Reconciliation without Forgiveness:  
The EU in Promoting Postwar Cooperation in Serbia and Kosovo

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Abstract

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International Studies

This paper examines the role and depth of interstate reconciliation in the postwar relationship between Serbia and Kosovo via their interactions with the European Union. Examined within this paper are models of interstate reconciliation, historical examples of this phenomenon, and the unique position that the European Union holds in terms of its leverage over both countries.

Provided first in the paper is a section dealing with the historical importance of Kosovo within Serbian national mythology, the gradual deterioration of ethnic relations during the breakup of Yugoslavia, the eventual outbreak of war and Kosovo's independence, and the subsequent normalization of ties between Belgrade and Pristina. The paper continues to examine several different scholarly frameworks for defining and identifying the concept of interstate reconciliation—that is, its meaning, its components, and its processes—and synthesize them into a useable model for the Serbia-Kosovo relationship. Explored further are the historical cases of post-World War II Germany/Poland, Japan/China, and Turkey/Armenia as precedents for future reconciliation. Serbia and Kosovo are then themselves placed on this established spectrum, and different factors examined as explanations, including a concerted effort by the government of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić to chart a course of European integration for Serbia.

The conclusion of the paper offers an examination of and recommendations for European Union policy in Serbia and Kosovo with the aim of fostering a process of interstate reconciliation and setting the foundation for sustainable peace in the Balkans. The EU holds a great deal of leverage over both Serbia and Kosovo and finds itself in a position to act as a security guarantor as both nations learn to coexist within the larger European community.
I. Introduction

Long known as the "powder keg of Europe", the Balkans stands as a multi-ethnic region rich in history and the often-violent interactions between these different groups. As a longtime borderland between Christian Europe and the encroaching Muslim Ottoman Empire, the Slavic lands of the southeast and Germanic lands of north-central Europe, it comes as no surprise that the region has played a major role in several world conflicts. Concentrated in particular around the lands that would become Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslavia, the 20th century played witness to a great deal of bloodshed and terror. The Yugoslav wars of the early 1990s, along with names like Srebrenica, shocked a Western world that thought such days were behind it. The late 1990s saw again an eruption of violence between the government of Serbia and a growing ethnic-Albanian insurgent movement in its autonomous province of Kosovo, which ended in further ethnic cleansing, NATO bombs falling on Belgrade, and a forcible removal of the province from government control. In the wake of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, there are still many questions regarding the Serbia-Kosovo relationship that need answering moving forward after the devastation at the turn of the century.

Long locked in limbo, Serbia and Kosovo face a turning point at which living as neighbors could be a real possibility should a process of reconciliation be successful. Kosovo's autonomy and de facto independence is likely irreversible, and Serbia is slowly beginning to accept that its political and social exchanges with its former province, recognized or not, will need to occur within a new status quo. The European Union holds a unique position as both a mediator and aspiration for Serbia and Kosovo, maintaining significant leverage over both nations' governments and societies. A nudge towards a gradual reconciliation between the two former enemies is complicated by the legal status of Kosovo, but certainly not impossible. This
paper will examine the current status of the Serbia-Kosovo relationship within reconciliation frameworks, and will argue that if the EU can play an active role in jump-starting an elite-driven reconciliation process through trust- and confidence-building measures, socio-economic development, and the gradual equalization of national narratives, a workable level of reconciliation and coexistence between the former foes, Serbia and Kosovo, is within reach.

II. Kosovo and Serbia: Myth-Making, War, and Separation

The place of Kosovo in Serbian national mythology has its roots in the year 1389, when on June 28 the advancing armies of Ottoman Turkey, pushing northwards into the Balkans, met with a force of Serbian defenders under the command of Prince Lazarevic on a field near the modern-day city of Pristina (Bieber 187). Estimates vary, but leading Western historians often cite close to 30,000 troops for the Ottomans and around 20,000 for the Serbs, and the fighting was fierce (Malcolm 64). Though both Serbian Prince Lazarevic and Ottoman Sultan Murad I were killed, "everything else about the battle of Kosovo is uncertain," though if it were indeed a small Serbian victory it would certainly be a Pyrrhic one (Malcolm 61). However, "it does make sense to regard the battle of Kosovo as an important turning-point, the event which ensured that Serbian statehood would be extinguished sooner or later" (Malcolm 58).

Over the next century, the Ottoman advance would continue, eventually conquering the Serbian lands and beginning nearly six centuries of Turkish rule over the region (Živković 189). The young Serbian state, reborn in the late 19th century, would not again have control of the mythical land of Kosovo until 1912, at which point hundreds of years of Turkish rule had realigned the ethnic makeup of the province to favor ethnic Albanian Muslims (Malcolm 69).

Trouble had been brewing for years in Kosovo before the outbreak of widespread violence in the 1990s. Though the new Yugoslav constitution of 1974 granted what was
essentially self-governance and autonomy to Kosovo, it would be relatively short-lived (Zimmermann 235). After Tito's death in 1980, Yugoslavia began to fracture, slowly, along ethnic lines. Clashes between the primarily-Albanian police force and Serb minority in Kosovo fomented constant tensions through the 1980s in the form of rioting and protests on both sides. The year 1987 brought a new development: Serbian Communist leader Slobodan Milošević, a relatively unknown party official, was dispatched to Kosovo "to mediate what was considered a minor incident in a dispute between the ethnic Albanian majority and minority Serbs" (Doder 109). Though clearly uncomfortable with the horde of angry Serbs before him, indignant at what they claimed was abuse by the Albanian police, Milošević famously uttered the words "No one will beat you again!", launching him to fame as hero of the Serbs and in an instant turning him against the anti-nationalist mantra of Marshal Tito (Zimmermann 235; "Speech of Slobodan Milošević at Kosovo Polje April 24, 1987.").

Two years later on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Field, on June 28, 1989, now-Serbian leader Milošević again took to the podium. Before nearly two million chanting people, he proclaimed that "Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, [and] also defended Europe" ("Slobodan Milošević's 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech."), extolling the nation's virtuous martyrdom in the face of the Turks and warning the crowd that "armed battles…cannot be excluded yet" ("Slobodan Milošević's 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech."). The nationalistic fervor echoed the mythology of his 1987 speech, in which he asserted: "Yugoslavia and Serbia will never give up Kosovo!" ("Slobodan Milošević's 1989 St. Vitus Day Speech."). The myth was complete, and Milošević followed up his speech by revoking Kosovo's autonomous status that had been laid out in 1974 and asserting federal police control. Local Albanian leadership responded with a unilateral declaration of independence in 1990, which led Belgrade to respond
by totally dissolving the province's government and purging its administrative ranks of ethnic Albanians (Seifert 218). The gradual formation of parallel shadow government by unofficial Kosovar Albanian President Ibrahim Rugova follows, as he warns Albanians in the coming years to defend themselves against Serb aggression (Daalder 40).

Following the implementation of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and their lack of resolution for Kosovo, ethnic Albanians began to take more extreme action. By 1996, the newly-founded Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was ramping up terror attacks against Serbian police forces and other targets, erupting into a full-blown uprising in the following two years (Zimmermann, 235). In March 1998, the situation in Kosovo quickly turned uglier, as a series of KLA assaults on Serbian police positions led to brutal reprisals from security forces. Between March 5 and 7, more than 50 residents of the town of Prekaz were killed by Serbian forces, prompting a wave of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations within both Kosovo and Serbia (Daalder 61-62). Western-sponsored talks between Milošević and Rugova, overseen by former negotiator of the Dayton Accords, Richard Holbrooke, got nowhere in the following months, taking place before the backdrop of more killings and reprisals by both sides in Kosovo (Fischer, 141).

By the late summer of 1998, Serbian army and police forces had succeeded in assaulting several villages in Kosovo's Drenica region, pushing Kosovar Albanians and KLA members out into the surrounding countryside and hills (Daalder 61). On September 23, the United Nations Security Council voted to approve Resolution 1199 urging a Serbian withdrawal from Kosovo and demanding the right of refugees to return to their homes, though this was met with little response by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Scattered violence continued throughout the rest of the year despite NATO's apparent victory in convincing Milošević to withdraw many
security forces from Kosovo, including multiple massacres by Serb paramilitaries and retaliatory strikes by the KLA around the villages of Gornje Obrinje and Podujevo (Daalder 70).

By the time dawn rose on 1999, peace was appearing increasingly unlikely, as President Clinton continued to draw up plans with his national security team and NATO renewed its force activation order to maintain its military threat should the need arise. Continuing talks in France between Kosovar Albanian and Serbian delegations, with the oversight of U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Senator Bob Dole, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, and others, eventually convinced the Albanians to accept autonomy within the remains of Yugoslavia; however, on March 18, Serbian representatives refused, the Serbian military prepared for spring assaults, and Western diplomats left Belgrade in droves. Milošević refused to cave, and on March 24, 1999 NATO went to war for the first time in its history (Daalder 5-10).

As the bombs fell on Serbia, Serb forces unleashed a massive ground offensive within Kosovo, rounding up ethnic Albanians and shipping them towards the border with Macedonia in a wholesale campaign of ethnic cleansing. Refugees poured out of Kosovo, and accusations flew at Serb forces detailing of horrifying massacres of ethnic Albanian civilians. Belgrade endured numerous air strikes and cruise missile impacts, and 78 days after the start of the NATO campaign Milošević agreed to remove all Serbian troops from Kosovo. NATO troops and UN peacekeeping forces (KFOR) entered the province, and though the KLA had agreed to lay down its arms many ethnic Serb civilians fled for their lives as ethnic Albanian reprisals torched churches, burned homes, and threatened violence (Abrahams 64).

In the wake of the war, it would be several years before Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leadership even held direct discussions regarding the status of the province. By the time this occurred in 2006, Ibrahim Rugova, champion of the independence movement, had been chosen
as Kosovo's president and subsequently died of cancer. Former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj had been indicted on charges of war crimes, and 19 people had died in and around the northern Kosovo town of Mitrovica in ethnic clashes. Despite a Serbian referendum in October 2006 that affirmed Kosovo to be an unassailable part of national territory, the drive for independence was picking up steam ("Kosovo Profile - Timeline - BBC News"). Months of UN-brokered negotiations in 2007 over Kosovo's future status could not reach a compromise, and Kosovo declared unilateral independence on February 17, 2008. Though recognized by the United States and much of the European Union, major powers like Russia and China maintained that the declaration was illegal, as did Serbia ("Kosovo Profile - Timeline - BBC News"). It should also be noted that several EU member states dealing with their own problems with secession of national minorities (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain—not all of whom were members at the time) refused to recognize Kosovo ("EU Relations with Kosovo"). Violence quickly broke out once more, as ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians in northern Kosovo clashed with one another and peacekeeping forces in the area, leaving many injured ("EU Relations with Kosovo"). During this time, protests also erupted across Serbia, and culminated in the burning of the American embassy in Belgrade as thousands marched in the Serbian capital declaring, "Kosovo je Srbija!" ("Kosovo is Serbia!") ("US Starts Evacuation from Serbia"). After the Kosovo parliament agreed on a new constitution in the summer of 2008 and governmental power was transferred to majority-Albanian authorities, parallel Serb-dominated administrative structures began to arise in Mitrovica in the north of the country with the support of Serbia (Daalder 203).

The second decade of the 21st century brought with it slightly more progress for the relationship between Kosovo and Serbia, as the UN's International Court of Justice ruled that
Kosovo's independence was not illegal with regards to accepted international law, and Serbia began to slowly accept the reality of the situation. In 2013, after several years of slow negotiations that included the normalization of border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo, Kosovo receiving its own telephone code, and Serbian government support for ethnic-Serb populations within its former province, the two nations reached a huge turning point in which both agreed to not hinder one another's attempts at membership within the European Union moving forward ("After 7 Years of Independence"). This signaled the beginning of a de facto normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia that provides a great deal of precedent for the gradual development of the relationship into one of peaceful neighbors rather than bitter foes.

III. Interstate Reconciliation: Setting Parameters for Methodology

i. Defining Reconciliation: He’s Model

Though there are multiple schools of thought on reconciliation from a number of academic fields, this paper will utilize methodology related to intergroup reconciliation. The “groups” in this case are the societies and governments of states, as well as the states themselves at an international level. It is important to keep in mind that the process of reconciliation, according to many eminent scholars in the field, is an open-ended process, and one that can be inherently beneficial to the states involved regardless of the current status quo. As explained by Bar-Siman-Tov, reconciliation is “a psychological endeavor achieved through a psychological process,” in this case extrapolated onto an interstate tier (37).

Lehigh University's Yinan He, a specialist in Chinese foreign policy who formerly taught at Seton Hall University and served as a research fellow at both Harvard University and Princeton University, provides a useful model for examining case studies of interstate reconciliation. Her seminal work, The Search for Reconciliation: Sino-Japanese and German-
Polish Relations since World War II aims to examine the differences in these two important post-war situations, but also seeks to highlight their similarities and comparable properties in the context of traditional international relations theories. Her 2011 work, the article-length Comparing Post-War (West) German-Polish and Sino-Japanese Reconciliation: A Bridge Too Far? serves essentially as a condensed version of this study with a heavier focus on side-by-side examination of the two cases and their postwar conditions.

The paradigm He has formulated lays out three indicators for determining the status of an interstate relationship, the severity (or lack) of which categorizes said relationships into three different levels of reconciliation ("Comparing Post-War" 1160). These indicators are, as He describes: a shared expectation of war, national recognition, and economic interaction. All three go a great length towards identifying, at least generally, the health and status of an international relationship. Though Kosovo is not recognized as a sovereign state by Serbia, five of the European Union’s 28 member states, and nearly half of the UN’s member states, the relationship functions for all intents and purposes as an international one.

He continues to clarify her aforementioned levels of reconciliation into three categories: non-reconciliation, shallow reconciliation, and deep reconciliation. Deep interstate reconciliation serves as the ideal goal for a relationship between former enemy states, and despite the process’ indefinite nature there are many benchmarks for determining progress, to be discussed later. Non-reconciliation stands as the lowest rung on the hierarchy, as in this state of affairs states maintain no official relationship, disagree about major sovereignty issues, have little economic interaction or interdependency, and, perhaps most importantly, expect that the possibility of war or violence is extremely plausible. Shallow reconciliation, the middle tier on the spectrum, sees states interacting with normalized relations and a notable level of economic interaction; however,
sovereignty or territorial disputes remain unsettled and though war is not an immediate fear there remains no guarantee of long-lasting peace. Deep interstate reconciliation, the highest tier laid out by He, features an interstate relationship in which war or a return to violence is totally unthinkable and peace is the norm. There are no sovereignty disputes, and there are high levels of economic interconnectedness, interaction, and cooperation. Lastly, the societies in each state tend to hold one another in generally warm regard (He, "Comparing Post-War" 1160).

This model provides an excellent framework for exploring the Serbia-Kosovo relationship thanks to its straightforwardness and relevant indicators; He’s comparison of Germany-Poland and Japan-China on the post-World War II international stage utilizes this same framework, allowing for a level of standardization in determining the level of reconciliation in an interstate relationship.

ii. Reconciliation without Forgiveness: A Philosophical View

Lily Gardner Feldman, a senior fellow at Johns Hopkins University's American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, draws on a number of fields in her work Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity, ranging from religious and philosophical models of reconciliation to more traditional political science models. Her research pays particular attention, as the title might suggest, to the idea that Germany's rehabilitation in the second half of the 20th century arose as a part of a concerted policy of unilateral apology and confrontation with its past by its government. Germany's relations with its neighbors, notably France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, as well as Israel, are examined, and Gardner Feldman notes the emergence of a distinctive "German model" of reconciliation that pervades almost every aspect of its international interactions.
It is extremely important to note in this regard Gardner Feldman's point that "the very nature of reconciliation...is [that of] an ongoing process typically without a definable end" (7); even relatively advanced cases of reconciliation, such as Germany and Poland, are not at an "endpoint." By this measure, there is no true extant endpoint of reconciliation, as constructing interpersonal, intercultural, and intergovernmental ties, particularly within an institution like the European Union, can continue as long as both parties are willing and committed to the process. This philosophical and theological view of reconciliation stresses the idea that some crimes, specifically horrific evils like the Holocaust, will never be and can never be forgiven. However, that is not to say that the "sinner", the perpetrator, cannot be forgiven in a fashion that enables reconciliation. What is needed in this model of reconciliation is not, as Gardner Feldman describes, "the resurrection of old ties" (7), but rather a totally new relationship constructed on a reexamination of narratives, sources of conflict, and the prospects of future cooperation, which can help societies and governments develop a fundamentally lens through which to view former adversaries. Forgiveness, therefore, may be a part of the reconciliatory process, but Feldman argues that it is not necessary nor should it be expected. While forgiveness is a major aspect of traditional, interpersonal models of religiously-based reconciliation, interstate reconciliation on the international stage does not require such measures. At the very least, states can form a pragmatic relationship that amounts to peaceful coexistence without forgetting crimes perpetrated by or against them--as Gardner Feldman describes, "recognizes and accepts the past without condoning it, [and] compensates for the past without indulging it" (18).

IV. Historical Precedent: Case Studies of Interstate Reconciliation

To say that Serbia and Kosovo are locked into an irresolvable situation is to discount entirely past examples of interstate reconciliation throughout the world. The 20th and 21st
centuries are ripe with case studies for comparison; though these interstate pairings today represent varying levels of success and progress on reconciliation, there are valuable lessons to be gleaned from the post-World War II world order.

i. Germany and Poland

Wedged precariously between Prussia, Austria, and various iterations of the Russian Empire, Poland has long experienced division and foreign rule over the past three centuries. After the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1940, Poland was again torn apart by the aggressions of Stalin’s Soviet Union and Hitler’s Nazi Germany. No occupation in particular took a horrific toll on the Polish nation and, combined with the systematic extermination of Jews in the country, left more than six million Polish citizens dead. The postwar division of Germany and incorporation of Poland into the Soviet-dominated Eastern bloc provided huge hurdles for reconciliation between the two former enemies. While the Communist German Democratic Republic (GDR) had formal relations with Poland, it remained unrecognized and vehemently opposed by its western counterpart in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). It was between the FRG and Poland that the process of reconciliation would take place.

The postwar climate was contentious, as West Germany under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) placed a great deal of emphasis on wartime German victimhood, rather than Nazi crimes. Of particular note was the Adenauer administration’s refusal to recognize the nation’s eastern border; that is, saw the border of East Germany with Poland as illegitimate due to Poland’s postwar territorial gains at the expense of Germany. A major reinforcement of this attitude came in the form of West Germany’s academic textbooks, which focused on German suffering as opposed to the Holocaust and Nazi belligerence. Of course, this concept had a counterpart in Poland, where communist authorities
played down the history of Soviet and Russian aggression while portraying Polish history as a constant sacrifice at the hands of bloodthirsty Germany. However, both of these government lines played heavily to long-standing prejudices between Germany and Poland, as appealed as much to popular belief as they did to any overarching Cold War ideological affiliation. Mutual misunderstandings and a lockdown on information on the Eastern side certainly did not help matters, as both sides took one another’s lack of remorse as a sign of aggression to come.

The leadership of Willy Brandt in the FRG after 1969 led to a thawing of relations, and the introduction Brandt’s policies of Ostpolitik. These initiatives focused on forming ties with the Communist bloc with the aim of fostering relations with East Germany. An increased openness and reflection on Nazi crimes and World War II-era Germany history in the West contributed to a gradual increase in collective memory, acknowledgment, and understanding of Germany’s aggressor role in the war. Perhaps most notable was Brandt’s apparently spontaneous gesture in December 1970: while visiting a memorial to the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Brandt unexpectedly knelt in silence before the monument, a move that was widely photographed and helped inspire a wave of positive sentiment in Communist Poland. The Treaty of Warsaw of 1970, in which the FRG accepted the Oder-Neisse Line as a legitimate border, also helped to reduce tensions. He emphasizes that this change in discourse did not come about entirely on its own, but rather was the result of a calculated, rationalized thought process for West German leadership. Were the FRG to have any chance of recreating a united Germany, it “had to secure a friendly relationship with the Eastern bloc countries so that they would tolerate closer connections between the two Germanys” (He, "Comparing Post-War" 1186). He also cites what he calls the convergence of historical memory between publics in West Germany and Poland in the 1960s and 1970s as critical factor in driving the process of interstate reconciliation.
The Solidarity movement in Poland beginning in 1980 helped to inspire a reexamination of national history as well, despite the attempts by the military government of General Jaruzelski to clamp down on civil society. It was during this decade that intellectual debates arose regarding Poland’s “moral responsibility for the Holocaust” and the wartime actions and brutality of Poland’s erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union (He, "Comparing Post-War" 1171). Overall, the reflection contributed to a reduction in the Polish self-image of a victim, while simultaneously turning full blame for the atrocities away from Germany.

Popular feeling in both Poland and Germany, however, did not necessarily keep pace with interstate relations, signaling the postwar reconciliation may not have been as deep in all levels of society as it might seem at first glance. Even after German reunification and the fall of Communism in Poland, large chunks of both societies still viewed each other antagonistically according to polls, expressing doubt that there could ever be warm feelings between the societies. However, the 1990s saw a huge turnaround in this public opinion, the culmination of decades of elite-driven interstate dialogue and cooperation. Poland's gradual integration into the larger European community and European Union helped to solidify German-Polish relations within a reliable framework, and alleviated the security concerns that had so often defined postwar dialogues between the two nations (Guisan). It is important to note, however, that a deepening of interstate reconciliation does not signify an end of the road; in fact it is “an open-ended, continuing process in which history will not be forgotten or stop being debated” (He, "Comparing Post-War" 1176).

ii. Japan and China

The historical relationship between Japan and China, much like that between Germany and Poland, featured a great deal of tension, violence, and hatred in the years before the Second
World War. Beginning in 1937, the Sino-Japanese rivalry rose to new levels, as Japan’s war of conquest against mainland China left nearly 10 million Chinese dead and countless wounded, mutilated, and scarred. Brutality of unprecedented levels was seen as invading Japanese forces killed, raped, and pillaged their way across the country. In the infamous “Rape of Nanking” in the winter of 1937-1938, it is estimated that more than 200,000 unarmed Chinese, according to the postwar Tokyo War Crimes Trial, were massacred in sadistic fashion by Imperial Japanese troops. This violence continued throughout the war as Japan ruled parts of China under various military governments and puppet states. Japan suffered greatly during the Second World War as well; though not in the position of “victim” as was China, Japan by the end of the war had lost millions of soldiers and civilians, seen its cities and industry destroyed, experienced nuclear weapons, and been occupied by the United States.

As was the case in Europe, postwar Japan and China quickly found themselves on opposite sides of the ideological divide that would morph into the Cold War. Once Mao Zedong’s Communists established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and aligned themselves with the Soviet Union, the victorious United States quickly became far more interested in propping up Japan as a regional ally than in promoting confrontation with its bloody wartime history. Mao’s China, ruled by the Communist Party, clamped down on civil society, and as a totalitarian state was not ripe ground for a discussion of China’s wartime role or its relationship with Japan.

It was in both of these countries that He’s idea of national myth-making came into play. Both Japanese and Chinese leadership constructed, implemented, and sustained narratives regarding their nations’ respective roles in the Second World War (He, "Search for Reconciliation"). Japan is notable due to the continuity of many wartime members of the
government in the postwar administration; indeed, Japan did not undergo the type of postwar purges that Germany instituted as a part of its De-Nazification process. This meant that conservative forces in the Japanese postwar government held a vested interest in downplaying wartime atrocities and instituting several pernicious national myths. He describes in his work three main national myths in postwar Japan, which attribute World War II in Asia to a small circle of military leaders, brush off Japanese atrocities in the Pacific, and attempt to glorify the sacrifices of ordinary Japanese soldiers. Another critical facet of He’s argument lies in the fact that even Japan’s postwar left-wing parties, such as the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), displayed a great deal of opposition to the idea of collective national responsibility, instead focusing on the image of the Japanese nation as a victim or hostage to a military junta. Chinese Communist government line, though focused on demonizing the nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) regime in Taiwan, placed a great deal of emphasis on Chinese wartime suffering at the hands of Japan.

After 1970, the international political atmosphere shifted; a falling-out between the Soviet Union and PRC and recognition of the PRC by the United States pushed Japan to do the same, and in 1972 Japan and the PRC normalized relations (He, "Comparing Post-War"). While the threat of war receded between the two nations and in the minds of their publics, there is significant evidence to suggest that the relationship did not move beyond a stage of shallow reconciliation. Rather than engage in deep discussion of historical grievances, China and Japan instead generally paved over the memory of the Second World War in the interest of promoting bilateral trade, investment, and infrastructural development (He). However, even this progress saw setbacks during the mid-1980s, when an increase in Japanese defense spending, Chinese rapprochement with the Soviet Union, and controversial visits by Japanese Prime Ministers to the Yasukuni war shrine contributed to a wave of anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese public
sentiment in China and Japan, respectively. Japan’s pre-war colonialism in and postwar relationship with Taiwan did not help matters.

A battle in the Japanese Parliament (the Diet) erupted during the early 1990s centered, on socialist Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi’s attempted apology to nations in Asia for Japan’s “war of aggression” (He, "Search for Reconciliation"), a battle that saw a deadlock over the phrasing and issuing of the official text of the apology. In the end, a watered-down substitute was adopted, symptomatic of the historical implications that have plagued the Sino-Japanese relationship since the end of the Cold War. During this same period, the PRC’s leadership was stoking nationalist fervor in an attempt to re-unite the nation around Communist ideology in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre and pro-democracy movements in China.

The turn of the 21st century sees Sino-Japanese relations at a rather low point, certainly not past a level of shallow reconciliation. Basic historical facts and memories are heavily disputed, and both sides feel on both public and governmental levels that they have been wronged. Polls suggest that many in China feel that Japan has tried to evade its responsibility to confront and heal its historical legacy and has downplayed China’s wartime suffering; however, similar polls in Japan expose a feeling of Japan serving as a scapegoat for China’s problems and a belief that the Chinese “obsession” with history precludes any improved relationship (He, "Search for Reconciliation"). This impasse highlights the huge gulf in Sino-Japanese historical memory, an issue that has not been dealt with in the same effective manner as Germany and Poland.

iii. Turkey and Armenia

Turkey recognized post-Soviet Armenia in 1991 with little incident, though it should be noted that at the time the two nations did not formally establish diplomatic relations. The
prospects of creating and normalizing ties screeched to a halt in 1993 when Turkey closed its border with Armenia in support of Azerbaijan during the war in the Nagorno-Karabakh.

However, it is the Armenian Genocide that acts as the most significant obstacle to Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. In the spring of 1915, as the First World War raged across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, Ottoman Turkey began a systematic campaign of liquidation and extermination against its ethnic-Armenian minority. Situated primarily in the eastern provinces of modern-day Turkey, the Ottoman Armenia population was between 1915 and 1917 evicted, deported, and massacred by Ottoman government forces. A combination of forced labor, killings, and organized marches saw, according to some Western nations, upwards of 1.5 million Armenians killed, reducing the population to a fraction of its prewar number and devastating the Armenian cultural homeland. Though the partition of the Ottoman Empire after the end of World War I saw Armenia gain back a great deal of territory, a subsequent conflict between the short-lived Republic of Armenia and the newborn Republic of Turkey in 1920 saw much of those concessions once again lost. It remains unknown exactly how many Armenians were killed during this period, but the mark on the nation has been undeniable.

With Turkey and Soviet Armenia on opposite sides of the ideological conflict during the Cold War, there was relatively little interactive discussion of the events of 1915-1917, though in the second half of the 20th century it became commonplace among most Western historians to refer to the period as the first example of a modern genocide. Though the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict hampered post-Communist Turkish-Armenian relations, attempts were made in the early 2000s to reestablish ties.

Then-President of Turkey Abdullah Gul made a historic trip to Yerevan in 2008 to attend talks with Armenian President Sargsyan in front of the backdrop of FIFA World Cup soccer
qualifiers; the genocide itself was not a point of discussion, but the visit ended with a great deal of hope that a reopening of the border and a normalization of Yerevan-Istanbul relations might be just around the corner (Hill, Kirişci, and Moffat 131). This was reinforced in 2009 with the signing of the so-called Zurich Protocols between the two nations. Moderated by the United States, Russia, and France, this set of agreements was intended to establish a plan to both reopen the border and form official diplomatic ties. However, both the Turkish and Armenian publics reacted with anger to the deal, as critics on both sides saw the agreement as a sellout and weakening of their respective national positions (Hill, Kirişci, and Moffat). The deal was not ratified by either nation's parliament, and there has been little progress towards normalization since.

Armenia has turned increasingly towards Russia in the second decade of the 21st century not necessarily as a part of an ideological realignment, but due to its isolation: surrounded by Turkey and Azerbaijan, Russia offers the only reliable strategic outlet in terms of security and income. Renewed skirmishes in Nagorno-Karabakh in early 2016 and renewed military ties with Russia have not helped Turkey and Armenia move towards a resolution. Some have suggested a unilateral opening of the border by Turkey could prove to be an effective incentive to reconciliation, thereby allowing Armenians to visit the many historical Armenian churches and sites in Eastern Turkey (Hill, Kirişci, and Moffat). However, competing memories of the events of 1915-1917 likely preclude any true improvement. The centennial of this dark period was met in Armenia and in the Armenia diaspora around the world with huge shows of solemn remembrance and renewed calls for world leaders to push Turkey to answer for its actions during World War I. However, the same is not true in Turkey, where the subject is often suppressed or acknowledged only within the context of an alternative interpretation.
Compared with the two previous case studies, the case of Turkey and Armenia illustrates the least-successful of the three attempts at reconciliation. While the risk of actual violent conflict appears relatively low, there is a complete divergence of historical memory that shows no signs of resolving itself in the immediate future, leaving the two nations in a state of non-reconciliation. The conflict was a high-intensity, brutal, and one-sided affair, and the devastation wrought upon Armenia is certainly not forgotten a century later. Likewise, in Turkey, despite a number of protest groups that offer unilateral apologies, there is little political will to proactively recognize the events of World War I as a genocide. Furthermore, neither nation has seen the rise of a particularly transcendent figurehead willing to undertake risk-embracing forms of leadership, as Armenia has struggled under the weight of a corrupt political system and Turkey finds itself caught between the West and the increasingly-autocratic administration of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

V. Aspects of Conflict and Necessary Conditions for Reconciliation

There is much to be gleaned from these historic examples of interstate reconciliation (or lack thereof), most importantly the patterns of conditions and events that occur relatively consistently within each case. By scanning case studies for recurring themes, it becomes easier to understand catalysts for reconciliation—therefore providing a type of blueprint by which the process can be fostered, accelerated, and maintained. The following section identifies features of conflicts and post-war relationships between states that serve as indicators of reconciliation and different levels thereof. Based on the case studies provided, an interstate relationship possessing two to three of these conditions and attributes can qualify as a state of "shallow reconciliation." The table below correlates attributes of conflicts and post-conflict societies with different outcomes in terms of depth of reconciliation between former enemy states.
Figure 1: Necessary Conditions for Reconciliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Germany-Poland</th>
<th>Japan-China</th>
<th>Armenia-Turkey</th>
<th>Serbia-Kosovo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conflict intensity</td>
<td>Brutal/Claims of genocide</td>
<td>Brutal/Claims of genocide</td>
<td>Brutal/Claims of genocide</td>
<td>Brutal/Claims of genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(10,000+ dead/displaced)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-party enforcers</td>
<td>Yes (US/EC)</td>
<td>Yes (US)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>US/EU/NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Community/Regional Framework</td>
<td>Yes (EU/NATO)</td>
<td>No (Competing)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (EU/NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynamic Leadership</td>
<td>Brandt and Kohl</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Vučić</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome (level of reconciliation)</td>
<td>Deep</td>
<td>Shallow</td>
<td>Non-reconciliation</td>
<td>Shallow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i. Conflict Intensity

It seems self-evident that the level of violence involved in a conflict should have a significant effect on prospects for post-conflict reconciliation, as more intense conflicts raise political and social stakes. Lengthier wars with high levels of brutality, for example, particularly inflicted upon civilian populations, naturally contribute to bitter memories among survivors and help to reinforce perceptions of perpetrators and victims alike.
All three of the aforementioned case studies involved conflicts with extreme levels of violence and intensity, as well of examples and accusations of ethnic cleansing and genocide. For example, while Polish Jews were decimated as a part of the Holocaust, Nazi racial beliefs also held Slavs to be "inferior," and many non-Jewish Poles were wiped out during five years of German occupation. Horrific incidents such as the Rape of Nanking, perpetrated by Imperial Japanese forces against Chinese civilians, still hold huge sway in Chinese national memory in the 21st century. Armenia is battling for worldwide recognition of the Ottoman massacres of ethnic Armenians in 1915 as a genocide, and the issue remains one of Armenia's foremost foreign policy priorities. In other words, none of these three examples featured conflicts that involved solely military forces, but rather were notable for the extreme violence perpetrated against civilian populations in addition to high-intensity military clashes. Direct apologies for and recognition of these acts of genocide, however, are not uniform across all three examples, and the acknowledgement of responsibility for wartime atrocities seems to have a significant effect on the propensity for two states to reconcile. Furthermore, it does not appear that the level of bloodshed plays a significant role in preventing reconciliation; in the case of Germany and Poland, and, indeed, Germany's postwar relations with Israel and the Czech Republic as well, massive casualties and horrific violence served as a further impetus for national introspection, responsibility, and soul-searching.

More than 6 million Polish citizens died during the bloodshed of the Second World War, almost all of which occurred during Nazi German military operations and the subsequent occupation. Many of these victims, including nearly 3 million Polish Jews, were killed in systematic campaigns of racial extermination. German (and Soviet) forces savaged the nation in one of the greatest tragedies in human history and left an indelible mark on Polish national
memory and development. Though the years immediately following the war, particularly under the leadership of West Germany's Konrad Adenauer, witnessed a proliferation of myths regarding German "victimhood," this irredentism later evolved into a policy of national responsibility under the likes of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt (He, "Comparing Post-War"). West German leadership offered apologies for Nazi atrocities against Poland without the expectation of forgiveness or the establishment of conditions; this unilateral remorse shown for German victimization of Poland grew into a cornerstone of the relationship between the two former combatants and led to a total remaking of Germany's image in the eyes of its neighbors.

Prospects for Sino-Japanese reconciliation were hindered in the decades following the war by persistent national myths on both sides of the conflict; while the ideology behind this will be discussed in a later section of this paper, the behavior of the Japanese postwar government requires further examination. As the perpetrator nation against China during the Second World War and earlier Sino-Japanese War, Japan alone holds the capacity to foster reconciliation through unilateral apology. However, this has not happened, as the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and conservative forces within the political sphere maintained a policy of accepting responsibility for war against the United States and other Allies, but not against China and other nations in Asia. Unlike in Germany, responsibility for wartime atrocities committed by Japan was repeatedly linked to military leadership rather than the nation as a whole, thereby avoiding the same kind of "national responsibility" that Germany and the German people took upon themselves after the war. He mentions in her work that seemingly-halfhearted or insincere apologies by a perpetrator nation can contribute to preventing reconciliation in the victim nation rather than fostering it, and this is exactly what occurred in the 40 years following the end of hostilities between Japan and China. While multiple Japanese political figures,
including Prime Ministers, expressed regret for Japan's role in China's wartime suffering, they did not explicitly recognize Japanese atrocities or in fact offer an unambiguous apology (He, "Comparing Post-War" 1179). Public backlash in China evidence displeasure with such lukewarm demonstrations of remorse.

Turkey does not currently recognize the events of 1915-1923 as a genocide; instead, the government maintains that the huge numbers of deaths in the Ottoman Armenian population were due instead to more generic wartime hardships, such as starvation and deprivation. Though there were Ottoman government-mandated measures, such as the "Tehcir Law," to remove and deport the Armenian population, Turkish leadership also denies that these were intentional acts of violence, extermination, and expulsion. Though there are a number of civil organizations and groups present in Turkish society that push for recognition of the genocide and offer unilateral apologies towards Armenia, official government line has shown little movement in the past several decades. The Turkish closure of its border with Armenia in support of Azerbaijan during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh has further contributed to a lack of dialogue between the two countries.

ii. Third-Party Enforcers: Outside Powers and Regional Security Frameworks

Outside forces can have huge roles as security guarantors in relationships between states, driving the process of reconciliation forward by providing a stable environment in which grievances can be aired and cooperation discussed without the fear of an imminent return to violence. Charles A. Kupchan, Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University, argues that the creation of a "zone of stable peace" is a prerequisite for building the kind of regional community and international political cooperation seen today in the European Union.
Such a zone represents a group of nations among which "war is eliminated as a legitimate tool of statecraft" (2); this theory certainly runs parallel to He's model of deep interstate reconciliation, in which conflict between two parties is unthinkable regardless of political disagreement. With the creation of such a security network, disputes can be dealt with effectively and issues resolved without the specter of war ever rearing its ugly head in the minds of the parties involved. In this case, the interests of member states within the same security framework or with the same security guarantors can grow and converge rather than rely on a series of bilateral relationships. However, the opposite is also true: states have a hard time reconciling with one another through a convergence of security interests when a part of competing security networks or when stuck on the outside looking in. In both the West Germany-Poland and China-Japan relationships, the pairs of nations found themselves on opposite sides of the Cold War's ideological, East-West divide. Armenia and Turkey also lay on opposite sides of this divide, though the issue was more muted due to Armenia's position as a constituent republic of the Soviet Union itself.

In the case of Germany and Poland the stage for deep reconciliation was set relatively early on through the leadership of Willy Brandt and Helmut Kohl—and incentivized on the German side by the prospect of national reunification through the improvement of relations with the Eastern Bloc. However, the confrontation of the Cold War in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact prevented a unification of German and Polish security goals. It was only after the fall of Communism, the reunification of Germany, and the establishment of the modern-day European Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s that the process of reconciliation between Germany and Poland truly took off. Once a part of the same regional framework of first the European Union and, later, NATO, the two former enemies were able to develop much stronger inter-societal and political ties, as well as encourage a more even-handed approach to their
shared history in the form of textbooks and national historical initiatives. Their European identity was emphasized over national identity, highlighting cultural similarities and institutionalizing peaceful relations, as well.

In East Asia, the story is a different one. Though originally aligned rather closely with the Soviet Union, China later split off into what could be considered its own security network in Asia. In the past four decades, China has grown powerful enough militarily and influential enough in terms of the global economy to qualify as its own "security network." Japan, on the other hand, has since the war played a huge role in the United States' Asia-Pacific sphere of influence and military reach, first as a bulwark against Communism and later as a key American ally in the region. However, its position within the American security network puts it directly at odds with that of China, and with no overarching regional community in Asia in the mold of the European Union there are few alternatives to either for discussion of the past and the fostering of reconciliation other than the processes that occur organically.

Turkey and Armenia also share no regional framework for security and cooperation; Turkey, as a part of NATO and an increasingly active player in its own sphere of influence in the Middle East, has few shared security needs with Armenia. Armenia, a part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and firmly under the military and cultural influence of Russia, has had little interaction with Turkey since the closure of the border in the 1990s, looking at its Muslim neighbor across a kind of modern-day Iron Curtain. The renewal of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016 and the ongoing tensions between Turkey and Russia regarding Russian military operations in Syria serves only to highlight the firm position of both Turkey and Armenia in opposing security camps.
iii. The Critical Role of Leadership: From Zero-Sum to Positive-Sum

Conflict resolution, peace-building, and reconciliation are often hampered and blocked by the persistent characterization of such efforts as "zero-sum." That is, that between parties in a conflict a gain for either represents a loss for the other. This mercantilist view on conflict resolution is extremely effective in perpetuating states of conflict and non-reconciliation as it removes the incentive for negotiating parties to compromise, as "zero-sum" by nature transforms most disputes into irreconcilable differences. These irreconcilable disputes between states often manifest themselves in the form of competing territorial or historical claims, or prerequisites for negotiations laid down by both sides that cannot be accepted by the other, thereby precluding any and all steps towards resolution.

However, Read and Shapiro argue that zero-sum conflicts can, with the right type of leadership, be translated into positive-sum outcomes, where both sides are required to compromise but also both reap benefits (41). Many post-war and post-conflict relationships resemble the classic "prisoners' dilemma," a long-standing tenant of game theory, in which neither side can trust the other to uphold its end of the bargain. Therefore, "defection", rather than cooperation, is always the best choice for defending one's own interests, despite the fact that cooperation would result in more beneficial outcomes for both parties. However, this is a simplified view of conflict resolution, as interstate conflicts and their aftermath do not occur within a theoretical vacuum; rather, they take the form of an "indefinitely iterated prisoner's dilemma," in which neither side knows the length of negotiations. However, it is in this model that "risk-embracing leadership" and "strategically hopeful action" as described by Read and Shapiro can reap huge rewards by fostering a bond of trust and cooperative action, which then in turn alters the types of outcomes available to the parties involved (42). Put simply, strategically
hopeful action is an inherently-beneficial choice that acts as the key with which to open new
doors in processes of interstate reconciliation.

The key of strategically hopeful action is the readiness and willingness to strengthen
adversaries and negotiating counterparts and take huge personal risks, both physical and
political, all with the hope of establishing a brighter future (Read, Shapiro 41). This allows for
the dismantlement of continual cycles of distrust and dispute that often plague post-conflict
societies and relationships. Transcendent leaders in the mold of a Willy Brandt or Nelson
Mandela may only come about once in a generation, but it is the willingness to face down huge
political dangers rather than rare talents in statesmanship that gives hope to this approach. The
authors mention Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin in particular as examples of such: leaders that
were not particularly extraordinary, but were willing to push their populations and governments
for support of a reconciliatory process with a historic foe. Arafat in particular is mentioned as the
"head of a corrupt and ineffective organization" with "shaky" credentials, yet his determination
to negotiate with Israel played a huge role in nearly securing an agreement (Read, Shapiro 51).

Read and Shapiro focus heavily on South Africa’s transition from apartheid-era white
minority rule to multiracial democracy in the early 1990s, which succeeded thanks to the efforts
of Nelson Mandela and then-President F.W. de Klerk. Though this example of reconciliation
illustrates reconciliation within a single state, which in itself is beyond the scope of this paper, it
also offers an interesting case study of strategically hopeful action and the aforementioned
deliberate risk-taking by the players involved. It is extremely important to note the fact that
regardless of any action leaders are not entirely in control of their own destinies; events and their
flow are unpredictable, particularly during times of extreme change (Read, Shapiro 41. However,
the relatively stable relationship between Serbia and Kosovo in the second decade of the 21st
century, highlighted by the normalization of Belgrade-Pristina relations via the Brussels Agreement in 2013, offers perhaps less fertile ground for a return to conflict than did 1990s South Africa, which stood on the brink of a racial civil war.

Though the Vučić administration in Serbia, along with the Serbian Progressive Party, maintain as part of their official platform that Kosovo is a part of Serbia and do not recognize the breakaway state, the cooperation between Belgrade and Pristina reveals what seems to be a tacit acceptance of coexistence. Indeed, it may be that more "practical" concerns in Serbia are pushing Kosovo further and further down the list of public political and national priorities, particularly with persistently-high levels of unemployment and the migrant crisis taking their toll (Economides). While the position of Vučić and SNS lies far from recognition, the reelection of the Prime Minister and his party in Serbia's April 2016 elections with a sizeable majority suggests a high degree of public support for his policies. This is not to say Vučić's popularity would not suffer as a result in a renegotiation of Kosovo's status or increased ties between the governments, but it at least demonstrates that there is decent political capital in Serbia with which to work should Vučić decide to pursue further steps towards de facto recognition of Kosovo sovereignty ("Serbia: 57 percent").

VI. Situating Serbia and Kosovo on the Reconciliation Spectrum

The postwar relationships of Germany and Poland, Japan and China, and Armenia and Turkey provide solid foundations for comparisons with Serbia and Kosovo, and upon further examination there are a number of similarities. For the purposes of clarity and succinctness, this paper will use “Germany-Poland,” “Japan-China,” "Armenia-Turkey," and “Serbia-Kosovo” to describe each respective interstate pairing.
All three of these interstate relationships found themselves after the cessation of hostilities on opposing sides of significant ideological divides, divides which played a profound role in promoting, hindering, and influencing the reconciliation process. Both the Germany-Poland and Japan-China relationships developed before the backdrop of the Cold War, as the United States and the Soviet Union battled for influence in the post-World War II world. However, these basic conditional similarities did not lead to identical or even very similar trajectories of reconciliation.

West Germany and Poland had to interact across the Iron Curtain, and plenty of resentment remained between the two nations after World War II due to Poland’s suffering at the hands of the Nazis and the controversy over Germans expelled from former territories after the war. However, West Germany’s main domestic and foreign policy goal lay not in Poland, but in reunification with East Germany. Therefore, West German leadership pursued a concerted policy of forming friendlier ties with the nations of the Eastern bloc, notably Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, in hopes of forming tighter links with its Communist Eastern counterpart. After the 1960s, West Germany also placed a huge amount of emphasis on unilateral apologies and building relationships with its neighbors (and former victims) based almost entirely on the idea of rehabilitation and reconciliation (Gardner Feldman). After the fall of Communism in Poland in 1989 and the nation’s further integration with the budding European Union in the early 1990s, the Germany-Poland relationship enjoyed exponential improvement; common institutions, frequent interactions in civil society, and democracy helped to build a shared sense of pan-European identity in both countries, which was followed by a wave of joint historical studies intended to construct a shared narrative of the past. As of the second decade of the 21st century,
Germany and Poland, as full, interconnected members of the European Union, have progressed to a state of deep interstate reconciliation.

The Japan-China relationship suffers from many of the same ills that plagued West Germany and Poland in the first two decades following the Second World War: a huge disparity in historical memory, a lack of a shared international framework, and nagging national myths in each nation regarding the other. However, the difference in this relationship is that the post-Cold War era has not seen much of an improvement or even many attempts at improvement by the parties involved. Japan after the Second World War was pushed by the United States to transform itself from a recovering nation into a powerful regional ally and buffer against both Communist China and its ally in the Soviet Union. Coming to terms with the wartime brutality in China was far from the minds of American leadership, and China’s authoritarian government under Mao Zedong was far more interested in perpetuating memories of Japanese atrocities for political gain than it was in undergoing a comprehensive process of memory convergence with their island neighbor. Though the early years of the 21st century saw Japanese and Chinese authorities attempt to make a number of minor amends regarding public perception, there is little evidence to suggest that national memory has experienced any kind of true convergence, and is instead little more than a bandage on a gaping wound. The Japan-China relationship, therefore, is in a state of shallow reconciliation; while the specter of war has dimmed, there is no real sense of international community in Asia as in Europe, which has precluded the formation of a shared regional identity.

The Armenia-Turkey relationship occupies an interesting point on the reconciliation spectrum, as atrocities occurred not as a part of a war between sovereign nations but rather as a concerted campaign of expulsions of minorities within a larger empire. Vast numbers of ethnic
Armenians were displaced, and more than a million killed through famine, hard labor, and concerted efforts of elimination. A total lack of international relations and a denial of atrocities by Turkish officials has helped to ensure that no reconciliation has taken place.

The postwar Serbia-Kosovo relationship was defined, particularly directly following the 1999 NATO intervention, by an estrangement of Serbia from the European and Western communities as a whole, with Kosovo firmly under the protection and influence of the European camp. Though NATO peacekeeping forces have been present in Kosovo since the 1999 war, it is safe to assume that in the years directly following the intervention Kosovo and Serbia were in a state of non-reconciliation, where a return to violence remained very possible. Though a relatively small regional conflict, the Kosovo War was certainly a brutal one—coming out of the war, there were more than 10,000 dead on both sides and, according to some estimates, nearly 90 percent of the Kosovar Albanian population in Kosovo had been displaced. However, much as in the case of Germany-Poland in particular, the Serbia-Kosovo relationship has been hugely influenced by outside forces, particularly the European Union. Perhaps even more relevant is the imposition of a process or pathway to reconciliation from within; Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić’s willingness to interact with Kosovo’s leadership despite strong public opposition to a normalization of ties is akin to much of West Germany’s post-Adenauer leadership, which essentially decided on a path of reconciliation with its neighbors that was not born of grassroots support. With Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, significant international recognition, and normalization of ties with Serbia, the relationship between the two nations functions essentially as an international one despite Serbia’s refusal to acknowledge the sovereignty of its former province.
The 2013 agreement signed in Brussels between Belgrade and Pristina, which normalized relations between the two former foes, also contained a critical promise that both Serbia and Kosovo would refrain from impeding one another’s aspirations for EU accession. Two previous deals in 2011 saw the two nations end a mutual embargo of one another’s goods and allow unrestricted movement between their respective territories for Serbian and Kosovo citizens (Barlovac). The freedom of trade and movement was further enhanced in mid-2015, when Belgrade and Pristina agreed on cross-border telecommunications policies and an opening of the long-disputed bridge over the Ibar River in Serb-controlled northern Kosovo (Barlovac). These agreements, though not without setbacks between the two parties, were overseen and facilitated by the European Union, and suggest that Serbia and Kosovo have transitioned into a state of shallow interstate reconciliation. With Serbia as an official candidate country for the European Union, and Kosovo now party to a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU, they are developing ever-closer ties with the common European framework that proved so beneficial for improving ties between Germany and Poland, and improving them at a surprising speed (European Union; "EU Relations with Kosovo."). These positive structural conditions mean that a return to violence is unlikely thanks to international and regional security oversight—though Serbia has yet to offer any kind of unilateral apology for its actions during the war.

i. The evolution of the Kosovo issue in Serbian politics since 1999

The post-war Serbian political environment of 1999 onwards saw a gradual erosion of Milošević's grip on the political system; growing opposition and street protests culminated in the so-called "Bulldozer Revolution" in October 2000, when one rigged election too many and angry mobs around Belgrade forced Milošević to resign for good. However, Kosovo policy during the
four years following the end of NATO's air campaign and effective occupation of Kosovo remained relatively unchanged. Milošević had of course claimed victory over NATO and the United States in the Kosovo War, asserting that the presence of peacekeepers in the province was illegal and that Serbia would never be coerced into giving up the region. While Serbia struggled with stability and its transition to democracy, no major Serbia political figures of the era, opposed to Milošević or otherwise, supported the NATO bombing or the effective separation of the Serbian religious heartland. Even Western-minded Zoran Đinđić maintained Kosovo as an inseparable part of the country. However, former Serbian Prime Minister Đinđić realized in the two years following Milošević's ouster that the situation of Kosovo desperately needed to be addressed, as the status quo was no longer a sustainable option. Đinđić originally supported the creation of parallel ethnic-Serb institutions in northern Kosovo, as well as a plan that could have resulted in ethnic-Serb districts splitting from Kosovo and joining with Serbia (Culafic). Critics of Đinđić pointed out that his drive for reelection in 2003 against Vojislav Koštunica, his nationalist opponent, may have led him to adopt a more "anti-Kosovo" and "nationalist" platform in order to siphon off votes. At one point, he even called for a return of the Yugoslav Army to the territory of Kosovo, inciting accusations of populist demagoguery in an attempt to deny Koštunica the whole of the "patriotic" Serb vote (Culafic).

Đinđić's assassination in March 2003 and the controversial leadership of Zoran Živković, during which Serbia faced a constant state of emergency and instability, helped pave the way for the election of nationalist (and last President of Yugoslavia) Vojislav Koštunica to the post of Prime Minister in 2004. Koštunica maintained a hardline position towards Kosovo, maintaining its integral nature to the Serbian nation. In 2008, following Kosovo's declaration of independence, Koštunica gave an impassioned speech in Belgrade in which he vowed that
Kosovo would remain a part of Serbia forevermore ("Реч је дата"). This reassertion of government policy was followed in the coming months by Serbian government anger towards the United States and the European Union, to the point that Koštunica declared that membership in the EU was no longer desirable for Serbia, and equated signing a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) to national treason. Though the next Prime Minister, Mirko Cvetković, reversed course on the SAA as one of his first moves in office, he reasserted Serbia's refusal to accept Kosovar independence.

The election of Ivica Dačić, a former Socialist Party of Yugoslavia member and close associate of both Slobodan Milošević and his wife, as Prime Minister in 2012 signaled a shift in Kosovo policy as well. Dačić, leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) and himself born in Kosovo, came under scrutiny in the international community for his so-called nationalist credentials and insistence as late as 2011 that a partition of Kosovo would be the only realistic solution to the Serbia-Kosovo conflict. In an abrupt reversal in policy, Dačić in early 2013 gave several statements emphasizing the need for Serbia to settle its borders with Kosovo (though not in the sense of actual recognition) in order to move towards a future in the European Union (Poznatov). Dačić acknowledged the situation on the ground, mentioning that Serbs were "lied to" if they thought that Kosovo was somehow still under their control, tacitly accepting the fait accompli in the former breakaway province (Robinson). Pressure from the EU to normalize relations with Pristina as a condition for accession talks pushed Dačić to meet with then-Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi in the historic talks that would result in the Brussels agreement (Vasovic, "Serbian Court"). Significant in itself was the Dačić's agreement to meet in the fashion of Prime Minister to Prime Minister; since 2008, negotiations had really only taken place
indirectly, with the Serbian side usually insisting on communicating through UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) and EULEX (Poznats).

Under President Boris Tadić, Serbia exhibited a gradual shift in Kosovo policy that seemed to suggest an acceptance of the need to cooperate with Pristina on practical matters in order to achieve a long-term solution. The "Four-Point Plan" of 2011, put forward by Tadić's administration, reasserted that Serbia would not recognize Kosovo's independence (Lehne 9). Its main points posited special privileges and protections for ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, along with a special Serb zone in the north of the country, protection of Orthodox religious sites, and the launch of a process aimed at settling long-standing postwar property claims (Lehne 9). However, perhaps even more significantly, the initiative also dropped Belgrade's previous ideas for a potential partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines in the vein of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Lehne 9; Cehajic-Clancy). Rather than attempt to fashion another version of the Republika Srpska, Serbia would instead try to secure rights for ethnic Serbs within the bounds of Kosovo itself through the creation of parallel institutions (an effort that, it should be noted, has since fallen to the wayside in favor of integration).

Winning with a majority larger than Milošević ever received, even in the days of rigged elections and a repressive regime, Vučić in 2014 emerged with an unprecedented amount of power concentrated in his and his party's hands. His party's victory by a similar margin in the April 2016 elections further reinforced his mandate and public support and allowed him to retain his absolute legislative majority. The former Minister of Information under Milošević, Vučić routinely bullied and shut down newspapers and restricted free speech during the days of that repressive regime (Link). It should be noted that old habits may die hard in this regard, as there have been reports of increasing press censorship and declining freedom in the press in Serbia.
since Vučić's election in 2014 (Link). Once a "fanatical nationalist who wanted to create a Greater Serbia on the ruins of Bosnia and Croatia," Vučić was as late as 2006 on the campaign trail for Vojislav Šešelj and other notable war criminals, including both Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadžić, a far cry from his pro-European image today ("Zealot"). Vučić asserts that Serbia will maintain a neutral military policy, cooperating with both the United States and Russia, and states that Serbia has no desire to join NATO (the only Balkan nation not to have applied for membership) (Croft & Vasovic; "Vučić has no plans"; Rogel). This position holds despite Serbia's encirclement by Albania, Croatia, and Slovenia (all NATO members and two EU members), a heavy NATO presence in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, and the fast-approaching accession of Montenegro to the status of NATO member state (Croft & Vasovic; Rogel).

To date, no Serbian President or Prime Minister has recognized Kosovo's independence or pushed for any such initiative in Parliament, and government policy maintains that Kosovo is an integral component of the Serbian nation. Though Prime Minister Vučić is perhaps Serbia's most pro-European leader to date, at least in terms of party platform, it is important to note that he has still frequently defended Serbia's territorial integrity in line with this policy. However, Vučić hinted at a 2014 lecture at the London School of Economics that economic concerns were Serbia's priority; indeed, recent hardships and stagnation compared to the high standards of living in the former Yugoslav nations (and current NATO/EU member states) of Slovenia and Croatia seem to have changed public focus in Serbia, where the average salary barely tops 400 euros per month (Economides 1037; "Vučić: Average Salary"). The Serbian public does not want to be left out of the enlargement process that has so benefitted its formerly-Yugoslav and formerly-Communist neighbors; public opinion in Serbia favors EU membership, with a 2014
survey showing levels of support at 57 percent ("Serbia: 57 Percent of Citizens"). Other recent polls ranking important national issues seem to suggest that Kosovo is sliding ever-farther down the list of priorities for ordinary Serbian citizens, particularly given the idea that continued conflict between Serbia and Kosovo could delay the former's EU accession and access to the common market, however diminished it may be by the recent financial crises (Economides 1035). At the same time, polls taken during the Vučić administration suggest an enduring popularity and public approval for the Prime Minister, with approval ratings reaching some 69 percent of those surveyed in 2014 ("Istraživanje").

One development that bears observing is the reemergence of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) under the leadership of Vojislav Šešelj in the 2016 parliamentary elections. In March 2016, the Radical Party leader and former paramilitary commander was acquitted of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the U.N.'s tribunal at The Hague. Finally free to return to Serbia, Šešelj helped lead his party (after several years shut out of the Serbian Parliament) to a third-place finish in the elections while campaigning on an openly anti-Western, anti-EU, pro-Russian platform ("Projections Based on New Results"). While not a threat to oust Vučić and his sizeable majority, Šešelj represents what is likely a dissatisfaction with Serbia's westward lurch of recent years, and the recent election results put Šešelj's Radicals in the position to harass Vučić in policy-making and the public eye—particularly if the austerity measures in place by the Vučić administration to help meet the economic demands from the EU and IMF prove to be more painful than anticipated.

ii. The case of the Vučić government in Serbia

As mentioned previously, the attitude of the Serbian government under the leadership of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić and the government Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) bears
watching thanks to an intriguing process described by Spiro Economides as a "pre-accession Europeanization" (1030). The process describes a set of deliberate policy choices enacted by the Serbian government as a concerted effort to forcibly move the country in line with European Union-style values, particularly with regards to the Kosovo dispute. What is notable here is that this is done in the face of public opinion rather than as a result of it, much as was the case with the aforementioned reforms in post-World War II West Germany under the Brandt government; essentially, Economides argues, "an explosive issue of national interest was addressed in a very unexpected way for the purpose of managing it and achieving material gain" (1038), without the overwhelming support of the public.

This behavior on the part of the Vučić administration did not appear out of the blue—far from it. While the EU could not, due to divisions among its own member states, ask Serbia to recognize Kosovo as a direct condition for membership, the Brussels Agreement of 2013, along with the *acquis communautaire* (common law) of the European Union stipulated that Belgrade achieve a degree of normality in its dealings with Pristina before Serbia's accession could hope to be completed. Economides argues that this negative conditionality, which essentially ties a tacit acceptance of coexistence with Kosovo to Serbian membership in the European Union, sparked a huge surge of pragmatism within Serbian leadership: as long as membership within the EU is the ultimate incentive, the process of accession remains an incredibly useful tool with which the EU can in turn influence Serbia's Kosovo policy ("Serbia's Geopolitical Dilemma"). Though much of the Serbian public and government does not openly acknowledge Kosovo's split with Serbia, economic concerns, the migrant crisis, and other pressing issues seem to have overshadowed much of the political posturing on the former province (Robinson). This seeming willingness to accept the loss of Kosovo, however painful, in exchange for the economic growth, security,
stability, and opportunity offered by the European Union in the eyes of many Serbs may be a sign of Europe's success in the Balkans – though perhaps in more of a coerced fashion than many in Brussels may have originally envisioned. Economides asserts that attitudes within Serbia towards Kosovo since 2008 have undergone a "profound change…and that this transformation has come about as a direct result of the influence of the EU" and as a "direct result of consequentialist logic" within the Vučić government in Serbia (1039).

For Serbia, one of the main sticking points with regards to the Kosovo issue lies in the protection of Serb minorities in northern Kosovo, as well as enclaves scattered around the rest of the country. Access to important religious sites in the Serbian Orthodox church, particularly the monastery of Gračanica, and protection of religious minority rights under the Kosovar Albanian government, also hold a great deal of sway in Serbian public opinion and government positions.

Though Serbian citizens can as of 2016 enter Kosovo for 90 days without a visa, using only a passport or national ID card, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario that would see the border closed as an act of political retribution should relations between the two neighbors sour. Ensuring that Kosovo enters the European Union would, in theory, likely help to make the territorial dispute somewhat moot; by enshrining both Serbia and Kosovo within the European Union's zone of free movement and, eventually, the wider Schengen Area, Serbia can ensure that ethnic-Serb citizens of Kosovo can move freely between Kosovo and Serbia. Downplaying the importance of borders in this case could serve as a critical security guarantee for Serbs in Kosovo, as well as for Kosovar Albanian minorities in Serbia.

In this same vein, a European Union in which both Serbia and Kosovo are members could potentially help to reduce tensions within Serbia's public sphere, downplaying the idea that Kosovo is irrevocably "lost". The European Union's "Euro-federalist" configuration offers the
unique chance to create a kind of "dual sovereignty"; that is, would allow Kosovo to be both independent and accessible to Serbia at the same time. This of course is not to suggest that Serbian irredentism would benefit from such a scenario; community-building, as discussed by Kaplan, is the process here that has the potential to make the issue of whether or not Kosovo is a part of Serbia proper somewhat irrelevant if both nations are contained within the EU's borders ("Serbia's Geopolitical Dilemma").

VII. **Recommendations for the European Union**

Using He's model that builds upon this sense of reciprocal mistrust, there appears to be decent evidence to suggest that Kosovo and Serbia were until recently in a state of non-reconciliation, described as lacking in "any formal diplomatic relationship" and characterized by "clash[es] over significant sovereignty rights" (He, "Comparing Post-War" 1160). However, this is where the European Union can push and has pushed its advantage: Thanks to the Brussels Agreement of 2013 and normalization of Belgrade-Pristina relations, the European Union has in a way encapsulated the sovereignty dispute within a kind of collective safety net, acting as a security guarantor that ensures violent conflict is an extremely unlikely option. "As the Balkans are all more or less turned towards EU help in terms of economic and financial support, but also at the political and individual person level," argues Hebert, "the compulsory, enabling and connective impacts of the EU can be very high" (12). By this measure, Kosovo and Serbia are in reality in a state of shallow reconciliation, as the sovereignty issues themselves remain unsettled but there is at least a decent consensus that disagreements will not again escalate to armed conflict and violence (He, "Comparing Post-War" 1161).

One of the most critical options and outcomes that the parties involved must consider is revisiting the idea of "reconciliation without forgiveness," (Gardner Feldman 6), a philosophical
state in which "resentment can still be present but is accompanied by some degree of mutual respect" between former enemies and between a victim and a perpetrator. Naturally, many people in Serbia and Kosovo, both within and outside of leadership positions, have differing personal views on who exactly represents the perpetrator and who the victim, but the concept applies equally both ways. This lack of total reconciliation, while made understandable by the fact that some wartime atrocities need not be forgotten due to their brutality and impact on a collective memory, does not entail a failure of the reconciliation process. "Reconciliation is peace building, not peace itself," and therefore requires a greater, overarching commitment from all involved parties in order to be successful (Tang 714). According to Bar-Siman-Tov, the process of reconciliation itself, which must ultimately be an organic one focused on the long-term objectives of establishing a lasting peace and changing of societal perception, is beneficial, as it promotes a "mobiliz[ation] of society's institutions to support" the end goal of a "formation of new beliefs, attitudes, motivations, goals, and emotions that support the peaceful relations" (36-37).

Encouraging symbolic actions on the part of both governments is a huge first step towards showcasing goodwill and good faith in restoring a working relationship between Kosovo and Serbia. While the key word regarding this idea is "symbolic," these motions need not necessarily be practical to have a far-reaching effect on the prospect of reconciliation. Hebert mentions briefly the importance of a vote by the Serbian Parliament in 2010, which acknowledged responsibility for crimes in Srebrenica committed by troops under the command of General Ratko Mladić. (12). While Serbia has oftentimes been reluctant to push such cases farther, there are encouraging developments in recent years. In an example from 2014, Serbia's War Crimes Chamber sentenced several former Yugoslav army members "for the killing of over
120 Albanian civilians in 1999," and indicted others, including a former general, for "crimes against civilians" ("World Report 2015: Serbia."). Though a small step, such willingness to prosecute war criminals within Serbia provides a beacon of hope that government and civilian forces in the country are not totally unwilling to admit a modicum of responsibility for wartime atrocities (Vasovic; Fischer & Simic 180). Moreover, such actions serve as an "externalization and particularization of acts of violence—transferring them into a political sphere above and beyond society and attributing violence to single culprits and not social groups—allow a coexistence of groups… even after conflict," which argues that the memory of violence does not necessarily irreparably damage an inter-ethnic or inter-communal relationship (Seifert 228).

The European Union's Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) also successfully appealed for the reopening of cases in Kosovo against former KLA operatives and commanders, accused of wartime human rights abuses, in 2013. While this is certainly not the end-all, be-all in terms of reconciling with past abuses from the Kosovo war, the pressure placed on local court systems in Kosovo in particular via EULEX (and, by extension, the EU) are a solid demonstration of the oversight role that the EU should continue to play in the region, and a reinforcement of EULEX's "crucial role in investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating crimes involving public officials, war crimes, and corruption" according to Human Rights Watch (2015). Perhaps most encouraging is the sheer number of cases pending in the Kosovo court system under the supervision of EULEX; with more than 160 cases in the works, involving both ethnic-Serb and ethnic-Albanian defendants, this should be taken as the first step in what Gardner Feldman describes as an "institutionalized transformation" that leads to "patterns of commitment by both individuals and collectives" that "can facilitate the development of joint interests" over time (15). Specifically with regards to Kosovo's ethnic-Serb population (regarding
which the conditions for reconciliation take on a slightly different form due to their internal nature), these war crimes cases can serve confidence-building measures in Kosovo's judicial system, thereby showcasing the "conciliatory manner" of the government in Pristina towards its ethnic-Serb citizens (Pente 4).

On top of this, the European Union in Kosovo in particular has an in-built advantage, as "public trust in international institutions such as the EU… is high, and the Kosovo public in particular appears to see a role for these institutions in holding Kosovo’s politicians to account," allowing Europe to serve as the type of "systematic external and internal pressure" for both Serbia-Kosovo relations and for Kosovo’s own internal judicial and political processes (Zabyelina 21). Europe's many ongoing challenges (including the migrant crisis, ongoing uncertainties regarding a potential exit by the United Kingdom, fear of a collapse of the euro, a general aversion to expansion, to name but a few) mean that an accelerated accession timeline for Serbia is unlikely at best, and less so for Kosovo, and therefore not a viable policy as the political willpower is simply unavailable for the time being. However, a continued dialogue between the two nations vis-à-vis the European Union can continue to forge bonds and promote coexistence in the background, "however imperfect they may be" (O'Halloran 115).

Of course, these policies are not without their obstacles; as recently as April of 2015, Serbia’s war crimes court threatened to arrest Kosovo's Hashim Thaçi (now the country's Foreign Minister) should he enter Serbia to attend, ironically, a reconciliation conference in Belgrade ("Serbia Will Arrest Thaçi"). The European Union will need to convince Serbia on high-profile cases such as this to consider a type of "unilateral concession" as described by Kupchan, as this demonstrates a huge amount of good faith in inter-elite and intergovernmental negotiations that can provide valuable political capital down the road; as a confidence-building gesture, these sorts
of "unilateral accommodations" reinforce the perception between states "that any disputes that might emerge among them would be resolved through peaceful means" (2).

Looking back at the recent history of both Serbia and Kosovo, it becomes apparent that both nations (under the umbrella of Yugoslavia and later in the breakup) have been heavily influenced by the process of national mythmaking and the cooptation of said myths by powerful elites. The immediate example that stands head and shoulders above the rest is the rise and rule of Serbian Communist (and later nationalist) leader Slobodan Milošević. Milošević is often credited with exacerbating and amplifying the mythology of Serbia's spiritual attachment to Kosovo. Indeed, while many of the Serbian Orthodox Church's most important monasteries and religious sites lie within Kosovo's borders, including the monasteries of Gračanica, Dečani, and Peć, it is the legendary status of the Battle of Kosovo Field that holds some of the greatest sway in Serbian lore. Though the battle certainly took place, it is important to note that "mythologization… achieves its effect typically not through out-and-out falsification but through distortion, oversimplification, and omission of material that doesn't serve its purpose or runs counter to it" (He, "Comparing Post-War" 1161). It is this glorification of a battle more than 600 years in the past that contributes to Serbia's sense of victimhood with regards to Kosovo, as the ultimate defeat of Serbia by the Ottoman Empire plays right into a similar constructed narrative about Serbia being victimized by the power of NATO (He, "Comparing Post-War" 1161). In fostering a new sense of cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo, the European Union and other outside actors will need to tackle the crux of the problem described by He:

"The perpetrator country’s self-glorifying and whitewashing myths will lead to a lack of sympathy for the victim country, and it will develop disgust for and frustration with the victim country, which will seem to be obsessed with the past. The victim country will
also tend to link the unrepentant attitude of the perpetrator to its remaining or reviving aggressive ambitions. Meanwhile, the perpetrator country will find the victim’s sense of entitlement unjustified and will see it as merely a disguise for that country’s own hostile intentions" ("Comparing Post-War" 1161-1162).

It is immediately obvious that this should be a critical area of focus between Kosovo, Serbia, and the European Union moving forward. In this regard, constructing a "common psychological framework" as described by Bar-Siman-Tov within which communications, societal interactions, and memory can flow freely, enabling dialogue about past conflicts and exposing each party's respective public to opposing viewpoints and experiences (18). This fundamental reframing of interactions between former enemies is one of the first steps towards achieving a workable, lasting peace, and the European Union needs to put pressure on both Serbian and Kosovar leadership to participate in continuous cycles of confidence-building measures that can assure one another that they have committed to "adopt[ing] the principle of peaceful conflict resolution… that can resolve any possible conflict and disagreement" without even the slightest hint of violence (Bar-Siman-Tov 23). Not only does this build trust and mutual respect, but it also plays a critical role in reducing "the perception of threat and feelings of fear that often underlie the eruptions of violence" (Bar-Siman-Tov 23).

The European Union, in order to promote a deeper, more permanent form of reconciliation, must strike in Kosovo and Serbia while the metaphorical iron is hot and "intervene in a multi-dimensional manner to convert the current reservations into cooperation" (Pente 4); even after the normalization of Belgrade-Pristina relations via the Brussels Agreement, the two Balkan "countries are clearly ‘unfinished’..." and this ‘unfinished policy’ mentioned by Hebert essentially allows the European Union to utilize the motivation of eventual accession to
membership as a tool of reform (11-12). Both Kosovo and Serbia are examples of "a Nation State with limited sovereignty," and should the EU allow this window of opportunity close it could very well go down in history as a sorely-missed chance for real progress in forcing Kosovo and Serbia to accept cooperation with one another (Hebert 12).

VIII. Conclusion

The reconciliation, rehabilitation, and development of the post-war, post-normalization relationship between Serbia and Kosovo is one of modern Europe's most pressing challenges, yet it presents an opportunity for the European Union to both flex its peace-building muscles and achieve a genuine sense of stability in a deeply-troubled region ("EU relations with Kosovo"). Challenges abound across the board, from persistent national narratives that stand in the way of an acceptance of the status quo to unrequited demands for apologies and accountability for wartime crimes, but the European Union in particular stands in a uniquely-advantageous position in which it serves simultaneously as a model, an aspiration, and a benevolent enforcer for the two states in question (Tomson). However, it is necessary to put the challenge of a joint Serbia-Kosovo future within a dynamic and transformative framework, as the process of reconciliation with regards to these two former enemies does not fit any single model, but rather is a hybrid of several. There has been a modicum of progress in terms of reconciliation, and shallow as that reconciliation may be it offers a glimmer of optimism. Perhaps future cooperation and community-building between the two nations will be somewhat adversarial; that is not to say threatening, but it is to say that rivalry and some level of dislike is acceptable. Ultimately, Hebert perhaps does the most effective job of boiling this concept down to its bare bones: "if [Kosovo and Serbia] do not want to renew the bloody 1990's wars they have to at least accept coexistence with their neighbors" (12).
Bibliography


