Poland and Germany, 1989-1991: The Role of Economic Factors in Foreign Policy

Randall E. Newnham
Poland and Germany, 1989-1991:
The Role of Economic Factors in Foreign Policy

Randall E. Newnham

The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington
2000
The Donald W. Treadgold Papers in Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies provide a forum for the rapid dissemination of current scholarly research on the regions indicated by the title. Publications include papers from symposia and monographs that may be too long for most journals but too short to appear in book form. Subscriptions and special orders are available. The Editorial Board of The Donald W. Treadgold Papers does not endorse the views, or assume any responsibility for the factual accuracy, of any publication in the series. The respective authors are solely responsible for the views expressed and the factual accuracy of their contributions.

Submissions in the field of Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies are considered for publication. Articles should be of substantial length—approximately 40-100 pages, including endnotes. All transliteration should conform to Library of Congress rules. Submission on disk is requested upon acceptance. Submissions should be sent in triplicate to the address below, with attention to Sabrina P. Ramet, editor. Scholars interested in submitting works for consideration are asked to obtain a copy of the style guide before submitting their work.

The Donald W. Treadgold Papers
Jackson School of International Studies
Box 353650
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3650
(206) 543-4852
treadgld@u.washington.edu
About this series

The Donald W. Treadgold Papers publication series was created to honor a great teacher and great scholar. Donald W. Treadgold was professor of history and international studies at the University of Washington from 1949 to 1993. During that time, he wrote seven books, one of which — Twentieth Century Russia — went into eight editions. He was twice editor of Slavic Review, the organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, and received the AAASS Award for Distinguished Contributions to Slavic Studies, as well as the AAASS Award for Distinguished Service. Professor Treadgold molded several generations of Russian historians and contributed enormously to the field of Russian history. He was, in other ways as well, an inspiration to all who knew him.

The Treadgold Papers series was created in 1993 on the occasion of Professor Treadgold's retirement, on the initiative of Professor Daniel Waugh. Professor Treadgold passed away in December 1994. The series is dedicated to the memory of a great man, publishing papers in those areas which were close to his heart.

Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor
About the author of this issue

Randall Newnham is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Berks-Lehigh Valley College of the Pennsylvania State University in Reading, Pennsylvania. His works include *Deutsche Mark Diplomacy: Economic Linkage in German-Russian Relations* (forthcoming from the Penn State University Press), "More Flies with Honey: Positive Economic Linkage in German Ostpolitik from Bismarck to Kohl" in *International Studies Quarterly* (March 2000), and "The Price of German Unity: The Role of Economic Aid in the German-Soviet Negotiations" in *German Studies Review* (October 1999).
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the Editor and Managing Editor of the Treadgold papers—as well as the anonymous reviewers—for their help in refining this paper. Earlier versions of this piece benefitted from the input of Dr. Andrzej Korbonski of UCLA. The research which made this work possible was sponsored by the UCLA International Studies and Overseas Program (ISOP) and by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). The help of Dr. Dieter Bingen and others at the Federal Institute for Russian, East European, and International Studies (BIOST), in Cologne, Germany was also essential, as was the cooperation of numerous interview partners in both Germany and Poland.
In recent years a number of studies have appeared on the key diplomatic events related to German reunification. The importance of Germany's actions at this time, particularly its efforts to win over its suspicious eastern neighbors, Poland and the then-USSR, seemed clear to scholars; winning the cooperation of these states helped not only to make reunification possible but to facilitate the end of the Cold War. However, most studies of the reunification period have been limited to simply recounting the history of these crucial international events. An attempt to explain the diplomacy of this period in a way which will advance our understanding of the underlying nature of German-East European relations or of International Relations theory has rarely been made. This study will make such an attempt.

The underlying focus of the study will be on the role of Germany's economic strength in shaping its ties with Poland, a much poorer state. The disparity between the states is clear; recent figures from the World Bank, for example, indicate that Germany's GNP is some twenty times larger than that of Poland. Noted political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye aptly described such a condition as "asymmetrical interdependence;" the economic ties do affect both sides, but one side is far more dependent on the other. Often such an economic gap between countries facilitates the use of economic statecraft by the wealthier state. While other factors, including some German concessions on political and security issues, certainly played a role in influencing Poland and its other eastern neighbors at the time of reunification, it is the contention of this study that German economic strength also played a key role—in two ways.

First, the study will focus on economic linkage, the use of economic leverage to win political concessions. In particular, the role of "positive linkage," the use of economic rewards as a tool of influence, will be stressed. While all types of economic linkage are frequently neglected by scholars of diplomacy, positive linkage has been especially understudied, perhaps because it is often subtle and non-conflictual compared to negative linkage (the use of economic sanctions). Yet a close study of German diplomacy in the period before, during, and after reunification makes it clear that the promise of German economic aid of various types did play an important role at the time. Furthermore, by using rewards rather than punishments, Germany seems to have been able to influence Poland (and other East European states) while at the same time building friendly bilateral ties.

As in other such cases of "asymmetrical interdependence,"
though, German relations with Central and Eastern Europe do not involve only outright economic linkage by the wealthier state. A second factor is also of great importance—the subtle role that the economic imbalance plays in shaping the poorer state’s foreign policy preferences, even when the wealthier state does not initiate a clear economic quid pro quo. As we shall see, for example, the views of opposition leaders in Poland before 1989 on relations with Germany—and, in turn, the attitude of the new post-communist government after 1989—were shaped in part by their knowledge that Germany was vital to Poland’s economic recovery. Germany was needed as a bilateral trading and investment partner, as a link to the rest of Western Europe and, eventually, as an advocate for possible Polish membership in the European Union.

However, it will also become clear in this study that a situation of “asymmetrical interdependence” does not leave all leverage in the hands of the wealthier partner. It is certainly possible for a weaker state to initiate linkages of its own—offering to make the smallest possible political concessions in return for the largest possible economic ones. Also, the economically weaker state can, of course, evade the bilateral “asymmetry” by appealing to other, stronger states. As we shall see, this dynamic was particularly important in the crucial German-Polish dispute over finalizing recognition of the Oder-Neisse border.

Why, though, has this study chosen to illustrate the role of economic asymmetry and linkage by focusing on German-Polish relations during the 1989-1991 period? This case has been chosen for several reasons. First, Poland was an important target of German diplomacy during the reunification period; indeed, it could be argued that Poland was second only to the then-USSR as an obstacle to unity. Certainly Britain and France also had some doubts about unification. Yet they were linked to Bonn by long-standing political and military ties and did not have any border disputes with Germany. Thus, opposition to unification was less intense and easier to defuse in these states than in Poland or the USSR. As we shall see, fear of Germany led the Poles to attempt to disrupt the 2+4 negotiating framework, in hopes of bringing more states into the process and slowing it down drastically. Hence, understanding German-Polish ties is important to understanding the overall diplomacy of German unification, with all its implications for East and West Europe and the world as a whole.

Second, the scale of economic disparity between the states is similar to that seen in German relations with other states in Eastern and Central Europe; hence, this study may have relevance for these
states as well. As we shall see, the argument can even potentially be extended to comparisons with other cases where economic inequalities have existed for many years, such as U.S.-Mexican relations.

Third, it could be argued that German-Polish relations represent a "hard case" for the role of economic influences in world affairs. While the clear economic disparity between the states seemed to make economic linkage possible, the political issues involved were very difficult. How could such tense ties be affected by the "weak" weapon of economic aid? Many Poles were fiercely opposed to reunification and deeply suspicious of cooperation with Germany on any issue, from border controls to the rights of the German minority in Poland. Bilateral ties seemed to be poisoned by memories of German atrocities in 1939-1945 and the Polish expulsion of millions of Germans after 1945. The lingering territorial dispute over the German lands which Poland had been given after the war remained formally unresolved until after German unity was achieved. Indeed, in early 1990 relations temporarily became so tense that the non-communist Polish government actually asked Soviet troops to remain in Poland to help protect the country. Yet despite these huge problems, Germany eventually succeeded in establishing a very close relationship with Poland, a relationship so close that many Poles now regard Germany as being not only their country's most crucial diplomatic partner but also its closest friend.

How was Germany able to achieve this astonishing result? This study will show that economic aid—in the form of loans, export credits, and help in facilitating Polish ties to the European Union—played an important role. Also, more subtle knowledge of Germany's economic role was at work. Generally, even when Poles were inclined to resist German initiatives, they remembered that Germany was crucial to their future, especially in the economic realm, and decided to be more flexible.

In this study, the transition to the new post-Cold War era in German-Polish ties will be examined in detail, with a focus on the often-subtle role of German economic strength in influencing Polish policy. The analysis will center first on the emergence of a new attitude toward Germany among the Polish opposition, then on the dramatic upheavals in Eastern Europe, which made it possible for the new ideas to become political reality. Next, three major events in German-Polish ties will be examined, in chronological order. First, the initial breakthrough in bilateral ties which took place in the fall of 1989—culminating in Chancellor Kohl's visit to Poland in November, 1989—will be discussed. The Joint Declaration accompanying Kohl's
visit was a classic example of the kind of mutually beneficial positive economic linkage which has come to characterize German-Polish relations in recent years. Next, the period of tension which began with the re-emergence of the Oder-Neisse border issue in late 1989 will be examined. Although an awareness of Germany's economic importance to their country was important in inducing the Poles to moderate some of their demands on this issue, ultimately the crisis could be resolved only by German recognition of the border. Third, the negotiations which led up to the June 1991 comprehensive German-Polish friendship treaty will be discussed. Here there were clear signs that relations were returning to the economic linkage pattern of late 1989—but with one difference; in 1991, the crucial lure which Germany employed was not bilateral economic aid but a promise to help Poland enter the European Union. In the final section of the chapter, German-Polish relations immediately after 1991 will be briefly outlined, with a focus on cross-border cooperation and Poland's efforts to strengthen its ties to the EU and NATO. In each of these sections we will examine the goals of the two sides and the various strategies—economic and otherwise—which they employed to achieve their goals.

**Polish "Deutschlandpolitik": A new approach emerges**

For many years after the Second World War the conventional wisdom about Polish attitudes toward Germany was clear. Despite such steps toward reconciliation as the conclusion of the 1970 Warsaw Treaty, it continued to seem obvious to most observers—both inside and outside Poland—that Poland would always, unalterably, oppose the reunification of Germany. Poland's leaders had long tried to put a brave face on the Warsaw Treaty's provisions regarding the Oder-Neisse border, claiming that Germany had fully recognized the border and that this recognition would, indeed, be binding on a reunified Germany. Nonetheless, at the same time, they were quite clear that the continued existence of East Germany [the GDR] remained vital to Poland. The GDR divided and thus weakened Germany and also provided a buffer between Poland and the Federal Republic, a state which could never be fully trusted by many Poles. Mieczyslaw Rakowski, who later headed the last communist government in Poland before democracy was introduced, stated the view clearly:

I see the creation of the GDR as the only gift that we have received from God since the battle of Grünwald
[the Polish victory in 1410 over the Teutonic knights]. Unfortunately our forefathers were not able to use that battle politically—but for our part, we will not lose this gift. We will use it.8

It should be emphasized that it was assumed, even in the 1980s, that all sectors of Polish society shared the government’s opposition to German reunification. Western and Eastern observers alike generally assumed that the division of Germany was truly in Poland’s national interest.9

The democratic breakthrough in Poland in the spring and summer of 1989, however, unexpectedly created the potential for a momentous change in the Polish attitude toward Germany. Unnoticed by many Western leaders, the Polish democratic opposition had quietly begun to plan a radical reorientation in Polish foreign policy toward West Germany. Their reasons for doing so were rooted in part in Bonn’s actions from the late 1960s onward—its willingness to show both political and economic generosity to Poland, which demonstrated that Germany should no longer be seen as Poland’s enemy. In turn, Polish public opinion toward Germany began to change, encouraging changes in the views of opposition leaders.

As we shall see, the changes in public opinion and opposition policy suggest that the logic of the new Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt was working. Brandt had preached Wandel durch Annäherung [“Change Through Rapprochement”], offering concessions on political and economic issues in order to build trust and eventually win reciprocal concessions from the Eastern bloc. Brandt did make concessions on the contentious Oder-Neisse border issue in the 1970 Warsaw Treaty and also scored a great public relations coup with his famous “Kniefall,” kneeling before the memorial to the Warsaw Ghetto. Yet economic aid also played a major role, both under Brandt and his successor, Helmut Schmidt. In 1970 Brandt agreed to an economic treaty, which had long been sought by the Poles.10 In the following years, with the aid of generous Hermes credits, bilateral trade soared. German exports increased sixfold between 1970 and 1974.11 In 1975, Schmidt gave Poland a large credit (1 billion DM) and also a large grant (1.3 billion DM) to provide pensions for those who had lived on German territory before the Second World War and had thus paid into German pension plans.12 In return for this aid Poland made some political concessions; notably, Warsaw allowed large numbers of ethnic Germans to emigrate after both the 1970 and 1975 economic deals. Yet the positive linkage not only won some immediate political gains;
it also helped to gradually change Germany’s overall image in Poland. After the crackdown on the Solidarity movement in 1981 Germany felt compelled to reduce its generosity; nonetheless, a positive impression of Germany remained—especially after Schmidt encouraged Germans to send thousands of food packages to Poland in the difficult winter of 1981-1982. Even under the more conservative Chancellor Kohl West Germany continued to make an effort to be more accommodating to Poland economically than other Western states; in 1986, for example, Hermes credits to Poland were resumed, despite the country’s dismal economic and political situation at the time.\(^{13}\)

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s an important change was also quietly taking place in Polish public opinion. While the public’s true views are of course difficult to assess in a communist country, there is some evidence that, particularly after the 1970 Warsaw treaty, public opinion in Poland was becoming more positive toward Germany. This fact also undoubtedly emboldened the Polish reformers as they planned their foreign policy goals. In opinion polls carried out in the 1970s, only 7-8 per cent of respondents said they “liked” the Germans, while 60 per cent did not.\(^{14}\) In 1981, almost half of respondents still disliked West Germans. By the mid-1980s this figure had fallen to about one-third. In 1989, only 27 per cent of respondents “disliked” West Germans, while 23 per cent “liked” them and 50 per cent were indifferent. These results were confirmed by more detailed surveys which asked Poles to list various characteristics which they associated with Germans. In 1975, 44 per cent of the characteristics listed were clearly negative, including cruelty, aggressiveness, and hostility toward Poles. By 1989, however, fully 74 per cent of the characteristics given were positive, including reliability, solidarity, conscientiousness, good organization, and a high level of culture. Interestingly, by the end of this period, hostility toward East Germany—allegedly an ally of Poland—was slightly higher than hostility toward the “revanchist enemy,” West Germany. In all, these shifts are remarkable evidence that both the passage of time and Bonn’s positive gestures toward Poland—including such measures as economic aid—were having an effect on Polish attitudes.

The new level of trust in Germany came to be reflected in an increasing popular willingness to allow German reunification. Nonetheless, it was clear that some doubts remained which Bonn would have been wise to keep in mind. Although there had been an increase in the percentage of Poles who felt that reunification would actually be “good” for Poland (from 18 to 24 per cent in 1987-1989) the percentage which felt that reunification would be “bad” for Poland re-
mained high, declining only from 59 to 45 per cent over the same period. Clearly, Poles had learned to trust Germany more and fear it less, but still needed more evidence that a reunified Germany could be fully trusted.

Similarly, a new attitude toward Germany gradually took hold in opposition political circles. As Bingen notes in his analysis of Polish views toward Germany in the 1970s, the first breakthrough to a new concept seemed to occur in 1977. At that time, a small Polish opposition group, the Polish Union for Independence (PPN) published two papers proposing that Poland should support German reunification, since it would provide Poland with direct access to Western Europe, with Germany acting as a "bridge." Needless to say, the government press was quick to condemn the new ideas. However, such thinking was also too revolutionary for many Polish opposition figures. Most members of the opposition preferred in any case to concentrate on initiating reforms at home. They knew that foreign and security policies were taboo subjects, while domestic economic and social policies were at least slightly more amenable to change.

Over time, though, particularly after the 1980-1981 Solidarity interlude ended in repression, Polish opposition leaders began to reexamine their foreign policy thinking. The opposition was clearly no longer bound by the tacit agreement that foreign policy and security matters should remain exclusively in the regime's hands, as long as some progress was made on domestic reforms. By suppressing Solidarity, the government had failed to keep its end of the bargain.

Even more importantly, the opposition gradually came to realize that a new foreign policy—involving a decisive reorientation to the West—was in fact an indispensable part of domestic reform. This was true for two reasons. First, real reform seemed impossible as long as Poland was trapped in the Soviet bloc, since the repressive "Brezhnev Doctrine" strictly limited the internal policies of each satellite state. The Polish military coup of 1981, carried out under the threat of Soviet intervention, had again demonstrated this fact. This reinforced the lessons of 1956 and 1968, when reform efforts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were crushed directly by the Soviets. Second, by the 1980s, Poland's dire economic condition meant that major economic aid (including debt rescheduling) was necessary before any reforms could bear fruit. Such aid could only come from the West, and would only be granted if Poland took steps to move away from its exclusively pro-Soviet policies at home and abroad.

While this line of thinking was not entirely new for the Polish opposition—since the time of the London Exile government during
the Second World War many Poles had favored closer ties to the West—its implications for Germany were new. For the first time, the Polish opposition began to understand that both escaping from the Soviet bloc and building new links to the West could not be done without Germany’s help. A slogan was coined which would become widespread after 1989: “the road to Europe runs through Germany.” This realization represented a radical break from past opposition thinking which, building on interwar traditions and on the universal hatred of Germany after 1945, had favored building bridges to France, Britain, and the U.S., while considering Germany to be an enemy.

As one might expect given the history of German-Polish relations, a key motivation in the opposition’s desire to support closer ties with Germany was economic. First, as noted above, it had become clear that a major debt rescheduling was vital to the Polish economy. The German government was Poland’s largest governmental creditor, and German banks were the country’s largest private creditors. Thus, winning the cooperation of Germany was crucial to any hopes for debt reduction. Second, Poland looked to Germany to facilitate Polish links to Western European and other Western economic bodies, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and most importantly, the EC. The slogan about “the road to Europe [running] through Germany” referred in part to that country’s central role in the EC and its presumed ability to help Poland improve its ties to that organization. Finally, the direct benefits of bilateral links to Germany would be of huge importance to any new reform government. Germany was by far Poland’s most important Western trading partner, and its importance could only increase as Poland reoriented itself to the West. Also, the democratic opposition planned to go much further than the communists in promoting more extensive forms of international economic cooperation, such as foreign investment. Here again, given its geographic proximity and large historic role in investment in the East—dating back to before World War One—Germany was likely to play a crucial role.

Most amazing of all was the extent of the volte face on the issue of German reunification among the leaders of the Polish opposition. Some daring opposition thinkers now considered German unification to be not only good for Poland, but, in fact, essential. It was, they believed, the only way to achieve the simultaneous escape from the Soviet bloc and reorientation to the West which was a necessary part of any democratic reform effort. A reunified Germany would decisively reduce Soviet influence in Poland in several ways. The demise of the GDR, which would be an inevitable result of German unification on the terms of the West, would silence one of the East bloc’s most stri-
dent anti-reform voices. Unlike other East European countries, which were essentially national states with long historical traditions, the GDR's only justification for existence was its communist ideology. Thus, it had long supported all efforts to enforce orthodoxy in Eastern Europe, including the repressive actions of 1956, 1968, and most importantly for Poland, 1981. Additionally, German reunification could presumably mean the withdrawal of the large Soviet army in the GDR, also helping to free Poland from its sense of being surrounded and locked into the East bloc.

Of at least equal importance was the fact that German reunification would mean not just a retreat for the East, but an advance for the West. The argument was raised that reunification would "advance the borders of the West up to the Oder," thus bringing Poland directly into contact with the Western world. All of the benefits, economic and political, which Poland hoped to gain from its new relationship with the Federal Republic could be better achieved if Germany were unified. Trade and investment would rise dramatically with a direct border link on the Oder and the EC market would be directly accessible. In the longer run it would be far more feasible for Poland to join the EC and other Western organizations if it were contiguous with "Western" territory rather than isolated behind a hostile, communist East Germany.

The new and controversial ideas about Germany began to gain support within opposition circles in the early 1980s, gradually becoming accepted by many in Solidarity as well as the liberal and moderate conservative wings of the opposition. By the middle of the decade, as martial law relaxed somewhat, most opposition leaders had been freed from prison and began to meet to plan their future strategy. One important forum for such discussions was the Konwersatorium Polskie w Europie [Discussion Group on Poland's Role in Europe], which numbered among its participants the future Solidarity parliamentary leader Bronislaw Geremek, the future ambassador to Germany Janusz Reiter, and the future Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Artur Hajnycz, one of the leaders of this opposition roundtable and the future director of the Polish Senate Center for International Affairs, was important in evolving the new view on German unification outlined above. In fact, he had traveled to Germany as a spokesman for the opposition during the mid-1980s, when most more senior Solidarity leaders were barred from traveling abroad. While there, he stunned his German hosts by openly advocating reunification, at a time when all but the most conservative Germans believed that reunification could not happen in their lifetimes. Hajnycz summed up the opposition's new ar-
gument in 1988: "The persistence of the division of Europe through the division of Germany freezes Poland's geopolitical situation, reduces its freedom of movement, and makes internal changes more difficult."²³

However, despite the evolution of new foreign policy views, in one respect the old conventional wisdom about Polish foreign policy attitudes toward Germany was correct: the Polish people and opposition leaders agreed with the government that the Oder-Neisse line could not be called into question. A large part of the opposition's positive attitude toward German reunification was based on the feeling that Germany could finally be trusted to respect the Oder-Neisse border. Germany was to learn in 1989-1990 that even the seemingly friendly new democratic regime in Warsaw could turn hostile if the border question was not settled. Thus, under the democratic government, as under the nationalist regime of Piłsudski and the post-1945 communist government, the border question could not be easily impacted by Germany's economic strength—or any other form of German leverage.²⁴

As opinion polls and statements of opposition leaders showed, a new image of Germany was being created and perceptions of a "German threat" were falling. Germany's patience and generosity in dealing with Poland after 1970 deserve at least some of the credit for this change. Germany had metamorphosed from the eternal, oppressive enemy to a crucial ally in Poland's quest for freedom. Over time, this had led to a greater sympathy for such German goals as reunification. The quiet reorientation in popular Polish thinking on Germany and reunification did not, however, have a great impact until two crucial events occurred: first, the Polish opposition was able to come to power in the summer of 1989, and second, partly as a result of change in Poland, the East German regime began to collapse in the fall of 1989. With these developments, the German question was thrust back onto the European agenda and German-Polish relations entered a new era.

Cracks in the wall: From reform to the "Ten Points" speech

Throughout the last years of the 1980s Poland's transition to democratic rule was driven by its desperate economic condition.²⁵ The sense of impending economic crisis played an important role in shaping both domestic and foreign policy at the time. The Soviet Union, itself embarking on a reform program largely driven by economics, decided to give Poland's government a green light to initiate reforms.
Probably the most critical step was the Polish regime’s decision in the summer of 1988 to initiate a dialogue on the nation’s future with the opposition. By taking this action, the leadership was admitting that it could not solve the nation’s problems alone, and thus in effect was abrogating the traditional Leninist dictum of the party’s monopoly of power. After much wrangling, the formal Round Table negotiations between the government and Solidarity began in February 1989. Again, the regime made a crucial decision in the direction of democracy, agreeing to create a new upper house of the Polish parliament, the Senate, with all of its seats to be filled by freely elected candidates. The regime hedged its bets by opening only 35 per cent of the lower house, the Sejm, to popular election and by creating a new office (the Presidency) with supervision over the armed forces and foreign policy, which seemed to be designed to be occupied by the martial law leader, General Jaruzelski. Nonetheless, the government was allowing the population to be heard.

The Polish communists’ gamble on allowing partially free elections soon turned into a disaster. In the June elections, the voters elected ninety-nine Solidarity candidates and one independent to the one hundred freely-contested Senate seats. Equally humiliating for the ruling party was the fact that a number of top national leaders were defeated in their bids for seats in the Sejm—although they were running unopposed. Although the communists and their satellite parties and organizations retained their guaranteed majority in the Sejm, which was to choose the Prime Minister, they were unable to form a government. The extent of the popular repudiation of the old regime was so obvious that more and more of the bloc organizations—and even some communists—realized that it was politically necessary to allow Solidarity to form the next government. Thus, on 24 August 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was confirmed by the Polish Sejm as the first non-communist Prime Minister of the country in fifty years.

The new Polish government was cautious at first in announcing a major reorientation in its foreign policy. There were several reasons for this. First, the behind-the-scenes deal which had brought Mazowiecki to power allowed Poland’s former communist leaders to retain control of the Presidency, which in turn officially controlled the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and the Interior. Second, it was believed by most Polish leaders that Gorbachev’s tolerance for democracy ended at the Polish border. Commentators spoke of a “red line” which the reformers could not cross: Poland’s commitment to the Warsaw Pact, in particular, was not to be tampered with. Third, Poland still faced hard-line, anti-reform communist states in much of
the rest of the Warsaw Pact at the time Mazowiecki became Prime
Minister. Romania was clamoring for a new Warsaw Pact interven-
tion in Poland, and the GDR and Czechoslovakia were equally hos-
tile.\textsuperscript{29}

Nonetheless, the new government in Poland was able to move
German-Polish relations forward immediately. The most contentious
issue, the status of the Oder-Neisse border, still appeared to be buried
by the \textit{modus vivendi} contained in the 1970 Warsaw Treaty.\textsuperscript{30} Conditions
were now ripe for major progress in a classic mode of German-
Polish relations: economic linkage, with Germany using its economic
strength to push for political concessions from the Poles. As had often
been the case since the early 1970s, Germany used \textit{positive} economic
linkage, offering various forms of economic aid which were linked—
often subtly—to Polish political actions.

International conditions also facilitated German economic aid
to the new Polish regime. The new government’s very existence as a
democratic bridgehead in Eastern Europe qualified it for much sympa-
thy and aid from the West as a whole. President Bush visited War-
saw with an offer of economic help in July 1989, even before the new
government was formally installed,\textsuperscript{31} and Germany soon followed suit.
Previously, particularly during the Reagan years, some in the West
had opposed Germany’s tendency to pursue generous economic poli-
cies in the East—as shown in the controversy over the German gas
pipeline deal with the USSR. Now the Federal Republic could pursue
its ties to Poland, seeking to meet its own national objectives, and be
confident that these actions were fully compatible with the interests
of the West.

Conversely, Poland was now free to offer a number of unprec-
edented political concessions. For example, large advances were pos-
sible on the problem of the German minority. Soon after the Solidar-
ity-led government took power, Solidarity’s main newspaper, \textit{Gazeta
Wyborcza}, published an article admitting that a German minority did,
in fact, exist in Poland and that it had been oppressed under the com-
munist regime. The article was path-breaking in that it accepted the
German view that many—perhaps even hundreds of thousands—of
the so-called Autochthons, classified as “Poles” after the Second World
War, in fact identified themselves as Germans.\textsuperscript{32} The principle that
people of mixed background could decide freely which ethnic identity
to assume was openly advocated. Free emigration, for which Ger-
many had fought for decades, was now certain to be allowed; yet, more
importantly, it would also possible for the first time for the minority
to live openly as Germans in Poland. As the democratic transition in

18
Poland took place, members of the German minority were able to use
the German forms of their names for the first time since the 1940s,
form their own cultural organizations, and even move toward found-
ing a German political party.\textsuperscript{33}

The visit of Lech Wałęsa to Germany in early September also
was a hopeful sign of improvement in German-Polish ties. Although
Wałęsa was visiting only in his capacity as the leader of the Solidarity
union, it was clear that his political importance was extremely large.
Again, the role of economics was unmistakable. Wałęsa met with For-
eign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Economics Minister Helmut
Haussmann, and pointed out the urgent need for fast and concrete
assistance from the Federal Republic to Poland. It was agreed that
Western economic help “was necessary for creating a free Poland,”
and that West Germany should “play the leading role in that respect.”\textsuperscript{34}
Wałęsa also met with West German industrialists in Bonn, urging a
radical increase in German investment in Poland. To the delight of
the Germans, the Solidarity delegation stated that:

![Image]

This statement not only showed Wałęsa’s support for the opening of
the Berlin Wall; it also could be seen as containing another element
very pleasing to German conservatives. The notion that borders could
become superfluous in the future united Europe was construed by some
to imply a lessening of Poland’s incessant pressure on Germany to
formally recognize the Oder-Neisse border. Wałęsa himself soon dis-
avowed this impression; nonetheless, conservative Germans retained
the hope that the new democratic government would put practical
cooperation ahead of the border issue.

At the same time, other Polish democratic leaders were becom-
ing ever more open in calling for German reunification. In early Sep-
tember, the leader of the Solidarity caucus in the Polish parliament,
Bronisław Geremek, gave an interview to a German newspaper sup-
porting reunification. His views were supported by Solidarity public-
cist Adam Michnik who, writing in Gazeta Wyborcza, stated that “we
should allow to the Germans the right we claim for ourselves—the
right to their own state.”\textsuperscript{36} Even Foreign Minister Krzysztof
Skubiszewski noted in a September television interview that reunifi-
cation was "first of all a question for the Germans themselves" and that the Germans "have the right to self-determination." When one considers that in September 1989 Erich Honecker was still in power and no one in the West was talking seriously about reunification, it becomes clear that the statements of these Polish leaders were truly revolutionary. These statements and other developments in Poland probably contributed to quickening the pace of change in the GDR, a fact remembered with gratitude by the West Germans.

The new, hopeful atmosphere in German-Polish relations boded well for Chancellor Kohl's visit to Poland, which had been scheduled for early November of 1989. In the weeks before the visit, Germany again provided a special economic "sweetener" to help pave the way towards resolving any last-minute political difficulties, as it had in signing the 1970 Economic Treaty as the final details of the Warsaw Treaty were being negotiated. On 9 October 1989, Bonn agreed to unilaterally reschedule all payments which had been due in 1986-1988 on German government loans to Poland. The amount covered was some 2.5 billion DM, and the action was a major step in easing Poland's strained balance of payments situation. Months later, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski would still note with gratitude that "Germany was the first country" to act to reduce Poland's large debt. Clearly, this German gesture succeeded in generating goodwill, much as other instances of positive economic linkage had in the past.

The negotiations which had led up to the November Kohl visit represented a real breakthrough in bilateral ties. In two rounds of talks, held in September and October in Warsaw and Bonn, negotiators were able to prepare a number of agreements for presentation at the summit, most importantly a Joint Declaration to be signed by the two heads of government. Previously, under the communist government, several rounds of preparatory talks had been held in 1988 and nine more in 1989; yet only now, with the new Polish government, was success achieved. The chief Polish negotiator, Mieczysław Pszon, attributed the talks' success to the democratic government's radically new attitude toward the German minority and Germany's economic role in Poland. Interestingly, he accused the previous Polish government of being too forward in initiating a political-economic linkage of its own. The communists had, he claimed, alienated Bonn by demanding a huge economic quid pro quo for even limited German minority rights. This episode is interesting, since it suggests that the poorer partner in an "asymmetrical" relationship is by no means without influence; just as the wealthy state can initiate economic linkage by offering economic inducements for political concessions, the
poorer state can initiate linkage by offering political concessions—for a price.

In contrast, Pszon stated that the new government would be more willing to grant these rights freely, as part of the democratic transition. Meanwhile, as will be detailed below, Germany agreed to provide a number of economic rewards to Poland, again as support for the democratic transition rather than as open economic linkage. Thus, both Germany and Poland would achieve the results they sought; yet the accusations of a “sellout” resulting from a direct economic linkage could be avoided.

Both sides had good reason to try to avoid the onus of direct linkage. This was particularly true for the Polish government, which faced close scrutiny by old-style communists both at home and in Moscow. Both of these groups were only too eager to accuse the Mazowiecki government of sacrificing Poland’s national interests for monetary gain, by promoting a very exaggerated view of the German “economic threat.” Poland’s communist former Prime Minister, Mieczysław Rakowski, made such charges repeatedly, as did Jerzy Urban, formerly Jaruzelski’s press spokesman.  

In a typical article, a representative of the Polish war veterans’ organization expressed the fear that German economic pre-eminence could even lead to a creeping re-annexation of lands beyond the Oder-Neisse line. The author noted that Hartmut Koschyk, a leader of the Germans who had formerly lived in those lands, the so-called “expellees,” had visited Warsaw and had advocated targeting German investment in Poland towards the formerly German regions such as Silesia. By doing this, the article alleged, Koschyk believed that Germany could “transform these [regions] into a Poland different from the remaining Polish regions.” The ultimate consequences of such an effort to create a “unique” region of Poland oriented toward Germany were clear to the suspicious author of the article. Similarly, the hard-line Moscow newspaper Soietskaya Rossiyia wrote this about Kohl’s visit to Poland:

“Our road to Europe goes through the Federal Republic,” I read in one of the Polish newspapers, “whether we want to or not, we can only return to the European and world economic scene with the help of the Federal Republic. But just as there is no place for sentiment in politics, in economics nothing is given for free. No one gives assistance without gaining something in return. Compromises are necessary.” What is this? The truth of the moment or the moment of truth?
Nonetheless, despite the political incentives to downplay it, the economic linkage component of the final Joint Declaration was clear to many observers. A typical Western newspaper report on the Kohl-Mazowiecki summit noted that "the main obstacle to Kohl's visit was how much financial assistance Bonn should give Poland in exchange for concessions on what it regards as an ethnic German minority in Western Polish territories."\(^{47}\) Meanwhile, the spokeswoman for the Polish government, Malgorzata Niezabitowska, summed up the Joint Declaration by noting that "both sides made concessions" and then listing the key Polish concessions as being in the area of the rights of "Polish citizens of German lineage" and the "major attainment" for Poland as being "decisions concerning economic cooperation."\(^ {48}\) Similarly, Horst Teltschik, personal assistant to Helmut Kohl and the chief negotiator on the German side, confirmed that "for Poland the economic and financial problems took priority, while the attention of the Federal Republic was directed above all at the cultural rights of the German minority in Poland."\(^ {49}\)

Both sides also confirmed that the economic provisions and the minority rights provisions were the hardest parts of the agreement to negotiate. On the German side, Teltschik stated that the questions of economic aid and minority rights were "especially sensitive" and were the reason why it had been necessary to change the format of the talks in early 1989. Initially, three diplomatic working groups had begun to prepare the Joint Declaration; however, it could only be finished by top-level personal emissaries of the respective national leaders.\(^ {50}\) Niezabitowska noted that in earlier rounds of talks between Teltschik and the communist-appointed Polish chief negotiator, Mr. Kucza, "about three-fourths of the declaration's text" had been negotiated. However, it was Mieczysław Pszon, the appointee of the new democratic government, who was able to settle "the most important and most difficult problems," including "the issue of Polish citizens of German origin" and "details [of] the question of Hermes [export credit] guarantees, the jumbo credit, and support for our postulates to the IMF and World Bank."\(^ {51}\)

Specifically, the key provisions of the positive economic linkage at the heart of the carefully negotiated Joint Declaration were as follows.\(^ {52}\) Germany was to provide Poland with 2.5 billion Marks in Hermes credits over the following two years, more than the amount granted to any other East European state or to the USSR. This was a huge breakthrough for Poland, since no substantial Hermes credits had been granted since the 1981 imposition of martial law and Poland was trapped under a mountain of hard currency debt. Kohl also com-
mitted himself to rapidly provide more Hermes guarantees when the initial amount was exhausted. Also, Germany would provide a 500 million DM credit to stabilize the weak Polish złoty. Just as valuable for Poland were Germany’s decisions relating to the one billion Mark “jumbo credit” granted by Chancellor Schmidt in 1975. Germany agreed to unilaterally forgive the 760 million DM of arrears on the credit accumulated by Poland. The remaining 570 million DM owed on the credit would be paid by the Polish government in złoty into a joint German-Polish fund to be spent on joint projects in Poland. Thus Germany was in effect writing off virtually the entire billion DM credit and its accumulated interest. Finally, Bonn also committed itself to provide a number of other services which would benefit the Polish economy. Half of Kohl’s cabinet accompanied the Chancellor to Warsaw, signing fifteen agreements with their Polish counterparts in such areas as environmental protection and health care. German advisors were to be sent to help Poland in a variety of areas, including many financial and economic ministries.

Additionally, Bonn committed itself to intervene in Poland’s favor with two other key economic actors: German corporations and other Western governments. Germany and Poland signed an investment guarantee treaty, which committed Bonn to promote German investment in Poland and to actually guarantee it against political risks. The Joint Declaration also committed Germany to support Poland’s demands for emergency loans from the IMF and World Bank, working with other Western leaders to secure these additional funds. Bonn would also ask the Paris Club of governmental creditors to agree to reschedule all of Poland’s huge debt owed to Western governments.

Also, Kohl committed Germany to support Poland in relations with the European Community. Kohl was careful to keep these commitments. In his report to the German parliament following the Warsaw visit, Kohl appealed to all German businessmen to support reform in Poland with their investments. When he was forced to briefly interrupt his visit to Poland due to the fall of the Berlin Wall and called the major Western leaders to report on the Berlin events, he began each call by stressing the need to support Poland economically. The leaders with whom he spoke—President George Bush, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and President François Mitterrand—were surprised by Kohl’s attempt to focus first on Poland and pressed the Chancellor to immediately discuss the historic events in Berlin. Soon, Kohl was able to state that he had won the support of the other leaders for completing negotiations between Poland and the IMF on an emergency loan in December 1989 (i.e., within a month of his visit to Poland). He
also worked with President Mitterrand of France and others to ensure that the EC summit held in mid-November in Paris would announce further support for Poland and other reformist East European states.\textsuperscript{56}

Meanwhile, the Polish government made concessions on the area of greatest concern to the Kohl government, committing itself to grant unprecedented rights to the German minority in Poland.\textsuperscript{57} For the first time Poland agreed that a German minority did exist, and that many of the Autochthons (previously classified as Poles) considered themselves to be Germans. Also, the very agreement to openly include the German minority in a bilateral German-Polish agreement for the first time since the Second World War was an enormous breakthrough for Bonn. Previously, as in the "package" agreements reached in 1955, 1970, and 1975,\textsuperscript{58} Poland had always insisted that any concessions on the German minority would be presented as "unilateral" actions by the Polish regime; now Germany was in effect being accepted as a "protector" of Germans within Poland. In Article 45, the Joint Declaration provided that the minority would be defined by self-identity, not by the Polish authorities, and that the minority would have the right to "protect and develop its cultural identity."\textsuperscript{59} Article 46 provided that "all interested persons shall be given increased access to the language and culture of the other [country]," thus promising increased German language instruction in Poland, a key step to the preservation of the German minority. Finally, Poland committed itself in Article 50 to permit "the formation of associations to support the language, culture, and tradition" of the minority, which would also be allowed "equal access to the media of their region" and could "maintain contacts" to Germany. Thus, the way was clear for the German minority to finally form its own organizations (which could presumably play a large role in Upper Silesia, where the minority was heavily concentrated) and to receive support from the German government and the German expellee organizations, which had long been anathema to Poland. An important program point on Kohl's November summit schedule also reflected Poland's new sensitivity to the German minority. Kohl and Mazowiecki attended a church service in the formerly German lower Silesian town of Kreisau (now Kryżowa), conducted in both German and Polish by the Bishop of Opole, Alfons Nossol.\textsuperscript{60}

Admittedly, not all problems related to the German minority were solved; the issue would simmer behind the scenes throughout the German reunification talks, and would again be at the center of attention when the Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations was being negotiated in early 1991. Yet the statements made by the Polish gov-
ernment in the Joint Declaration—and its decision to allow the Kreisau visit—represented great progress on the minority issue.

Another key Polish concession was in allowing Kohl to continue to "finesse" the Oder-Neisse border issue, refusing to finalize the border beyond the vague modus vivendi of the 1970 treaty. Article 51 of the Joint Declaration merely repeated that the 1970 treaty remained the cornerstone of German-Polish relations, without addressing the treaty's many ambiguities, particularly the fact that it might not be legally binding on a reunified Germany. When one considers that German reunification was being discussed more and more openly in the fall of 1989, the significance of Poland's forbearance on the border issue becomes clear. German government spokesmen were able to counter questions from German reporters about the border guarantee by saying "Why are you asking us about that? Even the Poles did not want any more from us [on the border issue]." In retrospect, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski regretted deeply that Pszon and the Polish negotiating team had not been able to achieve a better statement on the border; yet at the time German bargaining power was too great and Poland's concern over the border was relatively low. As an article in Die Welt noted:

The visitors from Bonn...profited from their stronger, i.e. economic, leverage. The Foreign Minister does not talk about this; he says only that in the end, the Poles agreed to forego [a stronger border guarantee] "since that was the German condition for the entire declaration."

Yet, despite these important advances in bilateral German-Polish ties, in the two months preceding Kohl's visit to Poland Germany's attention began to shift to the even more dramatic events involving the GDR. A rising stream of East German refugees had been crossing the Hungarian-Austrian border, and refugees also packed Bonn's embassies in Warsaw and Prague. Gradually, demonstrations began to break out in the GDR itself and the regime of Erich Honecker was unable to respond. On 18 October, even before Kohl traveled to Poland, Honecker had been deposed and Egon Krenz installed in his place. Yet no one could predict how rapidly events would proceed in early November. Unfortunately for the growing German-Polish rapprochement, events in the GDR intervened in a stunning fashion in the middle of Kohl's visit to Poland. On 9 November the Berlin Wall was peacefully breached by hundreds of thousands of East Germans. Kohl was
forced to return to Germany. Although he returned to Poland within twenty-four hours to complete the visit, and formally signed the Joint Declaration with Mazowiecki on 14 November, the trip’s meaning and significance seemed to have been overshadowed.

Poles were profoundly ambivalent about the Berlin events. On one hand, many Polish democrats distrusted the GDR and wished that it would reform itself. Some even had begun to theorize that German reunification might in some ways be beneficial to Poland. On the other hand, the pace of events in Germany raised troubling questions. Would Bonn be distracted from its emerging rapprochement with Poland by a race toward reunification? Would economic aid and political support to Poland now be forgotten? As Kohl’s advisor, Horst Teltschik, recounted, immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall Lech Wałęsa expressed Poland’s fears as follows:

[Wałęsa] said he was happy about the fall of the wall, but he was afraid that Poland “would pay the price for it.” The West German politicians and businessmen would, in his view, now concentrate totally on the GDR. My answer was meant to reassure him, but came out sounding rather weak, since I essentially knew that he was right.64

Perhaps most troubling of all was the fact that with German reunification now becoming a real possibility the status of the Oder-Neisse line again became a crucial issue, overshadowing other less problematic areas of Polish-German relations. As was noted above, the 1970 Warsaw Treaty had been carefully designed to be ambiguous about the borders of a reunified Germany. Now this omission, previously seen as an abstract question, suddenly assumed central importance.

Poland’s uneasy feeling that the fall of the Berlin Wall would put German reunification and the Oder-Neisse issue firmly back on the historical agenda was confirmed by Chancellor Kohl’s famous “Ten Points” speech to the German parliament on 28 November 1989.65 For the first time, a step-by-step program leading to German unification had been explicitly set forward. While this was stunning enough, Polish leaders felt that the worst problem with the Ten Points speech was its failure to specify the boundaries of the future reunified German state. Press reaction in Poland to Kohl’s Ten Point plan was immediate, unanimous, and negative. It was generally agreed that, as the Marshall of the Sejm, Andrzej Stelmachowski put it, Kohl’s plan was “missing an eleventh point,” namely the crucial delineation of a re-
 unified Germany's borders. Many leaders in Poland began to distance themselves from the optimistic attitude about German reunification which had prevailed in September and October, when the matter was seen more as a distant point of principle than an imminent reality. After the speech Poland began, with steadily increasing unease, to focus its foreign policy efforts on ensuring that the Oder-Neisse border was recognized by Germany and guaranteed by other states. Bilateral German-Polish relations entered a period of tension which was not fully resolved for almost a year. As the following section will show, during this period West Germany would learn that its influence—economic and otherwise—was insufficient to induce Poland to make major concessions on the Oder-Neisse issue. In part this was due to the fact that the Polish position was supported by other powerful states, but the very nature of the issue was also of vital importance—in contrast to issues such as minority rights, territorial questions are likely to be very difficult to affect by mild economic pressure.

The border issue at center stage

In the last month of 1989 and the first two months of 1990, the pace of events related to German unification accelerated still further. As a result, Polish fears about the still-insecure Oder-Neisse border grew as well. Within East Germany, public opinion was beginning to swing rapidly toward supporting immediate reunification. At the weekly demonstrations in Leipzig—seen as a key barometer of East German sentiment—the earlier signs reading "Wir Sind Das Volk" were being replaced by ones stating "Wir Sind Ein Volk." Finally, even the "reformist" communist government in East Berlin, now led by Hans Modrow, saw that it would have to present its own version of a unification plan if it was to maintain any credibility. Accordingly, Modrow put forward a unification plan at the end of January, and traveled to Moscow to secure Gorbachev's blessing for it. A crucial feature of the plan was its insistence that the reunified Germany should not be in the NATO alliance. Thus, although Modrow's plan (unlike Kohl's) did explicitly guarantee the Oder-Neisse border, it merely added to Poland's fears. The prospect of a neutral Germany was a nightmare for Poland, since the German army would be freed from the command of the NATO or Warsaw Pact alliances. Also, it seemed clear to Poles that a neutral Germany would be tempted to greatly build up its own forces, if only for self-defense, and that these increased forces could someday be turned against Poland. The most alarming prospect of all
was that German reunification might combine the worst features of both the Kohl and Modrow plans: the reunified Germany might be neutral and yet still refuse to guarantee the Oder-Neisse border.

Poland's alarm was further increased by the events of early February 1990. Kohl and Genscher traveled to Moscow for a summit with Gorbachev, and succeeded in winning the Soviet leader's support for the notion that, in principle, the reunification of Germany could be allowed, as long as the "external aspects" of the process were regulated by the Four Powers. The Chancellor's advisor, Horst Teltschik, jubilantly recorded in his notes "Das ist der Durchbruch!" ["This is the breakthrough!"] Further, Gorbachev was at this time still strongly insisting that the reunified Germany should be neutral, much to Poland's dismay. The Moscow decisions were followed by the formal decision to create the "Two Plus Four" negotiations on the external aspects of German reunification, codified in Ottawa by the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers on 13 February. With this the disaster for Poland seemed to be complete: German reunification was clearly on a "fast track," and only the Four Powers and the two German states would have any say in the process at all. And still, Germany had not made any binding border commitment. Poland's sense of exclusion was particularly painful. In its history, Poland had often been the subject of arbitrary decisions by the Great Powers—in the eighteenth century, at the Congress of Vienna, and most recently at the Yalta and Potsdam meetings at the end of the Second World War. Poland feared that such a process was again underway, and was determined to resist.

Throughout this period, the role of some leading individuals in Poland should not be underestimated. Within the national leadership, opinions about Germany differed, sometimes dramatically. President Jaruzelski and the ministers of Defense and the Interior were holdovers from the Communist regime, and thus were strongly inclined to favor ties with the USSR and have strong suspicions about Germany. Another influential voice in decisions on the "German question" was Foreign Minister Skubiszewski. Skubiszewski was respected for his background as an independent Catholic intellectual, but was not a member of Solidarity and thus had not been directly shaped by the opposition's "new thinking" about Germany in the late 1980s. Skubiszewski was a specialist in international law, who had spent years arguing in support of the Polish interpretation of the Warsaw Treaty—namely that it fully and finally settled the Oder-Neisse border issue. Thus, it is not surprising that Skubiszewski was inclined to take a hard, legalistic line on the border issue, insisting that no German promises
or unilateral guarantees should be accepted, but that only a legally binding treaty, in place before reunification, would suffice.71 Other government advisors pressed for a softer line on the border issue. They were more influenced by other concerns, such as economics and the general need to build a long-term relationship with Germany. They were more inclined to trust Germany on the border issue and not insist on a full-scale border treaty before reunification. This tension between a harder and softer line on the border question was constant in the Polish leadership. This gave German negotiators all the more reason to try to sway Polish opinion by demonstrating goodwill and reminding Poles of Germany’s political and economic importance to their future.

In late 1989 and early 1990 it became clear that the rising anxieties within the Polish elite were being reflected among the population as a whole as well. In a survey released in mid-December, 41 per cent of the Poles questioned said that they felt threatened by Germany.72 In a January survey, fully 64 per cent were either "very opposed" or "fairly opposed" to German reunification, and only 26 per cent were "very favorable" or "fairly favorable." At the same time, respondents in other European countries viewed matters very differently: opposition to reunification stood at only 6 per cent in Spain, 13 per cent in Italy, 22 per cent in Hungary, 23 per cent in France, 27 per cent in Great Britain, and 30 per cent in the USSR.73

As a result of these resurgent fears, Poland pursued two related goals in its diplomatic efforts in late 1989 and early 1990. Poland asserted that it—and other European countries—had a right to be directly involved in any negotiations involving German unity. This could include any decisions on the size of the German army and other security arrangements for Germany, as well as the all-important border question. Poland also asserted that German reunification should be slowed down dramatically. As Foreign Minister Skubiszewski put it in a speech to the Sejm on 7 December 1989:

The changing relations between the German states should be part of the reunification of Europe...on the scale of the entire continent. The mutual relations between the German states cannot precede these efforts and achievements.74

In pursuit of these goals, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski began a determined campaign to reach out to the smaller European states near Germany. He visited states such as Holland and Belgium, attempting
to convince them that they, too, should be concerned about the possibility of German unification. Thus, in an interview for a Vienna newspaper, he stated that:

This [German reunification] is really a problem, not only for us but for all of Europe. Particularly for those states that share borders with one Germany or the other. Thus, the problem exists for both Poland and Austria.75

Skubiszewski hoped that these other countries would join Poland in demanding a role in the German unification talks, supporting Poland's border demands and also delaying the entire process. As one government spokesman put it, in addition to the formal responsibility of the four powers for all German questions, "the German problem is also the joint matter of all European states, including those belonging to the Warsaw Pact and NATO and also the CMEA and the EEC."76 As Poland's anxiety about Germany's plans for the Oder-Neisse border rose, this attempt to find "allies" in the rest of Europe continued. The culmination of Poland's efforts to find allies among Germany's smaller neighbors was reached on 2 March, when the Polish Foreign Minister formally summoned the ambassadors of all nine of the countries which bordered on the two German states. Each was given an identical diplomatic note urging that their governments should support Poland's position on German reunification.77

However, the other states concerned—particularly those which had long been closely tied to Germany in NATO and the EC—found it hard to take Poland's fears very seriously. Even Czechoslovakia and Hungary were cautious. Poland was eager to promote tripartite cooperation with these two states, but they were wary of being drawn into an anti-German alliance. Some commentators were all too frank about the possible role of the proposed troika:

At the moment, West Germany is the great economic power in Europe, and after reunification this power will be still greater. We now have an unprecedented historical chance to create a dam lest Central Europe be again pulled into colonial dependence.78

Hungary, as has already been noted, enjoyed very good relations with Bonn, particularly after its decision to open its border to East German refugees and the resulting package of German financial aid. Czecho-
slovakia, too, was wary of alienating the Germans. Thus, it is not surprising that when the three countries finally convened a meeting in Bratislava in April, it was generally agreed that few concrete results were achieved. When the states did eventually agree in February 1991 to form a cooperative group, which came to be known (after the site of its first meeting in Hungary) as the Visegrád triangle, no anti-German component was visible. By then the Polish-German dispute had been largely settled and the states agreed to focus on jointly building closer ties to Western Europe.

In addition to attempting to involve other small European states in the reunification process, the Poles also were eager to find a role for various European organizations, such as the EC and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). For example, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski proposed on several occasions that reunification be delayed until the CSCE could “legally guarantee all the borders in Europe” by means of an “all-European treaty.” Prime Minister Mazowiecki attempted to involve the EC in the ongoing debate over reunification by demanding that the organization intervene to prevent Germany from reunifying by using Article 23 of the West German Basic Law.

Yet Poland realized that the most important targets for lobbying were the four great powers who were (along with the Germans themselves) formally responsible for “all-German issues” under the terms of the 1945 Potsdam agreements. Great Britain and France were of major importance. Mazowiecki was in London at the time that the creation of the “Two Plus Four” mechanism was announced, and promptly began to lobby the Thatcher government for Poland’s formal inclusion in the process. Poland’s efforts to court the French were even greater. On 1 March the French Foreign Minister, Dumas, gave a speech in Berlin in which he supported Poland’s right to be included in the Two Plus Four negotiations and stated that he felt that Germany’s efforts to that point to reassure Poland about the permanence of the Oder-Neisse border had been inadequate. Finally, on 9 March, all of the top leaders of Poland (Jaruzelski, Mazowiecki, and Skubiszewski) traveled together to Paris. Their visit was accompanied by rhetoric which seemed designed to undermine the normally close ties between France and the Federal Republic. Poland’s deputy Prime Minister, Jan Janowski, stated that “in the past, peace was only guaranteed when a strong France was allied with a strong Poland,” and Mazowiecki himself said at the meeting’s final press conference that “it is a rule of history that when the German question is important to Europe, France and Poland want to come together.” While
the French were cautious to avoid a full endorsement of this rhetoric, Bonn could see that its stubbornness on the Polish border issue could jeopardize its "special relationship" with France, which lay at the heart of West Germany's foreign policy.

Just as important was the support which Poland received from Moscow and Washington. The USSR was the first of the Four Powers to strongly support Poland's demands for border security and for a voice in the Two Plus Four process. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze quickly agreed that Poland should have "its own voice and its own place" at the Two Plus Four talks, and that the USSR would act as an advocate for Poland's views in talks with the two Germanies and the three Western great powers. For a time, the identity of interests on the "German question" between Poland and the USSR was so strong that it led to Poland openly refusing Moscow's offer to discuss the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. Here the German-Polish dispute was impacting a matter of great geopolitical importance: the dispute was breathing new life into the moribund Warsaw Pact, leading even anti-communist Polish politicians such as Skubiszewski to state that the Pact had "lost its ideological character" and become a true "defensive alliance." When one considers that by February 1990 both Hungary and Czechoslovakia had already signed agreements for the total withdrawal of Soviet forces from their countries, it becomes obvious that Poland's attitude was radically out of line with that of the other leading reformist states in the former East Bloc. Hungary and Czechoslovakia were reluctant to pressure Moscow to formally disband the Warsaw Pact without Poland's support. It became increasingly clear to the West—and, especially, to the United States—that Poland's fears of a German threat could not be shrugged off; they could potentially have a real impact on the balance of power in Europe and even in the world as a whole. In the end, then, all four of the great powers came to support Poland's demands. This was to prove decisive in resolving the issue.

Needless to say, the West German government was not pleased with the two central goals of Poland's diplomatic campaign on the "German question," namely that Poland (and possibly other states) should be included in the Two Plus Four process and that the process should be slowed down dramatically. The Federal Republic did not want to have to carry out complex negotiations over reunification with every single nation in Europe; it would be difficult enough to win the support of the Four Powers which had a formal responsibility for "all-German questions." Also, although the exact pace of German reunification was still unclear in late 1989 and early 1990, it was certainly
clear that it would take place before anyone could unite Europe as a whole. Thus, Poland’s demand that German unity be delayed until “the continent as a whole” had been united was unacceptable to Bonn. Also, it was very unclear what Poland meant by “uniting Europe.” Political unity? Economic unity? And what definition of “Europe” did Poland have in mind? At the extreme, Poland’s demand could be construed to mean that German reunification would have to be postponed until the poorest and most politically backward states in Europe—such as Albania—were integrated into all-European institutions, such as the European Community. This could have delayed German unity for many years.

Chancellor Kohl was determined to prevent Poland from realizing its objectives, seeking to ensure instead that the negotiations over reunification were both rapid and relatively simple. He was equally determined—largely for domestic political reasons—to make no statements which would compromise the Federal Republic’s long-standing legal position that it was impossible for Bonn to commit a future, reunified Germany to any particular position on the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line. Within the limits of this position, Kohl tried to give Poland some reassurance; for example, in a major speech on 17 January 1990, Kohl said that “no one wants to link reunification to a change in [Germany’s] present borders.”85 This was, of course, still not a guarantee of what Germans would want in the future. Worse yet, it also did not have the virtue of being true; some Germans were indeed still interested in changing the Oder-Neisse border.

The leaders of the Vertriebenen [expellees] continued to agitate for a revision of the Oder-Neisse line. They had finally stopped insisting that all of Germany’s pre-1937 territory would have to be returned (incredibly, they made this concession only in October of 1989).86 Nonetheless, they continued to insist that a freely-negotiated “fair settlement” [faiser Ausgleich] was possible. This might include a “territorial compromise in the middle” of the disputed area, or at least a form of regional autonomy for the German minority. German settlers and expellees would then be encouraged to settle in Silesia and Pomerania. Economics was to play a key role in these plans: German “experts,” “skilled workers,” and investors would be essential to fuel Poland’s economic reform program.87 The hope was the same expressed by more mainstream conservatives in the 1950s: economic cooperation with the wealthier Germany would eventually lead Poland to agree to return at least part of the Oder-Neisse area, in much the same way that France had agreed to peacefully return the Saar region in 1957 in return for German economic and security guarantees.88 While those
expressing such views were clearly a minority in Germany by 1989, Poland did have some reason for concern.

The German government itself certainly did not share the openly revisionist goals of the expellees’ groups, but it found it necessary to respect their political influence. Kohl feared that if he guaranteed the Oder-Neisse border, the expellees would throw their support to the far-right Republican party [Republikaner]. The Republikaner were unlikely to grow large enough to actually win a national election. Yet they could, Kohl feared, block his Christian Democratic party (CDU) from winning. Since the Second World War, a key factor in the CDU’s strength had been its control over both moderate conservatives and the right wing. If a far right party were able to climb above the 5 percent barrier—thus winning seats in the German Parliament—and establish itself as a permanent part of the political landscape, the CDU could face a dangerous dilemma. It could either form a coalition with the Republikaner, thus alienating moderate voters, or stand alone, and thus be unable to muster enough votes to prevent an election victory by the opposition Social Democrats (SPD). Keeping public support for the Republikaner below the 5 percent mark thus was an important motivating factor for Kohl in the debate over the Polish border.

Kohl was also, of course, constrained by the German Basic Law [Grundgesetz] and by a complex web of legal precedents. For example, the West German Constitutional Court had ruled in the 1970s that Germany continued to exist as a legal entity within the borders of 1937, despite the border provisions of the Warsaw Treaty. These constraints were strong enough that many conservative legal scholars saw no way for Kohl to accept Poland’s demands for a stronger border guarantee. A number of carefully argued articles by such scholars came to the conclusion that “the Federal Republic of Germany has done everything in its legal power to assure Poland of the inviolability of its Western frontier.”89 Of course, others disagreed; the SPD and many in Kohl’s own coalition argued that “creative legal interpretations” could overcome the problem.90

Due to these legal and domestic political constraints, Kohl decided to resist Poland’s diplomatic campaign for a voice in the Two Plus Four process for as long as possible. Progress in talks with Poland was limited; for example, the visit of Foreign Minister Skubiszewski to Bonn in early February 1990 produced few results. Like the Poles, the Chancellor appealed to the Four Powers to support his position; however, he was not successful. For example, Kohl traveled to Washington at the end of February, only to meet pressure from President Bush to find a way to finalize the Oder-Neisse border. At the press
conference following their talks, the American President openly stated his support for a border guarantee, while Kohl was conspicuously silent on the issue and apparently rather embarrassed.91

Subtly, Germany was also again playing the economic card to pursue its goal of persuading Poland to "keep quiet" and allow reunification to proceed. The message was sent that Poland’s obsession with the border was a remnant of "old thinking" in the "new Europe." If Poland did not adapt itself to the changes now sweeping the continent—including, of course, German reunification—it would be left out of the new Europe. As one commentator put it:

It now appears that this new Europe will only reach to the Bug [River], the border between Poland and the USSR. Or it could end already at the Oder-Neisse line, if Warsaw does not move quickly to strengthen its ties to the EC...This requires, however, a settlement [Ausgleich] with the Germans, which is not the responsibility of Bonn and East Berlin alone.92

Certainly this potential dilemma was noticed and much debated in Poland. Poles were forced to consider the possible costs and benefits of their campaign for stronger border guarantees. Was the border issue worth souring long-term relations with Germany, a state which was Poland’s largest trading partner, creditor, and investor, and also held the key to Poland’s evolving links with Western Europe? By and large, the consensus seemed to be that the border issue was too important to be put off until after reunification, even if this decision was costly. Yet, as we shall see below, Poland did become increasingly willing to compromise on the timing and nature of the border guarantee, and this was to prove crucial to reaching an eventual agreement. Certainly some of this willingness to compromise can be attributed to Germany’s economic importance, although it is difficult to quantify this precisely.

Ultimately, however, at the height of the border dispute in early March 1990, Chancellor Kohl made a key tactical error: he brought the linkage between economics and the border issue into the open, thus provoking a storm of outrage. The Chancellor had been simmering over what he viewed as Poland’s obstructionism and finally exploded over Poland’s demands for large war reparations from Germany. Poland’s desire for compensation for individuals harmed by German atrocities during the Second World War had been a long-running issue in bilateral ties. Kohl felt that now an effort was being made
to, in effect, blackmail Germany. Huge compensation figures were being discussed in Poland; for example, the Association of Polish Victims of the Third Reich (SPP) suggested that Poland deserved a total of 537.1 billion DM, to be distributed to over 13 million Polish war victims. With such demands in mind, Kohl feared that Poland might not give its consent to German reunification unless it first received huge reparation payments. In effect, it seemed that Poland was setting up another economic linkage of its own, as the communist government had at the time of the preliminary negotiations over the Joint Declaration, demanding a high economic price for a political concession. This would, of course, have been costly to Germany; and it would also have achieved Poland's goal of delaying the reunification process and possibly of involving more countries in the negotiating process as well. The USSR and other cash-strapped East European states could also line up for reparations from Germany. Chancellor Kohl reacted to this possibility in a statement issued on 2 March 1990. He stated that Poland would not receive a firmer border guarantee from Germany unless it first dropped all talk of reparations and immediately granted more rights to the German minority in Poland.

Here Kohl had overreached himself, as reaction to the statement clearly indicated. It seemed to many observers—in other Western nations and in Germany itself, as well as in Poland—that Kohl's attempt to force Poland to back down was undiplomatic, even threatening. Perhaps more importantly, however, Kohl's statements helped to drive the Western allies to put pressure on Germany to find a way to resolve the border question once and for all.

The resolution of the crisis began when Chancellor Kohl quickly retracted his demand that the border issue should be linked to Polish concessions on reparations and the German minority. On 6 March, only four days after the linkage was made, Kohl admitted that "mistakes were made on all sides, including by me," and dropped the demand. On 8 March the West German Bundestag [Parliament] passed a resolution again reaffirming the permanence of the Oder-Neisse border. Finally, after intense behind-the-scenes pressure from Germany's Western allies, a crucial concession was made by the Federal Republic at the first session of the Two Plus Four negotiations, held in Bonn on 14 March. There it was announced that Poland would, after all, be allowed to participate in the Two Plus Four talks when issues which affected it directly were discussed. However, Poland would not be permitted to be a full partner or to sign the final Two Plus Four treaty. Poland was assured that its concerns about the border would be explicitly addressed in the treaty and that Germany
would sign a formal border treaty immediately after reunification.

The outcome of this crisis was primarily seen as a victory for Poland. As the Polish government spokeswoman said on 15 March, "yesterday we had the true end of Yalta." However, Poland had still received less than it had hoped for. It was not to be included in any broader discussions on issues such as the size and armament of the future German military. Furthermore, Poland won little support for its demand that a German-Polish border treaty be negotiated and initialed before reunification. As was noted above, Poland eventually decided to compromise, reluctantly retracting a number of more radical demands, in part because of its realization that good relations with Germany were crucial to Poland's future, particularly in the area of economics. As the German analyst Michael Ludwig noted,

It appeared that the realization had sunk in that the "path back to Europe" must take priority, since only Western Europe had the ability to guarantee the economic and political stabilization of the Polish [reform] experiment. The way to Europe could obviously only lead over Germany, whose help was especially necessary to Poland.97

Some Poles stated the case even more bluntly, as in this cite from Gazeta Wyborcza:

The division [of Europe] into blocs will someday be ended, and then nothing more will block Poland's path toward integration with the EC and with all of Europe. In this process our relations with Germany will be the key to our ties with Europe...To disturb the Germans in their unification efforts, to delay them, means to condemn ourselves to hostile relations with the Germans. This would damage our security and drive us into isolation—into isolation in an otherwise united Europe. We would have then catapulted ourselves out of Europe, our views would no longer count, our interests would be endangered. Poland would be condemned to backwardness and would be forced to rely only on the support of Russia. [However], Russia itself is interested in profiting as much as possible from cooperation with Europe, and above all from coop-

37
Still, the question remains: why had Germany been forced to essentially back down on the border issue, despite the fact that it was clearly more powerful than Poland? Several crucial reasons can be cited. First, Germany was far from united in demanding that the border issue be kept open. In fact, aside from the expellees, Chancellor Kohl had few supporters on the issue. Even Foreign Minister Genscher and the FDP favored giving Poland a binding border guarantee. Thus, only a relatively modest amount of external pressure was needed to tip the internal balance and force Germany to back down. In fact, many have speculated that Kohl was not overly disappointed by the foreign pressure; it enabled him to give way gracefully on the issue (thus keeping the support of moderate voters) while still demonstrating to the expellees that he had done his best to pursue their views. Second, Poland was not involved merely in a bilateral dispute with Germany. The Poles were eventually able to win the support of the Four Powers for their demands, and Germany could not ignore this backing since these powers had the legal power to veto reunification. As General Jaruzelski proudly noted, “From Washington to London and Paris and Moscow, we have never before experienced such unanimous and intensive support for our wishes as in the matter of our western border.” Finally, the very nature of the issue made it a difficult for Germany to bring its main form of leverage—economic power—to bear. The protection of territorial sovereignty is generally the highest single priority of the modern state. It is thus difficult to induce a state to allow its borders to be questioned—let alone changed—without war. Thus, Germany’s influence, which was substantial on other issues in bilateral ties, was insufficient to decisively impact the border problem. Solidarity publicist Adam Michnik stated this quite bluntly: “Any attempt to change this border simply means war.”

On the sensitive border issue, German economic power (like any form of power) was in any case a double-edged sword: its existence did help to persuade Poland to moderate its demands somewhat, but it also helped to feed Polish fears, as this article noted:

The intelligentsia and the younger generation no longer fears that heavily-armed Germans will attack Poland in a new Blitzkrieg. They are much more concerned over the prospect of an economic superpower [emphasis in original] which could gradually buy up the entire country and could use a network of hard-working German factory directors to threaten Poland’s national and cultural independence.
The final resolution of the border problem and the reemergence of economic linkage

Although German-Polish relations gradually recovered from the nadir of the first three months of 1990, the border issue was not fully resolved until after German reunification more than six months later. During the interim, bilateral German-Polish relations were in a state of flux. It was assumed by many in Bonn that Warsaw’s territorial fears had been largely assuaged, and West Germany could concentrate on its complex negotiations with the Four Powers and the GDR over the many other aspects of the reunification process. In fact, the border issue still had not been entirely laid to rest. Meanwhile, though, the gradual lessening of Polish fears on the border cleared the way for the gradual reemergence of economic concerns as a central factor in German-Polish ties.

The March compromise on the Polish border issue, reached at the urging of the Four Powers, left open the crucial details of the nature and timing of the proposed border settlement. Poland feared that if the German-Polish border treaty were negotiated after reunification, the Four Powers would lose interest and Germany would achieve its goal of unity, and thus Germany would be able to create obstacles and delays to the border treaty, possibly putting it off for years. Kohl’s attempt to link the border issue to minority rights and reparations was not an encouraging omen in this regard. Thus, Poland continued to press for the border treaty to be negotiated and initiated by a joint delegation of the two German states before reunification. Later, the agreement could be formally signed and ratified by a united German government. Germany objected to this formulation, continuing to see it as an infringement on Bonn’s position that it could not legally act on behalf of a future unified Germany and the borders could not be finally delineated before the eventual peace settlement (the Two Plus Four treaty) was signed.

The May 1990 visit to Poland by the well-respected President of the Federal Republic, Richard von Weiszäcker, played a major role in further calming bilateral ties. Weiszäcker soothed the Poles on the border issue, noting that “the question is now in substance clearly resolved.”104 Polish Foreign Minister Skubiszewski agreed that “the unfortunate debate over the Oder-Neisse line has ended.”105 Perhaps even more important than these positive statements was a letter from Foreign Minister Genscher, which was delivered to the Poles by the American Secretary of State, James Baker, on 6 May. The letter confirmed that the Foreign Ministers of the Two Plus Four process, at
their meeting in Bonn the previous day, had decided to formally invite Poland to attend the third meeting of the Two Plus Four group on the ministerial level in July in Paris. At this meeting the question of the borders of the future united Germany would be discussed.\textsuperscript{106}

In June, the Poles succeeded in persuading Bonn to consent to a new joint resolution of the Bundestag and the East German Volkskammer which further clarified the border issue. Two previous Bundestag resolutions, each intended to reassure Poland, had proven ineffective. The first, passed just before Kohl's November 1989 visit to Poland, was undermined by the Chancellor's reluctance to personally support its formulation that the Polish border would not be questioned in the future "by us Germans," a phrase which implied that the future united Germany would also commit itself to respect the border. The second, passed in March 1990, was not fully satisfactory as its guarantees seemed to be conditional on Poland's actions in the questions of minority rights and reparations. The June resolution, however, not only confirmed that Germany would definitely negotiate a final border treaty with Poland immediately after reunification; it also contained a draft text of such a treaty.\textsuperscript{107} This cleared the way for Poland to drop its demand that the border treaty be negotiated and initialed before reunification. After all, if the legislative bodies of both German states—now clearly backed by their executive leaders—had almost unanimously approved a text which fully recognized the Polish border, and even precisely defined the border by citing Poland's earlier treaties with the GDR, what was left to negotiate?\textsuperscript{108}

In the months that followed, some diplomatic maneuvering continued, and the raw wounds of the border confrontation were sometimes reopened. For example, Lech Wałęsa gave a controversial interview in which he warned Germany that if it ever again disturbed the peace of Europe it could be easily wiped off the map by the nuclear weapons of the two superpowers.\textsuperscript{109} Polish government officials, too, were obviously still concerned about a "German threat" and groping for possible security countermeasures. Foreign Minister Skubiszewski and President Jaruzelski proposed the stationing of Polish troops in East Germany, perhaps as part of a joint German-Polish force modeled on the joint brigade formed by Germany and France.\textsuperscript{110} The German government, however, saw this proposal not as a step toward reconciliation but as a proposal for a new occupation force in Germany. In June and early July, another idea was proposed to "control" the reunited Germany: Prime Minister Mazowiecki began hinting that the Four Powers should not permit the reunified Germany to regain its full sovereignty until it had signed and ratified a binding border
treaty with Poland. Again Bonn was aggravated by Poland’s obvious lack of trust in the emerging unified Germany.111

In the end, though, the conflict continued to move steadily toward resolution. On 4 July in Berlin, preparatory talks were held—with Poland’s participation—for the upcoming Two Plus Four Foreign Ministers’ meeting. The 17 July meeting in Paris produced a statement which provided a road map to the final border settlement. Specifically, the Foreign Ministers of the Two Plus Four countries agreed with Skubiszewski that:

— the unified Germany will be made up only of the present territories of the Federal Republic, the GDR and Berlin
— both German states obligate themselves to change the Grundgesetz [Basic Law] of the Federal Republic in such a way as to make it clear that the unity of Germany is completed with the accession [of the GDR]
— the unified Germany will have no territorial claims against any other country
— both German states and Poland obligate themselves to finalize their border after reunification through a bilateral treaty
— the Four Powers accept the guarantee of the two German states and declare, that with its fulfillment the final character of the borders of Germany is determined112

On 5 August Chancellor Kohl finally removed all doubts about his personal sincerity on the border issue. Addressing a meeting of the national expellees’ organization (the Bund der Vertriebenen [BdV]) held in honor of the forty-first anniversary of the group’s founding document, the Charter of the Expellees, Kohl forthrightly informed the outraged delegates that the time had come to declare that “the border between Poland and Germany, in its current form, is final.”113 Next, on 12 September the Two Plus Four treaty was signed in Moscow. It contained the provisions agreed upon at the Paris meeting, and thus formalized the commitment of the two Germanies and the Four Powers to guarantee the Polish border.114 The final treaty between the Federal Republic and the GDR on German unification, signed on 20 September, fulfilled another of Poland’s demands by altering the German Basic Law to expunge references which suggested that other “German territories” might still need to be attached to the new, enlarged, Federal Republic.115

After German reunification was finalized on 3 October 1990,
some doubts remained in Poland over how rapidly Germany would be willing to finalize the proposed Border Treaty. On 30 October, though, negotiations in Warsaw at the working level speedily produced a draft agreement. Although Poland still feared that the Germans would want to delay the signing of the treaty until after the December all-German elections, Chancellor Kohl had clearly had enough of the issue. At a mini-summit meeting with Mazowiecki in the German-Polish border town of Frankfurt an der Oder on 8 November Kohl unexpectedly agreed that the treaty could be signed immediately. On 14 November 1990, Foreign Minister Genscher signed the border treaty in Warsaw. With this step, the long and complex dispute over the Oder-Neisse line formally came to an end. Germany and Poland could now direct their attention fully to other issues.

With the border question on the way to resolution, Poland began to again turn its attention to other issues in bilateral German-Polish ties. The situation had come full circle, returning to the model of the fall of 1989: again, as will be shown below, economic issues and various types of economic linkage seemed to be of central importance. In fact, this shift in Poland's attitude could be seen even before German reunification was completed and the border treaty was signed. As has been noted above, even at the high point of the Oder-Neisse border dispute in late 1989 and early 1990, some voices—both in Germany and Poland—were cautioning the Polish government not to forget that its "community of interests" with the Federal Republic could be more important in the long run than the Oder-Neisse issue. After the decision to include Poland in the Two Plus Four talks, reached in mid-March 1990, Poland could begin to devote an increasing part of its attention to this "community of interests."

Poland's new approach was probably influenced by continued hints from Germany that any further demands on the border issue could have economic consequences. Such statements continued to be heard, especially when Poland made demands which seemed extreme to German ears. For example, the mainstream German conservative newspaper Die Welt replied to President Jaruzelski's suggestion that Polish troops could be stationed on German soil as follows:

Obviously Jaruzelski is confusing 1990 with 1945. Such a mistaken idea is not a problem for Germany (since it will not have any real results), but it is a problem for Poland. This country, economically ruined by the communists, is in urgent need of German economic help, in both bilateral and multilateral forms. It is no
wonder, then, that Foreign Minister Skubiszewski speaks of a German-Polish "community of interests." It is exactly this which Jaruzelski obviously wants to damage. The Polish democrats should not allow him to do this.\textsuperscript{119}

The perceived message was clear: economic aid to Poland was in danger unless the Polish government toned down its political demands. Similar statements could be seen elsewhere. For example, writing in \textit{Die Zeit}, Helga Hirsch condemned Poland's "hysterical fears" that "they [the Germans] will buy us out," seeing such attitudes as proof of Poland's "insufficient preparation for European integration" and claiming that Mazowiecki's actions on the border issue could prove to be a "Pyrrhic victory" which would "delay his country's return to Europe."\textsuperscript{120} As noted below, Chancellor Kohl's comments at his July meeting with the Polish Prime Minister also reflected these views, albeit in a more subtle form.

Pressed by "hints" from Germany and by their own realization that the Federal Republic remained a vital partner—particularly in the economic sphere—Poland's leadership had indeed already begun to shift the focus of German-Polish ties from confrontation back to a "mutually beneficial" mode. On 27 April Poland submitted a draft German-Polish treaty to both the East and West German governments. To the surprise of some in Bonn, the treaty did not focus merely on the burning question of the time—the border issue—but addressed a number of other areas as well, many of them economic. In particular, the Polish government was clearly interested in ensuring that Polish treaties with the GDR—especially the many economic agreements which linked the two states—would be respected by the Federal Republic after reunification. Another major issue raised by the Poles, which also had economic overtones, was the Polish desire to ensure that the unified Germany would keep its eastern border open to Poles.\textsuperscript{121} Many Poles had come to depend on access to German territory for their livelihoods. Thousands worked in the GDR and feared that they could lose their jobs when reunification occurred; many thousands more made their livings by acting as small traders, buying goods in the GDR or in West Berlin and reselling them in Poland.\textsuperscript{122} In the end, though, the Polish treaty draft had little effect. The Federal Republic refused to negotiate a treaty on behalf of the future united German state, although it did agree to enter into quiet negotiations with East German and Polish representatives over the possible "road map" to a future diplomatic solution—for example, whether to plan on negotiating the
border issue alongside of other bilateral problems or in a separate treaty.123

Poland's economic demands were reiterated several times in the following months. For example, on 15 June the Polish Foreign Minister handed the ambassadors of the GDR and the Federal Republic a memorandum on the economic effects of German unification.124 In this document, Poland's demand that treaties between the GDR and Poland should not be unilaterally abrogated after reunification was again emphasized. It was noted, though, that teams of Polish and German experts, meeting behind the scenes, were already nearing agreement on which of the treaties were to be preserved by a united Germany. Poland also raised a new demand in this document: when the former GDR was incorporated within the EC, its territory should not be subject to EC import restrictions on Polish products.125

Foreign Minister Skubiszewski offered a plausible defense of the Polish proposals, claiming that they were not an attempt to benefit from unification, but merely an attempt to ensure "that the unification of Germany does not cause unreasonably high losses for the economy of Poland."126 Yet some of the Polish demands—such as maintaining visa-free access to the former GDR and the ability to trade freely with the former GDR after reunification—would not just "avoid losses," but would provide substantial economic benefits. The GDR would now be part of the Federal Republic; thus trade with the ex-GDR would now bring in hard Western currency and access to the ex-GDR would in fact be access to the West, opening up new opportunities for legions of Polish small traders, consumers, and workers.

Events immediately preceding the July Paris summit of the Two Plus Four process clearly showed the reemergence of the central role of economics. Chancellor Kohl echoed the implied economic threats of some German commentators when he met Prime Minister Mazowiecki in Budapest at a conference of European Christian Democratic parties over the weekend of 30 June to 1 July 1990. There, Kohl "expressed his amazement to Mazowiecki that Poles were attacking the one person [himself, Kohl] who really could help them and wanted to help them." Further, he urged Mazowiecki to look beyond the immediate political issues and work to "develop a concept for regional cooperation along the German-Polish border."127 The Chancellor was thus implicitly offering a carrot and a stick: the implication that further political disputes could endanger Bonn's willingness to help Poland was balanced by the promise of more fruitful cooperation if Poland allowed German reunification to proceed smoothly. The message was not lost on Mazowiecki; he informed the Chancellor at the
Budapest meeting of a key concession: Poland had decided to accept the concept that the border treaty would be negotiated after German unification.

Immediately after the Budapest meeting, on 3 July, the Polish Prime Minister wrote Kohl to ask for the Chancellor's help in Poland's efforts to reduce its huge foreign debt. The German leadership found it ironic that Poland was asking for economic help at the same time it was making other political demands which angered Bonn, such as proposing that the Four Powers withhold their decision to grant Germany full sovereignty until after the German-Polish treaty had been signed and ratified. Indeed, within days Poland had dropped these political demands. This was undoubtedly due in part to the fact that the Poles had become more cautious about the long-term risk of alienating Germany. Also, at the same time—in early July at the famous "Stavropol summit"—Chancellor Kohl succeeded in winning the USSR's support for German reunification on Bonn's terms, in large part through a generous package of economic aid. Thus, Poland was isolated in its desire to slow down the unification process and felt pressured to quickly settle the border issue. As we have seen, the issue was indeed largely resolved at the 17 July Paris meeting of the Two Plus Four group.

At the Paris summit itself, it was speculated that another German economic carrot had been offered to further ease Poland's decision to formally withdraw some of its more controversial political demands. Formal agreement was reached that Germany would negotiate a border agreement with Poland only after reunification and that German sovereignty would not be delayed until after the signing of the treaty. At the same time, Skubiszewski agreed with Genscher that a new package of economic help for Poland would be discussed at a meeting of economic specialists in Bonn within a month of the Paris meeting. The implied economic linkage was seen by many observers; one newspaper headlined its story on the meeting "Poland Wants to be Paid for its Concession." There was some resentment in Bonn that, as that article stated,

For agreeing to give up a demand which it must have known from the beginning was impracticable, some political circles in Warsaw believe that they should at least be able to negotiate solid economic and financial promises from Bonn.
Several new types of economic aid were now being considered. First, Poland wanted to ensure that reunification would not harm any of its economic ties to the GDR. Thus it pressed for resolution of the issues raised in its draft treaty of 27 April: the continued validity of GDR-Poland trade and economic cooperation agreements, the protection of the jobs of Polish workers in the GDR, and the right of Poles to travel and trade in the former GDR, preferably without visas. Additionally, the issue of reparations had again resurfaced. Recognizing the sensitivity of the issue, Poland had decided not to press Germany to sign a formal treaty arranging compensation for Polish war victims. Instead, Poland suggested that the two countries set up a joint foundation to compensate victims, which would be "seeded" with a large "donation" from the West German government.\(^{131}\)

Thus, in all, it is clear that in the months following the sharpest crisis over the border issue in early 1990, economic issues again gradually came to occupy center stage in the German-Polish relationship. Indeed, economic issues were important in helping to influence Poland's demands on the timing and nature of the proposed border treaty. Thus, Germany's economic strength did have some bearing on the issue, although it had not been sufficient to persuade Poland to drop its demand for a border treaty altogether. With the practical resolution of the border issue at the Paris summit, and its formal resolution in the September Two Plus Four treaty and the November German-Polish Border Treaty, the territorial question was finally resolved in its entirety. Work could now begin on a more comprehensive German-Polish treaty, which would be based on the November 1989 Kohl-Mazowiecki Joint Declaration and would echo that declaration's emphasis on economic linkage.

**Linkage redux: The German-Polish Friendship Treaty**

One of the most important decisions reached at the Paris Two Plus Four summit in July 1990 was that Germany and Poland would negotiate two treaties after German reunification, not just one. Both sides by now wanted to resolve the border issue quickly; thus it was decided that a simple border treaty would be signed very soon after reunification. After this, all remaining bilateral issues would be resolved in a comprehensive treaty, which was eventually called the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation. This second treaty returned the focus of bilateral ties to the issues which had dominated relations in the early fall of 1989. The German side focused
on minority rights, border cooperation, and other political issues, while Poland tried to maximize potential economic gains from its new Western neighbor.

The comprehensive German-Polish treaty was negotiated over a period of eight months, a far longer time span than either side had initially envisioned.132 The first round of negotiations was held in Warsaw on 30 and 31 October 1990, with Jerzy Sulek at the head of the Polish delegation and Dieter Kastrup representing the German side. At this time a draft of the border treaty was completed, and work was begun on the friendship treaty. In an early November meeting between Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Mazowiecki at the German border town of Frankfurt/Oder it was agreed that the comprehensive treaty would "be concluded by the end of January," and that both the border treaty and the friendship treaty would be ratified in February.133 These hopes were not fulfilled.

From the beginning the negotiations on the comprehensive friendship treaty were filled with complications. As the following description will show, like the negotiations over the Joint Declaration of November 1989, the talks revolved around two crucial issues: how much would Germany be willing to give in the economic area, and how much would Poland be willing to concede on such political issues as minority rights? Over the contentious eight-month-long negotiating process a number of issues emerged, all of which could generally be subsumed under this overall rubric.

One recurring problem was the question of Poles' ability to enter Germany without a visa. Although this issue was not formally a part of the friendship treaty negotiations, it was seen as a vital part of the package of concessions being offered by Germany. With the official conclusion of German unification on 3 October 1990, West Germany's border restrictions had been extended to the territory of the GDR. As has been noted above, Poland felt that such restrictions posed a serious problem, particularly in the economic sense. Accordingly, Poland pressed Germany strongly to lift the visa requirement as soon as possible. Bonn responded quickly; at his November meeting with Kohl, Mazowiecki was able to extract a promise from the Chancellor that visa-free travel would be allowed by Christmas.134 Yet in truth the issue was to prove far more complicated to resolve.

One major complication faced by Germany in its effort to introduce visa-free travel for Poles was its interconnection with neighboring EC states. Germany was a member of the so-called Schengen group within the EC, states which had already abolished all passport controls on their mutual borders. A Pole entering Germany would there-
fore easily be able to enter any other Schengen state, including such
countries as Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Thus, Ger-
many was forced to win the approval of these states before opening
its border to the Poles. While this process caused some delay in the
border opening, it also was a boon for Poland: its contacts with Ger-
many had won Poland major travel concessions from other Western
states. In other, larger issues as well, Germany’s ability to act as
Poland’s representative, persuading other Western states to make con-
cessions to the Poles, was to prove invaluable in reaching agreement
on the Polish-German friendship treaty. In the end, visa-free travel
was not introduced until 8 April 1991, and its introduction was marred
by anti-Polish rioting in Germany, led by Neo-Nazi thugs.

Another economic issue of great concern for Poland was the
question of reparations for individuals who suffered at the hands of
Germany during the Second World War. This issue had been on the
Polish agenda for some time, and Warsaw was determined to finally
achieve results. However, as was the case with the visa issue, Poland
decided not to press Germany to resolve this problem as part of the
comprehensive friendship treaty itself. As will be discussed below,
this issue was eventually settled by a low-key intergovernmental agree-
ment several months after the signing of the Friendship Treaty.

Perhaps the most significant economic issues for Poland, though,
involved Germany’s ability to intercede on Poland’s behalf with other
Western nations. First, Warsaw looked to Germany to help resolve
Poland’s ongoing foreign debt problems, both bilaterally and in multi-
lateral fora. Second, and even more importantly, Poland saw Ger-
many as being central to the country’s hopes of entering the European
Community.

The foreign debt problem was partly a bilateral issue, since Ger-
many was Poland’s largest single creditor both in the public sphere
(loans granted by governments) and in the private sphere (loans
granted by banks). As has been noted above, in the negotiations lead-
ing up to the Polish-German Joint Declaration in the fall of 1989, Ger-
many was the first Western state to make major concessions on
Poland’s debt. However, in 1991 Poland’s main focus was on influ-
encing the multilateral negotiations taking place under the rubric of
the Paris Club (Poland’s governmental creditors) and the London Club
(private creditors). The German government was doubly important
in this regard. First, Poland knew that Bonn, as the largest Polish credi-
tor in the Paris Club, would be crucial in negotiating debt relief from
the group. No debt rescheduling or reduction plan could survive Ger-
man opposition; conversely, German support could be a major factor
in passing a plan favorable to Poland. Second, it was believed that the London Club of private creditors would not act until the Paris Club had sent a clear signal by resolving its part of the debt crisis. Germany's actions in the Paris Club—and the direct effect of behind-the-scenes pressure on German banks which would presumably accompany these actions—could thus have a major effect on the London Club as well.\textsuperscript{136}

Germany's central position in the EC was even more important to the Poles, as they pursued the goal of attaining association with and eventual membership in the organization. Membership in the EC could potentially bring Poland economic benefits which would dwarf any conceivable program of conventional economic aid. Poorer EC member-states received massive transfer payments from Brussels, running the gamut from agricultural price supports to "structural adjustment" funding for outmoded heavy industries. Further, poorer EC states benefited greatly from being included in a large free trading area dominated by wealthy states such as Germany, which could afford to pay premium prices for their products. The combination of trade and transfers had resulted in huge benefits for such poorer EC states as Spain and Portugal, and Poland was understandably eager to take a similar shortcut to prosperity.

In earlier German-Polish talks, such as the sessions which preceded the November 1989 Kohl-Mazowiecki summit, Poland's relations to the EC had not played such a central role. At that time, no one could have foreseen that German unification would bring the border of the EC up to Poland's western frontier, or that the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and CMEA would free Poland of its ties to the Eastern bloc with such unexpected speed. For both of these reasons, by mid-1991 Poland was able for the first time to seriously contemplate the possibility of joining the EC. It was of course recognized that, given Poland's poor economic condition and its still-incomplete transition to a market economy, attaining membership in the organization would be a long process. Thus, Poland planned to first negotiate an association agreement with the EC providing for a gradual lifting of trade restrictions, then enter a transitional period and begin to negotiate full membership. Some optimists in the Polish government hoped that membership could be achieved within ten years. To meet this ambitious objective, it was obvious that Poland needed a powerful friend within the European Community.

Germany was clearly a vital potential ally on EC questions. In international debt questions, Germany's influence was somewhat diluted by the presence of such major non-European states as the U.S.A. and Japan. In the EC, however, it was clear that Germany played a
leading role. Germany had long been the largest net contributor to the EC budget and a major player in shaping the Community’s future. After reunification, Germany’s status as the most populous and most prosperous state in the organization was solidified, further increasing its clout. In an important move which symbolized this large and growing role, Germany was granted an increase in its allotment of seats in the European Parliament. Before reunification it had held the same number of seats as Italy, Great Britain, and France, since all four countries had populations in the range of 50-60 million. The new Germany, with its population of 80 million, clearly stood alone as the largest EC state. In addition, the Poles were well aware that the question of Eastern European ties to the EC was an intensely divisive issue within the organization. In such a situation the support of Germany would be especially vital.

Meanwhile, as had been the case in previous bilateral talks, Germany’s demands in the friendship treaty negotiations centered on political issues. Once again the central issue was the rights of the German minority in Poland. Germany’s demands in this area had grown more ambitious since the drafting of the German-Polish Joint Declaration in late 1989. At that point, it had been considered an enormous breakthrough that Poland would even acknowledge that a German minority existed and grant it the right to use its language and form cultural associations. A little over a year later, Germany was prepared to push for far more extensive rights, going beyond those customarily granted to national minorities in some cases.

The new catalogue of desired minority rights was extensive. Perhaps most controversial was Germany’s demand that Poland acknowledge the right of minority members to hold dual German-Polish citizenship. To many Poles, this demand was outrageous. Anyone holding German citizenship, they reasoned, could vote in German elections, commute freely to Germany to work, and serve in the German army. What reason was there to believe that such persons would remain loyal to Poland? Would this not mark a major step toward the effective secession of German-speaking areas—notably in Upper Silesia—from the Polish state? As one Polish scholar noted with disbelief, with true dual citizenship, members of the minority could simultaneously be elected as representatives to the parliaments of both states.137

In addition to the issue of dual citizenship, Germany envisioned a number of other new rights for members of the German minority. For example, they should not only have the right to speak their language, but the right to German-speaking schools, churches, and the
right to use German with the Polish authorities. Further, the Polish government should commit itself to actively protecting the cultural heritage of the minority, by such steps as preserving memorials to famous German philosophers, politicians, and scientists on now-Polish territory. Even more controversial was the proposal that Poland allow German-speaking communities to set up memorials to German soldiers killed in the two world wars. Most Poles still remembered German soldiers in World War Two as part of a vicious army of occupation, dedicated to the extermination of the Polish people; it was shocking to see them commemorated with respectful memorials, in some cases featuring the old Iron Cross of the German Reich—symbol of the German army under Hitler as well as under the Kaiser. Also, Germany demanded that towns with German majorities be permitted to rename themselves, regaining the names they had held when they were part of Germany—or at least holding dual German and Polish names. Here again, this proposal brought up memories of both the pre-World War One German efforts to assimilate Poles and the more brutal Nazi occupation. In all, these demands would ensure that the Polish government not only passively allowed the German minority to exist, but that it would work actively to ensure that the minority was preserved and strengthened and not assimilated into Polish society.

Germany also envisioned Poland making a number of difficult concessions on behalf of those Germans who had been expelled from the country after the Second World War. Some suggested that Poland should be required to compensate the expellees for property taken after the war, although this suggestion was not pursued strongly by German negotiators since it seemed to imply equating Polish and German guilt for war crimes. However, a larger number of Germans noted pointedly that Poland had never even formally apologized for the expulsions. President Václav Havel of Czechoslovakia, who had made such an apology, was held up as an example for the Polish leadership to follow. Many Germans did not seem to take into account, though, the factors which made it much harder for the Poles to be as ready to “forgive and forget” as the Czechs. First, Germany’s wartime occupation of Poland had been much more brutal than its treatment of the Czechs and Slovaks. Second, Germany’s claims to Czech territory were much weaker than its claims on Polish lands. Germany had occupied the Czech Sudetenland only from 1938 to 1945, while its claim to the regions occupied by Poland after the war dated back centuries. Also, Germany had formally abandoned its legal claims on the Sudetenland years earlier, while the Polish border was only granted full recogni-
tion in November 1990. Thus, it was clear that Poland had some grounds to both hate and fear the *Vertriebenen* far more than did the Czechs, making a Polish apology to the expellees a very difficult political issue.

Additionally, Germany proposed that Poland should give expellees the right to return to Poland to live if they should so choose. Poland's 1920 law which made all purchases of land by foreigners subject to case-by-case approval by the Interior Ministry should be scrapped, Germany believed, and Germans should be granted the right to buy land in Poland for any reason without restriction. Bonn argued that this change would not threaten Poland with a wave of German settlers—only a few harmless, elderly expellees were likely to actually move to Poland. Further, the Germans noted that easing the restrictions on land purchases could result in a flood of beneficial investment into Poland. Poland, however, rejected this economic argument, fearing that any returning expellees could be a security threat. Many Poles felt that returning *Vertriebenen* would feel no loyalty to Poland at all, and could encourage "revanchist" sentiments among the German minority already living in the country.

Given Poland's fears, it is perhaps not surprising that Warsaw had a very different view of the issue of minority rights. It demanded that the negotiations should stress not the rights of the minority but its responsibilities to the Polish state. Thus, in speaking of the issue, Polish diplomats generally mentioned "the question of the rights and duties of the German minority" in one breath, while Germans mentioned only "rights." Poland wanted to explicitly note in the treaty that the minority had the obligation to behave loyally toward Poland and to avoid questioning the country's western border.

The process of hammering the German and Polish demands into a finished treaty was a difficult one. A number of negotiating rounds were required. After initial discussions on 30-31 October 1990, in Warsaw, the early November summit meeting of Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Mazowiecki further advanced the negotiations. The second round of working-level talks took place in Bonn on 26-27 November and the third round was again in Warsaw on 10-11 December. Although the fourth round had been scheduled to take place in Bonn on 10-11 January it was postponed. Following the first all-German elections on 2 December the Germans claimed they needed time to form a new government and could not devote their full attention to the talks. A second reason was likely just as important: the talks were stalled, and both sides needed to regroup and reconsider their options.

On 5-6 March 1991 the new Polish Prime Minister, Jan Bielecki,
visited Bonn. The main subjects of his visit were predictable: German economic concessions and Polish political concessions. Specifically, the discussions focused on Germany’s role in helping to reduce Poland’s looming foreign debt and on a new draft of the friendship treaty’s controversial provisions on the rights of the German minority.\textsuperscript{138} Meanwhile, the chief Polish negotiator in the Friendship Treaty talks, Jerzy Sulek, also confirmed that the “most difficult” issues being discussed in those negotiations were minority rights, bilateral German-Polish economic ties, and the issue of EC admission.\textsuperscript{139} Following Bielecki’s visit, the Paris Club was finally able to agree (on 15 March) to a 50 per cent reduction in Poland’s debt to the participating Western governments. This decision could not have been made without the support of Germany, Poland’s largest creditor, which was initially very reluctant to agree despite encouragement from the U.S. and others. At least in part, Germany’s decision to make this costly economic concession must be considered to be a “sweetener” designed to speed up the difficult talks on the Polish-German Friendship Treaty. It should be recalled that in the run-up to the Kohl-Mazowiecki meeting of November 1989, a similar inducement was offered at the time that the summit’s important Joint Statement was being hammered out.\textsuperscript{140} Immediately following the decision of the Paris Club, the fourth round of the Friendship Treaty negotiations was finally held on 19-20 March in Bonn. Yet the two sides’ problems with the treaty draft were still not over. A fifth round of talks was held on 4-5 April in Warsaw. Again, it had been expected in preceding weeks that this would be the final round of talks, but this was not the case.

In a further positive gesture to Poland, Germany at last opened its eastern border to visa-free travel by Poles on 8 April 1991. As has been noted above, the visa issue was of major importance to Poland economically; it also had become a matter of political prestige and a symbol of Poland’s feelings of being isolated from the prosperous West. The results of the border opening, however, were disastrous. German Neo-Nazis rioted at the border crossing points, throwing stones at Polish cars and physically attacking visitors. The local police response was widely viewed as being weak. Accordingly, a gesture that had been meant to encourage progress in ties with Poland backfired, at least in the short run. The Polish government called in the German ambassador to deliver a sharp protest note, which condemned both the violence and the inadequate police response.\textsuperscript{141}

It was in this volatile atmosphere that Foreign Ministers Skubiszewski and Genscher met at Weimar on 28 April to finally hammer out a draft of the friendship treaty. Their meeting had been im-
mediately preceded by a sixth, and final, meeting between German and Polish negotiators at the working level in Bonn. Also, Poland had made a last-minute positive gesture of its own; Prime Minister Bielecki had traveled to Upper Silesia to meet with representatives of the German minority on 24 April. As expected, the most difficult issues which faced the Foreign Ministers in Weimar were the extent of Polish political concessions to Germany (notably in the controversial issue of minority rights) and the extent of German economic concessions to Poland (particularly the question of Germany's support for Polish membership in the EC).  

In the end, the treaty was finally initialed on 6 June 1991, and signed by Chancellor Kohl and Prime Minister Bielecki in Bonn on 17 June. The treaty's provisions generally fulfilled the demands of both sides as outlined above, by once again creating a large-scale economic/political compromise. As had been the case with earlier German-Polish agreements, such as the Kohl-Mazowiecki Joint Statement of November 1989, commentators were quick to notice the essential economic-political linkage at the heart of the German-Polish Friendship Treaty. The subtitle of the account of the agreement in the main German news magazine Der Spiegel, for example, was quite clear: "Bonn and Warsaw Come to an Agreement: The German Minority Finally Gets its Rights, and the Polish Reformers Will Achieve Admission to the EC."  

On the issue of the German minority, Poland made a number of important concessions. A formal apology for the injustices done to the expellees was not included in the treaty itself. For some time, though, Polish leaders had been making statements which edged ever closer to such an apology. As early as 1985 Jaruzelski had acknowledged for the first time the "suffering" of the expellees. The new Polish leadership was even more conciliatory. After the signing of the German-Polish border treaty in November, 1990, Prime Minister Mazowiecki made this statement:

"We ask for the forgiveness of the German nation for the suffering which was caused by moving Poland from East to West. Remember that in the counting of victims, arithmetic has no value and the suffering will remain, regardless of who inflicted it."  

This statement was particularly valuable to the Germans since it not only constituted a clear apology, but also specifically countered the common argument that the sheer number of Polish war victims made
it impossible for Poland to ever apologize for its less serious post-war actions.

In another area of concern to the German expellees, Poland made a direct economic/political linkage of its own. Warsaw refused to allow Germans to settle in Poland or to loosen its restrictions on the purchase of land by foreigners, but in Section Two of the exchange of letters which accompanied the friendship treaty the Polish government did make the following statement:

The government of the Republic of Poland declares that the possible admission of Poland to the European Community, as mentioned in Article 8, Section 3 [of the friendship treaty], will create increasing possibilities for German citizens to settle in Poland.\footnote{146}

Thus, Poland was explicitly linking the right of Germans to live in Poland to its own admission to the EC. This would provide one more reason for Germany to help Poland improve its ties to the EC. It also allowed Poland to frame a possible concession on German settlement as merely a move toward the EC-wide norm of free movement of persons, rather than as a unilateral concession to Germany.

However, the concessions on minority rights which Poland made in Articles 20-22 of the treaty itself were even more substantial. While the rights granted were officially described by both sides as being mutual—i.e., applying equally to Germans in Poland and Poles in Germany—and as being absolutely "normal" under international law, in reality they were unusually extensive and unusually beneficial to Germany. The most important "asymmetry" in the rights granted to the two states' respective minority groups can be seen in the very definition of the groups involved. Article 20 speaks of "the German minority in the Republic of Poland," but only of "persons of...Polish origin," in the Federal Republic.\footnote{147} Thus, the treaty appears to explicitly deny the existence of a coherent minority group within Germany. The existence of a minority group could be construed as demanding a higher level of rights than a small number of individuals. This asymmetry was debated in the Polish Sejm when the Friendship treaty was ratified in October 1991, and was cited by several deputies as the key reason for their opposition to the treaty.\footnote{148} Furthermore, the enumerated minority rights are restricted to citizens of Germany who are of Polish origin and citizens of Poland who are of German origin. While this is not a problem for the German minority in Poland, it would appear to limit the rights of Poles in Germany. Many of them are recent immi-
grants, who still find it difficult to obtain German citizenship despite the recent loosening of the Federal Republic's restrictive immigration laws. In a partial concession to Polish concerns on this issue, Germany agreed in the exchange of letters which accompanied the treaty that

The government of the Federal Republic...is striving to ensure that [non-citizen Poles] living in the Federal Republic...may also to a large extent benefit from the rights mentioned in Article 20 and...Article 21.

However, this German statement did not fully resolve the asymmetry in the minority issue.149

In two of the most controversial minority rights issues—the questions of dual citizenship and of German-language names for Polish town in the area settled by ethnic Germans—Germany did not win a total victory but did make some progress. Poland did not agree to cooperate with Germany in formally granting dual citizenship to the German minority. However, the exchange of letters accompanying the treaty specified that “this treaty does not deal with issues of citizenship.”150 Germany was thus able to continue to issue passports to Polish citizens of German origin and to consider them to be German citizens, under the provisions of Article 116 of the Basic Law, despite Polish disapproval. Meanwhile, Polish emigrants to Germany were not permitted to hold dual citizenship and continued to be regarded as Ausländer [foreigners]. In the issue of German-language place names Germany was less successful, but it did win Poland’s recognition that the issue was of “interest to the Federal Republic of Germany’s government,” and would be examined again at some future date.151

Additionally, the Polish government promised in the treaty to uphold the identity of the German minority against “any attempts to make them assimilate against their own will,” and even to assist the minority in “promoting [its] identity.”152 Children of the German minority were to be instructed in German in Polish schools, and this instruction was to “take account of the history and culture of the minority group.”153 The German minority was to be permitted not only to maintain contacts with groups in Germany, but was to permitted to “work together in international non-state organizations” with such groups.154 Thus, the much-feared Bund der Vertriebenen could set up explicit organizational links to its compatriots in Poland. The minority was to be permitted to use the German language “wherever this is possible...with the authorities.”155 Additionally, the Polish government
further increased the political status of the minority by agreeing to create a "Commission for National Minorities," directly under the Council of Ministers, and the position of "minority commissioner" in each Voivodship (district) with a significant national minority. These latter concessions were again asymmetrical: Germany saw no need to create a Commission for National Minorities or a system of minority commissioners in the Federal Republic.

In all, Germany's performance in guaranteeing unprecedented rights for the minority in Poland was so impressive that it even achieved one of Chancellor Kohl's domestic political goals—winning some support from the German expellee movement. In view of the minority rights provisions, the young General Secretary of the Bund der Vertriebenen, Hartmut Koschyk, decided to openly support the German-Polish Border Treaty and Friendship Treaty. He was opposed by BdV die-hards, led by the organization's President, Herbert Czaja. Koschyk led an attempt to remove Czaja from office, failed, and then resigned himself. However, the controversy made it clear that even within the BdV many members had given up on their goal of actually reclaiming lost lands in the East. Thus, Kohl was able to move ahead in reconciliation with Poland, secure in the knowledge that his political "right flank" was safe.

In addition to the concessions achieved in the minority rights area—the main point of political controversy in the treaty talks—Germany also made progress on other political issues. Poland agreed to facilitate cross-border cooperation between German and Polish towns and regions (in Article 12 of the Friendship treaty). This was in itself a miniature economic-political deal. This cooperation was clearly of interest to Poland mainly for the economic benefits it would bring to the Polish border areas, and was of interest to Germany mainly for the perceived political benefits of strengthening stability along the border and establishing a German presence—in a friendly and non-threatening way—in the areas east of the Oder-Neisse line. Also, Poland agreed to establish cooperation with the Federal Republic in customs and border enforcement issues (Article 19). This agreement would become especially important when Bonn later asked Poland to help interdict the stream of East European refugees which flowed over the Oder-Neisse border. Both the regional cooperation and border enforcement cooperation issues will be discussed in more detail below, since they have assumed an important role in bilateral ties after the negotiation of the Friendship Treaty. Finally, the atmosphere of trust engendered by the treaty would have intangible political benefits as well, which would help Germany to win Poland's help in dealing with other
political problems in years to come.

Germany, meanwhile, agreed to a number of provisions in the Friendship treaty which were very beneficial to Poland. As might be expected, these centered in the economic area. Most importantly, Germany promised to help Poland build closer ties to the EC, explicitly including the pledge that Germany would support full membership for Poland in the EC.159 This assurance was seen as being of great importance, since at the time the treaty was signed (June 1991) Poland had not even concluded an association agreement with the EC. This was also potentially a very costly provision for Germany—both in economic terms, due to the huge costs which would be associated with integrating Poland into the EC, and in political terms. As was mentioned above, many EC countries were openly skeptical about the association agreement, and adamantly opposed to giving Poland a promise of eventual membership in the organization. Thus, it is not surprising that German support in the EC membership question was the subject of serious hesitation on Bonn’s part. Kohl and his negotiators feared that their promise to support Poland’s EC admission would be resented by Germany’s European partners, and seen as an arrogant Teutonic attempt to speak for the EC as a whole. This problem was hotly debated at the Kohl-Bielecki summit meeting in Bonn in March 1991, before Germany finally conceded.160

Germany’s promise to support Poland in other multilateral organizations was also of great importance. The June 1991 Friendship Treaty committed the Federal Republic to help Poland in its relations with the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the IMF, and the World Bank (Article 10). The same article also contained Germany’s commitment to help in achieving a “settlement of the problem of Polish debts,” as Poland had sought. As with German help in the EC membership question, this help must be considered as an important form of indirect economic aid to the Polish regime. Finally, Germany also gave the first indirect acknowledgment that it would also work to improve Poland’s ties with NATO. In Article 36 the treaty mentions that “both sides” will help each other to develop ties to “organizations in which one party to the treaty is a member.” This general provision was designed to skirt the NATO question, which at the time was still largely taboo but—as will be noted below—became steadily more important after 1992.161

In addition to its promises to help Poland in its relations with other countries and multilateral organizations, Germany also committed itself to continue helping Poland on a bilateral basis. In the Friendship Treaty Germany agreed to make efforts to help Poland
achieve a "fully developed social market economy," which would "considerably reduc[e] the differences of development" between the two states.\textsuperscript{162} The importance of German Hermes export loan guarantees is mentioned in this context (Article 10).

As was mentioned above, Germany's April 1991 decision to allow visa-free travel between Poland and the Federal Republic was a major bilateral concession which helped pave the way for the final negotiations on the Friendship Treaty. It also was an example of Germany's ability to influence other countries on Poland's behalf, since Germany was able to persuade all of the Schengen group countries to open their borders to Poles as well. The introduction of visa-free travel was an important step in showing Poles that they could await concrete benefits from their rapprochement with Western Europe—with the help of Germany.

Germany also finally took steps to resolve the issue of compensation for Polish victims of Nazi repression in the Second World War. As had been the case several times previously in German-Polish ties, here again a sensitive issue was gently sidestepped by separate negotiations which were not "officially" part of the main treaty talks. Shortly after the Friendship Treaty was signed, Germany agreed with the Polish government to establish a joint foundation to compensate Polish war victims, and agreed to contribute 500 million DM to the agency. In this way, Germany was able to avoid the onus of "reparations" by paying to a non-partisan group rather than to the Polish government, and was also able to avoid the appearance that the payment was directly part of the Friendship Treaty package.\textsuperscript{163}

With the conclusion of the Friendship Treaty Poland was now aware that, as Prime Minister Bielecki put it when signing the treaty, "United Germany...is Poland's most important partner in all areas."\textsuperscript{164} This awareness was made palatable to the Poles by generous German concessions, which made it clear to Warsaw that the Polish-German partnership could be very beneficial to Poland's interests. However, Germany too had won substantial benefits. In short, the treaty was an effective example of positive economic linkage—the use of aid for political purposes—which seemed to leave both sides better off.

\textit{New problems in a new era}

In the months and years which followed the signing of the German-Polish friendship treaty, both sides moved to implement the promises which they had made in the agreement. In a series of long,
tense negotiations, Germany helped to craft an association agreement between Poland and the EC. Germany was also important in the agreement reached by the Paris Club to cut Poland’s debt to Western governments in half. It is estimated that this action cost the German government—Poland’s largest governmental creditor—fully 4.5 billion DM at one stroke. As Poland had hoped, this agreement was followed—after further difficult negotiations—by a similar agreement with the private creditors represented in the London Club. Meanwhile Poland, too, fulfilled its side of the economic/political bargain. It has studiously upheld the rights of the German minority in Poland, and also—as we shall see below—has worked well with Germany in the emerging political areas of border control and cooperation between towns and regions along the border.

As was noted above, Germany’s importance as a representative of Poland’s interests in the EC was further increased by the attitude of the other members of the organization. Germany stood almost alone in its willingness to support eventual EC membership for Poland and the other Visegrád States (Czechoslovakia and Hungary). Poorer EC states, such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain, were vocal in their opposition to expanding the EC. They feared competition from East European farm goods, textiles, and steel, as well as the loss of generous EC farm subsidies and structural help, which had long flowed to the poorer EC states. Since Poland’s per capita GNP was about half of that of Portugal, currently the EC’s poorest state, it was obvious that the current members of the EC “poorhouse” would be rudely displaced with the accession of Eastern Europe to the organization. To the disappointment of the Poles, their traditional ally France joined the poorer states in opposition to East European EC membership. Although some sectors of France’s more developed economy would benefit by increased ties to countries such as Poland, the political importance of sectors which expected competition from Eastern Europe—particularly agriculture—proved to be decisive. Also, France was worried by the possible political implications of the accession of Poland and its neighbors to the EC. It feared that the Franco-German axis, long the central relationship in EC politics, would be eclipsed by the emergence of a new German-dominated Mitteleuropa bloc, made up of the East European states as well as the Scandinavian countries and Austria, which were also moving toward EC membership. Britain was, to some extent, a supporter of the idea of expanding the EC to the East. It favored the idea of signing association treaties with Poland and its neighbors, which would extend the EC free trade zone into Eastern Europe. However, the British were extremely wary of making a com-
mitment to eventual EC membership for these states, since that could entail huge expenditures for structural subsidies and agricultural price supports.

Thus, in all, support within the EC for closer economic links with Poland was extremely tenuous in 1990-1991—and it remained tenuous in the following years. In this situation, the firm support of Germany was vital if Poland was to have any hope of achieving association with the community and moving toward eventual membership. When one takes the views of the other EC states into account, Germany’s attitude seems particularly unusual. Most other EC states take the economically rational position that, since admitting any East European states will be incredibly expensive, admission must be approached with extreme caution. Germany, however, has stronger political reasons to favor admission—namely its need to repay its eastern neighbors for their support of reunification and for Germany’s past treatment of the region, as well as a strong concern for the stability of its own borders. Thus, Germany’s differences with its EC partners on the question of expanding the organization are quite understandable. These differences can also be seen in attitudes about extending the EC even further to the east, with Germany seeing it as self-evident that the Baltic States should be considered for full membership and Russia should at least be closely associated with the organization, while other EC states are horrified at these plans.

After a full year of tortuous negotiations, which included a walkout by the East European nations at one point over France’s repeated efforts to restrict future Eastern exports to the EC, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia were finally able to sign Association Agreements with the organization on 16 December 1991. Under the Polish agreement, EC tariffs on Polish exports began to be reduced on 1 March 1992. However, due to the economic objections of some EC states, several areas of great importance to Poland were largely excluded from this trade liberalization—steel, textiles, coal, and, most notably, agricultural products. Exports in these so-called “sensitive areas” continued to be limited by a complex system of quotas and other regulations.

In several respects, Germany was able to further advance its own political objectives through the provisions of the Association Agreements [Europa-Abkommen] with Poland and the other Visegrad states. The East European states agreed that their full adherence to “democratic principles” could be a condition for their membership in the EC. These democratic principles explicitly included the granting of full rights to minority groups. Also, the Visegrad states agreed to permit companies from all EC states to freely invest in their countries,
as part of a general commitment to the principles of market economics. This commitment expressly included the right to buy land and property.¹⁷¹ In both cases, these provisions supported demands which Germany had traditionally sought to pursue in its bilateral ties with these states. We have seen, for example, that in talks with Poland the rights of the German minority and the right of Germans to buy land and property in Poland were of great importance to German negotiators. The incorporation of these provisions in the Association Agreements was especially beneficial to Germany in two ways: first, these political concessions by Eastern Europe were explicitly linked to these countries’ accession to the EC. Thus any backsliding in these areas could harm the countries’ chances of EC membership—a potent economic/political linkage. Second, the incorporation of these demands in a multilateral accord allows both Germany and its East European partners to lift the issues outside of the divisive bilateral context. Granting concessions to the German minority in a treaty with Germany may be controversial; granting concessions to all minorities in a treaty with the EC is much less so.

The tepid nature of Western Europe’s welcome to its Eastern neighbors was further underscored by the fact that it took over two years for the EC member-states to ratify the Association Agreements. Thus, they did not formally take effect until 1 February 1994, although their provisions had been practically implemented by a series of interim agreements between the EC and the Visegrád states.¹⁷²

Since the signing of the Association Agreement, Germany has continued to work behind the scenes to speed the process of Poland’s admission to the EC. When Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka visited Bonn in November 1992, Chancellor Kohl reaffirmed Germany’s commitment to support Poland’s admission to the EC—within ten years, if possible.¹⁷³ At the June 1993 summit of EC leaders in Copenhagen, Germany led the fight to speed up the lifting of quotas on imports of “sensitive” goods from Eastern Europe and to increase the funds given to the region under the PHARE project.¹⁷⁴ Germany was also able to persuade its EC partners to agree to a final communiqué which sought to give definite membership prospects to Poland and its neighbors.¹⁷⁵ The communiqué stated clearly that “The European Council agreed that the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union.”¹⁷⁶ However, the document linked full membership to a number of vague preconditions, including “the union’s capacity to absorb new members,” and did not contain the specific timetable for admission which the East European states had sought.
In addition to its efforts to influence the EC as a whole, Germany has also taken unilateral actions under the Community’s umbrella to support links to states such as Poland, for example by interpreting EC regulations in ways that favor these states. Germany is the only EC state which has taken advantage of the provision of the Association Agreements which permit EC states to arrange to hire contract workers in Eastern Europe. In various bilateral agreements Germany has agreed to take some 56,000 East European workers on an official basis, and it is common knowledge that many more have entered semi-legally, to work in such areas as construction and the harvesting of crops.

In the years after 1989-1991 Poland’s ties to another Western organization, NATO, became a second important focus of attention. Here again Germany played an important role as an “advocate” for Poland, although it was less central than in ties with the EC. In 1989-1991 Poland’s efforts to “rejoin Europe” had focused on the EC. Poles hoped that membership in the Community could be achieved quickly. Joining NATO, meanwhile, was seen as too provocative to Moscow. In any case, it seemed possible at the time that both of the Cold War-era alliances would dissolve. By about 1993, however, the situation had changed. Despite Germany’s efforts, it became clear that full Polish membership in the EC would take some years to achieve. Poland would have to change innumerable laws and regulations to accommodate to EC norms. Perhaps more importantly, as noted above, many EC states were unwilling to pay for efforts to improve Poland’s standard of living or to accept competition from Poland in areas such as agriculture, steel, and coal. While joining the EC now seemed more difficult, joining NATO seemed easier. NATO had not been dismantled after the Cold War; if anything, as the series of crises in the former Yugoslavia showed, it was more central to European security than ever. Russia was still a threat and still opposed to Poland’s membership in NATO, but its hold over the region was gone.

Accordingly, while Warsaw continued to push for EC membership, it also applied to join NATO. Here, too, as in the EC question, Germany played an important role in supporting Poland. In military affairs as in economics, Germany did not want to be on the volatile edge of a West European island of stability; it preferred to have stable and safe neighbors to its East. Hence, it strongly supported Poland’s inclusion in NATO. Of course, the power dynamics in this case were somewhat different. In the EC Germany is the largest and most important member; NATO, in contrast, is led by the U.S., diluting Germany’s role. Also, Germany’s military power is relatively less than
its economic strength. In the end, at the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to join the alliance.

Since 1991, another key issue in German-Polish ties, in addition to the questions of EC and NATO membership, has been bilateral cooperation along the German-Polish border. Here, too, the familiar pattern of German economic aid and Polish political cooperation can be seen clearly. Among the more important issues in this area have been bilateral cooperation in restricting immigration to Germany, cross-border regional cooperation, and the practical effects of cross-border trade on a day-to-day basis.

Since German reunification, several efforts have been made to establish productive cooperative links between German and Polish regions in the border area. These efforts have generally been met by caution on the Polish side, due to fears that German economic strength will result in a "creeping re-annexation" of the formerly German areas along the border. Polish fears that a possible German economic linkage strategy could be strong enough to affect Polish territorial control have often been excessively downplayed by the German side, and this has sometimes resulted in diplomatic difficulties—most prominently in the case of the so-called "Stolpe Plan."

Manfred Stolpe, the Minister-President of the German state of Brandenburg, made a dramatic proposal for regional cooperation in July 1991. Stolpe's plan envisioned a cooperative zone which would extend along the entire German-Polish border, reaching some 100 km into Poland and 50 km into Germany. The Polish port of Szczecin (formerly Stettin) was to have a free port which would be under "international" management, and the nearby island of Uznam was to be made a special economic zone to attract German investment. Other towns on both sides of the border region were to specialize in various types of production. Development in the zone would be promoted by a joint German-Polish development bank, headquartered in Berlin, with Germany providing 70 per cent of the capital and holding a majority on the Board of Directors.

Much to the surprise of Stolpe and many Germans, this plan raised a storm of outrage in Poland. All of its provisions were seen as unfairly benefiting Germany, even leading to a threat to Polish sovereignty in the border regions. It was noted that the zone was designed to incorporate twice as much Polish territory as German. As one Polish newspaper put it, the plan "slices off a 100 km strip of Poland's territory and thereby shifts Poland's border, as it were, to the east." Furthermore, the provisions for special zones in Stettin and
Uznam seemed to some to be tantamount to placing these areas under joint Polish-German administration. Also, the "specialties" assigned to German and Polish regions seemed to Poles to be unfair. Germany would specialize largely in modern manufacturing projects, while Polish tasks—such as simple processing of food and raw materials—were designed to "exploit uncompromisingly the low land prices and labor costs" in Poland. Other areas of the Polish border region were to serve as tourist attractions for wealthy Germans, while still other areas were to be used as dumps for German municipal waste; both of these tasks seemed somewhat demeaning to Poles. The plan also called for Germans to buy land and vacation homes in Poland, which violated Poland's restrictions on property purchases by foreigners. Finally, the proposed regional development bank seemed to many Poles to be an instrument of economic penetration, since it would clearly be controlled from Germany.

In all, the Stolpe plan seemed to be far too obvious in its promotion of German goals to win Polish support. Accordingly, it was rapidly scuttled. The proposed development bank was dropped at an October 1991 meeting of the German-Polish border cooperation commission, and soon thereafter the entire plan disappeared from view. However, this did not mean that regional cooperation was impossible; it would merely have to be recast to overcome the Polish objections.

Since the failure of the Stolpe initiative, German-Polish regional cooperation plans have had two new characteristics. First, they have been placed under the aegis of the EC's program of cross-border cooperation, the "Euroregion" program. As in other areas of German-Polish relations, this involvement by the EC lifts the issue out of the strictly bilateral context and makes it easier for Poland to rationalize its concessions. Second, in contrast to the Stolpe plan, other plans have taken pains to make the proposed cooperation appear as equal as possible, rather than being slanted toward Germany.

Recent cooperation plans have revolved around several so-called "Euroregions." One is the "Euroregion Neisse" (or "Euroregion Dreiländereck") located at the intersection of Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic. It is explicitly modeled on a similar three-country region along Germany's western border, which links Germany with Belgium and the Netherlands in the Aachen area. The Neisse Euroregion was established in December 1991, and the German city of Zittau was selected as its temporary headquarters, with the provision that the headquarters be rotated among the three countries involved to guard against German predominance. Other Euroregions were soon created, including one in the mid-Oder region and one in the Szczecin area.
However, despite these various “top-down” plans, an equally important development is taking place at the border spontaneously—various day-to-day contacts are building “bottom-up” cooperation. Most notably, there has been an explosion in trade and travel across the border. The formerly sleepy Oder-Neisse border was crossed by over 100 million people in 1993, and even more in succeeding years.\(^{166}\) Huge numbers of Germans now cross the border to shop in Poland, generally in border “bazaars” resembling those on the US-Mexican border. This phenomenon has immense political and economic importance. In 1993, for example, it was estimated that some four billion Marks were generated by the unrecorded trade at these border markets.\(^{167}\) This compares with 8.3 billion DM in “official” Polish exports to Germany in the same year.\(^{168}\)

Still another form of cooperation along the German-Polish border can be seen in joint efforts in the area of infrastructure and border control. Here again, German economic assistance is used to help promote Polish political cooperation. In the area of infrastructure (construction of roads and bridges to facilitate cross-border travel) it is obvious that Germany will provide much of the financing, as it once did for the GDR in a series of infrastructure arrangements between East and West Germany before 1990. For example, when it was decided in 1992 to expand the roads leading to the busy border crossing at Frankfurt (Oder), Germany provided 40 million DM to finance the Polish part of the project.\(^{169}\) Similarly, when other projects along the border are discussed—ranging from improved border crossing points to joint nature parks—it is obvious which side will provide the bulk of the money.\(^{170}\) With its financial help, Germany is ensuring that the border zone remains open and friendly, allowing Germans to have free access to the formerly German areas along the country’s Eastern frontier.

Similarly, German aid has helped to ensure improved cooperation in the sensitive area of border control. In the aftermath of reunification, Germany found itself faced with a major political crisis over the influx of Eastern immigrants who sought to take advantage of Germany’s generous policy on granting political asylum. Germany was eager to choke off the flow of refugees, but did not want to resort to completely dropping the right to asylum from the German Basic Law. Many in Germany were vocally opposed to abolishing this right, seeing it as a key sign of Germany’s post-1945 commitment to democracy. Accordingly, the government devised a clever stratagem: it would officially affirm the right to asylum, but virtually eliminate it in practice. Bonn declared that immigrants who passed through “se-
cure third countries” to get to Germany were obviously not genuine political refugees and could thus be deported, and then defined all states bordering Germany to be such “secure third countries.”

This decision presented real problems for Poland; it was host to a large number of refugees en route to Germany, who could potentially become trapped in Poland if the German border was effectively closed. To resolve this problem, Germany again resorted to “checkbook diplomacy.” Just before the new asylum law was to take effect on 1 July 1993, Germany and Poland signed an agreement in which Poland agreed to take back illegal immigrants who had entered Germany through Poland. In return for this help, Poland was granted immediate financial assistance for 1993 and 1994, with the provision for additional help in future years if there is “a rapid or massive increase in the [number of] refugees” in Poland. Here again, the economic/political linkage was clear to most observers; some in Poland saw the agreement as a sign that their country was assuming the role of “a well-paid and occasionally stroked ‘watch dog.’” However, being declared a “secure third state” was also advantageous for Poland, since it gave Germany an additional large incentive to help keep Poland economically and politically stable. If Poland ever ceases to be a “secure state,” presumably all Poles—as well as any citizens of other states who pass through Poland—would be eligible to apply for political asylum in Germany, thus tearing a gaping hole in the country’s meticulously crafted solution to the asylum problem. Thus far, the asylum agreement seems to have worked fairly well, with the number of illegal aliens crossing the Oder-Neisse border declining from its pre-1993 peak.

Inevitably, the sum total of these various efforts at cooperation along the Oder-Neisse border—including regional cooperation, infrastructure cooperation, and border enforcement cooperation—has been an increase in German-Polish interdependence. However, as was noted in the introduction to this study, interdependence is often “asymmetrical” to one degree or another, and thus it still allows one side to influence the other. This is clearly the case along the German-Polish border. Despite some problems, the former GDR lands are much wealthier than western Poland. Thus, like the Stolpe plan, the “Euroregion” plans, as well as cooperative programs in transport and border control, generally are “unequal”—they involve Germany paying for projects in Poland. However, as one might expect, the Poles (as the weaker party) are more sensitive to this underlying asymmetry, while Germans tend to make statements that express the asymmetry almost without realizing it. For example, in a generally balanced article laud-
ing cross-border ties one German author casually stated that “the entire area east of the Oder and Neisse will have a German-Polish future.” Why, a Pole might wonder, only the area east of the Oder and Neisse?

Many authors have made a comparison between the Oder-Neisse border and the US-Mexican frontier. The comparison seems to be a fitting one: in both areas, a huge difference in incomes and living standards is seen on either side of the frontier. As a result, both borders are plagued by problems of illegal migration, problems with smuggling and the drug trade, and Tijuana-like border bazaars. However, the comparison is also fitting in another way: it serves to lift the German-Polish situation of “asymmetrical interdependence,” with its associated high level of economic/political linkage politics, out of the bilateral context and place it in a broader theoretical framework of such relations between states across the globe.

Conclusion

As this study has shown, the pervasive role of economic/political linkage has been a constant in German-Polish relations in recent years, and it will likely continue to be important in the foreseeable future. The long-term structural nature of the economic relationship between the two states—which can accurately be characterized as one of “asymmetrical interdependence”—has seemingly made some type of linkage strategy almost inevitable in bilateral relations. However, in recent years Germany has had more success with some strategies than with others, and has seemingly learned to use its “economic power” primarily through positive linkage and with a measure of subtlety. In most cases, recent German policy has enabled both Bonn and Warsaw to benefit from economic/political linkages.

At present, despite the rapid economic advances taking place in Poland, it is clear that Germany will continue to be the dominant economic partner in the relationship for many years to come. Germany’s role in trade with Poland has increased massively since 1989, both due to Poland’s economic turn away from the CMEA bloc and to German reunification, which has brought both the attractive German market and aggressive German marketing to the Oder. By 1994, German trade with Poland had more than doubled as compared with Polish-West German trade in 1989. Germany now accounted for 28 per cent of Poland’s imports and 36 per cent of its exports, even without taking the thriving small border trade into account. These
figures are noticeably higher than the combined East and West German shares before 1990. At the same time, even this increased trade continues to represent a very small share of total German trade. In 1989, exports to Poland accounted for only 0.70 per cent of total West German exports and 0.71 per cent of total imports. By 1992, these figures had increased to only 1.23 per cent and 1.30 per cent, respectively, and in the years since they have grown slightly more, reaching 1.90 per cent and 2.33 per cent in 1997. Despite this growth it is clear that bilateral trade is about 10-20 times more important for Poland than for Germany, a factor which inevitably plays a role in the political area.

In terms of financial links, too, Poland has become more closely tied to Germany in the years since reunification. Since 1989 German investments have risen dramatically, although other countries—notably the U.S.—have also played a large role. In early 1994, it was estimated that German firms had invested about 420-440 million DM in Poland by the end of 1992, and this rose rapidly, to 3.228 billion DM by the end of 1996. In terms of governmental and non-governmental debt, too, Germany has retained a leading role.

Germany has also been the most important provider of economic aid to Poland. According to official German documents, the country gave Poland some 12 billion DM in aid during the crucial transitional period from 1989 to mid-1993 (see Table 1 below). Finally, one must also take into account a factor stressed repeatedly in the previous section: Germany continues to play a key role as an "advocate" for Poland in multilateral Western institutions, including the EC. More recently, Germany also played a similar role in encouraging Poland’s affiliation with NATO, thus further expanding its importance for Poland in the political-military arena.

However, this manifest superiority can breed resentment if it is flaunted too openly. Thus, in carrying out its linkage policies, Germany has learned to act with a fair degree of subtlety. The Germans must continue to guard against any excessive sense of Überheblichkeit [superiority] with respect to Poland. If Poland feels that it is being looked down upon too conspicuously by the Germans, it may cease to cooperate politically. In many important, often unconscious ways, many Germans have long regarded Poland as inferior, both economically and otherwise. For example, even today the term "Polnische Wirtschaft" ["Polish Economics"] is readily understood in Germany as a shorthand expression for a whole range of distinctly un-German disorders which are assumed to infuse the government and economy of Poland. Unfortunately, this perceived inferiority often extends to the German view of the Polish people as a whole.
Table 1: German Aid to Poland 1989-1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount (bwn. DM)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Credits from the Federal Government for export credits, general finance credits, and capital investments (Total Credits outstanding, including pre-1989, 8.656 bln. DM)</td>
<td>2.727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Forgiveness and Interest Subsidies</td>
<td>6.118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Aid (Food, Medicine, Energy)</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance (Training, Advising, Environmental help)</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer ruble balance (end of 1992)</td>
<td>2.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest on transfer-ruble balance</td>
<td>0.256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German share of EC support</td>
<td>0.554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.914</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Additionally, some share of Germany’s contribution to the EBRD (1.737 bln. DM) and of credits made by German Länder for exports to Eastern Europe (.370 bln DM) can be counted as aid to Poland.)

In a recent survey of German youth, 47 per cent felt that Germans were superior to some other nations. Of these, fully 87 per cent named Poles as one nationality which was inferior to Germans, outdistancing nations such as Turkey and Russia. Overtones of similar attitudes also crop up from time to time among German politicians. This could be seen clearly in the debate over opening the border to visa-free travel to Poles, which featured prominent complaints (for example, from Christian Democratic leaders in Berlin) that visiting Poles would ruin the Strassenbild [appearance] of German cities. These sentiments may express some underlying racism; but objective economic differences play a large role. Similar feelings seem to exist in many cases where a wealthy state borders a poorer one. A survey in the U.S. of attitudes towards Mexico, for example, might yield similar results. Conversely, Polish attitudes toward Germany are still marked by open and repressed feelings of inferiority and resentment, often
based again on economic differences.\textsuperscript{204} Poles are uncomfortably aware that if the Oder-Neisse is Europe's Rio Grande, than they must be considered Europe's Mexicans. Fears are often expressed that a new "Silver Curtain" has replaced Europe's old "Iron Curtain," or that "the Wall will be moved from Berlin to the Oder-Neisse."\textsuperscript{205} This feeling is reflected in personal experience as well. As one Pole put it after a visit to Germany, "When I go over there I feel so tiny. They have money; I don't. When I go [to buy something] they look down on me."\textsuperscript{206} Polish politicians are certainly not immune to these feelings; for example, Waldemar Pawlak, who was appointed Prime Minister after the September 1993 Polish parliamentary elections, warned upon leaving office of the threat that "uncontrolled or excessive" foreign investment in Poland could make the country into "a white semi-colony."\textsuperscript{207}

Considering these (often almost subconscious) attitudes on both sides, it is easy to understand why Germans and Poles sometimes perceive their bilateral ties—including economic linkage—very differently. Specifically, Poland is inevitably very sensitive to what Germans say or do, while Germans often seem relatively insensitive to Polish concerns. Thus, often German officials do not perceive that they are even making an explicit economic linkage attempt, but Poles will perceive such an intent. Many Germans, even academics and government officials specializing in German-Polish relations, do not seem to take this imbalance in perception fully into account. Thus, they regard some Polish statements and actions with puzzlement, seeing them as overreactions, even as examples of paranoia. For example, when the nationalist then-Deputy Prime Minister of Poland, Henryk Goryszewski, expressed doubts about Poland's ties to the EC by saying Poland should not join a "Europe of the German nation,"\textsuperscript{208} many German observers were shocked.

Polish sensitivity also helps explain why the more positive (aid-based) and indirect forms of economic linkage—favored by the German government since the time of Willy Brandt—have been more successful in most cases than negative linkage—the use of economic sanctions and threats. Positive linkages are more acceptable psychologically, since they tend to lead to less resentment on the part of the "target" state. It might be added that indirect positive linkage strategies—in which the economic rewards are not linked formally to a future reciprocal political concession—are even more effective from a psychological standpoint.

In all, then, two major conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, in looking at the particular case of German-Polish relations, and by implication German-East European relations in general, it seems
clear that German economic strength has indeed played an important role, albeit at times a subtle one. Poles have been constantly aware of Germany’s economic importance to their state, and this has repeatedly influenced Polish actions—even at times when Germany did not intentionally make an overt economic linkage attempt. This dynamic could be seen clearly in the 1989 Kohl-Mazowiecki Joint Declaration, the 1991 Treaty on Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, and in later agreements on cooperation in border regions and other issues. Economics even influenced the contentious debate over the Oder-Neisse line, although to a lesser extent since that issue was of crucial security importance. The pervasiveness of this factor should alert scholars to look for economic linkage in all cases of relations between rich and poor states, from present-day German-East European relations to Japanese-Russian relations and U.S.-Mexican ties.

Second, this study has shown that positive economic linkage, an instrument which is frequently neglected by International Relations theorists, may play a surprisingly large role in world affairs. States such as Germany, which offer generous economic aid to their partners, may ultimately be able to reap a rich harvest of political cooperation in return. This is a lesson which has been repeated many times in recent history—for example, in the great success of the Marshall Plan in winning American allies in Western Europe after the Second World War. Yet it is a lesson which bears repeating in today’s world, given the rising importance of economics in international affairs in the post-Cold War era.
Endnotes


See, for example, the speech of Polish First Secretary Gomułka on 14 December 1970, before the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) Central Committee, reprinted in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Mieczyslaw Tomala, eds., *Die deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen: Analyse und Dokumentation* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1992), pp. 230-235. Gomułka also stated that Germany had recognized the border as unchangeable, not merely inviolable. All of these views ran counter to the prevailing German interpretation of the treaty, as Gomułka must have been well aware. However, his interpretation was echoed by Polish scholars and politicians—including the future non-communist Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski—for twenty years.


An exception to this generalization is the attitude of Konrad Adenauer and some of his contemporaries. Adenauer believed that a "free Poland" would be sympathetic to German reunification and might even be willing to negotiate territorial concessions. At the time, he was probably wrong; before the 1970s, most elements of the Polish opposition, both at home and abroad, shared the communist government's suspicions about German unification.


From 650 million DM annually to 3.6 billion. See *Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, 1970 and 1974 editions (Bonn: Statistisches Bundesamt).

This agreement resulted in two political benefits for Germany; first, most of the pensions went to members of the German minority in Poland, and second, in return for the payments Poland agreed to allow thousands of members of the minority to emigrate to Germany. The Polish government was unhappy that the deal did not provide any compensation for the many Polish citizens who had worked at forced
labor during the war, but muted its objections since the large hard currency payment could be essentially pocketed by the Polish regime—the pension payments were far lower, and were made in złoty. See Ash, *In Europe’s Name*, pp. 237-238 and 553; and Cziomer, “Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen,” pp. 142-143.


16 Much of the material in this and the following two paragraphs are drawn from author’s interview with Artur Hajnicz, Polish Senate Institute for International Affairs, 1994.

17 This phrase has been used very often by Polish politicians and commentators since 1989. See for example the statement by the commentator Kazimierz Wojcicki at a forum on German-Polish relations in July 1989, trans. in Joint Publication Research Service (JPRS), *East European Report*, 17 July 1989, p. 15.


19 During the Solidarity period, the GDR had earned the enmity of many Poles by not only harshly criticizing Solidarity, but also restricting travel between the two countries in an effort to prevent the “Polish disease” from spreading to the allegedly more disciplined German workers.

20 This phrase became a stock phrase of democratic politicians and
commentators in Poland, especially as German unification neared and the need to convince Poles of the value of reunification increased.

21 Die Welt (29 September 1988), p. 2, cites statements from many different Polish opposition groups and figures to demonstrate this point.

22 Author’s interview with Artur Hajnicz, Warsaw, March 1994.


24 As we shall see later in this study, however, there are still some in Poland who believe that the peaceful pressure of Germany’s looming economic presence may yet subtly undermine Polish sovereignty over the formerly German parts of Poland.


26 Here again, as in the balloting for an important 1987 referendum in which voters were asked to approve limited, government-controlled reforms, the Polish leadership was undone by its inability to structure the voting method properly. In 1987, the regime had actually won the support of the majority of the voters for its referendum questions; yet the referendum had failed because the regime had foolishly set a higher standard for passage—a majority of all of those eligible to vote. Similarly, in 1989 the regime allowed voters to vote down even unopposed candidates by simply crossing out their names on the ballot. Despite the fact that even the Solidarity leadership urged the voters to confirm the top national leaders (to avoid totally humiliating the communists) most voters could not resist the chance to “cross out” the hated leaders of the martial law regime.
The presidency controlled these offices under the provisions of the amended 1952 constitution. The communists' ability to hinder a new policy toward Germany was, however, limited by their low public credibility on the issue. Thus, for example, even newspaper articles warning of the "German threat" now had to be framed cautiously: "Many of us have been persuaded that no one threatens us any more and that West German revisionism is simply a convenient propaganda bugbear that the authorities trot out every time they want to divert public attention from our own domestic problems..." Citation from Głos Robotniczy (Lódź), 1 September 1989, p. 3, trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 27 September 1989, pp. 46-47.

On 24-25 October 1989, for example, a meeting of all Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers took place in Warsaw, at which time Poland had to strongly reaffirm its continuing loyalty to the Pact. For a detailed discussion of Soviet attempts to limit Poland's freedom of movement in foreign policy questions, see Michael Ludwig, "Polen und die deutsche Frage," in Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik, No. 60 (1991), pp. 11-21.

In the GDR, for example, the Tienanmen Square massacre in China on 4 June 1989, had been greeted with conspicuous approval by the hard-line leadership, with the implication that such methods might be needed in other countries. On the Romanian position, see Frankfurter Allgemeine (3 October 1989), p. 6.

In that agreement, West Germany had promised to regard Poland's western border as "inviolable." However, the two sides saw that promise very differently. Poland maintained that the treaty committed any German state to avoid altering the border. Germany maintained that the treaty bound only West Germany—not a potential future united Germany—and that the commitment was only to avoid "violating" the border, i.e., changing it by violent means. Voluntarily negotiated changes in the border were thus supposedly still possible. Ironically, these clashing interpretations actually allowed both sides to pronounce themselves fairly well satisfied with the agreement, and to effectively shelve the border issue for almost twenty years.

32 See "Gazeta Wyborcza on the German Minority in Poland," in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Polish Special Report, No. 16 (14 November 1989), pp. 19-22. The Autochthons were persons who had lived in the area east of the Oder-Neisse line before 1945 and had chosen to stay in the area after it was taken over by Poland. Often they were people of mixed heritage, who spoke enough Polish to convince Polish authorities to allow them to stay when all other German citizens were expelled, yet who still thought of themselves as partially—or even largely—"German" in identity.

33 Thus, for example, the prominent German minority leader Jan Krol became Johann Kroll and his son Henryk became Heinrich. The cultural organizations grew out of the clandestine German Friendship Circle, which had been unsuccessfully petitioning the communist regime since 1984 to register as an official organization (see "Gazeta Wyborcza," p. 21). Although such groups began to operate more freely under Mazowiecki, they were not officially registered until spring 1990.


35 Ibid.

36 Geremek and Michnik's views are discussed in Frankfurter Allgemeine (19 September 1989), p. 2.

37 Skubiszewski as cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine (3 October 1989), p. 16.

38 This agreement is noted in the final text of the Kohl-Mazowiecki Joint Declaration, signed at the November summit. See Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, No. 120 (1989), pp. 1094-1098.


40 See note 38.

41 For an excellent "insider's" view of Kohl's visit and the negotiations
preceding it, see Horst Teltschik, "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Polen: eine schwierige Partnerschaft im Herzen Europas," in Aussenpolitik, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1990), pp. 3-14.


43 The statements by Rakowski and Urban, as well as by Ryszard Wojna, a leading communist commentator on Germany, are cited in Ludwig, "Polen und die deutsche Frage," pp. 23, 29-30.

44 This study will use the term "expellees" to refer to those Germans who were expelled after 1945 from the formerly German lands beyond the Oder-Neisse line, which had been given to Poland after the war. This term is seen as controversial by many East Europeans; by referring to themselves as "expellees" rather than "refugees," these Germans have tried to stress the fact that they did not leave their homes voluntarily. The main organization of the expellees is the Bund der Vertriebenen, or BdV, which was long an important force in conservative politics in Germany—although its influence has fallen in recent years.


47 Reuter wire service report (7 November 1989).


49 Teltschik, "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland," p. 3.

50 Ibid., p. 6.

51 Polish news agency (PAP) report (14 November 1989), trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 16 November 1989, pp. 62-63. The view that the key aspect of the agreement was in effect an exchange of eco-
onomic for political concessions can also be seen clearly in an inter-
view given by Jacek Ambroziak, head of the Office of the Council of
Ministers. Trybuna Ludu (2 November 1989), pp. 1-2, trans. in FBIS,

52 See the text of the Joint Statement (as cited in note 38) and Teltschik,

53 As noted by the Chancellor’s spokesman, Hans Klein, in a press con-
ference in Warsaw on November 13. See *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), 14
November 1989, pp. 63-64.

54 The text of Kohl’s speech is reprinted in *Bulletin des Presse- und
Here, p. 1102.

55 For details about Kohl’s telephone conversations with Western lead-
ers, see Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung* (Berlin:
Siedler Verlag, 1991), pp. 21-22.

56 *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung*, No. 129


58 All three agreements permitted thousands of members of the Ger-
man minority to emigrate; yet in each case the Polish government was
careful to avoid entering into a formal agreement with Germany on
the minority. In 1955, an emigration agreement was signed between
the Polish and German Red Cross societies, and in 1970 and 1975 the
Polish government made "unilateral" decisions to permit more Ger-
man emigration (which were in fact connected with German conces-
sions in the form of the Warsaw Treaty and the pension plan credit
agreement, respectively).

59 This and subsequent quotes from the Joint Statement are from *Bulle-
tin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung*, No. 120 (1989).

60 Kreisau was the site of the estate of Graf von Moltke, where leading
German anti-Nazis had met in the famous Kreisauer Kreis [Kreisau
Circle] during the Second World War. By agreeing to meet here,
Mazowiecki seemed to be showing that he believed in the "good" Germany of the Kreisauer Kreis, and that he accepted Kohl as a representative of that tradition.

61 At the time of the visit to Poland, the continuing reluctance of Kohl and his party to consider any strengthening of the 1970 border commitment was quite obvious. In the days before the visit, Kohl's coalition with the small Free Democratic Party (FDP) was seriously threatened over the FDP's attempts to pass a Bundestag resolution affirming that no territorial claims would be made on Poland now or in the future "by we Germans." (This phrase had been used by Foreign Minister Genscher in a September 1989 speech to the United Nations.) Kohl and the rest of the CDU/CSU leadership bitterly opposed the inclusion of this phrase, as it seemed to imply that a future, united Germany would also be bound by the 1970 border treaty. Kohl thus risked his government on defending the principle that the treaty would not be binding on a reunified Germany. Although the Bundestag finally did pass a carefully worded compromise resolution which was intended to reassure Poland, the incident must have strengthened Polish fears that a reunified Germany could pose a potential threat to the Oder-Neisse border. For a discussion of the tense behind-the-scenes negotiations between the CDU and the FDP over this issue, see Frankfurter Allgemeine (9 November 1989), pp. 1-2.

62 Horst Teltschik, quoted in Die Zeit (Hamburg), 17 November 1989, p. 7.


64 Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 16.

65 See the discussion of the speech in Ibid., pp. 55-56. The full text of the Ten Point plan is reprinted in Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, No. 134 (1989).

66 Stelmachowski was quoted in Die Welt (6 December 1989), p. 10. For other Polish press reaction see, for example, Slowo Powszechne (Warsaw), 29 November 1989, pp. 1-2, trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 5 December 1989, pp. 67-68.
The importance of this was clear: the first slogan, "We Are The People," was directed at breaking the power of the domestic communist elite by mocking its claim to speak for the common people of the GDR. The second slogan, "We Are One People," was a clear call for reunification.

Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 140.

The Yalta analogy was prominent in Polish official statements and press commentary at the time.

Author’s interview with Artur Hajnicz, Warsaw, March 1994.

Skubiszewski’s background is noted in Die Welt (14 September 1989), p. 5. A good example of Skubiszewski’s legalistic thinking was his assertion that the “peace settlement” that Germany had long insisted would be needed before the Oder-Neisse border could be finally delineated had in fact already been signed. He reasoned that a “peace settlement” could be a series of agreements, not just one peace treaty, and then claimed that all treaties touching on German issues—including, of course, the 1950 Görlitz Treaty and 1970 Warsaw Treaty, which guaranteed the Oder-Neisse border—cumulatively made up the “peace settlement.” Thus, with the “peace settlement” already accomplished, there was no legal obstacle to the finality of the Oder-Neisse line. Understandably, German negotiators were not pleased with this type of reasoning. Skubiszewski’s comments are reported in Rzeczpospolita (8 December 1989), pp. 1-2, trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 14 December 1989, pp. 68-71.

As noted in Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), 14 December 1989, p. 2.

The polls conducted in Poland and elsewhere were reported in New York Times (20 February 1990), p. A10.


78 This statement, by the Czechoslovak academic Eduard Goldstuecker, was quoted in The Times (London), 20 February 1990, p. 8.

79 See Frankfurter Allgemeine (9 February 1990), p. 2.

80 Poland opposed the use of Article 23—whereby East Germany would simply accept West Germany’s current constitution and immediately join the Federal Republic—for two reasons. First, it meant reunification would proceed very rapidly as compared to the alternative method of reunification, namely negotiating an entirely new constitution. Second, Poland feared that Article 23, which allowed any “German” areas to vote to join the Federal Republic, would be invoked by the German minority in Poland—thus threatening Poland’s territorial integrity. See Ludwig, “Polen und die Deutsche Frage,” pp. 73-74.

81 As Horst Teltschik notes, Chancellor Kohl was quite upset about Dumas’ remarks. See Teltschik, 329 Tage, p. 166.


83 As Teltschik notes (329 Tage, p. 163) the statements of Shevardnadze greatly intensified the pressure on Kohl to settle the issue.


87 All of these ideas were expressed by Hartmut Koschyk, General Secretary of the Bund der Vertriebenen, in Frankfurter Rundschau (4 January 1990), p. 4.

88 Franco-German cooperation in NATO and the emerging European Community played a key role in persuading France that it was safe to return the Saar region. Chancellor Adenauer had similar plans for
Poland (citation from Hinrichs, *Die Beziehungen*, p. 101): "One day this entire region—Upper Silesia, etc.—will in my opinion have to be part of the European union and of the common market, and the political boundaries which we now have will lose more and more of their meaning. Then we will have to seek patiently...for a solution [to the border issue]."


90 See, for example, the statement by the SPD leader Norbert Gansel in *Frankfurter Rundschau* (3 January 1990), p. 4.

91 Ludwig, "Polen und die Deutsche Frage," pp. 64-65.


94 Specifically, Kohl demanded that Poland reaffirm its 1953 statement renouncing further reparation payments to Germany and fully implement the minority rights guarantees contained in the Joint Declaration of November 1989. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (3 March 1990), pp. 1-2.


97 Ludwig, "Polen und die deutsche Frage," pp. 77-78.

98 The article is cited in a Radio Polonia report (18 February 1990), trans. in *BPA Ostinformationen*, 19 February 1990.

99 See note 61.

100 Quoted in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), 5 March 1990, p. 25.

101 This was not necessarily the case, however, in the period before the emergence of modern nationalism. In the eighteenth century, for ex-
ample, land was often seen more as a resource for a ruler to use or trade as circumstances dictated.


103 From * Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (20 February 1990), p. 4.

104 See *Der Speigel* (30 April 1990), pp. 34-48.

105 Quoted in *Bild am Sonntag* (Hamburg), 6 May 1990, p. 4.


108 The West German expellees were well aware that this Bundestag resolution was a crucial step, and fought it fiercely. However, in the end only 15 of the 504 voting Bundestag members voted against the measure, although a larger number (about 100) issued personal statements noting that their votes should be understood as being conditional on Poland’s attitude toward such issues as German minority rights. The fact that the resolution explicitly cited the 1950 Görlitz border treaty between the GDR and Poland, engineered by Stalin, was especially offensive to some conservative delegates. See Hartmut Koschyk, ed., *Das Recht auf die Heimat: ein Menschenrecht* (München: Langen Müller, 1992), pp. 161-208.

109 The interview was with the Dutch magazine *Elsevier*. Wałęsa later claimed that his statements had been taken out of context and exaggerated to make them sound more anti-German. See *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (6 June 1990), p. 7.


111 * Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (14 July 1990), p. 2. Teltschik also discusses Mazowiecki’s suggestion and the outrage it sparked in Bonn. See
Teltschik, “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” p. 315.

The five key principles are enumerated in Ludwig, “Polen und die deutsche Frage,” p. 88.

For the text of Kohl’s speech, see Koschyk, Das Recht auf die Heimat, pp. 126-149, here p. 136.

For the full text of the treaty, see Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamts der Bundesregierung, No. 109 (1990), pp. 1153-1156.

Specifically, the Basic Law was altered in three places: Article 23, which provided for the Basic Law to take effect “in other parts of Germany after their accession” to the Federal Republic, was abolished entirely. Article 146, which declared that the Basic Law could be superseded by a new constitution which is decided upon by “the German people,” was altered to note that reunification had been completed. With these changes, both possible methods for new territories to join the Federal Republic were abolished. Finally, the Preamble of the constitution was also altered, now reading “The Germans in [list of German states] have...completed the unification and liberation of Germany. Thus, this Basic Law is now in force for the entire German people.” In all, these changes fulfilled Poland’s demand that the Basic Law be rendered unusable for justifying any annexation of Polish territory which had once been German.

Los Angeles Times (9 November 1990), p. A18. Here again, the role of domestic politics in Germany—particularly the role of the expellees—can be seen. It was generally felt that a major reason for Kohl’s willingness to sign the agreement quickly was that he held a commanding lead in opinion polls as the 2 December national elections approached. Thus he did not need the support of the expellee diehards to easily win reelection.

For the final text of the border agreement, see Deutsche Aussenpolitik, pp. 244-246.

The phrase “community of interests” was used by Foreign Minister Skubiszewski in several statements in April 1990. The statements were widely interpreted as a signal that the Polish leadership realized that it had been too strident in criticizing Germany on the border issue. The time had come, many within Poland believed, to return to the
attitudes of the fall of 1989, when Germany was seen as the keystone of Poland’s efforts to “return to Europe.” See Ludwig, “Polen und die deutsche Frage,” pp. 74-79, for a discussion of this cautious reorientation in Polish foreign policy.


120 Die Zeit (6 April 1990), p. 6.

121 For a report of some of the contents of the treaty draft—which was not released to the public—see Polish news agency (PAP) report (7 May 1990), trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 8 May 1990, p. 28.

122 Although West Berlin was a part of West Germany, its borders were controlled by the three Western occupying powers until reunification was completed. In an attempt to show that Berlin remained a united city, the Western allies had never maintained border controls on their side of the Berlin Wall. Thus from 9 November 1989—when the Wall was breached—until 3 October 1990, when West German border controls were instituted on the German-Polish border, West Berlin was inundated by small traders from Poland and elsewhere.

123 The three delegations, led by the political directors of their respective Foreign Ministries, met for the first time in Warsaw on 3 May, then in Berlin, Cologne, and Warsaw over the following two months. See DPA press agency report (3 May 1990), trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 3 May 1990, p. 43, and AFP press agency report (22 June 1990). The negotiations were suspended once Poland agreed in Paris to settle the problems in two separate treaties, both to be negotiated after German reunification.


125 This suggestion was clearly impracticable; exempting the former GDR from these restrictions would have in effect opened the entire EC market to Polish goods.

126 As quoted in an interview with Skubiszewski on Radio Polonia (30 June 1990), trans. in BPA Ostinformationen (2 July 1990), p. 5.
Teltschik was present when the Chancellor reported this conversation to his top aides on the morning of 2 July. See Teltschik, "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland," pp. 292-293. On the Budapest meeting, see also Die Welt (2 July 1990), p. 12.

Teltschik, "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland," pp. 296-297.

For a discussion of the vital role of economic aid in these talks, see Randall Newnham, "The Price of German Unity: The Role of Economic Aid in the German-Soviet Negotiations," in German Studies Review, Vol. 22, No. 3 (October 1999), pp. 421-446.

General-Anzeiger (Bonn), 20 July 1990, p. 11.


For a comprehensive “insider” account of the treaty negotiations, written by the deputy leader of the Polish negotiating team, see Jan Barcz, "Polska-Niemcy: traktat o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy," in Państwo i prawo, No. 9 (September 1991), pp. 22-34.

This timetable was repeated by a number of officials at the time. See for example Mazowiecki’s interview with Warsaw Radio (13 November 1990), trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 14 November 1990, p. 34.

Ibid.

In the end, the visa-free travel agreement took the form of a multilateral pact between Germany, Poland, and the other Schengen states, in which both Germany and Poland obligated themselves to take back any Pole who illegally entered any other Schengen state. See Der Spiegel (25 February 1991), pp. 46-53, here pp. 46-47.

This episode helps to illustrate that national governments can play an important role in directing private financial flows for political purposes. The governments did not order the private creditors to settle with Poland, but their actions gave the private companies an incentive to do so, thus effectively pushing them to follow the governments and reinforce the political signal to Poland. Many political scientists have recently proclaimed that large corporations have escaped the control of the states; episodes like this tend to show that such conclusions may be premature.
Author’s interview with Artur Hajnicz, Warsaw, March 1994.


At that time, as was discussed earlier, the German concession was a major unilateral reduction in Poland’s debt to the government, through the partial cancellation of the billion-DM credit granted to Poland by Chancellor Schmidt in the mid-1970s.


*Die deutsch-polnischen Verträge*, p. 70.

All references to the text of the treaty are drawn from *Ibid*.

In presenting the treaty to the Sejm, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski was careful to defend its provisions on minority rights, despite the apparent asymmetries (see the text of his speech on Warsaw Radio (13 September 1991), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 16 September 1991, pp. 24-26). However, although most representatives supported the treaty, four Senators did abstain, citing the asymmetry in minority rights. See Polish news agency (PAP) report (23 October 1991), trans. in FBIS, *Daily Report* (Eastern Europe), 25 October 1991, pp. 26-27.

For a more extensive discussion of the various “asymmetries” in the rights granted to the respective minority groups, see Marlies Jansen,
“Nachbarschaft mit Polen,” in Deutschland Archiv, No. 8 (August 1991), pp. 787-789, especially p. 788. Since 1991, the Polish minority in Germany has been able to improve its situation somewhat, most notably by forming a single umbrella organization to speak for all Poles in the Federal Republic. Author’s interview with Stanisław Kramerz, Polish Embassy branch in Berlin, March 1994.

150 Die deutsch-polnischen Verträge, p. 74.

151 Ibid., p. 72.

152 Ibid., Article 20 (p. 44) and Article 21 (p. 48).

153 Ibid., Article 21 (p. 50).

154 Ibid., Article 20 (p. 48).

155 Ibid., Article 21 (p. 50).

156 As noted in the exchange of letters accompanying the treaty. Ibid., p. 72.

157 This split was reported in Der Spiegel (8 July 1991), pp. 25-27.

158 The Friendship Treaty was in fact accompanied by a separate agreement which expanded cooperation in these areas by creating an intergovernmental “Commission for Regional and Cross-Border Cooperation.” For the text of this agreement, see Ludwig, “Polen und die deutsche Frage,” pp. 307-310.

159 Die deutsch-polnischen Verträge, p. 34 (Article 8). In addition to this passage, the treaty preamble refers to “the importance that the membership of the Federal Republic of Germany in the EC and the political and economic path of the Republic of Poland toward the EC have for the future relations of the two countries” (Ibid., p. 22).

160 The account of the meeting released by the Polish news agency PAP (19 March 1991) notes that the two most important issues in the talks were “national minorities and Poland’s rapprochement with the EC,” and that the greatest concern for the German side was “undertaking [a] unilateral commitment on behalf of the remaining EC member states.” Trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 21 March 1991, p. 23.
161 Die deutsch-polnischen Verträge, p. 66.

162 Ibid., p. 34 (Article 9).

163 However, in submitting the Border Treaty and Friendship Treaty to the Polish Sejm for ratification on 13 September 1991, Foreign Minister Skubiszewski was quick to mention the pending deal on creating the foundation as an important part of the treaty package. Warsaw Radio report (13 September 1991), trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 16 September 1991, pp. 24-26, here p. 25.


166 On the fears of the poorer Mediterranean states, see for example Vladimir Sobell, “Eastern Europe and the EC,” in RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe (23 February 1990), p. 45. In 1993, it was estimated that Poland’s per capita GNP was half of that of the poorer EC states, and only one-quarter of the level of the wealthier ones. The magnitude of this difference can be seen clearly from the fact that even if Poland can achieve a yearly growth rate which is 5 per cent higher—every year—than that of the other EC states, it will still take the country twenty years to achieve the per capita GNP currently enjoyed by Portugal. See Roland Scharff, “Von der Assozierung zur Integration: Anmerkungen zur EG Perspektiven Polens,” in Deutsche Studien, Vol. 30, No. 119 (September 1993), pp. 264-277, here pp. 266-267.

167 On France’s fears of a new Mitteleuropa, see for example Gabriella Hedri, “Die EG und die Staaten des Visegrader Dreiecks,” in Osteuropa, Vol. 43, No. 2 (February 1993), pp. 154-166, here p. 156. Often statements from French politicians, while appearing to be sympathetic to Eastern Europe, in fact underscored how negatively France viewed the membership prospects of these states. President Mitterrand, for example, stated that the Visegrad states must be prepared to wait at least “several dozen years” before gaining membership, while the
states in question were hoping for membership within ten years. Mitterrand quoted in *The Economist* (13 July 1991), p. 58.

168 This point is stressed by de Weydenthal, who notes that the battle within the EC over admitting the Visegrad states boils down to a trade-off between economic losses and political gains. Thus, the battle lines are drawn between those states which will be impacted most heavily by East European economic competition, and those who will benefit the most politically from the admission of these states, notably Germany. See Jan de Weydenthal, “EC Keeps Central Europe at Arm’s Length,” in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 5 (29 January 1993), pp. 29-31, here p. 31. Other sources are also indicative: “Polish and Czechoslovak membership [in the EC, German diplomats] say, would resolve Germany’s historic problems with those countries. The talk in Bonn is that these two and Hungary could be ready to join by 1998.” See *The Economist* (13 July 1991), p. 58. As this passage shows, Germany had at the time developed a timetable for East European membership in the EC which was radically different from the assumptions of the French and others that admission would take “several dozen years.” This accelerated timetable was clearly motivated by uniquely German foreign policy goals.


172 See *Das Parlament* (Bonn), 20 May 1994, p. 4. The Association Agreements required ratification by each member state since some of its provisions affected areas which are still the responsibility of each state, such as the free movement of workers.

PHARE, standing for Polish and Hungarian Aid for the Reconstruction of Europe, has thus far been the most ambitious EC project to aid Eastern Europe. The original intent of the project, which was conceived before Eastern Europe was fully freed from Communist regimes, was to purchase goods in the more reformist East European states and donate them to the less advanced states. In this way humanitarian aid could be given which would simultaneously provide a boost to the fledgling economies of the more capitalistic East European states.

Germany's role in pushing through this provision was confirmed by many observers at the time. De Weydenthal, for example, notes that at the 10 May 1993 Brussels meeting of EC Foreign Ministers—which prepared the Copenhagen communiqué—Germany was the main power supporting the pro-East European position, in cooperation with Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark. The opposition to this view was led by France, Greece, and Portugal. See Jan de Weydenthal, "The EC and Central Europe: A Difficult Relationship," in Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 21 (21 May 1993), pp. 7-9.


See for example Mathias Schulz, Der Spiegel (21 November 1994), pp. 54-60.


Ibid.

As quoted from the Stolpe plan itself in Ibid.

de Weydenthal, “German Plan,” p. 41. The German-Polish “Governmental Commission for Regional and Border-Area Cooperation” was created by the June 1991 Friendship Treaty.


Author’s interview, Polish Consulate in Berlin, March 1994.

See Der Spiegel (5 April 1993), pp. 88-94.

See Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Bonn: Statistisches Bundesamt, 1994).


For more examples of this German aid, see Rynki Zagraniczne (Warsaw), 11 August 1992, p. 6, trans. in JPRS (East European Report), 14 September 1992, pp. 6-7.


Prawda, “Polens Begegnung,” p. 814. Germany was also already
providing smaller amounts of aid which were directly targeted to improving Polish border enforcement. For example, German Interior Minister Rudolf Seetars visited Warsaw in August 1992 for talks on strengthening border enforcement, and brought with him a promise of six million DM in police equipment, including “equipment to detect forged passports, night security devices, and police vehicles.” ADN News Agency Report (19 August 1992), trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 20 August 1992, p. 17. Similarly, during her November 1992 visit to Bonn, Polish Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka noted that improvements on the border would “involve some financial means” and that “I believe we shall have some support form the German side.” Radio Warsaw Report (6 November 1992), trans. in FBIS, Daily Report (Eastern Europe), 9 November 1992, pp. 26-27, here p. 27.


197 See Statistisches Jahrbuch für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, various issues, and own calculations.


200 Data from “Antwort der Bundesregierung,” p. 61.
The transfer ruble question is complex and has not been discussed in detail in this study since it was not strictly a bilateral German-Polish question. However, it forms an important indirect source of German aid to Poland. Briefly, in order to prevent a sudden collapse of GDR trade with its eastern partners after the Deutsche Mark was introduced in East Germany on 1 July 1, 1990, Bonn agreed to continue to accept so-called transfer rubles (the normal exchange unit used in intra-CMEA trade) for trade with the GDR for a transitional period. The transfer ruble was thus assigned a rather arbitrary value in hard West German marks. This allowed Poland to make a large hard-currency profit from its continued trade with the GDR.

For more details on the historical evolution of underlying German attitudes toward Poland, see for example Harry K. Rosenthal, German and Pole: National Conflict and Modern Myth (Gainesville, FL: University Presses of Florida, 1976).

Der Spiegel (19 September 1994), p. 68.

For an overview of Polish attitudes toward Germany, see for example Der Spiegel (2 September 1991), pp. 48-57.

Radio Polonia commentary (28 June 1990), reprinted in Deutsche Welle Monitor-Dienst (29 June 1990), pp. 9-11. This commentary also asks rather plaintively why so many Germans continue to speak of "Polnische Wirtschaft" when their own compatriots in the GDR have clearly shown that it is communism, not ethnicity, which is the real cause of economic ruin in the former East bloc.


The remark implicitly compares the EC to the old Holy Roman Empire, which was called the "Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" to reflect its largely Germanic composition. Such a comment is also a fascinating example of the long historical memory shown by Poles, which also is linked to their feelings of inferiority and of historically being victims of outside powers. Goryszewski, a leader of the nationalistic Christian National Union (ZChN), was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister by Hanna Suchocka in July 1992. See Frankfurter Allgemeine (3 September 1992), p. 6.
Contributors to the Publications Fund of the
Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies Program of the
Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies

Patrons - $1,000 or more  Donors - $100 - $499
Sponsors - $500 - $999  Supporters - $99 and under

1993 - 1994

Sponsor:
Alexander Muller

Donors:
Imre & Elizabeth Boba
John Budlong
Robert Byrnes
Thomas Hankins
Deborah Hardy
Dawson Harvey
John Headland
Richard & Kathleen Kirkendall
Mary Mann
Gloria W. Swisher
G. L. Ulmen
Daniel C. Waugh
Eugene Webb

Supporters:
Burton Bard
Walter W. Baz
Arthur & Dorothy Bestor
James & Edith Bloomfield

Boeing
John Phillip Bowen
Patricia A. Burg
Robert Croskey
Douglas Daily
Ralph Fisher
Anne Pietette Geiger
Rev. Paul Grivanovsky
James & Patricia Hamish
Donald C. Hellmann
Henry & Trude Huttenbach
Martin Jaffee
Douglas Johnson
Richard Johnson
Rodney Keyser
Elsa G. Kopta
Joel Migdal
Sergei Mihailov
W. J. Rorabaugh
H. Stewart Parker
Helen K. Pulsifer
Joel & Vivian Quam
Peter F. Sugar
Eric & Barbara Weissman
Seung-Ham Yang

1995

Patrons:
The Henry M. Jackson
Foundation

Donors:
John Berg
D. R. Ellegood
Herbert J. & Alberta M. Ellison

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa
Robert Heilman
Donald C. Hellmann
David Hsiao
Ronald M. & Margaret S. Hubbs
David A. & Catherine J. Hughes
Jerome Johnson
Law Office of Lane, Powell,
Spears, & Lubersky
Joel & Abby Li
Lucile Lomen
Mary Earl Maltman
William L. Maltman
Margaret Nicholson
Stanton R. Pemberton
Peter F. Sugar
Alva G. Treadgold
Robert G. & Joan C. Waldo
Robert L. Walker
Daniel C. Waugh
Jun-Luh H. Yin

Supporters:
George N. & Lorna D. Aagaard
Franklin I. & Helen C. Badgley
Abbie Jane Bakony
Irwin S. & Freda R. Blumenfeld
Louise R. Bowler
Patricia A. Burg
Robert J. C. Butow
Mary P. Chapman
Luxar Corporation
Gerald & Lucille Curtis
Charles F. & Eugenia R. Delzell
Jean S. Fisher
Katherine Huber
Cathy Kawamoto

1996 - 1997

Patrons:
Allen W. & Laura T. Puckett
Alva G. Treadgold

Sponsors:
Herbert J. & Alberta M. Ellison

Supporters:
Dagmar K. Koenig
Lewis O. Saum
Glennys J. Young

Bettina Kettenring
Elsa G. Kopta
H. G. & Estelle C. Lee
Jean Maulbetsch
Marion Osterby
Donna M. Poreda
Douglass A. & Katherine L. Raff
Sabrina P. Ramet
John S. Reshetar, Jr.
Joel & Nanci B. Richards
Nancy Robinson
John & Venus Rockwell
Harold J. & Betty Runstad
Barbara R. Sarason
Suzanne E. Sarason
Michael C. Schwartz
Stuart W. Selter
Thaddeus H. Spratlen
Donald & Gloria Swisher
Grace Tatsumi
Helen Louise Thwing
Natalie Tracy
The Fred & Steve Treadgold Families
Annie T. Warsinske
Robert A. & Juanita Watt
David E. Williams

Donors:
Kent R. Hill
Daniel C. & Patricia Matuszewski
Sabrina P. Ramet
William Ratliff
Floyd & Barbara Smith
Peter F. Sugar
1998

Patron: Alva G. Treadgold

Sponsor: Sabrina P. Ramet

Donors:
Peter F. Sugar
Victor Erlich

1999

Patron: Alva G. Treadgold

Donor: Leighton T. Henderson

Supporter:
Ralph T. Fisher
Jonathan Coopersmith

2000

Patron: Alva G. Treadgold

Sponsor: Allen W. & Laura T. Puckett
Available Papers

No. 1: Law In Russia (1994) - Theodore Taranovski, Peter B. Maggs, Kathryn Hendley, and Steven A. Crown ($5.25)


No. 3: The Fate of Russian Orthodox Monasteries and Convents Since 1917 (1995) - Charles Timberlake ($6.50)

No. 4: The Mennonites and the Russian State Duma, 1905-1914 (1996) - Terry Martin ($5.25)

No. 5: Corporate Russia: Privatization and Prospects in the Oil and Gas Sector (1996) - Leslie Dienes ($5.25)

Andrii Deschchytsya ($5.25)

No. 7: Russian Banking: An Overview and Assessment (1996)
Kent F. Moors ($5.25)

No. 8: Nationalism and Religion in the Balkans since the 19th Century (1996) - Peter F. Sugar ($6.50)

No. 9: Modes of Communist Rule, Democratic Transition, and Party System Formation in Four East European Countries (1996) - Grigorii Golosov ($7.50) - 2nd Printing


David Lucas ($6.50)

No. 12: Literacy and Reading in 19th Century Bulgaria (1997)
Krassimira Daskalova ($5.25)
No. 13: Critical Theory and the War in Croatia and Bosnia (1997)
Thomas Cushman ($6.50)

No. 14: Nation, State, and Economy in Central Asia: Does Ataturk Provide a Model? (1997) - Paul Kubicek ($6.50)

Alexander Agafonoff, Dilnara Ismuddinova, and Galina Saidova, Editors ($6.50).

No. 16: German-Bashing and the Breakup of Yugoslavia (1998)
Daniele Conversi ($6.50)

No. 17: Romanian-Hungarian Economic Cooperation and Joint Ventures in Post-Ceausescu Romania (1998)
Erica Agiewich ($6.50)

Leslie Dienes ($6.50)

Norman Naimark ($6.50)

No. 20: Nationalism, Populism, and Other Threats to Liberal Democracy in Post-Communist Europe (1999)
Vladimir Tismaneanu ($6.50)

Rafis Abazov ($6.50)

No. 22: Serb Lobbyists in the United Kingdom (1999)
Carole Hodge ($7.50)

Amy Knight ($6.50)

Leopoldina Plut-Pregelj, et al. ($7.50)
Brigit Farley ($7.50)

Randall E. Newnham ($7.50)

Forthcoming

No. 27: Eastern Europe and the Natural Law Tradition
Sabrina P. Ramet ($7.50)

No. 28: Local Self-Government and the State in Modern Russia
Thomas E. Porter and John F. Young ($7.50)

No. 29: Catholicism as a Component of Modern Polish National Identity, 1863-1918
Konrad Sadkowski ($7.50)

No. 30: Structure and Exposure: The Dilemmas of Democracy in Russia’s Television Market
Ellen Mickiewicz ($7.50)

To order: Make checks payable to the University of Washington (international orders add $1.00 per issue, WA residents add 8.6% sales tax). A ten issue subscription is available for $65 ($70 international). Orders and subscriptions should be directed to the managing editor at the following address:

Donald W. Treadgold Papers
Jackson School of International Studies
Box 353650
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3650

Tel: (206) 543-4852
Fax: (206) 685-0668
For orders and copies of the style guide: treadgd@u.washington.edu
For editorial queries: spr@u.washington.edu
Website: http://depts.washington.edu/reeceas/dwt/dwt.htm
The Donald W. Treadgold Papers
In Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies

Jackson School of International Studies
Box 353650
University of Washington
Seattle, WA 98195-3650