Sovereign Redistribution and Its Constrained Imagination: 
An Anarchist Critique of ‘Equity Planning’

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This thesis argues that the state’s sovereignty is an illegitimate expropriation of power because it prevents individuals from developing their capacity to care for themselves and others. This argument is constructed around two main theoretical assertions. First, through Mark Purcell’s deconstruction of Hobbes’ Leviathan, that the proper place of power is within everyone, not within the sovereign state. Second, through Saul Newman, that equality and liberty within the liberal democratic imagination are always in tension. Contrastingly, the indeterminate space outside of the sovereign state wherein we all take up our power, resolves that tension, making possible a collective liberty. Equality then is not a distributable good but a social and political practice we all engage in together. This political practice amounts to developing our capacities to care for ourselves and others, rather than leaving those activities to a sovereign authority like the state or market.
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“. . . anything that we can call morality today merges into the question of the organization of the world. We might even say that the quest for the good life is the quest for the right form of politics, if indeed such a right form of politics lay within the realm of what can be achieved today.”

—Theodor Adorno

“We are not planning on seizing state power and overthrowing the government. We do not need to . . . We are building relationships of support that can withstand every crisis and give people fertile imaginations full of the possibilities of what can be built . . .”

—Mutual Aid Disaster Relief (MADRelief)

Introduction

Given the embroiled political situation in the United States in 2017, many are struggling to understand what exactly they can do to make things less bad. Highlights include immigration bans, the construction of border walls, reductions in already limited healthcare coverage, regressive energy policies denying global reach of climate change (Taylor 2017). What concrete actions can individuals take to protect people particularly marginalized by these changes? Flurries of social media posts list senators’ phone numbers and provide scripts of the issues to push them to vote yes/no on. People anxiously wait to see who will campaign for the next presidential election. Options feel constrained.

Planners are similarly concerned with what programs and policies they might implement to protect or support individuals. Is it a linkage fee or new property tax that could best finance affordable housing? How can zoning be used to incentivize developers to build affordable housing rather than redlining people of color? How can we incorporate more community voices in planning processes? Will public art make this TOD development more appealing to a broader range of income groups? At the basis of these questions, in part, are struggles to produce a better lived experience for as many people as possible—asserting that everyone deserves ‘the good life’
and that it can be equitably distributed across population profiles. For some, that means letting
the market work its magic, for others that means taxing developers more, and for even others that
means making community meetings more accessible to people with different work schedules.

Many of the questions we ask are confined within a given disciplinary or professional
practice—how can this or that practice be more inclusive, or more efficient, or more
transferrable? A broader question is necessary: should we, as individuals both within or outside
of the planning profession, spend our energy making political institutions less rapacious and
destructive, more efficient and inclusive, or should we spend our energy making those
institutions obsolete? This thesis argues for the latter. Specifically arguing that the process of
redistribution within equity planning constitutes an illegitimate expropriation of the power within
everyone. The sovereign state and its planning practices alienate individuals’ capacity to act, to
develop relationships of care on terms they determine with each other.

Variations on the term ‘anarchy’ are used throughout this thesis; however, nothing in this
thesis refers to destroying authority figures or seizing property. It is about destroying our
attachment to the state making decisions for us, destroying the part of ourselves that cannot
fathom another’s capacity to act, and seizing our ability to engage with others. The contention I
present is that the sovereign state expropriates individuals’ power, thereby preventing them from
developing their capacity to directly care for the self and others. The state mediates our social
relations, making sovereign determinations of the kinds of care we need, whether that involves
segregating land uses, maintaining property boundaries, or regulating building heights, to draw
from the planning lexicon.
As I will argue, we have the power to develop our capacities to care for ourselves and others without the state. This is the only way we can seek a collective liberty, as opposed to settling for some acceptable amount of inequality within liberal democratic forms of governance. I construct this argument around Mark Purcell’s and Saul Newman’s understanding of the state and collective liberty, respectively. Their arguments comprise the first main section of the thesis and highlight an anarchist position to action. The second section applies their arguments to planning theory and practice. The remainder of this introduction summarizes these arguments.

Purcell describes, through Hobbes’ Leviathan, that the state’s sovereignty exists through collecting up everyone’s power, controlling that power as if the state’s actions enact the collective will of those people. Without the ‘artificial person’ of the state, for Hobbes, we live in a ‘state of nature’ with no guarantees or protections (Purcell 2017). This situates power as existing within every individual, not within the institutions and practices of the sovereign state. Put another way, power does not have to be ceded to the state for protections or rights. Rather than giving up our power to others to determine our needs and provide services, Purcell asserts that we have the capacity to carry out those activities ourselves.

Purcell articulates a definition of the state, as expropriator of individual’s power; Newman agrees, furthering that the sovereign state produces a tension between equality and liberty that can only be resolved through taking up that alienated power. Newman highlights two theories making sense of the tension between equality and liberty in liberal democratic governance. Herbert Spencer’s law of equal freedom suggests that equality must always be secondary to individual liberty. Contrastingly, John Rawls’ understanding of justice as fairness asserts that institutions can determine an appropriate amount of liberty that individuals can give
up in order to produce an acceptable amount of equality. That is, his theory makes room for seeking equality within the mechanisms of the sovereign state. Rawls’ theory resonates in planning practice through a focus on fair treatment and increasing choices for those who have few.

In contrast to these theories that focus on the institutions of the state, Newman, primarily through Bakunin, suggests that only through making decisions with others outside of the sovereign state can we resolve the tension between equality and liberty. This resolution demands an entirely different formulation of freedom than that available within the sovereign state. Such a collective liberty can only be created through individuals negotiating their needs for themselves, together. As will be shown, this form of liberty is not something individuals separately possess, but is understood as something beyond or more-than the sum of individual liberties. For both Purcell and Newman, this space outside of the sovereign state provides no guarantees, but it is this indeterminacy that makes possible inventing other ways of meeting our needs, to develop relationships and other forms of care on terms we negotiate together.

After presenting their arguments, I review ways that anarchism appears in planning practices, focusing on coordination and redistribution. Applying their arguments to these practices highlights the distinction between individuals actively determining and negotiating their needs themselves versus any sense that some spatial ordering can produce a desired social relation. That is, some practitioners and theorists, like Peter Hall and Ebenezer Howard, suggest an ideal scale or spatial organization at which communities can autonomously manage their affairs. For Newman and Purcell, acting to produce relationships outside of the mediating institutions of the sovereign state precedes any spatial order. From this, an anarchist planning
practice would focus on relationships, not on pre-determining spatial patterns or basic infrastructure. An anarchist planning practice would understand equality as immanently defined, not defined through a sovereign authority.

The second section situates planning theory and practice as increasingly attentive to difference in attempt to produce a better lived experience for more people, recognizing that earlier planning practices did not always serve everyone equally. A review of theories on rational, equity, and multicultural planning show this trend, highlighting the role of the planning professional and the redistributive tools used to create more equity amongst more categories of people. In order to determine needs of diverse people, planners employ increasingly complex community engagement strategies. These strategies seek to map who has what resources in order to increase choices available to individuals historically marginalized by policies and regulations. While these theories show an increase attention to difference, the planner ultimately remains in a position of controlling individual’s expropriated power, from Purcell’s critique. That is, the sovereign state makes decisions for individuals, rather than them determining for themselves their needs and negotiating with others how to meet those needs.

Following the review of planning theory, I present a case example of Seattle’s Equitable Development Initiative (EDI) and the EDI Fund, which aim to promote greater racial and social equity in Seattle. I break down this analysis through highlighting the practices that delegate authority, collect data, and determine appropriate forms of redistribution. Taken together with Newman’s and Purcell’s concepts shows a complex system that determines for individuals their needs, constraining their capacity to directly care for one another. Various entities have authority to project growth and make decisions, and assume that individuals have delegated their own
power to the sovereign state to carry out those tasks. Through their data collection and community engagement strategies, as I will argue, these entities construct a veneer of legitimacy for their sovereign decisions and maintain equity as a state-led redistributive project rather than a matter of social relations in which we determine together how to meet our needs. The final act of distributing funds then is not some realization of the collective will of the people, but a choice produced from an already narrow and sovereignly determined set of choices. The case example highlights the state controlling expropriated power, providing individuals with choices, rather than the individuals themselves determining their needs, imagining and negotiating possibilities.

From Newman and Purcell, the alternative to letting this sovereign authority make decisions involves developing our own capacity to make those decisions. This exists in practice in the everyday efforts of individuals developing their capacity to act and providing mutual aid and care to one another without sovereign rules, exchange, or the state. Planners might wonder how communities could possibly manage wastewater infrastructure, coordinate bus routes, or mediate land use disputes. These are not relevant questions to ask. This thesis asserts that social relations are prior to conceiving, let alone solving, any of those problems. Any example such as these might be irrelevant, at least within our present formulation of them, once communities determine their needs for themselves rather than a sovereign authority. While I do not present any in depth case studies exploring communities’ decision-making capacities, examples exist in everyday practice—we are always learning, coping with change, and creatively applying our skills to new challenges. And we do that with other people. If we train our attention away from any sovereign authority and towards one another, we might find that our capacity to care for
ourselves and one another has been ours all along—and that making possible a form of collective liberty matters more than the certainty and consistency of weekly garbage pickup.

The conclusion highlights planning not through the politics of the sovereign state, but a kind of planning in which people determine for themselves their needs and the means to meet those needs towards a collective liberty. These practices highlight a politics of attention and care in everyday life, wherein people reject the sovereign state expropriating their power. This form of politics makes space to care for the self in whatever ways one can invent, to refuse care without penalty, to give care without need of exchange or acknowledgement. In this indeterminate space with no guarantees, individuals can negotiate those strategies directly with others, rather than through the constrained channels the sovereign state provides. Rejecting the state’s sovereignty is not simply an objection to the aesthetic choices made by the Design Review Board, or the inconvenience of bureaucratic red tape causing a small building project to take three years to permit, but to the constrained imagination we have to care for one another and ourselves. When the sovereign state controls our expropriated power, it prevents us from developing our social capacities to negotiate with others and plan for ourselves, together.
Anarchism and the State

What is the state?

Purcell and Newman assert a categorical critique of the state form as a dominating relation. For them, the state, whether liberal-democratic or authoritarian, is a problematic form of social organization as it alienates individuals’ capacity to negotiate their affairs for themselves.

As Purcell and Newman show, the sovereign state constitutes an illegitimate expropriation of the power inherent in everyone. This section details these arguments, showing that the sovereignty of the state to make decisions for others is an unnatural and constructed condition—one that renders unimaginable alternatives to consenting to the state’s sovereignty and its decisions. However, as their arguments suggest, this condition can be rejected through taking up that alienated or expropriated power.

Then the following section builds off of that argument to articulate the anarchist contention that seeking equality within the state always impinges on individual liberty, precluding any possibility of collective liberty. The issue, as we will see, is not the restriction of individual liberty, but that liberty is understood as an individualized concept at all. The final section will show that in equity planning, the state uses that expropriated power to determine for individuals their needs and deservingness of resources or protection, constraining how we might care for ourselves and each other. The alternative then is to reassert our power.

Purcell understands Hobbes as a useful resource for critiquing the state because Hobbes’ argument provides a clear conception of the state as a sovereign entity above-and-beyond any individual, and a salient point of entry for locating an original agency or power within everyone,
not just within a governing body. According to Purcell, Hobbes’ argument is that in a natural state, without a sovereign government, we are all free to act anyway we want; we possess our own power to act (Purcell 2017). In this ‘state of nature’ we all have “a ‘right of nature,’ which is the right to undertake any act that will preserve our own life” (ibid.). This could be peaceful or violent, but there are no structures or institutions to prevent violence as everyone attempts to meet their basic needs. There is no system of laws, no police forces to apprehend those who do ‘wrong’, nor juries to judge their deeds. Indeed there is no formal system at all for distinguishing right from wrong; survival must be negotiated and any action is possible. In this condition of possibility, the issue for Hobbes is in knowing that one could be attacked. So for him, in order to deal with this fear of the other, we need something outside of each of us to protect us from one another.

For Hobbes, Purcell explains, “it is precisely people having their power to act that is the problem”, as they could conceivably act in any way, violent or otherwise (ibid.). So they must surrender their power to some “artificial person” who would collect everyone’s power and enforce peace through its sovereignty, through its ultimate authority. The state then is this sovereign entity, whose authority is, according to Purcell’s account, both quantitatively and qualitatively greater than the individuals ruled by the state. The state is the sum of all surrendered power and of a kind superior than the original power within individuals. These are necessary conditions for Hobbes’ state because if power is surrendered to another individual or group of individuals, they would “simply use our surrendered power to further their own survival, and quite possibly threaten ours” (ibid.).
These characteristics of the state, as being above and beyond any individual’s will, make it useful for addressing seemingly intractable problems. Purcell highlights several issues that planning, as an institution of the state, attempts to address through its sovereignty: “the crowding, pollution, and disease of the industrial city; the sprawl of the post-war suburbs; the ‘blight’ of the ‘inner city’; or, more recently, the scourge of the automotive city” (Purcell 2017). The environmental degradation resulting from pollution or sprawl, and the concomitant human health impacts, involve many actors, complex causes and effects. The state is a convenient entity to provide authoritative directives on effects that should be addressed now versus the ones that can wait and to coordinate the many actors that might help mitigate undesirable effects.

This is not to say that other ways of addressing issues of pollution or coordination are impossible, but the state’s sovereignty and ultimate authority makes it a powerful tool for ameliorating the poor conditions we have created—rather than taking the time to coordinate private wills, everyone can surrender their power to the state to manage the problem as if that management were the collective will of those people.

While the transcendence of the state’s power appears convenient for addressing some problems, it remains structured by, as Hobbes argues, the need to prevent what we might do to one another. That is, the sovereign state expropriates everyone’s power in the service of security—preventing violence and saving us from our fears of one another. Through this logic of security, in attempting to protect us from one another’s violence, the sovereign state also prevents us from caring for ourselves. The condition of indeterminate possibility from which Hobbes argues we need saving, is the very condition that enables forms of action other than violence. That is, the state is not just a system of laws and institutions seeking to punish violent
acts or act decisively on major issues in the built environment, but seeks to prevent the possibility of violent acts even in the context of care, thus constraining the kinds of care one can enact.

For example, in Seattle, former Mayor Ed Murray recently declared a state of emergency regarding homelessness and the proliferation of informal encampments around Seattle. Part of the strategy for addressing this condition was to coordinate sweeps, or cleanups, of the encampments with outreach support aimed at connecting individuals with formal social services. While City officials had good intentions to care for those living in the informal encampments, the result of the sweeps included destroyed possessions, of which those individuals have precious few, and disrupted, already precarious, day-to-day schedules (Baker 2017).

“Officials say [sweeps are] a good thing because unauthorized encampments are dangerous for residents”, as if the City’s building code constitutes the ultimate authority on what is safe and what is ‘dangerous’ (Beekman 2016). Their supposed safety becomes more relevant than their having a consistent place to store their belongings, some semblance of a place to call home, tent neighbors they might rely on to help meet various needs. The state determined their needs, prioritizing their sovereign determination of security over a group’s determination of care.

This is not to glorify the precarity of living in a tent beneath a highway interchange, but to highlight that people invent ways to survive given the situations in which they find themselves. The logic of security embedded in Hobbes’ Leviathan ends up regulating against some means individuals invent for caring for themselves. Survival strategies get hindered by the state’s interest in protecting individuals from potentially hazardous or illegal situations, both of which would have been defined by an entity not involved in the actual living situation.
In this way, caring for oneself is only conceivable within the logic of security. This logic renders impossible, or at least illegal, some kinds of care, some kinds of survival. Caring for oneself or for others must align with predetermined systems aimed at preventing violence or ensuring peace; there is little room for negotiating those terms outside of the political process of litigation and changing regulations. This is neither to assert that individuals have an innate desire to care for others nor the opposite that we should not care for others. Rather, in preventing violence, in constraining that possibility, the state simultaneously structures and constrains the logic of care and its possibilities. For Purcell, the sovereign state constrains our ability to develop those capacities of care.

From Hobbes’ argument, Purcell contends that “in our natural state, people possess their own power. It takes an artificial and unnatural movement to separate people from their power” (Purcell 2017). That is, there is nothing natural or unequivocally right about the state—it is something we have constructed and to which we have ceded our power, our agency. This ‘unnatural movement’ has left us with only narrow channels of authority through which we can articulate our needs and care for ourselves and others, whether through voting for the right politician, donating money to a lobbyist whose interests somewhat align with our own, or applying for an affordable housing voucher. By refusing the assumption that we need a sovereign state to protect us from one another’s violence and one another’s care, “we see that our power has always been ours” (ibid.). The sovereign state illegitimately collects up everyone’s power, expropriating that which has always belonged to them. Importantly then, this argument suggests it is possible to refuse that expropriation.
Saul Newman explains that this critique of the state as the expropriator of power applies to more than just authoritarian states, because “the state embodies a certain structure and logic of domination regardless of the form it takes”, whether authoritarian or liberal-democratic (Newman 2010: 30). Whether a single dictator, a single party, or a system of representatives and institutions, anarchists take issue with the hierarchical ordering that dispossesses individuals of decision-making power.

Adding to Purcell’s argument, Newman summarizes the anarchist critique of hierarchical decision-making structures, in terms of “the extremely limited and inadequate fashion in which current parliamentary arrangements represent the will of the people, and in the more general sense that the idea of representation itself inevitably distorts the will of the people” (Newman 2010: 32). In hierarchical or representative forms of decision-making, people are alienated from their political power, as that power gets reduced to a vote or constrained to a brief comment period. One can be vehemently against a war or a building requirement, but the voting cycle and the scales of governmental institutions constrain, across time and space, one’s power or opportunity to shape those decisions. Hobbes’ sovereign state claims to be the collective will, since individuals have ceded their power to it. But it is an ‘artificial person’ that has illegitimately expropriated that will, that power. As Hobbes argues, this sovereign power is quantitatively and qualitatively greater than those individual wills; therefore, it is not really their wills but something else.

Newman, in developing a post-foundational anarchism, further asserts that the state has no legitimacy in making decisions on behalf of individuals. Newman describes Reiner Schürmann’s “anarchy principle”, which suggests that there are no first principles from which
action might be derived—there is nothing in the beginning. Newman uses this to say that some 18th- and 19th-century anarchists critiqued the seemingly irrational authority of the state with ‘rational’ authority of natural laws like our innate sociability and desire to cooperate (Newman 2010: 28-30). In contrast to some anarchists, Newman suggests that no such foundations exist—we are neither innately caring nor predisposed to act violently. So he deconstructs the foundations of some threads of anarchism and through that offers a general critique of domination, including the state. Where Hobbes argues for the sovereign state to assuage our fear of violence, this argument asserts that neither violence nor peace are inevitable, and that there is nothing natural about the state’s authority. This constructs the same kind of possibility Purcell identifies in locating an original power within everyone that becomes alienated through the state.

For Newman, from this ‘anarchy principle’, there is no natural basis upon which to construct any kind of domination: “anarchy is precisely what destabilizes any idea of a natural inequality between people that forms the justification of political or economic oppression” (Newman 2010: 53). Therefore, domination and the state are constructed not given, thus can be deconstructed through creating something else, through taking up that alienated power by developing relations of care. Using some form of the term ‘anarchy’ to describe an original condition (or lack thereof), and not referring to the ethics or politics of anarchism, is used elsewhere, too. Purcell (2013) describes Rancière’s reading of Athenian democracy where an-arkhé was for them the foundational non-order upon which any social order must be subsequently constructed.

Newman’s argument attempts to deconstruct all foundations and legitimacy of any hierarchy through an original non-order to social relations, suggesting something else is always
possible. Purcell provides a more specific critique of the state’s legitimacy, asserting that individuals have the capacity to act and struggle in their ‘natural state’ without a sovereign authority. So Purcell rejects the sovereign state’s domination on the grounds that it expropriates individuals’ power. Newman elsewhere develops this logic, that people possess a capacity to act outside of the state—a capacity that is alienated through the institutions asserting how everyone should live.

Taking from Chantal Mouffe, Newman identifies ‘the political’ as “‘the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations’” (Newman 2010). That is, simply in existing together we have a capacity to struggle or fight. This as opposed to ‘politics’ which is “‘an ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order and organize human coexistence’” (ibid.). The state is a part of this order, so for Newman, the “properly political” can only exist outside of the state. The state, or set of institutions and practices that compose it, then, is a site of depoliticization that constitutes “the absolute alienation of people from political power” (Newman 2010). That is, the political process is not something that expert politicians carry out in state-led institutions, but is something inherent to our being human together. For Purcell, dealing with this political condition is a capacity we can and must develop.

Purcell and Newman both base a critique of the state’s domination on the fact that it usurps the power inherent in individuals, whether that power is taken over, for Newman, or given up from fear of violence of another, in Purcell’s account of Hobbes. This power people possess then is distinct from Mouffe’s ‘politics’, or Hobbes’ sovereign state. These institutions
expropriate that power, constraining individuals’ capacity to make decisions about their lives, to
give or receive care, to be peaceful or violent.

Elsewhere Purcell notes that questions of alienated power and the legitimacy of the
institutions doing the alienating are central to political theory. In his understanding, Marx,
Bakunin, Deleuze and Guattari, Foucault, and Hardt and Negri, in their arguably disparate projects, understand people as the source of all political power. For Purcell, “the question of democracy is the question of the relationship between the proper power of people—all people—and the entities that have expropriated and organized that power into routinized institutions like the state, the corporation, the party, the union, the church, the family, and so on” (Purcell 2013).

In these accounts, whether called anarchism or democracy, the central concern is the
sovereign state expropriating power through forms of representation and control. Countless tendencies with varying permutations of labels and strategies exist (communo-anarchism, anarcho-feminism, democratic confederalism, anarcho-syndicalism, libertarian socialism . . . ). While they take on different practices, focusing on specific struggles, they share a contempt for authority expropriating or occluding the original power people possess.

This argument that the state constitutes an illegitimate expropriation of the power residing in everyone provides a categorical critique of planning as a state-led practice, as an institution alienating the capacity of everyone to act. I next mobilize another concept to extend the critique of the redistributive function in planning for equity and social justice. The following section reviews how Newman conceives of the tension between equity and liberty in liberal democracies, in that efforts to produce equality necessarily impinge on individual liberty. Planning's focus on mediating this tension ultimately precludes any formulation of collective
liberty. As the final section will show, these critiques apply to equity planning through the state’s sovereign determinations of deservingness and through the data collection strategies that legitimate that sovereignty and sustain the definition of liberty as an individual right rather than a social or collective concept.

**Equality Versus Liberty**

The tension between individual liberty and social equality is of significant concern in political theory and practice. Saul Newman describes this equal-liberty tension at length in order to argue that outside of the state’s sovereignty, this tension is resolved, making possible a collective liberty, a collective autonomy that does not impinge upon liberty in attempt to produce equality. This argument is consonant with the previous arguments in that Purcell and Newman assert that the state constitutes an illegitimate expropriation of individuals’ power to act. Here then their assertions carry to a specific function of the state—its sovereign ability to take and give resources, rather than the people themselves making those determinations. Through this function, individuals are recipients of redistributed resources or state protections, rather than active agents in negotiating their needs, caring for themselves or for others; the sovereign state alienates their power.

In anarchism, liberty and equality are inextricably linked, in that one is not possible without the realization of the other. From Bakunin, Newman highlights:

The freedom of others, far from limiting or negating my liberty, is on the contrary its necessary condition and confirmation. I become free in the true sense only by virtue of the liberty of others, so much so that the greater the number of free people surrounding
me the deeper and greater and more extensive their liberty, the deeper and larger
becomes my liberty. (Bakunin in Newman 2010: 20-21)

In this formulation of equal-liberty, equality and liberty are not in tension nor in opposition, but are mutually enhancing. Liberty only holds meaning as a collective capacity—a liberty shared and struggled for, not one in which liberty of one is a threat to the liberty of another.

This idea of collective liberty contrasts to the equal-liberty of liberalism. Newman explains that the basic liberal understanding of the relationship between equality and liberty is articulated in Herbert Spencer’s law of equal freedom. Newman quotes: “‘Every man has the freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man’” (Newman 2010: 21). Spencer asserts that we all have an equal right to be individually and privately free, so no action should constrain the liberty of another. In this formulation, equality is understood as equal rights, equal protections of ones individual liberty from the threat of others or the state, not necessarily a material equality or access to opportunities. Within a formal equality of rights, pursuing material equality poses a threat to individual liberty. So in an attempt to increase equality, the state necessarily impinges on liberty as it redistributes resources.

Therefore, as Newman indicates, Spencer connected this law to a form of libertarianism, such that “all government institutions must be subordinated to the equal-liberty principle, and that therefore we have the right to simply ignore and disobey the state when its directives would lead to a violation of this principle” (ibid.). While there is an anti-authoritarian ethos here, it conceives of liberty as confined to an individual freedom.

Newman identifies several forms of liberalism that attempt to accommodate social and economic equality, beyond the formal equality of rights imagined in Spencer’s law of equal
freedom. John Rawls’ egalitarianism is one that is particularly familiar in the planning profession, specifically cited in sectors ranging from transportation to infrastructure service planning (for example Downs 2004, William 1988). Rawls articulates a ‘justice as fairness’ in which we can identify a fair distribution of resources that balances a socially acceptable amount of liberty with an individually acceptable amount of equality. In this thinking, we can determine a “fair” imposition on liberty to attain a sufficient amount of equality, as proffered in Keynesianism, based on what we might choose if we had no knowledge of our status or position in life.

Rawls outlines two principles to guide institutions to realize a liberal understanding of equal-liberty. First, “each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all” (Rawls 1985). This first principle, similar to Spencer’s law of equal freedom, asserts formal equality of rights. The second principle outlines the conditions for acceptable levels of social and economic inequality. Any inequalities “must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls 1985). From this second principle, equality should be sought through equal access to opportunity or choices, and unequal treatment must benefit the least advantaged, such as redistributing resources to those with less.

Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’ sets conditions for seeking equality, which involves increasing choices, and highlights acceptable types of unequal treatment. However, for Newman, these liberal theories of equality posit the individual as “a passive recipient of either state protections or redistributive rights: there is no notion of the subject seizing, constructing and organizing for
himself or herself in collaboration with others, egalitarian and libertarian social arrangements” (Newman 2010: 22). Two issues come from this. First, the subjects receiving the benefits or costs of redistribution have no agency in that process; their original power is alienated in this system. So while Rawls tries to develop a way to most fairly impinge upon individual liberty, it is ultimately a hierarchical imposition in which some entity determines for others their needs, expropriating individuals’ power to determine their needs for themselves. Second, and more importantly, Rawls’ theory and the practice of redistribution still only conceives of liberty as guarded, as something an individual alone possesses that can be guaranteed or provided by the state. This is opposed to a collective liberty in which individuals act together to produce the circumstances of their shared lives and develop relations of care.

This understanding of liberty as something sovereignly determined and maintained is similar to the conception of equality in planning practice. That is, equality understood as externally determined, rather than immanently defined. Contemporary planning practitioners oriented towards social justice often make the distinction between ‘equity’ and ‘equality’, with equity understood as the more progressive form of justice (for example Hamai 2017). ‘Equality’ is accepted as redistributing resources and services such that everyone receives the same without regard for historical inequities or existing resources. I have ten plums and you have five plums; we both receive three plums from the state because our geographic districts are the same size. ‘Equity’, in this distinction, seeks to build resources profiles of needs and redistribute goods and services in order to create a more fair and level playing field. I have ten plums and you have five plums; you receive four plums and I receive two plums from the state. You were given slightly
more because the state experts determined that since you started with less, in part as a result of institutional histories with exclusionary policies, you deserve more.

I am, perhaps, allergic to plums and you do not like plums at the time, so here we are with an excess of plums that was fairly redistributed to us by some entity that determined, through a system of policies and data collection methodologies, which might have inadvertently neglected allergies and preferences, that we were deserving of $x$ number of plums. At some point we may have voted for a legislator who promised to tax people with more resources, but plums had never been discussed. By the time plums had entered into the equation, decisions were far removed from our initial vote, so we had little say in whether or not plums were to be taken or received. With our additional plums, we are closer to possessing equal resources or means of carrying out our lives, but we are passive recipients of someone else’s decisions. You might want a plum in a few weeks, but the fruit is already rotting.

‘Equality’ here appears closer to Spencer’s law of equal freedom, while ‘equity’ resonates with Rawls’ distributive egalitarianism. However, for Newman, the distinction between equity and equality is meaningless since they both still operate within the assumption of the redistributive, hierarchical mechanisms of the state, even if one is more attentive to historically produced inequalities. Practices of equity planning that operate within the state are necessarily confined to redistributive tools that must identify a socially acceptable amount of individual liberty people will give up in order to achieve an individually acceptable amount of social equality. Both ‘equity’ and ‘equality’ in these distinctions still understand liberty as individually possessed, not collectively imagined. And, from Purcell's contention, the state in both cases is
rendered as the appropriate site of politics, rather than amongst the people themselves developing their capacity to engage with others.

Newman takes Étienne Balibar’s formulation of equal-liberty, which resonates with Bakunin’s articulation of collective liberty. For them, “it is impossible to conceive and institute equality between humans based on despotism”, as in the Hobbesian state, because there is always an entity, or artificial person, outside of the people-being-made-equal who is above and beyond those people (Newman 2010). The issue for Newman, and most anarchists, is this dominating and hierarchical force attempting to produce equality, not only rendering passive individual’s capacity to act, but logically impossible when someone determines for someone else the means for achieving equality.

This highlights the sense in which anarchists understand equality. For them, equality is not equal rights or equal recognition from the state, as understood in Spencer’s law of equal freedom. Neither is equality produced through equivalent access to opportunities or choices, as Rawls suggests. Equality then is a social condition referring to individuals having the equal power to make decisions about the circumstances affecting their lives; equality is not defined by a sovereign entity but is immanent in our social relations. As a social condition, it requires practice to develop the capacity for being attentive to the self and others.

This resonates with Newman’s understanding of the ‘properly political’, in that ‘the political’ is not that which happens in and through the sovereign state, dealing with its various institutions and practices, but is the struggle amongst individuals outside of the sovereign state—the ‘dimension of antagonism inherent in social relations’, as described previously. Politics is an intractable social condition. Political equality then is not that which the state grants to its
subjects, in the form of rights or recognition, but can only be produced through taking up one's power that the state has expropriated.

For anarchists, liberty is inextricably linked to this conception of equality. Newman explains, again from Bakunin, “the very principle of political authority violates that of individual freedom and must, therefore, be abolished: liberty can be realized only when the individual is no longer governed by external political institutions” (Newman 2010: 27). Liberty then becomes a collective possibility without the sovereign state determining acceptable forms of liberty or protecting one’s liberties from another’s liberties. Without a sovereign authority tabulating rights, redistributing resources through clearly defined systems of recognition, liberty shifts from an individual claim to a collective possibility. In this thinking, liberty is an act of taking up one's power, negotiating one's needs with others, caring for oneself in whatever ways one can invent.

This formulation of equality and liberty is not to erase the very real and miserable conditions that many people face due to a lack of resources. Neither is it to ignore the pain and violence people experience as a result of their social positions. For some, receiving redistributed resources such that they could have shelter for their family feels more secure than and outweighs the indeterminacy of what individuals could do through taking up their power to produce something else.

As Elizabeth Grosz saliently articulates: “it is about ensuring that the future is different from the past and the present, that those subjects and social categories privileged or subordinated in the past or present have a future in which that social status has no guarantees” (Grosz 2011: 95). That is, in the Hobbesian state of nature in which there are no guarantees of safety or peace, there exists the corresponding possibility of inventing forms of care and modes of relating to...
others never before imagined. Rather than redistributing that which already exists, this radical understanding of equal-liberty looks to reinvent our world on the terms of the present, instead of accepting the terms of the past that have constructed the current condition.

The most progressive form of equal-liberty imaginable within a sovereign state is one in which liberty is ceded to the state in order to provide greater opportunities to those marginalized by that system. Anarchism resolves the tension between equality and liberty through redefining those terms. This ultimately translates to taking up the power inherent in everyone in order to invent new modes of caring for ourselves and others, developing our social capacities rather than only ever speaking to the state. Rather than understanding equality as equal rights or access to opportunities, anarchists understand equality as a way of being together. Equality is not something one can distribute, an object moved from point A to point B, but is listening, hearing, negotiating with others. Equality is an ongoing practice, not a box one can check. Similarly, liberty is neither a guarantee nor a set of protections or rights owed based on citizenship. Rather, liberty is a freedom to act and re-appropriate ones alienated power, to collectively produce a world in which we can bear residing together. Equality and liberty are actions taken, care given, possibilities invented, not guarantees that people demand from a sovereign authority.

Anarchism and Planning

Threads of anarchism appear throughout urban planning. The previously described assertions condemning the sovereign state illegitimately expropriating people’s power, translate into, as Peter Hall and Colin Ward highlight, practices related to communalism, regionalism, and mutual aid. Practices at the confluence of planning and anarchism express a general resistance to
authority—for decisions made on behalf of others—highlighting individuals taking up their power to coordinate with others and care for themselves in whatever ways they can imagine. However, these practices also highlight tensions between planning and anarchism; these theories and practices do not possess an easy affinity. While practices at times embody anarchism’s anti-authoritarian ethos, they do not always assert and struggle for a collective liberty. The will to more comprehensively coordinate activities slips into hierarchical decision-making and the desire to enable ‘the good life’ for more people impatiently imposes on others a vision for what constitutes ‘good’ in this life we are forced to live together.

In *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design Since 1880*, Peter Hall identifies several tendencies in his understanding of anarchism: rejection of big government, emphasis on common property, and decisions made and resources shared at small scales (Hall 2014). Colin Ward, the planner and architect often associated with anarchism, similarly defines anarchism as not disorder or “the opposite of organization”, but “the absence of government”, elaborating that it is governments who enforce inequality through enforcing laws that maintain a given distribution of resources (Ward 1973). From Purcell's argument, this is the sovereign state expropriating people’s power to determine for themselves, together, their needs. The government prevents individuals from developing social capacities. Ward blames “authority” for the injustice of having to work not for enjoyment or want, but because employment is the only means of survival (ibid.). Here Ward identifies ‘authority’ as the entity that structures and determines social and economic life. Rather than constructing a shared liberty, authority structures a world in which individuals compete for employment, as opposed to working to meet their collective needs.
From this understanding of anarchism, Hall suggests early utopian planning stemmed from anarchist thinking. Ebenezer Howard’s garden cities were imagined as an order ideal for decentralized governance, not needing a big government to conduct the necessary affairs of the community—people could participate freely in the matters that concerned them. Hall calls Howard’s utopian designs “the vehicles for a progressive reconstruction of capitalist society into an infinity of cooperative commonwealths”, stating that Howard has been mislabelled as a “physical planner” when he perhaps was more of a political visionary, for Hall (Hall 2014). Experiments with cooperative ownership appear everywhere, from cooperatively owned housing to cooperatively managed factories. These egalitarian values grow away from their radical roots into a tradition of regional planning, simplifying the anti-capitalist ideals into a spatial prescription for planning at a particular scale, coordinating activity across a region.

For another path these early anarchist sentiments take in planning, Hall later describes that eschewing authority and hierarchy does not necessarily stem from the ethos of anarchism even if practically resembling it, but appears as more of a deregulated development strategy. A notable thread is “non-plan” as put forth by a quartet of designers and planners associated with the magazine *New Society*: Paul Barker, Peter Hall, Cedric Price, and Rayner Banham. Their’s was more of a thought experiment—could things be any worse if there was no planning at all? They were largely concerned with the hierarchical imposition of aesthetic choices and the bureaucratic red tape that resulted in less-than-ideal-to-them planning (Barker 2000). Their experiments show some amount of taking up their power to make decisions for themselves.

Hall elsewhere identifies this non-planning thread in Jane Jacobs, who argued for a return to “the density and mixed land uses of the traditional unplanned city” (Hall 2014: 313). Her
vision suggests more of a spatial determinism of ‘the good life’ than the anarchist desire for individuals to determine for themselves how to meet their needs. Hall also highlights Richard Sennett’s assertion in *The Uses of Disorder* that the overly rigid ordering of cities stifles personal growth (ibid.). This resonates with Colin Ward’s articulation of ‘self-help’, which he sees as the complementary principle to mutual aid in anarchist social arrangements. For Ward, self-help and mutual aid, as an ongoing process of developing one’s capacity for self-care and social solidarity, respectively, are central to producing relationships outside of the sovereign authority of the state (Ward 1973, Wilkin 2015). From this then, anarchism is not a design feature, but actions that individuals take, care that they give to themselves and others. Through these actions, they take up the power that has always been theirs.

Throughout *Cities of Tomorrow*, Hall charts out the ebb and flow of what he deems anarchist tendencies, from increases in regulatory control enabling iconic boulevards and eight-lane highways, to the “accidental anarchism” of the sale of public housing to tenants in Britain (Hall 2014: 324). However, in that last case, Hall is too quick to label the devolution of state authority to market rationality “anarchism”, even modified with “accidental”. In applying Colin Ward’s anarchist critique to contemporary public participation practices in Britain, Wilkin and Boudeau (2015) suggest that the authority of the state and the market similarly alienate individuals’ capacity to negotiate their affairs themselves. While this is not the logic of sovereignty Purcell describes in deconstructing Hobbes’ argument, it is an organizing and alienating logic. Rather than just eliminating the state’s control of certain assets, anarchism is an ongoing action—an unending struggle—to create relationships outside the logic of the state and
any hierarchical market mechanism. Both the state and market prevent us from developing our capacities to govern ourselves.

Ward highlights, through Bakunin, the concept of “a right to succession” that connects Purcell’s and Newman’s arguments to Hall’s regionalism. In describing coordination of self-managed communities, Ward quotes, “the right of free union and equally free secession comes first and foremost among all political rights; without it confederation would be nothing but centralization in disguise” (Ward 2004: 85). Attempts to coordinate across regions then must come with an ability to secede from associating; communities must have the ability to associate voluntarily. This makes sense of Hall’s conjecture that regional planning stemmed from anarchism, in that people attempt to coordinate for themselves across regional scales without a sovereign authority like a Federal government. While there appears this connection, any question of scale must always come back, for Purcell and Newman, to whether or not strategies rely on forms of representation or authority that expropriate individuals’ power, not just focusing on communities or regions.

In all of these cases, their originators express discontent with someone else determining for them the right way to live or structure the built environment—that someone else could not know their wants or needs. Some, like Howard, assert that they do know the right way to structure the built environment, and that it would enable communal living without significant government interference. Purcell’s and Newman’s arguments counter that no given spatial ordering is inherently conducive to a desired social relation. Further, Howard’s position neglects that any such spatial determinism alienates individual’s power to determine utility for themselves in direct negotiation with others.
Saul Newman provides a contemporary articulation of anarchism in planning, identifying practices wholly outside the logic of the sovereign state and the market. For him, an anarchist planning practice would “seek to realize alternatives to capitalism and statism within the current order”, prefiguring, and practicing, the world in which individuals might want to live (Newman 2011). He highlights “the organizational capacities of ordinary people to transform their social space” through the example of Tahrir Square in 2011 where people occupied open space and set up services in attempt to meet protestors’ needs and care for others. Individuals coordinated services from sanitation and medical treatment to rigging up electricity and providing sleeping space. This kind of prefigurative politics, as a tradition, recognizes that the world we might want cannot come into existence over night, but that we begin to realize it by enacting it right now in our everyday practices through modes of coordination and care. This contrasts to revolutionary theories of change that argue for overthrowing a sovereign authority and installing a temporary authority that will somehow institute this new world of egalitarian social relations.

Newman extols the seemingly spontaneous coordination and the celebratory moment—insurrection as “unbinding of the self from his or her attachment to power” and a “utopian rupture” (Newman 2011)—but this kind of prefiguring can only manifest through relationships and self-awareness that have been cultivated over long periods of time. These are relationships without guarantees. Instead, they are acts of voluntary association in which individuals determine for themselves how and when they give and receive care and support. Newman highlights that these acts of coordination and redistribution without a sovereign state—rather, done by people in cooperation with others—provide a fleeting example of what an anarchist planning looks like.
These cases highlight that anarchism appears in many different forms in planning practice—regional coordination and shared management of resources, designing communities without the planning department’s authority, occupying public space. Importantly, they highlight experiments—individuals practicing constructing space with others. While certain strategies like cooperative ownership and decentralized coordination can support those efforts, prefiguring and inventing society on the terms of the present requires practice engaging with others. As the definition of equal-liberty developed through Purcell's and Newman's arguments suggest, equality and liberty are actions we take and ways we directly interact with others. These examples then show experiments in negotiating those relationships, rather than leaving those relationships for a sovereign authority to mediate.

Whereas this section highlighted examples of individuals participating in directly negotiating their needs or collaboratively prefiguring the world the might want to live in, the next section reviews processes within planning that, despite planners’ efforts to make those processes work for more people, still assume the need for a sovereign authority to mediate those decisions. That is, they assume that individuals cannot develop their capacities to care for themselves and others, thus need the state to take on those activities. In mediating the social, the state prevents the possibility of a collective liberty, confining a desire for equality to something we can distribute rather than equality as an immanent social condition.
Who plans for whom?

Professional planning is made up of a set of tools that help planners and decision-makers order space and distribute resources. From the data collection methods that help planners understand existing conditions to the policies that allocate resources and the financing mechanisms used to meet those policy objectives, planning is a process of a sovereign authority understanding needs and justifying who gets what. This section reviews three process theories within planning—rational planning, Krumholz’ equity planning, and Sandercock’s multicultural planning—highlighting a trend in planning to seek greater inclusion and more attention to difference. These shifts look to produce a better life for more kinds of people, focusing on those who have historically been marginalized through policies and regulations that did not recognize the many different lived experiences within a city.

As this review shows, despite increasing attention to difference and more inclusive community engagement practices, planning practice remains confined to hierarchical decision-making practices. That is, these methods for understanding existing conditions do not ultimately translate into individuals making decisions, but serve to legitimate sovereign decisions. For Purcell and Newman then, state-led planning mobilizes expropriated power to determine for individuals their needs, rather than the people doing that themselves. From Purcell, the sovereign authority of the planning department, as a political institution, alienates the power individuals possess to act and make decisions for themselves. So for Newman, the redistributive mechanism
lauded in more progressive planning theories and practices, is built around a tension between
equality and liberty, ultimately subverting any understanding of a collective liberty.

These critiques suggest that those processes of data collection and community
engagement serve to legitimate decisions planners make for individuals and communities. Wilkin
and Boudeau (2015) apply this logic to their assessment of public participation in Britain. They
contrast Colin Ward’s understanding of public participation, which “presupposes the actual
running and maintaining of the very services that the public relied upon through the key values
of mutual aid and self-help”, compared to the instrumental incorporation of public comments in
liberal democracies, which legitimate decisions made by a sovereign authority (Wilkin and
Boudeau 2015, italics in original). The distinction then is that people participate in constructing
and directly negotiating their affairs themselves, rather than participate in having their wants or
needs incorporated into a sovereign authority's decision-making process. Purcell (2009) extends
this concept to communicative and collaborative planning, insofar as those practices reflect
Habermasian ideals. In Purcell's argument, the practices of seeking consensus or ‘ideal speech
situations’ legitimate a given hegemony, whether that of the state or the market, rather than
shifting power relations or mobilizing a counter hegemony. In both accounts, a sovereign
authority implements a program to collect or exchange information, which serves to legitimate
the existing, or hegemonic, decision-making structure. The following review of planning theory
highlights this logic.

Theories on systems and rational planning provide a baseline for understanding some key
components in the redistributive process, including the broad methods planners use to understand
existing conditions and who makes decisions. In reviewing these theories, Allmendinger (2002)
describes them as viewing the city as a complex organism requiring many datasets and sophisticated models in order to understand that complexity.

Many actors are making decisions at any given moment, so the planner “must find ways in which they can classify and predict such decisions in order to be able to manage such complex change” (Allmendinger 2002: 44). Overall, the planner is tasked with collecting information, building models to understand trends, coordinating actors, and developing alternative courses of action based upon the stated goals and projections of possible outcomes. Given this framework, better decisions come from collecting ever more information, developing evaluative tools to assess accuracy of the models and reduce uncertainty, and assessing how close implementation comes to meeting the stated goals. Better decisions do not come from the people themselves, rather, institutions use these strategies to legitimate that they remain the decision-makers.

Some theorize general concepts for managing the complexity of the environments in which planners work and the uncertainty of planning outcomes. Lindblom (2003 [1959]) suggests an incremental method for dealing with both the impossibility of perfect information and the challenge of every stakeholder not holding the same priorities or values. He asserts that policy-making in practice involves two issues: “evaluation and empirical analysis are intertwined” and values get applied in the process of making decisions, not necessarily ahead of time (Lindblom 2003 [1959]: 200). He determines these are not in fact “issues” to solve, but are the realities of policy-making that can be dealt with through ongoing improvements and evaluations. That is, through more of a cyclical and reflective process than a linear process, but
the planner remains an expert data collector and analyst, even if those processes involve iterations.

As a result of relying on data for decision-making, researchers and planners are immensely concerned with reducing uncertainty. As every introductory quantitative methods course stresses, data cannot predict causation, only show correlation. Therefore social science research within planning must always account for uncertainty. For example, researchers recently combined two simulation models of housing, jobs, land use and transportation to analyze the impact of tearing down the Alaskan Way Viaduct on commute times (Ratery 2011). The research aimed to reduce the uncertainty that different construction alternatives would have on commute times for several modes of transportation. The researchers took multiple datasets and attempted to correlate changes in that data over time in order to come up with possible futures such that they can present their results with 95% confidence. That is, 95% of the time, their prediction would occur. The research was a project of reducing uncertainty for the purposes of decision-making, justifying the state’s authority through expertise. Which is to say, this expertise and focus on ‘uncertainty’ provide a veneer of legitimacy to the state making decisions.

Equity planning arose from a recognition that in the rational planning process, some people where not receiving as many benefits or were burdened with more costs than other people; these rational methods did not necessarily serve everyone equally. Paul Davidoff suggests, “so long as poverty and racism exist in our society, there is an ethical imperative for a single direction in planning”, which, for him, is towards mobilizing these tools to redistribute goods and services to “marginalized communities” (Davidoff 1978: 70).
Building off of the methods used in rational or systems processes, equity planning asks for a distributional analysis. For equity planners, planning is not just a matter of approving a certain amount of square footage on residentially zoned lots based on projected population growth and average household size. Rather, Davidoff describes, “planners should know who gets what out of a proposed plan—by class, by race, by sex, by age, by ethnic group” (Davidoff 1978: 70). For Davidoff, projections of planning alternatives should involve modeling and understanding the disparate impacts decisions might have on different categories of people. In equity planning, people become more narrowly defined categories, more specific datasets, than just one geographically distributed public. The aim then is to create a better lived experience for more people.

In this way, equity planning aligns with the Rawlsian egalitarianism described previously. According to one of the conditions in Rawls’ second principle, unequal treatment is acceptable if it benefits those who have the least. In order to achieve this redistribution towards those who have the fewest resources, Davidoff asserts that planners should know which categories of people receive the benefits and which categories receive the costs of a sovereign decision. Through this project of knowing who has what, the authority can make decisions to redistribute based on those categories and known benefits or costs. Thus, being attentive to different lived experiences—whether ‘by class, by race, by sex, by age, by ethnic group’—involves sovereign knowledge and decisions, rather than people themselves making decisions together. Rawls’ second principle suggests this imposition on liberty is acceptable in order to produce equality. For Newman, this tension between equality and liberty misarticulates liberty, as liberty is reduced to something an individual possesses, something one can receive from the state.
Whereas Newman's understanding of collective liberty is a freedom that is expansive and shared, not limited by the rights a state can guarantee or enforce.

This explicit shift towards, as Davidoff articulates, acknowledging different identities and abilities adds another layer of information required to adequately understand existing conditions, but it does not shift away from a sovereign authority making decisions for those different identities and abilities. In the paradigm Davidoff presents, planners act as advocates speaking for marginalized communities. That is, planners mediate the social rather than individuals engaging in those relations themselves. From Purcell's and Newman's critiques, individuals must develop this capacity if they are to seek collective liberty rather than simply an equal distribution of resources. Seeking this equitable distribution of resources is not equivalent to getting needs met.

Norman Krumholz (1999) describes several examples of cities attempting to make local economic development planning more equitable. He quotes his previous publication on Cleveland, which states, “equity requires that locally responsible government institutions give priority attention to the goal of promoting a wider range of choices for the Cleveland residents who have few, if any, choices” (Krumholz 1999: 87). This comment situates the planner as judge; ‘government institutions’ have the power to decide who deserves attention, not the people themselves. The role of the individual is to passively be recognized by the sovereign authority.

Krumholz’ comment further highlights the constrained sense of liberty imagined within the confines of state-led planning, which is liberty understood as choice or opportunity versus liberty as action. A second condition to Rawls’ second principle of justice as fairness reads “social and economic inequalities . . . must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 1985: 227). Rawls suggests that, from an
institutional standpoint, as long as individuals have the opportunity, the access, the choice to attain something, a persisting inequality is acceptable. From this, in equity planning, liberty involves a sovereign authority ‘promoting a wider range of choices’. That is, freedom is presented as choices. Providing this modicum of freedom to choose between a few options, rather than the state providing one option, provides some legitimacy to the fact that the state made most of the decisions leading up to that limited choice. Contrastingly, in anarchism, freedom is neither a constrained set of choices nor a set of guaranteed protections, but is a freedom to determine together individuals’ needs and how to meet those needs. Where Krumholz seeks to extend freedoms to marginalized communities in the form of increased choices, Newman would argue that a set of choices provided by a sovereign authority is no freedom at all.

Krumholz offers a more specific example of a decision-making process within planning. He describes a policy put in place to help guide decision making, which directed planners to “invest in private redevelopment efforts where it can be shown that such investment will provide a return to the city in the form of jobs for city residents, net increases in revenues for the city and/or improved services for low-income residents” (Krumholz 1999). Ultimately, the policy “led the planning commission to disapprove a $350 million downtown development proposal”, because it did not sufficiently meet that policy dictate. Importantly, it was not the community that made that decision, but it was a group of elected officials who made that decision based off of a policy developed for the Cleveland plan. While there may have been community input in the process of developing the plan, the Commission’s decision was several times removed from any decision a community member made.
Indeed, in this model the role of the community is primarily to vote for decision-makers who will act in that particular community’s interest. Krumholz warns that it is possible for leadership to “undermine grass-roots action, and cooperative leadership may be co-opted by centralized, top-down approaches and ignore redistributive issues” (Krumholz 1999). For Krumholz here, “grass-roots action” has a very narrow definition. It is not communities directly acting to collectively get their needs met, but refers to “the organization, participation, and support of a majority of urban voters” (ibid.). In this way, equity planning relies on individuals mobilizing their votes to elect people who will make policies in favor of redistribution to marginalized communities. This vote attempts to legitimate the sovereign authority’s expropriation of power from the people.

In addition to this voting public, equity planning identifies certain communities that are in need of redistribution. Another example Krumholz describes is in Oakland during the 1980s, when the city decided that a top priority was “the employment of minority youth” (ibid.). Aside from the problem of determining who belongs to this category, the broader issue concerns city officials determining for others their needs. The planning department invariably had to construct a methodology for who counts in the category of “minority youth”. Then, they would have had to have a system to understand how a given person identifies—is it if they go to a community center in a certain area, or is it by census data, or by skin tone, or by proof of income? In turn, every person would have to make themselves recognizable through whatever means the planning department used if they wanted to receive the benefits of the City’s efforts.

From these examples, equity planning requires individuals to conform to whatever system of recognition the planning department or data collection methods require. Equity
planning acknowledges a reality that some people might need more attention or resources than others, but leaves that determination to the planning department, not to those people themselves. The planning department determines both the terms of recognition and what individuals need, whether employment or housing or transit service. This again highlights the constrained understanding of freedom found in equity planning—the authority grants freedom through increasing employment opportunities. This is not a collective liberty but one in which everyone vies for a specific quantity of employment opportunities. Rather than developing their capacity to construct alternatives together, communities are passive recipients of the state’s determinations.

This is not to say that planners have not tried to address this shortcoming in their ability to know people’s needs. Planners employ participatory methods, increasingly robust community engagement processes, and more specific or targeted data collection. As the following shows, efforts to increase participation and include more voices into the process of understanding existing conditions does not lead to individuals themselves making decisions; the sovereign authority retains that power. That is, increasingly complex categories of recognition and community engagement strategies legitimate equality as an institutional project rather than as an ongoing struggle to develop social relations outside of the state. Here recall Newman's articulation of, from Mouffe, the 'properly political' as those relations engaged in outside of the institutions of the state. For Newman, a proper understanding of equality is within social relations and decision-making, not as distributable resources or equal rights granted by the state.

An example of research to oriented towards improving community engagement processes includes Buckley and Graves’ (2016) work to include ‘intangible heritage’ in historic preservation. They argue that more racially and culturally inclusive processes lead to more
diverse experiences getting representing in preservation decisions, thus ultimately creating a more livable environment for those who have been left out of the dominant values mobilized through historic preservation. Similarly, Mackenzie et al (2012) applied a Participatory Action Research methodology to water district planning process in Australia to access a wider range of stakeholders, create more opportunity for reflection and collaborative deliberation, and increase opportunities to be heard. These examples argue for process improvements focused on inclusion in order to create outcomes that accounted for more kinds of experiences, whether the experience of an ethnic minority or a single mother.

The important distinction is whether increased participation amounts to actively making decisions with others or if it only amounts to instrumental inclusion in sovereign decisions. A recent example that clarifies this distinction is a community engagement process for a recent traffic improvement project in Bellevue, WA. The project was surrounding two schools, and the consulting agency considered the area “highly diverse minority majority institutions with students spanning the income spectrum from millionaire to homeless”—racially and economically diverse (Clinkscales 2017). In order to understand the mobility patterns of this diverse group of people, the consultant identified ten different groups-of-interest based on intersections of “income, ethnicity, language, school, parents of kids, or just home owners or business owners in the neighborhood” (ibid.). The engagement strategy involved outreach at sports clubs, libraries, a community center, and the YMCA to meet people across the income spectrum, plus social media post, paper mailers, and intercept surveys.

Just as the Alaskan Way Viaduct research project pulled together diverse datasets in order to ascertain possible outcomes, this project developed a dataset of people in order to understand
the potential impact of the different traffic improvement alternatives. In attempt to address the
many different lived experiences individuals have as they move through the built environment,
they must become data for the sovereign authority, rather than become decision-makers. While
planners and City officials attempt to understand what it might look like to care for people with
different needs and experiences, they ultimately expropriate those individuals’ power to
determine for themselves what it looks like to give and receive care.

Contemporary thinking on equity planning remains confined to the paradigm Krumholz
presented in his publications, in terms of the main values and goals of practice, and who makes
decisions. Zapata and Bates (2017) conducted a review of grant applications for the HUD
Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grants with the goal of understanding how practice
does or does not align with the ideals of Krumholz’ equity planning. Zapata and Bates build their
analytic framework around Krumholz’ Cleveland Policy Plan, specifically the goal “to expand
choices for those who have fewest”, which also resonates with Rawls' formulation of ‘justice as
fairness' (Zapata and Bates 2017). They found that the HUD CFP upheld the ideals of equity
planning through clearly defining populations that should benefit from land use decisions and
distributed funds. However, in their review of applications, they found that rather than focus on
specific populations, applicants made arguments that addressing equity issues benefit the entire
region. So, in their analysis, “social equity is often related to its potential impact on economic
growth or efficiency, rather than to justice for populations who ‘have the fewest choices’” (ibid.: 423).
Which is to say, in this case, equity planning appears in contemporary practice in the HUD
grant program, but regions show reticence to carry forward targeted redistribution, focusing
rather on economic growth in hopes that everyone receives the benefits.
Doussard (2015) explores similar tensions between equity planning within the state and actors outside state-led planning. He is specifically interested in “the potential to scale equity planning ‘up’ to political scales at which redistributive policy is both more effective and more likely to be enacted” (Doussard 2015). Further, he takes from Krumholz and Forester to orient his research towards mobilizing action outside of the planning profession, quoting them “‘planners cannot single-handedly change the landscape and political economy of our cities. We should not ask planners to do what only broader social movements can accomplish’” (ibid.).

Within the confines of the redistributive paradigm Doussard articulates, the ‘social movements’ and extra-state collaborations resonate with Krumholz’ earlier assertion that the role of the public is in mobilizing votes in order to get decision-makers to take specific actions. That is, people must collectively give up their power for others to make decisions. In attempting to ‘scale equity planning up’, Doussard provides a clear image of Hobbes’ Leviathan collecting up all of the people’s power, ceding that power to ever higher scales of sovereign authority.

Where Krumholz focused at the city-scale, both Doussard and Zapata and Bates, explore the possibilities of equity planning at regional and national scales. While these examples incorporate extra-state actors as decision-makers in seeking redistribution, they remain within hierarchical decision-making mechanisms, focusing instead on making those mechanisms more efficient and inclusive. Further, these contemporary cases suggest a limit to equity planning in achieving its own ideals in the face of a market logic. For Zapata and Bates, policies struggle to incentivize redistribution towards targeted populations. For Doussard, action must be oriented towards larger scales of institutions in hopes of mobilizing the political will of those controlling expropriated power beyond the City planning department.
In planning theory, more radical attempts of inclusion and social amelioration, despite their innovations, still assume the need to expropriate power in order to make possible improved conditions. Planning theorist Leonie Sandercock’s goal is to figure out “how we stroppy strangers might live together without doing each other too much violence” (Sandercock 2003: 105). Her project asserts that our collective survival depends on our ability to value diversity and difference, to find new ways to care for others. She develops a framework of multiculturalism that finds a kind of “difference that recognizes itself as historically contingent and inherently relational; and a cultivation of a care for difference through strategies of critical detachment from the identities that constitute us” (Sandercock 2003: 104). She is attentive to both the lived experience of the social construction of our identities that we cannot shake and also the need to recognize that militantly asserting these identities produces the kind of nationalism and closure she hopes to prevent. As in equity planning, the overarching goal remains figuring out how more people can live a better life.

She explains that planning, or political communities broadly, cannot design a singular vision for the good city and then figure out how much diversity can fit into that vision, but rather that we have to begin with cultural diversity as a starting assumption “and then structure political life accordingly” (ibid.). Therefore, practice must be both dialogical and agonistic, that is, based on discussion and a kind of productive tension or struggle. For her, this process “requires certain institutional preconditions, such as freedom of speech, participatory public spaces, empowered citizens, agreed procedures and basic ethical norms, and the active policing of discriminatory practices” (ibid.). For her, this political process cannot happen without a mediating entity structuring and enforcing the process. So while she states that “in this multicultural imagination,
the twin goods of belonging and of freedom can be made to support rather than oppose each other”, she still asserts that a sovereign institution, an ‘artificial person’, should structure the kind of freedom and belonging that is possible (ibid.). Planning grounded in her vision then is still structured by the state, the tools it employs and the kind of understanding it demands. Her radical vision imagines a freedom constrained through a sovereign authority expropriating individuals’ power in order to uphold values like freedom of speech and to police discriminatory practices.

Sandercock attempts to distinguish her project from equity planning, defining the latter as “an attempt at a top-down inclusionary politics, in which the poor, the marginalized, are still not part of the action, and do not feature as active agents in the narrative or theory of ‘making equity planning work’” (Sandercock 1998, italics in original). This top-down planning puts the expert planner at the center of the work—the ultimate knower of what is best for everyone. In contrast, in radical or multicultural planning, the planner takes more of a “critical distance” from both state-led planning and from communities. This practice operates in the borderlands, trying to empower the positive of communities and the state while also preventing the tyranny of the state or of mobilized communities.

So while the planner is no longer “the expert” per se, they are still in a position of determining who needs empowering, who needs subduing, and when. The equity planner collects data, mapping conditions to understand who has what, and modeling changes to project and justify who will need what in the future, focusing on giving more to those with less. In the more radical paradigm, the planner’s methods may use less mapping and modeling from the planning tower, but their ‘critical distance’ does not entirely relinquish the illegitimately expropriated power the state possess.
While the shift from equity planning to radical planning sees more kinds of difference, individuals remain dispossessed of their power. Even as planners attempt to operate with more attention to different lived experiences, these efforts operate within the constraints of certain paradigms—a hierarchical determination of the parameters that matter, collecting information in order to understand conditions, upholding decisions through a sovereign entity outside of any community or individual. Through expanded data collection methodologies and community engagement processes, the planner takes a more humble stance in their own knowledge of the public but ultimately occupies same position as controller of expropriated power, setting the terms of recognition, analyzing the data, and making the decisions.

These planning paradigms lie on a continuum of knowledge about the people and the environment for whom planners plan—they show a shift in the kinds of information that matters and the source of that knowledge; however, an important similarity between equity planning and radical or multicultural planning is they assume the need for the state. In equity planning, the state has regulatory and policing tools to enforce practices and redistribute resources. Sandercock sees the state as a necessary authority for preventing mobilized communities from oppressing other communities, so the state plays a role in enforcement or policing. Even as Sandercock seeks to deepen the planner’s attentiveness to difference and diversity, striving for a more expansive imagination of care and attention, planning is still necessarily confined to the regulatory tools and police power of the sovereign state.

Through recognizing more kinds of difference and hearing more voices, radical planning aims to empower communities with a process that remains structured by the sovereign authority of the state. In still assuming the state, her project is a more attentive and more inclusive kind of
equity planning. The planner makes determinations about who needs attention or empowerment. The decision-making processes include voices of more and different kinds of people, letting the grassroots influence what still remains “a top-down inclusionary politics”, since the terms of that process are structured by the governing body, the holder of expropriated power, the enforcer of the “institutional preconditions” she sees as necessary.

Overall, these theories show a desire to create more livable environments in which more kinds of experiences and identities might thrive. Through collecting information on more kinds of people, equity and multicultural planning look to define tools to increase individuals choices and provide more hospitable spaces for carrying out those choices. However, despite more inclusive practices, sovereign political institutions remain the authority on what counts as ‘livable’ and whose experiences are categorically recognizable or possible. Data collection and community engagement strategies legitimize both the state as the appropriate decision-maker and ‘equity’ as a state-led project. From Purcell’s and Newman’s understandings, the issue remains this constrained possibility: a set of defined choices and quantifiable futures provided by a sovereign authority. From their perspective, the goal of acting in the world is to collectively produce choices, rather than receiving those determined by a sovereign authority.

**Seattle Equitable Development Initiative**

While the previous section applies Newman’s and Purcell’s thinking to concepts developed in planning theory, this section looks at the specific case of Seattle’s Equitable Development Initiative to apply their thinking to contemporary practice. The section describes, within the context of Newman’s and Purcell’s arguments, three specific practices. First, I
highlight the entities and documents connected to the Equitable Development Initiative that delegate authority and promote coordination. Second, I provide a brief overview of the community engagement strategies used to inform the distribution of the Equitable Development Initiative funds. Last, I integrate the understanding of decision-making and authority developed in the first two components to understand the limits of the outcomes of this particular case of redistribution. Overall, this case example shows that a sovereign authority constrains the ways individuals can articulate their identities and needs, thus expropriating their power to develop those terms with one another. Through the processes of coordination and data collection, redistribution ultimately provides a constrained set of choices produced on the terms of the sovereign authority, rather than a realization of the collective will of the people.

*Agencies and Documents: Authority and Coordination*

The Seattle Equitable Development Initiative (EDI) and the Seattle 2035 Growth and Equity (G&E) analysis are two planning efforts from the Seattle Office of Planning and Community Development. The EDI runs the EDI Fund and the G&E informs the allocation of that money. There is a broader system of policies and regulations authorizing various entities to participate in planning for growth in the region. Data collection and documentation inform these entities on their decisions. This section details some the entities, documents, and data collection involved in that process, highlighting that the complexity of this system provides legitimacy to that fact that a sovereign authority is making decisions, rather than the people themselves.

While the document must be completed to comply with SEPA, as stated in the EIS, it neither binds nor authorizes the City to act any certain way. Decision-makers consider the EIS and associated documents when determining appropriate code amendments or Comprehensive Plan policy updates. The Seattle 2035 Growth and Equity (G&E) analysis is a supplementary EIS to the Comprehensive Plan, further legitimating decisions a sovereign authority, such as an elected body of officials or the planning department, makes.

The Comprehensive Plan itself is required to plan for a pre-determined projection for growth in housing and jobs. Projections are determined through the Puget Sound Regional Council’s (PSRC) Vision 2040 planning process, which was mandated in part through the Washington State Growth Management Act. Vision 2040 allocates the state-determined growth projections across PSRC’s four-county membership. For the purposes of Seattle’s 2035 Comprehensive Plan update, the projected growth is 70,000 housing units and 115,000 jobs (City of Seattle 2016).

The G&E document is involved in the first of four broad actions the City lists on its Equitable Development Initiative Implementation Plan. The Implementation Plan recommends using the G&E analysis “to inform coordinated community development and planning project selection and implementation priorities” (City of Seattle 2016, emphasis added). It is a set of data and analyses to help planning staff prioritize projects and make decisions for communities. It represents the supposed will of the people insofar as community input makes up the content of the document. Yet it is not binding, but rather informs, thus legitimates, decisions made for communities.
The G&E analyzes “impacts on displacement and opportunity related to Seattle’s growth strategy”, specifically “some of the ways that the growth strategies could affect the city’s marginalized populations” (City of Seattle 2016). While the EIS informs decision-makers on the environmental impacts of five different growth strategies, the G&E looks at the distributional impacts of these strategies on individuals and groups. The focus on specific populations aligns with the equity planning theories reviewed in the previous section.

These documents are both part of the Seattle 2035 Comprehensive Plan process, which in itself has a community engagement process and coordinated revisions across many City Departments and Utilities. Many groups and individuals informed the content of these documents. Formal entities—Washington State, PSRC, the City of Seattle, individual Departments and Offices—have authority over different pieces of this process, whether GMA, population projections, community engagement strategies or determining actual implementation, respectively. Neither the EIS nor the G&E are binding, but rather are part of this collection of documents analyzing various kinds of data that go towards justifying decisions City officials make (City of Seattle 2016). Authority gets delegated from the state to regional or local governing bodies through regulatory mechanisms, such as the GMA. Within that delegation process, it is assumed that, through voting, individuals have delegated their own authority or power to the sovereign state. This system of delegation from Washington State government and individuals' voting rights, legitimates decisions made at the City level. These processes justify that the sovereign authority makes decisions, rather than the people themselves.

Data Collection and Community Engagement
In the introduction to the G&E analysis, the authors explain, “social equity has been one of the core values guiding the Comprehensive Plan since its adoption in 1994” (City of Seattle 2017). They then reference three City policies guiding the intentions of the analysis: Resolution 31164 (2009), Executive Order 2014-02 (2014), and Resolution 31577 (2015). The first two direct City Departments to focus on “equitable development”, and the third affirms “the City of Seattle’s core value of race and social equity is one of the foundations on which the Comprehensive Plan is built” (ibid.). The G&E analysis fully aims to contribute to racial and social equity within the sovereign authority of the state. These many affirmations legitimate equity as a state-led distributive project, rather than, from Newman and Purcell, a project of developing our capacity to engage with others.

As mentioned previously, the G&E analysis informs the EDI staff as they allocate the funds in the EDI Fund. The analysis involves demographic, spatial, and economic data from several sources. The analysis integrates these datasets into a Displacement Risk Index and Access to Opportunity Index. Each index contains 14 indicators. Data for nine of the 28 indicators comes from either the 2010 Census or 2008-2012 American Community Survey. The remainder are from local transit agencies or City departments that provide data on proximity to services and infrastructure.

The G&E analysis seeks to account for potential displacement in “marginalized communities”, defined as “persons and communities of color, immigrants and refugees, English language learners, and those experiencing poverty” (City of Seattle 2017). Again, this shows a focus on target communities, as Krumholz’ equity planning prescribes. These communities get approximated through the datasets the analysts have available to them, however limited those
dataset might be. For this system to recognize an individual, one has to confine or align their identity and needs with whichever datasets are available or whichever categories are currently used in the Census or American Community Survey. That is, a sovereign authority has the final say on which identities are allowable.

One hundred and fifty years ago, people of color could identify themselves in the Census as either “Black”, “Mulatto”, “Indian”, or “Chinese”. In 2010, the identities recognized for race or ethnicity included 18 categories, with “Mulatto” no longer existing and “Indian” changed to “American Indian or Alaskan Native” (Pew Research Center 2015). While the categories are still determined by a sovereign authority, they show an increasing attention to difference. As planning seek to become more attentive to difference and issues of equality, the tools for recognizing difference must also shift. If planners want to create more racial equity, they have to have information for understanding which racial category everyone is in and what resources they have as an individual in that category. These shifts legitimate equity as a redistributive project, rather than one aligning with Newman’s sense of equal-liberty in which equality is defined through social relations.

In the context of the G&E, these datasets taken together establish the framework for knowing who has what resources. Put another way, these datasets pre-determine what resources matter to individuals and groups. Since there is no data set describing the quality of ones social support network, that asset does not matter to ones risk of displacement or access to opportunity. Proximity to a library, employment, job center, a location that sells produce, or a park do matter; those datasets exist.
Individuals’ needs are only visible if there is a dataset describing it, and if those needs conform to the parameters or language of that dataset. In the Access to Opportunity Index, nine indicators describe proximity to a good or service, three indicators describe school performance, one describes property appreciation from 2000-2013, and one for the completeness of the sidewalks.

In the three indicators of school performance, the two for elementary and middle school render “access to opportunity” through “math and reading proficiency scores by attendance area” (City of Seattle 2017). Locations with high proficiency in these two areas, plus high high school graduation rate, suggests greater access to opportunity in this index. Therefore, opportunity is seen as concentrations of students who do well on standardized tests and students whose social and extracurricular lives are not more important than their math and reading lives. Neither the student who excels in circus arts nor the one who is highly literate but experiences intense anxiety in classroom situations are visible in this context. The kinds of “opportunity” they may seek or their understanding of success is not allowed within this particular data collection and decision-making process. One can argue that math and reading proficiencies are central to making other life experiences possible; I am not arguing against that per se, just highlighting that certain kinds of success are visible given the datasets used in the analysis.

The Census and American Community Survey structures what is hearable in the Displacement Risk Index. You are “heard” as a white homeowner with two children, a spouse, and a household income >$120,000/year. You are not heard as a skateboarder, amateur robot builder, or person recovering from childhood trauma because those are not options in the surveys. These might be central facets to what and how you speak, or your needs in the built
environment, but there is no means for recognizing those parts of you in the system that makes decisions about what you may or may not need, let alone conceive of your likelihood for displacement.

Everyone’s agency exists in participating through the categories of representation available to them, through the mechanisms presented in the community engagement and data collection processes. Overall, this analysis establishes the field of recognition for identities that matter and for infrastructure or services that matter, all of which are structured through available data. It is not to say that these are good or bad indicators of quality of life or access to opportunities, only that they constitute a system of categorization that has inherent limits, yet structures the way individuals can identify themselves to the decision-making entity and the way the built environment can be recognized. Indeed, the report provides a full page of disclaimers on the limitations of this analysis, including “the relationship between growth and potential displacement is not straightforward” and “income, behavior, and physical proximity affect opportunity in complex and nuanced ways” (City of Seattle 2016). The analysis does not claim to be a perfect image of what exists nor an absolute predictor of outcomes. Importantly, complexity and difference are reduced to specific and bounded categories in order to apprehend the urban environment. A sovereign authority constructs these pre-determined systems of recognition that constrain possible needs and identities, thus constraining possible forms of care that can meet those needs.
The Last Word: Sovereign Redistribution

The EDI Fund was initially authorized through a Mayoral decision in the 2016 budget cycle to allocate $16 million in proceeds from the sale of the Civic Square property (https://www.seattle.gov/opcd/ongoing-initiatives/equitable-development-initiative#background). Since that transaction had yet to be finalized at the time, the City Council approved a transfer loan of $6.5 million from the General Fund (ibid.).

The Civic Square property was city-owned and sold to Bosa Development, who will construct a 629-foot tower with 520 condo units, three retail units, and 25,000 square feet of publicly accessible space (http://www.djc.com/news/re/12105674.html). The developers paid fees as part of the Housing Affordability and Livability Agenda’s Mandatory Housing Affordability incentive program. This and the public space contribution allow the developers additional height, which increases potential income from additional units.

An empty, City-owned lot was sold to a private entity. The private entity will profit in the long term, assuming individuals want to rent or buy their units. The private entity paid a fee to help the City create more affordable housing. Combined with the Mayor-approved proceeds from the actual sale, funds get redistributed from a private entity to benefit those projects that get approved in the EDI Fund.

The EDI Fund has an advisory board and staff for developing the RFPs to determine how to disperse the funds. In addition to the RFP determining initial project eligibility, the Growth and Equity analysis informs their decisions (https://www.seattle.gov/opcd/ongoing-initiatives/equitable-development-initiative#whatwhy). However, prior to creating the advisory board, staff members selected five projects to fund “through inclusive community engagement processes that
helped create the Equitable Development Initiative” (ibid.). These projects include: Multicultural Community Center, Rainier Beach Innovation District, Southeast Economic Opportunity Center, William Grose Center for Cultural Innovation, and Little Saigon Landmark Project. While these projects will no doubt bring some benefits to some individuals, particularly those who have been marginalized by past decisions, it represents a very constrained will of the people. The projects are framed in innovation, economic opportunity, and cultural preservation, confined to the imagination of contemporary discourse and filtered through pre-determined systems of recognizing needs, in the form of the data collection methodology. The redistribution then is not grounded in individuals’ assessment of their needs and negotiating a coordinated effort to meet those needs—it is constrained to the planning department’s existing ways of knowing and recognition. Entities, like the mayor or the EDI staff, make decisions; the documents, like the RFPs and G&E analysis, legitimate those decisions and the expropriation of individuals’ power to make decisions for themselves.
**Conclusion**

From the planning documents’ stated goals, it seems that planners ultimately are in search of a better life for more people. Planners have some drive to produce for others ‘the good life’. Sometimes that gets narrowly focused to strategies like implementing tolls on heavily travelled highways in order to make the movement of goods more predictable and efficient, with the underlying assumption that if goods where delivered more predictably, economic conditions would be more stable and life would be better for more people. More broadly, they use strategies like community engagement, regional coordination, and redistribution in attempt to understand different needs and efficiently get those needs met. With the best of intentions, planners navigate tax bills to find opportunities to incentivize affordable housing, or revise tomes of zoning code in order to streamline the development process in hopes that efficiencies will make housing more affordable.

Within the hierarchical decision-making mechanisms of state-led planning, these strategies will only always expropriate the power within everyone and constrain individuals from imagining the possibility of a collective liberty, leaving us only ever fighting for more or different rights and individual liberties. That is, some planning activities—community engagement, coordination, redistribution—are not in themselves bad or particularly damaging pursuits. There exists some amount of logic in those strategies, if our goal is to survive, for us to engage with others, coordinate our needs, and share what we have to get those needs met. Rather, planners implement these strategies through the wrong form of politics, through a sovereign authority, through wielding power that is not theirs.
As Newman argues, the ‘properly political’ is not that which occurs in the institutions of state-led planning, but is the ineluctable struggle amongst individuals, an ongoing contestation of wills. But as Purcell and Newman suggest, this struggle does not have to be imagined as a struggle of ones liberties against another’s, a guarding of possessions or freedoms. Taking up our power to act does not demand that we violently engage with others. We can do anything with our power. For them, it is this very indeterminacy that makes possible resisting institutions and norms that have been given to us, without simply incorporating ourselves into those systems. Without the guarantees and protections the sovereign state was supposedly meant to provide when it gathered up everyone’s power, we are able to develop our capacities to care for ourselves and others in whatever ways we can invent, on the terms of the present rather than the terms of the past.

Perhaps these critiques suggest that planning should not exist at all. As a state-led practice, it can only ever act as a mechanism for sovereign decisions, controlling the power expropriated from individuals. While the practice as a whole might not be worth saving, it is instructive to reframe some of its strategies and intentions. How might we apply the ideas presented in this thesis to community engagement, coordination, and redistribution? It is not to say that these terms are particularly worth saving, only that reframing the terms through which planners see practice might help to reorient the politics they use to implement their practice.

For planning practitioners, community engagement or public participation involves data collection in the form of public meetings and surveys to inform decisions officials make. Community engagement outside of the sovereign state cannot be structured by pre-determined categories of recognition, like the Census, that constrain both our identities and the needs we can
Imagine. Rather community engagement is a process of learning to hear and see oneself and others through the haze of institutions and norms structuring their recognition.

Rather than speaking through mediating entities, like planners and policy-makers during community meetings or ‘legitimate’ institutions like NGOs, an anarchist planning practice would involve speaking to each other as equals with no state planners. While this can be practiced in all interactions, some anarchists highlight restorative justice as a form of anarchist criminology that operates on contingent and negotiated terms for understanding ‘guilt’, outside of the existing legal structures. The manifesto for the open access journal Radical Criminology states, “radical criminology must be proactive in pursuing workable alternatives to statist forms of criminal justice. Indeed the notion of ‘criminal justice’ should probably be discarded altogether” (Shantz 2012). They aim to refuse the given constructions of legal/illegal or the system of rules determining what counts as fair punishment. Rather, those terms become negotiated based on the individuals involved. The point is to imagine, and try, something inconceivable within the existing paradigm, engaging with others beyond a sovereign authority.

In planning practice, coordination occurs across Departments and scales of government to produce efficiencies, like ensuring that the sewer pipes and electric wires get laid such that the road does not have to get torn up and paved twice, or to provide coordinated transit service across multiple regions. Ward suggests that coordination “requires neither uniformity nor bureaucracy”, indicating that the postal service shows that it is possible to coordinate activities without a central authority (Ward 2004). While this demonstrates the feasibility of coordinating without a central authority, like a global postal service, it does not question the necessity of existing practices. Another way that aligns more closely with the ideas of attention and care is to
deeply question what kinds of coordination we actually need. Is there anything that must happen quickly or go very far? Maybe not. [note: this is not a statement against fully automated luxury communism; that might be an idea we need, at least as we negotiate our needs together]. The intention of Purcell’s and Newman’s critiques are not to simply replace the authority of the state with the authority of our unexamined practices and ingrained habits that we have developed as subjects of a sovereign state, but to engage with one another to determine together our needs.

While we coordinate activities and resources in our everyday lives, whether with friends, coworkers, or family members, one example of a group coordinating at a larger scale is the NYC Metropolitan Anarchist Coordinating Council. From their founding documents: “MACC is a coordinating (not mandating) body . . . This means committees and working groups are free to determine their own internal structure and pursue their own vital projects” (MACC 2017). It has some structure, in terms of working groups, such as Communications, Infrastructure Group, Jail and Court Support, Art&Propaganda. But its organization is flexible, to be determined by the energies and interests that construct it, not by the persistence of rules or order. Coordination is in the service of both surviving in the present and practicing other ways of relating that are voluntary, not obligatory.

Redistribution, in the equity planning imagination, involves a sovereign authority determining who, categorically and on average, has the least, and then implementing a tool to give them more, taken from elsewhere. The process involves a rational tabulation of inputs, accounting for all recognizable parts, and then a sovereign determination of individuals’ needs. An anarchist planning would seek to share without terms or mediation, but also without rendering passive the recipient. Refusing care or support is a valid response to an offer of
support, in an anarchist paradigm, unlike within the redistributive mechanisms of equity planning in which one receives whatever the planning department’s data suggests one should receive.

The group Mutual Aid Disaster Relief provides a sense of these ideas. Their core values include, among others, mutual aid and self-determination: “individuals and communities impacted by disaster have the agency, ability, and power to make their own decisions and choices about their lives, recovery, and long-term resilience, without interference or coercion from outside forces” (MADRelief 2017). Thus aid and care is not determined by a sovereign state, but is offered and received (or not) on the terms set by the individuals involved. The terms are negotiated, recognizing that the recipient has agency, has their own capacity to understand their needs and solve problems.

Professional planning aims to construct the built environment, coordinating activities and providing services to individuals in an effort to produce a world that some might deem ‘livable’. However, it operates through controlling illegitimately expropriated power to make decisions for individuals, rather than them negotiating with each other their needs. It precludes imagining a collective liberty; within the redistributive mechanisms of the sovereign state, we can only ever guard our liberties against another’s, or give up our liberties for equality. In the anarchist imagination, planning is a contingent and collective dream negotiated by the people themselves, without a sovereign entity determining their needs. We enact that dream through taking up our power, through a politics of attention and care in everyday practice.
References


