Not like us?: The professional boundaries of American and British journalism in the digital age

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Journalists increasingly face challenges to their professional autonomy. The internet allows anyone with a computer or mobile device to post content online, making it easy for individuals with little or no journalistic training and no formal news outlet affiliation to engage in reporting. Whether this content creation constitutes “journalism,” however, is often contested by those traditional journalists affiliated with mainstream media outlets (Carlson, 2012; Ruggiero, 2004; Singer, 2007). Mainstream journalists now feel challenged by online actors who consider themselves journalists, or at least consider the work they do to be journalistic in nature.

Given the recent challenges posed to journalism by the internet, and guided by past research on social identity theory and boundary work, this dissertation examines the relationship between evolving journalistic professional identity and mainstream journalists’ treatment of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, and Glenn Greenwald. Using a content analysis and two textual
analyses, this study illustrates how definitions of journalism are changing in the digital age and how journalists working for traditional news organizations draw boundaries around their profession and attempt to differentiate themselves from new forms of journalism enabled by the internet. Results indicate that journalists moved to protect their professional boundaries in ways predicted by social identity theory: Journalists enhanced their profession identity by subsuming the innovative aspects of WikiLeaks’ and Greenwald’s work under the rubric of traditional journalism, and used the other (less professionally desirable) aspects of WikiLeaks and Greenwald’s behavior to place them outside the boundaries of real journalism. Analyses also show that American journalism has a stronger set of professional boundaries than British journalism, which makes them less open to new forms of journalism made possible by the affordances of the internet.
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Dedication

For John
Chapter 1: Introduction

As the journalist and civil liberties advocate Glenn Greenwald tells it, when he and documentary filmmaker and freelance journalist Laura Poitras were en route to Hong Kong to meet National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower Edward Snowden for the first time, they had an unwanted tagalong: longtime Guardian defense journalist Ewen MacAskill. MacAskill had been sent on the trip at the insistence of Guardian editors, who wanted a veteran journalist who they trusted to size up this new, too-good-to-be-true source. Janine Gibson, the editor of the Guardian’s US website, also wanted MacAskill on board to make sure the reporting stayed objective; all of Greenwald’s past work for the Guardian had been opinion columns, not traditional reporting, and he was now about to cross over to the news section. Gibson wanted to make sure the paper “questioned every single word, making sure we didn’t overreach, and justifying every single claim where a legal case could be made” (Harris, 2016, p. 17). Unlike past stories Greenwald had written for the Guardian, which he published directly to the paper’s website with no editorial oversight, the stories on the Snowden disclosures were going to involve the full editorial staff at the newspaper. For the first time, Greenwald was going to take part in the Guardian’s normal editorial process.

Both Greenwald and Poitras did not want MacAskill to accompany them to Hong Kong. In Greenwald’s view, MacAskill was a “company man” who was sent along to be his “babysitter” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 62). He and Poitras did not know him and so were unsure if he could be trusted. Further, the source was only expecting to meet two particular people: Greenwald and Poitras. How would the source react when a stranger was added to the mix?

But Greenwald reluctantly agreed to let MacAskill come along, because he needed the Guardian’s “substantial institutional support” to do his reporting (p. 21). Given the scale and
sensitive nature of the NSA documents, he knew that this support would inevitably include help from other Guardian reporters. But he and Poitras were still unhappy that MacAskill was accompanying them at this juncture, so they decided to “freeze him out,” “ensuring that he felt excluded” on the trip to Hong Kong (Greenwald, 2014, p. 26).

When they arrived in Hong Kong, Greenwald and Poitras met the source, Edward Snowden, for the first time. They had long conversations with Snowden, without MacAskill, during which Greenwald used his legal training to essentially cross-examine Snowden. After these conversations, both Poitras and Greenwald were convinced Snowden was genuine. They also admired the young man, who was prepared to give up a lucrative career as an NSA analyst and a comfortable life in Hawaii in order to get these documents out to the public, all because he believed it was the moral thing to do. “He had made his choice in a spirit of fearlessness, passion and strength. I was determined that the reporting I did would be driven by the same spirit, to do justice to the sacrifice our source had made,” Greenwald said (2014, p. 61).

After only one full day in Hong Kong, Greenwald had written four articles that he wanted the Guardian to publish immediately. However, Gibson told Greenwald that the paper needed to come to an agreement with its legal team first, and this process would require multiple meetings. During these meetings, Gibson said the Guardian’s lawyers insisted that the newspaper consult with the National Security Agency (NSA) and White House before publishing. The lawyers said the US government had not prosecuted news outlets for publishing classified information about signals intelligence in the past, but only if the outlet “observed the unwritten rules giving officials an advance look and the opportunity to argue that the publication would damage national security” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 59). Greenwald had long detested this unwritten rule, and spoken against it publicly; he ardently believed the government should have no place in the
editorial processes of independent news outlets. Further, he felt the government would try to scare the *Guardian* out of publishing by coming up with a litany of reasons why the stories would damage national security, even though he “knew there was no plausible national security argument” to be made against publishing (p. 67). But the *Guardian*’s lawyers were firm on this point. They said that consultation with the government was what enabled news outlets to argue that their publication of classified documents was not intended to harm national security, and so avoid criminal prosecution.

Although Gibson told Greenwald she had to consult with the government, she said he was “operating under a wrong assumption if [he] thought the paper was going to be bullied out of publishing” (p. 66). Greenwald said he was not assuming this, he just did not know what to expect—after all, he had never before worked within the *Guardian*’s normal editorial process, or indeed within *any* large newspaper’s editorial process.

At this point, Greenwald decided to speak with MacAskill for the first time, to get his opinion on the how aggressive the *Guardian* would be. MacAskill reassured him that the paper was motivated to publish these documents quickly. As he felt that getting MacAskill’s approval of Snowden would encourage the *Guardian* to publish more quickly, Greenwald let him meet Snowden for the first time. After questioning him, MacAskill was also convinced that Snowden was the real thing, and called Alan Rusbridger, the *Guardian* UK’s editor and Gibson’s boss, to tell him to start publishing immediately. Greenwald and Poitras were impressed:

“We realized that our suspicions had been entirely unfounded: lurking under the surface of Ewen’s mild-mannered, avuncular exterior was a fearless reporter eager to pursue this story in exactly the way that we all thought necessary. Ewen, at least as he viewed
himself, wasn’t there to impose institutional constraints but to report and, at time, to help overcome those constraints.” (2014, p. 62)

Despite their initial misgivings, Greenwald and Poitras had come around to MacAskill; but they were still unsure of the Guardian and Gibson. As Gibson met with Guardian lawyers and waited for the NSA and White House to respond to her requests for comment, Greenwald was growing impatient. Greenwald thought the Guardian’s ongoing consultations with lawyers and the government were driven by fear, and he wanted to report on the documents aggressively. So Greenwald began to consider alternative routes for publishing his articles that did not involve the Guardian. He contacted the news website Salon, which was his old “publishing home” and the magazine The Nation (p. 64). Both outlets said they could publish his articles immediately:

“But … we decided there was an even more powerful alternative: to simply create our own website, entitled NSAdisclosures.com, and begin releasing the articles there, without the need for any existing media outlet. Once we went public with the fact that we had in our possession this huge trove of secret documents about NSA spying, we would easily recruit volunteer editors, lawyers, researchers, and financial backers: an entire team, motivated by nothing but a passion for transparency and real adversarial journalism. … From the start, I believed that the documents presented an opportunity to shine a light not only on secret NSA spying but on the corrupting dynamics of establishment journalism. Breaking one of the most important stories in years through a new and independent model of reporting, separate from any large media organization, was extremely appealing to me. It would boldly underscore that the First Amendment’s guarantee of a free press and the ability to do important journalism were not dependent on affiliation with a large
media outlet. The free press guarantee does not only protect corporate reporters but anyone engaged in journalism, whether employed or not.” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 64-65)

Frustrated with the bureaucracy and what he perceived as the timidity of the Guardian, Greenwald had created an escape plan. But if he stayed with the Guardian, he would benefit from the newspaper’s existing infrastructure, expertise, research abilities, and distribution. In deciding what to do, he “also had to acknowledge my personal fear: publishing hundreds if not thousands of top secret NSA files was going to be risky enough, even as part of a large organization like the Guardian. Doing it alone, without institutional protection, would be far riskier” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 69)

Greenwald decided to present the Guardian with an ultimatum: Publish by the end of the day, or he will quit and publish the stories on his own website. This would mean the Guardian would lose access to the documents. But from Gibson’s perspective, Greenwald was being unreasonable. She could not make decisions unilaterally. As the editor of the Guardian’s US edition, she was responsible for doing what was best for that institution and its employees, which meant considering the concerns of the Guardian’s lawyers and consulting with the US government prior to publication. When government officials finally did respond to her messages, they tried to delay publication by suggesting a meeting sometime the following week. When Gibson had held firm, the government officials she was speaking with—who came from the NSA, White House, and Department of Justice (DOJ)—became “belligerent, even bullying” at this point (Greenwald, 2014, p. 68). “They told her she was not a ‘serious journalist’ and the Guardian was not a ‘serious newspaper’ because of its refusal to give the government more time to argue in favor of suppressing the story” (p. 68)
But Gibson kept her resolve, and repeatedly asked for concrete arguments against publishing. She was offered none. However, she could still not guarantee Greenwald that publishing would happen that day. She was the editor of the *Guardian’s* US website—this meant she had a boss, Alan Rusbridger, who was the editor of the main *Guardian* newspaper in London. She felt she should get her boss’s approval before publishing against the wishes of the US government. Unfortunately, Rusbridger had just boarded an airplane from London to New York City to oversee publication of the Snowden articles in person, and so was unreachable for the next seven hours.

Gibson was in a tough and unenviable position: She was responsible for making the best decision for her publication. She had a team of lawyers warning her what could happen if she published. She had the US government telling her she was being unreasonable, and belittling her and her organization in a way that suggested they could become more aggressive in the future. Her boss was incommunicado for the next several hours, and so could not offer his input. Her employee, who was her only link to an unprecedented trove of documents, was telling her to make a decision now or he would walk.

The time limit on Greenwald’s ultimatum had been reached. From his Hong Kong hotel room, he sent Gibson the following message: “I understand that you have your concerns and have to do what you feel is right. I’m going to go ahead and now do what I think needs to be done, too. I’m sorry it didn’t work out.” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 70)

Gibson called him immediately, and said he was being “terribly unfair” (p. 70). She promised Greenwald that the paper was no more than 30 minutes away from publishing, and convinced him to give the paper a small extension on the ultimatum. Forty minutes later, Gibson sent Greenwald a link to the very first Snowden story, with the headline “NSA Collecting Phone
Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily” (Greenwald 2013c, 2014). Greenwald’s article was there, along with the original documents on which the article was based.

The article immediately received massive attention. Greenwald was giving interview after interview for the next 24 hours. Greenwald and Gibson spoke the next day:

“Janine was proud of the article and I was proud of her resistance to government bullying and her decision to publish the piece. The *Guardian* had fearlessly, admirably, come through. Although it had seemed at the time that there was a substantial delay, it was clear in retrospect that the *Guardian* had moved forward with remarkable speed and boldness: more so, I’m certain, than any news venue of comparable size and stature would have done.” (p. 73)

I begin with this anecdote because it is illustrative of the larger dynamics at play in today’s news industry, where new kinds of outlets and journalists are merging—or confronting—traditional or establishment outlets and journalists. The characteristics of the traditional news—greater resources and organization, but with institutional constraints and bureaucracy that can make it slow-moving— are often at odds with those of online news media, which prizes moving quickly and often eschews traditional institutional hierarchies, but lacks many of the benefits of media institutions like editorial, research, legal, and distribution support. In the very early days of their reporting on the Snowden disclosures, the 190-year-old *Guardian* newspaper and its editors had a tenuous relationship with the lawyer-turned-blogger-turned-columnist and the freelance journalist/filmmaker. Even if they shared a similar vision for how the Snowden documents would be reported, each side had a different vision of how that reporting would be implemented. The *Guardian*, on one side, had an established set of procedures for how to
undertake this type of reporting, and a hierarchy of staff and legal counsel who had to be consulted before publication could move forward. The paper’s editors and legal counsel also felt the need to play by the established rules when it came to publishing classified documents: You meet with government officials and hear their concerns before publishing, so that you can protect the publication against criminal charges down the road. Although the paper was moving quickly for an organization of its size—as even Greenwald later admitted—it’s layers of institutional bureaucracy were frustrating for Greenwald, who had never before had to report to an editor and strongly believed that news organizations should not consult with governments about their work. On the other side, Greenwald wanted to publish the Snowden reporting immediately, as he had always been able to do on his own personal blog, on the news website Salon, and in the past with the Guardian. To him, establishment media’s institutional structures were just hindrances to adversarial investigative reporting.

But each side needed the other in this situation—the Guardian needed Greenwald so it could have access to the Snowden documents, and Greenwald needed the Guardian for its institutional resources. But each side also did not fully appreciate the other’s situation. While both the Guardian and Greenwald wanted to do the same thing—report aggressively on the Snowden disclosures—each had different expectations about how it would reach that goal, and each was unsure about how the other would behave.

While this anecdote illustrates the misjudgments, uncertainty, and differing priorities that emerge when members of the old and new media are forced to interact, it also illustrates the successes that can happen when they do. Snowden specifically sought out Greenwald and Poitras because they had a history of reporting on the US government in an adversarial way and were
not affiliated with other mainstream outlets that he mistrusted, like the *New York Times*. The *Guardian* would not have had access to the Snowden documents if not for its relationship with Greenwald. But if he reported alone, Greenwald would not have had the help he needed to turn the thousands of Snowden documents into meaningful stories; he needed the *Guardian’s* reporters, data expertise, and distribution to report on this information in the most impactful way. When the two sides came together, it resulted in the publication of one history’s biggest scoops.

While the story of the *Guardian*-Greenwald-Poitras collaboration ended in a positive way, in the beginning of their collaboration both sides were struggling to maintain their professional autonomy. In decades past, Greenwald would have been relatively powerless in this situation; he would have needed the *Guardian*, or some other large newspaper, to publish his articles if he ever wanted the public to read them. But today’s technology allows someone like Greenwald—who even admits in his account of reporting on the Snowden documents that he is not at all tech-savvy—to use the internet to circumvent big establishment news outlets. Greenwald was prepared to cut out the *Guardian* and publish his articles to a new website, NSAdisclosures.com, on his own. It would have been difficult, and would have involved more unknowns, but it was a real and viable option for him. If he had chosen this route, it would have

1 According to Greenwald, “Snowden had been clear from our first conversation about his rationale for distrusting the establishment media with his story, repeatedly referring to the *New York Times*’ concealment of NSA eavesdropping [in 2004]. He had come to believe that the paper’s concealment of that information may very well have changed the outcome of the 2004 [presidential] election” (2014, p. 56). Snowden was referring to a story the *New York Times* intended to publish in 2004, but held off publishing until 2005 at the request of the Bush Administration. The story described the administration’s warrantless wiretapping program.
left all major outlets in the world playing catch-up to an hours-old website run by someone with no familiarity with the traditional editorial process. It would have been a massive blow to establishment journalism, which is partly why the option appealed to Greenwald.

A similar confrontation between establishment journalism and digital newcomers to the journalistic field took place three years earlier. In 2010, the whistleblowing website WikiLeaks partnered with the *New York Times* and the *Guardian* in reporting on US military and State Department documents leaked by whistleblower Chelsea Manning. WikiLeaks is an online organization that grew out of a hacker culture, and which believes in radical transparency for the powerful. The organization and its founder and leader, Julian Assange, see most institutions—including both authoritarian and democratic governments, as well as large news outlets—as untrustworthy. WikiLeaks’ ideological roots make it quite different from most traditional newspapers and the editors and staff they employ. Indeed, several clashes between WikiLeaks staff and reporters and editors at the *New York Times* and *Guardian* occurred throughout the collaboration. For instance, the *New York Times* refused to link to WikiLeaks’ website in its coverage of the Manning documents because it was concerned—“rightly, as it turned out,” according to former *New York Times* editor in chief Bill Keller—that WikiLeaks had not taken proper care in redacting its documents to remove names of civilian informants (Keller, 2011, para. 26).

Perhaps not surprisingly, Greenwald has been an ardent defender of Assange and WikiLeaks against what he has called “the war on WikiLeaks” (Greenwald, 2010a). He has written multiple columns and appeared on numerous news programs defending WikiLeaks both from the US government and from other journalists who “are leading the way in calling for the head of anyone who exposes the secrets of the powerful” (Greenwald, 2010c, para. 5), and he
defended Assange when he received criticism for hosting a television news program on Russia’s
government-sponsored new channel Russia Today (Greenwald, 2012). Greenwald has described
Assange as “an advocate for transparency and adversarial journalism,” and he therefore sees
Assange and himself as coming from a similar mold (Greenwald, 2012). Greenwald has
argued—as have some other journalists—that mainstream journalists see himself, WikiLeaks,
and other journalists who have come to prominence online as threats to their continued
dominance, and so try to discredit or marginalize them (e.g., Sirota, 2013).

As with most professions, journalists have always been forced to confront external
dimensions to their professional authority. These challenges take many forms; for example,
journalistic professional authority is tested when government officials try to persuade or
otherwise prevent journalists from publishing certain information, or when advertisers threaten to
pull funding in response to a particular story. These examples, along with many others, constitute
attempts by outside actors to pressure journalists to act against their own professional instincts.
However, journalists increasingly face internal challenges to their professional autonomy, which
come from people who claim to be members of the journalism profession—people like
Greenwald or Assange, or institutions like WikiLeaks. The internet allows anyone with a
computer or mobile device to post content online, making it easy for individuals with little or no
journalistic training and no formal news outlet affiliation to engage in reporting. But whether this
content creation constitutes “journalism,” however, is often contested by those traditional
journalists affiliated with mainstream media outlets (Carlson, 2012; Farhi, 2013; Gregory, 2013;
Ruggiero, 2004; Singer, 2007). Mainstream journalists now feel challenged by online actors who
consider themselves journalists, or at least consider the work they do to be journalistic in nature.
While nontraditional journalists have existed in the past—e.g., community newspapers written
by neighborhood volunteers, or community radio stations—few have been able to pose serious challenges to the professional distinction of mainstream journalists. The internet has changed that: Some of the biggest stories of the past few years—the releases of war logs detailing the on-the-ground toll of the war in Afghanistan, of U.S. diplomatic cables from the past four decades, and of secret documents detailing U.S. and U.K. surveillance practices—have not been the result of intrepid mainstream investigative journalists working at large, traditional news outlets. Rather, individuals and outlets that do not fit the mold of mainstream journalism—specifically, WikiLeaks and Glenn Greenwald—have been successful at breaking these big news stories, thus infringing on the functions traditionally assigned to the established news media.

Given the recent challenges posed to journalism by the internet, and guided by research on social identity theory and boundary work, this dissertation examines the relationship between evolving journalistic professional identity in the digital age and mainstream journalists’ framing of WikiLeaks and Glenn Greenwald. It uses two events—WikiLeaks’ publication of the Manning documents, and Greenwald’s reporting on the Snowden documents—as case studies to examine the changing nature of journalistic professional identity. These two cases were chosen for their similarities: both involve high-profile nontraditional journalists who have often been critical of traditional reporting practices, who believe in advocacy journalism, and who broke major news stories involving secret or classified documents from the US government (in the case of the Manning documents) or the US and UK governments (in the case of the Snowden documents). Further, in both cases the nontraditional journalistic actors worked with journalists at American newspapers and British newspapers; WikiLeaks partnered with the New York Times and the Guardian, and Greenwald worked with the Guardian (his then-employer) and the Washington Post (and later the New York Times). Because both WikiLeaks and Greenwald
worked with American and British newspapers, this dissertation is also internationally
comparative between the US and UK. It examines and compares how journalists working in the
two countries reacted to WikiLeaks and Greenwald, how they defined WikiLeaks’ and
Greenwald’s work, and how they defined “real” journalistic work generally.

This dissertation uses a quantitative content analysis of news coverage of the two actors
in mainstream newspapers in the US and UK, and provides insight into how journalists in the
two countries covered WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald. It also uses qualitative textual
analyses of the metajournalistic discourse, or the public discussions journalists have about their
own profession, surrounding these actors to better understand how journalists position
WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald within the larger journalistic ecosystem. Overall, this study
illustrates how journalists working at a variety of news organizations draw boundaries around
their profession and attempt to differentiate themselves from new forms of journalism enabled by
the internet, and whether journalists perceive these challenges as disruptions or opportunities.

**Outline of the dissertation**

This dissertation proceeds in the following chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the scholarly
literature related to this study. It discusses the values and routines common in professional
journalism, their role in defining the profession, and the academic and practical reasons why
definitions of journalism matter are explored. I then turn to past research on social identity theory
and boundary work, and discuss metajournalism as a site of identity negotiation and boundary-
defining.

Chapter 3 outlines the two cases on which this dissertation focuses. It begins by outlining
and comparing the American and British newspaper industries, which are the two sites under
analysis here. The nations’ media systems are often thought to be quite similar (for instance, they
fall into the same category in Hallin & Mancini’s (2004) seminal comparison of Western media systems, but their newspapers industries differ in important ways. The chapter then describes the two cases studies under comparison in this dissertation: WikiLeaks and Julian Assange in the context of the Chelsea Manning disclosures of 2010 and 2011, and Glenn Greenwald in the context of the Edward Snowden disclosures of 2013. The chapter describes Assange’s role in creating the whistleblowing website, WikiLeaks’ roots in cypherpunk culture, its dedication to radical transparency, and the notoriety it achieved after it began publishing documents from the Manning disclosures. It also describes how the organization developed into something more closely resembling a news organization over the course of its work. The chapter then turns to Greenwald, and his beginnings as an attorney, his transition to blogging about civil liberties issues, and his transition to the Guardian and subsequent contact with whistleblower Edward Snowden. I end the chapter by outlining the research questions that will be the focus of the remainder of the dissertation.

Chapter 4 outlines the methods used in this study. This dissertation is mixed-methods, and includes a quantitative content analysis and two qualitative textual analyses. I first outline the content analysis methodology. The content analysis examines how mainstream newspapers in the US (New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal) and UK (Guardian and the Times) covered WikiLeaks and Greenwald. Chapter 4 also describes the two qualitative textual analyses used in the dissertation. These analyses examine metajournalistic coverage of WikiLeaks and Greenwald in both the US and UK contexts. The goal of these analyses is to better understand how American and British journalists defined their profession and where they placed WikiLeaks and Greenwald in relation to these definitional boundaries.
Chapter 5 explores the results of the content analysis by newspaper, comparing the US and UK newspapers as well as comparing the newspapers that did and did not work directly with the Manning or Snowden documents. Newspaper coverage of the two cases under analysis (WikiLeaks and Greenwald) is also examined.

Chapters 6 and 7 outline the results of the qualitative discourse analyses of metajournalism, or the public discussion that journalists have about the practice of journalism, surrounding WikiLeaks and Greenwald. Chapter 6 outlines the boundaries of professional journalism that American and British journalists identified as they discussed WikiLeaks, the ways in which WikiLeaks both fit within and violated these boundaries, and what this means for changing journalistic professionalism in the digital age. Chapter 7 performs the same type of analysis, but in the context of American and British journalists’ treatment of Greenwald.

Finally, Chapter 8 discusses and synthesizes the main findings of the content analysis and textual analyses, and relates the findings back to the broader theoretical concerns outlined in Chapter 2. It also discusses the limitations of the dissertation, and suggests future areas of research.
Chapter 2: Literature review

Both Assange and Greenwald have vocally criticized mainstream journalism in the US and UK, but each also claims to be a journalist. This chapter outlines scholarly literature that can help clarify the discrepancies between WikiLeaks, Greenwald, and mainstream journalists, and aid in figuring out where WikiLeaks and Greenwald fit into the larger journalistic ecosystem.

This literature review is divided into two parts. Part I discusses definitional aspects of journalism, both from an academic’s perspective and a journalist’s perspective, and makes an argument for why the definition of journalism matters. Part II explores journalistic professional identity, social identity theory, and boundary work, and describes how both concepts can inform our understanding of journalists’ reactions to newcomers to their field generally and to WikiLeaks and Glenn Greenwald specifically.

Part I: Defining journalism

Sociologists have studied the professions for decades, and created various lists of attributes that an occupational group must have to qualify as “professional”—including esoteric knowledge, a public service orientation, a licensing body, and autonomy (Larson, 1977; MacDonald, 1995). Scholars have attempted to place journalism within these sociological frameworks, and they usually find that journalism fits quite imperfectly (Singer, 2003). While it is easy to argue that journalists perform a public service by informing citizens, and possible to argue that journalists and news outlets have varying degrees of professional autonomy, it is difficult to argue that journalists meet other professional criteria. For instance, despite the proliferation of journalism schools in the United States and, more recently, in the United Kingdom, it is difficult to argue that journalists possess esoteric knowledge. While journalism schools teach students how to craft leads and interview sources, this training is not a requirement
for entry into the field, and working journalists have degrees in a wide variety of fields. Similarly, journalists lack a licensing or governing body, and the formal set of professional ethical obligations and codes of conduct that usually accompany membership in such organizations. Although organizations like the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) in the US and the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) in the UK have professional codes of conduct, individual journalists’ adherence to these codes and membership in these organizations is voluntary. Further, if a journalist breaks one of these codes, he or she has no professional license to revoke; while ramifications would likely include public censure and firing, the SPJ or NUJ cannot *prevent* someone from practicing journalism.

Other scholars within the field of journalism studies have argued that journalism is more of an ideology than a profession. Seeing journalism through this lens “primarily means understanding journalism in terms of how journalists give meaning to their newswork” (Deuze, 2005, p. 444). Ideologies can persist over time, and be reapplied as communication technologies change; in this way, journalists continually assess new entrants into their ecosystem, and use these assessments to reaffirm their professional ideologies. The practice might shift over time, but the underlying ideologies—e.g., having a public service orientation (Clayman, 2002), or being objective or fair (Schudson, 2001)—stay relatively consistent. “On a cultural level, the widely shared occupational ideology of journalism serves to reproduce the dominant self-understanding of journalism among its practitioners” (Deuze, 2008, p. 20).

However, for journalists, whether journalism fits academic definitions of a profession or of an ideology is probably immaterial\(^2\); but this does not mean that professional definitions do

\(^2\) In fact, no profession fits any sociological definition completely and perfectly—even medicine, long considered a clear and perfect example of a profession (MacDonald, 1995). While doctors
not matter to journalists. Most journalists consider themselves professionals, and subscribe to a similar set of journalistic values and “best practices” (Shoemaker & Reese, 2013; Singer, 2003). Among journalists in most nations with a free press, the utmost of these values is a commitment to reporting the truth (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014; Singer, 2007). In the SPJ Code of Ethics, for example, the first principle listed is that journalists must “seek truth and report it” (Society of Professional Journalists, 2014). This includes, among other things, being “accurate” and “fair,” verifying information, and taking “responsibility for the accuracy of their work” (Society of Professional Journalists, 2014). Although the NUJ’s code of conduct does not contain the word “truth,” it does say that a journalist should “ensure that information disseminated is honestly conveyed, accurate, and fair,” (NUJ, 2011).

Other values enumerated by the SPJ and NUJ, and widely accepted by most American and British journalists and mainstream news outlets, include being transparent about reporting methods, being dedicating to informing the public, immediately acknowledging and correcting errors, differentiating between reporting and commentary, acting independently of personal or institutional profit motives, being impartial, and minimizing any harm that might befall sources, subjects, or colleagues as a result of reporting (BBC, 2015; Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014; NPR, 2012; NUJ, 2011; Reuters, 2009; Society of Professional Journalists, 2014). Most journalists cite the values described within these codes as highly important to the responsible practice of journalism. In a 1999 Pew survey of American news people, a full 100% of national news have a licensing body, distinct esoteric knowledge, a Hippocratic oath that prescribes general professional ethics, and clear public service orientation, doctors face threats to their autonomy from insurance companies, hospital administrations, and government guidelines or regulations (Singer, 2003).
executives and reporters and 99% of local news executives and reporters cited “getting facts right” as a core principle of journalism. Other principles cited included “getting both sides” (98% and 97%, respectively), “not publishing rumors” (87% and 84%), “keeping some distance from the people you cover” (84% and 76%) keeping business departments and newsrooms separate (84% and 72), “always remaining neutral” (76% for both), and making the audience the first obligation (80% and 81%) (Pew, 1999). Within this same survey, nearly three-quarters of news executives and journalists said “it is possible to obtain a true, accurate, and widely agreed upon account of an event,” and two-thirds said it is “possible to develop a systematic method to cover events in a disinterested and fair way” (Pew, 1999). In the ongoing “American Journalist” study, Weaver and colleagues examined the functions and values that journalists identified as important. Their 2007 edition of the study reported that majorities of US journalists identified several functions related to interpretation and dissemination as important to their profession (Weaver, Beam, Brownlee, Voakes, & Wilhoit, 2007). Majorities of journalists said investigating official claims (82%), analyzing complex problems (76%), discussing international or domestic policy (76% and 55%, respectively), getting information to the public quickly (71%), and not reporting unverified facts (66%) were “extremely important” functions of their profession.

Journalism has a strong set of ethical and ideological principles binding together its practitioners, and a strong sense of what the function of journalism should be in a democratic society. These principles can also be thought of as norms, or “cultural phenomena that prescribe and proscribe behavior in specific circumstances,” which have “long been considered to be at least partly responsible for regulating social behavior” (Hechter & Opp, 2001, p. xi). Norms are values or beliefs held commonly by a group of people, and “entail a moral imperative—that is, a
sense of ought-ness” (p. xiii). As I will discuss later, adherence to and respect for these norms are also used as boundaries to define who is (and who is not) a journalist.

While these principles (or norms) are widely held, journalists may interpret and operationalize them differently. For example, while the 2007 American Journalist survey mentioned above found that 82% of journalists thought investigating government claims was an extremely important function of journalism, only 18% said it was extremely important for journalists to be adversarial toward the government (Weaver et al., 2007). Someone like Glenn Greenwald might argue that a journalist who is *truly* holding the government accountable is inherently being adversarial, but this interpretation is clearly open to debate (e.g., see Keller & Greenwald, 2013 for an example of the debate on the role of adversarial posture in journalism).

Further, important concepts like “truth,” for example, are particularly open to interpretation. For some, truth might be synonymous with accuracy, and getting names, numbers, dates, quotations, and locations correct. For others, “journalism built merely on accuracy fails to serve contemporary civil society” (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014, p. 56):

A report that the mayor praised the police at the Garden Club luncheon seems inadequate—even foolish—if the police are in fact entangled in a corruption scandal; the mayor’s comments are clearly political rhetoric, and they come in response to some recent attack by his critics. (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2014, p. 57)

In this example, the larger context of the mayor’s remarks is crucial. It would be accurate to report what the mayor said, and when and where he said it, but without larger context that reporting would be misleading or even untruthful.

But most journalists do not need to wrestle with philosophical debates, like the meaning of “truth,” on a daily basis. As with other professions, journalism relies on routines, or “habitual,
ongoing procedures that are accepted as appropriate professional practice” and that help journalists argue that their work adheres to professional standards like accuracy, objectivity, and balance (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996, p. 15). For example, the principle that reporting should be balanced has, operationally, created the journalistic routine of including two opposing opinions in every story; if a Democrat is quoted in a story, a Republican also needs to be quoted to provide balance. Similarly, if an article about the environment quotes a climate scientist warning about the detrimental effects of global warming, that article also needs a quote from a climate change skeptic in order to achieve balance.

Belief in these professional principles and practices is inculcated in journalists through on-the-job training and formal journalism education. That these principles are passed down as part of the molding of new journalists highlights the principles’ perceived importance to the continued existence of the profession. The principles outline how professional journalists should behave in order to do their work well, and their accompanying practices can be used to publicly defend any reporting that may come under fire (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). But these professional principles and practices—and indeed the very concept of a “profession”—serve another function as well: delineating who is a journalist and who is not. Journalists, like members of any other profession, partly consider themselves professionals so they can elevate their occupational status and control who can reach this status (Larson, 1977). Only someone who believes in and acts according to professional norms, likely through the adherence to established routines, may call herself a journalist; anyone else may not. As a result, professional principles and practices also serve to control the behavior of members (Abbott, 1983) and to keep non-members from benefitting from the profession’s elevated status.

In summary, journalists subscribe to an important, and often quite uniform, set of
professional values. These values give rise to particular practices and routines, which, again, are often quite uniform, and are reproduced at the organizational level. But what about people who have not been taught through education and training to hold these same values and practice these same routines? New communication technologies now enable anyone to publish information online, meaning anyone can now perform acts of journalism. “The creative exploitation of technological affordances by a new generation of reporters and editors unfettered by lifelong experience or socialization processes” means that traditional journalists are now competing with people who call themselves journalists but who do no share their values (Deuze, 2008, p. 20). Julian Assange calls himself a journalist, but has never worked in a newsroom, is vocal about his points of view, distrustful of institutions, and believes his work should advance his political agenda. Glenn Greenwald believes he is just as much a journalist as someone who works at the Washington Post (Greenwald, 2014), but he too has never worked in a newsroom, is highly critical of traditional news routines (such as consulting with governments prior to publication or relying on official sources), and believes that all journalism should be advocacy. Are Assange, Greenwald, and others like them “real journalists”? The journalistic ecosystem is changing to include more types of actors and more types of content, and news organizations no longer have sole access to means of mass communication. Has this increasing diversity of actors and content, made possible by new technologies, redefined the criteria necessary for an actor or content to be considered journalistic?

Some might argue that, in today’s fast-changing media environment, it does not matter whether someone is considered a “real journalist.” Those definitions come from an old-media environment, they might argue, and old-media definitions are outdated and increasingly irrelevant. But I argue it still matters practically whether someone is considered a “real
People gain concrete benefits from being considered journalists. The next section explores why it matters how we—academics, journalists, and society generally—define journalism.

**Why it matters how we define journalism**

Defining who is and is not a journalist is not merely an academic exercise. Fitting the definition of “journalist” affords a person very real privileges—perhaps respect or trust, but also more tangible things like the ability to qualify for press credentials and important legal protections that other groups do not enjoy. In the United States, these legal protections take many shapes. For example, many states recognize various kinds of reporters privileges, and 31 states including the District of Columbia have shield laws designed to protect journalists from being compelled to disclose confidential or unpublished information or to name their sources (Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, n.d.). These state laws offer journalists more protection than federal laws; however, in order to receive these protections, an individual must meet the law’s definition of “journalist.” These definitions, like the privileges reporters enjoy, will vary from statute to statute, with some statutes defining a journalist in very narrow terms. For example, some state statutes limit their protections to people who work for particular media (such as newspapers, magazines, or broadcasting), people who derive the majority of their income from journalism-related activities, or people who spend a certain number of hours per week on reporting (Peters & Tandoc, 2013). While journalists generally might not be concerned with whether their job fits the academic definition of a profession, American journalists have good reason to be concerned about whether they fit the legal definition of “professional journalist.”
Unlike the US, the UK has no written constitution. Freedom of expression and of the press are, therefore, not enshrined in federal law as they are in the US’s First Amendment. However, Britain has a strong tradition of a free expression, and publishers have a legal right to not disclose sources of information used in publications, which benefits British journalists.\(^3\) Even US federal courts, despite the US’s constitutionally protected press freedom, do not recognize such a privilege (although some states grant these protections to journalists).\(^4\)

So, from a legal perspective, defining who is and is not a journalist is important; for someone potentially facing a subpoena, fitting the definition of journalist can be critical. In addition to legal protections, having one’s work considered “real journalism” has social benefits. Membership in a profession confers someone a higher level of prestige than membership in a trade, craft, or commercial occupational group (Freidson, 1989). Being considered a “real journalist” gives someone a sense of legitimacy, not just within one’s professional peer group but also among audiences. Compared to other forms of communication like public relations or celebrity gossip reporting, “real journalism” is taken seriously, the facts reported in it are

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\(^3\) Per the UK’s Contempt of Court Act 1981, a publisher can only be compelled to reveal a confidential source if a court agrees that disclosure is “in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.”

\(^4\) In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled in US v. Sterling that journalist James Risen could be compelled to testify at a treason trial, even if that meant revealing the names of sources to whom he had promised anonymity (Columbia University Global Freedom of Expression, 2015),
assumed to be truthful, and the topics it covers are considered more important or newsworthy. Conversely, placing someone outside the boundaries of “real journalism” serves to delegitimize that person’s work, and to deny that person the prestige that real professionals are afforded. Saying someone is not a journalist signals to other journalists and to the public that the information that person is conveying has not been held to the same standards as journalism and is therefore less valuable. Journalists—and indeed members of any profession—therefore have a vested interest in their definition of the profession being the “correct” one. They will want to define their profession so that their own work fits wholly within the definition.

In sum, defining who is and is not a journalist matters from a legal perspective and from a social perspective. Because journalists get privileges not afforded to others, they have an incentive to define their profession in ways that will include their own work. In the US and Britain, journalists and their professional organizations have identified a remarkably uniform set of ethics and practices that they feel define their profession. But, as mentioned earlier, journalism has no licensing body, and so adherence to these standards is optional (albeit strongly encouraged). Further, the definitions of journalism, like the industry itself, are constantly being challenged by emerging communication technologies and the evolving information needs of citizens. The internet is an inexpensive means of publishing, and offers no space constraints, which has allowed for a proliferation of outlets that can experiment with different approaches to gathering and relaying information. In light of the voluntary nature of professional standards and

5 In the US and UK, some may debate whether journalists are actually afforded more respect or trust due to their professional status; while the American and British publics report high levels of trust in other professions, like doctors, nurses, and teachers, they hold journalists in low esteem (e.g., see Gallup, 2015; Opinium, 2015; Pew Research Center, 2013).
the rapid changes happening within the journalism industry, what do professional journalists make of actors who fill some, but not all, of the traditional traits of journalism? In the next section, I explore how theories from social psychology and journalism studies might help explain how journalists react to new entrants to their field.

Part II: Professional boundaries and identity maintenance

When most people think of meaningful social groups within a society, they likely think of groups characterized by shared racial, ethnic, or religious identity, or groups of people who live within a particular city or geographic region. But these are not the only groups from which people can draw meaning; a professional group can also provide members with a strong sense of purpose and self-definition (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Dutton, Roberts, & Bednar, 2010). Most people devote significant portions of their waking hours to work, and so work-related identities are often salient in people’s self-construction. Several theories from social and organizational psychology describe how members of groups, including professional groups, behave in relation to perceived outsiders, but two of these theories are particularly relevant to the discussion of how professions give meaning to their work: social identity theory and boundary work.

Professional identity and boundary work

Social identity theory (SIT) is a useful entry point into the discussion of professional identity, as it describes the broad psychological factors at work when competing groups encounter one another. SIT is a social psychological theory of intergroup behavior. The theory, originally developed by psychologists Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1975), posits that an individual’s self-concept comprises both a personal and a social identity. A personal identity consists of an individual’s sense of self-definition, and might included traits like physical attributes (hair color, body type, height, etc.), psychological traits
(sense of humor, tendency to introversion or extroversion, etc.), or personal interests (politics, sports, etc.) (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). An individual’s social identity is derived from his or her social group memberships, where a group is defined as something that “exists psychologically if three or more people construe and evaluate themselves in terms of shared attributes that distinguish them collectively from other people” (Hogg, 2006, p. 111). Group memberships that contribute to one’s social identity are numerous, and might include one’s race, gender, political party affiliation, profession, preferred sports team, alma mater, and so on. Which group membership is most important at any given moment depends on how strongly someone identifies with a group and on situational factors, meaning whether a particular group membership is made salient by events occurring at that moment.

In addition to helping individuals achieve self-definition and belonging, group membership also prescribes acceptable attitudes and behaviors; when a particular social identity is salient, that identity will cue individuals into how they should behave (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). When a particular social identity is made salient, SIT predicts a person will seek to maintain, protect, or enhance his or her social identity. Group identity, therefore, “provides a partial answer to the question: Who am I?” at many different moments in a person’s life (Ashforth & Mael, 1989, p. 21).

If all people belonged to the same groups, these groups would cease to be meaningful. Therefore, group categorization and inter-group comparison are also central to SIT; group attributes define who may be categorized as an in-group member, and groups only exist in the presence of relevant out-groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). SIT assumes individuals strive to maintain a positive social identity, and thus positive self-esteem, via these comparisons with relevant out-groups (Brewer, 1991; Brown, 2000; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Tajfel & Turner,
Positive comparisons with relevant out-groups produce high self-esteem, and negative comparisons with relevant out-groups produce low self-esteem. The need for positive self-esteem creates “pressures to evaluate one’s own group positively through in-group/out-group comparisons [that] lead social groups to attempt to differentiate themselves from each other” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 41)—also referred to as the achievement of “positive distinctiveness.”

When a group’s positive distinctiveness is threatened—either by negative intergroup comparisons or by an out-group encroaching on the in-group’s distinctive attributes—individuals will take action to restore that positive distinctiveness and, ultimately, positive self-esteem. If group members’ positive distinctiveness is threatened by perceived outsiders, SIT predicts individuals will take one of three actions: (1) engage in individual mobility, and attempt to either distance himself or herself from that group or leave the present social group altogether for a higher-status group, (2) employ social creativity, and try to redefine the comparative attributes of his or her group, or (3) engage in social competition, or direct competition with the out-group, typically via in-group favoritism and/or out-group hostility (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Which action the individual chooses is influenced by a variety of situational factors, including the relative status differences of the in-group versus the out-group, the perceived legitimacy and stability of those status differences, and the permeability of group boundaries. In the case of professional journalists who feel threatened by an outsider, options 2 and 3—social creativity and competition—are the most viable options (unless a journalist wishes to leave their professional group altogether, in which case individual mobility is also an option). Social creativity and social competition are collective strategies; whereas individual mobility is intended to improve the status of the individual, the “objective of collective strategies is to enhance the status of the in-group as a whole, thereby enhancing the social identities of
individual group members” (Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996, p. 241). Journalists who wish to engage in social creativity may attempt to redefine or clarify the attributes that make their profession distinct or important. They may also try to place more importance on those traits in which traditional journalism excels, while placing less importance on those areas where journalism is lacking. Journalists wishing to engage in social competition can attempt to compete directly with the perceived out-group. This might take the form of denigrating the work of these perceived outsiders who, presumably, are not qualified to produce real journalism. Social competition and social creativity strategies might also occur in tandem.

In sum, social identity theory says people try to maintain positive distinctiveness via their relationships to their in-groups. One such important in-group is one’s professional group, which can confer prestige and unique privileges upon members. If it were easy to claim membership in a profession, that membership would lose its distinct prestige; professions, therefore, try to create and maintain distinct boundaries around their work and around the duties they are expected to perform in society. These actions can take the form of “boundary-work” (Gieryn, 1983), or “the rhetorical strategy of one group wishing to distinguish itself from another” (Winch, 1997, p. 3). Boundary-work rhetoric is a manifestation of individuals’ desire to maintain their professional group’s distinctiveness. Boundaries “serve to exclude providers of ‘similar’ services who falsely claim (according to insiders) to be within the profession” and to “deny expertise” (Gieryn, Bevins, & Zehr, 1985, p. 393). Boundary-work rhetoric is a reaction to the violation of professional boundaries by an outside occupational group. This rhetoric may serve three purposes: (1) to expand the profession’s authority in neighboring areas, (2) to monopolize authority by labeling rivals as “‘pseudo,’ ‘deviant,’ or ‘amateur,’” or (3) to protect existing
autonomy by blaming outsiders for any negative attention the profession has received (Gieryn, 1983, p. 792)

For journalism, these expertise-deficient outsiders are other people who attempt to be mass communicators (Frank, 2003), such as tabloid reporters (Berkowitz, 2000; Bishop, 1999), “media professionals” (Dahlgren, 1992), bloggers (Singer, 2007), or people employed by online media outlets (Carlson, 2012; Ruggiero, 2004). With so many groups being journalism-adjacent, journalists must “constantly defend their jurisdiction against incursion by innovations and substitutes created by outsiders” (Freidson, 1989, p. 425). New technologies have increased the number of groups competing to be information providers. Regular internet users can now perform many of the functions traditionally thought of as the province of journalists, such as providing information or commentary or acting as a gatekeeper.

Recent research in journalism studies has looked at journalists’ reactions to new entrants into their profession through the lens of boundary work. For example, Frank (2003) studied 14 news stories in which journalists criticized “pack journalism,” or what occurs when journalists “descend en masse to cover a big story” without apparent regard for the privacy or well-being of the people involved (p. 444). Frank argued that journalists who are part of the pack-journalism system, yet publicly denounce pack journalism, are doing so out of a “kind of distanced reflexivity [that] is best understood as a strategic ritual aimed at maintaining the culture of journalism in the face of public disaffection with intrusive reporting and excessive coverage” (Frank, 2003, p. 441). By publicly denouncing particular journalists guilty of “pack journalism,” these journalists are attempting to draw a line between good and bad journalists, and demonstrating to the public that the larger profession is aware of, disowns, and condemns these irresponsible actors.
Similarly, Bishop (1999) examined how mainstream journalists responded to Princess Diana’s 1997 death by drawing boundaries between mainstream news and paparazzi reporting. In his textual analysis of more than fifty television, newspaper, and magazine news reports published the week following her death, Bishop found that mainstream journalists used boundary-work rhetoric to try to convince the public that paparazzi, like the photographers allegedly responsible for Diana’s death, did not operate by the same ethical standards as mainstream journalists. This drew a line between paparazzi and mainstream journalists, and this line served to both remind the public of the good attributes of real journalism and to denigrate a group that potentially threatened journalism’s reputation.

More recently, Carlson and Berkowitz (2014) used a qualitative analysis of 127 British news articles and 57 American news articles to compare how UK and US journalists used boundary work rhetoric to define the UK tabloid newspaper News of the World’s (NOTW) reporting practices—namely, illegal phone hacking—as deviant. In the US, newspaper journalists used this story as evidence of their ethical superiority to the sensational tabloid-newspaper culture of the UK. Berkowitz and Liu (2016) performed a qualitative textual analysis of 42 articles to examine how social media threatened the boundaries and cultural authority of professional journalism in the aftermath of the Sandy Hook elementary school shootings in Newtown, Connecticut. In crises like these, the news media often relies on social media reports to piece together events; the authors concluded that the news media’s increasing reliance on social media more frequently (and prominent) errors in reporting have threatened the definitions of appropriate professional behavior.

Other research has touched in various ways on WikiLeaks’ place within the boundaries of journalism. In her doctoral dissertation, Roberts (2013) examined how US journalists framed the
actions of WikiLeaks. By analyzing editorials, blog entries, and opinion columns, Roberts concluded that most American journalists framed WikiLeaks as non-journalistic. Journalists appeared to feel that WikiLeaks violated established boundaries of journalism by demonstrating little concern for US national security, not having an editorial structure, and lacking a physical location. As a result, Roberts argued, journalists attempted to paint WikiLeaks as deviant and non-journalistic, so as to repair the paradigms of journalism. Coddington (2012) used a qualitative analysis to compare general news coverage of the Manning disclosures in the New York Times and the Guardian, the two papers that worked directly with WikiLeaks in releasing the Manning disclosures. He found that the New York Times’ coverage placed WikiLeaks outside the professional norms of journalism in terms of institutionality, objectivity, and source-based reporting, while the Guardian’s coverage only did so in terms of institutionality. Coddington concluded that institutionality, meaning the extent to which a news organization is stable and accountable with established ethical norms, is a norm shared by American and British journalists. Conversely, he concluded that objectivity and source-based reporting methods are not important journalistic paradigms for British journalists.

Still other research has examined what WikiLeaks means for definitions of journalism in a digital age, albeit not explicitly through the lens of boundary work. In a commentary piece on the new “networked Fourth Estate,” Benkler (2011) argued that WikiLeaks is an example of an organization using a new networked model of journalism to “circumvent the social and organizational frameworks of traditional media, which played a large role in framing the balance between freedom and responsibility of the press” (p. 311). Benkler noted how the tone of the New York Times’ coverage of WikiLeaks shifted from March 2010 (before the release of “Collateral Murder,” or any other information from the Manning disclosures) to December of
2010, after WikiLeaks has achieved international recognition (or notoriety) for its work. In March, Benkler said the New York Times portrayed WikiLeaks as “The Little Engine that Could of new media muckraking journalism,” optimistically describing the organization’s potential (p. 326). But by December, “Wikileaks would come to be described by Tom Friedman on the Times’ op-ed page as one of two threatening alternatives to a strong, democratic America, alongside an authoritarian China” (p. 326). Ultimately, Benkler argued that mass media attacks on WikiLeaks were fueled by journalists’ anxiety about the changes that networked journalism poses to their profession. WikiLeaks was treated as emblematic of these larger industry changes, and attacked and ostracized in order to minimize the perceived threat.

Chadwick (2013) similarly examined WikiLeaks through the lens of what he terms our current “hybrid media system.” Chadwick described our current media system as anchored in both old and new forms of media, which “highlights complexity, interdependence, and transition” (p. 8). He described WikiLeaks as a hybrid media actor: New technologies are obviously central to what it does, but traditional forms of communication like face-to-face interaction are also important to its operations. Chadwick observed that the US media was much more occupied with determining whether WikiLeaks was “real journalism” than the European media was, which he partially attributed to the US’s strong professional norms of objectivity and its “related ambivalence toward advocacy journalism” (p. 112):

“In some respects, then, WikiLeaks’ hybrid model of journalist, publisher, and mobilization movement is much more disruptive of the media system of the United States than it is of those in Europe, though there are of course many important differences across the European context. This goes some way toward explaining the distancing tactic of [former New York Times editor in chief Bill] Keller and his allies.” (p. 112)
Overall, Chadwick argued that, while WikiLeaks did have organizational weaknesses and its journalistic partners provided crucial infrastructure and support throughout the Manning disclosures, journalists’ dismissals of WikiLeaks were still “self-justificatory” reactions to a new approach to reporting that “threatens traditional investigative reporting because in some ways it offers a more effective model” (p. 109).

As the Snowden disclosures occurred in 2013, research on journalistic reactions to those leaks and to Glenn Greenwald is still emerging. But one such study (Salter, 2015) examined how the BBC’s flagship nightly news program, “Newsnight,” framed Greenwald during one interview segment filmed shortly after the Snowden revelations began. Salter observed that the host focused largely on the concerns expressed by government officials, and failed to ask Greenwald about the larger connections between the surveillance practices revealed by Snowden and past instances of improper state surveillance. The topic of state security dominated the interview. Salter also observed that these state security talking points were subsequently repeated throughout British newspapers. He did not see this as evidence of a wide-ranging conspiracy, but rather as indicative of the fact that establishment journalists and members of the government see people who challenge the status quo in a similar light. “The [NSA/GCHQ] scandal must be reported because of its gravity but it is clear that its reporting takes the view of the state above all else,” Salter concluded (p. 198).

Overall, what these studies demonstrate is that journalists have strong professional norms and boundaries which they will try to defend, as they are what separates journalists from other groups and what gives them certain privileges and rights not afforded to others. But while these studies provide important insights into how journalists draw boundaries around they work, or how journalists see WikiLeaks and Greenwald fitting into journalism, they also leave important
questions unanswered. For example, some studies focus on very particular aspects of media coverage—e.g., one BBC “NewsNight” interview (Salter, 2015), or news coverage in only the New York Times and Guardian that focused on the Manning disclosures (Coddington, 2012). It is difficult to use analyses of one program or one newspaper to make large claims about the entirety of a nation’s news coverage. Further, past internationally comparative analyses have addressed one specific case, such as the News of the World phone-hacking scandal (Carlson & Berkowitz, 2014) or the Manning disclosures (Coddington, 2012). The strength of the present study is that it employs a systematic content analysis of news coverage around two similar cases—the WikiLeaks in the context of the Manning disclosures, and Greenwald in the context of the Snowden disclosures—from multiple popular newspapers in both the US and UK. The content analysis examines how journalists portrayed WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald, whether journalists attempted to humanize them, what sources journalists used in their coverage, and how those sources portrayed WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald. While this content analysis will aid in understanding how journalists covered WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald—journalistic actors who challenged established journalistic norms—in their day-to-day coverage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures, it is also unique in that it allows me to compare the coverage across nations and across case studies.

Pairing this quantitative content analysis with qualitative textual analyses of the metajournalistic discourse surrounding WikiLeaks and Greenwald further strengthens the present study. In the next section, I turn to past research on metajournalism, and introduce this genre of journalism as an important site for boundary work examination.

Metajournalistic discourse as a site of identity negotiation and boundary work

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Journalistic boundaries and values, and the day-to-day practices they create, are publicly debated in metajournalistic discourse. Metajournalistic discourse refers to the ongoing public discussions journalists have about the work of journalism, in which they try to articulate the meaning, importance, and societal role of journalism (Carlson, 2012). These discussions take place in news outlets, often on opinion pages alongside journalists’ reporting on current events, as well as on journalists’ own blogs. This discourse “reveals attempts by journalists to articulate, negotiate, defend, and even obscure their cultural, social, and political significance (Carlson, 2012, p. 268).

Carlson (forthcoming) provides one of the clearest articulations, to date, of metajournalism and its significance. He argues that metajournalism is based upon three premises regarding journalism as a cultural practice: (1) the practice of journalism is constantly changing and varies from place to place, and is therefore different throughout time and location; (2) journalism is embedded within larger societal and social networks; and (3) journalists, like other professions, establish and maintain legitimacy through their interaction with others. These premises, Carlson says, “contest the idea of journalism as an independent, fixed, and naturalized knowledge practice, even if this is the image of journalism its practitioners favor” (Carlson, 2016, p. 354).

Owing to the ever-changing nature of the journalistic profession, metajournalistic discourse is ongoing, and occurs regularly as journalistic roles, norms, and values are challenged and reaffirmed by new events and reporting (Dahlgren, 1992; Winch, 1997). Journalists use metajournalism as a way to communicate to each other and the public what good journalistic practice is, and what the role of journalism in society is (or should be). Importantly, metajournalism often arises in response to particular news items or current events. Often, the
events that spark metajournalistic comment involve particular journalists or outlets deviating from traditional profession norms, or perceived outsiders attempting to infringe on the societal role journalists have identified as their own. Because American and British journalism lacks a licensing or governing body, these concepts—what constitutes professional deviance, who is an outsider, what proper practice is—have no set definition. In many ways, then, metajournalistic discourse is the impromptu and unofficial governing body, where journalists decide what practices are right or wrong, what values a journalist should adhere to, and who gets to call themselves a journalist.

The present study combines the previously mentioned quantitative content analysis with a two qualitative textual analyses of metajournalistic discourse surrounding WikiLeaks and Greenwald. These analyses will allow me to compare the boundaries of professional journalism identified by journalists in the US and UK, and how those boundaries are drawn to include or exclude WikiLeaks and Greenwald. The analyses also allow me to compare the boundaries drawn in the two cases to each other. This combination of content analysis and textual analyses will enable me to understand how journalists in both countries perceived WikiLeaks and Greenwald, and how these perceptions impacted both their day-to-day coverage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures as well as their metajournalism.

In the following chapter, I outline the cases that the remainder of this dissertation will examine: American and British newspaper journalists’ reactions to WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald. I also relate these cases to the literature and theories discussed here, and outline the research questions that motivate the study.
Chapter 3: Overview of cases

The goal of this chapter is threefold: to outline the two international contexts on which I focus, to describe the two cases I analyze, and to introduce my research questions. I begin by outlining the two international contexts (US and UK) I will examine in this dissertation, paying specific attention to the newspaper industries in both nations, as these are the focal point for the dissertation. I provide an overview of both nation’s newspaper industries, including the role of regional and national publications, the political orientations of newspapers, the economic hardships facing the newspaper industry, journalistic legal protections, and levels of journalistic autonomy and professionalization. The differences between the newspaper industries in both countries offer important insight into how American and British journalists covered WikiLeaks and Greenwald, and how they might react to WikiLeaks and Greenwald as newcomers (and potentially challengers) within their profession. I next describe the two cases that will be examined in this dissertation: WikiLeaks and Julian Assange in the context of the Chelsea Manning disclosures, and Glenn Greenwald in the context of the Edward Snowden disclosures. The section describes who these two actors are and the context in which I will examine them throughout the remainder of this dissertation. I pay specific attention to the philosophies held by each, while explaining how these backgrounds might differ from those of traditional journalists. Finally, in light of the theoretical underpinnings discussed in Chapter 2 and the international contexts and cases discussed in the present chapter, I introduce the six research questions that drive the remainder of the dissertation. Overall, these research questions ask how American and British newspaper journalists covered WikiLeaks and Greenwald in their coverage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures, and how journalists drew their professional boundaries in relationship to WikiLeaks and Greenwald.
Part I: American and British news media

This study compares American and British news media—in particular, it focuses on American and British print media. The quantitative analysis (Chapter 5) compares how American and British newspapers characterized coverage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures. The two qualitative analyses (Chapters 6 and 7) examine newspaper, magazine, and online articles in which journalists discussed where WikiLeaks and Glenn Greenwald fit into the journalistic ecosystem. Many books have been written describing print media in these two nations, and exploring the complex political and economic issues that influence the content of their news coverage, the historical events that influenced their development, and the ways in which the practice of journalism has evolved over time. I will provide an overview of both nations’ newspaper cultures and industries here, paying specific attention to ways in which the two are alike and different.

The press in the United States

Compared to nations in Western Europe, including the UK, the US has a small number of national newspapers. This is mostly due to the large geographic size of the country; until advances in communication technologies made it inexpensive and easy to quickly send information great distances, national newspapers were infeasible. The US’s large size meant that regional and local newspapers historically dominated the news landscape (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Therefore, while newspapers like the New York Times (frequently referred to as the country’s “paper of record”\(^6\)) and Wall Street Journal are now widely read across the country, this is a relatively recent development. Both newspapers began as regional publications serving

\(^6\) The New York Times is frequently referred to the as the US’s “newspaper of record by scholars (e.g., Zelizer, 2002) and more colloquially by members of the media (e.g., Doctor, 2015).
the New York City metro area and New York City's financial sector, respectively. Now that the internet makes these publications easily accessible, Americans now read many large regional papers as if they were national—for example, the *Washington Post, Los Angeles Times,* or *Chicago Tribune*—despite not having access to a hard copy in their area. Americans can also keep up with news from small local newspapers, as many such publications now have their own news websites.

Unlike countries in Europe and elsewhere in the world, most American newspapers do not fall on a clear political continuum from conservative to liberal (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Patterson & Donsbach, 1993). Instead, “political neutrality has come to be the typical stance of newspapers,” and most newspapers are politically centrist (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 208). There are two main reasons for this: one economic, the other social. First, at the national newspaper level, the small number of newspapers means that the market is less competitive—especially when compared with a nation like the UK, as I will describe below (Semetko, Blumler, Gurevitch, & Weaver, 1991). At the local and regional levels, newspapers often only had one or two competitors; today, it is rare for a US city to have competing newspapers. Newspapers, therefore, want to appeal to the largest number of readers possible, and taking a strong editorial stance would alienate a significant portion of their potential audience. Remaining objective is economically valuable. Second, as described earlier, American journalists have a strong orientation toward objectivity—or, as New York University Professor Jay Rosen has described it, they report with a “view from nowhere” (Rosen, 2003). Journalists are trained to produce a detached, “just the facts, ma’am” style of reporting, in which they present all sides of a debate without offering their own opinion about which side’s evidence is more compelling. The economic necessities of the newspaper industry and the traditional values of American
journalism mean that newspaper reporting generally lacks overt bias (although some pundits and citizens might vocally disagree). Further, US newspapers have cross-class readership, unlike in the UK where newspapers are geared toward particular socioeconomic classes (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).

Journalism outlets in the US are self-regulating, and no licensing body exists for the profession. While professional organizations, like the Society for Professional Journalists (SPJ), do exist and have clear codes of ethics, these organizations have no authority to sanction members. Each outlet takes it upon itself to determine what constitutes appropriate professional conduct, to police the conduct of its reporters, and to punish employees who behave inappropriately.

Newspapers in the US are struggling economically. Over the past few decades they have experienced declining readership and increased production costs; further, overall ad revenue has been decreasing steadily since 2006 (Barthel, 2015). Although digital ad revenue has increased in recent years, it still accounts for a small portion (12%) of newspapers’ overall revenue (Newspaper Association of America, 2014). And despite the growing number of people accessing news from their mobile phones, mobile revenue accounted for less than 1% of total newspaper revenue in 2014. Overall, despite newspapers’ attempts to adapt their business models to the digital era, income from digital ad venue is failing to keep pace with falls in print ad sales. The economic outlook for newspapers shows little signs of improving. According to Pew Research, “2015 was perhaps the worst year for newspapers since the Great Recession and its immediate aftermath”; ad revenue at publicly traded newspaper companies was down 8%, and circulation was down 7% (Barthel, 2016, para. 3). Newsroom staffing fell by 10% in 2014,

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7 I focus on newspapers here, as that is the type of media under examination in this study.
Despite the uptick in other areas of the US economy. Recent years have also seen long-running newspapers move online (e.g., Madison, Wisconsin’s *Capital Times* and Seattle’s *Post-Intelligencer*) or close altogether (Denver’s *Rocky Mountain News*).

Despite their economic struggles, US newspapers enjoy some of the strongest legal protections found in any nation. The First Amendment of the US Constitution guarantees freedom of the press and of expression, and several states have additional shield laws protecting journalists. Several US Supreme Court Cases have further extended journalists’ legal rights. For example, in *New York Times Co. v. United States* (1971) the court ruled that the government cannot engage in prior restraint by preventing an outlet from publishing material—in this case, the court ruled the Nixon administration could not suspend the *New York Times*’ and *Washington Post*’s publication of the classified Pentagon Papers. This ruling has been valuable in other cases where American newspapers published classified or secret information—as the *New York Times* did with the Manning disclosures, and as the *Washington Post* (and later *New York Times*) did with the Snowden disclosures. These strong legal protections help encourage a watchdog press.

Despite the US’s strong legal protections for journalists, the government has found ways to spy on the press and to learn about journalists’ confidential reporting activities. For example, in early 2013 the Associated Press learned that the US Department of Justice (DOJ) had secretly obtained the phone records from lines used by more than 100 of its journalists and editors (Pruitt, 2013). The DOJ refused to reveal the reason for the subpoena, but the AP said it believed the DOJ was attempting to identify the source used in a 2012 story about a foiled Yemeni terror plot (Sherman, 2013). Journalists largely assumed that the DOJ intended this action to intimidate the press and to discourage sources from speaking to journalists (Johnson, forthcoming). Shortly after the AP scandal, the *Washington Post* revealed that the DOJ had been tracking the
movements and communications of Fox News’ chief Washington correspondent James Rosen. The DOJ said that, in cultivating a source relationship with a State Department official, Rosen has become “an aider, abettor, and/or co-conspirator” in the illegal disclosure of classified information (Marimow, 2013, para. 18). So although the US has some of the strongest journalistic legal protections in the world, its journalists are not immune from government infringement on their professional autonomy.

It is not just the government that has occasionally hindered American journalists’ abilities to be government watchdogs. Despite their high levels of professionalization, belief in the importance of its watchdog function, and the importance they attach to professional autonomy, social norms have sometimes prevented the press from engaging in critical and analytical reporting. For example, the US press was criticized for its reporting in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq; critics (including journalists themselves) have said journalists were too concerned with appearing patriotic in the wake of September 11, and so suspended their critical faculties and did not ask enough tough questions about the Bush administration’s justifications for the invasion (e.g., see Kurtz, 2013; Mitchell, 2013). Some journalists who take on an advocacy role in their work (e.g., Glenn Greenwald or Matt Taibbi) also argue that US journalists’ strong orientation toward objectivity hinders their professional autonomy, as they are prevented from expressing opinions about which side has a better argument. Journalism scholars like New York University’s Jay Rosen make a similar argument; his description of American journalistic objectivity as a “view from nowhere” was certainly not meant as a compliment (Rosen, 2003).

In summary, the US newspaper industry is dominated by regional and local titles; however, technological advances have increasingly made larger regional newspapers more
accessible to readers all over the country, and several formerly regional newspapers (like the
*New York Times* or *Wall Street Journal*) are now widely considered to be national newspapers.

Most American newspapers do not fall along a clear political spectrum. Instead, they tend to be
politically centrist due to economic necessity and a widespread professional orientation toward
objectivity. Journalism has no licensing or central authority, and individual publications are self-
regulating. As in other countries, the US newspaper industry is struggling economically as
circulation rates and ad revenues fall. But US journalists also enjoy some of the strongest legal
protections in the world, with press freedoms codified in the Constitution and additional
protections via state laws and Supreme Court rulings. These strong legal protections have
encouraged the development of a watchdog press, although the government has still found ways
to intimidate journalists. Further, some critics argue that American journalists’ professional
values are self-restricting or outdated, and could be loosened to allow for a wider variety of
journalism that would better serve the public.

**The press in the United Kingdom**

The UK has a vibrant press, both at the national and the regional level. While all print
papers except the *Times* have seen circulations decline in recent years (Turvill, 2015), newspaper
readership rates in the UK are still among the highest in Europe (European Social Survey, 2010)
and higher than in the US (Ofcom, 2015; Pew, 2012). In 2015, 31% of Britons read a daily
newspaper, which was down 9% since 2014 (Ofcom, 2015). But many more get their news from
the websites of national newspapers. Of the top 8 most-visited news websites in the country in
2008, seven were affiliated with national newspapers: *Mail Online* (*Daily Mail*),
Telegraph.co.uk, Guardian Unlimited, *Times Online*, *The Sun*, FT.com (*Financial Times*), and
*The Independent* (McNair, 2009). Unlike the US, the UK’s smaller geographic area allowed
several national newspapers to emerge and flourish. Even today, the national press sets the nation’s news agenda (Sanders & Hanna, 2012).

The British national press is traditionally divided into tabloids and broadsheets. The term “tabloid” refers to popular press titles, like the Daily Mail, which focus on a mix of entertainment and sensationalist news stories and are printed on tabloid-sized newsprint. The group of papers called tabloids is further divided into “mid-market tabloids” (e.g., the Daily Express), which cater to relatively higher socioeconomic populations, and “red-top tabloids” (e.g., The Sun), which cater to lower socioeconomic populations, often include more salacious content, and focus mostly on sports, celebrity gossip, and political scandal (McNair, 2009). The term “red-top tabloid” comes from the red mastheads of the most salacious tabloids—The Sun, The Daily Star, and The Daily Mirror. Most tabloids lean conservative to varying degrees, with the exception of the Daily Mirror, which leans left. All other papers are called broadsheets, due to the larger size of their printed newspapers; these papers are also sometimes called the “quality press.” Broadsheets focus on hard news content, and their readers are generally higher in socioeconomic status than tabloid readers. However, due to declining budgets, many broadsheet newspapers have recently moved to smaller and more economical formats. The Times, for instance, became tabloid-size in 2004, and in 2005 the Guardian and its sister publication the Observer moved to the Berliner format (which is slightly larger than the tabloid format). Therefore, it might be more accurate to refer to these papers as the “quality press,” but the tabloid-broadsheet distinction is still commonly used.

The move many broadsheets made to smaller print sizes is emblematic of larger problems facing the print industry. The British press, like the American press, has experienced economic hardships in recent years due to decreased ad revenue, declining readership, and increased
production costs. The internet has exacerbated these problems; newspapers have struggled with how to adapt their business models to an online environment, where advertising earns less revenue and readers are accustomed to getting content for free. These hardships have led to newspaper closures and newsroom cutbacks. The Guardian, for example, announced in March 2016 that it planned to lay off 250 staff members, including 100 editorial staff, and not fill another 60 currently vacant positions to help cut £54 million from its annual operating budget (Ponsford, 2016). The Guardian operated at a loss of £58.6 million to the year ending March 2016; these losses have occurred despite the fact that the Guardian operates one of the most-read news websites in the English-speaking world (Guardian News Media Press Office, 2015)—a website that is even among the top five most-visited news sites in the United States (Pew Research Center, 2016).

Because Britain has such a large number of national press titles, the market is very competitive. Therefore, each newspaper differentiates itself from its peers by serving a particular demographic or by taking a particular party line. This means the national broadsheet and tabloid newspapers in Britain can be placed along a continuum from left to right, liberal to conservative. The Independent, for example, is a broadsheet newspaper that takes a centrist position. The paper’s editorial board supported the Liberal Democrats in 2010 but did not come out in support of any candidate in the 2015 election (Independent Editorial Board, 2010, 2015), and it supported remaining in the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum (a position favored by many liberal Britons) (Independent editorial board, 2016). The Daily Telegraph is politically conservative; it has supported the Conservatives in recent elections, and supported leaving the European Union in the Brexit referendum (a position favored by many conservatives) (Telegraph editorial board, 2016). Political orientations are more starkly delineated in the tabloid market,
with titles like the conservative *Sun* tabloid being more overt than the broadsheet *Telegraph* in its disdain for liberal parties (often mocking the opposition’s leaders and their supporters). The broadsheets generally employ a subtler form of political bias (Hallin & Mancini, 2004).

The political orientations of the national press are also visible in the political affiliations of their readers. Readers of the left-leaning *Guardian*, for example, largely voted for Labour (43%) or Liberal Democrats (41%) in 2010, whereas readers of the right-leaning *Daily Telegraph* mostly voted Conservative (70%) (Ipsos MORI, 2010). The British press, then, can be said to have a high level of political parallelism, which means the newspapers reflect the political divisions present in society (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). This differentiates them from the American press, which tend to be centrist and have low levels of political parallelism.

These clear political orientations mean that the UK national press, especially the tabloid press, does not subscribe to American notions of objectivity. While the British TV news media practices objective, just-the-facts journalism that would be recognizable to American audiences (as is visible in BBC news programs), British newspapers tend to frame their news coverage in a way that supports their respective political affiliations. For example, a recent study of EU referendum coverage found the majority of newspapers framed their coverage in a way that either supported the Leave or Remain side, with Leave opinions (the opinion backed mainly by conservatives) being more common in newspaper coverage than Remain opinions (Loughborough University Centre for Research in Communication and Culture, 2016). In contrast, the majority of TV news reports about the referendum contained no clear evaluations of the Leave or Remain positions.

The regional press is also a large and integral part of the UK press landscape—Britain has 1,060 local and regional newspapers (Shackleton, 2015), including many like the *Manchester
Evening News or London’s Evening Standard that have large circulations. The regional press includes local newspapers and “free sheets,” which are advertising-supported and available for free. Like the national press, the majority of regional newspapers have seen declines in their readership numbers in recent years (Burrell, 2014).

Britain does not have a written constitution, and so journalists do not have their rights codified in the same manner as American journalists. However, British journalists benefit from legal protection via the Contempt of Court Act 1981, which says a publisher can only be compelled to reveal a confidential source if a court agrees that disclosure is “in the interests of justice or national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime.” However, critics say the British courts have interpreted “the interests of national security” and “the prevention of disorder or crime” quite broadly, and have often compelled journalists to disclose their sources or be held in contempt of court (Phillips, 2014). Article 10 of the European Court of Human Rights’ Convention on Human Rights has held that “protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedoms,” and has ruled in the past that the UK government violated British journalists’ rights to freedom of expression (European Court of Human Rights, 2016). Britain is also different from the US in that prior restraint is permissible. British courts can, and do, issue gag orders preventing the press from publishing material (for a recent example, see Dearden, 2016). The government has also used the Defence Advisory Notice (or DA-Notice, or D-Notice) system to prevent journalists from publishing material related to national security. Also, shortly after the Guardian began reporting on the Snowden disclosures, the UK government forced the paper to destroy its own hard drives and computers or else turn them over. While the US government has taken its own steps to intimidate or interfere with journalism (e.g., with the DOJ’s secret collection of the Associated Press’ phone records), prior restraint and the forced
destruction of journalists’ hard drives would be illegal in the US. During the Manning and Snowden disclosures, the Guardian sought out partners in the American media for this very reason; if the reporting were also taking place in the US, the Guardian would benefit from its partner’s First Amendment protections (O’Carroll, 2013).

Like the American press, the British press is considered to be highly professionalized compared with other countries—although “As the partisanship of the British press and the prevalence of interventionist owners [like Rupert Murdoch] suggest, professionalization may be less fully developed, or at least less consistently so, in the British than the North American press” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 222). The national press’ political parallelism and close proximity to the political system means that news coverage is very party-driven, with party officials initiating many stories (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Semetko et al., 1991). In their comparative study of election coverage in the US and Britain, Semetko et al. also described the British press as “more respectful” than the American press (p. 142), and said US journalists had a “more suspicious view of politicians and politics” (p. 174). The UK press, then, is overall less professionalized than the American press.

The British press is self-regulating. But unlike the US press, which relies on individual outlets to police the conduct of their employees, most British newspapers are members of the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). IPSO describes itself as an independent regulator of the press, with a duty to “hold newspapers and magazines to account for their actions, protect individual rights, uphold high standards of journalism and help to maintain freedom of expression for the press” (Independent Press Standards Organisation, 2016). IPSO enforces its code of conduct, investigates complaints about online and printed material, offers advice for editors and journalist, provides training for journalists on ethical standards, among
other functions. IPSO also requires member publications to submit annual statements explaining how they have worked to adhere to IPSO’s code of conduct, to address reader complaints, and to conduct internal investigations when concerns about journalists’ behavior are raised. Unlike professional organizations in the US (e.g., SPJ), IPSO has the power to investigate press publications’ behavior and punish those publications that are found to have violated IPSO’s code of conduct. IPSO is a relatively new organization, having replaced the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) in September 2014 after the Leveson press inquiry determined the PCC was not sufficiently independent from the industry it was supposed to be regulating. The PCC received heavy criticism during the News of the World (NOTW) phone hacking scandals, with critics saying the organization did not do enough to prevent NOTW journalists from engaging in unethical behavior. Labour leader Ed Miliband called the organization a “toothless poodle,” and said although the PCC’s chair admits that the NOTW lied to her about its phone hacking practices, she was powerless to do anything about it (Watt, 2011, para. 4). Based on these calls and the suggestion of the Leveson report, the PCC was dissolved and IPSO was created to take its place. However, it is still unclear whether IPSO has been more successful at regulating the press than its predecessor; some critics say IPSO is just as toothless as the PCC (Toynbee, 2015), and others argue IPSO is too sensitive to public complaints and can end up censoring journalists who publish unpopular information (Delingpole, 2015). Membership in IPSO is voluntary, and some major newspapers, like the Independent, have not joined.

In summary, Britain has a stratified press system that is split between red-top tabloids, mid-market tabloids, and the more prestigious broadsheets. Most tabloids have far higher circulation rates than any broadsheet newspaper (Turvill, 2015). Unlike the American press, British newspapers have clear political orientations. The majority of major tabloids are right-
wing, including the *Daily Mail, Daily Express, Sun,* and *Daily Star.* The UK also differs from the US in that British journalists have fewer legal protections. But journalists on both sides of the Atlantic are experiencing economic turmoil. In the UK, national and regional newspapers are dealing with lower ad revenues and declining readership numbers, and the internet has perhaps made these problems worse. Financial problems have caused newspapers to cut staff and move to smaller print sizes, and many local newspapers have shuttered. Even long-established newspapers like the *Guardian* have struggled, despite having a strong online presence (Chittum, 2014).

**Section II: Background on Julian Assange, WikiLeaks, and Glenn Greenwald**

Chapter 2 described the strong sense of professional values held by journalists. Journalism is a profession with a powerful mythos, and journalists strongly believe their profession is central to the functioning of a healthy democracy. The actors under analysis here—WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, and Glenn Greenwald—also believe in the importance of journalism for democracy, but explicitly reject many of the professional values journalists traditionally hold and are critical of many of their reporting routines. Below, I provide an overview of WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald. I describe who they are, the parts of their professional and personal backgrounds that influenced their later journalistic work, and the ways in which they differ from traditional journalism. This information provides important context for understanding how other journalists perceived and responded to these actors.

**WikiLeaks & Julian Assange**

The organization known as WikiLeaks officially emerged in October 2006; however, its philosophical and technological origins extend back decades. WikiLeaks’ founder, Julian Assange, and his collaborators come from a libertarian hacker culture that believes in radical
transparency for the powerful (Assange, Appelbaum, Müller-Maguhn, & Zimmerman, 2012; Beckett & Ball, 2012). This ethos has been deeply embedded in computer programming and cryptography circles since the early days of personal computing (Greenberg, 2012).

WikiLeaks is solely the creation of Assange, an Australian programmer and former hacker born in 1971. From a young age, Assange was distrustful of powerful people and institutions. This distrust stemmed from the influence of his mother, as well as from his nomadic childhood (Greenberg, 2012). Assange moved dozens of times as a child and teenager, and with each move he attended a new school or dropped out all together. His mother, Christine, thought “formal education would inculcate an unhealthy respect for authority in her children and dampen their will to learn” (Khatchadourian, 2010, para. 63). “I didn’t want their spirits broken,” she told New Yorker writer Raffi Khatchadourian (2010, para. 63), and the young Assange was frequently homeschooled or left to study informally on his own.

An ex-partner of Christine’s is often cited as the reason for the family’s nomadic existence. Christine had a child (Assange’s younger half-brother) with a musician who was allegedly a member of the Australian cult called The Family. After the relationship became abusive, Christine fled with both children. Fearing that the man and his fellow cult members would track them down and take away Assange’s half-brother, the family went on the run (Greenberg, 2012; Khatchadourian, 2010). Assange spent ages 11 through 16 moving from town to town with his mother and half-brother; he has said that he moved more than 37 times by age 14 (Khatchadourian, 2010). Paranoia was, therefore, at the core of his childhood, and became a natural state of mind. Indeed, even in adulthood Assange was known for crashing on various friends’ couches, keeping no fixed residence of his own for fear that someone—usually some shadowy government agent seeking retribution—would track him down (Domscheit-Berg,
At the same time Assange was learning to distrust everyone around him—the Assanges tried to keep even family and friends in the dark about the their whereabouts, afraid that someone might intentionally or accidentally alert The Family to their location—his interest in computers was growing. The burgeoning programming culture of the 1980s fascinated Assange, who first took an interest in programming in his early teens. “The austerity of one’s interactions with a computer is something that appealed to me. It is like chess—chess is very austere, in that you don’t have many rules, there is no randomness, and the problem is very hard,” Assange has said (Khatchadourian, 2010). In 1987, at the age of 16, Assange got his first modem, and his career as a hacker began. His hacker name was Mendax, an homage to the ancient Roman poet Horace’s motto *splendide mendax*, meaning “nobly untruthful” (Dreyfus & Assange, 1997; Khatchadourian, 2010).

That same year, Assange and two hacker friends formed a group called the International Subversives. The small group “developed into elite hackers, and Assange soon became by some accounts the most accomplished practitioner of digital intrusion in Australia, a near-mythic figure across the burgeoning hacker subculture” (Greenberg, 2012, p. 106). Mendax and the International Subversives claimed they were able to hack into highly secure networks like NASA, Lockheed Martin, and Los Alamos National Laboratory (Dreyfus & Assange, 1997). Assange has said the group never intended to harm any of the networks; rather, they were interested in hacking into these highly protected systems simply for the joy of puzzle-cracking. In a book he co-authored with journalist Suelette Dreyfus, he defined the values, or “golden rule,” of the International Subversives and other underground hackers of the time: “don't damage computer systems you break into (including crashing them); don't change the information in
those systems (except for altering logs to cover your tracks); and share information. For most early Australian hackers, visiting someone else's system was a bit like visiting a national park. Leave it as you find it” (Dreyfus & Assange, 1997, p. 62).

Although they were persistent in erasing their tracks and leaving networks as they found them, the International Subversives soon found themselves in hot water. In September 1991, when Assange was 20, they were caught by Australian Federal police hacking in the Canadian telecom corporation Nortel, which had offices in Melbourne (Khatchadourian, 2010). In 1994, Assange was charged with 31 counts of hacking-related crimes in connection with the incident, charges which carried penalties of up to 10 years in prison (Dreyfus & Assange, 1997). He pleaded guilty to 25 of the charges in December of 1996, but walked away with a relatively small fine of $2,100 AUD; the judge was lenient in his sentencing, citing Assange’s troubled childhood and the hacking’s lack of malicious intent. One of the Australian federal investigators noted the moral imperative that seemed to drive Assange’s hacking, even at the age of 20: “He had some altruistic motive. I think he acted on the belief that everyone should have access to everything” (Khatchadourian, 2010, para. 70).

The trial-and-sentencing process lasted for several years. During this long process, Assange became active in the Cypherpunk online mailing list, which was started by a mathematician and two engineers from the San Francisco area. The political leanings of the cypherpunk community (which still exists today) are largely anarchist or libertarian (Greenberg, 2012; May, 1992). Regardless of their politics, cypherpunks have one core belief that unites them: They all believe in using strong encryption to protect the privacy of regular citizens from governments and corporations. Related to this belief, cypherpunks oppose any government policies limiting the use of encryption, and advocate for anonymous online communication to
ensure full freedom of expression. Clearly, Assange had much in common, both politically and philosophically, with the cypherpunks. During his legal proceedings, Assange read and contributed voraciously to the Cypherpunk mailing list (Greenberg, 2012). But cypherpunks’ ultimate interest is not theorizing about the evils of authority; rather, cypherpunks are interested in creating computer code that can protect private citizens from government and corporate surveillance (Greenberg, 2012). In the mid 1990s, Assange developed a program named Rubberhose, which was intended to help political activists in authoritarian regimes smuggle data out of their countries (Greenberg, 2012).

But after the sentencing was complete in 1997, Assange abandoned the Mendax moniker and hacking altogether. In the late-1990s and early 2000s he worked various computer security-related jobs, even starting his own short-lived company. He tried his hand at college, studying mathematics and physics at the University of Melbourne from 2003 until 2006 (but not completing his degree). But Assange never loved mathematics and physics as much as he loved computer programming and cryptography, and he saw the university as yet another institution that should be treated with disdain; these feelings were exacerbated by the University of Melbourne’s close relationship with several military organizations around the world, who funded much of the university’s research and recruited campus scientists and engineers (Greenberg, 2012).

During his time at university, Assange became more politically radicalized than he had been years earlier, when he was a regular member of the Cypherpunk mailing list (Greenberg, 2012; Khatchadourian, 2010). By the 2000s, Assange “had come to understand the defining human struggle not as left versus right, or faith versus reason, but as individual versus institution” (Khatchadourian, 2010, para. 79). This political radicalization and contempt for
formal education led him to abandon his university studies before earning a degree, and focus his energies on writing his own political manifesto: “Conspiracy as Governance,” published to his personal blog in 2006 (Assange, 2006; Greenberg, 2012). In this essay, Assange describes the power of authoritarian regimes as stemming from their reliable means of communication; disrupt these lines of communication, he argued, and the regime will fall (Assange, 2006). Assange saw information leaks as the best means of disruption. If members of authoritarian regimes could no longer trust that their communication systems are secure, they will stop their internal communication. The resulting lack of coordination will cause the regime to slowly crumble from within.

This line of thinking lead Assange to think seriously about creating a website that could facilitate such regime-destroying leaks. At the end of 2006, that idea came to fruition in WikiLeaks: a secure online drop box where whistleblowers could anonymously upload documents exposing government or corporate corruption. Since its founding, Julian Assange has served as the leader of WikiLeaks: he is its “heart and soul…its founder, philosopher, spokesperson, original coder, organizer, financier and all the rest” (Poulsen & Zetter, 2010, para. 14). The website does not target or attempt to convince specific leakers to submit information; rather, it is intended to be a passive receiver of documents. It receives documents anonymously (WikiLeaks says it has no way of knowing who submits documents, as the entire process is anonymous), vets the documents internally, and posts them to the website in the order in which they were received (Domscheit-Berg, 2011). The website began publishing leaked documents shortly after its creation, in December 2006. This first leak detailed an alleged decision by a Somali dissident leader to begin assassination attempts on Somali government officials. The second leak was published in August 2007, and detailed corrupt actions by former Kenyan leader
Daniel arap Moi. Between February 2008 and March 2010, WikiLeaks published several sets of documents exposing wrongdoing or corruption by organizations such as the Swiss banking institution Julius Baer, the London-based Barclays Bank, and the U.S.-based religious organization Scientology.

Although WikiLeaks had been steadily publishing leaked documents detailing corrupt practices by governments and corporations around the world since late 2006, the organization and its leaks had yet to receive significant attention in the mainstream press (Beckett & Ball, 2012; Benkler, 2011). This changed in spring 2010, when the organization began publishing a series of documents related to the U.S. military. First, WikiLeaks published a 2008 U.S. Department of Defense report that detailed the threats posed to the government by WikiLeaks and outlined possible ways to curb the organization’s activities. Next came the April 5, 2010 release of video footage showing an American helicopter shooting and killing 12-18 individuals in Baghdad, including two Reuters journalists. WikiLeaks released the 39-minute raw footage on its website, along with a shorter, edited version titled “Collateral Murder.” This video received significant attention from the mainstream press both in the US and internationally, and provoked public responses from US government officials (Beckett & Ball, 2012).

The footage used in the “Collateral Murder” video was provided by U.S. Army Private Chelsea Manning (then Bradley Manning), who also provided WikiLeaks with thousands of internal, secret, and classified documents containing information about the U.S. Army’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. WikiLeaks published the Afghanistan documents, collectively known as the Afghan War Diary, on July 25, 2010, which marked the beginning of WikiLeaks’ collaboration with mainstream media organizations. WikiLeaks made the documents available to The New York Times, The Guardian, and Der Spiegel before publishing them on its own website.
In October 2010, WikiLeaks released the Iraq documents, collectively known as the Iraq War Logs. WikiLeaks expanded its number of media partners for this release, making the documents available in advance to The New York Times, The Guardian, Der Spiegel, Al Jazeera, Le Monde, the UK’s Bureau of Investigative Journalism, and the Iraq Body Count Project. WikiLeaks’ final major document leak of 2010 was the release of U.S. diplomatic cables dated from 1966 through February 2010, which were also provided by Manning. WikiLeaks partnered with The New York Times, The Guardian, Der Spiegel, Le Monde, and El País to initially release 220 of the estimated 251,000 cables.

Although it began as a whistleblowing website, over the course of releasing its US military documents, WikiLeaks morphed into an entity more resembling a news organization (Beckett & Ball, 2012; Benkler, 2011). Indeed, since May 7, 2011 WikiLeaks’ website has described itself as a “non-for-profit media organization” dedicated to “bring[ing] important news and information to the public” (WikiLeaks.org, 2014).

Understanding elements of Assange’s formative years—his ingrained distrust of authority, his family’s need for secrecy owing to their constant (and perhaps legitimate) paranoia that Christine’s ex-partner would find them, and his fascination with programming and hacking—makes his creation of WikiLeaks seem understandable and almost inevitable. It also illustrates that Assange’s motivations in creating WikiLeaks were quite different from the motivations of the average Western journalist. WikiLeaks’ roots in hacker culture and beliefs in radical transparency have often placed the organization, and particularly Assange, at odds with those in mainstream news media who subscribe to a different set of ethical and professional standards (Beckett & Ball, 2012; Keller, 2011). Although most journalists pride themselves on serving a watchdog function, values like balance and objectivity and a desire to stay on good
terms with sources (who primarily come from government institutions; see Bennett (1990)) prevent them from making bold and aggressive public statements like Assange frequently does\(^8\).

Understanding Assange’s early life also sheds light on WikiLeaks’ relationship with mainstream journalism: Assange’s ingrained distrust of institutions and those who work for them make him quick to criticize mainstream journalists, particularly those journalists who express criticism of Assange or WikiLeaks. From Assange’s perspective, mainstream journalism is an institution that should not be trusted; he might not see journalism as on par with the United States government in terms of its power and desire to distort truth, but he is still disdainful of most journalists (Domscheit-Berg, 2011) and has said “Large newspapers, including the Guardian, are forced to remove or water down investigative stories rather than risk legal costs” (Assange, 2010, para. 2). In addition to having different motivations than most traditional journalists, Assange clearly has a different skillset and different training than can be found in most newsrooms. Indeed, when Assange and the rest of the WikiLeaks team joined forces with the editors and reporters of The New York Times and The Guardian, the relationship was tumultuous. Each group operated with different goals, ethics, and work routines, and many of the Times and Guardian journalists viewed Assange as emotionally unpredictable, egotistical, and untrustworthy (e.g., see Keller, 2011).

Today, any discussion of WikiLeaks frequently includes discussion of Assange’s personal life. In August 2010, two Swedish women filed sexual assault charges against him and, as a result of the charges, a UK judge placed Assange under house arrest in December 2010. He remained under house arrest in Norfolk until June 2012, when he sought political asylum from

\(^8\) For one example, among many: “Intelligence agencies keep things secret because they often violate the rule of law or of good behavior” (Greenberg, 2010).
the Ecuadorian government. Assange has lived at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London since June 19, 2012, and was officially granted political asylum by the Ecuadorian government in August 16, 2012. He denies the charges, and insists they are part of a US government-led plan to extradite him to Sweden, a country which he believes would then extradite him to the US to face charges related to his work with WikiLeaks (Groll, 2014). Sweden denies this is the case.

The sexual assault investigation is still ongoing, and Assange remains in the Ecuadorian Embassy as of this writing.

Glenn Greenwald

By his own account, Glenn Greenwald can be an argumentative and confrontational person. “The most important thing my grandfather taught me was that the most noble way to use your skills, intellect and energy is to defend the marginalized against those with the greatest power—and that the resulting animosity from those in power is a badge of honor,” he said (Reitman, 2013, para. 15). He began honing his argumentation skills at a young age; he was a state debate champion in high school, and a star on the George Washington University debate team during his undergraduate years. His love of debate is perhaps the best-known aspect of his persona, and has led to notable public arguments with people like former Meet the Press host and journalist David Gregory (Wemple, 2013) and political blogger Andrew Sullivan (Martel, 2012), as well as clashes with long-standing journalistic institutions like The New York Times (for one example of many, see Gebreyes, 2015). The Intercept, the online news outlet for which he currently works and which he co-founded along with colleagues Laura Poitras and Jeremy Scahill, was created as an outlet for Greenwald’s particular brand of “fearless, adversarial journalism,” which is intended to “bring transparency and accountability to powerful governmental and corporate institutions” (Intercept, 2016).
But Greenwald did not begin his career as a journalist. After George Washington University, he attended New York University’s School of Law, graduating in 1994. He immediately took a job as a corporate attorney at the high-powered New York City law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz (Testa, 2013). He was initially drawn to the firm because it was, at the time, one of the only in New York to offer same-sex partner benefits. However, he quickly tired of the world of corporate law and of representing investment bankers and massive corporations like JPMorgan (“I knew that I didn’t want to be representing rich people. I wanted to be suing them,” he said (Testa, 2013, para. 11)). In 1996, he left Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz to open his own practice specializing in First Amendment and civil-liberties cases (Reitman, 2013). Greenwald’s practice took on clients that most people would despise—for instance, Greenwald spent five years as the defense attorney for a group of neo-Nazis, successfully arguing that even hateful people are deserving of First Amendment protections. His decision to defend clients with odious beliefs—on the grounds that even hateful speech is protected under the First Amendment—is indicative of Greenwald’s strong, principled stances on civil liberties issues. “To me, it's a heroic attribute to be so committed to a principle that you apply it not when it's easy, not when it supports your position, not when it protects people you like, but when it defends and protects people that you hate,” Greenwald told Rolling Stone in 2013 (Reitman, 2013, para. 21).

In the mid-1990s, Greenwald’s love of arguing and defending the underdog found a natural outlet in the emerging world of online debate forums. He found his way to TownHall, a conservative online political forum created by the Heritage Foundation think tank and the National Review magazine (Testa, 2013). He spent hours each day debating strangers about political topics like same-sex marriage and abortion rights. Initially, his motivation was to “go in
there to torment the conservatives,” he has said (Testa, 2013, para. 15). But the more time he spent in these forums, the more he enjoyed the debate, and not simply because it was an outlet for the argumentative side of his personality. “I stayed [on the TownHall forum] for two years and made friends with all these people … I argued with them, debated with them. I was totally openly gay, and they were very accepting. It was an eye-opening experience, and it taught me not to make assumptions about who people are,” he said (Testa, 2013, para. 15).

In 2005, Greenwald was winding down his law practice, and choosing what to do next with his life. He decided to take a vacation to Rio de Janeiro for a couple months, hoping that the change of scenery would help him figure out his new life path (Testa, 2013). While on this vacation, he met a man named David Miranda, and the two fell in love. At the time, the US’s Defense of Marriage Act prevented Miranda from moving to the US with Greenwald; Greenwald, therefore, stayed in Rio, where the Brazilian government recognized his partnership with Miranda and granted him a permanent visa (Bernstein, 2011; Testa, 2013). However, Greenwald was not licensed to practice law in Brazil, and thus legally prevented from continuing his legal practice there. He was, therefore, forced to consider alternative career options.

In October 2005, he began blogging on the free website Blogspot. His blog, called Unclaimed Territory, focused on current events related to the same kinds of issues he worked on in his law practice: civil liberties and constitutional law. His motive in starting his blog was his concern about “the radical and extremist theories of power the US government had adopted in the wake of 9/11,” and the hope that “writing about such issues might allow me to make a broader impact that I could in my then-career as a constitutional and civil rights lawyer” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 1). A couple months after he started his blog, the story broke that the Bush Administration had authorized the National Security Administration (NSA) to conduct
warrantless domestic eavesdropping, and Greenwald began blogging regularly about the legal implications of these revelations. He also wrote critically about *The New York Times*’ decision to sit on the story for one year at the request of the Bush Administration. The political blog Slate began regularly linking to Greenwald’s commentary, and *Unclaimed Territory*’s readership quickly grew (Testa, 2013). *Unclaimed Territory* became part of Salon.com in February 2007.

Greenwald blogged at Salon.com until 2012, when the UK-based newspaper *The Guardian* hired him as a columnist. While writing for Salon.com and *The Guardian*, Greenwald had an agreement with his editors that he would not need to report to them, and that he could post his columns directly to their sites without editorial oversight—an arrangement that the *New York Times* has called “unusual” (Cohen & Kaufman, 2013, para. 10), and that the Salon.com editor in chief admitted was “unheard of,” although he said he never “lost a moment of sleep” over this arrangement due to Greenwald’s scrupulousness (para. 11).

It was Greenwald’s background—his reputation as an outspoken critic of the US’s post-9/11 security policies, his knowledge of and advocacy for civil liberties issues, and his unwillingness to allow his work to be censored (even edited) in any way—that prompted an anonymous reader calling himself “Cincinnatus” to contact him on December 1, 2012. Cincinnatus asked Greenwald for his PGP encryption key in order to send him a secure email (Greenwald, 2014). PGP stands for “pretty good privacy,” but the level of protection it offers is actually far better than “pretty good”; it essentially allows users to prevent online information from being read by anyone other than the intended recipient, thereby safeguarding communications from hacking or surveillance. Cincinnatus assumed, correctly, that since he could not find Greenwald’s PGP key online, that Greenwald was not encrypting his online communication. To persuade Greenwald to learn PGP encryption techniques, Cincinnatus sent
him a message implying that whistleblowers with important information would refrain from contacting Greenwald unless they could be certain their communications were satisfactorily encrypted.⁹

PGP was well above Greenwald’s level of computer expertise, and so he ignored Cincinnatus’ message. “Because I had become known for covering stories the rest of the media often ignores, I frequently hear from all sorts of people offering me a ‘huge story,’ and it turns out to be nothing,” Greenwald said (Greenwald, 2014, p. 9). But Cincinnatus persisted, offering to help Greenwald install the encryption program and even sending him a step-by-step video called “PGP for Journalists.” Greenwald occasionally wrote back, saying he would find someone to help him install the software, but he did not treat the matter with much urgency.

In April 2013, while on a trip to New York, Greenwald received an email from Laura Poitras. Poitras is an American Academy-Award-nominated documentary filmmaker who directed a series of films critically examining the US War on Terror; as a result, she claims she has been the target of frequent detentions (more than forty times, by her estimation) by the US Department of Homeland Security when entering or leaving the country (DemocracyNow!, 2012). Greenwald knew Poitras, as he had written articles for Salon.com about her border detentions. Poitras wanted to meet with Greenwald about a source that had contacted her. This source emailed her secret documents (Poitras had a PGP key) indicating that the US government was conducting surveillance on its citizens. Poitras was convinced that the source was legitimate, and Greenwald agreed. They decided to work together with the source. Poitras got in touch with

⁹ Cincinnatus told Greenwald, somewhat cryptically, that “There are people out there you would like to hear from who will never be able to contact you without knowing their messages cannot be read in transit” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 8).
her source, and said she and Greenwald were interested in hearing more. Greenwald returned to Rio, where Poitras put him in touch with a technology expert who could help him set up PGP so he could communicate with their source directly (Greenwald, 2014).

At this point, Greenwald had still never heard the name “Edward Snowden,” and he did not make the connection between the messages he received from Cincinnatus and the messages Poitras showed him in New York. But this was about to change; at the end of May, Poitras contacted Greenwald and told him that they would need to travel to Hong Kong to meet their source in person. Greenwald needed to decide whether to report on this story in his capacity as a Guardian columnist, or to report independent of any journalistic institution. He considered publishing the stories on his own blog, to make the point that anyone publishing stories of public interest is due the same legal protections, whether affiliated with an established journalism outlet or not (Cohen & Kaufman, 2013). He ultimately decided to publish the story with The Guardian, which meant he needed to get in touch with the newspaper’s editor, Alan Rusbridger, to explain the situation and come to a decision about how to proceed.

Rusbridger was interested in the story, but insisted that a veteran Guardian defense and intelligence correspondent named Ewen MacAskill accompany Greenwald and Poitras. Greenwald and Poitras were initially opposed to this idea, as their source was expecting to meet just the two of them—people he had specifically chosen due to their distance from mainstream news outlets. However, Greenwald and Poitras eventually agreed to let MacAskill join them on their trip to Hong Kong, on the condition that he would only be introduced into the meetings when the source felt comfortable with it.

The source turned out to be Edward J. Snowden, a systems analyst at the U.S. National Security Agency’s (NSA) Hawaii Regional Security Operations Center. Snowden had been in
Hong Kong since May 2013, when he left his home on work leave to supposedly receive epilepsy treatment. At a series of meetings in a Hong Kong hotel in the first days of June 2013, Snowden walked Greenwald, MacAskill, and Poitras through details about his life and the thousands of classified documents he had obtained while working for Booz Allen Hamilton. The documents detailed the extent of the NSA’s ability to collect data on the communications of American citizens and foreign nationals.

Greenwald did not realize until many days into their Hong Kong interview session that Snowden was Cincinnatus, the source who had contacted Greenwald back in December 2012.

The first article based on Snowden’s leaked documents was written by Greenwald and appeared in *The Guardian* on June 5, 2013. The article described a secret court order forcing Verizon to hand over millions of domestic phone records to the NSA (Greenwald, 2013c).

Greenwald faced criticism almost immediately after the first story on the Snowden disclosures was published (e.g., see Farhi, 2013, or Gregory, 2013). He—and not others involved in the reporting, like Poitras, MacAskill, or the *Washington Post’s* Barton Gellman—was a lightning rod for criticism. This is likely because he did the bulk of the reporting on the Snowden disclosures, was the most vocal defender of the Snowden reporting, and appeared on the most interviews and TV news programs discussing the reporting. Further, his past interactions with the media ensured he would receive the most attention of any one reporting working on the Snowden disclosures10:

“I had expected the American media to direct its hostility toward me, especially as we continued to publish documents and the unprecedented scope of the leak began to be

10 As a result, this dissertation focuses on Greenwald, and not Poitras.
clear. And as a harsh critic of the journalist establishment and many of its leading members, I was, I reasoned, a natural magnet for such hostility. I had few allies in the traditional media. Most were people whose work I had attacked publicly, frequently, and unsparingly. I expected them to turn on me at the first opportunity…” (Greenwald, 2014, p. 79)

Further, many critics portrayed Greenwald as “some high-tech oddity for whom the old categories [of journalism] were inadequate” (Davidson, 2014, para. 10)—which is itself odd, considering how admittedly inept with technology Greenwald was. Indeed, he almost lost out on the Snowden story altogether because he could not be bothered to learn how to encrypt his personal communications. Perhaps this perception of Greenwald as a “high-tech oddity” arises not out of of misperceptions about his level of technological skill, but because Greenwald has made his name working for online outlets—his own blog, Salon, and the online-only US edition of the Guardian. But regardless of the reason for this particular misconception, there is no denying that many journalists perceived Greenwald to be “different”—perhaps too outspoken about his politics, too aggressive in his criticism of other journalists or of Western governments, or too far removed from the values and routines found in traditional newsrooms.

**Boundary work and American and British press reactions to WikiLeaks and Greenwald**

Given the state of the print news media in the US and UK outlined in Section I of this chapter and the ways in which Assange, WikiLeaks, and Greenwald challenge the journalistic norms outlined in Chapter 2, what insight might boundary work provide about how and American and British journalists will respond to WikiLeaks and Greenwald?

Past research has found that journalists tend to portray whistleblowers in a neutral to positive light, giving their claims serious news coverage and describing them as heroic and
selfless people who expose wrongdoing at great personal risk (Wahl-Jorgensen & Hunt, 2012). Whistleblowers provide journalists with information of public interest, and aid them as they strive to perform their watchdog function by exposing corruption. However, journalists also cover whistleblowers in a very personalized way; their stories focus not just on the content of the whistleblowers’ leaks, but also on the everyday heroism of the whistleblowers themselves. Journalists further personalize the whistleblowers by quoting them frequently, thus allowing them to explain their concerns and motivations. Portraying whistleblowers as heroic individuals and allowing them to speak for themselves lets journalists humanize and ultimately legitimize the whistleblowers, their actions, and the information they provide.

In the digital age, the line between whistleblower and journalist is increasingly blurry. WikiLeaks, which is actually itself not a whistleblower but rather an anonymous online drop box where whistleblowers can deposit documents they wish to make public, was often portrayed in news coverage as the source of the leaks. The leaks were often described as the WikiLeaks disclosures, WikiLeaks’ documents, or WikiLeaks’ releases, not just in the US (numerous, but for examples see Cloud & Parker, 2010; Eichler, 2010; Wolfson, 2010) and UK (e.g., Daily Mail, 2010; Fallon, 2010), but in other nations as well (e.g., see Der Spiegel, 2010), when the source of the leaks was in fact army private Chelsea Manning. As the cited articles demonstrate, the attribution of the leaks did not change after Manning was outed as the source. Did newspapers treat WikiLeaks and Assange—who they often characterized as whistleblowers—in the same way as Wahl-Jorgensen and Hunt (2012) observed journalists treat whistleblowers? Further, with Snowden being on the run, Greenwald was often the public face of his disclosures. Indeed, he was questioned about the disclosures as if they were his own, and were something to which he should be made to answer (e.g., by David Gregory on “Meet the Press” (Gregory,
Was Greenwald, as the central conduit to Snowden—he was the journalist Snowden specifically and repeatedly sought out, and he and Poitras were the only journalists to whom Snowden gave his full trove of documents—made to appear similarly humanized? Wahl-Jorgensen and Hunt’s (2012) study is the only systematic content analysis of news coverage of whistleblowers. To date, no researcher has examined how mainstream journalism treats actors who straddle a line between whistleblower and journalist, and who operate mostly in the digital journalism realm. To address this void in the literature, and to better understand how mainstream newspaper journalists covered WikiLeaks, Assange, Greenwald, and other difficult-to-categorize entrants into the field of digital journalism, my content analysis will answer the following questions:

RQ1: On which aspects of the revelations were different mainstream American and British newspapers most likely to focus?

RQ2: How did news coverage in different mainstream American and British newspapers characterize Assange, WikiLeaks, and Greenwald?

Further, journalists often index the range of acceptable opinions they report to those expressed by elites, who are usually government officials (Bennett, 1990). Current and former government officials seemed, for the most part, to be against the unauthorized leaks of sensitive US and UK government documents. If journalists were to index their coverage to the range of opinions expressed by elites, this would likely result in overwhelmingly negative coverage of WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald. But this would perhaps go against the findings of Wahl-Jorgensen & Hunt, which suggest that journalists portray in a neutral or positive light those that expose corruption and help journalists fulfill their watchdog function; therefore, if journalists are to portray these actors in a neutral-to-positive light, they will likely need to interview sources
who are not government officials. To better understand how journalists portrayed WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald, and to examine what kinds of sources were used in their reporting, it will be illustrative to examine the sources journalists cite in their coverage. Therefore, I propose the following two research questions:

RQ3: What kinds of sources were cited in mainstream American and British newspaper coverage of the whistleblower disclosures?

RQ4: How did those sources characterize Assange, WikiLeaks, and Greenwald?

But journalists are inquisitive by nature, and are trained to be skeptical and to question motivations. Therefore, I also expect journalists in the US and UK to be skeptical of WikiLeaks and Greenwald, as they claimed to be part of their profession while also criticizing many of the long-standing norms and values of journalism. For WikiLeaks, which was a new type of organization—an online drop box for leaked documents, which engages in advocacy—journalists might be uncertain about where WikiLeaks fits within the journalistic landscape. Within metajournalism in the US and UK, we would expect to see confusion about how to define WikiLeaks and where to place it in relation to journalism. Is WikiLeaks a new tool journalists can use? Is it a source? An activist organization? The answers to these questions were unclear when WikiLeaks first emerged. But after the release of “Collateral Murder,” WikiLeaks began to represent itself as a journalistic enterprise. After the website began releasing documents about wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Assange started referring to WikiLeaks as a publisher and to himself as its editor in chief. WikiLeaks and Assange were laying claim to the journalistic identity, thus directly encroaching on the boundaries of journalism.

As Chadwick, Coddington, and others have pointed out, WikiLeaks’ advocacy approach puts it at odds with American journalism’s strong professional orientations toward objectivity.
For this reason, we might expect American journalists to work harder to place WikiLeaks outside the bounds of professional journalism. They want to protect the idea of objectivity, which in the US is often used by journalists to separate the information they produce from information produced by biased communicators, like public relations professionals. However, the idea that journalists should be government watchdogs is also important to the mythos and identity of the American journalist. WikiLeaks, with its strong and vocal commitment to government transparency, might be seen as a means of bolstering journalism’s watchdog bona fides. For this reason, perhaps American journalists will embrace aspects of WikiLeaks. Some aspects of WikiLeaks fall within the boundaries of traditional journalism; social identity theory suggests American journalists will try to separate out, and claim ownership over, those aspects of WikiLeaks that strengthen the positive aspects of their group identity. Conversely, they will attempt to paint as deviant any aspects of WikiLeaks that do not comport with existing professional norms, in an effort to maintain positive distinctness from WikiLeaks. As discussed earlier, Tajfel and Turner (1979) refer to this behavior as “social competition,” where group members engage in direct competition with the out-group, typically via in-group favoritism and/or out-group hostility.

In the UK, journalists’ weaker orientations toward objectivity might mean that they take little issue with WikiLeaks’ advocacy orientation. However, as Semetko et al. (1991) observed, the British press may be “more respectful” of the government and politicians than the American press (p. 142). WikiLeaks forcefully and unequivocally challenged the authority of the US government, and ignored calls by both the American and British governments to cease publication of the Manning materials. Further, many journalists criticized (rightly or not) the quality of WikiLeaks’ redactions; WikiLeaks’ behavior toward governments and the debatable
quality of its redactions might be seen as irresponsible or disrespectful conduct, inappropriate for a professional. British journalism also places a high value on supplying readers with context and analysis; although WikiLeaks released the edited “Collateral Murder” video and published some articles on its site, it mostly released files without context or comment. For these reasons, one might also expect British journalists to paint WikiLeaks as outside the boundaries of real journalism.

Greenwald’s style of advocacy journalism might similarly rub American journalists the wrong way; he does not subscribe to the idea that journalists should aspire to be objective, and is openly critical of traditional American journalistic norms. Edward Snowden actually chose to seek out Greenwald, and supply him with one of the biggest journalistic scoops of all time, because Greenwald practices advocacy journalism. His success makes Greenwald’s refusal to conform to norms of objectivity more of a threat to American journalism. We might expect journalists, particularly those working at large establishments outlets like the New York Times that were snubbed by Snowden, to highlight Greenwald’s partiality in an attempt to place him outside the bounds of journalism and minimize his contributions to the field. In addition, Greenwald’s vocal critiques of American and British mainstream journalism might further provoke journalists in both nations to respond to him in a negative manner. He frequently defines himself in opposition to mainstream journalists, and claims that advocacy journalism is inherently more honest and more likely to hold the powerful to account. Because he already defines himself in direct opposition to mainstream journalism, mainstream journalists might be inclined to say, “We agree with you—you aren’t one of us.”

Answers to the question of how US and UK journalists will respond to WikiLeaks and Greenwald are complex and difficult to predict, given the rapid changes that are happening in the
news industries in both countries and the many ways in which WikiLeaks and Greenwald both adhere to and challenge aspects of journalistic professionalism in both countries. Therefore, I propose the following two research questions, which I will address with analyses of metajournalistic discourse:

RQ5: What professional boundaries do journalists in each country identify in metajournalistic discourse surrounding WikiLeaks and Greenwald?

RQ6: Where do journalists place WikiLeaks and Greenwald in relation to those boundaries?

Answering these questions will offer insight into how journalistic boundaries are changing and how journalists see newcomers in their field. These answers will ultimately contribute to and extend past research into how journalists respond and adapt to changes in the news media ecosystem—particularly changes brought about by the internet and its associated technologies. It will also shed light on how journalists define their work in the digital age, and the aspects of traditional journalism that have become more or less important since journalists at longstanding media outlets stopped having a monopoly on information procurement and distribution.
Chapter 4: Methods

This dissertation makes use of mixed methods research by combining a quantitative content analysis with a qualitative textual analysis. My goal in combining quantitative and qualitative methods is to take advantage of the strengths and weaknesses of each research approach. For instance, if quantitative research uses random sample, it can produce generalizable results; however, those results often do not offer much in-depth description of the observed phenomena (R. B. Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In contrast, qualitative research can provide far more detailed and complex accounts of phenomena, but those results are often not generalizable to other cases or settings. Quantitative and qualitative research methods, therefore, complement each other in numerous ways; “there is more insight to be gained from the combination of both qualitative and quantitative research than either form by itself” (Creswell, 2009, p. 203).

Both methods are outlined below.

Content analysis

This project employs a quantitative content analysis of mainstream news coverage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures. The goal of this content analysis is to understand how these American and British newspapers covered the disclosures provided by Manning and Snowden, with particular focus on characterization of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, and Glenn Greenwald. Components included in the second content analysis address all research questions, which relate to how mainstream news media characterize journalists working with whistleblowers, whether mainstream journalists criticize these journalists for their perceived lack of adherence to traditional profession norms and how these criticisms evolved over time, the kinds of sources
used in coverage of the disclosures, characterizations of whistleblowers, and the aspects of disclosures on which mainstream media were most likely to focus.

Outlets included in this analysis are the New York Times (US), Wall Street Journal (US), Washington Post (US), Guardian (UK), and the Times (UK). The New York Times and Guardian were chosen because both organizations worked with WikiLeaks in covering the Manning documents. The Guardian and the Washington Post also worked with Snowden documents; the New York Times later reported on Snowden document as well. The Wall Street Journal and the Times were added to the sample, as neither outlet worked with Manning or Snowden documents, and therefore might not display a level of pro-whistleblower that one might expect to see at those outlets who worked directly with Manning and Snowden documents. Further, both the Wall Street Journal and the Times are examples of slightly right-leaning—yet well-respected—mainstream media in their respective nations, providing a counter-balance to the slightly left-leaning Guardian and New York Times. This makes for an interesting comparison, both intra- and internationally.

The news article is the unit of analysis in this study. Articles from the New York Times, Washington Post, Guardian, and Times were retrieved using LexisNexis Academic database. The Wall Street Journal is not available on LexisNexis, and so ProQuest was used to retrieve articles from that publication. Each article was assigned a random identification number.

To retrieve articles related to the Manning disclosures, the search terms ("WikiLeaks" OR "Julian Assange" OR Assange OR "Bradley Manning" OR or "Iraq war logs" OR "Afghan war logs") were used, with duplicate articles being omitted. Because this search returned such a large number of articles, I took a random selection of the article population was chosen. This random sample was achieved by first sorting the articles into chronological order, and then selecting
every sixth article to be included this analysis. In total, 354 articles were included in the WikiLeaks content analysis. The number of articles sampled from each publication is shown in Table 3.1.

[Table 3.1 here]

To obtain articles related to the Snowden disclosures, the search terms used were ("Edward Snowden" OR Snowden OR "Glenn Greenwald" OR “Laura Poitras”). Duplicate articles were omitted in the results. As with the WikiLeaks/Manning results, the Snowden disclosures search returned a high number of articles; to make the analysis more manageable, a random sample of every sixth article was taken using the method described above. The total number of articles included in the Snowden/Greenwald sample was 414. The number of articles sampled from each publication is shown in Table 3.2.

[Table 3.2 here]

Coding

Three undergraduate research assistants were trained to use the codebook and codesheet. Inter-coder reliability was checked multiple times during the training process, using relevant articles that were not included in the actual sample. In response to these inter-coder reliability tests, the codebook and codesheet would be refined for clarity, and additional coder training would occur. Inter-coder reliability would then be measured again, and additional refinements would be made, if necessary.

This process of testing, refinement, and training continued until inter-coder reliability (ICR) between the research assistants and the researcher (me) reached acceptable levels (coefficients of .8 or greater). Once this occurred, all four coders were allowed to begin coding the articles in the sample. One of the coders could only work on the project for one quarter, and
another for one quarter and limited time on a second quarter; therefore, the bulk of the coding was done by one of the undergraduate research assistants who was available more long-term, and myself. Approximately 10% of the total sample of articles (n = 83, or 10.8% of the total sample) was coded by multiple coders for ICR, with the bulk of it being coded by myself and the long-term undergraduate research assistant; because two of the undergraduate assistants were unable to continue assisting in the study, only 5% of the total sample was coded by all four coders. Therefore, when inter-coder reliability results are reported for each variable below, I report intercoder-reliability for (1) all four coders and (2) for the long-term assistant and myself. The ICR sample was chosen randomly. Inter-coder reliability was measured using Krippendorff’s alpha ($\alpha$); these measurements were obtained using ReCal (Freelon, 2011).

The codesheet and codebook can be found in the Appendix.

**Identifying information about article:** Coders first entered basic identifying information about the article, including the article identification number, the headline, date, newspaper name, and type of article (news story, editorial, letter to the editor, feature, or other).

**Primary topic of article.** Coders were asked to determine the primary topic of the article from a list of 21 general topics (a 22nd option was “other,” which was to be used when coders felt none of the existing categories fit well). Detailed descriptions of primary topic options are included in the codebook. The topics included (1) the actual content of the leaked documents; (2) reactions from US government officials to the leaks; (3) reactions from UK government officials to the leaks; (4) reactions from foreign (non-US and non-UK) government officials to the leaks; (5) the personalities or personal lives of the actors involved in the leaks; (6) Assange’s house arrest, legal troubles in Sweden, or subsequent asylum in the Ecuadorian Embassy; (7) the careers of the journalistic actors involved; (8) the careers of the whistleblowers; (9) the
whistleblowers’ decision to leak the documents; (10) the consequences Manning faced for leaking; (11) the consequences Snowden faced for leaking; (12) WikiLeaks as an organization; (13) decisions made by the mainstream news organizations involved in reporting on each disclosure; (14) reactions from for-profit companies to the leaks (e.g., Google, Amazon); (15) actual or potential repercussions of the leaks; (16) reactions from non-government or non-corporate actors to leaks (e.g., regular citizens, activist groups, public opinion polling); (17) how communication between Snowden and Greenwald or Poitras took place; (18) the David Miranda detention at Heathrow Airport; (19) the hacktivist collective Anonymous; (20) how media cover whistleblowers generally; (21) the legal consequences facing Assange and WikiLeaks; and (22) other ($a (4 coders) = 0.818, a (2 coders) = 0.817$).

**Portrayal of journalistic actors in headline and article.** Coders were then asked a series of questions about the portrayal of the journalistic actors—Assange, WikiLeaks, or Greenwald—in the headline and article. Headlines were coded separately from articles for two main reasons: (1) Some newspaper readers skim headlines without reading articles, and a negative/positive headline could influence these readers’ views of WikiLeaks and Assange, and (2) the British national press is highly competitive (as described in Chapter 3) and often uses attention-grabbing headlines to entice readers, while the main text of the article might not be as salacious. Coding the headline and article separately allows me to compare these depictions.

The coders indicated whether the headline and article portrayed these actors “very negatively,” “somewhat negatively,” “balanced/neutrally,” “somewhat positively,” or “very positively.” Per the codebook instructions (see the Appendix), a “balanced/neutral” portrayal was one in which no apparent judgment was made about the actor’s actions; this included headlines and articles that simply described Assange’s, WikiLeaks’, or Greenwald’s actions, or articles that included
an even mix of both positive and negative statements about one or more of these individuals or organizations.

A “somewhat positive” headline or article was one that implied that the journalistic actor’s actions were necessary or could have positive implications. “Somewhat positive” articles might focus on what supporters say about these actors, or include mostly positive comments about Assange, WikiLeaks, or Greenwald. A “very positive” headline or article was one that unequivocally and explicitly commended or praised the journalistic actor and his/her/its actions, and contained no negative statements about the actor; this kind of portrayal was usually only present in editorials or articles written by columnists.

A “somewhat negative” portrayal was one that implied the journalistic actor’s action were questionable and could have negative implications. A “somewhat negative” article might focus on the detractors of Assange, WikiLeaks, or Greenwald, or include mostly negative comments about one or more of these actors. A “very negative” headline or article was one that unequivocally and explicitly condemned the journalistic actor and his/her/its actions; these articles contained no positive statements about the actor. “Very negative” portrayals were usually only found in editorials or articles written by columnists.\(^\text{11}\)

If coders were undecided about whether a portrayal was neutral versus somewhat negative, or somewhat negative versus very negative, they were instructed to err on the side of neutral. If the journalistic actor was not mentioned in the headline or article, coders selected “not portrayed.” Assange was rarely portrayed in headlines in the ICR sample, so coder agreement was high \(a (4 \text{ coders}) = 0.924, a (2 \text{ coders}) = 0.919\). Krippendorff’s Alpha for portrayals of Assange in the articles \(a (4 \text{ coders}) = 0.808, a (2 \text{ coders}) = 0.865\), and WikiLeaks in the

\(^{11}\) Examples of headlines in each category can be found in the Appendix.
headline \((a (4 \text{ coders}) = 0.871, a (2 \text{ coders}) = 0.817)\) and article \((a (4 \text{ coders}) = 0.795, a (2 \text{ coders}) = 0.781)\) were all acceptable. Greenwald was only portrayed once in the headlines in the ICR sample, so Krippendorff’s measures of reliability are not meaningful. Reliability measures for portrayals of Greenwald in the article were high \((a (4 \text{ coders}) = 0.889, a (2 \text{ coders}) = 0.835)\); the Greenwald reliability was likely higher than the Assange or WikiLeaks reliability because Greenwald was mentioned far less within the news articles, and coders thus agreed more (by answering “not portrayed”).

**Description of journalistic actors’ physical appearance or personalities.** Coders next indicated whether the headline or article described the physical appearance or personalities of Assange, Greenwald, or Poitras. If the article did describe one or more of these actors’ appearances or personalities, coders were asked to indicate whether that description was “flattering,” “unflattering,” or “neutral.”

A “flattering” description was one that included complimentary remarks, or that included descriptions that are traditionally thought to be attractive or positive. Coders were told to ask themselves: “If someone described your appearance or personality in this way, would you be happy?” If the answer was “yes,” then the description should be coded as flattering. Examples of flattering descriptions of someone’s physical appearance which were offered in the codebook included athletic, attractive, handsome, in-shape, sexy, well dressed, or youthful. Flattering descriptions of someone’s personality included, for example, saying someone was charming, compassionate, honest, funny, kind, noble, patient, polite, witty, and so on.

An “unflattering” description was one that included remarks that would be considered insulting, or description that are traditionally thought of as unattractive or undesirable. Coders were told to ask themselves: “If someone described your appearance or personality in this way,
would you be insulted?” If the answer was “yes,” then the description should be coded as unflattering. Examples of unflattering words that might be used to describe someone’s physical appearance included dirty, gaunt, pale, nerdy, sloppy, smelly, unwashed, and so on. Examples of unflattering personality descriptions included arrogant, egotistical, impolite, moody, narcissistic, paranoid, rude, sneaky, tactless, vain, among others.

A “neutral” description simply described the physical appearance or personality of the journalistic actor, without making obvious judgments about whether this appearance or personality is attractive or desirable. Examples of neutral descriptions of someone’s physical appearance given in the codebook include bearded, blond, short, tall, wearing a coat, or wearing glasses. Examples of neutral personality descriptions included being shy, quiet, reserved, or cautious.

Descriptions of Assange’s personality or physical appearance were very rare; they did not occur in the four-person inter-coder reliability sample, and they only occurred three times in the two-person inter-coder reliability sample; inter-coder reliability scores were therefore very tentative (a (two coders) = 0.829). Descriptions of Greenwald’s personality or appearance were even more rare, and only occurred once in the two-person inter-coder reliability sample.

Sources. The final section of the codesheet asked coders to list, in chronological order, the sources quoted in the article. Coders were asked to do this for each sentence, or portion thereof, included in the article. For each quoted sentence or portion thereof, coders were asked to list the source’s name, and to assign the source a code indicating what kind of person the source was. Possible source codes included (1) US President Barack Obama, (2) another current US government official, employee, or department, (3) a former US government official or employee, (4) UK Prime Minister David Cameron, (5) another current UK government official, employee,
or department, (6) a former UK government official or employee, (7) a current foreign (non-US and non-UK) government official, employee, or department, (8) a former foreign government official or employee, (9) a terrorist organization or its representative, (10) Julian Assange, (11) another WikiLeaks staffer or volunteer, or official WikiLeaks statement, or attorney working for WikiLeaks, (12) Glenn Greenwald, (13) Laura Poitras, (14) other journalist, news outlet, or media commentator, (15) Bradley/Chelsea Manning, (16) Edward Snowden, (17) a friend, family member, partner, or acquaintance of Manning, Assange, Snowden, Greenwald, or Poitras, (18) an activist, activist organization, or its representative, (19) a completely anonymous source with no identifying information given, (20) an “expert,” usually on law, diplomacy, or extradition, (21) a private citizen, (23) Daniel Ellsberg, (24) a commercial company or its representative (e.g., Booz Allen Hamilton, Microsoft, Amazon, Twitter, Apple, Facebook, etc.), or (22) Other. If a coder was unsure who the source was based on the information provided in the article, he or she was instructed to look up the source or source’s organization—for example, one coder was unfamiliar with Britain’s MI6, and needed to look up that organization in order to determine which source code to apply. However, most news articles clearly described who quoted sources were, and in what capacity they were being quoted. Inter-coder reliability for the source code variable reached acceptable levels ($a_{4 coders}= 0.826$, $a_{2 coders} = 0.836$).

**Source evaluation of WikiLeaks, Assange, or Greenwald.** Coders next indicated whether the source’s quote referenced WikiLeaks, Assange, or Greenwald in any fashion ($a_{4 coders}= 0.918$, $a_{2 coders} = 0.890$). If yes, the coder then indicated whether this quote was generally supportive, unsupportive, or neutral of WikiLeaks, Assange, or Greenwald ($a_{4 coders} = 0.864$, $a_{2 coders} = 0.799$).

**Qualitative textual analysis**
This project uses two qualitative textual analyses to examine metajournalistic discourse surrounding whether WikiLeaks should be considered a journalistic organization and whether Glenn Greenwald or Laura Poitras should be considered a journalist. As described earlier, metajournalistic coverage, sometimes referred to as “journalism in the mirror” (Zelizer, 1993), refers to public news discourse where journalists talk about their profession, revealing “attempts by journalists to articulate, negotiate, defend, and even obscure their cultural, social, and political significance” (Carlson, 2012, p. 268). Research in this area aids in understanding how journalists attempt to publicly define their profession, its role in society, and, ultimately, the public image of their profession (Bishop, 1999; Carlson, 2012). Included in the present textual analysis is material from any mainstream news outlet in which journalists (as opposed to guest op-ed contributors) debate whether to include WikiLeaks, Greenwald, and Poitras in the sphere of journalism is taking place. The goal of this analysis is to better understand how mainstream news media journalists perceived WikiLeaks and Greenwald, and how they chose to characterize them in public discourse.

Articles for this analysis were compiled using Google News, Google, and LexisNexis Academic searches for articles related to Assange, Greenwald, and Poitras that cover the debate over whether these individuals are journalists, and articles related to whether WikiLeaks should be considered a journalistic organization. Search terms for metajournalistic coverage of Assange and WikiLeaks included (“Julian Assange” OR WikiLeaks) AND journalis* AND debate). Search terms for metajournalistic coverage of the journalists working closely with Snowden included (“Glenn Greenwald” OR “Laura Poitras” OR “Ewen MacAskill” OR “Barton Gellman”) AND journalis* AND debate). Articles returned from both searches were vetted to ensure they actually discussed whether these individuals or organizations should be considered
journalistic in nature. Further, these articles often link to similar articles engaging in metajournalistic debate about who is a journalist and why. If these links pointed to relevant metajournalistic articles, they were included in this analysis.

In total, 68 articles were included in the WikiLeaks metajournalistic discourse analysis—38 from US sources, and 30 from UK sources. A total of 71 articles were included in the Greenwald/Poitras analysis—37 from US sources, and 34 from UK sources. A complete list of the articles included in both metajournalistic discourse analyses can be found in the Appendix.

It bears mentioning here that few metajournalistic articles related to the Snowden disclosures mentioned Laura Poitras. As described in Chapter 2, Greenwald is a person who enjoys debating issues of journalistic practice and national security, and he has long since had antagonistic relationships with many members of the mainstream press. His personality and his interactions with other journalists made him a lightening rod for news coverage and criticism about the journalism-related aspects of the Snowden revelations. Poitras has a much more reserved personality, and took a more back-seat role in commenting on the revelations. She consequently attracted less news coverage and criticism. For this reason, my analysis focuses on Greenwald.

This qualitative analysis addresses research questions RQ5 and RQ6, which relate to how mainstream news media characterize journalists working with whistleblowers, and whether mainstream journalists criticize these journalists for their perceived lack of adherence to traditional profession norms. This analysis is intended to describe the state of journalists’ discourse about their own profession as it relates to WikiLeaks and the journalists working with Snowden. This analysis provides a contextual backdrop which aids understanding the
quantitative content analysis (described below), which focuses on the news content journalists actually produced.

**Textual analysis methodology**

This analysis used four close readings of metajournalistic discourse about (1) American journalists reactions to WikiLeaks and/or Assange, (2) British journalists’ reactions to WikiLeaks and/or Assange, (3) American journalists’ reactions to Greenwald, and (4) British journalists’ reactions to Greenwald. To be included in this textual analysis, an article had to be in print (including online), be written by a journalist from the respective nation, focus on the debate surrounding whether these three actors could be considered journalists, and be written within one year of when the respective disclosures took place. These articles were compiled using Lexis Nexis and Google web searches; a complete list of the articles included in each analysis can be found in the Appendix.

The articles were examined using the constant comparative method (Glaser, 1965; Thomas, 2011), aided by Atlas.ti qualitative research software. For each of the four analyses, articles were first placed in chronological order. The entire corpus of articles was then read through six or more times. The first few readings made note of how journalists defined their profession, how they defined WikiLeaks or Assange, and how journalists described attributes of WikiLeaks or Assange either conforming to or deviating from journalistic boundaries. These notes were made by highlighting passages of text using Atlas.ti, and assigning the passages a label. After two to three passes, these labels were assessed in Atlas.ti to look for similarities, duplicate labels, and broader themes relating to boundaries. Based on these assessments, I combined some labels and made some new labels; on subsequent readings, I applied these refined labels to passages in the articles. Throughout this process, I also noted compelling
quotations or remarks that succinctly summarized a journalist’s thinking on a particular issue; many of these quotes were included in the analyses presented in Chapters 6 and 7. I stopped reading through articles when I felt I had extracted all possible information from them. I then made a theme matrix in Microsoft Excel, which listed each of the articles on the left side and each of the larger themes on the top; these themes included the professional boundaries journalists identified, and ways in which journalists described WikiLeaks/Assange/Greenwald as having attributes that did or did not conform to journalistic boundaries. Each boundary was color-coded to aid in analysis. The goal of the theme matrix was to assess the prevalence of each boundary in one visual location, and to aid in the broader understanding of the boundaries journalists identified in each case. The most prevalent boundaries (ones mentioned by three or more journalists) were included in the results presented in Chapters 6 and 7.

American journalism surrounding WikiLeaks was analyzed first, followed by British metajournalism surrounding WikiLeaks. I then turned to the metajournalism surrounding Greenwald. Because I began with American journalism in the WikiLeaks case, I chose to examine British journalism surrounding Greenwald first. My rationale for doing this was that I did not want to begin both analyses with the same country; I was concerned that, by analyzing the same country first in both the WikiLeaks and Greenwald cases, I might subconsciously use the themes that emerged in the first country to assess the discourse of the second country. By switching the order in which I analyzed the countries’ metajournalism, I hoped to mitigate this effect.

The guiding ethos of any qualitative discourse analysis methodology is the belief that researchers should be sensitive to subtleties in language and meaning. Like many qualitative analysis methods, constant comparative analysis is “not designed (as methods of qualitative
analysis are) to guarantee that two analysts working independently with the same data will achieve the same results; it is designed to allow, with discipline, for some of the vagueness and flexibility which aid the creative generation of theory” (Glaser, 1965, p. 438). Therefore, I do not intend for this analysis to lead to a definitive statement of how all journalists view Assange, WikiLeaks, or Greenwald Rather, the goal of this analysis is to closely examine some mainstream journalists’ views of these actors, and to ascertain where this subset of mainstream journalists sees these actors fitting into the journalism landscape.
**Table 3.1**

*Total Articles Included in Manning Disclosures Content Analysis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.2**

*Total Articles Included in Snowden Disclosures Content Analysis*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Number of articles</th>
<th>% of total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 5: Content Analysis of News Coverage of the Manning and Snowden Disclosures

In this chapter I use a quantitative content analysis to examine the larger breadth of newspaper coverage about the Manning and Snowden disclosures. The content analysis examines how journalists portrayed WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald, whether journalists made attempts to humanize them, what sources journalists used in their coverage, and how those sources portrayed WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald. This content analysis aids in understanding how journalists covered WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald in their day-to-day coverage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures, and allows me to compare the coverage both across nations and across case studies.

The analysis includes coverage from five newspapers—three from the US (the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street Journal) and two from the UK (the Guardian and the Times). As discussed in Chapter 4, the unit of analysis in this content analysis is the article. I will report the results by newspaper in this chapter, rather than comparing the three American newspapers to the two British newspapers. This is because it is reasonable to expect that newspapers that worked directly with WikiLeaks and Greenwald (the New York Times and Guardian in the case of WikiLeaks, and the Washington Post and Guardian in the case of Greenwald) might cover them differently than other newspapers. It is also reasonable to expect the coverage in the more conservative British newspaper The Times to differ from the coverage found in the left-leaning Guardian. The Wall Street Journal’s coverage might also differ from other American newspapers; is owned by the same company as the Times, and its coverage might skew more conservative as a result. Therefore, I will break down the results by newspaper.

This content analysis addresses RQs 1, 2, 3, and 4, which relate to aspects of the disclosures on which mainstream newspapers were most likely to focus, how mainstream news
media characterize journalists working with whistleblowers, the kinds of sources used in coverage of the disclosures, and how these sources characterized Assange, WikiLeaks, and Greenwald. Each research question is addressed in turn below, beginning with coverage of the Manning disclosures before turning to coverage of the Snowden disclosures.

Part I: WikiLeaks and Assange

Results

Topics in news coverage. RQ1 asked which aspects of the revelations received the most attention from mainstream newspapers. In the US, the New York Times devoted the largest portion of its coverage (31.9%) to the content of the documents (see Table 5.1 for the top ten categories covered in each newspaper). The Washington Post devoted the largest portion of its coverage (25.6%) of its Manning disclosures coverage to the content of the leaked documents. The Wall Street Journal, in contrast, devoted the largest portion of its coverage to Assange’s sex charges and house arrest (22.6%).

[Table 5.1 here]

In the UK, The Guardian was the paper that worked with WikiLeaks and Assange directly, and which had direct access to the Manning documents. Most of its coverage focused on the content of the leaked documents (29.1%). The Times’ coverage looked quite different from the Guardian’s, and largely focused on events relating to the personal lives of the actors involved in the Manning disclosures. The most common topic in the Times’ coverage was Assange’s sex charges and house arrest (33.7%).

12 Chapter 3 details the complete methodology of this content analysis and the rationale for choosing these five newspapers.
The five newspapers differed in their focus on Assange’s sex charges and subsequent house arrest ($\chi^2 \ (4, \ N = 354) = 11.995, \ p = 0.02$). The chi-square standardized residuals$^{13}$, which indicate the difference between the expected and observed values, showed that the *Times* was more likely to cover Assange’s sex charges than any of the four other newspapers. The *Times* was also more likely than the other newspapers to cover the personal lives of Assange or Manning; however, 30% of the cells in the chi-square contingency table had had expected values less than 5, which violates one of the assumptions of the chi-square test.$^{14}$ Therefore, the significance of these results is tentative. However, the topics of (1) Assange’s sex charges and (2) the personal lives of Assange and Manning are both related to personal lives of the actors involved in the disclosures, as opposed to the disclosures themselves or any actor’s reaction to the leaks. It therefore makes sense conceptually to combine these two topics, as well as sense statistically so that the expected counts in each cell will be greater than 5. If these two topics are combined for conceptual and statistical purposes, chi-square results indicate that the newspapers devoted different amounts of coverage to the personal lives of the actors involved (particularly

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$^{13}$ In the event of a statistically significant chi-square test, “a cell-by-cell comparison of observed and estimated expected frequencies helps us to better understand the nature of the evidence” (Agresti, 2007, p. 38; see also Sharpe, 2015).

$^{14}$ When conducting chi-square tests, Cochran’s (1952) rule states that no more than 20% of the contingency table cells should have an expected value of less than 5. If this rule is violated, the results of the chi-square test may be unreliable.
Assange, as Manning was rarely mentioned in any news coverage of her disclosures\(^{15}\) \(X^2 (4, N = 354) = 21.127, p < 0.001\). Looking at the standardized residuals for the chi-square test, I again observed that that the *Times* was more likely than any of the other four newspapers to devote coverage to topics that related to the personal lives of the actors involved.

The newspapers did not significantly differ in their coverage of other common topics, such as the actual contents of the leaked documents or government reactions to the leaks.

**Characterizations of Assange and WikiLeaks.** RQ2 asked how news coverage characterized Assange and WikiLeaks. This content analysis addressed this research question in a number of ways. First, it examined how Assange and WikiLeaks were portrayed in headlines and articles. Coders indicated whether the portrayal was very negative, somewhat negative, neutral/balanced, somewhat positive, or very positive. Second, the content analysis noted whether the article described any of the legal or personal consequences that Assange or WikiLeaks faced as a result of their reporting.\(^{16}\) As described in Chapter 3, legal consequences

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\(^{15}\) Results show that Manning was only mentioned in 4.5% of headlines and 19.5% of articles about her disclosures \((n = 354)\). In comparison, WikiLeaks was mentioned in 49.7% of headlines and 92.4% of articles, and Assange was mentioned in 29.1% of headlines and 56.8% of articles.

\(^{16}\) Assange and some of his supporters have alleged that the Swedish sex charges were a honeypot scheme orchestrated by the US government in retaliation for WikiLeaks’ publication of the Iraq and Afghan war documents and diplomatic cables. They argue that the ultimate goals of the honeypot scheme are (1) to smear Assange’s name and (2) to get Assange back in Sweden, where the US-Sweden extradition agreement would allow the US to extradite Assange and make him face criminal charges. However, these allegations have never been proven, and the American and Swedish governments deny any such collaboration on the sex charges. It is also
included any consequences imposed by a court of law as a result of Assange’s or WikiLeaks’ reporting or publishing, such as criminal charges or potential prison terms. Personal consequences included any consequences that might cause inconvenience or hardship in one’s personal life, such as loss of contact with family and friends, losing income or property, or, in the case of WikiLeaks, losing access to financial resources via Mastercard, Visa, or PayPal. Third, the content analysis noted whether articles mentioned Assange’s or WikiLeaks’ journalistic motivations—that is, whether the article describes their motivations for working with Manning and for reporting on the leaked documents. Motivations might include, for example, wanting to inform the public or believing the documents provided evidence of crimes. Fourth, the content analysis asked whether articles included descriptions of Assange’s physical appearance or personality and, if so, if those descriptions were unflattering, neutral, or flattering.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show how each newspaper depicted Assange and WikiLeaks in its headlines and articles. For the purposes of this analysis, I combined “very positive” and “somewhat positive” portrayals into one category called “positive,” and “very negative” and “somewhat negative” portrayals into one category called “negative.”

unclear whether any of the charges Assange faces in the US would qualify as extraditable offenses under the US-Sweden extradition agreement (Groll, 2014). Therefore, simple mentions of Assange’s sex charges and house arrest were not included in the category of personal or legal consequences, because these were not consequences he faced because of his reporting. However, articles that explicitly stated Assange’s sex charges were a ruse to get Assange extradited to the US, where he would face legal charges, were included in the category of legal consequences.

17 See the Appendix for examples of headlines that were coded as very positive, somewhat positive, neutral, somewhat negative, and very negative.
The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Times depicted Assange in a balanced-to-negative way; no American paper ran a single article depicting Assange positively (Table 5.2). The Guardian was the most balanced in its coverage of Assange, with most coverage being neutral (19.1% of headlines and 36.9% of articles), and roughly even amounts being positive (2.8% of headlines and 9.9% of articles) or negative (2.1% of headlines and 6.4% of articles). A Chi-Square test of how newspapers portrayed Assange in headlines was not significant at the p < 0.05 level ($X^2 (8, N = 102) = 14.325, p = 0.074$); however, newspapers portrayed Assange significantly differently within the body of their articles ($X^2 (8, N = 201) = 25.176, p = 0.001$). An observation of the chi-square residuals showed that the Guardian covered Assange more positively than all other newspapers, with more positive and balanced articles than expected and fewer negative articles than expected. The Times was the most negative in its coverage of Assange.

[Table 5.2 here]

The New York Times, however, did not cover WikiLeaks in nearly as negative a manner as it did Assange; the vast majority of its coverage depicted the organization Assange founded in a neutral way (40.4% of headlines and 91.5% of articles) (Table 5.3). The Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, and Times all covered WikiLeaks in a neutral-to-negative way. The Guardian was again the most balanced, with its headlines and articles being mostly neutral, with approximately even amounts of positive and negative coverage of WikiLeaks.

A Chi-Square test revealed that the newspapers characterized WikiLeaks significantly differently from each other in both their headlines ($X^2 (8, N = 176) = 23.518, p = 0.003$) and their articles ($X^2 (8, N = 327) = 39.149, p < 0.001$). The chi-square residuals indicated that the Guardian’s headlines portrayed WikiLeaks more positively than any other paper, and the Times’
headlines portrayed WikiLeaks more negatively. Residuals also indicated that articles in the *Wall Street Journal* and *Times* depicted WikiLeaks more negatively than other newspapers, and that the *Guardian*’s coverage of WikiLeaks was more positive than any other newspaper.

[Table 5.3 here]

**Depictions of Assange’s physical appearance and personality.** Descriptions of Assange’s physical appearance and personality were most common in the *Times*, where 30.4% of articles made some reference to Assange’s personality or physical appearance, usually in an unflattering light (Table 5.4). Flattering references to Assange were rare. Newspapers did not differ significantly in how they characterized Assange’s appearance.

[Table 5.4 here]

**Sources.** RQ3 asked what kinds of sources were most commonly cited in news coverage of the Manning disclosures. Past research has demonstrated that government sources tend to dominate news coverage (Brown, Bybee, Wearden, & Straughan, 1987; Dickson, 1992), and news coverage of the Manning disclosures was no exception (Table 5.5). Current US government officials were the most commonly cited sources within the *New York Times*’ (37.1%), *Washington Post*’s (46.6%), *Wall Street Journal*’s (31.0%), and *Guardian*’s (25.1%) coverage of the Manning disclosures. Within the *Times*’ coverage, Julian Assange was the most commonly cited source (18.3% of quotations), followed closely by current US government officials (18.0%). This tallies with the fact that the most-covered topic within the *Times*’ Manning coverage was Assange’s house arrest and sex charges in Sweden; because the *Times* focused so much on Assange’s personal troubles, it makes sense that it also included many Assange quotations.

[Table 5.5 here]
If all the government-affiliated source categories are collapsed, so that current and former US officials, current and former UK officials, current and former foreign officials, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister David Cameron are grouped together, the extent to which government officials dominated the Manning coverage is even more apparent. The *Washington Post* relied the most on government officials, with 62.5% of its quoted sources being past or current government employees; it was followed by the *Wall Street Journal* (52.9%), the *Guardian* (49.9%), the *New York Times* (46.5%), and the *Times* (34.6%).

Further, in all newspapers except the *Times*, government officials—particularly current US government officials—were most likely to be one of the first, and therefore most prominent, sources cited. In the *New York Times*, 44.7% of the first sources cited were current US government officials; 52.4% of the first sources cited in the *Washington Post* were US government officials, along with 48.4% of the first sources in the *Wall Street Journal* and 33.0% in the *Guardian*. The *Times* again was alone in its focus on Assange: Assange accounted for 22.4% of the first sources cited in the paper’s coverage of the Manning disclosures.

RQ4 asked how sources characterized Assange and WikiLeaks. Research has shown news outlets tend to index their coverage to the views expressed by government officials, such that the range of opinions espoused by officials becomes the only acceptable range of opinion expressed in media coverage (Bennett, 1990). Government officials in the US were almost universally against Assange’s and WikiLeaks’ actions; when they discussed Assange or WikiLeaks publicly, their comments were always unsupportive or neutral (Table 5.6). UK officials were mostly neutral in their assessments of Assange and WikiLeaks (Table 5.7).

[Table 5.6 here]

[Table 5.7 here]
Government sources’ characterizations of WikiLeaks and Assange differed from the characterizations of sources generally (Table 5.8). Overall, most sources were neutral in their assessments of WikiLeaks and Assange (on average, 49.3% and 43.8%, respectively), but many were supportive as well (22.4% and 33.8% on average, respectively) and unsupportive (28.3% and 22.3% on average, respectively). Newspapers, then, were seeking out sources that spoke supportively of WikiLeaks and Assange—and as the US government was uniformly neutral or unsupportive, this meant that journalists needed to venture outside their usual field of sources. In the *Guardian*, the sources who most often spoke positively of WikiLeaks were Assange himself (35.1% of positive quotations) or members of other activist organizations (29.7%), and most sources who spoke positively of Assange were lawyers (35.6%), Assange himself (28.8), or Assange’s friends or family members (15.3%). In the *New York Times*, most positive quotes about WikiLeaks came from Assange (57.1%), as did most positive quotes about Assange (38.5% of positive quotes). The *New York Times* also ran quotes supporting Assange that came from lawyers (23.5%), private citizens, other activists groups, and WikiLeaks staffers or volunteers (each 11.5%). The *Washington Post* and the *Wall Street Journal* very rarely included sources that were supportive of WikiLeaks or Assange; in the few instances where they did, those quotes likely came from WikiLeaks staffers/volunteers, Assange himself, or lawyers. Finally, when the *Times* ran positive quotes about WikiLeaks, they mostly came from Assange himself (61.5% of positive quotes), other WikiLeaks staffers/volunteers (15.4%), or other activist groups (11.5%). Positive quotes about Assange in the *Times* came mostly from Assange’s friends and family (32.7% of positive quotes), Assange himself (29.1%), attorneys (20.0%), other activist organizations (9.1%), or other WikiLeaks staffers and volunteers (another 9.1%). Although the *Times* ran more negative headlines about Assange than any other publication
analyzed here, it also reached out to a wide breadth of sources who spoke positively about Assange and WikiLeaks, and gave them significant speaking time (albeit often at the end of articles).

[Table 5.8 here]

**Summary & Analysis**

RQ1 asked which aspects of the Manning disclosures received the most coverage from mainstream American and British newspapers. The results presented here indicate that the newspapers differed significantly in how much time they spent covering Assange’s personal life, including his sex charges in Sweden. The *Times* focused on Assange’s personal life more than any other paper, and it devoted the largest portion of its disclosures-related coverage to Assange’s house arrest and sex charges—the most salacious part of the WikiLeaks story, and a topic that had nothing to do with the actual whistleblower or the contents of the documents. This suggests that the *Times*, more so than other papers, thought that the personal lives of the actors involved in the Manning disclosures (particularly Assange) were the most newsworthy aspects of the disclosures. The Time’s focus on the most salacious aspect of the WikiLeaks story cannot be solely explained by the fact that the paper did not have direct access to the Manning documents, like the *New York Times* and *Guardian* did. The *Washington Post* and the *Wall Street Journal* also lacked direct access the leaks, yet devoted similar amounts of coverage to the contents of the documents (presumably reporting on them secondhand). Perhaps the *Times’* coverage of Assange’s sex charges and house arrest could be explained by the fact that Assange served his house arrest in England, and eventually took refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London to avoid extradition to Sweden. However, the *Guardian* is also based in the UK, and it still focused the bulk of its coverage on the content of the leaked documents.
Overall, the newspapers did not differ between countries; instead, the *Times* was an outlier.

RQ2 asked how news coverage characterized WikiLeaks and Assange. In headlines, WikiLeaks was depicted similarly in the three American newspapers. The two British newspapers again differed significantly, with the *Guardian*’s headlines characterizing WikiLeaks the most positively of the five newspapers and the *Times*’ headlines depicting WikiLeaks the most negatively. Articles appearing in the two Rupert Murdoch-owned newspapers, the *Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*, depicted WikiLeaks the most negatively. This suggests that the *Wall Street Journal* was trying to stay neutral about the organization in its headlines, but was less balanced in the body of its articles, either by including mostly sources or quotes that disparaged WikiLeaks or by allowing its journalists to be openly critical of WikiLeaks themselves. The *Times*, on the other hand, had no qualms about voicing its disapproval of WikiLeaks in both its headlines and its articles. Overall, these results indicate differences between papers, but also between nations. The *Times* and *Guardian* were both significantly more negative and positive, respectively, about WikiLeaks, while the American newspapers (with the exceptions of articles in the Murdoch-owned *Wall Street Journal*) were overwhelmingly neutral.

The newspapers depicted Assange more negatively than they depicted WikiLeaks. Among American newspapers, the *Wall Street Journal* was again the most critical, running the highest percentage of articles that painted Assange in a negative light. In the UK, the *Guardian* and *Times* were again opposites in their depictions: The *Guardian*’s coverage of him was very balanced (the only paper analyzed here whose coverage of him did not skew negative), while the *Times*’ coverage was balanced-to-negative. Again, the results suggest differences not just
between papers but between nations, with the British papers being more biased (either for or against Assange) and the American newspapers being more likely to be neutral.

The *Times* was also unique amongst all newspapers analyzed here, because it featured Assange in the bulk of its headlines (73.9%), while most other newspapers did not mention Assange in their headlines. This again points to the *Times*’ strong focus on Assange above all other aspects of the Manning disclosures. The *Times*’ headlines were also more negative about Assange than its articles. This fact, accompanied with the paper’s significant focus on Assange’s personal affairs, suggests that the paper may have been using salacious headlines about Assange to grab readers’ attention. Further, the *Times* was also unique in that nearly one-third (30.4%) of its Manning coverage made references to Assange’s physical appearance or personality, the most of any newspaper analyzed here. Most of these references were unflattering (but when Assange’s personality or appearance was mentioned in *any* newspaper, it was usually in an unflattering way). This again suggests that the *Times* was the most biased against Assange, and the most focused on his personal life and appearance—significantly more than any American newspaper.

The papers that did not work directly with WikiLeaks all covered the organization much more negatively. It is perhaps surprising that the *New York Times*, which worked directly with Assange and WikiLeaks, was quite critical of Assange; 17.0% of its articles depicted him negatively. This contrasts with the depictions of Assange by his other collaborator, the *Guardian*. The differences in these depictions might explain why Assange and WikiLeaks chose to freeze the *New York Times* out of the diplomatic cables release, while continuing their relationship with the *Guardian*. Indeed, this was the reason cited by those close to Assange, who was particularly unhappy with how he was depicted by the *New York Times* in an October 23, 2010 front-page
profile (Burns & Somaiya, 2010; Zetter, 2011).^{18} This profile happened to be included in the New York Times sample analyzed here.

RQ3 asked what kinds of sources were most likely to be cited in news coverage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures. Present and past government officials dominated news coverage of both disclosures. In particular, US government officials were most likely to be cited early on in articles, thus giving their opinions and analysis more prominence. However, in the case of the Manning disclosures, the Times’ most-quoted source was one man in particular: Julian Assange. This is keeping with other analyses here which demonstrate the paper’s strong focus on Assange, his personality, and his personal life. The Times was, once again, an outlier amongst the five newspapers.

Finally, RQ4 asked how sources characterized Assange, WikiLeaks, and Greenwald. Current US government officials, who were the most frequently cited sources in all newspapers except for the Times and most likely to be cited early on in articles, were overwhelmingly against WikiLeaks’ and Assange’s actions; the quotes they gave reflected this disapproval, as they were always unsupportive or neutral in their assessments of WikiLeaks or Assange. However, all

^{18} Assange was allegedly angry about the New York Times’ front-page profile of him (“WikiLeaks founder on the run, trailed by notoriety,” by John F. Burns and Ravi Somaiya), which he felt was inaccurate and unflattering (Zetter, 2011). After the New York Times refused to publish a front-page apology for the profile, Assange decided to leave the paper out of the diplomatic cables release. However, the New York Times obtained access to the full cache of diplomatic cables from the Guardian (thereby causing new rifts in Assange’s relationship with that paper as well).
papers analyzed here countered US government officials’ disapproval of WikiLeaks and Assange by seeking out sources who were supportive. This suggests that the newspapers’ tendency to index their coverage to the opinions of government elites might have been balanced out by their desire to appear neutral. This is particularly true for both of the British newspapers analyzed here, which ran more quotes supportive of WikiLeaks and Assange than unsupportive. The Times’ use of sources that supported Assange and WikiLeaks might seem surprising, given the paper’s otherwise negative and scandalous coverage of Assange; however, Assange was also that paper’s most-quoted source, and many of those supportive quotes came from him (29.1% of those supportive quotes about himself, and 61.5% of the supportive quotes about WikiLeaks). Assange will, of course, speak positively about himself and his organization, but the Times’ otherwise contemptuous coverage of Assange will allow readers to easily dismiss these quotes. Therefore, by running positive quotes about Assange and WikiLeaks that mostly come from Assange, the paper may be undercutting their portrayal of him even further by making him seem out-of-touch, big-headed, or otherwise unlikeable. Interestingly, the Times also let Assange speak for himself more than any other newspaper—however, this could be less of an attempt to humanize him (as Wahl-Jorgensen and Hunt (2012) argued in their piece on news coverage of whistleblowers) and more of a desire to quote the often bombastic or attention-grabbing sound bites that Assange is prone to offer the media.

Part II: Greenwald

Results

Topics in news coverage. RQ1 asked which aspects of the revelations received the most attention from newspapers. Table 5.9 lists the top ten categories in each newspaper. In the Washington Post and the Guardian, which were the two papers that worked directly with the
Snowden documents, the most common article topic was reaction from US government officials to the revelations (27.9% and 16.3% of articles, respectively). In the other three newspapers, the most common topic was the consequences Snowden faced as a result of his leaks (18.9% of New York Times coverage, 38.1% of Wall Street Journal coverage, and 30.2% of Times coverage). The papers differed significantly in the amount of coverage dedicated to reactions from the US government to the leaks ($\chi^2 (4, N = 414) = 13.372, p = 0.010$). An analysis of the standardized residuals shows that the Washington Post covered reactions from US government officials far more frequently than any other newspaper. The newspapers also differed in the amount of coverage given to the UK government’s reaction to the leaks ($\chi^2 (4, N = 414) = 29.257, p < 0.001$). As might be expected, an observation of the chi-square residuals showed that the British newspapers covered the UK government’s reaction to the Snowden disclosures more than the American newspapers. The newspapers also differed significantly in their coverage of foreign (non-US and non-UK) government reactions to the disclosures ($\chi^2 (4, N = 414) = 10.003, p = 0.040$). An examination of the chi-square residuals indicated that the Washington Post covered this topic much less than the other four newspapers. Finally, newspapers devoted different amounts of coverage to the topic of Snowden’s consequences as a result of leaking the documents ($\chi^2 (4, N = 414) = 17.834, p = 0.001$). The chi-square residuals indicate that the Wall Street Journal covered this topic more than would be expected, while the Guardian covered it less.

[Table 5.9 here]

**Characterizations of Greenwald.** RQ2 asked how news coverage characterized Greenwald. The content analysis addresses this question by examining depictions of Greenwald in headlines and articles, depictions of the legal or personal consequences Greenwald faced as a
result of his reporting, depictions of Greenwald’s journalistic motivations, and depictions of Greenwald’s physical appearance and personality. As with my analysis of Assange and WikiLeaks, I have combined “very positive” and “somewhat positive” portrayals, and “very negative” and “somewhat negative” portrayals for the purposes of statistical analysis.

Greenwald did not receive nearly as much coverage within the Snowden coverage as WikiLeaks and Assange did within the Manning coverage (Table 5.10). Greenwald was rarely portrayed in headlines for Snowden-related articles—only 6 of the 414 articles analyzed here depicted Greenwald in their headlines. When he was depicted in headlines, it was always in a balanced or neutral manner.

[Table 5.10 here]

Greenwald was depicted more frequently in the body of the news articles (19.3% of the 414 articles). However, he was still depicted infrequently enough that 66.67% of the chi-square contingency table cells had expected values less than 5, exceeding the 20% threshold suggested by Cochran (1952). Therefore, a chi-square test would not provide reliable results. Examining the residuals, however, I observe that the Wall Street journal was more negative in its coverage of Greenwald than the other newspapers—although these results are, again, tentative.

**Depictions of Greenwald’s physical appearance and personality.** Similarly, articles rarely mentioned Greenwald’s physical appearance or personality; only 12 out of the 414 articles mentioned his appearance or personality, and most of these references (10) were neutral. This is perhaps surprising, given that the metajournalism surrounding Greenwald frequently noted his argumentative personality.

**Sources.** RQ3 asked what kinds of sources were cited in news coverage of the Snowden disclosures. As with coverage of the Manning disclosures, current government officials
dominated: They occupied the top two source categories for all newspapers (Table 5.11). If all categories of government officials are combined (current and former US officials, current and former UK officials, current and former foreign officials, Barack Obama, and David Cameron), the extent to which government officials dominated the Snowden coverage is even starker:

44.7% of New York Times sources, 56.7% of sources in the Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, 59.6% of Guardian sources, and 68.3% of Times sources cited had some government affiliation. Current government officials were also more likely to be cited early on in an article, and thus giving their opinions and information a more prominent place in the story’s narrative; 50% of the first sources quoted in New York Times articles were current government officials, as were 55.5% in the Washington Post, 70% in the Wall Street Journal, 48.8% in the Guardian, and 66.8% in the Times.

[Table 5.11 here]

RQ4 asked how sources characterized Greenwald. Whereas most current US government officials described Assange and WikiLeaks in a negative way, current US government officials rarely spoke about Greenwald. The same was true of current UK government officials. Indeed, sources of all categories were rarely quoted discussing Greenwald. The newspaper that ran the most quotes about Greenwald was the New York Times. Most of the New York Times’ positive quotes about Greenwald came from his friends and family members (35.3% of positive quotes about Greenwald), Greenwald himself (29.4%), or other journalists or media commentators (17.6%). The negative quotes came mostly from journalists and other media commentators (77.8%), current UK government officials (one source, or 11.1%), or attorneys (one source, or 11.1%).
The *Guardian*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* ran very few quotes about Greenwald (9, 23, and 3, respectively). When these papers ran quotes supporting Greenwald, these quotes came mostly from Greenwald himself, as well as other journalists or media commentators, and current UK or US government officials. Unsupportive quotes about Greenwald came entirely from other journalists and media commentators or current US government officials. The *Times* did not run any quotations that spoke of Greenwald in any manner.

Overall, most negative quotations about Greenwald came from his fellow journalists and media commentators (although there were few of them).

**Summary & analysis**

RQ1 asked which aspects of the Snowden disclosures received the most coverage from mainstream American and British newspapers. The topics covered during the Snowden disclosures varied across newspapers. The three newspapers that did not work directly with the Snowden documents—the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Times*—each focused the most on the consequences Snowden faced as a result of leaking. This could be because this was a topic on which they could report firsthand, without needing to attribute their information to the *Guardian* or *Washington Post*. But the two papers that worked directly with the Snowden documents focused the largest portion of their coverage not on the content of the documents but on US government reaction to the leaks. All the papers differed significantly in the amount of coverage they dedicated to US government reaction, with the *Washington Post* focusing on the US government reaction the most of all newspapers, and focusing on foreign government’s reaction the least—perhaps not surprising, given the Post’s location in Washington, D.C. Also unsurprisingly, the British papers were more likely than the American
papers to cover the UK government’s reactions to the Snowden leaks; however, the British papers also devoted large portions of their coverage to US government reaction. This suggests that the American newspapers are more domestically focused, while the British papers take on a more international perspective.

RQ2 asked how news coverage characterized Greenwald. Greenwald did not attract as much personal commentary as Assange. The New York Times, Washington Post, Guardian, and Times all depicted Greenwald in a mostly neutral or balanced way. The Wall Street Journal was alone in having its coverage skew negative, with 9.6% of its Snowden-related articles depicting Greenwald in a negative way; the Wall Street Journal was also significantly more negative in its coverage of Greenwald than any other paper.

RQ3 asked what kinds of sources were most likely to be cited in news coverage of the Snowden disclosures. As with the Manning coverage, government officials past and present dominated news coverage of the Snowden disclosures across all newspapers. Government officials were again most likely to be cited early on in articles, thereby giving their opinions and analysis more prominence.

Finally, RQ4 asked how sources characterized Greenwald. Greenwald, again, did not receive as much attention in the Snowden disclosures as Assange did in the Manning disclosures; sources rarely spoke about him. Most positive quotes about Greenwald came from his friends or family members, Greenwald himself, or other journalists or media commentators. However, other journalists or media commentators also supplied the majority of unsupportive quotes about Greenwald—perhaps suggesting that, while they wanted to remain neutral in their day-to-day reporting on the disclosures, they had negative personal opinions about him.

Part III: Comparison & conclusion
WikiLeaks and Assange dominated coverage of the Manning disclosures. Manning herself was largely forgotten in news coverage of the documents she leaked. Whereas Snowden and the consequences he was facing received significant coverage in all the newspapers analyzed here, Manning’s consequences did not. This could be because the US government identified Manning as the whistleblower shortly after the disclosures began; the government arrested her, and she was quickly moved outside the reach of journalists and television cameras. Snowden, in contrast, was able to evade arrest and gain asylum in a foreign country, explain his motivations via a series of interviews released by the Guardian, and stay in touch with international media outlets and other organizations via web chat. Manning’s absence may have left news outlets with a hole in their coverage; wanting to add a personal angle to the disclosures, they focused on Assange or WikiLeaks as an organization. Newspapers’ focus on WikiLeaks may also be attributable to a misunderstanding or uncertainty about what WikiLeaks was. Indeed, coverage often referred to the disclosures as the “WikiLeaks disclosures” rather than the “Manning disclosures,” or characterized WikiLeaks as the whistleblower when it was in fact Manning who obtained and released these documents in the context of her work in the US Army. In contrast, the Snowden disclosures were never characterized as the “Greenwald disclosures”; news coverage did not exhibit the same sense of ambiguity or confusion about Snowden and Greenwald’s respective roles in the release of the documents. Or, perhaps Assange was such an odd and polarizing character, and the sexual assault allegations against him so salacious, that the press could not resist devoting significant coverage to him.

If Manning had evaded arrest and been available to tell her side of the story, perhaps coverage of her disclosures would have focused less on Assange and WikiLeaks. Similarly, had Snowden been arrested, perhaps Greenwald would have received more attention in coverage of
the Snowden’s disclosures. As it was, the news coverage analyzed here shows that Assange received significantly more attention, and more negative attention, than did Greenwald.

Comparing coverage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures also illuminates the American and British press’ differing orientations toward covering foreign countries. Specifically, the US newspapers focused little on the UK government’s reaction to either set of disclosures—even in the context of the Snowden disclosures, where both nations were impacted in similar ways and for similar surveillance practices. Although the US press often focused on foreign government’s reactions to the leaks, an overview of the articles suggests that this topic was often covered in the context of how a particular foreign government’s reaction could harm US interests. The UK press, in contrast, devoted significant time both to their own government’s reactions to the leaks, as well as to the US government’s reactions. In general, this supports past research that has found US news coverage to be more inwardly focused than that of other nations (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2013).

Another difference between US and UK media that emerged related to neutrality. Coverage in the Guardian and Times was frequently at odds, with the Guardian covering WikiLeaks and Assange more positively and the Times covering them more negatively. The Times was also singularly focused on Assange and the more salacious aspects of his personal life. The British press, then, was far more polarized in its coverage than the American press. This could be caused by each newspaper’s different political orientations (the Guardian being liberal, and the Times being conservative) or the fact that the Guardian was reluctant to speak ill of its collaborator and source. Whatever the cause, the British press was more biased than the American press which, on the whole, remained neutral (although some aspects of the Wall Street Journal’s coverage indicated that it thought little of Assange and Greenwald).
This analysis found differences in newspapers both within and between each country, and differences in treatments of the two disclosures. But while this analysis can aid understanding of how these newspapers covered these three actors broadly, it cannot speak directly to journalists’ own thoughts and opinions. In the next two sections, I will explore a particular aspect of the news coverage of the Manning and Snowden disclosures—metajournalistic discourse—which can. I will also explore this coverage in greater detail, thus adding in-depth analyses to broader analysis described here.
Table 5.1.

*Manning Coverage: Ten Most Common Topic Categories by Newspaper*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>New York Times (n=47) Rank (%)</th>
<th>Washington Post (n=43) Rank (%)</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal (n=31) Rank (%)</th>
<th>Guardian (n=141) (%)</th>
<th>The Times (London) (n=92) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content of leaked documents</td>
<td>1 (31.9)</td>
<td>1 (25.6)</td>
<td>3 (19.4)</td>
<td>1 (29.1)</td>
<td>2 (20.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assange’s sex charges/house arrest</td>
<td>2 (14.9)</td>
<td>3 (14.0)</td>
<td>1 (22.6)</td>
<td>2 (17.7)</td>
<td>1 (33.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction/response from US gov’t</td>
<td>2 (14.9)</td>
<td>2 (16.4)</td>
<td>4 (12.9)</td>
<td>4 (8.5)</td>
<td>5 (5.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction/response from UK gov’t</td>
<td>9 (2.1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (9.7)</td>
<td>5 (5.0)</td>
<td>7 (3.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction/response from foreign gov’t</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 (3.5)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WikiLeaks as an organization</td>
<td>5 (6.4)</td>
<td>3 (14.0)</td>
<td>1 (22.6)</td>
<td>3 (11.3)</td>
<td>4 (8.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions from non-gov’t, non-corporate actors to leaks</td>
<td>4 (8.5)</td>
<td>5 (11.6)</td>
<td>7 (3.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manning’s consequences</td>
<td>5 (6.4)</td>
<td>8 (2.3)</td>
<td>6 (6.5)</td>
<td>6 (4.3)</td>
<td>9 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal lives of actors involved</td>
<td>8 (4.3)</td>
<td>6 (4.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6 (4.3)</td>
<td>3 (12.0)</td>
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<td>Anonymous (hacktivist organization)</td>
<td>5 (6.4)</td>
<td>8 (2.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6 (4.3)</td>
<td>5 (5.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decisions made by mainstream press involved in leaks</td>
<td>9 (2.1)</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>6 (4.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>6 (4.7)</td>
<td>7 (3.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repercussions of Manning’s leaks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 (2.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assange’s legal consequences of leaking</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The *Wall Street Journal*’s articles only fell into eight different categories.
Table 5.2.

Manning Coverage: Depictions of Assange in Headlines & Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portrayal</th>
<th>New York Times (n=47) (%)</th>
<th>Washington Post (n=43) (%)</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal (n=31) (%)</th>
<th>Guardian (n=141) (%)</th>
<th>The Times (n=92) (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Headline (%)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<td>Article (%)</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced/neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Headline (%)</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>39.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article (%)</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>38.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headline (%)</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
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<td>Article (%)</td>
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<td>35.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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Table 5.3.

Manning Coverage: Depictions of WikiLeaks in Headlines & Articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portrayal</th>
<th>New York Times (n=47) (%)</th>
<th>Washington Post (n=43) (%)</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal (n=31) (%)</th>
<th>Guardian (n=141) (%)</th>
<th>The Times (n=92) (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Positive</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<td>Balanced/neutral</td>
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<td>Headline</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>48.9</td>
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<td>61.3</td>
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<td>71.7</td>
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<td>Negative</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>13.1</td>
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<td>19.5</td>
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### Table 5.4

*Manning Coverage: Articles Including Descriptions of Julian Assange’s Physical Appearance or Personality*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Flattering (%)</th>
<th>Neutral (%)</th>
<th>Unflattering (%)</th>
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<td>New York Times</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=47)</td>
<td>(n=43)</td>
<td>(n=31)</td>
<td>(n=141)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=43)</td>
<td>(n=31)</td>
<td>(n=141)</td>
<td>(n=92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=31)</td>
<td>(n=43)</td>
<td>(n=141)</td>
<td>(n=92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=141)</td>
<td>(n=47)</td>
<td>(n=31)</td>
<td>(n=92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=92)</td>
<td>(n=47)</td>
<td>(n=31)</td>
<td>(n=92)</td>
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### Table 5.5.

**Manning Coverage: Top 10 Types of Sources Cited by Newspaper**

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<th>Source category</th>
<th>New York Times Rank (%)</th>
<th>Washington Post Rank (%)</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal Rank (%)</th>
<th>Guardian Rank (%)</th>
<th>The Times (London) (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Current US gov’t official</td>
<td>1 (37.1)</td>
<td>1 (46.6)</td>
<td>1 (31.0)</td>
<td>1 (25.1)</td>
<td>2 (18.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Current UK gov’t official</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (12.1)</td>
<td>4 (10.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current foreign gov’t official</td>
<td>4 (6.2)</td>
<td>2 (10.6)</td>
<td>2 (21.8)</td>
<td>6 (9.1)</td>
<td>7 (4.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former US gov’t official</td>
<td>10 (2.3)</td>
<td>5 (4.0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 (1.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julian Assange</td>
<td>2 (14.1)</td>
<td>6 (3.8)</td>
<td>3 (13.8)</td>
<td>2 (13.6)</td>
<td>1 (18.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activist or activist org.</td>
<td>8 (3.8)</td>
<td>2 (10.6)</td>
<td>4 (6.3)</td>
<td>5 (9.7)</td>
<td>6 (6.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist/media commentator</td>
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<td>6 (3.8)</td>
<td>7 (4.6)</td>
<td>4 (11.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/friend of Manning or Assange</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 (3.5)</td>
<td>5 (5.2)</td>
<td>9 (3.2)</td>
<td>3 (17.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer/legal expert</td>
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<td>4 (3.8)</td>
<td>5 (5.2)</td>
<td>8 (4.6)</td>
<td>5 (8.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WikiLeaks staffer/volunteer</td>
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<td>8 (3.5)</td>
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<td>Private citizen</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>7 (4.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Private company</td>
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<td>9 (2.8)</td>
<td>9 (3.4)</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>Assange (n=5)</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>WikiLeaks (n=13)</td>
<td>Assange (n=0)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Assange</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
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1 Includes President Barack Obama and current US government officials

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<th>%</th>
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<th>Assange (n=0)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>WikiLeaks (n=0)</th>
<th>Assange (n=0)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>WikiLeaks (n=10)</th>
<th>Assange (n=5)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>WikiLeaks (n=3)</th>
<th>Assange (n=6)</th>
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<td>0.0</td>
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1 Includes Prime Minister David Cameron and current UK government officials
### Table 5.8.

*Manning Coverage: How All Sources Characterized WikiLeaks and Assange*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York Times (WikiLeaks n=0)</th>
<th>New York Times (Assange n=2) (%)</th>
<th>Washington Post (Assange n=0) (%)</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal (WikiLeaks n=0)</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal (Assange n=0) (%)</th>
<th>Guardian (WikiLeaks n=10)</th>
<th>Guardian (Assange n=5) (%)</th>
<th>The Times (WikiLeaks n=3)</th>
<th>The Times (Assange n=6) (%)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>Supportive</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>33.60</td>
<td>36.60</td>
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<td>33.30</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>39.00</td>
<td>39.00</td>
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<td>45.00</td>
<td>41.80</td>
<td>41.80</td>
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<td>32.30</td>
<td>29.50</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>31.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Julian Assange</td>
<td>16.40</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>35.00</td>
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<td>19.10</td>
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Table 5.9.

Snowden Coverage: Ten Most Common Topic Categories, Ranked by Newspaper

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Content of leaked documents</td>
<td>2 (18.9)</td>
<td>3 (16.3)</td>
<td>6 (4.8)</td>
<td>4 (11.9)</td>
<td>4 (9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snowden’s consequences</td>
<td>1 (14.4)</td>
<td>2 (26.0)</td>
<td>1 (38.1)</td>
<td>4 (11.9)</td>
<td>1 (30.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction/response from US gov’t</td>
<td>4 (13.3)</td>
<td>1 (27.9)</td>
<td>2 (11.9)</td>
<td>1 (16.3)</td>
<td>5 (7.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction/response from UK gov’t</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (12.6)</td>
<td>3 (14.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reaction/response from foreign gov’t</td>
<td>2 (18.9)</td>
<td>7 (2.9)</td>
<td>2 (11.9)</td>
<td>2 (13.3)</td>
<td>2 (16.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions from companies to leaks</td>
<td>8 (3.3)</td>
<td>9 (1.9)</td>
<td>4 (7.1)</td>
<td>9 (4.4)</td>
<td>7 (4.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reactions from non-gov’t, non-corporate actors to leaks</td>
<td>5 (6.7)</td>
<td>7 (2.9)</td>
<td>9 (2.4)</td>
<td>7 (5.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Snowden’s decision to leak documents</td>
<td>5 (6.7)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenwald or Poitras’ career</td>
<td>7 (4.4)</td>
<td>9 (1.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal lives of actors involved</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (4.8)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 (3.7)</td>
<td>7 (4.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Miranda detention</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>6 (4.8)</td>
<td>7 (5.9)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Decisions made by mainstream press involved in leaks</td>
<td>10 (2.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6 (6.7)</td>
<td>9 (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8 (3.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Repercussions of Snowden’s leaks</td>
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<td>6 (3.8)</td>
<td>4 (7.1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snowden’s career</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 (6.7)</td>
<td>6 (4.8)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How the media covers gov’t whistleblowers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 (2.4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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</table>
### Table 5.10.

**Snowden Coverage: Depictions of Glenn Greenwald in Headlines & Articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portrayal</th>
<th>New York Times (n=90) (%)</th>
<th>Washington Post (n=104) (%)</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal (n=42) (%)</th>
<th>Guardian (n=135) (%)</th>
<th>The Times (n=43) (%)</th>
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</thead>
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<td><strong>Positive</strong></td>
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<td>Headline (%)</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Article (%)</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Balanced/neutral</strong></td>
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<td>18.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>16.3</td>
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<td><strong>Negative</strong></td>
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<td>Headline (%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article (%)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.11.

Snowden Coverage: Top 10 Types of Sources Cited by Newspaper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source category</th>
<th>New York Times Rank (%)</th>
<th>Washington Post Rank (%)</th>
<th>Wall Street Journal Rank (%)</th>
<th>Guardian Rank (%)</th>
<th>The Times (London) Rank (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current US gov’t official</td>
<td>1 (17.8)</td>
<td>1 (34.6)</td>
<td>1 (27.5)</td>
<td>1 (20.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current UK gov’t official</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 (2.9)</td>
<td>3 (11.8)</td>
<td>2 (14.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current foreign gov’t official</td>
<td>2 (16.3)</td>
<td>2 (8.7)</td>
<td>2 (22.5)</td>
<td>2 (13.7)</td>
<td>1 (16.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former US gov’t official</td>
<td>10 (3.7)</td>
<td>7 (5.9)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 (3.1)</td>
<td>3 (10.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former UK gov’t official</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 (5.3)</td>
<td>6 (7.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barack Obama</td>
<td>8 (5.0)</td>
<td>5 (7.1)</td>
<td>7 (3.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (9.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Cameron</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 (5.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Snowden</td>
<td>4 (9.2)</td>
<td>8 (5.3)</td>
<td>4 (8.8)</td>
<td>6 (6.5)</td>
<td>7 (5.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenn Greenwald</td>
<td>5 (7.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10 (2.5)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura Poitras</td>
<td>7 (5.2)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activist/activist org.</td>
<td>9 (4.2)</td>
<td>10 (4.0)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 (4.0)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend/family of Snowden or Greenwald</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (7.5)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist/media commentator</td>
<td>3 (13.3)</td>
<td>3 (7.5)</td>
<td>3 (12.5)</td>
<td>4 (11.8)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer/legal expert</td>
<td>6 (5.6)</td>
<td>6 (6.3)</td>
<td>6 (5.4)</td>
<td>8 (4.0)</td>
<td>3 (10.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private business</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9 (4.2)</td>
<td>5 (6.3)</td>
<td>5 (7.7)</td>
<td>10 (4.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private citizen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 (3.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 (5.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: American and British Metajournalistic Discourse Surrounding WikiLeaks and Julian Assange

Chapter 6 explores my analysis of US and UK metajournalistic discourse surrounding WikiLeaks. This analysis will help clarify the concerns American and British journalists have about WikiLeaks, an organization that is one of the many new entrants into their field that makes use of new technologies to selectively circumvent traditional news outlets, and which holds different standards and values than traditional outlets. News reports that came out during the WikiLeaks revelations focused on much more than just the content of the leaked documents. Journalists and commentators frequently debated WikiLeaks itself—what WikiLeaks was, what values (if any) it held, what its goals were, whether it was a new kind of news organization, whether it should receive the same legal protections afforded to other journalists, and so on. Depending on the news outlet someone followed at the time, journalists’ reactions to WikiLeaks might have seemed uniformly positive or negative; however, journalists responded to this newcomer in varied and nuanced ways. This analysis takes stock of journalists’ metajournalistic conversation—or the public conversations that journalists have about journalism—to understand (1) what boundaries journalists, when faced with a distinct newcomer, identified as important to their profession, (2) where they placed WikiLeaks in relation to journalistic boundaries, and (3) what discursive strategies journalists used to make sense of WikiLeaks’ place in the journalistic ecosystem. Guided by past research on the two nations’ media system, the chapter then compares the American and British cases to identify differences and similarities in their response to WikiLeaks.
This analysis reveals that American and British journalists largely used the WikiLeaks episode to reaffirm the continued importance of traditional journalism, often while insisting that WikiLeaks was, at its root, not a new phenomenon. The WikiLeaks traits that Assange and his supporters touted as new to the field of journalism—for example, the development of “scientific journalism,” where raw documents are posted alongside analysis so that readers can examine data for themselves—were largely subsumed under the rubric of traditional journalism (“journalism has actually been doing this for a long time”) or dismissed as irrelevant or even irresponsible. Further, journalists often described WikiLeaks’ attempts at producing traditional journalistic content (such as edited videos or news articles with original reporting) as lacking value because of WikiLeaks’ anti-war bias. In the UK, some journalists interpreted WikiLeaks through the lens of their existing views on the Guardian; some British journalists see the Guardian as a left-leaning agitator, and so they saw the paper’s collaboration with WikiLeaks as yet another instance of the Guardian stirring the pot.

In the following sections, I first outline the contours of the American metajournalistic debate surrounding WikiLeaks and its place within the journalistic ecosystem. Using the textual analysis methods described in Chapter 3, I first outline how US journalists defined the profession of journalism when confronted with this new entrant into their professional ecosystem. I then describe how American journalists saw WikiLeaks’ actions and organizational traits as being either within or outside the boundaries of journalism. Finally, I identify larger themes that arose within the metajournalistic discourse, and describe how these themes can inform understanding of journalism in today fast-changing digital environment. I then do the same for British metajournalistic discourse, before moving on the comparison of the American and British cases.
Overall, the analysis presented here seeks to understand the professional boundaries American and British journalists identified as important in response to the WikiLeaks events (RQ5), and to understand where these journalists place WikiLeaks in relation to these boundaries (RQ6).

Section I: American Metajournalism Surrounding WikiLeaks

This analysis is based on a purposive sample of metajournalistic discourse articles, as outlined in Chapter 3. In total, 44 articles published in 27 different outlets were analyzed here; these articles represent the views of 38 different American journalists. Not all outlets are representative of old media; while articles do come from publications like the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, or the Denver Post, journalists writing for newer outlets like (the now-defunct) GigaOm, Slate, and Mashable are included as well. For a complete list of the 44 articles included in this analysis, including the outlet, date of publication, author, a brief professional history of the author, and publication information, please see the Appendix.

Within metajournalistic discourse surrounding the WikiLeaks disclosures, US journalists identified many values and behaviors that they felt were necessary for a person or organization to be included within the bounds of traditional journalism. I outline here the most prevalent criteria that journalists cited. However, it should be noted that these journalists might have a more expansive list of ethics, values, or behaviors required for membership in the journalistic profession—the criteria described here are ones that these journalists felt relevant to the discussion of WikiLeaks.

Defining the Boundaries of Journalism in the United States, vis-à-vis WikiLeaks

This section describes attributes that journalists identified as necessary to their profession. Journalists mentioned these attributes in the context of defining what journalism is or
who qualifies as a journalist, and did not necessarily use them to explicitly contrast their profession with WikiLeaks. All of the following boundaries were mentioned by at least three journalists.

**Journalists provide context and additional reporting.** Many journalists identified providing context as one of their profession’s central purposes—that is, one of journalism’s main goals is to “fashion coherent and instructive reporting from a jumble of raw field reports” (*New York Times*) (Keller, 2011, para. 21). Real journalists take raw information—from reports, interviews, data, or some other type of document—and tell readers why the information is important and describe how it fits within the larger context of events occurring around the world. Providing context also helps readers to understand new information, because it places the information within a larger narrative. Without this contextual information, “the documents are nothing more than raw data. They provide ‘color.’ They provide details. They help reinforce existing biases” (*Washington Post*) (Applebaum, 2010, para. 9). For example, the *New York Times*’ then-editor-in-chief Bill Keller said that, in his paper’s reporting on the diplomatic cables, it was important for the *Times* to make clear to readers that all US embassy cables contain the signature of the ambassador and all State Department cables contain the secretary of state’s signature, even if the ambassador and secretary have never see the cable (Keller, 2011, para. 44). Without this context, someone reading a cable might have assumed that all cables were approved, or even written, by ambassadors and the secretary of state—an incorrect assumption in itself, but one that could also potentially lead readers to accuse a leader of various duplicities or of withholding information.

**Journalists verify and vet information.** Journalists consistently described vetting, or verification, as a behavior required of someone wanting to be a journalist. Proper vetting requires
a journalist to be transparent about which information can be confirmed, and by whom, and which information is unverifiable. Verifying information, and being clear about the process and results of verification, provides a useful signal to readers about the accuracy of that information. In several metajournalistic pieces published in the *New York Times*, journalists praised their publication’s processes for vetting the WikiLeaks documents. However, these journalists did not specify what the *Times*’ verification processes were, beyond speaking to Obama administration officials about which documents should be redacted or omitted from publication to avoid harming national security interests. Other journalists, like Timothy J. McNulty (2010) in CNN, similarly described the value of information verification to the profession of journalism.

*Journalists redact documents to avoid harming lives, often working in conjunction with the government.* While many American journalists mentioned the importance of information verification, one particular type of verification received the most attention within metajournalistic discourse. For journalists at the *New York Times*, as well as for journalists elsewhere, vetting the documents with the US government seemed to be the most important vetting that the WikiLeaks documents needed. Journalists seemed to take as a given that the documents were genuine and unaltered; at no point did any journalist in this sample raise the possibility that the documents were fraudulent or that someone—Assange, Manning, or anyone else—had tampered with the contents. According to the discourse analyzed here, the most important vetting the documents needed was verification from the US government as to what information should be redacted or held back. Indeed, the importance of working with government officials to redact documents to avoid harming national security interests, compromising ongoing intelligence collection, or endangering the lives of key informants was raised in the large majority of the articles under analysis. This type of verification was described
as the duty of all responsible journalists; then-president of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and investigative journalist Hagit Limor said she “certainly would never public information that would risk life or country. I know of no professional journalist who would” (Limor, 2010a, para. 5).

Although the New York Times’ metajournalistic articles did not describe how the newspaper corroborated the authenticity of each individual document, the articles did describe the process by which the paper had “taken care to exclude, in its articles and in supplementary material, in print and online, information that would endanger confidential informants or compromise national security” (New York Times editorial board, 2010, para. 4). To determine which information to exclude, the New York Times sent Obama administration officials the diplomatic cables that it planned to upload and report on, and asked the administration to suggest redactions or challenge publication of any document that might harm US interests. In this editorial, which is titled “A note to readers,” the New York Times editorial board stressed the importance of handling secret documents responsibly, and on working with the government to ensure that the reporting is done with care:

“The question of dealing with classified information is rarely easy, and never to be taken lightly. Editors try to balance the value of the material to public understanding against potential dangers to the national interest. As a general rule we withhold secret information that would expose confidential sources to reprisals or that would reveal operational intelligence that might be useful to adversaries in war. We excise material that might lead terrorists to unsecured weapons material, compromise intelligence-gathering programs aimed at hostile countries, or disclose information about the
capabilities of American weapons that could be helpful to an enemy.” (New York Times editorial board, 2010, para. 6)

According to then-Times editor-in-chief Keller, the administration condemned WikiLeaks for releasing the documents and challenged some of the conclusions that the New York Times took from the cables, but ultimately “thanked [the New York Times] for handling the documents with care” (Keller, 2011, para. 15). In his own writing about working with WikiLeaks and making decisions to publish the Iraq War Logs, Afghan War Diary, and the diplomatic cables, Keller seemed confident in the decisions the New York Times made. “Your obligation, as an independent news organization, is to verify the material, to supply context, to exercise responsible judgment about what to publish and what not to publish and to make sense of it. That is what we did” (Keller, 2011, para. 66).

New York Times journalists were not alone in arguing that, in order to be within the bounds of real and responsible journalism, journalists need to cooperate with government agencies to redact secret material that might be harmful to the national interest. Journalists outside of the New York Times repeated Keller’s anecdotes about working with the Obama administration, or about the administration thanking the Times for responsibly handling the WikiLeaks documents; these anecdotes were often repeated to contrast the responsible behavior of Times journalists with the irresponsible, non-journalist behavior of WikiLeaks. “Part of real journalism is exercising judgment, not just dumping unfiltered data. The New York Times didn’t start releasing the most recent round of diplomatic chatter—some of which was a fun read, by the way, refreshingly candid—until it had verified and vetted the information with the agencies affected,” writes Fred Brown, retired Capitol bureau chief for the Denver Post (2011, para. 10). Even Glenn Greenwald, who took issue with how closely the New York Times worked with the
Obama administration in redacting the documents, stressed the importance of redacting the names of military informants to protect their lives. While Greenwald criticized Keller’s anecdote about the administration thanking the New York Times for treating the documents with care (“having the Government pleased with his behavior is his metric for assessing how good his ‘journalism’ is”), he also acknowledged that some of the documents were “legitimately classified,” and that the government did have some “reasonable concerns” about the impact of the cables leak on future diplomacy efforts (2010, para. 25 & 28).

Despite Keller’s assurances that the New York Times worked closely with government officials prior to publication, Fox News journalists still expressed concern that the newspaper did not use enough care in its reporting on the documents (Goodwin, 2011; McGowan, 2010). For example, writing in a column for Fox News and the New York Post, former New York Times reporter Michael Goodwin argued that Keller described his decision to publish as “simplistically binary—either a free press or a government veto,” meaning that he “fails to recognize his duty to exercise voluntary discretion” (2011, para. 16).

Journalists are government watchdogs. While working with the government to redact and vet information was consistently highlighted as an important component of responsible journalism, so was working to uncover government wrongdoing (although this was cited less frequently). Some journalists cited being a government watchdog as one of the defining functions of journalism. Then-SPJ president Hagit Limor said that the WikiLeaks episodes gave her the opportunity to “reaffirm” one of her organization’s core values: a commitment to open government. “Unfortunately, governments sometimes use secrecy to hide what should shine in the light of day. It is these abuses we expose in our role as watchdogs” (2010b, para. 16). In the Denver Post, longtime journalist Fred Brown said journalists “enjoy finding out things that
government doesn't want them to know, and they believe the public is entitled to know as much as possible about what its government is up to” (2011, para. 9). Journalists like Greenwald (2010) and Steven Greenhut (2010) (who is an investigative journalist and founder of the website CalWatchDog, who also currently write a column for the San Diego Union-Tribune) lamented that American journalism is not more focused on government transparency.

**Journalists work for the public.** Related to their role as a government watchdog, many journalists highlighted their profession’s public-service orientation. In the *OC Register*, investigative journalist Steven Greenhut (2010) repeatedly described journalists as people who give citizens the information they need in order to govern themselves effectively. Then-SPJ president Hagit Limor said her organization is fundamentally a First Amendment organization, part of which includes a belief in “the right to public truthful information in the public interest” (2010, para 5).

Journalists working at the *New York Times* said their desire to inform the public drove them to report on the WikiLeaks documents. In an article describing their reporting on the diplomatic cables, the *New York Times* editorial board said that the decision to publish was motivated by a belief that the documents were of public interest, “illuminating the goals, successes, compromises and frustrations of American diplomacy in a way that other accounts cannot match” (*New York Times* editorial board, 2010, para. 1). Howard Kurtz at the *Washington Post* made a similar argument in favor of publication of the Afghan war logs, saying “these documents provide vital information about a struggling war effort,” which “Americans are entitled to know” (2010, para. 4). Multiple *New York Times* pieces described the often difficult balancing act that news outlets perform when they weigh their duty to inform the public against a government’s duty to protect citizens (Brisbane, 2010; Keller, 2011; *New York Times* editorial...
board, 2010). Brisbane described it as a “fateful cost-benefit analysis,” in which journalists and editors ask themselves: “Does the public interest in having this information outweigh the risks to coalition forces and intelligence-gathering in the war zones?” (para. 6).

In summary, American journalists used metajournalistic discourse about WikiLeaks to highlight the following criteria as being within the bounds of legitimate journalism: providing context to raw data and other information, vetting information before publication to ensure accuracy, consulting with the government prior to publication of any secret information, redacting documents to avoid harm, serving as a watchdog for government wrongdoing, and working for the public. Two of these criteria—providing context and consulting with the government—were particularly prominent in the metajournalism examined here. Based on this analysis, I propose that American journalists define their profession thusly:

> Journalists verify and vet information and work with the government to redact sensitive documents (actions), to produce reporting that provides context (product), in order to serve as a watchdog for the public (societal function).

In the next section, I describe how journalists situated WikiLeaks in relation to these professional boundaries.

**Situating WikiLeaks in Relation to These US Journalistic Boundaries**

**WikiLeaks’ commonalities with American journalism.** About half of the articles analyzed here mentioned some behavior or value that WikiLeaks shares with journalism. The most prevalent commonalities are discussed below.

*WikiLeaks aids in the production of journalism.* Journalists who thought WikiLeaks had anything in common with journalism often cited the fact that WikiLeaks is part of an emerging news media ecosystem—not technically a journalistic outfit, but an organization that does some
of the things that journalists do and helps journalists produce reporting. The main proponent of this idea was GigaOm journalist Mathew Ingram (2010c), who frequently argued in support of WikiLeaks and the idea that WikiLeaks is a journalism-like entity worthy of press freedoms and legal protection. Ingram (2010b) said WikiLeaks is indicative of a “new form of media emerging: not a new or journalism entity specifically, but a kind of media middleman that exposes secret or undiscovered information, which can then become a source of news” (para. 1). He saw WikiLeaks as an organization that can provide a service to news outlets by being a depot for documents of public value. Further, WikiLeaks can provide journalists with a document database that is out-of-reach of governments or other entities that might have gone after a newspaper; with its thousands of mirror sites and BitTorrent archives of its documents, it is virtually impossible to remove WikiLeaks documents from the internet. Ingram (2010a) further argued that WikiLeaks, and organizations like it, will continue to emerge as part of our new media ecosystem:

“in the current era, media—a broad term that includes what we think of as journalism—has been dis-aggregated or atomized; in other words, split into its component parts, parts that include what WikiLeaks does. In some cases, these may be things that we didn’t even realize were separate parts of the process to begin with, because they have always been joined together. And in some cases they merge different parts that were previously separate, such as the distinction between a source and a publisher. WikiLeaks, for example, can be seen as both.” (para. 6)

WikiLeaks publishes information. Similarly, David Carr, the late media writer for the New York Times, said during the WikiLeaks-Times collaboration that he also sees WikiLeaks as a publisher, not just a source (putting Carr in stark contrast with his editor-in-chief, Keller). The
“carefully choreographed” collaboration between WikiLeaks and the Times “represented a new kind of hybrid journalism” (Carr, 2010a, para. 5). But Carr, like Ingram, did not see WikiLeaks as falling entirely within the bounds of journalism; like many other journalists, Carr said WikiLeaks needed traditional journalists who knew how to comb through data, find what is important, and place that information in a coherent narrative. In this sense, Carr saw WikiLeaks as a useful tool to help an organization like the New York Times create informative and investigative journalism. “High-impact stories in the world of journalism are generally the product of months or years of investigation. Having documents through WikiLeaks shortened the work considerably. In doing so, it further redefined how journalism is practiced,” Carr said (2010a, para. 17). Similar sentiments—that WikiLeaks does many of the same things as journalism and falls within the emerging news ecosystem, but that it does not fall squarely within the traditional bounds of journalism—were echoed by other journalists writing for the Poynter Institute, Atlantic, Newsweek, Wired, the Denver Post, and Mashable (Adler, 2011; Denver Post Editorial Board, 2010; Hansen, 2010; Hotz, 2010; Madrigal, 2010; Meyers, 2010). Arguing for the inclusion of WikiLeaks in the broader journalistic field, organization president Hagit Limor said the Society of Professional Journalists should not try to define journalism, or define who is a journalist. “These are epic times in the redefinition of information-gathering and sharing. To exclude any format will define us as the fools of tomorrow” (Limor, 2010b, para. 6). Limor’s article highlighted the fast-changing boundaries of journalism, and argued that the new journalism ecosystem is constantly being altered to include new types of organizations, like WikiLeaks.

WikiLeaks is a watchdog. Other journalists argued that WikiLeaks is a journalistic enterprise because its main goal is to be a watchdog on wrongdoing. New York Times reporter
Scott Shane told Politics Daily correspondent Delia Lloyd that although the *Times* and WikiLeaks were “not equivalent historically or in terms of philosophy … in this particular project, they're doing almost literally the exact same thing as us” (D. Lloyd, 2011, para. 10).

Investigative journalist Steven Greenhut said WikiLeaks “has done our nation a service” by bringing some transparency to an increasingly secretive government, and he “applaud[ed] WikiLeaks and its efforts to provide the information necessary so Americans can govern themselves in this supposedly self-governing society” (2010, para. 2, para. 5). Mathew Ingram of the online technology news outlet GigaOm said “WikiLeaks’ stated intention is to bring transparency to the political process and expose wrongdoing,” and asked “Isn’t that the same thing the Times does?” (2010c, para 5). A similar argument—that WikiLeaks is journalism-adjacent, or at least serves journalism, because it provides information of public interest—was made by other journalists as well (N. Cohen, 2010; Meyers, 2010; Woolner, 2011).

Glenn Greenwald went a step further, and argued that many journalists are only critical of WikiLeaks because the organization fulfills the watchdog role much better than most mainstream news outlets. “Most political journalists rely on their relationships with government officials and come to like them and both identify and empathize with them. By contrast, WikiLeaks is truly adversarial to those powerful factions in exactly the way that these media figures are not: hence, the widespread media hatred and contempt for what WikiLeaks does” (Greenwald, 2010b, para. 25). Tom Junod (2011) of *Esquire* also took issue with mainstream media who argued that WikiLeaks did not belong in the journalism field. Junod was particularly critical of Keller’s (2011) post-Cablegate editorial, in which Keller repeatedly said WikiLeaks was merely a source, that WikiLeaks’ value has been overblown, and that the organization lacks proper journalistic ethics, in addition to making several disparaging comments about Assange’s appearance and
personality. Junod said Keller’s piece failed to acknowledge that, “for all its pretensions of being one of the professions, journalism is and must forever remain an ad hoc practice, with its ethics improvised in response to circumstance, and tending, like the odds at a casino, to favor the house” (2011, para. 4). He further argued that Keller’s insistence that WikiLeaks was merely a source is condescending, and is an example of “pulling of journalistic rank” and “boast[ing] of moral superiority” (Junod, 2011, para. 3).

Overall, some journalists in this sample saw WikiLeaks as being adjacent to journalism in many ways, if not being a journalistic enterprise entirely. Some argued that the internet has completely changed what it means to be a news organization, and so old definitions of journalism do not apply to a modern media environment. WikiLeaks—an organization that does some of the things journalists do, like publish documents of public interest—might well be within the bounds of journalism in this new ecosystem. Others identified WikiLeaks as a useful new tool for investigative journalists; WikiLeaks is not a news outlet, but rather a helpful aide to those who can take the information and add context and analysis. In this sense, WikiLeaks is journalism-adjacent, but not completely within the boundaries of journalism itself. Finally, some argued that WikiLeaks’ goal of keeping powerful institutions transparent overlaps with journalism. For these journalists, an organization dedicated to publishing information of public interest is at least partially within the boundaries of journalism.

Drawing together the various boundaries identified in this analysis, American journalists who argued that WikiLeaks fit within the journalistic ecosystem made the following argument:

*WikiLeaks publishes information and aids in the production of journalism (actions), and acts as a watchdog (societal function).*
But journalists highlighted many more differences between WikiLeaks and real journalism than they did similarities. In the next section, I outline the main differences journalists identified.

**WikiLeaks’ deviations from American journalism.**

**WikiLeaks dumps data online without context.** For many journalists, WikiLeaks’ deviations from journalism were more numerous than its commonalities. Journalists cited many reasons why WikiLeaks was outside the bounds of real journalism. The most commonly cited reason was that they saw WikiLeaks as an organization specializing in data dumps. As described earlier, many journalists see providing context and analysis as one of their profession’s main goals. In their view, they question whether a website that “makes raw data dumps available to the public is the same as a journalistic organization that adds value by sorting through and excerpting information to provide relevant facts and analysis” (Magid, 2011). Indeed, journalists frequently used variations of the term “data dump” to describe WikiLeaks’ actions (e.g., Farhi, 2010; Milbank, 2010; Rubin, 2010). In a post-Cablegate article addressing where SPJ members stand on the question of “Is WikiLeaks journalism?,” the SPJ president said that those members “who say ‘no’ … call the 2,000 diplomatic cables posted online a data-dump without filters, fact-checking or context from other sources. They say there’s no original reporting, hence the need for established media partners to get out the word” (Limor, 2010b). Journalists repeatedly stressed the need for journalists to place new data, such as the raw numbers and reports contained in the Iraq and Afghan war documents, into a clear narrative in order to help readers make sense of them. Although Fred Brown identified “finding out things that government doesn't want them to know” as a commonality between WikiLeaks and journalists, he quickly followed
qualified that statement: “But good journalists are ethical about not releasing everything. Part of real journalism is exercising judgment, not just dumping unfiltered data” (2011, para. 9-10).

In many journalists’ view, WikiLeaks’ devotion to releasing secret documents—without explaining the material in the documents and supplying contextual information—does not fall within the bounds of journalism.

**WikiLeaks is not dedicated to serving the public.** Providing context for readers is, for many journalists, part of journalism’s public-service mission; by not providing context, WikiLeaks is also failing to put the public’s interests first. The *Washington Post*’s Anne Applebaum argued that most of the Afghan war documents would appear to be jargon to the vast majority of people, and would therefore be of little value to citizens. In her view, this is why WikiLeaks partnered with traditional media outlets. “Assange, despite his insistence on the value of raw data, knew perfectly well that the public wouldn't be able to make much of this stuff and gave the documents to three news organizations in advance. … Without more investigation, more work, more journalism, these documents just don’t matter that much” (Applebaum, 2010, para. 5, para. 10). In a CNN column, Timothy J. McNulty (2010) said he did not know of anyone who had actually read more than a few of the raw Iraq and Afghanistan war documents; he argued the documents did not make much sense without the context and narrative provided by print news outlets. “Without the printed media, however, the information would be presented in such a helter-skelter fashion, it would be difficult to analyze or even know what is true and which documents are bogus” (McNulty, 2010, para. 10).

Some articles analyzed here told stories of WikiLeaks’ earlier, pre-“Collateral Murder” releases, and described how Assange was surprised and angered that simply putting raw documents online, without context, attracted little public attention (Khatchadourian,
Assange’s realization led to WikiLeaks’ first attempt at producing original, contextualized content: the April 2010 release of a video titled “Collateral Murder.” This video depicted US Army pilots shooting 17 Iraqis and two Reuters photographers; Reuters had unsuccessfully lobbied the government to release this video for years. WikiLeaks released the 39 minutes of raw footage, as well as a shorter edited version that it called “Collateral Murder,” focusing on the shooting of the photographers and a few civilians. McClatchy’s Nancy Yousseff (2011) said that WikiLeaks performed journalism when it released its “Collateral Murder” video. “Few could argue that WikiLeaks didn’t perform journalistic functions when it released [Collateral Murder] … In addition to editing and captioning the video, WikiLeaks interviewed the Iraqi families about the incident” (Youssef, 2011, para. 11). In editing and captioning video and interviewing sources, Yousseff said, WikiLeaks seemed to make an effort to provide context. Even a New Yorker feature on Assange, which was largely skeptical of him and WikiLeaks, acknowledged that “the video, in its original form, was a puzzle … Assange and the others in the Bunker [a rented home in Iceland] spent much of their time trying to piece together details: the units involved, their command structure, the rules of engagement, the jargon soldiers used on the radio, and, most important, whether and how the Iraqis on the ground were armed” (Khatchadourian, 2010, para. 31). However, for the most part, journalists were dismissive of the journalistic value of the “Collateral Murder” video. Alexis C. Madrigal of the Atlantic called the video “an attempt at an editorial” (Madrigal, 2010, para. 7). The New York Times’ Noam Cohen said the video “was criticized in the media for lacking context and for its provocative title” (N. Cohen, 2010, para. 7). Keller also said the video lacked proper context, because “in its zeal to make the video a work of antiwar propaganda, WikiLeaks … didn’t call attention to an Iraqi who was toting a rocket-propelled grenade” (Keller, 2011, para. 5).
WikiLeaks has an advocacy mission. Keller’s comment points to another issue many journalists raised with WikiLeaks: It has an advocacy mission, which they saw as unacceptable for an organization wanting to be called a journalism outlet. “Assange’s stated ambition is to embarrass the U.S. This means that his goals and those of most journalists are not the same. WikiLeaks doesn’t trouble itself with these questions. The rest of us, journalists included, should,” said George Packer in the New Yorker (Packer, 2010, para. 4). Journalists described WikiLeaks’ mission in various ways, but most highlighted one or both of two goals: WikiLeaks’ goal of imposing total transparency on the powerful, or its goal of disrupting the US government. Both of these missions were described as outside the bounds of traditional journalism. According to many journalists, while real journalists might also be dedicated to providing a check on the powerful, they also understand that governments need some secrets; further, many argued American journalists should not be trying to take down the American government, or targeting any other government specifically. These goals, in their view, do not align with journalism’s goals of being objective and serving the public interest. WikiLeaks is “committed to a form of transparency that verges on anarchy,” said a Vanity Fair profile that told the story of the organization’s collaboration with the New York Times and Guardian (Ellison, 2011, para. 45). “Assange believes that information kept classified by governments should be distributed freely.Leaks are the tactical weapon, redistribution of power the strategic objective,” said a CNN article (Larsen, 2011, para. 11). Many journalists also argued that WikiLeaks’ focus on the US government in 2010 and 2011 meant that the organization lacked objectivity, and was trying to “make it harder for the system as a whole to function—not to right a specific wrong” (Rubin, 2010, para. 7).
In *Newsweek*, Ben Adler (2011) said that, in his view, many American journalists’ professional dedication to objectivity kept them from defending WikiLeaks and Assange against politicians and pundits who were calling for their prosecution:

“American journalists, unlike many of their foreign counterparts, have a strong commitment to objectivity and nonpartisanship. … That same notion of objectivity shared by journalists makes many of them suspicious of WikiLeaks’ journalistic bona fides. … [M]any mainstream reporters, editors, and producers might see associating with Assange as inappropriately endorsing an advocacy mission.” (para. 11-12)

**WikiLeaks does not properly redact sensitive documents.** According to many journalists, some of the legitimate secrets that governments need to keep are the names of government informants or details of ongoing military operations; as described earlier, many journalists mentioned this as a requirement to be a real journalist. To this end, several journalists expressed concern about WikiLeaks’ harm-minimization policy, or lack thereof (Khatchadourian, 2010; Milbank, 2010; *New York Times* Editorial Board, 2010). Keller and other *New York Times* reporters described how their organization worked closely with the Obama administration in releasing the three batches of documents (Keller, 2011; *New York Times* Editorial Board, 2010). The newspaper sent the administration documents that it planned on publishing, and gave them the opportunity to lobby for certain documents to be held back. The *Times* also asked for government officials’ help in redacting information that might compromise lives in the field or affect ongoing military or diplomatic operations. Although WikiLeaks allegedly offered to work with the US government in redacting documents, the government turned down their offer; according to many journalists, this left WikiLeaks with little idea about what information required redacting, and so many documents (particularly in the earlier releases) contained
potentially harmful information. Journalists accused WikiLeaks of being cavalier with government secrets. “No doubt Assange’s carelessness with documents has cramped diplomatic communications. Whether it has also cost lives as some predicted, we don’t know,” said Bloomberg columnist Ann Woolner (Woolner, 2011). Others pointed out that organizations like Amnesty International and Reporters Without Borders condemned WikiLeaks for not redacting names of Afghan informants and activists (McGowan, 2010; Rubin, 2010). When WikiLeaks did institute a harm-minimization policy, some argued it was too little too late:

“WikiLeaks was roundly criticized for its seeming indifference to the safety of those informants, and in its subsequent postings it has largely followed the example of the news organizations and redacted material that could get people jailed or killed. Assange described it as a “harm minimization” policy. In the case of the Iraq war documents, WikiLeaks applied a kind of robo-redaction software that stripped away names (and rendered the documents almost illegible). With the embassy cables, WikiLeaks posted mostly documents that had already been redacted by The Times and its fellow news organizations.” (Keller, 2011, para. 63)

Even Glenn Greenwald, a defender of WikiLeaks’ and Assange’s place in the journalistic world, said that some documents are legitimately classified, and it is likely that some such documents were included in the Cablegate disclosures (Greenwald, 2010b).

*WikiLeaks is not transparent as an organization.* Finally, some journalists argued that WikiLeaks’ own lack of organizational transparency at least partially excluded it from the journalism club. WikiLeaks, as a “mostly hidden organization of digital dark ops” (Carr, 2010a, para. 3), is not beholden to its readers or anyone else. “It is not a news organization, not subject to the usual checks and balances, but in some ways has more power than any news organization.
It is a global power unto itself” (Kurtz, 2010, para. 12). Further, after Assange took asylum in the Ecuadorian embassy, he was even less accessible; it is “harder to [be accountable] when you’re in hiding” (Limor, 2010b, para. 15).

Combining these various violations, I can put forward the following explanation for why some American journalists argued WikiLeaks did not constitute journalism:

*WikiLeaks is not journalism because it simply dumps data online without proper redactions and it provides no insights into its information gathering processes (wrong actions), it does not produce original reporting with context (wrong product), and it is committed to advancing its own interests rather than serving the public (wrong function).*

**Social identity theory: American journalists’ strategies for assessing WikiLeaks and Assange**

In addition to the specific actions and values journalists identified as their profession’s boundary markers, journalists used a few broader strategies to make sense of WikiLeaks and Assange. These strategies can be interpreted as social identity theory at work: Journalists were engaging in social creativity or social competition, in order to restore their positive group distinctiveness. Three strategies— reaffirmation, shared fate, and industry changes—were particularly prevalent within US metajournalistic discourse about WikiLeaks. I expand on each strategy below, and explain how each was used to situate WikiLeaks in relation to journalistic professional identity.

*Social creativity: WikiLeaks reaaffirms the continued need for traditional journalism.*

For many journalists, the WikiLeaks-mainstream media collaboration was an affirmation of the continued importance of traditional, mainstream journalism. For example, while she was ultimately hesitant to define journalism or define WikiLeaks’ place in the field, former SPJ
president Hagit Limor acknowledged the difference between publishing and journalism, and used the WikiLeaks episode to argue that society still needs traditional journalists:

“Perhaps WikiLeaks sought out professional partners because Assange of all people realizes the truth of his site’s limitation: a lack of credibility whether real or imagined. That’s something from which you can’t hide. You earn it over time. You earn it doing the hard work, applying the principles of good, ethical journalism the world can believe.”

(Limor, 2010b, para. 19)

In the Los Angeles Times, Doyle McManus wrote that the WikiLeaks revelations taught everyone—“even Assange, no fan of traditional institutions”—that “we still need journalists to decipher what raw information means” (2011, para. 10). Although he said WikiLeaks did partially shift power away from traditional news outlets, former Poynter Institute editor Steven Myers (2010) argued that “the power of self-publication isn’t quite enough” (para. 11) for a story to achieve impact and recognition. WikiLeaks, Myers said, “needed these titans of old media,” like the New York Times and Guardian, for “their reporting, their reach, their distribution networks, their reputation” (para. 6). Writing for CNN, Timothy J. McNulty highlighted the importance of certain aspects of traditional journalism, while diminishing the importance of the internet. “Many say the electronic information age has done away with traditional or mainstream journalism, but here it is evident that the journalists at The New York Times, The Guardian, Germany's Der Spiegel magazine and the Spanish daily El Pais are still doing the legwork -- sifting through information, confirming, editing and presenting it to the public,” he said (McNulty, 2010, para. 11).

In the New York Times, David Carr (2010b) said that traditional journalism might have changed WikiLeaks more than WikiLeaks changed journalism. WikiLeaks, he argued, became
more like journalism over time out of necessity; when WikiLeaks learned from earlier, pre-
Manning releases that posting raw documents attracted little attention, it tried its hand at editing
and reporting (with the release of “Collateral Murder”). When “Collateral Murder” received
substantial criticism that the video had been edited to suit Assange’s political agenda, WikiLeaks
decided to engage in a full-on partnership with mainstream news outlets. “Notice that with each
successive release, WikiLeaks has become more strategic and has been rewarded with deeper,
more extensive coverage of its revelations,” Carr said (2010b, para. 7). Carr, essentially, argued
that mainstream journalism reined in WikiLeaks and turned it into something more closely
resembling a responsible publisher. If not for the mainstream media, WikiLeaks would have
simply published its raw documents online, causing the important aspects of the documents to be
lost in the huge volume of data, and likely leading to the disclosure of information that should
have been redacted. The mainstream media, in Carr’s view, still plays an important role as a
benchmark of professional responsibility, and challenges newcomers in the field to become
better—with “better” meaning more like the mainstream media. (Carr, the honest observer of the
news industry that he was, did not shy away from acknowledging the professional biases that
came from his employment at the *New York Times*. “Of course, as someone who draws a
paycheck from a mainstream journalism outfit, it may be no surprise that I continue to see
durable value in what we do even amid the journalistic jujitsu WikiLeaks introduces,” he said
(2010b, para. 8)).

Although using more acerbic and sarcastic language, the *Washington Post*’s Anne
Applebaum similarly argued that the WikiLeaks revelations reaffirmed the need for traditional
journalism. “[T]he proprietor of WikiLeaks [Assange] has made an iron-clad case for the
mainstream media. If you were under the impression that we no longer need news organizations,
editors or reporters with more than 10 minutes' experience, think again. The notion that the Internet can replace traditional newsgathering has been revealed as a myth” (2010, para. 2). She included two jargon-filled excerpts from WikiLeaks’ Afghan war documents as evidence, arguing that these documents required traditional journalists to explain the significance of the information and place it within the larger context of the Afghan war. “Without more investigation, more work, more journalism, these documents just don't matter that much” (para. 11).

Viewed through the lens of social identity theory, arguing that WikiLeaks’ success merely reinforces the need for traditional journalism can be thought of as a means of employing social creativity to restore the profession’s positive distinctiveness. By arguing that WikiLeaks would not have been successful without its mainstream journalistic partners, journalists are placing greater importance on aspects of their professional identity in which they excel—namely, their institutional credibility and name recognition, their ability to put information in context, and their experience vetting information. In doing this, journalists are conversely placing less importance on the areas in which WikiLeaks excels: gathering large amounts of documents that may be of public interest, working with large amounts of data, and publishing data online. For example, the New York Times’ Noam Cohen argued that, by even partnering with organization like the New York Times, WikiLeaks was outright admitting it was not a journalistic enterprise. “By handing over the documents to professionals, with no strings attached, and before the site itself could offer its own interpretation, WikiLeaks was retreating to the job of information procurer rather than information explainer,” said the New York Times’ Noam Cohen (2010, para. 5). While WikiLeaks could be credited with gaining access to the secret government documents (“procuring” this material), the organization did not do the actual reporting (or “information
explaining”) necessary to transform the documents into meaningful journalism—and it is this information explaining that is truly important, not the information procurement. Therefore, Cohen has creatively renegotiated the relative importance of certain aspects of the journalistic profession. In doing so, he has elevated the significance of the aspects in which mainstream journalists excels, thereby restoring part of his profession’s positive distinctiveness.

However, it is important to note that journalists’ attempts at employing social creativity to address the differences between real journalism and WikiLeaks’ were undermined by their widespread assertion that, legally, the two entities were probably indistinguishable. Regardless of whether journalists thought WikiLeaks was journalism, they were largely in agreement that WikiLeaks and journalists were probably legally indistinguishable—that is, any attempt to prosecute Assange or WikiLeaks could set a precedent that would inevitably be used against journalists. During the WikiLeaks disclosures, the US Congress was debating a proposed journalism shield law that would allow journalists to protect their sources’ identities. Many politicians, like Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY), wanted to make sure that the wording of the law would be specific enough to exclude organizations like WikiLeaks from falling under its protections. Some journalists were concerned with how Congress would draw such a distinction. “What is an ‘organization like’ WikiLeaks? The New York Times published some of those same documents on its website. Does that make it ‘like’ WikiLeaks?” asked the Los Angeles Times’ editorial board, which was generally supportive of WikiLeaks (Los Angeles Times editorial board, 2010, para. 2). Concerns about whether a WikiLeaks prosecution would later be used to stifle investigative journalism were echoed widely, by journalists at CNN, GigaOm, Wired, New York Daily News, the Denver Post, the New Yorker, Bloomberg, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the Society of Professional Journalists, and even the New York Times’ Bill Keller
A few journalists’ claims that prosecution of WikiLeaks or Assange could be a danger to journalism’s future undermined their otherwise strong assertions that WikiLeaks is not journalism, or not even journalism-adjacent. The *Wall Street Journal* editorial board, which characterized WikiLeaks as an enemy of the state and Assange as a “provocateur” who “is not serving the interest of free societies,” said that “as publishers ourselves, we nonetheless worry that indicting a bad actor like Mr. Assange under an ambiguous statute would set a precedent that could later be used against journalists” (*Wall Street Journal* editorial board, 2010, para. 11-13).

Bill Keller, who repeatedly asserted that he did not regard Assange or WikiLeaks as journalistic in nature and refused to characterize the *New York Times*-WikiLeaks collaboration as a partnership, also said “it is chilling to contemplate the possible government prosecution of WikiLeaks for making secrets public, let alone the passage of new laws to punish the dissemination of classified information, as some have advocated” (2011, para. 67). The rest of Keller’s and the *Wall Street Journal* editorial board’s writing indicated that they wanted to dismiss WikiLeaks outright—for being irresponsible, for not conforming to traditional journalistic professional norms, for being “suffused with such glib antipathy toward the United States” (Keller, 2011, para. 67), or for Assange’s personality and eccentricities. But their ability to dismiss Assange and WikiLeaks outright was curtailed by their admission that, legally, what they do and what WikiLeaks does is difficult or impossible to distinguish.

Bloomberg News columnist Ann Woolner was one of the few journalists to call out this specific discrepancy:
“Mainstream journalists say Assange’s release of thousands of classified documents isn’t real journalism. And yet they realize their plight is tied to his. … For all the lines we’d like to draw, the law makes no distinction among civilian publishers of classified documents, whether unleashed in raw form on WikiLeaks or wrapped into articles in the New York Times.” (2011, para. 3-4)

**WikiLeaks is merely a new tool for traditional journalism.** Some journalists employed social competition by defining WikiLeaks not as a challenge to journalism, but merely as a new technological tool for journalism—not unlike the computer or digital recorder. As a new tool, WikiLeaks was not going to change the journalistic process, but rather simply speed up the work real journalists have always done. In this sense, journalists described WikiLeaks as a change in the industry, insofar as it offers a means to accelerate traditional investigative journalism. For example, in CNN journalist Kaj Larsen (2011) described how WikiLeaks provided him and other journalists with “the kind of access that veteran journalists once spent their careers cultivating” (para. 4), and said that the information is made even more accessible by being digitized and searchable. David Carr (2010a) described WikiLeaks in like terms. He said that stories like the Afghan war logs were previously the fruit of months, or potentially years, of investigative work. “Having documents through WikiLeaks shortened the work considerably,” he said (para. 17). Similarly, *The Atlantic*’s Alexis C. Madrigal (2010) said the *New York Times*-WikiLeaks collaboration fits into a larger trend of traditional news outlets turning to smaller journalistic startups for help with investigative work. He likened the collaboration to the online investigative news website ProPublica, which offers its stories and investigative services to traditional outlets like PBS’ *Frontline* or NPR. However, he said “while ProPublica and others are certainly journalism outfits, Wikileaks is neither here nor there” (para. 7); like Larsen and Carr, Madrigal
saw WikiLeaks as more of a tool or accelerator for journalism, and not a journalistic outlet itself. Therefore, Larsen’s, Carr’s, and Madrigal’s descriptions of WikiLeaks as a new digital tool for journalists can also be interpreted as dismissive; like or digital recorders, cell phones, or online databases for government records, WikiLeaks is just a tool that journalists can choose to use to speed up their work, but one that ultimately, does not fundamentally change the nature of journalism. Further, by describing WikiLeaks as a tool for journalists, they also indicate that the organization is less than a news outlet.

In describing WikiLeaks as a new tool that mainstream journalists could use to speed up their work, journalists denigrated the work of the perceived outsiders. In social identity theory terms, these journalists engaged in social competition. They argued WikiLeaks could not be a threat to journalism, because WikiLeaks is just a new technology designed to help real journalists do their jobs. In describing WikiLeaks merely as a new tool, journalists diminished the significance of the outsiders. WikiLeaks is an object that can be used, but it is not a profession like journalism.

Summary

As one can see from the analysis presented here, American journalists held a variety of opinions on WikiLeaks’ place within the boundaries of journalism; indeed, sometimes journalists seemed to disagree about what values or actions are necessary in order for someone to truly be considered a journalist. As a profession without a governing or licensing body, it is up to individual American journalists and news organizations to create ethical requirements, and the ad-hoc nature of these rules has been further complicated by the introduction of the internet. When the ability to publish or broadcast was held in the hands of a few—newspapers, magazines, broadcast news bureaus—the number of people with the power to define journalism
was relatively small. Further, because being labeled a “profession” gives a group credibility and legitimacy, these few publishers and broadcasters had an incentive to label whatever actions they took as the defining features of journalism.

While this analysis clearly demonstrates that journalists did not have a uniform reaction to WikiLeaks, it also demonstrates a pattern to these variations. Many of the differences in defining the bounds of journalism, and in placing WikiLeaks within these boundaries, fell along predictable lines. Journalists working for traditional media institutions, like the *New York Times*’ Bill Keller, the *Washington Post*’s Anne Applebaum, or the *Philadelphia Inquirer*’s Trudy Rubin, have a stake in the continued dominance of such institutions; they therefore have an incentive to define the bounds of journalism such that they describe the activities and values held by their old-media employers, and that they exclude new, non-traditional outlets, including WikiLeaks. Conversely, journalists who have had success in non-traditional media outlets—Mathew Ingram at GigaOm; Steven Greenhut at his own investigative journalism start-up; or Glenn Greenwald on his own blog, then Salon, and now his own journalism venture called First Look Media—have incentive to widen the bounds of journalism to include more varied forms of digital content. It was not uniformly the case that journalists at old-media outlets dismissed WikiLeaks’ place in the journalistic ecosystem while new-media journalists welcomed it (e.g., see Tom Junod’s (2011) strong defense of WikiLeaks, and rebuke of the *New York Times*’ treatment of Assange, in *Esquire* magazine), but definitions of journalism and opinions of WikiLeaks largely fell along these lines.

Journalists also used social creativity and social competition strategies to situate WikiLeaks within the journalistic field. These two strategies—arguing that WikiLeaks merely reinforces the need for traditional journalism, and describing WikiLeaks as yet another tool in
the traditional journalist’s repertoire—allowed journalists to re-establish their profession’s positive distinctiveness in the face of this out-group, which they perceived as challenging their status.

In the next section of this chapter, I discuss the results of my analysis of UK metajournalistic discourse. I similarly describe the values and actions British journalists cited as necessary for those wishing to practice real journalism, and the ways in which WikiLeaks was within and outside these boundaries. I also highlight the discursive strategies that British journalists used to make sense of WikiLeaks.

Section II: Analysis of British metajournalistic discourse

My analysis of British metajournalistic discourse about WikiLeaks includes 39 articles taken from 17 different news sources throughout the United Kingdom. The articles were written by at least 27 different journalists (some organizations, like The Economist, do not list author names with their articles, so it is not possible to find out which reporter wrote these articles). A list of all articles included in this analysis, along with their publication date, publication name, author name and affiliation, and the publication type is included in Appendix 1, Table 2. Unlike most newspapers in the United States, British newspapers often have a known political affiliation; this information is included in Table 2. Articles came from a variety of publication types, including national newspapers (e.g., The Times or The Independent), regional publications (e.g., Leicester Mercury, London’s The Evening Standard), tabloid outlets (e.g., Daily Mail), and the publicly funded BBC. However, unlike the US sample, the UK sample does not include articles published in niche or online-only news websites, like the American GigaOm or Salon.com.

Defining the Boundaries of Journalism in the UK, vis-à-vis WikiLeaks
Within British metajournalistic discourse about the WikiLeaks disclosures, journalists identified many professional values and behaviors required by a person or organization to be considered within the bounds of professional journalism. I outline here the most prevalent criteria that journalists cited. However, as with the previous section on metajournalistic discourse in the United States, it is important to note at the outset that British journalists might have a more expansive list of ethics, values, or behaviors required for membership in the journalistic profession—the criteria described here are ones that British journalists felt relevant to the discussion of WikiLeaks and its place in the journalism landscape.

**Journalists provide context and analysis to raw information.** One of most common functions of journalism that British journalists identified was giving context to information. In an editorial that detailed how its reporters worked with WikiLeaks, the *Guardian*’s editorial board described the “painstaking” process of “editing, contextualising, explanation and redaction” as one that is “part of the craft of journalism” (*Guardian* editorial board, 2010, para. 12). In the *Sunday Herald*, Scottish journalist Ian Bell praised WikiLeaks and described its leaks as important and newsworthy. He argued that the documents revealed coalition forces “fought dirty,” that “to defeat the Iraqi resistance and al Qaeda opportunism, the allies allowed, and sometimes indulged in, war crimes,” and that the coalition mismanaged the occupation of Iraq (Bell, 2010b, para. 7 & 8). However, Bell also argued that, on their own, the Iraq war logs did not clearly explain any of these important stories. To illustrate, Bell included a sample entry from the Iraq logs:

```
___ Brigade (UK) REPORTS IN BASRAH CITY A /___ HEARD SOME SHOTS
FURTHER INVESTIGATION FOUND ___ X UNKNOWN MALE AT GRID ___.
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THE UNKNOWN MALE HAD BEEN BLINDFOLDED WITH HIS HANDS TIED BEHIND BACK AND HAD 1X Gunshot wound TO THE ___” (para. 13)

This entry, Bell argued, leaves many questions to be answers, such as the affiliations of those involved (were they insurgents, Iraqi security, or simply common criminals?). “You need to spend a great deal of time wading through such reports before the patterns begin to emerge” (Bell, 2010, para. 14). Providing this context and explanation, Bell said, is “the province of traditional journalism. If you want the truth, understanding, a proper accounting, even mere publicity, dead trees are still required (2010, para. 12). Similar sentiments—that to be a journalist is to provide readers with context and analysis—were expressed by many other British journalists (e.g., Glover, 2010a; Greenslade, 2010b). “Information, to be meaningful, needs context and perspective” said Harold Evans in the Financial Times (Evans, 2010, para. 4). On its own, raw data are of much less value to the public than coherent news stories with narratives and additional reporting. British journalists saw “added value” in this context, analysis, and additional reporting (Greenslade, 2010c, para. 16).

Journalists work in the public interest. The idea that raw data are less valuable to citizens, and so it is the job of journalists to turn data into stories, is related to another important aspect of journalism: working in the public interest. Many UK journalists identified a commitment to working in the public interest as a necessary prerequisite for inclusion within the boundaries of journalism. In the Sunday Times, Irish journalist and former editor of the Sunday Tribune and Irish Independent Matt Cooper described “genuine journalists” as having the main objective of “serving the public interest” (2011, para. 19). In a Guardian article describing how the newspaper handled the WikiLeaks data, data journalist Simon Rogers (2011) spoke directly to his readers, and made it clear that the readers’ interest was the prime motivator in the
Guardian’s reporting. His article recounted how he and other Guardian journalists have “had to handle major datasets before, such as the release of the treasury's huge spending database (Coins) earlier last year. With the WikiLeaks files we had the same criteria of success: help our journalists access the information, break down and analyse the data—and make it available for our users” (Rogers, 2011, para. 1). In the Evening Standard, Roy Greenslade noted the “essential job done by traditional newspaper journalists,” who made “sense of scraps of knowledge for the wider public good” (2010b, para. 33-34). These journalists, and others like John Kampfner in The Independent (2010) and Alan Gold in The Spectator (2010), made it clear that they and other journalists are motivated by a desire to serve the public interest.

But while several British journalists identified working in the public interest as a key component of journalism, how they operationalized “public interest” varied. For instance, John Lloyd, contributing editor at the Financial Times and co-founder of the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of Oxford, described the public interest as central to journalism, but also argued that what is in the “public interest” is difficult to define. He said he has seen conceptualizations of the public interest evolve throughout his long career in journalism. Writing in the Financial Times, Lloyd (2011) said:

“The public interest is often defined as that which aids the citizen to be more fully a citizen—from information on votes cast and public money spent to revelations of state or corporate corruption. In more than 30 years of journalism, mostly for this paper, I've seen this concept develop; from a view that ferreting out as much information as possible was good for society (as well as for one's career), to one framed in much more aggressive and polemical terms” (para. 5)
Lloyd went on to describe these aggressive and polemical conceptualizations of public interest as being increasingly defined as whatever information damages public figures. He cited Fox News programs, particularly its then-popular “Glenn Beck” show, as well as Jon Stewart’s “The Daily Show” as examples of journalistic programs that purport to directly represent the public and contribute to the notion that journalism is a “high-decibel state of complaint and tenuous assertion” (J. Lloyd, 2011, para. 9). Ultimately, Lloyd seemed to draw a distinction between information that is of public interest and information that is in the public interest; a journalist’s job, he argued, is to work in the public interest, and, unfortunately, much of today’s journalism is simply of public interest. Former Times and Evening Standard editor and current Guardian writer and BBC broadcaster Simon Jenkins (2011) also explicitly argued that journalists must understand the difference between information of public interest and information in the public interest. Jenkins went on to argue that journalists need to create a new set of rules for our digital age—“professional self-regulation” of the kind employed by doctors and lawyers (2011, para. 15)—which more clearly outlines the bounds of legitimate public interest.

Another disagreement related to the public interest in journalism emerged: whether a story’s public interest factor could justify breaking the law. Writing in the Guardian, columnist and former Daily Mirror editor Roy Greenslade argued yes, a journalist’s commitment to working in the public interest is so fundamental and strong that it can justify illegal behavior (2010c). He made a similar case in The Independent (2010b), saying that journalists regularly breach boundaries to get information that the public needs to know. However, Simon Jenkins (also writing in the Guardian), disagreed. “The reality of the matter is that one person's brave investigation is another's illicit intrusion. … While [journalists’] stories may sometimes be in the
Journalists try to keep powerful figures transparent. For many British journalists, one way in which they work in the public interest is by keeping powerful figures, particularly political figures, honest and transparent. “It is vital to know when governments collude in torture or other illegal acts. It is important to know when they say one thing in private (about a particular world leader) and do quite another in public,” said John Kampfner in *The Independent* (2010, para. 10). Even though asking these tough questions might embarrass public figures, or lead to uncomfortable public discussions, asking these questions is “vital for the democratic debate” and “essential for a healthy civil society” (Kampfner, 2010, para. 11). In the *Evening Standard*, Roy Greenslade similarly argued for the importance of journalism in giving some power back to the people:

“It might be trite to observe that knowledge is power and that a lack of knowledge means a lack of power. But, trite or not, it remains a valid statement of reality. Journalism was founded precisely to redress the knowledge/power imbalance. It was born from a need among the don't-knows to know.

That is why the knowledgeable stifled journalistic inquiry from its inception in Britain and why, in states where democracy is non-existent or very fragile, their authorities continue to harass a nascent journalism.” (2010b, para. 11-13)

Many British journalists criticized their nation’s journalists for failing to keep powerful people transparent. Alan Gold of the weekly news magazine *The Spectator* described journalists as “gatekeepers of the public’s right to know,” who necessarily have an “inbuilt suspicion of bureaucracy and its propensity to prevent the release of information” (Gold, 2010, para. 8).
The Independent, John Kampfner (2010), who argued for the importance of journalism in British civic society, took issue with editors and journalists who regularly get invited to meet with British security officials; he argued that these journalists, who are invited to these meetings to discuss how news outlets can behavior more responsibly, get flattered by the officials’ attention and subsequently cease to critically examine government behavior. Writing in the Guardian almost two months later, Kampfner (2011) further criticized the British press, saying it had “under-invested in and devalued its responsibility—to use that pious phrase—to speak truth to power” (para. 12). In the Sunday Times, Irish journalist Matt Cooper (2011) warned journalists against become “part of the establishment who activities we are supposed to report without fear or favour” (para. 10), because “there is no point in being a stenographer when people in positions of power and authority lie as a matter of routine” (para. 11).

Journalists understand the need for discretion. In defining the boundaries of journalism, some journalists focused on the importance of speaking truth to power; however, many more UK journalists spoke about the importance of discretion and understanding when to keep secrets. Indeed, even some journalists who spoke passionately about the importance of holding authority accountable talked about the necessity of discretion. For instance, Matt Cooper said that the powerful “lie as a matter of routine” (2011, para. 11), but also said “if I’m told something in confidence, on the basis that I won't use it, then I have to respect that, frustrating as it might be” (para. 10). And Alan Gold (2010), who described journalists as naturally suspicious “gatekeepers of the public’s right to know” (para. 8), also expressed concern that the internet was bringing about a “brave new world of potentially unrestrained electronic freedom of information” (para. 17) that lacks any boundaries:
“Of course, people’s right to know how their government is dealing with them is very
different from uncovering inconvenient facts about wars and the rendition of prisoners
from one country to another. But the transparency industry, courtesy of the internet,
doesn’t believe in gatekeepers, and without such circumspection, potential damage to
reputations or dealings can get out of hand.” (para. 15)

Ultimately, Cooper’s and Gold’s columns argued for balance—that journalists’ suspicion
of powerful individuals and institutions is a positive attribute, but that responsible journalists also
need to understand when disclosure is unethical, either due to previously made agreements with
a source or to the information’s release not being in the public interest. But some British
journalists came out more strongly in favor of discretion. In The Independent, Yasmin Alibhai-
Brown argued that large-scale releases of information were irresponsible, and likened them to the
unhealthy gorging of food. She argued that responsible journalists should understand that
confidential information, like diplomatic cables, should stay secret, because it “will lead to
instability in parts of the world where frustration is high and basic needs are unmet. Without
social and political stability there can be no sustainable liberties - obvious, really” (2010, para.
4). Alibhai-Brown further argued for more journalistic discretion:

“A harder, though equally incontrovertible, truth is that even in the most developed of
democracies, where freedoms are guaranteed by constitutions and cumulative wisdom,
there are legal and also unspoken, generally understood limits to what is acceptable in the
public space. These are indeed frequently and necessarily contested. However, in the last
decade, an unprecedented resistance has being mounted by those who cannot
compromise, who truly believe anything goes and that restraint is a form of censorship.
These freedom fighters have brought down political correctness and delivered the dubious benefits of loose tongues and careless thoughts.” (para. 5)

For Alibhai-Brown, people who want to be considered journalists—or responsible journalists—must understand that they need to follow British secrecy laws as well as a set of unspoken limits that favor political correctness and polite restraint. Janet Daley echoed this sentiment in *The Telegraph*. “Private conversations, even when they are not at the level of the diplomatic communiqué, are generally considered to be no-go areas for journalists, because it is recognised that professional life of any kind would be virtually unsustainable without the possibility of confidential communication,” Daley said (2010, para. 11). In the *Daily Mail*, Stephen Glover (2010b) argued that journalists should not publish the details of conversations held between people who think they are speaking in private. In this article and another in *The Independent* (2010a), Glover also argued that journalists should recognize that keeping secrets is often in the national interest, with the further implication in both articles being that responsible journalists must have a sense of national allegiance. An article in the *Leicester Mercury* argued secrets were preferable to living in an insecure nation, and that responsible journalists should understand this. The article concluded that “if leaking secrets could compromise peace processes and national security, would we not be better off remaining in the dark?” (2011, para. 11). In the *Independent on Sunday*, former *Daily Telegraph* reporter, *Times* correspondent, and *Independent* associate editor Paul Vallely argued that “in the real world, lists of spies, secure locations, clandestine operations, vulnerable pipelines and sensitive communications systems must remain secret. It is not ideal, but the world is not an ideal place” (2010, para. 11).

Some journalists expressed concern about politicians’ reactionary responses to journalists who publish secrets. In *The Sunday Times*, Matt Cooper expressed concerns that politicians upset
by the WikiLeaks releases or the News of the World wiretapping scandal could seize upon angry public sentiment to push for stricter privacy laws. He said politicians might label these laws an attempt to “rein in the media,” but they could ultimately have the effect of stifling investigative stories that hold powerful people accountable (2011, para. 17). Part of Simon Jenkins’ call for journalists to create a new set of professional rules defining what is in the “public interest” was a desire to not have someone else create those rules. “Put your own house in order, or someone else will do it for you,” Jenkins warned in The Guardian (2011, para. 15).

Journalists recognize the consequences of publishing, and redact documents when necessary. Another requirement for inclusion in the journalism profession emerged, one which is related to understanding the need for discretion and working in the public interest: recognizing the real-world consequences of publishing. In The Times, Scottish journalist Hugo Rifkind (Rifkind, 2010a, 2010b) emphasized the importance of the “agonised deliberations that occur in every newsroom over what to publish, and what harm it might cause (which often get it wrong, but do at least occur)” (2010b, para. 9). Many journalists talked about the need for professional journalists to redact documents (e.g., Greenslade, 2010c; Mair, 2011), particularly in cases where information contains the “identities of vulnerable individuals who might suffer reprisals from foreign regimes” (Guardian Editorial Board, 2011, para. 18; see also Greenslade, 2010a; Guardian Editorial Board, 2010; Rogers, 2011; Times Editorial Board, 2010). John Kampfner was critical of the UK press and argued that they are too close to those in power, but agreed that “context is everything in the free-speech debate; risk to life is an undeniable caveat”—although he then added that “most other caveats are, however, mere ruses by the powerful to prevent information from reaching the public domain” (2010, para. 1).
Journalists verify and vet information. Many British journalists described verifying and vetting as a requirement for journalists. “Credibility must always be the first issue,” said Harold Evans in *The Financial Times* (2010, para. 3). To illustrate this point, Evans described a comment made by then-*New York Times* executive editor Abe Rosenthal during the Pentagon Papers publication. “My greatest nightmare was that they were written by a thousand SDS [Students for a Democratic Society] kids in some loft in Harvard. You know, one of them would say ‘I'll be [Robert] McNamara and you be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,’” Evans quoted Rosenthal as saying (para. 3). Roy Greenslade (2010c, para. 16) described the process of fact-checking and additional reporting as part of the “added value” that journalists provide to raw information. Matt Cooper said journalists “go to the lengths you can to be factual and accurate” (2011, para. 11), although he admitted that the verification process often requires complicated judgments.

In summary, British journalists regularly identified several behaviors and beliefs as professional norms. These included: providing context and analysis to information; working in the public interest; keeping powerful figures, particularly politicians, honest and transparent; understanding the importance of exercising discretion, and understanding when discretion is necessary; recognizing the consequences of publishing, and redacting documents to avoid harmful consequences; and verifying and vetting information before publishing. In the following section, I describe how British journalists situated WikiLeaks in response to these norms, and identify the ways in which journalists thought WikiLeaks both conformed to and violated the bounds of real journalism.

Based on this analysis of metajournalism, I propose that British journalists assessed WikiLeaks using the following definition of journalists:
Journalists verify and vet information, redact documents, and appreciate that some sensitive or embarrassing information should be kept secret (actions), produce reporting that provides context and analysis (product), and keep powerful people transparent and work in the public interest (societal function).

Situating WikiLeaks in Relation to These UK Journalistic Boundaries

WikiLeaks’ commonalities with British journalism.

WikiLeaks aids in producing journalism. The most-cited reason that WikiLeaks falls within the bounds of journalism was that the news media environment is rapidly changing and expanding, and WikiLeaks is a new kind of tool that journalists can use to produce reporting. Today’s news ecosystem, many British journalists argued, now includes a more diverse array of actors, rather than simply traditional newspaper and broadcast reporters. Writing a few days after the April 2010 release of the “Collateral Murder” video, current Guardian journalist and former Independent deputy editor Archie Bland described Assange as a hacker and journalist, and said WikiLeaks is “at the forefront of a new information era” (2010, para. 8). Some British journalists described WikiLeaks as an organization that is contributing to the news ecosystem by driving journalism to innovate. The Economist (2011b) described how WikiLeaks’ success encouraged other news outlets, like Al Jazeera or the Wall Street Journal, to adopt similar anonymous online drop boxes to encourage whistleblowers to come forward. In a CNN column, Roy Greenslade said he was “taken with” Assange’s call for more news outlets to practice “scientific journalism,” in which outlets make raw data used for stories available online for public perusal (2010a, para. 18). By practicing more scientific journalism, Greenslade said news outlets could become more transparent and better serve the public, as readers would be able to judge an article’s conclusions for themselves. Financial Times technology reporter Tim Bradshaw (2010) said that WikiLeaks
combines hacker culture with journalism, and argued that this combination emerged as a needed response to the gaps in investigative journalism caused by newspapers’ shrinking financial resources. Another *Economist* (2011a) article described WikiLeaks as one of many new and innovative experiments occurring in the news environment. *Guardian* data journalist Simon Rogers also described the *Guardian*-WikiLeaks collaboration as a important and innovative merger of traditional journalism and new technology:

> “When the Wikileaks releases exploded onto the news agenda last year, they changed many things—international diplomacy, the conduct of war and national secrecy. Perhaps lesser-realised is how they changed journalism. Wikileaks didn't invent data journalism. But it did give newsrooms a reason to adopt it. There was just too much data for it to happen any other way.” (2011, para. 1)

Even *The Times*’ Editorial Board, which was mostly critical of WikiLeaks overall, said Assange’s “brand of citizen journalism is an exciting development in global media,” while warning that this development “wields a power with which its practitioners have not yet come to terms” (*Times* editorial board, 2010). Others who were critical of WikiLeaks or Assange also admitted that WikiLeaks represented a new form of publishing, made possible by the internet; for example, Hugo Rifkind (2010a), who held a generally unfavorable view of WikiLeaks and its belief in total transparency, called the organization “an awesomely brave form of publishing” (para. 5). And longtime journalist John Lloyd, while critical of WikiLeaks, described it as a journalistic innovation that is “greatly expanding the scope and power of journalism” (2011, para. 3).

WikiLeaks is committed to serving the public interest. Some British journalists identified WikiLeaks’ commitment to working in the public interest as a reason why the organization is at
least journalism-adjacent. These journalists argued that WikiLeaks’ goal is to inform the public (Bell, 2010a, 2010b; Greenslade, 2010b; Kampfner, 2010; Vallely, 2010), with some citing the organization’s posting of raw documents online as evidence of this goal (Economist, 2010; Greenslade, 2010a; Mair, 2011). “The Afghan War Diary is up there on the net available for anyone to seek out their own gold nuggets of information,” said Roy Greenslade (2010a, para. 3). Even if some journalists saw WikiLeaks’ commitment to total transparency as overly idealistic, they still argued that it is motivated by a desire to inform the public. “WikiLeaks is bigger by far than a single individual and is motivated chiefly, it seems, by internet idealism, by the notion that information should be free. In matters of life, death, war and lies, we have the right to know,” said Ian Bell in The Herald (2010b, para. 17).

Greenslade, who was generally in favor of WikiLeaks’ style of disclosure, also found common ground with WikiLeaks’ goal of promoting greater information freedom and transparency. By putting its documents up online, he saw WikiLeaks as pushing governments to be more transparent about their activities, and pushing news outlets to be more transparent about their source material and reporting practices. “We journalists should be delighted that WikiLeaks exists because our central task has always been one of disclosure, of revealing public interest material that others believe wish to be kept secret,” Greenslade said in a CNN article (2010a, para. 20).

WikiLeaks provides a check on the powerful. One specific way in which some journalists thought WikiLeaks worked in the public interest was by serving as a check on the powerful. As discussed earlier, several British journalists in this analysis cited keeping government figures transparent as a crucial duty of their profession. John Kampfner, who was critical of mainstream journalism and what he perceived as the British media’s deference to
authority, praised Assange’s “wherewithal to hold truth to power” (2010, para. 12). “It is perturbing to know that aid agencies may have been used by the military, particularly in Afghanistan, to help Nato forces to ‘win hearts and minds,’” Kampfner argued (para. 10). Instead of attacking WikiLeaks, Kampfner said newspapers should ask themselves why they did not uncover this information themselves. In the Sunday Herald, Scottish journalist Ian Bell described WikiLeaks as “muck-raking journalism in the good old American style” (2010a, para. 12), and went on to say:

“In essence, WikiLeaks has committed three offences. First, it has practised journalism: it was handed a story and ran with the story. Secondly, WikiLeaks has risked a confrontation in order to demonstrate that the people have a right to know. Are lies being told? Have dishonourable deeds been committed? Let the people decide. Finally, there is impertinence, the puncturing of the imperial ego. The website has had the temerity to hold America’s government to American standards. This is no longer permissible.” (para. 16).

**WikiLeaks vets and redacts information.** A few journalists cited WikiLeaks’ attempts to verify, vet, and redact information as an indication that the organization was engaged in responsible journalism. While acknowledging WikiLeaks’ hacker roots, Tim Bradshaw argued in the Financial Times that “Wikileaks’ emphasis on fact-checking, verification and protection of its sources has a longer journalistic lineage” (2010, para. 7). Olivia Lang (2010) at the BBC said that WikiLeaks only gave its documents to its newspaper partners after scrutinizing them itself. Ian Bell (2010b) also questioned why Assange was being “demonised and harassed” (para. 16), despite his thorough redaction of the Iraq war documents and the lack of evidence that any of WikiLeaks’ releases had harmed anyone.
Overall, British journalists who argued that WikiLeaks fell within the boundaries of journalism saw WikiLeaks thusly:

*WikiLeaks vets and redacts information and aids in the production of journalism (actions), and works as a watchdog in order to serve the public interest (societal function).*

Although some British journalists saw commonalities between WikiLeaks and journalism, many more cited reasons why WikiLeaks is outside the boundaries of mainstream journalism. I explore the ways in which these journalists attempted to draw a line between their profession and WikiLeaks in the following section.

**WikiLeaks’ Deviations from British Journalism**

*WikiLeaks does not properly redact information.* The most-cited reason for WikiLeaks falling outside the bounds of journalism was that the organization did not properly redact its documents, particularly parts that might identify Afghan informants working with coalition forces. Shortly after the publication of the Iraq war logs, *The Times* Editorial Board condemned WikiLeaks for its poor job redacting the documents:

“Examining the leaks over the past two days, *The Times* has found dozens of instances where Afghans who have provided information to US forces are clearly identified. In reporting this, it should be noted, this newspaper has not compounded the error. It is safe to assume that the Taleban, already, have had both the time and inclination to do the same. Mr Assange claims to have held back 15,000 extra documents because ‘some of them, very, very few, mentioned the names of local Afghans that might have been subject to retribution’. Viewing those that slipped through the net, this claim is breathtaking.” (2010, para. 2-3)
The Times’ editorial board went on to say that the consequences of publishing such information—“it is a literal matter of life and death”—should have been obvious to anyone who took even a moment’s consideration (para. 9). “No established news organisation in the world would have published these leaks in full, nor should they,” the Times Editorial Board concluded (2010, para. 8). Times journalist Hugo Rifkind (2010a, 2010b) agreed. Although he called Assange an “awesomely brave individual,” and WikiLeaks an “awesomely brave form of publication” (para. 5), he said he was troubled by the organization’s lack of nuance and seeming indifference to the consequences that might occur as a result of its publications. “Will this prolong the war in Afghanistan or shorten it? Will more people die or fewer? Mr Assange doesn't appear to care at all. That's what I find so chilling,” Rifkind said (para. 5). Yasmin Alibhai-Brown had similar questions in The Independent. “Assange's freedom to publish, while vital, cannot be the only consideration. What happens next? Who deals with the ensuing disarray?” she asked (Alibhai-Brown, 2010, para. 3). Two Financial Times editorials said that the Afghanistan leaks had endangered lives (2010a, 2010b), as did Stephen Glover in The Independent (2010a). In London’s Evening Standard, Sam Leith said the diplomatic cables in their unredacted state—as he said WikiLeaks had—had the potential to endanger “many, many lives” (2011, para. 3).

Other journalists expressed concern about whether WikiLeaks’ lack of redacting could harm military operations. In the Sunday Herald, journalist Jasper Hamill described WikiLeaks as an organization of “net warriors” who are “free of journalistic ethics and unwilling to bow to any call to withhold information, even if it compromises troops lives,” as he implied the WikiLeaks releases would (2010, para. 5). In the Spectator, Alan Gold said WikiLeaks’ “release of incredibly sensitive information concerning the Pentagon’s dealings in the Middle East could give advantage to terrorists,” which he described as “potentially catastrophic” (2010, para. 11).
In the Daily Telegraph, Janet Daley highlighted one document published as part of the diplomatic cables release that listed soft targets, many of which were civilian, which the US identified as important to its national security. “The claim by [WikiLeaks’] spokesmen that this information was already ‘in the public domain’ is neither here nor there. It has never been offered up in such a readily accessible form (for that is what the ‘information revolution’ is all about, isn’t it?) and with such an extravagant flourish of publicity (because that is what WikiLeaks is all about)” Daley said (2010, para. 6). Stephen Glover (2010a) of the Daily Mail said he failed to see how publishing information about such important facilities could not damage security. The Leicester Mercury described WikiLeaks as “irresponsible journalistic practice,” and said any information that might endanger national security or ongoing peace processes should not be published (2011, para. 10).

Even The Guardian, which was not as vehement in its denunciation of WikiLeaks as the New York Times, said that Assange needed persuading in order to go along with The Guardian’s planned redactions. “His original ideology was that all information should be published on principle,” without any redactions (Guardian Editorial Board, 2011, para. 19). The Guardian ultimately persuaded Assange that redacting some information—like unverifiable and potentially libelous claims, and “identities of vulnerable individuals who might suffer reprisals from foreign regimes” (para. 18)—was acceptable.

WikiLeaks does not respect the need for legitimate secrets. Many journalists placed Wikileaks outside the bounds of responsible journalism because the organization did not have proper redaction or harm minimization policies—in short, these journalists argued WikiLeaks did not consider the consequences of its actions, which is something they thought professional journalists should do. Another way in which WikiLeaks did not demonstrate an understanding of
consequences of publishing was that the organization showed no respect for legitimate secrets—secrets that governments need to keep in order to maintain order and safety, or secrets that might simply embarrass officials. In *The Spectator*, Alan Gold described secrets as “one of the firmest foundation on which governments are built” (para. 2). Gold is a British journalist writing for a British magazine, but he currently lives in Australia; his article laments that country’s passage of new media regulations that would allow any Australian citizen to file a freedom of information request forcing the government to release any document, provided that the information is in the public interest. “Aside from issues of national security or commercially confidential details, there are times when information has to be held in check because issues are both delicate and ongoing. Premature leaks of information can destroy confidence, create confusion and result in misrepresentation,” he said (Gold, 2010, para. 10). Gold was concerned that increased transparency, of the likes desired by WikiLeaks, would make it more difficult for governments to govern by damaging the reputations of those in power. Yasmin Alibhai-Brown of *The Independent* agreed. She said that WikiLeaks’ releases will cause cynicism among citizens, and “without trust between rulers and the ruled, governance is impossible” (2010, para. 3).

According to many British journalists, no responsible news outlet or profession journalists would believe in the kind of transparency for which WikiLeaks advocates. “Believe it or not, the now-abused ‘mainstream media’ do subject their work to some legal and ethical filter. That is not true of the now-eulogised internet. Its champions deride the ‘censorship’ of newspaper editors and their lawyers, and imply that such professional discipline is for wimps. The result has been a real ethical collapse,” said Simon Jenkins in *The Guardian* (2011, para. 9). Jenkins went on to lament that the rise of organizations like Wikileaks means people in the public eye, from politicians to celebrities, must always assume they are on the record. “There is
no such thing as off-air. No one can be trusted. No email is safe. Walk down the road, enter a shop or pub, or talk to a friend, and someone somewhere will claim a ‘public interest’ in revealing it” he said (para. 11). Jenkins ultimately argued that WikiLeaks’ push for greater transparency would actually result in greater secrecy amongst the powerful; other British journalists expressed similar sentiments (J. Lloyd, 2011; Patterson, 2010; Vallely, 2010). “There must be protection for some individual and collective privacy, or private and corporate life will retreat into gated communities of body and mind. There must be such a thing as a secret worth keeping” (Jenkins, 2011, para. 14).

**WikiLeaks does not provide context, analysis, or other original content.** Many British journalists argued that WikiLeaks fell outside the bounds of real journalism because it did not engage in reporting, which is a process that includes providing readers with context and analysis to accompany raw data. The BBC’s John Mair said that instead of just publishing raw data on their own, WikiLeaks sought out “professional journalists” who were able to go about “processing it and turning it into stories” (2011, para. 5). As described earlier, Ian Bell of The Herald said that without “dead trees”—or traditional newspaper reporting, including explanation and “proper accounting”—the WikiLeaks documents would be meaningless to most readers (2010b, para. 12). The Financial Times describe WikiLeaks as “promoting partial views by releasing scattershot data without context” (2010a, para. 7). Even Roy Greenslade, a Guardian columnist who was supportive of WikiLeaks and “taken with” Assange’s call for more scientific journalism (2010a, para. 18), made it clear that journalism is more than simply publishing documents:

“The really significant feature of the WikiLeaks material is that it is up-to-date data, enabling journalists and the public to obtain a clearer picture of what has been happening
in Afghanistan. In that sense, the documents we can all now read offer us an invaluable insight. However, the posting of the material on the internet is not in itself an act of journalism. It is merely the beginning of a journalistic process, requiring analysis, context and, in this particular instance, a form of necessary censorship in order to protect individuals identified in the documents.” (para. 13-14)

Further placing WikiLeaks outside the bounds of real journalism was many journalists’ implication—or outright statement—that the organization needed to partner with traditional news outlets because WikiLeaks members did not have the skillset required to report on the documents themselves. In *The Independent*, Stephen Glover argued:

“For all the nation-dwarfing power of the internet, international whistleblowers such as Mr Assange still need old-fashioned national newspapers—in this case, *The Guardian*, *The New York Times* and the German weekly *Der Spiegel*. It was these publications which propelled his leaked information into the media stratosphere. He needed them partly to sift and make sense of the 92,000 documents and, more than that, to confer importance on his revelations, to induce the world to take them seriously.” (2010a, para. 3)

In another article in *The Independent*, Glover described *The Guardian* as the “prime mover in the publication of WikiLeaks documents” (2011, para. 2). Other journalists said WikiLeaks needed mainstream media either for help publicizing its materials (*Economist*, 2011b; Lang, 2010; Leith, 2011) or to provide added value to the raw documents (Bradshaw, 2010; Greenslade, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). Many other journalists—even those who otherwise defended WikiLeaks—characterized WikiLeaks’ actions as mere information dumps (Bell, 2010a; Evans, 2010; Kampfner, 2010; Rogers, 2011) or document-collecting (Tweedie & Swaine, 2010), as
opposed to proper journalism. “The quantity and the unedited state of the information WikiLeaks publishes set it apart from traditional journalism,” said the Financial Times (2010a, para. 5).

**WikiLeaks is not accountable to any nation’s laws.** British journalists expressed concern that WikiLeaks is not beholden to any one nation’s laws, and holds no national allegiance. Because many British journalists identified a professional commitment to keeping legitimate state secrets, are required to abide by a stricter set of libel and secrecy laws (as compared with American journalists), many took issue with WikiLeaks’ intra-national status. “The operation's disembodied nature—willfully designed to stay out of reach of any jurisdiction's enforcement—makes it more prone to act irresponsibly, with worse potential consequences when it does,” The Financial Times argued (2010a, para. 5). Other articles similarly described WikiLeaks as an organization beyond any authority’s control and without national loyalties, discussing these facets of WikiLeaks as detriments to responsible reporting (as opposed to a revolutionary development) (Financial Times, 2010b; Gold, 2010; Jenkins, 2011; Patterson, 2010; Times Editorial Board, 2010). In The Daily Telegraph, Janet Daley (2010) said because WikiLeaks is not accountable to any nation’s laws, the organization is inherently undemocratic. “[WikiLeaks’ releases are] an arrogant, defiant provocation of international conventions by a tiny handful of unidentifiable people that involved no consultation or popular mandate. … To whom could a society or an electorate—even if it was overwhelmingly opposed to such actions—protest or present its arguments?” she asked (para. 7).

This idea that WikiLeaks is not accountable to anyone—not governments, not citizens—also arose within criticisms of WikiLeaks’ lack of organizational transparency (Daley, 2010; Evans, 2010; Financial Times, 2010a; Tweedie & Swaine, 2010). WikiLeaks’ opacity, they argued, further ensures that it is not held accountable to anyone.
WikiLeaks has an anti-American agenda. While WikiLeaks may not be accountable to any nation’s laws or have any particular national allegiance, that does not mean journalists thought it was an organization without an agenda. On the whole, British journalists did not take issue with WikiLeaks having a bias or a point of view motivating it actions. The idea that an organization purporting to practice journalism had a distinct perspective was, in itself, not identified as problematic. Rather, it was the specific perspective—perceived as anti-American—which irked some British journalists. In The Times, Hugo Rifkind (2010b) accused Assange of seeing American conspiracies where there were none. “For him, every criticism is a smear, and every critic has an agenda, probably e-mailed over by the Pentagon. Frankly, it's insulting” Rifkind said (para. 9). In the Financial Times, Harold Evans (2010) said WikiLeaks’ only ambition was to damage the US in any way possible. In The Daily Telegraph, Janet Daley took swipes at both WikiLeaks and The Guardian. “The only opinion that is implicitly conveyed by WikiLeaks’ exposures is the boringly prosaic anti-Americanism of the average Guardian comment writer,” she said (2010, para. 3). Some journalists accused WikiLeaks of ignoring the fact that many of their own documents showed US officials behaving responsibly—for instance, that “anyone who reads the carefully edited reports cannot fail to be impressed by the efforts of American diplomacy for peace and security” (Evans, 2010, para. 9; see also Daley, 2010).

Overall, British journalists who argued WikiLeaks was outside the boundaries of journalism said so because:

*WikiLeaks does not properly redact sensitive information or respect the need for legitimate secrets, and it has placed itself purposefully outside the reach of any nation’s laws (wrong actions), it does not produce original reporting that provides context or*
analysis (wrong product), and it is only dedicated to advancing its anti-American agenda (wrong function).

Social identity theory: British journalists’ strategies for assessing WikiLeaks and Assange

British journalists used several strategies to make sense of WikiLeaks, and these strategies provide context for understanding the ways in which journalists placed WikiLeaks inside or outside the boundaries of real journalism. While reactions to WikiLeaks were diverse, and the metajournalism analyzed here featured journalists applying their own unique personal experiences and views to the WikiLeaks case, three strategies appeared frequently: using WikiLeaks to reaffirm traditional journalism, casting WikiLeaks as merely a new tool for journalists to use, and describing WikiLeaks as symptomatic of The Guardian’s continued deviance.

Social creativity: WikiLeaks reaffirms the continued need for traditional journalism.

Many British journalists thought the WikiLeaks disclosures provided evidence of the continued importance of traditional newspapers. BBC journalist John Mair (2011) said that, without his newspaper collaborators, Assange would have simply published the raw documents online without any redacting or consideration; it was the “professional journalists” (para. 5) who exercised responsibility by redacting the information, analyzing it, and turning it into meaningful stories for the public. In the Evening Standard, Sam Leith said Assange’s lack of nuance about what constitutes “disclosure in the public interest…made the case for exactly what overexcited Assangistas like to deride. That is, the Mainstream Media: aka, proper journalism” (2011, para. 7). Roy Greenslade, a regular Guardian columnist who expressed support for WikiLeaks, said in the Evening Standard the crucial role journalists played in the disclosures should encourage even people who dislike WikiLeaks. Greenslade argued in multiple columns that it was WikiLeaks’
newspaper collaborators who turned massive amounts of data into “sensible, readable editorial copy” (2010b, para. 33), thereby giving it “added value” (2010c, para. 16). Other journalists noted that WikiLeaks chose to team up with mainstream newspapers because it understood the continued power of the press in attracting readers and analyzing information (Bell, 2010b; Bradshaw, 2010; Lang, 2010; J. Lloyd, 2011; Rogers, 2011). Assange himself told The Economist that partnerships with mainstream news outlets give his organization’s leaks greater impact. “We see actually that the professional press has a nose for what a story will be—the general public becomes involved once there is a story, and then can come forward and help mine the material,” Assange said (Economist, 2011b, para. 4).

Even Stephen Glover, who was critical of both WikiLeaks and The Guardian (as I will describe in greater detail below), said The Guardian was “the prime mover in the publication of WikiLeaks documents” (2011, para. 2). Glover also said that WikiLeaks needed its mainstream newspaper collaborators to help make sense of the documents, confer legitimacy to them, and draw attention to them. “In other words, although this has been portrayed as a story about the power of the new media, it is also about the power of the old,” he wrote in The Independent (2010a, para. 4).

Applying social identity theory to these actions, one can see journalists employing social creativity to restore their profession’s positive distinctiveness. These journalists attributed any success WikiLeaks enjoyed to the abilities of the organization’s traditional journalistic partners; journalists were the ones that “added value” to the documents by engaging in analysis and placing the documents in context. This diminishes the value of WikiLeaks’ actions and the skillset of the organization’s contributors, while elevating the value of traditional journalists’ skillset.
**Social competition: WikiLeaks is a useful tool for journalists.** Some journalists described WikiLeaks as just another technological development within the field of journalism—a useful technological tool for journalists to use, but not journalism itself. Thus, journalists engaged in social competition with WikiLeaks by denigrating the organization’s contributions to journalism. Some of these journalists were not necessarily describing WikiLeaks in an actively negative way, but rather describing the organization as a promising new tool for real journalists to use. In this way, they were expressing excitement about the possibilities of a tool like WikiLeaks, while also engaging in social competition by making it clear that WikiLeaks is not journalism itself. The BBC’s Olivia Lang said “the true perpetrator of aiding the disclosure of confidential files is technology itself,” and noted that such a large disclosure would have more difficult and dangerous decades ago (2010, para. 15). Lang saw WikiLeaks as a tool helping to enable and expand whistleblowing, which she said “underscores the significance of technology to the future of journalism and transparency” (para. 22). Conversely, this means WikiLeaks is not a journalistic outlet, and therefore not a threat to journalists’ professional identity. Lang’s article likened WikiLeaks’ platform to Daniel Ellsberg handing over the Pentagon Papers to the *New York Times* in hard copy—the leaks are just faster now, and can be made available to more people. Roy Greenslade made clear that the act of leaking is not journalism by itself, but rather the beginning of a much longer reporting process. But he expressed excitement about the potential for outlets like WikiLeaks to aid investigative journalism. “Now, in the digital era, the tools exist for journalists—and citizens—to discover more than ever before,” Greenslade said (2010b, para. 29); “In essence, journalists in the 21st century are still doing what their forebears did in the 17th century, making sense of scraps of knowledge for the wider public good” (para. 34). The creator and former editor of the *Guardian’s* Datablog, Simon Rogers, expressed similar
excitement, and made clear that WikiLeaks’ successes do not come at the expense of traditional journalism:

“[s]ometimes people talk about the internet killing journalism. The WikiLeaks story was a combination of the two: traditional journalistic skills and the power of the technology, harnessed to tell an amazing story. In future, data journalism may not seem amazing and new; for now it is. The world has changed and it is data that has changed it.” (2011, para. 15).

When describing WikiLeaks, journalists like Lang, Greenslade, Rogers, and The Economist’s reporters focused on the potential for innovation in investigative journalism. They acknowledged that technology’s impact on the future of journalism is unknown and still unfolding, but they described these developments as exciting and promising additions to their field.

Social competition: WikiLeaks is just another example of The Guardian’s continued deviance. Some British journalists characterized the WikiLeaks disclosures as another incident where The Guardian went against established British journalism norms. These journalists understood WikiLeaks largely in the context of its collaboration with The Guardian—a newspaper disliked by many journalists working at other UK newspapers—and dismissed WikiLeaks as another example of The Guardian trying to make waves. In social identity theory parlance, these journalists were engaging in social competition with WikiLeaks (and, by extension, the Guardian), with the goal of diminishing these competitors and removing them as threats to the positive distinctiveness of their profession.

Some journalists used the WikiLeaks episode to criticize The Guardian. In The Independent, Janet Daley (2010) said the average commenter on The Guardian’s website was
boring and anti-American. Harold Evans (2010), writing in *The Financial Times*, praised *The New York Times*’ reporting on the WikiLeaks documents, but not the *Guardian*’s. In the *Daily Mail*, Stephen Glover (2010) said “*The Guardian* newspaper has been given privileged access” to the WikiLeaks material, and that other “liberal-minded publications around the world have also been granted preferential treatment” (para. 4). Throughout his article, Glover refers to *The Guardian* as a “liberal newspaper” that, like WikiLeaks, does not care about the harm its reporting might cause—implying strongly that *The Guardian* does not care because it is a liberal outlet. In *The Independent*, Glover (2011) also blasted *The Guardian* (and the *New York Times*) for abandoning WikiLeaks after it was done reporting on the diplomatic cables. “I doubt that the roughest "red-top" tabloid would write about a once-valued source in the way *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* have done about Mr Assange,” he wrote (para. 4). Overall, this strategy—describing the WikiLeaks disclosures as yet another instance of *The Guardian*’s deviancy from traditional British journalistic norms—allowed these journalists to accomplish two things. First, it allowed them to dismiss WikiLeaks by arguing that the organization only made headlines because it found a sympathetic, liberal, or even anti-American ear in its *Guardian* collaborators, who were happy to use the newspaper to give Assange an outlet for his views. Second, it gave them a chance to reiterate their disdain for *The Guardian*, and to remind their readers that *The Guardian* is too liberal, unprofessional, and out of touch with mainstream Great Britain.

Other journalists who criticized *The Guardian* also drew connections between *The Guardian*’s publication of the WikiLeaks documents and the *News of the World* phone hacking scandals of 2006-2011. *The News of the World* (*NOTW*), a red-top tabloid newspaper that began publication in 1843, closed in July 2011 after investigations revealed that its journalists had engaged in widespread phone hacking. Its journalists had not only hacked into the phones of
public figures like politicians, celebrities, and members of the British Royal Family, but also the phones of private individuals, including murder victims, families of deceased British soldiers, and victims of the July 7 terrorist attacks. Many considered The Guardian to be key in NOTW’s downfall; the paper continued to report extensively on the phone hacking allegations long after NOTW settled out of court with many of its hacking victims, and it published several investigative pieces alleging further NOTW misconduct. A December 15, 2010 article was particularly damning: It alleged that documents seized from the office of a private investigator indicated that NOTW editors specifically instructed journalists to hack into phones, and that other documents proved that the investigator, who had been imprisoned in 2007 for phone hacking, was actually employed by NOTW. The fallout from the article was extensive and swift: London’s Metropolitan Police Service and Crown Prosecution Service re-opened their investigations into NOTW, the NOTW’s editor Ian Edmondson was suspended from his job, and former NOTW editor Andy Coulson resigned from his job as Prime Minister David Cameron’s press secretary.

Some journalists who were critical of The Guardian and WikiLeaks accused the paper of hypocrisy, and said they saw parallels between NOTW’s phone hacking and the WikiLeaks disclosures, particularly the diplomatic cables—which were being published at the same time as the December 2010 article that led to the renewed investigation into NOTW’s phone hacking. In a Daily Mail (a middle-market tabloid) article titled “Why does the left treat one man as a pariah and the other as a hero?,” Stephen Glover (2010b) asked why The Guardian published the WikiLeaks documents, which were stolen from the US military, but “led a kind of holy war against the News of the World” when news broke that some of its journalists had been hacking into the phones of public figures and crime victims (para. 10). “While The Guardian congratulates itself in its own leader column for publishing private conversations, the News of
the World has certainly been punished for doing so, and has made restitution,” Glover said (para. 13). He made it clear that he is against the NOTW’s phone-hacking, and that he saw The Guardian’s publication of WikiLeaks documents as being in the same league. But Simon Jenkins (2011)—also writing in The Guardian—described both the News of the World and WikiLeaks as examples of decaying journalistic ethics. Regular Guardian columnist Roy Greenslade responded to accusations made on a fellow journalist’s blog (the Trinity Mirror’s David Higgerson19) that The Guardian’s publication of diplomatic cables was no different than phone-hacking. Higgerson said:

“The Guardian has made a crusade out of trying to chase down News International and former News of the World editor Andy Coulson over the phone hacking allegations. It became such a crusade that many people had stopped listening to the Guardian’s protests and only began to take it seriously again when the New York Times appeared in London with allegations which, when boiled down, weren’t that different to everything the Guardian had been saying. But how different is using information gleaned from alleged phone-hacking to using information which has been obtained using methods which many argue are illegal? Does the fact that you perhaps didn’t commission the potentially illegal act—as has been claimed of the NOTW—make a big difference?” (Higgerson, 2010, para. 6-7)

Greenslade, an advocate of adversarial journalism who was also in favor of WikiLeaks, responded by saying that, yes, he sees a big difference between the actions of the Guardian and those of The New of the World. “I know there will be Guardian journalists who disagree with me

on this, [but] I think we can justify breaking the law if we can demonstrate that we are acting in the public interest,” Greenslade said (2010c, para. 9). The point of The News of the World’s scandal, he said, was that the information its reporters were trying to obtain was not newsworthy or of public importance. Greenslade even said he sees instances where News of the World-style phone-hacking could be permissible, given that reporters had evidence that the information gleaned would be of public interest, as opposed to “fishing expeditions” for potentially scandalous bits of information (para. 11).

**Summary**

The analysis presented here demonstrates that British journalists varied in how they described the boundaries of journalism, and in how they positioned WikiLeaks in relation to those boundaries. Indeed, journalists frequently disagreed: For instance, some journalists thought WikiLeaks could be journalism because it redacted information, while other journalists thought WikiLeaks did not do a good enough job with its redactions. British journalists also described journalism’s role in democracy in varying terms. Some thought journalism’s job is to speak truth to power, and to uncover information that those in power would prefer remain secret (e.g., (Bell, 2010a, 2010b; Greenslade, 2010b, 2010c; Kampfner, 2010, 2011). This is a more adversarial view of journalism. Adherents to this view of journalism were more likely to welcome WikiLeaks into the journalistic ecosystem, because in WikiLeaks they saw a kindred spirit also dedicated to exposing corruption and keeping officials honest. Still other British journalists described journalism in different terms, and stressed not the importance of speaking truth to power but the importance of responsible discretion. For these journalists, responsible and professional reporting involved thinking about consequences, and erring on the side of restraint if
publication might have any harmful impacts—even if that impact was just embarrassing an official.

While some journalists were unwavering in their support (Bell, 2010a, 2010b; Greenslade, 2010b) or condemnation (Alibhai-Brown, 2010; Daley, 2010; Leicester Mercury, 2011; Leith, 2011; Patterson, 2010) of Wikileaks and its revelations, others held very complex or even conflicting opinions of the organization. For instance, writing in *The Times*, Hugo Rifkind called Assange and WikiLeaks brave, but also described Assange as having “flesh-colored hair (can it move? Can it grab? Can it blush?)” who gives him the creeps, who has a troubling lack of nuance or concern about the consequences of his actions (2010a, para. 1). Paul Vallely in *The Independent on Sunday* said WikiLeaks performs an important public services, but that the “challenge for us is to separate the good that WikiLeaks has done from its potential for harm” (Vallely, 2010, para. 10). *The Economist* talked about the line between journalist and activism, and said “line between activism and journalism has always been somewhat fuzzy, but has become even fuzzier in the digital age” (2011b, para. 11). Ultimately, *The Economist* was unsure on what side of that line WikiLeaks would fall. Others were similarly unclear what to make of WikiLeaks. Is it investigative journalism (Mair, 2011)? Does it hold itself to traditional journalistic morals, or any morals at all (Gold, 2010)? Part of this confusion can be attributed to WikiLeaks’ lack of organizational transparency, and the fact that WikiLeaks seems to be the first organization of its kind.

Finally, British journalists used three main strategies to address WikiLeaks’ potential challenge to their profession’s positive distinctiveness. Some used the WikiLeaks events to reaffirm the continued importance of traditional journalism. These journalists argued that WikiLeaks still needed their mainstream newspaper collaborators to make sense of the vast
amount of data, and that without journalists at The Guardian, the New York Times, and Der Spiegel, the WikiLeaks documents would not have had much meaning or impact. Others described WikiLeaks as part of the ongoing changes going on in the news industry. These journalists saw WikiLeaks as a new technology that could make investigative journalism better—a useful tool but not journalism, and therefore not a threat to the profession. Still others saw WikiLeaks as another example of The Guardian making waves and refusing to conform to other outlets’ norms. Some of these journalists said The Guardian was guilty of hypocrisy because the newspaper reported so aggressively on the News of the World phone-hacking case while also reporting on conversations that participants thought were private (in the diplomatic cables).

Within British journalism, one can observe variation in descriptions of the profession, beliefs about what the profession should aspire to, and opinions about where new organizations like WikiLeaks might fit in (if at all). Now that I have compared American and British metajournalism within each nation, respectively, I will next compare the two cases.

Section III: Comparing US and UK Metajournalism Surrounding WikiLeaks

In Comparing Media Systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004) placed the United States and Great Britain within the same ideal media system type: the North Atlantic or Liberal Model. They highlighted the common characteristics shared by the US and UK press—for example, both have commercial newspapers that developed early and became the dominant purveyors of news information, journalists who tend toward a fact-based style of reporting, news outlets that have traditionally been insulated from direct political pressure, and journalists that stress their adversarial relationship with their governments.
However, as Hallin and Mancini (2004) and others have noted, just because the US and Britain have media systems that are more similar to each other than to other Western media systems—Britain’s media system is more similar to the US’s than it is to Sweden’s or Italy’s, for example—does not mean that the two systems are identical. As discussed in Chapter 3, the American and British newspapers industries differ significantly in terms of political orientation and parallelism, and journalists in each nation are afforded different levels of legal protections (with US journalists enjoying more codified legal protections). These differences are reflected in how each nation’s journalists describe their profession and do their jobs. In this final section of Chapter 6, I outline the similarities and differences between metajournalistic discourse surrounding WikiLeaks in the US and Britain.

**Journalists’ relationship with their government**

The biggest difference between the American and British metajournalistic discourse was the perception of the press-government relationship. American and British journalists in particular had different ideas about how the process of redacting sensitive documents should proceed.

*Redactions and the adversarial press-government relationship.* Both US and UK journalists describe themselves as having an adversarial relationship with their respective governments (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). And while many US and UK journalists did express this sentiment in the metajournalistic discourse analyzed here, how this adversarial relationship worked in practice differed.

Having the ability to be adversarial to one’s government requires autonomy—in this case, the ability to publish what one likes without outside influence or restriction—which is a key component of most conceptualizations of professionalism. American journalists see themselves
as comprising a “Fourth Estate,” and see their profession as being of similar importance as government officials. In their metajournalism, many US journalists said journalists should work with government officials when writing stories about secret government documents; they characterized this situation as collaborative and equal. For example, a New York Times editorial board article described the paper’s reporting on the diplomatic cables thusly:

“After its own redactions, The Times sent Obama administration officials the cables it planned to post and invited them to challenge publication of any information that, in the official view, would harm the national interest. After reviewing the cables, the officials—while making clear they condemn the publication of secret material—suggested additional redactions. The Times agreed to some, but not all.” (2010, para. 5)

Many American journalists working at other outlets described the above course of action as the preferred one, and characterized it as responsible and professional (e.g., Farhi, 2010; Society of Professional Journalists, 2010; McNulty, 2010). Therefore, in instances involving sensitive material, American journalists think they should work with the government to redact potentially harmful information, but with the understanding that the decision to publish ultimately lies with the journalists; journalists are willing to collaborate with government officials as equals (or, at least in a manner in which they perceive to be equal), but can ultimately exercise veto-power over government suggestions.

This conviction that their profession occupies a high rank and exercises high levels of independence and autonomy is likely attributable to the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly guarantees that the press will be free from governmental interference. References to the First Amendment and press freedoms arose frequently in the American metajournalism. The Constitution is generally revered in American society and seen as
the nation’s foundation; that the Founders highlighted the press in the First Amendment
contributes to the mythology of journalism as a profession, to American journalists’ sense of
professional prestige, and to the belief that their profession occupies a similar rank as
government officials. The centrality of the Constitution to US journalists’ professional identity is
also reflected in the fact that so many expressed concern that politicians could use the WikiLeaks
disclosures to pass laws restricting press freedoms, which journalists regard as sacred.

Compared to their British colleagues, American journalists might work more closely with
government officials—and say that responsible journalists should work with them—precisely
because they have significant legal autonomy. This is not to say that American journalists’ legal
 protections actually do insulate the press from government influence; to be sure, government
officials can sway journalists without using outright coercion, and some journalists argue that
journalists’ proximity to government officials compromises their work (e.g., Greenwald, 2010b).
American journalists’ constitutionally guaranteed autonomy allows them to still claim that they
are autonomous and that their reporting is adversarial, despite working with the government;
they can argue (rightly or wrongly) that although they listened to government officials’
arguments against publishing, the government’s arguments amounted to suggestions rather than
demands. Further, even if they do not heed government advice, merely listening to government
officials’ opinions allows an American news outlet to appear responsible and considerate, which
can help guard against a future public opinion backlash.

British journalists, on the other hand, have no such legal protections, and in the
metajournalism analyzed here did not see themselves as equals with their government; to engage
in the kind of collaboration described by American journalists would be more detrimental than
beneficial to their interests. As described in Chapter 3, the United Kingdom does not have a
written constitution, and “freedom of the press remains an important cultural tradition but not the privileged legal principle it is in the US” (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, p. 230, emphasis added). This lack of legal protections is apparent in the UK’s Defence and Security Media Advisory notice program (or DSMA notice, formerly known as a DA-notice or D-notice), as well as its application of the Official Secrets Act against journalists.\(^\text{20}\) Mainstream journalists almost always comply with the DSMA notices they receive (Grimley, 2011). If an outlet does not comply with the DSMA notice, the government’s requests may quickly become demands. The UK government may threaten legal action against a news outlet, either by raiding the outlet and seizing any sensitive materials or by prosecuting the outlet under the UK’s Official Secrets Act. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is what happened in 2013 after *The Guardian* began reporting on the Edward Snowden documents. The UK government’s displeasure with the Guardian’s reporting, and the paper’s refusal to return the documents, resulted in Guardian staff being forced to destroy hard drives while agents from the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) watched (Borger, 2013). “The Guardian’s lawyers believed the government might either seek an injunction under the law of confidence, a catch-all statute that covers any unauthorised possession of confidential material, or start criminal proceedings under the Official Secrets Act,” Guardian journalist Julian Borger wrote in an article detailing why the paper destroyed its copy of the Snowden files (2013, para. 23). In the United States, the

\(^\text{20}\) In response to reporting that relates to national security issues, the UK government may send a news outlet a DSMA notice, which advises that outlet on whether and how to report on issues pertaining to national security. Although the government says “the Notices have no legal standing and advice offered within their framework may be accepted or rejected in whole or in part,” (Defence and Security Media Advisory Committee, 2011), mainstream news outlets almost always comply with the DSMA notices they receive (Grimley, 2011). If an outlet does not comply with the DSMA notice, the government’s requests may quickly become demands. The UK government may threaten legal action against a news outlet, either by raiding the outlet and seizing any sensitive materials or by prosecuting the outlet under the UK’s Official Secrets Act. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is what happened in 2013 after *The Guardian* began reporting on the Edward Snowden documents. The UK government’s displeasure with the Guardian’s reporting, and the paper’s refusal to return the documents, resulted in Guardian staff being forced to destroy hard drives while agents from the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) watched (Borger, 2013). “The Guardian's lawyers believed the government might either seek an injunction under the law of confidence, a catch-all statute that covers any unauthorised possession of confidential material, or start criminal proceedings under the Official Secrets Act,” Guardian journalist Julian Borger wrote in an article detailing why the paper destroyed its copy of the Snowden files (2013, para. 23). In the United States, the
comply with these notices, due to the implicit threat of legal action (Grimley, 2011). Because UK journalists’ interactions with national security officials generally result in restrictions on their reporting, it is understandable that British journalists would be disinclined to seek out their counsel. US journalists who seek out government counsel therefore appear, to UK journalists, to be giving up their autonomy. But most US journalists do not see it that way: Because they are protected by the First Amendment and can ultimately decide what information to print, most American journalists see little harm (again, rightly or wrongly) in listening to the government’s perspective on publication, and actually perceive several benefits in seeking government input. Many also see it as their duty as responsible journalists to listen to the government’s perspective, so that they can fully understand the potential ramifications of publication and gain a better sense of what should be redacted in order to protect human life and national security interests.

Journalists and government security officials, therefore, have fundamentally different relationships in the US and the UK, and it is difficult for American journalists and British journalists to understand why the other interacts with government in the manner it does. As a result, many American and British journalists disagreed about whether responsible journalists would vet the WikiLeaks documents with the US government prior to publication. This fundamental disagreement is apparent in the following exchange\(^2\) between a BBC News anchor

government would have no such legal standing, and an act like this would be interpreted as a violation of First Amendment rights.

\(^2\) The exchange occurred shortly after the *New York Times* and *The Guardian* began publishing articles based on the WikiLeaks documents. A video of the exchange may be seen here:

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RvMn4q4FNHg](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RvMn4q4FNHg).
and Bill Keller on BBC’s nightly news program, which the American blogger and journalist Glenn Greenwald (2010) included in one of his Salon.com columns:

“KELLER: The charge the administration has made is directed at WikiLeaks: they’ve very carefully refrained from criticizing the press for the way we’ve handled this material… We’ve redacted them to remove the names of confidential informants… and remove other material at the recommendation of the U.S. Government we were convinced could harm National Security…

[BBC] HOST (incredulously): Just to be clear, Bill Keller, are you saying that you sort of go to the Government in advance and say: ‘What about this, that and the other, is it all right to do this and all right to do that,’ and you get clearance, then?

KELLER: We are serially taking all of the cables we intend to post on our website to the administration, asking for their advice. We haven’t agreed with everything they suggested to us, but some of their recommendations we have agreed to: they convinced us that redacting certain information would be wise.” (Greenwald, 2010b, para. 20-23)

This divergence in perspectives on working with the government was also evident in the New York Times’ and the Guardian’s different approaches to working with the US government during their WikiLeaks reporting. In a Guardian editorial board article describing how the paper reported on the WikiLeaks documents, the board said then-editor Alan Rusbridger agreed to go along with the New York Times’ desire to notify the US government of their impending publication, but only because the Times made such notification inevitable: “The New York Times made it clear that they would in any event do so themselves as a matter of policy” (para. 17). But Rusbridger refused to tell the US government which specific cables he would publish (as the New York Times did) or to withhold “allegedly politically sensitive material” (2011, para. 17).
The Guardian was clearly less willing than the *New York Times* to work with the US government on redactions and to seek government input about what material was appropriate to report.

In sum, this disagreement highlights an important difference in how US and UK journalists talked about their profession’s relationship to the government: British journalists do not see themselves as equal collaborators with the government and so are unwilling to seek out government consult, and American journalists see themselves as equals and so think such collaboration is possible and beneficial to all involved. A practical result of this difference is that adversarial outlets like the *Guardian* generally avoid governmental conflicts (and potentially censorship) by determining themselves which information should be redacted. Even UK journalists who criticized WikiLeaks (or, indeed, the *Guardian*) for publishing too much sensitive information characterized redactions as something done by the outlets themselves. Journalists used their professional judgment, not governmental input, to determine which information to hold back. For example, Hugo Rifkind at *The Times* in London described “the agonised deliberations that occur in every newsroom over what to publish, and what harm it might cause” (2010b, para. 9), and other British journalists offered similar descriptions of the process of weighing the harms and benefits of publishing (e.g., Alibhai-Brown, 2010; Cooper, 2011; Gold, 2010). So while American journalists criticized WikiLeaks for not working with the Obama administration or State Department to redact the leaked documents, UK journalists did not. British journalists do not see themselves as on equal footing with their government in terms of legal power, and so do not seek out government input on reporting; therefore, they did not criticize WikiLeaks for not doing so. Rather, UK journalists criticized WikiLeaks for not doing a good enough job redacting the documents on its own.
One could argue, then, that WikiLeaks could never meet the standards set out by both the US and UK press for how a professional journalist should interact with the government. While both US and UK journalists seemed to agree on the broad principle that journalists should avoid causing harm to innocent people or troops on the ground, and that this principle often calls for the redaction of sensitive materials, they disagreed about how those redactions should take place. American journalists, protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution, feel comfortable (or even duty-bound) in consulting the government before publishing sensitive information. British journalists have no such legal protections; while they consider redactions of sensitive information to be necessary and important, they describe such redactions as activities undertaken by journalists themselves (without government collaboration). But regardless of this difference in methods, both American and British journalists found the redactions WikiLeaks made to the Afghan war documents to be poorly done.

**Willingness to accept government secrecy.** More British journalists than American journalists described a need for legitimate state secrets (e.g., Alibhai-Brown, 2010; Gold, 2010; J. Lloyd, 2011; Patterson, 2010; Vallely, 2010), and criticized WikiLeaks for not recognizing this as well. British journalists described a wide range of situations in which the government should be permitted to keep secrets, including when a story is about national security, “delicate and ongoing” issues (Gold, 2010, para. 10), issues that would increase citizens’ cynicism or erode their trust in government, or matters that might damage the reputations of people in power. In contrast, American journalists described a much narrower set of situations in which government

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A minority of the American journalists described here (e.g., Glenn Greenwald) would argue that these meetings are likely to cause journalists to be swayed or flattered into holding back information that should be disclosed to the public.
secrets would be acceptable. These situations were mainly confined to issues of national security where disclosure would cause a real and immediate danger to human life.

**Legal accountability.** British journalists, particularly ones working for more right-leaning outlets like the *Daily Mail* or *The Times*, expressed concern about WikiLeaks not being accountable to any one nation’s laws. They argued that this lack of legal accountability made WikiLeaks more likely to behave irresponsibly (e.g., see *Financial Times*, 2010a, 2010b; Gold, 2010; Jenkins, 2011; Patterson, 2010; *Times* Editorial Board, 2010). Therefore, these journalists interpreted legal systems as a mechanism of enforcing responsible professional behavior. No American journalists expressed such views, likely because of their nation’s First Amendment protections and their subsequently stronger feelings of professional autonomy.

**Professional norms**

*Providing original analysis and reporting.* Journalists in the US and UK frequently said providing original analysis and reporting was central to the definition of journalism. This was often one of the first things that came up when they defined their profession, and one of the most commonly cited reasons for placing WikiLeaks outside the boundaries of journalism. Journalists in both nations used this criticism of WikiLeaks to reaffirm the continued importance of their profession.

It should be noted here that Mathew Ingram, who made his career working for non-traditional online news outlets like GigaOm, had a wider definition of what constituted original analysis and reporting. And journalists working at the *Guardian*, which prides itself on quickly adopting new technological developments and incorporating them into its reporting, characterized WikiLeaks as part of the new news ecosystem (e.g., Bland, 2010; Greenslade, 2010a; Rogers, 2011). But this is where American and British journalists differed: A much wider
array of British journalists and outlets described WikiLeaks as part a new online news ecosystem (e.g., *The Economist*, 2011a, 2011b; Rifkind, 2010a; *Times* editorial board, 2010). In the US, such discussion of the broadening definition of news content was largely left to Ingram and the *New York Times*’ media reporter David Carr.

**Objectivity.** This analysis corroborates what many past researchers have noted, which is that American journalism places a high value on objectivity—that is, the idea that good and responsible journalists should not let their own biases influence their reporting (Reese, 1990; Schudson, 2001). “According to the objectivity norm, the journalist’s job consists of reporting something called ‘news’ without commenting on it, slanting it, or shaping its formulation in any way” (Schudson, 2001, p. 150). Many American journalists criticized WikiLeaks for having strong political biases influencing its actions. They argued that these biases placed WikiLeaks outside the boundaries of real journalism, and rendered any of its attempts at creating news content (like the “Collateral Murder” video) illegitimate.

British journalism’s weaker orientations toward objectivity could be seen in the language they used to discuss WikiLeaks and Assange, which different notably from the language used by American journalists. British journalists often included colorful personal descriptions of Assange in their metajournalism, particularly if they were condemning his actions. From Hugo Rifkind asking if Assange’s “flesh-colored” hair is capable of grabbing or blushing, to Christina Patterson (2010) description of the shapeliness of Assange’s mouth and her concerns about his iron intake, to Sam Leith’s (2011, para. 5) description of Assange as “an amateur, a creep and a chump,” British metajournalism surrounding WikiLeaks had no shortage of biting comments about Assange. Some of the colorful language centered around Assange’s technology savvy. “Julian Assange experienced something this week that he has not known since boyhood: a
prolonged period without a computer,” began Neil Tweedie and Jon Swaine’s article written shortly after Assange’s arrest related to molestation charges in Sweden (2010, para. 1). Others disparaged WikiLeaks because the online hacker collective Anonymous had launched attacks against companies who denied service to WikiLeaks (“most of them are just internet geeks instinctively defending their obsessions,” said Paul Vallely (2010)).

Despite British journalism’s weaker objectivity norms, WikiLeaks did receive criticism from some British journalists for having what they saw as an anti-American agenda. It was not the fact that WikiLeaks had an agenda at all that bothered some British journalists, but rather that they thought WikiLeaks’ agenda was expressly anti-American or anti-democratic. For many American journalists, any agenda is bad because it breaks journalism’s ideal of objectivity; for British journalists, particular types of agendas are bad. UK journalists’ concerns about WikiLeaks’ anti-democratic agenda were also reflected in their criticism that WikiLeaks did not respect the need for legitimate state secrets. For some British journalists, being pro-democracy meant recognizing the need for discretion (e.g., Daley 2010; Gold, 2010), or even believing that national security interests trump press freedoms (Alibhai-Brown, 2010; Glover, 2010a; Leicester Mercury, 2011).

**How to best serve the public interest.** Journalists in the US and UK expressed a range of views about how journalism could serve the public interest, and about whether and how WikiLeaks served the public interest.

As described above, many US journalists said WikiLeaks’ biases and stated advocacy mission prevented it from producing real journalism; some journalists took this a step further, and said that WikiLeaks’ advocacy mission was actually keeping it from serving the public interest. For example, George Packer said WikiLeaks’ desire to tarnish the US meant that the
organization was preoccupied with finding any embarrassing information about the US, at the expense of looking for actual, real government wrongdoing. Writing in the *New Yorker* after the release of the diplomatic cables, he said:

“If WikiLeaks and its super-secretive, thin-skinned, megalomaniacal leader, Julian Assange (is he also accompanied everywhere by a Ukrainian senior nurse?), were uncovering crimes, or scandals, or systemic abuses, there would be no question about the overwhelming public interest in these latest revelations. But the WikiLeaks dump contains no My Lais, no black sites, no Abu Ghraibs. The documents simply show State Department officials going about their work over a period of several years. … Assange’s stated ambition is to embarrass the U.S. This means that his goals and those of most journalists are not the same.” (2010, para. 4)

In the *New York Times*, Bill Keller similarly described how WikiLeaks’ “zeal to make the video a work of antiwar propaganda” prevented the organization’s “Collateral Murder” video from telling the public an accurate story—namely, he claimed that one Iraqi in the video was holding a rocket-propelled grenade, making the situation depicted in the video more volatile than WikiLeaks’ edited version suggested (2011, para. 5). Trudy Rubin of the *Philadelphia Inquirer* also said Assange was preoccupied with his desire to disrupt international systems, rather than a desire to expose actual wrongdoing. For Packer, Keller, and Rubin, WikiLeaks failed at working in the public interest because its biases made it see wrongdoing where there was none.

But other American journalists defined “public interest” more broadly, so that it included not only uncovering wrongdoing but also keeping governments transparent. Journalism, they argued, should force governments to be open and honest, which in turn prevents wrongs from occurring in the first place; several US journalists said WikiLeaks fulfilled a public interest role
in this capacity (e.g., Ingram, 2010c; Greenhut, 2010; McNulty, 2010). Although the diplomatic cables, for example, might not have exposed specific wrongdoings, they gave the public a better sense of how their government operates, thereby serving the public interest. Interestingly, this was the argument that Bill Keller (2011) made in defense of the *New York Times’* publication of the diplomatic cables; however, he did not apply the same argument to WikiLeaks, the organization that supplied him with the cables, and instead argued that WikiLeaks did not have a public interest orientation. His 2011 article about working with WikiLeaks made clear that he thought WikiLeaks’ lack of objectivity precluded it from truly serving the public interest.

Several British journalists identified increasing government transparency as a central duty of journalism; however, few British journalists said WikiLeaks helped increase government transparency (e.g., Bell, 2010a; Kampfner, 2010). Far more took issue with what they perceived as WikiLeaks’ anti-American biases and lack of professional discretion.

**Focus on international perspective.** The WikiLeaks story involved international media players: a “stateless news organization” (Rosen, 2010), a British newspaper (*Guardian*), and an American newspaper (*New York Times*). UK journalists regularly compared the state of their news media to the US, but US journalists rarely did the same thing. British journalists compared their nation’s press climate (particularly legal protections for journalists) to those in the United States, often highlighting American journalists’ stronger freedoms and autonomy:

“In the US, with its First Amendment, restrictions are seen as an exception to the rule. In the UK, free speech is regarded as a negotiable commodity. An interest group's right to be offended is seen as just as important as the right to air an opinion. A government's right to secrecy is seen as more important than the public's right to know.” (Kampfner, 2010, para. 6).
The Guardian’s editorial board also praised press freedoms in the United States, calling the First Amendment a “formidable bulwark of free speech, rightly admired around the world” (2010, para. 11). In a later article, the editorial board also favorably compared US press freedoms to those in the UK. Describing the paper’s uncertainty with how the US government would respond to its WikiLeaks reporting, they said “On previous occasions [in the UK] when the paper had published leaked documents, it was not unknown for opponents to wake judges in their pyjamas, to get them to hand down injunctions and gag orders, forcing removal of the material. It was hoped that the cross-jurisdictional deals the paper had brokered would protect it, particularly the one made with the New York Times which was protected in the US by the First Amendment” (2011, para. 16).

Within the WikiLeaks metajournalism, American journalists never contrasted their system with the UK. Perhaps they did not need to because, as the Guardian editorial board pointed out, they felt the First Amendment would protect them from government reprisal. A most illustrative comparison will come in the sections focusing on the Snowden revelations, as these leaks also included documents from Britain’s GCHQ.

Social identity strategies

Both American and British journalists tried to cast their own strengths as more important to the definition of true journalism, and cast WikiLeaks’ strengths as less important to journalism. In doing this, they used social creativity to reassert the continued need for traditional journalism. Both nations also used social competition, describing WikiLeaks simply as a tool for real journalists to use and thereby removing WikiLeaks as a threat to the profession’s positive distinctiveness. However, British journalists engaged in additional social competition, not just with WikiLeaks but with the Guardian. They described WikiLeaks as yet another example of the
Guardian’s deviant journalistic practices, and thus dismissed both organizations as outside the boundaries of real journalism.

**Summary**

American and British journalists differed in their approaches to the press-government relationship and in some of their professional norms. American journalists saw themselves as equals with the government during discussions about what aspects of the Manning disclosures should remain secret. The idea that journalists would engage in discussions with the government about what they plan to publish was foreign to British journalists. More British journalists argued that the government had a right to keep legitimate secrets, and argued more so than Americans that journalists should be respectful of this right. These differences can perhaps be attributed to the two nations’ different legal protections for journalists.

In terms of professional norms, both American and British journalists said providing original analysis and being dedicated to the public interest were important aspects of journalism. They differed, however, in terms of how they thought journalism should serve the public interest, with more Americans expressing the idea that it is their job not just to uncover government wrongdoing but also to force the government to be transparent. In the metajournalism analyzed here, American journalists took a more adversarial posture toward their government than British journalists did toward theirs. American journalists also expressed a continuing dedication to objectivity; British journalists did not argue that objectivity was required for someone to be considered a journalist, although many did criticize WikiLeaks for being “anti-American” (suggesting that some types of bias in journalism are OK, but just not the kind of bias held by WikiLeaks). Finally, American journalists took a less international perspective in their discussion of WikiLeaks. Whereas British journalists frequently compared their media system
and legal protections to the US—usually arguing that the American journalists enjoy more freedoms and greater levels of autonomy—Americans rarely compared their press system to the British one.

Overall, journalists in both countries were generally unaccepting of WikiLeaks’ and Assange’s places in the journalistic ecosystem. The notable exceptions to this were journalists who made their names working for online and alternative media outlets (e.g., Mathew Ingram and Glenn Greenwald) and some Guardian-affiliated journalists (e.g., Roy Greenslade). Instead of accepting WikiLeaks as a new type of journalistic organization, journalists often argued that WikiLeaks’ success reinforced the need for traditional newspaper journalists. WikiLeaks was only successful, the argument went, because it partnered with mainstream newspapers who knew what they were doing. These newspaper journalists had the resources and experience necessary to turn the raw material into meaningful stories that would be comprehensible to readers. Many journalists, including most notably the New York Times’ Bill Keller, described WikiLeaks as little more than a source. However, journalists like Keller and others who work at old establishment newspapers have a personal incentive to argue WikiLeaks is “nothing new” or “just a source,” and to argue that WikiLeaks needed its newspaper collaborators more than the newspapers needed WikiLeaks. In this way, both American and British journalists’ opinions about whether and how WikiLeaks fit the definition of “real journalism” was often self-serving—suggesting that journalism’s definitions are less concrete than many journalists (particularly those working at establishment outlets) would like to think.
Comparison of US and UK journalistic boundaries, vis-à-vis WikiLeaks and Assange

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<th>Definition of journalism</th>
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<th>United Kingdom</th>
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<td>Journalists verify and vet information and work with the government to redact sensitive documents (<em>actions</em>), to produce reporting that provides context (<em>product</em>), in order to serve as a watchdog for the public (<em>societal function</em>).</td>
<td>Journalists verify and vet information, redact documents, and appreciate that some sensitive or embarrassing information should be kept secret (<em>actions</em>), produce reporting that provides context and analysis (<em>product</em>), and keep powerful people transparent and work in the public interest (<em>societal function</em>).</td>
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<th>WikiLeaks’ and Assange’s commonalities with journalism</th>
<th>WikiLeaks publishes information and aids in the production of journalism (<em>actions</em>), and acts as a watchdog (<em>societal function</em>).</th>
<th>WikiLeaks vets and redacts information and aids in the production of journalism (<em>actions</em>), and works as a watchdog in order to serve the public interest (<em>societal function</em>).</th>
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<td>WikiLeaks is not journalism because it simply dumps data online without proper redactions and it provides no insights into its information gathering processes (<em>wrong actions</em>), it does not produce original reporting with context (<em>wrong product</em>), and it is committed to advancing its own interests rather than serving the public (<em>wrong function</em>).</td>
<td>WikiLeaks does not properly redact sensitive information or respect the need for legitimate secrets, and it has placed itself purposefully outside the reach of any nation’s laws (<em>wrong actions</em>), it does not produce original reporting that provides context or analysis (<em>wrong product</em>), and it is only dedicated to advancing its anti-American agenda (<em>wrong function</em>).</td>
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Chapter 7: American and British Metajournalistic Discourse Surrounding Glenn Greenwald

This chapter explores my analysis of US and UK metajournalism about Glenn Greenwald. Metajournalism refers to the public discussion that journalists have about the practice of journalism (Carlson, forthcoming); specifically, the metajournalism analyzed here discussed Greenwald’s place within the two nation’s journalistic ecosystems. The goal of this analysis is to understand how journalists interpreted Greenwald, a longtime blogger who rose to international prominence over the course of his reporting on the Edward Snowden disclosures. As discussed in Chapter 2, Greenwald’s route to journalism is uncommon in the US and UK: He began his career as a lawyer, and began blogging in the early 2000s. After his personal blog gained popularity, he moved to *Salon.com*, and then to the *Guardian*, and now publishes primarily on his online news magazine *The Intercept*. Greenwald is emblematic of a new type of journalist who, as a result of online publishing technologies, does not require formal affiliation with a mainstream outlet to attract readers. Rather, his readers follow him as he publishes work across a variety of mainstream and independent outlets. His success demonstrates that today’s journalists need not publish their work in old-media brand names in order to garner attention. Greenwald also stands out among journalists for his adversarial style of journalism and combative approach to interviews. He is vocal in his criticism of American and British mainstream media, and in particular ardently rejects traditional American conceptualizations of journalistic objectivity.

Greenwald, then, is disruptive to journalism’s status quo. As a result, his rise to prominence elicited a variety of reactions from journalists in the US and UK. In the following sections, I take stock of how journalists reacted to this lawyer-turned-blogger-turned-journalist within the context of metajournalistic discourse. I outline the professional boundaries they
identified as important to their profession as they either accepted or rejected Greenwald’s status as a journalist, as well as the larger themes that emerged throughout the metajournalism. I start in the US context before turning to the UK, and end by comparing American and British journalists’ reactions to Greenwald.

**Section I: American Metajournalism Surrounding Glenn Greenwald**

This analysis uses a purposive sample of metajournalistic discourse articles, as outlined in Chapter 3. In total, 40 articles published in 23 different outlets were analyzed here; these articles represent the views of 34 different American journalists or editorial boards from a variety of traditional and online-only media outlets. For a complete list of the articles included in this analysis, please see the Appendix.

Within the American metajournalism surrounding Glenn Greenwald, journalists were frequently grappling with issues that had been slowly coming to a head for many years. In an age where people make claims that “anyone can perform an act of journalism,” journalists wondered whether it was still useful to draw a distinction between different producers of journalism. Is there a difference between (1) a *New York Times* beat reporter, (2) someone who reports on politics for several different blogs, and a (3) citizen who uploads a video he or she thinks the public has a right to see? If yes, then what are those differences, and why do they matter? Many

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23 This analysis is based on a purposive sample of 40 print and online metajournalistic articles, as described in Chapter 3. For a complete list of the articles, including the outlet, date of publication, author, brief professional background on the author, and publication information, see the Appendix.
journalists struggled to articulate the differences between the work produced by different kinds of journalistic actors, and many who tried were later lambasted by other journalists who thought the distinctions they drew were too narrow or self-serving.

So what attributes—if any—are essential for someone to be a journalist? Are there some attributes that journalism cannot do without (e.g., objectivity, impartiality, adversarial posture)? Journalism comes in many different flavors: mainstream, objective, adversarial, advocacy, access-style. Is one style more legitimate or trustworthy than another? In the following sections I outline the bounds of acceptable journalism that came up in American metajournalism surrounding Greenwald. Overall, American metajournalism largely focused on whether someone with a clear and open point of view, like Greenwald, could produce real journalism and, if so, whether that journalism would be more or less valuable than traditional American objective journalism. Many US journalists asked themselves whether someone who is upfront about his political beliefs could provide accurate reporting. Some argued that all journalism inherently advocates for something—for a certain belief or cause, or for more general goals like greater transparency, increased government accountability, or the public good. Journalists debated whether it is better to strive to be objective while knowing that biases could subconsciously impact one’s reporting, or if it is preferable to abandon the objectivity ideal and be transparent about one’s opinions and predispositions. No journalist included in the present analysis expressed the idea that pure objectivity is possible, but many said it is the striving for objectivity that makes for accurate and fair reporting. Still others argued that objectivity is a myth in American journalism; journalists always end up advocating for something, and many journalists who claim to be objective are actually hiding biases within their reporting.
Before diving into the metajournalism analysis, it is helpful to first outline two important American metajournalistic events that took place shortly after Greenwald began reporting on the Snowden disclosures: Greenwald’s appearance on NBC’s “Meet the Press,” and Andrew Ross Sorkin’s comments about Greenwald on the cable news channel CNBC. Many of the articles analyzed here mentioned these events, and used them as points of departure to discuss larger issues of journalistic boundaries. Because references to these incidents recurred so often, and because both occurred on television rather than in the context of written metajournalism (the object of analysis here), it is useful here to provide a brief context on each.

The first incident involved David Gregory, who at the time was host of NBC’s Sunday-morning news program “Meet the Press.” Gregory had Greenwald as a guest on the show shortly after the Snowden revelations began. The entire interaction was strained, and during the interview the two got into a now-infamous argument. At several points, Gregory denied Greenwald the title of journalist. “You are a polemicist here, you have a point of view, you are a columnist, you’re also a lawyer” Gregory told Greenwald (Gregory, 2013, para. 17). The tension reached a head when Gregory posed the following question to Greenwald: “To the extent that you have aided and abetted Snowden, even in his current movements, why shouldn’t you, Mr. Greenwald, be charged with a crime?” (para. 19). Greenwald responded:

“I think it’s pretty extraordinary that anybody who would call themselves a journalist would publicly muse about whether or not other journalists should be charged with felonies. The assumption in your question, David, is completely without evidence, the idea that I’ve aided and abetted him in anyway. The scandal that arose in Washington before our stories began was about the fact that the Obama administration is trying to criminalize investigative journalism by going through the-- the e-mails and phone records
of AP reporters, accusing a Fox News journalist of the theory that you just embraced, being a co-conspirator with felony-- in felonies for working with sources. If you want to embrace that theory, it means that every investigative journalist in the United States who works with their sources, who receives classified information is a criminal, and it’s precisely those theories and precisely that climate that has become so menacing in the United States. That’s why the New Yorker’s Jane Mayer said investigative reporting has come to a standstill, her word, as a result of the theories that you just referenced.” (para. 20)

Gregory responded:

“Well, the question of who’s a journalist may be up to a debate with regard to what you’re doing and of course anybody who’s watching this understands I was asking a question. That question has been raised by lawmakers, as well. I’m not embracing anything. But, obviously, I take your point.” (para. 21)

Moments after the interview, Greenwald tweeted “Who needs the government to try to criminalize journalism when you have David Gregory to do it?” (Greenwald, 2013b). Gregory responded to this tweet on-air at the end of the program:

“I want to acknowledge there is a debate on Twitter that goes on online about this, even as we’re speaking. And here’s what Greenwald has tweeted after his appearance this morning: “Who needs the government to try to criminalize journalism when you have David Gregory to do it?” And I want to directly take that on. Because this is the problem from somebody who claims that he’s a journalist, who would object to a journalist raising questions, which is not actually embracing any particular point of view. And that’s part of the tactics of the debate here when, in fact, lawmakers have questioned him. There’s a
question about his role in this, *The Guardian*’s role in all of this. It is actually part of the debate, rather than going after the questioner, he could take on the issues. And he had an opportunity to do that here on ‘Meet the Press.’” (para. 67)

The second incident involved Andrew Ross Sorkin, who is a financial columnist for the *New York Times*. Sorking founded the paper’s DealBook blog, and he appears frequently on the cable news network CNBC. Sorkin made the following statement on one such CNBC program:

“I would arrest him [Snowden], and now I’d almost arrest Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who seems to be out there, he wants to help him get to Ecuador or whatever” (Kludt, 2013, para. 3).

Greenwald learned of the comment, and he and Sorkin exchanged words on Twitter. “Maybe worth discussing the dark irony that someone who works for the NYT (you) is suggesting that journalists be arrested,” Greenwald tweeted at Sorkin (Greenwald, 2013b). Another of Greenwald’s tweets read: “Strange: 1) being accused by Wall St cheerleader @andrewrsorkin of "advocacy journalism"; 2) NYT reporter suggesting arrest of journalists” (Greenwald, 2013b).

Sorkin ultimately apologized for the comment on-air on CNBC:

“I put my foot in my mouth, and I’m sorry about this, when I veered into hyperbole and suggested that he almost be arrested—that was the quote—and I have to say it didn’t come out right and I misspoke. I’m sorry I said it that way, and I’m sorry I said it. … I was trying to raise a question, not about the legality of publishing the leaked information about the NSA, but about the implications if a journalist aided someone like Snowden in trying to evade authorities on the run and what that would all mean.” (Byers, 2013, para. 2-3)

**Defining the Boundaries of Journalism in the United States, vis-à-vis Greenwald**
Objectivity. Journalists fell into two camps in this analysis: (1) those who argued that journalists should strive to be objective in their reporting, and (2) those who argued that objectivity is a myth and journalists should instead be open and honest about their points of view.

Journalists strive to be objective. Some journalists (although a minority in this study) argued that true journalists strive to be objective. Because humans are subjective by nature, they will likely never reach the goal of being purely objective, but the striving is important. Former New York Times editor-in-chief Bill Keller, an advocate of traditional unbiased journalism, said “I avoid the word ‘objective,’ which suggests a mythical perfect state of truth,” and instead opted for the goal of impartiality (Keller & Greenwald, 2013, para. 56). The striving itself is the important thing, because it involves confronting one’s own biases and choosing to actively set them aside in favor of the truth. Striving for objectivity requires journalists to be constantly asking themselves whether they are making assumptions. “Without objectivity as an aspiration, the correctness of a political line comes before a fair consideration of facts: the facts follow the line, not the other way around,” said Michael Kinsey in The New York Times (2014, para. 21).

For John B. Judis, having the goal of objectivity separates journalists from other types of mass communicators. Judis argued in the magazine The New Republic that the “quest for objectivity was an attempt to carve out an area of public information and judgment that the public (who may not familiar with the Egyptian street or the details of a trade agreement) can rely on. And it’s well worth preserving at a time when it is under attack from both left and right” (2013a, para. 15). In another New Republic article, Judis said having a desire to be objective is what is important; it “differentiates coverage that is trustworthy from coverage that is not” (2013b, para. 7). In the Washington Post, Paul Farhi said “the line between journalism — traditionally, the
dispassionate reporting of facts — and outright involvement in the news seems blurrier than ever,” thus describing objectivity as a line between real journalism and activism or advocacy (2013, para. 14). Keller similarly argued that striving to be impartial “does not come naturally,” and the act of constantly “testing all assumptions, very much including your own” is a discipline unique to journalism (2013, para. 57).

Some other journalists made a related argument about objectivity: Journalists can be openly biased or opinionated and still call themselves “journalists,” but the journalism they produce is less valuable to the public as a result. For example, Keller cited the reporting done by the Fox News cable network. “I believe journalism that starts from a publicly declared predisposition is less likely to get to the truth, and less likely to be convincing to those who are not already convinced. (Exhibit A: Fox News),” he wrote (2013, para. 57). In the Los Angeles Times, Benjamin Mueller (2013)—who argued that “point-of-view and viewless journalism can and should coexist” (para. 11)—said “objective journalism is different from journalism that’s open about its views and origins,” and “one could fairly argue” (para. 6) that advocacy journalists are more likely to ignore conflicting evidence or misrepresent information to suit their needs. David Carr, who also described point-of-view journalism as valuable, had a similar caveat. “I do think that activism — which is admittedly accompanied by the kind of determination that can prompt discovery — can also impair vision. If an agenda is in play and momentum is at work, cracks may go unexplored,” he said in the New York Times (Carr, 2013a, para. 22)

**Journalists should be upfront about their beliefs and viewpoints.** Other journalists argued that objectivity is too perfect of a standard; because it can never be achieved, it is not a meaningful goal. Humans are naturally subjective, and to expect them to be objective invites
problems—namely, that audiences will suspend their critical faculties because they believe what they are reading is nothing but fact. One of the most vocal advocates of this position was Matt Taibbi (who later went on to work for Greenwald’s First Look Media venture, albeit very briefly). In *Rolling Stone*, Taibbi forcefully argued for what he called advocacy journalism:

“But to pretend there's such a thing as journalism without advocacy is just silly; nobody in this business really takes that concept seriously. ‘Objectivity’ is a fairy tale invented purely for the consumption of the credulous public, sort of like the Santa Claus myth. Obviously, journalists can strive to be balanced and objective, but that's all it is, striving. Try as hard as you want, a point of view will come forward in your story. Open any newspaper from the Thirties or Forties, check the sports page; the guy who wrote up the box score, did he have a political point of view? He probably didn't think so. But viewed with 70 or 80 years of hindsight, covering a baseball game where blacks weren't allowed to play without mentioning the fact, that's apology and advocacy. Any journalist with half a brain knows that the biases of our time are always buried in our coverage.” (2013, para. 12-13)

Taibbi said he decided to be open with his readers about his point of view. However, he sees one value in the “Just the facts, Ma’am” (para. 14) style of reporting: The American audience trusts this approach. But he argued outlets and journalists who purport to be objective often take advantage of the audience’s trust by subtly manipulating facts. Thus, claims of objectivity are often used to hide biases in reporting.

Longtime magazine journalist and former editor of the *New York Daily News* Jeff Jarvis concurred with Taibbi, and was a vocal advocate for the idea that journalists need not be objective or even strive for objectivity. He said traditional American journalism “thinks” it is
objective, but is actually not (2013a, para. 1). He argued that all journalism is advocacy; if someone is not advocating, then he or she is not practicing journalism. “When an editor assigns reporters to expose a consumer scam or Wall Street fraud or misappropriation of government funds, that’s advocacy. When a newspaper takes on the cause of the poor, the disadvantaged, the abused, the forgotten, or just the little guy against The Man, that’s advocacy,” Jarvis argued on his Buzz Machine blog, an entry that was cited by several other journalists in the metajournalism analyzed here. He went on to say that non-advocacy topics we commonly think of as journalism—sports box scores, so-called “click-bait,” or human-interest stories—are entertainment, not journalism. He was clear that entertainment still can have value, but said that entertainment is not journalism because it does not “carry information that people can use to better organize their lives or their society” (Jarvis, 2013, para. 7). “I’d say it fails the journalism test,” he added (para. 7).

Other journalists similarly argued that journalists need not strive for objectivity, and that most journalism involves advocacy of some form. Mathew Ingram, then writing for the technology news site GigaOm, said “almost all of what we call journalism is advocacy of some sort of another. Some journalists are more obvious or transparent about what they are advocating for than others” (2013b, para. 4). Ingram said many of the most important journalists in American history were advocates for something, citing I.F. Stone and Seymour Hersh as examples. The editors of the Columbia Journalism Review (2014) argued that the debate about whether objective (or, to use Keller’s preferred word, “impartial”) journalism was better or worse than activist journalism was an irrelevant debate that will never be resolved. Instead, they said the important argument to have is whether access journalism or accountability journalism is more valuable to citizens, with “access journalism” referring to work focusing on what the
powerful say (and therefore produced by journalists who are close to those in power) and “accountability journalism” referring to work focusing on what the powerful actually do (and produced by those with more distance from powerful individuals and institutions).

**Other boundaries of journalism**

*Journalists should base their reporting on fact.* Most journalists would probably agree with the statement that journalism should be based on verifiable fact, rather than conjecture or information that comes from a single source. In the sample of metajournalism analyzed here, many journalists cited ensuring that information is factually accurate as a key function of their job. This process requires journalists—whether in the objective tradition or in the advocacy tradition—to not weigh certain facts more heavily than others, and to not let their own viewpoints impair how they interpret facts. Verifying that information is accurate and truthful was cited as important by *New York Times* Public Editor Margaret Sullivan (2013a), Eric Deggans at the Poynter Institute (2013), John Nichols at the *Capital Times* (2013), and David Carr at the *New York Times*. “Journalists are responsible for following the truth wherever it may guide them,” Carr said, noting that an activism mission might impair journalists’ judgment and cause them to suspend their critical faculties (2013a, para. 22). In the *New Republic*, John B. Judis said the process of verification requires rules about evidence and sourcing, and he argued many of these rules can be credited to traditional journalistic outlets like the *New York Times*, who articulated verification processes back in the early 20th century. “Editors, to take a prime example, generally ask for writers to have two sources for any controversial claims. One can suffice if there is written or aural or video evidence,” he said (Judis, 2013b, para. 7). In another *New Republic* article, Judis described his experiences with confronting bias while verifying his reporting:
“When I used to do “man-in-the-street” interviews to judge who was ahead in a race, I often had to recognize afterwards that I had asked questions and picked out people to interview who would confirm my hopes that the Democrat was going to win. It happens all the time, but it’s also not inevitable. You learn to question your assumptions; you write second and third drafts; you listen to a taped interview again; editors ask questions; and so do fact-checkers. And sometimes, as a result, you are able to write things that are accurate—and in this sense, objective—even if they don’t accord with your hopes and wishes.” (Judis, 2013a, para. 6).

On his Buzz Machine blog, Jeff Jarvis described intellectual honesty—which he defined as the willingness to follow facts wherever they go, no matter if they damage your own side—as the height of responsible journalistic behavior (2013a). A true journalist verifies facts and debunks rumors, he said (2013b). In the debate about the future of journalism that former New York Times editor-in-chief Bill Keller had with Greenwald, Greenwald also said that “ultimately, the only real metric of journalism that should matter is accuracy and reliability” (Keller & Greenwald, 2013, para. 13). Journalists of all stripes—those who believe an objective press produces more accurate information (like John B. Judis or David Carr) and those who believe an activist press produces more accurate information (Jarvis, Greenwald), as well as those who fall somewhere in-between—agreed that real reporting is based on truthful and accurate information.

Journalists should hold sources accountable. Another issue that arose is holding sources accountable; this function of journalism is related to ensuring the factual accuracy of information. In an article for CNN, Howard Kurtz expressed concern about (what he perceived as) a shift toward more partisan reporting, because this shift would entail sacrificing “the media's role as neutral arbiter, a sense that they are holding their sources accountable even while
disseminating their information” (2013b). Many journalists talked about the importance of not getting too close to sources, because this closeness can cause one to become enamored of the source and not question the source as toughly as one should (Farhi, 2013; Ingram, 2013a; Mueller, 2013). Journalists need to have a “critical distance from the source,” according to longtime national security journalist George Packer (2014, para. 28). In the *New York Times*, Michael Kinsey argued journalists must feel entirely free to ask questions of anyone, without fear of being publicly castigated (which is why he defended David Gregory’s line of questioning during Greenwald’s “Meet the Press” appearance) (2014).

The *Columbia Journalism Review* (2014) article that declared the objectivity vs. advocacy debate unproductive argued that the real debate should be about access vs. accountability journalism. Accountability journalism is more valuable because it is more likely to hold sources accountable:

> “Given the competitive pressures and the way the world works, there will always be a journalism focused on getting close to elites to learn what they are thinking and intending. And that’s okay. It’s the other stuff—public interest-oriented, accountability journalism—that is at once journalism’s most powerful and paradoxically its most vulnerable form; the riskiest, the costliest, the most technically difficult. It’s the journalism we need to worry about” (*Columbia Journalism Review* editors, 2014, para. 8).

*Journalists are adversarial to those in power.* Many expressed the sentiment that true journalism is about challenging people who hold power. “A real journalist is one who understands, at a cellular level, and doesn’t shy away from, the adversarial relationship between government and press – the very tension that America’s founders had in mind with the First
Amendment,” said *New York Times* Public Editor Margaret Sullivan (2013b, para. 17). Responding to Sullivan’s statement, Jeff Jarvis (2013b) said he rarely sees this kind of adversarial journalism on television or in political coverage, although he wishes he did (2013b). Mathew Ingram said Sullivan’s statement was too narrow, and argued that the boundaries of “real journalism” should be expanded to include those who challenge power wherever they find it—not just in the government. Ingram said Sullivan’s definition “leaves out many journalists who pursue stories that expose corporate corruption or malfeasance in other spheres” (2013b, para. 7). John Nichols (2013) of the *Capital Times* similarly described the importance of speaking truth to power, wherever one finds it, and said that journalists must be vigilant about defending their right to challenge authority. “The conflict over the right of a free press to speak truth to power—and to state truths that power would prefer to keep hidden—has never really ended,” Nichols said (2013, para. 17).

The *Columbia Journalism Review* editors said being adversarial was at the heart of accountability journalism, which strives to challenge those in power while maintaining a distance from them. “This debate [about objective vs. advocacy journalism] is not about the use of hot words, like ‘torture.’ It’s about whether journalism perceives as its core mission holding power to account. If it doesn’t, then the DealBooks and Playbooks of the world will always win the day,” they said, referring to Andrew Ross Sorkin’s DealBook blog for the *New York Times* and Mike Allen’s *Politico* blog, which they saw as examples of “access journalism” that reports on the perspectives of leaders in finance and politics, respectively (2014, para. 17). The *New Yorker*’s John Cassidy expressed optimism that some new journalism start-ups—including Greenwald’s First Look Media, as well as former *New York Times* editor Bill Keller’s Marshall
Project—signaled that the journalistic commitment to producing quality, in-depth reporting that “when necessary, upsets powerful interests” had not faded (2014, para. 4).

**Journalists work in the public interest.** Finally, the idea that all journalists work for the public’s best interests came up very occasionally, but always in relation to whether objective or advocacy journalism better serves the public good.

Jeff Jarvis argued that all journalism involves advocacy for the public. “The choices we make about what to cover and how we cover it and what the public needs to know are acts of advocacy on the public’s behalf. Don’t we believe that we act in their interest?” he asked (2013a, para. 4). Jarvis further argued that information that is not of public use cannot be journalism. In *Forbes*, John McQuaid (2013) argued that what matters most about journalism is that it injects quality information into the public sphere, so that citizens can have meaningful debates about issues.

A few journalists connected working in the public interest with being an objective journalist. In their view, advocacy journalism places too high a burden on the public, because they must be aware of the leanings and biases of every journalist whose work they consume. This kind of hyper-awareness is not possible for most citizens. The “view that journalism is advocacy and that objectivity is a fairy tale puts the onus of entangling the truth entirely on the reader. It’s the market place of ideas without consumer protection,” argued John B. Judis in the *New Republic* (2013b). Judis said requiring this kind of work of one’s audience is unacceptable, given the vast array of issues a person might want to understand. On the Poynter Institute’s blog, Eric Deggans (2013) agreed that advocacy journalism, while a valid form of journalism, asks more of the public than objective journalism. Advocacy journalism requires readers to have a good awareness of a particular journalist’s past work or state political leanings before they can
decide whether to accept that journalist’s work as fact. David Carr agreed. “It is now up to the consumer to assemble a news diet of his or her choice, adding in news that is produced by people who have skin in the game,” he said in the New York Times (2013a, para. 14).

Drawing together the various boundaries identified in this analysis, American journalists defined journalism thusly:

*Journalists strive for objectivity and/or transparency and hold their sources accountable (actions), produce fact-based reporting (product), and are dedicated to holding the powerful to account and working in the public interest (societal function).*

How did Greenwald measure up to this definition? In the upcoming sections, I explore how American journalists thought Greenwald exemplified and violated the boundaries of journalism.

**Situating Greenwald in Relation to the Boundaries of American Journalism**

Most journalists were willing to afford Greenwald some space within the boundaries of journalism. Some argued that he was a journalist in the truest sense of the word—an adversarial muckraker who advocated for the public interest. Some only reluctantly included him in the journalism club, describing him as having a “unique brand of journalism” (Reitman, 2013, para. 7). However, others argued that Greenwald’s brand of journalism was inferior to the more neutral, objective style, or that his reporting evinced some other kind of potential professional impropriety. I next explore the ways in which journalists argued Greenwald did or did not fit within the boundaries of professional journalism.

**Greenwald’s commonalities with American journalism.**

*Greenwald is adversarial to those in power.* No journalist questioned Greenwald’s position as an adversary to those in power; if anything, some thought he was *too* adversarial. As
New York Times Magazine staff writer Emily Bazelon put it in Slate, “Greenwald is the fighter—the one you want in your corner when the world comes after you” (2014, para. 1). Greenwald’s adversarial posture toward power was the most cited way in which journalists felt Greenwald fell within the bounds of journalism. “Investigative reporters cause trouble. And, in most American towns and cities, the relationship between the local newspaper and the political and business establishments is very cozy. Greenwald, who was a lawyer before he turned to blogging, is squarely in the troublemaking tradition; Keller, less so,” said John Cassidy in the New Yorker, in an article comparing Greenwald’s and Bill Keller’s new online journalism ventures (2014, para. 6-7). John Nichols of the Capital Times said Greenwald’s adversarial journalism put him in the crosshairs of government officials, but described this as a badge of honor that Greenwald had earned “for informing the American people what their government is doing—and why it might be wrong” (2013, para. 5). “[Rep. Peter King (R-NY)] is not satisfied to go after Snowden, the private contractor who has provided a measure of insight regarding the extent to which we live in a surveillance state. King wants at the journalist who dared to tell the people,” Nichols said (2013, para. 3).

Some journalists said Greenwald’s consistently adversarial posture toward those in power made him unique in the journalism field—but that they wish this were not the case. “Unlike most mainstream-media reporters, he voices contempt for certain American officials. And when he believes that they have broken the law, he doesn't shy away from urging that they be prosecuted and imprisoned for their crimes. It is no accident that there is no love lost for him in the national-security state,” said Conor Friedersdorf in the Atlantic magazine (2014a, para. 5). “Unlike many famous journalists, he is not deferential to U.S. leaders,” Friedersdorf said in another Atlantic article (2014b, para. 7). David Sirota, writing for the online outlet Pando Daily, argued that
mainstream journalists try to evict Greenwald from the journalism club because his style of reporting highlights their own professional deficiencies. “In this new reality, the independent adversarial journalist like Greenwald who digs up genuine scoops finally has a chance to become more important than what the watchdog group Fairness and Accuracy in Media rightly calls the ‘state-identified journalist’ who simply transcribes the claims of the rich and powerful,” Sirota said (2013, para. 26).

Matt Taibbi, an outspoken adversarial journalist himself, took umbrage with the idea that journalists who advocate for the truth should be treated as oddities; Taibbi sees all journalists as advocates, because all journalists advocate for the public and for increased transparency and accountability. They do this by challenging those in power, as Greenwald does. “What's frightening now is that we suddenly have talk from people who ought to know better, not only advancing the childish lie that Glenn Greenwald and his ilk are the world's only advocacy journalists, but also that the legitimacy of such journalists is even in question,” he said in Rolling Stone (2013, para. 16). Taibbi went on to argue that people should actually be more skeptical of journalists who claim to be objective, because “those people are almost always lying, whether they know it or not” (2013, para. 25). Jeff Jarvis, who similarly argued that all journalism involves advocacy on behalf of the public, drew a distinction between journalism that advocates for a political position and journalist that advocates for the public. He said Greenwald’s and the Guardian’s reporting were examples of journalism that advocates for the public (2013a).

Greenwald bases his reporting on facts. Some journalists argued that Greenwald’s writing was based on verifiable fact, and therefore counted as journalism. “I come down squarely on the side of Greenwald against Gregory and Sorkin. Greenwald’s reporting followed the canons of accurate journalism,” said John B. Judis in the New Republic magazine (2013, para. 2).
Writing for the Poynter Institute, Eric Deggans said that there is “a craft to the unearthing of information,” and that it takes skill to turn that information into a story that has context and is fair (2013, para. 7). “Media figures who are also advocates for a point of view utilize those skills, too. Take Glenn Greenwald, the blogger/writer who reported on Snowden’s leaks for The Guardian at the same time as the traditional journalists at The Washington Post,” Deggans said (para. 8). Deggans said Greenwald used the same skills as other journalists, although he also clearly drew some distinction between Greenwald (as an advocacy journalist) and what he saw as “traditional journalists” at the Washington Post (who, presumably, are “traditional” because they practice objective journalism). Erik Wemple of the Washington Post praised Greenwald for being transparent in his reporting. This transparency allowed audiences a glimpse into how Greenwald’s reporting took shape, and thereby allowed them to better judge the accuracy of the information. “In response to various questions going back to the days just after his first NSA stories, Greenwald has delivered a remarkable amount of disclosures about how he got the story, how he executed it and how he plans to continue pursuing it. It helps that Greenwald’s source voluntarily outed himself, an element of sunlight that has enabled him to hold forth on reporting methods” (Wemple, 2013, para. 6).

Greenwald works in the public interest. Finally, a few journalists said anyone who reports information with the goal of enlightening the public could be counted as a journalist. “You can be a journalist who is an advocate and advances a political point of view. Or one who remains politically agnostic. Both are legitimate. But what really matters is the information that enters the public sphere, its validity, how it is presented, and any debate it provokes. Not who put it there in the first place, or even why they did it,” said John McQuaid in Forbes (2013, para. 10). Writing for Reuters, Jack Shafer said he “care[s] less about where a journalist is coming from
than to where his journalism takes me” (2013). Shafer argued that democracy needs partisan journalism, and that anyone who argues that quality partisan journalism does not exist misunderstands the history of American journalism. Jeff Jarvis argued that the reporting done by Greenwald and the *Guardian* should not be seen as political advocacy, but rather advocacy for the public (Jarvis, 2013a).

Overall, journalists who argued that Greenwald fit the bounds of journalism made the following argument:

*Greenwald produces reporting that is based in fact (product), and committed to holding the powerful to account and working in the public interest (societal function).*

**Greenwald’s deviations outside American journalistic boundaries.**

**Greenwald is too close to his source.** Many journalists expressed discomfort with Greenwald’s relationship with Snowden. They argued Greenwald was too personally close to his source, and that he had become an advocate for Snowden’s virtue rather than an advocate for the public interest. This was one of the concerns that led Paul Farhi (2013) to write a column in the *Washington Post*, asking whether Greenwald had become “something other than a journalist” over the course of his Snowden reporting. “Greenwald has been close to Snowden ever since the government contractor approached him anonymously early this year, offering to relate secret information. … Greenwald has appeared frequently on TV to plead Snowden’s case as a whistleblower—an advocacy role many mainstream journalists would be uncomfortable with,” Farhi wrote (2013, para. 7-9). The same day that Farhi’s column ran in the *Washington Post*, Greenwald appeared on “Meet the Press” where host David Gregory made a similar argument about Greenwald’s lack of distance from his source. “To the extent that you have aided and abetted Snowden, even in his current movements, why shouldn’t you, Mister Greenwald, be
charged with a crime?” Gregory (2013) asked, implying that Greenwald was potentially committing a crime by being close to his source. Benjamin Mueller (2013) said he wished Gregory had parlayed these comments into a thoughtful dialogue about whether Greenwald’s affinity for Snowden clouded his judgment. “One could fairly argue that Greenwald overlooked conflicting evidence because he became enamored of Snowden, or that he misrepresented parts of his story because he’s loyal to a particular view of government, not the truth,” Mueller said (para. 6). However, Mueller argued this is not what happened on “Meet the Press”—Gregory instead focused on whether Greenwald committed a crime by working with his source, thus eschewing more important questions about Greenwald’s style of journalism. Mathew Ingram of GigaOm took a similar stance. While he defended Greenwald’s place in the journalistic ecosystem, he also acknowledged the potential hazards of Greenwald’s advocacy. “There are obvious risks to Greenwald’s position as an advocate of leaks and whistle-blowers like Snowden and Bradley Manning: among them are the possibility that journalists who take this kind of approach could become too close to a topic, and could avoid asking hard questions of their sources,” Ingram said (2013a, para. 10).

Multiple journalists pointed out, with apparent discomfort, that Snowden chose Greenwald specifically because of his political leanings. “When Edward Snowden decided to expose the administration's massive surveillance program, the CIA contractor turned to journalists he knew would be sympathetic,” said Howard Kurtz in CNN (2013b, para. 1). Kurtz’s article described how traditional media outlets are missing out on big scoops and being “forced to play catch-up,” because leakers are “wary of journalists who play by a traditional set of rules” (para. 2-3). In this interpretation, by simple virtue of his outspoken beliefs—which themselves are a violation of traditional journalistic rules—Greenwald is poaching big scoops that otherwise
would have gone to traditional outlets. The *New York Times*’ managing editor Dean Baquet was similarly scornful of Snowden’s decision to approach Greenwald rather than the *Times*. “It’s an important story, and clearly I would have loved for us to have had it. But he chose to go to someone who had a clear point of view,” Baquet told public editor Margaret Sullivan (M. Sullivan, 2013a, para. 8). In a *Prospect* article titled “The errors of Edward Snowden and Glenn Greenwald,” longtime *New Yorker* international affairs journalist George Packer was similarly skeptical about the relationship between Snowden, Greenwald, and Poitras. “Greenwald and Poitras have a clear political agenda, which is why Snowden, with his deep distrust of the institutional press, chose them,” Packer said (2014, para. 16). In all these cases, journalists are describing collusion between source and journalist, and the idea is clearly distasteful to them. Indeed, Packer was highly critical of Greenwald’s style of reporting. He described Greenwald as an “anti-establishment columnist in a left-wing British paper” (para. 11), and never referred to him as a journalist.

*Greenwald’s activism makes it difficult to trust the accuracy of his reporting.* Some journalists, like Packer, said Greenwald’s activism made it difficult to trust the accuracy and fairness of his reporting. In addition to Greenwald’s unacceptable relationship with his source, Packer said Greenwald also violates journalistic norms by never wavering from his point of view, despite being confronted with evidence that contradicts those views. “Some of the instances [in Greenwald’s book, *No Place to Hide*] are more subtle than others, but spread over the several hundred pages of this book, they reveal a mind that has liberated itself from the basic claims of fairness. Once the norms of journalism are dismissed, a number of constraints and assumptions fall away,” Packer said (2014, para. 28). John B. Judis argued Greenwald was wrong about all journalism being advocacy, and said Greenwald’s lack of respect for objectivity
impacts the fairness of his reporting. “Yes, journalists (or policy experts) usually have a rooting interest in what they write about, but it need not shape what they write. That’s the whole point about objectivity—and the role of editors and second drafts,” Judis said in the New Republic (2013a, para. 10). Packer similarly rejected Greenwald’s claims that all journalism is advocacy. “Of course everyone has biases, which is exactly why the effort to think and report in spite of them is important. Without objectivity as an aspiration, the correctness of a political line comes before a fair consideration of facts: the facts follow the line, not the other way around,” he said (2014, para. 21). In their back-and-forth in the New York Times, former Times editor-in-chief Bill Keller told Greenwald that activist journalists like him are more likely to manipulate facts than their objective journalist counterparts (a notion that Greenwald rejected). “Yes, writers are more likely to manipulate the evidence to support a declared point of view than one that is privately held, because pride is on the line,” Keller told Greenwald (Keller & Greenwald, 2013, para. 57).

**Greenwald makes himself part of the news he covers.** A majority of journalists noted Greenwald’s aggressive, outspoken personality—he “reacted combatively” to claims that he stepped beyond journalistic boundaries and “bristled” at David Gregory (Farhi, 2013, para. 4), he is “a reliably prickly interview” (Mueller, 2013, para. 1) and “argumentative” (Carr, 2013b, para. 17), and he has “spent his career as a provocateur at Salon, sticking his thumb in the eye of MSM [mainstream media] figures like Gregory and Sorkin before the Guardian hired him last year” (Judis, 2013b, para. 2). “In ‘No Place to Hide,’ Greenwald seems like a self-righteous sourpuss, convinced that every issue is ‘straightforward,’ and if you don’t agree with him, you’re part of something he calls ‘the authorities,’ who control everything for their own nefarious but never explained purposes,” said Michael Kinsey in a New York Times review of Greenwald’s book (2014, para. 3). But these statements were often included as a way of articulating (albeit in a
sarcastic manner) another problem journalists had with Greenwald: He makes himself part of the story he is reporting. “That is not to say that Mr. Greenwald’s work is suspect, only that the tendentiousness of ideology creates its own narrative. He has been everywhere on television taking on his critics, which seems more like a campaign than a discussion of the story he covered,” said David Carr in the New York Times (2013a, para. 13). “The argumentative Mr. Greenwald and the often obnoxious Mr. Assange don’t just have opinions, they tend to rub our mainstream noses in them,” Carr wrote in another article (2013c, para. 16). Greenwald’s aggressive, often antagonistic nature draws attention in and of itself, which distracts from the story he is supposed to be relaying to the public.

Taking all of these points together, journalists who argued that Greenwald violated the bounds of journalism argued:

Greenwald is not a true journalist because he makes himself part of the stories he covers and has too close of a relationship with his source (wrong actions), and produces reporting that is untrustworthy (wrong product) because its main goal is activism rather than public service (wrong function).

Social identity theory: American journalists’ strategies for assessing Greenwald

As stated at the start of Section I, metajournalism surrounding Glenn Greenwald saw many journalists taking on large issues within their profession—ones that had been growing more pressing for many years. Debates about where Glenn Greenwald fit into journalism often turned into debates about who should be the rightful keepers of the profession’s boundaries. Who gets to define a journalist and why? Do traditional journalists working at old establishment outlets have more or less of a right to define journalism in the digital age? Journalists also kept returning to the changing economics of the news industry as they assessed Greenwald.
Greenwald’s success demonstrated that new forms of journalism are viable, which was encouraging to some journalists and threatening to others. Overall, these strategies are important, as they are ways journalists tried to employ social creativity and social competition to restore their profession’s positive distinctiveness.

**Social creativity and competition: Defining journalism to specifically exclude Greenwald.** If one is going to debate if and how Greenwald fits into the definition of journalism, a logical question follows: Whose definition? In their back-and-forth debate about the legitimacy of different types of journalism (titled “Is Glenn Greenwald the Future of News?”), former *New York Times* editor-in-chief Bill Keller opened by drawing a line between his and Greenwald’s styles of journalism:

“We come at journalism from different traditions. I’ve spent a life working at newspapers that put a premium on aggressive but impartial reporting, that expect reporters and editors to keep their opinions to themselves unless they relocate (as I have done) to the pages clearly identified as the home of opinion. You come from a more activist tradition—first as a lawyer, then as a blogger and columnist, and soon as part of a new, independent journalistic venture financed by the eBay founder Pierre Omidyar. Your writing proceeds from a clearly stated point of view.” (Keller & Greenwald, 2013, para. 3)

Instances like these, where mainstream journalists drew boundaries around their work and (as Keller went on to do) declared other types of journalism “less-than,” sparked a debate amongst journalists: Do some journalists have more of a right to define the boundaries of the profession? Is someone like Keller, who won a Pulitzer Prize and who spent nearly three decades working at the *New York Times* before becoming its editor-in-chief, a more legitimate arbiter in the “Who is a journalist?” debate than someone else? Or, is Keller’s long establishment career a
relic of a bygone media era, in which case his opinion may be out-of-touch with the realities of today’s journalism environment? Or is perhaps something more insidious lies behind Keller’s perspective, and the perspective of other journalists who question Greenwald’s place within journalism: Maybe they sense that their brand of journalism is falling out of fashion, and they are lashing out at Greenwald because they perceive him as representative of a threat to their relevancy and livelihoods. Shades of all of these arguments came up as journalists attempted to describe how Greenwald did or did not fit into definitions of journalism.

Many journalists described attempts to place Greenwald outside the bounds of traditional journalism as evidence of the continued in-group biases held by traditional journalists working at establishment media outlets; such in-group bias is predicted by social identity theory, in the form of social competition. These journalists argued that other journalists working at large establishment outlets consider themselves the sole boundary-definers of the profession; further, these journalists explicitly argued that the questions and accusations Greenwald faced from David Gregory, Andrew Ross Sorkin, Paul Farhi, and many other journalists would not have happened if Greenwald worked at an establishment outlet. “Would Gregory have made those comments if someone from the New York Times was on the show talking about a major investigative report? Unlikely. Greenwald is seen as fair game in part because he isn’t a traditional journalist, but rather someone who started as a blogger, and also because he has an obvious point of view,” Mathew Ingram argued in GigaOm shortly after Greenwald appeared on “Meet the Press” (2013a, para. 4). Conor Friedersdorf agreed that mainstream journalists attack Greenwald simply because of the outlets he writes for:

“Among the dozens of reporters, editors, and commentators who have worked on articles sourced to Edward Snowden, just one, Glenn Greenwald, has been subject to a sustained
campaign that seeks to define him as something other than a journalist. … So what is different about Greenwald? The news organizations he works with are different. Rather than publishing in the Washington Post or the New York Times, institutions that have particular, unique, and often cozy relationships with America's ruling class, he started out with a personal blog, later moved to Salon.com, started publishing stories sourced to Snowden at The Guardian's U.S. edition, and has worked with the foreign press.” (Friedersdorf, 2014a, para. 1-4)

Some journalists thought media outlets’ descriptions of Greenwald as a “blogger” were attempts to belittle his work, and make him seem like something less legitimate than a true journalist. For instance, the first New York Times article written about the Snowden documents used a headline that referred to Greenwald as an “anti-surveillance activist”; the headline was later changed to refer to him as a “blogger, with a focus on surveillance” (Cohen & Kaufman, 2013). The article never used the word “journalist” to refer to Greenwald. It also spent considerable time describing what it calls Greenwald’s “unusual” career route (para. 10), focusing on his beginnings as a lawyer, decision to take up blogging in 2005 on his personal website, and his experience working for online outlets like Salon and the Guardian’s US website. David Sirota said this New York Times article was trying to “marginalize him as a ‘blogger’—and not a real reporter” (Sirota, 2013, para. 8). Even New York Times public editor Margaret Sullivan found her paper’s description of Greenwald in this article to be belittling. “At the time, I wrote (on Twitter) that I found the headline dismissive. There’s nothing wrong with being a blogger, of course—I am one myself. But when the media establishment uses the term, it somehow seems to say, ‘You’re not quite one of us,’” Sullivan said (2013b, para. 9). Another Times employee, David Carr, agreed with Sullivan (2013a). Journalists outside the New York
Times, like Jeff Jarvis (2013b), Mathew Ingram (2013b), Eric Deggans (2013), and John McQuaid (2013) noted the apparent dissention within the Times’ staff about how to label individuals who do not fit within traditional, establishment journalistic boundaries. The dissention signaled the different views establishment journalists have about the legitimacy of nontraditional outlets. “The New York Times, for example, has to figure out who to label a journalist, or not, in its news stories, and what the Times calls them matters, because it’s the Times,” said John McQuaid in Forbes (2013, para. 8). “Asking ‘is so-and-so really a journalist?’ is often not a sincere inquiry but a way of intimating so-and-so isn’t one and a prelude to delegitimizing their work and what they have to say. It quickly devolves to tribalism” (para. 9).

Others wondered why some journalists were criticizing Greenwald, but not the Washington Post journalists—like Barton Gellman—who also worked with Snowden’s documents and who broke similar stories (Friedersdorf, 2014a; Judis, 2013b; Mueller, 2013; Sirota, 2013). David Sirota in Pando Daily argued:

“Greenwald also gets rougher treatment than Gellman because of general in-group bias. You can call it cliqueishness, gated community decorum, country club rules, or just raw tribalism, but that bias is the same: Even though both the insider and the outsider may be doing exactly the same thing, the American establishment treats the in-group member with reverence and respect, while attacking the outsider for daring to be on the outside.” (2013, para. 12).

For example, McQuaid said he saw such in-group bias at work in a Wall Street Journal article written by Edward Jay Epstein, in which Epstein suggested that Greenwald and Snowden engaged in a secret long-term collaboration to steal secrets:
“Curiously, the piece does not mention Bart Gellman, who also had Snowden as a source and broke the NSA stories in the *Washington Post* more or less simultaneously with Greenwald in the *Guardian*. … Does this mean Epstein has examined Gellman’s actions and cleared him of wrongdoing somehow? I have no idea! But obviously Gellman is an old-school Pulitzer Prize-winning investigative journalist, not a “blogger” or a documentarian or an advocate. … So maybe Gellman gets a pass in Epstein’s book, and Greenwald and Poitras get indicted, not by virtue of what they wrote or did to write it, but because of what they are.” (2013, para. 6-7)

Journalists, particularly those at establishment outlets, have long felt pressure from new online competitors. That Snowden sought out Greenwald specifically for his non-establishment background and non-traditional journalistic style—and explicitly avoided the *New York Times*, citing its decision to sit on a story about the Bush administration’s warrantless wiretapping program until after the 2004 presidential election (Carmon, 2013)—was too threatening for them to ignore. Thus, journalists’ tendencies toward in-group bias reached something of a tipping point with Greenwald’s success—a fact that did not go unnoticed among journalists. “The larger sense I get from the criticism directed at Mr. Assange and Mr. Greenwald is one of distaste—that they aren’t what we think of as real journalists. Instead, they represent an emerging Fifth Estate composed of leakers, activists and bloggers who threaten those of us in traditional media. They are, as one says, not like us,” said David Carr in the *New York Times* (2013b, para. 14).

In sum, many journalists noticed other (mostly mainstream) journalists’ attempts at competing with Greenwald, and expressed concern or indignation that these actors felt they had the right to define their profession and cast others out. Rather than echo this social competition
themselves, these journalists publicly called out their colleagues, and argued that this type of social competition was unnecessary or even detrimental to the standing of the profession.

**Social creativity:** Greenwald’s success shows that journalism is successfully adapting to technological changes. The internet has obviously allowed more journalistic outlets to emerge; however, for the most part, the websites of old establishment outlets—e.g., *New York Times, Washington Post, CNN*—have dominated online news traffic. For example, in 2012, Nielsen’s list of the top ten most-visited global news websites was filled with establishment media names, like ABC News, CNN, MSNBC, *New York Times, Tribune Newspapers, Fox News, NBC’s “Today Show” website, and USA Today* (Nielsen, 2012). The sole online-only news website to make the list was the Huffington Post, which largely aggregates news from the websites of traditional journalism outlets. At the time Greenwald had his success with the Snowden disclosures, the American online journalism landscape was still dominated by long-standing journalism brands.

But Greenwald successfully broke his story on the U.S. website of a British newspaper—and a newspaper that bucks traditional American journalistic norms by being openly progressive in its politics. The establishment outlets on Nielsen’s top 10 list were left playing catch-up to the *Guardian*’s website; indeed, in the month following the Snowden disclosures, the web traffic to the *Guardian*’s website increased by 41% (Woolf, 2013). Today, Alexa web traffic rankings put The *Guardian*’s website as the world’s fifth most-visited news website; the *New York Times* is ranked third, and the top news site worldwide is the user-driven link-sharing and discussion forum Reddit (Alexa.com, 2016).

Some journalists saw the diversity added by Greenwald and the *Guardian* as positive developments for their profession. Their success proved that, for all the challenges it poses to the
industry, the internet will not kill journalism. In fact, many noted that new technologies allow anyone to perform an act of journalism (e.g., Deggans, 2013; Ingram, 2013b; Jarvis, 2013b; McQuaid, 2013). In a *New Yorker* article, staff writer John Cassidy said he was optimist that the abundance of new online journalism start-ups—like Greenwald’s *First Look*, Ezra Klein’s *Vox*, and Nate Silver’s *FiveThirtyEight*—meant that public-interest journalism was still viable in the digital age. “After a decade of layoffs and wage freezes, many journalists, particularly the older ones, are shell-shocked. But the trends aren’t all negative. Today, at least, there is some good news to report,” Cassidy said (2014, para. 14). He said that while the internet does undercut much of the old journalistic business model, it also creates new opportunities by lowering the cost of publishing, allowing for new story formats, making it easier to reach a large audience. “In any case, we shouldn’t let nostalgia color our thinking,” he said (para. 6). Jeff Jarvis agreed that journalists should be heartened by the success of new forms of online journalism. “Anything that reliably serves the end of an informed community is journalism. Anyone can help do that. The true journalist should want anyone to join the task,” he said (2013b, para. 11). From a social identity theory perspective, these journalists could be employing social creativity by interpreting Greenwald’s success as evidence of mainstream journalism’s successful adaptation to the changing media environment. Thus, they redefined Greenwald’s differences from traditional journalism in a way that stresses journalism’s continued relevance and technological savvy.

But naturally, some journalists currently employed by establishment outlets interpreted these developments in a threatening manner. Paul Farhi did not sound pleased when he described Greenwald as someone who “blurs a number of lines in an age in which anyone can report the news” (2013, para. 1). Indeed, some journalists accused their peers of disliking Greenwald because he challenges the status quo. They see Greenwald’s success as coming at their expense:
“Greenwald is publishing his reporting in multiple venues. In doing that, he is exploiting the fact that in the digital age, information's relevance, salience, and significance is today less contingent on its particular medium and more defined by its actual content. Put another way, he is taking advantage of a Web-centric, social-media-dependent, email-connected world in which every article is just another link. The rise of that new world means that if a reporter like Greenwald, a documentarian like Laura Poitras, or any other journalist digs up news that is significant, it now has a chance to reach a huge audience, whether or not it happens to be transmitted by the old media oligopolies. That reality, of course, is an enormous change—and a frightening one to those old media oligopolies and the governments those oligopolies too often serve.” (Sirota, 2013, para. 13-14)

In summary, some journalists were encouraged by Greenwald’s success, and the success of the *Guardian*’s US website. Their ability to break important stories and garner significant attention and web traffic demonstrated that, despite the challenges facing the industry, journalism might still thrive in an online environment. Some were less optimistic about what Greenwald and the *Guardian*’s success meant for their industry. They talked ruefully about being “forced to play catch-up” (Kurtz, 2013b, para. 2) to a British news site and a blogger who frequently criticizes traditional journalistic practices. Either way, these reactions point to journalists recognizing—whether pleased about it or not—the viability of new kinds of journalism outlets.

**Summary**

The analysis of metajournalism surrounding Glenn Greenwald demonstrates that journalists are still divided about which, if any, traits are necessary for someone to be a journalist; further, they expressed different opinions about who should be allowed to determine necessary traits or professional boundaries. Journalists even debated whether it was appropriate
to draw any boundaries around journalism in today’s digital age. Some argued it is now meaningless to talk about who is and is not a journalist, as new technology makes it possible for anyone to perform an act of journalism. “There are no journalists, there is only the service of journalism,” Jeff Jarvis wrote in a much-discussed entry on his Buzz Machine blog (2013b, para. 1).

Journalists were divided on whether objectivity or impartiality was necessary for journalism. Some argued that journalists should at least strive for objectivity, because the act of striving produces more accurate reporting by requiring journalists to question their own biases. Others argued objectivity and impartiality are fanciful ideals that humans can never hope to reach; as a result, journalists better serve the public when they are upfront about their beliefs, because this transparency allows the public to judge for itself whether the journalist is presenting accurate information. But journalists generally agreed on other important and required bounds of acceptable journalistic practice, including basing reporting on verifiable fact, holding sources accountable, being adversarial to those in power, and working in the public interest.

Most journalists saw Greenwald’s reporting as falling within the bounds of true (if not traditional) journalism. They argued he is adversarial to those in power, that he bases his reporting on facts, and that he works in the public interest. These traits, they argued, are the most important aspects of journalism, and are far more important than devotion to ideals of objectivity or impartiality. But others thought Greenwald violated the bounds of real journalism by growing too close to his source, Edward Snowden. They said journalists should retain an appropriate distance from their source, so that they are not afraid to subject the source to tough scrutiny. Greenwald had become an advocate for Snowden, they argued, which made it more likely that he failed to critically examine Snowden’s authenticity (although these journalists admitted they had
no evidence that proved this was the case). Some argued that Greenwald’s outspoken political beliefs made it difficult to trust the accuracy of his reporting; they said he might be weighing certain facts more heavily than others in an attempt to make a compelling argument. Finally, some journalists criticized Greenwald for making himself part of the Snowden story. They said Greenwald’s aggressive advocacy for Snowden and appearances on news programs drew attention away from the real story: the actual contents of Snowden’s disclosures.

Journalists also used two clear strategies to interpret Greenwald. First, journalists debated whether it was appropriate for other journalists to engage in social competition with Greenwald, and try to unilaterally define the profession in ways that exclude him. These journalists interpreted the debates about whether Greenwald is a true journalist as part of the debate about who has the right to define journalism. Do traditional, objective journalists who work at respected establishment outlets have more of a right to define the profession than other journalists? Or are these journalists’ opinions too colored by their establishment backgrounds, such that the boundaries they draw around “real journalism” are too narrow and exclusionary? Second, journalists described Greenwald’s success as evidence of the viability of nontraditional journalism, and journalism’s successful adaptation to the changing media environment. Regardless of whether one likes Greenwald personally, or whether one thinks his style of reporting is better or worse than journalism that strives to be objective, there is no denying the success he experienced with the Snowden disclosures. And this success was experienced via the online-only American edition of a progressive British newspaper, which drew American journalists’ attention. Some were heartened that Greenwald was able to achieve such success by publishing in an online-only outlet that had only been around for a few years (although the UK Guardian dates back to 1821, the US edition was launched in September 2011). They interpreted
his success as evidence that the internet was not necessarily a death knell for investigative journalism. But others perceived Greenwald’s and the Guardian’s success as yet another threat to existing journalism outlets.

Section II: British Metajournalism Surrounding Glenn Greenwald

This analysis of British metajournalism uses a purposive sample of articles, as outlined in Chapter 3. In total, 29 articles published in 16 different outlets were analyzed here; these articles represent the views of 23 different British journalists and editorial boards. For a complete list of the articles included in this analysis, please see the Appendix.

On the whole, British journalists spent significantly less time debating whether Greenwald was a true journalist, compared with the time they spent debating WikiLeaks’ place in journalism. Most journalists referred to Greenwald as a journalist, and did not question his right to hold that label; however, many took issue with his style of journalism. They debated whether Greenwald’s type of journalism could provide accurate and balanced accounts of current events, and whether his strong biases meant his analyses would always be incomplete. British metajournalism surrounding Greenwald was also light on descriptions of what journalism should entail; British journalists frequently criticized the behavior of Greenwald or of the Guardian, but usually did not offer descriptions of how the behavior of either could be rectified to fall within the bounds of proper journalism.

24 This analysis is based on a purposive sample of print and online metajournalism, as outlined in Chapter 3. Twenty-nine articles are included in this analysis. For a complete list of the 29 articles, including the outlet, date of publication, author, brief professional background on the author, and publication information, see the Appendix.
Defining the Boundaries of Journalism in the United Kingdom, vis-à-vis Greenwald

*Journalists should provide news coverage that is balanced.* British journalists argued that journalists should produce stories that are balanced, meaning the stories contain information that is presented fairly and accurately and that they include multiple perspectives. News stories should allow for nuanced views of current events, and journalists should not let their personal biases keep them from fairly representing other perspectives. But British journalists’ conceptualizations of balance should not be confused with American notions of objectivity; whereas American objectivity requires journalists to give equal weight to all sides of an argument and not voice opinions about which side has better evidence, British ideas of balance do not require journalists to remove these opinions from their reporting. British journalists may decide which evidence they find more compelling or accurate, and make readers aware of this assessment. Blogger and former *New Republic* editor Andrew Sullivan defined balance as “careful consideration of internal government documents before publishing; it means eschewing excess zeal in revealing secrets, in favor of measured and responsible explanation of the broader issues involved” (2013b, para. 6).

Although opinions about which side has better evidence are permissible in British reporting, adhering to the ideal of balance should keep journalists from using “cherrypicked exhibits” to support their arguments while ignoring evidence that does not support their position (Lucas, 2014a, para. 7; see also Foxton, 2013), or from running single-sourced stories (Foxton, 2013). “Journalism isn’t just about writing good copy, it's about actually finding the truth, and accepting that sometimes it won’t be a truth you like,” Willard Foxton said in *The Telegraph* (2013, para. 9). Being balanced also means not over-reacting to events, or giving “hysterical narrative” to stories that should be treated in a more evenhanded manner (McKinstry, 2013, para. 1; see also Lucas, 2014).
Journalists serve the public. British journalists repeatedly argued that journalism should serve the public interest, and that the news should provide the public with the information they need to govern themselves. Journalists are tasked with informing the public, and this duty involves being able to freely report on the goings-on of government; the concept of public service is, therefore, closely related to the watchdog function of journalism. “Journalists have a duty to inform and facilitate a debate and to help test the consent of people about the nature of any trade-offs between civil liberties and security,” said the Guardian’s editorial board (2013, para. 14). Also writing in The Guardian, George Brock argued that a public-interest orientation was the defining feature of real journalism; anyone who produces stories that are valuable to the public is a journalist. Therefore, Brock said laws protecting journalists “should not turn on the status of an individual but on the value of the disclosure” to the public interest (2013, para. 7). Because journalism is committed to public service, any government attempts to intimidate the press ultimately undermine the public’s ability to hold their government accountable. “Silencing journalists keeps you, the public, in the dark,” the Daily Mirror editorial board argued after the detention of Greenwald’s partner, David Miranda, at Heathrow Airport (Daily Mirror, 2013, para. 6).

The Guardian and the Daily Mirror, which are both left-leaning publications, both published metajournalism arguing that serving the public is a central goal of journalism; however, this sentiment was echoed by moderate and right-leaning publications as well. In the conservative Daily Mail, for example, Stephen Glover was critical of much of the Guardian’s and Greenwald’s coverage; however, he also praised the stories that revealed “eavesdropping on ordinary people” in the US and UK, saying that the publication of these information “has been in the public interest” (2013b, para. 17). John Gapper in the Financial Times also commended The
Guardian and Washington Post for their coverage of the Snowden documents, saying the two papers “acted as watchdogs and told us things that we have a right to know,” and that the UK government’s attempts to intimidate the press implied that it “does not want its citizens and media to know or to question what is being done in their name” (2013, para. 2 & 6). *The Spectator* argued that journalists should “seek to expose [government] secrets if they believe it is in the public interest,” although it was skeptical about whether the Guardian and Greenwald were in fact motivated by a desire to serve the public interest (2013, para. 5).

**Journalists defer to experts on national security issues.** According to much of the metajournalism analyzed here, one important way journalists can work in the public interest is by heeding requests from British national security officials. Many journalists argued that responsible journalists should be able to recognize when they are out of their depth—that is, when they are reporting on matters they cannot completely understand. “It is for ministers to decide which details ought to be in the public domain, and which ought to be kept secret so that we can better intercept terrorists. Over recent years it has been decided by sections of the media that it is in fact their role, not that of elected, accountable officials, to perform this task,” said *The Spectator* (2013, para. 4). *The Independent*’s former editor, Chris Blackhurst, wrote a column in that paper in which he said he would not have published articles based on the Snowden documents because “if the security services insist something is contrary to the public interest, and might harm their operations, who am I (despite my grounding from Watergate onwards) to disbelieve them?” (2013, para. 12). Blackhurst went on to say that the UK government had served him with defense advisory notices on multiple occasions, and that each time he opted not to publish as a result. He argued these past decisions made him a “responsible and sensible” journalist (para. 13). Stephen Glover of the *Daily Mail* argued that a deference to national
security experts helps journalists avoid publishing material which “borders on the treasonable,” such as information about British or American overseas spying operations (2013b, para. 18).

Journalists who argued that deferring to experts was an important aspect of responsible journalism used this criterion to criticize the Guardian’s coverage of the Snowden leaks. Stephen Glover accused Rusbridger and the Guardian of “stupendous arrogance and presumption,” because they believed that they were qualified to determine which information should be in the public interest (2013a, para. 19). “Isn’t it clear that the Guardian is floundering far out of its depth, in realms where no newspaper should ever venture?” he asked (para. 25). In The Telegraph, Willard Foxton (2014) argued that The Guardian’s inability to recognize that it was out of its depth had led to irresponsible and speculative reporting. Journalists, he argued, do not work for security services and so cannot possibly fully understand the Snowden documents; this ignorance has led them to seize on documents detailing small or experimental surveillance programs, and make these programs appear more important than they ever were. “You have to ask yourself if these journalists, holding only pieces of the puzzle, are really in a position to make what could be life or death calls,” Foxton said (para. 11). Economist journalist Edward Lucas wrote in the Wall Street Journal that “Mr. Snowden’s allies lack the skills to keep the material safe, or redact it to limit the damage. Their claims to the contrary are incredible” (2014b, para. 7). The ability of journalists to recognize when they are outside their areas of expertise was, for these journalists, vital to the profession.

**Journalists protect and advance British national interests.** Journalists repeatedly identified the desire to protect and advance British interests as an important defining aspect of journalism. This criterion is closely related to the previous two: advancing national interests was
frequently described as synonymous with serving the public interest, and deferring to security officials was often described as a way to ensure British national interests remained protected.

British journalists, however, disagreed about how best to protect and advance their nation’s interests. Those who were affiliated with The Guardian argued that making the public aware of previously secret government surveillance programs was how journalists should advance national interests; they argued democratic governments can only function properly when citizens are well-informed. “Special treatment is reserved for ‘journalists’ because they dislodge facts that society needs to know,” said George Brock in the Guardian (2013, para. 4). “What role does a free press have in assisting and informing this debate? ... The Guardian did what we hope any news organisation would do—patiently analysed and responsibly reported on some of the material we have read in order to inform the necessary public debate,” said the Guardian’s editorial board (2013, para. 8).

Other non-Guardian journalists argued that journalists protect and advance British interest by not interfering in issues related to national security, and by heeding government requests to not publish stories based on the Snowden documents. In the Daily Mail, Stephen Glover said the Guardian “should surely wish to defend” the United Kingdom’s interests (2014, para. 11). In another column, he criticized the Snowden leaks for not being in those interests:

“More even than WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, whose occasionally damaging and often embarrassing revelations the Guardian published, Snowden is a menace to British, and Western, interests. A small proportion of what he revealed may have been in the public interest, but it is greatly outweighed by the damage he has done. The fact is that states do have necessary secrets, and the best interests of Britain are not served by sharing
those secrets with our enemies, be they foreign powers or home-grown Islamic extremists.” (Glover, 2013a, para. 27-28)

Leo McKinstry in *The Express* said that Britain and the West are up against an “ideologically barbaric” enemy, and said journalists should respect the importance of the challenges facing national security officials (2013, para. 20). “Those who give aid to terrorists, even indirectly, are the real enemies of freedom,” McKinstry said, referring to the *Guardian* and other outlets publishing Snowden documents (para. 20).

Based on the elements that British journalists identified as being important to their profession, I can put forward the following definition of journalism:

> Journalists protect and advance British national interest and defer to experts on national security issues (actions), they provide news coverage that is balanced (product), and serve the public interest (societal function).

**Situating Greenwald in Relation to the Boundaries of British Journalism**

Most British journalists used the word “journalist” or “reporter” to refer to Greenwald, and (with a few exceptions) did not challenge Greenwald’s standing within the boundaries of professional journalism. However, as I will describe, many were still critical of his style of journalism, and British journalists identified few commonalities between Greenwald and the larger profession. Indeed, praise for Greenwald—or even the expression that his work fell within the bounds of journalism, beyond referring to him as a “journalist”—was limited to *Guardian*-affiliated journalists or Andrew Sullivan, another opinionated blogger.

**Greenwald’s commonalities with British journalism.**

*Greenwald is a watchdog.* Greenwald’s adversarial nature was, for some journalists, the best disposition a journalist should have. They argued journalists should be tough, inquisitive
truth-seekers who are not afraid to take on political leaders and other powerful interests. Greenwald, they argued, embodied this commitment to the journalistic watchdog function.

Andrew Sullivan strongly voiced this opinion in his Sunday Times column and on his own blog, The Dish. When Greenwald began blogging, Sullivan said, “[h]e asked no permission to take on the US government when so many Washington journalists were terrified of losing access and were refusing, even at The New York Times, to call the torture of terrorist suspects by its proper name. In this cowardly swamp of deferential ‘reporters,’ Greenwald was a merciless exception” (2013a, para. 2-3). And after Greenwald’s debate with former New York Times editor-in-chief Bill Keller, Sullivan said Greenwald walked away with the advantage. Sullivan said the New York Times’ hidden biases keep it from speaking truth to power; he said the paper has “a self-understanding as a responsible and deeply connected institution in an American system of governance,” which means it is too close to the administrations it covers and, as a result, frequently fails to engage in tough reporting (2013b, para. 2). As an example, Sullivan cited Greenwald’s criticism of Keller’s decision not to use the word “torture” to describe the Bush administration’s interrogation practices. Keller, Sullivan said, refused to use the word “torture” out of a “desire not to burn bridges with an administration and not become a lightning rod for right-wing press critics” (20103, para. 3). He went on:

“Trying to appear objective, in other words, by appeasing both sides in a dispute, is not actually being objective or impartial. It’s enabling war crimes—which I think the New York Times did under Bill Keller’s leadership. No one ever hesitated to use the word torture to describe waterboarding in the past, and the NYT itself did so when other countries were guilty. So hiding your biases, and trying to appear objective, can mean the opposite of honest.” (para. 3)
Sullivan (2013b) argued that journalism, and the public, needs Greenwald because his reporting encourages other outlets to be more adversarial in their own coverage—in other words, Greenwald pushes other journalists to produce better journalism. Henry Porter, journalist and former columnist for The Guardian, expressed similar sentiments in the Observer. He said that “Greenwald is rightly contemptuous of the journalists on both sides of the Atlantic who act as proxies for authority—better an activist than a lackey anytime” (2014, para. 9). In the Observer, Peter Preston was critical of politicians and journalists who sought to discredit Greenwald by arguing he “is an ‘activist’—which means he isn’t fair, balanced and suitable for employment by ‘respected’ news organisations” and that his work is “somehow tainted” as a result (2013, para. 4). Preston said journalism should be judged by the stories someone produces, and whether those stories have public impact; on that measure, “Greenwald is a journalist,” Preston said (2013, para. 10).

Then-Guardian editor Alan Rusbridger agreed, and argued that Greenwald’s work revealed important, and often unsettling, truths about Western surveillance practices—the kind of truths a watchdog journalist should expose. “Greenwald’s work has undoubtedy been troublesome and embarrassing for western governments…but] he has raised acutely disturbing questions about the oversight of intelligence; about the use of closed courts; about the cosy and secret relationship between government and vast corporations, and about the extent to which millions of citizens now routinely have their communications intercepted, collected, analysed and stored” (Rusbridger, 2013, para. 5). Guardian journalist Oliver Burkeman described the criticism that Greenwald received from US Congressman Peter King (R-NY)—King said Greenwald’s reporting was treasonous—as a “badge of honour” which Greenwald received for doing his job as a journalist (2013, para. 1).
Greenwald is passionate. Others argued that the best journalists are passionate about what they write. Passion is not the same as bias, but it is related to it; journalists who are passionate about what they write often have strong opinions fueling that passion. In The Observer, Peter Preston described the important role of opinions in journalism, and how they can motivate someone’s search for the truth: “From the early pamphleteers—Tom Paine for one—to the muckrakers who fought injustice such as Nellie Bly; from Rachel Carson's Silent Spring to Ralph Nader's Unsafe At Any Speed; from Mother Jones to the Pentagon papers, the words that shook America mostly came from passionate reporters with a cause to champion. The point can equally be made about British journalists—from John Wilkes to Alfred Harmsworth” (2013, para. 6). Greenwald, Preston argued, is in this camp of passionate truth-seekers.

According to Henry Porter (2014), this passion was on full display during an interview on BBC’s Newsnight program in October 2013. The program’s presenter and guests, Porter said in a column for The Observer, chose to go after Greenwald rather than focus on the content of the Snowden documents; one of the guests, former chair of the UK’s Joint Intelligence Committee Pauline Neville-Jones, “disparagingly” called Greenwald a “campaigner and an activist” during the program, implying that he was not a real journalist (para. 1). Greenwald “held his own rather well, roasting [BBC Newsnight presenter Kirsty] Wark and Neville-Jones with remorseless trial lawyer logic, making them look ill-prepared and silly in the process. At the time, I remember thinking that Edward Snowden had chosen exactly the right person for the job of chief advocate—a smart, unyielding, fundamentalist liberal outsider” (Porter, 2014, para. 2). Greenwald’s passion—and debate skills—help him take on powerful people who wish to silence or discredit his reporting. Further, Greenwald’s fervor for the topics he covers spreads to his readers—the public, with whom journalism is trying to engage and serve. “Greenwald is an engaged,
opinionated journalist who writes to his own agenda for a community that follow his every word,” said Emily Bell, a journalist who was editor-in-chief of the *Guardian* from 2001-2006 (2013, para. 7).

Overall, journalists who argued that Greenwald fell outside within bounds of real journalism argued:

*Greenwald brings passion to his work (action) and serves as a watchdog who holds the powerful to account (societal function).*

**Greenwald’s deviations outside journalistic boundaries**

Even when journalists criticized Greenwald’s reporting, most did not make an argument that he was not a journalist. Rather, they were criticizing his output—the stories he wrote were *too* opinionated, *too* biased, *too* simplistic, or came from the wrong perspective. So while some UK journalists identified ways in which Greenwald violated the boundaries of journalism, these violations were usually not enough to cast him out of the profession completely. This suggests that, in the UK, the professional boundaries are flexible enough to allow for a wide range of reporting styles, and that bias and opinion are acceptable to some degree.

However, for some journalists, Greenwald’s reporting went beyond the acceptable degree of bias and opinion. Willard Foxton in *The Telegraph* (2013), explicitly argued that someone can be an activist (like Greenwald) or a journalist, but not both—although this opinion could itself be tainted by the fact that Foxton does not like Greenwald personally, and said that he is “jealous of the success he’s had, and the stories he’s broken” (para. 5). Edward Lucas and *The Spectator*’s editorial board said Greenwald’s bias was so strong that it disqualified him from producing journalism—suggesting, still, that journalistic bias is acceptable to some degree, and that Greenwald’s level simply exceeds this limit.
Overall, UK journalists have a complex relationship with bias in reporting. For some journalists, it often seemed as if bias was acceptable as long as it was in their preferred direction. For others, it was the strength of the bias that concerned them; a reporter who is too biased might produce reporting that is inaccurate or that lacks balance.

**Greenwald’s strong biases cast doubt on the accuracy of his reporting.** The most frequently cited way in which Greenwald violated the boundaries of proper journalism was by having overly strong opinions, which many journalists said could cast doubt on the accuracy of Greenwald’s reporting. For example, many UK journalists argued Greenwald had too close of a personal connection with his source, Edward Snowden, and that he believed his source to be completely virtuous and heroic; these feelings, they argued, made him unable to report fairly about Snowden or his documents. “Greenwald does not ask why Snowden chose to steal far more material than would have been necessary to illustrate his worries, and he gives no insight into the mysterious escape to Moscow or the conditions of his sojourn there. It is odd that such a zealous inquisitor fails to pursue such obvious and troubling questions. Perhaps he is scared of the answers,” said Edward Lucas in *The Times* (2014a, para. 11). David Aaronovitch, writing for the *New Statesman* magazine, said that unlike Alan Rusbridger and other *Guardian* staffers, “Greenwald is not interested in abstract notions such as ‘the truth’. He is Snowden’s advocate, and that is a better thing to be” (2014, para. 13). Greenwald, Aaronovitch and Lucas argued, is blinded by his support for his source, and his reporting is the worse for it. Greenwald’s pro-Snowden bias has prevented him from asking important questions and performing the careful scrutiny that journalism requires.

Besides having a pro-Snowden bias, others journalists argued Greenwald has an anti-West or anti-Britain bias. These journalists said this bias meant that Greenwald’s reporting started
from the assumption that the US, UK, or other Western nation was lying or doing something terrible. Willard Foxton (2013) in *The Telegraph* said he wondered whether this worldview would prevent Greenwald from giving equal weight to information that opposes his anti-West beliefs:

“I’m sure Mr Greenwald sees himself as a crusader for justice. It’s exactly that commitment to a cause that makes me wonder if he came across a document exonerating the Obama administration in this scandal, would he throw up his hands and say ‘Sorry guys, we have to forget about this one’? Or would he quietly bin it, because it doesn’t fit with what he believes as an activist?” (para. 9)

Foxton also said that because Greenwald thinks no state surveillance is justifiable, he blows any instance of surveillance out of proportion to “make America look like a vicious Police state” (para. 8). David Aaronovitch (2014) wondered in the *New Statesman* if Greenwald’s biases prevented him from covering the United States fairly. For Greenwald, he said, “[t]here is no hostility out there that the US has not brought on itself, no misbehaviour that is worse than what the US does, no threat that has not been wildly exaggerated” (para. 15). Aaronovitch thinks Greenwald sees the US as at fault in all situations, and imagines that the US is constantly looking for any flimsy excuse to flex its power; starting from these assumptions casts doubt on the accuracy of Greenwald’s reporting. *The Economist* concurred. Greenwald, it said, “is very good at showing that much NSA activity was against the law; for example, the agency took raw data collected from Americans and secretly gave it to Israel. All too often, though, he proselytises rather than analyses. ... The issue of why some surveillance is necessary is never explored, nor is the question of how intelligence-gathering might be reformed” (2014, para. 5). Again, journalists argued that Greenwald’s biases kept him from asking important questions, entertaining opposing
arguments, and giving weight to legitimate concerns held by Western governments.

The blogger and editor Andrew Sullivan, who praised Greenwald’s fearlessness in challenging government powers, was critical of Greenwald’s strong anti-West bias; Sullivan said it negatively impacted Greenwald’s ability to be balanced. “There lies behind his solid argument for less secrecy and more transparency in the US government a conviction that the concept of terrorism as used by the West is a fiction for maintaining global hegemony,” Sullivan said in the *Sunday Times* (2013a, para. 10); this conviction prevented Greenwald from even considering many opposing arguments. In a *Financial Times* feature on Greenwald, foreign policy reporter Geoff Dyer (2014) expressed skepticism of Greenwald’s articles that claimed US surveillance was actually an effort to pursue greater international economic dominance. Dyer questioned Greenwald’s malevolent interpretation of several surveillance programs, including one NSA program that eavesdropped on a Latin American economic conference. Dyer said these programs “sound less like a new front in electronic snooping and more like traditional espionage” (para. 25). Dyer also said Greenwald’s biases against the US make him likely to offer readers inaccurate interpretations of American surveillance programs. “Greenwald still sounds naïve about the way China works when he suggests that the links between the corporate sector and the US government are not that different to China,” he said (para. 25).

*Greenwald is trying to affect the issues he covers.* Some journalists thought Greenwald’s anti-West bias was doing more than tainting his reporting: It was driving him to try to impact the stories he was covering, which is behavior outside the bounds of responsible journalism. Specifically, many argued that his biases led him to actively seek to harm Western or British interests—something a Western journalist in particular should not want to do (Glover, 2013a, 2013b; McKinstry, 2013; *The Spectator*, 2013). These journalists often cited as evidence a
statement Greenwald made after his partner’s detention at Heathrow. In this statement, which was made to reporters at the Rio de Janeiro airport where Greenwald picked up his partner, he allegedly said his partner’s detention had inspired him to expose more aspects of England’s spy system. In *The Express*, Leo McKinstry (2013) said this statement “graphically illustrated” (para. 16) that Greenwald, along with Snowden and Assange, are “saboteurs with an obsessive, anti-Western agenda, whose actions only aid our enemies” (para. 15).

Many of these journalists’ argument came down to the fact that they saw Greenwald as an

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Greenwald made this statement in Portuguese to reporters in Brazil. *The Spectator* (2013), *The Express* (McKinstry, 2013), *The Independent* (Blackhurst, 2013), and *The Daily Mail* (Glover, 2013b) published the following English translation of Greenwald’s statement: “I will be far more aggressive in my reporting from now. I am going to publish many more documents. I have many documents on England’s spy system. I think they will be sorry for what they did.” Greenwald claimed on Twitter that Reuters mistranslated what he said, and that the quote was also taken out of context because it did not include the questions to which he was responding. In response to several media reports that disparaged his comments, Greenwald offered the following alternate translation of the exchange:

“Q: Will the UK’s detention of your partner deter your future reporting?
A: Absolutely not. If anything, it will do the opposite. It will embolden me: I have many more documents to report on, including ones about the UK, where I’ll now focus more. I will be more aggressive, not less, in reporting.
Q: What effect do you think they’ll be of the UK’s detention of your partner?
A: When they do things like this, they show the world their real character. It’ll backfire. I think they’ll come to regret it.” (Greenwald, 2013a)
activist, and they believed journalists cannot also be activists. Activists are dedicated to bringing about change, while journalists should not try to influence the topics they cover in such a manner. “[T]hough Rusbridger may be a ‘proper’ journalist (and he certainly is), someone like Greenwald is first and foremost an activist. He wants above all to challenge the world, not just to report it” said David Aaronovitch in *The Times* (Aaronovitch, 2013, para. 15). Aaronovitch further argued that Greenwald’s activist nature gives readers little reason to trust him, particularly with top-secret information that could harm Western interests. In *The Telegraph*, Willard Foxton (2013) also argued that being an activist is incompatible with being a journalist. “The path between activist and journalist is a road people have tried unsuccessfully for years. … I think Mr Greenwald should pick, before something goes wrong,” Foxton said (para. 11).

*Greenwald’s reporting lacks nuance.* Many journalists argued that Greenwald’s black-and-white worldview leads to reporting that lacks nuance. They said he sees the world as peopled with heroes and villains, and this view prevents him from portraying reality with the complexity it requires. Many journalists, like Edward Lucas in *The Times* (2014a), attributed Greenwald’s lack of nuance to his background as a lawyer:

“Greenwald is a lawyer by training, and he certainly has a litigator’s trick of framing questions in a way that trip up any adversary. But he also has a lawyer’s trademark weakness, of letting detail and process obscure the big questions. He is outraged by incompetence, deceit and excessive secrecy in government—but he portrays his opponents as the cartoon villains of a Hollywood thriller, rather than getting to grips with their real-life dilemmas.” (para. 2)

Andrew Sullivan, an opinionated blogger himself who was strongly supportive of Greenwald’s adversarial style of reporting, also criticized Greenwald for having a lawyer’s lack
of nuance. Greenwald, he said, sees the world in black-and-white: “He doesn’t see the case from the government’s point of view and he lives—like a good lawyer—in an abstract world of guilt and innocence” (2013a, para. 14). Willard Foxton (2013) of The Telegraph agreed. He said Greenwald is an “unabashed polemicist” who only provides evidence supporting his side, and who attacks anyone who entertains other possibilities (para. 7). “That’s fine if you're a trial lawyer, or an opinion writer—you want them to put forward a challenging opinion, a slanted version of the facts. However, I often feel when reading a Greenwald article there are valid explanations for some of the things he's reporting on,” Foxton said (para. 8). In a review of Greenwald’s book, No Place to Hide, The Economist said Greenwald’s legal training makes him very effective at arguing that the NSA’s surveillance programs violated the law; however, that same training makes him likely to ignore evidence that would lead someone to another conclusion. To illustrate this point, the magazine noted that Greenwald referred to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA) Court as “an empty pantomime,” despite the fact that “the reality is far more nuanced” (2014, para. 5). Having the ability to understand nuance allows journalists to cover complex issues, and these journalists thought Greenwald’s binary worldview—perhaps a product of his legal training—prevented him from understanding such nuance.

Greenwald does not engage in traditional editorial practices. Finally, British journalists criticized Greenwald for his lack of respect for the traditional journalistic editorial process. Greenwald has repeatedly said that he wrote for the Guardian and Salon.com on the condition that editors there would not edit his work; he, unlike other employees, would be able to post his pieces directly to the web without first getting approval from any editors (e.g., see Greenwald, 2014). In The Telegraph, Willard Foxton (2013) described this as Greenwald insisting on
special rock-star privileges” (para. 3). Foxton said this resulted in Greenwald writing enormous, turgid pieces…complete with 500-word updates when people challenge him” that would not have been published if Greenwald’s work was subject to editing (para. 2). In *The New Statesman* magazine, David Aaronovitch (2014) said the results of Greenwald’s lack of editing were “apparent and lamentable” (para. 3). Edward Lucas said in *The Times* that Greenwald’s refusal to take part in the editorial processes at *Salon.com* or the *Guardian* revealed his contempt for news media. “Greenwald likes to call himself a journalist, but he despises the normal editorial process and sees the world’s best-known media outlets as a bunch of sycophants and cowards. He wrote for *The Guardian*, he notes proudly, only on the basis that ‘nobody could edit or even review my pieces before they ran’” (Lucas, 2014a, para. 1). Greenwald’s refusal to take part in traditional editorial review, and his public discussion of the deals he struck with Salon.com and The Guardian, were evidence of Greenwald’s contempt for a long-standing aspect of the journalistic process. Some journalists appeared to interpret this as Greenwald not wanting to adhere to traditional rules, or to his thinking that journalistic standards and practices were beneath him. Either way, for some journalists, Greenwald’s refusal to submit to editing was a violation of one of journalism’s boundaries.

Based on the violations identified above, I put forward the following reason why British journalists thought Greenwald fell outside the boundaries of real journalism:

*Greenwald is not a true journalist because he tries to affect the issues he covers (wrong actions), he produces reporting that lacks nuance, is not held to traditional editorial standards, and may be so biased as to be inaccurate (wrong product), and his goal is to be an advocate (wrong function).*

**Social identity theory: British journalists’ strategies for assessing Greenwald**
One strategy for addressing Greenwald’s potential threats to British journalism’s positive
distinctiveness recurred throughout the British metajournalism: the Guardian’s ongoing
deviance. This was a way for many British journalists not affiliated with the Guardian to
understand Greenwald, and to denigrate his work and dismiss his success.

**Social competition: Greenwald is just another example of the Guardian’s deviance.**

Many journalists described Greenwald and his reporting through the lens of the Guardian’s
deviance. There is no love lost for the paper among journalists who work for other outlets; many
see the Guardian as an outlier in the British news landscape, a too-liberal newspaper that is
overly critical of the government and of the West in general and that enjoys going against the
grain. Greenwald’s combative personality and aggressive, adversarial style of reporting—which
specifically took on the British and American security services, to whom many British journalists
thought the profession should be deferential—was indicative of the larger, ongoing qualms that
these journalists had with the Guardian. Journalists that were critical of Greenwald’s reporting,
and extended their criticism to the Guardian (or vice versa), could be found at the Financial
Times (Gapper, 2013), The Spectator (The Spectator, 2013), The Daily Mail (Glover, 2013a,
2013b, 2014), The Express (McKinstry, 2013), The Independent (Blackhurst, 2013), and the Wall
Street Journal (Lucas, 2014b).

Many journalists appeared to think that the Guardian and Greenwald were collaborating to
harm British interests; to restore their profession’s positive distinctiveness, they engaged in
social competition to place both actors outside the boundaries of real and responsible journalism.
For example, The Spectator (2013) accused The Guardian of assisting Greenwald, Snowden, and
Assange in attempting to harm the UK’s intelligence-gathering capabilities. The magazine
alleged The Guardian was colluding with Greenwald and David Miranda as “part of a
professional operation leaking classified information which betrayed British and American
national security” (para. 2). Further, the Spectator was not convinced that the Guardian believed
its reporting was in the public interest, particularly because the paper employed Greenwald, who
“certainly speaks as if he is waging a kind of information jihad against the British government”
(para. 5). Stephen Glover of the Daily Mail asked how the Guardian could ever employ a
journalist like Greenwald, who he said clearly detests Britain. Chris Blackhurst (2013) of The
Independent said Greenwald and the staff of the Guardian were both unqualified to handle the
Snowden documents, and that both were displaying arrogance if they thought otherwise. “What
we’re into here appears to be not so much someone blowing the whistle on one story to highlight
specific wrongdoing but the dumping of tons of information—and the recipient [Greenwald and
the Guardian] acting both as unqualified filter and feeling the need to brag about how much
documentation it has received,” he said (para. 14).

Sometimes metajournalism about Greenwald’s reporting devolved into an airing of past
grievances against the Guardian. John Gapper of the Financial Times used his column to
criticize the Guardian’s past stances on British tax law. He said the Snowden documents had put
Rusbridger into a “curious position,” because the Guardian “takes an extremely dim view of
multinational corporations moving their operations to low-tax regimes to avoid UK liabilities,”
but yet the Guardian appeared to be basing some of its Snowden reporting in the US so that it
would be protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution (para. 12). “Does he believe
in legal forum shopping only for his own organisation?” Gapper asked (para. 12).

Some journalists used the Snowden revelations to excoriate the Guardian for its reporting
on the News International hacking scandals, and to blame the paper for the subsequent Leveson
Inquiry and Report. *The Spectator* was particularly upset about what it saw as the *Guardian’s* support for a government proposal that would have re-instituted state licensing of the press (a regulation suggested in the Levenson Report). *The Spectator* said it would boycott any such attempt to re-instate press licensing, and that it “[does] not remember Mr Rusbridger rushing to support us” (2013, para. 8). The magazine went on about Rusbridger:

“He seems to have a rather different test for press freedom: whatever suits his newspaper the best. The Leveson report, and the notion of allowing politicians to set the parameters in which the press can operate, seemed to be quite acceptable to him: after all, it would hurt his rivals the most” (para. 8).

Leo McKinstry agreed, and said it was hypocritical for the *Guardian* to present itself as an advocate of press freedom when it “actually supported the cause of far greater regulation and censorship” during the Leveson Inquiry (2013, para. 18). Stephen Glover (2013b) said the *Guardian*’s central role in bringing about the Leveson Report—“*The Guardian*, of course, is almost single-handedly responsible for Leveson,” he said (para. 28)—meant the paper was also to blame for Miranda’s detention. The British airport officials, Glover said, felt “emboldened to throw their weight about” because of the Leveson Report (para. 27).

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26 The Leveson Inquiry was a public judicial inquiry that examined the practices and culture of the UK press following the News International phone hacking scandals. Public hearings related to the inquiry were held in 2011 and 2012. After the inquiry, the panel members published a 2,000-page report, called the Leveson Report, in November 2012. The report summarized the inquiry’s findings, and made recommendations for changes in UK media regulations that the panel thought could prevent another such scandal from occurring.
In summary, by treating Greenwald as an extension of the Guardian newspaper and (what they perceived as) its continued deviance from traditional British journalistic practices and political opinions, some UK journalists attempted to diminish Greenwald’s work and success.

Summary

Four key journalistic traits emerged within British metajournalism surrounding Greenwald. First, journalists argued that true journalism is balanced, meaning that news stories should be fair and contain multiple perspectives. Second, they argued that journalism should serve the public by providing them with the information they need to govern themselves. Third, some British journalists argued that responsible journalists must defer to government experts on issues of national security. Doing this helps journalism serve the public interest, they argued, because the public is absolutely interested in remaining safe from harm. Finally, many journalists argued that true journalists protect and advance British national interests.

Greenwald stayed within some of these boundaries, and violated others. Journalists said Greenwald had an adversarial approach to covering those in power, and fulfilled the watchdog function of journalism. Others said his passion for the issues he covers makes him a better reporter; the best journalists are passionate about the topics they cover, and they convey this enthusiasm to their audiences.

But British journalists identified many more ways in which Greenwald strayed outside the boundaries of British journalism. Some argued Greenwald’s strong, publicly held biases cast doubt on the accuracy of his reporting. Others said Greenwald tries to impact the issues he covers, and that this activism is inappropriate for a journalist. Some journalists also argued that Greenwald’s reporting lacks nuance; because he approaches journalism in the way a lawyer would approach his work, Greenwald is only able to see his own perspective. This black-and-
white worldview prevents him from portraying complex issues with the depth they need. Finally, some journalists took issue with what they interpreted as Greenwald’s lack of respect for traditional editorial practices. Greenwald has rarely reported to an editor, a fact that he has discussed in public multiple times. Some journalists saw this as evidence of Greenwald’s contempt for the journalistic process, and his unwillingness to see the value in traditional journalism. In addition to these boundaries that journalists identified, one social competition strategy emerged multiple times: Journalists saw Greenwald’s tough, vocal reporting as yet another way in which the *Guardian* was trying to draw attention to itself or buck the status quo. They used this association to engage in social competition with Greenwald and the *Guardian*, and try to dismiss both actors as outside the bounds of serious journalism.

In the next and final section of this chapter, I compare and contrast the US and UK metajournalism surrounding Glenn Greenwald.

**Section III: Comparing US and UK Metajournalism Surrounding Glenn Greenwald**

As discussed in Chapter 3, American and British print journalism differ in many important ways. This section outlines the key differences and similarities between US and UK print journalism that emerged within metajournalism surrounding Glenn Greenwald (Figure 7.1).

[Figure 7.1 here]

**Objectivity as an ideal.** Objectivity was a big topic of discussion among American journalists in the metajournalism about Greenwald. Should journalists strive to be objective, even if the ideal is impossible to obtain? Those who said yes argued that the public can better trust journalists who at least *try* to overcome their personal biases and political leanings. This trustworthiness and objectivity separates journalism from other communication-related professions, such as public relations and lobbying. And even if no one is ever perfectly objective,
journalists can still get very close by being aware of their own biases and subjecting their work to editorial scrutiny, they argued. On the other side, some journalists said if objectivity is unattainable, it is better for journalists to abandon it as a goal and instead be transparent about their biases. Journalists who took this stance said many journalists who claim to be objective are actually biased in some sort of manner, even if they might not know it. Because human bias always creeps into reporting, “objective” journalists are actually tricking their audiences when they claim that their reporting is free of bias. Transparency allows news audiences to judge for themselves whether they think information is fair or trustworthy.

No comparable debate occurred in the British metajournalism. Instead, British journalists argued that true journalists provide news coverage that is balanced—but not necessarily objective. Whereas American objectivity is often operationalized as “Side 1 says this, Side 2 says this, and it is up to you, the reader, to decide which one is right,” British balance allows a journalist to say “Side 1 says this, but Side 2 says something else and they have more compelling information to back it up.” British journalists described balance as hearing out all sides in a situation, and making a fair decision about which side is more legitimate. The concern British journalists had with Greenwald was not with his lack of objectivity (many even praised Greenwald’s passion for the topic of civil liberties), but rather that his biases might be so strong they render him incapable of reliably weighing all sides on an issue. Some human bias, then, is acceptable and expected, but outright and vocal activism is a step too far. This difference between American and British journalism is also reflected in the fact that British journalists were not as concerned about whether Greenwald got too close to Snowden.

The difference between American and British newspaper journalism here is shades of gray: Both strive for accuracy and fairness, and journalists in both countries expressed concern
that Greenwald might be too biased to report fairly on the issues he cares about. But American journalism is still actively debating whether objectivity is a necessity in achieving accuracy and fairness. And, for many American journalists working at old establishment outlets—e.g., Paul Farhi, George Packer, or Bill Keller—traditional norms and definitions are proving difficult to change, despite industry upheaval.

**Beliefs about the press-government relationship.** Different debates about the press-government relationship emerged in the US and UK. In the UK, much discussion focused on whether it was acceptable for a journalist to report on the Snowden disclosures. Many journalists argued the information was too sensitive to report because government officials said it would be harmful to national security—for example, the former editor of *The Independent* newspaper said he would not have published articles based on the Snowden documents because “if the security services insist something is contrary to the public interest, and might harm their operations, who am I (despite my grounding from Watergate onwards) to disbelieve them?” (Blackhurst, 2013, para. 12). Journalists who work for other (non-*Guardian*) outlets like *Express*, *Daily Mail*, and the *Economist* expressed similar concerns about the national security implications of the Snowden reporting. They doubted that journalists have the skills necessary to decide which information should be kept secret and which is safe to air publicly. As a result, they argued that journalists should defer to government officials on matters of national security, and not publish anything that those officials think could be harmful.

If American journalists had similar concerns, they did not raise them in the metajournalism analyzed here. The article that was most critical of the content of the Snowden leaks instead argued that they showed nothing new and revealed no wrongdoing (*Wall Street Journal* Editorial Board, 2013). The general consensus was that the Snowden stories produced
by the *Washington Post* and *Guardian* were reported responsibly, and that they only included information that the public had a right to know. Even some of Greenwald’s critics, who argued that his reporting style *could* lead to less accurate or balanced news coverage, admitted that they failed to see concrete evidence of this in his Snowden reporting—although they attributed the quality coverage to the influence of the *Guardian*’s institutional infrastructure, which has “a technical staff that knows how to make the most of a database, editors and fact-checkers who fortify the stories, graphic designers who help make complicated subjects comprehensible and, not least, lawyers who are steeped in freedom-of-information and First Amendment law” (Keller & Greenwald, 2013, para. 33).

So what does this mean for how British and American journalists perceive the press-government relationship in their respective countries? Journalists in both nations described the importance of a watchdog press (albeit that, in the UK, these statements largely came from journalists working at the *Guardian* or its sister publication, the *Observer*), but many British journalists argued that journalists should defer to government officials on matters of national security. In the UK, then, the press-government relationship seems to be more politely deferential, at least in matters of national security; national security is a sacred and unique area of reporting, and one where British journalists seem less likely than their American counterparts to challenge official lines. American journalists at the *Washington Post* did consult with the Obama administration prior to publishing any Snowden documents, but the appropriateness of publishing the Snowden documents was not a central or even peripheral debate within the American metajournalism. As with the WikiLeaks documents, this difference might be borne out of necessity: British journalists have fewer legal protections than American journalists, and are vulnerable to prosecution under the UK’s Official Secrets Act, which protects secret government
information (particularly that related to national security). Their desire to defer to officials on national security matters might be a means of self-preservation. In contrast, although the Obama administration has aggressively pursued whistleblowers under the US’s Espionage Act, this law has never been used against a journalist.

**The Guardian.** However, one might wonder whether these British journalists would have the same reactions to the Snowden disclosures if they were published in any other newspaper besides the *Guardian*. One observable difference between the US and UK press is that the UK press often uses more colorful language in its descriptions, and many such colorful descriptions were used for the *Guardian*. “Needless to say, I don’t accuse [Guardian editor] Mr Rusbridger of any lack of patriotism. I am sure he loves his country as much as anyone. But he does stand accused of the most stupendous arrogance and presumption,” said Stephen Glover at the end of a *Daily Mail* article that strongly implied that Rusbridger lacked proper national loyalty (2013a, para. 19). British journalists’ discussion of Greenwald’s reporting frequently devolved into a discussion of the *Guardian* and the various ways in which it is different from the rest of their nation’s press. This is partially because Greenwald’s opinionated style is less remarkable in the UK, where the objectivity ideal is less entrenched, but it is also because of the antipathy for the *Guardian* that many journalists feel.

US journalists focused less on the *Guardian* and more on Greenwald himself, who they knew from “his career as a provocateur at Salon, sticking his thumb in the eye of MSM figures like Gregory and Sorkin” (Judis, 2013b, para. 2). Greenwald, not the *Guardian*, was the lightning rod for American journalists’ attention. They often treated the *Guardian* as an interesting novelty or new journalism start-up, despite the fact that its UK edition has been in publication since 1821. American journalists described the *Guardian* as not being an establishment outlet (Kurtz,
2013b), and wrote articles describing the paper as an interesting British novelty (Haughney & Cohen, 2013). The Guardian is not a novelty in the UK—it is a long-standing newspaper that has irked journalists at other papers for years, and thus any story it reports (no matter how big of a scoop it is) takes on that baggage.

**Who has the right to draw professional boundaries.** American journalists used debates about Glenn Greenwald’s role in the Snowden disclosures as a jumping-off point for debating who gets to define the profession in today’s digital age. This debate has been brewing for years, since the internet made it easy for people without any institutional affiliation to publish their own work for public consumption. The debate reached a turning point with the Snowden disclosures: Greenwald, a longtime blogger who has written for several different websites (including his own blog) and who has no establishment media background, was able to break one of the decade’s biggest stories by writing for the US website of a British newspaper. This event made American journalists stop and reflect on how to define their profession in today’s digital age, and consider who should be allowed to define the boundaries of their profession.

This debate did not occur in the UK in response to Greenwald. This could be attributable to two reasons. First, it could be that British journalists did not interpret Greenwald’s and the Guardian’s success as being as revolutionary as US journalists did. Again, the Guardian is a long-standing institution in Britain, whereas many American news reports described the Guardian as a novelty (or even as an online-only British outlet). Further, Greenwald’s opinionated style of reporting was less remarkable to UK journalists. Perhaps Greenwald’s scoop was less significant to UK journalists, and so did not trigger huge debates about the future direction of the profession. Second, it could be that journalism is less deeply (or strictly) professionalized in the UK, and that journalists have looser criteria for inclusion in the
profession. While the BBC attempts to remain objective in its coverage (although some Britons might debate this), print publications tend to pursue news from their own political perspectives. The range of acceptable reporting styles is wider in the UK than in the US, and these looser boundaries could mean that British journalists already allow a wider range of people to define the profession. Greenwald arguing that he could be both opinionated and a journalist, then, was not a significant threat to British professional definitions.

**Social identity strategies**

American and British journalists engaged in different strategies to restore their profession’s positive distinctiveness. Some American journalists engaged in social competition by trying to define journalism so that it specifically excluded Greenwald; however, many more journalists in the metajournalism analyzed here criticized these journalists for engaging in this social competition, arguing that doing this was a blatant example of in-group favoritism. American journalists also engaged in social creativity by describing Greenwald’s success as their own success: Greenwald’s profession achievements were reflective of the profession’s large success at adapting itself to today’s changing media environment.

In comparison, British journalists focused much of their discussion of Greenwald on the Guardian, a newspaper about which many journalists hold polarizing opinions. These journalists described Greenwald as symptomatic of the Guardian’s ongoing deviance from traditional British journalistic practices—for example, of the Guardian’s lack of concern for British national interests, or their hypocrisy. To restore their profession’s positive distinctiveness in the face of the Guardian’s and Greenwald’s success, these British journalists used social competition strategies to place both actors outside the bounds of real journalism.

**Summary**
Overall, ideals about objectivity are still entrenched within segments of American journalism—particularly among older journalists working at establishment media outlets. Instead of objectivity, British journalists advocated for balance in reporting. But both American and British journalists thought true objectivity and true balance were unattainable. Therefore, their main issue with Greenwald was not that his reporting was biased or imbalanced (few journalists threw either accusation at him), but that he was too vocal about not striving for either. Even though journalists said they had no evidence of Greenwald behaving improperly or unethically in his Snowden reporting, the fact that he does not value objectivity or balance made his reporting suspect. So while the values—objectivity vs. balance—might be different, Greenwald’s rejection of both caused American and British journalists to express similar concerns about the integrity of his reporting.

American and British journalists also differed in their thoughts on whether the Snowden reporting should have even taken place. In the UK, several journalists argued that only national security officials are qualified to judge whether the Snowden documents should be made public. In the US, the larger sense was that the documents revealed nothing new, and that news coverage was making too much of them; nearly all journalists said it was fine to publish the documents, but they questioned the conclusions some journalists drew from them. Overall, the British press was far more conservative in its opinions about what kinds of government information journalists should publish—the exception to this being journalists who worked at the Guardian and Observer. Indeed, as was the case with the WikiLeaks metajournalism described in Chapter 6, the British press’ discussion of Greenwald frequently turned into a discussion of the ways in which the Guardian’s values differed from that of the rest of the British media. In this way, journalists treated Greenwald—with his outspoken rejection of traditional journalistic values,
and his left-leaning politics—as emblematic of the *Guardian*. American journalists, being less familiar with the *Guardian*, did not bring the same professional baggage to their interpretation of Greenwald.

Finally, this analysis suggests that British journalism allows for a wider range of acceptable reporting styles. While some British journalists criticized Greenwald for not striving for balance, more American journalists criticized him for not striving for objectivity (or impartiality, to use Bill Keller’s term). This suggests that, in the UK, journalistic norms are less strict and professionalization is less developed. Although “less professionalized” may at first glance have a negative connotation, professionalization is also restricting. As the media industry changes, and as old models of journalism become financially unsustainable, the norms that accompany professionalization may serve to hinder adaptation and innovation. While American journalism may benefit from its more adversarial orientation toward government—an orientation that caused even Greenwald’s detractors to not question whether the Snowden documents should have been published—it may also suffer from a more constricting and institutionalized set of professional norms. Those who do not adhere to these norms, like Greenwald, may have their work delegitimized as a result.
Comparison of US and UK journalistic boundaries, vis-à-vis Greenwald

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<th>Definition of journalism</th>
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<th>United Kingdom</th>
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<td>Journalists strive for objectivity and/or transparency and hold their sources accountable (<em>actions</em>), produce fact-based reporting (<em>product</em>), and are dedicated to holding the powerful to account and working in the public interest (<em>societal function</em>).</td>
<td>Journalists protect and advance British national interest and defer to experts on national security issues (<em>actions</em>), they provide news coverage that is balanced (<em>product</em>), and serve the public interest (<em>societal function</em>).</td>
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<th>Greenwald’s commonalities with journalism</th>
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<td>Greenwald produces reporting that is based in fact (<em>product</em>), and committed to holding the powerful to account and working in the public interest (<em>societal function</em>).</td>
<td>Greenwald brings passion to his work (<em>action</em>) and serves as a watchdog who holds the powerful to account (<em>societal function</em>).</td>
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<th>Greenwald’s deviations from journalism</th>
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<td>Greenwald is not a true journalist because he makes himself part of the stories he covers and has too close of a relationship with his source (<em>wrong actions</em>), and produces reporting that is untrustworthy (<em>wrong product</em>) because its main goal is activism rather than public service (<em>wrong function</em>).</td>
<td>Greenwald is not a true journalist because he tries to affect the issues he covers (<em>wrong actions</em>), he produces reporting that lacks nuance, is not held to traditional editorial standards, and may be so biased as to be inaccurate (<em>wrong product</em>), and his goal is to be an advocate (<em>wrong function</em>).</td>
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion

This dissertation began with an anecdote comparing the values held by Glenn Greenwald and his editor at the Guardian’s US edition, and describing how these values were in conflict in the early days of their reporting on the Snowden disclosures. Greenwald was an opinionated blogger who had published with different online outlets in the past. He was successful on his own and had developed a large audience on his own, and this independent success gave him leverage to negotiate a huge amount of autonomy with outlets that wanted to publish his work. Indeed, until June 2013 he had never before answered to an editor, or even had his writing subjected to copyediting. With the Snowden revelations, he was moving for the first time to the news section of an outlet. This was new territory for him. It was also new territory for the Guardian: Not only was the paper working with a leak of unprecedented scale, but its editors were figuring out how to appease the demands of an employee accustomed to total autonomy—who was also the paper’s only link to the leaked documents. If the Guardian could not find a way to work with Greenwald, it would lose access to a history-making scoop. But if Greenwald could not find a way to work with the Guardian, he would lose access to its institutional resources. Both sides needed each other, but both were also uncertain of how the other would behave. This uncertainty bred apprehension and mistrust.

A similar situation played out in WikiLeaks’ relationship with the Guardian and New York Times. Assange was, and is, vocal of his distrust of mainstream media organizations, and he and other members of WikiLeaks believe in radical transparency—in other words, releasing as much information about the powerful as possible. While most journalists agree that transparency is a good thing, Assange and WikiLeaks’ approach to transparency is rooted in a cypherpunk ideology that is far more extreme and inflexible than that held by most journalists (and
particularly the journalists with whom WikiLeaks was collaborating at the *New York Times* and *Guardian*). But the *New York Times* and *Guardian* needed to learn to work with WikiLeaks in order to gain access to the Manning documents. And WikiLeaks had learned from its past releases that simply publishing documents online did not attract the kind of significant attention it wanted; if it wanted more people to read and care about its leaks, it would need to partner with news organizations that could turn the leaks into stories with narratives and context. So again, both old and new media needed each other, but neither side trusted the other or appreciated the other’s values.

The interdependence of WikiLeaks and Greenwald with their old-media collaborators exemplifies the hybrid media system that Chadwick (2013) described. Our current media system has one foot in an older, more clearly defined, more rule-based journalism, and the other in a new system that is more porous and less concerned with definitional criteria, and that is reconfiguring itself every day. When these two systems meet, conflict will inevitably arise. It is this conflict that this dissertation has sought to understand. In examining the cases of WikiLeaks and Glenn Greenwald, it has ultimately sought to understand the definitional boundaries that journalists identify as important in the broader conflict between old and new media systems. Because much of the conflict between traditional journalism, WikiLeaks, and Greenwald centered on press-state relations, this dissertation has also focused on the boundaries related to journalists’ relationship with government officials.

In the following sections, I discuss the main findings from the previous chapters in light of the larger concerns of this dissertation—issues of boundary work, professional norms, and press-state relations. I do this through comparisons of US and UK journalism, as well as through comparisons of journalistic response to WikiLeaks and Greenwald.
Professional norms as boundaries

As I said in Chapter 2, journalists usually do not need to wrestle with issues like the meanings of truth or the legitimacy of their professional ideals on a regular basis; rather, they follow routine reporting practices that are designed to help them adhere to acceptable professional boundaries, and which are passed down through education and on-the-job training. But when an actor emerges who rejects journalistic norms while still arguing he is within the boundaries of real journalism—or that he is even a better, more legitimate practitioner of journalism than traditional journalists—journalists are provoked into reassessing their boundaries.

The metajournalistic discourse analyzed here featured journalists reassessing the boundaries of their profession in reaction to two newcomers to their field—newcomers who were able to produce a journalistic product, without affiliation with an established news outlet, because of the affordances of new technologies. Journalists have been struggling to adapt to the current era’s digital environment. The internet allows anyone with an internet connection to produce and distribute information via blogs, internet comments, videos, or social media posts, and this has diminished journalism’s traditional gatekeeping role. But for the most part, these internet users do not actively purport to be journalists, and their presence is therefore not as explicitly threatening to journalistic professional boundaries. The two cases examined here are of a different kind, because the actors in question claimed to be journalists, vocally questioned existing journalistic boundaries, and criticized the work of any mainstream journalist who argued their work was not real journalism. And while they were challenging mainstream journalism’s norms and boundaries, they were at the same time finding willing partners in the mainstream news industry, and successfully publishing their work and attracting public attention for it.
In response to these events, American and British journalists took time to both affirm and re-evaluate many of their existing professional boundaries. In doing so, journalists in both nations described many similar professional norms as being important for people who wish to call themselves journalists—norms like fact-based reporting, holding powerful individuals and institutions to account, working in the public interest, vetting information, and redacting sensitive documents to avoid harming innocent lives. Based on the metajournalistic analyses presented in Chapters 6 and 7, these boundaries are still relevant and important to journalists in the US and UK. However, areas of contestation about boundaries arose around appropriate orientations toward objectivity and press-state relations. I explore these issues below.

**Objectivity is still a boundary in the US context, but it is eroding**

Chapter 5’s content analysis showed that the three American newspapers analyzed here had more neutral coverage of Assange and WikiLeaks. Whatever American journalists thought of Assange or WikiLeaks—and, as the metajournalistic analyses demonstrated, they held a wide range of strong views on both—they were mostly neutral in their day-to-day coverage. This demonstrates that mainstream American newspapers’ orientations toward objectivity remain relatively strong. It is not surprising, then, that American journalists would have objections to other communicators calling themselves journalists while refusing to conform to the objectivity norm.

In contrast, the two British newspapers were far less homogenous in their coverage; they occupied the extremes in terms of how they represented Assange and WikiLeaks, with the Guardian being the most positive of the five newspapers analyzed here, and the Times being the most negative. This confirms past scholarship characterizing British newspapers as less objective
and more politically polarized than American newspapers. Further, it is indicative of the British professional norm of providing analysis of events, rather than just relaying accounts or facts.

But while objectivity may still be the norm at large mainstream American newspapers, the metajournalistic discourse in Chapters 6 and 7 showed that American journalists were increasingly conflicted personally about whether objectivity is still necessary for journalism—that is, whether it is still a boundary separating real journalists from other types of communicators. Indeed, one might even argue that to engage in metajournalism at all is insert oneself into a story, thus suspending objectivity. Even journalists who were in favor of objectivity as a continued norm in American journalism qualified the term “objectivity” in several ways—for example, by admitting that true objectivity is impossible, but that the act of striving for objectivity is what makes real journalism, or by arguing that journalists should use the term “impartiality” instead, because objectivity “suggests a mythical state of perfect truth” (Keller & Greenwald, 2014, para. 56). So although these journalists still argued that a partisan mentality produces less valuable journalism, they admitted at least some degree of fault in the traditional American journalistic norm of objectivity. These qualifications of the objectivity norm occurred more frequently in the Greenwald analysis, which covered the period of 2013-2014, than in the WikiLeaks analysis three years earlier. This may suggest that objectivity is becoming a less powerful professional boundary. Further, journalists who argued in favor of objectivity as a continued profession norm were largely older journalists working at older news outlets—people like Bill Keller, Michael Kinsey, Paul Farhi, or John B. Judis. Younger journalists who worked for online-only or nontraditional outlets, like Mathew Ingram or Matt Taibbi, mostly argued that objectivity was no longer a useful profession norm. Some, like Taibbi, even argued that the notion of objectivity can be actively detrimental to journalism, because
news outlets and journalists who claim to be objective frequently take advantage of the public’s trust by subtly manipulating facts. Advocating for knowingly unobtainable goals sets journalism up to fail; by continuing to claim they are objective when true objectivity is impossible, news outlets can, over time, undermine the public’s trust in journalism.

While the metajournalistic discourse analyses suggested that American journalists’ orientations toward objectivity might be shifting, their commitment to reporting based on verifiable fact is still a strong professional norm; perhaps this boundary is taking the place of the objectivity boundary. Journalists, at least in the US, have traditionally drawn a boundary between their objective, just-the-facts reporting and any communication that had a point of view. A devotion to objectivity has for many decades been used by journalists to separate their work from persuasive communication like press releases, advertising, political messages, and editorials. But journalists increasingly seem to acknowledge that these black-and-white definitions of journalism are restricting, and are unfairly dismissive of a large swathe of fact-based reporting—reporting that still talks to sources, still vets information, and still tries to acknowledge multiple sides to issues, but that acknowledges when one side’s argument is more credible or compelling. Journalists in the UK, and increasingly in the US, were open to the idea that advocacy journalism and fact-based reporting are not mutually exclusive, and that advocacy journalism could therefore contain information of public value. This idea was again more frequently expressed in the 2013-2014 Greenwald metajournalism, as compared to the 2010 WikiLeaks metajournalism. Journalists in both the US and UK frequently criticized WikiLeaks’ original content for having an advocacy mission, with US journalists criticizing the organization for having any advocacy mission and UK journalists criticizing it for having an anti-American or anti-Western advocacy mission. Journalists in both countries suggested that the content was therefore less truthful and
less valuable to the public, even though they did not question the authenticity of the documents on which WikiLeaks was reporting. Three years later, some journalists—even in the US—suggested that Greenwald could be considered within the boundaries of real journalism, despite his clear advocacy orientation, because his reporting was ultimately based on verifiable fact. In today’s evolving journalistic environment, even American journalists working at older establishment outlets are coming around to the idea that advocacy is not always synonymous with public relations.

Many American and British journalists argued that all journalism is advocacy of some type, or that advocacy journalism can have value. Again, this point of view was expressed far more frequently in the British metajournalism, and more frequently in the American metajournalism surrounding Greenwald than in the metajournalism surrounding WikiLeaks only three years earlier. This further suggests that perhaps the American boundary of objectivity is eroding over time. This is not to say that objective journalism, or journalism that at least strives to be objective, will completely fall to the wayside in the US. Rather, this indicates that boundaries of journalism may be expanding so that a reverence for objectivity is not a requirement for entry into the American journalistic sphere—a marked change from much of the mainstream American journalism of the 20th century. As more online-only outlets emerge, more journalists are trained in digital newsrooms, more journalists move from traditional outlets to online outlets, and more traditional outlets become online-focused or digital-first, this change may become more rapid. So while some American journalists continue to express frustration with the mainstream press’ continued dedication to a relatively homogenous and detached form of journalism that defines objectivity—and therefore journalism—in a narrow way, they have reason to be optimistic: There is evidence that the proliferation of newsrooms in the digital age,
as well as the success of advocacy journalists like Greenwald, is slowly normalizing more varied approaches to printed journalism.

**Norms around press-state relations are difficult to change, particularly in the US**

Most journalists in the US argued that before publishing articles based on sensitive government documents, journalists should consult with government officials and let them suggest redactions. This norm provides legal protection for the outlet, and lets journalists argue that they took precautions to not release information that might harm innocent lives. Assange had to conform to these norms if he wanted the *New York Times* to partner with WikiLeaks, and Greenwald had to conform to these norms if he wanted to publish with the *Guardian’s* US website. Further, even though Greenwald allegedly received word from the news website *Salon* that they would publish his Snowden reporting immediately, it is not entirely clear from his account whether *Salon* actually meant “immediately, after the standard consultation with our lawyers and the US government agencies mentioned in your story.” And Greenwald himself admitted to have deep reservations about the potential legal ramifications of publishing his Snowden reporting on his own website. In short, the potential legal fallout from publishing sensitive government information without going through the established bureaucratic channels may push even the most adversarial, boundary-breaking journalists into engaging in traditional press-state interactions.

Further, Greenwald may advocate for more journalists to be “in the troublemaking tradition” (Cassidy, 2014, para. 6-7), but this approach to government relations may not be feasible in the long-term for journalists wishing to cover government departments, let alone as part of a newspaper beat; an aggressively adversarial personal approach is not always conducive to relationship-building and cultivation of sources. While the affordances of the internet may
allow journalists to publish work without help from established news outlets, they still need the help of sources willing to speak with them. Therefore, while the internet may allow journalists to report in a wider variety of styles, norms around press-state relations (and, indeed, around interpersonal interactions) may push even online journalists into more traditional relationships with government officials.

*But international collaborations may be normalizing aspects of American press-state interactions in Britain*

As evidenced by the exchange between Bill Keller and a BBC nightly news anchor described in Chapter 6, British journalists are not accustomed to consulting with government officials before publishing articles, even if those articles pertain to potentially sensitive national security issues (Greenwald, 2010). British journalists repeatedly described redactions as a process undertaken by individual news outlets, without input from government officials. During the Manning disclosures in 2010, *Guardian* editor Alan Rusbridger was reluctant to consult with the US government prior to publication. He only consented to meeting with officials after realizing the *New York Times* would be doing so as a matter of policy, regardless of his opinion on the matter. However, Rusbridger refused to tell US officials which specific documents the *Guardian* would publish, and he refused to withhold any information that he felt was merely embarrassing to the government. But just three years later, Greenwald found himself frustrated by the *Guardian*’s publication delays while the paper waited to consult with the US government—actions it had taken on its own, at the recommendations of its legal team. Granted, Greenwald was working with the US branch of the newspaper, while the WikiLeaks disclosures were published in the UK edition. But the US edition of the *Guardian* is a digital subsidiary of the main UK-based *Guardian* newspaper, and the US website’s editor answers to the UK
newspaper and its editor-in-chief. If the *Guardian* wanted to avoid conferring at all with the US government, it could have published the articles in its UK paper; this would have had the added benefit of appeasing its reporter, Greenwald, who was eager to publish immediately and who is a vocal critic of the practice of news outlets conferring with the government before publishing stories. However, the *Guardian*’s desire to benefit from US press freedoms apparently outweighed its dislike of consulting with government officials prior to publication, and so the paper’s editors decided to publish in their US edition. This was the same rationale that WikiLeaks and the *Guardian* had in 2010, when they decided to collaborate with the *New York Times* in their reporting; even though WikiLeaks and Assange were critical of the *New York Times*’ decision to hold off publishing a 2004 article about the Bush administration’s wiretapping program, they and the *Guardian* decided these disagreements were less important than the benefits that they would derive from publishing in the US, which has stronger press freedom laws than the UK.

It is important to note that these international collaborations would not be possible, or at least would be made immeasurably more difficult, without the affordances of the internet. Thus, the internet allows news outlets to shop around for the best press freedom laws by finding collaborators in other nations. In the two cases analyzed in this dissertation, this ability to shop around led UK news organization to decide to publish simultaneously in the US, where they would benefit from the First Amendment and from the Supreme Court precedent against prior restraint. If the UK government decided to interfere in the publication of articles in the UK (as it did in 2013, when it forced the *Guardian* to destroy its own hard drives), publication could continue unabated in the US. But in order to fully benefit from US laws, the UK news outlets were advised by their lawyers to consult with the government prior to publication; as the
Guardian’s lawyers told Janine Gibson, this allows news outlets to potentially prove in court that their publication was not intended to harm US national security. The British journalists, therefore, had to conform to US journalistic norms in order to avail themselves of US press protections.

This idea may seem unremarkable from a legal perspective, but from a boundary work perspective it suggests the increasingly digital nature of journalism, and the ability for news organizations to engage in international collaboration, may lead to increasing shifts in national-level journalistic boundaries. In such collaborations, the nations with the weaker press freedoms will generally be the ones forced to adhere to the other nation’s professional norms. Ultimately, the country with the strongest press freedom laws may become the standard-bearer for press-state relations. This phenomenon is made possible by the affordances of the internet, which allow for greater and easier international collaboration between news outlets, and may become inevitable in situations where one collaborator’s country has stronger press freedom laws.

While further study will be needed to establish the extent of this trend, the two cases analyzed here suggest that as publications seek out international collaborations with publications in countries with stronger press freedom laws, that this has the (perhaps unexpected) result of requiring that journalists conform to the journalistic norms of the nation with stronger press freedoms. Future study should examine which boundaries, besides appropriate press-state relations in the context of publication of sensitive national security-related documents, get exported when publications collaborate internationally. Ultimately, this has the potential to have a homogenizing effect on journalistic norms, particularly with regards to reporting on sensitive political issues, with journalists increasingly adopting the norms of countries with stronger press freedoms.
Social identity theory and journalists’ response to WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) argues groups try to achieve and maintain positive distinctiveness—that is, they want their in-group to compare favorably to out-groups. The theory predicts that, when confronted with challenges to their positive distinctiveness, groups will take one of the following actions: (1) engage in social mobility by leaving their group for another more respected or powerful group; (2) engage in social creativity by redefining aspects of their group, or by placing more importance on their group’s positive aspects while placing less importance on the areas in which the competing group excels; or (3) engage in direct social competition with the out-group. In cases when leaving a group (social mobility) is not possible, threatened groups will respond to perceived threats by engaging in social creativity or social competition.

If journalists perceived WikiLeaks, Assange, or Greenwald as members of an out-group, and perceived their successes as threats to the continued positive distinctiveness of traditional journalists as a social group, social identity theory predicts they will respond via social mobility, social creativity, or social competition. In this case, journalists were likely unable to engage in social mobility, unless they wanted to leave their profession entirely behind. This left journalists who felt threatened by the success of WikiLeaks, Assange, or Greenwald with two options: social creativity or social mobility. To engage in social creativity, journalists would need to place increased significance on particular areas in which they felt traditional journalism uniquely excels—perhaps in their institutional resources (e.g., research abilities, editorial systems, legal teams, long-standing relationships with government officials and administrations). They would also need to diminish the relative importance of those areas in which the perceived out-group
excelled. To engage in social competition with WikiLeaks, Assange, or Greenwald, journalists would need to directly confront these actors and cast them as illegitimate.

Indeed, analyses presented in Chapter 6 and 7 demonstrated that journalists in both countries used social creativity and social competition to fend off competition from these perceived newcomers—albeit in different ways. Journalists employed different strategies to respond to WikiLeaks in 2010 than they did to respond to Greenwald in 2013. Back in 2010, journalists used WikiLeaks’ successes to reaffirm the continued importance of traditional journalism. In 2013, journalists took no such solace from Greenwald’s success: Greenwald’s ability to do original reporting on his own for a variety of online-only news outlets did not provide journalists with the same reassurance that traditional outlets were still necessary. This could be evidence that journalists in both nations are adapting to the rapid changes happening in their industry, and are no longer able to deny that these changes are allowing nontraditional forms of journalism to emerge and thrive.

When comparing the two nations, British journalists’ regular focus on the Guardian is striking. For both of these cases, British journalists used their dislike of the Guardian to engage in social competition that ultimately allowed them to dismiss newcomers to their field. This suggests that while British journalism may be more accommodating of different orientations toward objectivity, their willingness to embrace new forms of journalism is dependent upon who is introducing them.

Implications for the changing news industry

Overall, the content analysis and metajournalistic analyses presented here suggest that American journalism is more professionalized than British journalism, with stricter norms about what journalism should look like. As described in Chapters 6 and 7, while American journalists
appeared to be becoming more open to the idea of advocacy journalism, many still argued that the advocacy orientation of WikiLeaks, Assange, and Greenwald either precluded them from being real journalists, or precluded them from producing valuable journalism. This observation has implications, both good and bad, for how journalism in each nation will respond to the changing news industry.

In Britain, the wider range of acceptable reporting styles means that journalism like Glenn Greenwald’s—which is openly political—is both commonplace and considered to have value. The British press’s looser professional norms are not necessarily a bad thing; its more inclusive definition of journalism could mean the British media industry is more accepting of different kinds of journalism, and thus better poised to adapt to changes in the news industry. However, the lower levels of professionalization of the British also mean journalists there are less able to take on a watchdog role. British journalists do not see their profession as occupying the same level of importance as the government, and they frequently spoke of the need for journalists to respect government officials and defer to them on important matters, like those involving national security. This may be because British journalists have fewer legal protections than American journalists, or because of other sociopolitical factors. But regardless of the reason, British journalism’s lower level of professionalism can also have negative implications for the future of watchdog journalism in that nation.

Conversely, the US’s stricter professional norms—including the still ongoing debate about whether objectivity is a necessary goal for anyone wanting to call themself a journalist—might make US journalism less likely to accept new forms of journalism. This could be problematic for news outlets that need to adapt to a changing media landscape. However, the professionalization of American journalism, accompanied with the strong legal protections
afforded journalists by the US Constitution, Supreme Court precedents, and various state laws, means that journalists are also able to be (somewhat) comfortable in holding power to account. Finally, the metajournalistic discourse analysis presented here demonstrated that, generally, journalists’ definitions of their profession were self-serving. Stricter definitions of journalism were espoused by journalists who worked at older establishment news outlets, like the New York Times, and broader, more inclusive definitions of journalism were described by younger journalists and people who have made their careers working at online outlets. This suggests that the definitions and boundaries of journalism are becoming more flexible in the digital age.

**Limitations and avenues for future research**

This study is not without limitations; however, those limitations highlight avenues for future research. First, this study relies on analyses of print journalism. I believe this is an important area of study, because this content is consumed by large numbers of citizens and can therefore play an important role in influencing public opinion. Further, large print outlets like the New York Times and Guardian are still agenda-setters in today’s media environment; one need look no further than the list of most-visited news websites to see that these legacy media outlets still play a dominant role in today’s online media landscape. However, future research would benefit from expanding the scope of this study to include a wider array of news outlets. This could include other legacy outlets that still play an influential role in today’s media environment, like broadcast or cable news. It could also include analyses of newer sources of information, such as blogs or social media posts, which are playing an increasingly important role in delivering information to citizens.
Second, much of this analysis relies on metajournalistic discourse. This is an important aspect of journalistic coverage of both disclosures, because it is where journalists gave the public their expert opinions about WikiLeaks and Greenwald. However, metajournalism only offers so much insight into journalists’ thoughts; journalists likely hold much more complex views about their profession than they were able to express in columns, either due to space constraints or to professional constraints about what they could express publicly. Further, not all journalists probably feel comfortable publicly writing about their opinions about other journalistic actors at all—particularly in the US, where many journalists argued that real journalists do not make themselves part of the stories they cover. Written metajournalism also, for the most part, captures the opinions of print journalists. Future work should involve interviews with journalists working at a variety of news outlets—print, broadcast, online only, or freelance—to get a better sense of the opinions of a wider scope of journalists.

Finally, this study focuses on only two nations: the United States and the United Kingdom. Although I have highlighted the many ways in which print journalism in these two nations differ, they are—in the larger international scheme of things—more similar than different. Future research could compare more disparate media systems to better understand how journalists’ professional norms impact their acceptance of new kinds of journalistic actors.

While the framework and analyses presented here come from the US and UK, the findings are relevant to any nation where traditional journalism is confronting changes brought about by the internet and emerging technologies.
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Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/collegeofjournalism/entries/e7e77e4f-72e4-374f-8b53-fde45071e6a7


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http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324299104578529373994191586


Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PORTRAYAL CODESHEET</th>
<th>Coder Initials _________</th>
<th>Article ID# _________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**SECTION 1: ARTICLE INFORMATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Headline of Article</th>
<th>____________________________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of article: MM/DD/YY</td>
<td>____________________________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper (circle one)</td>
<td>1 Guardian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 Washington Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 Wall Street Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 The Times (London)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Type of article (circle one) | 1 News story |
|                             | 2 Editorial or weekly columnist |
|                             | 3 Letter to the editor |
|                             | 4 Feature |
|                             | 5 Other (listings, roundup, etc.) |

| Article authors | (circle all that apply) | 1 Glenn Greenwald |
|                |                          | 2 Laura Poitras |
|                |                          | 3 Ewen MacAskill |
|                |                          | 4 Julian Assange |
|                |                          | 5 Wire service (AP/Reuters/AFP) |
|                |                          | 6 Any other reporter(s) |

**SECTION 2: OVERVIEW OF ARTICLE CONTENT**

1. Generally, on which set of disclosures does the article focus? Circle one.
   - 1 Manning/WikiLeaks
   - 2 Snowden/NSA

2. Based on the headline and first paragraph of the article, what would you say is the primary topic of this article? Circle only one.
   - 1 The actual content of the leaked documents
   - 2 Reaction or response from US government officials or departments to leaks
   - 3 Reaction or response from UK government officials or departments to leaks
   - 4 Reaction or response from foreign government (non-UK) officials or departments to leaks
   - 5 The personalities or personal lives of the actors involved (Manning, Assange, Snowden, Greenwald, Poitras)
   - 6 Assange’s house arrest/legal troubles in Sweden/asmily in Ecuadorian embassy
   - 7 The careers of the journalistic actors involved in breaking the story (Assange, Greenwald, Poitras)
   - 8 The careers of the whistleblowers (Manning or Snowden)
   - 9 Manning’s or Snowden’s decision to leak their documents, or their decision-making processes
   - 10 Manning’s consequences: Manning’s arrest, charges, treatment while held in US detention, trial, or sentencing
   - 11 Snowden’s consequences: Snowden’s asylum/fleeing to Hong Kong and Russia, potential charges filed against him
   - 12 WikiLeaks as an organization
   - 13 Decisions made by the mainstream news organizations involved in reporting on the leaks (e.g., Guardian, New York Times, Washington Post)
   - 14 Reactions from for-profit companies to leaks (e.g., Google, Amazon, Booz Allen Hamilton, Apple)
   - 15 Repercussions of Manning or Snowden leaks (either actual or potential repercussions)
   - 16 Reactions from non-government and non-corporate actors to leaks
   - 17 Communication between Snowden and Greenwald/Poitras
   - 18 David Miranda detention
   - 19 Anonymous
   - 20 How media cover government whistleblowers or leaks
SECTION 3: PORTRAYAL OF MANNING AND SNOWDEN

3. How are the following people portrayed in the headline/sub-headline and article? Indicate whether they are portrayed positive, negatively, or neutrally, using the 1 - 5 scale listed below. If the person or organization isn’t mentioned, write in “X.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portrayed in headline…</th>
<th>Portrayed in article…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bradley/Chelsea Manning</td>
<td>_______   _______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Snowden</td>
<td>_______   _______</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Very negatively (usually only editorials)
2 Somewhat negatively (mostly detractors, but with 1-2 supporters)
3 Balanced/Neutrally (article focuses on facts, or includes both supporters and detractors)
4 Somewhat positively (mostly supporters, but with 1-2 detractors)
5 Very positively (usually only editorials)
X Not portrayed

[IF NEITHER IS MENTIONED, SKIP TO SECTION 4.]

4. Does the article explicitly mention any of Manning’s or Snowden’s own motivations for leaking their documents? Motivations might include the desire to tell the public the truth, personal values or morals, the need to expose illegal activity, and so on.

Yes _________   No _________

5. Does the article mention the following potential consequences to Manning or Snowden as a result of their leaks?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consequences</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal consequences</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(any consequences imposed by a court of law or through the legal system—e.g., arrests, charges, prison sentencing, legal restrictions on travel, need to flee to avoid arrest)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal consequences</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>___</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g., loss of career, loss of contact with friends/family, loss of income or property, emotional consequences, detainment of partners/friends/family)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6. Does the article include descriptions of the physical appearance or personality of any of the following people? If yes, indicate whether the description is flattering, unflattering, or neutral. If no descriptions of physical appearance or personality appear in the article, check “Not mentioned” below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not mentioned</th>
<th>Yes, Flattering</th>
<th>Yes, Unflattering</th>
<th>Yes, Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bradley/Chelsea Manning</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Edward Snowden</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION 4: PORTRAYAL OF JOURNALISTIC ACTORS

7. How are the following people or organization portrayed in the headline/sub-headline and article? Write in the numbers below. If the person or organization isn’t mentioned at all, write in “X.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Portrayed in headline…</th>
<th>Portrayed in article…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Julian Assange</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WikiLeaks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glenn Greenwald</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laura Poitras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Very negatively (usually only editorials)
2 Somewhat negatively
3 Balanced/Neutrally (article focuses on facts, or includes both supporters and detractors, or only briefly mentions the person)
4 Somewhat positively
5 Very positively (usually only editorials)
X Not portrayed

[IF NONE IS MENTIONED, END OF CODING.]
8. Does the article explicitly describe Assange’s, Greenwald’s, or Poitras’ own motivations for reporting on or publishing the leaked documents?

Yes ________   No _________

9. Does the article mention the following potential consequences to Assange, WikiLeaks, Greenwald, or Poitras as a result of their work with leaked documents? Check yes or no for each potential motivation listed below.

1 Legal consequences
   (any consequences imposed by a court of law or through the legal system—e.g., arrests, charges, prison sentencing, legal restrictions on travel, need to flee to avoid arrest)

   No  Yes

2 Personal consequences
   (e.g., loss of career, loss of contact with friends/family, loss of income or property, emotional consequences, detainment of partners/friends/family)

   No  Yes

10. Does the article include descriptions of the physical appearance or personality of any of the following people? If yes, indicate whether the description is flattering, unflattering, or neutral. If no descriptions of physical appearance or personality appear in the article, check “Not mentioned” below.

   Not mentioned  Yes, Flattering  Yes, Unflattering  Yes, Neutral

   Julian Assange

   Glenn Greenwald

   Laura Poitras

-- END OF CODESHEET --
Journalists commonly include sources in their articles. For each time a source is quoted (even if the quote is only one word!), with quotation marks, in the article either by name or with a pronoun (e.g., “he said”), (1) write the source’s name, (2) code the source, (3) code the subject of the source’s comment, and (4) code the source’s overall evaluation. If a source’s quote is given back-to-back sentences, each sentence receives its own line the table below.

Fill in the following table with information on all sources cited in the article, in chronological order. Use the codes on the last page as reference for columns C, D, & E. Each source cited in the article receives its own row, each time it is cited.

*Please note: You are coding for actual quotes, not paraphrased quotes or mere mentions of the source. Also, sources are always people or organizations (not documents or publications).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source #</th>
<th>Source name (write it in)</th>
<th>Source code</th>
<th>Does the source mention…</th>
<th>Evaluation (if 1-8 in Column 4)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ex. Angela Merkel</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Ex. Barack Obama</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ex. Angela Merkel</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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CONTENT ANALYSIS: NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF WHISTLEBLOWING

Contains instructions for the following codesheets:
  Codesheet 1: Portrayals
  Codesheet 2: Sources

General tips for content analysis:
  1. Do not make inferences, or try to “read into” what the article might be implying. You are looking for overt, explicit descriptions or portrayals.
  2. Refer to the codebook for important definitions of key terms (e.g., very negative vs. somewhat negative, or flattering vs. unflattering). You should be referencing the codebook frequently during the content analysis process.
PORTRAYALS CODESHEET INSTRUCTIONS

TOP OF CODESHEET: Always enter (1) your initials and (2) the article ID number. You can find the article ID number at the top of the article.

SECTION 1: ARTICLE INFORMATION

Main headline of article: Enter the first few words of the headline (title) of the article. You do not need to enter the sub-headline.

Date of article: Enter the publication date of the article here, in MM/DD/YY format. The date will be listed at the top of the article, near the headline.

Newspaper: Circle the name of the newspaper in which the article appears. The name of the newspaper will be listed at the top of the article.

Type of article you are coding: Circle one of the following:
1) News story – This will be the most common type of article. Look for information that has a time element — for example, does the first sentence of the article say something happened yesterday or today? Does the article describe an event that just occurred in the past couple days? If the article is not timely, or if it could have been held to fill space in a later paper, it may be a feature. Also look for information on whether the article’s author explicitly states an opinion; if yes, then the article is likely an editorial, letter to the editor, or weekly column.
2) Editorial board or weekly columnist – Most editorials take two forms. First, traditional editorial board columns are articles in which the newspaper states its official position on a subject, or just talks about an issue from the newspaper’s point of view. These editorials provide speculation and analysis regarding recent topics or events, but do not add new, timely information (e.g., news) on the topic or event. These editorials are written by the newspaper’s editorial board, and as such do not carry one person’s name in the byline. Second, newspapers also employ columnists, who are commentators who contribute regular opinion pieces to the newspaper. If you are not familiar with a particular publication, weekly columnists may be difficult to spot, unless the headline or byline specifically states the author is a weekly columnist. Look for an individual’s name in the byline, and a clear expression of an opinion, and/or the words “Editorial” or “Comment and Debate Pages” listed in the “SECTION” field at the top of the article.
3) Letter to the editor – Letters to editors are often formatted to look like letters, and are written to the paper by the paper’s readers. In these letters, writers will openly state their opinion on a news-related issue, or respond to an article that appeared in the newspaper days earlier. The letter will usually be signed with the author’s name and hometown.
   - Includes articles from The Guardian, where the headline begins with the word “Comment”
4) Feature – These are topically based stories. Features typically lack the time element of a news story (in other words, these articles usually are not focused on providing facts about an event that occurred today or yesterday). Features tend to go in-depth about a topic that may or may not have been in the news recently, and are often written with a more artistic or stylistic flare than standard news articles. As such, they are often longer than news stories.
5) Other – Include anything not mentioned above, including roundups and listings (articles that just give excerpts from publications/speeches or top ten lists). This category also includes short, 1-3 sentence “teasers” for articles that will run the following day.
**Article Authors:** Indicate who the author of the article is, which you can find in the article’s byline. Here, we are specifically interested in whether the article is authored by someone directly involved in the cases (e.g., Glenn Greenwald) versus all other journalists.

**SECTION 2: OVERVIEW OF ARTICLE CONTENT**

1. **Indicate which set of disclosures the article is discussing.** Look at the content of the headline for information on the article’s focus. If you are still unclear about which set of disclosures the article is focusing on, skim through the article’s contents.

Another clue to the article’s focus will be the **date**; any article you are coding which is dated prior to May 2013 will relate to Manning/WikiLeaks, because the Snowden disclosures had not yet occurred.

The *vast majority* of articles will focus on either (1) the Manning/WikiLeaks disclosures, or on (2) the Snowden/NSA disclosures. You can tell which set of disclosures is the focus by looking at the headline or the date: Articles from 2010 will relate to Manning/WikiLeaks disclosures, and articles from 2013 will relate to the Snowden/NSA disclosures.

*Keep in mind that even if a Snowden article also mentions WikiLeaks, the article isn’t necessarily about the WikiLeaks disclosures.*

2. **Primary topic:** Several potential topics related to the Manning and Snowden disclosures are listed. Indicate which option best describes the primary topic of the article. Primary topics are usually mentioned in the headline of the article. If it is unclear from the headline what the primary topic of the article is, read the first paragraph of the news story (this is called the “lead”).

The vast majority of articles will fit into one of the listed topics. However, if none of the listed topics accurately describes the news article’s focus, circle “13” and briefly indicate what the article’s focus is on the line provided.

1. **The actual content of the leaked documents:** An article fits in this category if it focuses on discussion regarding what is said within the leaked documents. The goal of the article is to relay the information contained in the leaked documents, and not to provide government reaction to the leaked information or the act of leaking itself. The documents cover the following topics:
   - **Manning/WikiLeaks documents:** These leaks related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to U.S. diplomatic cables relating to countries around the world. These documents also include the video titled “Collateral Murder.”
   - **Snowden/NSA documents:** These leaks relate to surveillance practices used by the National Security Administration (NSA) in the United States and the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) in the United Kingdom.

2. **Reaction or response from US government officials or departments to the leaks:** These articles focus on responses from the US government, departments, or officials to the leaks. Reactions or responses might include statements or actions, such as denouncing the leaks; giving foreign governments advanced warning about disclosures...
that are yet to be revealed; holding a government hearing on the leaks; pursuing legal action against the leakers or publishers of the documents

3. Reaction or response from UK government officials or departments to the leaks:
These articles focus on responses from the UK government, departments, or officials to the leaks. Reactions or responses might include statements or actions, such as denouncing the leaks; giving foreign governments advanced warning about disclosures that are yet to be revealed; holding a government hearing on the leaks; pursuing legal action against the leakers or publishers of the documents (including the Guardian).

4. Reaction or response from foreign government (non-US or UK) officials or departments to the leaks:
These articles focus on responses from foreign governments, departments, or officials (non-US or UK) to the leaks. Reactions or responses might include statements or actions, such as denouncing the leaks; denouncing US or UK practices; changing communication practices to avoid US and UK surveillance; requesting that US or UK diplomats leave the country.

5. The personalities or personal lives of the actors involved:
These articles focus on the personal characteristics or personal lives of the people involved in the Manning and Snowden leaks, rather than on their careers or professional endeavors. People who might receive this kind of coverage include:

- **Chelsea/Bradley Manning:** Articles might discuss Manning’s sexual orientation; Manning’s transition to becoming a transgender woman; Manning’s hormone therapy; Manning’s childhood in Oklahoma (including her maltreatment by her mother, her mother’s attempted suicide, and suspicions that Manning has Fetal Alcohol Syndrome); Manning’s time living in Wales with her mother; bullying Manning faced throughout her life.
- **Julian Assange:** Articles might focus on Assange’s arrest for computer hacking in the 1990s; his troubled childhood (his parents were part of a cult in Australia, and Assange lived in 30 different cities by the time he was a teenager); his relationships with various women; his various children around the world (and the associated custody battles); his personality flaws; his physical appearance; the time he got married in his teens; his political views.
- **Other WikiLeaks volunteers:** e.g., Daniel Domscheit-Berg, or Birgitta Jonsdottir.
- **Edward Snowden:** Articles might focus on his past girlfriends; his childhood in North Carolina and Maryland; his political views; his health history (epilepsy).
- **Glenn Greenwald:** Articles might focus on his sexual orientation; his past or current romantic relationships (his current partner is named David Miranda); his childhood in Florida; his personality; his personal life in Brazil; his political beliefs.
- **Laura Poitras:** Articles might focus on her family; her childhood; her personal beliefs or political views.

6. Assange’s house arrest/legal troubles in Sweden/asylum in Ecuadorian embassy:
These articles focus on the sexual molestation allegations made against Assange in Sweden; Sweden’s attempts to extradite Assange to Sweden for questioning; Assange’s request for asylum from Ecuador; Ecuador’s decision to grant Assange asylum and let him stay in the Ecuadorian Embassy; Assange’s initial house arrest in a mansion in England; Assange’s life while under house arrest.
7. The careers of the journalists, or journalistic actors, involved in breaking the story: These articles focus on the professional history of the journalists, or journalistic actors, involved in reporting on the leaks: Assange, Greenwald, or Poitras. These stories might focus on:

- **Julian Assange**: Computer programmer, founder and editor-in-chief of WikiLeaks, internet activist
- **Glenn Greenwald**: Attorney/lawyer, businessman, blogger, contributing writer at Salon.com, columnist at The Guardian, editor of the online news website The Intercept
- **Laura Poitras**: Documentary filmmaker, journalist

8. The careers of Manning or Snowden: These articles focus on the professional history of the whistleblowers, either Manning or Snowden.

- **Manning**: These articles will focus on detailing Manning’s time in the U.S. Army, including training at Fort Drum in New York; deployment to Iraq; her work as a low ranking Army intelligence officer
- **Snowden**: These articles will focus on Snowden’s career, which might include discussion of his time in the U.S. Army Reserve; his job working for the CIA in Langley, Virginia and Geneva, Switzerland; his position as a contractor for Dell Computers, during which he was assigned to work at NSA facilities in Japan and Hawaii; his job at NSA contractor Booz Allen Hamilton

9. Manning’s or Snowden’s decision to leak their documents, or their decision-making processes: These articles will focus on the morality or ethics of Manning’s or Snowden’s decisions, and the factors they considered (or didn’t) when choosing to leak their documents

10. Manning’s consequences: Manning’s arrest, charges, treatment while being held in U.S. detention, trial, or sentencing: These articles focus on the legal (and perhaps personal) consequences of Manning’s decision to leak documents including: Manning’s 2010 arrest; the various charges files against her; her treatment while being held in Kuwait, Quantico (Virginia), and Forth Leavenworth; her 2013 trial; or her 2013 sentencing

11. Snowden’s consequences: Snowden’s asylum/fleeing to Hong Kong and Russia: These articles focus on the legal and personal consequences of Snowden’s decision to leak documents, including: Snowden’s decision to travel to Hong Kong to avoid arrest; his time spent stranded in a Russian airport after the US revoked his passport; his applications for asylum in Russia; or what his life is like in exile in Russia

12. WikiLeaks as an organization: These articles focus on WikiLeaks as a website or organization, rather than on Julian Assange specifically. These articles might describe WikiLeaks’ struggles to remain financially viable; PayPal, Visa, Mastercard, and Amazon cutting off services to WikiLeaks; WikiLeaks’ goals as an organization; the internal structure of WikiLeaks; dissent or arguments within the WikiLeaks organization; WikiLeaks’ “insurance file” that gets triggered if something happens to Assange or WikiLeaks

discuss why the news outlets decided to work with WikiLeaks/Assange/Snowden, what
the working relationship was like, or why the news outlets thought the leaks were
newsworthy.

14. Reactions from for-profit companies (e.g., tech companies, Booz Allen Hamilton)
to leaks: These articles focus on reactions from corporations or businesses to the
information in the Manning or Snowden leaks. For example, an article in this category
might describe Google’s reaction to learning that the NSA accesses its servers.

15. Repercussions of Manning or Snowden leaks: These articles focus on what the
(real or potential) effects of the whistleblowing will be. These effects usually relate to
homeland security, the military, laws or public policy, or politics generally; for
example, an article in this category might discuss whether terrorist organizations might
benefit from the information in the leaked documents, or whether US or UK
intelligence operations will be compromised as a result of the leaks, or whether new
legislation could be passed in response to the leaks. These articles will often include
speculation about what could happen as a result of the leaks. If the article focuses on a
US official speculating about effects of the leaks, then code that article as 2, not 15.

16. Reactions from non-government and non-corporate actors to leaks: These
articles focus on reactions from people or organizations to the leaks. People may
include individual activists, journalists, lawyers, or scholars (e.g., Daniel Ellsberg,
Noam Chomsky). Organizations may include non-profits or activist organizations, such
as the Electronic Frontier Foundation or American Civil Liberties Union or the
hacktivist collective called Anonymous. If the organization is a for-profit company
(e.g., Google, Apple, Booz Allen Hamilton, Facebook, Twitter), then code the article as
14.

17. Communication between Snowden and Greenwald or Poitras: These articles
describe how Snowden tried several times to communicate with Greenwald, or how
Snowden was able to establish communication with Poitras first, or the cryptic online
communications Snowden had with Greenwald and Poitras prior to meeting in Hong
Kong

18. David Miranda detention: These articles focus on the British government’s
detention of David Miranda, who is the partner of Glenn Greenwald.

19. Anonymous: These articles focus on the hacker collective calling themselves
Anonymous. Many of these stories will focus on Anonymous’ response to Visa,
Mastercard, and PayPal’s decision to stop processing payments to WikiLeaks, banks’
decision to close Assange’s personal accounts, or Amazon’s decision to stop providing
server space to WikiLeaks

20. How the media cover government whistleblowers or leaks: These articles focus on
how the news media portrays whistleblowers or leaks.

21. Assange/WikiLeaks legal consequences for leaking: These articles talk about the
legal consequences Julian Assange or WikiLeaks may face for publishing documents
(e.g., espionage charges in the United States). These articles do not focus on the sexual
assault charges Assange faces in Sweden.

22. Other:
These articles do not fit into any of the above categories. This will be rare! If you select
this category, please write a very brief description of the topic on the line provided.
SECTION 3: PORTRAYAL OF MANNING AND SNOWDEN

3. Portrayal of whistleblower in headline and article: In this question, focus specifically on how the whistleblowers (Manning or Snowden) are portrayed (1) in the headline/subheadline and (2) in the article overall, using the following scale. If you are on the fence about whether a headline or article is neutral or somewhat negative, or neutral or somewhat positive, err on the side of neutral.

- (1) Very negatively: The headline or article unequivocally and explicitly condemns the whistleblower and/or his or her actions. The article contains no positive statements about the whistleblower—every value judgment made about Manning or Snowden is negative. This kind of portrayal will mostly only be present in editorials or weekly columnists.
- (2) Somewhat negatively: The headline or article implies the whistleblower and/or his or her actions were questionable or could have negative implications. The article might focus on Manning’s or Snowden’s detractors, and what they have to say about Manning or Snowden. An article like this is “somewhat negative” if it includes mostly negative comments about Manning or Snowden, but some positive comments as well.
- (3) Balanced/neutrally: The headline or article makes no apparent judgment about the whistleblower or his or her actions. This would include headlines or articles that simply describe the whistleblower’s actions. A balanced article may also be one that includes an even mix of both negative and positive statements about the whistleblower.
- (4) Somewhat positively: The headline or article implies the whistleblower and/or his or her actions were necessary or could have positive implications. The article might also focus on Manning’s or Snowden’s supporters, and what they have to say about Manning or Snowden. An article like this is “somewhat positive” if it includes mostly positive comments about Manning or Snowden, but some negative comments as well.
- (5) Very positively: The headline or article unequivocally and explicitly commends or praises the whistleblower and/or his or her actions. This kind of portrayal will mostly only be present in editorials or weekly columnists.
- (X) Not portrayed: The whistleblower is not mentioned in the headline or article.

4. Whistleblower motivations: Indicate whether the article explicitly mentions the whistleblower’s own motivations for leaking—in other words, whether the article mentions why Manning or Snowden themselves claim to have leaked the documents. If the article explicitly mentions a motivation, check “yes.” If the article does not mention the motivation, check “no.” (Remember: Do not make inferences, or try to “read into” what the article might be implying. You are looking for overt, explicit descriptions of why Manning or Snowden say they leaked their documents."

5. Consequences to whistleblower: Indicate whether the article mentions any potential legal or personal consequences for Manning or Snowden that could occur as a result of his/her actions.

Legal consequences include any consequences imposed by a court of law or through the legal system, such as arrest, criminal charges being filed, potential prison terms, asylum-seeking, restrictions on international travel, the revoking of a passport, being the subject of a criminal investigation, needing to flee or live in hiding to avoid arrest or detainment, and so on.
Personal consequences include any consequences that may cause inconvenience or hardship in the whistleblower’s personal life, such as losing a career, losing contact with friends and family, losing income or property, the detainment of partners/friends/family, or suffering emotional distress.

6. Descriptions of whistleblowers’ physical appearances or personalities: Indicate whether the article describes the physical appearance or personality of Manning or Snowden—in other words, does the article tell readers what the whistleblower looks like or what his/her personality is like? If yes, indicate whether that description is flattering, unflattering, or neutral. If the article doesn’t describe what the whistleblower looks like, check “Not mentioned.”

**Flattering**: A flattering description includes complimentary remarks or descriptions that are traditionally thought to be attractive or positive. Ask yourself: If someone described your appearance in this way, would you be happy? If so, the description is probably flattering.
- **Flattering physical appearance examples**: athletic, attractive, handsome, in-shape, sexy, well-dressed, youthful
- **Flattering personality examples**: affable, caring, charming, compassionate, easygoing, extroverted, faithful, funny, generous, hard-working, honest, kind, modest, noble, optimistic, patient, polite, sensitive

**Unflattering**: An unflattering description includes remarks that would be considered insulting or descriptions that are traditionally thought of as unattractive. Ask yourself: If someone described your appearance in this way, would you be insulted? If so, the description is probably unflattering.
- **Unflattering physical appearance examples**: dirty, fat, gaunt, nerdy, pale, scrawny, sickly, sloppy, smelly, unwashed
- **Unflattering personality examples**: aggressive, arrogant, big-headed, cowardly, dishonest, emotional, egotistical, greedy, impolite, impulsive, intolerant, introverted, jealous, moody, narcissistic, paranoid, pompous, pushy, rude, secretive, self-serving, sneaky, stubborn, tactless, unreliable, vain

**Neutral**: A neutral description includes remarks that simply describe the physical appearance of the whistleblower, without making obvious judgments about whether the appearance is attractive.
- **Neutral physical appearance examples**: bearded, blond, brown-hared, short, tall, wearing a coat, wearing glasses
- **Neutral personality examples**: quiet, shy

SECTION 4: PORTRAYAL OF JOURNALISTS

7. Portrayal in headline and article: In this question, focus specifically on how the journalists or journalistic actors working with the whistleblowers (NOT journalists generally—specifically those journalists working with whistleblowers, e.g., Glenn Greenwald) are portrayed (1) in the headline/subheadline and (2) in the article overall. If you are on the fence about whether a
headline or article is neutral or somewhat negative, or neutral or somewhat positive, err on the side of neutral.

- **(1) Very negatively:** The headline or article unequivocally and explicitly condemns the journalist and/or his or her actions. The article contains no positive statements about the journalistic actor—every value judgment made about the actor is negative. This kind of portrayal will mostly only be present in editorials or weekly columnists.
- **(2) Somewhat negatively:** The headline or article implies the journalist and/or his or her actions were questionable or could have negative implications. The article might focus on the detractors of Assange/WikiLeaks/Greenwald/Poitras, and what the detractors have to say about them. An article like this is “somewhat negative” if it includes mostly negative comments about the journalistic actor, but some positive comments as well.
- **(3) Balanced/neutrally:** The headline or article makes no apparent judgment about the journalist or his or her actions. This would include headlines or articles that simply describe the journalists’ actions. A balanced article may also be one that includes an even mix of both negative and positive statements about the journalistic actor.
- **(4) Somewhat positively:** The headline or article implies the journalist and/or his or her actions were necessary or could have positive implications. The article might also focus on the supporters of Assange/WikiLeaks/Greenwald/Poitras, and what the supporters have to say about them. An article like this is “somewhat positive” if it includes mostly positive comments about Assange/WikiLeaks/Greenwald/Poitras, but some negative comments as well.
- **(5) Very positively:** The headline or article unequivocally and explicitly commends or praises the journalist and/or his or her actions. The article contains no negative statements about the journalistic actor—every value judgment made about the actor is positive. This kind of portrayal will mostly only be present in editorials or weekly columnists.
- **(X) Not portrayed:** The journalist is not mentioned in the headline or article.

8. **Journalist motivations:** An article might describe different motivations that Assange/WikiLeaks or Greenwald/Poitras had for working with whistleblowers and reporting on leaked documents. Examples might include (but are not limited to) include wanting to inform the public, having a sense of moral duty to report/publish the documents, believing the leaked documents were interesting, and believing the leaked documents provided evidence of crimes or other wrongdoing.

These motivations should come directly from one of these journalistic actors, either in the form of a quotation or a paraphrasing of a quotation; do not include speculations about Assange’s, WikiLeaks’, Greenwald’s, or Poitras’ motivations made by another party.

If the article explicitly mentions a motivation, check “yes.” If the article does not mention the motivation, check “no.”

(Remember: Do not make inferences, or try to “read into” what the article might be implying. You are looking for overt, explicit descriptions of why one or more of these journalistic actors felt motivated to report on these leaked documents.)
9. Consequences to journalistic actors: Indicate whether the article mentions any legal or personal consequences for Assange, WikiLeaks, Greenwald, or Poitras, that could occur as a result of his/her/its reporting or publishing actions.

Legal consequences include any consequences imposed by a court of law or the legal system, such as arrest, criminal charges being filed, potential prison terms or other government-imposed penalties, asylum-seeking, restrictions on international travel, the revoking of a passport, being the subject of a criminal investigation, needing to flee or live in hiding to avoid arrest or detainment, and so on.

(Note: Mentions of Julian Assange’s rape charges do not count for this category, as these charges do not come as a consequence of his reporting or leaking activities. However, if the article mentions speculation that the rape charges are a ruse to get Assange extradited to the United States, where he would face charges, these can count as legal consequences.)

Personal consequences include any consequences that may cause inconvenience or hardship in the journalist’s personal life, such as losing a career, losing contact with friends and family, losing income or property, the detainment of partners/friends/family, or suffering emotional distress. In the case of WikiLeaks, this might also include losing the funds necessary to keep the organization running, or losing access to WikiLeaks bank accounts via Mastercard, Visa, or PayPal.

10. Descriptions of journalist actors’ physical appearances or personalities: Indicate whether the headline or article describes the physical appearance or personalities of Assange, Greenwald, or Poitras—in other words, does the article tell readers what they look like? If yes, indicate whether that description is flattering, unflattering, or neutral. If the article doesn’t describe what the journalistic actors look like, check “Not mentioned.”

Flattering: A flattering description includes complimentary remarks or descriptions that are traditionally thought to be attractive or positive. Ask yourself: If someone described your appearance or personality in this way, would you be happy? If so, the description is probably flattering.

- **Flattering physical appearance examples:** athletic, attractive, handsome, in-shape, sexy, well-dressed, youthful
- **Flattering personality examples:** affable, caring, charming, compassionate, easygoing, extroverted, faithful, funny, generous, hard-working, honest, kind, modest, noble, optimistic, patient, polite, sensitive, sharp, witty

Unflattering: An unflattering description includes remarks that would be considered insulting or descriptions that are traditionally thought of as unattractive or undesirable. Ask yourself: If someone described your appearance or personality in this way, would you be insulted? If so, the description is probably unflattering.
• *Unflattering physical appearance examples:* dirty, fat, gaunt, nerdy, pale, scratny, sickly, sloppy, smelly, unwashed, many more very specific ones (e.g., wearing dirty slouchy socks, dressed “like a bag lady”)

• *Unflattering personality examples:* aggressive, arrogant, big-headed, cowardly, disagreeable, dishonest, emotional, egotistical, greedy, impolite, impulsive, intolerant, introverted, jealous, moody, narcissistic, paranoid, pompous, pushy, rude, secretive, self-serving, sneaky, stubborn, tactless, unintelligent, unreliable, vain

*Neutral:* A neutral description includes remarks that simply describe the physical appearance or personality of the journalistic actor, without making obvious judgments about whether the appearance or personality is attractive or desirable.

• *Neutral physical appearance examples:* bearded, blond, brown-haired, short, tall, wearing a coat, wearing glasses

• *Neutral personality examples:* quiet, shy, reserved, cautious

-- END OF CODESHEET --
TOP OF CODESHEET: Always enter (1) your initials and (2) the article ID number. You can find the article ID number at the top of the article.

SECTION 1: ARTICLE INFORMATION

Enter in the title of the article. This is meant as a fail-safe that will ensure the correct article is matched up with the correct article ID number. It is OK if you only enter in the first few words of the title.

SECTION 2: SOURCES

Journalists commonly include sources in their articles. Fill in the table on the codesheet with information on all sources cited in the article, in chronological order. Please note that you are coding for actual quotes in quotation marks (e.g., “Snowden has done irreparable damage to NSA practices,” President Obama said...), not paraphrased comments or mere mentions of the source (e.g., Obama attended a conference this weekend...), and that you should count even quotes of only one word.

Each source cited in the article receives its own row, each time it is cited. Also, list each quoted sentence separately in the table. If a source is quoted in two back-to-back sentences, then that source gets two back-to-back entries on the codesheet. If a source’s back-to-back quotes are both about the same subject, that source still gets two back-to-back entries on the codesheet. Basically, list every single quoted sentence in the article on the codesheet.

Sources are always people or organizations (i.e., not documents or publications).

Each time a source is quoted in the article either by name or with a pronoun (e.g., “he said”), do the following:

(Column 2) Write the source’s name, in full. If the source is unnamed or anonymous, enter in the phrase used to identify the source (e.g., “a White House official,” “a representative from the ACLU”)

(Column 3) Write down the source code, which indicates who the source is generally. Look to the article for the source’s affiliation. If the source’s affiliation is unclear from the article, Google the person’s name or the name of the organization with which he/she is affiliated. The list of available codes for Column 3 is on the last page of this codebook.

(Column 4) Indicate whether the source is talking about (1) WikiLeaks, (2) Julian Assange, (3) Chelsea/Bradley Manning, (4) Manning’s leaks, (5) Glenn Greenwald, (6) Laura Poitras, (7) Edward Snowden, (8) Snowden’s leaks, or (9) Other. If the source mentions 1 through 8, even if 1 through 8 is not the subject of the sentence, code the quote with 1 through 8. Use 9 for quotes that do not mention anyone in 1 through 8.
(Column 5) If you entered number 1 through 8 in Column 4, indicate the source’s overall evaluation of the person or organization in Column 4—in other words, determine whether the source was speaking positively or negatively about the person or organization in Column 4. The list of available codes for Column 5 is on the last page of this codebook.
3. SOURCE CODE LIST

1 US President Barack Obama
2 Other current US government official/employee or department
3 Former US government official/employee
4 UK Prime Minister David Cameron
5 Other current UK government official/employee or department
6 Former UK government official/employee
7 Current foreign gov’t official/employee or department (non-UK)
8 Former foreign gov’t official/employee (non-UK)
9 Terrorist organization or its representative (e.g., al-Qaeda)
10 Julian Assange
11 Other WikiLeaks staffer or volunteer, or official WikiLeaks statement, or attorney working for WikiLeaks
12 Glenn Greenwald
13 Laura Poitras
14 Other journalist, news outlet, or media commentator
15 Bradley/Chelsea Manning
16 Edward Snowden
17 Friend/family/partner/acquaintance of Manning, Assange, Snowden, Greenwald, or Poitras
18 Activist, activist organization or its representative
19 Completely anonymous source (no identifying information is given; very rare!)
20 “Expert” on law, diplomacy, extradition
21 Private citizen
22 Other
23 Daniel Ellsberg
24 Commercial company or its representative (e.g., Booz Allen Hamilton, Microsoft, Amazon, Twitter, Apple, Facebook, etc.)

5. SOURCE EVALUATION

According to the source’s quote or the story overall, how does the source feel about [SUBJECT IDENTIFIED IN 4]? You only need to indicate the source evaluation if you entered 1-8 in Column 4.

1 Supportive/positive
The source is speaking positively about the subject, or seems to generally support the subject and/or its activities. The source might say that the subject’s actions will have positive consequences.

2 Neutral
The source does not take a clear stance in support of or against the subject. The source might simply be stating a fact about the subject.

3 Unsupportive/negative
The source is speaking negatively about the subject, or seems to not support the subject and/or its activities. The source might say that the subject’s actions will have negative consequences.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Date published</th>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Headline</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Author background</th>
<th>Publication Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Feb. 3, 2010</td>
<td>Politics Daily (now part of Huffington Post)</td>
<td>WikiLeaks, whistleblowing, and the future of journalism</td>
<td>Delia Lloyd</td>
<td>American journalist, currently at digital magazine The Broad Side</td>
<td>Online outlet focusing on political news and commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>June 7, 2010</td>
<td>New Yorker</td>
<td>No secrets: Julian Assange's mission for total transparency</td>
<td>Raffi Khatchadourian</td>
<td>American journalist; currently a staff writer at the New Yorker</td>
<td>Weekly national magazine focusing on politics, commentary, and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>July 25, 2010</td>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>WikiLeaks may have just changed the media, too</td>
<td>Alexis C. Madrigal</td>
<td>American journalist; currently an editor at Fusion</td>
<td>Monthly national magazine focusing on news and political commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>July 26, 2010</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>Behind &quot;War Logs,&quot; a new kind of alliance</td>
<td>David Carr</td>
<td>American journalist; media columnist</td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in New York City</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>July 26, 2010</td>
<td>Slate</td>
<td>Not the Pentagon Papers</td>
<td>Fred Kaplan</td>
<td>Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist; weekly columnist for Slate; former Boston Globe correspondent</td>
<td>Online outlet focusing on political news and commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>July 27, 2010</td>
<td>Poynter Institute</td>
<td>How WikiLeaks is changing the news power structure</td>
<td>Steve Meyers</td>
<td>American journalist; former managing editor of Poynter; currently at The Lens, a nonprofit investigative journalism website for New Orleans</td>
<td>Poynter is a non-profit journalism school, which also publishes a blog about journalism-related issues</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>July 27, 2010</td>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>WikiLeaks, the MSM and national security</td>
<td>Howard Kurtz</td>
<td>American journalist and author; former Washington bureau chief for The Daily Beast, media writer for Washington Post, and host of CNN's &quot;Reliable Sources&quot;; currently hosts Fox News’ “Media Buzz” show</td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>July 29, 2010</td>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>WikiLeaks' defense of journalism</td>
<td>Anne Applebaum</td>
<td>American journalist; foreign affairs columnist</td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aug. 1, 2010</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>A regenade site, now working with the news media</td>
<td>Noam Cohen</td>
<td>American journalist</td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in New York City</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Aug. 4, 2010</td>
<td>Mashable</td>
<td>Why WikiLeaks and the mainstream media still need each other</td>
<td>Alex Hotz</td>
<td>American freelance multimedia journalist; currently teaches at Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism</td>
<td>Online outlet focused on news and commentary related to digital culture</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Aug. 8, 2010</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>WikiLeaks and a journalism &quot;shield law&quot;</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times Editorial Board</td>
<td>American journalists and editorial writers</td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in Los Angeles</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Aug. 21, 2010</td>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>WikiLeaks controversy highlights debate over shield law</td>
<td>Paul Farhi</td>
<td>American journalist; Washington Post staff writer</td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in Washington, DC</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Nov. 29, 2010</td>
<td>New Yorker</td>
<td>The right to secrecy</td>
<td>George Packer</td>
<td>American journalist, novelist; foreign policy writer</td>
<td>Weekly national magazine focusing on politics, commentary, and culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nov. 30, 2010</td>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Real danger of WikiLeaks dump: Curtailed rights</td>
<td>Timothy J. McNulty</td>
<td>American journalist at Chicago Tribune for 30+ years; instructor at Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern</td>
<td>National 24-hour cable news channel</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Nov. 30, 2010</td>
<td>Salon.com</td>
<td>WikiLeaks reveals more than just government secrets</td>
<td>Glenn Greenwald</td>
<td>American journalist, blogger, civil litigator</td>
<td>Online outlet focusing on political news and commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Dec. 2, 2010</td>
<td>Society of Professional Journalists</td>
<td>WikiLeaks: There is no consensus. But consider the ethics.</td>
<td>Hagit Limor</td>
<td>American journalist; former SPJ national president</td>
<td>Professional organization representing journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Dec. 4, 2010</td>
<td>OC Register</td>
<td>WikiLeaks no threat to free society</td>
<td>Steven Greenhut</td>
<td>American journalist and editor; founder of CalWatchDog investigative journalism website; currently a columnist for the San Diego Union-Tribune</td>
<td>Regional daily newspaper based in Santa Ana, CA</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Dec. 4, 2010</td>
<td>GigaOm</td>
<td>Like it or not, WikiLeaks is a</td>
<td>Mathew Ingram</td>
<td>Journalist in the US and Canada;</td>
<td>Online outlet focused on</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
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<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Organization/Source</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Dec. 6, 2010</td>
<td>Wired</td>
<td>Why WikiLeaks is good for America</td>
<td>Evan Hansen</td>
<td>American journalist; currently editor-in-chief at Wired</td>
<td>Monthly science and technology magazine</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Dec. 9, 2010</td>
<td>Denver Post</td>
<td>WikiLeaks prosecution would set bad precedent</td>
<td>Denver Post Editorial Board</td>
<td>American journalists and editorial writers</td>
<td>Daily regional newspaper published in Denver, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Dec. 9, 2010</td>
<td>Society of Professional Journalists</td>
<td>&quot;First they came…&quot;: A modern-day witch hunt</td>
<td>Hagit Limor</td>
<td>American journalist; former SPJ national president</td>
<td>Professional organization representing journalists</td>
</tr>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Dec. 10, 2010</td>
<td>GigaOm</td>
<td>Is WikiLeaks the beginning of a new form of media?</td>
<td>Mathew Ingram</td>
<td>Journalist in the US and Canada; currently a senior writer at Fortune magazine; worked for Globe and Mail and GigaOm</td>
<td>Online outlet focused on news and commentary related to emerging technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Dec. 12, 2010</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>WikiLeaks taps power of the press</td>
<td>David Carr</td>
<td>American journalist; columnist</td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in New York City</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Dec. 24, 2010</td>
<td>GigaOm</td>
<td>Is what WikiLeaks does journalism? Good question</td>
<td>Mathew Ingram</td>
<td>Journalist in the US and Canada; currently a senior writer at Fortune magazine; worked for Globe and Mail and GigaOm</td>
<td>Online outlet focused on news and commentary related to emerging technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Jan. 3, 2011</td>
<td>Bloomberg News</td>
<td>Why journalists must defend Assange</td>
<td>Ann Woolner</td>
<td>American journalist, Bloomberg columnist; currently a freelance writer</td>
<td>International news agency based in New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Jan. 4, 2011</td>
<td>Newsweek</td>
<td>Why journalists aren't defending Julian Assange</td>
<td>Ben Adler</td>
<td>American journalist; currently at Newsweek</td>
<td>Weekly national news magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Jan. 9, 2011</td>
<td>Denver Post</td>
<td>Drawing the line of publishing leaks—Wiki or other</td>
<td>Fred Brown</td>
<td>American journalist; retired bureau chief for The Denver Post</td>
<td>Daily regional newspaper published in Denver, CO</td>
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<td>#</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>Jan. 9, 2011</td>
<td>McClatchy</td>
<td>In WikiLeaks fight, U.S. journalists take a pass</td>
<td>Nancy A. Youssef</td>
<td>Senior national security correspondent for The Daily Beast</td>
<td>Publicly traded publishing company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Feb. 1, 2011</td>
<td>Vanity Fair</td>
<td>The man who spilled the secrets</td>
<td>Sarah Ellison</td>
<td>Former reporter for Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>Monthly national magazine focusing on popular culture and public affairs</td>
</tr>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Feb. 14, 2011</td>
<td>San Jose Mercury News</td>
<td>Media landscape grows more murky</td>
<td>Larry Magid</td>
<td>American journalist</td>
<td>Regional daily newspaper based in San Jose, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Apr. 28, 2011</td>
<td>Fox News</td>
<td>Whitewashing WikiLeaks</td>
<td>Michael Goodwin</td>
<td>Pulitzer Prize winner; New York Post columnist, Fox News contributor</td>
<td>National 24-hour cable news channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>June 10, 2011</td>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>How WikiLeaks has changed today's media</td>
<td>Kaj Larsen</td>
<td>American journalist; currently at Vice News</td>
<td>National 24-hour cable news channel</td>
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<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>Author</td>
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<td>Publication type</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Apr. 8, 2010</td>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>How Wikileaks shone light on world's darkest secrets</td>
<td>Archie Bland</td>
<td>British journalist; former deputy editor of <em>Independent</em>; currently at the <em>Guardian</em></td>
<td>Daily British national compact newspaper, based in London</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>June 27, 2010</td>
<td>The Sunday Herald</td>
<td>The battle could be an online Vietnam for America</td>
<td>Jasper Hamill</td>
<td>British journalist; formerly at <em>The Herald</em>, now technology reporter for <em>Daily Mirror</em></td>
<td>Compact Scottish Sunday newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>July 7, 2010</td>
<td>The Economist</td>
<td>Impartiality: The Foxification of news</td>
<td><em>Economist</em> (unnamed writer)</td>
<td><em>Economist</em> does not list author bylines in its print edition²⁷</td>
<td>London-based weekly news magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>July 14, 2010</td>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>Julian Assange: The whistleblower</td>
<td>Stephen Moss</td>
<td>British journalist and TV producer; currently feature writer for the <em>Guardian</em>, often about nature</td>
<td>British national broadsheet daily newspaper, based in London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>July 26, 2010</td>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>WikiLeaks: Hard facts in a grand tradition</td>
<td>Tim Bradshaw</td>
<td>British journalist who is currently a technology reporter for <em>Financial Times</em></td>
<td>International daily broadsheet newspaper, based in London</td>
</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>July 27, 2010</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>Welcome to a new age of whistle-blowing</td>
<td>Olivia Lang</td>
<td>British journalist; currently at BBC News</td>
<td>British national public service broadcaster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>July 27, 2010</td>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>If you publish sometimes you deserve to be damned</td>
<td>Hugo Rifkind</td>
<td>Scottish journalist; worked at <em>Times, Evening Standard, Glasgow Herald</em>; currently a columnist for <em>Times and Spectator</em></td>
<td>British national broadsheet daily newspaper, based in London</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>July 29, 2010</td>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>The publication of leaks identifying Afghans who have collaborated with US and ISAF forces is irresponsible, immature and dangerous</td>
<td><em>Times</em> Editorial Board</td>
<td>Staff of the <em>Times</em></td>
<td>British national broadsheet daily newspaper, based in London</td>
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<th>No.</th>
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<th>Political Affiliation</th>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>July 30, 2010</td>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>We should be thankful for WikiLeaks</td>
<td>Roy Greenslade</td>
<td>British journalist; former editor of <em>Daily Mirror</em>; teaches journalism at City University; writes media columns for <em>Guardian</em> and <em>Evening Standard</em></td>
<td>Centrist</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>July 30, 2010</td>
<td><em>Financial Times</em></td>
<td>Internet guerilla</td>
<td>Name not listed</td>
<td>Cable news network, based in US</td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Aug. 2, 2010</td>
<td><em>The Independent</em></td>
<td>What WikiLeaks is really telling us</td>
<td>Stephen Glover</td>
<td>British journalist; co-founder of <em>The Independent</em>; currently a columnist for <em>Daily Mail</em></td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Oct. 14, 2010</td>
<td><em>Financial Times</em></td>
<td>WikiLeaks: Lifting the fog of battle</td>
<td>Name not listed</td>
<td>Daily British national compact newspaper, based in London</td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Oct. 26, 2010</td>
<td><em>The Times</em></td>
<td>Remind me. It's the red one I mustn't press, right?</td>
<td>Hugo Rifkind</td>
<td>International daily broadsheet newspaper, based in London</td>
<td>Center-right, conservative</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Oct. 27, 2010</td>
<td><em>The Herald</em></td>
<td>The truth is that lies over Iraq made leaks inevitable</td>
<td>Ian Bell</td>
<td>Scottish journalist; 35-year career at <em>Glasgow Herald</em>, <em>Scotsman</em>, <em>Sunday Herald</em>, <em>Daily Record</em>, <em>Scotland on Sunday</em>; editor for <em>Observer's Scottish section</em></td>
<td>Centre-left</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Nov. 6, 2010</td>
<td><em>Spectator</em></td>
<td>Some dark corners must stay that way</td>
<td>Alan Gold</td>
<td>British journalist, columnist, and author; began at <em>Leicester Mercury</em>; moved to Australia, where he currently writes for the <em>Spectator</em></td>
<td>Center-right, conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nov. 29, 2010</td>
<td><em>The Independent</em></td>
<td>Wikileaks shows up our media for their docility at the feet of authority</td>
<td>John Kampfner</td>
<td>British journalist; former correspondent for <em>Daily Telegraph</em> and <em>Financial Times</em>; former editor of <em>New Statesman</em>; currently chief executive of Creative Industries Federation</td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Dec. 1, 2010</td>
<td><em>Evening Standard</em></td>
<td>WikiLeaks empowers us all, whatever the critics say</td>
<td>Roy Greenslade</td>
<td>British journalist; former editor of <em>Daily Mirror</em>; teaches journalism at City University; writes media columns for <em>Guardian</em> and <em>Evening Standard</em></td>
<td>Center-right</td>
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<td>Dec. 1, 2010</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>WikiLeaks: Journalistic law-breaking can be justified in the public interest</td>
<td>Roy Greenslade</td>
<td>British journalist; former editor of Daily Mirror; teaches journalism at</td>
<td>Center-left, liberal</td>
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<td>City University; writes media columns for Guardian and Evening Standard</td>
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<td>British national broadsheet daily newspaper, based in London</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 3, 2010</td>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>Right to publish the Wiki cables</td>
<td>Harold Evans</td>
<td>British journalist; former editor of the Sunday Times; currently editor-</td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
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<td>at-large of Reuters</td>
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<td>Dec. 4, 2010</td>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>That's quite enough of a man who messes with your head</td>
<td>Christina Patterson</td>
<td>British journalist; formerly at Independent; currently freelance</td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
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<td>Daily British national compact newspaper, based in London</td>
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<td>Dec. 5, 2010</td>
<td>The Sunday Herald</td>
<td>A case of homeland insecurity</td>
<td>Ian Bell</td>
<td>British journalist; 35-year career at Glasgow Herald, Scotsman, Sunday Herald, Daily Record, Scotland on Sunday; editor for Observer's Scottish section</td>
<td>Centre-left</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 10, 2010</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>WikiLeaks is delinquent and anti-democratic</td>
<td>Janet Daley</td>
<td>British-American journalist; worked at Independent; currently at Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>Center-right, conservative</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 11, 2010</td>
<td>Daily Mail</td>
<td>Why does the left treat one man as a pariah and the other as a hero?</td>
<td>Stephen Glover</td>
<td>British journalist; co-founder of The Independent; currently a columnist for Daily Mail</td>
<td>Center-right, conservative</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tweedie is a British journalist who is currently a feature writer for The Telegraph; Swaine is a British journalist who currently works as Washington correspondent for The Telegraph</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 11, 2010</td>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>The most dangerous man in the world</td>
<td>Neil Tweedie and Jon Swaine</td>
<td>British journalist; former correspondent for The Times; worked for Daily Telegraph; former associated editor of The Independent</td>
<td>Center-right, conservative</td>
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<td>Dec. 12, 2010</td>
<td>The Independent on Sunday</td>
<td>The year when the internet came to power</td>
<td>Paul Vallely</td>
<td>British journalist; former correspondent for The Times; worked for Daily Telegraph; former associated editor of The Independent</td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 13, 2010</td>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>Freedom shouldn't mean doing exactly what you want</td>
<td>Yasmin Alibhai-Brown</td>
<td>British journalist; currently a columnist for Evening Standard and Independent</td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
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<td>British national broadsheet daily</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 17, 2011</td>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>WikiLeaks turned the tables on governments, but the power relationship has not changed</td>
<td>John Kampfner</td>
<td>British journalist; former correspondent for Daily Telegraph and Financial Times; former editor of New Statesman; currently chief executive of Creative Industries Federation</td>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 21, 2011</td>
<td>Guardian</td>
<td>WikiLeaks data journalism: How we handled the data</td>
<td>Simon Rogers</td>
<td>British journalist; created and edited Guardian's Datablog; former news editor for Guardian; currently data editor at Twitter</td>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 26, 2011</td>
<td>Leicester Mercury</td>
<td>Leaking of secrets poses risk to peace</td>
<td>None listed</td>
<td>British journalist who writes for the Guardian and does broadcasting for BBC. He was an editor at the Times and London's Evening Standard.</td>
<td>Leicester</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 27, 2011</td>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>As secrecy and privacy become things of the past, media ethics are in a mess</td>
<td>Simon Jenkins</td>
<td>British journalist; co-founder of the Guardian; currently a columnist for Daily Mail</td>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 13, 2011</td>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>Assange may yet come to hurt The Guardian</td>
<td>Stephen Glover</td>
<td>British journalist; co-founder of The Independent; currently a columnist for Daily Mail</td>
<td>London</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 16, 2011</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>Is Wikileaks investigative journalism - or even journalism?</td>
<td>John Mair</td>
<td>Longtime BBC current affairs producer; co-creator of investigative journalism program “Watchdog”; worked for Channel Four and ITV; currently teaches journalism at Coventry University</td>
<td>London</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author/Editorial Board</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
<td>Political Affiliation</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>July 7, 2011</td>
<td><em>The Economist</em></td>
<td>Bulletins from the future</td>
<td><em>Economist</em> (unnamed writer)</td>
<td>London-based weekly news magazine</td>
<td>Centrist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>July 17, 2011</td>
<td><em>The Sunday Times</em></td>
<td>Don't let journalism be hacked to pieces</td>
<td>Matt Cooper; Irish journalist; former editor of <em>The Sunday Tribune</em>; former business editor of <em>Irish Independent</em>; currently hosts a news radio program</td>
<td>British national broadsheet Sunday newspaper, based in London</td>
<td>Center-right, conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>July 25, 2011</td>
<td><em>Guardian</em></td>
<td>High-wire journalism – with added future shocks</td>
<td><em>Guardian</em> Editorial Board; Staff of the <em>Guardian</em></td>
<td>British national daily broadsheet newspaper, based in London</td>
<td>Center-left, liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Sept. 5, 2011</td>
<td><em>Evening Standard</em></td>
<td>WikiLeaks is now the foe of free speech</td>
<td>Sam Leith; British journalist; currently literary editor for <em>The Spectator</em></td>
<td>Local free daily compact newspaper, based in London</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
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<td>#</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Publication</td>
<td>Headline</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Author background</td>
<td>Publication type</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>June 6, 2013</td>
<td><em>New York Times</em></td>
<td>Blogger, with focus on surveillance, is at center of debate (Original headline: Anti-surveillance activist is at center of new leak*)</td>
<td>Noam Cohen and Leslie Kaufman</td>
<td>Both American journalists for the <em>New York Times</em></td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>June 7, 2013</td>
<td><em>Wall Street Journal</em></td>
<td>Thank you for data-mining</td>
<td><em>Wall Street Journal</em> editorial board</td>
<td>Editorial board comprised of editors, columnists, and journalists</td>
<td>International daily newspaper with focus on business news, published in New York City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>June 12, 2013</td>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Leakers seek out advocacy journalists</td>
<td>Howard Kurtz</td>
<td>American journalist and author; former Washington bureau chief for <em>The Daily Beast</em>, media writer for <em>Washington Post</em>, and host of CNN's &quot;Reliable Sources&quot;; currently hosts Fox News' &quot;Media Buzz&quot; show</td>
<td>Website of national cable news network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>June 17, 2013</td>
<td><em>Buzz Machine</em></td>
<td>All journalism is advocacy (or it isn't)</td>
<td>Jeff Jarvis</td>
<td>Journalist; worked at several publications including <em>Chicago Tribune</em>, <em>TV Guide</em>; former editor of <em>New York Daily News</em>; currently journalism professor at CUNY's Graduate School of Journalism</td>
<td>Jarvis' own blog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>June 23, 2013</td>
<td><em>Washington Post</em></td>
<td>On NSA disclosures, has Glenn Greenwald become something other than a reporter?</td>
<td>Paul Farhi</td>
<td>Journalist and media reporter for the <em>Washington Post</em></td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>June 23, 2013</td>
<td><em>Washington Post</em></td>
<td>David Gregory whiffs on Greenwald question</td>
<td>Erik Wemple</td>
<td>Journalist, currently reports on media for the <em>Washington Post</em></td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in Washington, DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>June 24, 2013</td>
<td>GigaOm</td>
<td>Greenwald's Meet the Press incident shows why &quot;bloggers vs. journalists&quot; still matters</td>
<td>Mathew Ingram</td>
<td>Journalist in the US and Canada; currently a senior writer at <em>Fortune</em> magazine; worked for <em>Globe and Mail</em> and GigaOm</td>
<td>Online outlet focused on news and commentary related to emerging technology</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<td>Title</td>
<td>Author</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>June 26, 2013</td>
<td>Bill Moyers Journal</td>
<td>David Gregory, Glenn Greenwald and the First Amendment</td>
<td>John Light</td>
<td>Journalist, writer, and producer for Moyers; has written for Atlantic, Slate, Vox, Mother Jones, Al Jazeera, among others</td>
<td>Web publication affiliated American current affairs show on public broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>June 27, 2013</td>
<td>Rolling Stone</td>
<td>Hey, MSM: All journalism is advocacy journalism</td>
<td>Matt Taibbi</td>
<td>Journalist and writer, currently at Rolling Stone</td>
<td>Biweekly magazine focusing on popular culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>June 29, 2013</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Why Glenn Greenwald drives the media crazy</td>
<td>John McQuaid</td>
<td>Journalist; written for Wired, Washington Post, Mother Jones, Guardian, among others; former reporter for Times-Picayune of New Orleans</td>
<td>Biweekly business magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>June 30, 2013</td>
<td>Buzz Machine</td>
<td>There are no journalists</td>
<td>Jeff Jarvis</td>
<td>Journalist in the US and Canada; currently a senior writer at Fortune magazine; worked for Globe and Mail and GigaOm</td>
<td>Jarvis' own blog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>June 30, 2013</td>
<td>GigaOm</td>
<td>Thanks to the web, journalism is now something you do—not something you are</td>
<td>Mathew Ingram</td>
<td>Journalist in the US and Canada; currently a senior writer at Fortune magazine; worked for Globe and Mail and GigaOm</td>
<td>Online outlet focused on news and commentary related to emerging technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>July 2, 2013</td>
<td>Salon.com</td>
<td>Meet the &quot;journalists against journalism&quot; club!</td>
<td>David Sirota</td>
<td>Journalist, currently senior writer for International Business Times</td>
<td>Online outlet focusing on political news and commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>July 3, 2013</td>
<td>Poynter Institute</td>
<td>Snowden's leaks force media self-examination</td>
<td>Eric Deggans</td>
<td>Journalist, currently NPR TV critic; formerly at Tampa Bay Times; written for several other news outlets</td>
<td>Poynter is a non-profit journalism school, which also publishes a blog about journalism-related</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Issue</td>
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<td>July 16, 2013</td>
<td>Reuters blog</td>
<td>From Tom Paine to Glenn Greenwald, we need partisan journalism</td>
<td>Jack Shafer</td>
<td>Journalist and media writer for <em>Politico</em>; formerly of <em>Reuters</em> and <em>Slate</em>; former editor of <em>Washington City Paper</em> and <em>SF Weekly</em></td>
<td>International news agency and wire service</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 20, 2013</td>
<td><em>Wall Street Journal</em></td>
<td>Snowden's Miranda warning; transporting stolen intelligence secrets can lead to questioning</td>
<td><em>Wall Street Journal</em> editorial board</td>
<td>Editorial board comprised of editors, columnists, and journalists</td>
<td>International daily newspaper with focus on business news, published in New York City</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 25, 2013</td>
<td><em>New York Times</em></td>
<td>War on leaks is pitting journalist vs. journalist</td>
<td>David Carr</td>
<td>Media writer for the <em>New York Times</em></td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in New York City</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2, 2013</td>
<td><em>Wall Street Journal</em></td>
<td>What Miranda was carrying; the British say the stolen files could put agents at risk</td>
<td><em>Wall Street Journal</em> editorial board</td>
<td>Editorial board comprised of editors, columnists, and journalists</td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in New York City</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 27, 2013</td>
<td><em>New York Times</em></td>
<td>Is Glenn Greenwald the future of news?</td>
<td>Bill Keller and Glenn Greenwald</td>
<td>Keller is the former editor of the <em>New York Times</em>; Greenwald is a journalist and blogger currently writing for <em>The Intercept</em> news site</td>
<td>National daily newspaper based in New York City</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 6, 2013</td>
<td><em>New Republic</em></td>
<td>Glenn Greenwald and Bill Keller are wrong about objectivity in journalism</td>
<td>John B. Judis</td>
<td>Journalist and senior writer at <em>The National Review</em>; former senior editor at <em>The New Republic</em> and contributing editor at <em>The American Prospect</em></td>
<td>Monthly liberal political news magazine</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 3, 2013</td>
<td><em>Pando Daily</em></td>
<td>The journalist who hacked the old system</td>
<td>David Sirota</td>
<td>Journalist, currently senior writer for <em>International Business Times</em></td>
<td>Web publication focusing on Silicon Valley news and analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 4, 2013</td>
<td><em>Rolling Stone</em></td>
<td>Snowden and Greenwald: The men who leaked the secrets</td>
<td>Janet Reitman</td>
<td>Journalist and contributing editor at <em>Rolling Stone</em></td>
<td>Biweekly magazine magazine focusing on popular culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan./Feb. 2014</td>
<td><em>Columbia Journalism Review</em></td>
<td>The right debate: Access vs. accountability is what matters</td>
<td>CJR editors</td>
<td>Editors at the <em>Columbia Journalism Review</em></td>
<td>Magazine aimed at journalists, covering news industry trends and analysis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 5, 2014</td>
<td><em>USA Today</em></td>
<td>Foolish attempt to criminalize journalism</td>
<td>Rem Rieder</td>
<td>Journalist and media editor at <em>USA Today</em>; formerly at <em>American Journalism Review</em>, <em>Washington Post</em>, <em>Miami Herald</em>, and <em>Philadelphia Inquirer</em></td>
<td>National daily newspaper</td>
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<td>Issue</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
<td>Article Title</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Institution/Role</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Feb. 6, 2014</td>
<td><em>Atlantic</em></td>
<td>Like it or not, Glenn Greenwald is now the face of the First Amendment</td>
<td>Conor Friedersdorf</td>
<td>Journalist and staff writer at <em>Atlantic</em></td>
<td>Monthly national magazine focusing on news and political commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Feb. 10, 2014</td>
<td><em>New Yorker</em></td>
<td>The new public-interest journalism</td>
<td>John Cassidy</td>
<td>Weekly national magazine focusing on politics, commentary, and culture</td>
<td>Weekly national magazine focusing on politics, commentary, and culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Feb. 18, 2014</td>
<td><em>The Nation</em></td>
<td>Edward Snowden is not a &quot;traitor&quot; and Glenn Greenwald is not an &quot;accomplice&quot;</td>
<td>Robert Sheer</td>
<td>Journalist, currently writing syndicated column for Truthdig news site; former longtime reporter for the <em>Los Angeles Times</em></td>
<td>Progressive weekly political news magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>May 13, 2014</td>
<td><em>Slate</em></td>
<td>Why are you so fearful, o ye of little faith? In his new book, Glenn Greenwald takes on the doubters</td>
<td>Emily Bazelon</td>
<td>Journalist and staff writer for <em>New York Times Magazine</em></td>
<td>Online outlet focusing on political news and commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>May 14, 2014</td>
<td><em>Atlantic</em></td>
<td>No Place to Hide: A conservative critique of a radical NSA</td>
<td>Conor Friedersdorf</td>
<td>Journalist and staff writer at <em>Atlantic</em></td>
<td>Monthly magazine focusing on current affairs, news, and politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>May 22, 2014</td>
<td><em>Prospect Magazine</em></td>
<td>The errors of Edward Snowden and Glenn Greenwald</td>
<td>George Packer</td>
<td>American journalist, longtime US foreign policy staff writer for the <em>New Yorker</em>; former staff writer for <em>Mother Jones</em></td>
<td>Monthly British current affairs magazine based in London</td>
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<td>#</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<td>Author</td>
<td>Author background</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>June 11, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Telegraph</em></td>
<td>The problem with Glenn Greenwald and the creepy cult that surrounds him</td>
<td>Willard Foxton</td>
<td>British investigative journalist, freelancer, and television producer</td>
<td>Daily national broadsheet newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>June 13, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>Most of us are coherent in our partnership. Not Peter King</td>
<td>Oliver Burkeman</td>
<td>British journalist for <em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>Daily national broadsheet newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>June 16, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Sunday Times</em></td>
<td>Eyes wide shut, the Prism buster has missed the real danger</td>
<td>Andrew Sullivan</td>
<td>Former editor of <em>The New Republic</em>; previously wrote for <em>Time, Atlantic, Daily Beast,</em> currently a columnist for <em>Sunday Times</em></td>
<td>National broadsheet Sunday newspaper</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>June 24, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Dish</em></td>
<td>David Gregory is what's wrong with Washington</td>
<td>Andrew Sullivan</td>
<td>Former editor of <em>The New Republic</em>; previously wrote for <em>Time, Atlantic, Daily Beast,</em> currently a columnist for <em>Sunday Times</em></td>
<td>News blog</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>August 11, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Observer</em></td>
<td>Judge journalists by what they do, not what they are</td>
<td>Peter Preston</td>
<td>British journalist and columnist</td>
<td>National broadsheet Sunday newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>August 19, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>David Miranda, schedule 7 and the danger that all reporters now face</td>
<td>Alan Rusbridger</td>
<td>British journalist and former editor-in-chief of <em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>Daily national broadsheet newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>August 19, 2013</td>
<td><em>Metro</em></td>
<td>Glenn Greenwald is only human—the UK government is not</td>
<td>Matthew Champion</td>
<td>British journalist, currently news editor at i100.co.uk and <em>The Independent,</em> former news channel manager at the <em>Metro</em> newspaper</td>
<td>Free national tabloid format newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>August 20, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Daily Mirror</em></td>
<td>Freedom at stake</td>
<td><em>Daily Mirror</em> editorial board</td>
<td>British editors and journalists</td>
<td>National tabloid</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Article</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Editor/Contributor</td>
<td>Political Affiliation</td>
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<td>August 21, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Daily Mail</em></td>
<td>That airport arrest troubles me. But the Guardian's in murky waters where those who love their country should not venture</td>
<td>Stephen Glover</td>
<td>British journalist; co-founder of <em>The Independent</em>; currently a columnist for <em>Daily Mail</em></td>
<td>Center-right, conservative</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 22, 2013</td>
<td><em>Financial Times</em></td>
<td>Do not blindly trust official guardians of our security</td>
<td>John Gapper</td>
<td>British journalist, associate editor and chief business commentator for <em>Financial Times</em>. He previously worked for <em>Daily Mirror, Daily Mail, and Daily Telegraph.</em></td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>August 22, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Evening Standard</em></td>
<td>Use the law against real terrorists not journalists</td>
<td>Martin Bentham</td>
<td>Home Affairs Editor at the London Evening Standard</td>
<td>Center-right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 22, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Express</em></td>
<td>What about some respect for UK's national security?</td>
<td>Leo McKinstry</td>
<td>British journalist who has worked for <em>Daily Mail, Daily Express, and Sunday Telegraph.</em></td>
<td>Conservative party; supported UKIP in 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 24, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>This way the debate goes on: Surveillance and the st</td>
<td>Guardian editorial board</td>
<td>British editors and journalists</td>
<td>Center-left, liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 24, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Spectator</em></td>
<td>The Guardian didn't care when Murdoch's journalists were arrested. So why the hysteria now?</td>
<td>Spectator editorial board</td>
<td>British editors and journalists</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 29, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>Does David Miranda count as a journalist? That's not the point</td>
<td>George Brock</td>
<td>British journalist formerly at <em>The Times</em>, board member of the International Press Institute; currently professor and head of journalism at City University London.</td>
<td>Center-left, liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 9, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Daily Mail</em></td>
<td>Stupendous arrogance</td>
<td>Stephen Glover</td>
<td>British journalist; co-founder of <em>The Independent</em>; currently a columnist for <em>Daily Mail</em></td>
<td>Center-right, conservative</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Source</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>October 10, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Times</em></td>
<td>Beware: A dangerous new generation of leakers</td>
<td>David Aaronovitch British journalist and</td>
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<td>columnist for <em>The Times</em>.</td>
<td>newspaper</td>
<td>Center-right, conservative</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>October 13, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Independent</em></td>
<td>Edward Snowden's secrets may be dangerous. I would not have published them.</td>
<td>Chris Blackhurst British journalist and</td>
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<td>group content director of <em>The Independent</em> and <em>Evening Standard</em> Live. He was the</td>
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<td>editor of <em>The Independent</em> from 2011-2013.</td>
<td>newspaper</td>
<td>Centrist, economically liberal</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>October 28, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Dish</em></td>
<td>Keller vs Greenwald: Why not both?</td>
<td>Andrew Sullivan Former editor of *The New</td>
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<td>Republic*; previously wrote for <em>Time</em>, <em>Atlantic</em>, <em>Daily Beast</em>; currently a</td>
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<td>columnist for <em>Sunday Times</em></td>
<td>column for <em>The Independent</em> and <em>Evening Standard</em>.</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>October 29, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>Greenwald vs Keller—adversarial journalism vs mainstream journalism</td>
<td>Roy Greenslade British journalist; former</td>
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<td>editor of the <em>Daily Mirror</em>; teaches</td>
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<td>journalism at City University; writes</td>
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<td>media columns for the <em>Guardian</em> and <em>Evening Standard</em></td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>December 16, 2013</td>
<td><em>The Guardian</em></td>
<td>A year of fireworks for the NSA and BBC: Austerity and the digital era have</td>
<td>Emily Bell British journalist who has</td>
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<td>forced big changes on to the media, with new partnerships and bold decisions</td>
<td>previously been the director of</td>
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<td>the keys to delivering quality journalism in the new world</td>
<td>digital content for Britain's Guardian</td>
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<td>News and Media and the editor-in-chief of</td>
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<td>Guardian Unlimited. She is currently a</td>
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<td>professor at the Tow Center for Digital</td>
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<td>for <em>The Economist</em>; formerly a</td>
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<td>correspondent for <em>The Independent</em> and</td>
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<td>the BBC. Occasional writer for <em>The Daily Mail</em>.</td>
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<td>February 14, 2014</td>
<td>Financial Times</td>
<td>Lunch with the FT: Glenn Greenwald</td>
<td>Geoff Dyer</td>
<td>British journalist who covers US foreign policy for the Financial Times, and is the former Brazil bureau chief</td>
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<td>February 20, 2014</td>
<td>The Daily Mail</td>
<td>The arrogant left may gnash their teeth but our judges are right about this reckless threat to our security</td>
<td>Stephen Glover</td>
<td>British journalist; co-founder of The Independent; currently a columnist for Daily Mail</td>
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<td>February 28, 2014</td>
<td>The Telegraph</td>
<td>The latest Snowden leaks perfectly illustrate the risks of reading too much into leaked documents</td>
<td>Willard Foxton</td>
<td>British investigative journalist, freelancer, and television producer</td>
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<td>May 17, 2014</td>
<td>The Economist</td>
<td>The Snowden leaks: Glenn Greenwald peers back the curtain</td>
<td>The Economist (anonymous author)</td>
<td>Economist does not list author bylines in its print edition</td>
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<td>May 18, 2014</td>
<td>The Observer</td>
<td>Ever feel like you're being watched? You're not alone. An account of the Snowden case reveals the threat of surveillance</td>
<td>Henry Porter</td>
<td>British journalist and former Guardian columnist</td>
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<td>May 24, 2014</td>
<td>The Times</td>
<td>Lobbing a leaky bucket of bile; This case for Edward Snowden is naïve, cartoonish and flimsy</td>
<td>Edward Lucas</td>
<td>British journalist who works for The Economist; formerly a correspondent for The Independent and the BBC. Occasional writer for The Daily Mail.</td>
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</table>

**Editors' Notes:**

- **Centrist, economically liberal**: Politically centrist or liberal economically.
- **Center-right, conservative**: Politically center-right or conservative.
- **Middle-market tabloid newspaper**: A newspaper that targets a middle-market demographic.
- **Weekly magazine**: A publication that is released weekly.
- **Daily national broadsheet newspaper**: A newspaper that is published daily and has a national circulation.
Manning Coverage: Examples of Assange- and WikiLeaks-related headlines coded as very negative, somewhat negative, balanced/neutral, somewhat positive, and very positive

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very negative</th>
<th>Somewhat negative</th>
<th>Balanced/neutral</th>
<th>Somewhat positive</th>
<th>Very positive</th>
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<tr>
<td>“Wikileaks logs are meat and drink to jihadists; The leaking of this material tells us little that is new, but comes fraught with dangers” (<em>Times</em>)</td>
<td>“Can the U.S. Bring Assange to Justice?” (<em>Wall Street Journal</em>)</td>
<td>“Assange's supporters pledge £1m for bail” (<em>Times</em>)</td>
<td>“Letter: WikiLeaks reveals the stark reality of Iraq” (<em>Guardian</em>)</td>
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<td>“WikiLeaks: The publication of leaks identifying Afghans who have collaborated with US and ISAF forces is irresponsible, immature and dangerous” (<em>Times</em>)</td>
<td>“WikiLeaks: Too much information?” (<em>Guardian</em>)</td>
<td>“World News: U.S. Asks WikiLeaks To Return War Logs” (<em>Wall Street Journal</em>)</td>
<td>“The job of the media is not to protect the powerful from embarrassment: It is for governments—not journalists—to guard public secrets, and there is no national jeopardy in WikiLeaks' revelations” (<em>Guardian</em>)</td>
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</table>
Vita

Courtney N. Johnson received her MA in Journalism & Mass Communication and her BA in Journalism and English-Creative Writing from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.