Regionalism of Russia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: A Case of "Reversed Anarchy"

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About the author of this issue

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The puzzle: missed opportunities for internationalization through the regions

It has become a conventional wisdom in the 1990s that Russia's international interactions could no longer be understood by examining debates and policies emerging in the Kremlin. Since the collapse of communism, the constituent regions and republics of the Russian Federation and regionally affiliated Financial-Industrial Groups (FIGs) took advantage of political and economic decentralization to articulate and conduct quasi-foreign policies of their own—suggesting that Russia had become less and less of a unitary actor in the global arena. According to Russia's foreign ministry, Russian regions in the 1990s signed 1,200 agreements on cooperation with entities in 69 countries and had representatives in 46 countries. In post-Soviet Russia, regional decentralization became a double-edged sword with respect to Russia's foreign relations. On the one hand, regional economic and political fragmentation, or perceptions that it could conceivably increase, presented the Kremlin with the credible threat of, if not disintegration Soviet-style, at least a considerable loss of influence and ability to govern at the periphery of its own state. This threat has been most dramatically illustrated by Chechnya's drive to independence and instability in the North Caucasus.

On the other hand, political decentralization also offered greater opportunities for Russia's incorporation into the world economy and for faster and sustained economic development than those which had been available under a communist government. Without the constraints of a centrally planned, Cold War-driven economy, the governments of Russian regions and republics quickly engaged in international interactions, primarily dealing with trade and investment. Projects to develop free economic zones (most visibly in Kaliningrad and Nakhodka), trans-border free enterprise zones, transport corridors, and special regimes for border crossings and custom clearance quickly emerged both in the regions and in Moscow. For example, the Republic of Karelia proposed a Kostomukhsha transit corridor linking the Kola Peninsula and
Russia's resource rich areas of Arkhangelsk and Komi Republic with the Nordic states and Europe. In Primorskii Krai, which remained a closed city prior to the Soviet collapse, a Tiumen' (Tumangkan) river project was proposed to enhance trade and exchanges among the cluster of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean provinces and lay down a "Northeast Corridor" to speed up cargo transit between China and the West Coast of the United States. Even in the region of Pskov—the only one in Russia where the first competitive gubernatorial election in 1996 was won by a member of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's extreme nationalist and grossly misnamed Liberal Democratic Party of Russia—cross-border business exchanges developed with the neighboring Baltic States and showed the promise of profits and growth. Globalization effects have also been regionally fragmented in Russia, while globalization in Moscow proceeded through McDonald's, IKEA, and Tiffany's, economic globalization in Vladivostok proceeded through Chinese eateries, street markets, and trade centers. Overall, the benefits of internationalization in the regions became tangible by 1993: one simple ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis found that differences in per capita foreign currency inflows accounted at the time for about a third of the variance in per capita regional incomes and that the relationship was highly significant statistically.

And yet, the Russian government generally failed to develop a coherent strategy for taking economic advantage of its regions' newly found potential for integration into the world economy. In its foreign policy concepts, the Kremlin did not emulate the strategies of devolution, subsidiarity, and trans-border regionalism that underwent successful economic and political integration within the European Union (EU). Free economic zones developed slowly (if at all); most regional initiatives to establish transit corridors never took off; and tourism has not become a strategic priority even in gateway regions such as Pskov and Primorskii Krai. In the course of the 1990s, Moscow came to view its primary goal in relations with the European Union as seeking "due respect for its interests" out of concern over EU consolidation and enlargement, and emphasized "bilateral relations with individual EU member countries." Putin's foreign policy concept does not mention, on the other hand, strategies such as pursuing a free-trade agreement with the EU. In the Far East, the Kremlin failed to provide leadership in developing the Nakhodka and Tumangkan free-trade areas and its laws and agencies hindered at least as much as it helped major oil companies to develop deposits off Sakhalin Island. And yet, while
discounting the economic benefits of internationalizing Russia's economy through the "gateway" regions, Moscow amplified concerns over security and territorial integrity. The Kremlin failed to make the internationalization of regional economies a top foreign policy priority despite demonstrable economic benefits. This failure is part of the larger picture of Russia's shrinking share in world trade over the 1990s. Whereas in 1990, the Russian Federation accounted for 2.6 per cent of global exports and 2.7 per cent of imports, in 1999 these indicators dropped to 1.3 and 0.7 per cent.' Why has Moscow seen the internationalization of regional economies as a security threat and discounted economic opportunities? Why have decision-makers in Moscow failed to buy into cross-border regionalism which one scholar has recently described as "an emergent geoeconomic norm?"

This question addresses one of the central challenges facing post-Soviet Russia's foreign policy and, more broadly, the Kremlin's strategies for integrating Russia into the global economy. Vladimir Putin, addressing the Russian foreign ministry employees on 26 January 2001 framed this challenge directly: "In conditions of the mounting globalization . . . our country has to find its place in the world. In that context, our strategic course is aimed at integrating into the world community. It is aimed at developing a broad political dialogue and mutually advantageous cooperation with all who want and who are ready to cooperate with us." What, then, has been so threatening to the Kremlin leaders about finding Russia's "place in the world" that they consistently failed to interpret cross-border regionalism as a facet of "mutually advantageous cooperation" with outside actors? Why did geopolitical concerns trump geo-economic opportunities and norms, especially in the world in which Russia, according to the Kremlin's foreign policy doctrine, saw no security threats from any particular nation-state?

That the Russian leaders failed to interpret integration processes in Europe (and, to a lesser degree, in Asia) as an opportunity to internationalize Russia's economy at the regional level, draws attention to a number of broader theoretical questions. Those questions include the following: When is security and when is economic gain a primary behavioral motivation? On what basis should one predict when security threats would outweigh the prospects of economic gains from internationalization, and when, in contrast, would prospects of economic gains dampen security concerns? Moreover, how could one explain situations—in a generalizable, non ad hoc fashion—under what kind of conditions
these very prospects of economic gains enhance rather than diminish the magnitude of perceived security threats? In other words, not only may it be more difficult to buy increments in security than one would think, but attempts to do so may cause greater insecurity than one initially attempted to reduce.

Toward a new explanation: “reversed anarchy” at the domestic-foreign frontier

To explain the “securitization” of cross-border regionalism by Russia’s leaders in the 1990s, I place post-Soviet Russia’s challenge of “finding its place in the world” in the context of what R.B.J. Walker identified as the “inside/outside problem” in international relations theory.” Walker sees the source of the inside/outside problem in that “both the presence and the possibility of something that might usefully be called world politics or human identity flatly contradict the understanding of political identity affirmed by claims to state sovereignty.” In this sense, the inside/outside problem encapsulates and transcends the debates between the realist/neorealist and liberal/neoliberal (or idealist) approaches to world politics. The focus is on political challenges “concerning the proper relationship between the finite and the infinite, and consequently, those concerning the relationship between the claims of men in general to those of the citizens of particular places.”

Positing the problem this way only begins to illuminate the magnitude of conceptual challenges which confronted the Kremlin in the aftermath of the Cold War. After all, Russia never existed as a nation-state whose boundaries its leaders pledged to defend in a rational-legal fashion. Rather, Russia evolved as an empire or quasi-empire with ever-shifting outside borders and fluid internal administrative divisions. Russia’s external sovereignty until the democratic transition of the late 1980s was never institutionally bound to the requirements of domestic political legitimacy or democratic accountability of its governments before its citizens.

Thus, post-Soviet Russia was simultaneously confronted by what Walker describes as “the puzzles of unity and diversity, presence and absence, and space and time.” If, as Walker argues, it is “within the secure confines of particular states” in the global states-system that “it becomes possible to aspire to the universal,” then post-Soviet Russia’s aspirations to the universal have been severely constrained by the lack of domestic commitment to its confines as a new nation-state. One readily appreciates how making sense of the relative importance of military power and territorial integrity
(emphasized by realists) vis-à-vis international laws, universal human norms, and domestic legitimacy (emphasized by idealists) vis-à-vis international commerce, multinational business, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations (emphasized by complex interdependence theorists) presented a momentous identity and ingenuity challenge to the Russian leaders in the 1990s."

One way to interpret these challenges systematically is to examine Russia's options in what Rosenau calls "a new field of play" in world politics, namely, the "domestic-foreign frontier" characterized by "multiple contradictions:"

The international system is less commanding, but still powerful. States are changing, but they are not disappearing. State sovereignty has been eroded, but it is still vigorously asserted. Governments are weaker, but they can still throw their weight around. At certain times publics are more demanding, but at other times they are more pliable. Borders still keep out intruders, but they are also more porous. Landscapes are giving way to ethnoscapes, mediascapes, ideoscapes, and finanscapes, but territoriality is still a central preoccupation for many people.\(^5\)

Some rules of this new field of play have been explained through integration of theories of international and comparative politics. Robert Putnam developed a metaphor of two-level games suggesting that heads of governments balance between problem solving simultaneously in international and domestic arenas.\(^6\) Heads of government in different states must not only strike deals acceptable to them, but also must win approval for such deals among key domestic constituencies. Thus, domestic political debates become internationalized and international interactions become dependent on domestic inputs. Rogowski demonstrated how exposure to international trade diversely affected domestic political debates depending on abundance or scarcity of capital, labor and land within a state.\(^7\) In other words, the foreign-domestic arena is linked politically through two-level games and economically through international trade's effects on domestic economic cleavages.\(^8\) These two approaches imply that there is a divide ("a frontier") —however wide or narrow— between domestic and international politics. According to one other approach, the domestic-foreign divide is not one of a kind, but one of degree." Interactions among constitutionally sovereign states over time "domesticate" international politics through specialized law-making
institutions and establishment of hierarchies of norms and laws of international behavior. The “domestication of international politics” approach, however, implicitly agrees with all other research programs reviewed above—including neorealism—by acknowledging that these hierarchies are more consistent and formalized within states than among them.

The evolution of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, however, from “strategic partnership” with the West and its institutions toward a “Cold Peace” and “pragmatic” approach suggests a different possibility for the balance of anarchy at the domestic-foreign frontier than these theories would. I start with the assumption that the internationalization of domestic politics and domestication of international politics occur unevenly in a highly complex manner and that states themselves vary on a continuum from strong to failed states. In fact, state failure—or loss of governability and the onset of domestic anarchy—contributed to the dissolution or fragmentation of 113 states around the world from 1955 to 1994. If so, we should be able to find cases in world politics where anarchy at the domestic level is higher than anarchy at the international level (at least in close proximity to a given sovereign state or parts of that sovereign state). Or—since anarchy is hard to operationalize and measure—we would at least find cases where chiefs of government in a Sovereign State X would perceive their capacity to govern domestically as decreasing (hence, a perception of rising domestic anarchy), while simultaneously perceiving the capacity of the neighboring groups of states to formalize or “domesticate” their relations as increasing (hence, a perception of diminishing international anarchy). Structural anarchy becomes reversed. The possibility of “reversed anarchy” (albeit without introducing the term) has been briefly suggested by Bjorn Moller:

While in modernity the inside of a state was supposed to be orderly, thanks to the workings of the state as a Hobbesian ‘Leviathan,’ the outside remained anarchic. For many states in the Third World, the opposite seems closer to reality—with fairly orderly relations to the outside in the form of diplomatic representations, but total anarchy within.22

The elaboration of this very basic conceptualization of world politics—and, subsequently, an analysis of its implications—has been missing in the mainstream theoretical analyses of international relations. Table 1 compares and contrasts the anarchy-reversed argument with neorealist, complex interdependence, and domestic-international frontier perspectives.
I am not arguing that interdependence and dispersion of universal norms have attained such levels that politics within sovereign states is now characterized by greater anarchy (or absence of law enforcement) than politics among sovereign states. Rather, I suggest that world politics is an uneven playing field with

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical perspective</th>
<th>Domestic Politics</th>
<th>International Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realism and Neorealism</strong> (Waltz 1979)</td>
<td>Sovereign governments, territorially defined monopoly on coercive power</td>
<td>Absence of laws, rules, enforcement; security depends on military power distribution within the world system; politics is a zero-sum game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Complex Interdependence</strong> (Keohane/Nye 1988)</td>
<td>Sovereign governments, dependence on international interactions; limited, or &quot;perforated sovereignty&quot;</td>
<td>Integration processes mitigate effects of anarchy, providing incentives to long-term cooperation; security increases with interdependence; politics is a positive-sum game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic-Foreign Frontier</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Two-level games (Putnam 1993)</td>
<td>Sovereign governments; policy choices influenced by incentives from international interaction of heads of government</td>
<td>Structural anarchy, but international interactions influenced by estimated preferences of domestic constituencies; security/cooperation depend on multiple games played at two levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Second-image reversed (Rogowski 1989)</td>
<td>Sovereign governments; economic cleavages shape domestic debates over the benefits of international trade</td>
<td>International trade provides structure in the absence of global governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Domestication of international politics (Suganami 1989)</td>
<td>Sovereign governments; highly formalized hierarchies of norms and laws</td>
<td>Emergent, but less formalized hierarchies of norms and laws mitigate anarchy, reduce insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reversed Anarchy</strong></td>
<td>A continuum of strong to failed states with varying degrees of internal challenges to sovereignty</td>
<td>Unevenly evolving patterns of economic interdependence and institutionalization; security dilemmas arising at the junctures between weaker states and regions with higher levels of interdependence and institutionalization of norms and laws; insecurity in weaker states results from fears of exclusion from areas with higher levels of institutionalization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
varying levels of anarchy and interdependence or institutionalization. Within some groups of states (those within EU and NAFTA) two-level games proceed more smoothly, trade patterns internationalize domestic politics to a greater extent, and hierarchies of laws and norms become denser, more formalized and enforceable than within other groups of states (e.g., Soviet successor states). Similarly, within some (strong) states we would find stable central governments and only marginal sub-national actors challenging constitutional sovereignty over a given territory. Within other (weak) states we would find unstable central governments facing internal military, economic, political, and demographic challenges to sovereignty.

In this sense, the inside/outside problem and the meaning of sovereignty, as articulated by Walker, is also reversed. For an internally challenged state operating under increasing interdependence, sovereignty is less about marking "a distinction between political life inside and a mere relations outside the modern state," but rather about protecting the "mere relations" inside the state from that orderly "political life" outside. Under "reversed anarchy," international interactions outside the state are characterized by what Walker described as "the serious theory of established political community," whereas domestic interactions follow "the depressing theory of guns, bombs, lies, and the occasional butter."

Security dilemma under increasing interdependence

The reversed anarchy approach suggests that heads of government in weaker states (those characterized by higher and/or increasing levels of domestic anarchy) which come into contact with groups of states with increasing levels of interdependence (i.e., with decreasing levels of interstate anarchy) and/or with institutions representing such states would assess threats and opportunities in a predictable manner, with serious and nonrandom implications for policy preferences. In such cases, the prospects of mutual gains from cooperation will be neither automatically discounted (or interpreted in zero-sum terms, as the neorealist school argues), nor automatically treated as an inducement to cooperate (or interpreted in positive-sum terms, as the interdependence approach would suggest). Rather, the assessment of threats and opportunities will depend critically on whether heads of government see international cooperation as likely to reduce or amplify domestic challenges to their sovereign power. As a corollary, threat and opportunity
nuclear equipment to Iran and India and of supporting pro-independence para-militaries in Abkhazia. In fact, under the classic security dilemma one can argue that Russia should see NATO enlargement to the Baltic States after the end of the Cold War as beneficial to its security. Since the absence of territorial claims on other states is a condition for NATO membership, the governments of Latvia and Estonia, in a bid to join NATO and the EU, dropped the claims on Russian territory which they had advanced shortly after the Soviet Union had collapsed. The reversed anarchy perspective explains why Moscow discounted this potential advantage.

Third, under the traditional security dilemma, more vulnerable states would want to belong to tighter institutional systems at the international level. Under reversed anarchy in a world of unevenly evolving interdependence, states perceiving a greater threat from domestic challenges to sovereignty will be more likely to reject tight institutional systems, if the latter are associated with constraints on the government’s capacity to contain or suppress internal challenges. In an internally challenged state, engagement with international institutions would be seen as beneficial only if it is not perceived as fueling domestic anarchy. Hence, Moscow’s preferences for strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) over cooperation with the new NATO, a demand for NATO military operations to be cleared with the United Nations (UN) Security Council (where Russia has veto power), and its opposition to adopting humanitarian intervention as an international norm.

Therefore, the heads of a government in a weaker, “challenged” state at the edges of regions with dense and increasing interdependence would assess the implications of their foreign policy positions by estimating the impact of these positions on internal challenges to sovereignty. Moreover, by originating in macro- or structural processes at the international level, these perceptions are likely to cut across domestic political spectrum and generate cross-partisan support and consensus. The issues associated with these perceptions become something like “mom-and-apple-pie” issues in American politics.

The reversed anarchy model must have some observable implications at the level of threat assessment and policy. Perceptions of internal insecurity due to increasing contact with areas of growing interdependence are likely to focus on key elements of state power, covered in the first four propositions. For
brevity, the term “challenged state” designates a state in which the central government capacity relative to constituent sub-state units and non-governmental actors declines while the same state has more contact with increasingly interdependent groups of states and non-state actors outside its borders.

Proposition 1. Heads of government in a “challenged state” would associate the economic and political autonomy of its constituent units with the diminishing capacity of the center to control the police and the military.

Proposition 2. Heads of government in a “challenged state” would associate increasing international interactions of its constituent units with decreasing sustainability of national economy (though the fragmentation of the national market and the emergence of areas where external economic pull is likely to be higher than incentives to operate with that national market).

Proposition 3. Heads of government in a “challenged state” would associate increasing international interactions of its constituent units with the decreasing legitimacy of state institutions across diverse populations.

Proposition 4. Heads of government in a “challenged state” would associate the economic and political autonomy of its constituent units with diminishing demographic sustainability (i.e., ability to influence population trends and migration flows).

Proposition 5. Heads of government in such states would attempt to increase participation in less tightly international institutions (as in Asia), but emphasize bilateral relations or relations with looser international institutions within areas with higher interdependence levels (as in the Euro-Atlantic area).

Proposition 6. Perceptions of domestic insecurity arising from interactions with increasingly interdependent states would translate into policy responses aiming at restricting and controlling foreign relations at the level of the state’s administrative/constituent units.
The next section presents a plausibility probe of these propositions by assessing Russia's position in the post-Cold War world and Moscow's views, doctrines, and policies regarding external relations of Russia and of Russia's regions and republics.

Anarchy reversed: Russia, regionalism, and security dilemmas of the 1990s

Two fundamental conditions characterized the Soviet Union at the time of its decline and fall: (1) exclusion from the global economy (with the exception of regional trade in raw materials and arms trade) and (2) the disintegration of government institutions designed on the basis of a defunct communist ideology. Combined, these two conditions define post-Soviet Russia as being in a position of structural anarchy reversed. The new Russia emerged as a state in which the authority and capacity of the central government was challenged by regional leaders who declared sovereignty and demanded the redistribution of economic benefits in their favor. The overt challenge of the "parade of sovereignties" from 1991 to 1993 peaked in Chechnia's de facto secession. At the same time internal wars broke out from Moldova to Tajikistan—in the general area that had only recently been governed from Moscow. And just as the Kremlin kept receiving evidence that its military machine failed to reinstate power over Chechnia failed, despite brutal campaigns, regional economic fiefdoms emerged causing analysts and Russian leaders to warn of the impending state disintegration."

This challenge was exacerbated by an institutional vacuum: old communist institutions collapsed and the new institutions had not replaced them. Uncertainty about the rules of the game in the absence of ideological constraints favored rent seeking, asset stripping, and corruption on a national scale," further increasing domestic anarchy. In fact, one could argue that an average Russian in the 1990s, when facing a threat of violence, would see the Interpol or the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations as more likely to provide security than the local police.

Russia at the turn of the 1990s was also an autarkic state coming into contact and increasing interactions with states tightly integrated through trade, capital flows, and transnational institutions. To the West, Russia faced the expanding European Union and NATO. To the East, Russia faced Japan and China whose economies had been integrated tightly with both the world's leading
economic power, the United States, and, increasingly, with the states of the European Union. With major trade and investment flows bypassing it, Russia found itself at the periphery of the grand game of economic globalization. Direct U.S. investment into Western Europe amounted to over $48 billion in 1994 and $72 billion in 1999, in Asia and the Pacific to over $13 billion in 1994 and $29 billion in 1999, and in Russia and all Soviet successor states to less than $1 billion a year during this period.∗

Russia thus presents a perfect case study of the anarchy reversed paradigm and the "reversed" security dilemma. Within this paradigm, understanding of Moscow's assessment of security implications of regional decentralization in the 1990s becomes a critical element in understanding Russia's foreign policy. How did a fundamental transformation of center-periphery relations in post-Soviet Russia affect the Kremlin's threat assessments and subsequent policy responses? What evidence, if any, may suggest that heads of government in Russia in the 1990s have indeed associated greater political and economic autonomy of Russian regions (including ability to conduct international interactions) with challenges to the central government?

Proposition 1: Domestic capacity to control police and the military.

Redistribution of revenue flows among the regions in the 1990s as a result of bargaining with Moscow over taxation, subsidies, loans, and jurisdiction over production assets and natural resources∗ generally weakened Russia's capacity to sustain the military economically. For example, in 1997 V. N. Lysenko, who chaired the State Duma subcommittee on federal relations, concluded in an internal Duma publication that as a result of power-sharing treaties signed between Moscow "some subjects of the Federation have to spend their last pennies on supporting the [federal] armed forces, police, transportation, and communication networks, whereas other subjects spend money on their local projects ensuring a higher standard of living for the local populations and, respectively, acquiring the capacity to purchase the loyalty of government agencies."∗ In other words, richer regions, Moscow feared, would buy off representatives of federal power ministries, thus undermining the center's hold on coercive power. And whereas the Russian military units continued to take orders from Moscow, some developments caused alarm. For example, the governor of Primorskii Krai, Evgeny Nazdratenko, paid a part of wage arrears that the federal government owed to the Pacific Fleet in exchange
for the preferential enrollment of officers born in the region.” A report of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces in September 1998 cited “regionalization” of the armed forces among the causes of psychological stress and low morale among troops. Perhaps more importantly, two massive military campaigns in Chechnia to suppress its drive for independence exposed the weakness of the Russian military and drained resources.

**Proposition 2: Sustainability of national economy.**

A report published in 1999 by the Moscow Center for Strategic Research (CSR, tasked by Putin to develop policy guidelines) on the influence of Russia’s constituent units on federal policies concluded that regional elites engaged in “attempts to develop multiple channels of dialogue with foreign powers.” These attempts, according to Putin’s leading think tank, contributed to the “formation of a unitary government at the level of the subjects of the Russian Federation.” This, in turn, suggested that Moscow had less control over the situation within the regions due precisely to the regions’ capacity to have “dialogue with foreign powers.” This assessment provides some of the clearest evidence that decisionmakers under a “reversed security dilemma” are likely to see internationalization at the regional level as a security threat at the national level. In the same breath, individual attempts by regional elites to foster international ties have been linked to growing capacity of regional leaders to control currency emissions (through surrogate payments), industrial assets, and the flow of goods and services within Russia—all seen as trends destructive to Russia’s common market. The threat of Russia being “squeezed out” of the North and South Caucasus (and, hence, out of the “great game” for the Caspian oil resources) if Chechnia achieved independence contributed to the perception of clear and present threat of Russia’s economic disintegration in the 1990s. Moscow also became alarmed about the capacity of regional governments to impede inter-regional commerce through quasi-customs offices and embargoes, to issue regional quasi-currencies (usually in the form of IOUs), to buy off representatives of federal agencies such as the border and custom services, and to collude with financial-industrial groups on tax evasion and price fixing.”

**Proposition 3: Legitimacy of state institutions across diverse populations (especially regarding vulnerability to separatist/irredentist claims).**
Official statements of the Russian president, the military, police and intelligence service on the threat of external support for Islamic fundamentalists (Wahhabis) in Chechnia and Dagestan provide the strongest evidence that Russia's chief policymakers saw post-Soviet political decentralization as destabilizing the North Caucasus. Not surprisingly, Moscow preferred to resolve the Chechnia issue with the massive use of military power. The Kremlin discerned a threat in the proposals of local business leaders and politicians to set up a Caucasus Common Market with a view of diffusing sovereignty disputes with Moscow. Support of this idea by Jacque Attali, one of the architects of European integration, hardly impressed the Kremlin.

While not mentioning traditional threats of separatism coming from Chechnia and the North Caucasus, Putin's leading think-tank in 1999 saw cross-border migration of ethnic Kazakhs in the southern Urals area and ethnic Armenians in the North Caucasus (Krasnodar Krai) as capable of leading to separatist claims on behalf of these non-Russian ethnic groups. "The separatist leaders of these groups," claimed the CSR report, had "already set the task of creating national-territorial entities based on the idea of the separation of peoples." My interviews in 1999 and 2000 indicate that the leaders of Primorskii Krai, including Yeltsin's former representative in Vladivostok, Vladimir Ignatenko, continued to issue warnings that Chinese migration poses a similar problem of "creeping China-fication" eventually leading to annexation by China of the vast and resource-rich areas of the Russian Far East. According to Ignatenko, speaking as chair of the Krai Duma's committee that deals with migration issues: "If we lifted border controls right now, more than half of [Primorskii] Krai population would be Chinese."

**Proposition 4: Demographic sustainability.**

Whereas Yeltsin and Putin expressed concern with population decline and deterioration of life expectancy in Russia, CSR reported that Russian regions took measures to "artificially 'correct' the demographic situation." This "artificial correction" entailed "illegal and uncontrollable migration" with the number of illegal migrants [primarily laborers] arriving in Russia estimated at 1 to 1.5 million people. The encouragement of illegal migration into the regions, the Center assessed, "posed a threat to the national labor market and criminalized the law enforcement system [i.e., passport and visa service, police, and federal migration service]."
The Center also estimated that by engaging in illicit economic activities these migrants drained the budget of 7 to 7.5 million USD.

Proposition 5: Multi-lateral vs. bilateral orientation.

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation approved by President Putin in July 2000 provides some systematic evidence on this issue. Part IV of the concept—entitled “Regional Priorities”—overviews Russia’s foreign policy objectives in relation to states and international institutions around the world. Regarding the “Euro-Atlantic” region—characterized by dense international institutions and tight economic integration—the concept envisages first and foremost “the establishment of a stable and democratic system of pan-European security and cooperation.” The concept then defines “further development of the multifunctional nature of the OSCE”—one of the more amorphous institutions—as central to this pan-European system. In contrast, the concept sees the need for Russia to stand for itself and “demand due respect to its interests” in relations with the more tightly integrated institutions, the European Union and NATO. Regarding the EU, the document expressed concern over “enlargement, common currency, institutional reforms, the emergence of common foreign and security policy, and defense identity.” Regarding NATO, the concept sees challenges to Russia’s security in the alliance’s enlargement and its new strategic concept that “does not exclude military operations out of theatre defined by the Treaty of Washington without authorization of the UN Security Council.” Reliance on “bilateral relations with individual EU member countries”—Great Britain, Germany, Italy, and France (listed in that order)—then becomes “an important resource to defend Russia’s national interest in European and world affairs.” The document implies, in this sense, that by cultivating weaker but more inclusive European institutions, such as OSCE, and bilateral relations with key European powers, Russia is likely to reduce interdependence in the Euro-Atlantic region that Moscow associates with the NATO and EU enlargement strategies.

By contrast, in the Asia-Pacific region, the foreign policy concept sets as a priority “intensifying Russia’s participation in the key integrationist institutions”—APEC and the regional security forum of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Both institutions, however, are much looser than the EU and NATO. The document also sees Russia as a facilitator of a new interstate institution in the area, the Shanghai Five, embracing Russia, China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Overall, the concept assigns top regional priority to cooperation and institution building within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—an area formerly integrated under Soviet rule where interstate relations have been poorly institutionalized. In the CIS, Moscow sees itself supporting the Customs Union, the Collective Security Treaty, the Russia-Belarus Union, the CIS free-trade area, and a treaty on natural resource sharing in the Caspian Sea basin. This strategy seems to envision engineering a cordon sanitaire of denser interdependence around Russia in Europe and in Asia which—in Moscow’s view—would reduce threats to its hold on power in Russia’s periphery.

Proposition 6: Controlling external relations of sub-national units.

From the mid- to late 1990s, the Kremlin took measures which gradually reduced the regions’ capacity both to influence decisionmaking processes of the central government in foreign policy and to develop their own foreign policies and independent “paradiplomacy.” Moscow also increased centralized coordination of regional initiatives to attract business and foreign investment. Several channels were used.

(1) Treaties on Division of Powers. Whereas power-sharing treaties which Moscow concluded since 1992 with over 40 of Russia’s regions and republics generally redistributed jurisdictions over foreign relations and international trade in favor of the regions, the same treaties also bound regional elites to operate within federal institutional constraints set by the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Federal Security Service, the Defense Ministry, Rosvooruzhenie (Russia’s arms export monopoly), and other federal agencies. In short, while gaining more rights on paper, the regions agreed they would coordinate their initiatives with the federal foreign policy establishment. Considering sheer staff numbers, expertise, and international contacts of the federal agencies, the agreement to coordinate policy ensured that Moscow would have a disproportionately more powerful leverage over the regions and republics than the latter could have over federal policy. The regions quickly found out that they lacked diplomatic personnel, policy experts, analysts, and managers to design strategies for and to conduct foreign relations. In a telling example, in the 1990s no ethnic Tatar who served within federal agencies and had experience with foreign policy responded to the call of the president of Tatarstan, Mintimer Shaimiev, to
return to Tatarstan and staff the Foreign Relations Department in Kazan."

(2) "Regionalization" of federal agencies. Moscow's institutional capacity advantage became evident when federal agencies dealing with foreign relations established regional offices and branches in the regions. The Russian foreign ministry expanded the number of regional offices from three in the late Soviet period to 26 in the late 1990s and planned to open an additional 20 offices in the next few years. Thus, for my visits to Vladivostok in August and September 2000, the academic institute which issued an invitation to me to come to Russia had to get approval for it from the Maritime regional branch of the foreign ministry—signaling, if anything, a tighter federal control over international interactions at the regional level as a result of these institutional changes. Rosvooruzhenie established branches in over a dozen regions, driven by the location of key arms producers. In 1994, Moscow, under the foreign ministry umbrella, established a Consultative Council on Foreign Relations and International Trade (KonSovet) with a mission to coordinate diplomatic support for the interests of Russia as a whole and of its constituent regions and republics. Prior to becoming Russia's foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, had been in charge of KonSovet since 1994. In practice, the KonSovet set out to hold seminars, conferences, briefings, and informal discussions with key regional actors with the purpose of preventing these actors from making mistakes in the international arena and training regional personnel. In the process, the federal center gained both advance knowledge of regional intentions and an institutionalized channel for early intervention in case these intentions were found contradicting Moscow's designs. The economics ministry set up the Foreign Investment Promotion Center to channel all international business contacts originating in the regions through its missions abroad.

In a telling example, Russia's Foreign Ministry held a special meeting on 30 January 2001, attended by President Putin and a group of governors, at which the Russian president "criticized the ministry for not doing a better job in coordinating foreign policy." Responding to the criticism, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned the governors that they should not pursue foreign relations without prior approval from Moscow. Moreover, the foreign minister criticized the governors for maintaining friendly ties with President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus, stressing that "the national interests of Russia and Belarus are not identical," and thus
suggesting that decisionmaking centralization supercedes the stated foal of CIS integration." This clearly stated preference underscores Moscow's acute perception that international cooperation—even with closely related states that Moscow wants ultimately to integrate—poses a threat to domestic governance.

(3) Legislation. The "Law on Coordination of Foreign Relations and International Trade of the Subjects of the Russian Federation" (No. 4F-3, Russian State Duma, 4 January 1999) codified the center's increasing control over international interactions through the following measures:

1. Pre-approval requirement: The law obligates the regions to:

   A. Provide advance notice of conducting negotiations with any entity outside Russia

   B. Submit drafts of agreements with foreign entities for approval of the foreign ministry 30 days in advance.

   C. Register all documents and agreements concluded with foreign entities with the federal government.

   D. Make public all regional agreements with entities outside Russia.

   E. Request approval for opening offices representing the regions outside Russia and offices representing foreign entities in the regions.

2. Status regulation:

   A. The regions cannot conclude agreements which have the status of international (interstate) agreements or treats with foreign governments; the regions' activities abroad are restricted to trade and economic relations, scientific and technological exchanges, and environmental, humanitarian, and cultural projects.

   B. Offices representing the regions abroad may not have diplomatic status, i.e., they may not perform consular and diplomatic functions and their staff may not have
diplomatic immunity (e.g., Tatarstan’s trade mission in Turkey).

C. Disputes between federal and regional agencies are to be regulated by federal law.

3. Activity regulation:

A. Federal agencies are granted the right to “receive information from the government offices of the subjects of the Russian Federation (regions and republics) about activities of the latter related to foreign relations and international trade.” This provision provides the legal basis for the center to intervene in and regulate regional decisionmaking relevant to foreign policy.

B. The law stipulates that federal agencies “render assistance” to regions and republics that pursue international contacts. The scope of assistance is defined as legal support, policy analysis, organization and conduct of negotiations, drafting texts of agreements, and implementation of the same agreements—in other words, the law grants Moscow virtual control over all significant organizational aspects of international interactions of the regions.

With power-sharing agreements, KonSovet, the foreign investment promotion center, and the law on foreign policy coordination Moscow sought primarily to both control and increase foreign investment in the regions. At a KonSovet meeting in December 1997, Igor Ivanov directly linked centralization of the region’s external relations under federal agencies with foreign policy goals: “Attracting foreign investment [into the regions] is crucial for resolving the central strategic task of our diplomacy, i.e., to ensure that Russia becomes one of the poles in the emerging multipolar world capable of actively influencing world affairs.”

Center-periphery relations and foreign policy: evidence of conceptual linkage

The co-evolving trajectories of Russia’s foreign policy and center-periphery relations are evident in the timing of key policy
shifts in each of these arenas. The big picture—a more nuanced examination being beyond the scope of this paper—consists of two distinct phases. The 1991-1993 period was characterized by both a more lenient position of the Kremlin with regard to international engagements of Russia’s regions and a more active pursuit of the economic benefits of cooperating with the rich industrial democracies and of participating in international institutions. By 1993, a prolonged standoff between Moscow and Tatarstan over Tatarstan’s Declaration of Independence and a de facto secession of Chechnia made the central government gravely concerned about its ability to govern diverse and assertive regions parading their sovereignty declarations. At the same time, disappointments over the effectiveness of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and Western economic and technical assistance increased uncertainty of the prospect to gain from pursuing interdependence with rich industrial democracies. The decisions to enlarge the EU and NATO signified increasing interdependence at Russia’s edges.

Thus, Russia faced increasing internal anarchy contrasted with increasing interdependence outside its borders under growing uncertainty of the benefits of this increasing external interdependence. Center-periphery relations in Russia then fed into what may be termed a “negative feedback loop.” Perceptions of growing external interdependence accentuated perceptions of internal vulnerabilities. The enthusiasm of the late 1980s and early 1990s over free economic and trade zones in Russia’s gateway regions precipitously waned. The ensuing stalemate in both economic development and the balance of power between Moscow and the regions then gave rise to concerns over Moscow’s capacity to govern in Russia’s periphery. Perceptions of internal vulnerability to regional disintegration, economic contraction, and demographic decline followed, reinforcing Moscow’s perceptions of external vulnerability, associated with the enlargement and consolidation of the Western alliances (especially, NATO) and regional institutions (such as the EU) and of economic interdependence between China and the United States. The stark contrast between Moscow’s perceptions of Russia’s internal weakness and increasing interdependence of major outside powers—from the Vishnevgrad Group to China—has nourished a security dilemma under “reversed anarchy.”

The year 2000 Foreign Policy Concept directly associates domestic challenges to Russian sovereignty with the increasing interdependence of the major Western states: “Integration
processes, in particular in the Euro-Atlantic region, often tend to be selective and limited. Attempts to downplay the state sovereignty as the fundamental element of international relations pose the threat of unconstrained interference in internal affairs." The concept further emphasized that "strengthening of Russia’s statehood" — meaning stronger central authority — would be decisive for Russia to "gain a dignified position in the world."

In this way, perceptions of international security became inseparable from perceptions of the state of center-periphery relations within Russia. Putin’s Center for Strategic Research argued that by the year 2000 the increased capacity of Russian regions to influence the federal government "posed real threats to sovereignty and integrity of the Russian Federation." Moreover, "in their scope and embedded risks, these threats have become more significant than the recently (January 1999) adopted concept of national security stated they were." The report called for resolving center-periphery and national security issues on the basis of "a comprehensive approach" (kompleksnyi podkhod). The "comprehensive approach" logic explains why Moscow constructed linkages between external interdependence and internal security, overestimating negative implications of Western policies.

For example, the Gulf War came to be interpreted not as an instance of beneficial international cooperation to prevent interstate wars and territorial claims by force, but as an instance of the United States and its former Cold War allies acquiring license to intervene wherever they have economic interests." If the Gulf War could happen over Kuwait, it could — in the view of the head of the North Caucasus military district expressed privately in 1998 — plausibly happen over Chechnia and Dagestan." Similarly, if NATO could muster the resolve to intervene in Kosovo and to help Islamic pro-independence fighters, it could muster the resolve to intervene in the North Caucasus and boost Islamic pro-independence fighters there. Or at least, such actions were seen as capable of generating non-military external support to domestic secessionists and putting pressure on the central government to grant Chechnia independence. Moreover, under the security dilemma, perceived threats escalate rapidly and the non-military involvement of outside powers then plausibly appears to serve as a prelude to military intervention. Hence, Putin’s uncompromising opposition to Western mediation in internal disputes over sovereignty between Moscow and the regions: "We were offered intermediaries to resolve the conflict in Chechnia. We do not need any intermediaries there. That would be the first step toward internationalizing the conflict.
First, intermediaries, then somebody else, then observers, then military observers, and then things will be out of our control.”

Similarly, the Russian foreign policy concept states:

Attempts to introduce into the international lexicon concepts such as ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘limited sovereignty’ in order to justify the use of force without UN authorization are inadmissible.

*A case study of the “inside/outside problem”: Moscow vs. Pskov*

The case of the Pskov region is especially instructive. Covering an area larger than Denmark immediately to the east of Estonia, Latvia, and Belarus, Pskov finds itself at the interface of Russia and the West. Accounting for nearly 500 miles of post-Soviet Russia’s external boundaries, Pskov region encompasses all of Latvia’s and most of Estonia’s borders with Russia. The city of Pskov is equidistant from Riga, Tallinn, and St. Petersburg. By default, Pskov found itself at one of Russia’s critical junctures with the post-Soviet Europe. The Soviet collapse left regional politicians geopolitically shocked. They increasingly had to grapple with foreign policy and foreign trade issues they understood little, while defining Pskov’s strategic role in Europe-Russia relations. This role—largely determined by Pskov’s location—has been traditionally two-fold.

On the one hand, Pskov is firmly associated in the Russian mind with uncompromising resistance to the West’s eastward pushes. Pskov is the site of Lake Peipus, where Russian prince Aleksandr Nevskii—later sanctified by Russia’s Orthodox Church—defeated in 1242 the army of Teutonic knights expanding east. Most of Russia at the time was devastated by the Mongol hordes expanding west. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow used Pskov primarily as a stage for rhetorical saber rattling, evoking this historical role of Pskov.

These geopolitical pressures came out loud and clear in the 1996 gubernatorial campaign, when a moderate Yeltsin protégé and then incumbent, Vladislav Tumanov, running on the pro-government *Nash Dom Rossiiya* (Our Home Russia) ticket, made a major issue in the final weeks before the election out of NATO expansion. Portraying himself as a tough bargainer with Moscow for Pskov’s greater military muscle and citing “NATO’s push to the borders of Pskov region,” Tumanov publicized a letter he had sent to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Defense Minister Igor Rodionov protesting the General Staff’s decision to disband
the 237th paratrooper regiment stationed in Pskov region (and named after none other than Alexandr Nevskii). In an interview with Rabochaia tribuna just a few days before the election, Tumanov said:

Pskov’s Oblast’s situation as Russia’s western border requires the strengthening of the group of forces, not the opposite . . . The weakening of the airborne division is taking place when the Latvian Saeima has adopted the ‘Declaration on the Country’s Occupation.’ It officially advances territorial claims on the Russian Federation. What is meant is the age-old Russian land—part of our Pytalovskii Raion.56

Also, in what appeared to be a concession to nationalist sentiments in an election year, the authorities in the Pskov region administration declared, but did not enforce, a five-kilometer no-go zone along the Estonian and Latvian borders in June 1996 requiring special entry permits.7

On the other hand, Pskov has been Russia’s major trade link to Europe and, at one point, was Russia’s foothold in the prospering Hanseatic League. After the Soviet collapse, political players in Pskov have had many opportunities to see that the West—even with NATO expansion— is not coming to the region with a sword, but with trade carts. If Pskov looks up only to its legacy as geopolitical barrier against the West, it risks ending up as a backwater province with fewer trade carts to and from Europe passing through. With severe shortfalls in federal financing, these economic opportunities have been the sole hope for economic survival precisely in those districts (raions) within the Pskov region which were directly threatened by the territorial claims of the Baltic states. And so, Pskov’s growing cross-border trade with the Balts coincided with the election as governor of a member of Zhirinovsky’s nationalist (and grossly misnamed) Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Yevgenii Mikhailov. In late 1996, Pskov became the only region in Russia where an LDPR member won a gubernatorial race.

Yet this victory was not so much due to the Zhirinovskyites beating the Yeltsinistes at geopolitical rhetoric, but to Mikhailov offering a better vision of regionally sustainable economic development. Whereas at the national level Zhirinovsky ran parliamentary election campaigns in 1993 and 1995 pledging to recapture Alaska and Finland—as well as to build a huge fan to spread radioactive dust over the Baltic states— Mikhailov’s election platform in Pskov stressed regional economic grievances, especially, “the absence of regional financial resource base, and the futility of counting on help from the federal government.”
Symptomatically, when Zhirinovsky toured the Pskov region during the 1996 gubernatorial election campaign, Mikhailov was very seldom seen next to the party leader and, according to one report, “scarcely managed to get a few words into the leader’s monologue.” Putting economics over geopolitics, Mikhailov pushed “the Moscow oblast model,” implying greater regional economic sustainability and lower taxes. Mikhailov’s main campaign slogan — “Clean hands, clear goals” — had little, if any, semantics of geopolitical posturing.⁶⁰

With ultra-nationalism superseded by bread-and-butter issues, the distribution of votes for the LDPR in the Pskov region ran contrary to the general pattern of LDPR vote distribution in Russia. Whereas throughout Russia the LDPR mainly won in regions adjacent to external borders or areas of inter-ethnic conflict, in the Pskov region, the LDPR candidate won more votes in the administrative districts located farther away from the Baltic borders than in the districts where the Baltic States claimed Russian territory.” In other words, Mikhailov carried Pskov while suggesting an economic development program which implied enhancing Pskov’s economic benefits from external trade—irrespective of geopolitical sloganeering of the LDPR’s national leaders.

These acute and complex tensions between geopolitical and geo-economic pressures at the regional level delineated the conflict between Moscow and Pskov. Pskov political elites—under the governors representing distant ideological positions—came under strong economic pressures to engage in cross-border regional cooperation. First, Pskov leaders had to deal with the dependence on cross-border trade under declining post-Soviet economy of nine out of Pskov’s 24 administrative districts (raions) located along the border with Latvia and Estonia. In March 1997, the first deputy governor of the Pskov region, V. L. Vasen’kin, and chairman of the committee on foreign relations of the administration of the Pskov region, Valerii Poberii, used the Russian-Latvian border demarcation talks to promote trade and cultural exchanges between Pskov and the Baltic states. In fact, Poberii’s statement after the talks suggests that by focusing on local socioeconomic and humanitarian issues, the regional and local authorities played a positive role in overcoming political disagreements on border demarcation:

The administrations of [the Pskov] region and of borderline raions constantly search for and find opportunities for cooperation with neighbors across the border. We are now intensively working on procedures that would simplify border crossing for people in frontier
districts who have relatives, familial graves, or real property in adjacent territories. We organize exchanges of delegations on stepping up trans-border trade and organizing joint cultural and sporting events.62

Second, agency policies at different levels of government in Estonia and Latvia (especially those with the financing or prospects of financing from European institutions) have offered their Pskov counterparts tangible benefits which could not be matched by the Russian federal center. A network of relations has been emerging between these officials in Pskov and those in the Baltic states to deal with specific economic and trade issues in cross-border areas, marginalizing geopolitical tensions. I base this conclusion on the analysis of Pskov-Latvia, Pskov-Estonia, and Pskov-Belarus relations from March 1995 to January 1998, namely the analysis of contacts among top officials at different levels of government on at least one side. I tracked down reports of such contacts in the local press (mainly Pskovskaja pravda, Novosti Pskova, and Vechernii Pskov), in various Russian and Baltic news outlets monitored by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), in RFE/RL and Russian Regional Report stories, and in a number of NGO publications, especially Transboundary and Environmental News and Lake Peipus Quarterly. While Mikhailov had no “summits” with the heads of the Estonian or Latvian governments (though he met with Lukashenko), Pskov officials at lower levels had almost four times as many meetings with representatives of Estonia and Latvia as with those of Belarus. Of the 22 Pskov-Baltic states meetings, 11 (50 per cent) focused on trade, joint ventures, cargo transit, and other functional economic issues. Seven (32 per cent) dealt with border issues, and two meetings were dedicated primarily to environmental problems. Of the seven meetings on border issues, three dealt primarily with simplifying border crossing for trade and business exchanges.

Third, the growth and internationalization of private business in Russia and the Baltic states, particularly in the oil and transit sectors, created a whole new layer of actors which did not exist in Soviet times and who now play a role in shaping regional development strategies in Russia. The geo-economics of oil and gas shipments through Russia’s northwest to the Baltic Sea and the converging interests of companies such as Russia’s LUKOil and Estonia’s Pack-Terminal suggest that Pskov would be better off participating in a new Hanseatic League than withdrawing into Fortress Russia.
Strikingly enough, despite these incentives and despite Pskov’s dire economic situation, Moscow’s policies distinctly failed to take advantage of Pskov’s location and enhance the “Hanseatic League” aspect of its regional identity and economic role. Moscow’s programs for Pskov development neglected or misinterpreted the economic gateway potential of the region and, in addition, imposed economic and social costs that the regional leaders found hard to sustain. Thus, “a special federal decree for the socioeconomic development of Pskov Oblast in 1996-1998,” adopted in February 1996 during Yeltsin’s re-election campaign, had the typical trappings of the Yeltsin electoral gimmick. The word “special” meant the funds had yet to be allocated by the legislature. The word “decrees” meant the document could be easily modified by other decrees. And “1996-1998” signaled a short-term approach, clearly inadequate to solve the deeply rooted socioeconomic problems of Pskov. Pskov gubernatorial candidate Mikhailov guessed as much and ran his successful campaign on the assumption that Moscow’s program would not be implemented—an assumption which helped him design effective campaign messages.63

Pskov’s leaders also got a taste of Moscow’s fundamental ignorance of the region’s outlook on economic integration with Europe when Yeltsin was campaigning for re-election in 1996. First, Yeltsin signaled—when Russian bureaucratic doublespeak is translated into plain language—that prospects for turning Pskov into a free-trade zone were remote. Yeltsin talked only vaguely about “a possibility, in principle” to set up a free-trade area in the Russian northwest, to be called “Pleskov”—or Pleskau, as Pskov is known in Germany. Moreover, the only reason Yeltsin cited for setting up “Pleskov” was development of tourism, rather than the easing of taxes and tariffs on businesses engaged in cross-border trade.64 The Russian president bypassed the simple truth that making Pskov an international tourist attraction would require massive investments in the construction of hotels and in global marketing—resources both Pskov and Moscow clearly lack and few outside of Russia would bother to invest.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin continued to charge all goods coming from or through Estonia into Pskov twice the import tariff charged on shipments not going through the Baltic States. Many in the Pskov government saw this as a senseless geopolitical game which hurt the region’s economy. The double tariffs—raised an additional 10 to 20 percent in July 1995—targeted all major items that Pskov could otherwise import from Estonia and Latvia at bargain prices, including cattle, meat, dairy products, vegetables,
sauerkraut, confectionery items, mineral water, roasted coffee beans, tea, fruit juices, flowers, pharmaceuticals, and furniture." Yeltin’s “Pleskau” program failed to address this grievance.

Local officials in Pskov also saw major problems with Moscow’s policy on improving the customs and immigration control along the region’s external border. The major thrust of Moscow-led efforts was the construction of three highway checkpoints at Kunichina Gora, Ubylinka, and Burachki. While increasing the number of highway checkpoints from four to seven, this policy made little economic sense to Viktor Kriuchkov, chief of the motor vehicle control checkpoint at Ubylinka, on the border with Latvia. For one thing, he noted that the cost of each of these new checkpoints was more than $12.5 million, whereas an estimated 95 per cent of contraband could be moved by train. Moreover, whereas the Ubylinka checkpoint was built to handle up to 2,000 vehicles a day, at the time of its opening no more than 60 vehicles a day passed through the checkpoint, according to Kriuchkov. In other words, Moscow’s policy resulted in a poor return on investment for the Pskov region. Kriuchkov tied this inefficiency to two federal decrees. First, the State Customs Committee of Russia established “Rostek,” a company which monopolized the construction and subsequent maintenance of customs facilities. Second, the decree that charged federal agencies to set up railway, maritime, and aviation control points did not provide suitable financing. In addition, Kriuchkov pointed out that construction contracts were given to Finnish, American, and Yugoslav firms, ignoring local construction companies that were starved for jobs. Contracts were awarded without competitive bidding. In the construction of Kunichina Gora complex, Pskov subcontractors got slightly over $2 million of the $12 million contract signed with a firm from Yugoslavia. Besides, the opening of the three new checkpoints was also delayed by several months, since the federal funds were not received on time."

Dissatisfaction with the federal government’s mismanagement has been particularly strong among heads of nine out of the 24 raion administrations in the Pskov region located along Russia’s state border. These elected local administrators, in charge of one quarter of the region’s territory and representing one quarter of the region’s population, remained in power after Mikhailov became governor. They complained that the arrival of border guards and customs employees hampered tax collections in their districts. Municipal budgets in the districts were mandated to provide tax privileges and housing to the federal employees, and to
absorb the maintenance costs for increased usage of public utilities and city transport. The local authorities were not compensated from the federal budget for these rising costs. Local officials have claimed the right to keep a percentage of customs duties to compensate for these costs, but the Finance Ministry in Moscow turned down their demands. Former Pskov governor Tumanov, who at the time of writing was deputy minister for regional development, lamented that even under Ivan the Terrible, 99 per cent of customs duties remained in the localities in which they were collected. Yet his ministry is no match for the Ministry of Finance when it comes to political clout in Moscow. Another major grievance of the district officials in Pskov is that Moscow is withholding ratification of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Trans-frontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities (ETS No. 106) —a legal framework with numerous model agreements designed to galvanize economic development across state boundaries without violating domestic laws.

Patterns of internationalization of Russia’s regional economies

A systematic look at patterns of internationalization of regional economies in Russia in the 1990s—measured as regional shares in foreign trade and direct foreign investment—also suggests that Moscow failed to capitalize on the potential of its numerous gateway regions. Internationalization rather came to depend primarily on economic diversification, the “relationship capital” (such as ease of access to key decisionmakers in federal agencies), urban infrastructure, and population density. The latter enables a critical mass of consumers to ensure the feasibility of new ventures. These factors, as Table 2 demonstrates, trump resource endowment and location close to international borders—the factors which made so many of Russia’s “juncture” regions look promising in the early 1990s. Moreover, according to Russia’s State Committee for Statistics, 10 regions (mostly city of Moscow and Tiumen’) accounted for 60 per cent, or $53.5 billion of the total Russian foreign trade in 1998. Nearly 81 per cent of foreign investment into Russia in 1997 went into just four federation units: the city of Moscow, Tatarstan, Omsk, and Krasnoiarsk. Moscow’s predominance in these interactions suggests that the outlying regions are by and large isolated from the mainstream of international economic interactions affecting Russia.

Thus, other than the city of Moscow (the government of which has largely stayed away from foreign policy decisionmaking),
a proactive strategy for integrating Russian regions into the world economy along the lines of Euro-regions or Chinese coastal provinces.

The reversed anarchy concept also contains broader theoretical implications. First, it suggests that incentives for economic gains from interdependence cannot be achieved in internally challenged states. This is, to a large degree, a counterintuitive implication: should states whose economies need substantial assistance from outside actors not emphasize economic needs over political prestige and territorial security — especially if territoriality has been declining as a factor in world politics? Second, the reversed anarchy paradigm outlines a possibility that a security dilemma would arise not only from international anarchy or collapse of government within states, but also from the prospects of increasing interactions of an internally challenged state with a group of interdependent strong states. Third, facing reversed anarchy, a state is likely to view its security in terms of the “balance of interdependencies.” In other words, such a state would seek engagement with international institutions where it sees prospects for greater influence (these are likely to be looser and/or newer institutions). Concurrently, a challenged state would balance interactions with international institutions in which it has less or no influence by pursuing bilateral ties with their member-states and by creating new institutions where it can expect to play a greater part. These priorities must have a systematic impact on domestic-foreign bargaining games, on domestic disputes over the benefits of foreign trade and on domestication of international institutions.

From a policy viewpoint, the reversed anarchy perspective has implications for strategies designed to integrate domestically challenged states into the global economy. Since this paper presents only a plausibility probe of the new theory, these implications can only be sketched out very broadly. Nevertheless, with regard to Russia, two necessary conditions will have to be achieved: (1) greater inclusion of Russia into Euro-Atlantic institutions and (2) a change of emphasis in Russia’s central government policy from increasing political and economic control over regional governments to “managed decentralization” entailing support for free economic and trade areas and acceptance of pooled sovereignty to resolve protracted center-periphery conflicts. Outside Russia, the reversed anarchy theory should have profound implications for understanding the problems in overcoming the global North-South divide and the resulting tensions. Weak and failed states of the global South coming into contact with strong and densely integrated
states of the global North find themselves in a situation of “reversed anarchy” perhaps even more than Russia. The question to ask and study empirically, then, is to what extent domestic opposition to global economic integration indeed stems from cultural resistance, national pride, or economic miscalculation, and to what extent these or other manifestation of resistance are proxies for deeply embedded vulnerabilities at the edges of anarchy and interdependence.
Endnotes


4 Phillip Hanson, "(1996) Russia’s 89 Federal Subjects," Post Soviet Prospects, Vol. 4, No. 8, <http://www.csis.org/ruseura/psp/pspiv8.html>. The t-statistic for this relationship translates into significance at the 1-percent level (or, p = 0.01).


Ibid., p. 169.

12 Ibid., p. 176.

13 Ibid., p. 177.


Although evidence suggesting that most wars and most deaths from political violence after 1945 happened in conflicts within states, rather than among states, would support precisely such an argument.


31 And while in a state with weak governmental control one would find actors still preferring to take advantage of economic opportunities from globalization (albeit by illicit means), such activities over time would only add to increasing association of globalization with insecurity by the heads of government. Even if such heads of government were bought off with proceeds from international economic activities, they would still be constrained in their public policy by security implications of globalization. They would not be expected to promote greater devolution of powers and encourage independent international interactions of sub-national units.


33 In practical terms, especially with regard to post-Soviet Russia, this entails capacity to prevent separatist and irredentist movements among different ethnic, religious, or other regional groups. The central government will then be particularly sensitive to estimated intention of external actors (states, NGOs, IGOs, corporations, individuals) to support such groups.

34 D. V. Olshansky, Alternative Scenarios of the Disintegration of the Russian Federation, (McLean, VA: Potomac Foundation, 1993); Graeme P. Herd, "Russia: Systemic Transformation or Federal


38 V. N. Lysenko, “Prochna li dogovornaia osnova federativnykh otoshchenii?” [How Strong Are Treaty-Based Federal Relations?] *Sbornik dogovorov i soglashenii mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti Rossiiskoi Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoi vlasti sub"ektov Rossiiskoi Federatsii o razgranichenii predmetov vedenia i polnomochii*. (Moscow: Russian State Duma Press, 1997).


40 Ibid., p. 265.


42 Daniel S. Treisman, “Russia’s Taxing Problem,” *Foreign Policy* No. 112 (Fall 1998), pp. 55–66.

43 Ruud Lubbers, a former Dutch prime minister who conducted Track-2 negotiations over the status of Chechnia with the ex-speaker of the Russian State Duma, Ivan Rybkin, told me that he
did not table his idea of applying “pooled sovereignty” to resolve the Chechnia issue to Rybkin. This decision, Mr. Lubbers said, came after he had been tipped off that the concept of “pooled sovereignty” was viewed in the Kremlin as an attempt to interfere in Russia’s internal affairs and undermine its territorial integrity.

44 Interview, Vladivostok, Primorskii Krai Duma (1 June 1999).

45 Bagramzhiya, “Vliianie sub”ektov RF.”

46 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Kontseptsiiia uneshnii politiki.

47 I am thankful to Nikolai Petrov of MacAlaster College and formerly of the Moscow Carnegie Center’s program studying Russian regions for that information.

48 EastWest Institute, Russian Regional Report Vol. 6, No. 4 (31 January 2001).

49 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Kontseptsiiia uneshnii politiki.

50 Bagramzhiya, “Vliianie sub”ektov RF.”

51 Belaia kniga rossiiskikh spetssluzhb [The ‘White Book’ of the Russian Intelligence Services] (Moscow: Obozrevatel’, 1995), p. 18. This publication presents a summary of discussions by a panel of contributors comprising top officials and consultants working with Russia’s intelligence services (successors of the former KGB).


53 Vladimir V. Putin, Ot pervogo litsa: razgovory s Vladimirem Putinym [In the First Person: Conversations with Vladimir Putin], (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), p. 158.

54 Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Kontseptsiiia uneshnii politiki.


Ibid, p. 2.

See Mikhailov’s election program, “Nash real’nyi shans,” Russkii zapad (Pskov, formerly Pravda Zhirinovskogo—Pskovskii vypusk [Zhirinovsky’s Pravda—Pskov edition]), no. 15, (28 October 1996). Tumanov’s campaign theme (“Let the young people work”), cooked up by his team of consultants from Moscow, failed to address local concerns the same way as Mikhailov’s did. Moreover, Tumanov’s slogan played right into the hands of Mikhailov, who was 33 at the time of the campaign. Vladimir Vagin, “Pskovskii variant gubernatorskikh vyborov” [The Pskov version of gubernatorial elections], Politiia Vol. 1, No. 3 (1997), p. 75.


Obozrenie (March 1997): para. 4.4. Poberii also said that regional and district governments must do more to facilitate registration of joint ventures and ensure enforcement of business regulations.

Pskovskaia Pravda (February 24, 1996), in TEN 2, no. 4 (16-29 February 1996); and Vagin, “Pskovskii variant gubernatorskikh vyborov,” p. 75.

Information provided by Vladimir Vagin, at the time an employee of the Pskov Oblast government who witnessed Yeltsin’s speech.


67 Granitsa Rossi (Moscow: 21 August 1996), p. 5, trans. in FBIS, Daily Report, FBIS-SOV-96-209-S. At the time of writing, in March 2001, Russia was not listed as the CE’s convention (ETS No. 106) signatory, according to the official CE world wide web site <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm>.

68 The Islamic factor—that could be of political significance given that Russia has 20 million Muslims—has also failed to play out consistently in formulation of the NATO/Kosovo response. While Tatarstan leaders made cautious protestations, Bashkortostan leaders kept silent. Ethnicity has also accounted for little differentiation: of the 10 non-Russian ethnic republics that signed power-sharing treaties with Moscow by mid-1996 (Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Sakha, Komi, Kabardino-Balkaria, Udmurtia, Chuvashiia, North-Ossetia-Alania, and Buriatia), only Tatarstan registered any protests to NATO’s action in Kosovo.
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