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The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies
University of Washington
2001
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Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor
About the author of this issue

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the Fulbright Program of the International Institute of Education and the East European Studies Committee of the American Council of Learned Societies for funding received between 1992 and 1994 for dissertation research and write-up. Funding provided by the Graduate College, the Office of International Programs, and the History Department, all at the University of Northern Iowa, also contributed to the completion of this paper. Portions of this paper were presented at national conferences of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies in 1994 and 1995 (a Wilson Center funded panel), at the 1996 conference on “Christianity in East Central Europe and its Relations with the West and the East” in Lublin, Poland, and at the Third West Virginia University Senator Rush D. Holt History Conference in 2000. Robert Blobaum and Andrzej Walicki graciously read earlier drafts of this paper and offered very valuable suggestions, as did the anonymous reviewer. To these individuals and all others who offered their advice and comments, I extend my sincere appreciation. Of course, the views presented here are my own.
The relationship between Catholicism and Polish national identity was a major issue in the multinational Polish Second Republic (1918-1939). The dominant question was whether independent Poland should forge a civic Polish nation on the basis of the legal equality of all citizens, or on the basis of the ethnic Polish core and its culture, including Catholicism. Recent scholarship has confirmed that, for their part, many Catholic priests and bishops worked diligently to build a new Polish nation around the ethnic Polish and Catholic core, attempting, for example, to Catholicize and Polonize the non-Polish Slavs and exclude the Jews from national life. But while the interwar Polish Church clearly was a conservative and nationalistic institution, the partition-era (1795-1918) Church is viewed much less critically. Scholars recognize that the Church actively participated in the national struggle and suffered for it; however, we know very little of just what sort of nation Catholic priests worked to build. The year 1918, then, is a deep dividing line in assessments of the Church's nation building activities. Concentrating on the pre-World War I Kingdom of Poland, this paper will show that already by the turn of the twentieth century, Catholic priests had convinced Catholic Poles that opponents of the Church or non-Catholics could not be "true Poles" — i.e., that only loyal Roman Catholics could be. Well prior to 1918, then, Catholic priests had begun to politicize Catholicism as an element of ethnic Polish culture. They did this so that through the Church-nation association they could maintain power in a rapidly changing and modernizing Polish society.

I assess this nation building by examining how priests presented the association between the Church and Polish nation over time in the half-century prior to 1918. Specifically, I discuss the January Uprising, the profound economic, social, and political changes of the late nineteenth century, the Mariavite sect, the early social Catholic movement, and the Ukrainian minority in the Chelm region. I use these specific events and issues to explore three greater and interrelated "modern" challenges that the Church encountered beginning in the final quarter of the nineteenth century: a new conception of the Polish nation based on ethno-cultural boundaries open to socio-political negotiation, Catholic Poles' opposition to traditional priestly authority, and nationally awakening ethnic and religious minorities living among the Poles. It was these unprecedented developments, I believe, which challenged the Church's historic position in Polish society and
compelled priests and Church leaders to increasingly associate only Catholicism with Polish national identity. This study makes no claim to be a complete analysis or explanation of the "Polak-Katolik" identity but rather is a contribution to a fuller understanding of it, specifically regarding the role of the Church in shaping it.

I locate the Catholic Church and modern Polish nation building within a broader theoretical and comparative framework, and believe this framework can be employed as a methodology for illuminating the influence of the Church on nation (and state) building in other parts of Europe, especially Eastern Europe. My starting point is the fundamental intersection of the modern Polish nation and the Catholic faith (and Church) on the cultural plane. Specifically, in the nineteenth century, "eastern" European peoples defined themselves largely in cultural (i.e., ethnic) terms as nations and then produced their own states. As for religion, from both anthropological and sociological perspectives, it is cultural practice par excellence. Thus, I examine the role of the Catholic Church in Polish nation building by considering the content of priests' religious work (i.e., religious culture) and how it intersected with the cultural definition of the Polish nation. According to Robert Wuthnow, religious culture can be viewed as something "tangible, explicit and overtly produced," and does not have to be accepted as something "implicit or taken for granted." Religious culture can be examined through such things as religious rhetoric, discourse, texts, music, and other symbols. Extending this to the Polish context, we can, I believe, while acknowledging the historical and thus "natural" connection between Catholicism and Polish ethnic identity, also examine any uses of this relationship for political purposes. Specifically, I attempt to show that through their rhetoric and organizing, Catholic priests politicized Catholic belief for the purpose of constructing new identities through which they, and the Church generally, could maintain authority in Polish society. Finally, examining the Church and nation on their mutual ethno-cultural plane also facilitates a much more causal understanding of both why and how the Church attempted to fashion a specific Catholic Polish identity beginning in the late nineteenth century.

My argument is that after the 1863 January Uprising, the Polish Church and clergy were severely attacked by the Russian state and in due time could not adequately perform their religious work. But while the Russian state inadvertently "mobilized" the Polish-and-Catholic identity through its repression, and priests and Poles further strengthened it through the defense of their faith and Church after 1864, Catholicism was not progressively politicized simply by the oppressive Russian state. After 1864, the elimination of feudal dues
and the granting of land to peasants, along with industrialization, urbanization, and growing literacy and communication, radically transformed society in the Kingdom of Poland. By the late nineteenth century, a new culturally based Polish nation — supplanting the pre-modern "nation of the nobility" — began to coalesce in the peasant masses. This emerging modern Polish nation began to voice with increasing energy and anger not only demands for economic, political, and cultural concessions and rights, but also criticisms of the Church and especially of the clergy for their frequent overbearing paternalism and materialism, as well as on philosophical grounds. Critical questions arose within this context as Polish society — including non-Catholics and non-ethnic Poles — struggled for greater economic, political, and cultural empowerment. What characteristics would Poles share, and what would they believe? And considering the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's ethnic mix, who would be a Pole? In the 1890s-1900s, the Russian state continued its Russification policies. But by this time, liberals, nationalists, socialists, and populists of various shades also competed to direct the development of Polish society, as well as over the values and identities to which Poles would adhere. Greatly weakened by the prolonged attacks of the Russian state, but woven tightly into the fabric of the Polish culture and society, the Catholic Church was in the thick of this competition. With a modern Polish nation evolving ethno-cultural characteristics whose boundaries were nevertheless open to socio-political negotiation, the Church and its clergy — in order to continue their religious work and protect "Polishness", but also to maintain their traditional status and authority in Polish society — increasingly claimed through their religious rhetoric and activities (i.e., cultural production) an exclusive status for Catholicism in the Polish culture and nation. In other words, for the Church, the modern "nation" as a real structure of societal organization now also became an instrument for the maintenance of socio-cultural power. For obvious reasons, Catholic priests most opposed the Russian state, but a large number also were wary of the anti-clerical National Democrats and attacked liberals, socialists, and, increasingly, non-Catholics and non-Poles. They opposed the state because, in one way or another, by the first decade of the twentieth century these groups (or their spokesmen) were trying to define or seeking (openly or implicitly) a place for themselves within the boundaries of Polish identity and, by implication, limiting — or trying to eliminate — the Church as a defining agent of these boundaries.

Most complicated was the relationship of Catholic priests and Church leaders to National Democracy. As nationalists, the National Democrats invoked historical-cultural tradition, including
Catholicism, for identity construction and political mobilization, yet they opposed the Church as an independent political force. Their highest ideal was the nation itself, to be constructed according to their vision.\textsuperscript{10} Certain elements in the National Democratic agenda appealed to Church people, while others stood out for condemnation, resulting in significant ambivalence toward the National Democrats. Bishops especially opposed them for their anti-clericalism, while numerous parish priests sympathized with them because of their association of Catholicism with Polish culture. Ultimately, however, despite the affinity which some priests had for National Democracy, the overriding issue for the Church was adjustment to the reality of the modern nation as a fundamentally different and new structure of societal organization. It was this new, real structure into which priests and their leaders sought to embed Catholicism and constantly reinscribe therein, and thus utilize for the maintenance of institutional power. In other words, at its core, Church people only cooperated with the National Democrats because in the increasingly hostile, "modern" world, institutional power was vital for the Church to pursue its religious mission. Critical to remember here is that the entire European Church felt besieged at this time, and that the Vatican’s response to this was centralization and dogmatism.\textsuperscript{11} The influence of the Church can be gauged if we consider that hardly all Catholic Poles sympathized with or were members of National Democracy. But most went to church, where priests politicized Catholicism in pursuit of the Church’s interests and not the National Democrats’ (though the two could overlap). In sum, through their activities among Catholics and extending into the larger Polish society, by the early twentieth century, the Catholic clergy (i.e., the Church) had begun to narrow the cultural boundaries of Polish identity, asserting, in effect, that only Catholics could be true Poles. This desire to define an exclusively Catholic Polish nation was visible by 1905-1906, but it especially emerged after Poland regained its independence in 1918. With the preoccupation of the anti-Russian struggle gone, the clergy and Church pursued their cultural construction more or less freely through a wide and expanding range of institutional resources (especially the press and social organizations) and more than ever politicized this culture.

**The January 1863 Uprising and the growing redefinition of nationhood**

In 1863–64, the Poles in the Kingdom of Poland and the former Polish lands of Russia’s western provinces rebelled against Russian
rule. The uprising was a struggle for Polish independence against an “external” enemy — Russia; it was not a struggle or civil conflict within the multinational Polish society over the characteristics which Poles should share. Within Polish society, conceptions of who belonged to the Polish nation were undergoing transformation, but because this was an independence struggle, important questions on social power as an expression of membership in the nation could not be tackled and were left for the future. Catholic priests were much more active in the January Uprising than they had been in the November 1830 insurrection against Russian rule. As they fought for independence, they were convinced that if it were won, the Church would regain the position it had held in the pre-partition Polish state, one where it had enjoyed real political power and did not have to worry about social groups and classes influencing its position in Polish society.

This was evident in Catholic conceptions of the position of non-Catholics and non-Poles as well as of the peasantry in the Polish nation. For example, priests employed “inclusivist” rhetoric toward non-Catholics and non-Poles to engage them in the uprising. Głos kapłana polskiego, a leading publication of the Catholic clergy in the uprising, was representative of this rhetoric. Issue #8 (1862) was an appeal to join the uprising directed to the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) population of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which had been forcefully converted from Greek Catholicism to Russian Orthodoxy in 1839. “It was not long ago,” the publication reported,

that even in the Ruthenian lands [na Rusi], lords and peasants attended the same Catholic and Uniate [Greek Catholic] churches; brotherhood was complete, as it is today among our [Catholic and Uniate] brothers in the Kingdom and Galicia.... Brothers, torn away from the bosom of the Church, this unity will save you for the Fatherland and for Poland....

Brothers, today in our national uprising all faiths, rites, and classes are equal before the law. We are all equals: latinists, unionists [Uniates], non-unionists [Orthodox], dissidents, Tatars, and Jews. Poland loves all its children with one love; and to all does it give the freedom of religious belief.13

This appeal suggests that in the early 1860s, Latin rite priests in the Kingdom of Poland did not see the Uniate Church in Galicia or in the Kingdom as a Ukrainian national institution. Further, they wanted
the Orthodox Ukrainians in Russia’s western provinces to rejoin the Uniate Church and believed that this population should be part of a new Poland. But they did not stop here, extending equality to other non-Catholics and non-Poles, notably Jews. In “romantic” fashion, then, this appeal suggests that priests believed that the new Poland should retain its pre-partition borders and that the peoples within these borders would not represent any challenge to the Church’s authority. By the 1890s-1900s, however, Polish priests’ views of the national and religious minorities living on the historic Polish lands are dramatically different (see the section on the Chehm region).

Concerning the peasantry, some peasants took part in the uprising, and some priests supported land reform. Yet this did not mean that, in the early 1860s, the clergy accepted that peasants, by virtue of their ethnic Polish identity, should have the ability to influence the clergy’s standing or role in Polish society. In fact, at this point peasants themselves were not ready to claim a place in the political nation because most had an undeveloped sense of Polish national identity. Also, beyond demands for land directed against landowners, peasants still did not pressure priests over economic, social, or political issues. However, by the 1880s-1890s, growing conflicts between peasants and priests over peasant power in the village is proof of great changes in their relations. Thus, during the uprising, many priests might have “imagined” peasants as Poles, but they did not recognize the long-term impact of peasant class power on the clergy’s own position in society.

In short, in the January 1863 Uprising, as they fought for an independent Polish state, the Catholic clergy, while they often conceived the Polish nation as a cultural entity, did not recognize the implications of this for their own position in Polish society. The clergy did not recognize how ethnic minorities would soon complicate Polish nation and state building, nor did they acknowledge the peasantry as the foundation of a new Polish political nation. It would not be an exaggeration to say that most clergy supported Polish independence in the context of the then-existing social relations where the Church’s real political power in an impending Polish state was taken for granted. In other words, in the 1860s, many clergy fought for Polish independence and suffered immensely as a result, but the struggle for independence at that time occurred in the context of an accelerating and not always perceptible redefinition of the Polish nation. By the turn of the twentieth century, the struggle for an independent Polish state includes a concomitant struggle over the characteristics that Poles should share. By then, the clergy recognize that their social prestige and authority, the Church’s institutional power, as well as the effective continuation
of their religious mission depend on their ability to influence Polish culture in its broadest terms.

Repression, societal change, and a new rhetoric of Church-nation identification

In March 1864, the Poles’ fifteen-month uprising against Russian rule collapsed. Many Poles now faced severe repression, and language, education, administration, the courts, and public life in the Kingdom were Russified. For their participation in the January Uprising, the Catholic clergy were especially persecuted, and the Church’s administrative and organizational structures (e.g., monasteries and convents, seminaries, the parish network) were decimated. While priests in urban areas suffered the worst direct repression, priests in rural parishes who did not take part in the uprising were greatly affected as well. These priests now became even more isolated from their superiors and the European Church.

In the spring of 1864, Tsar Alexander II eliminated feudal dues and granted land to the Kingdom’s peasants in an attempt to win their loyalty and eliminate them as a military force in the January Uprising. But while the debts peasants owed their landlords were annulled, and the peasants took possession of the lands on which they lived, they now had to pay taxes as payment for their land. Also, the reforms generally left intact large estates. Eventually, the combination of inadequate reforms, a population explosion, and the proliferation of small-holdings led to chronic peasant land hunger in the Kingdom. This produced peasant anger and conflicts with the landowners. Increasingly, peasants also resented the Catholic clergy for their continued ties to landowners and their persistent attempts to maintain an unassailable status and authority in rural society.

By the 1890s, industrialization also had deeply transformed Polish society. In the Kingdom, the main industrial areas were Warsaw and Lódź. Warsaw’s population rose from 235,000 in 1865 to 790,000 in 1910, Lódź’s from a mere 28,000 in 1860 to 410,000 in 1910. Overall, from 1872 to 1909, the Kingdom’s urban population rose from 16 per cent to 33 per cent of the total population. The new urban proletariat now encountered, on an unprecedented level, the squalor, long working hours, child labor, prostitution, and alcoholism with which workers in Western Europe had been struggling for decades, as well as socialism as a program to eliminate these ills. Due to constant repression, the Church could not fully address either these social problems or the challenges that socialism presented. For example, it could
not build enough churches to accommodate the large urban populations; between 1850 and 1860, the number of parishioners per parish in the Warsaw archdiocese was about 2,200, while by 1910, this had increased to 6,400.25

The failure of the November and January Uprisings, the “liberation” of the peasant masses, and rapid industrialization demanded new ways of thinking about the social, political, economic, and cultural development of Polish society. After 1864, positivistic “organic work” — the patient and rational build-up of the material and intellectual resources of Polish society — replaced “romantic” insurrection as the preferred method to regain Polish statehood. More importantly, Polish identity itself increasingly was defined in terms of cultural norms and attributes, such as knowledge of the Polish language.26 Ultimately, the secular national movement recognized the peasant masses as the backbone of a new Polish political nation, and a growing — though still small — number of peasants claimed membership in this nation. But national activists also recognized that the social, political, and legal norms and rules which defined the national culture — including the place of religion in it — could be socially and politically “negotiated”. Indeed, by the early 1890s, a burgeoning intelligentsia was spreading liberal, nationalist, socialist, and populist visions of the development of Polish society. These competing programs of national and societal development found their organizational expression in new, though still illegal, political parties: the Polish Socialist Party (PPS, 1892); Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL, 1893/1900); and the National Democratic Party (Endecja, 1896), an extension of the National League (1893), which continued to exist. We can say that these Polish political parties, especially the National Democrats, now competed to define the shared characteristics that Poles would recognize and claim — i.e., over who would be considered a Pole.27 Finally, these processes were given greater life and energy because of increased literacy and advances in communication.

In light of its own problems, how did the Church in the Kingdom of Poland adjust to the rapid evolution of the new, culturally based Polish nation and the reality of the modern nation itself as a fundamentally new structure of societal organization? How did the Church respond to the fact that its role in Polish society and the place of Catholicism in Polish national identity could be open to social and political “negotiation”? Broadly, Catholic priests now progressively exploited Catholicism’s existing location in ethnic Polish culture to create a discourse declaring that historically the Polish nation had always been Catholic, that Poles should only be Catholic, and that non-Catholics
or opponents of the Church could not be true Poles. The goal was to prevent liberals, socialists, secularists, and other "modern" forces now rising from within Polish society, or non-Catholics or non-ethnic Poles living amongst the Poles, from defining the new Polish nation or becoming part of it and further weakening (beyond the effects of Russian repression) the Church's position in society. For the Church, the question was not whether the Polish people would remain a Catholic people but, in the new modern conditions, just how Catholic it would be. Because culture was now the basis of nationhood, the Church could reemploy the vehicle of Catholicism as an eminently symbolic (cultural) practice to oppose the new forces lining up to challenge its traditional position in Polish society. In effect, Catholic priests increasingly "used" the nation (being forged out of a "mass" society that included non-Catholics and non-ethnic Poles) as a fundamentally new structure of societal organization to preserve the Church's historic position in Polish society and to secure the most favorable conditions for the Church to pursue its religious mission. This instrumentalization of the nation progressed from the 1880s-90s onward, beginning with the most politically active, and encompassing progressively more priests. As the competition to define the boundaries of the new Polish nation heated up, more and more priests visualized the position of the Church in Polish society "through" the nation. This, in turn, made the idea of Church-nation symbiosis part of the Church's internal institutional culture. In sum, the Polish Church had, indeed, been a fixture in Polish society for over nine hundred years, and the clergy had contributed mightily to the nineteenth century independence struggle. But by the turn of the twentieth century, it was also infected with the Vatican's obsession to oppose modernity. This opposition was now molded into the Church's established struggle against Russia and its "protection" of the nation.

The Catholic "use" of the ethnic nation appeared with greater and greater clarity as the competition to define just what it meant to be Polish intensified in the 1890s. In this early period, it best expressed itself in clerical activism in the Collegium Secretum and the National League, which were components of the National Democracy camp. Russian repression against the Church and Polish society after 1864 ultimately pushed nationally minded priests toward — as they would come to be known — the National Democrats, who declared an important role for Catholicism in the Polish culture and nation. At the same time, by the 1890s these priests were concerned with reforming and strengthening the Church, which was stagnating. Thus, support of the National Democrats would advance the twin goals of nationally active priests: opposing Russia and strengthening the Church as a so-
cial and national institution. Consequently, the priests in the clandestine Collegium Secretum sought to shape "a national and civic" spirit among the clergy, including seminary students. The group published "several dozen" issues of Wiara i ojczyzna. In 1901, the National League began accepting priests into its ranks, and the Collegium Secretum was dissolved. Not all of the priests in the Collegium joined the League, but a total of 33 priests ultimately did, including the future bishops Walenty Dymek, Arkadiusz Lisiecki, Stanisław Łukomski, and Józef Teodorowicz. The future bishop of the Lublin diocese, Father Maryan Fulman, did not join the League but sympathized with it, and he was also the acknowledged leader of the many other priests with similar sympathies. He was, in addition, a frequent contributor to Dla swoich, the mouthpiece in 1903-04 for the "social and national views" of priests in the League. Most significantly, as Ryszard Bender writes, the priests in the National League, "less through organizational means [than] through numerous networks of friendship ... put in first place national matters, current political problems, and educational work as far as the social activism of priests and believers was concerned."30 As National Democracy developed, Catholic priests continued to be its close allies. But when the Church's rights and "organizational means" in Russia changed, bishops and priests also rapidly increased their own activities to shape the nation so that "through" it — as a malleable structure of societal organization — they could ensure a preeminent position for the Church in Polish society.

The 1905 Russian Revolution exposed how Church people sought to politicize Catholicism (as an element of ethnic Polish culture) to be a criterion of Polish national identity in order to maintain power in Polish society. The revolution and the legislation it spawned released long germinating and suppressed forces in Polish society and breathed new life into the Catholic Church.31 The bishops and many clergy now visibly and staunchly advocated Church-nation solidarity and class harmony. They wanted to base social relations generally, and Polish national culture and identity specifically, on Catholic religious and social teachings. But the goal was not only to raise religiosity and ethical conduct in society; it was also to defend and preserve Church prestige, authority, and power in the conditions of a rapidly intensifying conflict over the boundaries of national identity as well as class power. We can see this in priests' and bishops' activities and especially in their responses to certain initiatives and organizations which challenged their and the Church's standing in Polish society.
Church reform and Church power: the Mariavites

In 1893, Maria Franciszka Kozłowska, a Catholic nun in the city of Płock, had a vision of the Virgin Mary. Quickly, a grassroots movement of Catholic renewal and reform arose around Sister Maria Franciszka and her vision. The Mariavite movement, as it came to be known, was a reaction to such problems as priests’ frequent over-charging for religious services, and their paternalism and moral and material corruption. Mariavite leaders also called for some purely religious reforms, including a more frequent distribution of the Eucharist and the use of the vernacular in the mass. On a more abstract level, however, what the movement’s adherents and sympathizers really demanded was that the Polish Church do something about its internal stagnation, and better address Catholics’ — especially peasants’ and workers’ — needs in the new social and economic conditions in which Polish society found itself. This is not the place for a detailed discussion of the Mariavites. What interests us is that in calling for serious changes in the parish, the Mariavites de facto challenged the relationship of the Church to the Polish nation. Ultimately, the clergy and Church leaders defended themselves not by working with parishioners to address their concerns, but by attacking the Mariavites, which helped lead to their condemnation by Pope Pius X in 1906. A central method of attack was declaring that the Mariavites were “anti-Polish”. This rhetoric exemplified how Catholic priests now associated what they perceived as beneficial to themselves or the Church as “Polish”, and “dangerous” as “anti-Polish”. (This rhetoric, readily available from the anti-Russian struggle, was already being applied to other groups which arose from within Polish society to challenge the Church, especially the Polish socialists.) More specifically, this rhetoric was an important example of how priests now employed the nation as an emerging cultural entity to maintain control in the parish, and power in society.

According to Krzysztof Mazur, “from the beginning” the Mariavites were attacked for opposing Church discipline and criticizing Catholic priests for their relations with parishioners. “All sorts of methods were used to prove that the Mariavites had nothing in common with Polishness.... The movement was bombarded with threats intended to provoke a general protest; it was denied the right of national membership and any attempts by Mariavite priests to appeal to this membership were decidedly negated.” The height of the attacks came in late 1905 and 1906. While within the Church there were individuals who accepted the “constructive criticism” of the Mariavites, and publications directed to priests spoke frankly about conditions in the
Church, Church leaders did not share this information with the laity. Thus, the brochures and articles published for Catholic believers were of “the worst quality, full of hatred, accusations and slander.” 37 For example, in 1906 the influential monk, Honorat Koźmiński, published in Przegląd katolicki a valuable work on the Church’s problems as inspired by the Mariavite controversy. The same work, however, when issued in shortened format to the general public, was an exclusively negative depiction of the Mariavites. Another example might be Father A. Szlagowski, who wrote in 1906 that “there is no room for even one “koźłowita” [a follower of Sister Kozłowska] in our circle [i.e., among priests] because this is a traitor of the Church and Fatherland, and a propagator of ignorance and superstition.” 38

Such Catholic publications and priests’ invectives from the pulpit helped provoke serious opposition to the Mariavites among Catholics and in the secular press. Sister Maria Franciszka Kozłowska was accused of being a Russian Orthodox nun, and the icon of the Mother of God of Perpetual Help was declared to be “foreign to Polish tradition.” 39 Even worse, Catholic priests helped to inspire violence against the Mariavites. Tragically, in 1906, eighteen people were killed and several hundred injured in twenty-four separate incidents of violence between Catholics and Mariavites. 40 After the condemnation of the Mariavites by Pope Pius X in April 1906, opposition to the Mariavites continued on the grounds that they were anti-Polish. In 1909, a Catholic priest writing under the pseudonym Stary Matus declared that “the greatest enemies of the cross and Polishness are socialists, Jews, anarchists, and the ‘mankietnicy’ [Mariavites].” 41 Also in 1909, a brochure carrying the “imprimatur” of the Lublin bishop, Franciszek Jaczewski, called the Mariavites “people related to the devil,” and blamed them for creating national divisions and depriving Poles of “one faith”. 42 Finally, between 1911 and 1913, accusations appeared that the Mariavite founders had contacts with Germans and German nationalist Hakata organizations. 43

It is obviously not insignificant that the most intense Catholic attacks against the Mariavites came during the revolutionary years of 1905-06. At this time, the conflict took on the dimensions of a religious war, with parishioners fighting each other over churches. But this only occurred because of the Church’s shortsightedness. The Polish bishops did nothing to address the criticisms raised by the Mariavites regarding priest-parishioner relations; yet they began to lobby the Vatican in 1903 to suppress the movement, beginning in September 1904. The suppression itself carried no accusations of heresy ex cathedra. 44 Intransigence on both sides then followed, and when revo-
olution came in 1905, the conflict could not but devolve into “religious war”.

But why, in the first place, had so little been done before 1904 to address the problems raised by the Mariavites? Of course, years of Russian control had helped create a stagnant, even backward, Polish Church. But pride and power were also critical factors. As Mazur declares, “the Church was very opposed to any independent initiatives, which disrupted its internal order and hierarchism.... [Mariavitism], not approved by Church leaders, opposed the power of the institution [and] its traditions....”45 Thus, prior to 1904 the bishops saw Mariavitism as a challenge to their vision for the Church in Polish society — one based on tradition and central authority; and most clergy saw it as an attack on their personal status. In these critical years of Polish nation building, then, the Mariavites represented an attempt — no matter how implicit — to redefine the role of the clergy and Church (but not Catholicism) in Polish society and in Poles’ lives.

This appeared more so the case after the revolution of 1905. During the revolution, the Church acquired new freedoms of expression and organization, and the opportunity to begin to rebuild its structures. The bishops and clergy wanted to assert their authority and lead their parishioners on their own terms. Instead, “through their particular expression of Catholicism,”46 the Mariavites intensified their challenge to clerical authority. Wary of the scrutiny of the Mariavites — indeed, a reassessment of the relationship between the Church and its believers (i.e., the Polish nation) — the clergy and bishops fought back. In the prevailing revolutionary conditions, it was easy for priests to appropriate the anti-Polish rhetoric long leveled against the Russians and apply it to the Mariavites. In doing so, the Church declared that only it, and not Catholics themselves or any other group from within Polish society, could define the relationship between the Church and the nation.

In conclusion, we might ask whether in fact the Mariavites were branded as being “anti-Polish” because St. Petersburg sought to use them as a political instrument to divide Polish society. Here, it is important to remember that when Pope Pius X unequivocally condemned the Mariavites in April 1906, there were still no accusations of heresy.47 The Polish Church, however, made this accusation, and despite calls by Mariavite leaders to retract it, it persisted. As the conflict intensified in the spring and summer of 1906, the Mariavite leaders turned to the Russian authorities for protection, citing the Toleration Edict of April 1905 as a basis, but the Russians refused to intervene in this “internal Church matter”.48 Ultimately, in November 1906, when it became clear that the Mariavite leaders would not submit to Church
authority, St. Petersburg granted the Mariavites legal recognition. In Catholic eyes, the Mariavites now definitively became not only anti-Polish but also “pro-Russian”. Obviously, by now the Russians envisioned the Mariavites as a potential political instrument. However, that the designation of the Mariavites as anti-Polish or pro-Russian was not simply the outgrowth of the long-standing anti-Russian sympathies of Polish society is apparent when we consider the clergy’s response after 1918 to another reformist “sect”, the Polish National Catholic Church (PNCC). After the importation of the PNCC from the United States in the early post-independence period, the Catholic clergy in Poland (beyond the small number who joined the PNCC) also attacked the PNCC as being “anti-Polish”, as well as harmful to the Polish state. Clearly, then, the Catholic Church’s reaction to the Mariavites, especially after 1903-1904, revealed that its rhetoric of anti-Polishness was a visible instrument for maintaining status and authority in the parish and society. This is all the more apparent when we consider that, up until 1906, the Mariavites were only an internal reform movement and did not challenge the Church’s overall religious mission.

**Social Catholicism, politics, and the nation**

Through the conflict surrounding the Mariavites, most Catholic clergy and authorities showed that they would lead their believers on their own terms, firmly controlling the faithful along the way; innovation or dissent in the parish would not be tolerated. On the other hand, the Mariavite movement helped to reveal what Catholic leaders understood, that is, that the Church needed reforms and to “catch up” with its counterparts in other parts of Europe. This pertained especially to the social Catholic movement. By the 1890s, repressive conditions in the Kingdom had left the Polish Church stagnant and even backward, and had weakened the intellectual ties between it and the Vatican. Thus, Pope Leo XIII’s watershed encyclical *Rerum novarum* (1891) reached the ears of only a minority of priests in Russian Poland. The encyclical called on Church people and the laity to apply Catholic morality and religious principles to all areas of social, political, and economic life and especially to develop activities and organizations based on these principles. The main objectives were to help resolve the “Social Question” and to retain people in the Church, but at the same time the Church hoped to weaken socialism’s appeal to the working class. The social Catholic movement began to develop in
Poland only with the 1905 Russian Revolution, though individual clerics had been active for some time.52

The starting point for the social Catholic initiatives of Polish bishops and priests was a concern for individual Catholics and their morality, and the conviction that the development of Polish society could only come through the Church. But the social Catholic organizing of priests and bishops, while based on lofty ideals, also included messages about the “proper” characteristics of a Pole, and what was not Polish or was “un-Polish”, especially with regard to political attitudes.53 Priests and bishops also invoked history to legitimate their claim for a Catholic Polish nation. Finally, to stem the attacks by the Mariavites, socialists, and other “radicals” against priestly authority and religious faith, Catholic priests called on their parishioners to follow only them. Several sermons published in 1906 by Father Adam Maciejowski about the “proper” way to love the fatherland serve as a good example of this rhetoric, which now permeated the Church.

Our fatherland has incurred many, and costly, debts to the Church. The Church has been the cradle of our nationality.... You are probably unaware of the quiet but constant work of the servants of the Church. You do not attend the classes conducted by priests prior to children’s First Communion. If you looked there you would be convinced that priests teach not only faith and morality, but also the traditions and history of our nation; they inculcate in children the feeling of Polishness....

Today, it is in the interest of the nation to unite as firmly as possible with the Church and clergy....

Above all else, dishonest people [Jews — K.S.] cannot be good Poles....

Further, the irreligious [socialists — K.S.] cannot be good Poles.... Especially today, when by Pole is also meant a Catholic, no one can with impunity trample on the faith and Church without at the same time undermining [our] nationality. He is a poor Pole who says: “religion does not matter as long as I am an honest person....” It should also be added that a good Catholic, and therefore a good Pole, will not rule in
church like a gray goose [the Mariavites — K.S.], but will first ask for guidance and permission of his priest....

You have not matured to freedom yet; the whip is still needed on you....

Only that is Polish and patriotic which is not against [the Catholic] religion. Your priests are your leaders. They are Poles like you, and they love their fatherland. Turn to them for advice.\textsuperscript{64}

We sense here a true concern for the moral development of the nation. But we also see examples of the strong paternalism which many priests maintained toward their parishioners. Most importantly, Father Maciejowski’s rhetoric exhibits the conscious attribution of Polish identity based on adherence to the Catholic faith. It might appear that he was judging whether only Catholics were “proper Poles” based on the level of their moral behavior. However, we know from, for example, the labeling of the Mariavites as “anti-Polish”, that Father Maciejowski conveyed a powerful rhetorical model. Thus, while Father Maciejowski did not directly mention socialists, Jews, or Mariavites, by strictly correlating Polish identity with the Catholic faith and especially the institutional Church, he strongly implied denominational, political, and ethnic criteria for membership in the nation. While he was concerned with the moral development of the Polish people, Father Maciejowski — and many others like him — created and legitimized for Catholics the conceptual tools with which to imagine and create a much more exclusionary Polish nation. Finally, Father Maciejowski also described an important method used by priests — i.e., the religious education of children — to convey these conceptual tools along with their religious (moral) guidance.

Indeed, Polish peasants for one adopted these conceptual tools and began to employ them to progressively delimit — however unwittingly — membership in the Polish nation to only Catholics. In its inaugural issue in 1905, \textit{Głos gromadzki}, a mouthpiece of the recently formed Polish Peasant Union (PZL),\textsuperscript{55} reported:

\begin{quote}
In the darkness that surrounds the village from all sides, it is not easy for everyone to understand the simple fact that the peasant can rely only on himself and others like himself. The various enemies of the liberation of the peasantry from its excessive lordly,
priestly, or other care only intensify this darkness. These enemies constantly shout only about “national unity”. But they understand this unity to mean that the peasant must eternally bow to someone, kiss his hands, and call him Reverend Father. Anyone who tries to break away from this care and “unity” is called a “wrecker”, “squabbler”, “atheist”, “a bad Pole”, and whatever else only to keep deceiving the peasant who has been deceived since anyone can remember. And we must admit that the peasant often listens to this nonsense and repeats this foolishness as he repeats the Hail Mary....

Thus, peasant leaders, who were in close contact with the parish clergy, saw priests’ calls for “national unity” as nothing more than an instrument for the preservation of clerical power in society. They recognized that the Church might have a religious mission to fulfill, but that due to the emphasis on controlling their parishioners and maintaining their own status, many clergy overlooked this mission. More importantly, peasant leaders recognized that peasants themselves accepted and repeated the negative characterizations that priests created of their alleged opponents. Ultimately, it was the repetition of these (and future other) depictions which served to narrow the cultural boundaries of Polish identity.

One organization epitomized how the Kingdom’s bishops attempted to use the social Catholic movement to control the Catholic faithful and politicize Catholicism in Polish identity. The Catholic Union (Związek Katolicki — ZK) was founded in 1907 as a Kingdom-wide Catholic organization whose goal, according to its statute, was “to base on the teachings of Christ all expressions of national life in the areas of religion and socio-cultural and economic development.” Since only Catholics could belong to the Union, “the teachings of Christ” meant the teachings of the Church. In other words, in calling for “all expressions of national life” to be based on the Church, the Union implicitly communicated that Poles could be only Catholic. The possibility of transforming the Catholic Union into a political party was left open. The Union did not have its own newspapers, but its circles distributed to their members periodicals edited or run by priests — e.g., Posiew and Polak-katolik. The latter title is highly symbolic of the direction in the Church by the early twentieth century to fuse Catholicism with the emerging new culturally based Polish nation. Finally, the national leadership of the Union included influential la-
ity; however, priests directed the parish circles, and this was the most important organizational level in the Union.

Ultimately, however, the Catholic Union never spread throughout the Kingdom the way Church leaders desired; in 1909, only 19 per cent of parishes had circles, and in 1912, only 20 per cent.\(^6^0\) Nevertheless, the Union had a "significant" impact on Polish society.\(^6^1\) A crucial reason for the Union's weak development was that it was a controlling, domineering, and political organization, and it presented the Church as such. All Catholics were supposed to join the Union and drop their membership in such anti-religious, anti-clerical, or socialist political parties as the PPS, SDKPiL, PZL and the so-called Progressive Democratic movement (Postępowa Demokracja — PDoja).\(^6^2\) Catholics could only belong to the National Democratic Party and the tiny Party of Real Politics (Partia Polityki Realnej), both of which were judged by bishops to support the Catholic upbringing of the nation. But because the National Democratic Party was anti-clerical (and since Catholic activists regarded the Union as the foundation of a possible Catholic political party), the endorsement of the National Democrats by the bishops amounted to a strategy to weaken the National Democratic Party. The National Democrats fought back against the bishops. Ultimately, the political struggles with the socialist and peasant parties, and especially the National Democrats, significantly inhibited the development of the Catholic Union.\(^6^3\) Another important reason for the Union's poor development was that most Catholic priests had no experience in social organizing and were reluctant to undertake it.\(^6^4\) Still another cause was Russian repression. For its alleged nationalism and anti-Russian activities, the Catholic Union was closely watched by the Russian authorities. For example, in 1909 the Union's schools were abolished; and in the Lublin diocese the Union was not allowed to establish circles in former Uniate areas and was forced to dissolve previously established circles there.\(^6^5\) The Union did not survive World War I.

In conclusion, we must reiterate that the official social Catholic movement represented far more than a program of broad Catholic outreach. Specifically, through the movement, the Polish bishops sought to Catholicize the Polish "public sphere".\(^6^6\) By 1905-06, a new Polish nation — as a culturally based and "negotiated" entity — had emerged, and the bishops recognized that the Church's position in Polish society rested on their ability to shape Polish culture on the broadest level. Ethnic Poles would remain a Catholic people, but would the institutional Church play a dominant role in society? This was at issue. The social Catholic movement, beyond its religious dimension, represented an unprecedented attempt by the Church to work through
mass public culture to define Catholicism as a criterion of Polish national identity for the purpose of preserving the Church’s status in society. Because of the Church’s centuries-long entrenchment in the Polish ethnic nation and culture, the Church could “reference” itself to Polish identity with great skill and with considerable success. Catholic priests, first, by associating exclusively Catholicism with the Polish nation, and second, by creating negative depictions of the Church’s real and imagined enemies, helped implant in Poles’ minds the idea that true Poles must be Catholic. This was the case despite the fact that the Church’s early social Catholic initiatives were not great organizational successes.

Catholicization and Polonization: the Chełm region Ukrainians

As we saw above, in 1862 Głos kaplana polskiego called on the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) Orthodox believers residing in the eastern reaches of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to join the Poles in an uprising against Russia, to rejoin the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, and eventually to reunite with the Poles in a future state. Moreover, the publication declared that non-Catholics, such as the Christian Orthodox and Jews, were “equals” to Catholics. But by the late nineteenth century, the noble-based social system through which the Church had long maintained power had practically decayed. A new Polish nation based on shared culture now coalesced, and priests had to seek social power through “the people”. Now, how did the Catholic clergy regard the non-Catholics and non-Poles who lived amidst or alongside the Catholic Poles? Were they not, and had they not been for centuries, part of Polish society? By the early twentieth century, Polish priests increasingly looked to convert to the Latin rite (unless they were already Catholic) and ultimately to Polonize those Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Lithuanians who lived on the territory of the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. They also increasingly questioned the status of the Jews as members of “Polish” society. This behavior had complex causes. Important were the nationalisms (e.g., Lithuanian, Ukrainian, in addition to the “official” Russian), with religion at their center, which had arisen around the Poles. These nationalisms were submerged beneath the dominant Russian-Polish struggle; yet Polish priests, as Poles, nevertheless joined other Poles to “defend” against these new claims to perceived Polish territory. But essentially, Polish priests now promoted the Catholicization and Polonization of Polish society’s historic religious and ethnic
minorities or otherwise marginalized them because in doing so they could more effectively utilize the nation (as cultural community) to maintain social power. In other words, for Polish priests to concede that Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Jews could preserve their distinct ethno-religious identities as well as be Poles in a civic sense would have meant that they conceded these minorities' right to help define the Church's position — including physical location — in the "modern" Polish society. It could be argued that to even consider that priests could have made this "concession" is highly unrealistic because the nationalisms Poles faced — not to mention the absence of a Polish state — inhibited priests from envisioning Polish society as a civic collectivity. But we must look at this from the perspective of Polish priests, as priests. Because Polish identity was now evolving on cultural foundations, had bishops and priests accepted Polish society's historic minorities as integral members of society, these minorities, with their particular ethno-religious cultures, would undoubtedly have challenged the Church's social and physical position within society. Ultimately, then, the Catholic clergy's growing opposition to Polish society's minorities had far more to do with the clergy's greater defense of their social status, prestige, and religious mission as they adjusted to "modernity" — where popular sovereignty, not the power of a privileged social class, was the norm — than it had to do with these minorities' nationalisms. Indeed, in reacting ever more stridently to the "anti-Polishness" of Polish society's historic minorities, priests only further activated these minorities' nationalisms. The complex case of the Chełm region Ruthenians/Ukrainians shows how Polish priests struggled against an aggressive Russian nationalism and an emerging Ukrainian national identity, but in so doing also utilized the Polish nation (as cultural construct) to further the Church's institutional and ideological interests.

In 1875, as an extension of the Russification of the Kingdom of Poland and attack on the Catholic Church, the Uniate Church in the Kingdom of Poland was liquidated through a so-called "voluntary union" (dobrovolnoe vossoedinenie), and its members were forced to accept Russian Orthodoxy. The Uniates were concentrated in the Podlasie and Chełm regions (respectively, the eastern Siedlce and eastern and southern Lublin provinces), centered on the town of Chełm, which was also the seat of a Greek Catholic diocese. The Chełm and Podlasie regions were the final outposts of the Uniate Church in the Russian Empire; the Uniate Church in Russia's western provinces was destroyed in 1839. The Russian authorities considered the Kingdom's Uniates to be Ruthenian (Ukrainian) and hoped to "unify" the "Little Russians" with the Russian nation. Indeed, many residents of the
regions were Ruthenian (Polish: Rusini) and spoke dialects of Ukrain-
nian; however, many other ethnic Ruthenians had succumbed to Polonization over the centuries. On the whole, the Ruthenian popula-
tion was nationally "malleable" and in transition to becoming Ukraine,
and the conflict over the region appeared as a Russian-Polish conflict.

The abolition of the Uniate Church had a critical impact on
the Latin rite Church. Most importantly, after 1875 (and repeated,
often violent attempts to force them into Orthodox churches) many
Uniates turned to Catholic priests to satisfy their religious needs. Cer-
tain Catholic priests suffered surveillance, fines, arrests, and even ex-
ile for their contacts with Uniates. The Uniate problem was trans-
formed with the 1905 Russian revolution; the Toleration Edict of April
1905 allowed the "resistant" Uniates to join the Latin rite Church. No
doubt, many Uniates would have preferred to reclaim their old
churches and former faith, but the Union of Brest remained officially
annulled in the Russian Empire. Thus, their next best option was to
convert to the Latin rite; after all, they were still loyal to the Pope. As
a result, after the Toleration Edict approximately 175,000 "resistant"
Uniates in the Kingdom of Poland converted to Latin rite Catholic-
cism. The Catholic Church saw the conversions as a great individual
victory against Russia and Orthodoxy. After years of repression, the
conversions represented a partial repossess of the eastern border-
lands for Catholicism. Many Poles, feeling united in a new Polish na-
tion, also saw the conversions as an enormous victory against their
long-time oppressor.

Encouraged by the Toleration Edict and the October Manifesto,
after 1905 Catholic priests and authorities stepped up their actions
against the Orthodox Church in the Chełm and Podlasie regions. The
conversions allowed them to visualize the complete eradication of the
weakened Orthodox Church and the redemption of the remaining
former Uniates — i.e., those who chose to remain Orthodox. There
was also a glimmer of hope that in some distant future the Church
might reclaim the pre-1839 Uniates in Russia's western provinces.
The Church now began to "reconstruct" (through word and deed) the
Chełm and Podlasie regions as Polish and Catholic territory. (For their
part, the Russians provided additional justification for this reconstruc-
tion. Specifically, in 1909 the Orthodox bishop of Chełm, Evlogii
[Georgievskii], revived a campaign in the Russian State Duma and gov-
ernment to separate the eastern portions of the Siedlce and Lublin
provinces and create from them a new province. The bishop was mo-
tivated by the losses Orthodoxy had suffered in 1905-06 and by fears
of its complete demise. Fueled by Russian nationalism and pride, the campaign gathered momentum, and in 1912 a new Kholm [Chełm] province was created.)

In light of the Russian brutality in the Chełm and Podlasie regions, the Church's reconstruction of the regions as Catholic and Polish territory appeared appropriate; by and large, Polish society also saw the regions in this manner. But more was at stake in the Church's reconstruction. We must remember that in the early twentieth century, the Church and Polish society — with the latter represented by various political factions — were deeply engaged in defining Polish identity — i.e., in the "invention of tradition". While Catholic authorities and the majority of Polish society accepted Catholicism as integral to Polish identity, Poles disagreed on how much influence the Church should have in society. Thus, the fact that both the Church and society claimed the Chełm and Podlasie regions as Polish and Catholic territory hardly meant that they had identical interests in doing so. Broadly, Polish society claimed the regions as Polish and Catholic territory in defense against an external threat (Russia) and to affirm its Catholic cultural heritage. It did not necessarily endorse through its claim one exclusive vision of the Polish nation or greater power for the Church in society. The Church also stood against Russia in the name of "Poland"; however, its claim — and its supporting actions — endorsed the idea of a Catholic Polish nation. In the larger context of Polish nation building, this was not simply an example of the Church's defense of the nation, but comprised an attempt to strengthen the Church's position in society.

The Church confronted not simply the Russians but the local Ruthenians/Ukrainians in its reconstruction of the Chełm and Podlasie regions as Catholic and Polish territory. It was especially in this engagement that the Church's new propensity toward Latin rite conversion and Polonization as an aid to maintain power became apparent. First, local Catholic priests and their leaders recognized those former Uniates who remained Orthodox after 1905-1906 as Ruthenians/Ukrainians; however, they believed that this population had been "Russified". As a result, and despite continued Russian repression, the Catholic clergy embarked on the complete Catholicization — and Polonization — of these Orthodox believers. As mentioned, this was an apparently justified response in light of Russian brutality in the regions since the 1860s. But Catholicization and Polonization were also pursued because priests believed that, had the Uniate Church not been destroyed in the regions in 1875, the Uniates would have become Poles. This latter view now represented a very important shift in how priests viewed the relationship between the
Church and the Polish nation, and the Church and the ethnic and religious minorities in Polish society. Specifically, in the 1860s-70s Catholic priests accepted the Uniates for who they were, both Poles and Ruthenians. Being a Catholic in the Latin or Greek Catholic rite was acceptable; and Polonization was not explicitly pursued among the Ruthenian Uniates. Conversely, in claiming after 1905 that the Orthodox Ukrainians should have become Poles — and in seeking to convert them to the Latin rite and to Polonize them — Catholic priests demonstrated that they now saw their religious mission directly through their association with the Polish nation. The following “response” of April 1905 from the Society for the Defense of the Uniates, an organization with deep Catholic and National Democratic roots, displays the strong conviction among priests (and Church supporters) that the “Russified” Orthodox in the Chełm region should be Poles:

Brother Uniates!... Read every word written here carefully and teach your neighbors — your brothers — so that all the Uniates [cała Unia] and [our] entire Catholic country know what to do....

For all the crimes, for all the repression, for the thievery and murders, for depriving us of our Catholic faith and the Polish language, for enslaving our Poland the Muscovites [Moskale] are now receiving their due punishment in Manchuria ... from the Japanese....

Those who suffered the greatest repression but did not submit, did not forsake their God and faith, deserve great credit. But there are those who yielded to the devil’s temptation; there are those who were frightened by Moscow’s threat and succumbed to Orthodoxy and its priests.

We must save these sinners from doom and perpetual damnation because they too are our brothers. Although they are dumb and weak, and through their ignorance and weakness of heart forsook the Holy Faith ... we must help them.81

This statement presents “all the Uniates” as Poles through the simultaneous reference to them, “our Catholic faith”, the “Polish language”, and the Russian persecution of “Poland”. This conflation and the subsequent call to save those former Uniates who “succumbed”
to Orthodoxy strongly imply that those who became Orthodox should be Poles — indeed, that they were always Poles. This is further emphasized through the declaration that those who are Orthodox have remained so not because of a deliberate choice, but because they are "dumb and weak".

The Church confirmed that its opposition to the Ruthenian/Ukrainian Orthodox was not simply the result of animosity to Russia or Orthodoxy in two interrelated ways. First, it reinterpreted the Uniate past of the Chełm and Podlasie regions as an essentially Polish past, omitting the obvious Ruthenian presence in this history; and second, it exhibited signs that it now rejected the return of the Uniate Church to the Chełm region because the Uniate Church had become a Ukrainian national church. The above example not only shows that the Ruthenian/Ukrainian Orthodox should be Poles, but presents the Uniate past as a Polish past. In fact, many (former) Uniates in the Podlasie region were Poles, but many others, especially in the Chełm region, were not; however, the Ruthenian heritage of the Uniates is not mentioned.

Bolstering the view that the selective use of history was a means to oppose the Ruthenian/Ukrainian presence in the Chełm and Podlasie regions is the fact that in 1905 the local Catholic Church no longer desired a return of the Uniate Church to the regions. This was because the Uniate Church was now a Ukrainian national church, having become so in eastern Galicia by the late nineteenth century. Now, if it were reestablished in the Chełm and Podlasie regions, the Uniate Church — Catholic authorities and priests comprehended — would present a challenge to Polish identity in the form of a Ukrainianization (or de-Polonization) threat. The reintroduction of the Uniate Church — now a specifically Ukrainian institution — would deprive the Church of being able to "use" the nation (as a cultural entity) to maintain institutional authority in society. It is not important that in 1905 the reestablishment of the Uniate Church in the Russian Empire was impossible; the critical point is the real Catholic opposition which had emerged to the Uniate Church on national grounds.

Indeed, the evidence for Catholic opposition, while somewhat circumstantial, is considerable. First, Dla swoich, published by the priests of the National League, had already reported in 1903 that in the Biłgoraj area (a sub-region of the Chełm region) "Our brothers [i.e., clergy] are more Catholic ... than the Pope himself. They want their sheep to be absolutely Catholic — that they have nothing in common not only with the schismatic [Orthodox] Church, but also with the Uniate Church!!" Second, the Lublin bishop, Franciszek Jaczewski, and Catholic priests in the Chełm region could not have been blind to
the nationalist tensions between Catholic (Polish) and Uniate (Ukrainian) priests in Galicia. Third, during the mass conversions of 1905, some Catholic priests changed Ukrainian names to Polish names. And finally, in a letter of 1919 to the new Lublin bishop, Maryan Fulman, Father Teofil Harasowski, a former Uniate priest from the Chełm region who had escaped to Galicia in 1875, argued that the fate of the Uniate Church was already decided in 1905. Father Harasowski, expressing apprehension about Bishop Fulman’s attitude toward the Uniate Church, wrote that in 1905 he had contacted Stefan Wydżga, a local notable in the town of Raciborowice, about the possibility of reactivating the Uniate Church in the Chełm region. Wydżga responded:

The Union has no right to exist here.... [I]t lies in no one’s interest — neither us Catholics nor the government itself. I should add that were the Union revived, it would be harmful to our Church. It could serve as a revolutionary instrument, fulfilling religious and political propaganda roles, as is taking place for no good there in Galicia among the Ruthenians. [The Ruthenians are simply] pawns in a political game played by clever agitators. Here we want nothing to do with the Union. It would only lead to disaster.

Though Wydżga was a layperson, “we must believe”, wrote Father Harasowski in 1922 to the Lublin province voivod (provincial head), “that the decision [to oppose the return of the Uniate Church to the Chełm region] was taken [in 1905] during [then Lublin] Bishop [Franciszek] Jaczewski’s visitations.”

Several more moments in the Catholic-Orthodox-Uniate (Polish-Russian-Ruthenian/Ukrainian) relationship in the Chełm and Podlasie regions deserve mention. In 1915, the Central Powers expelled the Russians from the Kingdom of Poland, and the Kholm province ceased to exist. The Catholic Church firmly expected that upon the completion of the World War, the former province would truly “be” Catholic and Polish territory. To this end, Catholic priests and authorities began to reclaim properties confiscated by the Russians after 1867/1875. Yet in February 1918, the Church and Polish society were dealt a sudden blow; the Brest-Litovsk agreement between German and Ukrainian representatives placed the former Kholm province in the fledgling Ukrainian National Republic. The agreement showed that the Ukrainians also saw this territory as “theirs”. Ultimately, the collapse of Germany invalidated the agreement. Formal Polish independence followed in early November 1918, and, on the heels of this, the 1918-19
Polish-Ukrainian War. The Catholic Church and Polish society vehemently opposed the Brest-Litovsk agreement,\textsuperscript{92} and between November 1918 and 1924 Bishop Fulman rejected all efforts by the Uniate Church to return to the Chełm region.\textsuperscript{93} With independence, Catholic priests also began an all out effort to eliminate the vestiges of the Orthodox Church in the region.\textsuperscript{94} After 1918/1921, the Church continued to claim that it was acting as a national guardian and for the good of society. But clearly the Church also operated with its own interests in mind. Bishop Fulman opposed the return of the Uniate Church to the Chełm region not because it was a religiously "hostile" institution, but because he interpreted it as politically hostile. He understood that the Uniate Church, as a "Ukrainian" institution, would challenge the Catholic Church's own use of the Polish nation through which to define its social power. This is strong confirmation that the Church generally worked to fulfill its religious mission through the nation, by attempting to build a Catholic Polish nation. But these signs were visible much earlier.

To conclude, we might ask whether we can truly assess the clergy's apparently self-defensive actions in the Chełm and Podlasie regions as also motivated by a drive for personal and institutional power. Indeed, it is nearly impossible to draw a line between the clergy acting as Poles and as self-interested priests, especially for the pre-independence period, when Polish society had to defend itself against various attacks. However, the line is easier to draw after 1918, when there was a Polish state. Despite these difficulties, we can nevertheless point to an emerging hostility within the Catholic Church toward Polish society's historic religious and ethnic minorities. In the greater context of Polish nation building, I believe these groups obstructed the Church in utilizing ethnic Polish culture as an instrument to enhance its power in the new Polish nation. When we include the Church's rhetoric and actions against such groups as the socialists, Mariavites, and Jews, this view is even more defensible.

\textbf{Concluding remarks}

In February 1937, the Koc Declaration of the new ruling Camp of National Unity (Obóz Zjednoczenia Narodowego — OZN) assigned the Catholic Church a central role in the development of Polish society.\textsuperscript{95} Between late 1918 and the late 1930s, the Church built up the "Catholic Poland" that the OZN sought to tap into to legitimate itself. This paper has argued that the Church's fundamental motive for and tactics of building such a state can be discerned in the Kingdom of Poland in
the decades prior to World War I. It was then that a modern Polish nation (as a "negotiated" cultural entity) emerged. A dominant cultural, social, and political institution in Polish society for centuries, the Church and its clergy felt deeply threatened not only by the Russian repression, but also by the enormous societal and ideological transformations of the period. Could the Church, cognizant of its historic strong position in Poland (e.g., the *antemurale christianitatis*), allow the "people" of the Polish society — including secularists, liberals, socialists, populists, and non-Catholics and non-ethnic Poles — to define the place of the Church and Catholic belief in the new Polish nation? To maintain the Church's dominant position in society, Catholic priests and bishops transposed their rhetoric — and actions — from the anti-Russian struggle onto those initiatives and groups that appeared to challenge or threaten the Church. This resulted in the manipulation of long existing symbols about ethnic Poles, the Church, and non-Catholics and non-Poles, and the creation of new ones for the purpose of maintaining power in society. Thus, labeling the Mariavites as anti-Polish, using social Catholic organizations to counter Polish secular organizations and anti-clerical political parties, and opposing the Ruthenians/Ukrainians in the Chełm and Podlasie regions were elements of the steady politicization of Roman Catholicism in Polish national identity. On a more abstract level, this comprised the instrumentalization of the ethnic Polish nation for the maintenance of institutional power in society. While the signs of this cultural politics existed before 1905, they became undeniably visible after the 1905 Russian Revolution. During and after the revolution, Church leaders and many clergy staunchly promoted Church-nation solidarity while attacking all expressions of social radicalism and challenges to their authority. But the Catholic Church — paternalistic and heavy handed, allied with the Polish landowning class, having inadequate resources, and facing continued repression — could not energetically promote its agenda. For this it had to wait for an independent Polish state.

What role did state repression play in politicizing Catholicism in Polish identity? Obviously, the attacks against the Church and Russification in the Kingdom coupled Catholicism with Polish identity on a political level. In this regard, state repression was probably a greater factor in Prussian Poland, which experienced the *Kulturkampf* and a persistent and oppressive Germanization.6 But the Polish Church was not oppressed in Catholic Austria, yet bishops and clergy (e.g., Father Stanisław Stojalowski) there used political parties, associations, and the press to attack Polish socialists and secular organizations as un-Polish, and struggled with the (Ukrainian) Uniate
Church over what constituted “Polish” territory. In other words, the repressive policies of Russia and Germany surely intensified the association between Catholicism and Polish identity, but repression alone did not compel a growing number of Poles to associate membership in the Polish nation with membership in the Church. This was due to the secular nationalists, but also very much to the Church’s cultural politics, which were a partial reaction to repression but more so to a rapidly encroaching modernity. Overshadowed by the immediacy and “visibility” of state repression, this politics was often unapparent.

Did priests in fact seek to enhance their authority or power in Polish society by deliberately politicizing Catholicism in Polish identity? Did they “consciously” or “intentionally” convince Catholic Poles that opponents of the Church, or non-Catholics or non-ethnic Poles could not be “true Poles”? There was no question that the Poles were a Catholic people and that they would remain so. The more important question was just how Catholic this people would be. This especially concerned the Church’s institutional role and power in society. To ensure that the most important allegiance of Poles would be to the Church, priests began to exploit the raw material of ethnic Polish identity, politicizing Catholicism in this identity by associating or disassociating particular political, ethnic, and religious identities with Polishness. They might have believed that the formula “all Poles should be Catholic” (as all Africans or all Chinese) derived from their religious mission and was non-political. But in a situation when the nation was being forged on the principle of shared values and characteristics, this formula could not but be political because it communicated to Catholic Poles the sense that non-Catholics were somehow inferior or illegitimate. As far as this “process” of politicization goes, the individual, generally unorganized actions of priests in the decades prior to 1905 accumulated to become an accepted and deliberate form of collective action for the purpose of protecting Catholic interests and latitude of action in the Polish mass nation. Priests contributed to the work of Polish secular nationalists but went beyond it, reflecting what Catholic doctrine held: that is, that civil power comes from God, and that the Church stands above any secular form of politics despite having to reconcile itself to its existence. In sum, intentionality derived not from any programmatic strategy but rather from the Church and clergy being forced into a situation where, due to the forces unleashed by the French and Industrial revolutions, adjustment to the mass nation as cultural entity compelled priests to work “through culture” to maintain their societal influence. With religious practice as an eminently cultural
practice, the Church found the ethnic nation a fully amenable terrain on and through which to reaffirm and reclaim its historic mission and position.

In this paper, I have tried to reconceptualize the position of Catholicism in Polish national identity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by reframing it as not simply the result of Russian repression or of the historic attachment of Poles to the Catholic Church, but also as the result of the Church's response to particular "modern" challenges. I have endeavored to show the larger picture and recognize that this is only a starting point. There are questions that need further exploration and topics of research that, if incorporated, will improve this analysis. The diversity of opinion and actions within the Church; what Catholic believers themselves contributed to the politicization of Catholicism; the relationship of the clergy to women; the relationship of the clergy to the Jews; the relations between the Polish Church, other European Churches, and the Vatican — these are some of the larger issues that need further research.

For the most part, historical writing on the role of the Church in Polish society has been dominated by the question: How did the Church help to preserve Polish culture in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries against oppressive state systems? This question has been dominant because for the previous two hundred years the Poles, indeed, have almost incessantly struggled for national sovereignty. But issued from "within" succeeding struggles — and, therefore, always emotional and politically motivated — this question did not, and does not, go far enough in exposing the complex intersections between Catholicism as a belief system, the Church as a social institution, and Polish nation and state building. The analysis presented here, I hope, better illuminates these intersections.
Notes

1 Religious affiliation became a powerful designator of national identity in the nineteenth century throughout Europe, but especially throughout Eastern Europe. At least three distinct (often overlapping) categories of a large volume of literature related to the intersections between religion, and nation and state building can be discerned. First, and most relevant for this study, is the work on the role of priests and churches in national identity construction and national movements against foreign or hostile states. An example is John-Paul Himka, *Galician Villagers and the Ukrainian National Movement in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988); or “Church, State, and Nation,” Chapter 3 in Emmett Larkin’s, *The Historical Dimensions of Irish Catholicism* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1976). Second is the research on religion and politics, where the state is “legitimate” to people (religious or lay) promoting a religious influence on politics. Here, sub-categories are Church-state relations and Christian political parties. An excellent example is David Blackbourn, *Class, Religion, and Local Politics in Wilhelmine Germany: The Centre Party in Württemberg before 1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); as is Caroline Ford, *Creating the Nation in Provincial France: Religion and Political Identity in Brittany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Third is the still more theoretical work on religion and politics/society, most often presented in historical comparative contexts. Two examples are Sabrina Petra Ramet and Donald W. Treadgold (eds.), *Render Unto Caesar: The Religious Sphere in World Politics* (Washington, DC: American University Press, 1995); and José Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). Any considerations of the applicability of the theoretical ideas presented in this article to other national contexts will obviously have to take into account variations in religious institutions, the nature of the relationship between nation and state, as well as the pattern of state development.

2 During much of the pre-partition Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, membership in the noble political nation was not bound up with membership in the Catholic Church. The Counter-Reformation Church began to change this, however, and by the early twentieth century the concept “Polak-Katolik” was firmly rooted. Overviews of these developments are presented in general histories of Poland: for example, Norman Davies, *God’s Playground, A History of Poland* (New York:...

3 On the role of the Church in the national struggle, see, for example, Bolesław Kumor, *Ustrój i organizacja Kościoła polskiego w okresie niewoli narodowej (1772-1918)* (Kraków: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne, 1980); Jan Skarbek, “W dobie rozbiorów i braku państwowości (1772-1918),” in Jerzy Kłoczowski, Lidia Müllerowa and Jan Skarbek, *Zarys dziejów Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce* (Kraków: Wydawn. Znak, 1986); and the articles in Czesław Strzeszewski, Ryszard Bender, and Konstanty Turowski (eds.), *Historia katolicyzmu społecznego w Polsce, 1832-1939* (Warsaw: Ośrodek Dokumentacji i Studiów Społecznych, 1981). Second, by the clergy’s nation building, I do not mean the role of the clergy and Church in creating the idea of the modern Polish nation, but rather in articulating, or “imagining”, a particular kind of Polish nation and convincing others to adopt their vision. Thus, I do not necessarily dispute Peter Brock’s assertion that “within the Polish community the nationalist impulse during most of the nineteenth century came from sources that stood aloof from or opposed orthodox Catholicism. The Poles, of course, remained a Catholic people, but the fact that they became a modern nation was not closely related to their Catholicism.” See Peter Brock, “Polish Nationalism,” in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), p. 338. Ernest Gellner makes this same point. See his *Nationalism* (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1997), p. 78. On the importance of how a nation imagines itself, see Andrzej Walicki, “Intellectual Elites and the Vicissitudes of ‘Imagined Nation’ in Poland,” *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring 1997): pp. 227-230.
Within the Kingdom, I concentrate often on the Lublin/Chełm and Podlasie regions. Specifically, the eastern reaches of these regions were borderland areas — populated by ethnic Poles, Ruthenians (Ukrainians) and Jews — where the construction and reconstruction of religious, national, and class identities were very visible. In addition, the Lublin/Chełm region was a prime location of radical peasant politics. As politically sensitive and borderland areas, the Lublin/Chełm and Podlasie regions are excellent micro-regions to study the development of Church-society relations, especially the role of Catholicism and the Catholic Church in Polish nation and state building.

For example, Adrian Hastings, paraphrasing Rogers Brubaker, has written: “The French have defined themselves territorially in terms of a country created by a state and then productive of a nation; the Germans have defined themselves ethnocentrically in terms of a community of descent (in theory), of language (in practice), which is then productive of a state. Each arrived at a nation-state but came at it from opposite ends. The one is inclusivist of everybody in a place, the other is inclusivist only of people who share certain ethnic or cultural characteristics.... All in all France represents in this the earlier ‘western’ European experience, while Germany is the prototype for the later ‘eastern’ experience. Nevertheless ... other west European states by no means followed exactly the French route, nor did east Europeans always follow the German route.” See Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 13. See also Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). Brubaker’s ideas themselves are based on Hans Kohn. See his *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* (New York: Macmillian, 1945).

According to Theodore Weeks, Russification did not mean the attempt to transform Poles into Russians. Weeks suggests that Russification was the attempt by the Russian state to maintain and expand Imperial institutions and to make Poles into loyal subjects of the Russian Empire. See Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier*, 1863-1914 (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996).

This interpretation reflects Rogers Brubaker's recent theory on nations and nationalism. He writes:

Nationalism is not engendered by nations. It is produced — or better, it is induced — by political fields of particular kinds. Its dynamics are governed by the properties of political fields, not by the properties of collectivities.... [W]e should focus on nation as a category of practice, nationhood as an institutionalized cultural and political form, and nationness as a contingent event or happening, and refrain from using the analytically dubious notion of "nations" as substantial, enduring collectivities.... To understand the power of nationalism, we do not need to invoke nations. Nor should we, at the other extreme, dismiss nationhood altogether. We need, rather, to decouple categories of analysis from categories of practice....


Both the motives for and methods of the Polish Church's politicization of Catholicism in Polish identity were closely linked to the larger challenges that the European Church faced in the nineteenth century, though unique Polish conditions also defined the Church's course of action. Three authorities have described the challenges that the European Church faced, and how it reacted to them, in the following way. On the European Church's confrontation with "the state", Alec Vidler has written that
Certainly, the French Revolution was a great-dividing line in the political history of Europe.... The Church had been an integral, if not always a vital, element in the old system. Its establishment had been taken for granted. What would its fate be when the system in which it was established disintegrated? This question arose wherever the forces that the Revolution released made their way, as they did everywhere sooner or later.... What was writ large in France was written in lesser or derivative scripts elsewhere.

Further, in reference to the question of the “fate” of the Church after the “disintegration” of the old system, Max Weber has commented: “Certainly, the goal of the Catholic church is to salvage its ecclesiastical power interests, which have increasingly become objectified into a doctrine of the fundamental interests of the church, by the employment of the same modern instruments of power employed by secular institutions.” Finally, on these “modern instruments of power,” Owen Chadwick has written:

[By the late nineteenth century] Democracy allowed freedom of propaganda to the various groups in the State, and among them the Churches. Churchmen, feeling their freedom, and realizing that they competed in an open market of opinion, were open, zealous, popular, aggressive. The Ultramontane movement in the French Church had for an outward aim the lifting up of the Pope’s power. But underneath it was a devotional movement at the level of parishes, placing Catholic life before a half-educated public, making religion warm, emotional, exciting, colourful, and ardent. Ultramontane priests and laymen had no desire to make religion quietly acceptable among the people. They pursued a more uncomfortable goal. They wanted to make disciples, if possible, and if not disciples, then antagonists.

In the end, these comments provide not only a view of the general European situation but also a solid foundation, and justification, for the analysis in this paper. More specifically, the Church in the pre-partition Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was a vital part of the Old Order, and its power was taken for granted. Second, the Church in the Kingdom had to adjust drastically to the new political movements and

10 See the National-Democratic Party program of 1903 in Barbara Toruńczyk, *Narodowa Demokracja: Antologia myśli politycznej "Przeglądu Wszechpolskiego" (1895-1905)* (London: Aneks, 1983), p. 120. See also Bogumił Grott, "Rola katolicyzmu w ideologii obozu narodowego w świetle pism jego ideologów i krytyki katolickiej," *Dzieje Najnowsze*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1980): pp. 63-94; and Teodor Mistewicz, "Rola religii i Kościoła rzymskokatolickiego w świetle publicystyki polskiego ruchu nacjonalistycznego (do 1905 r.)," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (1985): pp. 765-789. From a theoretical perspective, Geilner has written that "the Age of Nationalism in Europe is also an Age of Secularism.... [Nationalists] may value their faith because it is, allegedly, the expression of their national culture or character, or they may be grateful to the Church for having kept the national language alive when otherwise it disappeared from public life; but in the end, they value religion as an aid to community, and not so much in itself." See Geilner, *Nationalism*, pp. 77-78.

11 In the encyclicals *Diuturnum illud* (1881), *Immortale Dei* (1885), *Libertas* (1888), *Sapientae Christianae* (1890), and *Satis cognitum* (1896), Pope Leo XIII declared such things as the indifference of the Church to forms of government, that the right to rule comes from God, the need for the unity of faith and government, opposition to the separation of Church and state, and opposition to freedom of thought and religion. See Claudia Carlen, *The Papal Encyclicals [1740-1981]*, Vol. 2 [1878-1903] ([Wilmington, N.C.]: McGrath Publishing, 1981); Sister M. Claudia [Claudia Carlen], *Dictionary of Papal Pronouncements: Leo XIII to Pius XII [1878-1957]* (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1958); Josef L. Altholz, *The Churches in the Nineteenth Century* (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967), pp. 152-155; and Anne Fremantle (ed.),


13 The thirteen issues of Głos kapłana polskiego — a "red" publication published by and for priests before and during the uprising, but one which had a much broader readership — are reproduced in S[tefan] Kieniewicz and I. Miller, Prasa tajna z lat 1861-1864, część 1 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1966). See pp. 256, 262. See also Wereszycki, "Znaczenie Powstania Styczniowego....," pp. 735-736; and Groniowski and Skowronek, Historia Polski, p. 150.

14 According to Andrzej Walicki, by the time of the uprising, there was growing acknowledgment that the Polish language and the Catholic faith should be the mainstays of Polishness. Yet the national aspirations of the Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians) were also recognized, with a preference for them to be included in a federation. While the Głos kapłana polskiego appeal makes no reference to the federal concept, it implies that Catholicism is inseparable from Polishness as well as promotes legal equality for non-Catholics. See Walicki, Poland Between East and West: The Controversies over Self-Definition and Modernization in Partitioned Poland, The August Zaleski Lectures, Harvard University, 18-22 April 1994 (Cambridge, Mass.: Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, 1994), p. 36.

15 The Lublin region reflected the ambiguous position of the peasantry in the uprising and in the Polish nation. After the uprising began, peasants from the huge Zamoyski estate joined the fighting, as did peasants from around Lubartów, Bychawa and especially Puławy. But in three districts along the Bug River in the eastern Lublin province, peasants attacked landlords and on occasion falsely but purposely
accused them of being supporters of the uprising, and turned them in to the Russian authorities. According to Groniowski, 2,948 peasants in the Kingdom suffered retribution for their participation in the uprising (35.4 per cent of the total for the Kingdom). See Krzysztof Groniowski, “Chłopi w Powstaniu Styczniowym a reformy agrarne lat 1861-1864,” in Kalembka, p. 130; and Krzysztof Groniowski, Uwłaszczenie chłopów w Polsce: Geneza — realizacja — skutki (Warsaw: Wiedza Powszechna, 1976), pp. 207-208.

16 For example, commenting on Głos kapłana polskiego, Kieniewicz and Miller note: “The accents against the upper classes — who do not work and exist from the exploitation of the peasant masses, which also makes these classes more susceptible to cooperating with the foreign government — are very interesting in Głos kapłana polskiego. Consistent with the general line in the conspiratorial press, Głos kapłana encourages the gentry to sacrifice for the benefit of the peasants; and the latter it encourages to seek agreement with the former. Maybe more clearly than in many other publications, [Głos kapłana polskiego] calls for peasant emancipation and land reform [uwłaszczenie].” See Kieniewicz and Miller, Prasa tajna, p. 202.

17 See Wereszycki, “Znaczenie Powstania Styczniowego...,” pp. 734-735; and Groniowski and Skowronek, Historia Polski, pp. 146-147.

18 For a valuable discussion of the conflicts between Polish peasants and priests in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Józef Ryszard Szaflik, O rząd chłopskich dusz (Warsaw: Ludowa Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza, 1976). See also Groniowski, Uwłaszczenie chłopów, p. 131.

19 The last unit of insurgents, led by Father Stanisław Brzóska in the Podlasie region, lasted to the fall of 1864. Any traces of autonomy the Kingdom once possessed were eliminated. Even the Russian word “gubernia” replaced the Polish “voivodship” (województwo), and the name of the kingdom was changed to “Vistulaland” (Pravislyanski krai), though the latter did not gain wide acceptance.

20 Of nearly 21,000 people tried for their participation in the uprising, 466 were priests — five per cent of the priests in the Kingdom and six per cent of those in the Lithuanian and Belarusian lands. Thirty of them were executed, 100 sentenced to hard labor, and several hundred more exiled. In 1867, the Janów diocese — where Father Stanisław Brzóska led the last unit of insurgents, and bordering the
Lublin diocese in the north — was liquidated, and its bishop, Beniamin Szymański, exiled. (In response, Rome placed the diocese under the temporary jurisdiction of the bishop of Lublin. It was finally reactivated in 1918; then, its seat was moved to Siedlce, and it was renamed the Siedlce (Podlasie) diocese.) Only one bishopric remained occupied in the Kingdom in 1870. In addition, the movements of the clergy were circumscribed and put under administrative control. As for Church properties, they came under the complete control of the state, and most monastic orders were closed. Though a concordat was signed between Russia and the Holy See in 1882, the situation did not improve greatly for the Catholic Church. For an extensive discussion of the persecution the Church and clergy suffered, see Kumar, *Ustrój i organizacja Kościoła*. See also Skarbek, "W dobie rozbiorów...," pp. 235-236.

21 Stimulated by advances in agriculture, industry, hygiene, and the growth of cities, between 1860 and 1910 the population in the Kingdom of Poland, Galicia, and Prussian Poland rose from eleven million to twenty-two million. Skarbek, "W dobie rozbiorów...," p. 242.

22 In the Lublin gubernia in 1870, over 58 per cent of the arable land still belonged to large landowners. Of peasant farms in 1870, 11.1 per cent were no more than three morgs (one morg equals 5,600 square meters, one hectare equals 10,000 square meters) in size, 39.6 per cent were from 3-15 morgs, and 49.3 per cent were over 15 morgs. By 1904, though peasants overall had acquired some additional land, many peasant farms had shrunk greatly: 10.9 per cent were less than three morgs, 77.1 per cent from 3-15 morgs, and only 12 per cent were over 15 morgs. Thus, by 1904, 88 per cent of peasant farms in the Lublin gubernia were no larger than 15 morgs (8.4 hectares), and of these, 71.8 per cent were no larger than 8.9 morgs (5 hectares). In the Kingdom as a whole, 64.4 per cent of the peasants lived on farms up to five hectares in size. In addition to the proliferation of smallholdings, the number of landless peasants increased. In 1874, there were 14,648 landless peasants in the Lublin gubernia, in 1890, 94,475, and by 1901, 154,234, many of them working under difficult conditions on large estates. See Albin Koprukowski, “W okresie kształtowania się kapitalizmu (1864-1918),” in Tadeusz Mencel (ed.), *Dzieje Lubelszczyzny*, Vol. 1 (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawn. Naukowe, 1974), pp. 658-666.

23 See Szaflik, *O rząd chłopskich dusz.*
Population statistics are from Skarbek, "W dobie rozbiorów...," p. 242.


For a good overview of the development of Polish national identity in the nineteenth century, see Brock, "Polish Nationalism."


Here, we must reiterate that the Church and Catholicism were central elements of Polish tradition and society; in many ways Catholicism both created and protected Poles' values and their sense of community and identity. For this reason, priests, as Poles, could not but be very interested in how the Polish nation, as cultural construct, "imagined" itself. But the clergy and the Church also wielded great social and economic prestige, authority, and power. It was especially these latter factors that clashed with the peasants' and the workers' increasing demands for economic and political rights and power after 1864, and the intelligentsia's rationalism. In other words, these latter factors became central in the Church's desire to shape national identity, and the general "negotiating" process over the position of Catholicism in Polish national identity. On the functionalist role of religious experience in creating social cohesion, see Emile Durkheim's classic, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, 5th impression (London: Allen & Unwin, 1964), pp. 416-418; and Peter Berger, The Sacred

29 At the same time that National League members created the conservative National Democratic Party in 1896, a group of priests formed the Collegium Secretum within the National League, which continued to operate apart from the National Democratic Party. The National League itself was formed in 1893 out of the Polish League (Liga Polska), founded in 1887. Priests representing various dioceses of the Kingdom of Poland belonged to the Collegium Secretum, with the Włocławek diocese represented by as many as seventeen priests. The priests met at least once a year, usually in Warsaw. See Stanisław Kozicki, Historia Ligi Narodowej (okres 1887-1907) (London: Myśl Polski, 1964), pp. 78, 408-414; and Ryszard Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl i działalność społeczna w zaborze rosyjskim w latach 1865-1918,” in Strzeszewski, et al., Historia katolicyzmu społecznego..., pp. 210-211, 248-249.

30 Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl...,” p. 211. See also note 52.

31 The revolution was sparked by the Russian failure in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, poor socio-economic conditions, and demands for rights by the empire’s national and religious minorities. In response, the state granted unprecedented civil liberties to Russian society, including to the Poles and to other minorities. A major concession was the Toleration Edict of April 1905, which allowed for a relatively free choice in and practice of religion. Later that year, the October Manifesto established the Russian State Duma (parliament) and allowed for groups and institutions in the Russian Empire to establish their own representative organizations, such as trade unions and political parties. A very good account of the revolution in Russia is Robert E. Blobaum, Rewolucja: Russian Poland, 1904-1907 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, NY, 1995). See also note 60.

32 Maria Franciszka Koźłowska was heavily influenced by the monk Honorat Koźmiński, who in the 1870s began to establish secret associations — almost exclusively of women — for self-help and to extend aid and protection to girls and women working in the new and often exploitative factories in the Kingdom. Between 1873 and 1895, Father Koźmiński established nineteen different associations — some with houses throughout the Kingdom — which had 649 women who lived a
common life and 3,713 associates. Father Koźmiński’s work was a reaction to the massive liquidation of convents and monasteries after the January Uprising. Individuals with “greater spiritual needs” eagerly welcomed it. On the other hand, “the attitudes of priests toward these associations was far from tolerant.” It was out of this tradition of secret and independent Catholic associations that the Mariavite (from the Latin Maria vita) movement began, though it quickly took on a life of its own. See Franciszek Stopniak, Kościół na Lubelszczyźnie i Podlasiu na przełomie XIX i XX wieku (Warsaw: Akademia Teologii Katolickiej, 1975), pp. 389, 414 (note 47); Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl...,” pp. 206-207; and Blobaum, “The Revolution of 1905-1907....”

33 Stopniak gives an excellent account of the development of Mariavitism in the Lublin and Podlasie regions to 1914, including dozens of accounts of the complaints of peasants against their priests. Based on these accounts, he notes that “The main traits of Mariavitism in the parishes [to 1906] was the rejection of the bishop’s authority, the cult of the Holy Eucharist, and the cult of the Mother of God [Virgin Mary].... It must be emphatically noted that the main reason for the spread of Mariavitism was the financial abuses [of priests].” See Stopniak, Kościół na Lubelszczyźnie..., pp. 389-457, and especially 389-414, 419-420. On the Mariavites, see also Krzysztof Mazur, Mariawityzm u Polsce (Kraków: Zakład Wydawniczy “Nomos” and Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Instytut Religioznawstwa, 1991); Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl...,” p. 232; Olszewski, pp. 263-65, and Blobaum, “The Revolution of 1905-1907....” Only one book length study on the Mariavites exists in the English language. See Jerzy Peterkiewicz, The Third Adam (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

34 Several points concerning the Mariavites, however, should be made. Statistics on the Mariavite movement and opinions on when it achieved its greatest development are contradictory because, from its beginnings to its condemnation by Pope Pius X in the encyclical Tribus circiter on 5 April 1906, Mariavitism was a grassroots Church movement. Upon its formation in 1893 to spread “Devotion to the Holy Eucharist,” the Catholic Union of Mariavites (Katolicki Związek Mariawitów) had 40 Catholic priests in its ranks (the organization was received enthusiastically by some younger clergy who wanted a modernization of the Church). According to Stopniak, “at its full development [no date given]” there were 33 priests, a “considerable” number of nuns, and 60 parishes with “many” churches and chapels. In May 1905, a letter to the Pope asking for recognition of the Mariavites men-
tioned that there were 120,000 Mariavites in Poland. But an anonymous brochure of 1909 rejected the claim that "at one time [pre-1906] there were 150,000 [Mariavites], since today there are 33 priests and 30,000 adherents." This would make it appear that the movement declined greatly between 1906 and 1909. However, according to Robert Blobaum, "[t]he full development of the Mariavite movement did not occur before its condemnation. Rather, it peaked in 1910-11, and began to decline in the last years before the war, a fact that was celebrated in the Catholic, nationalist, and liberal/nationalist press." After the Mariavite movement was condemned, many adherents succumbed to Church discipline; however, the Mariavites were legalized the same year by the Russian government, and the "sect" continued into the interwar period. In 1935, the Mariavites split into two branches. Both exist legally today. See Stopniak, Kościół na Lubelszczyźnie..., pp. 414-415; and Jan Kozłowski, Janusz Langer, and Tadeusz Zagajewski, Atlas wyznania w Polsce (Kraków: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1989), pp. 39-42. The information from Blobaum is from personal correspondence.

35 Mazur, Mariawityzm w Polsce, pp. 25-27.

36 The Mariavites came under the scrupulous observation of the Polish Episcopate in January 1903 after they presented to the Warsaw, Lublin, and Płock bishops a history of Sister Maria Franciszka Kozłowska's visions and the Mariavite movement. On 4 September 1904, the Congregation of the Holy Inquisition instructed that the Catholic Union of Mariavites be disbanded and that a specially appointed episcopal confessor "cure [Sister Maria Franciszka Kozłowska] of her hallucinations and return her to true devotion." The Catholic clergy were informed of this instruction by their bishops, but it was decided not to inform parishioners. The first attacks on the Mariavites in the Catholic press came in October 1905. On the other hand, according to Mazur, there was no "centrally coordinated" action by Catholic priests and bishops. See Ibid., pp. 6, 25-27, 51.

37 Ibid., pp. 51-54.

38 Quoted in Ibid., pp. 53-54.

39 Ibid., pp. 54-55.

40 According to Mazur, numerous Warsaw court documents confirm many cases against Catholic priests for offending the religious beliefs


43 This was in response to a work by Pastor Artur Rhodes in praise of the Mariavites. Mazur, *Mariawityzm w Polsce*, p. 55.


45 However, Mazur’s final assessment of the conflict between the Catholic and Mariavite leaders is that “on both sides, ambition and emotion took the upper hand over caution and pragmatic thinking.” *Ibid.*, pp. 29, 39.


47 Specifically, the Mariavite priests were accused of: “1) submitting themselves to the will of a woman and the ‘illusions of imagined revelations’; 2) the promotion of ‘improper’ religious practices; 3) unfairly offending the clergy who opposed the movement; 4) disregarding the September 1904 decree and other papal instructions; and 5) hypocrisy toward Church authorities.” *Ibid.*, p. 37.

48 According to Mazur, there is no evidence to suggest that the Mariavite movement arose from the inspiration of the Russian authorities. Nevertheless, the conviction only grew in the Polish press and Catholic society that “the mankietnicy [Mariavites] are supported by the Jews, socialists and Russians.” See *Ibid.*, pp. 36, 47-51.


51 Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl...,” p. 215. Father Roman Dzvonkowski argues, however, that the encyclical was adequately
known of in Russian Poland. The Polish bishops’ accommodationist strategies toward the Russian authorities, however, surely impacted on their ability to fully carry out the Pope’s instructions. See Listy społeczne biskupów polskich, 1891-1918 (Paris: Editions du Dialogue, Société D’Éditions Internationales, 1974).

52 See Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl...,” pp. 212-216; and Stanisław Gajewski, Społeczna działalność duchowieństwa w Królestwie Polskim, 1905-1914 (Łublin: Red. Wydawnictwa Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Łubelskiego, 1990), pp. 17-29. It should be noted, however, that the Catholic clergy’s inexperience with social work and preoccupation with the national struggle, and especially the Polish bishops’ persistent fears of socialism, precluded broader Church support for social Catholic activities among the working class. There were, nonetheless, important exceptions among priests (see note 62).

53 Ford presents a valuable comparative perspective on the use of social Catholicism in France for political and nation building purposes.


55 Having developed for several decades, the Polish peasant movement finally emerged as a cohesive political force in 1904 with the founding of the Polish Peasant Union (PZL) near Warsaw. The PZL sought to raise the educational and economic level of the peasantry. It did not seek a conflict with the Catholic Church, criticizing only those priests whom it believed inhibited the development of the village and who charged excessive fees for religious services. However, the PZL confronted a repeated charge from the Church that it was breaking up the unity of the nation. The archconservative Catholic Union and other pro-Church associations opposed the PZL, and the Catholic and pro-Catholic press publicized that the PZL was a dangerous organization. Ultimately, the Russian authorities outlawed the PZL in 1907. Nevertheless, new initiatives replaced the PZL. But Catholic leaders and many clergy resolutely attacked these as well, such as the journals Siewba and Zaranie. See Szaflik, O rząd chłopskich dusz, pp. 259-290, 315-338.

56 Quoted in Ibid., pp. 256-257.

57 Quoted in Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl...,” pp. 229-230, 235.
Still another publication that “was close to the Catholic Union for a long time” was *Rola*. While not run by a priest, *Rola* was highly anti-Semitic. *Polak-katolik* itself was founded in Lublin in 1906, and while it “appeared” independent, it in fact was very sympathetic to the Union’s goals. See Szaflik, *O rząd chłopskich dusz*, p. 307; Gajewski, *Spoleczna działalność duchowieństwa...*, pp. 89, 95-96; and Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl....,” pp. 236-237. In general, the Catholic press began to rapidly evolve after 1905, and while it often contained divergent views on a wide range of topics, the press and Catholic organizations now operated symbiotically to Catholicize Polish society.

Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl....,” pp. 233-234; Gajewski, *Spoleczna działalność duchowieństwa...*, pp. 76-78; and Stopniak, *Kościół na Lubelszczyźnie...*, pp. 493-499. In itself, the Catholic Union might not have been wholly successful, but after 1905 there was a dramatic increase of Church activities to shape private and public opinion in Russian Poland. In addition to laws that allowed the Church to establish new organizations, after 1905 “[t]he relaxation of press laws and state censorship enabled the church to expand its publications dramatically and to discuss previously prohibited topics, including social and national issues. Further concessions on education ... vastly improved the church’s chances to influence the direction of youth.” Blobaum, *Rewolucja...*, p. 250. Theoretically, we can restate this by saying that what was at stake for the Church was the shaping of the new Polish “national public” as it expressed itself in the “public sphere”. See Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, “Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation,” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny (eds.), *Becoming National: A Reader* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 23; and especially, Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century,” in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). The latter article is reprinted in Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner (eds.), *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). On the emergence of the Polish “national public”, see Blobaum, *Rewolucja...*, pp. 188-233.

In this connection it is worth noting that the Kingdom’s bishops even opposed certain activities undertaken by priests. The best example is the Association of Christian Workers (Stowarzyszenie Robotników Chrześcijańskich — SRCh), established by Father Marceli Godlewski in 1906 to aid urban workers. The SRCh was attacked by the PPS, SDKPiL, and National Democrats, but more important, its growing decline by 1909 was due to the fact that within the Church SRCh leaders were accused of being socialists and Catholic modernists. The SRCh, however, survived World War I and continued into the interwar period. See Bender, "Chrześćcijańska myśl...," pp. 217-228, 235; Gajewski, *Społeczna działalność duchowieństwa...,* pp. 45-70; Ks. Ryszard Hermanowicz, *Chrześcijański ruch zawodowy w Polsce, 1918-1939* (Rome: Papierski Instytut Studiów Kościelnych, 1973), pp. 62-72; and Stanisław Markiewicz, *Chrześcijaństwo a związki zawodowe* (Warsaw: Instytut Wydawniczy Związków Zawodowych, 1985), pp. 157-166.

The conflict between the bishops and National Democrats also expressed itself strongly through the Polish Motherland Schools (Polska Macierz Szkolna — PMS), in which many priests were active. The PMS existed legally in 1906-1907, dominated by the National Democrats. Initially supported by the Polish bishops, in April 1907 they threatened to withdraw their support if one of them were not selected to sit on the organization’s governing board. This came shortly after the establishment of the Catholic Union, through which the bishops hoped to establish their own schools. The strategy, then, was to influence the PMS through the pressure of the Catholic Union. Indeed, the concern of the bishops, including Lublin bishop Franciszek Jaczewski’s, was not necessarily for the work of the PMS, but its connections to the Church and Catholicity. See Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl...,” pp. 230-231; Gajewski, *Społeczna działalność duchowieństwa...,* pp. 92-102, 129-149; Stopniak, *Kościół na Lubelszczyźnie...,* pp. 222-225; and note 10.

Gajewski, *Społeczna działalność duchowieństwa...,* pp. 75-78.

The Union also fared poorly in the Lublin diocese because the radical and anti-clerical peasant movement was strong there, especially in the south. Bender, “Chrześcijańska myśl...,” p. 232; Gajewski, *Społeczna działalność duchowieństwa...,* pp. 78-79.

See notes 28 and 60. As Ramet (based on A. James Reichley’s, *Religion in American Public Life* [Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-
tion, 1985]) has pointedly noted, “all religious systems are value systems and ... values always matter in politics. The consequence is that religion is intrinsically a political concern.” Ramet and Treadgold, *Render Unto Caesar*, pp. xi, 9-11.

67 The boundaries of the Polish society that Church people operated with at this time, I believe, corresponded to the borders of the pre-partition Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Church had an important presence in the eastern borderlands of the Commonwealth and no doubt hoped to one day reclaim it.

68 See the quote from Brubaker in note 8.


70 I use the term Ruthenian to mean pre-national Ukrainian. I do not mean Ruthenian as connected with the Rusyns (Ruthenians) of Subcarpathian Rus’. The Ukrainian-Rusyn controversy does not extend to the Chełm and Podlasie regions.


72 Transmitted by the predominant lower gentry, a stronger sense of Polish national identity existed in the Podlasie region. Conversely, in the Chełm (broadly, Lublin) region, the estate-dominated social structure with its more entrenched serfdom inhibited the development of Polish national consciousness. See Zygmunt Łupina, “Narodowa
Demokracja w lubelskiem, 1919-1926. (Zasięg organizacyjnych i politycznych wpływów na terenie województwa lubelskiego)” (Ph.D. diss., Uniwersytet Marii Curii-Skłodowskiej, 1974), pp. 19-24. A Lublin region priest provides a personal example in his memoirs. “The Uniate from the Lublin region was a terror to [Catholic] priests. Here, it was the rare priest who served a Uniate. Here, the Uniate and priest were easily betrayed by anyone and given over to the Muscovites [Moskalom]. Everyone trembled. Here, the Muscovites completely controlled the situation and the battle with them was almost always lost. It was completely different in the Podlasie region. The greater the persecution, the greater the heroism and opposition of the Uniates. For this reason, the work of priests was exciting.” See Przez X, Moje wspomnienia (Lublin: Wydawca A. Z., 1934), pp. 8-9.

73 See Stopniak, Kościół na Lubelszczyźnie..., pp. 100, 300-306; and Kumor, Ustrój i organizacja Kościoła, p. 698.

74 This is the figure that Lublin diocese Catholic authorities derived. See Stopniak, Kościół na Lubelszczyźnie..., p. 324. A figure of “no less than 168,000” is given in Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Prilozheniia k stenograficheskim otchetam, 1910-1911, Vol. 5, No. 440, pp. 1-21. The research on the conversion of “resistant” Uniates to Catholicism in 1905 is extensive. See, for example, the chapter on the separation of the Chełm region from the Kingdom of Poland in Edward Chmielewski, The Polish Question in the Russian State Duma (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970). See also, Robert Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife: The Struggle Between Catholics and Orthodox Christians in the Chełm Region of Russian Poland, 1904-1906,” Polish Review, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1990), p. 120.

75 During the mass conversions of 1905-1906, many former Uniates, especially in the Chełm region, chose to retain their recently adopted Orthodox faith. Undoubtedly, some remained Orthodox out of convenience or because of threats from the Orthodox clergy. But by the early twentieth century, Ukrainian national consciousness had emerged in the Chełm (and Podlasie) regions to further complicate the main Russian-Polish conflict. Thus, many former Uniates also remained in the Orthodox Church as an expression of Ukrainian ethno-religious distinctiveness (transitional as this still was from pre-national Ruthenian to Ukrainian identity). The existence of Ukrainian national identity in the Chełm and Podlasie regions by 1905-1906 is confirmed by the publication of the Ukrainian periodical Bułh in Hrubieszów in 1905 (the Russian authorities quickly suppressed the publication) as
well as by personal reminiscences. See Mykhailo Panas, “Spohady Mykhaila Panasa,” with a foreword by Iurii Havriliuk, in Martyniuk, Nadbuzhanshchyna..., Vol. 2, pp. 734-742.

In this context, it is interesting to note that in 1907 the Uniate metropolitan of L’viv (Lwów) in eastern Galicia, Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, appealed to the Vatican for jurisdiction over the orphaned Uniate dioceses in Russia. The Vatican granted this jurisdiction and reconfirmed it a number of times prior to World War I. The metropolitan hoped to ultimately use the Greek Catholic Church to promote union between the Western and Eastern Churches. But in light of the 1905 Toleration Edict, conversions in the Chełm and Podlasie regions, and Polish-Ukrainian tensions in Galicia, I also believe that Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi was positioning his Church to prevent Latin rite priests from absorbing and Polonizing former Uniates in Western Russia, however remote that likelihood was at the time. See Ivan Muzyczka, “Sheptyts’kyi in the Russian Empire,” in Paul Robert Magocsi and Andrii Krawchuk (eds.), Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts’kyi (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1989), pp. 314-316; and Konrad Sadkowski, “Religious Exclusion and State Building: The Roman Catholic Church and the Attempted Revival of Greek Catholicism in the Chełm Region, 1918-1924,” in Harvard Ukrainian Studies, Vol. 22 (1998), pp. 509-526.

Blobaum has described this process well: “Although Russian nationalism rather than Orthodox religious zeal motivated official thinking (the main provisions of the Edict of Toleration, including the right of Orthodox to convert to other religions, remained in force), the de facto, then de jure separation of the Chełm region coincided with the interests of Orthodoxy as well; indeed Bishop Eulogii of Kholm became its foremost lobbyist in the State Duma.” See Blobaum, “Toleration and Ethno-Religious Strife...,” p. 124; Klaus Kindler, Die Cholmer Frage, 1905-1918 (Frankfurt am Main and New York: P. Lang, 1990). See also the chapter in Chmielewski; Mirosław Wierzchowski, “Sprawa Chełmszczyzny w rosyjskiej Dumie Państwowej,” Przegląd Historyczny, No. 1 (1966); and Paweł Piotr Wieczorkiewicz, “Biskup Eulogiusz i oderwanie Chełmszczyzny od Królestwa Polskiego,” in Andrzej Garlicki, Józef Ryszard Szaflik, and Marian Wojciechowski (eds.), Historia XIX i XX wieku: Studia i szkice: prace ofiarowane Henrykowi Jabłońskiemu w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, WDN, 1979).
As Eric Hobsbawm writes: “The most universal political traditions [between 1870 and 1914] were the achievement of states. However, the rise of organized mass movements claiming separate or even alternative status to states, led to similar developments. Some of these movements, notably political Catholicism and various kinds of nationalism, were keenly aware of the importance of ritual, ceremonial and myth, including, normally, a mythological past.” See Eric Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914,” in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983, 1996), p. 283.

This feeling would only intensify. For example, Father Michał Niechaj, the most prominent supporter of Orthodox-Catholic union in the Lublin diocese (but through the Byzantine Slavonic rite, not the Greek Catholic rite), declared in 1937: “Until 1875 [today’s Chełm region Orthodox population] belonged to the Catholic Church...it listened to Polish sermons...though linguistically it was separate [nie zamiłował językowo — italics and bold in original].... Tragedy then came from the east.... Must we give up on this population which is so close to us, but which only 60 years ago was torn away from Poland, once by Moscow, now by Kiev?” Unwittingly, Father Niechaj also pointed to the ethno-linguistic distinctiveness of the Chełm region Ruthenian population of the late nineteenth century and the root cause of its later desire to define itself as Ukrainian. See Father Michał Niechaj, “Zagadnienie unijne,” Wiadomości Diecezjalne Lubelskie, Vol. 19, No. 3 (March 1937), pp. 94-95.

The belief that the Orthodox (former Uniates) should have become Poles existed prior to the campaign to create a separate Khholm gubernia, thus, the campaign cannot be “blamed” for it.

Polak, Vol. 10, No. 4 (April 1905), pp. 63-64. The entire “response” is presented as Appendix 1 in Dorota Leśniewska, “Problem unicki na łamach Polaka,” in Jerzy Skowronek and Urszula Maksymiuk (eds.), Martyrologium Unitów Podlaskich w świetle najnowszych badań naukowych I (Siedlce: Stowarzyszenie “Martyrium,” 1996), pp. 265-266. According to Leśniewska, Polak’s view was that “the Uniates in the Russian partition should accept Latin rite Catholicism since it will ‘preserve’ the Uniates for Polishness....” See pp. 261-262.

Numerous other Catholic and pro-Catholic publications instilled this imagery. See, for example, Ks. Józef Pruszkowski, Martyrologium — Czyli męczeństwo Unii Świętej na Podlasiu, Parts I and II, reprint


84 Did the Ukrainian Uniate clergy instrumentalize the Ukrainian national movement (i.e., “use” the nation as cultural construct) to further Uniate institutional interests? This is a topic for another paper.

85 Dla swoich, No. 1 (1903), p. 87.

86 Leśniewska, for example, notes that “Polak regarded the nationality and religious situation in Galicia as bad. It blamed the Ruthenian politicians, Uniate clerics, and Austrian authorities for this.” The publication devoted much attention to the Uniates in the Kingdom of Poland but little to the Uniates in Galicia because the latter were “above all Ruthenians isolating themselves from Polishness.” “They were traitors and dissenters from the Church and nation who were setting the two brotherly nationalities against each other.” Polak, a publication of the National League whose true founders were Roman Dmowski and Jerzy Popławski, appeared in Kraków from 1896 to 1903, then briefly in L'viv (Lwów), and in Warsaw between 1904 and 1906. See Leśniewska, pp. 251, 261-262; and Krasowski, pp. 178-180.

87 Stopniak, Kościół na Lubelszczyźnie..., p. 296.


89 AAL, Rep. 61.XII.5. Copy of letter from Father Teofil Harasowski to the Lublin province voivod, 14 May 1922.

91 See Ryszard Torzecki, “Sheptyts'kyi and Polish Society,” in Magocsi and Krawchuk, p. 80. Incidentally, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi ardently supported the provision in the February 1918 Brest-Litovsk agreement to include the Chełm and Podlasie regions in the Ukrainian National Republic. He expressed this support in the Vienna parliament soon after the agreement was signed. See Bihl, “Sheptyts'kyi and the Austrian government,” pp. 22-25; and Bohdan Budurowycz, “Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914,” in Magocsi and Krawchuk, p. 50.


93 See Sadkowski, “Religious Exclusion and State Building....”

94 See Sadkowski, “From Ethnic Borderland to Catholic Fatherland....”

95 On relations between the Polish Episcopate and the OZN, see Krasowski, pp. 136-139. A copy of the “Declaration” by Colonel Adam Koc, which launched the OZN, is reprinted in Szymon Rudnicki and Piotr Wróbel, Druga Rzeczpospolita. Wybór tekstów źródłowych (Warsaw: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1990), pp. 301-308.

96 On the Church in Prussian Poland, see Lech Trzeciakowski, The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland, trans. from Polish by Katarzyna Kretkowska (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, 1990); Richard Blanke, Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871-1900) (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, 1981); William W. Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772-1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); and Harry Kenneth Rosenthal, German and Pole: Na-
tional Conflict and Modern Myth (Gainesville, Fla.: University Presses of Florida, 1976).

97 Szaflik discusses all of these issues except the last. See also Andrzej Chwalba, Sacrum i rewolucja. Socjaliści polscy wobec praktyk i symboli religijnych (1870-1918) (Kraków: “Universitas”, 1992), pp. 9-19. More generally on relations between the Polish Church and society in Austrian Galicia, see Czesław Strzeszewski, “Chrześcijańska myśl i działalność społeczna w zaborze austriackim w latach 1865-1918,” in Strzeszewski, et al., Historia katolicyzmu społecznego..., pp. 135-199. As for the Church’s reaction to the Ukrainians, it was not unlike the Church’s response to the Chehm region Uniates. Broadly, as nationally conscious Poles, the clergy might have believed they were protecting “Polish” territory and preventing de-Polonization, yet in protecting what they believed to be Polish they were also ensuring that the Church could work “through” the Polish ethnic heritage and new political nation to maintain power.
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