Ukraine’s Two Maidans: How Competition Between the Grassroots and the Political Opposition During the Euromaidan Revolution Paved the Way for a New Civic Culture

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Abstract

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This project examines the growth of urban civic activity in Kyiv, Ukraine since the 2013-2014 Euromaidan revolution and analyzes changing dynamics of the country’s civic culture. It argues that the Euromaidan uprising was driven by two competing “Maidans” — the opposition political party leaders and the grassroots, or public. Those two blocs competed for influence over the events and cooperated only when it was necessary to advance shared goals, leading to distrust following the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych. Investigating the processes that shaped Euromaidan and situating the events in the broader context of popular uprisings and social protest in independent Ukraine reveals a diminished role for political parties in shaping the public sphere as urban activists embark on small-scale initiatives outside traditional institutions following Euromaidan. This paper explores how the public’s larger role in the second revolution and the marginalization of the political opposition paved the way for more sustained grassroots activity in the uprising’s aftermath. Through interviews with urban civic activists in Kyiv, the paper examines how distrust of political parties and the symbolism of Euromaidan as a leaderless independence movement fueled greater grassroots activity in the months that followed it than in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, which relied on the efforts of political elites.
Introduction

On October 29, 2014 arsonists set fire to the oldest cinema in Kyiv. Located in the city’s historic Podil neighborhood, Zhovten Cinema was a fixture of the local cultural scene with a reputation for screening films outside the mainstream. It was known for hosting independent festivals and for being among the few cinemas in the country to show foreign films in their original languages. At the time of the fire, the main cinema hall was screening an LGBT-themed film, which the accused arsonists later claimed was their motivation for setting the building ablaze. In the days that followed, a group of local activists gathered to form the Save Zhovten initiative, which successfully lobbied the local government to support efforts to rebuild the cinema rather than sell the property to crony investors. The group’s success marked a high-profile victory for civic activists in the months after the mass street protests of the Euromaidan uprising forced the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych.

In the three years since Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Euromaidan protest movement, networks of volunteer organizations and civic groups have appeared throughout Ukraine. Many of these projects have concentrated on relief efforts to assist those affected by violence in the east. Other projects focus on national political issues, such as corruption among lawmakers. But a third group that has received less attention focuses on local projects and local governance. Urban activists have formed in Ukraine’s major cities to address issues such as building codes, smart city planning, and historic preservation. These small-scale projects grew out of increased civic activism and engagement stirred up by grassroots activity during the 2013-2014 Euromaidan uprising. Despite widespread media attention during the events, the causes and dynamics of that uprising remain somewhat misunderstood abroad.
According to the popular narrative in Western media, Euromaidan was largely led by members of the political opposition as an attempt to force the state to foster closer ties with the European Union. A closer examination of the revolt reveals that Euromaidan was never monolithic. In fact, there were two Maidans working in parallel: The political opposition and the grassroots, or public. Both competed for power and influence and cooperated only when necessary. When the street protests ended, the public’s activity continued, as some activists headed to the front lines as soldiers and others returned to their neighborhoods to embark on new projects to remake their cities. Euromaidan was not the country’s first mass uprising, but was is the first to bring about sustained civic participation in its aftermath. That civic participation is working largely outside the auspices of establishment politics, a phenomenon that is changing the relationship between citizens and their cities and neighborhoods in today’s Ukraine.

When discussing dissident activity under communist rule in his 1978 essay, “The Power of the Powerless,” playwright and future Czech President Vaclav Havel described a universal longing for “humanity’s rightful dignity,” which he saw expressed through citizen initiatives. That longing is reflected in Ukrainians’ preferred name for the events that unfolded throughout the winter of 2013-2014—the Revolution of Dignity (Революція Гідності). More than two years after the Euromaidan uprising, activists in Kyiv spoke of the revolution not in terms of the movement’s political goals but spoke of it as a symbol and affirmation of independence and resistance against the paternalism and clientelism that have characterized Ukrainian society since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Havel wrote about the “small-scale work” that helped forge national identity while Czechoslovakia was still under Austro-Hungarian rule and the “independent culture” and

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“independent life of society” that allowed people to maintain their dignity during the repressive communist period by working on small-scale initiatives outside the established power structure. Similarly, historians have written about “small deeds” during the late Russian Empire, referring to local projects to raise living standards and promote cultural development carried out by the zemstvos, or semi-autonomous councils that were able to function partially independent of the imperial government.

The small-scale civic projects in Ukraine serve a similar purpose—to provide an outlet for citizens to make an impact on a local level outside a political system that has shown itself to be ineffective and unresponsive. Like the Zhovten Cinema example, small deeds characterize many of the urban initiatives taking root in today’s Ukraine, where activists have found ways to bypass party politics and unresponsive institutions to achieve limited goals on a local level and to build new networks of engaged citizens. However, this phenomenon poses challenges to lasting progress as a new generation enters the public sphere, wary of established political groups and distrusting of the country’s traditional institutions after 25 years of failed reform.

Civic activity and Euromaidan: A new perspective

Analyses of the events in Ukraine have tended to emphasize geopolitical dimensions of the 2013-2014 uprising and the ensuing armed conflict in the Donbas region. Recent works, such as Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia by Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton, position these events in Ukraine as symptoms of a

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2 Havel, pp. 66 and 82
broader “regional power dynamic,” portraying them as the outcome of a geopolitical tug-of-war between Russia and the West. Rajan Menon and Eugene B. Rumer’s *Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War International Order* acknowledges the failure of political factions in Ukraine to conduct nation-building and to solve “contradictions” in the country but also largely focuses on international dimensions and “big power” geopolitics when framing the events that began in 2013 and continue to the present. Similar narratives can be found throughout news media as the armed conflict in the Donbas continues to simmer away.

Such analyses are useful for understanding regional political considerations and help explain international reactions, but they do not provide adequate insight into the domestic political forces and grassroots dynamics that underpinned Euromaidan and its aftermath. While geopolitical forces were no doubt important to shaping the events that unfolded, the revolution itself when viewed from the streets of Kyiv was understood by its participants to be as much a domestic political event aimed at removing the country’s corrupt and increasingly violent regime as it was a power struggle between the Kremlin and the Europe Union or the United States.

This project seeks to challenge some of the prevailing assumptions about the Euromaidan uprising and to focus on the grassroots and opposition politics that drove the movement. By allowing activists to speak in their own words and by examining the civic projects that have developed in the wake of Euromaidan, this project hopes to shine a light on developments in Ukraine’s civic culture over the past three years and to reveal how the uprising serves as a guide and a mobilizing force for grassroots activism. It also seeks to reveal why Euromaidan was fundamentally different from the mass protest movement that took place a decade earlier.

In 2004, the Orange Revolution raised hopes that Ukrainian civil society’s victory at

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thrusting a new generation of political leadership to power would usher in a new era of reform, reduce corruption, and curb the influence of anti-democratic elites. Despite high expectations, reform efforts faltered and jubilation gave way to disillusionment as the newly elected leaders turned on each other and failed to deliver on their promises. Viktor Yanukovych, denied the presidency when that uprising overturned the results of a fraud-ridden vote, returned in 2010 and won the presidential election, ushering in an era of unprecedented corruption and creeping authoritarianism. The promise of the Orange Revolution seemed to have ended in a humiliating retreat.

But in 2013, mass protests returned to Ukraine’s streets, eventually ousting Yanukovych. What seemed initially to be a repeat of 2004 turned out to be something entirely different. While the grassroots groups that populated Kyiv’s streets in 2004 largely evaporated in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution’s success, regular Ukrainians have turned their efforts to a number of civic causes since the Euromaidan Revolution. This paper seeks to explain why civic activism has been more visible in aftermath of Euromaidan than it was following the Orange Revolution by examining the political and symbolic dimensions of those movements and placing them in context of Ukraine’s post-communist domestic politics.

A comparative examination of the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan reveals starkly different power dynamics between the political opposition and the public during those movements. These dynamics offer clues to why the two revolutions had distinct effects on civic participation. While observers hailed the Orange Revolution as a triumph of civil society, reviewing the history of the actors who shaped that movement and the events that led to it reveals that it was at heart a victory of an opposition political elite over the establishment political elite. Euromaidan, by contrast, was less centralized and the opposition political parties
found themselves competing for power and influence with grassroots elements as the protests played out during the winter.

This project will draw on the author’s observations and reporting from the Euromaidan protest movement and its aftermath and build on existing research of the events to reveal how the grassroots dynamics of the upheaval led to continued activism in Ukraine’s capital, Kyiv, in the movement’s aftermath. After establishing the mechanisms that drove both the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, this paper seeks to demonstrate through interviews with activists involved in urban initiatives and civic activism how the grassroots dynamic of Euromaidan and that movement’s rejection of political elites set the stage for a more active urban civic culture in Ukraine. It will suggest that those factors reveal that Ukraine’s transition from Soviet and post-Soviet patrimonialism and clientelism is ongoing and that the events of 2013-2014 have brought to focus the issue of civic identity in contemporary Ukraine. This project will limit itself to urban grassroots activism in Kyiv due to its position as the country’s largest and most diverse city and because it was the epicenter of the Euromaidan uprising. A more thorough examination would incorporate projects from other major cities, but doing so is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, these interviews and this analysis is meant to be a window into the development of contemporary civic activism and to provide a basis for further research into the subject.
Chapter I, Part I

Competing for Influence: The Dynamics of Ukraine’s 2013-2014 Revolution

Thousands attend a viche in Kyiv on December 8, 2013 (Chris Collison)

European Aspirations

On a cold and wet day in November 2013, a group of about 2,000 people gathered on Kyiv’s main square, Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square). They were there to protest signals from the government of President Viktor Yanukovych that he would abandon a long-

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5 The word “maidan” translates literally as “square.” It is a loanword from Arabic or Persian. There is some debate over whether to use a definite article when referring to the local nickname for Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square), as in “the Maidan.” This paper will use Maidan without an article to refer to Kyiv’s main square due to local tendency to refer to it without an article in English speech and because it is part of a proper noun. Other authors may prefer to use an article.
sought economic and political agreement with the European Union, which he had repeatedly
promised to conclude prior to that autumn.6 According to popular narratives, these people—
mostly activists, journalists, and students—headed to Maidan in response to a Facebook post by
Mustafa Nayyem, an activist-journalist who had urged those upset by the government’s decision
to organize, rather than simply “like” his post.7 Other prominent figures, including Arseniy
Yatsenyuk, who led the largest opposition party, also called for protests on November 21, but it
is Nayyem who is remembered in most popular accounts.8 The date was also the anniversary of
the runoff election that sparked the Orange Revolution nine years earlier.

The gathering would be repeated on the following day, the 22nd, which marked the
anniversary of the beginning of the Orange Revolution. Whether those who joined during the
initial two days were there because of Nayyem’s call to action, pleas by opposition politicians, or
to mark the anniversary of the protest movement nine years earlier remains a source of debate
among some factions of Ukrainians. Those who support Nayyem, who now holds a seat in
parliament, tend to adhere to the popular story, while his critics are more likely to believe the
anniversary narrative. Few will admit that they followed the lead of the political opposition
parties. While on the surface the debate may seem like nitpicking between activists and politicos,
it serves to illustrate a dynamic that would characterize Euromaidan and Ukrainian society in the

6 “Yanukovych: Ukraine hopes Vilnius summit will produce practical results in signing of EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement.” Interfax-Ukraine. 6 June 2013. Available: https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-
politics/yanukovych-ukraine-hopes-vilnius-summit-will-produce-practical-results-in-signing-of-eu-ukraine-
association-agreement-325249.html
7 See Mustafa Nayyem’s original Facebook post:
https://www.facebook.com/Mustafanayyem/posts/10201177280260151
8 See Twitter account of Arseniy Yatsenyuk: https://twitter.com/Yatsenyuk_AP/status/403453433648148481
See also: Call to action by opposition leader Yuriy Andreev: http://blogs.korrespondent.net/blog/pro_users/3289622-
vuhav-zbir-sohodni-na-maidani-nezalezhnosti-o-2230-video
9 See Olga Onuch’s discussion of the role of Nayyem and other journalists in organizing journalist-activist networks
2015.
years to follow—namely, the distrust between grassroots activists and the political establishment. That dynamic was clear from the earliest stages of Euromaidan. Protesters agreed not to bring any signs bearing political party logos or slogans, worrying that the movement would be taken over by the parties and their interests. From the beginning, Euromaidan had a complicated relationship with the opposition political parties. The grassroots wing of the protest movement and the political parties occupied two separate spaces during much of the early phases of the demonstrations—grassroots protesters stayed largely on the main square, the “Maidan,” while the political parties centered around European Square, located a block northeast on Khreshchatyk Street. This physical and psychological distance became especially evident on November 24, when the opposition parties—Batkivschyna (led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk), UDAR (led by Vitaliy Kitschko), and Svoboda (led by Oleh Tyahnybok)—called for a weekend protest. According to the opposition politicians, the event was meant to send a signal to Yanukovych ahead of his trip to Vilnius, where he was expected to formally suspend work on the European Union Association Agreement at a summit of the Eastern Partnership. That day established two distinct Maidans by giving them two physical homes: the central square, which was largely controlled by non-partisan activists, and European Square, where political parties used a stage erected outside the Ukrainian House convention center.

Students held a demonstration on November 26, marching from Taras Shevchenko

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See also: http://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-protests-generational-divide/25182439.html


National University to Maidan. Organizers again told students not to carry political party signs
and instead bring Ukrainian or European Union flags, highlighting the group’s preference to
identify as an element of the broader grassroots wing of the movement and not with the political
opposition. As with the Orange Revolution, students were an integral part of mobilization
efforts, especially in the earliest phases, and the average protester on Maidan was about ten years
younger than the country’s national average.

**Phase Two: Mass mobilization**

By the end of November, the protest had failed to bring in the huge numbers of
participants that had made the Orange Revolution a success, and the movement relied mainly on
local students, activists, and supporters of the opposition political parties. The largest gathering,
on November 24, brought an estimated 100,000 people to central Kyiv— sizable but far fewer
than the larger demonstrations in 2004. When Yanukovych suspended EU Association
agreement talks during the Vilnius summit, it looked like the protest movement was destined to
fizzle out.

That all changed during the pre-dawn hours of November 30, when Ukraine’s elite riot
police, the Berkut, raided the protest camp on Maidan, brutally cracking down on the several
hundred activists who had camped out for the night. The troopers ruthlessly beat activists, mostly

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14 Authors notes from interviews with protesters on 26 January 2013.
15 See Anna Chebotariova’s demographic data: Chebotariova, Anna. “Voices of Resistance and Hope: On the
Motivations and Expectations of Euromaidaners.” In Marples, David R., and Mills, Frederick V. (eds). *Ukraine’s
2015.
young students, sending several to the hospital. Ukrainians awoke a few hours later to images of bloodied students and journalists—scenes that went viral online and sparked outrage across the country.

A day later, on December 1, huge crowds flooded Kyiv, demanding justice for the violent beatings they had seen online and in opposition publications. It was at this point that the movement transformed from a relatively limited protest against government policy into a mass mobilization effort. The government’s violent crackdown mobilized a diverse group of people, many of whom had no opinion about the association agreement, to express their anger at the violence perpetrated by security forces.

In “The Power of the Powerless,” Havel discusses how the trial of “The Plastic People of the Universe” band in 1976 helped spur the Charter 77 human rights initiative in Czechoslovakia, bringing together a diverse group of people who did not necessarily hold the same political views but who felt solidarity with the band members for their treatment by the state. In a similar way, the brutal crackdown on students and activists on November 30, 2013 could be seen as the catalyzing event that transformed Euromaidan into a mass protest movement and subordinated the European question to more fundamental issues.

Ukrainian researchers found that after December 1, about 70 percent of protesters cited the state-sponsored violence on November 30 as their primary motivation for joining the movement, while about half cited the president’s position on the association agreement among their reasons for attendance. The protest was no longer simply a collection of pro-EU activists

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18 For example, see RFE/RL video of the crackdown: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UkBmZtaA4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UkBmZtaA4)

19 See Havel, pp 47

but was a coalition of concerned citizens.

The mass protest phase of Euromaidan saw much higher levels of participation and larger crowds on Maidan that were sustained throughout December. An estimated 350,000 people attended on December 1, and weekly Sunday meetings, which came to be known as “viches” (the word used to describe people’s councils held during the times of Kyivan Rus’), brought similarly large numbers throughout the month. On December 8, known as the “march of millions,” an estimated 800,000 people attended a viche in the capital, while protests spread to cities across the country. At this point, the stage was relocated to Independence Square, where speakers from various activist groups, politicians, musicians, and regular citizens were allowed to speak throughout the protest movement. It proved an especially important element of the weekly viches.

By the mass protest phase of Euromaidan, the demonstration had become more linguistically, ethnically, and geographically diverse. Media reports often painted the movement as primarily composed of Western Ukrainians, who are geographically closer to Europe and tended to support the Orange coalition in elections more than their Eastern counterparts. Western Ukrainians and those from the central regions made up the bulk of protesters, but survey data found that protesters from eastern and southern Ukraine made up a significant number of demonstrators as well—about 20 percent. Those who primarily spoke Ukrainian at home made up just over the national average of 51 percent, while Russian and bilingual speakers made up

*ucasnikiv-protestiv-v-infografitsi
Also See Chebotariova’s article with Maidan activists.
21 “Viche.” Internet Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Available:  
http://www.encyclopediаofukraine.com/display.asp?linkpath=pages%5CV%5CI%5CVicheIT.htm  
about 40 percent. These numbers are worth noting, considering popular narratives that the protest was dominated by Ukrainian speakers from the far west. Protesters were also more likely to be from cities, highlighting the urban nature of the movement, which saw Kyiv as an important symbol of the country's future. Protesters from rural areas were only about 18 percent of the movement, even though rural dwellers made up about 31 percent of the population more broadly. Most importantly, demographic surveys reveal the non-partisan nature of the movement. One survey found that 13 percent supported a political party, while another survey found that only 3.9 percent considered themselves political activists. The strikingly small number of people who identified with a political movement show that the grassroots Maidan significantly outnumbered the political Maidan in real numbers even as the two sides jockeyed for influence.

Throughout December and into January, acts of violence and harassment against protesters and activists, including the disappearance of several prominent journalists, increased dramatically, drawing condemnation from leaders in the European Union. Hired thugs, known as titushky, were sent to the streets to provoke fights and to provide fodder for pro-Yanukovych media to paint the protest movement as a fascist uprising. Although these instances of violence and harassment appeared to be an attempt to intimidate and discourage people from protesting, large numbers of people continued to occupy Kyiv’s central square. It was during December that activists built barricades using bags filled with snow, benches, car tires and pieces of metal from the New Year’s tree to seal the encampment. Volunteers manned the barricades to spot

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24 Chebotariova, pp. 166.
provocateurs and to coordinate supplies. The protest camp took on a carnival atmosphere, with artwork decorating the square and Ukrainian music blaring from the speakers throughout the day. Volunteers held seminars and classes on various topics, including mobilization and journalism. The Trade Unions building became the unofficial press center, and classes and public events were also held there. Viches and protests continued into the new year, with activists preventing the government from finishing the steel-framed New Year tree, which had become a symbol of resistance after the government insisted that the reason it had cracked down on protesters on November 30 was to continue construction of the tree and to make way for the yearly holiday market.27

The third phase of the protest began on January 16, 2014, when the country’s parliament passed, by a show of hands, a package of draconian laws targeting protesters. This legislation, which became known as the “dictator laws,” gave the government expanded power to shut down the internet, created a blacklist of so-called “foreign agents,” and made it a crime to wear a helmet at a protest, among other bans meant to cripple demonstrations.²⁸ The move provoked a reaction among activists, who on January 19 called for another mass viche on Maidan. That day, a group of protesters booed the political opposition leaders who were speaking on stage, broke

away from Maidan and began an attempt to march toward government buildings up the hill. Berkut riot police pushed back, and violence broke out. The government forces and protesters clashed for days, with protesters lobbing bricks and Molotov cocktails toward police, who beat them with clubs, threw tear gas canisters, and fired rubber bullets. It proved increasingly difficult for the opposition politicians to control Maidan protesters. In one infamous video, protesters were filmed spraying Vitaliy Klitschko, a former boxing champion and leader of the UDAR party, with a fire extinguisher while he tried to stop demonstrators from clashing with police on Hrushevskoho Street.29

On January 22, Serhiy Nigoyan, the 20-year-old protester of Armenian descent, was shot and killed on Hrushevskoho Street—the first protester killed by gunshot wounds during the demonstrations.30 His death, and the deaths of two others not long after, marked an escalation in tension between the government and Euromaidan activists, ushering in a more violent and unpredictable phase that left the opposition political parties less able to influence the events on the ground as emotions ran high and grassroots elements further mobilized self-defense groups with no explicit partisan allegiances.

The next day, violence stopped temporarily when the two sides agreed to a ceasefire and resumed negotiations, leaving a barricade of burned-out police buses to separate protesters and riot police on the street leading to the parliament building.31 Over the next several weeks, the two sides observed an uneasy truce as the opposition parties, European Union leaders, and the government attempted to come to some sort of agreement. Meanwhile, “self-defense groups”

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29 Watch the video of protesters spraying Vitaliy Kitschko with a fire extinguisher: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MjUWYKaVRAU
trained in combat techniques on Maidan in anticipation of further violence. Hostilities resumed on February 18, when riot police made a push to retake the central square after Yanukovych ordered protesters to leave by 6 pm that day. Riot police descended, setting fire to protest tents and pushing toward the main stage. People from around the country flooded Kyiv to defend the encampment as violence quickly escalated, culminating on the morning of February 20, when the death toll climbed to more than 100 after dozens were killed by government troops wielding Kalashnikovs and sniper rifles on Institutska Street.

Berkut riot police crack down on the main Euromaidan encampment on February 18, 2014. The trooper on the left appears to be flipping the bird toward protesters. (Chris Collison)

32 Kuhn and Burgsdorff.
33 Sources differ when reporting exactly how many were killed on February 20. Ukrainian media identifies 115 protesters who confirmed were killed in the revolution: “Spisok pogibshikh v khode aktsiy protesta v Ukraine (yanvar'-mart 2014). 15 March 2015. Available: http://lb.ua/society/2014/03/15/256239_spisok_pogibshih_hode_aktsiy_protesta.html
By this point in the protest, the rift between the public and the opposition politicians had widened and would prove irreparable. On February 21, the political opposition signed an agreement with the Yanukovych regime, brokered by representatives of the European Union, which would restore the previous 2004 constitution, create a coalition government, and schedule early presidential elections no later than December 2014. When the opposition leaders announced the agreement from the stage on Maidan, the crowd roared in anger, prompting Vitaliy Kitschko to apologize for bargaining with the regime. Volodymyr Parasyuk, a 27-year-old who led a volunteer self-defense group, climbed up to the stage and announced that his volunteers would reject the opposition’s deal with Yanukovych, calling the previous day’s

massacre inexcusable. He warned that if Yanukovych didn’t resign by 10 am the next morning, he and his volunteers would storm the presidential building.\textsuperscript{35} The grassroots wing’s rejection of the compromise between the political opposition and the regime showed just how deep the gulf between the political parties and protesters on the ground had grown in the three months since the movement began. The opposition had fought for control of the movement during crucial moments of the revolution, and the violence pushed the two sides further apart as anger reached a boiling point. The two competing leaders of the revolution—the political wing and the grassroots—proved to be a marriage of convenience. The grassroots needed the opposition for political bargaining with the regime and European diplomats, while the political opposition needed the grassroots for mobilization and day-to-day operations.

Little did either side know that even before there were plans for a siege on the presidential building, Yanukovych had secretly left Kyiv, fleeing first east to Kharkiv and then to Crimea from which he left Ukraine for Russia.\textsuperscript{36} The revolution had ousted the president from power, but distrust between the political opposition that would soon assume power and the grassroots was there to stay. There would be no honeymoon.

\textsuperscript{35} Watch Volodymyr Parasyuk’s speech: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ys0FDfXQak
\textsuperscript{36} Higgins, Andrew and Kramer, Andrew E. “Ukraine Leader Was Defeated Even Before He Was Ousted.” The New York Times. 3 January 2015. Available: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/world/europe/ukraine-leader-was-defeated-even-before-he-was-ousted.html?hp&_r=0
Chapter I, Part II

Ukrainian Revolutions: Changing Dynamics of the Public Sphere

Protesters gather on November 21, 2014 to mark one year since the beginning of the Euromaidan uprising. The banner on the left reads, "No - corruption; Yes - Lustration." The second banner reads, "Rights are not given. Rights are taken." (Chris Collison)

Large-scale protest movements were nothing new in Eastern Europe by 2013. Ukraine itself had experienced three major demonstrations in 15 years—the Revolution on Granite in 1990, which preceded the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union; Ukraine without Kuchma in 2000-2001, which brought together prominent activists but was quashed by the government; and most notably, the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005. While the Revolution on Granite and Ukraine without Kuchma were relatively high-profile events, the Orange Revolution eclipsed them both in scale and in terms of outcome. The mass protest
movement was among a wave of so-called “color revolutions” that swept through the former Soviet Union in the early 2000s, coming on the heels of the Rose Revolution in Georgia, which brought to power a new political alliance headed by the flamboyant, Western-educated Mikheil Saakashvili. Similarly, the Orange Revolution brought in a new, pro-Western coalition headed by Viktor Yushchenko, a charismatic banker who promised reform and closer relations with Europe.

The 2004 protest movement erupted after a runoff presidential election between Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, a Donetsk power broker who was hand-picked by the increasingly unpopular President Leonid Kuchma and who had support from the Kremlin. The events of the election brought to focus widespread reports of fraud throughout the country. Yanukovych was declared the official winner of the vote, although exit polls indicated that Yushchenko had beat him by wide margin. Throngs of people filled Maidan in the wake of the announcement, calling for the results to be annulled and demanding a do-over. The courts eventually relented, allowing international election observers into the country as Ukrainians returned to the polls to elect Yushchenko.

Heralded by Western observers as the beginning of a new democratic chapter in Ukraine, the revolution seemed to vindicate the prevailing neoliberal consensus that the world was witnessing the “end of history” as the countries of the former Soviet Union moved slowly toward democracy. The assumption followed that Ukraine and other countries would see a blossoming of civil society and democratic institutions in the wake of these demonstrations of people power.

But the high hopes raised by the Orange Revolution soon gave way to disillusionment as

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38 The essays throughout the book edited by Åslund and McFaul, written in the immediate aftermath of the Orange Revolution, paint an especially rosy picture of the prospects for democracy and civil society in Ukraine.
the political coalition found itself mired in bitter infighting. Change proved slow and halting under Yushchenko, who was beginning to face challenges from other politicians in his own coalition—most notably from Yulia Tymoshenko, a one-time ally who served as prime minister under Yushchenko and would go on to run in the next presidential election. Eventually, Yanukovych, thought to be forever defeated by the victory of civil society and democracy, returned to triumph over Tymoshenko in the 2010 presidential election in a vote declared fair by international observers.

Much has been written about the Orange Revolution and its outcome, especially during the initial jubilation surrounding the success of the protest movement. In the years that followed, however, social scientists, many of whom expected to see the consolidation of democracy and the emergence of newly enlivened civil society, largely concluded that neither took place in the aftermath of the mass mobilization movement. To understand why, it is useful to look at the dynamics of the movement itself—the demographic and political makeup of the revolutionaries and the events that led to the events of 2004. Doing so reveals a number of similarities with Euromaidan, but also some important differences, namely the central role of the political opposition and the focus on electoral outcomes.

Origins of the Orange Revolution

Although it caught some Western observers off guard, the Orange Revolution did not happen spontaneously. It was the result of months of careful planning by the opposition coalition

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and volunteers ahead of the presidential vote of October 2004 and the runoff between
Yanukovych and Yushchenko in November. But its origins can be traced back even further. The
seeds for the revolution were planted as early as 2000, when opposition journalist Georgiy
Gongadze was kidnapped and beheaded by unknown assailants. The release of cassette tapes of
recordings implicating President Leonid Kuchma and his associates of involvement in
Gongadze’s disappearance and murder sparked what would come to be known as the “Ukraine
Without Kuchma” protests, which brought people to the streets in the first major anti-regime
protests since independence.

The movement was largely organized by a handful of well-known activists and
politicians—including Yuriy Lutsenko and Tetiana Chernovol, who would participate in both the
Orange Revolution and the early phase of Euromaidan. Ukraine Without Kuchma never
transformed into a mass movement on the scale of the Orange Revolution and was snuffed out by
the Kuchma regime in March 2001, but it brought together these prominent activists, and helped
solidify a recently formed opposition party headed by Yulia Tymoshenko that would soon form
an alliance with future President Viktor Yushchenko.

Yushchenko, who was well regarded by the Kuchma government for his stewardship of
the country’s national bank, was appointed prime minister in 1999 to help Ukraine out of a
growing financial crisis. He was sacked a month after the Ukraine Without Kuchma protests
ended for angering oligarch power brokers by canceling hundreds of state subsidies and

41 Karantycky, Adrian. “The Fall and Rise of Ukraine’s Political Opposition: From Kuchmagate to the Orange
Revolution.” In Åslund, Anders, and McFaul, Michael (Eds). Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s
42 Lynch, Tammy. “Social Mobilization and the Orange Revolution.” In D’Anieri, Paul J. Orange Revolution and
; Johns Hopkins UP, 2010., pp. 52-53.
43 Kartnycky, pp. 31
privileges for their companies. During his brief stint as head of government, Yushchenko managed to successfully steer Ukraine’s faltering economy back on course, ushering in an era of growth and earning a reputation as skilled technocrat who was willing to implement reform, despite oligarch pressure.

After his dismissal, Yushchenko, along with a number of opposition figures, formed the Our Ukraine party, which allied with Tymoshenko’s Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party. Together with the Socialist Party, the opposition campaigned as a bloc in the 2002 parliamentary elections, nearly gaining control of parliament, although negotiations to include the Communist Party in a ruling coalition dragged out long enough for pro-Kuchma factions to grab power. The election saw physical abuse against opposition campaign staff and candidates, highlighting intimidation tactics pro-Kuchma elements were willing to carry out against the opposition, which was growing in popularity. However, the election demonstrated that an organized opposition was possible and was seen as a dry-run for the presidential election of 2004.

By 2004 the opposition coalition was in a position to wage a strong political campaign and to mobilize thousands of volunteers to the cause, tapping growing frustration with the Kuchma government over the cassette tape scandal and endemic corruption—issues that amounted to what Tucker calls an “accumulation of grievances.” Yushchenko prepared for the fall elections by holding rallies throughout the summer that attracted increasingly large crowds of supporters, while positioning himself close to the charismatic Tymoshenko, who was effective

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46 Åslund, pp. 14-16
47 Tucker, pp. 25
Yushchenko embarked on a whirlwind tour of the country, mobilizing volunteers and empowering his campaign to develop the Pora! ("it’s time!") group, which would prove instrumental in bringing protesters to Maidan for the Orange Revolution.\(^{48}\)

Pora, formed principally at the initiative of Vladislav Kaskiv, who was tapped by pro-Yushchenko lawmaker Taras Stetskiv, always had a close relationship with the Yushchenko campaign, but also attracted together other civic organizations, including student groups (the Association of Law Students, Young Prosvita, the Christian-Democratic Youth of Ukraine, etc.) and pro-democracy NGOs, which were brought together under the umbrella of Pora.\(^{49}\) The group was responsible for providing information to voters and getting people to the polls—and eventually the streets. Pora spent months drafting strategies, coming up with slogans, and learning to respond to state oppression through targeted media campaigns and by participating in several local elections. Pora eventually split into two groups: Black Pora (the civic and youth wing) and Yellow Pora (the political wing), although both ended up cooperating during the events of the Orange Revolution and for all intents and purposes were the same organization in the lead-up to the election.\(^{50}\)

The election was a fundraising bonanza as oligarchs poured money into the campaigns, especially the campaign of the candidate preferred by the establishment—and the Kremlin. Yanukovych raised an estimated $600 million, while Yushchenko raised about $150 million for both the election and the Orange Revolution. Total spending amounted to more than 1 percent of Ukraine’s entire GDP, roughly 100 times the amount spent on the 2004 US presidential election.

\(^{48}\) Karatnycky, pp. 33, 36-37
\(^{50}\) See Lynch (2010) and Shukan (2010) for more on the organizational structure of Black and Yellow Pora
in terms of percent of GDP.\textsuperscript{51}

When other opposition candidates were knocked out of the first round of voting, they gave their full support to Yushchenko. Anticipating foul play, Yushchenko and his supporters prepared for a challenge to the November 21 vote, purchasing tents and supplies for a large-scale protest in advance. Pora was especially active and was ready for a fight after spending months practicing mobilization tactics, holding training retreats in Crimea and the Carpathian mountains, and building a nationwide network of activists.\textsuperscript{52} When the results showed Yanukovych winning, despite exit polls showing him far behind, Yushchenko called for a protest on Maidan for the next morning, November 22. The Orange Revolution had begun.

Pora and party volunteers brought thousands of people to the streets, setting up a tent city and coordinating with the municipal authorities to organize garbage removal. The mass protest itself lasted 17 days—much shorter than Euromaidan—and saw no major acts of violence.\textsuperscript{53} The spectacle caught the attention of the international press, which broadcast images of Ukraine’s capital awash in a sea of orange, further pressuring the embattled government. When the country’s high court on December 3 ruled the initial results invalid and scheduled another vote for December 26, the protest began to dwindle.

Among the most striking indications that the energy from the Orange Revolution had receded in the aftermath of the election was the near disappearance of civil society groups. Pora, most notably, spun off into different organizations. One iteration was a political party, which ran

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\textsuperscript{51} Åslund, pp. 20


in the 2006 parliamentary elections but only gathered about 1.5 percent of the vote.\textsuperscript{54} Another project became the International Democracy Institute, a think tank.\textsuperscript{55} After the election, Pora never regained the stature it had during the Orange Revolution. Some members formed OPORA, a group that educates civil activists and organizes pro-democracy lobbying and campaigns.\textsuperscript{56} Pora and the movements that spun off from it played a minimal role in Euromaidan compared to the group’s efforts in 2004. The civic groups that had become prominent between the Ukraine Without Kuchma protests and the Orange Revolution focused primarily on election issues such as monitoring, mobilization, and election law.\textsuperscript{57} It seems that with an election victory, these groups quickly became less relevant and were not sustainable as the opposition suddenly became the establishment.

\textbf{The last electoral revolution?}

The Orange Revolution was among a number of mass protests movements during the late 1990s and first decade of the 2000s that would be known as “color revolutions.” Looking back at these events, it is clear they followed a certain pattern. Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik characterize these movements as “electoral revolutions” because they brought opposition political parties to power during election years as the result of successful civic protests—the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan, and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{58} These movements had a clear political goal: The electoral success of the opposition

\textsuperscript{54} Election results: http://da-ta.com.ua/mon_mainnews/916.htm
\textsuperscript{55} Demes and Forbrig, pp. 100
\textsuperscript{56} OPORA’s website: https://www.oporaua.org/en/about-us
\textsuperscript{57} Diuk, pp. 72
political party or coalition.

Georgia’s “electoral revolution” is the most obvious analog to the Orange Revolution. That movement was a coordinated effort by NGOs, civil society groups, and the political opposition, who prepared long in advance for the election by borrowing techniques and strategies from movements in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{59} According to Giorgi Kandelaki, the Rose Revolution’s success hinged on three factors: the opposition political parties (especially Mikheil Saakashvili’s National Movement), the main opposition media outlet, and Kmara, a youth movement similar to Ukraine’s Pora. Kmara was less closely associated with a single political movement than Pora, although it played a similar role in mobilization efforts and helped promote trust between the public and the opposition parties.\textsuperscript{60}

Similarly, the Orange Revolution was carefully planned and rehearsed by political elites and politically oriented groups, particularly Pora. However, during Euromaidan, the political opposition, elites, and social movement organizations played a much smaller role. That protest by and large was loosely organized and there was no electoral goal, so that movement does not fit in the same category as the electoral revolutions of a decade earlier.

Mark Beissinger argues that the Orange Revolution was characterized by a large-scale “negative coalition”—a large group of consisting of diverse preferences on “politically salient issues” but united by their rejection of an outcome, namely the fraudulent election of Viktor Yanukovych.\textsuperscript{61} Citing what he believes was the key common factor bringing protesters together—their “extreme rejection of the incumbent regime,” Beissinger argues that the Orange

\textsuperscript{59} Angley, Robyn. "Escaping the Kmara Box: Reframing the Role of Civil Society in Georgia's Rose Revolution." \textit{Studies of Transition States and Societies} 5, no. 1 (2013).


\textsuperscript{61} Beissinger, pp. 576
Revolution fits this definition. But by his own admission, nearly all social revolutions could be characterized as negative coalitions “to some degree.” Using Beissinger’s definition, by the mass protest phase Euromaidan could certainly be classified as a negative coalition, given the movement’s opposition to the Yanukovych regime. He cites Robert Dix’s descriptions of negative coalitions in Latin America, where in the most successful negative coalitions, moderate elements are pushed into loose cooperation with more militant elements due to the “alienating policies undertaken by the regime.” This certainly happened during the Orange Revolution, when actors with varying political beliefs were brought together—most notably the more radical elements who supported Tymoshenko in alliance with the more moderate Yushchenko bloc, and it happened even more overtly during Euromaidan, when moderates were forced into coalition with groups such as the nationalist Right Sektor, which was willing to use violence to advance its goals.

But the term “negative coalition” is too broad to differentiate Euromaidan from the Orange Revolution, or any mass protest event in Ukraine since independence for that matter—all of which defined themselves in opposition to those in power and brought together a variety of different elements of society. What separates Euromaidan from the Orange Revolution in terms of internal dynamics is the role of political parties and the overtly political goals of the Orange Revolution. While it is true that the Orange Revolution itself was the result of a broad coalition, that coalition was largely the result of efforts by organized political factions, namely the Yulia Tymoshenko bloc and the Our Ukraine (Yushchenko) bloc, which would come to form the Orange Coalition once Yushchenko assumed the presidency and Tymoshenko was named prime minister.

The political nature of the Orange Revolution was also evident in the groups used to
mobilize participants. For example, groups such as Chysta Ukraina and Pora, which Beissinger characterizes as “politically oriented civil society associations,” were instrumental in getting people to the polls and mobilizing protesters. Those groups, especially Pora, were closely aligned with the political opposition and cooperated closely with the Yushchenko campaign. Furthermore, their near disappearance in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution demonstrates how closely linked they are to the election process and the opposition political groups, casting doubt on claims that the Orange Revolution was fundamentally a grassroots movement.

Sociological data, while incomplete, further suggests that the participants of Euromaidan felt less connected to the political opposition. A Ukraine Monitoring Survey, compiled by Beissinger, found that 21 percent of participants of the Orange Revolution belonged to a social or political association, compared to 13 percent of Euromaidan participants who supported a political party and 3.9 percent of who said they considered themselves political activists. Beissinger’s research also found that commitment to democratic values among participants was “conspicuously weak” and that a majority of Orange Revolution participants were not motivated by the “desire to defend democratic values.” According to his research, 40 percent chose “to defend the values of a just, democratic society” as one of the two main reasons why they were protesting. Finally, 90 percent reported that they had voted for Yushchenko in the election.

While the overwhelming majority of Orange Revolution participants voted for Viktor Yushchenko in the first round of the presidential election, the revolution was fundamentally a coalition of various political groups and political ideologies. Not all who voted for Yushchenko considered him their first pick. Forty-six percent reported that their vote for him was conditional.

63 See accounts of Pora’s formation and activities in Karatnytcky (2005) and Diuk (2005)
64 See Chebotariova, pp. 166 and Beissinger’s breakdown of the Ukraine Monitoring Survey
65 Beissinger, pp. 582
on endorsements from other politicians, such as Yulia Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz.\footnote{See Beissinger} Thus, it is possible to better understand the diversity of political beliefs among participants. Beissinger has a breakdown of political leanings among participants, finding that protesters came from a broad array of political beliefs—the largest being “nationalist or national-democratic” (34 percent), socialist or social-democratic” (26 percent), and unaffiliated (26 percent). Still, the overwhelming majority reported that they had voted for Yushchenko in the first round of the election—the key common factor among participants.

Writing in 2010, Anna Fournier argued that the Orange Revolution called into question the relationship between citizens and the state, although she concludes that protesters were mobilized largely by economic considerations and a desire for “order.”\footnote{Fournier, Anna. “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution: Beyond Soviet Political Culture?” In D'Anieri, Paul J. Orange Revolution and Aftermath : Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine. Washington, D.C. : Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center ; Johns Hopkins UP, 2010., pp. 52-53.} If the Orange Revolution—and other social movements—do indeed call into question the relationship between state and citizen, opposition political parties might well have seemed in 2004 to be one way to create a link between citizen and state. When the citizens demanded accountable government, and the Orange Coalition raised hopes that it could accomplish exactly that, putting those politicians in the government seemed like the logical way to achieve that goal. Without a responsive electoral system, protest was the best way to force the state’s hand to hold an honest vote. But when the political parties failed to show results, it stands to reason that the people who put their faith in political actors became disillusioned and disengaged from partisan politics, paving the way for Yanukovych’s victory in 2010.

Paul D’Anieri argues that the Orange Revolution was essentially a battle of elites against
elites. If that is so, then Euromaidan might be viewed as a battle between elites and a loose alliance of a mostly non-politically aligned public and a weakened group of opposition elites. Following that logic, it could be expected that when Euromaidan again brought up the relationship between citizen and state, participants began to look beyond political parties, realizing they had failed them before. Indeed, Anna Chebotariova’s interviews with Euromaidan participants demonstrated that while a reported 62 percent of Euromaidan participants had protested during the Orange Revolution, they were not optimistic about the ability of the political system to work for them, with one protester calling Euromaidan “less romantic and more conscious” and saying that “people do not trust politicians.”

The absence of a near ubiquitous mobilizing force like Pora or a leading opposition political figure further suggests that the movement could be viewed as civil society’s rejection of party politics and as a roadmap for a new civic culture that seeks to redefine its relationship with the state. Finally, the violence that characterized the final weeks of Euromaidan was the most dramatic departure from the pattern of the Orange Revolution. Olexander Shulga describes the demonstration as a symbolic revolution, which he believes created a “semantic core capable of becoming a unifying matrix for society,” predicting that the violence on Maidan would act as a symbol of the struggle for independence and nationhood for younger generations as they become politically active.

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69 Chebotariova, pp. 172
Chapter II

Maidan Ongoing: Ukraine’s New Urban Activists
Urban civic activism in post-Euromaidan Kyiv

Unlike the Orange Revolution, which largely disappeared from Maidan following the election of Viktor Yushchenko, tents remained on Kyiv’s main square for nearly six months after Yanukovych’s ouster. Their presence served both to remind the authorities of the sacrifice during the revolution and as a public forum to express opposition to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the crisis erupting in the Donbas. The continued presence of activity on Maidan was also a symbol of ongoing efforts to change Ukraine’s political landscape and implement reform by holding the interim authorities accountable.

But despite lofty hopes of change in the first months that followed the ouster of Yanukovych, Ukrainian civil society found itself preoccupied with a range of unexpected activities that had little to do with political or government reform. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 prompted large numbers of Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars to flee the peninsula and relocate to mainland Ukraine. Volunteers set up temporary housing for the internally displaced. One such center, in the Kyiv suburb of Puscha-Vodytsia, housed about 120 residents from Crimea in April 2014. By October, those families would share the space with residents displaced by the war in the Donbas. Other services, such as the Frolovska 9/11 Volunteer Center would provide clothes and medical services to the internally displaced. A report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe reported in 2015 that civil society had become more active in Ukraine, but noted that a large number of organizations were providing

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72 Author’s notes for reports produced for JN1, Transterra media, and Ukraine Today in April and October 2014. Available: https://www.transterramedia.com/media/33113-refugees-from-crimea

73 Author visited Frolovska 9/11 in December 2015. 9/11 refers to the organization’s street address in Kyiv. See also: http://life.pravda.com.ua/volunteers/2015/07/17/197359/
“immediate assistance” to those affected by the conflict, including the internally displaced and
Ukrainian servicemen. In Kharkiv Oblast, for example, 21 out of 29 groups surveyed by the
OSCE were providing services to the internally displaced.74

The government’s inability to provide sufficient services to soldiers and the internally
displaced prompted volunteer and nongovernmental organizations to step in. International
observers report that civil society groups have since been “distracted” and that their resources
have been diverted toward providing resources and filling gaps in the social safety net left open
by the government. Ukraine’s economic crisis and its lack of institutions dedicated to providing
such services have meant that those in need have had to rely on NGOs and volunteer groups,
many of which are supported by private donations rather than government funds.75

Meanwhile, civic activity in Ukraine’s major cities has continued to organize and
develop. One of the first notable expressions of civic activism came in October 2014. Kyiv’s
oldest cinema, Zhovten, was set on fire during the screening of an LGBT-themed film that was
being shown as part of an international film festival. The fire was an apparent arson carried out
by two people who identified with the far right.76 The Zhovten building was located on an
attractive block of the city’s historic Podil neighborhood, and many locals expected a
development company that had been eyeing the property to use the opportunity to snap up the
charred remains at a discount and build a new luxury apartment block in its place—a common

74 OSCE: “Thematic Report: Civil Society and the Crisis in Ukraine.” Organization for Security and Cooperation in
75 For further discussion of post-Euromaidan civil society activity in providing services to IDPs and soldiers, see:
Cleary, Laura. “Half Measures and Incomplete Reforms: The Breeding Ground for a Hybrid Civil Society in
Also: Kräftner, J., L. Maï, and C. Druey. 2014. Ukraine 2014. “Civil society creating space between past and future:
Informal follow up discussion.” KOFF Roundtable Bern: Centre for Peacebuilding.
76 The two men were convicted, but questions remain about the handling of the case. Read more about the
https://www.kyivpost.com/multimedia/photo/renewed-zhovten-cinema-400557
practice in Ukraine. Local activists rallied around the historic cinema, swiftly organizing a campaign to lobby the city government to save the property and block any redevelopment. Shortly after the arson, they organized a protest outside Kyiv city hall, where hundreds gathered wearing yellow clothing and ribbons. The campaign, which registered as an NGO, succeeded in mobilizing a vocal public outcry and forced newly elected Mayor Vitaliy Klitchshko to allow the cinema to be rebuilt and to donate some of his own money to reconstruction efforts. A related charity foundation set up in the wake of the protest gained support from the mayor and solicited donations from locals and international supporters.

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This issue was raised by activists during interviews in autumn 2014 in the fire’s aftermath. One of those who brought up the concern was INTERVIEWEE F, who I first met while reporting on the fire in Kyiv.

See images from the rally by Andrii Prots: https://www.flickr.com/photos/freund2/sets/72157646728793664

Interior of Zhovten Cinema on October 30, 2014. (Chris Collison)
One of the main organizers of the “Save Zhovten” campaign and NGO, INTERVIEWEE F, said he felt compelled by the events on Maidan to participate in civic activism.80

“For me it was kind of a moral obligation to continue what we started,” he said. “We paid a really high price for this chance and we shouldn’t waste it. I guess my main motivation was the protest—the peaceful protest that we had at the beginning and the victims on Maidan.”

The aftermath of Euromaidan saw a proliferation of grassroots initiatives in Ukraine’s major cities. An online database called Mistosite, organized by Ukrainian social research organization CEDOS, listed 213 civic initiatives throughout Ukraine in February 2017.81 Those projects are involved in a wide range of activities, such as volunteer legal services, smart city

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80 NOTE: All but two interviews were conducted in English. Those conducted in Russian were translated to English by the author.
81 See Mistosite database: http://mistosite.org.ua/initiatives
planning, and the promotion of art.

The number of civic initiatives operating more than two years after Euromaidan is in contrast to the low levels of civic activity following the Orange Revolution, as discussed in Chapter I, Part II. There were a handful of online initiatives in the Orange Revolution aimed at local issues. One such project, called Zabudovi.NET, operated a website that highlighted issues surrounding construction projects throughout Kyiv. The site quit updating in 2010, and an Internet Archive capture indicated only 42 topics in the site’s forum. Activists interviewed for this project had not heard of Zabudovi. A link on the Zabudovi site leads to another project, Nasha Zemlya (“Our Land”), which sought to reform Ukraine’s proportional representation system of elections. The site has not been updated since 2011, and a person associated with the project has not responded to inquiries by the author.

Those projects represent two examples of initiatives in the same genre as those that have appeared since Euromaidan, but their reach appears to have been limited in comparison. That they operated largely before social media became a strong mobilizing force and communication tool (a phenomenon discussed later) may be a factor. Another notable instance of civic activism between the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan was the so-called “Tax Protest” of 2010. Early during the presidency of Yanukovych, business owners held rallies on Independence Square to protest changes to the tax code and to demand protections for small business owners. The protests were short lived and eventually dispersed by the authorities.

Lack of interest in these groups and the relatively small crowds of the anti-tax protests seems to corroborate social science research finding weak levels of civic engagement in the years

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82 See Zabudovi site: http://www.zabudovi.net/
84 See Nasha Zemlya site: http://www.nashazemlya.org.ua/
that followed the Orange Revolution. Those findings, as well as the election of Yanukovych in 2010, further indicated an apathy toward politics and activism more broadly. Current activists interviewed indicated they believed the Euromaidan experience had a different effect on civic engagement in spite of widespread distrust of the political establishment.

Urban activists said the results of that protest were difficult to measure, but they shared the belief that the movement had changed people’s perceptions of their roles and responsibilities in society. Those interviewed echoed INTERVIEWEE F’s belief that Euromaidan was a reason for increased involvement in local communities and that the focus on values during that protest movement was an important motivating factor for participating in both Euromaidan and subsequent urban projects.

Without prompting, three people interviewed used the word “values” to describe reasons for the revolution and the results it achieved. “I think that it was good and we have many people who changed their values. We have many people who understand that they should share their resources with other people—that they should volunteer,” INTERVIEWEE C said. “They learned how to volunteer. I think the main good result of Euromaidan is that we got more people who are involved in this ‘third sector.’”

INTERVIEWEE F invoked the importance of values when comparing Euromaidan to the Orange Revolution.

“I do think that Maidan, the recent one, had more values and ideas,” INTERVIEWEE F said. “It was a more complex phenomenon than the Orange Revolution.”

Asked what those values were to him, INTERVIEWEE F responded:

“I believe it started from—it’s probably not proper to say democratic—but self-governance and the right to influence the life of your country and the future of your country.”

86 For example, see Gatskova and Gatskov.
That’s how it all started in November—those marches we had. And then I think it was about solidarity, equality, dignity, and I guess the nation at some point.”

INTERVIEWEE A said Euromaidan for him was a struggle for “liberal values” and “European values.”

“For me that was a mental revolution of people,” INTERVIEWEE A said. “I connected with liberal values—the values of the rule of law, of liberty, of independence and of being a subject and a whole as a country. And for getting closer to what is called ‘European values.’ So that was the goal of Euromaidan for me as for now ... Euromaidan asked the right questions. Everybody should have answered them. I answered them in this way, which brought me to local politics. Other people, maybe they are doing the same job but in a different way. That is the basic answer.”

At least in Kyiv, activists tend to be young and few were adults during the Orange Revolution. All of those interviewed agreed that civic culture had become more active since Euromaidan, and all had participated in that protest. The only activist I spoke to who was old enough to participate in both the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, INTERVIEWEE D, told me that the difference between the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan was that participants of the first movement put their faith in politicians rather than taking matters into their own hands:

“The thing is that during that first attempt—the Orange Revolution—everything about the authorities was bad. So people thought that if they changed the authorities, changed one president for another one, everything would automatically become better. When that didn’t happen, for totally natural reasons, they became very disappointed. This disappointment brewed for 10 years and then boiled over in 2014 during the Revolution
of Dignity [another name for Euromaidan]. When the revolution happened for a second time, people realized that simply changing the authorities won’t give you anything and that something will occur only when you make the changes that you want.”

When asked if he also put his faith in politicians during the Orange Revolution, INTERVIEWEE D said that he “probably thought like the majority,” adding, “I can’t say that I was so clever and could see 10 years into the future.”

Ksenia Gatskova and Maxim Gatskov discuss generational differences in their investigation into civil society in 2012. They found that those who did not grow up with memories of the Soviet system and its institutionalized civil society groups, such as the Komsomol and trade unions, had more trust in civic organizations than those who remembered the Soviet Union. It is worth noting the relative youth of these organizations in Ukraine and the generational divide between many Euromaidan activists and the rest of the population.

When asked about the difference between the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan, INTERVIEWEE A said he saw the Orange Revolution movement as a “paternalistic” movement.

“Ukrainian society is deeply paternalistic,” he said. “The usual answer is that 10 years ago nobody created the network of these initiatives and the people who were on that Maidan weren’t active afterward because they were standing not for what I think are liberal values, but for an exact person who should be president. So for me it was a paternalistic action. All the hopes for the country were on that person.”

INTERVIEWEE C also used the word “paternalistic” to describe Ukrainian society and its relationship to the state and political establishment before Euromaidan. She said she believes

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Ukrainian society has become less paternalistic since then, suggesting that the relationship between citizen and state is changing. She also emphasized the role of values in Euromaidan, saying that people have a more sober view of what can be accomplished.

“Euromaidan was not about the president—not about a person,” she said. “It was about values. That is the difference. It didn’t matter who became the president because we have this feeling about dignity. It’s strange, but people feel this dignity. They have dignity about their quality of life, not about their vote for president. They understand that they should have quality of life and a future for their children. I think it’s also about the future for their children. People understood that nothing will change in a few years, but maybe it will change in 10 years. I think that this idea that something will change, not today but maybe tomorrow, people still believe in the idea of Euromaidan. This is the difference from the Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution was more about a person.”

She said activists like her feel they don’t have much influence on a national level but they can contribute on a local level and “solve some small problems.”

The use of the word “paternalistic” reflects research on clientelism in the former Soviet Union. Aberg argues that Ukraine’s lack of civic traditions and informal networks outside of institutions has promoted clientelism and non legal practices throughout society. These interactions with activists suggest that the subjects were aware of a clientelist relationship between citizen and state and saw Euromaidan as a reaction to that dynamic.

Conversations with activists also revealed that the rejection of political parties during Euromaidan was common among activists. They indicated that they had become disillusioned

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88 Aberg, pp 297
with the political parties and tribalism among the oligarch clans who fund them. INTERVIEWEE B said he thought the results of the protest were mixed, and saw it largely as an attempt to save Ukrainian independence.

“At least we saved our independence,” INTERVIEWEE B said. “Otherwise, we would have lost it. Sure, our expectations—my expectations—were not so high because I realized that the three politicians were connected to oligarchs and there has not been so much change.”

He said he had lost his faith in political parties before the revolution.

“There were a few years when I lost my illusions about political systems and I understood what was really happening,” INTERVIEWEE B said. “I became conscious about oligarchs, about post-Soviet legacy, and I was searching for the key to change it. For a long time I thought political parties were the key, but it wasn’t working. There is no real political party. There are political projects created by oligarchs, and they convert political power into money-making.”
Zhenya Kuleba, who helped organize the Heavenly Hundred Park, stands in front of the park’s mural of slain Euromaidan activist Serhiy Nigoyan. (Chris Collison)

Trust Issues

While the number of urban initiatives is high and more people seem to be participating in urban activism, trust remains a challenge in Ukraine. This issue has been discussed by scholars since independence. In one study from 2000, Martin Aberg attributes low levels of trust between Ukrainians and institutions to the Soviet historical legacy and the proliferation of “exchange networks” that exist in lieu of functioning state institutions. In his famous work, *Bowling Alone*, Robert Putnam describes trust as an important component of social capital. To Putnam,

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trust between citizens and between non-state actors and organizations is a crucial way of measuring and realizing social capital, which he sees as a central lubricant in democratic society and civic culture.\textsuperscript{90}

Trust in most Ukrainian institutions in Ukraine remains low, as measured by surveys conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Their work found that political institutions are the least trusted. A 2016 survey finding that only 5.3 percent trust the parliament and 13.7 percent trust the president, numbers that are actually several points lower than those found by a survey conducted in 2012, before Euromaidan. There are only three institutions in the survey that more than 50 percent of respondents reported they trust: The church, volunteers, and the armed forces. “Volunteers” was not a category included in the 2012 survey, but that report does measure trust in “civic organizations,” which received 27.1 percent in 2012 and increased to 37 percent in 2016. The most dramatic increase in trust was, perhaps not surprisingly, the armed forces.\textsuperscript{91} Ukraine’s military has seen a massive overhaul since the beginning of the war in the Donbas and the armed forces have seen surging levels of support across society as volunteers and conscripts have been killed in battle.

According to Aberg, the absence of trust in institutions does not mean that Ukraine is lacking in social capital, but rather that it exists in a different form—namely, informal exchange networks. Aberg claims that informal exchange networks, or “non-communitarian social capital” are a sort of social capital that exists separate from formal institutions. He concludes that these informal networks reduce the social transaction costs of solving problems by allowing them to be

accomplished outside formal institutions.

In a similar manner, informal civic organizations and urban activist initiatives function largely independent of traditional institutions such as the city administration, universities, and political processes—relying instead on influencing public opinion, mobilizing demonstrations, and fundraising. Since activists view formal institutions as ineffective, civic groups offer an alternative. Like Aberg’s informal exchange networks, these new civic groups operate in parallel with formal institutions that would otherwise be involved in issues such as historic preservation, education, and urban development. If we accept Aberg’s claim about social capital in Ukraine, it becomes clear how operating outside the regular political processes can provide civic activists with a space where they can express solidarity with each other, thus realizing a kind of social capital that isn’t easy to measure using the traditional definition. These activities provide a kind of social capital independent of more established processes, where activists can pursue their interests in spite of traditional institutions of the state or the political apparatus rather than with the help of those institutions. This could help explain why trust in most institutions did not change in the aftermath of Euromaidan even though activism has increased. Those institutions proved themselves ineffective and activists sought alternative avenues to expend their energies.

These informal groups mirror those described by Havel in “The Power of the Powerless.” He writes about an “independent life of society” that brings people together for a common purpose through small-scale initiatives. In his view, these groups help increase cooperation, build community, and “raise the confidence of citizens.” To Havel such projects are more useful for building communities of active citizens than for bringing about government reform.

However, trust issues still characterize relations between urban civic groups. Many of the teams of activists who work on an individual initiative remain small and groups struggle to

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92 Havel, pp. 82
coordinate and cooperate with each other. This may be due to the relative newness of participating in the public sphere. It also may be a symptom of the traditionally low levels of trust among citizens and toward institutions more broadly as activists adapt to working with other groups rather than working individually.

Activists have been making some efforts to improve cooperation and understanding between their organizations. During two meetings organized by CEDOS in June and July 2016, representatives from about two dozen initiatives met in Kyiv to talk about the goals of their individual projects and to discuss ways to coordinate with other groups. They discussed mission statements, better methods of communication, and compiled a list of common values. One of the organizers of CEDOS, Interviewee C, said that a chief challenge facing Ukrainian civil society is that many activists feel that they are in competition with others and resist sharing

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93 Author’s notes from meetings attended during summer 2016.
knowledge and resources.

INTERVIEWEE F, who in addition to working on Save Zhovten became involved in other urban projects and lobbying efforts, agreed that coordination with other initiatives and with the local authorities is a major obstacle for civic groups.

“It is obvious that those groups will need to consolidate and learn how to cooperate,” INTERVIEWEE F said. “It is really hard—and that is the challenge I see—that civil activists have to find a way to coexist with the authorities.”

**Potential results: City and Nation Building**

Civic activism has coincided with a renewed interest in Ukrainian culture, which can be seen through the revival of traditional fashion and music since Euromaidan. For example, Ukrainian national embroidery, long associated with peasant life, has made its way into more mainstream fashion since events of 2013-2014 as a way to celebrate Ukrainian heritage. The city of Kyiv has also become host to a number of cultural initiatives and the site of permanent art exhibits. Apartment blocks in Kyiv have become canvases to showcase domestic and international artists.

According to Aberg, nation building, the revival of national culture (namely, cultural and religious life), and democratization “move hand in hand in contemporary society.” Thus, development of civil society should be considered in the context of the emergence of civic

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See also
culture and a civic national identity. The latter issue has been thrust into national discourse over the past three years. The events of 2014 are powerful symbols that play an important role in the development of the Ukrainian national narrative. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its war in the Donbas have served as a catalyst for the re-examination of Ukrainian identity and as a justification for patriotism as Ukrainians lose their lives in defense of their country’s independence.

National identity has proved a thorny issue in Ukraine since independence. Taras Kuzio has discussed the challenges of historiography in defining Ukrainian nationhood and history. He argues that Ukrainians have long suffered from a “little Russianism” inferiority complex. Furthermore, he argues that the Soviet period subordinated Ukrainian and Belarusian identity to Russian identity and that according to Soviet historiography those identities were simple branches of a broader Russian nation.

Ukraine, which experienced only a brief period of quasi independence following the Russian Revolution and whose territorial boundaries were assembled by Stalin, lacked a cohesive national story. Catherine Wanner discusses Ukraine’s experience as a fractured and colonized region for much of its history, one which brought together a number of ethnic, linguistic, and religious groups. Inna Melnykovska and Rainer Schweickert write that many post-communist states lacked the experience of nationhood and have had to “rediscover the national ‘Self.’” Looking specifically at Ukraine in the years before Euromaidan, they identify three civic identities: Ethnic Ukrainian, Soviet Ukrainian, and Eastern Slavic. They found that

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civic national identity was strong only in the west, writing that in other parts of the country a civic identity could not be based on stable historic or cultural heritage.\(^9^9\)

Since independence, Ukraine’s historical heroes have often been controversial and have not been able to unify a diverse number of Ukrainian citizens due to their association with ethnicity or language. The most obvious example is that of Stepan Bandera, a World War II-era independence fighter who is viewed by some as a symbol of national struggle but is also infamous for his ties to Nazi Germany.

Melnykovska and Schweickert conclude that the Orange Revolution did not have much effect in forming consolidating a civic identity and may have actually deepened political divides in the country. They claim that the major political parties at the time, which were largely split by region, were an important factor in Ukrainian identity.

Western publications have traditionally tied Ukrainian national identity largely to the Ukrainian language, an issue used by Ukrainian politicians to mobilize voters in past elections when regional and linguistic differences were exaggerated for political gains. Euromaidan, which brought both Russian and Ukrainian speakers, helped to deconstruct the stereotype that Ukraine is only for Ukrainian speakers. Wanner explains how both language and religion in Ukraine have become less politicized and that language is not necessarily a marker of Ukrainian identity, noting that some Euromaidan protesters held signs calling themselves “Russian-speaking nationalists.”\(^1^0^0\) The war in Donbas further chipped away at the language issue as large contingents of Russian-speaking volunteers joined pro-Ukrainian battalions in 2014 and 2015.\(^1^0^1\)

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\(^1^0^0\) Wanner, pp. 432

\(^1^0^1\) In the early phases of the conflict, battalions tended to draw members from the region where the groups were founded. For example, the Aidar Battalion (named after the Aidar River in Luhansk Oblast) drew members from the
Those who were killed during Euromaidan became symbols of Ukraine’s fight for independence. The so-called “Heavenly Hundred” are viewed as martyrs and heroes of the revolution. Kyiv’s Heavenly Hundred Park is a deliberate reminder of the sacrifice of ordinary Ukrainians. It serves both to memorialize those lost and to mobilize citizens to action. The fact that it was built by Euromaidan activists and bears Nigoyan’s portrait is also a challenge to the political establishment, since its demolition or sale to a developer would be a hugely symbolic affront to the public and the memory of those who were killed at the hands of the state.

The emphasis on values and the symbolism of the leaderless movement were important for finding meaning in the events of 2013-2014. For some activists, the city of Kyiv itself seemed to serve as a symbol of the struggle to build a new, cleaner civic identity.

INTERVIEWEE E headed the effort to build the “Heavenly Hundred” park in central Kyiv, just up the hill from Maidan across from St. Michael’s Cathedral. The site, located behind an apartment building, spent years as a derelict square where locals would throw their garbage. In 2014 INTERVIEWEE E helped organize a cleanup of the site and mobilized volunteers to plant trees and install playground equipment and art.

“Local citizens showed their dignity,” she said. “They want to show that they don’t want to live in a garbage place anymore.”

The most prominent feature of the Heavenly Hundred park is a mural depicting Serhiy Nigoyan, a 20-year-old of Armenian descent who was the first Euromaidan activist to be killed by gunshot wounds in January 2014. Looking down on the park, his image seems to serve as a


102 “Heavenly Hundred” refers to the approximately 100 people who were killed during Euromaidan.
reminder to Kyiv residents of the sacrifice carried out by activists during the protest. To the urban activists, the significance of Euromaidan seems to be less about the political results of the uprising and more about the expression of common values and the possibility of building a new civic culture in which individuals work together to achieve their goals.

City cleanup and urban revival is a common theme among many urban projects. One activist, INTERVIEWEE B, co-founded an initiative called Podolyanochka, which seeks to provide information about public services, events, and protest actions in the Podil neighborhood. INTERVIEWEE B, through this group, also helped organize a project to redevelop a small piece of vacant land rented by the Russian Embassy into a park. The project brought together neighborhood activists to install a vegetable garden, public art, and play toys for children. He said those two groups, through interactions on social media and the process of bringing people together to organize the garden project, has helped to improve relations between neighbors.

“Trust is growing,” he said. “Maybe not as fast as I wanted, but I became connected to many very nice people and we started to invite each other to meet as guests or to walk dogs, things like that. We also made some routes to clean the city of illegal advertising. We worked in teams of four. I think it’s a good thing and it’s continuing to grow.”

INTERVIEWEE B said that although he participated in some civic projects prior to Euromaidan, the protest movement made him more optimistic that change was possible. He said he had considered emigrating prior to Euromaidan, believing the government would have further restricted civil liberties.

“I think Ukraine would have lost freedom of speech and all other freedoms and we would become a proxy state of Russia, maybe like Belarus. If you don’t have freedom, there is no sense.”
Like the organizations that formed in response to the government’s inability to provide services to the displaced, many civic organizations see themselves as fulfilling roles that the state is unable or unwilling to fulfill. CEDOS, for example, conducts specialized urban research, including sociological studies, to provide planners with better data to make decisions about construction and development. *INTERVIEWEE C* said the Ukrainian education system does not provide contemporary urban studies, which is why CEDOS and other organizations try to provide such research.

“We have no urban studies in our universities,” *INTERVIEWEE C* said. “We have sociology and urban sociology, but that’s only one course at the university. We have architects, but architects don’t know how to do research in the city. We have cultural studies, but we only have one or two courses on culture in the city. We don’t have a system of urban studies. We don’t have that many people who know how to work in multidisciplinary fields and how to work in the city, and not many organizations do research for the city, because they have no money.”

Another non-governmental organization called CANActions holds classes to engage architects, designers, and journalists with “European” approaches to city planning and urban development. The school, which opened in autumn 2015, draws on the expertise of urban planners from various countries around the world. Students then implement small-scale urban projects designed through collaboration in the class in various cities throughout Ukraine.

“There is gap for sure when it comes to linking education and reality,” one of CANActions’ coordinators said in an interview. “The idea is to focus on real events and real situations instead of just being theoretical.”
New Media: Opportunities and Challenges

The growth of urban initiatives and the formation of networks of activists and citizens likely owes part of its success to the internet. Facebook was an important method of communication during Euromaidan protest, and social media remains the main avenue of communication between activists and the public. Facebook, in particular, is where the overwhelming majority of civic initiatives operate. But Facebook has proved both an asset and a limitation for these groups. The platform provides a cost-efficient, reliable, and instant way to engage and mobilize—the ability to share information and photos, plan meetings, and solicit feedback about projects.

INTERVIEWEE D, for example, whose project develops new maps for the Kyiv metro and designs signage for underpasses and pedestrian walkways, solicits feedback on designs and uses Facebook as a platform for dialogue with other designers and the public to talk about ways to improve city navigation. His Facebook group has about 2,000 members, who talk about projects, offer suggestions, and critique designs. His open-source approach to city planning is an enthusiastic embrace of public process in working on city initiatives.

However, as two interviewees complained, social media limits communication to a rather narrow group of people. Those who are not active on social media, especially older generations, are largely excluded from the conversation.

INTERVIEWEE F, whose Save Zhovten initiative was active on social media but managed to also attract the attention of more traditional news outlets, said he believes urban initiatives are missing opportunities by concentrating their work online.

“I hope that this culture will get out of the social networks and be more offline and have
direct contact with citizens,” INTERVIEWEE F said. “Right now, I believe it’s a more Facebook-populated culture. It has to become more offline. The civil activists are more or less the same age group, more or less same income, and they consider Facebook to be this beautiful, useful tool for communication and solving their tasks.”

INTERVIEWEE C agreed, adding that civic initiatives will not be effective politically if they don’t find ways to reach beyond social media. She noted that the authorities are more effective at reaching a broad audience through traditional means than urban activists, who communicate largely with young and educated.

“So when using Facebook, while we can provide all the information over that channel, the result is that the people who are not on Facebook can’t find out what these initiatives are doing,” INTERVIEWEE C said. “So only a small percentage of Kyiv residents know about the existence of these city initiatives. That’s the big contradiction. Those who vote and elect, the Babushkas, the people over the age of 50—Klitschko influences them by giving them new roads and painting the children’s play areas so they will vote for him.”

A study published by CEDOS in December 2016 evaluated awareness of civic activism among residents of Kyiv’s Obolon neighborhood. Of the 472 people surveyed, 69.1 percent could not name a single initiative. The study also found that only 29.9 percent reported social media as a source of information about their neighborhood, underscoring the challenge of reaching out to a large audience using only online tools.103

**Looking Forward: Challenges to Going Mainstream**

Following the elections of October 2014, several well-known activists and veterans from the war that had erupted in the spring joined politics and entered the government as members of parliament. Many had no prior political experience but were co-opted by the two major parties—the People’s Front led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Bloc Petro Poroshenko—as a way to show reverence to Euromaidan activists and soldiers. For example, Mykhailo Havryliuk, who gained exposure when he was shown on Ukrainian television stripped naked and humiliated by Ukrainian police during the Euromaidan protests, entered parliament as a member of Yatsenyuk’s party.\(^{104}\) Others were more prominent and had a long background of political activism, such as Mustafa Nayyem and his fellow journalist Serhiy Leshchenko, both of whom worked for independent news website Ukrainska Pravda and have been involved in activism since the early 2000s.\(^{105}\)

The fresh faces raised hopes abroad that the new parliament would embark on new reform efforts as the country made its pivot to Europe.\(^{106}\) However, trust in parliament among regular Ukrainians remained low, and the fact that many of the deputies of the major parties were holdovers from the Yanukovych era did not help to calm doubts.\(^{107}\)

Nayyem and Leshchenko, disillusioned with Bloc Poroshenko, left the president’s party in 2016 to join the Democratic Alliance, a liberal, pro-European party.\(^{108}\) The two have seen

\(^{104}\) See list of parliament deputies: [http://gapp.rada.gov.ua/radatransl/Home/deps/ru](http://gapp.rada.gov.ua/radatransl/Home/deps/ru)
See also [http://censor.net.ua/tag/539/gavrilyuk](http://censor.net.ua/tag/539/gavrilyuk)


glowing coverage in Western media, notably in a 2016 New Yorker profile.\textsuperscript{109} However, in late 2016 a scandal erupted over Leshchenko purchase of a luxury apartment in the center of Kyiv. The revelation prompted accusations of corruption as asset declarations indicated that some of the money he used to pay for the apartment did not belong to him.\textsuperscript{110} Although the investigation against Leshchenko was eventually closed, the scandal reverberated across the media and highlight suspicions among Ukrainians toward elected officials, even those who declared their commitment to reform.

When discussing political developments since Euromaidan, \textit{INTERVIEWEE C} expressed disappointment in the activists who joined political parties and now serve in the government, explaining that the political parties are still beholden to oligarchs and are not transparent in their activities.

“Even the activists from Euromaidan who became part of these big parties, I don’t see what they do. I don’t have any information about what they do in the parliament,” she said. “I voted for them, but now I have no information about what they do or what opinion they have and what things they provide. This is another problem. How can I evaluate what they have been doing during this period? The lack of information is a big problem.”

Distrust of the formal political process presents a challenge to these groups, which are wary of partnering with political parties or joining the political process. According to the 2015 OSCE report, many civic groups see no advantage to being institutionalized as formal organizations and some even fear retaliation.\textsuperscript{111} According to social capital theory, trust helps to

\textsuperscript{111} OSCE: “Thematic Report: Civil Society and the Crisis in Ukraine.” Organization for Security and Cooperation in
“lubricate” the political system and to improve interactions between institutions and the public. Without a mechanisms or a willingness to bridge the gap between civic organizations and the political realm, it is likely that the effectiveness and scope of these groups will not grow.

As Ukraine nears three years at war, a few activists say they fear what some have called a “third Maidan”—a much more violent revolution led by soldiers and far-right groups.

INTERVIEWEE F said that among his motivations, he felt a duty to participate while soldiers were continuing to fight, adding that he fears what could happen when they return from the front lines.

“I disagree with the concept that soldiers have to come back from the front line and change the country from the inside,” he said. “That’s one of the popular theses or messages that people articulate—like, ‘Oh, as soon as the war is over, the soldiers will be back home and they will make it right.’ I kind of doubt that soldiers can make it right when they are back from the front line and they have a different violence barrier. I don’t think I would like to see it.”

Nationalist groups, most notably the political and paramilitary organization known as Right Sector, have staged periodic rallies and marches against the Ukrainian government, often choosing days of national importance such as the Day of Defenders and the birthday of controversial nationalist figure Stepan Bandera.

INTERVIEWEE C said the rise of nationalist groups was one of the negative effects of Euromaidan. She said the failure of establishment political parties to change and reform has emboldened nationalist groups and strengthened their position in society, even if many of their

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112 Aberg, pp. 297
supporters don’t agree with their political positions.

“They became popular—people wanted to support organizations like Pravy Sektor [Right Sector] just because they saw that they now have power,” she said. “They know how to influence the decision-making process. That’s why people want to join. But not all of their ideological positions are good for me, and I’m afraid of that. For example, we don’t have very many left parties or left organizations. We only have right organizations. Our administration even supports them. It doesn’t mean they have the same ideology, it means that they are afraid because these groups are popular. I think it’s just because they are afraid and they don’t know what to do with them. Maybe it’s because of the war. During this crisis and the war, these right organizations show that they are more effective, so they can influence the government.”

Conclusion

Despite its success at ousting Yanukovych, Euromaidan was not a unified movement. The uprising was marked by an internal power struggle between the political opposition and the grassroots public. That friction was the result of nearly a decade of disillusionment with party politics and made for a less cohesive, more unpredictable uprising in 2013-2014 than 2004. When the smoke cleared and Yanukovych fled, the split between the grassroots and the political opposition did not heal. The first Maidan, the political opposition, assumed power in the parliament and city councils across the country and set out on a course of halting and incomplete reform. The second Maidan, the grassroots, found itself on the front line as soldiers and on the
streets of Ukraine’s major cities as the country’s new urban activists. That latter group, which never trusted the political system, is attempting to break the cycle of political apathy by working on small-scale projects in neighborhoods and cities.

For this new civic culture, distrust of the authorities and the political system is proving both an asset and a challenge. On the one hand, these new urban activists hold no illusions about politicians and their promises to act in the best interests of the people. They waste no time waiting for the authorities to act and have begun implementing projects and discussing ways to change their cities through the public process. On the other hand, distrust makes it difficult and politically risky for these groups to work with the authorities on issues where cooperation could benefit both sides. Trust issues, characteristic of the post-Soviet experience, also makes grassroots projects more cautious about pooling their resources and coordinating.

Two years after the adoption of Ukraine’s constitution, Taras Kuzio sounded a cautionary note when writing about Ukraine’s transition from the Soviet system to independence: “There are no ready-made theories that can be lifted off bookshelves, dusted down, and then applied to all postcommunist states to guide them in their transition processes.”114 Ukraine was failing to live up to expectations that a Western-style civil society and market economy would develop after the totalitarian system was dismantled. Nearly two decades later, Kuzio’s warning is still relevant. Ukraine, like many former Soviet republics, has followed a path of halting and incomplete democratic reform since the end of Communist Party rule, despite guidance and encouragement from Western governments and NGOs and several changes of government.

Ukraine’s civic culture remains young and unconsolidated. It is impossible to predict how it will develop as the country remains entrenched in military conflict and hampered by a sluggish

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economy. Continued political instability and the fatigue and resource drain from the War in the Donbas pose a particularly acute challenge. By contrast, the former communist countries of Central Europe and the Baltics were absorbed into the European Union and NATO following the end of totalitarian rule and were thus required to implement the reforms necessary to gain access to that political and economic system. The security guarantees provided by those systems allowed them to focus heavily on political and economic reform. Ukraine has not been afforded that luxury.

In the aftermath of Euromaidan, there is little question that urban activism is more visible. New tools such as social media make it easier than ever to communicate and organize. However, these groups lack diversity and their reliance on social media makes it difficult for them to effectively reach a broad audience. If they choose to enter electoral politics or address larger issues, they will need to find ways to reach diverse sections of Ukrainian society, namely older generations who are less tech savvy but crucial for local elections.

Three years after Euromaidan, the revolution endures as a powerful symbol for activists in a way that the Orange Revolution could not. The regular Ukrainians who sacrificed their lives on Maidan and in the Donbas inspire a sense of responsibility among activists and serve an important role in efforts to build a collective national and civic identity in independent Ukraine.

Euromaidan began as an attempt to force the government to adopt the European system for Ukraine. In “The Power of the Powerless,” Havel argued:

“The Second and Fourth Internationals, like many other political powers and organizations, may naturally provide significant political support for various efforts of ours, but neither of them can solve our problems for us. . .We know that ultimately it is
all the same to us whether or not the system in which we live, in the light of a particular
doctrine, appears ‘changed’ or ‘reformed.’ Our concern is whether we can live with
dignity in such a system, whether it serves people rather than people serving it.”

The situation for Ukraine is similar in many respects. While the European Union can
provide guidance and support through the Association Agreement, which was eventually signed
following Yanukovych’s ouster, the burden of nation-building remains primarily a domestic
concern. Small-deeds activism and urban initiatives provide an outlet for building a new civic
identity but are currently limited in scope. Whether they can flourish remains a question of
resources, time, the capacity to attract future activists and leaders, and the ability to continue
achieving results.

Areas for further study

This project is meant to provide insight into recent developments in urban Ukraine’s civic
culture and to encourage future interest in the topic. Further study into activism and urban
initiatives is necessary to better understand how civic engagement across Ukraine is changing
and to measure regional variations. Organizations in other cities as well as groups that provide
support to those displaced by violence could further shed light on small-deeds civic activity and
its relationship to the state and reveal activists’ attitudes toward the Euromaidan uprising in other
parts of the country. Documenting successes and failures at training and outreach could help
foreign and domestic NGOs better identify opportunities for improvement and development in
Ukraine and elsewhere.

115 Havel, pp. 53


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