 20.8 per cent, whereas agricultural employment grew to 42.7 per cent of the workforce. Industrial output is at 55.3 per cent of 1989 figures. These are reported in Turar Koichuev, “Kyrgyzstan: Economic Crisis and Transition Strategy,” in *Rumer*, ed., *Central Asia in Transition*, pp. 168-170.

Ibid. It might be noted that the problems may not be inherent with privatization *per se*, but rather in the lack of a firm legal basis for it as well as influence and corruption from the old *nomenklatura*. However, given the state of Central Asia today, these must be factored into any
economic strategy.


91 World Bank data reveal that about 25 per cent of the GDP is produced in the private sector (World Development Report, p. 15).


93 Zhukov, “Economic Development,” p. 107. By contrast, industrial and agricultural decline in Kazakhstan was 47 per cent and 20 per cent (respectively) and 59 per cent and 27 per cent in Kyrgyzstan.


96 This notion has been developed at length by Jagwida Staniszkis, Dynamics of Breakthrough in Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).


98 Yuri Kulchik, “Central Asia After the Empire.”

99 According to the World Bank, by the end of 1995 the largest site of foreign direct investment was Kazakhstan with $719 million, or less than 4 per cent of 1994 GDP (World Development Report, p. 64). Thus far, the overall impact of foreign investment has been small, although billions are expected to roll in to exploit energy reserves. The $20 billion committed by Chevron to develop the Tenghiz fields in Kazakhstan is only the most copious example, although this project has hit numerous snags since the money was first pledged in 1990.

100 Roger Kangas, “How Real Are the Changes in Uzbekistan’s Human Rights Record?”, in OMRI Analytical Report, 14 October 1996.
101 Irina Zvigelskaia, _The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia_ (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1995).


104 This problem was suggested to me by Larry Diamond. I hope that my answer will suffice.


106 Of course, Russian emigration and high Central Asian birthrates could drastically change this demographic picture in a couple of decades.

107 Kulchik, “Central Asia After the Empire.”

108 Ibid.

109 The Latin script has been officially adopted in Turkmenistan, and a gradual transition is planned in Uzbekistan.

110 John Stuart Mill, _Considerations on Representative Government_ (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958 [1861]).

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