The Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine:
Capitalism, Sympathy, and Urbanization in Seattle’s
South Lake Union Neighborhood

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Abstract

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This dissertation intervenes in a debate that was published in the journal City in 2011 over how Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual repertoire might profitably contribute to critical urban inquiry. However, rather than siding with the pro-Deleuze and Guattari contingent that can loosely be lumped together as “assemblage urbanists” on the one hand, or with the proponents of more traditional Marxian critical urban theory on the other, I argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s underexplored political philosophy is not only capable of grounding critical urban inquiry, but is nuanced enough to address not only the productive role of political economy, but also extraeconomic concerns, such as ethics and aesthetics, both of which are significant forces in many cities, including the redevelopment of the South Lake Union (SLU) neighborhood (Seattle,
Also drawing on Deleuze’s reading of David Hume, I argue that all institutionalized motivations, both economic and extraeconomic, are but different rationalizations of underlying human sympathies, and that given this common foundation, it is necessary to develop a critical urban theory that can also account for the typically neglected and often marginalized sphere of the extraeconomic. This argument is based on a close reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualizations of the relationship between the state and capitalism across both volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* that I adapt for urban studies via a Foucauldian archaeology of SLU. In terms of content, the empirical investigation that spans sixty years of documents related to statewide growth management, regional planning, as well as urban comprehensive planning and a local developer with a compatible vision of how urban redevelopment should occur, leads me to posit that we are seeing a new form of coordinated urbanism, and that all these entities together can be understood as constituting what I call the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine.
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I will never forget the day in Gould Court that Mark Purcell held up a copy of *A Thousand Plateaus* like it was a brick destined for a Starbucks window and told me and Cheryl Gilge that we needed to learn how to “wield” it. I am not presumptuous enough to think that I have accomplished this, but I have certainly tried in many venues to get my mind around it and other related works: on my own in innumerable locations around Seattle (often while walking); through interactions with the Becoming Poor reading group; with Cheryl in Bob Mugerauer’s office, where we waded through *Difference and Repetition*; at *Deleuze Studies* and closely related conferences in New Orleans, Lisbon, Istanbul, Athens, and West Lafayette, Indiana; and finally in a Comparative History of Ideas (CHID) independent study where Knute Jordan and I tackled *Nietzsche and Philosophy* before he rode his motorcycle off to, well, somewhere (I miss you, man). There are, of course, many other people along the way who have helped me directly or indirectly: Wayne Reed for reading my ramblings about why I needed to go back to school while I was slowly dying in a cubicle at Magnusson Klemencic Associates (MKA); the higher-ups at MKA both for helping me pay for my first classes in this program and especially for laying me off when I was too scared to quit; the crews at both Café Solstice locations for making the best coffee in Seattle; Web Crowell for finding us that workspace in the back of the Northwest Film Forum; Ignasius Seilie and Dave Hornsby for hiring me to do contract engineering work when I was broke, and not giving me a hard time when I needed to focus on research; Anne at the Seattle Municipal Archives for hauling out so many boxes of records for me to examine; CHID for taking a chance on me and, especially, Nara Hohensee for her casual encouragement (I don’t think she knows how much it meant); Michael Hardt for appearing in Café Victrola when I was running on fumes and needed a little inspiration; Andrew Culp and Stuart Elden for showing me how maintaining a blog can be useful for this kind of work; all my students for giving me the affective return on my investments in teaching that I needed to make this joyous; and Kirsty, Kev, and Henry Miller for bubbling with life in the flesh and on the page. Finally, extra special thanks are due to Bob Mugerauer and Alex Anderson for welcoming an erstwhile structural engineer into this doctoral program, Cheryl for being my co-conspirator, and to Risa Joy, Saul William, Adelaide, and my parents for putting up with my vicissitudes.
Ultimately, however, the main thrust of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is not ontological: it is political. The point of doing philosophy is not to arrive at even the best possible understanding of the nature of being: they presuppose an ontology compatible with contemporary math and science to do political philosophy – to articulate Problems posed by contemporary social life in the hope of provoking the discovery of practical solutions to them or, at least, better ways of addressing them.

Holland 2011, 16-17

Rien n'est plus loin de l'homo economicus que l'analyse de Hume.

Deleuze 1953, 34
INTRODUCTION

If pressed to place this work in any particular discipline, I would unhesitatingly say that it belongs in the philosophy of social science because, above all, it is posing one very specific question: what can Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy contribute to critical urban inquiry? There are several ways to attempt to answer this question. First, one could look to their coauthored works and excavate what they have to say about cities in particular. In their primary work this does not amount to much, and although turning to some of their marginalia is a compelling exercise,¹ the question quickly becomes one of how their ideas have been absorbed into disciplinary research.

Some theorists in Architecture and Urban Planning strive to build upon particular “Deleuzoguattarian” concepts, such as assemblages (Dovey 2013), planes (Hillier 2008, 2011), folds (Burns 2013; Frichot 2013), becoming (Hillier and Abrahams 2013), etc., but in most of this work, the issues of power and politics that are so central to Deleuze and Guattari are difficult to find.² In Geography one finds discussions that use the notion of assemblage to think through policy mobility (McCann and Ward 2011) or the materiality of cities (Fariñas 2011a, 2011b; McFarlane 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d), as well as references to how cities themselves are machinic (Amin and Thrift 2002), but an analysis of the actual production of this urban space is largely absent. One is all but left holding a tattered copy of A Thousand Plateaus and

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¹ See Chapter 3 for a review of their coauthored thoughts on cities, both in their primary works and in less known works. Guattari, to his credit, was more invested in exploring how the urban phenomenon relates to subjectivity (Genosko 2015), which is a fecund topic but must be bracketed here in order to focus on the production of urban space itself.
² I concede that the adjective “Deleuzoguattarian” is both monstrous and unfortunate, but in contradistinction to Storper and Scott (2015) I will not use it sarcastically, but completely seriously.
wondering if these disciplinary scholars really paid it much attention. This feeling is exacerbated when a titan of critical urban theory dismisses these attempts as being incapable of addressing “the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions of contemporary urbanization processes and associated forms of worldwide capitalist restructuring, dispossession, and uneven spatial development” (Brenner 2013, 92-3). To be fair, Neil Brenner is here responding to a wave of work that can be loosely gathered under the name of “assemblage urbanism,” and – as I discuss at length in Chapter 2 – his critique stands as long as it is directed only toward this subset of Deleuzoguattarian thought that hardly deserves that monstrous adjective. However, the fact remains that the entire terrain of Deleuze and Guattari’s political thought has gone unexplored as ontology for critical urban inquiry.

Moreover, the drive to intervene in this debate is fueled upon reading the words of a Deleuze and Guattari scholar:

Deleuze and Guattari’s political thought is largely neglected…Mostly obviously, this elision allows the silencing of the crucial fact that Deleuze and Guattari’s co-authored work produces, in a direct and explicit way, identifiable in perfectly circumscribed texts, a working re-elaboration of a number of nodal problems of contemporary political thought: the State-form…relationships between economic processes and structures of social and state power…the intricacies between geoeconomics and geopolitics, etc. (Sibertin-Blanc 2013, 7, my translation).

This passage is striking because it stands in direct opposition to Brenner’s own thoughts on the “particularly problematic tendency” presented by “neo-Deleuzian concepts of assemblages” (Brenner 2013, 92). A space of inquiry is thus opened between these three voices. The assemblage urbanists are allegedly invested in using Deleuze and Guattari to think about urban problems, but neglect the fundamental political dynamics that consistently strive to structure the “urban assemblages.” Brenner takes note of this and considers their efforts to be nothing more than a new methodology that can be invoked in the service of his own theoretical approach,
without ever engaging Deleuze and Guattari directly. I, however, find a real ally in Sibertin-Blanc, but the problem is that he is a political philosopher who is not particularly interested in cities.

This, however, is just an opening toward engaging with the actual problem. In Deleuze’s eyes, theoretical bickering is only one way of raising philosophical objections, and it is not a worthwhile endeavor because it fails to address the nature of the problem (Deleuze 1991, 105). The second mode of philosophical critique “is a matter of knowing whether things are like that or not; it is a matter of knowing whether the question which presents things in such a light is good or not, rigorous or not” (Ibid., 106). For me, then, the question becomes one of determining whether or not Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy is a rigorous framework for analyzing the process of urbanization in the twenty-first century. This is a problem that I address through a close reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s texts alongside an investigation into the ongoing production of South Lake Union (SLU), a rapidly growing neighborhood in central Seattle, Washington.

I provide a more detailed introduction to the neighborhood in Entracte I, but here it suffices to say that it has primarily been redeveloped by the real estate division of Vulcan – the investment and philanthropic organization of Microsoft cofounder Paul Allen. Since 2001, Vulcan has developed “5.0 million square feet in 24 projects including 1,367 residential units [and] also has 400,000 SF under construction and 1,000,000 SF in pre-development planning” (Vulcan 2015a). Although the original vision for the neighborhood was as a biotechnology hub that built off relationships with organizations such as the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center and Zymogenetics, a developer of vaccines, that were already located in the area, its major growth has come in the wake of first building office space for – and then selling it to –
Amazon. Additionally, Vulcan’s approach to redevelopment is particularly interesting for at least two reasons. First, as one of Allen’s many projects that encompass everything from private space exploration to curing Ebola, the motivation behind the project does not easily fit into categories that one might call economic and extraeconomic. It is far from philanthropy, as the staggering sales prices that the buildings command indicate, but it is not exactly cold and heartless land development either. There is a real commitment to environmental sustainability, which can be seen in LEED-certified construction and investments in infrastructure, such as the Seattle Streetcar and the “Swale on Yale” – a bioswale that helps clean the stormwater runoff from 630 acres of the adjacent Capitol Hill neighborhood that flows directly into Lake Union.³

Second, Vulcan’s approach to developing SLU is anything but simply buying property, building anew, and selling their buildings for profit. Instead, they take on what might be best described as a curatorial role, as they not only reinvest in new buildings in neighborhood, but are also very active in shaping the regulatory framework that guides new construction, as in the case of the 2013 rezone of the area, which I discuss at length in Part II. Combined with their efforts to publicize the various dimensions of their work via the SLU Discovery Center – which is essentially a showroom for the neighborhood – and the number of copycat developers, such as Touchstone and Skanska, that are following Vulcan’s lead on an inferior budget, it seems that the best way to describe the entire project is through the language of ethics. This is certainly not to endorse their conception of the good life, but is instead to take a step back from the cynicism that underpins most critical urban thought and consider the possibility that they really believe that what they are doing is good. The developers are not saying that this is “just business,” but rather

³ Vulcan “provided technical and professional services and [funded] $1.2 million of the design and construction costs of the project” (Seattle Public Utilities n.d.).
they seem to believe that a more socially and environmentally sustainable city is compatible with a more profitable one.⁴

But returning to the complexities of trying to use Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy as a basis for critical urban studies, an important caveat must be made. One of the most powerful political characteristics of such a framework lies in an assertion that Deleuze makes in his book on Foucault:

[The] final word on power is that resistance comes first, to the extent that power relations operate completely within the diagram, while resistances necessarily operate in a direct relation with the outside from which the diagrams emerge. This means that a social field offers more resistance than strategies, and the thought of the outside is a thought of resistance (Deleuze 1988, 89).

I want to be explicit here in noting that this dissertation is only a first step toward thinking about urbanization through Deleuze and Guattari. To borrow their language from Anti-Oedipus, it is akin to the “negative task” of what they call schizoanalysis, which can be understood as trying to identify how various desires are shaped and invested. I strive to do this by digging through an archive that relates to the production of SLU, and focusing on the relationships between the economic and extraeconomic interests that have guided its development. In short, this is meant to show that Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy can ground critical urban inquiry in something other than political economy. Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy can undoubtedly also fuel conceptualizations of alternatives – as it does in the work of Hardt and Negri (2009),

⁴ I hesitate to attribute the notion of social sustainability to Vulcan, especially given their proclivity to demolish affordable housing (cf. Kephart and Mistur 2008) and their litany of complaints over incentive zoning fees, which would require them to either build affordable housing or pay into a fund for its construction in exchange for being permitted to build taller buildings (cf. Minard 2013). But it would nevertheless be irresponsible to ignore their proposal to make a cash payment to the city of $3.25 million and trade 1.5 acres of land in SLU that could be developed into affordable housing and job training and childcare facilities (Vulcan 2013) for being allowed to build taller buildings in three blocks along Mercer Street. This attempt to balance profit and social investment is a key theme of Vulcan’s approach to redevelopment as well as broader regional planning efforts.
Holland (2011), Culp (2013), Purcell (2013), and Massumi (2015) in ways that are often explicitly urban – but that is not the task here. Instead, this dissertation is a very specific intervention into discussions about urban theory that is intended to give authors who are working in the critical vein of urban research, or undertaking the project of envisioning alternative urban futures, a common philosophical foundation. I am, of course, not alone in this pursuit of establishing a useful ontology for critical urban inquiry, for many of the most compelling urban theorists working today are either calling for a similar project (Roy and Ong 2011; Roy 2009), undertaking one (Farías and Bender 2011; Brenner 2014), or assessing the projects that are underway (Storper and Scott 2015). But I am, to my knowledge, the only person taking up the challenge of developing a critical urban theory that is grounded in Deleuze and Guattari’s political thought.

The primary task of this dissertation is, then, to argue that Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy is perfectly capable of contributing to critical urban inquiry. However, since their work was not specifically developed to address twenty-first century urbanization, it will nevertheless have to be augmented and transformed in order to do so. This is accomplished in two steps. The first step is to clarify how indebted Deleuze and Guattari are to Marxist political economy, but to also specify how their philosophy can also engage extraeconomic concerns. The second step, which is augmenting their framework for studying urbanization, comes after an archival investigation of the forces that have created SLU. In the end, I provide a transformation of their description of the relationship between the “state apparatus” and the “war machine” that accounts for the variety of political economic, ethical, and aesthetic interests embodied in what I
call the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine. As I define it, this Machine is not reducible to Vulcan. Nor is it reducible to regional growth management, Amazon’s growth, urban designers, or any other easily delineated group. Instead, as I strive to illustrate through the empirical research, the Machine takes all of these entities as its parts.

This is a significant departure from the assemblage urbanists’ work, which is, in short, not machinic enough. As I argue at length in Chapter 2, this vein of research is nearly satisfied with the description of “sociomaterial assemblages” (McFarlane 2011a, 218) that exist in urban environments, but pays little attention to the broader set of forces determining the potential configurations that assemblages might take. In other words, assemblage urbanism is primarily focused on products rather than the production process that I discover in the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine. This is, in fact, a critique that closely resembles the one proffered by Brenner et al. (2011), but which differs in an important way: whereas critical urban theorists are interested in the “structure” of capitalist political economy, I focus on how different economic and extraeconomic concerns come together to constitute the machines that drive the urbanization process. Therefore, by stepping back from the various collections of difference that an assemblage urbanist could catalog in SLU and paying attention to both the historical intricacies of their production, as well as the global political economic context in which they function, I strive to provide a critical urban theory that provides a rich and multiscalar account of the production of a complex early twenty-first century urban redevelopment project. This is, above all, a strategic attempt to address “the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions of

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5 These concepts are explored in great detail in Chapter 1, but for now it suffices to say that the state apparatus is a general way of describing the process of creating an interior via the dual process of capturing and organizing, while the war machine is a free-moving and pure exteriority. Their archetypes are the “Asiatic” or despotic state (Marx 2002) and nomadic tribes the pre-exist and constantly ward off state formation (Clastres 1989, 2010).
contemporary urbanization processes” (Brenner 2013, 92), as well as the localized production of urban space – both from a Deleuzoguattarian perspective – rather than the everyday “use” of such space.⁶

Again, my argument does not stop at claiming mere sufficiency with respect to Brenner’s vision of a critical urban theory that can capture the underlying political economic dynamics, but instead asserts that this Deleuzoguattarian perspective on urbanization is in fact more agile than this dominant critical approach. Warren Magnusson, for example, expresses the myopia of Brenner’s work, as insightful and exciting as it is, in his brief commentary on Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City (Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer 2012). He writes:

It occludes most of what is happening in urban politics, because it insists with few exceptions on a particular theoretical framework that derives mainly from the political economy of the urban developed by Castells, Harvey and Lefebvre, and to a lesser extent from critical theory of the Frankfurt School type. The effect is to shunt aside most of the theoretical work associated with the collapse of orthodox Marxism – I am thinking especially of the delightfully various investigations and speculations of French thinkers like Bachelard, Badiou, Bataille, Barthes, Baudrillard, Bourdieu, Clastres, Debord, Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Latour, Lefort, Levinas, Levi-Strauss, Lyotard and Rancière, but the list could be lengthened and diversified – and to impose an understanding of urban politics that – although insightful in many respects – is at odds with most people’s experience (Marcuse et al. 2014).

Using the redevelopment of SLU as a unique instance of contemporary urbanization – not to mention one that the primary developer, Vulcan, sees as a model for future developments – I argue that a Deleuzoguattarian approach can grasp both the drive for capturing surplus value and progressive values such as environmentally sustainable construction, increased urban density, and alternate modes of transportation without reducing the latter to a duplicitous strategy of the

⁶ Studying the use of such spaces is also an important task, as I argue in Chapter 3 and throughout this dissertation, but my present focus is on the broader theoretical foundations of contemporary critical urban research.
In short, I insist that we must take statements, such as this one from a Vulcan executive, seriously: “Thoughtful sustainable development also makes good business sense — we’ve found that you can ‘do well’ and ‘do good’ at the same time. That’s good news for an industry that focuses heavily on financial return” (Hazlehurst, 2003). Approaching critical urban inquiry in this manner does not require one to only make arguments familiar to experts in political economy or to reduce practitioners to functional pawns in a capitalist system, but instead highlights the ethical and aesthetic paradigms that are operative in this particular redevelopment, even if they run counter to the analyst’s own normativity. This is, therefore, a truly interdisciplinary and immanent undertaking: on the one hand, I seek to stake out a space between design disciplines, philosophy, and critical urban studies in order to capture the complexity of the urbanization process; on the other, I strive to account for the multiplicity of factors producing the neighborhood without imposing an a priori normative standard.\(^7\)

Moreover, a Deleuzoguattarian framework for critical urban inquiry also opens a realm that has yet to be addressed, to my knowledge, with respect to the production of urban space: the realm of the passions, specifically sympathy. The notion of affect has certainly been invoked in various strands of geography, such as in studies regarding the experience of place (cf. Anderson 2009; Degen et al 2010; Rose et al 2010), while Lefebvre (1991) famously includes directly lived experience as one ingredient in the production of social space, yet the role of the passions as they exist alongside political economy and urban design has not been considered. The empirical investigation herein is strictly archival and will therefore be unable to directly access these passions, but as I argue in Chapter 7, following Deleuze’s (1991) reading of David Hume, the

\(^7\) This does not, however, mean that the present analysis lacks a normative position. Instead, I sketch out an immanent vision of an alternative form of urbanization based on the categories that emerge from my analysis in Chapter 6. See Smith (2003) for a discussion of Deleuze and normativity.
various interests and beliefs that direct flows of capital into the built environment are fundamentally attempts to smooth out the natural unevenness of human sympathy and extend it in such a way that a moral world – a society – is tenable. Therefore, rather than seeing potential profit as the rational motivation for urban development, I take a step back and argue that both the economic and extraeconomic criteria for shaping the built environment are grounded in this attempt to deal with conflicting natural sentiments. This is decidedly not an “arboreal” regrounding of critical urban studies in sentiment rather than capitalist political economy, but is rather an attempt to highlight the single differential field out of which all motivations for reshaping urban space emerge. With this common ground established, any critical theory that only focuses on economic interests must be condemned as reductionist.

In the case of SLU, then, the archival research suggests that the primary driving forces amount to sympathy for the capitalist market, for the natural environment as long as economic productivity is not compromised, and for a well-ordered urban environment. In the case of the alternatives to SLU that exist unrealized in the same discursive constellation that has produced SLU, these sympathies are for truly free markets – or what Eugene Holland (2011) calls nomad markets – and the natural environment, as well as difference, equity, self-governance, and a built environment that expresses and can accommodate the tangled drives of the human “soul.” It is important to note that this was not an assumption I had at the outset of this research, but is rather one that emerged as I was trying to understand how qualitative or extraeconomic concerns interface with capital in Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy. Moreover, it is not so much

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8 In fact, I only had three assumptions at the outset: the producers of SLU believe they are in fact improving the world; Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy can help me understand how this might work; and, finally, I need a methodology that is much more well-defined than anything Deleuze and Guattari provide if I am going to make a convincing argument for readers in the social sciences (again, this turned out to be Foucauldian archaeology).
an explanation of what is going on in SLU as much as it is a gesture toward what (my and others’) future critical urban research should focus on: the affective dimension of the urbanization process. Such research clearly involves methods beyond archival research, which are not without their own set of challenges, but the most important point for now is that Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is equipped for dealing with this realm, while critical urban theory has no language to deal with such problems.

This dissertation is subdivided into three parts, which are broken down into seven chapters, with two “entractes” that are intended to be read as bridges between the chapters they connect. The preceding comments on assemblage urbanism and critical urban theory are intended to give the reader some context of the argument at hand, but rather than covering the details of the debate up front, I have chosen save that argument for the second chapter, and dedicate Chapter 1 to clarifying how Deleuze and Guattari envision the relationship between capitalism and the state across the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. The strategy behind this organization is to put the reader in a position similar to my own when I first encountered the 2011 debate between the assemblage urbanists and the critical urban theorists. Above all, it is intended to show that the relationship between the state and capitalism has been fundamental since the beginning of Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative efforts, and that any work purporting to invoke or extend their ideas should pay close attention to these dynamics as well.

Chapter 2, then, is what would traditionally be considered a literature review, except that it is both more focused and critical than a traditional one. It steps through the debate that begins

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9 I am riffing on the organizational structure that Hardt and Negri use in their trilogy (2000, 2005, 2009), where “intermezzos” act as hinges between different sections of the books.

10 I want to thank Mark Purcell for making this suggestion.
with Colin McFarlane’s (2011a) exploration of what assemblage thinking might contribute to the critical urban theory that has been expounded by Brenner and various fellow travellers (cf. Brenner 2009; Marcuse 2009), Brenner et al’s (2011a) penetrating critique of McFarlane, which deflected the conversation in such a way that the present project became possible, as well as a host of other papers that support and extend both the assemblage position and that of critical urban theory. As I review this material, I constantly refer back to the foundational relationships between the state and capitalism that are presented in the first chapter in an effort to substantiate the two aspects of my critique: first, that although the assemblage urbanists are to be admired for trying to bring Deleuzoguattarian notions into critical urban theory, they are missing this aspect completely; second, Brenner et al. are correct to identify this shortcoming, but due to their unwillingness to engage Deleuze and Guattari, they are also unable to see the political economic dynamics that subtend the former’s philosophy.

Chapter 3 has two functions. First, it presents Deleuze and Guattari’s textual references to urbanization across the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, along with rich yet lesser-known conversations with Michel Foucault and François Fourquet about cities that occurred between the publication of the two volumes. Second, it introduces the practical problem of doing rigorous social science research under the influence of Deleuze and Guattari, and argues that Foucauldian archaeology is a particularly powerful method for conducting such research, since it is both philosophically compatible and provides a powerful framework for understanding the immanent relationships among wide range of diverse documents. This chapter also explains the limits to the present project, and highlights that although I have chosen to focus on archival material corresponding to the production of SLU – primarily in an effort to engage with the
critiques leveled by Brenner et al. (2011) – some texture could be added by pursuing ethnographic lines of research.

Entracte I extends my short description of SLU above, and provides a brief but more comprehensive history of the visions for the area that predate Vulcan’s activity, as well as how they became involved in the neighborhood. Its intent is to provide the reader with an accessible and linear narrative for how the area has changed before I begin the much more analytical process of archaeology, which forms Part II (Chapters 4-6). Chapter 4 is the first part of the empirical investigation and is organized around four immanent lines that emerge from the archive: land use and character, institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life. It is important to note that these lines were not extracted according to any predetermined set of criteria, but instead were consistently addressed in archival documents, frequently alongside one another. This is also not to imply that these lines exist unchanging throughout the archive either, for different discourses continuously modify their constitutive elements. However, these emergent categories have been selected in an effort to isolate the major “discursive objects” – that is, what the discourses are talking about – that run throughout the archive. Finally, the time frame for the analysis, which runs from 1953 to 2013, but also includes a few newer documents in an effort to capture some of the most recent changes, was not chosen ahead of time. Instead, as I tracked instances of inter-jurisdictional coordination back through time, I eventually came to a speech that spurred the formation of what is now known as King County Metro.

Chapter 5 begins with these four lines of research and seeks to understand how they are related to one another, or in other words, what holds them together in an immanent whole. This, for Foucault, is a critical aspect of archaeology because it helps the analyst understand how a
discursive formation defines its own limits. In the present analysis, I discuss four specific ways in which discursive formation that produces SLU is held together: via forms of knowledge, collective actors who produce the statements guiding development, logical connections that arise between various documents, and practical connections that explicitly link these documents together into a whole. With these four thematic lines and four modes of interconnection defined, it becomes possible to see how the discursive elements that produce coordinated urbanization are intertwined and interdependent.

The final empirical chapter, Chapter 6, takes a step back from the statements that directly affect the production of SLU and addresses how some discourses are taken up, circulated, and transformed, while others remain peripheral. First, however, it begins by highlighting the fact that incompatible discourses can belong to the same discursive formation – as in the case of the tensions between affordable and luxury housing, and between a diverse local economy and a global economy, in SLU. Second, I generalize the four immanent research lines that emerged in Chapter 4 into the broad categories of political economy, ethics, and aesthetics, and examine how only certain elements of broader discourses on these subjects are realized in SLU. This investigation takes me into critical and celebratory writing on: neoliberal political economy and innovation economics; different ethical systems that allegedly drive urbanization; and different visions of how a city could develop. From the perspective of critical urban theory, these latter two categories are often seen as utterly bankrupt, if not at least as obfuscations or misunderstandings of what is “really happening” in terms of capitalist urban development. But instead of taking this cynical line, I argue that these three elements form the necessary discursive infrastructure for the production of the Coordinated City. Moreover, I also identify how this “discursive constellation” includes ideas that have not been realized in SLU, and therefore
represent real alternatives across these same three realms: free market communism as an alternative political economy; justice, sustainability culture, and joy as alternative systems of ethics; and the flexible Situationist City as an alternative vision of a city that expresses the complexity and entanglement of the human’s variegated internal drives.

Entracte II follows this empirical storm and summarizes how these four different passes across the archive establish the limits of our discursive formation, or what amounts to the particular qualities of the Coordinated City’s model of realization (to return to Deleuze and Guattari’s language). For capital to unfold into any built environment, it must pass through a set of such models, and this short section encapsulates how a particular consistency has emerged in the Central Puget Sound region in the postwar era, thereby enabling the production of SLU.

Chapter 7 is devoted to the primary theoretical task of this document: using the empirical details extracted from the case of SLU to transform Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy into a framework for critical urban inquiry. Above all, two primary concerns are addressed: first, when thinking about urbanization, the opposition between the state apparatus and the war machine is neither as clear as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) present it, nor can it even be clearly grasped by the global capital/models of realization schema that they elaborate. Second, and similarly, the built environment is also a unique kind of commodity in many terms: spatial scale, the duration for which it lasts, the cost of production, and the consequences of its production. With these two aspects in mind, as well as the wealth of empirical detail about SLU, it becomes possible to revisit and transform the kernels of Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy. By following Eugene Holland’s (2011) identification of the four constitutive elements of any relationship between the state and the war machine – aim, object, space, and form of sociality – I can pinpoint where our particular interventions need to be made. One caveat must be made,
however. Since the empirical research was limited to archival materials, I can only properly address the first three elements and make a few brief and speculative remarks on how the fourth – the form of sociality – might be addressed through a different method, such as various forms of ethnography (cf. Rose et al 2010) or Foucault’s technique of *enquête* (cf. Hoffman 2015).

Nevertheless, whereas the aim and the object – the end and the means – of what Deleuze and Guattari call the global capitalist axiomatic as a general condition are to capture surplus value, some slight transformations must be made to account for how SLU has developed. The aim becomes managing a particular kind of growth and capital accumulation, while the object is managed space and economic productivity. The nature of space is also transformed from oscillating between being smoothed and striated, depending on whims of capital, to being increasingly striated on terms shared by capital and the models of realization. The chapter concludes by generalizing the notion of the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine as this particular relationship between capital and models of realization, and substantiating this claim for paying serious attention to extraeconomic motivation by returning to Deleuze’s early work on Hume in order to see that all motivation is based on sentiments rather than rationality. By establishing a common foundation between economic and extraeconomic motivation, it now makes sense to say that critical urban theory’s unrelenting focus on political economy is indeed reductionist with respect to various human motivations.

The conclusion, finally, recapitulates the total arc of this document and seeks to establish links between the extraeconomic motivation that plays an essential role in the era of the Coordinated City, and how we as scholars, teachers, and citizens might intervene through research, teaching, and practical activity. Following Massumi’s (2015) recent ideas about reassessing the political role of sympathy, I argue that if we want to have any success
transforming the urbanization process, our best bet is to reclose the artificial gap that has
separated sympathy from the rational and practical process of urban design and development. If
SLU can teach us one thing, it is that extraeconomic motivations are clearly a part of
contemporary urbanization. The political task, then, is multiplying and transforming the
“productive sympathies” in a way that better reflects the multiplicity of sympathies in the world
today.
Part I

DELEUZE AND GUATTARI’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND
THE STATE OF CRITICAL URBAN STUDIES
Chapter 1. POLITICAL AND CAPITALIST AXIOMATICS

Deleuze and Guattari discuss the relationship between the state and capitalism in both volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Each conceptualization has its own merits, although their thoughts in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) are much more refined. My reading, largely inspired by Eugene Holland’s (2011) notion of “schizonomadology,” engages both volumes in order to show their debt to a wide range of critical thinkers, including Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Friedrich Nietzsche, Pierre Clastres, and Georges Dumézil. Moreover, it also engages some of the most engaging contemporary commentators on Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, particularly Holland and Jason Read. Although this chapter is primarily a review and clarification of Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective on political economy, it is a necessary first step in establishing how a Deleuzoguattarian critical urban theory goes beyond Brenner’s (2009) formulation by also accounting for the wide range of extraeconomic motivations that are crucial to coordinated form of urbanization that is occurring in South Lake Union (SLU). Herein I also highlight points where their ideas require a degree of transformation in order to address issues of contemporary urbanization – a task that is comprehensively undertaken in Chapter 7. This is not to claim that there are any inherent shortcomings in their system, but is rather to point out how it must be transformed for my particular object of study.

For the present project, the most important movement across the two volumes is the inversion of the relationship between the state and capitalism that Deleuze and Guattari locate in the wake of World War II. From their perspective, however, this does not merely entail capitalism coming to dominate the state, but also involves the state becoming one among many “models of realization” for capitalism (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). While this concept exists in
a nascent form in *Anti-Oedipus* as extraeconomic codes or beliefs that “[engineer] the couplings between qualified flows [of capital]” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 248), it is not fully developed until the subsequent volume. Their conception of contemporary political economy therefore always involves a subterranean flow of capital that is shaped, channeled, and organized by a multiplicity of models that operate according to various extraeconomic criteria on the surface. As the realm of qualitative difference, any particular ensemble the models is thus tasked with integrating or coordinating differences amongst themselves, including the constant demand to capture a portion of the surplus value generated by the entire system. It is in this collection of models of organization, I argue, where concrete forms of urbanization are determined. Moreover, the interactions between economic and extraeconomic interests that occur in this domain also make it both the theoretical and practical point of intervention for transforming how cities develop. I focus on the former, but strive to do so in a way that maps out the field of productive models, so that those who concentrate on the latter can better direct their efforts.
1.1 The State and Capitalism in *Anti-Oedipus*¹

If it is true that the function of the modern state is the regulation of the decoded, deterritorialized flows, one of the principal aspects of this function consists in reterritorializing, so as to prevent the decoded flows from breaking loose at all the edges of the social axiomatic. One sometimes has the impression that the flows of capital would willingly dispatch themselves to the moon if the capitalist state were not there to bring them back to earth…This essential aspect of the regulation performed by the state is even more readily understood if one sees that it is directly based on the social and economic axiomatic of capitalism as such.

Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 258

In order to understand Deleuze and Guattari’s first conception of the relationship between capitalism and the state, one should begin with how they understand desire. Yet, it is crucial to heed their comment on the relationship between desiring-production and social production:

> We can say that social production, under determinate conditions, derives primarily from desiring-production: which is to say that *Homo natura* comes first; But we must also say, more accurately, that desiring-production is first and foremost social in nature, and tends to free itself only at the end: which is to say that *Homo historia* comes first (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 33).

Without undertaking a technical explication of the components of Deleuzoguattarian desire,² I can begin with the idea that, for them, desire is connective and productive in nature. As such, it does not have any inherent loyalty toward its investments; conversely, it flows madly, making connections, disconnections, and conjunctions in the three passive syntheses of the unconscious.

A brief description of these syntheses is necessary to understand how it is that social institutions can organize desire or integrate uneven sympathies. These syntheses are based in

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¹ It is crucial to note that Deleuze and Guattari’s aim in constructing their genealogy of the relationship between social organization and capitalism is ultimately to show how the Oedipus complex is a form of repression historically specific to capitalism. However, the point of the genealogy at hand is to track how their thinking at the level of social production proceeds between their coauthored books, so many of the references to how desiring-production is organized through the incest taboo will be left out. For a complete treatment of these themes, see Holland (1999) and Buchanan (2008).

² For this, see Holland (2005)
Kant’s syntheses of apperception (apprehension, reproduction, and recognition), but have been rerouted through Deleuze’s Bergson-inspired philosophy of time, as presented in *Difference and Repetition*, and transmuted into the unconscious register (cf. Holland 1999, 25-36):

1) The connective synthesis occurs in the pure present and is defined by continuous investments of desire. These connections can be understood as instinctual and are made between “partial objects,” rather than between whole bodies. The classic example is the baby’s mouth connecting to mother’s breast, while simultaneously making eye contact: these are two altogether different desiring connections.

2) The disjunctive synthesis is most easily understood as the contraction of past connections into the present, or more simply, as a disconnection and recording of where desire has been invested. It is therefore both necessary and dangerous, because without it, no new connections could be made; however, at the same time the recording is antiproduction, and if it overpowers production it can stifle new connections altogether. This synthesis is especially important because it marks the genesis of representation (the recording) on the pre-individual level that can interact with representation on the social level to bind desire to particular representations. In the mother-infant example, this is the breaking off of the flow of milk to establish other connections: looking at the mother’s face, laughing at big brother, etc.

3) The conjunctive synthesis is the process by which a subjectivity arises in the wake of the first two syntheses. Therefore any recognition of desire, and any conscious enjoyment thereof, are retrospective. Put another way, this is to say...
that the subject in question is not an agent, but is rather an effect of how his or her desires undergo the continuous connections and disjunctions of desire. In the case of the nursing infant, Holland (Ibid., 33), notes that a child who breaks the flow of milk to smile is consequently constituted “as ‘a snacker,’ ‘an extrovert,’ or whatever.”

Given the fundamental place accorded to desire and its inherent unruliness, these flows must be organized in order for any collectivity to exist. Critically, understanding how social organization works requires analyzing both the level of social institutions and the pre-individual level of desire. But how is this done?

Deleuze and Guattari are perfectly clear about the apparatus that is responsible for organizing desire: the socius. “The prime function incumbent upon the socius has always been to codify the flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see to it that no flow exists that is not properly dammed up, channeled, regulated” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 33). In the opening section of the third chapter, Deleuze and Guattari repeat this sentiment by writing, “to code desire – and the fear, the anguish of decoded flows – is the business of the socius” (Ibid., 139).

This concept of the socius is grounded in Chapter 9 of Marx’s Grundrisse (1993) – wherein he

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3 This thesis extends back to Freud’s Civilization and its Discontents (2002), but it is perhaps more interesting to compare Deleuze and Guattari’s project to Herbert Marcuse’s (1974) own attempt to historicize the relationship between social and psychic repression. Whereas Marcuse sees the Oedipal triangle as the primary location of psychic repression that expands into social repression, Deleuze and Guattari understand its movement from the social down to the psychic, as indicated in the previous quotation about Homo historia preceding Homo natura. As Holland (1999, 6) puts it: “the form of social oppression determines the form of psychic repression, and since the former varies historically (as Marcuse also insists), the latter does not remain constant, and thus does not always take the form of the Oedipus complex.”

4 For Deleuze and Guattari, to “code” desire means to direct it toward specific objects and thereby endow the objects with value and meaning. It is important to note, however, that value and meaning are an effect of the investment of desire, rather than its origin.
discusses how the appropriation of the products of labor occurs – and is invoked to demonstrate the parallels between desiring-production and social production.\textsuperscript{5}

Marx’s discussion proceeds from two familiar historic preconditions for the emergence of capitalism: the separation of the laborer from his labor, and the separation of labor from the objective conditions of its realization (Ibid., 471).\textsuperscript{6} Describing the first sedentary societies, Marx notes that the members of a community naively consider the body of the earth to be communal property, and thus consider the products of their labor to be theirs only through a double abstraction: from the earth itself to the community, and from the community to its members. In short, whereas human labor is responsible for cultivating or molding natural material into useful forms, these “natural or divine presuppositions” are not at all production, but are instead imaginary claims on the products of labor (Ibid., 472). In Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization, the socius thus falls back on (\textit{il se rabat sur}) all production, constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed, thereby appropriating for itself all surplus production and arrogating to itself both the whole and the parts of the process, which now seem to emanate from it as a quasi cause (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 10).

\textsuperscript{5} Deleuze and Guattari stress that the parallel they are drawing is intended “to be regarded as merely phenomenological: we are here drawing no conclusions whatsoever as to the nature and the relationship of the two productions, nor does the parallel we are about to establish provide any sort of \textit{a priori} answer to the question whether desiring-production and social production are really two separate and distinct productions. Its one purpose is to point out the fact that the forms of social production, like those of desiring-production, involve an unengendered nonproductive attitude, an element of antiproduction coupled with the process, a full body that functions as a socius” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 10).

\textsuperscript{6} In a political rather than economic key, Marx notes that this also “means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature (Marx 1978a, 77).
This concept is central to Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history of capitalism, in which they map the three periods of social organization, each of which corresponds to the three historical forms of the socius: the earth, the despot, and capital. Their use of term “social machine” for these forms of social organization is, as always, literal and “has men for its parts”:

The social machine is literally a machine, irrespective of any metaphor, inasmuch as it exhibits an immobile motor and undertakes a variety of interventions: flows are set apart, elements are detached from a chain, and portions of the tasks to be performed are distributed (Ibid., 141).

Before reviewing their universal history, it is important to again note that each socius has to operate both in the registers of desiring-production and social production: that is, on pre-individual flows of desire and in relations of collective production and consumption.

In the discussion of the first form of social organization, the primitive territorial machine, it is bodies themselves that are distributed across the undivided earth. The entire discussion hinges on the relationship between filiation and alliance, with the former being the human stock and the latter being political and economic ties (Ibid., 146).

Although it goes unmentioned

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7 Deleuze and Guattari claim that “it is correct to understand all history in the light of capitalism, provided that the rules formulated by Marx are followed exactly,” since desiring-production exists from the beginning and is liberated at the limit of capitalism, when “the deterritorialized socius gives way to the body without organs, and the decoded flows throw themselves into desiring-production” (1983, 140). For them, such a history is universal not because its fate is to occur everywhere, but rather because the unique process of capitalism has been so successful to date that “we now have the universality of the object defined as wealth, the product as such or again labor as such, but labor as past objectified labor” (Marx 1993, 104).

8 However, it is also important to remember that the “nature of the relationship between desiring-production and social production” (Holland 1999, 61) also changes over time. Under the primitive territorial machine, for example, the earth as socius is “the savage unity of desire and production” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 140).

9 This is an important aspect of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of territoriality, which differs from the notion of territory as a political subdivision of the planet (cf. Engels 2010, 114). Conversely, for Deleuze and Guattari, this abstract division instead represents the first deterritorialization, and falls under the despotic machine (1983, 145-6).

10 Buchanan (2008, 99) notes that the notions of filiation and alliance are both central to understanding the political dimension of their work and typically overlooked.
explicitly, Deleuze and Guattari’s debt to Spinozist metaphysics takes center stage here, in that
the biological flow of humans, with the filiative relationship between stock (bodies) and the
signifying chain (ideas), is coded as the socius subtracts bodies and detaches signification, as it
installs a new relationship between them – specifically, one of debt as the determinant element of
social organization (Ibid., 149).\textsuperscript{11} Debt, of course, relies on the qualitative valuation of bodies –
both natural and artificial – and thus requires a “surplus value of code” (the predecessor of
surplus value). The question, then, is how is this code established?

Following the second essay in Nietzsche’s \textit{On the Genealogy of Morals} (1989b), Deleuze
and Guattari locate the genesis of the memory necessary for lasting collectivities in the
establishment of this debtor-creditor relation in prehistoric societies. Nietzsche claims that this
memory is constituted through direct bodily inscription – a practice that Pierre Clastres allegedly
confirms through his fieldwork among the Guayaki tribe (Clastres 1989, 177-188) – which marks
the birth of debt and is the original attribution of meaning, or the coding of pure flows.\textsuperscript{12} In short,
the trinity of the speaking voice, the hot irons scarring the skin, and the primal pleasure taken in
witnessing the whole ordeal binds the members of the group together. Subsequently, as a
member,

\begin{quote}
one enjoys the advantages of a communality (oh what advantages! we sometimes
underrate them today), one dwells protected, cared for, in peace and trustfulness,
without fear of certain injuries and hostile acts to which the man outside, the
“man without peace,” is exposed (Nietzsche. 1989b, II, 9).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{11} See the \textit{Ethics} (1994), E2P7, for the classic definition of parallelism: “The order and
connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.”
\textsuperscript{12} David Graeber (2011, 78-9) points out that Nietzsche’s proposition is profoundly insane and
that this is, in fact, part of the point, for it challenges the bourgeois economist’s notion that
relationships between human beings are, above all else, based on exchange. Moreover, while
Graeber considers this portion of Nietzsche’s account to be absurd, he also notes that Nietzsche’s
analysis of how debt is transformed into a feeling of guilt is very true. He does not mention
Clastres.
But if one betrays the group or fails to “make good” on the extended benefits – defaults, as it were, on the given line of credit – the community may punish or banish the offender. This process “breeds man” by establishing a relationship of debt to the group, to its history, and most importantly to its future: it “render[s] him capable of alliance” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 180), or the open-ended and complex set of relationships defining this first social machine.

The second social machine, the barbarian despotic machine, follows from this primitive construction when the multiplicity of these debts is redirected to a new socius, and pushed to infinity (Ibid., 132). The primitive system of filiation and alliance is not destroyed but is reconstituted with the despot placing himself in a divine lineage and shifting all primitive lateral alliances back to himself. However,

[w]hat counts is not the person of the sovereign, nor even his function, which can be limited. It is the social machine that has profoundly changed: in place of the territorial machine, there is the ‘megamachine’ of the state, a functional pyramid that has the despot at its apex, an immobile motor, with the bureaucratic apparatus as its lateral surface and its transmission gear, and the villagers at its base, serving as its working parts (Ibid., 194).

This conception of the state is explicitly drawn from the On the Genealogy of Morals (1989b, II, 17), but also owes herein unacknowledged debts to Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1977, II, “Of Great Events”). Recounting his visit to the island of fire, Zarathustra tells his followers of two of the earth’s “skin diseases”: domesticated man and the “fire hound,” the latter of which Deleuze considers to be an image of “species-activity”: “deformed unnatural activity which serves reactive forces, which becomes mixed up with the Church and the state” (Deleuze 2006, 139). In

13 This a reference to what Nietzsche elaborates on as “bad conscience” in Beyond Good and Evil (1989a, V, 199) and, especially, in On the Genealogy of Morals (1989b, II, 16), where he writes, “I regard the bad conscience as the serious illness that man was bound to contract under the stress of the most fundamental change he ever experienced – that change which occurred when he found himself finally enclosed within the walls of society and peace.” It refers to the “instincts of wild, free, prowling man” that, unable to be discharged externally, are instead turned inward, resulting in the development of “what was later called his ‘soul.’”
response to Zarathustra’s telling the fire hound of his advice for kings and churches (“let yourselves be overthrown-so that you may return to life, and virtue return to you.”) the fire hound inquires, “Church? What is that?” Zarathustra’s response contains what was evidently misattributed by the translators of Anti-Oedipus to On the Genealogy of Morals, but is nevertheless a succinct account of Nietzsche’s overall perspective on the state:

[The Church] is a kind of state – the most mendacious kind. But be still, you hypocritical hound! You know your own kind best! Like you, the state is a hypocritical hound; like you, it likes to talk with smoke and bellowing – to make himself believe, like you, that he is talking out of the belly of reality. For he wants to be by all means the most important beast on earth, the state; and they believe him too (Nietzsche 1977, II, “On Great Events”).

Nietzsche’s later perspective on the state echoes this sentiment, which is redoubled by Deleuze and Guattari. In particular, it serves as at least part of the basis for their assertion that “there has never been but a single state” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 192, emphasis in the original) and, moreover, inspires their rendering of the state as a transcendent machine that operates through violence. For Nietzsche, “the oldest ‘state’ thus appeared as a fearful tyranny, as an oppressive and remorseless machine, and went on working until its raw material of people and semi-animals was at least not only thoroughly kneaded and pliant but also formed” (1989b, II, 17). Perhaps most importantly, Nietzsche’s account renders the state’s emergence as a violent break, an overcoming of lesser powers by stronger powers, and refutes any account of the state’s nature as being founded in a social contract:

14 Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 192n40 refers the reader to On the Genealogy of Morals (Nietzsche 1989b, II, 16), which, in fact, contains no reference to “the state-as-dog that ‘speaks with flaming roars.’” However, the original L’Anti-Oedipe (Deleuze and Guattari 1972, 227) reads "Il se peut que, spirituel ou temporel, tyrannique ou démocratique, capitaliste ou socialiste, il n’y ait jamais eu qu’un seul Etat, le chien-État qui « parle en fumée et hurlements »,” which corresponds to E.W. Fritsch’s French translation, Ainsi Parlait Zarathoustra (Nietzsche 1917, 114): “L’État est un chien hypocrite comme toi-même, comme toi-même il aime à parler en fume et en hurlements, – pour faire croire, comme toi, que sa parole vient du fond des choses.”
I employed the word “state”: it is obvious what is meant – some pack of blond beasts of prey, a conqueror and a master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and nomad. That is after all how the ‘state’ began on earth: I think sentimentalism which would have it begin with a ‘contract’ has been disposed of. He who can command, he is by nature ‘master,’ he who is violent in act and bearing – what has he to do with contracts! (Nietzsche 1989b, II, 17).

Under this new socius, the previous relationships between filiation and alliance, coding, and inscription are still operative, but they have been radically transformed. Again, the previous primitive relationship between alliance and filiation, wherein the former both determines the latter and remains the basis of surplus value, remains, but has now been “harnessed” by the despot. The relationships among bodies are still coded, but instead of being established through local rituals, they are overcoded by the state and directed toward its interests (controlling territory, self-perpetuation, etc.). Moreover, money replaces local codes as the universal form of surplus value that is used to perpetually pay the now infinite debt. Finally, the form of inscription is shifted from direct bodily inscription to writing. Instead of the body, voice, and eye remaining independent, as they were in the primitive system, the writing of laws (an abstraction of scarring the bodies of members under the primitive territorial machine) becomes both dominant in practice and always refers to the absent voice of the despot. Like cattle being forced into slaughterhouse chutes, the “coded flows of the primitive machine are now forced into a bottleneck where the despotic machine overcodes them” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 199). This overcoding operation is the essence of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the state: it transforms existing social relationships.

Before moving on to the civilized capitalist social machine, it is crucial to note the difference in nature between the state and the decoded flows that eventually constitute
Harris, 32

capitalism.\textsuperscript{15} Following Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari (Ibid., 218-9) assert that the break constituting the state’s emergence is unique in that “it is perhaps the only [social institution] to appear fully armed in the brain of those who institute it,” while capitalism emerges slowly and out of contingent conjunctions of flows escaping the state’s grasp. In the same way as Nietzsche disposes of contract theory, his account of the state’s emergence should not at all be understood as a movement of rational creation, but instead follows from his model of the unconscious as a tangle of competing wills (1989a, I, 19). These “born organizers,” these founders of the state: come like fate, without reason, consideration or pretext; they appear as lightning appears, too terrible, too sudden, too convincing, too ‘different’ even to be hated. Their work is an instinctive creation and imposition of forms; they are the most involuntary, unconscious artists there are – wherever they appear something new soon arises, a ruling structure that lives, in which parts and functions are delimited and coordinated, in which nothing whatever finds a place that has not first been assigned a ‘meaning’ in relation to the whole (Nietzsche 1989b, II, 17).

Deleuze and Guattari consider this “cerebral ideality” of the state (the “Urstaat”) to be its origin; although it is never actualized, it is still real and exists virtually in all concrete instances of the state. Although Deleuze developed this philosophical schema in \textit{Difference and Repetition} (1995) under the names of the virtual and the actual, here the authors make a quick – so quick that it is indeed almost unhelpful – reference to Marx to support their claim about “a way in which history proceeded from the abstract to the concrete” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 221). Investigating this reference in greater detail will help illuminate Deleuze and Guattari’s fundamental debt to Marxian political economy.

In his explication of the method of political economy in the introduction to the \textit{Grundrisse}, Marx argues that to begin any analysis with the real and concrete is false, for concepts such as population are “chaotic conception[s] of the whole” (Marx 1993, 100). Any

\textsuperscript{15} It should be understood that the term “decoding” should always be read as undoing, rather than interpreting, the codes.
attempt to grasp something this broad makes for an empty abstraction if one neglects what constitutes it: classes, for example, which are in turn underpinned by wage labor and capital, both of which rest on concepts of exchange, division of labor, and prices. With this in mind, he outlines two ways to undertake political economic analysis.

The first method, which he ascribes to 17th century economists, proceeds exactly in this fashion: they begin with an abstract totality (the way in which the concrete world in front of us appears) and develop the simplest concrete determinations (division of labor, money, value), before attempting to theorize political economic relations. However, Marx argues that this approach does not free these analyses from being empty abstractions because the simple concrete determinations are never used to reassemble the starting point in thought. Put another way, the simple concrete determinations are not used to re-conceptualize how the starting point functions beyond its mere appearance. However, the second method – “the scientifically correct method” – picks up where the first ends. By reconstructing the current state of affairs through these simple elements, one genuinely arrives at the concrete in thought:

The concrete is concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of departure for observation [Anschauung] and conception (Marx 1993, 101, my emphasis).

Marx reminds us that while this is in no way the process by which the concrete – the objective world, the world as it exists in front of eyes – emerges, it is indeed the way in which the concrete in thought is born. The relationships of the world, in and of themselves, remain autonomous from thought, while the concrete in thought reproduces it.

To emphasize this difference between the “concrete substratum” of the objective world and even the simplest of concepts, Marx turns to Hegel’s claim in Elements of the Philosophy of
"Right" (2008) that possession is the simplest juridical relation. Marx argues that, while this is true, possession as a concept in fact *preexists* juridical relationships. Or, as Marx (1993, 102) puts it: “One can imagine an individual savage as possessing something. But in that case possession is not a juridical relation.” This leads directly to the passage that Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 221) quote:

> the simple categories are the expressions of relations within which the less developed concrete may have already realized itself before having posited the more many-sided connection or relation which is mentally expressed in the more concrete category; while the more developed concrete preserves the same category as a subordinate relation (Marx 1993, 102).

Therefore, a simple category like possession can either express the dominant social relations of a previous time – a pre-juridical era in this example – or the subordinate relations in a more developed epoch: one can, of course, possess something these days without it being their property. But, unlike in the case of the “individual savage,” we also have property rights guaranteed by law. Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of state functions in the same way: the latent despotic state that Nietzsche describes – which is realized in all state-forms, whether ancient city-states, socialist, capitalist, etc. – has always existed, and each particular state is concretized in relation to the dominant forces of the historical epoch: under the primitive territorial machine, immanent social organization was powerful enough to keep state from being actualized, but when the despot and capital emerge, their particular attributes determine the form that the state takes.

The civilized capitalist machine emerges in an altogether different break from that of the despotic state, and is slowly effected by the conjunction of decoded flows:

> Decoded flows strike the despotic state with latency; they submerge the tyrant, but they also cause him to return in unexpected forms; they democratize him,

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16 This is discussed at greater length in the following section.
oligarchize him, segmentalize him, monarchicalize him, and always internalize and spiritualize him, while on the horizon there is the latent Urstaat, for the loss of which there is no consolation. It is now up to the state to recode as best as it can, by means of regular or exceptional operations, the product of the decoded flows (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 222).

The decoded flows that ultimately produce capitalism – “production in the form of money-capital, and the decoded flows of labor in the form of the ‘free worker’” (Ibid., 33) – are but two of the wide range of flows that escape the state’s overcoding over time. For example, Deleuze and Guattari explain the fall of Rome through a particular set of decoded flows: the privatization of property, formation of great private fortunes, commodity production, and slave labor, but capitalism nevertheless does not arise. Instead, and in contradistinction to the state which “come[s] like fate, without reason, consideration or pretext” (Nietzsche 1989b, II, 17), the capitalist machine emerges contingently out of the slow march of history, specifically at a historical juncture in which generalized decoding was occurring. In other words, beyond the simple encounter of decoded flows in a place, there must necessarily be a conjunction of decoded flows at a time when they can make enough connections to upend the overcoded desire of the despotic machine and constitute the new desiring-machine of capitalism. This generalized movement of decoding marks the second deterritorialization\(^\text{17}\) of Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history (the first was the emergence of despotic overcoding), and accounts for the momentum required to create the third socius: capital. Moreover, with respect to the project at hand, this moment corresponds historically to the literal deterritorialization of peasants from the...

\(\text{\footnotesize 17 The notion of deterritorialization is can be understood as the abstraction of the socius, or the movement toward what Deleuze and Guattari call the “body with organs,” which is a completely deterritorialized socius, and is only traversed by decoded flows. By contrast, the earth as socius is traversed by coded flows, the despotic socius by overcoded flows, and the capitalist socius – as we will see – by axiomatized flows. However, since capitalism emerges from and proceeds by a generalized decoding (whereas the socius’s primary function is organizing flows) it is necessary for this movement. It should also be understood that all deterritorializations are accompanied by reterritorializations: in this case the undoing and reconstitution of the socius.}\)
countryside and their reterritorialization in the factories of new industrial towns and transitioning commercial cities.

To support their claim about this massive reorganization of the social field, Deleuze and Guattari continue to draw on Marx – now referencing the necessity of capital and free labor for the birth of capitalism as proffered explicitly in *Capital* (1992a) – as well as Althusser and Balibar’s (2009) comments thereupon and Maurice Dobb’s (1964) historical studies on the emergence of capital through the privatization of land. In Deleuzoguattarian parlance, capital as such emerges through:

the deterritorialization of wealth through monetary abstraction; the decoding of the flows of production through merchant capital; the decoding of states through financial capital and public debts; [and] the decoding of the means of production through the formation of industrial capital (1983, 225).

The free worker also emerges through a similar suite of decodings and deterritorializations:

the deterritorialization of the soil through privatization; the decoding of the instruments of production through appropriation; the loss of the means of consumption through the dissolution of the family and the corporation; and finally, the decoding of the worker in favor of the work itself or the machine (Ibid.).

An in-depth engagement with each of these claims would undoubtedly be fruitful, but the central point here is that when the open relationships of alliance and exchange which are merely mediated by money become beholden to it – along with other commodities, the means of production, and labor power itself – they become part of a “self-contained fully economic system [then] industrial capital becomes the new socius at its center” (Holland 1999, 82-3).

Crucially, a brief comment on the defining elements of this new form of social organization illuminates how Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of political economy is particularly relevant for analyzing contemporary urban revitalization projects such as SLU:
It is no longer the age of cruelty or terror [as in the primitive and despotic machines, respectively], but the age of cynicism, accompanied by a strange piety. (The two taken together constitute humanism: cynicism is the physical immanence of the social field, and piety is the maintenance of a spiritualized Urstaat; cynicism is capital as the means of extorting surplus labor, but piety is this same capital as God-capital, whence all the forces of labor seem to emanate.) (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 225, my emphasis).

It is necessary to understand this quotation in terms of how capitalism handles social organization. In the place of qualitative social relationships that define the primitive and despotic social machines, the capitalist machine substitutes a quantitative system (money) that Deleuze and Guattari call an axiomatic. There are four primary characteristics that distinguish the axiomatic from the process of coding that was responsible for social organization under the first two social machines. First, money as a general and quantitative equivalent is indifferent to qualities inherent in coding, and second, its operation depends on decoded flows whose only relation is one of quantitative difference. Third, as pure differential relations, the limit of this system becomes “schizophrenia” – the absolute decoding of all flows, where nothing means anything – but this is constantly displaced by new axioms and their temporary recoding function. This accounts for the flexibility of capitalism to commodify whatever it encounters and constantly expand markets. “The strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of adding a new axiom to the previous ones” (Ibid., 250). Fourth, from the perspective of social organization, individuals no longer need memory or belief, but are rather to be understood in terms of their capital or their labor capacity, both of which can be integrated into the overall system.
Table 1.1. Summary of Social Machines (Deleuze and Guattari 1983)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Machine</th>
<th>Socius</th>
<th>Debt to socius</th>
<th>Mode of inscription</th>
<th>Desire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primitive territorial machine</td>
<td>Earth</td>
<td>Finite and Collective</td>
<td>Code: direct bodily inscription</td>
<td>United w/ social field (objects, bodies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbarian despotic machine</td>
<td>Despot</td>
<td>Infinite and Individual</td>
<td>Overcoding: writing (law)</td>
<td>Corresponds to the Despot's desire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilized capitalist machine</td>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Infinite and Individual</td>
<td>Axiomatic: decoding, converting to quantitative values with temporary recoding</td>
<td>Relegated to the private sphere (family) and repressed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The capitalist axiomatic, then, operates through the dual processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, decoding and (to a lesser extent, temporary) recoding, and constitutes a radical break from the functioning of the previously dominant social machines. The deterritorialization and reterritorialization couple expresses capitalism’s perpetual self-expansion. As in the case of the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the socius – wherein the organizing body is disassembled and reconstituted – these two movements correspond to capitalism’s “constant revolutionizing of the means of production” (Marx 1992b, 264), as in the cases of, for example, steam power, electricity, the integrated circuit, and outsourcing. Innovation corresponds to the moment of deterritorialization, or the freeing up of creative energy – a moment that does not occur regularly under the despotic machine – while its
immediate application and valorization is reterritorialization. Under the capitalist axiomatic, where new axioms constantly integrate new ideas, practices, and processes, and direct them toward the accumulation of surplus value, it is clear that reterritorialization is the strongest movement.

Simultaneously, and of at least as much interest to the present discussion, social organization in this system proceeds by decoding and recoding – the former of which corresponds to cynicism because all belief is evacuated and quantified; the latter of which expresses temporary and artificial codes (piety, systems of belief) that ultimately promote the accumulation of surplus value. In contradistinction to the deterritorialization-reterritorialization couple, this process of recoding and is undeniably secondary to decoding. Yet with the proliferation of extraeconomic discourses addressing land use and character, institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life in the empirical investigation of SLU, a discussion of recoding is central for the analysis of SLU. This is not at all to claim that piety is overtaking cynicism, but is merely a gesture to the possibility that there is room in Deleuze and Guattari’s system for the former, even though it is grounded in the latter and therefore potentially misguided, futile, or even ultimately more dangerous – all of which are real possibilities. In any case, an effort to incorporate these two movements demands a more detailed analysis of its roots.

Jason Read (2008, 147-8) sheds invaluable light on this relationship by pointing to the relationship between Marx’s conception of the split between the civil society and the political

19 Recoding is, in fact, such a minor operation that it is only mentioned four times in Anti-Oedipus. Axiomatization – the conversion of qualitative codes to quantitative values – is the dominant movement, but it spawns new codes that are constantly reworked. As Holland (1999, 21) writes: “Whatever temporary local meanings capitalism does provide through recoding are strictly derivative of the axioms that happen to be in place.”

20 These four analytical categories emerge in Chapter 4.
sphere in “On the Jewish Question” and Peter Sloterdijk’s (1987, 192) assertion that “the nineteenth century develops a first form of the modern cynical consciousness that links a rigorous *cynicism of means* with an equally rigid *moralism of ends*.” For Marx, civil society is characterized by private beliefs and individual life, wherein men treat one another as means, degrade themselves to mere means, and, moreover, become “the plaything[s] of alien powers” (Marx 1978b, 34). By contrast, in the political sphere, man understands himself as part of a community, albeit through the form of a state that transcends these immanent and effective differences, and consequently remains above and separate from civil society.\(^\text{21}\) Therefore:

> [t]he political state, in relation to civil society, is just as spiritual as is heaven in relation to earth. It stands in the same opposition to civil society, and overcomes it in the same manner as religion overcomes the narrowness of the profane world; i.e. it [civil society] has always to acknowledge it [the state] again, re-establish it, and allow itself to be dominated by it (Ibid.).

In Sloterdijk’s terms, then, the state’s ends can be understood as moral or pious in the same sense as religious ends – a notion that resonates with Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of a “spiritualized Urstaat.”

But things are not quite that simple: while one can analytically retain the relationship between private belief and public action, the capitalist socius complicates everything. Read (2008, 148) opens up the discussion of contemporary consumer values when he writes of “our own piety about the importance of books, organic food, etc.,” but it is only to make the point that, under capitalism, we now function in a collective sphere that is dominated by exchange value, and is thus cynical at the core. For Read, even though we may privately believe in books and organic food, we still act “as if everything including labor power is exchangeable for

\(^{21}\) A tension emerges here between Marx’s conception of the state as the institutionalization of egoism and Deleuze’s (1991) early writing on Hume wherein naturally uneven sympathies are coordinated and extended through artificial institutions. This is discussed at greater length in Chapter 7.
everything else” (Ibid.). This is not only an inversion of Marx’s formulation of cynicism and piety – thereby placing cynicism in the public sphere, where the state’s function is to assure the reproduction of capital, and piety in the private sphere where it can guide one to making “smart” choices for consumption – but is also a reworking of piety in such a way that it is a temporary and always shifting effect of whatever is valorized by capital. Read’s interpretation seemingly makes no room at all for the extraecononomic, and for a good reason. His assertion that desires “are already organized by the practices and relations (what Deleuze and Guattari call flows) of capitalism” (Ibid.) is grounded in Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of why the axiomatic differs from codes, specifically their assertions that “there is no longer any need for belief” (1983, 250) and the passage he partially cites:

> The person has become ‘private’ in reality, insofar as he derives from abstract quantities and becomes concrete in the becoming-concrete of these same quantities. It is these quantities that are marked, no longer the persons themselves: *your capital or your labor capacity*, the rest is not important, [we'll always find a place for you within the expanded limits of the system, even if an axiom has to be created just for you] (Read 2008, 149). \(^{24}\)

In short, it does not matter what one believes; as long as she participates in the cynical system of exchange, the capitalist machine will keep on running, and surplus value will be distributed as planned. \(^{25}\) The perspective of the individual – her sympathies and beliefs – which emerges from unconscious investments of desire \(^{26}\) and are first and foremost susceptible to the organizational

\(^{24}\) Read does not include the bracketed portion (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 251).

\(^{25}\) Perhaps even more importantly, even if one is participating in cynical exchange, one should not forget that decoded flows of desire are never completely axiomatized, a fact which is succinctly captured in phrases like “something always escapes” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 217) and “the [capitalist] system is leaking all over the place” (Deleuze 2004, 270).

\(^{26}\) In a published conversation with Foucault, Deleuze notes that “the thrust of Marxism [is] to define the problem [of exploitation] essentially in terms of interest” when “there are investments of desire that function in a more profound and diffuse manner than our interests dictate” (Foucault 1977b, 214-5). In short, it is unconscious desire which subtends and shapes interest.
efforts of the capitalist socius, are understood as already structured by capitalism (Ibid., 149), so any discussion of beliefs in reference to this portion of Anti-Oedipus is not particularly illuminating.

However, a few pages earlier, Deleuze and Guattari do address the role of the extraeconomic in relation to the economy. It is important to note that there is a code when the socius claims the product of an economy (which is always the case), and it “is a sign of necessarily extraeconomic power, although its causes and effects lie within the economy” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 248). Moreover:

the code relation is not only indirect, qualitative, and limited; because of these very characteristics, it is also extraeconomic, and by virtue of this fact engineers the couplings between qualified flows. Consequently it implies a system of collective appraisal and evaluation, and a set of organs of perception, or more precisely of belief, as a condition of existence and survival of the society in question (Ibid., my emphasis).

It is these systems of evaluation (belief, piety, values, morality) and the subsequent engineering of flows that are of particular interest in SLU: who is doing the engineering, the regulating, and in response to what particular criteria? In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari are clear that such regulation falls under the purview of the state, and is no way inseparable from capitalism, but in the case of SLU, one will do well to ask whether or not the developers – particularly Vulcan, but also the others following their lead, as well as a wide range of residents, citizens groups, and other organizations – have adopted some of these functions. Undertaking this sort of analysis will require turning to Deleuze and Guattari’s elaborations on the relationship between the state and capitalism in A Thousand Plateaus (1987), to which I will turn momentarily.

To conclude: under the civilized capitalist machine, the axiomatic assumes responsibility for social production and reproduction, and the state is transformed into “the regulator of decoded flow as such, insofar as they are caught up in the axiomatic of capital” (Deleuze and
Guattari 1983, 252). Arriving at this transformation of the state and its new role as attempting to regulate flows under capitalism is the first indication that Deleuze and Guattari’s system is more than capable of addressing the aspects of political economy required for critical urban studies. The question, however, is whether or not Deleuzoguattarian approach to urban studies can go further. I believe it can, but only after moving along to their conceptual innovations in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987).

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27 Hardt and Negri (2000) conceptualize a new form of supranational sovereignty that is faithful to Deleuze and Guattari’s political economy across both volumes of *Capital and Schizophrenia*. However, my overarching claim is that forms of urbanization such as SLU cannot be reduced to political economy, so although Hardt and Negri’s work is compelling, it does not engage specifically with the extraeconomic qualities that must be considered to discuss urbanization as such.
1.2 The State and Capitalism in A Thousand Plateaus

Thus the states, in capitalism, are not canceled out but change form and take on a new meaning: models of realization for a worldwide axiomatic that exceeds them. But to exceed is not at all the same thing as doing without.

Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 454

The conceptual tools for interrogating the relationship between the state and capitalism become much more refined in A Thousand Plateaus (1987). The concept of the socius has vanished and a much more subtle political philosophy is developed across two plateaus\(^{28}\): Plateau 12, “1227: Treatise on Nomadology – The War Machine” and Plateau 13, “7000 B.C.: Apparatus of Capture.” In these two sections, Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between what they call the “war machine” and the “state apparatus,” and describe how they interact with one another in our current historical moment, which – drawing on their conceptualization of capitalism in Anti-Oedipus – they call the “global capitalist axiomatic.” To avoid any confusion it is important to first note that although the concept of the war machine is built on actual war, it is actually a generalization that “does not necessarily have war as its object, although war and the battle may be its necessary result (under certain conditions)” (Ibid., 416). Of particular interest here is the constant struggle between these two elements, namely how the war machine constantly strives to operate autonomously but can never completely separate itself from the state apparatus, which

\(^{28}\) Deleuze and Guattari divide this work up into “plateaus” rather than chapters in an effort to distance themselves from the linear structure of a book. For them, plateaus are “multiplici[ties] connected to other multiplicities by superficial underground stems in such a way as to form or extend a rhizome” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 22). For this reason, and per the Authors’ Note at the outset of the volume, one can allegedly read it in any order, with the exception that the conclusion should be read at the end.
always tries to appropriate it, and direct it toward the state’s ends.\footnote{As I will show, at present the capitalist war machine has converted the state to one of its models of realization, but this has only been the case since World War II. The struggle, however, between the state and war machine is transhistorical.} As with all of Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, this bipolar schema never produces any sort of cozy dialectical sublation but is instead defined by a constant struggle between two forces of different natures.

This section proceeds by first stepping through each of these concepts in detail, drawing both on Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas as well as on key sources that inspired them. Second, it examines how these two forces have interacted historically and how they interact today, paying special attention to the idea that in our present epoch the state has been transformed into one of many different models of realization for worldwide capitalism. Finally, it addresses some of the characteristics of the models of realization that guide the empirical investigation into SLU that forms Part II of this dissertation.

1.2.1 The Nature of the State and the War Machine

The crux of Deleuze and Guattari’s argument is that the state apparatus and the war machine differ in nature and although they interact in many different configurations throughout history, they are ultimately irreducible to one another. Deleuze and Guattari claim that this difference in nature is attested to in several registers – mythology, epic, drama, games, epistemology, noology\footnote{The study of the mind and phenomena originating therein.}, and ethnology – the first and last of which I will explore in detail here.

First, drawing on Georges Dumézil’s (1988) comparative and empirical analysis of Indo-European mythology, Deleuze and Guattari develop their notion of the state with a far richer set of tools, replacing the social machines in \textit{Anti-Oedipus} with the claim that political sovereignty has two heads or poles: “the magician-king and the jurist-priest” (1987, 351). It is important,
however, to note that they do not stray from their previous Nietzschean idea that the state “comes into the world fully formed and rises up in a single stroke” (1987, 427). Therefore, one should not consider them to be offering a theory of the state’s origin, but rather “a series of relations through which to consider the state” (Read 2008, 144).

To take the inseparable yet antithetical pair which serves as the title to Dumézil’s (1988) book as an example, the Indic god Varuna is the “binder” and expresses the fearful aspects of political sovereignty: he is the terrible, tyrannical, magical and omnipresent deity with “immediate prehension and action everywhere and over everything” (Ibid., 67); he corresponds to night, poorly executed sacrifice, otherworldliness, roasting food over flames, intoxicating drinks…in short, “the sovereign under his attacking aspect” (Ibid., 72). Mitra, by contrast, is the “organizer,” the god of the daytime, rewards for proper sacrifice, the human world, cooking with steam, and milk: “the sovereign under his reasoning aspect, luminous, ordered, calm, benevolent, priestly” (Ibid.). Mitra outlines proper conduct, Varuna enforces it. While this might seem like a dramatic departure from Deleuze and Guattari’s previous formulation of the state, there is in fact a direct connection: debt. In these debtor-creditor relations, one can “glimpse a collaboration between Mitra and Varuna, the former presiding benevolently over correctly executed exchanges, the latter ‘binding’ any defaulters” (Ibid., 98). For Deleuze and Guattari, then, sovereignty is constituted by the unity of these poles, both of which are always at play in varying intensities; together they delineate the interiority of the state’s milieu.

Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the war machine is of an altogether different nature and is not contained within the state apparatus; it is, instead, a pure exteriority, directed against

31 “[T]hese on the origin of the state are always tautological” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 427).
32 Mitra-Varuna. In his discussion, Dumézil invokes a wide range of mythologies, language, and practices from Greece, Rome, northern Europe, Germany, Iran, etc.
both heads of sovereignty, constantly untying bonds and betraying pacts. It will be further
developed below in the discussion of Pierre Clastres’s work, but it is important to show how
Dumézil’s investigations accommodate such a notion. Dumézil (Ibid., 61) cites the fascinating
story of Manu, whose śraddhā33 is so strong that he is prepared to hand over his wife to be
sacrificed by two demonic priests. However, Indra the warrior-god – who operates outside the
bond-pact couple defined by Varuna and Mitra, and in which Manu is ensnared – appears and
intervenes, saving the wife, beheading the priests, and guaranteeing that Manu receives the
benefits of his devotion. This pure exteriority defines the essence of the war machine: whereas
the state apparatus binds and organizes, the war machine disaggregates and disperses.

It is crucial to note that in Dumézil’s account of Indra, the latter is by no means part of a
cynical outside group, but is instead marked by a morality that opposes that of the sovereign. To
elaborate, Dumézil relies not on his knowledge of Indic culture, but instead on his familiarity
with Germanic warrior groupings. Although these groups’ “economic morality…as well as their
sexual morality and conduct in general, both in peace and in war, had nothing in common with
the principles regulating the rest of society” (Ibid., 107) – as evidenced by their lack of
possessions, excess, and ability to entertain themselves in any circumstances – this does not
signify that they lacked internal principles of order. Instead, the difference is between “the
opposition and blind law of the jurist and the flexible counter-law of the warrior” (Ibid., 110-1).
In other words, these groups have an organizing principle, but it is one marked by flexibility and
adaptation, not blind adherence to law. This dimension is central to the argument for using a
Deleuzoguattarian approach to analyze the political economic, ethical, and aesthetic dimensions

33 Dumézil (1988, 58) discusses how the Sanskrit word śraddhā is often “too hastily” understood
as faith or trust, and is better described, following Sylvain Lévi, as “the state of mind of a
sacrifice who knows how to perform his office correctly, and who also knows that his sacrifice,
if performed in accordance with the rules, must produce its effect.”
of contemporary urban redevelopment, because as the archaeology in Part II shows, the
developers working in SLU do not merely kowtow to official regulations. Instead, they challenge
these regulations, but not from a purely cynical and profit-driven point of view. Instead, the
developers – not to mention the broad assemblages of designers, citizens, activists, and advocates
within which they work – have their own versions of order that are relatively compatible with the
official vision.

The greatest strength of Dumézil’s work is the comparative nature of his study.
Therefore, in order to understand the relevance of his work for critical urban studies, it is helpful
to revisit how these relationships between capture and organization in mythology, as well as debt
in Indic mythology, are also present in western culture. Dumézil renders the distinction between
the two poles of the state through a discussion of Romulus and Numa as the “two ‘fathers’ of the
Roman state [who] both worked on the same material yet modeled it differently” (Ibid., 47).

34 Briefly, Romulus occupies the same pole as Varuna and is a young adventurer, a bachelor, a
passionate and self-made king who offends the senators and disappears and reappears swiftly,
always accompanied by his armed guards who carry straps to bind members of the populace on
his command. Numa, his successor, is his antithesis: he is forty years old, married, without
passions (including violence and ambition) and has lived in seclusion when the senators offer
him the crown. Moreover, his first act as king is to dissolve Romulus’s guard and install the
priesthood (flamonium), which operates through a moral order rather than violence. Dumézil also

34 Lest we forget the myth of Romulus and Remus: the twins were fathered by Mars and tossed
into the river Tiber by an uncle who had overthrown their grandfather as King. They were nursed
to health by a she-wolf before being found by a shepherd and his wife who raised them as such.
Born leaders, they attract many followers, kill their uncle and reinstall their grandfather as king
before founding their own city. A dispute over the interpretation of the augury signaling where
the city should be leads to Romulus killing Remus and founding Rome in his own name.
Harris, 49

points out the fact that these two kings ruled in succession, and that moving through the chronology of early kings, one sees an alternation between “war-loving, terrible kings” and “pious, peace-loving kings,” as if each reign emended the faults of the previous one.

Dumézil also ascribes this debtor-creditor relationship to Roman law, in which debt is defined by the *nexum* and *mutuum* pair. Literally, “*nexum* is the state of the nexus, the insolvent debtor who was, very literally, bound and subjugated to the creditor,” while *mutuum* signifies “the money borrowed” (Ibid., 99). Although he notes the etymological relations between several languages, the relationships between Sanskrit and Latin are telling: *nexum* is derived from the same Indo-European root (*nedh*) as the Sanskrit *naddha* (“fastened”), while *mutuum* stems from the root (*mei*) which not only “gave us Mitra” but also the Sanskrit *maithuna* (“union, coitus, marriage”) (Ibid.). In sum, the crux of his argument is that since *nexum* is the status of the borrower, and *mutuum* is the borrowed material, these two components must necessarily be seen as an irreducible couple, even in the earliest incarnations of Roman law. These three pairs – Varuna-Mitra, Romulus-Numa, and *nexum-mutuum* – are only a selection of the parallels that Dumézil uncovers across the Indo-European world, but form the basis for how Deleuze and Guattari understand the nature of the state, as well as its antithesis, the war machine.

A similar dynamic between the state and the war machine can also be traced in ethnology, which comes to Deleuze and Guattari through Pierre Clastres, particularly his *Society Against the State* (1989) and *Archeology of Violence* (2010). In contradistinction to their invocation of Dumézil primarily to explain the nature of sovereignty, Deleuze and Guattari use Clastres, for the most part, to develop their understanding of the war machine’s nature. Striving to break with the traditional ethnocentric and evolutionist reading which maintains that primitive societies were not economically or politically developed enough for a state to form, Clastres
instead “asks if it is not a potential concern of primitive societies to ward off or avert that monster [the state] they supposedly do not understand” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 357). Although Deleuze and Guattari specifically focus on war “as the surest mechanism directed against the formation of the state (Ibid.),” it is worth noting some of the other specifics of Clastres’s earlier investigation, which will assist us in describing the complicated relationship between the state and private sector activity in SLU.

First, it is important to note that Clastres was primarily concerned with understanding how the political realm was constituted without sovereignty in South American indigenous societies, which:

are distinguished by their sense of democracy and taste for equality. The first explorers of Brazil and the ethnographers who came after often emphasized the fact that the most notable characteristic of the Indian chief consists of his almost complete lack of authority; among these people the political function appears barely differentiated (Clastres 1989, 28).

Above all, the titular chief is to be distinguished from the temporarily empowered chieftain, in that the former leads during times of peace and the latter only assumes authority during war. Clastres both notes that these two social roles were often filled by different individuals altogether, and that only very few tribes had chieftains with authority that extended beyond the immediate circumstances of war. The role of the chief as the relatively more permanent form of leadership is, then, the one that must be seen in relation to the state, even though it is of a completely different nature.

Clastres (Ibid., 29) describes four characteristics of the chief: he is a peacemaker or an arbiter that moderates the tribe’s internal conflicts; he is obliged to be generous to the point that he cannot reject the sometimes-exploitative demands of the tribe; he must be a skilled orator; finally, though somewhat supplementary but nevertheless central to Clastres’s argument,
polygamy is his exclusive privilege. The functional aspect – the chief’s role as mediator, as “an ‘integrator’ of differences” (Ibid., 60), as the guardian of both the esprit de corps\(^{35}\) and the collectivity of bodies – must then be distinguished as the strictly political practice, while the latter three aspects are obligations/privileges of the role.\(^{36}\) Clastres’s point is that the chief does not command, for he has no standing power. Instead, the task of mediation is occasional and the chief’s performance is always susceptible to evaluation by the tribe.

Occasionally a chief accepts running that risk and attempts to put his personal interest ahead of the collective interest. Reversing the normal relationship that determines the leader as a means in the service of a socially defined end, he tries to make society into the means for achieving a purely private end: the tribe in the service of the chief and no longer the chief in the service of the tribe. If it “worked,” then we would have found the birthplace of political power, as force and violence; we would have the first incarnation, the minimal form of the state. But it never works (Clastres 1989, 209).\(^{37}\)

Moreover, the chief is not a judge and can make no demands, but instead remains “impotent”: he must rely on his rhetorical prowess and generosity to resolve disputes. This political role is, in turn, reinforced by its relationship to obligation and privilege.

The three realms in which the chief’s obligations and privileges conveniently correspond to the three modes of exchange that primarily define society: the exchange of objects, words, and women as wives (Ibid., 37). It is indeed the chief’s relation to such exchanges through the aforementioned obligations that prevents him from obtaining any lasting power. More precisely, it is the unequal relationship between the privilege of polygamy and the obligations of material

\(^{35}\) Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 366) invoke the esprit de corps that the great medieval Muslim thinker Ibn Khaldūn uses to explain how Bedouin collectivities are held together.

\(^{36}\) Or, in Clastres’s words (1989, 36-7): “To treat as homogenous elements the mode in which power is constituted, and constituted power’s mode of performance would, in effect, lead one to confuse the nature of chieftanship with its activity, the transcendental with the empirical aspect of the institution.”

\(^{37}\) Clastres goes on to cite the cases of Fousiwe (Yanomami) and Geronimo (Apache), both of whom unsuccessfully tried to convince their tribes to enter their own personal wars.
and verbal generosity that dissolves any notion of equal exchange and therefore the amassing of material or rhetorical power: ultimately, the chief gives much more than he receives.\(^{38}\)

But what about war as such? Deleuze and Guattari insist that Clastres identifies:

\[\text{war in primitive societies as the surest mechanism directed against the formation of the state: war maintains the dispersal and segmentarity of groups, and the warrior himself is caught in a process of accumulating exploits leading him to solitude and a prestigious but powerful death (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 357, emphasis in original)}\]

Clastres’s later work, which focuses explicitly on war, can thus be understood as “substantial reworking” (Viveiros de Castro 2010, 10) of his hitherto cited research focusing on the role of the chief. Herein lies Clastres’s inversion of Hobbes, which Deleuze and Guattari adopt: “He [Hobbes] was able to see that war and the State are contradictory terms, that they cannot exist together, that each implies the negation of the other: war prevents the state, the state prevents war” (Clastres 2010, 277).

Herein Clastres foregoes his previous focus on the role of the chief, and instead investigates how the function of war itself prevents an amassing of wealth and power, either to a particular tribe or to a subset of the tribe, specifically the warriors. First, he is adamant that the small, autonomous, undivided – meaning there is no social stratification\(^{40}\) – tribes are intentional about maintaining this social arrangement and therefore always live on the brink of intertribal war. This is also the case internal to each tribe, as any surplus production would be the consequence of individual effort and subject to immediate liquidation by the collective (cf.

\(^{38}\) In fact, Clastres (1989, 28) notes that one of the only reason that the chief can be generous and therefore revered is that his wives help him to do so. To say that a feminist critique of this entire arrangement would be interesting is an understatement, and Clastres briefly discusses the complicated gender roles in the last essay of *Archeology of Violence*.

\(^{40}\) “Primitive society is unaware of – because it prevents the appearance of – the difference between rich and poor, the opposition between exploiters and the exploited, the domination of the chief over society” (Clastres 2010, 259).
Bataille 1991). Moreover, while all men are trained as warriors, only those with the desire for prestige (and consequently, war) become committed to its pursuit. This however, proves to be a Sisyphean task for the ultimately tragic figure of the warrior, for the pursuit of prestige is an individual task, which keeps the warriors in competition with one another for collectively consumed spoils, and almost always results in premature death.

The primitive social field is, therefore, best understood in terms of “absolute difference,” with the threat of war serving as a means for maintaining a fragile equilibrium between the tribes, each of which has its own mechanisms for preventing the centralization of power and/or wealth: “[e]xternal segmentation, internal non-division are two faces of a single reality, two aspects of the same sociological functioning and of the same social logic” (Clastres 2010, 275).

Second, however, this does not mean that primitive society is static and utopian; conversely, there is a complicated system of strategic alliances (executed through marriages), which also serve as the basis for exchange. Together, these two moments constitute the positive function of war, which is to preserve the being of this society and to ward off a state that would collapse these differences between communities through an external power (rather than this immanent organization) and stratify society (in contradistinction to the existing radically egalitarian society).

Never ones to remain faithful to the ideas of those who inspire them, Deleuze and Guattari transform this idea into their own. As I have shown, for Clastres, war literally signifies war and is a means for preserving a particular social configuration. For Deleuze and Guattari, however, war is by no means the sole object (means) of the war machine. Instead, the nature of the war machine is generalized into a function of smoothing space: “[m]ake the desert, the steppe, grow; do not depopulate it, quite the contrary” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 417). This is
their way of saying that the war machine’s function is to propagate the space of absolute differences that Clastres saw as defining primitive society. War as such becomes a special case and arises only when this function is impeded by the state, which has an antithetical function altogether: to striate, organize, and manage space. So here is Clastres, repackaged: the war machine indeed opposes the state – and the entire urban phenomenon, for that matter, which is indeed an assertion that is directly addressed in Chapter 7 – but instead of taking war as a conservative force maintaining a fragile equilibrium in a society against the state, it now must be seen as an active force propagating multiplicities and difference which is constantly threatened by the state’s striation efforts.\(^4\) Put another way, a war machine can indeed undertake war, but this is just one of its capacities; its primary concern is to distribute pure differences against the state’s organization. It is this characteristic that enables Deleuze and Guattari to juxtapose the state (as organizer) to the global capitalist axiomatic (as the purveyor of pure quantitative differences).

1.2.2 Interactions Between the State and the War Machine

Drawing, then, on the empirical and theoretical work of Dumézil and Clastres, it is fairly straightforward to see how Deleuze and Guattari understand the state and the war machine as always coexisting and struggling, while nevertheless remaining irreducible to one another. Between its two poles of binding and organization, the state defines interiority, while the war machine expresses pure exteriority. Yet, despite the difference in nature between the two, the state can appropriate the war machine in the form of a military: “the jurist-king is a great

\(^4\) This is not to say that they have misread Clastres, but is rather to insist that they have generalized his work. Moreover, Viveiros de Castro (2010, 34) insists that Deleuze and Guattari have essentially completed Clastres’s work – which was cut short by his early death in 1977, three years before *Mille Plateaux* was published – by developing its philosophical content.
organizer of war; but he gives it laws, lays out a field for it, makes it principled, imposes a discipline on it, [and] subordinates it to political ends” (Ibid., 425). Again, such appropriation in no way implies a domestication once and for all, for like the state, the war machine also has two poles: at one pole, the war machine is appropriated by the state or uses the state to realize its own ends; at the other, the war machine’s object is flight, escape, and the creation of new alternatives. Moreover, the act of appropriation not only transforms the war machine but also the state itself. These interdependent transformations are key to understanding the emergence of the global capitalist axiomatic.

Deleuze and Guattari point out three categories of such appropriation, beginning with the classical situation in which states appropriate the war machine, makes limited war its sole object, and direct it toward particular political (extraeconomic) ends: “striating, securing, and expanding territory” (Holland 2011, 26). Under this type of appropriation, von Clausewitz’s (2007, 28) famous assertion “war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” still holds. However, the rise of fascism marks the point at which this type of appropriation gives way to an autonomous war machine, which still takes the state’s ends as its aim, but now has a new object: unlimited war, which is characterized by a full mobilization of resources as well as the annihilation of the “entire [enemy] population and its economy” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987,

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42 The bulk of this dissertation focuses on the first of these poles, since the project at hand is sketching a framework for analyzing capitalist land development, but it is nonetheless crucial to note that the true political power to reshape entrenched patterns of development inheres in the latter pole.

43 The word “appropriation” is potentially confusing because, as I will show, the war machine ultimately comes to be the stronger force in relation to the state. Therefore, to obviate any confusion, I suggest understanding it to signify a relationship in which the state is not “warded off” or “on the horizon,” but is, rather, fully present even if its primary task is aiding and abetting capital accumulation.

44 Deleuze and Guattari discuss these three appropriations on pages 466-7 of A Thousand Plateaus.
This development is crucial because it marks the first point at which the state has reconstituted a war machine that is out of its control, and in relation to which the state becomes secondary. Finally, following World War II, the war machine frees itself from state control and is able to pursue its own aim and object (end and means): the distribution of pure differences in a social field marked by a fragile equilibrium. Concretely, this takes the form of global capitalism and the attendant world order necessary for the accumulation of surplus value. In this new configuration states do not vanish – neither do local differences, such as variations in population, natural resources, wealth, industrial capacity, education, etc. – but are instead transformed into constituent parts of the axiomatic, or what Deleuze and Guattari somewhat vaguely call “models of realization.”

It is precisely these qualitatively differentiated models of realization that globalized flows of capital must pass through in order to create surplus value. In the language of Anti-Oedipus, this is the dimension in which belief – even though it emerges from the cynical movements of capital – is the extraeconomic factor that “engineers the couplings between qualified flows” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 248). It is, in fact, these models that provide the motivation and directionality of the flows of capital. In terms of urbanization, in SLU or elsewhere, the extraeconomic criteria that determine both the function and the form of the city constitute these models. This is, of course, not to say that a more socially just or joyous type of urbanization is guaranteed to unfold just because some of those involved in its production believe in building cities in such a way. In fact, the odds are against this happening, for as Holland (2011, 26) succinctly puts it, “state politics and diplomacy, even war itself, are now merely the continuation of capital accumulation by other means.” The point, however, is that this conceptual framework

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45 As Holland (2001, 59) notes, from a military perspective, the war machine remained in the service of the state’s aims throughout the Cold War era.
is capable of accommodating such movements without reducing them to ideology: models of realization do not, by definition, obfuscate the operations of capitalism but, instead, *effectuate* them. In this capacity they are certainly capable of producing an increasingly unjust and boring city, but they are by no means required to function in that way.

What, then, are the characteristics of models of realization? Robert Blanché, the mathematician from whom Deleuze and Guattari borrow the language of axiomatics writes:

> When models are distinguishable from each other only by the differences in the concrete interpretations given to their terms, and exactly coincide when we abstract from the latter for the purposes of formal axiomatization, we call them isomorphic: they have in effect the same logical structure. The axiomatic method aims specifically at establishing isomorphisms between apparently heterogeneous concrete theories, thereby exhibiting the unity of the abstract system underlying them all. (Blanché 1962, 36).

First, and just as in the schema proffered in *Anti-Oedipus*, all models of realization are immanent to the single world market, the capitalist axiomatic or the “abstract system” to which Blanché refers, which serves as their basis. Second, models of realization must be isomorphic – meaning that they have the same logical structure and can only be distinguished through an assessment of qualitative differences (Ibid.) – in their relation to the capitalist world market in which they “exactly coincide.” This is not, however, to say that any two particular models are interchangeable, but rather, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 455) note:

> Are not all modern States isomorphic in relation to the capitalist axiomatic, to the point that the difference between democratic, totalitarian, liberal, and tyrannical States depends only on concrete variables, and on the worldwide distribution of those variables, which always undergo eventual readjustments? Even the so-called socialist States are isomorphic, to the extent that there is only one world market, the capitalist one.

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46 Deleuze (1991) held a similar position in his earliest book on Hume, in which he addresses the latter’s theory of artifice. For Hume, like Nietzsche, humans express a bundle of competing tendencies, and Hume argues that institutions are necessary to extend the natural inclinations that particular cultures value, and are therefore productive in nature. This discussion will be revisited in Chapter 7.
Third and finally, axioms are independent of one another, “that is to say…that we can modify any one of them without rendering the system contradictory” (Blanché 1962, 41). They can also be continually added to each model of realization – even to an already saturated system – in order to accommodate any and all differences that arise.

Deleuze and Guattari primarily focus on the nation state – which they assert “is precisely the State as a model of realization” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 456) – but I think this system needs to be expanded to account for the various machinations that are producing SLU. Of course, these include governmental dynamics at lower levels of the nation-state – from the State of Washington down through the Central Puget Sound region, King County, and the City of Seattle – but also involve citizens’ groups, real estate developers, planners and designers, as well as commentators. The extraeconomic criteria that emerge here range from growth management efforts that seek to conserve rural land to environmental efforts to protect water and air quality. They are aesthetic in that they address the layout of the neighborhood, the heights and setbacks of buildings, the design materials, and what the neighborhood should “feel” like. They are ethical in their concern for providing a wide range of housing and amenities for citizens. Above all, these models are the critical locations, the gears and transmission belts of the urbanization machine, that we must focus on if we seek to intervene in the ways that some of the loudest most critical voices in urban studies suggest is necessary: “It must be clear by now that capitalism will never fall on its own. It will have to be pushed. The accumulation of capital will never cease. It will have to be stopped” (Harvey and Wachsmuth 2012, 274). Or in a less oppositional key that promotes the construction of alternatives, one can place a variety of concepts that are meant to redirect resources and create a more joyous and sustainable world. This is path that I will sketch out beginning in Chapter 6 where I identify three limit cases to the discourses that presently
regulate the development of SLU: Eugene Holland’s (2011) free market communism as an alternative political economy, Adrian Parr’s (2009) sustainability culture as an alternative ethical system, and various works by the Situationist International as an alternative vision of the city.

But before getting to this, I first turn to a recent debate in the journal *City* (2011) that pits proponents of a peculiarly reductionist reading of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of assemblage against the well-developed notion of critical urban theory. Encountering this debate inspired this entire dissertation primarily because although I am sympathetic to the assemblage urbanists’ attempts to bring Deleuze and Guattari into critical urban inquiry, I feel that the critiques leveled against their work to date – specifically the claim that it cannot serve as ontology for urban studies due to its lack of engagement with political economy (Brenner et al. 2011) – have been on point. However, as I have striven to demonstrate in this chapter, Deleuze and Guattari are heavily indebted to critical political economy, but have also developed a political philosophy that makes room for extraeconomic factors. I therefore consider this dissertation to be the first step in a new direction for a critical urban studies that can not only engage with political economy, but can also address the specifics of ethical systems and visions of the city that determine the form that urbanization takes.
CHAPTER 2. ASSEMBLAGE URBANISM OR CRITICAL URBAN THEORY?

Encounters between independent thinkers always occur in a blind zone.

Deleuze 1998, 42

Ultimately, however, the main thrust of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is not ontological: it is political. The point of doing philosophy is not to arrive at even the best possible understanding of the nature of being: they presuppose an ontology compatible with contemporary math and science to do political philosophy – to articulate Problems posed by contemporary social life in the hope of provoking the discovery of practical solutions to them or, at least, better ways of addressing them.

Holland 2011, 16-17

2.1 CLEARING THE GROUND

A 2011 debate in the journal City highlights some of the tensions between those who are trying to import Deleuzoguattarian concepts into urban theory and the proponents of critical urban theory, who remain committed to a largely Marxist understanding of urbanization as it has been developed since the early 1970s through the work of Lefebvre (2003), Castells (1977), and Harvey (1973). This often-cited debate began with an article by Colin McFarlane (2011a), a British geographer who argued that the notion of assemblage could contribute to the critical study of cities, and illuminate potential avenues for creating progressive, if not radical, alternatives to current patterns of urbanization.¹ In response, the prominent American urban

¹ An assemblage, for Deleuze and Guattari, is a tetravalent arrangement of objects and words, or what they call a “machinic assemblage of bodies” and a “collective assemblage of enunciation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 1987). Each dimension, has a pole of stability (territoriality) and instability (deterritorialization). Mark Bonta and John Protevi (2004, 10), assert that these four dimensions actually constitute a “structural axis” that must be considered against an “ethical axis” whose poles are the affirmation and destruction of life. Finally, as Ian Buchanan (2015, 383) points out, the word assemblage is Brian Massumi’s translation of the French word
theorist Neil Brenner and two of his associates deflected McFarlane’s initial points and argued that while the notion of assemblage is in fact useful methodologically, it is not suitable as an ontology for urban studies, since it allegedly does not consider the central concepts of radical political economy (Brenner et al. 2011). However, both as I have demonstrated in Chapter 1 and as Eugene Holland’s quotation that serves as the second epigram to this chapter asserts, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s thought deeply engages with political economy and should therefore not be disqualified as being a potential ontology for critical urban theory. In short, I am responding to the critique that Brenner et al. level against the entire corpus of Deleuzoguattarian thought on the basis of what McFarlane and others\(^2\) have presented with the cherry-picked concept of assemblage, precisely because it fueled a debate which unfolded over four issues of the journal and continues today (cf. Brenner 2013; Storper and Scott 2015).

This chapter examines, first, the concept of critical urban theory and, second, reviews the initial proposition for how an assemblage approach could augment it. Third, it will take stock of what Brenner and his associates consider to be the shortcomings of this approach, specifically with respect to their claim that it cannot serve as ontology for critical urban studies. Fourth, it will consider other relevant voices in this debate, and finally, it will briefly revisit the discussion from the first chapter to put it in direct conversation with this contemporary disciplinary debate.

Above all I am claiming that the two *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* collaborations between Deleuze and Guattari can serve as more robust politically-charged ontology for critical urban studies than the critical urban theory that Neil Brenner and his associates have developed, precisely because it can not only address the political economy of urbanization, but can also

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\(^{2}\) See Brenner et al. (2011, 231) for a summary table of how the concept of assemblage has been invoked in critical urban studies.
integrate crucial extraeconomic factors such as ethics and aesthetics into the study of urbanization.³

2.2 Developing the Concept of “Critical Urban Theory”

Neil Brenner (2009, 198) asserts that the term “critical urban theory” is typically used in a descriptive fashion to characterize the work of leftist urban thinkers – specifically Henri Lefebvre and those working in his wake, such as David Harvey and Manuel Castells (Katznelson, 1993) – in the period after 1968. However, he also claims that it has determinate content and “emphasizes the politically and ideologically mediated, socially contested and therefore malleable character of urban space” (Brenner 2009, 198). His conception of critical urban theory subsequently relies on reformulated elements from Frankfurt School critical theory to shape critiques of ideology, power, inequality, injustice and exploitation in the urban context.

The addition of the urban here is Brenner’s key contribution because, as he notes, Walter Benjamin’s The Arcades Project (2002) was the only work emerging from the Frankfurt School that specifically considered the city. In fact, this incorporation of the urban into social theory forms the infrastructure of much of Brenner’s recent work on “planetary urbanization” (Brenner 2013, 2014; Brenner and Schmid 2011; Wachsmuth and Brenner 2014), which draws on Lefebvre’s (2003) notion of the “urban revolution” – the tendency toward generalized urbanization of the world – to theoretically ground his claims that social theory and critical urban theory are becoming enmeshed to an even greater degree.⁴

³ The concept of assemblage hardly figures at all into what I am presenting because assemblages are nothing but the effects of the machinations between the political economic, ethical, and aesthetic dynamics that I am concerned with: they are the products – the physical environment, the discursive and nondiscursive practices as well as experiences that take place within it – while what interests me is the production process itself.
⁴ Planetary urbanization is discussed at greater length in Chapter 6.
Although many other thinkers have contributed to the recent re-centering of critical urban theory (Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer 2009, 2012; Marcuse 2009; Whitehead 2013), Brenner’s self-positioning as an arbiter of how it might be used, his argument for grounding it in a particular tradition of social thought, his direct engagement with attempts to bring assemblage thinking – “a particularly problematic tendency” (Brenner 2013) – into urban theory make his account crucial for the argument at hand, and therefore demands special attention. In outlining his project, he makes four central propositions: first, critical theory is indeed theory, and is therefore “unapologetically abstract”:

It is characterized by epistemological and philosophical reflections; the development of formal concepts, generalizations about historical trends; deductive and inductive modes of argumentation; and diverse forms of historical analysis. It may also build upon concrete research, that is upon an evidentiary basis, whether organized through traditional or critical methods (Brenner 2009, 201).

Referencing Herbert Marcuse (2007), Brenner asserts that critical theory is therefore not a strategy for political action, but instead is an abstract and necessary moment that occurs before practical actions are proposed. Though it may go without saying, this entire call for abstraction is deeply Marxian, and can be traced to some methodological notes in the introduction to Grundrisse (1993). Herein Marx notes that whenever “production” is discussed, his intended meaning is concrete and particular instances of production. Yet one can still take note of common aspects that extend over time. “Production in general,” he writes “is an abstraction, but a rational abstraction in so far as it really brings out and fixes the common element and thus saves us repetition” (Marx 1993, 85).

Second, Brenner asserts that critical theory is reflexive in that it is a product of, and directed toward, specific sociohistorical circumstances. It therefore both rejects all claims of standing outside spatiotemporal context and focuses on how forms of consciousness,
subjectivity, and knowledge can emerge in and against specific social configurations. Most importantly, the internal contradictions of capitalist society enable critique; without them, Brenner argues, critical consciousness would be unnecessary. Third, and drawing on Max Weber, critical theory rejects instrumental reason, or the use of means-end rationality that streamlines activity without an explicit interrogation of the ends. This orientation thus rejects technocratic visions of efficiency or apolitical engagement with the world, and demands explicit normative orientations in both practical and political registers.

Finally, critical theory focuses on the disjuncture between actual forms of oppression/domination and the underlying possibilities of emancipation. Combining the successes of postwar capitalist development and the Frankfurt School’s dismissal of a possible proletarian revolution, this orientation accounts for the pessimism that can be found in Horkheimer and Adorno’s work (cf. 2007). However, by turning to Marcuse’s (2007) insistence that the disjuncture between the actual and possible could only be overcome through concrete practice – therefore “sublating” or absorbing critical theory into practice – Brenner (2009, 204) essentially reinforces critical theory’s diagnostic role outlined in his second proposition: “There is no theory that can overcome [the actual-possible] divide, because, by definition, it cannot be overcome theoretically; it can only be overcome in practice.”

In conclusion, Brenner notes that although practitioners of critical urban studies have drawn heavily on Marx, they have largely neglected the Frankfurt School’s contributions to critical thought. With these four propositions, Brenner seeks to sketch a broad conception of critical urban theory that can guide further theoretical and empirical work that must be

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5 This dissertation essentially makes a similar argument but replaces the Frankfurt School with Deleuzoguattarian thought and the transformations it has enacted on the Marxian and Nietzschean traditions.
undertaken with a wide range of methods and objects. This is, he argues, not an attempt to install eternal laws, for critical theory’s focus on context and reflexivity demands adaptability. However, it is an argument for “a much more systematic integration of urban questions into the analytical framework of critical social theory as a whole” (Brenner 2009, 205). Acknowledging and endorsing Brenner’s assessment that the world is undergoing “planetary urbanization” (Brenner and Schmid 2011; Brenner 2013, 2014), the present question then becomes, is the Frankfurt School really the preferred foundation for contemporary critical urban thought, to the exclusion of French post-structuralist theory?

2.3 Assemblage Urbanism as Critical Urban Theory?

Colin McFarlane has a similar question, but he asks it in a slightly different way: rather than challenging Brenner’s proposed foundation for critical urban theory – he explicitly says this is not his task – he seeks to explore how assemblage thinking “might connect, differ, and add to critical urbanism” (McFarlane 2011a, 204). He concedes that the notion of assemblage is “not very well elaborated in the social sciences,” yet instead of undertaking that project – and potentially revealing how fundamentally different it is from Brenner’s framework, while remaining perfectly capable of addressing critical political and economic issues – he presents a well-informed account of how assemblage thinking applies to various urban phenomena, such as human-nonhuman relationships between informal settlements and potable water. This sort of “assemblage-hunting” is undeniably illuminating in that it shows the robustness of the concept.

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6 This coinage is indebted to Colin Koopman’s (2013, 6-7) assertion that many theorists working with Foucault often engage in “biopower-hunting”: that is, “ferreting out the nefarious inner workings of biopower (or disciplinary power, or slavish morality) in some context where its appearance was perhaps unexpected. Although such work bears obvious conceptual relations to Foucault’s work, methodologically it is no closer to his genealogies than is old-fashioned ideological unmasking.”
for descriptive purposes but, as I argue below, it nevertheless softens some of the critical edges fundamental to Deleuzoguattarian thinking. In this respect, its similarity and debt to Manuel DeLanda’s “assemblage theory” (2006) is both evident and explicitly cited, even though McFarlane (2011a, 205) reminds his readers that “the notion of assemblage was always political.” ¹ What I mean here, to be perfectly clear, is that these thinkers correctly see assemblages everywhere, but their explications largely lose sight of the fundamental relationship between self-organized movement and imposed organization that underlies Deleuze and Guattari’s entire collaborative enterprise: that is, the perennial struggle between the war machine and the state apparatus that defines their political philosophy. Indeed, as both McFarlane and DeLanda argue, assemblages constantly undergo a process of disassembly and reassembly (deterritorialization and (re)territorialization), but they place far too little stress on the fact that assemblages are, above all else, strongly influenced by processes operating in the background by forces of organization.

But, first, what is an assemblage? First, it is important to note that Brian Massumi selected the word for his translation of the French word agencement in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Ian Buchanan (2015, 383) has recently argued that a more descriptive translation for the French term might in fact be “working arrangement,” since – although it does not exactly roll off the tongue – it emphasizes the temporality of the collection of elements in a way that other translations, such as “layout” or “ensemble,” do not. Second, he notes that agencement is actually Deleuze and Guattari’s version “of the German word Komplex (as in the ‘Oedipal complex’ or the ‘castration complex’)” (Ibid). This is crucial for

¹ Neil Brenner (2013, 92) correctly observes that assemblage urbanism is neo-Deleuzian but challenges its shortcomings with the aforementioned set of tools instead of digging in to Deleuze and Guattari.
understanding McFarlane’s, as well as other assemblage urbanists’, use of the term because it emphasizes that their focus on the materiality of an assemblage is only capturing part of the concept’s dexterity. Assemblages can certainly contain material elements – as in the “man-horse assemblage” that Deleuze and Guattari note in their discussion of the war machine (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 399) – but, as Buchanan argues, assemblages are not defined by their materiality, but can also exist between an individual and their own anxieties, neuroses, etc. A somewhat less provocative – but no less apt – critique is that the assemblages urbanists’ focus on materiality also misses half of the concept. For Deleuze and Guattari, an assemblage is constituted along two axes. First, along the horizontal axis, it is “a machinic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another” (Ibid. 88, emphasis in original) on one end, and “a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies” (Ibid.) at the other. The vertical axis runs from a territorial or stable extreme to a deterritorialized or destabilized edge. These elements are independent but presuppose one another.

As for the forces that shape the configuration of an assemblage, DeLanda (2006, 30) does mention the Deleuzoguattarian notion of the diagram, as “a set of universal singularities that would be the equivalent of a body-plan, or more precisely, that would structure the space of possibilities associated with the assemblage,” (my emphasis) but it is only mentioned four times in his book, and is never discussed as having much gravity. In fact, DeLanda’s final mention of the diagram lends credence to Holland’s assertion in the epigram to this chapter that claims

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8 Deleuze and Guattari frequently use the terms “diagram” and “abstract machine” interchangeably. Herein either word should be taken to mean a force that functions in and transforms assemblages.
Deleuzoguattarian philosophy should be understood as being political first, rather than ontological. DeLanda writes:

Finally, the ontological status of assemblages is two-sided: as actual entities all the differently scaled social assemblages are individual singularities, but the possibilities open to them at any given time are constrained by a distribution of universal singularities, the diagram of the assemblage, which is not actual but virtual (DeLanda 2006, 40).

The political dimension of this struggle between possibility and constraint is unmistakable, and by neglecting it, DeLanda’s momentous effort to show the flexibility of an assemblage-based social ontology is effectively neutered before the urbanists ever get to the operating room.

But this is, unfortunately, not the only misstep from the political perspective. A central aspect of DeLanda’s project is showing how the concept of assemblage can be applied at a range of scales from the pre-individual to international scales, with a wide range of nested scales – including that of the neighborhood – in between. He is correct to assert that this configuration is not at all akin to a set of Russian dolls – wherein assemblages at each scale could fit neatly into the next broader scale – but that the heterogeneous terms of an assemblage crosscut multiple scales (DeLanda 2006, 33). One can indeed simultaneously be the member of a family, an organization, and the world market (sitting at the dining room table and using a laptop from the

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9 “Ultimately, however, the main thrust of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy is not ontological: it is political. The point of doing philosophy is not to arrive at even the best possible understanding of the nature of being: they presuppose an ontology compatible with contemporary math and science to do political philosophy – to articulate Problems posed by contemporary social life in the hope of provoking the discovery of practical solutions to them or, at least, better ways of addressing them” (Holland 2011, 6-7).

10 I am not alone in this assessment. Clough et al (2007, 392) express a very similar sentiment by asserting that “while Delanda offers a good introduction to these thoughts born of Deleuzian philosophy, he has stripped the latter of its passion, aesthetics and political orientation.” Buchanan (2015, 387-8) writes “DeLanda ‘improves’ on Deleuze and Guattari by reformulating their concept in such a way that it lacks all analytic power.”
office to shop on Amazon?). However, as Buchanan (2008, 92) argues, this argument for scaling up excises a critical aspect of Deleuzoguattarian thinking that directly relates to the opposition between freedom and organization: desire. Buchanan argues that DeLanda’s invocation of assemblage to describe relationships at increasingly broad scales conflates the difference in kind between unconscious flows of desire, and desire as organized in a regime of social production: the former is nothing but relationships of pure intensity – much like the abstract machine or diagram – while the latter is constituted by “relations of exteriority.” Consequently, desire as a potentially liberating force that bubbles up out of present social relations is removed from consideration.

As previously mentioned, McFarlane – following Tampio (2009) – asserts the political nature of assemblages in Deleuzoguattarian thought, but in his initial contribution to the debate, he makes no reference to the notion of a diagram structuring the space of possible connections, nor to the concept of desire, and therefore doubly misses the underlying political dimension of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy. Perhaps the most startling aspect of this omission is that Tampio’s entire argument focuses on the difference between his own and Hardt and Negri’s (2001, 2005) conceptions of Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy. For him, “the [political] left is an abstract machine [or diagram], an incorporeal power that pilots the formation of assemblages” (Tampio 2009, 393). Moreover, the resulting “[l]eft assemblages are semi-coherent political entities that express and work for the ideals of liberty and equality” (Ibid., 394). Even with this as a source, McFarlane ends up in similar territory as DeLanda: focusing on the effect of political and economic forces rather than their actual engine and asymptotes. Why?

It is perhaps a strategic maneuver, for his goal is “to think through what might usefully emerge from bringing assemblage into the disparate debate around critical urbanism, that is, for
thinking and acting towards a more socially just and ecologically sound urbanism” (McFarlane 2011a, 205). That is to stay, to start from the assemblages in which we are now enmeshed, and looking for a framework that helps conceptualize alternative paths of action. This is undeniably a refreshing goal, for it highlights the role of individual agency among urban citizens, but it nevertheless produces two problems, one theoretical and the other empirical. First, and most important for this chapter, it leaves assemblage approaches to urban theory open to critique by the likes of Brenner, for whom it (understandably) lacks a critical edge. By focusing on the responses to urban inequality – in Mumbai’s informal settlements, for example, where the author conducts his field work – and relegating the production of those problems to a few empirical details without arguing for how they are part of the fundamental nature of the philosophical framework in which he is working, McFarlane’s analysis is vulnerable to critique. Second, and most important for the project at hand, “a more socially just and ecologically sound urbanism” is being actualized in South Lake Union (SLU), and yet something is still tremendously lacking. There is a diagram, an abstract machine, at work in SLU, and it is guiding the production of assemblages. But considering assemblages themselves is not enough. Instead, one must strive to understand the entangled economic and extraeconomic forces producing them. By looking closely at the production of SLU from the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, I can both build upon McFarlane’s intuition that they have something to offer critical urban theory and address Brenner’s critique of his attempt to do so. But first a little more on the contemporary literature.

With respect to urbanism, assemblage thinking is taken up in a variety of registers, from a focus on a theory of place (Dovey 2010) to actor-network theory (ANT) approaches (Farias and Bender 2009), and to more content specific work on cyborg urbanism (Gandy 2005), the politics
of urban socio-natural relations (Swynegedouw 2004, 2006), the historical geography of sanitation in colonial cities (McFarlane 2008), urban dwelling (McFarlane 2011b), and policy mobility (Allen and Cochrane 2007, 2010; Ong 2007; Collier and Ong, 2005; McGuirk and Dowling 2009, McCann and Ward 2011). Dovey finds the notion of assemblage – as interpreted by DeLanda’s (2006) – to be a helpful way to envision the interactivity between the materiality of places and the accompanying sense of place, both of which are in constant flux (becoming). In his introductory essay to *Urban Assemblages*, Farias (2009) argues that ANT actually does offer an alternative ontology for the “messy and elusive object” called the city, and outlines how urban space can be explained through a close examination of the concrete assemblages producing it.^11^ Gandy (2005) also offers the cyborg – that is, “a hybrid creature composed of organism and machine” (Haraway 1990, 1) – as an “ontological strategy” for exploring the relationships between human and biophysical processes that enable everyday urban life. Swynegedouw (2006) proffers two historical materialist concepts – circulation and metabolism – as possible ways to analyze and radically politicize urban socio-natural relationships. McFarlane (2008) explores the social, natural, and technical relationships of sanitation in practical and discursive registers in Mumbai. Moreover, he elaborates (2011b) on connections between the sociomaterial assemblages constituting informal housing and the Heideggarian notion of dwelling as a practice. While assemblage thinking has contributed greatly to the discourses of policy mobility, one can turn to Ong (2007, 5) for a somewhat archetypal discussion, in which she argues that neoliberalism is better understood as an assemblage that is open to “the situated interplay of

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^11^ It is worth noting that neither *Anti-Oedipus* nor *A Thousand Plateaus* is referenced here, though the “Rhizome” plateau as an independent publication, DeLanda (2006), and a handful of Latour’s essays are.
motion and contingency, of technology and ethics, of opportunity and risk” than as a hegemonic structure.

Clearly inspired by these approaches to assemblage in geography, McFarlane (2011a) proposes that assemblage thinking can contribute to critical urban theory in three ways. First, it serves a robust descriptive orientation that, via thick description\(^\text{12}\), accounts for the historical dimensions of existing urban inequalities as well as potential directions that alternative urbanisms might take. McFarlane argues that “[a]ssemblage places emphasis on the depth and potentiality of urban sites, processes and actors in terms of their histories, the labor required to produce them and their inevitable capacity to exceed the sum of their connections” (Ibid., 209). Crucially, he argues that assemblage thinking entails a concerted effort to avoid both essentialism and reductionism by focusing on the historically contingent processes that create assemblages (Delanda 2006; Dovey 2010, 16).\(^\text{13}\) He draws a connection to critical urban theory, by arguing that this line of thinking is also “concerned with analyzing ‘the systemic, yet historically specific, intersections between capitalism and urbanization processes’ [and strives to] ‘demarcate and to politicize the strategically essential possibilities for more progressive, socially just, emancipatory, and sustainable formations of urban life’” (210, citing Brenner et al. 2009, 179). McFarlane’s argument hinges on the productive nature of assemblage thinking – in contradiction to the primarily diagnostic orientation of critical urban theory – and he highlights

\(^{12}\) McFarlane (2011a) uses the phrase thick description without a specific definition. In her contribution to the debate, Tonkiss (2011, 586) notes that this use strays from Geertz’s (1973) use which focused on developing “an interpretive account of an act or even in its cultural context, where culture was understood primarily in semiotic terms.” In his final paper, McFarlane (2011d, 735) clarifies that his use refers to how relations are assembled, the inevitable contingencies therein and how they might point toward more just cities, and the judgments inherent in choosing objects of analysis.

\(^{13}\) As I show below, it is precisely the fact that McFarlane does not focus on the historic and contingent processes that lay out the urban assemblages he discusses that renders his work susceptible to penetrating critique.
Harris,

two processes of reassembly as evidence: first, producing/assembling the common (cf. Hardt and Negri 2009), which involves “bringing into imagination, debate and realization forms of thinking and doing that are resolutely held in common” (McFarlane 2011a, 212), and corresponds to both positive and negative aspects, such pluralistic spaces and pollution, respectively. Second, he asserts that assemblage thinking’s focus on potentiality fuels “generative critique,” which can be understood as new associations and connections that emerge from novel sociomaterial relationships.

The second way McFarlane sees assemblage thinking contributing to critical urban theory is as a reconceptualization of agency, specifically in relation to assemblage’s focus on sociomaterial relationships. Borrowing Ignacio Farias’s (2009, 15) definition of agency as “an emergent capacity of assemblages,” he focuses not only on human agency, but the alleged “agency of the materials themselves” (215). Citing Bennett’s concept (2010) of “vital materialism,” McFarlane claims that materiality must be seen as a process that modifies relations between the humans and nonhuman elements of assemblages, as he has studied in depth in the informal settlements of Mumbai: in particular, he mentions the different lifespans of building materials and the potential for using different materials for resistance. For McFarlane, this reconceptualization of materiality affects critical urban studies because it illuminates how researchers must select methodologies that can account for nonhuman processes and requires consideration when tracking responsibility and causality in urban settings.

Third, the concept of assemblage as a collection of heterogeneous elements has many affinities with the idea of cosmopolitanism, and therefore using the former as an imaginary for urban relationships could potentially inform the political pursuit of a city where difference is central. Citing Henri Lefebvre’s concept of the right to the city, McFarlane (2011a, 220) points
out how the affirmation “of both access to the city and active participation of a range of groups in the production of the city as a lived reality” that undergirds critical urban thought has strong resonances with assemblage thinking. Moreover, he links this inclusiveness back to the nonhuman elements of assemblages, thereby opening pathways for connecting critical urban thought with a wider range of political movements.

In sum, McFarlane’s article is valuable because it brings a certain aspect of Deleuzoguattarian thought into conversations about urban studies. If it is taken as an exploratory exercise rather than as a challenge, then it can be read as pointing interested researchers in potentially profitable directions. However, as I show in the following section, Brenner et al. (2011) are not particularly interested in this type of thought experiment, and neither am I.

2.4 A Devastating Critique and a Response

In their initial response to McFarlane, Brenner et al. (2011, 228) note that his account is only partially connected to Deleuze and Guattari, but rather than elaborating any such specific shortcomings with a more focused engagement with Deleuze and Guattari, they bring the argument back to their own realm of Frankfurt School-inspired critical urban theory. They are indeed diplomatic when asserting that, in an era of planetary urbanization, “there is today a need for ambitious, wide-reaching engagements – theoretical, concrete and practical – with the planetary dimensions of contemporary urbanization across diverse places, territories and scales” but state plainly that their “own orientations for such a project diverge considerably from those that have to date been proposed by the major authors advancing this framework” (Ibid., 226-7). Above all, they “are concerned that McFarlane’s construction of an assemblage-theoretical urbanism remains too broadly framed, at times even indeterminate, to realize its proper analytical potential” (Ibid., 229). Their specific critique of assemblage analysis revolves around two broad
concerns: first, the status of capitalism and political economy therein; second, and more broadly, how assemblage thinking could contribute to critical urban theory. In sum, they are open to the notion of assemblages, but only as a method for understanding cities, not as ontology for urban studies. This section focuses on their three specific critiques and McFarlane’s response.

The first critique by Brenner et al. (Ibid., 230) claims that even though McFarlane’s essay seeks to highlight ways in which assemblage can augment critical urban theory, it displaces “the key concepts and concerns of radical political economy – for instance, capital accumulation, class, property relations, land rent, exploitation, commodification, state power, territorial alliances, growth coalitions, structured coherence, uneven spatial development, spatial divisions of labor and crisis formation, among others.” More broadly they argue that other theorists of the assemblage persuasion are also confused with regard to how and if such concepts should even be used to explore the relationship between capitalism and urbanization. This is a devastatingly accurate critique, and the only appropriate response is to engage this critique by returning to Deleuze and Guattari – as I have done in Chapter 1 – to show that their philosophical framework is heavily indebted to Marxist political economy.

Through an extensive literature review, Brenner et al. sort recent assemblage-based approaches into three articulations, highlighting the relation of each to urban political economy. At the empirical level, assemblages are used to describe particular research objects – such as technological networks or interconnected regimes of authority – that are analyzed using political-economic frameworks. The methodological level is also erected on a political-economic foundation, but extends and reformulates parts of it by investigating dimensions of capitalist urbanization that are typically neglected, such as flows of energy or people. Finally, the ontological level consists of work that seeks to displace urban political economy as the
fundamental analytical orientation toward how urbanization occurs (Ibid., 230). Brenner et al. endorse assemblage urbanism’s contributions to critical urban theory from the first two categories, but remain skeptical of it at the ontological level. Their skepticism is indeed warranted, given the research to which they have been exposed, yet the fact remains that none of these conceptualizations expresses the underlying political dimensions of Deleuzoguattarian thought, for as I have shown, the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* project is committed to assessing the dynamics of capitalist society as well as alternatives to it.

Their second critique argues that assemblage urbanism as ontology focuses too much on description and rejects structure to a point that it deprives itself of key tools for “understanding the sociospatial, political-economic, and institutional contexts in which urban spaces and locally embedded social forces are positioned” (Ibid., 233). Moreover, they claim it is unable to determine which actants are relevant, due to its ontological flattening, or what they term “naïve objectivism,” following Sayer (1992, 45). Powerfully critiquing McFarlane’s assertion that agency is demonstrated by the inhabitants of informal housing settlements in Mumbai who cobble together dwellings from materials at hand, Brenner et al. (2011, 234) assert that his approach “leaves underspecified the question of what historical geographies of land ownership, deprivation and struggle generated and entrenched the unequal distribution of resources and the precarious life-conditions in the areas under discussion.” They drive this point home by noting, “without a sustained account of this *context of context*, the analysis remains radically incomplete” (Ibid., 234).14

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14 This notion of context of context – meaning the political and economic situation in which urbanization occurs – forms a central element of Brenner and his various coauthors’ critiques and will be discussed in greater depth below.
Their third critique proceeds by interrogating McFarlane’s conception of the actual and the possible as they relate to assemblage and comparing it to Frankfurt School critical theory. Brenner et al. claim that in assemblage, potentiality is an exteriority, even though McFarlane (2011a, 209) is explicitly “referring to both the intensity and excessiveness of the moment – the capacity of events to disrupt patterns, generate new encounters with people and objects, and invent new connections and ways of inhabiting everyday life – and to the potential of urban histories and everyday life to be imagined and put to work differently.” Moreover, he specifically refers to the dual nature of assemblage as actual and emergent. Nevertheless, the critique asserts that in assemblage, admittedly fruitful alternatives such as the right to the city, the common, and cosmopolitanism are described without reference to particular sociospatial circumstances. In contradistinction, critical theory argues that historically specific structures produce both determinate constraints and openings for social transformations, thereby resulting not in external or normative critiques, but rather immanent critique that gestate within the womb of dominant structures.

In his subsequent response – which was published alongside a handful of other contributions to the debate that will be referenced as appropriate herein and addressed more completely in the following section – McFarlane (2011c) reiterates his claim that his exploration of assemblage was not intended to displace critical urban theory, but rather to augment it. This, again, is a missed opportunity to seriously engage Deleuze and Guattari and demonstrate how their philosophy is not only as fertile as Frankfurt School-inspired Marxism is as an ontology for urban studies, but is actually more robust, though certainly not without some strategic augmentation and transformation. So, while McFarlane (2011c, 377) asserts that his “concern was no more than to consider what assemblage might offer, not to argue that assemblage should
become the ‘foundation of contemporary critical urban theory’ (Brenner et al 2011, 225) that must exclude other approaches and histories in urban studies,” I assert that Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy could indeed become a better foundation for critical urban theory, but that it must include other approaches and histories in urban theory.

Nevertheless, McFarlane (2011c, 377) reasserts that two primary goals constituted his attempt to “signal an ontology of sociomaterial composition and potential transformation in deeply unequal conditions”: first, highlighting the sociomateriality of assemblages and the distributed agency therein; and second, stressing that assemblage is both a dynamic process that draws on multiple histories and processes and a particular type of research object. From this point, he concedes that his initial contribution did not address political economy and continues to elaborate what he considers to be a different approach to it than the critical urban theorists offer by asking two questions: first, how is assemblage oriented toward capital, value, and work? Second, how can assemblage contribute to ideas like urban policy mobility?

Rather than returning to Capitalism and Schizophrenia to show how the dynamic forces of politics and capitalism play a fundamental role in the constitution of assemblages, McFarlane opts to invoke a description of capitalism by Vinay Gidwani (2008). Through Gidwani, he explains that rethinking the “ontology of capital” necessitates reconceptualizing value production as a sociomaterial process that constantly experiences phases of assembly and disassembly. Such an understanding of capitalism indeed exposes the “multiple logics that interact with one another and are entangled in and entrench social hierarchies” (McFarlane 2011c, 378), but McFarlane’s commitment to thick description of sociomaterial processes only illustrates half of the picture.

15 Gidwani’s account of the diagram of development helps him structure an incisive argument about the state of affairs in contemporary India but nevertheless falls short of engaging the underlying functioning of the global capitalist axiomatic as developed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987).
The reader is left with an image of how capitalism operates in the Indian state of Gujarat, but the nature of capitalism itself, as Deleuze and Guattari explain it through a broad engagement with its historical relationship to social organization, is missing and therefore still fails to accede to sufficiently general level to be taken seriously as ontology.

In his discussion of policy mobility, McFarlane asserts that assemblage can help explain why neoliberalism should be seen as a contingent set emergent logics rather than an all-encompassing hegemonic force that drives urban planning and policy. Drawing primarily on Ong (2007) and Prince (2010), he asserts that neoliberalism is “migratory technology of governing” that emerges asymmetrically in relation to particular local contingencies, practicalities, and political rationalities, not to mention unexpected events, failures in implementation, and subsequent reconfigurations. From the perspective of assemblages, McFarlane (2011c, 380) argues that his research approach would both invoke the ANT method of following the actors and study particular sites in an effort to excavate “the differential capacities of changing interactions to act in and reshape the urban world.” While this is an undoubtedly reasonable use of the concept of assemblage as a descriptive device, it still neglects the perpetual struggle between capitalism and the State that, in Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history, has always been a constitutive element of the social field: codes that will be decoded via capitalism were invented in “primitive” society while the state that it warded off will ultimately come to be a “model of realization” for capitalism itself.

McFarlane also addresses the critique that his account of assemblage seeks to eradicate the structures that form sociospatial, political-economic, and institutional contexts – or “context of context,” in Brenner’s language – that underlie critical urban thought by proffering four principles that assemblage thinking provides. First, he argues that assemblages are historically
constituted and contain multiple potentials to rework the present state of affairs, and that their “relations of exteriority” can accommodate new elements or eschew old ones. Second, he confirms that assemblages are indeed structured, but that their disavowal of a priori loci of power does not preclude the ability to account for existing power differentials. Third, assemblage is attuned to the seemingly minor occurrences that occur “on the ground” and sees these as indications of possibilities for alternatives, rather than immediately jumping to predefined analytical frameworks that seek to explain macro-level phenomena. Fourth, assemblage complicates the relationship between particular sites and wider contexts. Drawing on Law (2004) and Deleuze (1998), he argues that these details are in fact central and that they constitute large-scale processes, rather than vice-versa, and that causality should therefore be sought within particular assemblages rather than at a broader scale. McFarlane’s intent is clear: in contradistinction to the critical urban theorists, he is not satisfied with explanations for urbanization that are located in pre-established concepts but rather seeks to highlight specific instances of emergence. In sum, he argues, assemblage thinking demands more incisive inquiry into the forces shaping the context of contexts.

Yet these responses are still ultimately unsatisfying. In elaborating his second point about assemblages being structured, he gestures toward several institutions that lay out the assemblages he researches – the World Bank, for example, which is a central feature of his empirically rich work on informal settlements in Mumbai (McFarlane 2008) – but again misses the opportunity to emphasize the theoretical importance of the diagram, as well as the way in which all institutions – including the State – are transformed into models of realization for capital accumulation under the axiomatic. This is undeniably complex terrain and, again, and the author regularly manages to convey half of the story, as evidenced by his summary claim that:
assemblage thinking locates causality not in wider or underlying contexts, but within particular contexts. Assemblage thinking positions causality as *immanent causality*. Causes take place *within* the assemblage, not above it (which does not mean that hierarchies and structures cannot be produced through assemblages) (McFarlane 2011c, 383).

But half correct is not enough, especially when there are barbarians at the gate. The fact is that “causality” in Deleuzian thought must be understood as both a result of actual historical events and as limited by a set of virtual potentials. It is the diagram, the abstract machine, that is this field of potentiality and which is both always in an assemblage and constitutes its outside.\(^{16}\) That this element goes completely unmentioned helps explain why McFarlane is so invested in describing the material elements of assemblages and noting their uses and potentials rather than exploring the fundamental political and economic forces defining the general parameters of their constitution.

Finally, the conclusion of McFarlane’s paper is a response directed to his critics’ assertion that his original paper frames assemblage analysis too broadly: rather than clamping down on a proper way to think about assemblages, McFarlane argues that diverse points of view should be maintained. While I concur with this sentiment and recognize the contributions proffered by the wide range of thinkers he mentions, I nevertheless believe that if we are discussing an ontology for urban studies based on assemblage – which is, to be sure, the direction toward which the initial essay by Brenner et al. (2011) profitably steered the discussion – we should have a full understanding of the context in which this concept emerged. By relying

\(^{16}\) Strictly speaking, the abstract machine or diagram forms the outside the “strata” – Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) term for actual historical formations – while also remaining part of the strata as an historical formation, while assemblages are specific tetravalent configurations of elements from these strata. DeLanda (2006) eliminates strata from his “assemblage theory” so the notion is nowhere to be found in work following his lead. This is an unfortunate consequence because it obscures the relationship between Foucault’s work and Deleuze and Guattari’s, but will be addressed herein as appropriate.
on DeLanda’s (2006) development of assemblage theory and plumbing Deleuze’s published dialogues with Claire Parnet for a general definition (McFarlane 2011b, 651), rather than proceeding through Deleuze’s work in *Difference and Repetition*, the two books coauthored with Guattari before *A Thousand Plateaus* – or even engaging in depth with intricacies of assemblage therein – McFarlane’s account of assemblage, as strong as it is, leaves much to be explored. In particular, two specific points that were developed in Chapter 1 must be understood: first, the fundamental relationship between capitalism and politics that traverses the entire social field, serving as the “context of context” in which particular diagrams or abstract machines that guide the formation of assemblages; second, the constitution of these particular diagrams or abstract machines. With these points in mind, I can address the other voices in this particular debate to see if they can offer any more insight.

2.5 *OTHER VOICES*

Ignacio Farias’s (2011) contribution to this dialogue is significant for two reasons: first, he is one of the primary advocates of actor-network theory (ANT) in urban studies and, as such, he actively promotes an alternative ontology to urban studies. In his introductory essay to the volume he coedited with Thomas Bender, he argues that their book “engages in a much needed exploration in urban studies beyond the strong structuralist programme still informing the largest portions of the field” (Farias 2009, 1). He accurately argues that the most recent conceptual innovation in urban studies was the turn to Marxist political economy in the 1970s (cf. Harvey 1973), and that a move to an ontology founded in ANT provides “an immense ethnographic accuracy and analytical sophistication to follow and conceptualize objects” (Farias 2009, 8).

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17 This will not be undertaken explicitly, but relevant connections to Deleuze and Guattari’s coauthored works will be highlighted herein.
Second, and perhaps most interesting for this discussion, Farias’s ideas about an assemblage based ontology appear to be the only attempts that Brenner – both writing alone and with coauthors – seems to take seriously.\textsuperscript{18} This strand of assemblage urbanism shares with McFarlane the influence of DeLanda (2006), but also draws heavily on Bruno Latour’s oeuvre (cf. Latour 2007). Consequently, it is heavily invested in the empirical, and devoted to three methodological principles: “‘follow the actors, forget the contexts’, ‘describe, don’t explain’ and ‘do not switch conceptual repertoires when you describe’” (Farias 2011, 367). This orientation constitutes the first distinction that Farias draws between his version of assemblage urbanism and critical urban theory: a focus on inquiry into actual relationships rather than critique founded on a set of political economic concepts that allegedly accesses the truth of urbanization. The resulting “open and explorative engagement with the urban” (Ibid., 366) does not stand directly opposed to critique as such, but is indeed antagonistic toward “a version of critique that is committed to theory rather than to the empirical” (Ibid., 367).

As in my critique of McFarlane’s mobilization of assemblage, I argue that this turn toward the empirical expresses a reductionist understanding of how the production of urban space might be understood via Deleuze and Guattari. On the one hand, and in line with the critiques of “naïve objectivism” leveled by Brenner et al. (2011, 233), this seemingly reduces Deleuzoguattarian thought to methodology, as if to say, “the world is rhizomes, follow these connections.” On the other hand, Farias (2011, 367) obviates this vulgar interpretation by

\textsuperscript{18} Brenner (2013, 92n9) asserts that Farias’s work “proposes a radical, if controversial, rethinking of the urban question,” in that it does not shy away from addressing the “field’s decaying epistemological foundations” (Ibid., 91). These epistemological foundations are for Brenner, again, the decreasing specificity of the urban now that urbanization is a worldwide process.
asserting that ANT “offers a theory about how to conduct inquiries and how to elaborate concepts.” Nevertheless, his undeniably correct assertion (Ibid., 366) that “it is impossible to know in advance the definitive list of human and nonhuman actors involved, affected or concerned, the scope of their networks or their actual relationships,” does not mean that one should neglect the relationships which are obviously involved, namely the political economic relations subtending all urbanization. For me, the specific differences between how urbanization unfolds in different places and times can be tracked through empirical details viewed from the perspective of the relationship between models of realization and the global capitalist axiomatic.

This insistence on the global capitalist axiomatic troubles Farías’s second distinction between ANT and critical urban theory, which is based on the “central question” of “whether we study cities as an instance of something else, of capitalism in this case, or we engage in an inquiry into the city and urbanization as a positive, actual and self-entitled process” (Ibid., 368). Farías asserts that the notion of urban assemblages is oriented toward the latter, but the fact is that Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy has no use for this artificial dichotomy. Instead, the relationship between global capitalism and the various models of realization form the virtual condition in which all contemporary urbanization occurs. Speaking like Deleuze, one might say that capital is a mole moving through the underground network of its multiple hole: each penetration to the surface would be another actualization of urbanization and the qualities of the specific hole would correspond to the characteristics of the specific models of realization at work.¹⁹ Plenty of theoretical space remains for investigating specific empirical relationships and

¹⁹ “[Power] is a mole that only knows its way round its network of tunnels, its multiple hole: it acts on the basis of innumerable points; it ‘comes from below’” (Deleuze 1988, 82). This quotation is taken from a different context altogether but nevertheless resonates here.
processes, but these dynamics must be seen as the specific local conditions actualizing the
general movements of capital.

This leads directly to Farias’s third assertion: the city should not be understood as whole
which is structured by capitalist political economy but should rather be seen as an assemblage of
heterogeneous processes. Again, from the Deleuzoguattarian perspective, this duality is
altogether unnecessary: flows of capital in the global capitalist axiomatic are actualized through
heterogeneous models of realization. Yet Farias’s assertions (Ibid., 369) that “the notion of
assemblage involves no outside, no exteriority” and “assemblages are self-contained processes of
heterogeneous associations calling for a positive description of their becoming, not external
explanations” demand further attention. Similar to McFarlane (2011a, 2011b), this understanding
of assemblages obfuscates both their structuring and Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual
apparatus that defines the diagram or abstract machine as the “quasi-causal operator” – the
limited field of potentiality – that forms the outside of the strata.20 For Farias, the concept of
assemblage is powerful because it helps account for spatial formation and reformation, as well as
highlighting the agency of actors contributing to these processes. This is all well and good, for
one of an assemblage’s two axes is indeed oriented toward the strata or fixity, while the other is
oriented toward novelty and innovation. However, in turning to his fourth argument, I can show
that this accuracy nevertheless only addresses part of an assemblage’s overall conceptualization.

Fourth, Farias (2011, 371) argues that the agentic side of an assemblage – the
deterritorializing edge in Deleuze and Guattari’s vocabulary – should be seen not as the location
of imminent revolutionary theory and praxis, but rather as the stage for “a redefinition of
democracy toward participatory practices.” This is indeed a powerful way of framing the

20 The historical formations that serve as the fields out of which assemblages are constructed.
political potential of assemblages, and it resonates with Tampio’s (2009) remarkable conception of left assemblages, yet it ultimately remains situated within a reductionist understanding of assemblages themselves. Drawing on science and technology studies (STS) literature, Farias (2011, 371) argues that democratization requires “introducing objects, natures and nonhumans into (urban) politics.” This assertion is welcome – encouraged even – but the real problem emerges when these material objects come to supplant the discursive: “Urban politics is thus not about subjects, subjectivities or discourses, but about things, complex entangled objects, socio-material interminglings” (Ibid). Here Farias eradicates the second axis of Deleuzoguattarian assemblages, which is constituted by both material bodies and expression: on the one hand, there are “machinic assemblages of bodies”; on the other there are “collective assemblages of enunciation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 1987). These are irreducible to one another and by neglecting this aspect of assemblages, Farias is presenting a decidedly reductionist reading of the concept.

Michele Acuto (2011, 552), however, presents a more incisive account of the critical potential of ANT in his argument that “assemblage approaches can provide crosscutting explanatory tools to understand the linkages between contemporary metropolises and global affairs and grasp the multi-scalar reconfigurations of our time.” Although his embrace of ANT means that he falls victim to the same reductionist interpretations of Deleuze and Guattari as Farias, his serious consideration of the critique by Brenner et al. and his subsequent discussion of ANT’s capacities makes his project similar to my own. In particular, he notes that “the core tenet of actor-network analysis remains, albeit at times implicitly, focused on power relations” (Ibid., 556), which it uncovers by focusing on “black boxes” that obfuscate the functioning of certain parts of networks. The question becomes, then, one of determining which actants are
contributing to this arrangement. This orientation represents an altogether different – and more critical – perspective than McFarlane or Farias, both of whom “see agency everywhere” at the expense of thoroughly considering structuration (Tonkiss 2011, 584). Acuto (2011, 556) concedes that ANT analyses “tend to lose [sic] sight of their key theoretical advantages in terms of capacity to deconstruct spatial dynamics and to highlight the politics inherent in these” but asserts that this flaw is to be attributed to the theorists rather than the theory itself. Yet his description of ANT’s capacity to uncover these power relationships is nevertheless compelling.

Building on his opening assertion that the tripartite division that Brenner et al. make between empirical, methodological, and ontological invocations of assemblage mistakenly renders these dimensions as separate, he proceeds by showing how one can “build up” to the ontological level through positive analysis. First, he argues that ANT’s detailed empiricism provides “in-depth readings” of the relationships between actors and processes. Second, in terms of methodology, Acuto argues that investigating these relationships reveals power differentials that make certain relationships possible. Third, “the politics-savvy ANT analyst finds not only a multiplicity of actants…but also bargaining, delegations and hierarchies that more generally constitute the structuration of the previous level of agency” (Ibid., 558, my emphasis). One problem with this approach is explicitly noted by the author: namely, that ANT analyses are often bereft of serious critical engagement with power and politics. Conversely, by putting these aspects first, as would a Deleuzoguattarian approach, criticality becomes a constitutive element of the analysis rather than a consequence of a properly conducted research program. This is ultimately a matter of perspective, but is not this exactly what is at stake when the topic at hand is laying out an appropriate ontology for critical urban studies?
Before turning to the final exchange between the original interlocutors, I should note how the most radically politicized account of assemblage in this debate is presented. Russell et al. (2011, 577) are specifically focused on “the relevance of assemblage theory and related concepts for contemporary strategic action by those involved in social change activities broadly defined as anti-authoritarian/anti-capitalist.” This is, to be sure, a project altogether different from the original exploration of how assemblage thinking might contribute to critical urban theory, but there are nevertheless points of contact as well as commentary on what is missing in McFarlane’s accounts (2011a, 2011b). In particular, they are heavily invested in Hardt and Negri’s (2009) concept of the metropolis as “both the ultimate nodal point in the organization and governance of neoliberal capital, [and] the ultimate site for resistance and struggle, and articulating and circulating alternatives through the productive capacities of the multitude” (Russell et al. 2011, 581).21

With respect to the specific issue of Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy as ontology for urban studies, they make two assertions that resonate with my own perspective on the entire assemblage urbanism discussion. First, they assert that “[a]ssemblages are not political in and of themselves; it is what puts them in movement, what composes them or decomposes them that is the object of the political” (Ibid., 580). While I contend that the nature of assemblages as having both a territorialized side and a deterritorializing edge makes assemblages political, their claim that the political object is “what composes or decomposes” assemblages rings true. And although they do not invoke the Deleuzoguattarian notions of the diagram (abstract machine) or the political economic relations of the global capitalist axiomatic, these authors have pinpointed the

21 The multitude, as defined by Hardt and Negri, is the contemporary version of the Marxian proletariat, updated for the unique conditions of global capitalism (cf. Hardt and Negri 2005, xiii-xiv).
precise location of the critical capacity of this philosophical orientation. Second, they reinforce this orientation by asserting that they are “not even interested in assemblages per se, but rather the forces of composition and de-composition that form them” (Ibid., 581). Whereas their particular focus is on the latter in the form of “attempts to create alternative commons in terms of open source web applications and site [sic], patents and knowledge banks, repertories of social movement organizing that increase our ability to be ‘in common’ (Ibid.), my focus herein is on the forces of composition – such as growth management, coordinated design efforts, as well as a commitment to protecting the natural environment – that are playing out in the redevelopment of SLU.

2.6 Final Exchange

The final exchange between McFarlane (2011d) and Brenner et al. – a writing assemblage which has been transformed to Wachsmuth et al. (2011) as one of the secondary authors takes the helm – wraps up the debate, although as Swanton’s editorial (2011, 729) preceding it asserts, the “comments do not offer any closure or easy consensus about what assemblage thinking might contribute to critical urbanism [but] leave a renewed sense that something of considerable importance is at stake in this discussion.” Neither paper strays far from its initial stance but a few refinements emerge that are worth noting.

McFarlane’s contribution covers three central topics: first, following Simone’s (2011) contribution to the debate, he notes that assemblage is uniquely positioned to grasp urban life in a way that is unavailable to Brenner’s (2009) rendering of critical urban theory. Thus McFarlane reinforces his argument that the empirical focus on assemblage reveals:

the possibilities of contexts to be materially made in different ways, and to be expressed by different groups in a range of sociomaterial alignments through the
diverse uses and imaginaries of urban sites, objects, institutions and networks (McFarlane 2011d, 732-3).

To elaborate on this point, he makes two other assertions that gesture toward what I insist has been missing throughout the debate, and which I will elaborate below. First, he notes that “different and sometimes unexpected openings and closures are made by various ‘abstract machines’ that codify and unfold within contexts in different way” (Ibid., 733). Although he does not elaborate on the centrality of this concept for laying out assemblages, its appearance is reassuring for the debate, and marks one significant point of contact between my project and this debate. Second, McFarlane (Ibid.) suggests that he grasps the notion of the global capitalist axiomatic when he writes that since “the strategies and processes of capitalism…require, constitute and generate multiples [sic] sites across and beyond cities, [therefore] urban life cannot be understood as external to variegated capitalisms.” Even more telling is his suggestion that “capitalist relations of power, oppression and exclusion occur through processes that enroll a long chain of actors and sites that do not just impact but become realized in everyday urbanisms” (Ibid., my emphasis). The relationship between the worldwide flows of capitalism and the various models of realization is, even though it is not described as such, the second point of contact between this debate and my own work.

The next two topics that McFarlane addresses are less central but will be included here for the sake of completeness. The second aspect he addresses is the critique of the notion of thick description that is central to his rendering of assemblage (Rankin 2011, Tonkiss 2011). In response to the charge that descriptions do not speak for themselves, he argues that description is in fact a constitutive element of explanation, and involves critical evaluation. Moreover, he reasserts his claim that his discussion of assemblage thinking was never meant to replace critical urban theory but was rather to augment it. Third, and following two other contributions to the
debate (Rankin 2011, Russell et al. 2011), he stresses that assemblage thinking helps theorists consider how solidarities can be formed between heterogeneous actors in pursuit of constructing the “radical urban commons” (Swanton 2011, 728). Central to this idea is, again, an embrace of messy and uncertain interactions that create the conditions for the emergence of a new, radical form of urban sociality.

In their final rejoinder, Wachsmuth et al. (2011, 740) seek to “clarify [their] meta-theoretical stance, address several methodological questions and reiterate [their] arguments regarding a reinvigorated geopolitical economy of planetary urbanization.” This mission is situated in relation to another claim they make that has direct impact on the research at hand: “[t]heoretical, conceptual and methodological choices must be framed in relation to concrete explanatory and interpretive dilemmas, not ontological foundations” (Ibid.). In a way, this feels somewhat like a “switcheroo,” since these authors are indeed the ones that oriented the debate toward ontological foundations, but it nevertheless is an important point, and I will take it as axiomatic for the way in which I seek to argue for a Deleuzoguattarian ontology for urban studies in general and SLU in particular. In any case, for Wachsmuth et al. (Ibid., 741), planetary urbanization is the concrete process that demands a “reinvent[ed] conceptual apparatus of urban studies,” while my attention is piqued by a local form of urbanization that combines liberal progressive moral imperatives and the drive for capital accumulation.22

Their first critique – and one with which I sympathize – is that the hodgepodge of “assemblage urbanists” has not “yet attained a level of definitional or methodological coherence, or substantive focus, which could justify their classification under either of these rubrics,” (Ibid., 743) let alone that of ontology. This confusion on the side of those invoking assemblage

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22 In Chapter 6 I explicitly generalize from what I learn about SLU to construct a framework that can be directly compared to Brenner’s notion of planetary urbanization.
purportedly leads either naïve objectivism or a haphazard definition of which elements constituting an assemblage are worthy of analysis (cf. Tonkiss 2011). In short, “the specificity of assemblage-based analyses cannot be delineated coherently in terms of their supposed commitment to empirical investigation and concrete description alone” (Wachsmuth et al. 2011, 744). In contrast, they assert that assemblage theorists would do well to systematically articulate their basic theoretical agendas and normative-political orientations – an argument that both resembles Acuto’s (2011) observation that shortcomings in ANT analyses should be attributed not to the theory but to the practitioners, and fuels the strong sympathy that Wachsmuth et al. have for Fariás’s attempts to theorize an ANT-based ontology for urban studies. This sympathy, however, is accompanied by a powerful assertion that I consider to be a complete misunderstanding of the capacity of Deleuzoguattarian thought, even though it seems to hold for the account of assemblage urbanism as it has unfolded thus far: “It is logically impossible, from our point of view, to simultaneously endorse a strong, ontologically inflected version of assemblage analysis and a robust version of critical geopolitical economy” (Wachsmuth et al. 2011, 745). Challenging this assertion is one of the primary goals of this dissertation, which of course means abandoning any attempts to make assemblage theory an ontology for urban studies and returning to the basic elements of Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy.

Their second critique concerns how the assemblage approach understands the city to be so complex that it can only be described, rather than grasped through critical concepts. In the view of Wachsmuth et al., abstraction and concept building is required to make sense of how urbanization unfolds. They do not doubt the complexity of the city, but instead take issue with analyses that seek to describe portions of this complexity instead of explaining its production. They ask, pointedly, “Why should unruly research objects require unruly analyses?” (Ibid., 747).
Again, I am sympathetic to this critique of assemblage urbanism in its current state, but take issue with it as related to the capacities of Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy. For as Deleuze and Guattari (1996, 2) note in their final collaboration, “philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.” This entire book, *What is Philosophy?* (1994), is an exegesis on the difference between philosophical inquiry, scientific investigation, and artistic practice, and demonstrates how Deleuze and Guattari understand the process of creating concepts. Although there is little practical difference between the approaches of Wachsmuth et al. and what I build based on Deleuze and Guattari, there is one crucial theoretical difference between how the nature of the concept is understood. On the one hand, Wachsmuth et al. (2011, 747) assert that “some form of abstraction is a necessary moment within any critically reflexive (rather than simply everyday) form of sociohistorical knowledge.” Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, are adamant in their position that concepts are not abstract at all, but are instead “concrete assemblages” which are in the virtual realm of ideas “without being abstract” (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 22, 36). Put another way, they understand concepts to be “real,” but not in the sense that they are just lying around. Nevertheless, the point here is that the act of creating concepts is central to Deleuzoguattarian thought, while the infinite description of all varieties is not.

With these various movements in the discussion of assemblage thinking and critical urban theory it should be clear that while I am sympathetic to the attempts to mobilize the

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23 This is, in fact, an instance of Deleuze and Guattari carefully transforming their predecessors. Whereas Marx (1993, 85) understands “production in general” as a “rational abstraction,” Deleuze and Guattari instead draw on the Spinozist parallelism between thought and extension, granting them an equivalent status as real, and therefore can speak of concepts as a different kind of concrete, existing alongside the material world. Marx (1993, 101) essentially says the same thing when he describes the concrete in thought as the “the concentration of many determinations…[which] appears in the process of thinking…as a result.”
former, I am even more moved by Brenner’s two coauthored challenges to its legitimacy as a potential foundation for critical urban inquiry. However, I believe that Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy itself – that is, not as rerouted through DeLanda’s assemblage theory or any variety of ANT – is perfectly capable of grounding critical urban theory. Moreover, its capability to engage with everything from the flows of pre-individual desire to the relationship between politics and globalized capitalism – as well as other extraeconomic imperatives, such as sustainability, morality, and creativity, that have not yet been addressed – makes this approach better than Brenner’s version of traditional critical theory for understanding the multifaceted contemporary urbanization process.

2.7 OUTLINE FOR A NEW INTERVENTION

In lieu of trying to “reform” the work that has been done on assemblage urbanism, this dissertation strives to show how elements of Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy that have been neglected can be mobilized to address the critiques of Brenner et al. Although this could be undertaken in a purely theoretical argument, I will instead rely heavily on the redevelopment of the South Lake Union (SLU) neighborhood as an example to illustrate these points and, more importantly, to inform a transformation of Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy that makes it appropriate for critical urban studies (Chapter 7). The primary goal is to show that this approach can not only serve as ontology for critical urban studies – that is, as a starting point for how one considers urbanization to occur – but that it can do so in a way that does not require recourse to execrable concepts, such as ideology. This neighborhood is being redeveloped with a set of moral values and, concomitantly, an ethic that in no way seeks to mask the developer’s drive for capital accumulation. A Deleuzoguattarian approach to urban studies is uniquely positioned to both account for how this sort of compatibility arises and how the ethical and
aesthetic dimensions – now that they are becoming central to urbanization, even if the most radical theorists do not endorse their particular characteristics – might possibly lead to further urban inequality or orient us toward more joyous and life-affirming futures. In sum, I aim to both replace the current conception of critical urban theory with a new philosophical framework, absorb its tools for analyzing the political economy of cities, and make an argument for the fundamental role of sympathy in critical urban studies that reaches beyond the cold logic of political economy.

This is undeniably a tall order, but as Deleuze and Guattari (1994, 82) assert, things that occupy such categories as Interesting, Remarkable, or Important demand philosophical engagement. Moreover, Eugene Holland (2011, xv) notes that historical occurrences that are categorized as Problematic or Intolerable frequently spur philosophical thought. In the present context, there are two elements that fall on to the spectrum bound by these two types of catalysis. On the one hand, there is the reductionist reading of Deleuze and Guattari by the assemblage urbanists, which leaves this type of analysis open to incisive critique. On the other hand, there is the emerging urban form and attendant discourse about how to build cities of the future. I would hesitate to claim that the bulk of what I will be undertaking herein is philosophical inquiry – for it is really mostly matter of clarifying philosophy that has inspired me – but I maintain hope that by the end of this dissertation, I will have introduced a new domain of Problems into the relationship between capitalism and urbanization.

Broadly, the first aspect of the critique of assemblage urbanism that must be addressed is its alleged descriptive focus that displaces structure. Brenner et al. (2011, 233) write:

In explicitly rejecting concepts of structure as remnants of an outdated model of social science explanation (or in simply ignoring such concepts), ontological approaches to assemblage analysis deprive themselves of a key explanatory tool
for understanding the sociospatial, political-economic and institutional contexts in which urban spaces and locally embedded social forces are positioned.

The fact of the matter is that Deleuzoguattarian thought does not simply reject structure once and for all, but instead argues for a temporality that frees analysis from the stranglehold of structure, and focuses instead on the production of temporary assemblages or arrangements. Before ever meeting Deleuze, Guattari was inspired by his work in *Difference and Repetition* (1995) and *The Logic of Sense* (1990), and used it to help formulate his own idea of machines. In his essay “Machine and Structure,” Guattari (1984 [1969]) explicitly reworks Deleuze’s definition of structure to conceive of machines as a way out of the structuralism dominating theoretical work in his own professional realm of psychoanalysis (cf. Dosse 2011, 39). Discussing the construction of sense (meaning), in Lewis Carroll’s writing, Deleuze (1990, 50-1) lays out three essential attributes of structure:

1) There must be at least two heterogeneous series, one of which shall be determined as ‘signifying’ and the other as ‘signified’ (a single series never suffices to form a structure).
2) Each of these series is constituted by terms which only exist through the relations they maintain with one another.
3) The two heterogeneous series converge toward a paradoxical element, which is their ‘differentiator.’ This is the principle of the emission of singularities. This element belongs to no series; or rather it belongs to both series at once and never ceases to circulate through them.

From these three attributes of structure, Guattari redefines the first two as structure, and posits the third as the machine. In this paper, he is specifically addressing historical events that restructure the world of social production, and consequently demand that a new type of
subjectivity emerge. Therefore, Guattari expands the two interacting series that Deleuze discusses in relation to semiotics to encompass other elements – a procedure that both underlies the birth of structuralism, in the case of Lévi-Strauss (1963) adopting Saussurean linguistics to explain social relationships in primitive societies, as well as the “double articulation” of content and expression that Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 39-74) construct out of Hjelmslevian linguistics. This development by Guattari ultimately “provided Deleuze with a possible way out of structuralist thinking” (Dosse 2011, 11) and their subsequent work can benefit us in the same way.

For the argument at hand this notion is crucial because it demonstrates that the radical concepts of political economy that are missing from assemblage approaches to urbanism can in fact occupy a place “beneath” or “behind” the assemblages themselves, in the diagrams or abstract machines that direct their formation. This is to heed the assertion by Brenner et al. (2011, 236) that “it is essential to explore who (or what, as the case may be) is doing the structuring to whom.” Moreover, the entire framework for discourses of new urbanism and conscious capitalism also finds a place in this realm, for the adoption and codification of these tenets defines the range of possibilities for the actualization of the SLU assemblage. Of course, these machines do not operate in a vacuum; conversely, they are enmeshed in what Brenner et al. refer to as the “context of context,” or what I understand to be variegated models of realization engineering the connections of capital flows.

Brenner, Peck, and Theodore (2010, 207) first invoke “context of context” in their attempt to ground the “rascal concept” of neoliberalism in its internal variegation: “Our approach, rooted in geographical political economy, entails positioning the problematic of variegation, or systemically produced geoinstitutional differentiation, at the heart of a
reformulated conception of neoliberalization.” The authors make their case for variegation through a discussion of three other attempts to theorize neoliberalism – neoliberalism as a national regime type, a global disciplinary regime, and translocal technology of rule – the last of which corresponds to Foucauldian governmentality approaches. This paper will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, but here it is important to note that the context of context is mobilized specifically to critique the governmentality studies of neoliberalism, which – in true Foucauldian fashion – focus on the discursive and nondiscursive micropractices of neoliberalism rather than any centralized rationality. It is this descriptive focus on the unique instantiations of neoliberal practices to the exclusion of considering “the conditions of production of the unevenly developed institutional landscapes in and through which neoliberalizing regulatory experiments are articulated” (Brenner et al. 2010, 202) that attracts criticism. For the latter, “is the context of context – specifically, the evolving macrospatial frameworks and interspatial circulatory systems in which local regulatory projects unfold” (Ibid).

This critique indeed applies to the cited theorizations of neoliberalism (i.e. Collier and Ong 2005; Ong 2006, 2007) but there is indeed a blind spot for both the subjects and objects of this criticism, when it comes to how a Deleuzoguattarian formulation of neoliberalism would appear. Specifically, I am referring to the relationship between capital flows and the state (as a models of realization) that emerges from their discussion of the relationship between the war machine and the state apparatus. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Again, the state is understood as constituting interiority through its twin functions of binding and organizing, while the war machine is a “pure exteriority” that is constantly warding off the state. Despite these differences in nature, the State can indeed capture the war machine as an army, and direct it toward political ends. However, the war machine can also come to dominate the State (while still working in
conjunction with it) as it has done in the form of what Deleuze and Guattari call the global capitalist axiomatic. In this arrangement, the movement of capital and pursuit of surplus value becomes primary, and the state is reduced to assisting in these capitalist endeavors. This conceptualization is simultaneously perfectly compatible with, and more general than, the analysis that Brenner et al. (2010) provide, and perfectly capable of integrating a wide variety of political impulses beyond those of mere capitalist accumulation, such as the realms of ethics and urban aesthetics that empirical digging will uncover. This global capitalist axiomatic – or what Brenner and his various coauthors call the context of context – proceeds by way of political and economic experimentation, and is therefore, by nature, uneven, additive, and dynamic. Moreover, it is the global condition under which the abstract machines (diagrams) lay out the assemblages and limit their potential. In short, it constitutes the political and theoretical basis of what has come to be known as assemblage theory, and is therefore crucial to arguing for Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy as ontology for urban studies. The task now becomes one of identifying which specifically urban phenomena must be considered in relation to a political philosophy that is not particularly concerned with the production of urban space.
CHAPTER 3: CONTEXT AND METHODOLOGY

For Deleuze and Guattari the city is, above all, a form of material organization, a spatial expression of the underlying processes of production and anti-production. In the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (1983, 1987) they do indeed make references to cities and the urban phenomenon in general, but their perspective is so broad and historical that it is of little use for preparing their readers to study patterns of contemporary urbanization, much less finding ways to affect how it occurs. However, in other less well-known works, one can find more specific and insightful perspectives that reinforce how their perspective can contribute to critical urban studies (cf. *Centre d'Études, de Recherches et de Formation Institutionnelles* [CERFI] 1973; Foucault 1996).

This chapter has two functions: first, it presents their textual references to urbanization across the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, along with rich yet lesser-known conversations with Foucault about cities that occurred between the publication of the two volumes; second, it introduces Foucauldian archaeology as the method that will be used to investigate my case study of urbanization, South Lake Union (SLU), and situates it in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical system.

3.1 DELEUZE AND GUATTARI ON CITIES

The first and perhaps most telling insight into how Deleuze and Guattari conceive of the urban comes in *Anti-Oedipus* when they reinforce their argument that the Oedipus complex and the release of flows of desire both occur through capitalism:

Thus it must be said of Oedipus as well as of desiring-production: it is at the end, not at the beginning. But not at all in the same fashion. We have seen that desiring-production was the limit of social production, always thwarted in the
capitalist formation: the body without organs at the edge of the deterritorialized socius, the desert at the gates of the city (1983, 101-2).

The desert versus the city: two figures that form the poles for how they come to theorize two types of space in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987). The desert is a “smooth space” – a space of pure difference, with no imposed boundaries – while the city is a “striated space”: an organized space, a parceled out and categorized landscape. But at this point, in their first coauthored work, Deleuze and Guattari are still working in much broader conceptions. The majority of their references to cities are specific to the city-state its historical relationship to the *Urstaat*. Yet the city-state – along with religious, democratic, and socialist states – remain but one particular actualization of the *Urstaat*, the “single State, the State-as-dog that ‘speaks with flaming roars’” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 102). In this sense, the *Urstaat* is the pure state, the limit to all other concrete instantiations of the state, including the municipalities that are part and parcel of contemporary capitalist states. They do not say this explicitly – for, again, the city is not their concern – especially in *Anti-Oedipus*.

A similar perspective on cities reappears in *A Thousand Plateaus*, but it is primarily used descriptively in the simplest cases, and as a marginal theme expressing different instances of the relationship between interiority and exteriority or organization and disorganization in others. With respect to this first case, it is too easy to bemoan the contemporary urban theorist for pointing out that cities are “like rhizomes,” or insisting that one look at the city “as a rhizome,” but the simple fact is that Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 15) said something similar: “Amsterdam, a city entirely without roots, a rhizome-city with its stem-canals, where utility connects with the greatest folly in relation to a commercial war machine.” But one crucial difference is that they

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1 See Chapter 1 above.
were developing their concept of the rhizome, not hunting for instances of that concept out in the world.

The second case however – using the city as a foil for thinking about the relationship between interiority and exteriority – is much more fecund for the present discussion, though it also demands specific elaborations to think through contemporary capitalist urbanization. Most often, cities are invoked in much the same way as they were in *Anti-Oedipus*, as the antinomy of the smooth space of the desert, as striated, managed, and interior space. Deleuze and Guattari’s lightning fast radical empiricism mentions how members of the sedentary Hopi tribe leave the settlement only to return, while the Crow are nomadic (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 113); the city in comparison to capital, the state, the army, the factory, and the communist party is an instance of “coagulation and sedimentation” (Ibid., 163); they christen mankind “the segmentary animal” and note the variety of spatial and social segmentations of the house, city, and factory – “[t]he house is segmented according to its rooms' assigned purposes; streets, according to the order of the city; the factory, according to the nature of the work and operations performed in it” (Ibid., 208).

But, of course, exteriority remains, both at the borders of the city and within its boundaries, always smoothing striations. They mention the Black English or “ghetto languages” that have transformed American English to the point that “New York is virtually a city without a language” (Ibid., 103), as well as that heroic soul, Henry Miller:

> a stroll taken by Henry Miller in Clichy or Brooklyn is a nomadic transit in smooth space; he makes the city disgorge a patchwork, differentials of speed, delays and accelerations, changes in orientation, continuous variations…The beatniks owe much to Miller, but they changed direction again, they put the space outside the cities to new use (Ibid., 482).
Harkening back to the discussion of political and economic axiomatics (Chapter 1), it should be clear that this smoothing is the operation of the war machine, the pure exteriority, while the forces of striation construct an interiority. So whereas Deleuze and Guattari describe the way these forces act in general way, they are also at play in the realm of contemporary urbanization. The difference is that they are using a scattered collection of ideas about the urban to help build this immanent political theory, while my task is adapting it to think about the economic and extraeconomic forces driving the urbanization process, in a way that accounts for a wider range of variables than the dominant formulation of critical urban theory can.

A bridge to help us understand how to link up Deleuze and Guattari’s thoughts about the general relationship between the global capitalist axiomatic and the models of realization that was discussed earlier with the dynamics of urbanization lies precisely in a pair of lesser-known discussions where Foucault was, fortuitously for us, also present.

Without getting too mired down in biography, it is worth noting that Guattari, the “militant psychoanalyst, the director of [the La Borde] psychiatric clinic, the author of several articles, and a social scientist” (Dosse 2010, 1) and his retinue founded CERFI in 1967 in response to their shared belief that globalizing capitalism had corrupted communist organizations, and that a new theoretical framework was necessary to continue their project (Querrien 2002). The group established a new and experimental journal, Recherches, to propagate the members’ and fellow travelers’ work. According to Dosse (2010, 267-8), a chance encounter between Anne Querrien, CERFI’s secretary general, and a neighbor who worked for the Ministry of Public Works resulted in CERFI being contracted by the Ministry to research the planning of a Parisian banlieue, the construction of a new psychiatric hospital, as well as public demands for community facilities. Needless to say, this was a strange situation for a group of
radicals, but it nevertheless empowered them to undertake crucial research into improving social conditions. Some of this work appears in *Recherches* 13, which was published in 1973 and which includes some of the rare explicit insights into the urban phenomenon by Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault.²

The issue opens with a paper entitled “*La Ville-Ordinateur,*” by François Fourquet and Lion Murard (1973) and which was inspired by Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault, and also framed at least two discussions among the philosophers (one of which also included Fourquet).³ The essay begins by describing the functionalist and culturalist poles of urban discourse: the former seeks to build a new city corresponding to the demands of contemporary capitalism while the latter prefers to recreate the harmony of the past. Fourquet and Murard argue that these two poles rest on a common foundation of seeking to remediate the urban disorder of the capitalist city, and they point to a set of “collective equipments” that have been created to do so.⁴ Importantly, they argue that both poles of urban discourse “consider collective equipments exclusively from the point of view of consumption,” (Ibid., 17, my translation)⁵ rather than as a component of the means of production. Fourquet and Murard are in no way denying the functions and symbolisms

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² As Genosko (2015) points out, Guattari, writing on his own, addresses the urban condition more explicitly, yet he nevertheless primarily focuses on the city’s functioning and experiences thereof, rather than its production.
³ These two discussions are published under the title “Equipments of Power: Towns, Territories, and Collective Equipments” (Foucault 1996, 105-12), but they are presented completely out of context. They are published in reverse order from how they were originally conducted, and the first (which was really the second) begins with Deleuze saying, “There is not a single category coming out of the text you propose.” A natural question is, “what text is he talking about?” This “text” is a collection that includes Fourquet and Murard’s essay.
⁴ Circulation (roads, transit, water, sanitation), education, treatment (hospital and sanitation), enrichment/cultivation (theaters, libraries), sports, play, and green space equipments (Fourquet and Murard 1973, 17).
⁵ For example, play, green space, and bicycle transportation “equipments” are understood as being consumed through use, which is both functional and symbolic – “I am getting exercise and I am a conscientious urban denizen.”
of urban space, but are instead arguing that they are the effect of these concrete means of production. These equipments function in their own ways, producing the flows of a machinic city (the immanent unity of the equipments) and therefore the urban unconscious. Over time, the network of cities draws together increasingly diverse material and immaterial flows (natural resources and knowledge, respectively, for example), and builds the institutions – which are also collective equipments – necessary to keep the whole machine running. In this sense, their perspective falls very much in line with the aforementioned Marxist perspective taken by Castells (1977) and Harvey (1973).

In response to this essay, Guattari energetically adapts these assertions into his own vocabulary: the city is “pseudo-totalization of these equipments,” (Foucault 1996, 108) the socius that claims their productive activity. For him, the city is an accumulation of desire to which all of these collective equipments (machines) hang: a vision of the city, a unifying force, an identity. Each collective equipment is there to capture the unruly flows, to constitute the city. Foucault subsequently responds to Guattari’s broad conception with his own list of specific questions that should be raised about any particular collective equipment: the property status of the equipment, how it functions and its effects, the relationships of power producing the equipment, as well as how they produce urban spaces. These questions are, of course, exactly the types of questions I will address in my empirical investigation of SLU, and the fact that Foucault was the one to mention them is a hint toward why his archaeological method will be so useful here.

In another conversation, and referring again Fourquet and Murard’s essay, Guattari argues that “far from understanding the nature of an equipment according to the spatialized form it takes, it is necessary to first understand what kind of axiomatic is implied” (Foucault 1996,
He goes on to assert that the equipments themselves are the axioms, but his concern is more general in that he wants to be able to define the broader axiomatic at work or, put another way, the relationship between the axioms being produced. This is, as we will see below, similar to the aim of Foucault’s archaeological method, in its relentless search for the rules determining the objective dispersion of statements. Guattari even says that “[i]t is necessary to have a tree of implication…from a given mutation” (Ibid.). Again, this is exactly what we will track across the empirical details of the “mutation” at hand: SLU as a specific actualization of what I will come to call the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine. The question then becomes one of whether we can form general categories out of this empirical information to define the sort of axiomatic that is at work. Or, put another way, can we characterize the specific set of relationships between global capitalism and the models of realization that are operative in SLU in such a way that the framework is transferrable to other instances? Or still, can we define the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine as a specific type of axiomatic? Both of these questions can be answered in the affirmative for, as I argue in Chapter 7, SLU’s form of urbanization necessitates a high degree of collusion between the state apparatus and war machine that is not present in Deleuze and Guattari’s original formulation. In the case of the Coordinated City, the state apparatus’s commitments to managing regional growth does much more than merely “provide [capital] with compensatory reterritorializations” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 455); in fact, these commitments largely structure the conditions of possibility in which capitalist urbanization occurs.

In the same conversation, Deleuze and Foucault present compatible ideas of how this might be done, with Deleuze summing it up succinctly: “So, one should ask each collective equipment what its role is, production of production, production of demand, [and] regulation” (Ibid., 107). Grasping production of production involves interrogating investment, which can, of
course refer to financial investment, but can also refer to services (roads, daycare centers) that permit work. Second, the production of demand is to be understood in terms of how the equipments maximize demand for what is produced. Concretely, accessible and safe roads – where safety is promoted by the police – ensures that both products and consumers can access markets. Third, one must address normalization and regulation: how are production and demand balanced, or, using Deleuze and Guattari’s language, how are the material and immaterial flows channelized? To answer such questions in a way that can both satisfy the epistemological demands of social science and be reliable enough to serve as a basis for transforming Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy into an ontology for critical urban studies, we need a systematic method of inquiry.

3.2 Methodology

This dissertation is primarily philosophical in the sense that it strives to show that Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy can serve as a robust ontological foundation for contemporary critical urban studies. Yet, at the same time, it is also historical in the sense that it relies on various archival documents to construct a case for this claim. For this reason, I am adopting Foucauldian archaeology as my method, both because it has been carefully developed to deal with this type of source material (Foucault 2010) and because of its compatibility with Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical enterprise. But why is this necessary?

Deleuze and Guattari are, after all, no strangers to the coupling of history and philosophy: Deleuze’s early writings from the 1950s and 1960s firmly fall within the history of philosophy, while their third coauthored book, A Thousand Plateaus (1987) draws heavily on an exceptionally wide range of historical and empirical studies. But any attempt to “think like Deleuze and Guattari” is not, however, without its own unique set of challenges, namely the fact
that, although I am convinced by their mode of building philosophical concepts out of historical scholarship (Bell 2009), I am in a different position altogether, for no history of SLU’s redevelopment has been written. Therefore, I am presented with the opportunity and challenge of writing a history under their influence, out of which I can also construct concepts for thinking about this and other forms of early 21st century, morally-inflected urban redevelopment.

Moreover, it should also be noted that despite the unprecedented breadth of Deleuze and Guattari’s source material, it does not draw very heavily upon urban theory as such. Although in the two volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, they cite V. Gordon Childe, Jane Jacobs, Henri Lefebvre, and Lewis Mumford, they are largely referring to works by these authors that relate to the emergence of the city and the state, rather than to their scholarship on contemporary cities – hence, both the critical engagement with the debate in *City* above (Chapter 2) as well as the exploration a wide range of urban theorists below (Chapter 6). The primary aim here is to argue for a Deleuzoguattarian ontology for urban studies that does that tradition’s processes and products justice. This is, however, only half of the story, for the real question is how to systematically approach the wealth of archived empirical material relating to the redevelopment of SLU.

But why history and why archives? I could have easily followed some the most often cited literature from critical urban studies, such as Harvey’s (1989) work on entrepreneurial urban governance, or the wealth of research that begins cataloging deregulation and privatization during the Reagan administration (cf. Peck and Tickell 1994a), or even Peck and Tickell’s later work (2002) where the local state reemerges in support of capitalist urbanization, but that would skew this analysis toward the very economic myopia that I am trying to avoid. This is not at all to say that the economic is not absolutely critical to urbanization, for under the global capitalist
axiomatically it serves as the condition of possibility for urbanization, but I am trying to capture the multiplicity of economic and extraeconomic criteria that channel and mold dollars into the built environment. The case of Seattle is particularly interesting in this regard, because environmentalism and interjurisdictional coordination that strive to balance capitalist accumulation and a certain quality of life extend into the era before neoliberalization. To begin with the economic geographer’s preferred dates – the oil crisis of 1973, the elections of Margaret Thatcher as British Prime Minister in 1979 or Ronald Reagan to the United States’ presidency in 1980, or even the 1947 gathering of proto-neoliberal intellectuals at the posh Hôtel du Parc near Mont-Pélerin, Switzerland – forecloses these local dynamics that have structured so much of Seattle’s growth. The challenge here is therefore to choose a method that can capture how a place like SLU is even possible.

A reasonable place to begin answering the question of how to systematically analyze an historical archive is Deleuze’s first book, *Empiricism and Subjectivity* (1991). Herein, Deleuze gives the name transcendental empiricism to the attempt to respond to two related problems in Hume’s philosophy. First, there is the problem of how a given “collection of ideas,” “a flux of perceptions,” becomes a system (Deleuze 1991, 22-3). The second problem, which follows from the first, is to interrogate how the mind transcends this given perceptual flux; or, put another way, how does the mind become a subject? (Ibid., 23). The transcendental aspect of Deleuze’s reading of Hume is concerned with how something can be given or extracted from the flowing mass of perceptions, while the empirical aspect addresses how a subject who may receive perceptions is constituted within these flows (Ibid., 87). Hume’s answer to the question of how the flux of perceptions becomes identity is through the notion of time: duration introduces fictional difference into any unchanging object, and consequently, the lack of change in time
constitutes identity. For Deleuze, this amounts to the human’s double capacity to create and believe: “[t]his subject who invents and believes is constituted inside the given in such a way that it makes the given itself a synthesis and a system” (Ibid., 132).

Bell (2009, 60) refers to this foundational aspect of Deleuzian thought as indicative of what he calls a “historical ontology,” meaning that all identities have a history by definition. Of particular interest for the present investigation is the way that Deleuze follows Hume’s claim that humans are not naturally concerned for the well-being of mankind, but are only constituted as moral subjects through political and social institutions that develop over time (Hume 1985, 594-5) This position resonates with Deleuze’s deep commitment to positivity and productivity over negativity and lack.⁶ He asserts that the main idea of Hume’s “critique of the social contract” is this: “the essence of society is not the law but the institution” (1991, 45), for law restrains while institutions produce. Deleuze is absolutely clear on this point: “The institution, unlike the law, is not a limitation but rather a model of actions, a veritable enterprise, an invented system of positive means or a positive invention of indirect means” (Ibid., 45-46, my emphasis). Its function is to integrate, to draw together, humankind’s naturally uneven sympathies. In other words, to establish a society is to align sympathies in such a way that our natural partialities are decreased; it is a positive or productive process of stabilization, of transcending natural partiality and extending sympathy. This orientation is helpful for thinking through the redevelopment of SLU – a place in which sympathy for the natural environment, capital, and the human capacity to innovate all coexist, while deep sympathies for resources such as affordable housing are lacking⁷

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⁶ This common reading of Deleuze has recently been questioned (cf. Culp forthcoming).
⁷ Such an orientation toward sympathy presents an empirical problem since it is not something that is directly recorded in an archive. Instead, an archive provides records of interests or beliefs, which correspond to sympathies. In short, all perceptions are impressions on an individual, which produce both passions (pleasure or pain) as well as a copy of the impression: an idea. The
– and will be addressed in much greater detail across this work, but the practical question is: does this sensitivity to history and commitment to the empirical provide a systematic methodological approach to conducting archival research? As any reader of *A Thousand Plateaus* will attest, such a question probably seems like a joke: their volume uses mythology, ethnology, philosophy, metallurgy, birdsongs, linguistics, fiction, psychoanalysis, and much more as empirical fuel for the authors’ theoretical combustion. In his introduction to *Anti-Oedipus*, Mark Seem (1983, xix) addresses Deleuze and Guattari’s approach directly:

> While Deleuze and Guattari use many authors and concepts, this is never done in an academic fashion aimed at persuading the reader. Rather, they use these names and ideas as effects that traverse their analyses, generating ever new effects, as points of reference indeed, but also as points of intensity and signs pointing a way out: points-signs that offer a multiplicity of solutions and a variety of directions for a new style of politics. Such an approach carries much along with it, in the course of its flow, but it also leaves much behind.

One crucial difference between their project and this dissertation is that my argument is precisely meant to persuade the reader of something specific: that Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy is not only perfectly capable of serving as ontology for critical urban studies, but it also offers a much more precise account of contemporary urbanization than does critical urban theory – as elaborated by Brenner and his various colleagues – and exposes the crucial role that models of realization play. The wealth of empirical information documenting the emergence of SLU – legislation at the state and county levels, city council decisions, independent studies by consultants, design guidelines, press releases, advertisements, blog posts, etc. – is central to understanding how this process of redevelopment works. Therefore a bridge between these principles of association – resemblance, contiguity, and causality – cause these ideas to be linked together into beliefs. These same principles make it possible for one’s ideas about the passions that another is experiencing to cause a similar passion in the observer – a link which can only be explained by sympathy. This fundamental correspondence provides a philosophical basis for considering the beliefs and interests constituting the archive to be *traces of sympathy*. 
details and broader concepts, as “fragmentary wholes that are not aligned with one another so that they fit together” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 35) is necessary.

A Foucauldian methodology is one powerful approach for dealing with the empirical details of South Lake Union’s emergence and persuasively arguing that Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy can address the complexities of the production of urban space in a way that moves beyond the assemblage theorists’ description of the resulting environment and the critical urban theorists’ conviction that political economy is the only motive force worth addressing. By combining the archaeological method’s commitment to archival research and its ontological compatibility with Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, which makes room for both the transcendental flows of capital and the models of realization that guide connections between these flows, I can establish an alternative form of critical urban theory. To his credit, John Protevi (2010, 1), makes this connection between Foucault and Deleuze (and Guattari) explicit when he argues that one of his tasks is to “expose the Deleuzian nature of Foucault’s differential historical methodology.” At first glance the question becomes, does one follow Foucault’s earlier archeological method, which Deleuze and Guattari implicitly endorse, or his latter genealogical method, which Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 11) obliquely condemn: “The rhizome is an anti-genealogy”: “[i]t is a short-term memory, or antimemory. The rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture, offshoots” (Ibid., 21). Or is the best approach to find ways to pick up aspects of Foucault’s methods that are reflected in his own refinements (Foucault 2010), while heeding Deleuze and Guattari’s critiques? How, then, to proceed with an investigation of a concrete set of processes, within a bounded area and throughout a specific duration, while expressing this spirit of variation and expansion, which corresponds extremely well to the very real movements of capital and urban policy?
These, however, are not the only questions, for Deleuze’s points about the institutions’ role of integrating variegated sympathies in Humean thought beg the question of how I might engage with the affective dimension of the production of urban space. This question, however, forms the limit of – if not the specter haunting – the present study. By choosing to focus on the critiques that Brenner et al. (2011) level against assemblage urbanism, my theoretical point of departure has been to show Deleuze and Guattari’s deep commitment to not only political economy, but also to how it interfaces with extraeconomic criteria. Consequently, my empirical investigation has focused on discovering these dynamics in SLU’s archive, in an effort to enter the debate on the plane where critical urban studies is now conducted.

3.2.1 Building an Archive

Before looking specifically at the methods involved, I want to address some practical questions, namely: how does one build an archive? Given that the object of this study is a neighborhood – an obviously spatial phenomenon – a reasonable inclination is to start looking for documents in that space or referring to it directly. Early on, I found a timeline (Fig A1.1) that Vulc (2011) – the primary developer in the neighborhood – had produced in an outreach document regarding the neighborhood’s 2013 rezoning. The first two entries are from 1990 and refer to the State of Washington’s Growth Management Act (GMA) and the Vision 2020 regional plan that was produced by the Puget Sound Council of Governments (now the Puget Sound Regional Council, PSRC). Clearly, I was going to need to think on a broader spatial scale, but even more that than, I was going to need temporal dimensions. Could I reasonably start at 1990 with the GMA, or did I need to go back further? And if so, how far back?

I then decided that my first task would be to understand Vulc’s timeline and fill in any gaps between 1990 and today for the simple reason that it provided an accessible record of some
of some of what they considered to be important events. Unsurprisingly, as I began to dig into the particular elements, references to municipal legislation and studies began to proliferate, and I realized that I needed my own timeline, which of course included the dynamics in SLU, but also related movements across the region. As the documents began to pile up, I made the decision to start writing out much of what happened chronologically. I did not know if what I was writing would ever find its way into the dissertation directly – most of it did not – but I needed to learn what had happened. As I began approaching the present, I realized that the relevant time frame began, somewhat unsurprisingly, with attempts in the 1950s to deal with the negative consequences of rampant post-World War II suburbanization, which in Seattle is marked by the birth of what is now called King County Metro to address water pollution in Lake Washington. By relaying this discovery I am in no way asserting that this was the origin of the activities in SLU. Instead, I am saying that this is the beginning of the period in which statements and practices that have also created SLU began to intermingle and harden into a guiding structure: it is where the coordinated efforts across jurisdictions to solve the problems of haphazard urban growth begin. With this point established, I could then begin looking for other key shifts leading up to the Growth Management Act’s passage in 1990, which has been a central in defining how SLU has grown. This orientation also helped me see how efforts to mitigate growth emerged at different scales of governmental and citizen activity, and that this was clearly a nonlinear process. Seattle, for example, was already developing a comprehensive policy plan – the Seattle 2000 Goals (Seattle 2000 Commission 1972) – with a significant element of citizen participation almost 20 years before it became a Washington state requirement. With a temporal duration thus delineated, and these historical shifts established, I could then begin combing the municipal

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8 A portion of the land use timeline is reproduced here in Appendix 2.
archives for documents corresponding to these shifts, which mostly included City Council resolutions and ordinances, as well as urban planning documents and reports, but also included relevant letters between the municipal government and active citizens. Finally, I began searching out other media that corresponded to these same shifts in terms of planning, which brought me various types of journalism (print, video), advertising, and art. A grid showing the documents constituting this archive can be found in Appendix 3.

This made for an archive that is organized around topics that were taken up and discussed – in other words, it is constituted by what Foucault defines as statements (see the following section) rather than by fleeting ideas that might have made for more radical changes. It would, however, be incorrect to say that only successful ideas have been included, for the effort to build the Seattle Commons – an 85-acre park in the middle of what is now SLU – was not at all successful, but it both expresses the collective will to reshape this portion of the city and serves as a point where Vulcan appears as a major force in reshaping the area. This is indeed a limit to the Foucauldian method (cf. de Certeau 1984) but is one that could be somewhat tempered with ethnographic research. Alas, I have chosen to limit this dissertation to archival work, as I explain below in the final section of this chapter.

3.2.2 Archaeology

What is Foucauldian archaeology and what is it good for? First, as its name suggests, it involves digging around carefully to collect and describe what Foucault “takes to be a previously unnoticed type of linguistic function – the statement (énoncé)” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 45). The statement is distinguished from two other types of linguistic functions: propositions and sentences. In contradistinction to a proposition, which has a fixed relationship to truth independently of how it is used, a statement’s relationship to truth is relative to the way it is
used. To take Foucault’s example (2010, 104), the statement “species evolve” means something different in Darwin’s own use, in late 19th century neo-Darwinism, and in a mid-20th century neo-Darwinian synthesis, all of which place a different emphasis on the genetic transfer of characteristics based on a less or more developed understanding of genetics. Furthermore, a statement can be expressed in modes other than sentences – a map, a plan, a graph, a rendering, a photograph, or a video, for example. Therefore, a statement is both contextual, in that it relates to other statements and autonomous in the sense that it can be expressed in different ways.

Moreover, although the requirement that statements are taken at face value rather than excavating a deep meaning aligns archaeology with speech act theory as developed by Austin (1975) and Searle (1969), Foucault’s method has an altogether different focus: he is not at all concerned with the everyday context and efficacy of an utterance, but is instead interested in a statement’s claim to truth and its effect in particular historical epochs. What matters, for him, is that there is a social infrastructure – such as institutions, validation procedures, and expert knowledge – that makes a statement’s claim to knowledge (truth), and thus its capacity to change some element of the world, worthy of investigation. As Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 49) clearly put it:

Foucault is exclusively interested in types of [statements], the regularities exhibited by their relations with other [statements] of the same and other types – which he calls discursive formations – and in the gradual and sometimes sudden but always regular transformations such discursive formations undergo.

Central to the archaeological method is the double bracketing of the truth claims and the meaning claims of the statements constituting the discursive formation (cf. Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 49). This is to assume a radical neutrality as a researcher in an effort to “maintain [discourse] in its consistency, to make it emerge in its own complexity” (Foucault 2010, 47).
However this double bracketing is not the same thing as removing oneself from the analysis to the point that all utterances must be considered. Instead, statements are rare, in that they are:

things that are transmitted and preserved, that have value, and which one tries to appropriate; that are repeated, reproduced, and transformed; to which pre-established networks are adapted, and to which a status is given in the institution; things that are duplicated not only by copy or translation, but by exegesis, commentary, and the internal proliferation of meaning (Foucault 2010, 120).

This double bracketing allows one to consider a wide range of statements that are repeated and transformed across an immanent slice of time. The statements that fit this criteria are considered important by some (the reproducers, the transformers, the commentators, for example), but the researcher may not necessarily take them seriously, in the sense that the archaeologist might be skeptical about the ideas at hand. Researchers using this method must distance themselves from their own predilections and interpretations in order to account for how the object of study has emerged. The discursive formation thus essentially produces its own dimensions, content, and critiques, and the archaeologist “can then simply study the carefully preserved raw serious statements and the plethora of commentary upon them” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 52). It is precisely this immanent consistency that I am arguing constitutes the set of models of realization that has produced SLU. These models are responsible for effectuating the transcendental flows of global capital, for shaping how they are funneled into particular patterns and types of urbanization. They vary in accordance with local resources and commitments, and are therefore the terrain on which one can try to understand the multitude of desires or goals that different forms of urbanization are trying to satisfy. Put another way, if capital is expanding toward covering the entire earth, the localized models of realization are responsible for the different intensities of urbanization: they make Seattle different from New
York, which is different from Istanbul, which is different from the variegated types of development in between (cf. Brenner 2014), and so forth.

So much for identifying statements – what is one looking for when studying the discursive formations they constitute? Foucault’s answer is straightforward – the rules governing how the statements are distributed and related to one another in the discursive formation – but the strategy he suggests is more complicated. He suggests “four directions” in which a discursive formation can be analyzed: the “formation of [discursive] objects, formation of the subjective positions, formation of concepts, [and] formation of strategic choices” (Foucault 2010, 116). The project of archaeology is, then, to uncover the rules or regularities “behind,” “within,” or “beneath” discursive formations that account for the dispersion of these objects, subjects, concepts and strategies. I describe each of these “cuts” individually in the following section, but for now it is important to note that as far as Foucault is concerned, the set of rules that emerges from these four directions of research is the only unity that can be found for a discursive formation, if indeed one exists at all (Ibid., 72).

This procedure is particularly appropriate for developing a Deleuzoguattarian critical urban theory because it provides a way to identify the functioning models of realization that would otherwise be inaccessible. These models, again, correspond to the specific and contested discursive space that governs how capital is molded into a built environment. A quantitative method that only tracked ground rents, for example, would miss the broad set of criteria requiring increased density in certain areas of the region and city. Another qualitative method, such as phenomenology, could indeed account for how one experiences a place such as SLU, but would provide little to no insight into how it was produced. Ethnographic research, such as interviews, with people who have produced and use SLU would indeed add texture to this
analysis and was part of my schematic research plan, but as I began to uncover such a wide range of archival material that gestured to how SLU emerged, I made the decision to focus on these documents for this project (with the full intention of branching out into ethnography as I develop these ideas and apply them to other instances of contemporary urbanization).

3.2.3 Four paths of research

In *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, Foucault defines paths of research for interrogating a discursive formation: the formation of discursive objects, subjective speaking positions (enunciative modalities), concepts, and strategies. Herein I explain the central aspects of each path before describing how I present the results of my archaeology of the Coordinated City.

The formation of objects refers to an organization of statements with respect to the object that they address, although an intuitive understanding is troubled by the fact that “discursive formations produce the object about which they speak” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983, 61).

Reflecting on his previous archaeological investigations (2006, 1994a, 1994b), Foucault (2010) asserts that one can isolate discursive objects by specifying what he calls authorities of delimitation, surfaces of emergence, and grids of specification. The authorities of delimitation are the institutions that define the objects of discourse in question. For Foucault’s archaeology of madness (2006), these included medicine, the law, religious authority, and literary and art criticism (Foucault 2010, 41-2). In the case of SLU, these authorities include municipal government, private developers, and designers, among others. Importantly, the discursive object is not a relationship of reference to an already existing object in the world: “madness,” for example, is not just lying around. Rather the discursive object is the result of a complex relationship of production, which these authorities create by assigning statuses to actual differences in various locations, or what Foucault calls surfaces of emergence. These surface are
the social fields where the objects of discourse emerge, be they “the family, the immediate social
group, the work situation, the religious community” (Foucault 2010, 41) in the case of madness
or, as I show below, social relationships surrounding land use and character, institutional
coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life in the case of SLU. Finally,
grids of specification are the systems of knowledge that are used to categorize real life
phenomena into objects of discourse. Again, Foucault is attuned to systems addressing the soul,
the body, the life and history of individuals, and neuropsychological correlations in his
investigation of madness (Ibid., 42), while I focus on systems corresponding to the human body,
characteristics of the natural and built environment, and political and economic logic, as
proffered in the various planning documents. Briefly, then, various institutions use specific kinds
of knowledge to assign statuses to objects in various social fields – these are the three aspects of
the production of discursive objects.

Second, the archaeological method focuses on who produces statements. To do so the
archaeologist investigates the formation of subjective positions, or enunciative modalities, in an
effort to map how the statements of any particular discursive formation are held together. The
three primary questions the archaeologist must ask are: first, who is accorded the right to speak,
and how? Second, what are the institutional sites in which these discursive objects are produced?
Third, what possible subject positions can this subject “occupy in relation to the various domains
or groups of objects”? (Foucault 2010, 52). Whereas in the Archaeology, Foucault refers to his
own empirical work on nineteenth century doctors and the emergent clinical discourse (Foucault
1994a), I focus on mid- to late-twentieth century and early twenty-first century politicians,
activists, and professionals contributing to urbanization in order to sketch out three types of
emergent enunciative modalities: the representative body enunciative modalities, which
addresses elected groups such as the state legislature or city council, or even groups largely constituted by elected members; the citizen-government-professional enunciative modalities, which concern how citizen groups’ voices make their way into the public realm, via different sets of professionals such as urban planners; and private and semi-public enunciative modalities, which focus on private organizations and movements that distance themselves from governmental operations (at least officially). This typology is only meant to be an organizational guide rather than set of rigid categories.

Third, turning to the formation of concepts is also intended to account for the dispersion of statements constituting the broad categories of inquiry, and is based not on tracking how permanent and coherent concepts relate to one another, but rather by seeking unity in “their simultaneous or successive emergence, in the distance that separates them and even in their incompatibility” (Foucault 2010, 35). This is not, therefore, a call to uncover an ensemble of perfectly general concepts to describe a particular phenomena, but is an orientation whereby one sketches out the field from which cotemporaneous concepts emerge. As in the discussion of discursive objects, we are dealing with a somewhat narrower field of inquiry than Foucault, but now the “gap” between the two inquiries is greater. In The Order of Things (1994b) – his book-length attempt to do an archaeology of three human sciences – Foucault tracks the relationships between the historical development of psychology, sociology, and cultural history and their empirical counterparts (biology, economics, and philology). In doing so, he ranges broadly in time, from the late 16th century to the early 20th century. Our time frame, conversely, is about 60 years at the longest. This approach can nevertheless add texture to our understanding of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation by illuminating how disparate ideas are being held together, especially in the case of SLU.
The analysis of concepts has three concrete foci: tracking successive emergences, forms of coexistence, and procedures of intervention. The primary form of succession that emerges in this archive is how efforts to address environmental problems fracture from centralized, integrated, and reactive efforts to highly decentralized, coordinated, and proactive efforts to anticipate and prevent such problems without restricting growth or economic development. Herein I examine how Metro addressed the problem of water pollution in Lake Washington by investigating the sewer system at a regional scale, and progressed to examine how land use and environmental planning has followed in its path, but by delegating responsibilities to a much wider range of actors. Second, in terms of coexistence, I look specifically at what Foucault calls fields of concomitance, which means the heterogeneous discourses that share a relationship to another concept altogether – which here is the notion of innovation. I track how private industry, the service economy, and governance related to SLU adopt innovation as a common pursuit. Finally, I map how four discursive regularities establish relationships between heterogeneous statements: explicit reference to other documents (through quotation, rewriting, excerpting sketches, etc.); a pattern of functional optimization; the shift from prescriptive to performance-based regulatory criteria; and the reference to and the operationalization of guiding principles. As in the previous two cuts, the defining point here is that we can track common elements between altogether different undertakings, such as governance, high-technology and high-value industry, and service industry by looking at shared aspects of their individual constitutions.

The final direction of research that Foucault outlines for the archaeologist is one that tracks how concepts are brought together into what he calls strategies: that is, the discursive and nondiscursive practices that regulate which discursive objects, enunciative modalities, and concepts appear. For Foucault, the primary task is to “discover how [strategies] are distributed
in history” (Foucault 2010, 64). He asks, what links them together across history? Is it necessity? Chance? Or is there a regularity beneath which we can define a common system responsible for their distribution?9

Foucault warns his reader that he has not fully developed this approach, for his previous three book-length archaeologies (Foucault 2006, 1994a, 1994b) focused on objects, enunciative modalities/subjects, and concepts respectively, and, it should be noted, “with inadequate methodological control” (Foucault 2010, 64). The Archaeology of Knowledge is, again, an attempt to gain some methodological control, and the analysis of strategies directs one to uncover the “regulated ways…of practicing the possibilities of discourse” (Ibid., 70) by examining what he calls points of diffraction, the economy of the discursive constellation, and the field of nondiscursive practices.

For Foucault, a point of diffraction is a fork in the discursive road – an either/or. These points emerge when two incompatible objects, types of enunciation, or concepts come into contact. They are inherently paradoxical, for they emerge from the same the same rules producing the entire discursive formation, as I show with the twin discussions of affordable and luxury housing in SLU. The notion of the economy of the discursive formation addresses the fact that not all possible ensembles of discursive elements are actualized. To understand the ones that do arise, the archaeologist can “account for the choices that were made out of all those that could have been made…[by describing] the specific authorities that guided one’s choice” (Foucault 2010, 66). This element constitutes the majority of my examination of the discourses regulating the production of SLU, which emerge in three categories that form the basis of my

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9 Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983, 75) assert that is Foucault is here behaving like a “true phenomenologist” because he “stick[s] as closely as possible to the facts of dispersion and…call[s] the resulting description a ‘system of transformation.’”
transformation of Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy into critical urban theory: political economy, ethics, and aesthetics. Finally, although nondiscursive practices play an undeniably significant role in understanding how SLU’s discursive formation is regulated, I am bracketing out this element for the current analysis. Although it would be possible to comb through the existing archive in search of traces of nondiscursive practices, the fact that I am primarily dealing with a live project – rather than a historical one, as is the case for both Foucault’s archaeologies and genealogies – and could track nondiscursive practices ethnographically through a method such as Foucault’s *enquête* (cf. Hoffman 2015), causes me to envision such work as the second half of this project that I could engage in much greater depth. By bracketing it out, I am, again, forcing myself to focus on the discursive elements of SLU’s model of realization, and staking out the directions that future research can take to further develop this project.

It is well known that Foucault came to the realization that strategies were the most important aspect, since they ultimately shape how particular discourses are drawn together into practice. Consequently, for him, archaeology became one of “two halves of a complementary approach” (Elden 2002, 104) – with second half being genealogy. It is at this point, however, where I part ways with Foucault, but not without owing him a tremendous debt: his method provides a systematic and comprehensive way to cut through an incredibly variegated archive of statements which I will, following Deleuze and Guattari, consider as the models of realization that are channeling flows of capital into a particular urban formation. As I have shown, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) are clear that under the capitalist axiomatic, the state has been converted into one such model, but they do not take the time to outline any other such models. Regarding SLU, statements regarding growth management policy, urban planning, and city council decisions can be affiliated with a state model of realization, but as we will see the statements themselves also
have other dimensions that include design theories and ethical systems. These statements are rewritten, translated, and adapted in particular models of realization, and it is this multiplicity – which includes design documents and reviews thereof, journalistic coverage, advertisements, speeches, advocacy, criticism, etc. – that constitutes the SLU model of realization.

Finally, there is the question of how to assemble these various cuts in a way that avoids both the scattered mess of Foucault’s early work – I am primarily thinking of *The History of Madness* (2000) – and Deleuze and Guattari’s asteroid-like approach, through which they seemingly draw everything into their orbit. To do this I am drawing inspiration from Paul Rabinow’s Foucauldian anthropology of the biotechnology firm that developed the polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which “shows how a contingently assembled practice emerged, composed of distinctive *subjects*, the *site* in which they worked, and the *object* they invented” (Rabinow 1996, 2). I am, however, transforming this to fit my project: although I touch upon the subjects and sites through which SLU’s models of realization have emerged (in accordance with Foucault’s exploration of enunciative modalities), my primary focus is the process by which different social practices are drawn together into a coordinated form of urbanization, both empirically in SLU and then more generally in the forms of inquiry focusing on various aspects of urbanization. In Foucauldian terms, then, I am primarily interested in discursive objects, concepts, and strategies, but present them here in a mixed fashion.

Chapter 4 focuses on discursive objects, but primarily on what Foucault calls the surfaces of emergence: the social fields that are drawn into discourse.\(^\text{10}\) Four immanent categories – land use and character, institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life – are extracted from the archive that includes documents reflecting the interests of

\(^{10}\) The other two dimensions of this portion of archaeology – authorities of delimitation and grids of specification – are included in Chapter 5.
governmental entities, private companies, and citizen-led groups (Fig. A3.2). By identifying these categories, a sketch of the discursive formation at hand becomes visible, but their particular interconnections do not. Chapter 5, then, focuses on how these four lines of research are held together via components from Foucault’s exploration of discursive objects, enunciative modalities, and concepts, namely: the collective actors who are producing statements, the shared forms of knowledge that are used to draw various phenomena into the SLU’s discourse, as well as logical and practical connections among the discourses constituting the archive. Finally, Chapter 6 steps back from the details of SLU’s discourse and identifies the broader discourses out of which the elements of the Coordinate City’s discourse emerge. In contradistinction to the perspective of critical urban theory, this does not turn out to be a primarily political economic discourse, but also includes a consistent engagement with the ethical and aesthetic to produce a tripartite set of criteria structuring how capital is molded into SLU. The last section of this dissertation then draws upon this archaeology to transform Deleuzoguattarian political theory into a framework for critical urban theory that can address how urban space in the Coordinated City is produced in accordance with terms shared in the political economic, ethical, and aesthetic criteria. Finally, it also opens the discussion of how all of these realms share a common foundation in the sentiments that must be taken seriously if one wishes to wield the full power of Deleuzoguattarian thought for critical urban studies. It remains a gesture toward future work in this dissertation, but is also meant as an elaboration on why this approach to studying contemporary urbanization can address a far richer set of active forces that a political economy-based critical urban theory ever could.
3.3 The Limits of This Project

To stop after an analysis of discourse is undoubtedly only addressing part of what a Deleuzoguattarian framework entails,\(^{11}\) for the authors assert that all systems – social, biological, geological, technical – operate through what they call a double articulation of “planes of expression” and “planes of content,” both of which are also divided up into substance and form (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 40-5). The empirical focus of this project, however, is only on the substances of expression (the statements, in Foucault’s language) – mentioned above as they are gathered in form of expression that is producing SLU (the discursive formation, for Foucault), or what I call the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine. The substance of content – the building materials themselves, for example – and the form of content – the specific buildings, roads, plants, etc., as they have been assembled – are not specifically addressed. Moreover, other substances and forms of expression (both discursive and nondiscursive) – such as the Food Not Bombs collective that distributes food to those in need at the Cascade Playground on Sunday afternoons\(^ {12}\) – that correspond to the same built environment are not explicitly discussed herein either. This is a strategic decision that has been made in order to engage the critical urban theorists’ object of study – the urbanization process – and their critiques of assemblage urbanism, but it nevertheless produces an attenuated version of what a fully developed Deleuzoguattarian system could address. I have provided a short recapitulation of how this notion of double articulation applies to Foucault’s analysis of another spatial phenomenon, the

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\(^{11}\) Foucault’s archaeology also addresses nondiscursive practices in his description of strategies (See Chapter 6), but this element will be bracketed for future work for the same reasons that I am providing here for focusing specifically on discourses related to the production of SLU, and foregoing an analysis of other discourses, nondiscursive forms of expression, as well as the substance and form of content.

\(^{12}\) A special thank you is owed to Shannon Tyman for pointing this out to me one afternoon at the Central Co-op.
prison, in Appendix 4, and also draw upon its importance for envisioning and enacting alternative urban futures in the Conclusion.

Finally, there is the limit that exists “before” the planes of expression and content unfold: the affective realm from which all motivations emerge, only to be rationalized into extraeconomic and economic criteria that funnel flows of capital into the urban environment (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 262). At this point, however, with my focus on confronting critical urban theory on its own terms, all I can do is acknowledge this virtual presence and bookmark it as the direction that future research into Deleuzoguattarian critical urban theory must take. I discuss this at greater length in Chapter 7 and the Conclusion.
ENTRACTE I: SOUTH LAKE UNION

South Lake Union (SLU) is one of the largest redevelopment projects in the United States (Vulcan 2015a), and is currently under construction immediately north of Seattle’s central business district (Fig. EI.1). It has primarily been developed by Vulcan, the investment and philanthropic giving firm of Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, and has been transforming from a sleepy commercial, light industrial, and modest residential neighborhood into an increasingly dynamic urban environment that houses technology and e-commerce firms, high-end residential buildings, biotechnology firms and global health nonprofits, design and advertising firms, a museum, as well as a wide range of retail, restaurants, and other services. Its boundaries are formally Lake Union to the north, Interstate 5 to the east, Denny Way to south, and Aurora Avenue to the west, but the development boom has recently spread into the formerly barren Denny Triangle area between SLU and downtown and made its southern border less definite (Fig. EI.2). Many major employers call the neighborhood home, including University of Washington (UW) Medicine, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, NBBJ (architecture and design), Group Health Cooperative, Seattle BioMed, PEMCO (insurance), Seattle Cancer Care Alliance, PATH (Program for Appropriate Technology in Health), and Amazon, which currently employs 24,000 people in Washington State (Forshee 2015), many of whom work in the 11 buildings that the company purchased from Vulcan in 2012. Moreover, Vulcan has recently completed two more buildings for Amazon, the latter of which is also currently building a massive new corporate headquarters in the Denny Triangle (Fig. E1.3) area that will increase their available floor space to 10 million square feet by 2019 (Stiles 2014b).
Fig. E1.1. South Lake Union in Context

Fig. E1.2. South Lake Union
Allentown, Amazonia, or a neighborhood that is “living a contradiction,” as one of my students recently put it – no matter what shorthand is used to describe SLU, one fact remains: the area is no stranger to foiled grand plans. In 1911, Virgil Bogue’s controversial and ultimately rejected City Beautiful plan for Seattle proposed a new central passenger rail terminal near the present intersection of Dexter Avenue and Mercer Street, as well as a grand Civic Center complex at Fourth Avenue and Blanchard Street, in the nearby Denny Triangle that had just been flattened in the Denny Regrade (Bogue 1911, 79). The plan, which would have been Seattle’s first Comprehensive Plan and was lauded by urban Progressives, such as the Municipal League and R.H. Thomson – the city engineer who spearheaded the technical aspects of the Regrade in order to provide more buildable land for a rapidly growing city – was rejected by Seattle voters almost 2:1 in a 1912 vote (McRoberts 1998).

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1 The first phase of the Denny Regrade was large scale civic engineering project that sluiced away Denny Hill, which was located in the present day Belltown neighborhood of Seattle.
In the closing years of the 20th century attention was again turned to the area, but this time for the Seattle Commons (Fig. 4.3): a central park that extended from Denny Way to Lake Union and which, over time, came to be envisioned as an amenity for an urban village that would be built on its periphery. This vision is addressed in more detail throughout this study, but the important point for now is that Allen – the homegrown billionaire and civic patron – was a supporter of the effort. He loaned the Committee for the Seattle Commons $20 million to purchase land that would be absorbed into the park, with the stipulation that it would be forgiven if a property tax levy funding the remainder of the project were passed by voters; otherwise the land would be returned to him (cf. Becker 2007). However, the levy failed twice, in 1995 and 1996, by a much slimmer margin than the 1912 election that sacked Bogue’s plan. Allen found himself with 11.5 acres of property in the area, and had to make a decision about what to do with it. His real estate agent catalogued the entire neighborhood and gave him succinct advice: “buy more dirt” – he did so, gradually accumulating 53 acres at a cost of $200 million by 2001 (Young 2008).

In the wake of the early 2000s recession, civic leaders and Vulcan executives began collaborating on plans to build on the emerging cluster of biomedical research and treatment that was occurring in the vicinity of SLU: the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (Fred Hutch), had centralized their scattered operations in their current campus on Eastlake Avenue in the early 1990s; by 1995 Zymogenetics, a pharmaceutical company that was founded by two UW professors and a professor from the University of British Columbia, had outgrown its laboratory in the University District and moved to the former Lake Union Steam Plant in order to be near Fred Hutch; in 2001, the Seattle Cancer Care Alliance – which is a partnership between Fred Hutch, UW Medicine, and Seattle Children’s Hospital – had built their own facility on southern
edge of the Fred Hutch campus. The Puget Sound region already ranked sixth among the eight bio-technopoles in the United States and 1995 projections indicated that by 2003, the industry would employ 12,000 people across the state of Washington and generate $3-$4 billion in annual revenue (Central Puget Sound Economic Development District 1995, 2). For the newly elected mayor, Greg Nickels, the burgeoning biotech activity in the area and Vulcan’s intention to develop the area into a biotech hub appeared to be a route toward economic recovery. The Mayor’s Action Agenda for South Lake Union (2003) expresses the administration’s key commitments with respect to the neighborhood: attract biotech jobs; create a new waterfront park; improve neighborhood amenities; build a streetcar; fix the “Mercer Mess”\(^3\); and build infrastructure to create new jobs. With this local governmental support, not to mention the statewide commitment to managing urban growth that had come with the adoption of the Growth Management Act (GMA) in 1990 and the attendant municipal comprehensive plan that utilized an urban village strategy, Vulcan cautiously began co-developing buildings – with seasoned developers – for biotechnology and health-related uses. Seattle BioMed and Merck moved into new buildings along Westlake and Terry Avenues in 2004,\(^4\) while Group Health and Vulcan began developing the former’s new headquarters in 2006. Later that same year, Vulcan completed construction of the mixed-use development at 2200 Westlake,\(^5\) which is home to the Pan-Pacific Hotel, luxury condominiums, and multiple retailers, including Whole Foods (Fig. EI.4). In this same era, Vulcan also began residential projects in the Cascade neighborhood, which forms the easternmost portion of SLU and had long been an active mixed-use

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\(^1\) A high-volume traffic bottleneck along Mercer Street that had frustrated commuters and planners for more than forty years (cf. Seattle Department of Transportation n.d.)

\(^2\) Joint ventures with Harbor Properties and Schnitzer Northwest, respectively.

\(^3\) A joint venture with Milliken Urban Limited Partnership.
neighborhood that was home to some of Seattle’s earliest sustainability movements and affordable housing for workers and artists (cf. Cascade Neighborhood Council 1997; Kephart and Mistur 2008), as well as UW Medicine’s campus at the northern end of SLU and speculative projects scattered across the neighborhood that were eventually leased to – and then sold to – Amazon in 2012 for over $1 billion (Martinez and Pryne 2012).

While the price tag of this sale is indeed staggering, it gestures toward Vulcan’s curatorial approach to urban redevelopment, which is enabled by their unprecedented access to liquid and financial capital: selling their assets at record prices (Stiles 2014a, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c) and reinvesting in the neighborhood. With the reclassification of the area as an “urban center” in the 2004 update to Seattle’s Comprehensive Plan – the densest growth category – and
the increased growth that the area would consequently have to absorb, it was rezoned in 2013 to allow much taller buildings across most of the neighborhood (Fig. E1.5). Vulcan can therefore now use the profits from their original investments to reinvest in larger structures in key locations, namely a three building complex at the corner of Westlake Avenue and Denny Way as well as three mixed-use complexes in the lakefront parcels bounded by the newly widened Mercer Street and Valley Street that will include 638,000 square feet of office space for Google, as well as retail and 16-story apartment towers (Graphite Design Group n.d.)

This practice of selling and reinvesting attests to a peculiarity about Vulcan’s involvement in the neighborhood, which is reinforced by their involvement in neighborhood
planning efforts, community groups, local activities, as well as the presence of South Lake Union Discovery Center (EI.6) – a modular showroom for the neighborhood – which will have to moved to make way for the new complex at Westlake Avenue and Denny Way (Fig. EI.7). In contradistinction to the typical approach of real estate developers to build and eventually sell off one building at a time, Vulcan is taking the long view of the entire neighborhood by engaging with and influencing discussions around its design, as well as building and reinvesting in the neighborhood. Moreover, they have also played the role of a “pioneer” in SLU (cf. Smith 1996) and have attracted like-minded developers to the area, such as Touchstone and Skanska, both of whom are currently building or have recently completed environmentally sustainable office buildings along Fairview Ave. In this sense, Vulcan’s assertion that they are stewards – or what one might call curators or managers – of the neighborhood rings true. As Vulcan describes their activity under the heading of “Stewardship” on their website:

Successful communities are made up of people with shared values, pursuing common goals. At Vulcan, we know how to build alliances that bring diverse groups of citizens together to advocate for positive change. Whether endorsing major infrastructure improvements, supporting local non-profits, or promoting sustainability, our community leadership is widely recognized (Vulcan 2015c).

This tendency is reflected in the claim that they are operating according to “a real estate model [that] is based on quality, sustainable development that builds new value across the entire community” (Vulcan 2015a), as well as their being selected by the Seattle Housing Authority to lead the redevelopment of Yesler Terrace, which is Seattle’s oldest public housing project (Young 2013). Ada Healey, the director of Vulcan’s real estate operations, recently commented that the new Yesler Terrace would be “kind of like South Lake Union” (Stiles 2015d), which again speaks to the notion that Vulcan’s approach to urban redevelopment is akin to building a machine that can transform large swaths of urban land into an environmentally sensitive,
economically productive and perhaps somewhat socially just built environment, the latter of which remains to be seen in Yesler Terrace.\(^6\)

But my project is not merely tracking these historical events. Instead, it is an attempt to understand how this machine has been assembled and how it works. The form of urbanization that is taking place in SLU cannot be simply attributed to Vulcan’s activity, but as I have suggested, is intimately connected to much broader social, political, and economic movements that have occurred in the postwar era. If one seeks to understand SLU, one must look at the immanent consistency across this time frame and understand the cogs, gears, and transmission

\(^6\) Their record in SLU is far from impressive, especially in the realm of affordable housing, of which they have built exactly zero units. Yet it has been argued by the executive director of the Low Income Housing Institute that Vulcan’s proposed approach to building affordable housing through a program called R.I.S.E. (Real Investment in Social Equity) would have produced more affordable housing (up to 400 units) – not to mention other social services – in exchange for greater height limits along the lake front in SLU than what the city council approved in the 2013 rezone (Lee 2013; Vulcan 2013).
belts of a machine that has been under construction since 1953 – which is, coincidentally, the same year that Allen was born. This machine first emerges in response to the detrimental environmental effects of postwar suburbanization, but morphs into an increasingly coordinated system that guides the urbanization of the Central Puget Sound Region: it determines growth categories across the state of Washington, requires that particular counties and municipalities plan for growth, and ultimately creates a web of regulation that extends down to material selection for buildings that fall within its purview. It is this entire web of regulation that unfolds...
from different discourses in the public sector, the private sector, and various mixtures of both
that is responsible for SLU and is what I call the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine. It is this
machine that I am striving to understand.
Part II

THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE COORDINATED CITY
CHAPTER 4. THE BIRTH OF THE COORDINATED CITY

To understand the emergence of South Lake Union (SLU) it is necessary to look at the various political, economic, and social forces in the Central Puget Sound Region during the postwar era. Although Paul Allen is typically considered to be the progenitor of the neighborhood, I am starting with a broader set of movements that created the conditions of possibility for SLU. However, if a heroic figure is still necessary for a good story then I propose that we begin with the following:

A dark-haired young man strode forcefully along downtown Seattle’s Fourth Avenue on Nov. 20, 1953, the future of the region in his briefcase. To one side was the imposing and posh Rainier Club, its landscaping lush and green even in the dead of winter. His destination, however, was the Downtown YMCA, an architecturally interesting building somewhat worn by generations of young feet. He was to deliver a noontime speech he had been thinking about and working on for months (Lane 1995, 3, my emphasis).

This young man was none other than Jim Ellis, the “father” of the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro), which has since been absorbed into local governance as King County Metro. The future that Mr. Ellis was carrying that day in 1953 was a speech in which the young lawyer decried the effects of “a revolution in urban living” that has left us “[un]satisfied with close-platted homes and walk-up tenements” and demanding both “a view from our picture windows” and a family car (Ibid., 4). For Ellis, the familiar effects of this revolution – urban decay, white flight, traffic congestion, and most importantly for him, the water pollution that was causing excessive algae growth in Lake Washington – could be best addressed through the “creation of a single metropolitan government given authority to do what the cities and the county could not or would not do individually” (Ibid., 5). Lane’s mythologizing aside, the creation of Metro was
indeed a critical moment in the history of coordinated urbanization in the Central Puget Sound Region, and one which is a precedent for the SLU of today.

This chapter maps the trajectory of coordinated urban planning from this moment in 1953 up to the documents corresponding to the 2013 rezone of SLU in response to its reclassification as an “urban center” – the densest type of urban village in Seattle’s Comprehensive Plan for growth – in 2004 “to reflect significantly increased expectations for housing and job growth” (Seattle Department of Planning and Development [DPD] 2007, 7). These expectations were undoubtedly due to Vulcan’s activity in the neighborhood, but the story here is neither one of neoliberal cutbacks that allow real estate developers to reshape urban space according to their own visions, nor one of an authoritarian state micromanaging how cities develop. Instead, following the theoretical edifice that Deleuze and Guattari (1987) have constructed, and which I discussed at length in Chapter 1, I am herein assembling a story of the constitution of the models of realization that determine how capital produces coordinated landscapes such as SLU. In the present situation, where capital has become a condition underpinning the production of everything from computer code to space exploration, its identification as the motor for how different forms of urbanization arise does not suffice. Instead, it is the dynamic confluence of capital flows and the localized and differential criteria that shape how it produces urban space that must be explored.

The organizing principle of this chapter is simple: regional planning in the Central Puget Sound Region has gone from reactive and centralized planning, in the case of Metro, to proactive and coordinated planning in the case of SLU. My overarching concern is how different governmental, private sector, and citizen-led efforts have emerged and become interrelated in a way that funnels capital into the particular form of the built environment that is SLU. This
discussion is presented in four immanent lines that correspond to the social fields that the
Coordinated City’s discourse enfolds: land use and character, institutional coordination,
sustainable economic development, and quality of life. These lines were not chosen at random,
nor were they foisted upon the archive at hand: instead, they were extracted from an archive of
discourses that have shaped the way urbanization is regulated in SLU. A detailed list of the
archival documents, as well as two timelines situating the documents in relation to one another
and to my emergent analytical categories, are presented in Appendix 3, but an abbreviated
version (Table 4.1) helps establish the major time frames and movements under consideration.
These four research lines express themes that are repeated across the archive, although as I show
below, they vibrate and transform slightly at times, gently staking out their domains in a robust
discursive framework that has shaped and continues to shape the urbanization of SLU. It is this
repetition of particular concerns – this emergence and fixing of specific ideas and values through
constant use and modification – that illustrates SLU’s criteria for urbanization, or its models of
realization for producing a Coordinated City.

Finally, this chapter forms the first of three empirical chapters. It focuses on major points
of land use, institutional coordination, economy, and quality of life independently, while Chapter
5 highlights how these discourses are held together by shared forms of knowledge, collective
actors, as well as through logical and practical connections. With this immanent set of discourses
in SLU established, I then take a step back and identify the broader sets of discourses that shape
what is – and what is not – included in SLU’s models of realization. In contradistinction to the
perspective of critical urban theory, this does not turn own to be a primarily political economic
discourse, but also includes a consistent engagement with the ethical and aesthetic realms to
produce a tripartite set of criteria structuring how capital is molded into SLU (Chapter 6). Put
another way, I am starting with immanent statements that are directly related to coordinated planning in the Central Puget Sound Region and the urbanization of SLU rather than with urban studies or urban planning concepts, and using these statements to identify which broader conceptual categories are structuring – or are left out of – local discussions. These three empirical chapters are briefly recapitulated in Entracte II, before being invoked to adapt Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy into a critical urban theory in the final section.

Table 4.1. Categories of Archival Documents (See Appendix 3 for detailed tables and timelines)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time frame</th>
<th>Major movements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early 1950s - present</td>
<td>Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1950s - present</td>
<td>State of Washington Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1950s - present</td>
<td>Regional Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1970s - present</td>
<td>Seattle Comprehensive Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1980s - mid 1990s</td>
<td>Seattle Commons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Early 2000s - present  | South Lake Union
  * Biotechnology, E-commerce, Global Health
  * Design Guidelines/Built Environment
  * Displacement
  * Governance
  * Retail
  * SLU Streetcar
  * Vulcan/Paul Allen
  * Other SLU developers
  * 2013 Rezone |
4.1 Land Use and Character

This section tracks the major, as well as a few minor, efforts to shape land use and character that have occurred since the Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle (Metro) was established in 1958 as an independent metropolitan corporation to address a variety of “metropolitan ills” resulting from haphazard postwar growth.\(^1\) Although Metro was not established to directly address land use, its dual role as a reaction to the detrimental effects of unplanned growth and as a successful and early example of inter-jurisdictional coordination intended to improve social, environmental, and economic conditions makes it an important event in the history of coordinated urbanization.

The Metro Enabling Act permits a metropolitan corporation to be formed between two or more cities, and to address up to six functions: comprehensive planning, sewage disposal, water supply, public transportation, garbage disposal, and parks and parkways (Washington (State), 1961, 2). This legislation – which was spurred by middle-class activism via the Municipal League, of which Ellis was a key member (cf. Wilson 1984, 175) – predates the state of Washington’s own efforts to encourage county and regional planning via the state’s Growth Management Act (GMA), which was not passed until 1990.\(^2\) The formation of Metro thus stands as an early movement that draws the largely unconnected (at that time) notions of land use, environmental quality, and social institutions such as the family together: following the first defeat of a referendum to create Metro, for example, a new campaign which included a widely circulated photo of five white children on the shores of Matthews Beach on a polluted Lake Washington, emerged and helped gain support for its passage (Fig. 4.1). After its establishment,

\(^1\) An earlier attempt by the Municipal League and the League of Women Voters – two of the major actors behind the formation of Metro – to revise the King County charter to address these issues was defeated by voters in 1952 (Washington (State), 1961, 1).

\(^2\) Middle class activism is one refrain that will emerge across this archive and can also be seen in setting the Seattle 2000 Goals, the Seattle Commons effort, and neighborhood planning efforts.
Metro’s first project was to assume the operation of 14 sanitary sewer systems and reengineer them into a regional system that successfully eliminated the water pollution problem.

Metro, however, was not the only official body concerned with postwar land use. The Planning Enabling Act (RCW 36.70) was passed by the Washington State Legislature in 1959 and extends the previously ratified Planning Commission Act (RCW35.63) by “provid[ing] a specific statutory framework that integrates planning with zoning, platting, and other specific land use regulations” (Planning Association of Washington and the State of Washington Department of Commerce 2009, 35). It is directed specifically at counties and is a crucial element in establishing the statewide growth management policies that have heavily influenced postwar urbanization in Washington. It begins:

The purpose and intent of this chapter is to provide the authority for, and the procedures to be followed in, guiding and regulating the physical development of a county or region through correlating both public and private projects and coordinating their execution with respect to all subject matters utilized in developing and servicing land, all to the end of assuring the highest standards of environment for living, and the operation of commerce, industry, agriculture and recreation, and assuring maximum economies and conserving the highest degree of public health, safety, morals and welfare (RCW 36.70.010).³

This single quotation, in fact, specifies the four lines of inquiry that structure this chapter: the familiar trio of categories of critical urban studies – the relationship between political dynamics, economic growth, and land development – is here supplemented by a concern with well-being or quality of life (recreation, environmental health, public health, safety, morals, and welfare).

Although this particular confluence seems natural when thinking about urbanization, current

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³ This text was initially adopted in 1959 as Chapter 201 of the Revised Code of Washington (RCW), but it was shifted into its current location when Title 36 was created in 1963.
scholarship in critical urban theory, with its overwhelming focus on political economy, and the urban planning literature, which often focuses on quality of life, do not have much overlap.\textsuperscript{4}

During this same era (late 1950s), county commissioners from King, Kitsap, Pierce, and Snohomish counties – collectively known as the Central Puget Sound Region – were establishing the Puget Sound Regional Planning Conference, which is today known as the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC). Even at the outset, a preference for compact development is explicit: “urban development should be encouraged along lines which will result in compact rather than scattered growth” (Puget Sound Governmental Conference [PSGC] 1962, 7). Implicitly, this orientation is reinforced by other goals: striving to minimize air, water, and soil pollution; minimizing travel distances between concentrations of employment and residential areas; and

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{campaign_photograph.jpg}
\caption{Campaign photograph supporting the establishment of Metro}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{4} This disjuncture is, in fact, one of the primary motives for this dissertation and led me to Deleuze and Guattari because of their philosophy’s potential to accommodate both the economic and the extraeconomic.
reducing traffic congestion (Ibid.). This orientation continues through to the early 1990s, when Vision 2020 – the first regional plan for the Central Puget Sound – was adopted (discussed below).

Turning to the municipal scale is particularly interesting because much like in the case of Metro, it gestures toward how the push for more environmentally and socially sensitive land use planning is not a directive from the state level, but is instead something that bubbles up from below – particularly amongst the urban middle and upper classes – before being absorbed and codified by the state. The municipality of Seattle, along with Bremerton, Everett, and Tacoma, joined the PSGC in 1959, and in 1972 the Seattle City Council committed itself to comprehensive planning, 18 years before it was required by the GMA:

The Mayor and the City of Council of the City of Seattle hereby declare their intent that the City shall have a Comprehensive Plan for its development during the remainder of this century which accords with Seattle’s status as one of the most livable and progressive of the world’s major cities. The plan shall further accord with the aspirations of the citizens of Seattle for a city which is economically sound, which embodies the most positive aspects of urban civilization, and which provides an attractive and healthful environment enhancing the lives of its citizens (Resolution 23684).

Herein the “livable and progressive” character of the city, as well as its economic productivity, is put forth as a vision that remains today: almost two decades later, very similar language is used in the GMA, which requires comprehensive plans for larger and faster growing cities across the state of Washington. This early attempt at municipal comprehensive planning produced the Goals Statements from Task Forces of the Seattle 2000 Commission, which addresses a wide range of issues: community, downtown and major activity centers, economy and economic security, education and communication, environment, government and citizen participation,

\footnote{If the Bogue Plan (1911) had been adopted, it would have been Seattle’s first comprehensive plan.}
housing, law and justice, recreation and the arts, social and health services, social justice and human resources, and transportation/utilities/new technologies (Seattle 2000 Commission 1973b). Moreover, this document also adds or develops two of the research lines structuring this inquiry: political participation and quality of life. The political field, as I have defined it so far, has primarily been oriented toward land use, but must now include citizen participation in government. The expansion to the notion of quality of life is even more drastic, with the inclusion of housing, recreation, the arts, social and health services, and emerging technologies.

The GMA was passed by the Washington State Legislature in 1990, and both provides a policy framework that is more detailed than earlier statewide legislation and addresses cities directly. Broadly, it establishes tools for cities and counties to funnel growth into areas where efficient infrastructure can be developed rather than propagating unruly suburban growth. Its Legislative Findings reinforce the four lines of inquiry that have emerged so far:

> The legislature finds that uncoordinated and unplanned growth, together with a lack of common goals expressing the public's interest in the conservation and the wise use of our lands, pose a threat to the environment, sustainable economic development, and the health, safety, and high quality of life enjoyed by residents of this state. It is in the public interest that citizens, communities, local governments, and the private sector cooperate and coordinate with one another in comprehensive land use planning. Further, the legislature finds that it is in the public interest that economic development programs be shared with communities experiencing insufficient economic growth (RCW 36.70A.010).

These findings do, however, transform some of the previous concerns of such legislation. The GMA deletes the explicit reference to morals and adds: common goals expressing public interest to land use; the adjective “sustainable” to economic development; a new object entitled “quality of life” that I have already invoked above; and a list of social groups (citizens, communities,

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6 The development of the Seattle 2000 Goals involved an impressive amount of public participation while the GMA also includes citizen participation and coordination as one of its planning goals: “Encourage the involvement of citizens in the planning process and ensure coordination between communities and jurisdictions to reconcile conflicts” (RCW 36.70A.020).
local government and the private sector) who have a duty to contribute to the public interest through coordinated planning efforts. Importantly, one of its central functions is to require more populous and/or faster growing counties and cities to produce integrated comprehensive plans (RCW 36.70A.040). In its discussion of Planning Goals, the first explicit distinction between urban and suburban land development occurs (RCW 36.70A.020):

1. Urban growth. Encourage development in urban areas where adequate public facilities and services exist or can be provided in an efficient manner.
2. Reduce sprawl. Reduce the inappropriate conversion of undeveloped land into sprawling, low-density development.

Around the same time, Vision 2020 – the region’s “first integrated long-range growth and transportation strategy” (PSRC 2009a, 2), which elaborates the GMA’s planning goals – was published. Importantly, it also opens with a pointed critique of the suburban landscape:

New subdivisions, shopping malls, office campuses and parking lots are consuming land at a fast rate. These sprawling development patterns, together with more registered drivers, more cars per registered driver and more miles driven by each driver, are creating traffic jams and air pollution (Puget Sound Council of Governments [PSCOG] 1990, 2).

In a positive movement, its “strategy is to contain urbanization and concentrate new employment into central places, with appropriate urban design characteristics that will foster transit, ridesharing, pedestrian and bicycle travel” (Ibid., 7). It is also a document intended to persuade the reader that its vision is indeed praiseworthy, replete with graphs reflecting population growth and land use, as well as photographs and conceptual sketches expressing its orientation visually (Fig. 4.2). The updated regional plan, Vision 2040 (2009), carries this mission forward by further

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7 King County had already produced two comprehensive plans (1964, 1985) and Seattle had initiated a Comprehensive Policy Plan in the early 1970s, which was adopted piecemeal through the 1980s, culminating (for our purposes) in a Land Use and Transportation Plan that was adopted in 1985 (Resolution 27281).
developing a much more comprehensive classificatory system, which enfolds many more aspects of contemporary urban society into its web.\textsuperscript{8}

In this same era (late 1980s/early 1990s) the collective visioning of the future Seattle also emerges outside of the official governmental sphere. The idea of the Seattle Commons, for example, began with a short column by John Hinterberger (1989a) – a columnist for \textit{The Seattle Times} – who argued for a major park running from Westlake Center to Lake Union, but

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\textsuperscript{8} The forms of knowledge constituting this classificatory system is discussed at greater length in Chapter 5, but a list of the topics will help convey the extent of the coordination at hand: health, growth targets, housing, environment, social and environmental justice, demographics, economics, transportation, subregional centers, and rural areas.
gradually transformed into a vision for “a revitalized 470-acre business and residential neighborhood surrounding an 85-acre park” (Committee for the Seattle Commons 1992, 1) in the heart of SLU (Fig. 4.3). Proponents of the Commons, such as Fred Bassetti, a well known local architect, considered the land to be “relatively under-used, available, and affordable” (Ibid.), despite the prevalence of many light industrial businesses, warehouses, as well as a small but active residential community, and wanted to build a park that would be Seattle’s version of Central Park or the Boston Common. The park would include open meadows, clusters of trees, as well as space for performances and political rallies, and would be surrounded by a diverse neighborhood privileging affordable housing and alternative transportation, modest height increases for buildings, all of which would be regulated by design standards for ground floor uses, landscaping, and architectural features (Ibid., 2-3). The composition of this vision fluctuated over the years, resulting in a smaller park surrounded by more intense development. In terms of land use and character, opponents to the project frequently note that it primarily consists of transforming active commercial and light industrial land with relatively affordable housing into a park that would be a tourist attraction and an under-policed magnet for transients, enveloped in a neighborhood of office towers, condominiums, and luxury retail offerings (Nelson 1991; Foley 1995; Network X 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Regier 1995). This perspective prevailed and attempts in 1995 and 1996 to pass a property tax levy funding the park failed. One of the major advocates for the park – Mr. Allen, who had purchased 11.5 acres in the area to donate in the event of a public commitment to funding the rest of its development – subsequently increased his (Vulcan’s) holdings to 53 acres at a cost of $200 million by 2001 before beginning to develop it into the South Lake Union of today (Becker 2007).
Yet, as the collaborative effort between citizens, designers, various other professionals, and local government to re-envision SLU as a mixed-use area around the Commons proceeded, governmental efforts to establish the first municipal Comprehensive Plan, which was published in 1994, were well under way. The Comprehensive Plan does not have the status of a municipal code, and therefore is not typically used to review projects, but instead directs the “development of regulations which govern land use and development” (Seattle DPD 2005, x). The most recently updated Plan (Ibid.) – as well as the new 20-year plan, Seattle 2035 (Seattle DPD n.d.-a), which is being developed at the time of this writing – utilizes an urban village strategy that assigns areas to one of four categories that “recognize the different roles that different areas will play in the city’s future”: urban centers, manufacturing/industrial centers, hub urban villages, and
residential urban villages (Seattle DPD 2005, 1.3-1.4) (Fig. 4.4). The plan is based on four “core values” that are compatible with the economic and extraeconomic lines identified in previous governmental documents: community, environmental stewardship, economic opportunity and security, and social equity.9

Another important aspect of the push for comprehensive planning in the 1990s is the city’s commitment to neighborhood planning. The original and updated SLU neighborhood plans (South Lake Union Planning Organization [SLUPO] 1998, Seattle DPD 2007) further subdivide the neighborhood into areas based on their character, and establish guidelines for directing the

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9 The full list of values from the Comprehensive Plan Framework Policies includes: continuity, diversity, economic security, education, environmental quality, freedom, good government, opportunity, physical security, and progress (Resolution 28962).
future development of each (Fig. 4.5). These plans primarily highlight the history of each area (maritime heritage along the southern of Lake Union or a mixture of residential, commercial, and industrial uses in Cascade, the easternmost portion of SLU), the characteristics and uses of the buildings, as well as strategies for supporting the preservation or orderly transformation of each zone. Although the first official neighborhood plan for SLU was adopted in 1998, the Cascade Neighborhood Council (CNC) – a grassroots organization representing the mixed-use neighborhood since the early 1970s – had already laid out its own ideas about neighborhood development a year earlier, in a document meant to encourage sustainable development. The official plan, on the other hand, addresses a larger area and focuses on preserving neighborhood character (primarily working class housing in the eastern portion and light industry, maritime-oriented, and small commercial businesses in the western portion), parks and open space, and transportation (SLUPO 1998). In the wake of the neighborhood being designated an urban center in the 2005 Comprehensive Plan update, the neighborhood plan was transformed to accommodate the biotechnology, global health, and high-technology firms that were moving into the neighborhood, as well as the new multifamily forms of housing required to absorb the expected increase in residential population (Seattle DPD 2007). That the plans were transformed, not eviscerated in the name of neoliberal urban policy, is important here, and further attests to Seattle’s consistent attempt to balance economic growth with the set of extraeconomic concerns that is being tracked here.

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10 The CNC’s plan aimed to strengthen community, use energy efficiently, conserve materials, protect waterflows, and enhance the natural environment (CNC 1997)
Moreover, in the years since Vulcan began redeveloping SLU in 2001, the practice of subdividing and organizing the particularities of land use have been extended down to the street level, where a comprehensive set of criteria called the Urban Design Framework (Seattle DPD 2010) designates street character (Fig. 4.6), preferred land uses, an integrated public space network, building setbacks to preserve views and sunlight, and the distribution of the towers that were to be permitted in the 2013 rezone. Similarly, the South Lake Union Street Concept Plans (Seattle DPD 2013c) elaborate design criteria for key areas in the neighborhood to the point that they specify particular materials and plant species to be used in new public streetscapes.

Individual buildings are also subject to a particular design regime and are encouraged to adopt particular elements of the existing landscape, including materials, detailing, and the grassroots social and environmental sustainability efforts of the Cascade area (artwork, gardens, etc.)
(Seattle DPD 2013a, 5-6). Therefore, beginning with the state level requirement for larger cities like Seattle to undertake comprehensive plan, it is possible to locate an increasingly detailed meshwork of regulation that essentially extends all the way down to building and landscape design materials. Still, however, this does not mean that state and local governments are the only forces striving to organize how this urban space is produced.

![Figure 4.6. SLU Street Character Plan (Seattle DPD 2010, 13)](image)

**Figure 4.6. SLU Street Character Plan (Seattle DPD 2010, 13)**

In an interesting turn in the early 2000s that harkens the entry of Seattle Commons advocates on to the scene of discussing the form of the future Seattle, Vulcan – who was by this point a major property owner in the neighborhood – also began to publicize how subareas of
SLU would develop in their advertising (Fig. 4.7), although their five subareas do not correspond to those of the official documents. In this conception, the Waterfront District is defined by peaceful and desirable residential use; Cascade (at the top of the image) is presented as a diverse mixed-use area that “is and will be equal parts Gore-Tex and garden patches; black labs and amber ale; home to the retired and the just-getting-started” (Soulmoto n.d.-a). The

Fig. 4.7. Vulcan’s version of the five neighborhoods of SLU (video capture from Soulmoto n.d.-a)

Westlake/Terry District (at the center of the image) is primarily understood as a place for business, life sciences, and the amenities that support such areas – food, coffee, and retail – while the Gateway District is formed by its edge nearest downtown: as the front door to SLU, Vulcan offers it as an “electric” and “cosmopolitan” mixed-use area, drawing comparisons to loft-style residences in New York City (Ibid.). Finally, the 8th Avenue district (at the bottom right of the image) is rendered as the artistic and entrepreneurial portion of the neighborhood, which will be soon be “joined by quiet, tree-lined streets, sidewalk cafes, handsome brownstones with their
signature stoops, and Veer Lofts,” which is one of Vulcan’s first residential project in this portion of SLU. (Ibid.).

Finally, even more recently, artists have turned their attention to highlighting the former or largely invisible efforts to draw the space of SLU into discourse and create meaning. The DETOUR: Cascade to South Lake Union project (2012), for example, collects oral histories that primarily focus on what the Cascade neighborhood was, and is especially interesting here because it expresses an alternate view of the more institutional perspectives on land use and character that have already been discussed. In particular, it drastically extends the definition of diversity that Vulcan presents by including interviews with: volunteers from Food Not Bombs who distribute protein-rich vegan food and messages of communal care for open spaces; a resident of the Low Income Housing Institute (LIHI)’s Lakeview Apartments, who volunteers at the Cascade People’s Center, explains how her work benefits underprivileged youth; and two artists that operated different art centers that are now sites of an Amazon office building and the mixed-use development at 2200 Westlake reflect on their experiences in the area. Each of the interviewees offer a perspective on the area that presents it as a space of care or creative expression that can not be captured by the zoning designations or advertisements of planners and real estate developers. Whereas Joe Fugere, the owner of Tutta Bella Neapolitan Pizzeria in the 2200 Westlake development can make the claim that “Every community has a center of commerce and culture; what I love about South Lake Union is that those groups come together to create energy and life” (Soulmoto n.d.-b), Matthew Richter – the founder of one of the now-

\[1\] As of early 2016, two of these visions have drastically changed. The 8th Avenue corridor has been partially built in accordance with this vision, but as I discuss in the following chapter, Vulcan has also proposed two office buildings in this area. In a more drastic change, Google recently announced that it is working with Vulcan to move into over 600,000 square feet of office space in mixed-use developments in the waterfront area (Lerman 2016).
defunct art centers, Consolidated Works (Terry Avenue and Republican Street, now Amazon) –
can celebrate how “wild-westy” the neighborhood was before Vulcan’s building boom.
Similarly, Greg Lundgren, Richter’s counterpart from Vital 5 Productions, which was formerly
housed in an old car dealership where 2200 Westlake now stands, calls the same era “a brief
wonderful firework display” (Detour 2012).

In sum, these movements illustrate a range of major – and a few minor – governmental
private sector, and citizen-led efforts to assign land use categories and intended characteristics in
the Central Puget Sound Region, specifically in SLU. The major efforts are indeed the focus here
because my present question concerns how SLU has been produced, but the minor voices are
included in order to draw attention to the complexity of how the models of realization are
constituted. Although I began by focusing on land use, the other three major lines of research –
institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life – tend to
emerge and modulate across these multiple documents, and are each considered in turn below.
Finally, having established the general historical chronology in this section, the following three
sections collapse some of the major movements in an effort to provide a more accessible
narrative.

4.2 Institutional Coordination

A second emergent line of research weaves through political field, which clearly plays a central
role in discussions of urbanization, but also pertains to more than the social dynamics around
land use and character. Here I am especially interested in two aspects: first, the fact that the
political field itself is becoming more coordinated from the state level down to that of the
neighborhood; second, the political field’s coordinating function, including its push for common
goals and its emphasis on public participation. This movement, however, is not limited to the
public sector, but is also manifest in the private realm, specifically in Vulcan’s approach to integrated land development, as well as in the Seattle Commons effort, which blurs the distinctions between the public and private spheres altogether. For this reason, I am using the broader term institutional coordination to define this line of inquiry, with the intention that political coordination is a particular subtype. Moreover, this reflects Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) assertion that the state is now but one model of realization for capital. This section’s focus, then, is illuminating how these various models of realization are coordinating their operations by revisiting a largely familiar set of documents produced by: the Washington State Legislature and the PSRC at the statewide and regional levels; the Seattle 2000 Commissions, City Council, Seattle DPD at the municipal scale; the Committee for the Seattle Commons, Vulcan and Touchstone (another active developer in SLU), as well as critique of the SLU redevelopment by John Fox of the Seattle Displacement Coalition at the neighborhood scale. Altogether these documents attest to the increasing coordination within and between institutions involved in the growth and development of SLU.

Although Metro’s regional approach to addressing water pollution stands as a critical precedent to coordinating governmental action, the Planning Enabling Act is directly connected to invested in guiding and regulating development by “correlating both public and private projects and coordinating their execution with respect to all subject matters utilized in developing and servicing land,” (RCW 36.70.010, my emphasis) toward specific ends (economic development and a high quality of life). It lays out the rules to establish, structure, and operate a county planning agency and specifies what their comprehensive plans must address. It does

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12 Above all, the comprehensive plans must contain land use and circulation elements, as well as supporting maps, diagrams, and other descriptive material required to explain these two elements (RCW 36.70.330).
not, however, mandate that such plans be created. The GMA, on the other hand, requires that the fastest growing counties and cities produce comprehensive plans, for haphazard growth and the “lack of common goals expressing the public's interest in the conservation and the wise use of our lands” (RCW 36.70A.010) threaten the quality of life across the state. The GMA addresses this problem by providing a list of common goals that are intended to guide the development of comprehensive plans.\textsuperscript{13} Moreover, the GMA’s emphasis on coordination results in requirements for: attempting to notify all potentially affected individuals and groups; addressing a common set of elements in each plan\textsuperscript{14}; and coordinating each plan with that of the enveloping county or adjacent jurisdiction.

\textit{Vision 2020}, the Central Puget Sound Region’s first regional plan, also expresses the necessity of coordination and common goals by:

recogniz[ing] that issues of land use and transportation transcend the boundaries and responsibilities of individual jurisdictions and that no single unit of government can plan or implement policies to deal with these issues without affecting other jurisdictions \textit{(PSCOG 1990, 3)}.

The process of homing in on common goals via public participation is another important aspect of this plan, which includes extensive efforts to involve the public, including regional symposia

\textsuperscript{13} Encourage urban growth; reduce sprawl; encourage efficient multimodal transportation systems; promote a variety of housing options and encourage preservation of existing stock; encourage a wide range of appropriate economic development schemes; protect property rights; process state and local permit requests efficiently; maintain and enhance natural resource-based industries; retain open space, enhance recreation opportunities, and protect wildlife (RCW 36.70A.020).

\textsuperscript{14} It originally required elements for: Land use, Housing, Capital Facilities, Utilities, Transportation, and Economic development. Rural land (where applicable) and Open Space elements were subsequently added. Moreover, larger cities, such as Seattle, are allowed to create their own elements (RCW 36.70A.070). Seattle exercised this option and included Housing and Human Development elements in its first comprehensive plan \textit{(Seattle Office of Management and Planning 1994)}. Its second comprehensive plan also added Urban Village, Cultural Resources, and Environment elements \textit{(Seattle DPD 2005)}, while its third plan will add Container Port (now required) and Urban Design elements \textit{(Seattle DPD n.d.-a)}. 
and workshops, open houses, surveys, community meetings, as well as regular open periods for comment. *Vision 2040* (PSRC 2009) – the updated regional plan – is even more specific about its outreach and public participation efforts, highlighting its outreach methods (print and online media), venues for participation (one-on-one communications, large public events, presentations to small groups, a streaming video aired on public television that reached entire communities, slide presentations that summarized lengthy reports, and half-day seminars to discuss technical data), modes of soliciting feedback (email, comment forms, post cards, letters, and flip charts), and the online publication of all materials (issue papers and technical reports, survey results, the environmental documents, draft versions of *Vision 2040*, comment letters, and summaries of public events and open houses) (PSRC 2009a). The “common vision” that emerges from this process is “an environmentally friendly growth pattern that will support compact communities where people may both live and work, and will focus new employment and housing in vibrant urban centers” (PRSC 2009b, 1). Specifically, it includes a set of multicounty planning policies that are sorted into six categories: environment, development patterns, housing, economy, transportation, and public services (PSRC 2009c, 30), and which each constituent county uses to guide their own comprehensive plans. Moreover, beyond defining these content areas that must be addressed, it also includes five general policies that address coordination, monitoring, and fiscal opportunities and challenges (Ibid., 33). The details of these policies are less important here than the idea that they serve to establish a systematic procedure for all affected jurisdictions to follow.

The Seattle 2000 Commission (1973b, v) – which was tasked with outlining goals to guide the formation of a municipal comprehensive plan – asserts that its final report is “an unprecedented partnership between citizens and government and long will serve as a definitive
model for citizen involvement here and elsewhere.” The specific way that public participation was encouraged is addressed in the following chapter, but here it suffices to note that the Commission developed goals

that would permit local government to meet community and regional needs; reorganize the administration to provide for greater accountability, effectiveness and responsiveness, and guarantee active participation with citizens in decisions which affect their lives (Ibid., 135).

Seattle’s current Comprehensive Plan is similarly conceived as a dynamic and flexible document that can respond to the changing conditions on the city “while maintaining a steady aim at its ultimate goals” (Seattle DPD 2005, viii). By using a set of mechanisms – neighborhood planning, inter-jurisdictional coordination, codifying regulations conforming to the plan, monitoring and evaluation, as well as citizen participation – the plan can guide development across the broad range of elements that it addresses.

At an even finer resolution, one finds a series of legislative decisions that establishes the Neighborhood Planning and Assistance Program (Resolution 27709) – which created the Office of Neighborhoods – as well as a planning framework to bridge citywide policies with neighborhood planning (Resolution 28195) and the framing of the original Comprehensive Plan, which includes neighborhood planning as a central element (Resolution 28535; Office of Planning and Management 1994). These movements culminate in the establishment of a robust neighborhood planning program, which provides personnel, training, funding, technical support, administrative resources, conflict mediation, outreach assistance, and monitoring (Resolution 29015). This program was very active in the 1990s and by 1999, the City Council had approved

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15 As Diers (2004, 27-30) recounts, Mayor Charles Royer appointed him the first director in 1988, a position which he held until Mayor-elect Greg Nickels fired him in 2001. During his tenure, and under the direction of Mayor Norm Rice, the Office became the Department of Neighborhoods by consolidating the Neighborhood Service Centers, Citizens Service Bureau, the Office of Urban Conservation, the P-patch Program, and the Neighborhood Planning Office.
38 neighborhood plans that were produced by almost 20,000 participants (Seattle Department of Neighborhoods n.d.).

Evidence illustrating the orchestration of the neighborhood’s development also emerges in other genres altogether, such as in research into the Seattle Commons initiative or public relations and advertising produced by Vulcan. The Seattle Commons effort was an exercise in coordination and cooperation, among citizens’ groups, real estate developers, design professionals, citizens, and the City itself. Lynne Iglitzin’s (1995) comprehensive fieldwork during this era provides insight into the diversity of actors – both within and outside the Committee for the Seattle Commons – as well as how the Committee carried out its work. Broadly, the effort involved private-sector civic leaders, real estate developers and other entrepreneurs, city planners and bureaucrats, and elected politicians as well as the media (Iglitzin 1995, 626). The Committee was led by a board of increasing size – corresponding to the shift in emphasis from just a park to an entire neighborhood with a park at its center – and functioned in “highly pragmatic and task-oriented working groups that included outside experts and professionals,” which addressed technical issues on their own and with the aid of city planners. (Ibid., 626). Therefore, while the entire effort was predicated on officially separating the Committee’s work from City Hall, the fact of the matter is that a complex set of concrete and coordinated interactions troubles any clear split between the two groups.

Vulcan also presents itself as an “integrated team of real estate professionals [offering] a full range of development and portfolio management services from site selection and urban planning to build-to-suit construction, leasing, financing and asset repositioning” (Vulcan 2015a). The firm’s integrated approach includes specialists in marketing, leasing, market research and appraisal, as well as government affairs and community relations (Vulcan 2015b).
and also highlights its interests in community leadership, through a wide range of commitments to stewardship including sustainability, infrastructure and parks development, historic preservation, public art, community building, and economic development (Vulcan 2015c). Similar to the entanglement between the public and private spheres that existed in the Seattle Commons effort, there are also close relationships between Vulcan and the City. As early as 2004, at least six legislative aides, public relations professionals, lawyers, and economic development experts had transitioned from working at City Hall to working for Vulcan (Mulady 2004). Tim Ceis, the Deputy Mayor at this time, affirms the extent of the coordination between these two entities when he asserts that at meetings of the City’s South Lake Union Project Team, “Everyone sits at the table and looks at all of the issues. Everyone knows what the others are doing” (Ibid.).

Although Vulcan is the primary developer in SLU, they are clearly not the only one taking this approach to urban redevelopment. Touchstone, for example, is another local development firm that is active in both SLU and the adjacent Denny Triangle neighborhood. In SLU they are building the Troy Block (Fig. 4.8), which is a two-building office project that integrates the red brick façade of the Troy Laundry – a 1927 building which was designated a historic landmark in 1996 – into the new structure. Their approach to real estate development echoes the complexity of how Vulcan envisions its own role as coordinator:

At the core of Touchstone’s ongoing success is our skill with complexity—solving the hard stuff. That can include everything from assembling parcels in urban locations and developing appropriate ownership structures (such as commercial condominiums and ground leases) managing zoning and entitlement risk, working on tight urban sites near transit, negotiating with the Department of Ecology to develop clean up plans for contaminated sites, dealing with landmark status, building extraordinarily complex structures, to working under extremely tight timelines (Touchstone 2015a).
The extent of coordination extends beyond public relations copy. A.P. Hurd, a vice-president at Touchstone, for example, has also been an ardent supporter of increased growth in SLU in ways that extend beyond the confines of her role at Touchstone. She not only co-authored a book entitled *The Carbon Efficient City* (Hurd and Hurd 2012), which develops strategies for reducing carbon emissions through policy changes at various levels of government, but is also a politically active supporter of more intensive growth in SLU. For instance, in the public comments addressing the 2013 rezone, she asserts in a public comment that urban growth need not correspond to environmental degradation. Citing her international experience as a Runstad Fellow at the University of Washington – where she also teaches a course on development economics (Touchstone 2015b) – she notes that three of Hong Kong’s great strengths are that it “thinks in mutual terms, it supports growth, and it preserves rural lands” before imploring:

Let's find a way to make great places for people in growth companies, lots of people and growth companies, and let's do it in a way that preserves our rural and working lands. Let's zone for something that looks like Alternative 1, a vibrant, compact, and intensively urban South Lake Union (Seattle DPD 2012, 5.23).

These relationships suggest that increasing coordination occurs within each governmental body, throughout their own inter-jurisdictional operations, as well as within two of the major development firms and between the developers and parts of the municipal governing structure. The logical and practical dimensions of this coordination are addressed at greater length in Chapter 5.

Finally, the pro-SLU contingent is not the only one that speaks to the degree of institutional coordination fueling SLU’s redevelopment. In particular, the perspective of John Fox, one of the most outspoken critics of the City’s investment in SLU, establishes many connections between the City and Vulcan. The highlights include: the claim that Mayor Greg Nickels established a 20- to 25-person interdepartmental team assigned to work “with Vulcan
and other biotech representatives to implement these plans…[and which] has met over 70 times since the Summer of 2002”; allegations that Dr. Paul Sommers’s report (2004) to the city on the expected economic benefits of creating a biotech cluster in SLU amounts to an inside job penned by a consultant who sits on the Economic Development Council of Seattle-King County alongside Amgen, Vulcan, and a wide range of biotech interests; finally, a meticulous tabulation of how much public money is being funneled into the redevelopment via the streetcar, infrastructure improvements, public services, and maintenance and operating expenses – which adds up to right over a billion dollars (Seattle Displacement Coalition n.d.). Again, the archaeological method proceeds by bracketing out claims to truth and values, so the issue here is not one of siding with either Vulcan and the City or the Seattle Displacement Coalition, but is to note that all of these statements are circulating simultaneously, and that they attest to increasing coordination between public and private institutions, as well as in organizations that blur the lines between the two.

Fig. 4.8. Troy Block Redevelopment
In conclusion, different activities in these institutional fields are classified, related, and reworked to promote what are often taken to be common values through coordination and participation in their own domains as well as in relation to other domains. That there is internal diversity and even conflict is neither problematic nor surprising; instead these struggles speak to the complexity of the SLU model of realization. To be clear, at this point I am not making any specific claims about the power dynamics between these groups, but am instead sketching out the various social fields that the Coordinated City’s discursive formation draws together. All discursive formations function by bringing statements regarding diverse social fields together, and although there are clearly power relations at play, the point here is that coordination within and between different institutions and organizations forms part of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation.

4.3 SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Coordinated City’s discourse also enfolds the social field of economic development. This does not mean that this discourse completely subsumes the economic field; instead, it draws specific elements of economic concern into its domain and relates them to statements about land use and character, institutional coordination, and quality of life. This section addresses approximately the same documents as the previous two sections, but also includes some specialized economic reports related to Washington State’s Innovation Partnership Zone program, as well as strategies for regional and local economic development.

Both the Planning Enabling Act and the GMA specifically address the economy: the former seeks to assure “maximum economies” while the latter seeks to protect “sustainable economic development.” The GMA also provides a planning goal that directly addresses economic development:
Encourage economic development throughout the state that is consistent with adopted comprehensive plans, promote economic opportunity for all citizens of this state, especially for unemployed and for disadvantaged persons, promote the retention and expansion of existing businesses and recruitment of new businesses, recognize regional differences impacting economic development opportunities, and encourage growth in areas experiencing insufficient economic growth, all within the capacities of the state's natural resources, public services, and public facilities (RCW 36.70A.020, Planning Goals).

In the state of Washington, the “go-to” source for assistance understanding how state-level mandates, such as the GMA, translate to municipal policy is the Municipal Research and Services Center (MRSC), which directly attests to the coordinated approach to economic development thus:

Economic development should not be an isolated activity taking place within the borders of a jurisdiction. It is an activity that is regional or county-wide, and sometimes even broader. Successful economic development activities are carried out through partnerships with other governments, associate development organizations, and local business groups such as the chamber of commerce (Municipal Research and Services Center (MRSC), n.d.).

Although exploring the particularities of how statewide economic activity is coordinated would be intriguing, that is far beyond the point of this study. Instead, my argument is that what we see in SLU is an instance of coordinated urbanization is bolstered by MSRC comments that demonstrate how little freedom local jurisdictions have with respect economic development. For example, “Due to strict constitutional limitations, cities and counties in Washington State have very few avenues open for direct participation in private economic development projects,” including facing “potential legal issues regarding the loaning or gifting of public funds” (Ibid.). This is, of course, heavily disputed territory – as Fox’s aforementioned study tracing upward of $1 billion investments of public money into SLU’s infrastructure suggests (Seattle Displacement Coalition. n.d.) – but the key point here is the interweaving of economic concerns from the state down to the municipal level.
One concrete way this has played out at the state level has been through the creation of the Innovation Partnership Zone (IPZ) program in 2007, which requires the Washington State Department of Commerce (WA Commerce) to:

- design and implement an innovation partnership zone program through which the state will encourage and support research institutions, workforce training organizations, and globally competitive companies to work cooperatively in close geographic proximity to create commercially viable products and jobs (RCW 43.330.270).

This program is indeed a response to an increasingly “neoliberalizing” economic environment, specifically one that is defined by “increased global competition, structural adjustment, and the recent recession” (Commerce Research Service 2011, 3). As of 2014, 18 such zones have been established across the state (Fig. 4.9). Each IPZ primarily functions to facilitate communication and interaction among its constituent institutions, but the designation also serves as a branding mechanism to attract other similar or compatible organizations to the zone, and provides limited funding to clusters for capital improvements and job training. Moreover, each zone’s administrator – a representative from “an economic development council, port, workforce development council, city, or county” (RCW 43.330.270) – contributes to the coordinating effort by interacting with the Department of Commerce to share information on its objectives, funding, major activities, partnerships, performance (private sector investment, job growth, licensing and patent issuance), and outcomes related to the IPZ itself (Ibid.).


17 Since the program’s inception, $20 million has been disbursed to IPZs across the state (WA Commerce 2013).
While this program clearly privileges the coordination of specific sectors, it also has its shortcomings. A recent study notes that while these types of programs are quite common across the country, they have nevertheless become overly scattered and uncoordinated (WA Commerce 2011, 17). This seems to be exactly the case in SLU, which was designated the state’s sole Life Sciences IPZ in 2007, but shifted its focus to Global Health before withdrawing completely from the program (WA Commerce 2014, 1). This however, does not signify a blow against the notion of coordinating among research institutions, training, and product development and delivery, but rather suggests that the IPZ model did not add enough value to the “organic” collaboration in SLU, which benefitted from having the Washington Global Health alliance handle “much of the typical IPZ activity” (WA Commerce 2012, 46). This situation is, however, an anomaly: a Department of Commerce study highlights many of the successes in other IPZs – Bothell, Grays Harbor, and Walla Walla – while noting barriers to future successes, as well as outlining a program for increased inter-IPZ competition and coordination (Commerce Research Service 2011, 17-21).

Fig. 4.9. Innovation Partnership Zones in Washington
The extent of economic coordination is also notable at the regional scale. From its inception as *Vision 2020* through its recent update as *Vision 2040*, the regional planning strategy has also included an economic prosperity element. *Vision 2040* explicitly defines a sustainable economy as one “marked by a high quality of life for all people in the region, as well as vibrant communities,” and asserts that “a healthy and diverse economy” is critical to fund public services, arts and cultural institutions, provide for our families and the vulnerable, and to preserve the region’s quality of life” (PSRC 2009e). It also explicitly integrates the *Regional Economic Strategy* (Prosperity Partnership 2012) with growth management, transportation, and environmental concerns. The *Strategy* has a very straightforward purpose: to assess the “region’s strengths and weaknesses and making plans for leveraging the strengths while shoring up the weaknesses” (Ibid., 5). One of the first steps toward realizing this purpose is identifying the region’s industrial clusters, several of which are implicated in SLU: business services, clean technology, information technology, life sciences and global health, and philanthropy. Subsequently, the *Strategy* seeks to “boost employment, reduce barriers, improve governmental policy and improve the region’s chances for…a robust economy that works in harmony with the region’s priorities” (Ibid., 10). The “region’s priorities,” again, are not merely economic, but also include extraeconomic concerns, as specified in the GMA: “the environment, sustainable economic development, and the health, safety, and high quality of life enjoyed by residents of this state” (RCW 36.70A.010).

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18 It is important to emphasize here that an analysis grounded in orthodox Marxism would read this as another example of economic determinism, while the approach being undertaken here is one highlighting this complexity, variegation, and differential intensities between each constituent element.
Similar relationships between economic and extraeconomic goals exist at the municipal scale. The Seattle 2000 goals for the economy and economic security, for example, focus on four central issues: building a stable and diverse local economy; assuring that economic benefits do not outweigh social costs; revising tax and regulatory policies “to control the type and quality of economic growth in Seattle”; and providing employment opportunities for all (Seattle 2000 Commission 1973b, 55). More recently, Seattle’s Comprehensive Plan (2005) also addresses economic opportunity and security as one of its core values. Similar to the economic strategy at the regional scale, the Comprehensive Plan asserts that “a strong economy is fundamental to maintaining a quality of life in Seattle in which individuals may meet their basic needs for food and shelter, health care and education” (Seattle DPD 2005, vi). Consequently, goals pertaining to economic development appear in each element of the plan, while economic development also has its own element. In economic terms, the Plan supports land use and transportation development that encourages efficient land use and mobility; strives to provide a range of housing opportunities balancing diversity and economic power; directs investment toward capital facilities and utilities that promote economic development; supports educational and cultural resources to create and retain a productive work force, while attracting new workers and businesses; and stresses that the natural environment is critical for economic development and competitive advantage. The Plan’s economic development element essentially gathers and focuses these goals, providing a general discussion and strategies relating to urban villages, specific sectors, labor force development, Seattle’s business climate, and supporting start-ups.

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19 An executive statement by the mayor on a draft of these policies emphasizes this balancing act: “These programs must be designed to encourage those industries that will utilize our unique resources, including our valuable human resources, without encroaching on our beautiful natural settings” (Office of Executive Policy 1973, 17).

20 See note 14 above for a list of the Comprehensive Plan’s elements.
and growth. Its commitment to both economic and extraeconomic concerns is clearly expressed though its function of:

promot[ing] a sound economy through planning for future growth in ways that maintain the city’s high quality of life by directing facilities and services to areas that support jobs and by identifying and encouraging economic sectors that offer the best opportunities for new job creation and future economic growth (Ibid., 7.3).

Regarding SLU’s explicit role in the local economy, two key City Council resolutions that were passed in the early 2000s address how the neighborhood’s redevelopment could contribute. First, in a 2002 resolution, the Council notes that “the City of Seattle has significant opportunities in underdeveloped or underutilized areas of the city, such as South Lake Union, South Downtown, Southeast Seattle and the University District” (Resolution 30542). SLU is the only neighborhood mentioned as being part of a particular strategy for recovery, and it appears as the local manifestation of the “regional commitment to grow and expand the bio-medical and bio-information sectors” (Ibid.). The second resolution, passed in 2003, expresses:

the City’s commitment to supporting the anticipated economic activity in SLU, and affirm[s] the City of Seattle’s commitment to making the South Lake Union area the region’s most competitive location for biotech research and manufacturing, clean energy, advanced energy technology research, manufacturing and distribution, other high-tech research and manufacturing, and other innovative entrepreneurial high-tech (Resolution 30610).

South Lake Union’s neighborhood plans, however, do not contain sections that target economic development. The CNC’s plan proffers five goals – strengthen community, use energy efficiently, conserve materials, protect waterflows, and enhance the natural environment – and it only mentions the economy briefly (and modestly) under the first of these. Its local economy guideline advocates for local businesses and encourages them to share resources, reduce waste, and utilize the local community for the benefit thereof (CNC 1997, 10). The original adopted South Lake Union Neighborhood Plan, however, does not even go this far, and only focuses on
neighborhood character, parks and open space, and transportation (SLUPO 1998, 4). Yet the version of it included in the 2005 Comprehensive Plan echoes the city council’s aforementioned commitments and sets a goal to create “a neighborhood that serves as a regional center for innovative organizations and that supports a diverse and vibrant job base” (Seattle DPD 2005, 8.158). Moreover, the updated neighborhood plan (Seattle DPD 2007) is organized around this and other goals.

The number of discussions addressing economic development from the state down to the municipal level is significantly reduced when one looks at urban planning and design documents, where it is almost completely absent. The *Urban Design Framework*, for example, mentions that SLU has the potential “to grow an innovative local economy in addition” to becoming a “livable, vibrant urban neighborhood” but primarily focuses on design strategies to promote the latter (Seattle DPD 2010, 2). The *Director’s Report* (2013b, 29) on the 2013 rezone takes a similar approach, arguing that a rezone is necessary to ensure that SLU “continues to develop as an Urban Center and a dynamic hub of economic development for the city and region,” but also situates this goal alongside extraeconomic concerns, such as providing a “more diverse mix of housing and employment…and encourage[ing] a safe and active pedestrian environment.” Finally, the architectural design guidelines (Seattle DPD 2013a) only invoke economic activity in relation to creating a welcoming environment that stimulates social and economic exchange. While the absence of statements regarding the economy in such documents is no surprise, it nevertheless affirms the role that these documents play in channeling how capital accumulation produces the built environment. Discussions of economic development occur at higher levels but nevertheless form part of the broad set of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation.
Moving out of the governmental realm does not mean eschewing discussions of economic development, which, for example, is also a central concern in the Seattle Commons documentation. Again, as the vision for the project expanded, it transformed from Hinterberger’s initial idea of a park to “a revitalized 470-acre business and residential neighborhood surrounding an 85-acre park” (Committee for the Seattle Commons, 1992). The Seattle Commons Fiscal Impact Analysis (Committee for the Seattle Commons 1994, 1) notes that the project’s broad range of coordinated initiatives “are expected to spur significant real-estate development and result in an increased number of jobs and residences in the city” – 22,000 jobs and 8,000 new households (Seattle Planning Department 1994, II-3) – and sets out to evaluate the increased tax revenues and expenses. Based on “dozens of assumptions” regarding markets for housing, office space, bio/high-tech, (destination and neighborhood) retail, and hotels, the report concludes that $275 million of new revenue would make its way into the city’s coffers. The report also sketches out the economic benefits to the state of Washington, King County, and the Port of Seattle, but bookmarks a detailed analysis for later. In parallel, the Seattle City Council endorsed the Committee’s general concept for revitalization of SLU and committed public investment “to promote economic development consistent with the City’s environmental social values” (Resolution 28804, my emphasis).

In the early years of the SLU redevelopment, discussions surrounding the Seattle Streetcar – which runs a 2.6 mile loop that connects Westlake Center to the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center at the northern edge of SLU (Fig. 4.10) – often centered on the idea that

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21 This analysis was performed on The Commons Draft 2 Plan, which has a smaller park (74 acres) than the initial 1992 Plan.
22 The sources of revenue include property tax, B&O tax, utility tax, real estate excise tax, and sales tax; projected expenses include general government, police and municipal court, the fire department, library, human services, and the park along with its maintenance and operation (Committee for the Seattle Commons 1994, 24-5).
such systems contribute significantly to neighborhood economic development (Parsons Brinckerhoff 2004, 2; Build the Streetcar Coalition 2003), particularly when the vision for SLU was envisioned as a biotech hub housing 20,000 jobs and a growing residential area (Young and McComber 2003a). This reinforces the city council’s previous commitment to making the neighborhood the most competitive place in the region for such work. Moreover, the Council specifically strives to evaluate the streetcar’s contribution by seeking to “[i]dentify potential economic development opportunities and impacts for each project with specific examples of how development of a streetcar might affect future economic development” (Resolution 30652, Attachment 1), while SLU business leaders argue in print that the streetcar can help “get people working and businesses generating tax dollars” – in fact, some go as far as to write, “We're so sure of this we're willing to spend our own money to see it happen” (Kessler and Lambert 2004). This sort of privatized funding scheme has remained important for the streetcar: part of the public benefits package for Amazon’s corporate headquarters development in the Denny Triangle area adjacent to SLU involved paying $5.5 million for an additional streetcar, improvements to streetcar stops, as well as increased service (Seattle Department of Transportation 2015, 2-35).

In the private realm, Vulcan currently notes how SLU’s redevelopment “has leveraged significant investment from both private and public sources. $4 billion in investments has produced $156 million in tax revenue between 2001 and 2011; 10,000 new permanent jobs and 1,000 “family wage construction jobs annually”; and 305% population growth between 1990 and

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23 The streetcar was completed in 2007 and came at a cost of $52.1M and was funded through a Local Improvement District (LID) that assessed property owners who would ostensibly benefit from its construction for over half its cost; the remainder was financed by Federal and State grants, as well as proceeds from neighborhood property that the City sold to Vulcan.
2010 (Vulcan 2015d). These numbers in themselves are significant, but turning to several studies that estimated potential economic impacts before construction began, and checked the estimates against actual construction and tax revenues, illuminates the extent of present coordination. First, Sommers’s (2004) report divides SLU’s development into two phases: Phase I consists of the planned projects through 2007, while Phase II is the difference between the development capacity of the neighborhood – as specified in an early economic development study (Heartland 2002) – and the projects in Phase I, during the period from 2008 to 2025. Assuming that 10,000 total residential units will be built and a commercial blend of 35% biotechnology research and development, 55% office and 10% retail, Sommers (2004, 12) estimates direct tax revenues
based on property, sales, utility, and business and occupancy taxes (B&O)$^{24}$ to be between $104 and $154 million between 2005 and 2025.

Michael Mann’s (2011) update to Sommers’s report compares the Phase I development and the first three years of Phase II to these projections (Fig. 4.11), noting many of the significant changes in the area, such as Amazon’s signing long-term leases in the neighborhood in late 2007. In terms of economic coordination, the fact that actual revenues exceeded the best case scenario from Sommers’s report by $5.5 million (19%) is less interesting for the present investigation than the routine cross-checking of projected and actual performance (Ibid., 18). Again, my point is not that this particular practice is necessarily new, but that it is being drawn into a larger discursive formation that integrates economic development as it is addressed by

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$^{24}$ The exemption from the B&O tax for high-technology endeavors, including advanced computing, advanced materials, biotechnology, electronic device technology, and environmental technology, also attests to the concerted statewide effort to cultivate economic activity in these particular fields (RCW 82.63). The 1994 legislation creating the exemption asserts that “high-technology businesses are a vital and growing source of high-wage, high-skilled jobs in this state, and that the high-technology sector is a key component of the state's effort to encourage economic diversification,” but notes the B&O tax – a tax on total receipts – prohibits innovative industries from being able to pay for the high costs associated with their own research and development. (RCW 83.63.05).
governmental entities at the state, regional, municipal, and neighborhood scales – but also by private developers, concerned citizens, and independent consultants – with concerns regarding land use, governmental coordination, and discussions around quality of life. A final pass through the archive, focusing on quality of life concerns, helps illuminate the extent and complexity of these relationships.

4.4 QUALITY OF LIFE

As in the three previous lines of research, this final section traces how particular differences in the qualitative characteristics of the environment are folded into the “quality of life” discourse.25 Returning to approximately the same set of documents in roughly the same order, but also specifically addressing the formation of King County Metro, the series of Seattle Times editorials that fueled the Seattle Commons effort, and the SLU neighborhood design guidelines, illuminates how quality of life concerns are drawn together with the discussions of land use and character, institutional coordination, and sustainable economic development.

The successful birth of Metro was also midwifed by a strong focus on the detrimental environmental effects of postwar suburbanization. In particular:

sewage and sewage effluent were turning Lake Washington into a well-fertilized garden of algae which was rapidly destroying the Lake’s recreational values. Important fisheries resources were threatened. Growth was being stunted. (Washington (State) 1961, 2).

The media coverage circulating around the time of vote to establish Metro, as internally variegated as it is, nevertheless focuses on quality of life issues: a limnologist26 identifies the algae as a species that often appears in lakes as they begin to die; engineers affirm an academic

25 The particular systems of knowledge used to make these differentiations are discussed in Chapter 5.
26 A scientist who studies lakes.
study which located meningitis- and polio-causing bacteria in the water; a campaign photograph showing five children at a contaminated beach stirs emotions (Fig. 4.1); a lawyer from neighboring Renton, who opposes Metro’s formation, eats some of the algae during a televised debate to show that it is harmless (Lane 1995, 13-15). Quality of life is an appropriate lens to frame this debate because there is no disagreement on whether or not the algae exists, but rather the question is whether or not it has an adverse effect on the human population.

At the state level, returning to the Planning Enabling Act provides orientation, for it is committed:

to the end of assuring the highest standards of environment for living, and the operation of commerce, industry, agriculture and recreation, and assuring maximum economies and conserving the highest degree of public health, safety, morals and welfare (RCW 36.70.010).

For the purposes of this archaeology, then, an environment that conserves public health, safety, morals, and welfare to the “highest degree” can be taken as a provisional definition for “quality of life.” Decades later the GMA’s planning goals explicitly elaborate on the environmental aspect of this phrase by including “air and water quality, and the availability of water” as constituent elements of “the state’s high quality of life” (36.70A.020), but following the Planning Enabling Act, I am also including public health, safety, morals, and welfare in my definition.

At the regional level, and in conjunction with the GMA, Vision 2020 highlights the paradoxical relationship between economic prosperity, and the subsequent lifestyle choices:

gle single-family homes on spacious lots, the private auto as the preferred method of travel, decentralized work places surrounded by free parking and traditional preference for local governmental control. Collectively these individual choices tend to undermine the foundations of the quality of life that Puget Sounders so ardently state they want to preserve (PSCOG 1990, 3).

By the time the environmental dimensions of Vision 2040 were being scoped in the mid-2000s, these specific issues had grown to include organic agriculture, sustainable construction, and
incorporating the promotion of active living into the overall vision (PSRC 2009a, 12). Yet, while it is clear that prosperity is understood to have contributed to the decrease in quality of life, Vision 2040 also reinforces the positive link between the two:

as a region we cannot achieve our social and environmental goals without economic prosperity and that the achievement of economic prosperity is strongly related to social well-being and environmental quality. VISION 2040 commits us to using our resources in thoughtful ways that do not compromise the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (PSRC 2009b, 1).

The central point here is not whether or not economic development increases or decreases the quality of life, but is instead the proliferation of discussions linking the two together, and striving to achieve a mutually beneficial balance between both commitments.

A similar situation is present at in municipal discourse. The Seattle 2000 goals, for example, are also oriented toward cultivating an even more broadly conceived notion of quality of life: affirming difference, livable population density, compatible institutions, self-determination, economic development, justice, and tolerance; building a thriving, diverse, and comfortable downtown; attaining economic stability, supporting small business, eliminating discrimination in employment, and optimizing government to support these endeavors, etc. (Seattle 2000 Commission 1973b). Its land use goals27 are very similar to those proffered two decades later in the GMA and Vision 2020, as are those the current municipal Comprehensive Plan (Seattle DPD 2005) echoes and elaborates in an urban village strategy that is based on four “core values”: community, environmental stewardship, economic opportunity and security, and social equity.28

27 The Seattle 2000 Commission (1973b, 116-7) asserts that the City should “establish a comprehensive master plan for orderly and purposeful development,” which includes avenues for citizen participation, encouragement for “communities where people can live, work, and play,” reduced reliance on automobiles, conservation of natural resources, and reduced sprawl.”
28 See note 9 above for the full list of values from the Comprehensive Plan Framework Policies.
Moving outside the governmental realm and into the hybrid public-private sphere in which the Seattle Commons effort operated, it becomes clear that media coverage frequently focuses on quality of life issues. Of particular interest due to its engagement with quality of life, not to mention its real effect on the history of SLU, is John Hinterberger’s series of columns for the *Seattle Times* that jumpstarted the effort to build the Commons. They recount a conversation about “extracting the city of Seattle from its present architectural hand basket to hell,” (Hinterberger 1989a) and proffer a wide range interventions varying in practicality.\(^29\) Even the published criticisms of Hinterberger’s proposals invoke a quality of life argument. One reads: “When Seattle can boast of the finest public school system in the nation, the lowest crime rate, and not one citizen of Seattle sleeping on the street or in a shelter, we’ll talk. But not until this is a city that deserves a ‘great park’” (Hinterberger 1991c). Hinterberger affirms this critic’s words, and uses them to fuel his argument that Seattle “need[s] a downtown that is a real downtown” (Hinterberger 1991b) and that “we have to do all those things if this city is not going to wither away and become just another desolate, empty town from which to escape every night at 5 p.m.” (Hinterberger 1991c).

More recently, quality of life concerns have emerged in the media surrounding infrastructure development. Advocates for the Seattle Streetcar, for example, note its reliable schedule and ease of use, attractiveness to those who would not typically use buses, reduction of traffic and support of an environmentally friendly pedestrian neighborhood, improvement of

\(^{29}\)They include: a pedestrian promenade from Westlake to Lake Union; a lidded freeway (open on the western side to preserve the view) covered with a natural habitat for mountain goats, deer, and bears; “a mile-long, world-class Disney-style amusement park” (Ibid.) on a waterfront sans the Alaskan Way Viaduct; streets closed to automobile traffic, and so on. His first earnest proposal is a bit more sober: “Whispering firs, running waters, running paths, multifamily housing along the fringes. A brand-new salmon run, maybe all the way to a fake pond in back of City Hall” (Hinterberger 1991a).
connections to regional transit, decrease in air and noise pollution, and spurring of development in terms of professional jobs, housing, and neighborhood retail (Build the Streetcar Coalition n.d.; Young and McComber 2003b; Jenniges 2003c; Kessler and Lambert 2004; Siegel 2007). Moreover, these documents are often accompanied by renderings and/or photography of walkable street scenes (Fig 4.12) and “sidewalk cafes, refurbished storefronts, tree-lined streets, and shiny new buildings” (Jenniges 2003c). Conversely, critics argue that the Local Improvement District tax which would fund about half of the streetcar’s construction could drive small businesses away, take away valuable parking, and adversely affect traffic (Young and McComber 2003a, 2003b; Jenniges 2003a). Again, I am less interested in taking the “right” side here than I am in identifying how this particular discursive struggle relates to the broader theme of quality of life, in relation to land use and economy.

Other documents that blur the line between the public and private realms also address quality of life concerns. The CNC’s neighborhood plan (1997, 3), which is intended to be a non-binding supplement to the City’s existing development guidelines, lists five specific goals for
improving the quality of life: strengthen community, use energy efficiently, conserve materials, protect waterflows, and enhance the natural environment. The first adopted neighborhood plan seeks to “perpetuate the health and vitality of [the] diverse neighborhood” (SLUPO 1998, 4) through a set of strategies to preserve the “multifaceted” and “historic” neighborhood character, produce more recreational open space, and reduce traffic congestion through transportation improvements. Although the updated neighborhood plan (Seattle DPD 2007) introduced a strong commitment toward spurring intensive economic development, it does not abandon these goals, but instead strives to balance these various commitments. In fact, it also adds goals focused on housing and sustainable development (Ibid., 4). This is contentious terrain but, again, the point here is not siding with affordable housing activists over development firms or vice-versa, but is rather trying to capture how quality of life issues form a consistent part of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation.

Quality of life concerns also play a central role in the urban planning and design documents, which attest to the contemporary meshwork of coordination from the state level down to that of the individual building. The Urban Design Framework, which references the neighborhood plan’s vision of SLU “as a thriving, sustainable, and diverse urban center,” (Seattle DPD 2010, 2) and proceeds according to principles which include: integrating the neighborhood with adjacent neighborhoods; creating an appropriate urban form with a network of great streets and a diverse system of open spaces and community services; and providing opportunities for family-friendly and affordable housing. Some of the particular design interventions to support these principles are discussed below, but the key point here is expressed by the DPD’s support of rezone legislation “that include increases in height and floor area as an incentive to provide important neighborhood amenities to ensure that as growth continues, it
contributes to livability and sustainability” (Seattle DPD 2013b, 2). This is, again, a balancing act between economic and extraeconomic concerns, which cannot be reduced to one or the other without losing track of their continuously modulating interrelationships.

Fig. 4.13. The Supply Laundry Building forms part of Vulcan’s Stack House development

At the scale of individual buildings, the architectural design guidelines for SLU strive to foster “design excellence,” which is defined as the ability for buildings to “fit seamlessly” into the existing built environment, remain functional by using appropriate materials, techniques, maintenance, and energy choices, and contribute to the public realm (Seattle DPD 2013a, iii-v). Additionally, these guidelines encourage design that expresses elements of Seattle’s natural setting, and the unique character of the site’s surrounding neighborhood. Proposed projects in SLU meet these requirements by responding to existing neighborhood amenities (Denny Park
and the rows of mature Sweet gum trees along 8th Avenue to the north,\textsuperscript{30} Cascade Playfield, Lake Union Park, and views of the Space Needle and downtown), natural and earth-toned materials, and a meticulously designed pedestrian-oriented environment. In some cases, historic brick buildings are integrated into the new projects, as in the case of the Troy Laundry, the Supply Laundry Building (Fig. 4.13), and the Van Vorst Building, which now forms part of Amazon’s campus.\textsuperscript{31}

Finally, statements authored by private sector entities, such as Vulcan, also frequently invoke the notion of quality of life. Vulcan’s website is a treasure trove of such statements, which take the form of advertising, press releases, and news headlines. In marketing its variegated stewardship, Vulcan cites its commitment to green building, infrastructure improvements, open space, historic preservation, public art, building community, and economic development. The earliest press releases regarding the development in SLU focus on the “neighborhood’s emergence as a thriving life sciences research center” (Vulcan 2004), highlighting the new research facilities and their contributions to the revivification of the neighborhood, and are followed by news of new residential, hospitality, and service offerings, as well as a handful of industry awards, and new tenants (such as PATH and Amazon). Other developers, such as Touchstone and Skanska, take a similar approach, with the latter describing its office and retail spaces at 400 Fairview thus:

[Office:] The building is comprised of collaborative and creative workspaces, featuring a side-loaded core, wide-open and flexible floor plans, natural sunlight and breathtaking views of the Olympics, water and urban Seattle.

\textsuperscript{30} The tension between the City’s and Vulcan’s vision for this area is discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{31} The Supply Laundry Building, now part of Vulcan’s Stack House development, was one site of the 1917 “Laundry Girls Strike” in the summer of 1917 (Historylink n.d.-a), while the Van Vorst Building has served at least as a furniture warehouse, and possibly a stable for delivery horses, for the famous Seattle department store Fredrick and Nelson (Historylink n.d.-b.).
[Retail:] The Hall at 400 Fairview is a street-side market designed to capture the spirit and energy of Seattle. It’s a place to experience commerce and human connection, intentionally created with a variety of flexible spaces and an open layout (Skanska n.d.)

There is, again, nothing necessarily new about this particular language from a marketing perspective, but the consistency that can be traced across various genres of documents spanning more than a half-century is notable. It is the immanent consistency with respect to the notion of quality of life that defines this line of research coursing through SLU.

To sum up, the complex social field wherein quality of life is discussed is clearly subject to absorption into the discourse of the Coordinated City, whether it appears in government legislation, planning documents, reports, media coverage, public relations, or civic debates. By considering these various instances side by side, and in conjunction with land use and character, institutional coordination, and sustainable economic development, it becomes possible to see an outline of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation.

4.5 Final Remark

This analysis has been undertaken in a radically neutral way that is meant to highlight what has emerged in discussions related to urbanization in the Central Puget Sound Region broadly, and to SLU in particular, rather than by invoking the conceptual repertoire of various forms of critical urban inquiry or urban planning. By refusing to question the veracity or rightness of what these statements offer, I am able to focus on the immanent consistencies that have arranged themselves into at least four lines of research: land use and character, institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life (Appendix 3). It must be said that this radical neutrality leaves my approach open to critique from scholars such as Brenner, who, again, argues that a critical urban theory must be explicit about its normativity (Brenner 2009). As I
argue in the Chapter 6, however, such a demand is simply an endorsement of the transcendence that Deleuze and Guattari oppose. Instead, following Smith’s (2003) incisive reading of Deleuze, my normative position must arise from within the inquiry. For now, however, these four research lines sketch out the “volume” or the limits of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation that has emerged during the last sixty years and which guides the urbanization of SLU.

It is a nonlinear emergence, with local middle- and upper-class activism initiating major coordinated environmental and land use projects, as in the case of Metro and the Seattle Commons, and with municipal efforts at growth management preceding the Washington State’s commitment to such projects. While the state has continuously absorbed and taken to coordinating how urbanization proceeds across Washington and particularly in the Central Puget Sound Region and SLU, private interests – spearheaded by Vulcan but also including other developers, such as Touchstone and Skanska – have also begun to participate in their own forms of coordinated operations, design, and development. These three collective actors, which can be provisionally generalized as governmental, private companies, and citizens’ groups, therefore produce the criteria directing how urbanization in SLU occurs through their interrelationships. However, the fact that they all share interests along the four lines of inquiry does not account for how they actually related. These interconnections – the “glue” holding the four lines of the discursive formation together – can be illuminated by turning to the various forms of knowledge that are shared across the different realms, the actual collective actors creating the statements governing urbanization, as well as the logical and practical connections drawing and holding together the elements of this archive (Chapter 5). After these connections are identified, I can step back and identify the broader discourses of political economy, ethics, and aesthetics as the
tripartite set of concerns – the models of realization – driving the coordinated urbanization of SLU (Chapter 6).
CHAPTER 5. KNOWLEDGE, COLLECTIVE ACTORS, AND TECHNIQUES

Having established four immanent lines that connect documents from governmental, private sector, and citizen-led efforts to shape redevelopment efforts at the state, regional, municipal, and neighborhood levels, it is crucial to understand how these lines are held together in the Coordinated City’s model of realization. Specifically, after identifying land use and character, institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life as four relatively stable lines running through the archive, the next task of the archaeology is to examine the forms of knowledge, collective actors, and techniques that hold the discursive formation together.

5.1 SYSTEMS OF KNOWLEDGE

The question here is one of understanding the systems of knowledge that are invoked to draw various discussions regarding land use, governance, the economy, and quality of life together into a system of coordinated urbanization that produces places like SLU. These systems can be best understood as the criteria that are used to specify how diverse material elements and activities are captured and transformed into objects of the Coordinated City’s discourse.

The most developed account of the different forms of knowledge utilized in the Coordinated City exists at the regional scale, where various criteria are used to define different types of central places for the purpose of regional planning. Critically, this knowledge is not used in a negative sense to limit regional growth, but instead forms a key component in a broad system of management for encouraging growth while preserving natural resources and reducing
carbon dioxide emissions. While *Vision 2020* utilizes knowledge involving residential and employment densities, zoning schemes and housing typologies, and characteristics of transit systems, the *Vision 2040* update drastically refines the operative criteria through a set of ten issue papers intended to explore the public concerns from the preliminary scoping process, eight of which are directly related to SLU: health, growth targets, housing, environment, social and environmental justice, demographics, economics, and transportation (PSRC 2009a, 14-15).² A careful review of these issue papers (Appendix 5) reveals five general categories that are used to determine how particular areas of the region should grow (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. Forms of Knowledge Utilized in Regional Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human body’s biological characteristics, socio-economic status, and distribution</td>
<td>Blood-pressure, weight, race, age, income, religion, sexual orientation, residential and employment density, graduation rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air and water quality and characteristics</td>
<td>Levels of gaseous pollutants, size and density of airborne particulate matter, surface permeability, stormwater runoff flows and concentrations of nutrients/pollutants, average sea level and arctic sea ice thickness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial habitat characteristics</td>
<td>Biodiversity and habitat quantity, quality, and continuity; surface temperature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Built environment characteristics</td>
<td>Sidewalk and bike lane infrastructure; housing age, density, type, and cost; vehicle miles travelled per day, number of trips, delays, traffic volumes and speeds, transit hours and ridership, water supply and sewer capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political and economic abstractions</td>
<td>Zoning, permitting, economic forecasts, commercial/industrial capacity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² Subregional centers and rural areas are the two issues that do not apply to SLU.
Using these criteria, *Vision 2040* assigns regional growth categories to cities and towns across the region, and even to specific neighborhoods in larger cities such as Seattle, where SLU is one of one six growth centers.\(^3\)

Even after a brief initial pass, it is clear that a wide range of criteria guide conceptualizations of regional growth. However, this classificatory web is woven more tightly as one considers other archival documents. At the municipal scale, for example, many of these regional planning criteria also apply: both the Seattle 2000 Commission’s goals (1973b) and the current Comprehensive Plan (Seattle DPD 2005) make the following additions: bodies’ creativity, emotional needs, mobility, fluency in English, resiliency, responsibility, and senses of justice and care are invoked; water and air quality are further specified by noting the strain on the municipal combined sewer system, as well striving to reduce methane emissions from landfills; terrestrial habit is elaborated to include tree inventory and distribution, plant origin, and heavy metal/petroleum levels in soil. Significant elaborations are made to the built environment criteria, including: intensity and diversity of use; residential privacy; building scale, orientation, energy use, and siting; degree of automobile or pedestrian orientation; design, scale, and programming of transportation facilities; number, size, function, capacity and distribution of capital facilities; the aesthetics and cultural symbolism of architecture and urban design; levels of noise and visual pollution. The political and economic abstraction category includes the development of incentive zoning, housing programs, design criteria and building codes; reformed personal income, corporate, and property taxes; cost-benefit-analyses, forecasting capacities and trends; participatory and decentralized planning; regularly revised criminal codes focusing on rehabilitation rather than revenge; as well a broad range of insurance and licensing schemes.

\(^3\) The other five growth centers in Seattle are Downtown, First Hill/Capitol Hill, Uptown Queen Anne, University Community, and Northgate.
Finally, a new category is added that involves infrastructural services, specifically the affordability, quality, reliability, and accessibility to water, sewer, electricity, and telecommunication networks.\(^4\)

The neighborhood planning initiative continues this process of refinement by establishing principles and a structure for participation wherein residents of the urban centers and hub urban villages can envision how they want their neighborhood to develop. The principles intended to guide this process are divided between the City’s responsibilities and those of the residents participating in the planning and focus on clear lines of communication about official goals and procedures, following established procedures, sharing information, distributing sufficient resources and using them wisely, and mutual respect (Resolution 29015).\(^5\)

SLU’s neighborhood plans (CNC 1997; SLUPO 1998; Seattle DPD 2007) work within this structure to further develop the criteria governing how the area develops: human bodies that work in innovative and/or sustainable industries and engage in self-policing behavior take precedence.\(^6\) The built environment criteria become much more specific, outlining material characteristics, compositions, and colors; buildings’ types of shading, floor-to-floor heights, and energy sources; plant transpiration rates; methods of waste disposal and flow rates in combined sewers; and street connectivity across major thoroughfares. The political and economic abstractions are expanded to include floor-to-area ratios (FAR), immanent district classifications based on dominant land uses, criteria for grants funding accessibility and seismic safety upgrades, as well as incentive

\(^4\) Table 5.2, below, includes all of the elaborations made to the original set of regional planning criteria that is presented in Table 5.1
\(^5\) An entire neighborhood planning toolkit exists and consists of 62 tools to help neighborhood planners complete their task. Looking at these in detail is beyond the scope of work here, but even a cursory glance shows that an extensive effort was underway (cf. Washington State Department of Community Development 1991).
\(^6\) The 2007 Neighborhood Plan explicitly notes this is a contentious issue (Seattle DPD 2007, 33).
programs for cultivating arts and affordable housing. Finally, infrastructure is addressed by referencing new schemes for energy production and distribution, including district energy and cogeneration facilities.  

This ever-increasing resolution is also manifest in other urban planning and design documents pertaining to the area’s rezone in 2013. The air and water quality category is further refined to consider airflow characteristics around buildings (wake zones and effects, shear layers, turbulence) as well as water turbidity (clearness), but the primary elaborations correspond to the built environment’s characteristics, including: minimizing amount of shadows and glare; specifying tower spacing and podium design (materials, level of transparency, etc.); tree and landscaping size, color, hardiness, and texture; and pedestrian environment characteristics (paving texture and layout, height of light fixtures, curb layouts, and street furniture).

This built environment criteria are further refined by the fact that all multifamily and commercial projects in Seattle are required to undergo a design review, part of which involves a public presentation to a Design Review Board. These presentations are created by architects and designers working in response to an appropriate set of design guidelines, and consist of design narratives, legal descriptions, zoning analyses, sketches, photographs, and renderings. They often include a narrative description of principles informing the vision of the project; a context analysis of the surrounding area (zoning, land use, traffic, existing and proposed building types, photographs of the existing streetscape); existing site conditions (surveys including topographical analyses, photographs from multiple vantage points, analyses of access points, tree

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7 Cogeneration facilities create both electricity and heat that can be harnessed (for heating a building or domestic hot water).
8 There is no required number of guidelines that must be met. Instead, involved parties are encouraged to “use their judgment and discretion in determining which approaches and strategies are particularly applicable to a given project” (Seattle DPD 2013b, v).
and existing building inventories, as well as solar analyses); site plans and sections showing
eexisting and planned landscaping; a description of which design guidelines apply and how they
are addressed; three design options (one denoted as preferred) which include floor plans,
multiple renderings of the building in context, sections, solar analyses, and lists of pros and cons
of each alternative; landscaping, lighting, and streetscape details; photographs of materials and
plants; finally, specific requests for departures from the prescriptive Land Use Code.

Finally, one can also pinpoint a system of knowledge that is much less scientific and
might be best described as aesthetic, not so much in its sense concerning beauty, but rather in the
Greek sense of *aesthēsis* – the general perception of something through all the bodily senses.
This emerges obliquely through the myriad statements about vibrancy, excitement, and energy.
The parameters of this sensibility are much harder to pin down than what has been tracked above
in the other criteria, but it is clearly present, both through the discourses promoting the SLU of
the past and of the present. For example, as we saw in the previous chapter, the testimonies
collected in the *DETOUR* (2012) project attest to the “wild-westy” feel of the neighborhood and
characterize it as “a brief wonderful firework display.” To extend this, we can consider some of
the comments made in a short documentary about the Lillian Apartments – formerly located at
1258 John Street and demolished to build Vulcan’s Alley 24 Project in 2002 – which
characterize the building as being “legendary in the arts and music community,” having an “old
industrial feel” and “ghosts” (Kephart and Mistur 2008). This same type of affectsive knowledge
is also invoked both in SLU’s advertising – wherein the viewer is told about commerce and
culture “com[ing] together to create energy and life,” the “whimsical feeling” of riding the
streetcar, or the neighborhood’s “spirit of inclusiveness” (Soulmoto n.d.-b) – and similar public
relations material from other developers. The video for Skanska’s 400 Fairvew project stresses
creating the “sense of connection with community,” “vibrancy and energy,” as well as building “something with a soul” (Skanska 2014). In sum, this system of knowledge is much “looser” than the others that I have identified but is nevertheless worthy of our consideration. Following Sandercock (2003, 11), this “way of knowing the city through the senses and emotions” constitutes what she calls an “implicit feminist epistemology” that corresponds more closely with everyday experiences and knowledge production than the scientific abstractions dominating the other systems of knowledge at work here. The Coordinated City’s discourse draws together both of these types of knowledge with ease.

In conclusion, many diverse forms of knowledge are drawn upon in order to sort different material differences into planning categories that can manipulated and distributed across various documents by a wide range of collective actors. These categories address everything from the human body and its various statuses and complex feelings to material infrastructure and political-economic abstractions (Table 5.2). However, in and of themselves, these various forms of knowledge do not illustrate how the set of discourses outlined in the previous chapter are produced and held together in the Coordinated City’s discursive formation. To understand this consistency, it is necessary to tighten up the analysis by focusing on the specific actors who use these forms of knowledge to order the built environment.
Table 5.2. Forms of Knowledge in the Production of SLU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Regional Planning</th>
<th>Municipal Comprehensive Planning</th>
<th>SLU Neighborhood Planning</th>
<th>SLU Rezone</th>
<th>Promotional and Artistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human body’s biological characteristics, socio-economic status, and distribution</td>
<td>Blood-pressure, weight, race, age, income, religion, sexual orientation, residential and employment density, graduation rates</td>
<td>Creativity, emotional needs, mobility, fluency in English, resiliency, responsibility, senses of justice and care</td>
<td>Privileging bodies that work in innovative and/or sustainable industries and engage in self-policing behavior</td>
<td>Diverse, innovative, friendly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air and water quality and characteristics</td>
<td>Levels of gaseous pollutants, size and density of airborne particulate matter, surface permeability, stormwater runoff flows and concentrations of nutrients/pollutants, average sea level and arctic sea ice thickness</td>
<td>Strain on the municipal combined sewer system, methane emissions from landfills</td>
<td>Bioswale</td>
<td>Airflow characteristics around buildings (wake zones and effects, shear layers, turbulence); water turbidity (clearness)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial habitat characteristics</td>
<td>Biodiversity and habitat quantity, quality, and continuity; surface temperature</td>
<td>Tree inventory/distribution; plant origin; soil pollution</td>
<td>Plant transpiration rates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.2 continued. Forms of Knowledge in the Production of SLU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Municipal Comprehensive Planning</th>
<th>SLU Neighborhood Planning</th>
<th>SLU Rezone</th>
<th>Promotional and Artistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Built environment characteristics</td>
<td>Intensity and diversity of use; residential privacy; building scale, orientation, energy use, and siting; degree of automobile or pedestrian orientation; design, scale, and programming of transportation facilities; number, size, function, capacity and distribution of capital facilities; the aesthetics/cultural symbolism; noise and visual pollution</td>
<td>Material characteristics; Buildings' shading, floor-to-floor heights, and energy sources; methods of waste disposal; street connectivity</td>
<td>Minimizing shadows and glare; tower spacing and podium design; tree and landscaping characteristic; and pedestrian environment characteristics</td>
<td>Innovative, sustainable, overpriced, bland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>SLU Neighborhood Planning</td>
<td>SLU Rezone</td>
<td>Promotional and Artistic</td>
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</table>

Harris, 205
Table 5.2 continued. Forms of Knowledge in the Production of SLU

| Categories                        | Regional Planning                                                                 | Municipal Comprehensive Planning                                                                 | SLU Neighborhood Planning                                                                 | SLU Rezone                                                                                                                   | Promotional and Artistic                                                                 |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Political and economic abstractions | Zoning and permitting, economic forecasts, commercial/industrial capacity        | Incentive zoning, housing programs, design criteria building codes; corporate, and property taxes; cost-benefit-analyses, forecasting capacities and trends; participatory and decentralized planning; criminal codes; insurance and licensing | Floor-to-area ratios (FAR); district classifications; grants funding accessibility and seismic safety upgrades; incentive programs for arts and affordable housing. |                                                                                                                               |
| Infrastructure                     |                                                                                    | Affordability, quality, reliability, and accessibility to water, sewer, electricity, and telecommunication networks. | Energy production and distribution                                                                                                                   |                                                                                                                               |
| Aesthetic (aesthēsis)              | Vibrancy, activity                                                                | Vibrancy, activity                                                                                | Vibrancy, activity, innovation                                                                                                                   | Vibrancy, activity                                                                                                           | Vibrancy, Wild-westy, legendary, old industrial feel, energy and life, whimsy, sense of connection with community, soul |
5.2 COLLECTIVE ACTORS

This section seeks to understand the actual constitution of the collective groups that have produced the Coordinated City’s discourse and which have provisionally been termed governmental, private sector, and citizen groups. These group definitions, however, are a relic of the simple categorization of statements from the previous chapter based not on an interrogation of who actually produced them, but rather as simple descriptive rather than analytical categories. A brief pass through some of the documents relating to the 2013 rezone of SLU – to accommodate increased growth targets that stem from the area being classified an urban center in 2004 – illustrates a more complex array of collective actors that serves as the organizing principle for this section.

The 2013 rezone is particularly interesting because it pits different groups of actors against one another, in assemblages that are not easily reduced to governmental, private sector, and citizen groups. In fact, the City Council found itself being pushed toward a more intensive form of urbanization than it thought was appropriate not only by Vulcan, but by a larger assemblage that also included Mayor Michael McGinn, the Seattle Department of Planning and Development (DPD), and a wide range of institutional housing advocates. The primary dispute was over incentive zoning provisions relating increased building heights to an increase in affordable housing.9 As it was eventually passed by the City Council, the program is expected to:

- provide capacity for up to 12,000 households and 22,000 new jobs over the next 20 years[…],
- generate approximately $45 million for affordable housing and $27 million in new infrastructure investments,
- [and] preserve 25,000 acres of rural farm and forest land over the next 25 years (Seattle DPD n.d.-b)

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9 Other amenities are also included in this package, such as childcare, transfer of development rights (TDR) both within the neighborhood and in rural King County, as well as local infrastructure and historic preservation, but I am focusing on affordable housing for the sake of brevity (cf. Seattle DPD 2013, 23-9)
This legislation is, however, the result of a struggle over what kind of balance among the various interests would best serve the intent of the Comprehensive Plan.

On one hand, there was the City Council, who I am defining as a specific type of actor called a “representative body” in order to distinguish it from other governmental actors, such as the Seattle DPD. On the other hand, I define the coalition including the mayor, the Seattle DPD, Vulcan, and various urbanists, such as Roger Valdez – the director of Smart Growth Seattle, a one-man lobbying endeavor funded in part by both Vulcan and Touchstone (Valdez 2014a) – and Sharon Lee, the Executive Director of the Low Income Housing Institute as a “citizen-government-professional” collective actor. Although these are the two major collective actors in the debate around the rezone, it is also possible to see that organizations such as Vulcan could be considered as their own type of “private sector” collective actor.

In this struggle, the mayor proposed a plan – which was elaborated by the Seattle DPD (2013) and supported by Vulcan (cf. Healey 2011) – that included significantly increased height limits across SLU, particularly along the southern shore of Lake Union where residential buildings of up to 240’ would be allowed in exchange for a certain percentage of all floor height above the existing height limit (85’ for mixed-use or 65’ for residential) being reserved for affordable housing, either on- or off-site. As an alternative, the developer could pay an “in-lieu fee” of “$15.15 per gross square foot of extra residential floor area or $18.75 per gross square

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10 In actuality this particular arrangement is more of a “government-professional” collective actor, but I have included citizens here to account for other types of projects, such as the neighborhood planning initiative during the 1990s.

11 “For residential projects, 14% of gross extra floor area if the housing is affordable to residents with incomes of 80% of area median income (AMI) for rental properties and 100% of AMI for owner-occupied units; or 8% of gross extra floor area if the housing is affordable to residents with incomes of 50% of AMI…For commercial projects, 15.6% of gross extra floor area if the housing is affordable to residents with incomes of 80% of AMI for rental properties and 100% of AMI for owner-occupied units” (Seattle DPD 2013b, 24)
foot of extra nonresidential floor area” (Seattle DPD 2013, 24). This configuration would produce the densest form of urbanization – and therefore allegedly the most environmentally sustainable – in the area, and would also include the possibility of 240’ residential towers in the middle portion of the neighborhood, as well as 400’ residential towers along the southern border of the neighborhood. Vulcan lobbied for this configuration with a program called Real Investment in Social Equity (R.I.S.E.) which involved turning over a 1.5-acre property to the city, replete with a 370,000 square-foot campus including everything from affordable housing to job training to a community kitchen – a $10 million value (Vulcan 2013) (Fig. 5.1).

The City Council, however, found this configuration to significantly detract from the intended aesthetics and function of the neighborhood, and passed legislation limiting height limits along Lake Union to 160’, although it also adopted many of the other provisions proposed in the original plan, including a limit to the number of towers per block, strict street-level design guidelines and upper-level setbacks, and the requirement that buildings eligible for the height bonuses must at least meet LEED Gold standards (Seattle City Council 2013).12 The Council also increased the amounts of in-lieu payments for residential ($21.68 per gross square foot of extra floor area) and commercial ($29.71 per gross square foot of extra floor area) developments (O’Brien 2013), a move which prompted commentators such as Valdez (2014b) to call the entire program “disincentive zoning” because it complicates the development process, thereby making the procurement of more housing more risky. Referencing the mayor’s proposal, in conjunction with Vulcan’s R.I.S.E. Program, Lee notes that the Council’s plan actually reduces the amount of funding for low income housing by $2 million (Lee 2013).

12 LEED (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) is a ranking system that quantifies the sustainability of a building, and is based criteria such as site selection, energy and atmosphere, and building materials.
Valdez’s and Lee’s *ex post facto* commentary also attests to the existence of another collective subject altogether, one with an even more marginal position than these two professionals in terms of directly affecting the new zoning scheme for SLU: everyday users and commentators. Much of this commentary circulates undocumented and is therefore impossible to capture through the archaeological method, but some of it can also be accessed through various media.\(^\text{13}\) For example, turning to the comments section of a blog post announcing the Council’s decision to not give in to pressures for higher height limits by Mayor McGinn and Vulcan,

![Fig. 5.1. Vulcan’s (2013) R.I.S.E. Proposal](image)

illustrates the statements produced by this collective voice: “giffy” writes “Considering the units in those newly allowed floors will likely sell in excess of a thousand a square foot [sic], this does not seem that onerous a burden for the extra height” while “fletc3her” asks “Why not eliminate

\(^{13}\) De Certeau (1984) famously critiques the fact that Foucault’s research is blind to the undocumented. While this is indeed a limitation on the present research, it is not an innate limit to Deleuzoguattarian philosophy in the least. See the discussion of the limits to the current project at the end of Chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion.
the fee and just require the housing be built?” (Minard 2013). “Just Jeff,” however, expresses an opinion that is more in line with Valdez when he writes: “Fuck you guys. Bring on the SLU development. The higher the better. Don't like it? Don't rent space in the towers. Unless you can bring back J.P.patches [sic] and Fidelity Lane (my preference), then fuck you. Bring on progress” (Ibid). The point here is that a wide range of competing statements are reproduced and commented upon by individuals with very different statuses and relationships to the actual production of SLU.

This brief recounting leaves out many details of the rezone but it nevertheless highlights how a more detailed look into the coalitions authoring the various statements regulating SLU’s development reveals complex assemblages of speakers that cannot be captured by the initial categorization that emerged in the previous chapter. By adopting the archaeological perspective on these “enunciative modalities,” one is armed with a systematic method for interrogating such collectives, including the requisite training for being qualified to make statements that materially affect the urbanization process, the sites in which each group operates, as well as the relationship between the collective actors and the discourse that they produce. Herein, three different collective actors that significantly affect how the Coordinated City develops emerge and express a complexification of the provisional categories above: representative bodies, citizen-government-professional collectivities, and private and semi-public groups.\textsuperscript{14} Each is briefly described below before turning to a more in-depth analysis.

First, representative bodies, which include the state legislature, regional growth coalitions like the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC), and the Seattle City Council, have authored many of the bills, resolutions, ordinances, and plans that were addressed in the previous chapter.

\textsuperscript{14} I have added semi-public groups to capture collective movements that blur the lines between private and public, such as the Seattle Commons.
Each of these groups is constituted by individuals with different types of professional training, but the power to make statements is not directly grounded in this training, but instead comes through election or appointment. Their sites of operation include a predictable range of governmental and public buildings, but their singular nature really emerges when considering their relationship to objects of discourse: they function as relays in between, or transformers of, the technical and observational work undertaken by planners, designers, developers, and consultants, and the discourses that emerge with the power to guide development. This capacity to endow language with the power to regulate urbanization makes these collective actors key for this analysis.

Second, the citizen-government-professional assemblages refer to coalitions between these three groups that are often established to address particular problems: water pollution in Lake Washington in the case of Metro, guidelines for a municipal comprehensive plan in the case of the Seattle 2000 Commission, or the neighborhood plans themselves in SLU and all across Seattle. The sites of these groups’ activity is as variegated as their particular missions, as is the specific training that participants have received, but again the relationship between the collective actor and the objects of discourse is the most important point. As collectors, organizers, and transformers of information about how the city should grow, urban planners come to the fore in these assemblages, and while they occupy a similar but less empowered role as the first assemblage – a facilitative role rather than a that of a higher level transformer of information into actual regulation – they differ somewhat to elected officials with a wide range of backgrounds in that they have all attained their status by passing through the same type of normalizing institution. Moreover, their direct power to affect how urbanization proceeds is less
than that of the representative bodies, but they play a crucial role in this process, and therefore must be carefully considered.

Third, the private and semi-public groups constitute a third type of collective actor: these are either private enterprises, such as Vulcan, or more complicated partnerships between middle class or elite groups and the city officials, as in the case of the Committee for the Seattle Commons. Their sites of activity are often behind closed doors and their professional training is more variegated than the urban planners dominating the previous assemblage but less diverse than in the first. Vulcan’s relationship to objects of discourse is primarily one of developing and strategically implementing plans within the regulatory frameworks ratified by the representative bodies, while the semi-public assemblages organize information and create documents, but have much less autonomy than Vulcan when it comes to implementation. Moreover, both private and semi-public groups also play a role in affecting the regulatory frameworks, and in the case SLU, they frequently participate in the collective visioning process that leads to what is and is not allowed in terms of development.

Finally, there is also the fourth collective speaker that emerges, but one that is currently much less empowered to shape SLU’s coordinated urbanization: the users of, or commentators on, the neighborhood. Although these collective actors do not significantly shape the physical environment, their statements accompany the changing environment and therefore form part of the same social system. The key point here is that while each of these assemblages produces discourse, it is only through the unique relationships between them that we can begin to understand the immanent consistency between different elements of the Coordinated City’s model of realization.
Table 5.3. Four collective actors in SLU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective Actor</th>
<th>Accretion - Transformation</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Sites</th>
<th>Instruments</th>
<th>Relationship to Knowledge</th>
<th>Diversity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Representative Bodies</td>
<td>Mostly accretion, some transformation (codification)</td>
<td>Relatively diverse</td>
<td>Collect and appropriately codify various information and proposals</td>
<td>Questioning, listening, observing</td>
<td>Typically governmental</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Primary (law) &amp; secondary (technical reports)</td>
<td>Most diverse (of materially productive ensembles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen-government-professional</td>
<td>Accretion and transformation</td>
<td>Diverse but w/ professionals using their specific training</td>
<td>Facilitate information collection, transform raw data into reports, maps, proposals for Representative bodies</td>
<td>Questioning, listening, observing, measuring, manipulating, and some quantification</td>
<td>Governmental, public</td>
<td>Low-tech (charretes) to high-tech (visualization)</td>
<td>Primary (law, codes, community and own preferences, etc.)</td>
<td>Somewhat diverse (professionals + active citizens)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private &amp; Semi-public</td>
<td>Mostly transformation</td>
<td>Mostly professionals with specific training</td>
<td>Envision and transform urban space</td>
<td>Questioning, listening, observing, measuring, manipulating, and intensive quantification/optimization</td>
<td>Private offices, governmental and public spaces</td>
<td>Low-tech (charretes) to high-tech (visualization, scheduling, funding, etc.)</td>
<td>Primary (law, visions, codes, preferences)</td>
<td>Least diverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentators</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Experience and respond</td>
<td>Questioning, listening, observing, talking</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Most diverse overall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.2.1 Representative Bodies

The representative body collective actors are the most heterogeneous of the three types that significantly affect the coordinated urbanization in SLU, which is to be expected since their members are elected from a wide range of individuals who do not have any particular form of training as a prerequisite. Operating broadly, their function is to integrate a wide variety of differences that are not especially technical or specialized. On a spectrum that ranges from accretion to transformation, they primarily do the former, collecting information from specialists and codifying it, but they also transform statements, as we saw in the case of the City Council adopting a higher in-lieu fee for the incentive zoning program than Mayor McGinn proposed. Finally, the spatial and temporal scale of their operation is also the greatest, affecting broad swaths of territory over long durations (as opposed to the more project specific sites and periods of time in which the other two collective actors typically function, although Vulcan’s long-term curatorial/managerial role in SLU somewhat troubles this perspective).

In the case of the Washington State Legislature, or Seattle’s mayor and City Council, each collective actor is clearly constituted by elected officials in a representative democracy. The state legislature contains members from 49 districts, each of which elects one senator and two members of congress in partisan elections, while the Council has nine seats, which have long been populated through at-large and nonpartisan elections but are currently based on seven districts and two at-large seats. Each is beholden to a particular constituency and each has a deliberative process by which a bill becomes a law, as well as a particular set of venues – such as the Washington State Capitol or Council Chambers – in which each step occurs: these are the legal conditions according the right to make statements concerning how urban growth may proceed, and they bestow a particular status on these members.
However, not all representative bodies are constituted by elected officials, so it is important to understand that other official groups that “possess their own status” (Foucault 2010, 50) to make or transform statements. Such groups have their own set of characteristics defining their functional relationship to society, much as the Washington State Constitution or Seattle City Charter regulates legal power. One such group is the Puget Sound Regional Council (PSRC), the official regional planning agency of the central Puget Sound region, which is composed of “King, Kitsap, Pierce and Snohomish counties, 72 cities within the region, four port districts, the region’s transit agencies, the Washington State Department of Transportation, Washington State Transportation Commission, the Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, the Puyallup Tribe of Indians, and the Suquamish Tribe” (PSRC n.d.-a). This intergovernmental council is woven into a fabric that extends upward to state and federal levels – on which it is reliant for transportation funding and on whose behalf it was established by the Governor of Washington as the central Puget Sound region’s Metropolitan Planning Organization in 1973, under the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962 (PSRC n.d.-b) – and downward to the municipalities and tribal councils. It thus occupies a particular place in the governmental hierarchy and has a specific and complementary function: to coordinate transportation planning, economic development, and growth management across central Puget Sound in accordance with “the region’s shared values” (PSRC n.d.-a).

In all three of these cases – state-level politics, regional planning, and municipal-level politics – the status of the members is defined in a way similar to the status of doctors that Foucault first describes in in *The Birth of the Clinic* (1994a). Later, in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, he recapitulates his previous findings and asserts that the status of doctors “involves

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16 Throughout this section I refer to the specifics of Foucault’s discoveries about doctors.
certain criteria of competence and knowledge” and which is subject to “institutions, systems, [and] pedagogic norms” (Foucault 2010, 50). However, the nature of the representative body assemblages that I am investigating means that they are subject to much more internal variegation. The Seattle City Council, for example, is currently made up of people with backgrounds in law, journalism, political science, law enforcement, urban planning, financial management, and economics. This raises the question of multiple types of knowledge affecting the collective speaking “subject,” but does not diminish the importance of shared criteria and norms – such as the values underpinning the Comprehensive Plan – which are of the most interest for this project.

Moreover, since the City Council is the elected body with the most direct relationship to SLU a deeper engagement with its institutional sites and the various positions that it occupies in relation to its domains and objects is illuminating. The Council Chambers is the primary location of its activity, and hosts both individual committee and full council meetings, which are open to the public. Similar to Foucault’s doctors, these elected officials are both questioning and listening subjects, particularly during committee meetings. The Planning, Land Use and Sustainability committee meetings, for example, open with a reading of the agenda, turn to a period for public comment (two minutes maximum, per speaker), and continue as discussions between the committee members and various other city employees from the Department of Planning and Development or the Office of Economic Development, as well as individuals from the private sector, such as consultants or developers. Furthermore, like Foucault’s doctors, the

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17 As of early 2016.

18 One could explain the relationship between power and spatial organization by presenting the space of the chambers, with the councilmembers seated on high during full council, separated from the masses by a “moat” which houses the conference table used in committee meetings, and which is also separated by a partial wall, but alas, that geographico-architectural problem is (thankfully) outside the scope of this study.
councilmembers are also seeing and observing subjects, often being presented with policy
documents, tables, graphs, and maps by their interlocutors.

However, the councilmembers as subjects quickly diverge from Foucault’s doctors when
one considers his notion of “instrumental intermediaries,” for their instruments are not technical
intermediaries between their own perceptual capacities and the bodies with which they are
confronted (no stethoscope, no otoscope, no x-rays). Instead, a wide range of professional
knowledge and techniques mediate between the councilmembers and the world beyond: the
planners with their codes and maps; the developers and consultants with their spreadsheets and
PowerPoint presentations; the architects with their renderings; the engineers with their
calculations. The councilmembers – and legislators in general – therefore stand at the
intersection of the perceptual situations and informational networks that Foucault (Ibid., 52)
describes as the unique position of doctors. Functionally, the elected officials have a similar role,
as relays or switches that collect and organize information that gets redistributed in the form of
ordinances, resolutions, codes, and budgets. The case of the 2013 rezone of SLU illustrates this
function clearly: the Council’s task was to consider documents such as the Comprehensive Plan
(Seattle DPD 2005), the Final Environmental Impact Statement (Seattle DPD 2012) and public
commentary thereupon, and Vulcan’s R.I.S.E. proposal (2013), before passing a controversial
ordinance regulating the neighborhood’s zoning. In this sense, representative body collective
actors function in exactly the same way as models of realization do for Deleuze and Guattari:
they integrate differences; they “engineer the couplings between qualified flows” (Deleuze and
Guattari 1983, 248). In this case, the flows are various forms of knowledge, interests, and
ultimately the investment capital that produces SLU’s built environment.
5.2.2 Citizen-Government-Professional Assemblages

In terms of internal diversity, citizen-government-professional enunciative modalities occupy the middle ground of the three significantly productive types that I have identified. They are less heterogeneous than the representative body assemblages due to the fact that they have narrower range of concerns as their object. In my brief recounting of the 2013 SLU rezone, for example, this type of assemblage included the mayor, the Seattle DPD, Vulcan, and housing advocates. Therefore, these collective actors are also more specialized and technical, and are more directly involved with specific missions in the realm of urban planning, such as comprehensive and neighborhood planning initiatives. They are, however, still integrators of difference, but ones that operate with fewer relative differences than representative bodies. In terms of accretion and transformation, they tend more toward the latter than do representative bodies, in part because their very nature is to modify elements of their environment, but as I demonstrate below, they are much less transformative than the private and semi-public enunciative modalities. Finally, the specific missions that they undertake means that the spatial scale of their operations is significantly smaller than representative bodies, while the duration of their activity varies in relative length, although it tends toward being shorter as well.

The birth of Metro was spearheaded by another collective subjectivity: the local chapters of the Municipal League and the League of Women Voters. The Municipal League is rooted in early twentieth century Progressivism, and envisioned itself as a nonpartisan group that appealed “to members of America's new urban professional working class, who sought to replace corrupt, graft-ridden city governments with honest and ‘scientific’ administrations” (Crowley 1999). The League of Women Voters is also an outgrowth of the Progressive Era and is “a nonpartisan political organization [that] encourages informed and active participation in government, [and]
works to increase understanding of major public policy issues and influences public policy through education and advocacy” (League of Women Voters of Seattle – King County n.d.). At the time of its founding, the Metropolitan Council, which was the governing body of Metro, consisted of Mayors and Councilmembers from Seattle and surrounding cities, two King County commissioners, and was chaired by C. Carey Donworth, a local management consultant, represented legally by Jim Ellis, the local lawyer known as the “father of Metro,” and directed by Harold Miller, a civil engineer who previously directed the state’s Pollution Control Commission (Lane 1995, 2, 17). Therefore, much like the state legislature, PSRC, or City Council, it was populated by a wide range of professionals who are less connected by their training than by their organization’s legal status and mission. Somewhat differently, however, it also employed a more homogeneous group of consulting civil engineers to develop technical plans and programs for addressing the region’s wastewater problems.

The initial public conversation that led to the formation of Metro occurred not in the marble halls of justice, but rather at the Downtown YMCA, although it quickly moved into more official locations after Mayor Gordon Clinton appointed a Metropolitan Problems Advisory Committee with Ellis as its chair (Ibid, 9). The technical details detailing the implications of dumping untreated waste into Lake Washington and Lake Union as well as plans for remediation emerged in engineering reports by Brown and Caldwell (1958) and scientific studies and speeches by University of Washington faculty, while public relations and outreach work necessary to gain voter support occurred in newspaper articles, radio and television debates, as well as the “Metro March,” in which approximately 5,000 volunteers distributed information about Metro in a door-to-door blitz on September 8, 1958, the day before the election that would
be a “substantial victory” (Ibid., 16). Finally, Metro set up shop in a humble two-story office building on Denny Way, where the technical staff worked alongside the executive board.

In contradistinction to the representative bodies as collective subjects of enunciation, Metro’s relationship to its domain was much more direct. Its relationship was much more akin to a special task force that had both the political and technical clout to solve a particular problem than a regulatory body that had to manage a wide array of problems. In contradistinction to Foucault’s doctors, it had no direct relationship to the bodies of the population but was instead charged with evaluating and redesigning a technical system that ultimately affected such bodies. In this sense, the technical staff somewhat resembles the doctors who Foucault (1994a) studied at length, although at a somewhat greater separation, while the executive board occupies a subject position more akin to the legislators already discussed.19

The Seattle 2000 Commission, which was tasked with establishing the groundwork for Seattle’s original comprehensive plan in the early 1970s, was a much broader coalition of “neighborhood, community, business, student, specific interest groups, and citizen advisory and governing boards of public agencies within the Seattle area that have demonstrated an interest in planning or the social, economic or environmental problems facing Seattle” as well as the members of the Planning Commission and an executive board (Resolution 23684).20 The

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19 While the nature of engineering work has its own set of interesting aspects, to delve into them here would be too much of a diversion. Instead of following that line, the technical work of urban planners, which has had a much greater impact on SLU itself, will be discussed below. The importance of Metro, I repeat, lies in its status as an early comprehensive and integrated solution to regional problems.

20 Participation in the commission is open to all concerned citizens from of age “2 to 200” (Seattle 2000 Commission Pamphlet 1972) but specifically invited participants include representatives from Patrons of Northwest Civic, Cultural and Charitable Organizations (PONCHO), Seattle Art Museum, The Restaurant Association of Washington, Washington Bankers Association, University of Washington, Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA), Washington Women Lawyers, Seattle Professional Photographer’s Association, King
executive board, however, was again composed of various professionals – including lawyers, architects, bankers, and accountants – small business owners, environmental advocates, a union representative, and even a former member of the communist party turned neighborhood community activist. Moreover, the broader commission was divided into specific task forces based on expertise and interest, and worked alongside staff from the municipal Department of Community Development. This arrangement provided a means of organizing a wide range of interests into a single document (integrating differences). Therefore the core of this group, much like the Metropolitan Council, was constituted by members who are primarily connected by their mission and responsibility to the City Council than by any one system of training or knowledge. Moreover, the fact that their activities relied heavily on public input further diversifies the number of active voices, and makes this particular assemblage one that not only observes, but also questions and listens.

The sites of the Seattle 2000 Commission’s outreach work included six months of intensive work in the City Council Chambers, meeting rooms at Seattle Center and City Hall, public schools around the city, information booths in shopping areas, posters, and the Seattle 2000 Center – which was a space reserved for research and meetings in the Central Building.

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21 Sally Goldmark – the wife of John Goldmark, who was a prominent liberal member of the Washington State House of Representatives – became a member of the Communist Party in 1935. This affiliation, along with Mr. Goldmark’s liberal voting record ultimately led to his being painted as Communist sympathizer in the 1962 elections and losing his seat (Kershner 2011).
downtown\textsuperscript{23} – as well as a newsletter and radio and television broadcasts. Documents from this era convey an open, welcoming, and inclusive environment in which the leaders of the task forces primarily serve as facilitating and listening subjects. The communications committee’s central role is that of boosters, encouraging potential participants to air their concerns and express their desires in a comprehensive way, but with a sense of urgency: “Remind people that if they want a better future, they have to start working today – and Seattle 2000 is one way to do it” (Seattle 2000 Commission 1973a).

The collective actors responsible for producing neighborhood plans are of a similar mixture, but have their own internal variegation, especially when one distinguishes between the Cascade Neighborhood Council (CNC)’s grassroots plan (1997) and the originally adopted neighborhood plan (South Lake Union Planning Organization (SLUPO), 1998). The common denominator between the two plans is, of course, neighborhood “stakeholders,” but even this category is destabilized by the fact that the CNC’s plan was prepared entirely by residents, while the adopted plan’s local representation also includes a wide range of other business interests.\textsuperscript{24}

The updated neighborhood plan (Seattle DPD, 2007) also includes input from an even broader range of community groups.\textsuperscript{25} In the two adopted plans, a specific group – the DPD in this case,

\textsuperscript{23} The hours of operation for the Seattle 2000 Center emphasize how committed the City was to this process: Monday, 7:30 AM – 5:00 PM, Tuesday – Friday, 7:30 AM – 7:30 PM, and Saturday, 9:00 AM – 4:00 PM. Moreover, the specific task forces were encouraged to come get a key and “avail themselves of the facilities and the resources at the Center” for after-hours work (Seattle 2000 Commission 1972).

\textsuperscript{24} “[T]he South Lake Union Roundtable, South Lake Union Business Association, area property owners, Center for Wooden Boats, Maritime Heritage Foundation, Cascade Area Business Council, Northwest Seaport and architects working on historic preservation” (SLUPO 1998, 5)

\textsuperscript{25} South Lake Union Friends and Neighbors (SLUFAN), CNC, Seattle Unity Church, Consolidated Works, Cascade Partnership for Safety, Morningside Academy, New Discovery School, SLUNET, SLU Area Schools Coalition, SLU Arts and Culture Coalition, and the SLU Chamber of Commerce, as well as community members (Seattle DPD 2007, 3)
with the assistance of the City of Seattle Interdepartmental team\textsuperscript{26} and the Seattle Planning Commission\textsuperscript{27} for the most recent plan – is responsible for collecting, organizing, and expressing these diverse interests according to their own criteria and norms. In contradistinction to the aforementioned collective subjects, the urban planners ultimately responsible for producing the documents do pass through a regulated and normalizing institution which assigns their professional status.

In this respect, planners do have something in common with Foucault’s doctors that those in elected positions and on commissions do not. Foucault (2010, 51) writes:

The status of the doctor is generally a rather special one in all forms of society and civilization: he is hardly ever an undifferentiated or interchangeable person. Medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value, efficacy, even their therapeutic powers, and generally speaking, their existence as medical statements cannot be dissociated from the statutorily defined person who has the right to make them, and to claim for them the power to overcome suffering and death.

To equate the status of urban planners in particular – or design professionals in general – with that of doctors is undeniably absurd, for the latter are not dealing with immediate suffering and death, yet the two functions have an element of isotropy even though they operate across different spatial, temporal, and biological boundaries. The status of both groups rests on the legally sanctioned right to make professional statements; criteria of competence and knowledge; and institutions, systems, and pedagogic norms (Ibid., 50). However, they differ in at least three primary respects. Temporally, the doctor deals with everything ranging from immediate suffering to lifelong illness, but the human life span is the outer limit of concern; the design

\textsuperscript{26} This team is composed of individuals from Seattle City Light, Seattle Public Utilities, the Office of Policy and Management, and the Departments of Human Services, Parks and Recreation, Neighborhoods, Housing, Transportation, Arts and Cultural Affairs, and the Fire Department (Seattle DPD 2007, 3).

\textsuperscript{27} The Planning Commission is “a 16 member volunteer body that is appointed by the Mayor and City Council. Each Commissioner serves a three year term and can only serve two consecutive terms” (Seattle Planning Commission n.d.).
professional necessarily thinks beyond the human life span and is increasingly concerned with long term social, environmental, and economic sustainability. Spatially, a doctor’s concern is largely confined to the immediate body in need of treatment, though it can certainly expand out in the cases of epidemics and public health; the design professionals under consideration here begin at the scale of the building, but are even more disposed to working at the neighborhood, city, and even regional scales. Biologically, the doctor is focused on human health, while contemporary planners are engaging with the health and relationships between built and natural environments. Moreover, there is another crucial qualitative difference at play: whereas doctors deal with human life as such, design professionals are primarily dealing with how humans experience and evaluate the quality of their lives. Life itself is indeed a concern at the limit of designers’ purviews – and perhaps increasingly so, with the looming threats of climate change, for example – but this is more of an orientation, a morality, an *esprit de corps*, than an object of their statements. This is not to downplay this element in the least, but is meant solely to further differentiate the relationship between these two types of professionals and life as such, and to acknowledge the potential domain of concern for design, even if it is often standardized, operationalized, aestheticized or outright constrained economically by “value engineering.”

The *Urban Design Framework (UDF)*, the Department of Planning and Development (DPD)’s *Director’s Report* on the 2013 rezone, and the neighborhood specific design guidelines were also produced by such professionals (Seattle DPD 2010, 2013b, 2013a, respectively). The project team for the *UDF* was constituted by three urban planners from the Seattle DPD, and three architects from the local design firm Weber Thompson, but also relies on a familiar range

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28 Office location: the corner of Terry Avenue and Thomas Street in South Lake Union.
of community stakeholders.\footnote{Local architects, a commercial real estate firm, Lake Union Opportunity Alliance (neighborhood advocacy), South Lake Union Friends and Neighbors (SLUFAN; the two representatives come from the Alliance of General contractors and another local architecture firm), Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Vulcan, Cornish College of the Arts, SLU Chamber of Commerce, CNC, Housing Development Consortium (affordable housing advocates). DPD’s City Design and City Green Building teams, Seattle City Light, Seattle Public Utilities, Seattle’s Office of Housing, and the departments of Neighborhoods, Parks, Housing, and Transportation. (Seattle DPD 2010, 4).} \textit{The Director’s Report} is an urban planning document that similarly draws on a wide range of information, including the neighborhood plan, \textit{UDF}, and public comments over a five-year period (Seattle DPD 2013b, 7). The design guidelines were penned by municipal urban planners and consulting architects, with assistance from neighborhood planning organizations as well as the Design Review Boards, which in the case of the West District board covering SLU, includes a representative from a local business, the community, the design sector, the development industry, as well as a local resident.\footnote{As of early 2016, four of the West District’s members are design professionals or developers. The fifth (the resident) is a management consultant who often works for design firms.}

The sites from which these discursive objects emerge are variegated, as the movement from the activity preceding the updated neighborhood plan to the \textit{Director’s Report} attests. It consists of a series of official open houses, public workshops, public hearings, and public meetings (Seattle DPD 2012, 2-15 – 2-16). These public events occur in a wide range of locations, from Council Chambers, to Unity Church in SLU, to Vulcan’s SLU Discovery Center, while it is also safe to say that much of the design work occurs in the DPD’s offices as well as in the private consultants’ offices. The public events are also broadcast on the Seattle Channel and are archived on their website, while councilmembers appear on talk radio shows to discuss the proposals that are in the works. Moreover, the reports themselves – whether they are prepared by
the DPD, private consultants, or a mix between these two groups – are published as official DPD documents.  

Similar to the elected officials, these design professionals are questioning, listening, seeing, and observing subjects: the former two particularly when they are working in public outreach; the latter two primarily when assessing the existing built environment. However, they are also facilitators of public outreach proceedings, where they provide the rules of engagement for design charrettes or reviews, for example, and are a particular form of intellectual laborer when they synthesize, categorize, design, and produce zoning and design documents. Each of these roles also has its own set of instruments: an actual charrette is built on simple technologies like colored pens and post-it notes, but it relies on the more sophisticated mapping and computer-aided design technology that also empowers their intellectual labor.

In conclusion, these collective speakers are less variegated than the representative bodies and engage more directly with the changing built environment and the public who seeks to engage in this process. The design professionals in this assemblage have passed through normalizing institutions and often play the role of intermediaries between the built environment itself and the other two types of significantly productive collective actors.

5.2.3 Private and Semi-public Assemblages

Private and semi-public enunciatve modalities constitute the other extreme – with the representative bodies being the first extreme – of the three types of productive collective actors that I have identified. They are: the most homogenous of these three types, the most specialized and technical, and are the most intimately connected with urban transformation. They are,

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31 In the case of the Final Environmental Impact Statement (Seattle DPD 2012), a wide range of comments from public agencies, community organizations and interest groups on the draft version, as well as the DPD’s responses, are also included.
however, still integrators of difference – for as I discussed in the previous chapters, the types of projects that I am addressing here are complicated and cannot be reduced to simple criteria such as capital accumulation – but given their focus of particular projects, these subjects draw together the least amount of relative difference. In the example of the 2013 rezone Vulcan was one such collective actor, and their desire to be able to build 240’ towers along the lakefront – undoubtedly for the increased rents the extra floor area would command – was accompanied by their willingness to spearhead the R.I.S.E. program, which brought together housing, education, child care, retail space, social services, and community gardens (Vulcan 2013). This is not to villify or deify Vulcan, but is merely to highlight their capacity to draw together multiple concerns. That this program was shelved by the City Council is not the point either; instead, I am trying to highlight the organization’s capacity to draw together these diverse economic and extraeconomic concerns into its own strategies and plans in the service of its own efforts to create. Therefore, in terms of accretion and transformation, this private assemblage tends heavily toward the latter. Finally, they also operate on the smallest spatial scale and perhaps within in a shorter duration than the other two types of enunciative modalities.32

Vulcan is the investment and philanthropic company of one man – Paul Allen, the cofounder of Microsoft – but the statements it produces come from a wide variety of individuals. Allen himself is unapologetically both progressive and normative in his approach to investing, as can be seen in his online biography:

Paul Allen has a question. And if you ever meet him, you’ll hear him ask it more than once. What should exist? What if we don’t have to accept the world as it is? What if there is more to know? What if we played the long game for the future,

32 It is difficult to make a strong claim here, because one aspect of Vulcan that makes them so problematic, is that they are clearly invested in land development and curation for the long haul. The other two enunciative modalities certainly existed before Vulcan, so in that sense their temporal scale is longer, but who can say with any certainty that they are going to outlast it?
instead of pursuing short-term rewards? […] Every direction he pursues starts from the very same place – a relentless belief in possibility and the desire to open up the future. Like many of us, when Paul notices something about the world that interests or fascinates or bothers him, he wonders if it can be done differently, more efficiently, more in service of progress. And over the years he’s discovered that it can. And it should (Allen n.d.-a).

His list of investments in business ventures, philanthropy, sports, music and culture, research, and exploration is nothing short of astonishing, and includes space exploration, artificial intelligence, film production, brain science, combatting Ebola, and of course, real estate development. “His business decisions are inspired by a desire to create solutions with the potential to change the world” (Allen n.d.-b).

The real estate division of Vulcan is a “fully integrated team of more than 40 professionals offers a full range of services including development, urban planning, portfolio management, marketing and leasing, market research and appraisal, financing, government affairs and community relations” (Vulcan 2015b), and is led by a smattering of individuals with M.B.A.s and degrees in architecture, civil engineering, and economics. There is clearly more homogeneity in this subgroup than in the representative body assemblages, and less than in the urban planning discipline itself, but each professional path nevertheless entails its own set of criteria and norms that contribute to holding this assemblage together.

Vulcan’s statements emerge in a range of institutional sites: city hall, various forms of news media, professional trade publications such as the Daily Journal of Commerce and the Puget Sound Business Journal, as well as Vulcan’s own marketing outlets – ranging from websites to the South Lake Union Discovery Center – and even the “blogosphere.” These statements also occur in different modes: text, photographs, graphs, charts, renderings, timelines, and video. In this sense, they correspond to the set of institutions proffering statements by the Seattle 2000 Commission or Committee for the Seattle Commons – which is discussed below –
but sharply diverge in terms of subject positions. As a private entity, Vulcan does not serve as a facilitator of public input. Rather, it takes the documents that have already been organized by planners, designers, and legislators and transforms them into plans for action – an altogether different kind of integration. It certainly questions, listens, sees, observes – as does Foucault’s doctor – but its primary function is operationalization and transformation rather than interpretation. Moreover, its set of tools is broader than that of legislators or designers: it marshalls the powers of qualitative data collection and coordination, as well as the tools for envisioning how they can ultimately be laid out, but converts this information into abstract quantities that can be sorted, analyzed, and optimized by Vulcan itself or its army of consultants, and presented to the world beyond its walls.33

The Seattle Commons discourses point to another multifaceted collective subject that involves newspaper columnists, architects, activists, politicians, neighborhood property owners, and so forth. In the interest of space, I am drawing heavily on Iglitzin’s (1995) summary of her detailed case study (1993) – which came out of two years worth of in-depth fieldwork34 – to get the most accurate information about this collective subject. Citing Hinterberger’s series of

33 One illuminating example of this occurred during Vulcan’s challenge to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, which involved independent analyses of the wind effects of taller towers along the lakefront and pointed critiques of how the City was defining affordable housing (see Seattle DPD 2012). This is discussed at greater length in Chapter 6.

34 Iglitzin (1995, 621-2) writes: “The author attended a wide range of Commons-related meetings over a period of two years: private gatherings and public neighborhood ‘information’ and fundraising meetings sponsored by the Commons organization, numerous press conferences, regular meetings of opponents’ organizations, city of Seattle planning department-sponsored forums and information meetings, and city council hearings. Informal interviews with participants and attendees at all of these meetings were conducted whenever feasible.” Moreover, she conducted interviews early in the planning process and near its end, with “Commons board members, architects, design professionals, policymakers, city staffers, civic leaders, housing and community activists, and business people” (Ibid.).
columns in the Seattle Times (1989a, 1989b, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c) as a “major impetus” for the project, she also notes that:

the vision of a large park captured not only the public at large, but, more significantly, it intrigued a small band of influential citizens who were attracted by the thought of making their mark by using their private entrepreneurial skills to create a major urban amenity that would endure throughout the years (Iglitzin 1995, 622, my emphasis).

A central figure in this portion of the discursive formation was Joel Horn, an “outsider” who was informally contacted and asked to lead the Committee for the Seattle Commons. His status as a leader was certified by the fact that he had “the needed leadership qualities, business background, experience in the land conservancy movement [Rails to Trails], and interest, energy, and political savvy” (Ibid., 623). Additionally, the group’s board was populated by civically-engaged attorneys and businesspeople, and people with experience and ties to neighborhood groups, low-income housing, human services, while working groups included individuals versed in park design, transit, housing, land acquisition, and finance, not to mention a large pool of volunteers (Ibid., 625-6). Iglitzin stresses that this group’s strategy was to operate independently of City Hall, but it nevertheless benefitted from the “informal support of the mayor and his top aides,” technical assistance from city planners, not to mention private developers and the media, who kept the story of the project circulating (Ibid.). The status of this assemblage is therefore cemented in the individual statuses of the constituents. They may not be elected officials, but they send one another Christmas cards; they are the movers and shakers, the “downtown elite.”

The institutional sites from which these discourses emerge are also diverse. In terms of media coverage, statements come from sites as diverse as The Seattle Times and Network X, which was broadcast on public access cable television. The Committee also regularly published its own design charrette documents, draft plans, informational publications, and a fiscal impacts
analysis (cf. Committee for the Seattle Commons 1992, 1994). As the City became officially involved, a Draft and a Final EIS were prepared, as was a review of its financing plan, summaries of public input, an independent fiscal impact analysis, and wide range of legislature adopting work plans and particular designs, releasing funds, and authorizing elections.

This collective subject’s range of positions resembles both those of the design professionals in their facilitative and productive modes, and of Vulcan in terms of its relative independence and strategic function – a predictable range considering the mixture of actors constituting the assemblages – but it also resembles the representative body collective subjects in terms of its diversity. However, it differs from these groups significantly because it lacks the normalized training of the planners, the degree of autonomy granted to Vulcan by its access to capital, and the public authority groups’ legal status.

5.2.4 Users and Commentators

Finally, there is the incredibly rich realm of various users who produce statements on SLU without significantly influencing its material production. This category pushes the boundaries of Foucault’s rubric for studying enunciative modalities for several reasons. First, these speakers have not necessarily been granted the right to speak by, nor have they passed through, a normalizing institution: all it takes to participate in the production of SLU’s archived discourse is an Internet connection and perhaps enough technical prowess to create a blog. For example, in a blog post entitled “A Day In The Life Of Kerner-Scott House,” Jack Golightly (n.d.) provides an account of life inside one of the Downtown Emergency Service Center’s facilities for homeless and mentally ill men and women in the Cascade area of SLU:

The sun slowly creeps over the parking lot and leaks onto the patio. Sleepy shelter women get up, some with complaint, some without. Lights are turned on. Smells of bacon and eggs waft around the building while the night shift RCs [Residential
Counselors] make coffee. Yesterday there was only cold cereal for breakfast... The sun warms people up till the swing shift rolls in and things get different-busy. The community room is transformed into a dinner area. *Walker, Texas Ranger* is turned off in lieu of the *X-Files*. Residents bring strange things through the door to decorate their apartments. Beer gets dumped out. Someone unsuccessfully sneaks up the elevator. The fire alarm goes off. Someone was drying their clothes in the oven again. Someone gets a lesson about using the dryer... There's leftover juice in the community room, hey, and *Soul Train* comes on at midnight. A few residents hang in the office listening to music with the RCs. A would-be illegal entrant is un-snuck out of the building. Lights go off in the shelter. The RCs are sorry that people snore next to you but try to ignore it. Night owls are out talking, relaxing in the office and the smoking room. Smokes are given out due to the good mood. Scrabble is played at the corner table. Night shift rolls in. They monitor the peace, talk to the insomniacs, get ready to make breakfast and watch the place. It is secure. A mini-counseling session breaks out in the office with the relapsed clean and sober resident. Community abounds. The sun slowly creeps over the parking lot. Repeat.

That this text emerges from within the Kerner-Scott House rather than City Hall, Council Chambers, or Vulcan’s headquarters presents a second problem, namely that identifying the sites from which such statements emerge is potentially a never-ending task. This leaves only one dimension of the archaeological approach to consider: the relationship that these speakers occupy between SLU and the statements they produce. Although Golightly is an extreme case, his position in relation to the neighborhood expresses a commonality shared by the vast majority of people in the neighborhood: as users, customers, consumers, or employees, their role in SLU’s discourse is that of a commentator. The remainder of this section briefly touches upon some of this commentary directed toward the built environment itself, neighborhood amenities, and the experience of working in SLU the before situating the collective actors producing it in relation to the other speaking assemblages.

Commenting on the architecture of Vulcan’s SLU Discovery Center (Fig. El.6) – the temporary building that serves as a showroom for the neighborhood – Lawrence Cheek (2008) writes that it is the “most intriguing building in the developer’s portfolio.” He, however, notes
that other buildings in the neighborhood – such First Western Development’s Terry Thomas Building, which was designed by its primary tenant, the architecture and design firm Weber Thompson – help the neighborhood from falling completely into aesthetic blandness, as do the streetscapes that abut many of Vulcan’s projects:

The sidewalk on the Minor Avenue side of Alcyone, Vulcan's big apartment building, is landscaped with trees that form a canopy embracing the sidewalk, and the jazzy farrago of textures and colors on the building's ground floor create plenty of visual interest. The new Amazon world headquarters sprawling four blocks between Terry and Boren avenues will absorb the historic Van Vorst warehouse into the complex, and will feature landscaped alleys, mini-plazas and a 31-foot-wide sidewalk on the Terry side (Ibid.).

Of course this type of commentary proliferates madly: Art Stable, a mixed-use project in the Cascade neighborhood won an American Institute of Architects (AIA) Honor award in 2013, “draws upon the architectural concepts of prospect and refuge, transposed to an urban setting” (AIA n.d.) while a visitor from Saint Paul, Minnesota notes on Yelp that “Lake Union Park is great if you really like goose poop. And/or wooden boats” (Yelp 2011).

Commentary on SLU’s various amenities extends in every direction as well. Reviewing fitness classes at The Bar Method, “C.C.” writes:

There is a reason why this barre class is the most expensive, you pay for what you get. The extra attention you get, the fact that the instructors go out of their way to learn your name, all makes for a very smooth, rigorous, worthwhile class. If I’m going to spend an hour of my day trying to get fit, I want it to be worth it. I have always felt accomplished leaving their barre classes (Yelp 2016).

Responding to the question about the best drink that he makes, Cody Goodwin – a bartender at upscale Italian restaurant Cuoco, which occupies historic building integrated into part of Amazon’s campus – notes the importance of context and says, “If I were on a patio in the summer, I would rather go for a drink I call the Summer Solstice: gin, St. Germaine, grapefruit, bruised mint, and prosecco” (Hendrickson 2013). Wendy, an SLU resident featured in one of
Vulcan’s marketing video shares her feelings about riding the streetcar: “It’s a little, um, whimsical feeling about being in Europe when you ride the street car” (Soulmoto n.d.-b).

Finally, commentary on the working life in SLU is equally scattered. On the one hand, a 2015 exposé in *The New York Times* highlights the punishing work environment at Amazon, which includes a “self-reinforcing set of management, data and psychological tools to spur its tens of thousands of white-collar employees to do more and more,” or what a former employee calls a “continual performance improvement algorithm” (Kantor and Streitfeld 2015). This highly competitive work environment is described by another former worker thus: “It’s as if you’ve got the C.E.O. of the company in bed with you at 3 a.m. breathing down your neck” (Ibid.). Of course, not everyone working for or alongside on Amazon shares this sort of commentary:

> “Amazon is a really good thing in our neighborhood, they're the biggest buyer of Jimmy Johns right now,” said James Fehskens who delivers for Jimmy John's Sandwiches. “They're why were busy and I love them for it. I even said, ‘Thank God for Amazon.com at Thanksgiving this year’” (King 5 News 2013)

The sheer amount and diversity of such statements reinforces the idea that users of the neighborhood produce discourse that is intimately related to the neighborhood, but this collective subject occupies the least empowered, if most popular, position of all the speaking subjects. Yet, it nevertheless forms an important layer that corresponds to how most people experience the neighborhood. My focus here on the actual production of the neighborhood makes this commentary marginal, but this is certainly not an effect of the Deleuzoguattarian theoretical apparatus, which celebrates the “minoritarian” voices (Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 1987). If the project at hand were one of establishing common complaints against SLU as a “yuppie ghetto” (Berger 2015) as a first step toward political mobilization, then commentators and commentary would be key collective actors and objects of discourse.
5.2.5 Final Remark on Collective Actors

In his reflection on medical discourse, Foucault (2010, 53) is clear that the discourse itself is the “integrator” of distinct elements concerning the status of doctors, as well as the sites and situations in and through which they spoke. Above all else, the point is that discourse is active: it is a practice that establishes relations between individual elements that did not previously exist. The discourse of the Coordinated City functions in a similar way, drawing together an even wider range of legally sanctioned statuses, sites, and situations. The four collective actors that have been sketched here – Representative Bodies, Citizen-Government-Professional, Private and Semi-Public, and Users and Commentators – cover a much broader portion of the social field, linking up professionals, politicians, and citizens across sites including local elementary schools, the state capitol, technical reports, and media through particular relationships of perception, facilitation, and analysis. The concrete relationships in the first three assemblages are responsible for determining how urbanization unfolds in any particular actualization of the Coordinated City, in SLU or elsewhere, while the fourth embodies a position that is largely outside of the material production of the neighborhood, but is nevertheless central to how it is experienced.

5.3 Techniques

The final inquiry into how the Coordinated City’s discursive formation is held together involves exploring the interconnectivity of various concepts. Following Foucault’s archaeological method, this amounts to sketching a preconceptual field in which a set of concepts can coexist and in which they can be subjected to certain rules (Foucault 2010, 60). If

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35 There is an affinity here with Deleuze’s (1995) distinction between the virtual and the actual, wherein the preconceptual field and the rules which govern it correspond to differentiation of the virtual field of potentials, and the concrete heterogeneous concepts that emerge across the discursive formation correspond the differenciация (actualization) of these potentials.
one can delimit a group of elements, such as particular organizational elements, points of
intersection, or procedures of intervention, that are drawn together into disparate concepts then
one is indeed dealing with the raw material – the conditions of possibility – for the sought after
discursive formation. Herein, I have organized the analysis along two lines: logical and practical
connections. Logical connections refer to how various set of documents are related to one
another, directly or indirectly, and either diachronically or synchronically. Practical connections
refer to actual procedures that tie the documents together, such as referencing one another or
adopting a standardized form. This final pass through the archive further illustrates how the
diverse collective agents use various forms of knowledge to regulate how the Coordinated City
develops – that is, it shows the textured relationships that hold the elements of the Coordinated
City’s model of realization together.

5.3.1 *Logical Connections: succession and dependence*

Returning to the chronology established in Chapter 4, which begins with the first attempts to deal
with the adverse effects of postwar suburbanization that arose in the early 1950s, and continues
to the present redevelopment of SLU into a dense, economically productive, and environmentally
sustainable neighborhood, provides a path along which to consider how the Coordinated City’s
discursive formation is held together. With the birth of Metro, the issue at hand is clearly
addressing the ills of uncoordinated urban growth, specifically the mitigation of water pollution
(which is clearly also a quality of life issue, as well as a detriment to economic growth). Ellis’s
1953 speech that spurred Metro’s formation in 1958 explicitly involved coordination and
“recommend[ed] that existing governments be empowered to work together to solve problems
they could not deal with individually” (Lane, 5). In this respect, the birth of Metro can usefully
be seen as a turning point toward increasingly integrated planning and governance.
For the archaeologist, such events are important because they “establish a set of rules for arranging statements in a series, an obligatory set of schemata of dependence, of order, and of successions, in which the recurrent elements that may have value as concepts [are] distributed” (Foucault 2010, 57). This is not to necessarily say that the birth of Metro is the defining event for dealing with water pollution, but is rather to stress how the previously dispersed responsibilities for controlling water pollution – or any other urban problems, for that matter – have become increasingly coordinated across various jurisdictions and institutions. The first action that Metro took after its formation was to adopt a Comprehensive Sewer Plan that had been prepared under the direction of state of Washington, King County, and the City of Seattle, and which was only possible to implement under the new metropolitan corporation with the authority eliminate the discharge of all treated effluent into Lake Washington (King County n.d.). This plan is a technical document that is organized in an eminently practical manner: it presents the history of the area’s sewer systems, the contemporary growth that has necessitated its expansion, the adverse effects thereof, and schematic designs for solutions, before turning to detailed design concepts, schedules, and financing options for an improved system (Brown and Caldwell 1958). An initial question for determining how successive documents in any particular discursive formation are tied together is asking whether or not they have a similar organization. As I show throughout the remainder of this section, they do for the most part, but with one important shift: the documents regulating how urbanization proceeds become more general as one moves through time toward the present, with one consequence being the proliferation and coordination of more specific documents to attain the same sort of control as in the Comprehensive Sewer Plan. This generalization is met with specific relations of dependence that connect these various documents together.
Staying with explicitly environmental concerns for the moment, increasingly generalized coordination becomes evident when one looks at other documents over this time period. For example, the ratification of the State Environmental Protection Act (SEPA) in 1971 created the Washington State Department of Ecology, which governs the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process. Any time a proposed project – like the Seattle Commons or the rezoning of SLU, for example – is likely to cause “adverse environmental impacts” an EIS is required. It is a tool for requiring coordination across different institutions in order to identify and analyze “probable adverse environmental impacts, reasonable alternatives, and possible mitigation” (Washington State Department of Ecology n.d.). Concretely, the EIS for the recent SLU rezone has a similar organization as the first portion of the Comprehensive Sewer Plan, beginning with assessment and the presentation of alternative scenarios, although it stops short of providing schedules and financing schemes, but for good reason: first, its increasing generality is marked by its nature as a predictive and proactive document, rather than a “fix” for an already-existing problem; second, it creates a different discursive space altogether, in that its function is to establish the conditions for future development by others rather than to produce a specific plan for implementation. It begins with a summary history of the area and four alternatives for rezoning, as well as the environmental impacts and strategies for mitigation, before providing a detailed environmental analysis of each scenario (Seattle DPD 2012).37

Also at the state level, the GMA has a similar organization and movement of generalization in identifying the problem of haphazard growth, providing a list of planning goals for addressing it, and establishing a wide range of rules for who must participate and how. Much

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37 Since this is the final draft of a document that was made available for public review, it also has another unique aspects, namely a more detailed engagement with a range of topics (plants, animals, aesthetics, housing, etc.) first explored in draft form, as well as public comments on the draft and responses to them.
like an individual EIS, the GMA is a proactive document, but it is one that operates at a greater
degree of generality: instead of investigating the environmental impacts of potential development
scenarios – such as the rezoning of SLU – it determines the conditions under which they can be
actualized. More importantly, perhaps, is the relationship of dependence that the GMA
establishes: although both King County and Seattle had either developed or begun developing
comprehensive plans decades before the GMA was passed, the state-level legislation made them
required, thereby establishing a clear hierarchy that runs from the state down to the municipal
scale.

Seattle’s current Comprehensive Plan (Seattle DPD 2005) also has a relatively
isomorphic organization to documents like the early sewer plan or an EIS, but it nevertheless
marks another movement of generalization, albeit less pronounced than that of the GMA. It
opens with a history of the comprehensive planning and the problem at hand: to grow in
accordance with citizens’ values. Whereas the first portion of the sewer plan and the EIS were
organized in a development from specific problems to several concrete solutions (with each
going in their own directions after this point), the Comprehensive Plan replaces these concrete
alternatives with something more general: the values of community, environmental stewardship,
economic opportunity and security, and social equity (Seattle DPD 2005, v). However, it does
not stop there: each element – land use, transportation, housing, etc. – has its own set of goals
that relate to these values and which are addressed by general policies rather than explicit
scenarios. Land use, for example, has three goals – develop in accordance with the urban village
strategy, cultivate mixed-use neighborhoods, and encourage public health and environmental
quality – which are elaborated into policies covering everything from encouraging compatible
adjacent land uses and the distribution of public services to keeping noise levels down and access to green spaces up.

Yet, as mentioned above, such documents also require more specific reports and plans to elaborate on how the broader goals will be met. The Comprehensive Plan, again, is not a binding document but instead guides of enforceable legislation, such as ordinances and the municipal Land Use Code. Two such supporting documents that are related to both the SLU EIS and the Comprehensive Plan are the *Urban Design Framework (UDF)* and the *Director’s Report* on the rezone (Seattle DPD 2010, 2013b), both of which also directly connect to the current SLU Neighborhood Plan (Seattle DPD 2007). This updated Neighborhood Plan expresses a particular relationship of dependence to the Comprehensive Plan, wherein the original Neighborhood Plan (SLUPO 1998) – which was primarily focused on the existing neighborhood character, parks and open space, and transportation – has essentially been recycled through the new set of goals and policies privileging economic development via high- and bio-technology activity in SLU that correspond to the area being rechristened an urban center. Moreover, the Neighborhood Plan functions in a way similar to the Comprehensive Plan, in that it is not binding. It is, however, more specific: it expands the Comprehensive plan’s policies into concrete strategies, according to which potential projects are evaluated in design reviews.

The *UDF* is also clearly a moment of increasing specificity, in that it proffers design guidelines down to the scale of the street: categorizing street character, areas of residential and retail focus, public space networks and view corridors, building setbacks, and limits on the number of towers per block, among other things. The *Director’s Report* draws on the EIS, the Comprehensive Plan, and the Neighborhood Plan – as well as other documents produced along the way – to recommend a certain rezone package to the City Council for approval. Its degree of
specificity falls between the generality of the Comprehensive Plan and focus of the UDF, but it is a synthetic document that abstracts key points from a range of detailed documents, and puts them forward as a regulatory scheme for guiding appropriate development.

Above all, the trajectory I am attempting to describe here is how efforts to address environmental problems fracture from centralized, integrated, and reactive efforts, such as in the case of Metro and water pollution in Lake Washington, to highly decentralized, coordinated, and proactive efforts to anticipate and prevent such problems without restricting growth or economic development (See Fig. A3.1, in Appendix 3, for a visualization of this emergence). This pattern can be seen in the broad range of contemporary policy documents constituting the chain that runs from the GMA, through the Comprehensive Plan, to documents that explicitly relate to how SLU is developing. Altogether these coordinated documents establish the conditions of possibility for what kind of neighborhood can emerge in a particular type of region and city.

5.3.2 Logical Connections: coexistence and concomitance

Along this spine of successive movements that privilege land use, Foucault’s method demands that the archaeologist also expand laterally and address coexisting occurrences. With respect to SLU, one finds discussions of new forms of intellectual labor – specifically biotechnology in the early years of the redevelopment, but becoming generalized into the innovation economy with the passage of time – in conjunction with a strong orientation toward environmental issues, and quality of life. This section addresses how the elements of these discourses are interrelated, in terms of coexistence and concomitance.

Alongside the succession of land use statements already presented, it is necessary to understand Vulcan’s entry into SLU from the perspective of the financial and palliative
potentials of biotechnology.\textsuperscript{39} Vulcan has a long history of investing in biotechnology ventures, which reaches back to at least 1992, when Ruth Kanath – one of the first five employees at the company – was hired to manage a biotech investment portfolio that had grown to $500 million and included holdings in 20 companies by the time she left the company a decade later (Timmerman 2003). As the vision of the Seattle Commons morphed into the vision of “an urban village with a large park at its core – a holistic plan that included multiple types of housing, transit, a pedestrian orientation, and a mix of commercial and residential uses” (Iglitzi 1995, 624), Allen envisioned this surrounding community as one consisting of “a collection of high-tech and biotech companies” (Rule 2011). This vision was based in part on the location of the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center – which moved into its nearby campus in 1993 – as well as Zymogenetics, a biotechnology company created by faculty from the University of Washington and the University of British Columbia, which purchased the decommissioned power plant on the eastern shore of Lake Union where it still operates today the same year.\textsuperscript{40} This commitment to the high-tech economy persists today, but the focus is no longer explicitly on biotech: instead, it has become generalized under the rubric of innovation. Vulcan’s real

\textsuperscript{39} It is important to note that Paul Allen’s former business partner, Bill Gates, was also very interested in the potential of biotech and his philanthropic foundation has donated millions of dollars to such endeavors. “At a National Press Club [November 28, 1996] luncheon Gates was asked: "If you could not invest in Microsoft, what company would you invest in?" Gates answered: "(An) area that I'm very excited about is biotechnology. Other than these information tools, the greatest opportunity right now is revolutionary advances in medicine, that through understanding DNA and other advances and understanding biological systems, will be very rapid in the next several decades. It's an area where it's very hard to pick out who the winners and losers will be a lot of companies with kind of confusing names. But I think if you can sort through that, you'll find there's some wonderful investments in that sector” (Washington Life Science n.d.).

\textsuperscript{40} Zymogenetics sold the building to Alexandria Real Estate in 2010 for $52 million and signed a 15-year lease to stay in place as a tenant (Timmerman 2002)
estate development activities are therefore not merely oriented toward building a new type of city, but rather for “fostering innovation through neighborhood development” (Vulcan 2014). Briefly, the concept of innovation as a foundational aspect of economic growth is typically traced back to Joseph Schumpeter (2009, 83-4), who famously asserts:

Every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the background of that process and within the situation created by it. It must be seen in its role in the perennial gale of creative destruction; it cannot be understood irrespective of it or, in fact, on the hypothesis that there is a perennial lull.

The literature on innovation that emerges from economics departments and business schools typically follows this line, and focuses on how to cultivate innovation by seeking to understand the factors driving it, such as the “intellectual property institutions, the supply side of innovation, and the financing of technological development” (cf. Nicholas 2011, 788). From an altogether different perspective, Harvey (1989b) has profitably adapted the Schumpeterian notion of creative destruction to explain how business cycles lead to cyclical investments in the built environment as constant capital. I, however, am interested in innovation not only rational economic strategy to be harnessed, nor in its dexterity as an explanatory concept, but also in the way it creeps into morality: the idea that innovation as such is good. This foreshadows a central theme of the following chapter – the discussion of how ethics contributes to urbanization – and will not be explicitly engaged here, but is worth keeping in mind as an extraeconomic motivation to create something new. In other words, I am interested in the passion to innovate.

41 Powell, Packalen, Whittington (2012, 437-438) remark that even though SLU has the private will of “computer technology millionaires” and the public commitment, it has “yet to develop an interactive community of firms and public research organizations that mirrors the dynamics of the Boston, San Francisco Bay Area, and San Diego regions,” which dominate the biotech industry.
42 Schumpeter is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6.
43 This argument is grounded in Hume’s (1985, 88) assertion that “[r]eason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or
In any case, this notion of innovation applies to many of the organizations calling SLU home, and is thus potentially one of the characteristics of the preconceptual field that ties together knowledge established in other fields. This marks a relationship of *concomitance* to the broader systems of knowledge being harnessed in new and potentially profitable ways. For example, natural sciences – primarily life sciences – underpin the endeavors of organizations such as the Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, the Seattle Cancer Care Alliance, the University of Washington (UW), PATH, the Institute for Systems Biology, Seattle Biomedical Research Institute, Novo Nordisk, and the Allen Institute for Brain Science, while computer science is the raw material for companies like Amazon, Glympse, (which recently relocated to Capitol Hill) and Rooster Park. Of course, these organizations do not operate solely within one system of knowledge, but instead mix them in different intensities: UW Medicine, for example, is extremely dependent on using highly sophisticated instruments and processes to “expand understanding of disease etiology and physiological functions via imaging” (UW Medicine Department of Radiology n.d.) while PATH has developed simple technologies, such as their vaccine vial monitor, which is a small sticker that changes colors to indicate if a heat-sensitive vaccine has been damaged in transit from labs to remote clinics (PATH n.d.). These two areas of knowledge also explicitly cross in the degree programs offered by the local branch of Northeastern University, which is located in SLU.45

Subsidiary to these larger organizations, there are a range of local services that also draw on particular knowledge systems and trade in their own types of innovation: self-care in the form

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exotic spa treatments\textsuperscript{46} and exercise programs\textsuperscript{47}; communications and public relations firms that combine a range of “creatives” – programmers, artists, and strategists, for example – to offer fresh experiences of brands; and a broader set of designers and builders that create the spaces where the innovation happens: the architecture firm Weber Thompson, occupies part of the Terry Thomas building which it designed and is notable for its sustainable choices of passive cooling over central air conditioning, reduced lighting, sunshades, automated blinds, and a reflective roof (Weber Thompson 2015). The firm’s neighbor, Innovative Dentistry, notes the connection between their location in a LEED Gold Certified building and their “broad spectrum of dental services, from general dentistry to restorative and cosmetic dentistry options, including dental implants, teeth whitening, and porcelain dental veneers” (Innovative Dentistry 2015). They even have a therapy dog, for those with anxiety. From the archaeological perspective, the point is that these various actors’ discourses all refer back to innovative assemblages of different forms of knowledge.

This dalliance with the notion of innovation is, of course, not limited to the private sector, but also describes an official commitment at all scales of government. To his credit, Bob Jessop has brought Schumpeter’s emphasis on innovation into the realm of State Theory, arguing that the postwar Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) as the “mode of regulation” for the Fordist “regime of accumulation,” has been replaced by the Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime

\textsuperscript{46} Banya 5 offers a “unique blend of hydrotherapy, body treatments and old world wellness rituals” (Banya 5 n.d.) while Vida Spa combines Ayurveda medicine, Reiki therapy (a combination of homeopathy, naturopathy, aromatherapy, meditation and energy transfer), Swedish deep tissue massage, infrared therapy, and acupressure (Vida Spa).

\textsuperscript{47} The Bar Method combines the Lotte Berk exercise technique, physical therapy, and a specific pedagogy (The Bar Method) while Flywheel uses custom bikes arranged in stadium seating, as well as performance metrics and tracking that can be piped to large displays to stoke competition among participants (Flywheel n.d.).
Although he presents a nuanced argument for this conception of the state, one element is of particular interest here: “it seeks to promote international competitiveness and sociotechnical innovation through supply-side policies in relatively open economies” (2002, 459). This perspective on the state does not reduce the state to the mere handmaiden of capitalist accumulation but instead identifies four strategies for how states intervene in the neoliberalizing global economy: intensifying neoliberal policymaking, strengthening states management of the economy (neostatism), rebalancing cooperation and competition (neocorporatism), or deliberation (neocommutarianism) (Jessop 2002, 461).

Policies and rhetoric supporting the notion of innovation that could be sorted into these groups abound across all the scales of government. The federal government, for example, had been investing in scientific research since the end of World War II, but had been adamant that patents arising from federally funded research were federal property, “and would only be non-exclusively licensed” (Stevens 2004, 94). Consequently, fewer than 5% of the 28,000 government-owned patents had been licensed to industry in 1980 (The Economist, 2002). That same year, the Bayh-Dole Act changed this drastically by giving universities and small business the right to these patents, thus transforming “universities across America [into] hotbeds of innovation, as entrepreneurial professors took their inventions (and graduate students) off campus to set up companies of their own” (Ibid.; cf. Rabinow 1996).

The state of Washington is similarly invested in the concept of innovation: “Governor [Jay] Inslee’s top priority is to create an economic climate where innovation and entrepreneurship can continue to thrive and create good-paying jobs in every corner of our state”

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48 These concepts will be addressed at greater length in Chapter 6 during the discussion of political economy and innovation as discourses that regulate what has been said with respect to SLU.
(WA Commerce n.d.), a commitment which is reflected in preexisting programs such as the previously discussed Innovation Partnership Zones (IPZs), which link up researchers, potential employees, and companies in a defined geographic area to facilitate the development of high-tech clusters. Another state effort, Innovate Washington, was created in 2011 through a merger between the Washington Technology Center and the Spokane Intercollegiate Research and Technology Institute with the intention developing “strategies to help tech companies accelerate the development and growth of technology in the Inland Northwest” (Spitzer 2014). It was awarded a federal i6 Green Challenge grant in 2011 to study the implementation of green energy technology in the built environment, and although it was shut down by the legislature in early 2014 and reincorporated as a nonprofit organization, it is currently building the Smart Buildings Center with host of partners, including the PSRC (Vamsi 2015).

The PSRC’s aforementioned Regional Economic Strategy (Prosperity Partnership 2012) also emphasizes the importance of innovation in the dominant industry sectors in the Central Puget Sound Region. Of particular importance is the Aerospace industry, anchored by Boeing, and the Information Technology cluster that has sprouted up alongside Microsoft and Amazon, the last of which is obviously implicated in SLU. However, other innovation industries – Life Sciences and Global Health, Philanthropy, Clean Technology (techniques and equipment necessary for constructing green buildings) and even Business Services (which are crucial for patents, commercialization, and advertising) – also figure heavily in SLU’s landscape. The entire strategy is organized around four foundations for cultivating these types of activities in the region – education and workforce development, a welcoming business climate, supporting

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Aerospace, Business Services, Clean Technology, Information Technology, Life Sciences and Global Health, Maritime, Military, Philanthropies, Tourism and Visitors, Transportation and Logistics (Prosperity Partnership 2012, 8-11). The document also mentions defining education and innovative retail as two additional industry clusters (Ibid., 23).
entrepreneurship and innovation, and investing in infrastructure – and a fifth that focuses on the quality of life for existing and prospective employees (Ibid., 47-53).

The notion of innovation also has a strong foothold at the municipal scale that has morphed from a haphazardly utilized term to an official orientation over the last 30 years. Former Mayor Greg Nickels (2002-2010), who played a key role in accommodating Vulcan’s desire to reshape SLU into a hub biotech, often invokes innovation to promote its early promises:

Seattle is an innovative city with a rich history of active entrepreneurs. We are investing in the South Lake Union neighborhood to support our growing life sciences cluster and foster the next wave of innovative discoveries in the biotech and biomedical fields. The City is proud to be a partner in this work that will benefit not only citizens in Seattle, but people all over the world (Seattle Office of Economic Development 2007).

In his 2008 State of the City message, entitled “A City of Innovation,” Nickels notes “a trait that runs deep in the foundation of Seattle’s soul – innovation” (Nickels 2008). Throughout the speech, he is clear that his definition of innovation is not one of newness for its own sake, but rather that “[i]nnovation must have a purpose – to make a difference in people's lives” (Ibid.). He continues to celebrate Seattle’s accomplishments – “Housing First” buildings, which do not require the chronically homeless to be sober; the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement51; contemporary efforts to make Seattle the capital of Green Buildings; pedestrian safety via automated traffic cameras; creating jobs “embracing our need to save the planet”; reducing gun violence; adding open spaces over reservoirs; and even providing innovative municipal customer service – before concluding that the “spirit of innovation is the very foundation on which this community has grown and prospered” (Ibid.).

51 Nickels launched this program in 2005. Participating cities commit to meet or exceed Kyoto Protocol targets for carbon dioxide emissions, urge state and federal governments to do the same, and to push for a national carbon emission trading system (United States Conference of Mayors).
From the archaeologist’s perspective, it is of no concern that such discourse is of the rhetorical stump speech variety because it is an articulation, a repackaging, or a different mode of the other “serious” statements that are circulating at the same time. In short, it is part of the same immanent consistency of discourse, even if it is an element that one might dismiss as rhetoric. Since the late 1980s, the City Council has regularly pursued policies that focus on innovation in arenas as diverse as high-tech infrastructure, policing, the new downtown waterfront design and its attendant public outreach process, affordable housing, immigration, transportation, health care, food security, and education. Specifically, its identification of “the global health sector as a critical component of the city's and region's diverse economy and one of the many economic sectors where Seattle is competitively positioned to create new jobs, attract new businesses, and commercialize innovation” leads the city to act in particular ways to support this kind of work, such as authorizing an application on PATH’s behalf for state funding to help build an “innovation center” in the SLU IPZ (Resolution 31168).

This orientation becomes generalized in the wake of the 2008 recession, when the city council adopts “The Guiding Principles and the Key Priorities, Goals, and Actions for achieving Economic Renewal and Development in the City of Seattle” (Resolution 31282). Although this document proffers a wide range of foci – including quality of life, a hospitable and responsive business climate, a resilient and sustainable local economy, infrastructure investment, collaboration and civic leadership, education, and adaptive strategies – that will be explored in Chapter 6, here our primary interest is in its orientation toward innovation. Crucially, it does not eschew social commitments. Instead, “[t]he City’s long term economic development strategies

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52 PATH, whose tagline is “Driving transformative innovation to save lives,” did not receive the state funding and none of the members of the SLU IPZ have to date. PATH, however, receives much of its funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation: over $246 million in 2014 and $2.2 billion in grants to date (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2015).
will be integrated with the values and goals expressed in the City’s Comprehensive Plan. Building local capacities for economic production and innovation will be a key priority” (Ibid.). Moreover, “[t]he City supports pro-active policies that retain and create employment, businesses, industry sectors, and innovation in Seattle” (Ibid.). This orientation toward innovation courses through other recent legislation, including the guiding principles for the new comprehensive plan – which is being developed at the time of this writing and seeks to “[e]ncourage great design and innovation” (Resolution 31370) – even though the concept’s hegemony might be challenged in the twilight of 2014, when the Council shifts toward another buzzword, resolving that Seattle continues to become a Safe, Vibrant, Interconnected, and Affordable City – where a Vibrant City is defined as “one that supports innovation, education, economic development and the environment” (Resolution 31557).

To sum up, I have tracked how heterogeneous discourses are related through their shared relationship to another concept altogether: innovation. I have noted how private industry, the service economy, and governance from the federal level down to SLU adopt innovation as a common pursuit. This is significant unifying force for these discourses and therefore attests to how the Coordinated City’s discursive formation is held together.

5.3.3 Practical Connections

The final pass through the archive focuses on the practical techniques that draw diverse statements together, such as rewriting, transcribing, and translating. This involves asking how notions like innovation, creativity, and sustainability make their way from the spheres of business and economics, the arts, and environmental sciences into governmental policy. However, it is important to note that this aspect of archaeology differs from the tracking logical relationships – how the City of Seattle, PATH, and everything from spa treatments to dentistry
refer to the notion of innovation, for example – in that it focuses on the concrete practices that draw various documents together. This perspective is crucial for the analysis because it directs attention to the mechanics of integration, or how the Coordinated City’s discursive machinations actually work.

In terms of successive logical connections, I have shown how coordinated planning processes have moved from a centralized and reactive effort that identifies the historical development of particular problems and proposes comprehensive solutions, into a proactive strategy that begins with principles and distributes the responsibility for creating solutions that further them across a wide range of subsidiary groups. In terms of coexisting logical connections, I have shown how synchronic movements involving other forms of knowledge – biology, computer science, self-care, and design – have become concomitant to the notion of innovation. Now the task is to determine some of the concrete discursive regularities that have established relationships between these statements. At least four discursive regularities that establish relationships between heterogeneous statements can be identified: explicit reference to other documents (through quotation, rewriting, excerpting sketches, etc.); a pattern of optimization; the shift from prescriptive to performance-based regulatory criteria; and the reference to and the operationalization of guiding principles.

First, there is the explicit reference to other documents, which sometimes takes the form of citing a document wholesale or, in the case of design proposals, inserting sketches from guiding documents like the *UDF*, but more often consists of rewriting specific passages from relevant regulatory frameworks. This occurs in many different ways, but an example highlights the process. Seattle’s Comprehensive Plan opens by rewriting requirements from Washington State, King County, as well as the city council, and opens thus:
The initial building blocks of the Comprehensive Plan are the “elements” required by the state’s Growth Management Act: land use, transportation, housing, capital facilities and utilities. King County’s Countywide Planning Policies require the addition of an economic development element, and the Seattle Framework Policies (Resolution 28535) inspired the inclusion of a neighborhood planning element when the plan was first adopted in 1994. The Framework Policies also inspired the later additions of a Human Development element and an Environmental element to the plan (DPD 2005, v).

Any number of design proposals published by developers and architects – particularly by Vulcan and their consultants – reference regulatory documents through various techniques. For example, in Vulcan’s proposal for twin office buildings at 300 & 333 8th Ave N., their architects mark out the “heart” areas that the UDF (2010, 10) defines as “anchors for the community [that] give form to the neighborhood”; label streets according to official classifications and the South Lake Union Street Concept Plans (Seattle DPD 2013c) (Fig. 5.2); and denote established height limits, setbacks, and view corridors.

This practice is, of course, not limited to Vulcan. Macfarlane Partners, for example – who are developing a nearby mixed-use project at the corner of Westlake and John (visible in Fig. 5.2.) – also explicitly reference the Seattle Design Guidelines (Seattle DPD 2013a) in their design proposal (Fig. 5.3). Regarding safety and security, for example, the Guidelines stipulate that nonresidential street-level uses have transparent glazing while residential spaces have both setbacks from the sidewalk and more opaque windows (Ibid. 13, 25 inter alia). This language is explicitly integrated into the proposal under the “street personality” design theme,
Fig. 5.2. Vulcan’s 8th Avenue Projects with references to the Urban Design Framework
(Vulcan and Graphite Design Group 2014)

Fig. 5.3. 201 Westlake + John design proposal directly referencing the Seattle Design Guidelines
(Macfarlane Partners and Ankrom Moisan Architects, Inc. 2013)

- Transparent base
- Strong vertical bays along street edge
- Wide sidewalks with benches, planters & bike parking to encourage pedestrian activity
- Awnings span entire street edge
- Setback at level 5 to reduce facade scale from street
- Focus of the residential facade is the base and street edge
- Higher opacity facade for privacy
- More landscaping provided along this edge
- Residential entry highlighted with awning and change in materials
and illustrates how much the municipal design criteria guide how the new developments look and function.

These two examples clearly do not exhaust the number of references between regulatory and design documents but are simply intended to demonstrate how the practice of referencing and rewriting ties together statements produced by different collective actors, thereby “thickening” the connections between multiple documents and contributing to the consistency of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation. Moreover, it is also important to note that this process does not only involve a literal citation of the regulatory criteria. A closer examination of Vulcan’s proposal for the 8th Avenue project not only cites the UDF’s conceptualization of neighborhood hearts, but also distributes them linearly along Terry Avenue, Westlake Avenue, and Harrison Street instead of centering them on important intersections or neighborhood amenities, as the UDF does for commercial districts and neighborhood parks (Fig. 5.4). This invocation and transformation of design criteria attests to the dynamic relationships among the different collective agents producing SLU. It is less a matter of either the City or Vulcan directing the other, but is instead a case of constant struggling toward a configuration that is desirable for both entities, according to criteria that are immanent to each group. In other words, it is a trial and error search for resonance.

Second, there is a recurring pattern of functional optimization, which begins with a multiplicity in which more than one option that satisfies regulatory demands is presented and assessed, with one being deemed the “preferred alternative” (Fig. 5.5). This is always the case in Environmental Impact Statements, which are prepared by public entities, but is also used in the design proposal process, which is undertaken by developers and their consultants. In another mode, there is the set of citywide and neighborhood specific design guidelines, out of which
proposed design documents must address an “appropriate” number. A number of tradeoffs are made in all these configurations, however, the important point here is that the relationship of coordination is not only maintained but *strengthened* though these constant modulations.

Fig. 5.4. Gateways, Hearts, and Edges in the *Urban Design Framework* (Seattle DPD 2010, 11)
The case of Vulcan’s 8th Avenue Projects is especially interesting because it not only follows this general pattern but also reflects a significant metamorphosis of the City’s vision for this corridor. The *South Lake Union Street Concept Plans* (2013c) note that the character of this area is established by Denny Park – which is located one block to the south of this project – as well as the canopy of mature sweet gum trees that line 8th Avenue and the open plaza at the UW Medicine campus two blocks to the north. Building on early shared visions of this as a residential area (cf. Soulmoto n.d.-a) between the commercial districts along Westlake Avenue North and Dexter Avenue North (see Fig 5.2 for a map), not to mention the 2013 rezone which permits 240’ residential towers, the *Concept Plans* offer a plan for shared use streets where “people are comfortable using the space for ‘staying’ activities – sitting, eating, playing, gardening, visiting neighbors and other desired uses by people who live nearby” (Seattle DPD 2013c, 18). In particular, it invokes “street rooms” as one way to accommodate these uses (Fig. 5.6). These rooms are presented in various typologies that focus on creating space for lingering: benches, planters, space for barbecue grills, play equipment for children, and so on. Vulcan’s proposal for this area certainly adopts this vision – as can be seen in “Option 3,” their preferred alternative (Fig. 5.5) – but with one crucial difference: these two buildings are not residential but are instead
office buildings. To complicate matters, Vulcan also requested a waiver for a $528,000 permit fee for the project, in exchange for providing the open space, or what City Councilmember Mike O’Brien, the lone critic of the offer, calls a “corporate park” that will serve the buildings’ tenants rather than residents (Feit 2015).

This leads directly into the third intervention that ties these documents together: the shift away from prescriptive to performance-based regulatory criteria. The design guidelines are performance-based – that is they invoke qualitative and relational terminology to describe how a building should fit into its environment – and for this reason a project may request “departures” from the prescriptive Land Use Code, which often uses quantitative and absolute indices to control aspects such as property line setbacks and building separation. For example, Vulcan’s proposal for two office buildings along 8th Avenue argues that setbacks greater than the Land
Use Code’s prescribed 12’ maximum and less landscaping than its minimum – which requires that “each setback area shall be planted with trees, shrubs, and grass or evergreen cover” (Seattle Municipal Code 23.48.055.B.2) – contributes to larger and more flexible open spaces, natural light, and more visually appealing design (Vulcan and Graphite Design Group 2014, A-98-A-101). This, again, is an important transformation of the web of regulation because it invokes a design standard – the Concept Plans (Seattle DPD 2013c) – as the basis for a challenge to the Municipal Code. However, what is not explicitly referenced is that the Street Concept Plans were prepared when this block was envisioned as a residential corridor, and the “street rooms” that were meant to serve prospective residential units that are now being reworked into amenities for office buildings. This transformation expresses Vulcan’s capacity to draw together its own financial imperatives – which in this case means capitalizing on the high rents that office tenants, specifically technology firms are willing to pay to be in the area (cf. Bhatt 2015b)– with other quality of life concerns into an emerging urban form that blurs the boundaries between an office park, a university campus, and a mixed-use neighborhood.

Fourth and finally, this set of documents is often marked by the reference to and the operationalization of guiding principles. Much like the translation that designers perform by moving from a set of design guidelines, client requests, and their own expertise to a visual representation of a building, policy documents often embark from a set of principles (in the case of Seattle’s Comprehensive Plan) or, in what amounts to the same thing, Legislative Findings in the case of the GMA. The Comprehensive Plan, for example, begins with four values: community, environmental stewardships, economic development and security, and social equity (Seattle DPD 2005, v), while the GMA cites legislative findings concurring that uncheck growth threatens “the environment, sustainable economic development, and the health, safety, and high
quality of life” (RCW 36.70A.010) of citizens across the state. The ensuing documents are an exercise in elaborating the principles into a framework that can be repeatedly invoked and linked up with other documents. Specific project proposals also frequently perform this same sort of elaboration and translation, either from a set of rational principles or from inspiration (Figures 5.7 & 5.8).

**Formal Concept**
Cradle & Guide vs. Capture & Focus

The cradling gesture blurs the edge of the mid block room while still accomplishing the intention of neighborhood open space and integrated street design. A heavy emphasis is placed on preserving and providing air & light to the existing large ‘Sweet Gum’ tree canopy at 8th Ave N.

**Fig. 5.7. Design Concept for Vulcan’s 8th Avenue Buildings**

Finally, it is important to note that even though these processes of intervention connect the documents at hand, it is far from a seamless interaction, as the existence of departures from the Land Use Code attests. It is, in fact, a much more contentious interaction that will be explored in greater depth in the following chapter, when we turn to the broader discourses that govern what is actually said with respect to the production of SLU. The point here, however, is that we can understand the mechanics of the integration process by looking at the specific practices through which the documents are connected to one another, and without which these documents would have no recognizable interconnection.
5.4 Final Remark on Techniques

Herein I have established parallels between how concepts emerge in different fields, diachronically and synchronically, through both logical and practical connections. The primary form of succession that I have mapped shows how efforts to address environmental problems related to land use fracture from centralized, integrated, and reactive efforts to highly decentralized, coordinated, and proactive efforts to anticipate and prevent such problems without restricting growth or economic development. I have examined how Metro addressed the problem of water pollution in Lake Washington by investigating the sewer system at a regional scale, and progressed to examine how land use and environmental planning has followed in its path, but by delegating responsibilities to a much wider range of actors, both inside and outside of government. In fact, drawing on the discussion of collective actors in the first part of this chapter, it makes more sense to abandon the binary between governmental and nongovernmental
actors together, and instead think in terms of collective actors or assemblages. Second, an investigation of coexistence must establish ties between various simultaneous activities. Here I invoked Foucault’s notion of concomitance, which means paying attention to how heterogeneous discourses share a relationship to another concept altogether. I traced how private industry, the service economy, and governance related to SLU were adopting innovation as a common pursuit. Finally, I tracked four discursive regularities that establish relationships between heterogeneous statements: explicit reference to other documents (through quotation, rewriting, excerpting sketches, etc.); a pattern of functional optimization; the shift from prescriptive to performance-based regulatory criteria; and the reference to and the operationalization of guiding principles. The central point here is that one can track common elements among altogether different undertakings, such as governance, high-technology and high-value industry, and service industries by looking at shared aspects of their individual constitutions.

By looking at these diverse documents from an archaeological perspective, it is possible to see that the discursive framework that directs the urbanization process in SLU is a unique and localized historical product with a wide variety of extraeconomic concerns. This is not at all to say that it is not at the same time intimately related to worldwide economic machinations – as is evident in the commitment to the innovation economy and building office buildings along 8th Avenue that command higher rents and lower construction costs than residential towers, for example – but is instead to emphasize that there is a set of productive emergent values and concerns that guides the realization of the neighborhood that cannot be easily reduced to increasingly unfettered global capitalism. To do so would be to discount the texture and consistency that can be tracked through these documents, all of which play a central piloting role when considering how SLU has emerged. One final step of the archaeology remains, however,
and involves taking a step back and trying to understand the broader discourses that limit what has been said here and in the previous chapter, as well as identifying a set of immanent alternatives to the form of coordinated urbanization taking place in SLU.
CHAPTER 6. DEFINING THE COORDINATED CITY: POLITICAL ECONOMY, ETHICS, AND AESTHETICS

The final element of this empirical study involves moving from the discursive formation that I have sketched over the last two chapters to the broader set of discourses that regulate what statements have been produced with respect to coordinated urbanization in SLU. It is important to note that these three emergent categories – political economy, ethics, and aesthetics – were not predetermined, but rather, have been discovered through the investigation of immanent statements related to SLU. Of course, I embarked on this project with the idea that there was much more to contemporary urbanization than could be described solely in terms of political economy – that is one reason why I was drawn to Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy – but I did not have this or any other particular ensemble in mind.

Moreover, at this broad level, beyond the limits of SLU, I can loosen my methodological reliance on Foucault’s archaeology briefly, and look at these regulating discourses as indicative of the processes that Deleuze and Guattari consider to define social formations. They write:

We define social formations by *machinic processes* and not by modes of production (these on the contrary depend on the processes). Thus primitive societies are defined by mechanisms of prevention-anticipation; State societies are defined by apparatuses of capture; urban societies, by instruments of polarization; nomadic societies, by war machines; and finally international, or rather ecumenical, organizations are defined by the encompassment of heterogeneous social formations (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 435).

This excerpt is essential to understanding why Deleuze and Guattari provide a rich framework for the project at hand. They clearly stake out room for the overwhelming force of capitalism – it is, in fact, one of the international or ecumenical organizations – but not without saying that it nevertheless accompanies “heterogeneous social formations.” It is precisely this heterogeneity –
this set of machinic processes that regulates how capital is actualized in the built environment—that is the object of study here, and the archaeological method has provided the tools to identify individual discussions surrounding the criteria for this realization (Chapter 4) and the various ways they are related to one another (Chapter 5).

The question now, however, is one of determining how this distribution of discourses is produced and regulated. My aim is to illustrate that although only particular statements have been produced with respect to SLU, this does not mean that they are the only ones that were possible. I reinforce this assertion in two stages. In the first, I identify two examples from SLU’s discourse wherein incompatible distinctions emerge, in an effort to make it clear that a discursive formation can contain antagonistic elements: affordable housing vs. luxury housing and a locally oriented economy vs. a globally competitive economy. The second stage involves reflecting back on the distinct discourses that emerged in Chapter 4 (land use and character, institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life), generalizing them into the three categories that define this chapter (political economy, ethics, and aesthetics), and distinguishing between which elements of those broader discourses are successfully realized in SLU and which elements remain virtual.²

This second task forms the main portion of this chapter and serves as a moment of generalization from the concrete details of SLU’s discourse into terms that can be transformed into a more general theory in Chapter 7. In parallel, this is also crucial for satisfying the first element of Brenner’s definition of critical urban theory:

> It is characterized by epistemological and philosophical reflections; the development of formal concepts, generalizations about historical trends; deductive and inductive modes of argumentation; and diverse forms of historical potentiality.

² For Deleuze, the virtual is best understood not as a set of possibilities but rather as unactualized potentiality (cf. Deleuze 1994, 191, 208 *inter alia*).
analysis. It may also build upon concrete research, that is upon an evidentiary basis, whether organized through traditional or critical methods (Brenner 2009, 201).

The second, third, and fourth elements of Brenner’s definition of critical urban theory should also be revisited here. His second criterion asserts that critical theory is reflexive in that it is a product of, and directed toward, specific sociohistorical circumstances, and is therefore easily met by the bounded spatiotemporal frame of this research.

Brenner’s third criterion, however, is not so easy to meet as it formulated, for it demands explicit normative orientations in both practical and political registers. As I have discussed in previous chapters and continue to discuss below, SLU’s development is marked by a richer sense of ethics than traditional urban development – as a confluence of ideas about what kind of urban development can provide economic development and without endangering the natural environment – but my ontological and methodological choices complicate things. Ontologically, I would betray the Deleuzian commitment to immanence if I were to posit normative criteria at the outset. As Daniel Smith (2003, 308) writes, “The error of transcendence would be to posit normative criteria as abstract universals, even if these are defined in intersubjective or communicative terms.”

Alternatively, he notes:

[I]t is the process itself that must account for both the production of the norm as well as its possible destruction or alteration. In a given assemblage, one will indeed find normative criteria that govern, for instance, the application of the power of the State, but one will also find the means for the critique and modification of those norms, their deterritorialization (Ibid.).

Therefore, normative criteria must evolve through the analysis of SLU. As I demonstrate in this chapter, each of the three emergent categories – political economy, ethics, and aesthetics – has a normativity that unfolds in the sense that particular approaches to urbanization are adopted and

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3 Smith’s essay is a critical review of Paul Patton’s *Deleuze and the Political* (2000).
replicated. However, at the same time, my identification of unrealized alternatives provides the critical moment that Smith argues is key to Deleuzoguattarian thought: the ability to modify existing norms. Methodologically, following Foucault’s archaeological method has demanded that I bracket my own normative judgments in order to track the emergent ethical orientations that have informed the production of the neighborhood. Foucault has been critiqued for his own “normative confusion” (cf. Fraser 1981), particularly in his later work, but the approach that I have taken here – only using Foucault’s method to systematically establish the dimensions of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation, only to “import” this set of discourse into a Deleuzoguattarian analytical framework – renders this criticism unrelated to my project. In sum, and in contradistinction to Brenner, I did not begin the research with a transcendent normativity in mind – a critique of capitalist urbanization, in his case – but instead I let SLU’s normativity and alternatives to it (my own normativity) emerge. These alternatives are introduced below and developed throughout the chapter.

Finally, Brenner’s fourth point – that critical theory focuses on the disjuncture between actual forms of oppression/domination and the underlying possibilities of emancipation – is explicitly addressed here. Although I am using the language of actualization in lieu of oppression or domination, the exploration of alternatives here is intended to show that coordinated urbanization need not proceed the way it has in SLU.

The key point here, which emerges from the previous two chapters, is that the Coordinated City’s discursive formation cannot exist without at least all three of these elements, and therefore it cannot be reduced to the political economy that fuels critical urban theory. As the previous two chapters illustrate, there are rarely discussions of economic development in SLU – or, for that matter, in the Central Puget Sound Region – that do not also address extraeconomic
concerns, or vice-versa (See Fig. A3.2, in Appendix 3, for a visualization of these relationships). Speaking like Deleuze and Guattari: *there is heterogeneity across social formations, and machinic processes define it*, even if capitalism underpins them all, even if they function to realize capitalism in different ways. Moreover, and most importantly for future work, any theory of an alternative form of urbanization must engage these three elements. In order to substantiate this claim, I examine both the majoritarian discourses in these three dimensions that have been taken up in SLU’s discourses, as well as the minoritarian discourses which represent a limit, or better, a true alternative to the form of urbanization that is occurring in SLU, as well as my own normativity. For political economy, the dominant discourses are those of neoliberalism and innovation economics, which I primarily address by invoking studies that are critical of these concepts (Brenner and Theodore 2002a; Harvey 1989a, 2005; Jessop 1993, 2002; Peck and Tickell 1994a, 1994b, 2002; Smith 2002), but which celebratory discourses also help illuminate (Katz and Wagner 2014; Katz et al. 2015; Schumpeter 2009). The limit case here, and the political economic dimension of my own normativity, is constituted by what Eugene Holland (2011) calls – in an unfaithful rereading and synthesis of Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Marx, among others – “free market communism.”

In terms of the discourses of ethics that regulate how SLU has been produced, I discuss a range of systems: an entrepreneurial virtue ethic (Harvey 2005, 2008; Keil 2009; Treanor 2005); the normative commitments of Critical Urban Theory, which focus on knowledge production rather than urbanization itself (Brenner et al 2011; Rankin 2012; Wachsmuth et al. 2011); a broader ensemble of moral sentiments that blurs the line between the public and private spheres (Schoolman 1987); Joseph Schumpeter’s (2009) hybrid of utilitarianism and virtue ethics that is accompanied by his demolition of religious deontology; and various forms of conscientious
capitalism, proffered by allegedly enlightened capital enthusiasts (Hurd and Hurd 2012; Mackey and Sisodia 2013). The limit case to this dimension of discourses is primarily sketched by references to two other thinkers – Susan Fainstein’s (2010) attempt to formulate a substantial theory of urban justice based on equity, democracy, and difference, as well as Adrian Parr’s (2009) discussion of sustainability culture – but I also briefly engage with even more distant alternatives (Hardt and Negri 2009; Purcell 2013, and The Situationist International, broadly). This constellation of alternatives defines the broader set of values constituting my idea of what a city ought to be.

Finally, the discourses on aesthetics – which, again, I am using in the Greek sense of aesthēsis, or the general perception of something through all the bodily senses – are organized around two parallel narratives on growth management policy (Chapin 2012) and the moral bases of urban planning (Fainstein 2010), and are limited by the provocative urban visions proffered by the Lettrist International and the Situationist International (Chtccheglov 1953; de Béarn et al 1998; Debord 1955, 1958, 1994; Pinder 2005). I provisionally adopt these visions of urban space as my own normative vision of urban space, but I have an ambivalent relationship with these groups: whereas I recoil at Constant’s megastructures (Fig. 6.4), I am filled with joy by Chtcheglov’s visions of neighborhoods organized around affective states. As a whole, these two groups provide the most desirable (for me) connection between the human “soul” and urban space that I have encountered thus far, but I am convinced that we can do even better.

These three axes that emerge from SLU’s discourse – political economy, ethics, and aesthetics – express the unique open, temporary, and immanent totality of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation. They make no claim to an enclosed totality that could have been
sketched at the outset by predetermined and transcendent principles, but instead unfold through consistent and methodical engagement with the discourses producing SLU.

6.1 Coexisting Incompatibilities: Housing and Economy in SLU

Before moving “up” from the concrete level of discourses in SLU to the more general level of discourses that regulate what kind of statements can be made in SLU, it is illuminating to briefly focus on some specific incompatibilities in order to emphasize that this discursive formation is not only held together by the forms of knowledge, actors, and techniques described in the previous chapter, but is also wrought with tensions. After this has been established, the movement of generalization that leads to the discursive struggles beyond the realm of SLU should be easier to conceptualize. At the empirical level, each of these contradictory elements spawns its own discursive sub-group, of which some statements are taken up, repeated, transformed, and acted upon, while others essentially lie dormant.

Revisiting the empirical archive described in Chapter 4, there are at least five different emergent points of incompatibility in SLU: housing (affordable vs. luxury), economic focus (local vs. global), infrastructure (pro- vs. anti-Streetcar, for example), open space (pro- vs. anti-Seattle Commons), and character (modest, historic, mixed-use vs. high intensity new development focused on employment). Herein, I examine the first two for the sake of brevity, and because the point is not to belabor the contradictions, but is rather to show that they exist, and that one side typically proliferates at the expense of the other(s).

The Cascade Neighborhood Council (CNC)’s design guidelines (1997), as well as the adopted neighborhood plan – which was prepared by the South Lake Union Planning Organization (SLUPO 1998) – specifically call for affordable housing in the neighborhood. The Comprehensive Plan sets goals for a range of housing options “that are diverse in their
composition and income” and are “attractive to workers in South Lake Union, to enable people to live near their jobs” (Seattle DPD 2005, 8.161), as well as a list of policies encouraging such housing and the investment in amenities for the community. These goals and policies are copied verbatim into the most recent Neighborhood Plan (Seattle DPD 2007), where they inform a wide range of strategies for promoting affordable housing.\(^4\)

Simultaneously, however, many statements circulate that not only neglect affordable housing, but unapologetically advance luxury market-rate housing. A 1-bedroom, 1-bathroom unit for sale in late 2014 for $625,000 in Vulcan’s Enso Condominiums, for example, is presented thus:

Enso defines luxurious and sustainable living (LEED Gold certified), and this penthouse home with captivating views of Lake Union, the Space Needle, the Olympic Mountains and Puget Sound offers you an oasis in the city. Your gourmet kitchen boasts Miele and Sub-Zero appliances, and state-of-the-art design graces every room. Next to Whole Foods, restaurants, and all that South Lake Union has to offer. Welcome to a truly unique urban home in one of Seattle's most thriving neighborhoods (IDX Northwest).

Similar statements crisscross the archive of advertisements for residential housing in the neighborhood, while the explicit focus on luxury is sometimes replaced by concepts guiding architectural design, such as inner focus/introspection or high energy/adventure – as in the case of a pair of buildings channeling the hestial space of the hearth and the hermetic space of movement (cf. Casey 1993, 132-142) – or just plain fashion consciousness (Fig. 6.1).

These incompatible points regarding housing in SLU do not, of course, exist in separate vacuums; instead they come into direct contact with one another and interact in a tangled

\(^4\) The strategies include incentive zoning (where developers either provide affordable housing or pay in-lieu fees for the right to build taller buildings), tax exemptions, adaptive reuse of existing buildings, public acquisition or support of existing privately-owned affordable housing, tracking new funding sources for subsidies, assisting employers develop assistance programs, rezoning to allow housing and commercial uses across the entire neighborhood, and encouraging residential enclaves near existing amenities like Denny Park (Seattle DPD 2007, 65-72)
relationship. This discursive formation’s set of relationships corresponding to the recent rezone is especially illuminating. The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) (Seattle DPD 2011) lays out three alternatives for providing sufficient capacity to accommodate the Comprehensive Plan’s growth targets. Broadly, these three alternatives relate to incentive zoning provisions that allow increased building heights in exchange for affordable housing and community amenities (as discussed in the previous chapter). Alternative 1 allowed the greatest building height increases: up to 400’ in height along the southern edge of the neighborhood, and from 240’-300’ tall across much of the remaining neighborhood. Vulcan, of course, supported this alternative and provided a comprehensive response advocating for its adoption that warrants closer attention.

Fig. 6.1. Conceptual photographs from recently proposed residential projects in SLU (AMLI and GGLO 2013; MacFarlane Partners and Ankrom Moisan Architects 2013)

The guiding thread of Vulcan’s official response to the DEIS is their utilitarian belief that this alternative “serves the greater good” by “accommodating growth while minimizing public investments in infrastructure,” creating a “high-quality built environment and public realm” and
“more new jobs and housing,” and pursuing “the most cost effective way to combat climate change” (Healey 2011). Although Vulcan challenges the City’s analysis on many points that render Alternative 1 as less than desirable, of particular interest here is Vulcan’s assertion that the City’s claim that the rezone would endanger existing affordable housing is incorrect. Through Vulcan’s own unit count, arguments for preservation strategies, and an expanded definition of “affordable housing,” they argue that only 1.2% of the existing affordable housing is at risk of being displaced (Seattle DPD 2012, 4-1, Letter 89). Moreover, Vulcan also concludes that the proposed incentive zoning program – which begins to charge developers $15.15 per square foot of real estate above 85’ in SLU, while these rates do not apply until a building exceeds 290’ in the downtown zone – is unfair and would make the exact same building 2.5 times more expensive to build in SLU than directly across Denny Way, in downtown (Ibid.). Lastly, Vulcan provides a list of general comments, arguing that specific design features (such as mid-block connectors) should be incentivized rather than required and asserts that massing renderings accompanying the EIS are misleading because they do not reflect the architectural details of what new construction would actually look like. Vulcan’s insistence for taller height limits along the southern shore of Lake Union peaks with the aforementioned R.I.S.E. program (Real Investment in Social Equity), which involved turning over a 1.5-acre property to the city, replete with a 370,000 square-foot campus including everything from affordable housing to job training to a community kitchen – a $10 million value (Vulcan 2013).

Again, Mayor McGinn, endorsed a plan with similar height limits – which is reflected in the Director’s Report (Seattle DPD 2013b) – but the City Council ultimately decided to allow the 400’ tall residential buildings along the southern edge of the neighborhood, 240’ tall buildings across most of the rest of the neighborhood, and a moderate height increase to 160’
along the waterfront (Fig. EI.5). It also increased the in-lieu fee to $21.68 per square foot (from $15.15 in downtown) of additional height (Seattle Municipal Code (SMC) 23.58A.014) and rejected the R.I.S.E. program, which altogether ultimately provides $2 million less for affordable housing than the Mayor’s plan and the R.I.S.E. program would have generated (Lee 2013). In sum, while various configurations that sought to balance the proliferation of market-rate housing with more affordable housing circulate and help us understand the economic and extraeconomic criteria by which the neighborhood is growing, programs such as R.I.S.E. fade into the recesses of the archive and do not ever actually become materially productive.

A second incompatibility can be identified in discussions of SLU’s economic focus. For example, both the CNC’s supplemental design guidelines and the first adopted neighborhood plan have a modest vision of the neighborhood’s economy. The CNC’s guideline encourages new developments to support the local economy by sharing resources, eliminating waste, providing a diversity of uses – affordable housing, business, and manufacturing spaces – which encourage the local circulation of dollars and reduction of transportation needs. Moreover, it offers three strategies for accomplishing this: it asserts that the neighborhood is home to design and construction professionals that could be hired to build new developments; it encourages the design of spaces that will “entice corner shops, restaurants, cultural venues, and light manufacturing to locate” in the neighborhood (CNC 1997, 10); finally, it suggests that live/work spaces be built to serve the needs of local entrepreneurs, artists, professionals.

The original adopted neighborhood plan describes the neighborhood’s economic function as “providing services and material that are utilized by downtown businesses and surrounding neighborhoods” (SLUPO 1998, 3) and notes that SLU is a “multifaceted, complex, historic, and working community” consisting of a wide range of businesses: a computer firm, the Fred
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, a car dealership, the Seattle Times, photographic services, wholesale florists, and marine-oriented services (Ibid., 10). Moreover, it emphasizes that the goal is to preserve the basic character of the district, specifically keeping it friendly for small businesses and light industry, but nevertheless attracting some diversity to “perpetuate the health and vitality of [the] diverse neighborhood” (Ibid., 4). In fact, its interest in attracting some diversity is evident in its discussion of the contemporary Industrial/Commercial zoning, which specifically mentions that a large section of the neighborhood’s center could accommodate “high-technology research and development uses” (Ibid., 9).

Four years later, in 2002, as the City sought pathways for economic recovery in the wake of the dot-com collapse and subsequent recession, it rechristened a neighborhood which considered itself healthy and vital as “underdeveloped or underutilized,” and began “consider[ing] strategies to make South Lake Union the region's most competitive location for biotech research and manufacturing” (Resolution 30542). At this time, the City appears to be following Vulcan rather than leading them, for three years earlier Vulcan had already begun renovating the Rosen Building and had entered into negotiations with the University of Washington’s School of Medicine to lease space for its genomic researchers. Moreover, at this same time, Vulcan had also begun discussions to build what would come to be called the Institute for Systems Biology (Lane 1999) and had already released plans to build a research facility for the Seattle Biomedical Research Institute, on the tail of its announcement for building the mixed-use project that is now known as 2200 Westlake (Kossen 2002). Vulcan’s aforementioned nature as an organization that draws together diverse visions of urban space and

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6 In Foucault’s terminology, this is a struggle between conflicting concepts: the previous multiplicity of economic activity was not concomitant to any specific notion but, as we saw in Chapter 5, the new wave of business endeavors and commercial offerings are becoming concomitant to the idea of innovation.
transforms them into something with its own unique internal resonances and dissonances is abundantly clear here.

The Comprehensive Plan and the most recent Neighborhood Plan each strive to accommodate both of these visions. The former provides two goals that make this juxtaposition clear: South Lake Union should be a neighborhood that “recognizes its history as a maritime and industrial community and embraces its future as a growing urban center that provides for a wide range of uses” and that “serves as a regional center for innovative organizations and that supports a diverse and vibrant job base” (Seattle DPD 2005, 8.158). These goals are reflected in the City’s policies to support and maintain existing human services, arts, maritime, and educational organizations but also to “[s]upport the growth of innovative industries in South Lake Union including biotechnology, information technology, environmental sciences and technology, and sustainable building” (Ibid.). The Neighborhood Plan proposes public/private partnerships and investment as ways to support the existing organizations, assistance with economic development for small business and nonprofits, as well as flexible retail spaces that can accommodate diverse tenants. It also specifically notes that there is disagreement among residents around the attempt to attract specific types of innovative industries, but nevertheless lays out four strategies to entice them: producing attractive neighborhood amenities, allowing taller buildings to accommodate special equipment used in this type of work, developing action agendas to support such businesses, and creating reliable power and communications infrastructure. What this amounts to is a regulatory orientation striving to include elements that are altogether contentious, putting them into relations of exchange wherein the new economic engines support some of the existing organizations, while the latter tolerate and/or become somewhat dependent on the former.
In sum, the housing and neighborhood economy discourses contain incompatible elements, as is evidenced by the fact that robust affordable housing programs and visions of modest local economies all but disappear in the actually existing SLU. On the one hand, the complexity of this system, particularly with respect to the entanglement of economic and extraeconomic concerns, comes into view when one considers the fact that the City Council’s decision to shelve Vulcan’s proposed R.I.S.E. program was not an economic decision in the least, but rather one that was fueled by qualitative concerns such as neighborhood character and territorial views of Lake Union. At the very least, this fact would disrupt any attempt to explain the decision in purely economic terms. Nor could this decision be understood as a extraeconomic decision that is meant to aid capital accumulation – because it makes Vulcan’s developments along the shore of Lake Union less lucrative – or economic development, since it reduces the value of those future developments and therefore the assessed tax revenues. Further, this decision cannot be thought of as improving the quality of life for marginalized citizens who would use the resources that the R.I.S.E. project would have provided. In fact, this decision leads back to my earlier assertion that polite, middle class visions of the city are dominant: the new buildings will not be tall or too close together; views of the beautiful lake will not be spoiled; and social services will not be concentrated together on the edge of this growing neighborhood. On the other hand, the simultaneous strength of the economic imperative is demonstrated in the second case, where attempts to cultivate a local economy are all but eviscerated by commitments to the global innovation economy, while compatible extraeconomic criteria are transformed to suit this new economic imperative: we go from qualitative concerns that produce a place like the Cascade P-Patch to a “false forest” (Graves 2014) that cuts through an Amazon office building on Westlake Avenue and is topped by public art (Fig. 6.2). The next question, then, is what are
the broader discourses that limit and regulate how these incompatible discourses come together, and how some – whether economic or extraeconomic – come to triumph over others.

Fig. 6.2. Cascade P-Patch and Amazon’s “False Forest”
6.2 Included and Excluded Discourses

In Chapter 4, I identified four emergent lines of inquiry – land use and character, institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life – that ran through the archive and served as an organizing principle for that chapter, and helped me isolate provisional collective actors – governmental, private sector, and citizens – for the following chapter. Part of the labor of Chapter 5 was to try to understand the systems of knowledge that were used in statements belonging to these four lines; another part was interrogate the actual collective actors, which turned out to be four different speaking assemblages: representative bodies, citizen-government-professional, private and semi-public, and users/commentators; and finally, the third part was to understand how the archival documents were are all connected, both logically and practically. The previous section of this chapter opened the discussion of power dynamics within this archive, and demonstrated how one discursive formation can contain two concrete discourses, of which some elements become productive, while others dissolve back into virtuality. Now, however, in this final section of the archaeology, my aim is to step outside of SLU’s discourses and try to understand the more general discourses that govern what can even be taken seriously – that is, uttered, recorded, transformed, propagated, etc. – with respect to SLU. This is a moment of generalization seeking to pinpoint the general and recognizable discourses that are structuring the coordinated urbanization of SLU, rather than those which are currently circulating in SLU.

I have been referring to these categories – political economy, ethics, and aesthetics – throughout this chapter, but have yet to explain how I arrived at them. Above all, they began with the four research lines identified in Chapter 4: I combined the significant role of politics that was present in land use and institutional coordination, and combined it with economic
development to get to the category of political economy; I took the general disposition of trying to create more sustainable land use patterns and character, active participation in governance, as well as sustainable economic growth and grouped them together in the ethics category; finally, I assembled the idea of rationally planned land use and carefully designed urban spaces into the aesthetics category. Structurally, these three strategies could be said to constitute the how (political economy), should (ethical), and could (aesthetics) of coordinated urbanization, and therefore each plays a critical role in the process. My aim is to produce an assemblage of emergent general categories that both include and exceed the field of political economy that currently dominates critical urban inquiry. This is, above all, a direct challenge to the idea that alternative ontologies must “[displace] the investigation of capitalist urban development and the core concerns of urban political economy (e.g. the commodification of urban space, inequality and power relations, state intervention, polarization, uneven spatial development)” (Brenner et al 2011, 231). It is not as much of a displacement of this political economic foundation as much as it is a transformation thereof, in the same way that Smith (2003) explains what normativity is for Deleuze: critique and creation.

The most important point here is that one cannot account for the kind of urbanization that is emerging in SLU exclusively from any one of these three perspectives, but one must instead address how these “discursive constellations” – to borrow Foucault’s coinage – interact and regulate what is ultimately expressed in the models of realization producing the neighborhood. The element of time is crucial here because, as the previous two chapters have demonstrated, a shift toward integrated forms of planning predates the earliest implementations of neoliberal economic policy by almost two decades, while a range of ethical orientations – from utilitarianism to market rationality itself as a virtue – has been invoked. Therefore, deferring to
capitalist urban development and neoliberalizing governance as the twin driving forces of contemporary urbanization does not explain much. Instead, the task is now to understand which elements from each of these categories make their way into SLU, and which elements remain as unactualized potentials.

6.2.1 Political Economy

This section draws on the wealth of critical studies of neoliberalism and innovation economics by political economists, sociologists and economic geographers to gain a sense of how cities are produced. I am using the word “how” in a very narrow sense here, in that I am not referring to the broad criteria guiding how urbanization proceeds – although there are certainly strong political economic imperatives at play – as much as I mean the “nitty gritty” relationships between capital and governance. Taking this as the starting point serves two purposes, practical and political: first, it drastically reduces the size of the archive that must be addressed, and allows me to focus on how these broader modulations have affected our archive pertaining to SLU; second, it allows me to engage with the theorists who are currently the most visible in the field of critical urban theory/studies.

Neoliberalism

Although he was somewhat of a late-bloomer with respect to studying neoliberalism as such, David Harvey (2005, 2) nevertheless succinctly defines it and its relationship to governance:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.
This notion has been widely discussed in critical strands of urban geography, even before the term “neoliberalism” was invoked. In Harvey’s own discussion (1989a) of the shift from “managerial” to “entrepreneurial” urban governance he notes three characteristics that resonate with his later interest in neoliberalism: public-private partnerships; competitive and speculative forms of urban development; and a focus on spectacular projects rather than those that are more egalitarian. For him, entrepreneurial governance is marked by its adoption of a combination of four distinct strategies: exploiting local advantages to stimulate productive activity; cultivating opportunities for consumption through gentrification, consumer attractions, and entertainment; investing in infrastructure to attract high-value production and governmental activities; and attracting the redistribution of governmental surpluses for further municipal upgrades (Ibid., 9).

In sum, “[t]he task of urban governance is…to lure highly mobile and flexible production, financial, and consumption flows into its space (Ibid., 11).

Around the same time, the political sociologist Bob Jessop was already dealing more directly with the concept of neoliberalism, although he was not explicitly focusing on cities.\(^7\) Instead, he was thinking about governance at the national level, but in due time he would both refine his analysis and bring it down to the urban level (Jessop 2002, which is addressed in the discussion of innovation below). In his earlier intervention, however, Jessop (1993) proposes a three-pronged theorization to the governance regime following the Keynesian welfare state (KWS), which is characterized by a shift to what he calls the Schumpeterian workfare state

\(^7\) Stepping for one moment out of the archaeologist’s position of distance and practice of double bracketing truth and meaning, Harvey’s assessment rings so true that it is no wonder that it has been so influential. One could very easily take this as a theoretical orientation and use it to examine what has been occurring in SLU, but to do so would ignore much of the texture of both the place and the array of possible analytical tools for thinking about it. In fact, one need not turn as far away from existing critical urban theory as wandering into the realm of poststructuralism to find a more nuanced orientation, which Jessop continues to provide in an exemplary way.
(SWS) and a “hollowing out” of the national state, both of which correspond to a shift from Fordist to post-Fordist economic regimes. Briefly, the SWS has a set of economic and social objectives that differ greatly from those of the KWS:

- the promotion of product, process, organizational, and market innovation; the enhancement of the structural competitiveness of open economies mainly through supply-side intervention; and the subordination of social policy to the demands of labour market flexibility and structural competitiveness (Ibid., 9).

This state form (or “mode of regulation”) noticeably differs from the line of “proper” neoliberals, such as Friedrich von Hayek or Milton Friedman, because it is focused on cultivating innovation, which as we saw in Chapter 5 and as we will see again below is what Schumpeter considers to be the engine of capitalism. Neoliberal economists, on the other hand, are more concerned with “the supply-side implications of liberty, money, or taxation” (Ibid., 17). Jessop’s scheme does not, however, dismiss neoliberalism in the least; instead, it is rendered as one ideal form among three governance strategies – the other two being neocorporatism and neostatism – for promoting market innovation. Neocorporatist strategies rely “on the institutionalization of a continuing, negotiated, concerted approach to the economic strategies, decisions and conduct of economic agents” (Jessop 1993, 30), which ultimately means that they seek to balance cooperation and competition. This is especially germane to the discussion of SLU because the participating institutions involve a wide range of policy communities: science, health, education are the three that Jessop mentions – all of which pertain to the economic activity occurring in SLU – but we would also need to add affordable housing advocacy, sustainable design, social services, and even retail to the list. Neostatist strategies are somewhat narrower in that they offer “a market-conforming but state-sponsored approach…in which the state intervenes to guide the development of market forces” (Ibid., 31).
Peck and Tickell (1994a, 1994b) argue that we should conceive of the contemporary relationship between the global and the local not as a new order – as Jessop would have it – but rather as disorder. In contradistinction to Jessop, they do not see the shift away from Keynesianism as a search for a new mode of regulation, but rather “as a regulatory vacuum and the outbreak of ‘jungle law’” (Larner 2000, 11). This exuberance comes to be tempered in their later formulations of neoliberalism, but it nevertheless loses much of the texture of Jessop’s initial categorization of governance strategies. In any case, and somewhat surprisingly, Peck and Tickell do not cite Harvey’s (1989a) notion of entrepreneurial governance, but they nevertheless write in a similar spirit:

local responses to global competition are more likely to be about competing even harder rather than about co-operating more effectively. The establishment of inward investment agencies, the construction of science parks, the pursuit of urban spectacles, even the development of new shopping centres…all of these are geared to winning a slice of the global action (Peck and Tickell 1994a, 317).

One of their primary claims is that the centrality of national scale has been “outflanked” by the interactions between the global and the local, and that this interaction is spurred by the adoption of neoliberal policies at supranational, national, and subnational scales. Yet, they take up a “more skeptical position” than Jessop, who interprets the neoliberal shift as presaging the emergence of a new state structure, and argue that it is, instead, a promulgation of perpetual crisis. Put another way, rather than being an element in a regulatory or institutional fix that could potentially lead to sustainable economic growth, “the ascendancy of neoliberalism represents a regulatory vacuum, the absence of a new institutional fix” (Ibid., 320).⁹ At the subnational scale

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⁹ To be clear, I am neither saying that neoliberal policies are strictly a nightmare (like Peck and Tickell are arguing here) nor a panacea to solving the world’s ecological and affordable housing problems (as Seattle’s own Roger Valdez, the director of the pro-development lobbyist group, Smart Growth Seattle, perpetually argues (cf. Stiles 2015e, Young 2015)). Instead, I am
of the urban, this jungle law stresses that interurban competition (entrepreneurialism) is a consequence of global competition for capital accumulation, and that to read local boosterism as anything else is to be confused by its rhetoric (Ibid., 323).

Moreover, in an expanded argument, Peck and Tickell (1994b) confront Jessop’s regulationism and his theorization of an emerging Schumpeterian workfare state (SWS) with its three constitutive elements – neoliberalism, neocorporatism, and neostatism – head-on. Although they concede that Jessop’s framework does not overdetermine future state-forms, they nevertheless argue that his claims are “contentious.” Listing the similarities between the SWS and pure neoliberalism – “an emphasis on supposedly immutable global economic forces, a reliance on supply-side instruments, advocacy of the virtues of the market and of competitive pressures” – they argue that neoliberal policies will constantly undermine the other two strategies, while simultaneously “being incapable of providing a sustainable model in their own right” (Ibid., 294). Therefore, they conclude that the ensemble of neoliberal market-led strategies should not necessarily be understood as a mode of social regulation, but is, again, the underlying problem. The point here is that this approach reduces the plural nature of both Jessop’s framework and the empirical information regarding SLU that I have excavated thus far.¹⁰

In Brenner and Theodore’s (2002a) preface to the frequently cited special issue of Antipode on “Spaces of Neoliberalism,” the editors note that the contributions seek to explicitly connect globalizing capitalism with shifts toward urban entrepreneurialism under the rubric of the neglected (at the time) analytical lens of neoliberalism. In their contribution on “actually

¹⁰In a later article, Jessop (2002) provides a more refined version of this argument. It will be discussed at greater length below in the section on innovation, but it is nevertheless worth mentioning here that it pays more attention to subnational scales of governance (including the urban).
existing neoliberalism,” Brenner and Theodore (2002b) argue that there is a significant gap between the “ideology” of neoliberalism and the way it actually unfolds. Proffering a familiar refrain, they begin by noting that “the linchpin of neoliberal ideology is the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development” (Ibid., 350). They proceed by highlighting how neoliberal policies have been adopted that both dismantle a wide range of “basic institutional components” that define postwar welfare society – including industrial deregulation, fleecing labor unions, reducing corporate taxes and so forth – and experiment with new ways to stabilize capitalist accumulation. Moreover, they highlight the necessity to consider the sociohistorical context in which these policies are enacted, as well as the indisputable unevenness of their success. More than a decade on, this argument is painfully familiar, yet at least two important contributions remain: connecting these movements specifically to the subnational scale, specifically at the urban level, and tracking immanent policy shifts that reveal the complex and contradictory nature of existing neoliberalism.

In their contribution to this issue of *Antipode*, Peck and Tickell (2002) link Harvey’s aforementioned notion of entrepreneurialism (1989a) to the wider program of neoliberalization. Crucially – and in a development on their earlier co-authored work – they argue that this not only involves a shift of market logic into commonsense terms, but is also constituted by both negative and positive moments. “Roll-back” neoliberalism – or what they previously called jungle law – is now seen as the deregulation and dismantling of key industries and labor organizations, the elimination of social and environmental regulatory standards, and the erosion of political collectivities instantiated during the Reagan/Thatcher years, and is responsible, they argue, for the competition fueling the entrepreneurial governance highlighted by Harvey (Ibid., 385). In
their dialectical explanation, “roll-out” neoliberalism necessarily follows in response to the internal limits erected and contradictions produced by this initial moment, and thus represents the further entrenchment of the neoliberal project. It is expressed in “a deeply interventionist agenda [that] is emerging around ‘social’ issues like crime, immigration, policing, welfare reform, urban order and surveillance, and community regeneration” (Peck and Tickell 2002, 389), which is implemented through changes in social institutions.¹¹

Finally, Neil Smith’s (2002) contribution primarily links up his previous work on gentrification (e.g. 1996) with emerging theorizations of neoliberal urbanism. He argues that the rise of revanchist urbanism over liberal urban policy in advanced capitalist cities parallels neoliberalism’s triumph over Keynesianism (capitalist production trumps social reproduction). Moreover, he notes how gentrification as a local aberration in command-center cities crystallizes into a mobile strategy for producing the neoliberal city. In this conceptualization, urban policy plays the role of handmaiden to market accumulation, which role it enacts both through actions that support capitalist production and a rhetorical campaign that renders the intentional reshaping of cities as a neutral and natural process. In contrast, nothing occurring SLU is presented as neutral or natural. Instead, the City calls it “a dynamic hub of economic development for Seattle and the region” that still needs to “provide a more diverse mix of housing and employment” (Seattle DPD n.d.-c), while Joe Fugere, the founder of Tutta Bella Neapolitan Pizzeria (2200 Westlake) praises Vulcan for being a “thoughtful developer” with a shared vision for the area.

¹¹ To pick one example from the early years of American neoliberalization: The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, passed under President Ronald Reagan, not only reduced the amount of funding to mental health institutions to the tune of 30%, but also restructured how institutions could access the funds. Rather than direct funding from the federal level, the new system installed a block grant system wherein local authorities would apply for funding, and receive it based on their applications’ merit (cf. Buck 1984).
(Soulmoto n.d.-b). Although the City’s acknowledgment of inequality could certainly be more explicit and Fugere could compare Vulcan to a less thoughtful developer, it is crucial that the neither of these voices on the side of production are rendering this as a natural occurrence.

Fugere reinforces the collective agency of producing SLU even further by saying, “If we can continue to challenge ourselves, and to work towards a common goal of creating this wonderful, world-class neighborhood, then it all comes together. And nowhere is more poised to do that than South Lake Union” (Ibid.).

Overall, the most general formulation of neoliberal urbanism comes through Brenner and Theodore’s concluding remarks to a special section of the journal CITY, which is slanted toward empirical detail and “attempts to map some of the contextually specific geographies of actually existing neoliberalism that are being imagined, constructed and resisted in North American cities” (Brenner and Theodore 2005, 103). Although the article is primarily meant to synthesize the preceding essays in the issue, the authors also take the opportunity to stake out seven central aspects of their understanding of neoliberalism (Ibid., 102-3):

1. Neoliberalism (or neoliberalization) is a process of market-driven sociospatial transformation, rather than a fixed end-state.
2. Neoliberalism is articulated through historically and geographically specific strategies of institutional transformation and ideological rearticulation.
3. Neoliberalism hinges upon the active mobilization of state power.
4. Neoliberalism generates contextually specific pathways of institutional reorganization that reflect the legacies of earlier modes of regulation and forms of contestation.
5. Neoliberalism is intensely contested by diverse social forces or “socialized” forms of coordination that constrain unfettered capital accumulation.
6. Neoliberalism exacerbates regulatory failure by undermining many of the economic, institutional and geographical preconditions for economic and social revitalization.
7. The neoliberal project continues to evolve – to reinvent itself politically, organizationally, spatially – in close conjunction with its pervasively dysfunctional social consequences.
This bogeyman is undoubtedly real and is still with us today, as the multitude of policy shifts that these authors cite to develop these theories illustrates, but both the Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy that underpins the present study and archaeological method being employed demand that we consider the multiplicity of relationships between global flows of capital and the specific models of realization that direct it. A handful of more recent studies are beginning to explore the intersections between this political economic perspective and other extraeconomic engines of urbanization, but the majority of critical urban research is still overwhelmingly keyed in to identifying “market-driven sociospatial transformation” (Ibid.) Leslie Kern (2010, 211), for example, argues that “the gendered dimensions of [fear, excitement, and safety] are vital to the success of new-build gentrification” in Toronto, but her approach relegates the affective and gendered aspects of urban revitalization to strategies for capturing financial returns. Similarly, Jerry Shannon (2014) sees food desert research and urban design intended to reduce obesity “as an expanded, spatialized form of ‘neoliberal paternalism’ (Soss et al. 2011), a set of policies meant to restore social order to dysfunctional communities and ‘mismanaged lives’ (Brown 2005, 42).” However, Gibbs et al. (2013, 2152) approach my own perspective when noting that their “particular interest [is] whether the aspirational discourses of the smart growth and new urban imaginaries compete with, or are complementary to, neoliberal urban discourses.” The problem here, from the perspective of immanence and continuous transformation, is that they are starting with a fixed idea of a neoliberal discourse and putting it in conversation with other frozen conceptions of smart growth and new urbanism. I, on the other hand, have started from the statements that regulate the production of SLU, and therefore do not see these relationships in binary terms of being competitive or complementary. Instead, I see them as much more intertwined and interdependent from the outset. In any case, although Gibbs et al. are attuned to a
similar question in terms of content – as are the authors who contributed to the special issue of *Urban Studies* that their essay introduces – they are not discussing my primary concern, which concerns the underlying frameworks used for critical urban studies.\(^\text{12}\)

In conclusion, although there is some recent critical work that does not reduce all urbanization to market-driven sociospatial transformation in the last 35 years since Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan took office, this perspective remains dominant. In the case of SLU, elements of this discourse undoubtedly exist, but they almost always appear in conjunction with the titanic effort to create inter-jurisdictional coordinated planning over the last 60 years. Who is to say that, given these long-standing planning efforts, it is really global flows of capitalism that are realizing their own particular vision of the 21\(^{st}\)-century city in the Global North, and not a confluence of different governmental priorities, ethical orientations, and design philosophies that are really conducting the process? Why is neoliberalism allegedly only contested by diverse social forces, when the empirical information presented in Chapters 4 and 5 suggests that plenty of space exists for particular liberal and ethically grounded social concerns to exist in conjunction with economic growth? Finally, is it sufficient to generalize and say that this is a mere reinvention of the neoliberalization process, or should we perhaps replace the focus on neoliberal policies with a variegated set of grids – some economic, others not – that are marshalling capital flows into the ever-changing built environment? Focusing on this mixture, even if the economic concerns tend to dominate, is the real goal here, and for that reason we must both turn to the kind of economy that is being cultivated in SLU and the parallel ethical

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\(^{12}\) It is important to note that Brenner (2013) does reference Fariás (2010) as working on the ontological problem of urban studies. However, the latter’s commitment to Actor-Network Theory leads him to consider political economy only as one element of the networks producing urban spaces. The ontological difference between this and a properly Deleuzoguattarian approach, is that the latter also takes global flows of capital as an underlying condition.
perspectives and modulations in planning theory that limit how this machine holds together and how it influences the built environment that unfolds as capital flows through it.

Innovation

All substantive discussions of innovation either depart from or, at the very least, mention the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, particularly his *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (2009). Central to his argument about the functioning of capitalism is his assertion that capitalism is, by nature, a perennially dynamic process, that functions through “discrete rushes which are separated from each other by spans of comparative quiet” (Ibid., 83n2). He is explicit that this is not a result of the social or natural environment, increases in population or capital, or vagaries of money systems, but instead:

> The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates (Ibid., 83).

In other words, this process – which he famously terms “creative destruction” – incessantly destroys and rebuilds the economic system from within. Moreover, it “is the essential fact about capitalism [and] it is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in” (Ibid.): a world in which competition is no longer strictly about price, but instead concerns producing new commodities, technologies, markets, and organizations.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^\text{13}\) One effect of this relates directly to theorists studying capitalism and how they can prevent their work from being “meaningless”: namely, instead of thinking about “how capitalism administers structures” we must instead seek to understand “how it creates and destroys them” (Schumpeter 2009, 84). This, of course, meshes quite well with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983, 1987) conception of the capitalist axiomatic, which continuously displaces its internal limits by adding new axioms, capturing escaping flows, etc. Yet I am even more interested in a footnoted comment that Schumpeter makes. He writes, “It should be understood that it is only our appraisal of economic performance and not our moral judgment that can be so changed. Owing to its autonomy, moral approval or disapproval is entirely independent of social (or any other) results,
This observation is indeed one of Schumpeter’s most famous, but it is important to note that he does not stop at analyzing the nature of capitalism. Instead, he argues that we must leave “the precincts of purely economic considerations [and] turn to the cultural component of the capitalist economy” (Ibid., 121). His primary argument – one that jibes with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983) discussion of the socius – is that capitalism transforms existing rationality in two ways: first, it installs money as the tool of rational calculation; second, and of more interest when trying to understand the proliferation of an ethic based in part on innovation, it “produce[s] not only the mental attitude of modern science, the attitude than consists in asking certain questions and in going about answering them in a certain way, but also the men and the means” (Schumpeter 2009, 124). In this sense, the positive moment of capitalism – following the negative moment of disturbing the social structure of feudalism – was producing a social space where those of “strong wills and strong intellects” could develop their own capacities outside of the existing social structure. Put another way, Schumpeter argues that before capitalism, the only paths for social advancement were through the church or as a warrior; capitalism, however, provides a third escape route for those individuals with ambition and ability. Therefore, he stresses that it is specifically capitalist rationality that has produced the increasing rationalization of humanity in general, and scientific endeavor in particular, whether or not it is pursued for profit. He writes:

Although the modern hospital is not as a rule operated for profit, it is nonetheless the product of capitalism not only, to repeat, because the capitalist process supplies the means and the will, but much more fundamentally because capitalist rationality supplied the habits of mind that evolved the methods used in these hospitals (Ibid., 126).

unless we happen to adopt a moral system such as utilitarianism which makes moral approval and disapproval turn on them "ex definitione" (Ibid.). We will keep this statement in mind as strive to excavate the moral system(s) at play in the redevelopment of SLU.
This observation is critical for my overall discussion in the following section on ethics and sustainability, but I must bookmark it here and turn to how the notion of innovation has flowed through broader discussions of urbanization.

Jessop’s (2002) contribution to the aforementioned special issue of *Antipode* is useful for drawing connections between neoliberalism and innovation, especially with respect to the role of subnational scales, such as the regional and urban, as well as discourses on urban policy. Herein he makes an important distinction between the international project to create a neoliberal market economy promoting “sociotechnical innovation” as the key to capturing surplus value, but is careful to distinguish between this movement and the frequent attempts to solve the problems it creates at the urban or regional level (Ibid., 464). His analysis of the *World Report on the Urban Future 21*, demonstrates how a mixture of approaches to urban governance very similar to those he outlined in his earlier work (1993), are essentially attempts to remedy the problems created by a globalizing neoliberal market economy: cities are presented as the engines of economic growth as well as economic, political, and social innovation; the creation of active and productive citizens should be undertaken at the local level by non-state actors; governance should take place via integrated action across multiple levels; and finally, top-down governance should be replaced with partnerships and networks that include various non-state actors (NGOs, religious and community groups, individual networks).

It is not at all difficult to see how this sort of analysis is transferrable to the proliferation of discourse shaping SLU, for all the elements (and more) are there: stoking innovation and integrating governance across multiple levels; partnerships between various stakeholder groups, public and private; and creating positive quality of life characteristics so that workers can remain healthy and productive. Therefore, this line of thinking is indeed valuable for thinking about the
modulations in governance that have occurred since the implementations of neoliberal policies in the early 1980s.

The discourse of innovation and urban redevelopment is, moreover, one that circulates at an intermediate scale between Jessop’s broad academic conceptualization, and my archive that has been primarily constructed from elements operating at the regional scale and below. One such discourse involves the notion of innovation districts, as proffered by The Brookings Institution (Katz and Wagner 2014; Katz et al. 2015), especially since it specifically mentions SLU in its attempt to understand the broader movement. First, innovation districts are defined as compact, transit-accessible and “wired” geographical areas where anchor institutions and companies, startups, and business incubators are clustered. Several different models of such districts are proffered, as are the three components – economic assets, physical assets, and networking assets – of “innovation ecosystems.” Above all, this discourse underscores the need for a “convergence of disparate [economic] sectors and specializations” (Katz and Wagner 2014, 2) and a variety of spaces and social events that promote collaboration and interaction.

As Jessop argues, this strategy advocates for such districts as solutions to sluggish economic growth and austerity, local fiscal challenges and social inequality, as well as sprawl and environmental degradation, so it is certainly reasonable to say that it at least “implicitly endorses neoliberalism” – as Jessop does with his empirical study – if not to accuse of it of being explicitly supportive. Innovation districts, as envisioned by Brookings, are meant to be foundations for commercialization, generators of municipal revenue, as well as tools to expand

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14 The “anchor plus” model contains a major institution and a mix of related firms, entrepreneurs, and smaller companies; the “re-imagined urban areas” model, which explicitly includes SLU, addresses formerly industrial areas that are undergoing physical and economic changes that capitalize on their location, building stock, and access to transit; finally, the “urbanized science park” model speaks to formerly isolated campuses around which urbanization is occurring (Katz and Wagner 2014, 2-3).
employment and access to education, but at the same time, they are also meant to promote more efficient use of existing infrastructure and produce denser residential and employment patterns (Katz and Wagner 2014, 2). While this might seem like a minor detail, the focus on infrastructure and density not only speaks to how this type of urbanization ostensibly makes neoliberalism more palatable, it also opens onto discourses that both predate the emergence of the neoliberal discourse and exist in parallel with it. Using infrastructure efficiently is not just a neoliberal concept, for it can be grounded in a range of ethical systems. Increasing residential and employment density need not be a strictly economic notion, but can also be based in environmental and broader quality of life concerns.

Free Market Communism

Finally, we can sketch out the opposite end of the spectrum from the tendency toward neoliberal policies and innovation economics that largely structure the political economy of what is said with respect to SLU by turning to Eugene Holland’s (2011) concept of free-market communism. This is, of course, not the only alternative that could be introduced but it is particularly relevant to the current discussion for two reasons. First, it draws heavily on von Hayek, a key progenitor of neoliberal theory, but rather than merely critiquing his work, Holland transforms it into a fruitful alternative. Second, Holland’s commitment to furthering Deleuze and Guattari’s political project makes his work especially relevant here. Therefore, this concept should not be

\[\text{Holland (2011, 105) writes, "[von Hayek's] analysis of the market as a mechanism for distributed decision making is too valuable to dismiss as mere right-wing cant (regardless of how much of this it may have inspired)."}\]

\[\text{16 This is a general pattern that I will hold to when identifying alternatives in the ethical and visions of the city sections, where I address Adrian Parr’s (2009) notion of sustainability culture and the Situationists’ interest in nomadic space, respectively, with Susan Fainstein’s (2010) notion of the just city straddling the other two. The former addresses Deleuze and Guattari explicitly and although the latter does not, in nevertheless has many compatible characteristics.}\]
taken as the only alternative to the political economy that is guiding how SLU unfolds, but is rather a strong counterpoint to it that can help us both see an altogether different approach as well as identify some of the elements of SLU’s political economy that escape the narratives of neoliberalism and innovation economics. Moreover, in accordance with the broader argument I am making, this alternative must also be presented alongside a system of ethics and a vision of the city if we hope to envision a form of urbanization that is a true alternative to SLU.

Holland’s formulation centers on the insufficient attention that has been paid to the difference between markets and capitalism. He asserts that although “the suprahuman decision making abilities of the market as a paragon of collective or distributed intelligence have long been touted,” the fact that “specifically capitalist markets are not often vehicles for distributed decision making or collective intelligence but rather exercises in collective stupidity, as the effects of advertising, overconsumption, and the looming environmental crisis” is rarely considered (Ibid., 99). For Holland, there are three primary benefits to markets: first, they are both “code-solvents” in that they undo the qualitative coding – the capture and organization of desire by the socius from previous eras – and install quantitative relations of pure difference (prices). This is undoubtedly problematic in capital markets where money becomes centralized in the pockets of the few, but Holland nevertheless argues, drawing on Marx, that money is still a “power-solvent,” because it destabilizes the power that was previously centered around the despot/despotic state. Third and finally, he emphasizes that markets expand the division of labor, or contribute to building a “productive multiplicity” (Ibid., 102). This not only expands the productivity of society, but more importantly, it enables the possibility of markets that are “self-organizing systems of distributed intelligence and collective decision making” (Ibid., 103). Holland notes that it was, in fact, Marx who mentioned the possibility of organizing social
Holland’s perspective – which follows from Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of the global capitalist axiomatic underlying the entire social field – demands that he starts from this situation, and affirm a different kind of market, which he calls a “nomad market.”

In order to sketch out an understanding of markets, he turns to von Hayek, specifically the distinction the latter draws between an economy and a catallaxy\(^\text{17}\): the first, following the Greek roots of the word, is taken as the management of a household, while the latter refers to the spontaneous order that emerges from a market. From this starting point, Holland makes two critical displacements of von Hayek’s assertion that:

> so long as collaboration presupposes common purposes, people with different aims are necessarily enemies who may fight each other for the same means; only the introduction of barter made it possible for the different individuals to be of use to each other without agreeing on the ultimate ends (von Hayek 1976, 110).

First, Holland argues that people with different aims are not necessarily enemies, but rather that they become enemies when the means to realize those ends are absent. Second, Holland (2011, 107) asserts that exchange does not convert enemies into friends, but rather transforms them “into potentially mutually beneficial trading partners, neither enemies nor friends.” In sum, for Holland, a catallaxy “facilitate[s] the emergence and development of a community where agreement on ultimate ends is not required for members' endeavors in pursuit of disparate ends to benefit one another through a network of market exchange” (Ibid.). In von Hayek’s conceptualization, then, an economy is centralized and operates with relatively complete information – such as in a single family or in the dream of Socialist state planning – while catallaxies function horizontally with limited and distributed knowledge.

\(^{17}\) A catallaxy is typically referred to as a free-market economy.
Holland also identifies three limitations that assist the formation of his concept of Free Market Communism: first, he asks whether or not the centralization of power and control, even if it were possible, would be desirable. Second, he notes that although von Hayek clearly appreciates how local knowledge is crucial to efficient markets, he nevertheless reduces this information to price. Finally, Holland notes that capitalism’s tendency to centralize “inevitably vitiate[s] the freedoms and virtues ascribed to the market itself” (Holland 2011, 110). From this general critique, he identifies three central aspects of capital markets that his alternative addresses directly. First, he argues that primitive accumulation – or what he also calls “primitive destitution,” in the sense that creating a pool of potential wage slaves through dispossession of the means of production via the Enclosure Acts and Game Laws in England\textsuperscript{18} was a necessary initial step in the birth of capitalism – is an ongoing process that must be met by identifying and affirming “social means of subsistence not already subsumed by the capitalist system” (Ibid. 19). Second, he argues that capitalism itself is marked by a perpetual process of systematization in which it must constantly strive to bolster itself against different crises, such as those of realization, reinvestment, and supply. Put another way, it must perpetually rearticulate its own conditions of existence, which are based on wage labor. Holland’s alternative, then, involves not destroying markets altogether, but instead only eliminating labor markets. Finally, there is the process of axiomatization, which is capital’s tool for addressing its own fragility and which constantly integrates new resources and markets into its constellation. From Holland’s perspective, this is, above all, to be seen not as an accumulation of a thing (gold, for example)

\textsuperscript{18} The Enclosure Act of 1773 was the first in a series of acts passed by the British parliament that restricted access to land that was previously held in common. Before its passage, these lands were available to peasants for small scale agriculture and grazing animals. Various game laws – such as the Black Act of 1723, Night Poaching Act of 1828, and Game Act of 1831 – placed restrictions on hunting that ranged from being sentenced to death for poaching to permitting the free killing of any and all animals that were on one’s own property.
but rather a social relationship predicated on debt. In sum, then, capitalist markets function via wage slavery and infinite debt, and the alternative, free-market communism, simply seeks to eliminate the “distortions, constraints, and excesses inflicted on markets by the domination of capital” (Ibid., 135).

Altogether this amounts to conceptualization of market society that still involves debt, a standard of value, interconnectivity, and labor, but in a significantly altered way. Infinite debt is eliminated altogether in favor of smaller debts issued by credit unions and microfinance initiatives that make loans according not only to economic criteria, but also, and primarily, per extraeconomic criteria that are established collectively. This same sort of collective decision-making also extends to the valuation of the products of labor, which Holland sees as emerging out of the abandonment of determining value according to the socially necessary labor time required to produce it. Instead, valuation proceeds according to collectively determined criteria in a process which could be bolstered by the incredibly fast tools currently being used to mine online transactions, but now being employed to different ends: sharing information in order to make informed decisions rather than maximizing the capture of surplus value. Finally, labor itself becomes the crux of the entire system, for without wage labor there is no such thing as capital. In nomad markets, then, production is undertaken not by an increasingly integrated capitalism but instead via a “multiplicity of multiplicities” that take the form of self-organizing and self-directed production cooperatives. In this system producers are no longer either destitute and forced to their sell labor power in order to purchase goods that are envisioned, produced, distributed, and publicized by invisible entities, but are instead free to participate both on supply and demand sides of the market according to immanent criteria.
By considering this vision of political economy alongside neoliberal retrenchment and the focus on economic innovation, it is now possible to understand some of the limits of the discourse on political economy that regulates what is said in SLU’s discursive formation. There is clearly an overwhelming shift toward privatization and a focus on innovative industries in SLU, but drawing on the other three lines of inquiry from the previous two chapters – land use and character, institutional coordination, and quality of life – it is clear that political economy is rarely discussed in isolation. The case of the City Council refusing to accept Vulcan’s (2013) R.I.S.E. proposal, which would have invested $10 million in affordable housing and social services, in exchange for being allowed to build taller buildings along the waterfront, illustrates this dramatically: not only did the Council refuse to go along with the plan for the densest, and therefore most valuable, scheme that was preferred by Mayor McGinn and Vulcan, their decision also provided less affordable housing for the poorest residents, to the tune of $2 million (cf. Lee 2013). There can be no doubt that extraeconomic concerns, specifically those circulating in middle-class circles, are also a central aspect of how the neighborhood has grown. These qualitative concerns fall short of the complete collective determination of such criteria for which Holland is arguing, but falling short is not the same thing as not existing. The crucial point here is that if we respect immanence then we must acknowledge that the political economy discourses that are realized in SLU exist in a web of extraeconomic discourses, and although they tend heavily toward the neoliberal and innovation poles, the broader discourse also contains a Holland’s radically alternative conception (and undoubtedly many more).

6.2.2 Ethics

Whereas the previous section addressed how urban spaces are produced, this section focuses on different conceptions of how they should be constructed. One place to begin an investigation of
how the discourse of ethics regulates what is said in SLU is by drawing on how those working at
the nexus of contemporary political economy and urbanization address ethics. Harvey (2005, 3),
for example, makes an explicit connection between neoliberalism and the ethical life:

In so far as neoliberalism values market exchange as ‘an ethic in itself, capable of
acting as a guide to all human action, and substituting for all previously held
ethical beliefs,’ [(Treanor 2005)] it emphasizes the significance of contractual
relations in the marketplace. It holds that the social good will be maximized by
maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring
all human action into the domain of the market.

Harvey takes Treanor’s notion of a neoliberal ethic for granted and does not even bother to
define “social good” with any theory of value, but for our purposes a little more digging is
necessary, for the latter explicitly takes neoliberalism to be more than economic doctrine: “it is a
social and moral philosophy, in some aspects qualitatively different from liberalism” (Treanor
2005).19 Specifically, he claims that it is a system of virtue ethics, wherein the ideal type is the
entrepreneur. His definition then quickly begins to look like a form of deontology, when he
begins to speak of “the moral duty of human beings, [which, under neoliberalism is] to arrange
their lives to maximize their advantage on the labor market” (Ibid.). This movement is reinforced
by a list of neoliberal principles which he provides: “act in conformity with market forces”;
“within this limit, act also to maximize the opportunity for others to conform to the market forces
generated by your action”; and "hold no other goals” (Ibid.). This tension is, of course,
understandable, and evokes William Frankena’s (1973, 65) comment on the relationship between
virtues and principles: “principles without traits [virtues] are impotent and traits without
principles are blind.” Following Frankena’s logic, it is difficult to see a virtue ethic obtaining any
lasting purchase on behavior unless some principles managed to develop a disposition in its

19 It should be noted, however, that this sort of engagement with the realm of ethics is standard
across the best writing on neoliberalism and the urban condition (cf. Brenner and Theodore 2002,
2005; Jessop 2002; Purcell 2008).
prospective adherents. Moreover, to conceive of any particular virtue as good or bad seemingly necessitates a set of external principles. A first question might then be: does this set of ethical principles suffice for describing ethics in the production of SLU.

Perhaps even more importantly for the current project, one might question whether Treanor’s construction of this ethical principle is consistent in and of itself, beginning with his narrow reading of liberalism as solely focused on processes (such as the market) that are free from all forms of intervention or interference. In his rendering, liberals “reject any design or plan for society – religious, utopian, or ethical” and “reject the idea that there are any external moral values” (Ibid.), yet he ignores the broad range of ethical and moral theories that constitute a crucial dimension of liberal doctrine: there are the subjectivist perspectives of the proto-liberal Hobbes (1996), who grounded value on desire, the quintessential liberal Locke’s (1988) argument that what one deemed good was a matter taste, not to mention both Adam Smith’s (2009) and Hume’s (1995) turning to sentiment as determining what was considered good; second, there are the perfectionist or utilitarian arguments of Bentham (1988) and Mill (2002); lastly, and much more recently, one could cite Isaiah Berlin’s (1990) and John Rawls’s (1999) work on pluralism and justice, respectively.

In the most literal reading of Treanor’s account of the neoliberal ethic, one would have to say that all of these philosophies are null and void, while in the most compassionate reading one could say that they still exist, but transformed in such a way that they are congruent with market forces. All “good” desires and tastes must refer to what the market can provide; only sympathy with the market and its effects, or taking pleasure in its utility are feelings of any value; developing one’s full capacity to produce and consume within the market and encouraging others to do the same is good; or finally, if the market’s products are distributed justly and/or are
considered valuable by society, then they are indeed good. Even if this is an emerging tendency today, it nevertheless still does not cover the entire temporal field of SLU’s emergence, and therefore cannot be the only identifiable ethical and moral perspective on the production of the neighborhood. In a more general sense, Treanor leaves one with no real sense of how these “neoliberalized” ethical traditions would be enacted or circulated – a shortcoming that makes it weaker as a theoretical argument. Harvey, however, continues to reproduce this perspective on a neoliberal ethic, which has been picked up by other critical urban scholars who are more closely affiliated with critical urban theory. In his discussion of contemporary urban politics, Roger Keil, for example, cites his diagnosis of this world as one “in which the neoliberal ethic of intense possessive individualism, and its cognate of political withdrawal from collective forms of action, becomes the template for human socialization” (Harvey 2008, 32, as cited in Keil 2009, 238).

Brenner is, again, not averse to discussing normativity, but his engagement with the idea almost exclusively relates to theory-building rather than how it might exist on the side of the urbanization process. His refrain is that critical urban scholars must be explicit about their normative orientations. These orientations are, in fact, summed of nicely by a contributor to the Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City volume that Brenner co-edited, in a discussion of the disjuncture between urban planning theory and Critical Urban Theory:

[I]t is fair to say that only a thin slice of planning theory takes up the normative commitments of critical urban theory: to challenge the violence of capitalism, to seek out the agents of revolutionary social change, and to interrogate the ends in relation to the means of practice (Rankin 2012, 102).

Similarly, the final article from the 2011 debate in CITY – of which Brenner was a coauthor – drives home the point that critical urban research be self-reflexive and explicit about its normativity:
We therefore need to identify and continually interrogate our own standpoints of critique—to ask why we use the concepts that we use, how and why they are conceived as they are, and what normative-political functions they perform. It is on this basis alone, we believe, that the resources of critical analysis may be effectively deployed to excavate the present for more socially just, inclusive, democratic and ecologically viable alternatives to global neoliberal capitalism (Wachsmuth et al. 2011, 748).

While I strongly agree with this assertion, even the way that it pits “global neoliberal capitalism” against “more socially just, inclusive, democratic and ecologically viable alternatives,” my concern is that neoliberal capitalism as a concept does not sufficiently describe the complex assemblage producing SLU (as argued in the previous subsection). There is no space in this perspective for any kind of extraeconomic contribution to the urbanization process. For example, in developing work, Wachsmuth and Angelo (2016) further deny the productive role of the extraeconomic by identifying two urban ideologies: “green urban nature” is the illusion that green elements of cities must be nature, while “grey urban nature” is the illusion that cities, as compact settlements that can be designed in sustainable ways.

There are, however, other less widely circulated perspectives on the relationship between neoliberalism and ethics. Following Smith (2009), Schoolman (1987, 208) asserts that there are indeed “moral sentiments – understandings, attitudes, beliefs, and practices – that individuals are encouraged to adopt by the structures of traditional and quite recent political economies.” Much like the regulation theorists on whom Jessop relies so heavily, Schoolman claims that the organization of production establishes a pattern that political power follows: in the case of Fordist mass production, the centralized power of the Keynesian welfare state “expresses the concentration and proliferation of political power (Ibid., 209); similarly, since the flexible production of the post-Fordist era is constituted by smaller, contract-bound, entrepreneurial firms, “macroeconomic regulation by the national government has been exchanged for
microindustrial initiatives at the state and local level” (Ibid., 211), which take the form of partnerships between government, institutions, private firms, and various interest groups. Although the members – or “stakeholders,” in contemporary parlance – of these partnerships may fluctuate with time, this novel sociopolitical form becomes a necessary and “permanent context of structurally interdependent beliefs and practices through which cooperation and growth can be sustained” (Ibid., 212-3). It is here, with Schoolman’s insistence that we dismiss the tendency of political economists to locate “matured systems of belief” that precede new practices and provide them with a ready-made supporting context” (Ibid., 215, my emphasis) and instead investigate the beliefs emerging within the relationships between the governing partnerships and production itself, that we can further substantiate the claim that Treanor’s (2005) vision of a neoliberal ethic, which Harvey (2005) adopts unreflectively, is not attuned the complex set of issues – economic and otherwise – guiding the development of SLU.

Schoolman’s elaboration of the emergent moral sentiments of neoliberalism is, however, well-suited to the discourses we have tracked over the last two chapters. First, he notes that flexible production produces new orientations to authority. Since the production process changes more frequently, individuals can see the results of their collective work, which in turn

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20 This conception is not only compatible with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) theorization of global flows of capital and models of realization, but actually adds some useful specificity to the latter in that it helps show that individual business enterprises or sectors are not only organizations through which capital flows, but also have an important role in local decision-making. In this way, enterprise should now be seen not only as part of the global capital war machine, but also as being a crucial part of the models of realization regulating its own expression.

21 Or what is typically trumpeted as “neoliberal ideology.” As Barnett (2005, 4 my emphasis) writes: “Accordingly, ‘neoliberalism’ is supposed to refer to a programme of policies and governance arrangements that favour privatization, the liberalization of markets, and more competition. Understood this way, ‘neoliberalism’ is presented as a coherent ideological project with clear and unambiguous origins, whose spread is sustained and circulated by an identifiable set of institutions.”
encourages them to conceive of themselves as creators of both the products and other consequences. For him, this corresponds to the “deepening of an evaluative concern for the quality of production” (Ibid., 217), or the birth of individual and collective responsibility with respect to production. This responsibility is, of course, still intimately connected to the constant economic pressure to innovate, which becomes an impetus to cooperative and individual growth – not to mention competition and evaluation, though these are not explicitly mentioned. In this way, Schoolman excavates an emergent structural link between individual, collective, and technological growth. Moreover, this interconnectivity spills beyond the boundaries of any individual enterprise. In concert with the new regulatory framework, these transformations cause individuals to become more aware of community expectations; the public sector becomes more concerned with how policy affects economic development; and the private sector adopts a broader view of how it interacts with society at large. This system provides a much more robust framework to think about the moral and ethical dimensions of the process of urbanization, which is typically only investigated critically from a political economic perspective. Moreover, Schoolman’s system also speaks to the way one might frame neoliberalism as an actual social and moral philosophy in a way much more robust histories than Treanor’s have done.\(^23\)

Of course, we are still left with the problem of understanding the constellation of discourses on ethics in the postwar era before neoliberalism became dominant.\(^24\) Fortunately, it is

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\(^23\) Jessop’s (2002) analysis of the World Commission’s report essentially argues that the multitude of policy initiatives carried out are in the service of supporting the global innovation economy, which is philosophically very close to this analysis. However, Schoolman’s explication is somewhat more revealing because it explicitly focuses on the moral sentiments accompanying the political economic transformations, while Jessop never strays from political economy.

\(^24\) That is, in the years before Margaret Thatcher was elected as the prime minister of Britain (1979) and Ronald Reagan was elected to the United States’ presidency (1980) (cf. David Harvey 2005).
not necessary to venture too far beyond the handful of discourses that I have already isolated, for Schumpeter (2009, 121) explicitly turns to “the cultural component of the capitalist economy – to its socio-psychological superstructure, if we wish to speak the Marxian language – and to the mentality that is characteristic of capitalist society and in particular the bourgeois class.” Grounding his argument on the claim that capitalism has “been the propelling force of the rationalization of human behavior” (Ibid., 125) leads him to several conclusions about the attendant ethics.  

First, he notes that development and propagation of rationality chases away “mystic and romantic ideas of all sorts,” thereby not only transforming our means to ends, but also the ends themselves (Ibid., 127). For him, this amounts to transforming the traditional foundation of duty-based ethics (the fear of God, as far as he is concerned) into rational utilitarianism – producing the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people. Second, it dismantles the traditional markers of goodness or high culture, and replaces them with a bourgeois celebration of empirically verifiable virtues, such as efficiency. Finally, and in a similar vein, he asserts that capitalist rationality is anti-heroic, meaning that the warrior’s ethos of victory for victory’s sake is replaced by a valuation of pacifism to the point that international relations are ultimately conceived in these terms.

Although in Schumpeter’s imagination this capitalist utilitarianism ultimately fails along with the capitalism as an economic system, it is important to take his formulation into account. For him, the proper capitalist ethic takes the long-term view and therefore “enjoins working for the future irrespective of whether or not one is going to harvest the crop oneself” (160); it functions in accordance with a “standard of accumulation” rather than the now ubiquitous

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25 Schumpeter is not claiming that capitalism itself is responsible for the development of rational thinking, but is instead elaborating on his brief argument that rational thinking develops in response to definite problems, such as those that we come to term economic.
“standard of consumption.” This confluence of the will to accumulate and to propagate happiness far and wide both meshes well with the ethical orientation of the early coordinated planning efforts in the Central Puget Sound region and resonates strongly with Vulcan’s often-repeated goal of “doing well by doing good” (Hazlehurst 2003; Vulcan 2015e).

This tendency in contemporary capitalism is, of course, not limited to Vulcan’s activity, and turning to some of their more verbose contemporaries helps sketch out this discursive constellation. One need not look farther than a book coauthored by John Mackey, the co-CEO of Whole Foods – which coincidentally occupies the lion’s share of the retail space at Vulcan’s 2200 Westlake project at the southern gateway to SLU – to gain some insight into this capitalist ethical turn. In a moment that situates their pop-intellectual work at a more general level than Vulcan, they explicitly assert:

Conscious Capitalism is not about being virtuous or doing well by doing good. It is a way of thinking about business that is more conscious of its higher purpose, its impacts on the world, and the relationships it has with its various constituencies and stakeholders. It reflects a deeper consciousness about why businesses exist and how they can create more value (Mackey and Sisodia 2013, 32-3).

The authors’ concern is above all to “recapture the narrative [of capitalism] and restore it to its true essence: that the purpose of business is to improve our lives and to create value for stakeholders” (Ibid. 20), with “value” here being shorthand for “social intellectual, emotional, spiritual, cultural, physical, and ecological wealth…while also delivering superior financial results” (Ibid. 32). In short, they render capitalism as an incredibly powerful means for realizing ends – in Mackey’s case with Whole Foods, these ends are in fact greater health and well-being for his customers. In doing so, they are distancing themselves from the traditional notion that businesses’ sole responsibility is to make profits (cf. Friedman 1970; Mackey et al. 2005).
Although the authors hint at familiarity with a wide range of ethical traditions,\(^2^6\) they explicitly argue that Smith’s (2009) exploration of moral sentiments is a necessary accompaniment to his writing on economics (Smith 2003), and that the purpose of any company can be defined with respect to three Platonic “transcendentals” – the Good, True, and Beautiful – to which they add the Heroic.\(^2^7\) They insist that the purposes of consciously capitalist organizations are expressions of these pure ideas, and that participation in the capitalist system is but a means for achieving them.

In a similar vein, but with an explicit focus on urbanization, one might also turn to another recent book, *The Carbon Efficient City* (Hurd and Hurd 2012), which was coauthored by the Vice-president of Touchstone Inc., one of Vulcan’s fellow-travelers in the redevelopment of SLU. As the title suggests, it strives to reduce the carbon footprint of urban environments through a broad range of strategies aimed at: national, state, and local government; institutional and nonprofit actors; and private developers. It is far less radical that Mackey and Sisodia’s mission of putting capitalism in the service of perceived moral ends and instead develops “a path of action that minimizes economic cost and maximizes innovation, delight, and resiliency” (Ibid., 7). This approach falls squarely within the stakeholder regulatory framework that Schoolman

\(^{2^6}\) Throughout their book the authors use language reminiscent of Aristotle (flourishing), Spinoza and Nietzsche (joy), as well as Bentham and Mill (pleasure and happiness), but do not cite any of these authors by name.

\(^{2^7}\) This is already somewhat of a misreading, for Plato actually considers Goodness, Beauty, Justice and Truth to be the most important for morality (Rist 2002, 147) Moreover, Mackey and Sisodia also fail to mention that Plato takes the Form of the Good to be above the other three: “it is the cause of knowledge and truth…it is something beyond truth and knowledge and, precious as these both are, of still higher worth” (Plato 1951, 220). Setting this (important) error aside, we can still grasp what they are trying to say, which is that they take market expressions Goodness (which they reduce to empathy), Beauty, Truth, and Heroism to be moral in and of themselves. Finally, their entire discussion of purpose is actually a subtle transformation of another text on business ethics that, following Kierkegaard, Aristotle, Hume, and Nietzsche prizes discovery, excellence, altruism, and heroism, respectively (Mourkogiannis 2006, 30-7).
(1987) proposes as the analog to neoliberalizing economic relations but is important to consider both because it adds contemporary specificity to his model, and because even though its project of “monetizing ‘virtuous’ behavior into something tangible that can be considered in every purchasing decision” (Hurd and Hurd, 152), it defines virtue in a way that is not merely entrepreneurial, as Harvey (2005) would have it.

Together, these discourses express a range of the general perspectives on ethics, both in relation to Critical Urban Theory’s normative position that does not grant any space to the extraeconomic in the urbanization process, as well as other more variegated conceptualizations that seek to tie ethics to capitalism and/or urbanization explicitly. These discourses, however, do not exhaust the range of possibilities for what could have been invoked in SLU; the following subsection identifies several other discursive possibilities that could be engaged to envision an alternative ethical framework for guiding urbanization.

Justice, sustainability culture, and the outer limits

It is possible to start sketching out the limit cases to the discourses on ethics by turning to twin discussions by Susan Fainstein and Adrian Parr, both of whom are significantly less invested – if not hostile toward – the project of defining an ethical version of capitalist accumulation.28 Fainstein (2010) approaches the problem of ethics and urbanization from a different perspective altogether: promoting justice. In contradistinction to the position emerging from the strictly critical corners of academia – both as outlined above and in Harvey’s (1973) understanding of

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28 It is worth noting that this alternative resonates with that which the critical urban theorists often propose (cf. Wachsmuth et al 2011). The difference, however, is that they do not present it in relation to a robust analysis of any ethical orientation on the side of urbanization.
social justice in economic terms⁴ — and even farther removed from the ethical discourses being discharged by the ostensibly enlightened members of the private sector, she focuses on the practical problem of attempting to plan a more just city. The aspects of her discussion that explicitly pertain to the urban condition will be discussed in the following subsection, but here we can comment upon her normative position, which holds that:

the tendency of recent theory in both political philosophy and planning to emphasize democratic processes as key to justice overly idealizes open communication and neglects the substance of debate (Ibid., 23).

In response, she argues for a substantial theory of urban justice founded on equity, democracy, and difference that challenges “the communicative model’s assumption that a just process necessarily produces a just result” (Ibid., 24). To her credit, she considers each of these goals to be sovereign, and describes both the nature of each, as well as the relationships between them.

Equity is defined as “a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favor those who are already better off at the beginning” (Ibid., 36). It is a practical concern rather than an idealistic one in that it aims not for immediate equality, but instead for a shift in the distribution of benefits that favors the disadvantaged both in economic and extraeconomic terms (politically, socially, spatially) in ways that are not captured by the liberal and Marxian traditions. This sensitivity to issues beyond individualism and class difference causes her to consider differences in race, ethnicity, culture, gender, and religion — a list to which many other forms of difference, such as sexuality or disability, could be added. Finally, democracy is included because it provides an arena for these different and equitable contingents to interact and self-determine how urbanization is to proceed. Critically, and

⁴ “Exactly how much redistribution of income should occur is, of course, an ethical question which different societies have answered in different ways at different times — this is the central ethical judgement which has to be made in the formulation of any social policy with respect to a city system” (Harvey 1973, 52).
following conceptualizations and critiques of democracy and deliberative planning by Flyvbjerg (1998), Mouffe (1999), Zucker (2003), and especially Purcell (2008), Fainstein argues that the goal of democracy is not consensus, but is rather that each disadvantaged group attains “democratic outcomes that best meet their particular interests” (Purcell 2008, 77). Above all, she asserts that if the goal is to build a good city, this notion must be added to the commonly accepted criteria regarding city form and environmental sustainability. Consequently, it focuses attention on the fundamental issues of urban and civic life that are ignored by beneficent elites – or their functionaries – like Allen, Mackey, or the Hurds.

In parallel with Fainstein, there is the subtle and critical discourse of “hijacking sustainability,” as proffered by Adrian Parr (2009, 3) in a book of the same title. For her, sustainability culture is a complex social practice that is decidedly not only a moral discourse, but it is also an affective encounter which can fuel political action: “[i]t is an instrument of knowledge formation; it is how a local context is narrated; it engages new and emerging social values and the energies driving these in dialogue with more traditional values and conventions, along with the habits and stereotypes driving these.” As such, there are two ways in which it can be put to work: at one pole it is reduced to representation that is appropriated by the state or corporate culture, and is thereby used to “camouflage” militarism and capitalism\(^\text{31}\); at the other, it can empower individuals and groups to make legitimate social change, through practices such as socially responsible investing or creating ecovillages (Ibid., 151). With respect to design she explicitly differentiates between “green design” – which, per her definition, uses green technologies and materials, but does not critically engage with the capitalist profit motive (cf. all the green buildings in SLU) – and “sustainable design,” which moves beyond environmental sustainability.

\(^{31}\) Two examples of this she offers are greening the military and building eco-friendly Wal-Mart stores.
issues to address social and economic issues. For Parr, to “reduce or restrict the dynamic and creative energy of life to profit-maximizing economic principles,” (Ibid., 150) as does green design, is ultimately to render sustainability “useless.” Although one might certainly take issue with the implied useful/useless binary, this radical ethical perspective, which is founded on the Spinozist notion that we consider whatever increases both our power to affect and be affected – our movement toward greater perfection – to be good (Spinoza 1994, 199-200), constructs a continuum on which one could locate particular discourses and actions for evaluation. This conceptualization resonates strongly with Holland’s aforementioned distinction between markets in general, which can be organized around extraeconomic criteria, and capitalist markets that have only one end in mind. It, therefore, serves as a limit to the discourses on ethics and urbanization that we have excavated, for none of them go far enough to question or challenge maximizing long-term profitability.

Finally, there is a constellation of even more minoritarian ethical fields that deserve much more attention that can be committed to them here: the joy or delight of becoming active through participating in direct democracy (Purcell 2013); the politics of love, in which love is taken as “a motor of association” (Hardt and Negri 2009, 188) which can go beyond the corruptions of identitarian or unitarian forms of love, and push individuals toward greater autonomy and cooperation; finally there is the Situationist International’s ethic of drifting, which prizes a continuous and fluid engagement with the surrounding world (briefly discussed in the following section). These are all critical elements of both an immanent normativity and alternatives to SLU’s coordinated urbanization.

In sum, if ones seeks to understand the range of discourses shaping how contemporary capitalism in general, or urban development in particular, addresses issues that are not easily
reduced to economics, then examining the productive role that such moral and ethical discourses play is crucial. These concerns, which circulate at a much broader level than discussions of SLU, sketch the limits within which the statements in the previous two chapters were drawn, yet they still lack specificity regarding how particular visions of the city are actualized. It is to this topic that I now turn.

6.2.3 Aesthetics: Envisioning the Urban

The postwar history of urban regeneration programs has involved a repetitive group of conflicts. Generally they can be encapsulated in the phrase growth versus equity. Fainstein (2010, 80)

The final region of the discursive constellation at hand is marked by a set of approaches to urban and regional planning that covers the same temporal field as the empirical details that I have addressed in the previous two chapters. While political economy is largely implicit in this subsection, I follow three broad lines that intersect with the ethics subsection: the development of growth management strategies, the shifting value systems guiding the planning profession, as well as the radical visions of urban space provided by Situationist International in the late 1950s and early 1960s. At times I also refer to this dimension as aesthetic, but as in my previous use of this word, I am not privileging the visual but instead mean it in the sense of the Greek concept of aesthēsis: the general perception of something through all the bodily senses. In other words, this section involves conceptions of experiential environments, or how the city could be experienced.

In his introduction to a special issue of the Journal of the American Planning Association, Timothy Chapin (2012) provides a concise overview of three historic waves of growth management and posits that a fourth is currently emerging (Table 6.1). The article is

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32 Chapin (2012), Hall (2014), and Fainstein (2010) have been invaluable resources for sketching out the trajectory of the subsection.
primarily a synthesis of several seminal books and essays on the topic and therefore provides exactly the type of broad perspective that is helpful for the current project. Moreover, with respect to Fainstein’s quotation that opens this subsection, it is important to note that Chapin’s discussion falls completely on the growth the side of the conflict. This however, does not mean that there is not a discernable ensemble of moral and ethical norms that course through the eras
of growth management policy that he highlights. Conversely, there is a very clear (and familiar) normativity that emerges in the list of issues to which each of these eras responds: remedying environmental degradation, conserving rural land, providing infrastructure, creating a sense of place, spurring economic development, and addressing climate change.

The primary advantage of this conception, even though it is idealized and delineates eras that are more fluid in reality, is that extends almost exactly across the temporal field that was defined in the previous two chapters. The birth of Metro and the Planning Enabling Act, for example, fall clearly within the first era: they were both undertaken through official government channels and meant to address water pollution and protect rural land, although the regional and state scales were more active than Chapin’s typology attributes to the first era. Both Seattle’s first attempt (1972-3) to development a comprehensive plan through the Seattle 2000 commission as well as Washington State’s Growth Management Act (1990) occur within the second and do not involve public-private partnerships, but the intensive participation at the regional and neighborhood scales that Chapin reserves for his emerging fourth wave were central: Vision 2020 was published in 1990 and neighborhood planning was first being supported in 1987 (Resolution 27709). Finally, the third and emergent fourth waves largely blend together in the case of SLU, with the fourth almost appearing to be addressing it directly. In any case, there is general concordance here and, if anything, one might say that the Central Puget Sound region in general, and Seattle in particular, have been prematurely expressing elements of the Era of Sustainable Growth.

In parallel but out of sync with the transforming orientation to growth management, it is possible to pinpoint four broad moral bases of planning: the public interest (broadly and vaguely defined), a process-oriented approach that democratically arrives at a substantial definition of
public interest, remedying disadvantages produced by poverty and discrimination, and finally, generalizing this approach to address different contextually specific forms of injustice (Fainstein 2010, chapter 2). In the first era – which significantly precedes the temporal field under concrete examination here, but which undoubtedly sets its tone – one can find a mix of approaches to urban planning that range from Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte and Haussmann’s monumental attempt to restore Paris to its “imperial splendor” (Carmona 2002, 6) to City Beautiful attempts, such as Daniel Burnham’s Chicago Plan, “to overcome collective inferiority complexes and boost business” (Hall 2014, 203); from Ebenezer Howard’s (2010) attempt to rectify the urban ills of Victorian England with his Garden City to Le Corbusier’s (cf. 1987) authoritarian attempts to synthesize the monumental and pastoral with the rise of the machine age. Although it is clear that many of the problems being addressed here are overcrowding, disease, squalor, and various forms of vice (cf. Engels 2009), there is no particular moral orientation that unites all of these attempts: nationalism (Anderson 2006), the Protestant work ethic (Weber 2001), rightful ownership of the means of production (Marx and Engels 2002), or deference to technological innovation and the entrepreneurial spirit (Treanor 2005) – many of these normative positions intermix in the planning solutions of the this era but each ensemble was taken for granted as the right thing to do for public benefit.

Yet Fainstein (2010, 58-9) explicitly notes that the Progressive Era’s movements “to rid government of bias and corruption…rested on a view that a sharp line separated politics from administration and a belief that experts could develop policies in isolation from selfish interests.” This is important for two reasons: first, and broadly, this attitude sets the stage for the second stage of planning’s moral basis (democratic participation); second, with respect to the discussion

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33 By simplifying a lot, I can temporally situate these periods as such: Wave 1 (mid 19th century-1940s), Wave 2 (1950s), and Wave 3 (1960s-1980s), and Wave 4 (1990s-present).
of the Coordinated City, it corresponds to the middle- and upper-class social movements that both resulted in the birth of Metro and the Seattle Commons initiative.

In contradiction to this ends-oriented approach, the second wave of planning normativity values the process of planning itself – by democratically elected officials – and rests on the assumption that it establishes general goals which will be carried out by disinterested, lower-level functionaries (Ibid., 60). Hall (2014, 388) asserts that, at the levels of city and regional planning, this marks the transition from utopian planning to “institutionalized [and] comprehensive land use planning” that, given its intellectual development out of architecture and civil engineering, is considered to be an analytical and technical – rather a normative and political – process. This shift is perhaps most infamously seen in the federal urban renewal program which, as part of the Housing Act of 1949, had three primary goals: eliminating slums, producing more higher-quality homes, and creating more desirable neighborhoods (Anderson 1964, 4). With the broad goals set at the federal level, urban planners could focus on efficiently implementing the locally established vision of the public good.

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34 This is an important distinction because, as Fainstein (2010, 59) notes, the development of a theory to supporting urban planning is based in Karl Mannheim’s *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (1940), which is grounded in “the national state’s participation in economic and social planning.”

35 Fainstein (2010, 61) clearly considers this shift toward positivism to be a misstep and is careful to remind her readers than Mannheim’s perspective, had it been considered in full, would have contributed to exactly the kind of value-laden perspectives on planning that planning theorists have been developing since in the 1960s.

36 That urban renewal ultimately was a social and economic failure in its time has been well established (cf. Anderson 1964), but Smith (1996, 87) asserts “it was actually very successful economically in laying the foundation for the phase of redevelopment, rehabilitation, land use conversion and, ultimately, private-market gentrification that would follow.” This, of course, does not constitute an endorsement from him (a former student of David Harvey), but is instead a retrospective view on how urban renewal is an important precedent for large-scale revitalization efforts that followed.
However, the idea that comprehensive land use planning is even feasible, not to mention desirable, is also raised in this era: Lindbloom (1959, 81) is not convinced that decision-makers have the necessary human capacity, information, or technology to optimize all interests and formalizes a method of “successive limited comparisons”; Altshuler (1965) shares this perspective, and adapts it to the urban milieu, arguing that planners are not capable of ranking all the various interests of a municipality into a single set of goals, let alone attaining them. In SLU, the fact that the City Council could only adopt about a third of its listed values into its comprehensive plan, might be taken as evidence of this practical concern. The limited term of the plan (20 years) along with annual amendments and a 10-year update also attest to the necessarily incremental nature of an allegedly comprehensive document.

The third wave that Fainstein delineates is founded in this skepticism toward rationality and comprehensiveness but is marked in part by the injection of Marxist ideas into urban studies, particularly by Harvey and Manuel Castells, and the corresponding response by the planning discipline. The conceptual basis of their positions – and one that I maintain is not relevant either analytically in our emergent approach to critical urban studies or empirically in SLU – is that the allegedly disinterested or objective position of planners is but a mask for the true power dynamics among property developers and elite interests. Ideology is, of course, the concept that Marx uses to describe this “unaware expression of the underlying ideas and beliefs which attach to a particular social situation” (Harvey 1973, 18; see Marx and Engels 1970) and despite my position that it is not helpful for the present investigation, it is nevertheless essential for this wave of critical thought.

37 The four adopted core values are community, environmental stewardship, economic opportunity and security, and social equity, while the full list also includes: continuity, diversity, economic security, education, environmental quality, freedom, good government, opportunity, physical security, and progress (Resolution 28962).
From this perspective, Harvey (1985) poignantly argues that the urban planner’s function, as part of parcel of the state, is to stabilize social reproduction, which is periodically disrupted due to the internal contradictions of capitalism. As such, the planner’s ethic of promoting social harmony (Ibid., 176) is understood as supporting capitalist social relations, and is therefore a rationalization of elite interests. This is, however, not the same as saying that planners reproduce the status quo in terms of the built environment itself – a point which Harvey makes explicit – but instead, these material improvements to the cityscape on which all classes depend for production and reproduction are seen as an ever-changing superstructure erected atop an economic base. Similarly, Castells (1977, 185) specifically mentions environmentalism as “a dialogue concerning the conditions for achieving the well-being of man.” As ideology, it allegedly naturalizes the social relations that are responsible for environmental and social degradation instead of confronting them. This ideology, he argues, is further distinguishable by the effects that it causes: namely, “the ideology of the environment transforms social inequality into physically harmful effects and merges social classes into a single army of boy scouts” (Ibid., 186) who focus on patching up the effects rather than dealing with the underlying problems – urban planners are undoubtedly understood as part of this group.

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38 This essay is a short repackaging of socialist formation of social justice from Social Justice and the City (1973, Chapter 6), where, following Marx and Engels, he argues that both material (economic) and ideological (politics, ethics, religion, philosophy) forces influence the march of history, with the former tending to dominate. For Harvey, this translates into the creation of social and political institutions that support the economic base by redistributing surplus value in cities, most often to the advantage of the elite. This is in contradistinction to his earlier liberal formation of social justice (1973, Chapter 3), where he grounds social justice in need, contribution to the common good, and merit, asserting that a just distribution of income will be determined on these three values. Ultimately, however, he argues that the capitalist system is incapable of satisfying these criteria because it is based on a socially produced scarcity, and therefore to disperse social surplus in this manner would put the system’s survival in question.
Planning scholars and practitioners responded to this climate in a variety of ways. Pierre Clavel (1986, 2), for example, describes a substantive shift in the way planning was used to link up “vital grassroots citizens movement[s] and the desires of progressive political leaders to formulate redistributive policies” in five different cities between 1969 and 1984. This response involves incorporating minoritarian planning themes into a more progressive planning doctrine: 

*public ownership* of utilities and real estate; the *opposition* of city residents’ interests to suburban and corporate interests; and new *methods* that privileged existing residents’ interests to potential new interests that would come after new projects were built (Ibid., 189-191). This was possible, especially in the cases of Berkeley and Cleveland, because the planners had a degree of autonomy from centralized authority and could therefore develop their evaluative and inventive capacities. In Cleveland, this amounted to a “quiet but important experiment” where “a group of professional planners, working for the city, [could devote] themselves to serving the needs of the poor even while the national mood, federal dollars, and local politics chased other priorities” (Krumholz and Forester 1990, xv). Such autonomy clearly serves as an outer limit to the increasingly integrated and coordinated situation in which urban planners in Seattle have found themselves, especially since the ratification of the Growth Management Act in 1990.

The final wave that Fainstein sketches addresses what she considers to be a return to Mannheim’s (1940) original vision of planning as a value-laden and immanent discursive production. It is important to note that the range of scholarship she cites as constituting this wave is not only about language, but is also about action. For example, Purcell (2008) advocates for establishing new “networks of equivalence” between radically democratic social movements that explicitly challenge the hegemony of neoliberal political economy, while DeFillipis (2004)

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39 Berkeley, Burlington, Cleveland, Hartford, and Santa Monica.
argues for practical maneuvers such as collective ownership of work, housing, and money as a means for establishing a degree local autonomy. For Fainstein, the implication is that planning in and for a just city must cultivate such activities as well as the principles – democratic participation, in this case, but also equity and diversity – on which they are founded.

New Urbanism is clearly the most influential planning and design discourse that has shaped SLU and falls somewhere between these last two waves, although given its overwhelming focus on the layout and characteristics of the built environment itself, rather than how it might be shaped by those inhabiting it, it falls significantly short of describing a process that Fainstein would consider just. Nevertheless, this design philosophy is extremely compatible with the urban village strategy that guides Seattle’s comprehensive plan, as is reflected in the first major claim of *The Charter of the New Urbanism* (Congress for the New Urbanism 1996):

> We stand for the restoration of existing urban centers and towns within coherent metropolitan regions, the reconfiguration of sprawling suburbs into communities of real neighborhoods and diverse districts, the conservation of natural environments, and the preservation of our built legacy.

To this end, the *Charter* outlines four principles that should guide both policy and development practices:

- neighborhoods should be diverse in use and population; communities should be designed for the pedestrian and transit as well as the car; cities and towns should be shaped by physically defined and universally accessible public spaces and community institutions; urban places should be framed by architecture and landscape design that celebrate local history, climate, ecology, and building practice (Ibid.)

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40 The CNU explicitly recognizes that changing the built environment will not solve social or economic problems, but argues that the economy, community stability, and ecological health need a “coherent and supportive physical framework” to be sustained.
Several design principles directly address the neighborhood, which is understood as one of the three “essential elements of development and redevelopment in the metropolis”\(^{41}\): they should be compact, mixed-use, and walkable, with a broad range of amenities within walking distance; they should contain a wide range of housing types and price levels, as well as open spaces; they should be near transit; and graphic design codes that encourage predictable changes should be adopted. Although these principles have undeniably guided how SLU has been actualized, they nevertheless lack the specificity to account for the intensity of growth that has been occurring and is expected to continue in SLU, an assertion which is reinforced by other projects around Seattle that are also considered to be examples of New Urbanism, such as New Holly, Rainier Vista, and High Point (Fig. 6.3). Dan Trudeau’s (2013) recent typology of how this new urban vision has been actualized since the Charter was published is especially illuminating because it extends some of the less intensely urban visions that established New Urbanism as a design concept (cf. Duany, Plater-Zyberk, and Speck 2000), and lays out three paradigmatic types: Mainstream Urbanism, Dense Urbanism, and Hybrid Urbanism. In this framework, Dense Urbanism best describes SLU because of its attempt to “create vibrant urban places through compact mixed-use design that culminates in a well-defined district” (Trudeau 2013, 120), and therefore provides a theoretical bridge between the design principles and how they are implemented in different urban contexts. Moreover, this form is largely distinguished from what Trudeau calls Mainstream Urbanism – a category that encompasses the other three aforementioned New Urbanist developments in Seattle – and Hybrid Urbanism by its

\(^{41}\) The other elements are Districts and Corridors (Ibid.).
proliferation of multifamily residences and concomitant lack of other housing options, specifically single-family homes.\textsuperscript{42}

Altogether, then, I have tracked four historical strategies for managing urban growth and put them in conversation with four moral bases of planning that roughly coincide, while also identifying a design philosophy that has heavily influenced how SLU has been conceptualized and built. Moreover, drawing on Trudeau’s typology, I have accounted for the specific differences between how New Urbanism has unfolded in different areas in Seattle, and how it will continue to be expressed in SLU. The final task of analyzing this cut through the discursive constellation is identifying an outside limit that is not actualized in SLU but nevertheless

\textsuperscript{42} Mainstream Urbanism describes “medium-density and large-area residential neighborhoods,” while Hybrid Urbanism denotes low-density projects that cherry pick “select attributes” of New Urbanism (Trudeau 2013, 120).
constitutes an ensemble of urban visions that could be realized in conjunction with the political
economic and ethical alternatives that I have already discussed.

Situationists and the City

Finally, an outside limit to these perspectives on coordinated planning can be found in the
minoritarian French Marxist tradition to which Lefebvre – and therefore essentially all of critical
geography – is connected: the Situationist International (SI), as well as their predecessor, the
Lettrist International (LI). These groups clearly do not have an immediate relationship to the
archive which was established in Chapters 4 and 5, yet they were nevertheless active in the same
temporal field and have multiple points of contact with other discourses that are more directly
related. The uneasy synthesis of Corbusian top-down ordering of space and Jane Jacobs’ (1961)
celebration of mixed-uses and life on the street that one can detect in SLU has, for example, a
direct connection to these two groups. As a member of both groups, Ivan Chtcheglov (1953)
commented thus on the former:

We will leave Monsieur Le Corbusier’s style to him, a style suitable for factories
and hospitals, and no doubt eventually for prisons. (Doesn’t he already build
churches?) Some sort of psychological repression dominates this individual —
whose face is as ugly as his conceptions of the world — such that he wants to
squash people under ignoble masses of reinforced concrete, a noble material that
should rather be used to enable an aerial articulation of space that could surpass
the flamboyant Gothic style. His cretinizing influence is immense. A Le
Corbusier model is the only image that arouses in me the idea of immediate
suicide. He is destroying the last remnants of joy. And of love, passion, freedom.

Jane Jacobs’s connection to the SI is much less explicit, but she famously shares their opinion of
Le Corbusier’s authoritarian “anti-city planning,” his utopian towers in a park, his call for killing
the street: “The man with the most dramatic idea of how to get all this anti-city planning right
into the citadels of iniquity themselves was the European architect Le Corbusier” (Jacobs 1961,
21). Most importantly, however, from my methodological perspective, is the fact that the truly
alternative urban vision offered by the LI and the SI constitute part of the discursive constellation, even though it has not been materially actualized.

A comprehensive review of this literature is undoubtedly beyond the scope of this project, but four central and interrelated aspects of it can nevertheless be tracked: unitary urbanism and psychogeography; the dérive and situations; the lateral connection to Lefebvre’s research; and finally Constant’s experimental designs for New Babylon.\(^43\) Chtcheglov’s (Ibid.) essay sets the tone for much of this tradition with its first polemic line\(^44\): “We are bored in the city, there is no longer any Temple of the Sun” – a boredom which corresponds to the ordered and rational city espoused by modernist planners such as Le Corbusier. In direct contradistinction to the rational reordering of the city, the Lettrists and Situationists prefer immersion to ordering; critique of the urban condition to the doctrine producing it; transformation to fixation; collectivity to alienation; spontaneity to planning; pleasure to usefulness; topophilia to topophobia; and action to ideas.

These elements come together in the concepts of psychogeography and unitary urbanism. Psychogeography refers to explorations of the “ambiences and potential uses of sites” (Pinder 2005, 152), which were often absorbed through the aimless – and frequently alcohol-fueled – wanderings of the dérive, and conveyed in written and graphic form (cf. Khatib 1958). Central to the entire project was to explore and represent how the ambiences of the built environment were fractured and distributed across a city that was fictitiously presented as coherent in the

\(^{43}\) See Pinder (2005) for a lucid engagement with the historical and theoretical details of the Situationist’s singular urban utopianism. 

\(^{44}\) The memorable first line of the essay reads, “SIRE, I AM FROM THE OTHER COUNTRY,” and is obviously intended to reinforce the author’s alterity. It is worth noting that Chtcheglov and his roommate Henry de Béarn were arrested for planning to blow up the Eiffel tower, “not as a political act, not as a nihilist affirmation, but because [its lights] kept them awake” (Marcus 1989, 376).
One of the most famous images from this era is Debord’s “The naked city” (Fig. 6.4), which expresses this fractured urban experience through the original method of *détournement*, perhaps best understood as “a means of subversive diversion, reworking, [and] hijacking” (Pinder 2005, 153). In this case, a map of Paris is “detourned” in such a way that its various areas are connected by strong and weaker desires to move among them (corresponding to thickness of the arrows). Unitary urbanism is best understood as a broader concept that is a critique of urbanism that is both an exploration of the existing city as well as an orientation anticipating the social spaces of the future. Pinder (Ibid.,129) explains it thus:

They envisaged unitary urbanism as being dynamic, continually evolving, concerned with ambiances and situations, and the outcomes of people’s desires and actions. It would transcend the kinds of segmentations instituted through modern planning and would ultimately constitute “a unitary human milieu in which separations such as work/leisure or public/private will finally be dissolved.

This orientation was a central aspect to the Lettrist’s and Situationist’s explicitly design-oriented work – notably Constant’s New Babylon, which is discussed below – and although it seems to fade in later more explicitly political work, such as Debord’s *The Society of the Spectacle* (1994), it remains an important aspect of the groups’ disposition toward the modernizing city.46

The *dérive* itself it is envisioned as a thumb in the eye of functionalism; its wandering is intended to be “the practice of a passional journey out of the ordinary through a rapid changing of ambiances, as well as a means of psychogeographical study and of situationist psychology” (Debord 1955; also see Debord 1958). It is the opposite of work, organization, and utilitarian yet is not free of any ethical system. Quite the contrary, in fact, as one of the early Lettrist publications on the practice attests:

45 The spectacle – wherein all social life is mediated by images – can be defined by Debord’s (1994, 12) first description: “All that was once directly lived has become mere representation.”
46 Pinder (2005, chapters 5-7) explores the internal dynamics of the group that contributed to shifts in membership and perspective.
The practice of de-familiarization [trans: dépaysement, also displacement] and the choice of encounters, the sense of incompleteness and ephemerality, the love of speed transposed onto the plane of the mind, together with inventiveness and forgetting are among the elements of an ethics of drifting (ethique de la dérive) which we have already begun to test in the poverty of the cities of our time (de Béarn et al 1998).

As Pinder notes, this orientation clearly aligns the Lettrists and Situationists with a lineage populated by the likes of Baudelaire and the flâneurs of the Parisian arcades (Benjamin 2002),

![Fig. 6.4. Debord's “The Naked City”](image)

the poet Arthur Rimbaud’s immersion in the Paris Commune, as well as Paul Lafargue’s manifesto, *The Right to be Lazy* (1999), which was published almost a decade after the author’s own participation in the Commune. Moreover, there are strong connections with two of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) sources in *A Thousand Plateaus*: Henry Miller’s (1994) roamings in New
York and Paris, as well as Jacques Besse’s (1999) three-day hallucinatory trip through the streets of the latter, constantly seeking both free glasses of water and “his women.” In all of these cases, whether it is Benjamin (2002, 418) connecting Charles Baudelaire’s habits to Edgar Allen Poe’s (1966) pursuit of the “man of the crowd” through the streets of London, the Situationist’s search for the emotional contours of the city, or Miller’s and Besse’s construction of “smooth space” through their trajectory, the point is the same: an oppositional and passionate experience of landscape that stands in sharp contrast to a city that has been ordered through the confluence of power and rationality.

Lefebvre’s personal and conceptual relationships to these groups are also germane to this discussion. First, his focus on everyday life and particularly his theory of moments (Lefebvre 2008a, 2008b) as irruptions of “presence” aligns him directly with the Lettrist’s and Situationist’s orientation. This conception of moments, which centers on passionate experiences such as love, hate, and delight is intended as a poetic rejoinder to Marx’s stark conception of praxis, but with a similar end: to combat the alienation that arises under the capitalist mode of production. However, whereas for Lefebvre a moment is a temporary revelation of the limits of one’s own circumstances, the Situationists believed in creating new concrete moments in space and time – or what they called situations. Tracking this relationship closely, Pinder (2005, 167) quotes the Situationists:

> The moment is mainly temporal, forming parts of a zone of temporality, not pure but dominant. Articulated in relation to a given place, the situation is completely spatio-temporal…Moments are constructed in “situations” might be thought of as moments of rupture, of acceleration, revolutions in individual life (Levin 1996, 101)

Although Lefebvre was ultimately “cut off” by the SI after they accused him of the worst kind of plagiarism – that is, a plagiarism in a boycotted journal (Pinder 2005, 170) – the effects of the
relationship was profound. Lefebvre’s notion of “the right to the city” as “a call for a radical restructuring of social, political, and economic relations, both in the city and beyond” (Purcell 2002, 101) is clearly an outgrowth of the exchange of ideas and attitudes toward intervention with the Situationists.

Finally, Constant’s conceptual design for New Babylon (Fig. 6.5), a form of urbanism that was intended to permit inhabitants to construct such situations is the closest thing to a form of planning: “urbanism made to please” (Constant 2004, 95-6). The various iterations of the design of a superstructure that would straddle the existing city and be a place where inhabitants could arrange spaces to suit their desires should rightly be seen, as Pinder (2005, 198) notes, as emerging “through post-revolutionary freedom, involving an unleashing of the creative potential of the whole population that [is] akin to Marx’s early understanding of communism as ‘the complete emancipation of all human senses and qualities’ [(Marx 1978a, 87)]” rather than a
formal expression handed down from above. Very much in line with the LI’s and SI’s conceptual innovations – Constant was a founding member of the latter in 1957 but resigned in 1960 – New Babylon was a conscious attempt to allow users to construct their built environments and situations in line with their own desires.

Pinder (2005, 203) isolates two interconnected themes expressed in its design that we can understand as explicit values informing this work: ludicism and nomadism. As a space for spontaneous and creative play for a new iteration of human beings defined by these activities – *homo ludens*, a name taken from Johan Huizinga’s (1971) book of the same title – and free from spatio-temporal fixity, New Babylon is an entirely alternative conception of urban space that promotes new encounters and unanticipated play. Much like Marcuse’s (2007) vision of a new society, it is still grounded on an industrial political economy, but one in which all basic values are met through automation, thereby freeing up humans to live according to the values that the Lettrists and Situationists hold dear.

6.3 FINAL REMARK

In sum, the three different discourses that bound the particular archive that was presented across Chapters 4 and 5 are political economy, ethics, and visions of the urban (aesthetics). I have tried to demonstrate how each has been discussed in the same temporal field as the previous two chapters, and have attempted to show both the majoritarian discourses that have actually been realized in SLU as well as the minoritarian discourses that serve as their limits, namely Holland’s notion of Free Market Communism as an alternative political economy informing *how* to build cities of the future; Fainstein’s idea of the Just City and Parr’s concept of sustainability culture as two poles of an ethical normativity informing what a future city *should* be like; finally, the Situationists’ joyous and topological city as what city itself *could* be. Together these
elements constitute immanent alternatives to the statements that are realized in SLU, but they nevertheless exist in the far reaches of the discourses that structure the production of the neighborhood. That I have identified these in particular also speaks to my own immanent normativity that has emerged through the present research. This, in fact, brings me to the very boundaries of what coordinated urbanization, as it currently stands, is capable of doing: if it cannot sustain the deterritorializations that these alternatives entail, then it cannot allow for immanent shifts in normativity. If this is the case – and I think it is because, for example, it is nearly impossible to imagine SLU continuing to grow without capitalist labor markets, in accordance with principles of direct democracy, equity, difference, or in such a way that would accommodate drifting over efficient movement between the condo and the cubicle – then coordinated urbanism is transcendent in the same way as is the standard neoliberal urbanization which the critical urban theorists decry. It is certainly more nuanced and I believe that such an analysis that can handle the extraeconomic dimensions is necessary to understand contemporary urbanization. But politically, the analyst ends up in a position at least as critical as the political critical urban theorist, if not more so, since the notion of what a good urban life looks like is corrupted in two additional registers. This, however, should not be seen as hindrance but rather as an opportunity to elaborate more conceptions of alternatives that are not merely aesthetic, moral, or economic, but which touch on all three of these of concerns.

I unfortunately must bookmark that project, for remainder of this dissertation is devoted to showing how the empirical details that I have extracted from the case of SLU and the discourses shaping it can be used to adapt Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy for contemporary urban studies.
ENTRACTE II: THE COORDINATED CITY’S MODEL OF REALIZATION

I have striven, by the way of archaeology, to establish the limits of South Lake Union (SLU)’s discursive formation, or, more generally, the particular discursive qualities of one concrete occurrence of the Coordinated City’s emerging model of realization. Together, these discourses define the channels through which capital must pass in order to produce coordinated urbanization. This empirical excavation reveals a unique consistency – a particular integration of specific differences – that has emerged in the Central Puget Sound region in the postwar era. Or, in Guattari’s prescient words, I have tried to “understand what kind of axiomatic is implied” (Foucault 1996, 106) in this system by sifting through the available documentation, in search of an immanent coherence between these heterogeneous elements. Moreover, this approach is consistent with Blanché’s original definition of the axiomatic that undergirds Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, in that it establishes consistencies between heterogeneous elements that exhibit “the unity of the abstract system underlying them all” (Blanché 1962, 36) – the underlying abstract system being the purely quantitative calculus of contemporary capitalism.

First, in Chapter 4, I sketched out four lines of inquiry corresponding to themes that were consistently repeated and transformed across the archive: land use and character, institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life. These lines are unique in that each one has no inherent relationship to the others, but they are nevertheless almost always addressed together in the archive (See Fig. A3.2 in Appendix 3 for a visual representation). Land use and character involves governmental, private sector, activist, artist, and citizen efforts to classify land in particular ways, from portions of the region targeted for intensive growth down
to the design and character of neighborhoods. Institutional coordination primarily refers to how the activity at various levels of government, in the private sector, and among citizen groups is being drawn into particular relationships, such that each group has a specific and interconnected role in determining how urbanization will occur. Sustainable economic development can be seen in a similar light, that is, as an effort to coordinate among multiple sectors that call the Central Puget Sound region home, such as aerospace, high-technology, biotechnology, and global health, in such a way that the region’s economy is highly diversified and tending toward sustainability in all senses of the word. Finally, quality of life refers to the natural and man-made amenities of the region, the infrastructure of social reproduction and enjoyment, including clean water and air, social diversity and tolerance, as well as appropriate density and urban vitality. These material aspects of the world – land, governance practices, production, and the environment – are repeatedly drawn together and suggest that a coherent discursive formation exists. However, identifying these coexisting lines is only the first step, and does not suffice for defining the discursive formation.

Second, I sought to understand how these four lines of research were held together in the Coordinated City’s discursive formation by examining: the forms of knowledge that documents from each line utilize; the collective actors who are producing, reproducing and transforming these statements; and the logical and practical connections that relate the statements to one another (Chapter 5). Reading through the archive from the perspective of forms of knowledge reveals a consistency between several categories of knowledge that is continuously refined as one moves from documents produced at the state scale down to the neighborhood scale, as well as in the private sector and among citizens’ groups: human bodies’ biological characteristics, socio-economic status, and distribution; air and water quality; terrestrial habitat characteristics;
Harris, 337

built environment characteristics; political end economic abstractions; infrastructure characteristics; and aesthetics (see Table 5.2). The shared reliance on these types of knowledge serves as a type of “blue” between the heterogeneous discourses that I have identified.

Specifically focusing on the 2013 rezone, I also identified three different active ensembles of speakers whose statements significantly alter the landscape of SLU – representative bodies, citizen-government-professional, and private and semi-public collective speakers – as well as a fourth that corresponds to using the neighborhood, and whose discursive function is mainly to produce commentary. The operative representative bodies include the Washington State Legislature, regional growth coalitions like the Puget Sound Regional Council, and the Seattle City Council. Each of these groups is constituted by individuals with different types of professional training, but the power to make statements is not directly grounded in this training, but instead comes through election or appointment. Their sites of operation include a predictable range of governmental and public buildings, but their singular nature really emerges when considering their relationship to objects of discourse: they function as gatherers and transformers of the technical and observational work undertaken by planners, designers, developers, and consultants. The citizen-government-professional ensembles refer to coalitions between these three groups that are often established to address particular problems: water pollution in Lake Washington in the case of Metro, guidelines for a municipal comprehensive plan in the case of the Seattle 2000 commission, or the neighborhood plans themselves in SLU and elsewhere in the city. The sites of these ensembles’ activity is as variegated as their particular missions, as is the specific training that participants have received, but again the relationship between the collective producers and the objects of discourse is the most interesting aspect. Urban planners, as the collectors and organizers of information about how the city should grow, come to the fore in
these ensembles and while they occupy a similar but less empowered role than the assemblage of elected officials – a facilitative role with a limited capacity to transform information into actionable plans – they differ somewhat in that they have all attained their status by passing through the same type of normalizing institution. Third, the private and semi-public ensembles occupy a third space: these are either private enterprises, such as Vulcan, or more complicated partnerships between elite groups and the city officials, as in the case of the Committee for the Seattle Commons. Their sites of activity are often behind closed doors (in the case of Vulcan) but also include community forums in public spaces (in the case of the Committee for the Seattle Commons). The primary members of these assemblages often have more variegated professional training than the urban planners dominating the previous group, but more homogeneous training than the representative bodies. Vulcan’s relationship to objects of discourse is primarily one of strategically implementing plans while the semi-public ensembles organize information and create documents, but with far less autonomy that Vulcan.

The key point here is that while each of these ensembles produces discourse, it is only through the unique relationships among all of them that one can see the emergence of the Coordinated City’s model of realization. The 2013 rezone that I discussed at length in Chapter 5 illustrates this clearly. In response to projected regional growth (by state, regional, and county officials), the City assigned a certain amount to SLU: 8,000 and 16,000 jobs in 2024; 12,000 housing units and 22,000 jobs in 2031 (Seattle DPD 2013, 6). In order balance the imperative for economic development and the extraeconomic goals of increasing affordable housing, preserving the natural environment, and not “overdeveloping” the area, the City Council decided not to allow the densest zoning option and to charge the developers more per square foot for additional floor area than initially proposed (in order to fund the construction of affordable housing). In
doing this, the Council also rejected the R.I.S.E. proposal (Vulcan 2013) that would have ultimately created more affordable housing in the area (Lee 2013). This widespread coordination, which is attested to by coalitions that pit the mayor, housing advocates, and developers against the City Council, and which puts a private developer in charge of coordinating various services to address the problem of affordable housing and social services, scrambles a simplistic binary conceptualization of the public and private sector. I argue that this coordinated system has emerged in order to manage urban development in what is considered by its producers to be an economically productive and environmentally friendly way.

The consistency of the Coordinated City’s discursive formation is also established by logical and practical connections between constitutive elements. The primary logical connections emerge over time and can be seen in how attempts to address environmental problems fracture from centralized, integrated, and reactive efforts to highly decentralized, coordinated, and proactive efforts to anticipate and prevent such problems without restricting growth or economic development. I examined how Metro addressed the problem of water pollution in Lake Washington by investigating the sewer system at a regional scale, and progressed to examine how land use and environmental planning has followed in its path, but by delegating responsibilities to a much wider range of actors. Similarly, an investigation of coexistence established ties between various simultaneous activities. Here I looked specifically at how heterogeneous discourses shared a concomitant relationship to another concept altogether: innovation. I tracked how private industry, the service economy, and governance related to SLU were adopting innovation as a common pursuit. Finally, I tracked four techniques that are used to establish relationships between diverse statements: explicit reference to other documents (through quotation, rewriting, excerpting sketches, etc.); a pattern of functional optimization; the
shift from prescriptive to performance-based regulatory criteria; and the reference to and the operationalization of guiding principles. Altogether, these investigations provide concrete ways that the Coordinated City’s discursive formation is held together.

Finally, in Chapter 6, I took a step back from SLU in order to identify the relationships between the field of possible enunciations and what actually appears in statements guiding the neighborhood’s development. This involved tracking points of incompatibility and the “discursive constellations” that contain both the actual and potential statements.² I identified two points at which incompatible sub-discourses can emerge within one discursive formation in the realms of affordable housing and economic focus in SLU. Here I illustrated the juxtaposition of affordable housing with luxury housing, as well as Vulcan’s attempt to redefine affordability altogether, as well as the oft-repeated desire to maintain a diverse economic base being confronted with an increasingly intense commitment to the innovation economy. The majority of this chapter was committed to identifying three broad categories of discourse that have circulated in the same temporal field as the empirical details from SLU: political economy, ethics, and visions of the city (aesthetics). In each section, I examined both the majoritarian discourses that have been taken up in SLU and the minoritarian discourses which represent a limit, or better, a true alternative to the form of urbanization that is occurring in SLU. This emergent tripartite structure of political economy, ethics, and aesthetics is more important for my overall argument that Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy is a powerful ontological framework for critical studies than the specific content, but the latter can nevertheless be briefly described thus: SLU is largely structured by neoliberal political economy, but this is not sufficient to account for its

² For Foucault, this step also includes addressing the field of nondiscursive practices, although I have bracketed out the analysis of nondiscursive practices for future work that can appropriately address is occurring outside the archive. See Entracte I for a more in-depth discussion of why I have limited the present analysis to the realm of discursive.
particular form. Instead, we must also consider an ethical normativity that ranges from Allen’s and Hurd and Hurd’s (2012) consequentialism – aimed at the goals of doing things “differently, more efficiently, more in service of progress” (Allen n.d.-a) or specifically reducing carbon emissions, respectively – or Mackey and Sisodia’s (2013) absolutism that considers capitalism good in and of itself. Again, critical urban theory à la Brenner is explicit about the need for an explicit normative orientation in analyzing the urbanization process, but it is blind to any system of ethics to which a developer or city might subscribe. Finally, visions of compact and pedestrian friendly cities, as specified in various growth management schemes and urban planning orientations, specifically New Urbanism, are a key organizing principle for how SLU has developed. In terms of immanent alternatives, I posited Holland’s (2011) notion of free-market communism as an alternative political economy, that could be accompanied by a robust vision of justice (Fainstein 2010) and/or sustainability culture (Parr 2009), as well as a vision of the city that might be drawn from the Situationist International’s conceptions of urban spaces organized around variegated human impulses rather than economy or efficiency. I concluded this section by again differentiating between the immanent normativity of my form of critical analysis and the transcendental normativity – “to challenge the violence of capitalism, to seek out the agents of revolutionary social change, and to interrogate the ends in relation to the means of practice” (Rankin 2012, 102) – that guides critical urban theory.

Having systematically analyzed documents relating to SLU as well as the broader conceptual fields underpinning them, I now have a sense of what constitutes the models of realization producing SLU: an intermingling of political economy, ethics, and aesthetics, which emerge in various documents related to land use and character, institutional coordination, sustainable economic development, and quality of life. Statements belonging to these categories
relate to one another via shared forms of knowledge that are used by interdependent collective speakers, and emerge in documents that relate to one another through commonalities in how they are organized, shared reference points, or the ways in which they reproduce and transform one another. The question is now one of specifying how these details relate back to the Deleuzoguattarian framework outlined in Chapter 1: do they fit cleanly within that framework or does the temporal gap between the theory and these details require some careful tinkering and transformation? Or does the phenomenon of contemporary American urbanization necessitate a rethinking of Deleuze and Guattari’s approach? The following chapter answers both of these questions and attempts to make the appropriate transformations that will result in version of critical urban theory that is truly grounded in Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, and can therefore add an analytical richness to – and perhaps even open some avenues for political action for – the dominant paradigm of contemporary critical urban theory.
Part III

THE COORDINATED CITY’S MUTATION MACHINE
CHAPTER 7. TRANSFORMATIONS

The final task is to take the empirical details that I have uncovered and see how they affect my theoretical point of departure. Are there transformations to Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy that must be made for it to become appropriate ontology for critical urban research?

Of central importance is that, although they see the relationship between capitalism and urbanization, the city – in the rare cases that it is mentioned – is treated as a blockage or as anti-production. Like the socius in *Anti-Oedipus*, it claims production that it is not its own: “The city and the body without organs of capital are increasingly identified with one another,” per Guattari (Foucault 1996, 109). The city itself is here presented as an illegitimate claimant and a location where capitalist enterprise occurs, but not as a producer or a product. The general situation is not much different in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where as I discussed previously (Chapter 3), the state and the city are understood as an interiority juxtaposed to the pure exteriority of the war machine. The city is again compared to capital as antiproduction, but also to the state, the army, the factory, and the communist party as “coagulation and sedimentation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 163). They christen mankind “the segmentary animal” and note a variety of spatial and social segmentations: the house, city, and factory – “[t]he house is segmented according to its rooms' assigned purposes; streets, according to the order of the city; the factory, according to the nature of the work and operations performed in it” (Ibid., 208).

The conceptual problem for this project arises, however, when considering Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion that global capitalism is the contemporary war machine which the state apparatus constantly strives to manage: the former strives to commodify the entire world, to convert all qualities to quantities and all use values to exchange values, while the latter seeks to
regulate and to manage (reterritorialize), and to install meanings (recode) in the face of this superior force. Or, as Hardt and Negri (2000, 327), put it: “Capital tends toward a smooth space defined by uncoded flows, flexibility, continual modulation, and tendential equalization.” A literal reading of this situation would undoubtedly please the parade of contemporary doomsday neoliberal theory enthusiasts and reinforce their refrain that this movement is so penetrating that it has not only transformed our ethics (cf. Treanor 2005) but also rationality itself (cf. Brown 2015). However, the fact is that in Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization, every realization of capital is dependent not only on the state, but on a broader set of models of realization that includes the state. In fact, Hardt and Negri (2000) clearly understand this, and they lump this entire system together in the concept of “Empire” – which expresses a new worldwide form of sovereignty that exceeds the state and operates in the service of capitalism – but I think they go too far, too fast, especially with respect to urbanization. They are clearly interested in the topic, as their discussion of the “metropolis” in the final volume of their trilogy (Hardt and Negri 2009, 249-260) demonstrates, but their perspective on it hardly account for the production of the built environment. Instead, they begin their analysis with a compelling analogy: “the metropolis is to the multitude what the factory was to the industrial working class” (Ibid., 250, emphasis in original) and proceed to draw three points of comparison between these sites of politics.¹ The closest they get to describing urbanization as such is when they assert that “metropolitan life is becoming a general planetary condition” (Ibid., 252) and when they describe gentrification as “a weapon that creates and maintains social divisions, reproducing in every metropolis on a smaller scale the global hierarchies and inequalities” (Ibid., 257).

¹ They argue that the metropolis is the site of contemporary production, a place for encounter and politics, and a place that is wrought with hierarchies (cf. Ibid. 250). The “multitude” is their name for the contemporary version of the proletariat, which includes not only the traditional working class, but all forms of labor that are subservient to capital (cf. Hardt and Negri 2006).
I therefore see my project as fitting in “behind” their analysis, for my question does not concern how the metropolis relates to the factory, but is rather one of understanding how economic and extraeconomic forces are transforming the contemporary metropolis. Whereas Hardt and Negri can make passing references to gentrification, I am instead turning to South Lake Union (SLU)’s urbanization and trying to understand the underlying dynamics. I maintain that the concrete models of realization that have produced the neighborhood cannot be merely reduced to getting out of the way of capital or of marshalling it through as in the conceptualization of “roll-back” and “roll-out” neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002) or “laissez-faire” and “aidez-faire” governance (Purcell 2008). As I have emphasized repeatedly, the economic dynamics, even if they are ultimately the strongest, are only a portion of the equation. This is certainly not a new claim, but it is an important one, as evidenced in a letter from Engels to Joseph Bloch (1890) after Marx’s death:

According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Other than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure – political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas – also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form. There is an interaction of all these elements in which, amid all the endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible), the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary. Otherwise the application of the theory to any period of history would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree.

This is a crucial idea because it is exactly the form of contemporary urbanization that is under investigation here. To rephrase Engels while speaking like Deleuze and Guattari, one might say:
the multiplicity of models channelize the flows of capital and play a role, perhaps the dominant role, in determining the form of the historical struggle for how urbanization occurs. The economy is ultimately the determining factor, as can be easily seen by the lack of rebuilding in the periodic waves of crisis, but when dollars are circulating, these various elements of the machinic infrastructure of the urbanization process always heavily influence the form that urbanization takes.

Moreover, the state and the war machine are no longer as easy to distinguish as they are for Deleuze and Guattari, especially from the perspective of urbanization. In fact, in one of the six variants of the war machine that Deleuze and Guattari develop (cf. Holland 2011, 25) they pit the two against one another: “the war machine has as its enemy the State, the city, the state and urban phenomenon, and adopts as its objective their annihilation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 417). In the case of SLU, and almost all of American urbanization for that matter, land development is an enterprise that operates at the intersection of private capital and the state; together they perform the striating, the fixing, the producing of the interiority that Deleuze and Guattari assign to the latter. Of course there are tensions, as I have illustrated in the case of Vulcan seeking greater building height limits in the 2013 rezone, but there are also many resonances that must be accounted for. Nor is it quite as straightforward as Deleuze and Guattari’s assertion that the state can appropriate the war machine and direct it toward its own (the state’s) ends, for the very production of these ends – that is, organizing physical space into a particular configuration – is owed to a wide variety of stakeholders, including capitalist enterprise and the state, but also planners, designers, residents, and so forth. It therefore seems

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2 It must be said, however, that this is an early conception of the war machine, in which “war” is the literal aim of this machine (cf. Clastres 1989, 2010), but Deleuze and Guattari generalize the concept of the war machine into the global capitalist axiomatic for the postwar era. I discuss this movement at length in Chapter 1.
that the necessary transformation here primarily involves emphasizing the relationship between global flows of capital and the multiplicity of models of realization corresponding to the process of urbanization.

A different but closely related problem is that Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of production by the war machine of global capital and its regulation/realization by the state and other institutions and organizations is fairly straightforward when thinking about traditional commodity production (widgets, pork bellies, etc.) but it is important to remember that the built environment is a unique type of commodity that is both much longer lasting and immobile (cf. Harvey 1973, 157 *inter alia*). Although increasing financialization and commercial real estate activity has increasingly diversified the ownership of real estate, and increased its turnover and the volatility of its prices, the simple fact remains that investments in the built environment stay around longer than other commodities, especially in an economy that increasingly trades in images, codes, knowledge, and affects (cf. Hardt and Negri 2000, 2005, 2009). With this decreased rate of capital flux – especially in the case of SLU, where not only one man’s capital, but also his sense of moral obligation, is heavily invested – it is only natural that developers would be at least open to considering the longer term effects of their activity. I, of course, am not relying on the observation that it is natural, but am instead building this claim on the discursive practices of the developers that attend their actions, such as: Allen’s own assertions about improving the world and his attempts to do so; Vulcan’s record in SLU; and the combination of Hurd and Hurd’s (2012) discourse on increasing carbon efficiency and one of the co-author’s development work in SLU and the surrounding area.³

³ Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 492) briefly present a distinction between a “state pole of capitalism” and an emergent “integrated (or integrating) world capitalism” but it seems that
With these two points in mind, the seeds for two necessary transformations to Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy in order to make it suitable for critical urban studies have been sown. The challenge is now to use what has been exacted empirically to cultivate something that both fits SLU and is generalizable for other instances of highly coordinated urbanization.

7.1 WHO STRIATES? FROM THE STATE TO URBAN MODELS OF REALIZATION

For Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 481), “the city is striated space par excellence.” The state, with its two poles, defines interiority and organizes or striates space. The war machine, on the other hand is by nature nomadic – it draws smooth spaces through its movement – but it can also work in conjunction with the state, so it has two poles as well. From this starting point, it is possible to note the perennial struggle between the state and the war machine, as well as the constant fluctuation between striated and smooth spaces. I have already noted how Deleuze and Guattari assert that a state can appropriate the war machine (Chapter 1) in the sense of building an army and sending the boys off to war, but the task here is to elaborate on how this appropriation plays out in the realm of urban development. Deleuze and Guattari provide a broad set of robust tools, but they nevertheless lack the specificity needed to critically analyze the urban phenomenon. To make sense of the relationship between these two types of space, it is helpful to briefly address how they discuss striation, particularly of the sea: “the sea, the archetype of smooth space, was also the archetype of all striations of smooth space” (Ibid., 480).

As a smooth space, the sea is the embodiment of heterogeneity or pure difference: it is flows, currents, temperature differentials, variations of life, “a smooth space par excellence”

given the state’s essential involvement with striation, all discussions of urbanization will be limited to the first pole.
(Ibid., 487), but is the first to be striated through latitude and the eventual discovery of longitude, which was only possible through state power, as in the case the British Board of Longitude, which was established in 1714 and offered monetary rewards for establishing a system of longitude (Casey 1993, 3-4). This gridding of smooth space is therefore a combined action of power and knowledge, but even more importantly for Deleuze and Guattari’s argument, it ultimately produces a new kind of smooth space that is traversed by, first, a “fleet in being,” and then from patrolling nuclear submarines in era in which these authors were writing to the Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) system currently used to coordinate the United States Armed Forces (United States Coast Guard 1998), and is used “for the purpose of controlling striated space more completely” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 480). In other words, one can track the movement from the sea as a smooth space, to its striation by the state, to a new socio-techno-political smooth space that has been established in the service of the state’s striations.

Land, although less smooth to begin with – due to its “fixed routes, constant directions, relative movements, a whole counterhydraulic of channels and conduits” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 387) – is striated in a similar fashion. The state is inherently territorial in that it makes the earth itself its “object of unity” by drawing borders, claiming a portion of production taking place within them, and overcoding previous significations by assigning laws and meanings (see Chapter 1). A political and technological smooth space that is similar to the one covering the sea has also emerged with air travel and wireless communications, as well as the increasingly ubiquitous electronic surveillance and 19-hour a day police helicopter patrols over Los Angeles (Davis 1990, 252 *inter alia*). However, this sort of re-smoothing, while being perfectly capable of explaining how capital is funneled into the maintenance of the state does not reveal anything
about urbanization as such. Urbanization of the kind occurring in SLU therefore seems to take on a dual role. On the one hand, and corresponding more to the state’s and the other models’ interests, it is a more sophisticated striation of the land, organizing it into specific uses and according to particular economic and extraeconomic interest. On the other hand, and corresponding more to capital’s own disposition to remove obstacles and increase its own velocity, one can see how a more economically productive landscapes, such as Amazon’s digital empire, are arising. These two movements correspond to the distinction that Deleuze and Guattari make between striated and smooth capital. For them, “the former gives rise to the latter” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 492) in the sense that the optimization of SLU’s productive environment – or innovation districts in general – would contribute to faster and faster capital accumulation. My concern, however, is less with the movement between these two paradigms and more with the machinations of the former: the production of coordinated urban space.

7.2 New Striations

At the broadest level, the archaeology reveals three broad dimensions of the models determining how SLU has developed: political economy, ethics, and aesthetics (Chapter 6). As I have argued, these constantly overlap and intersect, but it is through such resonances and dissonances that these three discourses govern what is actually said in the documents framing the production of urban space. The increasingly sophisticated, coordinated, and integrated patterning of urban space that is emerging in SLU therefore cannot be reduced to either the state’s impulse to striate nor to capital’s predilection to smooth, but instead relies on a materially productive yet inherently contradictory relationship between these two trajectories. A Deleuzoguattarian ontology for critical urban studies therefore must pay particularly close attention to how the
various models of realization function or, put another way, how the striations of urban environments are produced.

In the case of SLU, I have primarily tracked statements that directly relate to how the material environment is being produced, from the perspective of who is making them, what they are talking about, how they are related to one another, and how they are limited. Each of these approaches provides a different perspective on the models, but it is only the immanent totality of these parts – in their messy, fractured, and splintered consistency – that one can try to name: in this case I have called it the Coordinated City. Moreover, these models are by nature historically and geographically specific: they correspond to particular occurrences in the Central Puget Sound region from the early 1950s to the present.

This approach emphasizes who is speaking and according to what kind of logic. In the case of SLU, the question of who is producing the controlling the production of these statements cannot be reduced to any specific group, be it municipal planners and officials, Vulcan, or the residents, professionals, and scholars who have contributed to the multiple versions of the neighborhood plan. Neither can it be neatly sorted into ethical categories such as utilitarianism or an emergent entrepreneurial virtue ethic. Instead, it is a much more textured composition that does not lend itself to simplification: as soon as a bedraggled theorist of neoliberalization begins shouting about entrepreneurial subjectivity, a coalition of developers, scientists, and politicians can proudly announce that the Swale on Yale has drastically reduced the amount of pollutants flowing through 190 million gallons of stormwater into Lake Union per year (Seattle Public Utilities n.d.). The effect of this sort of multiplicity on the basic Deleuzoguattarian framework is complex, but following Holland’s (2011) typology of the six variants of the relationship between the war machine and the state apparatus, the problem of SLU’s form of urbanization can be
situated somewhere between two types: in the first type, the state appropriates the war machine as an army and uses it to attain its own ends, “striating, securing, and expanding territory” (Ibid., 26); in the second, capitalism has exceeded the state, and the latter’s function is to promote the accumulation of surplus value. Again, this has nothing to do with the destruction of the state, but instead involves the transformation of the state into a model of realization for capitalism:

Thus the States, in capitalism, are not canceled out but change form and take on a new meaning: models of realization for a worldwide axiomatic that exceeds them. But to exceed is not at all the same thing as doing without (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 454).

In SLU, we are dealing with all of this and more: spatial striation, economic security and expanding economic territory, and profit accumulation in conjunction with ideas about protecting and restoring the environment and boosting the quality of urban life.

To be sure, neither Deleuze and Guattari, nor Holland as one of their most insightful commentators, are saying that these are the only relationships that can occur. In fact, the latter is explicit on this point:

Of course, this neat conceptual categorization inevitably belies the complexity of actual historical states of affairs, particularly regarding the relations between the State and global capitalism, between politics and economics as ends and means, and between war-machines and war itself (Holland 2012, 26).

The nature of the present project is, of course, to think about how a particular historical relationship has produced SLU – and might very well go on to produce more landscapes using similar techniques, as can currently be seen in the redevelopment of Yesler Terrace from strictly public housing into a mixed-use and mixed-income neighborhood by Vulcan and the Seattle Housing Authority (Young 2013; Stiles 2015d) – and how this way of thinking can potentially grasp it.
Returning to the two variants of the war machine – state apparatus relationship that Holland sketches helps define how a transformed relation is necessary to address our case of urbanization. He notes that it is crucial to identify their four key components: “aim, object, space (smooth vs. striated), and form of sociality (ultimately hinging on the distinction between denumerable and nondenumerable sets)” (Holland 2011, 25). Calling the two aforementioned types of war machine-state apparatus relationship the state war machine and global capitalism, the key components can be summarized as follows.

Table 7.1 War Machine/State Relationships in *A Thousand Plateaus*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State war machine</th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Form of Sociality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State war machine</td>
<td>Striating, securing, and expanding territory</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Increasingly striated on the state's own terms</td>
<td>Increasingly denumerable sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global capitalism</td>
<td>Capital accumulation</td>
<td>Capital accumulation</td>
<td>Oscillates: Increasingly striated to promote capital accumulation; smoothed by new capital growth and mobility</td>
<td>Increase in both nondenumerable and denumerable sets, with the growth in nondenumerable sets outpacing the denumerable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is crucial to remember that Deleuze and Guattari historicize these archetypal forms of the relationship between the war machine and state. As they explain in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the break between these two types occurred with World War II where the fascist war machine broke free of the state’s control while keeping war as its object, a movement which prepared the way for the post-World War II capitalism becoming dominant, but taking capital accumulation rather than war as its object.
Holland uses this formulation to explain how the state, as a model of realization for capitalism, oscillates between its aforementioned poles of binding and organizing using concrete historical information. In chronological order, he argues that the Clinton administration’s use of trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) paved the way for globalizing capital because they provided the requisite legal infrastructure to operate in geographically expanding markets. As such, it expresses the organizational or axiomatizing pole of the state apparatus. On the other hand, the Bush administration’s War on Terror is seen resurrection of the despotic or binding pole in the service of profits for the petroleum industry. The situation that I have tracked in SLU is, of course, much closer to the organizational pole, and the archaeology extends Holland’s assertion that the “Clinton administration, in other words, represented – and had begun to institute – a dramatically different regime of capital accumulation” (Ibid., 60), albeit at a significantly smaller scale. Put another way, the Clinton administration’s attempt to produce an integrated worldwide set of channels for capital accumulation is being reborn across the continuum from the regional down to the scale of neighborhood elements. However, this rebirth is also a mutation, for with this new limited scope, new actors and voices appear. To account for this shift is to map the machinic infrastructure of the urbanization process; it is to produce the specificity required for a Deleuzoguattarian ontology for critical urban studies.

Specifying the war machine – state apparatus relationship for SLU’s urbanization draws on elements from the state war machine and the global capital war machine and takes this concrete form:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aim</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Space</th>
<th>Form of Sociality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLU</td>
<td>Managing growth and capital</td>
<td>Managed space and economic</td>
<td>Increasingly striated on shared terms</td>
<td>Increasingly denumerable sets(?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>accumulation</td>
<td>productivity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Much like capitalist war machine that Holland defines, this particular form has a resonance between its aim and object, but it significantly differs in that both the state apparatus and the war machine are heavily invested in striation. Moreover, if one takes the normative statements of Vulcan, the Hurds (2012), or their fellow travelers, Mackey and Sisodia (2013), seriously, it is difficult to say that this striation is merely a step on the path to smooth capital moving at its absolute velocity. Instead, this is a balancing act between capital accumulation and managing or curating growth: it is funneling (striated) capital through the set of political economic, ethical, and aesthetic criteria at emerged in Part II. Finally, the issue of the form of sociality is raised, but it will only be addressed in a speculative fashion here, due to my empirical focus on the production of the built environment that does not include a detailed examination of how it is being used. This, of course, does not diminish the importance of sociality, but instead points me in potentially profitable directions for future research on the ground.\footnote{See Hoffman’s (2015) investigation of Foucault’s technique of \textit{enquête}.} Elaborating each component in turn will help us understand the dimensions of this new relationship.

7.2.1 \textit{Aim}

For Deleuze and Guattari, both of their own accord and via Holland – not to mention Hardt and Negri (2000) – the aim of the global capitalist axiomatic and the state together is to generate and capture surplus value. This is, of course, the capitalist war machine’s imperative but as Deleuze...
and Guattari argue, the state has become subservient to capital in this era and therefore its function has become supporting this end. While this condition certainly describes the global tendency of political economy today, it lacks the detail required to discuss the complexity of urbanization, especially in the form it is taking in SLU. By tracking the discourse of the Coordinated City, I am essentially suggesting that the aim of this particular actualization of the state apparatus – global capital relationship is mutating toward the aim of capital accumulation and managing spatial growth *according to a wide range of economic and extraeconomic criteria* simultaneously. This is an important elaboration for at least three reasons. First, with respect to critical urban theory, I maintain that the entire constellation of extraeconomic concerns must be acknowledged if one seeks to understand coordinated urbanization, and especially if one seeks to propose alternatives that address its complexity. Second, it reflects what is unique about capitalist land development, as opposed to the products of traditional material and, more recently, immaterial labor. Third, it is especially important because Vulcan’s activity is not limited to SLU. Instead, they consider theirs to be a “real estate model [that] is based on quality [and] sustainable development that builds new value across the entire community” (Vulcan 2015a) which, again, is transferrable to other projects, such as the redevelopment of Yesler Terrace, Seattle’s oldest public housing community.

The previous three chapters demonstrate how this shift has occurred in the Central Puget Sound region quite clearly. Since the early 1950s, local, regional, and state government has striven to integrate multiple aspects of how the region urbanizes into an increasingly decentralized and highly coordinated network: beginning with addressing strictly environmental issues (algae growth in Lake Washington), to conserving rural land and managing regional transportation, to funneling growth into predetermined centers that ostensibly balance the official
vision for the area, economic growth, and the immanent vision of its residents via neighborhood planning. In order to generalize what this discourse enfolds, I have sketched out the categories of sustainable economic development, land use and character, institutional coordination, and quality of life, the latter three of which traditionally do not apply to capital’s quantitative calculus. However, I have also shown that in the case of SLU, global capital’s local agents – primarily Vulcan, but also the other developers (Touchstone, Skanska, and BioMed Realty Trust, to name a few) who seek to capitalize on their success in the area – are heavily involved in all four of these arenas. For this to occur in Deleuze and Guattari’s scheme, my only option is to argue that a transformation in the set of models of realization is occurring, which includes statements coauthored by a subset of capitalists who are directly involved in developing urban space for reasons that cannot – if they are taken at their word, which is a fundamental criterion of Foucauldian archaeology (cf. Foucault 2010, 47) – be reduced to the simple desire of capturing surplus value.

This shift evident from the broadest to the most detailed discourses that I have addressed, and I can pinpoint three characteristics that differentiate the aim of this particular war machine from the more general war machine of global capitalism. First, my attempt to sketch out the strategies – the broad discourses limiting what was actually expressed in/about SLU – reveals part of a subset of capital enthusiasts who firmly believe that accumulated capital is not just and end, but also means to realize their vision of the good. In terms of trying to address this theoretically, one could certainly follow Nicole Aschoff (2015) and call this ideology, in the sense that it is the vocabulary we invoke to make sense of our everyday lives, but the problem with this perspective is that it fails the Foucauldian imperative that one must distance oneself from claims to truth and meaning if the goal is to understand a discursive system’s internal and
immanent dimensions. Instead, her perspective, which clearly follows Althusser’s (2014) lead, is unreflectively rooted in the Marxist base-superstructure typology in which the Ideological State Apparatuses function to reproduce existing class relations of the bourgeoisie exploiting the working class. If one embarks from this perspective, one is sure to return to it, as Aschoff clearly demonstrates: John Mackey, Oprah Winfrey, Sheryl Sandberg, and Bill and Melinda Gates are repeatedly accused of trying to shore up a system that is falling apart at the seams, without ever questioning the internal contradictions of capitalism itself. While this may be true, it is nevertheless a conclusion that is guaranteed from the outset; it over-privileges capital accumulation as an end, while reducing any other convictions they may have to myth, to ephemeral and misguided dreams. Put another way, while Aschoff – or David Harvey, Neil Brenner, Fredric Jameson, Eugene Holland or even yours truly – might clearly see that capitalism itself is the problem and should be disposed with, this does not mean that authors and executives like Mackey (the co-C.E.O. of Whole Foods) are not fully invested in the project to reform it (or at least its reputation) according to some immanent standard of the good. And to put it bluntly, what matters if we want to understand how the system works, is what the likes of Mackey, the Hurds, or Paul Allen and his circle of city builders and celebrants believe without subjecting it our own truth claims. So it goes in poststructuralist critique.

A second characteristic is that capital’s interests have been repositioned within the regulatory infrastructure that Deleuze and Guattari locate not in the war machine, but in the state apparatus, as I have shown by Vulcan’s contributions to neighborhood planning, commenting on zoning changes, as well as simultaneously adopting and transforming design standards. As an active agent in determining priorities for how SLU develops in neighborhood planning, Vulcan’s concerns circulate with those of citizens, and find a place in documents guiding the
neighborhood’s development, while as a commentator on such documents, it takes on a role of an expert capable of marshalling both technical knowledge the capacity to coordinate various interests and resources to challenge what it sees as barriers to its own vision of growth. In this way, I can say without too much unwarranted skepticism that its vision infiltrates the regulation process from two directions: up through neighborhood planning efforts and laterally through the struggle with the municipal government. An unreformed account of the state apparatus and the war machine would only see the second dimension of this struggle, but the archaeology here highlights how Vulcan has also situated itself among a diverse range of speakers influencing which development policies are adopted.

Finally, I have also shown that a broad range of actors beyond the state and capital constructs the aim of this particular war machine. Deleuze and Guattari indeed stake out the analytical space for such models of realization, but they hardly devote any space to them. This is understandable of course, and expresses the difference between philosophy and social science, but it nevertheless suggests that a Deleuzoguattarian ontology for urban studies must necessarily pay close attention to such models. By doing so, I have illuminated how various moral and ethical systems, urban design theories, participatory planning events, as well as media representations and commentary have formed a crucial aspect in directing how SLU has been realized.

To sum up, the coordinated city’s war machine as it has been actualized in SLU has a more nuanced aim than that of the global capitalist war machine, which only strives to capture surplus value. Its particular aim, which is to both organize urban space and accrue capital, is an outgrowth of three shifts: the belief that capital can be mobilized to do good; the infiltration of representatives of capital into the infrastructure of urban policy-making, rather than just as the
object of regulation; finally, the heavy influence that discourses beyond the state and capital (sustainability concerns and design theories, for example) have on the orientation of this urbanization machine. Taken together, these three elements constitute a war machine that aims to produce neighborhoods like SLU, which fulfill functions beyond the mere accumulation of capital. This war machine coordinates political economic concerns with ethical and aesthetic programs in a massive effort to manage a profitable and “nice” form of urban redevelopment.

7.2.2 Object

As in the global capitalist war machine variant that Holland eloquently describes, the SLU submachine’s aim and object are the same: for the global capitalist war machine this is solely capital accumulation while for SLU it is simultaneously capital accumulation and managing spatial growth in a very particular way. In contradistinction to the state war machine, which has securing, expanding, and striating space as its aim (end) and uses actual “hot” war as its object, or means to this end, the SLU war machine-state apparatus relationship functions in both a softer and more nuanced way. The distinction that Althusser (2014) draws between the physical violence exercised by Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatus’s role of reproducing the relations of capitalist production is helpful here: by holding war as its object, the state war machine is clearly relying on its physical might to attain its ends of protecting and expanding territory, while the relationships constituting the global capitalist war machine and the SLU submachine are primarily engaged in sustaining and transforming capitalist relations of production. However, the current situation is still novel, because the hard line between the economic base (or infrastructure) and the political-moral superstructure on which Althusser relies so heavily is not so easy to distinguish. Put another way, the functions that he assigns to categories of infrastructure and superstructure still hold – as do their statuses as being means of a
class struggle that is clearly being dominated by the bourgeoisie\(^7\) – but the latter has been fragmented to such a degree that this particular topology is no longer the clearest way to conceive of the situation. Instead, the flows of international capital and the multiple entangled models of realization, which often include producers themselves – Vulcan primarily, but also Skanska and Touchstone in SLU – provides a more accurate image that I have been adopted.

It is this assemblage of models that has created a neighborhood that falls somewhere between an office park or university campus and a traditional city district, perhaps tending to the former. From the careful categorization of the streets, the building setbacks to preserve views, and the limits on the number of towers per block to the composition of major tenants – the e-commerce giant Amazon, health-related firms and nonprofits (PATH, Seattle Biomedical Institute, Group Health, The Allen Institute for Brain Science, etc.), design firms (NBBJ, Weber Thompson) – and service providers (spas, gyms, Tom Douglas restaurants, gourmet coffee), the overall effect is something like self-organization tending toward curation. Moreover, this effect is heightened when one considers that some aspects of the original neighborhood planning efforts have also been left intact – the primarily residential character of Cascade and the desire for a waterfront park reflecting the area’s maritime heritage, for example – while others have been significantly reworked: with the arrival of this much more intense economic activity, the “strong desire to keep the area friendly for small business and light industry” (South Lake Union Planning Organization (SLUPO) 1998, 16) has been neglected. No one vision of the area is comprehensive but the mixtures of visions constantly collide and resonate with one another,

\(^7\) This is not to reduce the present analysis to issues of class, for as the preceding three chapters have shown, there are also clearly moral, ethical, and aesthetic struggles taking place, but is instead to acknowledge Althusser’s argument against alleged functionalism and for the grounding of his analyses in the class struggle. Further research on SLU would likely also expose race, ethnicity, and gender struggles occurring in the neighborhood.
unevenly unfolding into an increasingly coordinated built environment according to the principles that I tracked in Part II.

Quantifying the accumulation of surplus value is, of course, much more difficult, but it is possible to get a sense of the trend through a brief examination of some recent news stories. Multiple articles relaying news of Vulcan’s sales highlight the “record-breaking” profits that the developer has garnered; reporting on the sale of the Institute for Systems Biology (ISB) building for $106.1 million, Marc Stiles (2014a) writes:

The per-square foot price works out to $755. The Puget Sound region per-square-foot record is $749, though that was for an all-office building that Amazon.com leases at 202 Westlake Ave. N. The ISB building at 401 Terry Ave. N., is about a block north of 202 Westlake.

The following year, Stiles (2015a) reports on $313 million in sales of three Vulcan-owned apartment complexes (Rollin Street, the Alcyone and the Martin, the last of which is not in SLU, but rather in Belltown, immediately to the south), then within weeks added more apartment building sales (The Stack House) for $150.5 million and $58.2 million (Alley 24) (Stiles 2015b, 2015c). In July 2015, Bhatt (2015) noted another $251 million sale for the office building at 2201 Westlake several months later, setting a new per-square foot price record of $791, and bringing the 2015 revenues to nearly $1.1 billion – a number that echoes the $1.16 billion Vulcan collected on the sale of Amazon’s campus in 2012 (Martinez and Pryne 2012).

The basic pattern of building and selling is, at first glance, nothing remarkable: it is, in fact, what most developers do. However, taking a closer look at the actual pattern of Vulcan’s activity how this is a novel form of land development: reinvesting in the same area in an effort to further their own vision. A portion of a press release highlighting the sale of the Amazon campus reads:
Harris, 365

Vulcan plans to invest proceeds from the sale toward continued revitalization efforts of Seattle’s South Lake Union neighborhood, where it has developed nearly 30 acres of land over the past 10 years. “Today’s sale of the Amazon campus will allow us to continue to invest in South Lake Union, which has, and will continue to be, at the heart of our redevelopment efforts,” said Ada M. Healey, vice president of real estate, Vulcan Inc. “We will continue to focus on sustainable, mixed-use urban development where businesses – like Amazon.com – residents, and visitors can experience the best of Seattle” (Vulcan 2012).

In short, Vulcan is using the spoils from these projects to reinvest in the larger development projects that are allowed following the 2013 SLU rezone, namely mixed-use projects in the 3 Mercer Blocks, each of which includes a sixteen-story residential tower and a 6-story office/commercial building (Vulcan and Runberg Architecture Group 2014), as well as another “signature” project in the last undeveloped quadrant of Vulcan’s “flagship” corner at Denny Way and Westlake Avenue, where Vulcan’s South Lake Union Discovery Center now stands: a 41-story residential tower, and 18-story office tower, and a pair of 2- to 3-story commercial/retail buildings (Vulcan et al. 2014). It is this cycle of development/organization, sales, and reinvestment that attests to their role in constructing of a new type of urbanization machine that can function in other locations. As Ada Healey, the head of Vulcan’s real estate operations, says when discussing the future of Yesler Terrace: “[it] is going to be kind of like South Lake Union” (Stiles 2015d).

But again, SLU’s redevelopment cannot be reduced to Vulcan’s activity; it is the long history of addressing environmental and growth issues that has culminated in the urban village growth management strategy which orients this development and, moreover, serves as the glue holding the private development initiatives together. As I have empirically explored in depth, this glue has ethical, political economic, and aesthetic elements; the other private developers constituting the less prolific ranks of this war machine therefore also construct spaces and reap
returns that are congruent with Vulcan’s activity. As a relatively early participant in SLU’s development, for example, the Biomedical Realty Trust has both developed a pair of adjacent buildings and bought one of Vulcan’s early biotech lab buildings (a record per-square foot price sale at the time). Touchstone, the development firm for which A.P. Hurd is the president and chief development office is building out the Troy Block, which consists of new, environmentally sustainable office buildings wedged into a construction site previously occupied by the Troy Laundry (the red brick façade remains and is being integrated into the project). Similar congruences occur throughout the neighborhood, but are especially pronounced along Fairview Avenue, where these two developers are working in the wake of a relatively mature vision spearheaded – yet not exclusively produced – by Vulcan. Within very few blocks, one can also find Skanska’s 400 Fairview building (Fig. 7.1) that “encourages a Northwest lifestyle though a connection to inspiring workspaces, local retailers, and the urban outdoors” (Skanska 2014) and

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Schnitzer West’s Urban Union project, though smaller in scale, similarly seeks to provide a work environment that helps “Boost productivity, elevate your brand, and increase flexibility” (Schnitzer n.d.).

In sum, much like the global capital war machine that Deleuze and Guattari describe, the situation in SLU is such that the aim and the object coincide: the end and means of profitable, ethical, and orderly built environment. This expresses a high degree of coordination between the multiple models of realization and the capital that flows through them, which is not at all identifiable under the state war machine, and which is more general in the global capital war machine. To effectively transform Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy into a critical lens for urban studies, it is necessary to envision a new variant of the war machine that combines these elements of a particular form of urbanization with the tendency to amass capital. The
underlying mechanics of this adaptation are the most pronounced when considering how space must be conceived in this new mutation of the war machine.

7.2.3 Space

At the most fundamental level the state produces striated space and the war machine produces smooth space. Under global capitalism the state has been transformed into one of many models of realization for capital: in the realm of commodity production, circulation, and consumption this is reflected in trade agreements to lower the cost of production and extend the reach of the market (GATT, NAFTA, etc.), thereby smoothing the hard boundaries between nation-states. However, in the realm of urban development this phenomenon becomes more complex. If the built environment were to be envisioned as a mere effect of cynical flows of capital, then the situation does not change much: buildings and infrastructure just become commodities with an exceptionally long shelf life. But if viewed from the perspective of what kind of space belongs to this particular relationship between the war machine and the models of realization – what kind of axiomatic is at work, to use Guattari’s phrasing – the state of affairs changes drastically, for physical space is crisscrossed with organized material, sorted into a mind-boggling array of mental categories, and overlaid with a socio-techno-political smooth space that serves the striations of the models of realization (including the state) as well as capital. As I have demonstrated in the empirical chapters, these operations proceed according to a wide range of political economic, ethical, and aesthetic criteria that direct how capital flows. What are some of these striations?

For the primary model of realization, the state, the striations are mostly territorial: in this study they can most easily be seen in the different growth management categories from the regional down to the neighborhood scales. Somewhat more abstractly, they are also present in
the economic development strategies that seek to cultivate the region’s productive capacities (Innovation Partnership Zones, the Regional Economic Strategy, etc.). This however, quickly expands to include other models of realization, such as value systems or design philosophies: discourses of environmental sustainability and social justice are realized through the practices of organizations operating in SLU (Whole Foods and PATH, for example) and both producing it and other similar projects elsewhere (the design firms of Weber Thompson and NBBJ, to name two of the major firms). Analytically bracketing the economic activity of these organizations for a moment and thinking about their activities as expanding particular conceptions of ways of being is the particular form of striation that I am trying to highlight here. Whole Foods propagates the notion of healthy eating and minimizing agricultural production’s impact on the ecosystem (Fig. 7.3), while Weber Thompson folds other salutary practices (such as a walkable built environment) and a similar focus on environmental sustainability into its Urban Design Framework (Seattle DPD 2010) for SLU, its own celebrated building in the neighborhood,⁹ as well as projects across the region. These are no less striations than those of the state model of realization. Touchstone’s and Skanska’s aforementioned projects, for example, also follow Vulcan’s efforts to create sustainable “spaces for innovation,” thereby inscribing a particular conception of work culture into the built environment.

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⁹ Weber Thompson’s Terry Thomas Building is notable not only for its energy and water efficiency, monitoring of indoor air quality, or interior design providing exterior views, but is also the first Seattle office building to be built in decades without central air conditioning.
Capital too, despite its tendency to smooth, is nevertheless also a prolific agent of striation en route to attaining its dream of infinite speed. To choose one specific example, Vulcan’s capital and designers have reworked private parcels of land to include a mutated form of public space, which they call “open space,” between some of the new developments that were sold to Amazon in 2011. These spaces, although technically private property, are home to many practices typically found in public spaces: lunch and coffee breaks, phone calls, cigarette breaks, or perhaps most commonly, sitting and people watching (cf. Whyte 2001). They are undeniably attenuated versions of public space in that they are patrolled by private security forces and prohibit allegedly unsavory activities like skateboarding and soliciting (and public assembly), but the point here is that they have been organized by capital’s representatives and consultants, not the state nor another model of realization. More generally, the organizations operating in the neighborhood are profound creators of markets (Whole Foods, again), keepers of records (Amazon’s databases suggest new purchases “inspired by your shopping trends”), and subdividers of a whole host of flows: temporal (work hours), spatial (housing opportunities and the availability of commercial space), and material (production, distribution, prices) to name a few.

What can be see here, then, is a relationship to both physical and abstract space that cannot be easily assigned to either of the archetypal war machines that Holland identifies in Deleuze and Guattari: space is neither increasingly striated on the state's own terms, as it is under the state war machine, nor does it merely oscillate between being striated to promote capital accumulation and smoothed by new capital growth and mobility, as it does under the general global capital axiomatic. Instead, it is striated on shared terms between capital and the operative models of realization. These terms frequently and overwhelmingly promote capital
accumulation, but by maintaining the critical distance that Foucault prescribes for addressing emergent phenomena, all truth and meaning claims must be bracketed in order to avoid making reductionist interpretations – in this case, such an interpretation would be taking capital accumulation as the sole force behind SLU’s redevelopment. This simply is not the case, at least in SLU. Rather, the vision of the area is one of balancing particular visions of economic productivity, design objectives, and ethical concerns. One can call them bourgeois, unjust, or just plain boring (I would call it all three if this were a matter of opinion) but this does not help us understand how the machine works. But how does it work, again? Various models of realization emerge and channel the flows of capital into the production of a built environment striated in ways that balance economic, design philosophies, and ethical imperatives. These models are pure positivity, in that they are not “repressing” capital in any sense, but are instead a necessary element of the machinic infrastructure for its realization. If that sounds too simple, remember that dominant critical urban theory essentially posits: the will to accumulate surplus value creates a built environment adapted to that end; the state, as a repressive apparatus, is being “hollowed out” and rebuilt to help the process along; any other concern (sustainability or social justice, for example) is but the necessary minimum to maintain the process of capital accumulation.

The most general characteristic of this form of striation can be expressed with the simple connector “and then.” Capital accumulation is indeed the transcendental condition – underneath the sustainable buildings, green infrastructure, and the bustle of creative labor, “the savage flows and fragments of productive capital rumble” (Fourquet and Murard 1973, 20, my translation) – but the actual configuration of space and the ends to which it is directed are always more complicated and must be addressed. “And then…and then…and then,” as Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 36) wrote in a completely different context. This is an issue of a host of concerns: capital
accumulation, *sine qua non*, and then conservation of rural land (growth management), and then quality of life (building setbacks, human scale design), and then solving diseases (PATH), and then promoting healthy lifestyles (Whole Foods), and then municipal economic development (“$156 million in new tax revenue generated for the City of Seattle between 2001 and 2011” [Vulcan 2015d]), and then exercising creativity at work (“Amazon Creative Services: Amazon’s global, internal creative agency — crafting content and customer experiences that drive results” [Amazon n.d.]), and then… Wherever these concerns intersect, wherever they resonate, a striation appears. Where the strongest concern – capital accumulation – dominates all others, there is a smoothing, but the sheer number of considerations beyond this transforms this concern into nothing more than a starting point, an initial condition, whose actualization is dependent on so much more. To take capital accumulation as both means and ends of the world economy is one thing, but to see it as the only aspect worth considering for studying urbanization is not only analytically reductionist – an academic problem to which this entire dissertation is meant as a response – but is also a political problem because it does not acknowledge or expose the vast range of groups driving the urbanization process.

### 7.2.4 Form of Sociality

Holland (2011, 25) argues that each variant of the war machine has a particular form of sociality, which “ultimately hing[es] on the distinction between denumerable and nondenumerable sets.” A denumerable set is one constituted by homogenous elements which are related to one another according to some imposed rational standard, while a nondenumerable set is a collection of heterogeneous elements whose interrelations can only be described in terms of co-presence. As with all such Deleuzoguattarian concepts, these two forms make up the poles defining a
spectrum; all concrete forms of sociality lie somewhere between the poles and tend in one direction or the other.

The state war machine, with its overwhelming movement of centralization, is marked by an increase in denumerable sets. Recalling Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history of capitalism (Chapter 1), this reflects the shift from the “primitive territorial machine,” which was defined by groups of stateless nomads, to the “barbarian despotic machine,” in which the despot leapt out of this flat social organization and redirected all debts to himself. More concretely, this corresponds to the increase of centralized record-keeping and the push for public hygiene in 18th century towns that Foucault notes in his discussion of sovereignty and spatial discipline (Foucault 2003, especially the January 11, 1978 lecture). The global capitalist war machine, on the other hand, is marked by the increase of both kinds of sets. Capitalism, by nature, strives to eliminate boundaries and therefore brings a greater number of heterogeneous elements into contact with one another. Whereas one might have previously been a member of a nuclear family, neighborhood, church, and workplace, contemporary social life is much more complex: one might move through contract jobs in different cities, postpone marriage and having children until later if at all, and socialize over a smartphone with various interest groups on different platforms, etc. This suggests many individuals are living within a fragmented and dynamic sociality that is much harder to pin down. Simultaneously, however, capitalism – in its perennial attempt to capture surplus value – strives to establish profitable relationships between these elements, but can never catch up, because the negative moment of decoding – of undoing previously dominant social relationships and their values – is capitalism’s defining feature.

But what about in the case of the coordinated city, specifically SLU? Its emergence is undoubtedly occurring during the era of global capitalist war machine, but if one focuses on how
sociality corresponds to this particular reworking of the built environment, it seems that the relative dominance of nondenumerable sets is harder to achieve by virtue of the pre-determined elements and pre-planned “synergies” that define the area. Put another way, while contemporary life is indeed marked by a fragmented and dynamic sociality, the question is whether or not one can identify any sort of coagulation or slowing of these diverse flows. I am unfortunately unable to sufficiently address the question empirically here – the archives assembled and analyzed in the last three chapters are clearly more historical and offer no ethnographic account of actually existing social life – but I can at the very least identify some provisional concerns that could be developed with demographic and ethnographic information: median household income, racial diversity, level of education and specialization, languages spoken in social settings, gender identification, sexual orientation, characteristics of neighborhood services that individuals and groups frequent, ratios comparing the number of residents working in the neighborhood to how many live their in comparison with other central Seattle neighborhoods, membership in community groups, etc. If I could extract strong tendencies toward similarity in these categories – and I presume that I could in terms of median income, educational specialization, languages spoken in social settings, and consumer preferences, but certainly not in categories such as racial diversity – that is more pronounced than in other areas of Seattle or cities of a similar size, I would be able to speak to any existing patterns of denumeration. Alas, given the constraints on this study, I believe that the curation of this neighborhood is likely to be accompanied by social relationships that correspond to one another according more to a rationally imposed standard than to a simple juxtaposition of different elements.¹⁰

¹⁰ Again, a particularly fruitful and compatible method for obtaining this information could take the form of Foucault’s enquête (cf. Hoffman 2015).
7.3 The Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine

Deleuze and Guattari only use the phrase “mutation machine” once (1987, 229), and it refers to the “good” kind of war machine – the nomadic war machine that resists the state apparatus of capture – but it is nevertheless the perfect phrase for describing the type of war machine that I am dealing with here. The phrase obviously lacks the connotation of “hot war,” which is helpful, but perhaps even more importantly, it highlights how the relationship between global capital and the particular configuration of models of realization that I have tracked in SLU are reshaping the built environment according to wide range of political economic, ethical, and aesthetic concerns. This machine has its own aim, object, space, and perhaps even its own form of sociality that notably differ from that of the war machine of global capital. Rather than taking capital accumulation as both an end (aim) and a means (object) by dissolving established differences and boundaries in order to install a universal and quantitative form of social organization, the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine is trained on directly ordering built space in such a way that an emergent set of ethical, aesthetic, and economic criteria are satisfied. Like the global capitalist war machine, the aim and object of this mutation machine coincide: the management of the built environment and capital accumulation. Its space is therefore one of increasing striation based on a tendency toward resonance between each constituent model of realization. These interactions produce the “raw material” of the neighborhood – the confluence of economic productivity, a relatively light impact on the ecosystem, minimal institutional friction, and a high quality of life – which is then distributed across the landscape. At first glance, this may appear to be smoothing in the sense that everything looks similar – the neo-modernist architecture with its glass and metal siding or the throngs of hoodie-wearing Amazon employees with their keycards aflutter in the wind – but the fact is that multiple different tendencies are resonating in a way that
installs and distributes specific differences in a highly coordinated fashion, and according to its own emergent internal logic.

The Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine is not reducible to Vulcan. Nor is it reducible to copycat developers, growth management, Amazon, urban designers, or any other easily delineated group. Instead, the Machine takes all of these entities as its parts. The Machine is not a state, for it did not “[come] into the world fully formed and [rise] up in a single stroke” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 427). Instead it came about over the decades since “a dark-haired young man strode forcefully along downtown Seattle’s Fourth Avenue [with] the future of the region in his briefcase” (Lane 1995, 3), and required legislation and planning at multiple scales of government, citizen efforts at envisioning the character of the city, and private enterprise with relatively compatible orientations. It is, therefore, deeply entrenched in the Central Puget Sound Region, but this is not to say that it only corresponds to SLU. I have referred multiple times to the redevelopment of Yesler Terrace, which is a joint effort of the Seattle Housing Authority and Vulcan, as another emerging instance of coordinated urbanization. The University District, too, is amassing a similar wealth of design proposals and visions for its future, which correspond to growth that, as of 2015, has already exceeded its growth targets for 2024 by 22% (Seattle DPD 2015, 1).

The central question though, for any ontology of critical urban inquiry, is whether or not it can ground further empirical inquiry. In this case, I have begun with a conception of the struggle that Deleuze and Guattari have identified between the war machine’s tendency to ward off a state that is striving to capture and organize differences, and tracked how a particular case of large-scale urbanization raises issues that allows its adoption for thinking about the changing
urban question. The final challenge is to generalize this perspective so that it can be used to interrogate other tendencies in urbanization.

As luck would have it, Neil Brenner, who could rightfully be understood as leading the assault against “assemblage urbanism” also happens to be one of the most compelling urban theorists working today. His work constantly focuses on the need for a robust and well-developed theoretical basis for a mode of critical urban inquiry which he calls critical urban theory. This emergent field is, of course, exactly what McFarlane (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d) is trying to contribute to with his essays exploring assemblage urbanism; moreover, it is the same field which Brenner and his associates claim cannot be grounded in assemblage thinking. As previously discussed, I take this critique very seriously and concur with its claims, but only when it is leveled against assemblage urbanism as it has been developed to date. That is, when the Deleuzoguattarian notion of assemblage is cherry-picked from a much more nuanced political philosophy and is used primarily as a device to describe material collections of difference without investigating the broader machinic forces influencing them. My task here, however, has been to return to the essential characteristics of the war machine versus state apparatus relationship that underpins Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy, and transform that into an ontology for critical urban inquiry, using a novel and complex case of urbanization – that of SLU – as a case study. A final test, as it were, for this stage of the research is to turn to the most recent developments that have grown out of critical urban theory and see if my notion of the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine can bear the epistemological weight required of it.11 This “test” is not exhaustive, but it is meant to accomplish two things: first, it illuminates where

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11 I began this process in Chapter 6, where I compared Brenner’s (2009) four characteristics of critical urban theory to my project. The primary point of divergence was between his assertion that one must be explicit about normativity whereas I sought out immanent alternatives to the normativity that I found in the production of SLU.
potential holes might lie in the Deleuzoguattarian framework, from the perspective of critical urban theory; second, and more importantly, it allows me to gesture to where this approach is actually more robust.

Brenner’s concept of “planetary urbanization” is an attempt to challenge the very notion of urbanization by developing Lefebvre’s claim that “society has become completely urbanized” (Lefebvre 2003, 1). This claim raises a host of conceptual questions, namely the status of categories that are holdovers from the era in which urban studies emerged as a discipline that are no longer relevant. The primary dichotomy that seems to dissolve here, per Brenner, is the idea of an urban/rural divide or, put another way, the notion that the urban is a unique kind of space that must be studied with its own set of “increasingly blunt tools” (Brenner 2013, 105). His claim is essentially that under worldwide capitalism, urbanization has become generalized to the point that it folds spaces that do not seem urban in the traditional sense of the word – such as the Alberta tar sands, a photo of which adorns the cover of his recent edited volume (Brenner 2014) – into its highly uneven process of development. In this new condition, the “the urban-form under capitalism [becomes] an ideological effect of historically and geographically specific practices that create the structural appearance of territorial distinctiveness, coherence, and boundedness within a broader, worldwide maelstrom of rapid sociospatial transformation” (Brenner 2013, 104). I do not disagree with the sentiment here, but rather than relying on a notion of ideology that responds to an alleged popular need to make sense of the rapidly changing world – that is to classify the built spaces of the world into categories such as cities, suburbs, exurbs, etc., with the whole array of possible adjectives to help establish a typology – it is important to consider how these categories play a productive role. These different forms of planning for growth from the regional down to the neighborhood level, of embracing resonant
assemblages of ethical, economic, and aesthetic concerns are not only doxic constructions that help us passively make sense out of the world; they are also part and parcel of how such transformations are effected. They do not overlay and sometimes veil the messy machinations of global capital, but instead *effectuate* them. These models, with their sets of economic and extraeconomic criteria, constitute the machinic infrastructure of urbanization, or what I call the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine in the case of SLU.

To be perfectly clear, the central notion of Brenner’s perspective is that globalizing capitalism is transforming space to its own advantages and that what we consider to be cities are nothing more than an imaginary layer superimposed on this bubbling maelstrom of activity in an effort to make sense of the whole mess. Moreover, this layer is not only taken to be imaginary, but is also often considered to distort the underlying relationship funneling surplus value into the accounts of the few at the expense of the many (Wachsmuth 2014, 77). The problem here is above all related to this execrable concept of ideology\(^{12}\): why must this relationship be considered imaginary and at times distorting when one can pinpoint a whole host of positivities that necessarily channel this undercurrent of chaotic capital into different configurations without trying to obfuscate the fact that making profit is central to the whole endeavor?\(^{13}\) To posit this is decidedly not the same as endorsing the normativity or functioning of these models, but is rather

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\(^{12}\) “Ideology is a most execrable concept obscuring all of the effectively operating social machines” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 68).

\(^{13}\) In their discussion of “the new science of government,” The Invisible Committee (2014, 37) write: “We’re not experiencing a ‘crisis of trust’ but the end of trust, which has become superfluous to government. Where control and transparency reign, where the subjects’ behavior is anticipated in real time through the algorithmic processing of a mass of available data about them, there’s no more need to trust them or for them to trust. It’s sufficient that they be sufficiently monitored. As Lenin said, ‘Trust is good, control is better’” (my emphasis). Their concern exceeds what I am discussing here, but the notion that we live in an age of transparency is fitting for this analysis. “Do well by doing good.”
to say that they have characteristics whose functions are much more subtle than mere distortions of the process at hand: instead they express it.

Brenner undoubtedly understands the productive nature of these conceptualizations, for he not only cites Lefebvre’s (2009, 170-1) assertion that “space is not a scientific object removed from ideology and politics; it has always been political and strategic,” but also co-translated (with Stuart Elden) the essay in which this assertion was made. The problem here is the certainty with which he reduces the strategic elements of representations of space (Lefebvre 1991) to merely reproducing capitalist social relations. They are not neutral – a claim with which I am in complete agreement. However, his assessment of the nature their productive role is where we part ways. For Brenner, these strategies primarily function to aid the processes of capital accumulation across the globe: they distribute communication and transportation infrastructure that connect areas traditionally understood as urban across the empty spaces in between (undersea cables, air traffic routes, communications satellites) or invade and extract raw materials (heavy crude from the Athabasca deposit in Alberta, Canada) from the spaces often called “rural” to support “urban” life, leaving a desolate landscape in their wake. As I have tried at length to show here, this perspective on capital accumulation is crucial to urbanization but it lacks the subtlety that a more textured examination – an archaeology – into how the specific characteristics of a built environment are produced. At a fundamental level, the assertions that underpin the entirety of critical geography – that contemporary cities are a product of capital and a site for its ever-intensifying reproduction – sets up everyone working in its wake to come to such conclusions, as if capital always realizes itself into a built environment either on its own

14 In his tripartite system, Lefebvre (1991) asserts that social space is the product of interactions between representations of space (mental representations of space or thoughts about space), spatial practices (physical objects and actions that occur in the world), and representational spaces (directly lived experiences of space).
terms or exerts such a great pressure on the entire process that it is the only culpable force at play.

Although it involves straying even further from the Marxist foundations of critical urban theory, it seems clear that what is missing here is paying careful attention to the difference between motivation and means, as Deleuze does in his early work on David Hume (1991). By looking at models of realization from this perspective, it becomes possible to find common conceptual ground for the productivity of these models in the notion of sympathy, in a way that does not reduce urbanization to the rational pursuit of surplus value and its obfuscation by different “ideologies.” Instead, this point of view allows one to draw a parallel between the channeling of capital flows into particular forms of the built environment and Hume’s understanding of social institutions as integrating many partial – in the sense that they are skewed or not impartial – sympathies. In SLU, there is clearly sympathy for the capitalist market, the natural environment, and a smartly-designed built environment, which sympathies are elaborated into the three broad discourses that the archaeology revealed (political economy, ethics, and aesthetics). The rough alternative to SLU that I have also sketched through these discourses is similar, in that it expresses sympathy for: a truly free market; the natural environment, equitable self-determination, and joy; and a built environment that corresponds to the complexity of the human soul. Capital, in concert with these extraeconomic concerns, becomes a rational means to satisfying the underlying passions. These means take the form of the financial system, the state and its departments, design codes and commissions, review processes, etc. A closer engagement with Deleuze’s (1991) reading of Hume, as well as Hume (1882, 1985) himself, illuminates how much more refined this perspective is in comparison with critical urban theory as it has been developed to date. By following my commitment to understanding how
Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy might contribute to critical urban research – primarily by understanding the influence of the extraeconomic – I am now arriving at the shared affective foundation of all motivation. For this reason, the following section should be read as an exploration of the limits to my current project and a gesture toward future work.

7.4 Sympathy is the Motive to Action

“Indeed, nothing is further from the homo oeconomicus than Hume’s analysis.”

Deleuze 1991, 45.

This account of the positivity of models of realization resonates with Deleuze’s (1991) early work on Hume, specifically in the claim that the motive to action is always sentiment – which is determined by sympathy (or taste) for Hume – and can never be reason. Hume (1983, 88) writes:

Reason, being cool and disengaged, is no motive to action, and directs only the impulse received from appetite or inclination by showing us the means of attaining happiness and avoiding misery. Taste [or sympathy], as it gives pleasure or pain, and thereby constitutes happiness or misery, becomes a motive to action and is the first spring or impulse to desire and volition.

To make sense of this, it is helpful to return to some of the foundations of Humean philosophy. Hume’s entire theoretical edifice in A Treatise of Human Nature (1985) is erected on two fundamental principles: the principle of the passions, which direct actions toward pleasure and away from pain, and the principle of association, which links ideas corresponding to perceptions together (Deleuze 1991, 123-4). Both of these principles contribute to how the mind continuously emerges from current impressions and images of previous impressions. In other words, this continual emergence is the only object of psychology because the mind does not have “the constancy or universality” (Deleuze 1991, 21) necessary to be the object of analysis. For him, instead, a flux of perceptions both arouses an individual’s sympathies and is associated with one another through contiguity, resemblance, causality. This, however, is not the end of the
process: according to these three principles (primarily causality), the association of ideas transcends the fundamental and delirious registration of perception and establishes belief – the “fixing” of the mind (Ibid., 24).

The real power of this schema lies in its transformation of reason from an assumed fundamental characteristic of the mind to something that emerges according to principles that are unique to human nature. Reason is therefore understood as a particular mode of the mind, rather than as its nature. In Hume’s own words: “we have found [reason] to be nothing but a general calm determination of the passions, founded on some distant view or reflection” (Hume 1985, 634). But the capacity for the human mind to be affected in this way does not mean that it becomes the motivation to act; instead, motivation remains in the realm of the passions, as it does for all living beings. The uniqueness of the human animal is that we have reason at our disposal, but it nevertheless emerges from passions.

This quickly becomes a sociopolitical project when one considers Hume’s assertion that all individuals naturally have different sympathies. Or, as Deleuze (1991, 35) puts it, we are all partial to certain elements in the world (people, places, things). It also challenges any perspective, such as Hobbes’s (1996), which takes egoism as humankind’s fundamental characteristic that must be limited through a social contract. Invoking language that Deleuze and Guattari made famous in their later work, egoism is a deficient starting point because it neglects the fact that individuals are always part of assemblages (tribes, families, clans, etc.). This is decidedly not to place a positive normativity on sympathy, for Hume is clear that partiality is just as oppositional as egoism is to society, but is rather an argument for sympathy as a fundamental – and perhaps even inconvenient – characteristic of human nature. Hume (1985, 539) writes:

For while each person loves himself better than any other single person, and in his love to others bears the greatest affection to his relations and acquaintance, this
must necessarily produce an opposition of passions, and a consequent opposition of actions; which cannot but be dangerous to the new-establish’d union.

Therefore, when starting with partial human sympathies the sociopolitical project becomes one of integration: to establish a society is to align sympathies in such a way that individuals’ natural partialities are decreased. It is a positive or productive process of stabilization, of transcending natural partiality and extending sympathy, which contrasts a view – such as Hobbes’s – that begins with various egoisms that must be limited. A moral world – or a society – for Hume, is therefore:

the artificial totality wherein particular ends are integrated and added to one another…[or] the system of means which allow my particular interest and also the interest of the other, to be satisfied and realized. Morality may equally well be thought of as a whole in relation to parts and a means in relation to ends. In short the moral conscience is a political conscience. (Deleuze 1991, 41).

The function of what Hume calls the “general rule” is therefore to establish shared and stable moral basis, which is independent of the natural partiality of sympathy. Undoubtedly, these rules affect us less than our own natural dispositions – that’s why it’s so hard for many of us to “be good” – but at the same time have the advantage of being general and slowly changing, extending and correcting diverse sympathies through integration.

One of Deleuze’s key insights here is that ethical notions, such as justice, which are produced through such rules function topologically. That is to say that they do not create new moral principles but instead reshape the naturally occurring and uneven sympathies. Moreover, that humans can even construct such concepts is due to the very fact that we are, by nature, creators (“Old father, old artificer, stand me now and ever in good stead”). Our ethical inventions certainly function to constrain our natural passions, but that does not mean that they have ends other than satisfaction or, as Deleuze is quick to note, an origin other than the passions. Quite the opposite, in fact: ethical concepts, such as justice, are born of the passions and are intended to
satisfy them “obliquely” (Ibid., 44) – that is, in a reasonable and regulated manner. How do they do so? Through social institutions, which function in the same way as models of realization. Both the economic and extraeconomic interests constituting the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine are, in this view, traces of variegated sympathies. This common foundation speaks to the need for a critical urban theory that can address this full spectrum of interests. In other words, this is another way of saying yet again that political economy cannot describe all the active motivations in urbanization process.

For Hume, the institution, not the law, is the very essence of society: it is productive and creative whereas the law is negative and restraining. “The institution, unlike the law, is not a limitation but rather a model of actions, a veritable enterprise, an invented system of positive means or a positive invention of indirect means” (Ibid., 46, my emphasis). These models of action, these regulators of partiality, these entities that determine needs and the means to satisfy them, are exactly what I have mapped in SLU. To be sure, the Coordinated City’s models of realization are different from the social institutions that occupied Hume’s imagination – marriage being the institution that allegedly satisfies sexuality and property being the one that ostensibly satisfies greed – but they function in exactly the same way. The models that I have been tracking integrate partialities toward everything from capital accumulation to aesthetic and functional qualities of the city, from concerns about the environment to strategies for participatory planning, and from economic growth to a high quality of life. This integration is a far more complex and nonlinear process than simply tracking the appetite to capture surplus value, and interrogating the subsequent rational strategies to do so. Instead, the models integrate a whole set of diverse rational elaborations of underlying sentiments. “Indeed, nothing is further from the homo oeconomicus than Hume’s analysis” (Ibid., 45).
But what explains the specificity of the institution? For Hume, it is not the drive itself (sexuality does not explain marriage) nor is it public or private utility. Instead the institution “is the reflection of the drive in the imagination” (Ibid., 48). The mind reflects the various perceptions and drives, and through its creative capacity, invents ways that they might be satisfied depending on the circumstances and how they relate with previously established associations. Similar to the relationship between nature and culture, the drive and the institution are united in the sense that the latter is a response to the former, but simultaneously remain distinct because the former does not naturally lead to the latter. In Deleuze’s reading of Hume, this creativity takes the form of three specific kinds of statements that establish, determine, and correct the general rules at hand (Ibid., 49-50). Deleuze steps through the main theme of Hume’s economic thinking, which addresses the establishment of the notion of property, the governmental system installed to secure it, and the corrective theory of political economy that is intended to address its shortcomings. From this analysis, Deleuze arrives at the statement addressing extraeconomic motivation that is crucial to my entire analysis:

The quantity of money, its abundance or scarcity does not act on its own: money is the object of a mechanics. We could say that the essential, or perhaps the only theme of Hume’s economic essays is to show that the effects which we ordinarily attribute to the quantity of money depend in fact on other causes. What is concrete in this economy is the idea that economic activity involves a qualitative motivation (Ibid., 53, my emphasis).

Qualitative motivation is thus at the heart of Hume’s theory of institutions as well as his economic thinking. Such qualitative motivations are part and parcel of the coordinated urbanization that is occurring in SLU. It is critical to note that this schema connects the most intimate realm of passions directly with the broader sociopolitical and economic sphere: institutions integrate various uneven intensities of passion in exactly the same way that they engineer connections between qualified flows of capital (cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 248). It
is precisely the way that it can identify and critique the interconnection of these two realms that makes a Deleuzoguattarian approach to critical urban inquiry more robust than analyses grounded solely in political economy, while simultaneously holding on to the contributions that critical political economic thought has provided.

At a more general level, such as that of the theory of planetary urbanization, the same dynamics are at play although the models themselves undoubtedly have their own characteristics depending on the site under investigation, but such an approach only tells half the story because neither does it acknowledge nor can it account for how the passions, how sympathy, underlies the models. As with the theory of planetary urbanization, there is no inherent reason to differentiate between the urban and nonurban locations, but instead of taking all forms of development as strictly the capitalist restructuring of space, one must instead account for the entire range of sympathies at play – not just the sympathy for capital accumulation or for the capitalist market. Analysis and critique of the Coordinated City – which might be better termed Coordinated Urbanization, to reflect the scale at which Brenner is working – becomes a matter of tracking which models are operating. How rules are established, determined, and corrected? What kind of axiomatic is at work? Which sympathies are reflected in the models of realization? For these models are a crucial aspect for the relationships between the quantitative and qualitative, and as my analysis of SLU shows, they play a significant role in determining how capital realizes the built environment. To specify these models and how they interact with global flows of capital is to account for the conditions limiting the configurations that “urban assemblages” can take, in a way that significantly exceeds the description of sociomaterial relationships in already existing urban environments. These conditions, both economic and
extraeconomic, share a common foundation in the sentiments, and should therefore be addressed if one seeks to develop a theory that accurately reflects the multiplicity of operative motivations.

7.5 Final Remark on Transformation

I have shown that the struggle between the war machine and the state apparatus forms the basis of Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy. However, since I want to avoid the fate of the assemblage urbanists, who merely adopt the isolated concept of assemblage and begin describing the world in its terms without any engagement with the political philosophy that undergirds it, my project has taken this conceptual foundation and transformed it into a system that can ground a more robust critical urban theory. To be clear, in the 2011 debate, it was indeed Brenner et al. (2011) who brought up the point that assemblage thinking cannot ground critical urban theory – McFarlane (2011a) never said it could – and it has been my task to affirm this critique and offer an alternative. This alternative, which I am calling the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine for the case of SLU, is a subtle transformation of Deleuze and Guattari’s worldwide capitalist axiomatic that has two central elements. First, its end is not solely about capturing surplus value but also seeks to reorganize the built environment according to a particular set of criteria: in the case of SLU, these criteria have been established as political economic, ethical, and aesthetic through the archaeology in Part II, but as the preceding discussion has shown, the elements available for analysis in the archive are traces of various passions or sympathies that are otherwise inaccessible.\(^\text{15}\) Second, the type of space that corresponds to this relationship between

\(^{15}\) Inaccessible via archival research, that is. Various attempts have been made in the study of built environments to access the realm of affective experience (cf. Rose et al 2010 or Christian Nold’s (2004) ongoing project *Biomapping*) but, again, the object of analysis here is not urban experience per se, but rather the production of the built environment. The next step in this direction for my work would be to understand the affective dimensions of the urbanization process itself.
the state and the war machine takes on a different form. In the global capitalist axiomatic, space oscillates from being striated in the service of capital accumulation, to being smoothed when previous striations become encumbrances. This conceptualization is clearly compatible with some of the most influential critical takes on contemporary urbanization (cf. Harvey 1989), but fails to pinpoint what is unique in SLU for the same reasons: it cannot isolate and elaborate the interactions between economic and extraeconomic concerns that drive the redevelopment. It is a cold logic when, as Hume argues, motivation always follows from the passions. In the production of SLU, there are clearly passions for supporting capitalist accumulation, protecting the environment, and building smartly-designed spaces. At the same time, however, there is a lack of passion for truly free and accessible markets and a cityscape that corresponds to the messiness of the human soul.
CONCLUSION: CAPITALISM, SYMPATHY, AND URBANIZATION IN SOUTH LAKE UNION

If South Lake Union (SLU) can teach us one thing, it is that extraeconomic concerns are clearly a part of contemporary capitalist urbanization. However, as Deleuze (1991) notes in his discussion of Hume, the problem with the sentiments that underlie all motivations is that they are necessarily partial, in the sense that they privilege certain individuals or groups more than others. This natural unevenness must be managed in order to produce society, and for this reason Hume sees institutions as fundamental elements whose function is positive: institutions integrate different sympathies; their task as artificers is to smooth out the natural unevenness of sympathy and extend a new version of it as a moral basis for society. An effect of this process is that social institutions become the means by which passions are satisfied. As Deleuze says, the rational construction of institutions undoubtedly restrains passions but still has their satisfaction as an end, albeit through the institutions themselves as means: in short, institutions satisfy passions “obliquely” (Deleuze 1991, 44). In SLU, for example, the passion to create can be satisfied in problem solving via computer programming, vaccine development, delivering global health solutions, urban design and architecture, or advertising; sympathy for the natural environment can be expressed by living in an increasingly dense urban area with access to alternative forms of transportation, or buying food at Whole Foods and gear at REI – all of which are activities that also produce surplus value.

In the case of SLU in particular, or in the broader concept of the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine in general, I have argued the various models of realization have exactly this same role: they integrate or coordinate different sympathies, which are only empirically
accessible in the form of interests such as managing land use patterns and characteristics, creating a sustainable economy, and ensuring a high quality of life. However, under the global capitalist axiomatic they play the additional role of supporting the unceasing imperative to support the production of surplus value that cannot be captured by Hume’s system. The point here is not to default to the now traditional critical position and say that in the case of urbanization, the models simply function to satisfy the capitalist imperative – as Deleuze and Guattari assert they do in their general conception of the global capitalist axiomatic – but instead to see them in terms of their own nature, which is to hold differences together, or to integrate. Through the archaeology presented in Part II, I have shown that this multiplicity of diverse interests, identified the producers of said interests, tracked the ways in which the interests have been related to one another, and outlined the broad discourses on political economy, ethics, and aesthetics that bound this discursive collection. Moreover, I have argued that this collection necessitates a transformation of the fundamental relationship between the global capitalist war machine and the models of realization that Deleuze and Guattari describe if we want to use their political philosophy as ontology for urban studies. This raises the two crucial points that were developed in Chapter 7. First, both the aim and the object – the end and the means – of the relationship between capital and the models is to manage how the built environment is organized and to ensure capitalist accumulation. Second, the space of this relationship is increasingly striated according to resonances between the models of realization and the imperative of capital accumulation.¹

This perspective cannot be easily aligned with either side of the 2011 debate between proponents of assemblage urbanism and critical urban theory that I reviewed in Chapter 2. It

¹ There is also the question of the form of sociality that corresponds to this particular relationship, but which I have bracketed for the current analysis. See Chapter 7.
differs vastly from looking at assemblages themselves and instead looks to the variegated
machinic forces producing them. In this sense, it is a return to Deleuze and Guattari’s political
philosophy that has no use for the urban elaborations on social theory proffered by DeLanda
(2006) or Latour (2007). This not at all to say any future work building on what I have tried to
establish here could not profitably invoke the concept of assemblages, for as Brenner et al.
(2011) point out response to McFarlane’s (2011a) original article, assemblage could certainly be
an effective methodology for urban studies. It cannot, however – and this is where I agree with
the critique leveled by Brenner and his coauthors – serve as ontology for critical urban inquiry.
They indict assemblage urbanism for its inability to address the central concepts of political
economy, and while I certainly agree with them, I also do not believe that they have gone far
enough for the very reason that urban assemblages are the effects of political economic, ethical,
and aesthetic forces, all of which are ultimately grounded in the passions. Put another way, my
fundamental question is this: if all motivations – whether they can be categorized as
extraeconomic or economic – are grounded in sentiments, what right does critical urban theory
have to analyze urbanization from only the perspective of political economy?

Brian Massumi (2015) not only offers a particularly compelling account of how the
contemporary political and economic scene should be reconsidered along not only rational but
also affective lines, but his work can help delineate the spectrum on which I am working. He,
like Deleuze and Guattari, is not particularly concerned with urbanization, but like I have
attempted to do with their political philosophy, we can look to his work – which also engages
Hume – for insight into the political project of expanding and transforming the institutionalized
sympathies. Massumi’s key insight is that the natural hierarchy of sympathies that Hume takes as
a starting point has actually been destabilized by “neoliberalism’s ‘massive withdrawal’ from the
normative-disciplinary regimes of power” (Massumi 2015, 66). This is akin to Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983, 1987) claims that capitalism’s rampant decoding has steadily undone many of our previous organizations of desire: even though society has a long way to go, many of the most controversial issues of today – such as gay marriage or new ideas about what constitutes a family, the decriminalization of drugs and sex work, migrant and indigenous rights, and democratic self-governance – speak to this decoding. Undoubtedly, governmental institutions are behind the curve here, and many individuals and groups currently fear such changes to an unbelievable degree, but the point is that there is a movement of undoing for many of these previous customs, even if they are sometimes met with overwhelming violence by states, collectives, and individuals. As Massumi argues, instead of a world in which the traditional disciplinary institutions of the family, church, school, and community reliably develop these hierarchies of sympathy, the forces organizing sympathies are “forced to operate in an open, oscillatory environment” (Ibid.) through what he calls “affective primings.”

This conception of the affective life echoes Deleuze’s assertion that Spinoza’s entire metaphysics, in which one’s power of acting (affect) continuously varies according to encounters\(^2\): per Deleuze, this “really is existence in the street” (1978). In Massumi’s contemporary reading of these ideas, the hierarchies of our sympathies are increasingly structured by different affective encounters, different “primings,” that we experience in the street, from our families and friends, and increasingly through media. Or in Humean language, there is a broader range of forces producing the partiality of natural sympathies than Hume could have ever accounted for. The familiar ambivalence of all Deleuzoguattarian concepts can be

\(^2\) For Spinoza, an increase in the power to act is at the base of all joyous affects – love, hope confidence, etc. – while a decrease in the power to act founds all sad affects – hatred, fear, despair, etc. See Spinoza 1994, Chapter 3.
found here: on the one hand, there are the “virulent primings tending toward fascist contagion” that are regularly attributed to fiscal austerity, social conservatism, and the pressure to be innovative and entrepreneurial; on the other hand, there are “the sympathetic tendencies uninclined toward resemblance/familiarity/contiguity-based hierarchies [which] readily multiply, and go feral, against the grain of ‘natural sentiment’” (Massumi 2015, 66). The latter is the realm of coalition-based politics, international and intercultural solidarity, sympathy for nonhuman life, etc. This scheme is founded on multiplicity and can very well accommodate a spectrum of sympathies, ranging from sympathy for the market to sympathy for the disenfranchised, to many mixtures that fall in between. Moreover, in Chapter 6, I explicitly sketched out a range of alternative interests – themselves rational elaborations of underlying sympathies – that correspond to the tripartite structure of the models of realization that I discovered in SLU: free market communism as an alternative political economy; the just city and sustainability culture as alternative ethics; and the Situationist City, which always expresses and celebrates the diversity of human drives instead of imposing an attenuated version of them back on society. Any movement toward actualizing a city reflecting these qualities should, from this perspective, consider how the field of affective priming could work with or against it.

Massumi, however, goes even further when he challenges Hume’s commitment “to the hedonic binary of pleasure and pain” (Ibid., 71), and therefore defines an(other) outside limit to the present analysis. For Hume, sympathy corresponds to what is likely to produce pleasure or reduce pain, but Massumi argues that this perspective mistakenly sees satisfaction at the end of a process, rather than as a part of it. For Massumi, satisfaction “comes en route, in the self-affirming value of the process itself. It comes in the immediate experience of a qualitative ‘more’ to life, a surplus value of life that is lived intensely, such that its living is its own reward” (Ibid.,
Harris, 396

70). In this vision, the words “satisfaction” or “pleasure” are not descriptive enough to handle the constantly modulating intensity of life, so Massumi turns to Spinoza, and argues that joy is the best word to describe this state: an increase in the power to affect and be affected. As in my previous discussion of ethics (Chapter 6), joy becomes the asymptote of the work at hand. It is bubbling and churning at the limit to this analysis, in part because it feels so far away, especially in comparison to the consciously capitalist landscape of SLU. But the very fact that sympathy can be identified in the production of SLU, and that very real alternatives to SLU, including ones promoting joy, emerge in same discursive formation, are gestures toward this as a real possibility. This is the potential for critical urban inquiry, but it must first deal with its political economic myopia, and acknowledging the role of extraeconomic criteria involved in the production of places like SLU is a first step. A second step, which I have only begun to sketch here, is to turn to the affective dimensions of the production of urban space.

In the case of SLU, then, I consider the operative models of realization to be assemblages of fixed sympathies guiding how the built environment is produced: the archive is indeed made up of documents that reflect beliefs of their variegated authors, but according to Hume, belief is nevertheless grounded in the passions. Sympathy for the capitalist market is indeed a major aspect of the production of SLU, but it clearly is not the only sympathy at play. These models of realization also attest to sympathy for the natural environment, for a well-designed and engaging built environment, for technical problem solving and innovation, for curing disease, for education, for nominal participation in self-government, and so on. However, there are two major problems with the models as they stand. First, and most importantly, a hierarchy of sympathies that clearly privileges the capitalist market clearly exists – “Vulcan gets record price

3 Massumi (2015, 70) transforms this aspect of Hume’s thought as well, and argues that “it is intensities of experience that give rise to interest” (emphasis in the original).
for Westlake office building,” reads another *Seattle Times* headline in July 2015 (Bhatt 2015a), while other headlines in the ensuing year attest to the company’s continuous activity and expanding operations around Seattle: “Vulcan to turn Paul Allen’s old hangout site into U District apartments” (Bhatt 2015c); “Vulcan sells two SLU buildings to German fund” (Bhatt 2015d); “Vulcan buys in Central District, plans project with 570 apartments” (Bhatt 2016a); “Vulcan sells project that helped begin S. Lake Union transformation” (Bhatt 2016b); and “Vulcan buys downtown Bellevue retail complex for $45M” (Torres 2016). If anything, this activity – in conjunction with other stories about new developers hustling to get a piece of the action in the neighborhood – attests to the political economic efficacy of the Coordinated City’s Mutation Machine. Yet, over the same year-long period, other superlative headlines speak to other aspects of SLU, such as new restaurants (a Brazilian steakhouse, Japanese fusion, and a new bakery), as well as exhibits on both Prohibition and Seattle hip-hop at the Museum of History and Industry (MOHAI) in Lake Union Park and a story about the effectiveness of a new transit-only lanes along Westlake Avenue, which serves as one of the spines of this mutated neighborhood. That the economic development dimension of SLU solicits more ink in *The Seattle Times* than the extraeconomic speaks to which dimension is dominant in term of Massumi’s concept of priming, and reinforces this as an ethico-political problem that thinkers and activists are consistently engaging with, though not typically through the language of sympathy. Addressing it is indeed the highest priority for progressive and radical politics of our time and although this serves as part of the inspiration for this project, trying to solve it is clearly not the major thrust of this dissertation.

Instead, my goals are much more modest and address the second problem, which is conceptual. Instead of falling back on the tired argument contemporary urbanization is primarily
“market-driven sociospatial transformation” (Brenner and Theodore 2005, 102), I am pointing out the multiplicity of sympathies that are fixed in the belief systems constituting the models of realization that actually generate the built environment. Critical urban theory, as it has been developed, does not speak this language. Assemblage urbanism, as it stands, cannot address the political economic, ethical, and aesthetic dynamics producing the assemblages that it takes as a starting point. But these issues have nothing to do with Deleuzoguattarian political philosophy, which I have argued is built around the relationships between global flows of capital and the local qualitative differences between models of realization. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari did not develop their system in order to understand the problem of urbanization, but the very openness of their schema has made its transformation into an ontology for critical urban inquiry a possibility that I have striven to realize here.

This analysis remains but a first step. I offer it, first of all, as a corrective to a debate that struck me as indicative of what happens when scholars from disciplinary fields start peeking over the fences, but without ever scaling them and rolling around in whatever mess they find. This, of course, is a problem that extends beyond the field of critical urban inquiry, and is one that I believe can only be addressed through patient interdisciplinary education. I can only hope that my own incredibly fruitful experience in such a program is evident in this work. Second, this approach to studying cities is meant to push beyond the critical urban theory that currently dominates the conceptual landscape. What I consider to be the developments should be clear by now, but I nevertheless repeat: first, political economic analyses are not enough. Instead, if one is to describe the contemporary urbanization process, one must also consider the extraeconomic realm, which includes ethics and aesthetics in my study of SLU; second, stopping with rational interest is not enough. Instead, if we want to think about cities, we need to consider the
fundamental roles the passions play, in and of themselves and as a common ground for economic and extraeconomic interests.

Finally, this brings me to the other directions for future work. First, and as I explained in Chapter 3, this analysis has only focused empirically on discourse. A fully Deleuzoguattarian approach to critical urban inquiry does not stop here, but would also engage with nondiscursive practices and materiality. I have repeatedly referenced Foucault’s method of the *enquête* (Hoffman 2015) – the inquiry – as a potentially powerful way to understand what producers and users of SLU actually do, but that will have to wait for a future project. Second, and related not only to these nondiscursive practices, but also to the recursive relationship between them and the environment itself, there is the entire discussion of subjectivity that I have left unaddressed. Some of the most exciting work in critical thought is currently engaging with this question (cf. Lazzarato 2014, Read 2016) and some thinkers working primarily with Guattari’s solo writings are even explicitly discussing cities (Genosko 2015). These thinkers form important parts of the academic constellation in which I want to work and into which I have already been making inroads, and I humbly offer this work as my first serious contribution.
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APPENDIX 1

Fig A1.1. South Lake Union Zoning Process (Vulcan 2011)
APPENDIX 2

Partial record of land use changes pertaining to South Lake Union (dark text corresponds to Vulcan’s 2011 timeline (Appendix 1) and light text corresponds to my additions, most of which were discovered in the Seattle Municipal Archive.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Resolution 24283 - Seattle 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Resolution 27281 - Land use/transportation for downtown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Resolution 27597 - Land use Goals/policies for SLU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Resolution 27709 - Establish neighborhood planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>GMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Vision 2020 (PSRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Resolutions 28168 &amp; 28259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>SLU Park Master Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Resolution 28535 - Seattle Framework Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City of Seattle first Comprehensive Plan: &quot;Toward a Sustainable Seattle&quot; (20 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Resolution 29015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 &amp; 1996</td>
<td>Voters reject Seattle Commons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sustainable Strategies: Proposed Cascade Neighborhood Council Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>first SLU Neighborhood Plan completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Neighborhood Plan Approval &amp; Adoption Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>City Council Adopts SLU Neighborhood Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Seattle OED - Real Estate Analysis of City owned prop in Mercer blocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Artwork Plan for SLU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Public-private partnerships and Mercer blocks RFQ's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Revising neighborhood plans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|      | Update comp plan vision - "amending Resolution 29215, the Vision for the City of Seattle Comprehensive Plan."
| 2001 | Raising bldg height limits |
|      | Context - commitment to the regional economic strategies developed at the 2002 Leadership Conference. |
| 2002 | SLU Urban Hub Village Update - Neighborhood Plan in Action |
| 2003 | Mayor’s Action Agenda (for biotech) |
|      | Context: commitment to making SLU the region's most competitive location for biotech research/manufacturing, clean energy, advanced energy technology research, manufacturing /distribution, other high-tech research/manufacturing, and other innovative entrepreneurial high-tech industries |
2003  Seattle's biotech strategy
2003  Code amendments: greater heights for biotech/biomed research
       There is a lot of pushback here; referencing L52 (Real Change Article); also see
2003  ST stories and Seattle Displacement Coalition (see emails record)
2003  Adopting SLU design guidelines
2003  Lift UW's lease lid -- allowing them do lease space off campus
2004  SLU transportation study by SDOT (see mercer tab)
2004  North Downtown Park Plan
2004  Terry Avenue North Street Design Guidelines
2004  SLU designated an urban center (in 2004 comp plan)
2004  Bio 21 initiative
2004  Streetcar, prelim study by SDOT
2004  Housing Principles and Action Steps
2005  Comp plan updated
2005  Zoning changed from industrial/commercial to seattle mixed
2005  SLU historic survey and inventory
2005  DPD and SLUCC to update neighborhood plan
2005  SLU Design Guidelines
2006  SLU Streetcar project
2006  South Lake Union Draft On-Street Parking Plan
2007  Stakeholder consensus on joint visioning recommendation for Uptown and SLU
2007  New SLU urban center neighborhood plan adopted
2007  Priorities summary
2008  Vision 2040 (PSRC)
       DPD, SLUCC, Stakeholders develop 3 building form/height scenarios - Urban
2008  Form Study
       DPD further develops these concepts and proposes three alternative approaches
2008  for EIS
2008  Incentive zoning legislation (referenced in 2010 Urban Design Framework)
       SLU community groups collaborate on Urban Design Framework (character &
2009  amenities not in EIS)
2009  DPD refines and publishes revised alternatives
2009  Procedures for amending comprehensive plan
2010  SLU UDF
2010  DPD begins EIS (an exploration of adverse affects)
       Draft EIS - DEIS (2/23), 45 day comment period; public hearing 3/28; final EIS
2011  to be released in summer
       Fall - mayor and DPD select Preferred alternative (zoning proposal by mayor to
2011  city council)
2011  SLU Mobility Plan
2011  Vulcan's comments on DEIS (see final EIS for all the comments…chapter 4)
   mid-late
2012  Possible city council action (ended up being spring 2013)
2012  Final EIS
Major update to comp plan "Seattle 2035" – scheduled to be completed by June 2015
2013 Landscape Conservation and Local Infrastructure Program LCLIP
2013 Rezone director's report
2013 Rezone
2013 Thomas Green Street concept plan
2013 Lake to Bay Loop
2013 LIPA (ord 124287)
2013 SLU Design Guidelines
2013 Street Concepts Plans
APPENDIX 3

Fig. A3.1. SLU Archive Timeline (Arranged by Decreasing Scale)
Fig A3.2. SLU Archive Timeline (Arranged by Immanent Categories)
APPENDIX 4

A3.1 DOUBLE ARTICULATION: DELEUZE AND GUATTARI READ FOUCALUT

Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 39-74) consider all systems – social, biological, geological, technical – to operate through what they call a double articulation of planes of expression and planes of content, wherein correspondences between these articulations involve assemblages and abstract machines. Moreover, each of these planes also contains particular substances and forms, so there are four operative domains in all. It is necessary to address each of these terms in turn, but it will perhaps be clearer if we follow their reading of Foucault’s analysis of the prison (Table A3.1), rather than attempt to follow their tracing of double articulation through geological and linguistic registers (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 40-5). The prison itself is a form of content, the prison-form, which is composed of various substances – concrete, steel, glass, tile, etc. – and stands in a particular relationship to other forms of content: the school, barracks, hospital, and factory that also interest Foucault (1977a). Lest we fall into the increasingly pervasive, one-sided materialist trap that haunts assemblage theorists and actor-network theorists, it should be emphasized that Deleuze and Guattari are not so much interested in these buildings themselves, but rather the fact that they are “complex state of things as a formation of power” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 66). Moreover, in contradistinction to a structural linguistic paradigm that would render the actual prison as a referent, to which the idea of a prison was a signified and referenced by the signifier “prison,” Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 66) link the prison-form to an entire series of discursive and nondiscursive practices – “classifying, stating, translating, and even committing criminal acts” – that make up the form of expression known as “delinquency.” The substance of expression, then, is defined by the statements which are drawn together into a particular configurations constituting the form of expression – in short, precisely the same
statements that the archaeological method excavates – and practices that could be tracked empirically through an ethnographic method.¹

Table A4.1. Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation of Foucault’s analysis of the prison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plane of expression</th>
<th>Substance of expression (discursive and nondiscursive)</th>
<th>Classifying, stating, translating, and committing criminal acts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form of expression</td>
<td></td>
<td>Delinquency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(discursive and nondiscursive)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plane of content</th>
<th>Substance of content</th>
<th>Bricks, bars, tile, lights, fencing, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form of content</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prison</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Again, the empirical work herein applies only to discourse, but in fact only to discourse that is engaged in the production of SLU. This is a necessary first step toward outlining a Deleuzoguattarian approach to critical urban research because it addresses the dominant version of critical urban theory head-on. The fact that there are other substances and forms of expression that correspond to the same SLU plane of content – I am specifically thinking of the Food Not Bombs collective that distributes food to those in need at the Cascade Playground on Sunday afternoons – highlights the critical fact that alternatives are not only possible, but that they already exist simultaneously. Returning to Deleuze and Guattari’s interpretation of Foucault’s analysis of the prison helps to clarify. They assert that the prison form of content has its own set of relative discursive and nondiscursive expressions that do not necessarily correspond to the form of expression known as delinquency: they do not specify these but we might assume slang,

¹ Again, this study only focuses on the discursive substance of expression but I mention the nondiscursive aspect to stake out room for other types of qualitative research. Foucault’s enquête – the method of inquiry he adopted for his research with the Groupe d'information sur les prisons (GIP) – is one such method that I intend to explore in future projects (cf. Hoffman 2015).
initiation rituals, and barter economies as potential candidates. Simultaneously, the delinquency form of expression also contains elements that relate to forms of content other than the prison: truancy to the school’s detention hall, or stealing bubble gum to municipal juvenile court and detention, for example. In other words, both the form of content and the form of expression have their own dynamics; specific relationships between the two planes imply, at most, “a shared state of the abstract machine” (Ibid., 67). With this in mind, any scheme that would neatly sort relationships between the planes quickly becomes untenable, and we are instead left trying to sketch out fluctuating correspondences – assemblages – between particular elements populating each plane. Assemblages, however, are never autonomous nor static; instead, one of their defining characteristics is that they put the abstract machine into operation. The production of SLU therefore involves an abstract machine that links one form of expression to the material environment through a wide variety of assemblages, while another abstract machine links Food Not Bombs to the same built environment through different assemblages. Here, again, I can only address this first abstract machine.

A little more insight into these two concepts will help clarify. First, we can think of assemblages as relationships of exteriority and abstract machines as an internal driving force; second, as such, abstract machines are engines of transformation or producers of singularity: “they constitute becomings” (Ibid., 510) in the sense that they regulate what kinds of assemblages are most likely to occur. In this project, I am only pursuing the abstract machine – or the set of relationships between various models of realization and global flows of capital – engaged in producing SLU through particular assemblages. But very real alternatives exist, such as the Food Not Bombs example that I have been using here or, even more radically, a tentative vision of the city defined by free market communism (political economy), justice, sustainability
culture, and joy (ethics), and a design corresponding to the full range of human drives (aesthetics) which emerged in Chapter 5 as a more developed alternative to the current pattern of urbanization is nevertheless grounded in the discourses that are producing SLU.

A pertinent question that might arise then is, why are Deleuze and Guattari even necessary, if I am drawing on Foucault so heavily? The reason is straightforward: this perspective on double articulation provides an alternative mode of escaping from the overpowering focus on discourse of the archaeological method without submitting to the single line of power that Foucault masterfully draws through them in his later genealogies. In other words, although I find Foucault to be untouchable in terms of providing a method for sorting through documents, Deleuze and Guattari’s broader philosophical orientation permits me to use this method while retaining the dynamism and multiplicity contributing to redevelopment of SLU. By focusing on practical activities that have guided the development of the neighborhood – that is, the ways that the various models of realization (the state, designers, experts, developers, commentators, advocates) have directed flows of investment – we can better understand the assemblage at hand as well as its motive force. Moreover, and more importantly for future research, we can also see how very real discursive and nondiscursive alternatives already exist and where they might be able to intervene in the urbanization process.
This appendix includes one example of the different types of knowledge that emerged from the archival documents related to regional planning. Similar grids were created for the Comprehensive Planning efforts in both the pre- and post-Growth Management Act (1990) epochs, the various SLU neighborhood plans, as well as documents related to 2013 rezone of the neighborhood to accommodate more intensive growth as an Urban Center.

**Table A5.1. *Vision 2040* Grids of Specification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Summary</th>
<th>Forms of knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health (PSRC 2004)</td>
<td>Specific health considerations that can be adopted into regional planning</td>
<td>Human body: blood pressure, weight; Natural environment: levels of nitrogen oxide and volatile organic compounds; Built environment: walkability and sidewalk connectivity, bikeability and bike lane miles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Targets (PSRC 2005a)</td>
<td>Considerations on distributing population growth to specific counties and cities</td>
<td>Residential: current and future persons-per-household, water availability and sewer capacity, unabsorbed capacity of previous targets, presence of urban centers, available zoned capacity, housing market trends; Employment: economic forecasts, commercial/industrial capacity, access to existing and planned transportation facilities, presence of urban centers and manufacturing/industrial centers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing (2005e)</td>
<td>Overview of housing trends and issues</td>
<td>Housing age, density, type, affordability; Equal access (race, color, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age, national origin, family status, income, disability); demographic shifts (retiring baby-boomers, in-migration); Barriers to construction (regulatory, environmental, fiscal, market pressure, insurance challenges, community opposition), best practices (comp planning, design, zoning/permitting, incentives and tradeoffs, private sector programs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment (PSRC 2005d)</td>
<td>How to incorporate environmental planning efforts of various institutions into regional planning</td>
<td>Air quality: size and density of particulate matter, levels of gaseous pollutants; Terrestrial habitats and species: biodiversity and habitat quantity, quality, and continuity; Aquatic habitat: surface permeability, volume and velocity of runoff, levels of nutrients and toxic substances in runoff and sewage; Climate: global average surface temperature, artic sea ice thickness, global average sea level, snowpack levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Environmental Justice (PSRC 2005c)</td>
<td>Examines issues and needs of disadvantages population groups</td>
<td>Race, income, and age; employment opportunities and housing prices; access to education, transportation and healthcare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographics (PSRC 2005b)</td>
<td>Population trends and issues</td>
<td>Population growth, distribution, and density; job creation, diversification, and focus; household size, race/ethnicity, age, education, income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics (PSRC 2005f)</td>
<td>Examine employment issues, specifically job retention and creation in strategic clusters</td>
<td>number and diversity of jobs sorted into clusters’ concentrations and projected growth rates, high school graduation/dropout rates, openings for undergrads at universities, barriers to commercializing academic research, proportion of high tech concentration to the number of appropriate degrees being granted, proportion of businesses created to businesses closed, characteristics of communications infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation (PSRC 2006)</td>
<td>A baseline for assessing the regional transportation system</td>
<td>Population and employment numbers and distribution, age, income, vehicle miles traveled and number of trips, transportation mode and number of people per vehicle, vehicle hours of delay per lane mile, traffic volume to speed ratios, transit service hours and number of passenger trips, environmental grids from above plus levels of toxic metals and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in water, freight mobility, and land use.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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B.S., Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University, 2001
M.Eng., Civil Engineering, Texas A&M University, 2003
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