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Dharmakīrti's Concept of the Svalaksana

by

Christine Mullikin Keyt

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

University of Washington

1980

Approved by  

(Chairperson of Supervisory Committee)

Program Authorized to Offer Degree Philosophy

Date  April 3, 1980
Doctoral Dissertation

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## PART ONE

### DHARMAKĪRTI'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION

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Sphuṭārthāvyākhyā of Yasomitra, as edited in AK.

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Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun of Huān Tsang. Translated from the Chinese with the Chinese text included by Wei Tat.

Tarkabhāṣā of Moksākaragupta. Edited by Raghunath Giri.

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Trimsākabhāṣya of Sthiramati, as edited in Vim.

Tattvasaṅgraha of Sāntarakṣita. Edited together with TSP by Dwarikadas Shastri.

Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā of Kamalasila, as edited in TS.

Tattvasaṅgraha of Sāntarakṣita. Translated with TSP by Ganganatha Jha.


Vimsātikabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, as edited in Vim.

Where an abbreviation is followed by Arabic numerals (e.g., NBTD 101.32), reference is to page and line. Upper-case Roman numeral references (e.g., BL I,33 and NB I:14) are to volume and page (where separated by a comma) and to chapter and verse (where
separated by a colon). Lower-case Roman numeral references (e.g., NS ii.1.1) are to adhyāya, āhnikas, and sūtra. Lower-case letters (e.g., PV II:32ab) indicate pādas.

Where a line number is given, the lines are counted from the top of the page (including titles, salutations, and headings on the initial page of a chapter and the editor's headings incorporated into the text on subsequent pages).
GLOSSARY

anumāna
Inference, one of two types of veridical cognitive activities (pramāṇa in sense 1). Also, the conceptual operation in perception, i.e., kalpaṇa*. 

arthakriyā
The useful function(s) that a real entity performs, e.g., carrying water in the case of a pot, cooking food in the case of a fire.

avayavin
A whole, as opposed to the parts of a whole. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, a whole is an entity ontologically independent of its parts, residing in its parts by the relation of inherence (samavāya). Dharmakīrti denied this doctrine of the whole, maintaining that the whole is nothing more than its parts.

avisamgvedin
"Uncontradicted"; veridical. A cognition is uncontradicted if it is able to "deliver up" (prāpaṇa) its object in the sense of resulting, if one acts on the basis of the cognition, in the object one reaches being the object the cognition led one to expect.

kalpaṇa
Any form of conceptual activity, including that of the mental operation in a perception (see kalpaṇa*).

kalpaṇa*
The mental operation in perception, Dharmakīrti's equivalent of perceptual consciousness. Its object is a universal or concept. It is responsible for transforming the fleeting, inherently uninteresting sensory object (svaḷākṣaṇa) into the perceptual object, which is an enduring, substantive thing admitting of classification and appealing to our likes and dislikes.

ksaṇa
The momentary entity that alone is real for Dharmakīrti. It is the object of sense (pratyakṣa in sense 2) and is a particular (svaḷākṣaṇa). A series of ksāṇas form the "enduring entity" (santāna).
paramāṇu
The atom of Dharmakīrti's ontology. Most probably an infinitesimal, i.e., something having positive magnitude and not just spatial location but a magnitude smaller than any assignable quantity.

pāramāṇḍaiya
The infinitesimal dimension of an atom (paramāṇu). Thought of as a globular shape, even though it is a measure without finite extension.

pramāṇa
1) Veridical cognition, both in general and specific instances. Also, a specific type of veridical cognition or a specific instance of such a type.
2) The most instrumental cause (kāraṇasādhana) of a veridical cognition.

prāpana
"Delivering up"; what a cognition is able to do when it accurately represents its object so that activity directed towards that object is successful, i.e., the object reached is the object initially cognized. A cognition that is able to "deliver up" its object is an "uncontradicted" or veridical cognition.

pratyakṣa
1) Veridical perception. 2) Sensing.

sāmāṇya
A universal. Universals are conceptual in character for Dharmakīrti, nonmental in character for his realist opponents (e.g., the Nyāya-Vaiṣeṣikas).

sānctīta
One of the names for the aggregate of atoms that is the sensory object. A term used by the Neo-Sarvāstivādins (according to K'uei Chi) and the Sautrāntikas (according to Kalupahana).

santāna
The "stream" or series of momentary entities (kṣana) that we experience as the enduring perceptual object.

samghāta
One of the names for the aggregate of atoms that is the sensory object. A term used by the Sautrāntikas (according to K'uei Chi) and the Vaibhāṣikas (according to Kalupahana).

sthūlākāra
Gross character; the feature of uninterrupted or "solid" spatial extension, such as a color patch in our visual field seems to have.
svalakṣaṇa  The sensory object; a momentary kṣaṇa. It is a particular as opposed to a universal (sāmānyā), universals being conceptual on Dharmakīrti's account.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express her gratitude to Professor Karl Potter for his invaluable guidance and criticism on philosophical matters and to Professor Allen Thrasher for his unflagging help with the Sanskrit. Special thanks also go to Professor Ram Chandra Pandeya of the University of Delhi for his help during a year of research in India, and to the University of Washington Graduate School for financial assistance at a crucial stage in the form of the Sarah L. Denny Fellowship.
INTRODUCTION

Dharmakīrti's Life and Works

Frauwallner speculates that Dharmakīrti lived from A.D. 600 to 660.\(^1\) Sorting fact from legend in the accounts we have of Dharmakīrti's life,\(^2\) it is probable that he was born in the Deccan in south India and that, coming from a well-educated family of Brahmāṇical faith, he was versed at an early age in Hindu philosophy. Bu-ston reports he converted from Hinduism to Buddhism in a fit of pique upon being insulted by an uncle;\(^3\) Tāranātha reports it was upon being praised by his teachers, which gave him the courage to read Buddhist scriptures.\(^4\) Whatever the circumstances, upon his conversion he left home for Nālandā in the north to receive Buddhist ordination from Dharmapāla and instruction in Buddhist logic from Īśvarasena, a pupil of Dignāga. He is said to have read Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya three times with Īśvarasena, surpassing even Īśvarasena's understanding of it at the third reading.\(^5\) Īśvarasena thereupon reputedly declared Dharmakīrti to be the equal of Dignāga and urged him to compose a commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya.\(^6\)

Before undertaking this commentary, Dharmakīrti returned to southern India for a time, presumably taking special instruction in the more esoteric doctrines of his Hindu adversaries. The triumph of Hinduism in the south disturbed him, and he embarked on a career of proselytizing and debate in defense of Buddhism. Tāranātha reports
that he converted hundreds at a time, sending many timorous rivals fleeing to the north. He came into favor with King Utpahlappaspa of the Vindhyācala somewhere towards the middle of his life. Under the patronage of this king, he wrote his Seven Treatises on logic, the most important of which was his commentary on Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, the Pramāṇavārttika. His works were not well received initially, and it is said that certain jealous persons tied the pages of his texts to the tail of a dog and scattered them through the streets. Dharmakīrti closed the Pramāṇavārttika (at least on some versions of the text) with a gloomy verse that Stcherbatsky translates as: "My work will find no one in this world who would be adequate easily to grasp its deep sayings. It will be absorbed by, and perish in, my own person, just as a river (which is absorbed and lost) in the ocean. . . ." Although Dharmakīrti's works evidently came to be read in the philosophical circles of his day, he seems not to have enjoyed fame in his lifetime. He is recorded as dying in Kaliṅga in a monastery he himself had founded.

Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises are the Pramāṇavārttika, the Pramāṇaviniścaya, the Nyāyabindu, the Hetubindu, the Vādanyāya, the Sambandhaparīkṣā, and the Saṃtānāntarasiddhi. The Pramāṇavārttika, as mentioned, is his commentary on Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya. The Pramāṇaviniścaya and the Nyāyabindu, in the opinion of some, are essentially abridgments of the Pramāṇavārttika. The Hetubindu and
Vādanyāya deal with the logic of the syllogism, and the Sambandhaparīkṣā with the problem of relation. The Saṃtānāntarasiddhi constitutes a refutation of solipsism in the school of Yogācāra, the school of Buddhism to which Dharmakīrti belonged. Dharmakīrti composed two autocomentaries in addition to these Seven Treatises, one on the Svārthānumāna chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika and one on the Sambandhaparīkṣā. Although other literary works have been ascribed to him, these are the extent of his logical and epistemological works.

Regarding the subject matter of the Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti basically continued the work begun by Dignāga in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Dignāga had advanced in the Pramāṇasamuccaya a novel epistemological theory restricting the modes of veridical cognition (pramāṇa) to two and limiting each mode to its own species of object. Veridical cognition was either an act of sensing (pratyakṣa) taking for its object a particular (svalaksana), or an act of inferring (anumāna) taking for its object a universal (sāmānyalaksana). Dignāga had advanced the theory in brief; Dharmakīrti undertook to develop it in full. He greatly elaborated upon the theory’s important tenets. For example, the all-important limitation of the modes of veridical cognition to two, which Dignāga had accomplished in one verse, Dharmakīrti set out in seventy-five verses. Dharmakīrti even went so far as to revise certain parts
of Dignāga's theory with which he disagreed. The final result was a text that, although technically a commentary, is for all practical purposes an original and highly independent work.

When Dignāga first advanced the theory of the two pramāṇas and their restriction to separate objects, he suffered a great deal of criticism from members of other philosophical schools. Hindu and Jain theories of knowledge recognized up to six pramāṇas and allowed for certain ones to mix their sphere of operation. (The Naiyāyikas, for example, numbered the pramāṇas at four and maintained that the universal was an object of sense as well as inference). The Buddhist theory was in direct opposition to these theories and elicited a strong response. Uddyotakara wrote his Nyāyavārttika to defend the Nyāya view against Dignāga, and Kumārila of the Māmāṣakas and Mallavādin of the Jains attacked Dignāga in their major works. Dharmakīrti, in effect, defended Dignāga against these critics, directing attacks of his own against Uddyotakara and Kumārila. He in turn came in for criticism, and a veritable battle occurred in the centuries that followed Dharmakīrti between the Buddhists on the one hand and the Naiyāyikas, Māmāṣakas, and Jains on the other. It produced such luminaries on the side of the Buddhists as Śāntarakṣita of the eighth century, Prajñākaragupta of the early tenth, and Ratnakīrti of the eleventh. It culminated on the Nyāya side in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa of the ninth century and
Vācaspati Miśra of the tenth. Throughout the whole period, Dharmakīrti was recognized as the champion of Buddhism. It was his works that were looked to for inspiration in the defense of Buddhism. The period from the fifth century to the twelfth century was a critical one in terms of the development of philosophical ideas, and Dharmakīrti's role in ushering in this period and serving as a major influence in it elevated him into one of the greatest figures in the entire history of Indian philosophy.

In spite of Dharmakīrti's great impact and posthumous fame, however, his pessimistic prediction as to the fate of his works very nearly came true. His works disappeared from India in the twelfth century with the disappearance of Buddhism. His Seven Treatises were preserved in foreign translation (all, for example, are preserved in Tibetan); but, with the exception of the Pramāṇapāda-vārttika and the Nyāyabindu, all were lost in their original Sanskrit.

Like other texts of its time, the Pramāṇavārttika was written in extremely terse Sanskrit verse that lent itself to memorization. It was intended to be studied in tandem with a commentary under the supervision of someone already familiar with the text. The existence of a commentary and an oral tradition were thus important to its transmission and interpretation. Dharmakīrti himself composed a commentary on only one of its four chapters, leaving the other three to be commented on by his followers.
As tradition has it (a point disputed by Raniero Gnoli\textsuperscript{16}), suitable commentaries on the remaining three chapters were a long time forthcoming. Devendrabuddhi (630–690)\textsuperscript{17}, Dharmakīrti's immediate disciple, has gone down in history as not up to the task; Dharmakīrti is recorded as having rejected his commentary on these three chapters two times before reluctantly accepting it a third.\textsuperscript{18} Dharmottara, a century later (730–800 or 750–810), was evidently equal to the task but commented only on the one chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika already commented on by Dharmakīrti himself; otherwise, Dharmottara contented himself with commenting on the shorter texts of the Pramāṇaviniścaya and the Nyāyabindu. The commentaries of Śākyabuddhi (660–720), Prabhābuddhi (c. eighth century), and Rāvigupta (eighth century, according to Gnoli\textsuperscript{19}) are the only other (Indian) commentaries known to have existed before the tenth century (except in Gnoli's opinion; he places Karnakagomin and Prajñākaragupta around the time of Śākyabuddhi\textsuperscript{20}). Karnakagomin's commentary, whether seventh century as Gnoli insists or tenth century as others hold,\textsuperscript{21} covered only the one chapter commented on by Dharmakīrti; and so did the tenth century commentary of Śaṅkarānanda. Only the tenth century commentary of Manorathānandin, and the commentary of Prajñākaragupta (tenth century unless Gnoli is right\textsuperscript{22}), adequately dealt with the three chapters not commented on by Dharmakīrti. Prajñākaragupta's commentary, the Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya or Vārttikālāṅkāra, was
extensive and philosophical; Manorathanandin's Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti was shorter and more philological. Prajñākaragupta's commentary was commented on in turn by Jina (c. 940), Yamārī (c. 1050), and Rāvigupta. 23

No sooner had the commentaries appeared, however, than Buddhism suffered its demise in India. With its disappearance, the commentaries suffered the same fate as the original works. Prabhābuddhi's commentary was lost altogether. Prajñākaragupta's, Manorathanandin's and Karpakagomin's commentaries alone survived in Sanskrit, the rest being preserved only in foreign translation.

This same story was repeated in the case of the commentaries on Dharmakīrtī's other works. The Pramāṇaviniścaya, for example, had been commented on by Dharmottara, Dharmottara's commentary in turn being commented on by Jñānaśrībhadra and Ānandavardhana. Ānandavardhana's commentary was completely lost, and Dharmottara's and Jñānaśrībhadra's commentaries survive only in translation. The Nyāyabindu had been commented on by Dharmottara, Vinītadeva, Śāntabhadra, Kamalaśīla, and Jīnāmitra. Dharmottara's commentary was in turn commented on by Durveka Miśra, Mallavādin, and two anonymous authors. Śāntabhadra's commentary was completely lost; Dharmottara's Nyāyabindu and the four commentaries on it were the only ones to survive in Sanskrit.

The disappearance of the Sanskrit texts was coupled with a further loss: that of the oral tradition. The monks who survived
the devastation of the northern temples and centers of study fled to safer places such as Tibet. They took the tradition with them, leaving it lost to India. Without either the Sanskrit texts or the oral tradition, Dharmakīrti's philosophy could not survive. Although it continued to be studied elsewhere, it fell into obscurity in India.

Western scholars took up the study of Dharmakīrti's works only with the nineteenth century. The few Sanskrit manuscripts that had managed to survive had been long hidden in forgotten places in India or carried off to Tibet. Their recovery began in 1887 when Peter Peterson found a copy of Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā in a Jain temple in Gujarat. Something of what the discovery meant to him is reflected in his words of his Third Report:

No. 215 is a Buddhist work, the only Buddhist book in this library: and my colleagues ... will sympathise with the feelings with which I came upon it. I have already tried to convey to the reader something of that sense of ruin and desolation which must flow into the mind of him who, in this empty temple, turns over these buried records of human faith and love and sorrow. Here in the midst of it all is one solitary survival of a still older faith, of a yet greater religion. ... 24

Peterson reconstructed the Nyāyabindu on the basis of the Nyāyabinduṭīkā; he then edited both works in 1889. 25 His edition was followed in 1904 by a Tibetan edition of the same two works. 26 In 1909 a Sanskrit edition of an anonymous commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā appeared, in 1908-13 a Tibetan edition of the Nyāyabindu together with Viniṭadeva's commentary, and in 1918
a second Sanskrit edition of the Nyāyabindu and Dharmottara's Tīkā. 27 There were subsequent editions and, in addition to an early Russian translation, later English translations; but these first editions were the earliest of any of Dharmakīrti's Seven Treatises or their commentaries, except for a single Tibetan edition of the Sampratāntarasiddhi, together with Vinītadeva's Tīkā, in 1916. 28

Of Dharmakīrti's two major works, the Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇavinīścaya, nothing appeared until much later. As to the Pramāṇavārttika, Frauwallner edited 145 out of its total 1453 verses in Tibetan (with some verses also in Sanskrit) in 1930-36, including portions of Dharmottara's Apachaprakarana and a German translation of both. 29 The complete Sanskrit texts of the Pramāṇavārttika and Dharmakīrti's autocommentary, as well as the commentaries of Prajñākaragupta, Manorathananandin, and Karṇakagomin, were not even recovered until 1934 and 1936 when Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana discovered them in Tibet. Sāṅkṛtyāyana brought out an edition of the Pramāṇavārttika in 1938 and, beginning in the same year, a second edition of this same text together with Manorathananandin's commentary. 30 His edition of Dharmakīrti's autocommentary and Karṇakagomin's commentary appeared in 1943; and his edition of Prajñākaragupta's commentary, aside from part of one chapter which appeared in 1935, waited until as late as 1953. 31 In 1959, Dalsukhbhai Malvania produced an edition of the Svārthānumāna chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika together with Dharmakīrti's autocommentary; and in
1960, Raniero Gnoli re-edited the same two works. As to English translations, Satkari Mookerjee and Hojun Nagasaki produced an English translation of the first fifty-one verses of the Svārthānumāna chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika in 1964, and recently a translation has been done (though not published) of verses 40 through 185 of this same text and chapter, together with the autocommentary. There is also an unpublished translation of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika, and a translation of the Pratyakṣa chapter in the making.

On the Pramāṇaviniścaya, nothing at all appeared until as late as 1966, when Tilmann Vetter brought out a Tibetan edition (together with Sanskrit fragments) and a German translation of one of its chapters. A Tibetan edition (together with Sanskrit fragments) of a second chapter, by Ernst Steinkellner, appeared in 1973. Of Dharmakīrti's other logical works, all have at least been edited.

The secondary literature developed slowly with the reappearance of the texts. Most of it consisted of articles or chapters in books. The two most notable exceptions were Satkari Mookerjee's Philosophy of Universal Flux and Theodor Stcherbatsky's two volume Buddhist Logic. The latter work appeared in 1930 (Volume 2) and 1932 (Volume 1) and contained, in the first volume, an English translation of the Nyāyabindu and Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭṭika; and, in the second, according to the author's own description, "a synthetical
reconstruction of the whole edifice" of Dharmakīrti's philosophy.\textsuperscript{38} Buddhist Logic is probably the most important work ever published on Dharmakīrti in English (or, for that matter, in any other modern language). It had an enormous impact and elevated Stcherbatsky to the position of a world authority on Dharmakīrti. Most subsequent literature of any substance on Dharmakīrti has been heavily influenced by it.

It can be seen from all this that Dharmakīrti's works did not disappear with his person as he feared but that there was considerable difficulty in preserving them. They were understood but not well. Problems in understanding his works persist today. Textual study is plagued by the troubles of corrupt manuscripts and imperfect editions. Mastery of the commentaries is complicated by the fact that they do not exist in any one language. The irrevocable loss of the Buddhist tradition in India, furthermore, insures that interpreting them will remain a demanding task.

**Dharmakīrti's Philosophy**

A Buddhist holds four basic beliefs: that life is marked by suffering, that this suffering has its causes, that the causes of suffering can be removed, and that the way of removing the causes of suffering is by adherence to a specific eight-step program of discipline taught by the Buddha. Suffering is engendered by a
sequence of causes beginning with ignorance (avidyā). This ignorance is of the true nature of things, of the way things really are. Things are really one way and we take them to be another; we mistake them for something they are not. Our mistaking things for something they are not leads us to respond to them in ways their nature does not warrant, and they in turn continually frustrate our expectations. The result is a state of discord. It is a state to which we are subject even in the best of circumstances, leading to the dictum that life as a whole is marked by suffering. This suffering can be done away with by acquiring knowledge of the way things really are (prajñā). Once things are known for what they really are and are not mistaken for something else, we no longer fall prey to false expectations and other such perturbations of mind with respect to them. This state of being free from all such mental disturbances is what the Buddhists mean by enlightenment. The Buddha attained it during his lifetime and spent a great deal of effort instructing others how to do likewise. It is the ultimate goal a Buddhist seeks and the reason he considers himself a Buddhist at all.

Buddhist schools traditionally were grouped by Buddhists themselves into four major sects: Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika, and Yogācāra. Each sect had its own account of what things truly are and what it is we mistake them for. Differences of opinion on these matters are what separated Buddhists of one persuasion from Buddhists of another.
Dharmakīrti belonged to the school of Yogācāra. According to this school, Consciousness alone exists, an impersonal, ideal absolute. This Consciousness is in a fallen state. In its pure, unblemished state, it is devoid of any content, or at least any that is endowed with the sense of being either internal (antar) and subjective (grāhaka) or external (bāhya) and objective (grāhya). In its fallen state, however, it has such contents; and, in an act of self-forgetfulness, it identifies itself with the contents characterized by a sense of subjectivity. It feels that it is many subjects—in effect, we unenlightened beings—confronted by a shared, physical world. Dharmakīrti appeals to the analogy of a dreamer to explain. Just as a dreamer, dreaming, thinks himself to be some subject in a physical world that is real enough so long as he is dreaming, so too Consciousness, ignorant and self-forgetful, thinks that it is all we unenlightened beings at once in our shared physical world. We are Consciousness caught up in our own nightmare. Our enlightenment consists in realizing that we are but Consciousness forgetful of itself, a realization that brings Consciousness to its pure state in what is the equivalent of the dreamer waking. Dharmakīrti does not explain why all of us are not already enlightened, there being in the past at least one enlightened being; but it may be that he thinks there are many Consciousnesses and not one (as many as there are enlightened and unenlightened beings), a point of Dharmakīrti's philosophy that is not indisputably clear.
Dharmakīrti was not only a Yogācārin, he was also a Sautrāntika. His philosophy was a novel synthesis of both views, made possible by the Buddhist belief in the doctrine of "two truths."

According to this doctrine, truth is of two sorts, ultimate (paramārtha) and provisional (saṃvṛti). This distinction corresponds roughly to the theistic distinction between God’s knowledge and man’s knowledge. Ultimate truth is the Indian equivalent of the viewpoint sub specie aeternitatis; it is knowledge that cannot be improved upon, the inner realization of which constitutes enlightenment. Provisional truth is the least mistaken understanding of things we can have short of knowledge of ultimate truth, the best way for us to understand things while operating on a mundane level. Dharmakīrti adapted this doctrine of "two truths" so as to combine Sautrāntika and Yogācāra views. He claimed that Yogācāra is ultimately true and Sautrāntika provisionally true. Sautrāntika is the proper way of understanding things short of the truth of enlightenment. Understanding one’s situation along Sautrāntika lines is actually the first step towards enlightenment; possession of such an understanding not only enables us to make the best sense of the state we are in but also to progress in an orderly way to the truth of Yogācāra. Yogācāra supersedes Sautrāntika at the point where we exchange the best possible mundane understanding of things for the enlightened viewpoint.
The Sautrāntika view is realistic, unlike Yogācāra: the subject-object framework in which we operate is ultimate. By way of explaining the mistake we ordinarily make in regard to things, the subjects and objects of our experience are not of the nature we take them to be. We take them to be substrates: property-possessing loci and enduring centers of change (ātman). We take subjects to be enduring, experiencing selves, and objects to be substantive. pots and the like. But there are no loci underlying properties in the Sautrāntika ontology. There are only what Dharmakīrti (in his late Sautrāntika terminology) calls svalaṅkānas. In a case of internally directed perception, these are the equivalent of the properties we assign to selves, e.g., emotions, sensations, ideas. When we ostensibly experience an enduring, experiencing self or "I," we are simply mistaking a set (or more accurately a series of sets) of these svalaṅkānas for this "I." What the svalaṅkānas are in a case of externally directed perception is the subject of this dissertation.

Combining Dharmakīrti's Sautrāntika and Yogācāra views into his two-level theory, each of us unenlightened beings really makes two mistakes in terms of understanding the nature of things. First, we mistake what are really only sets of mental and nonmental svalaṅkānas for substrates qualified by these svalaṅkānas. In the case of what is internal, for example, we mistake, say, an itch, a moment of panic, and a desire to run (etc.) for a self having these
experiences. Second, we mistake the subject-object framework in which our experiences occur as final. To gain enlightenment, we must come to experience the svalāksaṇas free from any sense of an underlying substrate. We are then in a position to transcend Sautrāntika and realize the truth of Yogācāra. The mental and non-mental svalāksaṇas that as Sautrāntikas we learned to experience free from any sense of substrate are really but oppositely polarized contents of an absolute Consciousness. We must now free them from the subject-object framework by a complex process of meditation and insight. Upon doing so, Consciousness gains its pristine state in which it is uncharacterized by contents, or at least any polarized into subject and object. Enlightenment has been reached, and we no longer suffer.

Dharmakīrti's synthesis of Yogācāra and Sautrāntika served the Buddhists of his time in certain ways. By then Buddhism had fallen into disrepute, and the schools of Hindu realism held sway. Part of the reason for this plight of Buddhism was the proliferation of Buddhism into the four schools of Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Madhyamika, and Yogācāra. Each school claimed a final say on the word of the Buddha, and the conflict in their opinions undermined the authority of any of them and of all of them. Dharmakīrti helped reduce the influence of the Hindus by finding and justifying a function for at least two schools: Sautrāntika as imparting the
Buddha's teaching regarding the best provisional understanding of things, and Yogācāra as imparting his teaching as to what is ultimately true. His synthesis served the added, rather unique purpose of enabling Yogācāra Buddhists to dispute with Hindu realists on points of realism, a realm otherwise outside their province. For now, although Yogācāra idealists ultimately, they were Sautrāntika realists provisionally, claiming for their realism a superiority above all other versions of realism. Their dispute with the Hindu realists sometimes worked to their advantage.

**The Subject of this Dissertation**

What is the svalaṃśana? Specifically, what is the svalaṃśana in a case of visual perception, say, a case of what we would loosely call "seeing the moon"?

To repeat, to the extent that Dharmakīrti is a Yogācārin, it is the moon-shaped color expanse, a sensum of the sort entertained in phenomenalism (a phenomenalism compatible with absolute idealism). But what is the svalaṃśana for Dharmakīrti to the extent that he is a Sautrāntika, aside from being something that we mistake for a substrate?

It is not the phenomenalist sensum that it is for him as a Yogācārin (only without this sensum being ultimately a content in an absolute Consciousness). For Dharmakīrti the Sautrāntika is a representative realist. He believes that behind sensa lie external entities
that generate them; sensa are immediately known representations of
mediately known, nonmental generating causes. And for Dharmakīrti the
Sautrāntika, the svalakṣaṇa is the generating cause, not the
representation. In other words, the svalakṣaṇa is for Dharmakīrti
the Sautrāntika the nonmental cause producing the very sensum that
is, for Dharmakīrti the Yogācārīn, itself the svalakṣaṇa. Dharma-
kīrti, a Sautrāntika-Yogācārīn, believed to the extent that he was a
Sautrāntika that sensa have nonmental causes and that these nonmental
entities and not the sensa they generate are the svalakṣaṇas; but
to the extent that he was a Yogācārīn, he believed that external
entities do not exist and that there are only externally ungenerated
sensa—and that these sensa are the svalakṣaṇas.

Because svalakṣaṇas are only mediately known in Dharmakīrti's
Sautrāntika realism, when we mistake a svalakṣaṇa for a substrate
we are really mistaking its sensum for one. And because the
svalakṣaṇa is only mediately known, the question arises, To what
extent does the sensum reduplicate its cause? Keeping to the moon
example, is the svalakṣaṇa like its sensum in all respects, i.e., is it
too a color patch, only a public, nonmental one instead of a private,
mental one? Or is it like its sensum in some respects but not others,
following a line of thinking like Locke's that distinguishes between
primary and secondary properties? Or is it utterly unlike its
sensum, i.e., a kind of Kantian noumenon? The question is important
because reality consists in svalakṣaṇas.
In this dissertation I will show that the svalaksana is different from its sensum in more ways than just that the svalaksana is nonmental and the sensum mental. I will show that it is like its sensum in many though not all respects. For I will prove that it is an aggregate of another entity in Dharmakirti's ontology: paramāṇus. These are the atoms of his system: partless, very small objective entities that are qualitative (and not substantive) in character, i.e., atoms of color (sound, smell, taste, and touch). A svalaksana is an aggregate of paramāṇus; and as an aggregate, it is like its sensum in color, size, and shape, but unlike it in what is perhaps best called "number of constituents."

The dissertation consists of three parts. In Part One, I discuss in considerable detail Dharmakirti's Sautrāntika theory of perception. I discuss it partly because it has received poor treatment in the secondary literature in at least certain respects. But I also discuss it as background for Parts Two and Three. In Part Two I consider two theories, found in the secondary literature, that imply that the svalaksana is not an aggregate. One theory is that the svalaksana is a kind of transcendent, Kantian noumenon. The other theory is that the svalaksana is each atom individually in that aggregate that I contend is collectively the svalaksana. I consider each theory at some length and assess the arguments in their defense. Part Three is the proof that the svalaksana is an aggregate of paramāṇus, like its sensum in color, size, and shape,
but unlike it in "number of constituents." This proof consists in textual evidence that has yet to be explored in the secondary literature.

**New Textual Evidence**

Nearly all of the information on Dharmakīrti's atomic theory is in the *Pramāṇavārttika* and its commentaries. The studies of the *svalaksana* to date have not adequately utilized this material.\(^{41}\) Part Three, as I said, will be a study of this material. My aim in taking it up, in addition to proving the theory of the *svalaksana* I just sketched, is at last to give this material the airing it deserves.

**A Final Point**

A final word needs to be said on the use I make of the commentaries. Earlier when I discussed the fate of Dharmakīrti's works (p. 5), I pointed out that texts such as the *Pramāṇavārttika* were meant to be studied in tandem with a commentary and were difficult (if not impossible) to understand without them. I make extensive use of the commentaries in what follows; but because of the connection between text and commentaries, I believe this is both necessary and justified. What I give here is, really, Dharmakīrti's philosophy as it was understood by members of his school. These members' own original contributions are separated out as much as
possible. But if the view presented here is by some chance more that of Dharmakīrti's followers than of Dharmakīrti's due to his followers misrepresenting him or obscuring his view with their own contributions, then whatever view Dharmakīrti held in his own right is indeed, for all practical purposes, largely lost.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1

2

3
Obermiller, p. 152.

4
Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, p. 229.

5
Ibid.

6
Ibid.

7
Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, pp. 231-235 passim. See also Obermiller, p. 153.

8

9
Obermiller, p. 154; Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, p. 238.

10
Sāṅkṛtyāyana, [2], Appendix, p. 123 of the Sanskrit text, fn. 3.

12 Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, p. 237.

13 BL I,37; Isshi Yamada, "Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇa-viniścaya (I)," Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, VIII, No. 2 (1960), 42.

14 Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, p. 407.


17 All dates of the commentators, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Karl H. Potter, comp., Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, Vol. I, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Delhi, 1970).

18 Obermiller, pp. 154-155; Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, p. 239.

19 Gnoli, p. xxvii of the Introduction. However, Ravigupta's commentary seems to have been on Prajñākaragupta's Vārtikālaṅkāra rather than directly on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, see BL I,47 and NB, Introduction, p. xxi.

20 Gnoli, p. xxii of the Introduction.

21 E.g., Sāṅkṣṭyāyana, see Gnoli, p. xix of the Introduction.
22
Gnoli, p. xxii of Introduction.

23

24
Quoted in Peter Peterson, ed., The Nyāyabindu-Tīkā of Dharmottara Āchārya to Which is Added the Nyāyabindu, Bibliotheca Indica, No. 128 (Calcutta, 1889; reissued, 1929), Preface, xiii, fn. 1.

25
The work referred to in the above n. 24.

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Both by Masatoshi Nagatomi of Harvard University. The first was his dissertation for Harvard, "A Study of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikā, An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramāṇavārttikā, Book I (Pramāṇasiddhi)," June, 1957. I understand from Allen Thrasher, University of Washington, that some or all of this material is in press.

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36
Calcutta, 1935; rpt., Delhi, 1975. Stcherbatsky, [1].

BL II, p. vi of the Preface.


There seems to be a disagreement among Yogācārins as to which is the case, see Yuichi Kajiyama, [trans.], An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 10 (Kyoto, 1966), pp. 154-158.

PART ONE

DHARMAKİRTI'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION
INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE

What follows is a reconstruction of Dharmakīrti's Sautrāntika theory of perception. It is structured around an analysis of two of Dharmakīrti's key epistemological notions: pramāṇa and pratyakṣa.

It is so structured to avoid one of the greatest shortcomings in treatments of Dharmakīrti's perceptual theory in the secondary literature. This shortcoming is that pramāṇa and pratyakṣa each amount to more than a single thing, but this fact is not appreciated in the secondary literature. The fact is disguised there as it tends to be disguised in Dharmakīrti: by constant equivocation on the different senses of "pramāṇa" and "pratyakṣa."

This reconstruction emphasizes rather than disguises the different senses. I take up the two most important meanings each of "pramāṇa" and "pratyakṣa," treating each in a separate chapter. In effect the reconstruction is proof that each notion amounts to more than one thing. For the material in the chapters clearly shows that two senses of each term are involved, however much Dharmakīrti equivocates.

I do not dwell on actual cases of equivocation, discussing only one important one towards the end of chapter 4. In discussing it, I suggest a reason why Dharmakīrti equivocates, a more plausible reason that mere inconsistent thinking on his part.
Organizing the reconstruction around an analysis of the double meanings of "pramāṇa" and "pratyakṣa" serves to do more than just avoid the pitfalls of previous treatments of Dharmakīrti's perceptual theory. It also serves to provide the necessary background for understanding Parts Two and Three on the svalakṣaṇa. Knowledge of the two different meanings of both terms is prerequisite for both parts. For the svalakṣaṇa is the object of pratyakṣa in one of its senses. Pratyakṣa in one sense amounts to perception, and its object is not the svalakṣaṇa but the substantive object that we mistake the svalakṣaṇa for (p. 15). Pratyakṣa in its second sense amounts to sensation, and its object is the svalakṣaṇa. One cannot know the two senses of "pratyakṣa" in order to understand this point without understanding the two senses of "pramāṇa," for pratyakṣa in each of its two senses is a species of pramāṇa in the appropriate sense of pramāṇa. Thus an analysis of both pratyakṣa and pramāṇa is necessary as background to Parts Two and Three. Further, to understand, in particular, the misconceptions of the svalakṣaṇa discussed in Part Two, one needs to know Dharmakīrti's theory of universals and how he analyzes perceptual consciousness, the cognitive acts additional to sensing in a perception. An analysis of the two meanings of "pratyskṣa"—these being perceiving and sensing—will supply this knowledge; for a discussion of these two meanings will involve discussing the process of perceptual consciousness that is the difference between the two. Thus, while emphasizing that pramāṇa
and pratyakṣa each amount to more than one thing, this reconstruction of Dharmakīrti's Sautrāntika theory of perception, in centering around the two meanings apiece of "pramāṇa" and "pratyakṣa," also provides the essential information for Parts Two and Three. (If "pramāṇa" and "pratyakṣa" have additional meanings, an analysis of just the two I have mentioned is sufficient for my purposes.)

Because what pratyakṣa is in each of its senses depends upon what pramāṇa is in the appropriate sense of "pramāṇa," I will begin with an analysis of a meaning of "pramāṇa," the one relevant to "pratyakṣa" meaning sensing. Because too much of what is said in each chapter is important to proving that "pramāṇa" and "pratyakṣa" have two senses and is independent of giving the background for Parts Two and Three, I will summarize at the end of at least the first three chapters what is particularly important in each chapter for Parts Two and Three; and I will let the chapters speak for themselves in proving that "pramāṇa" and "pratyakṣa" each have two senses.
NOTE TO INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE

1

Chapter 1
THE FIRST MEANING OF "Pramāṇa"

Veridical Cognition

Dharmakīrti opens the Nyāyabindu with the following verse:
"The attainment of a human end is always preceded by veridical
cognition. Therefore, [veridical cognition] is examined."¹

In their commentaries Dharmottara and Vīnītadeva explain this verse
as giving the reason why Dharmakīrti should bother to compose the
Nyāyabindu or anyone else bother to read it. There is, as the verse
says, an intimate connection between veridical cognition and the
realization of one's ends. Veridical cognition always precedes the
realization of one's ends and by doing so makes such realization
possible. Those who desire to further their aims can thus best do
so by acquiring a correct theory of knowledge. The Nyāyabindu
provides instruction in such a theory. It is therefore worth both
the author's efforts in writing it and the student's efforts in
reading it.²

The term "veridical cognition" (samyagjñāna) in this opening
verse is synonymous with "pramāṇa." This gives us the first meaning
of "pramāṇa": as knowledge (pramāṇa, pramiti) or, also, a particular
instance of it.

Although the word "pramāṇa" does not actually appear in
either the verse or its commentaries, it is clear from the
commentaries on the verse and also from what is said on pramāṇa in the Pramāṇavārttikā that "pramāṇa" is what is meant by "veridical cognition." The commentaries define veridical cognition as "cognition that is uncontradicted by activity" (avisamvādaka jñāna).³ This is the definition given in the Pramāṇavārttikā for "pramāṇa."⁴ Mokṣākaragupta, a late follower of Dharmakīrti, says in his Tarkabhāṣā (while claiming to be elucidating Dharmakīrti's thought to the point where even a child can understand it⁵), "On the worldly level, people who rationally pursue desired ends are guided by pramāṇa . . . . Pramāṇa is veridical cognition . . . ."⁶ This explicitly makes the identification between veridical cognition and pramāṇa.

The sort of "ends" Dharmakīrti has in mind here, whose realizations are preceded by veridical cognition or pramāṇa in this sense, consist in certain sorts of acquisitions and avoidances, namely of objects we respectively desire or dislike (the objects I called substrates in the Introduction). Purposive action is motivated by attachments, according to Dharmakīrti: finding things desirable (upādeya) or objectionable (heya), we act so as to acquire some and avoid others.⁷ The realization of an end lies in the successful completion of such an act.⁸ Ends are thus the acquisitions of desired objects and the avoidances of undesired ones. Pramāṇa, the sort of cognition that makes possible the realization of such ends, is always knowledge of this particular sort of object.⁹
Accurate Representation: Time, Space, Properties

A veridical cognition or pramāṇa is, in effect (although not actually defined as such), a cognition that represents an appealing or objectionable thing "as it really is." The connection between this way of characterizing a pramāṇa and its actual definition will be made later.) Dharmottara, a commentator on the Nyāyāntī, provides an analysis of what it is for a cognition to represent an appealing or objectionable thing "as it really is." (He bothers to do so, it should be said, because a veridical cognition does indeed amount to a correct representation of a thing, however pramāṇa is actually defined.) A cognition represents a thing as it really is, Dharmottara says, if it represents it rightly in three specific respects. These three respects are the place where it is located (desā), the time when it occurs (kāla), and the properties it possesses (ākāra). A veridical cognition represents something as in the place where it is in fact located, at the time when it is in fact there, and possessing the properties that it does in fact possess.

We can get a better idea of what cognition that is accurate in these respects amounts to by examining the examples Dharmottara gives of cognition that is not accurate in these respects, that is, of nonveridical cognition (asamyagṭāṇa).

The example Dharmottara gives of a cognition that inaccurately locates an object spatially is that of a cognition of a jewel that locates the jewel in one room when it is really in another. In
Dharmottara's own words, "And apprehending [a thing as if situated] in one place is not an instance of a correct cognition (pramāṇa) with respect to [that thing if it is really] located in another place. For example, a cognition that apprehends a jewel by seeing its radiance through a keyhole [between two adjoining rooms is not a pramāṇa] with respect to the jewel that is located in the next room." 13 Neither Dharmottara nor his commentator, Durveka Miśra, elaborate on this example; but I presume it to mean that one sees a jewel glittering through a keyhole between two rooms and takes the jewel to be in the first room, where one is standing, rather than in the second one, where the jewel really is. (Presumably also the conditions are somewhat favorable for making this kind of mistake, e.g., the dimensions of the room are not clear to the observer, the jewel has just been missed and one is frantic for it, one has just heard a sound like a jewel dropping in the room.) The cognition one has in respect to the jewel is wrong in respect to the location of the jewel. It incorrectly represents it as being in the one room when it is really in the other.

Cognitions of the sort being described are, it should be said, always judgmental in character. They always express a proposition of the sort "This is such-and-such." 14 In the case of the cognition of the jewel, the cognition is expressable by some proposition on the order of "The jewel is here in the room."

The example Dharmottara gives of a cognition that locates
a thing wrongly in time is a cognition about someone doing something which that person does in fact do but not at the time suggested by the cognition. Again in Dharmottara's own words: "And apprehending [someone doing something] at one time is not a pramāṇa for someone [actually doing that particular something] at another—as, for example, a dream cognition at midnight about someone [doing something] at noon is not a pramāṇa with respect to someone [doing that particular something] at midnight."\(^{15}\) Durveka Miśra elaborates on the example. The person doing the dreaming is a man with a son, and his dream is about his son's returning home from a trip connected with business. The father dreams his son returns at midday. The son actually returns at midnight while the father is doing the dreaming. The father wakes in the middle of the dream and, confusing dream with reality, has a cognition of the sort "My son is returning now at noon." This cognition is inaccurate in respect to the time it represents the son as returning, representing him as returning at noon when he really returns in the middle of the night.\(^{16}\)

The example Dharmottara gives of a cognition that misrepresents a thing in terms of its properties (ākāra) is the cognition of a white conch shell as if that shell were yellow. "Therefore apprehending a thing as possessing one property is not a pramāṇa with respect to a thing [really] possessing a different property—as the cognition of a yellow conch shell [is not a pramāṇa] with respect to a white conch shell."\(^{17}\) If one is walking
along the beach and one's eyes are adversely affected (by a disease or bad lighting or some other factor) to the point where a white conch shell appears to be yellow, then one is having a cognition that is inaccurate in respect to the properties it represents the object as having. The object is really white, and the cognition represents it as being yellow.

From these examples of cognitions that are wrong in respect to the spatial or temporal location or properties they represent an object as having, it is possible to construe what cognitions that are right in these respects amount to. A cognition that is right in respect to the spatial location it attributes to an object would, in the first example, represent the jewel as being in the room where it is in fact located and not in some other room. A cognition that is right in respect to the time it attributes to an object would, in the second example, represent the son as returning home when he in fact does and not at some other time. A cognition that is right in respect to the properties it takes an object as possessing would, in the last example, represent it as possessing the color it does in fact possess and not some other color.

The Features and Definition of Veridical Cognition

To return to the verse mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, a cognition that is right in respect to an object's spatial and temporal location and character makes possible the
realization of an end by enabling one to direct one's activities towards the place where the object really is, at the time when it is in fact there, and in consideration of the properties that it actually does possess. This is not actually said, but it follows from the examples and is clearly requisite for successfully acquiring or avoiding something. Clearly, no cognition that results in one chasing after an object in the wrong place, at the wrong time, or in consideration of it being other than what it is, will result in one acquiring or avoiding that particular something.

A cognition that is so able to properly direct one's activities by properly representing the object in the first place has, in the language of Dharmottara, the ability to "deliver up" (prāpana) to the agent the object he cognizes (pradarsīta artha). Such a cognition is said to be prāpaka or to possess prāpakatva. Veridical cognitions and veridical cognitions alone, according to Dharmottara, are prāpaka. Nonveridical cognitions always result in one looking in the wrong place or at the wrong time and finding nothing, or looking for the wrong thing and finding something other than what one cognizes. Veridical cognition alone, in summary, results in the realization of an end.

Regarding this notion of "delivering up" or prāpana, a question is asked of Dharmottara regarding the following possible case. Suppose one is on a moving ship and sees, on shore, a tree that one takes by mistake as moving past a stationary ship. (One
presumably was not aware one's ship had started moving, or perhaps this is one's first trip by sea). If one goes ashore and runs in pursuit of the tree, one will (barring unforeseen circumstances) "arrive at" (avāpti) the tree. If, as Dharmottara maintains, veridical cognition alone possesses the ability to make the agent reach an object, "how is it that one is able to reach this tree?" (This would seem, in other words, to be a case where a nonveridical cognition, that of a tree moving on the shore, has the ability to "deliver up" the object).\textsuperscript{22}

Dharmottara's reply to this question (and, for that matter, the fact that the question is raised at all) illustrates quite forcibly the importance Dharmottara attaches to the requirement that the object "delivered up" be the one initially cognized (pūrvam upadarsīta). The tree is not "delivered up," Dharmottara replies, since a tree changing its position in space is the object of the cognition, and a tree quite stationary in character is the one actually reached.\textsuperscript{23} "The moving tree which was seen is not the one gotten to, and the one gotten to is not the one seen . . . ."\textsuperscript{24}

This is not, therefore, an instance of a cognition that is wrong still "delivering up" the object. For a cognition to "deliver up" (prāpata) an object, the object reached must be the object cognized.

It is not necessary that an object actually be reached in order for the cognition governing the activity to be prāpska. Dharmakīrti does not want to rule out the possibility that a cognition might be veridical even if, for reasons other than those having
to do with the accuracy of the cognition, the activity of trying to reach the object is not successful. A cognition is prāpaka, whether or not one does reach an object, if one could have reached it in the sense of it being where, when, and what the cognition represented it as being. Dharmottara makes this point in the following way: the prāpaka function (vyāpāra) of a veridical cognition is accomplished with just the knowledge of the object (arthādīgama). Diverseka Miśra, commenting on this statement, says that by such a knowledge the object seen is capable of being obtained, even if it is not actually gotten to. The veracity of a cognition is thus just precisely this ability, in principle, to get one to an object.

A cognition that does (or in principle could) "deliver up" the object cognized does not, in the course of being acted upon, run afoul of experience (at least not from any fault of the cognition). Things turn out as expected. Such a cognition is said to be "uncontradicted" (avisamvādin), i.e., not proven wrong by action. "Uncontradicted cognition" is the actual definition Dharmakīrti gives of a pramāṇa.

This does not mean that one has to actually act on the cognition for it to be a pramāṇa, any more than it means that the action needs to be successful (as long as no fault rests with the cognition). A cognition is "uncontradicted" and hence a pramāṇa or veridical cognition if, were one to act upon it (whether or not one actually does), one would not and could not get a contradiction.
In the words of Manorathanandin, one of Dharmakīrti's commentators:

"That cognition too is a pramāṇa that one does not act upon even after it has [rightly] revealed an object—or acts upon but does not reach the intended object due to some hindrance—due to the presence of noncontradiction, which is the characteristic feature of [a cognition that] qualifies as a pramāṇa." 30

Dharmakīrti defines what it is for a thing to be real in a way that is important for the kind of "contradiction" a veridical cognition avoids. To be real, according to him, is to perform a function or functions (arthakriyā). 31 A real fire, illustrating with one of his examples, cooks food or burns fuel (which a fancied or hallucinated fire does not). 32 Real water quenches thirst. 33 Minimally, a real thing generates a perception. 34 The sort of contradiction one avoids with a veridical cognition is a contradiction of function. When one gets to a particular thing at a particular time in a particular place, the thing does something; and what it does is what the initial cognition of it led one to expect. Or if one does not actually act on the initial cognition, what one would have gotten had one acted would have performed according to expectations. If the cognition was of fire, for example, what one reaches (or would have reached) cooks food (or would have cooked food), as expected. A nonveridical cognition, on the other hand, results (or would result) in surprises. What one reaches (or would reach) acts differently (or would act differently) than what the cognition led one to expect. 35
As a final point in determining this meaning of "pramāṇa," a pramāṇa cannot be a doubtful (samsāya) cognition: that is, a cognition of an object about the nature of which the perceiver is in doubt. The stock example of such a cognition is one expressed by the proposition, "This is either a post or a man." Such a cognition, according to Dharmottara, first picks out an object as existing and then, recognizing that it might be something else, asserts the nonexistence of that same object and the existence of the something else. The cognition is, according to Dharmottara, "indefinite" (aniyata) as to the existence or nonexistence of each of its possible objects. "Since there is no object in this world that both exists and does not exist, such an object is not able to be delivered up." Because it is not able to be delivered up, the cognition of it is not a pramāṇa.

**Summation**

The first meaning of "pramāṇa" we have considered, then, is veridical cognition, either in the sense of knowledge in general or a particular instance of it. "Pramāṇa" in this sense, furthermore, means not only veridical cognition or any instance of it, but also the process of veridical cognizing. Just as in English where "cognition" can mean either the process or the product of the process, so too for Dharmakīrti is pramāṇa both process and product. (Dharmakīrti is known for identifying a pramāṇa with its fruit,
"Pramāṇa," then, means individual pieces of knowledge and also knowledge generally, and also specific acts of knowing and knowing generally.

We took up the meaning of "pramāṇa" initially as the first step in giving a detailed reconstruction of Dharmakīrti's Sautrāntika-based theory of perception. The reconstruction is centered around an analysis of the two most important meanings each of two key terms in Dharmakīrti's perceptual theory: "pramāṇa" and "pratyakṣa." Such a reconstruction is needed partly to emphasize that pramāṇa and pratyakṣa each do amount to more than one thing, a point that is often missed in the secondary literature. It is needed partly also to provide background information for Parts Two and Three. The most important points of the chapter in terms of Parts Two and Three are that a pramāṇa in this first sense of the word "delivers up" (prāpana) its object, and that the object so "delivered up" is one in which we have a vested interest (i.e., we find it either desirable or objectionable). This object is not the svalakṣaṇa or sensory object, a point that I will make in chapter 4.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1

NB I:1: samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir iti tat vyutpādyate. There is some disagreement among the commentators as to what "sarva" goes with. Dharmottara takes it as going with "siddhi" (NBTD 8.2-3), Viniṭadeva as going with "puruṣārtha" (NBTV 5.3-4), and Sāntabhadra as going with "puruga" (see DP 32.7). It seems best to take it with "siddhi"; and for the sake of better English, I have rendered it adverbially.

2

NBTV 4.18-22; NBTD 11.3-6.

3

NBTV 4.24; NBTD 17.1.

4

PV I:3a.

5

TB 1.3-4.

6

TB 1.6-8: iha khalu prekṣāpūrvvakāriṇo ’rthiṇās sarvapuruṣārthasiddhinīmitam pramāṇam anusaranti . . . . pramāṇam samyagjñānavam . . . .

7

NBTD 30.1-3. All objects fall into these two categories, according to Dharmottara. Objects towards which we are indifferent fall into the latter category, being objects that we do not desire. Viniṭadeva mentions as examples of objectionable things snakes, thorns, poisons, and spears; as examples of desirable things, he mentions garlands, sandalwood, clothes, food, drink, beds, and places to sit, NBTV 5.9-11. He thinks objects towards which we are indifferent form a separate category, NBTV 5.11-12.

8

NBTD 30.3-5.

9

PVBC 22.11: heyopādeyaviṣaye pravarttakaḥ hi pramāṇam ucyate. See also NBTD 5.12-15.
yathārthatā, TSP 493.16; prameyāvyabhicāra, PVB 169.7-8.

It amounts to a correct representation to a certain degree, namely, a degree sufficient to make possible successful actions in regards to objects. There is a sense in which it also "misrepresents" the object, a point that will be made in subsequent chapters.

I am merely assuming for simplicity's sake in this dissertation that accurate representation of an object is an acceptable analysis of veracity.

NBTD 25.1.

NBTD 25.4-5: desāntarasthagrāhi ca na desāntarasthe pramāṇam. yathā kuncikāvaradesāsthāyāṃ maṇiprabhāyāṃ maṇigrāhi jñānāṃ nāpavarakasthe maṇau.

BL I,211-212.

NBTD 25.5-7: kālāntarayuktagrāhi ca na kālāntaravatī vastuni pramāṇam. yathārddharātre madhyābhāvavastugrāhi svapna-jñānaṃ nārdharātrakāle vastuni pramāṇam.

DP 25.27-30.

Durveka Miśra suggests, alternatively, that the example refers to a situation where the father dreams during the night that his son returns at noon, and the son actually does return at noon the following day. The dream cognition "My son returns at noon" is still not a pramāṇa, Durveka Miśra explains, because the actual event of his son's returning at noon did not take place at the time of the father's cognition, namely, midnight. DP 26.5-8. And even had the father dreamed that the son returned at midnight and the son returned at midnight without the father waking, the father's cognition still would not be a pramāṇa "because every dream cognition is a false cognition in that it has no objective support," DP 26.21-22.

NBTD 25.3-4: tasmād anyākāravad vastugrāhi nākārāntaravatī vastuni pramāṇam. yathā pītaśāṅkhagrāhi śukle śāṅkhe.
18 Such as, the Indians commonly say, jaundice (kāmala), see TS:2990.

19 NBTD 32.1. See also NBTD 17.2-3.

20 NBTD 21.3.

21 NBTD 32.1.

22 NBTD 46.1: yadi mithyājñānam katham tato vṛksāvāptir iti cet, ...

23 NBTD 46.1-2.

24 NBTD 46.2-3: tato yaddesa gacchadyākṣo drṣṭaḥ, taddeśo nāvāpyate. yaddesaś cāvāpyate sa na drṣṭa iti . . .

25 NBTD 19.2.

26 DP 19.15-17.

27 PVV 4.4-6; PVB 22.24-25. See also TB 3.3-5.

28 NBTD 17.2-3; DP 17.13.

29 PV I:3. Also see PVB 169.3-4.

30 PVV 4.4-6: ataś ca yato jñānād arthaḥ paricchidyāpi na pravartate, pravṛtto va kutas/cit pratibandhāder arthakriyām nādhi-gacchati, tad api praṃāṇam eva; praṃāṇayogatālakṣaṇasyāvīrasvädasya satvāt. Also PVB 22.23-24: vyavasthāpita 'rthe yadi na pravarttate, nāyam praṃāṇasya doṣaḥ. (Where the editor of PVB omits the avagraha, represented in Romanization by an apostrophe and signalizing the elision of an initial a-, I have restored it without further comment.)
NB I:15; PV III:166cd; PV II:3.

TB 4.8; DP 24.3-4.

TB 4.9.

Dharmakīrti insists that a universal (sāmānya) is not real because it does not possess artha-kriyā, PV III:166cd. It does not possess artha-kriyā because it does not so much as generate a perception, PV II:5, PV II:50. See also such comments as TSP 400.10-11: nanu ca ghaṭādir ekakāryakārī katham ucyate, yāvata tatkāryam udakadhāraṇādi tadgrāhakaṁ ca viññānaṁ svalakaṣaṇaḥ bhedād bhidyata eva?


TB 2.2-3.

DP 22.18; TB 2.3: . . . sthāṇur vā puruṣo vedi . . . .

DP 22.18-21.

NBTD 22.2-3.

NBTD 22.3: na ca bhāvābhāvabhyaṁ yukto 'rtho jagaty asti. tataḥ prāptum asākṣas tādṛśāḥ.

PV B 23.5: praṃaṇataḥ phalan nānyat praṃaṇam na phalaṁ param/
Chapter 2

THE FIRST MEANING OF "PRATYAKŚA"

Two Kinds of Veridical Cognition

Pramāṇa, it is said, is twofold. 1 "Pramāṇa" here, of course, is being used in the sense of veridical cognition (the product) or veridical cognizing (the process) generally, rather than a specific instance of it. Veridical cognition and veridical cognizing are of two species or types (prakāra, vyakti). 2 To put it another way, when one has acquired a bit of knowledge, it is one of two kinds and one has gotten it by means of one or the other of two types of cognitive activities. Pratyakṣa is one of these two kinds and types. It is knowledge of a certain sort or knowing in a certain way. Analyzed etymologically, "pratyakṣa" means "dependent upon the senses." 3 Pratyakṣa amounts to veridical perception. Consistent with what was said in the last chapter about pramāṇa, pratyakṣa is also any specific instance of this type of cognitive act or product, i.e., any piece of perceptual knowledge.

In the secondary literature, "pratyakṣa" is often translated simply as perception. But "perception" has a double sense in English. It only sometimes means just those cases of sense-born cognitions in which what we think we cognize is in fact what is present to the senses. The rest of the time it means all cases
of sense cognition indiscriminately, whether the object believed experienced is actually present to the senses or not. We say, for example, that perception is by way of the senses, meaning by "perception" all sensory cognitions, veridical or not. Pratyakṣa in this first sense, amounting as it does to veridical perception, is really only perception in the first of the two senses of "perception"; it is only appropriate to call it perception keeping this in mind. To avoid possible confusion, I will refer to it as veridical perception.

Dharmakīrti does not deny the obvious fact of nonveridical sensory cognitions. These he calls, simply, cases of wrong cognition (asamyagijñāna, mithyājñāna).4 Where there is a need to be more specific, Dharmakīrti refers to nonveridical sensory cognitions as "pseudo-pratyakṣa," i.e., cognitions that masquerade as veridical perceptions but which are really not.5 There are occasional lapses in these two practices as one might expect, particularly on the part of Dharmakīrti's commentators. When this happens, even wrong sense cognitions come to be referred to as pratyakṣa; but the context usually makes it clear that this is a casual use of the word and that pratyakṣa are, strictly speaking, only veridical perceptions.

The other type of veridical cognizing that Dharmakīrti discusses is called anumāna. Although it is not our concern here, it amounts, briefly, to a process of veridical inference, specifically, veridical inference from perception. When one rightly
concludes the existence (or nonexistence) of a visually absent thing at a particular place on the basis of the perception of some other thing (or its absence) that also qualifies that particular locus and that is invariably connected with the thing in question, then an anumāna has taken place. An example often quoted in the literature (and here translated quite literally) is: "This mountain has fire, because it has smoke." Using the example to illustrate the point, when the visually present smoke is seen as qualifying the particular mountain, then when the presence of fire on the mountain is concluded on the basis of the fact that there is smoke and (on the Indian view) fire always accompanies smoke, a veridical inference has taken place.

Dharmakīrti does not seem to be as careful in restricting his use of "anumāna" to cases of veridical inference as he is in restricting "pratyakṣa" to cases of veridical perception. That he does intend such a restriction, however, is evident (if not simply from anumāna being a species of correct cognition) from certain comments in the Pramāṇavārttika. At one point, for example, the question is being discussed whether anumāna is actually a species of pramāṇa. The opponent raises the objection that it would be only if it invariably resulted in knowledge which, the opponent argues, it does not. To this Dharmakīrti replies that the objection comes from failing to see what is and is not a case of anumāna. Only inferences properly executed constitute cases of anumāna. To
include inferences which go awry, then, is simply to misunderstand the meaning of "anumāna." 9

The peculiar manner in which the perceptual object is present to consciousness—the sensuousness of the perceptual object—Dharmakīrti refers to as its vividness (sphūtatva). 10 This vividness varies in intensity according to whether the object is viewed up close or at a distance. 11 Predictably, the object of inference is said not to share this vividness, being perceptually absent. It is "nonvivid" (asphūtatva), and the clarity with which it is seen is said to vary not with distance but with the degree of concentration with which it is visualized. 12

The Reasons for Only Two Kinds of Veridical Cognition

Returning for a moment to the discussion of "pramāṇa," it should be said that this word comes to refer to each individual kind of veridical cognition as well as the genus of veridical cognition. That is, either of the two types of veridical cognition—veridical perception or veridical inference—is itself referred to as a pramāṇa, as well as veridical cognition generally being referred to as pramāṇa. "Pramāṇa is twofold" asserts, in this sense of the word, that there are two pramāṇas (rather than that pramāṇa is of two types). 13

Indian philosophy is characterized by a considerable debate over the number of pramāṇas, in this sense of type of veridical
cognition. The Buddhists did not agree with the Hindus on this point, nor even among themselves. Dharmakīrti shared with only one other school, the Hindu school of Vaiśeṣika, the notion that the pramāṇas (still using the last sense) were only two (although he assessed their nature differently than did the Hindu school). Dharmakīrti kept the number to two by rejecting some of the preferred candidates outright and reducing the rest to disguised cases of veridical perception or inference. A discussion of the reason why a rejected candidate was excluded (surprisingly enough, not because instances of it were nonveridical) will bring to light one important feature of pramāṇa in its generic sense of veridical cognition generally, that ease of presentation has so far dictated be ignored.

Restrictedness as a Requirement

The fault with a rejected candidate, as Dharmakīrti's followers describe it, is that it fails to be "restricted" (niyata) by its object. A cognition is "restricted" by its object if it is connected (sambandha) to it in such a way that the object directly generates the cognition; an "unrestricted" cognition is one which lacks such a connection and, consequently, arises not directly from the object but by way of something else. In the case of veridical perception, the presence of the object is the necessary connection. In the case of veridical inference, although the object
is not immediately present, another object is with which the inferred object is invariably connected, and this is sufficient connection. In the case of those cognitive activities that are rejected, however, it is alleged, there is no such restricting connection. Heard testimony or the cognition that arises from hearing the word of another (śabda) is offered as one case in point. Heard testimony is defined as those cases where someone learns about an object that is at the time not present to his senses (or connected to some other thing that is, as in the case of inference) through hearing about it from someone else. An example suggested by Śāntarakṣita is someone learning about the existence of a tree that he has never seen from someone else telling him that it does in fact exist. In all cases of heard testimony, according to the Buddhists, there is no sufficiently direct connection between the listener and the object. The only types of such connection, on their account, are causal relations and relations of identity. The relation between the listener and the object is, they say, neither. The relation between the speaker's words and the listener's cognition is causal, but neither an identity nor a causal relation obtains directly between the hearer and the object about which he hears. The listener's cognition arises, the Buddhists say, independently of the object: the listener is dependent upon the speaker alone for the origin of his cognition. Heard testimony is, therefore, always "unrestricted." Being "unrestricted," it cannot be a pramāṇa.
All other plausible candidates for a pramāṇa also suffer this malady of nonrestriction; they therefore too, for this same reason, fail to be a pramāṇa.

Lack of restriction results in heard testimony failing to be a pramāṇa not because heard testimonies are subsequently always nonveridical (although even this is sometimes asserted\textsuperscript{21}), but because it results in the listener not knowing even in those cases where his cognition is veridical that this is in fact the case. Pramāṇa, in other words (to return to its sense of knowledge generally), is not only veridical cognition but also cognition known to be veridical. Any case of it is cognition in respect to the truth of which one has a reasonable assurance: it is cognition that one believes true for an acceptable reason. Heard testimonies, even when they are veridical, are never known to be veridical. For, the Buddhists insist, the listener would know a verbally gained cognition veridical only if he could know that the person doing the talking was trustworthy (as well, presumably, as wise).\textsuperscript{22} Trustworthiness (not to mention wisdom) is a state of mind, Mokṣa\textsuperscript{23} Karagupta says, and states of mind are private. Because they are private, the states of at least another person's mind cannot be known.\textsuperscript{23} And the fact that a person has been found to speak truthfully in the past is no guarantee that he always tells the truth.\textsuperscript{24} Nor is it a guarantee that someone says he is telling the truth, people being notorious liars in this matter (in the
opinion of Mokṣākaragupta). Trustworthiness, in short, cannot be determined. The listener has no way of knowing that what he hears is veridical, even if it is. Veridical heard testimony, for this reason, fails to be a pramāṇa (in the sense of a species of veridical cognition). All other species of unrestricted cognition, even if all instances of it are veridical, are precisely because of their nonrestrictedness also impossible to determine to be true. On account of this, no such type of unrestricted cognition likewise qualifies as a pramāṇa.

The one exception in the case of heard testimonies are the statements of the Buddha. His testimonies are known to be veridical because his trustworthiness is beyond doubt. And the heard testimonies of ordinary mortals can be pramāṇas if what is learned from them is not something about the object being spoken about but about what the speaker wants to communicate. In such cases, however, the heard testimonies are reducible to inferences.

Since what makes it possible for veridical perceptions and inferences to be known to be veridical is their "restrictedness" or unique connection with the object, one would hope for Dharmakīrti to insist that this "restrictedness" is a self-evident guarantee of veracity. The veracity of veridical perceptions and inferences is self-evident, given their direct connection or "restriction" to the object. Unfortunately, he says something else, motivated by a concern to contravene the Hindus, some of whom advocate self-
evidence. Instead he maintains that veracity is guaranteed pragmatically: one acts on one’s (veridical) perceptions and inferences; and when they yield the expected results, one retrospectively knows that they are veridical.  

Unfortunately this means that to know that a cognition is veridical (which is necessary for it to be a pramāṇa) one must act on it, verifying it through the action. Yet Dharmakīrti wants to insist that action is not necessary for a cognition to be a pramāṇa (p. 40). Manorathananandin points out this inconsistency. By way of responding to it himself, he states that at least some veridical perceptions and inferences have presumptive veracity: one can justifiably assume them veridical on the basis of having earlier pragmatically tested these perceptions and inferences and found them to be veridical. In only rather novel or suspicious circumstances need the test actually be carried through. The matter is left in this unsatisfactory state (unsatisfactory because the need for action is still not ultimately escaped).

And even if presumptive veracity were not unsatisfactory in this way, it might be objected in a more modern vein that what one gets in verifying a perception is only more perceptions but at a "closer" perspective. If I seek to verify a first-time perception through action, what I get when I reach the object is simply a series of new, "close-up" perceptions. These, too, must be verified, if they are to verify the initial perception; and an
infinite regress results. Manorathanandin possibly addresses some such difficulty at one point; he seems to say that at some crucial point with perceptions their veracity is indeed self-evident. Of course, even if one has a regress of perceptions, the regress need not be vicious unless Dharmakīrtti is seeking certainty to an unreasonable degree.

But there remains the difficulty that Dharmakīrtti can no longer rule out as pramāṇas cognitive activities such as heard testimony simply because instances of them are not known to be veridical. The veracity of these instances can be confirmed just as well, and by the same pragmatic/presumptive means, as that of veridical perceptions and inferences. "Restriction" or "nonrestriction" has nothing to do with knowing the veracity of the latter if restriction is not a self-evident guarantee of truth. Heard testimonies and the like are, to be sure, not tied to objects in the way that the two favored types of cognition are; but why this should make the critical difference in terms of establishing veracity if self-evidency is ruled out has not been satisfactorily explained.

As a last point on heard testimony, it is possible that it amounts to only cognition of objects in principle beyond the senses, such as God. If so, this would explain why heard testimonies cannot be known to be veridical, possibly even because of their "nonrestrictedness": pragmatic verification is altogether out of the question. But if this is what Dharmakīrtti is getting at
all along by heard testimony, he has not shown why the equally
important set of cognitions in which we learn from the words of
another about an object which is not beyond the senses cannot be
veridical and known to be veridical and hence be cases of a pramāṇa.
His thesis that there are only two pramāṇas can be criticized
accordingly. All in all, the principal value of the Buddhist
discussion of why only veridical perception and inference are
pramāṇas seems to be to focus on the fact that pramāṇa in its
generic sense (with the appropriate implication for pramāṇa in its
specific sense) is more than merely veridical cognition. Veracity
is a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one.

It could perhaps be argued at this point that "pramāṇa"
in the sense of veridical cognition (with, again, appropriate
implications for its sense of a species of veridical cognition) is
being used in two ways rather than one: first, as veridical cogni-
tion known to be veridical; and second, as simply veridical cogni-
tion. The first usage is by far the more important if (as I suspect)
there are indeed two. I will from now on, purely for simplicity's
sake, ignore the possibility of two senses and mean by "pramāṇa"
(in sense 1) known veridical cognition. (I will take up an utterly
different sense of "pramāṇa" than these two in the next chapter.)
As a consequence pratyaksā, as a species of pramāṇa in this first
sense of "pramāṇa," will be veridical perception known to be
veridical (which is what I will now mean by the first meaning of
"pratyakṣa"). For simplicity's sake, however, I will not always call pratyakṣa in its first sense known veridical perception, nor call pramāṇa in sense 1 always known veridical cognition).

The Requirement of Novelty

The description of what is wrong with a means of cognizing other than veridical perception or inference in terms of "restriction" is more characteristic of Dharmakīrti's followers than of Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti actually discusses the issue of why there are only two pramāṇas very little and, except for suggestions in the direction of restriction, seems unable to justify his claim. On two occasions, Dharmakīrti argues that there are only two pramāṇas because there are only two sorts of knowable objects. He is here attempting to eliminate candidates on an altogether different basis than that of "restriction," with even less success. The new basis is that these candidates fail to take a "novel" (ajñāta, anadhigata) object.

The requirement that a pramāṇa take a novel object actually forms part of the definition of a pramāṇa, at least as certain of Dharmakīrti's followers such as Mokṣākaragupta render the definition. A pramāṇa, according to these followers, is a type of "uncontradicted" cognition of, specifically, a novel object. Dharmakīrti himself states this "novelty" requirement as an alternative definition of a pramāṇa: a pramāṇa is a type of "uncontradicted"
cognition or (vā) a type of cognition of a novel object. His followers explain this alternative definition as but the second half of a two-sided definition, thereby combining both definitions into one.

What a "novel object" is can be gathered from Dharmakīrti's argument that there are only two pramāṇas because there are only two sorts of objects. The only two sorts of objects there are, Dharmakīrti insists, are perceptually present objects (pratyakṣameya) and perceptually absent objects (parokṣameya). These, then, he insists, are the objects of, respectively, perception and inference. Any type of cognitive activity other than perception and inference must take either perceptually present or perceptually absent objects as their objects, these categories being exhaustive. They must then take a type of object already ranged over by another cognitive activity. They then do not take a "novel" object. By "novel object," then, Dharmakīrti means a type of object that is not already ranged over by some cognitive activity. All types of cognitive activities other than perception and inference are obliged to take a "nonnovel" object and are hence on that account, Dharmakīrti insists, not pramāṇas.

No acceptable justification is given why lack of novelty results in the loss of the character of being a pramāṇa. The only justification that is even attempted depends upon "novel object" suddenly taking on a new meaning. It comes to mean not a type of
object that is not already ranged over by some cognitive activity but rather those objects that are not already known by some particular veridical cognition.

Reconstructing this justification, an instance of a veridical cognitive activity is, of course, a veridical cognition. A veridical cognition (we saw earlier) is a cognition that guides activity. It does so by locating an object at the place where it is at the time when it is, and in consideration of its true character. In other words, the function of a veridical cognition is to rightly attest to the existence of an object. A cognition that does not take a novel object (already using "novel" in its new sense of a particular unknown object rather than a type of object) does not perform this function of a veridical cognition. It does not perform it because it performs it redundantly, this function already having been performed by the cognition by which the object was known originally. Not performing the function of a veridical cognition, the cognition cannot be one; nor can the type of cognitive activity of which it is an instance be a species of veridical cognition, i.e., a pramāṇa.

This change of meaning, of course, will not do. If nothing else, it means that veridical perceptions and inferences can never be of objects already cognized. For such objects are now in no way "novel," whereas before they were "novel" at least in being objects known only through perception (i.e., objects not known
through any other means). But in its favor, it should be said that the change in meaning now makes it possible to rule out as pramāṇas at least certain cognitive activities.

One such activity dispatched with some care in the literature is memory (smṛti). Accurate memory (which is the only sort that could qualify as a pramāṇa) is clearly never cognition of an object not already cognized. Such memory never tells us anything about the existence of an object that is not known through the original cognition. It is therefore not a pramāṇa, the Buddhists conclude. It fails to perform the function of a pramāṇa by performing it redundantly; and, failing to perform the function of a pramāṇa, it does not qualify as one.⁴⁷

But even if certain cognitive activities such as accurate memory are now dispatched, others such as veridical heard testimony are left relatively intact. The best the novelty requirement can do in these cases is rule out those cases of such cognition in which one has already cognized the object one hears talked about. But there are many interesting cases of veridical heard testimony not of this sort. All in all, neither the restriction requirement nor the novelty requirement can be considered convincingly successful; and the limitation of the types of veridical cognition to two is best just accepted as one of Dharmakīrti's principles.
In defense of Dharmakīrti's appeal to the novelty requirement, it should be said that this requirement seems not even primarily intended to rule out candidates as pramāṇas in the first sense of "pramāṇa." It seems primarily intended to rule out candidates in a second, altogether different sense that I will turn to in the next chapter. The function of ruling out candidates as pramāṇas in this second sense is the requirement's stated purpose, however much Dharmakīrti proceeds to actually use the requirement to rule out candidates in the first sense of "pramāṇa." Dharmakīrti's use of the novelty requirement to rule out candidates as pramāṇas in the second sense of "pramāṇa" will be noted in the discussion of this second sense to follow.

**Summation**

The important point of this chapter for understanding Parts Two and Three is that pratyakṣa takes an object that is desirable or objectionable. It does so precisely because it is a pramāṇa in the first sense of "pramāṇa." The perceptual object is one towards which we harbor attachments. This is not true of the sensory object or svalakṣaṇa, which is the object of pratyakṣa in the sense of "pratyakṣa" to be discussed next. This object is, instead, inherently uninteresting. For what makes the perceptual object desirable or objectionable is a certain operation of intellect that follows the sensing act in a perception, a mental operation that is
Dharmakīrti's equivalent of perceptual consciousness. We will turn to this mental operation after discussing the next sense of "pramāṇa."
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. PV II:1: mānaḥ dvividham . . . / NB I:2: dvividham samyag jñānam.

2. NBTD 35.4-5; NBTD 36.1.

3. NBTV 6.15; TB 7.4-5; NBTD 38.1.

4. NBTD 45.5.

5. PV II:288. But there are other types of cognition that are included in this category. PVB 332.27-28.

6. PV II:62; TB 8.5-6.

7. See, for example, NB II:17.

8. TB 39.3-5.

9. PV II:69 and PVV on that verse.

10. See, e.g., TSP 702.13-14; TS:3474-3475.

11. NB I:13 and NBTD on this verse.

12. NBTD 77.9-12.

13. PVB 169.3: pratyakṣam anumānaḥ ca pramāṇe.

14. NVIT 18.19-20; also TS:1487.
See, for example, the discussion in NBTD 49.1-4 and 50.1. "Niyata" has a number of different meanings, of which "restriction" is only one. See BL II,21,fn.1.

NBTD 49.1-4 and 50.1. Also, NBTD 40.1-2.

TS:1488.

TS:1521. See also TSP 531.16.

TS:1512-1513. TB 10.6-10.

TB 10.4-6: sābdām ca jñānam bāhyārthāvisāmśvādakatvena pramāṇam estavyam. avisāmśvādakatvam ca sambandham antareṇa na sam-gacchate. na ca sābdānam bāhyārthena sāha ka. cit sambandho 'sti.

This is what seems to be said in TS:1512-1513 and TB 10.4-6. This may simply be a peculiar way of speaking, meaning rather that heard testimonies are not necessarily veridical the way that properly executed perceptions and inferences are.

pratyayitapuruṣa, TSP 531.10.

TB 13.7-10.

TS:1510-1511.

TB 13.10 and 14.2.

TS:1509.

PV I:9a; PV I:147cd-148. He has no reason to lie, being beyond all worldly desires and aims.

PV I:3d-4.
29
TS: 1520-1524.

30
E.g., the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas.

31
PV I: 6d-7a. See also TS: 2926.

32
PVV 6.20-24; PVV 4.7-10. See also TS: 2966-2968.

33

34
When, e.g., Śāntarakṣita specifies "objects beyond the senses" (parokṣārtha), he does not specify whether these objects are beyond the senses due to circumstance such as distance or altogether (atyānta) beyond the senses. Either conceivably could be meant.

35
PV I: 5; PV II: 1-3; PV II: 63-68; PV II: 76-84. Interim discussions are devoted to topics such as the reality of the universal.

36
PV II: 1; PV II: 63. Also see PVB 169.7-10.

37
TB 1.8; PVB 21.17.

38
PV I: 7c.

39
See, for example, Prajñākaragupta's explanation of the necessity of both definitions, indicating that they jointly define a pramāṇa, PVB 30.8-19.

40
PV II: 63; TS: 1700.

41
See, for example, PV II: 75. Also, PVB 169.9-10.
PVB 169.7-9: prameyâvyabhicârataḥ prâmâyanaṃ. na ca prameyam antareṇa prameyâvyabhicâraḥ. prameyaḥ ca pratyakṣânumâna- pratipâdyād aparâṃ nāsti.

43
See PVB II:76 and Dharmakîrti's reply in PVB II:101:
anumânâd anityâder grahaṇe 'yaṃ kramo mataḥ/ prâmâyanaṃ eva nâyatra grhâtagrahaṇân matam// Also TSP 591.19-22 (on TS:1702-1703): tatra śabdâdînāṁ prâmâyanaṃ bhavatpratyakṣe vârthe bhavet, parokṣe veti pakṣadvayam. na tāvad âdye arthe, kasmāt? pratyakṣe 'ntargati- prâpteḥ; śabdâdînāṁ abhinnârthâvâsyâvatvât. atha pratyakṣaṇâdhitâ saty uttarakâlam tâî punar adhigamâh kriyate, ata āha VAÎPHALYÂM VÂ. grhâtagrahaṇât smrâtvad aprâmâyaprasaṅgât. (The words in capitals are those that appear in the verses being glossed.)

44
PVB 31.7-8: asti nâstîti vâ vyavasthâpanârtham prâmâyam prekṣâvatâpekyate.

45
See, for example, TS:451. Also PVB II:121.

46
There is a sense in which a pratyakṣa is always of a novel object; for things are momentary in the Buddhist view. But this is true of pratyakṣa only in another sense (that of sensing, see chapter 4).

47
PVV 8.9-11; TS:1549; PVB 22.1-2.

48
PVB I:5a; PVV 8.17-19.
Chapter 3

THE SECOND MEANING OF "PRAMĀNA"

"Pramāna" in its second sense means that causal factor (kāraṇasādhana) which is most instrumental in the production of a (known) veridical cognition (i.e., a pramāna in the first sense of the word).¹ In Manorathanandin's words, it is the "most efficacious" causal factor (sādhakatama kāraka, karapa) in the production of a (known) veridical cognition.² This most efficacious causal factor is a different thing with each different mode of (known) veridical cognition. In the case of veridical perception, which alone is of any consequence in examining Dharmakirti's perceptual theory, it is the sensing activity that constitutes the earliest stage of a perception.

Dharmakirti obviously includes among the causal factors generating a perception constitutes causes, or those cognitive acts that make up a veridical perception, as well as "causes proper," or those causes that bring about the constitutive acts of a perception. Dharmakirti's major opponents seem to have considered only the various "causes proper" the generating causes of a veridical perception;³ Dharmakirti was somewhat of a revolutionary in including constitutive causes among the generating causes. His opponents' objection to this inclusion seems to have been that this identifies
the product (phala) of the generating causes, i.e., the veridical perception, with one of the causes itself, i.e., the act of sensing (pramāṇa). The pramāṇa, they say, is supposed to be what is most instrumental in the production of a veridical cognition, not the veridical cognition itself. This objection, of course, overlooks the fact that one act involved in a veridical perception is not the whole of the veridical perception. The objection does, however, at least bring into question the policy of including the constitutive elements of a perception among its generating causes. The usual Buddhist reply to this objection is that constituting a thing in such a way as to make it what it is, which is what the sensing does in respect to the veridical perception of which it is a part, is sufficient to make that constitutive thing the pramāṇa, generating cause or not. But this dispute aside, Dharmakīrti defends his choice of the sensing with comments that are best understood after a closer look at how a veridical perception comes about.

Dharmakīrti, as said in the Introduction, holds a representational theory of perception. He believes that we are in indirect contact with the object through sense data. In a veridical perception, there is first contact between the sense and the object, and this produces an alteration in consciousness. This alteration takes the form of an image (ākāra, ābhāsa) that represents the object. Consciousness, by nature self-aware, is aware of this image, which is but itself transfigured. It takes this image
to be the object represented. The appearance of the image and the awareness of it by which we are aware of the object constitute the sensing act of the perception. Immediately following this sensing is a mental operation of perceptual consciousness in which the sensum is transformed into a percept.  

Regarding why the sensing is the most efficacious cause, Dharmakīrti denies this role to the mental operation because, he says, it "cognizes something already previously cognized." This is the same requirement that a pramāṇa take a novel object that we met with before, only put to a new use in rejecting candidates as pramāṇas in this new sense of "pramāṇa" (i.e., as "most efficacious cause" rather than "known veridical cognition"). The mental operation cognizes what has already been cognized by performing its operations on the data of sense. The justification for why this results in the loss of the character of being the most efficacious cause is the same now as it was when considering "pramāṇa" in its original sense: it results in the mental operation not having the function of a pramāṇa (i.e., a most efficacious cause) and, by not having the function of one, not being one. It does not have the function of one because it attests to the existence of an object whose existence has already been attested to by the prior activity of sensing. What Dharmakīrti is getting at here, it seems reasonable to suppose, is only that the mental operation is not the heart of the perception. The sensing act, in already
attesting to the existence of the object, presumably has already performed the critical function of a veridical perception, namely, (accurate) awareness of the object. Further, the sensing operation and not the mental operation is responsible for making the perception the sensuous sort of cognition that it characteristically is. The mental operation, in other words, is not what is most responsible for making a veridical perception a veridical perception. The sensing act, then, rather than the mental operation, is the pramāṇa of the cognition.

In regards to eliminating each of the various "causes proper" as the most efficacious generating cause, Dharmakīrti seems to rule each out simply on the basis that none is a constitutive cause. He makes the following comment to this effect. "Being a most efficacious cause is possible only of something of the nature of an awareness [and not a sense organ or sense faculty or the like] because 1) an awareness is the principal thing in [making a veridical perception able to generate successful] activity in respect to liked or disliked things, 2) the differences among perceptions are caused by the differences in images [representing the objects], and 3) the apprehension of the object takes place only when the image of the object is present."¹⁵ The best explanation for the parts of this comment seems to be as follows. An awareness, i.e., the sensing act, and not the sense organ or the like, is the principal thing in a veridical perception generating successful
activity because it is in the awareness of the object that a perception is motivating knowledge of the object at all. We act on the basis of an awareness and not a sense, says Manorathanandin in making this point. But being able to aid in the pursuit of aims in this way is essential to a veridical perception being a veridical perception, so what is most instrumental in producing this feature in a perception is most instrumental in producing the perception. An awareness, then, (i.e., the sensing activity), and not a sense, is the most efficacious cause of a veridical perception. In regards to the second reason, to be the (veridical) perception of an object a (veridical) perception must change when its object changes. A perception that remains the same when different objects are perceived is not a perception of those different objects. But what changes appropriately with the object is the representation of the object, not the sense organ. This image is an awareness, i.e., consciousness transfigured. The sensing, then, which is but the appearance of the image and the awareness of it, is again the pramāṇa—or, as Dharmakīrti sometimes puts it, the very image itself is the pramāṇa.

Regarding the third reason why an awareness (i.e., sensing) is the pramāṇa, only when the object is represented by an image are we conscious of the object. Our awareness of the object consists in our awareness of the image that represents it. But this image, again, is an awareness, i.e., consciousness altered. Sensing,
then, again is the most efficacious cause.

Dharmakīrti sometimes puts this last point not only by saying that the very image is the pramāṇa but that the relationship of "conformity" (sārupya, sādrṣya) between the image and the object, by which the image is a representation of the object, is the pramāṇa.\textsuperscript{20}

Although according to Dharmakīrti, no distinction is drawn at the time of being aware of the image between the image and its object but the image is directly "taken" for its object (in a manner left unexplained), the proof of the object is another matter. We infer the existence of objects in order to explain why our perceptions have images at all and why these images undergo systematic changes.\textsuperscript{21}

To review the purpose of these chapters on pramāṇa and pratyakṣa, I am reconstructing Dharmakīrti's Sautrāntika theory of perception, partly to correct shortcomings in treatments of this theory in the secondary literature and partly to provide the background for understanding Parts Two and Three. Part Two consists of a discussion of two theories of the svalakṣaṇa or sensory object that are contrary to the theory I prove in Part Three. What is important in this last chapter to understanding Parts Two and Three is mostly that Dharmakīrti's theory of perception is indeed a representative theory. It is the mediate character of our awareness
of the svalaksana that gives rise to one of the theories in Part Two; and this same mediate character is important to an issue that I will explore in some depth in Part Three.

One important point of this chapter has implications for the material to be discussed in the next chapter. The point was made in this chapter that the mental operation in perception is not the pramana, i.e., the most efficacious cause. The next chapter will show that Dharmakirti insists that because the mental operation is not the pramana, it is what is at fault in our perceptions. It will be remembered that our perceptions need improving, from the ultimate point of view; from that point of view, they are fundamentally mistaken. The next chapter will show Dharmakirti insisting that what is wrong with them is the very fact that they involve the mental operation. Equivocating on the two meanings of "pramana," Dharmakirti will insist that the mental operation, because it is not a pramana in the sense of a most efficacious cause, is not a pramana in the sense of a veridical cognitive activity; and that the reason that it is not is that it involves a grievous "error" that makes the perceptions involving them ultimately mistaken, even if provisionally adequate.

This "error" (that is an error only ultimately) is that the mental operation transforms the sensory object, the svalaksana, into the perceptual object or what I called in the Introduction a
substrate. This "error" is nongrievous provisionally, in terms of getting along in life; but it is disastrous ultimately, in terms of gaining absolute freedom from suffering. For it is responsible for suffering. The svalaṅga is, in itself before it is transformed into a substrate, inherently uninteresting. It does not afford us pleasures and pains. But, transformed into a substrate, it is an object of attachment, causing what can only be counted as grief from the ultimate aim of infinite peace. Because the mental operation is responsible for changing the svalaṅga into a substrate, resulting in attachments that result in suffering, the mental operation is ultimately (and, Dharmakīrti would say because of it, even provisionally) at fault in our perceptions. As I said, this will be discussed in the next chapter.

The subject of this next chapter is the second sense of "pratyakṣa." This second sense is sensing; the svalaṅga is the object of pratyakṣa in this sense. In the comments of Dharmakīrti that I report to show that he does use "pratyakṣa" with this second sense, those having to do with the svalaṅga portray it as (in the case of visual perception) a color patch. In fact, it is not a (nommental) color patch, as comments of his that I will quote in later chapters will show. For it is an aggregate of paramāṇus, the atoms of Dharmakīrti's system; and an aggregate of paramāṇus does not constitute a patch. It is an aggregate that is only represented in an image as a patch. But Dharmakīrti speaks of the
svalakṣaṇa being a color patch in comments such as those I record in the coming chapter because of a fact about his representative theory, one mentioned in this chapter (p. 74). Dharmakīrti believes that when we are aware of an object by way of its image, we do not at the time distinguish between the image and its object. We directly "take" the image for its object. Nor until we actively seek enlightenment do we need to do otherwise. Because in sensing a svalakṣaṇa we have no sense of being aware of an image instead of an object and because there is for the most part no point in being aware of this, Dharmakīrti simply does not distinguish between the svalakṣaṇa and its sensum in the comments in question; as a result, he treats the svalakṣaṇa as a patch. He just considers the svalakṣaṇa to be its sensum, the patch; or, more accurately, he takes us to be directly aware of the svalakṣaṇa which is a patch. Only in comments of the sort I will report very late in the coming chapter is it obvious that he considers us only mediately aware of the svalakṣaṇa, and only in the comments I will report in Part Three does it become clear that this mediately known svalakṣaṇa is an aggregate and not a patch.

Dharmakīrti even goes so far as to loosely refer to the svalakṣaṇa as, say, a tree, instead of a tree-shaped patch. This manner of speaking will also be evident in the comments I report in this coming chapter. I will organize the material in such a way that I will show only in stages that the svalakṣaṇa or sensory
object differs from the perceptual object, and that it is only mediately perceived rather than directly perceived, and that, as an aggregate of paramāṇus, it is not a color patch as is its sensum.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. \textit{PV} II:311: sarveśāṃ upayoge 'pi kārakānāṃ kriyāṃ prati/ yad antyaṃ bheda-kaṃ tasyāṃ tat sādhakatamāṃ matam//

2. \textit{PVV} 5.15. See also \textit{PVB} 23.12; \textit{NBTD} 84.6-7; \textit{PV} II:311.

3. E.g., see \textit{SV} IV:60-61.

4. \textit{NBTD} 81.6-7.

5. \textit{SV} IV:74-75; \textit{SV} IV:78.

6. \textit{PVV} 191.18-20; \textit{PVV} 192.13-16; \textit{PVV} 194.13-20; \textit{NBTD} 82.7-9.

7. \textit{TB} 100.7: svakārajñānajanakā dṛṣṭyā nendriyagocarāḥ.
\textit{PV} II:247: bhinnakālam katham grāhyam iti cet grāhyatām viduḥ/ hetuttvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpaṇaṃ/ \textit{PVV} 175.11-12: na hi sandamsāyogolayar iva jñānapadārthayor grāhya-grāhahakabhāvaḥ, kathām/ tad ākāram anukaroti tad grāhyasya grāhakam ity ucyate. Also \textit{PV} II:353: yathākathāḥ cit tasyārtharūpaṃ muktāvabhāsinaḥ/ arthagrahaḥ katham? .. \textit{PVV} 205.12-13: na hy arthāḥ svarūpeṇa dṛṣṭyate. tattvārūpabuddhivedanād arthagrahavyavasthā. sārūpyam eva cēna/ sambhavati kathām arthagraha iti manyate sautrāntikaḥ. Also \textit{TS}:1359-1360.

8. \textit{NB} I:10.


11 PV I:5: grhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṁ sāvṛtam. . . [PVV 5.10-11: sāvṛtam = darsānottarakālaṁ sāvṛtāṁ vikalpa-jñānām.]

12 PVV 5.10: . . . darsānagṛhitasyaiva grahaṇāt, . . .
TB 6.7-8: yathā ghaṭaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ jñānena drṣṭvā paścāt
tasmiṁ eva viṣaye ghaṭo 'yam iti savikalpakaṁ jñānaṁ smaranarūpam.

13 PVV 5.10-12: . . . darsānottarakālaṁ sāvṛtāṁ vikalpa-
-jñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ neṣṭaṁ; darsānagṛhitasyaiva grahaṇāt, tenaiva ca
prāpayituṁ sākyatvāt sāvṛtāṁ akṣicītakam eva.

14 Ibid.

15 PV I:5-6: . . . dhīpramāṇata/ pravṛttes tatpradhānatvāt
heyopādeyavastum// viṣayākārabhedāc ca dhiyo 'dhigamabhedaḥ/
bhāvād evāsyā tadbhāve; . . .

16 PVV 5.14: nahīndriyam astīty eva pravṛttih, kim tarhi?
jñānasadbhāvāt.


18 PV II:317ab; PVE 23.11; PVV 195.8.

19 Nandita Bandyopadhyay puts this point nicely: "It is the cognitive object-form that determines knowledge as capturing the object. This object-form assures me that I know the object. As long as the form of the object remains confined to the external thing it cannot be looked upon as given to knowledge. But when the external object confers its form upon cognition it (the form) becomes the cognitive object-form [his emphasis] which alone finally helps in manifesting the object as known to the knower. . . . The object-form in knowledge fixes the knowledge as being related to the object. . . ." "The Buddhist Theory of Relation Between Pramāṇa and Pramāṇa," Journal of Indian Philosophy, VII, No. 1 (1979), 51.
20

**NB I:20-21:** arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam. tadvaśād artha-
pratītisiddher iti. (sārūpya = sādṛṣṭa, see NBTD 81.3.)

21

**TB 101.1-6:** namu yadi prakāśamānāṃ jānām evemāṃ, tadā
'asti bāhyo 'rtha iti kutaḥ? bāhyārthasiddhis tu syād vyatīreṇa kāṭaḥ.
na hi sarvatra sarvadā nīlādaya ākārāḥ prakāśante. na caitat
svopādānāṃtre balabhāvitve sati yujyate. niyataviśaye pravṛtti-
yogāt. tasmād asti kiñ cid eṣāṃ samanantarapratyayavātyātiktaṃ
kāraṇāṃ, yadbalena kva cit kādā cit bhavantīti sākyam avastum, sa
eva bāhyo 'rtha iti, . . . . See also Shrinivas Shastri, [2]. I
agree with the conclusions Shastri draws in this article.
Chapter 4

THE SECOND MEANING OF "PRATYAKŠA"

The sensing element that is the pramāṇa (in the sense of the most efficacious cause) of a (known) veridical perception is what Dharmakīrti means by "pratyakṣa" in its second sense.

Actually, Dharmakīrti insists that "pratyakṣa" in this sense means more than just this. It means, he insists, any kind of direct apprehension (sāksātkarījñāna), of which sensing is but one of four types.¹

The three types of direct apprehension other than sensing are self-consciousness (svasamvedana), yogic perception (yogijñāna), and mental sensing (mānasapratyakṣa). Self-consciousness is that awareness which consciousness has of its own content, either an image of an object or an idea or a pain or the like.² Yogic perception is an extrasensory power born of meditation which enables a person to be cognizant of something just as if that thing were present to the senses.³ Mental sensing is a curious type of awareness said to play a role in perception but for which, according to Dharmottara, there is no evidence except that the Buddha spoke of such a thing.⁴

Although Dharmakīrti insists that "pratyakṣa" does mean all four kinds of direct awareness, he generally uses the word as if
it meant sensing alone.⁵ He would have us believe that when he is using this word as if it meant sensing alone, he is merely taking sensing as the paradigm case of direct apprehension.⁶ But he is not convincing. In such cases he is obviously talking about only sensing and not the other three kinds of awareness, for most of the comments can be shown not to apply to one or all of the other three.⁷ There is reason, then, not to take his attempt to include self-consciousness and the like in pratyakṣa very seriously. He attempts to include them only so as to make them veridical awarenesses; but his success at accomplishing this aim by doing so depends upon an equivocation.⁸ As a practice, then, I will take "pratyakṣa" as meaning simply sensing. This will make it possible to understand Dharmakīrti's comments about pratyakṣa in the sense we are now considering without constantly having to explain how what is said applies (so Dharmakīrti claims) to the other three kinds of awareness, when in fact it does not, or does so only with difficulty. It is possible following this practice to give an adequate enough account of Dharmakīrti's perceptual theory for my purposes.

Dharmakīrti also tends to take ocular sensing as a paradigm of sensing generally. This is a useful practice, and one I will follow.
The Nature of Sensing

Dharmakīrti's predecessor, Dignāga, characterizes sensing or pratyakṣa as the simple awareness of things (arthasamjñin) without any conscious or unconscious effort at interpretation (dharmasamjñin). Dignāga offers an example of it (an example that is also popular with Dharmakīrti) in connection with cognizing the blue color of some object. In cognizing this blue color, pratyakṣa or the sensing element is the initial apprehension of the color (nīlam vijñāti) without the awareness that it is a color of a particular sort, namely, blue color (nīlam iti vijñāti). The awareness that it is blue color is part of the interpretation, and this enters in only with the mental operation that follows the sensing.

We can sense without subsequently mentally interpreting what we sense, according to Dharmakīrti. We do so normally in the process of a perception when a number of things disturb our visual field but we attend to only one. Sensing unaccompanied by a mental operation of interpretation occurs at any time in the course of a perception when, while paying attention to one thing, other things enter our field of awareness but are not registered for what they are. Prajñākaragupta provides, as an example of this, cognizing the many colors of a butterfly's wing. When looking at the butterfly in such a way as to be picking out just one of its colors and recognizing that color for what it is—for example, in focusing
on its blue color and in coming to the awareness that the blue is
indeed blue—the other colors are just sensed. Although
Prajñākaragupta's example involves cognizing the many colors of
one multicolored thing, it is also intended to illustrate perceiving
many things of different colors. When one colored thing among many
is picked out and recognized as being of a certain color, the other
colored things not paid attention to are just sensed.15

One can also enter into a nonordinary state in which one
only senses. Dharmakīrti speaks of "stilling the mind" and
arresting the perceptual process short of the mental operation.
"Withdrawing one's thoughts from everything, remaining with one's
inner self stilled, color is seen by the eye; and this is cognition
born of the senses [i.e., an act of sensing]."16

One can know one has only sensed (and not interpreted what
was sensed) only in retrospection. Looking back upon a "mindless"
state of the sort just described or a perception in which one
registered only part of what one sensed, one can know one sensed by
noticing that at the earlier time one failed to register either all
(in the "mindless" state) or part (in the case of the perception) of
what one somehow knows disturbed one's visual field. Had these
other things been registered as was whatever it was one did register,
one would remember registering them the way one remembers register-
ing what one actually did (barring, of course, any fault of memory).
Not remembering having registered them, one knows that those things
were merely sensed. To illustrate with Prajñākaragupta's example of perceiving a multicolored butterfly, although retrospectively one knows one must have experienced its other colors besides the blue color that one registered, because one does not remember registering these colors the way one remembers registering the blue color, one knows (barring any fault of memory) that they were just sensed. 17

Kalpañā, the Mental Operation

To turn to the matter of registering or the mental operation in perception, it consists, as the examples might suggest, in seeing a thing as a particular sort of thing: that is, as belonging to a particular class (i.e., as blue, as a color, etc.). It is because perception involves this sort of registering that perceptions are judgmental in character, expressing propositions. The examples Dharmakīrti (or his followers) give of registering, in fact, are given in terms of propositions that reflect the perceptions of which the registerings are a part, e.g., "This is a pot." 18 The reason for this is not explained; presumably it has to do with the fact that the perception does get its judgmental character from the mental operation (or perhaps Dharmakīrti has simply confused the mental operation with the perception).

The mental operation Dharmakīrti calls kalpañā. It accomplishes the identification of a thing as to kind by contributing
to a perception a *sāmānyā*, the Buddhist equivalent of a universal. A full account of *kalpanā* or this mental operation of registering is best acquired in the course of detailing the Buddhist theory of universals. And this is best accomplished by first examining the Hindu theory of universals, or at least Dharmakīrti's understanding of this theory, to which the Buddhist theory was for the most part a response.

I would like to say at this point that it is Dharmakīrti's theory of universals, and the dispute over this theory that he has with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, that is the most important material in this chapter for understanding the remaining parts of this dissertation. It is considerations having to do with this theory that are behind the arguments for the two wrong views of the svalaṅkṣaṇa or sensory object that I discuss in Part Two and to my criticisms of them. It is also considerations in regards to this theory that lead Dharmakīrti to propound the view that I give in Part Three. In both respects it is the fact that Dharmakīrti is a conceptualist and a resemblance theorist that is most important.

The *Nyāya*-Vaiśeṣika Realist Theory of Universals

The *Nyāya*-Vaiśeṣikas were realists: a universal (*sāmānyā*, *jāti*) is a nonmental entity. It determines most classes of resembling things and explains their resemblance: the things resemble one another because they share some one thing, a universal,
in common. Class identification is accomplished in these cases by cognizing these nonmental, general entities.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas commonly offer as a paradigm case of a universal "cowness" (gotva). The class determined by a universal can be either a class of natural objects (cows, trees) or a class of artifacts (pots, lamps).

Universals are not qualities in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, a point that has been argued at length by Karl Potter. Colors and shapes and the like are not repeatable: they are particulars as much as are cows and pots, or whatever. For example, the blue of the morning sky is not the blue in a person's eyes. The blue is not repeated; rather each blue, a particular, stands in the same relation to a certain blueness that is itself not blue. And it is this blueness that is common to each.

The realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas was an extreme realism: universals exist independently of their particulars. They do not occupy a separate world of being from their particulars, as they do in Plato; but they exist in that very same world, only ubiquitously: in the places in between occurrences of their particulars as well as those places where their particulars occur. (Blueness, in other words, occurs in empty places and in conjunction with particulars of contrary colors as much as it does with particulars that are blue. It is an all-pervasive, unitary entity.) When a universal such as blueness occurs, say, in a particular of the right sort—the blue of a robin's egg, for example—it occurs fully and
equally in that blue at the same time as in all other blues, as well as everywhere else. Particulars do not manifest their universals by degrees, in other words, as they do in the philosophy of Plato. A universal is, rather, a breach of the principle that no one thing can be, all of a piece, in more than one place at a time.

A universal such as blueness is not cognized everywhere it occurs—specifically, in empty places and in unlikely particulars—because it is a perceptible entity, not just one cognized by means of the intellect; and among the conditions for its perception is that it be related to some particular and, inexplicably, just the right particular (e.g., a blue one in the case of blueness). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas actually argue for their universals on the basis that they can be perceived.\(^24\) The contention that universals are perceptible perhaps introduces an inconsistency in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view since universals, not being qualities, have no color and the like.\(^25\)

Regarding the relationship of universals to their particulars, universals are said to "inhere in" their particulars. Inherence is really rather an entity than a relation, a kind of cosmic "glue"\(^26\) that waits around to selectively and inseparably unite together universals and their particulars. It is an ontologically different kind of thing from either universals or particulars, as different in kind from them as they are from each
other. It, too, is a sensible object (at least for the Naiyāyikas). When observing a cow, for example, one sees the cow together with its color and the like (the particulars of the cognition, in other words), and also the inherence between each particular and its universals (the cow with its cowness, the white with its whiteness, etc.), and also the universals. In the perception of a single thing, in other words, a good many things put in an appearance.

A perception involves two distinct stages for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, as it does for the Buddhists; but the stages are differently analyzed. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the first stage consists in the sensing of the particulars, the "glue" or inherence, and the universals without realizing their relationship. The ordering of the three into the relation of a thing qualified by certain general qualifiers by means of a qualifying relation escapes notice. The perception then enters its second stage; here one only becomes cognizant of the relationship. The perceptual object is then understood to be a particular qualified by universals. Recognition of it is possible, and the identification of the thing as to kind. For the Buddhists, on the other hand, the first stage consists in sensing only particulars. Universals are mind contributed, and they enter into the perception in relationship with the sensed particulars only at the second stage.
Dharma-kīrti's Resemblance Theory

The Buddhist view was fundamentally opposed to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Where the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas were realists, Dharma-kīrti was a conceptualist. Universals are concepts (vikalpa), not nonmental entities (vastu). Like Locke, Dharma-kīrti maintains that what is objective is not general; concepts and the words that signify them alone are general.\(^{28}\)

Dharma-kīrti agreed that what is at issue is the objectivity of entities such as cowness, potness, and blueness.\(^{29}\) Colors and shapes are as much particulars for him as for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, so particular cows and pots and bits of blue (with an important qualification in respect to the first two that I will take up later\(^{30}\)) alone are objectively real.

Dharma-kīrti has been accused of being a nominalist in the sense of believing that concepts such as cowness, etc., arise without objective foundation. For example, Raja Ram Dravid says of Dharma-kīrti that he maintains such concepts are "pure and simple fabrications of the mind" and "not abstractions from experience, but mental constructions having their source in the creative nature of reason."\(^{31}\) (Dravid means to claim that Dharma-kīrti is a nominalist provisionally and not ultimately.\(^{32}\) A case could perhaps be made that Dharma-kīrti is a nominalist ultimately.) On Dravid's understanding, concepts reflect nothing objective, for particulars do not resemble each other at all but are absolutely
unique. Stcherbatsky might also have thought this of Dharmakīrti. But Dharmakīrti is not a nominalist (at least not provisionally). He is a resemblance theorist. Like Locke he believes, quoting Locke, that concepts "are the Workmanship of the Understanding, but have their Foundation in the Similitude of Things." It is worth proving that Dharmakīrti’s theory is a resemblance theory, given that he is mistaken for a nominalist. Also, I appeal to the fact that he is a resemblance theorist in Part Two.

First, the lines along which Dharmakīrti assesses a resemblance are in regards to the function a thing performs. Resembling things are alike in function. "The likeness (sādrṣya) [of resembling things] is [their] having a common result (ekakāryatā)," he says in the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Assessing the resemblance this way is not an attempt to address the question of the respect in which resembling things are alike, for a thing can have more than one function. Rather, it is a concession to the fact that a thing is nothing but its function(s). Anything real performs a function (or functions), and the function(s) it performs is (are) its sole reality. Because a thing is the function(s) it performs, any resemblance it bears to anything else must necessarily be of function; for that is all there is of the thing from which to have a resemblance.
By a function, Dharmakīrti has in mind an activity such as carrying water, cooking food, and the like. It is something done which, at least in the case of those functions captured in different concepts, serves a human need. A fire heats and is its heat, this heating function serving such a need as cooking. A pot is its impenetrability which, by virtue of being in a certain shape, accomplishes the need of, e.g., transporting water. If a thing has no other (useful) function(s), it at least generates a perception, this being the minimum function a thing must perform without which it is not even real.

Dharmakīrti provides, in effect, the following analysis of a resemblance. A resemblance is a comparative likeness. More consistent with the way Dharmakīrti talks about it, it is a comparative lesser degree of unlikeness. Particulars that resemble each other do so in that each is less different from every other than any is to certain other particulars—certain "foils," to use Quine's terminology. The resemblance of blue particulars, for example (to consider just their blueness), is their being less unlike each other than any of them is to certain—say, red—things. Other than thinking in terms of "foils," Dharmakīrti does not seem concerned by the problem of specifying which function among several is to be chosen for extracting one universal rather than another, where a thing performs more than one function.

That Dharmakīrti had some such resemblance theory in mind
can be seen, among other places, in a long and particularly noteworthy passage of verses and autocommentary in the Svārthānumāna chapter of the Pramāṇavārttikā. This passage is worth quoting as evidence of his theory.

The passage begins with a realist asking Dharmakīrti how, on Dharmakīrti's account, certain things have a common result on the basis of which one decides their class membership given that Dharmakīrti does not believe these things share a universal.

Moreover, how is it that [certain] unlike entities [i.e., entities that are in no way identical, that share no universal] have a common effect, in virtue of which it is said that they are the same [i.e., form a class] because of their difference from [select] other things?40

The very question presupposes that for Dharmakīrti "kind" concepts of the sort that concern him are derived from cognizing functional resemblances; for it is on the basis of only certain things doing something in common that one knows that they are of a kind. And the resemblance is in the things themselves, as Dharmakīrti goes on to reply that the things just produce their common result "naturally" (prakṛtyā). He proceeds to illustrate with an analogy and an example. To give just the analogy:

It is the very nature of entities that:

Certain of them, even though they differ from one another, are obliged by their nature to accomplish one effect such as the cognition in regards to them that they are one [i.e., of a kind], etc.—in the manner [by way of a parallel] that the sense organ
AND THE REST DO.

Just as the sense organ, the object, the lighting, and attentiveness [on our view of things] and the self, the eye, the mind, the object, and a conjunction [on your view] produce a single perception of color even though there is no universal common to either set, so too do trees such as Śīmkāps, each just as much a particular, naturally produce a recognition that they are one, i.e., of a kind. 41

The analogy is odd. First, the things in the analogy with which the resembling things are to be compared do not resemble each other. And, second, the function that the resembling things (the trees) are supposed to "naturally" perform by which one decides their class membership is the production of the idea of their class membership itself. But the analogy at least illustrates that the source of the likeness—or in this case the "kind" concept itself—lies in the things themselves, not in some way that we are disposed to take the things; for the generation of a (veridical) perception lies in the eye, the object, attentiveness, etc., and not simply in some way that we are disposed. And what Dharmakīrti goes on to say indicates that the function the things do commonly is not just the production of the "kind" concept but also some other function (anyām arthakriyām), upon which the concept is then based.

Or they accomplish some other function that is characteristic of wood, such as serving as fuel, providing material for a house, etc., depending upon what purpose one brings to them. 42

This is clearly a functional similarity that is in the object.

Dharmakīrti does not explain the relationship between the functions
of directly generating the concept and of serving as fuel, etc.; but presumably, given that the analogy and the fuel-serving function do indicate that the basis of the class concept is to be found in the objects themselves, the relationship must be something like the trees performing the function of generating the concept because they perform the function of serving as fuel and the like. The first function is *prima facie* evidence for the second. The things sometimes directly generate the class concept because we are familiar from past experience with another function that they perform which we know is appropriate for classifying them as trees.

Dharmakīrti’s next comments show that the functional resemblance is a comparative likeness. He indicates that in finding that the trees perform some function appropriate to thinking of (just) them as trees, they perform alike only in comparison with the way things perform that are not trees. And although Dharmakīrti does not specify that it is only certain other things that are not trees with which the comparison is to be made, his examples imply it.

But such things as water, although each instance of it just as much [as each tree] differs from every other, cannot [perform such functions as serving as fuel, etc.], any more than the ear and the rest can produce a perception of color.43

Evidently the analogy with the eye, the lighting, etc., is to emphasize that the resembling things, if *resembling*, are still not *identical* in any respect, which they would be if they shared a universal. That particular analogy is chosen to emphasize the
difference of resembling things—i.e., the fact that each is a particular—the point about them all serving as fuel, etc., then making the point that they nevertheless are resembling.

Dharmakīrtī goes on to give another analogy—really, an example, although it is offered more as an analogy\(^4^4\)—of how certain things perform a common function "naturally" without those things sharing a universal. The comparison can also be seen in this example, and also the emphasis on each thing's particularity.

OR AS CERTAIN HERBS, TAKEN ALL AT ONCE OR SEPARATELY, ARE SEEN TO QUIET FEVER BY THEIR NATURE, EVEN THOUGH EACH HERB IS DIFFERENT—WHEREAS OTHER THINGS [THAT ARE NOT HERBS] CAN NOT.

[It is] as in the case of specific gudūcī plants\(^4^5\) which, taken either together or separately, produce some one effect, namely, the quieting of fever. And they do not require a universal to do so, even though each individual plant is different, because it is their very nature to do so. And yet such things as curds and the fruit of the trupuṣī, even though each instance of these things too is different [from every other], cannot do so.\(^4^6\)

Thus resembling things perform similarly by nature, even though they do not share a universal; they do not perform similarly simply because we are disposed so as to think they do, as would be the case in a naive nominalism, but because this is just the way they are. And presumably (although this could be clearer) the fact that they perform similarly sometimes immediately produces the class concept, on some basis such as previous experience of how they function. Otherwise one simply notes the resemblance and derives the "kind" concept.
At this point Dharmakīrti goes on the offensive and offers an argument against universals in favor of resemblances. It draws on the fact that for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas it is the very selfsame universal in every instance of a class.

Should it be thought that there is indeed some common thing that exists in the herbs and that it is from that [universal] that the identical effect arises, this reasoning is not sound.

**THERE IS NO VARIATION**

in a universal.

**NO UNIVERSAL**

produces that effect,

**BECAUSE [IF ONE DID], IT WOULD FOLLOW THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VARIATION IN THE EFFECT, EVEN THOUGH EACH INDIVIDUAL PLANT GROWS IN DIFFERENT SOIL, ETC.**

If the effect, the alleviation of fever and the like, came about because of a universal, then because a universal never varies there would be no qualitative difference in regards to the speed with which the plants cure, even though each plant differs as to soil and the like. [If the plants operate] differently, this means the universal varies its nature and this destroys its very character. . . . However, there is no difficulty in saying that the individual plants, growing up under differences of time, place, and other factors, produce differing effects. Thus certain other entities as well [e.g., trees], even though they [too] are not identical in essence, are said to be the same when they accomplish an effect such as [generating] the recognition that they are all of a kind, because of their difference from other things that do not.

Dharmakīrti makes other comments that are supportive of a resemblance theory. For example:
Many things producing the same effect are treated in ordinary discourse as being the same by using words and concepts whose basis is a difference [of those things] from what cannot produce their effect. 48

As one of their properties, [certain] objects, even though different [from one another], are the cause of a cognition of such [a "kind" concept]. 49

But this is the longest discussion of the subject in the Pramāṇa-vārttika, and it is important enough to be reproduced in such later texts as Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṅgraha and Mokṣākaragupta's Tarkabhāṣā. 50

The Nature and Projection of Concepts

Dharmakīrti's "kind" concepts seem to be mental images, even though this is not well suited to his analysis of resemblances in terms of functions. For example, at one point Dharmakīrti compares these concepts to the images of dreams and to hallucinations. 51

More precisely, they are dispositions to entertain mental images; however, I will not speak of them dispositionally until later when it becomes important.

Although Dharmakīrti does not say enough to make this matter certain, these images are likely generic rather than merely images of some one particular taken in a general way. They are likely composite pictures like Galton's 52 or some kind of ghostly abstraction formed by selecting out of a number of particular sensations what is relatively common and overlooking the rest. And most importantly, remembering that Dharmakīrti's view is in response to
views such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, they are ideas of ways things are identical and not just resembling. They are the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas' universals, only mental creations formed on the basis of resemblances and not ideas capturing objective, general features. The misrepresentation of ontological fact Dharmakīrti keeps in mind by constantly referring to these concepts as "mistaken." 53

The image that is a "kind" concept, once it is arrived at from seeing a resemblance among certain things, is externally projected. That is, failing to recognize that the identity it has constructed among, say, a group of present trees, is purely mental (if based on a resemblance), the mind projects the mental image onto those particulars so that it takes on the guise of externality. 54 It now appears to be an objective feature of those objects, i.e., the nonmental universal of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. 55 The trees now appear possessed of the nonmental universal "treeness." In this way, Dharmakīrti concedes to the realists, we at least ostensibly experience nonmental universals. 56 The "kind" concept, entering the perception in this way through projection, makes the cognition determinate. The things are now identified as to kind. The cognition of each tree is implicitly verbalizable (if not actually put into words) as the judgment, "This is a tree." If at some later time another tree is perceived, what evidently takes place if it is recognized as a tree is that it is compared with the trees perceived earlier by comparing it with the generic mental image that is the
earlier trees' composite memory. If the resemblance is sufficiently close (a matter that Dharmakīrti does not discuss), the present tree is classed as a tree by it too receiving the image as a projection.  

It is worth quoting a passage in which the projection process is described. There are three verses and a number of paragraphs of comment on it that are particularly well worth quoting, again in the Svaṁthānumāna chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika. But before quoting this material, some additional information will be helpful.

The tendency to project "kind" concepts is inborn, according to Dharmakīrti. He believes in transmigration, the idea that one's present life is but one in a long succession of lifetimes stretching infinitely backwards, and forwards at least until the point where one becomes enlightened. The tendency to project concepts in one's present lifetime is the result of what one did—or, rather, did not do—in one's immediate past life. Throughout that lifetime one failed to realize that one was even then projecting concepts. For the fact that one is projecting them is not common knowledge; discovery of the fact is the first step towards enlightenment. Unaware in one's immediate past life that one was indulging in projecting, a certain disposition to continue with the habit in the next life was set up and then inherited. Until one realizes that one is projecting, this disposition will continue to be set up in the life one is presently living, to be inherited in the next. The
process will stop only with the necessary realization.

As a way of opposing the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Dharmakīrti tended to separate the conceptual and sensory acts of a perception. He tended to view them as two different cognitions, with two different sorts of objects. First there is the sensory cognition with the particulars as its object; then there is the conceptual cognition with the generic mental image for its object. But neither cognition is cognizant of the other’s object; the conceptual cognition has only the concept as its object (however much the sensing of the particulars is necessary for the arising of that concept), and the sensory cognition has only the particulars as its object (however much it generates the conceptual cognition).  

Somehow the two cognitions working together result in the awareness of particulars qualified by a universal, a process that is never quite adequately explained. Dharmakīrti, alluding to the point that it is after all the particulars that come to possess the universal, speaks sometimes of the particulars "attaining the status of objects of conceptual cognition," seeming to go against his otherwise strict separation of the two kinds of cognitions to their two kinds of objects.  

Dharmakīrti consistently avoids referring to the similarities that inspire our "kind" concepts as similarities. He refers to them instead as the similar things' "difference from whatever is different from them" (tadanyebhyo bheda, anyavyāvṛtti, anyāpoha).
that is to say their mutual difference (anyonyam viveka)\textsuperscript{62} of being able to accomplish an effect that other things cannot, which Dharmakīrti sometimes straightforwardly refers to as their "difference from what cannot produce the effect of them."\textsuperscript{63} His reluctance to refer to the similarities as similarities is evidently to forestall a realist opponent thinking that, in admitting a similarity, he is in effect accepting an unrecognized universal. His negative way of putting things emphasizes the similarity's character of a relative lesser unlikeness; it keeps more readily in mind the fact that the respect in which similar things are alike is a feature in which they are relatively less unlike each other than certain other things, and not an identical something that they share in common.

\textbf{Dharmakīrti's Negative Analysis of Concepts}

Dharmakīrti even thinks of the "kind" concept in negative terms. He insists, for example, that the concept "cow" is the equivalent of the idea "not noncow."\textsuperscript{64} It is the idea "whatever is not a horse, a lion, etc." A "kind" concept is in essence an "exclusion of other things" (anyāpoha), as Dharmakīrti generally calls it.\textsuperscript{65} His justification for this analysis seems to be that one knows a cow is a cow only by comparing it with things that are not cows. The very substance of the idea that $x$ is a cow, then, is the idea that $x$ is not a horse, a lion, etc.—in effect, not
a "noncow." 66

His opponents charge him with circularity in this negative analysis of a concept. They insist that he cannot hold that the idea "cow" is the idea "not noncow" without a circularity unless he has a positive idea of something somewhere, either of the cow or the "noncow," which in fact Dharmakīrti denies. 67

Later Buddhists in Dharmakīrti's line such as Śāntarakṣita respond to this by insisting that concepts are negative ideas with positive implications. They are implicative negations (paryudāsapratisedha). 68 As an example of an implicative negation, Śāntarakṣita offers the negative proposition that Devadatta, a fat man, does not eat during the day. 69 The denial of him eating during the day implies, since he is fat, that he eats during the night. The proposition is thus a negation with positive implications.

To further illustrate, the proposition about Devadatta is like the proposition, "This colored thing is not green," which implies that it is some other color. But it is unlike the proposition, "There is no apple on the table," which leaves it indefinite as to whether there is a different fruit, or anything at all, on the table.

"Kind" concepts, Śāntarakṣita insists, are negations of the implicative sort. For example, "cow," which is the equivalent of "not noncow," implies the positive fact that what is not a "noncow" is a cow. Śāntarakṣita actually goes so far as to contend that
"kind" concepts are really positive in import to begin with and that the negation is gotten by implication. The idea "cow" is first the positive idea "cow" and then only by implication the negative idea "not noncow." But with this last contention, Śāntarakṣita seems to go a step further than Dharmakīrti, who seems to stay with the idea that a concept is first and foremost a negation; and that positive import is arrived at as a consequence of comprehending the negation; but that the process is not one of implication if by that is meant (as Śāntarakṣita seems to mean) a sequence in which one first arrives at the negative import and then subsequently the positive one. Rather the two come together, the positive understanding being simply in essence the negative import. Again, the point of this view seems to be that a negative analysis of concepts keeps it more readily in mind that these concepts are not themselves nonmental universals, nor are they even ideas of nonmental universals.

All this information is helpful in understanding the upcoming passage. To turn to it, the opening verses speak of a cognition that is based on the cognition of certain present particulars; it has as its content some one, unitary thing. This is the conceptual cognition, with due emphasis on the fact that for Dharmakīrti the concept alone is its content, however much that concept is the result of the cognition of present particulars. The concept or image is spoken of as having a "unitary" (abhinna)
form as opposed to the "multiple" (bhinnaka) form of the particulars.

This unitary form, in the process of projection, is said to "cover over" (sambvriyate) the forms of the particulars. What this "covering over" amounts to is left frustratingly unclear. Presumably it means that the perceived objects now appear possessed not only of a particular character but also a general one. The result of the unitary form being imposed on the objects is said to be that the objects now appear "coalesced" (samarṣṭa). This makes it sound almost as if Dharmakīrti intends the particular character of the objects to be hidden altogether: they lose their particularity and merge into some single thing. But presumably this is just his peculiar way of saying that the particulars are now (ostensibly) qualified by a universal. The many objects are "coalesced" in the sense that they appear possessed of a common class essence. As put in a comment made by Dharmottara, borrowing from Dharmakīrti and Dignāga before Dharmakīrti: "An object has two aspects, a general one and a particular one." 75

In the first line of the commentary on these verses, Dharmakīrti's preference for referring to similarities negatively in terms of common differences from things which are dissimilar can be seen. The reference to "dispositions" (vāsanā) is to the fact that the tendency to project is inborn.

Indeed the cognition, produced from things that are [commonly] different from what is unlike them, is conceptual; in accordance with the nature of its dispositions, [this cognition] conceals the multiple form of the objects, superimposing [on them] its own unitary form, and displays the objects as coalesced. And it is the nature of the entities that are different from other things by virtue of their being the means to a single end [that the other things are not a means to]—and it is also the nature of the concealing disposition [of the cognition] in respect to these [objects]—to produce a cognition of this sort. The cognition is "concealing" because it covers over the form of the [objects] with its own form. The objects, even though discrete in themselves, appear through such a [superimposed] form as if they were the same, their differences being concealed by the [cognition]. That [superimposed form] is what people who go by appearances . . . call the universal.77

The last comment is in reference to the fact that people do not ordinarily know they are projecting and to the fact that the projected class concept seems itself to be a nonmental common feature of the objects.

The next comments require prior explanation. As I said, Dharmakīrti tends to think of "kind" concepts negatively; "cow," for example, is the idea "not noncow." The opponent now asks how, considering that the concept has just been described in a way that suggests it is a superimposed mental image (viz., it has a "unitary
form"), it can also be the equivalent of a double negation, e.g.
"not noncow." How can an "exclusion of others," which is the way
Dharmakīrti refers to his concepts that are negations of negations,
possibly be what is construed as a universal? Judging from Dharmakīrti's reply, the opponent is initially bothered only by the fact
that the concept is mental and what people take as a universal
seems external. The more interesting question—how can something
negative in character be represented in a positive image—is not
addressed until later; and then it is hardly addressed satisfactorily.
Dharmakīrti settles the opponent's initial complaint by pointing
out that the concept is taken for external; and that only philoso-
phers discriminate between the (resembling) nonmental particulars
that generate the class concept and the mental, but projected,
concept itself. Other people are simply too caught up in the
needs that projection serves.

If it is asked how in that case a [negative] exclusion
of others constitutes a universal, it is replied that
just such an exclusion of others is indeed [the
universal]. The [cognition] that apprehends precisely
that [exclusion of others] seems to be apprehending
something external, for concepts naturally embody
error. Indeed that [cognition], which occurs in
respect to objects which are different from those
things unlike them, is understood to have as its object
a discrimination [of certain things from other things].
But, [says the opponent], if particulars are external
and concepts are not a part of their nature [literally,
do not function in regards to them], how can [concepts]ecome [even ostensibly] a part of their nature? [We
reply] that philosophers discriminate [between what is
conceptual and what is sensory in their cognitions],
but not ordinary people. These [ordinary people],
believing in the externality of things that satisfy their purposes, take action after having first synthesized what is sensory and what is conceptual. We describe things the way we do taking into account what [these people] see. They use appropriate words to distinguish things that accomplish a certain function from those things that do not accomplish that function. Philosophers, of course, do not agree to the synthesis [of the conceptual and the sensory] because [the two things], for one thing, differ in appearance, [the latter being sensuously vivid and the former nonvivid].

This last comment requires further comment, to which I will turn in a moment.

At this point the objector turns to the more serious question of how a concept, if it amounts to a double negation, can be an image which would seem to be positive, not negative: the idea "cow," if equivalent to the idea "not noncow," seems to be, if an image, the image of a cow and not of a "not noncow" (and even if the latter, the image of something that is not a horse, etc., the image of the horse at least being a positive image). The opponent puts his point in the form of the question, How can a concept be a double negation with nothing more than implied positive import when the universal that people think they see is a very positive, say, cow? If the experience of ordinary people is appealed to, what they think they see is not easily described as a "negation of contraries." In reply Dharmakīrti merely attacks the opponent's view and says that what is experienced is not the sort of entity the realists say either. He then sums up with a comment in support of his resemblance theory, referring to a resemblance again negatively as a common "difference from others"
(a difference, to repeat, that consists in an ability to differently function).

If [the opponent should argue] that if the assumptions of those who go by appearances are [consistently] followed, an exclusion of others would surely not be the universal since [universals] do not appear [to these people] to be exclusions of others, [we reply that this is true enough]. But not only does [the universal] not appear [as an exclusion of others], it does not appear [as the sort of thing you say it is either, namely,] something different from particulars, or alternatively as something identical with them, or as eternal, pervasive, etc. It is only that a cognition with a unitary form is produced; and when it is asked what is the objective basis of this cognition, the [proper] reply is that it is a difference [of the perceived things] from other things. For the objects do truly possess such a difference, and nothing contradicts [this answer of ours]. Further, we see that practical activity based on words depends upon such [a difference from others]. Once again, then, there really is no universal the way that the cognition would lead us to believe, because:


Vividness

I would like to return to the comment that philosophers distinguish between what is conceptual and what is sensory in their cognitions (whereas ordinary people do not) because they are conscious of a difference in presentation of the two kinds of content. They notice what Dharmakīrti calls elsewhere a "vividness" on the part of what is sensed that is not present in what is only mentally contributed, the latter being called "nonvivid" in
contrast. Sensed things are sensibly intrusive while concepts have only the vague character of something visualized.

It will be remembered that the sensing act in a perception constitutes pratyakṣa in sense 2 (the sense of the most instrumental cause of a veridical perception). We saw (p. 51) in Dharmakīrti's description of pratyakṣa in the sense of a veridical cognitive activity (sense 1) that its object was also referred to as "vivid," in contrast with the object of anumāṇa or inference which was likewise "nonvivid." Consistent with Dharmakīrti's equivocating on the two senses of "pratyakṣa" (an equivocating I mentioned in the Introduction which I will discuss at the end of this chapter), he takes the characteristics of the object of pratyakṣa in sense 1 to also be characteristics of the object of pratyakṣa in sense 2. Comparing the sensory object with the conceptual object, he sees in the sensible intrusiveness of the sensory object a way of reasonably considering this object of pratyakṣa in sense 2 to be "vivid" (in contrast to the conceptual object), the way the object of pratyakṣa in sense 1 is "vivid" (in contrast to the object of anumāṇa or inference). He even tries to identify the mental operation with inference; the two would indeed be the same if pratyakṣa in fact had a single sense. But they are not the same, as has been noticed in the secondary literature.

Throughout the Pramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti insists that
"kind" concepts are "mistaken" (bhrāntidhī, mithyājñāna, mithyāvīkalpa). Part of what he means by this is that they capture no corresponding object, for there are only resemblances and not real generalities. They apprehend a "nonobject" (anartha), as Dharmottara puts it. But also what he means is that when we project concepts we misjudge their true character, taking them to be external even though they are only mental.

These, then, are the major points of Dharmakīrti's theory of universals. I said (p. 97) that in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika account of perception, three things—particulars, nonmental universals, and the ubiquitous glue, inherence—are all sensed in the first stage; and the second stage consists merely in becoming conscious of their relationship. The essential difference between the Buddhist and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika perceptual theories is that for the Buddhists, universals are mind contributed, not sensed. They enter in at the second stage, which for the Buddhists is a stage of pure mental activity (kalpanā). Certain particulars genuinely resemble one another; but the idea that these resembling particulars are identical is purely a mental fabrication.

Kalpanā, Memory and Dispositions

I took up Dharmakīrti's theory of universals initially to give a better understanding of kalpanā or the mental operation
in a perception. This operation was earlier described as the
collection of universals, an act which accomplishes the identifi-
cation of some perceived thing as to kind. It can now be seen—
although still imperfectly, as will soon be evident—in what this
operation consists. If one is forming a concept for the first
time, kalpanā is the constructing and projecting of a "kind" concept
on the basis of a resemblance between the perceived things and other
things either also perceived or (presumably) supplied by memory.
If the concept is already in one's possession, kalpanā is the
comparing of the present thing with the concept (which is a generic
mental image), and the subsuming of the present thing under that
concept (through projecting the concept) if the resemblance is
sufficiently close.

There is strong indication in at least Śaṅtaraṅga that
concepts are innate in that they are remembered from past lives.88
They lie dormant until an awareness of a resemblance activates them.
If this is Dharmakīrti's view as well as Śaṅtaraṅga's, for which
there is uncertain evidence,89 then the type of kalpanā so far
described as involving newly forming a concept must be understood
to be, rather, the first activating of a dormant concept by a present
stimulus. But since the evidence for this view in Dharmakīrti
is uncertain, I will continue to speak as if concepts were just
newly formed instead of retrieved from dormancy.

But the advantage of accepting the innate view as Dharma-
kṛtti's would be that additional sense could be made of comments to the effect that concepts are related to "dispositions" (vāsanā). This relationship was earlier explained (p. 107) as the fact that the compulsion to project concepts is inherited. One is "disposed" to project. But some of the comments made in connection with concepts and dispositions seem to be saying something more. They seem to be saying that concepts are actually produced from dispositions. The sense of these comments, then, since I have shown that Dharmakīrti is not a naive nominalist, is that concepts are not freshly formed but are retrieved from latent memories carried over from one's former lives. The awareness of a resemblance in one's present life just triggers them. Memory also then plays a role in the subsequent entertainings of the concept, which come about by repeated revival of the reactivated memory.

Kalpanā and Language

Our understanding of kalpanā, as I said a moment ago, is still far from complete. Dharmakīrti has a very wide notion of what constitutes a universal, and thus more needs to be said of what kalpanā amounts to just in terms of it being the contribution of universals. In addition, there is an important connection between kalpanā and language that needs to be discussed: kalpanā is actually defined in terms of language and in order to understand the definition one must understand the connection. Since Dharmakīrti's
thoughts on the relationship of kalpanā and language support the picture I have been giving of his theory of universals, I will take up this second matter first, turning to the other later.

To understand the relationship, first a point must be made regarding Dharmakīrti's theory of meaning. Quite as one might expect for a conceptualist, Dharmakīrti has an ideational theory of meaning: a word has a meaning because there is a concept (he seems to think a "kind" concept) with which it is regularly associated. The concept, in Locke's words, is the "proper and immediate signification" of the word. As Dharmakīrti puts it, a word is linked to a conceptual exclusion (apoha). The concept that a word signifies captures an objective resemblance (Dharmakīrti would say an objective "difference from others"); words thus have denotation as well as connotation, the denotation of those objects over which the concept ranges. To quote Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla:

Whenever many things are seen to perform the same activity, a single word is applied to them through projecting a common property.

Even when there is no [nonmental] universal, there is restriction regarding the application of a common word to a number of things, and the basis of such application lies in the fact of the things performing the same useful function. By their very nature, some things, even though many [distinct particulars], perform the same useful function; and for the purpose of expressing the fact that they perform the same useful function, people speaking of them, for the sake of brevity, project upon them a common form and apply to them a common name.
Dharmakīrti offers a number of reasons why words do not directly refer to objects. Among other things, words would then not have general application. In the process of learning a language, Dharmakīrti insists, if a word referred to an object rather than signified a concept, it would mean whatever object with which it was first associated and could not mean similar objects experienced at later times. Further, Dharmakīrti argues, if objects were the direct signification of words, one could not speak of past or future objects, such words having no meaning from the nonexistence of their referents. And one would experience objects being spoken about as clearly as if they were present.

Concept and word are, in fact, inseparable, according to Dharmakīrti. Dharmakīrti seems to have the idea that, with only one stated exception, words play a role in the very inception of concepts. A word is the means by which one knows which objects a concept that one is forming is to capture; (I will hereafter just assume concepts are freshly formed). One hears a word spoken in connection with just certain objects and this signals one where to look for a resemblance. The concept that the word assists in forming becomes from that time onwards the signification of the word. Whenever one entertains the concept, it is by means of the word. For the word serves to trigger the concept.

I mentioned earlier (p. 99) that a concept is really a disposition, a disposition to entertain a mental image and not just
the image itself. To possess a concept, the image need not actively be in mind; it is sufficient if it can be recalled from memory. The word is the means by which the image is recalled. Each time one entertains the image, first the word comes to mind and this triggers the image. One remembers how the word is used, which consists in entertaining a picture (presumably generic) of those things with which the word was initially associated (and possibly all like objects since). Words thus always attend concepts, at least in terms of getting the concepts in mind. A conceptual cognition, as Dharmakīrti says, is never present in the absence of words (with one exception to be mentioned shortly). 102

Dharmakīrti does not consider those cases that actually occur in life where a word-related concept comes to mind untriggered by a word simply because, say, the word comes to mind only reluctantly or is altogether forgotten. A charitable interpretation would be to assume that he acknowledges such cases; the inseparability of word and concept upon which he wants to insist would still be preserved by the fact that the word is still a possibility. And this way of interpreting Dharmakīrti is not unreasonable considering how Dharmakīrti defines conceptual cognition (a matter to be considered later). Also, Dharmakīrti may allow for purely symbolic thinking, where we think in words and not in images, using the words in an "uncashed" manner; but whether or not Dharmakīrti does allow for this is very unclear, and it is not very likely.
Dharmakīrti considers it possible in at least one special case to separate word and concept. This case is one where a word does not play the usual role in forming a concept (possibly the only case of this or of the inseparability of word and concept that Dharmakīrti allows). The case is that of infants prior to their mastering language (bhālakasyāvyutpannasaāketasya kalpanaḥ). An infant possesses concepts as soon as it exhibits purposive behavior, according to Dharmakīrti, concepts being prerequisite for such behavior. It exhibits purposive behavior (according to Dharmakīrti) almost immediately, as witnessed by the fact that a very young baby seeks its mother's breast. It thus almost immediately possesses concepts. Utilizing concepts at an age when it lacks words and understanding of language generally, the infant constructs and thus entertains its concepts independently of words. ¹⁰³

But, Dharmakīrti insists, its concepts are latently verbalizable (abhilāpasamsargayoga). ¹⁰⁴ Although no word is associated with them at their inception, later on in life when the child masters language, it will learn the appropriate word; and then the usual relationship between words and concepts will be established; and its concepts will thereafter not be activated independently of words. Its concepts are thus not really independent of words much more than the concepts of someone who has utterly forgotten the appropriate word.

Concepts, then, are always at worst latently verbalizable,
as in the case of a baby; and, generally, they are explicitly connected with language or, if one allows the charitable interpretation, implicitly connected, as when one forgets the word or it comes slowly to mind.

To return to kalpanā, because it is a type of conceptualizing (i.e., that involved in a perception), it always involves verbalization to one of these degrees. One sees something and then if first forming a concept, either forms a concept that is latently verbalizable, or that is at the time immediately connected with a word. Or if one is engaged in a kalpanā of the sort involving recognizing a present object, the object, because of past association with a word, brings the word to mind; and this then triggers the concept. Where not the word but the concept or image comes to mind first (assuming Dharmakīrti allows such cases), the concept is implicitly verbalizable by the word buried in one’s mind.

Kalpanā, as said, is actually defined in terms of language, or at least in terms of possible linguistic association. It is defined in the Nyāyabindu as "cognition whose content is capable of a relation with a linguistic expression" (abhilāpasamsargayogya-pratibhāsā pratīti). The relation is that of signification. The "capable of" is included to extend the definition to cover cases of infants' latent verbalization. As it happens, it also covers cases of implicit verbalization (such as when one temporarily forgets the appropriate word), although there is no clear indication that
Dharmakīrti intends the "capable of" to make allowances for these latter cases. 108

The definition of kalpanā in terms of language distinguishes kalpanā from sensing in the following way, according to Dharmakīrti. A content that is capable of linguistic association must be general, if words are to retain their generality. The content of a sensing, a sensum, is not capable of association with a linguistic expression (a denoting word or phrase) because it is not general. The content of a kalpanā, i.e., a concept, however, is general. As Dharmottara puts it (to all indications fully in accord with Dharmakīrti), a concept unites a present object with a past one, as when one sees something and it brings to mind the image of things of that same sort seen in the past. A kalpanā and not a sensing, then, is a cognition whose content is capable of association with a linguistic expression. 109

The workability of the definition presupposes that sensing and kalpanā are the two sole types of cognition; otherwise it would have to be shown how the definition distinguishes kalpanā from other types of conceptualizing as well as from sensing, which it fails to do. But, in fact, Dharmakīrti maintains that sensing and kalpanā are indeed the only two. More accurately, Dharmakīrti regards kalpanā not just as the conceptualizing in a perception but as any conceptualizing, e.g., thinking generally, reminiscing, inferring. I myself have treated it as identical with perceptually tied
conceptualizing because Dharmakṛtī generally does mean specifically this type when he speaks of kalpaṇā, and because he generally fails to indicate that "kalpaṇa" has a wider sense when he speaks of kalpaṇa as if it were only this type of conceptualizing. Because, however, it does mean any conceptualizing and not just that involved in a perception, I will from now on, in order to keep this in mind, refer to perceptually tied conceptualizing as kalpaṇā.

Dharmakṛtī ties together his thoughts on words, concepts, and objects with some claims about the pragmatic advantages of language use. As was pointed out much earlier (p. 33), man in Dharmakṛtī's opinion has a particular concern with objects, namely, the desire to acquire those that are pleasing and to avoid those that are objectionable. It is to a person's interest in pursuit of this concern to utilize language, Dharmakṛtī believes. Language allows a person to easily and efficiently signal all those objects able to accomplish a particular function. The word "pot," for example, allows one to easily designate all those things able to carry water. To refer to each thing able to accomplish a particular function by a different name simply because each performs that function somewhat differently is cumbersome and fruitless. It is more important to be able to designate them all by one word, indicating that they perform the same function however differently, than to emphasize their differences by calling each by a different name at the expense of acknowledging their similarities. It is more
important because if one is able to designate by a word all those things able to accomplish more or less the same function, then by hearing a thing called by a particular name or by knowing oneself what to call it, one knows what function it performs. One then knows what action is appropriate.  

In Dharmakīrti's comments in support of the above points, his insistence upon the negative character of concepts can be seen [his insistence, that is, that the concept that a word connotes (such as "cow") is basically a double negation (i.e., "not noncow"—that is, not horse, not pot, etc.)]. He rightly points out that words make it possible to collectively designate all those things able to accomplish a particular function only because they have a denotative capacity in the first place, a capacity, he then goes on to argue, that depends upon their connoting concepts of a negative character. If, he says in effect, words referred to real essences, positive in character, as the realists maintain, instead of to negative entities, then words would fail to have limited extensions. One would not know that a word not only does refer to certain things but also does not refer to certain others. For example, in learning that the word "cow" refers to the essence "cowness" by hearing the word used in conjunction with the alleged universal, one would not know that the word is also not to be used to refer to other universals such as "horseness" unless exclusion of contraries were the meaning of the word. Dharmakīrti is here
merely adapting a criticism earlier leveled at him, namely, the criticism that without some positive import a concept exclusively negative in character can have no meaning without involving a circularity—that, for example, the concept "not noncow" (and hence "cow") has no meaning unless there is something positive in the idea "noncow" to prevent the meaning of "cow" depending upon the meaning of "noncow" and of "noncow" on "cow." And if Dharmakīrti does not altogether escape this objection, neither does his opponent (so Dharmakīrti thinks) escape the objection that one cannot have the idea, say, "cow," without the awareness not only that this idea includes all cows but also excludes everything not a cow. Each side probably ultimately escapes the other's objection, for neither side fully appreciates the other's view.

Varieties of Erroneous Perception

It was said in the Introduction (pp. 11-12) that Dharmakīrti believes that a person is in bondage to suffering because, from the ultimate point of view, a person on the provisional level consistently misperceives things or fails to see their true character. More can now be said of the error that a person on the provisional level is committing. He is sensing things that only resemble one another as if they shared universals. Specifically, he is recording what are only resemblances as if they were identities (which is evidently the only way a person can record a resemblance according to Dharmakīrti). He is then projecting these "kind" concepts so they
appear to be objective features of objects. If, then, one is interested in gaining enlightenment following Dharmakīrti's scheme of things, one attempts to reach a state in which resemblances are evidently not recorded at all (since they can only be recorded as identities), and one stops projecting. At this time one will evidently experience things truly to the extent that this is possible on the provisional level; and this will be the beginning of transcending the provisional level altogether and forever stopping suffering.

However, although our perceptions involving "kind" concepts and their projection are ultimately (paramārtha) erroneous for Dharmakīrti, they are provisionally (samvyrti) veridical. One's perceptions on the provisional level are like the cognitions of dreams: they hold good as long as one remains on that level even though they are false from a higher perspective. Dharmakīrti indicates their provisional veracity by saying that they are "uncontradicted" (avisamvādin). ¹¹⁴ "Uncontradiction," we saw earlier (p. 40), is the criterion for a cognition to be a pramāṇa in the sense (sense 1) of provisionally veridical cognition. "Uncontradiction" consists in a cognition resulting (or being in principle able to result) in the object one acquires or avoids if one acts on the basis of the cognition being the object the cognition led one to expect; and although our perceptions on the provisional level represent resemblances as if they were identities, still this
"misrepresentation" as Dhammakīrti regards it is insufficient to result in the object one acquires or avoids being different than the expected object.\textsuperscript{116}

The representing of resemblances as identities is not what a western philosopher would probably regard as a "misrepresentation," but Dhammakīrti regards it as one, even provisionally. For Dhammakīrti, in other words, those cognitions that are provisionally veridical (i.e., \textit{avisamvādin}) are also provisionally "erroneous" (\textit{bhrānti}).\textsuperscript{117} But since the "error" does not interfere with the object acquired or avoided through activity based on the cognition being the expected object, the cognitions, to repeat, are "uncontradicted." And because what Dhammakīrti regards as the "error" here is not likely what we would consider an error, the cognitions, even though they involve this so-called "error," are still what even we might reasonably call veridical.

Dhammakīrti's insistence that provisionally veridical perceptions (\textit{avisaiptādyāśāna}, \textit{pramāṇa}) are also provisionally "erroneous" (\textit{bhrānti}) is his way of making the point that these perceptions (indeed, all perceptions) are \textit{ultimately} erroneous. By calling them provisionally "erroneous," he casts suspicion upon them. The suspicion is not that they are provisionally unreliable, as they are also "uncontradicted." The suspicion, rather, is that they are unreliable in some other way: specifically, given Dhammakīrti's known gnoseological concerns, on the ultimate level that
so much holds his interests. It is altogether inconceivable in a
Buddhist's mind that Dharmakīrti should go to such lengths to point
out that provisionally veridical perceptions are also provisionally
"erroneous" unless the point be somehow important for gaining
enlightenment.

Dharmakīrti cannot make his point in a more straightforward
way because he faces a difficulty with his Hindu opponents. These
opponents (principally, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas)
do not recognize two levels of discourse: they do not distinguish
between understanding things from the mundane (samvyūhisat) point of
view and the ultimate (paramārthasat) point of view. Thus
Dharmakīrti cannot make claims about the ultimate status of our
perceptions without the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas losing interest. So in
order to keep alive the debate with them on matters of perception,
he asserts, without switching levels, that those perceptions that
are provisionally veridical are also provisionally "erroneous."
Since the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas argue that these perceptions are not
 provisionally erroneous, \[118\] the debate is kept alive; and each side
seriously challenges the other.

Dharmakīrti illustrates with an example an error that he
considers does interfere with the veracity of a cognition and also
an "error" that he considers does not. The example illustrating the
latter he intends as an analogue of the "error" involved in
perceptions that "misrepresent" resemblances: just as the "misrepresentation" in the case he now offers does not interfere with the object one acquires or avoids being the expected object, neither does the "misrepresentation" in perceptions that represent a resemblance as an identity.

In setting out the examples, he says, literally, that if one mistakes the light of a lamp (pradīpaprabhā) for a jewel, one has an error in which the object that one acquires or avoids is not the object one was led to expect. If, on the other hand, to illustrate the second type of "error," one sees the "glitter of a jewel" (manipurabhā) and mistakes it for a jewel, one has an "error" in which the object one intends and the object one actually reaches coincide. Dharmakīrti does not explain either example; two scholars, however, interpret him to be saying that one sees the lamp-light and the glitter of the jewel through distant keyholes in doors. [These two scholars are possibly influenced by Prajñākaragupta, who speaks of a keyhole; Prajñākaragupta also further identifies the jewel that is believed seen as a ruby (sarasiruharāga).] Interpreting the example as these scholars do at least makes some sense out of how one could possibly mistake lamplight for a jewel, and of why "mistaking" jewel-glitter for a jewel is indeed a "mistake." In the second case, presumably one sees only a part of the jewel (i.e., a ray of it) glittering through the keyhole and mistakes the ray for the entire jewel.
But now there is an obvious disparity between the jewel-glitter-for-jewel case and the case of a perception representing a resemblance as an identity, for which the jewel case is offered as an analogy. 124 Most obviously, on any reasonable account of veracity, the jewel-glitter-for-jewel case clearly does involve an error: the jewel that one would acquire or avoid on the basis of the cognition is at least larger than the jewel the cognition led one to expect. 125 But there is no obvious error—or at least error of the same sort—in the case of a perception representing a resemblance as an identity. The disparity between the cases makes one suspect the example. Dharmacārtti is obviously hard-pressed to find a second case in which a perception that is veridical from the provisional point of view is in some reasonable sense still a "mistake."

Possibly (but not likely) the two scholars (and Prajñākaragupta) are wrong in thinking that the lamplight and the jewel are to be seen through distant keyholes. But then the examples are farfetched and it is unclear how taking the jewel-glitter for a jewel is any "error" at all. 126

Dharmacārtti supplies another set of examples that only deepens the confusion. The examples are that of mistaking a mirage for water, this being an example of an error that does interfere with the pragmatic reliability of the cognition, and of mistaking water itself for water, this being an example of an "error"
that does not. \(^{127}\) But although the first example is clear enough, the element of error in the second is now completely lost. Or if Dharmakirti intends the "error" to be that of mistaking-water-that-only-resembles-other-cases-of-water-as-if-it-possessed-the-universal-"waterness," then this is at least no analogy for the case of a perception "misrepresenting" a resemblance as an identity. It is rather an instance of it.

Unfortunately, Dharmakirti discusses none of these difficulties. However, he does provide the following useful analysis of the difference between the lamplight-for-jewel (or mirage-for-water) error and the jewel-glitter-for-jewel (or water-for-water) "error." This information sheds light on the "error" of perceptions representing resemblances as identities. He says that, in cases of the first sort where the error does interfere with the object acquired or avoided being the object that the cognition led one to expect, the "kind" concept that the mind contributes to the perception is "nonconforming" or "inappropriate" considering what the object is. \(^{128}\) That is, when the mind enters into the perception to interpret what is sensed, the concept the mind recalls and projects is wrong considering the sensory object. The mind is confused by a similarity between what is sensed and some recalled (generic) image, an image that is "inappropriate" because it is of things that are different in kind from the thing now sensed. Confused by the similarity, it subsumes the object under the wrong concept. \(^{129}\)
In the case of mistaking the glitter of the jewel for the jewel (or the water for water), on the other hand, the concept is "appropriate." It is the right concept for the sort of object sensed. The object is a jewel (or water) and the concept is "jewelness" (or "waterness"). The concept "conforms to the object in essence" (svabhāvānukāra).

Thus although all of the examples Dharmakīrti considers are "erroneous" (in at least Dharmakīrti’s opinion), the perceptions of the mirage as water and the lamplight as a jewel are out of conformity with the nature of the object; and the perceptions of the jewel-glitter as a jewel and the water as water are not out of conformity. Perceptions of the first sort are subsequently not "uncontradicted" (i.e., they are contradicted) and hence they are not veridical on even the provisional level. The others are "uncontradicted" and veridical.

Extending what has just been learned to the case of perceptions representing resemblances as identities, these are "errors" of the second sort: the concepts they involve are "appropriate." Thus even though these cognitions are (in Dharmakīrti’s opinion) "erroneous" (because they represent resemblances as identities), these cognitions still are "uncontradicted." Because they are "uncontradicted," they are veridical on the provisional level.  

The mind is at fault in errors that either do or do not interfere with the pragmatic reliability of the cognition, it should
be noted. It was shown earlier (p. 113) that Dharmakīrti considers it an act of mind that results in a resemblance appearing as a universal. Now it can be seen that, in the more mundane cases of error (i.e., in what we would more likely consider a true error), Dharmakīrti considers the mind also at fault. It is the mind that in these latter cases contributes the "inappropriate" class concept (a concept Dharmakīrti thinks already "erroneous" because it is of an identity and not a resemblance). This faulting of the mind for the errors in perceptions is consistent with Dharmakīrti wanting the mistakes we make regarding the true character of things in our perceptions on the provisional level to lie solely with the mental operation in perception.

However, Dharmakīrti does recognize that some perceptions are erroneous due to aberrations of the senses. Sometimes the class concept that the mind contributes is "appropriate" but the perception goes awry because of something wrong with the sensing. Dharmakīrti explains that, when a disease of the eye results in a person seeing double, the "two moons" the person sees when looking at the moon belong to a perception in which no "inappropriate" class concept is involved (a moon is truly what one is looking at and the class concept is that of "moon") but which is nevertheless erroneous because the sensing is corrupt. Thus errors in perceptions lie solely with the mental operation only in those cases where the initial sensing is not at fault.
Uncontradectedness and Veracity

Throughout the discussion of "mistaking" the glitter of the jewel for the jewel and this cognition being "uncontradicted" in spite of also being "erroneous," the perception is held to be "uncontradicted" because the expected object and the object acquired or avoided are both jewels. But surely just the fact that both objects are jewels is insufficient to make the perception veridical (the jewels must also be the same size, etc.), and one begins to suspect more than just the example. Is "uncontradicted" cognition really in any proper sense the equivalent of veridical cognition? So far it has just been assumed that Dharmakīrti understands by "uncontradiction" what his followers understand by it: in effect (although not actually defined as such) accurate representation of the object. I think Dharmakīrti does mean by "uncontradicted" cognition cognition that accurately represents an object and hence, reasonably, veridical cognition. (I am speaking here of Dharmakīrti as a Sautrāntika.) But if one takes seriously the implication in the discussion of the example, it seems that congruence between the expected and actual objects just as to kind is sufficient for a cognition to be "uncontradicted." The cognition is "uncontradicted" just if the object one expects to reach and the object one actually reaches perform the same function. Because the intended and actual jewels both perform the function of adornment, the cognition of the jewel-glitter as a jewel, having gotten the object right at least as to kind, is "uncontradicted," however
else it might misrepresent the object (in terms of size, etc.). But if congruence just as to kind is sufficient for "uncontradiction," then Dharmakīrti does not mean by an "uncontradicted" cognition one that accurately represents an object. On this point, he and his followers disagree. And "uncontradicted" cognition is not reasonably the equivalent of veridical cognition.

There are other places where Dharmakīrti speaks as if "uncontradicted" cognition were not cognition that accurately represents the object and thus not reasonably the equivalent of veridical cognition. The most obvious case is the first few verses of the Nyāyabindu. These verses are independently interesting because they also contain one of the most obvious cases of Dharmakīrti equivocating on the meanings of "pratyakṣa," a matter that was mentioned in the Introduction. This point is best dealt with first, for the equivocation is presupposed in what I say about "uncontradiction" and veracity.

The first four verses of the Nyāyabindu are:

The attainment of a human end is always preceded by right cognition. Therefore [right cognition] is examined. /1/

Right cognition is twofold. /2/

[It is] pratyakṣa and anumāna. /3/

Of these, pratyakṣa is what is free from conceptualizing and nonaberrant. /4/134
By "free from conceptualizing" (kalpanāpoda) in verse 4, Dharmakīrti explains that he means free from the mental operation involved in perception. "Pratyakṣa" in verse 4, in other words, means sensing. But in verse 3, it means veridical perception. In that verse, pratyakṣa is one of two kinds of right or "uncontradicted" (avisamvādin) cognition. And only a perception, not a sensing, can be "uncontradicted," for only it has the necessary judgmental character. Thus over the course of the verses, "pratyakṣa" has more than a single meaning. But by the way the verses are run together, it seems to have only one sense, a single meaning that is something of a combination of both senses: something like veridical sensing.

There is one possible reason why Dharmakīrti equivocates, but before discussing it I would like to return to the earlier matter of whether or not Dharmakīrti means by "uncontradicted" cognition the equivalent of veridical cognition.

In verse 6 of the Nyāyabindu, Dharmakīrti explains the "nonaberrant" (abhrānta) in verse 4 as ruling out as cases of pratyakṣa cognitions of the sort that are involved in cognizing the moon as if it were double. Yet, because of the equivocation, pratyakṣa is already a species of right or "uncontradicted" cognition. (It is one of the two species of "right cognition" mentioned in verse 2.) Dharmakīrti seems to be indicating, in adding the
"nonaberrant" in verse 4, that it is possible to have cases of pratyakṣa that are both "uncontradicted" (samyak, avisamvādin) and aberrant (bhṛanta). And this would seem to suggest that by "uncontradicted" cognition he as a Sautrāntika does not mean the equivalent of veridical cognition.

Dharmakīrti's commentators clearly insist that cognitions of double moons and the like are "contradicted" (visamvādin) and not "uncontradicted."¹⁴⁰ Thus they at least (as was said before) seem to identify "uncontradicted" cognition with veridical cognition, and on this point Dharmakīrti and his commentators would seem to disagree.

It is always dangerous to assume that Dharmakīrti and his commentators disagree, at least as radically as this. Furthermore, there is at least one verse in the Pramāṇavārttika in which Dharmakīrti is as clear as his commentators that aberrant cognitions such as two moons are never "uncontradicted."¹⁴¹ Hence for him also "uncontradicted" cognition does amount to accurate representation of the object as was all along assumed. There is, in fact, one reason why it must amount to this: "uncontradicted" cognition (which is what Dharmakīrti means by "right cognition") is the definition Dharmakīrti gives of a pramāṇa; and in his debates with his opponents over the number of types of pramāṇa, both he and they are obviously talking about the varieties of veridical cognition. Evidently any implication in the jewel example that the cognition of the jewel-glitter as a jewel is "uncontradicted" simply because the object
reached and the object intended are both jewels is to be ignored. And there is a reasonable explanation for the apparent suggestion in the Nyāyabindu that "uncontradicted" cognition is not veridical cognition.

For as it turns out, Dharmakīrti's definition of "uncontradicted" cognition is weak. To counter this weakness, Dharmakīrti adds the "nonaberrant" in verse 4, even though pratyakṣa is already a species of "uncontradicted" cognition (pramāṇa) by what he says in verses 2 and 3 (and even though by "uncontradicted" cognition he means veridical cognition).

As to the weakness in his definition, it will be remembered that this definition is in pragmatic terms, i.e., in terms of the object reached being the object intended, and not in terms of accurate representation of the object. Leaving aside any reasons for this that might stem from Dharmakīrti’s ultimate allegiance to Yogācāra, as a Sautrāntika most likely he is afraid that he cannot define "uncontradicted" cognition in terms of cognition that accurately represents an object if he is to maintain, under that definition, that a perception that represents an objective resemblance as an identity (but that is otherwise veridical) is "uncontradicted" even though it does involve this "error" (as Dharmakīrti regards it). That is, Dharmakīrti wants the representing of a resemblance as an identity to be a misrepresentation (bhrānta), and yet he wants the perception that "misrepresents" things in this way to still be "uncontradicted." Very possibly he feels that if he defines
"uncontradicted" cognition in terms of cognition that accurately represents its object, he rules out this possibility. Thus he defines it in purely pragmatic terms. This allows perceptions to "misrepresent" their objects in the way specified and still be "uncontradicted": the "error" does nothing to result in the acquired or avoided object being a different object than the one expected.

But now, having formulated a definition that allows this one sort of "error," Dharmakīrtti notices that it also allows another. Although the definition effectively rules out misrepresentations due to the mind, it allows in misrepresentations due to the derangement of the senses. For example, in a case where a disease results in one seeing a white conch shell as a yellow one, the object acquired or avoided will still be the expected object. Barring some improvement in the senses, the yellow shell one initially cognizes will be precisely what one reaches.

But Dharmakīrtti does want pratyākṣa to be, specifically, veridical cognition. So in his definition of pratyākṣa (verse 4) he adds "nonaberrant" to exclude the aberrant sensings that he now notices that his definition of "uncontradicted" cognition admits. The scholars of the secondary literature tend to think that Dharmakīrtti adds the "nonaberrant" unnecessarily. In making this criticism, they fail to appreciate the point that the weakness in his definition of "uncontradiction" forces him to it.

What Dharmakīrtti really needs to do, instead of adding the
qualification in verse 4 (the adding of which only serves to suggest that he does not mean by "uncontradicted" cognition veridical cognition, which in fact he does mean), is to strengthen his definition of "uncontradiction." He runs the risk of strengthening it so much as to no longer include as "uncontradicted" those "misrepresentations" he wants to say are. But, surely, Dharmaśīrśa could strengthen the definition to the point where "uncontradicted" cognition is straightforwardly admitted to be cognition that accurately represents its object, so long as he also took the time to distinguish between a strict and an informal correspondence theory of error, indicating that his definition is to be understood in terms of the latter. Under a well-developed informal correspondence theory, a definition in terms of accurate representation would allow the sort of "metaphysical" errors¹⁴⁴ that he insists upon, which are true errors only under a strict correspondence theory. At the same time, it would eliminate the other errors that he is (rightly) so concerned to avoid (such as seeing the moon as double), these latter being true misrepresentations under any reasonable correspondence theory. It is only under a strict correspondence theory of error that a new definition in terms of accurate representation of the object would rule out the sort of "errors" Dharmaśīrśa wants to allow. Dharmaśīrśa's Yogācāra interests would suffer no more from a new definition of this sort than they do from his addition of the qualification "nonaberrant" to his definition of pratyakṣa.¹⁴⁵
An Equivocation on the Meaning of "Pratyakṣa"

I would like to return to the point that the early verses of the Nyāyabindu also contain an equivocation on the two senses of "pratyakṣa." To repeat the verses:

The attainment of a human end is always preceded by right cognition. Therefore [right cognition] is examined. /1/

Right cognition is twofold. /2/

[It is] pratyakṣa and anumāna. /3/

Of these, pratyakṣa is what is free from conceptualizing and nonaberrant. /4/146

To repeat the equivocation, the "free from conceptualizing" in verse 4 means that "pratyakṣa" is being used in the sense of sensing (what I have all along been calling sense 2 of "pratyakṣa"). But in verse 3, as one of the two kinds of veridical cognition mentioned in verse 2, pratyakṣa has the sense of veridical perception (what I have been calling sense 1 of "pratyakṣa"). The effect of running together what are in fact two different senses of "pratyakṣa" is to make "pratyakṣa" seem to have some single sense, more or less a combination of the two, on the order of "veridical sensing."

Dharmakīrti is possibly unaware of the equivocation. More likely, he is fully or at least partly aware of it but thinks it justified for a reason.

Although this reason can necessarily only be conjectured, a likely possibility is that he equivocates in order to draw
attention away from the fact that veridical perception (pratyakṣa in the first sense of the word) is a pramāṇa. By equivocating so that pratyakṣa seems to amount to something like veridical sensing, he makes (veridical) sensing the pramāṇa and leaves out perceiving being one.

Dharmakīrtī would be eager to draw attention away from the fact that perceiving is a pramāṇa for gnoseological reasons. The word "pramāṇa" has a certain mystique about it among those knowing Indian philosophy. There is the implication that all one's cognitions ought to be cases of pramāṇa; this is clearly a state toward which a practicing Buddhist aspires. Dharmakīrtī most likely is afraid that if it is too keenly born in mind that perception is a pramāṇa, practicing Buddhists will lose sight of the fact that ordinary perceptions are unsatisfactory from the ultimate point of view. Calling cognitions a type of pramāṇa has the effect of sanctioning them as altogether acceptable. Dharmakīrtī is probably thinking that, under the spell of hearing perception called a pramāṇa, practitioners will forget that ordinary perceptions are radically in need of changing and will not work, as they should, towards a state of just sensing. So he equivocates and makes it seem that sensing alone and not perceiving is the pramāṇa. This has the effect of motivating people (if motivate them it does) to just sense. And people who only sense are one step closer to enlightenment, it being the mind meddling in the percpetual process that is responsible for bondage. Dharmakīrtī probably thinks
the equivocating is didactically necessary and, for that reason, even philosophically acceptable.

Dharmakīrti's commentator, Dharmottara, is quick to deal with the equivocation either without noticing it as one or in full agreement with Dharmakīrti that it is necessary and should be perpetuated. In commenting on the Nyāyabindu, he puts in the mouth of an opponent the objection that if sensing does not involve an element of mental operation but if also it is not a pramāṇa until it is followed by a mental operation, then it is really perception and not sensing that is the pramāṇa. He replies to the objection simply (and not to the point) that there is a distinction between the operations of intellect that follow a sensing and those that do not follow a sensing (say, for example, when one sets out to visualize something mentally). The operations of intellect that accompany a sensing are different in kind from the others. They conceal their true character and borrow the sensuous character belonging to the sensing they follow. Dharmottara concludes from this that the sensing is the pramāṇa and the full perception not. But this answer at best suggests why perception is not the pramāṇa (pointing to the mental operation in it), while assuming that it is not the pramāṇa. In agreeing with Dharmakīrti that it is not the pramāṇa, the answer concedes the equivocation.

Durveka Miśra, addressing the same sort of objection facing Dharmottara, offers an equally unhelpful answer, this one drawing
on an analogy. He says that the fact that sensing depends upon being followed by a mental operation in order to amount to a pramāṇa does nothing to make the mental operation itself the pramāṇa anymore than the fact that a father depends upon his son to be a father does anything to make that son into a father.\textsuperscript{150} This merely evades the issue by misrepresenting the problem. The problem is not why is not the mental operation (instead of the sensing) the pramāṇa; the problem is why is not the full perception (i.e., the sensing in company with the following mental operation) the pramāṇa. The mental operation is just as much a constituent part of the full perception as is the sensing: it makes no more sense to say that the mental operation is the pramāṇa than that the sensing is. And that was not what the objector was maintaining. By misrepresenting the problem, taking it to be why is not the mental operation (rather than the full perception) the pramāṇa, Durveka Miśra evades the issue while at the same time appears to give a satisfactory answer, the answer he gives being not at all bad for the problem (however inappropriate) he addresses.

Dharmakīrtti might have had an additional reason for equivocating on the two meanings of pratyakṣa. If not a reason, this surely was a happy consequence. Dharmakīrtti’s chief Hindu opponents, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, regarded both perception and sensing as types of pratyakṣa. They distinguished between
nirvikalpika pratyakṣa (their equivalent of sensing) and savikalpika pratyakṣa (their equivalent of perception). Dharmakīrti, always eager to contend with the Hindus, has in his equivocating a chance to contend with the Hindus on this central point. Because pratyakṣa means veridical sensing (given the equivocation), perceiving is not even pratyakṣa. Thus he and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are in what Dharmakīrti could only consider a very pleasant disagreement.

Substance and Duration

It is time to put this matter aside and turn to another question, raised a long time ago (p. 114), that still needs attention: What else does Dharmakīrti think a universal is besides a "kind" concept on the order of "cowness" or "potness"? Without answering this question, we cannot fully understand what we have set out to understand, namely, kalpanā* or the mental operation in perception, consisting in the contributing of universals.

It will be remembered that Dharmakīrti is a Sautrāntika on the provisional level. According to the Sautrāntika, there are no such things as substrates. The Sautrāntika believe that we sense (although indirectly through images) a physical (i.e., nonmental) world. But instead of this world being populated by property-possessing substrates, it is populated merely by nonmental color expanses, tactile expanses, odors, flavors, and sounds (with
a qualification that will be discussed later). Only these nonmental sensibilia (as I will call them) exist, and there are no "substances" underlying them in the relation of substrate to property.\textsuperscript{151} The property-substrate relation (\textit{vivekanaviveksyabhava}) is strictly of mental origin, one term of the relation, the "substance," being a mental fiction.\textsuperscript{152} The mind, in the course of its meddling in a perception, simply misconstrues a set of sensibilia substantively. "Substance," in effect, is another universal.

Earlier in describing Dharmakirti's theory of universals, I said that the universal "cowness" is projected by the mind onto the sensed object that I depicted at the time as a cow. This depiction was purely for convenience. It can now be seen that the cow itself, in the sense of a substrate possessing certain properties such as color, softness, etc., is as much the result of a mental effort as its universal "cowness." The mind first construes a certain set of sensibilia as a brown, soft, smelly, lowing substantive thing; having added the first universal "substance," it then goes on to construe the substance as a cow by adding the universal "cowness," adding also other universals such as "browness" depending upon the color, etc., of the "cow."

Not only are there no substances for Dharmakirti, there are also, contrary to the way things seem, no entities that persist through time. Whatever is real is momentary (\textit{ksanika}), according
to the Buddhists. The set of sensibilia we construe (by way of representative images) not only substantively but as some enduring object exists only fleetingly; that is, the set we take to be a (substantive) enduring object is really a series of sets, each set of the series being momentary, the sets following one another in succession so rapidly that the mind, beguiled as if watching a movie, takes them as constituting a single, enduring object. The "enduring object," as much as the "substance," is a universal. To borrow an example from Dignāga, the man Dīttha is a universal to the extent that he is thought to be a single enduring entity of which the many momentary sets of sensibilia that he really is are but object-stages.

Kalpaṇā*, then, not only contributes to a perception such notions as "cowness" and "blueness" but also ideas of "substance" and "entity enduring through time."

And it is due to kalpaṇā* that we believe objects worth pursuing or avoiding. What we have said shows that what we sense and what we finally come to believe that we see are really quite different. The former are series of sets of fleeting sensibilia and the latter are enduring, substantive things, admitting of classification. Kalpaṇā* is responsible for transforming the one into the other; and with the transformation, it produces out of something inherently uninteresting (so Dharmakīrti would insist) something worthy of our likes and dislikes. But likes and dislikes result in
suffering. It is in this way that kalpanā* is responsible for our bondage. The first step in gaining enlightenment is purging our perceptions of kalpanā*, arresting these perceptions at the level of sensing so that we are aware of just the momentary sets of sensibilia incapable of holding our interest.\(^{156}\) We are then beginning to see things for the disinteresting entities they really are, and we can begin to avoid the attachments and aversions that result in suffering.

Once again, however, our perceptions, even though involving kalpanā* and its fictions of "substance" and "enduring entity" (along with its fictions such as "cowness"), are provisionally veridical, a point we made earlier (p. 82) when we discussed kalpanā* contributing such universals as "cowness." Perceptions involving kalpanā* (those perceptions otherwise accurate, that is) are pramāṇas, however much Dharmakirti is at times not eager to draw attention to the fact.\(^{157}\)

**Summation**

We are now at the end of discussing Dharmakirti's Sautrāntika theory of perception. We have proven by it that pramāṇa and pratyakṣa each amount to at least two different things. For, if nothing else, there are the two different entities of the "enduring object" (santāna) and the momentary set of sensibilia (kṣaṇa). And they are both objects of pratyakṣa, meaning that
"pratyakṣa" has two senses. The former object is the object of pratyakṣa when it amounts to "uncontradicted" cognition, that is, when "pratyakṣa" means perception. The latter is its object when pratyakṣa is cognition free from kalpaṇa*, i.e., when "pratyakṣa" means sensing.

As Dharmottara says, to the last avoiding explicitly recognizing the two senses: the object of pramāṇa, specifically, pratyakṣa, is twofold (dvividha). One of its objects is the santāna. This is the object that is to be seen at one time and reached at another (prāpanṭya). The second of its two objects is the kṣaṇa. It is the object to be just "immediately apprehended" (grāhya). For, being momentary, it is not around long enough to be first cognized and then subsequently reached through activity. This is implicit recognition that "pratyakṣa" and hence "pramāṇa" have two different senses. The santāna, around long enough to be both seen and reached, is in effect the perceptual object, i.e., the object of pratyakṣa in the sense of "uncontradicted" cognition. The kṣaṇa, not around long enough, is in effect the sensory object, i.e., the object of pratyakṣa in the sense of the sensing operation free from kalpaṇa*.

Transition to Parts Two and Three

I mentioned in this last chapter when describing the objective cause of a sensation as a set of sensibilia (pp. 143-144) that
this point was subject to qualification. The qualification, mentioned long ago at the very beginning of this chapter, is that each sensibl[e in the set is really an aggregate of another entity in Dharmākīrti's ontology: \textit{paramāṇu}ṣ. These are the atoms of his system: very small, objective entities that are qualitative (not substantive) in character (i.e., atoms of color, sound, smell, taste, and touch). Each sensibl[e is an aggregate of \textit{paramāṇu}ṣ of the appropriate sense; the sensibl[e of vision, which I will restrict the discussion to, is an aggregate of atoms of color. Because the visual sensibl[e is an aggregate of color atoms, it is not, after all, really a sensibl[e. It is not, in other words, a (nonmental) color patch. For Dharmākīrti insists that an aggregate of color atoms does not amount to a patch. A color patch is numerically one thing, according to Dharmākīrti, and an aggregate of atoms numerically many. There is a sense in which the atoms are collectively one thing, but collectively they are one thing that is a unity of parts. A patch, on the other hand, Dharmākīrti says, is but one thing that is \textit{not} a unity of parts. I am now in a position to discuss this point that the sensory object, or the \textit{svalaκṣaṇa} as it is called, is an aggregate that is not a color patch. I will do this in Part Three. But before I do so, I will consider in Part Two two misconceptions regarding this sensory object or \textit{svalaκṣaṇa}. The first of these is made possible by the fact that the \textit{svalaκṣaṇa}, given Dharmākīrti's representative theory
of perception, is only mediately perceived. It, an aggregate of paramāṇus, gives rise to a sensum; this sensum is a patch, as it happens, even if the svalakṣaṇa, its cause that is an aggregate, is not.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1 NB I:7: tat caturvidham. TR 93.5: sākṣātkāri hi jñānam pratyakṣam; NBTD 41.2-4.

2 NBTD 64.3.

3 NBTD 67.5ff.

4 NBTD 63.1-2.

5 See, for example, NB I:12-13; where it is asserted that the object of pratyakṣa is the svalaksana; and the svalaksana is then described as that which presents a vivid or weak image according to the distance from which it is viewed. See also NB I:6, where all the types of illusion of which pratyakṣa is said to be free are tailored to the case of sensing. Also NB I:20, where the most efficacious cause (pramāṇa) of a pratyakṣa is said to be the "conformity" (sārūpya) between the image and the object that makes the image a representation of the object.

6 See, for example, Dharmottara’s comment of how the word "pratyakṣa" applies to all kinds of direct apprehension, even though its etymological meaning is "dependent upon the senses," NBTD 38.3-6. The implication is that what Dharmakīrti says of pratyakṣa when meaning sensing is to apply to the other cases of direct apprehension as well.

7 For example, all of the comments mentioned in the above n. 5. In reference to a comment of Dharmottara’s in NBTD, Durveka Miśra simply states that "pratyakṣa" means sensing because what is said of it does not apply to the other awarenesses, DP 71.27-29.

8 It depends upon "pramāṇa" meaning, not most efficacious cause (sense 2), but veridical cognitive activity (sense 1). For pratyakṣa is a pramāṇa. With the equivocation, pratyakṣa in the sense of sensing becomes a veridical cognitive activity. But then
by including self-consciousness, yogic perception, and mental sensing in pratyakṣa, they too become veridical cognitive activities, to the extent that the equivocation is successful and sensing is a veridical cognitive activity. (Of course, pratyakṣa in the sense of sensing is truly a pramāna only in the sense of a most efficacious cause.) I will discuss this particular equivocation by which sensing becomes a veridical cognitive activity towards the end of this chapter.

Dharmakīrti wants, e.g., self-consciousness, to be classified as a veridical cognitive activity because, to consider just one case of it, self-consciousness is how one becomes aware one is in pain; and this sort of awareness Dharmakīrti considers knowledge.

9
PS 26.17-19. In characterizing it this way, he is borrowing from his predecessors.

10
See, for example, PV II:124.

11
PS 26.15-17.

12
Dharmottara discusses this same example, making this very point, in NBTD 84.1-4.

13
See, for example, PV II:139, where Dharmakīrti insists that the fact that we attend to only one thing while witnessing several does not mean that we do not sense the several things simultaneously. We thus sense sometimes without interpreting. Also, TS:730: anyatragaticittasya vastumātropalambhanam/ sarvopādhivivekena . . . // Also PVB 245.30–31: yady akṣam vikalpasāmagrañvirahi na pravarttata eva tadbhāve . . . anyavikalpasāmukhībhāve . . . caṅṣuṣo vyāpāro na syāt padārthagrāhī. Also TS:1242.

14
PVB 286.1-2.

15
Prajañākaragupta uses the butterfly example in connection with a discussion that begins with PV II:200. Some of the other examples that are used in connection with the discussion make it clear that the discussion is to extend to many differently colored things, e.g., jems (maṇi).
16

PV II:124: saṃhṛtya sarvatasā cintām stimitenāntarātmanā/
sthito 'pi caṅkuṣā rūpan īkṣate sākṣajā matih'/

17

PVV 138:21-25.

18

PVV 5.9; TB 6.7-8; PV II:8d; TB 89.7; TSP 407.11.

19

Some classes of resembling things are determined by an
entity called an upādhi. But for my purposes, it is sufficient
to mention only universals and the classes they determine.
I mean by a resemblance class one in which the members
each bear to every other a nonarbitrary likeness—unlike, say, the
class of my left shoe, the number 78, and the possible worlds where
God is a woman, the resemblance among these being that they are all
objects of my thoughts on Mondays.

20

NM (Part I) 271.12; PV II:147; TS:713.

21

Karl H. Potter, "Are the Vaiśeṣika 'Gunas' Qualities?"
Philosophy East and West, IV, No. 3 (1954), 259-264; "More on the
Unrepeatability of Guṇas," Philosophy East and West, VII, Nos. 1 & 2
(1957), 57-60.

22

"... The Naïyāyika's guṇas are not repeatable; each
blue object has its own blue-color. If we ask the Naïyāyika what
sorts of things are blue, he must answer, 'Particular blue-colors
are blue, i.e., can have blueness.' Houses, pots, and toys do not
possess blueness on his view; rather, each house, pot, or toy
possesses its own blue color, and only these latter possess
bueness." Potter, [1], p. 264.

23

G 78.1-2; G 78.12. Some Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, however, held
a different view, see Karl H. Potter, ed., Indian Metaphysics and
Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgasā.
Vol. II, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (Delhi, 1977)
p. 139. See also Dharmendra Nath Shastri, Critique of Indian

24

TS:713.
25

The Buddhists entertain an objection in this regards, 
TS:738cd-739.

26

This is the terminology of Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions 

27

This is more the Naiyāyika view, as the Vaiśeṣikas do not 
agree that inherence is perceptible.

28

TS:1303; TS:1024; PV II:42-43; PV II:53d.

29

TS:1021; PVV 41.23; TSP 301.23.

30

The qualification is that, ultimately, the cow and pot 
reduce to phenomenalist sense, e.g., the cow to a color expanse of 
a certain shape, a tactile expanse, an odor, etc. For Dharmakīrti 
does not ultimately believe in substrates. Thus what exist are 
only color and tactile expanses, odors, flavors, and sounds.

31

Raja Ram Dravid, The Problem of Universals in Indian 
Philosophy (Delhi, 1972), p. 273.

32

Dravid, p. 266: "Dignāga rejects the realist theory that 
concepts are formed by abstracting identical or similar features 
observed in repeated perceptions. In the realist view, concepts are 
rooted in the experience of real objective universals. Dignāga and 
his followers, on the contrary, maintain that concepts are due not to 
experience, but to an innate constructive tendency of reason. This 
theory is obviously rooted in the Buddhist metaphysics which has no 
place for similarity or identity. The abstraction theory of concepts 
necessarily implies the objectivity of the character abstracted. If 
concepts are abstractions from experience, common characteristics 
and relations would be real. This being incompatible with the 
Buddhist conception of reality, Dignāga adopts the theory of 
construction. Concepts are the products of creative thought, having 
absolutely nothing corresponding to them in the real world."

Also, Dravid, pp. 273-274: "The [Buddhist] theory is clearly 
nominalistic, because concepts are said to have no objective 
foundation. They are pure and simple fabrications of the mind. But
the nominalism of the Buddhist is of a special type. He does not hold that concepts are mere names having no common basis whatsoever. Such a view would lead to complete arbitrariness in the use of words and would ultimately result in scepticism. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti admit that language is a source of common knowledge, and that it is the medium of communication of ideas and thought. They recognise also that such knowledge and communication presuppose a common basis which makes mutual understanding possible. What they deny is that the required common basis for language and concepts can be found in the immediate experience of the real world. This, according to them, must be sought outside experience, and they discover it in the creative reason which is transcendental and universal. Reason creates a priori general forms or concepts in order to express the data of immediate experience through them. . . ."

33 Dravid, p. 264: "... For the realist, conceptual knowledge is a direct apprehension of the real. Words and concepts stand for real universals, or particulars qualified by them. But, for the Buddhist, the real is the unique, causally efficient point-instant which is outside the reach of words and concepts. . . ."

See also the quotes in the above n. 32.

34 BL I, 182 (Secs. 263).

35 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk. III, Ch. 3, Sec. 13. Italics omitted.

36 PV III: 108. Also G 57.6-7: tasmād ekākāyataiva bhāvānām abhedāḥ. See also Dharmakīrti's comment, G 46.11, to the effect that the presence of universals among the activities of cows of giving milk or bearing burdens is to be denied, indicating that what are resembling among the cows, candidates for universals, are the functions that they perform.

37 TB 4.8-9: dāha, pāka, avagāhana, snāna, pāna; TS: 727: vāha, doha.

38 The only exceptions to this are imperceptible entities such as karma whose existence is attested to by the Buddha.
39  

40  
G 40.21-22: katham punar bhinnanam abhinnaṃ kāryaṃ yena tadanyabhyo bhedād abheda ity ucye. See also such comments as G 82.23-83.6, which raise the same question.

41  
G 40.22-41.4: prakṛtir esā bhuvanām yad ekaprtyayamarsārthaṃnāndyekārthaṃsadhane/ bhedē 'pi niyatāḥ kecit svabhāvenendriyādīvat// yathendriyavishayālokamanaskārā at mendriyamano 'rtatatsamnikarṣā vā ssaty api tadbhavaniyate sāmānye ṛūpāvijñānam ekam janayanti, evam śiśaśādaya 'pi bhedād parasparāntvaye 'pi prakṛtyalvaikam ekākāraṃ pratyabhijnānam janayanti.

When quoting verses together with commentary, I have made it a practice to capitalize the verses.

42  
G 41.4-5: anyām vā yathāpratyayaṃ dahanagṛhādikāṃ kāśṭhasādhyaṃ arthakriyāṃ.

43  
G 41.6: na tu bhedāviseṣe 'pi jalādayaḥ, śrotrādīvad ṛūpādijñāna.

44  
The "or" that connects this verse with the previous one (verse 73, see n. 41 above) implies that another analogy is being offered. So does the concluding sentence of the entire passage, which compares the case of the trees to the case of herbs, the way the earlier sentences compared the trees to the eye, the light, etc.

45  
Cocculus cordifolius.

46  
G 41.7-12: jvarādisāmane kācit saha pratyekam eva vā/ drṣṭā yathā vausdāhāyō nānāte 'pi na cāparāḥ// yathā vā guḍucīvyaktyādayaḥ saha pratyekam vā jvarādisāmanalakṣāpaṃ ekam kāryaṃ kurvanti. na ca tatra sāmānyam apekṣante. bhedē 'pi tatprakṛtītvāt. na tadaviseṣe 'pi dadhitrapusādayaḥ.
47
G 41.12-42.7: syād etat, sāmāṇya eva kīmci tāsu
tathābhūtaṇu vidyate, tata eva tad ekāṁ kāryam iti. tad ayuktam.
AVISĀṅĀN
sāmāṇyasya

NA SĀMĀNYAM
tatkāryakṛt. tasyāpi
AVISĀṆAPRASAṅGATAH/

TĀŚĀM KṢETRĀDIBHEDE. 'PI
yadi hi sāmāṇyāj jvarādiśāmanām kāryām syāt. tasyāvīśāsād
vyaaktinām kṣetradibhede 'pi ciraśīgrapraśāmanādayo vīśaṅā
guṇatāratabhāyanā ca na syāt. viśeṣe vā sāmāṇyasya svabhāvabhādāt
svarūpahānam... vyaktayas tu kāladesāsāṃskāravasāṇa
vīśaṅpotpattayo vīśeṣavat kāryām kuryur ity avirodhaḥ. tāvad
arthā api kecit svabhāvabhade 'pi ekapratyabhijñānādikām artha-
kriyām kurvantas tadakāribhyo bhedād abhinā iti ucyante. (Where
minor misprints occur in the edition, such as omissions of
diacritics, I have made the corrections without comment. I will
adopt this as a practice in quoting all editions.)

48
PV III: 82: tatraikakāryo 'neko 'pi tadakāryānayeṣūṣrayaiḥ/
 ekatvenābhidhājñānair vyavahāreṇ pratyāryate//

49
PV II: 161ab: vastudharmatayaivārthās tādṛṣṭvijñānakāraṇam/

50

51
G 82.18. See also PV II: 299, where the difference between
concepts and dream images, and also visual images, is said to be
a matter of a "vividness" on the part of dream and visual images that
is lacking in concepts.

52
See B. H. Price, Thinking and Experience (2d ed.; London,

53
PV III: 170 (G 85.24): ... upaplavaś ca sāmāṇya-
dhiyas...// G 85.25: nirvīṣayam eva khalv idam mithyājñānaṁ
yad anekatraikākāram... PV III: 72ab: tasman mithyāvikalpo
'yam artheṣv ekātmagrahaḥ/ G 56.19: tatra samsṛṣṭakārā buddhir
bhramānti eva.

55. G 25.7-8: tadātmānam eva hi buddhiḥ samsṛṣjantī sāmānyaviṣayā pratibhāṣate.

56. PV III:70; TS:1023; TB 83.8-10.

57. G 60.14-61.1. Further, recognition is said to require memory of a linguistic convention. In remembering a linguistic convention, one entertains a word and remembers what objects that word was associated with at the time it first acquired its meaning (and possibly also one remembers all other like objects experienced since, if they too have gone into the generic image). Presumably, then, one compares the present object with the image (judging from G 60.14-61.1).

58. PVV 150.19-23: nanu śabde jñāne grāhyam bāhyatayaiva pratiṣyate, na jñānaśāntiḥ ity āha: SĀBDĀD utpanna-JĀNE 'RTHA-PRATIBIMBAKAM VyATTREKIVĀ bhinnam bāhyam iva YAD ĀBHAṬI, TAD API NĀRTHĀTMA bahirarthasvarūpam; kīṁ tu BHRĀNTIḥ SĀ VĀSANĀnimītā. yathā taimırnikārṣṭeṣu keśādiṣu bāhyabhṛmaḥ, evam vikalpākare 'pi bāhyavyavahāro 'vidyāvasād ity arthaḥ. (Words in capitals are those that appear in the verse being commented on.) See also PV II:29.

59. TS:1296: svasāmānyātmanor yuktam jñānam caikam na vedakam/ savikalpānyathābhāve prāktanāparavīna hi///

60. kalpanāviṣayatāṁ upayāntyas, G 56.8.

61. G 39.14-16; PVV 150.15-17; G 68.5-6: na càṭrāṇugāmi kīṃcid rūpam asti. kevaṁ tadarthatāyā te bhāva 'tadarte-mybhyo bhinnā iti bheda evaiśaṁ abhedah. [bheda = tadanye-bhuyo bheda]
62
G 57.19. Also itaretarahabha, PV III:72.

63
atatkāṟyārthahabha, PV III:76; tadakāryānyatā, PV III:82b; atatkārisvabhāvaviveka, G 57.1; atatkāryavisleṣa, PV III:110a.

64
PVV 109.22-23.

65
E.g., G 85.19; PV II:171cd-172; also anyavyāyṛtti, PV II:173c, PV II:30b, PV II:42d. These are the same words Dharma-kṛti sometimes uses to refer to the basis of concepts, i.e., the similarities in the objects, see supra n. 61. See also TSP 338.13-14.

66
See, for example, TSP 411.6-10. See also such discussions as TS:1145-1146.

67
TS:942-943; PV III:114ff. (G 58.19ff).

68
TS:1010.

69
TS:1019.

70
TS:1018, 1094-1095, 1163.

71
TSP 395.17-18; TSP 396.8-9.

72
TSP 395.22-25.

73
G 62.24ff. That he deviates from Sāntarakṣita is particularly evident in his denying that a word has two functions, G 63.11-12. Sāntarakṣita is content to assert this in TS:1020; see TSP on this verse. The difference seems to be whether there are two results, but one following the other (Sāntarakṣita), or whether there is only one complex result (Dharma-kṛti). Satkari Mookerjee has some helpful comments on this in The Buddhist Philosophy of

74
See also G 56.19.

75
NBTD 70.8: vastuno hy asādhāraṇaṃ ca tattvam asti sāmānyam ca. For Dharmakīrti, see PV II: 1; for Dignāga, see PS 24.9.

76
PV III: 68-70 (G 38.11-16): pararūpam svarūpeṇa yaya sāmvyayate dhīyaḥ/ ekārtapratibhāsinyā bhavaṇ āsritaḥ bhedinaḥ//
taya sāmvyayataḥ samvyayata bhedinaḥ svayam/ abhedina ivabhānti bhava rūpeṇa kenaicit// tasyā abhiprayaṇaṣat sāmānyam sat
prakṛtitan// tadbhāṣyaṃ viṣayā samkalpitam tayaḥ//

77
G 38.17-39.1: buddhiḥ khalu tadanyavyayakino padarthān āsiritotpadyāmanā vikalpikā svavāsanapraṇṛtām anuvidadhatī
bhinnaṃ evaṃ rūpaṃ tirhāṣāṇa pratibhāṣam abhinnam ātmāya adhyasya
tan samṛjñati samvadāṣāyati. sā caikasaḥhyāṣāḥhanatā ānya-viveklām bhavāntām tadvikalpavāsanāyās ca prakṛtir yad evam eva
pratibhāti tadubhāvā. sā ceyām sāmvyayate tasyā svarūpeṇa pararūpam iti. te ca tayaḥ samvyayataḥ svayam bhedino 'py abhedina
iva kenacid rūpeṇa pratibhānti. tad evaṃ buddhipratibhāsām
anurundhānaḥ . . . sāmānyam ity ucyate.

78
See above n. 65.

79
G 39.1-10: katham idāṁ anyāpohāḥ sāmānyam. sa eva
khalv anyāpohas. tam eva gṛhṇatī sā prakṛtivibhramad vikalpānam
vastugraṇātānā pratibhāti. sā hi tadanyavivekiṣṭ eva bhāveṣu
bhavāntā vivekaviśayetā gamyate. nanu bāhyā vivekino na ca teṣu
vikalpaprayuṣṭitā iti kathāṃ teṣu bhavati. vyākhyātārāḥ khālv eva
vivecayanti na vyavahartāraḥ. te tu svālambanam evārthakriyāyogyam
manyamāna dṛṣṭāvyāklāpārthāv ekārtā pravartante. tadbhiprayāv-
asād evam ucyate. tatkāryāḥ 'tatkāryibhy bhinnāms tathā śabdena
pratipādayantīti. pratibhāsābhedādibhyas tu tattvacintakā nābheda
anumanyante.

80
Cf. TS: 909-910; TS: 923.
81

G 39.11-19: yadi pratipattrabhīprāyo 'nuvidhīyate, anyāpo ho 'pi śāmānye dhi bhūt, na by evam pratipattit iti. na vai kevalam evam apratipattith. vyaktivatiriktyāvatiriktaikanitya-vyāpītātākāraīr api naiva pratipattith. kevalam abhinākārā buddhir uptpayate. tasyāḥ ka āśraya ity anyāpoha ucyate. tasya vastuṣu bhāvāt. avirodhat. vyavahārasya ca śabdāśrayasya tathādarsaṁat. na punar vastubhūtam kincit śāmānye nāmātī yatheyām buddhī pratibhāti. yasmāt.

VYAKTAYO NĀNUYANTY ANYAD ANUYĀYI NA BRĀŚATE/

82

See, e.g., PV II:299, PVB 247.32-33.

83

See, for example, the discussion PV II:54cd-62. Here the talk is at one moment of the conceptualizing and at the next of inference, as if the two were one and the same thing. See also PV II:75: svalakṣaṇe ca pratyaksam avikalpatayā vinā/ vikalpena na śāmānyagrahas tasmāṁ tato 'numā/

84

Dharmendra Nath Shastri, "The Sautrantika Theory of Knowledge," Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, XXXII (1952), 126: "... A close observation will reveal that the term 'Anumāna' (inference) has been used in two different senses in the Diṇḍāga school. It is sometimes used in a broad sense ... when it means all judgment and intellection, all discursive thought, all cognitive process except pure sensation. When 'Inference' is used in that broad sense, the determinate perception (savikalpika pratyakṣa) of the realist will also be covered under it. But it is usually used in a narrower sense of the inference of pure logic, as when fire is inferred from smoke. In this narrow sense determinate perception will not be regarded as inference. ..."

Arcaṭa, the eighth-century Buddhist author of the Hetubindukkā, in effect admits that anumāna has two senses, at least according to Shastri, Ibid.; see NBT 24.10-13.

85

See supra n. 53.

86

NBT 71.5; 72.2. See also PV III:76, anarthika.

87

TS:1215.

PV II:141-144; NBTD 48.5-10.

E.g., G 82.16; TS:1203.

PV II:183a: samānyavācinaḥ sabdaḥ. TS:1217: tasyāṁ cādhyavasāyena bhṛntā sabdārthayoh sthitih/ aṁyāyogād asattve 'syāṁ sadṛśy api na sambhavet/

Locke, Bk. III, Cp. 2, Sec. 1.

PV II:172-173. PVV 139.16-17: tasmād YA eva SABDAŅAṬH VIṢAYA vyavacchedaḥ SA EVA TAIH SAMYOJYET, na svalakṣaṇam. (The words in capitals appear in the verse being glossed.) PVV 152.17: ... anyapohah śrutau vācyatayā sambadhyaete, nānyat. See also PV II:30: arthānāṁ yac ca sāmānyam anyavyāvṛttitakṣaṇam/ yan-niṣṭhās ta ime sabdaḥ ... /

PV III:76; PV II:163c; TS:1008cd.


TS:1033: KIN TV ANEKO 'PI YAṆE EKAKĀRYAKĀRĪ YA ĪKYATE/ TATRAIKADHARMAṆOPENA ŚRUTIR EKA NIVESYATE// TSP 399.16-20: tatrāntaṁ api sāmānyam sāmānyaśabdatvavyavasthāyā idam nibandhanam, yad bahūnām ekārthakriyākāritvam. prakṛtyaiha hi ke cīḍ bhāva bhavo 'py ekārthakriyākaṁ bhavanti. teṣām ekārthakriyāśāmarthya-pratipādaṁyā vyavahartbhīr lāghavārtam ekārūpaṁyāropeṇaikā śrutir nivesyate.

I have partially adopted here the translation of Ganganatha Jha, TStr., p. 546 (verse 1034 on his numbering).

PV II:127-128.

PV III:92 and autocommentary (G 45.22-29).
99
PV II:34; PV II:39.

100
G 37.27-38.3. See also TS:879.

101
PVV 154.9-10. Also Dharmakīrti speaks of recalling a concept only by remembering a "linguistic convention" (sabdassāmketa), PV II:45, PV II:2cd. Remembering one involves entertaining the word that signifies the concept and remembering (presumably in the form of a generic image) the objects with which the word was first associated. The fact that one always remembers a linguistic convention when recalling a concept suggests that the concept was not formed without a word serving in the capacity of signaling the concept's extension. Also, see TS:772-773; and such comments from the Buddhists as recorded in TS:940cd.

102
PV II:45; PVB 170.23-24. PV II:123d: vikalpo nāmasamārayah/ PVB 245.24-25: vikalpo hi nāma janayati nāmāpi vikalpam . . . . TS:101lab: tadṛṣṭapratibimbasya dhiyat sābdāc ca janmani/

103
See the discussion in NBTD 48.5ff. DP 49.30: yā niyamavatī pravṛttīḥ kva cāt prāṇīnaḥ, sā vikalpapūrvikāḥ. yathā vyutpānasāmketaścātyadhārasyaśānādiśeṣeścā pravṛttīḥ. niyamavatī ca taditararaparihāreṇa stanādau pravṛttir bālakasyeti kāryahetuḥ.

104
NBDT 48.8-9.

105
This is a point on which Kamalaśīla seems to disagree, see TSP 450.11-12.

106
NB 1:5.

107
NBTD 48.6-9.

108
But see TS:1214.

109
PV II:127-128; TS:872-873; TS:1263.
110  
PV III:137cd-143ab (G 66.15-26); G 67.26-68.10; G 46.2-9;  
TSP 399.16-20.

111  See supra pp. 103ff.

112  
PV III:96 and autocommentary (G 48.9-19); TB 85.7-10.

113  
PV III:119ab (G 60.2-3).

114  
PVV 118.17-20; G 43.3-4.

115  Actually, it is only one of two criteria. The cognition  
must also take a "novel object," see chapter 2, pp. 59-60.

116  
PV II:57-58; PV II:83.

117  
PV II:83; PV II:56abc; G 49.1-6.

118  
For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, there is nothing at all wrong  
with ordinary perceptions cognizing universals, for universals do  
exist and they are in fact perceived.

119  
PV II:57. Dharmakīrti repeats the example in G 43.2-7  
and G 49.4.

120  
Zwilling, [2], p. 146. The reference to the keyhole is  
not in the Sanskrit as the translation suggests. Also, Frauwallner,  
[1], Vol. XXXIX (1932), p. 271. The exposition is not Dharmakīrti's  
autocommentary but Frauwallner's comments. Dharmakīrti makes no  
mention of keyholes.

121  
PVB 218.33. See also NBTD 25.4-5.

122  
PVB 219.1.
Richard Salomon suggested to me that on his reading of Prajñākaragupta perhaps the beams of color are radiating out from the jewel and one mistakes a radiated beam seen through the keyhole for the jewel (so that one is not looking directly at the jewel at all). This is likely more consistent with the Indian way of thinking of jewels. What I go on to say follows on either interpretation, with the exceptions that I note in footnotes connected with particular points.

G 43.3–4: ... tatpratibaddhajamanam vikalpānām atatpratibhāsīte 'pi vastuny avisamvādo maṇiprabhāyām āva maṇibhrānteḥ, ... (Emphasis mine.) See also the context surrounding G 49.1–6.

On the Salomon interpretation (see supra n. 123), it is also not quite in the same location, since one has mistaken a radiated beam for the jewel.

On the Salomon interpretation, the example would merely be farfetched—so much so as to be virtually impossible. How could one misake a radiated beam for a jewel if one is looking straight at the jewel?

"jale jalaḥmaṇasya" must be supplied, see Zwingler, [2], p. 167.

For the Buddhist account of a mirage, see G 51.12–13; also NM (Part I) 82.23–24: griśme tapati tv alāṭantape tapanē tamārciṣu caturāmśarabhuvam abhihatyam samutphaliteṣu tarāṅgakārādhāriṣu ... .

G 51.5–7. ... yathāḍṛṣṭavīśeṣānusaramāṃ pari-
tyajya ... G 51.11–12: ... svabhāvānukārapratyarpāṇena jamanāṭ.

G 43.5–6: ... kimcitsāmānyagrahāṇena viśeṣāntarasaṃ-
rupād ... PVV 188.24: ... rajjvadau samsthānasāmyagrahāt utpādāyāḥ sarpādibhrānter ... PVV 189.15: ... marciṣu taraṅgajalasamāsā purvadrstajalasmarapāśāpeṣā jalaḥbhrāntiḥ, ...
See Frauwallner's comments to this effect, [1], Vol. XXXIX (1932), p. 271.

PV II:288-289.

PV II:294; PV II:297-298.

The function a thing performs determines what kind of thing it is, it will be remembered.

samyagjñānapūrvikā sarva puruṣārthasiddhir iti tad vyutpādyate. dvividhāṃ samyagjñānam. pratyakṣam anumāṇaḥ ceti. tatra pratyakṣam kalpanā 'podham abhrāntam. (On "tatra," see NBTD 7.6-8.)

NB I:5: abhilāpasamsargayogyapratabhāsa pratītiḥ kalpanā.

Or, Dharmakīrti would have it, direct apprehension generally, including self-consciousness, yogic perception, and mental sensing; see p. 82.

NBTD 17.1: avisamvādakam jñānam samyagjñānām

An "uncontradicted" cognition is one that is able to "deliver up" (prāpana) the object by properly representing its spatial location, temporal location, and character. This means, in effect, a judgmental cognition, e.g., a cognition in respect to blue that it is blue. As Dharmottara says, NBTD 84.5-6: tasmād adhayasāyaṃ kurvad eva pratyakṣam pramāṇam bhavati. akṛtte tv adhyavasāye nīlabodhārūpānayavasthāpitaṃ bhavati vijñānam. tathā ca pramāṇaphalāṃ arthādhiṣṭhūpāṃ anippannam. "Only when pratyakṣa has produced a judgment is it a pramāṇa. As long as that judgment is not produced, the cognition is not a determinate one of, [say, blue] as blue. And the knowledge of the object that is the fruit of the pramāṇa does not result."

As we will see later, the object of a nonjudgmental sensory cognition is not even around long enough to be first seen
and then "delivered up"; for it is momentary (kṣanika). Thus an "uncontradicted" cognition, whose object is one that is delivered up, can only be a perception.

139
tayā rahitāṃ timirāsubhramanauyānasamśobhādyanāhita-vibhramāṃ jñāṇaṃ pratyakṣaṃ.

140
E.g., see NBTD 25.3-4, where Dharmottara discusses the case of a white shell seen as a yellow one. This is on a par with seeing the moon as double, for the Buddhists. Such a cognition, Dharmottara says, is not a pramāṇa, i.e., is not "uncontradicted."

141
PV II:300.

142
That is, in terms of the fact that the object reached, if one indeed acts on the cognition, is (barring unforeseen circumstances) the object that the cognition led one to expect.

143
For example, see BL I,153; also Mookerjee, pp. 278-279, and Chhote Lal Tripathi, The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism (Varanasi, 1972), pp. 95ff. On p. 97, Tripathi attributes to Dharmakīrti Dharmottara's manner of defining "nonaberrant."

144
"Transcendental illusions," Stcherbatsky calls them, see BL I,153(para.3).

145
The new definition might well be unacceptable to Dharmakīrti to the extent that he is a Yogācārin. For according to Yogācāra, no perception, occurring as it does in a subject-object framework, truly accurately represents its object. But the definition of pratyakṣa in terms of "nonaberrant" is just as unacceptable to him as a Yogācārin, for no pratyakṣa is truly "nonaberrant" for precisely the same reason, see DP 44.18-20.

146
For the Sanskrit, see supra n. 134.

147
NBTD 85.3.
148
\textit{NBTD} 85.4-5 and 86.1-2.

149
\textit{NBTD} 86.2-3.

150
\textit{DP} 86.17-19.

151
\textit{NV} 73.15-19.

152
\textit{BL} I,97.

153
\textit{TSP} 179.18-19: \textit{utpādānantaraśāsvabhāvo vastumah}
\textipa{kṣāṇa} ucyate, sa yasyāsti sa kṣaṇika iti.

154
\textit{PV} II:104.

155
\textit{PS} 25.19-20; see also \textit{TSP} 453.14-25.

156
We are indeed capable of seeing momentary sensibilia
(kṣaṇa) upon reaching a certain stage, according to Dharmakīrti,
see \textit{PV} II:107; \textit{HBT} p.37; \textit{TSP} 302.6-7.

157
\textit{TB} 3.6-10 and 4.1-6; \textit{DP} 27.24-27.

158
\textit{NBTD} 71.1-4; see also \textit{DP} on these lines.
PART TWO

THE SVALAKŠANA: MISCONCEPTIONS
INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO

The theory I will prove in Part Three is that the svalakṣaṇa, the cause of, say, the crescent-shaped silver color sensum in our visual field that we take to be the moon, is an aggregate of paramāṇus, the atoms of Dharmakīrti's system. Paramāṇus, to repeat, are very small, objective entities that are qualitative in character, i.e., minute quantities of color (sound, smell, taste, and touch). I will prove that the svalakṣaṇa, in a case of visual perception (such as the example of the moon just given), is an aggregate of color atoms. As an aggregate of color atoms, it is not a color patch, as its sensum is; and it differs from this sensum in more ways than just that it is nonmental and its sensum mental. Specifically, it is numerically "many" things and its sensum numerically "one," according to Dharmakīrti's analysis.

Before turning to this matter, however, I will consider the two most prominent alternative theories of the svalakṣaṇa in the secondary literature. According to both of these, the svalakṣaṇa is not even an aggregate of atoms. The first theory is that the svalakṣaṇa is instead a Kantian noumenon. The second is that it is a single paramāṇu, one of the individual atoms in the aggregate that I say is collectively the svalakṣaṇa.

I will explain each theory and assess the arguments in their
defense. I will then give the evidence in Part Three that the 
*svalakṣaṇa* is indeed an aggregate of *paramāṇus* and show that it 
is not a color patch, as its sensum is, but that it differs from 
it in being constitutionally many while the patch is constitu-
tionally one.
Chapter 5

THE SVALAKŚANA AS A KANTIAN NOUMENON

In 1930-33, Theodor Stcherbatsky published his celebrated work, *Buddhist Logic* (see pp. 10-11). *Buddhist Logic* is a confusing work and leaves doubts about what Stcherbatsky's thesis of the nature of the svalakśana was. The thesis that most readily suggests itself is that the svalakśana, the cause of our sensations, is a transcendent Kantian noumenon. It is a qualityless,\(^1\) extensionless,\(^2\) thing-in-itself.\(^3\) "A deeper insight into what happens in our ordinary everyday cognition has led the Buddhists to establish behind the veil of empirical reality the existence of its transcendent source, the world of things as they are by themselves."\(^4\) This way of interpreting Stcherbatsky's thesis found favor with later scholars such as A.K. Sarkar.\(^5\)

There is good evidence that Stcherbatsky's thesis was instead that the svalakśana is given in sense but that it is transcendent in a non-Kantian way in that the sensation of it is too fleeting to ever be consciously experienced.\(^6\) I will consider each of these two, distinct theses, beginning with the one that it is a Kantian noumenon.

On this interpretation of Stcherbatsky's thesis, his claim is that the svalakśana in itself does not possess any of the
characteristics that the sensation represents it as having. For he insists: "Not only are the sensible qualities subjective moods of reaction to the external stimulus, but the so called primary qualities, extension, duration, time, space, the notions of existence, non-existence, reality, generality, causality etc. are all nothing but subjective constructions of the understanding." The svalaksana, in a case of visual perception, is colorless, an "absolutely propertyless pure object." Like Kant’s noumenon, it is the unknown cause of a sensation. "The fire is not the flaming object of a definite shape and extension which we deem present before us, but it is merely a moment of caloric energy, the rest is imagination. The jar is not the extended body having definite color, shape, tactile qualities and duration, which is present in our imagination, but it is an efficient moment represented, e.g., in the fact of pouring water, the rest is imagination." Why does Stcherbatsky think this, if this is indeed his thesis? Explicitly he gives one reason, implicitly an additional two. It is easiest to take up his implied reasons first, for a discussion of his explicit reason leads naturally into a discussion of the second thesis that may be his rather than this Kantian transcendent thesis.

Implicitly he appeals to two facts about the svalaksana. One is that Dharmakirti clearly states that it is not the direct referent of a word (śabdasya aviśayatva). Stcherbatsky, referring to this fact as the svalaksana's "unutterability," seems to take
this as meaning that the svalakṣaṇa is, like Kant's noumenon, that about which no empirical proposition is meaningful.\textsuperscript{12} The second fact that he implicitly appeals to is that Dharmakīrti describes the svalakṣaṇa as "different from things of its own class as well as things of other classes" (sarbato vyāvṛttta, sajñīyavijñāyavyāvṛttta).\textsuperscript{13} The svalakṣaṇa is, as Dharmakīrti sometimes puts this point, "dissimilar" (asadrśa) from all other things.\textsuperscript{14} Stcherbatsky understands this as meaning that the svalakṣaṇa is unique: it is absolutely dissimilar from all other things.\textsuperscript{15} And since anything propertied at least resembles other things, the svalakṣaṇa, he seems to reason, is propertyless, i.e., a transcendent Kantian noumenon.\textsuperscript{16}

To assess the second of the two implied reasons first, Dharmakīrti does not mean in saying that the svalakṣaṇa is "dissimilar" from everything else that it is absolutely unique. It is not: for, as we saw in Part One, Dharmakīrti is a resemblance theorist. The svalakṣaṇa is "different from things of its own class as well as things of other classes," but only in that it does not share a universal. This import of Dharmakīrti's use of "dissimilar" can be seen from context. "Dissimilar" is really a quasi-technical term. Svalakṣaṇas are "dissimilar" in that there is nothing common to a number of them.

To look at the context in which the word "dissimilar" (asadrśa) occurs, when a svalakṣaṇa is said to be "dissimilar,"
it is in contrast to the universal (sāmānyya), which is then "similar" (sadrśa). 17 "Common" is really what he means by "similar."

The universal is "similar," i.e., common (sādhāraṇa) or general (eka), while the svalaksana is "dissimilar," i.e., not common (asādhāraṇa) or not general (bhinna). 18 Dharmakīrti's point in calling the svalaksana "dissimilar" is, specifically, that it is a particular.

Were his point that it is a unique particular, he could not have been a resemblance theorist as I have shown he was. He could not have made such comments as "Many things producing the same effect are treated in ordinary discourse as being the same by using words and concepts whose basis is a difference [of those things] from what cannot produce their effect." 19 And since colors and the like are particulars and not universals for Dharmakīrti, the svalaksana—being something particular but not unique, and sharing resemblances with other things—is colored (or, really, a patch of color) and not, as Stcherbatsky would have it, a colorless Kantian noumenon.

As to the fact that the svalaksana is not the signification of a word, Dharmakīrti does not mean by this that the svalaksana is something in regards to which no empirical proposition is meaningful. This can be seen from what it is to be the signification of a word. To be the signification of a word is simply to be a concept or Buddhist universal. For, as we saw in Part One, Dharmakīrti is a conceptualist. Concepts intervene between words
and the things to which they refer. Thus "A word is said to refer [to a thing] in that it produces a [general] image that has been brought about by exposure to the object. But it does not directly signify the differentiating thing of the nature of a svalaksana. And it has no other denotative function than the production of the image." 20

The svalaksana, in other words, is as meaningfully, say, blue, as is its sensum. Neither of them is the signification of a word in the sense that both are particular; and both—or, really, the svalaksana by way of its sensum—figure in the meaning of a word in the sense that they are the source of the concept that the word immediately signifies. "By their very nature, some things, even though many [distinct particulars], perform the same useful function; and for the purpose of expressing the fact that they perform the same fruitful function, people speaking of them, for the sake of brevity, project upon them a common form and apply to them a common name." 21

To turn to Stcherbatsky's stated reason rather than implied reasons why the svalaksana is a Kantian noumenon, the reason is a comment of Dharmottara's that he thinks is to that effect. The comment, coming at the end of a discussion, is that it is impossible for a svalaksana, a momentary kṣaṇa (see p. 144), "to be delivered up in pratyakṣa" (kṣanasya prāpayitum aśākyata). 22 Stcherbatsky takes "pratyakṣa" to mean sensing and the comment to mean that the
svala\kṣaṇa is not captured in sensation: the properties that the sensation represents it as having are not ones that it has in itself.\textsuperscript{23}

But pratyakṣa, we have seen in the four chapters of Part One, amounts to perception as well as sensing. The "delivering up" (prāpaṇa) spoken of in Dharmottara's comment is connected with his description of pratyakṣa as perception. To understand the true import of Dharmottara's comment, we need to review what he says of pratyakṣa in the sense of perception.

Pratyakṣa in the sense of perception is a pramāṇa in the sense of a veridical cognitive activity. The characteristic of a veridical cognitive activity (pramāṇa in sense 1) is that it is able to "deliver up" (prāpaṇa) its object. When (and if) one acts on the basis of the cognition, the object one reaches (or potentially could reach) is the object that the cognition has led one to expect. This object is not at a different time, or in a different place, or of a different character than represented in the cognition.

When Dharmottara says that the svala\kṣaṇa, a kṣaṇa, is not able to be "delivered up" by pratyakṣa, he is only making the point that this svala\kṣaṇa is not the perceptual object. Only the perceptual object is around long enough to be "delivered up." Obviously, to be "delivered up," a thing has to exist long enough to be both perceived at one time and reached through activity at another. The svala\kṣaṇa or kṣaṇa, being momentary, is too fleeting to be
"delivered up." But the fact that the svalaṅga or kṣaṇa is not the perceptual object does not prevent it from being the sensory object, and in fact it is. Dharmottara's comments that occur right before the comment in question make precisely this point. In these immediately preceding comments, Dharmottara—in his own unique way of making the point that "pratīkṣa" and "pratīyāṣṭa" each have two different senses—says that a pratīkṣa, namely pratīyāṣṭa, has two different objects. These are "the object that is to be grasped" (grāhya) and "the object that is to be delivered up" (prāpāṇya). The momentary svalaṅga, he then says, is the first of these two objects and the "enduring object" or santāna is the second. "For," he concludes, "just the santāna is the object which is to be delivered up by pratīyāṣṭa, because it is impossible to deliver up in pratīyāṣṭa a kṣaṇa."24 It is the last portion of this comment to which Stcherbatsky appeals. But the meaning of the words "it is impossible to deliver up in pratīyāṣṭa a kṣaṇa" is only that the svalaṅga, a kṣaṇa, is to fleeting to be delivered up. It is thus the sensory object and not the perceptual object.25 In saying that the svalaṅga is the "object to be apprehended" rather than the "object to be delivered up," Dharmottara is not saying that the svalaṅga is transcendental to sensation. Presumably it may be, for all we know from this particular comment. But at least the point of the comment is not that the svalaṅga is
altogether different from its sensum, as Stcherbatsky thinks.

Srinivas Shastri has pointed out that Stcherbatsky sometimes seems to admit that the point of Dharmottara's comment is only that the svalaksana is the sensory object and not the perceptual object. 26 And Stcherbatsky also sometimes says things that indicate he thinks the sensation "photographically" replicates its object. 27 Has Stcherbatsky misunderstood Kant (for which there is some evidence), thinking Kant says that the noumenon is not transcendent to the sensibility? 28 Or, and I think this is more likely, does he think that Dharmakirti differs from Kant in that the svalaksana, but not Kant's noumenon, is given in sense? 29 Then, as in Kant, the empirical object is the product of both the sensibility and the understanding. 30 This latter analysis seems to be what Mookerjee thinks Stcherbatsky (or at least Dharmakirti) means. "Like Kant the Buddhist realist thinks [of] the categories of thought and reality as a priori subjective concepts and the difference lies in the latter's insistence on the evidentiary value of sensation, in which the thing-in-itself (svalaksana) is believed to be presented in its pure and unsullied character. Kant, however, thinks that the things-in-themselves are never revealed to the mind and as such, they are bound to remain unknown and unknowable. In spite of this fundamental divergence the two schools are found to agree in the proposition that all determinate knowledge, which is knowledge in
the real sense of the term, is the result of a synthesis of an
*a priori* and an *a posteriori* element.\(^{31}\)

The *svalākṣāṇa* is transcendent then, on this account, only
in that it is never empirically experienced. The sensation is
simply too fleeting.\(^{32}\) Our experience is always of the empirical
object, which is a product of the sensibility and the understanding.\(^{33}\)

"The Buddhist Thing-in-Itself as pure sensation is a bit nearer
the empirical world than the Kantian one. Kant protested against
this half-empirical interpretation of the Thing-in-Itself which,
according to him, is transcendental. [But as] a single moment, the
Buddhist Thing can hardly be said to be empirical."\(^{34}\)

If this is the view Stcherbatsky really intended (and I
think this likely), it is a true theory at least in that only
Buddhas and other enlightened beings such as yogins are ever aware
of experiencing *kṣāṇas*.\(^{35}\) But now Stcherbatsky's view is that the
*svalākṣāṇa*, rather than being like its sensum in no respects, is
like it in virtually every respect. It, like its sensum, is a
color patch, only a nonmental one instead of a mental one. For
example, he says "Since all external objects are reducible to
sense-data, and the corresponding sensations are always confined
to a single moment, it becomes clear that all objects, so far as
they affect us, are momentary existences."\(^{36}\) There are other
passages than this one that refer to the *svalākṣāṇa* as a sense datum
or a "sensibilium."\(^{37}\)
But what of the svalaśana’s relationship to paramāṇus, the atoms of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy? Either (like Mookerjee’s theory\(^\text{38}\)) this second theory says nothing of the svalaśana’s relationship to atoms; or, since Stcherbatsky knew Dharmakīrti held an atomic theory, the theory is that the svalaśana is an aggregate of atoms.\(^\text{39}\) Stcherbatsky then fails to appreciate that the svalaśana, as an aggregate of paramāṇus, is not really a (nonmental) patch. For, as I will show in Part Three, an aggregate of atoms differs from its sensum, the (mental) patch, in what is perhaps best called "number of constituents." The sensum is numerically one thing and, Dharmakīrti insists, the aggregate of color atoms numerically many. In being different from its sensum, the (mental) patch, in this way, the svalaśana is not itself a (nonmental) patch. I will have occasion to mention this difference between the svalaśana, an aggregate, and its sensum, the patch, in considering the misconception of the svalaśana in the next chapter.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1
BL I, 85: "... The point-instant itself, the ultimate reality cut loose from all imagination is qualityless, timeless and indivisible."
BL I, 152: "... 'a bare thing, a thing devoid of all qualities.'"

2
BL I, 182: "... it has no extension in space and no duration in time; ..." (Footnotes omitted.) Also BL II, 304, fns. 465.

3
BL I, 185 (line 9).

4
BL I, 63.

5
A.K. Sarkar, "Dignāga and the Four Buddhist Schools," World Perspectives in Philosophy, Religion and Culture, ed. Ram Jee Singh (Patna, 1968), p. 344: "... the jar is not the extended body having definite colour or shape, but the efficient moment represented in the fact of pouring water, the rest is imagination. The external reality is the force which stimulates imagination, but not the extended body, stuff or matter; it is energy alone; our image is only the effect of the efficient reality. Thus the reality is dynamic; all elements of the world are forces; the forces are the unique points of efficiency-particulars; the reality refers only to a 'pure sensation', stimulating the intellect to construct an image, but it is not that constructed image. ..." (Emphasis his; footnotes and Sanskrit terms omitted.)

p. 348: "... The jar, for example, in [a] perceptual situation, as a point of pure sensation, is only an efficient moment representing the fact of pouring water, and in the aspect of its image, it is variously interpreted as having a shape, colour, etc. ..." (Emphasis his.) Cf. BL I, 510-511.

6
BL I, 127: "... there are two realities, the transcendental reality of an instant and the empirical reality of a thing of limited duration. ..."

7
BL I, 510-511.
Indeed the external world, although consisting of mere point-instants, receives coloured perceptibility through imagination, but it can offer nothing in exchange, since it consists of colourless points! . . ."

BL I,150.

BL I,190. Here Stcherbatsky is presumably using "imagination," as Kant sometimes uses "understanding," in a broad sense that includes both the sensibility and the understanding.

PV II:2bc.

BL I,185.

PVV 99.17; TB 35.3; TS:1270ab.

See, e.g., PV II:2a.

BL I,104,fn.1; BL I,182,fns.1&2; BL I,185,fns.2&3; BL II,33,fn.3; BL I,71: "... A single moment is something unique, something containing no similarity with whatsoever other objects. . . ." (Footnote omitted.)

BL I,70: "... The one reality consists of bare point-instants, they have as yet no definite position in time, neither a definite position in space, nor have they any sensible qualities. It is ultimate or pure reality. The other reality consists of objectivized images; this reality has been endowed by us with a position in time, a position in space and with all the variety of sensible and abstract qualities. It is phenomenal or empirical reality." (Footnotes omitted.)

PV II:2 and PVV on this verse.

NBTD 70.7-8.
19

PV III:82: tatraikakāryo 'neko 'pi tadākāryāntāśrayaiḥ/
ekatvenābhidhājūśnaiḥ vyavahāraḥ pratāryate/

20

TS:1016-1017.

21

TSP 399.16-20. I have here partially adopted the
translation of Ganganatha Jha, TStr., p. 546.

22

NBTD 71.3-4.

23

BL I,78,fn.2. Stcherbatsky takes kṣaṇasya prāpyitum
asākyatvāt to be kṣaṇasya jānena prāpyitum asākyatvāt, BL I,106,
fn.9: "not representable in a sensuous image" (i.e., transcendent
in a Kantian way, BL I,200,§4; also BL I,183.fn.1).

24

NBTD 71.1-4: dvividho hi viśayā pramāṇasya—grāhyas ca
yadākāram utpadyate, prāpaṇīyas ca yam adhyavasyati. anyo hi grāhya
'nyās cādhyavaseyāḥ. pratyakṣasya hi kṣaṇa eko grāhyaḥ. adhyavaseyas
tu pratyakṣabalamānena niścayena saṁtāna eva. saṁtāna eva ca
pratyakṣasya prāpaṇīyaḥ. kṣaṇasya prāpyitum asākyatvāt.

25

See TB 3.6-10 and 4.1.

26

Shrinivas Shastri, "The Conception of External Object in
the School of Dignaga," Darsana, XVIII (1965), 96. See BL I,201,fn.2;
BL I,211,fn.4; BL I,181,fn.9. And see BL II 34(lines 11-14); also
BL II,33,fn.3.

27

BL I,446(line 16); BL I,510(lines 13-15); BL I,154
(lines 17-19).

28

BL I,201(lines 8-11). See also BL I,200,§3; BL I,179,
last lines.

29

BL I,202: "The Buddhist Thing-in-Itself as pure sensation
is a bit nearer the empirical world than the Kantian one. Kant
protested against this half-empirical interpretation of the Thing-in-Itself which, according to him, is transcendental. . . ."

30

BL I, 73: "... In every cognition there is a sensible core and an image constructed by the intellect, one part is sensible, the other is intelligible. The thing itself is cognized by the senses, its relations and characteristics are constructed by imagination which is a function of the intellect. The senses cognize only the bare thing, the thing itself, exclusive of all its relations and general characteristics. . . ."

31

Mookerjee, pp. xlvi-xlvii.

32

BL I, 209: "... a single moment is always transcendental, it cannot be represented in an image, . . ." BL I, 175-176: "... Pure sensation in the ordinary run has no duration, i.e., it lasts for one moment only and is therefore empirically uncognizable and unutterable, unutterability is its characteristic mark. We therefore have called it the transcendental element of our knowledge, . . ."

33

BL I, 154: "... But we cognize only the first moment of a thing directly, the operations of our intellect which thereupon constructs the image of the object are subjective. . . ."

34

BL I, 202.

35

PV II: 107; HBT, p. 37; TSP 302.6-7.

36

BL I, 87.

37

BL I, 68; BL I, 79.

38

Philosophy of Universal Flux.

39

BL I, 190-192. This section discusses the relationship of svalaksana to paramanu but so unclearly as to leave the matter in doubt. The opening sentence suggests that the svalaksana is a single atom: "Since the ultimate particular is thus an infinitesimal external
reality, how is it related to the atom which is also an infinitesimal external reality?" But how then can a single svalaksana generate the cognition of, say, a fire, BL I,189-190? Or a cow, BL I,193: "...The conception of a cow is understood as the judgment 'this is a cow'. In this judgment the essence of affirmation consists in the presence of a visual sensation produced by a point-instant of external reality, this sensation stimulates the intellect for the synthetic construction of a cow..." (Emphasis mine.)
Chapter 6

THE SVALAKŚANA AS A SINGLE PARAMĀNU

There is yet another theory that the svalakśana is not an aggregate of paramāṇus suggested in Buddhist Logic. This theory is the one finding favor with scholars influenced by Stcherbatsky such as Dharmendra Nath Shastri. It is that the svalakśana is a single atom, one member in the aggregate that I say is collectively the svalakśana.

On this view many svalakśanas, not one, are the object of sense. And the svalakśanas are exactly reproduced in sensation, as many "atomic" sensations. They are still transcendent in the sense of being too fleeting to be empirically experienced.

There are two possible versions of this thesis, and Stcherbatsky sometimes suggests the one and sometimes the other. The first is that the many svalakśanas are sensed simultaneously in many "atomic" sensations. The color patch in a case of visual perception is then a mental synthesis of many "atomic" sensations. The second version, less obvious, is that the many svalakśanas are sensed consecutively, one at a time. The patch is then the result of the mind first remembering all the previous "atomic" sensations at the time when the last atom is sensed and then synthesizing these remembered sensations with the one present sensation into what is (ostensibly) the sensation of a single,
solid patch.

Why does Stcherbatsky think that the **svalakṣaṇa** is an individual atom in the aggregate instead of the entire aggregate? In effect, his reason seems to be that he thinks that the aggregate is a universal. He thinks that it is a universal because he thinks that an aggregate of atoms constitutes a (nonmental) patch and that a patch is a universal. Because the **svalakṣaṇa**, a particular, is not a universal, it is therefore not the patch (i.e., an aggregate of **paramāṇus**). This reasoning is important because it is Dharma-kīrti's reason why an aggregate of atoms is not a patch. The **svalakṣaṇa**, an aggregate, is not a universal because, although a patch is a universal, an aggregate (i.e., the **svalakṣaṇa**) is not a patch.

Thinking that an aggregate is a patch, Stcherbatsky's argument that a patch is a universal is, reconstructed, that it is a "oneness" among many particulars. It is some one thing unifying the many atoms. But this is the nature of a universal. "Cowness" is an identity among different cows. "Substance" is a substrate unifying many different sensibilia (a color expanse, a tactile expanse, etc.). And the "enduring object" (**santāna**) is a unity among many momentary kṣaṇas. These things are universals because they are synthetic principles unifying many distinct particulars. The aggregate, i.e., a patch, being a synthetic principle among many atoms, is thus also a universal.

Stcherbatsky actually states his whole argument as follows.
He first points out that there is a dispute between Dharmakīrti and the Hindu Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas over the issue of the nature of parts (avayava) and wholes (avayavin). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, as extreme realists, believe that parts and wholes are ontologically distinct. They are altogether two different entities, even if causally related. In the case of a pot, for example, the pot and the atoms comprising it are two different things. Although the pot will not come into being without its atoms conjoining in a certain way, the pot which the conjoined atoms bring into being is ontologically independent of the atoms, related to them by the relation of inherence (samavāya). Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, Stcherbatsky insists, denies the reality of a whole over and above its parts. This whole is only conceptual in character. It is really but another universal, i.e., another instance of many things allegedly sharing some one thing in common. After mentioning this dispute Stcherbatsky, thinking that the aggregate is a patch, effectively identifies this patch with a whole. Because the patch (the aggregate) is a whole and the whole is conceptual in character, he concludes, the svalaṅkṣopa is not the patch (i.e., the aggregate of atoms) but is instead each individual atom.

According to the [Hindu] Realists, empirical things have a limited real duration. They are produced by the creative power of nature or by human will or by the will of God out of atoms. The atoms combine and form real new unities. These created real unities reside, or inhere, in their causa materialis, i.e., in the atoms. Thus we have one real thing simultaneously residing in a multitude of atoms, i.e., in many places.
This is impossible. Either the created unity is a fiction and real are only the parts, or the parts are fictions and real is only the ultimate whole. For the Buddhists the parts alone are real; the whole is a fiction, for were it a reality, it would be a reality residing at once in many places, i.e., a reality at once residing and not residing in a given place.8

The extended body being thus a fiction, there is no other issue left than to admit the ultimate reality of the point-instant [= atom, svalaksana].9

This sort of thinking involves a confusion. The aggregate, if it is a patch, cannot be a patch over and above itself as atoms; it can only be a patch that is atoms. Thus even if it is a patch, it is not a universal that is a whole. Is it still even a universal? Dharmakīrti seems to think it is; even if it is not an independent unity residing in many parts, it is still a unity of parts, which also perfectly describes a universal. Thus Dharmakīrti, although not in any danger of the aggregate being a whole if it is a patch, still insists that the aggregate is in fact not the patch.

However, a similar line of argument, together with an insistence that the patch is in danger of being a whole, provides the inspiration for Dharmakīrti to say that the aggregate is not a patch.

For example, the following argument appears in Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika on Gautama's Nyāyasūtras. It tries to convince Dharmakīrti10 that the sensory object is a whole on the basis of what we experience. The argument is that since when we sense something, it comes in the form of a numerically single thing, i.e., a patch, and not a plurality of color atoms, what we sense is then
a whole and not a multitude of atoms.

In regards to a cognition of the sort "This is one single thing," [we ask you Buddhists] whether this [cognition reveals] one object or many. If you say many, that is impossible, because there is no [unitary cognition] in respect to many things. The cognition "This is one" is not possible in respect to a multitude. And if [you say] one thing, then this one object of the cognition is a whole.  

Dharmakīrti's reply, as we will see in Part Three, is to insist that we are only indirectly aware of the object. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas think we are directly aware of it, which is why they argue—thinking also that a thing cannot be other than it appears—that if the object presents itself as a single thing and not a multitude, it must be a single thing as it appears, i.e., a whole. But Dharmakīrti insists that we are in only indirect contact with the object. Its sensum is a patch, which explains the facts of our experience. One experiences a patch, even though, Dharmakīrti then argues, the sensory object is not a whole because the patch is the way that the sensory object is represented in our cognitions. This sensory object is an aggregate. It is an aggregate that is not a patch (i.e., a whole), which is why this sensory object is not a universal. The sensory object (i.e., svaḷaksana) is an aggregate that is not a patch; and because it is an aggregate that is not a patch, it is not a universal, even though the patch that we experience is a universal.

Stcherbatsky's reasoning is wrong, then, only in the assumption that the aggregate is a patch; for a similar line of reasoning
in the hands of Dharmakīrti's opponents is why Dharmakīrti argues that an aggregate is in fact not a patch. Only because an aggregate is not a patch is the svalākṣaṇa, an aggregate, not a universal.

I would now like to turn to Dharmakīrti's actual words on the relationship between the sensory object (svalākṣaṇa) and atoms (paramāṇus). Before closing this chapter, however, I would like to make a final point about the "single atom" theory.

I mentioned that there are two possible versions of this thesis, one being that the many atoms (svalākṣaṇas) in the aggregate are sensed not simultaneously but one at a time, the other version being that they are sensed simultaneously. In the first case the patch is then the product of the mind first remembering all previous sensations and synthesizing these remembered sensations with the present one at the time the last atom is sensed. Why does Stcherbatsky maintain (if he does) this first thesis rather than the more obvious one that all the atoms are sensed simultaneously? The reason seems to be that then spatial extension—the "solid" spatial extension of the patch—is on a parallel with temporal duration—the patch's seeming continued and uninterrupted existence. For just as the fleeting kṣanas are sensed individually and sequentially and the (seeming) continuant, the "enduring object," is the result of memory and synthesis, so too then are the minute atoms sensed individually and sequentially and the (seeming) continuous patch
the result of memory and synthesis. The view has the advantage that memory continues to play an important role in the mental operation in perception. So important is memory to this mental operation (kalpanā*) that sometimes the mental operation is defined in terms of it, to the extent that a cognitive operation that does not involve memory is not kalpanā* precisely on that account. The disadvantage of the view, in addition to clear statements that the sensory object is an aggregate of paramāṇus, are clear statements that the sensory object is an aggregate of paramāṇus because atoms are simply too small to be individually sensed.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1
Shastri's indebtedness to Stcherbatsky is acknowledged in his book Critique of Indian Realism and his article "Contribution of Th. Stcherbatsky to Indian Philosophy," The Modern Review (February, 1953), 117.

2
The following quotes evidence that Stcherbatsky thinks that the svalaksana is a single paramāṇu. (I have omitted footnotes and made minor corrections in spelling and grammar to facilitate reading.)
"Since the ultimate particular [= svalaksana, BL I,184,fn.7] is thus an infinitesimal external reality, how is it related to the atom which is also an infinitesimal external reality?..." BL I,190.
"... That the composite must necessarily consist of simple parts [nonextended atoms, BL I,514], is proved by the following consideration. Supposing we remove all composition in taking from a compound all parts one by one until the uncompound remains. This uncompound residue will be partyless, indivisible. However it also will be unextended; like an instantaneous mental object it will be a point-instant [= svalaksana, BL I,182 et passim], like a momentary feeling; and therefore it will be a mere idea." BL I,514.
"... Either the created unity is a fiction and real are only the parts, or the parts are fictions and real is only the ultimate whole. For the Buddhists the parts alone are real; the whole is a fiction, for were it a reality, it would be a reality residing at once in many places, i.e., a reality at once residing and not residing in a given place." BL I,86.
"... Ultimate reality [= paramārtha-nātha, BL I,105,fn.2] is non-constructed, non-imagined, non-related reality, the thing as it strictly is in itself, it is the mathematical point-instant." BL I,105. ["... the atoms are... simple dimensionless mathematical points..." "Scientific Achievements of Ancient India," trans. Harish C. Gupta, Indian Studies Past and Present, X, No. 4 (1969),321.]
"Thus it is that ultimate reality for the Buddhist is timeless, spaceless and motionless. But it is timeless not in the sense of an eternal being, spaceless not in the sense of an ubiquitous being, motionless not in the sense of an all-embracing motionless whole, but it is timeless, spaceless and motionless in the sense of having no duration, no extension and no movement, it is a mathematical point-instant, the moment of an action's efficiency." BL I,87.
"... that blue which represents the atom (the underlying point-instant) which is capable of being efficient (is the real
object); . . ." BL II,35,fn.2. [sva-laksana = point-instant, BL I, 182,#5.]

"Both [the Sāṁkhya and the Buddhists] share in common a
tendency to push the analysis of Existence up to its minutest, last
elements which are imagined as absolute qualities, or things
possessing only one unique quality. They are called 'qualities'
(gūṇa-dharma) in both systems in the sense of absolute qualities, a
kind of atomic, or intra-atomic, energies of which the empirical things
are composed. . . ." BL I,19.

"A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire. Its presence is
physically efficient and it calls up a vivid image, an image whose
degree of vividness changes in direct ratio to the nearness or
remoteness of the physical fire. Even reduced to the shape of a
remote point-instant of light, . . . " BL I,69. (Emphasis mine.)

The following, all taken from Critique of Indian Realism, show that
the sva-laksana is a single atom for Dharmendra Nath Shastri.

"... The Buddhists hold that qualities like colour, touch,
etc., are atom-like point-instants (kṣanas), or unique particulars
(sva-laksanas) . . ." p. 137.

"As already stated, the Buddhist splits reality into discrete
and disconnected moments or point-instants called kṣanas, the ultimate
reals. Atom, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika also, is a mere point
which has no extension in space, but speaking in terms of time, it is
just the opposite of the Buddhist point-instant. Not merely has it a
duration but [it] is also eternal." p. 164.

"... It is thus obvious that the conception of the Buddhist
kṣana is different from that of the atom. But owing to their obvious
similarity in being the smallest fragments of reality, the Buddhist
kṣana is often spoken of as an atom (paramāṇu). For instance, both
Śrībhāra and Vācaspatimīśra refer to 'colour', etc. (kṣanas of the
Buddhist theory), as paramāṇu. . . ." p. 165.

3

BL I,213: "... The point-instant of reality receives in
such a judgment its place in a corresponding temporal series of point-
instants, it becomes installed in concrete time and becomes a part of
an object having duration. Owing to a special synthesis of consecutive
point-instants it becomes an extended body . . . ." (Footnotes
omitted.)

BL I,84: "The theory of Universal Momentariness implies that
every duration in time consists of point-instants following one
another, every extension in space consists of point-instants arising
in contiguity and simultaneously, . . ."

Shastri, [2], . . 3: "... A pure sensation (pratyakṣa or
grahāṇa), that grasps the transcendent reality as it is in the form of
unique particulars (sva-laksanas), . . ."
Shastri, [2], p. 3: "... The extension of an object means imagining a 'whole' (avayavin) or a substance which is common to all its parts, i.e., many reals (sva-laksanas) which are contiguous. ..."

Shastri, [2], p. 188: "... When we conceive these moments or point-instants as arising in succession, one after another, we construct the idea of duration or time. On the other hand, when we think of these point-instants as arising in contiguity with one another, we construct the idea of space. ..."

4

The evidence for this would be the many comments throughout BL that the svalakṣaṇa is captured in sensation, e.g., BL I,446 (line 16); BL I,510 (lines 13-15); BL I,154 (lines 17-19). Also:

"... Reality does not consist of extended and perdurable bodies, but of point-instants picked up in momentary sensations and constituting a string of events. Our reason then by a process of synthesis, so to speak, computes these moments and produces an integrated image, which is nothing but an imagined mental computation. ..." BL, I,187.

5

Shastri, [2], p. 308: "... The indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) perception, however, in which, according to the Buddhist, only particulars (sva-laksanas) are apprehended, is a true perception. Of course, we are never conscious of the nirvikalpaka perception in terms of thought, but it is a necessary precedent of the determinate perception. ..."

6

BL I,84: "The theory of Universal Momentariness implies that every duration in time consists of point-instants following one another, every extension in space consists of point-instants arising in contiguity and simultaneously, ..."

7

BL I,213: "... The point-instant of reality receives in such a judgment its place in a corresponding temporal series of point-instants, it becomes installed in concrete time and becomes a part of an object having duration. Owing to a special synthesis of consecutive point-instants it becomes an extended body ..." (Footnotes omitted.)

8

BL I,86. Reproduced without footnotes and with minor corrections in punctuation and grammar to facilitate reading.

9

BL I,107. Reproduced without the footnote.
The *Nyāyavārttika* was written in response to Dignāga, but Dharmakīrti replies to it.

**NV 241.18-22.**

Stcherbatsky's interest in getting the case of spatial extension parallel to the case of temporal duration can be seen in such comments as:

"... Either the created unity is a fiction and real are only the parts, or the parts are fictions and real is only the ultimate whole. For the Buddhists the parts alone are real; the whole is a fiction, for were it a reality, it would be a reality residing at once in many places, i.e., a reality at once residing and not residing in a given place.

By similar considerations it is proved that a thing can have no duration. . . ." *BL*, I, 86. (Footnotes omitted and punctuation and grammar corrected.)

"... Since an extended body involves position in at least two points of space, extension is not something ultimately real, in every point the thing is ultimately another thing. The same applies to time. The same thing cannot really exist in two different moments, in every instant it is a different thing. . . ." *BL* I, 105. (Footnote omitted.)

"... The perception of every extended body is a sense-illusion, because 'extension is never a simple reflex.' The duration of a thing will likewise be an illusion, because only instantaneous reality corresponds to a simple reflex. . . ." *BL* I, 157. (Footnote omitted.)

"... Just as the mathematician constructs his velocities out of differentials, so does the human mind, a natural mathematician, construct duration out of momentary sensations.

That space likewise contains no other ultimate reality than the momentary sensation has already been pointed out. Dharmakīrti says: 'an extended form exists in the (real) object not (more) than in its idea. To admit that (the extended body) exists in one (unextended atom) would be a contradiction, and to admit that (the same extended body being one) is present in many (atoms) is an impossibility'. The extended body being thus a fiction, there is no other issue left than to admit the ultimate reality of the point-instant." *BL* I, 107 (Footnotes omitted.)

**PVB 280.13-17.**

E.g., *PVV* 159.22-23: na hi pratyekam api avata dṛṣṭāḥ, kin tu sahitā eva.
PART THREE

THE SVALAKṣANA'S RELATIONSHIP TO PĀRAMĀṆUS
INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE

In this part I will prove that the svalaksana or sensory object is an aggregate of paramanus, the atoms of Dharmakirti's system. And I will show that this svalaksana is different from its sensum, a patch, in what I will call "number of constituents." Specifically, the sensum, a patch, is numerically one thing that is not a unity of parts, but the svalaksana is numerically one thing in being many things taken collectively. Otherwise the sensum exactly reproduces the svalaksana: the color of the atoms is imparted to the sensum, the number of atoms determines its size, and their disposition determines its shape.

Dharmakirti insists on the difference between the svalaksana and its sensum in order that the svalaksana not be itself a patch. For if it is a patch, it is a "unity amid diversity," a oneness unifying many separate things. But this is the perfect characterization of a universal; so the svalaksana, in order not to be a universal, is not a patch. I mentioned this in the last chapter and we will see it confirmed in what follows.

The most important discussion of the svalaksana's relationship to paramanus or atoms occurs in the Pratyaksa chapter of the Pramanavarttika. There is a short discussion in the Pramanasiddhi chapter, but it makes more or less the same points; and because it
does, I will concentrate on the much longer discussion in the Pratyakṣa chapter and fit in the points of the shorter discussion where they are appropriate. It is not important to take the discussions in order, as there is no progressive development of thought from chapter to chapter in the Pramāṇavārttika; rather the same subjects are treated again and again with different degrees of depth and emphasis. The order of the chapters, in fact, is in question.¹
NOTE TO INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE

1

Chapter 7

THE PRAMĀṆAVARTTIKA, PRATYAKṢA CHAPTER, VERSES 194-207

It can be seen from the very first verse of this section that the svalaṅkṣapa is an aggregate of paramāṇus. Discussing the verse and Manorathanandin’s comment on it for a moment before quoting either, the verse contains an objection against Dharmakīrti by an opponent who is likely a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The objection is, in effect: How for Dharmakīrti can a cognition that takes an aggregate of atoms for its object be a sensory cognition rather than a conceptual one? For, the objection continues, an aggregate of atoms is a universal, and the cognition of a universal is always a conceptual cognition. The objection indicates that for Dharmakīrti the sensory object (svalaṅkṣapa) is an aggregate, for this is presupposed in the opponent wondering how a cognition that takes an aggregate for its object can for Dharmakīrti then be sensory.

The opponent supplies as proof that an aggregate of atoms is a universal Buddhist statements to this effect. At least Manorathanandin, Dharmakīrti’s commentator, represents this as the evidence to which the opponent appeals.

[AN OBJECTOR SAYS:] AN AGGREGATE (SAṆCITA) IS AN ASSEMBLAGE (SAMUDĀYA) AND THAT IS A UNIVERSAL (SAMĀNYA). THUS A SENSE COGNITION, SINCE IT IS THE COGNITION OF A UNIVERSAL, MUST INVOLVE CONCEPTUALIZATION. (verse 194)
Objector: A leader of your school [Vasubandhu] has said, "The five sense faculties take as their object an aggregate (sāncita)." And it is also said [by Dignāga] that "In respect to their objects, [the sense faculties] range over universals, because [the sense cognition] is produced from many things." And in like manner it is said [by Dharmākīrti] that AN AGGREGATE (sāncita) IS AN ASSEMBLAGE (samudāya) of atoms. And THAT IS known to be A UNIVERSAL. THUS A SENSE COGNITION is produced from a universal. AND A COGNITION OF A UNIVERSAL MUST INVOLVE or be mixed with CONCEPTUALIZATION. Thus how can it be said that sense cognition is without conceptualization? 1

There is a deeper reason, however, why the opponent thinks the aggregate is a universal, intimated in the verse by calling an aggregate (sāncita) an assemblage (samudāya). From Prajñākaragupta's commentary we learn that an assemblage (samudāya) is in effect a patch, either a whole over and above its parts or a unity of parts. 2 The opponent is really bothered by how the object, if it is an aggregate of atoms, still presents itself as a patch. It is the same problem we saw in the last chapter (pp. 189-190) bothering Uddyotakara. The object, if it presents itself as a patch, ought to be a patch as it appears. But then this object is a whole, or if not a whole, it is at least a unity amid a diversity of atomic parts. But this perfectly describes a universal. As Prajñākaragupta, who is clearly worried about it being a unity of parts even if not so worried about it being a whole, says: "The form [of the patch] appears, the form of the [atoms] being suppressed. And this form also [as much as that of a whole over and above its parts] is merely a superimposition, because no object of that sort exists. So how can [you Buddhists
say that] the object is not a conceptual one [i.e., a universal]?"\(^3\)

What is really bothering the opponent is why the object of what the Buddhists allege is a sense cognition is not a universal because, although a "multiplicity," it presents itself as some one thing, i.e., a patch.

We can see from Prajañākaragupta's comment that the patch is not a reality for the Buddhists; for, on Buddhists assumptions as is known from context, he says of the (nonmental) patch that "no object of that sort exists."

Dharmakīrti no more than hints at a reply to the objection himself, leaving the answer largely to his commentators. Manorathananandin's reply, which he gives only later in his comments on verse 196, is that Buddhists sometimes do indeed say that the aggregate of atoms is a universal. But by "universal," they do not mean a universal of the sort that interests the opponent. They do not mean some one thing such as a whole or a patch. The Buddhists mean only something that is nothing but the parts, i.e., a plurality that retains its plurality. Manorathananandin seems to be saying that the Buddhists call the aggregate a "universal" to emphasize that it is a plurality of parts. The reply to the objection is that since the Buddhists mean by "universal" something other than what the opponent means, there is no substance to the opponent's objection that the cognition that takes an aggregate as its object must be a conceptual cognition simply because the Buddhists call the aggregate
a "universal." The Buddhists are using "universal" in their sense of the word.

To quote Manorathanandin's reply, abstracted from his comments on verse 196 and containing the relevant parts of that verse (in capitals):

THUS BECAUSE [A COGNITION] IS NEVER TIED TO A SINGLE [ATOM], A COGNITION IS SAID by the Buddhist authorities TO HAVE A UNIVERSAL AS ITS OBJECT, that is, to have as its object an agglomerate (samghāta) that is many atoms aggregated (saṅcita) but that is not an object amounting to a universal different from the atoms. Thus why do you [the opponent] claim that [this cognition] involves conceptualization simply because it has a universal as its object?4

It can be seen that Manorathanandin is primarily worried about showing that the aggregate of atoms is not a universal that is a whole. He is possibly not as concerned as is Prajñākaragupta—or at least not as obvious in his concern as is Prajñākaragupta—that the aggregate is also not a universal that is a simple unity of parts (and not a unity different from its parts).5

This answer, although it might satisfactorily address the voiced reason why the opponent thinks the aggregate is a universal, does not address the unspoken reason, namely, that the aggregate presents itself as a universal (i.e., a patch) and not a multiplicity.6

Prajñākaragupta's answer speaks more to this point. He compares the case of atoms to the case of the hairs of a horse's tail when seen from a distance. Just as the hairs are not seen individually but as a single, solid mass, so too are the atoms
seen not as a multiplicity but as a single, visually continuous
patch. "Should it be asked why the [atoms] do not appear [individu-
ally] when they are in fact separate from each other, [we reply:]
is it not true that hairs, etc., which do not join together [to
form one thing], from a distance present themselves as if not so
unconjoined?" This is the beginnings of the answer that the
aggregate, not a patch, is indirectly perceived in a sensum that is
a patch—except that here the theory seems to be more a theory of
appearing than a theory of indirect perception.

This reply seems to be basically the same as the one given
by Dharmakirti's predecessor, Vasubandhu. In answer to the question
of how many things, if they do not form some one thing, can produce
some single effect as if they did, Vasubandhu replies that "things
become causes individually when they are assembled." Yaśomitra
illustrates this comment with examples that show how atoms can
generate a perception without forming one thing. "[The case of atoms
is] as the case where, in hauling a log, many men who have not yet
[assembled and begun] hauling do not individually have the capacity
[to haul the log], but who do have that capacity when they assemble
and rely on one another. Or [it is] as when separate hairs are not
able to generate a visual cognition [for someone with] weak eyesight,
but they are able to do so when they are combined, even though they
are not united [into some one thing]." The atoms, working together
like the men with the log or the separate hairs, are each able to
jointly produce the perception of the patch without forming some one thing in the same way that the assembled men can pull the log, and the aggregated hairs produce the perception, without forming some one thing.

At another place than in connection with the verses being discussed, Prajñākaraguṇḍa gives further examples that illustrate his contention that many individual entities, while remaining many and individual, can produce some one effect. "Such things as hairs, mosquitoes, gnats, etc., produce a cognition with a single, solid image, even though [the things in each case] remain in their respective places [and do not merge into some one thing]." At one place Prajñākaraguṇḍa makes, once again in respect to the hairs: "We find no difficulty with the view that just as hairs at a distance have the appearance of a [single] solid configuration even though they are not conjoined [into some composite], so also with the atoms." Obviously the Buddhists do not think hairs or atoms (or mosquitoes, etc.) add up to a single thing just because they generate a patch, and their explanation of how this is possible is that the many things appear differently than what they really are.

As I said earlier, this is more a theory of appearing than a theory of the object being indirectly perceived. It remains sounding like a theory of appearing until much later verses. Dharmakīrtī might actually have settled for a theory of appearing
had not he believed that everything is momentary (kṣanika). This theory of momentariness led him to his indirect theory of perception. For he faced from his opponents the following objection. If everything is momentary, how can anything be perceived? For the perception of something requires that it persist at least two moments, one to cause the perception and one to be the object of it. In response to this objection Dharmakīrti held (however unsatisfactorily) that the object, existing only a moment, gives rise to a sensation in the next moment that bears its imprint. Sensing is then really awareness of this imprint rather than of the object itself. Obligated in this way by his theory of momentariness to a representative theory of perception, Dharmakīrti could not settle for a simple theory of appearing, one which recognized that a thing sometimes appears differently than it is, relative to conditions. Instead he held that the object is not directly perceived at all, and that the sensum through which it is indirectly perceived is in fact not altogether an accurate representation.

However, as I said he talks as if he did hold a theory of appearing and only in later verses indicates otherwise. He does so, I believe, for a reason that has to do with his interests as a Yogācārin. I pointed out in the Introduction (p. 14) that Dharmakīrti is a Yogācārin ultimately if a Sautrāntika provisionally. The Yogācārin in him does not believe in the existence of external objects. Dharmakīrti speaks as if he held a theory of appearing,
I believe, in order to be able to first make the point as a Yogācārīn that from the ultimate point of view there is no object at all before making the point as a Sautrāntika that, provisionally assuming such an object, this object is not directly but indirectly perceived. I will leave this point for further discussion when I turn to the verses where Dharmakīrti actually starts speaking like a Yogācārīn (PV II:211ff.).

In the two verses that follow verse 194, Dharmakīrti addresses yet another objection that the sensory object cannot be an aggregate, further confirming that in his opinion it is. The objection, only implied and not stated, is that the sensory object cannot be an aggregate of atoms because atoms are imperceptible.

On the surface of it this objection seems simple enough: it is the same objection that we simply do not see the individual atoms as atoms. Dharmakīrti's reply, also simple enough on the surface of it, is that atoms that are individually imperceptible are perceptible in aggregates. Prajñākaragupta then tells us, with his example of the hairs, that atoms in aggregation are perceived as a group, e.g., as a tail (and not as individual atoms).

Assuming for the moment that the objection and reply are just what they seem, verse 195 makes the point that atoms that are individually imperceptible are perceptible in aggregates by speaking
of aggregated atoms as "different" from unaggregated ones. Specifically, the verse first speaks of unaggregated atoms combining, and then of the aggregated atoms that result from their combining being "different" from the unaggregated ones, concluding that only the aggregated atoms are the object of cognition.

**THOSE DIFFERENT ATOMS THAT ARE PRODUCED FROM THE COMBINING OF OTHER THINGS ARE CALLED AGGREGATED (SAṆCITA). JUST THEY ARE SAID TO BE THE OCCASION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF A COGNITION. (verse 195)**

**THOSE ATOMS that ARE CALLED AGGREGATED (SAṆCITA) in the words "The five sense faculties take as their object an aggregate (saṆcita)" are those THAT ARE PRODUCED FROM THE COMBINING OF OTHER THINGS, i.e., other atoms, and that are DIFFERENT from these earlier [atoms] in closest [temporal] proximity that cause [the later ones] by coming together in a particular sort of proximity. JUST THEY, those very [atoms], ARE SAID TO BE THE OCCASION FOR THE PRODUCTION OF A COGNITION in such comments as "[the sense cognition] is produced from many things."**

The commentary is so obscure because it states the point of the verse taking into account Dharmakīrti's theory of momentariness. Because of this theory, it is not really the **same** atoms aggregated that are initially unaggregated; for the atoms do not exist long enough to go from being unaggregated to being aggregated. Thus the commentary speaks of an "earlier" set of atoms which by their coming together produce a later, "different" set, this later set being the aggregated ones that generate the cognition.

The second verse simply states that only atoms in company with other atoms generate a perception, the commentary (Manorathānandin's) stating that a single atom all by itself is indeed
imperceptible. Manorathanandin's answer to verse 194 is included in these comments on verse 196.

AND ATOMS HAVE NO SPECIAL QUALITY WITHOUT OTHER ATOMS. THUS BECAUSE [A COGNITION] IS NEVER TIED TO A SINGLE [ATOM], A COGNITION IS SAID TO HAVE A UNIVERSAL AS ITS OBJECT. (verse 196)

AND ATOMS HAVE NO SPECIAL QUALITY, namely, the capacity to produce a cognition, WITHOUT OTHER ATOMS which exist contiguously [with them]. Indeed, separate atoms cannot be seen but only aggregated (saṃcita) ones. THUS BECAUSE [A COGNITION] IS NEVER TIED TO A SINGLE [ATOM], A COGNITION IS SAID by the Buddhist authorities TO HAVE A UNIVERSAL AS ITS OBJECT, that is, to have as its object an agglomerate (saṃghāta) that is many atoms aggregated (saṃcita) but that is not an object amounting to a universal different from the atoms. Thus why do you claim that [the cognition] involves conceptualization simply because it has a universal as its object?¹⁵

There is reason to go beyond just this obvious interpretation and see the verses as saying something more. For according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika literature, the objector Dharmakīrti is replying to is a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.¹⁶ And for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the imperceptibility of the atoms is an in principle imperceptibility.¹⁷

This changes the whole character of the objection. The objection is not just that in seeing a patch one does not see individual atoms (i.e., see each atom individually); the objection is that we cannot be seeing atoms at all, as atoms or as a patch, for the atoms cannot be seen in any form whatsoever. They are in principle imperceptible, not just in fact too small to see individually; so the sensory object cannot be an aggregate of atoms.
It is worth discussing this point in more detail before again considering the verses.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas held that the atom is of a certain magnitude or dimension called pārimāṇḍalya. This is a dimension or magnitude too small to have any finite extension. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika atom is like Leibnitz’s "infinitesimal": something having positive magnitude and not just spatial location, but a magnitude smaller than any assignable quantity. Atoms have this dimension because they are the end product of a process of division, both actual and theoretical. They are that which cannot in either fact or principle be further divided. For they have no parts, having infinitesimal extension.

But because they are infinitely small, they are in principle imperceptible as well as in principle indivisible. This then leads to the objection that (according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas at least) Dharmakīrti is addressing in his verses. The sensory object cannot be an aggregate of atoms because each atom is in principle imperceptible. And an aggregate of in principle imperceptible components is as in principle imperceptible as these components.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, as they represent themselves, put the problem to Dharmakīrti in the following way. For him the sensory object is not a whole over and above its parts but just the parts, i.e., the imperceptible atoms. But, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas argue, the atoms are imperceptible and the aggregate is nothing more than the atoms, then the aggregate too is imperceptible. Many in
principle imperceptible things are no more perceptible than one in principle imperceptible thing. No number of things, each of which is infinitely small, can come together and produce something finitely extended, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas; hence no number of atoms can result in something perceptible. How then can Dharmakīrti say that the sensory object is an aggregate?²⁰

By way of escaping the objection themselves, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas offer their doctrine of the whole (avayavī). Because this whole is an entity distinct from its parts, it can and does have properties that are different from the properties of its parts. Specifically, the parts are nonextended and in principle imperceptible and the whole is extended and perceptible.²¹

There are very specific stages by which the extended and perceptible things of the world are built up out of the nonextended and imperceptible atoms. First, two atoms come together and conjoin (sanyoga). A whole called a dvayuṣka, still imperceptible and non-extended but at least having parts, comes to inhere (samavāya) in them. Then three of these dvayukas, serving as parts for an even larger whole, conjoin. A whole called a tryaṇuka comes to inhere in them. The tryaṇuka is both extended and perceptible; it possesses what the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas call "perceptible measure" (mahattva).²² It is the smallest perceptible particle of matter. The larger items of our world are composed of various numbers and dispositions of tryaṇukas.²³
Dharmakīrti does not say enough about the nature of the atom for it to be clear whether or not he concurs with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas that the atoms is of infinitesimal dimension. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas clearly think that he does. However, they might simply have attributed to him one of their own tenets in the course of enthusiastic but unfair criticism.

If Dharmakīrti does not agree with them on this point, then the verses say no more than the obvious interpretation. Atoms are simply too small to see in anything but numbers; and in numbers, as Prajñākaraṇagupta makes clear, they are seen only as a group and not as many individual atoms. But if Dharmakīrti does agree that the atom is an infinitesimal, the verses say considerably more.

What they say is that atoms are in principle imperceptible only when taken alone. Aggregated, they are in principle perceptible. When they go from being unaggregated to being aggregated, they undergo a quantum change in character. Rather than all of them going from being in fact too small to see when unaggregated to being perceptible as a group when aggregated, they each go from being in principle imperceptible to being in principle perceptible, even if they still remain when aggregated perceived only as a group. What the verses say is that each atom alone is in principle imperceptible as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas claim. But there is no problem with aggregates of them being perceptible (as groups and not as individual atoms) because each atom, when it aggregates with others, becomes in principle
perceptible. As Manorathanandin says later, in a comment that is not unambiguous but which could easily suggest this last interpretation: "For our atoms are not of one, unchanging nature like the atoms of others; indeed, being beyond the senses [individually], they are also sensible under the condition [that they aggregate]."\textsuperscript{24} The fact that the atoms of the Buddhists undergo a change that the atoms of others (e.g., the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas) do not suggests that the change is a quantum change from in principle imperceptibility to in principle perceptibility.

The obvious objection to such a theory, of course, is that aggregation does nothing to change the size of the atoms. Aggregated or not, each atom is still of infinitesimal (pārimāṇḍalya) magnitude. And if this was sufficient to make the atoms in principle imperceptible before they aggregated, logic would dictate that it is sufficient to make them in principle imperceptible after they aggregate.

If Dharmakīrti does indeed believe that atoms are of pārimāṇḍalya dimension, I do not think he can escape this objection. Prajñākaragupta seems to be attempting an escape with his comments on verse 223, which suggests that Dharmakīrti did in fact hold such a theory.\textsuperscript{25} If Prajñākaragupta is saying what I think he is saying, he attempts to escape the objection by claiming that, after all, finite magnitude is not necessary for perceptibility. It is not the fact that the atoms are pārimāṇḍalya that makes them in
principle imperceptible. Before they aggregate, they are in principle imperceptible but not because they are infinitely small (parimāndalya). After they aggregate they are in principle perceptible—although still infinitely small. I see no reason for thinking this is Dharmakīrti’s view, even if he does think that atoms are infinitely small, other than that Prabhākaragupta suggests it. But Prabhākaragupta is obviously under pressure to escape the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika objection; that makes his answer suspect, particularly considering the unreasonableness of his answer and the fact that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas do insist that Dharmakīrti believes finite magnitude is necessary for perceptibility. I suspect that Dharmakīrti, if he did believe the atom was infinitely small, simply did not develop his atomic theory well enough or far enough to escape the difficulties attending the idea that aggregation alone makes infinitely small atoms go from in principle imperceptibility to in principle perceptibility. Either that or he did develop his theory well enough and far enough, and his view escaped Prabhākaragupta. A final possibility is that Prabhākaragupta is in fact reporting a view different than I think. I reproduce his comments on the chance that the latter is the case.

These atoms assisting one another through their close proximity [i.e., aggregated atoms] do not truly become of ‘finite magnitude’ (mahānta). If it is then asked how, if they do not give up their subtleness (sūkṣmatā), they become the cognized object, we reply that the objector is not thinking along proper lines.

It is not the special property of "finite magnitude" [they lack to generate a perception], but rather the special property of a causal capacity.
The inability [of an atom to generate a cognition] is from its lacking the necessary capacity, not from its lacking "finite magnitude".

If perceptibility (drṣyatā) is a matter of producing a cognition that reflects the true nature of the atom, then this [perceptibility] does not exist—this proves just what we want to prove. Should you insist it is, simply, producing a cognition, then that presents no difficulty, as this can be observed in the case of hairs and the like. For just as hairs at a distance, even though they are not agglomerated [into one thing], appear as a solid configuration, so is the case with atoms; this presents no difficulty. If you should ask how the atoms, being subtle (sūksma), produce such an appearance [and insist that atoms aggregated are no different than] atoms taken separately, [we reply that this is simply not so] because separately they do not have the capacity. It is the lack of capacity that prevents their being a cause, not their subtlety (sūksmatā). [To draw a parallel], the senses and the like [i.e., the light accompanying a perception, the perceived object, the requisite mental attention, etc.] do not acquire the special property of grossness (sthūlata) when they produce together [a cognition with a gross image], any more than the hairs do. Moreover, their productiveness is simply the result of a causal capacity. . . .

Obviously Prajñākaragupta's example of the hairs is inappropriate—as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika point out at great length—if it is intended to illustrate not only how the atoms, aggregated and perceptible, are seen as a mass, but how individually in principle imperceptible atoms, when they aggregate, become in principle perceptible. For the imperceptibility of the hairs is never an in principle imperceptibility.

For an aggregate to be the sensory object, it must be possible for a single sense cognition to cognize many atoms
simultaneously. The next ten verses are a defense that this is possible against an opponent who thinks that simultaneous cognition of many things at once is impossible. I would like to just briefly summarize these verses. Then before taking up the verses that follow in order to finish up the long section on atoms in the Pratyakṣa chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika, I would first like to consider the shorter section of verses in the chapter on pramāṇa (Pramāṇa-siddhipariccheda).

To turn, then, first to the ten verses, the opponent initially tries to argue that, rather than the atoms being seen simultaneously, they are seen in succession (kramena). The many aggregated atoms are the object, in other words; but they are cognized in many sense cognitions and not one. According to this thesis, we successively cognize the atoms; and then we only think we see them all at once because the successive cognitions follow upon each other so rapidly (lāghava) that we get the illusion (bhrama) of seeing the atoms all at once. On Indian assumptions this thesis admits of two versions: the illusion is a sense illusion, or it is an illusion fostered by the mental operation in perception, i.e., kalpanā. That is, the thesis could be that just as (to use a Buddhist example) the sense cognitions of a firebrand in different places as it is being whirled in a circle follow upon one another so rapidly as to create the sense illusion of being a single cognition of a circle of fire, so too do the cognitions of the atoms follow upon one another so
rapidly as to create the sense illusion of a single cognition of all of the atoms of the aggregate simultaneously. Or the thesis could be that the various sense cognitions are quickly synthesized by the mind in a type of mental creation. This second version is more or less the "single atom" theory of Stcherbatsky.  

Dharmakīrti rejects the thesis (presumably both versions) on the basis that were it correct we would have (or at least ostensibly have) only simultaneous cognitions and never successive ones. All our successive cognitions would come out seeming to be simultaneous ones. For, Dharmakīrti reasons, cognitions always proceed at the same pace. If "swiftness" were sufficient to make what are really successive cognitions appear simultaneous in the one case, it would be sufficient in every. For example, Dharmakīrti illustrates somewhat unconvincingly, even when watching a handful of seeds being dropped from the hand one by one but rapidly enough so that all are in the air at the same time, we would have the impression of seeing the seeds simultaneously when we really see them in succession.

The relevant verses begin with a statement of the objection that many atoms are not cognized simultaneously. Dharmakīrti first asks how, if simultaneous cognitions are altogether impossible (which is how he interprets the objector), it is possible to cognize the seeds all at once when they are held in the hand, as we obviously do. The opponent then suggests the thesis that we have only the
appearance of cognizing them simultaneously due to the swiftness of those cognitions that cognize them one at a time, to which Dharmakīrti replies that we would then have the appearance of simultaneous cognition even in the case of the seeds being successively dropped from the hand.

[If the opponent objects that], even in the case of cognizing things of the same sense, many things are not cognized simultaneously, [we ask] how then a [handful] of separate seeds [resting in the hand] can seemingly be cognized simultaneously? (verse 197)

[If the opponent suggests] that it is due to swiftness, why is there no simultaneous apprehension in the case of these seeds being successively dropped? All cognitions proceed at the same pace [and the illusion would be created in the one case if in the other]. (verse 198)31

On the basis that we obviously do have cognitions in which we see things successively as well as cognitions in which we see all the objects simultaneously, Dharmakīrti concludes the impossibility of the thesis that we do not see atoms all at once but only think we do due to the swiftness with which the cognitions follow upon one another.32

The opponent then tries to suggest that the many atoms are not seen all at once because the object is really a whole (avayavin), not a plurality of atoms. He moves the discussion from the atomic to the nonatomic level and entertains examples such as that of a multicolored butterfly. He insists that it is possible to have a single sense cognition of a multicolored butterfly because the butterfly is not many differently colored things seen at once (nor
even one thing of many different colors) but rather a single whole of a single color, "multicolor" (citra). In seeing it, one is not seeing many colors simultaneously but a single thing of a single color. Dharmakirtti rejects this thesis on the basis that he finds it absurd, and also on the opponent's own admission that sometimes in cognizing a multicolored thing in a single sense cognition the thing really is many differently colored things (or one thing of different colors) and not a single whole of "multicolor." A multicolored cloth, for example, is for the opponent (on Dharmakirtti's understanding of him) just many threads of different colors and not a multicolored whole. Thus the opponent himself admits that a sense cognition can take many objects simultaneously.

Dharmakirtti then resists a last minute effort by the opponent to insist that all cognitions that appear to be of many objects at once are conceptual rather than sensory. He points out that (on at least the Buddhist account of conceptual cognition) it is impossible for a conceptual cognition to be cognizant of more than one object at a time. This has to do with the fact that the content of kalpana* is associated with language. As Manorathanandin explains Dharmakirtti's point: "... FOR when a person IS CONCEPTUALIZING about ONE OBJECT and linking that object up with a word, he ONLY SENSES the REMAINING objects not connected with a word; for there cannot be the linking [of two different things] with two [different] words at the same time." Thus, Dharmakirtti concludes, a sense cognition
can indeed have many objects, and furthermore a cognition having many objects is a sense cognition. "Therefore one [sense cognition] can well take many objects; and then [the cognition] is proven [by that very fact] to be without conceptualization. . . ." 37

Thus Dharmakirti defends the view that a sense cognition takes an aggregate for its object, and also that the cognition taking an aggregate as its object is indeed a sense cognition.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. Pvv 159.3-4: Sañcitaḥ Samudāyaḥ sa saṁñayam Tatra Čaśadāh/ Saṁñayabuddhis Čāvasyām ViKalenubadhyate/


(Where the verses appear together with commentary, I will continue the practice of capitalizing the verses and those words of the verses that are glossed in the commentary. I will also continue to correct minor misprints in the texts without comment.)

2. Prajñākaragupta first distinguishes between a real (pāramārthika) samudāya and a conceptual (kalpita) samudāya, Pvv 279,14-15. His comments then make it clear that atoms which appear as a patch (bahūnām parasparasvarūpaparihāreṇa) are not a real samudāya because the patch does not appear to be a whole over and above its parts, which is necessary if it is to be a real samudāya, Pvv 279,15-16. He then goes on to worry about whether the atoms appearing as a patch are a conceptual samudāya, Pvv 279.20-21.


4. Pvv 159.23-25: Tat tasmād ekasmin arthe paramānau jñānasyāni-

yamāt Saṁñayagocaraṃ Sañcita paramāṇasamghātaviṣayam Jñānām uktaṃ
tattvavādīnā. na tu paramāṇavatiriktaSaṁñayaviṣayam, tat katham
daṁnyaviṣayatvāt savikalpatvaprasāṅgaḥ. Cf. PS 26.31-38 (v. 4cd).

5. This is obvious, if not from his mentioning only the whole, from his use of the word "samghāta," which generally suggests a composite of parts. But if Manorathananandin means by his use of "samghāta," that the svalakṣaṇa is an aggregate that is a unity of parts even if not a whole, he has not escaped the objection that it is then a universal; and he is, I believe, arguing less than what Dharmakīrti is arguing, as what follows will show.
This is assuming that Manorathanandin does not mean that the aggregate can be a unity of parts, see above n.5.

PVB 279.28-29: parasparaviviktā eva kasmān na pratibhāsanta iti cet. nanv asaṃsaktāḥ keśādayo 'pi dūre nasaṃsaktatayā pratibhāsagocarībhavanti.

AKR 61.3: ... ekaśāḥ sanagrāṃ kāraṇabhāvāt.

SAV 61.16-19: tad yathā dārvākarṣaṇe bahūnām akrāṣṭṭīnām pratyekam asaṃarthham, samudittām tu parasparam apekṣyamānānām saṃarthham. yathā vā keśāḥ pṛthak pṛthak avasthitā na samarthās taimirikacakṣurviṣṇukarṣaṇe, samudittās tu asaṃyuktā api saṃarthāḥ. Yuichi Kajiyama discusses this material in his article, "The Atomic Theory of Vasubandhu, the Author of the Abhidharmakosā," Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, XIX, No. 2 (1971), pp. 19-24. For a further discussion of the second example, see NV on NS iv.2.14.

PVB 94.13: yathā viraladesāsthitaḥ api keśamasākamakṣikādayaḥ ekaghanakāraḥ pratyayam upajanayanti.

PVB 296.11-12: yathaiva keśa dāvyasi deśe 'asaṃsaktā api ghanasamānyāśahāsiniḥ paraṃparaḥ 'pi tatheti na virodhaḥ.

PV II:247ab: bhinnakālaṃ katham grāhyam iti cet . . ./

PV II:247: . . . grāhyatāṃ viduḥ/ hetutvam eva yuktiṃ jñānākarārpaṇaṃ/

PV 159.5-6: ārkhaṇarābhisambandhaṁ Jāyante ye 'navo 'pare/ uktaṁ te saṃcītaṁ te hi nimittaṁ jñānaṇamaṇah// PV 159.17-20: ārkhaṇarāṇaḥ paramārvantaranaṁ ābhisaṃbhandhaṁ samiddhanavisēṣeṇopasaṃpratyayebhyaḥ pūrvakarṣikāḥ pramāṇānubhitebhyaḥ 'pare 'naye ye 'navo jāyante te saṃcītaḥ uktaḥ "saṃcītaḥ labhā vijñānakāyaḥ" ity ādau. jñānaṇamaṇaṁ ta eva hi nimittaṁ uktaṁ "tattvānekārthaḥ jñānayo vā/ tātātā keśādhyāyatyāvaiḥ" ity ādīnā.

One would like the verse to say merely "Those atoms that are produced through the combining with other atoms are called saṃcīta"; but this is not what seems to be in the Sanskrit, particularly judging from the commentary. However Tilmann Vetter interprets the verse this way, see Vetter, [2], p. 67.
15

**PVV 159.7-8**: An̄unām sa vaiśeṣas ca nātareṇaparān anūn/ Tad ekāntyamā jñānam uktaṁ sāmānyagocaram/ 

**PVV 159.21-25**: An̄unām sa ca jñānajanaṁ saṁarthyalakṣaṇo vaiśeṣo 'parān anūn avyavadhānavarttinā 'ntareṇa vinā na bhavati. na hi pratyekeṁ añavo dṛṣṭyaṁ, kintu sahitā eva. 

Tat tasmād ekāṣmīn arthe paramaṇau jñānasyaṇīyamat sāmānyagocaram saṁcitaparamaṇaṁ saṁghaṁティvājayaṁ jñānam uktaṁ tattvavadinaṁ, na tu paramāṇvatisṛtīkaṁ saṁmāṇavaiśayam, tat katham sāmānyavaiśayatvat savikalpatvaprasaṅgaṁ.

16

See **NVTT** 396.17-19, where a later verse of the PV (PVII:223) to the same effect is actually quoted.

17

**sarvathānupalabhyamāna**, **NVTT** 396.4. See **NV** 230.21-231.2.

18


19

Dharmendra Nath Shastri, [2], p. 159.

20

**NVTT** 396.6-17; **NV** 239.15-17.

21

**NVTT** 396.23-397.1; **NV** 239.14-240.4.

22

**NVTT** 396.15: rūpavan mahattvam api bhāvaṁ svarūpapayogatā grahaṇam pratiti bhāvaṁ.

23

For a description of this process, see Dharmendra Nath Shastri, [2], pp. 160-161.

24

**PVV** 168.7-9: na hi pareśaṁ ivāsmēkaṁ ca nityaikasvabhāva añavaḥ, te hi yathā-pratyayamatiṁdriyaṁ santa aindriyaṁ api syuḥ.

25

The verse is misnumbered verse 224 in **PVB**.

26

**PVB** 296.7-15: na hi paramāṇavaḥ sahaṁcarisannidhāne 'pi mahāṁto bhavanti. sūkṣmatāṁ cenna parisyajanti kathaṁ grahyāṁ, tad apy asat.
mahattātisāyo nātra sāmarthyātisāyāḥ sa tu/
asāmarthyād ahetutvam amahatvāt tu neṣyate//
yadi paramāṇaḥ svarūpāṇukārikidhi janaṇanām dṛṣṭaḥ. sā nāstey eveti
siddhasādhyātā. artha vijñānāmātrajanānām. tad astey eva na viruddhaṁ
keśādiṣu darsanāt. yathāiva keśā dāvīyasi desē 'samśaktā api ghana-
samanīvesāvabhāsinaḥ paramāṇa 'pi tathetā na virodhaḥ. tad api
sūkṣmaṁ kathāṁ janaṇayantā. kevalavat eveti cet. kevalāṇām asāmarthyāt.
asāmarthyām eva hetubhāvavirodhi na sūkṣmatā. keśāvad eva na
cendriyādānām sthūlātādiviśeṣa upajāyate sāmagryavasthiñyām. atha
cā sāmarthyāvāviśeṣād eva janakatvam. . . .

27
NVTT 396.2-4; NV 242.14-243.1. See also NV on NS iv.2.14.

28
PVV on PV II:197-198.

29
PV II:140.

30
The second version seems to be the one favored by
Prajñākaragupta, see PVV 280.16-18. Tilman Vetter obviously thinks
this latter interpretation is the kind of illusion being discussed,
see Vetter, [2], p. 67, para. 2. See also the discussion in
Dharmkirti, PV II:133ff.

31
athaikṣayatanatve 'pi nānkeṁ dṛṣṭyaṁ sakṛt/ sakṛd grahaṁ-
vabhāsaṁ kīṁ viyukteśu tilādiṣu/ / pratyuyaktaṁ lāghavaṁ ca
tra ṭeṣāv eva
kramapātiṣu/ kīṁ nākramagrahas tulyakālāḥ sarvāś ca buddhayaṁ/

32
PV II:199.

33
PV II:200.

34
PV II:200ff.

35
PVV 161.15-16,

36
PVV 162.22-23: . . . YATAH śabdajitam EKAM ARTHAM
VIKALPAYANANYA [text: VIKALPAYANNANYAD] asamyajitam arthāntaram
API PASYATTI draṣṭā.
37

**PV II:207ab:** uṣṇārthaikā bhavet tasmāt siddhā 'to 'py avikalpikā/
Chapter 8

THE PRAMĀNAVĀRTTIKA, PRAMĀNASIDDHI CHAPTER, VERSES 88-89

I would now like to turn to the verses in the chapter on pramāṇa. I would like to discuss them before finishing the rest of the verses in the Pratyakṣa chapter because the next verses in the Pratyakṣa chapter are those where Dharmakīrti begins temporarily speaking as a Yogācārin. In the two verses in the Pramānasiddhi chapter, he is still speaking as a Sautrāntika. These two verses will say something further about the "special property" that aggregated but not unaggregated atoms have that Prajñākaragupta mentioned in his comments that I quoted in the last chapter.

To give the context in which the two verses occur, in the verse preceding them Dharmakīrti has been defending the idea of transmigration. An opponent has argued that there is no subtle body (the vehicle of transmigration) because no such body is ever seen.1 Dharmakīrti sets out to reply, in effect, that it is not seen because it is hidden inside the physical body. But this opens him up to a further, by now familiar objection, voiced in verse 88. How can the physical body hide anything, since on Dharmakīrti's account it is a mere collection of atoms? A mere collection of atoms has no power of obstructing vision, for none of the atoms has this power individually, i.e., none is individually perceptible. And,
insists the opponent, aggregated atoms are no different than unaggregated ones. They possess no feature (visēsa) in aggregation that would make them able to obstruct vision (i.e., be themselves perceptible so as to block the perception of the subtle body) when they cannot do so separately. The opponent is in effect arguing that unless there is a whole inhering in the atoms and not just the atoms themselves, the gross physical body can have no power of obstruction and cannot hide the subtle body.² The objection tends to favor interpreting the imperceptibility that atoms have before aggregation as an in principle imperceptibility; otherwise the objection hardly seems worth voicing.

Dharmakīrti first replies that there is and can be no whole (avayavin) because it can be neither the same nor different from its parts. He then rejects the opponent's insistence that atoms when aggregated are no different than when not. Aggregated atoms do possess a special feature (visēsa); they are perceptible in that state even though imperceptible separately. Because aggregated atoms have the power of perceptibility and obstructing vision, the gross body that is aggregated atoms can indeed conceal the subtle body.

Should it be suggested that there is no cognition [cf the gross body] because of its atomicity and because there is no special property [on the part of the aggregated atoms that comprise it, we reply that] it is not the case that there is no special property [on the part of the atoms]. (verse 88cd and 89a)
There is perceptibility on the part of those special [aggregated atoms in which it consist]. So [the gross body] is not [really] atoms. By this, the lack of any ability to conceal [the subtle body] is refuted. (verse 89bcd)³

It is necessary to turn to Manorathananandin's commentary to see the import of the comment that the gross body, because it is composed of perceptible aggregated atoms, is not really atoms (ananyu). This comment has import for the problem of how a multitude of atoms is perceived as a patch.

A visible body, Manorathananandin says, arises out of the combination of atoms that are imperceptible when not aggregated. But since the resulting visible body, which is nothing but the aggregated atoms, is indeed perceptible, its atomicity is rejected.⁴ For it is common knowledge, Manorathananandin goes on to say, that an atom is beyond the reach of the senses; yet the body is within the reach of the senses, and hence the body cannot be atoms. At least, Manorathananandin says, it cannot be called (ucyate) atoms. "For visible masses of atoms are not called atoms but are referred to as bodies and the like, similar to the way that threads woven into a cloth are called a cloth and not threads . . . ."⁵

Is there any suggestion here that the body of atoms that is no longer called atoms no longer amounts to atoms either? Do the atoms no longer remain as such? Out of the atoms coming together, is there created some sort of congealed mass that is no longer atoms?
I see no evidence for this; but I raise the possibility because some scholars have thought something like this to be the Sautrāntika view. David Kalupahana, for example, provides the following comparison of the views of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Buddhist Vaibhāṣika school (which rivalled the Sautrāntika to which Dharmakīrti belonged), and the Sautrāntika school. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, he says in effect, insist that the object of perception is a whole over and above the atoms; otherwise one would never have a cognition of a unitary thing but only of a plurality of atoms. The Vaibhāṣika, he says, maintain that the aggregate remains a multiplicity even though (and here he sees what he calls a "paradox" in the Vaibhāṣika view) it seems a single unit. "But this aggregate is not to be considered atom-wise a unity (eka); it is only a multiplicity (anēka)." Of the Sautrāntika he says, "Unlike the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sautrāntikas refused to accept the view that the 'whole', consisting of 'parts' (avayava) is directly perceived by the senses. Neither could they reconcile themselves to the theory of the Sarvāstivādins [= Vaibhāṣikas, especially early Vaibhāṣikas]. Therefore, they maintained that while the atoms are indivisible units, they could coalesce or mingle together to form an object. Thus while the Sarvāstivādins believed in the aggregation of atoms (saṅghata), the Sautrāntikas advocated the coalescence of atoms (saṃcita, samyoga)."
It is in connection with verse 89 that Prajñākaragupta makes his earlier mentioned (p. 206) comment, "Such things as hairs, mosquitoes, etc., produce a cognition with a single, solid image, even though [the things in each case] remain in their respective places." Since this is intended to be taken as also describing the case of atoms, it seems that the atoms do not "coalesce." Some real further suggestion that they do not can be found in the second half of the subsequent verse 90, where Dharma-kīrti asks a rhetorical question: "How is a cognition generated by the senses, [the object, the attending light,] etc., when each of these is incapable of producing a cognition separately?" We saw Prajñākaragupta also using this same, evidently important example (p. 216). And what it clearly seems to say is that the atoms are a causal unit without being a natural, ontological one. The atoms retain their discreteness the way the eye, the light, and the object, etc., do. Neither set of causes "coalesces" into some single thing.

This matter is worth pursuing. Pursuing it will help shed light on the remaining verses of the long section of verses in the Pratyākṣa chapter, verses to which I soon want to return. But pursuing the matter will first necessarily take us on a long digression. For Kalupahana cites as the source of his "coalescence" theory not Dharma-kīrti's Pramāṇavārttika (understandably, since I do not think it is Dharma-kīrti's view) but two other Buddhist texts, which need to be discussed.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1
PV I: 85d.

2
PV 94.6-7: avayavisamyogam antareṇa paramāṇava eva kevala
avyāhataparasparāntaramupravesāḥ kathāṃ āvaraṇabhaṭṭaḥ.

3
avisēṣād anūtvaṃ ca na gatiḥ cen na sidhyati// avisēṣaḥ;
visistānāṃ aindriyatvam ato ’naucūḥ/ etena varṇoṣadīnāṃ abhāvaś ca
nirakṣaṭaḥ//

4
PV 37.14-16: parasparāṇaṅgatetheh paramāṇupbhavo
dṛṣṭasaṅkāribhavo dṛṣṭānām evāṇonyasaṅkṛatānām utpattah, tesānām
visistānāṃ aindriyatvam indriyagrahyatvam. ato aindriyatvād anapur
iṣṭāḥ.

5
PV 37.16-18: puñjībhūtās tu dṛṣṭānāṃ nānava ucyante;
kītu sarvādiyapadesyāḥ, yathā tantavah pañcavasthāyāṃ na
tantavah ucyante, api tu pañca ity . . .

6
D.J. Kalupahana, "Aspects of the Buddhist Theory of the
External World and the Emergence of the Philosophical Schools in
Buddhism," The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities, I, No. 1
(1970), 103. Sarvāstivāda = Vaibhāṣika, particularly early
Vaibhāṣika.

7
Kalupahana, [1], p. 104.

8
PV 94.13: yathā viraladesaṣṭhitā api keśamaṇaṃkaṃsīkā-
dayāḥ ekaṃkāraṃ pratīyam upajanayanti. Verse 89 is misnumbered
88 in PVB.

9
. . . prthag aśektaṇāṃ akṣāḍīnāṃ gatiḥ kathām/
Chapter 9

VASUBANDHU'S VIMŚATĪKĀ AND DIGNĀGA'S ĀLAMBANAPARĪKṢĀ

The texts Kalupahana cites as his sources are Vasubandhu's Vijñaptimātratāśiddhi (Vimśatīkābhāṣya) and Dignāga's Ālambanaparīkṣā.¹ Both are Yogācāra texts concerned with refuting the idea that there is an external object.

Beginning with the Vimśatīkābhāṣya, the lines that Kalupahana thinks evidence the "coalescence" theory (sāncita, sāmyoga) occur in connection with verse 11 of the Vimśatīkā (which Vasubandhu also authored and on which the Vimśatīkābhāṣya is his commentary). The verse attacks the idea of an external object by eliminating each of the various possibilities as to what that object could be in terms of the atoms of which it is said to be composed.

The object is not some one thing; nor is it a plurality of atoms; nor is it just these atoms amassed (sambhata), for the atom is unproven.² (verse 11)

In his auto commentary (Vimśatīkābhāṣya), Vasubandhu identifies the first view as that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas: the "same one thing" (eka) is a whole (avayavīn).³ Of the second view, he says only: "Nor is [the object] a plurality, because the many atoms are not individually apprehended."⁴ Evidently this is a view, like Dharmaśītri's, of the atoms remaining as atoms; the criticism of it is that we see a patch, not atoms, yet the object ought to be a patch (and not just many atoms) if that is what we see. Dharmaśītri
escapes this objection by maintaining that the atoms are indirectly perceived by way of a sensum; evidently on this view, the atoms are directly perceived. Vasubandhu does not identify this view. He goes on to make a comment in regards to the last theory: "Nor are these [atoms] when amassed (samhata) the object, because there is no proof of a single, substantive atom." Kalupahana thinks the unidentified second and third theories are both Vaibhāṣika views, the Vaibhāṣikas being Buddhist rivals of Dharmakīrti. He seems to think the second view is that of the Sarvāstivāda (old school Vaibhāṣika) and the third view that of the Neo-Sarvāstivāda. The "coalescence" theory that Kalupahana thinks is the Sautrāntika view is then not even mentioned in the verse, being mentioned instead (if I understand Kalupahana correctly) in subsequent comments of the commentary (Vimsatikābhāṣya).

In giving this analysis of the verse, Kalupahana is going against K'uei Chi, the Chinese commentator on Hsūan Tsang's Chinese translation of the Vimsatikā. K'uei Chi identifies the second view as that of the Sarvāstivāda (as does Kalupahana), but he thinks that the third view is that of the Sautrāntika. He thinks it is that of the Sautrāntika to the extent that he thinks Vasubandhu intended by this third view to be mentioning only one aggregate theory.

But K'uei Chi is strongly of the opinion that Vasubandhu intended more than one theory. K'uei Chi thinks so basically because Hsūan Tsang, upon whom he comments, thinks so. Hsūan Tsang,
in his Chinese translation of the *Vimśatikā*, alters the verse from the Sanskrit slightly: where Vasubandhu speaks simply of atoms amassed (*samhāra*), Hsūan Tsang distinguishes between two different kinds of atomic masses: ho-ho (和合, *samghāra*) and ho-chi (和離, *sañcita*).\(^{12}\) K'uei Chi identifies the believers in these two different kinds of aggregates as, respectively, the Sautrāntika and the Neo-Sarvāstivāda.\(^{13}\)

I assume that Kalupahana is wrong in the way he understands the *Vimśatikā* and K'uei Chi right. The third view is (at least) that of the Sautrāntika. But is Sautrāntika then a "coalescence" theory, as Kalupahana says it is? It would seem that it is, as this third theory is clearly distinguished from the second theory of the *Vimśatikā* in which the atoms remain as just atoms.

We can get a clear picture of the Sautrāntika theory, and also of the Neo-Sarvāstivāda theory that K'uei Chi and Hsūan Tsang think is also included in the third view, from the *Alambanaparīkṣā*, the other of the two texts Kalupahana cites as evidencing that Sautrāntika is a "coalescence" theory.

This text rejects the various theories of the external object by taking up what each theory says this object is in terms of atoms and showing that such an alleged object does not even fit the definition of an object. To be an object, the proposed entity must both cause the cognition and be what is presented in it. According to the *Alambanaparīkṣā*, all of the alleged objects, one
way or the other composed of atoms, fail in one or the other respect.

Three views are discussed. Kalupahana thinks they are the [Nyāya-] Vaiśeṣika, the Vaibhāṣika, and the Sautrāntika. But again he is in disagreement with K'uei Chi. K'uei Chi says that they are the Sarvāstivāda (old school Vaibhāṣika), the Sautrāntika, and the Neo-Sarvāstivāda. K'uei Chi and Kalupahana are directly opposed in which aggregate theories they think belong to the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika schools: Kalupahana thinks the Vaibhāṣikas hold the theory of the aggregate called a samghāta and the Sautrāntikas hold the theory of the aggregate called a sañcita, and K'uei Chi thinks the Sautrāntikas hold the samghāta-aggregate theory and the Vaibhāṣikas (Neo-Sarvāstivādins) hold the sañcita-aggregate theory. The text of the Alambanaparīksā clearly supports K'uei Chi. For the first theory it describes is one in which the atoms remain as atoms but appear (directly) as a patch. This theory is rejected on the basis that what causes the cognition is then not what is presented in it. This can hardly be a [Nyāya-] Vaiśeṣika view, as the [Nyāya-] Vaiśeṣikas believe that the object generating a cognition is a whole, i.e., some one thing. Because we see this whole, our cognition is of a patch and not just many atoms. The text's description and criticism are not appropriate for the theory being a [Nyāya-] Vaiśeṣika.

The second and third theories are, then, the Sautrāntika and the Neo-Sarvāstivāda. A careful look at these two theories will
show what Kalupahana as well as K'uei Chi thinks is the Sautrāntika; for although Kalupahana and K'uei Chi disagree on which view belongs to whom, they agree that the Sautrāntika is one or the other.

To quote then the relevant part of the Ālambanaparīkṣā (verse 1-5, together with the author's, Dignāga's, autocommentary), the Sanskrit of which can be found in appendix A:

Those who think that an external object is the source (Ālambana) of our visual and other sense cognitions insist [that this object] is [many] atoms on the basis that atoms are the cause [of the cognition]. Or [they think that this object] is an agglomerate (samghāta) [of atoms], because the cognition is produced with that appearance.


That is, regarding the word "OBJECT," a cognition is cognizant of its own content [in being cognizant of an object] because it is produced bearing an image of that object. Although the atoms are the cause of the [cognition], [the image] does not copy them, any more than it copies the eye [which is also a generating cause]. Thus the [many] atoms are not the source of our cognitions.

This first theory is the Vaibhāṣika. The theory that Dignāga goes on to discuss is the one K'uei Chi thinks is Sautrāntika.

And the agglomerate (samghāta) too, even though [the cognition] appears with its image, [is not the source, for]:

A COGNITION DOES NOT [NECESSARILY] ARISE FROM THAT WHICH APPEARS IN IT. (verse 2a)
The object which produces a cognition bearing the image of itself is properly speaking the source of that cognition. For only that [object] is referred to [in the texts] as the true generating cause. But this is not the agglomerate (samghâta),

BECAUSE [THE AGGLOMERATE] DOES NOT SUBSTANTIVELY EXIST, ANY MORE THAN DOES THE DOUBLE MOON. (verse 2b)

The cognition [of a double moon] does not have an object simply because a person suffering from an eye defect has a cognition of a double moon. Likewise, the agglomerate is not the source of the cognition [which has its image]; for the [agglomerate], in not substantively existing [any more than the moon], can not be the cause.

THUS BOTH EXTERNAL THINGS ARE NOT POSSIBLE OBJECTS OF COGNITION. (verse 2cd)

The external object—either atoms or their aggregate—is thus not the source of our cognitions. For [in either case] there is one defect or the other, [either the defect of not being the cause or the defect of not being what is presented in the cognition].

The next theory is the one that Kalupahana thinks is Sautrântika. It requires a bit of explanation. It seems to be the view that the atoms "coalesce" only in the sense that each atom has a dual character. Each has an atomic character, which it retains even in aggregation. But in aggregation, each atom also has an additional, second character, a "gross" (sthûla) or nonatomic one. In seeing the atoms as, say, a pot, then, one is still seeing a character of the atoms. One is merely seeing each atom's "gross" character rather than each atom's atomic character. As K'uei Chi says, "Many indivisible atoms, for example, constitute jointly the mountain, etc. Possessed of many forms, each of these particles has
the dimension of a mountain, etc."¹⁶ As Dharmapāla says, "In each atom individually there is a 'combined' form (sañcitakāra). That alone is the gross object; it appears having a dimension that depends upon the number of the atoms. And that [gross form] is a real thing; this 'combined' form is the cause of the cognition with it as image, because it substantively exists."¹⁷

THERE ARE OTHERS WHO THINK THAT THE PROOF [THAT EXTERNAL OBJECTS ARE THE SOURCE OF OUR COGNITIONS] RESTS WITH THE [THEORY OF ATOMS HAVING A] COMBINED FORM (SAÑCITAKĀRA). (verse 3ab)

All objects [including atoms] have multiple forms, and a perception is held to pick up only certain of them. In the case of atoms, they have one [nonatomic] character that acts as the cause in originating a cognition with the appearance of a combination (sañcita). [To illustrate:]

THE ATOMIC FORM IS NOT THE OBJECT OF THE COGNITION, ANY MORE THAN IS SOLIDITY, ETC. (verse 3cd)

Just as solidity, etc., even though present [in the atoms], is not picked up in a visual cognition, so also is not the atomic form [picked up in a visual cognition. What is seen is only the combined form of the atoms. Thus what causes the cognition, i.e., the atoms, is also what presents itself in it.]

[THE OBJECTION TO THIS IS THAT] THE COGNITION WOULD THEN BE THE SAME, WHETHER OF A POT, A CUP, ETC. (verse 4ab)

To explain the objection for a moment before quoting the rest of the text, the text goes on to say basically that though the number of atoms in a pot and a cup differ, the atoms in each are qualitatively the same. There is no "special difference" (visēsa) between the atoms of a pot and a cup that would account
for why the (fewer) atoms of the cup do not make up instead a (small) pot. Granting that each atom of the pot and the cup has a combined form, is it the form of the pot or the cup (or whatever)? If it is the form of the one and not the other(s), we would not have the different perceptions of the pot in the one case and the cup in the other, etc. But if the combined form changes with different aggregations—if it is sometimes the form of the pot and other times the form of the cup—whence comes this difference? It does not come from the atoms, because each atom has only one atomic shape (i.e., parimandalya, really a size, namely that of an infinitesimal, but considered a globular shape unique to infinitesimal atoms). But if each atom has only one atomic shape, then it is unreasonable (so the argument seems to go) to assume that an atom can have different combined shapes, e.g. the shape of a pot in one case and of a cup in another. And if one locates the difference in the pot or cup (or whatever) and not in a character of the atoms, then although it is true that the pot or cup, etc., each has a different shape, yet the atoms alone truly exist (dravyasat, paramarthasat). The pot or whatever is not real in the way that the atoms are; it only conventionally exists (samvrtisat). Yet a cause has to be something that objectively exists, like the atoms and unlike the pot, etc. Thus one has not escaped the objection that what causes the cognition, i.e., the atoms, is not what appears in the cognition, because the "combined shape" is located in the
conventionally existing pot and not in the atoms.

There is no qualitative difference (vīṣeṣa) in the atoms of a pot, a cup, etc., even though there are many of these [atoms]. [Though the number of atoms is different in each case, the atoms themselves are qualitatively the same.]

IF THE OPPONENT SHOULD REPLY THAT [THE PERCEPTIONS OF A POT, A CUP, ETC.,] DIFFER BECAUSE THE FORM [OF THE POT AND CUP, ETC.] ARE DIFFERENT, (verse 4c)

[That is,] if [the opponent] thinks that the form of the neck, etc. [of the pot and cup] is something distinctive (vīṣeṣakriyā) by means of which there would then be a peculiarity (upādhi) that would distinguish the cognitions, it is true that there is this peculiarity in the pot, etc.

BUT IT IS NOT IN THE ATOMS THAT [ALONE] SUBSTANTIALLY EXIST, BECAUSE [THE ATOMS] ARE ALL OF THE SAME MEASURE. (verse 4d, 5a)

There is no difference in the infinitesimal globular measure of the atoms, even when the atoms are of different sorts.

THUS THE [DISTINCTIVE FORM] IS IN WHAT DOES NOT SUBSTANTIALLY EXIST. (verse 5b)

The difference in form is in what is only conventionally real (samyūrṇīsāt) and not in the [truly real] atoms. The pot and the like are only conventionally real.

FOR THE COGNITION WITH THE FORM [OF THE POT, CUP, ETC.] IS DESTROYED IF ONE REMOVES THE ATOMS. (verse 5cd)

[But] in the case of something substantively existing, even if whatever is connected to it is removed, the cognition of it is not destroyed, as is the case with the color [blue], etc. Thus it is established that the object of sense cognitions is not external.
Looking back to the second of the three views mentioned, if K'uei Chi is right that it is Sautrāntika, then Kalupahanah is justified in thinking that Sautrāntika was a "coalescence" theory, even if he thinks that the third view (rather than the second) is Sautrāntika. For the second theory is a "coalescence" theory. Kalupahanah is at least justified in thinking that some Sautrāntikas held a coalescence theory. But I do not think that Dharmakīrti did, mostly for reasons already mentioned. His constant emphasis is on the atoms remaining as atoms, e.g., when he compares the case of atoms causing a cognition with the case of the eye, the object, the lighting, etc., causing one. The "coalescence" theory must have predated Dharmakīrti, being as Kajiyama thinks a view predating even Vasubandhu. Or possibly it is the Sautrāntika view as it was misrepresented by its opponents.

Dharmakīrti's view is much more like the third view, which on K'uei Chi's account is Neo-Sarvāstivāda. Some of the vocabulary is the same. Dharmakīrti talks about combined atoms (sañcitaḥ paramāṇavah) causing a cognition, and the third view speaks of atoms having a "combined form" (sañcikāra). This is not insignificant, since each of the theories tends to have a different term for its special kind of aggregate (although sometimes sañcita is used indifferently for all). More importantly, Dharmakīrti speaks of aggregated atoms having a "special quality" (viśeṣa). This "special quality" is for Dharmakīrti, on Prajñākaragupta's under-
standing of Dharmakīrti (see p. 215), what makes infinitely small (pāramāndalya) atoms perceptible in aggregates. Could this "special quality" be the perceptible, second nature that atoms have in aggregation, according to the Neo-Sarvāstivādins? Is Dharmakīrti's view, in other words, the third view, even though this view is Neo-Sarvāstivāda and not Sautrāntika?

I do not think so. What argues that it is not is partly that Dharmakīrti and Neo-Sarvāstivādins such as Saṅghabhadra are traditionally regarded as rivals. But mostly what argues against it is a certain passage in Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa. Durveka Miśra, explicitly claiming to be speaking as a Sautrāntika in Dharmakīrti's line, espouses an atomic theory that takes advantage (as the Neo-Sarvāstivāda view does not) of an indirect or representative theory of perception. Durveka Miśra shows Dharmakīrti's Sautrāntika view to be a theory, not of aggregated atoms having a "gross" nature that is directly cognized, but of atoms of a "subtle" nature being indirectly cognized in a sensum that captures all but their atomicity. It is Prajñākaragupta's view when he says, "We find no difficulty with the view that, just as hairs at a distance have the appearance of a [single] solid configuration even though they are not conjoined, so also with the atoms." An aggregate of infinitesimal atoms, without "coalescing" into some one nonatomic thing, generates an image of a single, gross patch. Each atom of the aggregate is minutely visible (even if each
is in principle imperceptible when not aggregated with others); the contribution of each of them is enough so that all of them together present themselves in an image as some single, nonatomic thing.

I will take up Durveka Miśra's comments at the end of this dissertation. But I will first turn, in the next chapter, to the remaining verses of Dharmakīrti in the long section in the Pratyakṣa chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

1
Kalupahana, [1], p. 104, fn. 1.

2
Vimś 11: na tād evaṁ na cānekāṁ viśayāḥ paramāṇuṣaḥ/
na ca te saṃhātā yasmāt paramāṇur na sidhyati//

3
Vimś 6.28.

4
Vimś 6.30-7.1: nāpy anekam paramāṇūṇāṁ pratyekam agrahaṇāt.

5
See TB 105.10-12 and the identification of the various views
in the Vimśatikā that I go on to give.

6
Vimś 7.1-2: nāpi te saṃhātā viśayabhavanti. yasmāt
paramāṇurekam dravyam na sidhyati. Cf. TB 107.6: na caikāsiddhau
anekasyāpi siddhir īti na santi paramāṇavaḥ. Also see Ts:1988-1991.

7
Kalupahana, [1], p. 102: "... Here there are two
aspects of the atomic theory of the Vaibhāṣikas being criticised
by Vasubandhu. ..."

8
Although he says that Vasubandhu is describing "two
aspects" of the Vaibhāṣika theory, he goes on to speak of the
theories of the Sarvāstivāda and the Neo-Sarvāstivāda.

9
I gather this to be what he thinks from the fact that
his footnote reference to where he finds the view is to p. 7
of Sylvain Levi, ed., Viñaptimātratāsiddhi: Deux Traités de
Vasubandhu: Vimśatikā et Trimsikā, Bibliothèque de L’Ecole des
Hautes Études, Sciences Historiques et Philologiques, Fascicule
245 (Paris, 1925). P. 7 is the Vimśatikābhāṣya. Otherwise I
would have thought Kalupahana finds the view mentioned only in
the Trimsikābhāṣya (Trimś 16.20ff.).
10

11

12

13
Hamilton, p. 43, fn. 60 and p. 45, fns. 64 & 65; N. Aiyaswami Shastri, [2], pp. 4-5; La Vallée Poussin, [3], p. 44 (under c3).

14

15
N. Aiyaswami Shastri, [2], pp. 6-7. This is obviously also the opinion of Hsüan Tsang.

16
N. Aiyaswami Shastri, [2], p. 5, lines 8-10.

17
APV 31.2-4: paramāṇuṣu pratyekam saṁcitakāro 'sti. sa eva sthūlavīśayah paramāṇuṁ taratamabhāvam anusṛtya sākaraḥ pratibhāsate. sa ca vastusan. paramāṇoḥ saṁcitakāraḥ svākāra-vijnānajanakah dravyatvāt.

18
Kajiyama, [1], pp. 19-20.

19
PV II:195; AP:3ab.

20
See TrimB 16.20-32.
21  
\textbf{PV II:196; PV I:88-89.}

22  
\textbf{DP 44.20.} The \textit{Dharmottaraprad\textipa{\texti{p}}}a is a subcommentary on \textit{Dharmak\texti{rti's Ny\texti{yabindu.}}}

23  
See \textbf{TB 105:10-12.}

24  
\textbf{PVB 296.11-12.}
Chapter 10

THE PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA, PRATYAKṢA CHAPTER, VERSES 208–224

In the verses of this long section that I have so far discussed (vs. 194–207), Dharmakīrti has argued that the sensory object is an aggregate (sāṅcita) and that the many atoms of the aggregate are cognized simultaneously. He has rejected the opponent's argument to the contrary that the atoms are not cognized simultaneously, either because they are cognized successively or because the sensory object is, instead of many aggregated atoms, a whole over and above its parts. The discussion has been held at the nonatomic level with talk of such things as multicolored butterflies, but the discussion has clearly been intended to extend to the atomic level. Dharmakīrti, although he has rejected the opponent's idea that the sensory object is a whole instead of atoms, has not explained how the atoms, given that they are many, present themselves as a patch. The opponent then asks him in verse 208, reverting again to the nonatomic level: How are the many colors of the butterfly apprehended as if the butterfly were a single, multicolored thing?¹ This, on the level of atoms, is the question, How are the many atoms that are the sensory object cognized as a single, "gross" patch? The next verses of Dharmakīrti's in reply first give his answer as a Yogācārin and then his answer
as a Sautrāntika.

I said in the Introduction that Dharmakīrti is a Sautrāntika provisionally but a Yogācārīn ultimately. The Yogācārīn in him does not believe that objects exist at all. He takes the occasion of the question to urge first that the real solution to the problem is the abandoning of realism altogether before then granting, by giving the Sautrāntika answer to the question, that Sautrāntika is the best way of understanding things provisionally.

Ultimately, there simply is no object. What the Sautrāntika (and Dharmakīrti as a Sautrāntika) take to be the sensation of an external object is really but an ungenerated sense datum of the sort we have in dreams. It is not really a cognitive response to something external, but an external-seeming content in an Absolute Consciousness.

Dharmakīrti's Yogācāra reply is to say in effect that the Sautrāntikas' difficulty in explaining how many atoms appear as a patch is the result of there ultimately being no object. The Sautrāntikas, insisting that the object is only indirectly perceived, concede that the proof of the existence of the object is a matter of inference. The object is inferred to exist to explain why we have sensations and why these sensations undergo regular changes. But, Dharmakīrti argues as a Yogācārīn (elsewhere if not here), the existence of an external object is not necessary to explain either, as witnessed by the fact of certain realistic
dreams. There is thus no reason to insist that the object exists. And, as he says in effect here, the difficulty in explaining how the many atoms can appear as one patch is convincing evidence to deny that the object exists.

The most crucial verse of Dharmakīrti's present reply is verse 211. In it he insists that there is no real gross character in either the object or the cognition. There is none in the object because the many atoms are not individually gross. Not being individually gross, they are not collectively gross either. And, as is the point of another verse, if there is no grossness in the object, there can be no real grossness in the cognition of that object, however much there might appear to be. The way out of the dilemma is to realize that the gross sensum is not the sensation of an external object at all but a projected content of Consciousness.

It can be seen from Manorathanandin's commentary on this verse that the conversation has been held simultaneously on both the nonatomic level of objects like butterflies and the atomic level.

THEREFORE A GROSS (STHULA) NATURE EXISTS NEITHER IN THE OBJECT NOR THE COGNITION, BECAUSE THAT NATURE IS REPUDIATED AS BELONGING TO EITHER ONE OR MANY.
(verse 211)

THEREFORE NEITHER IN THE external OBJECT NOR IN THE COGNITION, i.e., the consciousness apprehending the object, is to be found A GROSS NATURE, i.e., a gross character. FOR THAT NATURE, that is, that gross nature, IS REPUDIATED AS BELONGING TO ONE, i.e., one part or one atom. And it is impossible in the MANY ALSO, because even when these things are united
(milita) they are just themselves. And they are singly devoid of grossness (sthaulya), and thus when they are assembled (samudita) they are the very same way. And because there is nonexistence of the grossness in the case of the multicolored thing in any of the colors singly, similarly it would be impossible in them when they are assembled (samudaya).5

Although it might be unwise to try to conclude anything of what Dharmakīrti thinks as a Sautrāntika from what he thinks as a Yogācārin (since these are two different levels of discourse), it is clear that as a Yogācārin he does not think there is any real gross character in the object. Of course, this is because there is no object; but it might also reflect that his view as a Sautrāntika is not that of Saṅghabhadra's, where atoms have a real gross character in addition to their atomic one. It would be a bit odder if Dharmakīrti, as a Sautrāntika, first accepted such a real gross character and then, as a Yogācārin, denied it than if he denied such a gross character even as a Sautrāntika.

Prajñākaragupta has some interesting comments on this verse, interesting mostly because they touch on the issue of the relationship among the atoms that Dharmakīrti insists as a Sautrāntika are the sensory object.

Indeed, there cannot be a gross nature in the atoms or even in the whole (avayavina). For grossness (stūla) is the fact of [occupying] different points of space [digbhāgabhīna, literally facing different directions, e.g., north, east, etc.] It is a multiplicity of position resulting from the mutually exclusive [character of] the spatial directions. However, suppose there is a gross nature in many [atoms]. That is, suppose many atoms of the same kind [e.g., many atoms of color],
appearing inseparable, are designated gross. But this is not acceptable [to us Yogācārins]. For many [atoms] are still just many [atoms], and grossness is not a feature of any individual atom. [If it is not a feature of any individual atom, then what is merely many atoms together cannot be gross.] If it is suggested that this grossness will belong to the assemblage (samudāya) [of them], what is this samudāya other than just the [atoms]? And what a semblance of grossness amounts to is the semblance of a single, solid mass (ekaghana). But when [there are many] mutually distinct [things] appearing, there is no [semblance of a] single, solid mass, because the interval [between each thing, i.e., each atom] also appears. Or if it does not appear, then neither do the [atoms].

The Sautrāntika and their Buddhist rivals, the Sarvāstivāda or Vaibhāṣika, had between them a running dispute as to whether the atoms that make up the sensory object have empty spaces between them or not. The Vaibhāṣika believed that they do, the Sautrāntika believed that they do not. Prajñākaragupta is assuming the Vaibhāṣika view in the last sentences of his comments and criticizing it on its own assumptions. Because the Vaibhāṣikas think that the atoms are separated by intervals, these atoms cannot give the appearance of a single solid mass. The intervals would show up as much as the atoms. Or if the intervals, though present, fail to put in an appearance, then for reasons that can only be guessed at one could expect the same from the atoms.

After some additional comments that seem addressed to a Nyāya-Vaiseṣika, Prajñākaragupta ends his comments with a conclusion favorable to Yogācāra. "Therefore neither the whole nor the parts [i.e., the atoms] are the object of the [gross] presentation. Let
it be just that, namely, a [mere] presentation [or appearance]. If it is simply a presentation [or appearance without any external object, like in dreams], then one has conceded the Yogācāra view."

Dharmakīrti's view of the relationship between atoms, then, as a Sautrāntika, is that the atoms are immediately juxtaposed. There is not even the ghost of an interval between them. Yet in spite of this, the many atoms do not add up to a patch, contrary to what one might expect. They do not constitute anything gross (sthūla) but remain just many, subtle (suksma) atoms. Their plurality and atomicity are not conveyed to the sensum that represents them, a sensum that otherwise captures their collective size and shape, as will be seen in the last of the remaining verses in this long section of the Pramāṇavārtti. As Manorathananandin at one point comments (although speaking as a Yogācārin): "That essential form of the atom—a form that is not gross—is not transferred to the cognition; and that grossness that is transferred to the cognition does not exist in the atoms."9

Dharmakīrti continues discussing the Yogācāra view up to verse 219. Most people need a provisional understanding of things, he concludes at that point, as most people are unenlightened. "Therefore the [Buddha's] sermons on the external object were delivered having in mind just those people who, proceeding [with the ponderosity] of elephants, ignore the [higher] truth."10

Continuing then as a Sautrāntika, Dharmakīrti gives, in the next two verses, what he thinks is the correct provisional view.
The first of the two verses is addressed once again to the issue of how atoms are cognizable at all, each individual atom being "beyond the senses" (atIndriya). Dharmakirti's answer is that, aggregated, they have a special property that they do not have unaggregated. This is the verse in connection with which Manorathananandin makes his comment about the atoms changing their character, a comment that suggests that the initial imperceptibility of the atoms is an in principle imperceptibility. This is also the verse about which Prajnakaragupta makes his long comment quoted earlier (pp. 215-216) that equally suggests that the initial imperceptibility is an in principle imperceptibility. To quote the verse and Manorathananandin's commentary:

WHERE IS THERE ANY DIFFICULTY [WITH THE VIEW THAT] MANY [ATOMS] THAT HAVE COME TO HAVE A SPECIAL PROPERTY INDIVIDUALLY BECOME THE CAUSE OF THE COGNITION? IF YOU OBJECT TO THIS, [WE SAY THAT IT IS JUST] LIKE THE SENSES, THE SELF, ETC. (verse 223)

To the objection that "because atoms are beyond the senses when taken individually, [their] combination (samkśita) also is not the object of cognition", he replies: WHERE IS THERE ANY DIFFICULTY IF MANY atoms . . . THAT HAVE COME TO HAVE A SPECIAL PROPERTY, that is, that have become capable of producing a cognition, arising as they do amassed (samhata), . . . BECOME THE CAUSE OF THE COGNITION, LIKE THE SENSES, ETC? The senses, etc., are not the cause of a cognition if taken separately, but united (milita) they are; this is the case also with atoms. For our atoms are not of one, unchanging nature like the atoms of others; indeed, being beyond the senses, they are also sensible under the condition [that they aggregate].
There is an interesting difference between Manorathananandin's recording of this verse and Prajnākaragupta's. I have given it above in accordance with Manorathananandin's. But where he states that the "special" atoms *individually* (prthak) become the cause of the cognition, Prajnākaragupta says they *simultaneously* (sakṛt) cause it.  

The verse is important enough to be reproduced in Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyārthīkātātparyādīkā*. On yet a further point, he records the verse differently than either Manorathananandin or Prajnākaragupta, but he agrees with Manorathananandin on using "individually" instead of "simultaneously."

There is an appealing reason for taking the verse as Manorathananandin and Vācaspati Miśra take it. "Individually" can be seen as adding an important emphasis. It can be seen as emphasizing that it is each atom that causes the cognition and not the atoms as a whole, as if the lot of them amounted to something more than just many individual atoms. Each and every atom is one cause, the whole lot of them being the cause. The comparison with the senses, etc., then follows as a natural illustration. Just as the eye, the person, the light, etc.—all the things that are necessary individually to generate a perception—are not able to generate it unless they work together, but when they are working together they do not form some single, natural entity, so too the many atoms are not able to generate a perception unless they work together, but likewise they do not form any one thing. In both cases it is
singular causes working together that produce the perception. Dharmakīrti made use of this same example once earlier (p. 231), and I suggested then that the point of it was that many things working together to produce an effect do not on that account form some natural unit.

The last verse in this long section that I want to discuss, verse 224, finally makes the point that for Dharmakīrti the many atoms appear as one patch because they are indirectly perceived in a sensum that captures all but their atomicity. He first states that the object of a cognition is that thing which causes it. In reply to an objection, recorded in the commentary, that then even the eye and the other causes of the perception would be the object, Dharmakīrti replies that the object is specifically that cause whose image appears in the cognition. Manorathananandin goes on to say that the image of the aggregate (saṅcaya) appears in the cognition, therefore the aggregate is the object.

THE PROPERTY OF BEING AN OBJECT [OF A COGNITION] IS NOTHING OTHER THAN THE FACT OF BEING THE CAUSE [OF IT]. AMONG [THE CAUSES], THE ONE WITH THE IMAGE OF WHICH THE COGNITION ARISSES IS SAID TO BE THE OBJECT OF IT. (verse 224)

... Would not the sense organ and the like also be the object because they also are causes? [To this objection Dharmakīrti] replies: AMONG the causes, THE ONE WITH THE IMAGE OF WHICH THE COGNITION ARISSES IS SAID TO BE THE OBJECT OF IT, i.e., of the cognition. And that is the aggregate (saṅcaya) of atoms, And that very cognition reflects the form [of the
aggregate] and not that of the sense [or any of the other causes]. So how could they [rather than the aggregate] be the object?\textsuperscript{15}

Compared to the other causes, that is, the cognition can be said to arise with the image of the many atoms, even though technically it represents them as a single, solid patch instead of a multiplicity. Presumably the sensum is of the collective size and collective outline shape of the atoms.

Prajñākaragupta's comments on this verse make the point that the many atoms are not perfectly represented. He first comments that when atoms of blue are cognized, the blueness is imparted to the cognition but not the atomic form. "The image in the [cognition] does not ultimately capture the plurality of the object; to consider an instance, from an aggregate (saṅcaya) of blue atoms a cognition will come to have an image that is blue but not an image that is of atoms."\textsuperscript{16} He then records, and summarily answers, a question whose sense is that if the blue but not the atomic form appears, how is it known that the blue of the image is the blue of the atoms. "But if there is no representation of the atomic form, how is it that the blue aspect [of the sensum] is that of the atoms? [We reply that] this poses no difficulty because anything else is illogical."\textsuperscript{17} The sensum is blue and the atoms are blue; and it is unreasonable to think that the blueness of the sensum comes from elsewhere than the atoms, considering that the atoms are otherwise the object.
The sensum, then, captures the color and collective size and shape of the atoms, but does not record their plurality (or atomicity) in representing them as a single, gross patch. This is the view we will see confirmed in the last passages to which I now turn.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

1
citrāvabhāseṣv artheṣu yady ekatvam na yujyate/ saiva
tāvat katham buddhir ekā citrāvabhāsīnī/ //

2
TB 101.1-6. But see also Shrinivas Shastri’s point that one
believes one actually sees the object even though the proof
of its existence is a matter of inference, [2], pp. 412-413.

3
PV II:210 and PVV on this verse.

4
See TSP 674.9-17.

5
PVV 164.1-2: TASMĀN NĀRTEṢU NA JNĀNE STHULĀBhĀSAH TAD-
ĀTMANAH/ EKATRA PRATISIDDHATVAD BAHUṢV API NA SAMBHAVAH//
PVV 164.9-13: TASMĀN NĀRTEṢU bāhyeṣu NA JNĀNE tadgrānakе
STHULĀBhĀSAH sthūla ākāraḥ saṅgacchate. TADĀTMANAH sthūla-
svarūpasaya āTATKĀMYASVA paramāṇau va PRATISIDDHATVAT. BAHUṢV API
teṣu SAMBHĀVĀVASTI, mīlītā api hi ta eva. te ca pratyekān
sthālayāvikāla iti samudītā api tathāiva syuh. tathā nālādy-
ākāresu pratyekān citrasya sthālayasya bhāvāt samudāye 'py abhēvah.

6
PVV 287.17-22: a: theṣu hi paramāguṣv avayaviṣu ca na
sthūlabhāsaḥ. sthūlatā hi digbhāgabhinā śa digbhāgaṁ ca parāpara-
[text: parāpara-]parivāraśa sthānānekatvām. atha bahuṣu sthūla-
bhāsaḥ. tathā hi bahuṣaḥ samānajātiyāḥ paramāṇavo 'vicchimntaryā
pratibhāsāmatāḥ sthūlatvaḥ vyapādisyantā. naitad api yuktām.
bahava eva te sthūlatāvah pratyekam abhāvāt. samudāyasya bhaviṣyatīti
cet. ko 'paras tebhyaḥ samudāyaḥ. ekaghanaśca pratibhāsāḥ
sthūlavapadesabhāk. na ca parasparaviviktāpratibhāse ekaghmatavya
antarālayāpī pratibhāsāntat. atha na pratibhāti na tarhi te
pratibhāsītaḥ syuh.

7
Aktr. I,91,fn.3; SAV 122.13-19.
These are the conclusions of Y. Karunadasa, Buddhist
Analysis of Matter (Colombo, 1967), pp. 151-152. But Karunadasa
also thinks that the atom is for the Sautrāntika not partless.
There is no evidence for this in the references just given, which
even suggest the contrary. Durveka Miśra, speaking as a Sautrāntika in Dharmottaraprakāśa, clearly states that atoms are partless, DP 43.24-25. However, Hsūan Tsang says that the Sautrāntika atom is extended (方分, digdesabheda), which suggests that it is divisible, T 46.13. It is possible that Karumadaka and Hsūan Tsang are thinking of the aggregate form of the atoms rather than the individual atoms; the aggregate form is extended and does have parts. Since for the Sautrāntikas atoms evidently always arise in aggregates and never individually, there is a sense in which the atoms that there are (always in aggregation) are "extended" and "with parts."

Kamalaśīla records three distinct views, TSP 677.20-21: 1) the atoms are in close conjunction (parasparaṁ samyujyante), 2) they are separated by intervals of space and are not touching (sāntarā ... na sprāsānti), and 3) they are not separated by spaces and are loosely speaking said to be touching even though they are not (nirantaratave tu sprātatasamāṁ). The second view is likely the Vaibhāṣika; and the third view, since it is Vasubandhu's (AKB 122.4-6), is reasonably Dharmakīrti's.

PVB 287.35-36: tasmān nāvayaṁ nāvayaṁ prātipihāsa-gocarāḥ. prātipihāsa ity evāstu. yadi tarhi prātipihāsa evāyaṁ sa eva viśeṣānavādaḥ prasaktah.

PVV 196.25-26: yad aṇusvarupam asthūlam asti na tat jñānārūḍham, yac ca jñānārūḍham sthāulyaṁ nānuṣu tad asti.

PV II:219: tad upekaśatattvārthaḥ kaṭvā gajānīmālamanam/ kevalām. lokabuddhyālva bāhyacintā pratanyate//

PVV 167.5-6: KO VĀ VIRODHO BAHAVAḥ SANJĀTĀTISAYAḥ PRAHAK/ BHAVEYUH KĀRAṆAṁ BUDDHER YADI NĀTME NDRIYADIVAT// PVV 167.22-25 and 168.7-9: yac cocrita—"paramāṇavah pratyekam atindriyatvāt saṁcitā api na jñānagogacarāḥ" iti—tattrāha: YADI BAHAVAḥ paramāṇava ... SANJĀTĀTISAYAḥ viṣeṣānājamanagocarāḥ saṁhitā utpannāḥ ... BUDDHERAḥ KĀRAṆAṁ BHAVEYUH, tadā KŌ VIRODHABH, INDIRYADIVAT. indriyādāyāḥ pratyekam na buddher hetuḥ, militas tu bhavanti, tadvad aṇavo 'pi syuh. na hi pareṣāṁ ivāsāśānaḥ ca nityaikasvabhāva aṇavaḥ, te hi yathāpratayah atindriyāḥ santa aindriyāḥ api syuh.

PVB 296.3 (Misnumbered verse 224).
13

NVTT 396.17-19.

14

Where the verse in PVV and PVB have "nāmendriyādīvat," NVTT has "nāmendriyādīvat." This makes better sense; but because I am quoting the commentaries, I have taken the verse as it appears in PVV. Manorathamandin does not gloss the "na."

15

PVV 168.1-2: HETUBHĀVĀD RTE NĀNYĀ GRĀHYATĀ NĀMA KĀ CANA/
TATRA BUDDHIR YADĀKĀRA TASYĀS TAD GRĀHYAM UCYATE// PVV 168.10-14:
Nanu hetute "pi katham aṇavo grāhyāḥ? ity īha: HETUBHĀVĀD RTE/
vīnā GRĀHYATĀ NĀMA yā prasiddhā sā NĀNYĀ KĀ CIT, api tu hetutaiva
grāhyatā. evaṃ tarhīndriyādikām api hetutvād grāhyam syād?
ity īha: TATRA teṣu hetuṣu BUDDHIR YADĀKĀRA bhavati TASYĀ buddhes
TAD GRĀHYAM UCYATE anusaṃcayaḥ. saiva ca buddhir ākāram anukaroti,
nendriyādeḥ; tat katham tadgrāhyam?

16

PVV 296.22-23: rūpāyatanasāmānyena tadākāratā na
paramārthataḥ. tathā hi nīlāparamāṇusāncayān nīlākāratā viśeṣānasya.
paramāṇvākāratā mā bhūt.

17

PVV 296.24-25: nanu yadī paramāṇvākāratā na pratibhātī
caramāṇum ān nīlākārateti kutaḥ. anyathā "yogād iti na dosāḥ."
Chapter 11

DURVEKA MISRA’S DHARMOTTARAPRADTPA

Before taking up Durveka Misra’s comments, I would like to consider one more set of Prajñākaragupta’s. These are in connection with a verse not in either of the two sections of verses so far considered. Dharmakīrti, after following verse 224 of the long section with some 95 verses from the Sautrāntika perspective, moves the discussion again to the higher level. Beginning with verse 320, in the standard Yogācāra line of attack he questions how our sense cognitions can be of external objects when the objects are aggregates of subtle atoms and the cognitions of them have gross images.

BY WHAT [FORM OF THEIRS] DO THE ATOMS EXHIBIT THE GROSS IMAGE [IN THE COGNITION]? (verse 321cd)¹

Prajñākaragupta’s first comments make the point that the sensum does not truly capture the object in respect to its atomic multiplicity, a fact that Prajñākaragupta (speaking as a Yogācārin) thinks makes the cognition an "error" (bhrānta).

If atoms are the object, then considering that the cognition has a gross image, how [can the atoms really be] the object of the cognition? For there is no conformity of form [between the image and the atoms]. The [cognition] must simply be an error, like the cognition of, say, a tree as a solid body.²

The example of the tree as a solid body is the example of seeing the many distinct parts of a tree, e.g., the branches, trunk,
leaves, etc., as if they comprised one solid unity, i.e., the tree.
(Another Buddhist example along similar lines is seeing the many
trees of a forest as if they constituted the solid body of a
forest.) Prajñākaragupta's next comments are the ones in which I
am particularly interested:

[Should you propose that] the atoms exhibit [the
character represented in the image] at least in regards
to the feature of color [and thus that atoms do cause
the image in the cognition], we reply that this is
unacceptable. For there is no shape apart from color.
[And] in possessing a shape that is identical with
color, [were the color of the atoms truly reflected
in the cognition], then it would follow as a consequence
that [the atoms] would be gross, [because that is the
shape reflected in the cognition].

Prajñākaragupta is arguing on the Sautrāntika's own account of shape
and color not differing, atoms can be proven not to reflect at
all in the cognition, the cognition not reflecting their atomic
shape and hence not reflecting their color either.

Not all Buddhists believed that color and shape are not
distinct. This seems to have been a peculiarly Sautrāntika belief.
The Vaibhāṣika rivals of the Sautrāntikas, for example, maintained
that shape and color are two different things.

What both views amounted to can be at least vaguely
understood by looking at what Vasubandhu, author of the
Abhidhammakosā, says on the subject. He records two Vaibhāṣika
arguments to the effect that shape is distinct from color. The
two are distinct, the first argument runs, because it is sometimes
possible to see the shape of a thing without seeing its color.
For example, in dim light at a distance we might see the shape of a man without seeing his color (a matter of some importance in caste-conscious India). The second argument is that were shape and color not distinct, then everything of the same color would be of the same shape. Pots of the same color would not differ in shape. (Both of the examples are Vasubandhu's.)

The Sautrāntikas respond to the second argument by saying that the shape of the pot is due to the disposition of the color atoms of which it is composed. Different arrangements of these atoms produce the different shapes. The response to the first argument is that the color is seen indistinctly (avyakta); because one sees it indistinctly, one sees but the dark shape of a man instead of a man of a particular color.

But what is worrying Prajñākaragupta in his question to the Sautrāntikas is not that the sensum has what might be called a particular outline, which can be explained as due to the atoms having a certain configuration. What is bothering him is that the sensum is a single, "solid" thing. Whence comes this feature of singular solidity? It cannot come from the atoms, because they do not form a patch.

The Sautrāntika response, as Prajñākaragupta represents it, is that this feature of singular solidity is purely a feature of the cognition. The way consciousness records a certain configuration of atoms is as a single, solid expanse of a particular outline
contour. The features of singularity and solidarity of the shape are not in the object the way the contour and the color are.

Prajñākaragupta only sketches this reply.

[The Sautrāntika reply that] grossness is a feature of the cognition [unlike the feature of color]; color is a property of the object. One speaks of grossness when many things are being apprehended. But [grossness] is not in the atoms individually. However, color such as blue color is in [each atom] individually, and it is therefore a feature of the object."

But the contour is not in the atoms individually any more than the grossness is; so it is not clear that just by making the grossness a feature solely of the cognition Dharmakīrti has escaped the objection that shape is not distinct from color. It is distinct, given what Prajñākaragupta has just said, in that it is a feature of atoms only collectively, while color is a feature of atoms individually. Further, if the outline shape of the sensum derives from the atoms only collectively and not individually, it is not clear that Dharmakīrti has escaped the objection that the aggregate is somehow a unity of parts and hence a universal.

The objection Prajñākaragupta himself goes on to state is neither of these two objections. Instead he goes on to object that in representing the atoms in a particular configuration as a single, solid expanse of a particular contour, the sensum does not capture the intervals between the atoms.

If it is [as the Sautrāntika claim], then the [cognition of the many color atoms as gross would yet be] an error because the [atoms], separated by intervals, are grasped as being without them.  


The obvious Sautrāntika reply is that the atoms are not separated by intervals. It is the Vaibhāṣikas and not the Sautrāntikas who believe that they are (see p. 252). Leaving aside the rest of Prajñākaragupta's comments (and any questions why the grossness is not then as much a feature of the arrangement of atoms as is the contour), I turn in closing to a long passage of Durveka Miśra's which is just such a clear reply that the atoms are not separated by intervals. The answer affirms that the grossness is not in the atoms, although the only reason given for this is, in effect, that the atoms, even without intervals, still remain "a multitude."

The passage of Durveka Miśra's to which I want to turn represents a comment on a line of Dharmottara's Nyāyabindūtiṁkā. Since the passage contains the words from Dharmottara's line from the Nyāyabindūtiṁkā, it is necessary to discuss this line before turning to the passage.

Dharmottara has been discussing verse 4 of Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindū, the verse containing the definition of pratyakṣa (in sense 2): "Of the [two kinds of veridical cognition], pratyakṣa is that which is nonerroneous (abhrānta) and free from kalpanā." The line we are interested in follows a number of lines devoted mostly to making terminological points. Dharmottara proceeds to gloss what Dharmakīrti means in his verse by "nonerroneous" (abhrānta). In connection with this, Dharmottara makes the following comment: "'Nonerroneous' means not contrary to a [visual] reality
that is capable of a function." He then glosses "a [visual] reality that is capable of a function" (arthakriyākṣama vasturūpa) as "that which consists in a color that has shape as a qualifier" (sannivesopādhivārvīnātmaka).  

Durveka Miśra, after a few comments on Dharmottara's line that "'Nonerroneous' means not contrary to a [visual] reality that is capable of a function," comments on Dharmottara's gloss of "a [visual] reality that is capable of a function" as "that which consists in a color that has shape as a qualifier." These latter comments of Durveka Miśra's are the ones to which I now turn. They begin, after an introductory question, with the statement that by the word "shape" Dharmottara means squareness and the like, i.e., solid, contoured expanse; and that shape is a feature of the image (pratibhāsa) in the cognition, at least (the rest of what he says makes clear) the solidity or "grossness" of it.

Durveka Miśra's point is that, because the color atoms are not separated by intervals, the cognition of many of them as a solid expanse of color is not an error (bhrānta). To make this point, he considers and rejects various suggestions as to what this interval could amount to, showing that in no case is the cognition of the atoms as a patch an error because of such an alleged interval.

The discussion is put in terms of the atoms being "unconnected" (asamprasta). The opponent insists that, the atoms being
"unconnected" (asamsrsta), the cognition of them as if "connected" is an error. Durveka Miśra replies by ruling out the different ways the opponent could think the atoms are "unconnected." Some of these ways are by having various kinds of interstices such as atoms of the substance "space" (ākāsa) or just intervals of empty space.

By ruling out the proffered ways the atoms could be "unconnected," Durveka Miśra does not mean that the atoms are "connected" in the sense that they lose their multiplicity and merge into a single patch, as other comments of his make clear. He only means that they are not "unconnected" in any way that would make the cognition of them as a single solid color expanse an error. The relation between the atoms is that of immediate juxtaposition, i.e., being right next to each other without even space interposing (but yet, Dharmakīrti would insist, somehow not touching\textsuperscript{16}). Because the atoms are immediately juxtaposed and not "unconnected" in any way that would justify them not appearing as a patch, the cognition of them as a patch is not an error, even though the atoms retain their plurality and do not actually amount to a patch. The singular solidarity of the patch is the correct way for consciousness to record the many atoms immediately juxtaposed.

The discussion ties in the analysis of error that we discussed in the first chapter. The recording of the many atoms immediately juxtaposed as a single, solid patch is not an error because there is no misrepresentation as to this object's location
in time, location in space, or character (see p. 34), or so Durveka Miśra seems to say. Here the characterization of error is one that is appropriate for a case of perception (pratyakṣa in sense 1), but it is taken as applying to a case of sensation (pratyakṣa in sense 2), retaining to the last Dharmakīrti's equivocating on the two meanings of "pratyakṣa."

Durveka Miśra's comments are straightforward and I will interpret them with my own comments as little as possible. (For the Sanskrit of the passage, see appendix B.)

What is it that is capable of performing a function? Is it a whole (avayavin), or something else? [To forestall a question of this sort, Dharmottara] says, "A [VISUAL] REALITY CAPABLE OF PERFORMING A FUNCTION IS THAT WHICH CONSISTS IN A COLOR THAT HAS SHAPE AS A QUALIFIER." SHAPE is squareness and the like, and it is a feature of the image. That color of which shape is the qualifier or attribute—a color that is an agglomerate (sāmphāta) of white atoms or atoms of another color and that is the denotation of words referring to objects and that is described as such—that is what is meant by [A COLOR THAT HAS SHAPE AS A QUALIFIER]. [Dharmottara] speaks this way because it can be seen, relying on the method of agreement and difference, that only a color qualified by a shape is capable of performing a function. [A VISUAL REALITY THAT CONSISTS IN or has as its essence [a color qualified by shape] is [THAT WHICH CONSISTS IN A COLOR THAT HAS SHAPE AS A QUALIFIER]. And it should be understood that all this has been said with respect to the object of [specifically] visual cognition; it would be quite inappropriate to construe it in any other way. By [saying what he does, Dharmottara] indicates that it is not some whole that is capable of performing a function but only an accumulation (pracayā) of atoms, for [the whole] does not exist. . . . 17

[But, it might then be objected,] this would be the case. You think the object of atoms is an external
reality. Yet every cognition that arises from these extremely subtle atoms has a gross image. How is such a cognition called nonerroneous? To this we give the following reply. The atoms, produced from the same causal nexus, reside by nature in their respective places. They are free from intervals of the nature of atoms of shadow and light\textsuperscript{18} because the cause of [such atoms] is absent. [Free from intervals, there is produced from them] an image that is continuous and that amounts to the appearance of spatial extension. Grossness is nothing but this. How could the cognition, being free of kalpanā\textsuperscript{*} and being based on an assemblage (samudāya) of atoms of this sort, be in error? [It would be in error] if it were to apprehend a single atom as residing in many places instead of many atoms in many places. It would be in even greater error if it were to cognize [many] atoms, which are in different places, as if they were in one place. But this [latter] is not what happens, because there is no image of a mass the size of a single atom—and in cognizing [the many atoms as if residing in] a single place, the mass (pinda) would be the size of a single atom and would not be spatially extended. And the cognition of many [places as the seat of many atoms] is not an error because [error] is of the nature of "this in that."

That is, error is an awareness of something as having a different spatial location, etc., than it in fact has.

The meaning is this. [There is no whole.] The [so-called] gross [mass] is many such atoms [i.e., atoms without intervals] apprehended by a single cognition. For if you insist that this gross [mass] is a whole, then we reply that [grossness] is a feature of the image [but not of the object], for it is arrived at on the basis of the image appearing as such [that is, as gross]. It is not a characteristic of the object, because each [atom] is not individually gross.

But, [an objector asks], how can a cognition which apprehends atoms which are in essence mutually unconnected (asamsṛṣṭa) as if they were unified (samsṛṣṭa) be nonerroneous? To this we say [the following]. What is this unconnectedness of which you speak,
from the mistaken apprehension of which the cognition is described as erroneous?

The reply, as I said, is not that the atoms are not "unconnected," but only that their unconnectedness is not mistakenly apprehended. It is the unconnectedness, Durveka Miśra goes on to say, of having distinct atomic forms and distinct spatial locations, which is correctly registered as a single, solid sensum. It is not the unconnectedness of having intervals.

[Is the unconnectedness of which you speak the fact of the atoms] having many forms? Or many places? Or being separated by something visible of a different sort (rūpenaiva vijarṣṭyena)? Or being kept apart by something cognized by another sense? If you think it is an unconnectedness of many forms, then cognizing [the atoms] as united [would for you] never be possible, since at all times one would cognize only unconnected atoms, on account of the fact it is only those atoms extended in space [that you say are really unconnected in some way that makes the cognition erroneous] that [ever] appear. Indeed, if only one form appeared [instead of their many forms], then the mass [of them] would be [the size of] an atom and there would be no experience of spatial extension.

But if you think the unconnectedness is having many places, then all the more there would never be cognition of them as united. For the blue atoms in different places are cognized precisely in their different places. Indeed if they appeared to be in one place, then as already stated the mass [of them] would appear the size of an atom.

If you hope to contend that the unconnectedness is being separated by a visual-sense atom of a different sort, then precisely because that is impossible, there could not be erroneous apprehension in respect to the [atoms]. For blue atoms that are without intervals are simply free from the interposing of other visual-sense atoms; and they appear that way, so how is there any error? For interposing visual-sense atoms such as light, different [from the blue atoms but of the
same sense field], are not produced there and make no appearance. And what prevents an atom of shadow or light from being produced, given that it is not produced, [an opponent might ask]? For it cannot be said that there is no room for another atom in between other atoms because an atom, being partless, can fit in anywhere. [We reply] that this is true. [However], the nonproduction of the [heterogeneous atom] is not simply because of the fact that there is no room but because there is no cause. And why is there no cause? Because of the absence of the cause's cause—there is absolutely no [point to press this] inquiry.

But your contention [might be that] the unconnectedness is the fact of being kept apart by [atoms] of touch and the like that are apprehended by another sense. Then when you say [in your objection that] the cognition grasps, as connected, atoms [that are unconnected], what is being said [in effect] is that [the cognition] grasps [the atoms which have atoms of other sense-fields between them as] destitute of [intervening atoms] graspable by other senses. But as before, there is nothing wrong [with this]. For although the [atoms] of touch, etc., that are cognizable by a different sense are not apprehended [when the blue atoms are], still each blue atom is indeed apprehended in its own nature and its own place. And when the essential nature [of the blue atoms] is being grasped [but as if the atoms were] devoid of [atoms] graspable by another sense, no error is involved. For there is no disparity of either time, place, or character.

That is, even though the atoms are apprehended as if free from intervening atoms of other sense fields and contiguous, still this cognition of them is not erroneous because the atoms are not misapprehended as to spatial location, temporal location, or character. It is only a cognition that is a misapprehension of them in one of these three respects that is erroneous. A visual cognition actually cannot take cognizance of atoms of other sense fields; so, as he now says, it can hardly be faulted for not doing so.
And nonapprehension [of something amenable only to another sense] is not an error.

[The objector, still not content, now suggests that] there are intervals between the atoms of the nature of [empty] space (ākāśa). But the [atoms] do not appear to have intervals, so how can the cognition be said not to be erroneous? [We ask in reply], What is this thing you call space? If it is but another entity amenable to the visual sense, then that does not exist [between the atoms], as we have already said. Likewise, [if it is something] of, say, a tactile nature, we have responded to that also. But [if it] is [just] the absence of anything that obstructs, space is then [not a positive entity, i.e., it is] a nonentity (avastu). And then in saying the interval is space, you would be saying that there is no interval that amounts to an interval that is a [positive] entity different [from the blue atoms]. But this would [be the equivalent of] saying that the atoms are without interval. So the atoms that are without intervals appear just as without intervals. Why do you say there is an interval of space, but that [interval] does not appear? How could something that is altogether nonexistent, like the horns of a hare, ever appear?

But, [the objector continues], without intervals of the nature of space, the forms of the atoms would meld (samsarga). We say this presents no problem. We do not say that the atoms have one form but not one place. Rather [the atoms] that originate with many forms and many places [i.e., with each atom having its own form and place] and that are free of any heterogeneous entities between them appear as such; so how would it follow that there is a conflation (samsarga) of [their] forms?

At this point, the objector tries one last objection. Something that is colored also often has taste (such as a blue wine grape). But then there are two things in the same place, the atoms of color and of taste. The reply given by Durveka Miśra, to the extent that it is intelligible, is reminiscent of the one given earlier to the objection that the atoms of color are
interspersed with atoms amenable to senses other than the visual.

But the form of blue appears where the taste and the like do. How can a cognition that apprehends something in a place (desā) when it is not in that place be nonerroneous? To this also we have a response. When a place is experienced (pratibhāsate), that thing which is experienced in that experienced place is the thing said to be qualified by that place. And if taste and the like appeared in a visual cognition, then in [also] apprehending the blue that pervades that place, the cognition would [truly] be erroneous. But taste and the like are not experienced there [in the visual cognition], because what is apprehendable by one sense is not experienced in the cognition of a different sense. How then is there the apprehension of the blue in the place of the [taste]? In fact [on our account of place] the place is nothing other than the very blue that is appearing! And when nothing appears that is graspable by another sense, there is an appearance of a pure form [that is unmixed with the form of anything heterogeneous]. And the appearance of a pure form is an appearance without intervals. Thus, it is blue atoms that are without intervals that are grasped. Therefore the blue atoms, staying in their own places, are apprehended with their very own forms. Then since not one [of the three things] of space, time, or character, is foresaken, the cognition is simply nonerroneous. . . .

In conclusion, these last comments of Durveka Miśra leave no doubt that the sensory object is an aggregate of atoms (paramāṇu).

The cognition of an aggregate is free from both error and kalpanā* or the mental operation in perception and is hence a sensory cognition (pratyakṣa in sense 2). The atoms remain many and do not, simply because they are immediately juxtaposed, converge into some single, solidly extended thing. The singular solidarity of the sensum recording them is not a misrepresentation of them because this is the correct way for atoms immediately juxtaposed
to be represented.

The sensum is thus like its object in all respects except that it misses the fact of the plurality of the atoms. Dharmakīrti may not be able to maintain consistently 1) that the color of the sensum is the collective color of the atoms, each atom being individually colored, 2) that the contour of the sensum's shape is only in the atoms collectively and not in each atom individually, and 3) that color and shape are yet not two very distinct things. Further, in his contention that at least the contour of the sensum is truly in the atoms (if collectively) but that the grossness of the sensum is only a feature of the sensum (and not of the atoms even collectively), it is possible that Dharmakīrti still faces the objection that the aggregate is a patch and hence a universal, particularly since the atoms are immediately juxtaposed (even if, as Dharmakīrti insists, not touching). And does it make sense to say that atoms that are immediately juxtaposed (even if not touching) do not constitute a patch? But if there are philosophical difficulties with Dharmakīrti's position, or aspects of it that are still far from perfectly clear, at least it is clear that the svalaṅga or sensory object is neither a single atom (paramāṇu) nor a transcendent Kantian noumenon. For if the sensum fails to capture the plurality of the atoms, it captures, e.g., their color, each atom clearly being colored. And each color atom is located in time and space, even if temporally it is no more than an instant
(ksana) and spatially it is no more than an infinitesimal. As an aggregate of paramāṇus, the svalaksana is neither a single atom nor a Kantian noumenon.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

1. SARŪPAYANTI TAT KENA STHŪLĀBHĀSAṂ CA TE 'ṆAVAḤ/'

2. PVB 350.4-5: aṇava eva yadi viśayastataḥ sthūlābhāsa-vijñānam iti sārūpyābhāvāt katham viśayo viśānavasya. vṛkṣādi-piṇḍagrahaḥ avad bhrāntam eva bhavet.

3. PVB 350.5-6: varṇākāratayā sarūpayantītī cet. na. varṇānavyatiśreṇa saṃsthānābhāvāt. varṇātmakasaṃsthānavattve sthūlataiva prāptā.

4. AKB 573.5-9.

5. Ibid.

6. AKB 576.8

7. AKB 576.5

8. AKB 576.6-7. See also SAV 33.29.

9. AKB 576.9

10. The contour must be in the atoms, in terms of their collective configuration, in order to make sense of the claim that the sensum reflects the aggregate but not the eye, etc., see p. 256.

11. PVB 350.6-8: atha sthūlatā grahaṇadharmaḥ. varṇās tu grāhyadharmaḥ. bahuṣu grhyamāṇeṣu sthūlām iti bhavati vyapadesāḥ. na sa pratyekāṃ paramāṇuṣu. nīlāditā tu pratyekam ato 'sau grāhyadharmaḥ.
12  
PVB 350.8-9: yady evam tathā sāntarāṃ m anantarata-vagrahaṇād bhrāntir eva.

13  
tatra pratyakṣam kalpanā 'poḍham abhrāntam.

14  
NBTD 41.5 and 42.1: abhrāntam arthakriyākṣame vasturūpe 'viparyastam ucyate.

15  
NBTD 42.1.

16  
There is good reason to think that Dharmakīrti's view was Vasubandhu's. That atoms do not touch (even though they are immediately juxtaposed) seems to be the point of Vasubandhu's comment, AKB 122.4-5: na sprānti, nirantarā tu sprātasamajhe ti bhadantaḥ bhadantamataḥ caistavyam. See AKB 121.2-4 and SAV 122.13-19. La Vallée Poussin, however, thinks the atoms touch, [3], p. 39.

Kamalasila records three views, TSP 677.20-21: 1) the atoms are in close conjunction (parasparam samyujyante), 2) they are separated by intervals of space and not touching (sāntaraḥ . . . na sprānti), and 3) they are not separated by spaces and are called touching (nirantaratve tu sprātasamajha). The last view is obviously Vasubandhu's.

17  
A line of gloss on a later comment of Dharmottara's is omitted here: NA BHRĀMYATTI na viparyasyati—anyathāgrāhi na bhavati.

18  
In the AK I:28b, light (āloka) and darkness (tamas) are said to make up space (ākāsa).

19  
Elided: sarvam caitad grāhyatattvam vinīścaye dharmottareqaiva vistareṇa nirūpitam iti neha pratanyate. It is not clear to what passage Durveka Misra refers.

20  
NB I:4: tatra pratyakṣam kalpanā 'poḍham abhrāntam.
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Dharmapāla. See N. Aiyaswami Shstri [1].

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Dīnāga. See Bhattori; N. Aiyaswami Shastri [1].

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Hsūn Tsang. See La Vallée Poussin [3].

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Vinātadeva. See Gangopadhyaya; La Vallée Poussin [2], Stcherbatsky [6].


Yaśomitra. See Dwarkadas Shastri [1].


APPENDIX A

EXTRACT FROM THE SANSKRIT TEXT OF DIGNĀGA'S ĀLAMBAṆAPARĪKṢĀ

(From the edition of N. Aiyaśwami Shastri, The Adyar Library Series, No. 32, pp. 3–5. Parenthetical glosses and bracketed emendations are the editors; reproduced without his footnotes.)

ye cakṣuṛādi jñānasyālambanāṁ bāhyārthatīṣṭaṁcchanti. nanu te kalpayanti paramāṇūn; tatkāraṇatvāt [jñānasya]. saṃghātaṁ vā tadābhajjñānasya jāyamāṇatvāt. tatra tāvat

YADY APĪNDRIYAVIJÑĀNAPTA GRĀHYĀMSĀH (=ANAVAḥ)
KĀRAṆAṁ BHAVET/ ATADĀBHATAYĀ TASYĀ NATKṢAVAD

VIṢAYAḥ SA TU (ANAVAḥ)// (verse 1)

VIṢAYA iti. jñānena svarūpa[m eva] nirdhāryate. tadākāraṇatvāḥ jāyamāṇatvāḥ. yady apy anavaḥ tatkāraṇam. tathāpi na tādṛśaḥ akṣavat. evaṁ ca nāṇavas tāvād alambanam. saṃghātas tu tadābhavte 'pi [jñānasya, nālambanam. yataḥ]

YADĀBHĀṢĀ NA TASMĀT SĀ (verse 2a)

yo 'ṛthaḥ svāvabhāśivijñāptim utpādayati sahyālambanam yujyate. yataḥ sa eva by utpattipratyaya ucyate. saṃghātas tu naiyam.

DRAVYĀBHĀVĀD DVICANDRAVAT/ (verse 2b)

indriyavaikalyāṇat dvicandradarśanasya tadābhavte 'pi na tasya viṣayo 'sti. tadvat saṃghātaḥ dravyato 'sattvena akāraṇatvāt nālambanam.

EVAṁ BĀHYADVAYĀN CAIVA NA YUKTAḥ MATIČOCARAH// (verse 2cd)
]\n\n anus kalapasa ceti bahyo 'rthah nalambam, ekangavaikalyat. tatra
 SADHANAM SAANCITAKARAM ICCHANTI KILA KE CANA/ (verse 3ab)
 sarvo 'r tho bahvakara atah tatra kena cid akarena pratyaksha
 isyate. paramanu sv apy asti saancitabhajannotpatikaranabhavah.
 ANVARKO NA VIPNAPTER ARTAH KATHINATADIVAT/ (verse 3cd)
 yathaa kathinatadi vicyamam api na cakusahaanuddhivisayah. evam
 aputvam api.
 BHAVED GHAṬASAṬARAVIDES TATHAA SATI SAMAA MATIHI/ (verse 4ab)
 ghaṭasaratavadiparamanu su bahusv api na ko 'pi visëso. 'sti.
 ĀKARABHEDAD BHEDAS CET (verse 4c)
 yadi manyase griivyakara visësakriya, yena buddher visësañam
 upadhir bhavet. iti. ayyam upadhir ghaṭadav asti.
 NASTI TU DRAVYASATY ANAII/ PRAMANA BHEDABHAVAT
 SAH (verse 4d, 5a)
 paramanu su dravyaṇtareśv api pārīmaṇḍalye bheda nasti.
 ADRAYYE 'STI TATAH SA HI/ (verse 5b)
 ākabhedah samvṛtisatsv evasti na tu paramanu. ghaṭadayas
 ca samvṛtisanta eva.
 ANUHMAH PARITARE HI TADBHAJANAVIPLAVAT// (verse 5cd)
 dravyasatsu apanītasambandhīv api [nīla-]varṇādīvata svabuddhir
 na tayajate. tathā sati indriyabuddhīnām visayo bahir nastity
 upapadyate.

*metrical substitute for parimāṇa.
APPENDIX B

EXTRACT FROM THE SANSKRIT TEXT

OF DURVEKA MIŚRA'S DHARMOTTARAPRADĪPA


kim tadarthakriyākṣamam? kim avayavi? athānyad evety āha: ARTHA-KRIYETI. SANNIVEŚAŚ caturasratvādiḥ pratibhāsadharmaḥ. sa
UPĀDHIR viśēṣaṁ yasya VĀKYĀSYA vastuṣabdavācyasya śuklādiparamāṇu-saṁghātasya tathotpannasya sa tatha. sanniveśāviśeṣēṣṭasyaiva
varṇasyānvavyayatirekābhyāṁ arthakriyāyaṁ upayogadarśanād etad āha. sa evātma svabhāvo yasyeti tat tatha. etac ca cakṣuṣajñāna-
viśayābhiprāyeṇoktaṁ draṣṭavyam. anyathā bahun asamāṇjasam syād iti. anena paramāṇupracayamātrasyaiśvārthakriyākāritvam nāvayavinas
tasyāsattvād iti sūcito. . . .

syād etat, paramāṇavartthe eva bhavamate bāhyam vastu. sarvam
cacācācān teṣu paramasūkṣmesu sthūlabhūsam ājñāte. tat katham
kīṁ cid abhrāntaṁ nāmeti? atrocīte. ekasāmagrajānmanāṁ
paramāṇūnāṁ bhinnadeśasvabhāvānāṁ taddhetvabhāvataṁ chāyāloka-
paramāṇusvabhāvenāntareṇa rahitatsvāṁ nirantaratvena pratibhāsa
eva deśāvāvabhāṣātmā sthāulyaṁ nāparam kīṁ cit. tatra
tathābhūta-paramāṇusamudāyanīṣṭhaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ viśīṇaṁ katham
bhrāntaṁ syāt? yady ekaikāṁ paramāṇum anekadēśāvāṣṭambhena
gṛhnīyāṁ na punar anekam anekadēśāvāṣṭambhena gṛhnat. ito 'pi
viparyasyed yadi bhinnadeśān paramāṇaṁ ekadesān grhṇīyāt. na ca itad asti, aṇumātrakapindapratibhāṣābhāvāt. ekadesāgrahe hi pindo bhāseta aṇumātrakā na tu vitatadesāḥ. na caṇekagraho bhramaḥ. atasmīṃs tad iti pratyayasya tādātmāyaḥ. tad ayam arthāḥ: eka-jñānagrāhyās tathāvidhā bahavah paramāṇaṅvah sthūla iti. eko 'yam sthūla iti tu tathābhūt-pratibhāṣāsaṁrayaṇa vyavasthāpyamānaṁtatvāt pratibhāṣadharma ity ucyate. na vastudharmaḥ, pratyekam aparī-samāpter ity alam iha vistareṇa.

namu caivam apy anyonyam asamsṛṣṭāsvabhāvān paramāṇaṁ asamsṛṣṭān grhṇād viśānah katham ivāviparyastam nāmeti. atrāpy ucyate. kim idam asamsṛṣṭatvam iva bhaṃvārā, yadviparyayagrapad bhrāntām jñānam upavarnyate? kim nānārūpatvam, atha nānādesātvam, uta rūpeśaiva vijātiyena vyavahitatvam, āhosvid indriyāntara-grāhyāntarētha vyavakīṁpatvam? tatra yadi nānārūpatvam asamsṛṣṭatvam iva iva tādā na kaś cit samsṛṣṭagraho nāma sambhavati yato 'samsṛṣṭā eva paramāṇaṅvah sarvadā grhṇyante. vitatadesā-svabhāvānām eva teṣām avabhāsanāt. yadi hy ekarūpa bhāseran, aṇumātrakā pindo bhāseta. na tu vitatadesabhāsanaṁ syāt.

atha nānādesātvam asamsṛṣṭatvam abhipretām tad api natarāṁ samsṛṣṭagraho yato nānādesā nilaṁ paramāṇavo nānādesā eva ca grhṇyante. ekadesātvabhāsanē hi pindo bhāsetāpumātrakā ity uktam.

atha rūpeśaiva vijātiyena vyavahitatvam asamsṛṣṭatvam vivaksitam; tadā tu tadāsambhavād eva na tadviparītagrahaḥ. yato rūpāntaravyavadhānarahitaṁ eva nirantarā nīlāḥ paramāṇaṅvahā, bhāsante
ca tathābhūtā iti katham vibhramaḥ. madhyavarttino vijātiyasyāloka-diparamāṇor anutpatter apratibhāsanaṁ ca. atha cchāyālokaparamāṇur upṭadyamānaṁ kena pratibaddho yato notpadyate. na ca sākyam vaktum: madhyā paramāṇvor nāsti paramāṇvantarasasyāvakāśa iti. yato niravayavah paramāṇuḥ sarvatra sāvakāśa iti. satyam etat. kevalaṁ nāvakāsabhāvāt tadanuttattir api tu hetvabhāvāt. kasmād hetur na bhavati? svahetvabhāvād ity aparyanuyoga eva.

atha bhinnendriyagrāhyasyāsparśādyavakīṛṇatvam asaṃśṛṣṭatvam abhimatam. tādā saṃśṛṣṭān paramāṇuṛ gṛṇāti vijñānam iti indriyāntaragrāhyasyāṇāṁ gṛṇātītīty uktām bhavati. tathā ca na kīn cid anīśtam. tathāḥi yadi nāmandaṇentaragrāhyasparśādir na gṛhyate tathāpi nīlarūpaṁ tāvat svadeśasvabhāvasthitām gṛhyata eva. na ca bhinnendriyagrāhyasyāṇāṁ svarūpaṁ gṛhyamāṇāṁ viparītaṁ gṛhitam bhavati. desākālākāraṇāṁ ekasyāpy aviparyāsāt. na cāgraḥo bhrama iti.

nānu ca paramāṇuṇāṁ antarāṇy ākāśātmakāni santi. na ca te sāntarāh pratibhāsante. tat katham aviparyāsa iti. atha kim idām ākāśam naṁ. yadi rūpāntarātmakaṁ tan nāstītīty uktām. athāpi sparśādyātmakaṁ tatrāpy uktām. atha sapratighadravyābhāvas. evam apy avastu ākāśam. tataś cākāśam antaram ity anyavastvantaraṁ na kīn cid antaram ity uktām syāt. tathā nirantarāḥ paramāṇave ity uktām bhavati. tato nirantarāḥ ca paramāṇavo nirantarā eva bhāsante. tat kim ucyate 'ntaram ākāśam, na ca tat pratibhāśata iti? yat khalv atyantram asat śaśāviśaṁapraṇaḥyām tat katham bhāseta?
namv ākāśātmano 'py antarasyābhāve rūpasāṁsargāḥ paramāṇūnāṁ
prasajyeta. naśa doṣaḥ. nāsmābhīr ucyate rūpam ekaṁ paramāṇūnāṁ
deso naika iti. api tu bhinnārupadeśā utpānā madhyavartti-
vijātiyāruparāhitās tathaiva bhāsanta iti tat kathāṁ rūpasāṁsarga-
prasāṅgaḥ?

namu ca rasādidesē nīlārupam pratiḥāsate. tataś cātaddesaṁ
taddevatāyā gṛṅṇad vijnānāṁ kathaṁ abhrāntatāṁ nāmeti? tatrāpy
ucyate. yadā deśāḥ pratiḥāsate taddā tasmin deśe pratiḥāsāmāne
yah pratiḥāsate 'rthaḥ sa deśāvistṛa ucyate. yadi ca rasādiś
cakṣurviṇāme pratiḥāsēta taddā taddēsavāpīni nīle gṛhyamāṇe
syād bhrāntatāṁ vijnānāṁ. na ca tatra rasādīḥ pratiḥāsate,
indriyāntaragrāhyasyendriyāntarajñānāme pratiḥāsāyogat. tat kutas
taddevānīlagrahaṇam? nīlam eva hi bhāsamānaṁ deśāḥ nāparo deśāḥ
kaś cīd abhāsate. indriyāntaragrāhyāpratiḥāṣe ca sūddharūpa-
pratiḥāṣaḥ. sūddhārupapratiḥāṣa eva ca nirantarapratiḥāṣaḥ.
tato nirantarā nīlāḥ paramāṇavo gṛhyante. tasmāt svadesāsthāyino
nīlaparamāṇavāḥ svarūpeṇaiva gṛhyante. tato deśākālākāraṇam
ekasyāpy aparītyāgān nīlabhāsāṁ vijnānam abhrāntam eva...
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