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by

David Allen

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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Approved by

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Department of Geography

Date June 11, 1997
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Abstract


by David Allen

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The concepts of place, nationalism and economic restructuring caused by globalization are applied to the study of sovereigntist voting in the Canadian province of Quebec from 1976 to 1995. Nationalism and identity are described as social constructions that must be mobilized by local elites before they have political impact.

Federal, provincial and referendum elections held in this period are studied using these three concepts. A unique dataset made up of constant units over the study period is used in a series of stepwise multiple regression analyses. This technique is used to compare the strength of linguistic and economic factors in predicting voting behavior. A variety of independent variables are used to build regression models of each party's support, including information on home language, income, occupations and home ownership. Also, to test whether an area's economic trajectory affects sovereigntist voting, changes in the economic variables from election to election were included. Finally, dummy variables representing regional differences in Quebec were entered into the analysis.

The results of these stepwise regressions suggest that language is a much more important contributor to support for sovereigntist policies and candidates than either current economic conditions or measures of economic change. Language was always the most important variable in the sovereigntist equations. However, in the regressions for the Liberal party, the provincial wing of the party was more sensitive to language than the federal wing. Also, the regional dummy variables were found to have a pronounced effect on voting, and reflect the core areas of a party's support pattern. Also, at least in the case of the referendum votes, the regional dummies have increased in importance, as measured by their beta coefficients.
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Finally, many thanks to Catherine Allen, for without her this task would not have been finished (even though she would deny this fact). Je t'aime!
Introduction

Contemporary theory in political geography concerns, in part, the relative roles of economic restructuring and of community/ethnic/national identity as determinants of territorial behavior, as expressed in voting at elections. The evolution of the demand for territorial sovereignty can be very effectively studied through the example of Quebec.

Research on these types of questions can follow two basic paths. On the one hand, a class-based theory of voting predicts the domination of compositional effects on electoral behavior. A voter's economic self-interest, as it is influenced by the redistribution of wealth in a society, plays the most important role in determining the parties, candidates and proposals that gain the support of the electorate.

On the other hand, a place-conscious theory argues that the differential character and experience of communities—for example, the francophone people in Quebec and their particular economic history vis-a-vis the rest of Canada—may be a compelling alternative for voter behavior. In this formulation, the interests of the community should prevail. Following contemporary theoretical developments in political geography, I propose that both components of behavior will co-exist, and that citizens are torn between wider-scale economic interests and community-scale social interests.

This is not a question of one or the other theory being the only influence on voting behavior; rather, they work together in creating local political responses. To the extent that people in a region perceive that their economic status and trajectory are suppressed by an external, culturally different hegemonic group, an economic rationale
for greater levels of self-government reinforces the cultural-linguistic basis for voting. How do these two explanations of voting behavior relate to each other? My dissertation will look at this question in depth.

In order to answer this question completely, a number of other factors concerning nationalism, place and the role of globalization in causing economic change must be considered. First, since nationalism is a force that needs to be mobilized in a population before it manifests, the nature of that mobilization is important to study. As this research concerns elections and electoral geography most directly, I will be looking at how various political parties use the mobilization and defining of nationalism as a support-gaining tactic. What were the campaign appeals? How successful were the parties at maintaining electoral support by appealing to nationalist sentiments?

Second, the use of place-specific conditions to help explain support for nationalist voting, although important, has been underplayed in studies of electoral politics. This is surprising because the level of difference between places is generally high: urban/rural, manufacturing/extractive, and cultural/linguistic axes of difference are easy to see on the landscape. Also, areas differ in terms of their rates of settlement and economic exploitation over time; history plays an important role here. A central tenet of geography is that place matters in the explanation of social phenomena; another purpose of this dissertation is to apply that belief to the study of nationalist voting in the francophone context.

Third, economic change has its genesis in the workings of the global economy.
As a result of competition from other economic actors, the primary and secondary sectors in many parts of the world have undergone dramatic reorganization, leaving some areas with high rates of unemployment, poorer economies and lower standards of living than other regions have. Therefore, explanations of economic restructuring have to include how globalization might impact them, and in turn how they both affect sovereigntist voting.

The importance of the present study is due to three factors. Namely the nature of the data and the method by which it is analyzed, the current focus by geographers on questions concerning democracy and the state's use of territory and ethno-territorial identities. First, the electoral data employed in this study were re-organized into a form that allows for a longitudinal treatment of this research problem rather than the more common cross-sectional view. Instead of using electoral districts as the basis for the analysis, voting results from each polling station were re-aggregated into census divisions, which were constant during most of the study period. The census boundaries changed in 1991, but these data were also re-aggregated to the old boundaries. To the author's knowledge, no other data set of its kind concerning Quebec politics exists. In addition to allowing for a historical look at voting trends in Quebec, this method of data presentation also matched that of the census geography, providing for a perfect match between electoral and socio-economic variables.

The other reasons for this study's importance are implied by reference to the results of a workshop on geography and democratization at the national Science
Foundation in late 1994. The introduction to the group's report, *Geographic Approaches to Democratization*, puts forth a series of research questions that cover the discipline's involvement with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War and the current trend towards democratization. The aims of this dissertation have much in common with this group's conception of what types of questions need answering in today's new geopolitical contexts.

Specifically, two areas of important new research relate closely to this study. One is the conception of ethno-territorial identities and the use of place by politicians to enhance their electoral fortunes by furthering ethnic claims. Quebeckers (Quebecois) who are sovereigntist have insisted on the territorial integrity of Quebec, and are not swayed by other conceptions of its spatial extent. The Quebec government's large-scale primary industrial developments, especially the dams in the northern part of the province, are taken as proof of the legitimacy of Quebecois' occupation of the land. Many election campaign photo opportunities are based around party leaders traveling to these outposts to pose with their inhabitants and take credit for their operation. On the other hand, non-francophones have stated their preference for remaining in Canada if the rest of the province votes for independence, an outcome which necessarily calls Quebec's territorial integrity into question.

The second area of research indicated by the workshop deals with local territorial structures. This topic has to do with how both national and local states use territory to govern their citizenry. The current debates in many Western societies over devolution
are caught up in this subject area. Central governments are shedding both
decision-making power and service provision to local authorities. Old ideas about the
proper relationship between central and local authorities are coming into question. In
addition, drives toward devolution, especially in Scotland, have been closely related to
ethnic identity. This dissertation deals with a similar push by an ethnic group for more
self-government, so its findings will illuminate the general processes at work in these
processes.

The first section of the dissertation lays out the theoretical foundations of the
research in terms of current studies on nationalism, the role of place in shaping political
opinions, and the effects of an increasingly globalized economy and its concomitant
economic change, on the growth of nationalist sentiment in Quebec. The second, third
and fourth chapters describe historical trends in support for nationalist parties in the
province from the late 1920s to 1974. The fifth chapter describes Quebec elections after
the PQ won their first mandate in 1976. The sixth chapter gives the results of the
statistical analysis for each of the thirteen elections studied between 1976 and 1995, as
well as trends discernible through the entire series. The conclusion examines the
contributions made by this research to the broader topic of electoral geography, as well as
the possible future paths and ramifications of separatism in Quebec after the federalist’s
paper-thin 1995 victory.
I. Nationalism, Place and Globalization in Quebec Sovereignist Politics

The night of October 30, 1995 was filled with high political drama across Canada. The country's fate quite literally hung in the balance as Quebeckers went to the polls in the second sovereignist referendum in fifteen years. While the arguments used in both campaigns had much in common, the context in which this election took place was much different than that of the 1980 sovereignty-association balloting.

First, two proposals to bring Quebec into the constitution while recognizing its "distinct society"—the Meech Lake agreements and the Charlottetown Accords—were defeated by a strong backlash from anglophone Canada. Second, these failures in federal intergovernmental policy came to be associated with the singularly unpopular Prime Minister, Brian Mulroney, and added to a general erosion was evident in the level of trust and support Canadians accorded to the political system in general and the Federal government in particular.

Third, a Quebec separatist party, the Bloc québécois (BQ) garnered enough support in the Federal elections of 1993 to be the largest opposition party in the House of Commons. This is a testament to the new-found strength that the sovereignists had gained since the late 1980s. Fourth, the economic predictions of dire consequences for Quebec stemming from a "oui" victory that were made by federalists were contested vigorously by sovereignists, especially the PQ (Parti québécois), who were elected to power in the 1994 provincial elections. They held that the economy of Quebec had
changed enough in the intervening 15 years to weather the changes that would result from voting for separation (the extent of which wasn't stated in the campaign). Thus, the sovereigntist cause was much stronger in 1995 than in 1980. This was reflected in the extreme closeness of the vote—the CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) declined to project a winner until over 90% of the vote had been counted. Even though the sovereigntists lost, they received almost 50% of the total vote, and almost 60% of the francophone vote. However, among non-francophones, the 'non' side gained over 80% of the vote—a huge "language gap" in support for separatism.

Along with the language factor, it is important to note that separatism won its first electoral victory in 1976, just after changes in the world economy started that started the massive de-industrialization and dislocation for workers in the mid 1980s and early 1990s. Since the economy was used by both sides in the campaigns, it is important to try to judge its effects on the voters' support for separatist sentiments.

Even though cultural and economic factors were important in the voting, it is equally true that not all francophones voted for the referendum, and conversely there were some anglo/allophones that supported it. The election results also carry with them a spatial patterning; one that displays regions in the province that voted differently that what could have been expected solely on the basis of language or economic indicators. Therefore, a complete study of sovereigntist voting patterns has to make mention of place, in terms of its important role in shaping political opinion.

The effects of economic distress on voting in the Quebec context should be
powerful, and influence voters to remain a part of the polity. I suspect that areas that are
depressed economically will be more reluctant to part with Canada than other areas that
are moving ahead economically. This is supported by the results of two referendums:
the Charlottetown constitutional referendum in Canada and the devolution referendum in
Wales in the late 1970s. In both, the regions that had weaker economies, the Atlantic
provinces in Canada and most of Wales, supported the central government; in fact, of the
four provinces that supported the Accord, three (Newfoundland, New Brunswick and
Prince Edward Island) were Atlantic provinces.

However, the question then arises, is this relationship the same in areas that are
dominated by a single language group, francophone, anglophone, or allophone? Put
another way, what is the more effective/stronger pull; economics or language/culture? At
what point, if any, are the ties to language weaker than the effects caused by a local
economy? This is the central question in my research. I suspect that language is the
more important of the two. but if that is always the case, why didn't francophone voters
support the 1995 separatist referendum at the same rate that the anglophone and
allophone communities voted against it? Something more than just appeals to culture
was at work here.

So, nationalism, place and the effects of globalization on the economy combine
to effect voting decisions in Quebec. The next portion of this chapter lays out in greater
detail these three concepts, and how they interact with each other.
Nationalism

Nationalism is one of the most potent political forces in the world. At its base, the term has come to mean the desire by a national group for increased political power. The amount of power desired by national groups differs from case to case from increased autonomy to outright independence.

The end goal of nationalist movements is relatively unproblematic, but what constitutes a national group has been a contentious issue. The definition used in this work is taken from Cobban, who writes that:

any territorial community, the members of which are conscious of themselves as members of a community, and wish to maintain the identity of their community, is a nation (quoted in Knight, 1994).

Implicit in this definition of nation are two things. First, it sets up an "us/them" dichotomy, which can act to strengthen intra-group ties while reifying inter-group differences (Knight 1994). The exact conditions for membership in a national group vary, of course, but are generally tied to a variety of cultural markers; language and religion are usually important. Other factors can add to a group's sense of identity as well, like a shared history, diet and dress.

Second, notions of "belonging" and "community" are social constructs. Nationalism does not exist outside of society, a force divorced from humanity, but is constructed by it (or parts of it) towards some end. As theorists on the topic point out
(Johnston et al. 1989), to have concrete effects in a society, nationalism must be 
mobilized or activated by actors in the milieux, either elites or grass-roots movements.

The pre-existing cultural mosaic supplies the resource upon which 
nationalist movements are based, but when and where, and for what 
reasons, such resources will be drawn upon to promote nationalism and its 
corresponding political organisation are determined by individual and 
collective actions, as well as the relationship between state, society and 
territory. It is important that we do not conflate the structural 
preconditions and triggering factors associated with nationalism (p. 13).

Therefore, one can expect the causes and effects of nationalism to vary from place to 
place and across time, as different places offer different options for national 
mobilization. The importance of this realization is underlined by the work of Breuilly 
(1994). His major thrust is that the conditions that give rise to nationalism are extremely 
variable from place to place and between historical periods. This idea leads him to 
critique the work of other researchers who don't take this variability into full account in 
their work. Breuilly finds that research centering around case studies are valuable in that 
they get at those specific contexts that nationalism both shapes and reacts to. This 
dissertation provides such a case study, applied to Quebec.

Taylor (1993), in his survey of nationalism, speaks of a disagreement in 
nationalist studies over the relationships between class struggle and nationalist politics. 
On one side, Marxist theorists such as Nairn (1977) state that Marxist approaches to the
study of nationalism have failed to incorporate the success and proliferation of nationalist movements in the post-WWII world. Nairn states that this strength in nationalist appeals has links to uneven development, where local movements take up nationalist forms of argument to win concessions from the center. Nairn and Gellner (1965, 1996) both speak of the importance of the local bourgeoisie in these types of movements.

On the other hand, writers like Anderson (1991) argue that nationalism was far more than just a political or economic ideology fostered by a few to gain power. Anderson postulates that the idea of nation took the place of religion as the great motif within which conflicts between states occurred. The new print technologies that swept Europe after the seventeenth century were the agent of change here. They made possible the spreading of information, in a given language, over a large population in a short period of time, thereby instilling a feeling of community between members of a linguistic group. These communities were "imagined" because they were too large in size for people to know each of its members.

This dissertation will provide a check of the above two positions by investigating whether language or economic indicators provide the best explanation for the electoral support of sovereigntist positions or candidates. Of course, the answers derived will be fully accurate for Quebec only, since, as Brueilly (1994) writes, nationalism manifests differently in different places and in different historical periods.

According to Quinn (1979), Quebec nationalism before the 1960s was defined by three points: the French language, an allegiance to the Roman Catholic church, and ties
to rurality and tradition. The usage of French dates back to the colonial period in North America, when the region that was to become Quebec was settled (albeit thinly) by French nationals. After a series of wars which resulted in the loss of French control over their continental holdings, the victorious British thought seriously about enforcing francophone assimilation into wider British colonial society as late as the 1840s and the Durham Report. However, because this policy was not seriously applied in Quebec by the colonial government, the francophones there were able to concurrently form a majority in the province of Quebec and a minority elsewhere in British North America. The idea of two "founding nations" of Canada, one British and the other French, became the basis of Quebec's outlook towards the rest of the country. The Canadian confederation, according to francophones, was built upon the notion of equality in political, economic and social matters between French and English speakers. This equality was the keystone of francophone policy, and any threat to it was dealt with by the Quebec provincial government. This accounts for the activist stands that Quebec embarked upon in terms of preserving the language rights and prerogatives of the small francophone communities in other provinces. regarding education and language usage. Therefore, the emphasis of early francophone nationalists could be described as "continental" in scope; a mode of action that would continue to the middle of the twentieth century.

The second major pillar of Quebec nationalist thinking was an adherence to the Roman Catholic Church's religious and social teachings. Since the defeat of the French
in the 1700s, however, the Quebec church hierarchy was insulated from changes in
doctrine that affected the church outside the province. Because of this separation, unlike
the Church in Europe by the turn of the century, the Quebec Church was very
conservative regarding economic and social theory, cut off as it was from the moderating
influence of later Church thinking and from comparatively progressive papal encyclical
that spoke out against the excesses of both the capitalist and communist economic
systems (like the Quadragesimo Anno by Pope Pius XI in 1931). The Church in Quebec
fulfilled many societal functions that in other regions would be carried out by the state,
including education and social welfare. It jealously guarded its role in providing these
services, and was therefore responsible in part for the non-involvement of the provincial
government in the social services arena. It was also highly distrustful of the growing
trends toward urbanization and industrialization on the grounds that they acted to weaken
the ties between the church and its flock. Strongly anti-Marxist, the Church also was
against the organization of workers by groups outside of its control, chiefly labor unions.
It did erect a number of affiliated groups for farmers, students and laborers, which towed
the Church's line about the issues of the day.

The Church, through its teachings, had much to do with the idealization of a rural,
agricultural lifestyle in Quebec's nationalist ideology. This was the third pillar of Quebec
nationalist ideology; a farming life was held to be the "natural state" of the Quebecker,
and anything that challenged this conception (like the steady movement of people from
the farms to the industrial centers looking for work) was to be feared and reversed, if
possible.

The second major phase of Quebec nationalist thinking occurred when Jean Lesage, Liberal party leader, gained the government in 1960. The era of *survivance* was over; the Quiet Revolution took its place.

The new Liberal government brought three major changes to Quebec. One was the abandonment of the *laissez-faire* policies that had controlled Quebec's political establishment in the past, another was an increased level of industrialization and urbanization in the province, and the last was an end to the commanding position that the Church had previously enjoyed in all spheres of life.

The provincial government was to become the agent of francophone development, in an attempt to become *maîtres chez nous*, or masters in their own house. This brought about an enlargement of the provincial government's role in economic and social affairs, as well as an increase in the size of the provincial government to make it equal to the task.

As a result of state economic activity, the levels of both urbanization and industrialization in the province increased. People moved off of farms and into cities in large numbers, to fill positions in industrial concerns that received state aid. As the state's size and role in the life of its citizens increased, and the population became less rural, the role of the Church decreased, displaced as it was by state intervention in its historical activities, such as welfare provision and education.

It is important to note that in both of these periods, nationalist sentiments did
have one important continuity—the desire to stay in Confederation. Those that were
sovereignist in thinking were few in number, and not taken very seriously by the Quebec
political establishment. Changes in attitudes towards sovereignty did not occur until the
late 1960s, when the independantist movement gained an important spokesman, Rene
Levesque, a former provincial Liberal cabinet minister under Lesage (Gingras and
Nevitte 1983).

The next phase of Quebec nationalist thinking included the idea of *etupisme*, or a
step-by-step approach to independence. Levesque and others thought that the Quiet
Revolution, while necessary for the development of Quebec in economic, political and
social terms, did not go far enough to close the gaps between Quebec and the rest of
Canada, and especially francophones and anglophones, in terms of economic and
political equality. Sovereignists thought that independence was the best way to
safeguard the continued existence of the Quebecois nation. Of course, other nationalists,
including most of the provincial Liberal party, disagreed with this analysis, and pressed
for more decentralization from Ottawa as their preferred method of protecting Quebecois
rights. This difference of opinion continues to the present, and is at the crux of current
Quebec political discourse.

*Place*

Place plays an important role in explaining nationalism's spatially-varying
character and level of support among local populations. Place as a concept, according to Agnew (1987), is composed of three similar ideas. One, *locale*, is the setting for routine social relations, or where everyday life experiences occur. The second is *location*, which places the area of interest in larger social structures—like the global economy, for example. The third is *sense of place*, which speaks to the process of socialization that occurs in a given area, conditioned by its economic, political and social past.

All three "levels" of place should be used in studies of nationalism. Locale, the most concrete of the three, provides the immediate setting in which nationalist mobilization occurs—a neighborhood, an outlying district in the country, or other "mappable" quantity. This is where potential supporters live their lives, sometimes with little regard towards larger political or ideological issues. This is also the setting in which the mobilization of nationalist sentiment has to take "place": to be successful in this, nationalists must find ways of making their policy goals relevant to voter's lives as they live them in varied locales.

Location in reference to larger global structures provides at least some of the economic and political conditions that the populations in locales have to deal with in their daily routines, therefore providing conditions which nationalist movements can react to in order to gain support. For example, the factory closing that occurs in a given locale could be caused by changes in the global economic structure; that same factory closing, if portrayed in a particular manner, could be used by a nationalist group to "demonstrate" to its target population the unfairness of government economic policy.
The "sense of place" designation is perhaps the most abstract of the three, and is of utmost importance in studies of nationalism. It speaks to socialization as well as the ideology of a national territory that is studied by researchers (Kaplan 1992, Knight 1994, Williams and Smith 1983).

Socialization in place is a process in which people learn to evaluate cues in the political/social environment according to norms present in particular places. These norms are derived from a variety of sources within the community: parents and other family members, peers, schools, media sources, religious institutions, and others. Johnston (1986, 1989) finds that political parties are an important part of the socialization process. Parties attempt to socialize voters in such a way as to increase their own political support.

A useful way of determining how successful parties are is looking at the continuity of the vote in different places. Areas that nearly always support one party over another. Johnston posits, are areas in which party socialization efforts are successful. This approach can be used fruitfully in Quebec. Most references to the current electoral geography of the province in the mass media point to three regions that are the core of continuing support for separatists and federalists. For the former, the area of the northern part of the province, called the Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean region is a source of solid majorities. For federalists, the region around the Ottawa River (the Outaouais) and the western suburbs on the Island of Montreal (like Westmount, Dollard, and Pierrefonds) fulfills the same function.
National territory is also implicated in the "sense of place" part of the concept of place. The term describes the area that a national group claims as its "homeland"—the area that is held by the group as most closely associated with the group's beginnings and is usually a cornerstone of nationalist ideologies.

The areal extent of the national territory is, of course, also a social construct and therefore subject to contention among differing forces in a state. Most conceptions of national territory are garnered from histories written to somehow glorify the nation in question. Many are, therefore, one-sided: more propagandist than scholarly. In this case, there are bound to be disagreements as to the true extent of a group's core territory.

In Quebec, arguments about what exactly constitutes the historic boundaries of the province are heated, and as yet have yielded no answers that are agreeable to supporters and opponents of sovereignty. We will revisit this aspect of Quebec nationalism in the conclusion of the dissertation.

The ideal of territory can be used by nationalist groups and states as a tool to promote certain goals. Gottman (1951) and Zelinsky (1988) have demonstrated through their work that territory can be used to reify a sense of nationalism through the erection of monuments, flying flags, conspicuously using national colors in a variety of contexts, among other methods. By these reiterations of national symbols, residents are frequently reminded of their status as member of the national group, and socialization of newcomers into the group is facilitated. Also, the use of these symbols can serve to buttress claims to territory; "flying the flag" has been a popular way of asserting the sovereignty of states.
This type of iconography exists in Quebec, although in two forms owing to its position as a part of Canada and simultaneously as the home territory of the Quebecois nation. A good example of its importance is its use in the 1995 referendum. The CBC in its election night coverage showed scenes at each campaign's headquarters. At the Oui campaign's gathering, the *fleur-de-lis* was hung in abundance, and waved by a good number of those in attendance. Songs important to the cause were also sung by the crowd, and picked up by those speaking at the event, most notably Jacques Parizeau himself. The Canadian flag was treated with the same symbolic reverence at the Non campaign's celebration. Each campaign worked its flag's emblem into its campaign posters and literature, as a glance at newspaper and magazine coverage of the campaign shows (for example, in various pictures that McLean's magazine ran during the campaign, both sides' posters and appeals were present).

In addition to the symbolic employment of territory, David Kaplan writes (1994) of two further ones. Rulers of a state employ territorially-based policies to segment and control populations—restricting movement, limiting settlement, and ensuring the elite's continued political power. National minorities, however, also use territory, but in a defensive fashion, in order to preserve their culture.

[In] this way, territoriality is an external tactic devised by the rulers as a means of efficiently controlling the actions of the ruled, with the additional benefit that any blame for unpopular actions can often be displaced to the spatial unit itself. In the ethnic context, ghettoization
would emerge as a potential result of such a strategy...Spatial concentration allows ethnics a better defensive position through which they can more easily protect themselves emotionally and politically against outside groups. As such, ethnic territory is internally constructed to further the aims of boundary maintenance and ethnic solidarity. In truth, external and internal territorial strategies usually operate concurrently, and spatial conflicts can result from the differing territorial aims of those within and those without, each of whom strives to utilize and define territory to their best advantage (p. 261).

The ability of the minority group to do this depends on the amount of political/economic power they have at their disposal. The more successful these groups are in gaining power and preserving their culture, the better the chance they have of changing the relationships between the state's constituent groups.

The political aspect of inter-group relations is an important one. and of course, the success of an ethnic minority's politics is dependent on the level of politicization of the group. Smith (1979) describes a number of factors that can cause a politicization of minorities in a state. They include changes in the economic or social order (expansion or contraction), the general political cycles associated with these changes, the changing social composition of the intelligentsia, and the specific governmental policies of ethnic elites.

In terms of economic changes, an important source of potential conflict is the
distribution of economic benefits among the population. An unfair distribution can be used to rally a group to greater political involvement if parties or groups can successfully mobilize group opinion around this issue. Francophones in Quebec have long harbored these types of grievances against the commanding position of the anglophones in the province's economy. Also, political changes that economic activity bring can change the overarching political system to such an extent that new parties, organized around new cleavages in society (like a resurgent or nascent nationalism) brought about by changing economic forces, might have an opportunity to wrest power and votes away from established parties and groups.

Electoral uses of place dovetail with nationalistic ones. Primary in this link are notions of the effects of place in elections, the mobilization of voters, and the strategies that nationalist parties can use to gain support.

Agnew (1996) writes that these effects stem from place's position as the location of mediation between broader social structures and individual voters—it is the "place" where voters experience the world economy, culture, and so on. Conversely, it is also the point at which their actions can help to shape these more global processes.

From this point of view, context refers to the hierarchical (and non-hierarchical) funnelling of stimuli across geographic scales or levels to produce effects on politics and political behavior. These effects can be thought of as coming together in places where micro (localized) and macro (wide-ranging) processes of social structuration are jointly
mediated. As a result, politics can be mapped not simply as the
generalized outcome of non-spatial processes of political choice, but as a
spatialized process of political influence and choice (p. 132).

Agnew describes six factors which help to shape local context and, by extension,
place's effects on politics. First is the social division of labor—who does what in an
economy. Economic development is differentiated across space. As Massey (1984)
writes, this can be explained by a place's social, economic and political experiences at
different points in time. The types of investments made in a location can make it either
more or less likely to receive more investment as economic and political conditions
change. This leads to a type of path dependence in that the effects of past "rounds of
investment" influence the present condition of places. It follows that different places will
have both different social divisions of labor and occupy different "places" in the global
spatial division of labor. In Quebec, this can be seen in the distinctive regional
economies that have developed in different parts of the province, from the extractive
industries in peripheral regions to the manufacturing and service-oriented economies of
Quebec and especially Montreal, an important center of business and finance in Canada.

Second is the nature and access to communications technology. Places that are
"tied in" more completely to trans-national information sources give rise to political
methods and issues that are fundamentally different than those in less open areas.

Third is the local-center tension in territorial states. The issue of devolution, or
the passing of central government power to regional interests, exists in most states in the
world today and shares many of the same aims as nationalist movements. Calls for
devolution can range from increased autonomy to outright independence for a given unit
of government; Quebec's recent history is illustrative of the politics of this issue.

Places are affected by devolution in two ways. As the locality gains in power, it
takes on more responsibilities and services to provide to its citizens. If it does not have
the necessary resources to pay for these services, or the ability to get those resources,
then the local government will either have to discontinue those services or contract the
work out to the private sector. This could lead to a fall-off in service provision for
citizens of localities. Also, these changes could heighten political conflicts in localities
as resources become more scarce and opportunities for compromise on these issues
smaller.

Fourth are social class, ethnic and gender divisions in society. According to
electoral researchers (Rokkan and Allardt, Johnston, Taylor), these form the basis of
electoral cleavages on which parties mobilize voters. The differences in participation
and voting between rich and poor, male and female, and members of different ethnic
groups are well documented in social science, and in fact have made up the bulk of work
in the field of electoral geography as well as political science and sociology. These
differences extend beyond the political realm as well, and influence housing choices,
wages, standards of health and living, education and literacy, and other facets of life.
However, this is not to say that the shapes of these cleavages are universal; each society
has different manifestations of them. Again, generalizations are hard to make.
Fifth is a political movement's ideology of place. How a movement reacts to a place, in terms of that place's history and likelihood of supporting that movement, can relate to policies that it makes in reference to campaigns, mobilization, and other activities.

Murphy (1990) writes about similar ideas of the role of place in politics. In his formulation, place has a sort of dual nature in elections. Any place is dependent upon a certain historical or social context for its existence. Therefore, a certain place will mean different things for different people at different times.

At the same time, these different contexts will lead to place having a "concrete impact on electoral behavior" (Murphy 1990, p. 229) through the campaign rhetoric and mobilization strategies of political parties and candidates. In this instance, the spending of campaign funds for advertising, campaign rallies or other political events, visits from candidates, door-to-door canvassing, and other campaign activities should vary from place to place, and from party to party, according to key actors' ideas about places and the differences between them. Parties should spend more time and effort in areas that offer them a chance of winning. Conversely, they will tend to ignore areas in which they have either a huge lead or a long, successful history, as well as those places where they have little chance of winning. The important point here is that these conceptions of partisan balance, even if based on polls or other research, often get implanted in the conventional wisdom of the political elite, and in future elections this forms the basis of how people (elites, media, voters) use place electorally. The patterns of campaign spending in
Quebec at both federal and provincial elections will be taken up in a later chapter.

The last of Agnew's factors in shaping local contexts is the micro-geography of everyday life. This is an important aspect, because it puts emphasis on a voter's ordinary activities and how they bear on political behavior. A person's everyday behavior puts them in touch with sources of political information, such as church groups, parent-teacher associations, neighborhood watch groups, labor unions, political organizations, the media and other organizations.

Generally, it is posited that these social networks that people have access to in a place will constrain the information readily available to voters. Access to these networks is highly differential, due to discrimination, prejudice, and segregation on the basis of ethnicity, race or economics. Because of this situation, different types of networks provide information with different "slants" on reality depending on the composition of the network. This can lead to certain areas exhibiting support for a particular party over what might be expected by knowledge of its socio-economic situation: this is called the neighborhood effect, and has been studied by political scientists and political geographers such as Cox (1969), Sprague (1982, 1994), Burbank (1995a, 1995b), Grofman (1995) Books and Prysby (1988, 1991). There are two modes by which a person can be influenced by these networks, although neither guarantees that a particular person's behavior will be changed. One is by the interaction between people in a network; the other occurs as a person observes his or her surroundings and draws conclusions about their neighbors' political leanings.
The efficiency with which this socialization process takes place is dependent on a few factors. One is the level of homogeneity in a place: areas with a homogenous population in terms of ethnicity, class structure, etc. are more efficient than those that are mixed (Burbank 1995a).

Involvement in the social network and prior political knowledge are also important. It is true that all of the inhabitants of a given place are not equally involved with their neighbors, or have the requisite political information at their disposal to translate the cues they receive by observation of their surroundings into knowledge of the political climate in the community. It is also true that some inhabitants of a place could be effectively barred from participation in a particular network because of pervasive prejudice or segregation. Therefore, the amount of pull, or the exact effect that contextual influences have on individual voters vary.

Mobilization by parties of both ideas and voters is another place-affected process. Johnston (1986, 1989) writes about the various ways that place, party and voters interact to create a local-based politics. He holds the view that much of the electoral work done by geography puts too much emphasis on the agency of the voter and too little on the role of institutions, primarily the political party, in describing how political systems work.

According to Johnston, parties have three main roles: vying for office, setting local political agendas, and political culture creation (Johnston 1986). He writes that even though an issue might become important in a given context, voter support still must be mobilized by some actor, usually the political party, before its effect can be felt. This
mobilization of voters can be accomplished through a number of means, such as media buys, campaign visits by candidates, membership drives, etc.

He has written (1989) about two types of mobilization strategies that parties can follow. One, the individual strategy, tries to galvanize support across places by erecting a coalition of voters in similar class or socioeconomic positions. This has been accomplished mainly through the mass media, and has become quite popular with national aggregative parties. The second, the community strategy, attempts to create a "permanent presence in the local culture", and appeals to people in place. While still accomplished by parties, this approach is not as common as it once was.

Parties will follow both strategies at once, and as Johnston points out, there is no need for the two to follow the same paths. Therefore, a party with a specific national message might highlight a different, perhaps conflicting, stance on the same issue locally if such a stance will increase their electoral support (Johnston 1986). This would serve to maintain a party's support in a locality while the national party pursues policies that would cause it to lose support in that same locality.

Given the above arguments, nationalist electoral geographies should be heavily influenced by place. First, due to widespread segregation along racial, ethnic and economic lines in Western democracies, contextual effects should be heightened. This is the case in Quebec, where it is possible to pick out areas with francophone or anglophone populations that approach 90%.

Second, nationalist movements generally follow community strategies at least at
first, by trying to increase the level of group identity, tying their opponent's policies to negative effects in their locality, mobilizing and organizing by reference to their national group, and other activities. In Quebec, there have been parties in the past that have organized along primarily ethnic lines in both the anglophone and francophone communities. The Equality and Unity parties gained votes among anglophones in the 1989 provincial elections, and of course, the PQ/BQ was always stronger among francophones than other groups.

*Globalization and Identity*

In addition to these place-based approaches to electoral success taken by nationalist groups, there are factors that are tied to the process of globalization. It is a rather difficult process to define with any certainty or consistency, because the degree to which this is occurring in the world currently is under question. However, a basic outline of the term would be the growing recognition of the world as a singular entity, with its increasing number of interrelations between once-separated areas. While it is recognized that globalization is still incomplete in many ways, it has brought with it a number of important changes in the world.

First, Agnew and Corbridge (1995) find that as globalization increases, individual state sovereignty decreases. This is due mostly to the increasing power of transnational capital, the increasing number of multilateral agreements on a variety of
issues including trade, the environment, and human rights, and the increasing level of
cross-border exchanges of all kinds including migration. This weakening has been
accompanied by a shift of decision-making power in many states from the central
government to smaller regions, a process known as devolution.

Second, the rise of a global culture, independent of nation-states, is starting to
rival older cultural norms in importance. Its growth is facilitated by the increasing rate of
inter-group ties, which are made possible by vastly improved telecommunications
technologies—faxes, the Internet, cellular phone technology, and other new tools. With
these, groups now have both the ability to send and receive information about a variety of
subjects in a very short time.

In this dissertation, the effects of globalization on economic conditions in the
province will be used to help predict support for sovereigntist causes. Thus far, the
process has been marked by generally higher levels of economic competition between
companies and places for market share or investment. This has led companies and states
to lower spending, cut back on wages, benefits and welfare and decrease their
workforces—to restructure their sectors to improve their positions vis-a-vis their
competitors. As a result, areas that are economically dependent on less-competitive
industries have seen increased levels of unemployment and a general decrease in the
average standard of living. On the other hand, areas that are home to competitive
industries have seen good times economically. This differential experience with
economic restructuring should have an effect on the politics of a given region. Given the
current free trade regime that governs economic relations between the US, Canada and Mexico with the passage of first the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in the late 1980s and the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994, processes of economic restructuring can be expected to continue as American, Canadian (or Quebecois) and Mexican companies compete with each other.

Restructuring in Quebec has resulted in unemployment in older industrial areas such as parts of Montreal, the Eastern Townships, and others. As is the case elsewhere, the main beneficiaries of the new economic regime have been the Montreal suburbs, which have grown in population throughout the study period.

In terms of the broader notion of globalization, the developments listed above are still in their infancy. However, Robert Cox (1995) has formulated three contradictions of globalization that have come to light thus far. First, even though it might be expected by some that the developing global regime would carry in it the seeds of a more equitable distribution of wealth due to the increased number of transactions, economic actors, and the increased rates of economic activity outside the West, it is actually the case that spatial polarization has increased in the world. This is true in both the rich and poor countries.

The second contradiction involves state power. Cox notes that, even though states are the enforcers of the new global regime, through international agreements on subjects like trade, economic "development", human rights, the environment, nuclear disarmament and test bans, their ability to shield their domestic populations from any
negative effects of these agreements has been sharply curtailed. This factor could explain why governments in the West and elsewhere are growing increasingly unpopular with voters: the state seems to be able to do less to improve the economic conditions of its citizens, when once they could be more active in this regard.

The third of Cox's contradictions refers to the increase of localization and the resurgence of localities in this age of globalizing structures. This can be attributed to the increased number of exchanges between populations. As the number of interactions increases, one can expect that groups will try to create distinctive identities, to maintain their differences in the face of pressure towards homogenization (Featherstone 1995).

The meaning of identity is important in understanding how cultures and groups see themselves. As Smith (1990) defines it, identity is "the subjective feelings and valuations of any population which possesses common experiences and one or more shared cultural characteristics", usually customs, language or religion. He further cites three components of identity: a sense of continuity of experience, shared memories of a collective history, and a sense of common destiny. All of these foster a sense of community with others in a group, and also imply that others not included in the group are outsiders, with fundamentally different identities and experiences.

It is true that any person has a number of identities simultaneously, like an occupation, or religion, or membership in a professional group. In order for an identity to become active, it has to be mobilized. This fact highlights an important aspect of the term: it, like nationalism, is a social construction, and the identities of any group can
change over time.

These changes in a group's conception of identity depend on how the three factors listed above are mobilized; that is, how the elites and the intelligentsia of a group choose to weave current events and issues into existing notions of identity, thereby strengthening the population's attachment to the local culture. Appadurai (1990) writes that the anxieties that local populations might have over the idea of cultural homogenization can be used by these elites in strengthening their hold on power in localities.

It is important to keep in mind that, even though localities which have a distinct identity can be mobilized into an adversarial relationship with other localities, Cox's first contradiction of globalization still holds: there has been an increase in the amount of spatial polarization in the world. Differences within a group, based on a cleavage outside of the group's shared identity like economics or gender, do not disappear when inter-group conflict arises. Rather, these differences are made less important because of the mobilization by the local intelligentsia of what Featherstone (1995) calls "cultural capital": the symbols and stories which are at the center of a group's identity. In effect, a call to "patriotism" is used to suppress cleavages that threaten the united front against other groups. It is important to note that this mobilization does nothing to change the cleavage or take away the grievances one part of the group feels towards the other: it just "postpones" its effects until the outside threat is dealt with.

An important example of this is the speech by Jacques Parizeau after the Oui lost in 1995. In blaming the loss on "money and the ethnic vote", he tried to focus
francophone attention on the fact that anglophones and allophones overwhelmingly voted against the referendum question. This is true, but he did not mention that nearly 40% of francophones voted against him as well. This glossing over of differences of opinion within the francophone community was an attempt to further demarcate the Quebecois identity and define it by language, while making it plain that it was the "other", not reticent francophones, that doomed sovereigntist aspirations.

On the basis of the above descriptions, we can say that concepts of place, globalization and nationalism are interrelated to the extent that they each depend on the existence of the others for their own efficacy in societies. The changes brought about by groups using one or another of them in a given context can serve to reinforce all of them. In the next chapter, these concepts will be used to study the antecedent conditions that gave birth to the successes enjoyed by separatists in the province after 1976.
II. Quebec Electoral Politics, 1927-1974

Because of nationalism's socially constructed nature, it is important to recognize that the way this force is both defined and used in a polity changes over time, emphasizing different aspects of similarity in the population that is the focus of such an appeal. In Quebec, it is relatively easy to mark out periods of the province's recent history in which different conceptions of nationalism influenced politics and economics. The first, from the beginning of the period under study in this chapter to about 1960, can be labeled "la survivance", and had as its focus the preservation of what was considered to be the "traditional" francophone way of life. The second, from about 1960 to 1970, consisted of the Quiet Revolution of Jean Lesage, and was based on the strengthening of the Quebec state and the modernization of its economy. The last, from 1970 on, saw the rise of an important challenge to the Lesagist view of Quebec by the Parti Quebecois (PQ), an avowedly separatist party which desired an independent Quebec within some sort of alliance structure with the rest of Canada.

The passage of time has seen Quebec nationalists striving for increased levels of autonomy. Compared to pre-1960s thinking, the program of the PQ is more sovereigntist and calls for a much more active role for the state in economic and social development. This chapter will investigate these changes in nationalist politics in Quebec at both the provincial and federal levels.

Along with a brief narrative of the campaigns and results in each of the elections.
maps that depict the average vote for each major party will be used to delineate each major party's spatial signature—the pattern of support that it enjoys. The set of 12 regions used to do this are depicted in Figure 1. They are based on counties in the province, and their limits are held constant over the time period. Because riding boundaries changed during the period, some error is introduced, but is probably at a minimum due to the aggregation: only if the district splits counties across regional borders will this error be important.

Because of the population distribution in Quebec, a map that doesn't take into account differences in regional population can be misleading. Throughout the period, the single most important electoral area in terms of seats was the Island of Montreal, but on normal maps it seems less important than the larger, but relatively voter-empty, northern parts of the province. To adjust for this effect, cartograms of the maps were drafted, with each of the regions' areas determined by its number of seats. It is important to keep in mind that, at least in the provincial election maps, Montreal's status is still understated because of widespread malapportionment of seats in the National Assembly perpetrated by both the Liberals and Union nationale (Quinn 1979, Masicotte and Bernard 1985).

This situation did not improve until the late 1960s.

The type of historical study of Quebec elections that is described in the next two chapters is important in a number of ways. It is important to know the genesis of sovereigntist ideas and appeals, which are rooted in this period even though truly sovereigntist parties didn't start to contest elections until the 1966 provincial election.
This aids in answering the questions of whether or not the basis for Quebec's politics has shifted, where it shifted to, and the degree to which it has changed over time.

Also, this portion of the study should demonstrate the amount of change in the spatial pattern of sovereigntist and nationalist support over time. Have the same regions voted for the same types of candidates over time? Can we point to individual elections that seem to signal a break with the past? Or does the electoral history of Quebec display more stability in its geography? Again, a historical survey that utilizes maps is a good way to answer these important questions.

Thirdly, this type of brief overview can give us clues about the electoral disposition of the two major types of cleavage that this dissertation is engaged with—namely, language and economic restructuring and distress. How did the major linguistic groups vote in the past, and how stable were their loyalties? In times of province-wide economic stress, did nationalists gain or lose support? These questions will be answered in the following descriptions of the voting in the province between 1927 and 1974.

*La Survivance, 1927-1960*

As was mentioned previously, the Roman Catholic church played an almost paramount role in Quebec society before 1960. This pre-eminence resulted in Quebec's distinctive politics (Quinn 1979, Gingras and Nevitte 1983). First, trends towards a more
activist state of the type then taking hold in other parts of North America were retarded. Another was the strongly conservative tilt of the population which the church reinforced through its teachings. The third effect of the Church on Quebec politics is the lack of real democratic practices that many researchers see evidenced in Quebec politics during most of this period (Quinn 1979, Trudeau 1958, Dion and O’Neill 1956).

The province’s history as a French colony, ruled with an autocratic system, also had much to do with this facet of Quebec’s political system (Quinn 1979). Quebec held elections, had political parties and a partisan but free press, but electoral practices were anything but democratic. First, the electoral map was malapportioned, favoring rural areas over the growing urban industrial centers and Montreal (Milner 1978). Since rural voters had a tendency to be more conservative and supportive of limited government, the high degree of malapportionment had a direct impact on policies that were enacted by governments that successfully courted rural voters. Another effect of skewed electoral maps was the fact that a tremendous majority of seats could be won with a minority of the popular vote. Although it is true that any single-member majoritarian electoral system is liable to exhibit this quality under certain circumstances, the extreme degree of malapportionment present in Quebec tended to magnify the effect.

Second, there were a host of voting irregularities present in the balloting which tended to favor the party in power. The variety of specific problems was impressive to list—from misplaced ballot boxes to ballot box stuffing to roving groups of bullies, hired by parties, to discourage opposition voters from casting their ballots (Quinn 1979, Dyck
These irregularities continued up until the 1960s when reforms instituted by the Liberal Lesage government lessened malapportionment and other unfair electoral practices.

The Liberal party under Taschereau was in the majority provincially in the elections of 1927, 1931 and 1935. Taschereau was at that time the latest in a line of Liberal premiers to hold office continuously since the 1890s. Generally, the Liberals were the party most linked to provincial rights and autonomy from the federal government. They were also desirous of more autonomy from Britain in Commonwealth affairs. Taschereau based the economic development of Quebec to a large extent on foreign interests as a way to maintain a small government, so his administration was solicitous of foreign capital, especially US interests. A lucrative investment climate was maintained through a laissez-faire governing style which included a somewhat less-than-benign neglect of the rights of workers (Quinn 1979).

The Liberal's main opponents in provincial politics were the Conservatives, led by Arthur Sauve in 1927. Previously, they were similar to the Liberals in terms of their preference of laissez-faire economic and social policies. However, the provincial Conservatives suffered from their attachment to the conscription policy during the First World War, which was extremely unpopular in Quebec. Because of their perceived closeness to the federal Conservatives, the party often lagged behind the Liberals electorally. In an attempt to differentiate himself from the Liberals and to garner the votes of those discontented with the Taschereau regime, Sauve led the party in a more
centrist and nationalist direction, calling for more active government, speaking out against the exploitation of Quebec's natural resources by outside (and anglophone) interests and claiming that the government's development policies worked against Quebec's traditional social order. However, Sauve met with resistance from within the right wing of the party, and after the Conservative defeat in the 1927 elections, he resigned from the leadership (Quinn 1979).

The politician picked by the party to succeed him was Camillien Houde, former mayor of Montreal, who continued the party's movement to the center in spite of the party's strong right wing. He called for various reforms, including the provision of government pensions for the aged and widows, a reduction in electricity rates, an intensified program of colonization of northern areas of the province (popular with nationalists who wished the government to encourage a move "back to the land" and traditional ways of life), the establishment of a Ministry of Labor, and a government-sponsored program of low-cost agricultural credit. However, due to Taschereau's control over the electoral system and widespread abuses by the Liberals, Houde's Conservatives were again defeated at the polls in 1931 (Quinn 1979).

After the election, two things happened that would finally contribute to the Liberals falling from power in 1936. First, Houde was replaced as Conservative leader by Maurice Duplessis, a member of the National Assembly from Trois-Rivieres, who said he would continue the Conservative's calls for major reform. The second event was the creation of a new political party, the Action Liberale National (ALN), formed by
disgruntled leftist Liberals led by Paul Gouin, son of a former Liberal Premier. The ALN embodied the policies that were formed by the latest Catholic thinking on social and economic matters. They called for a more interventionist state to guard against foreign exploitation of resources and increased social legislation by the government to aid in relieving the suffering due to the Great Depression (a topic not really addressed by the Taschereau regime). They held these beliefs even as they subscribed to a traditional view of Quebec nationalism, with its glorification of an agricultural way of life and continued heavy involvement in political affairs by the Church (Quinn 1979, Dyck 1988).

After a series of meetings, the Conservatives and the ALN formed an agreement heading into the 1935 elections to run as a united ticket; both parties would divide the ridings between them to avoid any ALN-Conservative contests which would serve to fracture the anti-Liberal vote. The Union Nationale Duplessis-Gouin, as the new movement was called, met with a good deal of success, paring down the Liberal majority in the National Assembly to just six seats (five after the election of the speaker) (Jones 1987a).

Figures Two and Three depict the average votes for the two major parties mentioned above in the elections of 1927, 1931 and 1935. The Conservative vote (Figure Two) is striking in its tendency to fall off as one travels away from the Quebec-Ontario border. In terms of linguistic divides, this is perhaps not so surprising, since the Outaouais. Montreal and Rive-Sud regions had a fair number of anglophone residents during this period. However, if the francophone/anglophone cleavage was utmost, the
Figure 2: Average Conservative Vote, 1927-1935
Figure 3: Average Liberal Vote, 1927-1935
Cantons-de-l'Est should also have been in the top category; it also had a large residual anglophone population. Since this region was composed of voters in a mixed industrial/agricultural milieu, the Conservative lack of support there could signify a farming vote that was strongly Liberal regardless of language, or support for the Liberal's development policies.

One last feature to note about the Conservative vote is that although the party received above-median support in the major populated areas of the province—the greater Montreal region—they failed to win enough seats to dislodge the Liberals from their long position of power. This is a demonstration of how effective malapportionment was during this period.

The Liberal vote in these three elections is also noteworthy because it was not the reverse image of the Conservative support signature. Areas that gave Taschereau large numbers of votes were of varied types—smaller industrial centers (Richelieu, Rive-Nord and Rive-Sud), mixed urban/rural with a sizeable minority of anglophones (Cantons-de-l'Est), and places with a primary economy (Gaspesie, Abitibi-Temiscamingue). These areas were the main battleground of these elections, even though the contests were one-sided.

Figure Four indicates the support for the ALN in the 1935 election. This party does have a pattern opposite that of the Conservatives, their partners in this election. The ALN's appeal in rural areas was pronounced, especially in regions farther from the Ontario border. This pattern also shows clearly the political differences between Quebec
Figure 4: Percent ALN, 1935
and Montreal, which will be in evidence in other elections as well. The map shows the key to the UN's successes that year: the union of the Conservative vote in Montreal and other southern regions and the ALN's appeal in Quebec and the north.

It is important to note that the elections that took place after 1929-30 were greatly affected by the Great Depression, when economic activity fell, bringing with massive unemployment and hardship for a large part of the population. During these campaigns, the Taschereau administration did little to aid the hardest hit in the province; his pro-market proclivities prevented concerted remedial action. The Conservatives, of course, were not much to the left of the ruling Liberals, but their rhetoric reflected their attempts to align with pro-reform causes and movements. The ALN/Conservative alliance did more stridently call for changes to benefit ordinary Quebeckers, but their narrow loss in 1935 prevented action on this policy front.

The real breakthrough for the new party came a year later, after Taschereau was forced to resign under a cloud of scandal. Duplessis was able to use hearings into the finances of the government to disclose wide-ranging schemes that many in the Liberal government benefited personally from. As a result, Taschereau was forced to resign, and was replaced by Adelard Godbout. The new leader tried to disassociate the Liberals from the discredited Taschereau, and promised to implement some reforms. These tactics were not enough to save the Liberal government, and the UN was elected with a majority of the seats in the National Assembly (Quinn 1979, Jones 1987a, Dyck 1988).

After the UN's election victory, Paul Gouin resigned from the party because he
claimed that Duplessis had no desire to follow through on the UN's internal power-sharing agreements made at the party's formation. Other members of the ALN left after Duplessis made clear that the underlying ideology that he subscribed to differed little from Taschereau's in terms of both economic development policy and social reforms—or lack of them, to be more precise. From that point on until the UN lost power completely after 1970, the party was nationalist in the sense of striving for the greatest amount of autonomy from the Federal government within its frameworks, and conservative in the sense that it stood against sweeping reforms needed by its industrializing population.

It was this ideological position that the UN brought with it into the next provincial election in 1939, at about the same time as the start of the Second World War. Called early by Duplessis, the election was meant to be a signal by the UN that Quebec would not stand for a repeat of the conscription policies that were used by the Federal government in World War I. However, since the Liberals were in power at the federal level, the ministers in the government from Quebec threatened to resign if the UN were reelected. This would leave Quebec without advocates in the federal government, and therefore no one to argue against the conscription of soldiers to fight in World War II. The provincial Liberals were able to use this leverage to take the government back from the UN (Dyck 1988).

The victory of Godbout's Liberals signalled a change in traditional Liberal policies. Godbout was both more progressive in his approach to reform, and less
autonomist. Since the Liberals were in power in Ottawa, and also because of the war and the need for higher levels of nationwide mobilization, Godbout probably had little choice in his dealings with the federal government. Some of the federal government’s new programs that Quebec accepted included unemployment insurance, family allowances and the centralization of taxation power to the federal level. Provincially, he made fiscal operations more open and responsible (so as not to repeat Taschereau’s difficulties), gave women the right to vote in provincial elections, new regulations on forestry and mining, the nationalization of Montreal Light, Heat and Power Company, which later grew to become Hydro-Quebec, compulsory education to age 14, and more progressive labor legislation (Quinn 1979, Jones 1987a).

All of these achievements were not enough to keep the Liberals in power. At the 1944 elections, the UN managed to portray the Liberals under Godbout as creatures of the federal government, and defeated them at the polls. The UN platform was similar to its older ones, calling for some reforms beneficial to agriculture, and above all, non-involvement in federal programs, which Duplessis regarded as challenges to the rights of Quebec as put down in the British North America Act (BNA), the document under which Canada became a self-governing polity.

Aside from Duplessis’ return to power, the 1944 election was notable because the two major parties were joined by a third: the Bloc Populaire (BP). It could be considered the heir to the ALN reform tradition—progressive in the types of reform it wanted to bring about, and nationalist in that it, too, wanted the most autonomy from the federal
government as possible in order to preserve Quebec's francophone society.

It suffered, however, from a schism involving its three constituent parts. The first was made up of former ALN partisans, led by Paul Gouin, Rene Chaloult and Philippe Hamel. They recognized the need to move the province into the future by careful regulation of economic development and the enlarged provincial state that would be needed to coordinate this task. The second grouping within the BP was made up of former federal Liberal members of Parliament, who were against the setting up of a strong provincial state, but were in favor of autonomy from the federal government in order to safeguard their old-line view of Quebec society—agricultural and traditional in thrust. The third group was made up of younger nationalists who successfully led the campaign against the King government's 1942 conscription plebiscite. This latter faction was caught in the middle of the fierce posturing of the first two; it was this internal friction that limited the electoral success of the BP (Behiels 1983-84).

The mix of reforms and nationalism that was present in the BP was to be echoed in the electoral platforms of other parties in the province. The need for a strong provincial state to preserve Quebec's francophone society and heritage was shared by both the PQ and the provincial Liberals after 1960. Its concern for the equitable distribution of wealth was taken up by the PQ after its creation in 1968.

Another new party that surfaced in the 1940s was the Union des Electeurs (UE), which contested the 1948 elections. It was a quasi-party that followed Social Credit economic policies, and only reluctantly entered the realm of direct electoral politics. Its
main policy goal called for the government to give the population money (a "social dividend") so it could better purchase the goods produced by the economy.

Underconsumption due to lack of capital in the population was seen by this group to cause unemployment and economic depression. Outside of this notion, it was basically a right-wing party, popular in rural areas that were depressed economically. Although it did not meet with great success in 1948, it would resurface in the 1960s to become a potent force at both the provincial and federal levels (Quinn 1979, Milner 1978, Pinard 1975).

After the 1944 return of the UN to power, Duplessis was able to hone the party's image as a rural-based, conservative nationalist force in the province. The next three elections—1948, 1952 and 1956—were fought primarily around issues of provincial autonomy and federal "interference" in provincial policy prerogatives, like education, pensions and taxation. Relations between the UN and organized labor deteriorated during this period due to the pro-capitalist stance of the UN and its role in breaking large strikes around the province during this period in Asbestos, Louiseville, and Murdochville. In addition, concerns about the methods in which the UN kept itself in power—irregular balloting procedures, extremely malapportioned districts, and pork-barrel projects in closely-contested districts that are discontinued after the election—began to mount in certain circles of Quebec politics (Quinn 1979).

Through the 1950s, three major factors were to change the course of provincial politics. The first had been building in force over the previous generation, but its
presence was just beginning to be felt. This was the weakening of the influence of the Church on political and social life. Years of steady industrialization and urbanization weakened the personal ties between parish priests and their flocks, and because of this, their opinions about political, economic and social matters were not heeded with the same respect that they would have received during a previous era. Also, the Church failed to show the public a united front on issues of importance to the citizenry, like electoral and bureaucratic reform. Evidence of this weakening of the Church can be found in increased levels of opposition to the UN government by certain members of the clergy who wished to modernize Quebec society as other secular leaders wished, as well as falling church attendance and fertility rates among Quebeckers (Quinn 1979, Gingras and Nevitte 1983).

The second major factor was the rejuvenation of the Liberal party under Georges Lapalme, Godbout's successor. His leadership was marked by his strategy to gather all of the opponents of the UN together under the Liberal banner--radical nationalists who wanted an interventionist provincial government, unions that desired a fairer stance towards the working class, and some sections of the Roman Catholic church that were more in tune with current Church teachings on social issues. He tried to match the policies of the Liberals to those discontented segments of the population—a further commitment to reforming the Quebec government, modernizing the electoral system and a rapprochement with labor. His efforts saw some success when the Liberal vote improved in his two elections as leader, 1952 and 1956. After the 1956 elections, he
resigned as leader in favor of Jean Lesage, although he stayed active in the Liberal party and his activities certainly strengthened it (Quinn 1979, Dyck 1988).

The third factor was the death of Duplessis while on a tour of northern Quebec in 1959, before a new election was to be called. This brought an end to the history of strong leadership that was the UN's hallmark during its existence. His immediate successor, Paul Sauve, led the party a bit to the left, but he died three months after he attained his leadership post. He was succeeded by Antonio Barrette, the provincial Minister of Labor since 1944. He led the party in the 1960 elections (Quinn 1979, Milner 1978).

The issues of that election were about the same as others that the UN had fought in the past. The party accused the Liberals as being the "party of federal centralization", but the charge was less effective than in the past due to the Conservative Diefenbaker administration currently in power in Ottawa. The Liberals continued to push for Lapalme's reform agenda, with the addition of the creation of a Department of Cultural Affairs which would "[maintain and foster] all those traits and characteristics of the people of Quebec as a distinct cultural group on the North American continent." The Liberals also promised to create an Economic Planning and Development Council to map out government development activities. (Quinn 1979).

Under fire from the Liberals, and without a strong leader like Duplessis at the party's helm, the UN finally went down to defeat in the 1960 election. In the past, the UN under Duplessis was deft at turning elections on the issue of provincial autonomy and appealing to the voters' sense of tradition. It was also able to wield great influence on the
electoral process, which was in dire need of reform to make it more representative of the urbanized and industrialized Quebec of the 1960s (Quinn 1979, Milner 1978).

The next four maps depict the geography of support for the UN, Liberals, BP and UE during this period of UN rule in Quebec. The first, Figure Five, shows the average UN vote in the elections between 1936 and 1956. It clearly shows the areas that preferred the UN's brand of conservative nationalism over the programs of other parties. They include smaller industrial towns in central Quebec (Trois-Rivieres and Rive-Nord), even though the UN's labor policies were not generally favorable to the working class's economic interests. However, Duplessis' laissez-faire economic policies did favor investment, which spurred job growth which the government was able to convert to valuable political currency. Also, the party gained many votes in areas involved with the primary economy (Gaspesie, Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, the Outaouais), which could be explained by the UN's pro-development stance, even though the money used for such undertakings was garnered from foreign sources.

It is interesting to compare the geography of UN support with that of the Conservatives in the earlier electoral period. One finds little in common between the two: this demonstrates the effects of a changed ideology on support. In this case the Conservative party, long thought to be tied with the anglophone elites and pro-British sentiments, lost the support that such a stand on the issues garnered when it formed the UN with the ALN. That being said, the UN failed to mobilize voters in places that had supported the Liberals in the preceding period either. This could stem from the fact that
Figure 5: Average UN Vote, 1936-1956
the Liberals under Taschereau/Godbout were not as stridently nationalistic as Duplessis' UN.

The Liberal vote in the 1936-1956 period, in Figure Six, shows the success of the party in urban places—Montreal, Quebec and, to a lesser extent, Richelieu and Rive-Sud. It also shows the split in the anglophone vote between the Montreal and Cantons-de-l'Est regions and the Outaouais, which gave a sizeable amount of support to the UN. It could be that the voters in the Outaouais supported the UN policy of primary resource development in terms of forestry and mining—a strong place-specific impetus to support the government, even though that region's ethnic makeup may indicate latent support for the Liberals. The areas of strong support for the Liberals shared much in common with previous elections, especially in Montreal, Richelieu, Gaspesie and Cantons-de-l'Est.

The next map in this series, Figure Seven, shows the support signature of the Bloc Populaire in 1944. The party demonstrated that a nationalist/interventionist program appealed to voters in three regions—the Montreal area (Montreal, Laval and Rive-Sud), the Cantons-de-l'Est, and the North (Abitibi-Temiscamingue, Saguenay-Lac-St.-Jean). These regions coincided with the areas of Liberal support during 1936-56 period, at least in the Montreal area and the Cantons-de-l'Est. On the other hand, the BP pattern shares almost nothing with the UN pattern, reflecting the different appeals of those two parties regarding economic policy.

The last map in this series, Figure Eight, is the geography of UE voting in 1948. This Social Credit-based party shows a clearly center-periphery form of electoral support.
Figure 6: Average Liberal Vote, 1936-1956
Figure 7: Percent BP, 1944
with fewer votes around the Montreal region and an increasing number of votes in out-province areas. This is not surprising since the movement appealed to rural voters concerned with their standards of living as well as those on the political Right opposed to socialism. These types of voters lived generally in rural areas or regions with lagging local economies. It is interesting to note that this pattern of voting has something in common with both the UN and Liberal support signatures, because both of those parties had gained votes in peripheral areas as well.

*The Quiet Revolution, 1960-1976*

With the Liberals coming to power after 16 years, the voters of the province opened a new chapter in the politics of nationalism in Quebec: from the defensive *la survivance* of francophone culture championed by the UN to the more expansive Quiet Revolution of Jean Lesage.

After the Liberal victory in 1960, the Lesage government embarked on an ambitious suite of reforms that touched on many sectors of the administration. The key goal of these reforms was to improve government performance in regulating the state. In this endeavor, the Lesage government shared a prime motivation of reformist parties of the past, like the ALN and the BP. Many of the reforms that the Liberals instituted had been talked about for a number of years, but after the 1960 election Lesage was finally in a position strong enough to push most of them through (Quinn 1979; Dyck 1988).
In terms of education, the government moved to increase the opportunities for learning in the province by raising the compulsory school-leaving age to 15 (and later 16), making schooling free to the 11th grade, increasing government loans to university students, the appointing of a Minister of Education (important in bringing final responsibility for education to the government instead of the Church, which ran the system before 1960), and the setting up of community colleges, called CEGEPs.

The Liberals also instituted changes to the government's role in economic affairs. First, it nationalized some industries, especially in the natural resources sector, which had long been tied closely to foreign interests. They also set about strengthening small and medium-sized francophone businesses through loans and advice.

Bureaucratic changes made by the government included a revamping of electoral laws that lessened the degree of malapportionment of seats and did away with a number of seats that were reserved for anglophones because of a section in the BNA drafted to preserve the minority's voice in politics. It also attempted to further professionalize the civil service, and gave public workers the right to strike. In the social arena, the government moved to install a comprehensive hospital insurance plan, more actively regulated social welfare agencies, and removed the anti-labor legislation passed by the UN governments.

In terms of federal-provincial relations, the Liberals were just as combative towards the Federal government as the UN was. Major disagreements between Quebec
and Ottawa erupted over taxation, participation in shared-cost programs, and pension plans. Taxation and pensions were important issues to the Liberals, as many of their policies were capital intensive and both of these contentious issues would give the Liberals more funds with which to carry out their reforms. Expense of the government was a concern to voters, and higher taxation was one of the main weapons the UN used against the Liberals. Since the size of government was so small during the UN's tenure in office, higher taxes provincially were something new to Quebec (Dyck 1988).

In 1961, the UN held a leadership convention to replace Barrette, who had run afoul of some in the party organization. Daniel Johnson, a member of the old guard, won out over his closest opponent, and started to oppose the government along the same lines that the party had used so successfully since the late 1930s. However, Lesage cannily sidestepped the taxation issue, called an election in 1962 (two years early) and fought it over the nationalization of the electric industry. The UN was not in favor of nationalization, but since it was a popular policy initiative among Quebec voters, they were ambiguous as to what they would do about it. This had the effect of blunting the fallout over the Liberal's higher taxes, and ended in a repeat Liberal victory (Quinn 1979).

After their loss, the UN under Johnson changed course, moved a bit to the center in terms of policy, and tried to regain the appearance of being the leading defender of Quebec nationalism. This latter tack was illustrated by Johnson's opposition to the constitutional amending formula, called the Fulton-Favreau formula, that gave the
Federal parliament the ability to amend the BNA if the amendments passed a number of Provincial parliaments that represent 50% or more of the population. The UN called for a more restrictive process because they worried that changes to the BNA would act to decrease the power of the Quebec government (Quinn 1979, Milner 1978).

The election of 1966 was fought primarily around the issues of the extent and cost of the Quiet Revolution and federal-provincial relations. The Liberals, of course, wanted a continuation of their program, while the UN thought it was too expensive and needed to be changed. What differentiated the UN's campaign in this election from others was their emphasis on local issues and well-known local candidates. The UN contested the 1966 elections on a seat-by-seat basis, with considerable success. They defeated the Liberals and became the government again (Quinn 1979).

A new development in 1966 was the entrance of two avowedly sovereigntist parties into the electoral process. The sovereigntist wing of nationalist thinking was actually rather old; the Laurentian League appeared earlier in the century and called for an independent Quebec. However, its appeal was low; autonomists, like the UN and others who wished to remain in Federation while having maximum self-government, seemed to provide the desired balance in federal-provincial relations.

However, there were segments of the population that thought the Quiet Revolution did not go far enough to guarantee the survival of the francophone culture. Adherents to this belief formed two sovereigntist parties: the Rassemblement pour l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN), which was leftist in its socioeconomic orientation, and
the Ralliement Nationale (RN), which was much more conservative. Together, they won nearly nine percent of the vote, a considerable bloc of voters that signalled their dissatisfaction with the status quo.

The UN administration actually changed little of the reforms made by the Liberals during the Quiet Revolution. However, until his death in 1968, Johnson tried to gain more powers for Quebec and build the province's international reputation. He called for a constitutional convention to write a new document that would "equalize" powers between the two "founding nations", francophones and anglophones.

Indeed, language issues would gain in importance after the succession to the premiership of Jean-Jacques Bertrand. The government was forced to act after the so-called "St. Leonard Affair", where immigrants to the province enrolled their children in Anglophone schools so they would learn English. Because of this, the government introduced Bill 85 in 1968, which gave the right to parents to choose the language of instruction for their children; this was a very unpopular move, and was removed from consideration by Bertrand. He introduced another language bill in 1969, Bill 63, which held that English students must acquire a working knowledge of French to graduate. Parents had the right to send their children to schools of their choice; immigrants were encouraged to enroll in French schools. Finally, the government was to look into how to promote French as the language of work in offices and factories. This more pro-francophone bill was passed, but gave the Bertrand administration a less nationalistic cast (Quinn 1979, Jones 1987b).
Besides the death of the premier, 1968 was also notable for the creation of a new sovereignist party, the Parti Quebecois (PQ), from three distinct entities: the RIN, RN, and the Mouvement souverenite-association (MSA), led by Rene Levesque, a former minister in Lesage's government. It was Levesque who provided the impetus for much of the nationalization of industry that took place under the Liberals, and when it was obvious to him that the party was not in favor of moving towards his idea of sovereignty-association--independence coupled with close economic and political ties--he left in 1967 and formed the MSA a year later. The MSA and RN, after a series of meetings between the leaders of both parties, decided to join forces. The RIN soon followed, leaving the PQ as the main voice of sovereignists in the province (Saywell 1980).

In the 1970 elections, the Liberals joined the UN in backing away from their previously nationalist stance, and under Robert Bourassa, concentrated on economic issues during this period of increasing unemployment and economic stress. The Ralliement Creditiste, a right-wing party and descendants of the Union des Electeurs of the late 1940s, was also pro-federalist. This left the PQ as the only nationalist party in the election. The Liberals won this election by a landslide, but the runner-up was not the UN, but the PQ, indicating that opinion in the province was becoming polarized around the sovereignty issue. This pattern extended through the next election in 1973, when the Liberals under Bourassa again won a landslide victory, and the PQ were left again in second place.
The Liberal support signature from 1960 to 1973, shown in Figure Nine, demonstrates again that its base is in the urban areas of the greater Montreal region. A secondary node of Liberal voting was Gaspesie. One can also guess that, due to the party's strong showing in two of the three anglophone minority areas, the Liberals were able to pick up the lion's share of their vote. This is probably due to Bourassa's emphasis on economic issues rather than federal-provincial relations—anglophones felt more "comfortable" with the Liberals. Liberal voting patterns changed since the pre-Quiet Revolution days. The party gained support in the Outaouais and Rive-Nord, and lost support in Richelieu and the Cantons-de-l'Est.

The map of UN voting, Figure Ten, was nearly the opposite of the Liberal vote, due to the fact that until late in the period, they were the two major parties. Trois-Rivières, Richelieu and Gaspesie had the highest UN average vote; the party attracted the least support in Montreal, Laval and Abitibi-Temiscamingue. Again, smaller industrial centers and areas associated with primary industry were key in the UN electoral coalition.

The next two maps, Figures 11 and 12, detail the votes given to the RIN and RN in the 1966 election. The leftist RIN won the body of its support in the same areas that the Liberals were strong: the greater Montreal region and the Outaouais. The rightist RN ran well in the far North of the province and the Cantons-de-l'Est, areas that the Social Credit parties also gain most of their votes.

The PQ, made up of the RN, RIN and MSA, blends aspects of its components'
Figure 9: Average Liberal Vote, 1960-1973
Figure 10: Average UN Vote, 1960-1973
Figure 11: Percent RIN, 1966
Figure 12: Percent RN, 1966
geographies: its showing is mapped in Figure 13. Even though the party failed to win a sizeable number of seats, it did well in terms of votes in the greater Montreal region and Saguenay-Lac-St.-Jean. Its predictable lack of anglophone support is highlighted by its poor showing in the Cantons-de-l'Est and the Outaouais.

Like its predecessor the UE, the RC's geography had a center-periphery pattern, but it was not as pronounced as in 1948. Its support is depicted in Figure 14. The party was still weak in the greater Montreal area, but had picked up a small amount in Quebec and Trois-Rivières. It was, like in 1948, a party of rural, right-wing discontent. In this respect, the RC was acting in the same capacity as the PQ, which gained many unhappy urban votes in 1970 and 1973.

To sum up the findings of this chapter, it is fair to say that nationalism has always been an important part of the success of provincial parties in Quebec. Liberals, the UN, the minor movements in provincial politics and the PQ have all championed the ideal of autonomy from the federal government in Ottawa. The major difference over time has been a shift away from this autonomistic view towards all-out pushes for independence advocated by the RIN, RN and the PQ. The exact make-up of this independence has changed over time, but the kernel remains. The major "hard sell" engaged by sovereigntists has been to change Quebeckers' thinking about independence and somehow convince them that mere autonomy will not suffice in guarding francophone rights. Of course, the major difficulty in this strategy is to not frighten leftist anglophone and allophone voters away. The PQ has had limited success in this, and as a result has
Figure 13: Average PQ Vote, 1970-1973
Figure 14: Average SC Vote, 1970-1973
had to blur its sovereigntist leanings in order to preserve its electability in the face of
opposition from an autonomist provincial Liberal party.

In terms of place-specific factors in these elections, one can point to the
difference in voting between Montreal and most other parts of the province. For the most
part, Montreal voters have supported the more reform-minded parties—the Conservative
opposition to Taschereau, the Liberals under Godbout, Lesage and Bourassa, and the
reform movements of the ALN, BP, RîN and PQ. This is not surprising, due to the
diversity of the Montreal population. Different groups in the city support different
candidates, according to either economic or cultural criteria. Also, during the Duplessis
regime, the unfair electoral system meant that Montreal's voice in government was much
smaller than it should have been on the basis of population; the city's support for the
opposition also signalled a desire to change this situation and institute a fairer electoral
system.
III. Federal Elections, 1935-1974

The same preoccupation with autonomism, and the major party's reactions to it, at the federal level is the central theme of this chapter. The federal voting behavior of Quebec voters is studied in a parallel fashion to the provincial analysis laid out in the previous chapter, and for much the same reasons. Provincial and federal elections are treated in different chapters because of the differences in ideology between the federal and provincial situations of the two major parties in this period, the Liberals and the Conservatives. The choices facing autonomist-minded Quebeckers voters in federal elections were rather circumscribed, as federal parties were generally loathe to recognize limits to their power that were desired by the Quebec electorate. As was the case in the provincial elections, federal politics in Quebec have been dominated by two major parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives. While it is true that other parties have won seats in the province, these parties have been paramount there.

In federal elections, the key to winning Quebec's support has been the issue of federal-provincial relations. Historically, the party seen by Quebeckers as being most respectful of francophone rights (or rather, the party that elites in the province were able to portray as the best protectors of the francophone community) have garnered the lion's share of their seats and votes. Since the Liberals have been cast in this role over the years, they have received the benefits of large majorities in Quebec; this fact was important in preserving the Liberal's dominance of federal politics during this time.

The weakness of the federal Conservatives in Quebec mirrors the provincial
party's situation. They were seen by the province's voters as pro-British centralizers who were hostile towards the preservation or advancement of Francophone rights. As a result, the Conservative party's organization was much weaker and less effective than that of the Liberals (Quinn 1979). The UN, who under different circumstances could have been identified as the Conservative's natural allies due to Duplessis' political origins, did not act to overtly support them during federal campaigns. This situation was due to an informal agreement between the UN and federal Liberals which amounted to a "nonaggression pact." The gist of this agreement was that if the federal Liberals stayed out of provincial contests, the UN would officially stay out of federal elections. Duplessis did allow his provincial organizers to work for the Conservatives on a nonofficial, voluntary basis, and while many did with the result of improving Conservative vote totals, this agreement worked to the benefit of the Liberals federally, because they did not have to worry about a determined campaign against them masterminded by the powerful Duplessis and his organization (Quinn 1979, Beck 1968).

The specific political ideologies of the two major parties have been quite similar through the years. Both parties can be called centrist, as both have advocated moderate amounts of government intervention in economic and social affairs, with the Liberals being perhaps more eager than the Conservatives to undertake these types of projects (Beck 1968). There have been challengers to the two major parties from both the Right (the various Social Credit movements the province has seen) and the Left (the CCF/NDP and the BP), but they have not been nearly as successful.
The ideologies of federal parties in Quebec can also be described by their views on centralization of government power. Again, both Liberals and Conservatives are quite similar in their preferences for a more centralized system (Beck 1968). Due to their role in the creation of the Canadian welfare state during the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Liberals have been portrayed as more centralizing than the Conservatives, but paradoxically have been able to hold on to most of their support in Quebec despite this. A reason for this is that Liberal leaders have been able to offer Quebeckers other important reasons to support them. They have had either influential Quebecker Cabinet ministers, like Lapointe, Lesage, Trudeau and others, or were themselves francophones, like St. Laurent and Trudeau. These ties tended to blunt criticism from nationalists concerned about the encroachment of the federal government into provincial concerns, and since the Conservatives were rather inept in courting francophone voters in any case, the electorate opted for the familiar Liberals (Beck 1968, Quinn 1979).

The development of the Liberals and Conservatives in the province can be traced through their electoral records. The federal elections that took place between 1930 and 1974 can be divided into three groups—1930 to 1953, 1957 to 1965, and 1968 to 1974. These groupings closely follow the fortunes of the Liberal party from strong dominance in the first, to a weakened position in a divided electorate, to renewed strength under Pierre Trudeau.
1930-1953

The success of the Liberals in the first period was mainly due to the efforts of two of their party leaders who between them ruled almost continuously throughout its length—Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent. The party's electoral strength during this time shows the efficacy of the UN/Liberal nonaggression agreement because the latter part of this period coincides with the early years of the UN's long reign. Any advantage given to the Conservatives by the UN organization was haphazard and of little effect (Beck 1968, Quinn 1979).

Mackenzie King was the leader of the Liberals from 1921 to 1948. With the exception of the election of 1930, he led his party to victory until his retirement. This impressive record was in spite of his being the (reluctant) architect of Canada's extensive set of social welfare programs and his reversal of his stance against conscription during the Second World War. In fact, when he held a referendum designed to give him political cover for his decision to go ahead with the draft in 1942, he lost the province of Quebec by a huge margin (Beck 1968, Behiels 1985). His defeat in Quebec was due to Quebec's memories of World War One and their conception of any European war as an extension of British imperialist policies that they wanted no part of.

Despite francophone's objections to involvement in World War II, there are two reasons for his general success in Quebec electorally after the 1942 referendum. First, he delayed the implementation of his conscription policy until 1944; therefore, the effect on
Quebec's draft-age population was lessened. Second, the vociferousness of English Canada in desiring immediate conscription and casting aspersion on French Canadians for their reticence about the government's draft policy made King the definite lesser of two evils as far as francophones were concerned (Beck 1968).

Louis St. Laurent took over from King in the 1953 election, and basically continued his policies, governing very much from the middle of the Canadian political spectrum. He was seen by much of Canada, including Quebec, as a reliable, likeable politician: "Uncle Louis". His francophone background also helped him in the province (Beck 1968).

The Liberals gained majorities in terms of both seats and votes in Quebec during the King-St. Laurent period. The bloc-voting tendencies of voters in the province has been its hallmark for most of its history; Quebec has rarely seen an election in which one side failed to get a large majority of seats and votes.

As Figure 15 shows, the Liberals scored large victories in the three regions outside Montreal—Rive-Nord, Rive-Sud and Richelieu. They also won an above-median level of support in Montreal, the Cantons-de-l'Est and Quebec. In the former two regions, the anglophone vote must have been fairly strongly anti-Liberal. More evidence for this is the lower Liberal vote in the Outaouais. During this period, it seems that anglophones inside and outside the province voted together for the Conservatives.

Figure 16 shows the average Conservative vote over the same elections. It was strongest in the Rive-Sud, the Cantons-de-l'Est and Gaspesie-Rive-Sud. It was
Figure 15: Average Liberal Vote, 1930-1953
Figure 16: Average Conservative Vote, 1930-1953
semi-competitive in the northern part of the province—Trois-Rivieres and
Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean. As these regions were also part of the UN's geography of
support, one could conclude that UN help, unofficial as it was, did serve to improve
Conservative support at least marginally.

The two strongest minor party efforts during these elections in the province were
the Reconstruction Party in 1935 and the Bloc Populaire in 1945. The first was formed
by a disgruntled Conservative member of Cabinet, H. H. Stevens, and advocated a
capitalist-oriented approach to the reform of the economy. It was billed by its supporters
as a safer, less-radical alternative to the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF),
an avowedly socialist-oriented party already strong in the Prairie provinces. In Quebec,
however, the Reconstruction party was much stronger than the CCF due to the Church's
opposition to socialist modes of economic organization.

Reconstruction's support geography (Figure 17) is interesting because the party
did well in the three regions of the province with a large residual anglophone
population—the Outaouais, Montreal and the Cantons-de-l'Est. It was weakest in
Trois-Rivieres and Quebec, two regions with above-median Conservative voting habits.
In these two regions at least, Conservative defections to the Reconstruction party were
low. Regions with a possibly higher defection rate were Rive-Sud, the Cantons-de-l'Est
and Gaspesie-Rive-Sud.

The second minor party to make a substantial impact electorally was the Bloc
Populaire in 1945. It was the federal wing of the provincial BP and shared its
pro-interventionist, pro-nationalist stance. Figure 18 shows that the party drew their greatest levels of support in the regions of Rive-Sud, Saguenay-Lac-St.-Jean and the Cantons-de-l'Est; the latter two areas also had a record of opposing the major parties in Quebec's provincial politics. They did poorly in Quebec, Gaspesie-Rive-Sud, and Laval.

Taking all of the maps for this period together, it can be seen that opposition to Liberal hegemony federally was centered in two major areas of the province— the North (Abitibi, Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean and Trois-Rivières) and the East (the Cantons-de-l'Est and Gaspesie-Rive-Sud). Both major areas had different economic structures. The North was an area of economic expansion and new settlement, while the East was dominated by a lagging economy based on primary industry with some manufacturing and a shrinking population. These economic conditions could have affected the electoral outcome, as each had a different set of policy preferences that the successful Liberal party did not have to pay attention to, since they were able to put together a powerful winning coalition of voters from other parts of the province.

1957-1965

The next electoral period, from 1957 to 1965, saw cracks develop in the Liberal's grip on Quebec electoral politics. This situation was due to four factors. First, the UN became much more involved in federal politics, which benefited the Conservatives. Duplessis desired to wreak revenge upon certain Liberal federal cabinet members who
Figure 18: Percent BP, 1945
campaigned for the provincial Liberals in 1956, thereby breaking the "nonaggression pact" (Quinn 1979). Second, John Diefenbaker, the Conservative leader in the elections of 1957 to 1965 who hailed from the Prairies, identified with anglophones and spoke only a small bit of French, was able to avoid inflaming tensions between English and French Canada. This campaign style won him some support electorally in the province, even if its nature was fleeting. Third, the Liberal leader through most of the Diefenbaker years, Lester Pearson, was also a hard sell in Quebec. During Pearson's leadership, the Quebec federal Liberals lacked a leader from their province, or even important Cabinet ministers who could tell Quebeckers why they should support Liberals. Fourth, the rise of the Social Credit movement in Quebec cost the major parties, especially the Liberals, a number of seats (Beck 1968).

Geographically, the Liberal's pattern of support changed in this period. As Figure 19 shows, much of the party's support came from the Island of Montreal and the Outaouais. Areas of weak Liberal support, like the North and the Cantons-de-l'Est, remained weak. The Conservative vote, pictured in Figure 20, improved in the province, gaining above-median support in the Cantons-de-l'Est again, as well as Trois-Rivières and Rive-Nord, which also supported the UN provincially. The party was weakest in the North.

The Social Credit-based parties provided the most formidable challenge to the nominally two-party system in Quebec during this period. They replicated the provincial Creditiste's pattern of support in the province's peripheral regions. Figure 21 shows that
Figure 19: Average Liberal Vote, 1957-1965
Figure 20: Average Conservative Vote, 1957-1965
Figure 21: Average SC Vote, 1962-1965
their support increased with distance away from Montreal, especially in Gaspesie-Rive-Sud and the North. Its appeal carried the votes of farmers and rural dwellers who were not fully integrated into the changes wrought by both federal government programs and the Quiet Revolution (Pinard 1975).

The other party that saw at least limited success during this period was the New Democratic Party (NDP), the successor to the old CCF. As urbanization and industrialization weakened old traditional values, the NDP was able to gain the votes of some union members and urban dwellers. The party's geography of support is depicted in Figure 22. The map shows that the NDP was based in urban areas; the regions most important to its voting strength in the early 1960s were Quebec, Montreal and Laval. The party did relatively well in the suburbs north of Montreal, the Outaouais and Saguenay-Lac-St.-Jean. The areas with the lowest levels of NDP voting were in regions that had above-median Social Credit support: Abitibi-Temiscamingue, the Cantons-de-l'Est. and Gaspesie-Rive-Sud.

1968-1974

The next three federal elections--1968, 1972 and 1974--were dominated by the Liberal leader Pierre Trudeau, who succeeded Lester Pearson in 1967. Trudeau had been an important player in Quebec provincial politics since the 1950s, when he and a circle of associates railed against the UN and its electoral and social policies. They published
Figure 22: Average NDP Vote, 1962-1965
the Cité Libre, which featured news and opinions that were critical of Quebec's political status quo. The group was sought after by the provincial Liberal party, and Trudeau became a member of the Lesage administration (Behiels 1985).

In terms of policy, Trudeau was to the left of many of his federal and provincial Liberal colleagues. He was also in favor of more centralization, but his stance on this issue did not cost him much support in Quebec, and in fact probably boosted his electoral chances in the other parts of Canada. His success in Quebec in spite of his views probably had to do with his background as a native Quebecker, his notoriety among the Quebec electorate, and his association with the Lesage government. He was also a young, charismatic, intelligent advocate for his positions, in contrast to the lackluster Conservative leader Robert Stanfield and his equally lackluster campaign.

Geographically, as Figure 23 shows, Liberal votes were concentrated again around the Island of Montreal, as well as the Outaouais, Trois-Rivières and Saguenay-Lac-St.-Jean. Low levels of support for the Liberals were located in Richelieu, the Cantons-de-l'Est, and Abitibi-Temiscamingue. The Conservative average vote in these elections, shown in Figure 24, shows that the party was strongest in Rive-Nord, Richelieu and Gaspésie-Rive-Sud. They were weakest in the western part of the province. Both Social Credit and the NDP had some success during this period. Figure 25 shows that the Social Credit pattern was reminiscent of past elections. The stark center/periphery contrast was still in evidence: the two regions of Abitibi-Temiscamingue and the Cantons-de-l'Est were among the party's best supporters. The NDP again
Figure 23: Average Liberal Vote, 1968-1974
Figure 24: Average Conservative Vote, 1968-1974
portrayed its urban support bias: Figure 26 demonstrates that Montreal, Rive-Sud and Laval were its best regions. It was weakest in Trois-Rivières, the Cantons-de-l'Est and Gaspésie-Rive-Sud.

So, from the maps and descriptions above, it can be seen that the geography of those parties that were considered nationalist during this period remained stable. The next chapter will look at the whole series of elections to describe the amount of stability present in the election results.
Figure 26: Average NDP Vote, 1968-1974
IV. Overview of Quebec Elections, 1927-1964

The foregoing analysis of elections in Quebec detailed a great many elections, and the large variety of parties that contested them. Even though the UN and Liberals were pre-eminent through most of the period, third party movements have helped shape voter choices, with the ALN, BP, Social Credit, NDP and RN/RN/PQ receiving votes as well. Finding the underlying patterns in this mass of data aids in its analysis by narrowing the number of aspects to consider into a manageable few.

To gain a more complete view of both the temporal and spatial interrelationships between these myriad parties described in the last two chapters, three principal components analyses (PCA) utilizing varimax rotation were performed on the entire series of federal and provincial elections. This is a commonly-used technique in geographical quantitative analysis to simplify a data matrix (Bailey and Gatrell 1995). Its use here parallels an analysis done by Johnston et al (1986) to uncover the degree to which party electoral geographies in a variety of polities exhibited dealignment, or the breaking of past partisanship ties among the voters.

One analysis was done for each major party or group of parties: the Liberals, the Conservatives: ALN/UN, and the other parties, including again the ALN. The input for the PCAs was a matrix of Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients ($r_s$) for each party's performance in both federal and provincial elections during the whole period—1926 to 1974. This statistic was used in place of Pearson's $r$ because of the small number of
regions (12). Both federal and provincial levels were included in the same matrix to
determine how similar voting patterns were across the different levels of government. As
noted earlier in the chapter, complex understandings between federal and provincial
wings of the Liberal party, between the federal Conservatives and the UN, and between
the federal Liberals and the UN existed that complicated the political scene. Due to the
small number of cases and imperfect boundary matching between elections, this part of
the analysis should be considered as an exploratory procedure to outline possible
connections between elections, rather than a confirmatory exercise. The primary
motivation for including these PCAs into the analysis is demonstrative in nature: to help
give more shape to the data discussed previously, and to make inter-election differences
easier to see.

This analysis has two attributes that will help in describing broad trends in the
returns over time. First, as Johnston and others have written (Johnston 1987, Johnston et
al 1986), looking at the amount of variance explained by the largest component yields a
measure of how stable a party's geography has been over time. This is due to the nature
of the analysis, which is based upon correlations between election results for a party over
a period of time. If there is a high degree of inter-election correlation in the party's
electoral geography over time, then that pattern in the data will explain most of the
variance in the set of elections under study.

For example, if a party exhibited exactly the same electoral geography from one
election to the next, then the inter-election correlations would be 1.0. Only one
component would be extracted by the PCA, and it would explain all of the variance in the set. On the other hand, if a party's inter-election correlations are generally low, it signals a lack of continuity over time. The resulting PCA would have as its first component a pattern in the data that explains less than 100% of the variance in the set, possibly much less, depending on the degree of dissimilarity in the data as measured by inter-election correlations.

Aside from providing a measure of continuity in the results, the PCA will also highlight associations between elections in a temporal sense, and highlight those years which mark a departure from the normal spatial patterns of party support. Shelley and Taylor (1981) use a related technique, factor analysis, to uncover temporal patterns in US election data from the early 1800s to 1980 utilizing state-level data. In it, they are able to group elections into periods, and discover which elections signal a realignment of electoral cleavages as indicated by changes in the electoral geography of the party in question.

The Liberal analysis uncovered eight components, or underlying patterns, with eigenvalues greater than one. Table One below describes the outcome of this PCA. Only component loadings greater than .4 (positive or negative) are listed. In the Liberal analysis, the first component explains 32.3% of the total variance present in the Liberal's voting matrix. This relatively low figure demonstrates that Liberal voting patterns have changed many times during the study period. The component has a fair representation from both federal and provincial elections. Its makeup suggests that it represents
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post-war Liberal dominance at the federal level, coupled with UN strength in provincial elections. It is logical that the first component should indicate this state of affairs, since the component explains the most variance and therefore is the one most representative of a "normal" voting pattern.

The second component describes a basically provincial voting pattern. It highlights elections that witnessed the lessening of the Liberal vote. The provincial elections of 1935, 1936, 1948 and 1973 load highly on it; the Lesage elections of 1960 and 1962 load negatively. The lone federal election involved in this component, Diefenbaker's first victory in 1957, loads negatively as well. The third component is also a chiefly provincial pattern and describes elections during the period of UN dominance in which Liberals either won—1939—or started to improve their standing—1952 and 1956. The 1940 federal election also loads strongly on this component.

Component four can be tied to the pre-war Liberal support pattern, as the provincial elections of 1926 and 1931 load highly on it. The two federal elections of 1972 and 1974 load negatively on it. Component five is a mainly federal pattern, and describes lower Liberal levels of support. Component six is also split between federal and provincial elections, and describes Liberal support during the King era. Component seven, mainly federal in constitution, highlights two elections, 1945 and 1962, which also correspond with serious challenges to Liberal dominance of the two-party system from two third-party forces, the BP and Social Credit. The last component picks out the 1960 provincial elections, certainly a break with the past in terms of government ideology.
Principal components analysis of the Conservative/UN/ALN election results uncovered eight components that together explain 93.7% of the variance in elections. The first component explains 32.1% of the variance, indicating that, like the Liberals, the Conservative group’s vote was not stable geographically. Table Two describes the analysis in more detail. The first component itself is a combination of federal and provincial elections, and describes the weakness in the group’s vote. UN/Conservative provincial victories in 1935 and 1936 load negatively, and weak provincial results in 1960 and 1970 load strongly positive, as do federal results in 1963, 1965, 1968 and 1974.

The second component, chiefly provincial in nature, focuses primarily on the last elections of the UN as well as the 1944 UN result. The largest loading is the 1966 election, when the UN under Daniel won power from the Lesage administration. The component also picks out the last election for the provincial Conservative party, in 1935. It loads negatively.

The third component underscores the weakness of provincial Conservatives, as the final three elections in which they ran candidates load highly negatively on it. The ALN in 1935, which signalled the end of the Conservatives provincially, loads highly positively. Component four is mostly federal in nature, and picks out elections made up of UN provincial election victories in their heyday, the late 1940s and 1950s. Component six highlights three elections that constituted setbacks for the party—the federal election of 1972 and the provincial election of 1939. The 1957 federal election loads negatively on this component. The remaining two components are minor,
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involving either one or two elections.

The final PCA includes the ALN, BP CCF/NDP, Social Credit, and the various separatist parties: the RIN, RN and PQ. The results of the 1942 referendum on conscription are also included in this analysis. Six components were uncovered, the first of which accounts for 46.3% of the variance; Table Three gives the specific loadings. The large amount of variance accounted for by the first component indicates that although the opposition to the dominant party system has been more geographically stable than the support for the other major parties, it is not stable in an absolute sense.

The first component, as it explains the largest part of the variance in the election matrix, has most of the elections loading on it. It seems to create a division of the various parties and issues on the basis of intervention by the state into economic and social matters, with leftist parties loading negatively and rightist parties loading positively.

The second component is provincial in emphasis. With the exception of the RN vote in 1966, it indicates a leftist, pro-nationalist pattern in the matrix. The third factor is similar in impact, but details leftist parties at the federal level. The fourth factor picks out two important federal elections—the Reconstruction's Depression-based vote in 1935 and the "non" vote in the 1942 conscription referendum. The fifth component indicates the parties at both the federal and provincial level that were the vanguard of the new nationalism in Quebec. The ALN in 1935 and the BP in the federal election of 1945 load on this component. Social Credit's showing in the provincial election of 1970 is also
### Table 3: "Third" Party Principal Components Analysis

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| Eigenvalue       | 12.50 | 4.02 | 2.97 | 2.48 | 1.75 | 1.15 |    |
| % of Variance Exp. | 46.30 | 14.90| 11.00| 9.20 | 6.50 | 4.30|    |
present; it loaded negatively. The last component also highlights the 1935 showing of
the ALN, but pairs it instead with the PQ vote in 1973. The federal NDP vote in 1974
loads negatively here.

This PCA of the three party groups that have competed in Quebec has uncovered
two primary findings. First, there is not a great deal of similarity between voting patterns
in provincial and federal elections during the period studied. This is not surprising given
the different types of issues that are at stake in each. Provincial politics, especially after
the UN won office, has centered around how federal-provincial relations should be
structured. Often, the issues that are important to Quebec voters center around how best
to promote francophone culture in Canada at large. This subtle difference in the framing
of campaign rhetoric leads to the voters in the province electing a right-wing government
provincially at the same time that they actively (and massively, in the case of the federal
Liberal party) support a center or center-left government in Ottawa.

Second, the PCA demonstrates that voting patterns in the province have changed
greatly over the study period, as measured by the amount of variance that each analysis'
first component explains. The importance of minor parties in the province is partly
responsible for this situation, and indicates the existence of a large group of voters whose
partisanship is weak, and therefore subject to the influence of campaign-specific factors
in the determination of their vote. This points to the potential for both language and
economic change to be important aspects of the vote in the province, since both offer
relatively easily understood issues upon which to fight campaigns.
From this analysis of the changing electoral fortunes of nationalism in Quebec, three distinct rationales for the rise of nationalist feeling can be discerned. First, nationalist support could be boosted by a desire to protect French culture from being dissolved in a wider Anglo culture already ascendent in the rest of Canada and the United States. This trend has always been important, even in the earliest and most conservative stages of nationalism in Quebec. The Liberal administration of Taschereau in the early part of the 1900s can certainly be included in this school of thought, as can the UN under Duplessis. Policies to limit government activity and to protect the important role of the Church, important in the UN period of Quebec governance, are examples of this type of thinking, as is the ongoing debate over language rights in the province as well as the federal government. These appeals were used by both Taschereau and Duplessis to strengthen their control over the province.

The second rationale stems from the perception that the economy of Quebec is controlled from outside the province, or at least, in the case of the anglophone community, outside francophone control. This is partly the result of the early Liberal and UN administrations' policies of development funded with foreign capital. Therefore, decisions about the Quebec economy are made outside of the francophone community and enrich segments of the population other than francophones. This view can be seen in the Quiet Revolution reforms of the Liberals in the early sixties as well as the PQ government in the late 1970s. The popularity of these measures signalled that they were an effective means of garnering electoral support among many segments of the Quebec
electorate. Most of these reforms attempted to make Quebec more self-sufficient, and to transfer at least some decision-making capability to the francophone community. This perception is also linked to the "internal colonialism" thesis that was popular among some circles in explaining the rise of nationalism (Hechter 1977). The third rationale shares much with the second. The internal colonialism view of nationalism brings with it the implication of discrimination against the group which is being internally colonized. Of course, the most effective way of ending such a power relationship, at least from a sovereigntist point of view, is to sever it completely, and administer the government and economy for the good of the colonized. This view is partly epitomized by the PQ under Rene Levescue, a defender of both large-scale economic projects and sovereignty-association which he thought would give Quebec the needed leverage to reverse the harm done to the francophone community over the years. Of course, his trying to sell the idea of sovereignty-association to Quebec's voters met with much less success.

It is important to note, then, that ample evidence exists in the Quebec electoral record that one need not advocate sovereignty to be considered a nationalist. Previous to the 1970s, all major parties advocated to some extent the principle of provincial rights. One could uncover differences of degree between how much power was to be afforded to the provincial government, but by and large most party programs could be considered nationalist.

We now turn from a broad historical perspective on Quebec elections to the study
of the province's voting after the PQ took power in the province in 1976. The next chapter will describe the campaigns waged in the province from 1976 to 1995.
V. Quebec Elections, 1976-1995

The electoral situation in Quebec was to change radically in 1976. The PQ finally gained the government after two elections which gave them many votes but few seats, due to the workings of the electoral system. This success was to change the face of Quebec politics and elevate the issue of sovereignty to a new importance.

This chapter will describe in a brief fashion the election campaigns in the province between 1976 and 1995. In many ways, it resembles in form the type of analysis that was in the previous chapters, but takes advantage of riding-level information about the major parties involved instead of aggregated regional figures. This allows for smaller-scale spatial patterns to manifest because it increases the number of observation to above 110 in provincial elections and about 75 in federal balloting.

In addition to electoral data, this chapter will incorporate campaign spending data by riding to determine party strategies in the election. Both Quebec and the federal government provide detailed information about campaign fundraising and spending at this level of aggregation, but in spite of this, the data are underutilized by researchers (Eagles 1992).

The work of Eagles (1992) and Johnston (1985) provide the rationale for using these data in electoral studies. Both have used campaign finance data to uncover the effects of both contributions and spending on campaigns, and have formulated a small set of propositions concerning its place. One could expect spending to increase in marginal seats or other seats where a party has a reasonable chance of winning. Spending
generally decreases in safer seats, or seats with incumbents, due to the fact that, barring a
dealignment scenario taking place. incumbents usually have many advantages over their
opponents, and are usually hard to defeat.

By looking at this data over time one can get a feeling for a party's own ideas
about where its resources can be employed most effectively. This ties into Murphy's
(1990) idea of the ideology of place and how it affects the course of campaigns. The
notions that party strategists hold about the characteristics of a certain seat or region help
to shape that party's actions, which in turn act to reify their prior ideas about its partisan
makeup, as well as the types of appeals that are most effective in gaining support.

Maps will be used to demarcate a party's spending strategy. A spending rate of
70% of the legal campaign limit was used as an indicator of a party's targeting of a seat.
To gain an understanding about how the major parties' strategies intersect, all of them are
shown on each map.

1976-1981

The issues and appeals used by the major parties at these elections makes
periodization easy. The first temporal bloc, which includes both federal and provincial
elections between 1976 and 1981, coincides with the Levesque administration and the
prime ministerial tenure of both Pierre Trudeau and Joe Clark. These governments had
widely divergent views on Quebec-Ottawa relations--Levesque, the champion of the idea
of sovereignty-association, often clashed with Trudeau, who thought that the devolution of power to the provinces had gone too far, and inhibited the Federal government from safeguarding the rights of Canadians everywhere.

The other major party involved in this competition was the Quebec Liberal party, under Robert Bourassa until 1978, when Le Devoir editor Claude Ryan, who backed the PQ in 1976, became its leader. Ryan led the party through the 1980 referendum and the 1981 provincial election.

Both provincial Liberal leaders were somewhere in the middle of the continuum bracketed by Levesque and Trudeau on the topic of sovereignty for Quebec. In terms of language policy, always a controversial subject in the province, both were in favor of legislation to improve the status of French in the province, much to the dismay of their anglophone supporters (Dyck 1988). Disgruntled anglophones, allied with social democrats, ran under the Democratic Alliance banner in 1976 to show their displeasure with the Bourassa government.

However, both Ryan and Bourassa believed that Quebec was better served remaining in Confederation, albeit with expanded powers for Quebec within any new constitutional framework that might be brokered and a pro-French language policy at home. So, a description of the Quebec Liberals would be that they were nationalist, but not sovereigntist (Saywell 1977).

Other parties that competed in these elections included the UN, under political neophyte Rodrigue Biron. After their disastrous showing in 1973, the party recouped
enough support among disaffected Liberals who couldn't support the PQ. They were also nationalist and farther to the right than the Liberals, who consistently concentrated on neo-Liberal economics throughout the campaign. Another right-wing provincial party was the Parti Nationale Populaire (PNP), led by a former Liberal cabinet minister (Saywell 1977).

Federally, there were a number of parties that tried to challenge the lock Trudeau's Liberals had on the Quebec Federal electorate. Social Credit, which by now was relegated to Quebec, continued to be competitive in a number of seats in 1979 and 1980. It was hoped by Rene Levesque that many PQ supporters would support the Creditistes because he regarded the party as authentically Quebecois and nationalist in outlook. Because the level of support the SC received was well below that of the PQ in either 1976 or 1981, it is safe to say that Levesque's call to support them went unheeded by many Pequistes (Penniman 1981). Instead, some hard-line sovereigntists inside the PQ set up the Union Populaire (UP) without the support of party elites to contest the 1979 and 1981 elections. Due to its lack of resources, this party failed to gather many votes.

The 1976 election was fought against the backdrop of three major policy questions—the sovereignty-association ideas of the PQ, the alleged corrupt practices of the Bourassa administration; and the economic situation, which was rife with labor strife and increasing unemployment and budgetary problems. For this election, the PQ embarked on a new strategy which disengaged the sovereignty issue from this particular election by stating that a referendum would be held before any changes resulting from
sovereignty-association would occur. This explicit "de-linking" of a PQ victory and immediate independence fulfilled two functions for the party. One was that it acted to attract voters that responded positively to the PQ's good government message but were repelled by its stand on independence. In addition, it also dulled the impact of Bourassa's frequent attacks on the PQ's stance on sovereignty and the negative changes it would bring to Quebec's economy, because a second election would have to be held to actually enact sovereignty association (Dyck 1979).

So, the 1976 election took place in the context of a varied political landscape with important issues being debated by the parties and the public. The stakes, as the various parties described them, were high, the number of parties with reasonable expectations to win seats was large, and the public was interested in the campaign and its outcome. The map of campaign spending strategies, Figure 27, describes this situation. All major parties in the province managed to mount major campaigns in at least one riding, as measured by spending at or above the 70% threshold. The two largest parties in the province spent the most money around the province, with the Liberals maintaining a presence in all ridings. The PQ's weakest campaigns were in the Eastern Townships and scattered seats in Montreal and the Outaouais.

The third party that participated in these elections was the formerly hegemonic UN. They managed to mount well-funded campaigns in most rural areas in the province, which of course mirrors the support that the party had historically enjoyed. The other right-wing parties that participated in the elections, Social Credit and the PNP, were able
Figure 27: Spending Strategies, 1976
to campaign effectively in only a handful of ridings, mostly rural and located in either the North (in the case of the SC), or the Beauce (PNP).

Figure 28 shows the winners in each riding as well as their margin of victory at the 1976 elections. PQ safe seats, those with margins over 10%, are found in four regions—the eastern part of the Island of Montreal, the suburbs around Montreal, the Quebec region, and the North. This arrangement of PQ support demonstrates its urban character at the time. This bias made it easier for the PQ to maintain a social-democratic platform once in office.

Liberal safe seats are found in the Outaouais region and the anglophone/allophone areas of western Montreal. However, due to the entry of the Democratic Alliance as a show of those communities' disapproval of Bourassa's language policies, support for the Liberals was lower than usual. Affluent francophone ridings in the central portion of the Island, around Outremont and Mont-Royal, supported Liberals strongly, but anglophone suburban seats, like Pointe-Claire and Marguerite-Bourgeoys, saw Liberal strength decay to the point of defeat to the UN in the former riding.

The UN was the most successful of the second-tier parties in the 1976 election. Most of the seats it won were rural or small town/industrial ridings, like Nicolet, Yamaska, Johnson, Richmond, Brome-Missisquoi, Saint-Hyacinthe and Bellechasse. Again, its boomlet can be traced to voters who disliked the Liberals but were frightened by the PQ. Social Credit and the PNP were successful in only one seat each; the Democratic Alliance did not win representation.
Figure 28: Party Margins, 1976
The PQ's strong majority victory in the 1976 elections had some effect on how the federal campaign of 1979 was fought. It pushed together the provincial and federal wings of the Liberal party. Also, Claude Ryan became the new provincial Liberal leader after Bourassa resigned in 1978; he appeared to be closer to Trudeau than Bourassa was. In addition, the promised PQ referendum on sovereignty-association was to be held in 1980, and it was thought by some that the 1979 federal election would be a sort of pre-referendum (Lemieux and Crete 1981).

The Progressive Conservatives, who defeated Trudeau nationally in 1979, nonetheless failed to win more than two seats in the province in either 1979 or 1980, the two federal elections in this period. Its success was limited by its leader, Joe Clark, an Albertan whose spoken French was poor and who didn't have much to say to Quebec voters about constitutional matters anyway.

Spending in the ridings for this election was rather widespread, as Figure 29 shows. Due to their command of federal politics in the province, the Liberals were able to spend at least 70% of the limit in most of the seats, and were the only party to do so in a number of seats.

Progressive Conservatives also spent a great deal of money in the province, even though their hopes of gaining representation commensurate with their efforts were low. This could have been done in an attempt to appear to be competitive nationally.

The SC did better than the Conservatives electorally in 1979. Their spending pattern seemed to have been one of incumbent protection, with most spending occurring
in SC-held seats. There was not much of an effort to win new territory.

The effort by sovereigntists to run a party in these federal elections was limited in their spending by lack of resources. In only one riding did they manage to spend over 70% of the allowed amount, and even this was due to the candidate's own resources rather than his fund-raising capability.

Except for the Liberals, no party was terribly successful in gaining votes in 1979. Figure 30 depicts the situation at this federal election. The majority of Liberal seats were won with margins over 10%, thereby considered safe seats. Moreover, except for the northwestern section of the province, Liberal wins were widely distributed across the province.

Conservatives won in only two seats—Brome-Missisquoi in the Eastern Townships and Joliette in the Rive-Nord region, even though they carried the election nationally. Social Credit, while more successful (six seats won), continued its decline in terms of seats and votes won. Their best regions were rural areas around Quebec and the Northwest.

Due to an unfriendly amendment to the Conservative's budget in 1979, their young government fell, and new elections in the spring of 1980 became necessary. Clark's government was still unpopular in Quebec due to its lack of concrete policies towards the province, but Liberals, still under Pierre Trudeau, were at least as popular as they were months before (Irvine 1981).

Party spending strategies in this election for the most part matched that of the
previous one as Figure 31 shows. The most obvious difference is the number of ridings in which no party spent near the allowable limit. Seats in this category included a large number on the Island of Montreal and the Outaouais, all Liberal-held in 1979. Conversely, only one seat saw spending by every major party in excess of 70% of the limit. Both parties practiced an election strategy based on incumbent protection; only the Liberal had the resources to spend money in other parties' incumbent seats.

For their part, Conservatives challenged Liberals less in 1980 than before. In addition to the large number of seats where spending by every party was low, there was only one seat where they were the only party to spend near the limit—on the island of Montreal. In their battle to maintain House of Commons representation, the SC spent their limit mainly in their incumbent's seats. They were matched in their spending by the Liberals in almost all of their seats.

However, SC spending was unsuccessful in protecting their incumbents from the Liberal tide in the province that swept Trudeau back into power. This Liberal landslide occurred even as the Liberals were effectively shut out in western Canada. They elected 70 members with majorities in excess of 10%, improving their showing over 1979. Conservatives again returned only two members, one in Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot (an area of UN strength in years past) and the other in Joliette, held by a popular incumbent. The geography of this election is depicted in Figure 32.

The next election in the province was the PQ-sponsored referendum on sovereignty-association in the spring of 1980. The party's policy makers had promised to
hold the referendum before their mandate expired in 1981. It was originally planned for 1979, but in order to keep it separate (as much as possible) from the general election held that year, the party decided to delay the balloting until May 1980. This date was after Trudeau's return to power in the election earlier that year.

To organize the campaign for each side, umbrella groups were formed, but the major parties nonetheless took the lead. the Liberals leading the Non campaign, and the PQ predictably championing the Oui. The federal government also played an important role, with Trudeau and various Quebec cabinet ministers stumping the province for the Non.

Major issues revolved around the economic, cultural and political facets of sovereignty-association. In the first instance, both sides used the economic situation (at this time one of relatively high unemployment and inflation rates) to their benefit. Oui supporters argued that Quebec was not getting its full benefit from being within Federation as currently constituted, with unemployment being higher than that of neighboring provinces. The Non forces argued that the benefits that Quebec enjoyed as a province, including relatively inexpensive oil shipments and receiving head offices for many governmental departments and bureaus, would disappear (Globe and Mail 1980a). Also, damage to the economy as a result of the turmoil that could be caused by a oui on the question.

Culturally, the battle between oui and non was fought on a variety of fronts. In appeals to voters, Levesque started to define Quebecois identity more narrowly according
to linguistic groups, not just place of residence. For example, in Sept-Iles, a small industrial town in the Saguenay region. Levesque said that "the referendum must be won by a francophone majority, by 'the nation which we constitute'" (Globe and Mail 1980b). Liberals predictably rebutted this trend, since their support base was much more dependent on anglophone/allophone voters who were understandably frightened by these types of speeches. In addition, scattered reports of campaign violence were reported by both parties: charges of "fascism" were also traded (Strauss 1980).

Politically, attention focused on the shape of constitutional relations between Quebec and Canada after the referendum. Questions centered around what kinds of agreements could be reached, and when. The Oui side told voters that a oui vote would not mean immediate independence. Only after the completion of negotiations with Ottawa over the framework for an economic union would independence be declared. Non campaigners pushed for constitutional reforms after their victory, but plainly within federal structures. However, whether or not these would satisfy oui supporters was questionable, given Trudeau's propensity for centralizing government power.

Unfortunately, spending information was not available from the Quebec government. Results by riding were, however; these are presented in Figure 33. This map indicates that Quebec's voters were not ready for Levesque's ideas. The Oui campaign won only a few ridings, mainly in the north and Montreal. Other areas of strength were in the Northern Montreal suburbs and the Quebec region. Not surprisingly, these regions were also prime PQ territory in past elections. Areas where the Non were
dominant include central and western sections of the Island of Montreal, the Outaouais and Eastern Townships, regions with relatively large anglophone populations and above-average support levels for the Liberals.

The next election in the province occurred in 1981, when the PQ was re-elected with a majority of seats even though they lost the referendum just months previous. The political climate was therefore much different than in 1976, and the PQ downplayed the issue of sovereignty this time. Instead, they played up economic issues, just as the Liberals did in 1973 and 1976.

As Figure 34 shows, the number of competitive parties dropped to just three—the PQ and Liberals were once again joined by the UN. Most ridings in the province received well-financed campaigns. Both the PQ and the Liberals fought in all corners of the province. In this elections as the last, these parties mounted credible campaigns even in their weakest regions—the Liberals in the North and Montreal suburbs, the PQ in Montreal's East End and the Outaouais. This indicates that party decision-makers still had hopes of overcoming their lack of support among certain groups even after the divisive referendum campaign.

The UN's effort was diminished from 1976. One can discern a further withdrawal from the major metropolitan areas of the province into their old rural bailiwicks. In addition, the number of seats that the UN was able to effectively contest decreased from the last provincial election. This was the last year that the UN had a reasonable chance of winning seats in the National Assembly.
Figure 35 shows the extent of the PQ's win. The party took the lion's share of
both the popular vote and seats, winning in almost every corner of the province.
However, Liberals demonstrated their strength in the Outaouais and the southern rank of
the Eastern Townships. In addition, Liberals continued to win in Western Montreal. The
UN declined further, and failed to elect a single member in the election.

1984-1989

The 1984 federal elections were held under new political circumstances as well.
Both of the major federal parties had new leaders with Quebec roots—John Turner of the
Liberals once represented an anglophone seat in the House of Commons, and the
Progressive Conservative's Brian Mulroney was a fluently bilingual native of
Baie-Comeau, a small pulp town in the Saguenay region. Both of the new leaders were
departures from the old in that they were more conservative than the men they replaced.
Both advocated smaller government and less government spending (Clarkson 1988,
Frizzell and Westell 1985).

This turn to the right failed to keep Trudeau voters in the Liberal camp. A dismal
campaign put on by the Liberals was coupled with certain advantages Brian Mulroney
enjoyed over his opponent. First, as was already stated he was bilingual and more
comfortable speaking French than Turner. Second, Mulroney made it plain that he was
in favor of changing the constitution to make it more amenable to Quebec's interests: in
1982 the constitution was repatriated from Britain without Quebec's approval. Turner did not concentrate on constitutional issues during his campaign. Third, Mulroney had the benefit of nearly 16 years of a Trudeau-led government; people just wanted a change of leadership, and for the most part voters doubted that Turner could deliver (Perlin 1988, Frizzell and Westell 1985).

In terms of campaign spending, the 1984 election demonstrates the resurgence of the Progressive Conservative party in Quebec. Figure 36 depicts spending patterns at this election. Due to its popular leader and other circumstances, the party had enough resources to mount a very large-scale campaign in almost every seat. The number of seats in which the Conservatives held the spending edge increased as well. These seats were generally located in the Outaouais and the Island of Montreal. In only one seat did the Liberals achieve this: on the East End of Montreal.

For its part, the New Democratic Party's first appearance in these maps was able to mount at least a semblance of a campaign in the province for the first time in its history. The likelihood of a breakthrough here was small, however; one reason for the amount of money that the NDP spent in its losing cause in Quebec might have been to appear as a national party, and thus increase its support elsewhere. The one seat where it spent over 70% of the campaign limit was Levis, a metropolitan Quebec seat.

The extent of the Liberal loss is shown in Figure 37. Once the hegemonic party in Quebec's federal politics, Turner's Liberals were left with a rump delegation mostly made up of Montreal MPs. The Conservatives, who were the beneficiaries of at least tacit PQ
Figure 36: Spending Strategies, 1984
Figure 37: Party Margins, 1984

[Map showing party margins with regions shaded differently for different margins.]
support, won seats in every corner of the province, including Mulroney's seat of Manicouagan.

The 1985 and 1989 provincial elections were similar in campaign themes and outcome. Leadership changes occurred in both parties. Robert Bourassa succeeded Claude Ryan in 1982, ending his retirement from politics. Pierre-Marc Johnson, son of the former UN premier of the late 1960s, took the leadership of the party after Levesque retired in 1984. His leadership saw the continued erosion of the party's commitment to social-democratic policies started after the 1981 elections, and further, a retreat from the then-unpopular idea of sovereignty-association (McLean's 1989).

During the campaigns it became clear that, although Johnson was able to smooth over most of the turmoil in his party over its new direction, he was unable to resuscitate the party in the eyes of the electorate. Under the PQ, economic conditions worsened and labor strife continued. The Liberals, with the technocratic, neo-liberal Bourassa at the helm, promised to run Quebec's finances better.

However, Bourassa had his own problems in both 1985 and 1989. He was never terribly popular personally in the province. The PQ leadership was more popular than Bourassa in terms of leadership qualities in both. Also, in these elections there was no hope of any assistance from the Federal wing of the party, since it was decimated by Mulroney in 1984 and 1988.

Campaign spending in both elections showed a similar pattern. The 1985 map, Figure 38, shows a decline in the PQ's position. As the party was unpopular in
pre-election polls, this is not surprising. What is rather unexpected is where the PQ was able to still mount some effort. Only two seats in Montreal were without PQ spending over the 70% threshold; only one of these was in the East End. On the other hand, the Liberals left only the far north to the PQ. Much the same patterns were evident in 1989 (Figure 39).

Bourassa’s Liberals won resounding majorities in both 1985 and 1989. The maps that show this. Figures 40 and 41, depict similar patterns of support for the parties. The Liberals demonstrated their popularity by winning margins of over 10% in most of the province: PQ support remained noticeable in two areas—Eastern Montreal and its surroundings, and the far North.

The 1988 Federal election was, in terms of party leaders, a repeat of the 1984 election. However, there were important differences. First, Mulroney was a popular incumbent, at least in Quebec. Secondly, he was able to initiate action on two fronts deemed important to Quebec’s future.

The first policy area was constitutional affairs. Mulroney and the provincial premiers developed the Meech Lake Accords in 1987. This agreement incorporated Quebec into the Canadian constitution by recognizing it as a "distinct society". This was an important point, and helped Meech to become popular in Quebec. The agreement provided for a three-year ratification period. At its conclusion, unanimous support in provincial legislatures was necessary for its enactment.

The second item that Mulroney was able to act on was the Free Trade Agreement
Figure 39: Spending Strategies, 1989
between the US and Canada. Although the FTA was attacked by unions, the Federal Liberals, and NDP and other groups, it fit well with neo-liberal tendencies in Quebec's government, and Bourassa's provincial Liberals were solidly behind it (Frizzell, Pammett and Westell 1989).

The map of campaign spending strategies for this election (Figure 42) show the amount of slippage that had occurred in the Liberal organization since their halcyon days of Trudeau and 1980. It was now the Conservatives that outspent Liberals in many seats, almost all off the Island of Montreal. Elsewhere, Conservatives and Liberals mounted credible campaigns in terms of money spent.

This election was notable as well because of the push that the NDP put on in the province in hopes of winning their first Quebec seat at a general election in their history (Frizzell, Pammett and Westell 1989). NDP-targetted seats could be divided into two major groups. The first were urban areas, like Montreal, Quebec and Saint-Maurice. The second was in resource-rich rural seats like Champlain and Témiscamingue, in the northern part of the province. Both were areas of some strength for the party in previous years.

The Liberal position in 1988 was much eroded from 1984. This was due to many factors, such as the continued unpopularity of party leader John Turner in Quebec, the popularity of Mulroney and the support for free trade in the province. Liberal money went to other places where the issues and personalities favored them more than in Quebec (Frizzell, Pammett and Westell 1989). This erosion in party organization and
campaigning is evident in the number of places where the party's spending fell off. This is most noticeable in the North, where Mulroney was especially popular. Liberal spending was maintained in their Montreal core, and as Figure 43 shows, Liberal victories were mostly relegated to that same area. Even there, races were close.

1992-1995

The next referendum held in the province was to ratify the Charlottetown Accords in 1992. This was the successor document to the Meech Lake Accords, which failed to gain unanimous approval among the provinces by the 1990 deadline. Two developments from this failure became important in Quebec politics. First, shortly after Meech Lake expired, nine members of the Quebec delegation to the House of Commons, including high-profile Cabinet Minister Lucien Bouchard, left the Conservative and Liberal parties to form the Bloc Quebecois, a party dedicated to representing the sovereigntist position in Ottawa, the first such movement to have representation at the federal level.

Secondly, since the Meech Lake Accords were popular in the province, their demise was taken as an insult to the sensibilities of Quebeckers. Therefore, support for separatism increased, and positions among even federalists hardened about what kinds of constitutional amendments would be acceptable to Quebec.

The Charlottetown Accords were an attempt to placate both Quebec nationalists as well as those in the Western part of Canada who desired more decentralization of
power and changes in the way some Federal institutions functioned. Like Meech Lake, the Charlottetown Accords also recognized Quebec as a distinct society, as well as an elected Senate with expanded powers and a more equitable allocation of seats (Burgess 1993).

Instead of a lengthy approval process like that of the Meech Lake debacle, the Charlottetown Accords were to be voted on in a referendum. Voting in Quebec was done under the auspices of the provincial electoral apparatus: the Federal Elections Canada administered the vote elsewhere in the country.

The balloting was scheduled for October 1992. In the beginning of the campaign, the measure was expected to pass by large margins in English Canada, with a closer vote in Quebec (Mclean's 1992). However, opponents of the Accords were successful in tying them to unpopular national and provincial governments, and the character of the race reversed until it was plain that the question would lose in many provinces (Mclean's 1992, LeDuc and Pammett 1995, Burgess 1993).

Campaign spending in the 1992 referendum, shown in Figure 44, illustrates interesting patterns. First, this election clearly demonstrates a change in pro-nationalist priorities. Montreal ridings were among those with very low levels of Non campaign spending, probably out of low expectations for the number of potential Non voters there. The ridings on the Island that received more attention by the Non committee were concentrated in the east central areas of Montreal proper. Other regions of heightened Non spending were in the North, the Gaspe, and a group of seats between Quebec and
Figure 44: NON Spending, 1992
Nicolet. This trend continues in both the 1994 provincial election and the 1995 referendum.

The results of this election in Quebec are shown in Figure 45. Overall the Referendum failed by a margin of 54.4 to 44.6%, but in Quebec the Non was marginally stronger and achieved a 55.4 to 42.4% win over the Oui. The map itself clearly shows the areal signature of the two main electoral cleavages in the province: anglophone/allophone vs. francophone and Montreal vs. the rest of the province.

The first voter cleavage is evidenced by the clear difference in opposition to the Accords between the West End of the Island of Montreal and the Outaouais on one hand and most of the rest of the province on the other. The former areas voted for approval by 60% and over; the second (and larger, in terms of voters) voted against them by the same vote. A secondary source of weak support for the Accords are also areas that are home to residual anglo population--the Eastern Townships.

The Montreal/rest-of-province cleavage is evident as well. Even in the francophone East End, support for the Non is weaker than in other parts of the province: the West End, as already mentioned, voted heavily Oui. Upper-class francophones in ridings like Outremont and Mont-Royal in the center-west part of the Island, voted Oui as well. In this regard, class seems to be a contributing factor as well.

The next federal election occurred a year after the Charlottetown Accord referendum. This was the BQ's first general election, and under the leadership of Lucien Bouchard the party was set to win a large number of seats, capitalizing on the new higher
level of support for separatism due to the failure of Meech and Charlottetown.

The Progressive Conservatives chose a new leader for this election. Brian Mulroney became a very unpopular prime minister in most of the country as a result of his party's policies regarding the Constitution and taxation. Mulroney's successor was Kim Campbell, a Cabinet minister from Vancouver. After enjoying a lead in the polls early in the campaign, a stumbling campaign allowed her opponents to overtake the PCs, and relegate them to a poor showing (Frizzell, Pammett and Westell 1994).

The Liberals, under Jean Chretien, were optimistic about the results. The new leader had been successful in selling himself to the public, and the party was enjoying a resurgence from the lowered support levels that plagued it under Turner. This increase in approval was nearly universal in Canada, from the West to Quebec (Frizzell, Pammett and Westell 1994).

Figure 46 shows the pattern of campaign spending for this federal election. One notes that the patterns evident are harder to characterize. Two things are noticeable almost immediately. First, in their premiere general election, the BQ were less-funded and mounted credible campaigns in all corners of the province. Their efforts in terms of campaign spending were in urban and rural seats, the northern Montreal suburbs, Quebec, the Eastern Townships, and the region around Saint-Maurice.

Second, one can also detect an increase in Liberal campaign activity in the province. Their most concentrated efforts occurred in the Montreal area, but were also active in most regions of the province, including Saint-Maurice, the riding that returned
Figure 46: Spending Strategies, 1993
Chretien to the House of Commons.

Third, the Conservatives were not as active as they had been in 1988. There were many reasons for this, including a poor campaign, Campbell's lack of attachment to Quebec, and the BQ siphoning off their supporters. They still managed to keep up with their competitors, but did not hold the commanding position they had in 1988.

Fourth, there was a sharp increase in the number of seats in which none of the parties spent over the 70% threshold, from none in 1988 to eleven in 1993. There was not a clear pattern to this phenomenon, but most of the seats involved were held by Progressive Conservatives in 1988.

As Figure 47 shows, the BQ were able to maintain sovereigntist strength in francophone areas of the province. This proved to be at the expense of the Conservatives, who were returned in only one seat—Jean Charest in Sherbrooke. Interestingly, he was Campbell's main challenger for the Progressive Conservative leadership. The lone independent in Quebec's delegation was a former Conservative whose papers were refused by Campbell over the candidate's legal problems.

The Liberals expanded their base in Montreal, and continued to win seats in the Outaouais. However, their only victories outside of these areas were in Saint-Maurice and Bonaventure-Iles-de-la-Madeleine. Closer races which were won by the BQ were in the Eastern Townships and the Quebec area. Like 1984, francophones in the province did not support Liberal candidates.

The next provincial election took place in 1994. Sovereigntist forces, buoyed by
Figure 47: Party Margins, 1993
the victory of the BQ in 1993, were hopeful for a victory by the PQ, led by staunch sovereigntist Jacques Parizeau. Liberals also had a new leader—Daniel Johnson, federalist, neo-liberal brother of former PQ leader Pierre-Marc Johnson. These parties were joined by a third for these elections. The Action Democratique Quebec (ADQ) was a nationalist offshoot of the Liberals, led by Mario Dumont, former leader of the Young Liberals in the province.

The campaign retraced familiar steps in Quebec politics. Liberals brought up the issues of sovereignty and its economic perils; the PQ refuted these and played up the idea that Liberals had been in power too long. The ADQ tried to take a middle ground between these two polar opposites, but still kept to a moderately pro-sovereignist line (Gagnon 1994).

Figure 48 shows the patterns of campaign spending in this election. The major point to make is that these patterns are similar to those in the 1992 referendum—pro-sovereignists spending less in Montreal-area ridings where they have little chance of winning, while Liberals were free to spend in more places. It seems that the PQ had given up trying to convince anglophones or allophones to support them.

On election day, the PQ were successful in unseating the Liberals. Figure 49 illustrates that the PQ were elected by large margins in areas that had supported them in the past—the East End of Montreal and francophone ridings in the rest of the province. Liberals also derived their seats from familiar territory, like the West End and the Outaouais. However, the closeness of the contest in popular vote terms is demonstrated
Figure 49: Party Margins, 1994
by the large number of marginal seats, especially in the Laval and Richelieu regions.

Liberal marginals were located in the rural Quebec region and the Gaspe.

The ADQ managed to elect only one member. Mario Dumont won his seat of Rimouski, in the Gaspe. They did better in raw vote terms, winning eight percent. However, since their vote was widely distributed, they had not won seats proportional to this figure.

Only one year into their mandate, the PQ held another sovereignty referendum, with much the same idea as the last one in 1980. Voting oui on the question would authorize the Quebec government to negotiate with the federal government about political sovereignty, while maintaining close economic ties with Canada. The federalist campaign used its stock appeals as well, warning about the dire consequences of a yes vote.

The campaign tightened considerably during its course. At first, the Non campaign seemed to maintain an early lead, due to a lackluster campaign by Parizeau that failed to ignite the emotions of the sovereigntist side. Their campaign picked up when BQ leader Lucien Bouchard took a more active role in the campaign (*McLean's* 1995).

Another factor that worked to the benefit of the Oui was the nature of the Non campaign. Their message was biased towards negative statements against the proposition rather than positive reasons to support federalism as it was or had the chance to become. Secondly, the federal government was slow to involve itself fully in the
campaign, leaving the task of winning the election to Daniel Johnson, even though he lacked charisma and appeal. Because of this, the Oui campaign worked its way from a seemingly insurmountable deficit to slightly ahead of the Non at the time of the voting (McLean's 1995).

Figure 50 details the pattern of campaign spending in the referendum campaign by the Oui committee. The pattern is largely the same as the last two elections. Sovereignist campaigns were run at a lower intensity in areas where victory was unlikely, but higher where prospects were better. The results of this mode of campaign are pictured in Figure 51, which shows the election result.

Turnout at this election was extremely high—over 90% of eligible voters in the province, one of the highest in its history. The Non barely held on to a majority of the vote, winning by 50,000 votes out of about 5,000,000 cast. However, the Oui won an important moral victory by carrying the francophone vote by slightly less than 60-40%.

The overall closeness of the vote is demonstrated on the map in Figure 51. While it is true that the Oui won more ridings than the Non, the Non won the referendum because of large turnouts and overwhelming margins in anglophone ridings, offsetting a slightly less-than-expected margin of Oui votes in the northern regions of the province.

The spatial pattern of support for the Oui is again reminiscent of other elections. Non voters were most numerous in areas of Liberal strength—West End Montreal and the Outaouais, with smaller pockets in the Eastern Townships and Gaspe. Oui voters were found mostly in the North, northern Montreal Suburbs, and the extreme eastern part of
Figure 50: OUI Spending, 1995
the Island of Montreal.

One thing must be pointed out concerning the differences in voting between the francophones and non-francophones in Quebec. While it is true that this between-group difference is far from trivial, it is also true that the monolithic nature of the francophone electorate can be overstated. This is demonstrated by looking at results from predominantly anglophone and francophone ridings for the 1995 referendum. Anglophone seats, like D'Arcy-McGee, Jacques-Cartier and Saint-Laurent, scored over 80% of the vote for the Non: in fact, in D'Arcy-McGee, the result was an astonishing 96.38% for the Non, on a turnout of just under 95%.

On the other hand, predominantly francophone ridings delivered a greatly lower amount of votes for the Oui, like Rimouski (63.73%), Kamouraska-Temiskouata (52.66%), and Joliette (63.88%). In fact, in the province as a whole, francophone support of the question hovered at just under 60%; if it received just over that mark, the question would have carried by the barest of majorities.

Why is there such a discrepancy in francophone support for sovereignty, when the anglophone community is in fact nearly unanimously against it? One could posit that the stakes are higher for anglophones; they may feel that they have more to lose in an independent Quebec culturally, economically and politically. However, the stakes for francophones are not as clear cut. Some segments of francophone society, such as the elderly and federal government workers (an important and numerous segment of the population in the Outaouais) would probably be negatively impacted if the sovereigntists
won a referendum, and so have different voting preferences from other francophones who are more confident of their economic and social place in an independent Quebec. In addition, one must keep in mind that it is not only francophone voters who are divided on the issue of sovereignty, but their elites as well. The leaders of the major political parties in the province, all francophones, have different views on the subject as well.

This is not to say that cultural considerations play no role in the francophone community in regards to sovereignty; far from it, as Jacques Parizeau’s comments after the defeat of the 1995 referendum clearly demonstrate. Rather, it is an issue of ethnic security—anglophones vote in great numbers against sovereignty and sovereigntists in order to retain their place in Quebec society. On the other hand, the favored place that francophone culture has held in the province since the reforms of Lesage and later premiers is secure in the province as long as francophones are able make up a majority of the population. This point is the reason that the PQ, BQ and other sovereigntists and nationalists of a more moderate stripe (like the provincial Liberal party) put such a premium on linguistic and cultural policy—to insure the socialization of newcomers into the francophone culture, at least as far as the primacy of the French language in the educational system.

Over the study period, voting patterns in the province have remained fairly constant, with all major parties maintaining their areas of strength. However, there have been changes. First, the PQ has seen its support slowly slip in the Montreal area from 1976 to 1989, with a small recoup in 1995. The party has always been strongest in the
extreme eastern ridings on the island, but over time has lost neighboring territory to the west.

Second, an area of marginal seats has become apparent in the Richelieu and Eastern Townships. As political opinion continues to be polarized, these marginal seats become more important.

There has been much more change in the partisan makeup of the Quebec delegation to Ottawa over the same period. The leading party in the province federally has changed three times in the five elections studied. All five elections have resulted in landslides for the victors, leaving the vanquished with a few isolated seats in the province. The most constant voters have been Liberals in the central part of Montreal. Even at their nadir of electoral success, they still elected a handful of MPs from this region. Only two seats fulfill the same role for the Conservatives: Joliette, which was held from 1979 to the 1993 election, and Sherbrooke, held from 1984 to the present.

This brief analysis of the election in Quebec after 1976 has sketched out the major issues at stake, as well as the geographical patterns of the vote for those parties that won seats at each. By mapping the election results and the patterns of party spending in each campaign, the geographical patterns are made easier to see, and therefore the relationship between place and voting is made clearer. As this is one of the major purposes of this dissertation, this outcome is important.

The inclusion of mapped party spending data into the analysis accomplishes the important goal of uncovering party strategies for victory. The researcher can see exactly
where the parties waged hard-fought campaigns, and conversely where they wrote off candidates with little chance of victory. Since riding-level data of this type is not used often (Eagles 1992), this analysis has uncovered information not generally referred to in other electoral studies.

The mapping of this data, both on spending and the actual election returns, adds an important spatial dimension to existing work on Quebec politics done by political scientists dependent on the analysis of survey data, which generally does not go into depth about the differences in voting between places except at the grossest of scales (Blais and Crete 1986, LeDuc and Pammett 1995, Pinard 1975). As was demonstrated in the previous chapters, there is much spatial heterogeneity in the province that should be taken into account more specifically if a fuller understanding of Quebec politics is to be had.

The next section links language and economic change with voting in order to discover which type of influence is a more important predictor of partisan choice.
VI. Multiple Regression Analyses of Quebec Elections, 1976-1995

In electoral geography, there has been a great tug-of-war over the "correct" assumptions between those who follow a more traditionally-based concern over compositional forms of argument (voters' socioeconomic attributes determine their vote; McAllister 1987) versus those who prefer a more contextualized, or place-based, approach (Johnston 1987, Agnew 1987). In the latter, emphasis is placed on how a voter's life experiences in a given locale help to form their responses to political stimuli. Since the local area in which a voter resides helps to form information networks, job opportunities, and the type of friends and peers they might meet, place is the physical context for these activities, and has been used by many in contextual studies of political phenomenon (Lutz 1995, Eagles and Erfle 1990, Johnston, Pattie and Allsopp 1988). This is not to say, however, that this is a purely dichotomous choice; composition and context both influence voting decisions. The issue at hand is a question of emphasis and, as Johnston writes, much of the work on electoral issues has concentrated too much on compositional attributes of the voting population (Johnston 1987). The form that my research will take is similar to the views of place set forth by John Agnew (1987), Doreen Massey (1984, 1993), Ron Johnston (1987, 1988), and Peter Taylor (1993), researchers who recognize the value of a contextual approach to these types of questions.

Thus, while the theoretical bases of why a contextual effect exists that conditions voting behavior in an area to attributes of that area's socio-economic and cultural
makeup, it is notoriously difficult to separate individual-level effects from group-level ones. The reality of the situation is that, as levels of aggregation become further and further removed from the level of the individual, correlations between variables tend to become inflated, rendering individual-level relationships among the data inferred by aggregate-level statistical methods unreliable. Robinson (1950), in a seminal work that has had a great chilling effect on the use of aggregate statistics in social science, brought this fact to the attention of researchers.

*Contextual Modes of Electoral Research*

Contextual methods of research should be used more often by electoral geographers for at least three reasons. First, much work that has been done to date in the study of elections relegates place's effect on voting to a "fixing account"—a certain portion of the variance left unexplained after other variables have been employed in a statistical analysis. Instead of seeing place as a causal influence on voting behavior, place's role is incidental to the spatial distribution of the compositional attributes of a population. Agnew (1987a, 1987b) and others (Eagles 1995, Burbank 1995, Sprague 1982, 1994, Books and Prysby 1991, Johnston 1987, Cox 1987, Rumley 1987, Savage 1987) argue for a much strengthened role for place in electoral studies. In this formulation, place accounts for variability in electoral support by appealing to issues behind the mere distribution of social categories: uneven development and the dialectic
nature of place (how place shapes and is shaped by more global forces) are brought into
the discussion to get a more complete understanding of electoral politics.

Since then, however, more researchers have been using this technique in order to
both circumvent some of the limitations of survey methods of research, namely its
expense and the time required to undertake such projects, and to test the strength of
contextual effects. In terms of research treatments, there seem to be three major
approaches to the use of aggregate data. One, attempts to uncover information about the
contexts in which people live as well as the types of candidates and issues supported by
voters in those contexts. This approach utilizes aggregate data exclusively; an example
of this type of study is the recent work by O'Loughlin, Flint and Anselin (1994), which
used spatial econometrics to investigate the sources of support for the Nazi Party in
Wiemar Germany at the 1930 elections. Since the focus of their research was not to
estimate individual behavior, but rather to focus on the "effects of space and place" (p.
374) on the pattern of the vote, the ecological fallacy was not at issue. Other works on
ecological methods make the same point (Iverson 1991, Langbein and Lichtman 1978);
only when individual behavior is inferred from the data does the ecological fallacy come
into play. If the effects of place are the focus of the study, then places are the proper
level of analysis.

A second approach to ecological studies in politics is held up by Grofman and
others (Grofman 1995, Grofman and Handley 1995, Grofman, Migalski and Noviello
1985), who use methods of ecological regression to actually estimate the behavior of
individuals. Most often, Grofman uses these techniques in voting rights cases to estimate the level of racial bloc voting present in a given jurisdiction: such a finding is important to force changes in prejudicial voting rules and electoral redistricting practices. Again, no survey data are used, since collection in these cases would prove prohibitively expensive and time-consuming. To avoid the ecological fallacy, this corpus of work relies on a refinement of methods of ecological regression proposed by Goodman (1959), Duncan and Davis (1953), and Boudon (1963) to circumvent problematic procedures. However, O'Loughlin, Flint and Anselin (1994) make the point that one of the assumptions used by Grofman's methods—that of a uniformity of individual response over the units of analysis in question—take out the effects of context that are most interesting to geographers. This is a definite drawback to applying his methodology to the question at hand in my study.

A third type of research in aggregate data analysis strives to explicitly study contextual effects in voting behavior by including both individual-level (gained through survey research) and aggregate-level data in the same analysis. Through the use of regression analysis, the relative strength of each type of effect can be sorted out. The main limitation of this type of research is that it needs the individual-level data: without it, it is impossible to disentangle the individual-level effect from the contextual effect (Iverson 1991).

I have chosen to use methods similar to those used by O'Loughlin, Flint and Anselin (1994). Since the pattern of voting at a higher level of aggregation is my object
of study, the ecological fallacy should not be a problem. Even though my research will
not try to measure directly the effect of context on individual voting behavior, it will
describe in more detail which contexts are more amenable to support for separatism in
Quebec.

The use of these types of contextual arguments in electoral geography also allows
one to get away from the assumption that regional and local differentiation in voting
patterns have become less important due to the broad reach of economic development
and modernization. The proposed nationalization of electorates, which holds that
electorates are becoming more homogenous due to economic development and
modernization as well as national-scale media saturation, has been an important starting
point for traditional research into voting behavior (Agnew 1987a). This is still the case
even though studies of elections in the US, Great Britain and Canada have found
increasing levels of sectionalism and regionalism in voting patterns (Johnston, Pattie and
Frizzell, Pammett and Westell 1994). Contextual methods of research, on the other hand,
posit that place is still important in explaining voting patterns. Since it is true that places
have been differentially affected by broader changes in society, a thorough discussion of
how a place has developed historically is needed to gain valuable insights into how voters
come to support various parties and issues.
Regression Variables

As I stated in the beginning of this study, economics and culture are two major determinants of electoral behavior. However, their relationship in the Quebec context is not clear cut. A major focus of the quantitative analysis is to test which type of influence is stronger most often in Quebec politics.

Measurement of language in the study is relatively straightforward. Home language use will be used instead of mother tongue, or the language one learns to be fluent in first. Census figures are available for home language since 1986. The inclusion of these language variables in the study is important for two reasons. First, language is often used as a cultural marker (Orridge 1982), a basis for inclusion in (or exclusion from) a given ethnic group. Secondly, knowledge of a particular language can be used as a vehicle for social advancement; conversely, lack of knowledge of a language can act as an obstacle to advancement. In earlier periods of Quebec history, English was seen as the language of commerce, and in order to gain access to economic power and influence, a working knowledge of English was essential.

The notion of economic change and its differential and dialectical relationship with place is more difficult to measure. Much research has been carried out on the topic of restructuring, global/local processes, and accumulation (Massey 1984, 1993, Agnew and Corbridge 1995, Dicken 1993, Knox and Agnew 1994, Luke 1994, Fagan and Le Heron 1994); however, very little of what is written on the topic relates it specifically to
electoral politics. Perhaps this stems from a belief that voting is less important than other, more demonstrative forms of participation, like campaigning, striking, or nominating candidates.

One can expect economic change to play an important role in sovereignty questions. The economic outcome of a vote for sovereignty in Quebec has been a major issue for both sides of the debate. Many people hold that separation from the rest of Canada would do irreparable harm to both the Canadian and Quebec economies. This has proven an effective campaign plank with the federalist forces in the sovereignty referendums. The obverse opinion, that in fact Quebec has developed its own economy enough over the last 15 years to make the federalist "economic ruin" argument much weaker, was argued forcefully in the 1995 referendum campaign by supporters of the PQ and others in favor of separation.

Of course, the impact of the above arguments on the voting decisions of individual voters would vary in effectiveness from place to place depending upon the direction of change in a local economy, attributes of an area's workers, the types of industries and jobs they hold, the type of firms located there, and the history of labor-capital relations, among other factors. Savage (1987) postulates that, as far as the voting decisions of the electorate are concerned, it is this change—an improving or decaying local economy—that will affect its reactions to candidates and issues more than static measures of an area's economic well-being. This observation provides the tie between economic restructuring and voting that I will investigate in this research.
The notion of a decaying or improving local economy is hard to operationalize. Since there are a host of measures that one could employ in such a study. In this work, I have chosen the following variables to represent the salient attributes of a local economy: gross employment levels, the rate of female participation in the labor force, the industrial mix of an area, average value of housing, and income levels, all available from Statistics Canada publications.

The questions that I will address in this research revolve around the concept of nationalism and how political parties use it to their advantage in elections. Three broad areas of investigation have been identified: the political mobilization of nationalism, the role that place plays in that strategy, and the ways that local economic conditions and language interact to make the success or failure of such an enterprise possible. Next, I will identify more fully the variables I plan to use in the study, as well as indicate some of the statistical methods I plan to use in order to answer these questions.

For the purposes of this study, the contextual unit used is the census division. This unit was chosen over other likely candidates, the electoral district and the census subdivision/tract, for the following reasons. The ideal would be to work with census subdivisions/tract, as they are smaller in size (both geographical area and population) and are closer to the level of geography identified by Sprague (1994) as most appropriate to contextual analysis, but their large number (over 1500) and the difficulty in obtaining election results for census tracts in Montreal and Quebec would make this approach difficult. The other choice, electoral districts at the federal and provincial level, had the
attraction of making the collection of electoral data easier, but since their boundaries had changed a number of times over the study period, their use would make longitudinal analysis difficult. Therefore, the use of census divisions (the rough equivalent of counties in the US) presents a good compromise between ease of data availability, size of units, and comparability over time.

The dependent variables are results from elections and referendums in Quebec, both federal and provincial, from 1976 to 1995. Figures for the referendums and provincial elections have been provided by the government of Quebec: federal results can be found in the relevant editions of the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer. The percentages for each party at each election were transformed using the logistic transformation detailed in Bailey and Gatrell (1995) to take into account the bounds of percentile data (ranging from 0 to 100).

The independent variables, all from the Canadian Census, are described in full below:

% of population 65 years and older (OLD)—older voters are generally held to vote against sovereignty positions, due to their stake in the Canadian pension system as well as being socialized into political life before the Quiet Revolution when sovereignty was not taken seriously as an alternative to the Canadian federal system.

% of population 20 to 34 years old (YOU)—this age cohort is sovereignty's primary source of support demographically. Most of the members of this group came into
adulthood after the Quiet Revolution reforms, and have experienced the more stridently separatist PQ in office.

% of population with English as Home Tongue (ENG), % of population with home tongue neither French nor English (OTH)—these variables were talked about above; their inclusion is important since voting in Quebec has long been polarized over language issues.

% of population over 25 years of age that have a college degree (UNI)—education is seen as an important variable in the support of sovereigntist positions in Quebec; studies have found that more educated voters are more likely to support sovereigntist parties and positions than those with less education (Blais and Crete 1986, Boucher 1984)

% civilian labor force over 15 years of age that was unemployed at the Census (UNEMP)—The effects of this variable are more complex to think about. I suppose the most likely association is a decreased support for sovereignty in those areas with high levels of unemployment, since those voters are dependent on government aid to provide them with the essentials of life. However, discontent with the current economic system could also spur support for the sovereigntist position: a key factor could be length of unemployment. figures for which are unavailable, however.
% of work force that is female (FEMPART), female median income as a percentage of male median income (FTM)—Quebecois culture has often been portrayed as conservative, tied to the agricultural past of the province, as well as to the role of the Church. This variable, as a surrogate to the extent to which patriarchy still operates in the province, could prove important to the research. I theorize that sovereignty and the PQ will be stronger in areas with large percentages of female participation in the work force and areas with more gender equality in income. This is the case for two reasons. First, the PQ is a neo-national movement, based on the principle that Quebec has to modernize and move away from older forms of economics and society in order to gain independence. Second, the PQ ran its first few campaigns on a socially activist platform committed to fair distribution of economic resources and women's rights.

% of workforce employed in manufacturing industries (MAN), % of workforce employed in wholesale and retail trade industries (TRADE), % of workforce employed in primary industries (PRIME), % of workforce employed in finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE): These employment categories will allow me to accomplish two things. First, they will be used, along with the other variables, to sketch out a riding's socio-economic makeup. Secondly, they will allow me to explore class differences in the voting for sovereigntist positions. The PQ was called by many names in attempts to categorize its message and appeal. From social democratic to nationalist-populist: the difference between the two being a function of its message and
discourse as well as its support base. The reasoning is that a social democratic party will gain support among the working classes, due to a discourse that concentrates on greater economic democracy—labor power, redistribution of wealth, and similar points. This line of argument should also provide the party with support from the poor and lower classes. A nationalist-populist party would pull votes from a variety of class positions, because it would not privilege the aspirations of the working classes to the extent that a social democratic party would. Instead, it relies on appeals to nationalism and the greater ethnic community to win votes. Therefore, the party that follows this route should be able to win votes from many classes. The inclusion of this data should help me to investigate which of these labels the PQ most resembles (McRoberts 1989).

**Median household income (MHI)**—This income measurement will complement the information on employment given in the previous group of variables, as well as help to describe the social and economic differences between the ridings. The general expectation is that higher incomes will vote against sovereignty, as they would have more to lose if the economy suffered.

**% of housing units that are owner-occupied (OOCC), Average value of owner-occupied housing (AVVAL)**—These variables have long been used as indicators of socioeconomic status in many other works on electoral geography (Books and Prysby 1991, Hahn and Kamieniecki 1987, Savage 1987). In this study, they are included to help
describe differences in SES from riding to riding, as well as to show a voter's stake in the community. I am positing an important difference of opinion on the sovereignty issue between owners of property, especially highly-valued property, and renters, with renters supporting sovereignty, and property owners trending against this position. Further, those with highly-valued properties will be even less inclined to support sovereignty than those with less-valuable property.

In order to provide more accurate measures of these variables, estimates of their values were calculated for elections that did not coincide with censuses. Variables for economic conditions in those years (1979, 1980, 1984, 1985 and 1988) were interpolated using the bracketing census years. For example, 1988 figures were derived by interpolating results from the 1986 and 1991 censuses. Since 1996 census returns were not available at the time of this analysis, the analysis of elections after 1991 used that year's census figures.

To provide an estimate of the effects of changing cultural and economic conditions on voting behavior, the change in these interpolations from election to election was calculated in the same manner. Again, since 1996 census data were unavailable, the analysis of the elections after 1991 could not include the dimension of change.

Finally, in addition to the above variables, dummies based on the regionalization used in the second and third chapters above were introduced in the analysis to quantify any regional effects that might be manifest in the regressions. In order to avoid a
closed-number set. Montreal and Laval were aggregated and left out of the stepwise analysis. The variables used are: RIVES (Rive-Sud), RIVEN (Rive-Nord), RICH (Richelieu), OUT (Outaouais), TROIS (Trois-Rivières), ESTRIE (Eastern Townships), QUEBEC, GASPE, SAG (Saguenay), and ABITIBI.

All of these variables—cultural, change, state and region—were entered as a single block into the analysis. This was done to test which indicators were the most important in determining support for the parties studied.

Two concerns that complicate many regression analyses are multicollinearity among the independent variables and spatial autocorrelation. The first was tested with two routine outputs from the SPSS-PC statistical package used to run the analyses in this chapter, the Variable Inflation Factor and the Condition Number. These indicators demonstrated that multicollinearity was not a problem in the data set.

In order to gauge the effects of spatial autocorrelation on the results of the regressions, Luc Anselin's SpaceStat computer program (Anselin 1993) was employed to check the SPSS-PC-derived stepwise regressions. The results of this work indicate that little is gained, at least in this dataset, by applying Anselin's ideas about this phenomenon. The row labeled "R2—Spatial Models" details the R2 of maximum-likelihood models that took into account spatial autocorrelation present in the variables. Not all of the elections have this entry in the table. This is because tests for spatial dependence in the residuals of OLS models included in Anselin's program (robust LaGrange Multiplier tests for both spatial lags and spatial errors) failed to detect
problems with spatial autocorrelation at a .05 level of significance. Those equations that were discovered to be biased were re-run using Anselin's software. Most often, the difference in the R² figures was only .02-.04; three equations, the 1992 Non vote in the Charlottetown referendum and the 1980 and 1989 NDP vote, showed changes of .07. Discovering that spatial autocorrelation played such a small part in the results of the regressions was surprising, since many researchers have demonstrated the value of modeling it in other settings (Reynolds and Archer 1969, O'Loughlin 1981, O'Loughlin, Flint and Anselin 1994). Perhaps the inclusion of regional dummy variables in these equations acted to diminish the effects of spatial autocorrelation in this dataset.

To discern trends in the data, all of the results for the separate stepwise analyses will be considered together. They are pictured in Table Four. Only beta weights that were included in the various equations are entered in the table. Further, the largest beta weight in each equation is shaded. Beta weights are used in order to make cross-equation comparisons easier: the largest beta weight in each equation is shaded.

First, the inspection of the R²s for the regressions indicates the spotty success of this variable set in explaining party support. The Liberal's vote was particularly hard to model, with R²s ranging from .20 in 1980 to .63 in 1981. In general, the provincial party's showings had the better-fitting equations, but since 1984, R²s have improved, perhaps because of the increased prominence of the sovereignty issue in Quebec politics.

In the PQ/BQ's case, R²s have always been above .48. Down from a high of .77 in the 1976 election, PQ/BQ r²s have climbed to nearly .60 in 1994. Like the increase in
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Numbers shown are Beta weights.
### Multiple Regression Analysis Results

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Values for 1979-1981 are negative, indicating a decrease in the analyzed variables.
Liberal R^2's, this could be a function of the resurgence of sovereignty as a potent political force. In the more moderate nationalist camp, both the UN and SC R^2's are generally strong, but the limited number of elections contested by them during this period prevent the discernment of a temporal trend. The equations for the referenda were the most successful of the group, explaining between 57 and 88% of the variance in the votes.

The Role of Language

Concerning the components of the equations themselves, the first point to make is that the effects of language, measured as the percentage of the population with English as their home tongue, was the chief indicator of support or opposition to nationalist causes or parties. The percentage of the population with languages other than French or English as a home language was not as important in predicting partisan choice, as the lower Beta weights show. In all, 60% of the province's Liberal equations were heavily influenced by this language variable; the PQ/BQ equations were all heavily influenced by it. Also, all referendum votes had language as the leading variable.

The direction of the relationship between voting and language has been predictable over the period. In the majority of cases, provincial Liberals have been helped by the anglophone vote in the province, as the size and sign of the betas suggests. This is true in all cases but one—the 1989 provincial election, which saw the birth of two anglophone parties formed to signal that community's displeasure with the Bourassa
administration's strongly pro-francophone tilt in language policy. The table shows the large reversal in anglophone support in terms of the betas in the regression equations—from .5 (and the most important variable) in 1985 to a -.24 in 1989.

It is interesting to note the unimportance of language in the federal Liberal's case. Only in 1993 did the ENGHOME variable gain inclusion into a federal Liberal regression. Of course, in that election it constituted the only real opposition to the BQ, and in that respect ENGHOME's .34 beta is understandable. It could be that case that, earlier in the study period, Liberals won such huge majorities that it is difficult to discern with regression techniques exactly which groups supported the party more than others—margins of victory here during the Trudeau era were truly monumental.

Federal Liberal equations seemed to be more affected by the change in the number of people with English as a home language, at least until 1984. Betas in Table Four suggest that, in the 1979 and 1980 elections, federal Liberals did better in areas with shrinking numbers of anglophones. The situation reverses in 1984, when areas with increasing numbers of anglophones supported the Liberals. These patterns suggest that the remaining communities of anglophones supported the centralizing policies of Trudeau more than other areas did, but the lack of larger betas for ENGHOME would seem to throw this conclusion into doubt. More research is needed to explain this phenomenon.

The Conservative equations were also not heavily involved with language. Brian Mulroney's success in Quebec was centered on his bilingual appeal, even though he
received support in varying degrees from the provincial PQ. As with Trudeau, both francophones and anglophones supported Mulroney's Conservatives in numbers great enough to make any linguistic cleavage in voting hard to detect in the 1984 election returns. Only in the 1988 Conservative equation did ENHOME have a rather small negative beta (−.29).

As was mentioned above, both the PQ/BQ and Referendum equations were greatly influenced by language. This is far from surprising, since the ethnic group they represent is partly defined by language. Betas for the ENHOME variable were routinely large—always over .4, and always in a negative direction. It is also worth noting that, as time has passed, the other causes of voting for the PQ/BQ have decreased in importance. This is visible in the lack of other variables included in PQ/BQ equations after 1981. Economic variables have generally decreased in importance since that election, leaving only language and region as prime motivators of PQ/BQ support. This has become especially marked in the post-Meech elections—the 1992 referendum, 1993, 1994 and the sovereignty referendum of 1995. In these, language and region are almost the only variables included in the PQ/BQ and referendum equations. These results point to the fact that polarization over the language issue in Quebec has increased since the events of the late 1980s.

In terms of the other parties in Quebec, language figured in only a few of their equations. Most notably, all of the SC equations included language. ENHOME was represented with moderately-sized negative betas, indicating the nationalist proclivities
of this party's supporters. One NDP equation, the 1979 federal election, had a large positive ENGHOMEx beta. This also makes sense, since the NDP in Quebec has always been hampered with a pro-anglophone image and lack of a strong francophone labor movement in the province.

The betas in Table Four also point to the fact that the strength of the association between language and nationalist voting has changed over time. Generally, the relationship has weakened since 1976, slowly decreasing in the PQ/BQ case, more dramatically in the Liberal and referendum equations. However, in no case does the relationship shrink to the point of triviality. In the equations of the three major parties in Quebec politics, the federal Liberals, the provincial Liberals and the PQ/BQ, betas for ENGHOMEx have ticked upward over the last two elections. This also signals an increase in the amount of linguistic polarization in the province’s politics.

The Role of Economics

The second notable characteristic in the data is the generally secondary importance of economic conditions in most of the equations. Indicators for employment were more important in predicting party support than income or wealth: manufacturing employment was the one that appeared in the greatest number of equations.

For the federal Liberals, two equations had economic indicators as the variables with the largest betas: AVVAL in 1979 and FTM in 1988. AVVAL was the only
traditional "economic" SES indicator (along with MHI and OOCC) to be important, and that happened only once. Judging from this, it is hard to tell anything about the economic conditions that might foster federal Liberal support. Change variables were also rather inconclusive, due to both their infrequent inclusion into federal Liberal equations.

CAVVAL had the largest beta (negative) in the 1980 equation, which indicates that areas with falling housing values supported Trudeau's party. The federal Liberal vote was more affected by change in 1988, when two variables—CFTM and CUNEMP—had a positive relationship to the party's vote.

Provincial Liberal equations also had little to do with economics. This type of variable had the largest beta only in the 1976 regression, when the Liberal vote was related to higher levels of unemployment, perhaps out of fear of a PQ government and its economic policies. The last provincial election had more of an involvement with economic variables, with AVVAL (negative beta) and MAN (positive beta) both included. This could also point to uneasiness with PQ stances on sovereignty and its economic consequences.

The PQ/BQ equations were a bit more involved with economics than the other parties' were. However, this has changed with time, as the number of economic variables in the regressions has decreased since 1976. It is interesting to note that income (as measured by MHI) has been the economic variable most often included in this party's regressions. It accounted for a large part of the variance in PQ support in 1976, but its importance has decreased since: it failed to enter into the 1994 equation after being in
both the 1989 and 1993 regressions. MHI's relationship to the vote has always been positive, indicating that the PQ/BQ find their support in areas of affluence: an interesting situation for a party founded on social-democratic principles.

Another indicator that is counter to a social-democratic party is its lack of support in areas of high primary and manufacturing employment, as shown by MAN and PRIME. This white-collar bias in PQ/BQ support is also borne out by the inclusion of TRADE in the 1989 equation. Thus, one could say that while both the PQ and BQ profess leftist policies in their campaigns, PQ policies while in government in the early 1980s, added to their sources of support (affluent, chiefly white-collar areas) would indicate that the PQ/BQ depend on appeals to nation rather than social-democratic ideals for votes.

The stepwise regression technique did not include economic indicators in the referenda equations to a large extent. What involvement there was included negative betas for both PRIME and MAN in the 1980 sovereignty-association referendum. This closely mirrors the 1981 PQ equation, both in terms of the magnitude of the betas and their sign. This could indicate that, after the PQ's slow turn to the right began in the early 1980's, blue-collar workers were less willing to support the PQ, or their initiatives.

The Conservative equations, like the PQ and the referenda, did not include many economic indicators. The two variables that did make it into regressions--MAN in 1980 and AVVAL in 1984--appear more in line with less affluent, blue-collar areas. Economic change variables tend to support this working-class dimension in Conservative electoral politics. Two of these variables load in the 1979 equation--change in median household
income and an increasing level of female participation in the labor force. However, because there are only four of these types of variable included in all of the Conservative regressions, extreme care must be taken to not over-analyze these results.

In the UN and SC equations, economic variables are more important. The UN's 1976 regression points to a relatively affluent profile, due to its association with low unemployment, and higher levels of manufacturing employment and female participation in the labor force. In 1981, the last election the UN contested, its largest beta was PRIME, with a .5, while maintaining its support in manufacturing areas. Change variables were included in 1981 as well; the UN did better in areas where both FTM and MAN were decreasing. This could point to a protest vote going to the UN, but in any case the party's total vote was too small in 1981 to make much of a difference.

Judging from the SC equations, it was this party, rather than the UN, that received the support of disgruntled voters. The most visible proof of this assertion is the negative betas for CMHI in both 1976 and 1979. Also, UNEMP had a negative beta in 1976. This function of the SC in Quebec politics has been extensively studied elsewhere (Stein 1973, Pinard 1975).

In the NDP's case, variables in this group have always been better represented in their equations; however, no one measure was repeatedly been included. FTM made it into three equations (1980, 1989 and 1994), OOCC in two (1985 and 1993) and UNEMP in two (1984 and 1994). The general ideology of the NDP—leftist, social-democratic—may account for their enhanced position in this type of indicator.
The three minor parties covered by this analysis—the ADQ, EP and UP—all had very little to do with economics. The ADQ equation does not include one economic or change variable. The UP's support comes from areas with decreasing housing values; the EP seems to cater to areas with healthier economies, as witnessed by its negative relationship with unemployment.

Surrogate measures of patriarchy. FTM and FEMPART, only appeared in a scattered fashion in the equations. The best beta in this group was a .56 for FTM in the Liberal equation for 1988. Overall, this dimension was not highlighted well by this analysis.

Economic variables were not the only ones that had a limited role in the regression equations. Age became an important factor in only a few instances, but where it did make its appearance, it was in line with expectations. In PQ/BQ equations and the 1980 referendum, results were such that older voters opposed them, indicated by the negative betas of OLD. Liberal support was greater among older voters, since they had positive betas on OLD. Conservative and UN support was also age-sensitive. The level of education among the population, in terms of the variable UNI, was disappointing from the standpoint of its inclusion in just a few of the equations. It was positively associated with the PQ victory in 1976 and the NDP showings in the early and middle 1980s.
Regional dummy variables were very powerful indicators of party strength. By looking at the betas for these variables, one can discern which regions were important to each party. In terms of the federal Liberals, two regions appear in more than one equation. The Outaouais appears in 1979, 1988 and 1993; its importance to the federal Liberals has increased over time, its beta increasing from .23 to .3. Rives-Sud appeared in 1979 and 1980, but its beta decreased between the two elections, and it was not included in later elections. It seems that the overall importance of region in explaining federal Liberal support has been on the increase since the 1980s; 1993 had three regions with significant betas. In addition to the Outaouais, both Quebec and Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean were part of that election's equation. These last two regions loaded negatively, meaning that these were areas of particular weakness for the federal Liberals. In the case of the Saguenay, the historical survey in the previous chapters relates that this has been an unfriendly area to the Liberals for some time.

The involvement of region in the provincial Liberal's support has increased in the last two elections. after a lull in the early 1980s. In 1976, three regions had large betas. Both the Outaouais and Quebec had positive signs Abitibi-Temiscamingue was negatively related to Liberal voting. No regional variables were included in the next two elections; it is interesting to note that language was the leading variable in both of them. In 1989, Rive-Nord was negatively related to the Liberal vote. The Outaouais made a
re-appearance in 1994, along with Rive-Sud. This pattern of areal influences matches the federal Liberals rather closely.

In the PQ's case, it seems that region has become more important over time. Three regions have repeatedly been included in the party's regressions. These are Rive-Nord, the Outaouais (negatively) and the Abitibi. In addition, two regions—Richelieu and the Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean area—have become important since the Charlottetown referendum of 1992. These five regions can also be traced to nationalist voting trends before 1976, both inside and outside of the independantiste movement.

The Progressive Conservatives also have a support base impacted by region, at least after their 1984 breakthrough. The Saguenay figured in both the 1984 and 1988 elections, and was the largest beta in the latter equation. Three others have been important factors in the party's strength in the 1984 and 1988 elections—Rive-Nord, Trois-Rivières and Quebec.

The equations for the referendums show a remarkably stable geography. The regions of Rive-Nord, Outaouais (negative) and the Saguenay are included, and the importance of the latter two have increased. This is indicative of a growing spatial polarization in the province based around them. It is interesting to note that these three regions also appear in the PQ/BQ's equations, showing that the independantiste clientele has a distinct regional makeup.

Interestingly, the UN had no regional dummies in either of its equations. This is a
function of the timing of the analysis. If the study period were to take in earlier periods of Quebec's electoral history, it is probable that the party would have a similar geography to the PQ. In fact, it is true that after 1976, the PQ was able to pick up the lion's share of UN-held rural seats; also, both parties had their northern bastions, based around Abitibi-Temiscamingue and Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean.

Judging from the SC's equations, the party was unable to capitalize on a consistent geography. In 1976, the Abitibi was the largest beta in the SC regression. However, after 1976, none of the regions included in later regressions appear in more than one. Again, this is probably a function of looking at the party just as it was about to leave the political scene in Quebec.

The NDP's regional signature has included two regions on a repeated basis—Gaspesie and Abitibi-Temiscamingue. In the latter's case, the party has won only inconsistent support, indicated by the wildly fluctuating betas. As the NDP weakened in the province up to 1994, region was decreasing in importance: the party's geography was unstable, and its level of support was quite low.

Of the three minor parties, the EP had the least involvement with region. The only area that had a large enough beta to merit inclusion into the EP's regression was Rive-Nord; indeed, it was the largest beta in the equation. However, this result is probably an artifact of the analysis, since all of the EP's success occurred on the Island of Montreal. If smaller regions were used in the regression analysis, a better depiction of the regional bases of EP voting could have been sketched.
Since the UP was not as relegated to Montreal as the EP was, its geography was more complicated. Rive-Sud, Richelieu and the Eastern Townships were all included in the UP equation. Both Rive-Sud and the Eastern Townships are areas of relatively large residual anglophone populations, so their importance in the party’s support is to be expected. Three regions are also included in the ADQ equation, but they all load negatively. They are Rive-Sud (which had the largest beta), the Outaouais and Quebec.

From the above regression analyses, three basic findings can be stated. First, language is the foremost motivator behind voting in the province, and seems to be of increasing importance in recent elections—francophone areas vote differently from non-francophone areas. Second, economic variables are decidedly less important in accounting for party support than language. This is the case for both status and change measures of the economy.

Third, region is very important in modeling party support in Quebec. The indications from the regional dummies closely follows the patterns illustrated in the historical description of Quebec elections in previous chapters of this study. This is exemplified by the analysis indicating the regions that have been longtime federalist (the Outaouais) and sovereigntist (Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, Abitibi-Temiscamingue) strongholds. The concluding chapter describes how these findings impact the future of Quebec politics in the short and medium terms.
VI. Conclusion and Discussion

The importance of language in Quebec politics underlined in the previous chapter is not surprising since francophone Quebeckers have long considered language to be a central part of their identity. The other supposed cornerstones of francophone identity, the Roman Catholic Church and a rural way of life, lessened considerably in importance after the changes wrought by the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s.

In terms of economic indicators, change measures did not do as well as state measures in capturing the variance in the election results. In addition, neither were as important in the Quebec context as language. Class seems again to have a minimal role in shaping electoral behavior when the context in which an election takes place is highly charged with nationalist fervor, such as in referendum campaigns or during periods of tumult in Quebec-Ottawa relations.

This ties in with Appadurai's (1991) work on the politics of culture discussed in the beginning of this work. When an outside threat to a group is perceived by a minority, differences within that minority based on class, gender, or other social cleavages are glossed over in the name of cultural survival. These differences do exist, and will remanifest when circumstances move the center of debate from linguistic or inter-group identity issues to others in which cross-group alliances will be easier to maintain.

In fact, this type of shifting was evident even between the different levels of election in which Quebec participated. In federal elections, support for the Liberals was
not based around language for the most part, as anglophones in Montreal and francophones off-island both voted for Liberals instead of Conservatives. In this case, nationalist wishes for a Quebec-led federal government combined with anglophone support for Trudeau's centralizing tendencies. After the federal elections, when sovereignty-association and the election campaigns for the Quebec National Assembly focused attention on cultural differences in the province, language resumed its primary role.

Another aspect of Quebec's political scene highlighted by this study is the fact that regional preferences for candidates and issues have stayed generally constant over the study period. It is possible to trace the geographical pattern of support for nationalism from the ALN, the BP and, to a lesser extent, the UN through to the PQ and BQ today. The absolute levels of support that regions give these parties may change, but the relative pattern stays much the same. This indicates the success of local milieus in socialization, as well as the strength of the social cleavages present in the various regions, in that they must still be relevant to today's voters.

*Importance of Spatial Effects in Electoral Research*

It is plain from the regressions that economic issues did play a role in shaping voter's opinions in elections, albeit a smaller one than language. This fact shows that both compositional and contextual modes of research have something to offer in the
understanding of voting behavior, contrary to the findings of McAllister (1987), who argues that the regional effect uncovered by electoral geographers is a reflection of the distribution of social indicators, and not indicative of a contextual influence on voting.

In particular, three particular aspects of this study can be used to argue that context is an important source of explanation in electoral geography. First, the inclusion of regional dummy variables into the stepwise regression analysis proved fruitful, and were important predictors of the vote for many parties across the time period under study, often eclipsing economic measures. Therein lies the importance of an approach that treats compositional and contextual factors as equals in modeling electoral behavior. The inclusion of regional dummy variables is not the only way in which to do this, however. If the number of observations in each region were larger, region-specific regressions could have been set up, thus exploring the different bases of support that parties enjoyed in different regional contexts. This approach was adopted by O'Loughlin, Flint and Anselin (1994) in their study of the geography of the Nazi vote in Weimar Germany. Also, a series of detailed case studies could have been done, akin to some of the early works in electoral geography by Siegfried (Taylor 1993), and more recently advocated by Agnew (1987a). Each of these methods would serve to highlight context as an important factor that shapes voting behavior.

Second, places in Quebec have habitual voting patterns that manifest in the regressions. Both the historical analysis of elections in the pre-1976 era as well as the multiple regression analyses point to this fact. The continuities and similarities in
regional support patterns are long-lived; one can point to anglophone areas (like the West End of the Island of Montreal or the Outaouais) being consistent in their support for more centralizing, federalist parties and positions, from the provincial Liberals in the 1940s through their support for the federalist option in the referendums of the 1980s and 1990s. Likewise, nationalist and sovereigntist parties and positions have habitually carried the majority of votes in out-province areas like Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean and Abitibi-Temiscamingue. As was mentioned previously, this points to the success parties have had in socializing new voters into the fold.

Third, it is plain that, in the referendum votes that the province has held since 1980, the role of place in influencing voting behavior in Quebec has increased, in terms of the beta weights of Rive-Nord, Outaouais and Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean. This runs counter to Agnew's (1987) conception of the "nationalization" thesis, which states that as modernization continues, local concerns will be subordinated in the minds of voters to national concerns. This implies that the regionalism present in the politics of many Western democracies should lessen and finally disappear. According to Agnew, this is one of the cornerstones of electoral studies in political science and sociology.

It is important to mention that compositional techniques would not have included the dummy variables in the analysis, because those approaches do not value the contribution that place makes on voting behavior. As a result, an important source of causation would be missed, and the regressions would explain less variance.
Ethno-territorial Identities, Local Territorial Structures, and the Future of Quebec Politics

The methods and subject matter of this study were mentioned in the introduction as being related to two research areas mentioned by the National Science Foundation's *Geographic Approaches to Democratization* report as being important avenues for increased scholarly attention, namely ethno-territorial identities and local territorial structures. Both have distinct contributions to make in understanding what might happen in Quebec politics in the short term.

The concept of local territorial structures has much to do with the future of Quebec politics, and further, the continued existence of the Canadian state. It is not clear what would happen if the sovereigntist position won a referendum on the issue at some future date. Questions about the size of a sovereigntist win needed to effect separation, the willingness of the players to engage in meaningful, constructive negotiation on the future disposition of the Quebec-Canada relationship, and the territorial integrity of Quebec surfaced during the campaign but were not resolved. In one respect, the country was lucky that the outcome was a non victory, even as narrow as it was, because it forestalled the need to answer these questions definitively.

Regarding the issue of the size of mandate needed by sovereigntists to declare success, answers ranged between a majority of the vote (the sovereigntist position) to a higher, unspecified threshold. Federalists were the champions of this latter position, and
declared that it takes more than just 50%-plus-one-vote to break up a country. Good reasons can be found on both sides of this argument, but due to the lack of rules governing this process, a solution to this problem is lacking.

The issue of the willingness of both sides to negotiate on the future status of their relationship is also important, because it goes to the heart of sovereigntist designs. Much of their scenario for the future depends on retaining close economic and political ties with the rest of Canada, but nowhere is it written that the rump of Canada has to engage in conversation with Quebec. It must be borne in mind that appearing to be rigid and not interested in dealing with Quebec could be construed as a campaign position that helps the federalist cause, since much of the support for sovereignty depends on keeping close ties with Canada. However, uncertainty on this point could be destabilizing in the next referendum campaign.

Ethno-territorial identity also plays an important role in these questions. In many ways, the territorial integrity of a newly-independent Quebec could be the most serious stumbling bloc to a stable transition. Demands on Quebec territory by others, namely anglophones and First Nations, are intrinsically hard to come to an agreement on. First, the pattern of settlement of anglophone/allophone communities is such that a solution meeting the two goals of maintaining a contiguous Canadian state and a viable Quebec are almost mutually exclusive. Second, native claims include most of the northern part of the province, resource-rich areas that the government of Quebec have asserted their control over.
It does not help matters that the sketching out of settlements to this thorny issue have been mostly propagandist efforts by federalists outside Quebec to weaken sovereigntist voting strength. Reid (1992) writes of these plans and puts forward his solution, which at first glance seems less punitive than those advanced by others. He advocates the holding of other referendums in areas which, by reference to voting statistics and other indicators, might prefer to stay in Canada. This approach bears a closer look as a possible settlement, based on democratic principles that both states claim to espouse.

No matter the answer to these questions, the durability of this issue in Quebec politics indicates that there are no easy solutions, and the results of this analysis point to a certain hardening of opinion on questions dealing with sovereignty. If this is the case, the forecast for Quebec politics in the short term is continued polarization along the lines of language. In federal politics, this points to the continued weak position of the Progressive Conservatives, because anglophones and allophones support the Liberals and francophones support the BQ. These patterns of partisanship owe their existence to many factors. First, the Liberals have been seen by anglophones and allophones as upholding the idea of a stronger federal state, something that the Conservatives have not campaigned for in the past. Also, the Liberals spearheaded the drive towards the principal of bilingualism, important to linguistic minorities like the francophones in Canada and anglophones in Quebec. Anglophone support for the Liberals can also be seen as a result of that community's socio-economic status, higher than the norm in
Quebec as a whole, and supportive of the Liberals' centrist policies. Allophone support for the Liberals also has historical roots: the party has long been seen as the protector of immigrants, and in Quebec and elsewhere Liberals reap the benefits of this belief.

The above factors leave little room for other parties not explicitly linked to a language group or without a long history of support in the province. Provincially, this indicates the continuation of the contest between Liberals and the PQ, again without much competition from other quarters.

This study of the electoral geography of Quebec sovereigntist opinion can serve as a template for formulating research that comes closer to Johnston's (1987) call for studies that are sensitive to both compositional and contextual modes of study:

My claim here, however, is that to date too much attention has been placed on compositional approaches and too little on contextual. This claim is not that one's social location is unimportant as an influence on voting behavior. It does argue, however, that much of one's understanding of that social location is learned in the local context (p. 11).

In this study, the variables chosen to represent economics, economic change and language capture the essence of compositional modes of research. The inclusion of regional dummy variables as well as the privileging of place in the historical narratives of elections combines those compositional aspects with a sensitivity towards how context shapes behavior. Even though it was shown that language variables were the most important influence in many of the regression models, the significance of the regional
dummy variables demonstrates that contextual information is also very important to a full explanation of electoral behavior. One could expect that, in most cases outside of Quebec, this importance of region is also manifest, if not explicitly used by other electoral researchers.

This work also describes how concepts of place, identity, and globalization can be used in an electoral geographical study. Local political parties translate these three abstract forces for voters in their local context to shape public opinion and gather support for their policies. Exactly how parties do this is dependent upon how these abstractions manifest in a given locality. If an area sees benefits from an increased level of economic interaction and trade, then the party's message will be different from what it says in different areas impacted negatively by the same process. By referring to how place, identity and globalization have affected these local contexts geographers can improve their explanations of how politics and elections function in ethnically plural societies.
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