The Salvadoran civil war, a twelve year war that left an estimated 75,000 people dead (Skidmore, 2005), officially began following murder of Archbishop Romero and the election of Ronald Reagan as U.S. president in 1980. According to Robert White, who was the United States Ambassador to El Salvador at the time, “The Salvadoran military understood this (Reagan’s election) as a go-ahead signal and unleashed a torrent of violence” (White, 2000). Although Reagan’s election in 1980 does mark the beginning of a new level of violence in El Salvador between the military and guerillas that would last until the signing of peace accords in 1992, it is misleading to refer to the Salvadoran civil war as lasting from 1980 to 1992. The struggle between the indigenous and rural poor people against the oligarchy has been ongoing since the nineteenth century. The oligarchy, who controlled El Salvador’s economy, military, and government has been exploiting the indigenous people and peasants while suppressing labor organizations and opposition political parties with violence for more than a century, even massacring thousands of Indians and peasants in 1932 during what has become known as La Matanza (Loveman, 1997).

Along with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, an advocate for the poor in El Salvador and outspoken critic of the oligarchy, on March 24, 1980 was an event that marked a heightening of the ongoing conflict in to an all out civil war (Hutchinson 1998, XIV). Archbishop Romero was highly respected and popular among the people of El Salvador and his sermons were broadcast nation wide every Sunday (Pellet 2002). Romero worked with the Nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador, which formed in 1978. They were the first group in El Salvador to document human rights abuses and murders. The group reported its findings to the United Nations and El Salvador became known as one of the six worst human rights violators in the world. Archbishop Romero, along with many others within the Nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador and within other organizations paid for their efforts with their lives (Hutchinson 1998, 4). The assassination gained world wide publicity and created enormous outcry within El Salvador.
Not long after, on December 2, 1980 an event took place that would bring the atrocities of El Salvador into every American home. Four American women, three nuns and a missionary, were raped and murdered by right wing death squads in El Salvador. The women were stopped at a checkpoint, then taken to a remote location where they were raped and shot at point-blank range (Pellet, 2002). According to former ambassador Robert White, the Salvadoran military death squads differentiated between “good nuns and bad nuns, good priests and bad priests”, and it had been decided that these women were “bad nuns”. For their work feeding and clothing the poor of El Salvador they were called communists and murdered (Pellet 2002).

Nearly nine years later, on the morning November 16, 1989, the third iconic atrocity of the Salvadoran civil war occurred. Six Jesuit priests, along with a domestic servant and her daughter, were murdered by the Salvadoran military in retaliation for an offensive that occurred on November 11. The priests were professors at the Universidad Centroamericana, where the murders took place (Sriram 2004, 79). The priests were known not just in El Salvador, but were internationally recognized for their work (International Commission of Jurists, 1992). The murders were found to have been committed by U.S. trained members of the Salvadoran military’s Batallion Atlacatl, causing outrage in the United States Congress (Sriram 2004, 79).

These three events, the assassination of Archbishop Romero, the rape and murder of four American churchwomen, and the murder of six Jesuit priests and their companions, are representative of the atrocities committed throughout El Salvador’s history and especially during the civil war. As advocates for the poor and indigenous people, members of the church were regularly targeted for intimidation, brutality, and murder at the hands of right wing death squads and uniformed members of the Salvadoran government. Just as representational as these cases are of the atrocities committed during the war, they are equally representational of the various mechanisms used, to varying degrees of success, to hold accountable those individuals who committed such acts.
The rape and murder of four American churchwomen in December of 1980 represents the first attempt by the Salvadoran government to prosecute members of the military responsible for the murder of civilians. The Salvadorans arrested five members of the National Guard for the murders, but took no steps to try them. Under heavy pressure from the United States congress, with a bill sponsored by Arlen Specter, cut of one third of all of the aid to the Salvadoran government until the five men who had been arrested for the murders were held trial death squad responsible. These men were found guilty and sentenced to the maximum of thirty years (Pellet, 2002). The lawyers for the women, who were Americans, were told they could not raise the issue of orders for the killings coming from higher up in the chain of command because the soldiers would use this as a defense and they had to be sure and convict these men. There was little satisfaction in this conviction for the relatives of the churchwomen and the few members of the United States government who wanted not only the men directly responsible for the murders to be held accountable, but also those individuals who orchestrated the murders, the men who had “command responsibility” for the men under their command.

Another attempt within El Salvador to prosecute those within the military responsible for the murder of civilians was made after the murder of the six priests and two women at the University of Central America in 1989. Leading the investigation was the Commission for the Investigation of Criminal Acts (CIHD). The CIHD was created in 1985 by with funds from the United States to investigate human rights violations that were attributed to members of the Armed Forces. CIHD’s directors and personnel were themselves members of the Armed Forces. Evidence in the case was lost and the investigation was poorly conducted. Soldiers were even given time to formulate alibis before statements were taken from them. There have been practically no cases where the CIHD, which was formed to investigate human rights violations involving military personnel, has found a member of the military responsible for a violation (International Commission of Jurists 1992, 32).
The investigation of the murders some gained legitimacy when President Cristiani, under pressure from the church and the international community to find those responsible, asked the FBI, Scotland Yard, and the Canadian and Spanish police forces to advise the CIHD (International Commission of Jurists, 1992, 33). The FBI learned that Colonel Alfredo Benavides Moreno had confessed to the CIHD about his role in the murders, but this had never been reported and would not be admissible in court. After this revelation, President Cristiani created the Commission for Honor, which was a commission made up of members of the military to help with the investigation. The commission named Colonel Moreno along with eight other men as being responsible for the murders. The commission did not look for responsibility further up the chain of command (International Commission of Jurists 1992, 34).

After his arrest, Colonel Moreno always denied his role in the killings. The eight men under his command, however, all confessed their roles in the murders to investigators. Despite their confessions, seven of the men were completely exonerated. Colonel Moreno was found guilty of committing all eight murders. His Lieutenant, Yusshy Rene Mendoza Vallcillos was found guilty of the murders of the two women. Colonel Moreno was also convicted of conspiracy to commit terrorism. Both were sentenced to thirty years in prison, the maximum under Salvadoran law (International Commission of Jurists 1992, 61). The Salvadoran legal system gained two convictions from these murders, but six confessed killers went free. There was no effort by investigators to find how from how high in the chain of command the order for the killings came. The Salvadoran legal system was clearly unwilling to properly investigate the pattern of human rights abuses within its own military. What was needed was an external investigatory body to find who was truly responsible for the atrocities of the war.

The opportunity for this came after the signing of a peace agreement between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government in Mexico City on January 16, 1992 (Loveman 1997, 413). As a part of the peace accords, a United Nations truth commission was created to to find which individuals, both from the military and the FMLN, were responsible for human rights violations dur-
ing the twelve year civil war. Every truth commission is unique for the nation and situation it is investigating. In Chile, for example, the Rettig Commission led to a successor body which, over a period of years, further investigated what happened to individuals and assigned reparations to help achieve reconciliation. The Rettig Commission also investigated the whereabouts of Chile’s “Disappeared”. In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission acted as a substitute for the judicial system, investigating individuals and assigning fines, prison terms, or amnesty where necessary (Popkin 2004, 105). El Salvador’s Truth Commission, by comparison, was not authorized to find guilt in a legal sense or to award reparations. The commission could refer cases to the Attorney-General of El Salvador for prosecution (Ensalaco 1994, 659), but as evidenced by the previous discussion of the Salvadoran judicial system, justice was unlikely. The Truth Commission did not investigate the fate of El Salvador’s disappeared. The Truth Commission was also unique in that it was made up entirely of non-Salvadorans (Buergenthal 2006/2007, 218).

The Truth Commission’s mandate was to “investigate serious acts of violence that have occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should know the truth” (Popkin 2004, 108). The Truth Commission was not given power of prosecution and did not see prosecution within the Salvadoran judicial system as a viable option due to the “Glaring deficiencies of the judicial system” (Sriram 2004, 89). The commission was given eight months to fulfill its mission of finding the truth of what happened during a war that lasted longer than a decade and during with more than seventy five thousand people died.

A major obstacle to the Truth Commission’s ability to ascertain who committed crimes during the war was that it was extremely difficult to get people to talk about what they had gone through. The “transitional” government after the war was the same right wing government that had been in power for the final years of the war and there was great fear and apprehension among the people about testifying to the commission (Buergenthal 2006/2007, 218). According to Thomas Buergenthal, who was one of three members of the Truth Commission, the commis-
missioners had to hold many “scary, cloak and dagger” meetings and needed to have their offices regularly swept for listening devices in order to assure the anonymity of those cooperating with the commission (Buergenthal 2006/2007, 219). The three commissioners and their team of investigators went to the countryside to interview those who lived through the war, visited massacre sites, inspected the work of forensic anthropologists studying specimens from the war, and subpoenaed government officials, members of the military, and guerillas in their efforts to find the whole truth of what happened in El Salvador (Buergenthal 2006/2007, 218). The Salvadoran people have seen the sham trials of military personnel accused of human rights violations and it took a lot of work by the commission members to gain the trust of the public.

Of the twenty two thousand cases brought to the Truth Commission’s attention, they included only thirty three cases of symbolic importance in their final report (Ensalaco 1994, 660). In these thirty three cases the commission found that they had ample evidence to make a finding and to name those individuals who were responsible for human rights violations. For these cases the commission created three levels of evidence for its findings: overwhelming, substantial, and sufficient (Popkin 2004, 111). Of the seven thousand cases that the commission actively investigated but were not included in the final report, ninety five percent were found to have been committed by government forces. The Truth Commission found that in the case of the Jesuit murders, the “Minister of Defense had ordered the killings and most of the members of the Armed Forces High Command had been involved in the decision to kill the priests”, (Popkin 2004, 112). The commission endorsed the Jesuits’ call to pardon Colonel Moreno and Lieutenant Mendoza, who earlier were convicted of the crime, as those who ordered the killings remained at liberty (Popkin 2004, 113).

The Truth Commission can hardly be known to have provided reconciliation within El Salvador. Before the commission’s began its work, an amnesty was granted to those who had committed political crimes during the war, with the exception of “persons who will be named in the Truth Commission report as being responsible for serious acts of violence” (Popkin 2004,
109). After the Commission issued its findings, however, a “broad, absolute, and unconditional” amnesty was granted by the Salvadoran assembly as the report, according to the assembly, was “unjust, unethical, illegal, and biased” (Sriram 2004, 89). The Commission’s report called for the resignation of the Supreme Court, that those named in the report could not hold office for ten years, it recommended that an investigation be led in to the rise of the death squads to prevent them in the future, it recommended that Salvadoran judges be named by an independent council, and it recommended that a fund be created to help compensate victims (Sriram 2004, 89). The Truth Commission only had the power to make recommendations, they had no powers of implementation.

Although the Supreme Court Justices were replaced, as recommended by the Truth Commission, the other recommendations went unheeded. The death squads resurfaced just years later as no plan was created to prevent them. Although quite democratic, assassinations and accusations of fraud plagued the 1994 elections. In 1995 there were one thousand eight hundred complaints of human rights violations against the government, mostly by political demonstrators (Sriram 2004, 90). No effort was made to locate the “disappeared” of El Salvador, and no fund was set up to help compensate the civilian victims of the war. Most Salvadorans lost faith in the peace accords, democratic reforms, and with the Truth Commission because of President Cristiani’s “flouting of the Truth Commission’s recommendations” (Sriram 2004, 91). The Truth Commission was able to find the answer to many key questions, such as who assassinated Archbishop Romero and who gave the order for the killing of the six Jesuits, but nothing was done by the Salvadoran judicial system with this information and impunity reigned.

The general amnesty granted after the release of the Truth Commission’s report was not the end of the story for some perpetrators of human rights violations. According to the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, the U.S. federal courts are “open to by aliens for torts committed in violation of customary international law, even when the case involves acts perpetrated in another country by a non-U.S. actor” (Prussia 2006, 381). With this law, victims of torture and other human
rights crimes can seek justice in U.S. courts if their own nation’s court systems are unwilling or unable to do so. There have been three cases in which the ATCA has been used to prosecute military commanders from El Salvador for their crimes during the war.

In 2000, the first case against former Salvadoran military commanders was brought against Generals Jose Guillermo Garcia and Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova for the having “command responsibility” for the 1980 murder and rape of four American churchwomen. The U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador at the time, Robert E. White, was called to testify. White testified that he had on many occasions pleaded with the generals to put a stop to the death squads, arguing that the death squads had directly led to an escalation in violence. He testified that the generals had full knowledge of the crimes being committed by men under their command, and they simply refused to do anything about. In his testimony, he relayed a telling conversation: “...Garcia finally admitted that perhaps one percent of his troops might be involved in death squads. I then pointed out that with sixteen thousand men under arms that meant that, at a minimum, one hundred and sixty uniformed criminals were murdering civilians with total impunity. Despite his admission, Garcia refused to make any commitment to take action against the soldiers” (White 2000, 12). The generals defense in the case was that they were simply carrying out U.S. policy in stopping the spread of communism. If they were doing anything wrong, they argued, why had General Garcia received the Legion of Merit, they highest honor the U.S. can give a foreign dignitary? General Cassanova had also received the Legion of Merit, and a letter of commendation from President Reagan. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador from 1985-1988, Edwin Corr, testified at the trial that General Casanova “made a tremendous contribution to the country and to the reduction of human-rights abuses”. The men were found to be not responsible (White 2000, 13).

In 2002, the same two generals, Garcia and Casanova, were brought to trial under the Alien Tort Claims Act. This time the claim was brought by three Salvadorans claiming they had been tortured by men under the generals’ command during the civil war. It was found that the
generals had “command responsibility” for the tortures committed by their men and were ordered to pay $54.6 million dollars in damages to the plaintiffs. According to a church worker who testified at the trial that she had endured twelve days of torture during the war, the court’s decision shows “that the Salvadoran military bears responsibility for what we, as a people, suffered” (Preston, 2006)

Although the perpetrators of his assassination were named by the Truth Commission’s report, Archbishop Oscar Romero’s killers were never brought before a judicial body to be held accountable until 2002, when Alvaro Saravia was brought before a civil court in Fresno, California for his role in the murder. Saravia the court found, had supplied the actual triggerman with a gun, logistical information, and transportation to commit the murder. Saravia was found to have committed state-sponsored murder and a “crime against humanity”. Saravia, who could not be found and was not present at the trial, was ordered to pay $10 million in damages (Jones 2004, 7). Saravia later surfaced, in 2006, and publicly acknowledged his role in the killings in an interview with El Nuevo Herald of Miami. Saravia asked forgiveness from the church and promised to tell everything he knows about the killings in El Salvador in an upcoming book (Reyes 2006, 1).

As shown in this examination of the mechanisms used to achieve justice for the victims of rape, torture, and murder in El Salvador, justice has not been served. Trials held within El Salvador during the war were a complete sham, never addressing the fact that the crimes were part of a systematic effort on the part of the military to terrorize opposition to the tyrannical political and military regime in power. The Truth Commission, although effective in finding individuals who were responsible for crimes during the war, lacked prosecutorial power. Their key recommendations were not implemented, leading to the resurgence of death squads, a lack of faith by the Salvadoran people in democratic reforms, a lack of closure for the relatives of the “disappeared”, no legal recourse for victims of torture, no compensation to victims of torture and relatives of those murdered, and impunity, despite having been identified in the report, for indi-
individuals responsible for massive human rights atrocities. Trials within the U.S. under the Alien Tort Claims Act have held individuals responsible for their actions during the war, but they can only award monetary damages to those plaintiffs who brought the case. The result of this is that several members of the Salvadoran military have been ordered to pay millions of dollars, which they don’t have, to a handful of victims and their families who will never see the money. The moral victory in these cases must seem minute to the individuals who saw their families tortured, killed, or disappeared, individuals who are still living in El Salvador, where the situation, due to lack of meaningful reforms, is once again deteriorating to a point where fear, violence, oppression, and death squads rule the day.