Nationalism, Culture, and Religion in Croatia since 1990

Edited by

Vjeran Pavlaković
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Sabrina P. Ramet
Editor, 1995–2001
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHO</td>
<td>Croatian Helsinki Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIP</td>
<td>Movement for Croatian Identity and Prosperity</td>
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<tr>
<td>HKDU</td>
<td>Croatian Christian Democratic Union</td>
</tr>
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<td>HOS</td>
<td>Croatian Defense Force</td>
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<td>HRT</td>
<td>Croatian Radio Television</td>
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<td>HSLS</td>
<td>Croatian Social Liberal Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>Croatian Party of Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDS</td>
<td>Istrian Democratic Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDH</td>
<td>Independent State of Croatia</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFRJ</td>
<td>Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNS</td>
<td>Serbian National Party</td>
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<td>SNV</td>
<td>Serbian National Council</td>
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Vjekoslav Perica

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Sabrina P. Ramet
Introduction

Vjeran Pavlaković

The rather muted celebrations for the tenth anniversary of Croatia’s independence – unlike the festive and jubilant atmosphere in neighboring Slovenia, which had declared independence at the same time on 25 June 1991 – reflects the mixed legacy of Franjo Tudjman’s regime and an independence achieved at the cost of a devastated economy and traumatized society. While there can be no doubt that democracy and market capitalism have firmly taken root in this ex-Yugoslav and ex-communist country, for most of the nineties Croatia was sliding towards authoritarianism and crony capitalism. Furthermore, most of the West characterized Croatia as a country ruled and inhabited by fervent nationalists, and few reports failed to mention a connection between the contemporary Croatia and the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) of the 1940s, which had been ruled by the Ustaša, fascists wanting to create an ethnically pure Croat state. It is true that Franjo Tudjman, Croatia’s first democratically elected president, was a nationalist whose failure to understand the nature of Croatia’s minorities (specifically the “Serbian question”) contributed directly to the escalation of hostilities in 1990-91. Even though he tolerated the partial rehabilitation of the NDH’s symbols and ideology, Croatia never became the reborn Ustaša state as claimed by Slobodan Milošević’s propaganda machine in Serbia.

During the war in Croatia between 1991 and 1995, both Serbian and Croatian extremists ran rampant, committed atrocities against civilians, and ethnically cleansed territories held by the respective military forces. Many Serbs blame the conflict on the Croat nationalist government, which was allegedly bent on eradicating or expelling Croatia’s Serbs, drawing a direct line from the Ustaša to the Tudjman regime. Croats, on the other hand, viewed the war as self-defense against Serbian aggression, in which they were the only victims. The truth, of course, lies somewhere between those two versions. Most scholars and analysts have traced the roots of Yugoslavia’s collapse (and the violent form it took) to the policies of Milošević in the late 1980s, and “the abandonment, by Serbia, of the principles of equality, democracy, and tolerance.” This paved the way for nationalists in the other Yugoslav republics to win elections when communism’s collapse created a political and ideological vacuum. Just as Milošević’s attempts at Serbian hegemonism in Yugoslavia helped Tudjman come to power, Tudjman’s nationalism allowed
Croatia’s Serbs to be manipulated by those in Belgrade chasing the dream of a Greater Serbia.

The end of the war in Croatia seemed like a victory for nationalism, since half of the Serbs in Croatia had either fled or been expelled, and Tudjman remained in power, seemingly stronger than ever. As Tudjman’s government became increasingly authoritarian – characterized by attacks on the independent media, discrimination against the remaining ethnic Serbs and those trying to return from exile, and the enrichment of those close to the ruling party – Croatia found itself isolated by the international community. Did the events of the nineties mean that nationalism was the only viable political force in Croatia?

The authors of this monograph argue that the reality of Croatia since independence is far more complex. Firstly, Tudjman’s party, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), never won over 50 per cent in any parliamentary election; the HDZ won 43 per cent in 1990, 43.7 per cent in 1992, and 45.3 per cent in 1995. However, the majority rule, as opposed to proportional, system of parliament allowed the HDZ to control the government by receiving a greater number of seats than corresponded to electoral results, a system established by the communists in the months before the first multiparty elections in the hopes that this tactic would secure them continued dominance. Secondly, despite Tudjman’s attempts to muzzle the independent press and political opposition, both continued to function throughout the nineties. Finally, non-nationalist parties received significant votes in both national and local elections, although it was not until Tudjman’s death and the forming of a coalition (the Opposition Six) that the HDZ was toppled from power.

My own chapter on minorities analyzes not only the fate of Serbs in Croatia, but also the experience of the numerous other ethnic groups who live there. In particular I examine how the Italian minority (which had come into conflict with Slavs in the first half of the century) was able to find non-nationalist solutions to the problems generated by Yugoslavia’s breakup, while Croatia’s Serbian minority was unable to negotiate a peaceful resolution with the new HDZ government in Zagreb after 1990. Of course, the separate historical development of Italians and Serbs in Croatia influenced contemporary conditions, and the fact that Italy is part of the European Union played a role in the relations between the Croatian government and the Italian minority, but I still think the comparison is valid in order to expose the lack of a monolithic nationalist policy in all of Croatia. I also emphasize the absence of the rule of law in Croatia during the nineties, which enabled Croatia’s political elite, empowered by the rhetoric of nationalism, to enrich themselves not solely at the expense of the Croatian Serbs (who were branded enemies of the state, regardless of their role in the war, by the government-controlled media), but all of Croatia’s citizens. The election of a new government in early 2000
offered Croatia a chance to change its policies towards its minorities, particularly regarding the issue of refugee returns, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the improvements which have taken place and problems which continue to challenge Croatia.

Gordana Crnković looks at the role of nationalism in Croatia from a different angle, in this case the attempt (and, as Crnković shows, failure) of the regime to transpose the exclusive nationalism prevalent in politics into the cultural sphere. By purging Croatian culture (films, music, literature) of any outside influence, particularly Serbian or Yugoslav, the government tried to replicate the ethnic homogenization that had taken place to a considerable degree at the political level throughout society as a whole. Rather than reject everything Serbian, many Croats continued to listen to Serbian bands or watch films from Belgrade, indicating that the “nationalist project” did not permeate Croatian society as much as the actions of the government made it seem. In other words, the “underground anti-nationalism” detailed in Crnković’s chapter reveals that the characteristics of a government do not necessarily reflect the characteristics of the society as a whole, despite that government’s deliberate attempts to exert its influence into the nation’s culture. My own recent visit to Croatia confirmed the popularity of films from Serbia, and whenever I brought up the topic of movies with young people many of them immediately asked if I had seen *Pretty Village, Pretty Flame [Lepa sela lepo gore]* by Serbian film director Srdjan Dragojević. The persistence of a heterogeneous culture in Croatia, in spite of the government’s efforts at creating a pure Croatian culture, is evidence that forces other than nationalism were operating since independence.

The relationship between the Catholic Church and Croatian statehood has been a controversial one for the second half of the twentieth century. As Vjekoslav Perica argues in his chapter, Franjo Tudjman’s efforts to create a Croatian state coincided with the goals of the Church, the symbol of Croatian cultural, ethnic, and religious continuity. However, like the HDZ regime itself, the Church has had to deal with the legacy of the NDH and the role of the clergy during the Second World War. Rather than promote tolerance and other liberal democratic values, the Church was aligned with nationalists and the right wing during the nineties, in effect condoning the increasingly authoritarian nature of Tudjman’s government. Perica also discusses the Church’s reaction to the defeat of the HDZ and its continuing flirtation with the radical right in attempting to dislodge the democratically elected government.

Sabrina P. Ramet discusses recent political events in Croatia in the afterword, along with some ruminations on the “murky” legacy of Croatia’s first democratically elected president. Tudjman was definitely the leading figure who shaped the Croatia of the nineties, and the country is still experi-
encing what President Mesić termed “de-Tudjmanization”. It is undeniable that Tudjman can be credited with defending Croatia’s independence and securing the country’s territorial integrity. His methods and ideology, however, threatened to unearth the specter of Ustašism, which had served as collective guilt for the Croatian people since the Second World War. Tudjman’s policy of national reconciliation, rather than uniting Croats politically and ideologically, deepened the divisions by trying to gloss over the crimes of the past and rehabilitate fascist criminals. While it was absolutely valid that the crimes of the Ustaša needed to be separated from the Croatian nation, it was still necessary to recognize that crimes had taken place. The controversy over war crimes from the Second World War should be a clear signal to the leaders of the Yugoslav successor states to vigorously prosecute war criminals from the recent Balkan wars in order to avoid a repetition of collective guilt. Tudjman, who was quite likely to have been pursued himself by the ICTY had he not died in December 2000, and his political heirs obstructed cooperation with the war crimes tribunal, and this issue, as Ramet argues, will continue to be a controversial one in Croatian politics.

While the majority of people in Croatia clearly supported secession from the former Yugoslavia, few expected the sort of independent state which suffered from chronic economic crises, xenophobia, war trauma, authoritarianism, corruption, and such a decline in the standard of living that made one wonder why had they abandoned the “communist dungeon” in which they had been living for the previous five decades. This is not to imply that there is a widespread desire to reconstitute a new Yugoslavia, but rather that the consequences of a decade of nationalist policies have not delivered economic prosperity nor brought Croatia closer to the European Union, resulting in bitterness among average Croats, especially the youth. Furthermore, Croatia remains divided, between anti-nationalist liberals and radical right extremists; “red bandits” vs. “fascist black-shirts.” The scars of the war will take many years to heal, more so on the local level, where the conflict was often very personal, than on the national level, where there has been at least some improvement following the election of a reformist government. The social impact of a regime which advocated ethnic intolerance continues to be seen, such as a recent survey among Croatian high school students which revealed that the most negative stereotypes were associated with Serbs, such as “vandals”, “dreamers of a Greater Serbia”, and “uncivilized”. It will be up to future Croatian political leaders to reverse the policies of ethno-nationalism which led the peoples of the former Yugoslavia into violent tragedy in the 1990s.
Chapter 1: Minorities in Croatia since Independence

Vjeran Pavlaković

In addition to the challenges confronted by the other European countries experiencing the transition from communism to capitalism and democracy, Croatia also had to surmount the difficulties of becoming independent from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) and the devastating war which followed. This war was not just between Croatia and the federal Yugoslav government; it was also an ethnic conflict between Croats and Croatian Serbs, who were the second largest ethnic group in the republic. Due to the historical and political developments of the last five hundred years, members of numerous nationalities had migrated into the territory which is now the Republic of Croatia. In the nineteenth century, as concepts of the nation-state spread through Europe, one trend which developed in Croatian political thought was based on ethnic exclusion and the creation of a “pure” state. The dominant political force in Croatia in the 1990s, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) led by Franjo Tudjman, was influenced by this ideology, and while it was able to successfully defend an independent Croatia, it was unable to build a liberal democracy protecting the rights of all of its citizens, resulting in international isolation. The refusal of the HDZ regime to improve its human rights record, particularly towards its minorities, hampered Croatian integration into European political and economic structures which were vital for the recovery of the damaged economy.

Tourism, seen by many Croats as the most important industry Croatia needs to develop, brings in hundreds of thousands of foreigners, speaking a myriad of languages, to Croatia’s coast annually, although the instability of the Balkans in the last decade has kept the numbers far below pre-war levels. Clearly, improving its human rights record and rejecting nationalism are essential for the development of tourism and the building of closer ties with the rest of Europe, in addition to creating a state which respects the rights of all of its citizens. The parliamentary and presidential elections in January and February 2000 brought into power a government which pledged to be radically different from its predecessor, especially concerning ethnic minorities, prompted by the desire to see Croatia enter the European Union as soon as possible. The question is, has the government lived up to its promises, and
have conditions improved for minorities since the transfer of power? Or does ethnic hatred continue to be a thriving political force? While the new government has had relatively little time to undo the damage of ten years of nationalist rule, the already visible changes in Croatian society reveal that the poor human rights record is not because of pervasive intolerance of minorities, but due to the lack of the rule of law, widespread corruption, and the manipulation of so-called ethnic hatreds by certain political elites for their own personal accumulation of political and economic power.

This chapter will analyze how nationalism in the political arena affected the status of ethnic minorities since the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia. A brief overview of minorities in general in Croatia will set the background for further discussion of two case studies, the Italians and Serbs. The Italians in Croatia are an example of ethnic minorities who have been able to preserve considerable cultural autonomy despite ethnic conflict earlier in the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the presence of a sizable Serbian minority in Croatia has led to several episodes of mutual violence in the past century, as conflicting nationalisms fueled rival concepts of state-building which proponents attempted to realize through the use of force. In addition to overcoming the post-war economic crisis, the greatest challenge facing Croatia’s government is creating a political system based on the rule of law, which applies to all citizens equally, rather than one based on exclusion and intolerance.

**Minorities in Croatia**

The Tudjman era in Croatia, while certainly not an outright dictatorship, nevertheless led to the development of an authoritarian system, strengthened by the concentration and centralization of power, necessitated by the threats to territorial unity during the war years. However, after peace was secured with the Dayton Accords in 1995, Tudjman did not attempt to democratize Croatian society, but rather focused on maintaining the control of power for the HDZ and its political allies. This was accomplished through various illegal methods, such as: the manipulation of the judiciary, including pressure on judges to acquit Croats accused of war crimes; the concentration of power in the office of the president; a non-transparent privatization process benefiting those with ties to the ruling party; control over key media and the monopolization of state television, which served as a mouthpiece for the regime; the intimidation of and legal pressure against the independent media; the manipulation of the electoral process in the 1997 elections; and the use of the secret services against the political opposition and NGOs. The entire HDZ government should not be criminalized, but there is plenty of evidence that a
considerable amount of corruption took place during its control of Croatian political life.

While the authoritarian nature of the HDZ government affected all citizens of Croatia, minorities were often denied their civil rights based solely on their ethnicity. That regime was based on an ideology which elevated all things Croatian, resulting in a xenophobic atmosphere reinforced by language reforms, omnipresent nationalist symbols, reinterpretations of history, and a system of values based, not on individual merits, but on ethnic identity. Extreme Croatian nationalism, by definition, treats all non-Croats as the “Other”, but in the last century the greatest amount of intolerance has been directed at Serbs. Political scientist Jovan Mirić states that “a nation is unable to homogenize and mobilize under conditions when animosity and hatred is diffused among many targets. For the Croatian state and the Croatian nation this target is the Serbs.” While relations between the Croatian government and the Serbian minority is the most vital issue in the present, it is worthwhile to briefly examine the status of Croatia’s other minorities, sixteen of which are officially recognized. According to the 1999 Country Report on Human Rights Practices released by the U.S. Department of State, “the situation of other minority groups – Slovaks, Czechs, Italians, Hungarians – did not reflect discrimination to the same extent as that of the Serb community.”

After Serbs (who constituted about 12 per cent of the prewar population and currently comprise about 6 per cent), the next largest ethnic minority were Muslims, about 0.9 per cent of the population before the war. This group most likely increased due to the war in neighboring Bosnia, although there has been some improvement in the return of refugees to Bosnia in the last few years. While Croat-Muslim relations in the twentieth century were good (the Ustaše referred to the Muslims as the “flower of the Croatian nation”), war between Muslims and Bosnian Croats in 1993–94 increased tensions in Croatia, especially since many Bosnian Croats had likewise fled to Croatia and continue to remain there in great numbers. Tudjman’s desire to annex Croat-controlled areas of Bosnia, the settlement of Croatian refugees in former Muslim villages (such as the lower Neretva valley in Herzegovina), and the participation of the Croatian Army in military operations against Muslim forces within Bosnia antagonized relations with the Muslims in Croatia. They were also denied a representative in parliament like the other large minority groups, and were not included as an officially recognized minority in a 1998 amendment to the Constitution. The Croatian president, Stipe Mesić, had broken with his erstwhile close associate Tudjman in 1993, resigning his HDZ membership, specifically because of the latter’s Bosnian policy, and, as president of Croatia, has taken steps towards full reconciliation with the Bosnian leadership. The role of Croats in Bosnia, however, remains a volatile issue, especially concerning war crimes committed by Bosnian Croat forces.
Hungarians, who were the political elite during the era of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, were only 0.5 per cent of the population in 1991 (down from 3.4 per cent in 1910), and were concentrated in Eastern Slavonia and Baranja, north of Osijek. Even though most of the ethnic Hungarians in Croatia were assimilated in the 1920s, various cultural institutions existed to preserve the identity of this minority, as well as promote economic relations with Hungary during socialist Yugoslavia. Tragically, it was attacks by Serbian forces in 1991 which forced most of the Hungarian population to flee from Eastern Slavonia, followed by the resettlement of an estimated 30,000 Serbs from other areas of Croatia. Furthermore, the Serbian occupation of this region "destroyed the vitally important institutional system which had played a key role in the preservation and development of the Hungarian community's intellectual life." Hungarian language education takes place in only two elementary schools and two high schools (operational since September 1999), and there is no Hungarian language daily newspaper. Italians, 0.4 per cent of the population, will be dealt separately in the following section. Albanians, 0.3 per cent of the 1991 population, have good relations with Croats, in part because of their solidarity in opposition to Belgrade. Members of the Kosovo Liberation Army's leadership had served in the Croatian Army during the war for independence, such as Agim Çeku, and while the Croatian government did not explicitly call for an independent Kosovo, it is well known that there was considerable support under the table. However, Croats from Kosovo (Janjevci), who were invited to "return" to Croatia by Tudjman in 1991, have found it difficult to integrate into Croatian society. Even though Janjevci communities have existed in Zagreb for many years, "native Croats see them as primitive and dirty, as impulsive and unreliable, as 'oriental' Croats who are not and simply never will be part of the civilized world."

Between 30,000 and 60,000 Roma (Gypsies) currently live in Croatia, and as in other East European countries, they are often discriminated against and stereotyped as dirty beggars and thieves. They are not considered a national minority in the Croatian constitution, and in some towns Roma students are separated from Croats in order to be taught Croatian. While school officials argue that this is necessary because of the Roma's lack of academic skills, this segregation sets an unpleasant precedent for further exclusion from society. There have also been reports of Roma being beaten without adequate response from Croatian authorities, although in general the government has made an effort to remedy the situation by promoting education and Roma cultural awareness.

Slovenes (0.5 percent), Czechs and Slovaks (0.4 percent), Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Jews, and several other minorities live in Croatia, but their activities are almost exclusively in the cultural sphere. The Croatian government's Office for National Minorities provides funding to organiza-
tions of all the ethnic groups in Croatia, which is used for things such as the maintenance of eight minority language libraries (the oldest being the Czech library in Daruvar) and cultural festivals, a recent example being a festival celebrating the one hundred year presence of Ukrainians in Croatia.¹⁷ Five seats in parliament are reserved for representatives of ethnic minorities: one for Serbs (reduced from three by an election law passed by the HDZ-dominated parliament in October 1999), one for Italians, one for Czechs and Slovaks, one for Hungarians, and one for the combined Ruthenian, Jewish, German, Austrian, and Ukrainian minorities.¹⁸ In addition to parliamentary representation for its national minorities, Croatia has ratified numerous treaties and laws which guarantee minority rights. The most important document dealing with Croatia’s minorities is the constitution, particularly Article 15, which asserts that “members of all nations and minorities shall be guaranteed freedom to express their nationality, freedom to use their language and script, and cultural autonomy.”¹⁹ Two other important international treaties ratified by Croatia in 1997 were the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. Unfortunately, as the leader of the Serbian National Council (Srpsko Narodno Vijeće - SNV), Milorad Pupovac, points out, “the laws and rules which regulate the status of minorities in Croatia are much better than their implementation.”²⁰

Thus, the legal framework exists to build a state with equal rights for all citizens, but since the rule of law was not functioning during the HDZ’s decade in power, minorities were in fact treated as second class citizens, especially Serbs, Muslims, and Roma for the reasons stated earlier. While Tudjman was claiming to put into practice the laws protecting minority rights in order to fend off international pressure, he was turning his back to what was really going on at the local level, where national minorities were in fact being discriminated against. As Yale historian Ivo Banac stated at a roundtable discussion in October 1996 on Serbs in Croatia, “it is time for Croatia to start living its constitution. That’s why new laws are not needed, but rather the existing ones need to be applied.”²¹ There was a complete lack of political will to enforce the laws, and in fact there is an increasing amount of evidence that the HDZ was involved in numerous illegal activities leading to the plunder of Croatia’s economy. Tudjman had achieved electoral victory by stoking the flames of Croatian nationalism, including its uglier, more extreme forms, which advocated the use of violence to solve the “Serbian question.” His policy of “national reconciliation” placed Croatian anti-fascism and the Ustaša movement on the same level; in other words, both were seen as legitimate expressions of Croatian national identity. Power was consolidated during the war years, branding any opposition to government policy as traitorous to the state. Criminals, who either profited from illegal activity in the chaos of war or actually committed atrocities, were protected by the HDZ, which sacralized the Homeland War fought against Serbian aggression.
The victory of the opposition parties, which Croatian Helsinki Committee (HHO) activist Bojan Munjić called "a truly revolutionary change," has not only given Croatia a government with the political will to carry out the existing legal duties stated by the constitution, but has changed the atmosphere in Croatian society regarding the country’s national minorities. Obstruction at the local level continues, since the elections brought about the most significant changes only at the highest levels of government, while municipal elections resulted in various coalitions in which the HDZ plays a strong role. It is significant, however, that both President Mesić and Prime Minister Ivica Račan have stated on numerous occasions that they are dedicated to bringing the rule of law to Croatia. The new government has pledged to fight corruption, and so far has arrested several people involved in scandals or shady business deals, while others, including members of the late president’s family, are under investigation. There has been a visible effort to capture Croats accused of war crimes, and the murders of Serb civilians in the so-called Krajina and Western Slavonia are being investigated with the cooperation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). The judiciary is also being reformed, with programs to train Croatian judges in accordance with Western standards. It will take Croatia a long period of time to completely emerge out of the shadow of the Tudjman regime, but the cases of the Italian and Serbian minorities can illustrate some of the changes which have already taken place, as well as some of the problems which remain.

**Italian minority in Croatia and the case of Istria**

The proximity of the Italian peninsula contributed to the Italian presence in Croatian lands, which can be traced back centuries in the past, particularly to the period when the Venetian Empire controlled much of the Adriatic coastline. Even though Dalmatia and Istria fell under Habsburg rule early in the nineteenth century, a large Italian presence remained and was strengthened when Italy received considerable coastal territory after the First World War as a reward for joining the Allies. Istria and the cities of Fiume (Rijeka) and Zara (Zadar) were under Italian control, even though most of the rural population in these areas were ethnic Croats or Slovenes. When the Fascists took power in Italy, they prohibited the use of Slavic languages and implemented other laws against non-Italians. This contributed to the development of a strong anti-fascist movement in the coastal areas, which would grow even stronger during the Second World War.

After the victory of the communist-led Partisans in 1945, thousands of Italians fled or were expelled from Istria and other Italian occupied areas. After the “Istrian Exodus”, Croats and other Slavs from throughout Yugoslavia
settled into these depopulated regions. While Italians make up only about 0.4 per cent of the total population of Croatia, on the Istrian peninsula they constitute approximately 10 per cent of the population (about 20,000 people). Despite Italian-Croat conflicts in the mid-twentieth century, culminating in the expulsions of the Second World War, relations between these two nations are positive today. It is significant that Italians and Croats were able to overcome their historical conflicts, while Croats and Serbs (who generally lived harmoniously until the end of the nineteenth century) continue to be obsessed with the events of the Second World War and use that past conflict to justify contemporary political actions. It is true that the Ustaša crimes against Serbs were far more brutal than what happened to Italians, but that does not fully explain why Serbs and Croats are not able to move past that point in their history.

Italians in Croatia have considerable cultural autonomy — both under the HDZ and continuing into the present — which is based on "three key principles: vested rights, international agreements, and autochthonous status, which logically makes [the Italian minority] not comparable to other ethnic communities." 27 There are numerous Italian language schools in Istria, with an enrollment of about 800 high school and two thousand elementary school students. 28 It is not uncommon for ethnic Croats to attend these schools as well, many of whom later go on to universities in Italy. The schools follow the Croatian curriculum, although about 30 per cent of the academic program deals specifically with topics concerning the Italian minority. This year, the Croatian government spent approximately 700,000 kuna (90,000 US$) on publishing new Italian language textbooks, although by the start of the school year some elementary schools were still lacking their new history books. 29

In some Istrian cities, such as Rovinj, administrative buildings have signs in both Croatian and Italian, while the city hall actually flies an Italian flag next to the Croatian one. There is an Italian language daily, La voce del popolo, printed in Rijeka and readily available all over Istria and even in other Croatian regions. The ruling party in Istria, the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS), 30 held power locally in opposition to the HDZ throughout the Tudjman era. The IDS policy has been "anti-nationalist and for the benefit of all nationalities," 31 which is reflected in the fact that all party emblems, symbols, and flags are in three languages (Croatian, Italian, and Slovene, the three constituent nationalities on the Istrian peninsula). Interestingly enough, IDS president Ivan Jakovčić stated in an interview that while he promoted the adoption of Croatian, Italian, and Slovene as all administrative languages in Istria, he saw demands for the official status of the Serbian language and the Cyrillic script as a "dangerous provocation." 32 Nevertheless, he portrayed the IDS as "the party which protected ethnic and minority associations and every individual for the last ten years." 33 The underlying principle behind the IDS is the
development of “economic regionalism,” which would promote cooperation beyond state and national boundaries.\textsuperscript{34}

This emphasis on regionalism was perceived as a threat by Tudjman, who was centralizing authority during the 1990s and curtailing regional power. A strong central government was necessary during the war when the very existence of the state was threatened, but the fact that this process of centralization continued after 1995 reveals that it had become a matter of amassing power for the HDZ. In order to try and break the IDS’s hold on Istria, Tudjman accused the IDS of wanting to secede from Croatia, which IDS Secretary Orijano Otočan argues was never a goal of the party.\textsuperscript{35} Tudjman also had the administrative center of Istria shifted from Pula (with a population over 80,000 the largest economic center in Istria and a stronghold of the IDS) to the much smaller city of Pazin, dominated by HDZ supporters, by reintroducing županiče (local administrative units) on 19 November 1992.

Despite the resistance from Zagreb, the IDS consistently won local elections and was part of the Opposition Six, the coalition which defeated the HDZ in the January 2000 parliamentary elections. However, after the IDS proposal to make bilingualism (Croatian and Italian) official in Istria was blocked in the Sabor, the IDS left the ruling six-party coalition and Jakovčić resigned as the Minister of European Integration. Party officials state that it was their anti-nationalist and pro-civil rights stance which not only spared Istria the destruction from the war (Istrian officials negotiated with Yugoslav National Army units stationed in Istria while JNA barracks in other parts of Croatia were attacked) but has helped speed up the region’s preparations for European integration. One thing is for sure, relations between ethnic groups in Istria were and continue to be far more amiable than in the rest of Croatia, and the concept of economic regionalism could serve to improve relations with both Croatia’s minorities as well as neighboring countries. The success of the IDS can also be attributed to the fact that the party was not based on ethnic identity, but rather encouraged the political participation of all of the region’s nationalities.

\textit{Serbian minority and the challenge of reconciliation}

While the lives of most of Croatia’s minorities did not differ much from that of Croats under the Tudjman regime, the fate of Serbs was quite different. From the earliest days of Yugoslavia’s collapse, Croatia’s Serbian population was seen as a threat to the security of an independent Croatia by the newly elected HDZ government. While it was true that armed Serbs rebelling in the Krajina region (later supported overtly by the Yugoslav National Army) were clearly intent on expelling all Croats and refusing to negotiate
with Zagreb, the atmosphere promoted in wartime Croatia was that all Serbs were traitors to the state and should therefore be "excommunicated" from society. This was accomplished by a government-controlled media which encouraged hate speech, job discrimination based on ethnicity, and threats against those who were critical of the regime, culminating in the physical liquidation of civilians and the expulsion of others from their homes. While human rights organizations noted that there was an improvement in the post-war years, the Tudjman government continued many of its discriminatory practices which relegated Croatia’s Serbs to the status of "second-class citizens." Some specific topics which can illustrate the situation of the last ten years as well as recent changes are refugee returns, the role of the media, activities of the radical right, and the perception of Serbs in Croatian society.

**Refugee returns**

One of the biggest demands of the international community on Croatia was the return of the expelled Serbian population, which was estimated to be about 300,000, most of whom had fled during the Croatian Army’s recapture of the so-called Krajina in August 1995. Despite some efforts to allow the refugees to come back, the government generally did not encourage returns by its actions on the ground. Denial of citizenship was one of the most common tactics used to prevent returns, since this did not allow access to funds for reconstruction, negated property claims (a controversial law allows the Croatian government to "temporarily" occupy abandoned property), and prevented visits to former homes. The Program of Return (passed on 16 June 1998) was supposed to simplify the return process, but like other legislation has been implemented with varying success, in some cases complicating the administrative process or having certain provisions ignored by the agencies actually working with returnees. Other obstacles to return included physical intimidation, the occupation of property by other displaced persons (usually ethnic Croats from Serb held areas of Bosnia), a lack of reconstruction funds, and a failure to notify people of the granting of amnesty by the government.

One of the most crucial issues at stake regarding refugee returns is the lack of housing and the return of property. The presence of ethnic Croat refugees from Bosnia, currently living in former Serb homes, is a major obstacle to the return process. In Knin, once the capital of the rebel Krajina and now inhabited by a majority of Bosnian Croats, 90 per cent of the resettled Bosnian Croats stated that they wanted to stay in Croatia. Marija Barić, a refugee from Sarajevo now living in Knin, stated that even though her situation is difficult, her family wants to stay because of "the feeling of security
they have in Croatia.”43 Solving the problem of refugees from Bosnia is not just dependent on the Croatian government, since a lack of returns to Republika Srpska – the Serbian controlled entity in Bosnia – has hindered the fulfillment of the Dayton Peace Accords in all of the regions affected by the war.

Even more harmful to the return process is the extent of corruption which was allowed to flourish under the HDZ, once again illustrating the lack of the rule of law. According to Martin Mayer, the OSCE’s media advisor stationed in Knin, the mafia controlled the housing in the region, resulting in certain people (in this case ethnic Croats) getting multiple houses while others (ethnic Serbs) were denied any housing at all.44 This phenomenon was by no means limited to the former Krajina. Radimir Čačić, Minister of Public Works, Reconstruction, and Construction, stated in an interview how under the HDZ government “some individuals could get one, two, three, five, even eleven new homes for one destroyed house.”45 This was taken to an absurd level in a case in Sisak, where “an ethnic Croat kept his dog in the otherwise empty home of an ethnic Serb” in order to obstruct return; this particular case was not solved until the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, personally intervened.46 In Vukovar, funds for reconstruction were withheld because the city was primarily inhabited by Serbs.47 A Croatian returnee to Vukovar stated that she knew of several people who had received new houses – which were used as “weekend houses” (vikendice) – even though they had already found alternate accommodations, while others remained without any housing and were still living in hotels and refugee camps.48 In this case it was not a matter of ethnic discrimination, but rather a corrupt system of reconstruction which favored those close to the ruling party. Minister Čačić gives another example of this, revealing that

in Vukovar [the Ministry of Reconstruction] built a new building, while around it were five or six five-story apartment buildings, which for the same amount of money could have been repaired and would have yielded five times as many apartments as the new one. The previous government did not do that because of political, ideological, and programmatic reasons.49

Serbian non-profit organizations in Zagreb funded by the Office of National Minorities, such as the Serbian Democratic Forum (SDF)50 and the Serbian Cultural Society (Srpsko Kulturno Društvo), also cite the problem of property rights as one of the key issues facing Serbs in Croatia. The monthly journal published by the SDF, Identitet [Identity], dedicated an entire issue to refugee returns and listed over one hundred cases of Serbs not being able to get their houses and property returned to them.51 Nenad Jovanović, a journal-
ist for the weekly *Novosti 7 dana*, accused the HDZ of reconstructing mostly Croat homes, and claimed that local authorities often manipulated the infrastructure (such as denying electricity, water service, road repair) in order to hinder returns.52

The new government has been praised by the West for its reversal of the HDZ's policies, and was quickly given 55 million US$ to carry through its return program.53 It is important to note that one of President Stipe Mesić's first statements after assuming the presidency was to encourage Serbs to return to their pre-war homes. In an interview with the opposition television station Studio B in Serbia, Mesić indicated that the citizenship requirement would no longer be a precondition to return, since “nationality was no longer an issue.”54

As of January 2001, the Croatian government reported that nearly 78,000 Serbs had returned to Croatia and registered with assistance organizations, while another estimated 20,000 had returned unofficially.55 While this number seems to indicate that returns are in fact taking place at a reasonable pace, Jovanović was skeptical because the statistics did not take into account the šetači (walkers), those refugees who were registered as returnees but could not actually get their property back, were denied necessary documents to stay in Croatia, or were pressured into returning to their former place of exile.56 This is particularly problematic for those refugees whose houses continue to be occupied, although it appears that many of the administrative obstacles to return are being eliminated as part of the new government’s plan for refugees. But looking simply at the number of Serbs returning does not give the complete picture of the status of Serbs in Croatia, since other factors, such as a lack of two-way returns to Bosnia, a devastated economy, a long period in exile, and the presence of mines, often influence whether or not individuals are willing to return to a certain area to try and rebuild. Most of the refugees (about 85 per cent) who do return to rural areas are over the age of 65, which indicates that economic incentives are lacking for those still in the workforce.57

“The key question is not how many Serbs there are going to be in Croatia,” argues Milorad Pupovac, “[but] it is crucial that they are integrated into Croatian society, that they are an integral part of Croatian national identity, and that they are recognized as a minority.”58

While it is evident that returns are going to continue, even liberal Croatian intellectuals expressed some concern that a massive return to the former Krajina would once again create a large population of Serbs who could be manipulated by Belgrade in the future to destabilize Croatia. Zdravko Tomac, vice president of the Croatian parliament, explicitly stated in an interview that he was against close relations between Croatia’s Serbs and Serbia, since the Milošević regime was responsible for the current situation of Croatian Serbs and that similar developments in the future would “directly strengthen nation-
alist forces in Croatia." This interview was conducted before the overthrow of Milošević in October 2000, yet reveals the importance of eliminating nationalist politics in neighboring countries in order for there to be some improvement in the conditions for Croatia’s minorities. If the rule of law is truly in effect, then the return process can be expected to improve even more in the future. Local obstruction will continue to be a problem until municipal elections take place, but the determination of the Croatian government in pursuing its stated goals of allowing everyone to return will resolve one of the ongoing problems of the war and is a step in improving relations between Serbs and Croats.

**Tolerance and the role of the media**

The spreading of ethnic hatred by the media was one of the tools used by both Serbian and Croatian nationalists in mobilizing the masses for the war in the former Yugoslavia. State control of the media (especially television) and intimidation of the independent press were two of the pillars of Tudjman’s rule in the 1990s, and the source of much international criticism. However, the strength of independent media had increased during the last years of the HDZ domination, with courageous reporting from the weeklies Nacional (Zagreb) and Feral Tribune (Split), and the dailies Jutarnji list (Zagreb) and Novi list (Rijeka). According to the OSCE’s Martin Mayer, there had been no examples of hate speech since the war, and no systematic campaign against Serbs in the media. Milivoj Djilas, a journalist for the Feral Tribune, agreed that the print media was fairly objective and that the newspapers did not promote ethnic intolerance during the past few years as they had done in the 1980s and most of the 1990s. Bojan Munjin likewise stated that the print media had already become more liberal in 1999, and that hate speech had disappeared by 1998, although the HDZ had filed some 1,200 cases against the independent media in an effort to stifle journalists unwilling to follow the government line.

However, it was television, and especially state-owned Croatian Radio Television (HRT), which provided news for about 88 percent of the population. The domestic opposition and international human rights organizations had extensively criticized HRT under Tudjman; so it was no surprise that reform of state television was one of the first things promised by the Račan government, which wants to make HRT into “a public broadcaster on the model of those in Germany and most other West European countries.” While some changes have been made, many “cadres of the HDZ remain in electronic media,” and television still lacks “professionalism” which is a result of ten years of serving as the government’s mouthpiece.
Furthermore, while all those interviewed agreed that there was no ethnic hatred toward Serbs being promoted in the media, there was also no attempt by either the print media or television to promote tolerance and reconciliation with Serbs. This was apparent just from watching the evening news, which would show a story on some positive aspect of Serbian culture in Croatia or the capture of Croatian war criminals accused of atrocities against Serbs, only to be immediately followed by a story showing Croat bodies (obviously murdered during the Serbian aggression) being removed from a mass grave, in order to somehow “balance” out the good with the bad. Another problem which remains is that newspapers (such as *Novosti 7 dana*) and journals (such as *Identitet*) published by Croatia’s Serbian community are unavailable for purchase in public and are only distributed among various Serbian organizations throughout Croatia, especially those which give aid to refugees. It is also impossible to find any books in Cyrillic for sale anywhere, except for a few hard to find places such as the Serbian Cultural Society’s tiny library, which was given all the discarded books in Cyrillic when the HDZ took over in the early 1990s. There is no legal mechanism for importing books from Serbia or Montenegro; so these have to be smuggled across the border, as well as newspapers and journals from Serbia, which likewise need to be smuggled into Croatia. This has resulted in Serbs isolating themselves in a “cultural ghetto” and becoming separated from Croatian society. The emphasis on removing the Croatian Serbs from this “ghetto” is a common theme stressed by Milorad Pupovac, who insists that “Serbs need to be integrated in the surroundings they live in, and to participate in local administrations and self-government, as well as regional [županijama] and state government.”

This integration needs to be extended to the various news media, which is one outlet that can serve as an expression of Serbian identity within Croatian society.

While hate speech and intolerance of non-Croats was common in the Croatian media during the first half of the 1990s, much of this stemmed from the fact that television and a good deal of the print media were controlled by the HDZ (either overtly or covertly as in the sale of the daily *Večernji list* to high ranking HDZ officials). As the independent media became stronger, alternate views were increasingly expressed, which rejected the demonization of non-Croats and those in opposition to the HDZ. This relative freedom of the press provoked a reaction from the Tudjman regime, which attempted, through various methods, to stifle these opinions straying from the official line. The diversity of regional newspapers in circulation today allows for a wide spectrum of ideas and is a significant step towards creating a truly open society. Even though there has been a significant improvement in the objectivity of the media, the next step is to actively promote better relations between Croats, Serbs, and other minorities in the country.
Radical right and extremism

One of the Serbian minority’s greatest fears as Croatia moved towards independence was a resurgence of the Ustaša movement, which was magnified by Milošević’s propaganda and misrepresentations of the events during the Second World War. While Tudjman, himself a former Partisan officer, did not encourage the return of the Ustaša, his policy of “national reconciliation” tolerated Fascist symbols and allowed extreme right wing political parties and paramilitary organizations to thrive. In 1992 parliament banned the paramilitary Croatian Defense Force (HOS) of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), but under Tudjman the destruction of anti-fascist monuments, speeches encouraging ethnic intolerance, and the open use of Ustaša symbols were not suppressed, even though these were clearly provocations directed at Serbs. There is no doubt that the forces of the radical right continue to advocate violence against national minorities and that they represent a certain segment of Croatian society, but it is a question of whether or not this segment really reflects the ideas of most Croats.

The new government, a coalition of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) along with four smaller parties, strongly rejects the ideology of the far right, gaining a considerable number of seats in the parliamentary elections and continuing to have the support of most of Croatia’s citizens. The government proposed a new law which would ban all fascist symbolism, although critics of this law argued that symbols of the far left – in other words, communist and partisan symbols – should likewise be banned. Two incidents in the summer of 2000 reveal the continuing debate over symbolic monuments. In May, Croatian veterans protested at the rebuilding of a Partisan monument in Veljun, where one protagonist even went as far as simulating urination on the monument, which was caught on tape and shown throughout the news media. In an interview with a Dalmatian daily, the protester, Biserka Legradić, claimed that she had “nothing against decent Serbs, nor against living together with them,” but she would fight against Četniks once again if she had to.72 Another controversial incident was the unveiling in of a monument to Jure Frančetić, an Ustaša officer from the Second World War, in the town of Slunj in June 2000. Many returning Serbs see this as warning to “get out and stay out,” and Mesić has not done anything to remove this memorial to an overtly fascist figure.73

Right-wingers became increasingly more vocal in August and September 2000 as the Croatian government acted on its pledge of cooperation with the war crimes tribunal by arresting dozens of suspected Croat war criminals who had previously been under the protection of the HDZ regime. One of the leading forces behind the protests were veteran’s organizations, which claimed that the legacy of the Homeland War was being disgraced by arrest-
ing "Croatian knights" (Hrvatski vitezovi). According to the Croatian Helsinki Committee for human rights, the radical right was vocal, getting lots of attention in the newspapers and television, but really was not that strong. However, Serbian journalists working for Novosti 7 dana claimed that in their view, the Right remained active and was strong, particularly in the amount of time they were given in regards to television coverage.

To what degree do the nationalist Right wing parties, such as the HSP, really believe their rhetoric against Serbs? The leader of the HSP, Ante Djapić, has often appeared wearing a black shirt (a symbol of the Ustaša) at rallies, and has made speeches warning Serbs that they would be in trouble if the HSP came into power. Djapić has also criticized Račan on numerous occasions for being conciliatory with Serbs and allowing them to return to Croatia. It was surprising therefore to see photos of Djapić in the Croatian press drinking shots of plum brandy and enjoying a lamb dinner with the president of the Serbian National Party (SNS), Milan Djukić, after their parties won the elections in the town of Donji Lapac. While 80 per cent of the population is ethnically Serb (many are returnees who fled during Operation Storm in 1995), the remainder are Bosnian Croats who have settled in the formerly abandoned homes. Therefore, both Serbian and Croatian nationalist parties did well in this town; yet according to their previous political positions cooperation between Serbs and Croats is impossible. Djukić has claimed in the past that he was physically attacked by Croats and that in the parliament he spoke “sixty-three times about the set of racist and discriminatory laws [in Croatia], and about political ethnic cleansing.” Furthermore, he has described statements made by Ante Djapić as “an open invitation to threats of terrorism and Croatian shame,” along with other negative remarks. If these politicians were true to their ideologies rather than acting as political opportunists, it would be inconceivable for Djapić and Djukić to work together let alone toast each other in photos splashed across the daily newspaper. However, ethnic intolerance has no longer become the path to political power as it had been under the HDZ, and now the least likely candidates for promoting liberal democracy are stating that in Donji Lapac “we won’t divide people into Serbs and Croats, but we will all be citizens.” This does not mean that the radical right has disappeared in Croatia, but rather that racism is brushed aside when it becomes politically non-viable.

Serbs and Croatian society

It is not surprising that after four years of warfare, and another five years of government propaganda labeling them as enemies, many Croats do not look favorably towards the Serbian minority. The war was seen as “Serbian
aggression” against Croatia’s cities, especially those such as Osijek, Vukovar, and Slavonski Brod, which still bear the scars of artillery assaults, and the blame for the ruined economy and international isolation is often placed at the feet of the Serbs who betrayed Croatia. However, this does not mean that Serbs are the targets of systematic discrimination in everyday life. Of course, the level of tension between Serbs and Croats varies from region to region, and generally there is greater tolerance in urban centers than in rural areas, where most of the wartime atrocities took place. However, if Croatia is to develop a strong society, it is necessary for all Croatian citizens to accept the premise of individual equality, and most importantly the relations between Serbs and Croats need to be improved. Pupovac identified the four goals of Croatia’s Serbian community as being “reconciliation, repatriation, reintegration, and reconstitution.”

The most visible results of the coalition government’s first months in power is the “change in the atmosphere,” signalling a break with the HDZ’s policies towards minorities. However, this change is difficult to measure quantitatively. Djukić stated that “Serbs are currently 100 per cent discriminated against in comparison to other Croatian citizens. The new government has shown the political will to do something, but the government has not yet made the first step to make changes.”

International observers and human rights groups have also commented on the government’s political will, but admit that in the short time since the elections the situation on the ground has not changed dramatically. An Amnesty International report about the situation in Croatia in 2000 noted an overall improvement, particularly regarding incidents of interethnic violence, although the return of property remains an issue of concern for Croatia’s Serbs.

Conclusion

Even though the HDZ ruled Croatia for ten years with an ideology which advocated the creation of an ethnically pure state, this line of reasoning is accepted by a minority of the population and is ultimately doomed to failure. The rejection of the HDZ at the polls was a clear signal that Croats wanted change, and they did not vote for a greater shift towards intolerance (the far right parties fared even worse than the HDZ), but rather for a government which pledged to protect all citizens regardless of ethnicity, to return the rule of law to Croatia, and to integrate the country into Europe. The concept of an ethnically pure Croatia is wedged in the minds of politicians unable to emerge out of the nineteenth century and realize that the conditions in Croatia favor building a democratic, multiethnic society.

Firstly, for the past 500 years Croatia has been part of a larger,
multiethnic state, whether it was the Habsburg Empire or some incarnation of Yugoslavia. The only way to reverse hundreds of years of settlement patterns is through violence, which was attempted with tragic consequences in the Second World War and to some extent during the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia. Secondly, Croatia’s geographic position placed it into a border region between two vastly different cultural, political, and religious worlds, Christian Europe and the Islamic occupied Balkan Peninsula. As the border fluctuated, Croatia was influenced by ideas from all of its neighbors while retaining a distinct identity. When the European Union expands, which it is likely to do, Croatia will once again play an important role as a border zone between those in the EU and those outside of it. The influx of tourists from Western Europe and the large number of Croats working in the EU as gastarbeiter continues to foster an exchange of ideas. Thirdly, Croatia’s best chance for economic recovery is to develop its tourist industry. Tourism brings in thousands of people from a myriad of cultures and nationalities, and therefore an atmosphere of tolerance for others is vital for tourism to succeed. Finally, integration into the EU is a stated goal of the Mesić-Račan government, and is generally supported by most Croatian citizens who see it as a way out of the economic crisis. Europe at the beginning of the twenty-first century is based upon liberal democratic principles, with a strong emphasis on the protection of human rights and ethnic minorities.

In order for Croatia to achieve its political and economic goals, it is necessary to ensure that the state is based upon the rule of law. It was a lack of this fundamental principle, in combination with a nationalist leadership, which directly led to the persecution of Croatia’s ethnic minorities, specifically Serbs, in the first ten years since independence. If the government had enforced the legal mechanisms which were embedded in the Constitution and in international treaties, then Croatia would not have suffered international isolation nor would it be facing as many of the social and economic problems it does today. It is true that will take more than simply laws to heal the wounds of war, but a government dedicated to promoting tolerance and a state based on citizenship, rather than ethnic identity, can speed up the process of reconciliation. The case of Croatia reveals that ethnic hatred was manipulated by certain political elites to enrich themselves and their allies, while the society was mobilized to hate their “ethnic enemies” who were in fact close neighbors and friends. The collapse of an ideology and the economic crisis of the 1980s unfortunately led to the emergence of nationalism to fill in the social vacuum left behind by communism’s disappearance.

However, regions such as Istria and the policies of political parties like the IDS show that tolerance and cooperation among ethnic groups is positive to a society, not negative as the HDZ propaganda machine tried to convince Croats for a decade. Croatia’s ethnic minorities are both an important
part of the country’s past and a valuable asset in the development of the country’s future in a Europe where national borders are disappearing.
Chapter 2: Underground Anti-Nationalism in the Nationalist Era

Gordana P. Crnković

To whose music do they dance?

At a party in August of 1995, which took place in a small apartment in the Croatian capital of Zagreb and was visited mostly by the student crowd in their twenties, I was astonished to see just what kind of music these young people enjoyed. To begin with, it was the rock music of the early eighties, to which my generation some ten years older than the crowd gathered at this specific party had listened a decade-and-a-half ago, at the time of the still solid existence of the former Yugoslavia. But the fact that this was “retro” music was not shocking in this age of universal retro-trends in pop culture—the really intriguing aspect of the Zagreb party was that the music was mostly by Serbian (primarily Belgrade) bands of the early eighties. We listened to the group Idoli [The Idols] and its songs “The Little Ones” [“Maljčiki”], “Amerika,” and “I rarely see you with girls” [“Retko te vidjam sa devojkama”], to Šarlo Akrobata [Charles the Acrobat] and its “She is waking up” [“Ona se budi”] and “No one like me” [“Niko kao ja”], to Disciplina kičme [Discipline of the Spine], and Pekinska patka [Beijing Duck]. People at the party did not just listen to these songs—they sang them as they were played, knowing their lyrics by heart—and they seemed to genuinely like them.

I was perplexed and intrigued: how was it possible that these young people knew these old Belgrade rock songs so well, given the official Croatian environment—at the time—of rigid cultural nationalism and anti-Serbian practices in which they grew up, the cultural nationalism which has accompanied the creation of a politically independent Croatia and which has, since 1991, literally moved Serbian books to the back rooms or basements of the libraries (or their dumpsters in some cases), erased Serbian authors from the school curricula, and banished Serbian music of any kind from the TV and radio airwaves? Where did these young people hear these songs? What, if anything, did these songs mean to them? To contextualize my wonder, I should also mention here that this was the period when a person could be viciously attacked in the Croatian government-run media as well as on the streets for merely having worked in Belgrade at some point in the past (like actor Rade
Šerbedžija), or for using a word which had been customarily been used before but was now proclaimed to be Serbian and replaced by a genuine “Croatian” one (passport, for example, was now to be called putovnica instead of pasos).

The Croatia of the 1990s had done a lot to distinguish itself from the Serbian culture with which it had been so unhappily bound during the “dark era” of Yugoslavia under Tito. Serbian culture was very simply defined as the complete opposite, the “Other” to Croatian culture in the set of binary opposites that were endlessly reiterated: they are East, Orient, Byzantium, primitive, rural, backwards, violent, etc., while we are West, Europe, advanced, urban, democratic, peaceful, and so on. What was once known as the Serbo-Croatian language (which had officially been called Croato-Serbian, “hrvatskosrpski,” in Croatia) was now meticulously separated into two languages, Croatian and Serbian, and dictionaries of the differences between the two languages were published.

And yet, as I spent more time in Croatia in the succeeding years, I noticed numerous other instances of the underground but vibrant popular presence of the proscribed and demonized Serbian culture in the Croatian cultural space. (I should add here that I mean Serbian culture from Serbia and not the one autochtonous to Croatia’s own space, that of the Croatian Serbs.) I call this presence underground because any notion or recognition of it was absent not only in the official media, but also in the opposition papers. My colleagues at the Faculty of Arts and Letters in Zagreb (Filozofski fakultet) did not seem aware of it, the journalists with whom I spoke did not see it. There was a huge discrepancy between a discourse on culture (the official or government one but also the one produced by oppositional media, academics etc.), and the culture itself: a whole range of things was present in the culture but nowhere described or verbalized.

The official cultural papers and media, still mostly obsessed with the creation of a pure national culture, primarily busied themselves with attempts to firmly define this elusive Croatian culture in its uncompromised pristine state, with many sterile polemics, and with the canonization of right-minded writers such as Ivan Aralica complemented with the ostracism of wrong-minded intellectuals and writers such as Slavenka Drakulić, Dubravka Ugrešić, Slobodan Šnajder, or Predrag Matvejević. The proscribed writers were to be regularly slighted not just because they were “against us” (Tudjman’s regime identified itself with the whole country of Croatia), but even more so because they included those who “succeeded in the World” (i.e., were published or performed outside of Croatia), such as the ones above, and whose voice had some weight and importance in other countries.

The main oppositional papers, on the other hand, such as Feral Tribune and Nacional, regularly gave space to openly oppositional Croatian intellectuals, writers, and artists living both within and outside of Croatia (Ameri-
can-Croatian historian Ivo Banac, for instance, wrote a regular column in *Feral Tribune* as well as to those who were ostracized in Croatia and had recently left the country. One could read interviews with Dubravka Ugrešić, the author of a collection of essays on Yugoslav nationalism, *The Culture of Lies* (1998), and of a recent novel, *The Museum of Unconditional Surrender*, who now lives in Amsterdam; with feminist journalist and novelist Slavenka Drakulić who wrote *Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War* (1994), and *Café Europa: Life After Communism* (1997), and who now divides her time between Sweden and Austria; with Croatian-Serbian actor Rade Šerbedžija, who worked with Stanley Kubrick on his last film, *Eyes Wide Shut* (1999), and lives in London; and with Croatian-Serbian actress Mira Furlan, who became somewhat of a cult-actress in the United States. One could also read things about and by literary scholar Predrag Matvejević, who is now teaching at the University of Rome and whose *Mediterranean Breviary* has been translated into numerous languages, playwright Slobodan Šnajder, who has been performed in Germany and who was refused the post of the director of the Rijeka Theater, and other figures who clashed with the government and were proclaimed Croatian foes at one point or another. (Ugrešić and Drakulić, together with Croatia’s premier journalist Jelena Lovrić, sociologist Vesna Kesić, and philosopher Rada Iveković, constituted the group of infamous “five witches” who were publicly denounced as enemies of Croatia in an article published in *Globus* in 1992.) All of these public personalities were denounced by the government-guided media, but many seemed to have proven their high professional value—and consequently how much Croatia lost by losing them—by being recognized by the “World”—the United States or Western Europe.²

One of the most interesting things in this whole contested debate about Croatian culture (whether it should or should not include oppositional writers who left the country, or Croatian writers from Bosnia,³ or those with “wrong” ideological inclinations⁴), is the fact that even the oppositional discourse and perception of Croatian culture of the second half of the 1990s did not thematize or discuss the astounding fact of the whole-scale underground reintroduction and reappearance, within Croatia, of the culture still most demonized of all, namely, the contemporary Serbian culture made in Serbia. Even oppositional papers such as *Feral Tribune* would run articles on Serbian culture in Serbia (by, say, a writer Filip David), or on Croatian artists who happen to be Serbs (the aforementioned Furlan or Šerbedžija), but precious little on Serbian culture within contemporary Croatian culture. The same behavior was exhibited by cultural magazines like *Vijenac* (at the time of editors Zlatar/Matan), which never concerned itself with this topic. One could argue that they were really not aware of it, but even more, that there was a kind of perhaps unconscious unwillingness to even become aware of such a possi-
bility. In the mid and late 1990’s, the opposition still stood precariously: it saw itself as the clear and radical opposition to the government, but did not want to look like a bad patriot. The official nationalist discourse which reshaped public speech in nationalist terms, and which regularly conflated the opposition to the government with “Yugo-nostalgia” or opposition to Croatian independence, exerted influence even there. The reason why the oppositional media and intellectuals, while strongly criticizing the government, did not talk about the presence of Serbian culture in Croatia perhaps lay in the unwillingness (conscious or not) to appear like Yugoslavs rather than Croats and to shatter their image of working and fighting for Croatia—democratic, free, and much better, but nevertheless Croatia and not Yugoslavia.  

**The “underground” presence of Serbian culture**

Official and oppositional media aside, it was hard to remain ignorant of the “underground” presence of Serbian culture in Croatia in its many aspects—literature, popular music, film, theater, even slang. One could walk through the center of Zagreb (a no-car zone full of pedestrians at any time of the day) on New Year’s Eve 1999, and see, in a small and temporarily-erected compact disk shop called Mrvica (A Crumb), discreetly displayed collections of Serbian rock—*The Best of Momčilo Bajagić Bajaga, Riblja čorba, Ekatarina Velika*. According to the salesman, all these CDs were much sought after and sold in large quantities despite a rather forbidding price.

In the fall of 1998, an inconspicuous poster which appeared in all the major Croatian cities announced a concert by Vojvodina (the northern province of Serbia) super-star and one of the most prominent ballad-singers of the former Yugoslavia, Djordje Balašević, which would take place in Ljubljana’s Tivoli Hall on 9 December of that year. I found out that going to Balašević’s concert in Ljubljana was a yearly ritual for many Croats. Given that Balašević could not perform in Croatia (allegedly because of the government’s security organs’ inability to guarantee his safety), people from Croatia would go to see him in Ljubljana, the Slovenian capital, approximately a two-hour drive from Zagreb. It was impossible to get the facts of how many people from Croatia attended the December 1998 concert, but, having been there myself, I can attest that in the huge Tivoli Hall he played to standing room only—and it was filled mainly by Croats. The city of Zagreb buzzed for days before and after the concert actually took place; the rumor had it that at least nine buses full of people took off from only one of several gathering places in Zagreb. (The tickets for the concert, as well as the organized transportation, were inconspicuously but efficiently available in Zagreb itself.) The border between Croatia and Slovenia was packed with private vehicles and buses headed
for Slovenia, and it was also stalled for hours at one border point thanks to the generous intervention of Croatian border officials, who of course knew where the entire crowd was going (it was a work-day evening, when the usual excuses of going to Slovenia for shopping or skiing did not make much sense), and who expressed their (and/or the official Croatian) disapproval of this excursion by body-searching people, questioning them, and taking ample time to go thoroughly through their passports.

The highly enthusiastic and mostly Croatian audience at the concert spanned generations—one could see twenty-year-old students, teenage neopunks, and middle-aged professionals with their not-yet-teen children. All of them joined amiably in creating a massive chorus that sang, word for word, almost all of Balašević’s songs together with him. The concert itself lasted some five hours, from 8 P.M. to 1 A.M., and Balašević did not once leave the stage. He opened the concert by greeting the Slovenian and Croatian cities one by one; when he said the names of specific Croatian cities, distinct parts of the audience responded, showing the high concentration of people from that particular city bussed in huge numbers, seated or standing together. Balašević greeted Split (huge response), Rijeka (huge response), Osijek (huge response). When he came to Zagreb, the Croatian capital and the state’s biggest city, Balašević had to break his greetings of the whole city into cheers to separate districts of the city: “Zdravo Peščenica,” “Zdravo Medveščak,” “Zdravo Dubrava,” and so on.

It was fortunate that the sound system at the concert was as good as it was so one could actually hear Balašević, because the audience, as I mentioned before, sang at the top of their lungs all of his songs together with him. How come, I wondered, that these twenty-year-olds and even younger people knew these songs, given that they were all of four or five years old—or even not yet born—when Balašević had released the first hits with which my generation grew up, hits like “Život je more” (“Life is the Sea”), “Lepa protina kći” [The Beautiful Priest’s Daughter”), “Oprosti mi, Katrin” (“Forgive me, Catherine”) or “Prva ljubav” [The First Love”]? How was it possible that these people knew Balašević’s songs so well—and obviously loved them—when they grew up after the break up of the former Yugoslavia, in a nationalist Croatia of the 1990s which had effectively removed all things associated with Serbian culture, and which did not have Balašević’s records in the stores or Balašević’s concerts in its concert halls? And what did Balašević and his music, and all those other many things by other Serbian artists, writers, filmmakers, and so on, mean to these Croatian people?

Before trying to answer this question let me mention some of the many other Serbian things living their underground—or at least very quiet—existence in Croatia of the nineties. Examples abound. The Serbian film Rane (Wounds), the first Serbian film to be officially presented in a Croatian
cinema after years-long hiatus (it played in the movie theater Kinoteka in the spring of 1999), was very well attended despite the fact that it had received almost no publicity, and the video version of that film, which became available in Croatia soon after the film itself played in theaters, became a kind of a cult-film for many Croatian youths. The predominantly young audience at Kinoteka seemed to genuinely enjoy *Wounds*’ raw humor and its engaging, fast-paced rhythm, unexpected plot turns, lively dialogues, inspired directing, and excellent acting. They laughed at the presence of Croatian subtitles: the theater wanted to avoid any possible problems with the powers-that-be, and given that Croatian and Serbian were proclaimed to be two entirely different languages, Kinoteka had provided Croatian subtitles of this Serbian-language movie. However, because of the fact that the Serbian and Croatian languages simply happen to have a hugely overlapping vocabulary, subtitles often grotesquely translated one set of words with the exact same set of words (“Kako si?” [“How are you?”] into “Kako si?” or “Lud je” [“He’s crazy”] into “Lud je”). One of the members in the audience, a girl in her early twenties, shouted excitedly to her friend on the other side of the cinema hall: “Oh well, I came to see this monster/miracle [čudo] with subtitles!”

One could also witness, in the city of Zagreb, the quiet proliferation of video-recordings of Belgrade performances of plays by Serbian playwright Dušan Kovačević, known in the United States as the screen-writer of Emir Kusturica’s movie *Underground*. I saw the recording of the Belgrade theater performance of his *Dušan III*, and I happened to have been accompanied at this particular viewing by yet another set of Zagreb’s curious twenty-year-olds, all of them having had very little (or none at all) official exposure to or contact with Serbian culture.

In the summer of 1994 I looked for a book by Serbian author Danilo Kiš in one of the city’s major libraries, thinking that it would be easy to get that book “now,” in the mid-90’s, when Kiš was not read in the school curriculum and when any public mention of him was rather scarce. But I was surprised to find that I could not borrow his book for quite a while, and that I would actually have to put my name on the waiting list to get that book in a few months’ time. The librarian explained to me that Kiš was in great demand, and that as of the mid-nineties people did not read Croatian writers such as Ivan Aralica any more (who had been in high demand in the mid and late-eighties), but asked for books by Kiš (the most popular of Serbian writers according to this particular source) and also by other Serbian writers such as Borislav Pekić.

Even the speech of the “coolest of the cool,” as the students of the Zagreb’s Faculty of Arts and Letters (*Filozofski fakultet*) like to think of themselves, sometimes playfully utilized Serbian language within their own particular slang. I was cut to the quick when, walking through the university, I heard a young man laughingly say to his friends: “Ajde da se nadjemo da malo
proćaskamo o tom problemčiću!” (“Let us get together to chat a bit about that little problem”). The word choice (“ćaskati”), grammatical structure (da + present instead of the infinitive), delivery (slower than Zagreb’s speech), accentuated difference between the so-called hard č and soft č (proćaskamo, problemčiću), and emphasized soft dj, all instantly marked this exclamation as part of the Serbian language—parodied and playfully used, no doubt, but definitely not just laughed at, which could have been the case in the eighties or early nineties. The slang, in short, was instantly recognizable. But what was less clear was the purpose—if any—of such inclusion of the Serbian language in this “cool” Zagreb speech.

Indeed, how can one interpret such a prominent presence of Serbian culture in Croatian popular culture? Exposed as they were to the intense villainization of the whole Serbian nation and everything it does, what did it mean to have all those Croats dance to Serbian pop music, go to concerts of Serbian rock-stars, read books by great Serb literati, watch Serbian movies and plays, and incorporate the Serbian language into their own slang? Though absent from the Croatian media—the government’s and oppositional alike—Serbian culture was undeniably present in the very life of the Croatian culture of the second-half of the 1990s. Why was that the case?

The missing parts of me

Let us consider in more detail several particular instances of the presence of Serbian culture in Croatia, and see if these “close-ups” might offer an answer to the above question. Having already talked about the Ljubljana concert of Djordje Balašević in 1998, we may start with a consideration of what he and his music may give or represent to the Croatian audience.

Balašević has been a prolific author of pop songs for over two decades, and his popularity seems to have remained high (openly or secretly) throughout the former Yugoslavia. His songs have catchy melodies and simple, unabashedly emotional lyrics, but are also often characterized by refreshing humor and self-irony. They have an appealing genuine note and warmth which help make them an integral part of the audience’s lives. “Count on Us” (“Računajte na nas”) was a mega-hit in seventies, “Forgive me, Catherine” (“Oprosti mi, Katrin”) and a score of his other songs have been a staple of Adriatic beaches, where young people entertain themselves by singing their favorite songs, and anecdotal evidence tells of people who record one or the other of Balašević’s most successful songs containing some inimitable “life wisdom” (such as, notably, “Life is the Sea” [“Život je more”]) at the beginning, middle, and end of a single side of a cassette, so as to hear it in regular intervals without having to search for it.
The persona of the “I” created in Balašević’s songs is that of a non-materialistic wanderer and dreamer who lives peacefully and quietly, writes verses and plays cards (“ponekad bacim kartu ili napišem stih”), and still “steals days from God” (“ja još kradem dane bogu”), that is, does not do something purposeful or useful, and in general prefers romantic reveries over rational or pragmatic behavior. The majority of his songs are in the minor key, and they sometimes employ Gypsy/Roma, Hungarian, or Russian melodies in their rhythms and orchestration. The space invoked in these songs is not that of an urban metropolis, but that of a small, quiet, and slow Vojvodina province or village, and often-times that of nature: Balašević sings about rivers, fields of wheat, tall grass, ponds and lakes of Vojvodina’s landscape and of one’s idealized childhood (“kad sam bio sasvim mlad // neke barske ptice sam lovio tad”) or romanticized past. Balašević’s own stage image is completely unproduced: he really looks like someone who just stepped into a performance straight from the car or a walk by the river, a middle-age man in everyday casual clothes that are not particularly flattering and that genuinely look like they never got even the smallest share of his interest.

If we make a short catalogue of the above-mentioned most obvious characteristics of Balašević’s music and performance—the neo-Romantic persona of a nostalgic dreamer, much use of nature symbolism and nature, the unabashed integration of “eastern” melodies, and Balašević’s stage image, we see that these characteristics are precisely those missing from contemporary Croatian popular music. There has simply been no musician of Balašević’s type in that music—the older-generation Croatian authors of ballads like Arsen Dedić and Ibrica Jusić are very different, and the contemporary Croatian rock is urban, harsh, and cynical. There is no one so unabashedly romantic and sentimental, so straightforwardly emotional as Balašević. His music clearly provides something which is missing and is missed by many Croats, and which evokes a positive response when recognized.

One could argue that Balašević’s music brings back or contains many of the aspects which had been present in Croatian culture during the Yugoslav period, and which were subsequently purged from Croatia in the 1990s with the whole-scale expulsion of cultural elements that were proclaimed to be Serbian, Yugoslav, communist, non-Croatian, and so on. A dreaming, romantic, nostalgic “I” persona of the songs, for example, was a trade-mark of much of “eastern” rock made in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia (e.g., in music of the groups such as Sarajevo’s Bijelo dugme [White Button], for a long time the most popular band in the former Yugoslavia), as was the use of Eastern (Roma, Russian, Hungarian) melodies and folk melodies in general, or the employment of nature imagery in lyrics. Croatian and Slovenian rock, on the contrary, was traditionally much less romantic, “folksy”, and melodious, and much more dissonant and “expressionist” (e.g., Zagreb’s Azra), parodic,
playful, and humorous (e.g., Slovenian Buldožeri), or experimental, conceptual, and political (e.g., Ljubljana’s Laibach, especially during the 1980s when the group was an integral part of the Neue Slowenische Kunst movement rather than “just” another rock band). A Croatian listener during the Yugoslav era could have liked Serbian rock or he/she could have found a good part of it too kitschy and sappy, but in either case this Serbian rock (and Bosnian, Slovenian, or Macedonian—e.g., Skopje’s amazing group Leb i sol [Bread and Salt]), was a comfortable part of one’s overall soundscape which rather naturally included and combined domestic rock from all over the former Yugoslavia with the canonized imports from England and the United States.

This Croatian soundscape and the related much wider national cultural terrain in general were in the 1990s impoverished and diminished by systematic practices of exclusion and expulsion of not only “Serbian” cultural elements but also those denounced as Bosnian, Yugoslav, communist, Croatian regionalist (Dalmatian, Istrian, Slavonian), as well as those from the non-European “Third-World” cultures. During the Yugoslav period, for example, the music of Belgrade’s group Idoli [Idols] or Momčilo Bajagić Bajaga was rather popular in Croatia, and quite unproblematically integrated in the Croatian cultural sphere or, more precisely, into a cultural milieu of any individual Croatian interested in contemporary rock music. It was of course known that this music happens to be Serbian (in the sense of having been made in Serbia), but, firstly, it was seen more as music from the city of Belgrade rather than from the state of Serbia, and, secondly, its having been Serbian both did not matter too much and had perhaps even added the flair of something slightly exotic and therefore intriguing and attractive. This music was different (some difference in language and in slang, often different overall atmosphere) and yet familiar because of many shared cultural concerns, and easily understandable because of greatly overlapping language(s).

But what used to be experienced during the Yugoslav era as an element of Croatian cultural space (because it had its place and relevance in that space), even though it may have originated in Serbia and was acknowledged as “Serbian,” was in the 1990s proclaimed to be Serbian as opposed to Croatian, or Serbian and therefore not Croatian, and was aggressively purged out of Croatian culture. The Croatian culture was thus pushed into losing its hybrid, cross-cultural identity characterized by lively interaction of different cultural spheres (not only national ones but also regional and local), on account of the claim that this hybrid identity actually enacts or aids the subordination of Croatian’s own national culture to either a Serbian one, seen as having clear hegemonic aspirations, or else a “Yugoslav” one, seen as either artificial or else just a cover-up for Serbian dominance. Given that Serbia under Milošević’s regime, from the late 1980s onwards, had clearly had hegemonic pretensions and had waged four wars (in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and Kosovo) to realize its territorial ambitions, it was possible to turn the fact about the hegemonic Serbian pretensions in Croatia at the present times into the justification for the call for the whole-scale purging of any and all “Serbian” cultural elements—political and those having nothing to do with politics, past and present, those more clearly identifiable as “Serbian” and those merely denounced as such by the powers that be.

The problem, however, lay in the fact that it was much easier to remove “inappropriate” materials (e.g., Serbian literary works from the school curriculum or Serbian musicians from Croatian stages), than to find an adequate replacement for them within the sphere recognized as Croatia’s “own” culture. Finding replacements for discarded things became especially difficult when the official policies of cultural purging went on to include (or rather exclude) not only things created outside of Croatia, but also those which were by origin “Croatian” but tainted with what was officially proclaimed to be “non-Croatian” sentiments, such as politically oppositional artifacts (previously mentioned writing by, say, Slavenka Drakulić), or ideologically unacceptable works (e.g., by leftist Miroslav Krleža), or overly regional and not sufficiently national publications or points of view (i.e., such as expressed in Rijeka’s Novi list or Split’s Feral Tribune). The list of the cultural elements and aspects which were proscribed and not to be used anymore grew large, and the much less rigorous attempts to replace those purged elements with either archaic (and thus purportedly authentic) Croatian elements or else newly-made ones mostly failed miserably. The net result was that Croatian culture became severely impoverished in numerous different ways.

Given the situation described above, one could argue that Balašević’s music and other things Serbian have been popular in the Croatia of the 1990s not so much because they were “Serbian,” but because they articulated missing elements of the impoverished Croatian culture itself. These Serbian cultural elements functioned as, so to speak, ready-made missing parts of the Croatian culture which could not readily “help itself” with the heavily promoted “European” German, French, or Austrian cultural elements (given the simple reason of linguistic, contextual, historical, and myriad other incompatibilities), but could easily understand, communicate with, and appropriate elements from Serbian culture.

At the beginning of this chapter I mentioned rigid official differentiation between Croatian and Serbian languages, and the creation of the dictionaries of differences between the two. In Tujman’s Croatia, one could not easily come across the Serbian language, which is characterized by, among other things, a different “jat” sound from the Croatian language (“mleko” instead of Croatian “mljeko” [milk]) and some different lexic (e.g., “hleb” instead of Croatian “kruh” [bread]). But the song-writer Djordje Balašević, with his considerable poetic talent, manages to show much of the beauty of the
Serbian language in his lyrics: his long “e” can actually sound much gentler and softer than “ije” would in verses like “Ne volim januar // i bele zimske grobove // u svakom snegu vidim iste tragove,” ([I don’t like January // and white winter graves // In every snow I see the same foot-prints], from “Ne volim januar” [I don’t like January]), and it yields itself much better to singing than “ije” would (one can hold a long note on the “e” and cannot on “ije”). The Serbian words such as ker [dog], džabe, divaniti, čiça [uncle; older man], and sokak [narrow alley], bring with themselves a slightly different meaning from their Croatian counter-parts, and seem to be better understood and employed as complements rather than alternatives to Croatian lexic: divaniti is not quite the same as pričati, govoriti, or razgovorati [talk, converse], džabe not the same as uzalud [futile, not producing a result].

In addition to other particular aspects (mentioned above) which Balašević’s songs may bring to Croatian popular culture, the widening and enrichment of the language itself is not the least important one. The Croatian language has been “purified” and severely reduced by the extraction of numerous “non-authentic” words, and the new words which were introduced, some archaic and some neo-logisms, have not in general taken much root. With a wonderfully rich vocabulary, attractive metaphors, and sensuous nature symbolism, Balašević’s lyrics enact a veritable enlargement of this language. The conscious or not recognition of the greater and richer vocabulary and range of expressions—and of the related widened range of emotions, experiences, insights, and concepts—can be one of the reasons for such ecstatic singing of Balašević’s songs by Croatian audiences during his 1998 Ljubljana concert.

(The similar sense of the enlargement of language—individual as well as communal—might have been enacted by many other Serbian artifacts. The above-mentioned film Wounds, for instance, offers a hilarious rendition of Belgrade’s “gangsta” slang and the urban lower-class population’s speech, which is, as things Serbian in the previous era, different enough to be new and interesting on one hand, and yet, on the other hand, familiar and understandable enough (even without the subtitles!) to provide some old-new vocabulary, including that of much used colorful and creative curses.)

It is Glorious to Die for One’s Homeland: Croatian victims and Serbian writers

The popularity of Serbian writer Danilo Kiš can be seen as yet another example of Serbian artifacts’ enlargement of Croatian cultural vocabulary. Though cultural anti-nationalism in Croatia primarily existed on the “ground” level of the people themselves and was usually not present in the
media, the appreciation of Danilo Kiš seeped into oppositional journalism. Kiš’s work was often mentioned in regard to one or the other of his more well-known pronouncements on nationalism. But one of the more interesting examples of the placing of Kiš, a Serbian writer, within the oppositional Croatian discourse is an article by Heni Erceg, “It is Glorious to Die for One’s Homeland” (“Časno je za domovinu umrijeti”), published in Feral Tribune, where Erceg uses Kiš’s story as an implied frame of reference which explodes in a manifold way the scope of her own article.

The article is a text about the death of a soldier of the Croatian army, a man named Silvio Jožić. Journalist Heni Erceg shows that the death of this particular soldier cannot be attributed to the actions of the enemy on the battlefield, but rather to the utmost carelessness and ignorance of Jožić’s own military superiors, who were later rewarded rather than punished for a series of military and moral failures. Erceg’s text is a collage: a photograph of Nada Majstorović, the mother of a slain soldier, an emaciated woman in black whose facial expression while talking, as well as a gesture made by her hands, seem to indicate that she is desperately trying to communicate something; the official notification of the death of Silvio Jožić, issued from the military quarters; a letter which Mrs. Majstorović received as a response to her request for an additional information about her son’s death (informing her that she could get that information only if the civil court requests it in her name); and the text of Heni Erceg’s article. Most of this text is in italics, which mark a direct speech of Nada Majstorović, which is not interrupted by the journalist’s questions or comments. The writer of the article, Heni Erceg, marks the places of her cutting of Majstorović’s speech by three dots. Aside from being shortened, Majstorović’s talk appears completely unedited.

_I will request that the colonel Zlatko Majić bear responsibility for the death of my son. He is guilty, in the same way in which he is guilty for the deaths of so many other young men.... You know, I don’t need anything. I have lost everything anyway, my Silvio, and my brother, and everything in Derventa, which I left with my daughter before it fell. But I want that it be known how these people died. No one knows anything, everyone keeps silent, and those children die....

Silvio was thirty-years old, he was a translator and a poet, he had an opportunity to avoid the draft but he didn’t.... What kind of an army is that? A normal commander would know that they cannot work the whole day on mine removal. Let him go to the army, but not like this, not with absolutely no one taking any care of them..._
I want the public to see what kind of a shameful little note I received as a report about the death of my son.... I only want the punishment for the person who gave to this Majić two thousand young men, for him to do what he wants with their lives. Only three days after Silvio’s death nine young men died in the minefield in Gospić. The two men who survived the accident when Silvio died were separated right away. The third one left the army and is now completely psychologically unstable...

When I finally managed to see Majić in order to ask him whether my son got medical care in the hospital, he answered to me that this was no concern of his...

* * * *

The confession of Nada Majstorović, the mother of a killed Croatian soldier, her sadness and her revolt appear futile today and here. Because futile stories—when told—turn attention to the hidden part of the war, that bitter residuum which is to remain hidden under the refreshing heroic epopée which the survivors have to drink up together, and in which every individual drop loses both its taste and its importance. As it is probably futile to attempt to draw one individual confession out of silence...

Journalist Heni Erceg constructs her writing as the silent listening of another woman. She does not write a single word of her own until the very last column—it is the other woman’s voice that fills her article. The journalist uses her public space by giving it to those who are silenced by the nationalist discourse. Erceg’s few concluding remarks point out that the title of her story, “Časno je za domovinu umrijeti,” is actually only a Croatian rendition of the Serbian phrase, “Slavno je za otadžbinu mreti,” which is the title of one of the stories by Danilo Kiš:

In one of his stories Danilo Kiš wrote: “History is written by the victors. Legends are woven by the people. Writers fantasize. Only death is certain.” The story’s title is: “To Die for One’s Country is Glorious.”

The story to which Erceg refers, “It is Glorious to Die for One’s Homeland,” is in Kiš’s collection of stories The Encyclopedia of the Dead.
This five-page long narrative deals with the last few hours of life of a young Hungarian count Esterházy, who was sentenced to death because of his participation in an armed revolt against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. On the way to his execution, the young nobleman thinks about the recent visit of his mother. During that visit, she said that she would wear a white dress on the day set for the young count's execution if she managed to obtain a pardon for him from the Emperor. Approaching the gallows,

Esterházy raised his eyes. In the light of the morning sun he glimpsed a blinding white spot on the balcony. Leaning over the railing, all in white, stood his mother, and behind her—as if to enhance the lily-white brilliance of her dress—the enormous dark green leaves of a philodendron.

Immediately, almost insolently, he straightened up, wishing to make it clear to the threatening mob that an Esterházy could not die just like that, that he could not be hanged like some highwayman.

And thus he stood beneath the gallows. Even as the hangman removed the stool from under his feet, he awaited the miracle. Then his body twisted at the end of the rope and his eyes bulged out of their sockets, as if he had just seen something awful and terrifying. [...] 

There are two possible conclusions. Either the young aristocrat died a brave and noble death, fully conscious of the certainty thereof, his head held high, or the whole thing was merely a clever bit of playacting directed by a proud mother. The first, heroic, version was upheld and promulgated—orally, and then in writing, in their chronicles—by the sans-culottes and Jacobins; the second, according to which the young man hoped to the very end for some magical sleight of hand, was recorded by the official historians of the powerful Habsburg dynasty to prevent the birth of a legend. History is written by the victors. Legends are woven by the people. Writers fantasize. Only death is certain.9

The appearance of a heroic death might hide a very different reality: a young nobleman, so brave and fearless, might have been only a terrified young man deceived into acting out valiantly his own death. In Kiš's story, the rules of the theater shape the politics of death. Good directors know how to make their actors play the scene in a desired way; letting the actors know what the scene is about might often not be the best approach.
Deception and theater figure prominently in journalist Heni Erceg’s story as well. Theatrical government officials take the central stage and storm out the “heroic epopea’ about the defense of the country,” pointing at the dead bodies on the ground and interpreting these silent bodies, speaking for and instead of them. This façade of national defiance and bravery erases shameful and un-needed deaths and makes them absent—or seen only in their transcended glory—from the collective consciousness. The task of an oppositional journalist is to write a text which functions as a missing speech of this absent dead body.

Erceg’s text is assembled of oppositional anti-nationalist fragments: a speech by a mother of a slain soldier, a disgraceful official death notification, journalist’s own speech which contains the fragments of Danilo Kiš’s story. Opposing nationalist government through one’s words does not only mean criticizing this government. Erceg complements her criticism with a display of the possibility of saying something very much “hers” through the words of someone whom the nationalist discourse prescribes as being very much “theirs” (Serbian Danilo Kiš). Erceg uses the words of someone who is allegedly alien, adversarial, and entirely different, and whose words and identity are never supposed to overlap with those of the Croatian Heni Erceg. This is again an example of using ready-made Serbian cultural artifacts to speak out a Croatian situation in economic way, and to show that their (Serbian) writer is mine or is nothing less than I myself (if my own speech is me), and that I am not identical with “we” (the abstract nation).

By her reference to Kiš, Erceg unlocks or brings to the forefront of many Croatian readers’ minds the whole mental file with the title “Danilo Kiš.” Aside from Kiš’s fictional work, that file contains many famous essays taking as their theme nationalism (“Licitarsko srce”), the relation between nationalist politics and kitsch in ideologically or interest-driven arts, the way in which nationalism recreates the minutiae of everyday life in its own image, and so on. The file “Danilo Kiš” also contains a memory of one of the biggest literary and cultural scandals in post-World War II Yugoslavia. Following the publication of his Tomb for Boris Davidovich (1976), a collection of stories having as their theme the fate of revolutionaries from across Europe (none of them Yugoslav, many of them Jewish) in Stalinist purges, Kiš was accused of plagiarism. This was a smear campaign which was, in effect, “[aiming] to [...] dismiss him [Kiš] for his lack of national consciousness and insufficient affinity for the traditions of his milieu” or, in other words, for his lack of proper national(ist) consciousness. Kiš wrote a whole book in response, the scathing The Anatomy Lesson [Čas anatomije, 1978]; a huge polemic ensued among the “cultural workers” (as they were called at that time) from the former Yugoslavia, who divided themselves between those for and against Kiš.

The recollection of a scandal associated with Kiš also includes the
memory of a loss and tragic ending. Kiš left Yugoslavia and permanently relocated to France, and he died there rather young from a terminal illness. Some attributed his becoming sick in the first place to perhaps irreparable psychological wounds which Kiš, proud as he was, incurred while fighting the infinitely inferior but numerous, loud, and established opponents who charged him with plagiarism. In the eyes of the world at large—gullible, distracted, scantily informed, and even less interested—one can never wash oneself of that kind of accusation, and this realization perhaps hurt Kiš deeply despite his own better judgment. As he himself wrote, “in the merciless battle of equal opponents ... no one comes out unharmed.” Heni Erceg’s article, both drawing Kiš into the sphere of her text and enlarging that sphere by the implication of Kiš, talks about the present-day Croatian nationalism and its lies and victims—a killed young poet and translator—by reminding the reader of another poet, a translator and writer Danilo Kiš, who fought nationalism and can be seen as one of the early victims of the early beginnings of this rendition of nationalism.

Serbian popular art and the oppositional vocabulary

Croatia had vigorous oppositional politics and oppositional parties throughout the Tudjman era. Tudjman never garnered the majority of votes, and the overwhelming majority which his party had in the parliament had more to do with the way electoral units (županije) were drawn than with the popular vote, allowing a slight majority (or even minority) of the popular vote to generate a strong majority of parliamentary seats. The oppositional parties such as the HSLS, IDS, Dalmatinska stranka, and SDP were a vocal and more or less consistent opposition to many of Tudjman’s reprehensible policies (though with some notable wavering, i.e., HSLS with regard to Tudjman’s policies in Bosnia). Though the opposition was disunited for most of the period and thus not too efficient, its combined strength indicates that the general population was much less homogenously nationalist when compared to the policies of Tudjman’s government.

Croatia, however, did not have much in the way of the oppositional popular art such as, say, popular musicians whose songs would be present on the “street” and who would openly and with no bars held create the songs with unmitigated oppositional sentiment, and who would thus provide some means for a collective to express its own oppositional sentiments or its basic frustration and anger over the way things were. The one great exception to this rule is the satirical addition to Split’s Feral Tribune, which was widely read, enjoyed, shared, and quoted. However, most of the popular art looked the other way and dealt with non-political themes, or else adopted a more or less
forced (or even genuine) “patriotic” attitude characterized by adherence to the “national cause” as defined by Tudjman’s government, and by the lack of opposition to this government.

A very good example of this kind of popular art is the movie *When the Dead Start to Sing* [Kad mrtvi zapjevaju, 1998, director Krsto Papić], which consists of two awkwardly joined parts. The first, longer part of the movie is a fabulous comedy revolving around the return from Germany to Croatia of a Croatian *Gastarbeiter* who pretends to be dead and is traveling in his own coffin, getting into all sorts of hilarious mishaps because of his actually being very much alive, and the second part concerns the man’s coming back to his home village located in the part of Croatia which is at that moment under attack by the Serbian troops. At once the mood subtly changes from comedy at the start of his return to a more serious and pathos-imbued story of old friendships going sour over national divisions (and so on), and to a tragic note at the end when this main character actually gets killed. The national epopee does not, of course, allow for a genre of comedy, and the awkward shifting of the gears towards the end of the movie turns a hugely successful film up to that point into something strangely dissatisfying and failing to materialize its immanent potentials, because of the film’s desertion of its own internal aesthetic logic on account of a prescribed ideological message.

The Serbian situation in the 1990s, however, was quite different from the Croatian one. There was no strong political opposition for much of that period, and much of it was nationalistic to boot, but there appeared some outstanding popular art expressions of the oppositional sentiment. The trio Biljana Srbljanović (Serbian playwright born in Sweden), Vladimir Arsenijević (a novelist), and film-maker Srdjan Dragojević, the director of aforementioned film *Wounds*, came to the forefront of the new Serbian art wave.

The film *Wounds* is an unforgiving and open-eyed statement of what Serbian society had become under Milošević’s rule, a place which completely degenerated under a corrupt regime and whose every facet is shown as marked by perversion created by the malignant nationalism running rampant. But this is not in the least a didactic movie which hits you over the head with its message. *Wounds* is a hilarious and entirely successful comedy which revolves around a coming-of-age story of two Belgrade adolescents, as told by one of them, who graduate from only admiring the neighborhood thug and the things he does (or rather has) to becoming themselves first his aides and then his heirs. The film opens with a shot of two young adolescent boys throwing stones at the third boy in what seems like a landscape of a garbage dump or a junk-yard; they yell things like “Slovenian whore” and “Slovenian faggot,” and the attacked boy (looking feminine and intellectual with his spectacles and curly longish hair) trying to defend himself by saying “I am not a Slovenian” and “only my father was Slovenian.” The shot ends with one of the boys get-
ting unnoticed behind the boy under attack and throwing a stone at his head as hard as he can. The final shot of this sequence is the close-up of the wounded boy’s face, all in blood and crying. This beginning sequence prefigures the end of the movie where the same duel takes place in the same space, but this time with real guns and onto death.

Given the bleak picture of Serbian society created in this movie, some Serbian movie-goers criticized the film from the stand-point of its not being a realistic portrayal of Serbia. “Maybe only 3 or 4 per cent of population lived that way, as gangsters and thugs, though there was a lot of crime, especially during the sanctions,” said Lara Andjelković, a twentysome-year old college student in Belgrade, “but most of the people lived different lives, fighting poverty and trying to survive or even oppose the nationalistic regime.” The point, however, is that the film should not be received as a realistic portrayal of Serbian society (as, in fact, hardly any art piece is a realistic portrayal of anything). The film is an aesthetic vision or expression of the real situation, not an attempt to be a visual or journalistic report of it. Wounds externalizes, so to speak, or embodies in its plot, images, characters, and language, some of the deeper currents or characteristics of Serbian society during Milošević’s era.

Government officials like Milošević and his whole group of supporters have commonly been seen, especially in more recent times, as thieves who ruined the country for their own political and material gain but were proclaimed to be national heroes. This social feature—of thieves and gangsters being called the heroes—is fully and literally recreated in the film. The main criminal repeatedly goes to “liberate the Serbian town of Vukovar” (Vukovar is a Croatian city on the Danube, which was destroyed by the Serbian army in the Fall of 1991 to the point of being called the second Dresden), brags that the blood on his shirt upon his return is surely “not his,” and brings back from Vukovar truckloads of loot—stoves, refrigerators, VCRs, and so on. Having looked through the booty, his girl-friend complains: “And why did you not bring me a microwave?!” to which the man responds: “Well, next time you oughta give me a list!” The grand war of “liberation and national cause” is, as so many times before, just a façade for the basest plunder and a pleasure in the destruction of things and in the killing of powerless people.

Wounds also externalizes some other major aspects of Serbian society at the time, such as the radical and swift change of idols. The icon of “brotherhood and unity,” Yugoslavia’s President Josip Broz Tito, was during the eighties replaced by the icon of nationalism and national paranoia which justified the unprecedented aggression, Serbian president Slobodan Milošević. In Wounds, this shift is shown through the eyes of the main character and the narrator of the movie, the adolescent boy Pinkie, who talks about his life by linking its important moments with the important historical events. Pinkie, it
turns out, happens to have been born on the day Tito died, 4 May 1980. We see that day through a shot of an obstetrics yard with newborn babies and their mothers, but instead of the sounds of happiness and relief one would expect in this setting, we hear the long sound of a siren and the unstoppable desperate crying of all the mothers in the ward (joined, of course, by the more understandable crying of all the newborns). A discrepancy between the expected happiness and the apparent misery creates a thoroughly comic effect. But aside from being funny, this scene also efficiently shows how people in Belgrade really cried when Tito died. The film shows, in short, how the tears Serbian people shed at the time were not artificial ones, and even less non-existent ones. Pinkie gives the nineties interpretation to Tito’s death in 1980: in his own a-posteriori narration of this scene present in the voice-over, we hear: “I was born on the day that Croat Tito died, and everyone cried.” The Yugoslav (our) Tito at the time of his death has become the “Croat” (their or the enemy’s) Tito by the early nineties.

The scene of Pinkie’s father, an Army officer, crying in 1980 because of Tito’s death and wanting to name his son after Tito is later juxtaposed with the scene of this same father some time in the late eighties, who is now taking down Tito’s picture from the wall of his apartment, and replacing it with a portrait of Slobodan Milošević (hitting his finger with the hammer in the process of doing it). The humorous contrast of these scenes is telling in itself—the enthusiasm with which Tito is mourned is in the movie almost immediately replaced by the enthusiasm with which the same person is hated, and this radical reversal—shown as radical because of the film’s shrinking of real-life time and the erasure of the million small gestures and actions which led to it—makes the people doing the loving and hating look very puppet-like. The sense of the absurdity of such a change is emphasized by the narrator’s stance. Pinkie has no ideology or values or ideals; he does not narrate things by interpreting them at the same time and seeing them as moments of some grander order (by, for example, spouting a line such as “the Serbian nation has finally raised its head and cried for justice,” or some such rhetoric resembling the one we hear in the film’s rendition of the Belgrade TV’s news); on the contrary, Pinkie talks a bit like an extra-terrestrial, not critical of the scene but detached from and seemingly unaware of its presumed emotional and ideological import: “Then father put a new picture on the wall...”

The destruction of the others leads to self-destruction: what happened to Serbia as a whole is again replicated in the story of the two friends who are first violent towards others (toward the Slovenian boy at the beginning of the film and towards the whole rest of Belgrade’s criminal underground at the end), and whose violence, coupled with fear, loneliness, alienation from others and from each other, and glorification of drug-dealing and drug use, eventually leads to self-destructive behavior. The two friends end
up shooting each other before they team up again, full of wounds and for the last time, to have the final encounter with the "Slovenian" boy.

The above thematic and structural features of *Wounds*, though relating to Serbian society in the nineties, are also very applicable to and recognizable in Croatian society of the same period. In Croatia, too, thieves have been proclaimed to be national heroes (at least in one period), the collective icons were changed with lightening speed (the non-nationalist Zagorje man Josip Broz Tito was replaced with the nationalist Zagorje man Franjo Tudjman, the first president of Croatia), the rhetoric of socialism was replaced overnight with the (deadlier) rhetoric of nationalism, and the destruction of "others" (in some stages of the war in Bosnia) led to self-destruction (with more and more people within Croatia being proclaimed enemies, until eventually Tudjman and his government seemed to be saying that the government is good but the people are bad). The Serbian film *Wounds* thus spells out and shows the features of Croatian society of the time as well, and the exaggerated manner in which it does so helps these features to really be seen and observed.

The many similarities between the situations in the two countries explain why the film *Wounds* was so well received in Croatia. The differences between the situations in the two countries, however, may account for the fact that Croatia did *not* produce a film which is so uncompromisingly severe and unambiguously critical. The situation in Croatia, in short, was much more ambiguous than the one in Serbia. While Serbia launched a succession of wars of aggression, from Slovenia to Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina to Kosovo, Croatia's first war in the summer and fall of 1991 was unambiguously a war of defense against the Yugoslav Army's troops: it ended with the aforementioned destruction of the city of Vukovar, the loss of a third of Croatia's territory, the cleansing of the Croatian population from the occupied territory, the ongoing shelling of the precious Renaissance Dalmatian cities of Zadar, Šibenik, Dubrovnik, and so on. The final military installment of this war was Operation Storm [*Oluja*] in the summer of 1995, which regained the lost territory, but did so with many alleged human rights violations. In between the two, Croatia was also militarily involved in Bosnia's war, where at times it collaborated with and at times fought the Bosnian Army with the clear goal of carving out a part of Bosnia for itself—the destruction of the Muslim side of the lovely Herzegovinan city of Mostar, including the destruction of Mostar's famous stone bridge, is one of the most abominable episodes of that part of the Croatian war.

The Croatian situation, in short, has been much more ambiguous than the Serbian one: Croatia has been both a victim and aggressor, and it has often been the two at the same time—a victim in the regions under Serbian occupation, but at times an aggressor towards Bosnia, its own Serbian minority, as well as its "own" opposition. The situation in Croatia during the rule of
Tudjman's regime was bad, to say the least. The whole-scale destruction of
the economy was accompanied by the enormous enrichment of the clique
connected with the ruling family and the impoverishment of the great major-
ity of the population, the real benefits of the well-governed and prosperous
democracy were withheld and people were instead given the symbols of
Croatian national sovereignty—from the new flag to the new names of the
streets, factories, new stamps, and so on. Like Serbia, Croatia in the nineties
experienced much impoverishment and corruption, and was in many ways ruled
by private interest covered by the national rhetoric. But the scale of things
was different: all the bad things were much worse in Serbia, and if Croatia had
an authoritarian regime which shamelessly intimidated opponents, Serbia had
a criminal regime which liquidated its most outspoken critics. Given the am-
biguity of its situation and the milder, "watered-down" degradation when com-
pared with Serbia, it could perhaps be said that Croatia could not, even aside
from material obstacles, make a film as radical and strong as Wounds—but it
could relate to it extremely well.

If the movie Wounds spells out all the negative aspects of national-
ism, shown in the context of Serbia but recognized in Croatia, Vojvodina's
musician Djordje Balašević creates a positive alternative to nationalism in
much of his music. Many of Balašević's songs go against the nationalist
premise that those who are from another nation are indeed the "Others," dif-
ferent and dangerous people to be cut off and avoided. Individuals in
Balašević's songs connect just fine across the national borders, and the bound-
aries prove illusory. The bodies and dreams communicate without problems:
the loved women in Balašević's songs, for example, are of various nationali-
ties, and the romantic male "I" of the songs remembers having loved a
"Šokica...whose eyes still enchant with the same luster" (šokica being a
Croatian woman; in the "Stih na asfaltu" ["The Verse on the Asphalt"], the
Bosnian woman from Banja Luka whom the singer loved while he was serving
the military duty in the Bosnian city of Banja Luka at the time of the former
Yugoslavia ("Povratak" ["The Return"]), a Hungarian woman ("Ne umem
madjarski" ["I Don't Know Hungarian"]), a French one ("Oprosti mi, Katrin"
["Forgive Me, Catherine"]), and so on. Romantic attachment and sexual at-
traction do not observe national boundaries; on the contrary, the specific cul-
tural milieu which each of these women carries with her or around her in
Balašević's songs (for example, the verses depicting the city of Zagreb in the
"Stih na asfaltu") only enchants her individual beauty, much like an idiosyn-
cratic style of dress which is worn naturally and gives distinction, something
specific which delights with its difference.

In the song "Sevdalinka" (sevdalinka being the famous genre of
Sarajevo urban music), the whole country becomes a person one relates to—
Bosnia is personified in a figure of a young, tearful shepherdess who "said her
name was Bosnia // a strange name for a girl..." In this song Balašević spells out again his credo, which asserts that the essence of a human being is precisely his/her internal connectedness or relatedness with the others which cannot be deterred by such crude divisions as national ones. He sings: "Nekom Drina teče desno // nekom Drina lijevo teče [the river Drina marks a border between Bosnia on the west and Serbia on the east] // ma sve da teče u dubinu // na dve pole sveta se sastanemo // znam tajni gaz, moje lane // most se pruži gde ja stanem // sve da vuku me konji vrani // nema meni jedne strane // dok si ti na drugoj strani." ["To some people the Drina flows to the right // to some people to the left // but even if it were flowing into the depths // cutting the world into two halves // I know a secret crossing, my fawn // the bridge lies itself down where I stand // even if I were pulled by black horses // there is no one side to me // while you are on the other side"]. It is the subject's own most intimate part, aspect, or side that is missing when "you are on the other side." And "their worries worry me," regardless of the fact that they are Bosnians and I am a Serb, because the two—they and I—are not radically separated as the aggressive nationalist rhetoric would have us think. On the contrary, they and I are connected in complex ways through some old ties of not only friendship ("the friends are mentioned hundred times in a prayer"), but also shared dreams and shared identity: "Nekad smo se bratimili po pogledu // sluteći da isto sanjamo // i bogu je prosto bilo // krsimo se ili klanjamo." ["Once we became brothers by looking at each other // guessing that we had the same dreams // and it was the same (irrelevant) to God // whether we cross ourselves or bow"] The basis for connection with the others is "the apprehension of the common dreams," which emerges when the two people look at each other and recognize in each other a kindred soul—what matters is this kind of substantial kinship, and what emphatically does not matter, even to the God, is whether one bows (as in a Muslim prayer) or crosses oneself (as in a Christian prayer), i.e., whether one is a Muslim or a Christian.

Balašević's songs, in short, subvert the nationalist discourse and ideology primarily by creating a different, non-nationalist vocabulary of human relations and identity. Balašević's songs create people who do not bind along the national affiliations but along personal affinities. The loss of lovers and friends, parts of language and culture, ways of relating, and places associated with now adversarial nations is always experienced as a loss: Balašević sings "If I could just pass through Ilica [Zagreb's main street] one more time...." At the same time, that which is lost is brought back and retrieved precisely through the lyrics' detailed memory of it—lost Zagreb, for example, includes the streets Ilica and Vlaška, the statue of "strašnog bana" [count Jelačić] marking the central Zagreb's square, the national drink gemišt, the old Serbian term šokica repeated in a refrain, which sounds like a pure word of endearment in comparison with the more recent, violently sexist and racist marking of
Croatian women in the Serbian language. The employed musical genres exhibit an irreverent, not nationally bound variety: the mix includes Argentine tango, Sarajevan sevdalinka, Hungarian chardash etc.

Given the above discussion of Balašević’s music, one can argue that another one of the reasons for his popularity with Croatian public lies in his songs’ creation of a generic vocabulary, so to speak, of anti-nationalism, a vocabulary and attitude which were severely proscribed in Tuzla’s Croatia. Two more points about Balašević need to be mentioned at closing. Firstly, his popularity in Croatia is often ascribed to the sentiment of Yugo-nostalgia, yearning for the lost past of the life in the former Yugoslavia. But if there is any nostalgia, it seems that it relates mainly to the lost facets of everyday life which existed in the past and have disappeared in the present, rather than to the political entity of the previous country. What people seem to mourn together with Balašević is the sense that before they felt more as “one with the world,” that they had open borders, passports with which they could travel anywhere, “flags which were sown by the needles of the record-players” rather than by national inclusions and exclusions, and in some ways better lives. What is also missed is the sheer sense that it is fine to indulge in bitter-sweet memories of the idealized recent past and in nostalgia—as yearning for this past—as such; missed, in short, is the sense that it is all right to have any past at all, given the much-trumpeted allegation that the all-important country and nation had just been properly born. In Croatia of the nineties, the era of the former Yugoslavia was so proscribed (Yugoslavia was commonly called the “Serbo-communist dungeon of the Croatian people”) that any mentioning of any positive aspect of that era or of an unrelated event simply happening during that era was indirectly cast as improper and therefore avoided. One had the sense that it would not be quite in order to say loudly even the most innocent things such as, for example, how one had spent a marvelous summer on one of the Croatian Adriatic islands some years ago, because at that time those beaches were still full of Serbs and Bosnians, Croatia was still imprisoned in Yugoslavia, “times were so bad for all the true Croats,” and so on. One lost large parts of one’s personal past because they were inextricably bound with the collective past of the former Yugoslavia, which was now squarely proscribed. Balašević’s songs, therefore, may function as a much needed catalyst for recognition and re-appropriation of the lost personal and most intimate past. Secondly, Balašević’s songs also re-create the vocabulary of private intimate life outside of politics; e.g., the song “Like a Wave”, which focuses on the union of two lovers in which the “malicious and false face of the world dissolves in a moment.”
Into the present times

Balašević’s music, Danilo Kiš’s writings, films like *Wounds*, and many other Serbian artifacts had their intense, though inconspicuous, life in the Croatian culture of the 1990s because they provided this culture with the aspects which it needed, and because they enlarged considerably the newly-impoveryished (at least in some ways) Croatian cultural vocabulary. Serbian things were thus popular not because they were Serbian but, paradoxically, because they were or had become *Croatian*—needed by the Croatian culture and integrated into it. It is impossible to say how much of an influence Serbian culture really exerted in Croatia in the 1990s, given the fact that its reception existed largely outside of the representations by the media or academic attention. But it is safe to say that it was there in a rather strong and varied fashion, and present much more than previously supposed.

It is hard to say how the dynamics of Serbian culture within (and merging with) Croatian culture are developing at the present in the post-Tudjman era, given the relatively short time the new Račan-Mesić government has been in place (about one year), and the typically slower pace of cultural changes when compared with the political ones. However, we can nevertheless note at least a few apparent developments. Firstly, there are more public presentations of Serbian and Bosnian cultural events, with great attendance and media attention. For example, Goran Bregović, formerly the leader of the Sarajevan rock-group *White Button* and now primarily a film composer who lives in France, held a hugely successful concert in September 2000 in Zagreb, and Biljana Srbijanović’s play *Family Stories* was performed in Rijeka before a full house, and received rave reviews. These events are perceived by Croatian cultural commentators as exciting new encounters between Serbian and Croatian culture after a ten-year-hiatus in which Croats knew nothing about things Serbian. But that is obviously not the case: the present, more visible presence of Serbian culture in Croatia should be more properly seen as the surfacing of underground trends which were there all along during the era of “high nationalism,” and not as the appearance of something entirely new. And the whole Croatian culture in the last decade and up to present times should be reconsidered accordingly.
Chapter 3:  
The Catholic Church and Croatian Statehood  

Vjekoslav Perica

From 1975 to 1984, the Catholic Church in Croatia commemorated thirteen centuries of evangelization of the Croats. The jubilee, known as the “Great Novena – Thirteen Centuries of Christianity in the Croat People,” was not only the most massive and ambitious religious undertaking in the Church of Croatia, but also a recapitulation of the long history of the Croats. The Church, operating within a restricted but still relatively broad space of religious liberty which facilitated the Great Novena, sought to promote a revisionist history consecrated by autonomous Catholicism in then communist-ruled Yugoslavia. The new history symbolically as well as explicitly announced urbi et orbi that the small Croat nation had survived for thirteen centuries, above all thanks to the Catholic Church which together with native ethnic princes in the seventh century C.E. brought the Croats into the “sphere of Western civilization.” Thus, the Great Novena created the myth of Croatia as a “western country” guided through history by its national patriotic Church. The historical truth, however, is that the Catholic Church, finally staffed by all-Croat native bishops and given the honor of the first native saints since the 1960s, has played a crucial role in Croatian society and politics only very recently, specifically in the decade before and during the decade after the collapse of communism.²

Croatian nationalism, including its recently influential clerical wing, claims not merely cultural, ethnic, and religious continuity since the seventh century to the present, but also a political one expressed through various forms of autonomy and statehood in which, allegedly, the clergy always decisively participated and brought about results beneficial to the Croat people. This myth was forged, among other things, in response to two key anti-Catholic myths. The first originated in the Serbian Orthodox Church and within Serbian nationalism, which has characterized the Catholic Church as alien, “unslavic”, and antinational. The second myth was a product of Marxism and Yugoslav communism, which perceived religion in general and Catholicism in particular as smoke screens obscuring the real sources of poverty and injustice, while the clergy promoted ethnic hatred and remained serviceable to foreign rule and the exploitation of the people by the ruling classes.
Again, although the anti-Catholic myths were exaggerated and in some respects untrue, an objective look at the past and present still shows a picture quite different from the role which the clergy attributed to themselves. In fact, clerical politics never brought about any success in the long Croatian quest for national freedom and effective statehood. Some forms of autonomy which the Croatian nobility and Croatian-populated provinces enjoyed during the centuries of foreign rule were secular, never ecclesiastical, and only some individual clergy took part in the struggle for autonomy, and then mostly on the cultural front. During the interwar Yugoslav kingdom, again, the Church vied with Belgrade’s centralism and the rival ultranationalist Serbian Orthodox Church for ecclesiastical autonomy and Church-state accommodation, but the form of Croatian home rule known as the Banovina of 1939 was the result of a political deal between secular forces, the Belgrade Cvetković government and the Croat Peasant Party, which, although allied with national Catholicism, was otherwise never decisively influenced by Catholic clergy.

A relatively greater, though not yet crucial Church influence in state and society, could be observed during the pro-Axis regime of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), 1941–45, but as clerical influence was growing, the negative results of new forms of statehood had multiplied and harmed both the image and the basic interests of the Croat people. In 1941, the Ustaše, consisting of only some two hundred-strong radical Croatian nationalists, established the NDH above all thanks to foreign occupation which otherwise brought about significant territorial losses, and consolidated power on the domestic front with help of nationalist clergy and prominent leaders of the Catholic lay movement. The Ustaše emphasized the Church’s role in the making of the new forms of statehood and nationhood, and Church leaders assisted local and national governance. Some clergy became leading Ustaše. The Catholic Archbishop of Sarajevo, Ivan Šarić, and his general vicar Krunoslav Draganović, sought to fuse Roman Catholic faith and Ustaše ideology. The Bishop of Banja Luka, Josip Garić, was a member of the Ustaše organization. A significant number of Catholic clerics and lay leaders wore Ustaše uniforms, and some became the regime’s officials. According to Croatian historian Fikreta Jelić-Butić, twenty-five Catholic priests held offices in the Ustaše state and eleven clerics joined the Ustaše in massacres of the civilian population, mostly Serbs, Jews, Roma (Gypsy), and supporters of the communist-led Partisan liberation movement. The NDH, however, was not officially recognized by the Holy See, even though the Pope sent a legate to Croatia’s capital Zagreb.

Under communism, the Church vied to preserve its property and autonomy, albeit facing several cycles of the regime’s persecution. However, after the amelioration of Church-state relations in the aftermath of the Second Vatican Council (1962–65), Catholicism was growing stronger and more
ambitious, especially regarding the clerical role in the making of Croatian nationhood and independent statehood. In the mid-seventies Slovene sociologist of religion Zdenko Roter argued in his study on Church-state relations in Yugoslavia that Catholicism in Yugoslavia "was the most vital force, with the best developed and widely expanded organizational structure and most visibly developed universal character... Besides, the Church's hierarchical structure operates more efficiently than any other religious organization's leadership, the clergy is the best educated and the Church as a social institution has demonstrated the highest degree of flexibility and adaptability to social change." Furthermore, one of the remarkable successes for the Croatian branch of the Catholic Church was the development of missions abroad in the Croatian diaspora. In the 1970s, the Church maintained a total of 515 pastoral workers and their assistants abroad, including 252 priests and 263 nuns and laypersons, to work in 192 Croatian missions and parish centers (114 in Western Europe and 78 in the Americas, Australia, and South Africa). Needless to say, the Church's foreign missions poured hard currency into the country so that thousands of new Church facilities and pastoral centers were built. Interestingly enough, Church leaders did not support the Croatian nationalist movement of 1967–71, because its most prominent leaders were Marxists and no one in the movement counted on the Church as part of the desired new Croat state's leadership. Consequently, the rise of the political significance of Croatian Catholicism actually began with the movement's collapse in 1971–73. It was bolstered by the Great Novena and reached its pinnacle in post-communism.

The rise of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s provided for the politically ambitious Croatian Catholicism the challenge and necessary outside threat to which the Church responded as the major mobilization framework for the unfolding new Croatian nationalist movement. In the 1980s, a "new Serbian history" was in the process of being written concurrently with the ethnic nationalist mobilization of Serbs aimed at restructuring the communist federation of six republics and two autonomous provinces within the largest federated republic of Serbia. This "new history" was influenced by Serbian nationalist ideology, Serbian Church historiography, Serb émigré myths and propaganda, and Holocaust and genocide studies developing in the West since the 1960s (according to which the Serbs identified themselves with the Jews). It argued that that the NDH was above all an instrument of genocide against Serbs conceived by the Croat Ustaše, who emulated Nazi practices. The NDH genocide, argued Serb historian Vasilije Dj. Krestić, among many others, targeted the Serb people for annihilation, while the idea of genocide grew not only out of the Nazi example but above all from Croatian culture, religion, and national character. The new Serbian historiography, to which both Church and secular historians had contributed, emphasized the role of religion as the
key catalyst of Serbo-Croat hatred, designating the Roman Catholic Church as the chief carrier of hatred and the inspirer of the idea of genocide against the Serb people. After inaugurating this new history, the Serbian nationalist movement argued further that, allegedly, another Independent State of Croatia was in the process of re-emergence in what was then the Socialist Republic of Croatia (at the time still ruled together by Croat and Serb communists devout to the communist patriotic ideology of multiethnic “brotherhood and unity”). Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were cautioned by Belgrade nationalist agitators to prepare for a possible repetition of the genocide of 1941, arm themselves, and win full autonomy in the territories predominantly populated by Serbs.

Reacting to this, the Catholic Church welcomed the 1989 foundation of the ethnic nationalist party Croatian Democratic Community (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – HDZ), under the nationalist historian Franjo Tudjman. Tudjman earlier distinguished himself by denying the Serbian “new historiography”, although he inclined toward minimizing NDH crimes against Serbs and Jews and explaining the Ustaša phenomenon as Croat anger caused by great Serbian hegemony visible in both Yugoslav states and during the pre-Yugoslav period in the nineteenth century. Monsignor Pave Žanić, who was the Bishop of Mostar in the 1980s, told this author in an interview that all Croat bishops admired Tudjman’s politics, scholarship, and personal courage. Tudjman was at the same time a good and a bad choice: good because he was a Partisan during the Second World War, and not an Ustaša, but bad because he was a red fabric for the raging bull of Serbian nationalism, since he used historical scholarship to debunk Serb myths, not in the name of “brotherhood and unity”, but in order to exculpate the NDH and prepare the ground for another independent Croatian state. In spite of his communist past, Tudjman was sufficiently nationalistic and ethnocentric to earn the Catholic Church’s sympathies. A strong and rigid man, and a former communist general, Tudjman made the bishops feel less afraid of the Serbian menace.

Exiled anticommunist and anti-Yugoslav organizations, as well as some Croatian Church missions and parishes in North America, were the earliest allies of Tudjman and the chief financial contributors for the HDZ. Tudjman conducted fund-raising campaigns among exile Croat communities with the assistance of the Croatian Catholic missions. Catholic priests such as Franciscans Ljubo Krasić from Canada, Tomislav Duka from Germany, and other Croat clerics from Croatian parishes and missions in the diaspora, raised millions in hard currency for Tudjman’s electoral campaign. Father Ljubo Krasić, a Herzegovinan Franciscan who had served as parish administrator in Sudbury, Ontario (Canada), with his fellow Herzegovina natives Gojko Šušak and Ante Beljo from Ottawa, and others from the so-called “Norval group” with which Tudjman collaborated during his American tours between 1987
and 1990, supplied Tudjman with dollars as well as his most reliable cadres. Šušak would become Tudjman’s defense minister and Beljo took over as the HDZ’s propaganda chief. Later, Šušak served as Tudjman’s chief aide in Croatian military campaigns in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1992–95.

The leading Catholic weekly *Glas koncila* favored the HDZ over other contestants in the elections. Many ordinary clerics agitated for the HDZ and some became party officials. Franciscan Tomislav Duka, the Bosnian prelate Anto Baković, and theologians Adalbert Rebić and Juraj Kolarić became members of Tudjman’s party. The friar Duka said in an interview with this author that Pope John Paul II, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Franjo Tudjman were prophets sent by Jesus Christ to finish off communism and bring eternal happiness to humankind. Baković became president of the “Croatian Population Movement”, promising generous rewards for families with more than two children and threatening higher taxes for bachelors and unmarried women under forty. Both the Church and the HDZ promised to the people a national renaissance, epitomized in high population growth and prosperity through the quick privatization of the socialist-era economy, quick admission into the European Union, generous investments by rich countries friendly to Croatia (notably Germany), and the return to the homeland of wealthy Croats from western countries.

The parish clergy campaigned for the HDZ over religious services and festivals and advised parishioners as to how to vote. In the spring 1990 elections in Croatia, Tudjman’s HDZ won a relative plurality of 43 per cent and beat the former communists (now posing as “nationally sensitive” socialists), who gained 34 percent. The clerical support also had a strong impact on the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to moderate Bosnian politician Ivo Komšić, the Bosnian branch of the HDZ was organized and prepared for the 1990 elections through the parish system of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian Catholic bishops and most of the Bosnian-Herzegovinan clergy, contends Komšić, made possible the HDZ’s electoral victory, even though it was obvious that the party’s goal was the dismemberment of the republic and the incorporation of predominantly Croat-populated zones into Croatia.

On the event of the first session of the new Croatian assembly (*Sabor*) on 30 May 1990, the HDZ electoral victory was celebrated throughout the country. The new Church-state symbiosis was shown through the indispensable presence of clergy at every occasion, with worship services, public prayers, and processions. The most valuable Church service for the emerging Croatian nation came on 14 January 1992, when the Vatican led several Western countries to recognize Croatia as an independent state.

Tudjman acknowledged a continuity between the NDH and post-communist Croatia at least inasmuch as both mirrored the Croat people’s will for
statehood. After 1992, in the newly independent Croatia, Tudjman allowed, and in some cases personally initiated, symbolic reminiscences of the NDH. The key national institution—a national council or assembly known long ago under the common Slavic term Sabor (community, popular gathering, assembly)—adopted the unique Ustaša title Hrvatski državni Sabor (the Croatian State Assembly), which this institution had borne only from 1941 to 1945. Former Ustaše, returning from exile, appeared in public, and many were honored with high state offices and pensions. Streets in two Croatian cities were named after one of the top Ustaša leaders during the Second World War, Mile Budak, executed by the communists and therefore, supposedly a hero. The Ustaša leader (poglavnik), Ante Pavelić, was commemorated in public meetings and in churches full of eminent individuals from the country’s political, cultural, and business circles. Militant neo-Ustaša groups attacked opposition leaders, disrupted opposition rallies, and physically attacked union leaders and antifascists who commemorated the World War II Partisan resistance. Right-wing rallies were frequent, the most massive and terrifying held in the coastal town of Split, at one time a center of the Croatian labor movement and communist antifascist resistance, but after 1990 increasingly populated by newcomers from Herzegovina.

HDZ militants sought to cleanse the Croatian language of words common to Serbs and Croats, and delete vestiges of the communist era and Serbian culture in Croatia. More than 3,000 memorials dedicated to the World War II antifascist resistance have been dynamited or otherwise damaged. According to the Croatian World War II veterans’ association, which labored on rebuilding destroyed monuments, this symbolic destruction was not merely a spontaneous outburst of HDZ militancy but in some cases planned activity carried out by the ruling party, state, and Church.

Although Tudjman’s Croatia, in contrast to Pavelić’s state, did not include Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Zagreb regime considered a portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina to be de facto part of Croatia. A HDZ branch loyal to Tudjman was set up in Herzegovina’s administrative capital, Mostar. Herzegovina’s HDZ was responsible for the outbreak of the Croat-Muslim War in 1993. During the Bosnian War 1992–95, the Zagreb government sent Croat divisions to protect Croatian interests, that is, to prepare the ground for the partition of the former Yugoslavia’s heartland. To maintain the Croatian enclave in Herzegovina, Zagreb employed 22,000 state, military, and police officials, provided pensions for war veterans, and covered other costs needed to facilitate the possible annexation of the predominantly Croatian-populated province.

The Catholic Church has become de facto state religion in Tudjman’s Croatia. On 30 November 1998, only two days before the second papal visit, the national assembly, Sabor, ratified a package of “treaties” regulating rela-
tions between Croatia and the Vatican concerning the status of the Church in Croatia. The treaty, which quickly became Croatian law, granted permanent financial assistance to the Church from the state budget. Parishes were entitled to financial aid and the clergy obtained pensions from the state pension fund (officials of other faiths were not granted this privilege). The law set terms and deadlines for a swift restitution of Church property confiscated under communism (no other religious institution, private individual, or firm received such guarantees). It also established a military vicariate with eighteen priests and a bishop military vicar (auxiliary Bishop of Zagreb Juraj Jezerinec) placed on the Defense Ministry’s payroll. Needless to say, no other faith was allowed to delegate its cleric to the armed forces, not even without pay. The law also introduced Catholic catechism in all schools as an optional course only in theory, since in practice non-attendance involved the stigma of “un-patriotism”. The Church even insisted upon religious instruction in pre-school and daycare centers. Candidates for positions in the state bureaucracy had to provide letters of recommendation from parish priests and bishops, as well as warrants about Holy Communion, confirmation, and children’s attendance of religious doctrine. Even liberal nationalist leader Dražen Budiša said in an interview that “such a favorable treaty the Holy See has never acquired from any other state in the world.” According to a U.S. State Department report on religious freedom in Croatia, Catholicism was de facto a state religion in Croatia while discrimination against other faiths was also observed.

Tudjman’s close aide Jure Radić (earlier a prominent Catholic layman and counsel to top Church leaders) became vice-premier and minister for religious affairs. Radić stated in an interview that all state laws must be based on the Holy Gospel, and announced the abolition of “the communist abortion law which violates the Gospel.” According to Evangelical pastor Peter Kuzmič, all decisions concerning religious affairs and Church-state relations were made through secret channels between President Tudjman and the Bishops’ conference. Kuzmič revealed in an interview that, amidst a public debate about the teaching of an ecumenical religious culture in public schools, Tudjman and the Bishops’ Conference of the Catholic Church, ignoring the debate as well as protests by religious minorities, reached a secret agreement about teaching only Catholic doctrine in schools. The Church launched a national Catholic radio station (“Radio Marija”) and obtained considerable airtime on state-run television. Constructions of Catholic religious facilities were booming. According to a Croatian weekly, the Catholic Church had become the largest construction investor in post-communist Croatia—in 1999, in Zagreb and Split alone, the Church had under construction new Churches and other Church facilities worth 104 million German marks. The gothic Zagreb cathedral was thoroughly renewed and a new shrine for Cardi-
nal Alozije Stepinac was built behind the main altar. Amidst the Bosnian war, the Franciscans from Herzegovina (cashing in on the globally popular Marian apparitions at Medjugorje) built a mammoth church and pastoral center in the Zagreb district of Dubrava worth 12 million German marks. 27

The ruling HDZ officially presented itself as a “Christian-Democratic party” at the fourth general party convention held in February 1998 in Zagreb. It adopted the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church as official party doctrine. President Tudjman’s speeches often included Biblical quotes and analogies, and he regularly attended Sunday masses in the Zagreb Cathedral. Tudjman also took private lessons in Catholic theology. Inspired by his new theological knowledge, Tudjman inaugurated in daily political jargon the concept of the pretvorba (literally meaning “transformation” but also used by the Church as liturgical term for the Eucharistic Transubstantiation) to designate the post-communist privatization. “The Croatian president,” wrote columnist Slaven Letica, “exploited the holy notion of the Eucharist to legitimize the quick and ruthless grabbing of national wealth by the ruling elite.” 28

Tudjman’s construction of the new Croatian nation also included a new wealthy elite and key state and social institutions. The new Croat post-communist aristocracy would consist of some “two hundred families” (Tudjman’s words) selected by Tudjman and the HDZ, and enriched through privatization programs in addition to a few already wealthy Croats returning from foreign countries to their homeland and investing in its economy. Other pillars of society were the military, the intelligence services headed by Tudjman’s son Miroslav, and the Catholic Church. As the state-run news agency HINA has revealed, in the second half of the 1990s, Croatia had put on the Defense Ministry’s payroll the largest number of generals of any country in the world in proportion to the number of inhabitants and ordinary soldiers. 29

Croatia’s intelligence and state security apparatus included the following: domestic security and public surveillance service (UNS) and service for protection of the Constitution (SZUP), both protecting prominent political leaders and fighting various enemies in the country (e.g., ethnic minority organizations, foreign-based and domestic associations for the protection of human rights, various independent voluntary associations and individual social critics, socialists, communists, liberals, religious sects, organized crime and criminal gangs, etc.); counter-intelligence services (SIS, HIS) focusing on foreign intelligence activities in Croatia; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Seventh Department and the Ministry of Defense’s Fifth Department.

Another Church-regime joint venture was a “new” history of the Croat people and its neighbors. An international commission established to supervise the new Croatian school history courses in high schools found that new textbooks minimized World War II Ustaša crimes (barely mentioning the Jasenovac camp) while magnifying the number of victims of communist re-
pression and the crimes committed against Croats by the Serb nationalist militia, the Četniks. A "new" world history was also taught in a similar fashion. Thus, on the sixtieth anniversary of the ending of the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), a pro-regime daily newspaper obscured the causes of the conflict and blamed Spanish communists and the Soviet Union for the persecution of the faith, for having brought about civil war, and for having attempted to promote communist revolution in Spain. President Tudjman himself encouraged the writing of a new national historiography, which portrayed the Ustaše as patriots and blamed Serbs and communists for provoking allegedly sporadic and not excessively cruel Ustaše reprisals. The government established a "Commission for the Verification of the Exact Number of Victims of the Second World War and Post-War Era." Twenty-four of the commission's members were politicians chiefly from the ruling party along with forty historians and experts, most of whom were close to the regime. This commission submitted to the Croatian Sabor a report which minimized the number of Ustaše victims and blamed the communists for most of the atrocities. The commission estimated the total number of killed in the war and after the war at 161,415 among whom 4,797 persons were executed in jails and concentration camps. In the World War II concentration camp of Jasenovac established by the Ustaše, allegedly only 2,238 lost their lives and the total number of Jews executed by the NDH regime was said to be 203. The commission found the communist-led antifascist Partisans and the communist regime of the postwar Yugoslavia accountable for 37,800 executions as opposed to the Ustaše, who allegedly killed 15,705 persons. Domestic opposition and the western media designated the report as scandalous neo-fascist propaganda based on false data.

In October 1998, Pope John Paul II came to Croatia to proclaim the wartime Church leader persecuted by the communists, Alojzije Stepinac, a blessed martyr of the Catholic Church. Stepinac became the central cult figure of the new patriotic ideology in post-communist Croatia. The new Stepinac myth was constructed between 1946, when the communist court sentenced the prelate for wartime collaboration, and 1998, when the pope beatified him and the Tudjman regime made him the patron saint of the new Croatia. The myth is new but creates a link between Croatian medieval principalities and the two modern Croatian states. It commemorates Croatia's thirteen centuries of loyalty to the papacy and its honorable status of a defender of Christianity against rival faiths (Serbian Orthodoxy and Islam) and other challenges, notably communism. The project of the making of the new Croatian nation was thus concluded in 1998, so that Tudjman's death a year later changed little for that matter. The main pillars of the system were the ideology of Croatian nationalism fused with the Catholic faith, a centralized government and its bureaucracy, the military, the police, and the Church. The new Croatia was not quite a replica of the NDH. Its role models seem to be Franco's Spain and
countries which political scientists termed “bureaucratic authoritarianism” in South America.

The clerical support for Tudjman does not mean that all Croatian Christians remained silent about his regime’s flaws. Anti-regime criticism from Catholic clerical and lay circles was obviously more outspoken in Croatia than in the new Serbian-dominated Yugoslavia. Cardinal Kuharić criticized Tudjman’s Bosnian policy and the Croatian army’s cruelty against Serb civilians during the last phase of the war in Croatia. Kuharić’s successor, Archbishop Josip Bozanić, criticized the regime’s privatization laws and was celebrated as hero for months by the desperate opposition media. The Christian ecumenical-oriented theologian Peter Kuzmić, who earlier figured as a friend of the Catholic Church, wrote about the Church’s “uncritical equation between Catholicism, national identity, and patriotism,” and pointed out that some religious leaders, prominent prelates, and Church media often overtly threaten non-Catholics, secularists, and liberals, or atheists who criticize such a Church, calling upon the state to prosecute them and mobilizing public opinion against anyone who dares to criticize the religious establishment. Theologian Bono Z. Šagi wrote about “post-communist neo-communism”, in which the Church supports another ideological monopoly and does not apply the same moral standards to those in power and to the people. Two priests close to the hierarchy, namely, the most popular preacher in the Zagreb Cathedral, Stjepan Kožul, and Josip Ćorić from Split, attacked in sermons and articles the regime’s corruption and the Church leaders’ inaction, although their crusades were short-lived. Eminent Catholic laymen such as Ivo Banac, Chris Cvijić, Boris Maruna, and others also publicly criticized the Church for contributing to the failure of democratization in Croatia and to the country’s international isolation. Catholic priest-sociologist Ivan Grubišić said in an interview that “the Church today, as well as earlier in history, was tempted by the offer of high social status, wealth, and power . . . the Church could not resist the temptation.” In a recent interview, Grubišić argued that the HDZ had destroyed Croatia’s chances for recovery and democratization in post-communism, and noted that no government will find it easy to get rid of the Church-state symbiosis as one of the forms of the new authoritarianism.

The history of Church-state relations in post-communist Croatia had four milestones: 1990, 1992, 1997, and 1998. In 1990, the Church had helped the HDZ to win elections. In 1992, the Vatican was first to grant international recognition to Croatia. In 1997, the Church again assisted the new electoral victory and consolidation of power of the HDZ. In the same year, Croatia and the Holy See agreed on treaties by which Catholicism became the de facto state religion in Croatia. Finally, in 1998, Pope John Paul II came to Croatia for the beatification of Cardinal Stepinac and the symbolic legitimation of the system in which the new saintly candidate became the most revered patri-
otic icon. Throughout the decade, in spite of a few clerical critical remarks, the Church’s supportive course toward the Tudjman regime varied little. It would be a cold comfort for Croatian Catholicism to find itself still less infamous than the Serbian Orthodox Church, whose leaders never uttered a word about atrocities committed by Serb nationalists, otherwise undoubtedly the major driving force of the recent Balkan wars. Finally, this above mentioned mild domestic Catholic criticism of the regime in Croatia, is by no means comparable with what the Catholic Church did in the 1980s in the Philippines, Korea, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Spain in the 1970s, and elsewhere, for which the eminent political scientist Samuel P. Huntington designated it as the driving force of the so-called “third wave” global democratization. The Church in Tudjman’s Croatia had clear examples to follow but it did not. The Serbian threat cannot be an excuse, especially not in the second half of the 1990s. And it seems that not even Serbs were the principal villains in the eyes of the Church, but rather, liberal and leftist Croats.

The only “controversy” of sorts among Church leaders concerning the Church’s support for the Tudjman regime occurred in 1996. In anticipation of the 1996/97 local, regional, and presidential elections, Church leaders debated the corruption issue and the Church’s relations with the HDZ at the regular autumn session of the national bishops’ conference in Đakovo, 3–5 October 1996. The conference’s chairman Franjo Cardinal Kuharić, (who was over seventy-five years old and was supposed to have retired in 1994), insisted on the Church’s independence from the ruling party and government, and urged the Church press and clergy to publicly criticize the regime’s corruption, class tensions, impoverishment and unemployment, and growing crime and police ineffectiveness. He also insisted that Croatia back the legal authorities and the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the well-informed Zagreb weekly Globus, there existed a personal animosity between Tudjman and Kuharić. While most bishops vacillated, the retired Metropolitan of Split-Makarska, Archbishop Frane Frančić, rose as the most outspoken of Kuharić’s opponents. Frančić campaigned in the media, calling on the Church to forge the same kind of relations with the HDZ as the Church in Western Europe used to do with Christian democratic parties during the Cold War. In Croatia, Frančić argued, communism was not completely defeated and might be back under the guise of social-democratic and liberal parties. Eventually, 1997 brought a great victory for Tudjman’s and Frančić’s views and policies. The pope sent Kuharić into retirement, and the HDZ emerged triumphant in the elections. Tudjman was re-elected, the Church-state symbiosis was fortified from the parish to the national level, and the Church reasserted itself as the regime’s trusted ally. Only briefly did Kuharić’s successor, Bozanić, warm the hearts of the opposition by his criticism of corruption and
privatization, but he did not propose any change in the established system and was on better personal terms with Tudjman than his predecessor had been.

Tudjman thus won the battle on the domestic front but seemed to be losing abroad. In the eyes of leading western democracies, the new Croatia has never become a part of the West. The West, to which Tudjman’s country was supposed to belong, could not embrace such an authoritarian regime. Only briefly, during the Serbian aggression on Croatia and Bosnia in 1991 and 1992, was Croatia popular in Germany, while it was never popular in the United States, France, or Britain. Yet, by 1995, public opinion in all the western democracies, including Germany, despised Tudjman’s country, viewing him and Milošević as two of a kind. Tudjman’s foreign ministry found it nearly impossible to arrange official state visits for the Croatian president. Few, if any, world statesmen came to Croatia during Tudjman’s reign except to put pressure and demand concessions regarding the Balkan peace process. Tudjman’s Bosnia policy, his dictatorial manners, faltering democracy, corruption, and reminiscences of World War Two Ustašism angered many in the West, even among the most conservative circles. Influential Jewish organizations in United States, Israel, and elsewhere agitated against the Zagreb regime. This pressure resulted in the trial of one Ustaša war criminal and the dismissal from the diplomatic service of another ex-Ustaša leader. Tudjman sought to appease Jewish groups in the United States and Israel by revising his historical studies on the Second World War, while Croatia also issued official apologies regarding the persecution of Jews in the Independent State of Croatia. Nevertheless, the pressure from Jewish organizations had continued and reached an apex in 1998 with numerous attempts to block the papal beatification of the controversial Second World War Church leader, Cardinal Stepinac.

In the 1990s, numerous reports critical of Croatia’s government were released in the West. Croatia’s already bad international image worsened in December 1999 as the international community accused the Zagreb regime and its extended arm in Herzegovina of sabotaging the peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina by spying on the peacekeepers and undermining inter-ethnic cooperation. Croatia was designated by a United States congressman as one of the gravest disappointments among former communist countries in the transition to democracy. On the occasion of Tudjman’s death, world leaders chose to boycott the 13 December 1999 burial in Zagreb. Thus, during the decade of Tudjman’s rule, the Catholic Church was the only foreign friend of his regime. Small wonder that Tudjman’s last foreign trip was his October 1999 visit to the Vatican.

After the January 2000 electoral triumph for the coalition of Croatian social democrats and liberals, Croatia seemed to have finally begun its real “return” to the sphere of Western civilization. Twelve heads of states and
sixty foreign delegations attended the inauguration of Croatia’s new president, Stipe Mesić, on 18 February 2000. The U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, traveled twice within three weeks to Zagreb, to congratulate, support, and encourage the change in Croatian politics. Yet the new government inherited a ruined country. According to an independent U.S. research agency, in ten years of HDZ rule, eight billion dollars appropriated through privatization and abuses of state budget were taken out of Croatia and deposited in private accounts in foreign banks, with an additional seven billion dollars of profit acquired by top HDZ officials and their partners from these transactions.48 What was once the wealthiest of the six republics in socialist Yugoslavia became an eroding society in which the number of users of illegal drugs rose from 4,000 in 1990 to 13,000 in 2000.49 Antun Bogetic, Bishop of Croatia’s province of Istria on the Croat-Italian border, lamented in a 1992 interview that “thousands young people had left Istria,” and that “many of Istria’s Croats had declared themselves Italians by nationality only to get a job in neighboring Italy.”50 The Bishops’ Conference of Bosnia and Herzegovina met on 9–10 November 1999 in Sarajevo to discuss a massive exodus of young Croat Catholics to western Europe and overseas.51 A survey of young people in Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted by two international organizations in 1999, revealed that 62 per cent wanted to leave the country (from 1996 to 1998, some 42,000 persons under forty years of age went abroad with no intention to return).52 According to the post-2000 ruling party SDP, in 1989, Croatia had 160,000 unemployed and 650 retired persons, and in 2000, the republic had 360,000 unemployed persons with about one million retired who could not survive on their pensions.53 In the words of economist Vladimir Gligorov, Croatia, which had in the 1970s one of the most promising economies in Eastern Europe, became by the late 1990s more autarkic and overall less efficient than the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia.54

The 2000 elections at which Tudjman’s regime was defeated caused much worry in the Church. According to the Ivan Grubišić, Archbishop Bozanič had to tour Church communities to calm down the clergy and convince them that the winning coalition of social democrats and liberals was not the same as the old communists, and that 1945 would not be repeated.55 A Croatian daily published a protest letter written to Archbishop Bozanič by a group of lower clergy, in which the new government was designated as “atheistic and evil”; the Archbishop was said to be a communist sympathizer and the new premier Ivica Račan was accused of atheism, marital infidelity, and drug abuse.56 Račan, however, was a former communist bureaucrat happy to be in power again and seemingly determined to retain the status quo. On Statehood Day, 30 May 2000, the new Premier Račan, (who was chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia in the 1980s), dutifully attended the mass for the Homeland. Over the mass, Archbishop Josip Bozanić
sermonized about what he saw as ten years of freedom and democracy. The Archbishop also spoke about the legacy of communist totalitarianism and Croatia’s martyrdom in the recent Balkan wars. Premier Račan promised in a statement to the press that he would regularly attend Church services.

Račan's appeasement, however, did not work. Like all radical revolutionary regimes, the HDZ did not put up with the 2000 election's outcome. The expected rightist backlash began in the fall of 2000. As an excuse for the new wave of nationalist mobilization, HDZ leaders backed by nationalist clergy, attacked the treatment of several Croat military leaders charged with war crimes by the ICTY and the “traitorous” new government’s collaboration with the Court. After the government had arrested several Croat war crimes suspects (including some whom were also involved in organized crime after the war), a right-wing group which called itself “Emergency Headquarters for the Defense of the Dignity of the War for the Fatherland” launched street protests and a media campaign against the government. Amidst the crisis, extremists assassinated the war veteran Milan Levar, who had testified against Croat war crimes suspects in The Hague. A group of twelve military leaders published an open letter criticizing the government and calling for defense of the honor of the “War for the Fatherland.” The defeated nationalist HDZ party released a pronouncement “to the Croat people in the homeland and worldwide,” calling for resistance against “the communist regime of an anti-Croatian spirit which draws the homeland into a civil war.”

The Catholic Church did not remain passive. In September 2000, *Glas koncila* accused the international community of playing games with the people and being biased against Croats, indicating that the government did not safeguard national interest and patriotic values. Shortly after this action by *Glas koncila*, the Croatian province of the Dominican Order released an open letter to the Republic’s President, in which monks and nuns called on him to resign for allegedly letting the Hague Tribunal charge “the whole Croatian people with war crimes.” In a similar vein, the military vicar Bishop Juraj Jezerinac held fiery sermons at gatherings of police and military servicemen, expressing doubts in the new government’s patriotism and spreading fear that the homeland might be again in danger. The Archbishop of Split-Makarska, Marin Baršić, sent an open letter of support to one of the war crimes suspects who refused to surrender. On 21 September, the national bishops’ conference, meeting at Poreč, Istria, released a statement in which they accused the government of intimidating the people by a demonstration of excessive force, creating a crisis in the country, and paying disrespect both toward the highest ideal of statehood and nationhood and toward the “brave defenders of the independent Croat state, thanks to whom the aggressor was prevented from committing crimes against the people and destroying the Croat state.” Right-wing marches and street protests continued through February and March 2001.
At these meetings, President Mesić and premier Račan were labeled “gypsies”, “traitors”, and “red bandits”, while mobs called for the lynching of the two democratically elected leaders. President Mesić stated it clearly in an interview that a coup attempt, masterminded by the HDZ and other far right factions, was taking place in Croatia. The upheaval was accompanied by terrorism. The Voice of America Croatian Service reported two terrorist attacks in March 2001 in the capital Zagreb. In the first, a Second World War memorial to fallen antifascist Partisans was damaged by a military explosive, and in the second, a bomb exploded in front of city hall.

In neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, the secessionist enclave “Croation Community of Herzeg-Bosnia” and its local HDZ sought conflict with local Muslims and EU authorities. HDZ officials boycotted Bosnian federal authorities and incited riots in Mostar and other west Herzegovina towns. The Catholic Church, led by the Archbishop of Sarajevo, Vinko Puljić, and Herzegovina Franciscan monks, backed local HDZ leaders’ plan to hold a plebiscite in order to secede from the Muslim-Croat Federation and establish Croat “self-administration” or a “para-state”, along the lines of the Bosnian Serb Republic. On 11 November 2000, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina held a pre-plebiscite conference in Novi Travnik. Cardinal Puljić was in attendance and even traveled to Zagreb to win over the new government’s support for the plebiscite. Croatian secessionism backed by the Catholic Church has continued to defy international appeals and threatening sanctions both from the European Union and United Nations. On 22 March in New York, the UN Security Council issued a statement according to which HDZ plans to establish a so-called “Croation self-administration” in western Herzegovina are in violation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The high representative of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Wolfgang Petritsch, described the politics of the Catholic Church as “tragic for Bosnian Croats.”

Meanwhile in Croatia, the Catholic Church’s activity aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected government and restoring the HDZ to power has continued. The national Bishop’s Conference announced that, allegedly, during 2000 and 2001, “an alarming decrease of baptism and Catholic marriages has been observed in the Church.” The pinnacle of the clerical anti-government campaign came in July 2001 when the commission Justitia et Pax (Justice and Peace), affiliated with the national Bishop’s Conference, released a statement in which the government was accused of undermining national unity and tearing apart national identity of Croatia. The statement was described by the liberal priest Grubišić as a “conflict with reason and sanity.” The Church’s pressure on the government, however, coincided with massive street protests and nationalist agitators’ calls for gatherings of millions of Croats determined to “defend their homeland”, and maintained the dramatic crisis unfolding since the 2000 elections. The Zagreb weekly
Nacional wrote that "such vehement anti-government activity as carried out by the Church since the 2000 elections in Croatia had not been dared by the clergy against the communists in Tito's Yugoslavia." The same source revealed that in August 2001 President Mesić launched a vigorous diplomatic campaign against clerical interference in politics in general and clerical support for right wing groups in particular. Mesić complained in a letter to Pope John Paul II and urged the European Union to intervene, which resulted in diplomatic pressure on the Church carried out by ambassadors from several leading western European countries. Nevertheless, the pope and the moderate Zagreb Archbishop Bozanić have encountered stern opposition from a broad front of radical nationalist clergy led by militant rightist prelates, namely the Archbishop of Split-Makarska, Marin Barišić, the bishop of Lika province, Mile Bogović, and the chief military vicar, Juraj Jezerinač.

All things considered, it is difficult to say what most of Croatian clergy found so appealing about Franjo Tudjman and HDZ and why they are so critical of the post-2000 government. Perhaps the most politically astute individuals in the clerical rank-and-file have never had much influence. Or, given the experiences of Pavelić's and Tudjman's states, both having received relatively strong support from the Church, the Church in Croatia lacks the talent to recognize a good government.
Afterword:
The Murky Legacy of Franjo Tudjman

Sabrina P. Ramet

When Tito passed away on 4 May 1980, the slogan one heard throughout socialist Yugoslavia, including in Croatia, was “After Tito, Tito.” Continuity, not policy departure, was the standard to which the country’s elites pledged themselves. Nearly twenty years later, when Franjo Tudjman passed away, no one intoned “After Tudjman, Tudjman.” Indeed, such a slogan would have seemed to blend the macabre with outright burlesque. Moreover, within two months, as Ivica Račan and Stipe Mesić took office, it was clear that Croats could expect a break with the policies of the Tudjman era, perhaps even a radical break, not continuity.

There are several reasons for this difference, among them Tito’s greater longevity in office (thirty-five years for Tito vs. nine and a half for Tudjman) and Tito’s greater political acumen. Nor should the distinctive features of Croatia’s fledgling pluralist system under Tudjman be forgotten. And then again, there was Tudjman’s obsession with symbols—leading him, inter alia, to rename the Dinamo soccer team “Croatia” and to invent royal uniforms in early nineteenth-century style, for the guards he posted in the Old Town. Neither of these innovations survived Tudjman’s death.

That Tudjman polarized Croatian society cannot be doubted. But psychologically, one may say, there was a difference between the reception which Tudjman’s policies found during the war years, and that accorded him after Dayton. Had Tudjman died in December 1995, immediately after signing the Dayton Peace Accords, he would not have had a chance to show his contempt for those accords by contacting Milošević to reopen discussions about partitioning Bosnia. His encroachments upon the independence of certain key media would have been forgiven by many as a measure necessitated by the exigencies of the state of war. Certain conversations reported by the Zagreb weekly magazine, Nacional, much to his posthumous discredit, would never have taken place. Indeed, had Tudjman died in December and had he not taped the conversations held in his office, the aura around him would have been less tarnished, in spite of his policies in Bosnia, in spite of nepotism and cronyism, and in spite of the damaging effects of the corrupt economics of HDZ rule.

Instead, in the four years between Dayton and his death, Tudjman proved that his authoritarian measures were not merely dictated by the exi-
gencies of conflict, but reflected his own personal preferences and insecurities. The continued subversion of the principal news media could no longer be justified by war; at the very least it reflected a distrust of free media enjoying foreign support and a sensitivity to the normal satire to which political leaders are subjected by a free press. And Tudjman’s continued interest in annexing parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina suggested a contempt for the very accords he had signed in Dayton.

As Vjekoslav Perica notes in his chapter for this collection, Tudjman engaged in the selective rehabilitation of the NDH, in order to assert a continuity between that state structure and the new Croatia established in 1990. Yet Tudjman, the former Partisan officer, could scarcely delegitimize the Partisan struggle. The result was an eclectic embrace of both the NDH and the Partisans, as well as Maček’s Croatian Peasant Party, indeed of virtually every notable figure in Croatian history from King Tomislav to the Kaiser’s loyal retainer Josip Jelačić, to Tito, to Tito’s Croatian rival Andrija Hebrang, to Croatian liberal Ante Starčević to the Austrian Kaiser himself, Kaiser Franz Josef. In spite of an embrace of some symbology associated with the NDH (as Perica notes), Ante Pavelić remained beyond the pale for Tudjman and one looks in vain for any formal rehabilitation of the fascist leader, though the commemorations of Pavelić at public meetings noted by Perica were a clue that the HDZ was helping to create a climate in which radical right elements felt empowered. The appearance of restaurants named “U”, “U2”, and “Poglavnik” in the village of Vodinci near Vinkovci illustrates this point.

Tudjman himself variously described the NDH as a “quisling regime” or as a “Croatian state”, and while noting that it is a “historical truth that the NDH committed crimes,” Tudjman also insisted that “...the centuries-long Croatian history cannot be compromised because of a period of four years,... which all European countries went through.” Yet in spite of his ambivalence concerning the NDH, Tudjman transparently hoped that the number of Serbs living in Croatia would be reduced in the course of the war. Indeed, Žarko Puhovski, president of the Croatian Helsinki Committee, has charged that “ethnic cleansing” was one of the goals of Operation Storm in August 1995.

Within this context, as Vjeran Pavlaković shows, Croatian Serbs figured as unwanted “outsiders”. They were, accordingly, subjected to a systematic campaign of media encouragement of hate speech, job discrimination, threats, and the passive condonement of physical violence against Serb non-combatants. Americans should have no trouble identifying a historical parallel in their treatment of Japanese American civilians during World War Two.

And yet, as Gordana Crnković notes in her contribution, there continues to be an underground presence of Serbian culture in Croatia, in which not just Serbian rock music but also Serbian literature, theater, and even slang enjoy a following. This, in turn, serves as a reminder that Croatian society is
not just politically, but also culturally, heterogeneous. The persistent criticism of President Tudjman’s Bosnia policy during the war years was just one manifestation of this heterogeneity.

**The legacy of war**

One of the most obvious legacies of the Homeland War (*Domovinski rat*), as the war is officially called in Croatia, is that the population of the country actually declined from 1991 to 2001. Where the 1991 census recorded a total population of 4,784,265 inhabitants (including about 581,000 Serbs), the census of 2001 records only 4,381,352 inhabitants (with about half as many Serbs as in 1991). These figures do not tell the whole story, however, because tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of those living in Croatia today were residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Vojvodina in 1991, while an even larger number of 1991’s residents either fled the country or died in the course of the war (total casualties estimated at about 20,000). The effects of migration and war were compounded by the fact that, in the years 1991–2001, there were about 25,000 more deaths than births in Croatia.

According to the most recent census, out of 6,746 cities, towns, villages, and settlements in Croatia, some 180 villages and settlements do not have a single inhabitant. To some extent this is a factor of the war, though in most cases this reflects national processes of rural decline.

The war also took its toll on the psychological health of the nation, so that *Nacional* could write of “a quiet epidemic of psychic disorders.” According to *Nacional*, some 400,000 people in Croatia, i.e., almost 10 per cent of the population, sought psychiatric help in 2000. About 38 per cent of these involved schizophrenia, 13 per cent involved alcoholism, 9 per cent involved deep stress and post-traumatic stress disorder, 8 per cent involved depression, and 32 per cent “other”. Among those in the 50–64 age group, suicides are at a 16-year high. According to *Večernji list*, more than 450,000 Croats suffer from depression today.

And there have been economic repercussions—not just of the war, but also of the corruption which spread rapidly in the Tudjman years. Direct war damage has been estimated at 236.4 billion kunas, or US $37.1 billion. As of March 2001, there were some 388,861 unemployed persons in Croatia, reflecting a steady increase in the unemployed rolls since 1999. The national budget is also in trouble, to the tune of a 3.6 billion kuna deficit (as of the end of June). The government had hoped to get through the current budgetary year by selling off the remaining 16.5 per cent shares of Croatian Telecom to Deutsche Telecom for an asking price of 4 billion kunas. But
when the Germans returned with an offer of just 3.3 billion kuna, the government went into crisis, seeming to confront a choice between further reductions in salaries in the public sector, as well as in pensions, child benefits, and so forth, and taking out yet another foreign loan to prop up the state. Croats are scarcely prepared to accept further cuts. Indeed, when the Croatian government announced plans, in June, to cut salaries in the public sector by 10 to 30 per cent, some 7,000–10,000 angry public sector employees assembled at Zagreb’s Ban Jelačić Square to protest the move.

Understandably, many Croats are dissatisfied with their present circumstances. Already in a 1996 poll, 33.1 per cent of respondents said that Croats were best off in the NDH (in spite of the fact that this was during World War Two!), 7.5 per cent of Croats speculated that Croats had never had it as good as in the days of Austria-Hungary, and 4.1 per cent identified the socialist era as the period when Croats lived best. Five years later, some 51 per cent of Croats said that they were better off before 25 June 1991 (i.e., before independence), while only 27.7 per cent of Croats said they lived better now than before June 1991. The remainder presumably either felt that their standard of living was about the same or refused to answer. When asked what was the best thing that has happened since independence, the largest number, 24.8 per cent, said international recognition of Croatia, followed by 15.1 per cent opting for Operation Storm (in the Krajina, August 1995), and a slightly smaller proportion (12.2 per cent) for Operation Flash (in western Slavonia, May 1995). Some 2.1 per cent said that the best thing to happen since 1991 was the death of Tudjman, while the number of persons (if any) who felt that the beatification of Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac in 1998 was the best development in the past decade was too small to be reported. Almost one in five did not know what should be considered the best development. Given the foregoing, and especially Croatia’s difficult economic transition, it may come as a surprise that the current prime minister, Ivica Račan, obtained by far the highest approval rating among Croatian prime ministers since 1991. In a June 2001 opinion poll, Račan was rated “the most successful prime minister” by 30.6 per cent of respondents, well ahead of second-place Nikica Valentić (18.1 per cent), let alone Zlatko Mateša (15.3 per cent) or Franjo Gregurić (15.1 per cent). But obtaining recognition as Croatia’s “most successful prime minister” is not the same thing as winning approval—as shown by the fact that Račan’s approval rating was only 12.2 per cent in July 2001 (13.4 per cent in August).
Coming to terms with the past

The election of Ivica Račan as prime minister and Stipe Mesić as president in January and February 2000 respectively was enthusiastically applauded in Western capitals, where expectations ran high that the new government would break with the nationalism of the Tudjman years and cooperate more fully with the International War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) in The Hague. Six months later, the 54-national Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) gave the Račan-Mesić government high marks for its cooperation with the tribunal and praised its albeit problematic progress facilitating refugee returns.25 In September 2000, the Council of Europe seconded this report, declaring that Croatia had made “significant progress” in the direction of liberal democracy since the death of Tudjman, praising new laws guaranteeing minority rights, and hailing the government’s guarantees of media independence.26 Less than a year later, the Council of Europe had some second thoughts. While still praising the post-Tudjman government for its progress in combatting racism, anti-semitism, and discrimination, it noted that serious problems of ethnic discrimination remained, especially vis-à-vis Serbs and Roma.27 AIM Press reports that Serbs have been excluded from institutions of local government, in flagrant violation of democratic practice, in the post-Tudjman era, and confirms the persistence of discrimination against Serbs.28 That this should be the case is scarcely surprising, when one considers that only a few years ago, President Tudjman was repeatedly asserting that 15 per cent of Croatia’s inhabitants were internal enemies.29

Attitudes about Serbs are, of course, directly connected with attitudes about cooperation with the tribunal. Those having the most negative views of Serbs tend to view all actions taken by Croatian forces during the years 1991–95 as beyond reproach, and therefore to be hostile toward cooperation with the ICTY. Those having a more complex and more modulated view of Croatia’s Serb population are apt to have a more complex and more modulated view of the war, and hence to be more receptive to the idea that Croatian forces committed some war crimes and that cooperation with the ICTY is in Croatia’s best interests. President Mesić probably speaks for many Croats when he repeatedly emphasizes that the identification of individual responsibility for atrocities is the best route to negating notions of “collective guilt”.

Resistance to cooperation with the tribunal has come, in the first place, from veterans’ organizations and from the opposition HDZ. In late September 2000, a group of seven active and five retired generals published an open letter to President Mesić, complaining “that the government was tarnishing the memory of the country’s war for independence by prosecuting alleged war criminals.”30 The following day, Mesić sent the seven active army
generals into forced retirement, thereby sending a clear signal that he was not to be deflected from the policy of cooperation with The Hague. There has also been resistance to the tribunal from among Catholic bishops, even though Zagreb Archbishop Bozanić has expressed his “understanding” for the government’s decision to cooperate with the tribunal.31

In February 2001, Croatian authorities issued an arrest warrant for General Mirko Norac, wanted in connection with the killing of some forty Serb civilians in the Gospić area in October 1991.32 Even before Norac turned himself in, thousands of supporters took to the streets of Split and Zagreb to protest the warrant for his arrest, and protests continued into early July, even as his trial got underway.33 The protests were probably not spontaneous. According to Nenad Zakošek, a prominent political scientist at the University of Zagreb, the 11 February protest (presumably, together with subsequent protest actions) “...was by no means a spontaneous gathering but rather a well-organized action with political goals of some veterans groups and the HDZ.”34 There was even an initiative, cosponsored by Ante Điapić’s Croatian Party of Right (HSP) and the Croatian Christian Democratic Union (HKDU) which would have granted permanent amnesty to all war veterans and terminated the prosecution of veterans and all cooperation with the ICTY. The initiative failed in the lower house.

Yet there were also demonstrations in Zagreb and Pula by anti-nationalists who supported the continuation of the trial of General Norac and cooperation with The Hague.35 Vesna Terselić, a key figure in the Zagreb rally, underlined the importance that all war crimes be prosecuted and guilt individualized.

In the midst of all of this, Carla del Ponte, the chief prosecutor at the ICTY in The Hague, confirmed publicly that she had prepared an indictment against President Tudjman in late 1999, and that the late Croatian president had been saved from prosecution only by his evidently timely death.36 Two and a half months later, after former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević had been arrested and remanded to the custody of international authorities, the satirical weekly Feral Tribune, recalling the 27 March 1941 slogan “Bolje grob nego rob” (“Better a grave than to be a slave”), under which angry Serbs had overthrown the government of Prince Paul for having signed a pact with Hitler, published a composite photo on its cover, showing a grinning Tudjman teasing a handcuffed Milošević under the headline “bolje grob nego rob.”37

With Milošević behind bars and other Serb indictees scheduled for extradition, del Ponte turned her attention to Croatia, rejecting Prime Minister Račan’s objection to certain clauses in two sealed indictments (of Generals Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi) and obtaining from the prime minister a pledge of complete cooperation.38 At this point, the HSLS (led by Dražen Budiša, who had been gravitating steadily to the right since January 2000 and
who had sent out signals of availability for a new coalition with the all-too-
receptive HDZ\textsuperscript{39}), rejected del Ponte’s demand for the extradition of the two
generals. In a vote on whether to accept her demand, on 7 July, nineteen of the
twenty-two members of the cabinet voted in favor, while one member (HSLS)
voted against cooperation with the ICTY and two members (also HSLS) ab-
stained. These three HSLS ministers resigned from the government in pro-
test, provoking a government crisis, while Deputy Prime Minister Goran
Granić, hitherto a member of the same party, remained in the government.\textsuperscript{40}
While the Liberal Party urged Račan to reconstruct the government whether
on the basis of the five parties in the coalition or on the basis of some other
combination (an option which would have depended on parliamentary approval),
four parties on the right, viz., the HDZ, the HKDU, the HIP (\textit{Pokret za Hrvatski
identitet i prosperitet}), and Honos, declared themselves opposed to the ex-
tradition order. In so doing, they declared their opposition to a 1996 constitu-
tional law passed during President Tudjman’s tenure, which committed
Croatia to cooperate fully with the international war crimes tribunal. Prime
Minister Račan, however, spoke for many when he pointed out that Croatia
had no reasonable alternative, if it wished to avoid becoming an international
pariah, but to to cooperate fully with The Hague.\textsuperscript{41} A slender majority of
Croats (50.2 per cent) supported Račan’s position, but Budiša now declared
that the indictment of Gotovina and Ademi amounted to an indictment of all
of Croatia for genocide\textsuperscript{42}—an interpretation specifically and explicitly re-
jected by both del Ponte and President Mesić.\textsuperscript{43} In fact, the two cases are
quite different. According to a reliable source, General Rahim Ademi is a
genuine hero, innocent of any war crimes, but embroiled in Hague investiga-
tions thanks to forged documents supplied by the HDZ in a deliberate attempt
to delegitimize the ICTY. General Gotovina, by contrast, according to my
source, may reasonably be suspected of war crimes, though others contend
that Gotovina too is innocent of the charges brought against him.

Budiša’s challenge provoked howls of protest among those left and
center, risked splitting the HSLS, and elicited a strongly worded warning from
the Liberal International, with which the HSLS is associated.\textsuperscript{44} Finally, on 11
July, amid gathering controversy, Budiša tendered his resignation as president
of the HSLS.\textsuperscript{45}

But Budiša’s resignation notwithstanding, Croatia remains politically
divided. In this calculus, the Catholic Church has been stridently vocal, urg-
ing its flock, in the pages of \textit{Glas koncila}, to support right-wing politics.\textsuperscript{46}
For his part, Archbishop Bozanić has traced the roots of the moral crisis not
only to xenophobia but also to “abstract cosmopolitanism”, according to so-
ciologist don Ivan Grubišić.\textsuperscript{47}
Conclusion

In some regards, Franjo Tudjman styled himself after Tito. Like Tito, he picked the first tangerines of the season on the island of Brioni. Like Tito, he liked to dress in white uniforms and to adorn himself with medals (a weakness of many rulers, of course). Like Tito, he saw himself, in some sense, as the "father" of his people (indeed, probably even moreso than Tito did). And like Tito, he was pleased when people in his intimate circle called him "Stari" (the Old One)—a term of affectionate respect. But unlike Tito, Tudjman considered himself to be a serious historian, and unlike Tito, Tudjman was never able to extract himself from controversy. The first Croatian president’s murky legacy was aptly highlighted in a speech delivered by his successor on the first anniversary of Tudjman’s death. Noting that Tudjman had made an important contribution to establishing Croatia’s independence, Mesić nonetheless emphasized that his predecessor had “conducted an erroneous policy vis-à-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina.”

Be that as it may, and in spite of TV Globus’ subsequent report that Josip Broz Tito was once more “fashionable”, albeit as kitsch, Tudjman is still venerated in many circles—as manifested, for example, in the unveiling of a 25-ton monument to the late Croatian president in the village of Katuni in June 2001. Perica wants to compare Tudjman with Spanish dictator Francisco Franco, and perhaps if Tudjman had had thirty-five years to rule Croatia, as Franco had in Spain, had not had the ICTY with which to contend, and had not taped himself, his government might have moved beyond the xenophobia which accompanied the Domovinski rat, and even mellowed as the dictatorships of both Franco and Tito did over time. But “might have beens” are speculation, not history, and Tudjman will be judged not by what he might have done and what might have been the consequences of what he might have done, but rather by what he actually did and by the legacy he left behind—a legacy of independence and rebuilding, but also a legacy of military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of corruption and theft of the country’s economic wealth (in a syndrome common in the post-communist area), serious economic decline, and a growing gap between the rich and the poor, as well as of xenophobia, and a legacy of equating patriotism with support of the HDZ in what amounted to a subversion of democratic political culture. Moreover, as of late August 2001, as forest fires raged in several locations along the Adriatic coast, endangering the lives of citizens, destroying some of Croatia’s natural beauty, and scaring away tourists, a high-ranking government official blamed right-wing opportunists for setting the blazes in order to stir up chaos and promote fear among the population. While it would be reckless to write off the prospects for political moderation in Croatia—to which some of Croatia’s lead-
ing intellectuals and journalists remain passionately committed—the Račan-
Mesić team has failed, at this writing, to live up to early expectations. More-
over, as Nacional writes, “...the strength of the right-wing extremist groups
should in no way be underestimated. Even though their leaders are using popu-
lar paroles [slogans] and massive gatherings to incite disregard for the law and
democratic principles, their lies and demagogue[rie]s can still fall on fertile
ground, especially in a country still in a deep economic crisis, with unhealed
war wounds, and poverty.”

53
Endnotes for Introduction (pp. 9–12)


3 During street demonstrations against the current government in Split, protesters carried signs referring to the president and prime minister as “red bandits” and “red rats”, implying that they are still communists.

4 Ustaša forces wore black uniforms, and some members of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) wore, until recently, black shirts in order to display their affinity for the NDH and to intimidate ethnic Serbs.

5 *Novi list* (Rijeka), 1 July 2001, p. 10.

Endnotes for Chapter One (pp. 13–30)

1 This political ideology is traced back to Ante Starčević’s (1823–1896) and Eugen Kvaternik’s (1825–1871) Croatian Party of Rights, although many of Starčević’s ideas were actually well rooted in the liberal democratic tradition. It was the twentieth century successors to the Croatian Party of Rights, such as Josip Frank’s (1844–1911) Pure Party of Rights and Ante Pavelić’s (1899–1959) Ustaša, which advocated the use of violence — particularly against Serbs — to create an ethnically pure state.

2 The results of a poll published by the Ministry of European Integration showed that “80 percent of the respondents have a positive view of the EU and that 70 percent favor Croatia’s joining that body.” See Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty *Newsline*, Vol. 4, No. 146 (1 August 2000).


All of the population statistics come from the 1991 census, which can be found on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia (www.mvp.hr). The ethnic structure of Croatia has been greatly transformed by the war from 1991–95, due to a massive influx of refugees from Bosnia, the expulsion of a significant portion of the Serbian population, and emigration to Western Europe, the United States, and Australia by those seeking to escape the economic crisis and war zone. A new census is scheduled for the spring of 2001, although many Serbs worry that Croatian Serbs still living as refugees in other countries will be excluded and thus their true numbers will be underestimated for future participation in the parliament, which allots a certain number of seats for minorities based on population. To be counted
in the census, individuals need to have resided in Croatia for at least a year, which would exclude many of those returning after the election of the anti-HDZ coalition.


11 *The Situation of Hungarians in Croatia*, report from the Hungarian Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, online version www.htmh.hu.

12 Interview with Fatmir Limaj, an official in Hashim Thaçi’s PDK party and former officer in the KLA, in Seattle, Washington (3 August 2000).


14 Estimate population figure given by Bojan Munjin, specialist on minority issues at the Croatian Helsinki Committee (HHO), during interview in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).

15 *Jutarnji list* (Zagreb), 12 September 2000, p. 15.

16 Report on Roma in Croatia, Minorities at Risk Project (University of Maryland), online version www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar.

17 The Ukrainian minority (estimated at 6,000 members) held its three-day festival in Slavonski Brod. *Novi list* (Rijeka), 17 September 2000, p. 8.


22 Interview with Bojan Munjin, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).

23 The arrest of Croats accused of war crimes in the summer of 2000 in both Croatia and Bosnia did result in protests from right wing groups and veteran’s organizations, who accused the new authorities of tainting the image of the Homeland War. This indicates that much of the nationalist mentality regarding the war remains, and that the new government cannot act too recklessly in persecuting all those who had profited during the war. Despite some vocal incidents against the arrests, polls published in the daily Večernji list show that 51.8 percent of respondents thought that Croats accused of war crimes should be tried in court, while 29.3 percent said that they should not. See Večernji list (Zagreb), 3 September 2000, p. 3.

24 Most judges in the Croatian court system were young and inexperienced, with about 60 percent working less than five years. Interview with Bojan Munjin, Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000). See also U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Reports for 1999 – Croatia, online version, section 1.d, which reports that “bureaucratic inefficiency mars the [court] system,” the “judges were inexperienced and did not consistently apply the rule of law,” and that “local authorities often refused to implement court decisions.” The Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) of the American Bar Association has been active in Croatia since 1993, helping to draft laws and train personnel at all levels of the judicial system. See CEELI Update, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 7–8.

25 Goldstein, Croatia, p. 124.

26 Ibid., p. 157. Goldstein estimates that the exodus was in the tens of thousands up to as many as 200,000.

27 Interview with president of the Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS), Ivan Jakovčić, in Glas Istre (Pula), 30 May 2000, online version on the IDS website (www.ids-ddi.com).


29 Ibid.

30 In Croatian the IDS stands for Istarski Demokratski Sabor, or Dieta Democratica Istriana (DDI) in Italian. The party was founded on 14 February 1990.
31 Interview with Livio Matošević, IDS Secretary for Personnel, in Pula, Croatia (20 August 2000).

32 Interview with Ivan Jakovčić, in Glas Istre (30 May 2000), online version.

33 Ibid.

34 Interview with Orijano Otočan, IDS Secretary for Information and Youth, in Pula, Croatia (22 August 2000).

35 Ibid.

36 This is the term favored by Jovan Mirić, a political scientist at the University of Zagreb, in his book of collected essays, Demokracija i ekskomunikacija, and seems to be a fairly accurate interpretation of what happened in Croatian society regarding the Serbian population.

37 For a critical evaluation of the later Tudjman years, see Second Class Citizens: The Serbs of Croatia (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).

38 Ibid. pp. 49–52.


40 Hrvatski Helsinski Odbor za Ljudska Prava, CHC Statement No. 94 (Zagreb, 19 March 1999), online version at www.open.hr/com/hho.

41 Human Rights Watch reported that 13,575 people from Eastern Slavonia who were granted amnesty were not notified by the Croatian government, impeding their possible return. See Human Rights Watch: World Report 1999, online version at www.hrw.org.

42 Vjesnik (Zagreb), 16 July 2000, p. 3.

43 Jutarnji list (26 February 2000), p. 32.

44 Interview with Martin Mayer, OSCE Media Advisor, in Knin, Croatia (2 September 2000).

45 Večernji list (13 March 2000), p. 5.

47 Interview with Bojan Munjin, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).

48 Interview with female Croatian refugee, in Vukovar, Croatia (18 September 2000).


50 The SDF (*Srpski Demokratski Forum*) is involved primarily in promoting Serbian cultural and religious identity, but also “affirms and protects human, civic, and political rights of all citizens in the Republic of Croatia.” See their website at [www.sdf.hr](http://www.sdf.hr).

51 *Identitet*, No. 42 (August 2000). The subtitle of the journal is “the independent newspaper of Serbs in Croatia,” and it receives funding from the Croatian government’s Office of National Minorities and various NGOs.

52 Interview with Nenad Jovanović, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).


54 *BBC News* (10 February 2000), online version at [news.bbc.co.uk](http://news.bbc.co.uk).

55 HRT website (23 July 2000), [www.hrt.hr](http://www.hrt.hr).

56 Interview with Nenad Jovanović, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).

57 Interview with Bojan Munjin, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000). This view was also expressed by some locals on the street in Knin, 2 September 2000, who said that only the elderly were returning and that promises to repair some outlying villages were never fulfilled.


60 For an excellent analysis of the media and the war in Yugoslavia, see Mark Thomson. *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina* (London: Article 19, 1994).
61 Interview with Martin Mayer, in Knin, Croatia (2 September 2000).

62 Interview with Milivoj Djilas, in Zagreb, Croatia (13 September 2000).

63 Interview with Bojan Munjin, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).


67 Interview with Nenad Jovanović, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).

68 Interview with Bojan Munjin, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).

69 Interview with Čedomir Višnjić, editor of the Croatian Serb publishing company Prosvjeta, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).


72 *Slobodna Dalmacija* (Split), 16 May 2000, p. 7. The Četniks were Serbian nationalists during the Second World War who committed atrocities against Croats and Muslims, and were later accused of collaboration with the Axis forces by the Partisans. While numerous Serbian paramilitary units actively declared themselves as Četniks, many non-Serbs refer to Serbs in general as Četniks, just as Serbs often generalize all Croats as Ustaša.


74 Interview with Bojan Munjin, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).

75 Interview with Nenad Jovanović, in Zagreb, Croatia (20 September 2000).

76 *Večernji list* (26 May 2000), p. 4. Djapić has also stated that Montenegro is actually Croatian (*Večernji list*, 19 August 2000, p. 4) and that money should
not be spent on the return of Serbs until all Croats have returned to their homes (*Jutarnji list*, 22 August 2000, p. 8).

77 See *Jutarnji list* (21 September 2000), p. 4; and *ibid.*, 22 September 2000, p. 9.

78 *Vjesnik* (12 May 2000), online version www.vjesnik.hr.


80 Pupovac, *Čuvari imena*, p. 137.

81 *Vjesnik* (19 April 2000), online version www.vjesnik.hr.

82 *Vjesnik* (9 February 2001), online version www.vjesnik.hr.

**Endnotes for Chapter Two (pp. 31–54)**

1 In the planning stage of this issue of the Treadgold Papers the present chapter had been envisioned as the general one on Croatian culture in the nineteen-nineties and into the new century. Such a broad topic, however, had soon proven to be unmanageable, and requiring more of a book-length study than a single article. If we take the concept of culture which does not limit itself only to the works of high art and the trends in popular culture, but also includes all the numerous aspects of the culture of everyday life, we can see that the nineties have brought a great number of radical changes to the Croatian culture. At the beginning of the decade the country had become independent from the former Yugoslavia and soon recognized as such by the international community. The war with the rump Yugoslavia ensued (or rather with Milošević’s Serbia and the Yugoslav People’s Army, dominated by hard-line Serbian nationalists and aided by some portion of militant Croatian Serbs), and left Croatia in 1992 without a third of its territory and with a gravely damaged economy, as well as with the heightened general nationalist sentiment. Croatia later took part in the war in Bosnia (about which more later), and regained back its own territory in 1995.

During that whole decade the country had gone through enormous economic, social and cultural changes. Yugoslav economic “socialism” (characterized by an uneasy tension between state and party governance and free market elements) had been replaced with the process of so-called “privatization”—which was presented as the first step to the fully free market economy but has later been proven to be simple appropriation of goods (bits
and pieces of Croatian economy) by the members of the ruling elite. While some got enormously rich, the majority of population got severely impoverished. The major social values, propagated by the Tudjman’s government and government-controlled media, changed drastically—Croatian nation and Croatian state became everything and got identified with the ruling party and especially the president of that party and of the country itself (Franjo Tudjman). The criticism of the government was identified with the criticism of the state and independence as such, and the critics (especially opposition journalists) were intimidated, sued, and harassed. The past was radically reevaluated—the infamous NDH, a Croatian World-War II fascist puppet state set by the Nazis and ruled by the Ustaše, was seen as the predecessor of the independent Croatia of today and thus as not bad; Croatian anti-fascist struggle of the same period, well-peopled by both Croats and Serbs of Croatia and led by Yugoslav Communist Party (the head of which was Yugoslav post-war life-long president Josip Broz Tito, incidentally a Croat himself), was seen as Yugoslav and communist and thus as bad. (All of this without regard to the fact that NDH happily gave to Mussolini’s friendly Italy large parts of Croatian coast and Istria, which Tito’s partisans later regained back; and without regard—or actually with approval—of NDH’s bloody record of elimination of Croatia’s Serbs, Roma, Jews, as well as Croatian partisans, communists, anti-fascist intellectuals and citizens, and so on.) The ultra-right forces were, if not outright condoned, often silently allowed to do as they please: the innumerable monuments to partisan struggle had been destroyed all over Croatia, the Ustaše memorabilia were sold on the Zagreb’s main square market (especially in the early nineties), and Tudjman himself went on record proposing that the dead Ustaše and partisans be put in the same tomb, because they all fought for the same, Croatian, country.

The very names of collective spaces changed—streets, squares, factories and so on lost the names they had or got in the previous communist era, and got new (or in some cases old, pre-communist) properly national ones. Some changes provoked steady and fierce protest (as, for example, the change of the name of the Zagreb’s “Square of the Victims of Fascism,” whose name was owed to the fact that the infamous Ustaše jail that claimed many lives was placed there, into the “Square of the Croatian Rulers”), but all of the changes undoubtedly caused a lot of confusion and anxiety in the already thoroughly shaken country. One man had told me: “They changed the name of my street, the house number, the name of my factory, the name of my child’s school, the name of the neighborhood square, all my documents, the name of our currency ... I am just waiting to have my own name changed as well!”

In short, one can safely say that almost everything changed in Croatia in the nineties—the value systems, official and public culture, the Croatian language itself (about which more later as well), the educational programs,
the way people reacted to each other, the way they lived, talked, and behaved. Some people went along with the powers-to-be and profited from joining in; some resisted by voting the opposition (Tudjman never got the majority of votes in Croatia) and making the difference in their work places or their homes (opposing the often illegal practices of privatization, for example, although that opposing was often unsuccessful, or privately helping some ostracized people); some opposed Tudjman’s government in a more outspoken and public way and were victimized on account of it. And during the nineties, of course, the whole political and cultural situation did not “stand still.” It changed slowly but surely—the nationalist euphoria subsided, the regime got more militant in ruling its own increasingly unruly and dissatisfied citizens, the country hit rock bottom of economic insolvency, unemployment, and poverty, and it also got isolated internationally. At the end of the decade, HDZ lost elections to the Mesić/Račan government of reform, and to the coalition of oppositional parties. It is too early to say how this change has affected the culture of everyday life, but it can probably be said that at least the official culture of high nationalism (xenophobic, hateful, and paranoid) has hopefully come to an end.

As mentioned at the beginning, the above brief sketch of some of the aspects of the Croatian culture of the nineties and beyond deserves a much more elaborate study than is possible in the space of this article. In the present work this preliminary outline should primarily serve as a background for my own topic, which relates to the so far not discussed (and, to my knowledge, not much perceived) specific aspects of the culture of anti-nationalism which existed in Croatia in this very same period of “high nationalism.”

An important feature of the Croatian cultural scene in the 1990s is an almost palpable inferiority complex shared by many in the government and the opposition, which delegated to the others—the so-called “World” or the Western countries—the authority to evaluate one’s own worth, cultural and otherwise. This inferiority complex replaced the enlightened “this writer should be read because she/he writes good books” with “this writer is good because so and so (from abroad) says that and we should all be ashamed for letting him/her leave our country.”

Tito’s Yugoslavia had perceived itself as actively finding and creating the “third way” (neither capitalist West nor Soviet East but socialism with some elements of market economy, neither NATO nor Warsaw Pact but Non-Aligned Movement), and had consequently seen itself as different and in some ways better than the other countries. I would argue that this political sentiment had, for better or worse, taken some hold in the general population. In contrast to this, Tudjman’s Croatia literally bred the cultural inferiority complex.
3 The most well-known Bosnian Croatian writers are Ivan Lovrenović and Miljenko Jergović, the popular author (both in Croatia and abroad) of Sarajevo Marlborough, Mama Leone, Nazi Culture, and other books.

4 The properly significant place in the Croatian canon was often denied even to Miroslav Krleža, arguably the greatest Croatian writer of the twentieth century, because of his communism, friendship with Tito, and his alleged Yugoslavism.

5 The other reason for this blindness may be a more prosaic one—closeness and certain cliquishness of Croatian cultural circles.

6 One of the three founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement, Tito established close ties with numerous African, Asian, and Latin American countries. Tudjman’s Croatia derided those on account of returning to Europe.


9 Ibid., pp. 130–31.


11 It is important to mention that intellectuals did not divide along national lines: one of Kiš’s main defenders was Zagreb University’s professor Predrag Matvejević. I would argue that this was only one of the many examples showing, firstly, that Croatian and Serbian nationalism was not an ahistorical constant of a Yugoslav cultural space but rather an ideological and political option which went in and out of use during the twentieth century (and was not there beforehand), and, secondly, that the re-activation of nationalism at the end-of-the-century, i.e., the response to the enormous crisis which took the form of nationalism, had in its genesis the prior and indispensable division between nationalist and non-nationalist intellectuals. The Serbian nationalism, after all, is commonly seen not as “people’s” spontaneous creation but as being directly started and articulated by the ignominious Referendum of SANU (Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences). With the help of Milošević’s government, nationalism did not go from people to intellectuals and government (though, of course, it postured as being nothing else than the voice of the
people), but rather from the intellectuals to the people.


13 Zagorje is the region of Croatia north of Zagreb.

14 Balašević’s emphasis on the positive side does not mean that he does not have critical songs in his opus. On the contrary, the first part of his newest album, *Devedesete* [*The Nineties*], is all criticism of what Serbia had become in the nineties. The songs such as “Devedesete,” “Balkanski tango,” and “Pero gluperdo” [“Pedro the Stupid One”] are all more or less ironic or humorous indictments of nationalism in general and Serbian nationalism in particular.

**Endnotes for Chapter Three (pp. 55–70)**


5 From the author’s article in the Croatian weekly *Nedjeljna Dalmacija* (Split), 1 July 1990, p. 19.

6 For more information on the Croatian Church’s foreign branch and the data on sacred rebuilding under communism, see chapter two in Vjekoslav Perica’s *Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).


12 In 1990, Duka became deputy minister for labor and social welfare. In an interview with the author, this Franciscan friar said that a large amount of the money he raised for Tudjman in Germany, would be allocated (according to a deal between Tudjman and Duka) for social welfare programs and aid to the unemployed affected by the economic transition from socialism to capitalism. By 1995, Duka left the HDZ and became Tudjman’s critic. The author’s interview with Duka appeared in Nedjelja Dalmacija (2 December 1990), p. 7.

13 According to one-time Tudjman’s close aide Josip Manolić, the Yugoslav Secret Police kept track of all of Tudjman’s activities abroad. See Nedjelja Dalmacija (30 December 1999), p. 22.


For example, at the Founding Convention of the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) in January 1990 in Zagreb.


*Feral Tribune*, No. 753 (19 February 2000), online version at www.feral.hr.

Večernji list (Zagreb), 3 May 2001, online version at www.vecernji-list.hr.

Quoted in *Globus* (Zagreb), 4 December 1998, p. 22.

According to the *Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 9 September 1999), in the section on Croatia the report reads as follows: “while there is no official state religion, the dividing line between the Roman Catholic Church and the State often was blurred, and the ruling party throughout the period covered by this report attempted to identify itself closely with the Catholic Church.” Cited from *Voice of America, Croatian Service* (10 September 1999).

*Feral Tribune*, No. 685 (2 November 1998), online version at www.feral.hr.


*Globus* (Zagreb), No. 458 (17 September 1999), pp. 58–61.

*Tjednik* (Zagreb), No. 3 (22 March 1997).

According to Christian theology, *transubstantiation* is the mode by which Christ’s presence in the Eucharist is brought about through the conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the body of Christ and of the whole substance of the wine into the blood. “After the inauguration of the term
pretvorba by Tudjman in 1990,” writes Letica, “the notion of the pretvorba has become the generic term for all operations aimed to transfer socialist state property into private hands thereby abusing religious sentiments of the people . . . the greatest mystery of Christianity would come to designate the “miracle” performed by the Croatian nouveau riches by the conversion of the nothing into substantial personal wealth.” Globus, No. 418 (11 December 1998), author’s translation.


30 Jutarnji list (Zagreb), 9 May 1998, p. 5.

31 Slobodna Dalmacija (Split), 9–10 July 1999, online version at www.slobodnadalmacija.hr.


33 See Vladimir Žerjavčić, Opsesije i megalomanije oko Jasenovca i Blajburga (Zagreb: Dom i Svijet, 1997), p. 5.

34 Voice of America, Croatian Service (22 October 1999).

35 Feral Tribune, No. 781 (2 September 2000), at www.feral.hr.

36 Bono Z. Šagi, “Krina morala” [The Moral Crisis], in Kana - Christian Family Review (June 1997); and “Neokomunizam i postkomunizam” [Neo-communism and Post-communism], in Kana (September 1997).

37 Vigenac (Zagreb), No. 106 (29 January 1998), online version at www.matica.hr/Vigenac.

38 Feral Tribune, Nos. 821 and 822 (June 2001), online version at www.feral.hr.


40 Davor Butković, Slaven Letica, and their collaborators contributed with a valuable analysis of Church-state relations in Globus (11 October 1996), pp. 9–10.
Tudjman earned a bad name in the West as early as the 1980s (especially in Jewish circles), as a historian who termed the Holocaust as a myth analogous to Great Serbian myths and cast doubt on figures of Holocaust victims. See Robert D. Kaplan, “Croatianism: The Latest Balkan Ugliness,” in *New Republic* (25 November 1991), online version at www.tnr.com.

In 1997, the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Vienna designated as war crimes suspects Argentine citizens of Croatian background Dinko Šakić, a former commander of the Jasenovac camp, and Šakić’s wife Nada, who ran a prison for women. The Šakićs were extradited to Croatia for a trial. Nada Šakić was released. The commander of Jasenovac, Dinko Šakić, was given a twenty-year jail sentence for war crimes and crimes against humanity, but was not tried for genocide.

As already indicated in note 24, in 1996, Tudjman’s book containing his revised views on the Second World War was published in English as *Horrors of War*. During the first top-level official visit of a Croatian state delegation to Israel, on 12 May 1998, Granić paid visit to the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial center in Jerusalem where he laid a wreath on behalf of the Croatian government and released a statement by which Granić “expressed and testified to the deepest regret and condemnation of the persecution and suffering and the tragedy of the Jews on Croatian territory . . . during World War Two and the Nazi occupation.” See *Associated Press* (12 May 1998), online version at www.ap.org.

For example, in the 1998 annual report on development of democracy in the world issued by the U.S. non-governmental organization Freedom House, Croatia was classified as “partly free country” with a downward trend in democratization (eighty-three countries, including the ex-Yugoslav republic of Slovenia, are designated as free according to this report, while the Serbo-Montenegrin Federation is marked as “unfree”). See *Voice of America, Croatian Service* (30 December 1998). In October 1999, the European Union decided to deliver two official diplomatic protest notes critical of the Electoral Law and organizations of the forthcoming parliamentary elections in Croatia, and non-cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, but appealed to the United States to restrain from imposing economic sanctions on Croatia lest it ruin its economy and aggravate the political crisis in the country. See *Voice of America, Croatian Service* (23 October 1999). Also in October 1999, a non-governmental organization for the struggle against corruption, Transparency International (TI), released an annual report according to which Croatia’s regime is one of the most corrupt in the world (Croatia is ranked at seventy-fourth place, while Milošević’s Yugoslavia is ninetieth among ninety-nine
countries included in the report). See Voice of America, Croatian Service (26 October 1999). Human Rights Watch released in December 1999 annual report on Croatia, according to which “serious restrictions of human rights and political liberties are the legacy of Franjo Tudjman and his regime.” See Voice of America, Croatian Service (21 December 1999).


46 On 21 October 1999, Christopher Smith, member of the U.S. House of Representatives and chair of Congressional Committee for security and cooperation in Europe, issued a report entitled “When Will Croatia Become a Democratic Country?” The Smith report explicitly stated that ten years after the demise of communism, Croatia has failed to become a democratic country because of an authoritarian and corrupt regime in Zagreb. See Voice of America, Croatian Service (22 October 1999).

47 Such comments were released, for example, by the German television Deutsche Welle, and Voice of America, Croatian Service, on 13 December 1999.

48 Globus (8 June 2000); and Voice of America, Croatian Service (17 July 2000).

49 Voice of America, Croatian Service (20 June 2000).


51 Voice of America, Croatian Service (10 November 1999).

52 Feral Tribune, No. 789 (28 October 2000), online version at www.feral.hr.

53 Slobodna Damlacija (11 August 2001), online version at www.slobodonadalmacija.hr.

54 Ibid. (2 June 2001), online version at www.slobodonadalmacija.hr.

55 Ibid. (30 January 2000), online version at www.slobodonadalmacija.hr.

56 Ibid. (3 March 2000), online version at www.slobodonadalmacija.hr.

57 Voice of America, Croatian Service (30 September 2000).
58 **Glas Koncila (Zagreb)**, No. 37 (10 September 2000), online version at www.glas-koncila.hr.

59 **Slobodna Dalmacija** (21 September 2000), online version at www.slobodnadalmacija.hr.


61 **Feral Tribune**, No. 817 (12 May 2001), online version at www.feral.hr.


64 **Nacional (Zagreb)**, No. 283 (19 April 2001), online version at www.nacional.hr.

65 **Glas Koncila**, No. 27 (8 July 2001), online version at www.glas-koncila.hr.

66 **Feral Tribune**, No. 828 (August 2001), online version at www.feral.hr.

67 **Nacional**, No. 306 (27 September 2001), online version at www.nacional.hr.

68 **Nacional**, No. 308 (11 October 2001), online version at www.nacional.hr.

**Endnotes for Afterword** (pp. 71–79)


2 See, for example, **Nacional (Zagreb)**, No. 237 (1 June 2000), online version at www.nacional.hr.

3 See AP (1 June 2000), on *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe* (hereafter *Lexis-Nexis*). President Tudjman’s son, Miroslav, allegedly stole a number of transcripts from the office of the president, including, according to Nacional, almost all of the transcripts relating to secret deals with Dubrovačka Bank, conflicts within the intelligence services, and certain media scandals, especially those involving Ivić Pašalić, a high-ranking functionary in the Tudjman
government and currently a deputy in the Sabor. See Nacional, No. 271 (25 January 2001), online version at www.nacional.hr.

4 This did not prevent the American media from accusing Tudjman of just that, however. On this point, see Slaven Letica, Političko pleme 2 (Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk, 1999), pp. 279–280.


8 Novi list (Rijeka), 14 July 2001, p. 7.

9 Večernji list (Zagreb), 11 May 2001, online version at www.vecernji-list.hr; and Vjesnik (Zagreb), 20 June 2001, p. 3.

10 According to Vjesnik, there are still about 150,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina living in Croatia today. See Vjesnik (16 July 2001), p. 5.

11 Ibid. (25 June 2001), p. 3.

12 Ibid. (20 June 2001), p. 3.


14 Večernji list (3 May 2001), online version at www.vecernji-list.hr.

15 See, for example, Jutarnji list (Zagreb), 14 June 2001, p. 7; and Novi list (1 July 2001), p. 3. For Račan’s recent admission that there continue to be major problems of corruption in Croatia, see Jutarnji list (6 July 2001), p. 5.

16 Croatia Weekly (Zagreb), 15 October 1999, p. 2.

17 HINA (Zagreb), 14 March 2001, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(22 March 2001), on *Lexis-Nexis*. See also *Vjesnik* (16 December 2000) and (17 January 2001)—both online versions at www.vjesnik.hr.

18 *Nacional*, No. 293 (28 June 2001), online version at www.nacional.hr.

19 *Vjesnik* (23 June 2001), pp. 1–2; and *Slobodna Dalmacija* (Split), 23 June 2001, p. 4.

20 Results of a 1996 opinion poll conducted by the Institute for Social Research (Zagreb), shared with me by Alija Hodžić, professor of sociology at the institute, Zagreb, 4 August 1997.


22 Ibid., p. 78.

23 Some 20.9 per cent said that they did not know who was the most successful prime minister. See *Globus* (Zagreb), No. 551 (29 June 2001), p. 24.

24 *Večernji list* (3 September 2001), online version at www.vecernji-list.hr.

25 *Aftenposten* (Oslo), 7 July 2000, online version at www.aftenposten.no/english.

26 Ibid. (26 September 2000), online version at www.aftenposten.no/english.


30 AP Worldstream (29 September 2000), on *Lexis-Nexis*.

Exhumation of the suspected mass grave in Gospić had started in April 2000. See *Croatia Weekly* (21 April 2000), p. 3.


*Večernji list* (29 April 2001), p. 2. Already in March 2001, Nacional claimed to be “...in possession of documentation and witness testimonies that unquestionably prove that the Croatian Army was the classic aggressor in the war in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina.” See *Nacional*, No. 277 (8 March 2001), online version at www.nacional.hr; also *Globus*, No. 494 (26 May 2000), pp. 6–9.

*Feral Tribune*, No. 825 (7 July 2001), cover.

*Vjesnik* (7 July 2001), pp. 1–2; and *Jutarnji list* (7 July 2001), p. 3. See also *Novi list* (5 July 2001), p. 3.


*Vjesnik* (10 July 2001), p. 3. See also *Slobodna Dalmacija* (8 July 2001), p. 3.

*Jutarnji list* (9 July 2001), pp. 1–3.

See, for example, *Vjesnik* (9 July 2001), p. 3.


*Slobodna Dalmacija* (12 July 2001), p. 3.

See his interview in *Feral Tribune*, No. 822 (16 June 2001).


*Vjesnik* (11 December 2000), online version at www.vjesnik.hr.


As announced in *Večernji list* (27 May 2001), online version at www.vecernji-list.hr.

The Croatian military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been sanctioned by a July 1992 agreement between the government of the Republic of Croatia and the government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Fighting broke out subsequently; in Bugojno and Vareš the conflict started when Muslims, failing to obtain the “voluntary” surrender of weapons by local Croats, began shooting at Croats. The Croatian Army subsequently violated the terms of the July 1992 agreement.

*Nacional*, No. 301 (23 August 2001), online version at www.nacional.hr.
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