The Repluralization of Slovenia in the 1980s: New Revelations from Archival Records

Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj, et al.
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With an Introduction by Dennison Rusinow

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Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor
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Preface

The papers collected here cast new light on the repluralization of Slovene society in the decade between the death of Josip Broz Tito and the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia. They also fill a lacuna in English-language literature about the Republic of Slovenia.

I am grateful to Dennison and Mary Rusinow for copy-editing the papers assembled here and to Sabrina Ramet for encouraging me to put together this monograph.

Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj
Washington, D.C.
Introduction

Dennison Rusinow

Until shortly before the peoples of East Central and southeastern Europe began the rush toward western-style democracy, a market economy, and "rejoining Europe" made possible by the collapse of Communist regimes in 1989-90, Yugoslavia seemed a sure bet to lead the pack. Titoist Yugoslavia's independence of Soviet constraints and consequent freedom to experiment with "market socialism," "self-management," and controlled political quasi-pluralism within a one-party framework, however limited and often aborted or at best marginally successful, had created a legacy of comparative advantages which seemed to augur for a quicker and less painful "transition" than any other "post-communist" country could hope for.

These comparative advantages included enterprise managers and workers with more and longer experience with competitive domestic and international markets for goods and services (and to more limited degree for capital and labor) and literally millions of Yugoslav executives, members of technical and humanist elites, and Gastarbeiter with often extensive exposure to and experience with "western" ways of doing things. Many non-communists as well as communists had also become acquainted with the uses and abuses of quasi-democratic and quasi-competitive politics, "elite competition," and what some (especially in Slovenia) were learning to call "civil society," all of which Yugoslavia's comparatively relaxed communist mentors periodically tolerated and in some years and places even encouraged. These advantages tended to be most pronounced in regions and urban cultural and economic centers, especially but not exclusively in the formerly Habsburg north (Slovenia and Croatia), which had brought similar head-starts with them into Yugoslavia.

With one exception - the Slovenes - the nations of Yugoslavia squandered these advantages, and much more, in the civil wars and other (mostly related) misfortunes which accompanied and followed the disintegration of their common state. Slovenes, in particular several of the pre-1990 opposition and 1990-1991 government leaders who played prominent roles in the developments analyzed in this Treadgold Paper, had been the first and most determined of the non-Serb Yugoslavs who took the exit road, some eagerly and others reluctantly, to escape Slobodan Milošević's efforts to impose his own and Serb control over a re-centralized and Communist-ruled Yugoslavia. But Slovene political and military tactical skills and good luck permit-
ted Slovenia to escape almost unscathed (its ten-day "war of indepen-
dence" in June-July 1991 inflicted little damage and few casualties).

The Slovenes' top-of-the-scale legacy of Tito- and Habsburg-
era comparative advantages were thus intact and usable for the kind
of relatively speedy, painless, and successful "transition" to "Euro-
pean" political, economic, and social systems and memberships which
their other former compatriots were forfeiting in civil wars and col-
lateral political, economic, and social damage. Moreover, during the
late 1980s a specifically Slovene coalition of liberal communists and
"opposition" leaders, building on these historic advantages, in effect
"jump-started" Slovenia's transition. These developments and some
of their consequences are the subject of this Treadgold Paper.

Utilizing newly available archival and other sources, includ-
ing recently opened Party archives, the authors explore three over-
lapping dimensions of Slovenia's road to "parallel" cultural and po-
litical universes and toward political pluralism in the 1980s and 1990,
to independence in 1991, and toward the "return to Europe" that is
still a work-in-progress.

All three stories begin with Slovene responses to the retreat
from the liberalizing economic, political, and cultural reforms of the
1960s which began with Tito's elimination of "nationalist" and/or
"liberal" regional party leaderships in 1971-1972, heralding "the so-
called 'leaden' 70s" (see Gabrič's discussion) with their renewal of
widespread repression of "dissident" views and activities.

In a central thread running through all three narratives, the
authors describe four specifically Slovene factors driving Slovene de-
velopments and their outcomes in the following decade. The first con-
sists of the increasingly deviant (more permissive and eventually even
pro-actively liberal) policies, actions, and deliberate inaction (e.g., fail-
ing to prosecute for "verbal delicts") of the League of Communists of
Slovenia (LCS) in the 1980s. The second consists of the increasingly
political activities and aims of "oppositional" and initially "anti-po-
litical" elites which both induced and exploited these changes in Com-
munist self-confidence, convictions, and policies. The third is a pecu-
liarily Slovene conflictual/cooperative relationship between party and
non- or anti-party elites with overlapping and sometimes inter-change-
able memberships and a multitude of the familial, school, and profes-
sional links characteristic of elites in numerically small and both liter-
ally and figuratively interbred communities.

Underlying and eventually overriding all of these is the acute
and historic sensitivity of almost all Slovenes to anything perceived
as a threat to their cultural and national identity. This individual and
collective concern and determination "to preserve their national identity," as Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj notes in this volume, is what led them into Yugoslavia in 1918 and again during the second World War, when the threat was perceived as German and Italian. It was also what led them out of Yugoslavia in 1986-91, when the threat was perceived as coming from first Yugoslav and then nationalist and hegemonic Serb re-centralizing and implicitly assimilationist forces.

Aleš Gabrič's theme is the transformation of "cultural activities", initially limited to "pushing the envelope" of cultural freedom in a gradually and inconsistently more permissive Slovene political environment in the early 1980s, into directly and openly "political activities" by 1987-1988, where his narrative ends (and is carried on by Božo Repe's previously parallel account of the emergence of political pluralism). His principal actors are writers (after initial resistance by the "older generation" particularly in the Slovene Writers Association), film-makers, other "cultural circles", and members of an emerging "youth subculture" represented by rock and punk groups and the controversial Laibach and Neue Slowenische Kunst group. The dynamics of the transformation he describes were also and increasingly in response to contrary developments in other parts of Yugoslavia - at first especially in Croatia and later primarily in Serbia - during which "cultural workers" from different republics continued to talk but decreasingly to listen to each other.

There is a striking correspondence between the "time line" of significant developments and many protagonists in Gabrič's account of "cultural activities" becoming "political activities" and in Repe's account of transformations in the political landscape. Both are describing how (in Gabrič's words) "[t]he 'Opposition' [as defined by the regime at the beginning of the decade] became a true opposition" by 1987. For both authors the crucial events of the 1980-1987 period, which also brought their respective dramatis personae together, were the founding of the "opposition" journal Nova revija in 1982, its famous 57th issue (February 1987), and debates over proposed amendments to the Slovene constitution (with a now thoroughly "politcized" Slovene Writers Association playing a major role in drafting "alternative" amendments) in 1987-1988.

Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj's contribution is a brilliant case study of a previously unresearched instance, intrinsically important and bound to have wider repercussions because it concerns the hyper-sensitive field of education and the transmission of language and culture, of growing Slovene frustration with and alienation from membership in the Yugoslav federation they ultimately rejected in its entirety.
Contesting the view that Slovenes were continuously if not congenitally uncooperative in federal matters, her meticulously researched analysis of Slovene participation in nearly a decade of debates over a proposed Yugoslav-wide "core curriculum" for primary and secondary schools, repeatedly discussed and re-drafted from 1979 to 1987, is a tale of perpetually ignored or outvoted Slovene pedagogical as well as "national" (linguistic and cultural) concerns and proposals. Agreeing that there was a genuine need for some "coordination of curricula" throughout the country, for practical reasons, Slovene participants objected to the detailed prescriptions (for each subject and often each course) advocated by educators and politicians in some other republics. Such "micro-management" was in their view an excessive and unnecessary infringement of each republic's constitutionally anchored right to determine its own educational system, including curricula, and of the historic as well as "national" peculiarities of each region's educational regimes and needs.

Partly accepted and adopted in Serbia in 1987, the proposed core curriculum was ultimately ignored in Slovenia, by then increasingly taking its own road. As Plut-Pregelj concludes: "Although the core curriculum was not implemented in Slovenia, discussions, which were not always civil, diminished the trust of the Slovenes in a possible development of a democratic, multicultural Yugoslavia, and certainly affected their will to cooperate."

Božo Repe examines the evolution of Slovenia's political landscape from "no noticeable opposition movements...in the early 1980s" through "alternative [social] movements" to the emergence of political but ostensibly non-party "Associations" (Zveze) and then of opposition political parties when these were legalized in late 1989. His narrative continues with the formation and victories of the "Demos" coalition that won the multi-party elections of April 1990, formed Slovenia's first post-communist government, and led the country to independence in 1991. His analysis of developments and their dynamics to 1988, where the other authors end their narratives, parallels and at times incorporates their findings and conclusions. It is in effect, and significantly, a summary of how dissent ("the 'Opposition'") among cultural and educational as well as political elites became a "true [and in 1990-91 triumphant] opposition."

Four points or arguments in Repe's contribution seem to this reader to merit particular attention for their often overlooked importance in the story he is telling.

The first is his point that attempts to introduce "political parallelism" in the early 1980s "meant that social issues began to be dealt
with 'outside the established forms and options provided by our social system.' The phrase Repe quotes here, a traditional Communist obfuscation and euphemism meaning outside authorized Party and Party-controlled forums, always and rightly represented the ultimate sin in Yugoslav Party establishment eyes because it constituted a vital threat to its monopoly of power. Grudging but growing toleration of such "political parallelism" by the LCS leadership, itself undergoing important personnel changes and loss of confidence in its right to rule because of its "correct" ideology, can be seen as the real beginning of the demise of Communist rule in Slovenia.

The second is Repe's view that "[w]ith the 57th issue of Nova revija the initiative was in the hands of the opposition," a contention supported by Gabrič's analysis.

The third, more implicit than explicit in Repe's text, consists of his references to the specificity of the Slovene "political class" (both Communist and non-Communist) and its relation to the "intelligentsia" in a small country, society, and elite in which all of these people tend to have more or less intimate knowledge of and relationships with one another. This was clearly of special importance in often successful efforts by all parties to co-opt one another in the political battles of the 1980s - and since.

The fourth is his description of the special influence that the Slovene Democratic Alliance (SDZ) came to have within the Demos coalition, an influence that later enabled leading members of the SDZ to control much of Demos's political agenda. This seems to have been particularly true on issues concerning the "national question," how anti-Communist Demos should be, and the desirability and timing of Slovene independence.

Both singly and especially together, the three authors of this Treadgold Paper also make an important contribution to our analysis and understanding of Slovenia's place and role in Yugoslav developments in the 1980s and Yugoslavia's disintegration in 1991. They similarly contribute to our understanding of why Slovene developments since independence have taken the direction they have: relatively rapid and successful "transition" into a "normal" country and society - with "normal" usually meaning like western European politics, economics, and society and thus including disquieting as well as laudable dimensions.
Chapter 1: Cultural Activities as Political Action

Aleš Gabrič

The regime in Yugoslavia differed from all other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in that, after the break with the Cominform, it showed a far greater degree of political tolerance towards dissenting citizens. Intellectuals in particular enjoyed the privilege of being allowed to express their views more openly on various issues than the average citizen. However, not all intellectuals enjoyed the same privileges. The intelligentsia in Slovenia/Yugoslavia who, unlike their colleagues in other Eastern European Communist states, had the possibility of voicing a more critical view of the communist reality, were often labeled “the opposition” by those in power. However, we must bear in mind that this “opposition” cannot be equated with the political opposition in multi-party systems.

In January 1979, one year before Tito’s death, the leadership of the League of Communists of Slovenia assessed the national security situation in Slovenia as favorable and stable. The elements listed as opposition forces included various groups of intellectuals. At the top of the list of threats to Yugoslavia were propaganda centers abroad and the institutions of foreign countries in Yugoslavia. Among Catholic intellectuals, the government kept a particularly wary eye on the circle of Christian socialists gathered around Edvard Kocbek - an ally of the Slovene Communist Party during the war whom the communists had removed from the political scene during a carefully directed political scandal in 1952. A number of scientists and in particular philosophers and social scientists at the University of Ljubljana were also labelled by the authorities as having distinct “anarcho-liberal and nihilist” tendencies. Although many of these experts had already been removed from the university during the political purges of several years earlier, the leading communists continued to keep a wary eye on them, as they were well aware of the great influence these people could have in shaping public opinion. The student movement, which grew in strength in Slovenia after 1968 as in the rest of Europe, was accused by the authorities of being ultra-leftist. In addition to their own newspapers, the students even founded their own radio station in 1969. However, the government soon cracked down on the more liberal faction of the League of Communists of Slovenia (in the early 70s), followed swiftly by “a settling of accounts” with the technical intelligen-
tsia which supported the liberal faction's concept of liberalizing the economy. The government referred to this group of the intelligentsia as the "techno-liberals."

State and party leaders in Yugoslavia opted for several methods in the fight against the criticism by the intellectuals - including repression. The simplest of these was legal intervention on the grounds of alleged anti-state propaganda and publication of false statements with the intent of causing "civil dissent and unrest." Shrouded in obfuscating legalese which could be interpreted in any number of ways, giving the state authorities considerable scope for intervention, was the legal concept of "verbal delict," which made it possible for people to be prosecuted merely on the grounds that they had uttered or written thoughts considered by the communist oligarchy in power as a threat to its rule. The special prohibition of imports of foreign literature and books also made it necessary for importers to obtain special government permits for all shipments of books and literature from abroad. The state apparatus was particularly meticulous in demanding (or refusing) the appropriate permits for Slovene literature published abroad by post-war political émigrés.

Through such legislation, the authorities attempted to prevent the spread of reports of unflattering incidents, and to stifle all mention of the privileges of the leading communist elite and revelations of a number of crimes committed by the communist leadership in its struggle for power, such as the extrajudicial mass killings of quislings and civilians in 1945 and the staged show trials conducted in Stalinist fashion during subsequent years, the purpose of which was to eliminate all political opposition. At the same time as introducing taboos, the political authorities took pains to prevent the disclosure of their well-kept secrets. Seen as "hostile, anti-state propaganda," several issues of various magazines were banned, confiscated, and destroyed, as were also a number of Slovene books published abroad. In the so-called "leaden" 70s, various writers, authors of works deemed "hostile," were also tried and convicted in court. The government was by no means ready yet to tolerate debate on taboo issues, opting instead for repressive methods as a more reliable way of settling scores with individuals whose opinions differed from the official Party line.

In opposition to all "wrong" tendencies in the area of culture, the League of Communists of Slovenia (LCS) established its own concept by which it purported to speak on behalf of the working class: the revolutionary achievements of the past were bandied about, along with their obsolete principles. The guidelines, which cultural creators were also expected to follow, emphasized the importance of Marxist think-
ing, and in effect encouraged artists whose aim was to satisfy the cultural needs of the masses. Priority in cultural funding was given to "progressive," "socialist" currents, a fact which was also reflected in the non-egalitarian policies of publishers and the programming policies of cultural institutions, which favored works which were to the ruling party's tastes.²

Despite paying lip-service to progress, the communist leaders did not approve of newly developing cultural phenomena - and especially not the youth subculture which began to emerge at the start of the sixties, or rock-and-roll and the punk movement that followed it. The gap between the authorities' official cultural policy and the situation on the ground continued to grow, while the communists stubbornly persisted in basing their assessment of the arts on political criteria. The attitude adopted by the LCS towards new cultural trends in general and towards the young generation in particular was not as obvious from the official assessments by communist ideologists as it was from the actions of the police, the banning of events, festivals and concerts, and ideological criticism in the media.³

This brought about the evolution of two parallel cultural currents or scenes at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s - often in opposition to each other, with the official cultural policy enjoying the full support and financial backing of the authorities, stuck in the past and in outmoded cultural and conceptual criteria. The lack of new ideas became increasingly obvious every year. The views of the ruling communists remained as though time had stood still since 1945.

This became strikingly evident on Slovenian Cultural Day on 8 February 1978, when, after a break of thirty-three years, a plenary session of cultural workers of the National Liberation Front was held for the first time since 1945. The plenary session then met annually, but discussions at these meetings were usually restricted to the times and people of earlier decades. Even those speakers and topics who managed to move beyond the events of 1945 cautiously steered clear of allusions to current events, avoiding drawing parallels with the crises in national awareness, politics, and culture developing throughout the nation in the first half of the 1980s. Speakers under fifty were more of an exception than a rule at these meetings. The conclusions reached in these debates on culture were still riddled with worn-out assessments of the great role played by the national liberation war and communism in the development of Slovene culture. As a result, the plenary sessions failed every time to establish a bridge between the different generations of Slovene cultural workers, even though this had been one of their main tendencies upon their revival in 1978.⁴
The double standards applied by the ruling party in its treatment of cultural issues were apparent in all branches of the arts. One striking example is provided by the production of two films - both with a wartime setting. In 1976, preparations began for the production of the film and television series *Dražgoška bitka* (*The Battle of Dražgoše*) - a depiction of the first major battle between the Slovene partisans and the German occupying forces in 1941. Filming did not progress at all according to expectations, since all the major production-related decisions were being made mainly by political circles, which pointedly bypassed all the cultural institutions. In this way, millions of dinars were squandered even before the project got off the ground, and less than a third of the scenes had been filmed by 1980 (a whole four years later). Despite the obviously ravenous appetites of the project, one of the older politicians still insisted that additional funding should be found and the project completed. The majority of public opinion, however, was for bringing the project to a close. The cultural community voiced its severe criticism of this and other, similarly grandiose "political" projects; yet despite calls for an investigation of the matter by the financial inspectorate, no inquiry was ever held.

On the other hand, politicians caused an uproar over another film set in Partisan times, which was screened in 1980. The movie *Nasvidenje v naslednji vojni* (*See You in the Next War*) was based on a book by Vitomil Zupan, who had already spent seven years in prison as a prisoner of conscience. The life of the Partisans in this film was not portrayed as one long, unrealistic heroic epic, but as a much more intimate and complex meeting and interplay of various different (and very human) characters and their fates. The film was criticized heavily by the party leadership, who argued that it was a case of artistic distortion of historical facts.

In the same way that the "celebrated" film *The Battle of Dražgoše* was produced, numerous other similarly grand cultural projects were planned by ageing politicians, who viewed them all as vehicles for propagating their own political principles. Events in them were limited to the time before 1945, with a special focus on the leading role of the Communist Party within the workers' movement and the revolutionary unrest in Yugoslavia before the Second World War, or the resistance to the occupying forces during the War offered by the Partisans. To this end, several lengthy television documentaries were planned, along with other projects, such as the construction of a brand new Museum of the People's Revolution (Muzej ljudske revolucije) in the southern district of Slovenia's capital, Ljubljana,7 which, however, was never realized.
In parallel to these developments, but removed from mainstream culture and out of sight of the ruling party, various cultural and political activities flourished, and the creativity of numerous young and several not-so-young artists and scientists gained fresh momentum after the death of the two leading communists: Slovenia's leading ideologist and Marxist theoretician, Edvard Kardelj, died on 10 February 1979, followed a year later, on 4 May 1980, by the great Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito. In June 1980, a month after Tito's death, an initiative was prepared for the establishment of a new magazine. This document was signed mostly by writers, poets, and professors of the humanities and social sciences at the University of Ljubljana. These included people who had been subjected to the close scrutiny of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or who had even been imprisoned because of their beliefs, as well as those who had been forced to leave their positions as professors as a result of political purges.

The signers of this document communicated their initiative to all the authorities and political bodies whose approval was required for the publication of the magazine and who would have provided government subsidies for it. The signers argued that there was a need for a new magazine due to the years of stagnation in the media space taken up by the majority of the existing magazines. Nor can there be discussion or debate among them: they do not differ from each other. Indeed, how could they, since, despite external appearances, there is little difference among the few that are on the market.⁸

According to the signers, other magazines (which did not fit into the above category) were based on far too narrow a concept and failed to touch upon a broader spectrum of issues - even though many of the signers were themselves on the staffs of some of the leading cultural magazines at the time. The signers also emphasized that conditions left little scope for magazines and other publications to adopt a broader outlook, and that the publication of the new magazine called for "a more liberal interchange and flow of cultural-political, ideological and aesthetic viewpoints," as the events of the past years had led to a suppression of culture:

The question at hand was this: how is it that despite our deliberately apolitical stance (which, however, by no means excluded standing up for social issues and
commitment) and an explicit non-ideological approach, it not only was impossible for us to avoid ideological pressure, but we were moreover often the primary target for political and ideological imputations and disqualifications; not to mention concrete examples in which the printing of our magazine and public appearances of its staff were prohibited outright.⁹

The initiative to establish this new magazine, which was to bring together numerous intellectuals (all proven critics of the social and political situation), did not receive a favorable response from the government. A series of debates took place in various forums, where the pros and cons of the new magazine were repeatedly argued. Most active in the drive to get the magazine started were the poet Niko Grasenauer, the philosopher Tine Hriber, and the sociologist Dimitrij Rupel. It must also be mentioned that the initiative was supported by the basic organization of the LCS at the Slovenian Writers’ Association and that the signers included several members of the LCS, who defended their viewpoint successfully enough in official forums. Yet the politicians who disapproved of the “opposition” alignment of the magazine’s founders nevertheless failed to prevent its being officially established.¹⁰

The ruling circles maintained that there were already enough magazines in circulation in Slovenia, which provided scope enough for anyone looking for a new magazine. Naturally, they failed to mention that the majorities in the editorial boards and publisher’s councils, the committees which had the final say on publication in these magazines, consisted of people who shunned severe criticism of the existing social system and who, backed by the legal provisions governing all printed matter at the time, often acted as censors. When the authorities finally accepted the idea of the new magazine, they attempted to force it to accept a committee and editorial board in which the prime movers behind the idea of founding the magazine would be in the minority, and the majority of votes would be held by representatives of the ruling political organizations, while the second proposal put forward by the authorities, in which the representatives of the ruling political organizations and the other members in these bodies would have equal representation (a 50:50 ratio), contained a provision on the right of veto.

In response, the initiators argued that it was precisely due to the existence of numerous magazines with such decision-making prin-
ciples that they wished to establish a new one. The long debates which ensued inadvertently gave birth to the magazine’s name: as the debate about the “new review” (nova revija) had gone on for over a year, its founders decided to call it just that. In an attempt to “punish” the founders, the authorities shortly before publication reduced the subsidies allocated to the magazine to far below the level of their competitors’. In addition, Dimitrij Rupel, one of the magazine’s strongest advocates, was not approved as editor-in-chief at the official founding assembly on the grounds that he had behaved undemocratically and evinced a lack of tolerance towards all those who disagreed with him during the process of the magazine’s founding. The first issue of Nova revija was published in May 1982. Its editor-in-chief was Tine Hribar, followed in 1984 by Niko Grafenauer and Dimitrij Rupel. The first issues confirmed the authorities’ worst fears, as the magazine’s staff opened up debate on issues which had until then been shrouded in silence, as well as conducted a policy of publishing articles which other publications refused to print. In doing so, they followed the tradition of the magazines prohibited in the 1950s and 1960s, making it a point to make the magazine even more vocal in its criticism than the predecessors it quoted.

From the very first issue on, Nova revija plunged into debates on the realities of the socialist system, and although it had “a monthly on culture” as a subtitle, it never ceased to address the most topical political and national issues. Among the topics researched by its staff were the role of the Communist Party during and after Second World War, and the way in which it dealt with the opposition. Initially, their stance was based on the statements made by Edvard Kocbek and Dušan Pirjevec, both of whom were still members of the ruling echelon in 1945 (the first as a Christian Socialist, the second as a Communist), but they distanced themselves from this soon after. In 1985, Nova revija brought the case of Stane Kavčič out into the open (Kavčič had been forced to resign as President of the Slovenian Government in 1972) and also saw to the (unofficial) rehabilitation of numerous Slovenes whose cultural contributions had been passed over by the official party line. In their talks with cultural workers who had spent time in communist prisons on account of their beliefs and whose works had been banned, the criticism was always aimed at achieving greater freedom of speech and of the press.

Although a great novelty, Nova revija was not alone in its field. The years following Tito’s death saw an avalanche of nation-wide criticism in cultural works. Authors began to speak openly of the days of Yugoslav Stalinism and the darkest chapters of the Communist reign
which had been off limits until Tito’s death, including anything to do with Goli otok, the largest concentration camp in Yugoslavia. Goli otok was an island on which those branded by the authorities as “Cominformists” and pro-Soviet sympathizers were imprisoned after Yugoslavia’s break with the Soviet Union. Many suffered gruesome torture at the hands of their jailers. Social scientists focused their criticism on the mistakes made by the guards, in particular the political monopoly held by one ideology, which hindered the free exchange of thoughts and ideas, and which they considered to be the main cause of the general crisis engulfing the country.¹¹

Two novels received particularly good reception in Slovenia. The effect that the changing cultural and political conditions had on the publication of books is nicely illustrated by the difficulties encountered by Branko Hofman when he attempted to publish his novel Noč do jutra (The Night Until the Morning). The book, which broached the taboo subject of Goli otok, had already been printed in November 1975 by one of Slovenia’s most prestigious publishing houses, Slovenska Matica. Just before it was bound, the entire print run was taken off the presses without so much as a prior formal prohibition. This was the beginning of a struggle lasting several years by the publishing house to complete the work it had begun. It was not until 1979 that the publisher managed to take the next step by demanding a written explanation from the authorities as to why the work should not be printed. After lengthy negotiations, Hofman’s novel finally came off the press in autumn 1981, and for the first time Slovenes were able to read about the horrors inflicted upon innocent people in a book published on the Slovene side of the border. As usual in such cases, the book sold out immediately, and the first edition was soon followed by a second.¹²

The second taboo topic, the Stalinist trials held in Slovenia, was broached in the novel Umiranje na obroke (Dying in Installments) by Igor Torkar, who had himself been convicted in 1949 at the so-called Dachau Trials. The first edition was published in 1983, but not entirely as the author had conceived it. The book was to have featured an annex, which consisted of a public opinion poll containing the question (posed by Torkar): “Do you believe that the Dachau Trials conducted in Slovenia were Stalinist?” The last pages, however, which showed the affirmative responses of thirteen highly respected Slovene cultural workers, was missing. The pages had been removed on the spot in the printing press following intervention by the State Security Service. Torkar’s novel sold out just as quickly as Hofman’s and also saw several reprints; in the third edition, the publishers were even allowed to print the controversial opinion poll.¹³
During the years in which works were produced on hitherto forbidden topics, action was also taken to enable the publication of many works of an older date which had been banned by the communist authorities in previous years. Once again, an initiative arose in Slovenia for the publication of France Balantič’s poetry collection. Although his poems contained no hint of politicizing and Balantič was regarded by literary critics as one of the most important Slovene poets of his time, his work had been prohibited by the communist authorities because he had died in the war as a collaborator. After his poems were published by Slovene political émigrés, who, ironically, used his poems for political manipulation, Balantič’s works were printed for the first time in Slovenia in 1966. Yet even before the books reached the public, the entire print run (with the exception of a few copies) was destroyed as a result of intervention by top members of the communist leadership. A new drive was launched in 1982 for Balantič’s lyric poetry to be published, and two years later the collection of works which was destroyed in 1966 saw the light of day.14

In this way, writers became some of the leading critics of the Communist order. This was also mirrored in the work of the Slovenian Writers’ Association (SWA). When Tone Pavček became chairman of the Association in February 1979, the Association began to become involved in more diverse public action and to take an interest in pressing social issues - particularly those which directly affected its members. These included the issue of Slovene nationality, equality of the Slovene language within Yugoslavia and freedom of artistic expression. The SWA also continued implementing this policy when Pavček’s younger colleague, Tone Partljič, succeeded him as chairman in 1983.

In the mid-80s the SWA went beyond being merely a professional organization and increasingly became a political actor. In 1985, a Committee for the Protection of Freedom of Thought and of the Press was founded within the framework of the SWA. The Committee, chaired by Veno Tauer, began taking positive action in response to violations of fundamental human rights and liberties.15

Although the written word is capable of expressing critical thought most accurately, social and political criticism manifested itself in all other branches of culture as well - including music. On 1 June 1980 (twenty-seven days after Tito’s death and nine days before the initiative for the founding of Nova Revija was signed) the rock group Laibach was founded in Trbovlje. Only four months later the first prohibition of the group’s concerts was issued. In 1983, Laibach joined up with the Irwin artistic collective and the Scipion Nasice Sisters Theatre, who later became the core of the Neue Slawenische Kunst (NSK) arts
collective. NSK later also founded the group Novi Kolektivizem (New Collectivism) to manage its public image in 1984. In its operation, NSK emulated model state organizations. Its members were bound by an internal code and its subgroups and departments were connected through an ideological council into a kind of convention (the NSK General Assembly).\textsuperscript{16}

The NSK, the functioning of which was reportedly based on strict collectivism, used Nazi and Communist symbols in its iconography, appeared on stage in Nazi-like uniforms and utilized violent noise and blinding lighting effects in order to make pointed allusions to totalitarian rule. Because of these features and the use of the German names Laibach and Neue Slowenische Kunst, the authorities heavily censored what it called a “Germanizing tendency” and “fascist bent,” and frequently banned the group’s performances in Slovenia. Despite this, the NSK collectives were by no means out of work, since, due to their explicitly political provocative attitude, nonconformity and unique form of creative expression, the movement was regarded abroad as the most interesting Slovene artistic act of the past few decades.

Punk also anchored itself firmly in Slovenia at the end of the 1970s, sparking strident debates at the beginning of the 1980s. For the first few years of the punk movement, the police had more dealings with it than did any of the competent ideological committees. The prohibition of the concert of the Pankrti (Bastards) group in 1977 was just the prelude to the subsequent pressure put on the punk movement. These “suspiciously” clad persons, with their punk hairstyles and image, were often the target of unprovoked police searches, interrogation, and maltreatment.\textsuperscript{17} The lyrics of the songs sung by punk groups not only often spoke critically on general social issues, but also were aimed specifically against those in power. In response, the authorities often took unpopular steps such as banning concerts and censorship, which only served to make the authorities less popular.

The reactions of the Yugoslav communist leaders to the criticism voiced by prominent figures from the world of culture differed. There was as yet no similar wave of criticism in Croatia. This was largely due to the activities of Stipe Šuvar, who at that time was Croatia’s leading cultural ideologist, and who adopted the role of defender of the “orthodox” line of thinking in cultural creativity. Šuvar compiled a list of quotes from the works of 186 authors as proof of what he termed “an atmosphere of a unique kind of bourgeois cultural counter-revolution.”\textsuperscript{18} The list was dominated by works by Slovene and Serbian authors.
Yet while heated political debates were taking place and court injunctions were being issued in Belgrade, the rest of Yugoslavia judged that Slovenia was very much in the lead as far as liberalization was concerned. Even writers from other Yugoslav republics often pointed out at the time that periodicals in Slovenia were the most open media in Yugoslavia. In 1982, the very first issue of Nova revija, for example, published translations of poems of Gojko Djogo. Djogo’s poems had appeared in 1981 in Belgrade in a collection entitled Vunena vremena (Woolly Times), which had been banned in Serbia due to the “questionable” political nature of Djogo’s poetry. In addition, an indictment was issued against Djogo by the public prosecutor’s office in Belgrade, and in the ensuing trial Djogo was sentenced to a year in prison.

The publication of Djogo’s literary works in Slovenia was no exception. Due to the greater tolerance shown towards those who differed from the official party line, the Slovene judicial system received criticism from the southern republics when the political situation escalated in 1988. These stated that the provision on verbal delicts was “applied in all other courts in the country, but not in the courtrooms of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia.” When some of Mladina’s journalists were arrested in the middle of 1988, the Serbian Writers’ Association expressed its solidarity on 9 June with the demands made by the Slovenian Writers’ Association for the release of the arrested journalists and expressed its concern over the fact that “arrests are now also occurring in your midst, which until recently was spared such incidents.”

Despite the apparently idyllic conditions in the clash between the cultural opposition and the authorities, prohibitions and political affairs were by no means rare in Slovenia. The provisions of a law dealing with acts against the state, slander of state functionaries, and similar “activities injurious to the state” were still frequently applied; as a result, the publication of numerous articles was prohibited, and several issues of various magazines were seized. The authorities kept a particularly vigilant eye on the student newspapers Tribuna and Katedra, as well as on the publication of the League of the Socialist Youth of Slovenia (LSYS), Mladina. From the moment the first issue was published, Nova revija was a target for ideological criticism and demands for legal injunctions against the publication of individual articles or issues. Yet in spite of the heated arguments by the opponents of the magazine, no legal proceedings were ever initiated against it. After a few years of relative calm, this wave of criticism from within the ranks of prominent figures in the field of culture brought about an
increase in prohibitions by the censors and a rise in confiscations. What separated Slovenia significantly from the rest of Yugoslavia, and for that matter from what was then the rest of the "Eastern world," was the legal practice in the country at the time. In Slovenia in the mid-1980s it was common for articles to be prohibited without their authors standing trial; nor was it uncommon for courts to drop charges against magazines and publications.23

The conflicts between cultural creators and the authorities had far-reaching political consequences. The so-called Nazi-Punk affair in 1981, for example, was a specific turning point for the LSYS, in which future leaders of the League of Communists were supposed to gather political experience. The affair emerged with the arrest of three young men - allegedly punks and Nazis. The accusations made by the politicians and the police against the punk movement sparked an extensive public debate on the pros and cons of the punk movement. The ruling party accused punks of being right-wing supporters of Nazism and Hitler, of drawing swastika graffiti and encouraging Nazi outbursts which manifested themselves in the form of demands for an ethnically pure Slovenia from which all the workers from the southern republics of Yugoslavia should be banished.

These accusations, construed in the minds of ruling party members and underlined by propaganda and libel, were accurate in one respect only: that the youth subculture refused to follow the path mapped out by the programs of the ideological leadership - the League of Communists. This was also the issue which the leadership of the LSYS was facing. The LSYS was forced to choose between two options: listen, as always, to the communists in power and forfeit its influence over a great percentage of the youth of Slovenia; or pay attention to the real wishes of the young and risk unfavorable developments in relations with the LCS. The functionaries of the LSYS opted for the second course of action and in favor of making the break (if only tentatively at first) with the League of Communists. The change could already be felt to a certain degree at the organization’s annual conference in 1982, when the decision was taken to support all activities popular among the young at the time. In doing so, the LSYS set no limitations and supported the expansion of the young people’s cultural horizons, placing special emphasis on the fact that the LSYS was open to punk fans too.24

The decision was a milestone in Slovenia’s political development. The LSYS had opened its doors not only to new social trends, but also to the peace movement, the environmental movement, and the feminist movement, all of which spoke in explicitly political
terms. The fact that these movements had the backing of an officially recognized political organization helped considerably to spread views on general social issues other than those propagated by the ruling party.

Luckily for the opposition, the political debates on what to do with youth newspapers and Radio Študent did not take a course which would have led to prohibition or even more repressive retaliatory measures as in the past, but focused instead on increasing the accountability of the founders of these media outlets, who, according to the laws in force at the time, were (secretly) empowered to exercise censorship.\(^{25}\)

Gradually, a new "political coalition" began to arise from the ranks of cultural circles, and the signatures of its members began appearing increasingly frequently at the bottom of statements of protest. Here I will mention only a statement aimed against the Slovene public prosecutor, who had criticized several media outlets for publishing articles containing legally questionable materials. The protest against this and similar statements by the public prosecutor was signed by representatives of all the institutions his attack had been aimed at: the Chairman of the Committee for the Protection of Freedom of Thought and of the Press (of the SWA), as well as the editors-in-chief of Nova revija, the youth newspaper Mladina, and the students' newspaper, Katedra.\(^{26}\)

In these and several other cases, the politicians did not avail themselves of the (hidden) censorship which they had utilized so assiduously only a few years previously. The feeling shared by intellectuals elsewhere in Eastern Europe that Slovenia was an oasis in this part of the world was not unfounded. Members of the judiciary in Slovenia also concluded increasingly often that the first and foremost concern of the public prosecutors and courts should be ascertaining liability in criminal matters and matters of corporate law, and that the more sensitive issues pertaining to freedom of the press would best be settled by other institutions. In their opinion, criminal courts and public prosecutors were not to be used as instruments in discussions on articles written by experts in philosophy, history, sociology, culture, and other fields, as the resolution of such issues called above all for cooperation among the experts in these fields, and not for the participation of the judiciary. Added to this was their growing conviction that various political organizations were also more competent to assess the political appropriateness of a given article than the judiciary. The democratization of the whole of Slovene society also affected the judiciary, which took an important step ahead towards democracy. In this way, the debates between the authorities and the cultural opposition gradu-
ally moved out of the courts and onto a more public platform.

Debates conducted on cultural platforms became increasingly political in the 1980s. At the beginning of the decade, writers, and artists still justified their statements with the right to artistic expression, while in the middle of the decade they began relinquishing even this form of protection. The chairman of the SWA, Tone Partlič, began his report before the general assembly of the Association on 25 February 1985 with the following words:

Please do not take offense if my introduction to the annual report on the work of our association is somewhat 'political,' as current conditions, our commitment and the cultural and political circumstances of these times call for such an approach. The politicians talk much about culture, which is why we cultural representatives are forced to speak about politics.27

The Association made further steps in a more political direction under the chairmanship of Partlič’s successor, Rudi Šeligo, who was elected to the post in March 1987. The Association organized several public debates in Slovenia’s main house of culture: the Ivan Cankar Cultural and Conference Center in Ljubljana (Cankarjev dom). The accusation aimed by the politicians at the organizers of the debates in Cankarjev dom was thus a political accusation aimed at political opponents, and no longer had anything to do with cultural (artistic, scientific, aesthetic, etc.) issues.

At the plenary session of the cultural workers of the Liberation Front, it became evident from the action taken by the delegates in response to the wave of criticism from the cultural circles that the old world was crumbling. At the fourteenth plenary session, which was held in Bled at the end of 1986, writers, artists, and scientists whose views on the role of culture and Slovenia’s recent past were diametrically opposed to those of the older generation of partisans-turned-politicians and cultural workers were given a chance to speak. The papers presented by the “younger” authors (only a few of them were under forty!) were severely criticized by the aged leaders of a number of political organizations, who accused their younger colleagues of not understanding the recent past. Most of the authors criticized were on the staff of Nova revija. The older veterans concluded that the plenary session was not serving the purpose for which it had been revived, and that this was the fault of the “younger” generation.28

The debate conducted in January 1987 by the leadership of the
Socialist Alliance of the Working People (SAWP) at the 14th plenary session of cultural workers brought about the fall of the cultural and political guidelines which had led to decades of stagnation on the official cultural scene in Slovenia, which had based its policies on the saving majesty of the revolution and the national liberation war, and which - by fleeing into the past and immersing itself in ideological formulae - had avoided facing numerous current and pressing social issues. This concept no longer found support even among the ruling political structures.

The leading figures in Slovenia's cultural circles finally found themselves at the heart of political events when the debate on the introduction of amendments to the constitution began. In 1986, the Yugoslav federal leadership submitted proposals for new amendments to the constitution, written according to the dictates of the centralist forces in Belgrade, for debate. In the same year, the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences drafted a Memorandum, in which it ascribed the Yugoslav crisis to the constitution of 1974 and its allegedly confederational principle, stating that the Serbian nation was the greatest victim of this principle. Both the demand for centralization issued by the federal government and the revival of "Greater Serbia" ideology and Serbian mythology were strong enough reasons to give the matter of redefining Slovenia's national goals serious consideration. Such external pressure temporarily toned down the conflict between the Slovenian political leadership and the "opposition," but because the stance taken by Slovenian official politics with regard to the pressures from Belgrade was, in the opinion of the cultural circles, far too indecisive, even timid, the latter decided to take the initiative in defining the political will of the Slovenes. The opposition was also able to gain strength so rapidly due to a change in the leadership of the LCS in 1986, even though the more liberal policies presented by the League's new president, Milan Kučan, still required the support of the older communist leaders.

In the autumn of 1986, the staff of Nova revija responded to the new political situation with a series of articles entitled "Contributions Towards the Slovene National Program." The editorial board of Nova revija described these articles as "contributions towards a program which does not exist yet, and the formulation of which is most definitely beyond the competencies of this magazine, or its staff." The contributions were published in February 1987 in the 57th issue of Nova revija, raising an instant political storm throughout Yugoslavia. In writing them, the authors had, in effect, infringed upon the monopoly of the League of Communists and its ideology, which believed
itself the only body competent to formulate the national, political, cultural, and other demands of the nations of Yugoslavia. Suddenly, the League of Communists was confronted with the fact that others were beginning to engage openly in the resolution of these issues as well. The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences was thus followed by a new program, a Slovenian one this time, which conflicted with the plans of both federal and Serbian interests.

The authors of the sixteen articles were writers, professors at the University of Ljubljana, legal experts, philosophers, and sociologists, and their articles touched upon sensitive issues such as the question of Slovene statehood within Yugoslavia, the right of Slovenia to break away from the federal union of states, the way in which Slovenia was kept consistently in the background regarding military matters, and the privileged social status enjoyed by Communists. Also included were clearly stated demands for Slovene independence, quoting as reference the legal right to self-determination and to secede from the federation, a demand that the League of Communists be stripped of its privileges and monopolies, and a call for the depoliticization of a number of areas of social life.30

The political demands voiced in the 57th issue of Nova revija were the target of numerous political attacks in Yugoslavia. The authorities implemented a classical mechanism: the leaders and field committees of political organizations sent protest resolutions on the “unacceptable theses” printed by Nova revija, even though the great majority of the senders of these protests had never even read or held a copy of Nova revija in their hands. The official responses from the federal capital, Belgrade, were unanimous in their rejection, while the response in Ljubljana was divided. The newspapers of the “opposition” had published favorable comments on the 57th issue of Nova revija, while the ruling political organizations (LCS and SAWP) opposed the demands published in the magazine.31 The response and ensuing debates even spilled over the Yugoslav border as West European media began to take notice of these new political demands, the realization of which had the potential to cause considerable political upheavals in this part of the world. The BBC, for example, broadcast a report airing the accusations Belgrade had directed at Slovenia all along, these being that it gave backing to the opposition and that the LCS and the intellectual opposition were fast forming an alliance against Belgrade.32

Despite the political storm, the legal institutions in Slovenia once again decided not to prosecute. The complaint, which accused the writers of Nova revija of engaging in hostile and anti-revolutionary
activities, anti-state association and of disseminating hostile propaganda, and which was submitted by the Federation of War Veterans of Yugoslavia, was quashed by the Slovene public prosecutor, on the grounds that the contents of the 57th issue of Nova revija contained nothing to substantiate the charges. The fact that the Slovene public prosecutor refused to prosecute was regarded in certain other parts of Yugoslavia as just one more reason to increase their attacks on Slovenia. The federal public prosecutor even attempted to take the initiative and to take over the case himself. This attempt was cut short in June 1987, when Slovene legal experts proved to him that such an act would be unconstitutional, since any legal action in this case would be within the jurisdiction of the Republic of Slovenia and not of the Federation.33

Despite the resounding scandal and the filed complaint, the 57th issue of Nova revija was not banned. The “free advertising” and the relatively small print run made it very hard to obtain, and the magazine soon became celebrated as the most frequently photocopied Slovene publication to date. The only thing the political storm against the “notorious” issue achieved was a change of editor. This did not affect the magazine’s policy guidelines, as its associates and staff remained the same. What was left once the dust had settled was the political program of the opposition, with which a large number of Slovenes (many of whom also gave it their support) had become familiar - partly due to the media campaign waged against it by the ruling powers. The fact that this was entirely a political action is mentioned indirectly in the position adopted by the leadership of the LCS, which stated that it was “responding to the articles in political language and from a political position - despite the fact that some of the authors of these articles have argued their opinions using professional terminology from what seems to be an academic standpoint.” Further on in the presentation of its position, the Slovene communist leadership added: “The LCS will, by the measures it will take together with all Socialist forces, do everything within its power to ensure that the viewpoints of certain authors of the ‘Contributions Towards the Slovene National Program’ and of those who defend other, similar viewpoints, which are not in keeping with the political program and principles of the SAWP, are not put into in practice.”34

After the change in the LCS leadership at the party’s annual conference in 1986, the resistance it offered to the opposition dwindled somewhat. Nor did the party ever fully recover. The judiciary was no longer an instrument for dealing with the party’s opponents. In the following years, a number of other issues of the magazine were also
confiscated, but this cannot be ascribed to the introduction of stricter judicial measures. The criticism voiced in opposition publications became increasingly strident and direct. The opening of taboos from the 1980s, when those responsible for mistakes were already deceased, was no longer topical. Arrows of criticism in the second half of the Eighties were aimed at holders of high political and military office amongst the ruling elite, in other words, against still-living politicians who had been in power for a long time and who were not at all used to reading criticism of themselves in the media.

Of these media outlets, Mladina had the most provocative tone. Yet each confiscation or prohibition of a cover page or an article was followed promptly by a dramatic increase in sales. Mladina’s circulation increased from 10,000 or so at the start of the 1980s to 80,000 during the politically decisive years of 1987-1989 - a circulation unrivaled at that time by any other Slovene weekly. The LSYS, of which Mladina was the official publication, was no longer an organization willing to blindly follow the ruling Communists. Its proposals for a reduction in the length of compulsory military service and the introduction of community service for conscientious objectors as an alternative to military service, the actions it carried out for the abolition of the provision on verbal delicts, and its criticism of the monopoly of the ruling Communists, all of these gradually transformed the LSYS into an independent political organization.

In 1987, the LSYS was again due to organize the Day of Youth celebrations, an event held annually in the form of a Yugoslav variant of the cult of personality held on Tito’s birthday (25 May). On this day, it was customary for representatives of the youth from all the republics to carry Tito’s Torch all through Yugoslavia, passing it on from one to the next, as a symbol of their loyalty to the revolutionary principles and to socialist Yugoslavia. In the opinion of the youth of Slovenia, the ritual of the Day of Youth was obsolete, but all proposals put forward for abolishing the practice, or at least for remodeling the celebrations, were voted down at the federal Youth Conference in Belgrade.

In 1987, when the LSYS was preparing the program, the League commissioned the Novi kolektivizem (New Collectivism) group, which formed part of the NSK, to design the posters. The Novi kolektivizem posters had often in the past caused wavering functionaries to have second thoughts (for political reasons), or had been the target of political criticism. Similar attention was frequently also drawn by the title pages of Mladina designed by the group. The poster designed for the Day of Youth by Novi kolektivizem contained a bold combination
of Nazi and Communist symbols - hinting strongly at the similarities between the principles of totalitarian rule whatever the form. The main image on the poster was a Nazi illustration, in which Yugoslav symbolism had replaced the Nazi symbols. In order to heighten the absurdity of such adulatory cults of personality, the artists had drawn a huge and ungainly baton, which could not possibly be carried in one hand. The discovery in Belgrade of the poster's hidden meaning triggered another wave of disgusted and outraged accusations in March 1987. Although the leaders of the LSYS judged that the poster conveyed a markedly antifascist and anti-totalitarian message, they were nevertheless pressured into deciding not to use the picture for the official Youth Day poster. This affair took place at the same time as the affair generated by the 57th issue of Nova revija. The Slovenian prosecutor reacted in the same way in both cases. The complaint against the designers of the Novi kolektivizem poster was also quashed on the ground that the image was not insulting to the state, but rather a form of artistic expression open to interpretation in many different ways.  

These political "affairs" and the "leniency" of the Slovene authorities reinforced the conviction that Slovenia differed considerably from the other Yugoslav republics. It was evident one month after the publication of issue Number 57 of Nova revija that the intellectual opposition had also given much thought to the implementation of its program, when on 16 March 1987 the SWA called for a public debate on adopting amendments to the constitution. An important development also announced at this meeting was that several leading members of the LCS and members of the opposition, such as certain authors who had contributed to 57th issue of Nova revija, had met and discussed a number of the most pressing political dilemmas in a professional manner - without attempts at "political disqualification" - at a debate called by the "opposition."  

In this way, the opposition began to participate actively in the political scene on the most pressing issue of all: the constitutional issue of the relationship between the Yugoslav Federation and the Republic of Slovenia. In June 1987, along with publication of a brochure containing details of the discussion in the public debate, a Constitutional Committee of the SWA was founded. In October 1987, when a majority of Slovene constitutional proposals placed before the Federal Assembly in Belgrade were voted down (as was the custom), the management committee of the SWA passed a resolution calling on its chairman, Rudi Šeligo, "to address a written request to the Constitutional Committee of the Slovenian Writers' Association, proposing that
it commence writing a new constitution.”37 This work was subsequently carried out by the Constitutional Committee of the SWA and the group for constitutional development at the Slovenian Sociological Association. At a second public debate called by the SWA on 25 April 1988, they presented the “Material for the Slovene Constitution”.

The “Opposition” (in quotes) increasingly became a true opposition. Thus, in 1987, its operations entered a completely political phase, one fraught in later years by the struggle for the pluralization of political parties and for Slovene independence in accordance with the program recorded in 57th issue of Nova revija which had, in the same year, set out on the path from vision to the seeds of the future constitution.
Chapter 2:
The Introduction of Political Parties
and Their Role in Achieving
Independence

Božo Repe

The Government and the Opposition Before 1988

There were no noticeable opposition movements in Slovenia in the early 1980s. The social calm of the 1970s, bought through foreign loans, was all but over and the population was faced with a serious economic crisis; but this did not trigger any significant social movements. In the 1960s, the state had already established a sort of a modus vivendi with the Catholic Church and, with the arrival of Archbishop Alojzij Šuštar (1980), the Church itself changed its attitude toward the government. The so-called alternative movements (various forms of subculture, e.g., feminist, ecological, peace movements) were in their initial stages. Whenever the government found it important, it could easily keep them under control. Besides, it was believed that most of them could be integrated into the institutionalized framework of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People (Socialist Alliance) and the Alliance of the Socialist Youth of Slovenia (Socialist Youth). Some intellectuals began to work toward publishing a new journal. The government, though, was used to this as it was a well known game which had been played several times since the 1950s. In 1980, directly before and after Tito’s death, the repressive state apparatus kept a very careful watch on any potential opponents. There was very little room for expressing criticism of the government, mostly because during Tito’s illness and during the first months after his death such criticism was perceived as a highly unpatriotic act and as an attack on both Tito and the system which he had created. The polls in 1980 reflected the totally euphoric mood of the people or, as the researchers put it, “the discrepancy between the declared and the genuine mood of the people is very small.”

Tito’s illness and death triggered speculation about the future of Yugoslavia both at home and abroad. The transfer of power to the collective leadership, however, was relatively smooth, the bipolar sys-
tem at the time seemed an eternal category, the socialist bloc was monolithic, and the geostrategic location of Yugoslavia as a country "between the two blocs" remained as important as it had been in the past. As such it received strong political and financial support from Western countries and especially from the United States. In view of this, the issue of potential democratization of Yugoslavia was of secondary importance: welcome but not crucial. Because of their investments Western creditors attributed much more importance to the restructuring of the Yugoslav economy than to its democratization. In such circumstances, realistic expectations did not reach beyond yet another period of "liberalization," even though, considering the growing tensions between the nations and the economic crisis, things could easily have taken a different turn. Under the surface, though, the newly emerging political (social) movements were much more important than they seemed at the time. They could be compared to the first pieces of a puzzle which later helped create the new political landscape of Slovenia. These movements were also encouraged by increasingly critical attitudes toward those in power, and partly toward the system, caused by the increasing severity of the economic crisis. Dissatisfaction was aimed primarily at the poor functioning of political and state institutions as well as at individual politicians who failed to provide a solution to the crisis; it only rarely turned against the system. As late as 1986, 60 per cent of those asked expressed confidence in the system of socialist self-management. Two years later, this figure dropped dramatically. The student movement had disintegrated by the first half of the 1970s. Some of its leaders tried to spread their leftist ideas through the Student Cultural Center (ŠKUC), directed for some time by Jaša Zlobec. There were a few minor demonstrations organized by Gregor Tomc and Mirjam Zupančić, which the authorities saw as a continuation of the student movement. In 1977, the Association for a Free (sometimes referred to as Democratic) Society was formed on Tomc's initiative. Its program supported human rights and liberties. The association failed to make any major impact and ceased to exist. Later, Tomc directed his efforts toward creating the Helsinki Watch Committee.²

In the authorities' view the main opposition activity in the early 1980s was an effort to create an opposition journal. The initiators of the journal (later named Nova revija) were Dimitrij Rupel, Niko Grafenauer, and Taras Kermauner; fifty-nine other intellectuals signed the proposal. At the same time, the Roman Catholic Church strove for a change in the constitutional definition of the Church-state relationship and for abolition of the unequal status of church-goers and
non-church-goers, especially in education and in the media. The authorities were also very upset by the emergence of punk. This reached Slovenia relatively quickly, as early as 1977 (Great Britain had experienced it in 1975). The Pankrti (The Bastards) band had its first concert in the gymnasium of Moste high school on 18 October 1977. Punk was attacked in the media and punks themselves were subjected to maltreatment by the police in the streets and bars. The authorities did not have a difficult job casting punks in a bad light, as the political, cultural, and general public opinion of punk was not very favorable anyway. Most intellectuals, the so-called bourgeois right, also rejected it. Besides, the originators of punk never really intended to use punk to change the world.³ Punk’s function was primarily to broaden the public arena, to introduce more freedom, and to express “other-ness” outside official institutions. By the mid-1980s, punk had already become part of the established youth culture, developed into a multi-media cultural activity and begun to receive public awards.⁴

As late as the spring of 1983, the authorities believed that despite increasing criticism of the system no organized opposition yet existed. There was speculation, however, that this situation might change because the Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order at the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia (P SRS) noticed some signs of opposition groups trying to work together.⁵ The Council saw the publication of the journal Nova revija (New Review)⁶ as a “pure” opposition phenomenon. It was first published in 1982 on the initiative of Slovene intellectuals, after long discussions and resistance from the authorities. In the beginning, the journal dealt primarily with issues related to literature and essay writing and advocated the independence of art from ideology and politics. In the mid-1980s, however, it became, together with the Slovene Writers’ Association, the main protagonist of the changed perception of national issues.

The first signs of the emerging organized opposition noticed by the authorities were attempts to introduce “political parallelism.” On the level of content that meant that social issues began to be dealt with “outside the established forms and options provided by our social system,” and on the organizational level it meant some resignations from the trade union and attempts to establish a parallel trade union and youth organizations.⁷ Similar phenomena (establishing informal alternative groups that were later legalized within the framework of individual associations, especially the Association of Journalists and the Sociological Association) occurred a year later in certain professions, e.g., some journalists claimed that “freedom is the freedom of those who think differently.”⁸
The game between the authorities and the opposition in the next two years thus revolved around the question as to how much freedom could be allowed in journalistic, publishing, and cultural spheres. In the mid-1980s, the State Security Service and the political leaders saw social movements as much more influential than the circle gathered around Nova revija. They saw them as a threat to their own impact on an important part of the youth and the population in general.9 There were also some politicians who thought that the authorities were too lenient with alternative movements and the so-called civil society.

Peace, ecological, feminist, and other movements, which in the mid-1980s formed a strong civilian movement in Slovenia, originated mostly in youth alternative clubs and organizations such as the Center of Interest Activities for the Young and the Student Cultural Center - ŠKUC - Forum. In 1984, these clubs also provided the basis for the establishment of the lesbian section Lilith and male homosexual section Magnus (the first associations of this kind in any socialist country). Until 1983, the movements were not organized (except in official institutions such as the Yugoslav League for Peace, Independence and Equality of Nations). The youth congress in Novo mesto in 1982 gave support to the emerging movements and in the beginning of 1983 the Republic Conference of the Alliance of Socialist Youth founded a Coordinating Committee for the "working group" for ecological and peace issues. Defending alternative movements and critical of socialist manifestations (especially of Tito's rally) and of repressive legislation, the Youth Alliance gradually moved away from its role as the party's offspring and a kind of a "hatchery" of party cadres. Its functionaries no longer had guaranteed bright political future careers even though the organization remained institutionally tied to the state (membership in the Socialist Alliance, in various committees and commissions, also in governmental committees) as well as financially dependent upon it. During the whole of the 1980s, the youth organization was thus somehow in between, partly participating in government and partly acting as opposition. Its existence continued through clubs, which provided room for alternative activities. The latter soon split into its ecological and peace sections (later, a third part emerged, namely a working group for spiritual movements).

In 1986, the popularity of alternative movements was nearing its peak. Over 75 per cent of those asked in a poll recognized them and more than 45 per cent were willing to join them.10 The political leadership admitted that they were "serious" and analyzed their orientation very carefully. Regardless of the unfavorable official view of the opposition, democratization in Slovenia reached a level where some
"civil" rights became part of the general citizenship standard. Slovene authorities also avoided the use of the repressive Yugoslav legislation. The decision as to how to react in individual cases was mostly left to the police and prosecutors. This was (at least from the second half of the 1980s on) a sign, on the one hand, of the increased individual responsibility demanded by public pressure and, on the other hand, the consequence of the relatively high degree of independence of individual branches of government or political centers. These were no longer so rigidly "coordinated" by the leadership of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia (CC LCS) despite the fact that the president (presidency) of the CC LCS remained the political figure with the greatest authority.

This relatively "soft" attitude toward the opposition depended mostly on the tolerance level of the individuals in power combined with their willingness (and the possibilities open to them) to defend the existing level of democratization against pressures from the center. Various security and political assessments from the beginning of the "Slovene spring" thus showed an interesting combination of critical attitudes toward the opposition and, at the same time, agreement with some of its ideas. It also became clear that the authorities obtained their information not only by analyzing the opposition's public activities, but also by "operative" covering of the situation. The assessments written for Belgrade also show criticism of the federal policy.

In 1987, the impact of public opinion grew immensely. There were demands that the Secretary of Internal Affairs should explain whose conversations were tapped by the police. In the beginning of 1988, there were calls for a special commission to be formed in the assembly to control the work of the Public Security Administration.

A completely new dimension in the Slovene political arena was introduced by the 57th issue of Nova revija (1988). The "No. 57" published sixteen philosophical, sociological, and other articles which addressed from various perspectives the issue of the Slovene nation in the modern world and its position in Yugoslavia. The basic idea of these contributions was that the Slovene nation had to achieve its statehood through a form of sovereignty which would not be subordinated to Yugoslavia. There should also be introduced a new legal order which would allow for a democratic expression of citizens' will - a call for stripping the League of Communists of its "custody" of the Slovene nation and for introducing political pluralism. At the time, the communist authorities considered that the national question lay exclusively within their domain. The person who was given the most credit for drafting the Yugoslav constitution in 1974 was the Slovene politi-
cian Edvard Kardelj (with the help of Serbian lawyer Dr. Jovan Djordjević), and the Slovene authorities believed that this constitution (which was viciously attacked by the Serbs) allowed for the legal and formal implementation of Slovenia's national rights. They thought that any changes to the federal constitution would lead to another centralization. With the intensification of the crisis it became clear that socialism did not resolve the national issue in Yugoslavia. Leading politicians stressed that the LCS was committed first to its nation (thus putting the national principle before that of class). They were fairly careful at first, using rather convoluted formulations, but became more and more determined as time went on, expressing their views more openly. 1983 also saw the beginning of a very heated debate about the so-called common core curricula in education as well as tensions in some Yugoslav associations and organizations (particularly in the Yugoslav Association of Writers, which was the first federal institution to disintegrate in 1986). During the next few years, various journals and newspapers published articles dealing with the Slovene national issue in a more comprehensive manner. The authorities were preoccupied with tiring daily battles with the federal center and the army and were therefore reluctant to study Slovenia's position in Yugoslavia in a more exhaustive way. At the meetings of various federal organs, however, Slovene politicians were very critical of the federation.

With the 57th issue of *Nova revija*, the initiative was passed to the hands of the opposition. Its articles met with an explosive reaction from official social and political organizations and most of the press. After the republic prosecutor refused to prosecute, the federal prosecutor wanted to do it himself, which triggered a conflict between the republic and the federation as to which jurisdiction was competent in this matter. Despite sharp criticism, which culminated in the hiring of a new editor, the Slovene authorities insisted unanimously that the authors could not be legally prosecuted. They acknowledged the relevance of the issue tackled by *Nova revija*, but did not agree with *Nova revija*’s interpretation of it.

**Power Struggle**

1988 was the year which saw not only the beginning of political pluralism in Slovenia, but also of the battle to seize power. In the period prior to the establishment of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and even later, the opposition was in an extremely
vulnerable position as the constitutional and legal system did not allow political parties (they were legalized only at the end of 1989). This was the first stage of political articulation. The forerunner of the political parties was the Slovene Peasant Alliance, which was established on 12 May 1988. It was still a member of the Socialist Alliance and described itself primarily as a professional organization. The authorities kept close control over the opposition and had accurate information about its activities, but the opposition, too, had a rough knowledge of what was going on at the top levels of the government. The flow of information was relatively good owing to Slovenia’s small area and, consequently, many ties between personal acquaintances, friends and relatives. Of importance was the previously “in-between” role of the Socialist Youth and also the relatively pluralistic Socialist Alliance. Representatives of the opposition and the government presented their views at various round tables and public debates, and there were discussions in professional journals and in newspapers.

Despite all this, the lack of trust on both sides was considerable and was lessened only by the feeling that both sides were equally threatened by pressures from the federation. Other factors that worked in the opposition’s favor were the economic crisis, conflicts in Yugoslavia, and the drastically decreased level of people’s confidence in socialism and the government. In 1988, the reputation of the League of Communists reached its lowest point and the general feeling among the people was that they had no way of influencing politics. This was the year when the opposition’s power began to have an impact. Because of previously mentioned circumstances, the power struggle at the time involved primarily the ambition to influence people’s awareness and to include them in various protests. The media played a very important role in this battle. The burden of smoothing relations with Yugoslavia was placed exclusively on the shoulders of the government, which was forced to maneuver between the pressures and demands of the opposition and simultaneous resistance to centralizing tendencies from Belgrade, demands from there to “discipline” the opposition movements and the tendency of the army to “settle” affairs on its own, either by prosecuting individuals or by introducing a state of emergency. The issue of political struggle in Slovenia thus consisted of two elements: the definition of the boundary to which democratization should expand (ultimately this involved the question of Slovenia’s future political system) and the definition of Slovenia’s relationship with Yugoslavia (what the national program should be and how to implement it).

In 1986, the Slovene League of Communists, which could be con-
sidered at that time still a synonym for government, started a process of internal restructuring. This was the point when Milan Kučan assumed its leadership. Under pressure from the opposition, the LCS also expanded the boundaries of freedom, abandoned a socialist view of democracy and gradually adopted - first informally and toward the end of 1988 also partly legally - some Western standards in human rights protection. This was accelerated by the "trial of the four" (questions by Assembly deputies, avoiding trial based on article 133 of the federal penal code on verbal delict, appointing an Assembly commission to exert control over the State Security Service, founding the Council for the Protection of Human Rights at the Republic Conference of Socialist Alliance). In 1988, the League of Communists announced its "stepping down from power", which in practice meant that it was giving up its constitutionally guaranteed leading role and was to become just one of the socio-political organizations which would present its views within the Socialist Alliance. The opposition was suspicious. The influence of the LC was rapidly declining, in 1988 membership began to drop and in the fall of that year over seventy eminent left-wing intellectuals left it. These were members who had been particularly active in the sections of the Marxist center, while some of them also wrote for Mladina and other newspapers. They had participated in civil movements and had thus contributed to spreading pluralism and reducing somewhat the gap between the opposition and the government. There were demands for new forms of organization, in which non-communists would be included as well. On the other hand, the leadership came under pressure from older communists who at best tolerated non-party pluralism and saw the emergence of the so-called alliances (forerunners of parties) as an abandonment of revolutionary principles. Despite that, as France Popit, who had been the leader of the Slovene League of Communists from the late 1960s to the beginning of the 1980s, said, the LC did not want to play the role of the "healthy forces."11 (Popit later resigned from the CC LCS because of his disagreement with Kučan's policy). The older generation had realized already by the first half of the 1980s that it was not capable of tackling the crisis in Yugoslavia, centralism, and the emerging civil society. It therefore accepted Kučan's leadership.12 In such circumstances, the leadership insisted up until the fall of 1989 on non-party pluralism, even though it knew already at the end of 1988, when the initiative to establish a Social Democratic Alliance came about, that "all variants of political pluralism, multi-party included, were open."13 Similar but even more heterogeneous and pronounced movements occurred within the Socialist Alliance and
Socialist Youth (within the framework of the latter they formed the Alliance of Youth Organizations and Movements, which intended to run in the youth elections in 1988).

The issue of Slovenia's political system and of its position within Yugoslavia at that time was focused on problems concerning the constitutional order. As early as 1987, this became the main battleground between socialist authorities on the one hand and part of a more critically oriented professional public and an already more articulate opposition on the other. At the same time as the debate focusing on the amendments to the federal constitution was taking place, the issue of changes to the Slovene constitution emerged. The opposition organized a joint Assembly for the Constitution, which included representatives of newly founded alliances, associations and the Socialist Youth, and began to prepare its own proposal for a Slovene constitution. On 25 April, opposition leaders first presented to the public the Theses for the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (later published in Časopis za kritiko znanosti - Journal for the criticism of science), which became popularly known as "the sociologists' and writers' constitution." This was followed by a series of expert articles on this topic in Nova revija and other publications. The opposition basically demanded a confederation (Yugoslavia as a contractual community), the division of government into legislative, executive and judicial branches, and the introduction of classic civil liberties. There were still some opposition writers and lawyers, though, who did not entirely discount the option of a non-party democracy and had a less reserved attitude toward Yugoslavia. The opposition's Theses for the Constitution were rejected by the authorities, but the debate about the Theses continued and included both sides.

The Slovene Assembly realized that the opposition was gaining an advantage over it with respect to the constitution and therefore the Assembly itself began to prepare amendments to the existing Slovene constitution. Even though the authorities kept rejecting the opposition's proposals, this rejection had to do primarily with their attitude toward the political system (they were against the abolition of socialism and the introduction of a multi-party system, i.e., they insisted on non-party pluralism to replace the one-party system). In their attitude toward the federation, however, they came close to the opposition's demands, even though they were still hoping for a softer variant in the form of a so-called asymmetrical federation.

The political balance of forces in Slovenia was changed by the "trial of the four" and by the establishment of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in early 1988. A very complex story, the details
of which are still not fully known, began when the army stepped up its level of military readiness in Slovenia and the military leaders began to prepare measures against Slovenia. At a meeting of the Military Council in Belgrade on 25 March 1988, political liberalization of Slovenia was labeled a counter-revolutionary phenomenon. The Military Council was a consulting body to the federal minister of defense (at the time Admiral Branko Mamula). It had no formal competence, but huge influence as it was made up of the majority of military leaders. After the meeting of 25 March, the commanding general of the Ljubljana military region paid a visit to the Slovene leadership and asked them whether the Slovene security authorities were capable of controlling the situation should there be a mass reaction to the arrests suggested by the military prosecutor. The Military Council’s assessment of counter-revolutionary activities in Slovenia referred also to writing critical of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA). The major culprit in this area was Mladina, which published a series of articles in which it revealed the special status of the army in society (the YPA as the so-called “seventh republic”), detailing circumstances in the army itself, the weapons trade, and the personal privileges of certain individuals, etc. Mladina advocated that the army should be under civilian control and that it should, in addition, undergo fundamental restructuring (reduced investments in arms, nationally homogeneous units, the option of civilian instead of military service). The YPA’s top officials thought that the Slovene authorities were not sufficiently firm in preventing such action, and that at least part of the Slovene leadership supported such writing, which is why they decided to act on their own. On 29 March, under army pressure, the presidency of the CCLCY discussed a document prepared by the YPA, which was entitled “Information on the Attacks against the Principles of General People’s Resistance, the YPA, and the State Security Service.” The discussion focused on the situation in Slovenia. They called for sanctions and arrests. Kučan, however, strongly protested against such a course of events. The transcript of Kučan’s speech found its way into Mladina’s editorial office. The publicist and psychologist Vlado Miheljak used the transcript as a basis for his article, “The night of long knives” (the article was signed by Majda Vrhovnik, an occasional pen-name used by the editor). In it he warned about the impending danger of a state of emergency in Slovenia. The article was supposed to be published in Mladina on 10 May, but the editors complied with instructions by the State Security Service and the prosecutor to withdraw it from publication.

Early on 31 May 1988, the Slovene State Security Service arrested
Janez Jaša, Mladina's publicist and a candidate for president of the Socialist Youth. This was followed within a few hours by the arrest of Ivan Boršnjar, a YPA sergeant major, by the military, and on 4 June by the arrest of David Tasić, a journalist working for Mladina. After their arrest and initial interrogations, the two civilians were handed over to the military. Also interrogated by the military, although not arrested, was a fourth suspect, Tasić's coworker Franc Zavril. At the end of July 1988, the Yugoslav People's Army staged a trial of the four accused in the military court in Ljubljana. They were formally accused of disclosing a military secret.  

On 3 June 1988, a Committee for the Protection of Janez Jaša's Rights was formed on the initiative of Igor Bavčar. It was later renamed the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights and grew into the strongest organization of civil society during the so-called "Slovene spring." Its members represented a very wide range of heterogeneous groups and organizations. Several hundred thousand individuals and over a thousand different organizations joined the committee. Its administrative work was done mostly by a student organization (University Conference of the Alliance of Socialist Youth). The committee organized various forms of demonstrations, which culminated in a meeting of several tens of thousands on 21 June 1988 in the Liberation Square in Ljubljana. The entire time that the trial went on, throngs of people gathered continuously in protest in front of the military court.

The committee continued its struggle for the protection of human rights even after the trial was over. Within it, however, there emerged a variety of opinions especially with regard to whether they should only insist on the protection of human rights or intervene more actively in political goings-on.

The committee (which was not officially registered) comported itself as the government's equal, and its president Igor Bavčar talked to the highest representatives of the Slovene government during the entire time. Representatives of the committee were allowed to speak in the Assembly, and the government and political organization responded to the public messages relayed by the committee.

During the trial and in the months that followed (until spring 1989), Slovene politics was torn between daily pressures from the center, especially from the army, and the opposition (the pressure from the opposition became stronger after a group of deputies in the Assembly was appointed to explore the background of the trial). The very intensive and stressful events usually dictated quick impromptu reactions. On the basis of the documents of the highest political bod-
ies kept from that period and minutes of informal meetings, however, basic characteristics of Slovene politics can be summarized as:

- initial confusion and discrepancies in the assessment of the situation;

- a growing conviction that the trial involved a plan to bring down the Slovene leadership;

- the feeling that the Slovene authorities were losing control as part of the power was in the hands of the opposition and the rest was in the hands of the army;

- the differentiation of Slovene leadership with regard to their assessment of the trial of the four and of the activities of the committee and of the opposition in general. There were three different views of the situation: it is a case of clear anticommunism; nobody who took any part in the revolution will survive if the opposition should seize power; the dialogue should be transferred to the Assembly and, at the same time, all legal measures, including repression, should be used if things get out of hand, and the existing level of democracy should be preserved at all cost;

- a defense of the actions taken by the Slovene State Security Service and of the Secretary of Internal Affairs in particular (the authorities believed that it was, in accordance with the legislation in force, the State Security Service's duty to hand the suspects over to the YPA investigators);

- a belief that with regard to the trial, one should adhere to the prescriptions of the legal order. As for the relationship to the federation, illegalities related to the trial were to be proven in those areas where such interpretations were possible (the basic argument of Slovene authorities was that the trial was illegal because it was not conducted in the Slovene language). An attempt was made to convince the opposition not to call for civil disobedience based on the argument that the socialist government was illegitimate and the state illegal (this was particularly relevant after the accused were convicted and about to begin serving their sentences and the committee was considering public demonstrations, the introduction of a cultural strike in addition to a general strike, and similar measures);

- endeavors to obtain as speedy and fair a trial as possible for the accused and after the verdict their fastest possible pardon. Until a certain amount of the sentence had been served, granting pardons was not within the jurisdiction of the Slovene authorities (they sent several requests to the Presidency of the SFRY and asked for pardon, but to no avail);

- insistence on non-party pluralism as the highest possible achieve-
ment of democratization;

- gradual adoption of some of the opposition's views (the requirement that the work of the State Security Service should be controlled by the Assembly; the assessment that the constitutional and legal order in Slovenia did not provide sufficient options for defending its sovereignty).

The authorities tried to prove to the people that they, too, and not only the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights (which limited its activities mostly to assistance to the four), were striving for a legal state and respect of human rights. On 4 October 1988, they established within the Republic Conference of Socialist Alliance a Council for the Protection of Human Rights and Liberties. Its objective was to provide assistance to anyone in Slovenia whose rights were violated, regardless of who was responsible for it. At the same time the council should contribute to the establishment of a legal order which would be built on a constitutional and legal basis guaranteeing the implementation of human rights in accordance with international norms. The council was headed by a prominent lawyer, Dr. Ljubo Bavcon, and functioned until the creation of the office of the ombudsman after the adoption of the new Slovene constitution in 1992.

Toward the end of 1988, when the trial against the four began to lose its political charge (the question of their serving their sentences remained unresolved), the collective leadership of the Committee was faced with the question of whether or not to continue its activities and if so, in what manner. The Committee for the Protection of Human Rights was divided on this question. It met on 15 December 1988, when the program of the Slovene Democratic Alliance (SDA) had already been published. The collective leadership of the committee decided not to join the Slovene Democratic Alliance, but simply to welcome its establishment. It also decided against becoming a political party and participating in the election. Members of the collective leadership themselves in the next few months joined different political alliances, which emerged in the first months of 1989, and in April 1990 the Committee formally ceased to exist.

The newly founded alliances entered the political arena with very diverse programs. Some focused primarily on the issue of democratization, others gave priority to the national question and/or built their image on the basis of anticommunism. On the opposition side, this initial division of the Slovene political territory resulted in the SDA's gaining the greatest political influence. The SDA gathered together a considerable section of the opposition's intellectual potential and was led by Dr. Dimitrij Rupel. The restructured leadership of the League
of Communists, which saw its future in a gradual social democratic orientation, reacted much more strongly to the establishment of the rival Social Democratic Alliance than to the establishment of the Peasant Alliance and the Slovene Democratic Alliance. The Yugoslav situation was such that on 27 February 1989 the opposition and the government decided to organize a common meeting in Cankarjev dom (a civic center) in support of the striking miners in Kosovo. The initiative for the support came from the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights (which at first considered demonstrations) and communicated to the government by the president of the Republic Conference of the Socialist Youth, Jožef Školč. At the time when the politics of rallies in Yugoslavia was at its height, the authorities were anything but enthusiastic about demonstrations and therefore suggested a meeting in Cankarjev dom. At the meeting, which was formally organized by the Socialist Alliance, there were speakers from the government (including Kučan) and from the opposition (representatives of alliances and groups). A "declaration against the state of emergency - for peaceful coexistence in Kosovo" was signed by all socio-political organizations of the time: the Republican Council of the Alliance of Socialist Trade Unions of Slovenia, the Republic Conference of the Socialist Youth, the Slovene League of Communists, the Republican Committee of the Alliance of Associations of Veterans of the War of National Liberation as well as by all newly founded alliances and a number of other associations, societies, and groups. The meeting met with a vociferous reaction in Serbia, where they claimed that all sectors of society in Slovenia (the LC included) had joined forces against Serbia and Yugoslavia. The Serb authorities organized a big rally in front of the federal assembly (the demonstrations began with Belgrade students who supported Milošević). The demonstrators demanded that the Albanian and Slovene leadership be crushed, shouting that "Yugoslavia is in the process of disintegration in Kosovo and in Slovenia." Slovene representatives in federal institutions, especially at the meetings of the Presidency of the SFRY and the Presidency of the CC LCY, were subjected to strong political pressure. The meeting of the Presidency of the CC LCY then lasted fourteen hours and turned into an all-out attack on Slovenia.

The meeting in Cankarjev dom was followed by an economic boycott of Slovenia by Serbia and, for all practical purposes, the cessation of political relations between the two. The political consensus reached by the opposition and the government at the meeting was then formalized by setting up a Coordinating Committee of the meeting's organizers.
By the end of March, the working group of the Coordinating Committee had prepared a declaration for which several names were suggested (Slovene Declaration 1989, Declaration of Slovene National Will 89, Declaration of Slovene Political Will 89). The Slovene Democratic Alliance especially thought that the draft of the declaration was not radical enough and its preparation too slow. Its Executive Committee therefore passed its own declaration on 28 March. It was written by Rupel and entitled the Slovene Declaration 89. That same day it was presented at the general meeting of the Writers' Association. The “alternative part” of the Coordinating Committee (the Slovene Democratic Alliance, and the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights) suggested that the coordinating committee accept Rupel's version, which should then be presented at the meeting of the Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance on 26 April. Socialist Alliance’s president, Jože Smole, rejected Rupel’s draft as “completely unacceptable,” saying that it played into the hands of those who accused Slovenia of separatism. On 8 May, there was a big demonstration, protesting the beginning of Janez Janša’s serving his sentence, and Rupel’s document, whose co-author was Dr. France Bučar, was publicly presented there as the so-called “May Declaration” and the action of collecting signatures for it was begun. The first reaction of the authorities to the theses of the May Declaration was that “they demand Slovene statehood without socialism, self-management and Yugoslavia.” More than by the May Declaration, “which is in fact a result of the crisis, undefined relations between the nations, and current pressures and threats against Slovenia,” the governing structures were upset by the anti-communist tone of the meeting and the assessment of some speakers that “the Slovene leadership is not legitimate and does not control the situation.” The thesis that the Slovene leadership had lost control of the situation and should therefore be brought down was also used by Milošević's propaganda machinery in his so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution. Miroslav Šolević, a Serbian nationalist leader in Priština, threatened to organize a protest rally in Ljubljana on 25 March. Such a rally in Ljubljana had already been planned during the high tide of similar rallies in the summer and fall of 1988, but was not carried out because of its organizers’ preoccupation with disciplining “Serb” territories.

Despite Jože Smole’s assessment that the May Declaration was unacceptable and the fact that it was already public, the working group of the Coordinating Committee continued to work on a common declaration. Its sixth version was presented on 29 May under the title “The Basic Charter of Slovenia 89” and was passed on 22 June.
the insistence of those in power (especially the trade unions), the Basic Charter still mentioned self-management socialism, while the League of Communists wanted the inclusion of the notion of "the supremacy of work" and believed that sovereignty could not be built on the Slovene nation alone, but on all of Slovenia's citizens.\textsuperscript{21} The document still allowed for the option of Slovenes' staying in Yugoslavia on the condition that the latter democratized. Compared to the May Declaration, the Basic Charter contained more compromises (owing to numerous coordinations and concessions) and in the heated political situation met with considerably less reaction.\textsuperscript{22} For various reasons, it was signed only by some members of the Coordinating Committee. In the following months, the opposition criticized it for accepting in advance the federal framework and thus "already now [December 1989] presenting a serious obstacle to the process of gaining Slovene political independence."\textsuperscript{23} Despite this criticism, the Basic Charter justified its function because through discussions it helped to bring the views of the government and the opposition closer together. The Coordinating Committee consequently passed a resolution that the Assembly should take into account the demands contained in the Basic Charter during the adoption of the amendments to the Slovene constitution. The Coordinating Committee also agreed to discuss the law on political assembly and election law at its next meetings.\textsuperscript{24}

\textit{The Development of Political Parties and the Victory of the Opposition in the Elections}

The dialogue between the opposition and the government, who had presented their separate views in the May Declaration and in the Basic Charter, was resumed in September 1989.\textsuperscript{25} The so called Round table discussed primarily the amendments to the Slovene constitution and their formulation, election-related legislation and the law on political assembly. The opposition was convinced that the government did not play fair in the Round table.

The authorities took advantage of the fact that the initiative was once again in their hands. The adoption of the amendments to the constitution of Slovenia contributed to their public image.\textsuperscript{26} That was further strengthened by their banning of the rally that Milošević's supporters had planned to bring to Ljubljana on 1 December 1989.\textsuperscript{27} Two weeks after beginning of the Round table, the Slovene Democratic Alliance, Social Democratic Alliance, Christian Socialist Alliance, and the Peasant Alliance left it, and the Peasant Alliance, Social Demo-
cratic Alliance, Democratic Alliance, later also joined by the newly founded Christian Democrats, started negotiations regarding the formation of a common pre-election coalition. After lengthy negotiations, the coalition - Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (Demos) was formed on 27 November 1989. On 8 January 1990, the Greens of Slovenia joined Demos. The Peasant Alliance, which vacillated between Demos and Socialist Youth, also became its full-fledged member. Before the election two minor parties joined Demos as well: the Liberal party, which represented primarily small businessmen, and the Gray Panthers, the pensioners’ party. The coalition was led by a presidency made up of two members from each party. A former dissident, Dr. Jože Pučnik, became its president. Its program consisted of two basic points: Slovenian sovereignty and parliamentary democracy. A large part of its campaign strategy was based on anti-communism.

The Slovene pre-election arena assumed its final shape in the beginning of 1990. Former alliances transformed themselves into classical political parties. The same was true of the former socio-political organizations.28 The Slovene League of Communists went to the last (Fourteenth) congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists (this was supposed to take place from 20 to 24 January 1990, but ended prematurely on 22 January), but the Slovene delegation walked out because its proposals on political pluralism, social reform, and restructuring of the LCY into a union of independent organizations were not even discussed, let alone accepted. This meant the disintegration of the last remaining all-Yugoslav organization. An attempt by the LCY to continue its work as a new party with the name LC - Movement for Yugoslavia failed. The same fate befell the federal premier Ante Marković’s initiative to organize his own Yugoslav party as the federal elections never took place.

The former socio-political organizations in Slovenia never united into a single party or a united pre-election coalition even though some politicians, such as Janez Stanovnik, then the president of the Presidency of the SRS, wished they had. Stanovnik, whose political career was drawing to a close, also suggested that they should agree in advance on candidacy for individual functions. Cooperation between the Socialist Alliance and the LC with at least part of the Socialist Youth would very likely enable the government to win the election. The degree of pluralization that the former socio-political organizations had reached, though, was too high for them to associate with one another in absence of a strong authority. This could have been achieved only by Kučan, but he decided to run for the presidency of
the republic and was no longer interested in a function limited to a party. Other leaders, too, had their own political ambitions (Jože Šmole, president of the Socialist Alliance, was certain that he and his organization enjoyed enough of a reputation to win the election. Jožef Školč, president of the Socialist Youth, thought the same about himself and his organization).

It is evident from the stalling of the Round table negotiations as well as from some other sources that at least some Slovene politicians believed as late as at the end of 1989 that a transition to a classical parliamentary democracy was inappropriate and strove to achieve a two-to-four-year transition period hoping that by then other parts of Yugoslavia would have democratized as well. In their view, other parts of Yugoslavia and the army would find it very hard to accept an eventual victory by the opposition. They also thought that a transition period would allow for a clearer political structure of the newly founded parties.29

These predictions failed and the April 1990 election was won by Demos. The new government’s ministers were faced with the question of how to implement their promise to establish their own state. In order to achieve this goal, Slovenia would have to become independent from Yugoslavia (either through a consensual “disassociation” or through a unilateral “secession”). In legal terms this meant first a transfer of constitutional independence from the federal state to Slovenia and then effectively taking over the government role.

In the initial stage after the changeover of power, there was considerable mistrust between the government and the opposition. Some governing parties believed that they should carry out the “independence project” on their own, as the opposition parties (for the most part successors of the former socio-political organizations) were supposedly slowing down the independence process. Still, there were different views even within the governing coalition. Especially the government faced with the realistic state of the economy was not eager to take any radical steps. It used the “transition” period as a convenient excuse for poor economic conditions and for the drastic fall in the standard of living. It also claimed that owing to the chaotic Yugoslav situation it was impossible to improve the economy as its ministers had promised during the campaign. The opposition was concerned that the independence-oriented policy might provoke the center to apply repressive measures. At the same time there was some “yugonostalgia” and fear of revenge. There was thus considerable tension in the assembly. In such circumstances a representative of one of the governing parties in the parliament proposed the adoption of the declaration
of sovereignty of Slovenia. The parliament adopted such a declaration on 2 July 1990. The declaration was a mixture of political declaration and legal document. In the circumstances of ever growing political polarization, it became clear to some influential Demos politicians and ideologues that the implementation of independence could not be a project advocated by only some political forces. Instead it had to be a national project and, if the government wished to achieve effective independence, it should have the support of the majority of political forces as well as of the population. The issue of the constitution thus became prominent again. The constitution would have to be passed in the parliament by a two-third majority vote. If the majority in the parliament adopted the constitution, a referendum would take place, a positive outcome of which the wish of the Slovene nation to live in a sovereign state.

In the period after the election, representatives of both the coalition and the opposition thus used the draft which had been prepared by the Constitutional Assembly as a basis for writing a new constitution. After the opposition came to power, though, it showed little enthusiasm for adopting it. The adoption of a new constitution would mean a different structure of the state order, a dissolution of the parliament, and calling new elections, all of which Demos resented because it had only just come to power. In addition, there were different views within the coalition itself with regard to ideology and some other issues which should be included in the constitution (the separation of Church and state, the issue of abortion, and others). Some politicians who had just come to power also believed that they should first consolidate their power and intensify their political strength by creating an economic base (through privatization and denationalization). Only then would “real” independence be possible. Another important factor had to do with foreign politics: in the period of transition individual parties enjoyed the support of their fellow parties abroad, and these warned against secession.

Some intellectuals in Demos who participated in the writing of the constitution realized that under such circumstances the constitution could not be passed by 23 December 1990 as had been planned by the Demos leadership. They also saw that the process of independence might stop if it depended legally only on the adoption of a constitution or even just legislation. This is why in November 1990 they revived the idea of a plebiscite, which had been unsuccessfully proposed in the parliament on 4 October by the opposition Socialist Party, the former Socialist Alliance.

The plebiscite was first discussed in Demos. After the idea was
approved (even though with a certain reluctance on the part of some parties), Demos started negotiations with the new opposition parties. These were initially difficult because the "party parliament," as Demos was called, had accepted some things beforehand without first discussing them in the real parliament. They could not agree on the date of the proposed plebiscite, on whether or not a relative or absolute majority was needed (the majority of those voting or the majority of all registered voters), and on the time at which the plebiscite on Slovenia's independence should be put into effect. There was also a concern about Slovenia not being ready for independence and the effective assumption of power. Negotiations were slow and at first it seemed that there would be no agreement. The coordination of different views was then taken over by the presidency and its president Milan Kučan and after a series of meetings an agreement in principle was reached. The plebiscite took place on 23 December 1990 and the results were officially announced on 26 December. The plebiscite was a success with 93.2 per cent of all those eligible voting and, of these, 88.2 per cent voting for independence. The decision was to be implemented within six months, i.e., by 26 June 1991 at the latest.

Despite the parties' unity with regard to the plebiscite, the differences between the Demos parties widened (there were many personal rivalries, too). Preparations for independence were slow (with exceptions in some areas) despite pressures from some "statehood" parties and individuals in Demos and also from President Milan Kučan. Many doubted that Slovenia was capable of becoming independent in six months (especially with regard to the economy). As late as the end of April, even Prime Minister Lojze Peterle was willing to interpret independence in terms of passing the constitutional law instead of its actual implementation. On 5 June, the new finance minister, Dušan Šešok, upset the parliament with the statement that Slovenia would gain normative, but not effective independence. Despite doubts and difficulties on 25 June Slovenia did declare its independence. This was followed by the intervention of the Yugoslav army, which followed a decision by the federal government that the army and police resume the control of Yugoslavia's external borders. The intervention was strong enough to homogenize the parties, but not too strong for Slovenia not to be able to resist it. The parties and the politicians were thus spared the disagreements with regard to (too many) casualties, damage, and possible capitulation, all of which would have — no doubt — further divided them. Before the final withdrawal of the army in July 1991 there was an internal conflict in Demos and a new Prime Minister-designate was proposed. The proposal failed. Demos lasted
through the crucial Brioni declaration despite the fact that some of its minor parties claimed that acceding to the declaration was a sign of capitulation; in fact, they distanced themselves from it. The Brioni declaration was nevertheless accepted by the opposition as well. After that more and more internal differences arose within the Demos, which was dissolved at the end of 1991.

**Evaluation of the Activities of the Political Alternative and Parties in the 1980: Their Contribution to Democratization and Independence**

1. Political and social changes in the 1980s took place within the context of the global crisis of communism, an ending of the bipolar division of the world, disintegration of the Soviet Union, and a deep political, national, and economic crisis in Yugoslavia. It is likely that without external changes the process known as the “Slovene spring” would have ended with a defeat of alternative movements and that the reform-oriented Slovene government would have been forced to leave the political arena.

2. It was typical of the Slovene situation that the political sphere, owing to a more democratic form of socialism (self-management), was more open to the circulation of ideas and meetings of the authorities and the opposition than in Eastern Europe. There existed the organizations “in between,” which acted as a bridge between the opposition and the government (Socialist Youth, Socialist Alliance) and allowed for discussion of various professional issues (professional associations such as the Slovene Writers’ Association, Sociological Association, Politological Association, and in its specific way also the Marxist Center of CC LCS). Some associations represented a kind of substitute party before real parties were actually formed.

3. By the mid-1980s, various alternative movements contributed to the development of a strong civil society, which then played a pioneer role in the democratization process in Slovenia.

4. The press contributed a great deal to the dissemination of the public voice. Especially important in this respect were the youth journal *Mladina*, the student press, and the opposition journals.

5. Ever since the mid-1980s, the processes of social democratization and emancipation were closely intertwined. The initiative for the articulation of the national program came from opposition intellectuals who gathered around the various journals and in particular *Nova revija*.

6. In the second half of the 1980s, the reform-oriented movement
prevailed in the League of Communists, which gradually adopted the opposition’s idea. It tried to defend the opposition’s activities against intervention from Belgrade (thus also protecting themselves) and also to implement the basic items of the national program, which, as far as Slovenia’s relation to Yugoslavia was concerned, was limited mostly, for both government and the opposition, to the demand for a confederation. Such a policy allowed for a soft transition from a one-party to a multi-party system and for a gradual preparation for independence.

7. The government followed the principle of legality (taking into account valid legislation and trying to introduce changes merely by means of passing new legal instruments). The opposition claimed that the government was not legitimate (although legal), but the government in fact did act in a legitimate manner (except in the few cases such as the trial of the four). This allowed the rules of the game to be fairly clear.

8. The development of the parties brought about the gradual disappearance of the role of civil society, which was at its strongest in the period of the Committee for the Protection of Human Rights.

9. The opposition parties joined a pre-election coalition, but remained heterogeneous. There was no one political option which would be dominant, as was the case in Croatia with its Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ). The government (former socio-political organizations) did not unite, as was the case in Serbia where the League of Communists and the Socialist Alliance joined together to form the Socialist Party, nor did it try to break up the opposition, even though it possessed the means to do so. A positive development was that pluralism was preserved (after the change in the government), and that parties were able to act in unison in the crucial moments of the independence process. Negative aspects emerged after independence, with individual parties putting their own interests before the national ones. In the 1990s, this has led to an excessive emphasis on individual parties, which remains (as in the Italian situation) a basic characteristic of Slovene political life.
Chapter 3: Slovenia’s Concerns About the Proposed Yugoslav Core Curriculum in the 1980s

Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj

The idea for this chapter came to me while I was reading Balkan Tragedy by Susan L. Woodward, who compiled an immense, detailed, and well documented “story” about the region, trying to illuminate recent Yugoslav history from different perspectives. Describing the effect of the Slovene secession on neighboring states, Woodward writes about the reason why Slovenes had joined Yugoslavia: protection against Germanization and Italianization. She continues that “Slovenes who wrested control after 1918 used their separate language to cement their power and to protect their internal unity and distinctiveness from other Slavic, Austrian, and Italian neighbors...giving the impression to outsiders that their ‘state’ ... had created a nation, not the reverse.” In an endnote she illustrates her statement by saying that the latest example, confirming her statement, is Slovenian “refusal to consider discussions...about establishing a countrywide core curriculum,” and alludes to it as a manifestation of Slovene nationalism.

She is right: the Slovenes did join other South Slavic nations in order to preserve their national identity, but history attests that they did not have in mind their assimilation into “a Yugoslav nation.” However, to my recollection, the Slovenes had not refused to consider discussions about a country core curriculum in the 1980s. Rather, as I remember it, endless and heated debates over many years could not yield an agreement on a core curriculum that was also acceptable to the Slovenes. Woodward’s perception that Slovenes refused to consider such discussions does not seem warranted, and thus I have tried to analyze what actually happened.

Many books and papers have been written about the end of Yugoslavia in 1991 with various explanations for the dissolution of the 73-years old state. Yet, to my knowledge, the role of Yugoslav educational politics, which were stirring self-protective and/or nationalistic “juices” among the nations in Yugoslavia since its creation in 1918, have not often been discussed in English sources. It seems that cur-
rent historical and especially political texts overlook the attempts to create a unified educational policy in Yugoslavia after 1974 and their consequences for political developments in the 1980s, which were exacerbated by the drive for the centralization of national cultures. These attempts at centralization created among different nations a fear of losing their ethnic identity and added fuel to the conflagration which engulfed the state in 1991.

A Brief Historical Framework

One of the characteristics of social and cultural developments in the first and second Yugoslavia (1918-1991) was the tension between the center — the Serbian nation — and other constituent nations, mainly the Croats and the Slovenes. Relations between these nations were complicated by the different expectations of each nation in the new state. The South Slav nations, which voluntarily entered the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (SHS) in 1918, hoped that the new state would enable them to realize their aspirations as individual nations. In this, however, Serbian aspirations to create a large state including all the Serbs in its territory were in direct conflict with Croatian aspirations aiming at the consolidation of their language and creation of a political identity in a territory with a large Serbian minority. The Slovenes wanted to establish themselves as a distinct nation with its own cultural and political institutions. None of the nations wanted to create a new “Yugoslav” nation. These ideas are ably illustrated by Charles Jelavich’s examination of the textbooks used by the South Slavs before World War I. The first “centralization battle” in the Kingdom of SHS ended in 1921 with the acceptance of a centralist, Serbian-inspired constitution. Strong political opposition to it created a stalemate in the regulation of many aspects of social life, including education. From 1918 to the establishment of a royal dictatorship in 1929 not a single educational law was passed. In Slovenia, Austrian educational laws remained in effect, but with some important changes in the Slovene educational system, which took place immediately after World War I. Slovene language became the language of instruction in all secondary schools and at the university, established in Ljubljana in 1919. The curriculum was modified, mainly in social sciences and humanities, with an emphasis on South Slav history, geography, and literature. Also, the Serbo-Croatian language was introduced as a required subject in Slovenian elementary schools. The 1929 law on education cen-
ralized the organization of the educational system, curriculum, supervision, high-school graduation exams, etc., at all levels of education throughout Yugoslavia, but its implementation in the 1930s was affected by the economic crisis and poverty of the country, and therefore many provisions were not implemented.

Strong centralizing forces after 1945, led by the Agitprop, were at work in education organizationally and through the curriculum. The Federal law on elementary schools (1946), introducing seven-year compulsory education (a revolutionary measure for the southern part of Yugoslavia), meant a step backward for Slovenia, where eight-year compulsory education had been in effect since 1869. Eight-year compulsory elementary education was, however, reintroduced in Slovenia in 1950. With the introduction of self-management (1950) and abolition of the Agitprop (1952), the centralizing tendencies in education eased. While the curriculum remained under the tight control of the League of Communists (LC) for its ideological content, it was otherwise the responsibility of the individual republics rather than of the federal government.

In the 1950s, a new school reform of elementary and secondary schools was debated in Slovenia among educational professionals. Teachers were asked to discuss new curricula and offer their experiences and suggestions. When the General law on education was discussed at the federal level, the Slovenians held highly critical views of it, especially of its provisions for secondary education. Their criticisms were disregarded and in 1958 a federal law, considered the most important educational act of the second Yugoslavia, was enacted. It abolished dualism (villages vs. cities) in elementary education, introduced eight-year uniform elementary schools, and four-year secondary level, vocational schools, and gymnasia, and provided general principles for the entire educational system, including higher education, special education, and schooling for ethnic minorities. It included an important provision, namely, that diplomas and certificates issued anywhere in Yugoslavia were valid everywhere in the state. The following year (1959), a Slovenian law on general education was enacted, but it differed from the federal law in the provisions on secondary education. This was the first significant departure from party discipline where the League of Communists of Slovenia (LCS) supported and defended national education policies.

Important differences between the Yugoslav and the Slovenian approach to the schooling of minorities in Yugoslavia after the London Agreement (1954) were evident. Slovenes were pushing for a new law on minority schooling in Yugoslavia, in part for the purpose of
using it as a bargaining chip for securing minor measures for the benefit of the Slovenian minorities in Italy and Austria in a struggle for their ethnic rights. The Slovenes drafted a bill providing for bilingual schooling in Zone B of the former Free Territory of Trieste and in Prekmurje, along the Hungarian border, which was discussed in the Central Committee (CC) of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) in 1957. Serbian and Croatian representatives were against it, with the explanation that conditions in their territories were not ready for dealing with the problem of bilingual schooling because of the sizeable Hungarian minority in Croatia and Vojvodina and the Albanians in Kosovo. Slovenian politicians gave up on the bill, but in explaining their retrenchment at home they said that they would do whatever was right for the Slovene minorities in Italy and Austria, although they did not have a legal framework for their actions.

As it turned out, the Slovenian position on bilingual education was well taken. In 1959, when the Slovenian minority in Austria lost the right to bilingual schooling, the Slovenes protested. Explaining their action, the Austrians replied: "Why should 50,000 Slovenians in Austria be treated differently from 500,000 Hungarians in Yugoslavia?" The Slovenes again pressed for minority schooling legislation in Yugoslavia. The Belgrade position on the issue became more flexible due to pressures from Macedonia, and thus Slovenia was able to go ahead with its legislation on bilingual schooling, which was enacted in 1962.9

In discussions of the school reform in Belgrade in 1958, demands were heard that all republic curricula be unified, but no direct action followed. The same year, soon after the federal General law was passed, a federal body, the Prosvetni ssvet Jugoslavije (Educational Council of Yugoslavia), was established to oversee the development of education in Yugoslavia. The Slovenian curriculum differed from those in other republics: the Slovene language and literature, history and geography, although deeply steeped in the Communist Party ideology, were taught with the national emphasis on the premise that one should first know oneself, one's roots, and then expand one's knowledge to different peoples and nations. But Slovene children also studied Serbo-Croatian language and literature in the fifth grade as an obligatory subject, and in grades six to eight as an elective. Although the LCY often requested that republic curricula should be unified across Yugoslavia, the LCS resisted these pressures. The movement toward republic control of education, which began in the mid 1950s, culminated in 1970, when the federal ministry of education in Belgrade was abolished and all responsibility for education was entrusted to indi-
vidual republics and autonomous provinces. The existing historical differences among the educational systems in different republics grew larger. Complaints — exaggerated, to be sure — were often heard that it was easier to continue schooling outside the Yugoslav state than within it.

The period of decentralization of education coincided with the liberalization of the Yugoslav economy and society in the 1960s. Yet, partial introduction of market strategies, privatization, and liberalization of society and the economy could not solve the unsurmountable problems of foreign debt and declining productivity and economic growth for several reasons: the major one was the League of Communists’ constant tampering with the economy. Partial economic liberalization, however, also affected individual ethnic groups and nations, which began to organize to protect themselves as groups in the developing competitive economy, and demanded more democracy. Although market strategies continued to be wrapped in the slogans of Yugoslav unity, equality, socialism, and brotherhood, the LCY felt it was losing control of society. It saw a market economy and decentralization of the Yugoslav society as the culprits of social and economic problems and rising nationalism. Recentralization and tight LCY control of economic and social developments in Yugoslavia was seen as the only possible way out of the crisis. In the beginning of the 1970s, market mechanisms were abolished and replaced with a contractual economy, expressed first in the constitutional amendments of 1971, followed by the 1974 constitution. The system of contractual socialism, supposedly more democratic, was established with the proviso that the LCY remain the final arbiter of all decisions. The institutional infrastructure abolished at the federal level was replaced by a series of interrepublic institutions, bodies, and committees, which cranked out agreements and contracts of various shapes and sizes to regulate developments in the economic and social spheres. These were then endlessly debated and coordinated among the republics and autonomous provinces with the intention of unifying Yugoslav society. These interrepublic bodies had no legal power and their “products” could not be enforced; it was the LCY which tried to enforce by coercion those common policies to which individual republics could not agree - debate until you drop. Education was not immune to these developments and the story of the Yugoslav core curriculum amply illustrates this situation.
Federal Structure Established for the Centralization of the Educational System in the mid-1970s

While the constitution of 1974 left all the responsibility for education to individual republics and autonomous provinces (Article 165), it did provide the possibility for organizing and coordinating common economic and social development, although there existed no federal organizational structure or legal basis for such activity. The constitution required direct cooperation, agreements, self-management compacts, etc. among the republics and autonomous provinces at the federal level (Article 244), all of which were organized in interrepublic committees. Thus, the 1974 constitution legalized a highly complicated, ineffective, expensive, and only seemingly democratic system of social self-management and contractual society. A resolution adopted by the Tenth LCY Congress (1974), which served as a blueprint for the educational reforms, called for the unification and Marxist orientation of all education through the creation of a unified Yugoslav area, which would facilitate social and regional mobility. The resolution was also a prime example of technocratic and utilitarian concepts of education, subordinated to political and labor demands. A technocratic orientation of education was manifested in the most pronounced way in the reform of secondary education, which was implemented in a modified form in Slovenia in 1980/1981 but still generated much resentment among Slovene intellectuals.

Already in 1975, an Interrepublic and Regional Educational Reform Commission (Medrepubliško-pokrajinska komisija za reformo izobraževanja) was established with the intention of unifying the educational system throughout Yugoslavia, but had no legal power. Two reasons for educational reforms seemed to be prevalent. The first was economic and social in nature: to provide mobility of the work force throughout the country, whereby some economic problems (e.g., unemployment) would be solved; the second, not specifically spelled out, was to crack down on elementary curricula in Kosovo by centralizing the curriculum across Yugoslavia. After it came to light that elementary schools in Kosovo had adopted in 1976 new textbooks for literature, history, and geography, translated directly from those in Albania, and that Serbian children in Kosovo had to study their own history from an Albanian perspective, the centralizing tendencies in the commission became much stronger. Because of the demographics of the Albanian population, the Serbs felt that Kosovo, the cradle of their civilization, was being "Albanianized," and that the Serbian minority in Kosovo was not respected. While Serbian complaints were war-
ranted, it is hard to justify the way the Serbs tried to protect their eth-
nic minority in Kosovo; the Belgrade establishment was confident that it could hold Yugoslavia together with overall Serbian-majority rule and dominance and without much regard for other constituent mem-
bers - the nations and nationalities of the federal republics.

In order to implement the reform of the national educational sys-
tems and form a more unified Yugoslav educational system, two im-
portant agreements, which provided for the unification of educational
systems, were signed by the republic and federal assemblies: a "social
agreement" on the common base for the classification of occupations
and occupational education (1980) and an "agreement" of socialist
republics and socialist autonomous regions on the common base of
the educational system (1981). The first document contains: first, the
description of eight levels of complexity of various jobs in society;
second, the skills required for these jobs at each level; and third, min-
imal education for jobs at each level. All signatories were obliged to
provide conditions for common education required by the various jobs
and also to prepare a detailed classification of occupations in Yugo-
slavia. Slovenia agreed in principle to the agreement on the common
bases of the educational system, but opposed it in its details; it was
considered too specific, and therefore in violation of the constitutional
rights of individual republics and autonomous provinces in the area
of education. The agreement looked like a federal law and called for
a unified educational system in Yugoslavia, which would, among other
things, prepare the young and the adults for work, self-management,
and general people's defense, develop in them a Marxist orientation
and sense of belonging to the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia,
and cultivate the positive traditions of the National Liberation Struggle
and socialist revolution. In order to achieve the goals of the agree-
ment, the signatories agreed to work together on several issues, among
them on a coordination of curricula for all levels of schooling, which
were to be ready for implementation in the school year 1982/1983. They
also agreed to work together on the preparation and publication
of textbooks and other teaching materials, teachers' education, etc.
Both agreements established the political reasons for unifying the edu-
cational system and gave a green light to the preparation of a core
curriculum for preschool, eight-year elementary, and the first two years
of secondary education. The frenzy of agreements and contracts in
Yugoslavia from the mid-seventies on was evident not only in educa-
tion but also in other spheres of society. The Official Gazette for 1980
and 1981, for example, contained pages upon pages of self-managing
agreements on economic issues: on prices of goods, on customs du-
ties, etc., which had the form of federal law, but could not be legally enforced. Yugoslav politics constantly interfered with the troubled Yugoslav economy, only to complicate the situation even more, while the different nations and ethnic groups tried to protect their own interests by organizing themselves as distinct groups.


In speaking about a core curriculum two things come to mind: first, a curriculum which is organized around certain topics, social problems, students' needs, etc. This concept was developed in the first part of the twentieth century as an opposition to subject (discipline) oriented curricula and departmentalized knowledge. Second, a core curriculum can also denote a body of courses or school subjects offering "general education" that every student must complete before graduating. The definition of the Yugoslav core curriculum, as it appears in the various proposals, fits more the latter meaning:

A core curriculum is an agreed upon and coordinated content in preschool, elementary, and common bases of secondary education, which is integrated into the curriculum of the socialist republics and autonomous regions. It is not a replacement for the republic curriculum... nor could its contents be simply added to the republic curriculum.¹⁸

Work on the Yugoslav core curriculum began in 1979.¹⁹ Its preparation was entrusted to the Interrepublic and Regional Educational Reform Conference, while the Institutes of Education of individual republics were responsible for developing core curricula for specific subject areas, e.g., for mathematics and natural science (Slovenia), languages and art (Serbia), etc. To accomplish this task, teams of subject specialists from every republic and province were formed. The process of coordinating the entire core curriculum was entrusted to the Croatian Institute of Education.²⁰ First the republic and regional curricula for each level of education were analyzed, with the conclusion that, despite the same general goals, there were significant differences among the several republics and autonomous provinces as to what was to be taught and when, and how much time would be allocated for topics at the elementary and, especially, at the secondary level of education. The analysis showed that differences in individual educational systems caused problems for students transferring between sys-
tems, and thus prevented a free flow of the work force. Differences in curricula were also a cause of non-economical use of resources for education, as each republic had to publish its own textbooks and study/teaching materials. The position was taken that such problems were to be solved by means of a core curriculum for all subjects taught in preschool, elementary, and the first two years of secondary schools.

More intensive work on the core curriculum reform began after the Agreement on the common bases of the educational system was signed in March 1981. In the period between 1980 and 1986, five drafts were prepared and discussed. While the first, second, and third drafts were debated mainly among educational professionals, the fourth draft in mid-1983 became in Slovenia the subject of public debate, which turned very political and reverberated in the rest of Yugoslavia as Slovenian nationalism. The debate was focused mostly on subjects/courses that dealt with national issues, mainly native language and literature, history, and arts, and on the constitutional rights of each nation regarding education. In 1983, there were also attempts at centralizing post-secondary studies, at least as regards general education courses such as economics, sociology, psychology, etc. General outlines for the core curriculum of these courses were prepared and discussed.

In the introductions of all the drafts, the reasons for the curriculum reform were stated in the terms spelled out in the 1974 blueprint for educational reform. Listed goals indicate the organizing theme of the proposed core curriculum and could be summarized as (1) to educate for brotherhood and common life in the socialist, self-managing Yugoslavia; (2) to systematically impart the Marxist view to all education; and (3) to foster revolutionary traditions of the NOB (National Liberation Struggle) and socialist revolution in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). These major goals were repeated in the drafts in slightly different words three times: first, at the beginning of each section dealing with preschool, elementary, and secondary education; second, at the beginning of each section dealing with groups of subjects, e.g., social science; and third, at the beginning of many sections on subject content, especially literature, music, and social science, e.g., history. It was obvious that the ideological and political goals of the curriculum reform were in the foreground. Disciplines — subjects, pedagogical considerations, and children’s needs (transformation of the traditional school, individualization, development of critical and independent thinking, skills for permanent learning) — although also mentioned, seemed not to matter much. Even more, they were in direct conflict with the proposed core curriculum.
for various courses.

Besides the reasons and goals, the proposed core curriculum also dealt with the subjects and courses in three areas, specified for every grade of every level of schooling. The core curriculum for every course spelled out the objectives, contents, and general methodological advice for its implementation. Grade curricula, prescribing the number of weekly and yearly hours of instruction for each course, were included in the third and fourth drafts. The content was organized by level of education and by subject: a core curriculum for preschool education (one to three-year olds; and four to seven-year olds), and a core curriculum for the eight-year elementary and general education (two years of secondary education) with six sub-sections, each dealing with groups of interrelated subjects taught at the elementary level and in the first two years of the secondary level. These were: (1) nature and science for primary grades; (2) language, literature, and arts; (3) social sciences; (4) mathematics and natural sciences; (5) occupational and polytechnical education; and (6) general and social self-defense. The proposed core curriculum was strictly subject oriented; its organization (not the content) was more in line with the conservative perennialist-essentialist position, as revived by Mortimer Adler in the early 1980s, calling for three groups of subjects: language, literature, and fine arts; social studies, history, and geography; and mathematics and natural studies, to which some practical subjects (home economics, technical education, elements of vocational education, first aid) were added.

The Struggle between Two Concepts: Centralized vs. Decentralized Curriculum

The issue of centralized vs. decentralized curriculum is a permanent dilemma in each society. The history of education can attest that in non-democratic societies, or societies in perceived or real crisis, regardless of their nature (economic, political, or military), there is a greater demand for control of education, which could be achieved, first, directly, by prepackaging the curriculum; and second, indirectly, through external evaluation of students' knowledge. Yugoslavia in the late 1970s and early 1980s fit the profile of a non-democratic society — a one-party system with serious economic problems aggravated by ethnic conflicts. The LCY, which wanted to stay in power and hold Yugoslavia together, saw centralization as the way to achieve this goal. In education, centralization focused on the organizational structure
of the educational system and curriculum.

From the very beginning, different ideas and expectations were expressed with regard to the core curriculum, but were never openly and honestly discussed. The stated definition of the Yugoslav core curriculum seemed to be obvious and did not essentially change from one draft to another. It clearly favored a more decentralized core curriculum. Such a definition was also in line with the federal and the republics' constitutions, which gave all the responsibility for education to individual republics and autonomous provinces. Yet, the ensuing core curriculum drafts indicated that the definition of a core curriculum was, in fact, at the heart of the dispute. It was obvious that adherents of the centralist conception of education were stronger and controlled the process of formulating the curriculum.

Contradictions in the conceptions of the core curriculum became very clear and highly divisive with the formulation of each individual curriculum, with its specifics. Rather than taking a more general approach and discussing the concepts and the objectives and strategies to achieve them in each subject or group of subjects, and the minimal common content to support the stated objectives, the professional teams listed specific contents — individual historical events, names of writers, painters and musicians, works of literature, etc., which they considered important enough to be included in the core curriculum. Moreover, the contents of the core curriculum were decided quantitatively: they were to reflect the ethnic composition of Yugoslavia by allocating to material relevant for each ethnic group approximately the same share of the curriculum that the group had in the population of Yugoslavia. Thus, approximately 50 per cent of the core curriculum consisted of material relevant to the Serbian ethnic group, while the Slovene or Albanian share was about seven per cent. Not surprisingly, members of professional teams from different republics and provinces could not agree on the specifics, especially for subjects such as history, geography, languages, literature, and art, which dealt with contents important to each nation.

In 1982, the Institute of Education of the SR Slovenia prepared information on the second draft of the core curriculum for the Professional Council of Education of the SR Slovenia, the republic's authority for approving the curriculum for preschool, elementary, and secondary education. The council was requested specifically to take a position on the two different concepts of the core curriculum, which emerged in the discussion and were expressed in the introductory chapter of the second draft of the core curriculum. The first concept called for common, specific contents, teaching methods, and textbooks,
along with the number of weekly and yearly hours to be devoted to individual subjects, and designated the grade in which they were to be taught. The second concept called only for common goals and a minimal amount of common contents, while all the rest would be resolved by individual republics and autonomous provinces.

The general goals and objectives were not in dispute, at least not openly, for adherents of either concept. The Professional Council, which discussed the Yugoslav core curriculum for the first time, called for a clearer and more explicit definition of it, which would provide everyone with a clear direction for further work. It stressed the Slovene position, which was in favor of a more decentralized core curriculum, limited to common goals and objectives, and to only a minimal amount of common contents. Slovenian educational authorities stressed that they would refuse to accept any measure which would demand unified schooling, inappropriate for the specific conditions in Slovenia.

Despite clear Slovene positions on the nature of the core curriculum and objections to the detailed individual curricula, which were raised in the discussion of the second draft, the third and the fourth drafts were even more specific. The third draft suggested that in the natural sciences the core curriculum should represent 90 per cent of the entire curriculum, and in the social sciences and native language with literature the core should represent at least 60 per cent of the entire curriculum. Due to opposition, mostly from Slovenia, these proportions were changed in the fourth draft, to an unspecified percentage in natural sciences and to at least 50 per cent in social sciences, literature, and arts. However, for some subjects, e.g., foreign languages, the core curriculum accounted for 90 per cent of the entire curriculum. Slovenes rejected the ethnic population structure of Yugoslavia as an appropriate criterion for structuring the core curriculum of any subject, but especially of the so-called "national" subjects in the language/arts group (Slovene language, literature, arts, and music) and the social science group (geography, history). Strong objections also were voiced against the suggested grade-based curriculum, with specified weekly and yearly hours of instruction, which was added to the third and fourth drafts.

At the beginning the Slovene criticism of the core curriculum, mostly based on pedagogical arguments, was mostly general and loosely expressed, but the arguments did not change over the years. Despite Slovenian criticism, each subsequent draft was more specific and less in line with the stated definition of the curriculum. The Slovenes repeatedly complained that their criticism and suggestions were neither properly addressed nor taken into account. Therefore,
the same objections were expressed to the second, the third, and the fourth draft.

The debates in republic educational institutions on the Yugoslav core curriculum were summarized by the Professional Council in an official position paper in the Spring of 1983. The paper, which was sent to the Central Committee of the LCS, was in two parts: general observations on the third draft, and specific objections to individual core curricula for various subjects; the former expressed in a rather vague language that the third draft was not acceptable to Slovenia, and that further work on the document was needed. The following findings and suggestions were made:

1. The core curriculum should not make the curriculum uniform and centralized; in order to avoid any misunderstanding, the role of the core curriculum should be defined again and precisely.

2. The core curriculum is too extensive and too specific. The decision on what ought be in the core curriculum should not be based on the percentage shares of the ethnic populations in Yugoslavia. More sensitivity should be accorded to individual nation and local adjustment in "national" subjects should be stressed.

3. The core curriculum should not define a grade curriculum by prescribing weekly and yearly hours of instruction for each subject. The Slovenes suggested that time frames should be suggested only for longer time units, e.g., lower level of elementary school, first two years of secondary education, etc.

Other pedagogical arguments that Slovene educational authorities used in opposing every draft could be summarized as:

1. A strictly subject-oriented curriculum, as suggested, did not provide sufficient flexibility for already existing programs in Slovenia (culture days, sports and health days, environmental days, special projects, etc.), whereby integration of various disciplines into student learning was hoped to be achieved. There were also other differences between the Yugoslav proposal for elementary — and especially secondary — education and the existing Slovene curriculum, which was defended as pedagogically modern, more attuned to students' and social needs and, therefore, more appropriate for Slovenia. For example, in Slovene elementary education subject specialization in social and natural sciences was delayed until the sixth grade, while the proposed plan introduced specialization of the social sciences already in the fifth grade and required two separate subjects: history and geography.

2. The Yugoslav core curriculum did not consider special conditions in Slovenia where, for example, fifth grade students took the
Serbo-Croatian language with literature as an obligatory subject, which, in turn became elective in the sixth and seventh grades. Also, examples of the literature of other Yugoslav nations were already part of the existing elementary and secondary curriculum. Or, in the seventh and eighth grades, a civic education course was obligatory in Slovenia, while in the rest of Yugoslavia civic education was only suggested as part of secondary education under the title "Marxism and self-management." Slovenian professionals evaluated the Yugoslav core curriculum for this subject as too theoretical and insensitive to the broader population, which did not hold to Marxist ideology. Consequently, the Slovenes prepared an alternative core curriculum on "self-management, with bases of Marxism," which emphasized individual participation in social and political life regardless of the ideological orientation of the population. The Slovenian proposal was rejected by the Commission for Theoretical and Ideological Questions of the LCY. The only Slovene suggestion that was considered acceptable was a change in the course title.34

3. The major problem of the proposed core curriculum for elementary schools was the extensive content proposed for every subject. There would not be enough time in school to teach the core, let alone to add the specifics that each republic wanted to include. The approach to the coordination of the core curriculum was rather mechanical, without much sensitivity for regional and cultural differences. The Slovenes objected mostly to its contents in native language, arts, and social studies, where discussions were focussed intensely on deciding which historical events, writers, painters, or musicians should be included in the core curriculum. They argued that including the objectives and basic concepts of each discipline, which could be illustrated with specifics close to students, would result in a more acceptable core curriculum for everyone concerned.

The discussions drew attention to many problems in coordinating core curricula of "national" subjects, from literature and history to art. For example, medieval Serbian literature was extensively included in the literature core curriculum for elementary schools, while the Slovenian curriculum devoted very little attention to medieval literature either in general or in Slovenia. Hence, inclusion of medieval Serbian history in the core curriculum was considered unwarranted for Slovene elementary schools.35

Not much was changed in the fourth draft. Therefore, the Slovene representative requested that a separate Slovene position be included in the introduction to the fourth draft. In addition, the Slovene complaint was also directed at the process of collaboration in formulating
the fourth draft. It stated that the proceedings of the meeting of the Interrepublican and Regional Educational Reform Commission (13 May 1983), where the fourth draft was discussed and the Slovene criticism voiced, were not recorded: there were no minutes which would guide the writers of the fourth draft of the core curriculum. Nor was the Slovene criticism taken into account in the final draft. Again, the Slovenes rejected the grade curriculum and their weekly and yearly time allocation for individual courses. They objected to the hurried procedures, which did not allow time for an analytical and creative approach to the core curriculum; hence, professional criticism, expressed either in the professional teams or in public discussion, was neither addressed nor taken into account in the formulation of the core curriculum. The criticism stressed that such a detailed core curriculum, as proposed, could not allow for students' developmental characteristics, for teachers' and students' creativity, nor for an integration of meaningful activities outside class instruction into the learning process.36

It seemed that the pedagogical debate was going around in circles. There had been professional criticism of the second draft, but only to find out that the third and the fourth drafts were rewritten without major changes; even worse, changes that were made were in directions diametrically opposed to the thrust of Slovene criticism. Slovene professionals argued for decentralized, individualized and national culture-bound curricula mostly on the basis of psychological and pedagogical merits. But, as they repeatedly complained, their objections were not discussed professionally, and were ignored or rejected by majority voting. It was obvious that numerically stronger nations, e.g., the Serbs and also the Croats, favored the centralized concept of the curriculum. Although the strongest opposition to the proposal came from Slovenia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, the latter very quietly, also raised their reservations about it.37

A month later, the official press agency Tanjug38 reported that the fourth draft of the core curriculum was finished and accepted by the Interrepublican and Regional Educational Reform Commission in its meeting of 9-10 June 1983. The Commission also set a deadline for a formulation of the final draft (October 1983) and for the beginning of its implementation (school year 1984/1985). It appears that the June meeting of the professional group, which discussed the fourth draft of the core curriculum, again dismissed Slovenian criticisms.
Debate About the Core Curriculum Becomes Public and Political

It seems, however, that the events in June and the Tanjug report gave the Slovenes the impetus to expose and politicize problematic aspects of the core curriculum which were rejected in Slovenia. In the spring of 1983, the presidency of the Slovenian republic conference of the Socialist Alliance of Working People (SAWP) was informed about the third draft of the core curriculum and discussions which had taken place in the Slovene educational establishment. The presidency of the Socialist Alliance discussed the topic and formulated its position, which was published later in the spring. While the SAWP position did reflect the professional criticism of the core curriculum, its wording was very careful, on the one hand approving the abolition of unnecessary differences in educational systems, but on the other hand opposing a mandatory uniform curriculum which would deny the nation’s constitutional rights. On the same issue, a group of professors of Slovene language and literature published their position on the core curriculum for Slovene language and literature, criticizing it as professionally and socially inappropriate for Slovenia. They requested that the core curriculum be accepted by consensus rather than by majority voting, and that a new professional team be formed and enough time allowed for work on the core curriculum for native languages.

An important change in the Slovene public discussion of the Yugoslav core curriculum occurred in the summer of 1983. The Ljubljana daily Delo published several articles on the subject, written mostly by Slovene writers, among them Ciril Zlobec and Janez Menart. Their criticism was directed at the state goals of education and at the suggested core curriculum for subjects dealing with national issues, especially the native (Slovene) language and literature. Both articles were very direct in pointing out that every nation has a constitutional right to decide about its education, and that nobody can force the Slovenes to implement any educational models with denationalizing effects. TV Novi Sad (Vojvodina) prepared a round table on the core curriculum at which Ciril Zlobec said: "The core curricula are a great shame for all those who collaborated on them and a great humiliation for those for whom they are intended." What carefully worded pedagogical arguments could not achieve was done by the Slovene writers, who were not afraid to verbalize what they perceived: they pointed at the emperor with no clothes. Their arguments were heard in Slovenia and throughout Yugoslavia, and discussions about the core curriculum continued in the fall. One of the most explosive ones was organized by the Society of Slovene Writers. Its main points
were summarized in a statement sent to the CC LCS with the request that it be passed on to the federal assembly and other federal political organizations. The statement was also sent to the principal newspapers in every republic and autonomous province. The essential points of the three-page statement were: (1) There was no real need for the Yugoslav core curriculum in Slovenia. According to the writers' view, Slovene cooperation in this endeavor was due to the belief that this action was necessary to achieve a stronger political unity of the state. The reason for this conclusion was the fact that in the spring of 1983 Slovenia adopted a new reformed curriculum for elementary schools independent from the Interrepublic cooperation. (2) The initiative went beyond the framework agreed upon in the interrepublic consultations and changed into an exercise where the "bigger and stronger" wanted to achieve their centralistic and unitaristic goals by coercion, and the proposed core curriculum was an infringement of the Slovene and Yugoslav constitutions. Therefore, the Slovene writers (1) requested an open public and professional discussion of the core curriculum, and (2) because of past Slovene experience in the interrepublic cooperation in the formulation of the core curriculum, demanded the withdrawal of all further Slovene participation to avoid further pressures. The articles and especially the writers' protest statement were presented in the media throughout Yugoslavia as Slovene nationalism, which needed to be stopped. Discussions followed in the republic assembly and political organizations in Slovenia. The SAWP and the LCS adopted the major criticism expressed by the writers, although their formulation of it was less direct. They played down the seriousness of the writers' criticism by stating that it had an emotional as well as rational component, and condemned the writers' call for ending the Slovene participation in the project. While the writers may also have reacted emotionally, they did address the problems of the core curriculum in a manner that received attention by using metaphors to get the message across, e.g., the poet Janez Menart wrote about the Slovene nation as a small and complete organism, which wanted to stay that way. He compared the Yugoslav core curriculum as a unitaristic attempt by which "the Slovene cat would be made into the tail of the Yugoslav lion."}

First, there was nothing wrong with being emotional; emotions are human and cannot be divorced from reason in real life. The two are interwoven and can only be separated artificially for analytical purposes. The unity of reason and emotions has not been respected enough in our societies where there has been much "rational" planning and regulating of human existence, which has not worked pre-
cisely because it has overlooked the human, vital emotional component. Since the Slovenes had an abundant historical experience of being oppressed as a nation, they might be overzealous when the outside world, for whatever reason, places restrictions on their freedom. While that is not always the most productive thing to be, it is, surely, human, especially when the most defining elements of one’s existence are touched. Native language, literature, history, and arts are certainly major defining elements of every culture, embodied in nations — intimate, almost sacred matters that have been in the center of national struggles for freedom and human rights everywhere, also in Slovenia. It was through their culture that the Slovenes constituted themselves not only as a nation but also as a state.

Only a few days after the writers’ statement, Andrej Marinc, president of the CC LCS, called a conference in which the most prominent representatives of the Slovene political and social life discussed the core curriculum. They agreed that “the writers are justified in warning about the centralistic and unitaristic tendencies which we are facing also in other areas of social and economic life.” They requested that the discussion about the core curriculum continue tolerantly on the interrepublic level, but that its role be defined more precisely, so that it could not be misinterpreted as being incompatible with the constitutional rights of each nation. They warned that misinformation, like that contained in the minutes of the fifth meeting of the committee for ideological and theoretical work at the CC LCY, to the effect that the core curriculum had already been adopted, was misleading and disturbing. In November, Andrej Marinc spoke on Belgrade TV about the Slovenia criticism of the core curriculum and defended the right of each republic to make its own decisions on education, especially as regards the native language and the nation’s history.

Slovene representatives also discussed the core curriculum in federal bodies. In November of 1983, Franc Šetinc, president of the republic conference of the SAWP, spoke about the topic at length at the presidency of the federal conference of the SAWP. In his discussion, he emphasized that the several authentic cultures and nations in Yugoslavia should not be eliminated but rather that bridges should be built between them. Šetinc stressed the need to respect the Yugoslav and the Slovene constitutions, and that the education of each nation should be based on its national culture, which, in turn, should provide the basis for respect and for understanding of other nations in Yugoslavia. A stronger Yugoslavia, he stressed, can be built only without the fear of individual cultures and nations for their existence. Unfortunately, the core curricula for “national” subjects did raise such a
fear among the Slovene intelligentsia, which, as has been explained many times, was not due to zealous nationalism or lack of information. The fear was due to real events which had taken place in the process of making the Yugoslav core curriculum. Šetinc admitted that mistakes had also been made on the Slovene side, and that some nationalistic remarks were heard in Slovenia, but he also said that the Slovenes would not allow themselves to be labeled as nationalists merely for expressing their criticism or protecting their constitutional rights. He called for further cooperation in searching for educational alternatives acceptable to all in Yugoslavia.47

After the political turmoil about the core curriculum in the fall of 1983, when assurances were given in every political forum on the federal level that it was the constitutional right of every republic to regulate its education, the core curriculum discussion continued throughout Yugoslavia. In Slovenia, specialists for language and literature prepared an alternative core curriculum, and a comparative analysis of the proposed core and the Slovenian curriculum was prepared for public debate, led by the SAWP. In June 1984, the discussion was wrapped up and three conclusions were formulated: (1) the fourth draft of the proposed core curriculum could not be accepted; (2) the definition of core curriculum as accepted by the Presidency of the Republic Conference of the SAWP should be followed in any further cooperation for discussion; and (3) there is no need to change the curriculum for elementary schools, except by updating its contents.48 Half a year later, the Professional Council of Education of the SR Slovenia sent a short report to the CC LC of Slovenia, which repeated the earlier stated conclusions.

In 1984, at the meeting of the Interrepublic and Regional Educational Reform Commission, representatives from individual republics, except Slovenia, stated that the proposed core curriculum would be included in their national curricula.49 In 1986, various political and professional organizations on the federal level organized in Belgrade a conference on uniformity and commonality of the Yugoslav educational system. It was stressed over and over again that a precise core curriculum was an essential ingredient for unifying the Yugoslav educational system and homogenization of the Yugoslav society.50 In 1987, according to a Tanjug report,51 the core curriculum with some changes, was implemented in Serbia, including in Vojvodina and Kosovo. All the educational laws were harmonized, new textbooks for elementary schools had already been published or were in preparation, and a cooperation agreement between the universities of Belgrade and Priština (Kosovo) was signed. Serbia succeeded in unifying the educational
system in the republic.

Although there were still reports in the daily press about Slovenian cooperation in the preparation of the fifth draft, I was unable to locate a copy of it. On the basis of media reports, one might conclude that the interrepublican commission continued to strive for a more acceptable alternative of the Yugoslav core curriculum, but with little practical consequences for the Slovene educational system.

Conclusion

The Yugoslav core curriculum project reminds us of the reasons why Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes joined in the Kingdom of the SHS in 1918: they joined in the hope of achieving their own, not only different, but also conflicting goals. The Serbian goal of uniting all the Serbs in one large state certainly did not materialize. Yugoslavia fell apart in 1991 with the Serbs defeated, scattered throughout all the Yugoslav successor states and emigrating by thousands to every continent. The Croats and the Slovenes had better luck; they attained their independent states. The goal declared in the 1970s of creating a unified Yugoslav space in a democratic, one-party state based on self-management, brotherhood, and equality of all nations, was not only an anachronism, but also a “dressed up” unitaristic Serbian goal, which did not materialize for several reasons. Two of them were clearly evident in the failed project of the Yugoslav core curriculum: first, the lack of respect for smaller nations, their cultures and rights; and second, the lack of a democracy in which majority rule would not be the only democratic principle.

Although the Slovenes tried to protect their economic interest in Yugoslavia, they were not very vocal about it, but they certainly did raise their voice when they felt their culture, language, and national identity were threatened. The Slovene united opposition to the project (professionals, intellectuals, and politicians) occurred precisely because of the fear that national identity and existence were being jeopardized. Yet, the Slovene criticism of the project was labeled as nationalism and selfishness. This concern was certainly not being alleviated by dire predictions in the media, triggered by the fight over the core curriculum, which saw the Slovene nation eventually melting into a Yugoslav one in any event. At the time, it really did not matter if the Slovene fear was real or merely perceived, because fear, regardless of its nature, produces the same human behavior: self-protective mechanisms, and mobilizes people to unite in their own defense regardless of their political and ideological orientation. Although the
Yugoslav core curriculum was not implemented in Slovenia, discussions, which were not always civil, diminished the trust of the Slovenes in a possible development of a democratic, multicultural Yugoslavia, and certainly affected their will to cooperate.
Endnotes for Chapter 1 (pp. 16-35)

1. Arhiv Republike Slovenije (ARS), Fond Edvard Kardelj, box 126, doc. 6599, Informacija s 14. seje predsedstva CK ZKS o varnostnih razmerah in delovanju opozicijskih sil v SR Sloveniji.


4. For more, see publications in: Zbirka plenuma kulturnih delavcev OF.

5. ARS, Fond republiške konference SZDL (RK SZDL), box 70, 19. seja predsedstva RK SZDL, 11 November 1980.


7. ARS, RK SZDL, box 69, 27. seja Predsedstva RK SZDL, 10 March 1981.


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17. Punk pod Slovenci (Ljubljana: Univerzitetna konferenca ZSMS, 1984).


25. ARS, RK SZDL, box 63, 67. seja Predsedstva RK SZDL, 12 April 1983; and box 62, 76. seja Predsedstva RK SZDL, 4 October 1983.


28. ARS, RK SZDL, Box 1, 65. seja Predsedstva RK SZDL, 13 January 1987.


30. Ibid.

31. ARS, RK SZDL, Box 1, 68. seja Predsedstva RK SZDL, 27 February 1987.

33. Horvat, Zaplembe in prepovedi.

34. Quoted in Ampak [note 32], pp. 44-45.


Endnotes for Chapter 2 (pp. 36-57)

1. Dozorevanje slovenske samozavesti, Dokumenti SJM (Ljubljana: Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij, 1995), p. 15 (discussion by Dr. Zdenko Roter).

2. Savezni sekretariat za unutrašnje poslove, Uprava za istraživanje, analize i informisanje, Neprijateljsko delovanje sa anarhističko-liberalističkih pozicija - rad i mere SDB, Arhiv Sove (Sova Archives).

3. "Intervju z Gregorjem Tomcem," in Razgledi (Ljubljana), No. 20 (29 October 1997).

4. See more about the history of punk in Slovenia in Punk pod Slovenci (Ljubljana: KRT, 1984). Most analytical writings about punk were published by the journal Problemi between 1977 (the so-called punk issue) and 1982.


6. The Council for the Protection of Constitutional Order was also in charge of controlling the State Security Service (SSS), i.e., secret police.

7. Joint session of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia
and the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia on 23 May 1983, *Discussion and adoption of security measures*, transcript of the discussion, p. 37, discussion by Tomaž Erli, Archives of the Republic of Slovenia (ARS), the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia section.


10. *Dozorevanje slovenske samozavesti* (Ljubljana: Center za raziskovanje javnega mnenja in množičnih komunikacij, 1995). But after the publication of issue No. 57 of *Nova revija* (1988), the authorities perceived alternative movements as a smaller “threat” than the so-called “bourgeois opposition.”

11. Shorthand notes of the meeting between the President of the Presidency of the CC LCS Milan Kučan and senior members of the LCS, 28 February 1989, ARS, former CC LCS Archives.


13. Transcript of the conversation after the seventy-fourth extended session of the PC CC LCS on 9 December 1998, ARS, CC LCS section.

14. The federal government called for the adoption of amendments to the federal constitution in the field of economy. This was done in the context of discussing the introduction of the market system. The Association of Slovene Writers was against the changes and some legal experts were of the opinion that the proposed changes would lead to greater centralism. There were several appeals to the Slovene Assembly to reject the amendments. The Association of Writers and the Sociological Association set up their own constitutional commissions. The Slovene Assembly backed the adoption of the federal amendments anyway.
15. For more about the writing of the writers’ constitution and about the attitude of the opposition toward constitutional issues see: Peter Jambrek, *Ustavna demokracija* (Ljubljana: DZS, 1992); Tine Hribar, *Slovenci kot nacija* (Ljubljana: ČZP Enotnost, 1994); and Dimitrij Rupel, *Slovenska pot do samostojnosti in priznanja* (Ljubljana: Kres, 1992).

16. While Slovene State Security agents were carrying out a secret search of the Mikro Ada, where Janez Janša worked, they came across a secret document written by the commander of the 9th, i.e. Ljubljana, army region General Svetozar Višnjić. The document referred to the stepping up of military readiness of his units because of circumstances in Slovenia. The State Security Service informed the military investigators about its discovery.

17. Information of Republic Conference of Socialist Alliance, third session of Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance, Dr. Ljubo Bavcon’s speech.


19. *Some elements for the analysis of the open session of the presidency of the Socialist Youth*, working materials for administrative staff of the Presidency of the SRS. Archives of the Presidency of the SRS.

20. Written record of the seventh coordination meeting of the organizers of the meeting in Cankarjev dom on 16 May 1989, ARS, section relating to the Socialist Alliance, 537, temporary cataloguing Republican conference of the Socialist Alliance, technical unit 1,012.

21. Various notes and letter related to the Basic Charter, ARS, section relating to the Socialist Alliance AS 537, temporary cataloguing Republican Conference of the Socialist Alliance, technical unit 1,012.

22. The May Declaration contained the following more radical views: 
1. We wish to live in a sovereign state of the Slovene nation. 2. As a sovereign state we will be free to decide about our ties to South Slavs and other nations within the framework of the new Europe. 3. The Slovene state can be based on the respect of human rights and liberties, a democracy, which includes political pluralism, and such social order as will guarantee spiritual and material welfare in accordance
with natural resources and human capacities of the citizens of Slovenia.


24. Minutes of the 8th coordination meeting of the organizers of the meeting in Cankarjev dom on 22 May 1989, ARS, section relating to the Socialist Alliance AS 537, temporary cataloguing Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance, technical unit 1,012.

25. Written record of coordination meetings and meetings of the Round table transcripts of Round table discussions and other materials related to Round table, ARS, section relating to the Socialist Alliance, temporary cataloguing Republic Conference of the Socialist Alliance, technical unit 1,012.

26. Constitutional amendments met with strong resistance in federal governmental bodies as well as in the leadership of the LCY, who did everything in their power to prevent their adoption.

27. The Slovene authorities banned the rally despite pressures from Belgrad and even though the American Ambassador, Warren Zimmerman, himself tried to obtain permission for it (after more than forty rallies in the southern parts of the country, and the violent overthrow of governmental officials in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro!).

28. The Socialist Youth changed its name to the Liberal Democratic Party on 10 November 1989. The LC retained its name, but in February 1990 added to it the Party of Democratic Reform. The Socialist Alliance became the Socialist Party in March 1990. The Veterans' Alliance remained a non-party organization, but secretly supported primarily the Communists. Former socialist trade unions, which also had the status of socio-political organizations, were under pressure from other trade union organizations and thus began to engage mostly in trade union issues.

29. Transcript of the conversation between the president of the presidency of the SR Slovenija Dr. Janez Stanovnik and the U.S. Ambassador to SFRY, Warren Zimmerman, 5 December 1989. In author’s possession.
30. The declaration proclaimed the sovereignty of Slovenia, demanded that federal bodies respect Slovene legislation in Slovenia, and promised to pass a constitutional act declaring which federal laws would no longer be valid in Slovenia.


**Endnotes for Chapter 3 (pp. 58-78)**

1. In this paper, the terms “nation,” “national,” and “nationality” have the same meaning as in the official English translation of the Yugoslav 1974 constitution. *The constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, 1974 (Ljubljana: Dopisna delavska univerza, 1974). The terms “nation” and “national” do not refer to Yugoslavia as a whole, but to any of its five South Slav constituent ethnic groups. The term “nationality” refers to either of the two autochthonous non-Slav ethnic groups (Albanians in Kosovo, and Hungarians in Vojvodina).


5. An excellent book, by Charles Jelavich — *South Slav Nationalisms: Textbooks and Yugoslav Union before 1914* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1990) — is a rare exception. Analyzing the Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian textbooks used in elementary and secondary schools before World War I, he set the historical framework for considering the role of education in the life of the new state of the South Slav nations.


7. For more information about cultural history, particularly education, in the first decade of the Kingdom of the SHS, see Ervin Dolenc, *Kulturni boj: slovenska kulturna politika v Kraljevini SHS, 1918-1929* (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva založba, 1996).

8. For more about education in Slovenia after World War II see: Aleš


14. The first draft of the agreement was written in 1978, and was debated for over two years before being signed on 6 March 1981. See Uradni list SR Slovenije (Ljubljana), No. 5 (21 May 1981), pp. 1203-1206.


17. Ibid., p. 1206.

18. “Skupna programska jedra vzgojnoizobraževalnega dela v predšolski vzgoji, osnovnom izobraževanju in osnovah srednjega izobraževanja v SFR Jugoslaviji, (delovni prevod),” Zagreb, June 1983,
(working translation of the fourth draft), p. 6. Fond MK CK ZKS.


20. Medjurepubličko-pokrajinska konferencija Zavoda za unapredjivanje odgoja i obrazovanja was established in 1976 for the purpose of assuming some functions of the federal ministry of education, abolished in 1970. The seat of the conference was located at a republic or regional Zavod za šolstvo/Zavod za unapredjivanje školstva and moved yearly from one republic to another.

21. I was unable to locate the first and the fifth draft (1985) in any form in Slovenia this past winter (1998). The first draft is mentioned in the introduction of the second draft (p. II), while the fifth draft is mentioned in two secondary sources: Ciril Zlobec, Slovenska samobitnost i pisac, translated from Slovenian by Pavica Hromin (Zagreb: Globus, 1987), p. 116; and in Nevenka Sreš, The Core Curriculum, (graduation thesis, Pedagogical Faculty of the University of Maribor, 1995), p. 59. A part of the second draft (introduction and the social sciences - May 1982) was found in the archives of the Strokovni svet SR Slovenije za vzgojo in izobražvanje (Professional Council of the SR Slovenia of Education) as the material for its eighth meeting, 21 January 1981. The entire third draft was published in the journal Misao (December 1982). The fourth draft for preschool and eight-year elementary education (June 1983) in the Slovenian translation was found in the archives of the CK ZKS. Predlog zajedničkog programskog jezgra jezičko-umetničkog područja (A proposal for the core curriculum for languages and art), Beograd, May 1983 (a part of the fourth draft) was obtained from the personal archives of Janez Menart. Unless otherwise stated, the third and fourth drafts were used for this analysis.

22. "Informacija o stanju osnutkov programskih jeder vsebin v visokem izobraževanju" Center za razvoj univerze (10 June 1983), Fond: MK CK ZKS; "Informacija o posvetu o usklajevanju programskih jeder vsebin za programe v visokem šolstvu" Strokovni svet SRS za vzgojo in izobraževanje (14 July 1983), Fond MK CK ZKS.

23. See, for example, the Fourth draft, p. 5. See also: Rezolucija X. kongresa ZKJ, 1974, pp. 316-328.


30. Ibid., p. 117.

31. Director of the Institute of Education of the SR Slovenia, Janez Sušnik, reported that professional criticism of the second draft, expressed by the Professional council, was not considered in the third draft. See Zapisnik 37. seje Strokovnega sveta SR Slovenije za vzgojo in izobražvanje (9 March 1983), p. 3. Archives of the Zavod SR Slovenije za šolstvo.


34. "Informacija o izradi zajedničkog jezgra predmeta 'Osnovi marksizma i socialističkog samoupravljanja,'" Centralni komitet SKJ, Komisija za idejni i teorijski rad u SKJ (3 October 1983), Fond CK ZKS, 717, 025-855/1.

35. Ibid., p. 9.

37. At the meeting of the InterRepublican and Regional Educational Reform Commission, a Macedonian delegate requested a democratic discussion and again stressed that suggestions from Slovenia and Kosovo should be evaluated. Tanjug (Beograd), quoted in Delo (Ljubljana), 5 May 1984, p. 12.


40. Ibid., pp. 351-352.

41. Ibid., p. 352.


43. Zlobec, Slovenska samobitnost, pp. 64-65.

44. “Protestna izjava Društva slovenskih pisateljev” (20 September 1983), Fond CK ZKS.


47. “Razprava Franca Šetinca na seji predsedstva Zvezne konference SZDL Jugoslavije” (3 November 1983), ARS, Fond RK SZDL, box 61.


50. See Stevan Bezdanov “Aktuelna pitanja ostvarivanja jedinstva i zajedništva u politici i sistemu vaspitanja i obrazovanja u SFRJ”, p.


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