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The tourism and handicraft industries in Xinjiang: Development and ethnicity in a minority periphery

Toops, Stanley Winfield, Ph.D.

University of Washington, 1990

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The Tourism and Handicraft Industries in Xinjiang

Development and Ethnicity in a Minority Periphery

by

Stanley Winfield Toops

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

1990

Approved by

(Chairperson of Supervisory Committee)

Program Authorized to Offer Degree

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Abstract

The Tourism And Handicraft Industries in Xinjiang
Development And Ethnicity in a Minority Periphery

by Stanley Winfield Toops

Chairperson of the Supervisory Committee:
Professor W. A. Douglas Jackson
Department of Geography

This study considers a basic question — how does ethnicity impinge upon development in the Third World? Three goals are addressed: 1) the need for a culturally relevant perspective on development; 2) an examination of the policies of People's Republic of China (PRC) for the development of minority nationality areas; and 3) a consideration of the contribution of the tourism and handicrafts industries to Third World development.

The setting for the research is the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Xinjiang has a Moslem non-Han population and is located in the peripheral northwest of the People's Republic of China. The time frame of the study is during the Reform Era (1978-1990). Field work in Xinjiang (August 1985-July 1986, December 1988, and January 1989) included document research of PRC-produced materials as well as interviews with personnel in the tourism and handicraft industries in Chinese and Uighur. The local variation of national policies is revealed in the practice of the industries in areas both open (Urumqi, Turpan, and Kashgar) and closed (Korla, Kucha, and Kulja) to foreigners.

With regard to tourism and handicrafts in Xinjiang, conclusions indicate that tourism and handicrafts enhance development through the use of local activities and capabilities. Tourism centers are Urumqi, Kashgar, and Turpan, while crafts centers are Kashgar, Kulja, and Kucha.

Overall China's development policy for minority nationality areas is still maturing. Economic and sociocultural aspects of development are being met while political aspects of development have proved most elusive.

How does ethnicity contribute to development? The experiences of
different ethnic groups provide each ethnic group with a reservoir of knowledge to contribute to the development process. Knowledge of local environments, production systems and spatial organization are all important parts of an ethnic group's perspective on development. Xinjiang's example shows how ethnicity, with its attendant knowledge and experience, can be a resource in development.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

"Tian gao, huangdi yuan. The heavens are high and the emperor is far away." This traditional Chinese saying describes the historical circumstances of the peasantry. The power of the state was far away and what occurred at the emperor's palace had little significance for peasants. In today's China, however, Beijing has a great impact upon the frontiers of China. China is like other Third World countries in this respect. While the seat of power is often far away from ethnic groups on the peripheries of the Third World, the effect of that power reaches to those peripheries.

Consider the ethnic groups that live in the border areas of the states of the Third World: Tibetan in China, Karen in Burma, Naga in India, Berber in Morocco, Hausa in Nigeria, Masai in Kenya, San in Botswana, Miskito in Nicaragua, or Yanomami in Brazil. These peoples and these states, though possessed of different cultural, political, and economic systems are faced with common issues. These states are all faced with the basic issue of development — how to provide for the needs of the people. Another major issue is one of ethnicity. Countries of the Third World are composed of a variety of indigenous groups. The state must consider factors of ethnicity in the formulation of policy. Ethnic groups in the border areas are often at the front line of national development programs. Whatever programs are adopted by states to improve the livelihood of the people, greater difficulties are encountered in extending these programs into the border areas inhabited by minority ethnic groups.

To comprehend the complexities of development in the ethnic minority border areas of the Third World, this study focuses on one such area, Xinjiang.
Located in the Central Asian portion of China, inhabited by the Uighur, the Chinese and eleven other ethnic groups, Xinjiang provides two essential characteristics for this study, border location and ethnic diversity. The question under consideration is: how does ethnic diversity impinge upon the development process?

The path of development chosen moves through the various locales of everyday life: home, market and work. The workplace, the zone of production, is the focus of this study as development includes the provision of the needs of the people. That provision necessitates either an intensification of existing production or the creation of new production systems.

Two systems of production present in Xinjiang are crafts and tourism. Crafts are a traditional production activity in Xinjiang. Tourism, in contrast, is the newest industry in Xinjiang, beginning in the post-Mao reform period. Both tourism and crafts are manifestations of local ethnicity. Both, as well, are sources for economic development. Given the dual nature of both crafts and tourism, these two industries are likely venues for the study of the interactivity of ethnicity and development processes.

This research proposes to study the interaction of development and ethnicity in the tourism and crafts industries of Xinjiang in the period of post-Mao reforms.

Research Goals

**Ethnicity, Development, Tourism and Handicrafts in Xinjiang, China**

This study tackles a basic question — how and why does ethnicity (ethnic diversity) impinge on the development process? To answer this question, three goals are at the heart of this inquiry. The first goal is to attain a culturally relevant perspective on development. The second goal is to examine China’s central policies for the development of minority nationality areas and the regional application of these policies to the development of Xinjiang. An aspect of this goal is to obtain a development of Xinjiang that has local meaning. Finally, a related goal is to consider how the tourism and handicraft industries are relevant to a culturally informed development.

1. This research addresses the need for a culturally relevant perspective on development. In order to attain such a perspective, a perspective that puts
people into the development of their place, this study integrates several bodies of theoretical work. The theories utilized in this study derive from the neomodernization approach to development (development from below) and the dialectical approach to ethnicity as both of these approaches are amenable to the articulation of development and ethnicity. The theoretical construct is inserted into the matrix of locality, into Xinjiang; in this fashion theory is linked together with practice.

The concept of development is understood in this study to encompass more than economic growth. This study considers development as a process of change that means the growth of life sustenance and self-esteem. Rather than an end in and of itself, development is a continuing process that varies with space and time. This process is not only an improvement in the per capita gross national product of the poorer countries but also an enhanced provision of material needs such as food, shelter, health, and security. Self-esteem is strengthened through the population's improved access to non-material needs such as education, worth, dignity, respect and honor (cultural and humanistic values). Development as considered in this study of Xinjiang encompasses both the economic and the non-economic, both material growth and cultural values.

To obtain a culturally relevant perspective on the development process means to consider that process from the local ethnic perspective. The matrix of local ethnicity provides a prism through which the process is perceived. Ethnic heritage provides a set of world views and cultural values that provide varying attitudes to change and development. One formulation of ethnic identity is that ethnic identity is a matter of circumstance and is thus changing. Through this formulation, the relationship of ethnicity to the development process is an evolving relationship. A culturally informed development requires the involvement of ethnic minorities as well as the production of goods and services used by ethnic minorities. Ethnicity, as a part of culture, influences the use made of space and resources in the development process. Ethnicity is linked to the political-economic process of development programs by officials who plan and implement policy as well as by the populace who, through their behavior, shape and reproduce the system. Through a focus on ethnicity and production, this research derives a culturally relevant perspective on development.

2. Another goal of this research is the use of Xinjiang as a case study to examine China's central policies for the development of the minority nationality
areas located in the inland portions of the country.

During the reform era, three aspects of central development policies are salient to the development of minority nationality areas such as Xinjiang. First, the chief characteristic of the economy has been pragmatism. Two of Deng Xiaoping's slogans, "seek truth from facts" and "it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice", reflect this pragmatism (Harding, 1987). Decentralization has allowed a greater productive drive based on a commercial economy in areas such as Xinjiang. Second, the seventh five-year plan considers development in China from a regional viewpoint. The inland region (the northwest and southwest) has crucial role to play in the development of the country; the northwest provides the country with needed materials such as oil and animal products. Third, the ethnic dimension of development in the minority nationality areas functions in several areas: the integration of minority nationality area economy into the national economy, the maintenance of traditional ethnic identity, and the provision for the basic needs of the minority ethnic groups. Zhao Ziyang (1988) has remarked that "economic construction in the minority nationality areas has experienced huge advances". Together these three aspects of China's development policy indicate a pragmatism that includes the regional and ethnic dimensions necessary for development in the minority nationality areas.

A related aspect of this second goal is to obtain a development that has local meaning for Xinjiang and its people. Locally-based development for Xinjiang is expressed in several ways. First, while Xinjiang has potentials for development based upon its material resources in the land, its major resource is its own people, who know the land. Second, locally-based development also means that the ethnic identity of the people of Xinjiang contributes to development process. The ethnic identity of the Uighur, the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang, is based on their being both Turkic and Islamic. Traditionally, the Uighur were farmers, craftsmen and traders living on the Silk Road; that ethnic heritage feeds into the modern setting for development. Finally, for the Uighur the development of Xinjiang is a special matter, as Xinjiang represents their home. As a home, Xinjiang has historical and cultural connections that bind the Uighur together. The improvement of life in Xinjiang has local meaning. Through a focus on the Uighur and the improvement of their life within the framework of Xinjiang and China, this research derives a local perspective on
development that has meaning for the people of Xinjiang.

3. A final goal is to understand how tourism and handicrafts, as ethnic industries, can contribute to development in the Third World. International tourism is an export activity in which the users must come to the production site, unlike other material exports (of agricultural goods, textiles, or electronics for example). As a tool for development, international tourism provides foreign exchange earnings. Tourism may also enhance self-esteem and provide for the growth of life sustenance. Discussion in the literature on tourism also examines the detrimental impact of tourism on local human and natural environments. The literature suggests that planning and control of the tourist industry will limit the extent of these negative effects.

There are several modes in which tourism, as an ethnic industry, can shape development; these are examined as propositions. The first proposition is that international tourism acts as a source for cultural reawakening. In this fashion ethnic qualities of the locality are reestablished to provide a basis for the tourism industry; this reestablishment leads to a recognition of the validity of the local lifestyle. The second is that tourism proceeds as a marketing of culture and of ethnicity as well. Marketing of culture can be through material goods, e.g. souvenirs, and through services, e.g. dance performances. The extent to which a product marketed is of the actual culture or a derivative is determined from an examination of its ethnic quality. The final proposition of this research is that tourism can serve to preserve the historical, cultural, and natural landscapes. Site preservation can be and needs to be a vital portion of any tourism activity.

Clearly, crafts also have a role to play in development. As crafts utilize local knowledge and are decentralized, actively labor intensive, small scale, and at an intermediate level of technology, from a development from below perspective, they are an appropriate activity for development in the Third World.

In regard to the role of crafts (as an ethnic industry) in development, there exist several propositions. First, crafts are seen to be a part of a locally based industry that is adaptable and flexible. Crafts survival necessitates adaptability. Second, the craft industry is broadened through the formulation of the export and tourism markets. The evolution of the product that occurs as the market expands needs to be examined in terms of both the economic and ethnic vitality of the craft. Third, cooperativization of the crafts industry has an initial role to play in the access to markets and materials. Increased production is sought
through a cooperativization that is a local organization.

Tourism and crafts have a shared commonality, as regards their role in development. Crafts and tourism while different are similar in that both have a dual economic/ethnic nature. Both crafts and tourism diversify the economy and thus increase the range of local economic opportunities, thereby enhancing development. Ethnicity is a component in the finished product of tourism and of handicrafts. By considering the contribution of tourism and handicrafts to development, the contribution of ethnicity is also examined

Research Structure
Organization and Fieldwork

This study first examines theoretical concepts and then empirical evidence to support the research goals. The research was accomplished through over one year of fieldwork and library research in Xinjiang, China.

Organization. Chapter Two discusses the threads of development theory and ethnicity theory, entwining ethnicity and development with a consideration of the significance of the periphery. After a discussion on China’s programs for development in minority nationality areas and the reasons for selecting Xinjiang as the region of inquiry, the study examines the theoretical and comparative perspectives on the tourism and crafts industries.

Chapter Three describes the historical and geographical (physical, spatial, and ethnic) nature of Xinjiang. The reordering of Xinjiang’s territorial administration, the reorientation of Xinjiang’s economy, and the restructuring of Xinjiang’s cultural landscape are interpreted to provide the framework for studying development and ethnicity in the tourism and handicraft industries. Here the materials gathered in China on Xinjiang’s development as well as secondary sources are utilized.

Chapter Four profiles the growth of Xinjiang’s tourism industry. After amplifying on theoretical and comparative perspectives on tourism in the Third World, the discussion centers on China’s tourism policies. Xinjiang’s historical, cultural and natural resources and the growth of the industry are examined. The impact of tourist activities on Xinjiang’s landscape is the final topic.

Chapter Five reflects upon the refurbishing of the handicraft industry in
Xinjiang. After a consideration of theoretical and comparative concerns on the role of the handicrafts industry, the chapter examines China's experience in the crafts. The potentials of the industry are expressed through a historical perspective. The current situation of handicrafts is analyzed via the results of the field surveys. Finally, the impact of the handicraft policies on the cultural and economic landscape of Xinjiang is discussed.

Chapter Six summarizes the articulation of tourism and handicrafts industries. China's programs for economic development in minority peripheries and the regional restructuring of Xinjiang carried out by the PRC is examined. Finally, ethnicity is considered as a resource in development, through the maintenance of cultural identity and achievement of development goals.

**Fieldwork.** Research on the topic was conducted from June through August 1985 at the Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong. The Centre provided access to PRC produced periodical and books which served as initial background for the field research. From August 1985 through July 1986, this author lived in Urumqi as the first long-term foreign student at Xinjiang University. During this period document research and field surveys were conducted. August and September 1986 was spent at the Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong consolidating the research notes. During another visit to Xinjiang in December 1988 and January 1989, follow-up document research was carried out.

At Xinjiang University, the collections of the China Languages Department and the Geography Department as well as the main library provided the local newspapers (1980 through 1986), journals and books (in Chinese and Uighur) utilized in the study. The contents of the newspapers and journals were analyzed with respect to the tourism and handicrafts industries as well as general development plans (industry, transport, agriculture, and animal husbandry), sociocultural policies (especially those related to ethnic relations and population) and political developments. Many periodicals were reviewed including the newspapers Xinjiang Daily, Kashgar Daily, Kulja Daily, Urumqi Evening News, Aksu Daily, Hotan Daily, Altai Daily, and China Western Development News, as well as the journals Xinjiang Social Science, Xinjiang Economic Research, Xinjiang University Bulletin, Xinjiang Geography, Arid Lands Geography, and Xinjiang Normal University Bulletin.

Consultations with members of the Geography Department at Xinjiang
University helped shape the direction of this research. During the winter of 1985-86 contacts were made outside the university community with the managers of the relevant industries and with the departments of the government charged with control over these industries. Round-table discussions took place with researchers and academicians of the Economic Research Institute and the Nationalities Research Institute of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, as well as with the Economic Geography Research Unit of the Geography Research Institute of the Xinjiang Academy of Science. Discussions ranged over the topics of the research, possible ways to enhance fieldwork activities, and an assessment of the available literature.

In the spring of 1986 an interview schedule was carried out with various governmental units. For the handicraft industry, interviews were held at the Secondary Light Industry Bureaus based in Urumqi, Turpan, Korla, Kucha, Kashgar, and Kulja. Interviews and site visitations were held at twenty-four different factories involved in the production of leatherware, rugs, knives, furniture, jewelry, clothing, musical instruments, hats, arts and crafts (Appendix I). Besides production sites, many retail sites, hotels, shops, and bazaars were visited to understand the market for handicrafts items. Data were acquired on changes that had occurred to the factories in the 1980s. Topics for survey inquiry included personnel, materials, products, and market (Appendix II).

To understand the nature of the tourism industry, interviews were held at Xinjiang Tourism Bureau, the Urumqi branch of China Travel Service, Foreign Affairs offices at Turpan, Korla, Kucha, Kashgar, and Kulja. At most sub-regional sites the Foreign Affairs Offices had under their wing the local Tourism Bureau, China International Travel Service (CITS) and China Travel Service (CTS). Developed and undeveloped tourist sites in and around the above areas were visited as well (Appendix III). Tourism data were collected about changes in the 1980s for topics such as the sites, personnel, equipment, infrastructure, and the tourists (Appendix IV).

In general, interviews were conducted in Chinese and Uighur through the services of a bilingual translator (Uighur/Chinese) made available by Xinjiang University. In this manner entrée was gained into the local Uighur communities through the informal network of Xinjiang University graduates. The Foreign Affairs Bureau of Xinjiang approved the nature of the field surveys; interviews of tourism and crafts personnel were conducted in an open manner that allowed
the pursual of the several topics indicated in Appendices II and IV. At survey sites officials from either the Secondary Light Industry Bureau or the Tourism Bureau took part. These local officials provided an official seal of approval of the field survey and proved most knowledgeable about the role of the factory or tourist site within the locality.

The nature of the interviewing process was structured due to several factors. Tape recording of the interviews was generally viewed as inappropriate. Notes were taken that allowed written record of the interviews. A visual record of the people and their activities on the landscape was maintained through color slides of handicraft production and tourist sites. While questions were freely answered, there was at times some natural reticence on the part of officials in dealing with a foreign researcher. Statistics were approximate, perhaps given in units of 10,000 or 1000. Such information was usually presented orally in the process of the interview. The information is presented here as gathered. An attempt at sophisticated quantitative statistical analysis would generate specificity where none exists. The interviews in Xinjiang, however, do contribute to the comparative perspectives on tourism and handicrafts in the Third World and provide a working exploration into the theories of development, ethnicity and periphery.

Travel through Xinjiang was by bus, train, and plane between cities; foot, donkey cart, jeep, and van in the cities. In most cases travel was done at the lowest level in order to maximize contact with the local people of Xinjiang. These opportunities for personal contact with the local populace proved valuable in understanding Xinjiang. Contacts with Uighurs as well as Han negated the presence of Uighur or Han bias in this study. In order to compare the varying impact of China’s policy of closing certain areas to foreigners, research was conducted at both open areas (Urumqi, Turpan, and Kashgar) and closed areas (Korla, Kucha, and Kulja).

Research Relevancy
Geography, Asia, and Indigenous Groups

This research has value and applications for geography, Asian Studies and studies of indigenous groups on the periphery.

First, the geographical value of this study exists in several dimensions.
One emphasis is on the ethnic characteristics of the locality undergoing development. The ethnic characteristics of locality are a part of place. Place, a central topic of geographic inquiry, provides the matrix for this study. Places and their experiences need to be the stage upon which the geographer's understanding of process is based. A focus in this study is thus on the people of the place (the localities of Xinjiang), and for development as interpreted through the locality and its people. Knowledge of place is a key tool for development. Local inhabitants have that knowledge; thus the geographer should study local knowledge to better understand the place and its experiences.

Brown (1988) has argued for a research program on Third World development that focuses on the dialectic between exogenous forces, i.e. the world at large, and endogenous forces, i.e. the locality. A geographical approach to this research program would require a knowledge of place, of the locality and the landscape. This requirement is a base of the present study. The type of knowledge involved here is one of ‘thick description’, an interpretation, rather than ‘thin description’, a recording (Geertz, 1973). Neglect of place knowledge may be especially common in research concerned with traditional development conceptualizations (Brown, 1988).

Another geographical focus of the study is on the region. China’s development programs are addressed to the needs of its various regions. Developmental change occurs in Xinjiang based on the dynamism of that region. Xinjiang as well is composed of different localities that vary in character and responses to government policies. Vital to geographic inquiry is a contemplation of regional change. How and Why do regions change? By deliberating upon development and ethnicity, this study centers on a process-oriented regional geography that integrates the various localities.

Recent regional studies are characterized by Gilbert (1988) as deriving from production, cultural identification, and societal interaction. Production in the tourism and crafts industries inscribes an activity region of Xinjiang and smaller sets of regions within Xinjiang. Regions of cultural identification in Xinjiang are constituted through relations between and within ethnic groups. The region is the medium for social interaction, the relationships that link together institutions and people shape the region. The present study, with its focus on Xinjiang, a region of ethnic distinction, contributes to this geographical understanding of regional diversity by emphasizing the regionally ethnic nature
of production in Xinjiang's tourism and handicrafts.

The geographical study of development in the Third World has considered primarily issues of spatial organization or population-resource questions. The present generation of development work in geography has also reflected upon the role of the state and international agencies in providing development aid. A component of the Third World which also has a bearing on development is the cultural settings and milieux in which development occurs. This study's geographical analysis contributes to an understanding of the role of ethnicity in development by showing the impact of local ethnic characteristics on the development process in Xinjiang's tourism and handicraft industries. This concern for ethnic diversity reflects that shown by Clarke, Ley and Peach (1984).

Second, this research has relevance to the study of Asia. The Inner Asian Heartland of China has been the focus of attention of a number of social scientists (McMillen; Hoppe; Lattimore; Stein; Hedin; Forbes; Fletcher; Grousset; Wiens). These works have ranged over a variety of disciplines — geography, political science, anthropology, archeology, history. Why has Inner Asia been of so much interest? People are intrigued by the location of Inner Asia as a historical crossroads linking east and west. This study shows Xinjiang as a place that is alive today, alive in the context of its past and in the context of its future.

Beyond the intriguing nature of the Inner Asian heartland, Xinjiang provides an excellent case for analyzing the interaction of ethnicity and development. China has formulated policies in the reform period, towards economic modernization and openness, but also towards the development of the minority nationality areas. These policies intersect and articulate with the local geographic character of Xinjiang — ethnic diversity and border location. This study of that articulation contributes to the study of Asia, where the issues of development and ethnicity are of immense concern.

The fieldwork component of the research — the analysis of local newspapers and journals, site interviews with scholars, planners, managers and workers — contributes to the research methodology utilized by foreign scholars in the People's Republic of China (PRC) through the integration of field interviews and documentary research in the ethnic minority areas, drawing on both majority (Han) and minority (Uighur) sources. Goldstein (1989) documents as well the rigors of field research in the ethnic border regions of China.

Through the research in Xinjiang, a picture of China's Northwest in the
reform period is drawn. The reform period saw vast changes in China and the
general picture of post-Mao reform at the macro-level is well known (Harding,
1987). This research provides a change of scale and moves from the national to
the regional and local levels of China to understand the nuances and variances of
reform, the regional practice of central policies.

Third, this research has relevance for study of the indigenous peoples of
the periphery. These are peoples of the Fourth World (autochthonous peoples
without a state based on their cultural perspective or heritage) The problems of
the indigenous peoples of the world range from exploitation of their land,
destruction of lifestyle, and employment, health and educational disadvantages
(Burger, 1987). A standard focus on the plight of indigenous groups has been
upon discrimination wherein indigenous groups do not achieve the full rights
accorded to them under law. A further focus would need to consider the
marginalization of the people of the Fourth World. This marginalization occurs
as the dominant culture imposes its will over the indigenous culture through the
mechanisms of the state, production, language, and education. Where
indigenous people do not face genocide, actual physical destruction, they may
well face ethnocide. Ethnocide means that the indigenous group is no longer
able to enjoy, develop, or disseminate its own culture or language.

Within the People’s Republic of China, there are 55 ethnic minority groups
recognized by the state. In China indigenous groups are known as minority
nationalities, shaoshu minzu. China’s development policy recognizes several
factors in providing for the needs of the minority nationalities. These factors
include the historical and cultural differences of the minority nationality groups
as well as their peripheral location, large territory, natural resources, and
international status.

This study of indigenous groups on the periphery explores China’s
policies for the development of its indigenous groups. This will illustrate that
the background of the PRC’s policies derive from a Chinese approach as well as a
socialist approach. While the policies may be initially formulated on the basis of
socialist goals, the implementation is shaped by the values and precepts held by
the ethnic Han majority.

Fourth, this research is timely in several respects. Now, at the beginning
of the 1990s, the world has begun to recognize objectively the indigenous groups
as a cultural resource for humanity. As indicated previously indigenous groups
are at a crucial juncture of having their livelihood and culture molded by external pressures. In 1982 the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations brought the state of the indigenous peoples to the attention of the international community by establishing the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Burger, 1987). This forum of the UN permitted indigenous peoples, independent experts on indigenous peoples, and unrecognized non-governmental organization representatives to participate freely in the discussion and presentation of rights issues of indigenous populations.

As the decade of the 1980s progressed, there was expanded involvement of the indigenous peoples in the determination of their own affairs. Two incidents in 1989 indicate the extent of this involvement. Individuals of the Yanomami indigenous group of Brazil recently testified before the UN on the impact of Brazil’s development programs upon the peoples of Amazonia. The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Dalai Lama recognized an articulate spokesman and spiritual leader; the award was accepted by the Dalai Lama for the spirit of the Tibetan community. Both of these incidents focused world attention upon the problems of indigenous groups. The 1990s will see further action among indigenous peoples and ethnic minority groups.

Now, at the beginning of the 1990s as the international tourism industry has grown larger and expanded, the developing world is poised to receive massive numbers of tourists. A major issue for research on the international tourism industry is the validity of tourism as a mechanism for development in light of the social changes that tourism engenders among the host population. China, as a developing country, has sought to make use of its scenic resources for the promotion of international relations and economic interaction. China’s experience of fostering tourism in its peripheral areas should have lessons for other Third World countries.

As will be indicated in Chapter 2, perspectives on development have changed. The focus in the 1990s will be on development with people as a resource. Previously emphasis in development thought and practice had been upon energy, land, infrastructure, and industry. The transition to a development based upon people began in the 1960s and carried through to the 1980s. This research thus has relevance in the timeliness in this research’s addition to development thought and practice.

Finally, the author hopes the study is relevant to the people of Xinjiang.
This research's relevance to the geographic discipline, to Asian studies, to the status of indigenous groups, and to the current time is further enhanced by the values and applications the research has for the people of Xinjiang. Plans have been made to communicate the results of this research to the university and research community within Xinjiang. In this fashion the research will come full circle back to the people of Xinjiang.
Chapter 2

The Interplay of Ethnicity and Development in a Minority Periphery

How does ethnicity impinge on the development process? The first goal of this research is to attain a culturally relevant perspective on Third World development. To accomplish this goal, definitions and perspectives articulated in the literatures of development, ethnicity, and the periphery are investigated to discover the intersecting links of these concepts. The second goal is to examine China’s policies for development in the minority nationality areas and the regional application of these policies to the development of Xinjiang. This examination of China’s policies and Xinjiang’s case represents a practical application theories of development and of ethnicity. Finally, the third goal is to consider the role of tourism and handicrafts in a culturally relevant development of the Third World. As crafts and tourism both have a dual economic and ethnic nature, the interplay of development and ethnicity is seen through these two industries. This examination of the theoretical and comparative aspects of the literature begins with development, ethnicity and the periphery, moves on to China and Xinjiang and concludes with tourism and handicrafts.

Development Theory
Definitions and Perspectives

Historical change within human communities has occurred as the people of a territory involve themselves in and interact with the world at large. After World War II the study of such change was generally restricted to economic growth; development was considered primarily a question of economic growth. Through the 1950s, this type of development meant the ability of a national
economy to sustain an annual increase in gross national product (GNP) at five per cent or more (Todaro, 1985, p. 83).

By the 1960s, some Third World states were meeting this overall requirement, yet the standard of living for many people remained unchanged. To get at the real meaning of development meant to get beyond a single statistic, GNP, and include other variables. The definition of development continued to evolve. Seers (1969) viewed the development of a country as including not just economic growth but as also involving a decline of inequality, unemployment, and poverty. "If one or two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result 'development' even if per capita income doubled." (Seers, 1969, p. 3).

Goulet (1971) broadened the term, development, to include the achievement of political and cultural as well as social and economic goals, in short, the enrichment of the quality of human life. The good life is composed of three trans-cultural core values, or goals, held in common by all people. The first value is life-sustenance, the provision of food, shelter, medicine, and protection to all people. The second value is self-esteem, a poorer society's retention of dignity, worth, and respect in the midst of contact with a materially more prosperous society. The third value is freedom from servitude, an expanded range of choice, a reduction of the dependence on nature, ignorance, misery, dogma, and other societies (Goulet, 1971, pp. 87-91).

Broadening the concept, Seers (1977) saw development as also meaning a growth of self-reliance, a reduction of cultural dependence, and a more proper distribution of the world's economic bounty (redistribution with growth). These changing definitions of development are reflective of the growing critique on the traditional approaches to development.

The three core values of development suggested by Goulet are dialectically linked. A society with low levels of life-sustenance is vulnerable to those with more, thus freedoms are limited. Low levels of life-sustenance also engender a lessening of self-esteem as a society compares itself to a society with more. With low self-esteem, a society is less able to resist domination, and thus may sustain a loss of freedom. A limitation of freedom and a loss of control lowers the sense of self-worth (Todaro, 1985, pp. 87-89).

Todaro's basic text (1985) on economic development in the Third World defines the transformation as: "the process of improving the quality of human
life”. Underdevelopment, in contrast, moves in the opposite direction to where people are worse off than before. In any case development does involve change.

In a survey of recent geographical literature, Riddel (1987) identified four perspectives on development in the Third World: diffusionist, neomodernization, dependency, and Marxist. These four perspectives have all been subsumed within the different fields in geography. Geographical study of population, resources, ecology, physical environment, location, space, society, work, economy, culture and politics may appear within the context of any one of the four perspectives on development.

1) The diffusionist approach holds that the path trod by Europe through the Industrial Revolution will be followed by the Third World, as modernization and development tendencies are diffused outward from the cores of the industrialized states. Myrdal (1957) and Hirschmann (1958) portrayed the structure of economic development as positive effects transmitted from the original areas of development to other regions. Positive effects included the spread of technology and the growth of markets (labeled as “spread” by Myrdal) and purchases and investments made by the center in the periphery (called “trickle down” by Hirschmann). Both recognized that there would be negative effects transmitted from the center to the outlying regions. The movement of people, capital, and trade from the periphery to the center, labelled “backwash” by Myrdal, and the resultant brain drain from the periphery and the depression of manufacturing in the periphery by the center, labelled “polarization” by Hirschmann, were some of the negative effects caused by the center. Both indicated the need for conscious policy intervention to limit the negative aspects of such growth. Hirschmann was more secure in the efficacy of the market mechanisms in eventually transmitting development impulses to other areas.

The experience of historical Europe in transforming its economies from agricultural subsistence to industrial societies was believed to be replicable in the countries of the Third World (Rostow, 1960). The stages of economic growth as envisaged by Rostow were 1) traditional society, 2) pre-conditions for take-off, 3) take-off into sustained growth, 4) drive to maturity, and 5) high mass consumption. The key for development is Stage Three where sufficient savings would be generated to sustain growth. It was believed that the Third World countries would grow (develop) in response to an inflow of capital through savings or aid at the take-off stage. The reality, though, is that much of the Third
World in the 1950s and 1960s did not possess the sufficient pre-conditions for growth and development that Europe had. Transport, manpower, education, markets, and infrastructure were all lacking.

Spatial dissemination of development across the urban hierarchy was the key to the geographical contribution to the diffusionist approach. The geographies of modernization followed the diffusionist perspective, including those by Taaffe, Morrill, and Gould's (1963) on transport network development in Africa, Berry (1966) on India, Berry (1969) on Chile, Soja (1968) on Kenya, Riddell (1970) on Sierra Leone, and Gould (1970) on Tanzania. The chief ideas of the geographies of modernization were that as a country modernizes, different areas of that country would develop (politically, economically, and socially) at different rates. The dominant foci of investigation were the establishment of an urban network, the evolution of the transportation and communication systems and the spatial diffusion of institutions (Riddell, 1981). This diffusionist perspective did not consider the rural as well as the urban in the Third World cultural landscape.

2) The dependency perspective holds that the economic development of the First World has caused the underdevelopment of the Third World. The states of the Third World are poor because of their position in the world economy, playing the role of peripheral dependencies providing raw materials to the First World. Dependency theorists argued that the fundamental issues facing developing countries were consequences of the international system of mercantile and industrial capitalism.

Dependency theory was first articulated by Frank (1967, 1970) in regard to Latin America's underdevelopment and represented a dissatisfaction with the diffusionist approach. Frank saw that 1) in contrast to the development of the world metropole (center), the development of subordinate metropoles is limited by their satellite (peripheral) status and 2) satellites experience greater economic development if and when their ties to the metropole are weakest. Thus the most underdeveloped satellites had close ties to the metropole in the past. The strongest developing economies were those according to Frank which had looser colonial ties.

Dependency theory entered the field of geography in large part due to the work of the so-called "radical geographers". Elliot Hurst (1971) on economic geography, Blaut (1973) in development theory, Santos (1975) on the periphery,
Regan and Walsh (1976) on minerals in Ireland, Schuurman (1978) on resources in the Andes, and Taylor and Thrift (1981) on investment in Australia all utilized dependency theory in their analysis of the relationship between core and periphery.

Dependency theory based on Frank and the allied world system perspective of Wallerstein (1979) contributed to the geographical literature on development. Dependency theory was applicable to geography with its emphasis on the interconnectedness of the world, its statement that different regions of the world have roles to play in the distribution of power, and its view of development and underdevelopment at the world scale. However, the difficulty in applying dependency theory to geography lay in the fact that dependency theory did not develop a pragmatic program for resolving development issues and take into account the geographic variables of location, population, resources or place.

3) The neomodernization perspective grew out of the diffusionist and dependency articulations of development. Neomodernization emphasizes development that emerges from the bottom up rather than from the top down. Development would derive from impulses that originate from the inhabitants of an area. Chief characteristics of the neomodernization (development from below) perspective are: a) people have a role to play in their future and b) the scope of development is small, focused on small projects that are labor-intensive and utilize appropriate technology. The emphasis is upon change in the rural economy and on the informal urban economy, as these sectors of the economy involve a majority of the population of the Third World.

The emergence of the neomodernization perspective occurred during the 1960s, the First Development Decade (declared as such by The United Nations). The Third World had not seen much results in the programs for development. At the UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964, Third World countries complained about the nature of aid programs and the terms of international trade (Reitsma and Kleinpenning, 1985, pp. 4, 13-14). Economic and social indicators of development did not show any real improvement in the situation of the Third World. Morawetz (1977, p. 12-14) notes that although the per capita gross national product (p. c. GNP) of the Third World was growing in the 1960s, a majority of those in the Third World saw only small increases in per capita income. A few elites were benefiting and becoming affluent. At the end
of the 1960s, there had been little development for the bulk of the world’s population.

The neomodernization perspective grew out of the debate between adherents of dependency theory and those who held to the more traditional diffusionist perspective. Development ‘from above’ (essentially the diffusionist approach) emphasized the economic nature of development issues and “presumed an eventually monolithic and uniform concept of development, value systems and human happiness, which automatically or by policy intervention will spread over the entire world” (Stoehr, 1981, p. 41). Neomodernization, in contrast, is a prescriptive approach that stresses appropriate technology, small-scale and labor-intensive enterprise, and the role of the area’s people in the plan of development (Riddell, 1987).

4) Marxists see the other perspectives as having basic flaws. The chief forces of underdevelopment for the Marxists are those of class stratification and the resultant contradictions of class relations.

In reaction to the dependency approach which emphasized the interrelations of states, the Marxist approach bases its analysis on the interrelations of class. To the Marxist or neo-marxist, the dependency approach is flawed as dependency is only a political explanation and thus represents an inadequate expression of the forces underlying development and underdevelopment. In the preface to Capital, Marx (1917) stated that the more industrially developed countries are the “image of the future” of the less developed countries. In contrast, dependency theory sees the future of the less developed countries in a continuation of their present state of subordination unless the world system is changed. Neomodernization approaches are considered by marxists to be re-workings of the diffusionist perspective, an approach that enables underdevelopment to occur. A complete reading of the Marxist stages of history should indicate that the Third World would move into capitalism on its way to socialism and communism. While dependency theorists would argue that the developed countries have grown strong at the expense of the less developed countries, a Marxist approach would emphasize how the capitalists in the First World have exploited workers in the Third World (Weaver and Berger, 1984).

One theme of Marxist geography has been uneven spatial development. Doherty (1977) in an examination of Tanzania concluded that the penetration of
capitalist development was the cause of urban landscape changes. Slater (1978) applied Marxist methods of analysis in his study of Latin America urbanization. A Marxist approach is also utilized in Santos (1979) on the spatial organization of the Third World urban economy. Soja (1980) formulated, within a Marxist theoretical framework, a perspective that the relationships between society and space are dialectically interdependent. Class struggle, then, has a regional component through this uneven spatial development. A second theme has been the pre-capitalist mode of production. In his analysis of petty commodity production in Southeast Asian cities, Forbes (1981) stated that these small scale manufactures involve the everyday forms of class struggle in the control of the relations of production. Seddon (1979) on peasant production in Nepal and Curtain (1981) on the migration of peasants in Papua New Guinea both utilized Marxian analysis of modes and relations of production. The Marxist approach to underdevelopment has some very articulate advocates. Watts (1983, 1987) considered spatial, historical and ecological factors in his analysis of the forces of capitalist development continued works on famine and food in Hausaland of northern Nigeria. Corbridge (1986a) critiqued radical development geography through a very Marxist analysis on population, environment, industry and interdependency while Forbes (1984) provided Marxist perspectives on uneven development, population mobility, and the informal economy.

Of the four perspectives on development, neomodernization, (development from below) allows an inclusion of the cultural and ethnic factors in the formulation of development. The focus of development from below is on the people of an area; in contrast development from above focuses upon large-scale organizations. In dependency theory the focus is upon states, while the Marxists are concerned with classes. The development from below perspective, through a recognition of the diversity of value systems and aspirations generated by the differences in cultures, envelops the cultural and ethnic factors in the calculus of development. Accordingly, this perspective is examined further and used as the theoretical approach to development in this research.

Neomodernization (Development from Below). There are several facets of the neomodernization response to the diffusionist approach. Basic needs strategies (Ghai, 1977; Lee, 1977; Streeten, 1977) emphasized the provision of shelter, clothing, food, health care and education for the poor of this world. Lee (1981) indicated that basic needs were not met and instead systems of inequality
on the international scale were replicated within the countries of the periphery. Alternative or intermediate technology (Schumacher, 1973; Ilich, 1974) pointed toward the use of technology that was not capital intensive but made use of local resources. This intermediate technology would be accessible to the entire population to spur development. McGee (1971) focused on the lower income urban populations of the Third World and the role of the informal urban economy in development. The urban poor of Third World cities were and remain employed in the informal sector of the economy, the lower circuit of traditional street, vendors, laborers and craftsmen. This sector represents a vital link between the urban formal economy and the traditional rural economy in the path of development impulses.

Agropolitan development (Friedmann and Douglass, 1978) in which rural and urban are linked in territorial integration was still another response to the development from above approach. The goal in agropolitan development is for autonomous self-sustaining rural development. A necessary condition for this rural development is the promotion of rural-urban linkages with diversified rural employment including agriculture, industry and services through the use of local resources and technologies (Lo and Salih, 1981). Myrdal (1968) shared in the beginning of dissatisfaction with the development from above perspective.

A challenge to diffusionist development theory appeared in Stohr and Taylor's work *Development from Above or Below?* (1981). Development from below in contrast to development from above would require the emergence of active development impulses within the less-developed areas and the control of the disastrous outflow of capital, commodities, and people away from the periphery to the center. Emphasis should be on small-scale development projects and on a fuller utilization of resources within the periphery for the periphery.

The development from below strategy (Stohr, 1981) is geared to the least-developed regions in Third World countries. Traditional center-down growth pole strategies may benefit certain areas higher up on the metropole hierarchy but the peripheral areas need a different mode of development. A development from below strategy would work best in areas with the following characteristics: 1) contiguous less-developed areas with large populations; 2) low per capita resource base; 3) low levels of living in a peripheral location; 4) few internal dynamic urban centers; and 5) a regional identity based on distinctive
sociocultural aspects.

There are several different elements to the development from below approach in planning. The overriding principal is one of selective spatial closure. Selective spatial closure would place the region at the focus of development impulses. Regional decision-making on a variety of issues would provide selective spatial closure (Stohr, 1977, 1981; Lo and Salih, 1981). 1) Regional decision-making would mean more self-determination in terms of local needs and standards for development. 2) Projects that satisfy the provision of basic needs (food, shelter, clothing, and health) would strengthen local capabilities. 3) The application of regionally appropriate technology would provide for a wise and efficient use of both natural and human resources. 4) For agriculture, regional closure would involve a) broad based access to land and b) national pricing policies that support the products of the region. 5) For industry, a) external assistance should be used to support industries that encompass the first three elements and b) export-base activities should be promoted to increase the standard of living of the local populace. 6) For transport, a) efforts should be made to enhance local access to transport and onward to markets and b) rural to rural linkages should be improved to increase a supply of basic services and decentralization. 7) Collective social structures that build upon local and regional initiatives for the discussion and dissemination of ideas are important for development from below. These elements of selective spatial closure for development from below as articulated by Stohr (1981) pull together ideas from Friedmann and Douglass (1978), McGee (1971), Lee (1977), and Schumacher (1973).

The neomodernization perspective has manifested itself in the field of geography as well. De Souza and Porter (1974) realized the shortcomings in both the diffusionist (particularly the geographies of modernization) and dependency approaches to development. Brookfield (1975) in a much broader presentation indicated the multidimensionality of development process and incorporated the human-environment theme into development.

Two applications of Stohr's concepts of development from below focused on China and on Thailand. China has practiced both planning from above and planning from below (Wu and Ip, 1981). China's approach to rural development was focused on six interrelated elements: 1) provision of basic needs; 2) a national framework for local control; 3) national support of rural
sector; 4) promotion of small-scale industries; 5) local control of surplus; and 6) use of local natural and human resources. During the era of reforms, 1978 to the present, the chief characteristic of reform has been a decentralization of the economy, thus relying on local resources for rural development (Harding, 1987). A case study of the Central Plains of Thailand (Douglass, 1981) indicated that the incorporation of the local economy into national trade patterns results in the loss of communal control of local development resources. Development from above planning in Thailand has served to erode the local initiatives for development. Douglass (1981) suggested for Thailand that an inward-looking rural-based approach that focuses on the region is appropriate.

Grossman (1984) built on Brookfield (1975) and integrated field research in a study of the people and land of Papua New Guinea, its ecology and economy. Two interrelated transformations have occurred in Papua New Guinea: 1) the local subsistence economy became tied into the wider commercial economy and 2) the local ecology was transformed through this production change. Armstrong and McGee (1985) and McGee (1986) continued the studies of informal urban economy in the Third World by showing that global forces of market affect the livelihood of communities of workers in Hong Kong and Malaysia. The role of ethnomedicine systems in development is taken up by Good (1987) on Kenya. These systems of health care represent a local set of environmental knowledge and technology that can provide for basic needs. Concerns of industry in the Third World are addressed by Dicken (1986) and Henderson (1986). The evolution and operation of the world economy and in particular the distinction between the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) and the rest of the Third World is a part of Dicken's focus. Henderson (1986) analyzed the semiconductor industry in Southeast Asia and concluded that capital investment there has become internationalized. Ecology and development was the concern of Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) in their discussion of the decline of land productivity in the Third World. Alternatives to fuelwood in the Sudan are examined by Whitney, Dufournaud, and Murck (1987) in a consideration of the mounting demands of population on the environment. Lewis and Berry (1988) focussed on Africa and its problems with the food crisis and environmental degradation. In Brown's (1988) conceptual analysis of the Third World development paradigms, a request was made for research based upon the interaction of the locality with the outside forces. The articulation of
the local context with the flows of capital (donor aid and investment), he argued, create the realities of development. Further evidence of the neomodernization perspective on development issues is presented in Riddell (1987,1988,1989).

The applicability of Stohr's (1981) approach to Xinjiang's development appears both in terms of the type of area and in the elements of the selective closure strategy. Stohr indicates that development from below programs would be useful for subnational peripheral areas that are less developed, populous, different socioculturally, rural, and poor. Xinjiang fits these criteria. Of its fifteen million people, over half are not ethnic Chinese. The standard of living is less than China's coastal provinces and the urban centers of Xinjiang are not well suited to absorbing the large rural population. The only criterion that Xinjiang does not fit completely is that of a low per capita resource base. With Xinjiang's oil, minerals, forests, and agricultural wealth, there exists a certain potential for development. With regard to the selective closure strategy, Xinjiang has focused on basic needs and adequate technology to utilize local resources and capabilities. Decision-making as in other parts of China has both a centralized and a decentralized character, involving indigenous groups. As will be seen in Chapter 3 on the setting of Xinjiang, the industrial and transport systems have developed a more centralized focus on Urumqi. As indicated by Wu and Ip (1981), China has followed a mixed development strategy, incorporating elements of development from above and development from below; Xinjiang's experience fits within China's larger scope.

The first goal of this research is to attain a culturally relevant perspective on development. In this survey of the literature, the development from below perspective puts people into the development of their place by including the cultural values and aspirations of local groups. More so than the other perspectives (diffusionist, dependency, and Marxist), development from below considers culture as a factor in development. The multiplicity of ethnicities constitutes a very real portion of culture in areas of the Third World. An examination of the ethnicity literature forms the second component of the first goal of this research.

**Ethnicity: Identity and Pluralism**

Besides development, the major issue faced by many Third World countries is ethnicity as those states are composed of a variety of ethnic groups.
A major topic is how ethnicity is constituted, formulated, defined and identified. Geographical studies on ethnicity have dealt with the issues of pluralism, segregation, and racism.

Researchers have regarded the formulation of ethnic identity in two ways, one cultural and one social. A cultural approach to ethnicity is labelled the primordialist. The primordial school viewed ethnicity as an unchangeable, inalienable aspect of one’s being that is based on a notion of common descent (Shils, 1967). This concept of descent stood as the main link among the various articulations of the primordialists; descent is not necessarily genetic but cultural (Keyes, 1981). Belief in common descent through similarities of physical type, customs, or memories, was important for the formation of ethnic groups, according to Weber (1968 [1922]), even without the existence of a blood relationship. Shared common descent was basic to the concept of ethnic group (Francis, 1976). Diagnostics of ethnic identity would include language, religion, myths, and folklore. The ethnic identity may be based upon any one or combination of these diagnostics. The key to this sense of ethnicity is that it is learned and thus cultural (Keyes, 1981). The primordial attachments of these diagnostics reinforce bonds to kin and neighbor in the sharing of ethnicity (Geertz, 1963). The difficulties of adhering to a complete primordialist explanation of ethnicity are two. The first is the nebulosity of ethnic sentiment expressed by the primordialists. The basis for ethnicity as a force that powers people needs to rely on more than “blood”. Second, if ethnicity is a primordial attachment, then it is immutable. Yet, ethnicity has changed with varying circumstances becoming more or less important (van den Berghe, 1981). In answer to the primordial perspective, a new interpretation arose based upon the fluidity of ethnicity.

A social interpretation of ethnicity is present in the circumstantialist perspective. Ethnic formulation, as examined by the circumstantialist school, is transmutable in the modern world, an evolving identity (Nagata, 1981). Ethnicity is held to be manipulable, variable, situationally expressed, and subjectively defined (Brass, 1974). The subjectivity of the circumstantialist approach to ethnicity was expressed by Barth (1969a) for whom ethnicity is whatever the natives say it is. Environment, economics, politics, and class would all have a role to play in the formulation of ethnic identity. Class contributed to the realization of ethnicity among groups in post-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa.
Wallerstein, 1972). Hausa ethnicity was refined through participation in politics in Yoruba towns (Cohen, 1969). Economic determinants also have a role to play in ethnic formulation; members of the agricultural Fur of the Sudan change their identity to that of nomadic Arabs to enhance economic opportunities (Haaland, 1969). Economic production, exchange, distribution, and labor produce relationships that can have expression in terms of ethnicity (Cohen, 1974).

Among the Northern and Southern Pathans, ethnic identity was predicated upon residence and food production associated with various ecological niches (Barth, 1969b). Ethnic identity was arrived at from elaborations and expressions of fundamental underlying relationships. The key to the circumstantialist perspective is that ethnicity is flexible and amenable to change (Nagata, 1981).

Ethnicity, as explicated by Barth (1969a), is composed of both outward and inward manifestations. The outward signs of ethnicity are what can be seen with the naked eye. Material culture of cultural artifacts of this sort are susceptible to change, but are nonetheless important characteristics of ethnicity. These materials and the creative process that produces these materials both are a part of the group's identity. The ethnic identity of the individual and the group provides basic value orientations.

In China the state has a major part to play in the formation of ethnic identity. Currently there are 56 ethnic groups recognized as such by the state. This process of recognition is carried out by researchers under the auspices of the State Commission for Nationality Affairs (SCNA). Over 400 different groups applied for recognition in the mid-1950s; the SCNA is still considering the case of fifteen groups (Fei, 1981). China's criteria for defining a minority nationality include four points: common language, common territory, common economic life, and common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national culture. These criteria are based upon Stalin's conception of ethnicity (Stalin, 1953, Vol. 11).

In the People's Republic of China, the state's activity is regarded by this author to be a part of the environment in which ethnic formulation occurs. A circumstantialist interpretation of ethnic identity in the PRC would mean that under the present circumstances of state policy ethnicity is shaped and changed. A primordialist interpretation would point to the Stalinist criteria as being a portion of primordial attachments that an ethnic group holds.

A consideration of ethnic identity in China points to a dialectical
perspective. In this dialectical perspective, articulated by Nagata (1981) and Keyes (1981), primordial sentiments are held by ethnic groups. The saliency of a group's ethnicity proceeds only because of the accumulation of circumstances. Primordial sentiments can create perceived circumstantial interests, while circumstances can bring out or push back primordial attachments. In China's case, part of the set of circumstances that either enhance or downplay primordial attachments is the activity of the state.

The significance of the state's role in determining ethnicity assumes greater importance as China has certain policies for improving the livelihood of minority ethnic groups. Groups that have an internal identity, but no state recognition, will not benefit from the nationality programs of China. The implementation of China's minority nationality policies in the 1980s means favorable treatment for minorities, including development aid from central government bodies to minority areas, minority representation in political congresses, affirmative action in schooling, and leniency in enforcing population control (Goujia Minwei, 1982).

For Xinjiang, a dialectical approach would be applied in the following manner. To the primordialist, diagnostics of the ethnic identity of the Uighurs include their language (Turkic) and their religion (Islam). The ethnogenesis of the Uighur has not been sufficiently established. Modern Uighurs have indicated to this author that the word 'yoghurt' and Uighur have the same root meaning, that of a unity congealed. Official Chinese sources indicate the advent of the Uighur into the area in the ninth century. In contrast, modern Uighurs have conveyed to this author the possibility of an older connection that pre-dates Han activity in the area. The historical beginnings of the Uighur are discussed in Chapter Three. The primordial identity of the modern Uighur, Turkic and Islamic, provides him/her with a set of values and views that differs from the Han. In circumstantialist terms, the ethnicity of the Uighur is evolving and changing as Xinjiang and China evolve and change. To take an extreme example, the Uighurs hid their ethnicity during the days of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During that time to be ethnic was to be anti-Chinese. The articulation of ethnicity in recent years is undergoing a rebirth as the laws of the state have opened avenues of expression, including support for religious instruction and observances. Ethnicity no longer needs to be reined in. In summary the dialectical interpretation of the Jighur’s ethnicity provides for a recognition of
primordial values in the midst of evolving circumstances.

Studies of ethnicity within geography have not focused upon the question of ethnic identity and the primordialist—circumstantialist debate. Research on ethnicity in geography often appeared as social geographies of ethnic and racial minorities. *A Social Geography of Belfast* (Jones, 1960) was deemed by Peach (1983) as one of the pioneering works in the study of residential segregation. The strong point of Jones (1960) lay in the description of the spatial pattern of minority group concentration. An interpretation of the diffusion process involved in ethnically segregated areas was present in Morrill (1965). Spatial process as well as pattern are analyzed in this discussion of the black ghetto; the inspection of both process and pattern is necessary. If just cartographic analysis is done, as Jones (1972) declares, then “atlases of social data are rather like cases of butterflies — very pretty and telling us something, but the butterflies are dead”. Research on the geography of ethnic and racial minorities has gone beyond cartographic analysis to include participant observation and social surveys (Jackson and Smith, 1981). Following in the steps of Jones, Boal and Douglas (1982) have traced the interconnections of society and space in the continuing ethnic strife of Northern Ireland. Ley (1974) extended the discussion on the black ghetto to the creation of segregated social worlds. The focus of much of this social geographic research on ethnicity has been on the issues of segregation in cities.

Recent studies in the geography of ethnic minorities have concentrated upon the issues of ethnic pluralism as well as segregation. The works on ethnic pluralism in geography began by looking at states or cities which have ethnic groups that might be economically integrated but socially separated. For Furnivall (1948, p. 304), this was a plural society “with different sections of society living side by side but separate within the same political unit”. Members of that state “mix, but only in the market place, buying and selling.” In a reconsideration of Furnivall’s plural society in Southeast Asia, Demaine (1984) pointed to the business programs in Malaysia for Malays and in the Philippines for Filipinos as being examples of the state’s attempts to reduce economic domination by ethnic minorities. Clarke (1984), utilizing the theoretical statements on cultural pluralism by Smith (1960, 1969), analyzed the impact of decolonialization on culture in Jamaica and Trinidad. In both countries, plural societies based on ethnic distinctions developed through slavery or indentured
servants have formed political organizations that remained stratified ethnically. The geography of ethnic minorities has also focused on the problems of racism and its social and spatial aspects. Jackson (1987) asserted that racism is structured; racism ranges from ethnic jokes to institutional racism in the form of public expenditure cutbacks that hurt minorities to academic racism that perpetuates unfounded myths and stereotypes. The political significance of racial segregation was addressed by Smith (1987). She argued that policies in England have sustained rather than ended racial segregation. This continued segregation has occurred because the state is unresponsive to the needs of the black minority in England. In the case of the Gypsy, Sibley (1987) showed how the state acts to limit the locations used by this mobile minority group. This territorial containment marks the Gypsy as the target of direct spatial control. In these works racism and its political importance was placed on the research agenda.

For China, Dreyer (1976, 1981) and Grunfield (1981) have discussed the issues salient to the relationship of the Han and the ethnic minorities. That relationship is of immense political consequence to the People's Republic of China, given the scale of the resource-rich territory in the border areas inhabited by the minorities. Following Clarke (1984), Xinjiang meets the criteria for a culturally and ethnically plural society (see Chapter 3 for details). In Urumqi, there are Uighur and Han sections of the city. While individuals work in a setting of integration, they live in unofficially segregated areas and shop at ethnically distinctive market zones. Minority groups in China have experienced a further increase in the rights recognized for them by the state. This recognition is a part of the solution to pluralism as articulated by Smith (1969). Racism in China can take the form of “Great Han Chauvinism”, Dahanzhuyi, in the case of racist attitudes on the part of the Han or “Ethnicism”, minzuzhuyi, in the case of anti-Han sentiment held by the ethnic minority groups (Dreyer, 1976). In the case of China, Great Han Chauvinism has a historical cultural base as well as a political structural component (the focus of the studies by Jackson [1987]). Great Han Chauvinism was strongest during the Cultural Revolution when it was institutionalized (Dreyer, 1981). During the reform era, such institutional racism is not practiced, but this author saw the structural patterns of ethnic segregation still in existence in Urumqi.

To summarize, the question of ethnic identity has been approached from a
primordialist and a circumstantialist perspective. A dialectical perspective, in contrast, recognizes that primordial values and the evolving circumstances come together to form ethnic identities. Geographical studies of ethnic minorities have focused on pattern and process, be it pluralism, segregation or racism.

Definitions of and perspectives on development and ethnicity have been reviewed thus far. While development from below considers culture, the dialectical perspective on ethnicity considers state policies which include development. The development from below perspective and the dialectical perspective on ethnicity have been selected as theoretical tools to conceptualize the interplay of ethnicity and development. Attainment of a culturally relevant perspective on development is the first goal of this research. The third and last component to be examined for this first goal is the periphery, thus providing the locational setting.

Periphery
Spatial Layers and Systematic Dimensions

Besides the formulation of development and ethnicity, this research is based upon the formulation of the periphery. This dissertation is limited to the issues of development and ethnicity as manifested in the periphery.

A periphery has been defined as being 1) territory subordinate to the authority of the center and 2) those less powerful in the decision-making system. Distant from, dependent upon, and different from the center are the key characteristics of the periphery (Rokkan, 1983). A minority periphery is one whose inhabitants consist of minority ethnic groups that do not hold power at the center.

The periphery may be conquered territory with a poorly developed economy and a marginal culture. The periphery can be conceptualized as an opportunity structure. Beyond its spatial representation the periphery functions as a set of sites that offer opportunities and imposes constraints. The periphery is isolated from other regions, controls at best its own resources and contributes little to the total communication flow of the center-controlled territory (Rokkan, 1980). Echoing these characteristics, Seers (1983) pointed out the lack of participation of the periphery in the center-dominated economy. As well the
periphery is weaker than the center, possessing unbalanced production systems and poor social services. Stohr (1982) defined the periphery as being an area of low accessibility to markets, production, services, culture, innovation and power.

Peripheries exist at a variety of spatial scales. At a global level, Prebisch (1970) and other dependency theorists have used a core-periphery model to show the power of the core (Western Europe, Japan, and the US) relative to the global periphery (Latin America, Africa, and Asia). Continental periphery structures exist as well in the works by Seers (1973, 1979) on the periphery of Europe, as seen in the dependence of Iberia, Greece, and Ireland upon the center of Western Europe (France, Germany, and England). Center-periphery relations function within a state (China’s West as a periphery to the coast, see Luk, 1985, and Wu, 1987). Even at a provincial level (Eastern Washington as a periphery to Seattle) center-periphery structures operate.

The concern of this dissertation will be at the last two scales. Adapting the notation from Galtung (1971), state center-periphery structures are represented as C v. P, that is the relations of the center of China with its peripheral territories (one of which is Xinjiang). At a more local level, provincial center-periphery structures are designated c v. p, that is the relations of the center of Xinjiang (Urumqi) with the districts on Xinjiang’s borders. The theoretical construct round which this dissertation is constructed is limited in its setting; it is applicable to peripheries rather than centers and that applicability is essentially at the sub-state level.

How does peripherality matter in the calculus of development? For C v. P relations in China, the history of penetrations into and connections out of Xinjiang have shaped the present context of development possibilities. Following Rokkan (1983, pp. 14-18), the working of peripherality is examined as an economic, territorial, and cultural phenomenon. Political transactions between center and periphery lend substance to the definition of the periphery as well. The differentiation across the districts of Xinjiang also needs to be examined. With the modern integration of Xinjiang into the People’s Republic of China there has been a reorientation of Xinjiang’s territory, economy and culture to China. As Xinjiang is a minority periphery, the ethnicity of the peoples of Xinjiang is also significant to the spatial and systematic dimensions of peripherality in Xinjiang.

Close examination of C v. P and c v. p relations will lead to a better
understanding of the needs of sub-state peripheries as regards development. Stohr (1982), in his analysis of the usual mechanisms for development (primary product export, labor migration) as applied to the periphery, pointed out that the resultant side effects of this development encompass the disruption of patterns of labor markets and the removal of natural resources from the periphery. The periphery (at whatever scale) by virtue of its distinctiveness and its subordinate relations with the center is rather more sensitive to these side effects.

A sub-state periphery is distinct from the state center; that distinction is apparent when different ethnic groups are present. Development of the periphery, which is distant from and dependent upon the center, is a formidable task unless the inhabitants of the periphery are involved in the structure of development. Development, ethnicity and periphery have been examined separately. The next step is to examine the intersections of these components.

Development and Ethnicity in Minority Peripheries

The purpose of this section is to identify the interactions of ethnicity and development within substate minority peripheries, thus merging together the development from below approach (Stohr, 1980; Goulet, 1971), a dialectical perspective on ethnicity (Keyes, 1981), and the distinctiveness of the periphery (Rokkan, 1983). In order to attain a culturally relevant perspective on development, the components of ethnicity, development, and the periphery are set within the broad background of the cultural dimension of development.

The interrelationships of culture and development are taken up by development theorists within and without geography. Configurations of development 'from below' arise from the varying value systems of local people involved. In defense of cultural diversity, Goulet (1971, pp. 263-270) argues that cultural heterogeneity enhances the global quality of human life and thus the second value of development, self-esteem. Cultural traditions play an important role in the viewpoints of different peoples (Mabogunje, 1981). The wholesale borrowing of development methods from the center by the periphery does not contribute to the development of the periphery when local cultural traditions are
not part of the consideration (De Souza and Porter, 1974).

A primary problem of development from above strategies is a lack of recognition of the cultural dimension of development (Stohr, 1981). Such strategies overwhelm the diversity of value systems among the peoples of the periphery. With such varying values and aspirations, imposing monolithic development concepts 'from above' leads to the subordination of cultural values and societal goals of the periphery to economic determinants emanating from the center. Peel (1976) argued for a recognition of the cultural factor and against the relegation of culture to the ubiquitous category of 'other' non-economic factors that impede the process of development. An emphasis on the cultural dimension of development means a search for original styles of development that maintain cultural identity and preserve cultural heritage (Ziolkowski, 1981). The crux of the problem, as expressed by Sanchez-Arnau (1981), is the need for a development that is not the transfer of the cultural modes and attitudes from the center to the periphery.

The early collection on geography and development by Ginsburg (1960) included works that operated within the traditions of regional and cultural geography. Hartshorne (1960) reminded us that even in advanced countries not all material and spiritual needs are satisfied. Spencer (1960) viewed development as a cultural process, involving elements of culture such as religion, language and the evolution of understanding. His interpretation of the development process in Malaysia rested upon an understanding of the significance of culture in that plural society. Ginsburg (1960, p. xiv) indicated that development which "reflects Western standards may not take into sufficient account the differing values of cultures."

More recently, the geography of development has included culture within its formulations. Bell (1986), on the interaction of development, the state, and culture in Africa, showed the interpenetration of Western, indigenous, and Muslim cultural forms into the production systems of Africa. The influences of culture upon community structures, broad variations in ethnicity and diverse cultural attitudes to development continue to be salient to the contemporary geography of Africa (Bell, 1986). Peet (1986), in a determinist Marxist framework, concluded that the peripheral cultures are being overwhelmed by a world culture based on that of the capitalist center.

As mentioned earlier, part of the distinctiveness of the Third World may
be seen in its ethnic configuration. Within the development 'from below' approach, greater emphasis is placed on the cultural dimension of development.

Where does development interact with ethnicity? Concretely, development efforts will have their presence felt on ethnicity in the home, the market place and the workplace. The locus of this study is the workplace. Production sites have an economic purpose, yet the extension of ethnicity into the workplace necessitates this investigation into the culture of production. Traditional work activities and their products are a part of the great conglomeration of ethnic markers that allow a group to identify itself as such. Theoretically, the nodes of intersection are a) the cultural interpretations of development present in the ethnic groups and b) the impact of development programs upon inward and outward markers of ethnicity.

The interacting theoretical possibilities of ethnicity and development are examined by Stavenhagen (1986). As he so profoundly expressed it, ethnic issues exist and confront us daily, yet much of the social, economic, geographical and political theories of development have neglected ethnic issues and relegated such concerns to anthropology. This neglect was not an oversight but a paradigmatic blind-spot as theorists have not considered the ethnic factor as relevant to the issue of development. A leap in the unit of analysis from the individual to larger collectivities such as the firm or the state has skipped over the impact of ethnic or religious communities on development. Stavenhagen (1986) suggested that a major issue of the theory of development would be ethnodevelopment — the development of ethnic groups within the framework of a larger society.

The primordialist viewpoint of descent conceives of ethnicity as remnants of the past. A circumstantialist perspective sees present-day structures of production, ecology, class, and politics as shaping ethnicity. A dialectical interpretation (Keyes, 1981) of ethnicity is useful to our understanding of development as it envelops both the evolving nature and the primordial sentiments of ethnicity. While a circumstantialist perspective contributes to the realization that ethnicity articulates with development in an evolving manner, a primordialist perspective recognizes that ethnic identities contain different perceptions of development.

Within the periphery (Rokkan, 1983), there is a further differentiation of inward (values) and outward (activities) dimensions of ethnicity. Barth (1969) posited that basic value orientations of ethnic groups are vital to the identity of
the group. Spicer (1971) spoke of the factor of persistence in the maintenance of ethnic identity systems in changing cultural environments. This ethnic identity becomes salient to development in that, as Singer (1971) suggested, the heritage of ethnicity presents the individual with a series of world views and value systems. When an area such as a minority periphery is ethnically diverse, then different value orientations exist; thus different attitudes to change and development are evident in that periphery. The cultural construal of identity affects the attitudes and perceptions towards development issues (in the realms of both theory and practice). Spencer (1960), in his examination of Malaysia, argued that cultural heritage imparts a different perspective to the improvement of people’s livelihood.

The varying value systems and orientations of ethnic groups in the periphery produce a series of different attitudes toward the development process. On a practical level the relative success of the development projects is tied to the degree to which those projects recognize the cultural realities of the people and their place. For C v. P relations, policies generated in the center and carried out in the periphery which do not encompass the ethnic factor will lead to changes in the outward signs of ethnicity in the periphery. Due to the spatial complexity of ethnic distribution in a minority periphery such as Xinjiang, the changes resulting from the development efforts would vary with the ethnic composition in the periphery. An examination of the relative degree of changes in ethnicity would allow for a better gauge of the “success” of development efforts vis-a-vis ethnicity.

A common thread woven into the design of development is the necessary humanity in the development process. Without a consideration of the cultural and ethnic diversity in human community, without putting people in their development, our understanding of development is not complete. On a practical level, development projects may not achieve their expected fruition without including the ethnic factor. Development ‘from below’ approaches with a further consideration of the cultural dimension have added to the wholeness of development. “Culture, not economics, technology, or politics, is the primordial dimension in development.” (Goulet, 1971, p. 272).

In essence the dissertation seeks to illuminate the relationship of ethnicity and development in sub-state peripheries. The first goal of this research is to attain a culturally relevant perspective on development. This is accomplished by
using the development from below perspective (Stohr, 1980), the dialectical perspective on ethnicity (Keyes, 1981) and the distinctiveness of the periphery (Rokkan, 1983).

The second goal of this research is to examine China's policies for the development of minority nationality areas and the regional application of these policies to the development of Xinjiang. Under the reform leadership of the post-Mao era, the development of the minority nationality areas has both a regional and an ethnic dimension. The landscape of development within Xinjiang in this period of reform is the product of the articulation of national policies, regional implementation and local response.

China's Policies toward Development in Minority Areas

The issues of development and ethnicity in the periphery are faced by the People's Republic of China in the efforts to develop the shaoshu minzu diqu (minority nationality areas). By definition the minority nationality areas are ethnic. They are also located in China's periphery and are considered in China to be backward and in need of development. The essential elements of the theoretical construct just formulated are present in China. The second goal of this research considers China's policies toward development in the minority nationality areas as followed by the reformers under Deng Xiaoping (1978 through the present).

The efforts to develop the minority nationality areas fit within the general context of China's general program for development. Pragmatism is a key aspect of the economic reforms overall. Another major aspect of the reform period has been that plans for development were regionally based. The reformist development for minority nationality areas is pragmatic and regional as well but it also possesses an ethnic dimension.

Since its founding, the People's Republic has embarked on massive efforts toward control and development. China's approach to rural development until 1978 had entailed a provision of basic needs, a national framework for local control, promotion of small-scale industries, local control of surplus, and the use of local resources (Wu and Ip, 1981). During the era of reform, 1978 to the present, the chief characteristic of the economy has been pragmatism. Two of Deng Xiaoping's slogans, "seek truth from facts" and "it doesn't matter if a cat is
black or white as long as it catches mice”, reflect this pragmatism (Harding, 1987). Rural development is based on the principle of “according to what suits the land”; this entails small-scale industrialization as well as agricultural activities that take into account local conditions of the market, human capital and natural environment (Wu, 1987).

China’s regional policies for development have also evolved. At the end of the Cultural Revolution (1976), priority was given to investment in the inland region (the northwest and southwest portions of the country, that is beyond China Proper). In the early eighties central policies encouraged the cooperation between the coastal and inland regions. In this fashion the capital, technology and management capabilities generated by the coastal region could be invested in the inland regions, thus redressing the regional imbalances in the country. The inland region has made economic gains during the period of reform, but the coastal region’s gains have been of greater magnitude. Thus a temporal comparison with the past would show an improvement for the inland areas, but a spatial comparison with the coast does not register an improvement (Wu, 1987). The current five-year plan continues to consider development in China from a regional viewpoint. The inland region functions nationally as a supplier for primary sector products (energy, minerals, animal by-products and specialty crops) and is a vital component in the overall development plans of the country (Goodman, 1989).

Much of the inland region is settled by minority nationality groups; there is an ethnic dimension to development for the inland areas of China. Zhao Ziyang has stated that uneven economic development of the inland and coastal regions will be a feature of China for a long time. According to Zhao (1988), “economic construction in the nationality areas has experienced huge advances, but the coastal areas have developed at a still faster pace.” The minority nationality areas, such as Xinjiang, develop through both the extension of commercial forces and center-led investment. Aspects of this mixed approach would include more provincial level control over central subsidies, commercial ventures, and encouragement of foreign investment (Cannon, 1989).

Within China, articles have been published in such journals as Minzu Yanjiu (Nationalities Research) and Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan Xuebao (Bulletin of the Central Institute For Nationalities) focusing on the issue of economic development in minority nationality areas. This emphasis reflects
portions of Zhou Enlai’s 1957 speech on minority ethnic work (reprinted in 1980 in *Minzu Yanjiu*). In this speech the necessity of developing areas of both Han and minority dominance is recognized. A China that encompasses areas like Xinjiang, Tibet and Mongolia and allows them to remain “backward” is not a Socialist China. Development of these areas is necessary before China can be “socialist” (Zhou Enlai, 1980).

China’s development policy recognizes that some different strategies may well be needed to provide for the minority nationality areas. Factors leading to the different strategies include the historical and cultural differences of the minority ethnic groups as well as their peripheral location. The concern for the minority nationality areas arises from their border location, large territory, natural resources and the growing importance of the minority ethnic groups in China’s relations with neighboring states (Dreyer, 1976).

Several items of concern emerge on the topic of economic development in the minority nationality areas: the integration of minority nationality area economy into the national economy, the maintenance of traditional ethnic identity, and the provision for the basic well-being of the minority ethnic groups. Fei (1981) indicated the necessity of studying the situation of minority ethnic groups in China to further their social-economic development. Liu (1982) considered the paucity of industrial development, inadequate transportation, and lack of capital to be the major problems of minority nationality areas. All of these factors inhibit the integration of the productive capabilities of the minority nationality areas into the national system of production, transportation and consumption. Development within the minority nationality areas must take into account the ethnic quality of the local people (Wang, 1986). Li (1982) and Mao (1980) both considered the problem of economic development in minority nationality areas as a question of modernization and socialist reconstruction.

China’s economic development program in minority nationality areas should be based upon the characteristics of these areas. According to Shi Zhengyi (1983), besides ethnicity, these characteristics include locality, economic backwardness, complexity, and international relations (border location). Development should be planned in accordance with local needs and abilities. The local character may well be complex; a number of economic activities may function side by side. The general perception is that the minority ethnic areas are economically “backward” in that the areas haven’t the proper infrastructure or
personnel to utilize their resources (Fei, 1981). As Dreyer (1976) has indicated, the international aspect of minority issues requires China to proceed in the development of minority ethnic areas in view of the fact that across the border in Korea, Mongolia, the Soviet Union, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Burma, Thailand, Laos and Vietnam are peoples with similar cultures as China's minorities. Given their proximity to border regions, plans have been made for minority nationality areas to develop further economic and technological cooperation with other countries (Renmin Ribao, September 12, 1986, p. 5).

Various sectors of the economy have also been examined with regard to the development of the minority nationality areas. A major characteristic is the diversity of economic sectors in minority nationality areas; agriculture may well be the most common sector in production but other primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors of the economy play a role in the development of minority nationality areas (Liu Yi, 1982; Yuan Shaofen, 1983). Minority nationality areas account for a significant amount of the forest products industry; many of the mountainous forested areas of the country are inhabited by ethnic minorities (Jin and Lin, 1983; Shi Tongyang, 1983). Animal husbandry has been a major production activity for several minority groups including nomadic herders as well as farming communities; Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia both provide China with animal products (Li Zonghai, 1982, 1983). The upper courses of China's major rivers flow through minority nationality areas; there is some potential for hydroelectric power in these areas (Zhu Yunxi, 1984). The development of rural industry in minority nationality areas appears as a complement to the primary sector and as further diversification of the economy (Zhang Xietang, 1984). Because of the large size and diversity of environment of the territory inhabited by the minority ethnic groups, the provision of transport is particularly crucial to the development of the minority nationality areas (Li Zhongying, 1984).

Beyond the development of the minority nationality areas, another emphasis has been on the integration of the minority nationality areas into the national economy. As noted above Liu (1982) connected economic development of the minority nationality area to national integration. Similarly, China can be conceived into three broad economic zones, east, central and west; the integration of the west into the national economy is made more complex because of its ethnic character (Alatan and Yin Cunyi, 1988). The ties between Han and minority nationality areas are considered to be two-way, mutual, and beneficial
in terms of an integration of production and consumption (Zheng Yiqiao, 1987). Ties between the west (minority periphery) and the east (China proper) are seen to be a part of the program for development and modernization in the minority nationality areas (Renmin Ribao, September 12, 1986, p. 5). The general perspective is that, through proper interaction with the Han in the center, the minorities in the periphery of China will be able to modernize and develop (Fei, 1981).

A cornerstone to both the integration and development of the minority nationality areas has been the provision of subsidies from the center. Ulanhu (1981) considers this center-periphery, Han-minority interaction as being beneficial to all concerned, utilizing the resources of the minority nationality areas in conjunction with the technical skills and financial aid of Han areas. “The modernization of the minority nationality areas is an organic component of the modernization program of the whole country.” (Ulanhu, 1981, p. 17). The subsidies from the center to the minority nationality areas were increased by 10 percent during the Sixth Five Year Plan (1981-1985) and an additional 500 million yuan yearly were allocated for the minority nationality areas (Beijing Review, May 30, 1983). In 1985 state aid amounted to 7.9 billion yuan; in 1986 this was increased to 8.5 billion yuan (China Daily, April 26, 1986, p. 1). The pace of capital investment in the minority nationality investment has not matched the investment in the rest of China. The subsidies can then be construed as a policy to aid the minority nationality areas until such investment take place (Leung and Chan, 1986, p. 42-44).

Development includes other than economic variables (see Chapter 2). In general, the ethnic character of the minority nationality areas is to be maintained in the midst of China’s economic development and integration policies. During the reform era of the 1980s a call has been issued for sociocultural development as well as economic development in the minority nationality areas (Li Mingzhe and Pei Junsheng, 1983). China’s sociocultural policies for minority nationalities in the reform era have reiterated the need to respect the rights of minorities. Radio and television broadcasts, book, magazine, and newspaper publications in the minority languages were resumed. Respect for minority customs and religions was also encouraged at the central and provincial levels (Dreyer, 1981). In terms of education, local minority languages are used in instruction, supplemented with Han instruction. Minorities are also given preferential
treatment for college entrance (Jiang Ping, 1980). For the minority nationality groups in the PRC, they are definitely better off now than during the Cultural Revolution.

Development in the minority nationality areas during the reform era is set within the overall framework of China's development policy; it is both pragmatic and regional. Central policies for development have included the integration of the minority periphery into the national economy, the provision of central subsidies, the maintenance of basic needs of the minorities, improvement in diverse economic sectors and a consideration of the sociocultural environment. This is the overall picture for development in the minority peripheries of China. The particularities vary from region to region in the periphery of China.

Xinjiang as the Region of Inquiry

The setting of this research is the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of the People's Republic of China. The geography and history of Xinjiang provides the clues for its selection as the region of inquiry. Xinjiang functions as a case study for China's policies of development in minority nationality areas, the examination of which is the second goal of this research.

Xinjiang's historical experience points toward its role as a marchland for China. The westernmost extent of China's power has, for the most part, been Xinjiang. Xinjiang means in Chinese "New Frontier". Xinjiang functioned as a crossroads — a pathway for the movement for peoples, ideas and goods. As a part of the Silk Road, Xinjiang was the avenue for the transfer of trade goods, silk and horses to mention two items. Two of the world's religions, Islam and Buddhism transited Xinjiang during their diffusion to China. The Xiongnu, Turks, Mongols, and Chinese all passed through Xinjiang (Grousset, 1970).

The current peripherality of Xinjiang was preceded by successive stages of connections and politico-economic subordination to the surrounding great powers (Persian, Chinese, Mongol, Russian) and of the dissolution in which these great powers lost their control (Lattimore, 1950). During the periods of dissolution, local leaders controlled the area. The basic units of societal occupation in the oases and the steppes of Xinjiang constitute the only allegiance of the local people.

The emergence of Xinjiang's role as a periphery rather than a crossroads
came about most forcefully during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). In addition to 
the growing connections to the Chinese state, the emergence of nautical trade 
meant the declining significance of the Silk Road and of Xinjiang's importance as 
a crossroads.

With the advent of the People's Republic, Xinjiang was further closed off 
from the outside thus reinforcing Xinjiang's reliance on one center of power 
resident in Beijing. Regional leaders continued to play a role but their power was 
diminished in comparison with that of rulers of Xinjiang in the past. Peripheral 
status, in terms of political, economic and cultural subordination was attained. 
Xinjiang's distance from Beijing, differences from Beijing and dependency upon 
Beijing characterized it as a periphery within China (C v. P).

Besides peripherality, Xinjiang may also be identified by its non-Sinic 
character. Ethnicity thus plays a major role in the identity of local people vis-a-
vis the center, as well as the outside world. Traditionally, Xinjiang has been the 
home of several peoples. In the desert oases, the Islamic Uighur, a Turkic people, 
are the most populous; within the steppe, the Kazak, also Turkic and Islamic, are 
the most common. Prior to 1949, Xinjiang's population was 75-80 per cent 
Turkic. During the 1950s and 1960s there was a vast migration of Han Chinese 
into the area. Now the population is almost 40-50% Han, mostly concentrated in 
the central region of Xinjiang. Thus while ethnicity is an important factor in 
term's of Xinjiang's connections to the rest of China (C v. P), it also occupies 
prominence in the relations of the Urumqi-Shihezi center with the rest of 
Xinjiang (c v. p). With a total of thirteen ethnic groups in Xinjiang, each having 
its own distinctive combination of language, belief and production systems, the 
regional government at Urumqi has worked to interpret the mandates of Beijing 
with regard to the local particularities. Ethnic relationships or minzu guanxi are 
an important consideration in government policies (McMillen, 1979).

Compared with neighboring areas, states within Xinjiang (the Uighur 
empire of Qocho, the kingdoms of Kucha and Khotan, the Kharakhanid rule of 
Kashgaria) maintained a definite local essence and rather highly evolved systems 
during the periods of dissolution. In modern times when Xinjiang was no longer 
a crossroads, Xinjiang could no longer keep up with neighboring areas. As a 
region economically poorer in its relations with the world and no longer the 
focus for any "real" development impulses of innovation and organization, 
Xinjiang had been reduced to a difficult situation. During the years of war and
rebellion under the Qing (1644-1911) and Republican periods (1911-1949), Xinjiang was ravaged and torn apart with a loss of life and vitality. Industry was near non-existent and agriculture was at a standstill in development.

Since 1949, the People's Republic has embarked on massive efforts toward control and development. Organization has been the primary factor in China's efforts towards development in terms of its own brand of socialism (Maxwell, 1979). Wu and Ip (1981), using Stohr’s paradigm of development 'from below' have analyzed the development strategies of China, indicating that the simultaneous implementation of local small-sized projects with centrally-planned support has provided for the basic needs of the populace. Temporal and spatial discontinuities in the flow of the development process are also evident (witness the chaos of the Cultural Revolution or the inequality of regional development between coastal and inland provinces).

Within Xinjiang, development efforts have proceeded at a slower pace. From the center, Xinjiang is perceived as being backward louhou in part because of its lack of industry, transportation facilities and capital. Perhaps this perception is also due to Xinjiang's distinctiveness vis-a-vis the rest of China. McMillen (1979) has examined the policies of the local communist leadership in Xinjiang; the industrial, agricultural, and pastoral sectors of the economy have all seen a directed policy of organized development. While integration of the economy has been the primary goal, the results have been less than successful. Xinjiang has a variety of natural resources that are not available to other parts of China. Xinjiang thus becomes a region of specialized production, on the periphery, feeding into the Chinese economy. To maximize Xinjiang's offerings to the Chinese economy and to maintain ethnic identity in the midst of economic development seems a tall order for the planners of Xinjiang. Yet socio-cultural goals as well as politico-economic ones form an important segment of China's and Xinjiang's seventh five-year plan (1986-90).

For reasons of peripherality, ethnicity, and development, Xinjiang is an appropriate region for inquiry. Xinjiang functions as a case study for understanding China's policies for minority nationality area development. The second goal of this research is accomplished through a consideration of the pragmatic, regional and ethnic aspects of development in the minority nationality areas.

The third goal of this research is to consider how tourism and crafts, as
ethnic industries, can contribute to development in the Third World. Both tourism and crafts are manifestations of local ethnicity. Both are also sources for economic development. Examination of the theoretical and comparative aspects of tourism and crafts derives from their roles in development as industries of ethnic distinctiveness. Through this consideration of the contribution of crafts and tourism to development, the contribution of ethnicity is also examined.

Tourism in the Third World
Theoretical Perspectives

International tourists are visitors that make at least one overnight stop in a country other than that which is the usual place of residence, for any reason other than following an occupation remunerated from within the country visited (Murphy, 1985, p. 5). The international tourists visit in search of a particular tourist product, through the structure of the tourism industry. Their search also affects the locale of the tourist product. This study focuses on the locale of the product and the resultant impact of tourism upon the area. Part of the final goal of this research to consider how tourism contributes to development.

Among developing countries, in general, international tourism has been seen as a relatively ‘quick’ way to garner foreign capital. Not needing the presence of resources for the development of heavy industry, tourism, the ‘smokeless’ industry, is perceived as making less demands on the resources of developing countries. The World Bank has made loans for tourist development, primarily infrastructure improvement.

As explained in the excellent discussion by de Kadt (1979), the appropriateness of tourism for development efforts in the global periphery revolves around the consequences of tourism — the socioeconomic benefits versus the sociocultural costs. The nature of the industry, consumers brought to the point of production, inserts variables into the socio-economic equation not present in other development strategies. Cultural and nonmaterial aspects of development activities are particularly crucial to the growth of tourism. Efforts of tourism development, stages of development, and the resultant sociocultural effects of that development are themes that have occupied the literature (Noronha, 1979).

As a starting point for the investigation of tourism, the UNESCO
produced document, “The Effects of Tourism on Socio-Cultural Values,” (1976) is of particular utility. Three points of departure are presented.

1. Tourism becomes a marketing of culture. Greenwood (1977) expresses this as the “commoditization” of culture. If tourism is marketing culture, the argument, then is that the local culture is debased in the eyes of the local populace as cultural manifestations are given a monetary value. A concrete example is the handicrafts industry that caters to tourism. Goods that may have traditional use for the autochthonous peoples become mementoes for the tourist.

Commoditization has different forms. The tourist may purchase authentic original artifacts that represent the host culture. Purchases of this sort can be more difficult. More common is the acquisition of pseudo-traditional material. Items that have been faked or quick copies of the traditional material may make a fast buck but at the same time cause a lack of information flow in tourism as a culture-learning process. In other cases the traditional art is formed to suit the needs of the purchaser-tourist. Items are made smaller (to fit into a suitcase) or cuter. In these latter two instances the artificiality of the commoditization may be seen to demean the host culture. Direct selling of true original artifacts becomes a removal of a people’s heritage (May, 1977).

“The basic commodity of tourism in general is exoticism” (van den Berghe and Keyes, 1984, p. 345). A tourist is drawn to exotic places because they are different. Part of the draw is the spectacle that the tourist can observe. The scrutiny of the experience may involve watching and photographing ethnic dances or recording ethnic songs. It may involve payment for such photographs. Local garb then becomes theatrical garb. In the search for and the acquisition of the authentic exotic, the tourist’s memories of a culture or ethnic group are enhanced by such commodities (MacCannell, 1976).

2. In contrast, tourism can be thought of as leading to a cultural reawakening, a salvaging of cultural values. In this mode, the tourists’ interest in and respect for the local culture leads to a re-evaluation of tourist elements. The values attached by the tourist to the cultural provides the local with a reaffirmation of their culture (Jafari, 1973).

The salvaging of culture could possibly articulate itself in the following manner. If the tourism is focused on a minority culture within the host country, that minority culture is provided with a restoration of cultural values vis-a-vis the majority. As the minority culture’s inner or outer markers of ethnicity are
considered by even the tourist to be worthy, the minority group has a humanity-based affirmation of their worth. Similarly the majority culture, if it can view the minority culture from the eyes of humanity, may extend to the minority culture an assessment of cultural worthiness. Traditions and customs of the minority culture would then thrive in a friendlier environment.

This reawakening of cultural values may extend as well to the handicrafts industry. De Kadt (1979) indicates that crafts may be revitalized through tourism. Though the crafts may be transformed, tourism may provide a basis for the survival of the crafts.

3. Site preservation. Tourism makes it possible to introduce into the economy cultural treasures which are not exploited. The preservation and restoration of historical sites benefits both locals and foreigners. Lonati (1969) points out that the development of tourism leads, through the restoration or preservation of monuments, to the maintenance of cultural wealth, which benefits the whole country.

This maintenance of historical sites preserves a culture’s heritage. Preservation of sites may be enhanced as tourism requires a viewing and experiencing of the sites. Such restoration of a cultural heritage may be financed through tourism. Locals benefit through their continued use of the historical site for outings. Tourists experience the site in a fuller sense when it is maintained and utilized by locals. Foreign tourists further enhance their experience through interaction with domestic tourists also participating in the site.

The problem as expressed by Fox (1975) is “how to protect, nurture, and improve the quality of life ... if, at the same time, a part of it is sold to the tourist industry?”

Until 1978 China followed a closed-door policy in regards tourism. With the entrance of China into the world tourism market, the issues raised above have become significant to China as well. Because of the distinctiveness of Xinjiang's historical, cultural and natural landscapes, a significant number of potential tourist sites are available.

This study tries to explain 1) the nature and organization of the tourist offerings, 2) the personnel, goals, policies, and the infrastructure in tourism industry, 3) characteristics and number of tourists, 4) socio-cultural and economic returns of the tourist industry to the community and 5) the conflict between preservation and presentation of tourist sites and activities. de Kadt
(1979) has made several recommendations on this agenda. The first item on this agenda, the tourism product, is the basis on which the industry can develop. The second item, structure of the industry, is the framework in which tourism proceeds; analysis of this item allows for an estimate of the impact of tourism as well as the scale of the industry. The third item, the tourist market, is important as a market with different origins and seasonal patterns allows the industry to diversify. Planning for the returns to the community, the fourth item, enables a realistic resolution to possible problems generated by tourism. Finally, a major thrust of the study is preservation. The product, market, and structure of the industry are all affected by the extent to which the tourist experience preserves rather than destroys.

The third goal of the research is to consider the contribution of tourism to development. Analyzing the tourism industry of Xinjiang provides an example of the relationship between ethnicity and development in a periphery. The industry utilizes ethnicity as a raw material in the production of tourist offerings. The planning of tourism comes under the greater umbrella of governmental units working according to the five-year plan. The tourism marketplace is thus a part of the stage for the interplay of ethnicity and development.

The second component of this third goal is to consider the role of crafts in development. Like tourism, the handicraft industry has both economic and ethnic aspects.

Handicrafts in the Third World
Theoretical Approaches

Within the secondary sector of the economy, programs of development have generally focused on heavy and light industry. Within traditional societies the beginnings of modern industry are found in the handicrafts sector. Craftsmen produce articles of daily-use; with the articulation of traditional societies into the world at large, imports of both raw materials and products begin to arrive. Imports are paid for from the products of the primary sector.

In developing countries, strategies of industrialization are a part of development considerations. For modern industry, factories are centralized, capital intensive, large scale and use advanced technology. Crafts, in contrast, are often decentralized, labor intensive, small scale, and at a simpler level of
technology. Indigenous knowledge rather than imported knowledge is utilized in craft production traditionally. With the entrance of the periphery into the modern world, the crafts industries are at an important juncture — do they remain the same, 'modernize' completely, or evolve an intermediate level of technology and organization. For some segments of light and heavy industry, 'modernization' seems the best route; for crafts, the intermediate status seems appropriate (Kersten, 1972).

As regards development various sectors have been emphasized. Heavy industry is the preferred model for development in the Soviet system; Western theorists have favored agriculture or light industry. The beginnings of modern industry are found in the handicraft sector of the traditional socitey. Crafts people produce articles of daily use; with the articulation of the Third World into the world-economy imports of various raw materials, products, and technologies arrive. Imports of mass-produced articles are paid for from the products in the primary sector. This change-over, observed in many societies, marks the specialization of the handicraft industry into two parts a) luxury items purchased by urban elites and b) goods used in households financially unable to purchase the mass-produced articles.

The crafts industry as a regular feature of Third World economies and as an expression of ethnicity is an appropriate sector to study. Strategies of industrialization are an important part of development programs. Crafts, in contrast to modern industry, are small scale, decentralized, labor intensive, and at a simpler level of technology. Indigenous rather than imported knowledge is utilized in craft production traditionally (Kersten, 1972). Given the common characteristics of crafts and development from below, crafts could occupy a position in such development.

Crafts are at an important juncture. Should crafts retain the same form but change their function, becoming thereby only museum pieces or curios? Should they retain function but change form? Should they be modernized completely or evolve to an intermediate level of technological production and organization? While heavy industry may well need modernization, the crafts industry may best be served at the intermediate level.

Beyond their economic purpose, crafts also function as markers of ethnicity. Crafts have a duality in their nature as they are the result of an economic activity and an ethnic process. They are a part of the material culture
of the people, the tangible result of a series of creative and productive activities that are ethnic. The craft is a reflection of the people's ethnicity, a part of the outward manifestation of ethnicity and an outward marker of the ethnic group. A people wears a certain style of clothing produced by local methods, using local products of a local design.

Changes in the form or function of the crafts are related to both development and ethnicity. Development from below is necessarily adaptive. From a circumstantialist viewpoint, ethnicity does indeed change, evolve, and grow. Craft, as an outward manifestation of ethnicity, can change and evolve without a necessary disruption or rejection of ethnic identity. The dual nature of crafts is analyzed quite well from a Marxist perspective by Canclini (1979). Arguing against both the romantic approach (idealist portrayal of crafts) and the positivist emphasis on crafts as a product, he requests rather for crafts to be understood as both an economic and aesthetic activity. Also of note, Canclini extends a theory of crafts by suggesting the transformation of this ethnic relationship as a production relationship. A 'we'/ 'they' identity in the craft occurs through a production activity.

The experiences of other Third World societies with the crafts sector provide a guideline for the issues pertinent to the role of crafts in development theory and practice.

Kersten (1972) takes up the economic aspects of crafts within Ethiopia (see also Cassiers, 1975). Kersten posits intermediate technologies as being crucial to continued development in the crafts, similar to a development from below perspective. Through his investigation, to remain viable as commodities, crafts cannot remain the same—'ossification' (as Canclini) produces a dead and useless item. Similarly, craft production as being conducted in conjunction with agricultural activities enables the producer to diversify their economic activities, ensuring a continued existence within the society. Adaptability to market conditions is a key to crafts survival.

This adaptability is also key to the reduction of reliance on 'imports' of daily use articles. Intermediate technologies and the emergence of work forces in rural areas engaged in cottage industry may alleviate the growing pains of such societies in transition. Karsten also cautions that even what the West considers areas of low level technology have developed a substantial amount of crafts as daily use articles.
Wagner (1980) analyses the role of tourism in promoting crafts development in The Gambia. Linking fieldwork and theories on development, crafts, and tourism, Wagner provides a thorough anthropological account of crafts as a medium for development. At a micro-scale, anthropological methods reap great rewards. Her analysis of women handicraft traders in The Gambia presents several points of departure in theoretical investigation of crafts in development. Several methods to improve the lot of the handicraft traders are scrutinized. First is the formation of work cooperatives. In the Gambian case cooperatives, primarily the result of outside initiatives, were not successful as they did not integrate local peripheries. Essentially they were not locally derived or set within the local matrix. Second is the impact of tourism on the re-birth of the handicraft industry. The articulation of the tourism handicrafts mechanism is seen through the creation of new products directed towards the foreign tourists. Of a related nature, de Kadt (1979) speaks of the revitalization of the handicrafts industry. Deitch (1977) has written of the similar process in the context of Amerindian arts and crafts in the southwestern United States.

Graburn (1976) offers the wide variety of experiences of the Fourth World (autochthonous peoples without a state based on their cultural perspective or heritage) in the articulation of traditional crafts production with crafts produced for the tourist market. These traditional crafts reflect the local people's ethnicity and may thus be labeled ethnic crafts. Items geared toward the tourist markets now serve a different purpose and thus their function has been changed. These touristic crafts may have also undergone some change in form to suit the tourist market. The programs of tourism engender both touristic and ethnic crafts. Swain (1977) discusses the role of ethnic crafts and touristic production among the Cuña of Central America. Schadler (1975) in his analysis of the Tanzania crafts industry argues, not unlike Cancillini, that the evolution of crafts is not really a dilution of the essence of crafts.

Dutton (1983) focused on the creation of rural community as seen in the thriving vitality of the crafts industry in Oman. He articulates a Bedouin perspective of development made concrete through modern and traditional crafts. Skilled artisans in the community form a sense of interdependence, self-reliance, and identity, all of which are key concepts in development from below. The approach followed by the Omani government is portrayed as quite haphazard. Similarly Dutton argues for the effectiveness of village or
cooperative based rather than national or top-down development strategies thus enhancing rural linkages.

Several points of departure are present in the literature of crafts. First, adaptability and flexibility of the crafts industry functions as a major element in the success of the crafts as a development from below mechanism. Adaptability to the market is a key to crafts survival.

Second, tourism can be a factor in reaffirming interest in the crafts (ethnicity) and in developing markets for crafts. New products are created for tourism and a revitalization of crafts occurs. Through the emergence of tourism in the Fourth World, both ethnic and touristic crafts are produced. The evolution of crafts in this manner is not necessarily a dilution of crafts and their function as markers of ethnic identity.

Third, the role of cooperativization in improving the crafts production structure is of concern. Access to materials and market and ease of production may be enhanced by cooperativization. Cooperatives are viewed as a way to increase production of daily-use articles (Rana, 1965).

Within China, handicrafts have a long history of development. During the first half of the century, China’s experience in the handicrafts sector of the economy was similar to that of other developing countries — cottage industries arising, a gradual substitution of imported goods for some crafts and a further specialization of high quality crafts (jewelry, fine rugs, and embroidery) for the more well-to-do sections of the populace.

Under the People’s Republic, development and organization programs dictated a cooperativization of handicraft industries in the 1950s concurrent with an emphasis on rapid modernization of heavy industry. There were no real specialists (individual entrepreneurs) in the private production of crafts. With the breakdown of the Cultural Revolution, some privatization of crafts production again occurred. By the 1980s craft production exists in three forms 1) state production under the secondary light industry bureau erqing gongye ju many of the cooperatives were upgraded to factory status), 2) entrepreneurs specializing in producing certain goods, and 3) sideline activity in which a family also produces craft items to sell on the open market or contracted to the erqing gongye ju.

Within Xinjiang, the handicraft industry had a long history in rural areas with the beginnings of specialized cottage industries in the oases of Turpan,
Kashgar, Kucha, and Hotan. Uighur styled products using local materials and technologies were produced for a local market — carpets, metalwork, hats and cloth. The Kazakhs produced materials suited to their nomadic lifestyle — boots, saddles, embroidery, and felts. There exist ethnic clothing factories, ethnic boot factories, and ethnic furniture factories; ethnicity has become an important attribute to an economic good.

In this study of Xinjiang’s handicraft industry, the historical origins of the articles are discussed briefly. Analysis focuses on the changes in personnel, raw materials, technologies, products, market and organization of the production system. The ethnic character of the handicrafts industry, goals of the industrial plan, and impacts on the cultural and economic landscape are elucidated. Examination of the handicraft industry provides another, but different, look at the ethnicity development relationship in a sub-state periphery. Handicrafts often receive short shrift in the development plans of countries in the global periphery. Given Xinjiang’s long tradition in the industry and the recent resurgence in handicrafts production, handicrafts was targeted as an industry of inquiry. More generally, the ties of handicrafts to tourism and the fact that it is usually overlooked in development planning make the industry useful to study. Given the small scale, lower level of technology and use of local inputs, handicrafts may well prove to be a significant factor in development ‘from below’, especially in peripheral areas.

The third goal of the research is to consider how tourism and crafts can contribute to development. The literature suggests several propositions to examine for tourism including, cultural reawakening, cultural commoditization, and site preservation. For the handicraft industry, their ethnic/economic duality is a major characteristic. Furthermore, the adaptability of crafts, the impact of tourism upon crafts and the role of cooperatives in crafts are all aspects of the industry to consider in its contribution to development from below.

Summary

This analysis of the changes in the tourism and handicraft industries in Xinjiang provides a case study of the development-ethnicity process in a periphery. Three research goals were formulated and examined. First, a culturally relevant perspective on development was sought. This entailed an
examination of the literature on development, ethnicity and the periphery. Ethnodevelopment was portrayed as a new area for development theory to embody. The development from below perspective and the dialectical ethnicity perspective were the most useful in obtain a culturally relevant development. Second, China's policies for development in the minority nationality areas were examined. During the reform era these areas engaged in a development that was pragmatic, regional and ethnic. Xinjiang functions as an appropriate case study of development in China's minority regions. Third, tourism and crafts can contribute to development of the Third World. As industries that utilize ethnicity as a raw material, crafts and tourism both provide a way for ethnicity to contribute to development. This research is accomplished through the theoretical perspectives utilized here: on development by Stohr (1981) and Goulet (1971); on ethnicity by Keyes (1981); on the periphery by Rokkan (1983); on tourism by de Kadt (1979) and on handicrafts by Kersten (1982).

The data gathered are most appropriate to the state-run sector of the economy and the workplace. Field research on the informal/private sector of the economy in China would be most difficult even though it is growing in importance. With the site of this study being the workplace rather than the home, the investigation saw the evolving structures of the production system. This study focused on the period since 1978 as this period of post-Mao reforms has not yet been well analyzed at the regional level.

The results of this study will augment current knowledge of China's development process and introduce contemporary Chinese studies on development in minority areas to the West. This study, it is hoped, will provide for a better theoretical understanding of the role of ethnicity and development in the periphery.
Chapter 3

Xinjiang: The Setting of the Study

In this chapter, the setting of Xinjiang is examined to provide a base for studying the interaction of development and ethnicity within the tourism and handicrafts industries. First, the nature of the physical landscape and resources is presented, providing a stage for human action. Second, the peoples of Xinjiang and their characteristics are examined, as people are a key to the development of their place. Third, a regionalization of Xinjiang based on historical associations is presented, giving names to the places discussed.

Fourth, Xinjiang has had a changing role in history. Sometimes the area was under the direct control of empires outside of the region. For the most part though, Xinjiang was not a part of the great empires; instead, Xinjiang was divided among smaller kingdoms. Xinjiang has functioned as a periphery and as a crossroads. As a crossroads, Xinjiang linked peoples, cultures and empires. As a periphery Xinjiang represented a backwater, far from the locus of interaction. This historical character of Xinjiang is crucial to understanding its role in the world today, as periphery about to emerge out of its shell. As well, an understanding of Xinjiang's history gives meaning to the current tourism and handicraft industries in Xinjiang today.

Finally, the restructuring of Xinjiang under the People's Republic of China (PRC) is examined. As the final chapter thus far in Xinjiang's history, the PRC has restructured the territorial landscape through the administrative districts. The economic landscape has also seen a reorientation toward the center of China. The cultural landscape has changed with the advent of new migrants. This restructuring is the stage on which the interaction of development and ethnicity
in Xinjiang’s tourism and handicraft industries is played out.

Physical Landscape and Resources

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the largest of China’s political units, covers an area of 1,650,000 square kilometers, one-sixth of China’s total area, three times the size of France. Located in the northwest of China, Xinjiang is bounded on the northeast by the People’s Republic of Mongolia, on the west by the Soviet Union, and on the south by Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Xinjiang’s eastern borders front Gansu, Qinghai, and Tibet (Figure 1).

Xinjiang lies in the middle of the Eurasian landmass, comprised mostly of intermontane basins and mountain ranges. The northern perimeter is bounded by the Altai Mountains, approaching 4000 meters in altitude. On the southern perimeter the Pamir reach over 6000 meters and the Kunlun Mountains has several peaks over 7000 meters including the world’s second highest peak, Mt. Godwin Austen at 8611 meters. The Tian Shan, the Heavenly Mountains, divides the region in the middle. North of the Tian Shan is the Dzungarian Basin and south of the Tian Shan is the Tarim Basin. Forking of the Tian Shan forms some intermontane troughs, the Ili Valley and the Turpan/Hami Depression (Zhou Lisan, 1963).

The Tarim Basin is the major focus of Nanjiang, Southern Xinjiang, covering about one-half of the XUAR. In the center of the basin is the Takla Makan Desert with an area of 327,000 square kilometers, the largest desert in China. The Takla Makan (which means “if you go in, you don’t come out” in Turkic) is one of the most formidable deserts in the world. The Khotan, Yarkand, and Kashgar rivers drain off of the Kunlun and the Pamir to form the Tarim River, which loses itself in the desert. The Tarim Basin is one of the driest areas in the world, primarily due to the surrounding mountain systems and the distance from the sea (Liu Jiaqin, 1984).

The Turpan Depression is separated from the Tarim by the Kuruk Tagh and Baghrash Lake. The Turpan Depression descends to Ayding Lake, the second lowest point on the earth at -154 meters. Just east of Turpan the Depression continues into the Hami Basin (Chang Chih-yi, 1948).

The Dzungarian Basin, with an area of 300,000 square kilometers, is the heart of Beijiang, Northern Xinjiang. The basin drains to the northwest; the
northern most river, the Irtysh, flows into the Ob River and on to the Arctic Ocean. All other rivers in Beijiang are of interior drainage. Located in the interior of the Dzungarian Basin is the Gurbantangut Desert. The Ili Valley is separated from the Dzungarian Basin and opens into the Seven Rivers Region (Semirechye or Yettisu) of the Soviet Union (Chang Chih-yi, 1948; Liu Jiaqin, 1984).

With the continental influence, Xinjiang's climate is relatively dry. Beijiang receives 150 to 400 mm annually on the average. Nanjiang is dryer, averaging 20 to 150 mm per year. In 1987, Kulja in the Ili valley received about 400 mm. In Beijiang, Altai received 260 mm and Urumqi 360 mm in 1987. In Nanjiang, Turpan received 26 mm and Kashgar received 120 mm in 1987. Kashgar's annual rainfall is 50-60 mm on the average, so 1987 was a good year. This indicates the extreme variability in precipitation in Xinjiang. Beijiang receives more precipitation than Nanjiang, all from the Siberian air masses (Xinjiang Nianjian, 1988).

Ranges of temperature in Xinjiang are quite large. In Beijiang yearly temperatures average 6-7°C; January runs about -15-20°C. Northern portions of Dzungaria reach temperatures of -50°C in winter. Summer temperatures average 22°-26°C. In Nanjiang yearly temperatures average over 10°C. Average temperatures in January are about -10°C. Summer temperatures in Turpan run over 30°C. Highs of 47°C have been recorded. In general, daily ranges of temperatures are from 10-20°C in Xinjiang. Nanjiang, on the whole, is much warmer than Beijiang (Liu Jiaqin, 1984; Xinjiang Nongye Dili, 1980).

Xinjiang with its mountains and deserts presents on the whole a harsh environment. However much of the population is situated in the oases ringing the Tarim or Dzungarian basins. In these areas runoff from the mountains can support agriculture (Xinjiang Nongye Dili, 1980).

The productive base of Xinjiang's land is in two areas, the oases of the Nanjiang and the new state farms in Dzungaria. Major crops include wheat, corn, rice and cotton. The oases of Nanjiang specialize in fruits and melons. Nanjiang has a frost free season of 210 days while Beijiang has a 150 day growing season. Xinjiang is also one of China's chief producers of animal products. The pasture lands of Xinjiang are focused in Dzungaria, especially Ili. Xinjiang is also a major source for timber on the Altai and Tian Shan. Xinjiang's primary mineral resource is oil, mostly around the Karamai fields in Dzungaria. Further
exploration and production is conducted in the Tarim. Coal reserves are located mostly near Urumqi and Hami, primarily for local use. Xinjiang also produces many minerals including tungsten, molybdenum, gold, uranium, copper, silver, zinc, jade, and iron in the Altai, Kunlun, and Tian Shan (Liu Jiaqin, 1984).

In sum, Xinjiang does have a hot and dry climate in the south and a cold and dry climate in the north. It is composed of mainly mountains and deserts. Yet Xinjiang has a crucial role to play in primary production for China. Xinjiang, with resources complementary to the rest of the country, supplies China with crucial items, such as oil, timber, fruit, and animal products, besides being able to produce much of its own food.

Ethnic Diversity

Xinjiang ethnic diversity forms a basis for regionalization. With a variety of ethnic groups living in one area, all of their experiences and traditions can be brought to bear on any problem. An understanding of the distribution of the ethnic groups provides clues to the cultural landscape of the area (Figure 2).

There about 30 different ethnic groups in Xinjiang, but only 13 are considered to have made Xinjiang their home. The 13 are Uighur, Kazak, Kirgiz, Tatar, Xibo, Manchu, Mongol, Daur, Han, Hui, Tajik, and Russian. They represent different language groups, scripts, religions, production relations and customs (Dreyer, 1976; Sinor).

The various Turkic groups of Xinjiang spoke of themselves as yerlik, locals. Thus one from Kashgar was known as a Kashgarlik, from Hotan, a Hotanlik. A conference in the 1920s in the Soviet Union suggested formal names connected with historical ethnic groups for the present-day varieties. Divide and Conquer at work again.

The Uighurs are the titular minority of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. The Uighurs speak a Turkic language derived from Chagatai. The Uighurs are Moslems, their ancestors converting from Buddhism in the ninth through 12 centuries. They use an Arabic script, previously having used Latin and Cyrillic scripts at the direction of the PRC. The Uighurs have been farmers, craftspeople and traders for the past few centuries while settled around the oases of the Tarim. Their forebearers include the Iranian kingdoms of Hotan, Kashgar, and the Qocho Uighurs. The name Uighur means united, a similar root is shared
with yoghurt.

The Kazaks live primarily in Beijiang where they have been nomads for centuries. The Kazaks are also Turkic and Moslem. Their language while related to Uighur has significant differences. Nowadays many Kazak also speak Uighur, but the reverse is not true. Their nomadic activities have meant wide ranging movements across Dzungaria. Most of the world's Kazaks live in the Kazak SSR of the Soviet Union. Kazak is a word meaning free.

The Kirgiz are another group of nomadic Moslems They practice Alpine herding techniques in the Pamir of southwest Xinjiang. The Kirgiz are a Turkic-speaking group; their language is a close cousin to Kazak. Most of the world's Kirgiz live in Kirgiz SSR of the Soviet Union. Kirgiz may refer to forty daughters kirik kiz, some of the group's ancestors.

The Uzbeks are a sedentary group of Turkic-speaking Moslems. The Uzbek language is quite similar to the Uighur. Only a very few Uzbeks live in Xinjiang, mostly in the large cities. They are traders, craftspeople, and farmers. The culture is very similar as well. Uzbekistan SSR is where most Uzbeks live. Uzbek comes from two words, uz meaning self and bek meaning rule or leader; the Uzbeks rule themselves.

The Tatars are another small Turkic speaking Moslem group. They live mostly in the northern cities of Xinjiang. Many Tatars were Imams or Mullahs and came to Xinjiang in this fashion from areas of what is now the Soviet Union.

The Xibo live now in northern Xinjiang. Coming originally from Manchuria, the Xibo are descendants of Manchu soldiers garrisoned in the Ili valley in 1770s. Their religion was Shamanism. Their language and script is quite close to the Manchu language of the Qing Dynasty. Today the Xibo have the highest rate of college graduates among any ethnic group in China.

There are Manchus as well in Xinjiang. Most of the Manchus in China do not know the Manchu language or script. The Manchus had controlled the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). Manchus are mostly urban dwellers.

The Mongols of Xinjiang live in two areas on either side of the Ili Valley. These are two different tribes that use different languages. Mongols traditionally were herders. Today many are farmers or work in industry. The Mongols have been Lamaist Buddhist for centuries. The Daur are also nomads and speak a Mongol language. Mongol, Manchu and Xibo are all Altaic languages.

The Han are the ethnic Chinese. They are the most numerous ethnic
group in the world. They are named after the Han Dynasty (220BC -206 AD), the first major unifying empire of China. Chinese has many dialects based on the regional variations of China. Within Xinjiang, Beijing and Shanghai dialects are common.

The Hui are Chinese speaking Moslems. Some of their ancestors were Arab or Persian traders who intermarried with Han. Their customs are different from both the Han and their fellow Moslems. They speak Chinese but use some Persian or Arabic words in religious matters or at the marketplace. Hui in Xinjiang live in both rural and urban areas.

There are two Indo-European groups in Xinjiang. There are a few Russians in Xinjiang, mostly in the big cities of Beijiang. The other group are the Tajik, Iranian speaking Moslems. They live south of Kashgar and practice farming at altitudes of 2000 meters in the valleys of the Pamir.

Xinjiang's thirteen ethnic groups represent the diversity of China. Within the cities one may see a great variety of ethnic groups especially on market day, but most of the minority groups live on the periphery of the region.

Regions of Association
Xinjiang's Spatial Order

What is now the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region has been labelled a variety of names. This Inner Asian area composed of the Tarim Basin, the Turpan Basin, the Dzungarian Basin, and the Ili Valley were part of what the Chinese since the Han dynasty have designated Xiyu, Western Regions. This area has also been known as Eastern Turkestana to distinguish it from Western Turkistan, what is now Soviet Central Asia and Kazakstan. Stein called Xiyu Serindia, that is between Seres (China) and India on the Silk Road. Following Stein and Schafer, historical Xinjiang will be referred to as Serindia.

South of the Tian Shan, the Tarim Basin was the location of many small oases that, during the times of the great empires, were as garrisons — controlled way-stations. During the periods of dissolution (between the great empires) the oases were locales for small kingdoms that had similar cultures and economies but retained individual political status.

North of the Tian Shan, the steppe land of Dzungaria was the home of a
series of nomadic peoples that were at times under the suzerainty of the other stronger nomadic groups, either to the east of the Altai Mountains or westward to the Turanian basin. At times as well the steppe land north of the Tian Shan came under the domination of the great empires. More often than not, this domination was in response to the emergence of a strong nomadic empire that could and did challenge the control of Inner Asian trade routes.

Two themes arise in the paths of history trod by the peoples north and south of the Tian Shan. One is the alternation of crossroads and periphery in the life of the area and its relations with lands to its east and west. Another is the breakup of Serindia into regions that are not so much bounded distinctly but have their own centers of interaction and foci of attention.

The southernmost region is Kashgaria, that area centered around Kashgar, also known as Alte Sheher, Turkic for Six Cities, referring to the oases around Hotan, Yarkand, Yengi Hisar, Kashgar, Uch Turfan and Aksu (Fletcher, 1970; Elias and Ross). Being in the southwest, Kashgaria was always the region last to be invaded by the powers to the north and east. The long distances around the perimeter of the Tarim, skirting the edge of the Takla Makan, as well as the desert itself have proven to be effective barriers to administrative control and cultural influence.

Kashgaria, being in the southwest, received the waves of the great religions first. Buddhism arrived in second century coming overland from India via the Kushan Empire; the Hotan area was a center of Buddhist culture. Similarly, Alte Sheher was the first segment of Serindia to come under the influence of Islam, during the ninth and tenth centuries. The imprint of Islam was increased with the Timurid Renaissance in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, centered around Kashgar.

The second region is that centered around Turpan — Qocho (Gaochang in Chinese). The area has also been known as Uighurstan, after the Uighur Empire. Mahmud al-Kashghari labels the area the Five Cities. Before Han control of Serindia, Qocho was a part of the Liu Shi protectorate under the Xiongnu people. After the fall of the Han, Qocho was a protectorate under the suzerainty of the Former Liang, the Former Jin and the Latter Liang (Northern Wei) during the Warring States period. During this period of dissolution, there was Chinese control, from Komul (Ham) to Qocho and even to Kara Sheher (under the Former Liang). Qocho was the capital of the Uighur Empire from 840 to 1200.
The Qocho Uighurs fell under the suzerainty of the Kara Kitai in the twelfth century and were the first Turkic group to acknowledge Mongol power in 1209.

The Qocho region retained its cohesiveness throughout many political changes. During the rule of the Chagatai Khanate followed by Mogholistan, Qocho continued to be a protectorate, maintaining its Buddhist and Nestorian heritage against the Islamicization of the Moghuls till the onslaught of Timur (Tamerlane).

This area was the first to be controlled by the Qing incursion (in response to the rising power of the Oirat Mongols). Qocho and its environs, west to Kara Sheher (sometimes to Kucha), east to Komul, and north to Beshbaliq always remained at the forefront of any possible insertion of Chinese forces or by the steppe peoples to the north of Tian Shan. Even into this century, the great influx of migration from Gansu and China proper arrived first at Komul and thence to Turpan. Under the People's Republic, the ethnic makeup of the Qocho area has seen a dramatic rise in the numbers of the Han, making the area stand out in sharp contrast to the more Turkic Alte Sheher.

The third region, bounded by the Tarbagatay, the Altai and the Tian Shan, lies in the Dzungarian Basin and the Ili Valley. In the regional and historical geography of Xinjiang, Dzungaria and Ili have always been the realm of the horse and the nomad — Wusun, Xiongnu, White Hun, Ruran, Turk, Karlux, Khitan, Chagatai, Moghol, Oirat (who left one of their names to the Basin) and Kazak. Coming from the north and east, these nomadic groups have in succession tamed the vastness of the Dzungarian Steppe, producing a cultural force that occupied the steppe. Often the nomadic peoples of Dzungaria had under their protection the less-mobile peoples of Qocho and Kashgaria.

Slightly more well watered than the Dzungarian Basin, Ili has found itself to be the headquarters for the nomads of the north and thus the focal point of their power. The Wusun sought by Zhang Qian were seated in the Ili Valley. The Western Turks sought by the Byzantines ruled in Ili. Almalik, near modern Kulja, was the center of the Karluk's powers. Later, the Kara Khitai and then the Chagatai Khanate focused their rule in Almalik. Timur concentrated his attacks on the heart of Mogholistan, Ili. The relative safety of Ili allowed Galdan, leader of the Oirat, to lead forays into the south. Ili was the focus of the Qing mandated migrations of Manchu, Han, Hui, Uighur, and Xibo after the Oirat were decimated. Kazak migrants and Russian control over the area in the latter part of
the 1800s served to differentiate Ili from other portions of Xinjiang.

These three regions Kashgaria (Alte Sheher), Qocho (Uighurstan) and Dzungaria (with the subregion of Ili) provide a way to organize Xinjiang into regions of historical associations, political control and cultural identity. Dzungaria has had a dominant nomad ecology. Kashgaria has remained an oasis culture. Qocho represents a transitional area. Their locations have also oriented the regions. Kashgaria has looked more toward Mecca, India, and Soviet Central Asia. Qocho has been the closest to China. Dzungaria has had closer linkages to the north, the Mongols or the Russians. Fletcher (1970) profiles the differences in the three areas during the Qing Dynasty, while Forbes (1986) considers the regional variants of power in Xinjiang from 1911-1949.

The strength of the nomadic peoples enticed the great empires into Serindia. Rather than let the nomadic groups of the North control the lucrative trade on trade on the Silk Routes, the great empires injected their troops into Serindia. Xiongnu and Han, Turk and Tang, Khitan and Chingissid, Oirat and Qing are the famous dynastic pairings in Xinjiang’s historical geography.

Historical Foundations of Xinjiang
Thrusts into Serindia

Xinjiang’s history has been characterized as a series of centralization-decentralization cycles by Lattimore (1950). Centralization is described as the orientation of the steppes and oases of Inner Asia to the neighboring powerful empires in the Far East. When these great and powerful empires fell into dissolution, decentralization occurred. The mighty empires withdrew to their centers leaving small kingdoms based on the economy of the oases or on rulers of nomadic groups on the steppes. During the periods of decentralization, Lattimore (1950) posits that the smallest natural unit of survival was a cluster of clans for the nomadic societies of the steppes. In the settled oasis society, each individual self-contained oasis formed this essential unit of survival.

The centralizing great empires that Lattimore designates are the Han, the Tang, the Chingissids (Yuan) and the Qing. Continuing into this century the Republican Era was one of dissolution under the warlords while the People’s Republic represents once again the binding of Xinjiang to China proper. During the periods of dissolution, the powers and the peoples of Xinjiang are as Table 1.
The thrusts into Serindia by the great empires represent a classic example of the antagonistic, symbiotic relationship of the steppe and the sown. Yet this relationship was taking place in a neutral corner, that of Serindia. The northern steppe associations growth in power would move west and south, eventually encountering the oases kingdoms of Serindia. As the steppe nomads overran the Serindic oases, the trade and tribute of the west, from the Mediterranean powers, the Mideast and India into China was threatened by the steppe associations. China retaliated by first advancing into the oases of the Tarim and then striking at the heart of nomadic power north of the Tian Shan. Essentially, the thrust of the steppe peoples was countered by a parallel thrust from the great empires, parry and counter-parry over the far reaches of Inner Asia.

**Thrust I: Han and Xiongnu.** The first set of movements, from 700 BC to 206 BC, culminated in the triumph of the Han over the Xiongnu. Prior to the interaction of the Han and the Xiongnu, several groups, the Saka, the Yuezhi, and the Wusun controlled parts of the Tarim and Dzungarian Basins.

One of the earliest groups of peoples to settle in the oases of Serindia were the Saka who spoke an East Iranian dialect and were agriculturalists, according to fragments discovered by Stein in Hotan. From about 700 BC onward the Saka occupied Kashgaria till they were pushed westward into Sogdia and then to Bactria by the Yuezhi around 125 BC (Grousset, 1939, p. 29-30).

The nomadic Yuezhi moved to the Ili Valley from Western Gansu in the second century BC, under pressure from the Xiongnu. Zhang Qian eventually found the Yuezhi in Bactria in 128 BC. Sent by the Han Emperor Wudi, Zhang Qian’s mission was to suggest an alliance of Han and Yuezhi against the Xiongnu. This mission failed, but Zhang Qian was sent on another embassy to the Wusun located in the Ili Valley in 115 B.C. Once again the Han were unable to find allies against the Xiongnu (Grousset, 1939, p. 29, 34).

The Xiongnu, a nomadic group with a well-developed steppe culture, were one of the major actors in the Serindian oases for several hundred years. Out of their base in the Ordos, the Xiongnu attacked and drove westward the Yuezhi and Wusun. By 100 BC the Xiongnu had advanced westward along the steppes and were north of Serindia. (Grousset, 1939, p. 27, 34)

In effect, the Han were competing with the Xiongnu for the affections of Serindia. The Han offered titles, princesses, gold, silk, and tea in exchange for the tribute and vassalage of the Western Regions in Serindia. The Xiongnu
traded as well with the kingdoms of Serindia, offering them protection from the Han. The western merchants involved in the trade weren’t representatives of their governments. The Han trade/tribute system was also used as a policy of influence beyond that of warfare. Many states in the west sent tribute memorials to the Han. The commodities provided by Serindia to the Han included raisins, grapes and wines, furs and woven textiles and jade from Hotan. As the western entry to China, the Jade Gate, Yumen Guan, was a symbol of this tribute/trade relationship. From beyond Serindia came glass, wool, and amber from Rome, alfalfa and horses from Ferghana and Sogdia as well as the more exotic commodities of jugglers, dwarves and dancing girls. The trade arose as a function adjunct to that of Han military expansion. Serindia became junctures for intermediaries from the Han and Rome. (Yu, 1967, p. 136-142).

Han power in Serindia was under more or less constant stress because of the terrain over which long distance campaigns had to be fought. General Ban Chao directed campaigns against the Xiongnu and their protectorates in Serindia, in the first century AD. Memorials to the Han throne by Ban Chao indicated that Serindia was captured “to cut off the right arm of the Xiongnu”. In the second century AD, Han generals led campaigns against revolts in the Turpan and attacked the Xiongnu north of Hami. Han forces in the area were often composed of locals; using the Han codex of yi yi zhi yi, barbarians were set against barbarians (Grousset, 1939, p. 43-47; Kwanten, 1978, p. 11-15).

The Yuezhi who had moved to Bactria had formed the Kingdom of Kushan, fronting on Kashgaria. From India, through Kushan and into Serindia came Buddhism. Great Buddhist centers of learning, translation and study developed in Kucha and Hotan. Buddhism spread along the Silk Routes into China (Grousset, 1939, p. 49). The earliest Buddhist caves of Kizil, north of Kucha, are of the second century AD (Interview, Chen Shiliang, April 1986). The Kingdom of Kucha, contemporary with the Han Dynasty was particularly important in regards to the transmission of Buddhism from India to China (Liu, 1969).

In conclusion, this first thrust, saw the Xiongnu reaching into Serindia from the north and the Han countering from the east. The Iranian peoples of Serindia, the Saka, the Yuezhi and Wusun all contributed to the character of the area. Serindia was during this period a crossroads for commodities, envoys, generals, and pilgrims. In effect the periphery of the Tarim became transformed
into a chain of oases, interacting intensively, transmitting Buddhist culture from India into China and serving as the path for China's westward push (Hirth 1885). This period saw the beginning of the centralization — decentralization cycle.

**Thrust II: Tang and Turk.** The second set of movements, from 220 to 618 AD, eventually involved two great powers, the Turk and the Tang. Essentially, for the space of several hundred years, China was unable to maintain control over Serindia. Nor were the Northern nomads powerful enough to exert any influence over Serindia. Buddhist kingdoms developed in the Tarim.

After the downfall of the Han and the rise of the Three Kingdoms, China was unable to entertain any grand notions of conquest in Central Asia. The cross-cultural interaction of the Serindian Buddhist kingdoms is reflected by Kumarajiva, a Kuchean who studied in Kashmir, was captured by the Chinese in Kucha, went back to China and translated Buddhist texts from Sanskrit into Chinese in the fourth century. Fa Xian, a pilgrim from China, traveled through Serindia on his way to India. Fa Xian's work *Fo Guo Ji* provides a wealth of description of the life of Buddhist culture in Serindia at the beginning of the sixth century (Grousset, 1939, p. 49-50; Beal 1884).

At the beginning of the fifth century the Ruran, a nomadic society, controlled the whole of the steppe, reaching west to the Irtysh and onto the approaches across the Tian Shan to Kara Sheher. The half-Sinicized Toba, who had founded the Northern Wei Dynasty (386-534) in China, extended their control to Komul (Hami) and thus faced the Ruran to the north and west. (Grousset, 1939, p. 60).

Vassals to the Ruran in the south were the Ephthalite (White) Huns, Yeta, whose rule ran from the Upper Yulduz westward across to Ili and the Turanian Basin in the fifth century. They exerted some influence over Kashgaria. The Ruran's vassals in the northern Altai area were the Kok Turks, Tuque (Grousset, 1939, p. 65-67).

The Turks allied with the Toba in crushing the Ruran rule in the mid sixth century. The Turks divided into two groups, the West in Dzungaria and Ili and the East in Mongolia and on to Komul. The Sui (518-618) and the Tang (618-905) entered into a series of intrigues pitting Eastern and Western Turks against each other. Using the policy of *yi yi zhi yi*, the Tang were able to subjugate the Eastern Turks in the early seventh century (Grousset, 1939, p. 88, 89, 92; Kwanten, 1978, p. 32-36).
From 630-644 the Chinese monk Xuan Zang made his famous pilgrimage to India. The states of Serindia at that time had alliances with the Western Turks and sent tribute to the Tang. Xuan Zang's records of his visits to the Kingdoms of Qocho (Gaochang), Kara Sheher, Kucha, Yarkand, Hotan, and Dunhuang profile these highly cultured Iranian Buddhist societies (Beal, 1884, Grousset, 1939, p. 93, 95, 98; Kwanten, 1978, p. 36).

Tang campaigns in Serindia with the aid of the Eastern Turks broke the power of the Western Turks in Qocho, Kara Sheher, Kashgar, and Hotan for a few years in the mid-seventh century. When the Turks rebelled against Tang suzerainty, the Tang's new allies, the Uighur, helped put down the Turks. By 670, Tibet was on the scene and took control of the oases of the Tarim — Kara Sheher, Kucha, Hotan, and Kashgar, thus causing an interdiction of Tang control of the Tarim until 692 (Grousset, 1939, 99-103; Kwanten, 1978, 36-37).

From 716 to 731, the power of the Turks returned, held by Kul-tegin and his brother Bilge Qaghan, the wise Qaghan. The two led the Turks in battles against nomadic groups to the east, north, and west and with the Tang to the south. The Orkhon was their center of power of an empire that stretched through Dzungaria and Mongolia. In 722 peace was made with the Tang; in 731 Kul-tegin died and in 734 Bilge Qaghan was poisoned (Grousset, 1939, 110-113; Kwanten, 1978, p. 38-39).

The stelae dedicated to Kul-tegin spelled out the wisdom of Bilge Qaghan. To his people Bilge Qaghan indicated the essential dichotomy between the nomads and the Chinese, saying:

The enticements of the Chinese people, who without exertion give us so much gold, so much silver, so much silk are sweet indeed and their riches are enervating. By these enticements and their wealth, the Chinese drew the Turkic people to them. Through yielding to the lure, many of your folk died, O Turkic People. Deserting the dark forest, many looked toward the south, saying, 'I would settle in the plain.' ...If you go into that country, O Turkic people, you will perish! But if you remain in the Otukan, where there are neither riches nor cares, you will preserve an everlasting empire, O Turkic People! (Tekin, p. 261-263).
Meanwhile the Tang were strengthening their power in the Tarim. In 751 however a combined force of Karluk Turks, and Arabs defeated Tang troops under the Korean General Gao Xianzhi on the Talas River, thus effectively shutting the Tang out of the Turanian Basin. (Kwanten, 1978, pp. 47-48).

The Uighur, a vassal to the Turks, were centered on the Orkhon River in northern Mongolia. In 744 the Uighur allied with the Tang to supplanted the Turk Empire. On one of their missions to the Tang, the Uighur Qaghan brought back Sogdian merchants, who converted the Qaghan to Manichaeism. By adopting Manichaeism and its values of love, faith, perfection, patience and wisdom, the Uighur embarked on a road distinct from that of the other Turkic peoples, mixing the nomadic lifestyle with the sedentary culture of the Sogdians. Besides religion the Sogdians brought their script, trading contacts as well as irrigation and agricultural techniques for the oases. In the early ninth century, the Uighur expanded their zone of influence into Serindia, controlling Qocho, Kara Sheher and Kucha and the trade along the Silk Routes. Of greater significance, the Turkicization of Qocho was solidified; the Turkicization that was begun with the influence of the Western Turks over Serindia. (Grousset, 1939, p. 120-122; Kwanten, 1978, p. 50-52).

By 840 the Uighur of the Orkhon were overthrown by the Kirgiz, a vassal of the Yenisei river area. The largest group of Uighur settled in Qocho, establishing an empire north to Beshbaliq (Jimisar) and south to Kara Sheher and Kucha. Le Coq (1928) and Gabain (1961) mirror the high degree of Buddhist civilization among the Qocho Uighurs (Grousset, 1939, p. 124).

The Tang flirtation with the exotics of Serindia had been intense. Music and dance of Kucheon styles were popular in the Tang court during the eighth century. Kucha provided the Tang with gold, horses and hounds. (Schafer, p. 52, 55, 60, 77, 257). In painting, Hotan styles were favored in the seventh century among the Tang. Hotan also contributed jade, carpets and camels. Qocho traded horses for silk. Grapes, wine and cotton all came from Qocho to the Tang (Schafer, p. 63, 119, 144, 205, 217, 251).

Serindia was the purveyor of many exotic commodities to the Tang. Horses and jade, music and dance flowed through this crossroads. Serindia acted as a conduit as well for the continued flow of Buddhist sutras, in Kucheon and Sanskrit, and pilgrims, Fa Xian, Kumarajiva, and Xuan Zang in this reawakening of China to the wonders of the west.
A parallel can be seen. The interactions of the Xiongnu and Han foreshadowed the interactions of the Turks and the Tang. As the Xiongnu caused the Han to think seriously about controlling Serindia, so did the Turks in their challenge to the Tang cause a Tang cognizance of the attractiveness of Serindia.

**Thrust III: Chingissid and Khitan** The third set of movements into and out of Serindia, covering the period from 751 to 1218, culminated in the Mongol takeover of the Khitan (and all of China). Direct Mongol control lasted until approximately 1334 with the dissolution of the Chagatai Khanate. During much of this period the Uighur Empire was centered around Qocho (840-1209) controlling the Turpan Basin primarily (Kwanten, 1978, p. 55).

A nomadic group, the Karluk, ranged the steppe north of the Tian Shan. With the Battle of Talas in 751, the Karluk were able to extend their holdings to the Ili Valley and southwards to the Turanian Basin. In the Turanian Basin, the Karlux were exposed to the Iranianized Muslim Samanid Empire (875-999) (Frye). Like the Uighur contact with the Sogdian merchants, the Karluk contact with the Samanid merchants led to a progressive conversion to a new religion - Islam. By the mid-tenth century, this led to the founding of the Karakhanid dynasty, set up as a typical steppe empire but influenced Sunni Islam. The Karakhanid established control over Kashgaria and the Turan Basin (Kwanten, 1978, p. 59-62).

The Karakhanid’s successes in Kashgaria lie in the field of culture. A new Turk-Islamic cultural synthesis came into being. In 1069 the *Kudatgu Bilig* (KB), a synthesis of Inner Asian tradition with Islamic religious values, was written by Yusup Khass Hajib for the prince of Kashgar. As an Islamic mirror for princes, Yusup’s work drew on the collective wisdom of the Turkic peoples of the Ili Valley and the Otukien Mountains of Mongolia. Passages also allude to the Koran, to *hadith* (sayings of the Prophet) and to Sufi literature. Thus the religious wisdom of Islam is welded to the statecraft of Turkic princes in a cultural model for the Karakhanid (Dankoff, 1983, p. 1-4). A contemporary of Yusuf, Mahmud al-Kashghari wrote the *Turki Tillar Diwani* (TTD), a great lexicography of tenth century Turkic dialects. Mahmud al-Kashghari recorded much of the distinctive traditions of the Turks and preserved the essence of the Karakhanids’ knowledge of Inner Asia (Dankoff, 1982-1985).

Karakhanid authority in the South Tarim and Uighur rule in the north was
disrupted by the advent of the Khitan, an Altaic but non-Turkic group, in the early years of the twelfth century. The Khitan, forced from the Upper Liao Valley in Manchuria, established the Kara Khitai suzerainty over Qocho Uighurs and by 1128 extended their control over Kashgaria of the Karakhanid. On the eve of the Mongol world empire, a wide variety of Turkic groups came under the suzerainty of the non-Muslim Kara Khitai — the Muslim Turks of Kashgaria, the Nestorian and Shamanist Turkic peoples of Ili, and the Buddhist Uighurs of Qocho (Grousset, 1939, p. 164-166; Wittfogel, p. 619-674).

A new force on the steppes of Inner Asia, the Mongols, embarked on their world campaigns under the direction of Temujin, Chinggis Khan. In 1209 the Uighurs recognized the suzerainty of Chinggis Khan, thus the Uighurs became one of the first Turkic groups to submit voluntarily to the Mongols. The Uighurs retained a vassal status rather than a slave status in the Mongol Empire. By 1211 the Karluk had also recognized the suzerainty of Chinggis Khan (Kwanten, 1978, p. 56, 57; de Rachewiltz, p. 283; Allsen, p. 247-248).

South of the Tian Shan, the peoples of Kashgaria were basically Moslem in contrast to the Buddhistic and Shamanistic Kara Khitai. The last of the Kara Khitai rulers tried to force the Moslems of Kashgaria to convert to Buddhism causing severe discord in the populace. The Mongols, with their precepts of religious freedom, were able to move against the Kara Khitai. By 1218 Mongol forces controlled the whole of present-day Xinjiang (Grousset, 1939, p. 235-236, Wittfogel and Feng, p. 652-654; Barthold, p. 400-402; Xinjiang jianshi, p. 178-179).

The influence of the Turks, especially the Uighur, on the Mongols is of particular significance, as this influence emphasizes the role of the Qocho Uighurs as culture carriers. As the first Turkic steppe people to sedentarize fully, the Uighur brought together the knowledge and traditions of a nomadic steppe-based shamanistic society with that of an oasis-based, Nestorian-Buddhist literary culture. One of the early instances of Uighur-Mongol cross-cultural influence was the development of a Mongolian script based on the Uighur script. Chinggis Khan seems to have relied on Uighur and Khitan advisers to direct the administration of the conquered sedentary powers. Through the Uighurs the Mongols were given access to the wealth of the traditions of the Orkhon Turkic civilization, Buddhistic, Nestorian, and Manichaestic cultures of Serindia. The Uighur-Mongol relationship was not unidirectional. A symbiosis existed in which the politico-administrative and cultural attributes of the Uighur were
cultural attributes of the Uighur were exchanged for the protection and military acumen of the Mongol (Grousset, 1939, p. 250-252; de Rachewiltz, 1983, p. 295).

The Chagatai Khanate (1227-1334), centered on Almalik (near present-day Kulja), held the dependencies of Kashgaria and Transoxiana. The Chagatai continued traditional Mongol customs and were less easily seduced into the sedentary lifestyle (unlike the Mongols who ruled Persia and China). (Kwanten, 1978, 250; Hambly, 1969, 109-129).

Culturally, the Chagatai Khanate saw among its vassal states three religions. In Qocho, the Uighur continued their Nestorian-Buddhistic beliefs, while in Kashgaria and Transoxiana, the bulk of the population was Islamic. The Mongols themselves maintained Shamanistic practices. Among the Chagatai rulers, the only one to adopt Islam, Tarmarshirin (1327-1334) or Sultan 'Ala-ad-Din (Greatness of the Faith), was also the last ruler of the Chagatai. Tarmarshirin forced conversions of the Qocho Uighur and the Shamanistic Mongols of Ili, causing the eventual dissolution of the Chagatai Khanate into a western state in Transoxania and an eastern state, Mogholistan, encompassing Kashgaria, Ili, and Qocho (Kwanten, 1978, p. 221, 251; de Rachewiltz, 1983, p. 292).

Transcontinental trade under the Mongols reopened the Silk Road. Mongol control of China, Turkestan, and Persia provided for relatively uninterrupted trade. One of the better known travellers on the Silk Road during the Mongol period of rule is Marco Polo. Kashgar is identified by Polo as “the starting point from which many merchants set out to market their wares all over the world.” (Polo, 1968, p. 80). The Polos’ travels across Central Asia illustrate the extent of East-West trade across the steppe, mountain and desert and the Mongols’ role in the re-opening of the Silk Road for trade. As well, the Mongol’s allowance of comparative religious freedom in the conquered and vassal states led to the further transmission of religions, cultures and scripts through Central Asia (Hambly, 1969, p. 109-110).

During this third period, Serindia continued its economic functions even during the long period of decentralization following the Tang withdrawal. The Mongol-Chagatai Khanate represented a re-emergence of the Silk Road. The rise of trade was matched by an intensification of cultural transmission as well. The crossroads function of Serindia under the Pax Mongolica stood in ready contrast to the decentralization of Serindia prior to the advent of the Mongols.

**Thrust IV: Qing and Oirat.** From 1334 till 1700 Serindia was not really
linked to any outside empire. This period saw the dissolution of the Chagatai Khanate, the Turkicization of the Mongols, the Islamification of Serindia through the catalyst of Tamerlane, and the formation of the Khoja Islamic state of Kashgaria. Finally, an attempt by Galdan, leader of the Oirat Confederacy to recall the glories of the Mongol Empire led to the marshalling of forces by the Qing dynasty to re-establish Chinese control over Serindia. Rebellions of Uighur and Hui served to disrupt Qing control over Serindia. Following Zuo Zongtang’s campaigns in Serindia in 1884 Xinjiang was incorporated as a province—marking the first time that the area north and south of the Tian Shan was “officially” a Chinese province.

The Chagatai Khanate dissolved into two smaller states, Transoxiana and Mogholistan. Mogholistan, “Land of the Mongols” in Persian, covered modern Xinjiang. Telug Timur, a convert to Islam, ruled Mogholistan from 1347-63, the very image of a nomad ruler, with a capital in Almalik. During his conquest of Transoxiana, Telug Timur received the vassalage of a prince of the Barlas clan of Kesh (south of Samarkand) Timur-i-lang, “Timur the Lame.” Timur was ethnically Turk but identified with the Chingissid notion of world-conqueror. By 1364 Timur had reconquered Transoxiana and set up a puppet Chagatai ruler. In a series of expeditions against the Turks of Ili and Kashgaria, Timur repeatedly attacked the heart of Chagatai power. Timur married Telug Timur’s granddaughter in 1397—thus gaining Timur connection with the descendants of Chinggis Khan. During this period the Qocho Uighurs were Islamicized. Timur prepared to invade China but he fell ill and died in 1405. Timur’s empire combined Turkic-Persian culture and a Turkic-Chagatai legal structure with Mongol and Islamic religious communities. No real center was established, other than the steadfast strength of Timur himself, the Man of Iron (Haidar, 1913; Grousset, 1939, p. 410-411, 423, 453, 456; Kwanten, 1978, p. 267, 271; Fletcher, 1970, 209-216).

During the fifteenth century, the Timurids and Moghols warred on one another. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Uzbeks had control of Transoxiana. Two brothers, Mansur Khan and Sa’id Khan, descendants of Telug Timur, ruled Kashgaria, Qocho and Ili. Travel could be made peacefully from Komul to Ferghana during the first half of the sixteenth century. During the latter half the Kazak came out of the north and settled Ili, pushing the Moghol descendants to Kashgaria (Grousset, 1939, p. 496-496).
The *Tarikh-i Rashidi* (early sixteenth century) speaks well to the relatively advanced literary culture of the Moghol Khans and the Princes of Kashgar. Kashgaria in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries looked primarily to the Timurid Renaissance as the leaders of their cultural world. Both Persian and Turkish was used. The Uighurs of Qocho, Kara Sheher, and Kucha were linked with Kashgaria, bringing about the real unification of the Turkic peoples of the Tarim and Turpan Basins in a Persico-Moslem civilization (Fletcher, 1978; Grousset, 1939, p. 498).

During the 1530s Sa’id Khan welcomed two Khojas from Samarkand, saints and teachers of Sufi Islam. The families of the Khojas had doctrinal differences and eventually divided into the Ak Taglik (White Mountain) and the Kara Taglik (Black Mountain) factions. By mid-seventeenth century, the Ak Taglik Khoja controlled Kashgar and were aligned with the Kazak of Ili while the Kara Taglik faction controlled Yarkand and were aligned with the Kirgiz of the Southern Tian Shan. In 1678 the last of the Princes of Kashgar drove out the Ak Taglik Khoja, Hazrat Appak, who then sought aid from the Oirat Mongols. The Oirat were able to defeat all of the Khojas and put Kashgaria under their suzerainty (Fletcher, 1978; Grousset, 1939, 500).

The fifteenth century brought a new power north of Tian Shan — the Oirat (Confederate) Mongols. Oirat expansion, like Timur’s, sought to restore the power of the Chingissid tradition of great empire. From 1439 to 1455 the Oirat controlled the great steppe regions from Lake Balkhash to Lake Baikal and southward to the Great Wall. The Oirat warred with the Moghols in Ili and the Kazaks in the Seven Rivers area. By the latter part of the sixteenth century, the Oirat (called Kalmuck by the Turk) were the major power from the Yenesei to the Ili. (Grousset, 1939, 506-508; Lamb, 1968, p. 295).

The Oirat consisted of four groups — Choros, Dorbot, Torghut and Khoshot, and the Khoit, vassals to the Dorbot. While the Torghut migrated to the Volga in the seventeenth century, the Choros in Tarbagatai became the strongest. In 1676, Galdan was recognized as Khan of the Choros and suzerain of the Oirat confederaacy, controlling all north of the Tian Shan. Galdan reinstated the Ak Taglik Khoja leader and made Kashgaria a protectorate. By 1681 Galdan held control over Qocho and Komul as well. This challenge to the Qing was answered and by 1697 Komul was back under Qing suzerainty (Grousset, 1939, p. 525-529; Lamb, p. 295-296).
In the early 1700s Oirat warred on the Kazaks to the west and the Qing to the east, facing the Qing in Lhasa, Komul, and Turpan. The Qing Emperor Qianlong prevailed in 1757 and the Qing forces occupied Kulja and invaded Tarbagatai. Oirat independence was ended. Dzungaria was directly annexed to the Qing and the Choros were exterminated. The modern ethnic map of the Ili valley was redrawn as the Qing repopulated Ili with Kazaks from the north, Turkic peoples from Kashgar, Han and Hui from Gansu, Khalkas from Mongolia, and Xibo from Manchuria. In 1771 the Torghut Mongols returning from their exodus across the steppes to the Volga were settled in south Kulja. The only tangible evidence remaining of the Oirat is the name given to the basin north of the Tian Shan, Dzungaria. The Oirat located in the west of Mongolia were also known as Dzungar, Mongolian for left-wing. The Qing Generals continued on and conquered the Ak Tagliks in Kashgaria. China controlled all of Serindia once again (Grousset, 1939, p. 531-540; Lamb, 297-299; Fletcher, 1970, 1978).

Manchu governor-generals were established at Kuja, Urumqi, and Yarkand to control the three main areas of soon-to-be Xinjiang — Dzungaria, Kashgaria, and Qocho. For another one hundred years, Qing controlled without major mishap. In 1862 the Hui of Gansu revolted against the Qing, thus cutting off China’s control over the Tarim. From 1865-1878 Yakub Beg ruled the Tarim. Yakub Beg entertained representatives of both the Russian and British Empires to maintain his power in the face of Qing counter-attack. Russia tired of Yakub Beg’s intrigues and occupied the Ili Valley in 1871. Zuo Zongtang was appointed to reconquer the Northwest for the Qing. By 1873 Zuo had reestablished Qing control of Gansu. General Zuo conquered Komul, Urumqi, Dzungaria and then Kashgaria by 1878 (Fletcher, 1970, 1978; Lamb, 1968, 299-300).

Zuo remained influential on Qing policy on the Tarim from 1880-1885, when he was an adviser to the court. Negotiations with the Russians over Ili continued until the Treaty of St, Petersburg in 1881. Under Zuo’s urging and arguments, Xinjiang, meaning New Dominion was created as a province in 1884 with the capital located in Urumqi. Xinjiang, encompassing Kashgaria, Dzungaria, Qocho and Ili, became a formal part of the Qing Empire. A full-fledge province rather than a military buffer zone, Xinjinag remained under the control of the Qing until the end of the Dynasty in 1911 (Lamb, 1968, p. 300-302).

In summary, the fourth period began with the dissolution of the Chagatai
Khanate. Mogholistan, through Timur's challenge, brought about the Islamicization of the Qocho Uighurs. The regional kingdoms of the Khojas welded the heads of state and religion into one. North of the Tian Shan, the Oirat developed into a regional power. After overrunning Serindia, the Oirat became a threat to the Qing and the buffer status of Serindia. With the Qing conquest of the Oirat, the Serindian kingdoms submitted to China. The last challenger of the Qing was Yakub Beg. With the incorporation of Kashgaria, Qocho, Ili, and Dzungaria, Xiyu became Xinjiang and the real Chinese control of Serindia began. Serindia was once again controlled by a centralizing regime.

**Thrust V: The Republic and the Warlords.** In the Chaos after the 1911 Revolution several warlords followed each other in a succession of power struggles in Xinjiang. The warlords maintained their own forces and played their own high stakes game in Xinjiang. In the 1930s and 1940s several Hui and Uighur rebellions also took place. The Soviet Russians had tremendous influence over the affairs of Xinjiang especially in the north. By 1945 an East Turkistan Republic was formed by Kazaks and Uighurs in the Ili area. In general this was a period of dissolution and a lack of central control.

In contrast after the People's Republic was formed and Communist troops walked into Urumqi in October 1949, control and power has definitely emitted from the top. Centralization under the Chinese Communists has cemented the bond between Xinjiang and the rest of China. A new orientation toward the center is manifested in the railroad linking Urumqi and Lanzhou, the Han migration into Central Xinjiang, the development of industries that feed the land inside the pass, and the administrative structures.

Xinjiang in 1911 experienced several uprisings against the Qing. By 1912, the province was under the control of Yang Zexin, a Yunnanese, classically trained with a reputation for being able to handle Moslems. The first Republican Governor, who ruled till 1928, held a tight rein over the province; his methods of control were divide and conquer, to play the Uighur against the Kazak, the Kazak against the Mongol. Popular discontent continued, the economy was ruined and Yang was eventually assassinated by a functionary (Wu, 1940; Yang, 1961; Skrine, 1926; Forbes, 1986, p. 11-37).

Jin Shuren (r. 1928-1933) succeeded Yang. From Gansu, Jin continued the policies established of censorship and control. Jin antagonized the Moslems by forbidding the Haj to Mecca. Moslems in Komul rose up in defiance against an
in-migration of Han from Gansu in 1931. Ma Zhongying, a Hui warlord of Gansu, invaded Xinjiang several times to save his Moslem brothers and also expand his area of control. Jin Shuren put down rebellion ruthlessly; uprisings began in Kashgaria and fighting continued between the Uighur, Hui, Chinese and Kirgiz in the south. Eventually White Russian mercenaries supported a coup against Jin Shuren; Sheng Shicai then took power (Hedin, 1936; Hedin et al., 1934-5; Cable and French, 1934; Davidson, 1957; Forbes, 1986, p. 40-105).

Sheng Shicai (r. 1933-44) had to deal with Ma Zhongying’s Hui forces, Kazak and Uighur rebellions in the north and the Turkish-Islamic Republic of Eastern Turkistan in the Kashgaria. Sheng had no support from the Nationalists at Nanjing; he turned instead to the Russians. The Soviets already had a favored economic status in Xinjiang. In 1934 Soviet troops beat back Ma’s Hui forces and Ma disappeared. Sheng Shicai was identified with the Soviet Russians, while in Kashgaria the Hui were building their own government aligned with the Nationalists, Guomindang (GMD). The Soviets cemented their ties to Sheng with arms; from 1937 through 1942, Sheng’s Xinjiang was a Soviet satellite. Characteristics of this alliance were police terror, military repression and Moslem resistance to Sheng. Events caught up with Sheng and the Soviets withdrew their support. Sheng in a quick reversal had many Communists killed, including Mao Zemin, the brother of Mao Zedong. Sheng flew to Chongqing, after making a deal with Chiang Kaishek. Sheng’s terror in Xinjiang did not break Uighur, Hui and Kazak opposition; rather it went underground (Whiting and Sheng,1958; Wu, 1940; Lattimore, 1950; Clubb, 1971; Forbes, 1986, p. 106-162).

The Guomindang appointed a series of administrators as Chairman of Xinjiang — Wu Zhongxin (1944-6), Zhang Zhizhong (1946-7), Masud Sabri (1947-8) and finally Burhan Shahidi (1948-9). Meanwhile Kazak unrest broke out in Dzungaria and the East Turkestan Republic was created in Ili in 1944. Known as the Revolt of the Three Regions, the East Turkestan Republic was supported by the Soviets. A major leader of the Republic was the Uighur Ahmetjan Hasimi. By 1945 the Chinese Nationalists had reached an accommodation with Moscow and in 1946 a new coalition government in Xinjiang was announced that included both Zhang Zhizhong and Ahmetjan Hasimi. While Zhang worked hard at the coalition government, the Guomindang replaced him with Masud Sabri. Masud, though a Uighur, was not favored by the politically aware populace in Kashgaria or Kulja. The coalition government disintegrated in the
summer of 1947; a de facto split existed between Kulja and Urumqi. The Tatar Burhan Shahidi replaced Masud in late 1948 as conciliatory gesture to the Soviets. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had marched to Gansu by July 1949 and in September 1949 Burhan severed relations with the Guomindang and prepared for the reorganization of Xinjiang under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The leadership of the Three Regions including Ahmetjan Hasimi flew to Beijing to take part in negotiations. Almost the entire leadership was killed in a plane crash in August 1949, thus making the CCP’s work at reunifying Xinjiang much easier. In December 1949, Burhan was appointed Chairman of the Xinjiang provincial government while military control of the province remained in the hands of the PLA (Chen, 1977; Clubb, 1971; McMillen, 1979; Moseley, 1966; Lias, 1956; Forbes, 1986, p. 163-228).

The Warlord era in Xinjiang was one of regions of influence. Xinjiang was disunited. Ili was dominated by the Kazak-Uighur East Turkestan Republic and the Kazak rebellions in the Altai mountains. Qocho, the area around Turpan, Komul and Urumqi, remained generally loyal to Chinese policy; culturally the area had more Han and Uighurs who know Chinese as well. Kashgaria, to the south, remained an area of Uighur secessionists who identified more with the Khojas or Afghanistan. This period of dissolution is followed with the centralization of Chinese Communist power. The advent of the People’s Republic consolidated Chinese control of Xinjiang and reoriented the territorial, economic and cultural landscapes of Serindia to Beijing.

Xinjiang in the PRC - A Modern Restructuring

With the establishment of control over Xinjiang, the PRC commanded a great restructuring of the area. That restructuring occurred through many different programs. Their focus was a reorientation of Xinjiang to Beijing. As was seen historically, Xinjiang’s centers of power and activity were in Kashgar, Turpan and Kulja, the centers of Kashgaria, Qocho and Ili. In modern Xinjiang under the PRC, the centralizing force of the government has meant that Urumqi has become the dominant center, in terms of production, administration, culture, population, and power. The CCP’s policies for rebuilding China after civil war emphasized both territorial and political integration (Toops, 1983). For Xinjiang
this meant a re-orientation to Beijing and a lessening of the status of Kashgar, Turpan and Kulja in a hierarchy of power.

In discussing this restructuring of Xinjiang, its re-orientation to China, the territorial landscape is the first consideration. Administrative structures delineate the path that the state takes. The reconstruction of the economic landscape is seen in the new transport map of Xinjiang as well as the distribution of the productive forces and their concentration in Central Xinjiang. The migration into Xinjiang of people from outside the region also reshaped its structure. The distribution of population among the various prefectures and the changing proportions of the ethnic minorities represent a further directional change — toward Beijing.

The Territorial Landscape. Following the PLA's entrance into Xinjiang state control was invested into the military. In late 1950 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conferences were established as a transitional government. Beginning in 1953, the program for ethnic autonomy was begun for the lower levels of the state. After the autonomy of townships, counties, and prefectures were established, the entire province was reorganized as an autonomous region. Autonomy at the local level would be based on availability of both ethnic minority and Han cadres. Autonomy did not mean independence from China. After completing the census in 1953 and the land reform program, autonomous counties, *aptonom nahiysi* (U.), *zizhi xian* (C.) and autonomous prefectures, *aptonom oblasti* (U.), *zizhi zhou* (C.) were established (Table 2). The province was designated the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region on September 20, 1955 (McMillen, 1979, p. 43-46).

Most of the ethnic groups of Xinjiang are represented by some autonomous area. The Mongol groups in Bortala and Bayingolin are represented by Autonomous Prefectures. The Kirgiz area is identified with the Kizilsu Autonomous Prefecture. Hui settlements are reflected in the Changji Autonomous Prefecture. The Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture recalls the Eastern Turkistan Republic. Within this Autonomous Prefecture, the prefectures of Altai and Tacheng are included.

The other feature of the administrative divisions include the municipalities. Regional level municipalities are administered directly by the XUAR authorities; these include Urumqi, Karamai and Shihezi. Urumqi, as the capital, rates municipality status. Karamai was detached from the Ili Kazak
Autonomous Prefecture in 1958 and made a municipality because of its oil production. Shihezi has municipality status as well because of its industrial production activities. Both are essentially new cities created in the desert, Shihezi for agricultural production and Karamay for oil production. Capitals of each prefecture are designated prefectural-level municipalities. Figure 3 shows the administrative divisions of Xinjiang in 1985. A hierarchy of authority has been established, centered on Urumqi.

Autonomy does not mean independence. For Xinjiang as whole it does mean that 1) Xinjiang is eligible for assistance from the central government, and 2) the Regional People's Congress can devise laws to fit the ethnic minorities' situation. In 1985 Xinjiang received about 1.6 billion yuan from the central government as a subsidy (Griffin, 1986, p. 979).

The Economic Landscape. Under the PRC and the Regional government, Xinjiang followed the movements of land reform, communization, the Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, the Four Modernizations, and the private responsibility system. These policies had their impact on Xinjiang as they have had in other parts of China.

Agriculturally, the hallmark of Xinjiang's development has been the Production and Construction Corps (PCC). As the People's Liberation Army in Xinjiang was demobilized in the 1950s, the Wilderness Reclamation Army was formed to clear land and do irrigation work, mostly around already settled areas. By 1954, the Production and Construction Corps was formed. Large amounts of central investments and subsidies were directed to rebuilding the land. At the same time these central funds and demobilized troops contributed to the consolidation of Central control (McMillen, 1981). Animal husbandry has continued growth, but the production policies during the collectivization period hindered the pastoralists. Nomad communes and the like inhibited production. Most disastrous though was the formation of agro-herding complexes that plowed up rangelands for grain. Xinjiang has the capacity to be a great meat producer for the rest of China. Production gains in agriculture must be understood in the context of reversals in animal husbandry (McMillen, 1979, p. 151-162; Griffin, 1986, p. 995).

Presently Xinjiang still emphasizes grain production rather than fruit. Grain has nearly seven times the acreage of fruits and vegetables. Each district has had to be self-sufficient in grain production because of transport.
inadequacies. If Xinjiang were to concentrate on more specialty crop production, there would need to be a concomitant increase in transport. One region that specializes in grape production is Turpan (Hoppe, 1987). Local conditions of climate are good but also important are the nearby rail and air connections. Overall though Xinjiang has seen a consistent rate of growth of production (Griffin, 1986, p. 981).

As the region modernized most of the industrial advancements took place in the central Xinjiang area, Urumqi, Shihezi, and Changji. In 1987 the economy of Xinjiang was focused on the central region. Urumqi had the largest value of industrial production and had the greatest diversification of industrial output, including heavy industry (iron and steel) as well as machinery, fertilizer, cement, cloth, leather, paper, plastics, and chemicals. Next largest were Karamai and Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture. Karamai is the center for the energy industry; besides crude oil and natural gas production, processing also occurs here. (Karamai is connected by pipeline to Urumqi). Much of Bayingolin’s production is in Korla. At one time in the 1960s Korla was considered as a potential capital for Xinjiang, so many large processing plants were built there. Changji and Shihezi in Beijiang focus on textiles and food processing and funnel into the Urumqi industrial center. Overall, Beijiang is more industrialized than Nanjiang. Districts in Nanjiang produce mostly for local use (cement, fertilizer, food processing); Kashgar and then Aksu are the industrial centers in Nanjiang (Table 3; Xinjiang Nianjian 1988).

In terms of agricultural production, Ili and Kashgar are most productive. In the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, while animal husbandry plays a major role, production of grain, sugar beets and cotton is strong as the area has also been the focus for water conservancy programs to reclaim the land. In Nanjiang, Kashgar is the center for traditional production of grain, cotton, oil crops and fruit, while the districts of Bayingolin, Aksu and Hotan are also strong agricultural producers. Bayingolin and Aksu are sites for the activities of the Production and Construction Corps, thus a more modern production of grains. Hotan is like Kashgar with its production of fruit more traditionally oriented (Table 3; Xinjiang Nianjian 1988).

Transportation has been a key to the restructuring of Xinjiang’s economy. Survey work began on the Xinjiang Lanzhou Railway (Xin-Lan) in 1955. By 1958 the rail line had reached Hami and by 1961 Urumqi. The railway was to extend
to the Soviet Union but that plan was tabled due to the Sino-Soviet Split. In recent years though construction was recommenced on the railway; in 1989 the rails had been laid from Urumqi to Wusu, halfway to the border. Construction is planned to be complete by 1992 (Figure 4). The Nanjiang Railway links Korla to Urumqi as well. Similarly construction crews worked throughout the 1950s on building new roads so that now all roads lead to Urumqi. The internal transport net focused on Urumqi and Urumqi was tied to the center (Beijing). The railways in particular provides China with a means of pouring in goods, equipment, and settlers into the Region. Xinjiang’s raw materials have a path into China Proper also. Without the railway, Kulja and Kashgar must rely on trucking for goods shipment. The border location of Kulja and Kashgar also meant that they were considered too vulnerable for setting up much in the way of industry and transport. Rather Urumqi and Korla were considered safer locations (McMillen, 1979, p. 172-173).

The industrial and transportation sectors of the economy have seen a centralization focusing around Urumqi. Agriculturally XUAR still emphasizes local self-sufficiency in grain. The central areas are able to compensate for a lack of agricultural production by exchanging industrial goods. Agriculture then remains focused in traditional areas, but Kashgar and Kulja are no longer the main productive centers. Instead the major industrial and resource base lies in Urumqi (Wiens, 1963).

The Population and Cultural Landscape. The demographic landscape of Xinjiang has undergone changes as well. There has been an influx of Han migrants thus changing the ethnic composition of the region. The migrations were regionally selective as well thus changing the distribution of population. Figure 5 shows the growth of population in Xinjiang during this century. At the 1982 census the population was 13,159,000 and by 1987 it had increased to 14,063,300 (Xinjiang Nianjian, 1988).

During the 1950s and 1960s Xinjiang saw the rapid influx of a great many youth from the land within the pass, China Proper. Official policy encouraged of technical and professional cadres to move to Xinjiang. Veterans settled as well. Finally young people from eastern cities were rusticated to Xinjiang. Rusticates worked in the Production and Construction Corps (PCC). Maoist policy up until 1967 dictated the migration for several reasons 1) to rebuild Xinjiang, 2) to relieve population pressures and labor oversupply in Eastern China, and 3) to
consolidate the PRC's control over Xinjiang (Schwarz, 1963; McMillen, 1981).

In 1941 the provincial government of Xinjiang completed a population survey (Table 4). The total population was 3,730,051 of whom 75% lived in the Tarim. The ethnic composition was: Uighur, 80%; Kazak, 9%; Han 5%; and others 6%. From Table 4, Altai is mostly Kazak, Tarim is overwhelmingly Uighur, and Kulja is equally composed of the various non-Han ethnic groups. Urumqi has about the same numbers of Uighur and Han (Chang Chih-yi, 1948).

From Table 5 the population figures from the 1982 Census show how the titular minority, the Uighur, account for a smaller share of the population, 45.7% down from 74.7% in 1953. In contrast the Han account for a larger proportion of the populace. In 1953 the Han made up 6.14% and in 1982 they accounted for 40.6%.

Changes in the proportion of ethnic groups within the municipalities and prefectures mirror the growing presence of Han. In 1987 Urumqi at 1,055,852 was 73.1% Han and 14.4% Uighur. Bayingolin at 803,986 was 53.5% Han, 4.9% Mongol, and 35.5% Uighur. Altai at 488,827 was 49.9% Kazak and 43% Han. Kulja at 1,676,625 was 32.8% Han, 27.8% Uighur, 22.8% Kazak, and 10% Hui. Kashgar at 2,588,184 was 90% Uighur and 7.6% Han. From these figures we see that the Tarim is still mostly Uighur. Bayingolin is mostly Han due to the PCC. Altai almost has a Kazak majority, quite a change from the 1940s. Kulja remains an ethnically diverse area. The cities of Kuitun and Shihezi are almost totally Han (Xinjiang Nianjian, 1988).

In conclusion the Han migration has filled in many corners of Xinjiang. Much of the migration has focused on the major lines of transport, from Urumqi south to Korla and from Urumqi west to Shihezi. Over the years Kashgar and Kulja have maintained their general ethnic composition. The central portion of Xinjiang has continued to grow with Han migration. In the future, though, Xinjiang sees a problem with water supply, especially in Urumqi. Xinjiang is large but not all of its land can be settled.

Taken together this chapter has surveyed several aspects of Xinjiang's geography, its physical, ethnic and regional divisions. The diversity of the land's physical attributes is matched by Xinjiang's internal ethnic variation. Given the ethnic distinctiveness of Xinjiang and its natural endowment of resources, the region is an appropriate one in which to examine the interactions of development
and ethnicity. The historical overview of the region shows the successive periods of peripherality imposed by China upon Serindia. Examination of the history of Serindia provides an understanding of the dynamics of relationships that Xinjiang has with China today. The survey of Xinjiang’s economy, territory, and population shows how Xinjiang is centralized around Urumqi. Xinjiang is bound to China, through the railroad, the administrative structure, and through streams of migrants. This overview of Xinjiang’s historical and geographical (physical, ethnic and spatial) character serves as a basis for understanding the intricacies of tourism and handicrafts in Xinjiang, their materials and markets.
Table 1
Decentralization and Centralization in Xinjiang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>700 BC to 206 BC</td>
<td>Saka, Yuezhi, Wusun, Xiongnu</td>
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<tr>
<td>206 BC to 220 AD</td>
<td>Han</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220 AD to 618 AD</td>
<td>Ephthalite Huns, Ruran, Western Turks</td>
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<td>618 AD to 751 AD</td>
<td>Tang</td>
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<tr>
<td>751 AD to 1206 AD</td>
<td>Karluk, Uighur, Karakhanid, Khitan</td>
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<td>1206 AD to 1350 AD</td>
<td>Chingissid (Yuan)</td>
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<td>1350 AD to 1700 AD</td>
<td>Moghol, Uighur, Timurid, Khoja, Oirat</td>
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<tr>
<td>1700 AD to 1911 AD</td>
<td>Qing</td>
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<tr>
<td>1911 AD to 1949 AD</td>
<td>Warlords, East Turkestan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949 AD to Present</td>
<td>People's Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autonomous Area</td>
<td>Date of Establishment</td>
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<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture</td>
<td>June 23, 1954</td>
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<td>Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture</td>
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<td>November 27, 1954</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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### Key to Figure 3
Xinjiang Administrative Divisions, 1986

<table>
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<td>B-1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Jeminay C.</td>
<td>B-7</td>
<td>Shawan C.</td>
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</table>

### Table 3
Value of Production in Xinjiang, 1987

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>VIAP</th>
<th>VIP</th>
<th>VAP</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urumqi</td>
<td>3136</td>
<td>3030</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>Karamai</td>
<td>1531</td>
<td>1523</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shihezi</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ili Kazak</td>
<td>2030</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>1255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bortala Mongol</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
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<td>Changji Hui</td>
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<td>468</td>
<td>401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turpan</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hami</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayingolin Mongol</td>
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<td>594</td>
<td>541</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aksu</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>568</td>
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<td>Kizilsu Kirgiz</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>97</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kashgar</td>
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<td>1152</td>
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<td>Hotan</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>103</td>
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<td><strong>Xinjiang</strong></td>
<td><strong>19762</strong></td>
<td><strong>11598</strong></td>
<td><strong>8164</strong></td>
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</table>


VIAP Value of Industrial and Agricultural Production in Million Yuan

VIP Value of Industrial Production in Million Yuan

VAP Value of Agricultural Production in Million Yuan
Figure 5
Population of Xinjiang, 1902-1987

Table 4
Per Cent Ethnic Composition by District, 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
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<th>Uighur</th>
<th>Kazak</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kulja</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>Chuguchak</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altai</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarim Basin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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Source: Chang Chih-yi, 1948, p. 62.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uighur</td>
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<td>4,943,000</td>
<td>5,955,947</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>475,000</td>
<td>643,000</td>
<td>903,337</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>95,000</td>
<td>112,366</td>
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<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>12,188</td>
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<td>Tatar</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>4,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongol</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>149,000</td>
<td>117,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>4,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibo</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>27,377</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>9,182</td>
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<td>Han</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>1,791,000</td>
<td>5,283,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>271,000</td>
<td>567,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>19,000</td>
<td>26,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>12,000</td>
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<td>2,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>54,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,874,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,000,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,081,538</strong></td>
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Chapter 4

Xinjiang’s Growing Tourism Industry

For developing countries the issue of promoting international tourism is particularly poignant, in that the developing country is already at an economic disadvantage. In 1978, China adopted an open door policy allowing the rebirth of China’s tourism industry. For China, tourism provides an opportunity to showcase its own scenic beauty, historical treasures, cultural activities, economic strengths, and political wisdom, while at the same time, generating foreign exchange. Tourism in 1978 brought China US$ 2.63 billion. A year later in 1979 four million tourists visited China. In 1984, 12,850,000 visitors spent US$ 11.31 billion. 1986 saw 22,800,000 tourists in China spending US$ 15.30 billion (China Statistical Abstract, 1985; Richter, 1989, p. 27-29). These figures show that tourism does have significance to China, as a whole.

The basis of Xinjiang’s tourism industry is its natural, historical and cultural landscapes. Beyond those landscapes, though, the tourism map of Xinjiang is structured by China’s policies. The tourism industry in the region grew in terms of numbers of tourists, the places they could visit, and the tourist receipts generated. The general character of Xinjiang’s tourist landscape, policies and growth are profiled in the first portion of this chapter. The local practice of the regional implementation of China’s tourism policies is examined in six different places of Xinjiang. This internal diversity of Xinjiang’s tourism industry is the focus of the latter portion of this chapter.

Three propositions on the relationship of tourism with ethnicity and development are explored. As detailed in Chapter 2, the first proposition is that tourism functions as a marketing of culture. This commoditization of culture through tourism puts a monetary value on the cultural activities and attributes of
an ethnic group as the tourists seek out and purchase the exotic. A second proposition is that local culture and ethnicity is reawakened and salvaged as appropriate tourism engages a local reaffirmation of ethnicity. For minority nationality areas, this second proposition would express itself through a rekindling of the worth of local ethnicity compared to the majority group. A third proposition is that tourism provides a mechanism for the preservation of historic sites that benefit both the locals and the international tourists. In this chapter the tourism industry in Xinjiang provides an excellent format through which to examine these propositions.

Xinjiang’s Tourist Offerings

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, with a population of approximately fifteen million (60% non-Han) and an area of 1.66 million square kilometers (three times the size of France), possesses numerous and valuable tourist resources. Tourism within Xinjiang, located in China’s Da Xibe (Great Northwest), has a three part basis.

First, Xinjiang’s Historical Sites. Xinjiang was a crossroads for religious, cultural, and economic communication between east and west. Trod by Marco Polo, Fa Xian, Xuan Zang, the Silk Roads linked China to India, Persia and Europe. The numerous ruins, monuments, ancient cities, Buddhist caves, temples, tombs, and garrisons of long forgotten Uighur, Iranian, Turkic, Mongol and Chinese dynasties and kingdoms have been evident in the landscape and represent an important part of the heritage of Xinjiang’s people.

Second, Xinjiang’s Cultural Offerings. The Uighurs, concentrated in the south have a sedentary lifestyle in the oases of the Tarim Basin. Their language Turkic, their script Arabic, their religion Islamic, the Uighurs have lived in these oases for centuries, engaging in the trade of the Silk Road and serving as cultural transmitters between East and West. The Kazakhs, living in Dzungaria and the Ili Valley live a nomadic lifestyle. Both Uighurs and Kazakhs are noted for their handicrafts, music, and dance. The nomadic lifestyle of the Kazakhs and the oasis lifestyle of the Uighur are important cultural resources for tourism in Xinjiang.

Third, Xinjiang’s Environmental Sites. Xinjiang’s natural landscape encompasses mountains, deserts, and steppe. The Tian Shan, dotted with lakes,
bifurcates Xinjiang. On the south Xinjiang’s Kunlun Mountains are the locale for K-2, Mt. Godwin-Austen. The southern part of Xinjiang is occupied by the Takla Makan Desert with oases on the rim of the desert. The Dzungarian basin, in the north, has both steppelands and desert.

The OPEN/CLOSED Policy’s Affect on Tourism

The prime determinant of the spatial expression of tourism in Xinjiang is not, though, the presence of tourist resources. Rather China’s open/closed policy is the primary factor. Those areas that can be visited by foreigners with a valid visa are labeled “open”. Closed areas can only be visited by those possessing an “Alien Travel Permit” issued by the Public Security Bureau.

China’s reasons for restricting the extent of tourist activity are varied. Before an area can be opened, the area must meet certain standards. There should be provided the appropriate infrastructure for tourism, a China International Travel Service (CITS) office, guides, chauffeurs, hotels, vehicles, and restaurants. Administrative, military, and geopolitical factors are involved as well. Xinjiang, located on the border with the Soviet Union, has had a rate of “opening” slower than provinces located in the interior. When Xinjiang was opened in 1978, Urumqi, Shihezi, and Turpan were the only cities open to foreign tourists. Kashgar was opened in 1984; in May 1986 the Khunjerab Pass was opened up to foreign tourists. By the end of 1986, Komul (Hami), Korla, Aksu, Artux and Senji (Changji) were opened to tourists (“Zhongguo Zai Kaifang 192 ge Shi Xian”, Wen Hui Bao, December 4, 1986). These places do not necessarily have the greatest possibility for tourism, in terms of tourist offerings. Rather because of their administrative status or transit facilities, in essence the possibility for controlled management of tourist activity, these cities received open status.

One of China’s goals for tourism, beyond that of foreign exchange, is to allow foreign travellers to see and view China and to go back home with a good impression. Tourism thus serves an information production-dissemination function. In the case of Xinjiang, the government’s policy regarding the minority nationalities are a part of the showcase, especially for tourists from Islamic countries. Xinjiang shows these tourists how China deals with its own Moslem minorities.
Open status, then, concentrates the flow of the tourists into selected areas. As indicated by Stohr (1979, 1982), the spatial closure of tourist activity, minimizes the contact and the friction between the tourists and locals. For Xinjiang, spatial closure means that the advantages and disadvantages of the international tourist industry have been concentrated in Urumqi, Turpan, and Kashgar.

Other areas such as Kucha, Hotan, or Kulja have more attractions in terms of cultural, historical, or environmental offerings, but because of various reasons, Hotan’s poverty, Kulja’s border proximity, and Kucha’s administrative status, they are not yet open. Discussion is still under way to grant these place open status. At the local level, open status is generally favored as to be “open” is perceived as gaining access to foreign trade and as a way to learn more about the world.

Xinjiang’s Tourism Development

Xinjiang’s international tourism begins in 1978 when Xinjiang was open to foreigners. In that year 88 international tourists visited Xinjiang. By 1982 this had increased to 8095 and by 1987 to over 41,000 tourists (Figure 6). Tourism is concentrated on a few areas: Urumqi, its main sites of Heavenly Lake (Tian Chi) and the South Mountain Pastures, Turpan, and Kashgar. Other areas like Korla, Kucha, and Kulja see some tourists, those who have received “Alien Travel Permits”.

Most of the tourists are from Japan and the United States (Figure 7). Japan is a chief tourist source because of the identification with Buddhism and the interest in the historic sites of the Silk Road.

From 1979-1981, the Tourist industry’s foreign exchange totaled US$ 5 million of which 30% went directly to the travel service, 30% to transport, 22% to accommodations and 18% to tourist goods (Table 6). From 1979-1985, the industry earned over US$ 24 million. In 1985 tourism generated over US$ 4 million (US$ 1.5 million directly to the travel service). In 1986 the industry had US$ 8.3 million in receipts, of that US$ 2.8 million went to the tourist service. In 1987 Xinjiang received US$13,823,800 from tourism; the tourist services accounted for $4,958,000 or 35.8% of the total. The rest came from airfare, train fare, commercial goods and the post (Hu, 1984; Xinjiang Ribao, March 30, 1986;

Infrastructural development has also taken place. In 1985 of Xinjiang's nearly 2400 standard beds (with attached bath) over 1000 are in Urumqi, 450 in Turpan, and 600 in Kashgar. By 1987 another 1000 beds had been added, including 700 in Urumqi and 200 in Kashgar. Workers (guides, drivers, etc.) for the travel service follow a similar pattern of concentration, 116 in Urumqi, 50 in Turpan and 25 in Kashgar (Interview, Bi Yading, Urumqi Tourism Bureau, May 20, 1986; Xinjiang Nianjian, 1988, p. 390).

Xinjiang's tourist season is at its busiest in the late summer-early fall, August being the peak month with almost 25% of the Tourists in 1981 (see figure 8). Within the central tourist area around Urumqi (in 1980) 98% of the tourists went to Turpan, 75% to Tian Chi, 62% to Nan Shan and only 9% to Shihezi, China's new industrial processing city built in the desert. In 1987 Urumqi attracted 63% of the tourists. Kashgar and Turpan each attracted about 45% of all tourists in 1987. The combination of the spatial closure policy and the seasonality of tourist activity means that the concentration of tourists in August at Tian Chi is tremendous. (Hu Zuyuan, 1984, p. 440; Xinjiang Nianjian, 1988, p. 390, 566, 609, 644).

As the tourism industry has developed in Xinjiang, different problems have been profiled. During the early stages of development (1979-1982), the industry in Xinjiang has felt that there was not enough capital for investment nor were there enough souvenirs for tourists (Xinjiang Ribao, January 28, 1982, p. 1).

Local Practice of Tourism in Xinjiang

Local forms of tourism in Xinjiang vary. This variance is in accord with the variety and types of tourism resources available in each place. As well each place relates to other places different because of their location. Availability of tourism resources is a part of the significance of the industry, but administrative status or border location are important considerations as well.

Six places in Xinjiang are analyzed with reference to the tourist industry. The tourist offerings of each place, its natural, historical, and cultural sites are portrayed as the raw materials of the industry. The tourists, in term of their numbers and origins, are considered as a market. Transport, accommodations, and tourist services are a part of the manufacturing process. The role of tourism
in both open (Urumqi, Turpan, Kashgar, and recently Korla) and closed (Kucha and Kulja) places allows a comparison of the variety of tourism impacts in Xinjiang.

Urumqi: Locus of Xinjiang's Tourism. Urumqi, the capital of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, sees a great proportion of Xinjiang's tourists by virtue of its central location, airport, rail and bus station. While not a major city on the Silk Road in historical times, Urumqi has been open since 1978. When the railroad is completed to the TurkSib line in the Soviet Union in 1992, Urumqi's connections will be further amplified. CIT's office in downtown coordinates tickets by rail and air out of the city, taxi service about Urumqi, as well as tours to local sights. Since Urumqi was not historically as important as other cities in Xinjiang, there are fewer ancient ruins for tourists to visit.

Sights within and around Urumqi include natural landscapes such as Hong Shan, People's Park, South Mountain Pastures and Tian Chi (Heavenly Lake), historical landmarks such as the Regional Museum and Wulabai, and cultural landscapes such as Erdao Qiao Market and Shaanxi Mosque. Other touristic venues include visits to carpet, jade-carving and musical instrument factories.

Of the tourists that visit Urumqi, 80-90% explore Heavenly Lake, Tian Chi (C.), Bogda Koli (U.). Located some 100 kilometers east of Urumqi in Fukuang county, the lake is situated at 2000 meters amidst alpine meadows in the Tian Shan (Heavenly Mountains). South of the the lake stands Bogda Tagh (U.), Bogeda Feng (C.), at 5445 meters, towering above the lake and Urumqi. In legend the lake is the home of the Xi Wang Mu, Queen Mother of the West. In fact Kazak herders have used the lake as summer pasture for centuries.

"Your yurts have increased the pleasure of our trip," quoted a happy tourist on their stay at Tian Chi (Xinjiang Ribao, August 13, 1983, p.1). Tourists have the opportunity to stay in the Kazak oy (yurt) overnight and eat boiled mutton. The tourist bureau also maintains a guesthouse at lake side. Tourists who visit the lake have a number of recreation options. Kazak horsemen provide mounts to ride up to the snow line or around the lake basin. The tourist bureau operates several boats that cruise the lake. Many people picnic or hike in these cooler altitudes as a welcome change from the summer temperatures in the rest of China. Several Daoist temples dot the hills around the lake.

The South Mountain Pastures, Nan Shan Muchang (C.), are also summer
pastures for Kazak herders. Situated 75 kilometers south of Urumqi, the most popular of the pastures, Baiyang Gou (White Poplar Valley) is visited by 70-80% of the Urumqi tourists. Activities available here include hiking to a 20 meter waterfall, horseback riding and eating mutton courtesy of the Kazaks. A restaurant staffed by Kazaks was established in Baiyang Gou for the tourist market (Xinjiang Ribao, July 15, 1985, p.2).

In the center of the Urumqi stands Hong Shan (Red Mountain). From this 900 meter outcrop, much of Urumqi can be viewed. On top of the mountain are two pagodas that date back to the 1780s. Close to Hong Shan is the People’s Park from which public buses and taxis venture to Tian Chi and Nan Shan.

The southern section of the city is where most of the Uighur inhabitants live; this is the area outside of the old city wall. The focal point is Erdao Qiao Market; in this bazaar, the local Uighurs come to shop for vegetables and meat, for jewelry and knives, for carpets and cloth, for fresh and dried fruit. The nearby restaurants with pullao (rice pilaf with mutton), legmen (noodles), samsa (baked turnovers), and manta (steamed dumplings) as well as the curbside kebab stands add to the flavor of the area. Jiefang Nan Lu, the street that leads from Erdaoqiao back to the central portion of the city, is lined with bootmakers and small shops of all kinds. Mosques, for both Uighur and Hui, are the focus for reputable dealers in carpets, hats, and the Koran. The oldest is the Tatar Mosque built in 1897. Nearby is the Shaanxi Mosque, built in 1906 from the gifts of Hui in the Wei Valley.

The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Museum, located in the northern section of the city, is divided into two sections. One section provides an overview of Xinjiang’s history, pulling together archaeological fragments from Kashgar, Kucha, Kulja, Altai, Hami, Urumqi, Lop Nor, Turpan and Hotan dating back to 200 AD. The other section concentrates on the variety and diversity of Xinjiang’s ethnic groups. Full scale mock-ups of Kazak, Kirgiz, and Mongolian oy (yurt), and a traditional Uighur household are highlights of this permanent exhibit.

The only non-modern historical site near Urumqi is Wulabai, located 20 kilometers south of town. The earthen remains of this walled city dates back to 600 AD. For modern historical sites, there is the military museum that commemorates the branch of the Eight Route Army that brought the Communists into Xinjiang. Of a similar nature, The Memorial to the Martyrs is
situated in a parklike landscape south of the city. Mao Zemin, the brother of Mao Zedong, was executed by the Nationalist forces in Urumqi and is buried here.

Tourists also make stops at the jade-carving factory, carpet factory, and musical instruments factory run by the Secondary Light Industry Bureau and at the Foreign Trade Bureau's carpet factory. These places are all canguan dian, visiting sites, as well as shengchan dian, production sites. The other major stop is the Antique Shop, Wenwu Shangdian, which has old carpets, jewelry and other cultural artifacts. Materials purchased here all have the state-sanctioned official red wax seal attached. These items, although cultural relics, are allowed by the state to be taken out of the country. Without such a seal, antiques may be confiscated by customs officials. (Liang Feng, 1987; Liang Aili, 1987, pp. 28-37; Bonavia, 1988, pp. 122-130; Samalgsaki, 1988, 769-775; Interview, Bi Yading, Urumqi Tourism Bureau, May 20, 1986).

While Urumqi was opened to tourists in 1978, tourists did not come in any numbers till 1980. By then Turpan was also open and established thus reinforcing the growth of Urumqi's tourism. During the early stages of tourism development in Urumqi, CITs Urumqi handled most of the tourists. By 1987 CITs saw only 35% of the tourists in Urumqi (Table 7). This is indicative of the growing independent nature of the Xinjiang tourist. Urumqi saw more tourists than any other single spot in Xinjiang, primarily because of dominant position in the transit network of Xinjiang. In 1985 25% of the tourists were from Japan and 20% from the US; other major contributors included Australia, France, West Germany, and United Kingdom. All in all Urumqi makes a significant contribution to Xinjiang's tourism statistics. CITs Urumqi received nearly four million US dollars in 1987, just under one-third of Xinjiang's total income from tourism (Table 8).

Accommodations available to the tourist include two new hotels completed in 1987, the eighteen story Xinjiang Hotel, Xinjiang Dajiudian, with 700 standard beds and the World Plaza Hotel, Huanqiu Dajiudian, with 400 standard beds. Both are joint ventures with Hong Kong (Xinjiang Ribao, June 24, 1986, p. 1). Prior to the building of these new hotels, the Friendship Hotel, Youyi Bingguan, with 270 standard beds, was the best quality. The Kunlun Hotel, Kunlun Bingguan, with 300 standard beds, and the Overseas Chinese Hotel, with 500 standard beds, were the other two hotels open to foreigners in 1985. In effect
a doubling of hotel space occurred with the opening of the two new hotels in 1987.

The Overseas Chinese Hotel, Huaqiao Bingguan, is under the administration of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Xinjiang. Its purpose is to serve the needs of the overseas Chinese community visiting Xinjiang. About two-thirds of their guests are from within China. During the off-season the hotel holds many government meetings, with conference attendees from all over Xinjiang. In this manner the space is utilized more fully. The hotel consists of two buildings. One was built in the 1950s to house Soviet technicians and the other, the tallest building in Urumqi, was completed in 1986. The management feels that its greatest problem is to continue to raise the quality of the staff. There are over 250 employees; several have received training in Wuxi, Suzhou, Quanzhou and Guangzhou. All have watched training videos prepared at the Guangzhou Oriental Hotel; much of this training occurs during the winter. There are written and practical exams for the service personnel; if they don’t pass on the third attempt, they may incur a 50% loss in pay. Cafeterias and shops complete the offerings of the hotel (Interview, Lan Yunyuan, Overseas Chinese Hotel Manager, May 27, 1986).

The China Travel Service (CTS) Urumqi is situated on the grounds of the Overseas Chinese Hotel. Fifty employees include six guides and twenty drivers. CTS also supplies the Overseas Chinese Hotel with drivers. In 1987, 7433 used the service, compared to 5948 customers in 1986. Income received in 1987 was US$311,000, while in 1986, income was US$172,185. Most of the profits go back into development; in 1986 five cars were purchased. CTS tries to provide quality individual service; guides should know the history, economy and culture of Xinjiang above and beyond the usual experience. Day trips can be arranged to Tian Chi, Nan Shan or around the city. Two day tours of Turpan or Shihezi are also available (Interview, Rixit Niyaz, CTS Urumqi Director, May 27, 1986.)

The China International Travel Service Urumqi is connected with the Tourism Bureau of Xinjiang. Total employees number 60 with about half of those engaged as translators or guides, Japanese, English or German being offered. The guides include seven different ethnic groups — Han, Uighur, Kazak, Hui, Xibo, and Kirgiz. In 1987, 9412 people used the guide services and nearly four million US dollars in income was gathered. Most of the guides are university graduates from Xinjiang University, Beijing, Shanghai or Xian. Every
year two guides study at the Tourism University in Beijing. Three day package
tours take in Nan Shan, Tian Chi and sites within the city. Five day packages
include the above plus two days in Turpan. Seven day package tours add on two
days in Shihezi.

There are two small tourism services. The Xinjiang Branch of the China
Youth Travel Service (CYTS) received 774 tourists in 1987 up from 307 in 1986.
CYTS had an income of US$160,000 in 1987 compared to US$94,900 in 1986.
CYTS promotes exchanges of young people. The Xinjiang Sports Tourism
Company (XSTC) specializes in mountain climbing activities. In 1987 426 sports
enthusiasts were received and US$480,000 in receipts were acquired (Xinjiang

Local transport is available from the public bus system with over one
dozens routes in the city. Two taxi companies serve the public, overseas Chinese,
and foreign tourists. The travel services and hotels also have cars and drivers for
hire. Buses and vans leave the People’s Park daily from June through October to
Tian Chi and to Nanshan.

Long distance bus service connects Urumqi with Shihezi, Kuitun, Wusu,
Kulja, Bortala, Karamai, Chuguchak, Altai, Turpan, Yanqi, Korla, Kucha, Aksu,
Artux, Kashgar, and Hotan as well as many smaller stations.

Train service out of Urumqi leads to Shanghai, Beijing, Zhengzhou, Xian,
Chengdu, Lanzhou, Yumen, Korla, and all points in between. By the 1990s,
service is to be extended to the Soviet Union; by 1987 this western extension of
the Urumqi-Lanzhou line had reached Wusu (Xinjiang Nianjian, 1988, p. 291).

Air China operates flights from Urumqi to Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,
Lanzhou, and Chengdu. Xinjiang Airlines flies to Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai,
Xian, Jiayuguan, Dunhuang, and Lanzhou. Within Xinjiang, Air China has
connections to Kashgar, Aksu, Hotan, Kulja, Altai, Korla, Kucha, Qiemo,
Karamai, and Fuyun. International connections are available to Karachi and
Istanbul (Liang, 1987).

Management of local tourist sites, especially Tian Chi, has been a source of
concern. Tian Chi is heavily used during the summer months. The site is
designated as Tian Chi Fengjing Qu (Tian Chi Scenic Area) in 1981 because of the
diversity of wildlife; yet in 1985 the area received 15000 visitors (foreign and
otherwise). Careful planning will be needed to maintain the character of the site
(Xinjiang Ribao, August 25, 1985, p. 2). Another point of concern for Tian Chi is
that the area had been used as a summer pasture by Kazaks. The Kazaks were
moved from the western to the eastern side of the lake. During the summer,
many of the Kazaks are now engaged as informal guides of the lake basin rather
than animal husbandry. The economic landscape in the area has definitely been
changed (Xinjiang Ribao, August 13, 1983, p.1).

Urumqi plays a key role in the tourism industry of Xinjiang. Priorities for
the tourism industry in Urumqi are continued development of the transport and
hotel portion of the industry. Urumqi has less to be concerned about the
problems of maintenance of local culture. Touristic activities in Urumqi are
directed away from the city proper, toward Tian Chi, Nan Shan or Turpan.
Cultural interactions between tourists and locals are focused on the service
personnel. In many ways this mitigates possible negative cultural influences
upon the local populace. A continuing issue is the training of service personnel.
Urumqi relies on arrangements with hotels and universities on the east coast of
China for training of personnel; yet this is tempered with the need to provide an
ethically distinctive experience for tourists. The number of hotels is certainly
sufficient; the construction boom in 1987 has expanded room capacity to the
desired level. During the off-season, all of the hotels are used for government
meetings. Urumqi continues to be the transport center of Xinjiang. Moving
tourists in and out of Urumqi during the high season is rather a strain on local
resources. Urumqi’s connections to cities outside of Xinjiang continue to
improve. With the establishment of international flights and railway routes,
Urumqi’s position will continue to improve (Interview, Bi Yading, May 20, 1988;
Liang Feng, 1987).

Turpan: Tourism in an Oasis. Turpan has been an important stop on the
Silk Road since the Han Dynasty and remains an equally important stop for
Xinjiang’s tourists. Turpan was half open in 1978 and completely open in 1979.
Even though there is no airport and the nearest rail station at Daheyon is 45
kilometers away, Turpan has remained a number one tourist attraction.

Turpan’s tourist venues flourish with their combination of natural
landscapes, e.g. the oasis in the desert, Aiding Lake and the Yalkun Tag (Flaming
Mountains), historical sites, e.g. the ruins of the ancient cities of Qocho and
Jiaohe, the Astana Tombs, Bezeklik Buddhist Caves and the Turpan Museum, as
well as the current cultural sites, e.g. Emin Minaret, Grape Valley, karez,
mosques, local dance and song performances, and the bazaar.
Keyum, the Foreign Affairs Director, feels that the main attraction of Turpan is the opportunity to experience local folkways of life in the oasis (Interview, June 4, 1986). At Grape Valley, Putao Gou (C.), the rural lifestyle is still maintained; it is possible to visit a local family, sit on the carpet-covered Kang, sip tea, eat grapes and hear the story of the valley and the grapes. 97% of the households in the valley produce grapes and dry them into raisins in the chunche, an earthen brick building. The local CITS has also established a Grape Valley Welcoming Station where visitors can eat their fill of the many varieties of grapes, ‘mare-nipple’, green pearls, or seedless green grapes, kixmix uzum. The combination of the hot climate and the irrigation causes the grapes to have a high sugar content (29%). All of this bounty is possible because of the kareez, a system of wells linked underground that bring water from the Tian Shan 60 kilometers away to the oasis.

Two well-appreciated cultural experiences are the bazaar by day and the song-and-dance performances by night. The bazaar is at its liveliest on Sunday with people enjoying thirst quenching Hami melon, koghun, and the ubiquitous grapes. In this two-story bazaar, completely rebuilt in the early 1980s, merchants now hawk their wares of hats, cloth, scarves, boots, and knives to locals and tourists alike. Behind this structure is the working bazaar, a maze of stalls housing restaurants, jewelers, bakers, craftsmen, tinkers, fruit-sellers, as well as the butchers. Recent additions to the bazaar are a soft-serve ice cream machine and a one-hour photo developing machine.

During the tourist season, a song-and-dance troupe formed by the Foreign Affairs Bureau performs nightly under the grape arbor, uzum baringi. The performers present Uighur songs, naksha, in lively fashion and a series of energetic traditional dances, usul, involving solo women dancers, groups of women dancers, a male-female pair, and the whole troupe. The dancers and singers are accompanied by an excellent band of Uighur instrumentalists; all the performers are outfitted in traditional Uighur costumes, the chapan, koynek and doppa. Following the performance, the audience is invited to partake in the dance, waltz or usul. The troupe has performed in other parts of Xinjiang and in Japan in 1985 and 1986.

Located just east of town, Emin Minaret, locally known as Suleiman Wang Minare, was built in 1777-78. This intriguing 44 meter high earthen tower, decorated with carved geometric and floral patterns, stands as an example of the
power of the Emin Khoja, a local ruler of the 1770s. Going through the adjacent
mosque, one climbs a spiral staircase inside the tower to the top from which the
oasis is viewed against the backdrop of the Tian Shan. Other mosques in the area
include a large imposing mosque with several spires on the west side of town,
the recently-built downtown mosque, and a mosque in the nearby community of
Huoyan Shan covered with Koranic verses in flowing Arabic script.

In an area forty to fifty kilometers east of town lie several of Turpan’s
historical sites. The Ancient City of Gaochang (C.), Qocho or Karakhoja (U.)
covers some 25 square kilometers, an inner and outer city and a palace complex.
In the interior of the palace complex Buddhist frescoes are still visible in certain
niches. Gaochang was first a Han Dynasty outpost; Xuan Zang taught here
during the Tang Dynasty. The present form of the city developed from the 800s
till the 1400s when the Uighurs maintained the Kingdom of Qocho.

The Bezeklik Buddhist Caves, Bezeklik Ming Oy (U.), Biezilike Qianhotong
(C.), situated in the foothills of the Yalkun Tag, have Buddhist frescoes dating
from the fourth century to the fourteenth centuries. The 77 caves represent the
evolution of Buddhism in the area, reflect the intermingling of Uighur, Chinese,
Turkic, Iranic and Indian cultures, and are a treasure for historians,
archaeologists, linguists and art historians. The German archaeologist von Le
Coq removed many of the frescoes; others had been defaced after the area
became Islamified. Tourists usually get to view only a few of the many caves. In
the summer perhaps 200-300 tourists arrive daily. Picture-taking is allowed, for a
price.

South of Bezeklik lie the Astana Tombs dating back to 273 AD. Here the
dead of Qocho were buried. The dry hot climate caused the bodies to be
preserved as mummies (two of which are at the museum). Three tombs are open
for tourists complete with frescoes and mummies inside.

Jiaohe (C.), Yarkhoto (U.), lies ten kilometers west of Turpan. Situated
between two dry river beds, these ruins had been a Han Dynasty garrison town
and were maintained during the Tang and Uighur periods. No one lived here by
the time of the Mongols. Much of the walled residences remain as well as a
monastery, tombs, government buildings and a prison. The buildings here are
more defined than those at Qocho.

All of these historical sites, Yarkhoto, Qocho, Astana, and Bezeklik are
under the protection of the Cultural Relics Bureau, Wenwu Guanlisuo (C.).
Protection and restoration has been rather slow going. Doors are in place at the Bezeklik Caves to protect the frescoes; a family lives there year round to guard the caves. At Qocho, some of the exterior walls have been repaired. The soil had been removed during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and used by farmers for fertilizer. At Yarkhoto, the Bureau spent some 300,000 yuan in digging out the space. At all of the sites archaeological investigations have been carried out. Many of the artifacts recovered are on display at the Turpan Museum, maintained by the Bureau. Of importance is the preservation of relic sites, which would, in turn, lead to an increase in the viability of the tourist industry (Xinjiang Ribao, July 18 1982, p. 1).

The desert surrounding the oasis is of the gebi variety, small stones and gravel like Gobi Desert. The power and beauty of the desert is enhanced by Yalkun Tag (U.), Huoyi Shan (C.), the Flaming Mountains. The mountains, which run some 100 kilometers, appear to be blazing in the noonday sun. Desert and mountains make an interesting contrast to the coolness of the oasis. Aiding Lake, 55 kilometers to the south, is the second lowest point on the face of the earth at 154 meters below sea level. The lake is a dried salt bed; ice-skating is good in the winter. (Hu, 1987; Liang, 1987, pp. 45-54; Bonavia, 1988, pp. 131-146; Samalgaski, 1988, 765-769; Interview, Keyum Rozi, Chief of Foreign Affairs, Turpan, June 4, 1986.)

Turpan, half open in 1978, has garnered a growing number of tourists; the period 1981 through 1983 registered increases of 40% per year (Table 9). Yearly increases from 1985 through 1987 were running about 20%. Tourists come from Japan, US, France, Germany, Italy and Canada with the Japanese being the most numerous usually. The busiest months are in July, August, and September during which time the grapes are ripe. Winter months are very slow for tourism in Turpan.

The Foreign Affairs Office at Turpan operates the CITS with about 50 employees, including 20 translator/guides who speak English or Japanese. Translator/guides have to pass an examination before acquiring a "guide certificate" indicating their competency in language. Several of the guides have studied in Urumqi or Shanghai. CITS Turpan has about 25 vehicles, including sedans, vans and buses; neither jeeps or Landcruisers are operated in Turpan as the terrain is not that rugged. As several historic sites are over 40 kilometers away and no public transport is available, CITS has several do-it-yourself tours,
involving only the hiring of the driver and the car for the sites.

Another option for the close in sites (Yarkhoto or Emin Minaret) is to take the Turpan taxi, the donkey cart. Young boys do fairly well during the summer taking the tourists on a bumpy ride through the back streets of the oasis. The boys can make between ten and thirty yuan on a good day.

The rail station is 45 kilometers at Daheyon; the public bus takes two hours, so CITS provides transport service to the rail station. Six trains ply the Urumqi-Lanzhou route daily; all stop at Daheyon each way. Turpan has no airport, so most tourists come by train or CITS vehicle from Urumqi (there are also three public buses daily on this route). Construction of an airport would increase traffic at Turpan, perhaps in much the same as the Dunhuang Airport has increased traffic at the Mogao Grottoes.

The Foreign Affairs Office operates two hotels, the older Turpan Hotel and the Oasis Hotel, constructed in 1985. In total 450 standard beds and 250 nonstandard beds are available in Turpan. The older hotel has a grape arbor covered interior courtyard at which a song and dance troupe, sponsored by the Foreign Affairs Office, performs almost nightly during the tourist season. The newer hotel has what Keyum Rozi refers to as ethnic stylings matched with modern conveniences. The hotel was built under a joint contract with a Hong Kong developer.

Through the 1980s Turpan has been transformed into an oasis town that has a surfeit of tourists in the summer months especially August. Individual bookings of rail ticket in or out of Turpan is rather difficult as group tours book sleeping berths on the train between Turpan and Dunhuang. As the number of tourists increase the pressure on the hotels in summer also increases. Yet in the winter there are far fewer tourists. Turpan’s winter is not particularly cold, but riding the Urumqi-Lanzhou in winter is not an activity usually undertaken by tourists. Workers in the tourism industry are mostly idle in the winter months.

To increase the appeal of Turpan several beautification actions have taken place. The rebuilding of the Turpan bazaar has provided the tourists with an interesting facility. Locals have benefited too from the cleanliness of the new stalls. In 1985 Turpan was building eight kilometers of grape arbors covering the sidewalks of the town (Zhongguo Xibu Kaifa Bao, May 8, 1986, p. 1). These arbors linked the two hotels with the bazaar downtown, thus encouraging tourist circulation in the oasis. (Interview, Keyum Rozi, Chief of Foreign Affairs,
Local officials have been concerned primarily with promoting tourism in Turpan, rather than possible deleterious effects of the industry. Preserving local traditions and customs was not considered a big problem. In part this may be because the tourists can be insulated from the locals (other than those who work in the tourism industry). Most tourists confine themselves to hotel and the appropriate "sites" supplemented with a walk to the bazaar. The historical sites will continue to be a draw for tourism. Turpan, though, has a competitor of sorts in Kashgar.

**Kashgar: Tourism, Culture and the Frontier.** Kashgar has been the focal point of Southern Xinjiang and the Silk Road for centuries. Marco Polo and Xuan Zang both remarked on this westernmost city of China in their chronicles. Kashgar Municipality was opened to tourists in 1982. Other cities in Kashgar District technically remained closed and require permission for tourists to enter. The Khunjerab Pass opened on May 1, 1986. This opening to Pakistan has been crucial in the increase of Kashgar's tourism (Xinjiang Ribao, January 2, 1986, p. 1). Similarly the land route between Kashgar and Artux is open. The international tourism industry is under the control of the local branch of the China International Travel Service, which is attached to the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Kashgar District.

Many public sites are open to the tourist in Kashgar. These include Appak Khoja Tomb, Id Kah Mosque, Ethnic Kindergarten, Sunday Bazaar, Central Bazaar, Uighur Hospital, Arts and Crafts Factory, Ethnic High School, Kashgar Normal School, #12 Elementary School, and Mor Pagoda.

The Kashgar District Cultural Relics Bureau, Kashi Diqu Wenwu Guanlisuo, has responsibility for the preservation and management of the Appak Khoja Tomb, Id Kah Mosque, Mor Pagoda, and #12 Elementary School.

The Appak Khoja Tomb is located on the northeastern edge of Kashgar. Built in 1640, the tomb, *mazar*, is encrusted with green and blue tiles, evoking an image of Samarkand or Bukhara (at a much smaller scale). The doors are open for local pilgrims, domestic and international tourists. The Appak Khoja was a Moslem religious leader of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Within the tomb five generations of the Appak Khoja's family are buried, including his granddaughter, Xiang Fei (Iparhan). Xiang Fei, a concubine of the Qing Dynasty Emperor Qianlong, died in the province of Hebei. Her body travelled 3000 miles
back to Kashgar to be interred with her family. Sometimes the tomb is referred to as Xiang Fei Mu; the preferred designation is Appak Khoja Tomb. Local women come to the mazar and tie threads to the windows in prayer for the birth of child.

The Id Kah Mosque is located in the central portion of Kashgar. Built in 1442, the Mosque, the largest in Xinjiang, has been the center for the teaching of Islam in Xinjiang. Four walls enclose a tremendous courtyard; tourists may proceed into this area. Along the west wall is a covered area where the faithful may pray. Five times daily the call of the muezzin vibrates through loudspeakers. At the noon prayer call on Fridays, perhaps 10,000 worship. During the holidays of Gurban Heyt and Roset Heyt, many Kashgarliks gather in front of the Mosque in a fair-like atmosphere, with musicians playing the sonai and the naghra sitting atop of the eastern wall of the Mosque.

Management of the Mor Pagoda and the #12 Elementary School present some problems. Mor Pagoda, 30 kilometers east of Kashgar, is located at the site of Hanoi city, a Buddhist center during the seventh century. A problem in finances has prevented the Bureau from rebuilding this site, although the earthen pagoda remains. On the grounds of the #12 Elementary School is the tomb of Yusup Khass Hajib, the author of Kudatku Bilig. During the Cultural Revolution, the tomb was destroyed. Pictures still exist of the tomb and the Bureau hopes to rebuild it.

The government is making arrangements to protect another site, the tomb of the philologist Mahmud Kashgari, compiler of the Turki Tillilar Diwani in the eleventh century. The mausoleum, located some 40 kilometers west of town, has undergone some renovation.

The local CITS has entered into agreements with several institutions, the Uighur Kindergarten, the Ethnic High School, Kashgar Normal School, the Arts and Crafts Factory, and the Uighur Hospital. Organized tour groups are led to the Uighur Kindergarten; the youngsters wear traditional dress and perform traditional dances for the tourists. Similar arrangements can be made at the High School or the Normal School, although the Kindergarten is preferred. The Arts and Crafts Factory is on the recommended list for tourists. A tour is given of the various workshops and then the tourists have an opportunity to buy excellent craft articles. Also of interest is the Uighur Hospital where traditional Uighur herbal medicine is practiced. Many of the remedies are used to treat Kashgar's
well-known skin diseases.

Kashgar's bazaars have also become important touristic sites (Xinjiang Ribao, April 9, 1986, p. 4). Located in the alleyways near the Id Kah Mosque, the Central Bazaar functions everyday. Musical instruments, knives, doppa, pottery, jewelry, cradles, trunks, and other traditional craft items are all available in this bazaar. The Central Bazaar underwent reconstruction in 1983; over 268,000 yuan was invested in the refurbishing of Kashgar's bazaars (Xinjiang Ribao, January 16, 1984, p. 1). The Sunday Bazaar, located on eastern end of town, is a true farmer's market. On the broad fields of the bazaar, horses, donkeys, sheep, goats, camels, wool and lumber are for sale. Jugglers, magicians and acrobats perform. Stalls for household goods, cloth, furs and hats are setup. Tea, kebab, grapes, melons, pulao, nan, iced water, and ice cream are there to slake thirsts and appetites. Locals and tourists with video cameras mix together, riding to and from the bazaar on donkey carts that function as local taxis.

The CITC also makes arrangements for tourists to visit local families. Part of the real experience of touring Kashgar is being a guest in the home of a family. Sitting cross-legged on the carpet, sipping cupfuls of tea with rock sugar, eating fresh, sweet grapes and melons, and tandoor-baked nan, the tourist for a brief hour participates in the traditional Uighur greeting of a guest, mehman. At times the tourist-guest may be invited to special family celebrations such as a wedding, in which more courtesies to the guests are extended. The Uighur families that the tourists visit usually have some connection to the Foreign Affairs office.

Outside of the city, tourists may venture to the mountains on the way to the Khunjerab Pass. Mt. Muztagata, Mt. Kongur, and Karakuli Lake may all be visited and the mountains climbed through arrangements with the Mountaineering Office of the Sports Commission of Kashgar District. 260 kilometers on the way to the border, Tashkurgan, the Stone City may be visited. Tashkurgan is the home of the Tajik, a Persian-speaking ethnic group. 130 kilometers onward, Pakistan begins at the Khunjerab Pass.

Kashgar's sites include elements of the natural, cultural and historical landscapes. Tourists may become actively involved in the traditions of Kashgar, via the bazaar or visits to local families. Thus a sojourn on this stop of the Silk Road has become a part of the world traveler's itinerary. (Wu, 1985; Bonavia, 1988, p. 165-179; Liang, 1987, pp. 103-114; Samalgaski, 1988, pp. 775-781; Interview, Kashgar District Foreign Affairs Director, Wang Jiangong, May 5,
Kashgar began to see invited foreign guests in 1982 but not in any great number (Table 10). When Kashgar opened in 1984, tourists had to travel to Kashgar and then double back to Urumqi. After the Khunjerab Pass was opened to foreigners in May 1986, Kashgar expected to receive double the volume of visitors. Most tourists visit between June and September. Japanese, British, American, and Australian tourists comprise most of the volume. The Foreign Affairs Bureau received a total income of 590,000 yuan from tourism in 1985. Of that 270,000 yuan was in excess of costs; the surplus was used to buy vehicles.

Kashgar District has put an effort in the production of tourist goods. Purchases by tourists totaled over 739,000 yuan in 1985. Most important of these tourist articles include doppa, musical instruments, earthen pots, carpets, felts, embroidery, clothing, jewelry, atlas, and knives. This side of tourism, commercial goods rather than services, has been a neglected aspect of tourism in Xinjiang in the past (Xinjiang Ribao, December 27, 1985).

CITS Kashgar in 1986 had 13 vehicles to transport tourists — five vans, four Landcruisers, two buses, and two sedans. In 1986 the Regional government allocated enough money to buy five Landcruisers. Because of the rugged terrain on the Karakoram Highway, Landcruisers are the preferred vehicle. The district Foreign Affairs office decided to borrow enough for five additional Landcruisers (at 130,000 yuan each). When the Khunjerab Pass opened in 1986, there was a greater demand for vehicles. Public bus service to Khunjerab leaves weekly; buses are scheduled daily for Urumqi. Daily flights are available to Urumqi. 25 people work at CITS Kashgar including translators, guides and chauffeurs.

The major accommodation in Kashgar is the New Kashgar Hotel located on the eastern end of town. The Seman Hotel is located on the grounds of the former Russian Consulate. Together these two hotels account for 600 standard beds (with bath). Other possible accommodations are at the Chini Bagh Hotel, the former British Consulate, and the Tian Shan Hotel for a total of 350 non-standard beds (public restrooms). Some 450 service personnel work at the hotels. Constructed in 1987, the Oasis Hotel offers another 200 standard beds.

As viewed by the Office of Foreign Affairs, problems related to the tourist industry include tourists wandering off into closed areas and the development of the black market. Routes along the Southern Silk Road (through Hotan and Yarkand) are still closed, yet these areas have a certain attraction to tourists.
seeking the off-the-beaten-track experience. One tourist died of illness and exposure in the mountainous Aksai Chin area near the Tibet/India border. Such incidents aren’t welcome by the Kashgar Foreign Affairs Office. The black market is growing in the area; the dominant activity involves the exchange of Chinese currency for dollars and of Foreign Exchange Certificates for Chinese 

renminbi. Stricter supervision of locals in the hotel areas or bazaars is the primary means of enforcement.

Maintenance of the historical sites of Kashgar is the job of the Cultural Relics Bureau. Much work on the refurbishing of the sites had to be accomplished before Kashgar became an open city in 1984. Similarly, the bazaars underwent renovation; renovation of canguan dian is a part of the general program before a city can become open. The bazaar is both a locus of local commerce and an item for tourism. In the case of the Sunday bazaar a new building was constructed at the entrance to the bazaar. Renovation of the bazaars benefits both tourists and locals (Xinjiang Ribao, January 16, 1984).

Kashgar’s attraction to tourists derives from its historical role on the Silk Road and the prominence of Uighur character in the area. CITS Kashgar has produced maps, brochures, and postcards in English to enhance the foreign tourist’s experience in Kashgar. Directed to Hong Kong visitors, books and a video in Chinese also have been produced; these materials are being translated into English and Japanese. The essence of Uighur culture dominates the landscape of this modern-day city on the Silk Road through its bazaars, mosques, tombs, architecture, foods, and products. (Interview, Kashgar District Foreign Affairs Director, Wang Jianguo, May 5, 1986).

**Kucha: Rich Tourist Resources.** Kucha, midway between Turpan and Kashgar, was known in historical times as Qiuci, Jiuci or Guici (C.). The kingdoms were instrumental in the transfer of Buddhism from Gandhara into China. Diffused to Tang China as well were the music and dance of Qiuci. The main attraction of foreigners to Kucha has been the historical Buddhist caves (some of the earliest in China), but the local culture, with its strong Uighur presence, should be of interest to people as well. Kucha is still a closed area, but permission to visit is usually granted from the Urumqi Public Security Bureau. The Kucha Foreign Affairs Office makes arrangements for tourists.

Historical sites in Kucha county include Subash and the Zhaoquli Temple, Kizil Kara Tower, Kizil Kara Buddhist Caves, and Kumutura Buddhist Caves.
The famous Kizil Buddhist caves are located in nearby Baicheng County, but Kucha makes arrangements for these caves as well. Natural scenery includes Salt Water Valley and the Veil of Tears. Cultural sites in town include the Grand Mosque of Kucha, the Tomb of Molenar Shidin Khoja, and the bazaars.

North of Kucha 10 to 20 kilometers lie three historic sites. Zhaoguli Temple, known locally as Subash (Head of Waters), was a center for Buddhist meditation and study in the fourth century. Existing are the ruins of a library, monasteries and a tower for worship in which some frescoes remain. The Kizil Kara Buddhist Caves date back to the third century. Of the 47 caves, only a few have any frescoes left; the best preserved show flying Buddhistic figures, asparas. The nearby Kizil Kara Tower, 17 meters high is one of the few signal towers that remain along the Silk Road. All of these sites are maintained by the Kucha Cultural Artifacts Preservation Bureau. No research is being done currently. Efforts are made instead to protect the sites from erosion.

The Kizil Ming Oy, Kizil Buddhist Caves, lie 70 kilometers north of Kucha in Baicheng county. These caves are some of the oldest in China; C-14 dating of wooden structural supports indicates the earliest were constructed in the Eastern Han Dynasty. There are over 200 caves in this river valley. Many have collapsed while the frescoes and statues of others were removed by archaeologists such as von Le Coq. Tourists usually get to see about a dozen of the more interesting caves. Kizil is important because of the early history of these caves and the unique stylings present showing the transition for Gandharan to Qiucian to Chinese influences in the Buddhistic art. In general there are two types of frescoes, those that tell tales of the Buddha’s life and those that show the lifestyles of Qiuci and neighboring countries. The Kizil Buddhist Caves Research Group, an arm of the Xinjiang Cultural Relics Bureau, is responsible for the caves. Their charge is primarily preservation and research, not guiding tourists. (Interview, Chen Shiliang, Kizil Research Group Director, April 29, 1986.)

The Muzart River flows by the caves. The moistness is nice for the tourists and workers but not good for the frescoes. Nearby is the Veil of Tears, a spring that flows into the Muzart. The other site of natural scenery is Salt Water Valley, Yanshui Gou (C.), Tuz Su (U.), located about midway between Kucha and Kizil. These rock formations have undergone immense folding into twisted shapes.

The Kumutura Caves, situated some 30 kilometers from west of Kucha,
number over 100. These caves are under the jurisdiction of the Central Cultural Relic Preservation Bureau in Beijing. Arrangements to visit Kumutura can be made in Urumqi. The caves were “explored” rather extensively by foreigners in the early part of this century. During the Cultural Revolution the caves were inundated by the waters of the Muzart River when a dam was built. Taken together these two incidences have damaged Kumutura rather extensively.

Within the oasis of Kucha, the city is divided into the old, on the western side of the river, and the new, on the eastern side of the river, but united by the new bridge. Twin bazaars makes for larger crowds on bazaar day, Fridays. Specialties include the Kucha meter kebabs, very spicy, pulla with dried apricots, excellent yoghurt and hand-cranked ice cream. Kucha is well-known locally for the Persian lambs, kope. There is a very lively market in the lambs and their skins, prized for making kulakhe. Activities for tourists also include attending performances at the cultural palace or go for picnics in the fruit orchards.

The Grand Mosque of Kucha was built in the 1920s by a businessman who had made a fortune abroad. Situated in the old city, the mosque is in two sections, a tall domed tower with a pair of minarets and a large hall. During Gurban Heyt, 5000 worshippers can be accommodated in the main hall.

The Tomb of Molanar Shidin encases the remains of a Muslim missionary. Molanan Shidan came from Bukhara to spread the word of Allah some 600 years ago. After having thoughtlessly killed a pigeon, he died. His tomb remains a local shrine. (Liang Ali, 1987, pp. 98-101; Bonavia, 1988, pp. 154-160; Interview, Imimjan and Ahmetjan, Kucha Foreign Affairs Bureau, April 29, 1986.)

Kucha began receiving invited guests in 1978. By 1981 invited foreigners arrived from Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and West Germany. For the most part huaqiao (including those overseas Chinese from Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan) made up the greatest portion of the visitors to Kucha till 1984. (See Table 11). By then the number of foreign visitors began to increase as Kashgar was open. Many such visitors to Kucha were only in transit to Kashgar; they could only stay in town or be taken to the historical sites managed by the Kucha Cultural Relics Bureau, not including the Kizil Buddhist Caves. By 1985 the official tourist groups consisted mostly of Japanese. These were usually specialty tours emphasizing photography of the Kizil Caves. In 1985 of the 360 tourists that visited the Kizil Caves, 350 were Japanese.
Americans, West Germans, French, and other countries contributed mostly individual tourists who had gained permission of the Urumqi Public Security Bureau to visit Kucha. A growing occurrence has been specialty tours of Moslems from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or Turkey who may have relatives in Xinjiang. In general most tourists visit April through August.

The Kucha Foreign Affairs Bureau includes the four guides in the China Travel Service for huaqiao. One guide is studying Japanese; the primary difficulty for Kucha is language training for the guides. The China Travel Service has three cars—one jeep, one four-wheel drive Toyota Landcruiser, and one 20-passenger van. The Foreign Affairs Bureau has three Chinese sedans. The Kucha Hotel, constructed in 1985, has fifteen double rooms with bath, souvenir kiosk, and both Chinese and Uighur restaurants. Weekly flights are available to Urumqi and Korla.

In 1986 Kucha had applied to be an open city; this request was denied. The tourist sites are there, but accommodations and personnel require further expansion. Kucha’s administrative status as a country seat rather than a district seat also hinders the upgrading to ‘open’ status. Still, the presence of the Kizil Caves and Kucha’s dominant Uighur folkways will make the area an interesting alternative. (Interview, Kucha Foreign Affairs Bureau Director, Imimjan, April 29, 1986.)

**Korla: Tourism and Administrative Status.** Korla is the capital of the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, which encompasses one-quarter of Xinjiang’s territory. Korla is at the southern terminus of the Nanjiang Railway. This city was opened to tourists in December 1986. There are not many sights, but it has become a station on the road west to Kucha and Kashgar. Arrangements can be made with the Korla Foreign Affairs Bureau to visit the nearby town of Yanqi (Karashahr).

Korla City has no major sites for the tourist to visit; much of the city is newly constructed. Seven kilometers outside of town is Tiemen Guan, Iron Gate Pass. A large wrought iron gate guarded this pass into the valley. Control of the pass was crucial to this link between southern and northern Xinjiang. No longer is there a gate; the remnants were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. Locals come to this area to picnic in this dammed river valley. The Shayidong Pear Orchard is another possible site for tourists.

Bosten Lake, Baghrash Koli (U.), Bosteng Hu (C.), situated some 20
kilometers east of Korla, is the biggest lake in Xinjiang. Some recreational possibilities exist for boating and fishing, but this has not been developed much yet.

Yanqi is the seat of a Hui Autonomous County; several large mosques are in this town. Outside of town are the Yangkeqin Buddhist Caves (dating back to the Tang Dynasty) and the Ancient City of Bogedaqin, neither of which are open to tourists.

South of Korla on the way to Hotan is Lop Nor, the wandering lake that piqued Przhevalski's curiosity. On the western shores of Lop Nor is Lou Lan, a fabled city of legend. Hedin and Stein investigated the area; Chinese archaeologists continue the work. China conducts nuclear testing near here, so no tourism is possible.

The mountainous regions of Bayingolin offer possibilities for mountain climbing or hiking. Mt. Muztag, Musitage (C.), on the border with Tibet, attains 7723 meters. Mountain climbing expeditions have focused on this peak of the Altun Mountain Range. The Altun Mountains are also the site of a nature reserve.

The Bayan Bulak area, situated on the border with the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture, is a summer pasture area for Mongols. Hot springs and waterfalls are present in this district which has been named a wildlife reserve; swans populate the area. Some tourists are allowed here in the summer. (Chen Zhenbin, 1985a; Bonavia, 1988, pp. 147-151; Liang Aili, 1987, pp. 88-90; Interview, Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture Foreign Affairs Office Director Sun, April 26, 1986.)

All in all Korla will probably not become a major stop on the tourist itinerary given the relative paucity of the sites available. Korla may perhaps develop into a gateway for the Takla Makan and the towns of Southern Xinjiang. Korla is, at present, at the railhead of the Nanjiang railway. This railway runs through the mountainous region south of Urumqi. The route is scenic with a number of bridges and tunnels (a minor engineering feat); the timetable puts the scenic section of the route in darkness, however. If Bayingolin is able to encourage planned tourism into the natural park areas, Korla will benefit as well.

The total number of tourists in Korla in 1985 was just over 1000 (including foreigners and huaqiao). Of the foreigners, the Japanese, then British, were the most numerous. Mountain climbing parties also arrived in 1985. May through
September are the peak months. In 1985, groups that planned to tour the area had to be approved by the Foreign Affairs Office of the Autonomous Region, one to two months in advance. Individual tourists that arrived had to make do as the Bayingolin Foreign Affairs Office had limited facilities.

The Bayingolin Foreign Affairs Office had available to it several cars for transporting tourist to the sites or to the airport. There were only a few personnel who dealt with tourists. Bayingolin Hotel, built in the 1980s, had 50 beds with attached bath and another 50 without. Planes fly weekly to Urumqi, Qiemo and Kucha. The train runs daily to Urumqi. In 1985 Korla was applying for open status. With its personnel, accommodations, transport, and, most importantly, administrative status, Korla was an open city by the end of 1986; even though the tourist offerings were not well developed. (Interview, Bayingolin Foreign Affairs Office Director Sun, May 26, 1986; “Zhongguo Zai Kailiang 192 ge Shi Xian,” Wen Hui Bao, Dec. 4, 1986).

Kulja: Tourism with the Nomads. Kulja (Ining) Municipality is the capital of the Ili District, which along with the Tacheng and Altai Districts form the Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture. Kulja is not an open city; with permission from the Public Security Bureau in Urumqi, one can visit this interesting area. The Ili River valley is well watered compared with the rest of Xinjiang; historically, the valley has been the preferred pasture lands of Central Asian nomads. Ili District Foreign Affairs Office makes arrangements for tourists.

The natural landscape tourist sites include the Ili River, Sayram Lake, and Gouzi Valley. Of a historical interest are Almalik, the Tomb of Telug Timur, and Huiyuan Drum Tower. Local culture is reflected in the Kazak fairs, the mosques, bazaar, and the People’s Park in Kulja and the Xibo of Chapchal. Of current political interest is the border town of Korgos.

Within Kulja proper there is not much of a historical nature. The two major mosques reflect the Uighur and Hui cultures. The bazaar provides Ili apples, cheeses, peppers, and strawberries. Barbers, knife-makers, saddlemakers, bakers, and noodle-sellers ply their trade in the farmers bazaar. At the People’s Park are located, besides the trees and flowers, the tombs of the martyrs of the Three District Revolution, Sanqu Geming.

Within the Ili District, there are ethnic groups besides the Uighur, Hui, or Han. In Kulja, the Russian ethnic group has an Orthodox church and a primary school. South of Kulja is the Chapchal Xibo Autonomous County.
Arrangements can be made to visit the Xibo, who are known as excellent archers. Kazak herders raise sheep in the northern and mountainous counties of the district. Nadam or fairs are festive occasions with horse-racing, wrestling, and the Girl Chase.

The center for nomad power in Ili Valley historically was Almalik, near modern-day Huicheng. From the tenth through the fourteenth centuries, nomads in this town maintained control and linkages on this Northern Route of the Silk Road. In the ruins, coins, carvings, and pottery have been found. Telug Timur, a descendant of Genghis Khan, was the first of the Mongol princes to convert to Islam. His tomb lies near what is now the Sino-Soviet border. In Huiyuan, a Qing garrison town, a Drum Tower was built in the 1880s. The purpose of the garrison was to guard against the northern neighbor, Czarist Russia. In the border town of Korgos, the easing of Sino-Soviet tensions has meant a great deal of trade passing through this small town.

South of Kulja, the Ili River flows westward into the Soviet Union. A great bridge spans the river going to Chapchal. North of Huicheng is the 28-kilometer long Guozi Gou, Valley of Fruits. Streams flow down out of the mountains into the poplar-lined valley. Kazaks graze sheep in the valley. The valley leads northward to Sayram Lake, Salimu Hu (C.), Sayram Koli (U.), a salty lake at an altitude of 2000 meters, on the border with Bortala Mongol Autonomous Prefecture. Kazaks herd sheep around the large lake basin. In July nadam are held. There are boats available for riding on this deep cold lake. The Kazaks tell a story of how a girl cried for her lover, filling up the basin with her tears.

About 1000 tourists came to Kulja in 1985. A large group led by Jules Verne Travel embarked on a Silk Road tour through Turkey, the Soviet Union and China by rail. From Alma Ata the group crossed into China at Korgos by bus, overnighted at Kulja, and then went onto to Urumqi by bus passing Sayram Lake. This sort of expensive travel group is welcomed by Kulja. Some individual tourists have acquired travel permits from Urumqi for this closed city; permission is for air travel only. Most of the tourists are from Hong Kong.

The Ili District Foreign Affairs Office manages the China Travel Service which includes several guides, one of whom speaks English. The centrally located Ining Hotel has 120 beds with bath. The Hotel is on the grounds of what used to be the Russian Consulate. Two new hotels are under construction on the
western side of town. Various guesthouses, at Sayram Lake and in town, are available. None of these have attached bath. There are flights six times weekly to Urumqi. The China Travel Service has available several vehicles, jeeps and sedans, for guests.

From Kulja to Sayram, this district with the variety of ethnic cultures, history filled places and beautiful natural scenes has a key role to play in the future of Xinjiang's tourism. Given the proximity to the border, however, Kulja will probably not become open until the Korgos border district is also open to foreign visitors. (Chen Zhenbin, 1985b; Bonavia, 1988, pp. 116-122; Liang Aili, 1987, pp. 56-68; Interview, Ili District Foreign Affairs Director Ren Yuandi, June 2, 1986.)

Conclusions
Effects of Tourist Activities on Xinjiang

The UNESCO (1976) discussion of tourism pointed toward possibilities of cultural reawakening, marketing of culture, and the preservation of sites (see Chapter 2).

The tourists' interest in local culture leads to a revitalization of cultural identity. In terms of cultural reawakening, the author saw in Xinjiang a blossoming of local culture in religion, in song, in dance, in crafts, and in architecture. The tourists' ability to partake of food in the homes of the Uighurs in the oases of Turpan and Kashgar, the chance to spend the night in a Kazak yurt on Bogda Mountain, to enjoy the music of the rawap or the dombura, to participate in the mehman-dost (guest-friendliness) of Turkic culture has led to a reaffirmation of Uighur and Kazak identity. This is especially rewarding for Uighurs and Kazaks in terms of the relative cultural dominance of the Han. Dance performances put on for the tourist give the tourist an insight into Uighur culture. The tourist dances are perhaps shaped for the tourist. A simplification is involved; yet the local people still have their own performances and experiences intact and unspoiled by the tourists. Cultural tourism has led to a recognition of the validity of the Uighur lifestyle.

The UNESCO document points towards tourism as being involved in the
marketing of culture (in Greenwood’s nomenclature “commoditization”). In Xinjiang, the homes are often those of personnel associated with the travel service bureau or with the government. At other times a small fee is paid for the food and entertainment in the Kazak’s yurt. This is beyond the usual rules of Kazak and Uighur etiquette, but tourism is perhaps beyond the usual realm of socio-cultural contacts. In any event the friction associated with these contacts is limited if the tourist is sufficiently educated to the character of the local people’s culture. De Kadt’s recommendations for the tourist industry are especially applicable here.

Tourism has developed into a new market for the handicrafts industry. Traditionally Xinjiang has had a viable handicrafts industry; such items as carpets, trunks, atlas (ikat) fabric, knives, musical instruments and doppa (skullcaps) are all ethnic markers of the Uighur people. These items, with the exception of the trunk, have all become tourist souvenirs as well. Some products have become changed. Miniaturized versions of knives and musical instruments are sold to tourists. Carpets with landscape scenes or with pastel colors are sold to tourists instead of the classic pomegranate-and-vase design in red and blue. But that is what the tourists want. The traditional knives, musical instruments, and carpets are available for the local people. A dilution of culture has not occurred.

In terms of site preservation, before a city becomes open, China’s policy is to clean up the place, restore vital sites, refurbish and preserve the qualities of traditional architecture and to create cultural relic preservation units whose job is to preserve the relics and sites. Especially in Southern Xinjiang, with the great variety and amount of historical sites, the preservation work feeds directly into the tourism industry and also satisfies local needs for cultural preservation. Preserved historical sites are used by locals as well, especially on public holidays. Government approval and subsidy of local historic sites is crucial for the sites’ continued existence. Some sites are not yet on the tourist itinerary because these sites are still in the restoration process.

As long as entrance to the sites is controlled, there will be no real damage done to the historical significance or the material culture of Xinjiang. Tourism has not done any of the damage to historic Buddhist sites that local Moslem religionists did in the Middle Ages, that European “explorers” did in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or that the Red Guards did during the chaos
of the Cultural revolution.

At present, Xinjiang's greatest need is for well-coordinated tourist plans, probably by the Xinjiang Tourism Bureau in connection with the Cultural Relics Bureau, and Secondary Light Industry Bureau, that would see to rational development of tourism. There needs to be continued controls on the number of tourists allowed in to Xinjiang and on the degree of spatial closure. Beyond China's goals of increased foreign exchange and "information" dissemination, there needs to be a view of greater depth considering the preservation of the historical, cultural, and natural landscapes.

Consider:
The legacy of Xinjiang's historical sites
Qocho of Turpan
Bezeklik Caves of Turpan
Kizil Caves of Kucha
Appak Khoja Tomb in Kashgar

The treasure of Xinjiang's culture
*dooppa* of Kashgar
*kulakche* of Kucha
Uighur Dance at Turpan
Id Kah Mosque in Kashgar
the Bazaar

The beauty of Xinjiang's natural landscape
Tian Chi and Mount Bogda
Yalkun Tagh and the Gobi

located in and around Urumqi, Kashgar and Turpan.

Can the locals and the tourists both be accommodated? Only with rational and cautious planning.
Figure 6

Tourists in Xinjiang, 1979-1987

Figure 7

Xinjiang, Tourist Origin, 1981

Table 6

Tourist Expenditures in Xinjiang
Millions of US$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourist Services</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodations</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist Goods</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>4.99</td>
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</table>

Figure 8

Monthly Distribution of Tourists, 1981

Source: Hu Zuyuan, 1984, p. 440
Table 7
Tourists in Urumqi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CITS</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,513</td>
<td>1,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2,741</td>
<td>3,850</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>3,060</td>
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<td>7,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>4,434</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>5,031</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6,605</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>8,764</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>9,412</td>
<td>26,387</td>
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Table 8
Receipts of CITI Urumqi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yuan</th>
<th>Foreign Exchange (US$)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>471,000</td>
<td>63,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,120,000</td>
<td>670,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,150,000</td>
<td>610,000</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>990,000</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>1,860,000</td>
<td>930,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,990,000</td>
<td>840,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,580,000</td>
<td>1,090,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986*</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2,213,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987*</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>3,998,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Bi Yading, May 20, 1986; Xinjiang Nianjian, 1988, p. 390
* Foreign Exchange includes the value of the yuan.

Table 9
Tourists in Turpan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>420</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,618</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>4,689</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>5,452</td>
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<td>1984</td>
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<td>1986*</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>18,132</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Estimated.
Table 10
Tourists in Kashgar

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Invited</th>
<th>Non-invited</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>4500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>9000</td>
<td>10000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>13000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>18300</td>
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</table>


Table 11
Tourists in Kucha

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Huaqiao Invited</th>
<th>Foreigners Bazaar</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>503</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>95 350</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>420 800</td>
<td>1661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Imimjan, April 29, 1986.

\* Bazaar includes those tourists in transit to Kashgar.
\* Planned.
Chapter 5

Refurbishing of Xinjiang’s Handicraft Industry

For Third World countries, crafts are an old tradition of production. Crafts also function as markers of ethnicity. Within the traditional sector of the crafts, there exists a duality in that crafts are both an economic product and an ethnic product. In the modern world, the handicraft industry is at an important juncture. As these countries change, crafts also change. The choices range from remaining the same to complete modernization; another possibility is to evolve to an intermediate level. In this fashion, crafts retain both their ethnic and their economic function.

China has an extensive history in the handicraft sector. The policies of the government of the People’s Republic have structured the form of crafts in China. Xinjiang’s regional implementation of China’s handicraft policies is in turn shaped by Xinjiang’s historical experience and by local variability. Six different places in Xinjiang are examined to portray the diversity of local practice of the handicraft industry.

Several propositions on the relationship of crafts with ethnic and development are explored here. As discussed in Chapter 2, the first proposition is that crafts, through their adaptability and their use of local resources, can function as a component in development from below. A second proposition is that tourism causes an evolution of crafts into two types, touristic and ethnic crafts. This two types of product have a duality in form and function matched by a duality in market and resources. A third proposition is that cooperativization enhances the production of crafts, through an improvement of the access to market and materials.
China’s Experience in the Handicrafts Sector: Central Plans

Within China, handicrafts have a long history of development. Tong’s (1981) able discussion of the development of handicrafts (shougongye) in China provided the historical background. Chen (1968), beginning with the role of palace artisans in the Shang and continuing through the significance of crafts in medieval imperial China, pointed out China’s commercial vitality based on handicrafts.

In the first half of this century, China’s handicrafts sector was similar to other developing countries (Tong, 1981). Cottage industries were established providing daily-use articles. Following the movement of China into the world-economy, there occurred a gradual substitution of imported goods for some crafts. For the more well-to-do members of the populace, high quality crafts (jewelry, etc.) were a product of further specialization.

Several periods can be differentiated during the People’s Republic, in terms of the policies followed with regard to handicrafts. During the initial years, from 1949 until 1952, particular handicraft policies were not fully formed (Lockett, 1986). After 1952, the general trend within the urban economy was towards “socialist transformation”. For advanced sectors (i.e. heavy industry), socialist transformation meant state-ownership. Backward sectors (as handicrafts) would be collectively owned and then transferred to state ownership. Socialist production in the collective sector would thereby negate any potential for petty capitalist development. This beginning stage of the socialist transformation was planned to last until the early 1960s. 1953-56 saw the emergence of this policy. Government-sponsored surveys into the nature of production were carried out in 1952-1954 to implement the policies of socialist transformation.

A ‘high tide of socialist transformation’ in 1957 meant the speeding up of the cooperativization and the elimination of private production of crafts. By 1958 and the beginning of the Great Leap Forward, there were no private entrepreneurs engaged in the production of crafts for the market. In the handicrafts sector, it was argued that “Socialist collective ownership is good, but whole people (quanmin or state) is better.” (Deng, 1958). In the early 1960s, the degree of state control was scaled down. During the Cultural Revolution ideological polarization would dictate more direct state control (cooperatives
being viewed by the far left as only semi-socialist); however, the chaos engendered private activities. By 1978 and the Third Central Meeting of the Eleventh Plenum of the Party, new economic policies were formulated. During the post-Mao period, the industry has once again undergone a set of changes. In the 1980s craft production exists in several forms; a) state production under the Secondary Light Industry Bureau (erqìng gōngyè ju) in which cooperatives have become factories; b) private entrepreneurs specializing in certain goods; and c) sideline activities in which farming families produce craft items to sell on the open market or contract to erqìng gōngyè ju.

Xinjiang Shougongye
Historical Perspective

In applying these theoretical and comparative perspectives to Xinjiang and Uighur craft items, the historical character of Xinjiang handicraft development needs to be considered. As noted in He (1981), the early historical, literary and archaeological evidences of handicraft industry in the Xiyu (Western Regions) point to extensive involvement in carpet weaving, jade production and leathercraft. Important historical sites for handicraft (kol sanaet in Uighur) production include Qiuci (Kucha), Shule (near Kashgar), and Hotan (Hetian) all of which date back to the Han dynasty. Archaeological finds by Stein (1912, 1921, 1928) give us early indications of rug fragments, especially at Niya near Hotan. From the Tang dynasty period, Xuan Zang provides descriptions of active production in the rugmaking industry in Hotan, a major center of the Tarim basin. Xuan Zang also observed felt carpets among the Turkic groups to the north of the Tian Shan (Bidder, 1964). Another famous traveller, Marco Pole, describes the great handicraft and trading activities among the peoples of Kashgar during the Yuan dynasty. By the Ming period, the peoples of the southern Tarim had been converted to Islam. Kashgar and Hotan revelled in the crafts during the cultural renaissance of the Timurids as evidenced by the Ming records of tribute — carved jade, silks and carpets (Ming Shi). During the Qing, Fu Jing (18th C.) discussed Kashgar’s wealth of carpets, gold, jade, copperware, boots and caps, mirrors, brocade and other fabrics. Tradition has it that during Qianlong’s rule Hotanese carpet weavers produced rugs at the imperial court (Bidder, 1964). Western explorers such as Forsyth (1875) also refer to the quality
and distinctiveness of the wool carpets of Hotan.

The historical, archaeological, and literary records thus indicate the long cultural significance of craft articles to the people of Xinjiang. That significance appears in modern times through the ethnic attachment to crafts (kol sanaet) such as carpets, metalwork (knives and jewelry), hats and clothing. Uighurs have produced locally styled items using local materials and technologies. The distinctive dress of the Uighur, doppa (skullcap), pichak (knife), chapan (jacket), otuz (boots) and atlas (ikat fabric) has served to distinguish the Uighur from other ethnic groups such as the Han. Significant regional variation existed among the stylings. Thus the Kucha badam (almond) doppa, the Turpan gulluk (flowery) doppa, the Kulja kizil (red) doppa, the Hotan round doppa, the Kashgar square doppa and the small round doppa worn by the older women of Keriya (Yutian) all function as outward signs of local identity.

The organization of the crafts industry during the 1800s and early 1900s was of the ustaz-xagirt (master-apprentice) variety. Study of the craft to make doppa took many years to master. Within larger towns, whole households would be engaged in production. An ustaz might have several poorer individuals apprenticed to himself; at times relationships became exploitatative. Crafts were supplementary activities for many farming households who derived extra income for producing more items than they could use. Daily-use articles were the mainstay of production. Regionally, Nanjiang was the center of production, especially Kucha, Kashgar, and Hotan, primarily for reasons of trade and commerce. In Beijiang, Kulja remained a center (He, 1981).

Xinjiang’s Handicraft Industry, post-1949

Regional Potentials

In general, the character of the handicraft industry within Xinjiang remained unchanged until 1954, by which time the new policy on socialist transformation had gone into effect. Data for the new policy were derived from the production surveys carried out in the early 1950s; results of which can be found in Nanjiang Shehui Nongcun. Each oasis in the Tarim has had to be more or less self-sufficient, thus creating over time the aesthetic distinctions in dress and daily-use articles (Han and Yang, 1979). Rural handicraft producers might be divided into two types — a) those whose primary income source is the land
and b) those whose primary income source is not the land but the secondary sector. For those tied to the land, the relatively inactive agricultural winter is the time most favored for the supplementary handicraft production activity.

Town/urban handicraft industries produced a much wider variety of goods than the primarily rural areas. Taking Kucha as an example, surveys conducted in 1952 provide an accurate portrayal of the pre-socialist Xinjiang handicrafts sector. In general, handicraft enterprises such as those in Table 12 were composed of one master and two apprentices; this small work force resulted in a small scale of production and small amounts of profit. (Monetary amounts in yuan are at the inflated prices of the 1940s and early 1950s before stabilization under the PRC. During this period a hoe might cost 100,000 yuan and a leather hat 35,000 yuan.) Following Kucha's specialization in the leatherware sector, a typical leather hat workshop with three workers produced 600 hats in a year. Out of a total income of 21,000,000 yuan, 35.7% went to raw materials, 24.6% to fuel and supplementary materials, 0.4% for depreciation, and 34.2% for labor costs. The remaining 5% can be considered as a profit for the enterprise. The craftsmen say, though, that they are better off than peasants. "Peasants in one year harvest once, we reap each time at the bazaar." (Yang and Fa, p. 174-175).

In 1952 Kucha's market was directed northward to Kulja, Tacheng, Altai, and Urumqi; little material was traded to Kashgar or Hotan. Changes in the structure of Kuche handcrafts after 1949 included the withdrawal of goldsmiths, silversmiths and jewelers. Other industries such as soap-making and cloth dyeing were impacted by the arrival of products from Urumqi. Copperware saw a reduction in the number of enterprises; work was becoming more seasonal in nature. Ironware continued its emphasis on producing agricultural implements especially hoes. Yang and Fa (p. 177) considered as important the following issues for Kucha 1) the need to retrain goldsmiths, silversmiths, and jewelers as that business was gone, 2) more support of crafts feeding into the agricultural sector (ironware), and 3) a change of scale as workshops grew to include more workers (by increasing the scale of production, greater productive force would be generated).

From the surveys, as of 1954 within Xinjiang about 5.23% (91,666) of the households were engaged in handicraft production (1.94% of the total population). The value of production in this activity was 229,820,000 yuan,
accounting for 54.79% of the value of industrial production. In general, 90% of the production occurred in Nanjiang (Dong, 1984).

Cooperativization begins in 1953 with the formation of shougongye hezuoshe (handicraft cooperatives), primarily within the urban areas. Matters progressed slowly until the high tide of socialism, peaking in 1958 (Table 13). Under the slogan of shougongye shang shan (handicrafts ascend the mountain), these enterprises were organized by the local state (27.5%), operating cooperatively (45.5%) or under commune leadership (16.8%). In the early 1960s individual craft activities were again allowed; they were recognized as a necessary part of socialism. Collective enterprises steadily grew in number, but with the Cultural Revolution, many units disbanded. In Urumqi, for example, from 1966 to 1976, the number of cooperatives fell from over 100 to 16. Recovery is reflected in Table 14. Note that all Xinjiang statistics are in terms of secondary light industry which includes non-handicraft articles. By 1980, the handicraft industry seems to have recovered. Regionally the secondary light industry was concentrated in Urumqi with subordinate centers in Kulja and Kashgar (See Table 15). This represents the restructuring of Xinjiang’s economy. During this period (1976-1981), approximately 28% of the enterprises were state controlled and 71% were collective. By 1981, 90% of the products were for daily-use, 1% for industry, 7% for agriculture and 2% for export (Dong, 1984).

Local Practice
Results of Field Surveys

This study focuses on the enterprises of the erqing gongye ju that produce minzu texu chanpin (ethnic distinctive articles). Individual entrepreneurs were not surveyed. Interviews were held with Secondary Light Industry Bureaus at Urumqi, Turpan, Korla, Kucha, Kashgar and Kulja. Personnel were interviewed at site visitations of 24 factories in both open (Urumqi, Turpan, and Kashgar) and closed (Karasheher, Kucha, and Kulja) sections of Xinjiang. Topics for inquiry are listed in Appendix Two and include a general history of the factory, financial situation, market, personnel, source materials, technology and product design.

At a general level, in 1986 major centers for production in the Secondary Light Industry were still Urumqi, Kulja and Kashgar (Table 16). Compared with
the previous spatial structure of Xinjiang's handicraft industry, the rising prominence of Urumqi over Kashgar and Kulja represents the reorientation of Xinjiang to China proper. However, in terms of the relative importance of the handicraft industry to each urban center, Kashgar and Kulja both are more dependent on handicrafts for their industrial base than is Urumqi.

In terms of minzu yongpin gongye the ethnic articles industry, the gross value of industrial output in 1987 for Xinjiang was 226,000,000 yuan up from 193,000,000 yuan in 1986. (Xinjiang Nianjian 1988, pp. 283-284).

Urumqi: Modernized Producer of Crafts. Within Urumqi about 10% of the Secondary Light Industry produces minzu texu chanpin. In 1986 Urumqi accounted for about 25% of Xinjiang's secondary light industry output. About one-quarter of the workforce is minority, roughly half men and half women. Wages average about 100 yuan per month, 150 yuan in piecework (Toops, Field notes, 1986).

In terms of the market, there is great expansion. The domestic market for crafts has improved as the overall rise in the standard of living means more discretionary income for the populace at large. Crafts are promoted in such venues as the Urumqi Secondary Light Industry Bureau Ethnic Specialty Products Exhibition held in April, 1986, at the Urumqi Embroidery Factory. Table 17 profiles craft enterprises in Urumqi.

Foreign markets are also targeted through exhibitions mounted in Hong Kong and Alma Ata. A number of foreign contracts have broadened the market base. Clothing articles are exported to Hong King and the USSR, while jade goes to Hong Kong and carpets to Japan, France and the US. Because of the struggle to keep up with local needs while maintaining the foreign contracts, individual craft producers have developed especially in furniture, clothing, and musical instruments. The individual producer is more flexible in meeting the needs of the local consumer. In order to stimulate further the production of minzu texu yongpin, taxes on these articles are cut in half during 1986 through 1989. In 1987, Urumqi had 15 enterprises in which a total of 1.12 million yuan in taxes were reverted back to them. (Xinjiang Nianjian, 1988).

Of the various factories in Urumqi, one of the more successful has been the Ethnic Musical Instrument Factory Minzu Yueqi Chang (C.) Milli Musika Zawodi (U.) This factory was founded in 1958 as a handicrafts cooperative with
fifteen workers producing sixteen different varieties of traditional musical instruments. By 1986 the cooperative had expanded into a factory with 120 workers who manufactured 70 different products including traditional musical instruments, tourist souvenirs, guitars, blackboards and playground equipment. The factory is both a production site (shengchan dian) and a visiting site (canguan dian) meaning that tourists are encouraged to visit and make purchases.

Among the personnel, 75% are minority nationality (including Uighur, Hui, and Kazak). Production workers account for 58% of the personnel, while management (includes party cadres) amounts to 17% and retail shop personnel 22%. Over ten retirees draw pensions equivalent to 75-80% of the annual wage. There are four master craftsmen who are responsible for the training of the workers and the creation of new designs. Prior to the 1980s compensation was of the daguofan variety, everyone sharing in the big pot. With the introduction of piecework instead of wages, compensation had increased in 1986 by 30¥ to approximately 150¥ per month.

For the simpler segments of the production process six months of training are sufficient for the beginner, while more complex segments may require two to three years to master. To know how to build completely a fine rawap with inlay is the culmination of several years of study. When the factory embarked on its expansion in the early 1980s, several of the personnel studied in the Technical Institutes of Beijing and Shanghai. In 1985 four workers studied in Guangzhou for two months to learn the guitar production process (part of the expansion plans of the factory).

The majority of the products at this factory are still produced by hand. Many of the tools are produced locally as well; specialized tools are made at the factory. The higher-quality goods require a greater investment of craftsmanship and time in production.

Materials are for the most part are of local origin. Woods used for the musical instruments include mulberry, walnut and apricot from Xinjiang. Lesser quality woods such as pine are used in the production of billiard tables and blackboards. Playground equipment was being made of wood or metal, but plans have been made to utilize plastics. Of an exotic nature, the dap, large tambourine-like instrument, uses snakeskin from Yunnan.

The factory itself is located midway between Nanmen and Erdaoqiao on Urumqi’s south side. When established in 1958, this cooperative was housed in a
building of 200 square meters. From 1976 through 1980 the present four story building of over 3000 square meters was constructed. The building was financed by a loan of 600,000 ¥ from the Autonomous Region governmental authorities. In 1986 an additional building was under construction in the back portion of the lot. This new building, financed by a 300,000 ¥ loan from the government, will house the expanded playground equipment and cultural articles workshops.

The production situation for this factory is relatively attractive (Table 18). In 1986, 67% of the planned value of production and 44% of the planned profit had been completed by June. After the factory had reopened in 1981, the initial startup costs made for a loss rather than a profit. But after 1982 actual profits and value of production exceeded the planned goals. Key to the building expansion and government loans was this financial success. By 2000 the plant manager, Torsun Basari, hopes to increase the value of production to 3.5 million yuan with a matching increase in the workforce.

The factory has been relatively stable in the production of traditional musical instruments since 1982 (Table 19). In 1985 guitar production was added. Major expansion has occurred in the development of cultural articles (including blackboards, school desks, and billiard tables). These items use similar labor skills as the production of musical instruments, but are less costly to produce and fulfill a great market demand. In 1986 a new item, children's playground equipment, was in production; 280 units were planned. This was the logical extension of technical expertise. The factory was the only one in the region producing playground equipment.

Traditional musical instruments represent craft items. These have undergone an evolution of form, pacing changes in culture. The kushitar, a stringed instrument played with a bow, previously had more strings. The naghra, a large bongo type drum, before was very heavy and the head was laced on with string. Now the naghra is lighter with the head riveted on. Various models of the satar, an eight-stringed instrument played with a bow, have been elaborated with inlay. The dombira, a traditional Kazak stringed instrument, has been produced in a larger size. The tambur of the 1950s and 1960s had little adornment; now they have more wood or bone inlay. The dutar, a two-stringed instrument, and the rawap, a shorter five-stringed instrument with a snake-skin head, also underwent further adornment. The ghijek is produced in several sizes akin to a bass viol or a cello. Percussive instruments include the sapai, dap and
\textit{naghra}. In all approximately fifty different musical instruments are produced. For some, such as the ghijek, hushitar and \textit{naghra}, only ten or twenty are produced per year. Hundreds of the simpler versions of the \textit{dombira, sapai} and \textit{dutar} are produced yearly. In 1986 about 500 guitars a month were being produced.

An innovation has been electrical versions of the \textit{satar, rawap} and \textit{hushitar}; this has undergone twenty years of product development. In 1984 the factory began producing child-size versions of the \textit{dutar, dombira, tambor}, and \textit{rawap}. These specialty items reflect the greater numbers of young people learning to play. In 1984 the factory also began introducing miniature versions of eight kinds of musical instruments, intended as tourist souvenirs. These miniatures represent an economic growth via market expansion while preserving \textit{minzu weidao} or ethnic flavor.

In terms of the market, the simpler versions of instruments are distributed throughout the region at cultural articles stores. The factory also opened a store in the same building in 1985. The higher quality traditional musical instruments have a dual market a) the national, regional, and local song-and-dance ensembles \textit{gewutuan} and b) national and regional hotels and friendship stores. Foreign exchange certificates must be used in the friendship stores; both hotels and friendship stores are geared to the tourists. Miniaturized versions are also available.

The duality of the market represents a duality of the craft: the ethnic and the touristic craft. Adaptability to market demand (local and tourist) and the transformation of a cooperative to a factory are keys to the successful nature of this factory. The ethnic character of the craft is retained while economic growth is engendered.

The Urumqi Embroidery Factory, \textit{Xiupin Chang}, was started in 1975 on the site of the Musical Instrument Factory with 20 workers. Products include doppa, embroidered linens, and work clothing. In 1981 the factory moved to its present location in the southern section of town. The goal of the factory manager, Erkinai, is to emphasize ethnic distinctive articles.

In 1986 the factory employed 240 workers of which 55\% are ethnic minorities including Uighur, Hui, Kazak, Kirgiz, Uzbek, and Tajik. As in other clothing factories, 95\% are women. 30 produce doppa, 80 produce embroidered items, 80 produce work clothing and others involved in administration, accounting, etc. The \textit{peixun ban} or training class allots three months to study the
making of embroidered articles and six months for work clothing.

Only the doppa are hand manufactured; all other items are machine
made. Chinese sewing machines are used, but the factory is acquiring Japanese
sewing machines as well. Much of the materials used are local, for example,
Xinjiang cotton processed at local mills.

After the move to its own building in 1981, the factory was able to double
its value of production (Table 20). In 1986 value of production was planned to be
1.5 million yuan with a profit of 10%. By 1989 value of production was projected
at 4 million yuan with a work force of 300.

Doppa production is still a craft activity. Many workers, all women, sit
around several large tables hand-sewing the doppa. A square of red, blue, or
purple felt and a square of smooth cotton lining are stitched together with rolled-
up paper tubes inserted to give these doppa a stiff ribbed feel. Traditionally,
cotton was used but the paper retains its stiffness much longer than the local
cotton. After being sewed, the doppa are formed over wooden blocks to various
sizes; the corners are bit for definition. The doppa are decorated with hand-sewn
sequins in the designs of grapes, the uzum doppa, or of almonds, the badam
doppa. Takiya, the Kazak version of the doppa for women are also produced
here. One woman, Oninam, had been making doppa since eight years old and at
age 40 was the chief ustaz of this craft.

Other items produced at this factory are primarily machine made. This
includes machine embroidered clothing, sheets, pillowcases, or prayer rugs.
These items constitute the bulk of factory production, employ the most workers
and are the most mechanized. Mechanization includes electrical scissors, sewing
machines and pattern makers for embroidery. Expansion in the factory has been
directed to the embroidery and clothing workshops. Later plans include a
possible expansion of the doppa workshop. However, the skills needed to
produce the doppa are more complex than those needed in the other workshops.

Most of the production of the Embroidery Factory remains in Xinjiang.
There is a store or menshibu available for local sales. The doppa are used locally
in Urumqi, while the embroidered materials are available in other the other
major cities of Xinjiang.

The Urumqi Carpet Factory, Ditan Zongchang (C.), Gilim Zawodi (U.) was
founded in 1973 with 140 workers. Prior to 1973 the site was used for the
production of felt products. Currently, both carpets and blankets are woven.
The factory is a *shengchan dian* and also operates a welcoming room, *jiedai shi*, for the convenience of tourists in purchasing carpets as souvenirs. The traditional Uighur designs are emphasized in this factory.

In 1986 the factory employed 459 workers. Three branch factories in Qitai and one in Urumqi county employed another 150 workers. Most workers are female and belong to the various ethnic minorities and Han as well. Several months of training are required before one is able to tie the knots in the carpets and cut the threads. Workers from Hotan and Kulja train here as well. The factory has had requests from factories in Nanjing to train in Urumqi but the factory has been unable to honor that request.

The raw materials of the carpet and blanket production include cotton and wool, both of which are available locally. Raw materials account for 60% of the total cost. The competition for the raw materials is fairly intense as there are both carpet factories in every major city and many small villages in Xinjiang; these are operated by the Secondary Light Industry Bureau and the Foreign Trade Bureau. The factory’s looms are steel; the knives and scissors used are produced locally.

The value of production in 1985 was 2.08 million yuan with a profit of 180,000 yuan. In 1979 12,000 square meters of carpet were produced; this decreased to 8000 square meters in 1980. During the early 1980s the entire carpet industry in Xinjiang suffered from a shortage of good quality raw materials, thus limiting production. By 1985 production had reached the 1979 levels of approximately 12,000 square meters; of that 8000 square meters was export.

Four levels of quality of the carpets exist. Local consumption is dominated by the 270 dao per square meter costing 80¥ per square meter. For foreign export, carpets of 360, 540 and 720 dao per square meter are made costing 150¥, 260¥, and 460¥ per square meter respectively. The higher quality carpets when purchased locally are mainly for institutions such as hotels or other non-private organizations.

Designs emphasize the locality using traditional Uighur concepts. This factory considers itself more design-oriented than the Foreign Trade Carpet Factory outside of town. The design department consists of five individuals. Recently more flower motifs have been added to the Uighur design collection. A second design type are the Persian carpets. Many of the tourists expect Persian carpets (referred to as Iran carpets by the factory), thus the introduction of these
non-Uighur designs. A third type are the landscape carpets. Designs are drafted of local scenic areas such as Tian Chi (Bogda Koli). Factory personnel report that these huge postcard carpets have received much favor with Japanese tourists. Such landscape carpets are stylistically similar to Chinese landscape paintings. The factory also produces custom-design carpets such as a series of pink carpets for a hotel in France. (Pink is not in the traditional palette of colors in Xinjiang.)

In addition to carpets, the factory diversified into machine-loomed blankets in 1983. Uighur carpet designs were adapted to the blankets and, in 1986, Kazak designs were utilized as well. The sources for raw materials, the technologies, and work skills involved were somewhat similar to carpets, thus the diversification complemented existing production.

In recent years the market has expanded to foreign exports and to foreign tourists in Xinjiang. The jiedai shi is estimated to account for ten per cent of the factory's profit. The export market is dominated by the United States, France and Japan. Competition in production is present in Kulja and Shihezi; still the factory has maintained its leadership role with contracts locally, in Beijing, and abroad. (Interview, Carpet Factory Personnel, June 17, 1986).

The Urumqi Leather Factory, Pige Chang (C.) Ayak Keyim Zawodi (U.) had its beginnings in 1954 as a private handicrafts workshop. By 1959 it was a handicrafts cooperative of 35 workers producing saddles and woodworking. In 1986 as a factory it specialized in the production of minority style shoes and boots.

The factory's 317 employees include 116 men and 197 women. 37% of the workers are minority nationality including Uighur and Hui. 23% of the employees are retirees who receive pensions of 75-80% of their wages. The women's shoes workshop account for 32%, sole workshop 28% and men's shoe workshop 9% of the workforce. The rest (8%) include management and accounting departments. All of the workshops function as training centers as well for Xinjiang. A cafeteria is provided for the employees. Housing and a nursery are planned.

All of the shoes and boots are made from cow leather, available from Northern Xinjiang. All materials are supplied from the government procurement system. For the most part the shoes are handmade including cutting the leather uppers, punching the design and stitching the leather upper to the sole. The sole workshop is the most mechanized.
The factory is located in a three story building on Shengli Lu in the southern part of Urumqi. The ground floor has a store or menshibu that was started in 1981. The factory also has four trucks which can be used for deliveries.

As a handicrafts cooperative in 1959 only 35 workers were employed. During that year 50,000 pairs of shoes, as well as saddles and woodwork were produced with a total value of 1 million yuan. By 1975 the factory was specializing in shoes and boots. During this period after the Cultural Revolution, there was more of a guaranteed market as well. The production situation of the factory is reflected in Table 21. There was a general rise in production till 1983 at which point the factory underwent some retooling and mechanization. In 1984 the market was not particularly good, so production was cut back. By 1985 quality was much better; a profit of 232,000¥ was made. In 1986 a profit of 10% or 250,000¥ was forecast on the planned value of production, 2.5 million yuan. The men’s shoes workshop has a peak daily output of 150 pairs shoes while the women’s shoes workshop has a peak daily output of 250 pairs.

In 1986 the factory was producing over 60 types of shoes and boots with plans to increase that to 80 types. In the early 1980s only about 20 types were manufactured. The styles used have been developed with regard to the design sensitivities of the local Uighurs and other minority groups. Shoes are produced with varying size heels (quite in favor in Xinjiang in 1986); Sandals and boots are also made. Boots are generally lined for winter usage and are usually at knee length. Leading ustaz in each of the workshops (men’s, women’s, and soles) are responsible for the teaching of the design and the techniques utilized in production. Generally the focus is on high-quality footwear as a continued market exists for these items.

The focus of the factory’s market has been Northern Xinjiang, including Ili and Tacheng, but also as far afield as Hotan. Contracts are held to supply the department stores in the cities of Xinjiang. Beginning in the 1980s some shoes were also exported to Alma Ata in the Soviet Union. There is a temporal pattern in production as well. In January the factory starts production of summer shoes in order for them to be on the market in March. In July the winter shoes are started for a September market date.

In general the Leather Factory has been relatively successful in design and production. The goals of the factory manager, Yasin, are to maintain that success and improve production through a loan from the regional government. This will
be used to modernize the equipment and expand the workforce in the men's shoes workshop (Interview, June 16, 1986).

The Urumqi Hat Factory, Xinguang Maozi Chang (C), Kulakche Zawodi (U) was established in 1956 with 16 workers as a private workshop. In 1959 the government took it over as a handicrafts cooperative. In 1986 its products include leather hats, gloves, and jackets.

Of the factory's 147 workers, 81 (55%) are retirees; the yearly pension for all the retirees amounts to 96,000¥. This is one of the causes of this factory's financial difficulties. The average age of the other workers is about 35. 70% of the workers are ethnic minorities, including Uighur and Hui. Most of the workers at the factory are women (80%).

The factory acquires leather and wool from various areas in Xinjiang to produce the leather hats and gloves. Regular sheepskins are provided from the Foreign Trade Leather Factory (who process sheepskin from all over Xinjiang). One square meter costs 7 to 17 yuan (average cost is 9 yuan). The cost of the high grade Persian lamb skins (kope) is 40 yuan from the Foreign Trade Leather Factory. One option that the Hat Factory is to go directly to Kucha to purchase the Persian lamb skins on the private market for 12 yuan. That entails an overnight jaunt to Kucha, though, and thus more expenses. It has become more difficult for the factory to produce the high grade Persian Lamb hats. In terms of other materials, the leather used in the production of gloves is substandard. Approximately 40% of the that leather can't be used as it is not good enough for export.

The technology involved in the factory's products is different. The lining of the hats is cut on machines, while the outer sheepskin layer is cut by hand. The hats produced here are sewn by hand. The gloves in contrast are hand cut and then sewn together on machines.

Another problem that the factory faces is its building site and location. Located off of the main streets on a narrow alleyways, transportation is inconvenient. The factory is a set of three low earth buildings, ping fang, built in the 1940s. Storage of the skins is a problem in these old buildings. The factory management wants to put up a new five-story building. This could require a government loan of 200,000¥ which was not forthcoming.

As a handicrafts cooperative from 1959 there had been no real problems at the factory. In the post-Mao era, though, the factory management felt that it was
becoming more difficult for the factory to compete. Profits at the hat factory ran
two or three percent compared to ten percent at the leather factory (Table 22). In
1983 the market was particularly poor, but 1985 was much better.

In 1986 twenty-three different products were made. These included the
many varieties of hats (for children, workers), but also leather aprons, jackets,
and long work gloves. The mainstay of production is the all-purpose winter cap
with dyed sheepskin outer ear flaps (kulakche). In the factory’s production
system it is possible for one worker to make three kulakche in one day. The high
quality caps are turned out more slowly. The smaller child-sized cap is made
from synthetic materials. In 1985 the factory began exporting leather work
gloves to the USSR, Japan and Hong Kong.

The winter cap market is concentrated from October to February. The
factory’s problem with the timing of production is concerned with this four
month market. The production season begins in March and continues through
the spring when the leather actually becomes available. Orders are made
throughout the year but contracts are only paid off upon delivery. This system
makes it difficult for the factory to see any major increases in production.

Regionally the market focuses upon Northern Xinjiang. Contracts are
held with department stores in Urumqi and with city and regional workers
supply organization. In Southern Xinjiang Kashgar dominates the market.
Changchun and Shenyang in China’s Northeast completes the domestic portion
of the market. The factory also exports leather work gloves to Japan, USSR, and
Hong Kong. This market is quite particular (to meet labor safety standards), so
the factory works hard to meet its contract.

The financial problems somewhat limit the future of this factory. At all
the factories visited, I asked what the factories goals for the Seventh Five Year
plan were. The factory management, in this case, responded that 1) rising raw
material costs, 2) large pension payments, 3) need for a new building, and 4) lack
of support from the regional government would mean the end of this thirty year
old establishment. (Interview, June 20, 1986).

In Urumqi the craft based factories of the Secondary Light Industry
Bureau have all maintained the essential nature of the crafts — hand production.
Yet all of the factories have also expanded into non-hand production or non-craft
items within their factories. This represents Urumqi’s position as Xinjiang’s
industrial base. Ethnic and touristic crafts have developed as well to serve the
local and foreign markets.

Outside of Urumqi several factories were surveyed in Kucha, Kashgar, Yanji, Turpan and Kulja. Goods produced include clothing, doppa, carpets, leatherware, metals, knives, and furniture. Table 23 profiles capabilities of several of the enterprises surveyed.

Kucha: Traditional Village Craft Center. Kucha is an old site of crafts production in Xinjiang. The city is still known for several craft items, knives and hats.

The Kucha Knife Factory, Jiandao Chang (C.), Pichak Zawodii (U.), was started in 1956 as a cooperative in the new city portion of Kucha. The factory made knives and swords, but by 1971 it specialized in knives. The present facilities were built in 1975.

The factory began with 60 workers in 1956. From then till 1975 the factory lost personnel as the work wasn’t steady. By 1986 there were 85 employees including the retirees on pension. All are Uighur; all are men. All of the present workers were trained by the ustaz, Ablakim, age 40, who had apprenticed as a boy. Ablakim in 1975 began being responsible for the development of the designs.

Materials such as iron, copper and silver are provided through the supply arm of the Secondary Light Industry Bureau, the Arts and Crafts Company, Gongye Meishu Gongsi (C.). In 1975 the factory produced many machine made knives, with no decoration. People seemed to prefer more decoration on the knives. Hand made knives enjoyed greater favor. Cow horn is used for the handle and sheath in the typical Kucha Knife. Locals buy knives as a man without a knife was no man. He does not have his “tooth”. Decorated knives were given as presents.

After the construction of the new building in 1975 and the hiring of new personnel, the factory had a solid base for production. In the mid-1980s emphasis was also placed on the acquisition of contracts. In 1985 30,000 knives were contracted for 140,000 yuan. For 1986 the plan was to sell 20,000 knives for 200,000 yuan (Table 24). During the first three months of 1986, 42,642 yuan worth had already been sold for a profit of 6700 yuan. This in spite of the factory being without electricity for a month.

In 1980 fifteen kinds of knives were made. By 1984 this had increased to
40 and by 1985 to 80. Knives with more decoration were favored. "Kucha" was carved into the sheath in Uighur, Chinese, or in Latin script. More of the knives became available at tourist venues as well. From meetings in 1985, directions for new knives arrived. Foreigners want less plastic and more copper, jewels, and jade on the knife sheath and handle. Also smaller knives were in vogue as souvenirs. In Hong Kong, the longer knives were illegal.

The factory has contracts with places in Xinjiang and outside of the region. The Turpan Hotel and the Kashgar Minority Goods Factory in Nanjiang. In Urumqi, contracts were held with the Regional Foreign Trade Bureau, Regional Museum and Exhibition Hall, the Overseas Chinese Hotel, the Friendship Hotel, the Tian Shan Hotel, Erdao Qiao Department Store (wholesale and retail), Cultural Relics and Antiques Store, and Hong Shan Department Store. The Beijing Arts and Crafts Store, Minorities Cultural Palace, and the Beijing Friendship Store held contracts. Knives were also exported to Japan and Hong Kong. The knives have become excellent souvenirs for tourists, even though the tourists don't necessarily make it to Kucha, a closed city.

The Kucha Doppa Factory, Huamao Chang (C.), Doppa Zawodi (U.) was established in 1956 and in 1958 was cooperativized under the direction of the Foreign Trade Bureau. Prior to 1965, the factory was located on the same site with the knife factory. The factory moved to its present site in the old city of Kucha in 1965. Doppa are produced as well as kulakche, leather hats.

In 1986 the factory employed 32 workers. Twelve were women and 20 were men; almost all were Uighur. 12 retirees were also attached to the factory. Several workers had had 20-30 years experience. Most of the younger workers had started studying in the 1970s and 1980s. For the doppa, eight years of study are required before one is able produce all the various types. The kulakche, in contrast, require three to five years of study.

Materials represent the major cost of production for the kulakche, while labor is the major cost for doppa. One piece of leather that can make ten hats cost 80 yuan. Kucha is well known for its Persian lamb hats. The Persian lambskin, Kope, costs 18-40 yuan for one skin (enough to make two hats). This high quality material from Kucha doesn't change color or form. Tight curls of wool on the lambskin bring a higher price. More of the unprocessed Persian lambskins are being sold through the Foreign Trade Bureau abroad to France and the United States. The ultimate cost of the Persian lamb hats, kope kulakche, has increased.
Leather for the kulakche is processed and then molded on hat forms at the factory. The materials and lining are then cut and sewn together. The doppa involve more intricate work. Cotton cloth is used. Designs are either hand embroidered or sewn on with a treadle sewing machine. The doppa ustaz need no pattern to produce the delicate embroidery.

The value of production was 220,000 yuan in 1985. For 1986 contracts had been signed for 160,000 yuan. 500 doppa and 500 leather hats were planned for 1986. Doppa sell for five to eight yuan, while kulakche run from twenty to forty yuan.

Twenty different kinds of kulakche for young and old, men and women are made at the factory. The cost of the kope kulakche, the specialty of this factory, have put them beyond the reach of the locals. The folded Turkish hat, papaka, the fox-fur lined Kazak tupak, and the round Russian style cap, kapka, are all made here. In the 1960s the badam (almond), qimen, unche (purple with sequins), gilim tashkan (red and white), and menpo (green velvet with purple flowers) doppa were all made here. During the Cultural Revolution the wearing of doppa was considered a sign of ethnic chauvinism; the making of doppa was effectively stopped between 1966 and 1980. In the mid-1980s badam, qimen, and gilim doppa were commonly made.

The factory has contracts with hotels in Aksu and Turpan; in Urumqi contracts are held with the Overseas Chinese Hotel, Kunlun Hotel, Arts and Crafts Company, and Erdaoqiao Department Store. The factory’s market extends to the immediate local area, to dance, art, and drama troupes throughout Xinjiang and to tourists from Japan and Kong Kong (Interview Adilzhan, April 30, 1986).

Kucha is not an open city; tourists to the area need permission from Urumqi before they can stay here. Yet the impact of the tourists’ buying power is seen in the knife and doppa factories. For the knives a duality of crafts, ethnic and touristic, are being produced. Crafts respond to the local and foreign markets. Crafts represent the basis of industry in Kucha.

Kashgar: Tourism, Local Markets and Craft Production. The Secondary Light Industry Bureau in Kashgar District employed over 5000 workers in 105 different enterprises in 1985. The value of production is 21 million yuan with a profit of 1 million yuan in 1985. Since 1978 the government has emphasized the
ethnic minority products. In 1985 ethnic goods were taxed 80% less. As the economy prospered in the mid-1980s more people could afford the ethnic style goods.

Workers in the ethnic goods industry saw a general increase in wages by 30 yuan. The range of wages goes from 50 to 300 yuan per month; the highest amounts derive from piecework. Women as well as men take home these wages, with women in the doppa and carpet industries.

Following are some production highlights. A new factory in Yengisar produced 300,000 yuan worth of knives. 20,000 yuan worth of doppa were made. 5000 square meters of carpet were woven in five factories, equally divided between local and export markets.

Problems include the cost of materials, the continued need to build more modern factories, and the need for capital. Loans have been made available by the regional and central governments, but Kashgar sees a continued need for capital.

The international tourist market has been boosted by the establishment of Kashgar's open status in 1984. 1980 through 1985 saw over 4000 tourists purchasing 60,000 yuan of ethnic goods. To continue to encourage tourists to spend, an addition to the Kashgar Arts and Crafts Factory was being built to include a restaurant and eventually a hotel, besides the usual display rooms and shop. (Interview, Liu Licheng, Kashgar Secondary Light Industry Bureau, May 4, 1986).

The Kashgar Arts and Crafts Factory, Kashi Gongyi Meishu Chang (C.), Keshker Huner Senet Zawodi (U.) was formed in 1979, combining three factories, the Crafts Factory, Gongyi Chang, (C.), Huner Zawodi (U.), the Ethnic Products Factory, Minzu Yongpin Chang (C.), Milli Lazimlatlik Zawodi (U.) and the Carpet Factory, Ditan Chang (C.), Gilim Zawodi (U.). The three previous factories had been organized in 1956 as cooperatives; prior to that they were private workshops. The factory is a canguandian as well as shengchandian.

The factory has 300 employees, most of which are Uighur. The plant is roughly divided half and half men and women. Men work in the knife, jewelry, and musical instrument workshops, while women work in the embroidery, doppa, and rug workshops.

Within the jewelry workshop, traditional methods of filing, hammering and heating the brass, gold and silver are used. Uighur bracelets, earrings and
rings with red glass or rhinestones as well as traditional Kirgiz silver coin earrings are made here.

In the musical instrument workshop, traditional instruments are handcrafted from mulberry and apricot wood from the local area. Rawap, dutar, dap, and sonai are all made here. High quality items such as an inlaid rawap can take more than a month to make.

The knife workshop is quite small. One ustaz teaches several students. Much of the Kashgar area knives come from Yengisar located outside of town. The knife workshop also makes the knives used in the carpet workshop.

The carpet workshop produces local, Persian and Chinese style carpets. Thread and dyes are processed locally; wool comes from the Kashgar District. In 1985 small carpets for tourist souvenirs were started. Many tourists come to see this workshop as they think the product looks machine woven. The rugs are hand woven on metal looms.

Hand embroidered shirts, koynek, are made here. Flowers are embroidered on the front of these white cotton shirts. They represent the traditional garments of Uighur males and are gifts for locals, used by dance troupes, or as souvenirs for tourists.

The best doppa are hand embroidered by Uighur women; these include the qimen doppa or the sequined zer doppa. In a separate workshop, qimen doppa are made on sewing machines. Hand produced doppa cost two to three times the machine produced doppa. After sewn and formed the doppa are washed and set outside to dry in the sun (Interview Abubekir Omer, May 4, 1986).

Market demand for the factory’s products has increased; over one dozen stores and hotels in Kashgar, Turpan, and Urumqi sell products from this factory. Workers in the factory are now spending full time in production rather than engaged in crafts as supplementary to agricultural work. ("Kashi Gongyi Meishu Chang", Xinjiang Ribao, September 23, 1981, p. 2)

The Ethnic Furniture Factory, Minzu Jiaju Chang (C.) Milli Øy Jahazliri Zawodi (U.) was established in 1979. The primary specialty of the factory is ethnic minority style furniture.

Of the 70 workers employed here, 97% are ethnic minorities, including Uighur and Hui. Most of the workers are men. (Women work in the upholstery department.) Apprentices usually study with an ustaz for three years before they are proficient in the techniques for furniture making. For the technical (as
opposed to design) aspect of furniture making, every year five to six workers are sent to Urumqi, Kulja, Shanghai, Tianjin, or Guangzhou to study.

In 1980 the factory had a value of production of 100,000 yuan; by 1985 this had increased to 600,000 yuan. Profits averaged 100,000 yuan per year in the mid-1980s.

Materials utilized are generally available from the Kashgar District, including poplar and walnut. The factory has its own mechanized band saws to cut lumber. Hand tools are used for most of the production.

Fifty different types of ethnic style furniture were produced. Their cabinet/wardrobes have won numerous awards including an Award for National Excellence. Tables, chairs, desks, beds, sofas are all produced here. The hallmark of these products is technical excellence (at the level of Shanghai) but with ethnic styling in the carving and design. (Interview, Mahmet, Factory Manager, May 5, 1986).

Karashahr: Local Resources and Domestic Markets. Korla is the capital of the Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous District. The Secondary Light Industry Bureau controls factories in the district producing carpets, furniture, clothing, leather shoes and boots, and employing 2500 people. The district has increased its profit from 320,000 yuan in 1980 to 675,000 yuan in 1985. Leather materials have always sold well in the local area; the quality of the leather coming from the district is quite good. Expanding into the export market has enlarged the scope of production. The Secondary Light Industry Bureau preserves the handicraft tradition (Interview, Ma Junde, Korla Secondary Light Industry Bureau, May 13, 1986).

The Leather Factory, Pige Chang (C.), Tere Zawodi (U.), located at Karashahr (Yanqi), was started in 1945 as a private factory. In 1958 cooperativization took place with 74 workers. Total value of production in 1985 was 1.5 million yuan, of that 50,000 yuan was profit. 70,000 pairs of leather shoes were made.

In 1985 the factory employed 300 workers, 39% Hui, 37% Han, and Uighur 23%. 70% of the workforce are men; most are young. Workers study and practice for two years; their final exam is to make a boot.

Utilization of local resources, cow leather and sheep leather, is the hallmark of the factory. Leather shoes and jackets are produced with a keen eye
to design. Every year styles are changed twice; previously, changes were made once per year. Older ustaz cooperate with young workers in design. A growing market exists among the young.

Nearly one-third of the production goes outside of Xinjiang, to Shanghai, Henan, Beijing, and Shenyang. Southern Xinjiang remains the focus of the factory’s local market. With the expansion in the market, continued growth in production, ample raw materials, and strong support from the government, this factory will maintain its position in Xinjiang (Interview, Fu Changma, May 14, 1986).

**Turpan: Reduction of Craft Significance.** Turpan represents an area where the handicrafts industry has been surpassed in its development by the tourism and agricultural sectors of the economy. In the past more than forty different kinds of doppa were made in Turpan, but now only about four kinds are made there. As Rehim of the Foreign Affairs Office explained it, the people of Turpan could make a good living from the specialized oasis agriculture (grapes or melons), so there was no need to engage in such a time consuming occupation as handicrafts. In Kashgar in contrast handicrafts are used to supplement the income of farmers producing grain (Interview, June 3, 1986). Turpan also has less access to many of the raw materials used in the handicrafts industries. The animal husbandry industry is not developed so leather or wool needs to be brought in for crafts; similarly metal or wood raw materials are not available in Turpan. Secondary light industry in Turpan has not developed as fast compared with other areas as the handicrafts industry base is limited in Turpan. (Interview, Liu Yushan, June 4, 1986).

Turpan has several small factories under the Secondary Light Industry Bureau (Table 25). Many daily-use articles are made, including pots and pans, bedsteads, trunks, felt boots, gloves, and shoes. Some of the factories are more mechanized, such as the clothing, plastics, printing, and cultural products factories.

The Turpan Ethnic Products Factory, Minzu Yongpin Chang (C.), Milli Lazimatlik Zawodi (U.) was started in 1983. Products include carpets, doppa, trunks, and jewelry. Of the 25 workers, 95% are Uighur; most are women. Workers study with an ustaz to learn their craft.

One ustaz, age 43, specializes in sanduk, the Uighur style trunk (hua
xiangzi, [C.]). In 1985 384 sanduk were made. The sanduk are made out of various woods from Bugur (Luntai) in Nanjiang. The exterior of the wood is covered with metal (tin); designs are drawn on the metal and then hammered on the outside. Three designs are utilized, Pichan, Toksun, and Turpan, named after the various counties of the Turpan district. The sanduk come in several sizes 80, 85, 90, and 100 centimeters. The sanduk have a cultural significance as well. All Uighur families should have a sanduk to store clothes and other items. Thus, the young couple may receive a sanduk upon marriage. A good sanduk costs 66 yuan.

A second ustaz, age 35, is in charge of gilim (carpets) and doppa. At first the factory attempted to make gilim for the export market. As that failed in 1984, the local market was concentrated upon. The local wool used cost two to four yuan per kilogram. Carpets from Hotan are cheaper as the wool is cheaper but not as good there. Generally the local market favors the traditional pomegranate and vase design in red and blue. The factory has ten metal looms, bought from the Yenji Carpet Factory.

Doppa are embroidered by hand. Four varieties are made at the factory. Qimen doppa, green and white, can be made on the sewing machine in one day; they cost over six yuan. Badam doppa, white almond on a black background are worn mostly by men. The bai doppa, a white flower design on green velvet, worn by women costs four yuan. The Turpan gulluk doppa, worn by women, is a flowered design embroidered to resemble a woven carpet. For everyday usage some men in rural areas wear the qimen doppa, but for the most part new doppa are worn for celebrations such as Roset Heyt or Gurban Heyt. The people of Turpan can purchase doppa from other places in the bazaar, so the factory does not produce much (Interview, Abdurehim, June 5, 1986).

The Jewelry Workshop, Shoushi Chejian (C.), Zinnet Buyumliiri Chejeni (U.), is located in a packed earth building in the bazaar; building space in Turpan is inadequate. Most of the workshop’s activities is repair and reworking of the customer’s jewelry. Three people staff the workshop, the ustaz, Abdurahman Tohti, and two women. The ustaz studied with his father since he was 13 and the women were seconded from the metals factory.

Earrings, bracelets and necklaces are worked on here. Earrings, halka, are of three different types. The antiques are called sirkilik; these are often brought in for soldering. The johey halka are favored in the rural areas. City folks like the kat johey halka. Both the johey varieties have red stones or glass in them. Most of the
repairs can be done here. The old style forge which burns oil rather than an electric furnace is used. None of the antique style can be repaired in Urumqi, so all of that is done in Turpan.

Repair of the kat johey halka costs 15 yuan, the johey halka 10 yuan, and the sirkilik 25 yuan. The monthly income from repairs amounts to 800-900 yuan. Wages for the ustaz is 200 yuan per month; the workers get 150 yuan per month (Interview, Abdurahman Tohti, June 7, 1986).

The Secondary Light Industry Bureau started an Ethnic Arts and Crafts Service Center, Minzu Yong Gongyi Meishu Fuwubu (C.), in 1981. This center is geared mainly to tourist, 80% of its sales are to foreigners. In 1985, out of an income of 580,000 yuan, a profit of 37,000 yuan was made. Many of the items for sale are from other areas of Xinjiang (Urumqi, Kashgar, and Kucha). Other items, like gilded cloth, are imported from Japan or Pakistan. Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Shandong are other sources for the stock. Craft items available from Turpan include doppa, scarves, and boots.

Craft industry in Turpan is directed to the local market. Only a few items such as the sanduk have a market outside Turpan. Turpan, rather, is net importer of craft items.

Kulja: Border Influences. The Kulja Secondary Light Industry Bureau operates 28 different enterprises employing over 9000 workers. Craft factories visited include the hat, rug, shoe and metals factories.

The Kulja United Shoe Factory, Ining Shi Tuanjie Xuexie Chang (C.), Kulja Ayak Keyim Zawodi (U.) was established in 1951 with 95 workers. In 1986 this factory with 330 workers specializes in ethnic minority style shoes. The factory is situated in the southwestern section of Kulja. Several large buildings built in the mid-1980s house the factory. Abdulla Ilahum, the factory manager, indicated that the factory enjoyed an excellent position in the economy of the Ili area.

Of the 330 employees of the factory, 95% are ethnic minority, including Uighur, Hui, Uzbek, Manchu and Xibe. 35% of the personnel are female. The factory also has some 150 retirees who receive small pensions. In the late 1970s the average age of the workers was 52, but, with new hires and retirements, the average age was 25 in 1986.

The factory has a fairly extensive training program. In the past an apprentice might study three years. In 1981 a training class was started in which
workers studied theory as well as working skills. In 1984 a class of 118 completed a two year course of study. Previously a worker learned how to craft the entire shoe. As of 1984 the workers concentrate on either the preparation of the sole or of the upper. The separate steps in production (six steps in the case of the upper) were identified and taught to each worker. In 1986 a class of forty were studying with three ustaz. Every workshop had one to three ustaz who were in charge of quality control.

Management was also emphasized at the factory. Nine people studied management and other technical matters in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Suzhou, and Qingdao. Management personnel were all to have graduated from high school. In 1986 the factory had personnel studying at the Beijing Central Nationalities Institute, the Xinjiang Financial Institute, and the Wuhan Accounting Institute. Many workers were sent back to school in Kulja as well.

Raw materials include cow and sheep leather. The quality of the cow leather in the Ili area is quite good due the fertile grasslands in the area. The product makes use of the Ili area’s special emphasis on animal husbandry. Some processing of the leather is done before manufacture. In general the material costs represent a good portion of the total shoe price. For the most part the shoe are handmade. An exception is the sole forming. A recently purchased machine accomplishes the job in one minute compared to the traditional methods which took two and a half hours. During 1986 more effort was made on mechanizing the production process.

Given the improvement in the market, the factory saw a good increase in the value of its production through the 1980s (Table 26). A better economic environment for the factory existed as more farmers and workers could afford a nice pair of shoes. 1986 was planned as a banner year since the improved workforce had completed training on the new equipment. In 1986 a profit of 53,000 yuan was made in the months of January through April.

The design workshop consisted of one ustaz and six students. Attention is paid to the local market. For example, high-heeled boots (2-3 inches) are favored by local women. In 1985, of the twenty new varieties introduced, five sold well. In 1986 three of the seven new styles sold well. One new style involves a boot with leather around the foot and palas (a thick woven rug material) around the leg, much more expensive than the usual leather boot. The factory also produces boots for the Kazak herders in the valleys of the Ili Prefecture.
In general the market has improved with more people having greater amounts of disposable income to purchase dress shoes. Also the Uighurs and Kazaks favor leather shoes more than the Han. The whole of Xinjiang provides a market with an emphasis on distribution in Kulja, Chuguchak, and Altai. In 1985 contracts were also signed with retailers in Hangzhou. In 1986 the Foreign Trade Bureau made arrangements for twenty different kinds of footwear to be sent to Alma Ata. The Ili District, bordering the Soviet Union, has made great efforts in re-establishing Sino-Soviet trade. (Interview, Abdulla Ilahum, May 30, 1986).

The Kulja Carpet Factory, Ditan Chang (C.) Gilim Zawodi (U.), founded in 1957, is a small factory employing 160 workers. The factory originally produced rope, then towels. By 1984, items produced include scarves, felts, and carpets. Of the 160 workers approximately one-half are ethnic minority, including Kirgiz, Hui, Xibe, Uzbek, Russian, and Uighur. Two small buildings are used; one includes the offices and the scarf and felt workshops and the other for the carpet workshop.

Most of the materials are acquired locally; Ili wool is used in the carpet weaving. In 1983 new metal frames for the looms were acquired to replace the traditional wood frames.

In 1985 total value of production was 150,000 yuan. Of that, 53,000 yuan was derived from the carpet workshop. In 1985 300 square meters of 360 thread carpet were produced. In the carpet workshop the 35 workers are mostly young minority women. Workers study for two or three years to learn the patterns for the Islamic style carpets. Most of the product feeds into the local market.

The Kulja Hat Factory, Ining Shi Guangming Maozi Chang (C.), Kulja Kulakche Zawodi (U.) started production in 1956 with 64 workers. The focus is chiefly on 33 different types of traditional ethnic leather and felt hats. The employees at the factory number 242, including 43 retirees. 85% of the workers are ethnic minority, that is, Uighur, Hui or Uzbek; a little over one-third are women. The regional government distributes the product over the whole of Xinjiang.

Yearly increase in value of production ran about 12% in the mid-1980s. Varieties of hats include the kulpak, the traditional white felt hat with black trim of the Kazaks, the tumakh, a fox-fur lined red felt hat of the Kazaks, the tupak, a Turkish style hat of Persian lamb, the Kope Kulakche in a style favored in Kucha, a blue uniform Russian hat, synthetic fur children’s hats, the red Ili gullik doppisi
(flowered) and the *sidam doppa* (with no flowers). Kulakche are made by three people. One prepares the lining, another the fur, and the third the leather. New in 1986 was a round Turkish-style hat. Production of leather jackets started in 1986 as well.

Completing the craft factories in Kulja is the Metals Factory, *Wujin Chang* (C.), *Bex Hil Metal Zawodi* (U.), established in 1956 as a cooperative. Located in downtown Kulja behind the Secondary Light Industry Bureau offices, the Metals Factory produces five categories of items; knives, samovars, bedsteads, wire, and tin plate products.

Workers number 165, including 28 retirees. 95% of the employees are ethnic minority including Uighur, Hui, Kazak, and Uzbek. Workers study the skills for the crafts to make knives for about three years.

Total assets for the factory amounts to 800,000 yuan. In 1985 the value of production was approximately 1,000,000 yuan with a profit of 70,000 to 80,000 yuan.

The knife workshop employs over 20 workers. 18 kinds of knives are produced; all by hand. Previously, machine made knives were introduced but the public rejected that style so the factory went back to the hand-crafted items. The *ustaz* of this workshop had been making knives in Kulja for 30 years. The Kulja style knife is characterized by a cow-bone handle. Some of the product is exported to the Soviet Union.

The samovar workshop has over 30 workers. The production of the samovars in this factory reflects the Russian influence over the Ili area. Kulja makes the best samovars in China. The samovar attains a prominent place in the home of the Uighur as an instrument used to honor guests. The high quality samovars utilize copper (perhaps from Guangxi) in their production. Besides samovars, hot pots are also produced. The samovars are fired and hammered to attain their final shape. (Interview, Factory Personnel, May 30, 1986).

The craft factories of Kulja represent crafts distinctive to Kulja (knives, samovars, Ili doppa, and Kazak boots) as well as crafts common to all of Xinjiang (carpets and hats). Besides the crafts produced by the factories under the charge of the Secondary Light Industry Bureau, there are many private craftsmen at work in the bazaar of Kulja, knife makers, saddle makers, and trunk makers.
Conclusions

Impact on the Cultural and Economic Landscape

The crafts industry within Xinjiang has undergone a rebirth during the post-Mao era. Governmental policy, while focusing on the economic aspect in handicraft production, has also addressed the cultural needs of the local people of Xinjiang. The government’s commitment to further production of *minzu texu chanpin* derives from both policies of development and ethnicity.

In regards to the points made in the literature on crafts in the Third World, several observations are pertinent. Adaptability and flexibility in the crafts industry have been significant in successful ventures. Attention to the needs of the local market was stressed at factory visited. Acquisition of raw materials meant an importance placed on backward linkages. Contracts with non-local outlets of the market represented extensions of the reach of the production sites. All of these activities are possible during this era of post-Mao reforms.

With regard to the impact of tourism on the handicrafts industry, there exists an overall recognition of the coming importance of tourism to the Secondary Light Industry Bureau. Greater economic activity derives from the production of special tourist goods. Care must be taken that there doesn’t exist a competition between tourists and locals for craft articles; the locals’ buying power has not risen to the level of international tourists.

Concerning the efficacy of cooperativization in promoting the craft industry, the overall time frame is important. During the 1950s and 1960s, the high rate of change under socialist transformation campaigns made for difficult transition. From the perspective of the 1980’s, cooperativization can been seen as a step in improving access to materials and markets. Imposition of the cooperativization from above, however, is an ineffective method. This developmental impulse must come from within.

Development from below perspectives are also informed by Xinjiang’s experience. Using local materials and local knowledge in production through labor intensive and small scale activities, the crafts make use of local capabilities.

In terms of ethnicity, a dilution of ethnicity is not found in the midst of production change. Changes were observed in the design, materials and methods. Market research suggested changes in the styles. Improvements in the
technology process were to increase output thus matching the local demand. The changes in the styles of touristic crafts do not diminish the traditional aspects of the crafts locally. Tourists "in the know" seek out crafts of authentic design. This reaffirms and strengthens the local recognition of ethnic identity in the crafts.

A refurbishing of the crafts industry in Xinjiang has taken place. The rise in the livelihood of the people has meant a larger role for crafts in the local market. Economic benefits of improvements in the crafts industry should continue but with consideration for the ethnic role of crafts.
Table 12

Capital Invested in Handicrafts Sector Kucha, 1952

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Handicraft</th>
<th>Number of Workshops</th>
<th>Capital Yuan</th>
<th>Average per Workshop Yuan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Copperware</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7,160,000</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloth Dyeing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>63,900,000</td>
<td>2,560,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap Making</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43,210,000</td>
<td>2,270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather Hat</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>479,300,000</td>
<td>4,140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hides</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>121,590,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ironware</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>189,200,000</td>
<td>2,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>904,360,000</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 13

Xinjiang – Socialist Transformation of Handicrafts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cooperative Unit</th>
<th>People</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>29,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>41,991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dong, 1984.

Table 14

Xinjiang – Secondary Light Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value of Production (Million Yuan)</th>
<th>No. of Enterprises</th>
<th>No. of Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>167.059</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>227.000</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>234.400</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>279.350</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>58,131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>448.000</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dong, 1984.
Table 15

Xinjiang
Secondary Light Industry, 1980
Regional Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District (Autonomous Zhou)</th>
<th>Value of Production (million Yuan)</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urumqi</td>
<td>111.17</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shihezi</td>
<td>6.25</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turpan</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hami</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changji Hui Central</td>
<td>17.63</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ili</td>
<td>31.25</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacheng</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altai</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bortala Mongol</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karamai</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>47.03</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotan</td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kizilsu Kirgiz</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashgar</td>
<td>15.56</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksu</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayingolin Mongol South</td>
<td>6.39</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>227.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Dong, 1984.

Table 16

Xinjiang
Secondary Light Industry, 1986
Regional Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>No. of Enterprises</th>
<th>No. of Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urumqi</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulja</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turpan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashgar</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayingolin</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Toops, Field Notes, 1986.
Table 17

Secondary Light Industry Enterprises in Urumqi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>No. of Workers (1986)</th>
<th>Value of Production (Million Yuan) (1985)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Musical Instrument Factory</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embroidery Factory</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Carpet Factory</td>
<td>459</td>
<td>2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather Factory</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hat Factory</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>112.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Toops, Field Notes, 1986.

Table 18

Urumqi Ethnic Musical Instrument Factory
Financial Situation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value of Production (yuan)</th>
<th>Profit (yuan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>planned</td>
<td>actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>252,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>192,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>226,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>312,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>384,000</td>
<td>416,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview, Torsun Basari, June 16, 1986.
Table 19

Urumqi Musical Instrument Factory
Items of Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Musical Instruments (piece)</th>
<th>Cultural Articles (piece)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>4700</td>
<td>4250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>9300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>4500</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5673</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview, Torsun Basari, June 16, 1986.
<sup>a</sup> Includes blackboards, desks, billiard tables.
<sup>b</sup> 1500 guitars also produced.

Table 20

Urumqi Embroidery Factory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value of Production (Yuan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>301,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview, Erkinai, June 17, 1986.
Table 21
Urumqi Leather Factory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value of Production (Yuan)</th>
<th>Shoes and Boots (Pairs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,990,000</td>
<td>168,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2,170,000</td>
<td>166,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,910,000</td>
<td>185,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,820,000</td>
<td>117,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,014,600</td>
<td>126,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986*</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987*</td>
<td>2,800,000</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview, Yasin, Factory Manager, June 18, 1986.
* Planned.

Table 22
Urumqi Hat Factory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Yield</th>
<th>Value of Production (yuan)</th>
<th>Profit (yuan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>1,010,000</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>71,000</td>
<td>790,000</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>860,000</td>
<td>36,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>1,180,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview, Kerimjan, Factory Manager, June 20, 1986.
### Table 23

**Secondary Light Industry Enterprises in Xinjiang**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enterprise</th>
<th>No. of Workers (1986)</th>
<th>Value of Production (Million Yuan) (1985)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kucha Knife Factory</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kucha Doppa Factory</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashgar Arts and Crafts</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashgar Ethnic</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture Factory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yanji Leather Factory</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulja Shoe Factory</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulja Metals Factory</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Toops, Field Notes, 1986.

### Table 24

**Kucha Knife Factory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value of Production (yuan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview, Adilzhan, April 30, 1986.
### Table 25

**Turpan Secondary Light Industry, 1985**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factory</th>
<th>Workers (Number)</th>
<th>Value of Production (yuan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metals</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>410,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Clothing</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>620,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Shoe</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>230,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Products</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Products</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>220,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felt</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plastics</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Arts and Crafts*</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureau Staff</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>450</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,200,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Total Income

---

### Table 26

**Kulja United Shoe Factory**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value of Production (Yuan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,440,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1,540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1,650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986*</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Planned.
Chapter 6

Synthesis and Summary

In this concluding chapter, the steps of the research are retraced from the empirical realities of tourism and handicraft in Xinjiang to the policies for development of the minority ethnic areas in China and then to relationship of development and ethnicity. The third goal of the research is interpreted through the articulation of the tourism and handicrafts industries in Xinjiang as a part of the central policies for development and nationality work. The second goal of the research is examined through a summary of China’s central programs for development in minority nationality areas and the regional implementation of these central policies in the restructuring of Xinjiang. Finally, the first goal of the research is addressed as ethnicity is discussed as a resource for development in which economic goals are reconciled with the maintenance of cultural identity.

Tourism and Handicrafts
Articulation of Industries of Change

The third goal of this research is to understand how tourism and handicrafts can contribute to development in the Third World. The concern here is particularly with minority areas in the periphery. Chapters Four and Five considered the empirical data from the fieldwork conducted in Xinjiang, while Chapter Two discussed the theoretical and comparative perspectives on tourism and handicrafts.

In China, the development of the tourism industry could play an important role in the economy of the minority nationality areas. One benefit would be in the development of related processing industries and commodity economy, through the tourists’ requirements for goods. Tourism would also be
beneficial in that connections between the minority areas and the outside world would be established, thus allowing an improvement in the built environment. From a regional standpoint, the benefits of tourism in the minority nationality areas would mean economic development in the western parts of China, narrowing the gap between east and west in China (Wang Changwen, 1985).

Tourism has developed into a new market for the handicrafts industry. Traditionally Xinjiang has had a viable handicrafts industry; such items as carpets, atlas fabric, musical instruments, knives, and doppa have all become tourist souvenirs. These materials are also all ethnic markers of the Uighur people. A duality in crafts production and in the crafts market has been created through tourism requirements.

Recommendations for crafts by de Kadt (1979) and Wagner (1982) have generally already been implemented in Xinjiang. The quality of craft production is of a good standard. State policy has been to organize cooperatives and provide access to both materials and markets. New artists in craft production are being trained. Beyond the role of the state in preservation of crafts traditions, there is a genuine interest on the part of local people to make an active use of their cultural heritage in the form of crafts.

In Xinjiang's tourism and handicraft industries, the creation of touristic crafts along with ethnic craft production is similar to the duality mentioned by Graburn (1976). The changes in the styles of touristic crafts do not necessarily diminish the traditional aspects of the crafts locally. As tourists become interested in and pursue crafts, the local recognition of ethnic identity is reaffirmed in the crafts. The touristic market has engendered the production of miniaturized knives and musical instruments. Other touristic products include pastel colored carpets, rather than the traditional pomegranate and vase design in red and blue. As long as the local people still have access to the traditional knives, musical instruments, and carpets, the local culture has not been polluted by tourism.

With regard to the impact of tourism on the handicrafts industry in Xinjiang, the Secondary Light Industry Bureau is aware of the growing importance of tourism. Greater economic activity derives from the production of special tourist goods. A competition should not develop between tourists and locals for craft articles. Similarly there needs to be a continued awareness of the possible competition of touristic and ethnic crafts for the available local materials
and skilled personnel.

The tourist, as a guest, represents the world (Humanity) to the local. If the tourist is properly aware of local customs, culture and history, the contact between the locals (hosts) and tourists (guests) is not detrimental to local identities. When tourism comes to areas of a minority periphery such as Xinjiang, the tourist-local interaction is more complex. As Xinjiang is one of China's minority nationality areas, the locals are Uighur (or any of the other minority nationalities) and the tourists may be American or Japanese. Some of the guides are most likely Han, who may or may not have a facility with the local minority culture. In this dynamic, the foreign tourists' concern and interest in the local Uighur culture validates and reaffirms that local culture.

Following de Kadt's recommendations for tourism (1979), Xinjiang's tourist plans need to be well-coordinated, by the Xinjiang Tourism Bureau, Cultural Relics Bureau, and Secondary Light Industry Bureau. Xinjiang is undergoing a current assessment of its tourism resources (as He Lin, 1988), a necessary step in rational tourism development. Access to tourist sites is available to both foreign and domestic tourists (as at Tian Chi). Following Stohr (1980), continued controls on the number of tourists allowed in to Xinjiang and on the degree of spatial closure would help to limit the extent of damage caused by tourism. Beyond the usual goal of increased foreign exchange, the major focus of tourism needs to be the preservation of the historical, cultural, and natural landscapes. Gradual and small scale tourist projects will have less of an impact on the landscape. As an example of the efficacy of small rather than large, with the recent construction of hotels in Urumqi the "tourism carrying capacity" may have been overshot. The integrative nature of tourism planning, as suggested by de Kadt (1979, p. 341-344), would involve planning for infrastructure, construction, housing, health, and education, thus providing for the tourism workers and the workers in related services. There needs to be as well a voice for the local populace in tourism planning. The hosts should know who and how many are coming to visit. This would necessitate effective local education in the problems and benefits of tourism. With rational and cautious planning, locals and tourists can both be accommodated.

The new touristic market for the handicrafts industry has had differential economic impacts. Kucha is an example where foreign competition for Persian lamb has meant an increase in the market price for the product. Production of
touristic goods has been a major reason for the success of the knife factory at Kucha. Contracts are held with tourist venues and hotels in major cities in Xinjiang and as far away as Beijing. Kucha, although a closed city, has already seen an economic benefit through the broadening of the touristic market.

Kashgar and Urumqi, as open cities, have been able to link up handicraft production and tourism development, thus improving the economic situation of the area (differential impact on Kashgar is much greater). The Gongyi Meishupin Gongsi (Arts and Crafts Company) of Kashgar and the Minzu Yueqi Chang (Ethnic Musical Instrument Factory) of Urumqi have both been very successful in connecting up with the tourist market.

Kashgar has shown impressive growth in tourist visits. In recent years, Kashgar has surpassed Turpan in the number of tourists. The border location of Kashgar and the opened Khunjerab Pass means that Kashgar is an entry point into all of China. That situation and the local tourist resources promises steady growth for Kashgar. In terms of handicrafts, there seems to be continued importance attached to the traditional craft activities in Xinjiang. The recent economic reform policies have meant the surge of craft production in the private and public sector. The activities in the crafts have also been translated to light industrial activities as well.

Urumqi, as the center of administration, population, transport and industry, has commanded large numbers of tourists. Urumqi has the infrastructure for processing tourists but the resources for tourism within the city are limited. The potentials for growth in tourism in Urumqi have perhaps already been reached. With regard to the crafts sector, the demands of Urumqi’s population for crafts are met by local production. Urumqi has other options though. What is beginning is the reduction of traditional craft activities in Urumqi. As Urumqi is at the transport node of Xinjiang, any craft articles needed by Urumqi can be produced elsewhere and then shipped to the capital. Touristic goods will perhaps continue to expand in Urumqi, witness the growth of the Foreign Export Bureau’s Carpet Factory (Interview, August 20, 1985).

In terms of its size, Turpan has seen the brunt of the tourist market. The major facet of the Turpan economy is still oasis agriculture, but tourism has become an increasing component. Turpan has not developed a handicrafts industry to serve the tourist market. Instead Turpan has developed the retail tourism industry. Turpan has also been the site, like Kashgar, for informal
tourist services to form. Such informal guides arise from the contacts in the bazaars and through donkey cart drivers. This sort of informal contact is rare in Urumqi.

Kulja has maintained a thriving handicrafts industry that is not dependent on the touristic market. Kulja with its border location has had limited tourist development. With the planned opening of the Sino-Soviet border at Korgos, though, there could well be a rise in tourist arrivals to mirror Kashgar's development after the opening of the Khunjerab Pass. The touristic offerings in Kulja rival Kashgar in terms of local culture, history, and natural landscapes. As the Soviet Union attracts more upscale tourists than Pakistan, Kulja could see an impressive turnabout.

The crafts industry in Xinjiang has been refurbished. As the economy has risen and the people have prospered, more discretionary income is available for crafts. As the economic situation for crafts has improved, care must be taken to maintain the ethnic role of handicrafts. The growth in touristic crafts should not overshadow ethnic craft growth. Craft articles for daily use should be produced in a manner that allows greater access while standards of quality are preserved.

As the tourism industry grows, Xinjiang needs to emphasize the preservation of the historical, cultural, and natural landscapes. Tourism has been considered a valuable resource in Xinjiang (Lu Yun, 1985). Rational development of such tourism resources can only be accomplished by coordinated action by the Xinjiang Tourism Bureau, the Cultural Relics Bureau, and Secondary Light Industry Bureau and with the involvement of the local people.

Urumqi emerges as the center of Xinjiang in terms of the PRC's policies of economic development and political integration. Growing centers for the tourist industry are found in Kashgar and Turpan. The centers for craft activities are in Kashgar, Kulja and possibly Kucha. Thus the present and future economic landscape of crafts and tourism in Xinjiang mirrors the past cultural landscape of Serindia.

The Post-Mao Program for Development in Minority Nationality Areas

The second goal of this research is to examine China's central policies for
the development of minority nationality areas. China's plans for minority nationality areas have been examined in Chapter Two, while the resultant impact of such policies upon Xinjiang are portrayed in Chapter Three.

China's minority nationality areas have several vital characteristics that need to be considered in the development programs of these areas. Chinese sources have identified ethnicity, locality, economic backwardness, complexity, and international relations as factors to be recognized in the development of these areas (Shi Zhengyi, 1983).

The ethnicity factor functions in the development program for minority nationality areas by the encouragement of the production of minzu texu chanpin to satisfy both the ethnic and economic needs of the minority groups. The refurbishing of Xinjiang's handicraft industry is a good example of the workings of this policy. Local needs and abilities are to be a part of the development plan; this locality factor can be perceived as a spatial expression of the pragmatism in the reform era program. In Xinjiang this translates to allowing Turpan to tread a path of development different from Kashgar. Similarly the policy of opening some areas but not others to foreign tourists recognizes the variance of needs and abilities within the Region. The complexity that exists in the culture and production systems of the area operates as another factor in development programs. This complexity appears in the diversity of economic structure of Xinjiang — oil production at Karamai, tourism in Turpan, heavy industry in Urumqi, textiles at Shihezi, food processing in Korla, oasis agriculture in Aksu, light industry in Kashgar, sheep herding in Altai, and leather processing at Kulja.

The cultural mosaic of ethnic groups in Xinjiang has necessitated the use of minority languages in media and in educational institutions, thus enhancing sociocultural development. Infrastructure improvement and personnel training and education have been key parts of the development program to remedy the perceived economic backwardness in minority areas. The railway linking Xinjiang with the rest of China and the comprehensive university courses are examples of these efforts. The border location of the minority nationality areas gives international significance to development in these areas. Xinjiang's ethnic groups have cultural compatriots in the USSR; development programs proceed in view of this international aspect. The interplay of these five factors in China's development policy for minority nationality areas (ethnicity, locality, complexity, economic backwardness, and international relations) are all part of the practical
issues for development in Xinjiang.

The gap in development between east and west in China has widened over the last decade, in terms of gross value of industrial and agricultural output, sales of commodities and per capita income. The minority nationality areas have not stagnated economically as the annual average growth rate of industrial and agricultural output value rose from 6.6% in 1981 to 9.7% in 1988, while growth in retail sales increased from 9.1% to 14.7% over the same period (Beijing Review, March 27, 1989).

In 1986 the State Commission for Nationality Affairs (SCNA) considered several propositions concerning the economic development of the minority nationality areas. First, the minority nationality areas should accelerate lateral ties with the eastern region; these regional connections are to be followed by state investment in the western region. Second, the minority nationality areas need to be well prepared for the competition that is present in a commodity economy; more support would need to be given to the minority nationality regions to enhance their competitiveness. Third, invigoration of the domestic economy of the minority nationality areas means a concurrent opening up to the outside world; border trade as well as technological contact and cooperation should be expanded with neighboring countries (Renmin Ribao, September 12, 1986, p. 5).

The State Commission for Nationality Affairs (SCNA) proposed policies in February 1989 to enhance development in the minority nationality areas, echoing some of the concerns from 1986. First, minority areas in the west should increase border trade with neighboring countries thus taking advantage of their proximity to an international market. Second, exploitation of natural resources should be strengthened; the Ministry of Geology and Mineral Resources and the SCNA have issued a joint circular calling for the rapid exploration of mineral resources in the minority nationality areas. Third, local specificities and concerns will be taken into account in the formation of large-scale plans for economic reform and development. The SCNA will give full consideration to the special feature of each ethnic group and locality with regard to their industry and economic capacity (Beijing Review, March 27, 1989). These policies consider the geographical factors of international proximity, natural resources and local ethnicity in the formation of plans for development and economic reform.

China’s programs for development in the minority nationality areas have
been linked to the integration of these areas into the national economy. Linkage to the national economy is accomplished through different means. One method is through the improvement of infrastructural connections. In Xinjiang’s case this has meant the construction of the Xinjiang Lanzhou Railway to provide a route for the transshipment of goods to and from the Region. Another method is through the provision of central subsidies to the minority nationality areas. Annual central subsidies for Xinjiang have amounted to over one billion yuan in recent years. Another facet to the reform era’s development program has been investment in the minority nationality areas. This translates into linkage of commercial ventures in Xinjiang with those in more productive areas such as Shanghai. All of these activities, commercial ventures from the coast, infrastructural linkages, or subsidies from the central government form a mixed approach to the development and integration of the minority nationality areas.

To summarize, the post-Mao program for development in the minority nationality areas is still maturing. Many different sectors of the economy have been examined. The presence of natural resources, large territory, and peripheral location of the minority nationality areas have been the major factors in some of policies for development, especially animal husbandry, forestry, mining and transport development. The center still provides financial subsidies to minority nationality areas. Goulet (1971) postulated three values of development, life sustenance, self esteem and freedom. In terms of the life sustenance values of development, the national minorities have their basic needs met through the recent economic reforms. Despite rapid economic growth, though, some 20 percent of the minority population do not have sufficient food and clothing (China Daily, April 26, 1986, p. 1). With regard to the second value of development, self esteem, China’s sociocultural policies for minority nationalities in the post-Mao era have been directed towards respect for the minority nationalities’ religious and ethnic customs. Such respect will enhance the level of self esteem held by the minority nationalities. The third value of development, freedom, is perhaps the most elusive. China’s primary program of response to the minority nationalities has been the minority autonomy policy. This autonomy, though, mandates that the minority nationalities remain in the politico-spatial framework of the People’s Republic of China. “All national autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People’s Republic of China.” (Constitution, 1978, Article 4). The uprisings in Tibet (see reports in
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China, December 1988, March 1989) and the PRC's response indicate that the state and the party will brook no dissent on these lines. Similarly, recent activities in Xinjiang show that Beijing is willing to use force in order to insure its continued rule over the minority nationality areas (New York Times, April 23, 1990, p. A3; Christian Science Monitor, April 18, 1990, p. 4).

How does China's program for development in the minority nationality areas compare with the theoretical aspects of development 'from below' perspectives? As Wu and Ip (1980) suggest, China's development record overall has included aspects of both from the top-down and bottom-up development activity. China has begun to utilize the natural resources of the minority nationality areas, located in its periphery. The benefits of these resources do not necessarily remain within the periphery (as they would in the theoretical perspectives of Stohr, 1980). A recent article in Minzu Yanjiu has suggested that the best way to continue development in the minority nationality areas would be to emphasize middle levels of technology and small scale development (Wang Wenchang, 1987). Simpler technology, organization and management would represent a step between traditional craft activity and large industrial complexes. Wang's ideas certainly fit the notions of development 'from below'. The best case scenario for minority nationalities in the People's Republic of China would rely on some aspects of development 'from below'.

Xinjiang
Regional Restructuring in a Minority Periphery

As discussed in Chapter Three, central policies have required the establishment of new territorial divisions, the migration of Han into the Northwest and Xinjiang, the utilization of Xinjiang's natural resources (especially oil), and the construction of new roads and railroads. The net result of these central policies and their regional implementation has been a restructuring of the Xinjiang territorial, demographic, and economic landscape (such restructuring in the Pearl River Delta has also been noted by Lo, 1989). Central policies and regional implementation interact with local characteristics in forming the landscape of development in Xinjiang.
After the PRC’s founding and the reincorporation of Xinjiang into the Chinese state in 1949, Urumqi was built up as the major center of activity in Xinjiang. Territorially this meant the promulgation of administrative structures oriented toward Urumqi and thence to Beijing. An active role in local affairs was assumed by the Party, thus inserting a greater presence of central policy into the local arena. The role of the center is also felt in the creation of municipalities which have a direct tie to Urumqi rather than the surrounding areas. The formation of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in 1955 assured the special status of the area. At the local level, autonomous prefectures and counties were also setup, thus providing the state with special zones of contact with the minorities. It is through this administrative hierarchy that the powers of the state move, all concentrated around Urumqi.

The demographic landscape has also seen a major change. Central policies have been directed toward a massive Han migration to Xinjiang. The source of the migrants has been both near, Gansu, and far, Shanghai. Regionally the destination of the migrants has been focused on the central portions of Xinjiang, from Urumqi west to Shihezi, Kuitun and Karamai and south to Korla. A significant proportion of the migrants belongs to the Production and Construction Corps. This influx of population has meant a demographic build-up in Central Xinjiang away from the traditional centers of Kashgar and Kulja. Thus demographically, the scales are tipped in favor of Urumqi and the center.

Xinjiang’s economic landscape in the past consisted primarily of oasis agriculture in the Tarim, agriculture in the Ili Valley and pastoral nomadism in Dzungaria. Kulja and Kashgar were the foci for economic interaction and trade with other peoples of Central Asia. Beijing’s policy was the reintegration of Xinjiang’s economy into China’s national economy. Transportation provided the key link. The completion of the Xinjiang-Lanzhou railway revitalized Urumqi’s position in the economic landscape; road-building efforts solidified Urumqi’s position. With the closing of the borders after the Sino-Soviet split, Urumqi’s domination over Kashgar and Kulja was enhanced. Industrial activity was further concentrated in Urumqi; coal and iron ore in the Tian Shan near Urumqi and oil in Karamai all flowed into the capital of the XUAR. In terms of the economic landscape, the construction of the transport linkages and utilization of industrial resources have re-integrated the Xinjiang economy into China through Urumqi.
The PRC control over Xinjiang restructured the territorial, demographic, and economic landscape. A three-part division of the region remained as in ancient times; however, the major segment of power and control is in Urumqi not in Kashgar or Ili. The central portion, Urumqi, is the core area of Han settlement, population density, administrative control, industrial activity, and transport nodes. Beijing’s policies of political integration and economic development have served to transform the landscape of Xinjiang, to reorient Xinjiang to Beijing.

The second goal of the research is to examine the PRC’s policies for the development of the minority nationality areas. The central policies for development are connected with the integration of the minority nationality areas into the fabric of China. The regional application of these policies have resulted in the restructuring of Xinjiang.

Ethnicity as a Resource in Development

Finally, the dissertation returns to the first goal of the research. That goal is to attain a culturally relevant perspective on development in the Third World. The intersecting links of ethnicity and development in the periphery are examined to accomplish this goal.

The debate on development in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s had focused on the economic dimension (van Nieuwenhuize, 1986). Growing recognition has been given the cultural dimension in development (Society for International Development, 1981). Given the diversity of Third World ethnic configuration, a concern for development paradigms as applied to the Third World should take into account the cultural side of life.

Within the development ‘from below’ paradigm greater emphasis has been placed on the cultural dimension of development (Goulet, 1971). In contrast, development from above perspectives conceive of strategies that overwhelm the cultural diversity and integral value systems of the peoples of the periphery. The aspirations of the periphery are easily lost in a development from above that replaces cultural values of the periphery with that of the center (Stohr, 1981). To attain a culturally relevant perspective on development entails a recognition of cultural diversity, in the face of standardizing forces, that allows a reservoir of knowledge and experiences to serve as a resource for development.
“If it is to be a humane operation, development must encourage and sustain cultural diversity.” (Goulet, 1971, p. 272).

Stavenhagen (1986) suggested that a major issue for the theorists and practitioners of development would be ethnodevelopment — the development of ethnic groups within the framework of a larger society. While ethnic issues exist and confront us daily, much of the body of development theory has neglected ethnic issues and relegated such concerns to anthropology. A concern in development for ethnicity means more than a respect for culture but an understanding of the workings of ethnicity and development impulses and programs as they interact.

How and why does ethnicity impinge on the development process? The varying geographical and historical experiences of different ethnic groups means that each ethnic group has a wealth of knowledge to contribute to the development process. Knowledge of the particularities of the local environment, local spatial organization, local methods of production, and local patterns of trade are all a part of the ethnic group's local perspective on development and represent their contribution to development. The diversity of knowledge garnered through experience by the varying ethnic groups can be shared in the programs for development. Ethnicity, and its attendant knowledge and experience, can be a resource in development.

As discussed in Chapter Two, the first value of development is life sustenance. The values and identities of ethnicity contribute to a knowledge of place and environment, and thus proceed to enhance the provision of basic needs. The second value of development is self-esteem. The retention of dignity, worth and respect by minorities on the periphery involves an ethnic awareness that holds the local culture to be valid. The third value is freedom from servitude, a reduction of dependence. The ability of ethnic minority groups to contribute their knowledge and self-esteem translates into an expanded range of choice.

The potency of these values of development is enhanced in an area of ethnic diversity when full rein is given to the combined experiences and knowledges of the various groups. Overreliance upon the knowledge and perspective of one particular group in periphery is just as ineffective as overreliance upon the values espoused by those in the center. One form of ethnocentrism (of the center) would be exchanged for another (of the periphery).
There needs to be a coming together of the values achieved by the various groups within a peripheral region. That also means a recognition of the worth of the values held by other groups.

Study of this issue of ethnicity and development is also a matter of the scale of investigation. At the scale of the person or the family, development has meaning usually for the anthropologist or the psychologist. The political scientist focuses upon the level of the state in regards issues of development or ethnicity. The focus here, in contrast, is upon a mesoscale, that of the region. Ethnicity has saliency to the meaning of region such as Xinjiang, a minority periphery. Development perspectives that do not consider the region or the locality also lose sight of the significance of ethnicity.

This study has examined the role of tourism and handicrafts in the development of Xinjiang. Part of the resources for tourism and crafts have being as a result of the ethnic identity of the Uighur, Han, Kazak and the other ethnic groups of Xinjiang. Besides tourism and handicrafts, the accumulated knowledge of the Kazak in animal husbandry, the Uighur in the oasis agriculture (Hoppe, 1987), and the Kashgarliks in the bazaar and cross-border trade are all ethnic legacies that Xinjiang can make use of in its development. The development of Xinjiang should entail a study of the cultural as well as the physical map of the region.

Ethnodevelopment is a dynamic and creative activity which can liberate energies for development (Stavenhagen, 1986). Through a consideration of the ethnic, more possibilities are opened up for development paths. Ethnodevelopment, if applied properly, would not mean the building of fences but the opening of gates. Cultural values and identities could be maintained. Development values, especially the second value of self esteem, would be achieved through this culturally relevant interpretation of development. The goal of ethnodevelopment would be to put people into the development of their place.

In both the tourism and handicraft industries, development impulses are shaped by the ethnic character of the local people involved. The product, be it a dopla or a dance, is most successful when the ethnic quality of the product is a focus. As Goulet (1971, p. 272) said, “Culture, not economics, technology, or politics, is the primordial dimension in development.”
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Appendix I

Handicraft Factories Visited

Urumqi:
  Embroidery Factory
    Erkinai, June 17, 1986
  Carpet Factory
    Kadir and Factory Personnel, June 17, 1986
  Ethnic Clothing Factory
  Leather Hat Factory
    Kerimjan, June 20, 1986
  Leather Boot Factory
    Yasin, June 16, 1986
  Ethnic Musical Instrument Factory
    Torsun Basari, June 16, 1986
  Jade Carving Factory

Turpan:
  Ethnic Articles Factory
    Liu Yushan, June 4, 1986
  Jewelry Workshop
    Abdurahman Tohti, June 7, 1986

Karashahr:
  Leather Hat Factory
  Leatherware Factory
    Fu Changma, May 14, 1986

Bagrash:
  Rug Factory

Korla:
  Ethnic Furniture Factory
Kucha:

Knife Factory
Adilzhan, April 30, 1986

Rug Factory

Doppa Factory
Adilzhan, April 30, 1986

Kashgar:

Arts and Crafts Factory
Abubekir Omer, May 6, 1986

Ethnic Furniture Factory
Mahmet, May 5, 1986

Ethnic Clothing Factory
Scarf Factory

Kulja:

Leather Shoe Factory
Abdulla Ilahum, May 30, 1986

Rug Workshop

Hat Factory
Abdurahman, May 30, 1986

Metals Factory
Nurtai, May 30, 1986
Appendix II

Interview Topics
Handicraft Factories

What is the history of the work unit?
When was the enterprise established?
Was the enterprise established as a cooperative or as a factory? When was the building constructed?
Had the factory been moved from a previous site?
To what extent is machinery utilized?
How much work is done by hand?
Does the factory produce its own hand tools?
How many employees (workers, management, technicians) does the factory employ?
Has the number of workers increased?
How many retired workers does the factory support?
What is the gender ratio for the employees?
Which ethnic groups are employed and in what proportion?
What is the wage structure?
What are the working conditions like?
Is there a cafeteria or housing provided?
How do the workers learn their craft study?
Are some workers designated as ustaz?
How long does it take the workers to learn how to produce the various items?
What production contracts does the enterprise hold?
What has been the history of the value of production?
What has been the major cost for the factory?
What has been the history of profits for the factory?
Has the enterprise acquired subsidies?
Has the enterprise taken out loans?
What are the various products offered?
Have the styles changed? Why?
What materials are utilized?
What is the source for materials?
How has the technology changed?
What is the service area of the enterprise?
Are local needs met through this enterprise?
Is some production marked for export?
Does the enterprise maintain a store?
Do tourists purchase some products?
Is the enterprise a shangchan dian or a canguan dian?
What is the enterprise's five-year plan?
Are there plans for expansion?
Appendix III
Tourism Sites Visited

Urumqi: Interview, Bi Yading, Urumqi Tourism Bureau, May 20, 1986
Heavenly Lake (Tian Chi), Bogda
Nanshan Pastures, Baiyang Gou
Hong Shan
People’s Park
Shaanxi Mosque
Tatar Mosque
Autonomous Region Museum
Wulabai
Memorial to the Martyrs
Military Museum
Erdaoqiao Bazaar
Jiefang Nan Lu

Turpan: Interview, Keyum Rozi, Foreign Affairs Director, June 4, 1986
Huoyi Shan, Yalkun Tag
Aiding Lake
Gebi Desert
Qocho Ruins, Gaochang
Jiaohe Ruins, Yarkhoto
Bezeklik Buddhist Caves
Astana Graves
Emin Minaret, Suleiman Wang Minare
Cultural Relics Museum
Karez
Grape Valley
Bazaar
Kashgar: Interview, Wang Jianguo, Foreign Affairs Director, May 5, 1986
Id Kah Mosque
Appak Khoja Tomb, Xiang Fei Mu
Mor Pagoda
Ethnic Kindergarten
Ethnic High School
Uighur Hospital
Sunday Bazaar
Central Bazaar
Arts and Crafts Factory
#12 Elementary School
Mahmud Kashgari’s Tomb
Tashkurgan
Mt. Muztagata
Khunjerab Pass

Kucha: Interview, Imimjan, Ahmetjan, Foreign Affairs Bureau, April 29, 1986
Grand Mosque
Tomb of Molenar Shidin Khoja
Old and New Bazaars
Kizil Buddhist Caves
Subash and Zhaoguli Temple
Kizil Kara Caves
Kizil Kara Tower
Salt Water Valley
Veil of Tears
Muzart River

Korla: Interview, Bayingolin Foreign Affairs Director Sun, April 26, 1986
Tienmen Guan
Baghrash Lake
Karashahr, Yanqi
Bayan Bulak
Kulja: Interview, Ili District Foreign Affairs Director Ren Yuandi, June 2, 1986
Sayram Lake
Ili River
Guozhi Valley
Huoyuan Tower
Alamlik
Tomb of Telug Timur
Tombs of Martyrs of Sanqu Geming
Hui Mosque
Bazaar
Xibe Chapchal Autonomous County
Korgos
Appendix IV

Interview Topics: Tourism Sites

What is the general history of the local area?
What is significant about the history for tourism?
When was this city opened? or
Are there plans to open this city?
What tourist activities are offered?
What tourist sites are offered?
When was this tourist site opened?
What built structures are used to enhance the site?
How many workers at the site?
What provisions are there for protection at the site?
Are there any plans for development?
Who are the visitors?
What is their country of origin?
How many tourists have arrived?
How have the numbers grown?
Are most tourists on escorted tours?
How many people work in the tourist business?
How many guides, drivers, and management personnel are there?
What are the gender and ethnic ratios among the personnel?
How have the workers been trained?
What are the external connections for transport?
What is used locally for transport?
What accommodations are offered?
How many beds are available?
How many service personnel does the hotel have?
What restaurants are available?
What tourist materials are provided?
What souvenirs or promotional aids are produced?
What is the seasonality of tourism?
How do the hotels and tourist services deal with the off-season?
What problems have occurred in the provision of tourist services?
What is the five-year plan for tourism?
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